Critique, Security and Power

The political limits to emancipatory approaches

Tara McCormack

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This book aims to engage with contemporary security discourses from a critical perspective. It argues that rather than being a radical, analytical outlook, much critical security theory fails to fulfil its promise to pose a challenge to contemporary power relations.

In general, 'critical security' theories and dialogues are understood to be progressive theoretical frameworks that offer a trenchant evaluation and analysis of contemporary international and national security policy. Tara McCormack investigates the limitations of contemporary critical and emancipatory theorising and its relationship with contemporary power structures. Beginning with a theoretical critique and moving into a case study of the critical approaches to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, this book assesses the policies adopted by the international community at the time to show that much contemporary critical security theory and discourse in fact mirrors shifts in post-Cold War international and national security policy. Far from challenging international power inequalities and offering an emancipatory framework, contemporary critical security theory inadvertently ends up serving as a theoretical justification for an unequal international order.

This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, international relations and security studies.

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Routledge Critical Security Studies series

Securing Outer Space
Edited by Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan

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Preface

Structure of the book and chapter overview

This book explores the political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches to contemporary international relations, in particular critical and emancipatory approaches to security and conflict. In chapters 1–3 of the book I make a theoretical critique of critical and emancipatory approaches to security, in chapters 4–6 a theoretical and political critique of critical approaches to the Yugoslav wars and in the final chapter a political critique of critical and emancipatory approaches to security.

In chapter 1 I establish the main arguments of contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists; that security needs to be reconceptualised in terms of human freedom and well being, and that more cosmopolitan forms of international organisation should be constructed, in which human rights and dignity should not be a matter of chance, depending upon which state a person happens to be born in, but universal rights.

In chapter 2 I begin a critical engagement with contemporary critical and emancipatory security theory. This chapter begins to examine the limits to critical and emancipatory approaches to security by setting it in the broader contemporary political context. Critical and emancipatory theorists make a powerful critique of Realism and the injustices of an international system based upon sovereign states, but to what extent is this model relevant for thinking about security theory or security practices today? I engage with the way in which traditional approaches to international security have been questioned and redefined in policy debate within the major international institutions, including the United Nations (UN), and also in the policy discourse and rhetoric of states.

In chapter 3 I explore critical and emancipatory approaches to security in more theoretical depth. I begin with a critique of Robert Cox, whose seminal 1981 article on critical and problem-solving theory is widely held to have launched the critical turn in international political theorising (Cox, 1981), suggesting that he introduces some problematic notions into his idea of critical theory that will later be taken up and expanded upon by contemporary critical theorists. I explore the way in which critical and emancipatory theorists turn to themselves and their own values as the source of their critical engagement with the world. I will argue that this limits critical theory.

In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I shift focus to look at critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars. I will argue that the Yugoslav break-up and wars led to a significant amount of critical work. The Yugoslav wars were argued to require a different paradigm of understanding to the way in which war had been understood during the Cold War. In chapter 4 I draw out the central arguments of these critical approaches. For critical theorists the Yugoslav break-up and war are wars which cannot be understood within a traditional political framework. Rather, these are degraded conflicts in which political elites pursued degraded social and political projects. For critical theorists international security policy during the Yugoslav break-up and wars was particularly problematic as it remained within the Cold War security framework (or 'Westphalian' framework) for dealing with war and conflict. International policy failed to understand the novel nature of the Yugoslav wars and remained reactive, stuck in a traditional security framework. Critical theorists posit new and cosmopolitan solutions to these degraded conflicts, cosmopolitan social groups within societies, or the implementation of new human rights frameworks by the international community.

In chapter 5 I engage with the main arguments of critical approaches as they have interpreted the internal nature of the Yugoslav break-up and wars. In this chapter I will consider the limits to the analysis through an exploration of what the discourse excludes. Far from being irrelevant, I will argue that fundamental political questions of citizenship and self-determination emerged as central in the context of the Yugoslav break-up and subsequent wars. Citizenship, it will be suggested, comes to the fore in the context of pre-break-up economic and social problems which weaken the federal state. It then becomes more prominent in the context of the dissolution of the federal state, which entailed a transformation of citizenship and associated political rights for some groups.

The following chapter, chapter 6, takes up the main arguments of critical approaches as they explain the external political context for the conflict. In this chapter I will argue that it is problematic to interpret international policy and policy initiatives in the early stages of the conflict as being within a self-interested, limited and reactive security framework for action. This narrative is challenged by an analysis of European Community (EC) policy in 1991, which represents a shift away from the old security framework. Rather than pursuing political compromise and stability, international policy and policy discourse showed a marked disregard for these traditional limited priorities of containment. Rather, international policy was marked by a moralised discourse that argued for the elevation of people's rights, and the rule of law, for example, above the integrity of the state, or political compromises between the parties to the conflict. Moreover, rather than being reactive and a case of 'too little, too late', it will be argued that the EC was actively involved in the conflict from an early stage and effectively became a major player, both in defining what the crisis actually was and in terms of laying out the framework for how the crisis was to be resolved. EC policies also served to internationalise the Yugoslav crisis and intervened in the conflict in important and novel ways.

In chapter 7 I turn to look at some significant aspects of contemporary international security policy and policy discourse in more detail, in particular I will look

at the post-Cold War human security framework and briefly at recent military interventions. I will argue that here we can see the political limits to these policies in terms of an orientation of policy around individual rights and freedom at an abstract level, in the absence of a political constituency to give content to those rights and freedoms. Here also one can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches that advocate a transformation of world order into a cosmopolitan order and a shift away from state sovereignty.

Acknowledgments

1   Introduction

This book is an argument about the political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches to contemporary international relations. In particular I focus upon critical and emancipatory approaches to security and conflict although the argument is applicable more broadly. For critical and emancipatory theorists, the Cold War state-based security framework is both archaic and immoral. It is archaic because sovereign states can no longer resolve contemporary security problems which spread across state borders (new types of conflict for example) and it is immoral because under the cover of sovereignty governments have been permitted to treat their populations as badly as they wish to.

Critical and emancipatory theorists argue that security needs to be reconceptualised in terms of human freedom and well being, and that more cosmopolitan forms of international organisation should be constructed, in which human rights and dignity should not be a matter of chance depending upon which state a person happens to be born in, but universal rights. By challenging the key tenets of the traditional security framework, critical and emancipatory theorists argue that they pose a challenge to contemporary global power structures.

Critical approaches to international relations have become increasingly influential, yet whilst critical international relations theorists often represent themselves as critical voices from the margins challenging contemporary power relations in the world, the contemporary context is one in which international and national security policy and discourse is often framed in similar terms to the prescriptions advocated by critical theorists. For critical theorists the limitations of contemporary security policies show that underneath the 'critical talk' powerful states and institutions are still in control of the security agenda, and that the promises of critical and emancipatory theorists are still to be fulfilled. Meanwhile, radical critics of universal human rights and post-Cold War security policies argue that powerful Western states are implementing new forms of imperial control over the developing world. In this reading, so-called emancipatory theorists are the theoretical handmaids of Empire.

This book will argue that current critical and emancipatory approaches cannot fulfil their promises and pose a challenge to contemporary power relations. However, the argument will be neither that critical prescriptions need to be more faithfully applied, nor that critical theorists are simply justifying Western power. Rather, the book will seek to draw out the problematic political assumptions of critical and

emancipatory theorists and similarities with contemporary security policies and rhetoric, and argue that whatever the intent of contemporary critical theorists they cannot pose a challenge to contemporary power structures or discourses.

In this work I will investigate different aspects of the limitations of contemporary critical and emancipatory theorising and its relationship with contemporary power structures. I will begin with a theoretical critique of critical and emancipatory approaches. The work will then engage in an investigation into critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and the policies adopted by the international community at that time. Finally, the work will investigate contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches in the context of major shifts in international security policy such as human security.

This introductory chapter overviews the central arguments of critical and emancipatory theorists and then discusses critical concerns about contemporary security policies which purport to be emancipatory. The chapter also sketches the main points of my argument.

What does it mean to be critical today?

During the Cold War security theory was relatively straightforward, security theorists on the whole focused upon military strategy. Broader questions about the nature of security were not part of the security studies remit (Baldwin, 1997; Buzan, 1991). As Ken Booth argued in one of the first major critiques of such an approach to security, 'It is not long ago when issues such as Cruise, Pershing, SDI and SS-20 made strategists out of us all' (1991: 315). Whilst to some extent this aspect of security theorising remains, the most significant shift in thinking about security has been the rise and rise of critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches to security and conflict. This critical turn is part of the broader rise of critical international theory since the 1980s.

The genealogy of this critical turn in international relations theory has been explored at length elsewhere (for example, Rengger and Thirkell-White, 2007; Hutchings, 2001). There are many definitions of what it means to be a critical theorist and critical theory encompasses a number of differing and sometimes contradictory theoretical approaches (see the following for various definitions and discussions about the problems of defining critical theory: Fraser, 1985; Brown, 1994: 218–222; Krause and Williams, 1997: xi; Jahn, 1998; Wynn Jones, 2001; Hutchings, 2001; Neufeld, 2001; Linklater, 2002 [1996]; Fierke, 2007).

This work, however, is not a discussion about intellectual origins; I do not aim to trace the origins of critical and emancipatory theory nor to reach a conclusion about which of critical security theory's ancestors are the best critics. Nor do I separate here theorists according to genealogies or labels given either by the theorist or others. Labels, as Fierke warns us, can too often artificially divide or lump together; that is they can serve to both hide links which could be made or to draw positions together that should not be together. In this work I will designate as critical and emancipatory theorists who begin from a variety of theoretical positions. There are, for example, clearly theoretical differences between scholars such as Andrew Linklater

or Mary Kaldor, both of whom draw upon liberal principles in their work on international relations, security and conflict, and a theorist such as R J B Walker who draws upon a different ontological framework. None the less, these theorists share arguments both about the international realm and new forms of international organisation. In this work I define critical and emancipatory theorists in their own terms, through the central arguments shared by these critical and emancipatory theorists about the international realm and their aims and objectives as critical theorists.

A recent special issue of the *Review of International Studies* was devoted to the topic of critical international theory, marking 25 years after the publication of Robert Cox's extremely influential 1981 article 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory' and also Richard Ashley's 'Political Realism and Human Interests' (*Review of International Studies*, 2007). Both these theorists used a critical theoretical approach derived from the Frankfurt School. Since then however, as Rengger and Thirkell-White argue, there has been a large amount of international relations scholarship that, though using different epistemologies and ontologies, has placed itself in critical opposition to traditional IR scholarship (2007: 4–5).

The key theme that binds together these different critical international theoretical approaches, whether engaging with international relations in general or security specifically, is an overarching critique of contemporary practices and discourses that lead to a perpetuation of structures of power and domination. Mark Neufeld highlights this shared critique, quoting from Robert Cox:

> [N]otwithstanding some fundamental differences between those with modernist and postmodernist commitments, scholars involved in the project share a common concern with calling into question 'prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized'.
>
> (Neufeld, 2004: 109)

Thus the central aim of critical work is to pose a challenge to contemporary power relations. As Hutchings argues:

> Although critical theory takes many different forms, it always distinguishes itself from other forms of theorising in terms of its orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the patterns of hegemonic power of the present.
>
> (2007: 72)

Critical international theorists then claim to offer a critique of the contemporary international system, situating themselves in a radical and progressive position that will challenge hegemonic power relations. Critical approaches to security make the same claims. As Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler argue:

> All forms of critical theory purport to 'think against' the prevailing current. Critical security studies is no exception. What it wants to resist, transcend and

defeat, are theories of security which take for granted who is to be secured (the state), how security is to be achieved (by defending core 'national' values, forcibly if necessary) and from whom security is needed (the enemy).

(2004: 11)

Thus central to the work of critical theorists from all theoretical backgrounds is also a belief in the emancipatory potential of critical work. This emancipatory purpose means that critical and emancipatory theorists understand themselves to be engaged in a particular struggle to illuminate contemporary orthodoxies, in terms of the way in which the international realm is organised, and contemporary practices, and to offer an alternative approach to thinking about the international system that can illuminate the inadequacies of the current global order and move beyond it. Richard Wynn Jones, for example, claims that critical theory stands or falls by its ability to illuminate the possibilities for emancipatory transformation (1999: 6, 56), K.M Fierke argues that 'all critical approaches ultimately seek emancipation in some form' (2007: 3).

Critical theorists claim to critique and challenge existing international power relations and point the way forward to new forms of international organisation which will be free from the exploitative power relations and domination that mark the contemporary international order. Certain existing political structures are held to be representative of domination, in particular the contemporary sovereign state, and freedom from existing power relations entails moving away from this political structure. Here critical and emancipatory approaches offer a critique of the state, arguing that new forms of post-sovereign political community beyond or below the state will offer greater freedom and security for individuals (see for example the arguments of prominent critical theorist Andrew Linklater, 2007; 2005; 2001). Critical and emancipatory theorists argue that behind the barrier of state sovereignty, governments are free to treat their citizens with impunity, as Richard Devetak argues, 'If critical international theory objects to anything, it is sovereignty; calling instead for a more "differentiated" conception of state that might enhance the prospects of "good international citizenship"' (2007: 172–173).

The overarching claim made by contemporary critical and emancipatory international theorists is that critical approaches offer a challenge to contemporary practices and discourses that enable structures of power and domination in the international realm. In this chapter I focus in particular on critical and emancipatory approaches to security and draw out in detail the main arguments and claims made by contemporary critical and emancipatory security theorists.

The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I focus on the problematisation and rejection of what will be termed a traditional security framework, in particular the Realist theoretical framework and its focus on the state. Critical and emancipatory theorists explicitly reject the Realist security problematic and the assumptions upon which it was based; states existing in an anarchical situation and pursuing or protecting their national interests. This old security framework is held to be an ideological construct which serves to shore up the interests of the most powerful states. For critical security theorists, it is both incorrect, as it does not

reflect the reality for most people, and immoral, as it is indifferent to the conse-
quences that this framework has for most people.

In the second part I focus on the related argument that security theory should
focus on the powerless and excluded and be for the purposes of human emancipa-
tion. I also show that for critical and emancipatory security theorists, it is post-
sovereign or non-state organisations or institutions that point the way towards a
more emancipatory future, whether new forms of international organisation or
transnational groups or networks or other forms of post-sovereign organisation
hold out emancipatory promise.

Critiquing the dominant security orthodoxy: Realism and the state

Critical and emancipatory security theorists define themselves in opposition to
what is argued to be the dominant orthodox or traditional security approach (Booth,
2007: 29). For critical and emancipatory theorists this is argued to be represented
by Realist approaches to security. Realism is often defined by critical and emanci-
patory theorists, drawing upon Robert Cox (1981), as a problem-solving theory
(Booth, 2007: 47–48; Wynn Jones, 2001). For Realist theorists it is accepted that
the given framework for action is that of the state and the anarchical system. The job
of the theorist is to solve the problems of survival and the pursuit of, and protection
of, national interests in this context.

Traditional security theory therefore has a narrow and limited focus. Traditional
security theorists assume an ontology of the state existing in anarchy and having to
pursue its interests in a potentially hostile world (Linklater, 2005: 117). The Realist
state-centric security framework has been based on certain assumptions: 'the drive
of states to survive and maximise power, the expectation of interstate struggles,
crises, and war, and the sanction of military force as an instrument of policy'
(Booth, 2005: 5).

Critical security theorists argue that Realist theorists claim to be simply describ-
ing the world 'as it is' (Wynn Jones, 1999: 100). However, this ontological focus is
not a neutral act but an ideological one. For critical and emancipatory security the-
orists, this ontology does not represent any kind of essential reality, but is an ideo-
logical construct that serves to naturalise a particular set of social, economic and
political arrangements (for example, Wynn Jones, 1999: 102). In contrast, critical
and emancipatory security approaches begin by challenging and seeking to 'de-
naturalise' this ontology.

Critical approaches seek to show, in contrast to traditional theory, the historical
specificity, and therefore the contingency rather than necessity, of the modern
state, the contemporary international political order, and the related concept of
state security (for example, see Walker, 1997: 68–69; Booth, 2007: 75). For
theorists working within a critical security perspective, traditional approaches to
security theory take for granted what critical and emancipatory approaches
believe should be the beginning point of enquiry. Williams makes this point
more broadly about the application of critical principles to International Relations
in general:

> One of the major contributions of the 'critical' movement in International Relations has been to denaturalize the modern state as a starting point for analysis, and to initiate a serious examination of its historical genesis and evolution. Both the structure of the modern political order and that of the modern episteme have become areas of significant inquiry.
>
> (Williams, 1998: 205)

Critical theorists argue that Realism is not simply reflecting the world 'as it is', as Realist theorists claim, rather Realism itself has played a role in actually reproducing a certain structural order, as Dunne and Wheeler argue, 'Realists got it wrong. The Cold War was not a permanent condition. Nor was it a structural necessity; rather, it was a confrontation that they had played a significant part in creating and reproducing . . .' (Dunne and Wheeler, 2004: 11). Booth stresses this point and highlights the alternative framework offered by critical approaches:

> [Realism] constructs and reconstructs the problems it is supposed to solve . . . Political realism is the classical problem-solving approach to security in world politics; in contrast, the study of security from self-consciously critical perspectives attempts to stand outside the given local or global framework, offers critiques, and then explores the immanent potentialities in order to provide ideas that might promote the emancipation of people(s) from oppressive situations and structures.
>
> (Booth, 2005:10–11).

Thus for critical approaches our understanding of the international necessitates a conception of security that is limited to the state, but this does not reflect something 'real'. Rather, it is a reflection of our failure to understand the contingent nature of the way in which the globe is organised and to grasp that other forms of organisation and therefore security are possible (Booth, 2007: 158–159). As R J B Walker argues:

> The security of states dominates our understanding of what security can be, and who it can be for, not because conflict between states is inevitable, but because other forms of political community have been rendered almost unthinkable.
>
> (1997: 73)

Critical and emancipatory approaches to security seek to reveal therefore that 'Security is usually a political desideratum well before it is an analytical category' (Dalby, 2000: 2). Walker discusses this in relation to traditional concepts of security:

> [M]odern claims about security are at root primarily normative both in their commitments and their effects, as even a rapid glance through professional journals like *International Security* will readily show. The forms of political

Realism that play such a crucial role in the legitimation of contemporary security policies affirm the way things should be far more clearly than they tell us how things are.

(1997: 62)

Thus for theorists working within a critical and emancipatory security framework, the theoretical underpinnings of Realism serve to objectify and reify what are only contingent historical structures, that of the state existing in anarchy. Critical and emancipatory security theorists have particularly sought to define what is understood by security and to highlight the inadequacy of a perspective that focuses on military force, the state, and the Cold War division between domestic and international policies (Fierke, 2007: 16–17).

For contemporary critical and emancipatory security theorists, questions about the nature of security and its implications for the citizens of a state are some of their central concerns. In this reading, the trouble with Realism is that it justifies the pursuit and protection of national interests and is indifferent to its costs. As Booth argues, Realism justifies the 'destructive and dismal rationality of Westphalia, Machiavelli and Clausewitz, which has shaped the statist outlooks of this and earlier centuries' (Booth, 1995: 119).

The traditional understanding of security, intimately linked to the state, is argued to be part of an exclusionary and violent international order, which serves to create insecurity for most people. Realism is indifferent to the effects that the security framework has upon the lives of people (Dunne and Wheeler, 2004: 12):

Realism is profoundly political and ethical, but both rest on a collective selfishness based in what Nietzsche called the 'cold monster' of the sovereign state. The ethics of realism reach to the state boundary; beyond is anarchy and necessity. Choice exists only within the polity . . . Realist ethics are narrow and selfish, based on the power politics of place. This is contrary to human interest.

(Booth, 2005: 8)

The traditional security framework creates an 'us' on the inside and a 'them' on the outside. This permits violence against those on the outside in the name of survival (as exemplified in Wight's famous distinction between thinking about the international and the domestic [1969]). Thus, for critical security theorists, the traditional security framework permits, even demands, acts of terrible violence. Violence is implicated in the very practices of maintaining the system which is kept in existence by a constant process of shoring up the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion; there is a '. . . complicity of modern accounts of security with practices of intolerable violence in the modern world' (Walker, 1997: 63; 1988: 118). This point is fundamental to critical theorists of all approaches, as Dunne and Wheeler argue:

A key claim of critical security theorists is that the rules, norms and institutions of the society of states are a permissive cause of political violence because they

provide a protected space in which individuals can be subjected to inhuman treatment with virtual impunity.

<div align="right">(2004: 9–10)</div>

The current system is inherently violent and oppressive because of the need to keep up the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, as Walker argues, 'It legitimizes an account of political necessity that can excuse the most intolerable barbarism' (1997: 75). At worst, it is suggested that the most terrible acts of modernity have been a direct result of the logic of the modern political order, for example the Holocaust (Campbell and Dillon, 1993: 164). For theorists working within a critical security perspective the traditional state security framework is responsible for 'human wrongs' (to paraphrase Booth's apt title [1995]). The idea of security as protecting the state at best simply fails to understand that for most people the greatest threats come from their own state not the Napoleonic ambitions of the neighbouring state (Booth, 1991: 318; Krause and Williams, 1997: 44).

Furthermore, the traditional state security problematic excludes questions of identity:

> [T]o speak of security is to engage in a discourse of repetitions, to affirm over and over again the dangers that legitimize the sovereign authority that is constituted precisely as a solution to dangers. But it is important to remember that this discourse of dangerous affirmations becomes, in another guise, a discourse of excluded subjectivities . . . of class, race, gender, and humanity . . . the forms of modern politics expressed in contemporary security discourses admit only one – although largely abstract – identity, in relation to which struggles among all other identities are expected to take their proper place.
>
> <div align="right">(Walker, 1997: 73)</div>

Yet critical security approaches suggest that matters of identity are crucial when considering the implications of the traditional security framework for the individual. The world is a much more complicated place than the one which we have been taught to see through Realism:

> [It is] multicultural, divided by gender and class, and made up of individuals, families, tribes, nations, and other collectivities; there are also some solidarities across all these (and other) subdivisions of humanity. The field of security studies, constructed out of political realism, continues to offer its students one image of reality, with predefined answers to key global questions.
>
> <div align="right">(Booth, 2005: 4)</div>

Because the traditional security problematic is premised on inclusion and exclusion, certain identities may threaten the state, for example, or certain identities may be threatened by state practices. Feminist security approaches also emphasise the exclusion of the experience and role of women in terms of the traditional security perspectives and the need to transcend this narrow security framework in favour of

a much broader concept of security which takes in violence, economic suffering and highlights the oppressive effects of militarisation (for an overview see Tickner, 1995 or Sylvester, 2002; although it would be incorrect to assume that a feminist perspective automatically translated into a critique of military intervention, see for example Elshtain's arguments in favour of military intervention, 2002).

Feminist security perspectives highlight, for example, the particularly vulnerable position of women under current security regimes. As critical feminist security theorist J Ann Tickner argues:

> The unitary state actor model favoured by realists conceals the extent to which individuals' insecurities are dependent on race, class and gender, categories that also cross state and regional boundaries.
>
> (1995: 192)

For theorists working within a critical security perspective, the contemporary international order of sovereign states causes insecurity and worse for those who make up the states. State security is revealed as being another way of saying human insecurity:

> When national security is defined negatively, as protection against outside military threats, the sense of threat is reinforced by the doctrine of state sovereignty, which strengthens the boundary between a secure community and a dangerous external environment. For this reason, many critics of realism claim that, if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed.
>
> (Tickner, 1995: 189)

For some theorists working within a critical security theory, the limits to problem-solving security theory are exposed by the behaviour of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In this narrative, the Soviet Union (under Mikhail Gorbachev) made a voluntary decision to reconceptualise its security priorities (see for example, Dalby, 1997: 11–12). This opens up the problem-solving security framework. Realism had not predicted the end of the Cold War, nor did the change, nor the behaviour of the Soviet Union, seem to fit into the traditional security framework that had dominated assumptions about international relations and security theory:

> The end of the Cold War raised serious questions about the dominant paradigms of International Relations, and particularly neorealism, given the failure to predict one of the most dramatic changes of the century
>
> (Fierke, 1996: 467)[1]

Rather than expressing some kind of eternal truth about survival in an anarchic world, the sovereign state-centric security framework serves to hide the contingent nature of the state system and stops us from being able to think of a different kind of politics (Wynn Jones, 1996: 203). Critical and emancipatory security theories

explicitly critique and transcend the traditional security framework, the given framework for action in Cox's terms. They seek to open up the very ontology of traditional security theory. In place of the protection of national interests, theorists working within a critical and emancipatory security framework argue that security should be orientated towards the emancipation of the individual. The focus on emancipation entails a critical orientation towards both orthodoxies in terms of theory that present the contemporary international system as an eternal truth. The central role of emancipation is drawn out in the following section.

Towards the emancipation of the individual

For critical and emancipatory theorists Realist security theory plays an inherently conservative function of maintaining the status quo and privileging existing power structures and the international order as it is. Theorists working within the parameters of Realist security theory, as argued earlier, ignored the content of the state, what it was protecting, and how it was protecting it. The presumption of the overriding imperative of the protection of national interests (whatever that national interest may have been) in an anarchical system formed the basis of security theorising. Critical and emancipatory approaches reject this conservative perspective that privileges state security over and above the life and freedom of the individual.

For critical and emancipatory approaches the state is seen to be the source of much human misery; this particular mode of organising the world is argued to be antithetical to human freedom and flourishing. Therefore a rethinking of sovereignty is central to critical and emancipatory approaches. This entails a critical approach to what is seen to be the dominant international model of state sovereignty (understood as 'Westphalian' state sovereignty, meaning self-government and non-intervention). Mark Lynch sums up the aims of critical international theory succinctly:

> Critical theory welcomes challenges to state sovereignty in the name of human rights as an essential step toward creating a more just world order, a norms-based international society taking individuals rather than states as primary . . . critical theory locates legitimacy within an emerging international public sphere of world citizens, which offers dramatically new opportunities for the emancipatory potential of human reason.
>
> (2005: 182)

For critical security theorists, the old imperative of national interests is rejected as destructive and dangerous, as critical security theorist Ken Booth warns, 'the price for old thinking about world security is paid, daily, in the death, disease, poverty and oppression of millions' (Booth, 2005: 260).

The Realist focus on the narrow pursuit and protection of national interests means that questions of ethics and human freedom or human development are excluded from the security problematic. Critical security theories are therefore explicitly normative and have sought to introduce normative and ethical questions

into the consideration of security policy. One of the key claims of critical and emancipatory security theorists is that theory should be orientated towards emancipation. Theorists working within this critical security framework share a commitment to the emancipatory purposes of new critical security approaches (Wynn Jones, 2005: 217). The emancipation of the individual should be the basis for a new security order: 'Emancipation should logically be given precedence in our thinking about security over the mainstream themes of power and order' (Booth, 1991: 319).

The commitment to emancipation is more explicit in some critical approaches, for example those who explicitly position themselves in terms of the Frankfurt School, and therefore explicitly argue that emancipation must be the foundation against which all theory and practice should be judged: 'a critical theory perspective suggests that this scrutiny and evaluation should take place from the perspective of emancipation, for which individuals are the ultimate referent' (Wynn Jones, 1999: 133; for more recent contributions see Booth, 2005; Alker, 2005; Wynn Jones, 2005; Linklater, 2005; Booth, 2007; Fierke, 2007).

Other theorists who take a critical position, those who are labelled as post-modern, for example, might eschew such an open and explicit emancipatory stance, they 'issue no promises. They bear no flag' (Ashley and Walker, 1990: 264). However, these theorists none the less share the same fundamental critique of the contemporary order and seek to point towards possibilities for emancipation. Through the 'de-naturalisation' of the contemporary order and the shared focus on exclusion/inclusion and identity, these critiques also claim to be working towards a system that is free of contemporary power relations and domination. As Walker argues:

> It is in this context that it is possible to envisage a critical discourse about security, a discourse that engages with contemporary transformations of political life, with emerging accounts of who we might become, and the conditions under which we might become other than what we are now without destroying others, ourselves, or the planet on which we all live.
>
> (1997: 78)

Other examples of emancipatory approaches to security from theorists who might be wary of classifying themselves as 'critical' because of various theoretical differences can be seen in Michael Dillon's 'ethico-political project' (1996: 204) or James Der Derian's celebration of insecurity, which understands security practices as oppressive and homogenising, emerging out of the human 'will to power' (1995: 33). David Campbell for example argues for a different politics organised around the struggle for, and on behalf of, alterity (1998c [1992]), and enabling multiple selves (Campbell and Dillon, 1993: 175).

Critical security theories prioritise human freedom and human rights. Critical approaches share a desire to extend our moral horizons beyond the narrow 'us and them' to more cosmopolitan conceptions of humanity (Dunne and Wheeler, 2004: 10; Booth, 2007). Furthermore, for theorists working within this framework, Wight's gloomy prognosis about the international sphere is no longer relevant.

Rather, the international sphere is held to represent greater potential for freedom and emancipation than the domestic sphere (for example, Shaw, 2003: chapter 10; Linklater, 2005: 123).

In place of the exclusionary, discriminatory and violent international order that the traditional state security framework is premised on, critical security approaches argue for an alternative security framework, one which transcends narrow national interests and places the freedom of the individual at its centre. As Dunne and Wheeler argue, 'the crucial contribution of critical conceptions of security is to shift the referent object from the state to individuals who constitute humanity as a whole' (2004: 10).

The state, through the creation of an inclusionary/exclusionary structure of order prevents us from understanding that those on the 'outside' have equal claims to those on the 'inside'. The system itself perpetuates violence and fear. For critical perspectives, the state is a major source of insecurity and the emancipation of the individual can only be achieved once the state no longer serves as the sole focus for identity and political organisation. The emancipation of the individual necessarily challenges the traditional state security framework, as this goal may be hindered by the sovereign state.

> The crucial contribution of critical conceptions of security is to shift the referent object from the state to individuals who constitute humanity as a whole. Rather than taking for granted the traditional assumption that the state has a monopoly over our loyalty and identity, critical security perspectives extend our moral horizons beyond national-based conceptions of citizenship.
>
> (Dunne and Wheeler, 2004: 10)

Sovereignty as we can see is a key theme for critical and emancipatory theorists, as Devetak argues:

> If critical international theory objects to anything, it is sovereignty; calling instead for a more 'differentiated' conception of state that might enhance the prospects of 'good international citizenship'. It is precisely this prospect that is raised by humanitarian intervention: the possibility that states might act on behalf of wider moral and legal obligations. But this should not be mistaken for an uncritical acceptance of humanitarian intervention.
>
> (2007: 117–118)

The key theme of the critique of both the state and the traditional international order, and theoretical approaches that both serve to create and 'naturalise' that order, is Realism, which means that critical and emancipatory theorists look to post-sovereign forms of political organisation that are argued to have greater potential for emancipation than existing sovereign forms of organisation.

New social movements, for example, embodied in 'global civil society' are seen to be agents of emancipation, as Dunne and Wheeler argue:

In the critical security literature, global civil society is often represented as being the crucial agent of emancipation. There are many good reasons for investing hope in transnational civil society. Groups like Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Red Cross, Oxfam and Save the Children exist to raise the consciousness of the security 'haves' about the plight of the 'security have-nots'.

(Dunne and Wheeler, 2004: 18)

Or 'transnational decision-making structures and loyalties' which challenge the way in which political space is organised are held to show a way forward towards non-state-based understandings of security (Booth, 2005: 8; see also Walker, 1988: 121–122; Tickner, 1995; Booth, 2005: 274; Kaldor, 2001: 117–118; Shaw, 2003: 232–236). Linklater, for example, argues that the way to ensure security for minority ethnic groups in developing countries is to ensure that political elites are answerable to 'global agencies with responsibility for the international protection of human rights' (2005: 123). Booth suggests that non-state-based emancipatory networks may offer emancipatory forms of political community (2007: 139) and procedures for forms of global governance.

How these emancipatory communities might work in practice is less clear when one reads critical theorists. Dunne and Wheeler acknowledge that the actual capacities of global civil society, as represented in their argument by non-governmental aid and advocacy groups such as Amnesty International, are limited (2004: 19). Perhaps this is not so important; Booth, for example, argues that the crucial point is that these communities are informed by the right ideas and values:

The precise character of those arrangements at this point is less important than the ideas that inform them, and in this respect enlightened world order values are central: if the global – we look after the processes, the structures will look after themselves.

(2007: 141)

Here the ethical content is argued to be the most important aspect of new political communities, overriding questions of organisation.

In conclusion, it can be seen that critical security theorists, despite their theoretical differences, share a number of crucial elements in their intellectual and political frameworks: a trenchant critique of traditional problem-solving security theory, a commitment to emancipation as central to thinking about security, and finally, a belief that post-sovereign forms of organisation or groups offer the best chance for emancipation in the contemporary international context.

I turn now to some critiques leveled against critical theory, beginning with arguments that challenge critical theorists' claims to be engaging with contemporary power relations. Then I turn to a consideration of the problem of recent humanitarian interventions and the dangers of the co-option of critical theory.

Critical and emancipatory international theory and the question of idealism

One critique that has been leveled at critical and emancipatory theorists is that they are little more than idealists. Beate Jahn, for example, has argued that contemporary critical theorists are liberal idealists in another guise, projecting their own normative desires with little grounding in the material conditions of the present, and therefore contemporary critical theory is unable to offer a challenge to current structures of power (Jahn, 1998). Realist Randall L Schweller has argued that critical theorists are simply retreating into their own private fantasy world of wishful thinking, ignoring the reality of a divided and hierarchical world (1999).

This criticism is of course rejected by critical and emancipatory theorists. Engaging with structures and discourses of contemporary power must be fundamental to the task of posing a challenge to those power relations and structures:

> A minor variant of this critique has also been to suggest that critical theory is essentially what one prominent contemporary Realist – Randall Schweller – has called 'fantasy theory' . . . that it consists chiefly of ever more ingenious attempts to build castles in the air but meantime, he suggests, the rest of us have to live in the real world of states and their conflicts. There is much that might be said about this astonishingly bad reading of what most critical theorists have been saying but one obvious point is simply to aver that few, if any, critical theorists of any stripe would take the royal road to what, in a different context, John Rawls called 'ideal theory'. *The critical theorists' concern has always been, first and foremost, with the situation of the here and now and how it came about: only then might we find possibilities of change immanent within it.* Their analysis might be wrong, of course, but it is no more a fantasy than is Schweller's.
>
> (Rengger and Thirkell-White, 2007: 11 [author's italics])

Critical and emancipatory theorists do not, however, reject the claim that their theorising is idealist in the sense of being explicitly normative, ungenerously misconstrued by Schweller perhaps as 'wishful thinking'. Indeed it would be a naïve theorist who could deny that to some extent all political theory is normative. According to Booth, to have an idea of a better future is a fundamental step towards practically engaging with the limitations of the existing world order (2007: 131). However most critical and emancipatory theorists would reject the accusation that their theoretical approaches are simply statements of normative values without engagement with the concrete problematic.

Theorists such as Ken Booth, Andrew Linklater and K M Fierke argue that the concept of immanent critique serves to potentially ground critical theory in engagement with contemporary politics and to preserve it from idealistic flights into fantasy. Immanent critique implies a necessity of engaging with the contemporary context and power relations precisely in order to identify possible progressive elements within the contemporary order (Booth, 2005: 11; Fierke, 2007: 167).

Critical theorists, if they are to fulfil their promises to critically challenge power relations and point towards a more emancipatory order, must engage in the here and now. The critical analysis of the state and state sovereignty that has been discussed above is fundamental to critical theorists claims to be engaging with the structures and discourses of contemporary power. Indeed, by not taking for granted structures such as the state, as Dunne and Wheeler argued earlier, traditional theoretical approaches such as Realism would be taken as a kind of natural fact, but by interrogating such structures or discourses of power, critical theory makes a claim to be more 'realistic' than Realism. The state, and therefore related concepts such as state security, are not eternal forms of human organisation but specific historical forms.

Critical international theory and the problem of liberal interventionism

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a marked shift in the way that powerful states and international institutions have framed interventions and engagements in other states (this will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3). The 1990s witnessed the rise and rise of arguments about universal human rights and the potential of international law and international intervention to ensure those rights. Linked to this has been a problematising of the concept of state sovereignty as it has been traditionally understood. This has been both an academic discussion and a shift in the way in which major states and international institutions reframed their policies (for example, Slaughter, 2005; ICISS, 2001a; UN, 1995 [1992]). Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the UN, set out what was argued to be a developing norm in favour of a reframing of state sovereignty:

> This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the international community. Any such evolution in our understanding of State sovereignty and individual sovereignty will, in some quarters, be met with distrust, scepticism even hostility. But it is an evolution that we should welcome. Why? Because, despite its limitations and imperfections, it is testimony to a humanity that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to end it.
>
> (1999: 81)

Humanitarian interventions undertaken by powerful states and military alliances during the 1990s were framed in terms of liberating and empowering citizens of other states, for example Somalia and Kosovo. These humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and other events such as the arrest of the former Chilean President Pinochet, the setting up of *ad hoc* criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the creation of the new International Criminal Court, equally the setting up on criminal tribunals and the new Criminal Court were seen as policies which could help to implement universal human rights and a more just world order. For advocates these events were all heralded as ushering in a new era of international justice

and human rights, an era in which one's human rights would no longer be dependent upon where one lived.

The question of to what extent there should be intervention in order to 'emancipate' is one that has been asked by critical international theorists during the 1990s and 2000s. There has not been a single 'critical' position in answer to this question. Some critical theorists have been enthusiastic supporters of such interventions, Marc Lynch for example has argued that,

> Critical theory welcomes challenges to state sovereignty in the name of human rights as an essential step toward creating a more just world order, a norms-based international society taking individuals rather than states as primary.

> (2005: 182)

Jürgen Habermas, one of the most important critical theorists working today, was a supporter of the Kosovo intervention, arguing that here was an emancipatory action (1999). Critics of Habermas have pointed out that his arguments simply served to enforce the power of major states, redrawing the lines between an 'enlightened' West consisting of 'legitimate' states and a barbarian East (Douzinas, 2007: 207–209). Certainly this can be argued to be the logical progression of critical support for intervention; Lynch, for example, quotes Neta Crawford's argument that non-democracies should not be considered 'communicatively competent' to engage in international public argument (Lynch, 2005: 186). Other critical theorists, however, have been far more reluctant to endorse military action undertaken by the most powerful states and military alliances. Ken Booth, for example, has argued that the military intervention in Kosovo was very problematic and that that sort of war actually reduced the possibilities for human freedom (2000).

If the 1990s were seen by some commentators to be the start of a movement towards a more just world order, the war in Iraq (2002) and the subsequent so-called War on Terror seemed to overturn the promises of the 1990s. Even Jürgen Habermas, who had supported the Kosovo intervention despite the lack of a UN Security Council resolution, now cited the lack of a UN Security Council resolution as a reason why he could not support the military action in Iraq (Habermas, 2002).

As critical and emancipatory security theorists explicitly claim to offer a challenge to the status quo and to contemporary unequal power relations and to the promise of emancipation, clearly there are problems in that contemporary international security policy discourse of powerful states and major international organisations claim to be acting in the same framework of emancipation as radical critical emancipatory theorists. As Richard Devetak has argued:

> The trouble for critical international theorists is that Kant's writings have been influential in strains of liberal internationalism that give expression to belligerence and neo-imperialism. This 'Wilsonianism with boots', as some have named it, which has been associated with the administrations of Bill

Clinton and George W. Bush in the USA, and with Prime Minister Blair in the UK, uses liberal notions of freedom and human rights to defend the extensive use of military force.

(2007: 152)

For critical and emancipatory theorists contemporary liberal internationalist interventions have some problematic implications as the interventions can be seen to enforce contemporary power relations and allow wars to be waged by the most powerful states (see also Booth, 2007; Fierke, 2007). Rather than an extension of universal justice and human rights, liberal interventions run the risk of being seen as little more than an extension of American power. Devetak distances critical approaches from those of liberal academics such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and Fernando Teson which, he argues, are virtually indistinguishable from those of contemporary American policy makers (2007: 156).

Critical and emancipatory theorists, however, do not believe that the promises of critical theory are therefore empty and that the critical project really is nothing but the theoretical wing of liberal internationalism. Rather, critical theory needs to clearly draw a line between itself and liberal interventionism:

While so many controversial wars are waged under the banner of liberal ideals associated with Kant, the Enlightenment and cosmopolitanism, critical international theory will need to ensure that its arguments are not co-opted by or aligned with such war-mongering. It will need to distinguish its position all the more clearly from liberal imperialism.

(Devetak, 2007: 152)

For other critical theorists, contemporary interventions reveal not the limitations of emancipation through NATO bombardment but that security policy remains stuck within a Cold War state-centric framework, though now articulated through the War on Terror discourse. As Dunne and Wheeler argue, 'the Cold War discourse of national security is being reinvented as a struggle between an America that represents a force for good in the world and the evil enemy represented by global terrorism and its state sponsors' (2004: 12). The critical project therefore cannot be invalid as it has not been tried yet. Thus the problem does not lie in critical prescriptions themselves, but in the way that states have abused critical and emancipatory discourses.

Radical critics, such as Costas Douzinas, are in agreement with the more thoughtful critical theorists such as Booth and Devetak, identifying the continuities of contemporary military actions with the 1990s humanitarian actions. Many of the premises of the War on Terror and the Iraq war fitted into the framework established in the 1990s for intervention (McCormack, 2008). However, for these radical theorists critical advocates of liberal intervention such as Habermas simply support a new kind of imperial assertion of power and the rhetoric of human rights has become an instrument for underpinning the power of certain states (Douzinas, 2007: 179; Jabri, 2007; also see Duffield, 2007). As Douzinas argues:

> Human rights and their dissemination are not simply the result of the liberal or charitable disposition of the West. Cosmopolitanism, universal morality and human rights, express and promote the quasi-imperial configuration of the new times.
>
> (2007: 189)

Radical critics rightly point to the problematic links between critical and emancipatory theorists who advocate post-sovereign, cosmopolitan international organisation and contemporary international policies. Devetak's proposed solution of clearly distinguishing between 'really' critical positions and state policies that masquerade as emancipatory and cosmopolitan fails to engage with the problem, which is clearly not simply one of the will of the theorists. Even for more cautious critical theorists such as Booth and Fierke, critical prescriptions still hold true. Fierke, for example, argues that critical security approaches can still pose a challenge to power relations and challenge contemporary militarism (2007: 204–205).

Radical critics however do not develop an argument about why critical and emancipatory approaches are doomed to appear as little more than the theoretical wing of contemporary liberal interventionism. As David Chandler has argued, this failure to understand what the actual limitations of critical approaches are and why these approaches can appear as theoretical cheerleaders for the exercise of power means that radical critics themselves ultimately turn to similar prescriptions of post-sovereign forms of organisation, although ones intended to be miraculously free of the structures of power that dominate today (Chandler, 2009).

Beate Jahn's argument about the idealism of critical theory is also very pertinent for this argument. However, Jahn too does not engage in depth with the limitations of critical and emancipatory theory and what it is about contemporary critical theory that makes it an idealist theoretical approach that cannot fulfil its promises to challenge contemporary power relations.

The aim of this work is to attempt to develop an understanding of whether critical and emancipatory approaches can pose a challenge to power in the contemporary context and if not, why not, and what the relationship is with discourses and practices of states and international institutions. The work will develop an understanding of the political limits to critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

2 The problem of idealism

Critical and emancipatory security theory in context

The key promise of critical and emancipatory theory, as we have seen from chapter 1, is to pose a challenge to contemporary power relations. For critical and emancipatory theorists this entails a critique of traditional theoretical approaches to security, Realism with its focus on state security and indifference to human freedom and emancipation, and a critique of the sovereign state.

In this chapter I begin a critical engagement with contemporary critical and emancipatory security theory. This chapter begins to examine the limits to critical and emancipatory approaches to security by setting it in the broader contemporary political context. Critical and emancipatory theorists make a powerful critique of Realism and the injustices of an international system based upon sovereign states, but to what extent is this model relevant for thinking about security theory or security practices today? In this chapter I look at both changes in mainstream security theory and the changing nature of the broader security framework itself. Today both the arguments made by mainstream security theorists and the justifications for many contemporary security practices seem to be based upon similar critiques to those made by critical and emancipatory security theorists.

Despite the critique and focus of critical and emancipatory theorists, one of the notable things about the contemporary security problematic is the rapid expansion of what is considered under the security rubric and the relentless questioning of traditional assumptions about security. The post-Cold War security problematic is one in which what security is and how it might be achieved (questions seldom asked during the Cold War, as noted by Baldwin, 1997: 8; and Buzan, 1991: 7) puzzle theorists and policy makers alike. There has been an explosion of conceptual debate about what security is.

One of the most distinctive features of post-Cold War international and national security policy and policy discourse has been that major institutions and policy makers have been engaged in an extensive problematisation of Cold War security policy. Post-Cold War security policy discourse has critiqued the static, immutable Cold War security framework and has sought to highlight radical changes which are argued to be rendering the traditional security framework of the military defence of national interest or territorial security anachronistic. In this transformed security environment threats such as AIDS, ethnic or new forms of conflict, environmental problems or terrorism, are argued to be transcending national borders

and challenging the traditional security presuppositions of a strict division between the domestic and the international. However, it is not just in terms of new security threats that the Cold War security problematic has been subjected to critique. Post-Cold War international and national security policy discourse has also explicitly critiqued the narrow focus on the protection of the national interest and elevation of the territorial integrity of the state above the lives of its citizens.

It is this broader context which begins to raise questions about contemporary critical and emancipatory security theory. Critical and emancipatory theorists, as we have seen, argue that the power of critical approaches emerges from their ability to challenge existing power relations, to engage with the 'here and now' and to point the way towards a more emancipatory way of organising the international political realm. One of the criticisms, as we have seen, of critical theory is that it is idealistic (for example Jahn, 1998). This criticism is roundly rejected by critical and emancipatory theorists, who point out that the key to beginning to challenge existing power relations must be to engage with the 'here and now'. Yet critical and emancipatory security approaches have emerged at the same time as significant changes in mainstream security theory and international and national security discourse and practices.

The aim of this chapter is not to suggest that critical theorists are simply the theoretical wing of liberal interventionism, however it will be suggested that critical and emancipatory approaches are idealistic because they do not engage with the contemporary security problematic. Their critique is not being driven by the changing international context and a problematisation of contemporary discourses of power. Note I do not say here that NATO and great powers have suddenly decided to act in other people's best interest but that discourses of power and the way in which power is being exercised has changed and this must be the starting point for a critical approach to security.

The chapter is structured as follows: in order to put the shift in mainstream security theory and security practices in context, the first part of this chapter overviews the predominant approaches to thinking about security during the Cold War. The second part of the chapter then analyses major shifts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. In this section I look at the way in which the international security problematic has been questioned and redefined by policy debates within the major international institutions, including the UN, and also in the policy discourse and rhetoric of states. I will set out the rapid increase of conceptual analysis and debate, both within academic and within international and national security policy discourse, that has been a major feature of the post-Cold War security problematic.

Securing the state in an anarchical system during the Cold War

The changing post-Cold War security problematic is the context that gives rise to the question about critical and emancipatory approaches to security and conflict. What is the contemporary security problematic? Once, this was a question that could be answered easily. During the Cold War the security problematic was most clearly

defined by security theorists. Most mainstream Cold War security theorists took as their central ontology the matter of the state existing in a system with no overarching authority (i.e., an anarchical or 'Westphalian' system). The primary concern for security theorists during the Cold War was with how, in this context, the state might protect and pursue its national interests (understood broadly as territorial and social, economic and political). The protection of national interests included protecting territory from potentially hostile forces which sought to either conquer the territory or transform the social, political and economic (within the context of broader Cold War ideological conflict) structure of the state. Linked to this, theorists worried about the potential for conflict between states and the maintenance of international order.

For most Cold War security theorists the point of their focus was on existing or potential threats to the state. As Barry Buzan notes, 'The field was driven by the search for causes of war, and for prescriptions to prevent its recurrence' (2002 [1996]: 48). This presumption holds true for both the inter-war Idealist theorists who suggested that this situation could eventually be ameliorated through international institutions and law and for the post-war Realists, such as Hans Morgenthau.

Much security theory therefore focused on questions of potential for war and to what extent the state could protect its national interests in that context. Security studies sought to find out how 'to secure the state against those objective threats that could undermine its stability and threaten its survival' (Lipschutz, 1995: 5). Stephen Walt gives a classic definition of security and security studies:

> The main focus of security studies is easy to identify . . . it is the phenomenon of war. Security studies assumes that conflict between states is always a possibility and that the use of military force has far-reaching effects on states and societies . . . Accordingly, security studies may be *defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force.*
>
> (1991: 212 [emphasis in text])

In particular, security studies was concerned with the use of nuclear weapons and the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, including questions of first strike, defensive deterrence and war fighting capabilities (for example Brodie, 1946; Kissinger, 1962; Jervis, 1979; Green, 1966). Other theorists focused on ways in which the chances of conflict might be ameliorated through security communities (for example, Deutsch, 1957). As Simon Dalby argues, '. . . Cold War security studies focused on deterrence and the finer points of preventing nuclear war through ensuring that 1939 did not repeat itself' (2000: 3).

This focus is exemplified in Stephen Del Rosso's discussion of a device used in Cold War strategic studies, the 'RAND Bomb Damage Effect Calculator'. This device allowed the strategist to calculate the devastation that would result from the explosion of a nuclear weapon:

> Equipped with a bomb damage effect calculator, the strategic studies devotee could gaze upon the world secure in the knowledge that in his hands lay the essence of the international security problematique.
>
> (1995: 175)

For Cold War security theorists, questions about the nature of their security framework, whether it did reflect an immutable fact (states existing in anarchy and in permanent danger), or ethical concerns about the consequences of the methods by which state security was ensured (for example, nuclear arsenals), were simply not part of their security problematic. As Ken Booth has argued, most Cold War security theorists did not question the formal assumptions and norms of the international realm, in their theoretical work security theorists privileged power and order over justice and equality (1991: 319).

The fundamental assumptions of much mainstream security theory during the Cold War were related to the formal framework for post-World War II international relations, as codified in the UN Charter:

> *Article 1*
>
> The purposes of the United Nations are:
>
> 1 To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
>
> (UN, 1945)

The primary principle through which the purposes of the Charter were to be fulfilled was through sovereign equality and the related rule of non-intervention (Article 2):

> *Article 2*
>
> 1 The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members
>
>   [. . .]
>
> 4 All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
>
> (UN, 1945)

The state is seen to be the primary actor in international relations and conflict a constant threat. As a corollary of these formal commitments, the post-World War II international order was formally pluralist (Bull, 1969; Simpson, 2005). The pluralist framework formally limited the 'right' to go to war to matters arising from the necessity for self-defence (see Article 51 of the UN Charter). For example, ethical concerns about the nature of a political system, or even a state's treatment of its population, were formally excluded as justifications for war (Article 2.4). States were assumed to have a limited role and interest in what went on in other states, with the protection of national interests being paramount. As Simpson argues, 'The

pluralist conception is universalist and egalitarian in orientation. The salient norms are those of non-intervention, sovereign immunity and state equality' (2005: 231).

In the context of a strongly polarised and politicised international realm, in which the most powerful states had ideologically opposed social, economic and political systems (and therefore different national interests), the norms underlying the pluralist framework (which were codified in the UN Charter) were derived from the limited area of agreement reached between states. This entailed the prioritisation of order, stability and the limitation of conflict in the international sphere over and above matters of justice and equality (which states with very differing conceptions of social organisation could not agree upon). As Hedley Bull argued:

> The view of the pluralists is not to be dismissed as a mere rationalization of state practice; it is a conception of international society founded upon the observation of the actual agreement between states and informed by a sense of the limitations within which in this situation rules may be usefully made rules of law. It seeks not to burden international law with a weight it cannot carry; and to have it leave room for the operation of those political forces, beyond the control of law, on which the existence of international society also depends.
>
> (1969: 69–70)

This pluralist framework was not limited to regulating conflict between states but also extended to regulating general relations between states. Regardless of the internal make-up or internal behaviour of a state it was formally legally equal to other states. In their dealings with each other and in international forums such as the UN, the most undemocratic state was formally entitled to the same treatment as the most democratic. This was combined with what Simpson calls legalised hegemony (2005: 174). The Great Powers (the permanent members of the Security Council) whilst equal between themselves, had special privileges above the other members of the United Nations, reflecting, as Bull argues, the 'sheer facts of inequalities of power' between the states that made up the international system (Bull, 2002 [1977]: 199). For example, as members of the Security Council they had the sole authority to decide on what was a threat to international peace and security.

The word 'formal' has been stressed so far. As Simon Chesterman wryly comments, the first four decades of the UN was a 'period not noted for the abandonment of the use of force in international relations' (Chesterman 2003: 114; see also Krasner, 1999). From outright intervention by America in Greece, Italy, Chile (to name but a few cases), to outright intervention by the USSR in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, to the proxy wars fought by the superpowers, the formal framework for international relations masked the practices of powerful states.

However, despite the gap between actual practice and the formal commitments to non-intervention and sovereign equality, it is of note that the language in which much intervention was justified by the interveners was the language of self-defence. Intervention was not justified as action on behalf of the citizens of other states. For examples see India's justification for intervening in East Pakistan in 1971, or Tanzania's intervention in Uganda 1979 (discussed in ICISS, 2001b:

54–56, 61–63). Even in cases in which there were clearly gross violations of human rights occurring (for example, the mass murder undertaken by the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia upon their assumption of power in 1975), the international community made it clear that these violations could not justify intervention and upheld the formal commitment to a pluralist international order, non-intervention and sovereign equality (ICISS, 2001a: 57–61; for further examples of the many interventions that occurred during the Cold War, and the justifications for them, see Chesterman, 2003: chapter 2, and ICISS, 2001a: 54–56, 61–63).

The justification of self-defence and the rejection by both the interveners and the broader international community of normative, ethical and emancipatory justifications for intervention suggest an affirmation of the formal organising principles of the pluralist international order. Here, the acceptable justification for military action could only be the idea of self-defence: the protection of the national interest. Other major twentieth century conflicts, such as the Vietnam War (1962–1973), the Arab–Israeli wars (for example the 1967 Six-Day War), the war in Afghanistan (1979–1989) or the various wars resulting from decolonisation (for example, Mozambique 1964–1975) were understood as political struggles within the context of the Cold War geo-political division or decolonisation, and were outside of the limited formal framework for international relations (see Bull, 1969: 69–70).

Resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly maintained the formal commitment to a pluralist international system: for example, the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN, 1960), the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (UN, 1965), the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Between States (UN, 1970), and the 1988 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field (UN, 1988).

Questions about the notable lack of conceptual analysis of security during the Cold War have been raised in more contemporary works (for example, Baldwin, 1997: 8) and it is apparent that there was a 'persistent underdevelopment of thinking about security' (Buzan, 1991: 7). Yet this lack of conceptual analysis is not so perplexing if we understand that in the specific Cold War context there was a separation between security and what was being secured. The ontology was that of a state in an anarchic system under threat from other states. Within this given framework for action it was understood that states would act to protect and pursue their national interests whatever they might be. Morgenthau famously argued that statesmen, whatever their country, 'think and act in terms of interest defined as power' (1993 [1948]: 5). The assumption was that in a system of competing sovereign states, nations were compelled to pursue power in order to ensure their survival. National or territorial security was the 'shell' that protected the state, whatever the content of the state. What national security was actually protecting in this context was less important and even open to change and debate.[2]

It was precisely this security shell, protecting the state from international anarchy, that was understood to allow the domestic realm to be the realm of progress and change (Wight, 1969: 33). Security then was the broader framework within which the national realm could exist. What security protected was not to do with security itself, these were understood to be discrete areas. Martin Wight exemplifies the position that many Cold War security theorists assumed in his well known essay 'Why is There No International Theory'. Here, Wight differentiated between the progressive possibilities inherent in the domestic realm compared to the brutal anarchy in which states must exist in the international realm. Whilst political theory might deal with matters of progress and change, thinking about the international realm could only be 'the theory of survival' (1969: 33).

Security studies was not immune to shifting intellectual and political currents and did not remain unchanging. During the 1960s and 1970s, security studies, in line with the rest of International Relations, adopted methods derived from microeconomics and psychology and became more self-consciously 'scientific' in order to understand interstate conflict and cooperation (for example, Allison, 1971). This was part of the 'behaviourist' turn, and led to a disagreement about the method by which international relations might best be understood, referred to as the 'history versus science controversy' (see Lapid, 1989; and Knorr and Rosenau, 1966, for an edited collection of essays which give an overview of the dispute). This is not to suggest of course that there is little difference between classical Realist approaches such as those of Morgenthau and behaviourist scholars such as Allison, far from it, none the less the essential parameters of security, what it was, what it was protecting and the focus on the maintenance of order and potential for conflict remained key.

The Cold War security problematic was not entirely without its critics, however, who argued that the focus on military force and interstate war blinded states to more pressing security threats. John Herz, in a 1957 article that anticipated much of the later interdependence argument and also more recent ideas about 'globalisation', questioned whether the modern territorial state, as a 'hard shell' protecting its nation, had relevance any more in the atomic age (Herz, 1957). Even Robert McNamara, in his short intervention *The Essence of Security* (1968), hinted that ultimately American security rested upon a stable and developed world order rather than solely upon military force.

This understanding was more explicit in Cold War development policy. Here, development, understood as national, state industrialisation, was promoted by the West in the developing world as a way of countering Soviet appeal and influence (see, for example, Walt Rostow's [1960] *The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto* and Pupavac, 2005, for a discussion). However, these were not so much challenges to the fundamental assumptions of security theory, that is, the primary norms of order and avoidance of interstate conflict nature of Cold War security, but rather as a questioning of the best way to ensure state security within that framework.

There were on the margins a handful of more radical critics who began to question the parameters of the debate and to identify the system as part of the problem,

for example Johan Galtung argued for an expansion in the way that violence was understood in total, to include the idea of 'structural violence' (1969). Galtung challenged the given framework for action itself, suggesting that the individual should be the focus for thinking about security. The World Order Models Project, set up in 1968, also promoted alternatives to the state system (see for example, Falk, 1975, and Mendlovitz, 1975).

In the context of the global economic crisis of the 1970s (including the end of the Bretton Woods economic arrangements and the oil crises) less radical theorists, like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, argued that the increasing complexity and interdependence of international relations was rendering military force a less useful means of ensuring state security (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The economic crisis also led to some uncertainty in terms of international security policy. The Club of Rome's report *The Limits to Growth* (1972), for example, and Lester R Brown's Malthusian paper, *Redefining National Security* (1977) argued that the assumption that the principal threat to national security arose from other nations no longer held true in a world of growing population, deteriorating environment and rapidly dwindling energy supplies. This was followed by Richard Ullman's 1983 article, 'Redefining Security', in which similar fears were expressed about immanent world crises induced by resource wars and population explosions.

Later, as the dust settled from the crisis, Keohane and Nye suggested that they might have overstated their case. Security settled down into what is termed the 'neo-neo debate' whereby a more 'scientific' realism debated with liberal institutionalism about the possibilities for overcoming interstate conflict through the ameliorating effects of international institutions and regimes (for an overview see Baldwin's edited collection of the major contributions to the debate, 1993). This debate was similar in essence to the debate between Idealism and Realism before World War II (Banks, 1993: 10).

Other ideas of 'Common Defence' and 'Alternative Defence' gained prominence in the early 1980s in the context of the 'new' Cold War (for a discussion see Kaldor, 1995). These arguments focused on the threat to all posed by a nuclear exchange and questioned whether policies of national security based on nuclear weapons were rational. *The Brandt Report* (ICIDI, 1980) and *The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues* (ICDSI, 1982, also known as the *Palme Report*, after the Chairman, Olof Palme) discussed the matter of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and argued for the idea of common security:

> [C]ountries must recognise that in the nuclear age, nations cannot achieve security at each other's expense. Only through cooperative efforts and policies of interlocking national restraint will all the world's citizens be able to live without fear of war and devastation, and with the hope of a secure and prosperous future for their children and later generations.
>
> (ICDSI, 1982: 6)

Later in the 1980s, Gorbachev introduced 'Perestroika', or 'new thinking' (Coates, 1988), arguing that nuclear weapons threatened national, and ultimately

international, security rather than ensured it. Gorbachev also suggested that ideas of economic and environmental security and human rights should be taken into account in constructing 'a comprehensive system of international peace and security' (Coates, 1988: 38). The most comprehensive new theoretical contribution to security came from Buzan's *People, States and Fear* (first published in 1981). Buzan sought to enquire into what national or state security might mean. He argued that military security was only a part of state security, which needed to be broadened to include political, economic, societal and environmental security.

Apart from the radical critiques from Galtung, and the World Order Models Project, most critical challenges to the way in which security had been theorised during the Cold War security framework, both theoretical (for example, Buzan, 1991) and from an institutional or policy perspective (for example, the Club of Rome), argued that the focus on military security and external threats to the state emerging from other states was too narrow. Security, and the threats to state security, needed to be understood more broadly. This in itself, however, was not a challenge to the security problematic; there was still a broad acceptance of the pluralist framework within which security could be 'done'. National interests, for example, were still understood to be at the heart of security, even though what the national interest was or what threatened it might be subject to more debate (for an alternative view that these developments did signal the beginning of a transformation of the security problematic, see Booth, 1997: 84–86).

Questions of international order and avoiding conflict between states remained for the most at the core of thinking about security, seeking to understand how a state might defend its interests in a potentially hostile world. These Cold War certainties about the nature of the security problematic have been eroded in recent years. The following section gives a broad overview and introduction to the changing post-Cold War security problematic.

From the margins to the mainstream – questioning the Cold War security problematic

The post-Cold War security problematic is one in which the questions 'what is security?' and 'how might it be achieved?' (questions seldom asked during the Cold War, as noted by Baldwin, 1997: 8; and Buzan, 1991: 7) puzzle theorists and policy makers alike. As Booth argued, in one of the first major expositions of a critical security approach:

> Until recently the security problematic was well-focused. A group of people . . . could predict what a speaker would talk about if 'security' was in the title of the talk. It is not long ago when issues such as Cruise, Pershing, SDI and SS-20 made strategists out of us all . . . The dominating security questions were: Is the Soviet threat growing? What is the strategic balance? And would the deployment of a particular weapon help stability? In that period of looking at world politics through a missile-tube and gun-sight, weapons provided most of the

> questions, and they provided most of the answers – whatever the weapon, whatever the context, and whatever the cost.
>
> (1991: 315–316)

There has been an explosion of conceptual debate about what security is. It is not surprising that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War should lead to changes in international and national security policies, but this in itself does not explain the particular form of the post-Cold War security problematic, which appears to be one of uncertainty.

Whilst the end of the Cold War initially seemed to resolve the overriding security threat of mutually assured destruction, the question of security seemed to be reposed almost immediately in a more puzzling and seemingly threatening form. For example, in 1991 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) announced its New Strategic Concept in which the Cold War institution re-orientated itself towards uncertainty, instability and risks that are 'multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess' (NATO, 1991). In his inaugural address, President Clinton warned that although the post-Cold War world might be freer, it was less stable, threatened by numerous new security problems such as AIDS and environmental collapse, rendering irrelevant the old division between foreign and domestic (Clinton, 1993).

If, as suggested above, Cold War security theory was related to the formal framework for international relations as codified in the UN charter, one of the most significant aspects of post-Cold War security theory appears to be a significant shift away from the old Cold War framework. This is not to claim that traditional theoretical approaches to security have disappeared. A browse through recent issues of *International Security*, for example, will still yield articles that are concerned with matters of military strategy and the potential for ameliorating conflict in an anarchical system (for example, Lieber, 2000), whilst neo-realist scholars such as Barry R Posen and Jack Snyder still discuss national interests (see for example, Posen, 2006).

However, the noted absence of theoretical debate about security during the Cold War has been replaced by an explosion of theoretical debate about what security is. The redefinition of security has moved from the margins of concern to the centre. Since the end of the Cold War the redefinition of security has, as Del Rosso comments, grown from a cottage industry to a 'mature and booming industry' (1995: 187). What is of note is not just that there has been a huge expansion in the volume of questioning and debate, although this is an important feature of the contemporary security problematic, but the critical nature of much of the debate.

Far from accepting the Cold War security ontology, significant strands of mainstream contemporary security theorists and policy analysts have also rejected it. As Emma Rothschild has argued, one of the distinctive features of the post-Cold War security debate of the 1990s has been that it has engaged not just critics but analysts and theorists working within the military establishment (1995: 59). In general, it has been stressed that the post-Cold War security environment is markedly different from that of the Cold War. It is not simply the end of the geo-political division

in itself, however, that has altered the security problematic. The end of the Soviet Union would necessarily have had a major impact on security policy both nationally and within international institutions, but this could not, of itself, explain the particular way in which the security problematic is being reconceptualised.

Contemporary mainstream security theorists and policy analysts have sought to show that changes in the international security environment are weakening the premise of the relationship between the state and the social realm and the fundamental security pact (as it might be termed) that is traditionally understood to link the two. Radically new types of threats and problems are argued to have emerged. In Gwyn Prins' evocative phrase, the end of the Cold War has caused a 'bonfire of the certainties' (1998: 794), in which the very premise of the relationship between the state and the citizen, and the provision of security, as represented by the theoretical device of the social contract, is no longer seen as being of any relevance (Prins, 1998: 796; see also Hinsley, 1966).

The paradox of these arguments is that despite the growth in the number of states and of the internal reach and control of many, especially Western, states (Buzan, 1995: 191; Del Rosso, 1995: 181), new forces are seen to challenge the state and render old political and conceptual categories, such as national security, meaningless (Dalby, 2000: 2; Mathews, 1997). As Seyom Brown argues in a contribution to an edited volume on the changing nature of world security, there is a basic incongruence between the traditional theoretical approach to security and changing reality:

> The so-called 'realist' view of international relations which takes the anarchic system of world politics as basically unalterable, and regards the pursuit of national interests as the essence of rational statecraft, is unable to comprehend, let alone counter, the structural contradictions underlying the contemporary security threats.

> (1998: 1)

National interests and national security, terms which were so unproblematic during the Cold War, seem to have become difficult concepts to grasp in terms of the post-Cold War security problematic. The post-Cold War security environment is argued to be one in which threats from interstate conflict fade away to be replaced by a vast expansion in both the nature of threats and the kind of threat that is posed. Some of the new security threats include energy and resource scarcity (Brown, 2003), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, internal oppression, ethnic wars, resource wars, intrastate war (Licklider, 1993; Brown, 1996; Turton, 2003; Brown, 2003), new kinds of conflict (Kaldor, 2001) or combinations of all of these things (Brzezinski, 1994; Moynihan, 1993; Kaplan, 1994; Evans, 1993; Renner, 1999).

Jessica Tuchman Mathews, in a much-referenced article, argued that environmental problems and overpopulation would challenge the contemporary international order:

> The 1990s will demand a redefinition of what constitutes national security . . . to include resource, environment and demographic issues . . . The assumptions

and institutions that have governed international relations in the post-war era are a poor fit with these new realities.

(1989: 162)

In other ways, the traditional security framework has been discovered to be an inadequate template for non-Western areas of the world, in which the traditional definition of security is inadequate to explain the problems of security as faced by most members of the international community (for example, Ayoob, 1997: 121). An extensive literature has developed using the concepts of 'failed states', 'weak states' and 'quasi-states', which endeavours to engage with the supposed rise in intrastate war and state collapse (Jackson, 1990; Milliken, 2003; Rotberg, 2004: Debiel and Klein, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004). It is suggested that for many non-Western states there is no real content to the state, rather it has been the formal international commitments to state sovereignty and independence that have propped up what Jackson has called 'quasi-states' (1990). In turn quasi-states, state failure and the problems emerging from them are argued to be one of the main sources of threats to international peace and security today (for example, The Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Rice, 2006).[3]

If many mainstream post-Cold War security theorists seem to be problematising and rejecting the parameters of Cold War security theory, the question is naturally raised about the post-Cold War security framework itself. As I argued earlier, despite the many interventions during the Cold War both states and international institutions remained formally committed to the pluralist security framework for international relations, as codified in the UN Charter. Whilst this formal framework remains in place, international and national security policy discourse has undergone a transformation. The old Cold War pluralist security problematic has been subjected to trenchant critique from the very definers of the old formal framework – the UN Security Council, other international organisations and in the security policy discourse of powerful states.

The pluralist security framework is argued to be inadequate in the face of a changed security environment, in which new threats and new kinds of conflict require a new approach to security (UN, 1995 [1992]: 7; ICISS, 2001a: 4; Solana, 2003: 5–8; UN, 2006). For example, the 2004 UN report, the *High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change*, sums up the extent of the new security threats and the inadequacy of the traditional security framework:

> The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war' – to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security.

(UN, 2004: 9)

Moreover, one of the most striking developments in terms of post-Cold War international and national security policy discourse has been that increasingly policy and policy rhetoric has been framed in terms of emancipatory discourses of rights and empowerment, with a related critique of the traditional conception of state sovereignty, non-intervention and formal international equality of states. Post-Cold War international and national security policy discourse explicitly seeks to introduce a moral and normative dimension to security policy. There has been a clear problematisation of the pluralist security framework, with its limited area of agreement between states, and the prioritisation of order and the maintenance of the status quo above matters of justice and ethics. The idea of an expansion of human rights, for example, has gained increasing salience since the end of the Cold War (Lewis, 1998). Universal human rights, it is argued, should be available to everyone, regardless of where they live, and traditional barriers such as state sovereignty, which allowed states to treat their own citizens as they wanted, should not stand in the way.

This shift is apparent in much international security policy discourse (at the level of the United Nations [UN] and other major international organisations, such as the European Union [EU] and international non-governmental organisations [NGOs]), and national security policy discourse that deals with international policy. In major post-Cold War international policy forums and statements such as the *Agenda for Peace* (UN, 1995 [1992]) or the *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (*ICISS*) (2001) it has been argued that the international community has a responsibility to ensure the protection of citizens in other states who are being mistreated by their own governments. Concurrently and relatedly, there has been an increasing downgrading of ideas of sovereignty and sovereign equality, with the argument that this is a barrier to the achievement of equal human rights, democracy, emancipation and security for all. The end of the Cold War is here argued to be a removal of a barrier to the achievement of a more emancipatory and cosmopolitan order.

Significantly, post-Cold War security policy discourses have criticised the exclusion of issues of human development and freedom from the pluralist security framework. This is exemplified in the concept of 'human security', which has been developed initially in the UN, but has been taken up much more widely (which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 7). Rather than the pursuit of national interests, whether material or ideological, post-Cold War military interventions, for example, have been explicitly justified in terms of emancipating the citizens of other states, and ensuring the human security of people in 'far-off countries'. Narrow national interests have been explicitly eschewed, or have been reinterpreted to entail the protection of the interests of citizens in other states (discussed in more detail ahead).

Major international institutions and powers seem to be shifting towards a security framework in which cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals, rather than the protection or pursuit of national interests, are argued to be central. No longer is the international sphere the place of mere survival, but it becomes (or could become) a site of progress, development, and freedom for the individual. The contemporary

security problematic appears to be not how best can a state pursue or protect national interests in a situation of anarchy, but to what extent can powerful states or international institutions resolve global problems and be a force for good in the world.

To clarify here, it is not suggested in this chapter that 'national interests' are never mentioned (for example, the USA's 1995 National Security Strategy [USA, 1995]), nor that this shift is not selective, nor that it underlies all foreign policy. The argument is that in significant areas of international and national security policy discourse there has been an explicit rejection of, and shift away from, the old security framework. International and national security policy discourse seems to share much of the approach of critical security theory. The pluralist Cold War security framework which has been subject to critique, seems to have diminishing relevance in the post-Cold War international order.

From the end of the Cold War, the pluralist security framework began to come under sustained scrutiny and has been subjected to extensive critique within the major institutions of the international community, the UN, and in the way that post-Cold War conflicts have been addressed. For example, in 1990 a North–South Roundtable on the 'Economics of Peace' stated the need for overturning the Cold War security framework. Rather than military defence, it was suggested that security should be reconceptualised to entail the protection of individuals from a far broader range of threats, including, for example, social violence and economic problems (the Roundtable included Robert McNamara, and senior figures from the UN, and national governments; Richard Jolly was Chair; see Jolly and Ray, 2006: 3–4 for a brief overview).

It was after the first major post-Cold War conflict, the first Gulf War in 1990, that the world's most powerful states signalled the beginning of a more extensive shift away from the limited pluralist security framework and towards a security framework which began to prioritise the protection and emancipation of individuals. Security Council Resolution (SCR) 688 in 1991 stated that internal Iraqi treatment of some of its population constituted a threat to international peace and security (UNSC, 1991).[4]

Following from SCR 688, a Security Council meeting held (for the first time) at the level of Heads of State and Government in January 1992 gave the first formal and explicit redefinition of the international security framework. At this meeting there was an explicit redefinition of international peace and security from the absence of interstate war (as specified in the UN Charter) and towards a broader conception of security, encompassing issues previously in the domestic realm and pertaining to development, such as poverty, and related economic and social problems:

> The members of the Security Council consider that their meeting is a timely recognition of the fact that there are new favourable international circumstances under which the Security Council has begun to fulfil more effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . . The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of

instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security . . . They recognize that peace and prosperity are indivisible and that lasting peace and stability require effective international cooperation for the eradication of poverty and the promotion of a better life for all in larger freedom.

(UNSC, 1992a: 2–5)

This statement signalled a formal break with the pluralist security framework that prioritised order and was blind to the internal content of a state, towards a security framework which begins to prioritise the protection and emancipation of individuals and therefore one that takes into account the internal behaviour of a state. At the invitation of the Security Council, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali elaborated on this new understanding of security in the *Agenda For Peace* report (UN, 1995 [1992]).

This report laid out a comprehensive critique of the Cold War pluralist security framework. In *An Agenda for Peace,* Boutros-Ghali argued that the pluralist security framework was anachronistic in the face of a changing security environment and new threats, including 'ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife' (UN, 1995 [1992]: 41), racial tensions, ecological damage, population growth, debt, barriers to trade, drugs, poverty, and the gap between rich and poor (1995 [1992]: 42). The report also made a strong moral critique of the pluralist security framework. For Boutros-Ghali, the old pluralist framework that prioritised order and stability and focused on state security and interstate conflict was problematic in that it ignored the many real problems and threats to human life and well being:

The adversarial decades of the Cold War made the original promise of the Organization impossible to fulfil . . . In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter – a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom' . . . the efforts of the Organization to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past.

(UN, 1995 [1992]: 39, 42)

Whilst the Cold War pluralist security framework was blind to the content of the state and maintained a (formal) commitment to non-intervention and sovereign equality, the new security framework, that began to take account of securing justice, human rights and promoting social progress required a shift away from these commitments. Despite a reminder that sovereign states remained the 'foundation-stone', the old framework of state security and non-intervention was to be modified:

The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to

understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.

(UN, 1995 [1992]: 44)

This shift away from, and critique of, the Cold War pluralist security framework entails a shift away from the previous prioritisation of order and stability above the protection and emancipation of individuals. It represents a move beyond the Cold War 'Westphalian' security framework of states pursuing and protecting their national interests in an anarchic system, in favour of a progressive international agenda for all. *An Agenda for Peace* suggested that all elements of the UN should be marshalled in order to play an 'integrated approach to human security' (UN, 1995 [1992]: 44). This was followed by Security Council Resolution (SCR) 794 in December 1992, in which the collapse of the Somali state was stated to constitute a threat to international peace and security. The rationale for the threat to international peace and security was stated to be the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict (UNSC, 1992b).

Post-Cold War international policy discourse has challenged the pluralist security framework as part of the problem in itself. State security and the protection of the national interest, it is now argued in the most powerful echelons of the international community, have often legitimated human insecurity. Within much post-Cold War international security policy discourse, the international sphere can become a place of freedom and development for the individual.

For some analysts, who have been engaging with the contemporary security problematic, the post-Cold War shift from a pluralist state-centric security framework to a security framework that prioritises the protection and emancipation of the individual is overstated. For these commentators, the pluralist security framework was significantly modified during the Cold War by various international agreements and institutions such as (aspects of) the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the various Conventions dealing with rights and the European Court of Human Rights (MacFarlane and Khong 2006: 68–71). These agreements and institutions sought to elevate the rights of individuals above those of the state and '[attempted] to set international standards for the protection of individuals' (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006: 75; see also Jolly and Ray, 2006: 2).

It could be suggested, however, contra MacFarlane and Khong, that during the Cold War *despite* the opportunities to elevate the protection and emancipation of the individual over the state and to claim justification using the various conventions on human rights, states remained formally committed to the prioritisation of state security and the related norms of non-intervention. These possibilities within the UN Charter (for example) were ignored by the international community. In the context of the highly politicised and polarised international system, security remained unambiguously focused on the state. Despite the ambiguities of the idea of 'national security', it remained, as critical security theorists Keith Krause and Michael C Williams state, that: 'Both the object of security (what is to be secured) and the means for studying it are treated as largely given and self evident' (1997: ix).

This shift away from and problematisation of the old security framework is also apparent in the security discourse of nation states and important regional organisations such as the EU. Military interventions during the 1990s have been argued to be in defence of the human rights or the security of others, and the narrow Cold War defence of national or territorial interests rejected as a motive for military or other forms of intervention (see, for example, Tony Blair's famous 'Chicago Speech' [1999]). These themes have also remained prominent in national and international security discourses after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.

I briefly turn to examine this shift in the security policy discourse of major international powers and international institutions such as the US, Britain, and also the European Union. For these major states and institutions, the narrow limits of the pluralist security framework have been rejected and major post-Cold War international interventions have been explicitly framed as being for the purposes of protection and emancipation of citizens of other states. The role of the international community or powerful states, far from being circumscribed by narrow national interests, is held to play a progressive and emancipatory role in resolving the security problems of people in other states, and the division between the domestic and the international realm is of less relevance.

This is first apparent in the 1991 Gulf War. For many analysts, the first Gulf War is understood as a 'traditional' or 'classic' war (for example, Cooper, 2004: 56). In this narrative, Iraq made a bid for regional hegemony and violated another country's sovereignty, prompting the international community to act in defence of Kuwaiti sovereignty and to reassert the regional balance of power (for example, Cooper, 2004: 56; Jolly and Ray, 2006: 6). Yet, as Simon Chesterman points out, the Cold War was not a period known for the abandonment of the use of force (2003: 114). The question raised, therefore, is why it was that the invasion of a small, autocratic country by Iraq (previously a favoured ally in the fight against the Islamic state of Iran, and armed by the West) turned into a global crisis. Moreover, as Realist theorists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt puzzled, far from making a reckless bid for regional hegemony, the quarrel between Iraq and Kuwait was about border disputes and oil prices, and moreover, Iraq thought that America had signalled indifference to any planned attack (2003).

Rather than being a 'classic' war, it is of note that international and national security policy discourse explicitly distanced the war from the Cold War security framework. Not only did the UN Security Council resolution 688 introduce the idea that internal treatment of the population might present a threat to international peace and security, but the then American President Bush (senior) made two significant speeches on the nature of the intervention. The first was made shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. In this speech President Bush announced a new international order in which the rule of law replaced the old power politics:

> The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times . . . a new world order can emerge . . . a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared

responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.

(Bush, 1990)

The second speech, after the resolution of the Gulf crisis, continued the theme:

Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided – a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict, and cold war. Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which 'the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong'. A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test.

(Bush, 1991)

In these speeches, the military intervention in the Gulf was framed in terms of a defence of the rule of law and the pursuit of justice, freedom, and human rights for all. The Cold War security framework was explicitly left behind and the military intervention placed within what could be argued to be a security framework in which the concerns seem to be more similar to critical security than otherwise.

Throughout the 1990s and into this century, high profile military interventions have been argued to be for the protection and emancipation of individuals in other countries. As elaborated by Cooper, the post-Cold War military interventions conducted by the West arise from: 'The wish to protect individuals, rather than to resolve the security problems of states' (2004: 74). The intervention in Somalia was understood as a humanitarian intervention (see Chesterman, 2003: 142; Coker, 2001: 158). In the United States, the themes of human security were also prevalent in President Clinton's foreign policy, the so-called 'Clinton doctrine'. Early foreign policy speeches argued for the need to expand the meaning of security to encompass human security (Rothschild, 1995: 55). After the Kosovo intervention it was argued that the US would only fight humanitarian wars (Coker, 2001: 149).

When the Labour Party came to power in Britain in 1997, it promised a foreign policy that would put human rights at its centre. In his inaugural speech Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Robin Cook promised a global foreign policy that would be guided by the goals of security for all nations, prosperity, protection for the environment and 'an ethical dimension' (Dunne and Wheeler, 2001: 167). The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was clearly framed in terms of a rejection of the old Cold War pluralist security framework for intervention. Tony Blair in his 1999 'Chicago Speech' argued: 'This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values'. Blair continued this theme by explicitly stressing that the old focus on state sovereignty could no longer be a barrier to intervention and called for a new framework within which international intervention could be carried out:

The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts . . . the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighbouring countries, then they can properly be described as 'threats to international peace and security . . . we may be tempted to think back to the clarity and simplicity of the Cold War. But now we have to establish a new framework. No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish.

(Blair, 1999)

Post-Cold War major military interventions cannot be understood in terms of the Cold War security framework and have been explicitly framed in terms that reject the norms of the Cold War security framework and share many of the concerns of critical security theorists. The Cold War pluralist security framework in which national self-interests might have played a leading role has been clearly rejected and the interventions have been framed in terms of the protection and emancipation of citizens of other states.

The attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) have led some commentators to argue that the ethical agenda has been set back since these attacks and there has been a reassertion of the state-based security framework (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 17). Yet, it is of note that the post-9/11 military intervention in Afghanistan has also been framed in a way that cannot be easily fitted into the old Cold War pluralist security framework. Post-9/11 interventions have been framed as very much being for the sake of the citizens of the states being intervened in. Tony Blair, for example, stressed that the intervention in Afghanistan was for, and on behalf of, the people of Afghanistan:

This is not a conventional conflict. It is not a battle for territory per se or for the subjugation of Afghanistan. It is a battle to allow Afghans themselves to re-take control of their country.

(Blair, 2001)

Even President Bush's notorious 2002 National Security Strategy, much derided by many liberal commentators, continues many of the themes of UN reports, for example stressing the need to engage in development and overcome poverty (USA, 2002).

These themes have been developed in the post-9/11 security strategy of the European Union, for example the 2003 *European Security Strategy* (ESS):

Our traditional concept of self-defense – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more

dangerous. State failure and organized crime spread if they are neglected –
as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act
before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start
too early.

(Solana, 2003: 7)

The 2004 Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities
discusses in what way the ESS may be implemented, suggesting a Human Security
Doctrine for the European Union and the establishment of a 'Human Security
Response Force' and a new legal framework 'to govern both the decision to inter-
vene and operations on the ground' (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005: 5). British foreign
aid policy has been very much focused on the necessity to preserve other people's
security (for examples see reports issued by Britain's Department for International
Development, DFID, 2005). The most recent military intervention in Iraq (2003)
has, as well as the alleged threat from 'weapons of mass destruction', been justified
rhetorically through liberating the country for the sake of the Iraqis (see for exam-
ple, Bush, 2003).

   At the time of writing, America has just elected a new president, Barack Obama,
who has promised to 'renew American leadership' in the world (Obama 2007;
2009). At the time of writing he has not yet embarked upon any major foreign pol-
icy initiatives, however Obama has selected Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State.
Clinton has stressed that under Obama, US foreign policy will focus more intently
upon matters of human rights and freedom. In her confirmation hearing Clinton
made clear what direction foreign policy would take:

   [Clinton] made clear that issues such as climate change, the liberty of women
   and human trafficking would be more prominent concerns on her watch. 'Our
   foreign policy must reflect our deep commitment to the cause of making
   human rights a reality for millions of oppressed people around the world', said
   Mrs Clinton, reprising campaign commitments. 'Of particular concern to me is
   the plight of women and girls, who comprise the majority of the world's
   unhealthy, unschooled, unfed, and unpaid'.

(Spillius, 2009)

Clinton has also appointed Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton academic and leading
advocate of humanitarian intervention and rethinking state sovereignty, as the
Director, Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State (see for example,
Feinstein and Slaughter 2004).

   Within the UN, and even in the discourse of the most powerful post-Cold War
state, there has been a marked transformation in the way that both security, more
generally, and particular military operations have been justified and understood.
The traditional Cold War security framework has been rejected in favour of rheto-
ric that understands security, and military interventions in terms of increasing the
security, well being and freedom of others.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to put critical and emancipatory security theory in its contemporary political context and through this to begin to interrogate critical and emancipatory security theorists' claims to both critically engage with contemporary power relations and hierarchies and point the way to more emancipatory forms of political organisation.

Critical security theorists focus on the inequities of the pluralist security framework, yet post-Cold War security policy, both within major international institutions and in the security policy pronouncements of major states, shares many of the criticisms and arguments made by critical security theorists. In much post-Cold War security policy and discourse the Cold War pluralist security framework, which sought to maintain order and the status quo through political compromise and agreements between states, is rejected. Post-Cold War security policy is framed as the pursuit of social justice, freedom and empowerment for the marginal, poor and oppressed. This entails a significant critique of the state and state sovereignty and a rehabilitation of external intervention.

This of course has not entirely escaped the notice of all critical and emancipatory theorists and we have seen in the introductory chapter that a small number of critical theorists have been worried about the similarities between their prescriptions and the liberal interventionist policies of Clinton and Bush. For these critical and emancipatory theorists contemporary military interventions are seen to be little more than naked assertions of American (and other states) power. However, as we have seen, liberal interventionism is but one aspect of changing security policies and discourses after the Cold War. As we have seen, there has been a fundamental shift in terms of the way in which major international institutions and policy makers have framed security and in attitudes towards state sovereignty.

Critical theorist Andrew Linklater elaborates the problem with sovereignty:

> The nature of the social bond which has bound the members of each modern European state together and separated them from the other states and the rest of humankind is being challenged by subnational groups and eroded by the advance of regionalism and globalization. These pressures pose a combined challenge to the exclusionary nature of sovereignty and to traditional ideas about citizenship.
>
> (1996: 78)

We would be hard pressed to find a statement from a major international security policy report that would be in disagreement with this critical statement. Mainstream security policy and international security policy discourse have clearly shifted in the last two decades to a form that is much similar than otherwise to critical and emancipatory security theory. Critical and emancipatory security theorists are critiquing an increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant model of security theory and practices.

The contemporary international context and security problematic is clearly very different from that of 20 years ago, yet reading critical and emancipatory theorists one could be oblivious to the fact that a major feature of post-Cold War security policy discourse has been a reorientation around human rights, empowerment and a critique of the old framework of sovereign equality and non-intervention. I do not suggest here that major international institutions and powers have become forces battling for the good of all mankind, nor that statements about human rights mean that America, for example, is pursuing human rights for all. However, an engagement with this major shift in the way in which power is being articulated and justified must be a first step towards any critical engagement with contemporary power relations and any potential for a more emancipatory politics. This makes the critical task more complicated for critical approaches – the old certainties of the Cold War security framework are disappearing and in its place there is a new world in which major powers and international institutions are disowning that very framework. In fact, an engagement with the problematic aspects of contemporary security policies would illuminate much about the limitations to abstract declarations of rights and freedom without political content (as we will see in some of the following chapters).

This suggests that contrary to the claims of contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists they are not engaging in the 'here and now', yet engaging with structures and discourses of contemporary power must be fundamental to the task of posing a challenge to those power relations and structures. This points to a serious theoretical limit to contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches. Critical and emancipatory theorists are engaging in an exercise in idealism, this is shown because their critique is not rooted in an engagement with and critique of contemporary structures and discourses of power. Whilst the moral impulses of critical and emancipatory theorists may well be altruistic, without an engagement in the material circumstances of the contemporary period their critique becomes little more than a statement of the moral values of the theorist. In chapter 3 I explore a different aspect of this theoretical problem.

3 'Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'

The theoretical limits of critical and emancipatory theory

The central aim of critical and emancipatory approaches is to call 'into question prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized', as Neufeld argues (2004:109). Through this, critical theorists claim to be orientated towards change and challenging contemporary power relations (Hutchings, 2007). As we have seen in particular this entails a focus on and critique of the state and state sovereignty. However, in chapter 2 I argued that critical and emancipatory theorists do not engage with contemporary structures and discourses of power; their theoretical approaches are idealistic.

In this chapter I further develop this theoretical critique of the idealist nature of contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches. I will suggest that there are theoretical limitations at the heart of contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches, which means that they cannot do what they promise. Because of their own commitments they cannot critically engage with the contemporary security problematic.

This chapter is structured as follows: I begin with a critique of Robert Cox, whose seminal 1981 article on critical and problem-solving theory is widely held to have launched the critical turn in international political theorising. In this I critically engage with Beate Jahn's analysis of critical international theory. Beate Jahn argues that the work of contemporary critical theorists is methodologically flawed in comparison with the work of earlier critical theorists such as Robert Cox (Jahn, 1998: 615). Post-Cox critical theorists, Jahn argues, ignore the most crucial aspect of what makes a theory critical: the methodological necessity of analysing a particular aspect of the social world in its historical and social totality (Jahn, 1998: 614, 637).

I will however argue that Cox's purported historical materialist framework, which assumes the possibility of an objective engagement with the social world, is contradicted by his argument that theory is 'always for someone and for some purpose' (Cox, 1981: 128). This introduces a purely subjective element into critical theory. It will be argued that some of the methodological problems that Jahn highlights in the work of post-Cox critical theorists are already present in Cox's definition of critical theory (Cox, 1981: 129–130).

The second section of the chapter will engage with the development of critical international relations theory (including contemporary critical security theory)

after Cox's 1981 intervention. I will suggest that the idealistic nature of contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches can be explained through an investigation into the methodological commitments of the theorist, in particular the turn to the values of the theorist himself or herself as the source of critical engagement with the world.

Cox's problem-solving and critical theory

Robert Cox's influential 1981 article is often attributed in critical theorists' own narrative with having begun the critical turn in international relations theorising, along with Richard Ashley's 1984 EP Thompson-inspired article, 'The Poverty of Neorealism'. In this article Cox argued for a distinction between *problem-solving* and *critical* theory (1981: 128). For Cox, theory can lead in two directions. Traditional theory accepts things as they are, the 'given framework for action' (1981: 128). Traditional theory is problem-solving theory because its aim is to work out how to ameliorate problems arising from this given framework for action (1981: 128). Problem-solving theory

> takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble . . . Problem-solving theories can be represented, in the broader perspective of critical theory, as serving particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order.
>
> (1981: 128–129)

Problem-solving theory then has two functions. It serves as a guide and an excuse for political elites; a guide because it aims to show elites how they might solve problems arising from a specific set of social and political relations, the 'given framework for action', and an excuse as these specific social and political relations are naturalised and presented as eternal and unchanging situations rather than a contingent set of arrangements that are open to change. Problem-solving theory naturalises and removes from questioning the institutions and social and power relations that exist, presenting them as immutable and unchanging facts of life (Cox, 1981: 129). Problem-solving theory, therefore, clearly has a conservative ideological function because it delimits what is legitimate enquiry and any potential for change (1981: 129–130).

According to Cox, critical theory can challenge both these aspects of problem-solving theory. Critical theory does not accept the given framework for action. For critical theory this framework itself is subject to critique and questioning. Critical theory begins, like problem-solving theory, with 'some aspect or particular sphere of human activity' (1981: 129). Yet whilst problem-solving theory stops at the boundaries, critical theory steps outside of the given framework for action. Critical theory questions the existing institutions and social and power relations which

problem-solving theory takes as an unchangeable 'fact of life' and tries to explain how and why problems arise by putting them in their broader social, historical, and political context (1981: 129).

Critical theory, as Jahn argues, has a methodological requirement of analysing concrete phenomena in their historical and social totality (1998: 614). Critical theory

> [is] critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about . . . It is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts . . . the critical approach leads towards the construction of a larger picture the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved.
>
> (Cox, 1981: 129)

Critical theory therefore requires a substantive material analysis of the framework for action, the historical structure (Cox, 1981: 135) which gives rise to the problematic considered. Cox here also explicitly identifies critical theory with historical materialism: 'Historical materialism is, however a foremost source of critical theory' (1981: 133). For Cox, historical materialism is a particular current within Marxist thought 'which reasons historically and seeks to explain, as well as promote, changes in social relations' (1981: 133). Cox argues that the prevailing international social order (the framework for action or historical structure [1981: 135]) can be understood, abstractly, in terms of the interaction between material capabilities, ideas and institutions (1981: 136). This historical structure influences both human action and theory although not in a direct or entirely deterministic way (1981: 135). As Marx argued, 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted by the past' (1978b: 595).

For Cox, critical theory has another advantage over problem-solving theory in that it understands that the social world is in a constant state of change: 'Critical theory is a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a constant process of historical change' (1981: 129). As reality changes we find that the divisions of the social world into separate disciplines may appear arbitrary. Cox gives the example of new kinds of theories that challenge the idea of the state as a coherent actor (1981: 130). Writing in 1981, Cox is referring to pluralism and interdependence theory in the context of the oil crises and the end of the Bretton Woods international financial system.

Cox argues that contemporary American realism, which he calls neo-realism, exemplifies the problem-solving approach to theory. Theorists working within this framework have an ahistorical approach which assumes a fixed and unchanging international system. For Cox, theory is a way in which we understand and explain

the 'real social world' (1981: 126). However, Cox argues that the relationship between the social world and the way in which it is perceived and theorised is more complicated than problem-solving theory allows for. For Cox, there is a crucial and complicated relationship between 'facts', 'reality' and knowledge. 'Facts' are not neutral stepping stones on the way to understanding 'reality'. Theory is not neutral but socially and politically bounded in a complicated way; it reflects, or is a product of, rather than describes actually existing social and political processes. The form that theory takes and the explanations that it gives, arise from and are part of the way in which people attempt to understand the social world and their position in it. Cox argues therefore that theory derives from a given perspective, a specific social, political and economic position, whether of a nation, or class, for example:

> [Theory is] always *for* someone and *for* some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crises, of past expectations, and of hopes and expectations for the future.

> (1981: 128)

At the epistemological level, therefore, problem-solving theory ignores the complicit relationship between theory and the social and political perspective which gives rise to theory (Jahn, 1998: 616–617). As well as methodological requirements to engage in a substantive analysis of the given framework for action, critical theory also has an epistemological requirement to be reflexive (Jahn, 1998: 614). For Cox, this means that critical theory can overcome the limitations of problem-solving theory because it is epistemologically aware of the socially constituted nature of theory. Critical theory is 'reflective upon the process of theorising itself' and is 'clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorising, and its relation to other perspectives' (Cox, 1981: 128). This reflexiveness ensures that, at the epistemological level (unlike problem-solving theory), critical theory can separate its own normative assumptions and values (which are part of critical theories' own social and political perspective) from what it is trying to explain and analyse objectively (Jahn, 1998: 616). Critical theory is therefore theory that is self-consciously aware of its own socially and historically situated origins.

This ability to be reflective is a crucial component, for Cox, of what makes a theory critical. Reflexiveness is why critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, can transcend the conservative limits of problem-solving theory and allow for a normative choice in favour of an alternative world order. The aim, therefore, of critical theory is to point towards alternative ways of ordering the world: 'to open up the possibility of choosing a different perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world' (Cox, 1981: 128). For Cox, critical theory has an explicitly normative dimension:

> Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to

alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world. A principle objective of critical theory, therefore, is to clarify this range of possible alternatives . . . In this way critical theory can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions, which intended or unintended, sustain the existing order.

(1981: 130)

For Cox, critical theory can therefore help us to identify potential forces which could push the world order in one direction or another (1981: 149). Cox argues that we may locate the future agent of historical change, which may lead to a different world order, in new social forces produced by changing global production processes (1981: 147, 149–151). Cox illustrates this process using the example of the incorporation of industrial workers into the political process of Western states from the end of the nineteenth century (1981: 138).

Whilst Cox draws upon both Frankfurt School critical theory and Gramsci, and subsequent critical theorists, as has been pointed out in the introduction, derive their positions from a number of different theoretical positions, none the less Cox's distinction between problem-solving and critical theory and the idea that critical theory could attempt to understand and challenge power relations is an accepted idea that runs through critical and emancipatory approaches. Critical and emancipatory theorists, even those who are not explicitly placing themselves as specifically following Cox, associate themselves with this general critique of Realism, and an orientation towards change and being able to challenge the contemporary status quo. In other words, critical and emancipatory theorists understand themselves to have an ontological and epistemological approach that is specifically geared towards unearthing the broader set of power relations that dominate the international sphere and lead to the problems that face us. Critical theory can then interrogate the 'given framework for action'; in the specific case of security for example, critical and emancipatory approaches to security can, unlike traditional approaches, ask why should security be framed in such a way? That framing is not a natural fact, it is not inevitable, but the consequence of a certain set of power relations which frame even what is to be understood as a problem.

Critical security theorists Keith Krause and Michael C Williams exemplify this approach when they argue:

[W]e have no wish in this context to engage in the ongoing debates within International Relations over the precise meaning of the term *critical*, a precise definition is unnecessary. Perhaps the most straightforward way to convey our sense of how *critical* should be understood in this volume is Robert Cox's distinction between problem-solving and critical theory: the former takes 'prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized . . . as the given framework for action', while the latter 'calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing'.

(1997: xi)

For other examples see Wynn Jones, 1999; Booth, 2005. Jahn argues that the works of post-Cox critical theorists are far less critical than Cox. She argues that contemporary critical theorists conflate a reflexive and self-aware epistemology with methodology, taking Cox's epistemological critique of problem-solving theory to mean that there is no possibility of distinguishing between facts and values (Jahn, 1998: 614) and that a critical theory is a question of using the values of a theorist as methodology. Jahn argues, therefore, that post-Cox critical theorists abandon substantive material analysis in favour of 'general pronouncements on the emancipation of the species' (1998: 622). In the following section it will be argued that Cox is more problematic than Jahn identifies and that Cox has conflated epistemology and methodology in his work. Cox, it will be argued, also shows a problematic conflation between epistemology and methodology. This means that Cox simultaneously argues for the necessity of and the impossibility of objective engagement with the social world. There is an inherent contradiction within Cox's work between critical theory's commitment to explanation and its purported historical materialist basis and the radically subjective elements introduced by reflexivity and the argument that theory is always for someone and for something.

Cox argues that both problem-solving and critical theory begin with a certain problematic or area of the social world (1981: 129). For Cox, problem-solving theory, however, cannot ultimately fulfil its promise to solve problems. The problem-solving approach narrowly focuses on specific aspects of the given framework for action in order to ameliorate problems arising from it. It seeks only to resolve particular problems that arise in isolation from an analysis of the broader historical, social and political context which actually gives rise to the problems. Therefore, by its very nature, problem-solving theory can only ever patch things up rather than really resolve the problem. Critical theory, on the other hand, has a much greater potential for problem-solving.

Indeed this is precisely the point of Cox's claims for critical theory. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory can work towards an explanation of how the world is and why, for example, particular problems emerge. Through a substantive analysis of the specific historical framework for action (namely the social, political and economic context which gives rise to the problematic considered [Cox, 1981: 135]), critical theory offers potential for genuine problem-solving. This is because only critical theory can get to the root of the problem and explain why that problem emerges, not simply attempt to resolve problems in isolation (1981: 129). Through theory, it is possible to arrive at an objective picture of the world and, ultimately, to address potential for change. For Cox then, it must be possible for theory to make some kind of objective evaluation of the world as it really is (rather than simply as ideological engagement, although because of the dynamic nature of the social world this can only ever be an explanation of the current historical framework). If this were not so, then there could surely be no hope of a critical theory as Cox sets out. Here we can say, following Jahn, that Cox does presume a distinction between facts and values.

Indeed, as Jahn argues, this distinction is built into Cox's critical theory at the epistemological level. Jahn argues that critical theory necessitates reflectivity at the

level of epistemology. This allows the critical theorist to ensure that his or her own values and assumptions (his or her perspective) do not pre-empt the theory. The danger is that theory can end up simply reflecting the theorists own assumptions or values; for example, the bourgeois theorist simply assumes an autonomous subject and extrapolates from there (Jahn, 1998: 616). It is problem-solving theory, in fact, that cannot distinguish between facts and values. In order to avoid this trap, critical theory must be both holistic and historical (Jahn, 1998: 616). This means that methodologically critical theory must engage in a substantive material analysis of the existing social order.

This strand of Cox's critical theory implies that there must be the possibility of reaching an objective analysis of the given framework for action; if there is not then there can be no difference between critical and problem-solving theory. Post-Cox critical theorists, Jahn suggests, seem to think that all that is required for critical theory is that the theorist asserts their own reflective self-awareness and normative intent. Post-Cox critical theorists misunderstand that reflectivity is restricted to the level of epistemology, taking it also to be the sole methodological criteria and abandoning substantive material analysis into the bargain (Jahn, 1998: 616, 622). These critical theorists, therefore, cannot distinguish between facts and their own values (Jahn, 1998: 637). As Jahn argues:

> The Critical Critics, however, having discarded this idea of critique [analysis of the material basis of society] and reduced it to some general pronouncements on the emancipation of the species, are clearly not in need of substantive analysis any more.
>
> (1998: 622)

Cox, however, is less clear in this than Jahn suggests. Cox introduces a confusing moral division between problem-solving and critical theory which seems to erode the epistemological distinction between facts and values and elevates the values of the theorist to be the major methodological requirement for critical theory. For Cox, critical theory allows for a normative choice to be made in favour of a better world order (1981: 130). Here, Cox is conflating theory with political action and giving theory a moral dimension as if in itself theory possesses some kind of moral agency. But this is to confuse theoretical explanation with how one chooses to use that theory.

This arises because there are two aspects to problem-solving theory which Cox does not recognise, consequently conflating them. Theoretically, as we have seen, problem-solving theory cannot go beyond the 'given framework for action', as this framework is accepted as a natural fact. Critical theory (or theorising) has the capacity to expand beyond the 'given framework for action' and begin to engage with the social, political and economic structures that give rise to the problems considered rather than treating the given framework as a natural fact; critical theory can begin to get to the root of the problematic (although because of the dynamic nature of the social world this explanation will always be historically specific rather than some kind of eternal truth).

Marx, for example, pointed out that hitherto even the best of the classical economics such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo had failed to progress much beyond the appearance of the commodity form to reveal the social relations that underlie it, taking such things as exchange-value or the money form to result from 'natural' material qualities or something inherent in human nature rather than a specific system of social organisation (Marx 1976: 126–177). This means that problem-solving theory cannot, as we have seen, really resolve problems, but can only attempt to deal with the consequences in a superficial way, trying to ameliorate the problems arising from the 'given framework for action'. Problem-solving theory is fundamentally theoretically limited.

The second aspect of the limitation to problem-solving theory is normative and political. Problem-solving theory is, as Cox has argued, conservative and functions to maintain the status quo by limiting what the scope of enquiry might be. An abstract example of this may be the way in which a dominant political class might attempt to deal with industrial problems (say through raising wages) thus lessening social strife but maintaining a fundamentally unequal relationship for the benefit of the ruling class. One could argue that the theoretical work of John Maynard Keynes could be understood in this context as work which sought to demonstrate how many problematic effects of the capitalist system could be smoothed whilst maintaining the essentials of the system.

These two aspects to problem-solving theory are of course not unrelated. Going beyond the theoretical limits to problem-solving theory in order to get to the root of the problem, to understand why the 'given framework for action' is as it is, must be the first step towards political action to overthrow that given framework for action. However, whilst these aspects are related they are separate and the one does not inevitably lead to the other. A critical theoretical approach might allow the theorist to explain why a particular mode of social production leads to certain features in a society (as Marx did, for example). However, the critical theoretical explanation of certain features in a given social order, for example, is neutral; in other words it is an objective engagement with contemporary social reality. What one chooses to do with the knowledge is a different question.

Theory in itself does not have any agency. For Marx, the ultimate point of critique was not simply to come up with a 'better' theory, it was intimately linked to the transformation of social reality through the assumption of power of the existing working class. Theory, of course, plays a vital role in this. Becoming conscious of the reality of existing social relations is the first step towards taking control of those relations. As Jakubowski writes, 'to become conscious is thus the decisive step towards revolutionary practice' (1990: 62). The goal or end point of theory however must be practical, a political revolution:

> [Marxist] critique of bourgeois ideology, therefore cannot stop at the establishment of a new theory which expresses the point of view of the proletariat. It can only conclude with the practical removal, by the proletariat, of their inhuman conditions of life and the inhuman conditions of life of society as a whole.
>
> (Jakubowski, 1990: 63)

It is illogical to assume that a theoretical insight or explanation in itself can have the 'right' moral impact. That can only ever be a political decision involving real men and women who can give content to emancipation. Cox's critical theory is already then problematic as it is an attempt to theorise without any collective subject who can be an agent of change (that for Marx already existed in the working class). Cox speculatively identifies new social forces as possible agents of historical change, but his critical theory of world order can only point, as he argues, to possible alternatives (1981: 130).

This moral division of theory and confusion between political action and theory is further compounded by Cox's famous assertion that theory and knowledge can never be objective but only subjective: 'theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose. All theories have a perspective' (1981: 128). Here the argument seems to be that because the theorist is always socially situated, theory cannot be neutral. For Cox, this does not seem to be a problem because through reflectivity and subjective self-awareness the critical theorist becomes capable of making a normative choice about a better world order. So here, Cox seems to assert that rather than the capacity to distinguish between facts and values (which is vital at the epistemological level and gives critical theory the capacity to be critical) it is in fact the 'good' values of the theorist that give critical theory its critical capacity. For Cox, reflectivity seems to be both epistemological and methodological *and* a step towards actual transformation of the social world.

For Cox, following from Marx, ideas have a material basis. Marx enabled us to 'recognise the unity between social life and the ideas which form a part of that life' (Jakubowski, 1990: 57). Marx, developing the materialist thesis advanced by Feuerbach and other early materialists, argued against Hegel, for whom the existing world derived from the Idea:

> In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.
>
> (Marx, 1978a: 154)

However, for Marx the material basis to ideas did not mean that it was impossible to objectively understand the underlying social relations that gave rise to those ideas. Cox seems to have taken Marx's insight about the material basis of ideas in a way that entirely contradicts Marx. Ideas and social life, or perspective in Cox's words, are linked but not in the way that Cox understands. Analysis is linked to social reality in that we can only really grasp social reality at a certain stage in the development of society (Marx 1976: 168–169), however, for Marx, there is a definite social reality and one that we can ultimately grasp through analysis. The commodity form, for example, is not a question of perspective or of value judgement, it

is the real material building block of capitalist society, and the contradictions of that commodity form (between exchange value and use value) are shown by Marx to be intrinsic to the broader development of capitalist society. Cox's statement about the always situated nature of theory implies that it is not possible to explain why the social world is as it is. However, this does not matter, because for Cox it seems that the normative values or choices of the theorist seem to be paramount.

The following section of the chapter develops the preceding critique in terms of aspects of contemporary critical international relations theory (including critical security theory).

Contemporary critical international relations theory

As we have seen in the introduction and chapter 2, contemporary critical and emancipatory international theory encompasses many different approaches (Brown, 1992; Jahn, 1998; Hutchings, 2001; Linklater, 2002 [1996]). None the less, contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists share a number of key arguments whatever their intellectual antecedents; an explicit critique of both traditional theory and the given framework for action. Furthermore, whilst traditional theory has privileged power and order over justice and equality (Booth, 1991: 319), critical theory has a commitment to the emancipatory purposes of theory. As Richard Wynn Jones states, 'the ties that bind are a shared commitment to exploring and elucidating the theme of human emancipation as it is highlighted in the study of world politics' (2001: 9). This entails a critique of state sovereignty and a highlighting of post-sovereign forms of organisation and solidarity.

The aim of this section of the chapter is to engage analytically with some influential critical contributions. In conclusion, it will be argued that the theoretical problems identified in Cox's critical theory are replicated and expanded in post-Cox critical theory and undermine the critical project. This will be shown by contemporary critical theorists' rejection of the fact/value dichotomy which mitigates the possibility of objective engagement with contemporary power relations and a consequent turn away from any substantive material engagement with the given framework for action in favour of the normative values of the theorist themselves.

Contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists build upon Cox's warning that theory is always socially situated and the inherent implications of the impossibility of independent knowledge. As critical theorist Mark Hoffman argues:

> In traditional theory, knowledge was seen to derive from the activity of describing the world . . . [it] saw the world as a set of ready-made facts awaiting discovery through the application of scientific methodology.
>
> (1987: 233)

This entails a critique of positivism, as Mark Neufeld summarises positivism, '(i) value-freedom in scientific knowledge, (ii) the methodological unity of science and most importantly . . . (iii) the correspondence theory of truth' (1993a: 55). According to Neufeld:

To begin, critical theory stands in opposition to positivism's objectivist conception of truth as correspondence to the real world . . . because theory tells us not only how the facts are to be interpreted but also what counts as a fact in the first place, the objectivist notion of truth as correspondence to the facts is untenable . . . (furthermore) such a view has the consequence of limiting the role reason can play in human affairs . . . In sum, a critical form of theorizing involves theoretical reflexivity, which makes political-normative content as much a criterion of theory assessment as empirical adequacy . . . critical theory (breaks with positivism's naturalist assumptions) promotes an interpretive approach to the study of human society that seeks to understand the potential for change within human practice and social orders . . . Third, critical theory stands in opposition to the positivist understanding of reliable knowledge as value free in nature.

(2001: 130)

Yet, as I have argued, within Cox there seems to be a contradiction between the necessity for explaining things as they 'are' (the possibility of theory corresponding to the world as it really is) and the impossibility of theory being other than socially situated. Hoffman, for example, argues that it is not possible to separate facts and values:

[F]acts cannot be separated from their social genesis; they are social and historical products . . . The world we study is the product of ideas and human action, which traditional theory seeks to identify as ahistorical and transcendental in quality rather than as the product of history and social action.

(Hoffman, 1987: 233)

Following from Cox, Neufeld argues that facts and values cannot be separated because theory always derives from a specific perspective:

[I]deas, words and language are not 'mirrors which copy the "real" or "objective" world' – as positivist conceptions of theory and knowledge would have it – but rather 'tools with which we cope with "our" world'. Consequently, there is a fundamental link between epistemology (the question of what counts as reliable knowledge) and politics (the problems, needs and interests deemed important and legitimate by a given community).

(1993a: 57)

Hidden beneath the supposedly neutral and value free observation of the 'facts' are the ideological and normative commitments of problem-solving theory. For example, as Sandra Whitworth argues from a feminist international relations perspective:

[T]he rejection of positivism has meant a rejection of the notion that there can be such a thing as a politically neutral analysis of external reality . . . In other

words, and following Robert W Cox's classic 1981 observation, theory is 'always for someone and for some purpose'.

(2001: 150)

As Ken Booth argues using the example of traditional approaches to security theory, 'Behind a mask of science, supposedly describing "the world as it is", are traditional security intellectuals describing their own reality through ethnocentric, class and masculinist eyes, albeit tempered by academic values and methods' (2007: 175).

   Critical theorist Steve Smith in his 2003 presidential address to the International Studies Association (ISA) described the problems of traditional positivist approaches to knowledge and how those approaches cannot grapple with the world:

> My main worry about the discipline today is that in the main IR academic community there is a powerful rationalist orthodoxy, fuelled and legitimised by a rational choice consensus on matters of how we know and how we construct our knowledge. I am not denying that this approach should be an essential part of the teaching of the discipline of IR, but I do not think that it should be all that the discipline is. I believe strongly and passionately in an intellectual pluralism, and I fervently believe that this is an essentially political statement. Ultimately, you see, I think the social world is like Las Meninas or the paintings of Magritte; the key issue is not accurate representation, but is interpretation, and interpretation without the possibility of ever pronouncing definitively on which one is correct. In the social world there are indeed always at least two stories to tell. No recourse to intellectual foundations can solve this problem.

(2004: 514)

According to critical theorist Andrew Linklater, critical approaches offer a completely different approach to positivist or traditional approaches:

> Critical theory takes issue with positivism by arguing that knowledge does not arise from the subject's neutral engagement with an objective reality but reflects pre-existing social purposes and interests. Critical theory invites observers to reflect upon the social construction and effects of knowledge and to consider how claims about neutrality can conceal the role knowledge plays in reproducing unsatisfactory social arrangements.

(2002 [1996]: 279)

Critical security theorist Richard Wynn Jones argues that critical and emancipatory approaches offer a different approach to knowledge:

> Epistemologically critical theory rejects the subject-object dichotomy – and the consequent sharp differentiation between fact and value – that underlies traditional theory. It argues for its replacement by an acceptance of the

dialectical interrelatedness of knower and known and a recognition of the inevitably political nature of social theory.

<div align="right">(Wynn Jones, 1999: 28)</div>

Booth defines critical theories' approach to knowledge:

Unlike political realism, critical theory is not a misnomer. It does not promise to deliver the impossible – objectivity and reality – but rather seeks to expose the problems of contemporary social and political life from a standpoint of critical distance, and it does so with an emancipatory interest.

<div align="right">(2005: 11–12)</div>

Following from Cox, theorists working within a critical and emancipatory theoretical framework argue that the socially situated nature of theory, and indeed knowledge in general, means that any kind of objective understanding is not possible. Yet despite the rejection of the possibility of any objective explanation of the social world, theorists working within this framework none the less purport to be able to offer a more 'realistic' explanation of the international sphere and security than Realism (Booth, 2005: 5):

It is important to examine this belief that realism has a special relationship with the substantial issues of world politics, as well as to show that critical approaches have a greater claim to be relevant to the immediate questions of security.

<div align="right">(Linklater, 2005: 123)</div>

Realism, it is argued, is guilty of ignoring the complexities of the 'real' world, in fact Realism serves to construct that world and limits what counts as knowledge or even what questions to ask. For critical theorists, not only does problem-solving theory hide its ideological commitments but it serves to constitute the given framework for action. For example, theorists working in a critical security perspective argue that the traditional security framework is not just an ideological justification for a particular social, economic and political order, but serves to construct it also: 'security discourses are constitutive of the *problematique* that, according to the positivist contention, their practitioners supposedly merely observe' (Dalby, 1997: 10–11; see also Dillon, 1996).

This presents an inversion of traditional security ontology in which states react to the anarchical system in which they exist. In this narrative the security discourses and practices of states create the state and the system (Klein, 1994: 3): 'Political realism . . . has created a prison of categories and assumptions that have worked to create a world that does not work for most of its inhabitants' (Booth, 2005: 4). As Smith argues:

I want to claim that the discipline of International Relations is complicit in the constitution of this world of international relations; I want to claim that there

can be no such thing as a value-free, non-normative social science; and I want to claim that the ways in which the discipline, *our* discipline, not *their* discipline or *the US* discipline, constructs the categories of thought within which we explain the world, helps to reinforce Western, predominately US, practices of statecraft that themselves reflect an underlying set of social forces.

(2004: 499)

In this narrative, security, rather than being a reaction to external necessity is part of the practice used to construct the system. As David Campbell and Michael Dillon argue:

[T]he Hobbesian chain of reasoning actually works in reverse to the conventionally understood course of its logic. If you wish to pursue and realise this sort of security. If you wish to contract into existence this sort of sovereign. If your understanding of the political arises out of such an ontology of violence. Then, you require the 'war of all against all'. You are obliged to discover and to re-discover, to produce and reproduce, these origins.

(1993: 31)

A focus on knowledge and epistemology then is key for critical and emancipatory theorists. As Friedrich Kratochwil argues, critical theory has to address 'what types of constitutive understanding authorise particular practices and this creates specific types of authority' (2007: 36). In place of a conservative Realist epistemology and ontology, critical and emancipatory theorists seek to put their own emancipatory epistemology and ontology.

Yet critical security theories undermine their own goals with the idea of the impossibility of explaining where problems come from, or, for example, why certain groups of people experience particular insecurity within a certain international or national order. Whereas Cox seems to have contradictory arguments in his work, contemporary critical theorists make the impossibility of independent knowledge central to their arguments about what gives theory its critical potential. For theorists working within this critical framework, facts and values cannot be distinguished from each other as knowledge is always for a purpose.

The explicit rejection of the fact/value distinction is in contradiction to critical theory's aims of engaging with contemporary power relations, as Hutchings argues, 'The positive potential of critical theory lies in its widening the range of phenomena relevant to the explanation of international politics and a range of questions that a realist agenda rules out in advance' (2001: 90). Yet there is a problem with fulfilling this promise if there is no possibility of distinguishing between facts and values. It is realist or positivist theorists who are limited by their values, or their ideological commitment to the status quo, who refuse to separate an analysis of the world as it is from their commitment to the world as it should be; that is, their values and commitment to the status quo lead them only so far in their explanation and exploration, beyond a certain point they will not go, retreating instead behind naturalistic explanations for social, political and economic

structures. So it is Realist or traditional theorists who cannot distinguish between facts and their values.

As has been argued above, the explanatory potential of critical theory is that which elevates it above traditional theoretical approaches. Traditional theory can only ever engage with problems in a narrow and limited way because it cannot and will not go beyond the immediate problem itself and ask where the problematic comes from. This kind of theory must to a certain extent deny social reality because it chooses not to go further in understanding and explaining why and how certain problems emerge. It limits itself to trying to resolve problems whilst refusing to engage with the broader social and political context which gives rise to the problems.

Potentially a critical and emancipatory approach to theory can go beyond a narrow traditional framework to situate the given problematic in its broader social, political and economic context. This however requires some kind of possibility of objective engagement with social, economic and political relations. It is surely the distinction between facts and values which gives critical theory the potential of a broader social and historical analysis. Potentially critical theory is not limited by its 'values' or its commitments to the maintenance of the existing order. Critical theory therefore attempts to explain where the problematic actually comes from and why the problematic is as it is (although because of the socially constructed nature of the social world this explanation can only be historically specific, there are no 'eternal' truths, in the way that some traditional theorists suggest, for example, Layne, 1995 [1994]: 292–293). If the distinction between facts and values is rejected, it is hard to see what advantage critical theory can have over problem-solving theory. Jahn argues that this rejection renders post-Cox critical theory little more than propaganda (1998: 637).

Having rejected the possibility of explanation and the fact/value distinction as a source of critical potential – indeed this rejection is central to critical theory, which stresses that knowledge is always for someone and for some purpose – theorists working within a contemporary critical and emancipatory framework develop this logically, as Cox also seemed to imply, to argue that the source of critical potential lies in the assertion of the values of the theorist. This also draws upon Cox's confusion between theory and political action and his conflation of epistemology and methodology. The following section draws out the central role of personal reflectivity in contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches.

Personal reflectivity is argued to be crucial for any critical theory. Reflectivity is understood to be self-awareness that one is engaged in a process of analysis and theorising and an acknowledgement of the interrelatedness between theory and social structures. Biersteker describes theorists working in a critical framework as

> concerned with a self-conscious reflection on the larger social and political context within which theoretical activity takes place. Some are concerned with the ways in which theory both reflects and reproduces dominant power positions and interests.
>
> (1989: 264)

For Hoffman, for example, the critical potential of theory lies within the critical theory itself, rather than through an analysis of social and political processes, he argues that, 'Critical theory, through the process of self-understanding and reflection, is able to provide a critique of the existing social order and point to its immanent capacity for change and for the realisation of human potential' (1987: 232). For Linklater:

> Critical theory invites observers to reflect upon the social construction and effects of knowledge and to consider how claims about neutrality can conceal the role knowledge plays in reproducing unsatisfactory social arrangements.
>
> (2002 [1996]: 279)

Critical security theorists also stress the importance of reflectivity and acknowledge the socially situated nature of theory (for example, Booth, 2005: 11):

> [A]ll social and political philosophies reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, the preoccupations of the historical epoch in which they were conceived and formulated . . . the question for intellectuals is not whether they can be perfectly detached and objective, but whether they can reflect upon their own relationship to the social world and attain a certain critical distance from it.
>
> (Wynn Jones, 1999: 9)

Here, the turn towards the self as the source of critical potential, that is already inherent in the idea of reflectivity as a component of critical theory, is taken further. Taking a lead from Cox's statement about all theory being *for* someone and *for* some purpose, theorists working within this framework stress that their theory is *for* normative or emancipatory purposes. We have seen above that Realist theory is understood to have played a crucial role in structuring the world as it is, thus critical and emancipatory theorists suggest that in place of Realism's conservative ideological commitments they can place their own emancipatory ones. For Biersteker, 'Post-positivist scholarship could be evaluated according to explicit normative criteria, in full recognition of the intellectual interests being served' (1989: 266). As Neufeld argues:

> [C]ritical theory stands in opposition to the positivist understanding of reliable knowledge as value free in nature. Recognizing that knowledge can never be value free – that 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose' . . . critical theory embraces an overt normative commitment to progressive social change.
>
> (2001: 130)

Prominent critical thinker Andrew Linklater also stresses that for critical theorists normative concerns are the purpose of knowledge and theory:

> [C]ritical social theory [is that] which examines the possibility of higher levels of political self-determination which are already immanent within existing

forms of life. Critical theory is explicitly concerned with an emancipatory project with universalist aspirations which transcend national frontiers.

(1996: 85)

See also Linklater, 2002 [1996] for an overview.

Neufeld, for example, criticises constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt for maintaining the distinction between facts and values, and therefore being unable to ask the crucial critical questions:

> In accepting the problematic objectivist distinction between facts and values, between the is and the ought, Wendt leaves no room to consider the ways in which his constructivism may serve politico-normative agendas independent of his personal value commitments. Because he limits reason to episteme – the direct consequence of his objectivist notion of truth – there is no way to ask critical theory's central question: What and whom is Wendt's constructivism for?

(2001: 133)

Linklater lists what critical theory aims for in transforming the world: '. . . the normative content of critical theory supports removal of the barriers to the equal enjoyment of rights, greater respect for radical differences of worldview, and efforts to reduce material inequalities' (2001: 32).

This conflation between epistemology, methodology and political action is present in the work of critical and emancipatory security theorists:

> In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the centre of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d'etat the prism through which problems are viewed . . . . If all theory is for someone and for some purpose, then critical security studies is for the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless, and its purpose is their emancipation.

(Wynn Jones, 1999: 159)

The conflation between facts and values and the elevation of the values into political action or practice (whether with emancipatory intent or conservative intent) seem to put the personal sentiments of the theorist squarely at the centre of theory. Whereas for Cox, there seemed to be two contradictory aspects to critical theory, the necessity of separating facts and values in order to explain a given problematic in its broader social, economic and political context and the simultaneous impossibility of doing so. Indeed Cox also seems to elevate the values or normative intent of the theorist into a crucial component of critical theory. For contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists the materialist aspect to Cox's theory has been left behind and all that remains are the good intentions of the theorist.

For many contemporary and emancipatory critical theorists, reflectivity is not combined with a broader concrete analysis of the given framework for action. Rather, reflectivity seemingly replaces substantive analysis of a given historical structure. It becomes in many cases the main methodology for a critical and emancipatory theory. For post-Cox critical theorists, the conflation of epistemology and methodology is a central component of critical theory (Jahn, 1998: 623). Critical and emancipatory theorists argue that if all theory is always socially situated then critical theory entails a declaration of the theorist's own normative intentions and furthermore that this will be the first step towards a better international order. The materialist method has been left behind and there has been a reversion to a Hegelian framework in which the idea can create the world.

Thus it is perhaps no surprise that for leading critical security theorists such as Booth the most important point for purported emancipatory communities and transnational structures is that they are informed by the right ideas and values, regardless of the actual political structure or content:

> The precise character of those arrangements at this point is less important than the ideas that inform them, and in this respect enlightened world order values are central: if the global-we look after the processes, the structures will look after themselves.

(2007: 141)

Here the unrealised idealism of contemporary and emancipatory theorists is exposed, their key agent for political change and emancipation is their own 'values'. Yet whatever the good intentions of the theorist, the political content of structures or organisations is of key importance.

The theoretical limitations of critical and emancipatory theory

Contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches reject the possibility of reaching an objective evaluation of the world or social reality because they reject the possibility of differentiating between facts and values. For the contemporary critical theorists, theory can only ever be *for* someone and *for* some purpose. As this is so then quite logically critical theorists elevate their own values to be the most important aspect of critical theory. As a result of the rejection of the fact/value distinction we see within the work of contemporary critical theorists a highly unreflective certainty about the power of their moral position. Critical theorists argue that all theory is normative, they offer in its place better norms: ones, as we have seen, that will lead to emancipation and will help the marginalised.

The claims made for the central role of the values of the theorist reveal the theoretical limits of critical and emancipatory theory today. Yet even good or critical theory has no agency, and only political action can lead to change. Theory does of course play an important role in political change. This must be the first step towards a critical engagement with contemporary power structures and discourses. In this sense, we can see that it is critical theory that really has the potential to solve

problems, unlike problem-solving theory which seeks only to ensure the smooth functioning of the existing order. Through substantive analysis the critical theorist can transcend the narrow and conservative boundaries of problem-solving theory by explaining how the problematic arises. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory makes claims to be able to explain why and how the social world functions as it does, it can go beyond the 'given framework for action'.

The critical theorist must therefore be able to differentiate between facts (or social reality) and values, this ability is what marks the critical theorist apart from the traditional or problem-solving theorists, who cannot, because of their values and commitment to the existing social world, go beyond the 'given framework for action'. If we cannot differentiate between our desires or values or norms (or our perspective, to put it in Cox's terms) and actually occurring social and political and historical processes and relationships, it is hard to see how we can have a critical perspective (Jahn, 1998: 614). Rather, through abolishing this division we can no longer draw the line between what we would like and everything else, and thereby contemporary critical theories are as much of a dogma as problem-solving theories. Contemporary critical theorists are like modern-day alchemists, believing that they can transform the base metal of the unjust international order into a golden realm of equality and justice through their own words. For contemporary critical theorists, all that seems that the crucial step towards progress to a better world order is for the theorist to state that their theory is for the purposes of emancipation and a just world order.

Hedley Bull, writing in the 1970s, made a trenchant critique of advocates of world government (addressing, at that time, Richard Falk and other participants in the World Order Models Project). Bull warned of the problems of abandoning any analysis of the social, political and economic order as it was. Bull argued that the advocate of world government simply projects his or her own normative desires without basis in any 'real' social and political systems and processes. The assumption seems to be that a different order would have none of the problems or injustices of the contemporary world order, simply because the critical theorists say so. In this respect, Bull, who most likely would not be considered a critical theorist by today's critical theorists, in fact shows a greater insight than many contemporary critical theorists:

> The advocate of world government makes the tacit assumption that it is his own moral and political preferences that will be embodied in it; he conceives the world authority as a projection of his own ideas, that is powerful enough to sweep aside the obstacles which now exist to the realisation of them. But this is an evasion of the issue; the world government with which the states system has to be compared is one that would be subject to the factors making for injustice in the present world, not one arbitrarily decreed to be immune from them.
>
> (2002 [1977]: 280–281)

In his criticism of constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt, Neufeld argues that because of Wendt's supposedly positivist and objectivist commitments, Wendt's

theory may end up serving political agendas very different to those that Wendt might intend to support. For Neufeld, Wendt cannot ask the crucial critical question, what and whom is Wendt's constructivism for? (2001: 133). However, Neufeld gets the problem exactly the wrong way round. The theoretical problem that Neufeld has identified in Wendt is actually one that lies at the heart of critical and emancipatory approaches. Because of the critical refusal to separate facts and values and the conflation between theory and political action there is no room to consider the way in which critical theory may serve political and normative agendas independent of their value commitments.

Theorists, as human beings, naturally have certain values and normative commitments. These values and normative commitments of course direct one's questions and research but contemporary critical theorists seem to assume that because their heart is in the right place their work is done. However, values cannot be a methodology for critical engagement with social reality. The core of contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches is an assertion of normative intent and a belief that this is a substantive part of critical work. In light of this assumption, accusations of normative idealism or even fantasy theory are reasonably justly earned. And whilst we might reject naïve empiricist claims that facts are just, to paraphrase EH Carr's witty critique of such approaches, like fish lying on a fishmonger's slab, ready and accessible with their meanings clear (Carr, 2001 [1961]: 18), none the less it must surely be fundamental to critical theory that it can go beyond the 'given framework for action' to establish the 'facts' or the real social relations that lie behind this framework that the problem-solving theorist takes to be a natural fact, an ontological reality. This entails an engagement with and substantive analysis of contemporary power structures and discourse.

Yet the elevation of the values of the theorist to playing a central role in critical theory is problematic in terms of the commitments of critical and emancipatory theorists to challenge contemporary power structures and discourses. We have seen in the previous chapters that critical theorists are aiming their critique at an international security framework that is of less and less relevance today, whilst their critical prescriptions are more similar than otherwise to the discourses of powerful states and international institutions. Crucially, although critical and emancipatory theorists claim to absolutely focus on power they do not seem to engage with the problematic implications of their prescriptions in the contemporary context.

The sovereign state as a form of political organisation is certainly limited and many of the critiques of the state are well made. However, the emancipatory potential of non-state forms or international organisations is something that can only be considered in a specific and social historical context, there is nothing intrinsically emancipatory about any form of organisation. As radical commentators such as Costas Douzinas (2007) or Danilo Zolo (2002 [2000]) have pointed out, 'human rights' or other forms of supposedly cosmopolitan post-sovereign political organisation can, in certain contexts, be used to enforce structures of power.

Within critical and emancipatory approaches there is, to paraphrase Friedrich Kratochwil (2007: 36), a certain unrealised constitutive understanding which is abstract and idealised. Critical and emancipatory approaches have an abstract and

idealised notion of emancipation and the political which is not, despite the claims of critical and emancipatory theorists whose main aim is to engage with the here and now and the exercise of contemporary power relations, grounded in the contemporary social and political international context. Emancipation in itself as a word or a concept or as a good intention cannot guarantee anything in the absence of political content. At worst it can empower precisely those practices which critical theorists wish to resolve.

In chapters 1–3 of the book I have made a theoretical critique of critical and emancipatory approaches. In chapters 4–6 I shift focus to interrogate the way in which the Yugoslav break-up and wars and international policy towards them was framed by academics and commentators.

4 Critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars

In chapters 1–3 I have made a theoretical critique of critical and emancipatory approaches to security and conflict. I argued that critical and emancipatory theorists have an abstract and idealised notion of emancipation and the political which is not grounded in a critical engagement with the contemporary social and economic context. Consequently, critical and emancipatory theorists do not offer a challenge to contemporary power relations and indeed can end up justifying those power relations. In chapters 4–6 I shift focus to investigate critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars and the policies that were adopted by the international community at the time.

In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the break-up of Yugoslavia and the civil wars that were part of that break-up had an electrifying effect on many commentators, academics and policy makers. For many Western intellectuals and academics the wars played a role akin to the Spanish Civil War for an early generation of intellectuals (Hammond, 2007a; 2007b). In a confused post-Cold War era in which there was no longer any clear political framework through which events could be understood, the Yugoslav wars seemed to provide moral clarity for journalists, commentators and academics (Hammond, 2007a: 22–26). As the years have passed, the relevance of the Yugoslav wars seems to grow rather than recede, as the anniversaries of infamous events such as Srebrenica have provided opportunities for Western politicians to redraw the moral boundaries between themselves and the conflicts in Yugoslavia (McCormack, 2005).

Whilst many contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists present themselves as voices on the margins fighting against overwhelming consensus, the Yugoslav civil wars in fact led to a significant amount of critical work. For many journalists, commentators and academics the Yugoslav break-up and conflicts were epochal events in which assumptions about the workings of the international sphere were challenged and overturned. For key academics and commentators, the Yugoslav break-up and wars revealed that contemporary war and conflict could no longer be understood in terms of the old framework of war and conflict. Most of these critics understood themselves to be representing a radical and progressive view, critiquing the old framework (through which war and conflict were understood) and its related policy as immoral and anachronistic.

The Yugoslav wars were argued to require a different paradigm of understanding to the way in which war had been understood during the Cold War. Academics and commentators have argued that the Yugoslav conflicts and other post-Cold War conflicts need to be understood in ethical and moral terms rather than through the old notions of politics or interests. This entails also the clear identification of right and wrong combatants (Hammond, 2007a; 2007b). For these critical scholars, the way in which the international community dealt with the break-up and wars and the security policy paradigm used was anachronistic and failed to take account of the new realities; contemporary security policy was argued to perpetuate the conflict because of a reliance on a state-centric model which elevated state security above human rights and freedom. The international community needed to take a more cosmopolitan and emancipatory approach. For critical and emancipatory approaches, questions of ethics, justice and human rights (for example) must be at the very centre of thinking about security. The old security framework is argued to be both anachronistic and immoral in the context of new kinds of conflicts.

This chapter will be structured as follows: the first section of the chapter will draw out the main arguments of the work of critical and emancipatory approaches to Yugoslavia in terms of their analysis of the conflicts. The second section of the chapter will discuss the small number of interventions that have explicitly critically engaged with the critical approaches, in particular focusing on the New Wars discourse which is part of the critical approaches to the Yugoslav conflict and wars.

The Yugoslav wars: paradigm changing wars

The break-up of Yugoslavia and civil wars that were part of that break-up had an electrifying effect on many commentators. For key academics and commentators, the Yugoslav break-up and wars revealed that contemporary war and conflict could no longer be understood in terms of the old state-centric framework through which war and conflict had traditionally been viewed. The Yugoslav break-up and wars exemplified a new type of conflict, one in which ethical and moral judgements needed to be made and the Cold War security framework of interstate war and political negotiations to be overturned in favour of more cosmopolitan frameworks for security.

This is clearly illustrated by one section of academic writing, the New Wars school. However, the New Wars theorists are part of a broader range of commentators, analysts and scholars who also argue this. Mary Kaldor, leading theorist of the New Wars school, represents a far broader range of scholars when she argues that the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the necessity of a paradigm shift, 'the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is likely to turn out to be one of those defining events, in which entrenched political assumptions, strategic thinking and international arrangements are both challenged and reconstructed' (Kaldor, 2001: 32; see also Munkler, 2005). From liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff and David Rieff to academics such as critical security theorist Martin Shaw or 'post-structuralist' theorist David Campbell, the Yugoslav wars are also central to

an argument about the changed nature of war and conflict and the necessity to reconceptualise international security policy in a more cosmopolitan framework.

For these theorists, the break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars in Bosnia, need significantly different categories and concepts from those that were used to understand war and conflict during the Cold War (and pre-Cold War). For New Wars theorists post-Cold War conflict as represented by the Yugoslav break-up and wars is argued to represent a transformation of war, from the traditional or old wars of the nineteenth century. Old wars are understood to be the kind of war identified by the Prussian soldier and analyst Carl Von Clausewitz in his work *On War* (1982 [1832]), which he wrote in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. Clausewitz famously identified war as the continuation of politics by other means (1982 [1832]: 119).

Old wars can be understood as wars for political purposes, wars in which, beginning with the French revolutionary army, there was a mediating political link between the state and society. Unlike in the preceding societies in which the state was the personal property of the ruler, modern bourgeois states are formally premised on the concept that the state emerges from and acts on behalf of its people, the citizens. Old wars therefore entailed the state pursuing its national interests (or protecting them) as understood in terms of a broader social project rather than simply as the private whim of the ruler.

The form of war that Clausewitz described was one, as suggested earlier, in which war was a means to an end, a strategic and rational act with a political goal. New Wars, as represented by the Yugoslav wars, differ from old wars which are understood to be 'war between states for a definable political end' (Kaldor, 2001: 15). Old wars were understood as 'rational if not always desirable activity, a means to a known end defined in terms of state or national interest' (Holsti, 1999: 3). As Shaw writes: 'In the era of national and international relations, war was understood primarily as a rational policy-orientated action of states: the continuation of policy by other means, as Clausewitz . . . famously defined it' (1999: 72). The very notion of strategy, as Clausewitz would understand it, as a means by which the war would be pursued in order to ultimately pursue one's political goals, is less relevant.

In the Yugoslav war, and the New Wars, the state (to paraphrase Max Weber) no longer has the monopoly of legitimate violence (Kaldor, 2001: 4). Holsti argues that the traditional analysis of war and conflict 'whether Marxist, Wilsonian or Realist rests on the same conception of the state as the territorial sovereign state of seventeenth century Europe' (1999: 11). Clausewitz's assumption of coherent political entities waging war on each other simply no longer holds true for many cases of contemporary war.

The Yugoslav wars however are seen to be 'after Clausewitz' not just because they were not initially wars between states, for example, but because when attempting to understand the Yugoslav break-up and wars the idea of a pursuit of political interests or a clash of interests (whether political, ideological, or even material) is assumed to have limited relevance or must be rethought at least. Traditional political interests have limited purchase for engaging with contemporary conflict as represented by the Yugoslav break-up and wars. Snow suggests that one of the main

characteristics of the New Wars is that 'War becomes an independent, self-justifying activity' (1996: 107).

The Yugoslav break-up and wars, therefore, are wars in which concepts that previously helped to clarify the nature of conflict are less relevant. As Kaldor argues, in distinction to New Wars, previous wars could be understood to be in some sense linked to society, or state interest:

> The goals of the new wars are about identity politics in contrast to the geopolitical or ideological goals of earlier wars . . . By identity politics, I mean the claim to power on the basis of a particular identity – be it national, clan, religious or linguistic. In one sense, all wars involve a clash of identities . . . But . . . these earlier identities were either linked to a notion of state interest or some progressive project about how society should be organized.
>
> (2001: 6)

Here political interests played a progressive role in state construction, whereas in the Yugoslav break-up and wars political interests are understood to be playing a narrow and destructive role. Rather we see a reversion to conflict in which war making is the whim of elites who seek to construct support by whipping up fear and hatred. The notion of a political conflict in a Clausewitzian sense, linked to a broader state project, is argued to be no longer relevant. Munkler, a key New Wars theorist, argues that it

> has been quoted at such length because it concisely summarizes the guidelines and principles of inter-state war. It presents the folly that throws the specificity of the new wars into such sharp relief. Only in certain cases will it be possible to say that they are 'a continuation of politics by other means', and even then mostly in respect of intervention by foreign powers. Nor is it the case that they are attached to the general or basic features of policy, because as a rule there are no such general features.
>
> (2005: 33)

In terms of the new kind of war represented by the Yugoslav break-up and wars, therefore, the concepts of the citizen and citizenship, fundamentally linked to modern political organisation (and modern warfare – from the French Revolutionary state's initial *levée en masse* to the 'total wars' of the twentieth century in which the army was formed from conscription) are far less relevant:

> In the classical civil wars, from antiquity to the modern age, the party that emerged victorious from a massive outbreak of violence wrested power within the state and tried to perpetuate in peacetime what had been achieved through war. Civil wars are intrastate conflicts over power and rule that are settled by violent means. Even if they drag on for several years, as did the Spanish Civil War, the different parties seek to capture state power in order to assert their political interests and ideas. This is not the point in the new wars . . . But it is

above all the political connotations of the concept of citizen . . . central to the definition of civil war . . . which cannot be reconciled with most of the features of the new wars.

(Munkler, 2005: 23)

As the end of the quote from Munkler indicates, at the centre of the post-Cold War conflicts as represented by Yugoslav lies the argument that the political interests driving them are not positive. In this narrative, the political interests driving the Yugoslav wars are essentially destructive of society rather than constructive. Here the interest groups are illegitimate elites who seek to maintain power through degraded and illegitimate links with people.

Munkler, as one of the most recent contributors to the New Wars literature, has most clearly drawn out one of the key points about the New Wars and the Yugoslav wars. Munkler highlights the notion of citizenship and that it cannot be understood in relation to the New Wars. In the New Wars it is not just that the form of the combatants changes (from state to non-state), or even that the state loses its monopoly on violence, but rather that the very rationale for war changes. There is a change in essence of the specific nature of the relationship between the combatant and the conflict. The notion of (modern) citizenship is intimately linked to a positive idea of political agency and the assertion or struggle of interests or ideology. For the Yugoslav wars, as New Wars more generally, the relation between the combatants and the conflict can no longer be understood in this way. These are not wars of citizens against citizens, fighting in order to establish a political system, rather, as several analysts have suggested, these wars more closely resemble pre-modern wars signifying a reversal of the state-building process (Kaldor, 2001: 5; Munkler, 2005), a degraded and destructive political relationship.

This degraded and destructive political relationship is illustrated for theorists by the role of violence in the Yugoslav wars, and New Wars more generally. This role is therefore different from that in old wars in which, as Clausewitz pointed out, it served a particular political purpose; violence is not an end in itself, it is the means by which a political purpose is pursued: 'War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will' (Clausewitz, 1982 [1832]: 101). The goals of the combatants in the Yugoslav wars and New Wars more generally are contrasted with the goals of combatants in traditional wars, in which groups were pursuing some kind of political or ideological interests. The aims of the Yugoslav war combatants were the pursuit of a fundamentally degraded, anti-political and anti-social establishment of homogeneous communities (Munkler, 2005: 20, 82; Campbell, 1998b: 99, 102). This involves the break-up of society and social organisations, as Kaldor argues with reference to New Wars:

> The aim (of the new warfare) is to . . . control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity . . . Hence the strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion through various means such as mass killing, forcible resettlement . . . this is why, in all these wars, there has been a dramatic increase

in the number of refugees and displaced persons, and why most violence is directed against civilians.

<div align="right">(Kaldor, 2001: 8)</div>

Snow contrasts contemporary conflicts with traditional insurgency. Traditional insurgency, he argues, can be understood as politics by other means: the insurgents wish to seize state power, they have a political programme and therefore their violent actions are a means to achieve this. In comparison, the wars such as the Yugoslav war lack this kind of constructive political purpose; they are criminal insurgencies with little political programme, or even interest in seizing political power in the old fashioned sense (Snow 1996: 66). As Holsti states: 'these [wars] are not the use of force for political purposes . . . These are peoples' wars, about people not interests' (1999: 39).

There is little broader political purpose to the conflict, rather they are characterised by the particular vicious, immoral, and criminal nature of the conflicts in which the leaders of the warring parties have no legitimate political programme or legitimate links to their society. In this context, these leaders seek to forge degraded links with their society through fear or creating nationalist sentiment. The persecution of civilians, therefore, plays a major role both as method and as goal in these degraded projects. Thus as Kaldor argues, the Yugoslav wars were:

> a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime (violence undertaken by privately organised groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals).

<div align="right">(2001: 2)</div>

James Gow, for example, develops this argument, suggesting that it was part of the Serbian strategy to give the war the appearance of an ancient and primitive conflict (this will be developed at greater length ahead). Violence here is not accidental to the project but absolutely integral:

> Many had jumped to the conclusion that the war was simply a chaotic maelstrom of uncivilized 'Balkan' peoples . . . in orgies of primordial bloodletting . . . (but) this appearance of confusion and ambiguity was . . . part of a strategy deliberately steeped in ambiguity, so as to limit the Serbian project being seen for what it was.

<div align="right">(2003: 23)</div>

As an illustration of the fundamentally degraded nature of the political project, theorists have argued that the role of violence in the war played a particular instrumental part. For New Wars theorists, the role of violence in the Yugoslav wars was a fundamental part of the war in which the aim was to create ethnically homogeneous areas (Kaldor, 2001: 33). Other theorists are in agreement, Campbell suggests:

> Had ethnic cleansing been no more than a symptom of territorial expansion, then one would have expected it to have diminished toward the end of the

Bosnian war . . . But it is the nature of the violence imbricated in ethnic cleansing that reveals that the conflict in Bosnia was more about political identities and their constitution than their inevitable antagonism.

(1998b: 110)

Ethnic cleansing was therefore not a by-product (however unfortunate) of the war, but the principal aim and purpose of the war (Bennett, 1995: 238; Donia and Fine, 1994: 247; Simms, 2001: ix; Rieff, 1995: 12). Ethnic cleansing was argued to be Serbian state policy (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996: 4; Malcolm, 1996: 246; Gow, 2003: 9, 23). This was because the link between those fighting and the war leaders needed to be artificially created. It was war that created a link between leaders and society and therefore war and violence became ends rather than means to legitimate ends.

Behind the violence of the contemporary war, therefore, there stands a particular kind of elite, an elite for whom the traditional assumptions of links with society are no longer relevant. In these wars, elites launch and sustain wars in the pursuit of degraded, anti-societal and criminal aims that have little connection with broader society, or any kind of social or political aims. For the New Wars theorists, these leaders rely on fear, and the construction of negative nationalist sentiments in the masses in order to gain support to pursue degraded and criminal projects and to legitimise their rule (Kaldor, 2001: 39, 110; Munkler, 2005). The Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević and Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman are argued to be representative of these kinds of degraded leaders, Milošević more often so (for example, Campbell, 1998b; Rieff, 1995; Ignatieff, 1999; Kaldor, 2001).

Therefore the purpose of war is no longer to defeat the other side but to commit violence against the other side (Ignatieff, 1999: 126; Campbell, 1998b: 99). As a consequence of this, the violence committed is both deliberate and excessive. Once violence is de-linked from political purpose it is no longer part of a controlled political strategy (Snow, 1996: 106), and this accounts for the particularly vicious nature of contemporary conflicts (Snow, 1996: 1–2). For theorists working with the New Wars framework and other critical theorists, the role of violence, as discussed earlier, is to achieve group loyalty; in the Yugoslav case this was understood mostly in terms of achieving ethnic homogeneity through mass murder and population expulsion.

The violence is therefore argued to be of an especially sadistic and barbaric quality. These actions are held to be the result of sheer barbarity but also in order to terrify others into fleeing (Donia and Fine, 1994: 247; Gow, 2003: 119; Ramet, 1999: 217; Gutman, 1993; Vulliamy, 1998: 75). As Kaldor and Vashee argue:

[W]hat were side effects have become central to the mode of fighting. Conspicuous atrocities, systematic rape, hostage-taking, forced starvation and siege, destruction of religious and historic monuments, the use of shells and rockets against civilian targets, especially homes, hospitals, or crowded places like markets or water sources, the use of landmines to make large areas uninhabitable, are all deliberate components of military strategy.

(1997: 16)

The aim of these wars then is population expulsion through mass killing (Kaldor, 2001: 8). Within contemporary wars there are no clear divisions, as in old wars, between state and non-state, civilian and combatant. There are therefore no clear 'front lines' as we would understand it from traditional warfare.

Here direct parallels with Nazi Germany are often drawn (Thompson 1994: 56; also see Rieff, 1995: 19; Bennett, 1995: 95–96; Gutman, 1993: xvii; Malcolm, 1996: 251; Donia and Fine, 1994: 2; Shaw, 1999: 74). However, even the Nazi war against the Jews, Shaw (2000) argues, took place within a 'sub-text' of the inter-state war across Europe unlike in contemporary intrastate conflict in which genocide is the principal aim.

> It was a war against civilians. In this sense it might terminologically go beyond a conventional understanding of war as a social phenomenon involving the use of organized means of restrained coercive violence according to conventions and rules to settle a political conflict.
>
> (Gow, 2003: 118)

As we have seen, the Yugoslav conflict and wars cannot be understood in terms of traditional frameworks for understanding war and conflict. Rather, these are wars that are closer to criminal acts than political acts. Therefore, for a significant number of academics and commentators, the way in which international policy was conducted during the conflict was entirely wrong. International policy, it is argued, was based upon the formal Cold War framework norms of non-intervention and the presumption of a limited role for states or international institutions in the affairs of other states. This policy framework, however, is argued to be anachronistic in the face of the kind of conflict the Yugoslav break-up and wars represent and is therefore immoral.

For critical academics and theorists, international security policy remains stuck in the Cold War pluralist security framework. In this framework, war and conflict are not viewed morally but politically. War is either an act of legitimate self-defence (as permitted by the UN Charter) or a political act outside of the formal framework for international relations (see chapter 2). For critical theorists, the pluralist norm of non-intervention and the assumptions of a limited role for states or international institutions in the affairs of other states are argued to be both anachronistic and incapable of dealing with the Yugoslav break-up and wars and also immoral in the face of these new kinds of conflicts. The states and international institutions which formulate international security policy are held to have remained committed to the narrow pluralist conception of the international realm, in which the pursuit and protection of national interests limits the role and responsibility of states in the international sphere, elevating political compromise and settlement over matters of justice and ethics.

For critical theorists, this is exemplified by international policy towards the Yugoslav crisis; the international community attempted to resolve the Yugoslav crisis through the application of traditional security policies for solving conflict. In this reading, the major states and international institutions (such as the EC and individual powers such as Britain) failed to understand the novel nature of the

Yugoslav wars. Rather than considering the conflict in ethical or moral terms or in terms of what was right, the international community remained within the narrow confines of national interest-driven policies, prioritising order and stability over concerns about the justice and legitimacy of the conflict and treating the parties neutrally, as equal combatants and legitimate parties to the conflict. The new nature of much contemporary conflict and war, especially in the non-Western world, renders this old security framework both anachronistic and immoral.

In this narrative, the international community understood that the Yugoslav wars were 'business as usual', conflicts emerging from perennial squabbles and disagreements, and were inevitable, or the result of the particular (with specific reference to Yugoslavia) culture or mindset of the people of the Balkans. Brendan Simms quotes Douglas Hurd, the then British foreign secretary, as a prime example of the flawed approach of the international community. Here, Hurd argues that it is not part of Britain's role in the world to resolve others' conflicts:

> 'It is empty to pretend that we can impose peace with justice on every disorder or dispute outside our national borders' and later to Parliament in 1994 'We do not have a new world order . . . We have a traditional set of world disorders'
>
> (Simms, 2001: 7)

Noel Malcolm quotes John Major speaking in June 1993: 'The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and the discipline that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia . . .' (Malcolm, 1996: xx; see also Mazower, 2001: 128; Campbell, 1998b: 84; Rieff, 1995: 42; Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996: 26–28).

In this situation the international community had little interest in intervention in these conflicts in which British national interests (for example) were not threatened, seeking rather to re-establish peace and stability between the parties. For many academics and commentators, the international community is understood to have played a largely reactive role to the Yugoslav break-up (for example, Kaldor, 2001: 57–58; Campbell, 1998b). As Kaldor argues:

> One response to the new wars has been to treat them as Clausewitzean wars in which the warring parties are states, or if not states, groups with a claim to statehood. Many of the terms used, like 'intervention', 'peacekeeping', 'peace-enforcement', 'sovereignty', 'civil war', are drawn from conceptions of the nation-state and modern war that are not only difficult to apply in the current context, but may actually pose an obstacle to appropriate action.
>
> (2001: 113)

It was this framing of the war in the international community that led to a lack of action, Kaldor, for example, argues (also see Campbell, 1998b: 86):

> The dominant perception of the war is expressed in the terms 'Balkanization' or 'tribalism' . . . This perception of the war, evident, for example, in David

Owen's book, pervaded European policy-making circles and high-level nego-
tiations . . . It is a view which corresponds to the primordial view of national-
ism, that nationalism is inherent and deeply rooted in human societies deriving
from organically developed 'ethnies' . . . But what if the current wave of
nationalism has contemporary causes? Does not the primordial view amount
to a kind of myopia, an excuse for inaction, or worse?

(2001: 34–35)

Therefore the fundamental problem of the international community was a lack of
understanding:

[T]he fundamental failure of IC [international community] was conceptual,
the failure to understand why or how the war was fought and the character of
the new nationalist political formations that emerged . . . The international
community fell into the nationalist trap by legitimising the perception of the
conflict that the nationalists wished to propagate. By failing to understand that
'fear and hate' were not endemic but were being manufactured during the war,
they actually contributed to the nationalist goals and helped to weaken the
internationalist humanitarian outlook.

(Kaldor, 2001: 58)

International policy failed to take into account the novel nature of the wars and pri-
oritised compromise and stability over concerns about the justice and legitimacy of
the conflict. Policy was aimed at reaching agreement or ceasefires between the war-
ring parties, assuming a limited role for these countries, constrained by assump-
tions of national interest. Much of the literature reflects the view that the West was
at fault for pursuing policies such as ceasefires and negotiations, which are based
ostensibly on a neutral position between warring parties and seek to end conflict
and re-establish order. Yet this framework of limited interest and responsibility
failed to engage with the reality of the wars in which the parties to the conflict were
not equal, as Malcolm argues:

The fundamental failure of the Western politicians was that they looked only
at the symptoms of the war, not at its causes: it was as if they did not even want
to understand the nature of Milošević's project . . . Apportioning responsibility
or blame simply became a matter of pointing to people who were firing guns
. . . 'Everybody is to blame for what is happening in Bosnia and Hercegovina',
declared the EEC negotiator, Lord Carrington, in one of his most revealingly
uncomprehending remarks, 'and as soon as we get the cease-fires there will be
no need to blame anybody'. The fixation with cease-fires . . . became the most
telling symptom of this lack of political understanding.

(1996: 242)

As we have seen earlier, for academics and theorists working on the Yugoslav wars,
this was a conflict in which the very aim was ethnic cleansing and the creation of

homogeneous territories and in which civilians were necessarily the primary targets. Reactive international intervention and attempts at mediation failed to stop the human rights abuses because it was part of a failure to understand, as discussed earlier, that these were not the unfortunate by-products of the conflict but the very purpose of the conflict. Attempts to mediate between the parties and treat them in an equal way amounted at worst to an appeasement and at best to an exacerbation of the conflict. As it was not a traditional conflict in which two sides had opposing though not illegitimate goals but rather the brutal implementation of an illegal and debased project, the international community, by brokering agreements and treaties, failed to distinguish between those who were the victims of these illegitimate projects and those who were the perpetrators.

Daniele Conversi argues that Britain, for example, insisted on referring to 'all parties in the conflict as "warring factions" engaged in a "civil war"' (1996: 245). Martin Shaw argues that in the mainstream British media there was little distinction made between the perpetrators and the victims of the conflict (2003: 185). The victims and the aggressors were treated as moral equals when clearly a conflict in which the goal of one side was the utter annihilation of the other (which sought only to protect itself) could not be moral equivalents. Nor therefore could the conflict be viewed in a morally neutral way. As Simms argues, 'There is no equivalence between the Bosnian government and its Serb nationalist assailants' (2001: ix).

Cushman and Mestrovic similarly castigate the West for its failure to distinguish between victim and aggressor:

> Such equivocation and relativism, we feel, obfuscate and obscure the realities of genocide, mass rape, and other atrocities and are, in our opinion, a central reason for the failure of Western intellectuals and political officials to respond adequately to these realities.
>
> (1996: 19)

Instead we are told we should compare the way in which the Allies and the Nazis were treated in World War II, where all sides were not found morally equal but 'this argument is regularly made regarding Bosnia in the 1990s' (1996: 24).

International intervention and mediation, based as it was conceptually on old wars and a limited national interest-driven security framework which pursued political compromise, made legitimate agreements with those leaders who were pursuing utterly illegitimate projects. In effect, the international community treated those who were war criminals as legitimate political leaders. International intervention, through ceasefires and the establishment of boundaries, served to legitimate the ill-gotten gains of the aggressor parties by making official the illegitimate project of ethnically homogeneous areas and, by implication, accepting the representations of the aggressors that this division and conflict was the inevitable result of pre-existing divisions and conflicts within the society. In effect, the international community rewarded aggression and accepted that ethnic homogeneity was necessary and inevitable (see for example Malcolm 1996: 253, 271).

This security framework, however, is at best of little value and at worst contributes to the problem. David Campbell, for example, argues that the policies adopted by the international community which assumed separate 'ethnic' warring parties and the necessity for these groups to make compromises with each other, simply served to construct and deepen these divisions (1998b: 225). Old fashioned neutrality, peace-making and political compromises are therefore no longer suitable for new kinds of conflict as represented by the Yugoslav wars, rather the international community must take an active role in terms of intervention against certain parties (see for example, Ignatieff, 1999: 100, 124).

Instead, for these academics and theorists, the international community needs to adopt policies that shift away from the traditional state-centric security framework towards a more cosmopolitan and ethical framework. For these theorists, the international community ought to have adopted a morally engaged policy, one which elevated justice, and, for example, democracy and human rights, above concerns about stability and political settlement. The parties to the Yugoslav conflict were not equal participants, each with valid reasons to fight, rather one party was clearly the victim and the other the aggressor. In this situation, the traditional security framework is immoral, allowing the victims to suffer at the hands of criminal opponents. In this narrative, international security policy ought to take an actively engaged position on contemporary conflicts, emphasising international humanitarian law, for example, or arming particular parties.

In place of the pluralist security framework of limited international intervention and concern, in which the main priority is to ensure peace and stability and states assumed a limited responsibility for what occurred within the borders of other states, critical academic and other theorists argue that the international community should adopt a morally engaged security framework, one that places justice, human rights and the suffering of victims at the centre. This security framework can be understood to be one that is based on cosmopolitan principles of moral universalism that promote human rights and justice for all (Shaw, 2003: 232–236; Kaldor, 2001: 112–137) rather than the narrow framework of national interest-centred security.

Kaldor argues against what she suggests were the predominant 'terms of the debate' in the international community about how the Bosnian war could be dealt with. This debate failed entirely to grasp the new nature of the war and the new kinds of policies that were necessary:

> An illustration of the artificiality of these terms was the debate about whether the war in Bosnia was an international or civil war . . . Both positions missed the point . . . What did it matter, in practical terms, whether Yugoslavia was the internationally recognised state or Bosnia? Something had to be done to protect the victims and to uphold respect for international humanitarian norms. In effect, the debate about whether the conflict was an international or civil war treated it as an old war between the fighting sides, in which violence against civilians is merely a side-effect of the war . . . An alternative cosmopolitan approach starts from the assumption that no solution is workable based on the

political goals of the warring parties and that legitimacy can only be restored on the basis of an alternative politics which operates within cosmopolitan principles. Once the values of inclusion, tolerance and mutual respect are established, the territorial solutions will follow.

(2001: 117–118)

Authors who have specifically focused on the Yugoslav break-up and wars also argue that the international community, because it remained within a pluralist security framework, served to actively work against those who were the victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing (for example, see Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996). Rather, the policies of the international community should have been within a cosmopolitan security framework which sought to protect the victims and to promote human rights.

David Rieff, for example, argues that the West should have intervened militarily in Bosnia in support of the Bosnian government as they were the only group which stood for multiculturalism and against ethnic division:

[T]he values that the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina exemplified were worth preserving. Those ideals, of a society committed to multiculturalism . . . and tolerance, and of an understanding of national identity as deriving from shared citizenship rather than ethnic identity, were precisely the ones which we in the West so assiduously proclaim.

(1995: 10)

Unlike in the pluralist security framework in which the role of the international community is (formally) severely circumscribed, the international community is argued to have a vital role to play in the suggested new cosmopolitan security framework. The international community becomes the force through which international law, for example, or humanitarian intervention and the promotion of cosmopolitan principles can achieve peace with justice in the new conflicts:

[T]he answer to the problem of war is not merely peace, but *just* peace . . . The Cold War reinforced the legitimacy of traditional state centres; it shored up authoritarian regimes and inhibited democratic movements. As this old set of power relations have dissolved, so new visions of global justice have developed.

(Shaw, 2003: 215)

As against the 'old' rights of the existing state or republics, critical and cosmopolitan approaches stress new, cosmopolitan rights should be prioritised.

In the following section of the chapter I will discuss the main arguments of the small number of scholarly works that have engaged directly with aspects of critical approaches to post-Cold War conflict, the recasting of war from the main body of academics and theorists who engaged with the Yugoslav wars. These critics engage directly with the New Wars thesis but their criticism is applicable more broadly, as

we have seen the New Wars thesis is representative of a broader shift in terms of a critique of traditional framework for understanding war and conflict.

Methodological critiques

Critics of this framework identify some of the central arguments made by the radical critics that emerge in the early 1990s, in particular the degraded nature of the ideological or political objectives (Newman, 2004a: 177). As Stathis Kalyvas suggests (see also Cramer, 2006: 76–77):

> Most versions of the distinction between old and new civil wars stress or imply that new civil wars are characteristically criminal, depoliticized, private, and predatory; old civil wars are considered ideological, political, collective, and even noble. The dividing line between old and new civil wars coincides roughly with the end of the cold war.
>
> (2001: 10l)

The critics of the New Wars discourse raise questions about the extent to which we can understand these central aspects identified by radical and progressive theorists and academics as entirely new phenomena. Both Mats Berdel and Christopher Cramer for example, suggest that, as an analytical and conceptual category, the New Wars lacks validity, posing a false juxtaposition between an era of political and ideological conflict and an era of degraded and apolitical conflict (Berdal, 2003: 480; Cramer, 2006: 77). These critics point out that conflicts have always had criminal and predatory elements, or have entailed the committing of atrocities (Cramer, 2006: 79; Newman, 2004a: 181–182; Kalyvas, 2001: 114–116).

New Wars theorist Herfried Munkler argues against these critics, and suggests that whilst these degenerate aspects of conflict may always have been present, in contemporary war and conflicts such as Yugoslavia they become central:

> War enables many people to make a living: it provides them with a means of generating considerable income in the short term and of living out blocked fantasies without restraint; it also endows a few with huge fortunes and indescribable wealth. It might be objected that things have always been so, that they were much the same in traditional inter-state wars. But the crucial difference is that what used to be a concomitant of war, more or less pronounced in each particular instance, has become the central focus and true goal of many new wars.
>
> (2005: 22)

However, as Cramer (2006: 79), Kalyvas (2001: 116) and Newman (2004a: 179) point out, there is little empirical basis upon which to draw conclusions about this changed nature of contemporary conflict.

Mats Berdal argues that the radical and critical perspectives that came to prominence during the Yugoslav wars distort the nature of contemporary war through simplistic explanations and a failure to take into account the distinctive nature of

each conflict and the full range of motives behind the various parties to the conflict. Furthermore, he suggests that the critical discourse shows an absence of a proper historical perspective and a failure to understand the specific historical context of each conflict (2003: 490; also see Newman, 2004a: 183). Kalyvas (2001) and Newman (2004a: 186) suggest that recent and contemporary scholarship on current and past civil wars shows that a more historically specific analysis of conflict is needed in order to understand it.

For Berdal, the examples of the Angolan, Liberian and Sierra Leonian civil wars and recent Algerian history show both the necessity for an understanding of the particular historical circumstances of a conflict, and that there is much more of a continuity between Cold War and post-Cold War conflicts (2003: 493–494). Thus, contemporary civil wars are not so different from old civil wars and, rather than understanding contemporary conflict as particularly non-political and criminal, we need to understand that this is more a reflection of the reality of internal or civil wars. Newman makes this point about Cold War civil conflicts such as the Congolese civil war in the period following independence and the Nigerian civil war, 1967–1970 (2004a: 184–185).

Rather than the particular nature of conflict changing, critics of the radical critics suggest that we may need to think more about the changing broader international political context which gave conflicts, both internal and interstate, their meaning. It was assumed during the twentieth century that civil wars and other conflicts were ideological or political in some way. The Irish civil war, for example, was understood in terms of a collective, ideological struggle (Kalyvas, 2001: 102, 106). This is particularly relevant for conflicts that occurred during the Cold War, during which there tended to be an overly ideological interpretation of conflict. Kalyvas suggests that (see also Cramer, 2006: 79):

> [T]he handy presence of coherent conceptual categories along the familiar left-right axis, which blinded casual observers to the complexity and messiness of civil wars, appears to have led to a significant overstatement of the ideological content of old civil wars via unwarranted inferences from the elite to the mass level. In this regard the end of the Cold War seems to have caused the demise of the conceptual categories used to interpret civil wars rather than a decline in the ideological motivations of civil wars at the mass level.
>
> (2001: 108–109)

As Christopher Cramer points out, this is not only an ideological or conceptual shift. The end of the Cold War has had certain material impacts upon internal conflicts, as governments and groups can no longer find financing from powerful external backers and must look elsewhere, for example to their own internal resources:

> Cold War rivalry regulated wars in developing countries: either it made some countries no-go areas for warfare or it facilitated and influenced warfare, for example through direct military aid and through general and fungible financial

support. Governments and rebel groups that might once have hoped realistically to be able to pay for a war by folding their war aims into Cold War tensions have since the end of the 1980s had to change their strategy. In many cases this has meant that commodity markets have come to play a significant role in the conduct and scale of wars . . . Thus where once a developing country conflict might have been shaped by ideological allegiance, nowadays often a similar conflict will be dominated by the characteristics of production and marketing of a given commodity.

(Cramer, 2006: 77–78)

Kalyvas also makes this point (2001: 117). Post-Cold War internal conflicts, therefore, do appear to be different from Cold War internal conflicts, and to some extent they are. The changing international context, as Cramer points out, has affected the means by which these wars are now fought and perhaps justified and understood. It does not follow, however, that post-Cold War internal conflicts are therefore criminal acts rather than political conflicts. As Cramer argues: 'there is little basis for arguing that contemporary conflicts are apolitical. They might not shine with the same armour of Cold War political projects and their politics are often profoundly illiberal, but political they normally are' (2006: 78).

   Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell (2004) also argue that the end of the Cold War has meant that internal conflicts have lost their international political function (2004: 12–14). They suggest that the radical and critical arguments about contemporary war and conflict are challenged by case study literature that attempts to illustrate that contemporary internal conflicts are not simply criminal, illegitimate and degraded conflicts, but often have a rational basis, for example economic, for some participants, for example, William Reno (1999), David Keen (1998) and Carolyn Nordstrom (2001). Keen argues that the analysis which understands civil wars as primarily political or military fails to take into account the economic benefits of wars, and, consequently, parties to the conflict may prefer to continue the conflict rather than to win (1998: 15). Nordstrom (2001: 220) and Reno (1999: 26–28) also describe the economic benefits of conflict for various participants, as does Berdal (2003). Most famously this thesis has been developed by Paul Collier (2000; 2003).

   There are, however, limits to the challenges offered to radical and critical new approaches to conflict by an alternative framework that introduces economic explanations for conflict (also, an overly economic focus on internal conflict [or similar 'commodity theories of war' as Cramer calls them, 2006: 150] is not without its own serious methodological and analytical problems and limits in its own terms, see Cramer, 2006: 124–137 for a discussion). This is because theorists working within the radical and critical framework discourse do not deny that there might be economic benefits from war, quite the opposite:

   Those who conceive of war in traditional Clausewitzean terms based on definable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying vested interests, both political and economic, in the continuation of war . . . War provides a legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandisement while at the same

time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources.

(Kaldor, 2001: 90, 110)

Also see the Munkler quote earlier, (2005: 22) for a similar argument. For critical academics and theorists, the main arguments are not that contemporary conflicts are not rational activities, nor that they may not be of great benefit for some participants. Indeed, as I have suggested earlier, for critical theorists of contemporary war and conflict the argument is that contemporary conflicts are deliberate constructions by illegitimate elites for their own benefit.

Mainly, the authors discussed in this section make valid criticisms of the critical approaches to contemporary war and conflict. There seems to be little empirical basis to the thesis in terms of evidence for the changed nature of conflict. In-depth research into particular conflicts tends to reveal that there are always criminal and degenerate elements to conflict, and that assumptions of highly political or ideological motivations of combatants do not necessarily always hold true on the ground. Cramer gives an example of Che Guevara's disillusionment with Kabila's rebel fighters in the 1965 Congolese civil war; Guevara described in his diaries the senseless, violent and degenerate behaviour of the rebel groups (2006: 79). Kalyvas argues that: 'A common finding in numerous studies of old civil wars is that at the mass level, local considerations tended to trump ideological ones' (2001: 106–107, 108–112).

Furthermore, Cramer and other theorists argue that the assumptions of the critical theorists need to be understood in a wider political context of shifts in international relations. This argument implies that this thesis emerges not from engagement with the changing nature of contemporary conflict, but the focus of the theorists. Critical theorists appear to focus upon certain aspects of conflict to the exclusion of most other aspects of conflict (such as the international context or internal social or political factors). In this reading, the complex and messy reality of most civil wars or internal conflicts is reduced to a description of violence and brutality. Yet there is not much basis for turning a particular and perennial aspect (however unpleasant) of conflict into the main explanatory element, other than the particular focus of the theorists, as Cramer suggests (see also Newman, 2004a; 179):

> There is a strong possibility that the new versus old war distinction is as much a matter of a changed projection by Western academics as a shift in underlying reality, as much a change in perspective and frame as in what is actually happening.

(2006: 79)

Kalyvas also highlights the demise of conceptual categories which previously framed our interpretation of conflict:

> [I]t is often overlooked that the end of the Cold War has decisively affected how civil wars are interpreted and coded by both participants and observers.

> By removing coherent, if flawed, political categories and classificatory devices, the end of the Cold War has led to an exaggeration of the criminal aspects of recent civil wars and a concomitant neglect of their manifold political aspects. It is highly possible that interpretations of recent civil wars that stress their depoliticization and criminalization are attributable more to the demise of the conceptual categories generated by the cold war than to the end of the cold war per se.
>
> (2001: 117)

The international context within which wars occur has changed, leading to a shift in the way in which internal war is understood and which aspects of war and conflict are focused on.

The theorists discussed in this section raise some very valid criticisms of the arguments of New Wars theorists in particular, but their criticisms are generally applicable to the wider range of theorists engaging with the Yugoslav break-up and wars and international policy. Cramer and the other theorists argue that it is not so much war that has changed but academic and scholarly frameworks of understanding (Kalyvas, 2001: 109; Newman, 2004a: 179; Cramer, 2006: 79). This critique is similar to the theoretical critique that has been made in the discussion of critical and emancipatory approaches. Critical approaches are limited theoretically because critical and emancipatory theorists turn to themselves and their own values as the source of critical engagement with the world.

Conclusion

The Yugoslav break-up and wars led to a significant number of critical approaches to the conflict itself and also critiques of the traditional policy framework for conflict and security.

Critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars construct a powerful and emotive case for the changed nature of much contemporary (particularly non-Western) war and conflict. Analysis of the Yugoslav break-up and wars is undertaken to show why we need to reject the pluralist security framework in favour of cosmopolitanism. For Clausewitz, and explanations of war derived from Clausewitz, conflict and war was understood to be the 'pursuit of politics by other means', there were political links between the citizen, the state and conflict. The Yugoslav break-up and wars are wars that are not political in the old positive sense of the word. Concepts such as citizenship or the pursuit or protection of societal interests are particularly highlighted as being irrelevant for understanding the New Wars. In the main texts, the critical theorists particularly highlight and focus on violence in order to make their case. The specific nature of these New Wars is argued to be shown in both the role and nature of violence within the wars. Violence is de-linked from political purpose, rather it is in the service of criminal elites, whose role is also highlighted, who pursue degraded and personal, private aims through ethnic cleansing and the encouragement of looting, rape and torture.

Critical theorists highlight also the particular role (or lack of a role) of the international community. In this narrative, the international community is argued to have remained within a neutral and reactive security framework in which states assumed limited responsibility for other states and sought to broker political compromise between the warring factions. In this pluralist security framework, questions of ethics, justice and human rights were ignored, instead stability and order were prioritised. For critical theorists, questions of ethics, justice and human rights should be at the very centre of thinking about security. The international community needs to adopt a morally engaged security framework for dealing with contemporary non-Western conflict, one that emphasises international humanitarian law, for example, and prioritises matters such as democracy and human rights.

In the next two chapters I critically engage with this radical and critical framework in terms of its understanding of both the Yugoslav conflict and international policy at the time. Through this investigation, I draw out the limitations to critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars both in terms of their theoretical understanding of, and engagement with, the actually occurring conflict, and explore the political limitations to these approaches in terms of their prescriptions.

5   Domestic exclusions

Citizenship and the state

In chapter 4 I argued that key theorists understood the Yugoslav break-up and wars through a critical framework. For these theorists and commentators the Yugoslav break-up and wars were an example of a new type of conflict and an illustration of why the old framework of rights based upon states was no longer suitable. In place, these theorists argue the need for new sets of cosmopolitan rights and protections, which the international community or cosmopolitan groups within warring states might promote. Representative of this critical theoretical point of view, Kaldor asks: 'What did it matter, in practical terms, whether Yugoslavia was the internationally recognised state or Bosnia?' (2001: 118). This chapter and the next will critically engage with these approaches.

In this chapter I engage with one aspect of the shared arguments of critical and emancipatory approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars, particularly with the way in which the internal political dynamics have been theorised and understood. For critical theorists the Yugoslav break-up and war are wars which cannot be understood within a traditional political framework. Rather, these are degraded conflicts in which political elites pursued degraded social and political projects. Critical theorists posit new and cosmopolitan solutions to these degraded conflicts, cosmopolitan social groups within societies, or the implementation of new human rights frameworks by the international community.

In this chapter, I will argue the particular nature of the Yugoslav break-up and wars that has been identified, that old concepts with political implications such as citizenship and statehood are problematic in terms of understanding the Yugoslav break-up and wars, can be challenged, and a more compelling narrative can emerge. The Yugoslav break-up and wars did not suddenly emerged out of nowhere, constructed by predatory elites stoking up ethnic fears and hatreds, rather the wars need to be understood in the context of an established state in which, far from being irrelevant, fundamental political questions of citizenship and self-determination emerged as central.

The chapter will be structured as follows. The first section of the chapter sets the broader discussion about citizenship and the Yugoslav crisis in context. I will give a brief overview of the formation of the Yugoslav federal state and the complicated links between citizenship and political rights that were established within the federal state. This is particularly pertinent when considering the Yugoslav crisis

because one of the main points of dispute that arose during the early stages of the crisis was where, in the event of separation or self-determination of the republics that made up the federal state, did citizenship lie. This suggests that there were real issues of contention and concerns for citizens of what had formally been Yugoslavia. In particular, new states were being created which did not have any automatic claims upon all citizens. Many people were to see a transformation of their citizenship, from a citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to a citizen of a newly created state based upon borders drawn up in the context of the overall federal state.

In the second part of the chapter, I will argue that in the late 1980s both domestic and international events begin to turn what had been until then theoretical questions about citizenship and political rights into concrete political questions. In this context the end of the Cold War and the end of Yugoslavia's privileged international role had a profound effect upon the federal state. The demise of Yugoslavia's international role came at the end of a decade of internal social and economic and political problems which had weakened the legitimacy of the federal state internally; during the 1980s the Yugoslav state was increasingly unable to provide economic or social or political leadership to the citizens. Following from this, I will argue that the purchase of the Yugoslav state (and consequently Yugoslav citizenship) became weaker and had less purchase in the context of the increasing economic and social problems in Yugoslavia prior to the break-up.

In the third section of the chapter I will argue that the weakening and subsequent break-up of the federal state brought to the fore fundamental political questions about citizenship, political rights and the nature of the state: who was to go where and with what political rights? Matters of citizenship and linked political rights were particularly pertinent in the case of the federal state of Yugoslavia, in which citizens had overlapping and complex forms of citizenship and linked political rights, related both to territorial place of residence and membership of 'ethnic' group. In this context, the new republican borders did not have any 'natural' affinity for the citizens, indeed some groups within the new republics wished to remain in the old state.

The Yugoslav federal state and citizenship

The Yugoslav state had not been formed from pre-existing states, only Serbia and Montenegro had existed as states before the 1918 formation of the country out of the ruins of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires (and even these pre-Yugoslav states had different borders to the ones given in the federal state). The 1918 state was called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Stavrianos, 2000 [1958]: 619) and organised into 33 districts with local government. In 1931 the country was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Stavrianos, 2000 [1958]: 628) and reorganised into nine provinces (Radan, 2002: 139; Trifunovska, 1994: 195). In 1939 the country was once again reorganised internally with the formation of a fully autonomous region of Croatia (Stavrianos, 2000 [1958]: 632; Radan, 2002: 142; Trifunovska, 1994: 196).

During World War II, Yugoslavia was occupied and divided between German and Italian spheres of occupation, with a puppet government established by the Nazis in Serbia. The 1943 declaration of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia established that Yugoslavia was to be a federal state of 'Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins, respectively the peoples of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina' (Trifunovska, 1994: 207). The 1946 constitution established these federal republics and the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous region of Kosovo-Metohija in the federal republic of Serbia (Trifunovska, 1994: 212).

On the question of self-determination the Yugoslav constitution is unclear. The 1943 declaration of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia identified five nationalities (as confirmed in the 1946 constitution) which formed the constituent nations of Yugoslavia. The 1946 constitution was based upon the argument that the Yugoslav state had been formed as a result of self-determination of the five peoples of the state. It could not have been self-determination of the federal republics as these had not existed before the 1943 declaration (which also introduced 'new' peoples, the Montenegrins and Macedonians).

These nationalities formed the federal state and the constituent republics, which was, as Frits Hondius argues, 'the redivision of a State which was previously unitary. None of the six People's Republics mentioned in Article 2 existed in that form before, or independently from the Federation' (1968: 140). However, the federal state was clearly the sovereign power (Article 9 and Articles 44–51, Trifunovska, 1994: 213–218), and this was reconfirmed in the 1974 Constitution (Articles 205–207, 282, 313, 316, 317, Trifunovska, 1994: 227–233).

The Yugoslav constitutional order differentiated between two groups of Yugoslav citizens. The first group was the five constituent (or founding) nations (Bosnian Muslims were only defined as a constituent nation in the 1964 constitution). For the constituent nations, their place of residence did not determine their political rights, as Paul Shoup writes:

> The members of a nation were not restricted to the republic in which the nationality predominated, but included all those of like ethnic (or national) background, whatever part of Yugoslavia they inhabited (Serbs in Croatia for example, were referred to as part of the Serbian nation). At the same time, each republic was considered a nation-state in the sense that it served as a rough equivalent of the homeland of the dominant nationality within its boundaries.
>
> (1968: 114–115)

The constitution also defined a second group of citizens:

> (i) The 'peoples (of Yugoslavia)'…(which) refers to those South Slav peoples whose members are nearly all to be found within the boundaries of the Yugoslav State; (ii) The 'national minorities' . . . or 'nationalities' . . . Under

this denominator the Constitution mentions those population groups which belong to peoples of which the majority live outside Yugoslavia.

(Hondius, 1968: 11)

These two groups had different political rights. Whilst the nationalities were guaranteed full constitutional rights, they did not have any rights of self-determination (territorial or peoples) which the constituent nations had in theory or at least symbolically:

> The minorities had a special status, and it was clear that the right of self-determination was not intended to apply, even in theory, in their case. Autonomous regions were not considered areas where minorities could enjoy a homeland analogous to that available to the Slav nationalities.

(Shoup, 1968: 115)

Where the right to self-determination lay was a matter of some dispute amongst Yugoslav constitutional lawyers and theorists (see Shoup, 1968: 115, note 40). For example, did the republics as defined as territorial units have the right to self-determination, or, did the right to self-determination lie in the national (or 'ethnic') groups that resided within the republics (but were not limited to the republics)? If the latter, then this would have implications for the territorial boundaries of a republic should a constituent nation decide to declare independence from the federal state. The drafters of the constitution argued that there was no intention to guarantee the republics the right to secession (see letter from Mosa Pijade, one of the founding Partisans, on the matter, reproduced in Hondius, 1968: 142, and Shoup, 1968: 116 and note 41). According to federal president, Borisav Jovic, one of the key issues was to differentiate between the right of a nation and the right of a republic, 'the nations united into one state, whilst republics were created later' (BBC, 1991a: B/5).

This overview of the question of self-determination, and where the rights to self-determination lay, show that within the federal states matters of citizenship were linked to political rights. Within the context of the existing federal state, these questions were effectively resolved, or at least remained theoretical, a matter for academic and legal dispute. However, in the context of the weakening or potential dissolution of the federal state these questions would no longer be theoretical but would have the potential to become matters of immediate and concrete political contestation. Questions about who was to be a citizen, and where, were not simply about a possible change in the name of the place where one lived, but also about the linked transformation of potential political rights attached to the citizenship, entailing a transformation of political rights for some groups.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter or work to come to a conclusion about where the rights to self-determination lay within the federal state. For the purposes of this work it is irrelevant, as there is no attempt to 'prove' who was right and wrong. However, what is of relevance to the way in which critical and emancipatory

theorists have framed the conflict is that in Yugoslavia this question was disputed and moreover one which had potential political implications. In the following section, it will be argued that a gradual weakening of the federal state began to turn these theoretical questions into matters of real and immediate concern.

Losing the Yugoslav citizen

The Yugoslav state occupied a unique position in the geo-political division of Cold War Europe. The position of Yugoslavia as the leader of the non-aligned movement, although often linked to the unique abilities of Tito, may also be understood as part of a broader international context and as emerging from its particular international position within the Cold War. As Zaki Laidi has argued, the Cold War allowed small states a role on the international stage. This also had the effect of enhancing domestic authority:

> [S]mall countries were increasing their room for manoeuvre by playing and replaying on the active rivalry between the two camps. With hindsight, this diplomatic posture can be seen to have exercised what was perhaps an even more vital political function: this *projection* into the planetary game was a source of internal political cohesion because it allowed the state a central role.
>
> (Laidi, 1998: 19)

Laidi's general theoretical insight into the position of smaller states during the Cold War can be applied to the specific position of the federal state of Yugoslavia, as Susan Woodward argues:

> The very political and economic identity of Yugoslavia as co-founder of the non-aligned bloc, for example, emerged as a response to exclusion from full membership in either Eastern or Western blocks in the period 1947–49. Although Yugoslavia's third way brought it international prestige and foreign trade flexibility, its independence was in fact a strategic resource that depended on the conviction of the Western powers that national communism in the Balkans was a propaganda asset, and that Yugoslav neutrality could be a vital element of NATO's strategy of containment in the east. The Yugoslav armed forces, under this policy, would defend Western Europe and the North Atlantic alliance against a Soviet onslaught through south-eastern Europe. In exchange it would receive privileged access to international financial institutions, public loans and Western capital markets.
>
> (1996: 157–158)

President Truman wrote of Yugoslavia's role in the defence of Western Europe in November 1951:

> I have determined that Yugoslavia is a country which is of direct importance to the defence of the North Atlantic area and that the increased ability of

Yugoslavia to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States.

(USA, 1952)

Linked to this position was special access to international loans. In this context, the economy of the Yugoslav state was heavily orientated externally, in terms of borrowing and reliance on imported materials (Woodward, 1995a: 225–226; Lampe *et al.*, 1990: 148). For detailed economic, social and political analysis of pre-break-up Yugoslavia see Woodward, 1995a; Dyker, 1990, Lampe *et al.*, 1990; Lydall, 1989; Rusinow, 1978.

The end of the Cold War had a direct impact on the position that Yugoslavia had occupied in European defence and security. The Yugoslav state was effectively 'demoted' from its special position in international affairs as the collapse of the Soviet Union ended Yugoslavia's central role in the Cold War geo-political division of Europe. The new American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, arrived in the spring of 1989, bearing news of Yugoslavia's demotion in world affairs. As Woodward writes:

For forty years Yugoslavia had had a special relationship with the United States, including the implicit guarantee of special access to Western credits . . . Now, however, Yugoslavia was unnecessary to U.S. vital security. It was being moved from a special category in the U.S. State Department and international organizations . . . and returned to its pre-1949 category, defined geopolitically, of eastern and southeastern Europe . . . Yugoslavia's special relationship with Europe seemed to become obsolete overnight.

(1995b: 104)

In this situation, the position of Yugoslavia *vis-à-vis* Europe also changed. Yugoslavia became just one of several Eastern European countries re-orientating themselves towards the EC. In this context, the international community seemed to be differentiating between the various countries in terms of which were more suitable to join Europe (Glenny, 1990: 197; Woodward, 1995b: 104–105; Woodward, 1996: 162–163).

These international shifts impacted on the federal state in a negative way, removing one of the main roles of the Yugoslav state, which was its particular and privileged relationship with the international community. For all political elites in Yugoslavia joining Europe and the new international order was of great importance. Dimitrij Rupel's words to the congress of Slovene Democratic Alliance in 1989 show both the importance of the EC and an acute understanding that the federal state was now irrelevant in terms of the post-Cold War international order:

[A] Slovene national programme should be made which could enable the Slovene state to find its appropriate place in the renovated Europe of nations . . . the Slovenes will not join Europe via Belgrade, and depending on its will and whims. We must contact directly other European nations. It is meaningless

to present our ideas to the Germans or the English in Serbo-Croat, in a Russian alphabet.

<div align="right">(BBC, 1989a: B/3)</div>

The erosion of the federal state's important role had an impact on its power and influence with the republics, as Woodward argues: 'The primary source of federal domestic power and leverage was precisely its international role, including as intermediary for foreign credits and trade' (Woodward, 1996: 163). In the context of the end of the Cold War the federal Yugoslav state lost its role, it no longer had any role to give 'access to the universal' (Laidi, 1998: 19). The federal state had enabled Yugoslavia as a whole to play a role, and a significant role at that, in the international system. In the new international context of the end of the Cold War and a re-orientation towards joining the EC, the federal state (which was still socialist and contained areas of poverty and social unrest, for example in Kosovo) could actually become a barrier to Yugoslavia or the republics playing a role in the new international order.

The loss of the external role for the Yugoslav federal state came at the end of a decade of internal economic, social and political problems which had begun to erode the role and legitimacy of the federal state internally. During the 1980s, the federal state became less able to provide economic and social stability for the Yugoslav citizen. These developments weakened the idea of the Yugoslav state, the social-political dimension (Buzan, 1991: 64). For some critical theorists (as drawn out in chapter 4), elites propagated a radical nationalist programme (as supposedly represented by the 'Memorandum' of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences [SANU]) using the media and key events to stir the Serbian population into a willingness to fight the other groups in Yugoslavia. This is held to have been necessary in order to fracture what was otherwise a harmonious federal state in which ethnic and religious differences were not matters of everyday concern (for example, see Campbell, 1998b: 94; Kaldor, 2001: 42).

The weakening of the 'idea of the state' presents an alternative explanation for contemporary concerns and fears as manifested in the SANU Memorandum, or the grievances of Serbs in Kosovo, or contemporary media discourse. Instead, it will be suggested further that a more compelling case can be made for explaining these nationalistic concerns as reflecting the erosion of a collective, shared interest in the federal state (which the SANU memorandum in fact identifies; see Mihailovic and Krestic, 1995 for the English translation) due to the growing social and economic problems of the country as a whole. This erosion of the idea of the Yugoslav citizen and loyalty to the federal state can be understood as raising some fundamental political questions for the citizens of the Yugoslav republics.

In this context, during the 1980s, there was a marked shift away from the idea of Yugoslav citizenship towards regional and republican identities and an increasing sense of distrust of other citizens, manifested, for example, in the revival of plays and novels about inter-communal massacres during World War II. This presents an alternative narrative for the growth of nationalism to the one presented by critical theorists, for whom virulent, constructed new nationalisms rip apart the federal

state. Rather, this follows the argument, developed by Laidi, that post-Cold War shifts towards 'regional' identity (he discusses, for example, Italy, 1998: 52–53) are not the result of a 'return to nationalism' (1998: 52) but paradoxically a result of the erosion or loss of belief in the *national* project. Making a similar argument about the Yugoslav federal state, Xavier Bougarel argues that what we see in the 1980s in Yugoslavia is a 'nationalist transfer' of economic and political frustrations (1996: 94). It was not therefore the strength of elite manipulated republican or 'ethnic' identities that began to undermine the federal state, but the weakening of the federal state itself that gave them a dynamic.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Yugoslav economy had been maintained through external loans. The economy was also highly decentralised, and Woodward argues that by 1971, in fact, the federal authorities had lost (or ceded) all control over credit policy (Woodward, 1995a: 23; also see Burg, 1983; Ramet, 1984, for further analysis). The oil crises of 1974 and 1979 resulted in high interest rates on external debt and Yugoslavia, along with many other countries, was in danger of defaulting on its debt repayments. The worsening economic situation was compounded by a European recession in the early 1980s which meant that Yugoslav workers abroad could less readily find work.

By 1982, Yugoslavia's economy, which had been heavily reliant on external borrowing and consequently suffered from the oil shocks which pushed interest rates up, was close to collapse. The situation was so drastic that US Ambassador David Anderson began a campaign to persuade the US and other international institutions to support Yugoslavia, with a message that became known as the 'Crossroads cable'. Anderson argued that this was the first major crisis of the post-Tito government and that it was essential for the international community to support Yugoslavia's economic viability (Lampe *et al.*, 1990: 160–161). Massive rescheduling of debts and loans were followed by stringent austerity measures in the mid-1980s and rising unemployment and inflation followed (Woodward, 1995b: 51). In 1984, unemployment was at 14 per cent nationally, however the situation in each republic varied widely. Whilst in Slovenia there was full employment, in Kosovo unemployment was at 50 per cent, 27 per cent in Macedonia and 23 per cent in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in much of Serbia proper. Inflation was at 50 per cent and rising (Woodward, 1995b: 51).

One of the main areas of conflict was the matter of foreign exchange and what the republics which earned most of the foreign exchange (Croatia and Slovenia) believed was exploitation by Serbian dominated federal financial institutions. Yet one of the measures that the federal government had to adopt to comply with IMF conditions was to return control of foreign exchange operations and allocations to the National Bank and away from the republics. As conditions in Yugoslavia worsened, the republics guarded their powers more vigorously, blaming the federal government and arguing that what was needed was even greater decentralisation rather than the recentralisation that the federal government was attempting. The richer republics also campaigned against mandatory contributions to the federal fund which developed the poorer, more backward, regions (see Woodward 1995a and 1995b for an overview).

In 1987 the IMF attached new conditions to debt rescheduling, these were linked to re-integrating the federal system, which had become increasingly confederal since the 1974 Constitution. This was especially a problem for the financial and banking system. IMF conditions insisted that the federal government re-gain control over foreign exchange (Woodward, 1995b: 82). By 1988, inflation was running at an average of 200 per cent (EIU, 1989a: 4). Despite the federal government's IMF dictated reforms which the EIU called 'Eastern Europe's most far reaching reforms' (EIU, 1989a: 5) by September 1989 inflation had reached 1,000 per cent (EIU, 1989b: 11).

Because of the structure of the Yugoslav federal state, issues of economic reform directly affected the constitutional position of the republics vis-à-vis the federal state. By the mid-1980s there were inter-republic disagreements over budgetary contributions to the federal budget and the supremacy of republic law over federal. There were several different proposals for fundamental constitutional reform suggested by the republics (Woodward, 1995b: 74, 83). Within the republics discontent was being articulated in different ways. The leaked SANU Memorandum (1986) argued for a re-federalisation of the system and stressed that Serbs in Yugoslavia were facing discrimination, especially in Kosovo (see Thomas, 1999: 41, for a balanced discussion of the Memorandum and official reactions to it).

Within Serbia there was a growing movement to reintegrate the province of Kosovo, which had been given increasingly greater constitutional autonomy during the 1960s (see Rusinow, 1978: 228) from which large numbers of Serbs and Montenegrins had been emigrating. This was especially a feature since the 1981 riots, which began as a protest by Albanian university students in Pristina (the capital of Kosovo) against university food and dormitory conditions but rapidly turned into popular demonstrations in favour of Kosovo becoming a republic (see Vickers, 1998). Despite large-scale federal investment, the Serbian region of Kosovo remained one of the poorest and most underdeveloped areas of the federal state, leading to increasing frustration and dissatisfaction amongst the regional population, especially the educated who had little prospect of a job in the region (see Vickers, 1998, for an overview).

Here again it can be argued that it was the failure of the federal state that led to calls for a 'nationalist' solution rather than the strength of the nationalist movement itself (Bougarel, 1996: 94). Within the Serbian republic as a whole there was also frustration that the 1974 Constitution had created what is known in Britain as the 'West Lothian problem', common to many devolved states. The Serbian autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina could vote on matters to do with Serbia proper but not vice versa. Within Slovenia, in February 1987, the journal *Nova Revija* published proposals on a Slovene national programme (for details see Pavkovic, 2000: 91; Woodward, 1995b: 94). The growing economic and social problems within the federal state and the increasingly open disagreements between the republics about the causes and solutions to these problems all contributed to the eroding of the shared national framework, disrupting the 'idea of the state'. It is against this background that the republics altered their constitutions. These constitutional alterations raised explicitly, for the first time, questions of citizenship and

linked political rights that had until then remained simply theoretical questions for constitutional lawyers to debate.

The first republic to alter its constitution was Serbia, which was permitted by the federal government to downgrade Kosovo and Vojvodina's status to pre-1974 levels, in October 1988 (though the process had been begun at the beginning of the year) (Woodward, 1995b: 94). This caused widespread anger in the province of Kosovo and mass protests. In terms of the *constitutional* position of the Albanian citizens of Kosovo, the constitutional alterations did not make any significant difference (the aspirations of the Albanian population of Kosovo to republic status were another matter). The majority Albanian population was a minority in constitutional terms, which meant that, unlike the constituent nations of Yugoslavia they were not entitled to self-determination, as a nationality or as a territorial unit. Nor, despite the high level of autonomy given, was the province elevated to republic status. This was precisely the right which Kosovo Albanians had been demanding since the 1981 riots.

The second significant constitutional changes came in the amendments to the Slovenian constitution the next year. In September 1989 the Slovenian Communist party supported draft amendments to Slovenia's constitution which gave it the right to self-determination and unilateral secession (BBC, 1989b: B/3). Croatia also began a similar process. The federal presidency argued that these amendments were against the federal constitution (BBC, 1989b: B/3; see also Hayden, 1999: 43–45 for a discussion).

Other cultural trends within the country also suggest an erosion of the idea of the Yugoslav state and the Yugoslav citizen, for example, the revival of the memory of war time massacres. This is illustrated by the publication of novels such as *The Knife*, which dealt with inter-communal violence in war time (World War II) Bosnia, by poet and politician Vuk Draskovic; the play by Radulovic *The Pigeon Cave* and Dobrica Cosic's novel, *The Time of Death*, which dealt with the memories of inter-communal massacres in Croatia (for a discussion see Denich, 1994).

These trends, it is argued here, can be understood as symptomatic of the erosion of the idea of the federal state. As the federal state became weaker and more crisis bound, citizens of Yugoslavia began to feel more anxious and less certain of their position in Yugoslavia. The overarching federal framework had both successfully removed the World War II violence from the public domain and presented a heroic, Yugoslav narrative of the Partisan struggle, whilst also establishing a collective and future orientated project that all citizens could be part of. Internal economic and social problems were weakening identification with the project, and indeed the project itself, and resulted in a turn to more local and parochial narratives and identities. The next section of the chapter considers matters of citizenship and the state arising in the context of the dissolving federal state.

New citizenship for old? The question of citizenship and secession

It has been argued previously that the end of Yugoslavia's role in the international system combined with increasing internal economic, political and social problems,

led to a decreasing connection between citizenship and the state. In this context, there was a realignment of citizenship towards the republics and discussions within republic governments about the possibilities of leaving the increasingly defunct federal state (as highlighted in the earlier discussion about constitutional alterations and suggested national programmes). However, in this situation fundamental political questions emerged as to the nature of citizenship – to put it simply, who went where and with what political rights? This section concentrates on the first part of the dilemma: who was to go where.

In the context of the alteration of constitutions and the potential separation of the federal state, or its transformation into a confederal state, the major point of dispute was about where that separation could occur. For some analysts the constitutional alterations themselves were the major problem. Ramet, for example, blames Serbian constitutional changes (1999: 69–70), whilst Hayden, from a different perspective, argues that the most significant constitutional changes were in Slovenia in 1989 (Hayden, 1999: chapter 2). Yet both authors miss the essential point of disagreement. There was no disagreement between the republics on the matter of self-determination and sovereignty in itself. Slovenia had already amended its constitution to assert sovereignty (see previous sections) and Croatia followed suit in July 1990 (BBC, 1990d: B/9), as did Serbia in September 1990 (Hayden, 1999: 48).

The disagreement rested on what this would entail; what were to be the boundaries of the new states and who was to be included where? The key question was where were the rights of self-determination and sovereignty vested? With the republics or with the national groups who were classified as forming the basis for the Yugoslav state (see section on the federal state and citizenship)? In effect, what would be the citizenship of people? The republic of Serbia, for example, concerned with the third of the Serbian population that lived outside of the Serbian republic, argued that inter-republican borders were administrative borders between the republics within a unified Yugoslavia and therefore could not be considered as the basis for new borders between independent states in the context of the dissolution of the federal state (BBC, 1990b: B/14). For Serbia, then, citizenship and associated political rights were vested in the national groups.

For Croatia, on the other hand, embarking on constitutional amendments and asserting its sovereignty against the federal republic in July 1990, the matter of preserving territorial integrity of the existing republic was of prime importance. Croatia argued that in the event of self-determination the issue of inter-republican borders was not a matter that would be open to discussion (BBC, 1990c: B/8). This was also Slovenia's position (BBC, 1991f: B/13). For Slovenia and Croatia then, citizenship and associated political rights were vested in the territorial republics. As will be discussed in chapter 6, it is noted that this aspect of the separation of the federal state, the one that seemed to be the most problematic according to the positions taken by the republics, was the one that the EC did not take into account. This is illustrated by the EC's refusal to consider changes to republic boundaries. However, the existing republican borders were drawn up in the context of the federal state, leaving, as with Serbia, large populations outside of their 'home' state. In

the context of separation of the republics and the maintenance of the boundaries established in the context of the federal state it seemed clear that some groups would not wish to be part of the new states.

Bosnia-Herzegovina also began constitutional amendments at the same time (BBC, 1990e: B/10). The Serbian population of Croatia, in the region of Krajina, conducted their own referendum in August (BBC, 1990f: B/2–3), which was declared illegal by Croatia, and in which it was declared that, in the event of Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia, the region would secede from Croatia. Kosovo also declared itself a republic, in early September (BBC, 1990g: B/10). This declaration was rejected as illegal by the Serbian government (BBC, 1990g: B/11).

Slovenia began the process to hold a plebiscite on independence in December 1990 (BBC, 1990h: i) which the federal presidency declared 'unconstitutional' (BBC, 1990i: B/11). Milan Kucan, the Slovene President, made clear that Slovenia understood itself to be a sovereign country by warning that any acts of force from the federal army would be understood as acts of aggression (rather than internal matters) (BBC, 1990h: i). Croatia passed its new constitution on the 21st and 22nd December 1990 (BBC, 1990j: B/20). The new Croatian constitution established the Croatian state as the national state of the Croatian nation with full entitlement to self-determination (Trifunovska, 1994: 252). For Slovenia and Croatia, the fact of full territorial sovereignty, including the right to secession was paramount.

Slovenia argued that it would no longer hold discussions with the federal state (BBC, 1991b: B/8) and that it would leave Yugoslavia by June 1991 (BBC, 1991d: pi). Slovenia adopted a resolution of separation (BBC, 1991g: B/7). Croatia rejected the federal government's demand that paramilitary groups be disbanded, stressing Croatian sovereignty (BBC, 1991c: i), and the Croatian assembly passed a law that asserted the primacy of republic law over federal (BBC, 1991h: B/18). The Croatian Government argued that in the event of Slovenia's secession Croatia would secede as well (BBC, 1991e: B/10). In Bosnia, the imminent declaration of Bosnian sovereignty and independence was rejected by Bosnian Serbs (BBC, 1991i: B/14). Radovan Karadzic, President of the Serbian Democratic Party, argued the declaration of Bosnian sovereignty negated the federal and republican constitutions and the state sovereignty of the Yugoslav state (BBC, 1991h: B/18). Croatia and Slovenia declared independence on the 25th June (Trifunovska, 1994: 286, 301).

After the June 1991 declarations of independence of Croatia and Slovenia, the Bosnian governing parties split, with the Serbian party arguing for the constituent nations of Bosnia to have the possibility of secession from Bosnia in the event of Croatia's secession and recognition by the international community (Hayden, 1999: 93). The question of citizenship was of major importance for the parties in the context of the separation of the federal state. This potential transfer of citizenship opened up essential questions over whose rights and citizenship determined the structure of the new states and to what extent all citizens in the potential new states wished to be part of them. Not only was this a question of a transformation of citizenship in itself entailing questions of to what extent all citizens identified with the

new states, but it was also linked to the questions of political rights because citizenship in the federal state was linked to different political rights. The following section discusses this further.

Whose rights to self-determination? Republics, nations, and nationalities in the federal state

The separation of the federal state (or even its transformation into a confederal state) would entail a transformation in citizenship for the Yugoslav citizen: in effect the removal of one level of citizenship, the Yugoslav. However, for the Yugoslav citizen, citizenship was complex. As discussed earlier, one was both a citizen of the republic in which one was resident and a member of a 'constituent nation' (or non-constituent nationality) of the federal state *and* of the republic in which one was resident. As Campbell argues:

> Citizenship and nationality in the West are more often than not synonymous, but for the former Yugoslavia citizenship was additional to nationality. A Yugoslav citizen could be a person of different nationalities, for there was no corresponding Yugoslav nation . . . [it meant that] one's state, residence, or place of birth is not a determinant of identity. In consequence, the territorial dimension to identity is sublimated, and the scope for self-ascription and self-identification is enlarged to the point of being decisive.
>
> (1998b: 214)

This meant that in the overall federal context of Yugoslavia place of residence was not definitive in terms of both identity and political rights. Indeed, as I have argued earlier, the federal project had subsumed the conflict and differences of World War II. So within the federal state one was (for example) a Serb living in Croatia but also a Yugoslav citizen – that is one's identity and political rights were not limited to place of residence. However, the potential separation of the federal state and the creation of new states within federal borders transformed that situation. In effect this potential separation created a situation in which nationality and citizenship would suddenly be conterminous and determined for the Yugoslav citizen. In the context of the formation of the Yugoslav state this meant that separation of the federal state based on the borders drawn up in the context of the federal republic would result in states which not all citizens would feel a belonging to.

Furthermore, as I have also argued, attached to the different types of citizenship were differing political rights. Constituent nations, for example, had the theoretical right to self-determination, which nationalities did not. The separation of the federal state into sovereign republics transformed the citizenship and linked political rights of many Yugoslav citizens. Whilst the federal state existed, questions of where the right to self-determination lay remained theoretical (or something for constitutional lawyers to debate). In the context of the possible disappearance of the federal state these questions became immediate and concrete. Disputes over who was to be a citizen, and where, were not simply about a re-location of citizenship

but also about the linked transformation of political rights attached to citizenship, entailing a transformation of political rights for some groups.

From citizenship to minority rights

The position of the individual citizen within the federal state was one of overlapping citizenships – the citizenship of the republic, and also of the constituent nation of the federal state of Yugoslavia. The secession or self-determination of the republics fundamentally altered the citizenship and linked political rights and political status of Yugoslav citizens by removing the federal layer of citizenship. Furthermore, the new constitutions that were promulgated in 1990/1991 transformed some of the republics into national states of certain nations (see Hayden, 1999 for a discussion of the ethnic basis of the new constitutions). The transformation of citizenship entailed a transformation of political rights for some groups, and of political status, from membership of a constituent nation of the federal state of Yugoslavia, with the potential political right to self-determination, to a minority in a new state.

For Slovenia, there was a 'fit' between the national and territorial space. Thus, whilst its unilateral assertion of republican sovereignty and repudiation of the federal state had serious consequences for the country as a whole, the issue of the transformation of republican borders into international borders had no effect upon the internal political position of the majority of Slovenian citizens. For Croatia, however, territorial secession was accompanied by a transformation of the republic into a national republic of the Croatian nation. This meant that non-Croats in Croatia no longer had full political rights (including the theoretical political right to self-determination), which were now vested only in the Croatian people. Thus for the large Serbian community in Croatia there was effectively a transformation in the nature of their citizenship. From citizens of a constituent nation of the federal state of Yugoslavia (in which they had full political rights, including the political right of national self-determination within their own country) they became a constitutionally defined minority of a new country.

European Community statements, and those of European statesmen, suggested that the main problematic matter of the Yugoslav break-up was understood as one of human rights and minority rights; what were needed were assurances that the new republics would ensure that minorities received protection and rights (Woodward discusses this view of the international community, 1995b: 210–211; see for other examples, the OSCE statement, 3–4 July 1991 [Trifunovska, 1994: 308]; EC declarations on 5th July [Trifunovska, 1994: 310]; the Brioni accord [Trifunovksa, 1994: 311]; the Peace Conference [Trifunovska, 1994: 357]). Yet the very transformation into a minority was part of the problem. This entailed a loss of political rights and political status. As Woodward argues:

> [The EC] referred instead to the need to guarantee minority rights, as if these assurances would be a positive contribution to peace instead of their repetition in fact of the very cause of conflict in Croatia and eventually

Bosnia-Herzegovina – the demotion of other constituent nations to minority status in the 1990 republican constitutions and therefore their loss of political equality and of a right to self-determination.

(1995b: 210)

If the international community did not grasp what was at stake, Yugoslav citizens certainly did, as evidenced by Kosovo Albanian demands for Kosovo to become a republic and the alteration of republican constitutions. The secession of republics from the federal state was not simply a matter of ensuring minority rights, rather the secessions would create minorities. The transformation of a group into a minority was in itself the problem – the official (as it were) demotion from full political rights and status in one's own country to a minority in a new state. Thus, in the context of the secession of the Yugoslav republics the Yugoslav citizen underwent a transformation in political rights and political status.

The question of Bosnian citizenship

This final section of the chapter considers the question of Bosnian citizenship that emerges in the context of the dissolution of the federal state. Here, a more critical narrative for the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia can be presented that begins to situate the Bosnian conflict in its social and political context, that of the end of the federal state and the removal of one level of citizenship for Yugoslavs. The Bosnian civil war represents the final stage in a process of a contested dissolution of a federal state rather than the new kind of conflict as presented by critical and radical theorists. The federal state presented a context within which a citizen of Yugoslavia could be both a citizen of the federal state and of the republic within which they lived. The removal of the citizenship of the federal state of Yugoslavia altered the situation, whilst some Serbs and Croats, for example, may have been happy to be citizens of Bosnia in the context of the federal state of Yugoslavia, once the federal state was gone, the independent state of Bosnia did not have much purchase for them. Conversely, one may imagine that for those for whom the republic of Bosnia did have purchase and who wished to establish an independent Bosnian state, the possibility of large chunks of the republic breaking away or being absorbed into its neighbours would have been something to fight against.

The votes cast in the 1990 elections in Bosnia were cast along 'ethnic' lines (Hayden, 1999: 92; Woodward, 1995b: 122). It could be argued that this is evidence of the success of the new elite-led nationalist programmes, confirming the arguments of theorists such as Kaldor and Campbell that those Bosnian Serbs (and Croats) who sought to remain in Yugoslavia or to join with Serbia and Croatia are understood as rejecting plurality and seeking ethnic homogeneity. This is 'proven' for these theorists because of the pre-war peaceful coexistence and intermarriage of the different nations and nationalities (for example, Campbell, 1998b: 94–96, 110; Kaldor, 2001: 32; Denitch, 1996: 63).

Campbell, for example, argues that it was both the parties to the conflict and the policies of the international community which 'ethnicized' Bosnia (1998a: 130,

chapter 5), a place where previously people had neither known nor cared about the ethnic origins or religious affiliation of their neighbours (citing a quote from a Bosnian reporter, Campbell, 1998a: 94). Yet this would be to entirely ignore the fact that within Bosnia, historically, there was a lack of overall identification with the Bosnian state and the idea of Bosnian citizenship in its own terms, and of Bosnian as a separate entity from the federal state.

As Bougarel has pointed out, twentieth century public life in Bosnia (and the federal state in general) had been premised on 'communitarian' or ethnic identity – rather than citizens as individuals – with positions within the state apparatus of the republic divided so that each ethnic group was represented (Bougarel, 1996: 87, 92, 97). This 'national key' system (one of the aims of which had been to overcome World War II inter-communal tensions and conflict through ensuring that 'ethnic' groups were not under-represented and made insecure through lack of political power) also ensured that ethnicity remained tied to political representation and effectively served to reinforce 'ethnic' identities (Bougarel, 1996: 92–93, 97). It is no surprise perhaps, that in this context in 1989 a number of political parties were set up that sought to represent specific religious or 'ethnic' communities.

Furthermore, in 1989 there was a surge in religious activism from the main religious institutions – the Serbian Orthodox Church of Bosnia, for example, organised the 1989 commemorations of the Battle of Kosovo, whilst Bosnian Islamic groups and associations played a key role in nationalist mobilisation of the Muslim community. For example, setting up political parties specifically aimed at representing Yugoslavs of Muslim orientation or descent, such as Alija Izetbegovic's party, the SDA (Bougarel, 1996: 95–96). The new constitution of Bosnia maintained the 'constituent nation' system (see Hayden, 1999) of the federal state.

It is quite possible, of course, for people to go to a religious/cultural rally and get on well with their friends and neighbours from other 'ethnic' or confessional groups as always. Nor do links between ethnic group and political representation imply that 'ethnic' strife was inevitable. None of this should be taken to imply that Bosnia was a place of seething ancient ethnic hatreds, just waiting to be sparked off into violent war. Critical and emancipatory theorists are quite right to argue against this narrative of the Yugoslav break-up and wars. But what it does show, however, is that 'ethnic' identities were neither the creation of the elite leaderships of the warring parties (although no doubt as the conflict progressed people's positions may have hardened and become more 'ethnic' in reaction to violence or the lack of alternative social networks) nor of the international community in 1990/1991. Equally, this can be argued to show that the 'Bosnia' of Western academic portrayal, a place of millennial multicultural harmony in which people had to be actively radicalised as the only explanation for why a majority of Bosnian citizens (Serbs and Croats) sought to separate from the new state, is one that only existed in Western academic imagination.

It would perhaps be better to say that Bosnian 'ethnic' identities were the creation of (or to put it in a better way, emerged in the context of) the post-World War II Yugoslav federal state (see the section on the federal state and citizenship). This is also true of the Bosnian republic itself as a political and territorial unit (its

historical existence as a region of the Ottoman Empire and then of the Hapsburg Empire, not withstanding). As for questions of citizenship within the federal state as a whole, the question of Bosnian citizenship remained purely academic as long as the federal state existed. Once the federal state was removed (or soon to be removed) then questions about the existence of the 'idea' of the Bosnian state and Bosnian citizenship in its own terms were raised for the first time.

Bosnia was therefore neither a caldron of simmering ethnic tensions nor a haven of multicultural co-existence in which 'ethnic' or religious affiliation was a matter of no importance. It is of no surprise that after the real horrors of civil war, people might romanticise the past and think that the growth of ethnic tensions was part of a conscious elite-led strategy to create war (see the citation from Campbell 1998a), although no doubt the nationalist parties did all, to some extent, seek to create ethnic tensions (for example, Bougarel, 1996: 98). None the less, whatever the malign or benign intent of the nationalist political parties, it can be argued that it was the context of the weakening of the federal state which led to a turn towards 'ethnic' parties and organisations rather than the strength of these in themselves.

Critical theorists, however, exclude this broader social and political context of the demise of the federal state, the transformation of citizenship and related political rights and political status and the validity of the new states for all citizens. It could be argued that this exclusion almost forces the theorists into a view whereby 'new' and vicious nationalisms spring up out of nowhere and criminal leaders embark on campaigns of destruction. This exclusion also leads these theorists into a particular view of Bosnian Muslims. If the Serbs (and Croats) are not understood as political actors, neither are the Bosnian Muslims. In this romanticised understanding the Bosnian Muslims are seen as fighting in order to defend an ancient and historical multicultural polity (for example Rieff, 1995: 10; Malcolm, 1996), rather than as fighting in order to establish their own state.

Having set up a framework that excludes social and political context and presents Bosnia as a place in which no one either knew nor cared about the religious affiliation or 'ethnic' background of their neighbours, critical theorists must also exclude the fact that Bosnian Muslim political parties sought political power on the basis of representing the Bosnian Muslim community (Bougarel, 1996: 95–96). These theorists cannot, therefore, argue for Bosnian statehood on its own political merit and are forced by their own framework to rely on pseudo-historical or sociological justifications. Because of the exclusion of all political context to the Yugoslav break-up and conflict, to suggest that the Bosnian Muslims fought in order to establish a state of their own is to tar them with the same brush as Serbia and Croatia.

There is a failure or refusal to understand that issues of citizenship, related political rights, and where people lived, could be things that genuinely motivated and concerned people, that whilst Western academics and journalists might assume that people in the Balkans should simply reimagine themselves a different community, lived experience is not like that. To return to Kaldor's statement, 'What did it matter, in practical terms, whether Yugoslavia was the internationally recognised state or Bosnia?' (2001: 118). This chapter has sought to argue that, in practical

terms, recognition and the transformation of citizenship and political rights and political status, and the potential transformation of people into new states may well have been important and concrete issues to the people living in Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1991.

Conclusion

For critical theorists, as discussed in chapter 4, the Yugoslav break-up and wars are wars in which old concepts such as citizenship, political concepts that were part of the old framework for understanding war and conflict, are less relevant, wars which, as discussed in the literature review, were marked by their essentially private, degraded, and criminal nature.

It would be an exaggeration to call the Yugoslav wars 'politics by other means', in the sense of a grand contestation over the future direction of society. However, given the particular context of multiple and overlapping levels of citizenship and differing political rights attached to them that the (pre-break-up) Yugoslav citizen had, it seems perplexing that such political interests, albeit limited and perhaps even parochial, are excluded from the critical framework. In this chapter it has been argued that in the context of the increasing social and economic crisis and proposed break-up of the federal state of Yugoslavia, issues of citizenship, which in the context of the federal state had been irrelevant and purely theoretical, became prominent and suddenly concrete matters. The issues arising from the transformation of citizenship in the context of new constitutions and the dissolution of a federal state are serious ones, and ones that can usefully be considered when engaging with the Yugoslav break-up and wars.

Critical theorists such as Kaldor critique what they suggest was the predominant way of understanding the Yugoslav break-up and wars, the idea of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' (see chapter 4). For Kaldor this narrative fails to either explain, or engage with the particular features of the conflict, yet that perception of the war is argued to be produced through a very specific (re)presentation of the history of the Balkans as the home of eternally simmering hatreds and grievances (2001: 34–35; or see Campbell, 1998b: 84).

However, critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars replicate what they critique methodologically. Theorists working with this discourse dismiss the 'ancient ethnic hatreds' argument as a Western discourse which evacuates all that is specific to the conflicts, only to replace it with an argument about specifically modern, deliberately constructed ethnic hatreds. Yet this 'new ethnic hatreds' narrative is as unsatisfactory as the old narrative. Because these critical approaches understand that the only political forces at work are degraded and exclusionary, they ignore the broader political and social context of the break-up and wars, including matters about citizenship and the separation of the federal state, and perhaps unsurprisingly come to the conclusion that the Yugoslav wars are wars in which these matters are irrelevant.

This focus also leads to the particular interpretation of the role of violence in the conflict. Violence is argued to be the main aim of the war. Again this is not a

surprising conclusion when other possible causes have been excluded from the discourse. The downplaying of fundamental political questions from the internal analysis of critical approaches leads theorists to present the complicated conflict as an irrational and criminal matter in which acts of violence take centre stage and there seems to be a new barbarism at work. Here violence, rather than being the 'end point', the expression of the irresolution or irreconcilable nature of the political conflict, is the main aim of the conflict. As this is not a political conflict that can be 'resolved' through agreements or compromises between the parties, this leads logically to the conclusion that the resolution to the conflict can only come through external intervention.

The exclusion of broader social and political dynamics of the break-up and conflict seems to suggest that these critical theorists take an uncritical approach in which their conclusions are pre-figured by their methodology. A critical engagement with the conflict must surely entail establishing the broader social and political context which gives rise to the conflict, rather than focusing on ever narrower aspects (however unpleasant) to the conflict. Through a critical analysis that reintroduces the social and political context, analysis can move beyond a narrowly moralised view of the problematic considered.

These exclusions from critical approaches suggest that the conclusions of the theorists are not based upon actual engagement with the internal dynamics of the Yugoslav break-up and wars. Critical theorists here argue for new cosmopolitan communities or valorise non-existing cosmopolitan ones (the 'Bosnia' of the critical theorists' imagination) whilst ignoring the existing concrete communities.

6 International exclusions

Re-considering international policy

In chapter 6 I investigate more fully the international dimension to the Yugoslav crisis. We have seen that for critical approaches the international community remained within the 'traditional' state-centric security framework in which it is argued that states took a traditional national interest view of limited responsibility in which the priority was to establish stability and peace rather than a 'just' settlement. In this narrative, the international community remained reactive and pursued a neutral policy between the parties, treating all parties to the conflict as legitimate and attempting to reach a political settlement through truces and ceasefires (for example).

As noted earlier, in chapter 5 I discussed the international context in which the Yugoslav crisis began was one of profound change including the collapse of the Soviet Union and the realignment of countries within Eastern and Central Europe towards the European Community (EC). In this novel context one might expect a critical perspective to pay particular attention to international policy. This chapter reconsiders the international political context through an engagement with international policy towards Yugoslavia in 1991. The chapter will discuss EC statements, resolutions and policy initiatives. It will focus on EC initiatives and policy during 1991 as this is a period in which international activity is under-theorised by the literature on the Yugoslav break-up and wars.

The chapter focuses mainly on the EC as, until 1992, policy initiatives and policy discourse emerged mainly from the EC. It therefore does not discuss American engagement or lack of engagement with the crisis. Whilst the argument can be made that inactivity is as important as activity (for example with regards to American policy, or lack of it), this chapter does not attempt to allocate blame for the conflict through an 'exposure' of Western action or inaction. It is beyond the scope of this work to examine in depth the causes of the break-up and wars in Yugoslavia.

In this chapter I will argue that contrary to the way in which international policy has been framed by critical approaches, it is problematic to interpret international policy and initiatives in the early stages of the conflict as being within a limited and reactive security framework for action. This narrative is challenged by an analysis of EC policy in 1991, which represents a shift away from the old security framework. Rather than pursuing political compromise and stability, international policy

and policy discourse showed a marked disregard for these traditional priorities. Rather, international policy and policy discourse took a highly moralised rhetorical form that elevated, for example, the importance of democracy, self-determination and human rights over political settlement.

Moreover, rather than being reactive and a case of 'too little, too late', it will be argued that the EC was actively involved in the conflict from an early stage and effectively became a major player, both in defining what the crisis actually was, and in terms of laying out the framework for how the crisis was to be resolved. EC policies also served to internationalise the Yugoslav crisis and intervened in the conflict in important and novel ways, for example, through treating the constituent parts of the federal state as entities at par with the state.

In fact far from being stuck in the old framework for action I will argue that EC policy was much similar to that suggested by critical and emancipatory approaches. And here we can see problematic implications of this suggested policy and the political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches. Drawing also upon chapter 5 in which Kaldor asked rhetorically 'what did it matter which was the recognised state, Bosnia or Yugoslavia' (2001: 118), I will suggest that here we can begin to see that there are political limits to external 'resolutions' of conflict and the ideas that the international community can create new political cosmopolitan groups or states as the answer to conflict. In fact, I will argue that this has a problematic and destabilising impact which serves to exacerbate conflict.

Whilst the EC framed much of its policy and discussion in terms of the rights to self-determination, human rights and international law, the trouble was that, as discussed in chapter 5, these matters, such as self-determination, were undecided and highly contested. The EC in this context conducted its policy and discussion in abstract terms which bore little relationship to the conflict. Beyond the realm of discourse and policy statements, matters such as self-determination cannot be decided in the abstract. By ignoring this and seeking to resolve the conflict with no bearing on what was going on 'on the ground', the EC as a powerful external actor undermined local political compromises (however imperfect) and in effect become the sovereign player in the conflict.

The chapter will be structured as follows: the first section will look at aspects of EC policy towards the Yugoslav crisis that challenge the critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars in two ways. I will argue that EC statements and policy initiatives that culminated in the Brioni Accord show a marked presumption against the federal state. The second section of the chapter will argue that through the Peace Conference, the Badinter Commission, and the EC's invitations to the republics to apply for recognition, the EC became an important party in the crisis, effectively defining what the crisis was and how it was to be resolved. In both sections I will argue that political settlement and compromise seemed to be downplayed in favour of ostensibly normative goals. The third and fourth sections of the chapter will draw out the often contradictory nature of many of the EC's policy initiatives. These sections will suggest that when policy is decided in terms of abstract and universal principles it will have problematic implications – working against political compromise and negotiation, and serving to institutionalise

divisions between the republics and empowering the external actor rather than local actors.

EC security policy as traditional security policy?

For critical theorists, international policy remained within the Cold War pluralist security framework for understanding and dealing with the Yugoslav break-up and wars. In this narrative, as discussed in chapter 5, international policy and policy rhetoric remained within the narrow confines of a Cold War security framework. In terms of international intervention or responsibility to other states, states assumed only a limited responsibility that prioritised political compromise and stability over matters of justice and ethics. Critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars argue that the EC treated the parties to the conflict equally and neutrally, without regard, for example, for people's democratic or human rights. The EC accepted the given framework for action and sought simply to ameliorate the situation by applying the standard policy prescriptions for standard civil wars.

This section of the chapter discusses EC policy and initiatives which challenge this analysis. It will be suggested that the international community was actively involved in the conflict from an early stage. Moreover, policy and policy discourse does not fit in with the traditional pluralist security framework in which we might have seen a prioritisation of order and political settlement. It could be expected that if this were the case the already existing state would be given priority. Instead policy was marked by a moralised discourse, that sought to elevate principles such as self-determination above the existing state, and to support legal rather than 'realpolitic' principles (for example, the Badinter Commission that will be discussed further). Many of these policy initiatives elevate other principles than political settlement. In fact, they can be argued to work against political settlement and compromise.

The first major item of international policy discourse that this section discusses is the European Community Parliamentary (EP) resolution of 15th March 1991, this resolution, it will be argued, is a clear departure from the Cold War security framework. The resolution initially affirms Yugoslav sovereignty but then states that the constituent parts of a federal state, not only the republics but also provinces with a degree of self-government and autonomy, are entitled to unilateral self-determination. The resolution:

2 Reaffirms in this context the position frequently expressed by Parliament and the Council, and more recently, by EPC in favour of the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia . . .

8 Accepts that the constituent republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right freely to determine their own political future in a peaceful and democratic manner and on the basis of recognized external and internal borders.

(EC, 1991c)

Rather than prioritising order and political compromise, which would entail a commitment to the already existing state, the resolution challenges the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state. Not only does the resolution argue that the republics have full rights to unilateral self-determination but, even more radically, the autonomous regions. It effectively argues that constituent parts of a state have a status in international law which is equal to the already existing state. This elevates internal borders within a state to the same status in international law as external, interstate borders. Within the Cold War pluralist security framework the internal borders of a state have not previously been within the jurisdiction of international law nor of any concern to other states (for a discussion of this matter see Radan, 2002: 227).

It could be argued that this equivalence between the state and its constituent parts simply constitutes neutrality. Yet neutrality between an existing state and its constituent parts can be seen as an important act of intervention which effectively serves to undermine the existing state. This suggests that political compromise and stability are not prioritised in this resolution. Furthermore, this is done in the name of democracy and self-determination – the resolution elevates the democratic rights of the republics and provinces over and above the maintenance of the federal state. This is a clear shift away from the Cold War non-hierarchical, pluralist conception of the international community (Simpson, 2005: 276, 278–279) in which order and stability would have been the priority and the content of a state mattered little in terms of its international position. The EP resolution signals a rejection of this framework, towards a more universalist or cosmopolitan approach which begins to take into account the content and behaviour of a state and matters of democracy and rights. This statement is reiterated in the European Parliament resolution of 16th May 1991 (EC, 1991e), which also warns the federal state against the deployment of the army (point 4 of the resolution).

These resolutions from the EP could be dismissed as statements from a powerless institution. However, in the context of the transformed international context (as discussed in chapter 5) in which Yugoslavia was re-orientating itself towards the EC these public pronouncements on the crisis were highly significant. As Susan Woodward argues:

> Some argue that the European Parliament is an insignificant body, but this mistakes the reality of power within western Europe for the symbolic power of any signal to those outside who hope for inclusion or even closeness with which any sign of support for one's cause among those with the power to realise it actually is read.

> (1995b: 458, note 31)

The shift from the prioritisation of order and stability in favour of democracy and rights had already been apparent in the policies of individual member states. For example, in January 1991, Douglas Hogg (the British Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) informed the House of Commons that:

> On 25th of January I summoned the Yugoslav charge d'affaires and made it clear to him that we would deplore any use or threat of force against the

democratically elected governments of Slovenia and Croatia and that any disputes should be resolved by peaceful negotiation.

(Hansard, 1991a)

The shift away from the Cold War security framework continued during the lead up to the Brioni Accord which, in effect, formally treated the constituent parts of the federal state as subjects in international law of equal weight as the already existing state. On 25th June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia (BBC, 1991m: i). The Slovene government sent military units and officials to take control of the republic's borders. The federal government declared the actions illegal and authorised the army and police to reassert control over Slovenia's borders (BBC, 1991m: B/19–20). The EC 'troika' of Jacques Poos, Gianni De Michelis and Hans van den Broek went to Yugoslavia and conducted meetings with the leaders of the republics and the federal government. The 'troika' requested that the parties reach an agreement on three things: an immediate ceasefire in Slovenia; the suspension for three months of the independence decisions by Slovenia and Croatia; and the election of President and Vice-President of the SFRY Presidency (BBC, 1991n: B/1). Both Croatia and Slovenian argued that there was no going back from independence (BBC, 1991o: A1/1, B/6).

The European Political Co-operation[5] (EPC) declaration of 5th July continues within this new policy framework; it stresses the importance of democratic and other rights for the settlement of the conflict:

[A]ll parties . . . should be based on the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe, in particular respect for human rights, including rights of minorities and the right of peoples to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

(Trifunovska, 1994: 310)

It was also announced that it had been decided to suspend the second and third financial protocols with the federal state and to place an embargo on armaments and military equipment (Trifunovska, 1994: 311).

The Brioni Accord (Trifunovska, 1994: 311–315), of 7th July, formalised the agreements reached at the end of June. It challenged the federal state by a de facto recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as subjects of international law and by formally internationalising the conflict, that is not treating it as a domestic internal matter. The Accord did not challenge the assumption of sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia but required a three months' moratorium on independence. This de facto recognition was clearly understood by the signatories to the accord. Dimitij Rupel acknowledged the de facto recognition of Slovenia in an interview the next day (BBC, 1991q: B2-B/3); Milan Kucan (president of the Slovenian Presidency) and Stipe Mesic (Prime Minister of Croatia and President of the Yugoslav Federal Presidency) both made it clear that, for Croatia and Slovenia, independence was not affected by the agreement (BBC, 1991p: B6); whilst both Milan Kucan and Janez

Drnovsek acknowledged that Brioni marked the formal internationalisation of the crisis (BBC, 1991p: B6; BBC, 1991q: B2). The Brioni Accord can be argued to be an early and important EC involvement in the Yugoslav crisis, both in terms of formally internationalising the crisis and through the de facto recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.

It could be argued that the Brioni Accord was simply taking account of the new reality of the situation, the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and was concerned with limiting military conflict arising from the declarations. Richard Caplan, for example, argues that it is at this stage that the international community changed its approach from supporting the territorial integrity of the state to accepting the de facto break-up (2005: 18–19). However, it is argued here that, in fact, from the beginning of the year, before the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence, we can see a clear shift away from the Cold War security framework which would have supported the existing state and an elevation of the rights of the republics. Through ostensible neutrality between an already existing state and its constituent parts, there is effectively a presumption in favour of the constituent parts of a state against the state. At each subsequent stage the federal state was treated as an equal to its constituent parts.

Moreover, the Brioni Accord does not make sense if understood through the Cold War pluralist security framework. In this framework the maintenance of order and stability would have been a priority, and therefore the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state would have been one of the main concerns for the international community (particularly so in the context of the role that Yugoslavia occupied in the security of Western Europe, as discussed in chapter 5). Thus, even if Caplan is correct in his argument that the Brioni Accord marks a shift in international policy, the form that this policy takes would not be explained. The international community would not necessarily be concerned to ensure the democratic rights of the republics or with stopping the federal state from using force to reassert control over its territory. Rather, through the almost immediate elevation of the republics into subjects of international law, the EC was behaving in a radically new way.

The continuing shift away from the old security framework is further reflected in the EPC declaration adopted on 27th August, in which the federal government was warned that: 'Territorial conquests, not recognized by the international community, will never produce the kind of legitimate protection sought by all in the new Yugoslavia' (Trifunovska, 1994: 333). As Marc Weller (1992: 575–576) points out, this language is clearly that of interstate conflict rather than intrastate as, of course, it is not possible for a state to conquer its own territory. Far from prioritising stability and political compromise, and therefore the existing state, this declaration explicitly warns the federal state not to attempt to reassert control of its own territory. The treatment, within the declaration, of the federal state and the republics as equal parties confirms the Brioni Accord.

The UN Security Council confirmed these new priorities by stressing the inviolability of internal borders on 25th September (for a discussion see Weller, 1992: 578–579). This principle was reiterated at the NATO meeting on 8th November

(Trifunovska, 1994: 380). The OSCE meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in Prague on 10th October also confirms this principle:

> [T]he principle that a political solution should be sought on the basis of the perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics in Yugoslavia wishing it, at the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith and involving all parties.
>
> (Bloed, 1993: 911)

The draft convention of the Peace Conference (18th October 1991 and formally issued on 1st November) confirms the principle of the right of republics over the federal state: '[supporting the] recognition of the independence, within the existing borders, unless otherwise agreed, of those republics wishing it' (Trifunovska, 1994: 357).

   At the level of the individual governments there was also a departure from the old Cold War framework of presumption in favour of the already existing state. This was reflected in the speeches of individual member states of the EC. For example, Douglas Hogg told the House of Commons in October 1991:

> The republics that wish to achieve independence will have it, the principle is not in doubt . . . We believe that it is right to work for an overall settlement, without one there can be no effective guarantees for the rights of minorities.
>
> (Hansard, 1991e)

Douglas Hurd, the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, told the House of Commons in November 1991:

> Although countries that assert their independence and are unwilling to re-enter any kind of union will not be denied that, I have two thoughts about the timing and style of recognition 1) recognition without protection and 2) the Southern republics.
>
> (Hansard, 1991f)

The presumption against the federal state is also reflected in the EC's suspension and termination of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and the suspension of the PHARE programme in November (Trifunovska, 1994: 379). A week later, the Agreement was separately re-established with each individual republic apart from Serbia (EC, 1991a: 100). As will be discussed ahead, the principle of inviolability of internal borders was confirmed also by the Badinter Commission in Opinion No.2 and Opinion No.3 (Trifunovska, 1994: 474, 479).

   So far, this chapter has argued that action by the EC which established the constituent republics as equal subjects in international law to the federal state, constituted early involvement in the crisis. Furthermore, it has been argued that the intervention did not conform to the Cold War pluralist security framework. Through supporting the constituent parts of the state above the state itself,

international intervention explicitly prioritised matters of democracy and rights over and above stability, order and political compromise. The following section will discuss related EC initiatives, the Peace Conference, the Badinter Commission, and the linked question of recognition. It will be argued that these initiatives cannot be understood as part of the Cold War policy framework. Far from pursuing political compromise and negotiation as a way to resolve the conflict, the recognition of the new states was made conditional upon the states agreeing to extensive commitments to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and minority rights.

EC initiatives: Peace Conference, Badinter Commission and the issue of recognition

The 27th August EPC declaration established the EC Conference on Yugoslavia (chaired by Lord Carrington), also known as the Peace Conference or the Hague Conference. The declaration also established the Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee, known commonly as the Badinter Commission:

> The European Community and its member States are dismayed at the increasing violence in Croatia. They remind those responsible for the violence of their determination never to recognize changes of frontiers which have not been brought about by peaceful means and by agreement . . . The Community and its member States . . . are determined not to recognize changes of borders by force and will encourage others not to do so either. Territorial conquests, not recognized by the international community, will never produce the kind of legitimate protection sought by all in the new Yugoslavia. Such protection can be brought about only by negotiations based on the principle of the fullest protection of the rights of all, wherever they may live in Yugoslavia . . . The Community and its member States cannot stand idly by as the bloodshed in Croatia increases day by day. An agreement on the monitoring of the ceasefire and its maintenance should allow the Community and its member States to convene a peace conference and establish an arbitration procedure . . . The arbitration procedure in the framework of this peace conference will be established as follows. The relevant authorities will submit their differences to an Arbitration Commission of five members chosen from the Presidents of Constitutional Courts existing in the Community countries . . . This Arbitration Commission will give its decision within two months . . . In the absence, by 1st September 1991, of an agreement on the monitoring of the ceasefire and its maintenance and on the peace conference, the Community and its member states will consider additional measures, including international action.
>
> (Trifunovska, 1994: 333–334)

In this declaration, the EC set out the definition of what the Yugoslav crisis actually was (a problem of violence in Croatia resulting from the illegal pursuit of territorial gain) and how it was to be resolved (through the establishment of a Commission of

Jurists from EC member states) and also when it was to be resolved by. The EC effectively became the deciding factor in the business. This is also confirmed by the use of an ultimatum, in the form of the 1st September deadline, by which agreement and acceptance of the Conference was to be reached.

The treaty provisions for the convention of the Peace Conference (1st November 1991) established that:

> The arrangements for a general settlement of the Yugoslav crisis will comprise the following components:
>
> a) Sovereign and independent republics with international personality for those that wish it
> b) A free association of the republics with an international personality as envisaged in these arrangements
> c) Comprehensive arrangements, including supervisory mechanisms for the protection of human rights and special status for certain groups and areas
>   . . .
> e) In the framework of a general settlement, recognition of the independence, within the existing borders, unless otherwise agreed, of those republics wishing it.
>
> (Trifunovska, 1994: 370)

This Peace Conference treaty effectively 'de-recognises' and by-passes the federal state of Yugoslavia. As has been argued before, by July and August Slovenia and Croatia had been recognised as subjects of international law, which can be argued to be a direct form of intervention against an established state. The Peace Conference treaty, to which all parties were obliged to agree, also contained extensive provisions for the protection of human rights in general and particularly minority rights (see Chapter II, Human Rights and Rights of National or Ethnic Groups, Trifunovska, 1994: 370–373).

The Badinter Commission formalised the 'de-recognition' of the federal state and the imposition of the EC's definition of the conflict. It also stated that although the federal state still formally existed, the republics had expressed their desire for independence through referenda (point 2.a of Opinion No.1, Trifunovska, 1994: 416). Opinion No. 1 went on to argue:

> 3 – that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution;
>   – that it is incumbent upon the Republics to settle such problems of State succession as may arise form this process in keeping with the principles and rules of international law, with particular regard for human rights and the rights of peoples and minorities.
>
> (Trifunovska, 1994: 417)

The Peace Conference, the Badinter Commission and the EPC declaration that established them, do not make sense if viewed from the perspective of the Cold War

pluralist security framework. Rather than any presumption in favour of the federal state, the federal state is clearly presented as just one party to the conflict. The conduct of the parties, both in terms of the conduct of the conflict itself, and the internal attributes of the republics and the federal state are clearly elevated above the preservation of order, stability and political settlement (which would arguably entail allowing the federal state to reassert control over its own territory).

Moreover, due to the prioritisation of the existing order and stability during the Cold War, many failed or contested secessions (perhaps ironically) resulted in war because it was accepted practice that a state could use force in order to contain a secession, regardless of the democratic implications or the will of those attempting to secede. Some examples include the ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka, or the attempted secession of the Nigerian province of Biafra (1967–1970). In Europe, certainly in the recent past, there has been no presumption in favour of attempted secession or separatist movements, rather the opposite. It has been accepted practice for a state to use military force to quash or control attempted secession or separatist movements; one only has to think of Spain and the Basque country and Catalonia, France and Corsica, Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Peace Conference, the Badinter Commission and the EPC declaration that established them seemed to introduce new principles in international relations regarding state secession. For the Peace Conference and the Badinter Commission, state secession seemed to be a matter of declaration, an expression of the democratic will of the seceding entities. This is illustrated by point 2.a of Opinion No.1 of the Badinter Commission (Trifunovska, 1994: 416), in which the factual existence of the federal state is nullified by the expressed desire of the republics to secede. These policy initiatives then clearly elevate the importance of democracy, and the protection of human rights and the democratic will of the seceding republics, over the preservation of the federal state. Here, in a shift away from Cold War priorities, the existing state was explicitly forbidden from asserting control over its territory because it would be contrary to the democratic will of the seceding republics.

Rather than political settlement, these policy initiatives were made in support of, and recognition of, the former Yugoslav republics, conditional upon their acceptance of normative criteria, for example democracy and minority rights (this is the basis of Caplan's [2005] discussion about EC policy towards Yugoslavia). This also entailed a normative commitment on behalf of the international community to the existing boundaries of the republics. Negotiation or compromise over boundaries was ruled out from the EP's first major policy pronouncement. These policies seemed to emphasise normative and ethical goals and values instead of political settlement. Here also there is a shift away from the pluralist security framework in which other states or international institutions would assume a limited role or responsibility towards a state, and in which the internal content of a state was irrelevant to the international community, towards a more cosmopolitan role in which other states take on the responsibility to act to ensure the human rights of the citizens of a state.

David Owen, in his memoirs of his time as European negotiator, puzzles over the refusal of the EC to consider border changes:

> [T]o rule out any discussion or opportunity for compromise in order to head off war was an extraordinary decision. My view has always been that to have stuck unyieldingly to the internal boundaries of the six republics within the former Yugoslavia . . . before there was any question of recognition of these republics, as being the boundaries for independent states, was a folly far greater than that of premature recognition itself.
>
> (1996: 34)

As Owen implies, political settlement and compromise may well have necessitated some negotiation about borders. However, Owen fails to understand that political compromise and negotiation were no longer to be priorities for the EC in terms of its policy towards the break-up of Yugoslavia.

After the announcement in late November that Germany would recognise Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas (BBC, 1991r: C1/7), an invitation to apply for recognition was formally extended to all republics by the EC on 16th December. This invitation to apply for recognition was explicitly based upon the acceptance by the republics of extensive commitments to the rule of law, democracy and human rights:

> The Community and its member states agree to recognise the independence of all the Yugoslav republics fulfilling all the conditions set out below. The implementation of this decision will take place on January 15, 1992. They are therefore inviting all Yugoslav republics to state by 23 December whether:
>
> a) they wish to be recognized as independent States;
> b) they accept the commitments contained in the above-mentioned guide-lines (see below) . . . The applications of those republics which reply positively will be submitted through the Chair of the Conference (the Peace Conference) to the arbitration commission for advice before the implementation date.
>
> [The guide-lines read as follows] . . .
>
> – Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;
> – Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;
> – Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers . . . The Community and its member States will not recognize entities which are the result of aggression . . .
>
> (Trifunovska, 1994: 431–432)

Within the context of the Cold War pluralist security framework, the internal content or conduct of a state was not considered relevant. For the EC, through these

new policy initiatives, the internal content of a state was held to be relevant for international security. Through its use of normative conditionality for recognition, the EC sought to mould states internally. Caplan points out this novel aspect to EC policy:

> The prospect of recognition, the EC reasoned, would induce the emerging states to adopt policies that might mitigate and perhaps even eliminate some of the presumed sources of the conflict. The EC's initiative, although not unprecedented, represented an innovation in EC security policymaking.
>
> (2005: 2)

It has been argued by some analysts that the German initiative in November and December was responsible for pushing through the recognition of the republics and contributing to the 'destruction' of Yugoslavia (for example, Woodward, 1995b: 184; Zimmerman, 1999: 177; Pavkovic, 2000: 150). This argument is difficult to sustain if one examines the EC statements, resolutions and initiatives which, from the early spring of 1991, represent a rejection of the Cold War pluralist security framework that would have prioritised order, stability and the already existing state. Rather, these policy initiatives started from a presumption against the federal state and prioritised normative criteria as the basis for future support of the republics. Moreover, here again we can see that it is the EC that assumes a decisive role in the crisis.

Douglas Hurd argued a year later: 'We cannot tell them (the peoples and republics of former Yugoslavia) what their frontiers are, who should govern them . . . We cannot act as a colonial power in Eastern Europe' (Hansard, 1992). Yet Hurd was unable to grasp that the new policy initiatives of the EC entailed a far more interventionist approach into the very content of the new states. As Woodward argues:

> Critics of Western governments denounced the ineffectiveness of their diplomacy to stop the fighting with the charge, which began to circulate near the end of 1991, that the crisis was a result of too little, too late. They failed to appreciate that they had been internal players in the story all along.
>
> (1995b: 147)

For critical theorists the international community remained stuck in the old Cold War security framework for understanding and dealing with conflict, a pluralist security framework in which states assumed a limited responsibility towards other states, pursuing instead political compromise and stability. It is argued here that this narrative is challenged by an analysis of EC policy in 1991, which represents a shift away from the old security framework. Rather than pursuing political compromise and stability, the EC seemed to be prioritising more cosmopolitan values, such as human and minority rights, democracy and so on. This entailed active support for the republics over the federal state and a lack of focus on political compromise and negotiation. Far from having a limited and reactive role in the Yugoslav

crisis, the EC can be argued to have had an active role in the crisis, both in defining what the crisis actually was, and in terms of laying out the framework for how the crisis was to be resolved.

Here the external assertion of a powerful actor in the shape of the EC served to undermine potential political negotiation and resolution between the republics, indeed once the EC became involved this was no longer very relevant as it was the EC which was deciding upon the conflict. The final section of the chapter will draw out the often contradictory and inconsistent nature of many of the EC's policy initiatives.

The December 1991 invitations to the republics to apply for recognition did not, as argued above, establish a new principle of recognition. The decision to invite the republics to apply for recognition in the absence of agreement did, however, contradict the EC's stated aim of an overall settlement (for statements to this effect, see EC statements on 19th September 1991; 6th October 1991; 18th October 1991; 28th October 1991 [Trifunovska, 1994: 347, 352, 356–357, 368]). Seemingly oblivious to the contradiction, the EC invitation to the republics to apply for recognition makes the continued support of the Peace Conference one of the conditions of recognition (Trifunovska, 1994: 432).

It is beyond the scope of this work to engage in any discussion about the Peace Conference itself, whether, for example, if the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia had run its course, it would have established a lasting ceasefire in Croatia and a general settlement, including Bosnia. This section of the work limits itself to suggesting that the EC behaved in a destabilising manner by extending the invitation for republics to apply for recognition in the absence of an overall settlement. Recognition had not been in doubt eventually. It was, however, according to EC statements on the matter, to have been within the context of an overall settlement. The granting of recognition in the absence of agreement can clearly be seen to work against compromise. If the republics were granted recognition by the EC, then there was no reason for them to continue to look for a settlement between themselves.

Lord Carrington, the chair of the Peace Conference, argued against recognition in the absence of an overall settlement, arguing that recognition would stall the conference and any progress made so far, by removing any leverage that the international community had over the parties (letter from Lord Carrington to Hans van den Broek, Dutch Foreign Secretary and chairman of the EC Troika, reproduced in Owen, 1995). The then Secretary General of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, also wrote to Hans van den Broek reminding him of the EC's commitment to an overall settlement and warning of the consequences of 'early and selective recognition' (letter reproduced in Trifunovska, 1994: 428–429). Douglas Hogg also suggested that the premature 'act of recognition would be likely to make fighting in Yugoslavia generally more widespread and intense . . . and would diminish the prospect of a settlement as recognised republics would have less incentive' (Hansard, 1991g). As understood by some politicians at the time, EC policy here was presuming that matters that were much contested on the ground were resolved. For example, whilst the EC unproblematically treated Croatia as a coherent entity and pronounced it as such, there were a substantial minority who did not, and wished to secede from any new state.

Contradictory nature of EC policy initiatives

The inconsistency of EC policy base seems to be confirmed in a statement made by Douglas Hurd in the House of Commons after the EC invitation to the republics to apply for recognition. In answer to a question from the MP Gerald Kaufmann as to whether Britain would recognise the republics if it did not believe the EC's criteria for recognition were met, and Germany did, Douglas Hurd stated:

> If the republics meet the Badinter Committee criteria then all 12 Governments will recognise them, if they don't there is no collective decision to implement and countries will be able to make their own assessment.
>
> (Hansard, 1991h)

Here there was clearly a contradiction within the policy initiatives. Despite the stated aims of achieving an overall settlement, applications for recognition were, none the less, invited before any kind of settlement was reached. Moreover, the announced criteria for recognition seemed not, in fact, to be important and recognition was a matter for individual member states to decide upon. Opinion No. 5 of the Badinter Commission held that Croatia did not meet all of the criteria for recognition (Trifunovska, 1994: 489–490), Opinion No. 6 held that Macedonia did meet the criteria (Trifunovska, 1994: 491–495). The EC Presidency statement of 15th January officially recognised Croatia and Slovenia but not Macedonia.

The forestalling of a negotiated settlement reached by the parties to the conflict was to be problematic in terms of resolving the conflict and served to prolong and to exacerbate conflict (as both Lord Carrington and Javier Perez de Cuellar warned). For commentators such as Owen (1996), as quoted earlier, the lack of negotiation and compromise clearly exacerbated the conflict and led to the Bosnian conflict (for a discussion of this view see Caplan, 2005: chapter 4, who ultimately rejects these arguments).

The *ad hoc* and contradictory nature of EC policy may be further observed in the way in which the EC applied principles about the use of force and changes of borders. Throughout the first half of 1991, EC statements (and statements of individual member states) argued that the existing federal state *and* its constituent parts had equal rights. Both the rights of the federal state to maintain its unity and the rights of the republics to democratic self-determination were stressed. Tristan Garel-Jones (then British Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) for example, argued in February that Britain was obliged to support both the unity of Yugoslavia and the right of individual peoples to self-determination (Hansard, 1991b). This was reflected in the 15th March EP Resolution. On 27th June Mark Lennox-Boyd (the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) told the British House of Commons: 'We and our Western partners have a clear preference for the continuation of a single Yugoslav political entity' (Hansard, 1991c). This was followed a week later by British Prime Minister John Major, who argued: 'I take the view as well that the Slovenes and the Croats have a right to self-determination' (Hansard, 1991d).

Support for the territorial integrity of the federal state was expressed by Jacques Santer (the then President of the Council of Europe) and Jacques Delors (the then President of the EC Commission) at the end of May 1991. Yet at the same time the EC warned the federal state that it could not use force to assert control of its territory, 'nothing that might cause conflict in Yugoslavia would meet with support in Europe' (BBC, 1991l: A1/1). I have argued that this equivalence between the existing federal state and its constituent parts marked a shift away from the 'Westphalian' Cold War pluralist security framework. However, in the context of the Yugoslav crisis this also shows the *ad hoc* and destabilising nature of EC policy, as it did not provide a clear framework within which the Yugoslav republics could negotiate, with each party perhaps taking heart from the statements.

Rather than the potential for political settlement and stability being a focus for the EC, there seemed to be little regard paid by the EC to the material impact of changes of borders and declarations of independence and the policies of the EC itself. This also seems to highlight the lack of concern with negotiations and settlement between the republics. So, whilst the EC stressed the rights of the republics and regions and condemned any attempts by the federal state to assert control over federal borders as an illegitimate use of force and illegitimate attempts to change borders, the first major unnegotiated change of borders, the declarations of independence of Croatia and Slovenia on 25th June 1991 (BBC, 1991m: i), were not subject to EC interventions. As has been argued earlier, the opposite occurred with the Brioni Accord, which, far from placing sanctions on the declarations, served to effectively establish the republics as subjects of international law. Furthermore the use of force by Slovenia when it seized border controls and established a border crossing with Croatia was not subject to sanction. Thus, all statements forbidding unilateral change of borders and use of force were specifically aimed at the federal state. Clearly, forbidding a state to assert control over its borders whilst permitting constituent parts of a state to assert control of their borders, will have a destabilising impact on the federal state.

The European Parliamentary resolution of 16th May 1991 does not mention the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav State but reconfirms support for the rights of the republics and regions. In a 'Declaration on Yugoslavia', which was adopted at the EPC Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting at The Hague on 2nd August, the EC also stressed the unacceptability of any unilateral change of any borders brought about by the use of force:

> Such negotiations should be based on the principles that any change of the internal and international borders by force is not acceptable and that any solution should guarantee the rights of minorities in all the republics.
>
> (EC, 1991a: 112)

This was reiterated on 20th August (EC, 1991a: 113), and on 27th August:

> They [the European Community and its Member States] remind those responsible for the violence of their determination never to recognize changes of

frontiers which have not been brought about by peaceful means and by agreement . . . The Community and its member States will never accept a policy of fait accompli. They are determined not to recognize changes of borders by force and will encourage others not to do so either.

(Trifunovska, 1994: 333)

This point was regularly repeated; on 3rd September (Trifunovska, 1994: 342); the opening declaration of the Peace Conference (Trifunovska, 1994: 343); on 19th September (Trifunovska, 1994: 347); on 18th October in both an EC declaration and the draft convention of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (Trifunovska, 1994: 356, 357); on 28th October (Trifunovska, 1994: 368); the OSCE Prague Meeting on 8–9th August 1991; and 3–4th September, and 10th October (Bloed, 1993: 906, 907, 910).

Here, the EC's pronouncements were based not upon any political events on the ground but upon abstract normative criteria. Yet in real practical terms there seemed to be a lack of understanding about the potential impact of these on possibilities for a political settlement. Whilst Slovenia and Croatia, for example, may have been guilty of disregarding these principles, their breaches were ignored, whilst the federal state was forbidden to act. This is further illustrated by the principle of the inviolability of internal borders. This was formally recognised by the Badinter Commission, using the principle of *uti possidetis juris* (Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitration Commission, Trifunovska, 1994: 474). Given that this was a novel use of an international legal principle only previously used to decide exact borders between two former colonies (as discussed at length in Radan, 2002), it does not seem clear why this principle should not also have been applied to the already existing state.

The inconsistent application of the principle of self-determination is another example of the destabilising nature of the EC's policy. The right to self-determination was stressed by the EC, for example, in the resolution of 10th July:

B. noting that according to Yugoslavia's present constitution, the federation consists of sovereign nations which possess the right to self-determination, including the right to secession.

(EC, 1991d)

And it was also stressed in the following:

The Community and its member states call for a dialogue without preconditions between all parties on the future of Yugoslavia, which should be based on the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe, in particular respect for human rights, including rights of minorities and the right of peoples to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

(Trifunovska, 1994: 310)

The referenda in Croatia (May 1991) and Slovenia (December 1990) for independence were held by the Badinter Commission in Opinion No. 1 to establish the 'process of dissolution' of the federal state (Trifunovska, 1994: 416), and to justify the recognition of Slovenia (Opinion No. 7 of the Badinter Commission, Trifunovska, 1994: 495–496).

Through its insistence on the inviolability of internal borders the EC was supporting the self-determination of the territorial unit not the 'sovereign nations' of the federal state. Contrary to the EC statement, this was not granted by the Yugoslav Constitution (discussed in chapter 5). Neither is this a right given by the UN Charter or the Helsinki Final Act. Outside of the post-war de-colonisation process there was no presumption in favour of territorial secession, had there been such a presumption the map of Western Europe (at least) would look very different.

The EC, however, contradicted itself also in this. Despite stressing the right of even the autonomous regions to self-determination, this was not carried through. Kosovo, for example, had proclaimed itself a republic in July 1990 (BBC, 1990a: pi). This was ignored by the EC. The referenda held in the Croatian regions of Krajina (BBC, 1991j: B/13) and Slavonia (BBC, 1991k: B/15) were also considered invalid, because they were contrary to the principle of *uti possidetis juris* (Opinion No. 2 of the Badinter Commission, Trifunovska, 1994: 474). Perhaps here the EC drew back from the implications of endless secession. Yet, if this principle could not apply to an already existing state (that is, the federal state) it is not clear why it should apply to a state emerging from the 'dissolution' of another (for example, Serbia or Croatia). Furthermore, it is not clear why the referenda in Krajina and Slavonia or Kosovo did not, for example, establish that the state of Croatia or Serbia was in a process of dissolution.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that contrary to critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars, international policy during the Yugoslav crisis does not seem to fit into the pluralist, or 'Westphalian', security framework, in which, at the least, there would have been a (formal) privileging of the existing state and a presumption against intervention. For the theorists discussed in chapter 5, the international community played a limited and reactive role in terms of the Yugoslav crisis, aiming at most to achieve political compromise and to re-establish stability. When the international community did intervene, action remained within the Cold War security framework, in which there was a focus on negotiations and political settlement, treating all parties to the conflict as if they were equal participants.

However, as mentioned earlier, rather than pursuing political compromise and stability, the EC seemed to be prioritising more cosmopolitan values, such as human and minority rights, democracy and so on. This entailed active support for the republics over the federal state and lack of political compromise and negotiation. Therefore, instead of playing a limited and reactive role in the Yugoslav crisis, the EC, it can be argued, had a decisive role in the crisis, both in defining what

the crisis actually was, and in terms of laying out the framework for how it was to be resolved.

There is little evidence that the EC prioritised political compromise and settlement between the republics. Policy initiatives focused on the need for the republics and federal state to conform to the international rule of law, or ensure the provision of human and minority rights, for example. Recognition of the republics was formally made conditional upon the republics meeting criteria established by the EC which focused extensively upon the provision by applicant republics of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. EC policy here seems to have been much closer to the cosmopolitan and universalist principles advocated by the theorists discussed in chapter 5.

A feature of these new policy principles was that they were applied and pursued in an *ad hoc* and often contradictory manner. Policy initiatives were characterised by contradictions even within the same resolution (for example supporting territorial integrity and the right to unilateral and un-negotiated secession). Even when political settlement was ostensibly part of a policy initiative (for example, the Peace Conference) any incentives that may have existed for the republics to engage in negotiation were undermined by alternative policy initiatives (for example, the invitation to apply for recognition). At the same time, the cosmopolitan principles which formed a major part of EC policy initiatives were not coherently supported either (for example, Croatia was recognised, despite not meeting the Badinter criteria, whilst Macedonia was not).

De-linked from any political relationship to events on the ground these declarations of democracy, human rights and self-determination could only lead to inconsistent principles. Cosmopolitan principles in this context were simply abstract assertions. However, the policies of the EC did have a major material impact upon the conflict. The impact of the EC's policies, framed as they were in abstract cosmopolitan terms with no relation to the existing political context, completely undermined the existing political framework of the Yugoslav state whilst treating as coherent and fully formed the new states of Croatia and Bosnia, when the political reality was that these states were in fact highly contested by sections of the population. The EC assumed a major role in the crisis, as a powerful external actor the parties to the conflict were orientated entirely towards the EC. This EC was empowered through its policies, not local actors. Moreover, the content of the policies served to institutionalise divisions between the republics, removing the need for seeking political compromise or negotiation with each other and served to prolong the conflict.

In conclusion, I return now to the broader question of critical approaches to the Yugoslav wars. In chapters 5 and 6 I have engaged with significant external and internal dimensions to the Yugoslav break-up and wars that are excluded from critical approaches. Critical theorists such as Kaldor here argue for new cosmopolitan communities or valorise non-existing cosmopolitan ones (the 'Bosnia' of the critical theorists' imagination) whilst ignoring the existing concrete communities and downplaying 'traditional' political concerns, such as citizenship, which I argued came to the fore in the context of the Yugoslav crisis. These concerns, whilst

complex, are shown to have had significant political implications. Critical approaches also exclude actually occurring international policy from their analysis. These exclusions from critical approaches suggest that the conclusions of the theorists are not based upon actual engagement with the internal dynamics of the Yugoslav break-up and wars. This critique is not driven by an engagement with the actual conflict, but seemingly by the moral values of the theorist.

Critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars share the idealistic approach of the critical theorists discussed earlier in the book. In chapter 3 I argued that for leading critical security theorists the most important point for purported emancipatory communities and transnational structures is that they are informed by the right ideas and values, regardless of the actual political structure or content:

> The precise character of those arrangements at this point is less important than the ideas that inform them, and in this respect enlightened world order values are central: if the global-we look after the processes, the structures will look after themselves.
>
> (Booth, 2007: 141)

For critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars there is an idealised assumption about rights and law and a lack of understanding that there must be a political constituency to give it content. Mary Kaldor is illustrative of this trend amongst critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars when she asks:

> What did it matter, in practical terms, whether Yugoslavia was the internationally recognised state or Bosnia? Something had to be done to protect the victims and to uphold respect for international humanitarian norms. In effect, the debate about whether the conflict was an international or civil war treated it as an old war between the fighting sides, in which violence against civilians is merely a side-effect of the war . . . An alternative cosmopolitan approach starts from the assumption that no solution is workable based on the political goals of the warring parties and that legitimacy can only be restored on the basis of an alternative politics which operates within cosmopolitan principles. Once the values of inclusion, tolerance and mutual respect are established, the territorial solutions will follow.
>
> (2001: 117–118)

Yet an engagement with actually occurring international policy at the time would show exactly the problematic limits of this approach in terms of conflict, that it serves to exacerbate conflict.

7 Power and agency in the post-pluralist security framework

In chapters 1–3 of this work I argued that there were theoretical limits to critical and emancipatory security theories. In chapters 4–6 I argued that the dominant theoretical and analytical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars took a critical and emancipatory approach to the conflict and how security policy should be. I argued that there were both theoretical limits to these approaches and political limits in terms of the policy prescription of critical approaches. These theoretical approaches posited abstract rights and groups, failing to engage with the political implications on the ground. At the same time, I argued that in fact international policy was much closer to that advocated by critical and cosmopolitan theorists than 'traditional' or pluralist security policy and that far from being an answer to conflict, this policy served to undermine local political settlements and placed the EC in the position of sovereignty. This illustrates that there are political limitations to cosmopolitan policies as advocated by critical and emancipatory theorists. Such policies undermined existing political frameworks and ultimately the power of people in such situations to exercise any meaningful control over their lives.

In this penultimate chapter I return again to considering the limits to critical security theory more generally in the contemporary security context. I have argued that critical and emancipatory security theory has rested on a trenchant critique of the pluralist security framework. Critical theorists argue that this security framework is both anachronistic and immoral. Critical security theorists argue that their theory should focus on the powerless and excluded and be for the purposes of emancipation. As the state and state-based forms of political organisation are argued to be oppressive and exclusionary, for critical security theorists it is in future developments in the international realm, whether new forms of international organisation or transnational groups or networks, that the agent of emancipation will be found.

Yet the context in which critical security theorists are writing is one, as we have seen in chapter 2, in which developments in international and national policy discourse are framed in terms that cannot be understood in terms of the Cold War pluralist security framework. Rather, as we have seen in chapter 3, one of the most striking aspects of the contemporary international security problematic seems to be a shift away from, and problematisation of, the old security framework in both international and national security policy discourse. Here, the old pluralist security

framework with its underlying commitments of non-intervention and sovereign equality is held to be both anachronistic and immoral.

In this chapter I turn to look at some significant aspects of contemporary international security policy and policy discourse in more detail, in particular I will look at the post-Cold War human security framework and briefly at recent military interventions. I will argue that here we can see the political limits to these policies in terms of an orientation of policy around individual rights and freedom at an abstract level, in the absence of a political constituency to give content to those rights and freedoms. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of allowing international institutions and powerful states a more interventionist role. This entrenches international inequality and allows for a shift towards a hierarchical international order. Rather than empowering, this becomes a situation in which people are disempowered, made wards of court rather than citizens. Here also we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches that advocate a transformation of world order into a cosmopolitan order and a shift away from state sovereignty.

The following sections of the chapter engage with the human security framework in which the critique of Cold War pluralist security framework has been further developed.

Human security

For critical security theorists, the pluralist security framework in which states focused on military might and ignored the real threats to the individual is both unrealistic and immoral, in Ken Booth's words: 'the price for old thinking about world security is paid, daily, in the death, disease, poverty and oppression of millions' (2005: 260). To overcome this situation, the presumptions of formal state sovereignty and equality must be overcome. 'Old' thinking about security is however, as I have argued, less and less in evidence in international security policy.

The human security framework represents a comprehensive shift away from the Cold War security framework. The human security framework begins from and is centred on a rejection and transcendence of the Cold War pluralist security framework in favour of the protection of individuals globally. A critique of the pluralist security framework is central to the human security framework. Here, the pluralist focus on state security is rejected as both narrow, inadequate and immoral in the context of 'real' security threats to the individual, such as poverty, and as failing to grasp that for many people the greatest threats come from their own state rather than neighbouring states. The pluralist assumptions of a limited role for the international organisations or states in the internal affairs of other states are also challenged, and a more expansive role for the international community is envisaged, weakening the pluralist formal framework of sovereign equality and non-intervention.

The human security framework was developed initially in the UN (for example, UN, 1994; UN, 1998; UN, 2000a; UN, 2004; UN, 2006), but then developed further in reports issued by international NGOs (for example the Carnegie Commission, 1997), transnational networks established by states.[6] Human security has also been developed as a specific foreign policy focus of certain states, for example, Japan (see CHS, 2003) and Canada,[7] and in reports by academics (for example, Glasius and Kaldor, 2005; Jolly and Ray, 2006; see also Commission on Global Governance, 1995; OECD, 1997; Collier, 2003; Human Security Centre, 2005; for overviews see Edson, 2001; Paris, 2001; Security Dialogue, 2004; Duffield and Waddell, 2004; Jolly and Ray, 2006; Debiel and Werthes, 2006; for individual commentaries, theoretical and policy orientated, see Bajpai, 2000; Alkire, 2001; McRae, 2001; McRae and Hubert, 2001; King and Murray, 2002; Mack, 2002a and 2002b; MacFarlane and Khong, 2006).

Human security is argued to be both an extension of the old security agenda (see Debiel and Werthes, 2006: 8) and a response to new security challenges and the end of the Cold War (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 3–4). Human security, however, is also premised on a rejection of the Cold War pluralist security framework. Whilst the Cold War pluralist security framework prioritised order over justice and human emancipation, human security has an explicitly normative dimension. Human security places ethical concerns about the freedom and emancipation of the individual at its heart.

Human security represents a transformation in both the means and aims of security, as it was understood during the Cold War. The shift to the security of the individual directly challenges the narrow state-centric security focus of the Cold War security framework and overturns Martin Wight's gloomy pronouncement about thinking about the international sphere (1969: 33). Human security rejects the narrow confines of the pluralist security framework of national or territorial security focused on the state, towards a normative commitment to human life globally, it 'puts the individual at the centre of debate, analysis and policy' (Thakur, 2004: 347–348). Rather than the narrow focus on the problem of interstate conflict and war, human security suggests that it offers, in the words of an important contributor, 'a tool for solving the problems confronting the majority of humanity' (Thomas, 2004: 354).

The 1994 *United Nations Human Development Report* (UNHDR) was the first report to give a full exposition of the human security framework, stressing the need for a new understanding of security. The report explicitly critiqued the Cold War pluralist security framework, arguing that this framework was inadequate for providing people with real security. The report argued for a new definition of security, one that placed the individual at the heart of the concept:

> The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. The superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle – fighting a cold war all over the world. The

developing nations, having won their independence only recently, were sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their fragile national identities. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the cold war receding, one can now see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations . . . Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity. Human security is people centred . . . first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes in jobs or in communities.

<div align="right">(UN, 1994: 22–23)</div>

For supporters of the human security framework it represents a progressive and normative transformation from the Cold War security framework (Suhrke, 1999: 266). Kofi Annan's 2005 report entitled *In Larger Freedom; Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, summarises the aims of the human security framework. The title of the report refers to the preamble of the UN Charter, which promises 'to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom' (UN, 2005). As the 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (Foreword) argues:

> The Commission on Human Security's definition of human security: to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human Security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.
>
> <div align="right">(CHS, 2003: 4)</div>

These arguments form the basis of a recent major UN report, the 2004 *Report of Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*:

> The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security . . . But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human freedom.
>
> <div align="right">(UN, 2004: 11)</div>

Examples of this shift away from the prioritisation of state security and towards more progressive and emancipatory aims can also be seen in the subjects of recent Security Council Resolutions (SCR). Post-Cold War SCRs have included

resolutions on the threat to international peace and security posed by AIDS (SCR 1308), humanitarian crises (SCR 1296), and the particular threats to women posed by conflict (SCR 1325).

The human security framework represents a major shift in the post-Cold War international security problematic. Human security cannot be understood in terms of the Cold War pluralist security framework, as it, in fact, represents a rejection of, and transcendence of, that framework in favour of a focus on the security of the individual. The following two sections illustrate this further with a discussion of the merging of development and security, and the critique of state sovereignty and equality which is central to the human security framework.

Critiquing the state

Within the Cold War pluralist security framework, poverty and associated social problems, or lack of political development, were explicitly held not to affect the rights of a state to international legal equality, non-intervention and the other norms associated with the pluralist international system (Simpson, 2005: 231). For examples of international statements on the subject see the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (Resolution 2131) and the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Between States (Resolution 2625).

Within the human security framework, this indifference to the internal content of a state is one of the major limitations of the Cold War pluralist security framework. Within the human security framework, it is recognised that in situations of poverty, hunger and underdevelopment the idea of freedom is limited. In such situations, people have limited potential to live their lives as they would wish to, even if political freedoms exist (UN, 2005: 5). Within the human security framework, therefore, it is argued that human security requires a different approach to the state, as the report of the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* argues, '[human security] means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity' (CHS, 2003: 4).

Here development and the security of individuals are formally linked, not only for the individual but also more broadly in terms of international peace and security. Through human security, it is suggested, real freedom and emancipation of the individual can be achieved. Thus, addressing human security is about empowering people, giving them real possibilities and potential, rather than letting their lives be consumed in a struggle for survival: 'human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community can be met' (Thomas, 1999: xi).

The formal merging of development and security has been a central tenet of the human security framework; a lack of development, poverty and associated instability are understood to cause conflict, or, more generally, human insecurity:

> The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them – with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development not in arms.
>
> (UN, 1994: Overview, 1)

These themes have been developed in other international organisations, such as major NGOs (for example the Carnegie Commission, 1997: xviii), and a similar framework is also central to other major recent reports, for examples see UN, 1998; UN, 2000a*;* UN, 2000b; ICISS, 2001a. Very similar themes were echoed in the *Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, 2004:

> International terrorist groups prey on weak States for sanctuary. Their recruitment is aided by grievances nurtured by poverty, foreign occupation and the absence of human rights and democracy; by religious and other intolerance; and by civil violence – a witch's brew common to those areas where civil war and regional conflict intersect. [paragraph 21] . . . Poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation and war feed one another in a deadly cycle.
>
> (UN, 2004: paragraph 22)

The merging of development and security reverses some of the central tenets of the Cold War pluralist security framework. In order to pursue the goals of freedom and emancipation of individuals, the content of a state can no longer be ignored. Thus, the human security framework also allows for the reintroduction of hierarchy back into the international system, through a distinction between those states who can provide human security, and those who cannot (Duffield and Waddell, 2004: 18).

Therefore, the associated norms of the pluralist security framework of non-intervention, sovereign immunity and international state equality are highly problematic. Formal sovereign equality and the consequent prohibition on intervention are effectively barriers to the achievement of human security. The international community has potential here to assume a far greater role than in the limited pluralist security framework. Human security is not however posed as a direct challenge to state sovereignty; rather sovereignty, as it was understood as part of the old security framework is problematic. It is argued that real content is given to state sovereignty through prioritising human security. Sovereignty is shifted from the state to the individual (MacFarlane, 2004). Sovereignty is redefined in a way which places human security at its centre (for example, ICISS, 2001a: 15).

An Agenda for Peace explained the role of the state in promoting human security and laid out the rationale that successive reports adopted in redefining state sovereignty to be compatible with human security:

> The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has

passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the need for good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.

(UN, 1995 [1992]: 44)

The state, therefore, has a vital role to play in the protection of human security but the security of states is no longer an end in itself (Axworthy, 1999): 'States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their people, and not vice versa' (Annan, 1999: 81). Within the human security framework it is recognised that the state has often been a great source of insecurity for its own people; for example, the *Human Security Report* points out that frequently people are more threatened by their own governments than other states and that more people have died at the hands of their own states than from the predations of other states (Human Security Centre, 2005: viii).

The Cold War pluralist security framework exacerbated these problems through the prioritising of non-intervention, and sovereign equality. As the *Report of the Commission on Global Governance* argues, 'Too often in the past, however, pre-serving the security of the state has been used as an excuse for policies that under-mined the security of people' (Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 81). By making the individual the referent object of security, the advocates of human secu-rity claim to be providing real security.

The barrier that traditional state sovereignty presents to human security was acknowledged in the 1998 *Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation*:

> In some cases effective prevention is actually impeded by the traditional focus on external threats to a State's security. Today we recognize that many other threats to human security, such as natural disasters, ethnic tension and human rights violations, may also be sources of conflict. The intimate relationship between social justice, material well-being and peace must also be taken into account if action is to be pursued far enough to prevent local conflicts from escalating and spilling over into the international arena.

(UN, 1998: paragraph 27)

Within the human security framework, the international community cannot be blind to the internal content of a state, and the framework legitimates intervention within a state. Intervention in a state, rather than being seen as destabilising, is understood to be necessary in some cases in order to provide human security. For example, pre-emptive intervention to prevent conflict is recommended. The *Responsibility to Protect* argues that the international community needed to move from a '"culture of reaction" to that of a "culture of prevention"' (ICISS, 2001a: 27).

There is also much greater scope for post-conflict intervention. Whilst the pluralist security framework aimed at reaching a settlement between parties to a

conflict, the human security framework aims at transforming the societies from within. As Boutros-Ghali argued in *An Agenda for Peace*:

> It is now recognized that implementation of the settlement in the time prescribed may not be enough to guarantee that the conflict will not revive. Coordinated programmes are required, over a number of years and in various fields, to ensure that the original causes of war are eradicated. This involves the building up of national institutions, the promotion of human rights, the creation of civilian police forces and other actions in the political field. As I pointed out in An Agenda for Development, only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation [p. 11–12] . . . support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.
>
> (UN, 1995 [1992]: 62)

These arguments have been developed in successive reports. For example, the 1998 *Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation* suggests an expanded role for the United Nations and Security Council (paragraph 29), using early warning systems and a robust post-conflict peace building, aimed at 'addressing the root causes of violence – whether political, legal, institutional, military, humanitarian, human rights-related, environmental, economic and social, cultural or demographic' (UN, 1998: paragraph 65). This was reiterated in the 1999 *Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation. Facing the Humanitarian Challenge; Towards a Culture of Prevention* (UN, 1999) in which preventative action to address the root causes of conflict was again called for. *The Brahimi Report* (UN, 2000b) argues for an extensive strategy of post-conflict intervention in order to ensure human security, which entails

> reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media; and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.
>
> (UN, 2000b: 3)

This chapter has argued, so far, that the human security framework overturns some of the fundamental tenets of the Cold War pluralist security framework and is

ostensibly concerned with the universal protection and promotion of human life and human dignity (UN, 1994: 22; Thomas and Wilkin, 1999: 3):

> To be concerned about human security is to be concerned about the threats to peoples posed by human rights abuses, poverty, hunger . . . From this perspective, human security's importance lies less in its explanatory power than as a signifier of shared political and moral values.
>
> (Mack, 2004: 366–367)

The pluralist security framework, which is the focus of critique for critical security theorists, seems to have declining relevance in the post-Cold War international order. The pluralist security framework has been subjected to serious critique in the highest echelons of the international community. Moreover, international security policy discourse appears to share many of the concerns of critical security theorists. However, this shift in international security policy discourse raises questions about the emancipatory potential of international security policy in which ethical and moral concerns replace the old framework of interests and political compromise. The ease with which the most powerful international institutions have adopted the new moral security framework suggests that it may not necessarily live up to its emancipatory promises and may present less of a challenge to the status quo.

It is not only in the human security framework that there has been a shift away from the Cold War security framework. I discussed in chapter 2 that major military interventions were also framed by leading powers, and international institutions (such as the European Union) have framed major post-Cold War military interventions in terms of a rejection of the pluralist security framework, eschewing the Cold War framework of narrow national or territorial interests in favour of the protection and emancipation of the citizens of other countries.

For critical theorists, emancipation and freedom for the individual may be achieved through international institutions or organisations. I have shown that in both the human security framework and in the way in which major post-Cold War interventions have been framed, the old pluralist norms of non-intervention and sovereign equality are argued to be barriers to the achievement of freedom and development, and international institutions and major states are argued to have a progressive role to play in the internal affairs of other states (for example, through military interventions such as the Kosovo intervention).

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or

agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before.

Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield's important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of non-intervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan.

Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are 'insured' – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security.

For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without

causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony.

Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

Within the pluralist security framework there was a formal presumption against intervention in a state. Moreover, whatever economic, social and political problems a state may have been experiencing internally did not affect the standing of the state, and it was still formally equal to other states in the international realm (see chapter 3 for an overview). For critical security theorists, this is one of the limits to the pluralist security framework as it permits states to treat their own citizens with impunity. However, as I have argued, both within the human security framework and post-Cold War military interventions, this aspect of the pluralist security framework has been extensively critiqued and argued to be inadequate, instead a more mediated approach to intervention and sovereignty is argued to be required.

As Boutros-Ghali argued in *An Agenda for Peace*, the old framework of state security and non-intervention must be modified (UN, 1995 [1992]: 44). This approach has been developed in other major reports, such as *The Responsibility to Protect*, in which sovereignty is redefined from control to 'sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties' (ICISS, 2001a: 13). This shift away from the formal norms of non-intervention and sovereign equality has also been apparent, as I have argued, in the way in which post-Cold War interventions have been framed, as Tony Blair argued in his Chicago speech during the NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia: 'We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not . . . We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure' (Blair, 1999).

A problematic implication of this shift away from the pluralist security framework is that state sovereignty becomes less of an inherent political right or juridical fact of a state but becomes instead something which depends upon the state's 'responsibilities' to its citizens and its role in the international realm (UN, 1995 [1992]: 44). This introduces a distinction between those states which can provide, for example, security for their citizens, and those which cannot (Duffield and Waddell, 2004: 18) and implies a shift towards a more hierarchical order in which international institutions or major states have greater freedom to act on behalf of the citizens of other states. This distinction is problematic also in terms of the purportedly emancipatory and empowering goals of human security and post-Cold War interventions. A weak or unstable state may become more subject to international

scrutiny and intervention (in a number of ways) in the name of its own citizens, yet those citizens will in effect have little control over the supposed agents of their own emancipation and empowerment.

The relationship between the recipient and the securer is one that is closer to charity, rather than a political right. As Emma Rothschild points out in her discussion on human security (although this is equally applicable to post-Cold War interventions in general):

> [T]he 'human security' of the new international principles seems to impose relations that are only tenuously political. The security of an individual in one country is to be achieved through the agency of a state (or a substate group, or a suprastate organisation) in another country. The individual is thereby very much less than a co-lawmaker, in Kant's sense, in the political procedure that ensures security. She is less, even than a co-beneficiary . . . she is not even a partner in being protected.
>
> (1995: 70–71)

Instead of political institutions mediating between the individual and society, within the human security framework and in post-Cold War interventions a direct, immediate relationship between the individual and those external agencies (whether international institutions or states) seeking to emancipate the individual is established. Yet in practice, in the absence of a political relationship, any agency that intervenes to empower and emancipate the individual must be one that is external to the individual, with no reciprocal relationship of obligation and control. Rather than empowering individuals, the shift away from the pluralist security framework allows for the empowerment of external institutions with agency, for example NGOs, other states and international organisations.

The individual on whose behalf international institutions or other states intervene or implement human security policies, is effectively an individual without agency, one who is not a political subject. Indeed, as the state is often held to be the greatest danger to its own citizens, the citizen's own political sphere is therefore seen to be a source of potential danger. For example, within the human security framework it is the individual's own society, rather than foreign states, which may present the greatest threat, there is a 'focus on social relations as sources of insecurity' (Tickner, 1999: 50). The particular vulnerability of women for example, is highlighted as a vital concern for human security (Haq, 1999: 95). Yet the removal of the collective, political sphere (however problematic), within which the individual may have some possibility of shaping their own life, and its replacement with a direct relationship with an unaccountable international institution or foreign state lessens the potential for individual control and agency.

This can be seen in theory, but also in practice in post-Cold War interventions. Clearly, for all the rhetoric about intervening on behalf of, for example, the people of Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Iraq, there is no mechanism by which any of the people of these countries may have control over the interveners. The people of Afghanistan, for example, had no say or control over the method, length, or indeed

any part over their 'liberation'. The institutions or states are not accountable to, or representative of, those on whose behalf they are intervening. The relationship between the intervening states or institutions or NGOs and those on whose behalf action is being taken, is not a political relationship in which (at least formally) there is a relationship of representation and control. Here there is a divorce between the exercise of power and control or accountability of that power.

This is not just relevant for direct military interventions, but also other types of intervention. An example of the way in which power may be taken further away from individuals in weak or unstable states and international organisations or states empowered, can be found in the memoirs of Oxfam's Tony Vaux (2001). Vaux describes how Oxfam had adopted a formal gender and equality policy in the early 1990s (2001: 123). This policy was challenged in Afghanistan in 1996–1997 when the Taliban occupied Kabul and other areas and forced women to remain at home. In reaction to these edicts, Oxfam decided to withdraw from all programmes in Taliban controlled areas, this included halting work on a major renovation of Kabul's water supply (which would supply an estimated 40,000 with clean water) and halting the distribution of winter clothes to the destitute in Kabul (a contract Oxfam had from the EU). Oxfam furthermore ensured that other aid agencies withdrew from Taliban controlled areas (2001: 125). There are no figures for how many people may have fallen ill or died as a result of not having clean water, or how many may have suffered in the freezing winter (2001: 127).

This narrative is of course taken from a memoir rather than an academic study. However, it does suggest that there are problematic implications when power is divorced from any control or accountability on behalf of those for whom it is being exercised. In this example, the Afghan people were further disempowered and Oxfam in effect assumed a sovereign role, deciding on the life and death of Afghanis, and it may be assumed that the most vulnerable, for example Afghan women and children, those whom Oxfam sought to empower, suffered the most.

The role of the EC in the Yugoslav crisis in 1990 and 1991 is another example of the effects of intervention without accountability. As I argued, the EC effectively became a deciding factor in the crisis, establishing both what the crisis was and how and by when it was to be resolved. Although the EC was a very powerful player in the crisis, the Yugoslav citizens had no mechanism by which they could control or hold to account the EC. Yet despite this, because the intervention was not a traditional interest-driven military intervention (for example) but rather policies were often attempting to promote human rights or democratic rights, the material political impacts of these policies are ignored by both analysts and the EC themselves.

More broadly, within the human security framework and in post-Cold War interventions, international intervention is depoliticised and presented as a moral and universal force. The shift to the protection of the individual and the focus on the threats to the life and health of individuals globally entails a transformation of social, economic and political problems into a moral imperative for those who might be in a position to overcome the human insecurity. States and international institutions have a moral duty to intervene to assist those suffering in other states, for example the ICISS argues that there is a responsibility for states and

international institutions to react to problems within states (ICISS, 2001a). International intervention is no longer a matter for political contestation, but is seen as a moral duty of the powerful to help the weak (for example, Blair, 1999).

At the same time, instability and conflict within states is depoliticised. Again, we may refer back to the Yugoslav crisis. Here the political matters of borders and citizenship which were the most contested matters, were precisely the matters which were ignored by the EC in its interventions. This is also visible in both the human security framework and more broadly in terms of international intervention. Social, political and economic problems are removed from their broader context and reinterpreted as security problems. Poverty, for example, and the associated problems that emerge with it are reinterpreted as security problems (in the emotive language of the 2004 UN report, an unstable or weak society is compared to a 'witches' brew'). Moreover, the roots of conflict are suggested to be found in poverty and deprivation (see for example, UN, 1994: Overview, 1).

Jolly and Ray argue that the advantage the human security framework has over the state-centric framework is that it can have a holistic perspective on the many threats and problems faced by people and, consequently, a far better ability to solve the problems that arise (2006: 14). However, it could be argued that the merging of development and security causes problems, for example the lack of women's rights, unemployment and crime, which are abstracted from their social, economic, and political context and reinterpreted as security threats. Vaux's discussion of the behaviour of Oxfam in Afghanistan is pertinent here also – Oxfam separated the position of Afghan women from the broader context of Afghan society. Whatever one might think of the position of women in Afghanistan, it is surely something that can only change through broader social transformation and development, not through individual punishments.

A corollary of this retreat from a political interpretation of conflict or social instability, is the delegitimation of social transformation in developing countries. Historically, social and political transformation has often been accompanied by war and strife. By pathologising conflict, the human security framework acts to prohibit social or political transformation, as such changes can only be understood in an entirely negative way (see for further discussion, Cramer 2006). As an important contributor to the human security framework has argued: 'much human insecurity surely results from structural factors and the distribution of power, which are essentially beyond the reach of individuals' (Newman, 2004b: 358). Thus to actually overcome human insecurity, collective action and change is needed. But this may result in internal conflict or strife, precisely the changes that human security problematises in the first place. People may be prepared to experience disruptions to their daily existence, or even severe societal conflict or economic deprivation in the pursuit of some other goals which are understood as worthy.

The shift away from the pluralist security framework is highly problematic. The formal links between the state and its citizens are problematised and weak and failing states are potentially held up to increased international scrutiny and international intervention. International institutions and states have potentially greater freedom to intervene in other states, but with no reciprocal methods of control to

replace the old political links between the state and its citizens which are weakened. The shift away from the pluralist security framework and the rhetorical adoption by international institutions and states of a more cosmopolitan security framework does not challenge contemporary power inequalities, rather it serves to entrench them.

Once we separate rights from any rights bearing subject, these rights are only things that can be given by external agencies, indeed as Chandler (2009) has argued, here the subject is created by external powers. Ultimately the cosmopolitan and emancipatory framework which seeks to give universal human rights through international law or forms of intervention posits abstract rights, seeking to make the world conform to universal human rights and justice in the absence of a political constituency to give it content. Indeed this is seen as necessary in the face of the current global injustices. Yet the problem is that without a political constituency to give content to those rights these rights are gifts of the powerful, they are closer to charity.

Rights in themselves, without political form, are of little value. Here rights are assumed to be able to correct political and economic and social wrongs, such as inequality or disempowerment. Yet such problems are not the result of a lack of rights, and cannot be corrected through rights. A lack of development is a political, economic and social problem (Lewis, 1998; Heartfield, 1996), the lack of rights or equality and empowerment stem from the real inequalities and power relations in the world. Divorcing rights from rights bearing subjects, and positing abstract individual rights that can only be 'given' by external agencies, does not enhance rights but ends up formalising real inequality (Lewis, 1998). Indeed, this is precisely what we can see with, for example, human security and contemporary interventions. Here, the old formal equality of the pluralist security framework is no longer relevant and it is increasingly accepted that more powerful states have a right to intervene in other states and to frame certain states as 'outlaw states' (Simpson, 2005).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that there have been significant shifts in the post-Cold War security problematic which cannot be understood in terms of the pluralist security framework. The most striking aspect of the contemporary international security problematic seems to be a shift away from and problematisation of the old security framework in both international and national security policy discourse. I have already discussed that the pluralist security framework with its underlying commitments of non-intervention and sovereign equality is held to be both anachronistic and immoral.

This chapter lends support to broadening the initial conclusions drawn about the critical security theory more generally. In their own terms critical security theorists do not seem to be very critical. Critical security theorists are not critically engaging and explaining the contemporary security problematic and offering an alternative to contemporary power inequalities. A critical question to ask would be why have international institutions and states framed their security policies in terms of a

rejection of the pluralist security framework and taken up cosmopolitan rhetoric? Where does this shift come from?

Despite their ostensible focus on power and power inequalities, it is striking that critical security theorists exclude the way in which power is being exercised in the post-Cold War international order from their analysis. Were critical security theorists to include this in their analysis they would discover that they seem to be sharing many of the assumptions and aims of the post-Cold War international order. Specifically in the context of the shifting international security problematic, critical security theorists seem to share a normative and ethical critique of the old security framework, combined with a depoliticised account of conflict and social, economic and political instability, and a depoliticised and idealised view of the potential of major international institutions and states to intervene.

Moreover, in the behaviour and rhetoric of international institutions, the problematic theoretical implications of critical security theory's idealised assumptions of the potential of international institutions or transnational organisations to be a force for emancipation and freedom for individuals is shown to be problematic in practice. I have argued that this rejection of the pluralist security framework does not challenge the status quo, but serves to further entrench power inequalities. In fact, it seems to reflect the increased freedom of the international community to intervene in other states.

8 Conclusion

The political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches to security and conflict

In the preceding chapters I have attempted to develop an argument about the political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches to contemporary international relations. The key claim of critical and emancipatory theorists is to pose a challenge to contemporary global power structures. In the preceding chapters I have argued that critical approaches cannot pose a challenge to contemporary power relations. However, this is neither because, as critical theorists such as Richard Devetak have argued, critical theorists need to ensure that they maintain a distance from interventionist policies (2007) nor because, as radical critics have argued, critical theorists are simply the theoretical wing of liberal interventionism (Douzinas, 2007).

Rather, the work has sought to draw out the problematic political assumptions of critical and emancipatory theorists and similarities with contemporary security policies and rhetoric. There are theoretical and political limits to contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches which mean that whatever the intent of contemporary critical theorists they cannot pose a challenge to contemporary power structures or discourses. This argument was explored in two ways, in chapters 1–3 I engaged with contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches to security, and in chapters 4–6 with critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars.

In chapter 1 I drew out the central arguments of contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists that security needs to be reconceptualised in terms of human freedom and well being, and that more cosmopolitan forms of international organisation should be constructed, in which human rights and dignity should not be a matter of chance depending upon which state a person happens to be born in, but universal rights. In chapter 2 I put critical and emancipatory theory in its contemporary context, and argued that critical theorists were engaging with a security framework which has decreasing relevance in the contemporary context. Within major international institutions, such as the UN, and in the policy and policy discourse of states the old certainties of the pluralist security framework were being subjected to critique and redefinition at the highest level of international policy making. In fact, security policies and discourses are much similar than otherwise to the prescriptions of critical security theorists.

This suggests that contrary to the claims of contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists they are not engaging in the 'here and now'. However, engaging with

structures and discourses of contemporary power must be fundamental to the task of posing a challenge to those power relations and structures. This suggests that critical and emancipatory theorists are idealistic, because their critique is not driven by an engagement with contemporary power structures. In chapter 3 I explored this theoretical problem in more depth, and argued that for contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists the source of critical engagement was in their own moral values rather than engagement with structures of power. This points to a serious theoretical limit to contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches. Critical and emancipatory theorists are engaging in an exercise in idealism, this is shown because their critique is not rooted in an engagement with, and critique of, contemporary structures and discourses of power. Rather, the critique of critical theorists is little more than a statement of their own moral values.

In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I shifted focus to look at critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars. I argued that the Yugoslav break-up and wars led to a significant amount of critical work. The Yugoslav wars were argued to require a different paradigm of understanding to the way in which war had been understood during the Cold War. For critical scholars, the way in which the international community dealt with the break-up and wars and the security policy paradigm used was anachronistic and failed to take account of the new realities. Contemporary security policy was argued to perpetuate the conflict because of a reliance on a state-centric model which elevated state security above human rights and freedom. The international community needed to take a more cosmopolitan and emancipatory approach. For critical and emancipatory approaches, questions of ethics, justice and human rights (for example) must be at the very centre of thinking about security.

In chapter 5 I argued that important political questions relating to citizenship and self-determination came to the fore in the context of the Yugoslav crisis. The questions of what would happen to citizenship in the event of the separation of the federal state (which until the 1980s had remained a theoretical problem for constitutional lawyers and theorists to debate) became, in the context of pre-break up economic and social problems, an actual pressing political question. As the federal state moved towards dissolution these questions became material matters of political contestation, as the dissolution entailed a transformation of citizenship and associated political rights for some groups.

In chapter 6 I argued that international policy and policy initiatives, specifically EC policy, in the early stages of the conflict could not be understood within a limited and reactive pluralist security framework for action. Rather than pursuing political compromise and stability, EC policy showed a marked disregard for these traditional limited priorities. Rather, international policy was marked by a moralised discourse that argued for the elevation of people's rights, and the rule of law, for example, above the integrity of the state or political compromises between the parties to the conflict. Furthermore, far from being reactive and a case of 'too little, too late', the EC was actively involved in the conflict from an early stage and effectively became a major player, both in defining what the crisis actually was, and in terms of laying out the framework for how the crisis was to be resolved. EC policies internationalised the Yugoslav crisis and intervened in the conflict in

important and novel ways, for example, through treating the constituent parts of the federal state as entities at par with the state. Furthermore, a significant feature of the EC's policy initiatives was their *ad hoc* and sometimes contradictory nature. Rather than being stuck in the old Cold War security framework, EC policy seemed to be de-linked from the pluralist security framework.

In conclusion I argued that critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars share the idealistic approach of the critical theorists discussed in chapters 1–3 and fail to engage with both the significant internal and external dynamics to the conflict, and their critique is not driven by an engagement with the actual conflict, but seemingly by the moral values of the theorist. Moreover, international policy towards the Yugoslav wars was much closer to that advocated by the critical theorists. For critical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars there is an idealised assumption about rights and law and a lack of understanding that there must be a political constituency to give it content. Yet an engagement with actually occurring international policy at the time would show exactly the problematic limits of this approach in terms of conflict.

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of 'emancipatory' security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states.

This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and 'blindness' to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to 'protect' and emancipate individuals globally.

Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, 'if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed' (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a 'cosmopolitan' legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005).

For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is *unrealistic*. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism

attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is:

> [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today's conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock.
>
> (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189)

Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

It seems clear that since the 1990s and the shift away from formal framework for international affairs in terms of formal sovereign equality and non intervention, weak and troubled states have become increasingly opened up to interference and intervention by great powers. There is no global political constituency in existence and the world order as it currently is one in which power is unevenly distributed. Shifting away from even formal prohibitions against intervention and formal sovereign equality simply gives more powerful states greater power. This cannot represent a step towards greater emancipation for the citizens of those states, in fact it represents an increasing lack of freedom. For contemporary critical theorists, there is a failure to understand that rights are not things in themselves that can create freedom. In certain concrete situations human rights can easily become their opposite, a system in which external powers become sovereign. For this reason, a critical approach must entail an engagement with the here and now and the exercise of contemporary power relations, but this is exactly what contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists are not doing.

An example of this trend can be found in Booth's arguments that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other declarations of rights have challenged the sovereign state (2007: 166–167). In the first place, as we have seen in chapter 1, despite such declarations the pluralist security framework remained in place during the Cold War, but perhaps more importantly a concrete engagement with the

exercise of post-Cold War power relations would show that the UN was an institution set up by the new hegemonic power, America, as a way of cementing its authority. In this context the various declarations of human rights were not a challenge to power but a fundamental part of the exercise of power (Sellars, 2002).

Critical and emancipatory theorists have an abstract and idealised view of the international system, excluding broader questions about international organisation and power inequalities. Critical security theorists wish the complicated world, and complex conflicts, to conform to an abstract moral framework. Yet, as 'traditional' theorists E H Carr and Hedley Bull warned, this is simply an evasion of engagement with the actually existing international order and a substitution of the moral preferences of the theorist. As Carr argued about contemporary idealists:

> The utopian is necessarily voluntarist: he believes in the possibility of more or less radically rejecting reality, and substituting his utopia for it by an act of will . . . the utopian makes political theory a norm to which political practice ought to conform.

> (1964 [1939]: 11, 12)

Of course, this is not to say that a real cosmopolitan order cannot exist, but this would entail a genuine transformation of the international and national order. The international order as it exists is still one that is divided into states and one which is marked by major power inequalities. In this context, the prescriptions of critical security theorists which aim to achieve a more 'cosmopolitan' international order becomes one in which power inequalities are entrenched even further. Moreover, there seems to be a step backwards in terms of a re-division between those members of the international community entitled to be full members and those which are there under sufferance and may be punished for their failings. This is quite clear in the human security framework, as discussed in chapter 7.

Towards a political critique of critical and emancipatory approaches

Critics of critical and emancipatory theory have raised pertinent problems in terms both of the idealism of critical approaches and their problematic relationship to contemporary liberal intervention. Critical theorists themselves are aware that their prescriptions seem to be hard to separate from contemporary discourses and practices of power, yet critical theorists do not seem to be able to offer any understanding of why this might be. However, the limitations to critical and emancipatory approaches cannot be overcome by distinguishing themselves from liberal internationalist policy. In fact a closer engagement with contemporary security policies and discourse would show the similarities with critical theory and that both suffer from the same limitations.

The limitations of critical and emancipatory approaches are to be found in critical prescriptions in the contemporary political context. Jahn is right to argue that critical theory is idealistic, but this needs to be explained why. Douzinas is right to

argue that critical theory becomes a justification for power and this needs to be explained why. The reasons for this remain undertheorised. I argue here that critical and emancipatory approaches lack a fundamental understanding of what is at stake in the political realm. For critical theorists the state and sovereignty represent oppressive structures that work against human freedom. There is much merit to this critique of the inequities of the state system. However, the problem is that freedom or emancipation are not simply words that can breathe life into international affairs but in the material circumstances of the contemporary world must be linked to political constituencies, that is men and women who can give content to that freedom and make freedom a reality.

Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a political content to emancipation and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment beyond the state that can give real content to those wishes. There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that the UN, for example, is a step towards global democracy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context cannot hasten any kind of more just world order in which people really matter (to paraphrase Lynch). Whatever the limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives.

Critical theorists who argue for more cosmopolitan international frameworks of universal human rights or more global democratic organisations in order to emancipate the oppressed fail to understand that in the current political context they are arguing for fictional rights and communities. In this context, these rights can only be given at the behest of a more powerful state or international organisation. This, however, leads to a relationship between the rights recipient and the rights giver which is not a political relationship of control and accountability, but one closer, as Emma Rothschild has perceptively argued, to charity (Rothschild, 1995).

In order to illustrate this problem from another angle, let us consider briefly the concept of Children's Rights (this example is taken from Norman Lewis, 1998) or gender inequality. Without a doubt in many parts of the world children and women suffer greatly and have many unfair burdens upon them. It may seem therefore that the UN Convention on Children's Rights, for example, or a framework of universal human rights codified in international law might be seen as a good and progressive thing in order to decrease inequality and empower women and children. Certainly for many critical and emancipatory theorists, as we have seen, the emerging rights regime is part of a potentially more just world order.

However, as James Heartfield (1996) has argued, this is to understand that rights are a purely legal matter, rather than a product of prior social and political struggle which is then given legal form. Rights derive from subjects who are capable of exercising them and giving content to them (Heartfield, 1996; Lewis, 1998). Without the social and political struggle and the development of the rights-bearing individual who gives the legal rights their content, rights are fictions. Of course in

reality a person in Britain (for example) does not directly exercise his or her rights, rather they are enforced by the existing state. If, for example, a women is denied employment because of her gender this infringes her rights. These rights are codified in state law. She may then go to court in order to force the company to abide by the law and her rights will be upheld. This is not, however, simply an esoteric point for political theorists but one with major implications for people.

If we return to the example of the UN Convention on Children's Rights we can begin to see what the problematic implications of rights without content are. Children's rights cannot be exercised by children, they do not have the capacity, they are dependent upon other people in order to survive. Their rights are fictions which must be exercised on behalf of them (Lewis, 1998: 93). In reality this means that the state, for example, is empowered here, not the child. In the broader context of contemporary international relations it tends to mean that the developing country in which children's rights are seen to be lacking (for example a country in which child labour is common) is subject to greater intervention and regulation from a more 'enlightened' international community. This also has the effect of turning what are essentially consequences of serious poverty and a low level of development into problems of law and morality. Again, more powerful 'enlightened' states are empowered to intervene and regulate developing states in the name of international law and human rights (Lewis, 1998: 95–98). As the problems, however, are not matters of law but of development they cannot be resolved through law. Not only is state sovereignty eroded but the idea of law also.

We could also consider the problem of gender inequality in a developing state. A woman in Afghanistan, for example, clearly does not have the civil rights that a woman in another state might have. Yet of course, these are rights that she cannot claim against the government of her state, or rather the government cannot give content to these rights as the government's control in the case of Afghanistan does not go much further than Kabul. Rather, the only way in which there may be a way for her to have these rights would be through the intervention of another state (indeed women's rights formed part of the rationale for the military intervention in Afghanistan) whether military or tied to aid. Here, there will be no political relationship between the Afghan woman and, for example, NATO. There will be no mechanism of control and accountability for the woman, her rights are in the gift of power external forces and therefore not rights that can empower as they are not controlled by her.

Friedrich Kratochwil argues that critical theory has to address 'what types of constitutive understanding authorise particular practices and this creates specific types of authority' (2007: 36). I argue that critical and emancipatory approaches have a certain unrealised constitutive understanding which is abstract and idealised, leading ultimately to forms of power and political practice that are disempowering. Critical theorists separate the rights bearer from the rights claimant. In the absence of any constitutive body that can give content to those rights or even agreed norms that can derive from that political body, these rights are at best meaningless and at worst empower precisely those practices which critical theorists wish to resolve. It is in this respect that in contemporary context critical

and emancipatory approaches reproduce and authorise the constitutive particular practices of contemporary powers.

Underlying this investigation of critical security theory is an argument that a critical theoretical approach to security may offer great potential to provide critical insights into the post-Cold War security problematic. Asking how critical is contemporary critical security theory is the first step in trying to engage in a critical analysis of the contemporary security problematic.

Notes

1 Introduction

1 Although it is of note that Realist scholars have not seen any need to change their analytical framework (see for example Walt, 1991; Waltz, 1993).

2 The problem of idealism

2 Although the problematisation of the Cold War security framework based upon the narrow pursuit of, or protection of, national interest is highlighted as a significant aspect of the post-Cold War security problematic, it will be beyond the scope of this work to engage in the debate about what the national interest actually *is* and how it is constituted. As Hedley Bull has pointed out, the concept of national interest in itself is relatively meaningless as a guide to understanding or explaining state behaviour in itself (2002 [1977]: 63). What each state's national interest might be, and how it might protect and pursue its national interests, must derive from the social, economic and political content of the state itself. The term national interest is here understood very broadly, to mean both the protection of territory and also the social, political and economic system of a state, whatever that may be. Certainly the argument has been made forcefully in recent years that the modern conception of national interest is specifically linked to a particular form of political organisation. National interest, far from representing some kind of objective reality or reaction to external necessity, is argued to play a specific ideological role in constituting the domestic political sphere (see for example, Rosenberg, 1994; Campbell, 1998c [1992]; Gourevitch, 2007; also Weldes, 1996, for an overview of academic discussion on the subject of national interest during the Cold War and an argument for a constructivist account of the national interest).

3 To clarify, this work does not engage generally in any debates about to what extent the global security problematic has changed since the Cold War. For example, recent research and data-sets have suggested that contrary to received opinion, overall the world has witnessed a steady decline in both inter- and intrastate conflict (Gleditsch *et al.* 2002; Human Security Centre, 2005; also see Newman, 2004a: 180). Nor does the work engage in questions about to what extent qualitative or quantitative changes in the global security problematic necessarily lead to an overturning of the Cold War framework; after all, as Zaki Laidi has pointed out, the Cold War framework withstood many changes, from decolonisation, to the spread of nuclear weapons (Laidi, 1998: 15).

4 This resolution does have some precedents during the Cold War, in which internal policies of Southern Rhodesia, and subsequently the system of apartheid in South Africa, were stated to be threats to international peace and security (for example, SCR 216, 217 [1965]; 221, 232 [1966]; 253 [1968]; 388 [1976]; SCR 282, 311, 418, 473 [1980]). However, there was a specific context for these particular resolutions, which was that of the dismantling

of the old European empires and the expansion of the formally self-determining sovereign state as the main political form in the post-World War II international system, which the system of apartheid, built explicitly on the exclusion of the majority of the population, clearly contradicted.

6 International exclusions

5 The name given to the system of committees established in the early 1970s in which senior foreign policy officials and foreign ministers from member states met regularly with the aim of increasing EC cooperation and coordination in foreign policy (see Cameron, 1999: 17–23 for details).

7 Power and agency in the post-pluralist security framework

6 For example, see www.humansecuritynetwork.org.
7 See www.humansecurity.gc.ca.

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