

The Francoist Military Trials

Terror and Complicity, 1939–1945

Peter Anderson



The Francoist Military Trials

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For Karen

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Introduction

On the 26th July 1940, a widowed landowner in the village of Pedroche in the north of Córdoba province in rural southern Spain handed over a note to her local police officer. The woman had lost her husband and three of her sons to gun wielding militia forces during the recently concluded Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 and in the missive, drawn in her own hand, she turned on a fellow villager: a 39 year old man who had lived in the village headquarters of the Spanish Socialist Party. She first denounced him for an incident that took place before the outbreak of the war. Allegedly, he had accosted her in the main village square and insulted her for attending Church services. To this charge she added the accusation that he had been one of the leading ‘Marxists’ in the village and that at the start of the war he had stomped around local streets flaunting a red flag. Finally, she accused him of seizing her house in the name of the new council in the bloody and revolutionary early days that marked the start of the Spanish conflagration.

That very afternoon, the police swooped on the man and threw him into prison where they kept him behind bars until 14 April 1942. This proved a fateful day for the socialist, who found himself hauled before a summary military tribunal. The army judges gave him short shrift and—on the basis of the denunciation, a few vague witness statements and a report from the village mayor that did no more than echo the widow’s allegations—condemned him, as his denouncer had every reason to believe they probably would, to twenty years in prison.¹

This one story forms just a tiny fragment of the wider history of the repression experienced by those who lost the war at the hands of the Civil War victors. Many tens of thousands of ordinary Spaniards who had rallied to the defence of the Spanish Second Republic (1931–1939) in the Civil War found themselves tried by summary court martial after Francoist forces occupied their towns and villages. Indeed, in 1945 the well-informed Secretary of the British Embassy in Madrid, Bernard Malley, estimated after careful study that the military courts had handed down sentences on more than one million people since the start of the Civil War in July 1936.² He also noted that ‘in many [cases] sentences were pronounced because service for the Republican government in any capacity was interpreted as

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responsibility or complicity in connection with common offences committed by third persons generally unknown to the accused'. In short, for Malley the trials represented no more than an unconscionable 'juridical monstrosity'.³ Although it is the case that across Spain the bulk of such prisoners had secured parole by the mid-1940s, we should remember that their suffering did not end at the prison exit. Indeed, they walked into society stigmatised by their criminal records and often broken by their time behind bars.⁴

This book investigates the post-war (1939–1945) trials when any possible military justification for the prosecutions that marked people out in such ways had withered away. It shows that large numbers of defeated supporters of the centre-left coalition governing the Republic, like the Pedrocche socialist, fell victim to the allegations that a number of their embittered neighbours proved prepared to level against them. Of course far from all Franco's supporters harboured a deep hatred for their defeated opponents or became drawn into the trial system. Moreover, those who did become wrapped up in the repression participated to many varying degrees. With these important qualifications in mind, however, the book does show the important role played by those neighbours who proved prepared to single out individual supporters of the elected government for prosecution and to furnish the 'evidence' that sealed their conviction at the hands of soldiers serving on the bench. The book also asks what happened to these victims of the courts, and their relatives, after they left prison. It shows that groups of the regime's supporters together with the Francoist authorities worked to criminalise, stigmatise and marginalise huge numbers of Spanish Republicans long after many of Franco's prisoners had emerged from the depths of the squalid prison system.⁵ In short, the book examines the way in which a significant number of grassroots Francoists supported, initiated and sustained the staggeringly large work of the post-Civil War military tribunals both inside and outside the courtroom.

Turning our attention in this way to the trials, and to the processes that underpinned them, matters for a number of reasons. One of the most fundamental of all is that the trials came to form one of the central pillars of the Francoist repression. The military trials began with the start of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 when a group of right-wing generals and civilian supporters took up arms against the government. The rebels botched their coup and won control of only parts of the country. The areas they captured included much of Spain north of Madrid and west of Catalonia, and a swathe of territory in western Andalusia.⁶ Concerned that the success of their rebellion depended both upon physically eliminating large numbers of the politicised and organised supporters of the Republic and on instilling fear and terror, rebels in these areas at once rolled out a programme of mass killing and incarceration. In many cases, they relied on an assortment of paramilitary squads to cut down the supporters of the Republic they rounded up.⁷ But they also dragged opponents before summary military tribunals and charged them with military rebellion for

supporting the elected government. Conviction carried the death sentence or terms of up to thirty years in prison.⁸ Although the death squads continued to slaughter supporters of the Republic throughout both the Civil War and post-war periods, over time the military tribunals took an increasingly central role.⁹ These courts laboured right through until April 1945, when following the defeat of Nazi Germany and the ensuing need to appease the Allies, the regime called a halt to the prosecutions of those accused of supporting the Republic in the Civil War.¹⁰

The post-war trials also tell a very particular story about how the Franco regime refused to bury the hatchet long after the end of the war in April 1939. The regime's own clerks recorded the scale of this grim story for us. Their ledgers tell us that between the formal end of the war and the turn of 1940, Francoist military tribunals had already condemned over 13,179 supporters of the Republic to long terms in the disease-ridden Francoist prison system. A further 186,012 still awaited the time when they too would fall under the military judicial hammer.¹¹ Large though these figures are, we have reason to treat them cautiously as they centre on provincial prisons and exclude those locked up in jails serving local courts and those packed into a legion of make-shift penitentiaries.¹² They also leave out those sentenced to death, and recent research has revealed that Francoist courts, together with Francoist death squads, sent 50,000 Republicans to an early grave between 1939 and 1945. These deaths came on top of the 100,000 killed behind the lines in the war itself.¹³ In addition to all this, we know that in some provinces the authorities investigated nearly 10% of the population for potential trials, although an as yet unquantified number of these victims had their cases shelved.¹⁴

Despite such qualifications, the Francoist repression stood out in Europe's grim mid-century. Indeed, both the scale and brutality of the killings and jailings sent shivers down the spines of Franco's Axis allies. For even the warmongering Mussolini found the punishment meted out by the Spanish military tribunals too much to stomach. He had first become deeply involved in Spain in July 1936 when Franco, among other generals and civilian supporters, had rebelled against the elected centre-left government of the Second Republic. The Duce lent a helping hand and over time poured in huge quantities of arms and soldiers into the conflict. While Mussolini pursued rapid victories and believed executions stiffened resistance, Franco set himself on dishing out harsh punishment on his defeated opponents. Thus in June 1937, when the Italians helped seize Bilbao, Mussolini's representatives first tried to keep Basque prisoners out of Franco's hands and then in August attempted to place Italian officers on prisoner classification committees in an effort to ease the repression.¹⁵ The Vichy regime too drew back from handing over prisoners to the pitiless Franco regime after recoiling in horror at executions.¹⁶ Similarly, Henrich Himmler, after he visited Spain in October 1940 to shore up close co-operation between the Spanish police services and the Gestapo, proclaimed his shock at the scale of the Francoist repression.¹⁷

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Despite this contemporary dismay by the hardened leaders of some of the most unflinching regimes at the refusal of Francoists to pull their punches about the trial system, in the early twenty-first century it is the grim Francoist repression in Spain that has dimmed most with the passing of time. For while vigorous debates on the dark national past emerged from the 1960s in countries such as the German Federal Republic, Italy and France, in Spain the stones piled over the past remained largely unturned until the mid-1980s.¹⁸ One reason for this is that, alone among the regimes within the Axis fold, the Franco regime survived the Second World War. Admittedly at the end of the Second World War, Franco found himself out in the cold. The common knowledge that the Axis powers had brought him to power and that he had itched to join Hitler in forging a New Order during the Second World War led many among the United Nations to hold their noses and to hope his regime would simply rot away. Once the Cold War began, however, Spain's leaders soon found themselves in favour with the leading western powers. Now regarding the Franco regime as a bulwark against communism, and preoccupied with other problems, these major powers showed little or no inclination to rummage around in the Franco regime's closets for skeletons. Instead, leading US senators and military emissaries from the Pentagon beat a rapid path to Franco's door.¹⁹

Given a free hand at home the Franco regime ruled with an iron fist that cowed the opposition and left the regime free to write its own history. In this regard, it is no mistake that Franco's policemen took charge of writing history for the regime and 'proving' the mendacity of their opponents. This process began in April 1938 when, with the SS lending a helping hand, Francoists set up the National Department for the Recovery of Documents. Its job was to follow frontline soldiers into newly occupied areas and confiscate any document that would help the authorities hunt down their enemies. So voraciously did its staff consume clues that by 1940 from across Spain its representatives could boast that they had stacked up 800 tons of paperwork at their headquarters in Salamanca which they claimed stood testimony to the inherent criminal bent of all Republicans.²⁰

This police archive now forms part of one the most important research centres on the Spanish Civil War. For years Franco's sleuths enjoyed exclusive access to historical documents which they exploited to churn out a whole series of diatribes criminalising supporters of the Republic. Police inspector Eduardo Comín Colomer provides a good example. Regime pen pushers like Comín prided themselves on what they proclaimed to be the quality of their evidence. Thus his 1965 book on the history of the Communist Party in Spain opens with the astounding claim that his study represents an exceptionally well-documented and objective study of the penetration of communism and its Soviet masters into the Spanish Fatherland.²¹ The fact was, however, that Comín, as a police officer, enjoyed access to documents denied to others. A case in point comes from the personal papers that belonged to the former president of the Republic, the centre politician

Manuel Azaña. The Gestapo had captured the documents in France in July 1940 and subsequently handed them over to the Spanish. After Franco had cast his eye over the documents, they ended up in a cupboard in an office at a police training college, and Comín also worked as a police instructor, until discovered in 1984 when the Socialist government which had come to power two years earlier swept its new broom through this dusty outpost of Francoism.²²

Ever mindful of the need to reassure their new Cold War allies and to present the Franco regime as legitimate, however, those who pushed their pens for the regime made little mention of the repression. When they did, they grossly underestimated the number of victims.²³ Francoists also carefully doctored records to disguise their crimes by dumping corpses in unmarked mass graves and leaving huge numbers of deaths unregistered.²⁴ Moreover, the regime constantly refused to recognise the flimsy, unsafe and unjust nature of the convictions in the military tribunals and kept the court records under lock and key.

This refusal to square up to the past continued even after Franco's death in 1975 and the subsequent transition to democracy that lasted until the Spanish Socialist Party came to power in 1982. During the transition, many of the Francoist old guard retained positions of power, especially in the army, which they used to hold a gun to the head of the elite politicians overseeing the change of systems. Accordingly, the political elite decided not to bring Francoists to book for their crimes and ordinary Spaniards felt it best to steer clear of discussing the divisive and repressive past.²⁵ Thus the transition gave a breathing space to old guard Francoists, which some of them used to shred important documentary evidence. A particularly notorious case is that of former Falangist (the Falange became Franco's own fascist-leaning party) Rodolfo Martín Villa. Martín, who occupied the post of home secretary between 1976 and 1979, ordered the destruction of the records of the Gestapo-trained Falangist police service.²⁶ In response, his underlings removed and pulped the all-important files by the lorry load.²⁷ Meanwhile, the records of the military tribunals remained under wraps, and even to this day the army archives remain extremely difficult to access and subject to the Spanish Official Secrets Act.²⁸

Thus the debate in Spain on the country's dark past could only begin to take shape during the 1980s and then with great difficulty. Indeed, basic information proved hard to come by and so historians played an important role in stimulating debate. From necessity many of the valuable books these tireless researchers produced focused on the basic questions that had long been next to impossible to discuss. In particular, they asked how many the death squads had done to death and also established both the victims' names and where Francoists had dumped their corpses.²⁹

Publishing the answers to these questions has played an important role in Spanish society's efforts to come to terms with the past.³⁰ Importantly, many family members have only come to know of how and where their

loved ones died through these publications.³¹ Significantly too, this work has helped to stimulate a major civil rights movement in Spain that now works to identify mass graves, to exhume and identify the corpses and to commemorate the dead properly.³² These are major achievements, but the pressing need to answer immediate questions about the number and identity of the dead means that to date historians have paid less attention to the processes and complicity that lay behind the Francoist killings and incarcerations. This book seeks to shed light on these two areas by placing the neglected military trial system under the microscope and by drawing on trial records that have only recently become available to study.

One of the benefits of being able to make a close study of these records is that they allow us to reconsider the way in which the Franco regime took hold in Spanish society. For the focus on the outcome of the repression in many existing studies tends to highlight the role and strength of state institutions and indeed some studies have placed great emphasis on the power of the Francoist police state to impose itself upon Spanish society.³³ However, a difficulty with the concept of the police state is that it comes largely from the early Cold War historiography of totalitarianism that portrayed regimes as autonomous from the societies they were credited with being able to control and subject. For this very reason, particularly from the 1980s, historians of Nazi Germany began to distance themselves from such concepts and instead began to examine self-policing societies where the overlaps between state and society could fall under examination.³⁴

Accordingly, as part of the efforts to deepen our understanding of the relationships that made repression possible in Europe's bleak mid-twentieth century, this book seeks to explore the role of members of Spanish society in driving the processes behind the military trials during the post-war period. The first three chapters begin this examination by studying how from the 1890s the lives of large number of Spaniards became caught up in bitter social and political conflict. It traces both how a number of opportunities to achieve social peace fell by the wayside and the way the voices of moderation increasingly lost their audience to belligerent hardliners.

Chapters 4–6 continue this analysis by showing how highly mobilised and ideologically charged members of Spanish society took up the gun at the start of the Civil War in July 1936 in order to destroy their enemies. It also traces the lines of continuity that ran through Francoist violence. Although some might have been cajoled into the death squads, an important reason why this violence flourished is that sufficient numbers among the rank and file of the political right believed both in the legitimacy and efficacy of violence. This backing for the politics of the bullet meant that death squads could recruit from within the mass ranks of right-wing parties and rely on their wider support base for information on which political activists for the Republic to target for elimination.

The Francoist authorities later did all they could to disguise the work of the death squads through simple remedies such as threatening to shoot

anyone who mentioned the murders.³⁵ In contrast, they constantly and misleadingly justified their military trials as a specific response to violence perpetrated by some of those who swung behind the Republic during the Civil War.³⁶ In reality, however, these superficial trials never proved that those in the dock had committed these acts of violence. As a result, Franco's military tribunals exercised much the same function as the death squads in targeting political activists for the Republic on the basis of intelligence supplied by the regime's support base about the political background of the accused. In this sense, the difference between the death squads and the tribunals lay, aside from the greater use of prison over the cemetery, in the larger scale of the trial system and the sheer quantity of supporters the regime needed to rope in to make the wheels of the military tribunals turn.

By turning its attention to such collaboration, the book argues that we can also help make further and richer comparisons with other European countries. For many existing studies of Francoist violence have explored the killings and jailings on a province-by-province basis. However, this book argues that across Spain the Franco regime devolved its prosecution system down to the municipal level. Consequently, the crucial collaboration that occurred here at the base of society can sometimes be missed in provincial-wide studies. Indeed, we possess evidence from across Spain that indicates that the prosecution process did take place at the municipal level.³⁷ Despite this, the prosecution processes behind the trials remain largely unexplored. Accordingly, this book, by studying the trials at the grassroots of society, seeks to offer both a worm's eye view of a national phenomenon and the chance to draw better comparisons with other European cases which have increasingly turned to the study of the role of those from below in interacting with the agents of the state.³⁸

To do this, Chapters 7–10 study the prosecution processes in the judicial *partido* (area) of Pozoblanco in the north of Córdoba province. They show how in this area a pool of denouncers played a fundamental role in selecting those for prosecution and that hostile testimony offered by groups of neighbours of those on trials proved crucial both in securing conviction and in shaping the length of prison terms handed down to the regime's enemies. This, of course, is not to stake a claim that the Pozoblanco area can be fully representative of the whole of Spain. Indeed, this area suffered very heavy levels of violence both during the time when held by the Republic during the Civil War period and in the course of the Francoist occupation that began at the end of the conflagration in late March 1939. However, precisely because Francoists chose to present their trials to the world as acts of justice against the perpetrators of 'red crimes', the Pozoblanco area offers an insight into the kinds of insubstantial allegations that underlay many military prosecutions across Spain. In this sense, the Pozoblanco case undermines any notion that the military tribunals simply meted out Franco's 'justice'. Moreover, we also possess memoir material that indicates that the kinds of collaboration revealed in the Pozoblanco case is very likely to be mirrored in other parts of Spain.³⁹

The study of Pozoblanco also shows that the work of the tribunals and their collaborators did much more than send supporters of the Republic down into the depths of the Francoist prison system. Indeed, as Chapter 11 shows, the military courts sat in the centre of a web of repressive institutions that ensnared supporters of the Republic for years. One way this web took shape was that copies of the sentences handed down by the courts passed automatically to other tribunals, such as the Tribunal for Political Responsibility, charged with seizing the property and assets of all those who had lent their support to the defeated Republic.⁴⁰ The web also drew in prisoners released on parole, many of whom found that the sentences passed down to them by military judges marked both them and their families out in their own communities. Indeed, significant numbers of those who made it out of the Francoist prison system found themselves, as Chapter 12 demonstrates, discriminated against and impoverished by some of their own neighbours.

Accordingly, by studying the work of the tribunals at the grassroots, and in their full social setting, we gain a much broader view than we can by looking at repressive institutions in isolation. We are also able to bring into relief the enduring nature of the repression long after the period when some historians argue that the repression had been ‘wound down’.⁴¹ Perhaps most of all we can see that Francoism itself consisted of much more than a political system. For it was also a social phenomenon and a process actively forged by both state representatives and ordinary sympathisers.

Importantly, by studying these ways in which Francoists honed their political and social system at the grassroots we can better understand why coming to terms with the past in Spain continues to prove so difficult. Certainly, one of the achievements of historians and political activists in recent years has been to push this past into the limelight and to press for parliamentary action to right the wrongs of Francoism. As a result, large amounts of parliamentary time have been devoted to debating and finally, in December 2007, passing the Law of Historical Memory that seeks to help families of those killed by the Francoist side, and whose remains often continue to rest in unmarked mass graves, to honour their dead.⁴² Despite these laudable intentions, however, one of the striking features of this law is that it caused a noticeable increase in friction between the political right and the centre and left.⁴³

There are many reasons for this rise in the political temperature. One cause is that the main conservative party, the Popular Party (PP)—founded by former Francoists and from the 1990s in good measure under the control of the children or grandchildren of one time ardent supporters of the general—argues that the past is best left untouched.⁴⁴ This is why it took six years of parliamentary harrying until in November 2002 the PP agreed to a parliamentary condemnation of the military coup that brought Franco to power and to take steps to honour Franco’s victims.⁴⁵ A further explanation is that behind this formal condemnation by the PP parliamentary

group lurks a profound antipathy among sections of the PP's grassroots who continue to resist attempts to revise the standing of the Franco regime in Spanish history. Thus while the parliamentary party found itself able to condemn the military trial and conviction of the Catalan Catholic deputy Manuel Carrasco, who had sided with the Republic during the Civil War and saved many lives, PP members at the municipal level drew a line in the sand at changing Francoist street names or at removing statues to the dictator or honorific titles bestowed on the dictator.⁴⁶ The debate over the Law of Historical Memory, however, which came at a time when the PP had embarked upon a course of unbending opposition, saw an end to the PP's parliamentary party's willingness to strike deals over the past. In defence of this position the PP marshalled the argument that it wanted to keep open the spirit of reconciliation that characterised the transition to democracy and to prevent Spaniards from confronting one another again.⁴⁷

A further difficulty in facing the past comes from the nature of the transition to democracy that saw an almost seamless move from Francoism to the new political system. Thus the democratic constitution of 1978 designed to replace the old regime in fact adopted many of the legal practices and principles that governed Francoism. This means that condemning Francoist legal decisions as illegitimate, and overturning the verdicts of the military courts in particular, threatens the legitimacy of the new political system built on the foundations of Francoism itself and leads politicians to be reluctant to overturn the verdicts of the summary military courts *en masse*.⁴⁸ Another potential problem is that the 1977 Amnesty Law designed to smooth the transition towards democracy is argued by some to make it impossible to bring charges against supporters of the Franco regime for human rights abuses.⁴⁹

That said, current governments also appear wary of issuing blanket condemnations of the Francoist military courts because it would open the field to a mass of claims for compensation. These claims could include not just victims and their relatives, unjustly deprived of their liberty, reputation and, in many cases, their lives, but also an enormous number of demands for the reinstatement of property rights. A recent court case, although involving an unusually large amount of money, casts some light on this wide problem. The case concerned land that had been 'given' to the Spanish Ministry of Defence by relatives of a man imprisoned by Francoists during the Spanish Civil War. In 1997, the ministry sold on the land to property developers for 1.5 million Euros. However, the Spanish Supreme Court ruled that the land should be returned to the family of the imprisoned man.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, at the heart of all the reservations about stirring up the Francoist past lies the festering fear of social division brought about by the Civil War and the Francoist repression. For victims of the repression in cities, towns and villages across Spain continued to live alongside some of those who had denounced them, testified against them, seized their property and pushed them to the margins of society. Understandably, avoiding

discussion of the past proved the easiest way of co-existing for both those who fell victim to the repression and those who had wanted to see them punished. Even today challenging the silence can come at a price. For some historians who have studied the Francoist repression, especially those working in small villages, have found themselves subject to civil prosecutions by the relatives of those whom their research shows to have been implicated. These prosecutions have continued even after the passing of the Law of Historical Memory.⁵¹ The result is that those who had suffered at the hands of the tribunals continue to shoulder much of the burden for the past because part of their travails continues to go unrecognised. Another consequence of these difficulties in coming to terms with Francoism is the almost obsessive references in the Spanish media to a past that seems so hard to put to rest.⁵²

By examining the role of groups of grassroots Francoists in the military tribunals, this work provides an insight into the fraught and plain nasty nature of this past and why it is so difficult to assimilate. Its aim is not to rub salt in old wounds nor to point the finger of blame, but rather to understand Francoism. For if we do not investigate the Francoist trial system we cannot fully appreciate the extent to which Francoism flourished on the basis of mass social exclusion. By the same token we will not be able to understand how the military trials came about and we will not fully comprehend the extent to which Francoists forged their system from deep inside Spanish society.

Part I

The Roots of Conflict

1 Planting the Seeds, 1898–1923

‘Long Live Death!’¹

Slogan of Franco’s military mentor Millán Astray

At the start of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, one of the leaders of the military- and civilian-backed revolt against the elected Popular Front government that sparked the conflict, General Mola, declared the rebels’ intention to ‘wrench out by the roots, for ever, all that represents the organisations and principles of Marxism’.² His words reveal a deep-seated fear of the mass ranks of the centre and left political organisations that had prospered since the arrival of the democratic Second Republic in 1931. For in the final analysis the rebels turned to violence because they wanted to wrestle back control of the state they had lost in 1931 and put an end to reforms brought about by the Republic, which they presented as ushering in the apocalypse. However, shedding light on why so many from the rebel side took up the cudgels requires us to take into account more than the fears of the 1930s. Indeed, the seeds of their concerns had long been germinating deep in the furrows of Spain’s social and political conflict. Importantly, these fears did not lead to a spirit of compromise which might have let steam out of the body politic. Instead, safely ensconced in power and with a towering command over the heights of the economy, many on the right had long held out against reform. As a result they let slip a set of chances to take much of the sting out of the struggles that bedevilled Spanish national life.

This is why analysing who had cracked the political whip before the coming of the Second Republic in 1931 provides an important starting point in understanding the violence of the 1930s and 1940s. One way Spain’s governing classes had kept their hands on power was through the notorious *cacique* system. Under this electoral arrangement first introduced in the 1870s, political bigwigs in Madrid working in cahoots with their placemen across Spain fixed ballots to ensure that their underlings won office and kept reformist upstarts out of parliament. Once parachuted into office, these sinecure politicians grouped together in loose political parties that alternated in office. This corrupt electoral system enjoyed its greatest strength in rural areas where

political bosses (*caciques*) could most easily fiddle the result. Unsurprisingly, such trickery produced truly scandalous results. Infamously, in the rural seat of Almería in southern Spain in 1918 just 124 voters returned the winning candidate with a declared 9,015 votes.³

Equally unsurprisingly, many *caciques* exploited their stranglehold over the political system to stymie urgent political and social change and, of course, this only raised the political temperature. Part of the problem here also lay with the entrenched attitudes of local employers whose refusal to compromise scotched many efforts to ease social tensions. The most pressing cries for change they stifled came from the rural poor whose weight of numbers gave their protests particular urgency. Indeed in 1900 two-thirds of the labour force still tilled the land, and even as late as 1930 farming employed 45.5% of the active population.⁴

The gravity of the protests also stemmed from the depth of social conflict within the rural world and particularly in the rural south. Here bitter resentment over the injustices of the landholding system scarred social relations. In this regard the statistics on land distribution speak for themselves. In 1930, in the area south of Madrid composed of La Mancha, Extremadura and Andalusia, estates over 100 hectares occupied twice as much land surface as in the central region, and large landholdings of over 500 hectares occupied three times more cultivated land.⁶ By contrast in central Spain smallholders controlled 46% of all land.⁷

The increasingly voracious appetite for Spanish agricultural goods on the world market only compounded the problems of the southern rural dispossessed. For from the early twentieth-century, many canny landowners in the region concentrated on growing lucrative single cash crops for export. In the Andalusian province of Jaén, for instance, the number of hectares given over to growing olives soared from 152,656 in 1900 to 320,000 by 1935.⁸ This made rural labourers easy prey for employers because the monocultural system required a considerable labour force for just a few weeks of the year and spawned a large pool of desperate unemployed rural workers. Thus workers often found they had little choice but to swallow their resentment when bosses slashed wages after prices slumped on the world market.⁹ By the same token, it proved impossible to mechanise the production method and this also favoured the growth of smallholders whose costs remained competitive.¹⁰ In the Civil War these smallholders would pitch themselves against the landless labourers who they felt threatened to strike a mortal blow against their right to select workers and set wages.¹¹

For the moment, however, southern rural employers felt able to dole out low wages to their landless labourers because they knew that if trouble did break out, with their fingers firmly on the levers of local power through tightly knit relations with *caciques*, they could simply call in the paramilitary police, the Civil Guard, or even the army itself to break a few skulls.¹² As a net result, wages remained low, and indeed just after the First World War rural labourers in the Andalusian province of Córdoba earned just 3

pesetas a day at a time when in other parts of Spain workers received 10 pesetas for a day's labour.¹³

However, saddling workers with ever-harsher contracts gave farm labourers every reason to fight their corner. As a result, from the early 1900s in particular, rural trade unions sprang up across southern Spain. It was in this period that the Spanish Socialist Party (the PSOE) and its trade union counterpart (the UGT) started to make great strides and most of all in the rural south. By 1921, Andalusia, where 20% of the population lived, formed a bulwark of the PSOE with 50% of its members residing there.¹⁴ This headway made by the Socialist Party built on the already long-established anarchist groups that had long flourished in the south. Anarchists had won over many rural workers because their argument that the state brought nothing but corruption and oppression cut much ice with impoverished labourers who received next to no government help.¹⁵

With both sides increasingly digging in their heels, a bout of struggles over working conditions and wages in the south gravely destabilised the country. In particular, in the inflation-hit years that followed the First World War rural workers flooded into unions and fought a large number of strikes. Meanwhile, their employers stared on in horror at the recent Russian Revolution and became consumed by a deep sense of foreboding. But Spain was not Russia and, in the end, repression won the day and the rural labourers retreated back to their everyday misery.¹⁶ Unfortunately, an important opportunity had been lost because landowners who had first been rattled enough by the strikes to contemplate compromise finally spurned the opportunity to redistribute some of their land. Indeed with strikes and unrest alarming many landowners some of them had come together in Madrid in 1917 to form the Catholic Agrarian Association (CNCA) in an attempt to stall rural protest. Their hope was that tensions could be eased by giving over some of their land to the rural dispossessed.¹⁷ At first, they enjoyed some significant recruiting successes with, for instance, over 11,000 members in the southern province of Córdoba by 1921.¹⁸ However, once landowners realised that the Civil Guard had broken the strike wave, they quickly reverted to type and refused point blank to surrender any of their land. Even the organisation's own journal, the *Revista Social Agraria*, voiced its frustration with southern landowners who, it bemoaned, had squandered the chance to lease out land to their desperate neighbours.¹⁹

Leaving the land and wage issue unresolved only set the scene for greater conflict. Moreover, the success of the CNCA in other parts of Spain also helped prepare the ground for increased tension by successfully mobilising large numbers of smallholders behind an explicitly anti-socialist agenda. Indeed Catholic agrarian schemes to create mutual credit unions and technical education met the genuine needs of the many small-scale farmers in the centre and north of Spain, and the number of rank and file members in these areas began to swell.²⁰

Industrial centres such as Bilbao, Barcelona and Madrid also saw a surge in labour protest and union membership from the 1890s. As in rural areas, employers often proved unwilling to cede to the increasingly vociferous demands of their workforce. This reluctance on the part of industrialists partly grew out of the fact that Spanish manufacturers hawked 80% of their goods on the poverty-stricken home market that could only generate small profits.²¹ Hampered also by limited access to credit to invest in more efficient machinery, hacking away at pay rates proved one of the few means to shore up profit margins.²²

Consequently, despite workers trying to bring employers in cities like Bilbao and Barcelona to the negotiating table, industrialists frequently preferred to badger the sometimes-reluctant authorities to deploy the rifle and the bayonet to settle disputes in their favour. Ministers often heeded their calls, as in Barcelona in 1903 when employers, backed up by the army, dismissed 10,216 strikers and pushed 1,200 union members behind bars.²³ This readiness to employ the gun meant that in the early twentieth century, Spain suffered the highest number of deaths of strikers in Europe.²⁴

Ultimately, however, this kind of aggression only bred the type of union activity that employers most lost sleep over. For in Barcelona Europe's largest anarchist movement flourished in the early twentieth century and a major reason it did so was because employers left next to no room for traditional craft unions to pursue collective bargaining. In addition, mechanisation heralded an increase in the number of unskilled workers. Easily replaceable, such workers could exert little leverage over employers and could ill afford regular union dues. The anarchist and syndicalists who came together to form the National Confederation of Labour (CNT) in 1911 capitalised on these very difficulties. Rejecting the union bureaucracy as a form of despotism, their loose organisational structure and preference for effective general strikes attracted large numbers of marginal and vulnerable workers.²⁵ Indeed, shortly after the end of the First World War, Barcelona stood out as Europe's most heavily unionised city, and in December 1918 the CNT here boasted an astonishing 345,000 members.²⁶ These huge numbers represented an enormous triumph for the tactics of moderate syndicalists dedicated to improving the workers' lot, although the moderates always had to try and keep in check radicals in their ranks who favoured the gun over piecemeal action.²⁷

The success of the moderates did not lead employers, infuriated by the violence of some of the anarchist hardliners, to take stock and broker agreements with the CNT. Instead, they resorted to the lock out and gunning down union activists. As a result, tensions rocketed and moderates in both the union and employers' camp found themselves pushed to the margins. A strike in the Barcelona electric power company, *La Canadiense*, provides a clear case in which hardliners trampled over moderates. Business owners breathed fire and fury when government representatives seeking to calm social tensions had negotiated an eight-hour day for power workers.

Employers, hardened in bloody conflict with anarchist gunslingers pursuing negotiation by assassination, determined to take matters into their own hands and to use all means to bring the CNT to its knees.²⁸

These tough bosses colluded with the military top brass in Barcelona to stamp out the CNT. Their chief support came from General Martínez Anido who acted as civil governor between November 1920 and October 1922. He freely made use of hit squads, mass arrest and deportation to break the back of the CNT. Indeed, in 1921 alone 311 people met their end in tat-for-tat battles in the streets of Barcelona.²⁹ For the far right the use of violence taught an easy lesson: during the reign of terror over 90% of CNT members preferred to let their dues lapse.³⁰ Such lessons were not lost on Franco either, and in October 1937 he appointed Martínez as his Chief of Internal Security.³¹

General Martínez's prominence formed no mere blip in Spanish history and in fact the army enjoyed a long pedigree in policing Spanish society. Indeed, through the nineteenth century the military had gained great ground in civil policing matters. A law of 1870, for instance, empowered army officers at times of trouble to issue a decree that imposed martial law and handed army officers the power to haul civil protestors before military courts. Civil politicians made it even easier for the military to arrogate power to itself in this way when in 1878 they passed a law defining the army's most important role to be defending the nation against not just its external 'enemies' but also its internal ones.³²

Given these laws, and that so many conflicts plagued Spanish life, it is hardly surprising that the army became so heavily involved in crushing strikes and protest movements. Indeed, the historian Eduardo González Calleja argues that the vicious use of the army in Spain went without parallel in the rest of western Europe and created an age of 'rampant militarism'. His calculations certainly back these bold claims, for he has shown that between 1875 and April 1931 (when the Second Republic came into being) Spaniards lived a total of 9,381 days under full martial law.³³ Such reliance on the army to maintain public order and police strikes led to harsh repression. For instance, a protest in Jérez de la Frontera in southern Spain in January 1892 led to the arrest of 400 peasants. They found themselves hauled before army tribunals and charged with military rebellion and subject to sentences that included death or up to thirty years in jail.³⁴ Leading political figures could also fall into the grasp of the military judges. Socialist leader and university professor Julián Besteiro, for instance, played a role in organising a general strike in Madrid in 1917 and for his pains the military slapped down a thirty-year jail term on him, although he later benefited from an amnesty.³⁵ Once Franco had won power, Besteiro, who believed the victors in the Civil War could not possibly prosecute those who surrendered without resistance, found himself in the military dock once more and again suffered a thirty-year term. This time he would die in a squalid prison before he could benefit from an amnesty.³⁶

This tendency of politicians to allow the military to ride roughshod over civil rights also comes across in the treatment of national minorities. For army officers saw themselves as the protectors of Spanish national unity against Basque and Catalan nationalists who from the 1890s had begun to put their case with ever-greater strength.³⁷ Their protests acted as a red rag to a bull to army officers who soon turned to violence. In 1905, for instance, 300 axe-wielding soldiers in Catalonia smashed up the headquarters of the Catalan newspaper the *Veu de Catalonia*.³⁸ This provoked a public furore, but the government proved unwilling to punish the soldiers and instead made public criticism of the army an offence that could be tried in the military's own courts.³⁹

Part of the problem in allowing the army such influence over civil matters resided in the fact that a significant section of the army nursed both a sense of weakness and an uncompromisingly violent outlook. The lack of self-confidence stemmed in part from events in the nineteenth century when the economy festered and Spain had lost vast swathes of its empire. Most distressingly, in 1898 Spain had suffered the humiliation of the US navy blasting its entire fleet out of the water and the loss of the jewel in its once grand colonial crown: Cuba.⁴⁰

From this weakness of Spanish nationalism grew a violent and aggressive desire to regenerate Spain. Groups of army officers saw themselves at the forefront of this task and glimpsed in Moroccan territory in North Africa the chance to regain national pride.⁴¹ However, the Spanish only set themselves up in northern Morocco through a 1904 deal in which the British ensured that the French remained fenced in southern Morocco while the Spanish gained control of a meagre strip of land in the north of Morocco, a mere 225 miles long east to west and just 30–50 miles wide north to south.⁴² This rather ignominious start for the Spanish did not stop them from labelling their troops in this colonial crumb as the Army of Africa. This clash between Spanish grand expectations and the sobering reality played an important role in shaping the Francoist repression.⁴³

Part of the reason for this was that the leaders of the July 1936 revolt hailed most of all from the Army of Africa and they had developed brutal tactics to eradicate their colonial enemies who constantly threatened to send the haughty Spanish packing with their tail firmly tucked between their legs. Demonstrating the importance of the Army of Africa in the coup presents little difficulty because this part of the military schooled sixteen of the most senior military officers on the Francoist side.⁴⁴

During their time in their splinter of land in northern Morocco, colonial officers developed brutal tactics to defeat a well-armed but essentially guerilla force. Fighting a dirty war, they began to place the emphasis on 'pacification'. On entering villages their 'pacifying' forces were given free rein to cut down both children and old people, as well as enemy collaborators.⁴⁵ They also frequently plundered and imposed crippling fines.⁴⁶ In part, this brutality reflected hard-line attitudes emerging within the right in all parts

of Spain. Within the Army in Africa officers such as Millán Astray, who had founded the Spanish Foreign Legion in Morocco, had already soaked up some of the ideas of reactionary modernism.⁴⁷ Like others under the influence of this movement, Astray celebrated violence and death as ways of redeeming both the nation and the individual.⁴⁸ This thought lay behind the slogan that Astray bestowed on the legion: Long Live Death!⁴⁹

In the peninsula, however, the concerns of the right revolved around the internal rather than external enemy. One reason why Spaniards themselves could be seen as a threat to national vitality lay in the changing attitudes towards the poor and those forced to turn to crime. Guided by concerns over these matters, Spanish intellectuals began to toy with the idea that crime had biological rather than social explanations. Some commentators now also discussed the political activity of the poor in terms of crime, with anarchists in particular being singled out as delinquents.⁵⁰

The attempt to heap opprobrium on opponents also reflected the defensive mentality of disconcerted Catholics who felt the advances made by secularism within Spain, particularly among the poor, had forced them onto the back foot. In fact, the supporters of the Church did have some cause for concern. During the nineteenth century the state sold off vast tracts of Church land. It also secularised the universities and outlawed some religious fraternities.⁵¹ Importantly, the Church found itself unable to rise to this challenge. It trained the priesthood poorly and left the clergy undernourished and, in southern Spain, kept their apostles thin on the ground.⁵² All of this fostered a siege mentality among certain hard-line supporters of the Church that led them to repudiate the secular world as impure and fired among them a longing to redeem all that had been lost to the faith.⁵³

For this reason much of the aggression from the Catholic right stemmed from the cultural war some of its members waged against those from the centre and left of politics. For instance, when liberals guided by the Enlightenment tradition established the Institute for Independent Learning (*Instituto Libre de Enseñanza*) in Madrid in 1868, intolerant Catholics filled with rage. Similarly, when the rationalist Modern School opened in Barcelona in 1906, conservatives conducted a campaign of harassment against it. After a riot in the city in 1909, they finally managed to have the school's founder, Francisco Ferrer, hauled before a military court and dispatched to the firing squad.⁵⁴ This despite the fact that they could produce next to no real evidence against him and in the face of international protests against the harsh punishment being meted out.⁵⁵

All these various political and social struggles put an immense strain on the Spanish political system. However, the fact that sections of the political right proved so willing to turn to the gun in order to keep the lid firmly pressed down on the pressures welling up from below explains most of all the overthrow of the *cacique* system and the fragile parliamentary system it underpinned in September 1923. With gun wars turning the streets of Barcelona red with blood, a recent bout of peasant unrest and a humiliating

20 *The Francoist Military Trials*

defeat in Morocco all putting strain on the system, General Primo de Rivera installed himself as ruler of Spain.

2 The Arrival of the Masses, 1923–1933

The Second Republic is a barbarian invasion that will 'enthroned the darkest instincts of men'

The Catholic newspaper *El Debate*, 1931

Although General Primo de Rivera soon established himself in power, he went on to squander his political capital and indeed that of King Alfonso XIII who had backed him to the hilt. More than this, he ended up strengthening the centre and left while casting the right into disarray. Thus his last ditch attempt to shore up the old order finished by destroying it and ushering in the Second Republic in April 1931. Emboldened by their success, centre Republicans and moderate socialists at the helm of the Republic between 1931 and 1933 launched a host of long-postponed reforms. These changes infuriated many of those who had prospered under the monarchy and *cacique* system and who had been thrown off balance by the rapid collapse of the old regime. In response, they began to mobilise large numbers against reforms by championing the defence of the Church, landholding and national unity. In the process, the right went a long way towards creating a culture of intransigent opposition that ratcheted up conflict in a deliberate bid to win more support, rather than easing tensions by bargaining with the political system.

In the grim light of this later conflict, one of the tragedies of Primo's coup is that it nipped in the bud attempts to build a more robust parliament that might have brought a measure of real change in slightly less strained circumstances. For at the time of his coup, reformers had trained their parliamentary guns on reducing the stranglehold of large landholders on the upper chamber. They had also set the ball rolling on agrarian reform and proposed better conditions of tenure for leaseholders. In addition, these politicians were striving to bring a degree of civil control over the army.²

The coup pushed aside moderate elements in the army who struggled to bring accountability and tolerance to the military. Indeed, the army itself had launched a judicial inquiry into the actions of the colonial soldiers in Morocco and their disastrous performance on the battlefield. The investigating military judge, Domingo Batet, had uncovered that cases of fraud, murder and drug abuse had gone unpunished in Morocco. At issue stood

competing visions for the army. For in his report, Batet showed his contempt for the methods of the bloodthirsty Millán Astray, whom he condemned as a clown.³ Perhaps unsurprisingly, after the Primo coup the papers relating to Batet's detective digging all suddenly vanished along with serious hopes of reforming the colonial army.⁴ In fact once Franco, who forged his reputation in Morocco, came to power he had Batet hauled before a military court and then dispatched to the firing squad.⁵

Primo's coup also stalled Catholic activists and placed the brakes on their efforts to create their own mass party that would work within a constitutional system. In its place the dictator set up his own single party, the Unión Patriótica (UP), but he imposed it from above and it exercised little mass appeal. In fact, in the south of Spain it simply became the bulwark of the old *caciques*.⁶ For this very reason, the radical right turned against Primo who it felt was frittering away the opportunity to build a genuine mass party to fight what they saw as the socialist threat.⁷

While Primo undermined the attempts of the right to organise, he, unintentionally, gave a tremendous fillip to urban socialists while contributing to the radicalisation of the rural masses who would be drawn to the Socialist Party in the Republic. These momentous events emerged out of Primo's misguided belief that he could neutralise, and eventually absorb, the socialists by giving them representation on government-led corporations that set wages for industrial workers.⁸ In practice, however, far from assuaging tensions and kicking the PSOE into touch, as the social Catholics and other rightists had hoped, Primo presented the socialists with a golden opportunity to mould the strongest and best-organised union in the country.⁹ Consequently, when the Second Republic came the socialists stood at the front of the political pack and soon formed the backbone of the Republic.¹⁰

Now more than ever the PSOE, and their Republican coalition partners, faced the problems of Spain with a renewed urgency brought about by Primo's misrule. Among these pressing issues, rural land and labour relations in the country loomed most of all. Primo, who hailed from southern land-owning stock, had stood square behind rural intransigents who refused to allow rural workers to negotiate wages in the kinds of corporations he had granted for urban workers. Thus with *caciques* also exploiting the UP to lay down the law in their fiefdoms nothing changed for the rural poor.¹¹ All of this meant that when they got their feet through the door of power, socialists, feeling their huge rural base breathing down their necks, pressed urgently ahead with reforms that proved unacceptable to rural employers.¹² Thus when during the Republic rural bosses resisted reforms, the long-frustrated demands for change surging up from below only grew more radical and played a crucial role in further polarising the body politic.¹³

Primo also unintentionally gave a shot in the arm of secular rationalists whose ongoing culture war with the defenders of a rigid Catholic orthodoxy gained greater momentum. Part of the reason for this lay in the fact

that Primo's efforts to smother free speech and political freedom backfired. For instance, when the left intellectual, and the future chief drafter of the constitution of the Second Republic, Jiménez de Asúa, gave a lecture in March 1928 calling for a more open attitude towards sexuality, students showed their support by boycotting classes. This was no one-off event, and over time the secularists gradually gained greater momentum. Accordingly, in March 1930, the socialist intellectual Luis Arquistáin founded the Lay League in a move that brought both Republicans and socialists together in an anti-clerical organisation.¹⁴

While his regime inadvertently bolstered the rationalists, a cluster of intellectuals gathered around the UP, such as Ramiro de Maeztu and José Pemartín, helped prepare the ground for a war to the death by portraying such activists as implacable enemies. Pemartín, for instance, argued that liberal democracy, by basing itself on universal suffrage, inevitably led to communism. The horror this prospect triggered among some sections of the right comes across in Maeztu's comment that the world had become involved in a struggle between civilisation and communism.¹⁵ Intellectuals like Maeztu gave a particularly Catholic infusion to this struggle by arguing that all those who supported the Church and 'civilisation' formed the 'true Spain', while the enemies of 'civilisation' could not be part of the nation. For Pemartín, a hodgepodge of 'mentally sick people who had no cure' made up this 'anti-Spain'.¹⁶

Thus during Primo's regime these intellectuals began to advocate the use of an authoritarian state to fight the socialists, build a strong economy and instil a strong sense of Catholic national identity. Behind these ideas simmered an important trend: not only the effort to build a new political system, but also the battle for the soul of society. Pemartín, for instance, pushed for the state to oversee religious teaching in its schools to ensure that pupils learned to think of themselves both as Spaniards and Catholics and to shake off any identification with those he labelled as 'Russian' Bolsheviks.¹⁷ Primo responded and built 8,000 new primary schools.¹⁸

While this cultural war intensified, Primo wrecked state finance and alienated whole rafts of his supporters through ill-conceived policies. Indeed, he ran his regime onto the sands so disastrously that even some hardened conservative monarchists began to look towards a Republic as the answer to the woes of Primo's, and his royal backer's, making. An exhausted Primo finally gave up the ghost in 1930, but the King tried to struggle on as head of state. When the King finally scurried out of the country in April 1931 and left his opponents to found the Spanish Second Republic important sections of the right lost their political north.

This was because for many of them the monarchy stood as shorthand for a political system that kept the masses under control, protected the Church, promoted the army and maintained the social and economic status quo. From their perspective, the horror of a Republic was that it cut them loose from these cornerstones of their beliefs, status and power. However,

divided among themselves, discredited by the Primo regime and shocked by the King's hasty departure they could initially do little to stem the tide of change.

The policies of the Republican-PSOE coalition that governed the Republic between 1931 and 1933 galvanised the right which responded to reforms by mobilising hundreds of thousands of Spaniards against changes that they represented as an existential threat to the livelihoods and mostly cherished beliefs of smallholders, businessmen and Catholics. A number of Spanish bishops, many appointed during Primo's time, stood at the front of the charge and did not even need to wait for policies to come into effect to voice their uncompromising opposition. Cardinal Segura, for instance, made his abhorrence at the Republic plain in a pastoral letter released in July 1931 in which he decried the principle of popular sovereignty as atheist and godless.¹⁹ Such sentiments found an echo among right political activists. Thus in 1931 the Catholic conservative newspaper *El Debate* denounced the arrival of the Second Republic as 'a barbarian invasion that would exterminate Hispanic civilisation and enthrone the darkest instincts of men'.²⁰

In fact, over time the religious issue became one of the most important assets for the right in its struggle to mobilise the masses against reform. Their success in doing so would bring them many foot soldiers during the Civil War who claimed to be struggling to save the faith from the barbarians who backed the godless Republic. Despite strongly inflamed passions on the right, in practice the government of 1931–1933 never seriously weakened the Church. True the Republic's constitution ended state subsidies to the clergy, gave control of education to the state, dissolved the Jesuits, allowed civil marriage and divorce and even brought secular and Catholic burial grounds together.²¹ However, in practice Jesuit activity remained largely unaffected, the Church continued to exercise great control over education and many burials continued to be religious.²²

One clear example of the way the anti-clerical measures of the Republic rejuvenated the right comes from the Carlist movement. Named after a pretender to the Spanish throne, the movement essentially looked back to the past and to a time before the arrival of capitalism, liberalism and the central state. By the 1930s, the tide of history had largely washed away this movement that had all but retreated to its heartlands in Navarre. But the feeling that Republicans were persecuting the Church led to a rapid revival in Carlist fortunes. Moreover, the fact that reactionary Carlists identified as Catholics allowed them to unite with their former opponents who had supported the rival and more modern monarchy of Alfonso XIII in an alliance known as *Acción Nacional* that also brought on board the Social Catholics.²³ This electoral coalition had been formed in the chaotic circumstances of April 1931 in a hurried attempt to keep various right-wing factions together. That such a grouping could emerge shows how a strong Catholic identity could replace monarchism as the ideological glue sticking

the right together and also reveals how moral fervour helped seal the gap between the previously divided monarchists.

Acción Nacional also flourished because it successfully articulated the fears of both large and small landholders who felt that land and labour reforms in the countryside threatened both their livelihoods and their social status.²⁴ Between April and June 1931, the Republican and socialist coalition that governed Spain had overturned the relations of power that had long dictated life in rural areas. A series of decrees (later enacted into law) significantly increased the bargaining power of the workforce. A decree passed in April prevented employers from shipping in workers from outside their area and stymied attempts to break strikes through blackleg labour. The government also established local commissions that set pay rates, and although employers could refuse these rates, workers enjoyed the right to strike for higher pay. Other changes such as the eight-hour day which replaced the traditional practice of working from dawn to dusk also increased employers' costs. Landholders also feared that their land could be taken from them. Landowners were particularly enraged when the government decreed that uncultivated land could be given over to local union organisations. Their fury only mounted when work-hungry rural workers began invading estates they claimed lay uncultivated from September 1931.²⁵

The CNT also helped raise the temperature through its confrontational policies towards the Republican-socialist coalition. Weakness and repression both help explain the CNT's confrontational attitude. Pushed underground by the Primo dictatorship, the CNT had bled members at an alarming rate while its socialist rival, the UGT, had prospered. With the arrival of the Republic, CNT members had once again been able to organise openly. Determined to make up lost ground, they saw violent action as a way of winning concessions and attracting members from intransigent employers. When Republican politicians reacted by sending in the troops against those they labelled as insurrectionaries, they only made matters worse. For they simply allowed hardliners in the CNT to push more moderate elements to the side by arguing that only direct action could bring any success against intransigent employers and a repressive government.²⁶

Overall, however, the response of many landholders did most to raise passions. The response betrayed, in equal measure, fear of social revolution, repulsion towards the Republic and a desire to forge a political movement through confrontation. Part of this opposition to agrarian reform came from the Social Catholic organisations that had long flourished in northern Spain. Carlist and even members of Alfonsine monarchist parties (supporters of the ousted King) added their voice to the chorus of protest, and politicians from all these backgrounds came together in the Agrarian Minority in the Constituent Assembly gathered together in July 1931.²⁷ Though a minority they excelled at putting a spanner in the works of parliamentary business and presented more than 100 amendments to

the agrarian reform proposals. Later between May and September 1932 they took up over one-third of debating time in further attempts to filibuster reform.²⁸

They also began to mobilise enormous numbers of smallholders against reform and against the Republic itself. In November 1931, in the relatively small agricultural town of Palencia, for instance, agrarian interests managed to bring together 22,000 people to protest against reform.²⁹ Opposition to agrarian reform went some way towards creating a culture of opposition to the Republic itself. The first manifesto of *Acción Nacional*, for example, painted the masses as the deniers of God who substituted free love for the sanctity of the family and whose proposals to abolish private property in the name of the collective rendered each individual a slave.³⁰

Angry and guided by a strong sense of their own virtue many landholders refused to increase pay rates in line with government orders.³¹ Often they also preferred to leave their fields fallow rather than give work to those who supported reform. Instead they took delight in taunting workers that 'the Republic can give you work'.³² During the Civil War, some landowners came to lead some of the death squads and infamously taunted rural labour activists they were about to kill and bury that now they would enjoy a piece of land all of their own.³³ Before the war, landowners also enjoyed enough influence to call in the army to crush agrarian strikes.³⁴

Many officers could respond to such calls with alacrity because, like Primo, they came from deeply Catholic aristocratic land-owning families. Convinced of their own right to 'save the nation', many such officers grew incandescent when the new Republican government of 1931–1933 attempted to bring the army under democratic control, to foster loyalty to the Republic and to restrict its responsibility to fighting external enemies. Indeed, the army press deliberately misinterpreted Republican reforms as an attempt to 'pulverise' the army.³⁵ Despite the diatribes launched against the government by army malcontents, the military reforms largely failed or missed their mark. The Army of Africa escaped the attentions of reformers, and civilians could still be arraigned before military courts. Indeed, the Republican-socialist governing coalition passed some draconian laws that presented the army even greater control over the civil population. The Act for the Defence of the Republic of 1931 and the 1933 Public Order Act handed the government the right to detain people without trial and impose martial law.³⁶ Moreover, although the government tried to limit the power of the military to try activists for political and public-order offences, it never repealed the 1890 law which allowed commanders to declare a state of war and arrogate power. It also failed to beef up its civil justice system enough to allow it to take over from the military courts.³⁷

With the reins of power in new hands, the disconcerted right, however, glossed over such inconvenient details and instead directed its gaze towards changes that more easily brought together supporters of the old order. Proposals to grant greater autonomy to Catalonia provide a case in point.

Many both within the army and among civilian groups committed to the steely Spanish nationalism that gave no quarter to Catalan and Basque sensibilities felt deeply perturbed by these proposals. In many ways, groups on the right themselves had inadvertently helped foster Catalan nationalism and Republicanism by backing Primo's coup and his centralist and monarchist regime. Accordingly, as the Primo regime fell out favour, Catalan Republican groups grew in prestige and became prominent in founding the Second Republic.

Despite this prominence, Catalan nationalists received little genuine autonomy from the Republic they had thrown their weight behind. In April 1931, through a series of decrees a very limited regional government that ran four provincial councils known as the *Generalitat* came into being. Attempts to grant greater autonomy remained log-jammed in parliament with right-wing deputies tabling two hundred amendments. The autonomy bill finally passed only after a failed right-wing coup in August 1932 emboldened the centre and left while the right cowered for the moment. Even then, most power still remained in Madrid and only poor relief, public health and the supervision of municipal government passed down to the region.³⁸

Although the *Generalitat's* powers remained feeble, the reforms touched a raw nerve as behind them lay the explosive question of national identity. For the government of 1931–1933 laboured to redefine not just the relation of the state to the regions but also the very meaning of Spanish identity. To this end the government fostered new symbols such as the Republican flag, the constitution and historical events such as the Liberal revolution of 1812. It also worked hard to forge a mass-education system and curriculum that could inculcate a new set of values. Indeed, reformers pumped considerable resources into schooling to help achieve their goals, and between 1931 and 1933 9,325 new classrooms mushroomed across Spain.³⁹ For many groups on the right such changes simply deepened their resolve to capture power, reverse reforms and impose their own vision of Spanish national identity. Their chance came in November 1933.

3 Sharpening the Knives, 1933–1936

‘[W]e should carry out as many shooting or garrotings as necessary . . . to rid ourselves of these people who do not deserve to be called either Spaniards or humans’.¹

Honorio Maura of the far right Renovación Española, 1934

Lurking just below the surface of the right’s success in mobilising supporters behind its opposition to reform lay a fundamental weakness that goes a long way towards explaining its growing conversion to the politics of violence. For although the right won over large numbers of supporters, it could never attract enough voters to gain an unshakeable hold on power. In February 1933, for instance, the Catholic right-wing coalition, the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA), began life with over 700,000 members, and in the elections of November 1933 it notched up an impressive number of votes.² Nevertheless, it still failed to win an outright majority.³ Worse still, in the February 1936 elections political parties on the right lost out to the combined parties of the centre and left united in the Popular Front.⁴

This presented a major dilemma to important sectors of the right which simply could not stomach the reforms threatened by the Popular Front and now saw their tactics of mobilising the masses against reform strewn around them in tatters. Taking up arms provided the obvious alternative. This option had proved useless in August 1932 when government authorities had easily thwarted a planned rising that simply could not command enough support. What changed after February 1936, however, was that many groups on the right threw their weight behind a military rebellion on the understanding that it would now enjoy mass support and would finally, in Mola’s words, ‘wrench out by the roots’ the ‘Marxist’ organisations.⁵

This popular support for violence, then, took much time to come to fruition. For understandably the flop of 1932 discredited the politics of insurrection and infuriated those who had been labouring in parliament to filibuster agricultural and regional reform. In fact, in a matter of weeks the failed coup brought to naught all their efforts as in riposte to the plotters an incensed parliament swiftly passed the agrarian reform law and, as we have seen, granted autonomy to Catalonia.⁶

With the insurrectionary strategy out of the question for the moment, parties that favoured working within the Republic became the only serious show in town for those who opposed both the policies of the government of 1931–1933 and political pluralism. This stark fact of life led to the rather convoluted practice of accidentalism under which many right-wingers proclaimed that they regarded the constitutional nature of the state as irrelevant (or, in the jargon of the time, merely accidental) to implementing their policies. They would therefore stand for election but would not publicly back the Republic itself. Inevitably, such an approach only threw up a smokescreen of confusion around the intentions of the accidentalists. Their leading exponent, the Social Catholic José María Gil Robles, built an entire electoral machine on these slippery foundations.

Robles had first made his name in agrarian Catholic circles in the Salamanca region. When the Republic arrived in April 1931, he played a prominent role in setting up the formally accidentalist *Acción Nacional*, which a number of monarchists who in truth favoured the violent overthrow of the Republic also joined because at the time they felt they had nowhere else to turn. This group took the name *Acción Popular* in April 1932. Both these parties recruited heavily among landholders in the countryside.⁷ In late February and early March 1933, Robles had also been instrumental in setting up the CEDA (a confederation of right-wing and Catholic parties). This electoral coalition fused a large number of accidentalist groups, with *Acción Popular* at its core, which in theory turned their backs on insurrection and defined themselves in opposition to hard-line monarchists. These Alfonsist monarchists, who favoured sweeping away the entire parliamentary and republican system, had in the meantime split off from the CEDA, some of them to form their own party, *Renovación Española*.⁸

For his centre and left opponents, however, this distinction between working within or against the Republic never seemed at all clear in either theory or practice. Indeed, Robles openly flouted his repugnance towards the Republic and did not shy away from proclaiming that if the political system could not be reformed he would not hesitate to consign it to the history books.⁹ He also pledged to reverse all that the Republic stood for in the eyes of its centre and left supporters. For their achievements on agrarian reform, secularisation and Catalan autonomy all sat square in Robles' sights.

Events in other parts of Europe only strengthened the fears of those who had toiled so hard to bring about the reforms Gil Robles pledged to reverse. Contemporary observers could not fail to notice how Gil Robles ramped up his rhetoric as anti-parliamentary as anti-socialist movements gained an ever-firmer hold in other European countries by dressing up in the clothes of anti-Bolshevism. This tactic could also be seen at work in Spain where even at the dawn of the Republic the right accused Republican and socialist parties of being in Moscow's pocket.¹⁰ Spanish rightists became even more outspoken when old-guard elites in Germany appointed Hitler as chancellor in late January 1933. The Nazis' success both in mobilising the

masses and in destroying the liberal political system as well as the socialist party inspired many Spanish politicians opposed to the Republic. Gil Robles became caught up in the fever and visited Nazi Germany to learn lessons from National Socialist mentors.¹¹ The watching Spanish left, which enjoyed close connections with German socialists, however, drew its own conclusions after seeing Hitler's regime smash the opposition and now deeply feared Robles as a menace to all they cherished.¹²

Tumbling prices on the world market further entrenched attitudes. Rural employers in particular resolved to save their bank balances by crushing unions.¹³ Importantly, large numbers of smallholders also set on grinding unions to dust. They had looked on aghast when socialist councils had tried to peg wage at higher rates and harboured deep fears that a socialist-backed government could shunt them off their land.¹⁴ Moreover, local mayors often incensed smallholders by forcing them to give work to unemployed workers and even preventing them from employing members of their own families.¹⁵ This made them open to rightist propaganda that suggested that the reforms formed the antechamber to mass expropriation of smallholders' land. As a result they turned definitively against reform and fell in line with intransigent landowners who would brook no change.¹⁶

Given this hardening of attitudes it comes as no surprise that already at the local level portents of the violence to come could be glimpsed. A telling example is provided by events in Castellar de Santiago in the province of Ciudad Real. Here rural workers had been protesting against the refusal of local landholders to give them work when one of the protestors stabbed an employer who had brandished his gun at him. In response a group of armed landholders grabbed their weapons and marched through the streets, killing one worker before the eyes of the passive local police. Enjoying this free rein they then hunted down the local head of the socialist land workers' union, the *Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra* (FNTT), and shot him dead.¹⁷

It is in this context that we can understand why the centre and left grew so alarmed at their loss of power, after dividing their electoral ticket, in the elections of November 1933. True the CEDA, drawing on the fears of significant numbers of large and small landholders, had the highest number of seats in the parliament, but it had not won enough deputies to be able to govern alone, and instead a government of the centre-right Radical Party took office. The CEDA's influence still made itself felt and most observers recognised that Robles represented the real power behind the throne.¹⁸ The new government soon confirmed the fears of its opponents by undoing the work of the previous administration. The conspirators behind the August 1932 revolt gained their freedom and the government proposed sweeping away the religious and agrarian reforms that had only reached the statute book after so many struggles.¹⁹ In parliament the CEDA deputy Ramón Ruiz Alonso, later implicated in the denunciation and death of the poet García Lorca, led a campaign to repeal the law that prevented employers

from hiring labourers from outside their hometowns and won success in May 1934.²⁰ Emboldened by this triumph, and the imposition of new conservative civil governors all over Spain, landholders ignored the municipal wage levels set by local committees and began to slash pay rates. In Jaén province, for example, an average family needed an income of 7.32 pesetas to survive, but wages had crashed to an average of 5.86 pesetas.²¹

These setbacks further inflamed passions within both the rural socialist trade union, the FNTT (which formed part of the UGT in itself allied to the socialist political party, the PSOE) and national politics. Membership had already risen from 27,000 in June 1930 to 1,041,539 in June 1932.²² Tempers now became increasingly frayed as both the core CEDA and PSOE supporters in the countryside dug in their heels against one another. In June 1934, for instance, the CEDA-backed government smashed a rural strike it branded as revolutionary but in fact came in support of demands for better working conditions.²³ When the government locked up 7,000 rural workers, FNTT activists easily drew the conclusion that the CEDA-backed government itched to destroy its opponents and all that they had campaigned to achieve.²⁴

This helps explain why advisers to the UGT leader Francisco Largo Caballero argued that only a more determined line could protect Spain against 'fascism', the destruction of socialism and bring real change to the countryside.²⁵ Caballero himself helped inflame passions by pushing for a government that would satisfy the demands of the workers. In practice, however, the right hankered after any move by the left that would provide them with the excuse to call in the army to smash their opponents and hand them the ammunition they needed to smear democrats as communists. Their opportunity came in October 1934 when Robles demanded, and gained, three cabinet posts for CEDA members. In response, left groups rose in revolt in what Francoists labelled part of a plot to hand Spain over to Moscow and which they mark as the real start of the Civil War. Thus in February 1939 Franco set up his Tribunals of Political Responsibility to fine not just those who had supported the Second Republic in the Civil War, but also anyone whose political activity stretched back to October 1934.

In fact, the events of October took a far more mundane form than a Bolshevik-inspired coup. For in reality moderate Spanish socialists formed the main organisers of the revolt and they turned to violence not to install communism but in the hope of forestalling the destruction of both the Republic and the mild reforms for which they felt it stood. Moreover, the moderates who led the revolt hoped that the threat of violence would strengthen their arm in talks to keep the CEDA out of the cabinet. This preference for bluster explains why they made such feeble efforts to organise the revolt.²⁶ Moreover, in areas where the revolt did take hold, such as in the northern mining area of Asturias, what drove people to act was not Moscow but frustration at falling wage levels and the fear that the CEDA would crush all reforms.²⁷

If the origins of the 1934 revolt do not fit the picture of a Moscow-inspired revolution, its repression in some ways prefigures that seen in the Civil War by those determined to root out and destroy supporters of reform. Robles and other ministers gathered together General Franco and his colonial Moroccan soldiers to suppress brutally the miners' revolt in Asturias. Indeed, Franco's devotion to violence came across when he spat nails after General Batet refused to obey his orders to crush the revolt in Catalonia with great force.²⁸ Important civilians too shared this outlook. Renovación Española leader José Calvo Sotelo, for example, fulminated that the repression of the Asturian miners lacked spine and reminded the country that the suppression of the Paris commune through 40,000 executions had brought sixty years of peace.²⁹

It was at this time that members of the Renovación Española also began to consider how to create a smokescreen behind which they could act out their violent desires. In November 1934, writing in response to the events in Asturias, Ramiro Maeztu set out the approach later successfully taken up by the rebels and Francoists during the Civil War. He proposed first to forge an entire body of atrocity literature that would discredit the left. This literature he felt would create enough strength of feeling to build a counter-revolutionary movement. This could then be used to smash 'once and for all' working class organisations. Finally, the army, education system and other state organisations could be purged of all 'theoretical or active revolutionaries'.³⁰ This lust for violence comes across clearly in the Renovación call for 'an iron surgeon' to 'root out from the school the malignant tumour of destructive Marxism'.³¹

However, in 1934 many on the right still preferred to follow the route of accidentalism rather than turn to violence. Indeed, when in 1934 the Catholic professor of law close to the circles of Renovación Española, Ancieto Castro Albarrán, published his work *The Right to Rebel* he found himself and his book ostracised by members of the CEDA who felt confident in their control of the rudder of the state.³² Nevertheless, by the time of the Civil War his logic that an elected and accountable government constituted a tyranny that could legitimately be overthrown by armed force became common currency on the right.³³ This hardening could be discerned in March 1935 when CEDA ministers stormed out of the coalition cabinet outraged that they could not secure the execution of twenty men condemned to death by military tribunals for their alleged role in the Asturian rising.³⁴ Although the CEDA soon came back into government it did so on much harder terms and dropped its reformist Minister of Agriculture, Manuel Giménez Fernández, known to many on the right because of his willingness to compromise over the land issue as a 'white Bolshevik', in favour of the uncompromising Nicasio Velayos y Velayos.³⁵

The turn to violence came with the victory of a centre and left coalition known as the Popular Front in the elections of February 1936. In response, Robles, and those like him, adopted straightforward tactics which built on

the arguments of the once marginalised Castro de Albarrán that the Popular Front governed both illegitimately and tyrannically. Of course those who became the rebels of July 1936 needed to field justifications for their revolt and the Civil War that followed in its wake. Accordingly, it is perhaps not surprising that they repeatedly protested to all and sundry their view of the Popular Front government.³⁶ The rhetoric grew harsher, as the ever-more confident radical right argued in favour of violence because the Popular Front formed a stooge organisation of communists designed to enthrone the agents of Moscow in the seat of power. Indeed, Franco himself would insist that he needed to use his military courts against supporters of the Second Republic to punish the instigators of communist revolution and 'red crime'.³⁷

In reality, the Popular Front formed little more than the reconstruction of the alliance of centre Republicans and the Socialist Party that had split apart so disastrously in November 1933. At the time, Largo Caballero and his supporters had been so frustrated with the slow pace of reform that they had wanted to strike out on their own. The lesson of the CEDA-backed government and the catastrophe of October 1934 drawn by reflective socialists like Indalecio Prieto was that coalition offered the only way of saving reform and the Republic in any meaningful shape. Although the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) did play a role in this coalition, its size was tiny. In fact, it was only because the PCE played such a small part that the socialists and Republican politicians, wary of scaring voters, would agree to working with the communists.³⁸

Moreover, the many charges the right flung against that Popular Front once in office that Francoist used to justify both their revolt and the prosecution of government supporters in military courts never passed muster.³⁹ On the accusation that the Popular Front swindled its way into office by practising electoral fraud, for example, the Popular Front government strove to placate the right by allowing a number of results to stand where the CEDA and other right-wingers had clearly sneaked to victory through fraud. In Albacete, for instance, a parliamentary commission kept the right victory in place despite the fact that the number of votes cast exceeded the number registered to vote.⁴⁰ The Popular Front government also did much to ease social tensions by urging its supporters not to fall into the trap of the right and turn to violence. Indeed, defeated at the polls the tactics of the now uniting right revolved around fermenting disorder to discredit the Popular Front and justify a military takeover.⁴¹

The Spanish fascist party, the Falange, led with these tactics from the front. Although pushed underground by the Popular Front, the Falange enjoyed the support of many of the politicians on the radical right who recognised its ability to bring the political temperature to boiling point. It did not disappoint, and between the Popular Front victory in February and the rebellion of July 1936 a total of 300 people lost their lives in political killings. The hand of Falangist squads lay behind many of these deaths.⁴²

Rightist agent provocateurs also attacked churches and the offices of right-wing political parties.⁴³ All of this provided grist to the mill of Robles, and in a notorious speech to the parliament on 16 June 1936 he listed numerous cases of disorder that he used to imply the criminal incompetence of the government and the need for it to be swept away.⁴⁴

This is not to say, however, that many on the right did not feel alarmed. In fact, large numbers of rightists feared the worst precisely because they felt the tables had now been turned and that accounts would be settled after their two-year reign of repression. Feelings ran particularly high in the countryside. Frustrated with the slow pace of reform and the laborious machinations of what many rural workers labelled the Institute of Anti-Agrarian Reform, in March 1936 60,000 landless peasants in the southern province of Extremadura occupied 3,000 estates and began to plant crops. The government, dazed by the pace of events and strength of feeling, recognised the occupations.⁴⁵

A growing wave of strike action also swept over Spanish cities. In urban areas the CNT in particular did much to ferment tensions. Indeed, by mid-June 1936 over 110,000 unskilled workers had withdrawn their labour in Madrid.⁴⁶ In fact, the right gained greatly by these strikes that played straight into the hands of politicians like Robles. Employers gladly used the lockout in order to fan the flames of conflict and then peddle the image of disorder. The rhetoric of the socialist leader of the UGT, Francisco Largo Caballero, also scored a goal in the right's favour. Alarmed that the UGT was haemorrhaging members to the more radical CNT, he resorted to more vehement revolutionary rhetoric.⁴⁷ Caballero had badly miscalculated, for only by uniting and by pursuing moderate policies could the Popular Front keep huge numbers of Spaniards from the middle ground of politics out of the clutches of the radical right.⁴⁸ Far from doing this, Caballero threatened instead that if a military revolt did take place, the workers, to a man, would respond with a general strike and by launching social revolution.⁴⁹ Much of this, however, was empty posturing. Indeed, when he finally took the post of Prime Minister in the Civil War in September 1936, Caballero showed little interest in social revolution and toiled to stem the tide of radical social change unleashed by the rebel coup of July 1936 that sparked the Civil War.⁵⁰

For the moment, however, Caballero only gave more power to the plotters' elbow. For although a cabal of military conspirators existed in February 1936, they felt in no position to mount a coup because of their very isolation.⁵¹ Thus through the spring of 1936 civilian and military leaders hatched the plot for the coup of July 1936 that triggered the Civil War and brought a wave of terror both on and behind the frontline.

Part II

Rebellion and Occupation

4 Rebel Terror

We must 'eliminate without scruple or hesitation all those who do not think like us'.¹

General Mola, 1936

'It is a pity they don't shoot more'²

Franco supporter after the occupation of Gijón

The Franco regime thrived on maligning those who supported the Second Republic and the Popular Front government. Indeed, from its birth in the crucible of civil war the Franco regime successfully pulled the wool over the eyes of watching powers prepared to buy its line that it administered justice according to due process and that the principal blame for wartime atrocities should be laid at the door of the Popular Front government. Following this line, apologists for the regime never tired of rehearsing its protests that 'Franco's justice' simply meted out just punishment to 'red criminals'.³

Behind these misleading assertions, however, lay a very different picture. For from the start of the revolt in July 1936 the rebels founded death squads that they set loose on terrible killing sprees behind the lines designed to put paid to their highly mobilised opponents. Accordingly, these killings had nothing to do with bringing the perpetrators of atrocities to book through the careful amassing of evidence and everything to do with drawing the teeth of their opponents.

Moreover, the distinction drawn by some historians between the less institutional and harsher work of rebel and Francoist death squads in comparison to the military courts draws attention away from some important lines of continuity between two arms of the repression.⁴ For both were directed from above, worked to batter political opponents, flourished on the basis of a belief that violence against ideological enemies helped redeem Spain and laboured successfully on the back of popular civilian support. Furthermore, behind the work of both lurked attempts to shroud the nature of the repression. In the case of the death squads the regime simply muzzled all mention of their activity while it exploited the courts to present Francoists exclusively as victims rather than perpetrators. Thus the death

squads and the trials can most definitely be seen as two sides of the same coin of ruthless and deliberate Francoist violence.

Even at the preparatory stage of the revolt, its initial director, General Mola, realised that the success of his enterprise depended upon gathering up massive civilian support and making use of intense violence to smother all attempts by highly charged supporters of the Popular Front to defend their government. One reason for this was that Mola's authority over the armed forces ran so thinly, partly because Republican feeling coursed strongly through some sections of the army outside the ranks of soldiers based in Morocco. Their reluctance also stemmed from their memory of the easily defeated revolt of 1932 and because they entertained few hopes for Mola, who had been sent to isolated Pamplona by the government to try and keep him out of harm's way and who they felt could not put together the forces needed for a national revolt.⁵

Aware of his meagre prospects, Mola toiled to bring on board as many civilian supporters as he could. This is why he ordered garrison commanders to set up committees with local civilian rightists to co-ordinate the rebellion and why he instructed Colonel Galarza Morante to liaise with leading rightwing politicians to ferment the rebellion.⁶ In fact, Galarza pushed at an open door and many right-wing politicians were already trying to goad Mola and his fellow generals into action. Indeed, in the spring of 1936 Robles had transferred the financial reserves of the CEDA over to Mola to bankroll the rising.⁷

Valuable though this support was, Mola pinned most of his hopes on winning the support of right-wing paramilitaries. The Carlist militia, the Requetés, inspired the greatest hope of all. Eventually he won over one of the Carlist leaders, the conde de Rodezno. He realised that revolt and violent repression offered the only realistic way of turning back the tide of history and recreating the Carlist ideal of a Catholic society free from liberals, socialists and secularists who were now so firmly entrenched in the body politic.⁸ Mola had reason to be grateful to them, for in the weeks following his rebellion around 20,000 Carlists flocked to his ranks.⁹ In June 1936, the Falange also climbed on board Mola's train, and within the first weeks of the revolt over 35,000 of its supporters had rallied to Mola's colours.¹⁰

Such large numbers formed a vital part of Mola's plan to wage a tough war behind the lines that would make up for his weaknesses. Indeed as early as April 1936, he instructed that the 'enemy' is 'strong and well organised' and that 'in order to subdue our enemy' we must be 'violent in the extreme'. He added, menacingly, that 'all the directors of political parties, societies, or syndicates not in favour of the movement will be arrested, and exemplary punishments applied, so as to stifle strikes or rebellions'.¹¹ To make matters absolutely plain he went on to instruct that 'we must create an atmosphere of terror and shoot any open or closet supporter of the Popular Front'.¹²

Emboldened by his own ruthlessness, Mola, who had cut his teeth in the Moroccan campaigns, went ahead with his revolt knowing full well that he risked sparking a major and bloody conflict with supporters of the Popular

Front. Without blinking, on 15 July 1936 General Mola gave the green light for the revolt against the elected Popular Front government to roll into action in northern Morocco on 17 July and to spread to mainland Spain over the following two days. One of the striking aspects of what ensued is that in many cases the rebellion triumphed or failed on the basis of popular support. In Barcelona the mobilised masses swiftly and violently put down the revolt. They did so too in Madrid and in large parts of Spain south and east of the capital. Meanwhile, the rebels often triumphed where their supporters enjoyed the strongest hold: especially in the north of Spain, with the exception of most of the territory around Gijón, Santander, Bilbao and San Sebastian.

Mola's base of Pamplona provides one the most powerful examples of how the rebels won their successes on the back of popular support. Here 10,000 people rushed to the rebels' standard and large numbers of civilians flooded on to the streets chanting feverish slogans such as 'Down with the Secular Republic' and 'To Die and Kill for the Triumph of God'.¹³ Conservative, Catholic and smallholder strongholds such as Burgos, Ávila, Salamanca and Segovia also fell easily to the popularly backed rebels. In this last town, small groups of Republican activists launched a forlorn strike and desperately scoured their neighbourhoods for weapons. Isolated and starved of both men and firepower, however, the much stronger rebel alliance of soldiers and Falangists (members of the Spanish fascist party) soon overpowered them and rapidly took the province firmly within its grip.¹⁴ In the south the rebels triumphed too in the provincial capitals of Granada and Córdoba where civilian support helped tip the balance and allowed the rebels to ensconce themselves in power.¹⁵

That said, some major cities where working-class organisations had put down deep roots, like Zaragoza, fell to the much better armed rebels. Here the city's military commander had the local civil governor clapped in jail and prised control of the city from the working masses who found themselves without weapons and hampered by the split between the UGT and the CNT.¹⁶ Meanwhile, in Seville military commanders put 5,782 soldiers on the streets to smother any resistance by government supporters.¹⁷ In Cáceres and Granada too local military and Falangist leaders also directly oversaw the mass killing.¹⁸

Importantly, the local rebel leaders directing repression found they could call on some members of their civilian support base to help them carry out their murderous task.¹⁹ Indeed, in towns like Cáceres, La Rioja, Santiago, Soria and Segovia a motley collection of police officers from the paramilitary Civil Guard, Falangists and other right-wingers rounded up activists for the Republic and did them to death.²⁰ These assassins often notched up a gruesome tally. In Zaragoza, for example, 2,610 people (74% of those killed overall here) had their lives cut short in the first few months of the Civil War.²¹ Those cut down in these ways most often hailed from the ranks of Popular Front activists, with mayors, councillors and union members being tossed into unmarked mass graves.²²

In some cases death squad members themselves proved willing to blaze their own trail of murder without waiting for orders. In Burgos, for instance, civilian death squad members took heart and redoubled their murderous efforts against those they believed to lead lives not worth living when they saw that the military authorities were more than happy to turn a blind eye to their killing spree.²³ Many civilians outside the death squads also often led the way by identifying victims for rebel killers. Indeed, death squads frequently acted on tip-offs offered by denouncers who revealed the identity and location of the political activists whom they wanted singled out for execution.²⁴ Moreover, killers sometimes paraded captives in front of locals who then selected those for execution.²⁵ Denouncers also helped the authorities to draw up lists of captives held in a legion of packed prisons and makeshift penitentiaries across rebel-held Spain. Local political leaders often fell in the heaviest numbers as their neighbours pointed them out to the murderers.²⁶

Part of the explanation for the pre-meditated nature of this violence lies in the depth of ideological loathing that seared through Spanish society. Indeed some, and particularly in the rebel military, openly welcomed the chance to do to death those they saw as their implacable ideological and 'foreign' enemies. Edmund Taylor, a news reporter with the *Chicago Tribune* based with Mola's forces stationed above Madrid in the summer of 1936, gained some insight into the beliefs that made such grisly killings thinkable for a number of the perpetrators. He found that rebel soldiers openly bragged of slaughtering 'reds'. They also made no bones about the fact that they did this because members of left parties threatened to destroy Spain.²⁷ Taylor's experience was not unusual. Indeed one rebel captain with Mola's forces put his ideas forward to a *Daily Express* reporter telling him these 'reds must be exterminated'.²⁸

Franco's colonial troops from Morocco behaved particularly brutally towards 'reds'. At the start of the revolt, a Republican naval blockade had left the rebels crack troops high and dry in Morocco, but the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini stepped into the breach in late July 1936. He sent twelve bombers to Morocco (three ran out of fuel before arriving) that General Franco used to shuttle his professional fighters to mainland Spain.²⁹ Hitler also lent a hand by authorising the dispatch twenty transporter aircraft with six escort fighter planes to help Franco airlift his men.³⁰ The air link with Morocco proved particularly decisive, and in the first week of August alone foreign planes whisked 15,000 troops into southern Spain.

These crack troops quickly pushed northwards through Badajoz province and towards Madrid.³¹ As they seized control of towns and villages en route they carried out the careful programme of 'pacification'. They termed this task 'cleansing', but this meant no less than murdering many of those they suspected of harbouring sympathy for the Popular Front government.³² Indeed, on this deadly progress through the south, the Army of Africa killed at least 6,610 people from eighty-six villages.³³



Figure 4.1 Prisoners captured in Utrera to the south of Seville in July 1936. ©ICAS-SAHP. Fototeca Municipal de Sevilla, Archivo Serrano.



Figure 4.2 Aznalcóllar north west of Seville in August 1936 after rebels had captured the village. ©ICAS-SAHP. Fototeca Municipal de Sevilla, Archivo Serrano.

The belief that 'reds' had to be killed was by no means confined to the military or to the frontline. Indeed, a number of civilians and members of the right-wing Catholic establishment openly advocated killing those they detested. In Granada, in August 1936 the former CEDA deputy Ramón Alonso Ruiz went on local radio and gave voice to the hatred that consumed him. He described leaders of Popular Front organisations as 'abortions' to whom no Spanish mother could have given birth and who have 'made crime a form of struggle and killing a way of life'. Speaking at a time when death squads roamed freely through Granada he also threatened that these traitors would soon choke on their own blood.³⁴

By describing human beings as abortions, such civilian rebels pointed to their belief that killing had a positive role to play in cleansing and purifying Spain. Sometimes perpetrators acted out their self-appointed purging mission in quite symbolic ways. Indeed, on occasions the killings took an almost ritual form by taking place on festival days held to honour locally venerated saints.³⁵ More frequently, priests attended executions in the hope of saving lost souls whose death they often saw as a form of atonement and an opportunity to conversion to the true faith.³⁶ Priests, of course, like others on the rebel side, did not behave in a uniform way, and some actively tried to prevent atrocities while others simply tried to keep their heads down.³⁷ Others joined up with rebel forces as military chaplains. Father Bernabé Copado, for instance, took part in the occupation of parts of Seville and Córdoba provinces and took pride in 'redeeming the Spanish people from the savage oppression of the Enemies of God'.³⁸ For him this meant ensuring that on occupation, 'criminals' received their just deserts by being shot by the roadside after confessing and kissing the cross.³⁹

This desire to win back Spain to traditional values also reveals the deep cultural war that drove much of the killing. Those responsible for the death of the poet and playwright Federico García Lorca in Granada in August 1936, for example, hated him for his homosexuality, his politics and his influence over the masses.⁴⁰ We should also remember that a schoolteacher died alongside Lorca in front of the firing squad.⁴¹ The rebels, of course, regarded teachers as secularists and corrupters of young minds. This contempt often led them to inflict great violence. In one case in Soria province, the Falange in the village of Ausejo de la Sierra hunted down and killed the teacher José Tabernero Bullón after some of his neighbours denounced him for breaking a crucifix. The crucifix was later found intact in his home.⁴²

It is also the case that some of the brutal killings illustrate the sense of fear and weakness in the face of the mobilised masses that lurked behind some of the murders. In Granada, for example, which fell to the rebels in the first days of the revolt, the seditious forces found themselves surrounded by government-held territory and ruling over a population that in large measure deeply favoured the Popular Front. The fear this situation brewed ran through rebel society to such a degree that the aristocratic mother-in-law of the chair of English at the University of Granada even instructed the

academic to shoot her down rather than let her fall into the hands of the 'reds' and their 'Russian system of terrorization'.⁴³ A Falangist from the town expressed the effect of such fear simply as 'either we killed them, or they killed us'.⁴⁴ A similar fear stalked the streets of rebel-held Seville; as one death squad member from the city put it, '[I]f they had won it would be us up against the wall'.⁴⁵ Others in death squads found themselves called up and ordered to take part in operations.⁴⁶

Despite such a range of atrocities and the murder of at least 30,000 people during the first months of the war alone, the rebels and the Francoists consistently denied or massively underplayed the crimes they committed.⁴⁷ They achieved this in the most ruthless ways: in some cases the local authorities forced bereaved relatives to register their murdered loved ones as missing rather than dead, and in other cases threatened to shoot people who mentioned where corpses lay.⁴⁸ They also exercised great care to prevent journalists from reporting on their outrages.⁴⁹ The journalist Arthur Koestler assigned to the British *News Chronicle*, for instance, fell into Francoist hands shortly after the capture of Málaga and promptly found himself imprisoned with the threat of execution hanging over him and under investigation for military trial for working for a 'communist' newspaper.⁵⁰ While Harold Pemberton of the *Daily Express* stated that rebels shot a Spanish photographer who took a picture of a pile of forty-one corpses.⁵¹ At the same time, they launched a barrage of propaganda about killings in government-held territory that still continues today.⁵²

5 Climbing Out of the Abyss

The Struggle to Bring Order in Loyalist Spain, 1936–1939

‘Whatever may have been the state of anarchism in the early days, there is now evidence everywhere in Republican Spain of order, control and organisation’.¹

British Wing Commander R. V. Goddard, February 1938

Ceaselessly wagging their finger of accusation at supporters of the Popular Front, while stifling all discussion of their own wave of terror, formed part of a piece to present Francoists as virtuous and exclusive victims. By portraying Popular Front supporters as inherently depraved in this way, Francoists prepared the ground for the argument that it fell to all decent-minded citizens to take part in the overthrow of the murderous Popular Front tyrants. With this in mind, Francoists constantly exaggerated the scale of the killings which took place in government territory and made endless and misleading claims about who the culprits were and the motives that drove them to steal the lives of their victims. In this context, pushing tens of thousands of government supporters through summary military trials, which granted next to no rights to defendants, presented Francoists with a golden propaganda opportunity to parade their accusations to the world and to claim to have proved their charges and so the legitimacy of their own pretensions to rule.²

The reality behind their rhetoric, of course, took a very different form. For instance, while Francoists routinely argued that 500,000 had died at the hands of Popular Front assassins, recent rigorous research has settled on a, nevertheless reprehensible, figure of around 55,000 murders in government-held territory, including around 6,800 members of the clergy.³ Most also died in the first weeks of the revolt and not in a systematic and sustained programme of terror. In Murcia, for example, 86% of those murdered had their lives cut short in the first six months of the war.⁴ Moreover, unlike the rebel and Francoist killing, the assassins did not operate on the orders, or with the connivance, of their political and military masters at the highest level. Indeed, the very rebellion itself made the violence possible by depriving such leaders of the wherewithal to maintain order. For the revolt brought the government policing and judicial systems crashing down as the power of the state passed to the street.

The profound crisis for the Popular Front government ushered in by rebel successes in July 1936 provides a good starting point for analysing the Francoist claims. The government responded first by attempting to barter with the rebels by trying to tempt them with a more hard-line government. With these feelers rebuffed, by 19 July José Giral, a left Republican, had taken the post of Prime Minister and, in a desperate last throw of the dice, had finally plumped to arm the workers who then went on to club together in their own militia forces.⁵ The fact that large parts of the Civil Guard had gone over to the rebels compounded this crushing blow to the state's monopoly of force. Especially as even in areas where Civil Guard officers had remained steadfastly behind the government, as in the case of 400 officers from Valencia, they often soon found themselves drafted into militia columns and pressed into service against the rebels.⁶ To make matters worse, many of those who remained fell under suspicion as rebel sympathisers and the authorities felt it too dangerous to turn to them for help. Indeed for these reasons, in Barcelona the Republican authorities purged 40% of Civil Guard officers.⁷

As a result, in towns across Spain where the rebels could command little support armed militias took control and earned their stripes by crushing the revolt. In Ciudad Real, for example, the government had stationed only small numbers of soldiers and policemen. These servicemen soon realised the strength of popular opposition to the revolt and elected to remain loyal to the government. Undeterred small numbers of Falangists and other right-wingers in various parts of the province attempted to seize power, but local militia forces from Popular Front organisations took little time in getting the better of them.⁸

Such triumphs often meant that popular militia forces became the *de facto* authorities on the ground. Indeed, in some areas like Aragón, for instance, councils and mayors simply lost power to armed groups.⁹ In other areas across Republican-held Spain local village and municipal committees made up of representatives of Popular Front parties tried to fill the vacuum of power by setting up their own militia patrols.¹⁰ In such varied ways, by the end of July the Popular Front had retained control of the most industrialised parts of the Basque Country and the vast bulk of eastern, central and southern Spain.

The all too frequent cost was a heavy blood toll as power passed from the government to armed bands. In Madrid, for instance, arming the workers first brought tangible results for the beleaguered authorities. For a start, savvy police officers quickly calculated the odds and remained loyal to the Republic. Moreover, determined rebels who had tried to kick-start a revolt in the capital from the Montaña army barracks found themselves surrounded by workers wielding their freshly issued weapons. Suppressing the revolt also brought horrific scenes, and when the cornered soldiers opened fire, the militia forces seized the barracks and slaughtered 116 soldiers.¹¹ In broadly similar events in Barcelona by 19 July over 450 had lost their lives, and the rebels' plans lay in tatters.¹²

Often the suppression of the revolt became wrapped up with the settling of accounts accrued during the years of struggle that preceded the war. Thus in areas where rightists had rushed to take up arms against the Republic the killings reached especially high levels. In the Catalan village of Vilabla dels Arcs, for instance, local rightists had become involved in a shootout with supporters of the Popular Front. The Republicans gained the upper hand, arrested seventy-four rebels and sent them on to Tarragona to be imprisoned. However, during the journey locals, including some from the village committee, shot fourteen of their neighbours on the roadside.¹³ Small towns and villages also bore witness to similar horrors in provinces such as Tarragona, Toledo, Albacete and Guadalajara.¹⁴

The tensions that underpinned this kind of slaughter came particularly to the fore in August 1936 in what, in many places, constituted the most intense bout of violence in Republican-held territory.¹⁵ Frequently, those carrying out the violence believed they acted from the highest motives. To many government supporters in Madrid, for instance, rebel columns beating a rapid and murderous path towards the capital seemed to place the entire Republic in mortal danger. Concern mounted further still because all the while in the capital, rebel fifth columnists continued to snipe from buildings and speeding cars while the police authorities seemed unable to bring the security situation under control. In this context, militiamen began to murder those they felt to be behind the rebels and frequently left notes, composed as surrogate judicial sentences, on the corpses of those they killed explaining why they had cut short their lives.¹⁶ Assassins similarly targeted their victims, sometimes relying on local denouncers, across Republican-held Spain in areas such as Aragón, Catalonia and Murcia.¹⁷

In the face of people taking matters into their own hands in such ways, the Republican authorities often struggled desperately to hold back the tide of the killings. As early as 19 July in Málaga the authorities, newspaper editors and trade-union leaders argued that mob violence only discredited the Republic and had to stop.¹⁸ Similarly, in Madrid on 23 August the newspaper *El Socialista* spoke out against people taking justice into their own hands.¹⁹ Sometimes the authorities resorted to much more desperate measures. In Málaga in October 1936 the local authorities had the entire village committee in Ardales executed for possessing stolen goods.²⁰ Despite such efforts, and setting up militia controls to maintain order across government territory, uncontrolled elements continued to gun down those they regarded as a threat.²¹

In the face of such horrors, Popular Front political leaders often fell back on humanitarian action and did all they could to save the lives of those under threat. For instance, the regional government in Catalonia, the *Generalitat*, ensured that 6,300 potential victims were issued with passports, escorted to boats and shipped to France.²² In this manner, the Catholic Catalan nationalist politician Manuel Carrasco (later shot after trial by Francoists) worked with the International Red Cross to evacuate vulnerable people out of

Catalonia.²³ Similarly, in Madrid the authorities also allowed leading right-ists to find sanctuary in foreign embassies. The Panamanian embassy, for instance, gave shelter to 847 rebel sympathisers and housed a further 773 in flats across Madrid.²⁴ Franco, meanwhile, insisted on imprisoning all those he could lay his hands upon and refused to exchange prisoners to secure their release, and when he finally grabbed ruled over Madrid in 1939 he rebuffed attempts of foreign diplomatic officials to give shelter to Republicans.²⁵

Plainly, given such differences between the two leaderships, to understand the violence in Republican-held territory we have to explain not so much the actions of the Popular Front authorities, whom the Francoists blamed, but the individuals who carried out the killings.²⁶ In this regard, the 'uncontrolled' violence often took a very local and personal form that reflected long-term tensions. Those caught in the sights of the killers were often those with whom they had been locked in conflict over wages and work conditions, particularly since 1931. For example, in the region of 'Los Cuatro Villas' in Jaén province twenty-two of the fifty-eight victims there had been members of a smallholders' association that had taken an intransigent line against reform.²⁷ Local political bigwigs associated with right political parties also fell to the guns of their rural enemies in significant numbers.²⁸ Such violence did not simply form the preserve of the south and similar patterns emerged in Zaragoza province too. Here the representatives of the right also fell in particularly high numbers where they had behaved especially intransigently towards the centre and left or had taken up arms against the government.²⁹ Such considerations led some of the killers to feel that they acted from the highest considerations of justice.³⁰

More than this, in this initially revolutionary situation emboldened elements within the CNT in particular began to advocate the use of selective violence to destroy the old regime so that a new, rational and pure civilisation could be built.³¹ This is why the CNT newspaper *Solidaridad Obrera* urged its readers on 18 October 1936 to 'destroy without hesitation and with blood and fire'.³² Many activists who had long identified the Church with the corrupt old monarchical order, the defence of vested interests and a culturally constricting lifestyle had already taken up the challenge and had begun destroying the Church's symbols of power. In the summer of 1936, militia firing squads from Madrid travelled out to a nearby hill top, Cerro de los Ángeles, where in May 1919 the Spanish King and leading bishops had dedicated huge statues that they hoped would help inspire the masses to return to the faith. Once at their destination, the squads lined up and blasted away at the heads of the monuments in mock executions.³³ In other places, activists turned over churches to new secular purposes such as meeting halls and garages.³⁴ They marked their conquest of these previously sacred spaces with purifying rituals. In Marbella, for instance, iconoclasts consigned pews and effigies of saints to the flames on the local beach.³⁵ This desire to start over partly explains why killers frequently started their grisly work by hunting down the local priest.³⁶

However, the purifying vision of revolutionary violence that burned inside many such individuals filled with ideological zeal does not explain all of the killings. For the events of the war itself also produced their own dynamic that helped drive the murders. For instance, the news of massacres carried out in rebel territory frequently led to reprisal killings. In Ciudad Real, the largest number of killings took place in August 1936 when refugees from areas where the rebels had carried out massacres flooded into the city brimming with gruesome tales and driven by a desperate thirst for revenge.³⁷

A particularly ugly set of events occurred in government territory during the summer of 1936 when militia forces and crowds, frequently incensed by tales of rebel massacres, attacked jails overflowing with rebel sympathisers. One such infamous attack occurred on the Modelo prison in Madrid on 22 August. The assault followed news of a terrible slaughter of Republicans in Badajoz, the first air attack on the capital and a rumour that a fire had been started at the prison as a ruse to allow for the escape of dangerous rightists. Despite the Popular Front Home Secretary speeding to the prison to try and calm passions, militiamen stormed the prison and killed sixteen important prisoners. The militia now controlled the prison and a series of killings took place until December 1936 when a member of the hard-line anarchist group, the *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (FAI), took over the prison and brought the killing to an end.³⁸ Similarly in Bilbao in the summer of 1936, a furious mob formed around prison ships moored in the port demanding revenge after 200 people died in a rebel air attack. Shortly afterwards, the Chief of Police in the city confessed to the representative of the International Red Cross in Spain, Marcel Junod, that 'we just had to hand over the more notorious among the hostages in order to prevent the slaughter of them all'. On other occasions, however, Junod did note that the police had managed to prevent similar atrocities from occurring.³⁹

The massacre of prisoners that took place in November 1936 in Madrid stands out as an exceptional example where leading politicians oversaw large-scale murder. With the capital seemingly about to fall into the hands of the rebels (an event which in fact eluded them until the end of the war in late March 1939), the Popular Front government fled to Valencia. It left control of the city in the hands of the military and a committee of Popular Front parties in which the Communist Party came to play the most pivotal role.⁴⁰ The communists in particular worried that the huge number of political prisoners in Madrid represented a potential danger to the rearguard in a situation when Franco's army might enter the city at any moment. Emotions also ran high because leading activists knew all too well that the rebel army massacred many of those it captured, and they had put their own lives on the line.⁴¹ But the presence of Soviet advisors who pressed their Spanish comrades to take up the same brutal tactics wielded by the Bolsheviks also shaped events.⁴² In response, the communist-dominated authorities in Madrid carefully organised the selection and murder of just over 2,000 prisoners from early November 1936 until early December 1936⁴³

It is also the case that in other ways the rooting out of political enemies on occasions became quite organised. Across Republican-held Spain, political organisations set up their own militia police services, which sometimes forged links with murky elements within the Republican police services, to arrest, interrogate and on occasion murder fifth columnists. These squads became known, after the police service set up by the Bolsheviks, as Checas. In the confusion of Madrid in these first few months of the war up to 200 different Checas laboured away on their own self-appointed repressive missions.⁴⁴ Some of these Checas kept their own prisons, and there is evidence that in some of them the guards abused their captives. Marcel Junod of the Red Cross, for example, gathered testimony from one captive who claimed to have been shackled naked and left among human excrement.⁴⁵

Despite such abuses, the awful Madrid killings of November 1936 catch the eye both for being unusual and as a high water mark in the wave of killing that shook Republican-held soil. In fact, the murder of prisoners in Madrid in August 1936 had marked the start of a turning point that gradually saw the re-assertion of central authority. One important point of departure came when the central Republican government founded Special Tribunals for Rebellion (*Tribunales Especiales contra la Rebelión*) created by decree on 23 August 1936 in the wake of the horrific Modelo prison attack on the day before.⁴⁶ Three judges, named from Popular Front parties and with some judicial experience, heard the cases in the tribunals alongside a jury made up of fourteen people.⁴⁷ The jury decided on whether the death sentence should be imposed.⁴⁸ They began their work in the first week of September 1936 when popular passions still ran very high.⁴⁹ Indeed large numbers of spectators often flocked to follow proceedings in person and sometimes bayed for the blood of those on trial or pressed for executions to be carried out rapidly.⁵⁰

Despite this, over time the tribunals came to monopolise and reduce violence in Republican territory. Certainly in some cases, especially autumn 1936, they meted out harsh justice. The tribunal in Valencia proved particularly harsh, and 44% of those it tried suffered the death sentence. Nevertheless, easy generalisations escape the historian, and the tribunals across Republican Spain present a complex picture. In Jaén, a much lower number, 26.4%, had the capital tariff imposed.⁵¹ Overall, however, from early 1937 tribunals tended not to pass the death sentence.⁵²

The sharp drop in the number of death sentences reflected the gradual rebuilding of the central Republican government's policing system. In September 1936, the authorities in Madrid made concerted efforts to put an end to the confiscation of property belonging to rebels being carried out by local committees through the creation of a confiscation board (*Caja de Reparaciones*). The board enjoyed the power to punish local committees that did not work through its offices.⁵³ A further crucial change came on 30 September 1936 when the central government, now led by Largo Caballero, placed all militias under army general command and made all

militiamen subject to the Code of Military Justice.⁵⁴ Similarly, the Popular Front authorities toiled to bring the Checas under control either by dissolving them or by bringing in some of the previously rather wild elements into the state police service where they now had to toe the line much more carefully.⁵⁵ In Barcelona by January 1937 a new Chief of Police had been appointed who had firmly set about restoring order. Many death sentences passed by the tribunals were also by this time being commuted.⁵⁶

As a result of such measures, by the spring of 1937 the wave of arbitrary killing had drawn to an end and prison life stood on a much more secure footing. Indeed, by 1938 the acting British Consul in Madrid, John Milanes, noted prison conditions were now so much better that inmates reported they felt delighted that their food, accommodation and security had improved so vastly.⁵⁷ Such reforms aside, the Republican authorities had also redoubled their efforts against fifth columnists. In June 1937, they set up the Tribunal Against Spies and Traitors, and in August a special army investigation service began work to root out those regarded as the enemy within.⁵⁸ This service proved to be very powerful and in Barcelona broke the back of the clandestine Falange party. By drawing in civilian supporters and exploiting their denunciations this service generated deep fear among opponents of the Popular Front government.⁵⁹ The work of these state agencies also led to a number of deaths, with 173 being shot in Barcelona between December 1937 and December 1938. Such executions, however, caused serious ructions inside the Republican government, with some ministers resigning in protest.⁶⁰ Moreover, through the latter part of 1938 the Republican government stayed executions in what turned out to be a futile attempt to encourage Franco to bring his side's wave of killing to an end.⁶¹ In the meantime, Republican police services set up their own work camps where those judged to be plotting against the Popular Front government were made to build roads and fortifications.⁶² British diplomatic officials found conditions in these camps could be harsh but also reported that prisoners enjoyed good health and were not overworked.⁶³

Furthermore, some Republican authorities also began to make reparation for what had already happened by identifying some of those who had been murdered. In various towns across Catalonia, the regional government authorities began to exhume and identify bodies. They also began to bring to justice some of those who had murdered political opponents in the first months of the Civil War. In Barcelona, for instance, the regional government, the *Generalitat*, urged relatives to come forward and name both family members they had lost and those they felt to be responsible for their bereavement. This led to a number of arrests, especially of members of the now somewhat persecuted CNT.⁶⁴ These proved inconvenient truths for the Francoist side keen to criminalise all those associated with the Popular Front. However, by relying on summary military courts to convict their political enemies, Francoists found they did not need to worry too much about proving their case.

6 Franco's Juridical Monstrosity

'[T]hese people who have been brought before the military tribunals in Málaga are subhumans who just like vermin deserve no less than an immediate death. But Nationalist Spain respects the law and human life and offers criminals, however vile they may be, the guarantees of due process'¹

ABC, Sevilla, 1937.

'[S]entences were pronounced because service for the Republican government in any capacity was interpreted as responsibility or complicity in connection with common offences committed by third persons generally unknown to the accused'.

Bernard Malley of the British Embassy
in his study of military sentences.²

In the autumn of 1936, the Francoist military trials of captured Popular Front supporters began to pick up steam and took centre stage in efforts to whip up domestic and international support by exploiting the violence that had sullied the reputation of the elected government. Importantly, the trials allowed Francoists to parade their political enemies to the world as 'proven' heinous criminals while filling their own supporters with a deep sense of virtue and purpose in fighting a war to the death against their opponents. More than this, they also offered the opportunity for the regime to rope in groups of its supporters in the task of eliminating or marginalising their mutual political enemies by denouncing and providing testimony against their own neighbours. In short, the trials played a pivotal role in making early Francoism by mobilising a significant number of supporters around the elimination of political opponents.

Crucially, the trials emerged as it became apparent to the rebels that only a rolling war of occupation across Spain could rescue their botched efforts to overthrow the Popular Front government. Fighting such a campaign required much more than simply relying on paramilitary groups and death squads: it meant mobilising both domestic and international support and presenting the rebel forces as engaged in a just struggle. This change of gear meant redoubling efforts to quell all talk of rebel violence.³ As a result,

even British diplomatic staff based in Francoist Spain stood in such fear of the authorities that some would only dispatch reports on the killing when outside Spain and felt confident that the rebels would not get wind of their missives.⁴ However, the rebels and Francoists' efforts to muzzle all talk of the programme of killing did not always score a success. In August 1936, for instance, rebel claims to be fighting a just war came under particularly serious threat when a storm of controversy broke out over the murder of Federico García Lorca in Granada and after the massacre at Badajoz hit the headlines around the world.⁵

Such scandals came at a high price for they risked squandering the impressive wave of sympathy for the rebels that revulsion over of the killings in government-held territory had generated over the summer of 1936. In this regard, a number of leading Catholics in Spain, shaken by the slaughter of thousands of members of the clergy, had played an important role in generating this surge of support. In September 1936, Bishop Pla y Deniel, for instance, argued that the war had become a crusade of the faithful against the sons of Cain inspired by the 'the hatred of God and everything that carries his stamp'.⁶ Statements of this ilk played a central role in the battle for hearts and minds as rebellion turned to all out civil war and the ability to present the struggle as legitimate became paramount. Particularly since the rebels still desperately struggled on the world stage to be granted belligerent rights and to be given official diplomatic recognition as the legitimate representatives of the Spanish people. Moreover, they hoped to win the support of a hostile Pope outraged by Francoist brutality.⁷ Indeed for the Francoist political elite, the gaining of belligerent rights grew into an obsession.⁸

In this context, it became vital for the rebels to present themselves as victims not perpetrators and to find a fig leaf to cover the embarrassment of their murderous campaign behind the lines. The growing craving for legitimacy coincided with the need to put the rudimentary rebel administrative house in better order. This process began in late September 1936 when the cabal of rebel generals at the helm of the coup rewarded Franco for his bloody charge through southern Spain towards Madrid over the summer by electing him their supreme leader. One of the most pressing tasks staring Franco in the face was the need to bring a degree of central co-ordination to the rebel government and to mould its institutions into something resembling a credible state. To this end he revealingly replaced the rebels' shaky government, the Junta de Defensa Nacional, with his own Junta Técnica del Estado. The job also now began of reining in certain rebel generals, such as Queipo de Llano in Seville, who had carved out their own virtual feuds in the territory they controlled. In the light of all this, working towards a common system of punishment offered a way of placing government on a more even keel across Francoist-held Spain.

What Franco brought most to office, however, was a vicious set of attitudes forged on the battlefield in Morocco. Particularly, as in his view the occupation of hostile territory required the complete subjugation of the

enemy. Franco made plain his unbending view of occupation in a revealing statement of 1937 to Mussolini's representative to his 'government', Roberto Cantalupo. Speaking frankly he told the Italian that his army had to proceed to 'the necessarily slow task of redemption and pacification, without which the military occupation will be largely useless'.⁹ This explains why during the war Franco would not compromise for anything less than outright victory and why he consistently rejected peace proposals, even when brokered by the Vatican.¹⁰ The deep desire he harboured to destroy his enemy also came across on several occasions during the war when he turned down the opportunity to win swift victory by moving on the vulnerable capital and chose instead to destroy the Republican army slowly in one part of Spain after another.¹¹

Significantly, when an area came under his control he insisted on hunting down all those identified with the Republican side and on hauling as many through military courts as possible.¹² As we have seen, even the bellicose Mussolini grew deeply wary of Franco's thirst for retribution and pressed the Spaniard to treat prisoners more leniently.¹³ In August 1937, however, when Santander fell, Franco refused to kowtow to the Duce's willingness to put military before social goals. Here the leaders of the Basque Republican army agreed to surrender to Mussolini's troops, believing that they would receive better treatment than at Franco's hands. But once the troops had offered themselves up, Franco's commanders took control of the prisoners by feigning that they would exercise leniency, but soon trials and executions began.¹⁴

Behind Franco's desire to lay his hands on Republican prisoners lurked his belief that he could use the courts as a tool to remodel, or in his term redeem, Spanish society. This is exactly why the repression continued long after official hostilities had drawn to a close and why the work of the courts dissolved the difference both between the frontline and the rearguard as well as between the war and post-war period. Franco made this much readily apparent in an interview first published in January 1939 as the war drew to its close. Despite knowing full well that total victory lay before him, Franco insisted that 'it is not possible to allow damaged, perverted and politically and morally poisoned elements back into society'. To sanction such a move, he insisted, would be to 'run the danger of contaminating everyone and endangering the historic victory we have achieved at the cost of such great sacrifices'. To ram home his belief that the courts and prison system could help recast society, Franco distinguished between these irredeemables and those who could eventually be saved through punishment and returned back into society with 'clean souls and hearts'.¹⁵

Thus one of Franco's overriding goals on assuming the mantle of rebel leadership was to create a trial system national in scope and vast in scale that could meet his burning desire to castigate his enemies and refashion Spanish society while building up his state and presenting his rule as legitimate. The existing military justice system provided the obvious material

from which to fashion this new national trial system. For, as we have seen, the Spanish army had long enjoyed the right to try civilians in its courts for public-order offences.¹⁶ Importantly, at the start of the coup the rebel generals had invoked their right to drag their opponents before such tribunals. Indeed, on 28 July, the Junta de Defensa issued a hugely important decree that covered the whole of Spanish territory. With a breathtaking sweep it made anyone who supported the Popular Front government, either by taking up arms or by offering moral support, liable to prosecution in military courts. Brazenly, the Junta defined its opponents as being in military rebellion against its legitimately constituted powers.¹⁷

Despite these sweeping powers, for the moment the rebels drew only relatively sparingly on their courts. In rebel-held Cádiz province, for instance, proceedings began in the summer of 1936 against some prisoners, but the authorities simply shot a number of them before they could be hauled into the dock.¹⁸ Similarly, in rebel-held La Rioja, while death squads got on with their grisly task, military tribunals tried just five people in 1936.¹⁹ In November 1936, however, Franco moved to build up the military courts into a formidable weapon to punish as many Popular Front supporters across Spain as possible. At this time, Francoists eagerly anticipated capturing both Madrid (a feat which eluded Francoists until the end of the war in late March 1939) and rounding up thousands of political opponents.²⁰ Importantly, the fall of the capital was felt to herald the collapse of the entire Republic. With this in mind Franco decreed that military courts would operate in all areas that his forces 'liberated'.²¹

To deal quickly with the huge haul of prisoners they expected to bag, Francoists also began to whittle down the relatively few legal safeguards that governed the existing military trial procedures. Accordingly, the High Court of Military Justice issued a circular on 21 November 1936 instituting emergency summary military tribunals.²² Under this 'emergency' system, defence counsel only gained notice of the case once the prosecuting authorities had fully prepared their brief and stood poised to herd their prisoner into the dock. Indeed, procedures granted a maximum of four hours to the defence to put together a response to the charge sheet.²³ Given these rules, it is perhaps unsurprising that those put on trial rarely knew the charge against them until they arrived in court.²⁴

But prosecution procedures cast legal safeguards to the wind in more ways than this. For a decree of 1 November 1936 had already placed military investigating judges under an obligation to carry out their investigations as speedily as possible. Indeed, they had no need to produce any burden of proof greater than simple allegations levelled by prosecution witnesses. Other safeguards were also thrown out of the window and a simple denunciation (anonymous until 1941) could be deemed as sufficient 'evidence' to secure conviction.²⁵ Moreover, when the day of the trial came judges could call defence witnesses only if they felt it 'convenient'.²⁶ In fact, judges did not put much store by the public cross examination of witnesses because

they felt that testimony had been more than sufficiently tested when judicial investigation officers preparing prosecutions took statements.²⁷ Thus the authorities established 'guilt' not in the courtroom, but in their 'investigations' that preceded the trial day.²⁸ This perhaps also explains the practice of the prosecutor himself forming part of the military tribunal that judged the accused.²⁹

Equally harsh, the military courts enjoyed the power to try people collectively to speed up proceedings. Moreover, those tried together could only call on the same individual defence counsel.³⁰ In theory, the authorities held that a common accusatory thread should link those tried at the same time.³¹ In practice this often became no more than a paper tiger.³² In these ways, the authorities achieved such a fast and efficient trial process that the imprisoned journalist Arthur Koestler reported that inmates in Seville prison in the spring of 1937 found their trials lasted just three minutes.³³ To cap it all, in November 1936 it became impossible to appeal against sentences imposed by military judges.³⁴

Streamlining the trials in this way made it possible for the occupying Francoist authorities to haul hundreds of thousands of their opponents over the coals. Admittedly, in places where the rebels had held sway since the start of the revolt, the growing prominence of the military courts could mean that the work of the death squads declined while the courts themselves passed relatively few death sentences. This happened in Zaragoza in 1937 and 1938. Indeed, by 1938 in Zaragoza the number of death sentences stood at a comparatively low 211. A similar pattern emerged in Segovia and Cáceres in 1937.³⁵ However, the decline in the death penalty in such areas could be accompanied by a growing number of long jail terms. This can be seen in the case of Badajoz where rebels earned worldwide notoriety for a terrible massacre they carried out on its occupation in August 1936. Here the scale of killing declined between 1936 and 1944, but in the same period 14,326 loyalists from the town suffered prosecution in military courts, with many receiving sentences of up to thirty years.³⁶

In areas that fell to Francoists over the longer course of the war, an even harsher picture emerges. In such places, supporters of the Popular Front continued to suffer ferocious repression at the hands both of death squads and of military courts. For instance, in the wake of Francoist and Italian forces storming Málaga in February 1937, thousands of people lost their lives without trial, but the army also prosecuted 20,000 people in just 100 days and sentenced 3,000 to death.³⁷ Firing squads carried out many of these sentences, and we know that in the provincial capital of Málaga alone 2,300 of Franco's prisoners perished at the former's hands during the war itself and a further 710 died after the conflict had drawn to a close.³⁸ Similarly, after Gijón in northern Spain fell to the Francoists in October the British Vice-Consul reported that the occupiers had forced up to 3,000 of their opponents through courts and sentenced 70% of them to death. But, he pointed out, even some of those found not guilty

were later taken by 'armed fascists' and done to death, their bodies left in 'isolated spots'.³⁹

Often the scale of prosecution became so vast that the 'army of occupation', as it called itself, found that it could not cope simply by establishing courts in provincial capitals. For this reason, they set up roving military tribunals that toured provinces, setting up courts and trying some of the large numbers of prisoners locked up in local prisons.⁴⁰ Such methods meant that the numbers put on trial often grew to staggering proportions. By way of an example, in the town of Tarragona in Catalonia, captured towards the end of the war, the courts judged 15.2% of the population.⁴¹

Final military victory did not mean an end to Franco's social war, and at the conclusion of the war the trial system steamed to its height.⁴² In the judicial area of eastern Andalusia covered by the military command in Granada, for instance, the courts took on 100,000 cases between the end of the conflict in 1939 and 1945, by which time the authorities had wound up the trials relating to wartime 'offences'.⁴³

In addition to providing a vital weapon in the fight to eliminate or prostrate Popular Front supporters, the trials also offered the regime the chance to bolster its propaganda war. For they provided an easy, and highly misleading, way of contrasting what regime apologists labelled as Popular Front terror with what they claimed to be the lofty and detached application of justice in the Francoist zone. In a tract of 1937, for instance, the



Figure 6.1 Republican prisoners captured in 1936. © ICAS-SAHP Fototeca Municipal de Sevilla, Archivo Serrano.

Catholic priest Constantino Bayle decried that Republicans had cut down over 50,000 people in Catalonia alone (the true figure is around 8,000).⁴⁴ By contrast, he insisted the virtuous Francoist had not murdered anyone. Instead, in government territory, justice, he argued, was being achieved through executions that proceeded according to the law and after trial.⁴⁵ Franco himself took up this refrain and repeatedly stressed that those under his command did not carry out rogue killing and that his side carefully measured out its use of justice.⁴⁶ In this vein, in an interview granted to Randolph Churchill in March 1937, Franco insisted that his officials would ensure just retribution with fair trials.⁴⁷

More than this, Francoists carefully culled material taken from the trials both to defame their opponents and to press for further harsh repression against Popular Front supporters. One example comes in a report Francoist authorities issued in 1937. The army's hacks who penned the piece argued it was the use of 'a full range of judicial evidence' in the report that provided 'irrefutable proof' of the 'barbarity of the red hordes'.⁴⁸ They went on to parade a series of gruesome atrocity stories which they claimed illustrated the 'perverse and foreign [Russian] hate' that consumed the depraved supporters of the Republic.⁴⁹ Official reports such as these were complemented by a rash of books, often in popular paperback editions, packed with lurid details of ghastly killings. For instance, in 1938 the novelist turned reporter Antonio Pérez published his book *Red Terror in Andalusia*. Pérez proclaimed that his desire to shame the 'bandits' so that 'justice is achieved' formed one of the motives that drove him to write the tract.⁵⁰ Francoist newspapers too exalted in relaying gruesome stories based on rumours doing the rounds in villages of people about to be dragged before military tribunals. Thus *ABC* in Seville in 1937 reported on rumours about Rafael Barea from Grazalema in southern Spain. The report branded him as a 'disciple of Lenin' and cited rumours that he had strutted around his village with blood stained hands bragging about a series of killings.⁵¹

At the heart of this myth of justice and due process that it was claimed awaited the like of Barea lay the collaboration of the regime's supporters who furnished the authorities with the rumours and accusations they drew on to give a veneer of legitimacy to the trials. Franco himself led from the front in this attempt to rope in as many people as possible in justifying what was ultimately an attempt to 'pacify' occupied territory. Thus, he declared to the United Press in November 1938 that he had a list of two million people who had committed common crimes with the names of witnesses and emphasised that only those who had carried out crimes would feel the full force of the law.⁵²

Both to facilitate the mass prosecution of opponents and to draw on the collaboration of as many grassroots Francoists as possible, the Francoist authorities had begun to devolve the prosecution of opponents to the municipal level. This process began in the early months of the war and came to form a cornerstone of the plan to occupy and pacify the whole of Spain.

One starting point came in November 1936 when Franco, as we have seen, decreed that military courts would operate in all areas that his forces 'liberated'.⁵³ With this in mind during the war, Franco's 'army of occupation' issued instructions on how newly conquered territory should be 'pacified'. These stated that the first and most important task incumbent on the new occupying authorities lay in talking to local people and compiling a report on all the 'crimes' committed during the 'red-Marxist domination'.⁵⁴ Such reports were later used both in prosecutions and in atrocity literature. With this done, the military authorities stood under orders to 'invite all the inhabitants to come forward and denounce for trial all those they suspected of 'crimes'.⁵⁵ On some occasions people could be ordered to present themselves to the new authorities to make a statement about their actions and those of their neighbours in order to facilitate the work of military prosecutors.⁵⁶

Francoist officials also planned to use their local supporters to push ahead with the prosecution of soldiers captured on the frontline. Under a decree of March 1937, soldiers captured on the battlefield would undergo vetting to establish whether they should be prosecuted. This involved calling for reports from local authorities (mostly Falangists) in the captive's hometown on the political and social background of the prisoner as well as his behaviour once the rebellion had broken out in July 1936. Ordinary citizens also enjoyed the right to vouch for, or denounce, the prisoner. Once camp officials had obtained this information from the local authorities and neighbours in the captive's hometown they, or preferably a member of the army's judicial service, would classify the prisoner for prosecution or eventual release.⁵⁷ Over the course of the war, the connection with the prisoner's hometown came to run deeper than this. For when a prisoner's home areas fell to Francoist forces, the military authorities preferred to ship him back to his municipality where they could most easily cull information on the prisoner.

Importantly, the procedures used to decide on prosecution for those captured on the frontline provided starting point for the 'investigations' into all those who fell into Francoist hands, whether captured on the frontlines or in their own homes. Indeed, once someone had registered a denunciation against a prisoner and the local authorities had compiled reports, military investigating judges would swing into action. Unburdened by the need for substantive evidence, they restricted themselves to simply gathering up witness testimony from locals in the captive's hometown. In turn, of course, this passed enormous power to those neighbours of prisoners prepared to step forward and help select and convict their personal and political enemies. The authorities themselves stood more than aware of the power they devolved in this way to those willing to collaborate with them. As one military prosecutor in Castilla-La Mancha proclaimed in a speech to a military tribunal, 'I base my charges on the information already collected by the investigating judge and his informants . . . it is not me that condemns them [the accused] but their own villages, their own enemies and their own neighbours'.⁵⁸

This breathtaking statement points us towards an important paradox. For historians have recognised the importance of the military trials in terms of the 'institutionalisation' of the repression, the vast numbers processed and the harsh punishment imposed on the basis of farcical trial procedures. However, little study has been made of the irony of a regime attempting to build its institutions and power by devolving power to its own supporters in such significant ways. One reason for this is that until very recently it proved impossible for historians to access the military archives where the documentary of the selection and investigation of prisoners at the local level lay hidden.⁵⁹ Another reason is that because historians' first priority lay in establishing the number of those repressed by the rebels and Francoists, the processes that underpinned the repression received less attention. In addition, the vast majority of studies of the repression have been conducted on a national or provincial-level basis and tend to pass over what were largely seen as farcical processes at the municipal level. Accordingly, in order to understand how the hugely important national trial system worked at the local level this study makes use of military records to study the processes that drove the repression in a cluster of municipalities grouped around the small town of Pozoblanco in rural southern Spain. In the process it shows that the Francoist authorities mobilised significant number of their supporters behind its programme to build their state, eliminate their enemies and cast their opponents as common criminals by devolving the processes of selection, prosecution and control.

Part III

Patria Chica, Infierno Grande

7 The Pozoblanco Partido

A Case Study in Grassroots Judicial Terror

‘The devil . . . is in the local’.¹

The judicial area (*partido*) of Pozoblanco in the north of Córdoba province in rural southern Spain came under the heel of the Francoist army at the end of the war in late March 1939. With prosecutions in the military court system across Spain surging towards their peak at this point and with the occupation authorities in the Pozoblanco area wasting little time in rounding up opponents for prosecution, studying this region in detail offers a crucial worm’s eye view of the post-war Francoist repression around the country.² It also affords an insight into the biting social and political conflicts on the ground which, as we have seen, poisoned personal relations and hardened attitudes to the extent that groups across Spain became prepared to collaborate with the central authorities in convicting many of their own despised neighbours. In this particular area, such loathing grew most of all out of the refusal of landholding groups to ease conflict over the land issue. As a result opposing interest groups flooded into political organisations dedicated to fighting their corner and increasingly locked horns until people became prepared to put their own lives on the line or take the lives of others.

Lying about 100 km to the north of its provincial capital of Córdoba in the hills of the Sierra Morena, the Pozoblanco *partido* includes the farming villages of Alcaracejos, Añora, Conquista, Dos Torres, Pedroche, Villanueva de Córdoba and Villanueva del Duque. Here in the early twentieth century farmers gave over much of the land to the growth of cereals, olives and fruit. They also raised pigs and sheep.³ Behind this bucolic picture, however, demands for land and labour reform had begun to disturb life from the late nineteenth century.

As early as 1873 protestors in Pozoblanco took to the streets to protest against the sale of communal lands that the landless had relied on to get by and to demand their redistribution.⁴ The late 1890s also saw a storm of protest as the hungry and landless staged demonstrations or occupied town halls demanding bread.⁵ In the following years, conflict became endemic to the area, and in the early 1900s waves of strikes in protest against the



Figure 7.1 Map showing the Pozoblanco area in Spain. Courtesy of José Antonio Cañete.

blatant social injustices that crippled the lives of the poor rolled across the region. The power of the gun and the baton proved stronger than the strikers' sense of outrage, and the semi-military police force, the Civil Guard, smashed the strikes.⁶

The inflation-hit years that followed the end of the First World War brought acute distress which led more and more workers to put the dangers of confronting the Civil Guard to one side and to flood into unions. By 1918, the socialist group in Villanueva de Córdoba, for instance, in a town with an agricultural workforce of 3,370, had attracted 1,047 members.⁷ In this context of growing mobilisation and discontent, a bout of strikes rocked both the south and the Pozoblanco area in the immediate post-First World War period.⁸

Such scares gave some landholders pause for thought. This is why in 1919 a number of activists for the National Confederation of Agrarian Catholics (CNCA) set up Catholic unions in eleven villages close to Pozoblanco. Predictably, however, the CNCA policy of parcelling out plots of land foundered, as in other parts of the nation, because of the deep reluctance of the bulk of landowners to surrender their most prized asset. In nearby Belalcázar, for instance, even at the height of the *trienio bolchevique*, owners offered up only a paltry 1,200 hectares of land to 784 people, and even here when the immediate threat of revolution receded landholders lost interest.⁹

As a result of such attitudes, land distribution remained deeply iniquitous right until the birth of the Second Republic. In Dos Torres, for instance, estates of more than 300 hectares occupied 33% of the land in 1930. In Torrecampo



Figure 8.2 Map showing the major villages in the Pozoblanco area. Courtesy of José Antonio Cañete.

the figure stood at 26%, for Villanueva de Córdoba 24% and in Pozoblanco and Pedroche 19%.¹⁰ These concentrations of landholding both made and reflected the wealth of a privileged few. In Pozoblanco just five landowners earned 17.59% of all taxable wealth, in Villanueva de Córdoba a mere twelve owners pocketed 22.6% of taxable wealth, while in Pedroche three owners had cornered over 23% of all taxable wealth in the municipality.¹¹

Behind the very rich, however, stood a range of groups spanning from smallholders to landless labourers. In Pozoblanco, for example, in 1934–1935 a total of 559 smallholders shared their sense of investment in the land with 389 farmers who either rented or sharecropped small parcels of land. Much poorer than these groups were the 1,958 landless labourers.¹² Dos Torres showed a broadly similar social structure in the immediate post–First World War period when 1,338 farmers enjoyed access to their

own plots of land while 1,037 labourers depended entirely on their own wage labour. By contrast, in Alcarecejos a mere 110 farmers either owned or rented plots of land and stood heavily outnumbered by the 500 people who relied entirely on working for others.¹³

Significantly, the sway of the traditional landed elite first came under serious threat when the Primo regime collapsed in 1930, and in 1931 the democratic Second Republic took over the reins of power. The land reforms of the early Republic united both catastrophist (those opposed to any compromise with the Republic from the start) and accidentalist landholders in the *partido* alike. Thus in the Pozoblanco area in the spring of 1931 conservatives swarmed into officially accidentalist Acción Nacional and took an uncompromising stand against any change in labour relations. Indeed, many stared down local mayors and like many of their brethren across Spain simply refused to increase the pay rates ordered by the government.¹⁴ More than this, they often left their fields fallow rather than give work to those who supported reform. Indeed they took delight in taunting workers that 'the Republic can give you work'.¹⁵

As a result socialist and communist mayors in towns like Pozoblanco and Villanueva de Córdoba crossed swords with landowners as they battled to enforce the new legislation in the face of this recalcitrant opposition.¹⁶ Employers responded by finding common ground and a sense of right in religion. One approach came in praying to the local Virgin for a right-wing victory in elections and in calling on local rightists to 'Vote for the Virgin'.¹⁷ The local Catholic press also presented centre and left-wing groups as hotbeds of crime that threatened to destroy the faith and unleash a wave of Soviet-style delinquency which would lead Spanish children into a life of prostitution and theft.¹⁸ In the face of this threat it began to call for the defence of the Church, the end of agrarian reform and the fight against the Russian attack.¹⁹

These cataclysmic attitudes helped set the scene for violence and landholders soon became involved in physical confrontations with their workforce that on occasion proved fatal.²⁰ They also formed their own vigilante groups to frighten strikers. Moreover, as these employers often enjoyed close connections with civil governors, they frequently and successfully petitioned for socialist and communist councils to be closed down. Governors also obliged when they urged that the Civil Guard be sent to crush strikes.²¹ Sometimes even the army became involved. In late 1931, for instance, soldiers camped on the outskirts of Pozoblanco and military planes buzzed overhead to intimidate strikers.²² Unsurprisingly, such aggressive tactics fostered further violence and more deaths.²³

In the midst of this growing tension, large numbers of smallholders swung behind the intransigent policy of resistance to agrarian reform that had first been championed by the larger landowners. As we have seen across Spain both *latifundistas* (owners of large estates) and smallholders seethed with rage and fear at the idea of the reforms, but the latter group was consumed by a particular dread. As a result, many smallholders, and

particularly after the Popular Front victory of February 1936, threw in their lot with catastrophist parties such as the Falange.²⁴

In the village of Pedroche, for example, during spring 1936 smallholders flocked into the arms of the Falange. Indeed, fifteen of the thirty Falangists executed in the village during the Civil War were smallholders who had experienced their own epiphany in early 1936 and passed into the openly seditious ranks of the Spanish fascist party.²⁵ But smallholders such as these were not alone in taking up arms. We can also see this journey of other social groups towards the rifle in the village of Pedroche. Here politically important landholding families allied first with Primo and then with the CEDA to defend their privilege. Indeed, members of Acción Nacional and the CEDA occupied the position of mayor until February 1936.²⁶ After February 1936 conservatives such as these increasingly saw eye to eye with the violent catastrophists.²⁷ Thus rightists of many hues and a wide range of social and generational groups converged around the desire to put paid to their mutual enemies.

The profound personal animosity that animated such hostility in the Pozoblanco *partido* comes across clearly in the struggles of two politically important families from Villanueva de Córdoba. The Torrico family owned large tracts of land in the area while its control of the local *cacique* system meant that over the years it had held local political office in its pocket. By contrast, the Caballero family spawned some of the town's leading communist figures. Julián Caballero became the Communist Party mayor in the town during the Second Republic, and his brother, Bartolomé, represented the Communist Party as a councillor. Deeply personal and political conflict between the families stretched back over twenty years.

In a post-Civil War denunciation to the Tribunal for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism, Bartolomé Torrico claimed that in 1918 Bartolomé Caballero had plotted to murder Torrico's father and had been caught hiding under the father's bed.²⁸ The conflict between the families reached far beyond this 'red under the bed' story. In the May 1931 municipal elections, the Torrico brothers stood against Julián and Bartolomé Caballero. The Caballero brothers won the elections and, sitting on the new council, they took part in attempts to force the Torrico family, and other landowners, to provide work to unemployed labourers and to increase wages by up to 40%. When these efforts crashed against landholder resistance, the Republican council launched court proceedings against the landowners. Conflict escalated when the two Torrico brothers later suffered imprisonment for their role in the *Sanjurada*, the abortive military coup against the Republic planned for September 1932. In October 1934, their roles reversed when the left's armed revolt designed to forestall the entry of the CEDA into government was repressed and the Caballero brothers now found themselves locked up. In the meantime, Antonio Torrico became leader of the Falange in Villanueva de Córdoba. However, the Caballero fortunes rose in the February 1936 elections when Julián

Caballero became mayor. In July 1936, Antonio Torrico led the rebellion in Villanueva, and the Caballero brothers played a prominent role in the defence of the Republic. At this time, Julián Caballero had several rightists placed under arrest. Meanwhile, Bartolomé Caballero served on the Committee for the Defence of the Republic set up by the Popular Front forces.²⁹ This committee oversaw the confiscation of much land belonging to the Torrico family.³⁰ However, Bartolomé Torrico enjoyed the last word when he later denounced Julián Caballero, without furnishing any evidence, for the death of his brother Antonio to the Francoist authorities.³¹

Such virulent political and personal animosity did not just poison the lives of local political bigwigs. For we possess evidence that significant numbers of people lower down the local political hierarchy also loathed one another. Importantly, this entrenched contempt formed a vital aspect of the post-war repression when some people sought to destroy groups of the neighbours they had spent years coming to hate. A picture of this pre-war loathing can be discerned through the lens of testimony provided to a post-war trial. One smallholder from the village of Conquista, for instance, declared that before the war he had been 'forced' to punch a local man from the Communist Party because he had insulted people from the right.³²

Frequently, the trading of insults became both deeply personal and very offensive, and it was often remembered with great bitterness after the war. One thirty-nine-year-old court clerk from Pedroche, for instance, declared that before the war, a local Communist Party member had fumed at the clerk that he 'shit on the bitch who gave birth to him'.³³ Despite such personal insults, it was political conflict that underlay such animosities. Indeed, in many cases political and personal conflict before the war became one and the same. In a case from Villanueva de Córdoba a war widow denounced one of her former tenants whom she declared she had attempted to evict before the war because the lodger was a communist.³⁴ In fact, politics and money frequently came between neighbours, and sometimes political grudges were made worse by conflict over the collection of debts. For example, the Falangist press officer for Pozoblanco denounced a leading socialist from the town for playing a role in the killing of a prominent rightist in the town. In the trial it turned out that the socialist had collected debts from the Falangist before the war.³⁵

The depth of social conflict in the area often meant that personal relations frequently became particularly blighted by the strong ideological charge that coursed through local life. In one post-war trial, for instance, a barber and Falange member from Villanueva de Córdoba testified against a local member of the Communist Party who he claimed had been his friend before the war. However, the Falangist testified that politics had come between them when his erstwhile friend began to sport Communist Party insignia. But they fell out most seriously when the communist accused the barber of cutting the hair of despised Civil Guard officers. The ensuing argument ended with the former friend storming out of the barber's shop leaving a legacy of bad blood

running between them that ended in the Francoist courtroom and the Falangist taking to the stand to secure the conviction of his one-time friend.³⁶

Although such personal and political conflict helped fuel the repression, fundamentally fear of reform lay behind the revolt of July 1936 in the Pozoblanco *partido*. For despite the arguments put forward by Francoists that the collapse of public order made the revolt necessary, such assertions cannot hide the reality that many landholders backed the rebellion to the hilt because the arrival of the Popular Front in power threatened their hold on power. Thus in practice proto-Francoists conjured up a feverish image of political chaos to provide an excuse for their own revolt.³⁷ Certainly if we consider the situation in Pozoblanco, we see that it was neither chaotic nor revolutionary. Indeed, in 1935 in the whole of Córdoba province there were no strikes, and in the first six months of 1936 there were just twenty-four strikes in the entire province and only two outbreaks of public disorder.³⁸

In fact, it was news of the army rising in July 1936 that provided the immediate spark for local civilians and members of the Civil Guard in Pozoblanco to make common cause and seize the leading towns and villages of the area. Alert to the danger, significant numbers of loyalists fled to the surrounding countryside and prepared to retake their lost homes. In the meantime, the Civil Guard concentrated its forces in Pozoblanco and prepared to make a stand against Republican forces.³⁹

Miners from Almadén in the province of Ciudad Real and from Linares in Jaén province soon joined those now besieging the towns and villages of the Pozoblanco. These united Popular Front militia forces then stormed and retook Villanueva de Córdoba after bloody street fighting on 24 July. They captured Torrecampo the next day, and Pedroche fell on 25 July too. By 28 July, a Republican army column under General Miaja had marched from Madrid and had arrived in Montoro, to the south and east of Pozoblanco, with the intention of recapturing Córdoba. At this point, Miaja decided to secure his northern flank by recapturing Pozoblanco. He sent troops to join the militia units besieging the town. The rebels eventually surrendered after a three-week standoff and the area's head town returned to Popular Front control on 15 August.⁴⁰ The village of Dos Torres remained the rebels' last outpost and stood surrounded until 25 August when local rebels surrendered.⁴¹

Events in the village of Pedroche illustrate the chaotic violence that often accompanied the capture of the Pozoblanco area. Immediately after the loyalist militia had taken control of the village, they gunned down fourteen landowners, twenty-eight smallholders, thirty members of the 'service class'—middle-class professionals and members of the local administration—and twelve day labourers. Militiamen had dragged many of these victims from their homes after hacking down their doors with axes. They prised others from hideouts where they had been sniping at the militiamen during the firefight for control of the village. Some they shot in the streets; others they forced to the local church tower where they shoved them against a wall and opened fire.⁴² The killings often took a brutal form. Militiamen

dragged a former mayor, for example, a few yards from his home and slew him in front of his mother and his sisters.⁴³

Killers often carefully picked out those like this former mayor who they felt had blocked attempts at reform. Given the close-knit bonds that connected the well off in this part of the world, this meant that some individual families suffered particularly awfully. In the village of Pedroche, for instance, two major landowners had ruled the roost as mayors during the Primo dictatorship and were married to two sisters.⁴⁴ A brother of these sisters who served as mayor in 1931 and later became a member of the CEDA met a grim end in July 1936.⁴⁵ The two major landowners also had their lives ripped from them in the terrible violence that accompanied the repression of the revolt in Pedroche in July 1936 or in later trials.⁴⁶

The confused circumstances in which these killings took place come across clearly in the official Francoist post-war compilation of 'crimes' allegedly committed by supporters of the Popular Front: the *Causa General*. As part of their efforts to put together their report, *Causa General* officials asked the local authorities to detail the names of those involved in the killings. In response, the mayor could only specify a reduced number of individuals and admitted that there were also 'a lot more who took part in the killings that only those named know about'.⁴⁷ The cloudy nature of events also comes across in other declarations in the *Causa General*. Here testimonies frequently refer to the part played by unknown outsiders in the killings, presumably miners from the militia who helped recapture the village. Moreover, we know that many militiamen arrested these victims in public and then lost control of their captives to unknown assassins who bundled them off to secluded streets where they murdered them in secret. Despite these murky circumstances, after the war people who had carried out arrests frequently went to the firing squad or suffered imprisonment for taking part in the killings.⁴⁸

What this also shows is that in the main the killings did not spring from the orders of political leaders. Indeed, the recapture of Pozoblanco also illustrates the ways in which local Republican leaders worked hard to prevent the violence being carried out by elements beyond their control. As we have seen, the efforts to retake Pozoblanco involved besieging the town with both the Republican army, under General Miaja, a known conservative and believer in order, and militia forces.⁴⁹ Realising they stood surrounded and in a hopeless position, the rebels holding Pozoblanco opted to negotiate and surrender. Under the surrender terms the rebels were to be handed over to the army rather than the militia and be afforded safe conduct out of Republican-held territory. In accordance with the agreement, Pozoblanco returned to Republican control on 15 August.⁵⁰

The writ of local leadership, however, did not always run far, and in the afternoon of 15 August, militia forces took over the town. Shortly afterwards rogue elements shot fifteen rightists in the street. The following day,

they took seven more lives, and on 17 August another four. The killings often took a brutal and horrendous form. For instance, incensed militiamen shot a much-despised businessman who had tried to break the power of the unions by introducing machine harvesters and repeatedly ran over his body with a car.⁵¹ Terrible though such brutal, hate-filled murders were, by 18 August, the authorities had managed to put a stop to the vast bulk of such officially unsanctioned killings.⁵² We also know that local political leaders laboured hard to try and prevent judicially sanctioned executions. In Pozoblanco, the local *Tribunal Especial*, a rapidly assembled Republican court, sentenced eighteen rightists to death in September 1936.⁵³ Two local political leaders did all they could to secure a reprieve from the national Republican leadership in Madrid. However, the sentence was carried out before they could secure clemency. A crowd, however, greeted the news of the death sentences with jubilation.⁵⁴

In fact, many of those killed from Pozoblanco did not fall victim to local assassins, but rather suffered trial and execution by the Republican authorities in Valencia over the autumn of 1936. Over 300 rightists from Pozoblanco, and neighbouring villages, were sent to Valencia for trial, of whom 287 were executed in 1936.⁵⁵ Although the authorities in Valencia carried out the killings, and despite the fact that the authorities in Pozoblanco had petitioned for clemency, many of the post-war trials of people from Pozoblanco revolved around responsibility for the deaths of these victims.⁵⁶

All of these horrors took their toll on local rightists and made many much more willing to take part in Francoist military trials. The plight of a war widow and major landowner from Pedroche illustrates many of the torments endured by those embittered people who in an important number of cases went on to work with the military authorities to convict those they blamed for their tribulations.⁵⁷ When Republican militia took the village on 25 July 1936, militiamen killed her husband and two of her sons for taking up arms against the Republic.⁵⁸ Her sister's brother-in-law also had his life stolen on the same day in Pedroche.⁵⁹ In addition, she and members of her family suffered imprisonment during the war. The widow herself remained in prison from the day Republicans retook Pedroche in July 1936 until December 1936.⁶⁰ By the same token, one of her sisters had to bear imprisonment from 1938 to 1939, and another one spent five days in prison in August 1936.⁶¹

The family's suffering did not end here, however, and both the widow and members of her family also lost a great deal of property in the Civil War. In November 1938, the Popular Front authorities declared two of her sisters and a brother enemies of the Republic because of their support of the uprising. They then used the power of this declaration to confiscate the family's property.⁶² In July 1938, the Republican government had already declared the widow's deceased husband an enemy of the regime and expropriated her farmland.⁶³ The local committee in Pedroche had also requisitioned a large number of her animals, and most of her clothing and

furniture had also been taken. These losses came on top of confiscations she had suffered in July 1936 when militia forces had burned many of her religious images and goods.⁶⁴ On top of all this, during the war the Pedroche Republican Classification Board officially designated the widow in the first group of rightists worthy of suspicion.⁶⁵

She also suffered great personal offence and humiliation. She testified that the local left leadership had granted one man the right to kick her husband's corpse in the stomach. She also declared that militia forces repeatedly ran over her husband's body with a lorry. The widow added that she had been forced to clean blood from the streets and to move bodies to the cemetery on the day of the killings.⁶⁶ Furthermore, on her first night locked up in prison, she claimed the village revolutionary committee held a big feast in her house to celebrate their recapture of the village. She further complained that when slung in jail she was left unable to comfort her remaining children still reeling from the recent murder of their father and two brothers.⁶⁷ To cap it all, in deposition to the *Causa General*, the widow accused a local supporter of the Republic of coming to her house during the war period and dressing himself in the clothes of her executed husband. He then began to call himself by her husband's name and title and proceeded to issue the widow orders in her own home.⁶⁸

Francoist victory, however, put figures like this deeply suffering widow firmly back in the saddle and in a position to settle accounts. In the Pozoblanco area the tide turned in their favour at the end of the war when Republican defences finally collapsed. On 26 March 1939, the Republican front in the area fell apart with Pozoblanco falling that day and Villanueva de Córdoba and Pedroche occupied on 27 March.⁶⁹ Some Republican soldiers had tried to flee to the port of Alicante but found themselves trapped there with no ships to spirit them off to safety.⁷⁰ Most, however, did not manage to get even this far, and the victorious Francoists swallowed up over 60,000 soldiers (substantial numbers of them from the Pozoblanco area) in Córdoba province and nearby Almadén and Puertollano as they rolled through the area.⁷¹

The collapse of the Republican war machine opened the door to huge repression. On 27 March, the victorious army set up a military court in Villanueva de Córdoba.⁷² They also established another two courts in Pozoblanco.⁷³ However, a significant number of these prisoners would not even see the inside of a military courtroom. Instead, the new authorities simply shot them out of hand. Indeed, Francoists shot forty-nine Republican prisoners in the Pozoblanco *partido* in April 1939. Many of those who went to the wall had served as mayors or heads of political parties supporting the Popular Front.⁷⁴ Some died after being denounced by leading rightist families.⁷⁵

The first military court case in Pozoblanco began after this first wave of killing on 26 May 1939, and the first judicial execution followed shortly behind on 22 June.⁷⁶ This set a pattern, and between 1939 and 1940 the

two courts in Pozoblanco sent 151 people to the firing squad.⁷⁷ For its own part, the court in Villanueva de Córdoba swung into action in November 1939, and by September 1940 the new authorities there had sent 100 of their victims to an early grave, most following a military trial.⁷⁸ This repression became more centralised in September 1940 when the military transferred the remaining local prisoners to the provincial capital in Córdoba where they placed them on trial.⁷⁹

Here in Córdoba between 1939 and 1945, Francoists shot eighty-three people from the villages of Alcaracejos, Añora, Dos Torres, Pedroche, Torrecampo, Villanueva del Duque and the towns of Pozoblanco and Villanueva de Córdoba alone.⁸⁰ A further seventy-seven from these towns perished in the disease-ridden Córdoba provincial prison.⁸¹ Moreover, a number of people from these villages escaped the repression by fleeing to France only to be imprisoned later in the Nazi concentration camp of Mauthausen.⁸² Twenty-five people from these villages lost their lives there.⁸³

These figures tell only part of the story of the repression. My research shows that the new authorities in the village of Pedroche investigated 14% of the total village population in the post-war period. The municipal archive in the village (population just over 3,000) also contains the names of 543 people who were branded as dangerous leftists.⁸⁴ The local authorities also placed those eventually released from jail under heavy surveillance so that they could impose strict controls over their freedom of movement.⁸⁵ Supporters of the Popular Front in Pozoblanco also suffered a massive wave of purges in which those accused of a leftist past could be dismissed from their jobs.⁸⁶ Moreover, those deemed to have supported the Republic could be fined and have their assets frozen by the Tribunal for Political Responsibility.⁸⁷ In the judicial district of Pozoblanco at least 463 people were placed before this tribunal.⁸⁸ Those accused of any connection with communism or freemasonry could also be punished by a special tribunal.⁸⁹

8 Denouncing the Defeated

‘Franco’s justice system depends upon and demands the co-operation of all Spaniards’.¹

Falange announcement 1939

‘The nation can be served . . . as well by showing up a traitor as by giving one’s life at the front’.²

Franco 1939

‘A case can be started by any denunciation worthy of consideration’.³

Military Code of Justice

The huge prison population built up in the Pozoblanco area after the Civil War drew to a close speaks to the power of the policing services that the Francoist state had built up during the conflict. For the new authorities wasted little time in setting up concentration camps along the lines of those dotted across other parts of Spain already occupied by Francoists. Accordingly in the nearby towns of Los Blázquez, Valsequillo, Cerro Muriano and La Granjuela camps soon sprang up for those prisoners whom the occupiers considered to be political small fry. La Granjuela alone came to house up to 20,000 such prisoners. Meanwhile the victors sent those they thought to be among the local political top brass to the area’s main prison in Pozoblanco.⁴ This penitentiary soon filled to overflowing, and in haste the new authorities pressed a whole series of buildings across the *partido* into service as makeshift prisons. With so many rounded up, houses, schools and town halls all found themselves filled to the gunnels with prisoners.⁵

Such vast numbers partly stand testimony to the detective skills that Francoists had honed through close collaboration with Nazi policing services during the Civil War. Here an important starting point came in December 1937 when SS Colonel Jost had arrived in Francoist territory to train Spaniards to track their enemies as effectively as possible.⁶ Following this in July 1938 Franco’s Minister of Public Order, the post-First World War warlord of Barcelona’s streets General Severiano Martínez Anido and the Nazi SS leader Henrich Himmler signed an agreement to keep each other up to date on best policing practices against their mutual political enemies.⁷ With this help the Francoist police service nurtured an efficient surveillance system modelled along Nazi lines.⁸ Indeed under Jost’s influence the National Department for the Recovery of Documents came to amass record cards on three million individuals.⁹

The purchase that such developments helped give Franco's policing services over their political enemies can be well seen in their success in the Pozoblanco *partido*. Here the Civil Guard, military police, the new municipal police and members of the Falange Investigation Service all joined forces in the huge roundup of prisoners. Local political figures well known in the community formed their easiest prey, and Francoists soon held many of them under lock and key in the makeshift jails.¹⁰ Lesser figures also fell in swoops on the groups of Popular Front supporters the authorities particularly held in their sights. In this regard, one simple but effective technique favoured by the authorities was to lie in wait at railway stations for soldiers returning home from the front. The mistake made by many of these victims had been to take Franco at his word that those who had not committed crimes would not be harmed.¹¹

Equally misled were those from the *partido* who found themselves through the vagaries of war in other parts of Spain that had also recently fallen to the Francoists. The regime instructed such people to register with the new occupying authorities. When they did so, many then promptly found themselves under arrest and shipped back to their hometown for interrogation and investigation.¹² All this formed part of a vast movement of people across Spain after Franco ordered those displaced by the war to return to their towns and villages. Here concentration camps and military courts were being established to cope with the huge numbers making their way home.¹³ Nor did local sleuths let sleeping dogs lie once the initial frenzy of occupation and return had died down. In November 1940, in Torrecampo, for instance, they simply rounded up, without deigning to give any reason, a number of men they had noted down as their political enemies and sent them to a work battalion where they were exploited until March 1941.¹⁴

Despite such successes, the sheer scale of the task they set themselves made it impossible, as Francoist judicial staff admitted, to prosecute all those to whom they would have liked to administer a judicial drubbing.¹⁵ This meant that the regime needed to classify those it now had at its mercy and to pick out those against whom it would press charges. In this continuing social war their weapons were to be loaded not with bullets but with knowledge, however cursory and misleading. This thirst for information explains why the police across Spain both amassed careful records and also turned to the regime's support base for help. Thus when Franco's troops rolled into Madrid at the end of the war, for instance, they brought with them a huge card index containing the names of 'enemies' they had already identified. To strengthen their hand they also began taking names and information from the 40,000 fifth columnists said at the time to inhabit the city.¹⁶ However, even this operation did not meet the ambitions of Franco's policemen who realised they needed to rope in as many from their support base as they could if they were to make the kind of headway they desired. This certainly comes across in a decree issued by the Army of Occupation on 30 March 1939 that outlined both the scale of this ambition and the need to bring on board

as many supporters as possible to make the desire a reality. It stated simply, 'Our triumph allows us to measure precisely the guilt of our enemies', and continued ominously, 'To achieve this aim Generalísimo Franco requires your unreserved and enthusiastic collaboration'.¹⁷

It is by digging down to the municipal level that we can unearth just how important this collaboration became for the regime. For the documentary evidence for the Pozoblanco *partido* suggests that in practice the Francoist authorities found that by falling back on their support base they could better convict their political enemies. This was because they realised that the scale of the task they had set themselves placed a crushing squeeze on their resources, and caring little for proper investigation but being keen to present the appearance of due processes they instead preferred to scoop up allegations hurled by their grassroots supporters. In July 1939, for instance, the investigating military judges in Villanueva de Córdoba, in the Pozoblanco *partido*, turned to the mayor of Pedroche and requested detailed information on no less than the entire population of the village 'in the interests of justice'.¹⁸ Judges also requested information on those who had been rounded up at occupation. In this way, the area's local military commander lodged a request with the mayor of Pedroche in April 1939 to produce reports on the background of 348 people from the village (population just over 3,000).¹⁹ Other correspondence in the archive indicates that the scale of such demands stretched the ability of the local authorities to cope in ways which would lead them to rely on groups of their supporters. True they laboured to fulfil their orders as best they could and investigated at least 444 people (14.8% of the population) on behalf of various institutions (military judges, concentration camp officials and so on) conducting the Francoist repression.²⁰ Archival records also indicate that as the investigations continued the mayor of Pedroche received a total of 743 different requests for information and many of these went unanswered.²¹ Research from other parts of Spain indicates that the scale of this work was by no means exceptional. We know, for instance, that between 1940 and 1943, in other words after the initial wave of arrests had died down, the Civil Guard arrested an average of 60,000 people a year and wrote 900,000 reports.²²

In Pozoblanco, the evidence strongly suggests that local Falange officials who staffed the council did not have the means to deal with such huge amounts of work. Importantly, this is despite the fact that the Falange operated an independent police service parallel to the Civil Guard and military police until 1940 when it became formally part of the army. Although it is true to say that in 1943 the Falange police force withered into a largely a bureaucratic organisation, even before this demise at the village level local Falange underlings struggled to make do with the meagre resources the central authorities put at their disposal.²³ We get an insight into the parlous state of Falangist finances in a statement to a military tribunal in March 1940 from one Falangist from Pedroche who served as both the Falange investigation officer and on occasion the local municipal judge in

the village. In his statement he declared that he did not have the money to travel to Córdoba to present evidence. To give substance to his claim he insisted that his job 'is not remunerated in any way' and that he had to 'beg in order to be able to eat'. For extra measure the local civil guard furnished a statement supporting the claim.²⁴ The Falangist might have been exaggerating, but there is further evidence that points to the poverty of the Falange. In another trial, a Falange investigation officer declared that he had no means of transport to send an officer to a farm twenty kilometers away to investigate a case. In the same case, it transpired that the local Falange lacked basics such as index cards to build their surveillance records.²⁵

While the Falange investigation officer might not have had to beg to eat, the dearth of resources at disposal of frontline investigators of his ilk certainly made them ravenous for the knowledge that denouncers could supply which would allow them to uncover their most important enemies from among the mass of the defeated. This mattered because judges keen to keep up the appearance of due processes demanded at least some slivers of information which the state's overstretched detective agencies struggled to discover. This desire to satisfy the judges' feeble demands explains why across Spain military prosecutors vaunted denouncers as proof of the charges levelled against supporters of the Popular Front.²⁶ Such attitudes also shed light on why local Francoists in Pozoblanco often preferred, as we shall see, to amass denunciations against their captives rather than simply launch cases themselves, although they enjoyed the full power to do so.²⁷

The importance attached to the façade of due process becomes clear in trial documents which show that if denouncers did not step forward with specific allegations prosecutions could simply peter out. Indeed, the local authorities on occasion found themselves with no choice but to release people against whom they had failed to find anyone to testify or to denounce and so found it difficult to launch prosecutions. In this way, officials released a prisoner from the village of Villaviciosa, near to Pozoblanco, in the north of Córdoba province (into a labour battalion—a common punishment for those not actually prosecuted) precisely because nobody could be found to denounce or testify against him. The authorities found this deeply galling and indignantly reported that they 'supposed' he had taken part in crimes.²⁸

This was no one-off case, and prosecutions of people who were prime targets for the Francoist repression could be abandoned if no denouncer came forward. In this way, a leading female communist activist from Villanueva de Córdoba did not suffer prosecution, despite the ease with which she could have been charged with military rebellion because of her past in the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). In the words of the *Dirección General de Seguridad*, '[T]here was no evidence that she had taken part in crimes despite her bad conduct'. In short, nobody had denounced her or would supply testimony against her.²⁹

Accordingly, the central authorities had everything to gain by allowing accusatory practices to flourish in order to identify victims and secure the snippets of information they craved so that their charges would cut enough ice with the military judges. This helps explain a national decree issued at the end of the conflict that instructed people who knew of 'crimes' committed during the 'red domination' to pass on all they knew to the authorities and on pain of prosecution if they failed to do so.³⁰ Similarly, those seeking an identity document giving them freedom of movement were encouraged to name two 'reds'.³¹ Meanwhile, all those re-applying for government jobs were asked to denounce any of their former colleagues over whom they felt suspicion fell.³² However, proving that people had not registered denunciations for 'crimes' that nobody had witnessed created a difficulty that no law could overcome and Falangists sometimes voiced their frustrations with individuals they believed must have held information they could have wielded to denounce Republicans.³³ Unfortunately for the regime's victims, efforts to spur regime supporters to come forward with denunciations proved much more successful.

The Francoist authorities went to considerable lengths to smooth the way for those eager to denounce their personal enemies. The Code of Military Justice that regulated the entire trial process, for instance, effectively created a denouncer's charter and allowed prosecutions to begin through 'any denunciation worthy of consideration'.³⁴ More radically still, denunciations did not even have to be signed before 1941.³⁵ Moreover, until 1941 the authorities exercised care to ensure that denouncers remained anonymous and not even the accused knew the names of those who had sent their world's crashing down upon them.³⁶ In fact, to this day some ageing victims in Spain continue to battle to know the names of their denouncers.³⁷

The authorities handed denouncers even greater power by freeing the police of any inconvenient, and ultimately crippling, duty to establish the guilt of those denounced before swooping on their victims.³⁸ They gave denouncers an extra rod with which to beat the backs of their local enemies when they made it incumbent on the accused to disprove the denunciation rather than the denouncer having to prove his or her accusation.³⁹ Importantly, the aggressive nature of these procedures outflanked even the Nazis' efforts to root out those they despised. Indeed, the Germans took measures to restrict 'self-interested' denunciations.⁴⁰ Across Spain the Francoist authorities made the most of such lax procedures by setting up special denunciation centres.⁴¹ They pulled out all stops in a concerted effort to rouse as many collaborators to step forward as possible. In this way, across the country, newspaper adverts exhorted citizens to denounce their neighbours and let them know just how straightforward informing on one's neighbours had become. As a correspondent for *The Times* noted in April 1939, the regime had begun issuing blue denunciation forms 'which adherents are invited to fill in if they suspect any of their neighbours or possess information enabling them to become denouncers'.⁴²

The regime also made it very much in the interest of its supporters to incriminate neighbours. Indeed those who could prove they had thrown their weight behind the victorious side and suffered for the Francoist cause now stood ready to inherit the burgeoning patronage of the new state. Under a decree of August 1939, for instance, compensation could be paid to those able to demonstrate they had either been 'subject to vicious persecution' or who had a relative that had suffered, in the words of the decree, 'a gory martyrdom'.⁴³ The decree also allowed local civil servants who had been dismissed for rebellion by the Republican government to claim compensation. Bereaved relatives could also stake a claim for compensation if the civil servant had perished in violence in the Republican zone.⁴⁴ In December 1939, the regime extended its patronage further and earmarked 80% of council jobs for the disabled, ex-soldiers, ex-prisoners and orphans from the Francoist side. So great grew the regime's largesse that it even devised a point system to measure 'suffering' and to distribute patronage on a 'rational' basis. Those who had been awarded the Cruz Laureada de San Fernando (a medal awarded for supreme valour) notched up ten points; disability caused by imprisonment also earned ten points. People who had been sentenced to death by Republican courts landed five points (obviously for those people whose sentences had been commuted or not enforced), and for each six months of imprisonment one point could be won. Family members of former prisoners could also expect points depending upon the particular fate which had befallen the relative.⁴⁵ Special pensions were also awarded to the widows of Francoist heroes.⁴⁶

In the first rank of those who profited from these measures stood Francoist ex-combatants who by 1942 had snapped up 50,000 jobs in the gift of the government.⁴⁷ Francoists who had suffered imprisonment during the Civil War clamoured alongside these battle-hardened chosen ones for their share in the booty. In 1941 they founded their own association, which one historian has described tellingly as a 'trampoline to state patronage', to press their claims.⁴⁸ By favouring its own in such ways, the regime whipped up a frenzied atmosphere in which people found themselves under intense pressure to proclaim their allegiance to the Franco side and to take a stand against the 'enemy'. We know this process started early on in the Civil War from the reports of Antonio Ruiz, a judicial official in Burgos who fled to the Republican zone in 1937. He noted with horror that those who escaped from Popular Front territory to Burgos and went in search of a job had to prove that they had suffered at the hands of the 'reds'. If they failed to do so they faced little chance of securing a job or indeed even avoiding jail. This brutal environment, he noted, led to a competition of woes in which everyone claimed to have suffered at the hand of the 'reds' in far more grotesque ways than anyone else.⁴⁹

Franco built on the outrage such accounts of suffering provoked to couple the meaning he saw for the losses bereaved relatives had suffered to the punishment of those from the defeated side. In a speech in January 1940, for instance, the dictator declared that the deaths of those from the

victorious side had delivered Spain from the 'perpetual tyranny of the barbarians' and that these losses could not go without retribution. The victims themselves, declared Franco, 'demanded justice'. The purpose of this retribution was clear to the *Caudillo*: no moral being could refuse these 'righteous claims for punishment', and the task of national redemption would not be complete until the 'horde' had been punished.⁵⁰

The evidence in the Pozoblanco area suggests that this febrile climate created by the war and fostered by the new regime led many to identify very strongly with both Franco's rhetoric about suffering and his demands for punishment. The municipal archive in Torrecampo, for instance, preserves a number of claims for compensation from people eager to prove the gruesome extent of their torments during the war. The well-placed pre-war municipal veterinary inspector made one of these claims. In his submission to the local authorities he plainly set out the grounds on which he believed he deserved compensation. He lamented that during the Civil War he had lost two sons and a son-in-law in executions following the storming of the village in the summer of 1936. He also stressed that he had endured prison at the hands of Republicans who abused him and stripped him of many of his possessions. He then claimed he deserved compensation because the 'Marxists' had forced him to work during the Civil War. Although he could request compensation on these grounds alone, the significance of the letter is that it shows the importance local Francoists attached to demonstrating their gruesome suffering and how they related personal torment to reward.⁵¹ Importantly, the same man also played an important role in defining those whom he held to be responsible for his suffering as criminals by making a number of denunciations to the military authorities.⁵²

In fact, the evidence from the Pozoblanco *partido* strongly suggests that some supporters of the regime often made coming to terms with their own bereavement dependent upon the punishment of others. Certainly, criminalising representations of the ideological enemies upon whom a number of bereaved relatives heaped the blame for their losses and whom they yearned to punish abound in the inheritance claims made by Francoists in the Pozoblanco *partido* after the Civil War. In their claims, relatives appear to have been free to describe the manner in which their loved ones had died. For instance, in their court depositions some of the bereaved chose to refrain from making excoriating comments about people associated with the defence of the Popular Front, perhaps because they did not share the desire to keep alive such bitter acrimony.⁵³ Many others, however, opted to explain the cause of death as 'barbarous Marxism' or death itself as a form of sacrifice 'for God and for Spain'.⁵⁴ One war widow from Pedroche and leading denouncer to the military courts blamed 'criminal Marxism' for the deaths of her husband and three sons.⁵⁵ Indeed, 80 of the 153 inheritance claims made in relation to those who died in the summer of 1936 for the judicial district of Pozoblanco draw on language that reflected a burning and ideologically charged hatred that demanded retribution.

After inciting denunciations from this ready audience the regime found in practice that it could draw on the help of some embittered members of its support base to drive forward the programme of killings and incarcerations. Indeed, particularly by pushing open the floodgates to denunciation the regime allowed both its local agents and ordinary Francoist citizens to single out those who would face prosecution in its perfunctory military courts. In fact, so successful were the authorities that such collaboration forged an exceptional case in Europe of state agents and ordinary members of society working together to rid themselves of mutual political enemies.

The practice of denunciation brings out the importance of this collaboration between state and society because, perhaps more than any other factor, denouncers made the military trial system tick. For they gave the authorities the allegations needed to press charges against those they already held in custody and to root out further victims still at liberty among the wider population. Thus denouncers helped pin charges on soldiers detained at the front, those rounded up when they returned to their hometowns and even those keeping their heads down in their home villages. That said, denouncers did not have to be ordinary citizens. Indeed, regime officials and members of the Falange could also lodge denunciations.

Overall, however, the practice of denunciation brought together both state agents and ordinary Francoists. To unravel the importance of these two groups from below in driving forward the repression, I began by studying the surviving 463 sentences for Popular Front supporters from the judicial area of Pozoblanco. Military tribunals handed down these judgements which are now preserved in the records of the Tribunal of Political Responsibility (TPR). The military tribunals forwarded these sentences to the TPR as a matter of course so that executed and imprisoned Republicans could have their assets confiscated. I then examined the full trial records for seventy-four Republicans from the judicial district of Pozoblanco stored in the archive of the military tribunals in Seville. These records come complete with denunciations, investigative reports, prosecution and defence statements and both the verdict and the judges' reasoning for the sentence they imposed.⁵⁶ I also studied copies of correspondence between the trial authorities and municipal officials in the archive of Pedroche and Torrecampo councils (the only municipal archives I found in the area where such documents had not been destroyed).

What these files demonstrate above all else is that encouraging denunciation paid off handsomely for the regime. For it is here at the grassroots that all the cases I studied began as local Francoist officials and regime supporters singled out their neighbours for prosecution and collected scraps of evidence against them. This raises the question of the extent to which the Franco regime either imposed itself on its society, as some historians have argued, or the degree to which that society policed itself. In this regard it is important to note that Francoist state officials formally launched twenty-two of the seventy-four

cases of their own bat. Civil Guard officers took the initiative in twelve of the twenty-two cases, and Falangists in eight. Documents in the files for the remaining two cases do not show who set the pace in the prosecutions.

In many ways, of course, these cases highlight the power of the Francoist state, as they often concerned prisoners held in concentration camps and whom the local authorities had singled out for prosecution following requests from camp officials for information on particular prisoners they held captive.⁵⁷ Other cases also reveal the strength of Francoist policing as they involved victims whom the local authorities had simply rounded up at the end of the Civil War, and some included those against whom the local authorities and particularly the Falange had simply launched their own investigations.⁵⁸ Moreover, in many senses we can regard these Falangist officials who carried out so much of the repression as agents of the central Francoist state. For in the post-war period, Falange members held important offices such as mayor or municipal judge that fell in the gift of the provincial civil governor. As we have seen, Falangists also manned their own investigation service that worked hand in glove with other policing services.

Importantly, Falangists such as these often burned with a particularly determined passion to destroy their enemies that made them stand out in their communities. Certainly, research from other parts of Spain shows that municipal-level Falangists became so transfixed on prosecuting the defeated that the party hierarchy had to force them to attend to other tasks.⁵⁹ By the same token memoir material and research from across Spain also supports the view that Falangists at the village level went to great lengths to hunt down their local opponents.⁶⁰ The evidence from Pozoblanco suggests that here too a number of local Falangists raged against their opponents and sat square behind the Francoist policy of punishing as many opponents as possible.⁶¹ In a report to the military authorities, the Falangist mayor of Pedroche, for instance, damned one former member of the Socialist Youth from the village as 'a dog'.⁶² In fact, grassroots party activists like him often issued more venom than the regime's upper echelon. One Falangist from Pozoblanco, for instance, fumed that 'it had taken three years and much difficulty to secure the execution' of a Republican and berated the central authorities because another 'still has not been executed'.⁶³ Very often there was an intensely personal element to this hatred. Indeed, reports preserved in the Pedroche municipal archive frequently contain charges against Popular Front supporters accused of hunting down Falangist comrades and relatives who had been killed in 1936.⁶⁴ This hatred harboured by some party members also made it easy for such Falangists to work alongside members of the Civil Guard. For some officers from this police force also showed profound contempt for those they despised as 'reds' and 'revolutionaries'.⁶⁵ Civil Guard officers also drew up many of their reports simply by copying Falangist missives or by talking to prominent local Falangists or regime sympathisers and parroting their hard-line statements.⁶⁶

The documents also reveal that local Falangists displayed some specific social characteristics that make it possible to think of them in some ways as a caste apart. They tended to be smallholders rather than major landowners and they were frequently young. For instance, in 1939 a Falangist investigation officer from Pedroche was a smallholder aged twenty-six, and one of his comrades, a Falangist mayor and municipal judge, was twenty-five and also a smallholder.⁶⁷ Evidence suggests that this social profile fits well with other parts of Spain where new Francoist office holders tended to be young and to have swung behind the Francoist side in the Civil War often by fighting or suffering at the hands of Republicans.⁶⁸

Despite this, for the Pozoblanco *partido* it would be a mistake to divorce Falangists from the very society from which they emerged. For in fact common family backgrounds, shared experience, joint understanding of the war and the mutual commitment to destroy their common enemies united Falangists to many other sectors of local society. In this regard it is important to note that young Falangists often hailed from *cacique* families associated with traditional conservative politics. In some cases, Falangist smallholders were the scions of landholding families awaiting their inheritance, and in other cases were related to *cacique* families through ties of marriage. Such family bonds between Falangists and *cacique* families are very evident in the village of Torrecampo. Members of one family, for instance, enjoyed great status as important landowners in the area and dominated the locality's political system. In this way one member of the family served as deputy mayor before the Civil War, while his wife headed the village CEDA. Meanwhile, his brother had married a woman with two brothers who threw their lot in with the Falange.⁶⁹

Falangists and *caciques* such as these also frequently stood united by their support for the rebellion, their suffering in the Civil War and their demands for retribution. Both of the brothers from Torrecampo had their lives taken in July 1936 after being identified with the rebellion. Similarly, the deputy mayor's sister-in-law lost two of her Falangist brothers in the violence.⁷⁰ Moreover, all the families had land and wealth confiscated during the war.⁷¹ In Pedroche two Falangists suffered similar fates in the war. One of them, who became a Falangist investigation officer in the village, lost two of his brothers in the Civil War violence while a Republican court handed down a fourteen-and-a-half-year jail term on him for his role in the rebellion.⁷² His comrade, the post-war Falangist municipal judge, took part in the rising against the Republic and fell captive in the fighting of July 1936. Rogue elements then put him through a mock execution.⁷³ Although he escaped death, a Republican court later sentenced him to a thirty-year prison term, and he did not taste freedom until the end of the war when Francoist troops seized control of the jail in Valencia.⁷⁴

These shared bonds and experiences go some way towards explaining why many Falangist office holders and a number of other locals combined together so effectively to root out Popular Front supporters from among their



Figure 8.1 Francoist troops take control of Pozoblanco in March 1939. © ICAS-SAHP. Fototeca Municipal de Sevilla, Archivo Serrano.

neighbours. This is certainly borne out in the remaining fifty-two cases I studied in which denunciations by locals formally launched prosecutions. Importantly, the authorities already held twenty-seven of the fifty-two individuals concerned in custody. By turning to collaborators in the community in this way, local officials found that they could furnish their charges with the vague allegations that military judges often demanded before sentencing. This certainly explains why local Falangists went out of their way to prod their fellow Francoists to denounce Republicans they reviled.

In the village of Pedroche, for instance, the local authorities (the Falangist mayor and the Falangist minions doing his bidding) on occasions herded bereaved relatives through offices where they harvested mass denunciations. They pressed widows, for instance, to denounce those they held responsible for the deaths of their husbands.⁷⁵ An element of coercion, or at least very strong encouragement, seems in some cases to have been at work here. Indeed, in a number of prosecutions some Francoists came to rue the denunciations they made. In one set of proceedings a woman who had tabled a denunciation appealed for leniency from the judges when she came to know of the harsh sentences of twelve and six years handed down on two women she had accused of taking a mattress from her during the war.⁷⁶

However, in other cases although widows were encouraged to denounce, we know that at least some of them fervently believed in the justice of the



Figure 8.2 Almadadén north of Pozoblanco in March 1939 after Franco's victory. © ICAS-SAHP. Fototeca Municipal de Sevilla, Archivo Serrano.



Figure 8.3 A reporter talks to nuns dressed in secular clothes in Pozoblanco March 1939. © ICAS-SAHP. Fototeca Municipal de Sevilla, Archivo Serrano.

death sentences eventually handed down against those they had named.⁷⁷ More importantly, in many prosecutions local policing officials easily plucked willing collaborators from a pool of local 'specialists' in denunciation.⁷⁸ Indeed, it is the very activism of these denouncers that often makes them stand out. In Pedroche, for instance, a rank-and-file Falangist, and former Francoist soldier, registered denunciations in three of the ten cases started by denunciation that I studied from the village. Sometimes such Falangist foot soldiers helped out their masters by denouncing particularly vilified local Republicans. When pressed in one trial how he knew an activist was guilty, a Falangist from Villanueva de Córdoba, for instance, replied that he had heard it 'from the mouth' of a local Falangist investigation officer.⁷⁹ Locals outside the Falange also offered the same service. A war widow from a *cacique* family in Pedroche, for instance, denounced two people in the cases I studied for the village. In one trial it turned out that she denounced a man only after being asked to do so by a local police officer.⁸⁰

In addition to these specialists, Falangist officials could also call on a wide range of local Francoist inhabitants who proved willing to provide denunciations on a more limited scale. These denouncers also often boiled over with rage and hatred. Some widows, for instance, denounced those they blamed very personally for the deaths of their husbands.⁸¹ Former Catholic conservatives also came forward with very personal accounts they wanted to settle. Two garage owners from Pozoblanco, for example, are known only to have denounced a former employee. They pointed the finger at him after returning at the end of the war from Valencia where they had been evacuated to in August 1936 by the Popular Front authorities following the surrender of the rebels. Now back in the saddle, they accused the man of stealing one of their cars and then using it to ferry two people they had been hiding in their house to their execution site.⁸²

Moreover, in many cases the local authorities seem to have followed the lead of some of their neighbours.⁸³ Indeed in twenty-three of the fifty-two denunciations I studied, the registering of a denunciation led to the arrest and prosecution of the person denounced (and in a further two cases this also appears highly likely). In some cases those arrested had even been released from labour battalions by the Francoist authorities, not famed for their leniency, only to return to their home village and be denounced by one of their neighbours.⁸⁴ This type of collaboration speaks much more of the kind of spontaneous communication with officials that the historians of the Soviet Union Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately argue define denunciation.⁸⁵

Indeed, local supporters of the regime supplied many of the denunciations with alacrity. Court records suggest that denouncers could choose how much information they passed on to the authorities, and in the majority of the denunciations I studied denouncers both provided ample information and conveyed a strong desire to visit a judicial drubbing upon their enemies. One war widow from Pedroche, for instance, denounced a socialist from the

village for impounding her house in the war and in her hand-written request to the authorities implored the local authorities to 'perform their job'.⁸⁶ Denouncers on occasion even supplied the addresses of those they accused in order to speed the work of the police services. Indeed, one man from Pozoblanco specifically gave the authorities an address so that they could pounce on the man he accused of trying to kill him during the war.⁸⁷

Such supporters of the regime in the post-war period well knew that levelling such accusations could lead to death sentences or long periods of imprisonment.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, demands for determined retribution are characteristic of denunciations made in the Pozoblanco *partido*. In one case a man from Pozoblanco denounced a left-winger from the town for allowing the killing of a local conservative. The denouncer implored the authorities 'to proceed with their work'.⁸⁹ Nor did many let matters rest there. Significant numbers of those first drawn into the repression through denunciation repeatedly provided testimony in successive cases right through until 1943–1944 when the regime began to wind down the trial system.⁹⁰

In some villages this practice of denunciation drew in large numbers from across the regime's support base, who came together to select some of their neighbours for prosecution. For example, from the eight cases begun by denunciation of people from Dos Torres that I studied a total of forty-four people signed denunciations. In one case, thirteen people denounced a socialist leader from the village they accused of being morally responsible for the killings that had taken place in the village. In fact, he had tried to negotiate a truce in the village and had protected as many rightists from the violence as he possibly could, but a number of widows, Falangists and people who had lost property blamed him for their misfortunes.⁹¹

The scale of such collaboration and the high degree of self-policing carried out by communities raise important questions about the nature of Francoism and how it can be compared to other European 'terror' regimes. One of the goals of the historians who began to uncover the Francoist repression from the 1980s was to expose the scale of Francoist repression and to re-integrate the Spanish case with other 'totalitarian' regimes. This quest, however, began just as the historians of other countries began to look at the interaction of state and society in building their regimes. Accordingly, by exploring this process in Spain we can further integrate the Spanish experience with that of other European countries. Certainly a number of similarities exist. A particular parallel can be drawn between the poverty of Falange police resources and the stretched resources of the Gestapo in Germany. Robert Gellately, for instance, argues that the Gestapo could rub together far too few officers to be an effective police force without support from the general population. In Dusseldorf, for instance, just 126 Gestapo officers watched over a city of 500,000 people.⁹²

But a number of differences also stand out. Historian Eric Johnson argues that in Germany the Gestapo concentrated its resources against its most important political enemies such as Communists, Jews and Jehovah's

Witnesses. In these cases, he contends, denunciation played at most a secondary role.⁹³ As we have seen, however, in Spain the Falange and their Francoist neighbours often worked together to collar their mutual opponents. That said, there is some evidence that in Pozoblanco the Civil Guard did concentrate its fire on political leaders who had testified against leading rightists in wartime trials in Jaén and Valencia.⁹⁴ This of course largely left the field free for Falangists and other locals to pick off their enemies from among the mass ranks of Popular Front organisations. It is in this respect that the findings for Pozoblanco more closely echo some of the conclusions drawn by Robert Gellately for Nazi Germany. He also found that denunciations started many cases. Indeed, in prosecutions for race defilement in one town in Nazi Germany (Würzburg) he discovered that denunciations initiated 57% of cases.⁹⁵ Similarly, he discovered, in a random sample, that denunciations sparked 73% of cases for listening to foreign radio.⁹⁶ However, Gellately drew very different conclusions to those that can be claimed for the Pozoblanco *partido*. For he argues that that Nazi police officers largely reacted to prompting from below.⁹⁷ By contrast, in Spain, as we have seen, the local authorities often took the initiative and did all they could to encourage denunciation.

Another important difference exists with Nazi Germany where civil war had not driven the same wedge through society. For here the percentage of the population that came under investigation would appear to be much lower than in areas like Pozoblanco. For example, Eric Johnson, researching the town of Bergheim, which had a population of 6,000 in the 1930s, calculated that a total of eighty-seven cases (1.45% of the population) were launched against people accused of illegal political activities.⁹⁸ As we have seen, the relative numbers who suffered such prosecutions seems much higher in Pozoblanco where up to 14% of the population came under investigation. The Pozoblanco case then lends empirical support to the contention made by historian of the Francoist repression Ángela Cenarro that no other 'fascist' country had such a huge system of denunciation.⁹⁹

My research suggests another significant difference between the practice of denunciation in Nazi Germany and in Franco's Spain. Gellately contends that many 'ordinary' Germans took up denunciation for instrumental purposes such as the settling of matrimonial or other personal disputes.¹⁰⁰ For Gellately, this meant that the Nazi terror system became 'normalized' in everyday life (diluted of its ideological content and the top-down drive for the repression reversed).¹⁰¹ In my study, however, 'political' disputes featured prominently among denunciation. Of the fifty-two people who were denounced in the cases I studied, forty-six of them were members of centre-left political parties and/or trade unions. Fourteen of these forty-six people had occupied important local leadership roles such as mayor, councillor, or secretary of a political party. Denouncers also caught in their sights those who had been mobilised in labour politics after the First World War and particularly during the Second Republic. Five of the forty-six had signed up with

left-wing parties just after the First World War, and fourteen had thrown in their lot with socialist organisations during the Republic. Moreover, in cases where personal grudges were present, the surviving documentation indicates that the origin of the rancour generally lay in political conflict.¹⁰²

A further difference between my findings for the Pozoblanco *partido* and those of Gellately revolves around the overlap between state officials and the society from which they emerged. Gellately argues that highly politicised officers staffed the Gestapo while most denouncers were 'politically' passive. As we have seen, however, in the Pozoblanco *partido*, however, there was no neat division between members of the local police services and the society from which they themselves emerged. Moreover, both Falangists and their formally more conservative collaborators often shared the same ideological fervour.

By analysing in a little more detail who registered denunciations we can see how accusatory practices provided a powerful means for the grassroots Francoist coalition to unite against their ideological enemies. For both Falangists and other Francoists sought retribution against their political enemies whom they blamed for the death of their loved ones and comrades. The father of two Falangist brothers, a prominent local vet, for instance, denounced many people from Torrecampo to the military authorities.¹⁰³ Equally, the widow of the CEDA mayor from the village who was killed in July 1936 made a number of denunciations to the military authorities.¹⁰⁴

Similar patterns can be discerned in the village of Pedroche. From the seventeen cases I studied in the military archive in Seville for this village, ten were started by denunciations. Officials in concentration camps across Spain began the remaining seven cases. Local members of the Falange made three of the ten denunciations, sometimes against those they said had tried to hunt them down personally.¹⁰⁵ While widows of conservative rebels killed in the summer of 1936 made a further five of the denunciations. Of the two remaining denunciations, one was made by a smallholder who claimed he had been threatened by the socialist he denounced, and the second was made by an imprisoned left-wing activists hoping to save her own skin by denouncing a former comrade. In short, most denouncers from Pedroche hailed from right-wing backgrounds.

Importantly, the Francoist view of supporters of the Republic as implacable ideological enemies and barbarian criminals seems to have glued together both some former conservatives and Falangist and helped them work together to denounce their mutual enemies. Rank and file Falangists, for instance, made 19% of the denunciations I studied.¹⁰⁶ In their denunciations Falangists were quick to present people who had allied with the Republic as barbarians who had personally and vindictively victimised themselves and their families.¹⁰⁷ Falangist denouncers frequently levelled charges against local political leaders who had supported the Popular Front during the war, alleging that they had demanded further executions of people allied with the right. This accusation always took a vague form and

only the notion that people from the left were deviant gave it any support.¹⁰⁸ The Falangist press officer from Pozoblanco, for instance, denounced one of his neighbours for trying to have a rightist killed. He began his denunciation by asserting that his victim had been secretary of the Communist Party affiliated Workers' Front which he claimed gave 'an indication of his delinquent and criminal personality'.¹⁰⁹ In other cases, Falange members presented themselves as victims of the heinous Popular Front village authorities during the war.¹¹⁰

Bereaved relatives from families long allied to Catholic conservative parties levelled similarly vague charges. This group registered 34% of the denunciations I studied (widows made 17% of these denunciations).¹¹¹ Tellingly, denouncers frequently described their relatives who had died as martyrs and their deaths as forms of martyrdom that helped save Spain from the 'red hordes'.¹¹² This meant that those denounced were generally portrayed as barbaric and innately criminal.¹¹³ Indeed, twenty-eight of the fifty-two (54%) denunciations that I studied centred on the putative immorality of the accused.

Many other denunciations buzzed with a strong ideological charge that stretched back through the area's troubled past. A smallholder, for instance, denounced one of his neighbours for being a Marxist activist since 1917.¹¹⁴ Outlining this political background provided the crucial means for the blanket criminalisation of those denouncers caught in their sights. One man from Pozoblanco who had been interned by the Popular Front authorities during the Civil War, for example, denounced a woman with a left-wing background for being 'very dangerous' because she had thrown her weight behind for 'everything related to communism'.¹¹⁵ Similarly, a bank manager from Pozoblanco denounced a militiaman from the town who he claimed had arrested rightists for having 'perverse ideas, being a Marxist fanatic and despite his young age being extremely dangerous'.¹¹⁶

Unsurprisingly, many such denunciations were frequently deeply suspect. Bereaved Francoists, for instance, often conflated the arrest of their loved one by local militiamen from Popular Front parties with the actual killing of a family member. Although generally there was no evidence that the local militiamen had carried out the killing, when pressed in trials on how they could substantiate charges, denouncers frequently found themselves forced to cite the political background as proof of the propensity to commit vile crimes. In fact, while local militiamen often selected those to arrest and carried out many of the detentions, uncontrolled elements, and often members of the militia from other areas, later killed many of those who had been detained. Moreover, local political leaders often did all they could to stop the violence, although in some cases it was local activists who selected those to be arrested.¹¹⁷

The most likely explanation for relatives conflating arrests with killings is that they wished to secure the harshest punishment for those they regarded as their enemies.¹¹⁸ However, there is also another possible

explanation. In order to come to terms with death, relatives needed an explanatory narrative for the loss of their loved ones. By blaming specific individuals retribution could function as a form of mourning by explaining sudden, seemingly random and frustratingly anonymous killings. Some widows, for instance, insisted in their denunciations that the 'barbaric' and immoral character of left-wing activists showed that they were responsible for the deaths of their husbands.¹¹⁹ Some Francoists, then, were able to unite and come to terms with the past by using denunciation to participate in the annihilation of others.¹²⁰

In particular, this made it possible for those Francoist widows who registered so many denunciations to play a very public and prominent role in the repression by turning private loss into public demands for retribution.¹²¹ Temma Kaplan, a scholar of Spanish social history, has argued that women in early twentieth-century Spain found room to intervene in public life by mobilising a discourse of justice rather than politics.¹²² Francoist collective memory of the Civil War made this task easier by presenting retribution as synonymous with both justice and honouring the memory of Francoist dead. These precepts fitted well with local culture in Pozoblanco within which widows were expected to honour the memory of their husbands.¹²³ This comes across clearly in the denunciation registered by a widow from Dos Torres against one of her husband's former employees and union activist. She finished her denunciation demanding 'justice for God and for Spain'.¹²⁴

This unity of the Francoist coalition carries important implications for our understanding of early Francoism. For some historians have examined Francoist local politics in this period in terms of conservative members of old ruling families returning to power and limiting the power of young Falangist upstarts. In this interpretation, denunciation has been explored as a weapon that Falangists and conservatives deployed against one in another in the battle for power and influence.¹²⁵ In Pozoblanco this interpretation certainly holds some water because Falangists and conservatives did indeed sometimes denounce one another to the authorities.¹²⁶ However, very specifically in relation to the repression of supporters of the Republic the evidence suggests that only because Falangists and former conservatives proved able to unite behind the Francoist interpretation of the enemy did the repression gain such a deep bite. Indeed, many prosecutions only became possible because the two groups colluded in denouncing Republicans. Thus in this regard the actions of these former conservatives reveal how they turned their backs on conventional politics and helped the Falange to kill and incarcerate their mutual opponents among those who had worked to defend the Republic and its programme of reform.

9 Into the Dock

To judge him by his past [in a left-wing organisation] it can be assumed that he took part in the killings'.¹

Mayor of Villanueva de Córdoba reporting to the military authorities.

I know he was involved because it 'was strongly rumoured in the village'.²

Testimony from Dos Torres

Once the local authorities or denouncers had singled out potential victims for prosecution, the wheels of the military judicial machinery began to turn with a vengeance. For those now caught in the clutches of the military courts the next ordeal came when the investigating judge called for reports on their political background and behaviour during the Civil War. Although local mayors, Falange investigation officers and other policing officials drew these up, they often did so simply by garnering the accusations that their fellow Francoist residents fired off against those on remand. Local officials then sent on the undigested allegations to the investigating judge.

After this judge had perused the report and decided to press ahead with prosecution, he would set about gathering 'evidence' such as confessions, statements, witness testimony and further police reports. Until July 1940, while the emergency summary rules for trials operated, his brief simply ran to collecting this basic information, and he worked unhindered by any obligation to find corroborating proof. Even after July 1940, when ordinary summary trials started up again, the demands for corroboration remained slight.³

Keeping up the appearance of due process, however, always counted. This is one reason why investigating judges attempted to shore up their cases by asking what they termed 'upstanding citizens' (Francoists) to take the witness stand or to supply affidavits. In the absence of any documentary or material evidence, the allegations levelled by these collaborators formed the bulk of the prosecution case. This led to huge participation in the trial system. In Madrid alone, for instance, the new occupying

authorities claimed they had already taken 20,000 witness statements in the capital by 3 April 1939.⁴ By relying so heavily on reports and hostile witness testimony in this way, military officials catapulted the neighbours of those on trial to the heart of the prosecution system and created levels of mass participation in the repression that exceeded even those spawned by the practice of denunciation.

In fact, a certain degree of inevitability lay behind this dependence upon those prepared to take the stand. For by turning to the military trial system to provide a fig leaf of legitimacy to their repression, Francoists had placed themselves in a real bind. In the first place, the 28 July decree had allowed for the prosecution of all those who had stood behind the Popular Front government. However, the resources of the state never stretched far enough to support such a vast endeavour.⁵ This inevitably meant that military officials did have to exercise a degree of selection. The denunciation process of course did much of this work, and the streamlining of the trial system also eased the burden, but military judges still found themselves swamped and eager for help.

Particularly, as in deciding how to proceed with prosecutions, investigating judges faced a choice between three major charges: supporting military rebellion, aiding and abetting military rebellion and inciting military rebellion. Behind these apparently clear distinctions stood a raft of confusions. The difficulties begin with the very notion of military rebellion. As the phase suggests, in many cases it meant prosecuting those who took up arms. Indeed, Franco's leading military judicial theorists defined military rebellion as an 'armed rising against the institutions of the state'.⁶ Muddying the waters, however, Francoist judicial officials also prosecuted those accused of 'common crimes' under the general rubric of military rebellion. When they spoke of 'common crimes' they invariably referred to the outrages that had occurred in Republican-held territory during the suppression of the revolt.⁷

However, the difficulties became much more entrenched when Francoists stirred politics into the pot of charges. For in practice the accusation of military rebellion in terms of taking up arms, supporting the Popular Front or committing 'common crimes' all became wrapped up with political support for the 'rebellion'.⁸ In part, this stemmed from the woolly nature of the decree of 28 July 1936 which stipulated that attacking people or property constituted military rebellion without classifying the category of rebellion these acts should fall under. This was why in June 1937 military judicial officials ruled that the political past of the accused should decide this question.⁹ Article 173 of the military code further lent the political witch hunters a helping hand by instructing that courts should always take into account the 'perversity' of the accused when coming to a judgement.¹⁰ In practice, the 'perversity' of the accused became a defining criterion for the application of harsh punishment, whether for taking up arms, offering political support or committing common crimes.¹¹

All of this meant that prosecutors needed to lay their hands on a good deal of information. For if charges were to stick they had both to know the political background of the accused and to be able to marshal arguments that their victim had taken part in the rebellion and demonstrated perverse instincts. Significantly, they could only measure and know huge sections of the population in these ways by turning to the neighbours of those they had herded behind bars.¹² By studying this self-policing carried out at the local level we can gain an insight into the making of Francoism from below both as a political system and as a set of cultural assumptions about virtuous victims and vile perpetrators.

This becomes clear when we study the reports drawn up by local officials in the Pozoblanco *partido*. Given the scale of the repression, drawing up these reports presented a huge undertaking.¹³ This is one reason why in their reports the local authorities often simply parroted the information fed to them by local Francoists without bothering to substantiate what they had been told. The habit of the under-resourced authorities to plagiarise one another's uncorroborated reports without troubling to write their own only magnified further the influence of those from below.¹⁴

Reports from the village of Alcaracejos illustrate the extent to which local authorities simply regurgitated charges without lifting a finger to check if allegations held any water. In four out of the eight trial cases studied in detail from the village, the local authorities openly stated that they based their reports on information offered up by named local 'upstanding citizens [Francoists]'.¹⁵ Indeed, across the *partido* many reports did little more than voice hostile feelings coursing against leading Popular Front activists. The mayor of Añora, for instance, declared of one socialist leader from the town that 'in this village he is considered a dangerous element and is totally undesirable'.¹⁶ Frequently, the local authorities went to little effort to cloak the flimsy nature of the allegations they levelled. Some reports simply repeated the charges made by named individuals and were vaguely expressed using phrases such as 'according to . . .'.¹⁷

The wont of the various local authorities reporting to military judges to parrot allegations already passed on in denunciations only increased the influence of grassroots Francoists further. One war widow from Pedroche, for instance, sparked the case against a member of the Communist Party from the village when she denounced him in 1939. In her denunciation she claimed that he had been involved in the 'revolutionary Marxist outrages before the war'. She also accused him of brandishing a gun in July 1936 and of haranguing and threatening her while Popular Front authorities held her captive in prison in 1936. The Civil Guard report simply echoed these details and laconically added that the widow could provide further information. The mayor's report followed much the same lines to the Civil Guard missive and again mirrored the allegations levelled by the widow.¹⁸

With such reports piling up on their desks, investigating judges bent on launching full-scale prosecutions would now set about cobbling together the

scraps of 'evidence' that sufficed to secure conviction in their farcical courts. The Pozoblanco case shows that numbers of grassroots Francoists jumped at the opportunities now presented to them both by the token rules of the trial system and by the hunger of prosecutors for information. Army judicial officials would begin gathering this testimony by writing to the mayor in the hometown of the prisoner and request that local 'upstanding citizens' provide further information on the accused.¹⁹ Under the rules regulating the conduct of investigations, judges could request testimony from as many people as they thought appropriate.²⁰ It was normal practice for the local mayor to pass requests for testimony to the municipal judge, a sinecure position reserved for Falangists who had sided with and suffered for the Francoist side in the Civil War.²¹ He would then collect the testimony and forward it to the investigating judges. These military judges would sometimes write back to the local officials and solicit more information or dictate a set of questions they wanted the witnesses to answer.²² This laborious process put great strain on the overburdened system already outlined. Nevertheless, many grassroots Francoists helped ease the burden and made the trial system work by declaring with alacrity against their local opponents.

Indeed, the scale of popular participation in the repression that this provision of testimony produced shows that Francoist sectors of society became one of the most important pillars of the post-war repression in the *partido*. Importantly, the number of people who provided testimony exceeds those who registered denunciations. In the sixty-nine cases that I studied which preserve a clear verdict and sentence, participants offered up 705 depositions: an average of just over ten pieces of testimony per case. A total of 217 collaborators gave hostile testimony and in some cases more than 11 witnesses testified. Many witnesses provided more than one statement in each case and appeared as witnesses in several different cases. Importantly, civilian participation on this scale gave an air of 'credibility' to the trial process and helped sustain the illusion that the rule of law was in operation.²³

The sheer scale of popular participation in Pozoblanco indicates the considerable comparative importance of the Spanish case in the history of mid-century European political repression. The figures from the *partido* suggest that more Spanish civilians acted as witnesses in the Francoist post-war military tribunals than German ones did in similar sorts of trials conducted during the Nazi period.²⁴ Eric Johnson, for instance, in a study of denunciation in a cluster of small towns in Nazi Germany, found that there were on average four witnesses per trial in his sample of 177 trials of people accused of illegal political activity.²⁵ Moreover, the degree of participation tended to increase over time. For example, in the cases for Pedroche there were an average of 5 testimonials per case in 1939, 5.3 in 1942, 6 in 1943 and 11 in 1943.²⁶ While some historians have seen the Francoist repression as declining in intensity over the 1940s, these findings suggest that another way of looking at the change in the Francoist repression over time is to see the trial system as 'maturing'.²⁷ For as it

became more established it steadily pulled in more people who collaborated in the repression in order to secure harsh retribution.

The broad social origins of those who co-operated with the repression also cut across the argument made by some historians that old-guard conservatives moderated the repression. In fact, in terms of participation in the trials it seems that significant numbers of older conservatives turned their backs on traditional politics and embraced the physical elimination or social marginalisation of those they had once tried to contain within the corrupt parliamentary system or by mobilising in the CEDA. This is not to undermine the importance of Falange activists in the military tribunals, as these party members often put themselves to the fore when it came to providing incriminating testimony. This much is very apparent in the trials of people from the villages of Alcaracejos and Pedroche. One Falangist from Alcaracejos testified in all the cases I studied for this village, and another Falangist from the village testified in 71% of the cases I examined. From Pedroche, a Falangist testified in 23% of the cases I analysed from the village, and one of his party comrades testified in 17% of the cases.²⁸

However, Falangists did not act alone and often found they could call on those from their pool of denouncers from former conservative groups who had already performed such useful service in opening up cases against mutual ideological and personal enemies. In the village of Pedroche, for instance, a major landowner and the widow of an important village politician testified in three of the seventeen cases I studied. Similarly, another widow of another leading political figure in Pedroche testified in three of the cases. Likewise a landowning widow of a *cacique* from Torrecampo with young relatives in the Falange threw her weight and social prestige behind the military trials.²⁹ Indeed, she provided testimony in 50% of the cases I examined for the village.³⁰ The testimony of these *cacique* groups frequently betrays a radical desire for retribution. Military judges reprimanded one of the widows from Pedroche, for instance, in two separate cases for changing her story in botched attempts to secure convictions.³¹

In addition to such specialists, the local authorities could also call on a wide range of other rightists who testified on much more ad hoc basis. In the trials I studied for people from the village of Pedroche, for instance, a total of sixty-two non-Falangists provided extremely hostile testimony. An analysis of the profession of these people (known in the case of forty individuals) shows that many of these Francoists came from what some historians have labelled the 'service class' (middle-class bidders of the Francoist rulers).³² Forty percent were smallholders, 30% were self-employed craftsmen or middle class professionals. A further 17% were female relatives of victims of the violence of July 1936 in the village.

Embittered grassroots Francoists like these often exceeded the radicalism of the military judges who at least felt the need to act out the farce of some sort of procedure, however hollow, and demand some fragments of evidence. Correspondence in the municipal archive in Pedroche shows that

the failure to provide such detail by those prepared to make allegations frequently exasperated army judges. For the records includes numerous requests from military judges for better quality and more specific information than had originally been provided.³³ In one characteristic case, a military judge became frustrated with the vagueness of the accusations presented to him. He wrote to the mayor in Pedroche requesting 'more concrete information' about an assertion that a local man had taken part in the executions of rightist rebels from the village.³⁴

However, many municipal judges burned with impatience for their enemies to be convicted and became frustrated by such military judges' 'inconvenient' desire for evidence. The Falangist municipal judge from Pedroche, for instance, testified rather petulantly in one case in response to one judge's demands for more concrete details. He snarled that he had already provided more than sufficient information to convict a former member of the Young Socialists accused of taking part in the violence that accompanied the suppression of the July 1936 rebellion. Faced with this belligerence, the military judge threatened him with disciplinary measures if he did not stump up more and better information.³⁵

Despite such clashes, both the bitterness of the pre-war conflict and the tantalising delights of offices up for grabs help explain the radicalism that burned inside some municipal judges. For in fact those who offered up such insubstantial testimony most certainly found they could shin up the greasy pole of social mobility. Indeed, cases such as that of a young Falangist from Pedroche show how those who pressed from below for harsh punishment could flourish under Francoism. The Falangist hailed from landowning stock and a traditional conservative family. His grandfather, for instance, a landowner who had entered the fold of *Acción Popular* before the war and identified with the rebellion had been gunned down in Pedroche in the violence of July 1936.³⁶ His brother also lost his life in the violence of July 1936, and other members of his family also found themselves evicted from their home. For his own part, the already radicalised Falangist had been languishing in jail in the months before the Civil War for shooting dead one of his socialist neighbours after he became embroiled in a street argument.³⁷ Despite lynch mobs baying for his blood outside Pozoblanco prison in the summer of 1936, he survived the war.³⁸ After all these travails, the end of the war brought a very personal salvation when Francoist forces prised him from his cell in a Republican jail.

Rejoicing in his freedom, the newly liberated activist regularly supplied hostile testimony to the military tribunals and proved ready enough to collude with his fellow Falangists. In one case, for instance, in his initial witness statement he declared that he knew nothing about the actions of a man accused of taking part in killings in the village. He later changed his testimony to say that he definitely knew the man had been involved in the killings. In fact, the Falangist had been in prison at the time of the murders, but he seems to have changed his testimony in this way because the local

authorities were experiencing difficulty in nailing their man.³⁹ Despite his manoeuvrings, or perhaps because of them, he went on to enjoy long-term political success in the village.⁴⁰

Although he became a village political bigwig, his experience does not seem so exceptional among those who flocked to the ranks of the Falange. Two other Falangist witnesses from Pedroche, for instance, both lost older Falangist brothers who were gunned down in July 1936.⁴¹ They were joined by other Falangist witnesses too young to be put before a firing squad at the outbreak of the Civil War but who later served time in Popular Front jails for their Falangist sympathies.⁴² Such underlings shared with their leaders both youth and a propensity to connive in the repression and offer up testimony to the courts.⁴³ In the small town of Villanueva de Córdoba, for instance, three Falangists were each deeply implicated in savage beatings and provided copious testimony.⁴⁴

Numbers of the regime's supporters from old conservative groups also found that by providing testimony to the courts they could settle accounts with their local enemies. Often they worked to trounce those who had taken power from them during the Republican period. A wealthy business owner from Dos Torres provides a case in point. For some years he had helped fill the ranks of the old Liberal Party, but when the Republic came he and other former monarchists in the village swung behind the Catholic party *Acción Popular*. This tactic paid off well, and in July 1936 he held a leading political position in the village.⁴⁵ Unfortunately for him, the suppression of the revolt saw supporters of the Popular Front sweep him from office. But in the end the Franco regime gave him the last word, and in the post-war period he became extremely active in the military tribunal hearings against those who had effectively usurped his domination of village politics during the Civil War. Indeed, he offered up hostile testimony in 30% of the cases that I studied of people from Dos Torres.

This potent mixture of lost power, personal score settling against ideological enemies and the desire to move within the orbit of the new regime all seem to have led former conservatives to work carefully with the local authorities to convict hated local political foes. A good example of such connivance comes in the trial of a local Communist Party leader from the village of Pedroche. At the end of the war, the communist had ended up in the La Granjuela concentration camp. Then on 24 June 1939, the widow of a prominent former conservative denounced him for the killing of her husband and two of her sons. When pressed on how she knew of his participation in the crime she later declared to the court that a local Civil Guard officer had told her. When court officials pressed for information on how this officer knew of his involvement, the Civil Guard replied he had been told by a man 'who has since been executed'. Before court officials learnt this, however, the widow's brother had already given testimony stating that the accused had long been a Marxist and bore responsibility for the actual killing of his brother-in-law and nephews. He offered no direct witness

testimony and other witnesses simply stated that they knew of the man's guilt from 'rumours' doing the rounds in the village.⁴⁶

Despite such clear examples of local Francoists trying to convict their neighbours without any real evidence, many of those who became involved in the trials seem to have believed they did so from the highest motives. Indeed, by looking at what they told the courts we can see that many of these grassroots supporters of the regime not only openly accepted the criminalising representations of Popular Front supporters peddled by the regime, but also actively produced them. Accordingly, their testimony also reveals the making of Francoism as a set of assumptions about the inherently heinous nature of those who had swung behind the defence of the Second Republic. More than this, it shows how they branded as monsters many of their neighbours whose criminal records even today remain in force.

At the heart of these understandings stood the fervent belief of many witnesses who demanded nothing less than justice for their 'martyred' relatives. Indeed, bereaved witnesses often demanded 'justice for God and Spain' in their remarks to court officials and argued they were making their statements 'in the interests of justice'.⁴⁷ Moreover, in their testimony some witnesses revealed that they believed that they or their relatives had suffered in the Civil War simply because of their faith rather than their role in supporting the rebellion or for being allied with right-wing political parties.⁴⁸ Such understandings inevitably came along with the belief that the accused were 'godless'. This explains why so many Francoist witnesses highlighted the propensity of some Republicans accused of a variety of 'crimes' to deliberately blaspheme in front of priests. For such witnesses it was not the blasphemy in itself that mattered so much as what they thought it revealed about their opponents. Indeed, many Francoists believed that the blasphemy of Republicans vindicated their belief that they faced a godless enemy and that their loss of property and social position in the war emerged from an assault on the divine order.⁴⁹

It is perhaps unsurprising then that some of those who understood their property as a God-given right should view the confiscation of their property as an attack on the natural order.⁵⁰ Thus many witnesses commonly described the confiscation of property, imposed as punishment for rebelling against the legally elected government, as pillage (*saqueos*).⁵¹ This is also why they quickly condemned as criminals rather than political activists those who took part in such confiscations. In testimony to the military courts, for instance, a smallholder from Dos Torres described a former employee in the most disparaging terms. The accused had been and member of a left-wing party and had been a municipal guard in the emergency police force set up by the village authorities to restore order following the collapse of the Republican state in July 1936.⁵² The employer claimed he had seen the accused in the summer of 1936 'riding around on a horse like a bandit'.⁵³ The statement reveals much about the way those who had

challenged the existing social hierarchy were perceived and represented as criminals not just among local Francoists but to the military tribunals too.

Much of the testimony concerning the loss of property also contains a deeply personal flavour. Such testimony became so charged precisely because centre and left political forces had challenged the social order in very powerful and very personal ways.⁵⁴ Testimony given by employers against former employees accused of 'stealing' property took on an especially hostile tone and they reserved particular venom for Popular Front supporters accused of provocatively wearing clothes taken from their employers.⁵⁵ Importantly, in cases where employers had been the victims of their own employees, many Francoists seemed especially prepared to give hostile testimony precisely because they saw the employees as guilty of inverting the social hierarchy.⁵⁶ Indeed, witnesses expressed particular indignance when they felt that those they accused had not shown sufficient respect to their employers.⁵⁷ In a case of a man accused of collectivising a shoe workshop, for instance, one witness reprimanded a former employee who had helped collectivise the workshop by asking 'are you not ashamed to address your employer like that?'⁵⁸

Often it was the personal experience of the reversal of power relations that dominated the testimony given by a wide range of people from Francoist sectors of society. In a case from Pedroche, for instance, a smallholder testified against a man who had acted as a guard in the emergency police force the village authorities set up in the wake of the coup and had later volunteered for the Republican army. These two acts offered more than enough reason to haul him into the dock under the charge of 'rebellion'. However, the smallholder spent the main part of his testimony describing how the man had forced him to serve him a meal in his own home.⁵⁹ In other words, the attempt to challenge relations of power constituted the real 'crime'. This is also why local Francoists who said they had been imprisoned in the early part of the Civil War placed considerable emphasis in their testimony on their personal humiliating loss of status rather than on the specifics of 'rebellion'.⁶⁰ Collaborating with the Francoist system of 'justice', then, allowed those who had lost out in the Civil War to play an active role in the counter-revolutionary reassertion of power that lay at the heart of early Francoism. In the process, they both gave support to and actively forged Francoist beliefs and values.

Despite being so willing to collaborate in convicting some of their neighbours while believing so fervently in the justice of their cause, the chaotic nature of events meant that these witnesses, like denouncers, had no real evidence to offer the courts. Instead, Francoist sectors of society relied on rumours to establish how their relatives, comrades and friends had died or suffered.⁶¹ Significantly, the rumours only worked because they circulated in an environment in which Francoists already commonly accepted that members of Republican parties stood out as depraved godless criminals. For the rumours frequently contrasted the barbarity of Popular Front

supporters with the martyrdom of those from the victorious side in the war.⁶²

Not unexpectedly, some Falangist mayors, eager to force their local enemies through the judicial process, quickly exploited such rumours. Thus the mayor of Villanueva de Córdoba did not hold back when he openly confessed to the military authorities that he did not possess information about how a day labourer from the town accused of ordering the killing of prisoner had behaved during the war. For he simply told the authorities, '[T]o judge him by his past [in a left-wing organisation] it can be assumed that he took part in the killings'.⁶³ This is no one-off example, and mayors frequently exploited of such backgrounds to provide the context for vague accusations of being involved in violence.⁶⁴ Indeed, the reports written by mayors were often based on gossip underpinned only by a belief that a person's past in a left-wing organisation confirmed a nefarious character.⁶⁵

Many from outside the ranks of the judicial corps and even the Falange also shared these assumptions. For instance, one man from Torrecampo, whose father had been shot by uncontrolled elements in July 1936, stated to the *Causa General* authorities that he 'suspected all members of the Popular Front and all members of left-wing parties' could have murdered his father.⁶⁶ This suspicion permeates testimony to the military tribunals too. In case after case, Falangists, *caciques* and ordinary Francoists presented a past in a left-wing organisation as evidence of inherent moral perversion and criminality.⁶⁷ A businessman from Pozoblanco, for instance, declared that his next-door neighbour, who had been in the Socialist union, the UGT, since 1918, was so morally corrupt that 'he must have been involved in the outrages [the killings in the town]'.⁶⁸

As many Francoists accepted that it was the political past of a person that meant he or she must have committed crimes, it was easy for local Francoists to criminalise their leftist neighbours by passing on rumours about them. These rumours thrived on examples of heinous behaviour that encapsulated the message that Popular Front supporters could perpetrate any depraved act. The rumours took a number of forms but all centred on gross moral transgressions that Republicans were said to have committed. A local socialist leader in Pozoblanco, for example, was strongly rumoured to have allowed two of his own brothers-in-law to be killed.⁶⁹ This was read as proof of his total depravity. One of the striking aspects of such rumours is how widely known they were. Four Francoists from Torrecampo, for example, stated that rumours that a day labourer from the town had boasted of taking part in the killings of July 1936 were extremely well known in the village.⁷⁰

Despite these obvious limitations to rumours, local Francoists often proved more than willing to draw on them to achieve convictions.⁷¹ A member of the CNT from Dos Torres, for instance, stood accused by local Francoists of playing a role in destroying church images and in the killing of the village priest. Court documents reveal that the wealthy business owner and former mayor openly declared that there were no witnesses to

the destruction of images from the church because only 'leftists had been present'. Nevertheless, he asserted that he knew the man to be implicated because it 'was strongly rumoured in the village'. Similarly a woman from the village accused the man of killing a relative, the local priest. When pressed on how she knew this she declared that 'it was a very strong rumour at the time'. The documents also show that a further five people testified that they knew of the accused's involvement, as it was established local knowledge in the village. No one offered any direct witness testimony.⁷²

Regardless of such shortcomings, the bereaved often pressed hard for judges to do their worst. For instance, one smallholder from Villanueva de Córdoba, whose son had lost his life in the killings that followed the suppression of the July 1936 revolt, demanded that those he testified against 'be given the punishment that in all justice they deserve'.⁷³ Similarly, a widow from Dos Torres testified against the former socialist mayor of the village she blamed for the death of her husband. The accused himself claimed that uncontrolled elements had spirited away a man he had arrested and did him to death. Although not a direct eyewitness to her husband's killing, in her testimony she revealed both a desire to explain her bereavement and gain the harshest punishment when she stated that the man had demonstrated his 'criminal instincts' by refusing her pleas not to detain her husband.⁷⁴

No doubt such relatives searched both for an explanation for seemingly chaotic and unattributable deaths and for a degree of closure when levelling accusations. Moreover, the military courts offered the only means of redress open to those who had suffered so badly during the war. But the reality was that bereaved relatives such as this established guilt by association rather than through evidence and used their agency to turn specific individuals into depraved members of the 'red horde'. As a result they co-operated in harshly castigating and stigmatising groups of people who had threatened their social, economic and political privilege, thereby re-establishing their own place in the local hierarchy.

This is not to say that all local Francoists participated to the same degree. For, importantly, witnesses could choose to reveal as much or as little information as they wished, and indeed some opted to refrain from firing off allegations.⁷⁵ Testifying about the killing of her husband, for instance, a widow from Pozoblanco stated that a large group of people had arrested him and she could not say who held responsibility.⁷⁶ While cases such as this show that those who participated by passing on as much detail as possible often did so purely of their own volition, it also reveals that some Francoist would not be drawn into the farce of the trials.

Much more than this, however, in the sixty-nine cases that I studied with a clear verdict and sentence, 79 people provided cautious and limited support in their testimony, while 100 people provided clearly positive testimony.⁷⁷ Although these witnesses rarely held much sway with judges, what they had to say matters for a number of reasons. Firstly, because the authorities themselves, by collecting so much of it, revealed that they set

great store by it. Doing this, of course, allowed them to create the impression of being committed to due process. Thus the provision of positive testimony became another important way in which those from below helped 'legitimise' the repression.

The testimony the authorities collected also reveals a range of responses to the regime's blanket criminalisation of those from the defeated side. Often those who gave positive witness testimony struggled to square their own love and affection for, or positive experience of, Popular Front supporters with the belligerent rhetoric of the regime. In a significant number of cases this meant they found themselves forced to steer their way through the crude divisions of virtuous victors and the vile vanquished that ruined life in post-war Spain. An example comes in the case of a Falangist from Dos Torres who put the ties of blood and affection before unflagging support for the regime's values and its war against the defeated.⁷⁸ The Falangist came to the aid of his brother who had stood out as an important socialist leader in the village. Various Francoists from Dos Torres accused the socialist brother of being responsible for the killings that had taken place in August 1936. Standing up for his kin, the Falangist wrote a letter to the judges pleading for clemency and arguing that the allegations were 'an abuse of Franco's justice' driven solely by personal grudges.⁷⁹

A similar effort to speak up for the most despised came from a woman who hailed from a right-wing family in Pozoblanco. Before the Civil War she had married an important left-wing leader who at the start of the revolt became the head of a militia unit. With the war over, a leading local Falangist had denounced her husband for arranging the death of the woman's two brothers. This placed her in the difficult position as the sister of two 'glorious martyrs' and the wife of a 'barbarian'. But when called to testify in her husband's trial she refused to become complicit in the conviction of her husband on the basis of insubstantial rumours. Instead, in her testimony she insisted to the court on the innocence of her husband and argued that the Falangist was bent on settling a personal grudge.⁸⁰

Ties of friendship also led witnesses to step forward in defence of those they cared about. However, sticking their heads above the judicial parapet in this way required witnesses to tread the fine line between political and personal loyalty by distinguishing between what they presented as the accused's 'true' character (i.e., 'good') and his or her 'bad' political background. This strategy is well illustrated in the case of a man from Pozoblanco who had been denounced for failing to work for the release of his former employer, a textile-factory owner, who had been imprisoned for his role in the rebellion. Three managers at the factory, however, came to the man's defence by providing character references in which they declared that 'despite being a leftist, he is a person of high moral calibre'.⁸¹

Indeed, even those who one might expect to be most inflamed by the tensions of class struggle and the terrible divisions in Spanish society thrown up by the horrors of war and Francoist identity politics could put such

personal bonds first. An example comes in a case from Alcaracejos of a man accused of arresting rightists in the summer of 1936. His employer insisted, however, that he had been a good worker and added that they had long enjoyed good personal relations. What the former employer omitted to say is also important. Unlike other witnesses in the case, for instance, he did not mention the left-wing background of the accused man and did not give a further airing to rumours passing from mouth to mouth in the village that his former employee had worked as an emergency police guard.⁸²

Others were prepared to go much further in trying to help their neighbours. In the front rank of this group stood people who felt morally indebted to supporters of the Popular Front who had saved their lives or eased their suffering. To these groups, the crass assertion that those who had backed the Republic were inherently depraved clearly made no sense. This could be true even of witnesses who in other cases had worked to secure the conviction of supporters of the Republic. For example, a man from Villanueva de Córdoba, whom forces loyal to the Popular Front had imprisoned during the Civil War, provided testimony to a Francoist military tribunal that a man in the dock had meted out barbaric treatment both to himself and the village leader of the Falange, whom he described as a 'martyr'.⁸³ However, in the trial of another man, a member of the Communist Party accused of killing a Falangist, the same 'witness' declared that 'despite being a communist he is a good person'. The motive driving this statement seems to be that the accused communist had both secured the testifier's release from jail and had worked hard to prevent killings.⁸⁴ In other words, the logic of his position was that the violence that occurred in the summer of 1936 fell largely beyond the control of local activists like the accused communist. Thus his very personal debt completely undermined the entire premise of Francoism and many Francoists that the Republic was governed by the inherently criminal and led him to throw his weight behind a reviled activist for the Popular Front.

This need to make sense of individual experience and to satisfy the demands of personal conscience led some Francoists to intervene actively on behalf of supporters of the Republic. This can be seen in the case of a socialist from Pedroche who was accused of taking over the house of local landowner and war widow. In this case, however, another local landowner would not go along with this attempt to push the accused before the firing squad or into the depths of the prison system. This despite the fact that he started his testimony demonstrating his full membership of the Francoist community by stating that in July 1936 he had 'fled to the countryside' pursued by the 'red hordes' bent on gunning him down. With his status as a persecuted Francoist established, he went on to declare that he was 'eternally grateful' to the man in the dock for his 'humanitarian action'. According to the landowner, the accused had ensured that a close relative of his who had been killed in the violence of July 1936 received a 'proper burial' rather than being cremated. Tellingly, the witness rounded off his

deposition by stating, '[S]o that this can be known and through the act of honourable conscience I sign . . .'.⁸⁵

In some cases, people who put their conscience before the destruction of the political opposition would take an active stand against the repression, even if it came at the price of conflict with other local Francoists demanding harsh punishment. An example comes in the case of a twenty-six-year-old woman from Pozoblanco. She stood accused of acting as a prosecution witness against a businessman from the town at his trial in Republican-held Jaén during the Civil War. A young Falangist from the town, whose cousin had been executed after a trial in Jaén, testified that the woman had taken money for her testimony and in general had done all in her power to 'cause harm'. However, the businessman himself testified that the woman had been forced to travel to the trial against her will and had not provided any testimony against him. After the woman was sentenced to twelve years in prison, the businessman sent a letter to the military authorities stating that she was innocent and petitioning for her release.⁸⁶ Clearly this victim of a Popular Front court was not prepared to have his experience exploited by those who attempted to justify the repression of political opponents through such vague and false accusations.

In fact, many other people (both Francoists and former supporters of the Republican) took an active stand against aspects of the repression by signing petitions of support in favour of those on trial.⁸⁷ The importance of these petitions is shown by their presence in 15% of the cases I studied. But their significance should not be stated too boldly because just over half of these 15% of cases concerned people with a pre-war history of membership of right-wing organisations and whom the new authorities accused of allying with the Republic during the Civil War. The other cases affected people with a longstanding connection to left-wing organisations. Although this division appears roughly equal, it should be borne in mind that the vast majority of trials were conducted against people with a clear left-wing background, and so petitions in support of people from the right are proportionally much higher.

Indeed, one of the outstanding features of the petitions made on behalf of people with close Francoist connections lies in the sheer scale of the support offered to them. In a case from Villanueva de Córdoba, for instance, a former bank employee, who enjoyed a good reputation in local right-wing circles as a church-going family man with little interest in politics, stood accused of throwing in his lot with the Communist Party in the Civil War.⁸⁸ His case reveals that such charges did not wash with 106 local rightists who stepped forward and signed a petition on his behalf. Significantly, the wording of the petition pleaded that 'he be absolved because he did not deserve punishment'. This reveals a breach between the judges who pressed ahead with the prosecution because technically he had supported the 'rebellion' and many local rightists for whom he had merely done his best to keep his head above water in the testing times of Civil War.⁸⁹

However, rightists proved far less willing to sign petitions in support of those more clearly identified with their opponents. As with the provision of testimony, they normally offered this type of support when Francoists considered that the accused had demonstrated good character, had suffered a blatant injustice or was someone to whom they felt personally indebted. In one petition in support of a Communist Party member from Villanueva de Córdoba, for instance, three local rightists insisted that the communist, accused of playing a role in killings, was 'incapable of committing any kind of crime'.⁹⁰ In another case, on this occasion from Dos Torres, a leading socialist stood accused by many Francoists in the village of being 'morally responsible' for killings in the town. However, a number of prominent Francoists, including the local priest and the former mayor, wrote petitions of support insisting that in fact he had hidden them from the roving and uncontrolled militia forces out on killing sprees.⁹¹

10 Under the Judicial Hammer

'It is proved that he took part in the monstrous killings because . . .
[a named witness] . . . saw him take the prisoners away'.¹

Military judges sentencing a prisoner

What judge can condemn a prisoner without proof?

Protest by Vicar of Vitoria to Military Governor of Guipúzcoa²

The Spanish Civil War brought Franco's soldiers out of the barracks and gave them the chance to win huge sway over Spanish society both through their staffing of the upper and lower echelons of government and the widespread use of army courts to prosecute civilian supporters of the Popular Front. However, army judges only arrived at their sentences after collaborating with significant numbers of civilians eager to work hand in glove with them. In fact, in many ways the military courts became a parade ground for civilians too and so became a forum for the exercise consent as well as coercion.

In addition to offering an avenue for the expression of consent, the courts also provided the chance to win further support, and indeed the Franco regime saw the sentences handed down by its military judges as means to justify both its repression and its right to power. This is why the sentences passed by military judges for the first years of the Civil War always began with an obligatory preamble in which judges declared that on 17 July 1936 the Spanish army had assumed the legitimate powers of the state under its constitutional duty to defend the nation from its enemies. Unsurprisingly, these enemies took the form of Popular Front supporters who the judges alleged had 'hijacked' the government and who by making a stand against the 'Spanish army'—that is, those supporting the revolt of July 1936—stood guilty of military rebellion.³ At the crux of these efforts to legitimise the revolt, the regime and the repression, sat the collaboration of ordinary citizens. For as Franco's chief military judge, Colonel Martínez Fusset, explained to the British in December 1938 the legitimacy of the sentences lay in the fact that in proceedings 'numerous witnesses testify'.⁴

In their franker moments, however, even hard-line Francoists scoffed at their own claims and recognised that court procedures simply gave

enormous leeway to judges and, by implication, civilian participants in the trial process. Writing in 1943, for instance, the leading Francoist army legal theorist Eugenio Fernández Asiain pointed out that the broad and largely undefined terms of the charge of military rebellion meant that judges across Spain had been sentencing the same 'crimes' in a host of different ways.⁵

One reason for the chaos in sentencing practice is that judges enjoyed enormous power of interpretation because the Military Code of Justice presented them, as we have seen, with no clear guidelines. Despite this, they had to plump for one of a number of specific charges. For not only did judges have to consider whether the accused had taken part in an armed rising, had committed common crimes and had suffered from a perverse personality, but they also had to distinguish between three forms of military rebellion (*rebelión militar*).

The charge of joining the 'rebellion' (*adhesión a la rebelión*) could be levelled against anybody said to have engaged in armed resistance to the military rebels after they had declared a state of war on 18 July 1936. Equally, it could be used against those accused of playing a prominent public political role in defending the Republic. Judges enjoyed the freedom to impose the death sentence or jail terms of up to thirty years for all those they convicted of this 'offence'. Judges could also sentence people to between twelve and twenty years for 'aiding and abetting the military rebellion' (*auxilio a la rebelión militar*). This was a charge normally brought against Republicans alleged to have co-operated in tasks of relatively low military importance such as searching for arms, carrying out arrests and taking part in political meetings. Army judges could also sentence Republicans to terms of up to six years for 'inciting rebellion' (*excitación a la rebelión*). Judges most frequently handed down this sentence against people who had conducted, or were said to have conducted, propaganda/publicity work in support of the Second Republic.⁶

As we have already seen, Francoists muddled the waters further by subsuming 'common crimes' that had occurred in Republican territory during the Civil War, such as murder and theft, within the charge of military rebellion. In theory, the gravity of the charge alone determined which level of rebellion they lay at the door of their victim.⁷ Aside from the rather arbitrary distinction at work here, the regime, as previously noted, determined that the political background of the accused and the 'perverse' nature of his or her character should also be taken into account.⁸

Matters did not improve much after January 1940 when the regime instituted a number of reforms to the military trial system in an effort to tackle the disarray its broad rules had created. One explanation for the softening of attitudes behind these changes is that the central authorities feared that the swollen prison population was squeezing its limited resources and threatening to cripple the state for years to come.⁹ More importantly, as the occupation of Popular Front territory became more secure the regime preferred to focus its prosecutions on Republican activists. Indeed, from

February 1940 the regime indicated that it was turning away from the persecution of those who had 'barely collaborated' with the Popular Front.¹⁰ Above all, however, to explain the change we have to take into consideration the growing criticism being levelled by opposition within Franco's own camp and by the Allies against the trials and incarcerations that they identified with the loathsome fascism of Nazi Germany.¹¹

As early as August 1939 Cardinal Gomá and Cardinal Segura hit out against the trials and the regime's refusal to foster reconciliation. Gomá had worked hard for the Franco side during the Civil War, describing the rebellion as an 'armed plebiscite'.¹² But with the war won he could no longer stomach the killing and declared in a heavily censored pastoral letter that there could be no lasting peace with vengeance.¹³ By the same token, in November 1939 monarchist generals in Franco's cabinet started to push against the Caudillo's dominance by pressing for full amnesties.¹⁴ The pressure from these groups, some of which felt that the repression damaged the prestige of the army, continued through the early 1940s and kept Franco on his guard.¹⁵ Even some elements within the upper echelons of the Falange claimed that by killing and jailing so many the regime was squandering the opportunity to win over the masses.¹⁶ By 1942 prominent opponents to Franco from within his support camp were even conspiring with the British in order to overthrow Franco, install a new government and institute an immediate amnesty.¹⁷

As well as this domestic pressure, Franco had to pay great heed to the complaints the Allies fired at him through the early 1940s. This criticism had been muted in the early Second World War period when the British in particular had felt unable to voice their loathing for fear of pushing Franco more closely into alliance with Nazi Germany. This is why the British Ambassador in Spain Sir Samuel Hoare reported in September 1940 that he intended, in his word, 'discreetly' to keep an eye on the Francoist repression.¹⁸ However, by July 1943, with the Second World War tipping in favour of the Allies, Hoare felt confident enough to berate the Francoist authorities over the military trial of a British citizen.¹⁹ By the time of his last meeting with Franco in December 1944, Hoare felt sufficiently emboldened to launch 'a frontal attack on the methods of the Spanish military courts' which led the two men into an argument about whether the military courts were 'more active now than in the past'. In response, the disconcerted Franco protested that 'outstanding cases' were being 'cleared off'.²⁰ Sure enough, deeply perturbed by the defeat of the Axis in April 1945, Francoists finally ended prosecutions for 'civil war offences'. Immediately, the head of the Spanish prison system took the opportunity to deny any similarity between the Nazi system of terror and Francoism.²¹

With such pressures in mind, the move towards a more targeted and less incriminating trial system began in January 1940 when detention, investigation, prosecution and sentencing rules became, in the regime's own nod to the reigning chaos, 'harmonised'.²² Importantly, the new rules for the

first time offered descriptions of the lengths of sentences that should be imposed for particular types of 'crime' within each of the three major categories of military rebellion. Linked to this, the authorities created special commissions to review sentences and, if necessary, to revise down sentences in accordance with the new sentencing guidelines. In addition, according to the terms of a Francoist decree, from now on only the most 'dangerous criminals' were to have sentences imposed.²³

Further reforms came in June 1940 when all those who had been sentenced to no more than six years and one day became eligible for parole. These were followed in April 1941 by a decree which made it possible to grant early release to prisoners who had been sentenced to a term of up to twelve years and one day, and from October 1942 those sentenced to between fourteen and twenty years in jail. In December 1943, inmates sentenced to just over twenty years were allowed to apply for parole. Finally, in October 1945 there was an amnesty (*indulto*) for all those accused of military rebellion for acts in the Civil War with the exception of those who had committed 'repugnant acts'.²⁴

The changes meant that judges began to release some prisoners who they felt would be sentenced to a term for which parole was applicable.²⁵ We also know that in the Madrid area, judges became a little stricter in their demands for corroborating evidence, and an unspecified number of pending cases were shelved. Historian Julius Ruiz also argues that sentences became less harsh from January 1940 onwards.²⁶

However, despite claims to the contrary, the scale of the changes from January 1940 should not be exaggerated.²⁷ Indeed, their limits were plainly apparent even at the time. In January 1940, the British Ambassador in Spain, Sir Maurice Peterson, for instance, pointed out that the new codification of the law and the revision of existing sentences would do little more than let off those 'guilty of minor offences'. He further noted that the order for the reduction of sentences applied only 'to persons already serving sentences passed by military tribunals'. Meanwhile, he pointed out that judges showed no sign of exercising greater leniency, stating that 'the effect [of the changes] is marred both by the rigour of the sentences which are proposed for quite subordinate participation in the violence of the Republican régime'.²⁸

Here Peterson hit the nail on the head because in fact the new graded sentencing guidelines still handed judges plenty of scope to dish out harsh punishment should they so wish. Thus thirty-year terms could still be handed down to those who were authors of 'repugnant and cruel' acts. So too could those who had taken up arms. Importantly, witnesses remained vital in determining such harsh sentences. Thus terms of thirty years could be given to those 'who harmed or badly treated prisoners' or who had taken part in 'thefts', which often meant collectivisation. Even more seriously, those accused by their neighbours of arresting people and handing them over for execution still stood in line for the death sentence.²⁹

Importantly, we possess evidence that numbers of witnesses still stood ready to help judges find the 'justification' to heap high tariffs on those in the dock. For instance, when describing her father's military trial and imprisonment in the early 1940s in northern Spain, the memoirist Victoria Tejedor argues that witnesses did their best to ensure her father received the death sentence. They did this, she writes, because they knew that if he were sentenced to twenty years he would be eligible for parole.³⁰ In this way, the breadth of the sentencing rules gave great freedom to both judges and witnesses. Accordingly, in order to understand sentencing practices properly we need to study not just the changing rules affecting the trials but also the attitudes of both the harsh judges and the witnesses who gave them the ammunition and façade of 'legitimacy' for which they and the regime hungered.

There can be little doubt that when the army judges imposed such harsh punishment they followed their own extreme beliefs as well as the stipulations of the military code. Indeed, one reason why these praetorian members of the bench behaved so harshly is that, like their counterparts in military courts in Nazi Germany, Spanish army judges saw their role as cleansing society of those considered a threat to the 'National Community'.³¹ However, in Spain the military judges emerged from an army culture much more deeply imbued with aggressive values than that of their Teutonic counterparts. In Nazi Germany, military judges only gradually came to accept Nazi values through the course of the Hitler dictatorship.³² By contrast, in Spain, before the rise of Francoism, officers had already adopted the values promoted within the army's brutal *esprit de corps* and within the dogma of national Catholicism. They largely hailed from upper- and middle-class backgrounds and had long believed national regeneration was to be achieved through violence.³³ In particular, many judges emerged from the brutalised ranks of the Army of Africa would had long relied on harsh punishment to cleanse occupied territory of 'enemies'.³⁴

During the war, these long-serving officers found their ranks swollen by a huge influx of civilians drafted into the army judicial corps to give it the muscle to mete out Franco's 'justice' to whole tranches of the population.³⁵ From November 1936, drafted officials from the civil justice system began to form the backbone of the military courts with many being kept out of civilian life until 1944 or later.³⁶ Despite their civilian origins, many of the drafted judicial officials shared much in common with their longer-serving brothers in arms. This was certainly apparent to observers at the time. Bernard Malley, a well-informed observer in the British Embassy, for instance, noted that many of 'civilian' military judges went out of their way to punish their political enemies.³⁷

Both the new recruits and their longer in the tooth comrades had been deeply embittered during the Civil War. Indeed, military and 'civilian' judges had often lost relatives in the violence in Republican territory and were an important part of the bereaved Francoist communities that sat square behind the policy of retribution. A particularly notorious case is that

of Carlos Arias Navarro. A young lawyer from Madrid, Navarro had been working in Málaga when the war broke out. After suffering a number of arrests only to be set free, the disconcerted Arias eventually found himself locked up in solitary confinement in, in his own words, a 'dungeon' without food and subject 'violent interrogation'. But he survived, and once Málaga fell to Francoist forces he became an investigating military judge where he helped hunt down those who he saw as his enemies.³⁸ So brutal did he become that he earned the title 'butcher of Málaga'. Despite this grim reputation, or perhaps because of it, he flourished under Franco and became the first Prime Minister following the dictator's demise in 1975.³⁹

Not all judges, of course, became such political bigwigs, but very often those further down the line shared the same bitter experience of war. In Baena (in the south of Córdoba province), for instance, the local rightist Manuel Cubillo worked as a military judge. He had lost his wife and two sons in violence in the town in the Civil War. In nearby Castro del Río Manuel Criado sat as a military judge in the town where he himself had lost two relatives.⁴⁰ Similarly, in Madrid in the case of Miguel Martínez, accused of killing a local *cacique*, the investigating judge turned out to be a relative of the assassinated local politician.⁴¹

Such backgrounds perhaps go some way towards explaining the personal readiness shown by some judges to use violence, as the example of the bereaved military judge, Juan Calero, in Villanueva de Córdoba shows. Historian Francisco Moreno has detailed the way in which Calero took an active part in the beating of prisoners. Calero also ensured that people went to the firing squad before they could be reprieved.⁴² What cases such as his help show is that while in Nazi Germany judges followed behind the regime, in Franco's Spain the radical actions of judges at the local level could be too excessive even for the vicious national leadership. For in this particular case, the central authorities found Calero's violent methods intolerable, even by their own lax standards, and eventually dismissed him.⁴³

His case apart, from the evidence available to us there can be no doubt that the military judges acting in the field acted in an extremely harsh way that went beyond the desires of the central command. Records of sentences passed against people from the Pozoblanco *partido* remain for 418. Of these, the military tribunals handed down death sentences on ninety-one victims with the relatively less harsh attitude of the central authorities revealed by the fact that forty-three of these people had their sentences commuted to thirty years by centrally based sentence review commissions. The severity continued, however, with a further 163 people receiving sentences of thirty years and 77 people suffering sentences of between fifteen and twenty years in prison. Judges sentenced another eighty-three people to twelve years and a further two people to six years. The surviving records show they freed two others.

However, the judges acted with more circumspection than many of the local collaborators on whom ultimately they depended. This becomes

apparent particularly in studying the death sentences handed down against supporters of the Popular Front. The allegation that someone had played a direct role in killings during the summer of 1936 proved especially important in leading judges to impose capital punishment. Well aware of this, Francoists at the local level often did all they could to secure the harshest of all sentences. Their fundamental lack of evidence, however, led them to pass on little more than rumours doing the rounds in their communities. But for judges keenly aware that they needed to act out the farce of due process such flimsy claims could be extremely frustrating, if only because they were cited anonymously. This is why in January 1940, investigating judges wrote to the mayor of Pedroche requesting names of those prepared to take the stand to testify to their knowledge of the 'public rumour' that a man from the village had taken part in the killing of thirty-two people in the village.⁴⁴

Moreover, the evidence suggests that judges felt much more constrained by the desire of the central authorities to reduce the rate of killing after 1940. This much is obvious simply by examining the surviving sentences in the records of the Tribunal for Political Responsibility (TPR) for Popular Front supporters from the villages of Alcaracejos and Torrecampo. From these alone we know that Francoists executed eleven people from Alcaracejos and twelve from Torrecampo. Judges passed only one of these sentences after 1940. Studies from other parts of Spain back up these findings. Julius Ruiz, in his study of post-war Madrid, for example, found that judges passed 82% of all death sentences in the capital between 1939 and 1940.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, before 1940 drew to a close grassroots Francoists did secure the execution of a number of their local enemies whom they impugned at the stand or in depositions to the court. The first of those in their sights were those Popular Front activists whom they identified as important local leaders. With this group, the harshest sentences only came with deeply hostile testimony. For unlike Popular Front leaders of national or provincial importance, the authorities at the municipal level, under the January 1940 sentencing criteria, did not readily qualify for the death penalty.⁴⁶ In this regard, there is an important difference between the sentences I studied of municipal leaders from the Pozoblanco *partido* and the sentences passed against provincial leaders from Jaén examined by historian Luis Miguel Sánchez Tostado. He found that the political activity of the accused was the central justification given for the military judges' verdicts. By contrast, what counted at the municipal level in dispatching village activists to an early grave was the accusation of holding a place on a local political committee which had ordered killings or the accusation of having arrested and handed over people for killing.⁴⁷

The effect was to hand considerable power to those prepared to level precisely these accusations. This seems to be the case across Spain, and we know from studies of the military high court that judges frequently cited witness rumours and vague allegations as the basis for their decisions.⁴⁸ It

is most certainly what happened in the Pozoblanco *partido* as can be seen in the case of a socialist member of the council in Alcaracejos. During the course of his prosecution, village Francoists declared that they were 'aware that' or 'had been informed that' he had been involved in some of the executions that had taken place in the village in the summer of 1936. To 'substantiate' this claim they went out of their way to demonstrate his 'perverse' nature, and some witnesses declared that he 'was capable of committing the most horrific acts' and had 'bloody instincts'. They also repeated rumours that he had boasted of slicing off an ear from the corpse of a Civil Guard officer. These allegations were reproduced almost verbatim in the judges' explanation of the death sentence that they handed down on 23 April 1940. It was rumours, then, fully redolent of the gruesome stories of Francoist atrocity literature, that sent the man to the firing squad on 12 September 1942.⁴⁹

In fact, the evidence suggests that local Francoists deployed character assassination and wild rumour to rid themselves of local political leaders who might not go to the wall for their political activity alone.⁵⁰ A good example of this is provided in the trial of a man who had been a socialist mayor in the village Dos Torres during the Civil War. Three Francoists testified against him without mentioning his position as mayor. Instead they charged that he had 'criminal instincts' and that he was responsible for a killing which had been carried out by uncontrolled elements. As we have seen, this charge had real power because under the 1940 sentencing rules those found to have handed over prisoners for execution could face death.⁵¹

In reality, his Francoist neighbours had no direct evidence of his involvement and conflated his role in carrying out an arrest with a later killing. In his own testimony the former mayor said that he had carried out the arrest, but that militiamen had seized the man and later killed him. The judges in their sentence made no attempt to discount this claim and simply repeated the charges made in the denunciation and testimony. The judges indicated that the principal basis for the sentence was the accusation levelled by a war widow from the village who claimed that the man had arrested her husband and had refused her pleas to save her husband's life, thereby 'demonstrating his criminal instincts'. In such ways, the provision of hostile testimony assisted the Francoist authorities in sustaining the myth that those sentenced to death were clearly guilty of blood crimes. Thus collaboration furnished the judges with the material they used to sentence the former mayor to death in October 1939, and he was executed on 6 November 1941 under the rules of the 'reformed' sentencing criteria.⁵²

Like the military judges on the ground, judicial officials overseeing the national trial process also preferred to rely on their local collaborators to help them decide on the death sentence. For despite the commonly held belief that Franco and his judicial sidekick, Colonel Martín Fusset, reviewed death sentences, in fact in many cases the central judicial authorities simply passed cases back down to the local level.⁵³ Indeed in May 1940,

the overwhelmed Francoist authorities ruled that the regional authorities could consider some of the death sentences without needing to consult their superiors in Madrid.⁵⁴ This is precisely what happened in the case of a village Communist Party leader from Pedroche. The authorities in Seville harboured misgivings about the death sentence passed against this man in June 1939. He stood accused in local authority reports and in testimony to the military tribunal of demanding the killing of rightists and was held to shoulder responsibility for 'everything bad'. Seemingly worried by the vagueness of the accusations, the officials in Seville wrote to the mayor of Pedroche in September 1940 asking if the communist deserved the death sentence. The mayor responded that he certainly did merit the death sentence as he 'had tried to have rightists shot'. This seemed to 'justify' the death sentence for the authorities, and the accused went to the firing squad on 3 May 1941.⁵⁵

That said, after 1940 military judges sitting on cases did generally become much more demanding in terms of the evidence they required before they would impose capital punishment (although not for lesser sentences). This much is apparent in the trial of a political activist from Torrecampo. The military put him on trial in 1941 after his local authorities had reported that he had been the leader who ordered executions in the village during the Civil War. The gravity of this charge cannot be understated as under the January 1940 sentencing guidelines it could lead straight to the firing squad.⁵⁶ To make matters worse, he was also denounced for acting cruelly towards important rightists in the village. In their sentence in February 1941, however, the judges stated there was no documentary evidence that the man had signed the execution orders and sentenced him to thirty years in prison.⁵⁷

The second group to receive the death sentence was made up of those accused by their neighbours of direct participation in murders. Such people formed by far the largest number of those the surviving records show suffered the death penalty. For instance, from the twelve people shot from Torrecampo, just three of them held positions on local committees or councils while the rest came from the lower ranks of political activists. In fact, an important qualification to the general point is that in the immediate post-war period such political small fry did not even need to be accused of being involved in killings to face the firing squad. Thus judges handed down the death sentence on a Communist Party member from Torrecampo on 22 September 1939 after one widow from the village registered a denunciation against him. She accused him of playing a leading role in the organisation of local village life and of taking her own bed into collective ownership during the war. Despite his minor role, the man went to his grave on 14 February 1940: the month after the new sentencing guidelines had come into operation.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the death sentence most often came with accusations of 'blood crimes'—accusations that did not need corroborating evidence beyond the say so of local Francoists.

A good insight into this process can be gained from the study of the case a Socialist Party activist from Villanueva de Córdoba who fell victim to a denunciation in June 1939. His denouncer claimed that the socialist had boasted of killing a Civil Guard 'martyr' for 'God and for Spain' by shooting the police officer in the back. The denouncer also claimed that the accused had flown the blood-stained shirt of the dead man from a flagpole. These charges soon received perfunctory backing from the local authorities and a witness. On the basis of these allegations and the vaguer still charge of being involved in general 'horrors', military judges handed down the death sentence in May 1940, and he went to the firing squad at 6 am on 12 September 1941.⁵⁹

Other cases, however, show that we can finesse some claims in the current historiography of the trials about the willingness of the regime to pass the death sentence on those accused of blood crimes. For some historians argue that no corroboration was required for charges heard by the tribunals.⁶⁰ By contrast, the evidence offered here indicates that after 1940, Francoists from the Pozoblanco area could not achieve all they wanted precisely because judges began to demand corroborating evidence. From then on, judges would sometimes reject the testimony of local Francoists who tried to secure the harshest sentences they could and would request further evidence when they felt deeply serious accusations needed greater support. In a case from June 1941, for instance, judges refused to impose the death sentence on the basis of rumours that a man had been involved in killings. Instead they imposed a thirty-year term.⁶¹ That said, it would be a mistake to assert that the tribunals simply 'raised the threshold of evidence' required to achieve the death penalty.⁶² For when the accusation centred on direct involvement in killings, rumours and unsubstantiated allegations backed up only by character assassination still sufficed to send Popular Front supporters to a premature death. Moreover, while some historians have noted that the stricter rules on imposing the death penalty points to a decline in 'punitive sentencing', we need to bear in mind that, as Peterson noted at the time, in large numbers of cases the prison tariff continued to be set at a harsh thirty years.⁶³ Moreover, the unsubstantiated allegations of local Francoists often played a vital role in shaping these very harsh sentences, even after review by the central commissions.

This can be seen in a study of the sentences commuted by the commissions from the death sentence imposed by the court to thirty years. These cases generally concerned Popular Front supporters accused of indirect involvement in killings. Although these cases do indicate that the authorities changed their view on the depth of involvement needed to carry out the death penalty, they do not show that they had raised the bar on the kind of evidence needed to secure conviction. For vague allegations levelled by local Francoists continued to shape sentencing practice. A common charge that saw commutation to thirty years concerned those accused of arresting and handing over rightists who were later killed. Thus a man from Pozoblanco

who had worked as a police officer in the town during the Civil War found himself denounced in April 1939 by a thirty-nine-year-old single man from his hometown. His denouncer accused him of arresting a rightist during the war and doing nothing to stop a crowd seizing and killing him. In the subsequent trial that followed this denunciation, the widow of the dead man testified that at least fifty people made up the crowd. Others testified that on other occasions the police officer had done his utmost to save the life of individuals under threat. Indeed, in regard to the specific allegation the accused argued to the court that he had arrested the man (at the dead man's own request) in an attempt to save him from the crowd. Despite all this, the court sentenced him to death in June 1939. He did not receive his commutation to thirty years until 20 June 1941 and still remained captive in a labour battalion in July 1946.⁶⁴

Those who fell victim to the vague accusation of 'demanding the heads of rightists' could suffer a similar fate, as under the January 1940 codification such charges of 'instigating killing' could be punished by death.⁶⁵ A revealing example is provided by the case of a Socialist Party leader who had been mayor of Pedroche from April 1938 until March 1939. On 29 March 1939, the Falangist soldier denounced, in his words, 'his neighbour', the former mayor, for stating in March 1937, as Francoists nearly took control of the area, that rightists in the local prison should be killed. The military police also reported that they had found a list of rightists in the mayor's house. In his defence, the accused stated the list was made up of people to be sent to the front. Despite receiving some positive testimony and the fact that nobody had been killed during his time in office, judges handed down the death sentence in June 1939. Although this was later commuted to thirty years, the former mayor did not gain liberty until August 1946.⁶⁶

Another way of measuring the impact of local Francoists on the punitive sentencing practices of the military judges is to examine many of the sentences of thirty years that they handed down. For many sentences in Pozoblanco could have been in the range of twelve and twenty years but, because of the influence of grassroots Francoists, were frequently set at thirty years.⁶⁷ One reason why grassroots Francoists could exert this powerful influence was that in practice the distinctions between 'joining the rebellion' (*adhesión*) and 'aiding and abetting the rebellion' (*auxilio*) were so blurred. This meant that people sentenced to periods of twelve years in jail for 'aiding and abetting the rebellion' could just as easily have been condemned to thirty-year terms for 'joining rebellion'.

In the cases I studied there were three categories of 'offence' that received twelve-year jail terms. People who had actively worked for political parties that favoured the Second Republic formed the first category.⁶⁸ People who helped re-capture of the towns of the Pozoblanco area for the Republic or who acted as guards during the early period of the Civil War made up the second group.⁶⁹ The third set was those who had acted as guards and had carried out arrests.⁷⁰ But each of these offences could also be defined as

joining the rebellion and could easily attract thirty-year jail terms. It was this fluidity between tariffs that gave such influence to the Francoist neighbours of those on trial. This was because in practice what often made the difference between a Republican being sentenced to twelve years and thirty years was the willingness of Francoist sectors of society to use rumour as 'evidence' that the accused had performed any of these three activities in a 'barbaric' manner.

This can be seen clearly in the sentence of a day labourer from Pedroche. In their sentence of March 1943, the judges stated that it had been proven that he had taken part in the capture of Pedroche and had arrested rightists: the kind of actions in the cases that I studied that would often result in a twelve-year sentence. However, the judges went on to say that the accused was 'rumoured to have taken part in the killing of the local priest, although there was no material evidence to support the rumour'. Despite this lack of evidence, the judges sentenced him to thirty years in jail rather than to twelve. Similarly, those said to have boasted of crimes for which there was no proof often received thirty-year jail terms.⁷¹ Equally, those accused in local rumours of taking a perverse delight in the suffering of people from Francoist sectors of society during the Civil War also suffered very harsh sentencing. For instance, a female Communist Party supporter from Villanueva de Córdoba accused of saying she would 'dance a tango' over the corpse of her former landlord received a thirty-year term.⁷²

By contrast, those who received sentences of twelve years tend not to have been the victims of deeply hostile testimony. Popular Front supporters accused of taking part in the recapture of the area for the Republic, being members of parties and acting as guards during the Civil War often received sentences of twelve years.⁷³ Being sentenced to twelve years had obvious advantages. Many Republicans sentenced to these relatively short terms were eligible for parole from April 1941.⁷⁴ Thus another effect of the vague allegations flung against Republicans was to deny them early parole and thus prolong suffering.⁷⁵

A further way of measuring the influence that mass participation in the post-war trials exercised on sentencing is to study the effect of positive testimony on judges' decisions. On occasion intervening on behalf of an accused person could secure a reduction in sentencing. A good example of this comes in the case of a member of the socialist union the UGT from Pozoblanco. A man from the town denounced the union activist for arresting him and marching him at gunpoint to the cemetery. The denouncer then claimed that some passing militiamen had foiled the man's plot to cut him down at the graveyard. Such charges of attempted murder frequently led to thirty-year sentences. However, in this case a number of people provided testimony that the accused had been drunk on the night in question. They further added that the arrest had in fact been carried out by another man who had tricked the denounced man into accompanying him. The judges accepted this testimony and cited it in the sentence they handed

down in September 1939 and elected to impose a sentence of twelve years rather than thirty years.⁷⁶ Such cases indicate that had more people been able or prepared to intervene and provide positive testimony some victims could have had their sentences reduced.⁷⁷

However, positive testimony or the issuing of petitions of support did not always have a significant effect on sentences. This was particularly the case where a number of people from Francoist sectors of society made allegations about the character and behaviour of the accused Republicans. In these cases, the judges frequently ignored any positive testimony and imposed harsh sentences of thirty years.⁷⁸

By contrast, where cases involved people with a right-wing background who were accused of cooperating with the Second Republic during the Civil War, some benefit could be derived from positive testimony and petitions of support. There are two groups of right-wingers who benefited in this way. Firstly, former rightists who were accused of transporting people to cemeteries or trial for execution and, secondly, former rightists accused of boasting that they had taken part in the violence of the summer of 1936. Such people generally received sentences of twelve years rather than thirty years.⁷⁹ In these cases, the judges seem to have been swayed by the opinions of influential local Francoist inhabitants and to have ignored the calls from the local Falange for harsher punishment. On the other hand, in cases where many local Francoists testified against former rightists, sentences of thirty years could be imposed.⁸⁰

Part IV

Civil Death

11 Caught in the Web

If he remains on parole he will only bring 'more death and mourning to the village'.¹

Denouncer on a man released from prison back to his community.

The Francoist victors of the Civil War did not simply settle for punishing those they had defeated in military courts. Instead, their understanding of victory demanded the total rout of the defeated. In practice, this meant stripping large numbers of the defeated of the right to employment, confiscating property and even forbidding individuals to live in their hometowns. All those convicted in military courts stood at the front of the line for this treatment.

Some of the origins of this vindictive attitude can be traced back to the colonial war in northern Morocco where soldiers aimed to deprive the 'enemy' of all resources. Thus 'pacification' in Morocco came to mean the torching of houses and the plunder of property.² This mindset explains why during the early months of the Spanish Civil War the colonial veteran Mola turned down a peace proposal brokered by the socialist leader Indalecio Prieto with the declaration that 'this war must finish with the annihilation of the enemies of Spain'.³

Civilians too played an important role in the dehumanisation of the defeated that stoked demands to bring those who had swung behind the Popular Front to their knees. The right-wing intellectual Ramiro Maeztu, for instance, had argued that Bolshevism represented nothing more than the revolt of subhumans against civilisation and it made no sense to negotiate with such sick souls.⁴ The atrocities of the war only further hardened attitudes. Thus the monk Antonio Aracil wrote in his 1944 book in praise of the Francoist dead that Popular Front supporters who had committed killings behind the lines were no more than 'abortions'.⁵

Such venom came as part of a piece with Franco's refusal to negotiate with the Second Republic during the Civil War, as well as his total rejection of reconciliation and his desire to prostrate the defeated. This became obvious when on 9 February 1939 Franco's Law of Political Responsibility first saw the light of day. Its clear purpose was to provide the framework in which the defeated could be forced from their jobs and to face

finer, the confiscation of their property and the public auctioning of their property in order to pay fines.⁶ The law also went some considerable way in forging a web of repression that came to envelop those who passed first before the military tribunals. In the first place this was because all those who had been found guilty in the military courts would have their sentences passed on to the Tribunals of Political Responsibility (TPR). The purpose behind this move was to ensure that in addition to being executed or imprisoned, they or their relatives could be fined in order to 'rub out their erroneous past'.⁷

As well as relying on the military courts for many of its victims the TPR drew its investigating judges for the most part from the ranks of the military judicial corps.⁸ The TPR also mirrored the dependence on those from below that characterised the military justice system. For just as with the military courts people could be pushed through the Tribunals after being singled out for prosecution by denouncers. Similarly, and as with the military courts, the TPR would also come to their decision on punishment after receiving reports from the local authorities. In this case, village Falangists (including the mayor), priests and members of the Civil Guard stood under orders to inform on the political, social and moral background of the accused.⁹ The central authorities carefully kept all these collaborators fully informed of the outcome of proceedings. Announcements of the fines imposed by the regional tribunals in Córdoba or in Seville, for instance, were regularly published in government bulletins.¹⁰

In another striking parallel with the military courts, the Law of Political Responsibility called for 'all people who might know about the behaviour and financial state' of those facing prosecution to make statements to the prosecuting authorities.¹¹ Indeed, once the tribunal authorities had decided to prosecute they worked under the legal obligation to announce publicly the name of the accused and to appeal to the general public to provide them with the information they needed to complete the case. For the villages in the Pozoblanco *partido* these announcements appeared regularly in the local provincial bulletin until 1942.¹² In some cases, the authorities requested information on a large number of people in one batch. For instance, in a single announcement in 1941, the tribunal authorities in Seville asked for information on twenty-eight people from the small village of Alcaracejos and fifty-five people from Pozoblanco.¹³

Despite such huge efforts, some historians have argued that the TPR suffered from very severe shortages of staff and huge amounts of work that made it very inefficient in collecting fines. Those writing from this perspective also suggest that changes to the Responsibility system in 1942 made prosecution a much less serious affair with all those who owned assets worth less than the very large 25,000 pesetas no longer in line for fines.¹⁴ But there is another way of reading the tribunals. For under the 1942 changes, grass-roots Francoists gained much more influence over proceedings in the TPR.

From March of this year, the central authorities devolved cases of political responsibility from the regional tribunals to civil courts based in each judicial area (*partido*).¹⁵ From its inception the whole Responsibilities system had been victim led, and in the Pozoblanco *partido*, the same aggressive municipal judges who had gathered testimony for the military tribunals had already been drawing up reports on Republicans for the regional tribunal. Now they did the same for civil court in Pozoblanco.¹⁶

In practice, one effect of the devolution of power was to render the entire system even more victim led than it had been before. One of the key developments in the Pozoblanco *partido*, for instance, was that the chief executive of the court in Pozoblanco now oversaw the workings of the tribunal in the *partido*. The chief executive saw himself as a victim of the Republic and had testified to the *Causa General* authorities at great length about his suffering in the Civil War, who recorded him as 'a true victim of Marxism'. He earned this lucrative description after describing fleeing Pozoblanco in August 1936, escaping to the Panamanian Embassy in Madrid where his son suffered from a very serious lung condition. Meanwhile, he declared that Republicans seized his property and that he and his wife suffered 'frightening hardships' through the Civil War.¹⁷

He had also collaborated with the military trials and much to his own benefit. For he testified on a number of occasions against the man who had replaced him as the court chief executive during the war. Importantly, his testimony played a central role in securing the thirty-year sentence handed down on his former deputy and removing the man who stood most between him and the return of his coveted job as chief executive of the court and whom he personally blamed for many of his own sufferings.¹⁸ It is perhaps not surprising that embittered local Francoists with influential roles in the tribunal system pushed for harsh punishment. Copies of mayoral reports that I examined in the Pedroche municipal archive, for instance, indicate that information forwarded to tribunal authorities displayed the same desire for punishment that had been expressed to the military authorities.¹⁹ Some local Francoists often achieved their desired goal, despite the 'easing' of the repression in 1942. Certainly some of those brought before the tribunal before 1942 were impoverished.²⁰ However, even after the changes of 1942 harsh punishment was still imposed.²¹

Here the crucial point is not the imposition of fines but that supporters of the Popular Front and their families facing proceedings in the tribunals could still have their financial assets frozen. Indeed, in some cases those arraigned did not gain free use of their assets until 1949.²² Moreover, those who did have some assets, but which fell short of the quantity required by the new law, could be declared bankrupt by the local officials carrying out the work of the tribunals.²³ In addition, Republicans and their families were harassed and humiliated by the workings of the tribunal. They were required to prove to the local authorities that they had no liquid assets to

be confiscated or savings and investments to be frozen. In villages such as Pedroche this often meant that widows of executed Republicans were called before the Falangist municipal judge from Pedroche who had done so much to convict their husbands in the military courts. They were required to prove their poverty to the vindictive Falangist.²⁴ Indeed, widows of those who had been executed could be forced to suffer the indignity of having their houses valued, and the worry that they could lose their main asset.²⁵ While in other cases mothers whose sons had been sent to the firing squad by the military authorities found themselves obliged to register the absolute poverty of their offspring.²⁶

Embittered local Francoists were also able to push for harsh punishment in the Special Tribunal for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism (TERMC), established in March 1940. The foundational decree, signed by Franco, powerfully conveyed the *Caudillo's* view of masons and communists.²⁷ They, the decree proclaims, had created the 'most pernicious organisations that threatened the unity, grandeur and liberty of Spain'.²⁸ Republicans suspected of having swelled the ranks of either organisation could be fined and/or imprisoned for periods of up to thirty years.²⁹ Based in Salamanca much of the TERMC's work consisted in trawling through documents confiscated from the PCE and masons. TERMC bureaucrats were on the lookout for the names of members of these organisations who, once identified, became targeted for further investigation. To do this, the TERMC authorities depended upon Francoists at the village and town level. For instance, once Franco's pen-pushers in Salamanca had identified the names of people from the Pozoblanco *partido* in confiscated documents, they would write to the local authorities in the suspect's hometown or village and request more information on the social and political background of the accused.³⁰ Copies of the sentences passed by the military courts and reports compiled by the local authorities for the military trials were often then forwarded to the TERMC placemen.³¹ But the process could also work the other way round, with prosecutions in the TERMC only starting once the military tribunal sentence had been forwarded on to its assiduous bureaucrats.³²

However, in practice, local Francoists performed the bulk of the investigative work for these officials. Once TERMC bureaucrats had established that a suspect was living in his or her hometown they would write and request that the local municipal judge interrogate their suspect. As a result, local judges did the investigative legwork for the deskbound Salamanca would-be sleuths.³³ The attitudes of many of these grassroots Francoists point to a growing divide between the thirst of the regime's local supporters for retribution and the increasingly relaxed view of the central authorities. For observers at the time noted that masons who retracted their allegiance to the fraternity could escape jail and that by December 1945 just 300 masons remained locked up in Franco's jails. By the same token, most members of the Communist Party had been pushed through the military courts

rather than the TERMC.³⁴ However, the evidence suggests that many grassroots Francoists continued to push for the harshest punishment they could achieve.

We can see this by studying the way the TERMC operated. Requests for information from TERMC officials in Salamanca to local authorities came on pro-formas. In these judicial missives, local authorities were requested to state whether the suspect had 'incited, taken part in or led communist activity'.³⁵ In some cases, the local authorities would write back to the TERMC officials and urge the severest of punishments. In one case from Villanueva de Córdoba, a woman accused of being in the PCE but who had been sentenced to a relatively mild sentence of one year by a military tribunal was given short shrift by the local authorities. They deliberately aped the language of the pro-forma and declared that 'she can be considered an instigator and active collaborator in communist activity'. For the local authorities it was who she was that counted rather than what she had done. To make up for the lack of any real accusations that they could level against her, they provided details on the execution of her brother by the military authorities in the immediate post-war period. The growing divide between the thirst of local Francoists for retribution and the increasingly relaxed view of the central authorities is revealed by the dismissal of the case against the woman in 1947. TERMC officials in Salamanca declared that the woman had not played a prominent political role and did not deserve punishment.³⁶

This uncompromising attitude of some of those from below took on such a vindictive aspect that even those who were children during the Civil War were identified as enemies simply on the basis of who their parents were. One man who was just fifteen in 1939 was questioned in Villanueva de Córdoba because his father had been in the PCE. After being questioned by the local judge, a report was forwarded to the TERMC authorities stating that although he had never been arrested he was 'an enemy of the regime'.³⁷

Such hostile grassroots Francoists capitalised most of all on their control of local parole boards to continue the repression. These boards developed from April 1939 when the regime first set up local prisoner supervision boards (*Juntas Pro-Presos*). Prominent members of the local community staffed the boards with the mayor, the parish priest and a local 'charitable and dedicated' woman sitting on them.³⁸ The authorities charged these local faithfuls with monitoring the behaviour of all those related to the incarcerated and ensuring that prisoners' families 'respected the law of God and that they showed true love for the *Patria*'. What this meant in effect was that centrally based officials were passing down the tasks of surveillance and discipline to grassroots Francoists.³⁹

Importantly, the local authorities gained increasing control over prisoners themselves during the 1940s. In June 1940, the regime opened parole to those sentenced to less than six years. Crucially, however, local Francoists sitting on the parole boards gained the right to veto the early release of

any prisoner.⁴⁰ Although the central authorities extended parole provision through the 1940s, it did not waver from allowing local Francoists to veto any application for early release. Accordingly, when the regime extended parole in December 1943 to those who had been sentenced to twenty years and one day it insisted that individuals could only be paroled if they received 'favourable reports' from their local authorities.⁴¹

Under a further decree of 1944, village and town parole boards were established to decide on the fate of individual Republicans when they became eligible for early release. The local municipal judge and the local police chief sat on these boards, and it is telling that the decree granting them their new role stated that when the place of exile was being chosen preference should be given to 'small towns where it is easier to observe conduct'.⁴² In short, the authorities clearly understood that local Francoists could act as the proxy surveillance agents of the central state and accordingly handed them sweeping powers.

Indeed, the boards wielded the power to allow prisoners to return to their hometown, banish them to internal exile or simply keep them in prison or labour battalions. The preamble to the decree granting the power of internal exile left no room for doubt that it was the opinion of local Francoists that was to count most when the boards came to their decisions. It declares that internal exile 'is not a punishment in itself, but a security measure to be taken when the reinsertion of the prisoner into his or her local community would be intolerable'.⁴³ In practice, this meant that embittered local Francoists in places like the Pozoblanco *partido* won yet another judicial weapon to add to their arsenal to deploy against their Popular Front supporting neighbours. In Pedroche, for instance, the Falangist who claimed to have been subject to a mock execution and who had been imprisoned during the Civil War for his role in the rebellion became president of the local parole board.⁴⁴

The reality was that local Francoists such as this provided a crucial meeting point in the Francoist web of repression. Indeed, this same Falangist had written reports for the military tribunals and he had gathered testimony on behalf of the military judges. Moreover, it is inconceivable that the decisions reached by local Francoists such as this could have been made without reference to the investigative work already carried out for the military tribunals and the ample reports prepared for the army judges still preserved in the municipal archive.⁴⁵ In these ways Francoists such as the Pedroche municipal judge helped drive the repression, and through their control of parole they proved able to further castigate some of their Republican neighbours. Indeed, devolving power downwards placed decision making in the hands of local groups who much of the evidence indicates stood much less inclined to wind down the repression than the central authorities. Correspondence preserved in the Pedroche municipal archive confirms that the local authorities were frequently much more intransigent about the release of prisoners than the regime itself and repeatedly turned down prison officials' requests for the granting of parole.⁴⁶

On occasion, this tension between the regime's dependence on those from below and its desire to relax some of the repression deeply frustrated officials in the upper echelons of the regime. This was readily apparent in 1940 when the law granting parole was reformed to curb what the regime had come to see as the inconvenient zeal of local Francoists. The preamble to a decree of November 1940 protested that reform of the parole system was needed because the regime's efforts to grant early release for prisoners serving less than six-year jail terms were being frustrated by local authorities. Whatever the practical desire of the regime's central officials to reduce the size of the prison population, we should not think that regime officials were softening. The law was changed so that authorities that objected to the parole of prisoners in their local communities had the alternative of imposing internal exile.⁴⁷ This measure had the obvious benefit of reducing the prison population while allowing for the further punishment of Republicans. It also satisfied the demands for punishment from below.

One powerful way they could do this was by refusing their local political enemies parole and thereby forcing them into labour battalions. The labour battalions had been created in the Civil War as a means of reducing prison overcrowding, exploiting Republican prison labour to reconstruct and develop the country and simply as another means of punishing Republicans.⁴⁸ Those who were detained by the authorities but had not yet been sentenced were forced to labour in work battalions (*bataillones de trabajadores*). But from 1940, Republicans who had been tried, convicted and sentenced could be placed in what the authorities labelled militarised prison colonies (*colonias penitenciarias militarizadas*) where they could 'redeem' parts of their sentence.⁴⁹ Depending on the prisoner's behaviour he or she could reduce the time spent in prison by up to six days for each day worked.⁵⁰ Francoists justified this system through Catholic notions of regeneration and argued that many Republicans would be able to redeem themselves through work.⁵¹

It should be noted that Francoist central officials did not shy away from condemning supporters of the Popular Front to long periods in work battalions. For instance, a man from Pedroche loyal to a centrist political party remained marooned in a work battalion until 1942 after receiving short shrift from the regional military authorities. He had been denounced by a war widow from the village in her statement to the *Causa General*, and she also testified against him to a military tribunal claiming that he had worked for the Republican council in the war. She failed in her quest, and in 1940 the judges recommended his release. However, the military officials reviewing his case simply decided that he should be placed in a labour battalion.⁵² A broadly similar example concerns a man from Dos Torres who had joined the PCE in 1938. Despite being provided with a positive report by the local mayor, the local military commander sent him to a work battalion where he had to serve fourteen months.⁵³

In addition, however, the central position of grassroots Francoists in the web of repression handed them considerable power to send and keep their Republican neighbours in either work battalions or the militarised prison colonies. Their influence began with soldiers captured at the front who required a certificate of good conduct to be released from concentration camps. As we have seen, not only did Francoists in the Pozoblanco *partido* frequently refuse to provide these, but they also went out of their way to denounce prisoners held in concentration camps. As a result, Republicans often remained in work battalions at least until trial.⁵⁴ They gained even more power when the regime decreed that Republicans refused parole by their Francoist neighbours could be obliged to perform forced labour in militarised colonies in order to 'redeem' their sentences.⁵⁵ Importantly, the evidence suggests that the parole boards exploited their powers to the full to ensure that many prisoners continued to suffer.

When deciding whether to impose such punishments local parole boards were supposed to take into account the prisoner's behaviour, the number of days he or she had worked to reduce his/her sentence and the financial and moral standing of the prisoner.⁵⁶ The evidence from Pozoblanco, however, indicates that the local parole board tended to focus most of all on the question of the moral standing of the prisoner. A possible explanation for this is that this criterion gave the boards the most room for manoeuvre. It also, perhaps, explains the 'success' of the boards in refusing parole to so many labour colony prisoners and the fact that very particular prisoners were refused this parole. One reason for arguing that the parole boards must have claimed that certain prisoners were not morally fit to be released is because no correlation exists between the granting of parole and the length of the sentence being served by prisoners. Thus, people accused of murder and with death sentences commuted to thirty years could be paroled before prisoners sentenced for lesser 'crimes'.⁵⁷

This indicates that there was a rupture between what military judges considered an appropriate sentence and the opinion of local Francoists. It also shows that such Francoists were in some cases able to savour a final victory over judges who had thwarted their efforts to achieve as harsh a form of punishment as possible at trial. Many of those refused parole from the militarised colonies had often been denounced by, or had received hostile testimony from, members of leading *cacique* families or important local Falangists during their trials.⁵⁸

By denying parole in these ways, some Francoists from the Pozoblanco *partido* who had been frustrated in their attempts to achieve the death sentence against certain Republicans could gain a modicum of satisfaction by ensuring that those they seem to have despised so deeply remained in some form of custody.⁵⁹ For instance, a socialist from Pedroche had avoided the death sentence even though a prominent local war widow and a powerful local Falangist had changed their testimony, to the judges' annoyance, during the trial in an effort to secure the harshest sentence possible. Despite

their strenuous efforts, however, the judges in their sentence concluded there was no proof at all that the man they accused had been involved in any blood crime. The judges, however, did not necessarily enjoy the last word, and the socialist still remained in a militarised colony in 1947.⁶⁰ Cases such as this add nuance to the argument mounted by some historians that Communists and Masons in particular were systematically discriminated against in the granting of parole.⁶¹ For those with powerful local enemies also found it incredibly difficult to leave the prison system regardless of whether they had thrown in their lot with the Communist Party or not. It should also be remembered that even when the parole board did decide to allow Republicans to return to their hometowns, they could still be denounced by their neighbours and thus be returned directly to the prison system. In one case from 1942 a lawyer denounced a former anarchist who had just been released and informed the authorities that if he remained on parole he would only bring 'more death and mourning to the village'. The man was arrested immediately and not released again until 1946.⁶²

As already mentioned, grassroots Francoists could also banish their former neighbours into internal exile. Some made great use of this power, and many Republicans caught up in the web of repression found themselves forced to live in other parts of Spain.⁶³ Once again, evidence suggests that local Francoists did not base their decision to ostracise Republicans on the grounds of the length of sentence or the gravity of the 'crime' for which they had been convicted. Republicans with vastly disparate sentences—of thirty, twenty or twelve years—are to be found among those refused the right to return to their hometown.⁶⁴ Nor does the year in which Republicans applied for parole affect the use of this punishment. Prisoners were sent into internal exile in 1943, 1945 and as late as 1946.⁶⁵ When imposing internal exile, two factors, however, do seem to have weighed upon the minds of parole board members. Republicans who had occupied prominent political office often found themselves ordered into internal exile.⁶⁶ By contrast, they often allowed Popular Front supporters who had been minor members of parties and trade unions to return to their home village and many as early as 1943.⁶⁷ However, Popular Front supporters who had been depicted in the military trials as the incarnation of 'red criminality' or those who had crossed swords with important local Francoists formed the biggest group that appears to have suffered internal exile.

In 1939, for instance, a Francoist woman from Dos Torres denounced a fellow villager, an UGT member from Dos Torres, whom she accused of strip-searching her at a control point during the Civil War. He also stood accused of having boasted that he had sliced off the ears from the corpse of the local priest with 'an enormous great knife'. Testimony in his case reveals that local Francoists regarded him as the embodiment of the 'red criminal' that so pervaded Francoist collective memory of the Civil War. Although he secured release from his thirty-year prison term in 1944, he had to live in Córdoba.⁶⁸ A similar fate befell a communist party member from Pedroche. In his trial,

various local Francoists drew on local rumours to allege that he had killed a former municipal judge from the village. However, the judges refused to give credence to the rumours, arguing that they had uncovered no evidence of blood crimes, and sentenced him to twelve years in jail in 1943. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, he was refused the right to return to his village, and as late as 1948 he was still living in the provincial capital of Córdoba.⁶⁹

Indeed one of the significant effects of Francoists from the Pozoblanco *partido* banishing some of their Republican neighbours to internal exile was to disperse people from the area across Spain and to incorporate them into the urban working class.⁷⁰ By providing cheap labour these victims of the repression helped create the conditions for Spain's later economic growth and thus prefigured the great rural exodus that according to some historians only began in the 1960s.⁷¹ The prison system itself was partly responsible for the diaspora of the rural poor from Pozoblanco. Although the majority of prisoners from the Pozoblanco area served their time in prison in Córdoba, the authorities transported a significant number of prisoners from jail to jail across Spain.⁷² In this regard the peregrination of a day labourer and UGT member from Villanueva de Córdoba fits a pattern. A military tribunal sentenced him to twenty years in April 1940 for taking part in the wartime recapture of his hometown for the Republic, and in 1941 the prison authorities transferred him from Córdoba to Zaragoza prison. He then served time in prisons in Madrid, Pamplona and Logroño. By 1946, he had secured release but he had to remain in internal exile in Logroño.⁷³

Nor was it at all unusual for those who served time in far off Francoist jails to continue to live in their penitentiary town.⁷⁴ In some cases, there is evidence that in the 1990s former prisoners were still living in towns in whose jails they had first been imprisoned in the 1940s.⁷⁵ It was not simply prison that dispersed Republicans. The labour battalions and the system of internal exile also scattered Republicans across Spain. Eight of the cases of Republicans from Pedroche that I studied in the military archive in Seville record the fate of those who passed through the military tribunals. Only two Republicans from these eight were living in Pedroche in the late 1940s.⁷⁶ The others had been spread across the province and the rest of Spain by the prison, parole and internal-exile systems. Similarly, of the five cases from Dos Torres that I studied which have information on the fate of those imprisoned, only one Republican returned to the village.⁷⁷

One of the enduring effects of the power of those from below in Pozoblanco, then, was to consign members of the politicised rural poor to the urban fringes of Spanish society. As Paul Preston has noted, the Francoist repression prepared the way for later economic growth by creating a docile labour force and depressing wages, which together led to higher profits and the accumulation of capital for investment.⁷⁸ This is Spain's story of modernisation that is often hidden in accounts of the tourist boom and migrations of the 1960s.

12 Dashing Families Against the Rocks

‘I have known men who have asked to be allowed to return to prison as they were starving and desperate because they could find no employment’.¹

Bernard Malley,
Secretary of the British Embassy in Madrid, October 1945

‘Later I was to discover this “generation of criminals” throughout the prisons of Spain. Their parents had been hard-working, self-sacrificing craftsmen, who had disappeared under bullets or into prison. The children were brought up in the gutter by nobody; they learned to cheat and thief’.²

Miguel García, *Franco’s Prisoner*

The pervasive misery of post-war Spain meant that simply scraping a living presented a huge challenge for the vast majority of the population. However, for paroled Republicans, just getting by proved especially arduous because of the very particular discrimination and harassment they faced. In this sense, the suffering they shared with the general population formed the start of their tribulations. For even as late as 1945, real wages for farm labourers stood at 50% of their 1936 level for all agricultural workers.³ From the crippling poverty that such meagre earnings produced, for those who could secure employment, emerged the scourge of hunger. Indeed, across Spain over 200,000 people perished from starvation in the early 1940s.⁴ The all-pervasive hunger grew so bad that the ‘famished poor’ began to steal cats and dogs for their own consumption.⁵

The hunger that drove people to such desperate lengths wreaked havoc on the general health of the population. By 1941 a major typhus epidemic was sweeping through southern Spain afflicting over 4,000 people just in Málaga. Dr. Janney, a relief official and the head of the Rockefeller Mission in Spain, put the outbreak down to the weakness caused by hunger. He estimated that in the typical poor family adults were only consuming between one-third and one-fifth of the necessary daily calories, and children only one-fifth.⁶ In this situation of extreme need, tuberculosis, malaria and diarrhoea also became major killers. In 1941, for example, across Spain 60,000 people perished from diarrhoea, and in 1943 400,000 people fell victim to malaria.⁷

The destruction and disruption that the Civil War visited upon Spain partly explains these grim statistics—but only partly. For in fact the transport system had largely survived the conflict unscathed, and agricultural production remained generally unaffected by the war. Instead, much of the blame for the country's plight falls on Francoist policies. A combination of autarky and state control of distribution gave rise to severe shortages and a huge, and deeply iniquitous, black market in which the rich often flourished while the poor frequently went to the wall.⁸ As a Spanish priest travelling through Spain in 1941 noted, 'There are districts which have not seen bread for months and yet the rich can buy plenty of food'.⁹

That said, in the Pozoblanco *partido* some of the region's economic difficulties undeniably grew directly from the effects of the Civil War. In Pozoblanco, for instance, the fighting destroyed 687 buildings over the course of the Civil War. In addition, the town's defenders had felled a large numbers of olive trees, which produced one of the region's staple crops, to provide timber for trenches. The war had also led to the closure of factories employing over 500 people.¹⁰

However, the underlying cause of the region's severe food shortages and rationing was the regime's bad mismanagement of the economy. Indeed, many fields lay abandoned as late as April 1940, a whole year after the end of the conflict.¹¹ In addition, the regime made it hard for ostracised Republicans to find work in other areas by placing tight restrictions on people's freedom of movement. By bringing about severe food shortages and closing off the opportunity to find work and supplies elsewhere in these ways, the regime effectively starved many people to death. In March 1941, the Falange in Belalcázar, not far from Pozoblanco, for example, reported that eight people were dying a month from starvation. In nearby Peñarroya thirty-two people had already died from starvation in February 1941.¹² Many of those who did survive only did so by stealing crops from private estates or by roaming the countryside in search of food growing wild.¹³ Equally appallingly, in the winter months some people froze to death because they had no means to keep themselves warm.¹⁴

In addition to suffering such hardships, those from the defeated side also faced the discrimination exercised against them by their Francoist neighbours. We know how bad this was from reports at the time in which even members of the Falange showed they could be taken aback by the belligerent attitude of some of their fellow local Francoists. In a report to the central Falange authorities in Madrid in 1940, for instance, Falangists in Pozoblanco noted that Francoist landowners refused to grow crops and give employment to those from the defeated side on 'the pretext that all the workers are reds and that they cannot work and live with people who killed their relatives'.¹⁵

Ordinary Francoists also made the lives of many Popular Front supporters even tougher by pressing as hard as they could for the re-establishment of traditional property relations. In doing this they partly followed the lead

of the regime which worked hard to restore property collectivised or confiscated during the Civil War. When the Pozoblanco *partido* fell in late March 1939, for instance, the occupying authorities set up a government agency charged with redistributing land, animals and machinery that had been collectivised during the Civil War.¹⁶ But the regime's support base often took up where it left off. Some landowners, for instance, who had lost small numbers of animals or a few pieces of agricultural machinery in either the collectivisation of their land during the war or through the hardships created by the conflict, initiated vindictive prosecutions in the civil courts against former employees to recover their losses. For instance, a farm manager allegedly left in charge of animals when the owner fled during the Civil War suffered imprisonment for three months as well as fines because some of his employers' horses had starved to death in the war.¹⁷ Ordinary citizens from the Francoist side also launched prosecutions in the civil courts against those they accused of taking small amounts of clothing when the Republican authorities confiscated property of rebels during the war.¹⁸

Firmly back in the saddle, landowners also jealously guarded their newly returned property. To do this they made free use of violence to ensure that the dispossessed and hungry who had backed the Popular Front could not take crops from their private estates. Such drastic steps cut in the face of tradition because in southern Spain the rural poor had traditionally enjoyed the right to take small amounts of firewood and crops left in the fields after harvest. However, in the post-war period landowners rode roughshod over these customary practices and threw a protective cordon around their estates.¹⁹ They retained the services of rural guards who regularly beat and in some instances shot and killed poor people taking small items such as acorns to feed themselves and their families.²⁰ They did so with the support of the law. In one case, a rural guard in Villanueva de Córdoba shot and killed a man working on a neighbouring field who in his lunch break had strayed into the estate protected by the guard and had collected a small number of acorns. The guard received a suspended two-year jail term and left the court a free man.²¹

Harsh though life was for all the rural poor, for those who had been condemned by the military courts and granted parole, eking out a living proved particularly onerous. This is a point sometimes missed in studies of the repression which neglect to ask what happened to Republicans after they had passed through Francoist prisons.²² This is a significant omission because, in Pozoblanco at least, paroled prisoners experienced a very specific form of impoverishment. The journey they had endured through the Francoist prison system had reduced many to complete destitution. A man from Villaviciosa, to the north of Córdoba, for instance, had returned home in his labour camp uniform which he had been forced to wear until his sister could scrape together some civilian clothes.²³ Indeed, some Republicans released on parole felt so ashamed of their poverty that they could not even contemplate returning to their small villages where they were well known

and chose instead to live rough in the countryside.²⁴ Freed supporters of the defeated Republic also had to live with the stigma of having suffered imprisonment and being branded as criminals and social pariahs.²⁵

In addition, given that the authorities kept them on a tight leash, paroled prisoners faced acute difficulties in finding employment. Indeed, in some cases the conditions of their parole prevented them from moving outside the municipal boundaries of their village. They could also be required to report to the local Civil Guard on a daily basis and during normal working hours.²⁶ The professional classes too suffered acute discrimination. For the authorities denied the professionals it set free to exercise their normal occupations. Bernard Malley of the British Embassy labelled this as 'civil death' and reported that lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers, schoolmasters and thousands of civil servants had this additional punishment brought down upon them.²⁷

In many ways, those released from incarceration suffered the triple burden of hard times, state restrictions and particularly stiff discrimination at the hands of their Francoist neighbours. The authorities themselves well knew the scale of this discrimination. Reporting in 1944, the Falange in the area complained that local employers were 'making life impossible' for those on parole by 'refusing to give them work'.²⁸ As a result of being reduced to abject poverty both by the state's onslaught and by the subsequent battering they received on their return home, some paroled Republicans found themselves forced outside mainstream society and into a twilight world of petty crime.

Among those who turned to robbery in the Pozoblanco *partido* were Popular Front supporters from other parts of Spain who had been banished to internal *partido* in the area. Here they found it difficult to find employment in towns and villages where landholders hated Republicans in general and detested former prisoners in particular. This discrimination hit them particularly badly because they enjoyed few family contacts or friendships to help them find work. Both socially excluded and isolated, they would sometimes turn to crime only to find themselves sentenced again, this time by the local civil courts.²⁹ For instance, in May 1944 civil judges handed down a sentence on a man from Guadalajara for stealing a small quantity of fruit and vegetables. In his defence he declared that he had been in *partido* in Pozoblanco for eighteen months, was unemployed and needed to feed both himself and his sister who had come to live with him.³⁰ On the surface, the prison terms imposed on people like this unfortunate man were relatively short, between two and five months. However, in practice they took a heavy toll. For they would be returned to jail to serve out the remainder of their military sentence and the authorities simply heaped their new sentence on the tariff already imposed by the military tribunals.³¹

However, even Republicans living in their hometowns, with family and friends around them, found it very hard to keep their heads above water. Indeed, half-starved paroled prisoners who returned to their towns and

villages commonly resorted to stealing and then eating sheep belonging to local landholders to stop themselves from going under. The records of the Pozoblanco civil courts bulge with cases of former prisoners who survived in this way and when caught found themselves shoved back into the prison system. A man from Pedroche, for instance, had been sentenced to thirty years in 1939 for 'aiding and abetting' the 'rebellion'. In the mid-1940s, the prison authorities placed him on parole and he returned to his impoverished family. He tasted freedom for just a short time, however, and in 1946 civil judges in Pozoblanco sentenced him and two of his brothers to five months for stealing sheep for their own consumption.³² Similarly, other former prisoners trying to get by took objects of little value that they could easily trade such as coal and metal and they too could be swallowed up once more by the Francoist prison system.³³

The relatives of former prisoners fared little better. Although spared the suffering of a Francoist prison cell, many relatives suffered harassment and impoverishment because of their family name. Certainly, the local authorities showed little hesitation in taking the lead in harassing them.³⁴ In an illustrative case from Belalcázar, near Pozoblanco, the municipal police prevented the wife of one prisoner from the defeated side from eating at a local Falangist charity soup kitchen on the grounds she had only taken up residence in the village when she married her husband, a native of the town.³⁵ The police then ordered her to leave her home and return to her 'native' Pozoblanco on the pretext that she was begging in the street and had no right to claim assistance.³⁶

Women such as this had been forced into abject poverty by the loss of their husbands and their main breadwinner.³⁷ In the Pozoblanco civil court in the early 1940s in case after case families accused of eating stolen animals were composed only of women, old men and young children.³⁸ Although wide sections of the population resorted to stealing animals for their own consumption, very frequently those prosecuted hailed from families with the relatives of Republicans who had been convicted by the military tribunals.³⁹ Indeed, records from the civil court in Pozoblanco show that relatives of prisoners suffered repeated convictions for the consumption of stolen animals.⁴⁰ Generally, they had not a penny to their name and found themselves left with little alternative but to serve prison terms because they could not stump up the money to pay the fines for stealing animals that averaged around 250 pesetas. Because of this the court authorities would also often declare them bankrupt.⁴¹ This spiral of repression-immiseration-repression in Pozoblanco hurled Republican families ever further downwards socially and economically. In this situation, recidivism often offered the only realistic response to the desperate poverty that cursed their lives.

One effect of this spiral was to smash Republican families even further apart by forcing children into state care. They became part of the tidal wave of children that Francoists tore from families that had backed the

Republic. For in the post-war years, the Francoist state oversaw the forced removal of tens of thousands of children. At the time, many of the parents of these children were suffering incarceration in Francoist prisons or labour battalions.⁴² Popular Front supporting parents had sent others into *partido*, but Falange foreign agents kidnapped them abroad and brought them back to Spain.⁴³

A panoply of central state agencies took charge of the children of Republicans taken into Francoist care in these ways. The Institute for the Care of Young People (*Tribunal Tutelar de Menores y la Junta de Protección a la Infancia*) monitored their 'welfare'. *Auxilio Social*, the Falangist charity run by 'philanthropic' Francoist women, provided material support.⁴⁴ In 1943 the Francoist home office created the *Patronato de San Pablo* to oversee the 'care' of prisoners' children. It ensured that most children were placed in orphanages run by nuns.⁴⁵

Members of the clergy played a central role in the Francoist task of recasting the identity of the children in their care. For under the watchful eye of the Francoist clerics running the orphanages, children imbibed a continuous stream of Francoist propaganda. They were told that Republicans were criminals and many came to reject their parents as heinous degenerates. In a substantial number of cases the authorities changed children's names to facilitate the total recasting of their identities.⁴⁶

Children from families in Pozoblanco that had suffered at the hands of the tribunals or the dirty war against the fugitives found themselves among those driven into Francoist orphanages. This could happen in cases where all the adult members of the family were either under arrest for 'aiding and abetting fugitives' or had actually fled to the countryside.⁴⁷ In some cases children were forced into state custody because the only other surviving members of their family had found sanctuary from the tribunals in foreign lands.⁴⁸ In other cases, children found themselves herded into state tutelage because their extended families had been decimated both by the military tribunals and the regime's war against fugitives. This process is evident in the case of a twelve-year-old boy from Villanueva de Córdoba taken into care in 1946. The boy's mother had died, and he was in the sole care of his father. The Civil Guard had orphaned him when they killed his father, who they claimed was assisting fugitives in the area.⁴⁹ The boy was thus bereft of all family. His uncle had already been sentenced to a thirty-year term by a military tribunal in 1943. In these circumstances it became impossible for the extended family to care for the child, and the boy was ordered into a Francoist orphanage.⁵⁰

Republican families could, of course, be wrenched apart by the actions of the military tribunals alone. For sentencing Republican men to long terms in jail left many mothers destitute. Even if these women were able to struggle on, their children could be forced into care later if they died, as so many did in those harsh times.⁵¹ While some of those who lived could not soldier on and make ends meet. One woman from Pozoblanco, for

instance, suffered terrible poverty after a military tribunal sentenced her husband to a thirty-year term. In 1946 she was forced to request that her three children be taken into care because with her husband still in prison she could not afford to maintain and educate their offspring.⁵²

We know some women left destitute when the military courts condemned their husbands tried to save their families by turning to prostitution.⁵³ A point in case is a women from Pozoblanco whose husband died in Córdoba prison from tuberculosis in 1943.⁵⁴ His death and imprisonment left her to care for her child alone. But her efforts to get by and protect her child led to further suffering. For a civil court imprisoned her from July to September 1942 after the authorities accused her of leaving her two-year-old daughter unattended while she had sex with a number of soldiers barracked in the town.⁵⁵

The military courts, then, dispossessed many women who hailed from families that had thrown their weight behind the Republic and forced them to the margins of society. Such fates only provided more grist to the regime's mill as Francoists were able to portray such victims as sinners unfit to care for their children. Indeed, to the minds of many Civil Guard officers when such women resorted to prostitution it simply confirmed to them that women who favoured the Republic were no more than 'red whores'.⁵⁶ Indeed, numbers of Civil Guard reports on Republican women forced into prostitution confirm that Francoists interpreted the plight of those they forced into the sex trade as the consequence not of circumstance but of ingrained Republican depravity. The Civil Guard described one former militia woman and nurse who in the post-war period had been driven to prostitution as 'politically depraved and a sinner'.⁵⁷ In the case of another woman who had supported the defeated government and, after the war was over, found herself left with no choice but to work as a prostitute, the Civil Guard declared her to be 'a vile character, both for her terrible Marxist past and for her current behaviour [working in the sex trade] that could not be any worse'.⁵⁸

The charge of prostitution offered some local Francoists a powerful tool to snatch children from their Popular Front supporting parents. In this task, village and town mayors stood particular well placed to take the initiative in child abduction. For they could write reports on particular Republican women to the local civil governor demanding that their children be taken into state care. In these reports they attempted to strengthen their case by drawing on criminalising representations of the left, gendered understandings of Republican women and the views of the local Francoist community. For instance, the mayor of Hinojosa del Duque, near to Pozoblanco, initiated proceedings against a woman from the town whose husband had been executed by the Franco regime following a post-war trial. As far as the mayor was concerned her sins were many and varied. He charged her with being a leftist sympathiser because 'her husband was executed after a military trial'. The mayor also complained that she refused to let her children eat at the Falangist soup

kitchen in the town and she insisted on 'gossiping among people who share her belief in the final triumph of communism'.⁵⁹ He also derided the woman for begging and insisted that the general population in the village believed that unless the state took her daughter into care, the young girl ran the 'danger of becoming a prostitute'. His words certainly took their toll for he made his request on 12 February 1943, and on 4 March 1943 the civil governor ordered that the girl be taken into care.⁶⁰

Republican women did not only lose their children because the Francoist repression left them destitute. For in addition, the experience of incarceration also destroyed some marriages, and this in turn led to children of Republicans being taken into care. For instance, one wife of a Popular Front supporting prisoner from Pedroche told the Pozoblanco civil court that before her husband had suffered imprisonment they had enjoyed a good marriage, but that his time behind bars had left him a changed man. There certainly seems to be something in this because he left the family home just ten days after being paroled. In this case, the prisoner compounded his family's suffering by ignoring a court order to pay maintenance for the child, leaving the mother with little option but to place their daughter in a Francoist orphanage.⁶¹ Of course, during early Francoism many women experienced the domestic sphere as a haven against state persecution, and there can be no doubt that in many instances the family did offer a bed-rock of support for those who had backed the Popular Front. Indeed, the families of Republican prisoners serving in militarised penal colonies or banished to internal *partido* would often join their husbands and fathers and restart family life.⁶² However, in cases like this, women could become the victims of the state, local Francoists and their own husbands.

Indeed, in some cases the domestic sphere came to form a battleground in which Republican prisoners stood shoulder to shoulder with the Francoist state against their own wives. Republican prisoners who discovered that their wives had been unfaithful while they were serving time, for instance, sometimes sparked the forced removal of their own children from the family home.⁶³ Imprisoned husbands found they could make common cause with the Francoist authorities because both believed that women who went to live with men other than their husbands to be morally corrupt and therefore could stake no legitimate claim to care for their children. One man from Pedroche imprisoned by a military tribunal, for instance, petitioned the civil governor to take his children into care because his wife had set up home with another man and she was 'providing a bad example to her children'. The authorities investigated and arrived at the same judgement as the prisoner, with the Falangist mayor stating that the mother was 'morally bad'. As a result of this process kick-started by the prisoner, the authorities took his children into care.⁶⁴

In addition to all this suffering, the military tribunals also generated fear that pushed many Popular Front supporters out of society altogether. For rather than risk an entirely predictable fate at the hands of a military court or Francoist firing squad, many who had thrown their weight behind

the Republic went to ground and lived as fugitives. Indeed, across Spain the Francoist occupation of an area frequently, and especially in hilly or mountainous zones, bore witness to an exodus of Republicans to hideouts in the countryside.⁶⁵

Although in many places across Spain high and remote areas offered good terrain for those on the run to keep their heads down, the most important reason fugitives proved able to survive, in the short term at least, was that they could count on a large number of supporters living in nearby settlements. In many cases relatives gave them food and support, but friends, former colleagues and political sympathisers also lent a hand.⁶⁶ Fugitives spent most of their time in a hand-to-mouth existence that revolved around finding shelter, getting hold of supplies and steering clear of Francoists. However, they sometimes attacked representatives of the regime too. All of this meant fugitives constantly stood on the brink of the abyss. Particularly as they got under the skin of Francoists to such a degree that across Spain local authorities with civilian vigilantes in tow frequently sallied into the countryside to hunt down their erstwhile neighbours. They enjoyed considerable success and eventually tracked down and killed the vast majority of fugitives.⁶⁷

Given that these beleaguered fugitives only temporarily eluded the firing squad or prison cell, and at the eventual cost of their own lives, they also have to be seen as wider victims of the tribunals and repression. It is, of course, true that one of the reasons some Popular Front supporters made themselves scarce was because they wanted to continue the political struggle and to wage war against Francoism. But in the circumstances of the harsh Francoist repression when thousands upon thousands of Republicans found themselves herded into military courts or simply being bumped off while 'trying to escape', the reality was that fighting the regime and fleeing the tribunals and the repression became synonymous. As Paul Preston has noted, the fugitives 'knew that to avoid death or prison they had to keep fighting'.⁶⁸

By the same token it is probably true that many of those who eventually joined the fight in the countryside sought something beyond simply avoiding the feared military tribunals. In fact, most of those who joined the fugitives after 1941 did so with the hope that the regime could be overthrown. The key to this change lay in the declining fortunes of the Axis powers in the Second World War and the growing expectation that the Franco regime would fall from power alongside its sister governments.⁶⁹ This calculation led to the development of a full-scale armed movement designed to topple the Franco regime. Even earlier, however, in 1941, the first stirrings of a coordinated movement had begun.⁷⁰ Fighters drawn from a diverse range of left-wing political movements slipped across Spain's borders and in some cases fused with existing bands of fugitives.⁷¹ By 1944, the fugitive phenomenon—those who had fled to the hills principally from fear—had given way to the rise of a guerrilla movement proper. This was an organised, armed resistance designed to overthrow the regime, and it was sponsored most of all by the Communist Party.⁷²

In 1944 the Communist Party, with a helping hand from the French resistance movement, threw its weight behind a large-scale invasion across the Pyrenees.⁷³ In battle, however, the Francoist armed forces overwhelmed the guerrillas, and the main invasion force was pulled back. Consequently, small guerrilla units that had already crossed into Spain and had laid the foundations of a clandestine resistance network were left high and dry. By the late 1940s, the Civil Guard had all but exterminated these forlorn groups in a vicious and murderous dirty war against the guerrillas and anybody they decided could be supporting them.⁷⁴

However, in Pozoblanco the distinction between fugitives and guerrillas should not be overemphasised. Here, in a huge number of cases, surviving and fighting the regime truly offered two sides of the same coin, and it is of little surprise that many surviving fugitives later became guerrillas. Certainly the majority of those in Pozoblanco who fled to the hills at the end of the Civil War were highly politicised and opposed to Francoism. But, in addition, the huge threat of the military tribunals hanging over the heads of many who had backed the Republic led substantial numbers of them to seek sanctuary in the hills following the Francoist occupation rather than await their fate at the hands of the regime's henchmen.

Indeed, important local political leaders made up some of the Pozoblanco fugitives. They had melted into the local countryside at the end of the war because they realised only too clearly that Francoists had extrajudicial or judicial murder in store for them.⁷⁵ Another sizeable group of fugitives was made up of prisoners awaiting military trial who broke out of makeshift Francoist jails before they could be condemned to the firing squad.⁷⁶ A number of low-level Republican activists who had learnt of Francoist extrajudicial and judicial killings at the start of the occupation and resolved to find sanctuary in the surrounding hills rather than be led like lambs to the slaughter also swelled the ranks of the fugitives.⁷⁷ People who had worked for the Republican authorities in the Civil War and feared the work of the military-run purging committees that were fed by denunciations and which plagued the lives of many in the early post-war period also added numbers.⁷⁸

Similarly, a proportion of fugitives had gone to ground because they knew some of their Francoist neighbours were working in tandem with the authorities. Indeed, a number of the fugitives had received tip-offs that members of their own communities, and in some cases their own relatives, planned to denounce them to the authorities. In response, they made good their escape before the authorities swooped down on them and hauled them before a military tribunal.⁷⁹ Relatives of Popular Front supporters who had already been condemned by the tribunals made up another group of fugitives.⁸⁰ These unfortunate relatives had turned to petty crime in order to survive, but when they realised that the Francoist police services were hot on their trail they took flight before they could be thrown in the cells.⁸¹ Others still decided to go into hiding simply because Francoist employers blacklisted them, and

roaming the countryside and taking food wherever and however they could represented their only realistic way of surviving.⁸²

At the peripheries of this movement stood some paroled Republicans who found it impossible to secure employment in their home village and resorted to living in shacks in the countryside where they occasionally worked as day labourers and supplemented their income by poaching. In some cases they would collaborate intermittently with the fugitives. These former prisoners would sometimes act as lookouts while fugitives brandishing weapons demanded food and supplies from petrified farm owners. The fugitives would reward the lookouts for their efforts with a small share of the proceeds.⁸³ Others, however, who found the door constantly closed on them when they applied for work became full-blown fugitives themselves. Indeed, the Falange reported that many paroled prisoners who were refused employment were melting into the countryside where they survived through a combination of theft and charity and hoped for the day the Franco regime would fall from power and they could return to their families.⁸⁴

At first these different victims from Pozoblanco of the military tribunals and their own Francoist neighbours would band together into small groups and hide out in the hills with just a few pitiful weapons.⁸⁵ Desperate to survive, they scraped a living by relying on charity, stealing from farms, eating wild crops and hunting or poaching. Some of these fugitives also clung to the hope that they could help overthrow the regime.⁸⁶ They also carried out some political work and killed a handful of Francoists.⁸⁷

The regime responded initially by sending the army to the Pozoblanco region on mopping up operations. Local Francoists were eager to see the armed forces finish off the fugitives and would collect money to reward members of the militarised units who had picked off some of these homeless Republicans.⁸⁸ Although the army killed some individual fugitives, they did not initially make a great impact against the movement as a whole. Eager to extirpate these thorns in its flesh, in the spring of 1940 the regime ordered the notoriously brutal Spanish foreign legion to the area.⁸⁹ They made life a misery for Republicans, but proved far from successful in eliminating the fugitives.⁹⁰ As a result, local Francoists grew increasingly frustrated and regularly badgered the authorities to be given weapons and to be allowed free rein to put paid their former neighbours who had gone to ground. Eventually the central authorities gave way, and from August 1940 Francoists from Pozoblanco clumped together in paramilitary groups that marauded through the countryside and from time to time finished off fugitives.⁹¹ From 1941, the Civil Guard was also deployed in ever-greater numbers in the region in order to hunt down fugitives.⁹²

Despite this, and to local Francoists' growing chagrin, as the Second World War swung in favour of the Allies it seemed increasingly likely that the regime would soon meet its demise and so more hopeful Republicans swelled the fugitives' ranks in Pozoblanco.⁹³ The regime met the

challenge by changing its tactics. Between 1946 and 1949, it deployed the Civil Guard in a dirty war against the guerrilla movement.⁹⁴ One tactic involved Civil Guard officers disguising themselves as guerrillas and roaming the hillsides of the Pozoblanco area intimidating the resistance movement's support base. By the late 1940s, Civil Guard hit squads had gunned down the vast majority of the guerrillas.⁹⁵

The authorities extended their dirty war against the relatives that the fugitives and guerrillas had left behind. This provides another reason not to over-emphasise the distinction between fugitives and guerrillas in Pozoblanco. In practice, local Francoists paid scant regard to such refined distinctions. What Francoist office holders and local Francoist inhabitants alike first saw when they cast their eyes over the families of fugitives and guerrillas were groups of people strongly associated with the defence of the Republic. As far as many local Francoists were concerned, these relatives deserved particular contempt and especially harsh treatment. Thus if we focus on the violence and abuse that Francoists visited on both fugitives/guerrillas and on their families then the distinction between the groups fades.⁹⁶

Certainly as far as many Francoist officials were concerned, relatives of Republicans who had fled to the countryside or were allied with the guerrilla movement constituted little more than the 'usual suspects'. The Civil Guard and Falange in particular persecuted them through the 1940s by regularly rounding and locking them up.⁹⁷ Reports from the Civil Guard on relatives of fugitives whom they harassed are peppered with phrases that reveal how they assumed guilt by association. In the case of a young man from Pozoblanco related to a group of fugitives who was detained in 1941, for instance, the Civil Guard simply declared that 'we arrested him for being a red'. They based this 'accusation' on no more than the fact that all his 'relatives are from the extreme left', and so he 'has no right to be part of society'.⁹⁸

Similarly, members of the Civil Guard set their sights on female relatives of fugitives and guerrillas whom they routinely locked up and charged with minor misdemeanours. This was a way of punishing Republicans as a group and, more specifically, seeking leverage over fugitives and guerrillas. They placed mothers under arrest, for instance, for 'failing to denounce' their fugitive sons. Some they imprisoned simply for sending photographs of themselves to their sons or writing short notes about family life to their offspring.⁹⁹ Civil Guard officers also developed the habit of regularly dropping by the house of one fugitive's mother and threatening her. They also arrested her from time to time, and she was imprisoned for nine months in 1946 on charges of helping her son. When another case against her was dismissed, the judge in Pozoblanco urged her to move to another area where 'she was not so well known'. She chose not to do this and eventually the Civil Guard swooped on her house after a fugitive action, took her and one of her daughters away and shot and killed them both in cold blood. Another daughter survived only because she was not at home at the time.¹⁰⁰

In another case the Civil Guard held a mother hostage until her fugitive son surrendered in the hope of saving her life.¹⁰¹

Many ordinary Francoists assisted the Civil Guard in their action against the much-afflicted relatives of fugitives. They supplied the authorities with information about those they wanted to see harassed by the Civil Guard.¹⁰² Many arrests followed a tip-off from local Francoists who harboured ill will against individuals from families associated with fugitives.¹⁰³ Indeed, reports by the Falange to the military authorities on those who they wanted prosecuted for helping relatives flee to the countryside often included derogatory comments drawn from the rumour mill that dominated the villages in Pozoblanco. It was claimed of one mother of a fugitive, for instance, that 'the general population considers her to be undesirable' and that 'widespread rumour has it that she is in contact with fugitives'.¹⁰⁴

Many families with members who had passed through the hands of the military tribunals for their 'rebellion' during the Civil War also found themselves harassed for aiding fugitives. Their 'crime' was that they stood out so clearly in the Republican crowd. The authorities kept one man from Villanueva de Córdoba, for instance, in jail for two years and one month, without trial, because the authorities suspected he was helping fugitives. For the authorities, the man's own left-wing background was pernicious enough, but it was severely compounded by the fact that a military tribunal had sentenced one of his sons for his alleged actions in the Civil War.¹⁰⁵

Such harassment could involve the Civil Guard trumping up charges against relatives of those condemned by the tribunals. This was the fate of a man from Villanueva de Córdoba. Two of his brothers had been in the Spanish Communist Party. The military authorities had executed one brother following a military trial, and another brother had first been sentenced to thirty years and then banished to internal exile.¹⁰⁶ In 1946 the Civil Guard alleged that he had stolen eight chickens that he planned to supply to resistance fighters operating in the area. They placed him under arrest, and a military trial seemed in the offing. Finally, in 1949 the military authorities transferred his case to the Pozoblanco civil court because they did not consider the charges serious enough for a military tribunal. This court ruled that the charges were a fabrication, but he had endured the case hanging over him for three years.¹⁰⁷

In many cases, of course, relatives of fugitives were also related to other Republicans who had been forced through the military tribunals. This often meant that families closely allied to the defence of the Republic suffered especially badly. The combined effects of the stigmatisation of Republicans, the marginalisation produced by condemnation in the military tribunals and the victimisation suffered by particular families with relatives who had fled the repression can clearly be seen in the fate of a particular family from Villanueva de Córdoba. The family suffered terribly at the hands of the military tribunals and surviving relatives were discriminated against and

pushed into poverty and theft. Some were forced to flee to the countryside and this brought further misfortune to the family.

The military prosecutions hit them very harshly. Army judges handed down a twelve-year jail term on a female member of the UGT from Villanueva de Córdoba, in 1940, for her political activism, but particularly for growing spinach on a small patch of collectivised land that had belonged to the local *cacique*.¹⁰⁸ The military authorities executed her brother after trial for taking part in the recapture of Villanueva de Córdoba.¹⁰⁹ The family also suffered because some of its members were forced to take refuge in the countryside. Her nephew, for instance, was widely detested by local Francoists both for his name and his own politics. Before the war he had been in the Young Socialists and then became associated with the Communist Party. Although he was not prosecuted by the state, after the war local landowners blacklisted him and he fell into deep poverty.¹¹⁰ He turned to theft to survive, and on hearing that members of the Civil Guard were preparing to pounce on him, he managed to slip through their fingers and ran for the hills. For about a year he stalked the countryside with a band of other fugitives until he was eventually captured after a shootout in August 1941. In 1944 a military tribunal handed down the death sentence on him, although this was later commuted to a thirty-year prison term.¹¹¹

His relatives who remained at 'liberty' in Villanueva de Córdoba suffered both harassment and discrimination. In 1941 the Civil Guard arrested the daughter of the female UGT activist, whom they accused of hiding and assisting fugitives. The Civil Guard 'justified' the arrest by claiming she was the cousin of an outlaw and citing widespread rumours in the town that she 'was in contact with outlaws'.¹¹² Although released, she and her family continued to suffer great hardship and found themselves forced to turn to crime. As late as 1947, two further close female relatives both faced prosecution and suffered imprisonment for eating sheep that they had stolen in the surrounding countryside.¹¹³

Epilogue

Making Francoism from Below

On 13 August 1940, the German military police burst into a house in Le Baule-les-Pins near Nantes in France. There they arrested the exiled former president of the Catalan government, Lluís Companys. Although much violence afflicted Catalonia during the early months of the Civil War, it is important to understand that Companys' government had laboured to save the lives of thousands and had ferried hundreds of priests abroad to safety. But Franco's policemen were not interested in such details, and his detention represented an enormous success for the Spanish police officials who had been scouting around occupied France since July and pressing the Germans to round up their leading exiled political enemies.¹ On 26 of August they scored their greatest victory when the Germans handed over Companys and they then drove him over the border and into a Francoist prison. On 14 October, officials in Barcelona herded the now somewhat battered former president into a military court room for his one hour trial. The next day at 6 am Companys went before the firing squad, and shortly afterwards his executioners consigned his body to a mass grave.²

The German-Spanish Police Agreement between General Martínez Anido and Henrich Himmler, Reichsfürer SS, signed on 31 July 1938, made this execution possible. For the agreement allowed for the repatriation, without diplomatic intervention, of Spanish opponents of the 'national cause', as well as obliging to the two parties to keep each other posted about communists, other 'subversive' elements and policing measures.³ In short, the agreement reveals how the two policing services shared enemies, goals and policing methods.

These close links between the two regimes indicate that we cannot understand the purpose and function of the Francoist military tribunals in the Spanish context alone. Indeed, the shared goals of the Nazi and Franco regimes in rooting out communists and 'subversive' elements points to a wider European civil war in which those from the far right laboured hard to destroy their ideological enemies in order to recast their societies and build a 'New Order'. This also goes a long way to explaining why, during the Second World War, the Nazis deported up to 10,000 of the Spanish refugees who fell into their hands in occupied France to German concentration

camps.⁴ Although the Spanish police had begun to look into the political background of those they suspected of 'fleeing from Spanish justice', in the end the Franco regime decided not to press for the repatriation of the thousands of Spanish exiles in France. In effect, they left their work to their Nazi wartime comrades who proved willing to take up the baton. Indeed, the German foreign ministry confirmed to the Franco regime that given the political background of many of these refugees and the threat they represented to public security they were being interned.⁵ In this particular sense, Franco's military trials and Mauthausen ploughed similar furrows.⁶

Indeed, the Francoist military trials emerged out of tensions that swept across Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. This is why to understand Franco's 'justice' system we need to examine not just the way the courts evolved as an institution and through a series of decrees, but also why they emerged. In this regard, the tribunals did not simply arise as a product of Francoist state building.⁷ Instead, they came to the fore as a response to the deep-rooted social and political tensions that had bedevilled Spanish political life from at least the 1890s. Particularly important in this respect is the realisation by many on the political right that they could no longer contain the mobilised masses that fell behind the Popular Front from 1936. Indeed, many of those who backed Franco feared that both their livelihoods and their control over their own lives stood on the brink of an abyss. Accordingly, in order to win back power and status they needed to deal with the mass ranks of the centre and left political reformist organisations. They justified this attack with arguments that they had the right to overthrow tyrants and that they stood prepared to sacrifice their lives to defend the Church and Christian civilisation. Thus many who threw their weight behind the revolt embraced violence as a means of 'saving' and regenerating 'Spain'.

This is why in the revolt of July 1936 significant numbers of those who participated in the rebel death squads, or who identified their victims for them, believed the struggle to save Spain from 'reds' had become a war to the death to be won by terror. Significantly, those they earmarked for the grave hailed most of all from the political organisations that backed the Popular Front or who had struggled, often against their own neighbours, to enforce government reforms. Franco too, once he became the rebels' supreme leader, fought the war slowly and mercilessly to destroy his political enemies and, he claimed, to 'redeem' Spain.

For this reason, it is a mistake to divorce the Francoist military courts as an institution from the death squads and the wartime and post-war killings.⁸ In fact, they both emerged out of the attempt to destroy the political cadres who stood between the rebels and Francoists and their goals. One area in which the death squads and the military courts do differ, however, is in their relation to the Civil War. For the courts emerged as a major force when it became clear that the coup had failed and that a long, drawn-out war stood in the offing. Fighting such a conflict brought with it the need to drum up support both at home and abroad and to muzzle talk of the

killings carried out by the rebel and Francoist side while trumpeting the murders that shook government territory. The courts provided a powerful means to do this, and another part of their importance is that they came to sit square in Francoist efforts to present the rebellion as a legitimate struggle against a band of criminal killers.

The killings in Republican-held territory, of course, well served the purpose of those implementing this strategy. For the genuine horror provoked by the slaughter provided the rebels with a rallying cry and brought many people flocking to their colours with a redoubled hatred and fear of the enemy. By claiming to prove the barbarity of this enemy in its courts, Francoists bolstered these emotions. But they went further than this and fostered a myth of legitimate due process that took the trials as proof that the rebellion and war were necessary to save 'Spain' from the 'red hordes'. Importantly, in an atmosphere hardened by the horrific experience of war, the evidence offered here from Pozoblanco indicates that these claims struck a chord with many among the Francoist support base who could connect with blood-curdling stories of horror allegedly perpetrated in 'red' territory. Thus the trials helped shape and reinforce Francoist understandings of Popular Front supporters as unconscionable deviants.

Importantly, the trial system also helped channel and direct these understandings into the Francoist state-directed programme of eliminating political enemies. In this sense, the courts helped build the state but also devolved power to the grassroots. For the enormous scale of the military trial system required huge resources and staffing. Indeed, the Franco regime came to allot up to 50% of public spending to its policing services and could call on over 50,000 officers in the Civil Guard alone.⁹ Despite these formidable figures, a regime which in some areas prosecuted up to 15% of the population found itself struggling to cope. Given this crushing squeeze on resources, and its limited interest in proving guilt rather than simply asserting it, the regime turned to its support base for the information that would help it know and measure those who fell into its hands at occupation.¹⁰ This is a significant reason why the values and beliefs shared by the regime and members of its support base that had been forged through years of conflict before the rebellion and which gained much more currency during the course of the conflict itself became so important. For, as the Pozoblanco case again indicates, they allowed groups of grassroots Francoists to collaborate with the official state authorities and to help them select, charge, prosecute and convict their local political enemies.

All of this formed part and parcel of the regime's efforts to make the municipality or village the beating heart of the repression.¹¹ This is why at the end of the war Francoists encouraged captured frontline soldiers to their hometown, where they could be more easily assessed and filtered. It is also why they set up military courts at the village level, opened denunciation centres across the areas they occupied and incited their supporters to step forward and incriminate their neighbours. Such exhortations reveal just

how strongly those from above cajoled and pushed the Franco support base to help them prosecute those from the defeated side. By the same token, the fact that enough people took up the chance to denounce and testify against their local political enemies points both to the scale of co-operation that existed between state representatives and members of society. But it also stands testimony to the strength of feeling boiling over among many at the grassroots of society, which meant that a great deal of the initiative for the judicial repression came from below. Indeed, the Pozoblanco case indicates that much of the bite of the judicial repression came from the fact that significant numbers of Francoists proved willing to collaborate in the regime's trial system.

Consequently, we need to reconsider the degree to which the Franco regime imposed its system of repression on Spanish society by bringing to bear the full force of the state institutions it controlled over Spanish society, as some of the existing literature implies. For the reality is that, as we have seen and as the Pozoblanco case suggests, the resources of the state alone did not stretch to the scale of the task the regime set itself. More than this, the repression enjoyed a significant degree of popular support. In fact, in some ways state officials such as military judges put the brakes on popular demands for harsh repression that welled up from below. But by participating so actively, grassroots Francoists also helped give a veneer of legitimacy to the judicial repression. We know the store that high-ranking Francoists put by this participation from the fact that leading members of the regime liked to boast to journalists and diplomats about the number of witnesses who could prove each individual allegation. Thus those from below helped to make the repression possible during the Civil War and post-war periods.

The regime's local collaborators, however, did much more than simply support, drive and offer a gloss of legitimacy to the judicial repression. At the local level they also kept alive the notion that virtuous victors had triumphed in the Civil War against social demons who deserved to be pushed to the very margins of society. In the process they also sustained the repression long after the bulk of military judicial officers had returned to civilian life and the regime had paroled those convicted for 'civil war offences'.

This is why we should add some qualifications to the argument that the regime began to wind down the repression from 1940 by raising the bar for the death sentence and instituting a programme of amnesties and parole.¹² Partly because the regime continued to execute people, but perhaps more importantly because one effect of the greater clarification of sentencing rules was often to push judges to hand down longer prison terms. Indeed, the evidence clearly shows that military judges continued to sentence their victims to long periods in jail right until Franco at last realised that his sister regime in Germany had disappeared and he needed to present his regime in a new light.

In this regard a note of caution should be sounded and it should be observed that the early months of the Civil War continue to present an

important challenge to the historian, as the scholar Julián Casanova argues. For this was when huge numbers met their grim end at the hands of the death squads, and up to 20,000 of these victims still remain unidentified.¹³ But in order to understand some of the important mechanisms of the later violence that engulfed the lives of hundreds of thousands and to grasp how this repression continued to cast its shadow over Spain we also need to focus on the relatively neglected issues of social participation both with the military courts and with the way sentences acted as a form of judicial branding on the defeated that scarred their victims for life.

Thus the fact that those at the sharp end of the trial system became enmeshed in a web of repression is important because it shows that reducing the number of death sentences and paroling prisoners did not mean that the repression was being wound down. In fact, in many ways the repression continued to be played out at the local level, as it always had been. Indeed, the regime handed to its grassroots supporters the decision on whether to release prisoners on parole or place them in internal exile. This was done in response to local opposition to clemency for Republican prisoners.

Certainly the Pozoblanco case indicates that many of those who did return to their home villages found that the strength of feeling held against them could lead some local Francoists to make their life a misery. This helps show just how deep rooted the Francoist hatred of the enemy had become among significant numbers of the regime's supporters and how unwilling many of these local supporters of the regime were to give any quarter to those they saw as their implacable foes. Consequently, many of those paroled found themselves unable to secure employment. Some could not even live in their villages and were forced to live in the hills scratching out a living in a twilight world of crime. Thus many of those condemned as criminals for their political support for a programme of reform found themselves pushed into a life of petty crime simply to survive. With their lives smashed apart—for a large number only their families remained as a haven against the repression. But even here some in Pozoblanco found their children taken into care.

The deep roots of the repression within Spanish society in terms of both those who participated in it and those who suffered from it forces us to rethink the concept of the Pact of Blood. The historian Raymond Carr drew on this term to observe perceptively that members of the Francoist elite who had joined together in the violent elimination of their political enemies knew they could expect little mercy if they surrendered power.¹⁴ Working with Juan Pablo Fuisi he also noted that the veterans of the Civil War became deeply attached to the memory of their struggle.¹⁵ The evidence presented here, however, suggests that we can extend this concept to include not just the political elite and war veterans but also many of those Francoists behind the lines who identified with the regime and collaborated in the trials or who helped push some of their neighbours to the margins of society.

This important role of those from below in the repression also casts some light on the infamous Pact of Silence during the transition to democracy that followed Franco's death. For on the one hand, if we understand just how profoundly some, and as we have seen by no means all, neighbours hated one another and how deeply they had harmed one another during the Civil War and Francoism, we can comprehend just what strength of character suppressing the rancour of the past during the transition took. On the other hand, we can also catch sight of some of the reasons why both the victors and the defeated would not want to rake over the past. For those who had been judicially branded by the military tribunals, and for their relatives, the stigma of criminalisation and the memory of such deep suffering was not something many would savour conjuring up again. In a sense, this was one victory of Francoism that the 2007 Law of Historical Memory left in place because it drew a line at overturning lock, stock and barrel the convictions handed down on the defeated. Thus the state has done little to challenge the feelings of criminalisation that permeate elements of Spanish society which in any case are so hard to challenge because those who suffered, or their relatives, in many cases continue to live alongside those who became involved in their plight.

This difficulty in confronting the past places the Spanish example within the mid-twentieth-century European experience and the history of coming to terms with a difficult past. However, the relatively fresh nature of the debate in Spain in comparison with, for example, France and Germany makes it stand apart from attempts to come to terms with Franco's sister regimes in Vichy and Berlin. Of course, Franco alone survived the Second World War, and this left his regime free to portray those from the victorious side in the Civil War as victims not perpetrators. But the Franco regime was also unique in emerging from a brutal and ideologically charged civil war that mobilised huge numbers Spaniards against one another. In Spain too, the war against the enemy became an exclusively internal affair. As a result this repression is an extremely difficult subject to exorcise.

With the debate still raging in Spain on the country's bleak past, this book seeks to shed some light on why it is so difficult to confront the ghosts hanging over the nation. The deep and awful suffering of many from the Francoist side of course meant groups among the regime's supporters believed fervently in their status as victims. But this led numbers of them to become caught up in a huge system of retribution whose shadow still falls over Spanish society.

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Notes

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

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30. Ledesma, *Los días de llamas*, p. 140.

31. Manuel Delgado Ruiz, *Luces iconoclastas. Anticlericalismo, espacio y ritual en la España contemporánea*, (Barcelona: Ariel, 2001), p. 31.
32. Delgado Ruiz, *Luces iconoclastas*, p. 52.
33. Delgado Ruiz, *Luces iconoclastas*, p. 54.
34. María Pilar Salomón Chéliz, *Anticlericismo en Aragón. Protesta popular y movilización política (1900–1939)*, (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias Zaragoza, 2002), p. 297.
35. Borrego, *La Guerra Civil en Marbella*, p. 83. Works considered to have artistic value could be saved from the flames; see Langdon Davies, *Behind the Spanish Barricades*, pp. 139–140.
36. Ledesma, *Los días de llamas*, p. 250.
37. Alía Miranda, *Guerra civil en la retaguardia*, p. 224.
38. Cervera, *Madrid en guerra*, pp. 82–83. Similar attacks on jails took place across Republican-held Spain. For examples see Nadal, *Guerra civil en Málaga*, p. 171; González Martínez, *Guerra civil en Murcia*, pp. 169–170; Alía Miranda, *Guerra civil en la retaguardia*, p. 215; Ian Gibson, *Paracuellos. Cómo fue. La verdad objetiva sobre la matanza de presos en Madrid en 1936*, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2005), pp. 193–196.
39. Marcel Junod, *Warrior without Weapons*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1951), p. 104. For the slaughter of 170 prisoners in Santander after the city suffered an air attack see TNA: PRO, 371, 21282, W 1275.
40. Gibson, *Paracuellos*, p. 54.
41. Gibson, *Paracuellos*, pp. 236–238.
42. Ángel Viñas, *El escudo de la República. El oro de España, la apuesta soviética y los hechos de mayo de 1937*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 2007), pp. 56–67.
43. Gibson, *Paracuellos*, p. 251; Cervera, *Madrid en guerra*, p. 89. An eyewitness account in Felix Schlyer, *Diplomático en el Madrid Rojo*, (Sevilla: Espuela de Plata, 2008; first published 1938), pp. 133–155.
44. Cervera, *Madrid en guerra*, p. 62.
45. Junod, *Warrior without Weapons*, p. 119.
46. Glicerio Sánchez Recio, *Justicia y guerra en España. Los Tribunales Populares (1936–1939)*, (Alicante: Instituto de Cultura ‘Juan Gil-Albert’, 1991), p. 55.
47. Casanova, ‘Rebelión y revolución’, p. 161; Francisco Cobo Romero ‘Tribunales Populares de Jaén’, *Justicia en Guerra. Jornadas sobre la administración de justicia durante la Guerra Civil española. Instituciones y fuentes documentales*, (Madrid: Madrid Ministerio de Cultura, 1990), p. 127.
48. Sánchez Recio, *Justicia y guerra*, pp. 104–105.
49. Sánchez Recio, *Justicia y guerra*, p. 25 and p. 87.
50. Cobo Romero, ‘Tribunales’, p. 131; Gabriel Avilez, *Tribunales Rojos (Vistos por un Abogado defensor)*, (Barcelona: Destino, 1940), p. 17; González, *La Guerra Civil en Murcia*, p. 170 and p. 237.
51. Sánchez Recio, *Justicia y guerra*, p. 137; Cobo Romero, ‘Tribunales’, p. 133; Alía Miranda, *Guerra civil en la retaguardia*, p. 257.
52. Cobo Romero, ‘Tribunales’, p. 135.
53. Glicerio Sánchez Recio, *La República contra los rebeldes y los desafectos. La represión económica durante la guerra civil*, (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1991), pp. 18–21.
54. Alpert, *El ejército republicano*, pp. 79–80.
55. Gibson, *Paracuellos*, pp. 60–63.
56. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/21282 W1212. British officials also reported that the authorities sometimes found it hard to prosecute members of the CNT for fear of reprisals. TNA: PRO, FO 371, 21383 W 1631.
57. TNA: PRO, FO, 425/415 W 11897/29/41.

58. Josep M. Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroya i Font, 'Mayo de 1937–abril de 1939', in Santos Juliá (Ed.), *Víctimas de la guerra civil*, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999), p. 183.
59. On denunciation see Cervera, *Madrid en guerra*, pp. 182–189.
60. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/2260 W 11001.
61. TNA: PRO, FO 800/323 H/XXXIV/9.
62. Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya i Font, *La repressió a la reraguarda de Catalunya*, pp. 268–285.
63. TNA: PRO, 371, 24149/ W 754/754/41.
64. Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya i Font, *La repressió a la reraguarda de Catalunya*, pp. 221–228. See also TNA: PRO, FO 371/21300/ W18215.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. ABC, Sevilla, 2/10/1937.
2. TNA, PRO, FO 371/49578/Z 12972/89/44.
3. See Sefton Delmer's outraged report on rebel killings that he dispatched once outside Spain in *Daily Express* 14/09/1936.
4. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/22629 W 12163/29/41.
5. On Badajoz see *The Manchester Guardian*, 17/8/1936. On the damage to the rebel image see, Tom Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 26; Gibson, *La represión nacionalista*, pp. 111–118.
6. Cited in Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain*, p. 349.
7. Hilari Ragner. *La pólvora y el incienso. La Iglesia y la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939)*, (Barcelona: Península, 2001), pp. 133–143; Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, p. 203; Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, pp. 52–53.
8. See TNA: PRO, FO, 425/415 W 11582/29/41 and FO 800, 323 H/XXXIV/9 Letter 14 Nov. 1938.
9. Cited in Preston, *Franco*, pp. 241–242.
10. Preston, *Franco*, p. 224, p. 276.
11. Coverdale, *Italian Intervention*, p. 216, p. 253; Preston, *Franco*, p. 283, p. 292, p. 293, p. 305, p. 311.
12. Preston, *Franco*, p. 285.
13. Coverdale, *Italian Intervention*, p. 288.
14. Coverdale, *Italian Intervention*, pp. 291–293; British disgust in TNA: PRO, FO, 371, 21379, W 22434. Trials and executions in *The Manchester Guardian* 30/10/1937. On trials in Bilbao see TNA: PRO, FO, 371/21300 W19078.
15. *La Vanguardia Española*, 4/4/1939. First published in *Diario Vasco de San Sebastián* 1/1/1939.
16. Ballbé, *Orden público*, p. 208.
17. Ignacio Berdugo Gómez, Josefina Cuesta, María dolores de la Calle and Mónica Lanero, 'El Ministerio de Justicia en la España Nacional' in *Justicia en Guerra. Jornadas sobre la administración de justicia durante la Guerra Civil española: instituciones y fuentes documentales*. (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1990), p. 251.
18. Romero Romero, *Guerra Civil*, p. 56.
19. Rivero Noval, *La ruptura de la paz civil*, p. 93.
20. Arenillas de Chaves, *El proceso de Besteiro*, p. 291.
21. Gil, *La noche de los generales*, p. 55.

22. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 187.
23. Mónica Lanero Táboas, *Una milicia de la justicia. La política judicial del franquismo (1936–1945)*, (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1996), p. 85.
24. Melique Rodríguez Chaos, *24 Años en la cárcel*, (Madrid: Forma, 1977), p. 56; De Guzmán, *Nosotros los asesinos*, p. 286; José Rodríguez Vega, *Impressions of Franco's Spain*, (London: United Editorial, 1943), p. 23.
25. De Guzmán, *Nosotros los asesinos*, p. 270.
26. Gil, *La noche de los generales*, p. 54.
27. De Guzmán, *Nosotros los asesinos*, p. 302.
28. An example in Solé i Sabaté, 'Presentación', p. xxx. See also Pedro Ruiz Torres, Juli Peretó Magraner and Salvador Albiñan, *Proceso a Juan Peset Aleixandre*, (Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2001), p. 54.
29. Emmet Hughes, *Report from Spain*, (London: Latimer House Limited, 1947), p. 135.
30. Solé i Sabaté, Villarroja i Font, *L'Ocupació militar de Catalunya*, p. 36.
31. Gil, *La noche de los generales*, pp. 54–55.
32. An example in Sánchez Guerra, *Mis prisiones*, p. 98.
33. Koester, *Spanish Testament*, p. 336.
34. Lanero, *Una milicia de la justicia*, p. 85.
35. Cifuentes and Maluenda, 'De las urnas a los cuarteles', p. 45; Vega Sombriá, *De la esperanza a la persecución*, p. 115. See also Chavez Palacios, *La represión en la provincia de Cáceres*, p. 222.
36. José Luis Gutiérrez Casalá, *Colonias penitenciarias militarizadas de Montijo. Represión franquista en la Comarca de Mérida*, (Mérida: Junta de Extremadura, 2003), pp. 69–84.
37. Francisco Espinosa Maestre, 'Julio de 1936', in Juliá Santos (Ed.), *Víctimas de la guerra civil*, p. 97.
38. Lucía Prieto Borrego and Encarnación Barranquero Texeira, *Población y Guerra Civil en Málaga, éxodo y refugio*, (Málaga: Centro de Ediciones de la Diputación de Málaga, 2007), p. 329.
39. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/22629 W 12163/29/41.
40. Ruiz Villaplana, *Burgos Justice*, p. 157. On the roving brigades of judicial officers who meted out Stalin's rough justice to peasants in the USSR see Peter H. Solomon, *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 80–127.
41. Josep María Solé i Sabaté, *La repressió franquista a Catalunya 1938–1953*, (Barcelona: Edicions 6, 1985), p. 64.
42. Lanero, *Una milicia de la justicia*, p. 322.
43. Rafael Gil Bracero, 'La justicia nacional y el Tribunal de Responsabilidades Políticas de Granada. La fuentes y primeras conclusiones', in *Justicia en Guerra. Jornadas sobre la administración de justicia durante la Guerra Civil española. Instituciones y fuentes documentales*, (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1990), p. 608.
44. Bayle, *¿Qué pasa en España?*, p. 10, p. 35, p. 39.
45. Bayle, *¿Qué pasa en España?*, p. 65.
46. An example, in Preston, *Franco*, p. 277.
47. Cited in Preston, *Franco*, p. 226; *Daily Mail*, 1/3/1937.
48. Defensa Nacional de Burgos, *Avance del informe oficial sobre los asesinatos, violaciones, incendios y demás depredaciones y violencias cometidos en algunos pueblos del mediodía de España*, (Burgos: Junta de Defensa Nacional de Burgos, 1936), p. 5. It was common practice to open a judicial investigation as soon as territory was conquered. First published in Burgos in 1936, this report was issued in Buenos Aires in 1937. Similar publications were produced

- for other areas. Examples include Defensa Nacional de Burgos, *Avance del informe*; Delegación de Prensa y Propaganda para América Española, *Avance del informe oficial, sobre los asesinatos, violaciones, incendios y demás crímenes, depredaciones y actos de violencia cometidos en algunos pueblos del centro y sur de España y señaladamente en Málaga, bajo el dominio del llamado gobierno de Valencia*, (Buenos Aires: Edic. Sud-Americana, 1937).
49. Defensa Nacional de Burgos, *Avance informe*, pp. 5–6.
 50. Antonio Pérez de Olaguer, *El terror rojo en Andalucía*, (Burgos: Ediciones Antisectarias, 1938), p. 82.
 51. ABC, *Sevilla*, 12/10, 1937.
 52. Cited in Gil, *La noche de los generales*, p. 38.
 53. Gil, *La noche de los generales*, p. 55.
 54. An eye-witness account in TNA: PRO, FO, 371, 22684, W 4407.
 55. Arenillas de Chavez, *El proceso de Besteiro*, pp. 402–403.
 56. Solé i Sabaté and Villarroja i Font, *L'Ocupació militar de Catalunya*, p. 58.
 57. Javier Rodrigo, *Los campos de concentración franquistas. Entre la historia y la memoria*, (Madrid: Siete Mares, 2003), pp. 30–32, pp. 227–228.
 58. José Manuel Sabin, 'Control y represión', in Manuel Requena Galleo (coordinador), *Castilla-La Mancha en el franquismo*, (Ciudad Real: Manifesta, 2003), p. 25.
 59. On the continuing problems accessing the military archives see *El País*, 16/08/08 and 10/08/08.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. Omer Bartov, 'Seeking the Roots of Modern Genocide: On the Macro and Microhistory of Mass Murder', in Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, *The Specter of Genocide. Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 87.
2. On the importance of the local in understanding the bigger picture see Bartov, 'Seeking the Roots', pp. 75–96.
3. Francisco Redondo Guillén, *Pozoblanco. Capital de Los Pedroches*, (Pozoblanco: Ayuntamiento de Pozoblanco, 2002), pp. 18–52.
4. Calero, *Movimientos sociales en Andalucía*, p. 17.
5. Manuel García Parody, *Los orígenes del socialismo en Córdoba, 1893–1931*, (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2002), pp. 50–51.
6. Díaz del Moral, *Historia de las agitaciones*, p. 210.
7. Pérez Yruela, *La conflictividad campesina*, p. 267; García Parody, *Los orígenes del socialismo*, p. 510.
8. Cobo Romero, *Conflicto rural*, pp. 27–28. For the strikes in a national context see Gerald H. Meaker, *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914–1923*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 121–144. For Córdoba province see Díaz Moral, *Historia de las agitaciones*, pp. 321–241. For the general strike in Villanueva de Córdoba see García Parody, *Los orígenes del socialismo*, p. 158 and p. 227.
9. Castillo, *Propietarios muy pobres*, pp. 218–237.
10. Pascual Carrión, *Los latifundios en España. Su importancia, origen, consecuencias y solución*, (Espulgues de Llobregat: Ariel, 1975), Figure 5.
11. Carrión, *Los latifundios en España*, p. 219.
12. Jacques Maurice, *El anarquismo andaluz. Campesinos y sindicalistas, 1868–1936*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 1990), p. 89.

13. Antonio Barragán Moriana, *Dos textos fundamentales para la historia social de Córdoba en el siglo XX. La Comisión y el Instituto de Reformas Sociales. Los informes de 1902 y 1919*, (Córdoba: Diputación de Córdoba, 1999), pp. 218–219.
14. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, pp. 76–105.
15. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 148.
16. For a discussion of the struggle of socialist mayors in the countryside see George Collier, *Socialists of Rural Andalusia. Unacknowledged Revolutionaries of the Second Republic*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), especially pp. 66–74.
17. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 15; Gabriel García de Consuegra, Ángel López López and Fernando López López, *La represión en Pozoblanco (Guerra civil y posguerra)*, (Córdoba: Francisco Baena, 1989); García de Consuegra *et al*, *Pozoblanco*, p. 28.
18. Examples in García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *Pozoblanco*, pp. 24–25.
19. García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *Pozoblanco*, p. 26.
20. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 105. Leading landholders in the Pozoblanco area also took part in an abortive coup against the Republic in 1932. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 155.
21. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, pp. 101–105.
22. Pérez Yruela., *La conflictividad campesina*, p. 134.
23. For example, a striker was killed in Villanueva de Córdoba in October 1931. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 105.
24. Cobo Romero, *Labradores, campesinos y jornaleros*, p. 53, p. 58, p. 65 and pp. 72–73.
25. See Archivo Histórico Nacional–Madrid (AHN-M), CG 1044 for information on the Falangist smallholders. The argument that the richest led the repression in Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 18. The importance of smallholders in Cobo Romero, *Labradores, campesinos y jornaleros*, pp. 53–73.
26. www.pedrocheenlared.com/pedroc09.htm and Archivo Municipal de Pedroche (AMP) Libro de Actas.
27. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1, Estado Número 3, Pedroche. *Alcaldes de Pedroche* www.pedrochesenlared.com/pedroches09.htm. For a discussion of old cacique groups entering the Falange see Ángela Cenarro, ‘El triunfo de la reacción: Fascistas y conservadores en Teruel’, in Julián Casanova, Ángela Cenarro, Julita Cifuentes, María Pilar Maluenda and María Pilar Salomón, *El pasado oculto. Fascismo y violencia en Aragón (1936–1939)*, (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de España Editores, 1992), pp. 178–191.
28. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Guerra Civil, Salamanca (AHN-S), TERMC, T. 19351, 3827-C, 411-C-46.
29. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 32, p. 45, p. 148, p. 155, p. 293, p. 441, p. 472.
30. AHN-S, PS. Madrid, 2495, Gaceta 5.
31. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1. Francoists frequently blamed Caballero for crimes without any evidence. A priest from the town alleged that Caballero had demanded the mass killing of rightists in July 1936. Bernabé Copado, *Contribución de sangre*, (Málaga: Artes Gráficas, 1941), p. 56. However, research by Francisco Moreno shows that Caballero worked hard to save the lives of two priests and worked hard to save the life of Juan Moreno, the chief executive of the local council. Francisco Moreno Gómez, ‘Julián Caballero’, *Villanueva*, 5, 56, (January 1985).
32. ATMSS, 1260, 31682.
33. ATMSS, 316, 12806.

34. ATMSS, 903, 2762.
35. ATMSS, 533, 4514.
36. ATMSS, 219, 3734.
37. Paul Preston, 'Spain', in Stuart Joseph Wolf., (Ed.), *Fascism in Europe*, (London: Routledge, 1981), p. 350.
38. Pérez Yruela, *La conflictividad campesina*, pp. 281–282. The left-wing leadership component of the socialist party before the Civil War did not promote revolution in the countryside. See Graham, *Socialism and War*, p. 48.
39. This and the following details from, Moreno Gómez, *La Guerra Civil en Córdoba*, pp. 136–158.
40. García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *La represión en Pozoblanco*, p. 50.
41. Moreno Gómez, *La Guerra Civil en Córdoba*, p. 348.
42. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1. In addition to these killings, a further forty-five rightists were imprisoned during the Civil War, and eighty-five villagers were identified by the Republican Classification Committee in the village as a serious threat to the Republic. On 11 July 1938, the Republican government formally confiscated the land of seventy-two people who were found to have used arms against the Republic. Eleven wives of the rebels also had their land confiscated. AHN-S, P.S. Madrid, 2495 Gaceta 11. Supporters of right-wing parties and those accused of making statements against the regime could be classified as 'disloyal' (*desafectos*) by Republican courts known as *Jurados de uencias* which operated from November 1936. For a discussion see Alía Miranda, *La guerra civil en retaguardia*, p. 258 and p. 264.
43. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1.
44. *Alcaldes de Pedroche* www.pedrochesenlared.com/pedroches09.htm. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1, Estado Número 3, Pedroche For land ownership, AHN-S, P.S. Madrid 2495, Gaceta 12.
45. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1, Estado Número 3, Pedroche. For a discussion of old cacique groups entering the Falange see, Cenarro, 'El triunfo de la reacción', pp. 178–191.
46. Cruz de los Caídos, Pedroche. AHN-M, CG, 1044.
47. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1.
48. A good example of this confusion in ATMSS, 268, 10979.
49. On Miaja see Alpert, *El ejército republicano*, p. 73. This and the following details from Moreno Gómez, *La Guerra Civil en Córdoba*, p. 329.
50. García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *La represión en Pozoblanco*, p. 50.
51. Some claim he was killed because he had denied work to a group of harvesters and had deployed a combine harvester instead. García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *La represión en Pozoblanco*, p. 54. On his shooting, ATMSS 1210, 30883.
52. García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *La represión en Pozoblanco*, p. 54.
53. García de Consuegra, López López and López López argue that these killings were influenced by news of killings committed by the rebels. García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *La represión en Pozoblanco*, p. 55.
54. Emiliano Mascaraque Castillo, *Memorias de un miliciano*, (Pozoblanco: Ayuntamiento de Pozoblanco, 2000), p. 151; Cobo Romero, 'Tribunales Populares', p. 131.
55. Moreno Gómez, *La Guerra Civil en Córdoba*, pp. 332–340; García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *La represión en Pozoblanco*, pp. 52–75. A further 673 people from Pozoblanco were imprisoned for some

- period of time ranging from less than one year to the whole duration of the conflict. AHN-Madrid, CG, 1044, 1.
56. A good overview in Laura López Romero, *Joaquín Pérez Salas y la batalla de Pozoblanco*, (Pozoblanco: Consejo Local de Izquierda Unida de Pozoblanco, 2003), pp. 18–28.
 57. Jordi Font also found that the Francoist support base was radicalised by war-time sufferings. Jordi Font, *¡Arriba el campo! Primer franquisme i actituds polítiques en l'àmbit rural nord-català*, (Girona: Unitat de Publicacions de la Diputació de Girona, 2001), p. 198. Examples of representations of Republicans by those who had suffered in the war in ATMSS, 636, 20329, ATMSS, 552, 11264, ATMSS, 825, 12401.
 58. Widows played an important role in producing representations of Republican 'criminality' to the military tribunals.
 59. Archivo Histórico Provincial de Córdoba, Sección Judicial, Audiencia Provincial de Córdoba, (AHPC, SJ, APC), Pozoblanco, Civil, 1942, 233 and 236; 1945, 239. Also list of the 'fallen in AMP, Legajo Guerra Civil'.
 60. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 2.
 61. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 2.
 62. AHN-S, PS, Madrid, 245, Gaceta 6.
 63. AHN-S, PS, Madrid, Gaceta 12.
 64. AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1.
 65. AMP, Legajo Guerra Civil.
 66. AHN-M. CG, 1044, Estado 3.
 67. AHN-M, CG, 1044, Estado 3.
 68. AHN-M, CG, 1044, Estado 3.
 69. Moreno Gómez, *La Guerra Civil en Córdoba*, p. 691.
 70. Francisco Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra (La represión y la guerrilla, 1939–1950)*, (Córdoba: Francisco Baena, 1987), p. 41.
 71. Moreno Gómez., *La Guerra Civil en Córdoba*, p. 695.
 72. Moreno Gómez, *La Guerra Civil en Córdoba*, p. 694.
 73. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 94.
 74. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 52.
 75. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 56.
 76. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, pp 161–162.
 77. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 163.
 78. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 167.
 79. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 165.
 80. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, pp. 252–253.
 81. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 287. These figures are not untypical of other regions in the south of Spain captured at the end of the war. Luis Miguel Sánchez Tostado found that in the province of Jaén similar-sized towns and villages such as Andújar and Mancha Real suffered ninety-three and twenty-eight executions, respectively. For Andújar Sánchez Tostado estimates that a total of 295 people were probably killed in various ways by Francoist forces. Luis Miguel Sánchez Tostado, *Víctimas. Jaén en guerra (1936–1950)*, (Jaén: Ayuntamiento de Jaén, 2005), pp. 558–559.
 82. For the story of Spanish exiles in Mauthausen see David Wingeate Pike, *Espanoles en el Holocausto. Vida y muerte de los republicanos en Mauthausen*, (Barcelona: Mondadori, 2003).
 83. Morneo Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, pp. 316–322.
 84. AMP, assorted correspondence.Caja Guerra Civil.
 85. See Àngela Cenarro, 'The Institutionalisation of Franco's Penitentiary Universe', in Museu d'Història de Catalunya, *Les Presons de Franco*, (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2004), pp. 291–304.

86. For a discussion of the purges at a national level see Francisco Morente Valero, *La escuela y el Estado Nuevo. La depuración del magisterio nacional (1936–1943)*, (Valladolid: Ámbito Ediciones, 1997); Ramón Jiménez Madrid, *La depuración de maestros en Murcia 1939–1942 (primeros papales)*, (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1998), especially p. 38.
87. For this tribunal see Mir, *Vivir es Sobrevivir* and Sánchez Recio, *Las responsabilidades políticas*; Julius Ruiz, *Justicia Al Revés. The Francoist Repressions in Madrid After the Civil War*, (D. Phil, Oxford, 2001).
88. Archivo Histórico Provincial de Córdoba (AHPC), LPR, Cajas 1–13.
89. *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, (BOE) 62, 2-3-1940.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. Falange announcement *Diario de Mataró* 9/2/1939. Cited in Solé i Sabaté and Villaroya i Font, *L'Ocupació militar de Catalunya*, p. 61.
2. Franco speaking in Málaga, *The Times*, 21/4/1939.
3. From the military code of justice. José María Dávila y Hugnet, *Código de justicia militar con notas aclaratorias, formularios. Obra declarada de utilidad para el ejército, por Orden de 26 de agosto de 1938* (Burgos: Aldecoa, 1938), p. 201.
4. García de Consuegra, López López and López López, *La represión en Pozoblanco*, p. 79; Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 41.
5. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 48.
6. Ros Agudo, *La guerra secreta de Franco*, p. 181.
7. A copy of the agreement in TNA: PRO, FO 371/49577/Z12191/89/41.
8. Hughes, *Report from Spain*, p. 130.
9. Comissió de la Dignitat, *The Archives Franco Stole from Catalonia*, pp. 15–23.
10. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 48; Sworn testimony of L.R. 8/11/1979 and J.P.G. 9/1/1979. Archivo Municipal de Torrecampo (AMT), Caja Secretaria Comparecencias.
11. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 49. This technique is found in other parts of Spain. In Málaga the Civil Guard waited with local citizens eager to denounce those returning home. Prieto Borrego and Barranquero Texeira, *Población y Guerra Civil en Málaga*, pp. 315–317, p. 325.
12. Example ATMSS 268, 10979.
13. Prieto Borrego and Barranquero Texeira, *Población y Guerra Civil en Málaga*, p. 312.
14. Sworn testimony of Francisco López Romero, 10/10/1980. AMT, Caja Secretaria Comparecencias.
15. Espinosa Maestre, 'Julio de 1936', p. 102.
16. *Time Magazine*, 10/4/1939.
17. *ABC, Madrid*, 1/4/1939.
18. AMP, assorted correspondence. Letter 14 July 1939 from Juez Militar.
19. AMP, assorted correspondence.
20. Conxita Mir found that 5% of the population was investigated, Mir, 'La repression franquista en la Cataluña rural', in Julián Casanova, (Ed.), *Morir, matar, sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 2002), p. 184. Manuel Ortiz found that 9.2% were investigated; Ortiz, *Violencia política*, p. 369. These studies were based on trial records alone.
21. AMP assorted correspondence.

22. Encarna Nicolás Marín, *La libertad encadenada. España en la dictadura franquista 1939–1975*, (Madrid: Alianza, 2005), p. 71.
23. Sanz Alberola, *La implantación del franquismo en Alicante*, pp. 37–38.
24. ATMSS, 17825, 491.
25. ATMSS, 1147, 29619. Falangists often wrote in pencil, not ink, on cheap scraps of paper. See AMP, assorted correspondence.
26. Cited in Gil, *La noche de los generales*, p. 38; Sabin, 'Control y represión', p. 25.
27. A man imprisoned by a post-war military tribunal wrote in his memoir that his military 'defence' lawyer informed him that his prospects were improved by the fact that no one had registered a denunciation against him. De Guzmán, *Nosotros los asesinos*, p. 240. Examples in ATMSS 990, 26806 and in ATMSS, 1238, 31360.
28. ATMSS, 1598, 20,598. For another man placed into a labour battalion although he was found not guilty see ATMSS, 361, 14102.
29. AHN-S, TERMC, T. 19539, 3987, 327 C 46. See also AHPC, LRP, 9, 24, 1944. In Nazi Germany the SS also failed to make denunciation a duty. Vandana Joshi, *Gender and Power in the Third Reich. Female Denouncers and the Gestapo (1933–1945)*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 171.
30. See *The Times* 5/4/1939 and *The Manchester Guardian* 31/3/1939.
31. José María Aroca Sardagna, *Los Republicanos que no se exilaron*, (Barcelona: Ediciones Acervo, 1969), p. 42.
32. Imperial War Museum, London, 78/2/1. Diary of Miss M. B. McDiarmuid, Folio 10.
33. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Presidencia, 51/20548 Folio 42.
34. Davila y Hugnet, *Código de justicia militar*, 201.
35. B.O.E. 5/9/1941.
36. Rodríguez Gutiérrez, *El último preso*, p. 60; De Guzmán, *Nosotros los asesinos*, p. 286.
37. *El País*, 02/06/08.
38. B.O.E. 5/9/1941.
39. Rodríguez Chaos, *24 Años en la cárcel*, p. 41; De Guzmán, *Nosotros los asesinos*, p. 270.
40. Robert Gellately, 'Situating the "SS-State" in a Social-Historical Context: Recent Histories of the SS, the Police, and the Courts in the Third Reich', *The Journal of Modern History*, 64, 2, (1992), p. 345.
41. Solé i Sabaté, *La repressió franquista*, p. 72; Font i Agulló, *¡Arriba el Campo!*, p. 120.
42. *The Times* 21/4/1939. For Barcelona see *La Vanguardia Española*, 5/3/1939. Cited in Solé i Sabaté and Villaroya i Font, *L'Ocupació militar de Catalunya*, pp. 54–55. On the power of the denunciation system in occupied Santander see *The Sunday Times*, 17/10/1937.
43. BOE, 27/8/1939.
44. BOE, 27/8/1939. This provision was later extended to all those who proved that they had been forced to work with the hated Republic. BOE, 27/10/1939.
45. AGA, Presidencia 51/20528, folio 23, 21/12/1939.
46. BOE, 22/12/1940 for the special award of 10,000 pesetas for life to such a widow.
47. José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, *Historia de Falange Española de las Jons*, (Madrid: Alianza, 2000), p. 392.
48. Rodríguez Jiménez, *Historia de Falange*, p. 391.
49. Ruiz Vilaplana, *Burgos Justice*, pp. 141–142. For Civil War mobilisation and polarisation see Stathis Kalyva, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 88–105.

50. *Azul*, 3/1/1940. This was also the meaning of the declaration made on *Radio Nacional* in Burgos in March 1939, as the Francoist victory approached, that it would be the hundreds of thousands of Francoist dead who would rule Spain in the future. *Azul*, 28/3/1939.
51. AMT, Caja Secretario Falange. The letter is dated 11 May 1940.
52. For example, ATMSS, 699, 20571; AHPC, LPR, 6, 358 1943; AHPC, LPR, 10, 44 1942.
53. For example, AHPC, SJ, APC, Civil, 1941, 232 and AHPC, SJ, APC, Civil, 1941, 232.
54. For example, AHPC, SJ, APC, Civil, 1939, 227 and AHPC, SJ, APC, Civil, 1940, 229.
55. AHPC, SJ, APC, Civil, 1940 229 and 1941 232. Her denunciations in ATMSS, 990, 26086. ATMSS, 1210, 26717.
56. The records are catalogued by name only, and I took the names from the sentences I read first in the TPR files. However, the chance survival of files determined which cases I studied. There were many files I could not study because they were not complete or had been transferred to archives across Spain. In addition, many had been ruined by floodwater or gnawed beyond use by rats.
57. Example in ATMSS, 219, 3734.
58. Example in ATMSS, 565, 18857.
59. Nicolás Marín, *La libertad encadenada*, p. 71.
60. For example, Tejedor, *Those Long Years Ago*, p. 145. Also Rodríguez Gutiérrez, *El último preso*, p. 82; Solé i Sabaté and Villaroya i Font, *La repressió franquista*, p. 71.
61. On the way local state officials in the Soviet Union exercised heavy influence over sentences imposed during the Great Terror see Peter Solomon, 'Soviet Criminal Justice and the Great Terror', *Slavic Review*, 46, 3/4, (1987), 391–413.
62. ATMSS, 660, 20758.
63. AHN-M., CG, 1044, 2.
64. AMP, Assorted Correspondence. Examples include reports on R.E. and A.A.
65. Example in ATMSS, 1143, 138.
66. Examples in ATMSS, 759, 22383, 735, 21998.
67. There are many examples of this. For example, in Alcaracejos in 1939 three important Falangists were twenty-seven, thirty-four and thirty. From Pedroche two Falangists were twenty-two and twenty-three.
68. Miguel Ángel del Arco Blanco, *Hambre de Siglos. Mundo rural y apoyos sociales del franquismo en Andalucía oriental (1936–1951)*, (Granada: Comares, 2007), pp. 63–85.
69. AHN-M., CG, 1044, Torrecampo Declaraciones. Antonio Leal Márquez., *La comarca de Pedroches (Córdoba) al comienzo de la guerra civil española (1936)*, (Madrid: Cedeco, 1985) p. 22.
70. AMT, Caja Falange Certificado 6-2-1970. One of the Falangist brothers was a smallholder and the other a major landowner. AMT, Caja Falange. List of the Fallen. The brothers had taken refuge in the house of their brother-in-law when militia forces retook the village. All three men were taken from the house and executed. Antonio Leal Márquez, *La comarca de Pedroches (Córdoba) al comienzo de la guerra civil española (1936)*, (Madrid: Cedeco, 1985), pp. 22–24.
71. AMT, Caja Falange.
72. ATMSS, 1288, 31205, ATMSS 320, 12968; AHN-M, CG 1044, 1.
73. AHPC, LRP, 11, 62 1943.
74. AMP, Caja Guerra Civil list of the imprisoned freed by the army. AHN-M, 1044, 1, list of the imprisoned.

75. Interview with A.M., Pedroche, 2/7/2004. ATMSS 258 10678.
76. ATMSS, 1238, 31360.
77. Interview with A.M. Pedroche, 2/7/2004.
78. The term specialists in Francisco Moreno Gómez, 'La Guerra Civil en Córdoba', in *La Guerra desde la Paz. Seminario sobre la Guerra Civil, Córdoba, 23–26 de abril de 1986*, (Córdoba: Diputación Provincial, 1988), p. 72.
79. An example in ATMSS, 269, 10990.
80. In the proceedings the judge admonished the widow for also changing her account of events in order to try and secure a conviction. ATMSS, 990, 26086.
81. Examples in ATMSS, 650, 20954 and ATMSS, 507, 17659.
82. ATMSS, 1210, 30883.
83. This pattern is echoed across Spain. Miguel García, an anarchist from Barcelona, managed to avoid detection until May 1939 when a woman from Madrid denounced him to the authorities. Miguel García, *Franco's Prisoner*, (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1972), p. 24.
84. Example in ATMSS, 507, 17569.
85. Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately, 'Introduction to the Practices of Denunciation', p. 747.
86. ATMSS, 590, 19384.
87. ATMSS, 1162, 2935. Similar demands for 'justice' in ATMSS, 636, 20329 and ATMSS, 269, 1090.
88. A.M. states that her mother felt capital punishment was deserved. Interview A.M., Pedroche, 2/7/2004.
89. ATMSS 11128864 267 10928.
90. Examples in ATMSS, 990, 26086, ATMSS, 1063, 27633, ATMSS, 912, 24894.
91. ATMSS, 825, 23538. In Dos Torres thirty-four landholders, eighteen Falangists, sixteen professionals, two students and two priests had been killed in August 1936. Local leaders had tried to prevent the violence. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 605.
92. Robert Gellately, 'The Gestapo and German Society: Political Denunciation in the Gestapo Case Files', *The Journal of Modern History*, 60, 4, (1998), p. 665.
93. Eric Johnson, *The Nazi Terror. Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans*, (London: John Murray, 1999), p. 354.
94. Examples in ATMSS, 552, 11264, 663, 20797.
95. Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo, and German Society. Enforcing Racial Policy 1933–1945*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 161.
96. Robert Gellately, 'Denunciations in Twentieth-Century Germany', p. 939.
97. Robert Gellately, 'Denunciation in Twentieth-Century Germany', p. 942.
98. Eric Johnson, 'German Women and Nazi Justice: Their Role in the Process from Denunciation to Death', *Historical Social Research*, 20, (1995), pp. 42–45.
99. Ángela Cenarro, 'Matar, vigilar y delatar: la quiebra de la sociedad civil durante la guerra y la posguerra en España (1936–1948)', *Historia Social*, 44, 3, (2002), p. 82.
100. Gellately, 'Denunciation in Twentieth-Century Germany', p. 945.
101. Gellately, 'Denunciation in Twentieth-Century Germany', p. 949.
102. Examples in ATMSS 4311 1939, ATMSS, 590 19384, ATMSS 316 12806.
103. For example, ATMSS, 699, 20571. Conxita Mir argues that denunciation shows how Francoist power seeped into private life. Mir, *Vivir es sobrevivir*, p. 271. But many of the denunciations I studied showed how highly politicised 'private' grief flowed upwards into Francoist repressive institutions.
104. For example, ATMSS, 1073, 27863.

105. Examples in AHPC, SJ, APC, Libro de Sentencia 180, Juzgado de Pozoblanco, Summario 66, Año 1946; AHPC, LRP, 12, 75, 1944. One Falangist frequently gave information about people he claimed had tried to hunt him down personally. An example in AMP, informe on A.A. 16/1/1940. His testimony in ATMSS, 320, 12968 and ATMSS, 1063, 27633.
106. It is not always clear if denouncers were members of the Falange. In some cases membership is clearly stated. In other cases, I have established membership by cross-checking with other sources but it has not been possible to establish a definitive Falange membership list.
107. Examples in ATMSS, 4806, 20731, ATMSS, 636, 20329.
108. Examples in ATMSS, 4211, 1939, ATMSS 1162, 29933. This was also a characteristic of Falange reports, an example in ATMSS 1148, 7079.
109. ATMSS, 553, 4515.
110. Examples in ATMSS, 638, 20383, ATMSS, 650, 20594, ATMSS 268, 10979.
111. Conxita Mir argues that grief led the bereaved to collaborate in the Francoist repression. Mir, *Vivir es sobrevivir*, p. 271. As I have shown, the bereaved often came from already highly politicised families who had supported the rebellion. Denunciation offered a means of continuing political conflict, but was frequently understood as an act for justice and as a way of honouring the memory of the dead.
112. Examples in ATMSS, 268, 1079; ATMSS, 198, 3456; ATMSS, 4806, 20731.
113. Examples in ATMSS, 519, 17942; ATMSS, 1217, 30989; ATMSS, 1290, 32013.
114. TMSS 1065, 27653.
115. ATMSS 1216, 30977.
116. ATMSS 482, 170111.
117. There are many cases of local political leaders protecting rightists and giving orders that no one should be killed. Example in ATMSS 825, 23538. See also the memoir of the Pozoblanco socialist leader Mascaraque, *Memorias de un miliciano*. There are also many cases of local leftist activists stopping the arrest of certain rightists. An example in ATMSS, 912, 24894. In Pozoblanco the regular army managed to prevent some of the militia killings. Example in ATMSS, 482, 17011. In other cases in Pozoblanco militiamen from outside the area were said to have prevented local people from carrying out killings. Example in ATMSS, 1162, 2935.
118. Examples in ATMSS, 268, 10979, ATMSS, 205, 3551, ATMSS, 111, 4514.
119. Examples in ATMSS, 507, 17659 and ATMSS, 327, 13212.
120. On the need for information in the mourning process see Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 36–44.
121. For example, ATMSS, 1210, 2617. AHN-M., CG, 1044. AMP, informes. In studies of Nazi Germany, Gisela Diewald-Kerman found women were responsible of 11% of denunciations, Eric Johnson found 17% of denunciations were made by women, Vandana Joshi found that 37.5% of denunciations were made by women. Cited in Joshi, *Gender and Power in the Third Reich*, p. 171.
122. Temma Kaplan., 'Redressing the Balance: Gendered Acts of Justice around the Mining Community of Rio Tinto in 1913', in Pamela Beth Radcliff, (Ed.), *Constructing Spanish Womanhood. Female Identity in Modern Spain*, (Albany: University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 283–299.
123. Manuel Moreno Valero, *La vida tradicional en los Pedroches*, (Córdoba: Manuel Moreno Valero, 2001), pp. 85–93.
124. ATMSS, 507, 17659.

125. Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, 'Dictatorship from Below: Local Politics in Making the Francoist State, 1937–1948', *The Journal of Modern History*, 71, 4, (1999), p. 885.
126. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20548.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

1. ATMSS, 1143, 29560.
2. ATMSS, 205, 3551.
3. Gil, *La noche de los generales*, p. 54.
4. *The Manchester Guardian*, 4/4/1939.
5. Espinosa Maestre, 'Julio de 1936', p. 102.
6. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 18.
7. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 57; Gil, *La noche de los generales*, p. 107.
8. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 55; Gil, *La noche de los generales*, pp. 129–130.
9. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 83.
10. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 123.
11. Vega Sombriá, *De la esperanza a la persecución*, p. 132.
12. This can often be so in Civil War situations; see Kalyva, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, p. 183.
13. As we have already seen, in Pedroche the incomplete municipal records show that the mayor alone received at least 743 different requests for information. AMP correspondence.
14. For example many of the reports held in AMP lodged by the Civil Guard and the Falange are identical.
15. ATMSS, 638, 20383; 637, 20361; 1197, 30669; 759, 22383. Cf. the Nazi case. Gellately observes that many Gestapo reports were vague and started with statements such as 'it has been discovered that', Gellately, 'Denunciations in Twentieth-Century Germany', p. 935.
16. ATMSS, 238, 31360.
17. Examples in AMP, Caja Guerra Civil, AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1; AHPC, LRP, 7, 282 1943.
18. ATMSS, 316, 12806. Similar examples in ATMSS, 4211, 1939, ATMSS, 590, 19384, AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1, Estado 3 Pedroche, ATMSS, 912, 24894.
19. There are many examples of these requests in AMP, assorted correspondence.
20. For a discussion of this regulation, see Pilar de la Granja, *Represión durante la Guerra Civil y la posguerra en la provincia de Zamora. De los consejos de guerra a la Tribunal de Responsabilidades Políticas en el partido judicial de Puebla de Sanabria (1936–1945)*, (Zamora: Instituto de Estudios Zamoranos Forián de Ocampo, 2002), pp. 71–72. In some cases, those who had provided testimony were called to the trial to give evidence in person. But most testimony was collected before the trial.
21. Templewood Papers, XIII, 25, 2/10/1945, 'La administración de la Justicia bajo el actual regimen', p. 2.
22. An example in ATMSS, 205, 3551.
23. For the deception that the rule of law was being followed in army trials held during the Nazi period in Germany see Stephen Welch, 'Harsh but Just? German Military Justice in the Second World War: A comparative study of the Court Martialling of German and US Deserters', in *German History*, 17, 3, (1999), p. 382.

24. For a discussion of the Nazi justice system see Hannsjoachim Wolfgang Koch, *In the Name of the Volk. Political Justice in Hitler's Germany*, (London: I. B.Tauris and Co., 1989) and Ingo Muller, *Hitler's Justice. The Courts of the Third Reich*, (London: I. B.Tauris and Co., 1991).
25. Johnson, 'German Women and Nazi Justice', pp. 47–48.
26. There were an average of four testimonials in Alcaracejos in 1942 and fourteen in 1943.
27. An example of this argument in Ruiz, *Justicia al Revés*, p. vii.
28. There are many more examples. Falangists from Villanueva de Córdoba also testified in thirteen of the fourteen cases I studied from this small town.
29. AHN-M., CG, 1044, 1. AMT, Caja Falange.
30. Similarly another witness gave testimony in 33% of the cases I studied for the village. Many of those who testified were not shedding their political virginity as Julián Casanova has argued in the case of denouncers. Casanova, 'Una dictadura', p. 32. For instance, Another witness from Torrecampo, who was the widow of a local *cacique*, had herself been head of the Ceda in the village in the pre-war period. For her testimony AHN-M., CG, 1044, 1, Torrecampo Declaraciones. As head of Ceda, Leal, *La comarca*, p. 62. These examples support Ángela Cenarro's argument that those from the CEDA and the Falange collaborated with the regime in consolidating its power. Ángela Cenarro., 'Elite, Party, Church. Pillars of the Francoist "New State" in Aragón, 1936–1945', *European History Quarterly*, 28, 4, (1998), p. 470.
31. ATMSS, 990, 26086. ATMSS, 912, 24894.
32. Eduardo Sevilla-Guzmán, *La evolución del campesinado en España. Elementos para una sociología política del campesinado*, (Barcelona: Península, 1979), pp. 133–135.
33. Examples in letters 5/1/1940, 13/8/1941 and 22/8/1942.
34. AMP, assorted correspondence. The letter is dated 5/1/1940. Similarly, in a case from Alcaracejos of a member of the Spanish Socialist Party accused of 'blood crimes', the judges demanded direct eyewitnesses rather than the vague assertions based on rumour, which the local judge had felt fit to pass on. ATMSS, 1197, 30664.
35. ATMSS, 1063, 27633.
36. ATMSS, 912, 24894. AHN-M, CG, 1044.
37. AMP, report on M.C. 17/8/1940. ATMSS, 825, 23538 for his blatant and rather proud admission of having killed the socialist.
38. AHN-M, CG, 1044.
39. ATMSS, 912, 24894.
40. www.pedrocheenlared.com/pedroc09.htm.
41. AHN-Madrid, CG, 1044. ATMSS, 735, 21998. ATMSS, 1162, 29933.
42. One was jailed in 1937 at the age of eighteen for his support for the Falange. ATMSS, 1148, 7079.
43. In 1939 three Falangist testifiers from Alcaracejos were twenty-seven, thirty-four and thirty. From Pedroche four Falangist testifiers were twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-six and twenty-five.
44. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, pp. 47–48. Examples of testimony in ATMSS, 1143, 29560, ATMSS 4806, 20731, ATMSS 219, 3734.
45. Moreno Gómez, *La República*, p. 48 and pp. 138–139; AHN-M., CG, 1044, Caja 1.
46. ATMSS, 990, 26086.
47. Examples in ATMSS, 205, 3551 and ATMSS, 507, 17659.
48. An example in ATMSS, 268, 27.018/39.
49. Examples in ATMSS, 2139, 9978 and ATMSS, 268, 10979.
50. Examples in ATMSS, 219, 3734; ATMSS, 565, 18857.

51. This was the commonest way of referring to these confiscations and is characteristic of nearly all the cases I studied. Examples in ATMSS, 1228, 31205, ATMSS, 258, 10, 678, ATMSS, 641, 20429.
52. In fact, local leaders often tried to use guards to re-establish order following the collapse of the state rather than to carry out killings. An order by the Torrecampo mayor made in August 1936 stated that any guards who abused their authority would be punished. Guards were instructed to act with respect and propriety towards others. Their main duties were to prevent theft, pillage and armed revolt. AMT, mayor's proclamation dated 31 August 1936.
53. ATMSS, 1109, 28, 824.
54. Examples in ATMSS, 825, 23538, ATMSS, 590, 19384, ATMSS, 990, 26086.
55. Frequently assertions were made about people who had carried out 'thefts' while the witness was in prison. An example in ATMSS, 641, 20429.
56. Examples in ATMSS, 1142, 29560, ATMSS, 1210, 30883. On post-war desires to re-establish traditional hierarchies see Joan Scott, 'Rewriting History', in Margaret Higonnet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel, Margaret Collins, (Eds.), *Behind the Lines. Gender and the Two World Wars*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 27.
57. Employees had sometimes collectivised their former employers' businesses on the orders of the local Republican authorities.
58. ATMSS, 507, 17569.
59. ATMSS, 660, 20758.
60. Examples in ATMSS, 636, 20329 and ATMSS, 114, 29578.
61. One Francoist from the Pozoblanco area wrote tellingly in his memoirs that Francoists *learned through rumours* who was responsible for killings in the towns and villages of the region during the Civil War. Leal, *La comarca*, p. 121.
62. On the role of rumour in reinforcing group identity see James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 142–143. On gossip see Melanie Tebutt, *Women's Talk? A Social History of Gossip in Working-Class Neighbourhoods, 1880–1900*, (Aldershot, UK: Scholar Press, 1995) and David Gilmore, *Aggression and Community. Paradoxes of Andalusian Culture*, (London: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 28–35.
63. ATMSS, 1143, 29560. Michael Richards points out that many charges brought by the military tribunals were presented in terms of morality. Michael Richards, 'Morality and Biology in the Spanish Civil War: Psychiatrists, Revolution and Women Prisoners in Málaga', *Contemporary European History*, 10, 3, (2001), p. 397.
64. Examples include AMP, Caja Guerra Civil. Reports on E.L. and J.R. The mayor of Pedroche reported that a leader of the village Communist Party, was the 'instigator of everything bad'. ATMSS, 4211, 1939.
65. An example in the report on E.L, AMP, Caja Guerra Civil.
66. AHN-M, CG, 1044, Caja 1, Torrecampo Declaraciones.
67. Examples in ATMSS, 205, 3551, ATMSS, 641, 20429, ATMSS, 660, 20758.
68. ATMSS, 1241, 31411. Further examples in ATMSS, 1065, 27653, ATMSS, 2139, 9978.
69. AHPC, LRP, 4, 288 1943. Other examples include, ATMSS, 553, 4515.
70. ATMSS, 1,330, 32884. In the case of a socialist from Pedroche, six people testified that they had heard rumours of his boasts of being involved in the killing of the local priest. ATMSS, 660, 20758.

71. Similarly, in her study of denunciation in Nazi Germany Vandana Joshi found that gossip was used 'literally to assassinate' Jewish people. Gossip was elevated to the level of the state when reported to the Gestapo, Joshi, *Gender and Power in the Third Reich*, pp. 118–119.
72. ATMSS, 205, 3551.
73. ATMSS, 341, 13563.
74. ATMSS, 650, 20594. Similar examples in ATMSS 1073, 27863; ATMSS 650, 20,594.
75. ATMSS, 638, 20383; ATMSS, 1148, 7079 and ATMSS, 519, 17942.
76. ATMSS, 267, 10928.
77. My figure for petitions, however, includes a single petition in favour of one man signed by 106 people.
78. Memoir material suggests that the relative safe position of Falangists made it easier for them to defend reviled Republicans than Francoists who were not members of the party. Rodríguez, *El último preso*, p. 80.
79. ATMSS, 825, 23538.
80. ATMSS, 553, 4515.
81. ATMSS, 327, 13212. Other examples in ATMSS, 1046, 27,207, ATMSS, 1217, 30989.
82. ATMSS, 638, 20383. Other examples in ATMSS, 1148, 7079 and ATMSS, 519, 17942.
83. ATMSS, 636, 20329.
84. ATMSS, 219, 3734. Similarly, a Francoist from Pedroche stated that a UGT member who stood accused of 'thefts' had saved his life. ATMSS, 641, 20429. A municipal policeman from Pozoblanco accused of doing nothing to prevent mob killings was said by the very brother of the man who denounced the policemen to be a good person who had saved his life. ATMSS, 111 28864, 10928.
85. ATMSS, 590, 19384. For a Falangist trying to free a man he believed to be falsely imprisoned see ATMSS, 114, 29578.
86. ATMSS, 552, 11264. Other examples of conservative sectors of society exposing the reductive versions of the past which were used in the trial system in ATMSS, 1231, ATMSS, 1162, 2935, ATMSS, 663, 20797.
87. Ángela Cenarro has noted the importance of these interventions. She sees the petitions of support as significant forms of collective resistance and points out that they have been insufficiently researched. Ángela Cenarro, 'La lógica de la guerra, la lógica de la venganza: Violencia y fractura en una comunidad Bajo Arogonesa, 1939–1940', *Enfrontaments civils. Postguerres i reconstruccions*, (Lledia: Recerqeus, 2002), p. 713.
88. On the wartime mobilisation of the Communist Party across class boundaries see Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War*, pp. 183–184. A former court executive from Pozoblanco who had continued working for the Republican authorities during the Civil War received over fifty signatures in his support. ATMSS, 198, 3456. By contrast, less well-connected Republicans often received just one or two signatures in support. Examples in ATMSS, 205, 3551 and ATMSS, 113, 29566.
89. ATMSS, 269, 10990.
90. ATMSS, 219, 3734.
91. ATMSS, 825, 23538. In her study of a village in Aragón, Ángela Cenarro found that women signed many of the petitions. In the cases I studied, however, this tended not to be the case. Men placed on trial tended to draw on the support of fellow workers or neighbours. Nevertheless, in the cases of women placed on trial there was a tendency for the accused to enjoy the support of their female neighbours with whom they had developed close bonds

over the years. Cenarro, 'La lógica de la guerra', p. 713. Examples in ATMSS, 111, 4514. ATMSS, 1046, 27,207. ATMSS, 903, 2762.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

1. From the sentence of a man from Alcaracejos sentenced to death. ATMSS, 1197, 30664.
2. Archivo Gomá, *Documentos de la Guerra Civil*, Edición de José Andrés-Gallego and Antón M. Pazos, 5: abril-mayo de 1937, (Madrid: Consejos Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2003), Letter 22 April 1937, p. 216.
3. Arenillas de Chaves, *El Proceso de Besteiro*, p. 250; Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, pp. 14–15.
4. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/ 22615/ W 16196.
5. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 175. See also BOE 26/1/1940.
6. Ignacio Berdugo Gómez, 'Derecho represivo en España durante los periodos de guerra y posguerra (1936–1945)', *Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Complutense*, 3, (1980), pp. 122–125. See also Lanero, *Una milicia de la justicia*, p. 320.
7. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 57, Gil, *La noche de los generales*, p. 107.
8. Fernández Asiain, *El delito de rebelión militar*, p. 83 and p. 123.
9. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 85.
10. BOE 6/2/1940.
11. Historians have offered two major explanations for the growing use of parole. José Sabín argued that from 1943 the regime felt the Allies were likely to win the Second World War and sought to curry their favour by 'white-washing' the repression. Sabín, *Prisión y muerte*, p. 21. Julius Ruiz argues that the easing of the repression began at the height of the German victories and that the real explanation for the mass paroles was the inability of the regime to cope with the scale of the task the authorities had set themselves. Ruiz, *Justicia al Revés*, pp. 288–299.
12. Julián Casanova, *La iglesia de Franco*, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2001), p. 43.
13. Templewood Papers XIII File 27. Memorandum by Bernard Malley: Survey of the Church in Spain and its Attitude towards the Regime, folio 7.
14. TNA: PRO, FO, 371, 23168, C 18778/13481/41, C19131/13481/41, C19312.
15. Preston, *Franco*, pp. 449–450.
16. Dionisio Ridruejo, *Escrito en España*, (Madrid: G. del Toro, 1976), p. 119.
17. Richard Wigg, *Churchill and Spain. The Survival of the Franco Regime, 1940–1945*, (Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), p. 56.
18. TNA:PRO FO 371, 24508 C10141.
19. TNA: PRO, FO 371/342834 C8259.
20. Templewood Papers, XIII, File 7 Telegram of 12 Dec. 1944.
21. TNA: PRO, FO 371/49575/ Z 48754.
22. BOE 11/1/1940.
23. TNA, PRO, 371/ C 2256/ C 1117/4.
24. Sabín, *Prisión y muerte*, pp. 207–209.
25. An example of person released because the length of his sentence automatically rendered him eligible for parole comes from Dos Torres. The man stood accused of membership of the political committee running the village in the

- Civil War was sentenced in December 1941 to twelve years. He was thus let free. ATMSS, 321, 13021.
26. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, pp. 85–96.
 27. For the contrary see Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 89.
 28. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/24524/C 2256.
 29. BOE, 26/1/1940, Appendix Group II and Group I.
 30. Tejedor, *Those Years Long Ago*, p. 227.
 31. Welch, 'Harsh but Just?', p. 382.
 32. On the gradual Nazification of German military judges see Welch, 'Harsh but Just?'.
 33. The military academy in Zaragoza taught the values of patriotism and sacrifice. The instructors were brutalised army officers who had served in Morocco. They were selected on the basis of their ideological fervour. See Preston, *Franco*, p. 59. For a statement by a military judicial official in 1939 that the courts had to 'disinfect' Spain see, Epinosa, *La justicia de Queipo*, p. 297.
 34. Nerín, *La guerra que vino de África*, p. 252.
 35. Example in Cifuentes and Maluenda, 'De las urnas a los cuarteles', p. 44.
 36. Lanero, *Una milicia de la justicia*, pp. 361–365.
 37. Templewood Papers, XIII, File 25, *Notas sobre la Justicia*, with letter 20/2/1945. Similar point in Ruiz Vilaplana, *Burgos Justice*, p. 158.
 38. AHN-M, CG, 1060 (1) Pieza Cuarta and Pieza Quinta.
 39. Similar cases in Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 95; Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 64. In any case, under a decree of September 1939 any judge considered unreliable could be dismissed. Sabín, *Prisión y muerte*, p. 28.
 40. Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 95.
 41. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 64. In any case, under a decree of September 1939 any judge considered unreliable could be dismissed. Sabín, *Prisión y muerte*, p. 28.
 42. Francisco Moreno Gómez, 'La represión en la posguerra', in Santos Juliá, (Ed.), *Víctimas de la guerra civil*, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999), p. 318.
 43. Moreno Gómez, 'La represión', p. 333. Judges' decisions were also reviewed by the central authorities. Franco himself commuted many sentences and confirmed many others. Franco infamously signed death sentences over coffee. See Preston, *Franco*, p. 227.
 44. AMP, letter 5/1/1940.
 45. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 101.
 46. BOE, 26/1/1940, Grupo I, 2 and 4.
 47. BOE, 26/1/1940, Grupo 1, 5 and 9.
 48. Gil, *La noche de los generales*.
 49. ATMSS 648, 20599. Further examples of citing denunciations and testimony as definitive proof in AHPC, LRP, 1, 06 1944. AHPC, LRP, 4, 36 1944. AHPC LRP, 1, 43 1942.
 50. Examples in AHPC, LRP, 2, 24 1943, AHPC, LRP, 2, 27899 1939 and AHPC, LRP, 2, 55 1943. My findings here cut against the argument made by Julius Ruiz that sentencing was not about punishing supporters of the Republic but about castigating all those who had remained in Republican territory. Ruiz, *Justicia al Reves*, p. v. But my findings do support the argument made by Julián Casanova that the Francoist repression depended upon the active collaboration of the Francoist support base. Casanova, 'Una dictadura', p. 32. They also bolster Ángela Cenarro's argument that collaboration was central to the Franco regime's consolidation of power. Ángela Cenarro, 'Elite, Party, Church', p. 464.
 51. BOE, 26/1/1940, Grupo 1, 9.

52. ATMSS, 650, 20594. Similar examples in ATMSS, 1073, 27863 and ATMSS, 650, 20,594.
53. On Fusset boasting to British diplomats about the ordered and just appeals process see TNA: PRO, FO 371 22614 W 15157.
54. Gil, *La noche de los generales*, pp. 118–119. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 102.
55. ATMSS, Legajo 4211, Núm. 1939. Mayors were sufficiently powerful for the wives of the condemned to sleep with them in order to win a reprieve for their husbands. Rodríguez, *El último preso*, p. 27; Moreno Gómez., *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 22. In a major challenge to the 'totalitarian' interpretation of the Stalinist terror, Peter Solomon has argued that local officials in the Soviet Union manipulated Soviet justice to their own ends. They ensured some people were prosecuted, protected others from prosecution, recommended sentences to judges and sometimes had cases retried when they were unhappy with the verdict. Peter Solomon, 'Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922–1941', in *Soviet Studies*, 37, 3, (1985), pp. 305–329.
56. BOE, 26/1/1940, Grupo I, 5.
57. ATMSS, 699, 20571. Other examples in ATMSS, 316, 12806 and ATMSS, 825, 23538.
58. ATMSS, 1073. 27863.
59. ATMSS, 4806, 20731. Further examples in AHPC, LRP, 9, 42, 1942, AHPC, LRP, 4, 287, 1943, AHPC, LRP, 11, 135, 1943.
60. Francisco Moreno, for instance, argues that denunciations and hostile testimony went unquestioned by the military courts. Moreno Gómez, 'La represión en la posguerra', p. 319.
61. ATMSS, 491, 17285. Similar example in ATMSS, 912, 24894.
62. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 111.
63. On the decline in punitive sentencing see Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 106.
64. ATMSS, 267, 10928.
65. BOE, 26/1/1940, Grupo I, 8.
66. ATMSS, 1162, 2993.
67. Francisco Moreno has pointed to the importance of mass participation when he stated that the first trials were held at the local level to ensure that people could 'gain vengeance'. Moreno Gómez 'La Guerra Civil en Córdoba' p. 66. Moreno is surely right to point out those seeking vengeance were more successful in achieving the death penalty in the first two years after the war. My findings suggest, however, that local Francoists if anything had a greater influence in the later trials. This was because, as I have argued, the amount of testimony tended to increase over time.
68. Examples in ATMSS, 1216, 30977, ATMSS, 1046, 27207.
69. Examples of people sentenced to twelve years for taking up arms in defence of the Second Republic in ATMSS, 735, 21998; ATMSS, 320, 12968; ATMSS, 120, 4692.
70. Examples in ATMSS, 1290, 32013; AHPC, LRP, 6, 95 1944; AHPC, LRP, 5, 5, 1943.
71. Examples in ATMSS, 491, 17285 and ATMSS, 912, 24894.
72. ATMSS, 90, 2762. Similarly, a cobbler from Dos Torres accused of rejoicing in the collectivisation of his former employer's shoe shop was sentenced to sixteen instead of twelve years. ATMSS, 507, 17659. Judges also cited testimony, and the names of those who had testified, when explaining sentences of thirty years. Examples in ATMSS, 198, 3456; ATMSS, 590, 19384 (in this case the sentence was twenty instead of twelve years), and ATMSS, 221, 9273.
73. Examples in ATMSS, 1260, 3734; ATMSS, 699, 20571; AHPC, LRP, 12, 94 1944.

74. This does not necessarily diminish the impact of these sentences because many of those sentenced to short terms died in prison. For example, ATMSS, 1065, 27653; AHPC, LRP, 4, 5 1944; AHPC, 4, 329 1943. Moreover, as I show subsequently, those released on parole suffered communal surveillance and punishment in the community.
75. Of course denying parole might not have been the intended outcome of the hostile witnesses, but achieving the harshest sentence possible was most likely their chief aim.
76. ATMSS, 1162, 2935. Similar case in ATMSS, 327, 13212.
77. An analysis of the sentences preserved in the records of the Tribunal for Political Responsibility for the judicial area of Pozoblanco gives an idea of the overall patterns of sentencing in my case study area. From the 463 remaining sentences, ninety-one people were sentenced to death, and forty-three of these people are known to have had their sentences commuted to thirty years. One hundred and sixty-three people were sentenced to thirty-year terms and seventy-seven people were sentenced to between fifteen and twenty years. Eighty-three people were sentenced to twelve years. Two people were sentenced to six years, and two people were freed.
78. Examples in ATMSS, 912, 24984; ATMSS, 552, 11264; ATMSS, 1290, 32013.
79. Examples in ATMSS, 1231, 31258 and ATMSS, 269, 10990.
80. Example in ATMSS, 198, 3456.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

1. ATMSS 925, 25104.
2. Francisco Franco, *Diario de una Bandera*, (Madrid: Afrodísio Augado, 1956; first published 1922), pp. 72–73, pp. 101–102, p. 129.
3. Nerín, *La guerra que vino de África*, pp. 240–241. This echoed German military thinking in the First World War. See Alan Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction. Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 31–33.
4. Qurioga, *Making Spaniards*, p. 61.
5. Aracil, *Dolor y triunfo*, pp. 302–303.
6. BOE, 13/2/1939.
7. BOE, 13/2/1939.
8. BOE, 13/2/1939.
9. BOE, 13/2/1939, p. 836.
10. Provincial bulletins reveal the scale of the fines. For example, in December 1940 the regional court in Seville imposed a fine of 100 pesetas (about one month's wages for a day labourer in full-time work of six days a week) on Matilde Medina from Belalcázar. As she was dead, her family was ordered to pay. *Bolín Oficial de la Provincia de Córdoba* (BOPC), 7/1/1941. Others were fined 200 pesetas and a few people up to 1,000 pesetas. Examples in BOPC 8/1/1941 and BOPC 18/6/1941.
11. BOE, 13/2/1939.
12. An example in BOPC, 15/8/1941.
13. BOPC 15/8/1941.
14. This position is argued in Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, pp. 153–162.
15. BOE, 7/3/1942, pp. 1646–1653.
16. Example in AHPC, LRP, 2, 58, 1943.
17. AHN-M, CG, 10444, 2, Justicia y Prensa, Folio, 7.649,837–7649, 839.

18. ATMSS, 198, 3456.
19. AMP, Caja Guerra Civil. The historian Conxita Mir has demonstrated that some priests, for instance, in their reports to the LRP authorities, were willing and active collaborators keen to see punishment imposed. Mir, *Vivir es sobrevivir*, p. 195.
20. Research in the civil courts shows that some of those fined by the TPR were forced to sell the family home. For instance, the widow of an executed Republican from Pozoblanco was saddled with a 5,000 peseta fine and was forced to sell the family farm. AAPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, Civil, Año 1942, 234.
21. BOE, 7/3/1942, p. 1648.
22. For instance, the widow of the president of the Socialist Party in Pozoblanco did not get the free use of her assets until 12 August 1949. AHPC, LRP, 6, 348, 1943.
23. Example in AHPC, LRP, 11, 30, 1943.
24. Examples in AHPC, LRP, 2, 58 1943; AHPC, LRP, 2, 55, 1943.
25. Example in AHPC, LRP, 10, 1, 1942.
26. Example, AHPC, 393, 1943.
27. Franco associated left-wing protest with freemasonry. He also felt freemasons were in league with Bolsheviks and Jews. Franco's obsession led him to build a collection of Masonic artefacts; see Preston, *Franco*, p. 12 and p. 324. On the hatred of freemasons in other far-right nationalist milieus see Alexander de Grand, *The Italian Nationalist Association and the Rise of Italian Fascism*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), pp. 43–44. On the fear of Masonry, Jews and communist revolution see Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred. The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia*, (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 37–39.
28. BOE, 2/3/1940, p. 1537.
29. Vinyes, *Irredentas*, p. 25.
30. Examples in Archivo Histórico Nacional–Salamanca (AHN-S), Tribunal Especial del Represión de Masonería y Comunismo, (TERMC) T. 19542, 3956, 330–C–1946 and in AMP, assorted correspondence, 28/4/1941, A.R.D.
31. A typical example in AHN-S, TERMC T. 19543, 3953–C–331–46. Prison officials could also forward sentences passed down by military tribunals. Examples in AHN-S, TERMC, T. 3838 476 C 46 and AHN-S, TERMC, T. 19345. Examples of reports being forwarded in AHN-S, TERMC, T. 19351 411 C 46, AHN-S, TERMC, T. 10074, 207 C 49.
32. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 207.
33. Examples of this collaboration with the TERMC authorities in AHN-S, TERMC, T. 19542, 3956, 330–C–1946 and AHN-S, TERMC, T. 19659, 353 C 46.
34. Templewood Papers, XIII, File 25, Report and Letter from Bernard Malley, 17 January 1946. Julius Ruiz argues that the Franco regime feared that prosecuting communists in both courts risked breaking the principle of double jeopardy. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 211.
35. Example in AMP, assorted correspondence. Request on A.R.
36. AHN-S, TERMC, 3860, 531–C–46.
37. AHN-S, TERMC, 19669, 353–C–46.
38. Details in Ánglea Cenarro, 'La institucionalización del universo penitenciario franquista', in Carme Molinero and Jaume Sobrequés, (Eds.), *Una inmensa prisión. Los campos de concentración y las prisiones durante la guerra civil y el franquismo*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003), pp. 137–138.

39. Ángela Cenarro has argued a similar point, although she did not examine the workings of these parole boards. See Ángela Cenarro, 'The Institutionalisation', p. 304, n. 26.
40. BOE, 6/6/1940.
41. BOE, 20/12/1943, p. 12062.
42. BOPC, 3/10/1944, p. 2.
43. BOPC, 3/10/1944, p. 2.
44. MP assorted correspondence.
45. Many examples in AMP assorted correspondence.
46. Records remain of prisoners who had been refused the right to live in their home village. For example, that of a leading female socialist activist. AMP, assorted correspondence. Letter 8/9/1943.
47. BOE, 29/11/1940. Similarly, in 1941 the law on denunciation was reformed in an effort to dam the vindictive energies of local Francoists. Denunciations had to be signed and then had to be ratified in twenty-four hours. No arrests could be made until the denunciation had been verified. Those who gave false testimony could be prosecuted in military courts. BOE, 5/9/1941, p. 6773.
48. Gonzalo Acosta Bono, *El Canal de los Presos (1940–1962). Texto imprso: trabajos forzados. De la represión política a la explotación económica*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), pp. 57–61.
49. The notion of redemption permeated the entire prison system. In 1943, for instance, prisoners who celebrated the saint's day of Our Lady of Mercy could redeem fifteen days of their sentence. Adela Alfonsi, *The Recatholisation of Málaga 1937–1966. Church and State in the Spanish Post-war*, (PhD, University of Adelaide, 1998) p. 48.
50. Vinyes, *Irredentas*, p. 197. Prisoners accused of particularly 'repugnant' crimes, however, were not permitted to reduce their sentences through labour. Some prisoners preferred being sent to do forced work to remaining in prison. Miguel Rodríguez, a prisoner forced to work on building the Valley of the Fallen, states that some prisoners were able to live with their families, they were served wine at meal time, they were paid 5 pesetas a day, they could reduce their sentence by up to a third and he could go for a walk at any time of night. Rodríguez, *Último preso*, pp. 125–128.
51. Acosta Bono, *El Canal de los Presos*, pp. 57–61.
52. AHN-M., L1044; ATMSS, 1143, 138. In the 1990s, this man claimed compensation for his suffering, but the authorities could not trace his prison record, they claimed, and so his application was turned down. AMP, *Memo-ria Histórica*.
53. AHN-S, TERMC, T 2167 139–C–46.
54. Examples in ATMSS, 641, 20429 and ATMSS, 1063, 27633.
55. BOE, 6/6/1940.
56. Acosta Bono, *El Canal de los Presos*, p. 63.
57. Example of a leading socialist from Pedroche who had a death sentence commuted and who was paroled in 1945 in ATMSS, 1162, 2993. For a case of a man sentenced in the first instance to thirty years, with not even a hint of a 'blood crime' still in a militarised colony in 1947 see ATMSS, 1065, 2763. For the argument that blood crimes were the most significant barrier to parole see Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 123.
58. Examples in ATMSS 825, 23538 and ATMSS 205, 3551.
59. A pre-war socialist leader of Pozoblanco council complained in his memoirs that a local powerful Francoist woman had used her influence with the local parole board to ensure that he was not given early release. Mascaraque, *Memorias de un miliciano*, p. 170.

60. ATMSS, 912, 24894. Broadly similar examples in ATMSS 825, 23538 and ATMSS, 1065, 2763.
61. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 122.
62. ATMSS 925, 25104.
63. The prison historian José Sabín argues that in 1943 25% of paroled prisoners were placed in internal exile. Sabín, *Prisión y muerte*, p. 209. An example from Málaga in Prieto Borrego and Barranquero Texeira, *Población y Guerra Civil en Málaga*, p. 319.
64. An example of a prisoner with a thirty-year sentence being banished in ATMSS 660, 20758. An example of twenty years in ATMSS, 1248, 31509 and twelve years in ATMSS, 641, 20429.
65. An example for 1943 in ATMSS 114, 29578, for 1945 ATMSS, 636, 20329, for 1946 ATMSS, 663, 20797.
66. Examples in AHN-S, TERMC, T 19543 3953-C-46; ATMSS, 1162, 29933 and ATMSS 1228, 31205.
67. Examples in ATMSS, 1216, 30977; ATMSS, 1241, 31411; ATMSS, 565, 18857.
68. ATMSS, 114, 29578.
69. ATMSS, 990, 26086. Similar examples in ATMSS, 641, 20429 and in ATMSS 759, 22383. However, there were some limits to the capacity of local Francoists to exile those they detested. The case of a member of the Young Socialists from Pedroche is instructive in this regard. He stood accused of forming part of the execution squad that had bungled its attempt to kill the head of the Falangist parole board in the village. The mayor had also called him a 'dog' in his report to the military tribunal. In March 1943 he was sentenced to thirty years in prison, and in 1945 he was put on parole and went to live in Córdoba. But by June 1946 he was once again living in Pedroche. ATMSS, 660, 20578. Similar example, in ATMSS, 636, 20329.
70. For instance, a PCE activist from Villaviciosa, had been released from Madrid Women's Prison after serving part of a 12 year jail term for political activity in Villanueva de Córdoba during the Civil War. She was placed in internal exile and began to work in a metal factory in Madrid on release from jail in December 1942. AHN-S, TERMC, 19345.
71. For an example of the link between the repression and forced migration in the 1940s see Acosta Bono, *El Canal de los Presos*, p. 285.
72. Ricard Vinyes argues that many women followed their husbands across Spain from prison to prison. Vinyes, *Irredentas*, p. 49.
73. ATMSS, 519, 17942.
74. Examples in ATMSS, 1248, 31509 and ATMSS, 219, 3734.
75. Example in ATMSS, 663, 20797.
76. Most lived in Córdoba. One lived in Villanueva de Córdoba, and one was in Burgos.
77. One person was in exile in Villaviciosa, another was living in Madrid, a further prisoner was in Córdoba and the last man was still serving in a labour battalion in 1947. Similarly, just three of the cases I studied for Alcaracejos preserve the fate of the prisoner on release. Only one was allowed back to Alcaracejos. Another was living in Córdoba, and the third was still in a labour battalion in 1947.
78. Preston, *The Politics of Revenge*, p. 46. This theme is developed in Michael Richards, 'Terror and Progress: Industrialisation, Modernity, and the Making of Francoism', in Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi, (Eds.), *Spanish Cultural Studies. An Introduction. The Struggle for Modernity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 173-182. For a characteristically strong condemnation of histories of Francoism which centre on development without

examining the repression see the interview with Julián Casanova in *El País*, 17/7/2006.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

1. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/459578/ Z 12972/89/44.
2. García, *Franco's Prisoner*, p. 23.
3. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/6041 Z 9651, Mallet to Cadogan, 12/11/1946.
4. Del Arco Blanco, *Hambre de Siglos*, p. 312.
5. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/28690, C 1199. Report 10/2/1941.
6. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/26891, C 9527/3/41. Hoare to Eden 19/8/1941.
7. Isaías Lafuente, *Tiempos de hambre. Viaje a la España de la posguerra*, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999), pp. 154–160.
8. Michael Richards, 'Constructing the Nationalist State: Self-Sufficiency and Regeneration in the Early Franco Years', in Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith, (Eds.), *Constructing the Nationalist State. Self-Sufficiency and Regeneration in the Early Franco Years*, (Oxford: Berg, 1996), pp. 149–167; Carlos Barciela, 'La España del «estraperlo»', in José Luis García Delgado, (Ed.), *El primer franquismo. España durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial*, (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1989), pp. 105–122. On the difficulties the black market presented to Republicans see Encarnación Barranquero Texeira, *Así sobrevivimos al hambre. Estrategias de supervivencia de las mujeres en la posguerra española*, (Malaga: Centro de Ediciones de la Diputación de Málaga, 2003).
9. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/26890 C 2208, Folio 74.
10. Falange report from Pozoblanco, AGA, Presidencia 51/20548.
11. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20528, Folio 50, 6/4/1940.
12. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20548, Folio 34.
13. AGA Presidencia, 51/20548, Folio 34. AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1941, Fuente Obejuna, Sentencia 29.
14. AGA, Presidencia, 51-20548, Folio 33, 25/01/1941.
15. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20528, Folio 120.
16. An example in AHPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, Penal, 290.
17. AAPC, Libro de Sentencias 1942, Fuente Obejuna, 38, AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1942. Similar example in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1942, Fuente Obejuna, 83.
18. Example in AAPC, Libro de Sentencias 1942, Fuente-Obejuna, Sentencia 145, Sumario 47, Año 1939.
19. Antonio Bernal, 'Resignación de los campesinos andaluces: La resistencia pasiva durante el franquismo', in Isidro Sánchez, Manuel Ortiz Heras and David Ruiz, *España franquista. Causa General y Actitudes Sociales ante la Dictadura*, (Albacete: Universidad de la Mancha, 1993), p. 152.
20. Examples in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1947, Fuente Obejuna, 60, Sumario 172, Año 1945, AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1942, Fuente Obejuna, Sentencia 224, Sumario 257, Año 1940.
21. AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1944, Pozoblanco, Sumario 72, Año, 1942.
22. As we have seen Ruiz argues the repression was wound down from the early 1940s. Ruiz, *Justicia al Revés*, p. ix. The experience of parole, however, was often very harsh.
23. ATMSS, 1147, 29619. See also Ricard Vinyes, 'The Prison Universe under the Franco Regime', in Museu d'Història de Catalunya, *Les Presons de Franco*, (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2004), p. 287.

24. Example in ATMSS, 1147, 29619.
25. Ángela Cenarro, 'Memory beyond the Public Sphere', p. 177.
26. Interview with M.N., Pedroche, 29/6/2004. Parole restriction also in ATMSS, 636, 20329.
27. TNA: PRO, FO 371/49578/ Z 12972/89/44.
28. AGA, Presidencia, 51-20638. There was an element of hypocrisy here because the Falange itself argued that paroled prisoners should be watched over with particular vigilance. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20528, Folio 61, 16/7/1940.
29. Examples in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1951, Sentencia 211, Pozoblanco, Sumario 66, Año 1950, AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1951, Sentencia 17, Pozoblanco, Sumario 33, Año 1946. Minor thefts led in both cases to five month sentences.
30. AHPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, Faltas, 366.
31. Example in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1943, Fuente Obejuna, Sentencia 37, Sumario 305, Año 1941.
32. AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1950, Pozoblanco, Sumario 33, 1946. His thirty-year sentence in AHPC, LRP, 2, 84 1944. The men stole the sheep from the sister of the man who had been mayor of Pedroche village in the Primo dictatorship. The sister had also denounced Republicans in the post-war military tribunals. See AHPC, LRP, 7, 15 1943. The owner of the sheep had been widowed after her husband had been executed for joining the revolt. AHN-M, C.G., 1044.
33. Examples in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1952, Sentencia 305, Pozoblanco, Sumario 171, Año 1950. AAPC, Libro de Sentencias 1940, Sentencia 39, Pozoblanco, Sumario 81, Año 1940. APC, Fuente Obejuna, Sentencia 327, Sumario 10, Año 1946.
34. There are cases of people being sentenced to up to twenty years in prison simply for helping the relatives of prisoners and the executed Republicans. Fernanda Romeu Alfaro, *El silencio roto. Mujeres contra el franquismo*, (Oviedo: F. Romeu Alfaro, 1994), pp. 158–159.
35. Many adult relatives of condemned Republicans avoided eating in Falangist soup kitchens because it meant putting themselves at the disposal of Falangists who had in many cases been responsible for the imprisonment or execution of their family members. Barranquero Texeira, *Así sobrevivimos al hambre*, p. 209.
36. An example in Archivo Juzgado de Primera Instancia Peñarroya, Criminal, 1945, 48, 1948. On such poverty see Barranquero Texeira, *Así sobrevivimos al hambre*, p. 71.
37. See also Barranquero Texeira, *Así sobrevivimos al hambre*, p. 117 and Romeu Alfaro, *El silencio roto*, p. 169.
38. Examples in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia, 1942, Pozoblanco, Sentencia 168. AAPC, Libro de Sentencia, 1941, Sentencia 191. Pozoblanco, Sumario 55. AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1942, Sentencia 128, Pozoblanco, Sumario 82, Año 1940.
39. Examples in AAPC Libro de Sentencia 1952, Sentencia 67, Fuente Obejuna, Sumario 78, Año 1947 and AHPC; LRP, 3, 47, 1944. AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1941, Pozoblanco, Sentencia 160 and ATMSS, 1228, Núm. 31205. AHPC SJ APC, Faltas, Pozoblanco, 365, 52, 1941 and AHPC, LRP, 12, 61, 1944.
40. Examples in AHPC SJ APC, Caja Pozoblanco, Faltas 365, 52, 1941; AHPC SJ APC, Caja Pozoblanco, Faltas 35, 53, 1941. AAPC, Libro de Sentencias 1941, Pozoblanco 1941. AAPC, Libro de Sentencias, 1942, Pozoblanco, Sentencia 136.
41. Examples in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1942, Hinojosa, Sentencia 66, Núm. 11, AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1942, Pozoblanco, Sentencia 128, Sumario

- 82, Año 1940, AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1942, Pozoblanco, Sentencia 168, Sumario 210, Año 1941.
42. On the state's theft of the children of female Republican prisoners see Vinyes, *Irredentas*, p. 80. See also Ricard Vinyes, Montse Armengou, Ricard Belis, *Los niños perdidos del franquismo*, (Barcelona: Plaza Janés, 2002), pp. 55–77.
 43. Àngela Cenarro, *La sonrisa de Falange. Auxilio Social en la Guerra Civil y en la posguerra*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006), p. 150; Vinyes, Armengou, Belis, *Los niños perdidos*, pp. 55–77.
 44. Cenarro, *La sonrisa de Falange*, p. 152.
 45. Vinyes, Armengou, Belis, *Los niños perdidos*, pp. 60–77.
 46. Vinyes, Armengou, Belis, *Los niños perdidos*, p. 63. A good explanation in Cenarro, *La sonrisa de Falange*, p. 153. The literature on the removal of children from their families has paid less attention to the offspring of tribunal victims.
 47. Examples in AHPC, Asuntos Sociales, Caja Una, Expediente 138 and AHPC, Asuntos Sociales, Caja 1946.
 48. Example in AHPC, Asuntos Sociales, Caja Una, Expediente 37.
 49. The killing of the father in ATMSS 196, 3922.
 50. The uncle's case in AHPC, LRP, 3, 16, 1944. Taken into care in AHPC, Asuntos Social, Caja 1946, Expediente 10.
 51. Example in AHPC, Asuntos Sociales, Caja Una.
 52. AHPC, Asuntos Sociales, Caja 1946.
 53. Prostitution was legal under Francoism until 1956. Francisco Núñez Roldán, *Mujeres públicas. Historia de la prostitución en España*, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995), pp. 200–201. On the link between general poverty and the massive rise in the number of prostitutes in the post-war years see Mirta Núñez Díaz-Balart, *Mujeres caídas. Prostitutas legales y clandestinas en el franquismo*, (Madrid: Oberón, 2003), pp. 23–24; Assumpta Roura, *Mujeres para después de una Guerra. Informes sobre moralidad y prostitución en la posguerra española*, (Barcelona: Flor del Viento, 1998), p. 64; Mir, *Vivir es sobrevivir*, pp. 172–175.
 54. Details of the husband's death in Moreno Gómez, *Córdoba en la posguerra*, p. 558.
 55. AAPC, Libros de Sentencia 1943, Pozoblanco, Sentencia 77, Sumario 43, Año 1943. Similar tragedies in Barcelona and Murcia in García, *Franco's Prisoner*, pp. 62–63, pp. 111–122.
 56. Shirley Mangini, *Memories of Resistance. Women's Voices from the Spanish Civil War*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 129–130; Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence. Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–1945*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 54. An extended discussion in Vinyes, *Irredentas*, pp. 49–60; Mir, *Vivir es sobrevivir*, p. 170.
 57. AHPC SJ APC, Fuente Obejuna, 1950, Caja 5,501.
 58. AHPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, Penal, 290.
 59. On the kitchens see Barranquero Texeira, *Así sobrevivimos al hambre*, p. 212. Ángela Cenarro argues many Republican women refused to use the soup kitchens because they were resisting Francoist social control. Cenarro, *La sonrisa de Falange*, p. 173.
 60. AHPC, Asuntos Sociales, Caja Una.
 61. AHPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, Civil, 1945, 239.
 62. On some families living together in slave labour camps see Rodríguez Guitiérrez, *El último preso*, p. 125. On families regrouping in internal *partido* see ATMSS, 903, 2762

63. On the role of the state in this process see Cenarro, *La sonrisa de Falange*, p. 159 and Vinyes, *Irredentas*, p. 84.
64. AHPC, Asuntos Sociales, Caja Una. For reports on the prisoner for the military tribunals see AMP, Assorted Correspondence. Similar example in AHPC, Asuntos Sociales, Caja Una, Expediente 45. The wife of one prisoner from Pedroche who had been sentenced by a military tribunal to thirty years in prison was herself imprisoned for one year after she gave birth to an illegitimate child in 1944, when her husband was still incarcerated. The military trial in AHPC, LRP, 3, 92, 1944. The woman's sentence in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1948, Pozoblanco, Sentencia 231, Sumario 62, Año 1946.
65. Good studies in Francisco Espinosa Maestre, *La Guerra Civil en Huelva*, (Huelva: Diputación de Huelva, 1996), pp. 261–307, and Luis Miguel Sánchez Tostado, *La guerra no acabó en el 39. Lucha guerrillera y resistencia Republicana en la provincia de Jaén (1939–1952)*, (Jaén: Ayuntamiento de Jaén, 2001).
66. A good explanation in Mercedes Yusta Rodrigo, *La guerra de los vencidos. El maquis en el Maestrzgo turolense, 1940–1950*, (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 2001), pp. 103–105.
67. A few isolated individuals remained in hiding for many years. See Jesús Torbado and Manuel Leguidelle, *The Moles*, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1981) and Ronald Fraser, *In Hiding. The Life of Manuel Cortés*, (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1982).
68. Paul Preston, 'Prólogo', in Francisco Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada contra Franco. Tragedia del maquis y guerrilla. El Centro-Sur de España: de Madrid al Guadalquivir*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 2001), p. viii.
69. Secundino Serrano, *Maquis. Historia de la guerrilla antifranquista*, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2001), p. 76.
70. By the summer of 1941, communist organised guerrillas had created the first formally organised and co-ordinated guerrilla sections in the northern region of León. Serrano, *Maquis*, p. 95.
71. Serrano, *Maquis*, p. 95.
72. Francisco Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada contra Franco. Tragedia del maquis y guerrilla. El Centro-Sur de España: de Madrid al Guadalquivir*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 2001), p. 1.
73. On the important role of Spanish Republican supporters in the French resistance and the connections between the groups see Eduardo Pons Prades, *Republicanos españoles en la Segunda Guerra Mundial*, (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2003). An account of the invasion in Serrano, *Maquis*, pp. 129–148.
74. For the dirty war see Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*.
75. Examples in AHN-S, TERMC, 3730 CN, 339C 46 and ATMSS, 1147, 29619.
76. On the many prison breaks see Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*, pp. 31–32. In August 1940, twenty prisoners escaped from a makeshift prison in Hinojosa del Duque. The Falange complained that they were rapidly assimilated and armed by local fugitives. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20528, septiembre de 1940.
77. Examples in ATMSS, 1234, 31292.
78. Falange officials complained the purges were leading to more people fleeing to the countryside. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20528, Folio 61. A significant number also feared being conscripted into the army where they faced severe discrimination because of their left-wing background. Falange report. AGA, Presidencia 51/20548, Folios 66 and 68.

79. Examples in ATMSS, 1234, 31292 and AHN-M, CG, 1044, 1, Causa 915 de Mérida, Núm., 502,344.
80. Examples of fugitives in ATMSS, 1234, 1292, and their relatives in military trials for 'Civil War offences' in ATMSS, 565, 18857.
81. Examples in ATMSS, 1234, 31292.
82. Report by Falange officials in Córdoba on Pozoblanco in AGA, Presidencia, 51/20528, Folio 120. On blacklisting by employers see Moreno Gomez, *La resistencia armada*, p. 54.
83. AGA, Presidencia, 51-20638; ATMSS, 1147, 29619. ATMSS, 196, 3922.
84. AGA, Presidencia, 51-20638.
85. One fugitive who surrendered to the authorities after the Civil Guard had kidnapped his mother carried just one old hand grenade. ATMSS, 1234, 31,292.
86. ee ATMSS, 709, 7437.
87. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20528, Folio 61, Report 16/7/1940. 21 Francoists were killed in Córdoba province between 1939 and 1944. Serrano, *Maquis*, p. 89.
88. An example in ATMSS, 925, 25104 and Azul, 19/12/1939.
89. Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*, p. 60.
90. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20548 Folio 34.
91. AGA, Presidencia, 51/20528, Folio 15 58 1940. 12. Seventy-four fugitives were killed in Córdoba province between 1939 and 1944. Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*, p. 561.
92. Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*, p. 74.
93. An example in ATMSS, 709, 7437.
94. Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*, p. 288.
95. One hundred and forty-six guerrillas were killed in Córdoba province between 1945 and 1952. Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*, p. 561.
96. Studies of fugitives and guerrillas include Benito Díaz Díaz, *La guerrilla antifranquista en Toledo. La primera Agrupación Guerrillera del Ejército de Extremadura-Centro*, (Talavera de la Reina, Colectivo de Investigación Histórico, 2001), pp. 47–118; Alía, *La guerra civil en retaguardia*, pp. 407–429; Espinosa Maestre, *La Guerra Civil en Huelva*, pp. 261–307. A social history in Mercedes Yusta Rodrigo, *Guerrilla y resistencia campesina. La resistencia armada contra el franquismo en Aragón (1939–1952)*, (Zaragoza; Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2004).
97. Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*, pp. 55–56.
98. Civil Guard Report from Pozoblanco in ATMSS, 502, 360. Similar examples in AHPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, Penal, Cajo 290, Expediente 2967.
99. ATMSS, 1234, 31292. Similar example in ATMSS, 205, 3551. Some mothers were kidnapped and held hostage until some of those who had fled gave themselves up for trial. Example in ATMSS, 1234, 31292.
100. Basilio García Rodríguez, *Sucedio en Pozoblanco. Retrazos dela vida del maquis 'Caraquemada'*, (Villafranca del Penedés: Edimestre, 2003), p. 60 and p. 116.
101. ATMSS, 1234, 31292 Two brothers were killed in Pedroche simply for being in an area where guerrilla activity was taking place. Interview, J.A., Pozoblanco 7/7/2004.
102. ATMSS, 196, 3922.
103. Examples in ATMSS, 1030/43, 502 7630. AHPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, Penal, 290. 6/2/1946.
104. ATMSS, 1234, 31292. Examples of collaboration also in ATMSS, 1147, 29619 and ATMSS 6231, 125. It is known that in other parts of Spain Fran-

- coist vigilantes beat, tortured and humiliated the wives of fugitives. Examples in Romeu, *El silencio roto*, p. 40.
105. AHPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, 290, Penal.
 106. ATMSS, 636, 20329.
 107. AHPC SJ APC, Pozoblanco, Penal, 1948, Sentencia 29/01/1949.
 108. She was paroled in September 1941. ATMSS, 565, 18857.
 109. AHPC, LRP, 3, 109, 1943.
 110. On his blacklisting see Moreno Gómez, *La resistencia armada*, pp. 54–55.
 111. ATMSS, 1234, 31292.
 112. ATMSS, 1234, 31292.
 113. They were sentenced in two separate cases. The sister in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1948, Pozoblanco, Sentencia 250, Sumario 3, Año 1947. The daughter in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1952, Sentencia 67, Fuente Obejuna, Sumario 78, Año 1947. Broadly similar example in AAPC, Libro de Sentencia 1952, Fuente Obejuna, Sentencia 67.

NOTES TO THE EPILOGUE

1. On the Catalan government see Atholl, *Searchlight on Spain*, p. 98. An account of exile in Louis Stein, *Beyond Death and Exile. The Spanish Republicans in France, 1939–1955*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
2. Solé i Sabaté, 'Presentación', pp. xix–xxxiv.
3. TNA: PRO, FO, 371/49577/Z12191/8/9/41.
4. The figure in Wingeate Pike, *Espanoles en el Holocausto*, p. 39.
5. Ros Agudo, *La guerra secreta de Franco*, pp. 196–197.
6. Stein argues that the Vichy regime also hunted down many supporters of the Popular Front and prosecuted them in its own courts. Stein, *Beyond Death and Exile*, p. 126.
7. Julius Ruiz has examined the build up of the court system very much as part of the rise of Franco's state institutions. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, pp. 58–60; Ruiz, 'A Spanish Genocide?', p. 176.
8. Julius Ruiz argues for a distinction between the work of the death squads and the courts and between the war and post-war killings. Ruiz, 'A Spanish Genocide?', p. 177.
9. Hughes, *Report from Spain*, p. 128.
10. Julius Ruiz argues that the scale of the task confronting the authorities led them simply to 'wind down' the repression. Ruiz, *Justicia al Revés*, p. vii.
11. The majority of studies of the Francoist repression have examined its effects on a provincial-wide basis.
12. Ruiz, *Franco's Justice*, p. 88, p. 105, p. 121, p. 227.
13. Julián Casanova cited in *El País*, 2/06/2008.
14. Raymond Carr, *The Spanish Tragedy. The Civil War in Perspective*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 258.
15. Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp. 19–20.

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Archivo Municipal de Pedroche (AMP)
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- daciones y actos de violencia cometidos en algunos pueblos del centro y sur de España y señaladamente en Málaga, bajo el dominio del llamado gobierno de Valencia, (Buenos Aires: Edic. Sud-Americana, 1937).
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