# The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe

Building Professional Armed Forces

Edited by
Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds
and Andrew Cottey

The Challenge of Military Reform in
Postcommunist Europe

One Europe or Several?

Series Editor: **Helen Wallace**

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The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe

Building Professional Armed Forces

Edited by

Anthony Forster
Defence Studies Department
King's College London/Joint Services Command and Staff College

Timothy Edmunds
Defence Studies Department
King's College London/Joint Services Command and Staff College

Andrew Cottey
Department of Government
University College Cork

Contents

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List of the Contributors

Alex J. Bellamy is a Lecturer in the School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland.

Laura Cleary is a Lecturer in the Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis, Cranfield University.

Andrew Cottey is Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Integration in the Department of Government, University College Cork, and a Lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

Pál Dunay is Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Timothy Edmunds is a Research Fellow at the Defence Studies Department of King's College London, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Anthony Forster is Director of Research and Senior Lecturer at the Defence Studies Department of King's College London, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College.

James Gow is a Reader in the Department of War Studies, King's College London.

Dale R. Herspring is a Professor of Political Science at Kansas State University and a member of the Council of Foreign Relations, a retired US diplomat and naval officer.

Erik Kopač is a Researcher and Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence Studies, University of Ljubljana.

Igor Kotnik-Dvojmoč is a State Undersecretary in the Slovenian Ministry of Defence, and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence Studies, University of Ljubljana.

Paul Latawski is a Senior Lecturer in International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

Robertas Sapronas is Head of the Analysis and Planning Division at the International Relations Department, Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence.

James Sherr is a Fellow at the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

Jan Arveds Trapans is a Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich is Associate Professor of Government, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College.

Marie Vlachová is a Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Marian Zulean is an advisor on NATO and the OCSE in the International Affairs Department of the Office of the Romanian Presidency.

Preface

This book is the product of a research project on 'The Transformation of Civil–Military Relations in Comparative Context', funded by the Economic and Social Research Council's (ESRC) 'One Europe or Several?' research programme (award number L213 25 2009). The project examines the transformation of civil–military relations in the countries of postcommunist central and eastern Europe, exploring emerging patterns of civil–military relations in the region, the policy challenges these raise and the implications for more general understandings of the changing nature of civil–military relations in the contemporary world. Within this context, this book provides a comparative analysis of the experiences of the countries of postcommunist Europe in attempting to reform and professionalise their armed forces. This volume is the second in a series of four to be published in Palgrave Macmillan's ESRC 'One Europe or Several?' Series. The first volume, Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (eds) *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards*, addressed issues of democratic control of armed forces in central and eastern Europe. Two further volumes will address wider military–society relations in the region, and the overall challenge of reforming postcommunist militaries.

The chapters in this book were first presented at a conference 'Transforming Postcommunist Militaries: Professionalisation of the Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe', funded by the Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe of the UK Ministry of Defence, and held at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), Shrivenham, in April 2001. The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this book are those of the editors and authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the UK Ministry of Defence or any other government agency. We wish to express our thanks to the contributors to this volume and to the Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe.

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ANTHONY FORSTER, TIMOTHY EDMUNDS, ANDREW COTTEY

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1

Introduction: the Professionalisation of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe

Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey

The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe had a profound impact on armed forces across the region, and all the postcommunist states have faced significant challenges in relation to defence policy and military reform. The political and strategic environment that regional defence policies and armed forces had developed to address altered fundamentally with the end of the Cold War. In addition, the 1990s saw a shift in the role of armed forces more generally, with broad technological, geostrategic and societal changes challenging the utility and legitimacy of previous systems of military organisation, and in particular those based around mass armies and conscription. Professionalisation is a useful way of analysing these developments. It encompasses regional processes of military reform, and is closely linked to the technical and political demands and developments of the postcommunist period – not least of which for many states is the desire for closer integration with Western security institutions, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

However, the context within which regional processes of professionalisation are taking place is a difficult one. Central and eastern European governments and electorates have been reluctant to prioritise defence reform at a time when they have been concerned with apparently more pressing demands of democratisation and economic transition. Moreover, professionalisation processes are occurring concurrently with sharp declines in defence budgets – at least in comparison with the communist period. While defence spending is now beginning to rise across the region, the overall pattern of budgetary frugality in this policy sphere remains constant. Thus, central and eastern European militaries are facing what we term a triple set of transition challenges in relation to their professionalisation processes: the need to build consensus for appropriate

levels of defence expenditure to provide effective national security; the need to recruit personnel with a high level of technical skill and to further develop them in response to changing military–technical demands; and the need to become adaptive learning organisations.

This volume aims to identify patterns in the development of professionalisation of armed forces in postcommunist central and eastern Europe through a serious of detailed country case studies. This introduction lays out a common framework for examining regional professionalisation processes in a comparative manner. In particular, it is concerned with three issues: first, providing a definition and typology of professional armed forces; second, exploring patterns of professionalisation in postcommunist Europe; and third, examining how different factors shape these patterns and identifying their relative importance and role.

The volume explicitly limits its analysis to processes of military professionalisation as they relate to regular conventional armed forces. We recognise that there are broader issues of democratic control of armed forces and the military's relationship with society which are related to some of the questions addressed in this volume. These are addressed in the two companion books to this volume, and for the sake of analytical clarity are not included in this study.[1] Similarly, we recognise that 'armed forces' are not necessarily limited to the regular military, and can include militarised formations such as paramilitary police or border guards and military intelligence services. However, the purpose of this analysis is to focus on regular conventional armed forces, and so for the most part, other militarised formations are excluded from this study.[2]

The existing debate on professionalisation of armed forces

The aims of this volume are ambitious since the debate on professionalisation is characterised by considerable complexity. Scholarly disputes have been focused on two areas. First, a number of academics have sought to explore the defining characteristics of the 'professional soldier' – that is to say those who voluntarily choose the armed forces as a professional career, as distinct from conscripts who usually serve in the armed forces for a shorter period – and the extent to and ways in which professional soldiers differ in their social and political attitudes and values to civilian citizens and the significance and implications of such differences. The broad approach of much of this work is summed up by the title of Morris Janowitz's seminal work *The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait* and has produced the subdiscipline of 'military sociology'.[3] This debate also focuses on professional socialisation, a process through which

individuals adopt an awareness of the issues and challenges of the military profession. For example, in an important contribution to the debate, Martin Edmonds argues that this process takes place in different ways through education and training as well as individual and group interaction.[4] Key questions address changes in outlook and behaviour of the armed forces as individuals and groups. This debate also asks questions about how far the military are different from civilian society in terms of the values they hold and whether there should be military codes of social conduct and behaviour distinct from civilian life. Janowitz has been at the forefront of arguing that changes in tactics, technology and the destructiveness of weapons systems require the military profession to have highly technical specialisations in order to utilise modern weapons systems. In many instances, these are similar to those required by other civilian sectors of society. In particular, personnel management and reliance on the skills of individuals are important in a decentralised combat environment.[5] Recently, however, analysts such as Ole Holsti have argued that (at least in the United States) there is a growing gap between the attitudes and values of the military and those of civilian society and that this is an issue of serious concern.[6]

The second academic debate focuses on professionalisation only in so far as it aids or impedes democratic and civilian control of the military. Samuel Huntington has been the leading figure here, arguing that professionalisation is central to civilian and democratic control of armed forces.[7] For Huntington, if the officer corps is 'professional', that is to say they exhibit expertise, responsibility and corporateness, this will facilitate both civilian control of the armed forces and the development of militarily effective armed forces. This leaves the military to run its own affairs in its own strictly defined area of expertise, and minimises the temptation for it to become involved in politics – what Huntington terms 'objective control'. In contrast, Janowitz contends that it is the very professional socialisation of the military through its relationship with, and sympathy for, the values of the society it serves that ensures civilian control over the armed forces – a process that has been termed 'subjective control'.[8] Bengt Abrahamsson argues that the professional military is a politicised and active interest group, whose often inherently conservative nature leads it to pursue its own institutional interests at a political level.[9] For Abrahamsson, therefore, professionalisation can sometimes act as an impediment to the implementation of democratic, civilian control of the military. Marybeth Ulrich argues that a distinction can be drawn between military professionalism, and democratic military professionalism. The first concerns the singular responsibility of the military to direct military force against enemies designated by the political

leadership. In terms of the second, however, Ulrich argues that in a democracy a military professional must strive to maximise both military security and democratic values. As a result, democratic military professionalism must also involve the internalisation of these values within the military institution.[10]

Most recently, attention has focused on how two separate but sometimes interrelated trends – the demands of increasingly complex military technologies and systems and of new types of military operations on the one hand, and the impact of broader social changes on the other – are reshaping the professional character of Western militaries. The first of these trends is imposing a new set of military–technical and operational requirements on armed forces. The assumption here is that the growing complexity of military equipment, the type of battlefield environment in which armed forces operate and the levels of technical competence necessary to operate effectively require new professional skills of armed forces. For a variety of reasons this is often referred to as the revolution in military affairs (RMA).[11] Alongside this, militaries, and in particular those of the developed Western states, have also been asked to undertake a range of new post-Cold War missions. During the Cold War, the military role emphasised nuclear deterrence coupled with large-scale war fighting. However, over the last decade an additional type of mission has become more commonplace – namely limited intervention missions of a humanitarian peacekeeping or peacemaking nature, often termed operations other than war or power projection. In terms of force structures, Christopher Donnelly suggests these missions create pressure for smaller, more professional and significantly more expensive armed forces.[12] To this end, future armed forces need the capacity to meet unseen threats and benefit from the ability to deploy out of area and operate for sustained periods. These new missions also require that national armed forces are interoperable with other countries' militaries and have joint force integration. For the purposes of legitimacy, the use of force for operations within states often requires authorisation by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), NATO and the EU. In turn this encourages standardisation and interoperability within complex command and control structures. It has long been recognised that changing military requirements lead to changes in the attitude, values, outlooks and behaviour of members of the armed forces.[13]

Bernard Boëne, for example, argues that new roles are changing the relationship between civilians and the military – and also require greater integration and interchangeability and a concentration on technical/managerial skills in the armed forces.[14] These developments

impose new demands on soldiers – in particular in terms of sophisticated technical knowledge and skills in order to take advantage of the technologies offered by the RMA and in terms of advanced social skills for the decision-making, communication, cooperation and management requirements of the increasingly complex military–political–social environments generated by new missions and the RMA. These changes are arguably generating fundamental changes in the 'professional' character of armed forces, at least in western European states.

Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams and David Segal argue that armed forces are also being reshaped by a second set of factors: broader societal changes from which the military cannot remain immune.[15] These include changing public attitudes towards the military, media relations, the growing role of civilian employees within the military, the growing importance of the equal opportunities agenda which is increasing the role of women in the armed forces and acceptance of homosexuality in the military. For Moskos et al. societal change coupled with changes in the international security environment necessitate important changes within the armed forces. For this group of scholars the changes are of such a magnitude to warrant a new 'postmodern' stage in the development of armed forces characterised by structural and cultural interpenetration of civil and military spheres.

From the above discussion it is clear that some degree of conceptual confusion surrounds the ideas of 'professional' armed forces and 'professionalisation' of the military. For some, 'professional' is a largely descriptive term relating to the dominant sociological and political characteristics and values of a society's professional soldiers.[16] For others 'professional' is a normative term describing armed forces which accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the state rather than themselves engaging in domestic politics or seeking to determine the overall direction of defence policy, who focus on conducting their professional military activities in an effective and efficient manner and whose organisation and internal structures reflect these twin assumptions. From this perspective the extent of the professionalism of different countries' armed forces is likely to vary significantly, and professionalisation is a goal to be pursued because of the perceived benefits of having genuinely professional armed forces in terms of both ensuring civilian control of the armed forces and military effectiveness. An additional more focused normative definition equates professional armed forces with the dominant military model emerging in many developed Western states, i.e. all or largely volunteer armed forces capable of engaging in complex peacekeeping or enforcement operations outside

their national territory. In more general parlance the term 'professional' is also regularly used to describe all-volunteer (as distinct from conscript) armed forces, often with the implicit normative assumption that states should aim to establish all-volunteer forces. Much of the debate on professionalisation of armed forces blurs the distinction between these various definitions, in particular between the descriptive and normative elements. Rarely are the terms 'professional' and 'professionalisation' defined in a systematic and rigorous way.[17]

A definition of 'professional' armed forces

The study of the professionalisation of armed forces – and in particular comparative analysis of the extent of professionalisation processes – in different countries and the factors shaping professionalisation therefore requires a precise definition of what is meant by professional. We argue that a purely descriptive understanding of the term 'professional' limits analysis because, while it allows comparison between different professional characteristics of countries' armed forces, it logically precludes the possibility that some armed forces are more professional than others. It thereby also prevents a proper assessment of the factors explaining, and consequences of, differing degrees of professionalism. Instead, we argue that a normative definition of professional – based around the twin precepts of armed forces which accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the state and are capable of undertaking military activities in an effective and efficient way, and whose organisation and internal structures reflect these assumptions – is more useful. This allows for the fact that different countries' armed forces may exhibit different degrees of professionalism and that such differences may have important consequences. It also has the benefit of providing a clear basis for analysing the factors shaping the extent of professionalisation. At the same time, we reject the normative definitions of professional armed forces as either those approximating to current or emerging Western models or all-volunteer forces because these definitions are too narrow and assume that there is only one possible model of professional armed forces.

In the sense of our definition, professional armed forces are an 'ideal type' end state or goal, an analytical construct that serves as a benchmark for analysts to determine the extent to which real types are similar and how they differ from it. Correspondingly, professionalisation is a set of processes whereby armed forces become closer to the ideal type of professional military, but also – to the extent one accepts that the development of professional armed forces is a desirable end state – a normative goal.

Following from the twin assumptions outlined above, we argue that professional armed forces are defined by four core characteristics which themselves generate a number of subcharacteristics:

1. *Role*: Professional armed forces have clearly defined and widely accepted roles, in relation both to external functions and domestic society:
   - they have a detailed statement of the role, mission strategy, goals and responsibilities of the armed forces which is explicit, understood and widely internalised within the armed forces;
   - they have legal and constitutional constraints on the role of the armed forces in domestic politics;
   - they are a goal-oriented organisation designed according to rational principles in order to efficiently attain their goals in terms of personnel, equipment and procurement;
   - they are structured and organised to reflect broader defence policy objectives.
2. *Expertise*: Professional armed forces have the expertise and skills necessary to fulfil their external and domestic functions effectively and efficiently:
   - they have fixed standards and formal qualifications for entry into the military in terms of education, training, experience, health and age;
   - they have effective training and military education, to prepare armed forces personnel for their roles and functions;
   - appointments are specialised requiring technical expertise and knowledge;
   - they have methods of retaining personnel.
3. *Responsibility*: Professional armed forces are characterised by clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military as an institution and of individual soldiers:
   - their operations are characterised by impersonal rules that explicitly state duties, responsibilities, standardised procedures and conduct of office holders;
   - information and orders can flow freely;
   - they have appropriate laws to ensure military discipline and discourage military insubordination;
   - they adhere to international laws of war and the Geneva Conventions;
   - they have mechanisms to establish standards preventing military corruption and involvement in business, especially material and professional pay-offs;

- there is efficient use of resources to meet the objectives of the armed forces.
4. *Promotion*: Professional armed forces are characterised by promotion based on achievement:
   - they have promotion procedures which are transparent and based on notions of competence or achievement;
   - appointments to posts are made according to specialised qualifications rather than ascribed political (or other similar) criteria.[18]

Following from this definition of the core characteristics of professional armed forces, professionalisation as a process involves defining the military's role, revising its force structure to be consistent with the redefined role and adopting professional standards – in particular in the areas of expertise, responsibility and promotion – so that the armed forces can carry out their missions. Professionalisation – a form of policy adaptation – can occur for a wide range of reasons, which can be internal and/or external, imposed or voluntary. While the definition offered here identifies a number of core characteristics and subcharacteristics of professional armed forces, it is clear that the role of the armed forces is the most important of these and is central to any process of professionalisation. Without a clearly defined and accepted external and domestic role armed forces are unlikely to develop the other characteristics of professionalism.

A typology of professional armed forces

While the definition of professional armed forces offered here is explicitly normative, it is also generic in that it does not preclude the possibility of different types or models of armed forces fulfilling the general criteria of professionalism, nor does it privilege one particular type of professional armed force over another – for example by assuming that professional armed forces must be all-volunteer. Indeed, we argue that there are in western Europe and North America today four distinct 'ideal type' models of professional armed forces. All of them meet the criteria of professionalism outlined above but which have very different roles, force structures and recruitment bases:[19]

- *Power Projection*: Armed forces substantially oriented towards the deployment of military power outside national territory, including for purposes of war-fighting and peace enforcement as well as traditional peacekeeping. While power projection armed forces may continue to have the role of providing for defence of national territory if that is required, the defining feature of this type of military

is that force structure, equipment and organisation are primarily driven by the goal of projecting military power beyond the national territory of the state concerned. Examples include the United States and the United Kingdom.

- *Territorial Defence*: Armed forces primarily oriented towards national defence but also capable of contributing in a limited way to multinational power projection operations. The defining feature of this model of armed forces is that, while they may contribute to power projection, force structure, equipment and organisation are primarily driven by the goal of maintaining forces capable of defending national territory from ground or air attack. Armed forces in this model are also generally based on relatively heavy armoured formations, rather than more lightly armed ground forces. Examples include Turkey and Poland.
- *Post-Neutral*: Small armed forces primarily oriented towards national defence but heavily reliant on mass mobilisation of reserves in time of war. Also capable of contributing to traditional peacekeeping operations and potentially but to a limited extent peace enforcement operations. The key distinction between Territorial Defence model armed forces and Post-Neutral model armed forces is the latter's reliance on more lightly armed ground forces and mass mobilisation in the event of war.[20] Examples include Sweden and Finland.
- *Neutral*: Armed forces almost entirely oriented towards national defence. Neutral model armed forces also rely on more lightly armed ground forces and mass mobilisation in the event of war, but in contrast to the Post-Neutral model they make no – or only extremely limited – contributions to international peacekeeping or intervention operations beyond national territory. A contemporary example is Switzerland.

These four models of professional armed forces reflect wider strategic political defence policy choices for countries, relating in particular to the appropriate balance between preparation for defence of national territory and the development of capabilities for projecting military power beyond national territory, and the extent to which the country's defence should be integrated into international structures such as NATO and the EU. These strategic defence policy choices in turn have major implications for the structure and organisation of armed forces and hence how a country approaches professionalisation.

Each type or model of professional armed forces has different referents, dominant values and institutional forms. The features of these different models of professional armed forces are outlined in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Typology of professional armed forces in western Europe

Professional characteristics		Active engagement		Limited engagement	
		Power Projection ideal type	Territorial Defence ideal type	Post-Neutral ideal type	Neutralist ideal type
Role	Mission	DNT, and in addition a commitment to independent power projection	Priority to DNT, but limited willingness to participate in PP missions as secondary actors	Priority to DNT, but modest willingness to participate in PK and humanitarian tasks	DNT only. Unwillingness to participate in military operations. Humanitarian tasks only
	Structure	Mobility/rapid reaction	Large land-based armies with some limited mobile forces	Rather small armed forces	Conscript armed forces
		Sustainable forces away from national territory	Land-based infrastructure	Predominantly land-based infrastructure but some mobile forces	Inflexible support systems
		Full interoperability with NATO	Some limited forces able to work in a NATO-led force	Some limited forces able to work in a NATO-led force	No forces which are sustainable away from national territory
		Joint force integration	Tri-service structures	Tri-service structures	Tri-service structures
Expertise	Qualifications	Very high entry qualifications	Aspire to be high but on quantity rather than quality	Relatively low	Low
	Training	Constant reskilling/training necessary	Training generally low-level	Training generally low-level	Low
		Operational skills as well as general education	Operational skills	Operational skills	Operational skills
	Technical expertise	High requirement especially for PK/PM tasks which require a wide spectrum of skills	Role specialisation	Role specialisation	Emphasis on numbers and not technical skills

	Skills	Skills exercised away from national territory	Skills predominantly exercised on national territory	Skills predominantly exercised on national territory	Skills solely exercised on national territory
	Source or recruitment	Volunteers with reserve forces	Conscript with volunteer cadre and reservists	Conscripts with volunteer cadre. Reliance on mass mobilisation of reservists in times of war	Citizen armies
	Retention	Retention is a major difficulty	Not so acute but some personnel with very high skill levels in demand in the civilian sector	Not so acute but some personnel with very high skill levels in demand in the civilian sector	No serious retention problems
Responsibility	Command and control	Complex command and control chains	Predominantly simple command and control chains	Predominantly simple command and control chains	Decentralised chain of command
	Delegation	Strong reliable NCO cadre	Officer top-down decision-making	Officer top-down decision-making	Individual initiative
Promotion		On merit with emphasis on technical skill and personnel management	On merit on basis of personnel skills	On merit on basis of personnel skills	On merit on basis of technical skills
		Transparent and consistent	Transparent and consistent	Transparent and consistent	Transparent and consistent
Examples (including aspirants)		United Kingdom, United States	Greece, Turkey, Poland, Ukraine	Sweden, Finland	Switzerland, Romania 1969–89

Notes: DNT – defence of national territory; PP – power projection; PK – peacekeeping; PM – peacemaking.

Figure 1.1   Conceptualising professionalisation

Our approach to professionalisation thus identifies four 'ideal type' models of armed forces, which can all be considered equally professional. These models provide a useful framework for analysing the strategic defence policy and professionalisation choices facing countries and for comparing emerging patterns of professionalisation in postcommunist Europe. Moreover, within each model it is possible to differentiate between degrees of professionalisation according to our professional characteristics. This conceptualisation can be expressed in the matrix shown in Figure 1.1.

Factors influencing professionalisation of armed forces in central and eastern Europe

In any country, the extent of professionalisation of armed forces and the model of professional armed forces which may emerge are likely to be influenced by a wide range of factors. Here we are concerned with exploring what the factors are that are shaping patterns of professionalisation in central and eastern Europe, whether they be political, economic and technological developments and whether they are internal or external. During the Cold War, communist bloc armed forces were characterised by elements of both 'professionalism' (force structures reflected the broad defence goals of the civilian government) and 'unprofessionalism' (advancement on the basis of party loyalty rather than

military merit, resulting in 'top heavy' personnel structures). With the collapse of communism, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the countries of central and eastern Europe inherited armed forces which retained many of the 'unprofessional' characteristics of the communist era. To compound the problem, they also inherited force structures, equipment and operating practices (tactics, training, etc.) which no longer reflected, and indeed were either irrelevant to or contradicted, newly redefined domestic and international objectives. Against this background, we argue that the following range of factors have influenced and will continue to influence the process of professionalisation of armed forces in central and eastern Europe. The balance between these different factors explains the extent of professionalisation and the different models of armed forces adopted in different central and eastern European states.

International factors

- *Threat perceptions and the geostrategic context*: What are considered to be the primary external military threats to the country? How serious and immediate are these threats perceived to be? How have these influenced the process of professionalisation and reform of the structure of the armed forces?
- *Other missions*: How far is it accepted that the country's armed forces should perform missions other than defence of national territory such as peacekeeping? How far have the country's armed forces participated in such missions? How has this impacted on professionalisation and reform of the structure of the armed forces?
- *International/Western pressure/aid*: What are the pressures from the international/Western community in shaping policy adaptation? In central and eastern Europe, these can be issues of conditionality from Western institutions (for example, NATO and the EU). Have specific forms of international/Western aid impacted on professionalisation?

Domestic factors

- *Domestic politics and society*: How far has there been domestic political consensus, or alternative dispute, on the role of the armed forces (a) internationally (threats, missions, broad defence policy/force structure) and (b) domestically (constitutionally defined role in relation to domestic politics, management of domestic unrest/conflicts, disaster response, etc.)? How has this impacted on professionalisation and force structure reform? How far has there been domestic pressure to maintain or abandon particular policies (for example conscription)?

- *Economic constraints*: How far have economic constraints impeded reforms or pushed the country towards particular models of armed forces?
- *Military culture*: Individual armed forces' military cultures influence the professionalisation process. For example, the communist-era concentration on the importance of military doctrine (focused on fighting a land war in Europe) hampers thinking about military reform in the region today.

Conclusion

There is considerable confusion over the terms 'professional' armed forces and 'professionalisation' of the military. For some these are largely descriptive terms relating to the core social and political characteristics of professional – as distinct from conscript – soldiers. For others, these are normative terms pertaining to armed forces' non-involvement in domestic politics and their ability to carry out military activities in an effective and efficient manner. Professional and professionalism are also often equated with the dominant models of armed forces emerging in post-Cold War western Europe and North America or volunteer non-conscript armed forces. We argue that professional armed forces are most usefully defined as militaries which accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian) government of the state and are able to undertake military activities in an effective and efficient way and whose organisation and internal structures reflect these twin assumptions. Professional armed forces are defined by four core characteristics:

1. Clearly defined and widely accepted roles, in relation both to external functions and domestic society;
2. Maintenance of the expertise necessary to fulfil their external and domestic functions effectively and efficiently;
3. Clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military as an institution and of individual soldiers;
4. Promotion based on achievement.

Professional armed forces, however, should not simply be equated with the military model to which most NATO countries now aspire (i.e. entirely or largely volunteer armed forces capable of forcefully projecting military power beyond national boundaries). Indeed, we argue that there are at least four distinct models or types of professional armed forces in western Europe and North America (the Power Projection, Territorial Defence, Post-Neutral and Neutral models).

Against the background of the legacy of their communist-era militaries, the countries of central and eastern Europe face great challenges in attempting to professionalise their armed forces. The success or failure of professionalisation, and the models of armed forces adopted by the countries of central and eastern Europe, are likely to be influenced by a wide range of factors, including national threat perceptions, new missions, international pressure, domestic politics, economic constraints and national military cultures. The case studies that follow explore the challenges of professionalisation in central and eastern Europe, while the conclusions explore the emerging patterns of professionalisation in postcommunist central and eastern Europe and the factors influencing professionalisation processes.

Notes

1. A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forster (eds) *Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); A. Forster, T. Edmunds and A. Cottey (eds), *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and Change* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2003).
2. Our focus on regular conventional armed forces reflects a value-based assumption that armed forces are primarily used to engage in war-fighting activity. Paramilitary formations are used in different ways, and are thus structured on different bases, with different implications for their professionalisation processes. While paramilitary groups are thus important, they do not fundamentally alter the balance and nature of the conventional armed forces – at least in a (central and eastern) European context – and as such fall outside the scope of this analysis. This restriction also applies to reserve forces, which are often sizeable in central and eastern European countries. However, because for the most part they are not deployed, their impact on the 'professionalisation' of the regular military is limited, and so are beyond the scope of this volume. In countries such as Switzerland where reserves are fundamental to the nature of the conventional military itself – and are regularly deployed in this context – the nature of the framework is such that they will be included in the analysis.
3. M. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1960).
4. M. Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988).
5. Janowitz talks about an 'organisational revolution' in the military that has led to the officer corps having to balance three roles: 'the heroic leader', 'military manager' and 'military technologist'. In turn, this leads to a requirement for increasingly 'civilian' skills from professional officers, and a blurring of civilian and military professional boundaries. However, he also notes that there are limits to the civilianisation of the military profession. Despite a growing 'equalisation of risk', due to the increasing employment of civilian contractors in military contexts and an increase in the number of military personnel

engaged in tasks not related directly to combat, the principle of 'heroic leadership' and a 'martial spirit' also remain key to the operation of the military, and maintain its distinctiveness from civilian society. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 21–37.

6. O. Holsti, 'A Widening Gap between the US Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976–96', *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), 5–42.

7. S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).

8. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 420.

9. B. Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1972).

10. M. P. Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: the Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

11. L. Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, IISS Adelphi Paper 318 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

12. C. Donnelly, 'Shaping Soldiers for the 21st Century', *NATO Review*, No. 2 (Summer/Autumn 2000).

13. Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization*.

14. B. Boëne, 'How "Unique" Should the Military Be? A Review of Representative Literature and Outline of a Synthetic Formulation', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1990).

15. C. Moskos, J. A. Williams and D. Segal (eds), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

16. The extent to which all armed forces are likely to be shaped by similar factors and therefore have similar professional ethos and values, or alternatively may be shaped by different national or international factors and as a consequence have very different ethos and values, remains a matter of debate.

17. For an exception, see Bengt Abrahamsson who attempts to define the concept of a profession as an occupation requiring a high degree of specialised knowledge, in which people are expected to carry out their tasks with attention to ethical rule, and are held together by a degree of corporateness. Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization*, 15.

18. The framework does not therefore preclude the possibility of soldiers having political allegiances as long as these do not influence core 'professional criteria' such as promotion procedures.

19. We do not preclude the possibility of other models of professional armed forces. We argue, however, that the various models of professional armed forces currently existing in western Europe and North America provide a useful template for exploring the options open to the countries of central and eastern Europe in reforming their armed forces.

20. A. Roberts, *Nations in Arms: the Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence* (London: Chatto & Windus for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), 34–7.

Part I
Central Europe

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2

Professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces: 'No Room for Amateurs and Undereducated Soldiers?'

*Paul Latawski**

Since the early 1990s, professionalisation is an issue that has been intimately bound up with all aspects of the transformation of Poland's armed forces. As the introduction to this volume notes, the term 'professionalisation' is essentially contested, especially since different 'professions' may take a radically different view of its meaning. Moreover, defining the distinctive features of armed forces in either a descriptive, normative or comparative sense can be a business replete with difficulties.[1] As P. W. Moss argues, the measure of military professionalism is its 'link to operational effectiveness'.[2] It is this approach that underpins the concept used in this volume that 'professional armed forces are defined by their acceptance that their role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the state and their ability to conduct military activities in an effective and efficient way and that their organisation and internal structures reflect these twin assumptions'.[3]

Within the context of this definition and the four 'ideal types' of professional armed forces set out in further detail in the introduction, the Polish case is distinctive. During the 1990s the predominant role of the Polish armed forces was clearly located in a Territorial Defence type – its missions were focused on the defence of national territory with a limited willingness to participate in power projection. However, more recently, the evolution of the Polish armed forces has seen a significant shift in the balance towards a 'Power Projection type' that maintains the

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*   The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of either RMA Sandhurst or the Ministry of Defence.

role of defence of national territory, but with a very strong 'commitment to independent power projection'.[4] This chapter examines this transformation in the Polish armed forces away from the 'Territorial Defence' towards the 'Power Projection' type. To this end it analyses three broad areas. First, the impact of security and defence policy goals (doctrine); second, the development of force structure and capabilities; and finally manpower and training issue – 'professionals' versus conscripts.

The impact of security and defence policy goals

In response to the changing conditions of the post-Cold War strategic environment, Poland's defence or military doctrine has evolved. In content, a significant watershed regarding the evolution of doctrine was Poland's entry into NATO in March 1999. Twice in the span of a decade the Polish government has issued statements of its security and defence policy, the first in the early 1990s and the second in 2000. The Polish use of the term 'doctrine' encompasses a wide range of levels and like its British counterparts, it represents a 'body of thought which underpins the development of defence policy'.[5] In 1990 and again in 1992, the Polish government published doctrinal texts setting out the first post-Cold War view of potential threats and the new purposes and tasks of the armed forces.[6] The Defence Doctrine of the Polish Republic was adopted in spring 1990 and its replacement, the Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, was officially accepted in November 1992. The former might be considered a first draft that still reflected some of the assumptions of the former communist regime, while the latter document more definitively met the security desiderata of the new political order. Following Poland's entry into NATO, the 1992 Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland was replaced by two complementary documents that separated discussion of security and defence policy: Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (4 January 2000) and The National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland (23 May 2000).

The 1990 statement of doctrine still saw as an 'important element' Poland's 'membership in the Warsaw Pact'; the 1992 document made clear that 'Poland is striving towards NATO membership' (and the EU/WEU) as the central goal of its security policy.[7] Despite the fundamental shift in goals, there were significant elements in continuity between the two documents; both of them underscored the reassertion of national sovereignty that lay at the apex of defence doctrine. 'The strategic defence goal of the Republic of Poland', stated the 1992 document, 'is to uphold the nation's sovereignty, independence, and

territorial inviolability', and it made this the primary purpose of the armed forces.[8] It also envisaged a secondary purpose in which the armed forces operated in coalition with other allied states either abroad or on Polish soil in support of international security. 'The Polish armed forces … must therefore be constantly prepared to form operational groups in order to fulfil various tasks as part of missions or expeditions by multinational allied armed forces.'[9] The balance in the early 1990s was clearly tilted towards territorial defence missions, although even at this early stage the way was left open for greater involvement in power projection. Such hedging may have been prudent in 1992 when Poland's prospects for eventual membership in NATO were still far from certain, but crucially for the professionalisation and modernisation of the Polish armed forces it presented a contradictory reform agenda.

The Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland adopted in January 2000 predictably maintained the strategic goal of security policy to be that of 'guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State as well as the inviolability of its frontiers'.[10] Nevertheless, this document marked a major shift away from the emphasis on defence of national territory. In examining the security environment, the document took a holistic view, stating that 'Poland approaches security in a comprehensive manner, taking into account the significance and influence of diverse political, military, economic, social, environmental, energy related and other factors'.[11] Unlike the earlier statement of security policy in 1992, Poland could now place its security firmly in the context of NATO, and especially the Article 5 Washington Treaty commitment that 'an attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all'. The Security Strategy indicated that 'Poland implements its own security interests above all within the framework of the North Atlantic system of allied cooperation and solidarity'. The Strategy went on to state that 'Poland's priority is for the Atlantic Alliance to maintain its capacity to perform its functions as an effective organisation of collective defence and to ensure reliable allied solidarity'.[12] Although Poland's national security must now be viewed as firmly within the NATO security community, in terms of the tasks envisaged for the armed forces that stem from these goals, there is still the requirement for defence of national territory but the profile of operations requiring power projection has grown significantly. According to the Security Strategy document of 2000 the tasks of the armed forces are as follows:

Operating both within the national defence system and within the NATO system, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland are ready

to carry out three kinds of strategic tasks: defence-related tasks in the event of war (repelling a direct aggression against the territory of Poland or participation in repelling aggression against another allied State), crises-management (also within the framework of missions run by international organisations) and stability-enhancing and conflict-prevention tasks in peacetime.[13]

The Security Strategy made specific mention of the impact that these 'strategic tasks' would have on the development of the Polish armed forces in terms of types of operations and the scale of effort expected of the armed services. Unlike earlier incarnations of security policy, there was far more emphasis on capability to participate in 'crisis-management operations outside Polish territory'.[14] The duality of operational tasks envisaged now is more finely balanced between defence of national territory and power projection:

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland should be ensured sufficient resources to enable them to deter a potential aggressor, to conduct defence operations against a large scale aggression, to take part, simultaneously, in two non-Article 5 crisis-response operations, or in several smaller operations, including peace-operations carried out within the framework of international forces.[15]

The implication of these tasks on the organisation of the force structure was to maintain the existing division of the land component of 'operational forces' and 'territorial defence forces' and to better articulate their operational roles. The operational forces were 'ready to be assigned to NATO' while the territorial defence forces remained 'under national command'.[16] More revealing, however, was the postulated role of each of these major elements of the force structure. For the operational forces this was a power projection role:

The operational forces are chiefly prepared for action within the framework of allied, multinational formations. Their size, level of preparedness, ability to regroup and conduct protracted operations with a minimum of casualties will be consistent with their obligations to mount together with the allied forces common defence operations and crisis response operations, including those outside Polish territory and at considerable distance from their bases. Modern equipment, mobility and considerable operational versatility will characterise those forces.[17]

The territorial defence forces, however, have no utility or role outside of national territory:

> The territorial defence forces are designed to lend support to and secure the manoeuvrability of operational troops while performing their local defence duties in close cooperation with non-military elements of the state structures. The composition and structure of the territorial defence forces and their command system are designed to fit the country's organisation and territorial division, and are adapted to local needs and conditions.[18]

The roles of the air force and maritime forces remained largely unchanged. The air force is to protect the air space of Poland and the navy its maritime boundaries. For the navy at least, part of its role is to take part in operations within the Atlantic Alliance that are in the 'area of the Baltic Sea and without'.[19] In the National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland 'special forces' are also specifically mentioned as a component designed to 'fulfil strategic or operating assignments during peace, crisis or war time'.[20]

The evolution of Polish security and defence policy and the policy changes that have taken place as a consequence of Poland's entry into NATO have thus been of crucial importance in shaping the armed


Figure 2.1   The professionalisation of the Polish armed forces

forces. As a result of the shift in policy goals, the Polish armed forces are moving well beyond a territorial defence type with an exaggerated power projection capability, to a wholly new force structure based around the Power Projection model. The matrix in Figure 2.1 illustrates this shift. The nature and scale of this change are clearly evident in an analysis of professionalisation processes, notably the development of the force structure and capabilities and manpower issues.

The tilt towards power projection: development of force structure and capabilities

The revision of Polish security and defence policy in 1992 triggered a series of changes to the force structure and capabilities of the Polish armed forces. In the eight years following the demise of communism in 1989, most of these changes had the effect of dismantling something that existed before rather than building something new. As a consequence, the changes that occurred to the armed forces developed in a piecemeal fashion. General Henryk Szumski, the former Polish Chief of General Staff, confirmed this lack of a coherent approach to reform in this period by noting 'our army has been in the process of reforms for many years now. Necessary as they were, those reforms were superficial, partial, and not based on a final vision. Separate segments were sorted out, while having in mind no complete picture of how the Army should look in the future'.[21]

By 1997, however, a coherent reform plan emerged called Tenets for the Programme of the Armed Forces Modernisation, 1998–2012.[22] 'Plan 2012', as it became known, was adopted by the postcommunist government as official policy. After the 1997 elections, the incoming government did not discard Plan 2012, but instead made a number of amendments to it.[23] The most important of these was to take into account the requirements for integrating Poland into NATO, leading to the publication of the Programme for Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces 1998–2012.[24] Although Plan 2012 went a long way in reshaping the force structure of the Polish armed services, in terms of the size of the forces planned, most analysts considered it too optimistic, particularly when viewed from the perspective of the yawning resource gap.

Poland's entry into NATO and fuller integration into the Alliance's planning cycle prompted further changes to plans for reforming the Polish armed forces. By autumn 2000, Plan 2012 was formally superseded by a Programme for Restructuring and Technical Modernisation

of the Armed Forces 2001–6.[25] The revised plan took a more realistic view of the Polish state's ability to fund the reform process, and as a consequence was more modest in its aims. Under the new plan, the manpower level of the Polish forces was to be reduced to 150,000 by the end of December 2003. Obsolete equipment was to be rapidly withdrawn from service to avoid wasting resources on material of little combat value. The aim of the Programme for Modernisation was to redirect resources to investment in new equipment. The programme was launched with a sense of urgency by the new and energetic Polish Defence Minister, Bronisław Komorowski, who had previously served as the chairman of the parliamentary defence committee.[26] Komorowski was clearly intent that the new plan would not succumb to vested interests in the armed forces or Poland's electoral cycle. The passage of legislation and its commitment to enact multi-year financial provision was a notable measure of Komorowski's success as too was the cross-party coalition the new Defence Minister built in support of the reform plans.[27]

The Programme for Modernisation for the armed forces reshapes the force structure in line with wider European trends towards smaller but better equipped formations. For the Polish land forces, the number of divisions will be cut from the six of Plan 2012 to just four in the new programme, with four independent brigades and two airmobile brigades.[28] The Polish air force will roughly match its previously planned aircraft numbers on seven permanent bases, but with its manpower down by a further 7000 to a total of 31,000.[29] For the Polish navy, the Programme for Modernisation will see service personnel reduced to 13,500 and older ships phased out at a faster rate.[30] The Programme for Modernisation in most respects is a more radical version of the previous Plan 2012, though it takes better into account the shift in NATO towards more flexible and mobile forces.

With these changes to force structure and the addition of new capabilities, the operational forces of the Polish armed services should see an improvement to their ability to project military power. In terms of land forces, each division will contain one full strength brigade and two cadre brigades. Alongside the four full strength independent brigades the army should therefore be capable of deploying ten full strength brigades. Three of these will be light elite brigades (6th Airborne, 25th Air Cavalry and 21st Mountain Infantry).[31] With rotation, these forces suggest a contribution of two brigades for two simultaneous non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Moreover, in an effort to ensure greater interoperability between the Polish 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade and its German neighbours in NATO's Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction

Corps, the Polish Defence Ministry will lease 110 Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks.[32] Other procurement priorities for the army include helicopters and wheeled APCs, both of which will enhance its mobility and flexibility. There are also plans under consideration for the Polish army to acquire a marine battalion by 2006.[33] The Polish navy has recently commissioned a small logistic support vessel that can carry 140 troops; among its most modern units are 6 Lublin class landing ships commissioned in the early 1990s capable of carrying 9 tanks or APCs and 135 troops.[34] The acquisition of an Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate from the United States, with a second ship to follow, has also given the Polish navy a blue water capability beyond the Baltic Sea.[35] For the Polish air force, the acquisition of a long-awaited multi-role aircraft of the F-16/Gripen/F/A-18 category will also permit more active participation in NATO air operations. Less prominent is the requirement for 6–10 new medium transport aircraft to replace the ageing An-26 in service. Furthermore, there have been suggestions that by 2006 there will be a requirement for a larger heavy lift aircraft.[36] The alterations to the force structure and planned capabilities acquisition all point to a much greater priority being placed on power projection for its operational forces, but most notably in the land component.

By contrast the development of the territorial defence (Obrona Terytorialna – OT) forces has moved very slowly, despite being designated as a major component of the land forces in successive security and defence policy documents. The reasons for the slow movement in creating territorial defence forces have been an ongoing disagreement over their size, role and importance in terms of defence priorities. Within the Ministry of Defence, the dominant school of thought has seen the OT forces as a distraction, depriving resources from more important issues related to the modernisation of operational forces. One officer serving in an OT unit lamented prevalent attitudes in the army towards Polish territorial defence, noting 'it is a matter of mentality and old habits. We are still seen as a mechanised infantry that can be used to bridge gaps in stationary defence or reinforce operational reserves.'[37]

The OT is to be a force armed with light weapons and to fight locally in wartime defending localities, key facilities, secure lines of communication and provide logistical support.[38] The Programme for Modernisation envisages 7 territorial defence brigades, many formed out of disbanding units linked to 16 territorial defence commands. The OT's peacetime strength will consist of about 10,000 men providing a training and mobilisation base.[39] However, it is equally clear that OT forces are not the main priority in terms of the Programme for Modernisation. The OT

represents a kind of national defence insurance policy that is unlikely to be cancelled given Poland's experiences in conflicts in the twentieth century. However, the level of priority and lack of serious investment raises some quite serious questions concerning the long-term military viability of the OT forces.

Manpower and training

One of the most pressing challenges that Poland has had to confront is the question of whether it should make its armed forces all-volunteer in composition. In the Polish context professional forces are synonymous with volunteers on fixed term or open contracts.[40] In 1998 General Józef Buczyński, head of the Polish Ministry of Defence personnel department, noted in an interview that the emphasis on professional all-volunteer forces is increasingly a military necessity '…in the face of the dynamic development of military technology, military service is becoming a domain of professionals [volunteers]. In future, there will be no room in it for amateurs and undereducated soldiers' [conscripts].[41]

The National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland takes the need for volunteers forward by indicating that all operational units should aim to have at least 50 per cent volunteers.[42] The Programme for Modernisation of the Armed Forces 2001–6 anticipates that, by 2006, 75,000 will be volunteers consisting of 22,500 officers, 22,500 warrant officers and 30,000 NCOs.[43] Likewise, the Polish navy will increase its proportion of volunteers to between 55 and 60 per cent.[44] While recognising the slow and uneven pace of creating volunteer armed forces, one strategy for implementing this change is to focus on units preparing for external tasks.[45] Clearly, a growing trend is to see all-volunteer personnel in operational units, with lower priority units staffed largely by conscripts.

Since Poland regained its independence in 1918, conscription has been a central feature of its military manpower provision. Annually, around 300,000 young men of 19 years of age are eligible for conscription, with about 100,000 called up for military service.[46] In autumn 1990, the length of service of conscripts was reduced from 24 months to the current 18 months. A further reduction of length of service to 12 months was put in place in January 1999.[47] After 2004, the government plans to reduce the period of service or conscripts to nine months.[48] The reduction in the length of military service certainly accords well with changing public perceptions regarding national service. The frequent and well-publicised examples of the bullying of conscripts have not

added to the public popularity of national service. Despite military efforts to crack down on bullying, it remains one of the key factors contributing to public disenchantment with conscription. Opinion polling by the Military Sociological Institute suggests that fewer young people want to serve in the armed forces and that many people view national service as a waste of time.[49] In May 1998, an opinion poll conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) indicated that some two-thirds of those consulted support an army without any conscripts whatsoever.[50]

The current system of conscription seems to provide many avenues for avoiding service for the more resourceful. Certainly the armed forces have been disappointed for some time by both the physical and mental abilities of its conscripts.[51] Since 1988, Polish law has made provision for alternative military service for those conscripts whose religious or moral convictions preclude serving in the armed forces. The duration of alternative service lasts 24 months and is served in health, social welfare or public safety organisations. However, on an annual basis, less than 4000 individuals perform alternative service.[52] The system of military service in Poland therefore faces a number of challenges, and from the point of view of both the Polish public and the military these may only be fully resolved by all-volunteer armed forces.

Under present reform plans, creating a 50 per cent split in the armed forces between conscripts and volunteers has led to the creation of a new category of extended service soldiers on contracts of differing conditions and lengths of service. The contract service can last up to five years and can be extended three times. The aim of this new category of military service is to encourage able conscripts through financial incentives to extend their military service and become NCOs. It is hoped that eventually half of the enlarged NCO corps will be in the contract category.[53] However, as elsewhere in the region, the programme to increase the level of more professional service personnel has suffered from the uncompetitiveness of the financial incentives. Like so many reforms, the effort to increase the number of contract soldiers has been constrained by resource limitations.[54] Despite the problems, the introduction of contract personnel has generally been seen as a positive transitional development.[55] For example, Defence Minister Komorowski has argued, '…what is realistic is an increase in the degree of professionalisation of the armed forces, mainly through the development of contract service periods. The ambition of Poland should be the attainment of a level similar to that of England, France and Germany – over 50 per cent.'[56]

The efforts to recruit more contract volunteers on fixed-term contracts, particularly in the NCO category, highlight a significant

obstacle – the military education system. This has managed to avoid serious changes in its focus in training the non-conscript leadership element of volunteer service personnel. Its output has been limited to officers and warrant officers. The Programme for Modernisation running to 2006 calls for major restructuring of the personnel structure to create a pyramid similar to western European armies. This means that the training of NCOs has become a major priority. When the armed forces reach 150,000, the requirement will be to train at the most basic level 600 officers and 2500 warrant officers/NCOs per year.[57] The existing eight academies in the military education system currently employ around 23,000 lecturers and instructors amounting to some 15 per cent of the current strength of the armed forces.[58] In testimony before the Polish parliamentary defence committee the Defence Minister Komorowski remarked that 'it would be madness to continue to maintain 23,000 lecturers and instructors in the bloated education system while the entire Armed Forces are being down-sized to 150,000 men'.[59] The Defence Minister therefore took the radical step of halting the 2001 intake for land forces schools and of curtailing the intake in others. Five of the existing eight military academies will remain after the reform and many warrant officer training establishments will be converted to training NCOs.[60] The total number of instructors and lecturers will be reduced by 50 per cent and much more emphasis will be placed in the military education system on continuous training during the course of a career.[61]

At the basic level of officer education and training, the present courses extend up to four years and upon commissioning into the Polish armed services the award of a degree. The most significant changes are in the consolidation of basic officer education institutions into one for each service. The basic officer education and training establishments will have responsibility for training up to the rank of captain.[62] Postgraduate military education to the MA level will continue to take place at more specialist institutions such as the Military Technical Academy (Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna – WAT), although streamlining and more links with Polish universities will be developed.[63] At the top of the military education pyramid is the National Defence Academy (Akademia Obrony Narodowej – AON), offering a two-year course for approximately 120 students that includes six months of foreign language training. Candidates at AON must have five to seven years' experience in regular units and the institution is tri-service in its faculty and students.[64] Another significant input in the realm of military education and training is the opportunity to attend courses abroad. Even before Poland's invitation to join NATO, attendance at courses abroad

embraced significant numbers of military personnel. Between 1991 and 1997, over 1200 members of the armed forces completed courses abroad, including 33 at high-level foreign staff colleges.[65] The changes to officer education and training reflect the strong desire to rationalise the system and reduce the bloated education and training establishment. Nevertheless, the pattern of universal officer education to graduate or postgraduate standards will remain a key feature of Polish military education.

Conclusion

The development of the Polish armed forces in terms of its security and defence policy, doctrine and force structure has steadily moved the focus of the armed services towards a power projection role often at the expense of providing for Poland's territorial defence. Undoubtedly this shift in the role of the armed services has been driven by national priorities related to the country's membership of NATO. These changes also reflect a domestic political elite consensus that accepts the need for Polish involvement in crisis management operations. How effective and efficient the Polish armed forces will be is crucially dependent on the process of professionalisation.

As this chapter has indicated, the Polish armed forces are in a state of transition from the Territorial Defence type towards the Power Projection type. However, having departed from one model, the Polish armed forces have not yet fully arrived at the other. Indeed, many of the challenges now facing the Polish government are a consequence of balancing the competing demands of the old model against that of the new force goal. Trends suggest investment and focus will be on the further development of Power Projection characteristics. This is illustrated by the fact that army units assigned to NATO's pool of deployable forces such as the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade have volunteer soldiers forming 80 per cent of the assigned manpower.[66] Similarly, officers serving in such units are more likely to receive promotion than are officers in other parts of the army.[67]

Ultimately if Poland fully embraces a Power Projection type, it requires the creation of all-volunteer professional forces. As a matter of national policy, trends in the evolution of the armed forces suggest that this goal may be under serious consideration even if it is not yet a matter of public policy. The idea of moving to all-volunteer professional armed services is now being more seriously debated in Poland than ever before.[68] In March 2001, the chairman of the parliamentary defence

committee, Staniław Głowacki, indicated that the proportion of professional service personnel could rise to 75 or 80 per cent at the end of the next decade.[69] The Defence Minister has taken a more cautious line, identifying some of the real challenges of moving towards and then sustaining a volunteer force on limited resources.[70] The choice of which professional model, however, inevitably has to be reconciled with political and economic considerations in a democratic state. For Poland, in the short to medium term, economic considerations are undoubtedly a limiting factor behind the continued reliance on conscription.[71] However, as a long-term proposition, all-volunteer forces will be more cost-effective and generally better able to meet the international requirements of the Polish government.[72]

Notes

1. See C. Downes, 'To Be or Not To Be a Profession: the Military Case', *Defence Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1985), 147–71 and G. Harries-Jenkins, 'The Concept of Military Professionalism', *Defence Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1990), 117–30.
2. P. Moss, 'The British Army and Professionalism', *The British Army Review*, No. 112 (April 1996), 8.
3. See Chapter 1.
4. See Chapter 1.
5. *British Defence Doctrine*, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01 (London: HMSO, 1997), 1.2.
6. The terminology used in expressing defence doctrine can often be difficult to equate between countries as it may reflect national practices that do not easily translate into another country's conceptual system. The aim here is to be consistent and to reflect British, and more broadly, Western practices in terminology.
7. 'Defence Doctrine of the Polish Republic', 21 February 1990, *Żołnierz Wolności* (26 February 1990), in JPRS-EER-90-038.
8. 'Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland', 2 November 1992, in *Wojsko Polskie: Informator '95*, (Warsaw: Bellona, 1995), 16–32.
9. 'Security Policy and Defence Strategy', 16–32.
10. *Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (4 January 2000), website of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.msz.gov.pl/english/polzagr/security/index.html.
11. *Security Strategy*.
12. *Security Strategy*.
13. *Security Strategy*.
14. *Security Strategy*.
15. *Security Strategy*.
16. *The National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 23 May 2000 (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defence, 2000).
17. *Security Strategy*.
18. *Security Strategy*.

19. *The National Defence Strategy*.
20. *The National Defence Strategy*.
21. Interview of General Henryk Szumski, *Polska Zbrojna* (2 May 1997).
22. See for example: 'Armia 2012', *Polska Zbrojna* (12 September 1997), W. Łuczak, 'Wojsko XXI wieku', *Zycie Warszawy* (10 September 1997), 'Armia mniejsza i silniejsza', *Rzeczpospolita* (10 September 1997) and P. Wroński, 'Armia XXI wieku', *Gazeta Wyborcza* (10 September 1997).
23. 'Armia 2012 do korekty (?)', *Polska Zbrojna* (26 December 1997), 'Armia 2012 do poprawki', *Polska Zbrojna* (6 March 1998) and 'Armia 2012 poprawiona', *Polska Zbrojna* (12 June 1998).
24. Janusz Zemke, 'Urodzaj na programy', *Polska Zbrojna* (13 March 1998).
25. 'Program Przebudowy i Modernizacji Technicznej Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 2001–2006', *Polska Zbrojna* (20 May 2001).
26. See interview of the Polish Defence Minister, Bronisław Komorowski, 'Wystartujmy z planem 6-letnim', *Polska Zbrojna* (30 June 2000) and article by Z. Lentowicz, *Rzeczpospolita* (15 June 2000).
27. See reports by the Polish news agency PAP (26 and 29 May 2001). For the text of the law governing the financial arrangements for the programme see *Polska Zbrojna* (12 August 2001).
28. 'Program Przebudowy i Modernizacji Technicznej Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 2001–2006'.
29. 'Prostowanie skrzydeł', *Rzeczpospolita* (19 April 2001).
30. A. Golawski, 'Cała naprzód!', *Polska Zbrojna* (8 April 2001).
31. J. B. Grochowski, 'Armia 2006', *Polska Zbrojna* (1 April 2001).
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33. G. Holdanowicz, 'Marynarka Wojenna Sets New Course for NATO Integration', *Jane's Navy International* (September 2001), 39.
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3
Professionalisation of the Army of the Czech Republic

Marie Vlachová

In modern history the fate of the Czech nation has been decided by politicians and not the armed forces. The existence of Czechoslovakia's pre-war army, supposed to guarantee national sovereignty, was short-lived and ended ingloriously when they were demobilised by the civilian government prior to the country's occupation by the Nazis. In practice, the Czechoslovak First Republic was never able to overcome widespread anti-military sentiments which had their origins in the Austro-Hungarian period. These trends continued during the communist era, when few citizens believed in the Party's justification for compulsory military service – the fight against imperialism. The failure of the army to resist the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces only exacerbated the poor esteem of the Czechoslovak armed forces. In the autumn of 1989, the armed forces drifted to the centre of attention of the public and politicians for a short time, but when it became apparent that the army would not intervene in the political transformation process, the focus of both the population and the new government shifted towards political, economic and social issues.

In spite of this negative popular perception of military matters, attitudes towards the armed forces and military service in the Czech Republic have gradually changed, partly as a consequence of the participation of Czech troops in peacekeeping missions. Conflicts in the Balkans have demonstrated the value of effective armed forces, and general post-Cold War military trends combined with changes in the security situation have cast doubt on the importance of conscription as a symbol of citizenship. NATO membership and the pressure exerted by it on the Czech army to complete its transformation processes have further stimulated professionalisation of the armed forces.

This chapter analyses the level of professionalism in the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) from the following perspectives.[1] First, the role assigned to the ACR; second, the professional qualities of personnel in the armed forces; third, the career structure of the armed forces, and especially the promotion system; and finally, the wider relationship between the ACR and society. In addition, it explores the international and domestic factors affecting levels of Czech military professionalism in its decade-long effort to transform the formerly totalitarian armed forces into an effective and efficient army of a democratic state and an active member of NATO.

This chapter argues that the professionalisation of the Czech armed forces has been an incomplete and only partially successful process. Throughout the 1990s the Czech armed forces have been characterised by weak operational capability, poor retention of key technical personnel and recruitment difficulties. They have also been downsized considerably, but in the absence of a clear strategy for future reform goals. There have been some successes in the reform of the military education system and more limited progress in professional career management and developing a professional personnel structure, but overall progress towards professionalisation has been slow. However, more recently a new commitment to fundamental reform of the ACR has emerged – in part as a consequence of NATO membership, but also because of a breakdown in the effectiveness of conscription, both through draft avoidance and the declining utility of a conscript army in support of NATO peacekeeping operations. A move to all-volunteer armed forces within a Power Projection perspective is now seen as a key means to address many of the challenges now facing the Czech defence sector. However, the expense of this transition will be significant, and its success is far from certain and in the mean time, the Czech armed forces will be more typical of the Territorial Defence model.

The role of the armed forces: tasks, missions and structure

The strategic tasks and objectives of the Czech armed forces are defined in two fundamental strategic documents – the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic. Both of these documents were written before the country's accession to NATO, and then amended during 2000–1 to take account of NATO's New Strategic Concept. The amendments have addressed such important topics as the Czech Republic's position on NATO enlargement, its contribution to the development of European security and defence initiatives,

the building of multinational forces, and emergency operations other than those carried out under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

The policy document on which the upcoming reform of the Czech armed forces will be based – the Analysis – defines the ACR's objectives, missions and tasks in great detail. From a strategic perspective, national defence will be secured through the Czech Republic's membership of NATO.[2] It recognises that the central European region is unlikely to be threatened by a major military conflict for at least ten years. On the other hand, it states that there may be new, difficult to predict security risks, especially on the periphery of NATO territory, which may have an impact on the security of the Czech Republic. Taking these factors into account, the Analysis defines the objective and mission of the ACR as the ability to secure defence of the Czech Republic as part of NATO. Thus, the armed forces are responsible for national defence and at the same time for 'participating in a broad range of joint NATO operations, in accordance with defined military and political ambitions, while being fully interoperable with allied forces'.[3] These two basic objectives are supplemented by other tasks which define the Czech Republic's specific contribution to NATO operations.[4] However, the Analysis very clearly states that the ACR presently does not have these abilities, and that an improvement will only occur through a radical root and branch reform: a change of the ACR's tasks, a substantial reduction of personnel and armaments, the abolition of conscription, and a different approach to the basic principles of executing operations.

The structure and composition of the armed forces

A key question when considering the process of military reform is whether the organisation of the armed forces reflects its missions and objectives, and whether its force structure is appropriate for the various demands of national defence. The Analysis concluded that the Czech armed forces have considerable defence potential. However, their operational abilities are not suitable for the type of missions in which the Czech Republic may be required to take part in the future. The current armed forces were built around the objectives and tasks defined before the country joined NATO, and three years of membership in the Alliance has exposed major deficiencies in this area.[5] The Czech Republic's participation in peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia illustrated that the army as a whole was not fully prepared for tasks of this nature. In particular there is an imbalance between those elite cadres that are used for foreign tasks, and the main part of the armed forces which focuses on territorial defence missions. Indeed, a concentration

on the elite power projection units deployed in foreign missions abroad has resulted in a neglect of the majority of the armed forces especially in areas such as training and equipment. Even then, in elite units deployed abroad they have only been replenished with considerable difficulty, often with a negative social impact on soldiers who return from missions. Moreover, previous reorganisation initiatives have failed to deliver results in part because a number of decisions proved to be questionable in light of the ACR's possible participation in future NATO operations, but also as a consequence of an unrealistic balance between funding and the anticipated results.

Part of the problem is that modernisation programmes adopted over the last decade – notably the development of the L-159 aircraft and modernisation of the T-72 tank – no longer correspond to current force requirements of a small, modern and highly mobile NATO army. A large and widely dispersed number of military installations also hamper the efficient use of funding allotted for the training and modernisation of the armed forces. Soviet technology from the Cold War era is largely outdated, and there is an urgent lack of material supplies for new technologies and weaponry. The national mobilisation system is also obsolete and too costly and unpredictable should the Czech Republic face the threat of a military conflict in its territory. The Czech armed forces have assigned 80 per cent of their forces to NATO, pledging that units allocated to the Alliance will reach NATO standards within an agreed plan. However, it is clear that this goal can only be achieved through quite radical reform of training and funding of the Czech armed forces in the next decade.

Career management in the Czech armed forces

When the Czech Republic became an independent state in 1993, it found itself with an oversized army that had a top-heavy structure. The military profession was perceived as a lifelong commitment, and career advancement was largely dictated by the number of years in service. To a considerable degree, the military functioned as a social institution that provided a professional career that was neither lucrative nor prestigious, but guaranteed stability and social security from recruitment to retirement. The personnel system of the Czechoslovak armed forces traditionally differentiated between planning and executive units, and this has caused frequent problems in respect of the number of soldiers needed for specific positions. While the performance of Czech soldiers on foreign missions has shown that communist-era training was not completely without merit, it has become increasingly clear in recent

years that the existing personnel system is unable to deal adequately with recruitment, training and retention of military professionals in the NATO context.

There have been several attempts to address this unwelcome legacy. The large number of military academies has been reduced, curricula have been adapted to new requirements and military schools have been incorporated into the state-run education system. One consequence of this policy is an increase in the number of young people interested in enrolling in military secondary schools and universities. Work has begun on new career advancement rules which will define important career points and specify the conditions for promotion to higher ranks, moves that should motivate citizens to enlist and improve retention rates in the armed forces. The ACR has begun creating a personnel marketing system which is responsible for recruitment and selection of military personnel based on its future requirements. Aware of the importance of social programmes for professional soldiers, the Ministry of Defence has also explored how employment conditions might be improved. The most important contribution to the improvement of the professional qualities of soldiers was the adoption of the 1999 Act on Professional Soldiers.[6] This piece of legislation presents new principles of military career management, defines in detail the recruitment process, career advancement rules, the promotion system and the conditions under which personnel can leave the ACR. The Act is an important step towards ensuring that conditions of professional service in the Czech armed forces become equivalent to the conditions that exist in more established NATO armed forces.

In terms of policy, significant progress has been made in establishing a professional career management and personnel structure. However, a number of obstacles remain. Although recruitment conditions are defined by law, their practical application lags behind for a number of reasons. In this regard, the most serious problem is the warrant officer corps, where the ACR has been unable to recruit the necessary number of personnel over the long term – mainly because it has proved unable to compete with the civilian sector in relation to salaries and working conditions. A much greater success has been achieved in recruiting young people to military secondary schools and universities. Nonetheless, as the number of students increases there is no guarantee that graduates will be able to find a military position at the end of three to six years of study.

Despite these changes, the military education system is still oversized in respect of the number of schools and lecturers on the one hand, and

fields of study and specialisations on the other. Three secondary schools and two universities draw significant resources from the budget – particularly when other training-related areas are being starved of funds. Training equipment used by military units is outdated and often unsuitable for NATO roles. The use of modern training equipment such as trainers and simulators is rare, although Czech soldiers have been clever in improvising and are well regarded by other NATO forces. However, internal documents suggest that in the area of training, the ACR lags well behind the professional armed forces of many Western countries.[7]

As a consequence of declining birth rates and a smaller pool of 18–25-year-olds to recruit from, the Czech armed forces need to retain soldiers in service for relatively long periods.[8] In the period 1997–2002, a number of promising young people left the ACR, and this has made it necessary to introduce an attractive package of measures to ensure retention rates remain high. Reform targets social policy as an area which deserves special attention – including housing, family assistance, medical care, work environment and systematic care for retired soldiers and veterans from foreign missions. Transparent career advancement rules and their practical application are also an important precondition for keeping professional soldiers in service for the necessary period of time. Career advancement among professional soldiers is based on qualifications and length of service. Although the law stipulates that performance criteria be taken into consideration, the practical application of this concept is hindered by a number of shortcomings that exist in all areas of the professional career management system. Although guidelines issued by the Ministry of Defence specify that every soldier has to be evaluated on an annual basis, many commanders pay little attention to this procedure and only complete it as a formality. In reality promotion depends mainly on whether there are a sufficient number of positions available in individual corps. Indeed, in the planning and promotion system described above not even the best of performances will necessarily guarantee promotion. Conversely, by law positions correspond to specific ranks, and soldiers are often promoted as a consequence of being transferred to a new post. Moreover, transfers are often motivated by an effort to remain in the military for the period necessary to receive retirement benefits rather than a consequence of ability or aptitude. This situation is illustrated by fact that a number of officers and chief warrant officers do not have the necessary qualifications for their positions. The promotion system is thus in a transitional state; however, without suitable reforms, little progress will be made in

modernising the ACR's outdated promotion system. One weakness is the absence of a unified human resources system, where planning and allocation of posts and career management are all effectively integrated. Another is the absence of a robust salary scale that provides sufficient incentives to motivate soldiers to remain in service.

A result of this situation is the absence of a clearly defined long-term target number of soldiers based on an analysis of realistically recruitable personnel. Purposeful management of the careers of military professionals requires not only clearly defined conditions of military service, but also a stable environment that will guarantee that the planned numbers of soldiers and positions will remain unchanged for a period of at least five years. In addition, annual restructuring and haphazard downsizing have created an atmosphere of uncertainty in which individuals tend to focus on short-term interests. In this environment it is particularly difficult to use modern methods of recruitment and career management.

The move to a volunteer basis for the Czech armed forces will certainly help to improve personnel issues and will function as an important vehicle for effecting a qualitative change. Voluntary recruitment will be built gradually in the period 2002–7 and will result in a sizeable reduction in the overall number of military personnel and especially in the top-heavy officer corps.[9] The process is also likely to result in the creation of better conditions for training and provide military personnel with social security comparable to other NATO armed forces – though the cost will be significant.

The command and management of the armed forces

The government's comprehensive analysis of the state of affairs in the Czech armed forces in August 2001 included a critical assessment of the military command and management system. As in other areas, past attempts to reorganise the command and management structure have not yielded the results which were initially expected. Efforts to comply with the ill-advised aim of reducing military personnel while at the same time maintaining as many positions as possible have had a destabilising effect. Moreover, the official figures detailing reductions were misleading, and did not include units from the auxiliary, technical and support structures which make up 22 per cent of the Czech defence sector. This has resulted in the creation of a complicated and unwieldy system where powers and responsibilities are not clearly defined, a number of structures overlap and some important elements are missing altogether. Commanders and supervisors are overburdened with administrative and operational tasks. Frequently, the responsibility for fulfilling a task is not

combined with sufficient powers and adequate financial means to achieve them. Moreover, communication between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff is inadequate and in many areas the division of powers is unclear. This burdens mutual relations with distrust and the evasion of professional responsibility for decision-making. Such a system does not encourage the application of modern management techniques or the delegation of powers and responsibilities to lower levels.

The main objective of reform in the area of command and management has therefore been to separate planning and executive activities, and to clearly define the various powers of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. Auxiliary organisational structures will be reduced considerably. In addition, the operational command level comprising headquarters of individual forces is of limited value in the NATO context and will therefore be abolished in the period 2002–8. In the ACR's new structure each command level will have precisely defined powers and responsibilities.

International influences on professionalisation

Over the long term, the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War have had the greatest impact on the professionalisation of the Czech armed forces. After the Czech Republic became independent in 1993, many citizens believed that a strong national army would be the best way of protecting the sovereignty of the new state. Some saw the future in various models of Western armed forces, such as the Swiss militia system, and later the fully professional structures that exist in small European countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands. Others preferred a neutral state protected by international conventions which would invest in the economy and social welfare rather than in military spending. The stable and relatively numerous group of people who opposed NATO membership comprised not only supporters of the old regime, but also those who were afraid of the high cost of professionalising the ACR and financing NATO missions. Part of their concern was that the Czech Republic might be drawn into international conflicts.[10] This hesitant approach to NATO accession was also influenced by low levels of threat perception among the population. In particular Russia was increasingly seen as less of a danger to Czech national security, and the conflicts in the Balkans posed no direct threat to the country. As for the tasks the ACR should fulfil, most citizens preferred a territorial defence focus to power projection, and even two years after the Czech Republic joined NATO, foreign missions were only supported by a third of the Czech population.[11]

However, despite these misgivings Czech membership of NATO and the development of NATO's New Strategic Concept committed member states to consider participation in conflicts beyond NATO's borders. The strategic deliberations over the structure of the armed forces were therefore marked by a clear effort to balance the national and international requirements of defence, so that neither national nor NATO interests would be damaged.[12] However, this dual approach resulted in an unrealistic defence strategy which has proven to be extremely expensive. It has also exacerbated the chaotic and short-term approach to transformation of the armed forces which over the past decade has hampered the reform process. Despite this, in the Kosovo NATO operation, Czech forces acquitted themselves well in fulfilling demanding tasks of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.[13] However, there is growing awareness in the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces as a whole that under present conditions, the deployment of troops abroad is siphoning off too many personnel, is too expensive and is at the cost of a reduction in the fighting effectiveness of the ACR in its defence of national territory role.

Professionalisation, politics and public opinion

The professionalisation of the ACR is a key element of the country's wider process of civil–military reform.[14] At the beginning of the 1990s, there were two lines of thought on this issue. One focused on defining and developing the basic characteristics of 'professional' soldiers as members of a democratic country. The other concentrated on the move from a conscript-based to all-volunteer system of recruitment. Proponents of the first approach drew inspiration from specialised Western literature on civil–military relations – such as Janowitz, Huntington and Moskos – that emphasised the importance of military knowledge and skills, the development of the personal qualities of all soldiers, the improvement of commanders' management skills, democratic values, patriotism and civil rights. Much attention was focused on the development of values and ethical standards, and the advantages of the 'citizen in uniform' concept. In this context, soldiers are seen as a distinctive profession which is to a large extent independent from society. At the same time they are also civil servants who represent the state's defence policy and are guarantors of the continuing development of democracy. Since 1993 the focus of the professionalisation debate has increasingly shifted towards, and been equated with, the creation of an all-volunteer military.

This focus went hand in hand with proposals to rapidly and effi-
ciently reduce the country's oversized and offensively oriented army
into a one structured around the defence of the nation state. Indeed, the
ending of conscription was viewed as a key strategy for transforming
officers trained by the communist regime into personnel capable of
enforcing the defence policy of a democratic Czech Republic. Further,
creating a volunteer force was perceived positively by young male voters
who considered conscription service as an unnecessary waste of time.
Thus, the creation of an all-volunteer ACR appeared to be a way of
resolving four important problems faced by the Czechoslovak armed
forces at the beginning of 1990s – depoliticisation, downsizing, restruc-
turing and gaining public trust.

However, between 1993 and 1997 a number of factors impeded the
move to a volunteer force. First, the military had had difficulty in
changing the elite rapid reaction brigade created in 1993 to an all-
volunteer structure, and this cast doubt on the feasibility of the plan as
a whole. Second, a much longer time frame of 15–20 years for ending
conscription gained currency. In 1995 Defence Minister Vladimír Holáň
noted that defence of the country must be a national priority and that
while desirable, a switch to an all-volunteer force was, for the time
being, unachievable.[15] Petr Nečas, the incoming head of the Ministry of
Defence, suggested in 1996 that any thoughts of professionalisation
were premature. He noted that the Czech Republic was not surrounded
by allies, there was a lack of well-trained reservists, military equipment
was outdated and the ACR would be unable to compete with civilian
enterprises on the labour market.

Thus despite a preference for a swift move to volunteer forces between
1993 and 1996 the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Social
Democrats (ČSSD) promoted the idea of a partly volunteer force as the
only means to reconcile the aspiration of ending conscription and the
reality of Czech circumstances. However, this view began to change as
the prospects of NATO membership became more realistic. The first
signs of this shift emerged when the political parties included conscrip-
tion in their 1997 election programmes, and called for a widespread
debate based on expert analyses of the situation in the armed forces in
light of this.

The Czech Republic's accession to NATO in 1999 therefore shifted
strategic thinking about the role of the armed forces. In particular it
altered the emphasis from a defence of national territory mission to a
more active role in the Alliance. This in turn promoted a new wave of
discussion on how the military should be transformed. Many observed

that both NATO accession and the increasing participation of Czech troops in peacekeeping missions would require fully professional units; that conscription was undemocratic and selective – affecting as it did only 30–40 per cent of the population; and noted that the reality was that few young men responded to their call-up. Many also noted that any modernisation of the armed forces that the Czech Republic would be required to complete in connection with NATO membership would almost certainly require volunteer forces.[16] For example, in July 2001, the Ministry of Defence was forced to admit the poor state of the Czech armed forces in the face of mounting criticism from NATO over both inconsistent modernisation programmes and overall lack of effectiveness throughout the armed forces. A new strategy, the 2001 Analysis of Required Capabilities, Target Structures and Composition of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, was introduced on the premise that the Czech Republic no longer needs to maintain a large army for the defence of its national territory. Instead, it will focus on building a well-equipped and suitably armed mobile force capable of being deployed abroad and prepared to respond to a broad range of tasks.[17]

Approved by the Czech government in August 2001, the preparatory stage of the initiative included an analysis of the condition of the military and the objectives of reform, including abolition of conscription. A concept of professionalisation and mobilisation of the armed forces was due to be drafted by March 2002. A precise timetable of the entire reform, expected to begin in the second half of 2002, should be submitted to the government by June 2002. These deadlines are based on realistic economic and demographic figures which reflect the current situation in the Czech Republic. Calculations have shown that professionalisation, including adequate remuneration for personnel and funds for training on modern equipment, can be completed on the condition that current levels of 2.2 per cent of GDP spent on defence will be maintained until 2010. Professionalisation will necessitate a change in the proportion of expenditure on staff costs from the present 46 per cent to approximately 50 per cent. Current expenses (training, the maintenance of equipment and infrastructure, travel expenses and so on) will remain roughly the same. Capital expenditures are not expected to fall below 20 per cent, a sum that should be sufficient to cover the ACR's investment needs.

However, these plans will require efficiency gains throughout the defence sector through better planning of resources, devolved budgets, systematic control of the quality of outputs in relation to costs, the sale of military surplus, and the introduction of outsourcing and insourcing

wherever appropriate. Thus, the basic philosophy towards financing the reform is that the funds allocated by the state for defence are already sufficient, and the annual 2.2 per cent share of GDP allocated to the defence budget is enough for accomplishing the reform if the defence sector can learn to use its budget better and look for internal efficiency savings.

This new momentum towards the establishment of armed forces based more on volunteers has also been supported by Czech public opinion. In 2000, 30 per cent of Czechs supported a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts, while around half of Czech citizens supported the creation of an all-volunteer army, with this figure rising to 63 per cent among the under 30s, and 80 per cent among those eligible for conscription. Much of this reluctance to serve in the military stems from the continuation of poor conditions for conscripts in the Czech armed forces – including bullying and inadequate accommodation. Conscription is also seen as poor preparation for future civilian career development, with 84 per cent of eligible citizens regarding it as a waste of time and a financial setback.[18] However, it is unclear whether this resistance to the conscription system will translate into support for an all-volunteer forces in reality. The level of public debate on defence issues in the Czech Republic is low, and the costs of such a move are not widely appreciated. Moreover, Czechs consistently prioritise defence of national territory and assistance to the civil sector – roles which are arguably best fulfilled by conscripts – over the kinds of complex NATO-orientated multinational missions to which volunteers are better suited.

Military perspectives on professionalisation

The planned reform has strong support among the officer corps. Young professional officers and NCOs in particular have high expectations that the reform will deliver higher professional standards, better employment conditions, a clearer career structure and a more effective military force. However, reform has encountered some suspicion and resistance from those who have experienced a number of chaotic restructuring efforts over the last decade. This scepticism is found particularly among uniformed personnel working at the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, members of support corps and at the headquarters of individual forces that are expected to be abolished. As a result, disillusionment opposition within the military paradoxically may be one of the greatest obstacles to the reform process as a whole.

Defence analysts attribute the 'relative stagnation' of the ACR to old stereotypes in people's thinking, a lack of experience with defence

planning and poor communication between the armed forces and politicians and society. The armed forces have a limited ability to examine their own problems and lack experts in civil–military relations and democratic control capable of perceiving developments from a broader perspective. These factors have contributed to the creation of a system that exacerbates flaws, prevents change and hampers the full integration of the Czech Republic into NATO.[19] However, according to a survey conducted among professional soldiers in August 2000, the idea of professionalising the armed forces does enjoy strong support among most military professionals, with 70 per cent of them backing the general reform plan. Opinions about the pace of professionalisation divide professional soldiers into three groups: 40 per cent are in favour of a rapid reform, 50 per cent think that it can only realistically be completed within 10–15 years and 10 per cent believe that the process will take longer than 15 years. The creation of a professional army is viewed particularly positively by the younger generation of military professionals, many of whom believe that the process should start as soon as possible.[20]

Conclusion

Since 2001 the Czech armed forces' objectives and tasks position them alongside other professional armed forces that are developing power projection capabilities and participating in international operations. However, the Czech military's organisational and personnel structure, professional qualities, quality of training, and ability to compete with the civilian labour market are more typical of the Territorial Defence type of force structure with a limited capability of deploying forces abroad. The persistence of a 'top-down' command system which does not allow for the effective delegation of powers and responsibilities to the lower ranks and an ad hoc promotion system further reinforce this conclusion. While the political elite has embraced the need for a more professional force, one should not therefore conclude that the professionalisation process initiated at the beginning of the 1990s is proceeding successfully. Close scrutiny suggests that as yet the armed forces are unable to fulfil in a timely manner the tasks defined in current Czech defence documents. Neither should the deployment of a limited number of soldiers on peacekeeping missions be taken to indicate that the Czech armed forces have attained Western professional standards, or indeed that they are able to fulfil the full range of NATO responsibilities. Whether this will be the case in the future is crucially dependent on the successful implementation of the latest reform plan, and this in turn

will be dependent upon adequate funding and political commitment to the military reform process.

Notes

1. In accordance with Czech practice, this chapter will employ the term 'Army of the Czech Republic' (ACR) to refer to the entire Czech armed forces.
2. *Analysis of Required Capabilities, Target Structures, and Composition of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic* (Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, August 2001), 1.
3. *Analysis*, 11–12.
4. This applies, in particular, to the Czech Republic's participation in NATINEADS (NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System in Europe), the deployment of NATO forces in the Czech territory if necessary, the deployment of the ACR abroad as an integral part of international forces, the improvement of the abilities of Czech soldiers in respect of psychological and information-gathering operations, and CIMIC (Civil–Military Cooperation). The main specialisations of the Czech armed forces in NATO are passive monitoring and reconnaissance systems and detection and identification of weapons of mass destruction with an emphasis on chemical and biological weapons.
5. The most important document, which was used as the basis for building the ACR after accession to NATO, was the *Concept of Building the Defence Sector* approved by the Czech government in June 1999. The ACR consists of ground forces, an air force, territorial defence forces and support services (logistics, military intelligence and medical support corps). From an operational point of view the ACR is divided into immediate reaction forces, rapid deployment forces and the main defence forces. There are three levels of command and management: the strategic (General Staff), operational (commands of individual forces) and tactical (commands of the mechanised division, brigade, units and services) levels.
6. *Act on Professional Soldiers* (No. 221/1999 Coll.).
7. *Information on the Results of the Analytical Stage of the Strategic Review of Defence in the Czech Republic, Concept as of March 1, 2001* (Prague: Ministry of Defence, Defence Planning Section, 2001), 16–17, and *Vision of Building and Development of the Army for the Czech Republic in 21st Century, Open Version*, 2nd Working Edition (Prague: Ministry of Defence, Perspective Planning Department of General Staff), 7–11.
8. The estimated necessary duration of service is 10 years for warrant officers, 17 years for chief warrant officers and 18 years for officers.
9. The professionalisation of units allocated for NATO will be completed by 2005. The ACR is expected to be fully professional within the two following years. The number of officers and civilian employees will be reduced by 4880 and 12,000, respectively. In the planned structure of an all-volunteer ACR, the largest corps will be warrant officers, who will account for 55.5 per cent of all military personnel as opposed to the current 9 per cent. It is expected that the number of professional female soldiers will increase from the current 9 per cent to 15–20 per cent. The current number of officers, who account for 60 per cent of all military personnel, will be lowered to 20 per cent.

10. J. Hartl and J. Huk, *Looking for a Direction: Ten Years after November 1989 in Surveys of the Empirical Research Center* (Prague: STEM, 2000), 44–56.

11. Continual public opinion survey aimed at defence, security and the army, October 2000, STEM Agency for the Ministry of Defence.

12. In addition to adverse historical experience with membership in military alliances, the insistence on the national dimension of defence was partly due to the interests of the Czech armaments industry.

13. The missions in which Czech units have taken part are listed at http://www.army.cz/sfor/index.htm.

14. For more details, see M. Vlachová and Š. Sarvaš, 'Democratic Control of Armed Forces in the Czech Republic: a Journey from Social Isolation', in A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forster (eds), *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

15. J. Kmenta, 'The Army Will Remain Semi-professional', *MF Dnes* (15 February 1995).

16. F. Mojžíš, 'The Majority is for a Professional Army', *A report*, No. 25–6 (2000), 8–9.

17. *Analysis of Required Capabilities, Target Structures, and Composition of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic* (Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, August 2001), 2.

18. Data gathered as part of continual surveys of the Czech population conducted by the Research Department of the Ministry of Defence since 1996. The figures were collected in December 2000.

19. For example, C. Donnelly, *AVIS (Military Agency for Information and Services of the Czech MOD) Media Monitoring* from 26 July 2001, 3–6 ('NATO Supports Reform of the Czech Army Provided that it is Organizational and Psychological', 'Experience with the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary Will Affect Further Enlargement').

20. E. Pavlíková, 'Future of the Czech Armed Forces – Opinions of Professional Soldiers about Professionalisation of the Army' (Prague: Research Department of the Ministry of Defence, April 2001).

4
Professionalisation of the Slovak Armed Forces

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich

This chapter analyses the extent to which the Slovak armed forces effectively and efficiently conduct military activities while fulfilling the demands of the civilian government that they serve. Such an analysis of the current state of professionalisation of the armed forces of Slovakia cannot ignore the overall state of the democratisation of the national security infrastructure inherited from the Soviet era. National security institutions in Slovakia, notably the Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR), continue to adjust to the consolidation of a democratic political system. These continuing adaptations are manifested in current defence reform initiatives that have important implications for accountability in resource management as well as comprehensive collaboration across all relevant governmental actors in the national security policy-making process.[1]

Slovakia's vital national interests include the preservation of its territorial integrity, the development of its democratic foundations, protection of its citizens, sustainable economic, social, environmental and cultural development of Slovak society and the preservation of peace and stability in central Europe.[2] Slovakia's Security Strategy identifies a number of more diffuse threats which if left unaddressed may foment into economic, social and political instability that could threaten the continued progress of Slovakia's democratic transition. These include international terrorism, the cross-border movements of refugees, trafficking in illegal substances and people, transnational organised crime networks, environmental security concerns and energy dependence.[3] Additionally, the negative effects of instability and stalled democratic transitions in the former Soviet republics may adversely affect Slovak security.

Confronting these trends requires a cooperative approach to security that pools resources within regional security institutions. Consequently,

NATO's new Strategic Concept, launched at the 50th Anniversary Summit in April 1999, committed the Alliance to pursuing 'a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe' that entails not only ensuring the defence of its members but contributing to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.[4] Consequently, Slovakia's security aspirations focus on NATO accession. Without NATO membership, Slovakia will be in the tenuous position of developing a national security strategy that addresses the full spectrum of threats but without the cooperative security means to achieve them. Meanwhile, as a NATO aspirant Slovakia must show that it has the means to support the strategic interests of the Alliance through participation in the non-Article 5 missions – such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian relief and intervention, and preventive diplomacy – that preoccupy the Alliance in the post-Cold War era.[5]

This chapter argues that Slovakia's single-minded pursuit of NATO membership as its priority national security task and its assessment of the steps required to achieve NATO accession have propelled the Slovak national security community into a period of serious consideration of comprehensive defence reform. However, there remains considerable divergence between existing levels of professionalisation which remain at a low level in three key areas: the development of expertise through military education, training and the development of technical skills; the recruitment and retention mechanisms of the ASR; and promotion systems and command and control structures. The extent to which current reforms will be successful will depend on the continued stability of the Slovak government, the availability of adequate – and importantly predictable – defence budgets capable of sustaining the reform process and a sustained engagement on the part of the government to overcome the quite significant obstacles to professionalisation outlined above.

Slovakia's current armed forces and national security structures set it squarely in a Territorial Defence model that allows for some limited contribution towards multinational power projection operations but is principally focused on the defence of Slovak territory. To this end, Slovak armed forces are organised around two components – the largely untransformed main defence forces alongside a few professionalising elite units capable of participating with some degree of interoperability in NATO-led operations. However, an analysis of current defence reform efforts suggests aspirations to move away from territorial defence towards a limited power projection capability. Successful implementation of the goals advanced in Slovak Republic: Force 2010 aimed at achieving total military reform would clearly place Slovakia in a position to be a more

active participant in non-Article 5 missions and thus strengthen its case for NATO accession. The extent to which the aspirations are being turned into reality is the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

The national security context

Progress in the professionalisation of Slovak armed forces is dependent on the quality and substance of a comprehensive set of national security documents. Among these is the 1996 Basic Objectives document which laid out national interests and key principles related to the achievement of these objectives.[6] The Slovak Ministry of Defence also published the Defence Doctrine (1994), the National Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic (1996) and the Concept of Reform to 2003. However, each of these policy and doctrinal statements were developed in the absence of an overarching national security strategy. They therefore lacked both a logical hierarchy and the consensus found in mature national security systems. According to the widely respected US Department of Defense Assessment of the Slovak Republic, these documents did not adequately address the defence requirements and concepts of their era.[7] One of the study's major findings was that a revised Constitutional Law on Security, a National Security Strategy, and a subsequent National Military Strategy were essential to provide the conceptual foundation for future military reform.[8]

The National Council of the Slovak Republic approved Slovakia's first Security Strategy in March 2001. The Security Strategy engaged key national security stakeholders in its drafting and for the first time articulated long-term Slovak interests.[9] The Defence Strategy approved in May 2001 elaborates the defence policy component of the Security Strategy and provides the conceptual framework for the development of the Military Strategy to guide specific defence reform, of which professionalisation is a key component.[10]

Slovakia is currently in the midst of a major reform effort – Slovak Republic: Force 2010.[11] At the heart of this effort is the development of a comprehensive set of strategic documents that will serve as the basis for comprehensive restructuring and reform. The Military Strategy recognises that the most likely threats will call for forces prepared to participate in 'cooperative security' responses rather than territorial defence, and assumes that Slovakia would not face an aggressor alone.[12] Despite the reservations of some Members of Parliament that the Military Strategy was too vague, it was unanimously approved on 25 October 2001.[13] The Organisational Structure of the Ministry of

Defence and Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010 are the basis for the proposed Long Term Plan for the Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. The National Defence Council approved Model 2010 on 15 October 2001 and at the time of writing it is expected to be presented to Parliament in December 2001.[14]

The Long Term Plan document includes force structure decisions and supporting functional plans for force requirements, personnel and leader development, training and doctrine, and logistics and basing.[15] It is expected that it will be presented to Parliament for approval in January 2002. The reform process appears to be scheduled to influence Slovakia's application for NATO membership, with a decision made at the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002. While reform will not be implemented until after the Prague Summit, the Slovak strategy is to rely on presenting a credible defence reform plan.

Though professionalisation is at an early stage there is a widespread belief that the reform effort now under way has real potential. After a decade of stasis, Slovakia may finally get a national security based on a rational defence planning system that sets priorities congruent with the political guidance inherent in key strategic documents, and which subsequently shapes and transforms defence structures in a realistic way that balances Slovakia's limited resources with its defence aspirations.

As important as the content of these documents is the process through which they were compiled and approved. Prior to March 2001 and the launch of Slovak Republic: Force 2010, observers of the Slovak defence planning process agreed that previous reform efforts did not benefit from collaborative participation either across relevant ministries or between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence. Furthermore, the half-dozen earlier attempts at reforms depended on the efforts of Moscow-educated military leaders who were neither committed to implementing real change nor had the relevant skills to conduct such a review.[16] This in part explains the absence of any consensus for reform and poor implementation. This new approach to Slovak Republic: Force 2010 has had a positive impact on the integration of work processes within the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff and between the two bodies.

However, progress towards professionalisation depends on the successful implementation of the reform plan – an achievement that is by no means guaranteed within the current Slovak domestic political system. Systemic bureaucratic change depends on reformers throughout the defence system to ensure that implementation is carried out throughout every relevant branch, directorate and unit in the field.

Part of the comprehensive reform calls for building up such a capacity, but the fact that such experts will not yet be in place at the onset of the reform's implementation is a significant risk. Slovakia will attempt to implement fundamental defence reform and complete its professionalisation with its present-day national security community comprised of some interested societal groups, military officers, ministry officials, researchers in non-governmental organisations, journalists and university experts. The challenge is to build on this base to create a process through which qualified experts grow in both number and influence until the outputs of the Slovak national security system uniformly support national interests and rationally expend resources in support of these interests.

Manning the force

Clearly an appropriate force structure for missions is central to an effective professionalisation process. No specific force size is mentioned in the proposed Military Strategy, but the document states the goal of creating a force structure that is 'affordable and capable of meeting known or emerging threats as a member of a coalition force'.[17] The Concept of Reform declares the long-term strategic intention of constructing a relatively small, appropriately equipped and well-trained ASR and other complementary paramilitary forces to carry out Slovak security needs.[18]

The Slovak Ministry of Defence has drawn up plans to shape a pyramidal force structure for the ASR that would reduce the number of senior officers, create an NCO corps and increase the ratio of volunteer to conscripted soldiers. This plan will reduce the proportion of officers from 25 to 18 per cent of the total force, increase the percentage of warrant officers from 15 to 24 per cent, increase NCOs from 4 to 18 per cent and reduce conscripts from 55 to 40 per cent.[19] The proposed reform also calls for further reductions in force structure. By the end of 1999 the 53,000-strong ASR had been reduced to 35,740, and the Slovak Defence Minister has called for further reductions to 30,000 by the end of 2002. Model 2010 goes further than these plans, proposing a move to an all-volunteer structure for the ASR in 2006, and reduction in its size to 24,500 service personnel.[20]

The Slovak government and armed forces have put forward a series of initiatives that have mostly gone unimplemented.[21] Decreasing the top-heavy senior ranks has been an intractable problem in postcommunist armed forces, principally as a consequence of a lack of social support structures to absorb middle-aged career military officers without transferable civilian job skills. Defence bureaucracies, furthermore, are

manned by senior military personnel who are less than enthusiastic about implementing proposals that eliminate their positions. Relatively low salaries and poor quality of life conditions have contributed to a severe shortage of officers at the junior officer and NCO level.

Ultimately, Slovakia's achievement of a Territorial Defence model with the capacity to meet Alliance expectations to have a power projection capability sufficient to support NATO missions, depends on the success of professionalisation plans. Not only must the concept of professionalisation in terms of a proper volunteer–conscript mix be appropriate to Slovak defence needs, but the scheme for financing personnel reform, simultaneous defence reorganisation and modernisation must be rational as well. Moreover, despite the policy goals advanced in Force 2010, current budget realities dictate that ambitions beyond a long-term shift in the balance towards volunteer professionals vis-à-vis a conscript force are not realistic. Informed observers are therefore sceptical that even with better planning documents and more effective defence planning systems, implementation of professionalisation goals will still be problematic.

Significant obstacles lie in the way of professionalisation, the greatest of which are budgeting and economic. However, the extent to which the force reduction plans and personnel policies are realistic is open to question. The prevailing view of the senior civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence responsible for overseeing the Slovak Republic: Force 2010 process is that rational defence planning will secure the policy objectives. Ratislav Kacer, Ministry of Defence State Secretary, noted that, 'process is directly linked to capabilities'.[22] In this view, there is a consensus on 'creating a more professional force'.[23] However, the US Department of Defense Assessment previously noted that none of the professionalisation objectives have received adequate funding. Moreover, paying competitive salaries and upgrading the conditions of service are key factors in fulfilling professionalisation goals. Negative demographic trends include a steadily declining pool of medically eligible young men fit both for volunteer and conscript duty. According to the Concept of Reform, the percentage of medically disqualified youth has increased from 11 to 23 per cent since 1985.[24]

The consequence of these factors is that most ASR units in the current force structure configuration are manned at only 60 per cent of their official strength. Senior Slovak defence officials and Western observers agree that this amounts to a hollow force structure with little real combat capability.[25] Major challenges therefore remain in developing key manning requirements and appropriate personnel of the right grade and skill.[26]

Educating and training the force

For nearly a decade Slovak military education establishments have avoided anything more than cosmetic reform, promoting anachronistic concepts and poorly preparing a generation of officers for service.[27] The current military education system also lacks a command and staff training level for the professional development of senior military leaders and opportunities for civilian national security professionals to study within the system. After a long period of neglect, the military education dimension of professionalisation is finally beginning to receive some attention in the Slovak defence community. The Military Strategy calls for the implementation of a system of lifelong education for every professional career path. This system will include a basic military education that prepares junior officers and NCOs for service in a more Western-style force structure, and it will provide professional development opportunities.[28] This will require a reduction in the independence of the military education system and the ASR's re-establishment of central control over military schools, possibly through a designated training command.[29]

In terms of training, low defence budgets have severely limited the frequency of training in the ASR. Unit training above company level has not been systematically conducted for several years, and joint training has been virtually non-existent since the establishment of the ASR in 1993. External assessments conclude that training at unit level has been reduced to levels below what is necessary to maintain readiness. Most training occurs in barracks as a consequence of the lack of resources to deploy to major training areas. The air force has been particularly hard hit with the lack of training resources. Indeed, flight training was completely suspended in 1999 until the early part of 2000 due to lack of funding. However, the acquisition of sophisticated flight simulators has helped to make up some of this flight training deficit.[30] Improvements in training are therefore a priority; however, defence spending of 1.89 per cent of GDP will be maintained until 2007, raising serious doubts as to whether any progress is realistic.[31] This further complicates several key dimensions of the professionalisation process, including improved combat capabilities and the retention and recruitment of critical force manning positions.

Leading the force

The combination of an officer–conscript force structure mix, a lack of institutional transparency, the presence of authoritarian bureaucratic patterns of behaviour that permeated communist political systems and the absence of a commitment to democratic values led to the development

of a different concept of leadership in the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSPA) to that in the West. The Soviet-era military and education systems did not focus on leadership development and the cultivation of professional competencies related to leadership skills.

The absence of NCOs continues to be a major weakness in command and control structures. Senior military officers recognise the importance of building an NCO corps to fill the leadership vacuum between officers and conscripts, and several reform efforts have attempted to build up a professional NCO component to the current officer–conscript mix. In fiscal year 2001 resources were allocated to creating 1000 NCOs, but only 300 of such designated positions were filled. The Slovak Ministry of Defence funded a number of marketing campaigns for recruitment, but following this experience have concluded that current resource constraints do not allow the ASR to offer attractive employment conditions for potential NCOs.[32]

The inability to fill the NCO ranks is exacerbated by retention problems within the junior officer ranks. The dearth of junior leadership in both the officer and NCO ranks adversely affects unit training programmes – especially those aimed at creating technical specialists. Moreover, the shortened conscription time from 12 to 9 months has created high levels of turnover, requiring constant training among each conscript cohort on an accelerated training cycle. Finding a solution to this command and control problem is central to developing a professional force. The draft Military Strategy sets the goal of reducing the top-heavy nature of the officer structure in order to attract junior officers and NCOs with better employment conditions and career prospects.[33]

However, the path to the achievement of professionalisation at the junior level is strewn with additional hurdles. A cultural shift is also required to enable junior officers and NCOs to develop command and control responsibilities. Vesting the few NCO professionals presently serving with responsibility for technical matters has occurred to some degree, instilling leadership responsibility and delegating authority have to date proved difficult to accomplish.

Factors influencing professionalism

Historical legacy

The ASR is the new creation of a new state, but its historical legacy can be found in the CSPA – which was born in the wake of the 1948 Soviet coup – and the Czechoslovak Army (CSA) – which existed from 1918 to 1938, 1945 to 1948, and again from the November 1989 Velvet

Revolution to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation in January 1993. The postwar CSA was dominated by communists who had served with the Red Army in the Second World War. The Czechoslovak people developed a persistent image of their armed forces as being unable to protect Czechoslovak sovereignty. This image dates to the collapse of an armed resistance to the Germans in 1938, perceived complicity in the 1948 coup, perceived passivity in the 1968 Soviet invasion, and finally, the CSPA's apparent supporting role in counter-revolutionary activities in 1989 when it issued a statement that it was prepared to 'defend communism [and the] achievements of socialism' if called upon by the political leadership to do so. Consequently, the CSA started the postcommunist era with a lack of prestige. The population held the military in low esteem and perceptions of incompetence reigned.[34]

Esteem of the ASR subsequently fared better when the CSA divided in 1993. Pacifism and anti-military attitudes were more rooted in Czech than in Slovak political culture, and in the postcommunist era Slovaks have consistently ranked the military as the most trusted institution in Slovakia.[35] However, the ASR bore a greater burden in reorganising itself after the division of CSA personnel and assets on a 2:1 basis, with the Czechs getting the larger share of resources. To institute the military forces of a new state, an entire national security structure had to be built from scratch. This posed a myriad of challenges – from finding office space for the Ministry of Defence and General Staff to creating a national security community among Slovak politicians, military professionals, journalists, academics and parliamentarians.

Domestic political factors

The process of military democratisation and professionalisation necessarily takes place within the broader context of the state's overall democratic transition. The nationalist, populist and 'clientelist' brand of politics embraced by Slovakia's first postcommunist leader, Vladimir Meciar, set back this democratic transition considerably.[36] The Meciar government (1993–98) was noted for its corruption, the wielding of personal influence throughout the government and party, the bullying of opponents and minorities, and its weak commitment to economic reform.

The Meciar period seriously affected the evolution of all Slovak institutions in general, and of the national security infrastructure in particular. The military was politicised to the extent that it was viewed simply as an instrument through which the regime could exercise power, and this included rewarding party loyalists with military and civilian defence posts.[37] National interests were neglected and the international

community repeatedly cited Slovakia for its violations of democratic norms and pointedly excluded it from integration into Europe's key institutions. Moreover, the penalty for Slovakia's related failure to 'qualify' during the first round of NATO enlargement has been exacting. NATO's role in the Kosovo crisis, and the realisation that assimilating the first three invitees will be a larger task than originally anticipated, has dampened NATO's enthusiasm for further unconditional expansion in the short term. All subsequent candidates face more stringent technical standards and a more competitive process of selection.

However, the election of Mikulas Dzurinda in 1998 with a broad-based coalition winning 58 per cent of the vote and 93 seats in the 150-member Parliament offers some hope. The Dzurinda government has been able to hold together its diverse coalition, which includes leftist social democrats, a Green Party, and right-leaning Christian Democrats.[38] Rejecting Meciar's approach of positioning Slovakia between the East and the West, the first aim of the Dzurinda government was to win back the trust of the EU and NATO countries to make membership in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU and NATO the centrepiece of Slovak foreign policy. OECD membership was extended in July 2000, EU accession talks have begun, and Slovakia's NATO candidacy is considered strong should another round of expansion take place.

The Dzurinda government has initiated several measures to improve the state of Slovak national security generally, and professionalisation efforts specifically. In June 1999, the Slovak government approved a programme for preparing the country for NATO membership called PRENAME (Program for Preparing Slovakia for NATO Membership).[39] This initiative was unique in that it facilitated effective coordination within the government across all ministries, recognising that NATO candidacy is the objective of the entire state. Additionally, in response to the high-profile Garrett Report,[40] which was quite critical of the state of the Slovak armed forces, in March 2001 the Dzurinda government ordered that a comprehensive defence review be conducted to improve the national security processes and capabilities of the Slovak armed forces.[41] Finally, the government is holding firm on its pledge to sustain defence spending at 1.86 per cent of GDP despite unemployment rates of over 20 per cent and 7.7 per cent inflation. However, even this level of funding resulted in practice in the figure of 1.7 per cent of GDP, which falls short of both the NATO European average of 2 per cent and Slovakia's Membership Action Plan pledge.[42]

The government had not supported a specific plan for ending conscription, but instead relied on the systemic review to produce a

recommendation that balances affordability and desired capabilities. Force 2010, in the end, recommended absolute professionalisation and the abolition of conscription by 2006. The plan calls for gradually reducing the number of conscripts while simultaneously hiring contract soldiers.[43] However, as indicated earlier, neither funds nor conditions of service have proven sufficient to facilitate professionalisation efforts to date. The degree to which the government will embrace the Force 2010 recommendations is still uncertain, but acting on the assumption that conscription will eventually be abolished, the Ministry of Defence has initiated a public education campaign through the Ministry of Defence public affairs division to prepare the public.[44] Polls indicate that the public supports the ending of conscription, but this has not yet translated in a willingness to serve in future all-volunteer structures.[45]

Institutional capacity of national security infrastructure

The attempt at comprehensive and radical defence reform through the Slovak Republic: Force 2010 document now under consideration reflects the Dzurinda government's recognition that current capabilities are insufficient to achieve the Territorial Defence/Power Projection model advanced in the Security Strategy. Most also agree that failure of the latest reform effort would be 'catastrophic' for the armed forces, because it would indicate that even with the backing of the government, real defence reform was impossible.[46] The present Chief of the General Staff, General Milan Cerovsky, has methodically assigned Western-trained officers to key positions within the Slovak army to actively pursue reform. Failure could lead to an exodus of Western-trained officers and the return of the 'old guard' among the officer corps and would almost certainly stall a broad-based professionalisation process.

International factors

The prospect of acceding to NATO has been a tremendous impetus motivating the Dzurinda government's actions. It has been keen for Slovak forces to participate in NATO peacekeeping missions and has been supportive of Western foreign policy efforts in general. For example, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken a public stand in support of US–UK policy in Iraq. Moreover, in the 1999 Kosovo crisis the Slovak government, in the face of negative public opinion, made the decision to behave as a 'de facto ally'. This stance impressed NATO governments, especially public support for the bombing, permitting NATO aircraft to use Slovak airspace and offering its transportation infrastructure for transit if necessary.[47]

British ground forces have been allowed to exercise in a Slovak training area and a British officer has taken up a post as special advisor to General Cerovsky. Slovak professional soldiers have also attended courses aimed at teaching new methods of army command at the platoon and company levels led and funded by a British military advisory and training team at the Vyskov Military Academy in the Czech Republic.[48] Additionally, Czech and Slovak military cooperation has markedly increased. In 2000, talks were held to discuss transformation issues common to both armies and the possibility of cooperating on defence modernisation.[49] Czech and Slovak air force commanders discussed the exchange of small squadrons and Czech and Slovak defence ministers are also considering the formation of a joint Czech–Slovak peacekeeping unit.[50] Finally, a joint Czech–Slovak exercise, Blue Line 2000, was the biggest Czech–Slovak military exercise since the separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993.[51]

Conclusions

Slovakia, not unlike its postcommunist neighbours, faces numerous obstacles in democratisation and in transforming its national security institutions to meet the security needs of a democratic state. These multilayered transitions are intrinsically linked, and lapses in one dimension of Slovakia's transition will necessarily have an impact on the others. The current Slovak government has set a clear course of political, economic and military reform. It has built upon these fundamental tasks by initiating a comprehensive process of reviewing the entire national security policy-making and defence policy-making process. Concrete results thus far include some structural and personnel reforms and a comprehensive set of national security documents. The goal of Slovak Republic: Force 2010 is the culmination of this effort to improve defence capabilities in general and capabilities related to NATO membership specifically. However, real progress rather than declaratory intent is dependent on resource requirements that have hitherto severely constrained the pace of progress, and on sustained political engagement to overcome quite significant obstacles to professionalisation. In many respects the extent to which these positive steps will prove a false dawn will depend on these last two factors.

Notes

1. A more thorough treatment of these issues as well as a broad discussion of the concept of democratic military professionalism can be found in M. P. Ulrich,

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28. 'Military Strategy', 11.
29. Interview with senior Western advisor participating in the *Slovak Republic – Force 2010* project, by author, Bratislava, July 2001.
30. *Defence Assessment of the Slovak Republic*, Chapter 4.
31. Kazocins interview.
32. Pavol Vitko, Spokesman, Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, interview by author, Bratislava, July 2001.
33. '*Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic*'.
34. *The Times*, 24 November 1989.
35. According to 64.8 per cent of respondents polled in January 2000 by Markant. *Bratislava TASR*, 'Slovak Armed Forces "Most Trustworthy Institution"', *FBIS*, EUP20000214000381 (14 February 2000).
36. T. S. Szayna, 'Slovakia: Trying to Catch up with Visegrad,' *Brassey's Eurasian and East European Security Yearbook* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2000), 75–6.
37. Senior State Department official, US embassy, interview by author, Bratislava, June 1999.
38. B. I. Konviser, 'Slovakia Strives for Role in Europe', *The Washington Times* (28 May 2000), C12.
39. V. Bilcik, M. Bruncko, A. Duleba, P. Lukac and I. Samson, 'Foreign and Defence Policy of the Slovak Republic', *Slovakia: a Global Report on the State of Society* (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2001), 251.
40. This report has been referred to as *The Defence Assessment of the Slovak Republic* throughout this chapter.
41. Bilcik et al., 'Foreign and Defence Policy', 258–9.
42. Insight offered by Ivo Samson, Research Fellow, Slovak Foreign Policy Association, June 2000.
43. F. Jasik, 'Model 2010 – Vision of a Professional Army', *Bratislava Novy Den*, *FBIS*, EUP20011102000180 (30 October 2001).
44. Vitko interview.
45. Vitko interview.
46. Samson interview.
47. B. D. Wood, 'Slovakia Heads West', *Europe* (May 2000), 28. It is important to note that Slovakia offered this assistance while the political leadership within the Czech Republic (a new NATO member) feuded openly about supporting Operation Allied Force. Slovakia's offer could have had real operational consequences given the initial Czech intransigence and Austria's refusal to open up its air space. Szayna, 'Slovakia', 82.
48. *Prague CTK*, 'First British-organized Military Training Course Ends in Czech Republic' (29 November 2000) *FBIS*, EUP20001129000125.
49. *Prague CTK*, 'Czech, Slovak Chiefs of Staff Discuss Army Transformation, Cooperation' (30 October 2000) *FBIS*, EUP200001031000091.
50. *Prague CTK*, 'Air Force Chief Expects Czech Pilots to Use Slovak Base Next Year' (29 June 2000) *FBIS*, EUP20000629000362; *Prague CTK*, 'Ministers Discuss Plan to Set Up Joint Czech–Slovak Peacekeeping Unit' (2 October 2000) *FBIS*, EUP20001002000338.
51. *Prague CTK*, 'Biggest Czech–Slovak NATO-Style Military Exercise Begins' (11 September 2000) *FBIS*, EUP20000912000053.

5
Building Professional Competence in Hungary's Defence: Slow Motion

Pál Dunay

Hungary has no proud military tradition. It was on the losing side in both world wars, and during the Soviet period had the rather inglorious task of providing 'forward defence' until the arrival of Soviet reinforcements. Since this would be in support of the Soviet armed forces, Hungarian units and formations were integrated in larger Soviet formations. This resulted in a lack of independent strategic planning in the Hungarian armed forces. Moreover, all strategic planning in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) was concentrated in the Soviet General Staff, and Hungarian officers therefore had little command and staff expertise. Hungary also inherited an antiquated defence structure from the WTO era. It belonged to the southern tier of the organisation and its equipment was less modern than those of the armed forces on the northern tier – the front-line states, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the presence of large numbers of Soviet troops on its territory further reduced its military importance, and from the 1970s the Hungarian government was reluctant to invest in military procurement. Taken together, these factors resulted in poorly trained, equipped and motivated armed forces, who were not respected at either domestic or international levels. In 1989, the Hungarian military therefore faced a series of challenges. The new political system inherited outdated structures, training methods and equipment in the new environment and these could only be reformed very gradually.

This chapter analyses the process of professionalisation over the last decade and those reforms planned for the future. It focuses on three areas: first, threat perceptions and doctrinal evolution; second, recent defence reforms and their prospects; and third, the implications of abolishing conscription. This chapter argues that the Hungarian military faced the postcommunist period with limited material and intellectual

resources to effectively address the changed international security environment. As a result, it looked to the country's political elite for guidance and orientation. In practice, however, Hungary's new political parties had many far more urgent concerns, including the establishment of democratic institutions and economic transition. Much of the defence establishment was satisfied with this vacuum since it helped to delay the potentially painful processes of professionalisation. As such the military drafted reform plans which had no chance of being adopted or, if adopted, implemented.

The Hungarian Defence Force (HDF) remains a largely territorial defence structure with a very limited number of forces available to work in a NATO-led force. Since 1999, the aspiration to develop Hungarian power projection forces based on mobility and rapid reaction, full interoperability with NATO and joint force integration and supported by an all-volunteer force, is government policy. However, in the context of a decade of half-hearted defence reforms and chronic underfunding, the real danger is that the Hungarian government ends up with the worst of both worlds – a defence force incapable of defending Hungarian airspace and territory, based on low-quality, poorly trained personnel and a small rapid reaction force capable of working with NATO, but adding little military capability to that force.

Threat perceptions and doctrinal developments

Hungary bordered all three of the multinational federations which disintegrated in the early 1990s – Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Successive Hungarian governments have therefore emphasised that the main regional security problem has been instability accompanying transformation and intolerant nationalism. More recent statements have been more ambiguous. For example, the 1998 resolution of the National Assembly listed an extremely broad range of threats – many of which cannot be addressed by regular armed forces. It stated that threats to Hungarian security resulted from:

> transitory or permanent controversies between countries and groups resulting from differences in social development, economic, financial and social crises, ethnic and religious tensions, terrorism, organised crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking, demographic tension, mass migration and intense environmental problems constitute a growing risk. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the possibility of attacks on information

systems present an increasing challenge and danger. Instability and unpredictability resulting from transformation and fragility of democratisation are specific sources of danger in our region.[1]

Hungarian threat perceptions have also been fundamentally affected by NATO, with the government placing more emphasis on the value of Alliance membership in providing Hungarian security rather than the need for defence reform. Thus, in 1998, it noted that 'through NATO membership Hungary has ultimately gained a place in the community of western democracies'.[2] In 1999, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared that 'due to our fast NATO accession we have arrived at the outbreak of the warlike conflict [the Kosovo crisis] not defenceless and lonely, but as an equal member of the strongest military alliance'.[3] Indeed, defence experts often point out that 'NATO is our reserve' when arguing in favour of a reduction in the size of Hungary's reserve forces, and in 2000, the Prime Minister expressed his view that 'Hungary has a mission, we were taken to NATO to have a stabilising effect in the region of central Europe and in particular in the region of south eastern Europe through our foreign policy'.[4] In sum, the Hungarian political parties generally share the view that the country's accession to the Atlantic Alliance has reduced both the scale and the nature of threats to Hungarian security. This perception has been reinforced by the democratisation of Hungary's neighbours, and their own processes of accession into Western (security) institutions such as NATO and the EU. In security terms, the transition era for Hungary came to an end with NATO accession, and Hungary's own perception of itself is of a 'security provider' rather than a 'security consumer'. Indeed, in relation to the central European region, Orbán, observed that:

we can see that in this moment the region is stable in military–security sense, I can say more stable than a year ago....Its reason is that matters south from us on the territory of Yugoslavia are in better shape than they were a year ago. With this I do not say that every danger has come to an end as the democratic transformation has not been completed, yet. In spite of all this, I feel that the region is stable today, and one of the pledges of this stability is Hungary.[5]

Significantly, most Hungarian politicians have been more cautious in considering the security environment to the east of Hungary – and particularly that of the former Soviet Union – clearly indicating that from the government's perspective residual threats and concerns do remain.

For example, in an address to senior Hungarian officers in 2001, the Prime Minister noted:

> Hungary does not regard the countries further to the east as enemies and seeks to cooperate with them … . I would like to make it clear that … Hungary is a committed supporter and part of the western security system and that we seek good economic relations with Russia, [and that these goals] do not contradict each other.[6]

In view of the perception of a fairly low level of threat to Hungarian security, many argue that the Hungarian government should reduce the emphasis on territorial defence and focus on developing power projection capabilities that can directly contribute to Hungary's international responsibilities and non-Article 5 tasks of the Alliance. The extent to which this is a prudent move centres on four factors. First, the extent to which there is no threat to Hungary's territorial integrity. Second, the extent to which developing power projection and peace support capabilities can take place without undermining the real need to professionalise the remainder of the Hungarian armed forces. Third, the extent to which the HDF can effectively move from 'threat based' to 'capabilities based' armed forces in practice. Finally, the extent to which the Hungarian government can secure public support for higher levels of defence expenditure to develop power projection capabilities that a sizeable part of the electorate regard as unnecessary.

The current defence reform

Because the need to develop the armed forces has been low on the Hungarian political agenda, the military has remained a playground of hasty and often ill-considered reforms. No administration since independence has prioritised the issue to the extent that they have been able to create the necessary broad consensus of political opinion that would allow their own reform efforts to survive Hungary's regular changes of government. It remains to be seen whether the defence reform which was approved in June 2000 will be more resilient, particularly in the light of the defeat of Prime Minister Orbán's government in the spring 2002 elections. This repeats the pattern of the past decade, where no government since 1989 has been able to win a mandate for a second term in office, and potentially threatens continuity in the pace and direction of the current reform plan. However, the new government's commitment to the reforms may be bolstered from outside by pressure

from NATO, which is keen that Hungary take active steps to live up to its NATO commitments and increase its levels of intellectual and material interoperability with its Alliance partners.

The current defence reform was formulated in summer–autumn 1999 by the Orbán government. By this time, it had become clear that serious defence reform could be postponed no longer. This urgency stemmed from two factors. First, considerable pressure had built up over the need to transform a defence structure which absorbed major resources, without contributing greatly to the defence capability of the country. The disruption caused by the Hungarian government's decision to send one battalion to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in July 1999, for example, highlighted the financial fragility of the Hungarian defence budget. The second pressure for reform was international, and stemmed from the need for the government to demonstrate it could shoulder the burdens of NATO membership. Specific Hungarian deficiencies had been highlighted during the Kosovo crisis, when, after Serbian planes had violated Hungarian airspace, the airforce had to rely on its NATO allies to patrol its airspace.[7] While these influences have served to push defence reform up the political agenda in Hungary, it remains unclear whether they are strong enough to sustain interest in professionalisation.[8] The government initially imposed two conditions on the review: (1) it must not result in the defence budget exceeding the limitations which had already been placed on it; (2) its implementation must not result in an increase in the personnel strength of the armed forces. However, less than a year after the strategic review process was launched the Hungarian Parliament passed two resolutions. The first of these addressed the long-term transformation of the HDF. The second modified a resolution which dealt with their future personnel strength.[9] The resolution on the long-term transformation of the HDF highlighted the need for a comprehensive consideration of 'the real security policy condition', the economic performance of the country, the implications of NATO membership and the requirements of the post-Cold War era.

However, it remained ambiguous whether the government intended to depart radically from the traditional defence tasks of the HDF in the light of changing threat perceptions and Hungary's increasing contributions to international operations. In relation to this question, Parliament stated that

> as a result of the transformation there will appear a force which is smaller than its current size, affordable and capable of fulfilling its mission, particularly: to be a retaining force, to assure the defence of

the country, as well as pursue its collective defence task, to participate in peace support and humanitarian operations within the frames of international obligations, as well as participate in tasks supporting manoeuvres and transportation of Allied forces, to support law enforcement organisations in emergency stages announced on the basis of the Constitution, to provide assistance in case of national disaster and catastrophe, and participate in pursuing civil emergency tasks.[10]

Unfortunately, this list can only be regarded as a catalogue of missions, and provides no clear prioritisation of one activity over another. Moreover, the statement that, once reformed, the armed forces will be smaller does not clarify whether this will occur in the context of a move to volunteer forces, or whether it will simply mean the retention of the existing mass army but on a smaller scale. This remains the most significant long-term uncertainty about the future of Hungary's defence reforms.

Nonetheless, the resolution set forth a gradual, multiphased, long-term transformation. It reduces the personnel strength of the military as well as the overall number of reservist and wartime organisations. In addition, it increases the number of existing reservist military organisations which are manned and trained at a level that makes them capable of being used at short notice, either for defence or participation in international crisis management operations. It is also expected that the combat capability of the units will improve with the introduction of new, modern equipment. In practice, this transformation process comprises four elements. First, the (re)integration of the Defence Staff into the Ministry of Defence. Second, the reduction of the peacetime strength of the regular armed forces to a maximum of 45,000 people and the closer homogenisation of the respective wartime and peacetime strengths of the HDF.[11] By the end of 2001, the total peacetime strength of the HDF should not exceed 42,900, comprising 8600 officers, 10,230 warrant officers and NCOs, 6700 contract soldiers, 12,160 conscripts, 1200 students of higher military educational establishments and 4010 civilians.[12] Third, the resolution states that the service and branch mixture should not change, though the proportion of immediately ready forces must be higher. By 2006 the resolution envisages that there will be approximately 60 fully operational and manned combat and combat support battalions at NATO standards. These reductions are a direct consequence of NATO membership – allowing Hungary in the event of conflict to rely on the support of allied nations, making the preservation of large reserves

unnecessary. Fourth, those organisations which deal with tasks not directly related to the basic mission of the HDF as set out in the law and the resolution on long-term transformation, will be removed from the structure and budgetary responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. This strategy means that Hungary will retain conscription for the foreseeable future while the reduction in officers will help to redress the currently top-heavy officer structure of the HDF, which – at the end of the 1980s – meant that lieutenant colonels formed the largest professional group in the military.

The process of transformation of the HDF is divided into three phases between 2000 and 2010. During the first phase from 2000 to 2003, the emphasis of the reform will be on transition to the new structure, relocation of troops, the establishment of adequate proportions of the personnel strength, the creation of the basis for reducing operational costs and costs of maintenance, improvement of living and working conditions, and the establishment of a minimum level of NATO interoperability. The second phase from 2003 to 2006, will pursue programmes to improve the quality of life, combat capability and training of the HDF. Until the end of this phase the armed forces will essentially have to operate on the basis of existing – though in some case upgraded – equipment. Phase three from 2006 to 2010, will see the modernisation of equipment in accordance with capability requirements, and the demands of increased NATO compatibility and interoperability. Priority will be given to areas related to command, control and information, integrated air defence, logistical systems, mobility, host nation support and the survivability of troops and infrastructure.

There is no doubt that the reform – which amounts to a strategic defence review – is comprehensive. However, it has stopped short of making particularly fundamental reforms and it remains to be seen whether if implemented it will provide Hungary with a force that meets Hungarians' security requirements. Prime Minister Orbán certainly appears to be serious about the initial stages of the reform, and has staked the government's political credibility on delivering the reforms. Thus, the defence budget has been increased to 1.81 per cent of GDP from its previous level of 1.61 per cent, and in the Ministry of Defence, new civilians and military officers have been given responsibility for delivering its goals. However, despite these developments, economic constraints are likely to play a significant role in the reform process, and previous governments have a track record of promising resources and then failing to deliver increases in defence expenditure.[13] However, the funds allocated to investment and development have started to gradually increase. In the

first half of the 1990s, 2.7 per cent of the defence budget was allocated for investment and development, of which 1.3 per cent was used for development. In 2000, these figures had increased to 15.9 and 3.8 per cent respectively.[14] However, the question remains whether the proposed increase in the Hungarian defence budget is sufficient to modernise the armed forces effectively. The starting point for the current reform is already at a fairly low level, and there is a danger that Hungary's defence reforms will make the HDF – in a technical sense at least – not 'small but modern' but 'small and mostly obsolete'.

Parliament's resolution on the long-term transformation of the HDF has caused a degree of concern among Hungary's NATO allies. In particular, the postponement of the investment heavy phase of the strategic review beyond the term of office of the current government and indeed its successor raises questions about the predictability of the reform process and in the medium term the seriousness of its interest. Moreover, in light of Hungary's high economic growth rate of recent years – and especially in 2000 when GDP grew by 5.2 per cent – many experts have questioned the appropriateness of the scheduling of the most investment heavy phase of the defence reform. Recent government actions in the run-up to the spring 2002 elections, notably sacrificing spending on the modernisation of military technology in favour of spending more likely to influence voting patterns, have generated some cynicism. Some have already argued that the defence reform serves to satisfy the Western partners of the country, or at least to placate them rather than actually professionalising the HDF.

In addition to technical modernisation, it is also crucial for the HDF to change the attitude and composition of its professional military personnel. Indeed, during the communist period, the Hungarian armed forces suffered from low levels of professional competence. Key difficulties that remain are: the mentality of the military establishment and their resistance to change; the quality of the professional knowledge transmitted by military high schools and defence academies; the establishment of a new professional NCO corps; long-term personnel planning, and retention planning specifically; the predictability of military careers and the transparency of the promotion system; the problems of calling up conscripts and their effect on a mixed system consisting of both conscripts and contract soldiers.

Though 'human compatibility' was promised by Prime Minister Antall in his speech to the North Atlantic Council in 1991, attitudes change slowly. In the HDF a generation of service personnel are struggling to adapt to the new system in large part as a consequence of their

previous training. This situation is aggravated by two factors. First, personnel leaving the armed forces are unlikely to be able to compete successfully in the labour market. Second, as a consequence of Hungary's negotiated transition, there was no major personnel shake-up in the armed forces, and this has contributed to the very gradual nature of the change in the composition of the officer corps.

Moreover, four tensions are already evident between service personnel. First, younger officers are becoming impatient with the speed of change. Many of these officers have argued for faster career advancement on the basis of better training and higher standards of professionalism. In turn, officers from the older generation have argued that younger generation officers lack command and staff experience and are therefore unready for more senior positions.[15] Second, tensions have also emerged between military professionals who participate in international assignments and those who have no chance to do so. Proficiency in English has become a valued skill, though it has led to fears among some that language abilities are valued more highly than other military professional skills.[16] A third tension results from differences in rates of pay. For example, the income of officers and NCOs serving in Hungary is approximately one-eighth the NATO average, while it matches the NATO average in international missions.[17] As a result, those officers who are internationally 'marketable' have a chance to catch up with – or even match – the incomes of employees in civilian sectors of the economy. Finally, international duties have also served to widen the gap between the professional standards of these service personnel and the remainder of the armed forces – arousing jealousy and contempt from both groups and eroding a shared sense of professional pride in the HDF.

Officer training has also been a major challenge in professionalising the HDF. Initially, there were no military officers in the HDF who were in a position to train future officers in the new spirit. This resulted in a 'parallel' approach to training where both WTO/Soviet doctrine was taught, as well as NATO strategic thinking. This familiarised new Hungarian officers with the military thinking of the Soviet Union and Russia – perhaps the major potential threat to Hungarian security. However, this parallelism persisted well into the mid-1990s at the cost of developing a better understanding of more relevant military doctrine. Indeed, a decade after the fall of communism, the legitimacy and direction of training at the Hungarian Defence Academy are still hotly contested. Training problems are compounded by the sometimes sub-standard quality of the trainers, leading to uneven and often rather poor training levels for officers.

The most severe problems relate to the establishment of a new professional NCO corps and also have their roots in the organisation of the communist era. During the Cold War period, NCOs in the Hungarian armed forces tended to carry out menial tasks – in an army which itself was not held in high regard. Since 1989 Hungarian NCOs have continued to be badly paid, poorly educated and held in low esteem and, as a consequence, there has been a serious retention problem with this group of service personnel – an outflow which has not been addressed by recruitment or promotion. This mass departure of NCOs has been due to a variety of different factors, of which two are perhaps most significant. First, many left because of their heavy workloads. This was particularly the case among those posted to units in the countryside where working hours tend to be more irregular than at headquarters. Second, many units were relocated and reorganised and many NCOs were not prepared to move to new units or locations. Unfortunately, this mass departure of NCOs has had a snowball effect, serving to increase the workload of those remaining. Between 1990 and 1993, 5100 NCOs left the HDF. Between 1994 and 1998, this figure was 4632. Only 7800 new NCOs joined the armed forces in this same period, and of these, only 1600 attended the Regular NCO school. Even more troubling is the fact that 80–90 per cent of those who left were below the age of 35, and for 50–60 per cent of them, it was not their first-choice profession.[18] Perhaps more shocking was the level of undermanning in the 1990s when national unemployment rates were over 10 per cent. With unemployment rates now at 5.6 per cent there are even fewer recruits, and the NCO shortage has increased in severity. The constant shortage of NCOs is only likely to be addressed if measures are introduced to increase their prestige, the quality of their training, their income and the development of attractive career paths.

Long-term personnel planning in the HDF has also proved difficult for several reasons. As a result of the low incomes of officers and NCOs, most military families rely on two incomes, and it has proved difficult for military spouses to find appropriate jobs in new areas. Reluctant to move, many service personnel have preferred to take early retirement, leaving critical gaps and undermanning. Moreover, the scale of service personnel taking early retirement has damaged many of the government's existing defence plans.[19] The costs of these layoffs are substantial, with the Deputy State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence responsible for personnel estimating that in 2001 and 2002, the cost would be approximately 10 billion forints (approximately USD35.7 million).[20] On this basis, a 'peace dividend' from the HDFs downsizing will only become available in 2003.

Moreover, long-term personnel planning has been an extremely difficult task in the context of successive short-term defence reform plans. This led to a downgrading of personnel planning with negative consequences for military career prospects. The promotion system of the HDF is not politicised, but it is certainly hampered by a lack of consistency, predictability and professionalism. Hungary's accession to NATO has in some important respects fixed some of the major parameters of the country's security policy, and in time might offer some stability for more effective personnel planning.

The abolition of conscription and its prospects

Throughout the decades of communism military service was compulsory in Hungary, and the armed forces were based on conscription. Over this period, the service time for conscripts gradually reduced from 3 years to 12 months. Since 1989, service time has been reduced to nine months and in January 2002 new reforms will reduce this to six months.[21] Moreover, the HDF has experienced increasingly severe disciplinary problems in relation to conscripts in recent years. Many draftees falsify their health examination results or attempt to bribe doctors involved in the conscription process in order to evade their call-up. The scale of this problem makes sanctions difficult to enforce, and there are some Hungarian counties where up to 70 per cent of all draftees are declared unfit.[22] It is not therefore surprising that there is a broad consensus among Hungary's parliamentary parties that conscription should be abolished in the next six to eight years.[23] The government itself reinforced these tendencies, when, in preparation for the referendum on Hungary's accession to NATO, it declared that NATO membership would result in the abolition of compulsory military service in a reasonably short period of time.

The timing of the abolition of conscription has been debated in Hungary, with the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) keen to move swiftly towards the introduction of a fully professional HDF in 2002. However, according to government calculations, the associated costs of such a move – in areas such as increased salaries and improved working conditions – would amount to between 70 and 90 billion forints (USD235–300 million) and would require a 50 per cent increase in the defence budget. There are also strong ideological objections to ending conscription, with several conservative parliamentarians expressing the view that armed forces based on conscription link the armed forces better to Hungarian society. Indeed, the chairman of the

parliamentary defence committee went so far to suggest that conscription is a matter of the 'philosophy of the nation'.[24] The two parties, the Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats, which formed the government at the end of May 2002 are committed to abolish conscription before the end of their term of office. The liberals, according to their promise made during the election campaign, would not call up conscripts to serve after 1 January 2003. The Socialists are more moderate and speak about terminating conscription by 2006.[25] It is most probable that the date of 1 January 2006 will be chosen for abolishing conscription. This means that during the term of office of this government such a decision will be put into effect. The date is a perfect selection for two reasons: first, the implementation of the decision can be adequately prepared during the years preceding it; and second, its introduction will most probably precede the next elections by several months and add to the popularity of the governing forces.

It is important to consider the problems of such a decision, however. First of all, there will be significant problems with military discipline in the period of transition. Young people will either try to avoid the draft or will serve with a lukewarm attitude. Beyond the problems of transition, the government should understand that it is impossible to put such a decision into force without another significant reform of the armed forces. In the absence of major additional financial resources the size of the HDF should be reduced further. It is necessary to find those people in the labour market who are ready to serve as contract soldiers or become NCOs. The will be extremely difficult in light of the current state of the Hungarian economy without a major increase in soldier and NCO incomes and other benefits. These problems notwithstanding, this major step is unavoidable.

In January 2002, before the end of the term of office of the conservative government, the amount of time conscripts have to serve was cut to six months. According to official explanation, this was in order to increase the number of people who are eligible for the draft.[26] Since Hungary's conscripts cannot be employed in international operations, the reduction in length of service will place volunteers under pressure in manning international missions in which the HDF is a participant.[27]

Conclusions

The recent military reform shows that the HDF is gradually moving in the direction of increased volunteer forces. In this sense, it helps to prepare the ground for their necessary modernisation. It is clear, for example, that

for different reasons, the reduction in size of the armed forces making for a 'leaner and meaner' defence sector has lately gained priority in the process. Though this is an important step in the right direction, it is neither identical with, nor indispensable to, modernisation. Consequently, the key question in relation to the current strategic review is whether it is being carried out in preparation for a more decisive, large-scale reform at a later stage, or whether the political establishment assumes that it is the last reform for a long while. If the former, then it can be regarded as an important step in the right direction – particularly in relation to issues such as downsizing and the resubordination of the Defence Staff to the Ministry of Defence. If the latter, then the implications are more negative. The reform will be insufficient and stop short of taking the radical steps necessary. In practice, it seems that the Hungarian government and defence establishment have not yet decided the appropriate balance and the relative importance of the national defence role of the HDF, and its need to contribute to the tasks of the Atlantic Alliance – and indeed, power projection capabilities more widely. In the light of this, it has not been able to conclude whether Hungary needs a small, fully professional, 'elite' armed force, or whether it is enough to improve the earlier defence structure and downsize it as necessary. It is a reflection of this dilemma that the new structure has not departed from the mass army concept, and conscription has not yet been abolished.

Reforms in the key areas of mission and role definition, the development of military education, training and technical expertise, and reform of command and control systems and promotion remain half-hearted. Indeed, government policy in this area has not consistently been motivated by a commitment to creating HDF forces able to effectively and efficiently fulfil the roles and missions set by the government. In the specific case of abolishing conscription, official statements leave doubt as to whether there is any real commitment to change in the near future. Moreover, many key reforms have been postponed, and the modernisation of armaments and equipment has not reached a stage that would make the advantages of a professional armed force apparent.

The limited nature of professionalisation of the HDF carries with it implications for other prospective NATO member states. While NATO influence has been sufficient to encourage a rhetorical commitment to developing rapid reaction forces capable of demonstrating that Hungary can play a role in new NATO tasks, the real added value to Hungarian security remains unclear, and the danger is that these reforms take place as a substitute for a more broad-ranging professionalisation process that reaches the whole of the HDF. As is the case in most central and eastern

European states, the need to apply sufficient resources to the process of professionalisation – and on a consistent basis – has proved a real challenge. Unlike most transition states, high levels of economic growth in Hungary undermine claims that the country cannot afford expensive defence reforms. Perhaps the greatest disservice Hungary has done to the defence reform process is to highlight the powerlessness of NATO allies to promote defence reform once a state has become a member. The creation of Membership Action Plans, a more targeted approach to professionalisation and a greater emphasis on the technical criterion for NATO membership may go some way towards addressing this, but if NATO is not to be hollowed out by new members consuming rather than supplying security, successive Hungarian governments and indeed the Hungarian electorate will need to ensure this new defence reform programme does not end up like all the others – ineffective and poorly executed.

The professionalisation process in Hungary is characterised by a poorly designed reform programme targeted at an existing antiquated defence structure which had low levels of professionalisation. Defence reform has simply not been prioritised by consecutive Hungarian governments over the past decade. Painful choices have been avoided, and there has been a significant mismatch between rhetorical statements and government defence policy, and the reality of action in the HDF.

Notes

1. Resolution 94/1998 (28 December) OGY határozat (Resolution of the National Assembly), in F. Gazdag (ed.), *Magyar biztonság- és védelempolitikai dokumentumok 1989–1998* (Hungarian security- and defence policy documents 1989–1998), Vol. 1 (Budapest: SVKI, 1998), 53–7.
2. *Az új évezred küszöbén: Kormányprogram a polgári Magyarországért* (On the eve of the new millennium: Government programme for civic Hungary) (Budapest, n.p., 1998), 63.
3. *Parlamenti vitanap: a miniszterelnök expozéja (29 April 1999)* (Day of Debate in the Parliament: The exposé of the Prime Minister) at: http://www.meh.hu/Kormany/Kormanyfo/1999/04/990429.htm, 1.
4. *Orbán Viktor a pozsonyi NATO konferencián (29 April 2000)* (Viktor Orbán at the NATO Conference in Bratislava) at: http://www.meh.hu/Kormany/Kormanyfo/2000/04/000429.htm, 1.
5. *A miniszterelnök a feladatszabó értekezleten (1 March 2001)* (The Prime Minister at the Task Assigning Conference of the Hungarian Defence Forces) at: http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=717, 2.
6. *A miniszterelnök*, 2.
7. Due to the persistence of IFF (identification friend or foe) problems, the Hungarian aircraft were obliged to stay on the ground throughout the entire Kosovo operation. This problem will persist until Hungary's MIG-29s are replaced by new leased Gripens.

8. For details of the early phase of the reform, see P. Dunay, 'Hungary', in H. Giessmann and G. Gustenau (eds), *Security Handbook 2001* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001), 255–62, and J. Simon, 'Hungary: Exorcising Trianon Ghosts', in U. Markus and D. Nelson (eds), *Brassey's Eurasian and European Security Yearbook 2000* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2000), 67–70.

9. *61/2000 (VI. 21.) OGY határozat a Magyar Honvédség hosszú távú átalakításának irányairól* (Resolution 61/2000 (21 June) of the Parliament on the long-term transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces) at: http://www.kerszov.hu/kzldat/O00H0061.HTM/mun_2.htm and *62/2000 (VI. 21.) OGY határozat a fegyveres erők részletes bontású létszámáról szóló 124/1997 (XII. 18.) határozat módosításáról* (Resolution 62/2000 (21 June) of the Parliament on modification of Resolution 124/1997 (18 December) of the Parliament regarding to the detailed personnel strength of the armed forces) at: http://www.kerszov.hu/kzldat/O00H0062.HTM/O00H0062.HTM. A not entirely precise English translation is available from the Hungarian Ministry of Defence.

10. *61/2000 (VI. 21.) OGY határozat* (Resolution 61/2000 (21 June) of the Parliament) point 3, at: http://www.kerszov.hu/kzldat/O00H0061.HTM/mun_2.htm

11. According to MoD estimates, wartime personnel strength will be approximately 50–60 per cent higher than the authorised peacetime personnel strength of the Hungarian Defence Forces. *Transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces* at: http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=582, 4.

12. *62/2000 (VI. 21.) OGY határozat a fegyveres erők részletes bontású létszámáról szóló 124/1997 (XII. 18.) határozat módosításáról* (Resolution 62/2000 (21 June) of the Parliament on modification of Resolution 124/1997 (18 December) of the Parliament regarding to the detailed personnel strength of the armed forces), point 1.

13. *Szerda reggel: Beszélgetések Orbán Viktor miniszterelnökkel 1998. december 5.–2000. december 27* (Wednesday mornings: Interviews with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, 5 December 1998–27 December 2000) (Budapest: Püski, 2001), 116. The cited interview took place on 14 July 1999.

14. It should be taken into account, however, that this trend can be significantly affected by particular year-on-year development such as the leasing of 14 Gripen aircraft in either 2003 of 2004. For the data see F. Gazdag, 'Une Décennie d'Indépendence – La Politique de Sécurité Hongroise 1989–2000', in F. Gazdag (ed.), *La sécurité de la Hongrie dans le nouveau contexte régional et international* (Hungary's security in the new regional and international context), Defence Studies No. 41 (Budapest: Institute of Strategic and Defence Studies, 2000), 56 and *2000. évi CXXXIII törvény a Magyar Köztársaság 2001. és 2002. évi költségvetéséről* (Law no. CXXXIII of 2000 on the Budget of 2001 and 2002 of the Republic of Hungary) at: http:// www.complex.hu/kzldat/t0000133.htm/mun_2.htm

15. L. Makk, 'NATO-csatlakozás, értékváltás, egzisztencia, esélyek, karrierépítés' (NATO accession, change of values, existence prospects, career-building), *Humán Szemle*, No. 3 (1999), 11.

16. Makk, 'NATO-csatlakozás', 11.

17. L. Hülvely, 'Javaslat a személyi kiegészítési rendszer átalakítására II' (Proposal for the change of the system of personnel substitution, part 2), *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, No. 6 (2001), 34.

18. Z. Szalay, *A Magyar Honvédség tiszthelyettes- és zászlósképzésének fejlesztési koncepciója* (The concept of development of the NCO and ensign training of the Hungarian Defence Forces), *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, No. 2 (2000), 47.

19. Z. Haszán and G. Szabó, 'Több lesz a pályaelhagyó katona a tervezettnél' (There will be more military people leaving their profession than planned), *Magyar Hírlap* (30 May 2000).

20. Z. Kiss, 'Napirenden a haderőreform' (The defence reform on the agenda), *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, No. 4 (2000), 6.

21. 'Hat hónapra csökken a katonai szolgálati idő' (Compulsory service time will be reduced to six months), *Népszabadság* (7 March 2001).

22. L. Hülvely, 'Javaslat a személyi kiegészítési rendszer átalakítására I' (Proposal for the change of the system of personnel substitution, part 1), *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, No. 5 (2001), 34.

23. P. Mátyuc, 'Hivatásos hadsereg hat-nyolc év múlva?' (Professional armed forces in 6–8 years time?), *Népszabadság* (3 February 2000).

24. *Lányi Zsolt hozzászólása* (The contribution of Zsolt Lányi to the debate of the National Assembly) (19 June 2000), 2.

25. The new Minister of Defence, Ferenc Juhász, when candidate of the Hungarian Socialist Party for the post made this promise. See T. J. K., 'A szocialista miniszterjelölt a honvédség àtalakitàsarol' (The socialist candidate for the post of minister of defence about the reform of the HDF), *Népszabadsàg* (8 March 2002).

26. S. Székely, 'A hadkiegészítési rendszer jelene és jövője a stratégiai felülvizsgálat tükrében' (The present and future of the replenishment system in light of the strategic review), *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, No. 4 (2000), 14.

27. There were 757 Hungarian military personnel on international assignment on 1 September 2001 in the service of the UN, OSCE and NATO. The largest contingents serve in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and KFOR.

Part II
The Baltic States

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6
Professionalisation of the Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: the Case of Latvia

Jan Arveds Trapans

The professionalisation of the Latvian armed forces began in 1991 when Latvia regained its independence. The influential International Defence Advisory Board to the Baltic States (IDAB) wrote of this time:

> it is worth recalling that, at the beginning, neither national ministries nor national armed forces existed; that the military infrastructure was in ruins; that equipment and logistical support were almost non-existent; that public support for the professional military was low; that training and experience … had been gained in a very different Soviet system, that the language of cooperation between the three states was Russian; and that the pressing operational task was to secure the final withdrawal of Russian troops and to secure state borders.[1]

When the Soviet army withdrew from Latvia, according to a NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report '(all) that was left behind consisted of 26 sunken submarines and ships leaking acid, oil and phosphorus. It was on this foundation that Latvia began building its armed forces.'[2] However, there were some advantages to this starting position. Unlike the central European countries, Latvia did not inherit the Warsaw Pact military establishment – consisting of a large force structure with heavy weapons, unexpectedly reincarnated as a national armed force in a newly sovereign state. In practice it has proved more difficult to restructure existing military establishments than to build them from the ground up. Nonetheless, in Latvia, the challenges have been significant, not least because of the psychological legacy of the Soviet period.

In the decade since independence, the Latvian armed forces have, step by step, moved away from a rather amateur organisation towards a professional military force. As the introduction to this volume sets out, professional armed forces accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of civilian government and are able to carry out military activities in an effective and efficient way. Professional armed forces have four key characteristics: a clearly defined mission and structure; the expertise to carry out external and domestic functions; clear rules about the military as an institution and the behaviour of the soldiers; and finally a recognition of competence – of promotions based on merit rather than on political grounds or favouritism.

In 1991, Latvia's Parliament was still called a Supreme Soviet. There was neither a defence ministry nor anything much in the way of governmental structures that in the West deal with defence affairs. The institutional arrangements for democratic control over the armed forces, like the armed forces themselves, had to be built *ab initio*. Latvia's fledging civilian leadership had to create a framework within which the soldiers could assume their place as neutral, apolitical servants. This condition deserves some comment.

Professionalisation of the Latvian armed forces in context

On independence Latvia restored its 1922 constitution without changes, and this has provided a solid foundation for democratic control of the military. Thereafter, the Latvian Parliament (the Saeima) has passed laws and provided regulations for the armed forces. As the Latvian Head of State, the President generally has limited political powers, though he is the nominal commander of the armed forces in peacetime and appoints a military commander in wartime. The President can declare war only following the decision of the Saeima, but can initiate necessary defence measures in the event of aggression. The parliamentary committees for security and defence affairs consider all pertinent legislation: the Saeima approves the budget, settles on the size of the armed forces, confirms the commander of the national forces and decides on Latvia's participation in international missions. It took time to pass the necessary legislation, but by 1994 the essential elements of civilian control were in place, though as in other new democracies, some laws were ambiguous and imprecise and revisions were needed. There has been some manoeuvring by the military directed towards policy-makers, but what has taken place can broadly be located within the limits of accepted democratic practice. Service personnel have

accepted the essential principle of democratic civilian control, a development validated through external audit of Latvian civil–military relations by the North Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly, the Kievenaar Study and the Latvian Membership Action Plan for NATO (MAP).[3]

A second context within which professionalisation has taken place is the appearance of distinct Latvian armed forces at the end of the Soviet period. As with Latvia's political structure, its armed forces emerged from the tumultuous events during the implosion of the Soviet empire. Early in 1991, when local Soviet forces attempted an unsuccessful coup, a large volunteer self-defence force emerged which later was designated as the Zemessardze (National Guard). In addition, the Saeima established a border guard formation and a special armed unit was created in order to defend Parliament from Soviet troops. Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Defence Committee summoned Latvian officers who had served in the Soviet army to set up regular armed forces. The Defence Ministry was only established in November 1991, after the new formations had been created, and faced the task of organising a number of ill-coordinated military initiatives which took some time to address.[4] The volunteer National Guard was the largest armed body in Latvia, numbering some 17,000 men. It had commanders with limited military experience, but imbued with a deep spirit of patriotism who saw themselves as the leaders of a 'nation in arms'. From the outset, there was a rivalry between the small professional force set up by ex-Soviet Latvian officers and the large volunteer body. The National Guard viewed former Soviet army officers with suspicion – sometimes contemptuously called 'the Red Colonels' – and professional ex-Soviet officers doubted the competence of the volunteers. Latvia's Defence Ministry faced the possibility of two separate military establishments developing – at odds with each other and with separate chains of command and separate supporters in the Saeima.[5] Resolving the complications especially in terms of developing missions and structures, a chain of command and joint headquarters was problematic for the Ministry of Defence. However, in time, a unified structure did emerge though, as will be discussed later, this foundational experience has had important consequences for professionalisation processes in Latvia.

Two additional factors have shaped professionalisation in Latvia. Geostrategically, Latvia has a large, acquisitive neighbour to the east, a sea to the west and two friendly but small neighbours to the north and the south. Its economy is small and so is its population. Defence plans have to be closely linked to the economic and demographic resources that the society has available and there will never be sufficient

resources, in terms of personnel or *matériel*, to counter a major external threat. As a result, the Latvian government has developed a strategy that can deny a rapid victory to an enemy and make the political and economic losses to any aggressor outweigh the envisaged benefits. At the same time it has had to recognise new threats as well as traditional risks, the requirements of regional security, and the consequences of the eastward expansion of NATO. These requirements were recognised in the various revisions of Latvia's National Security Concept, the most recent version of which was formulated in 1997.[6] The Concept states that the objectives of national security are to protect and preserve the nation's sovereignty, territorial integrity, a democratic, constitutional form of government, market economy, national identity and human rights. It recognises the importance of civilian control over the military and states that Latvia does not threaten any state and has a defensive posture. The Concept outlines Latvia's intention to join NATO and states that the armed forces have to prepare for this. Latvia assumes that a threat to one Baltic state is a threat to all three and that cooperation between the Baltic states will help lead to their integration into European and transatlantic structures. The Concept also recognises 'new' security risks to Latvia, that cannot be addressed through traditional military means. Three missions are identified for the armed forces. The first of these is to protect the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The second tasks the peacetime military with providing deterrence by demonstrating their readiness and capability to defend the nation's sovereignty. The third mission entails the armed forces' provision of support to the civil powers in emergency situations. Under the threat of a war, or in wartime conditions, they will defend national territory, airspace, territorial waters and key administrative and political centres.

The National Security Concept provided a basic statement on the missions and organisation of the armed forces and outlined a force structure. The armed forces are to consist of a conscript core backed by a large volunteer reserve. They are small, predominantly land based, but with naval and air force components. Defence plans, based on the Security Concept, call for regular armed forces with a strength of 10,000, consisting of 4000 volunteers and 6000 conscripts. The reserve component would number between 35,000 and 40,000.[7] However, the defence planners understood that the envisaged force structure would take some ten years to put in place. Latvia could not afford the necessary weapons, equipment and supplies, or conduct large-scale training to build up the desired end strength in a short time. Therefore it adopted a strategy similar to Finland's – territorial and total defence. A great power aims at

a swift military victory, forcing the defender to capitulate militarily and politically. A small country must deny the aggressor's objective, fighting on its home territory with extended small-scale actions. Territorial defence is a decentralised but cohesive military action. It is carried out by a small, active force, in a high readiness condition, supported by reserve components, relatively stationary and locally mobilised, organised in defence regions and defence districts. An aggressor would be met with protracted military resistance throughout the country's territory. Total defence includes passive resistance by the civilian population.[8] If a small country can rapidly mobilise reasonably well-equipped forces supported by the population, it can continue resistance until the political and economic costs to the aggressor exceed strategic benefits. Russia was considered the external threat to the Baltic states, but it was also recognised that it was not an immediate one. The Russian army is a shadow of the former Soviet army, but it could rebuild its strength and given the position of the Baltic states, it would not be wise for Latvia to rule out the prospect of Russian military aggression. In the mean time, Latvia would build up a defence capability, cope with the new risks, cooperate with Estonia and Lithuania and prepare for NATO membership.[9]

One aspect of the Baltic approach to the creation of efficient and effective armed forces is close defence cooperation as a force multiplier, and the three nations have closely collaborated since they regained independence. The first major project was the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion or BALTBAT, proposed in a meeting of Baltic defence chiefs in 1993. This peacekeeping battalion has allowed the Baltic nations to contribute to international peace and visibly re-enter the international community. The defence chiefs also hoped that the battalion will encourage defence interoperability among the three nations. Thus from the outset the battalion had both political and defence aims. It proved to be the first link in a mesh of regional security arrangements, and in 1995 the Baltic defence ministers signed an agreement identifying more specific areas of cooperation. This led to a Baltic Naval Squadron – BALTRON, a Baltic Air Surveillance Network – BALTNET and a Baltic Defence College. NATO membership requires interoperable staff procedures, communications systems, similar tactics, leadership principles and a shared military ethos in member countries. English language training has a high priority. Preparation for NATO membership thus helps Baltic defence cooperation. All three countries are developing the same command, control and information systems, logistics, resource management and training concepts based on NATO experience. Thus external and internal requirements are shaping similar Baltic defence establishments.[10]

Defence requirements, together with Latvia's political system, determine the specifics of professionalism which can be summed up as follows. Latvian armed forces are small, with regular and reserve components. Politically, officers have to be conscious that they belong to a democratic society. All of them need a combination of military and civilian skills, including knowledge of the democratic controls placed over the military. Militarily, they conduct operations as platoon, company and battalion commanders. This places emphasis on unit tactics and communications. At all levels of command, this requires the delegation of command responsibilities, initiative, individual leadership abilities and good relations between officers and enlisted men – characteristics that had not been important in Soviet military professionalism. Company and battalion commanders should have the ability to work with their Baltic counterparts and be good administrators of defence resources in line with relevant legal provisions and procedures. Senior officers serving at higher headquarters, senior staff positions or at international institutions – are expected to be 'military commander[s], … military diplomat[s] (or) … military policy maker[s]'.[11] The value of the professional non-commissioned officers who serve in Western armies has also been recognised in the Baltic states and Latvia is making preparations to train its own NCO cadre.

However, although professionalism was acknowledged as a means to deliver the national security strategy during most of the 1990s, progress has been slow. Defence reform was retarded by a lack of clear political support and less visibly a heritage of the Soviet past that undermined professional development. An additional major problem in this area was lack of funds and in particular severe shortfalls in defence expenditure. At the outset, the government's annual budget was small and social needs claimed a large share of what there was. In the absence of any reliable inflow of government revenue there was no dependable expenditure projection and funds voted by the Saeima rarely matched that which was needed by the Defence Ministry. While Latvia's defence planners could envisage how the armed forces should be developed, in reality budgets were barely sufficient to keep the defence establishment on an even keel. 'Whilst accepting that there are always competing demands for scarce resources and that the decisions on how these resources are allocated is a political one, to be decided on the cabinet level', wrote IDAB, 'we nevertheless judge that the low proportion of GNP allocated to defence in all the Baltic States has been historically such as to … frustrate internal military development.'[12] A chronic uncertainty about how much money would be provided for defence made

long-term planning a futile exercise. Military and civilians in the defence community developed new skills and marked time, waiting for the dawdling, politician-led supply train to catch up.

However, the late 1990s brought a more serious approach to defence reform. As Latvia's economy began to improve, the Saeima was able to vote defence budgets capable of delivering a reform agenda. Moreover, the Latvian government's commitment to NATO membership and encouragement at the Washington Summit in 1999 provided an influential external incentive to turn plans for more professional armed forces into reality. NATO gave a clear message to the Latvian government when in an assessment of Latvia it stated that 'the speed at which Latvia can build its armed forces depends in large part upon the level of spending it provides for support as well as the economic rate of growth'.[13] The resolve of the political establishment to commit more fully to defence reform was further bolstered by changing public attitudes to defence. Opinion polls indicated growing support for the armed forces and defence appropriations and an effective public relations programme by the Defence Ministry also helped to shape public views in this area. Indeed, Latvian defence expenditure has increased, from 0.69 per cent of GDP in 1997 to 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2001.[14]

The economic problems that slowed down the development of the Latvian armed forces can be clearly seen. Less visible but perhaps as difficult to overcome has been the heritage of the Soviet past. At the outset, what little knowledge Latvia's civilians had of defence planning was coloured by the Soviet experience. Soviet rule had left a culture that demanded conformity not initiative, control not delegation, compartmentalisation not cooperation, and secrecy not transparency. Although the Baltic political systems had changed, the supporting civil servants were slow to depart from their old ways. Bureaucratic processes did not exist or functioned inadequately and there was a lack of national governmental capacity, of people with overall competence for defence policy formulation and planning. Ministries, parliamentary committees and presidential advisors often lacked expertise. An aversion to information sharing and a culture of secrecy significantly affected the ability of other governmental agencies to establish relationships with each other and with the media and society at large. What countries like Latvia really needed was

a long period of readjustment; time to think out their new national security situation; time and money to plan at a measured pace downsizing and restructuring; time to work out new training systems and

procurement policies. But in the real world, everything has had to be done at once, with no clear vision of the future, and with strictly limited money.[15]

Initially, Latvian defence planning was in the hands of former Soviet army officers who had volunteered for armed forces that were still to be established. Although their loyalty to an independent Latvia should not be questioned, given their experience they were inclined to construct the defence forces according to Soviet practices – small but with a top-heavy grade structure. As a result, the Latvian armed forces were hindered by the inertia of old thinking, planning and organisation. Thus modernisation was significantly hampered by a layer of officers 'who lie like impermeable permafrost, lodged between the leaders at the top, who wish to speed up modernisation and those below, who actively desire it'.[16] Western observers noted that by the late 1990s progress had been made 'to thaw out those who can be persuaded of the need to adapt, and to thin out those who cannot'.[17] But a decade or so on, a generational change is evident. A new and well-trained group of younger officers was emerging, eager to take on more responsibility and supported by a younger generation of Western-educated civilian defence officials. Thus, by the late 1990s, there was a core of defence experts who could function with growing confidence in their role vis-à-vis the armed forces. However, their number, although increasing, was still small, leading IDAB to observe that 'enormous weight rests on the shoulders of a small group of admirable young men and women, who struggle to keep on top of the problem at hand'.[18] By 2001 it was clear that Latvian plans for a professional force were basically sound and could be implemented over the next decade, provided that funding was made available.[19]

Military education

One key element of developing professional armed forces is through military education. In Latvia's circumstances, education has had a leading role. Latvia did not have to restructure Soviet military schools since they were removed with the Soviet withdrawal. But building a new military education and command and staff training has taken time. The National Defence Academy, established in 1992, has undergone several reorganisations. The latest review, which changed the entry requirements, length of studies, and curriculum, was completed in 2001. Henceforth, the Academy will accept university graduates who have to pass exacting examinations. The cadets will receive a short, intensive

one-year basic military education, with subsequent assignments at other schools as a part of an officer's career path. The objective is to develop military professionalism in relation to technical military skills combined with high moral standards, intellectual qualities, the ability to lead by example and good communications with soldiers in the unit. Military discipline and unit cohesiveness are to come from a respectful treatment of soldiers and recognition of individual initiative.[20]

Field grade officers receive education at the Baltic Defence College in Estonia, which was established in 1999. Instruction covers strategy, total and territorial defence, staff duties and logistics. The students learn operational art, the development and application of military technology, national defence planning and how planning is related to a nation's economic and social resources. Instruction takes into account the geographic and political conditions, defence concepts and different administrative and legal systems of each country. Instruction is based on *Auftragstaktik* – mission-oriented command in the defence environment of the Baltic States. The College is also the place where a common Baltic military doctrine is being developed. The graduates are trained to serve as chiefs of staff at infantry brigade level and at defence regions, for planning positions in defence ministries, General Staff positions and international duties.[21]

An objective method of promoting officers is clearly a central requirement of professionalism. The Soviet system lacked a transparent, consistent system for evaluation and promotion, making career development subject to political reliability. As Christopher Donnelly notes, 'as far as defence reform itself is concerned, the most important feature of a personnel management system is that it should deliver the right sort of an officer that the new force structure requires'.[22] Latvia's Defence Ministry is introducing new methods of career management for professional soldiers, with explicit and open procedures, based on established standards of qualifications and achievement. An impartial board with military and civilian representatives evaluates qualifications and makes recommendations.[23] A soldier's career progresses with assignments to command and staff duty and periods of training at the Baltic Defence College or Western military schools. The Latvian government is making a deliberate effort to accelerate a generational change in the officers' corps, a change in its military culture, coupled with improvements in pay and living conditions for officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.[24] Corruption or misconduct by civilians or the military has cropped up rarely, but where it has occurred, the Defence Ministry has punished it quickly and effectively.[25] Moreover, the welfare of junior servicemen is being

taken seriously, with the eradication of *dedeovshchina* – harassment and bullying – very much on the ministerial agenda. The Defence Minister has also introduced a system of enlisted representatives, chosen at platoon level, who will represent the soldiers' views to their commanders.[26]

The influence of the West

The influence of the West has played a central role in Latvian professionalisation. It has been particularly strong in the Baltic for two reasons. First, the Baltic states are small and many Western states have provided greater defence assistance to them than in other parts of central Europe. Second, the Baltic states are anxious to join NATO. As a result, NATO has had more influence in Latvia than in other states in which NATO membership is less attractive. IDAB was established in 1995 at the request of the Baltic defence ministers. Composed of senior retired soldiers and civil servants from five NATO countries, plus Finland and Sweden, it works with presidential offices, foreign and defence ministers, chiefs of defence, parliamentarians, senior officials and military officers. Key achievements in this period have been the development of national security concepts in all three countries, a reorganisation of Latvia's Defence Ministry and the General Staff, and IDAB representation to NATO and SHAPE to identify what kind of assistance would be of strategic value. Although not the largest Western-supported institution working in the Baltic, it has been among the most effective. At the operational level BALTBAT has been supported particularly by the Nordic states. Western officers have served in the armed forces of the Baltic states and a colonel of the British army, Janis Kazocins, was the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Latvian army from 1994 to 1997. The Baltic Defence College was developed with assistance from the Scandinavian countries. The College is both international and Baltic in nature – in terms of faculty, courses of instruction, students and use of the English language. Latvian officers have also attended military schools in the United States, Finland, Germany, Sweden and other countries. The diversified nature of military education offered by various institutions in many countries might not provide an integrated study period relevant to Latvia's needs, but, given the small size of the officer corps, it has offered an opportunity to gain Western experience.[27]

The centrepiece of international assistance is without doubt the Membership Action Plan (MAP) which contains several key elements. First is a requirement that Latvia has to provide sufficient funds to reform and sustain its armed forces, that it contribute to regional

security, participate in international peacekeeping missions and, above all, in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). NATO has indicated that candidate countries should provide 2 per cent of their GDP for defence, and many Western documents on NATO expansion give the 'two per cent attainment' a prominent place.[28] The MAP is therefore a highly prescriptive document. Fulfilling the conditions does not guarantee membership, but failing to deliver objectives provides a legitimate reason to delay membership. In terms of domestic Latvian politics, the MAP has certainly proved a useful external *raison d'être* to secure increased defence expenditure. The Defence Minister's Report to the Parliament of 2000 specifically refers to the need to increase defence expenditure and pledges this by 2002, the year when the Alliance will consider candidates for the next enlargement.[29]

A second element of the MAP is to improve defence planning. With it, candidates must augment their levels of NATO interoperability and prepare to carry out missions identified in the NATO Strategic Concept. NATO provides defence planning tools, evaluates a country's progress and provides technical and political guidance. Latvia submits annual national defence plans to NATO on force improvement, budgeting and other matters. The Defence Ministry has implemented resource management based on integrated short, medium and long-term plans, adjusted to government budget cycles and the availability of appropriations.[30] All this helps with developing professionalism in defence planning.

However, not everything that the MAP brings is for the best. Latvia's defence officials formulate plans, bring them to NATO for approval and go back to their capitals. This introduces a relationship of a major patron with a small client where officials at Brussels assume some of the functions usually exercised by national parliaments. In a benign security community the dangers may be more theoretical than real. However, as Donnelly has argued,

> The demands of meeting the requirement to provide competent forces to participate in NATO led operations … push a nation down the route of developing forces which are NATO compatible. But these are so expensive that in order to afford them the country may have to switch scarce resources from a force structure for national defence.… Preparing for the MAP may actually reduce independent defence capability.[31]

At one level Latvian armed forces have certainly gained from this process through experience in PfP exercises, and the Latvian Company

of BALTBAT has participated in the Implementation Force (IFOR), SFOR and KFOR. This active involvement in NATO-led activity is motivated by political considerations as well as military ones – primarily a desire to demonstrate Latvia's determination and competence to play a full role as a NATO member. However, giving priority to international objectives has clearly placed national requirements in a subordinate position to the NATO power projection agenda. General Wesley Clark, visiting the Baltic in July 1999, favourably rated the progress achieved, commended Baltic defence cooperation and acknowledged Baltic contributions to IFOR, SFOR and KFOR. But Clark also advised the defence ministries to weigh their priorities carefully and suggested an emphasis on national military reform and training.[32] Similarly, IDAB recognised that the Baltic governments were enthusiastic members of the PfP and had contributed to international peacekeeping, thus demonstrating their readiness to provide security to others as well as to request it for themselves. 'But we sound a note of caution, as we had done before', reminded the Board, 'about the danger of allowing the benefits to be gained from international cooperation to consume a disproportionate amount of the limited defence budget, to the detriment of internal development.'[33]

International missions and PfP exercises provide a training of sorts. But Latvia's territorial defence requirements need training in battalion and brigade field exercises. Brigadier Michael Clemmesen, the head of the Baltic Defence College, argued that 'only such exercises will test and develop the cadre by giving relevant personal professional development by allowing the person to make mistakes and experience the friction that gets as close to operational reality as is feasible in peacetime'. Without national exercises that test equipment, logistics and command systems, which subsequently are combined with professional studies, some of the military skills acquired through education might not go beyond paper exercises. To some extent, the lack of national defence training comes from a shortage of funds, but to a degree also because NATO countries – while emphasising the importance of PfP exercises – have not given significant assistance to territorial defence training.

One further negative aspect of international assistance relates to confusion brought about 'by the plethora of [Western] advice and assistance, often uncoordinated and short-term in nature, offered by supporting nations and organisations'.[34] Brigadier Clemmesen has made a more critical assessment. He writes of advisors and support project officers, who are 'unfortunately only too likely to be without prior knowledge or understanding of (Baltic) defence problems', experts who 'only know their own system that mirrors the development of their own

forces and the politico-economic and geostrategic requirements of their own state during the recent years', and simply leave a Baltic country with two choices: either copy the supporting state's system fully or lose the opportunity for support. Worse: 'There have been too many cases of supporting states' representatives actively undermining each other's support projects, creating serious problems and delays.'[35]

So despite many positive consequences, especially BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET and the Baltic Defence College, the impact of uncoordinated and inappropriate assistance is an important issue in the further development of professional Latvian armed forces.

Conclusions

In evaluating the professionalisation of Latvia's armed forces over the past decade, this chapter has argued that despite a small military, the nature and scale of the challenge have been significant. It has taken place in a context of constrained financial resources, the need to create political structures, military formations and a military chain of command. The creation of a constitutional framework, a mission and force structure in line with defence policy objectives, and a planning system that can analyse and prioritise the requirements of personnel, weapons and supplies, are now established features of the Latvian armed forces. Considering that a decade ago, the foundation for Latvia's armed forces 'consisted of 26 sunken submarines and ships', progress has gone well beyond the halfway mark.

However, three developments stand out. First, the Latvian government has had to identify and articulate a role and mission for the Latvian armed forces when none previously existed. Finding the proper balance between armed forces for a defence of national territory which is clearly the requirement of the Latvian state, and NATO requirements for out of area missions has not been easy, particularly when funds are short. The implications of making decisions on priorities for the professionalisation of armed forces are equally important. The defence of national territory mission requires the capability for rapid mobilisation of a citizens' army for territorial defence. Manning this force requires conscripts and reservists with basic training and a volunteer cadre, while power projection requires volunteers with high levels of expertise capable of operating away from national territory. The Latvian government has balanced the requirements for some power projection capability with defence of national territory through a multinational Baltic regional approach to the development of these capabilities, notably

BALTBAT. However, conscripts will remain central to the mission of the Latvian armed forces. In the next decade the key questions for further development of professional forces will relate to the most efficient and effective means to train these forces.

A second aspect of Latvian professionalisation is balance between the professional characteristics of expertise, responsibility and promotion. Rapid progress has clearly been made in the field of military education – not least because of international assistance in developing this aspect of Latvian professionalisation. However, the 'reach' of developing a first-class military educational system will take time to percolate through the armed forces. Training especially in what might be considered 'core tasks' remains problematic – it is expensive, attracts little interest from international sources and yet this remains the primary functions of the Latvian armed forces. It is important not to be too pessimistic about this aspect of professionalisation. If Latvia becomes a member of NATO in 2002, its territorial integrity will be underwritten by the Atlantic Alliance.

Finally, as the previous points in this conclusion attest, professionalisation does not take place in a vacuum. With meagre resources and in a relatively short space of time, by design or default, the Latvian government has achieved some important goals in force professionalisation. That Latvia is a serious accession member to NATO is testament to these achievements. However, professionalisation is a process not an event, and despite important developments over the last decade, the indications are that if Latvia wants effective and efficient professional armed forces in the next decade, considerable political and financial investment will be required.

Notes

1. The International Defence Advisory Board for the Baltic States (IDAB), *Final Report* (February 1999). The Board was established in 1995 at the request of the Baltic defence ministers to advise and assist with Baltic defence and security reform.
2. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Committee Reports, *European Security: the Baltic Contribution* (November 1998), 12.
3. See NATO Parliamentary Assembly, *The Baltic Contribution*, and the findings of an expert group, headed by Major General H. A. Kievenaar, US army, in the Baltic states, *Latvian Assessment Document (NATO Unclassified)* or the 'Kievenaar Study', 1997.
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11. Baltic Defence College, *Information*, Department of Strategy and Political Studies (1999).

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15. C. Donnelly, 'Defence Transformation in the New Democracies', *NATO Review* (November 1996), 26.

16. IDAB, *Final Report*, 6.

17. IDAB, *Final Report*, 6.

18. IDAB, *Final Report*, 6.

19. *Latvian Assessment Document*, 14.

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30. Republic of Latvia, Defence Ministry, *Latvia's Membership Action Plan 2000*, and *Membership Action Plan. Latvia's Annual National Program 2001*.
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32. *Central European Review* (9 August 1999), 23.
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7
Lithuanian Armed Forces: Re-establishment, Professionalisation and Integration

Robertas Sapronas[1]

The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declared their independence in 1990–91 and embarked on a long process of professionalisation of their armed forces. However, in contrast to other states in the central and eastern European region, Lithuania and her Baltic neighbours did not inherit armed forces from the Soviet period and have had to develop military structures from the bottom up. As a result, the challenges of creating modern professional armed forces faced by the Lithuanian political and military authorities have been different from the problems encountered in Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic, and in many ways have been more similar to those of Slovenia and Croatia.

The first section of this chapter offers a brief overview of the development of the Lithuanian armed forces since their re-establishment in 1990. The second section analyses the main internal and external factors influencing professionalisation of the Lithuanian armed forces, while the conclusion reflects on patterns and trends evident over the last decade. The argument of this chapter is that for geographical and historical reasons, Lithuania broadly corresponds to the Territorial Defence model outlined in the introduction to this volume. The role, mission and structure of Lithuanian armed forces have been built around this concept, and there is now a broad consensus among the political parties about the need to make this a credible force.[2]

Significant progress has been made over the last decade in consolidating democratic civilian control of the armed forces, with a focus now on ensuring the armed forces can fulfil the demands of the civilian

government of Lithuania in an effective and efficient way, and developing the organisational structure of the Lithuanian armed forces to reflect this. Progress has been significant in a number of areas, but as this chapter goes on to argue, despite the fact that Lithuania could create a Western-type military force, a number of important challenges remain.

Structure, role and democratic control

Lithuania's national defence system was developed in accordance with principles set out in the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and the 1996 Law on the Fundamentals of National Security. This legislation applies the underlying principle of democratic civilian control of the armed forces to all institutions within the national defence system. The essential element of this principle is that all major decisions related to the use of the armed forces, their role in the society and appointments to the senior military positions, are taken by democratically elected officials. The Parliament (the Seimas) determines both the size of the defence budget and the use to which the allocated funds are put. Thus, the Seimas is responsible for approval of the acquisition of weapons and major equipment items. Control of the national defence system is exercised in accordance with a set of established procedures. The key feature of all these procedures is transparency in relation to decisions on national defence policy and the allocation of funds for defence. The Seimas also defines the mission of the armed forces and their structure and size. In addition, it is authorised to decide on the use of Lithuanian military capabilities abroad.

In accordance with the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security, the Lithuanian armed forces are responsible for the following key peacetime and wartime tasks. In peacetime they must guard and control the state's territory, airspace, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and military facilities; maintain combat readiness; prepare and – when approved by the Seimas – participate in peacekeeping operations and missions outside the territory of Lithuania and assist civilian authorities when appropriate.[3] In the event of aggression against Lithuania, they must defend the state with arms, seeking to deplete and destroy the enemy's forces and break its will to continue the aggression; be prepared for defensive measures against sudden and unexpected intrusions by aggressor forces; meet an all-out invasion with combat in depth or 'total defence'; and meet an intrusion of minor forces by neutralising it with a minimum loss of life.[4] In the year 2000, the Lithuanian armed forces consisted of the ground forces (7500 personnel), the air forces

(800 personnel), the naval forces (580 personnel) and the national defence volunteer forces (NDVF) (2150 regular servicemen plus 10,000 part-time volunteers). Conscripts constitute around 30 per cent of the armed forces' total strength.[5]

The other major actors in the national defence decision-making process include the President, who in accordance with the Constitution is the Supreme Commander of the Lithuanian armed forces; and the government, which executes defence policy through the Ministry of National Defence. Only civilians can be appointed to the posts of Minister and Deputy Ministers of Defence.

Historical overview: ten years of independence

Lithuania declared its independence in March 1990. However, it was not widely recognised as an independent state until the failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow and the subsequent official recognition of the Baltic states by Russia. The early years of independence were marked by the re-establishment of the national institutions and the dismantling of the Soviet system. In this context, the creation of national armed forces was one of the top priorities of the government and a prerequisite for sustaining the country's fragile independent status, despite the fact that Russian forces remained in Lithuania until the end of August 1993.[6]

Most of the infrastructure that the Lithuanian armed forces inherited after the withdrawal of the Russian troops required major renovation and in some cases reconstruction. Russian troops systematically removed any asset that could be sold in Lithuania or in Russia. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the Russian withdrawal local inhabitants took away whatever else was of value from their now unguarded barracks.[7] As a result, the fledgling armed forces inherited a military infrastructure that required major investment if it was to serve as a basis for the development of an effective, Western-type, national defence system.

Perhaps even more fundamental than the lack of adequate infrastructure, was the absence of military personnel and experience required for the construction of new armed forces. In 1990–91 these consisted mostly of part-time volunteers, who joined the paramilitary formations which were established in the wake of independence. The members of this group had little if any military background beyond conscription service in the Soviet army. A second group consisted of Lithuanian officers who had served in the Soviet army but – after Lithuania declared its independence – chose to leave their service and join the Lithuanian

armed forces.[8] This group's expertise was badly needed during the period of the formation of the Lithuanian defence forces. However, most of them had experience of dealing with military issues at the military unit level, rather than at headquarters or national levels. Moreover, their association with the Soviet military led some to question their loyalty. The Lithuanian armed forces and the political leadership at the Ministry of National Defence vigorously attempted to address this problem throughout their first decade of development by prioritising the education and training of defence personnel. However, in the absence of a national advanced officer training institution, Lithuanian military authorities principally relied upon the training opportunities offered by Western countries and from 1999 the Baltic Defence College.

Before the start of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in January 1994 and the Baltic battalion (BALTBAT) project later that year, Lithuania's defence cooperation with NATO and the Western countries occurred on a mainly ad hoc basis. Its scope was limited to 'soft' areas such as democratic civilian control of armed forces, resource planning and familiarisation visits to military units. Several countries provided gifts of 'non-contentious' items such as uniforms, vehicles and communications equipment. Any more substantial direct assistance to Lithuania in the military field was prevented by the West's need to engage Russia in closer defence cooperation – a process which could have been undermined at this time by too close a relationship with the Baltic states. As a result, quite paradoxically, the Lithuanian armed forces acquired their first weapons, ships and aircraft from Russia.

A qualitatively new stage in the development of the Lithuanian armed forces began with the official application of Lithuania to join NATO in January 1994. Since this application, NATO and EU membership has been the priority of Lithuanian foreign and security policy and this has had profound implications for the further development of the Lithuanian armed forces. Most important of all, the application for NATO membership established a clear set of objectives in the form of NATO standards for the Lithuanian armed forces to aspire to. National defence development plans had to be adjusted to develop capabilities for cooperation with NATO and for eventual participation in NATO-led operations. Thus, the Lithuanian armed forces have had to train for territorial defence operations and guerrilla warfare as part of their defence of national territory mission as well as for joint operations with NATO troops. This dual requirement has placed significant new demands on the national defence budget.[9] One strategy does not, of course, completely preclude the other. Areas such as cadre education and training,

the procurement of NATO interoperable tactical communication equipment, investment in military training facilities and the soldiers' quality of life, support both objectives and are important whether or not Lithuania eventually joins NATO. As a result, in the absence of specific recommendations from NATO as to what capabilities the Lithuanian armed forces should achieve in order to be militarily ready to join the Alliance, Lithuanian defence authorities have initially prioritised development in these areas.[10]

Cooperation with NATO became especially intense and result-oriented with the launch of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) initiative at NATO's Washington Summit in 1999. One of its outcomes was a major review of defence development plans, military structures and investment priorities. In general, Lithuania's aspiration for NATO membership and the consequent practical preparations for the assumption of Alliance responsibilities have been the single major force in the shaping of the country's defence capabilities, for an increase in defence spending as well as for the relentless modernisation efforts.

Factors influencing professionalisation

Domestic factors

Each Baltic state has had an opportunity to develop completely new organisations rather than remodelling existing ones. At the same time, the Baltic states were under pressure to create a military deterrent in the shortest time possible, in the context of extremely constrained financial resources and immature democratic institutions. In addition, the 50 years as part of the Soviet Union could not help but inculcate something of the Soviet mentality in the Baltic populations – a factor which has served to hinder reform. Thus, three factors have had the most pervasive influence on the process of professionalisation of the Lithuanian armed forces: time, resources and historical legacies.

Time

From the early days of the development of the Lithuanian armed forces, policy-makers were under pressure to do as much as possible and in the shortest period of time. Initially, the reason for this hastiness was the perceived fragility of state sovereignty as well as the weakness and immaturity of democratic institutions in newly independent Lithuania. Even after official recognition by the international community, many in Lithuania found it difficult to believe that Russia had completely abandoned its ambitions to exert control over the Baltic states. In the early

1990s popular and political perceptions of the Russian threat remained very high, and indeed Russian foreign policy and military posturing appeared to provide some grounds for these fears. Particularly worrying was the routine use by Russian officials of the term the 'near abroad' to refer to the Baltic republics – a term which implied that Russia intends to treat them differently than other parts of the world. Russia was also vocal in defence of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia – including threats to use appropriate measures 'to protect the honour, dignity and legitimate rights of our compatriots, including servicemen, retired army officers, workers at the munitions plants and their families'.[11] Finally, Russian military aircraft based in Kaliningrad and Belarus regularly violated Lithuanian airspace, despite protests from the Lithuanian government.[12] All these developments encouraged a rapid build-up of the Lithuanian armed forces.

In these circumstances, the natural choice of the Lithuanian defence establishment was to focus on increasing the number of armed citizens and to provide them with a very basic military training, rather than to place emphasis on the creation of regular forces. As a result, the Voluntary Defence Forces Organisation (Savanoriškoji Krašto Apsaugos Tarnyba – SKAT in Lithuania) consisting mainly of part-time, non-professional, but highly patriotic and motivated men and women, became the core of the national defence forces. The development of the regular forces was slower, but by 1994 the main structures were in place. The core of the Lithuanian armed forces consisted of six battalions, which in turn made up a motorised 'Iron Wolf' brigade. In addition, three separate, specialised battalions were created – Engineer, *Jaeger* and Coastal Defence. The navy operated two frigates, one auxiliary ship and a few small cutters, while the air force had over 20 non-combat aircraft and a quasi-functioning airspace surveillance system.[13]

The most important achievement of the Lithuanian armed forces in the first half of the 1990s was the relatively smooth and timely withdrawal of Russian troops. When the last echelon of Russian troops left Lithuanian territory in August 1993, the military authorities were able to begin a qualitatively new stage in the development of the armed forces, devoting all their efforts and attention to the anchoring of Lithuania's security with that of the West. In January 1994, Lithuania applied for NATO membership, and in the same month the PfP programme was introduced, which offered interested partners the opportunity to participate in a range of military cooperation activities. This exposed the embryonic Lithuanian armed forces to the real challenges of developing a modern professional armed force and highlighted

a number of critical deficiencies, in particular in the field of military education and training. It also created a pressure to learn – in a very short time – the English language and the standard operating procedures of Western militaries. Furthermore, regular participation in international military exercises in both the framework of PfP as well as bilaterally forced the Lithuanian defence authorities to shift their efforts from a quantitative approach to Lithuania's defence – increasing numbers in the armed forces – to developing units that could interact effectively with their Western counterparts.

As a result, in 1994, with Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania created the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) and, in 1995, of a joint peace-keeping battalion with Poland (LITPOLBAT). The initial success in creating these units, led to the launch of a number of similar international projects, notably the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College.

However, perhaps the most important and challenging step in this period was Lithuania's participation in international peace support operations (PSOs). Indeed, Lithuania deployed a platoon (LITPLA-1) to the United Nations Protection Force mission in Croatia (UNPROFOR) as part of a Danish battalion in August 1994 – only a year after the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory. Since then the Lithuanian armed forces have become permanent participants in international PSOs in the Balkans.[14] The effect that participation in international PSOs has had on the development and professionalisation of the Lithuanian armed forces cannot be overestimated. Soldiers and officers returned from these operations with invaluable multinational operational experience. In a very real way, therefore, these operations have acted as channels for change and westernisation in the Lithuanian military.[15]

In sum, over the last decade, a perception of time pressure has been an important influence on the development of the Lithuanian armed forces. However, sources of this pressure have changed and have produced different reactions within the Lithuanian defence establishment. Initially, short-term objectives with tangible outputs rather than long-term development plans were prioritised. Later, as international defence cooperation developed, and as Lithuania began to join international operations, this focus shifted towards building up multinational, NATO interoperable subunits, capable of participation in NATO-led operations. At present, the further development of NATO interoperability remains a pressing objective, but one which – as a result of the MAP process – is being pursued in a more systematic manner in close cooperation with NATO experts.[16]

Resources

The development of armed forces is inevitably a costly undertaking. Resources for this are often scarce, especially if an economy is in transition from a centrally planned system to a free market. Such transitions are normally accompanied by hyperinflation, the growth of a shadow economy, weakness of state institutions, and tax evasion. Lithuania has been no exception and to varying degrees all these problems were features of the Lithuanian economy in the early 1990s.

In the period between 1992 and 1996 the funds allocated for defence in Lithuania were small in both absolute and relative terms.[17] Practically the entire defence budget for this period was allocated to the payment of salaries and the maintenance of vehicles and equipment. Indeed, the Lithuanian defence budget (as a percentage of GDP) has remained consistently low in comparison to Western countries. Thus, in 1994 the defence budget was only 0.48 per cent of GDP. This rose steadily to 1.77 per cent in 2000, and is projected to rise still further to 2 per cent of GDP in 2002.[18] Nonetheless, the budgetary constraints of the 1990s and a lack of resources for procurement and training in the country, forced the Ministry of National Defence to take maximum advantage of the opportunities provided by the PfP. Moreover, since 1994, many Western countries have become more active in providing material assistance either through bilateral or multilateral projects. However, a disadvantage of being a recipient of external aid is that the armed forces have had to invent solutions for the incorporation of donated military equipment into the national defence forces, which in turn has created severe logistical problems.[19]

Another major deficiency has been in relation to military personnel capable of staff work and defence planning at a national level. The majority of officers who had joined the Lithuanian armed forces from the Soviet army had experience in commanding field forces with many specialists in areas of little relevance to the fledgling Lithuanian armed forces – such as fighter aircraft, air defence or artillery. In addition, Lithuanian political leaders had no experience of dealing with national security and defence issues. This certainly contributed to the absence of any agreement on a clear role and mission for the Lithuanian armed forces. A rather unproductive debate in the Seimas on some non-essential aspects of these and other defence-related issues lasted for several years. As a consequence, the Seimas only adopted its first major legal act on national security, entitled the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security, at the end of 1996 – more than six years after Lithuania had declared its independence. Significantly, however, the continuity of

NATO integration policy as well as the objective of creating armed forces based on the same professional standards was never seriously questioned, even if the resource base required was more problematic.

Historical legacies

In many respects, the historical experience of the Baltic states has had the most direct impact on the present security debate, especially the definition of Lithuanian national interests, and the identification of the means for implementation of these interests. A significant problem has been its highly emotional character which obscures just how profound have been the changes in the international environment and prevents an ability to identify new opportunities and policy options. Historically based thinking has therefore shaped the process of the development of the Lithuanian armed forces. Three episodes can be distinguished as having most profound impact on security thinking in Lithuania since independence.

The first of these is the Soviet Union's demand for Soviet military bases on Lithuanian territory, pressure that the Lithuanian armed forces succumbed to and which culminated in the eventual annexation of Lithuania in 1940. Today, pacifists draw on this example to argue that as in the past, Lithuanian armed forces will be unable to resist any serious aggressor and expenditure should be targeted elsewhere.

The second episode – the heroic armed resistance of the Lithuanian 'forest brothers', which lasted from the end of the Second World War until approximately 1953 – conveys a very different message – that Lithuania is in fact able to conduct successful military operations against an overwhelming force, as long as the citizens are willing and the choice of tactics is appropriate. The approach advocated by proponents of this kind of resistance centres around guerrilla warfare: mobility, small group operations, hit and run tactics and so on. The successes of Chechen fighters in their war against Russia have reinforced the arguments of those who advocate military development geared towards this sort of warfare.

The third, and probably the most pervasive, legacy which Lithuanian society inherited from the Soviet period was a highly negative attitude towards the military in general, and military conscription in particular. Features of Soviet conscription which made military service unpopular included regular physical abuse, poor service conditions and the use of conscripts as a cheap labour force. This negative image of compulsory military service has been one of the most difficult Soviet legacies the fledgling Lithuanian armed forces have had to deal with since the re-establishment of conscription in 1992.

These historical legacies have clearly posed three challenges to policy-makers. First, the Lithuanian armed forces had to be created and developed in a context where a majority of the population have been sceptical about their ability to oppose a major aggressor. Second, at the same time as Lithuania's government sought Western security guarantees, the Lithuanian population has had to be convinced that Western countries will be genuinely committed to Lithuania's security and that an attack on Lithuania would be considered an attack on all member states. Finally, conscription remains widely unpopular, yet is the only affordable mechanism for maintaining a standing force capable of any sort of effective deterrence and military action.

International factors

External factors have influenced the development of the Lithuanian armed forces in a number of different ways. As noted earlier, processes of accession to West European structures and most notably preparations for NATO membership, have served as powerful drivers for change. In addition, Russia's ambiguous security policy and the influence of returning Lithuanian emigrants assuming key positions in the government and defence establishment have also been key.

A 'return to Europe'

The basic direction of Lithuanian foreign and security policy has remained unchanged since the first independent government was formed in 1990. Lithuania is determined to become part of a free and democratic Europe. This determination is enshrined in the Lithuanian Constitution and other legal documents, and expressed by efforts to facilitate closer integration with the West in all possible areas – with security and defence being among the top priorities. Since 1994, membership of the EU, NATO and WEU – organisations embodying the 'West' – were declared as Lithuania's main foreign policy objectives.[20] Military cooperation and defence diplomacy have proved to be some of the best means to demonstrate to the world that Lithuania is part of the European security community. Through military cooperation and active participation in various multilateral formats, Lithuania has usefully contributed to the strengthening of security and stability in the Baltic region.

As well as the political benefits provided by the deployment of troops abroad and by military cooperation with NATO, Lithuania has also usefully used international defence cooperation to further develop its professional forces. As a result of the development of Western defence diplomacy roles, no other sector in Lithuania has benefited so much

from expert advice and direct support from the West as the defence sector. This support has helped to compensate for the Lithuania's resource limitations, and has also aided the process of professionalisation. Significantly, it has also placed the Lithuanian defence establishment in the forefront of the national effort of 'westernisation'.

The impact of Western assistance to the Lithuanian military has been multifaceted. Perhaps most importantly, principles of democratic civilian control over the armed forces have been widely accepted and never been challenged by the military. Additionally, good knowledge of at least one official NATO language and international experience have become key criteria for promotion to the senior ranks. Furthermore, practical preparations for NATO membership, extensive contacts with foreign counterparts, the education of Lithuanian officers in the best military training institutions abroad, donations and procurement of ever more sophisticated weapons and equipment and the gradual adoption of Western military culture and traditions, are all important elements in the continuing professionalisation of the Lithuanian armed forces.

The Russian factor

National security is a necessary prerequisite of any successful state activity, whether in the field of politics, economics or culture. Policy-makers in the security sector tend therefore to incline towards pessimism, seeking to prepare the country to counter all potential threats, including worst-case scenarios. For a great part of Lithuania's recent history the worst-case scenario has generally been associated with military aggression from Russia. Indeed, today Russia and Belarus are widely regarded in Lithuania as unstable and unpredictable neighbours. Furthermore, they openly oppose Lithuania's membership of NATO.

These concerns are reinforced by Lithuania's geographical situation, which consists of flat, open country with few natural barriers to inhibit the progress of invading forces. The capital Vilnius is only 30 kilometres from the country's eastern border with Belarus. To the south, Lithuania borders the highly militarised Russian district of Kaliningrad. As a result, Lithuanian military planners had to keep in mind the possibility of an invasion by an overwhelming force from several directions at once by land, sea and air. Because in this situation it is likely that there would be little time to prepare for mobilisation, Lithuania has chosen to have a sizeable standing force ready to encounter the enemy at any time and capable of delaying the advance of any attacking force long enough to enable a mobilisation of the reserve force. The requirement to have a large number of men in the armed forces at any one time supported by

a sizeable reserve force has led Lithuania to embrace conscription as the only affordable option.[21] After the completion of mandatory service of 12 months, conscripts are assigned to reserve units and are regularly called up for refresher training. Similarly, given Lithuania's unfavourable geographical position, and the fact that the threat may come from several directions, Lithuania has adopted the 'territorial defence' concept used by the Nordic countries.

The role of Lithuanian expatriates

The development of the Lithuanian armed forces has been strongly and directly influenced by 'returnees' from the Lithuanian community abroad, and particularly those from the United States. The Lithuanian expatriate community is large, and many of them have actively participated in Lithuanian politics since independence. Indeed, a number of senior military officers of Lithuanian descent – mainly from the US army and air force – came to work full-time in Lithuania after retirement. Their number and role significantly increased after the elections of 1996 when the former communists lost the elections to a coalition of right-wing parties and a number of former US officers were then appointed to senior positions in the Ministry of National Defence and the armed forces.[22] Furthermore, in 1998, Valdas Adamkus, a Lithuanian expatriate from the United States, became the President of Lithuania. Inevitably, the presence of these returnees has brought in new traditions, influenced the administrative culture of the Ministry of National Defence and the armed forces and introduced novel approaches to security and defence issues. More visibly, some military structures – such as the Training and Doctrine Command – have been established using the US model.[23] In general, expatriates have thus had a positive impact on professionalisation processes in the Lithuanian armed forces.

Conclusions

During the last decade Lithuania has succeeded in creating armed forces whose professional development has steadily improved. Hundreds of Lithuanian soldiers have taken part in international PSOs, and have to varying degrees proved that they are able to operate alongside NATO forces in the most demanding of circumstances. At home, the Lithuanian armed forces enjoy a very reasonable degree of respect and popularity.[24] Their role and missions are clearly defined in relevant legislation, and the military have fully accepted the principle of democratic civilian control of the armed forces.

It is unlikely that these achievements could have been made in such a short space of time if Lithuania had inherited coherent armed forces from the Soviet period. The fact that the Lithuanian armed forces had to be built from scratch and that the major political parties all supported NATO membership as their foreign policy priority, has helped to set clear priorities. Moreover, the defence structures have been sufficiently small in size to make the reform process manageable. As a result, professionalisation has been relatively unproblematic. To a large extent this success is also a direct consequence of a stable international environment. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia – perhaps the greatest potential threat to the Baltic states – was weakened by its own economic problems and remains preoccupied with its own internal stability. At the same time, most western countries have come up with assistance packages – including donations of equipment, training and maintenance – to support professionalisation of the Lithuanian armed forces. In addition, UN and NATO operations in the Balkans have provided an opportunity for Lithuanian soldiers to gain operational experience and to develop compatibility with NATO forces.

The future professionalisation of the Lithuanian armed forces will depend on three factors. First, the way in which NATO enlargement is managed, especially if Lithuania fails to be invited to join NATO in 2002. Rejection may have wide-ranging implications for Lithuania's commitment to the professionalisation process. Second, as Lithuania comes under increasing pressure to further develop power projection capabilities, the extent to which painful choices can be avoided – especially creating a two-tier armed forces – will depend on the extent to which the development of such capabilities supports both territorial defence and power projection and does not draw too many resources away from core missions and roles. Finally, professionalisation will depend on the continued engagement and willingness of elected politicians and citizens to provide the financial resources to fund the process – without which a decade of real progress will be undone.

Notes

1. The arguments and views expressed in this chapter are a personal reflection of the author based on the experience of working in the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence since 1995, and do not represent official opinion of either it or the Lithuanian government.
2. On 21 May 2001 all 12 political parties represented in Seimas signed a 'Defence Agreement' in which they agreed to allocate 2 per cent of GDP for defence purposes in the period 2002–4. The text of the Defence Agreement can be found at www.kam.lt.

3. *Law on the Fundamentals of National Security*, Chapter 18, Section Three.
4. *Law on the Fundamentals of National Security*, Chapter 7, Section Two.
5. *The Military Balance 2001–2002* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001).
6. A detailed account of the negotiations with Russia on troop withdrawal can be found in S. Ceslovas, 'Enhancing Security of Lithuania and Other Baltic States in 1992–94 and Future Guidelines', at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/94-96/stankevi/home.htm.
7. The looting of the barracks by the local population was confirmed by a number of Lithuanian officers who served in the Lithuanian armed forces at this time.
8. For more information about the history of the Lithuanian armed forces, visit Lithuanian Ministry of Defence website www.kam.lt.
9. The expenditures related to NATO integration are first and foremost incurred in the implementation of the Partnership Goals (until 1999 called interoperability objectives) within the NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP), participation in the PfP activities, and the posting of personnel to Brussels.
10. More detailed information on the distribution of Lithuania's defence budget is available on www.kam.lt.
11. *RFE/RL Daily Brief* (25 June 1993). For a detailed account of Russian policies related to troop withdrawal from the Baltic states, see S. G. Simonsen, 'Compatriot Games: Explaining the "Diaspora Linkage" in Russia's Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States' (July 2001) at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m3955/5_53/77615870/p1/article.html.
12. Between 27 April 1992 and 19 May 1995, Lithuania registered 5339 violations of its airspace, in which Russian aircraft flew 3018 times without permits. Ceslovas 'Enhancing Security'.
13. Lithuanian MoND website, www.kam.lt.
14. Lithuanian contributed military personnel to UNPROFOR in Croatia (1994–96), IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia (1996–97), Operation Allied Harbour in Albania (1999) and KFOR in Kosovo (1999–present). Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence website at: http://www.kam.lt/en/main.php?cat=bendadarb&sub=4.
15. See, for example, the special report by Ingrid Rasmussen to the North Atlantic Assembly, 'La multinationalité dans les opérations de réponse aux crises' (28 March 2000), http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2000/at-103-f.html.
16. The MAP process provides a framework for coordination of defence development plans with NATO experts. The results of the latest round of discussions Lithuania–NATO are summarised in *BNS* (17 September 2001).
17. Lithuanian MoND website, www.kam.lt.
18. Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence website at: http://www.kam.lt/en/main.php?cat=ministerija&sub=4&sid=42.
19. Author's interview with Povilas Malakauskas, Deputy Minister of National Defence.
20. The objective of joining NATO, the EU and the WEU has been promulgated not only in major defence policy documents and statements, but also is part of the *Law on the Fundamentals of National Security*.
21. Arguments in favour of the conscription system in central and eastern Europe can be found in C. Donnelly's 'Shaping Soldiers for the 21st Century', *NATO Review*, No. 3 (2000).

22. In 1999–2000, for example, former Lithuanian expatriates held the positions of State President (Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces), Commander of the Armed Forces, Deputy Minister of Defence, Inspector General and Director for Plans and Policy at the MoND.

23. This view was expressed by a number of Lithuanian officers including the current TRADOC Commander.

24. Monthly surveys conducted by the Lithuanian daily *Lietuvos rytas* on public attitudes towards various state and non-governmental institutions indicate that the armed forces have a steady rate of approval of approximately 40 per cent. About 20 per cent of the population view the armed forces negatively. Most other government institutions have considerably lower ratings of approval.

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8
Professionalisation of the Romanian Armed Forces

Marian Zulean

Professionalisation of armed forces in central and eastern Europe is an integral element of the democratisation of civil–military relations and the democratisation of society as a whole. For nearly two decades – and excluding the last years of the Ceauşescu dictatorship – the Romanian armed forces (RAF) were very professional – but professional in an authoritarian context. As a result, the main task of the political leadership after 1989 was how to replace the authoritarian pattern of professionalism with a democratic one. Indeed, one of the most striking images of 1989 consisted of Romanian soldiers in the streets and a crowd shouting 'The army is with us!' This image is the key to understanding the professionalisation of the RAF. It showed a terrified army, unable to fight an uncertain and unforeseen enemy. Romania's military leaders at this time showed themselves unable to correctly assess the threats and to train the army appropriately. The military's leadership was closely linked to the communist political leadership, and the army itself was trained to fight a classical war.[1]

The first stage of Romania's defence restructuring process began with the decommunisation and downsizing of the armed forces. In the aftermath of the revolution of 1989, some of the first 'revolutionary measures' involved the changing of commanders, and the transfer of control of the Patriotic Guards and Securitatea (secret service) to the army and the withdrawal of the military from use as a free workforce in agriculture and industry. The Action Committee for Democratisation of the Army (CADA) played a key role with its membership drawn mainly from younger officers. CADA pressed for promotion on the basis of merit and the retirement of the officers compromised by their support for the Ceauşescu regime. It was CADA that provided the first impulse towards a democratic system of control of the military and its professionalisation.[2]

Thus social, economic and political changes in Romanian society acted as the initial motivation for the reprofessionalisation of the RAF. Later, Romania's desire to join NATO – together with NATO assistance programmes and the conditionality inherent in the NATO accession criteria – acted as another important influence on the professionalisation process.

This chapter describes the transformation of the role, expertise, structures and education of the RAF after 1989 and examines the main factors that have influenced this transformation. The chapter argues that Romania has faced some difficult challenges in professionalising its armed forces. The historical legacy has provided a difficult context within which Romania has conducted this process. Priorities have been difficult to set and successive governments have changed the core roles and missions of the RAF, making the goal of professionalisation a moving target. The fixing of the mission has allowed some clear priorities to be set and important progress has been made though, as the conclusion suggests, this has required some very difficult choices to be made.

The context of Romanian professionalisation

History carries a heavy legacy in the Balkans, and Romanians have struggled for centuries for an independent and united territory. These aims were partially accomplished in the second part of the nineteenth century and fully realised in 1918. The development of a national army has been an essential part of Romanian nation-building and modernisation. The extended occupancy of Romania by the Byzantine, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires exercised an important influence on the development of the RAF and Romanian military culture. The more important features of this have been a sensitivity to external threats, high levels of public trust in the RAF, and the need to maintain Romanian territorial integrity. However, by far the most important influence on processes of defence reform and professionalisation after 1989 has resulted from the immediate heritage of the communist period.

Between 1945 and 1989, the RAF went through three important and identifiable phases: a *Sovietisation* phase between 1945 and 1965;[3] a *professionalisation* phase between 1965 and 1979; and a *deprofessionalisation* phase between 1979 and 1989. After the Second World War, the Treaty of Paris in 1947 reduced the strength of the RAF from around 500,000 to 138,000. For their part, the Communist Party used these reductions to begin the lustration process of the old 'Royal' army, and more than 100 generals were imprisoned or killed. In addition, a High Political Directorate of the Army was established under the command of then

General Nicolae Ceauşescu in order to ensure tight political control over the military. These measures triggered a long process of deprofessionalisation in the RAF. In particular, a new and inexperienced officer corps was created by recruiting people with proletarian origins and no military education in order to replace the 'old' officer class. By 1953, the number of new officers had increased from 6 per cent of the total to 84 per cent. Of these, only 67 per cent had attended elementary schools, and just 64 per cent of them high schools.[4] The Communist Party also created parallel structures within the RAF, to the extent that during the 1950s it had three separate mechanisms for control – Russian commissars, Romanian communists and Securitatea. The withdrawal of the Soviet army in 1958 allowed a change in direction, however, and marked the start of the establishment of a 'national' army for Romania.

The 'national army' and doctrine were fully created after 1965, when Ceauşescu became General Secretary of the Communist Party. The peak of Ceauşescu's power and legitimacy was reached in 1968, when he publicly opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Moscow-led WTO. This also helped to shift threat perceptions within Romania, with the Soviet Union suddenly emerging as much of a threat as the NATO Alliance. In turn, this new threat required the creation of a more professional army and a clear defence policy. This resulted in the so-called systemic approach, consisting of a coherent doctrine entitled The Struggle of the Entire People, a professional army and appropriate mechanisms and institutions to link the two together. The Law of Organisation of National Defence of the Socialist Republic of Romania thus became the foundation which created a system of independent defence planning and professional armed forces within Soviet bloc. The goal of the doctrine was to 'fight against imperialism' including, of course, Russian or Soviet imperialism, using strategies and tactics derived from the traditional Romanian experience (guerrilla war) and combined with lessons from Yugoslavia, China and Vietnam. In this context, the army was conceived as a 'specialist organism' which would directly oppose the enemy, but with the additional support of the 'armed people'. In this way Romania's defence strategy linked established military forces with a trained society that would be able to fight an effective partisan campaign. The Communist Party had a leadership role in this structure, and as General Secretary, Ceauşescu was the Commander-in-Chief of Defence. To support this strategy, the Romanian defence industry produced its own military equipment, ranging from tanks and artillery to aircraft. Thus, for nearly two decades Romania had a very professional defence policy, close to the Neutralist ideal.

During the 1980s, however, Romania's Neutralist model of professionalisation became too costly to sustain. A new mission – that of 'defending revolutionary achievements' – was added to the military doctrine, together with the concept of 'economic and social integration'. This made it possible for the RAF to work in the national economy, and a Directorate for Working in the National Economy (DLEN) was established in the Ministry of National Defence. The DLEN coordinated construction work for the military which included tasks such as canal and road building. Indeed, more than 85,000 military personnel were deployed in this manner in 1989 alone.[5] Thus, the final years of the communist regime found Romania with a large army, structured to defend the national territory against a superior enemy in a classical war, but not particularly well prepared to adapt to the new, post-Cold War security environment. In addition, a large part of the RAF was obliged to work in the economy and was thoroughly deprofessionalised. For his part, Ceauşescu had come to rely less and less on the RAF in its role as defender of the regime, and more and more on the Securitatea.

Romania's historical legacy in relation to the professionalisation of its armed forces therefore consists of five major elements. First, low levels of professionalisation in the RAF in relation to the quality of training and technical expertise; second, a tradition of politicisation of the armed forces; third, a legacy of military organisation based heavily around mass conscription; fourth, a history of strongly centralised responsibility mechanisms focused around the position of General Secretary; and finally a tradition of promotion on the basis of patronage and party membership. In these respects Romania was no different from many other central and eastern European states. However, unlike most it had little claim to professional status even under an authoritarian regime. The scale of the task of professionalisation alongside role and mission reorientation has therefore been of a scale and magnitude distinct from many other states.

Changing the role and the missions of the Romanian armed forces

During the communist period, Romania had a well-structured defence policy, whose main goal was the defence of Romanian territorial borders. However, the end of the Cold War introduced a new security environment that required the mission, doctrine and strategic concepts to be re-evaluated. As Jeffrey Simon argues, the changed European security environment has influenced the security concerns of the central and

eastern European countries, but the task of writing new security concepts has become more complicated since new security problems 'extend beyond the responsibilities and capabilities of traditional military forces and require a broader societal discussion and consensus on how to solve these issues'.[6]

Immediately after 1989, the role of the RAF was 'to defend, together with the whole people, the revolutionary achivements, the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity' and was thus Neutralist in its orientation. The Constitution, adopted in 1991, established that the army is exclusively subordinated to the will of people for the purpose of 'guaranteeing the state's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and its constitutional democracy', thus reaffirming the limited focus of the RAF to the defence of Romanian national territory. By 1994, a draft National Security Concept (NSC) and Military Doctrine (MD) had been produced, but in practice both of these were confused, identifying a large number of security risks, but offering no clear rationale of how these should be addressed by the RAF. As a result of Romania's application to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the inadequate nature of the NSC and MD, Parliament asked the government to reconsider and revise them. Clear and comprehensive security concepts and sound mechanisms of defence planning were in reality not drafted until 1997, and then only after the assistance of the United Kingdom and United States in the form of the Kievenaar Study.[7]

In accordance with the Law on Romanian National Defence Planning, adopted in 2000, the planning of Romanian defence is based on political and strategic decisions made by the Romanian Parliament, President and government, as well as other public institutions that assume security and national defence responsibilities. According to this law, the national values and interests, the risks and threats to these values, as well as the main guidelines for the provision of Romanian national security are defined by a presidential document officially presented to the Parliament – the National Security Strategy. In order to accomplish the provisions of the National Security Strategy, the government elaborates the Defence White Paper, establishing the goals, tasks and budget of the security and defence institutions. Each ministry or public institution with defence and security tasks then prepares its own departmental plan, programme or strategy according to the governing programme and White Paper provisions. At the level of departmental strategies, the Ministry of National Defence, as the authority responsible for the military defence of the country, produces the Military Strategy, while the Romanian Interior Ministry and Intelligence Services prepare their own strategies.

The first National Security Strategy in Romania was therefore approved by the country's Supreme Defence Council (CSAT) in June 1999.[8] The goals of Romania's security strategy are fivefold. First, guaranteeing the fundamental rights and freedoms of Romanian citizens; second, defending Romanian sovereignty and independence as a unitary, indivisible national state in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Constitution; third, consolidating the rule of law and democratic institutions; fourth, improving the living standard of the population; finally, protecting and promoting Romania's interests all over the world. In effect this marked the point at which Romania moved from an essentially Neutralist mission and force structure, to one that embraced the idea of Territorial Defence with aspirations to take part in NATO-led operations on a limited scale. In January 2001 this commitment to create a Territorial Defence model, but with very clear power projection capabilities, received added momentum from the incoming Nastase government. This more clearly prioritised the tasks of the RAF, creating a two-tier force structure with the first tier of operational forces clearly aspiring to offer the Romanian government some capability of working with NATO-led forces, and as a consequence on a higher level of operational readiness, and the second tier made up of a much larger territorial force capable of mobilisation but with longer warning time, less operational capabilities and consuming less resources.

Structural change in the Romanian armed forces

In practice, building armed forces that can deliver this mission will be a long-term process that must overcome a number of obstacles, most notably perhaps the structural implications of decades of commitment to the concept of 'total defence'. The main goals of structural reforms of the RAF have changed over the last decade. Initially the reform process was triggered by the requirements of the 1989 revolution and by the signing of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990. As a result, in November 1990 the RAF reduced its tank strength from 2850 to 1375, its armoured vehicle strength from 3102 to 2100, its artillery from 3789 to 1475 pieces and its aircraft from 505 to 430.[9] The first phase of reform lasted until 1992, and was essentially a period of de-communisation and downsizing. A more organised and coherent series of initiatives formed a second phase of reform begun in 1993. This was characterised by three aspects. First, civilianisation; second, the creation of a new political–military structure and third, rationalisation. In terms of civilianisation, some 720 posts were removed in the Ministry of National Defence and

100 civilians were appointed to jobs that had previously been held by military personnel. Second, a General Staff was established, together with separate Land, Air and Naval staffs. Third, a rationalisation of the RAF led to the disbanding of the Patriotic Guards and the creation of a system of territorial reserves. In addition, the size of the armed forces as a whole was further reduced from a strength of 320,000 in 1989 to 207,000 in 1999.

A third phase of reform took forward many of the initiatives in previous phases. The principal spur to a more rigorous approach to professionalisation has been Romania's active participation in PfP and more specifically NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the development of Membership Action Plans (MAPs). The Romanian Ministry of National Defence was fully reorganised with changes affecting both central structures and combat forces.[10] In addition, reforms focused on:

- Personnel management reforms, especially involving the officer and NCO corps.
- Upgrading national command communications computers and intelligence systems and developing interoperability with NATO through the acquisition of the STAR communication system.
- Enhancing air defence capabilities through the installation of new FPS 117 radar sets and the opening of the Air Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC).
- General infrastructural upgrading oriented towards facilitating the operation of NATO forces on Romanian territory.[11]

The NATO Washington Summit in 1999 introduced the concept of the MAP that in the case of Romania offered much greater clarity in the professionalisation process. Thus, the Romanian government focused on operationalising the Territorial Defence type of armed forces. In the area of expertise this entailed the introduction of a volunteer officer corps and NCOs supported by conscription and better training of key personnel. In terms of responsibility, better tri-service command and control structures were a priority and defence planning and procurement processes were further refined to deliver the Romanian mission.[12]

Although MAP offered a framework for professionalisation, some of the incentives for robustly following through the professionalisation process were removed when Romania failed to join NATO in 1999, and as a direct consequence of this, fewer resources were allocated to the defence budget. Notwithstanding this setback, since 1999 Romania has developed a settled view as to exactly what the purpose of professionalisation should be, which has assisted the overall process of reform.

Organisation and structure

One of the first measures taken by the newly elected Nastase government in January 2001 was to adopt the Ordinance for Organisation and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defence. According to this law, the RAF are directed by a General Staff and consist of three Services: Land Forces, Air and Air Defence Forces and Naval Forces. They are organised into *Operational Forces* and *Territorial Forces*.

The Operational Forces consist of an Early Warning Force of about 5000 personnel, a Rapid Reaction Force of 5000 personnel and an Augmentation Force of 40,000 personnel. The government intends that all these units will be 85–90 per cent operational by 2003.[13] These forces will be allocated for both collective security missions such as NATO-led peacekeeping operations or for national defence. The Territorial Forces are around 45,000 strong and consist of Low Readiness Forces and Reserve Forces. These are 30–70 per cent manned and are intended to be ready for combat action in 180 days. This type of organisation reflects the changing nature of the professionalisation of the RAF, and particularly its shift from a 'total defence' Neutralist model towards a Territorial Defence model with a clear commitment to provide some limited power projection capabilities. The direct management of these forces is the responsibility of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff is also the Chief of Defence, and Romania's senior military officer. The General Staff itself has recently been reorganised with 'joint' directorates similar to those in the staffs of NATO and the United States. A medium-term planning document, Strategic Vision 2010, envisages a move towards all-volunteer forces with 70 per cent volunteers by 2005.[14] Moreover, as part of the second and third cycles of the Annual National Plan for accession to NATO (derived from the MAP), Romania will further reduce the size of its military to a peacetime strength of 112,000, and a fully mobilised strength of 230,000.[15]

Developing expertise in the Romanian armed forces

Education and training have become an increasingly important part of the process of professionalisation in Romania. Since 1995, a process has been under way to overhaul the way in which expertise is developed in the RAF and education and training take place. In 1995, the Concept of Reforming Military Education established the need to develop defence professionals in two ways. First, through educating and training students at specifically military educational establishments and second, by recruiting graduates educated at civilian institutions. The concept aims to develop the basic skills of a professional soldier, including combat

effectiveness, leadership and responsible citizenship. The basic insti-
tutions for military education include military high schools, post-
high-school education for warrant officers and NCOs, three higher
education academies that prepare officers for command, command and
staff training, a training system for experts, a Regional Centre for PfP
Training, a Regional Centre for the Management of Defence Resources
and centres for foreign language education. This new system forms part
of an approach that aims to ensure that recruitment and selection,
initial training, career development and promotion based on profi-
ciency and potential deliver the quality of personnel that the RAF needs
to carry out its new roles and missions.

The Concept of Human Resource Management (CHRM) was outlined
in 1997 and was completed with British, Dutch and US assistance in the
form of two policies: a National Defence Framework Action Plan for
2000–3 and a Long-Term Framework. The plans identified three options
for the ultimate size of the RAF, ranging from 87,000 to 140,000. The
middle option of 112,000 servicemen and 28,000 civilians was identi-
fied as the ideal size for Romania's national defence system, with a dead-
line of 2003 set for reaching this goal.[16] Further reducing the RAF
formed the first phase of Romania's military reform process. In phase
two – between 2004 and 2007 – further reforms will concentrate on the
modernisation of equipment, and the development of full interoper-
ability with NATO. The CHRM also provides for the streamlining of the
RAF's top-heavy officer corps – a structural legacy from the communist
period. The current 30,000-strong officer corps will be halved, with the
number of colonels reduced from 2300 to 630, the number of lieutenant
colonels from 5600 to 1800 and the number of majors from 7800 to
2200. This will create an officer to NCO ratio of 1 : 3. As a result of the
initial draft of the CHRM since 1998, 11,000 officers and warrant offi-
cers have left the armed forces: 94 per cent of these took voluntary
retirement, and 85 per cent of them were drawn from the ranks of
major, lieutenant colonel and colonel.[17] From the pool of ex-service
personnel the Romanian Ministry of National Defence decided to build
an 'active reserve' with low readiness and which forms the majority of
the Territorial Force.

Two further reform initiatives include the Military Career Guide and
Professional Reconversion. The Career Guide, which has been in effect
since June 2001, is an important framework for the whole process of
professionalisation of the RAF, in accordance with its new missions
and roles. The main provisions of the Career Guide include first, the
adoption of long and short careers, thus introducing flexibility into the

personnel structure. Second, the introduction of NCOs in combat forces when previously they worked principally in logistics. Third, active recruitment from the civilian education system supplemented by the military training schools. Promotion is a more transparent process than in the past and is based on technical competence and aptitude for higher command. By 2004 the Nastase government is committed to complete depoliticisation, with professional competence the only criterion for promotion.[18] Professional reconversion is of fundamental importance in the context of the halving of the officer corps. The main measures here include the provision of social protection for officers who leave the army, as well as assistance and training to help them find a civilian career.

The need for interoperability with NATO in the framework of the PfP has also established new goals and strategies for the reform of the RAF. For example, the PARP has provided a structured approach for developing the interoperability of the RAF with the NATO allies. Subsequently, the MAP for Romania has pushed Romanian military reform towards a focus on operational rather than mass territorial forces. In the field of education, centres for foreign language training, peacekeeping and defence planning training have also been established, with some 800 Romanian officers attending courses in NATO member countries by 1998.[19] By the end of 2001 the Romanian government had made some progress in turning these commitments into reality. Key defence planning documents have been drafted and some have been launched, and an inter-agency body to coordinate the RAF preparation for joining NATO has been established under the Prime Minister.

However, professionalisation of the Romanian military still has a long way to go. While reforms are proceeding apace and with more coherence than ever before, most assessments of the readiness of the RAF for a war or major crisis are not good. The Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff presented a rather pessimistic evaluation of the RAF's state of readiness in the year 2000. They concluded that the military remained unprepared and poorly trained, mainly as a consequence of a lack of resources; 70 per cent of the air force's pilots were not operational because of lack of flying time, and the navy had received only 15 per cent of the fuel it required. Moreover, of the previous government's 84 Partnership Goals under the PARP, only 8 had been realised by the end of 2000.[20] In general, planning documents had been insufficiently prepared, were subject to frequent alteration and modification, and there was a mismatch between the goals of the plans and the resources allocated for their achievement.[21]

Factors influencing professionalisation in Romania

The end of the Cold War has changed the way in which both western and eastern Europeans shape their security policies. The nation state and its traditional security policies have been challenged by an increasing interdependence among states as well as – in some cases – increasing fragmentation at a substate level. This increased interdependence has introduced new kinds of threats to the 'national' security, and Romanian policy-makers have been active in trying to take these into consideration when formulating national security policy. In particular, Romania has prioritised the importance of collective security in addresssing the post-Cold War security environment and applied to join NATO in 1994. As a result, the NATO accession process has had an important influence on the professionalisation of the RAF, especially in relation to NATO's implicit and explicit conditionality with regard to military and civil–military reform. As a consequence, Romania's desire to join NATO, and the Western assistance inherent in this process, have been some of the most influential factors on the RAF's move towards professionalisation. However, other factors have also played a part, not least of which have been budgetary limitations and Romania's historical legacy of territorial or 'total' defence.

The role of Western assistance

One striking feature of Western assistance has been the central role played by the United States, which has been the most important donor towards Romanian military reform programmes. The International Military Education and Training (IMET), Mil-to-Mil and Foreign Military Funding (FMF) are three major American programmes of assistance. IMET, funded through an appropriation to the Department of State, and administered by the Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs and the Department of Defence's Defence Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), provides funding to take foreign military personnel to the US to study on both short- and long-term courses. IMET gives foreign students exposure to US military professionalism within the context of American life and culture. Since 1990, the IMET programme has also included foreign civilian personnel working in security-related positions. This Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programme has become the basis for greater Department of Defence involvement in training civilian personnel in a much more far-reaching programme focused on improving civil–military relations in target states. However, because of the limited number of places available at US institutions, the US Department of Defense has also supported the

establishment of two 'in country' education projects in Romania itself. The most significant of these is the Regional Centre for the Management of Defence Resources which was created in 1999. The Centre was supported by a US grant of USD1.2 million in 2001 and principally runs two courses. The first is a postgraduate course aimed at training leaders and specialists from Romania and its neighbours. The second project is the Romanian training centre for NCOs, whose activities are supported by the US Marine Corps.

Mil-to-Mil is a bilateral programme where American and Romanian officers organise cooperative activities. By the year 2000 more than 850 activities were sponsored under this programme. FMF for eastern Europe provides funds for military reform programmes under the auspices of Warsaw Initiative, and under this programme Romania is allocated around USD20 million per annum. In October 2001, the United States also introduced the 'Freedom Consolidation Act' to support military reform in seven central and eastern European countries. Under this Act, USD11.5 million are allocated to Romania. In addition, the United States has had an important influence on the professionalisation of the RAF through advisors attached to the Romanian Ministry of National Defence.

The United Kingdom, too, has been an important partner in support of the professionalisation of the RAF. The most prominent UK contributions have included the establishment of a Regional Centre for PfP Training (RTC) in Bucharest. The aim of the RTC is 'to encourage a more flexible ethos in the Romanian Officer Corps and in those of EAPC countries and, through joint training activities and shared experience, a better understanding of common NATO/PfP related issues …'. Since September 1997, 856 students have attended the RTC, 51 of whom have come from countries other than Romania.[22] The RTC is headed by a Romanian colonel who is assisted by a British army advisor. An important role has also been played by UK advisors and consultants – in particular through their close relationship with the Chief of the General Staff and the State Secretary for Defence Policy. Indeed, in 1998 the UK Management and Consultancy Directorate conducted a study on Romanian security policy that became the basis for reform of the Romanian National Security Concept. In addition, other advisors from France and Italy continue to offer assistance in the areas of human resources and logistics.

Romania lacks expertise on civil–military issues, democratic defence policy-making and the implementation of defence reform and has therefore been eager to utilise the advice of Western advisors, whose role

has increased over time. Foreign advice is generally seen to be useful within the Ministry of National Defence, and Western advisors often have access to top decision-makers. However, advice given in a bilateral context is sometimes partisan, and the Western advice effort as a whole can give mixed or confused messages to Romanian policy-makers.

Multilateral assistance. The role of NATO and Partnership for Peace

At a multilateral level, NATO has been the dominant organisation in promoting democratic civil–military relations and the construction of professional armed forces in central and eastern Europe. For many countries in the region, the prospect of NATO membership is a gateway to further integration with the more prosperous West, a factor which has significantly increased the organisation's influence. In common with the bilateral programmes of the US and UK, NATO has also been active in providing places for Romanian students at the NATO Defence College. However, the primary instrument of NATO assistance to central and eastern Europe as a whole and to Romania specifically has been the PfP. Thus, during the first stage of the PfP's PARP (1995–97), the RAF made significant progress towards developing its interoperability with NATO, accomplishing 18 of the PARP's 19 'interoperability objectives' (IOs).[23] During the second stage of the PARP (1997–99, extended to 2000), the Romanian contribution to the PfP rose to the level of two brigades and one engineer battalion. Romanian cooperation with NATO has also extended to joint military exercises. In 1997 for example, the exercises Cooperative Determination '97 (land), Cooperative Support '97 (naval) and Danube '97 (river) were hosted by Romania. Of the 44 interoperability objectives of the second phase of PARP, Romania met three, while the remainder were 75–90 per cent accomplished as a consequence of budgetary constraints.[24] The RAF have also participated in the NATO-led multinational operations in Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR). An engineer battalion of around 200 people has participated in IFOR and SFOR since 1996 and small group of staff officers form part of KFOR. On 19 September 2001, the Romanian Parliament also approved an increase in the Romanian contribution to both SFOR and KFOR. In addition, it is possible that the Southeast Peacekeeping Force (SHEER-BRIG) which includes Romanian personnel may replace part of the US Balkan contingent in time.

Romania clearly sees participation in the PfP as a key strand in its ultimate strategy of integration with Western security structures. Indeed, an internal Ministry of National Defence assessment concluded that some of the specific advantages included personnel training in the areas of

staff procedures and NATO operational languages (and particularly English); increased familiarity with new operational and logistical issues, especially those which emerge from multinational peacekeeping operations; direct experience in peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian aid missions; and improved operational interoperability with NATO armed forces.[25]

NATO is making a long-term investment in European stability through its ongoing enlargement process, and the Romanian experience helps to illustrate the extent of the impact it is having in this area. In many respects, NATO's MAP has been the most important instrument for the professionalisation of the RAF.

Security policy in the domestic context

In Romania a generally positive public opinion towards the military has helped to encourage the government to pursue the professionalisation of the RAF, and continue its reform of other aspects of civil–military relations. Polls suggest that in terms of institutions Romanians have more confidence in their Church and armed forces than anything else. This confidence in the military is explained partly by its historical and continuing role as a symbol of Romanian nationhood, and partly because it is one of the few institutions that offers a model of order in a uncertain transitional world. The positive role played by the military in the overthrow of the Ceauşescu dictatorship has clearly contributed to its good standing and prestige among the general public. Moreover, a February 2001 poll by the Metro Media Institute found that 60 per cent of the population supported the development of a professional army for Romania.[26]

Popular threat perceptions have also helped to garner public support for professionalisation. Many of these result directly from the final years of the communist regime, when Ceauşescu shifted much of his rhetoric towards a form of 'national' communism. During this period the regime's propaganda tended to exacerbate the danger of external threats in order to hide the weaknesses of the regime at home, and this created a very sensitive perception of outside threat among the Romanian populace. Thus, surveys conducted by the Paul Lazarsfeld Society in Vienna illustrate that in 1992, 67 per cent of Romanians were concerned with the threat posed by Russia; 62 per cent a war with an unspecified neighbour; and 60 per cent with the danger of nationalist unrest among ethnic minorities in Romania. However, in 1996 the same organisation found that threat perceptions had significantly decreased, although 55 per cent were still concerned by the Russian threat.[27] What is

interesting is a general perception in Romania that national threats are best addressed through the auspices of collective security organisations such as NATO. Indeed, a consistently high percentage of the Romanian public, between 75 and 84 per cent, support NATO accession.

However, one of the main constraints faced by Romanian policy-makers when reforming the military has been how to match available resources with the demands of the reform process. With the exception of the periods 1994–95 and 2000–1, Romania's GDP has decreased continuously since 1989, and this has, of course, influenced defence expenditures in real terms, with governmental budgetary priorities often lying in different areas. For the fiscal year 2001, however, the new Nastase government has allocated around USD1 billion to the defence budget – an increase of 35 per cent – in order to speed up the defence reform process.[28] While the level of defence expenditure is clearly a key factor in supporting a successful professionalisation process in the RAF, professionalisation must also take place in the context of a sustainable and predictable policy and budgetary environment if defence reform plans are to be successfully formulated and implemented in the medium to long term. This in turn requires predictability within the defence budget over time and a continued commitment by the government to developing appropriately clear and sustainable strategies for reform.

Conclusion

First and foremost what is striking about the professionalisation process now under way in Romania is the nature and scale of the challenge. Like most states in central and eastern Europe, democratically elected Romanian governments since 1989 have had to wrestle with armed forces that by 1989 had levels of professionalism that were at an all-time low. Role and mission reorientation has therefore taken place alongside the need for root and branch professionalisation in all aspects of modern armed forces – in terms of the development of a pool of qualified well-trained service personnel who have appropriate technical skills. In addition, Romanian governments have embarked on reprofessionalising their armed forces at the same time as changing the role and mission of the RAF, first from a Neutralist type to a Territorial Defence model and then to strongly emphasise power projection capabilities within this context. It is only since 1999 that Romania has settled the role and mission for its armed forces.

The obstacles and challenges to professionalisation have therefore been significant, and achievement uneven. Part of the problem has

clearly been the lack of focus of the professionalisation process, with too many aspects demanding attention and a lack of reform priorities. Since 1994, and especially since the MAP process of 1999, this has added some clarity – though the importance attached to these priorities depends on the perception among the political elite in Romania that NATO membership is a real possibility in the near term and the increase in levels of defence expenditure is a price worth paying to achieve this. In financial terms the increase in national defence expenditure since 1999 and especially 2000–1 suggests increased resources will be made available to fund a serious professionalisation process. However, it should be noted that in real terms defence expenditure in 2001 was less than that a decade earlier, and predictable and sustained levels of defence expenditure over the next decade will be just as important as higher expenditure.

However, as this chapter has argued, significant progress has been made in developing effective mechanisms so that the RAF accept their role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the state. Where progress has been slow is in developing the ability to conduct military activities in an effective and efficient way and in reorganising the organisational structures of the RAF to reflect the new missions that have been set out.

As noted above, some progress has been made in identifying the role and mission of the RAF, though the need both to create a robust territorial defence force alongside a more operational force capable of participating in NATO-led missions is a challenging one. It has already required the redirection of resources away from the majority of units towards the operational force, and in effect the Strategy for 2010 is to add further momentum to this process. The effect will be to create a two-tier RAF, with the operational forces winning the resources to bring them up to NATO standards and the territorial force getting less funds and dependent on a 'trickle down' or 'spillover' effect in further developing their levels of professionalisation.

This policy of developing a power projection capability within a Territorial Defence model has already generated further tension. In practice, the need to have relatively large Romanian-based armed forces means that the requisite manpower can only realistically be provided by conscription. There are simply insufficient volunteers to sustain a Territorial Defence model – and anyway the cost of such volunteers would be prohibitively expensive. Despite this, the government remains committed to reducing the proportion of conscripts in armed forces significantly by 2005, at which point further choices will need to be made – to embrace fully a Power Projection type of armed force or

accept that Territorial Defence will become increasingly difficult for the RAF to deliver within existing resources.

Clearly bilateral support and especially interaction with NATO are important factors in further developing professional armed forces in Romania. As the implications of Romania's disappointment at its failure to join NATO in the first round of eastern enlargement testifies, the external incentive structure – and more specifically the real prospect of NATO membership – will need to be carefully choreographed both to ensure Romania is actually ready to effectively bear the responsibilities of membership when it eventually joins, but in the interim also to ensure real progress is made towards further professionalisation. Over a decade on from the fall of Ceauşescu, it is clear that the RAF accept civilian democratic control and have in place sufficiently effective command and control mechanisms to subordinate the armed forces to the elected government. Where real challenges remain is in developing the operational effectiveness of the RAF – turning roles and missions into effective forces structures, staffed by military and civilians who can conduct military activities in an effective and efficient way.

Notes

1. A 'classical war' in the eyes of Ceauşescu and the communist leadership was one centred around external threats to national sovereignty.
2. For more on the early stages of reform and the role of CADA, see W. Bacon, 'Romanian Civil–Military Relations after 1989', in C. Danopoulos and D. Zirker (eds), *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc* (Boulder: Westview, 1999).
3. The best studies describing the Sovetisation of the RAF are A. Dutu, 'Impactul politicii de clasa si de partid asupra situatiei armatei romane', in Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, *Anuarul* edited by the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History (forthcoming 2001); and the study of W. Bacon, 'The Military and the Party in Romania', in D. Herspring and I. Volgyes (eds), *Civil–Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder: Westview, 1978).
4. Dutu, 'Impactul politicii'.
5. I. Gheorghe and C. Soare, *Doctrina militara romaneasca* [Romanian military doctrine], *1968–1989* (Bucharest: Editura Militara, 1999), 140–3.
6. J. Simon, 'Central and East European Security. New National Concepts and Defence Doctrines', *Strategic Forum*, No. 151 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, December 1998).
7. The Kievenaar Study was a plan designed by Western and Romanian experts that aimed to focus the reform of the RAF and increase their interoperability with NATO forces.
8. The Supreme Council for Defending the Country (CSAT) is a body led by the President and seconded by the Prime Minister. The CSAT is responsible for

security decisions during crises or wars, and has a consultative role during peacetime.

9. G. Gheorghe Diaconescu, G. Serban and N. Pavel, *Democratic Control over the Army in Romania* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică), 367–99.

10. The PARP works as a 'school' in which partners can plan their accession and reform strategies.

11. *Carta alba a Guvernului, Armata Rômâniei 2010: Reforma si integrare euro-atlantica* [White Book of the Government, Romanian Army 2010] (Bucharest, Editura Militara, 2000), 39–41.

12. *Carta alba a Guvernului*, 36.

13. 'Strategia militara a Romaniei' [Romanian Military Strategy], *Monitorul Oficial*, partea I, No. 191 (4 May 2000), 11–12.

14. See 'Viziunea strategica 2010' [Strategic Vision 2010] edited by General Staff and published in *Observatorul militar*, No. 10 (13–19 March 2001), 9–16.

15. See ANP, cycle II, available at: http://www.mae.ro.

16. *Managementul resurselor umane in Armata Romaniei* [Management of Human Resources in the RAF], AN I No. 1 (Bucharest: Human Resources Directorate of the Romanian MoND, 1998).

17. General Neculai Balan's statement in *Rebuilding the Armed Forces for the XXIst Century*, Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History (Romania) and Institute for National Strategic Studies (USA) (Bucharest, 1999), 84–5. See also J. Simon, 'Transforming the Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe', *Forum*, No. 172 (June 2000), 4.

18. *The Governing Programme 2001–2004* (Bucharest, December 2000), 114.

19. V. Babiuc, 'Reform of the RAF: Modernization and Interoperability', in K. Treptow, M. Ionescu (eds), *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration* (Iasi, Oxford, Portland, 1999), 125.

20. 'Bilant la Statul Major General', *Observatorul militar*, No. 13 (3–9 April 2001), 10.

21. D. Dragomir, 'Armata pe butuci', *Ziua* (3 April 2001).

22. 'PfP Regional Training Centre', presentation paper edited by the Romanian General Staff.

23. 'Bilant la Statul Major General', in *Observatorul militar*, No. 13 (3–9 April 2001), 10.

24. V. Babiuc, 'Reform of RAF', 122–3 and C. Degeratu, 'The Interoperability of the RAF', in K. Treptow and M. Ionescu (eds), *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration* (Iasi, Oxford, Portland, 1999).

25 *Carta alba a Guvernului*, 37.

26. Metro Media Transilvania, *Romania. Population's Attitudes Concerning NATO* (2001).

27. C. Haerpfer, C. Wallace and R. Rose, *Public Perceptions of Threats to Security in Post-Communist Europe* (University of Strathclyde: Glasgow, 1997).

28. See, for example, I. M. Pascu, 'Defence Planning in Emerging Democracies: the Case of Romania', in A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forster (eds), *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

9

The New Model Army? Bulgarian Experiences of Professionalisation

Laura Cleary

All states in central and eastern Europe have been concerned with establishing stable and legitimate governments and with incorporating the armed forces within that framework rather than having those forces dictate to government. The means to that end have been the assertion of democratic civilian control over the armed forces and their subsequent professionalisation. In attempting these reforms, the states of the region have looked towards Western states and institutions for guidance and inspiration. While advice has been willingly given, there has been a tacit understanding that the success or failure of defence reform will ultimately be dependent upon domestic determinants. Bulgaria is illustrative of this point, for the transformation of its defence sector has been dependent upon the broader processes of institutionalising democracy and furthering economic development. While significant progress has been made in terms of drafting the legislation required for democratic civilian control, the supportive culture necessary for the professionalisation of the armed forces has not yet fully developed. The internal motor of reform has tended to stall at crucial moments, progress only being resumed when Western institutions have chosen to offer a jump-start. As a result, while there is much to commend in Bulgarian defence reform, much remains to be done.

Every state's military will be reflective of its own culture, tradition and aspirations. Nevertheless, it is possible to place military establishments in comparative context. Bulgaria has demonstrated aspirations to become a Territorial Defence force, however, for the foreseeable future it will remain a Post-Neutral type. As will be discussed below, Bulgaria's geographical location and its aspirations to membership of NATO and the EU will continue to fuel its desire and need to participate at some level in international peace support missions (PSOs). Yet for political,

economic and social reasons the emphasis of defence reform will have to be on strengthening the army's ability to provide for national territorial defence. It is the government's intention to develop an 'active armed force' 'capable of securing the defence of the country and being a partner of equal worth in international cooperation', but it must do so within the framework of the resources available, both physical and financial.[1]

Adhering to a type: Bulgarian restructuring post-1989

The introduction to this volume draws attention to the need to carefully apply concepts of professionalisation and professionalism. This is certainly the case in Bulgaria on two counts. First, Bulgarians argue that a conscript force can have professional standards. By their reasoning, to use 'volunteer' and 'professional' as synonyms implies that any other type of force is amateur. Second, the officer corps maintains that any intervention by the armed forces in political affairs has been avoided, and that the Bulgarian armed forces (BAF) have acted as neither a guarantor of, nor a threat to, political stability during the transitional period.[2] So, in these two senses, the BAF have been professional. For the BAF, 'professionalisation' has represented an opportunity to depoliticise the army and return it to its traditional role of being above politics, with the military officer being the legal representative of the national security interest.[3] The Bulgarian interpretation of professionalisation is thus closely related to the concept of democratic civilian control. The adoption of that form of defence management is in itself contingent upon a shift in political orientation. Bulgaria was slow to begin the process of democratic transition, and this had understandable repercussions for the drafting of a military doctrine, the development of a normative framework and the restructuring of the armed forces themselves.

The evolution of Bulgarian doctrine and role

National security concepts and military doctrines are statements of intent. They provide an indication of how a government chooses to view itself and wishes others to perceive it. In the absence of a strong sense of national purpose both security concept and doctrine are likely to be formulated in a piecemeal fashion and this has certainly been the case in Bulgaria.

  While the overthrow of the Zhivkov government in 1989 has generally been classed as one in a series of 'Velvet Revolutions' which spread across central and eastern Europe, in practice the Bulgarian revolution

was in name only. Although Todor Zhivkov was forced to resign he was simply replaced by his Foreign Minister, Petar Mladenov. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), but it was not immediately ousted from power. Some attempts to initiate democratic reforms were made, but the BSP was predominantly concerned with trying to halt Bulgaria's slide into economic crisis. Within this context, wholesale reform of the armed forces was not viewed as a priority.

Since there had been no significant changes in personnel or attitudes, external factors would be the principal determinants in any revision of military doctrine. Between 1955 and 1986 Bulgarian military doctrine was one of 'counterforce deterrence' or a 'doctrine of balance'.[4] As the southernmost state within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), Bulgaria was tasked with screening the south-western and south-eastern flanks of the Joint Armed Forces and of the WTO as a whole. More specifically, Bulgaria was responsible for neutralising NATO members in the Balkans.[5]

The year 1986 marked an initial variation in doctrine for Bulgaria and its allies in the WTO. Mikhail Gorbachev's New Thinking in Soviet foreign policy was not yet fully formulated, but a change in emphasis was clearly imminent. There was a resultant shift from counterforce deterrence to 'joint defensive military doctrine' (JDMD).[6] The principal role for the BAF remained the defence of the socialist system, and the dominant ideology throughout the WTO would continue to be 'uniform and unambivalent', corresponding with 'an axiological self-identification'.[7] However, the burden of defence, both of the socialist system and individual states, would increasingly fall on those states themselves and not on the Soviet Union.

As a consequence of the abandonment of the WTO and the collapse of the USSR itself in 1991, instead of assuming greater responsibility for collective defence, Bulgaria found itself abandoning the system and assuming full liability for national defence. As a co-signatory to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 (CFE), Bulgaria was obligated to place limits on its ground and air forces. Had the WTO remained intact, security for individual states might have been achieved even with reduced force levels. The abandonment of that alliance and the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the Bulgarian military needed both to reconfigure its defences and seek alternative sources for military doctrine and do so with ever dwindling resources. Apart from initiating reductions in line with CFE requirements, little effort was made to substantially restructure the armed forces. As for military

doctrine, references were made to the Constitution, resolutions passed by the National Assembly, the UN Charter, international law and declarations of the then Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE, now OSCE). Socialism, clearly, was no longer defensible. The mission, post-1991, would be the development of mutual and regional security within the Balkans.

Between 1991 and 1997 that mission was accomplished on an ad hoc basis. Friendship and mutual assistance agreements were pursued with Turkey and Greece. In 1994 Bulgaria joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Inclusion within PfP allowed for more formal and regular diplomatic contacts between state and institution. It also resulted in Bulgaria's participation in a number of joint exercises and operations, including both the Implementation and Stabilisation Forces in Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR). In light of the instability in neighbouring Yugoslavia, mutual assistance agreements with Turkey and Greece were a natural requirement for stability in the region. Likewise even though the ruling BSP was wary of NATO intentions, it was unwilling to consign Bulgaria to the periphery of new security arrangements. The result of this series of bilateral initiatives has been to progressively lock Bulgaria into a new institutional framework for security. However, there was no coordinated effort to achieve this type of framework prior to 1997. The arrangements into which Bulgaria entered during this period are evidence of the reactive nature of its approach to defence reform.

Development of a more proactive policy of defence reform was dependent on two factors. First, the domestic economic situation would need to stabilise, and second a party more clearly concerned with the institutionalisation of democracy would need to be elected. This occurred in 1997 when a currency board was established and the Union of Democratic Forces (ODS) won the parliamentary elections. That government (1997–2001), headed by Ivan Kostov, chose to define security in terms reflective of those used by existing NATO member states.

During the Cold War threats to Bulgarian security were seen to originate from one of two sources: either from the expansionistic tendencies of capitalism or the blatant aggression of NATO. Post-Cold War the threats are more varied and their points of origin are less easy to identify. The end of ideological and military confrontation has reduced the threat of global nuclear conflict while increasing the opportunities for cooperation and interoperation among all nations.[8] Increased cooperation is therefore necessary to combat the host of economic, political, social, ethnic and religious threats which are seen to undermine stability and security worldwide. The recognition of these trends places the

Bulgarian National Security Concept of 1998 and the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria of 1999 on a par with North American, European and institutional security concepts produced after 1989. The aim of Bulgarian national security is to ensure that 'the major rights and liberties of Bulgarian citizens are protected', 'the state borders, territorial integrity and independence of the country are not subject to armed attack and … the state and civilian institutions are capable of providing the conditions for the nation's development and prosperity'.[9] Clearly, the military alone is unable to provide this type of security and must act in concert with other agencies of government, and these in turn must operate within a larger European and international framework.

The role of the armed forces underlines the general belief that the BAF is only a part, although an integral one, of a larger security network. According to the Military Doctrine, the armed forces of Bulgaria are a 'basis of the country's defence' ensuring its 'sovereignty, security and independence'.[10] The specific functions which the BAF discharge are the deterrence of attacks and defence, peacekeeping, and humanitarian and search-and-rescue missions. Significantly, the armed forces are seen as an important element of the Republic of Bulgaria's 'integration policy in Euro-Atlantic security organisations and for regional cooperation'.[11] Since 1997, there has thus been a growing awareness within the army, certain circles of government and outside the state that additional structural and institutional reforms will need to take place if the BAF are to fulfil the demands of the Bulgarian government in an effective and efficient way.

The legislative and institutional framework

Valeri Ratchev, the former Deputy Director of the Defence Planning Directorate of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence, has applauded the fact that in the immediate 'revolutionary' period of 1989–91 the military as an institution did not intervene in political affairs nor was it an 'actor in the "round table" negotiations between the communists and the new democratic forces', as was the case in Poland.[12] Nevertheless, the various political factions vying for power in the transitional system feared that the People's Army would split into partisan armed factions, or become the instrument of one political party. On the strength of this fear, depoliticisation of the armed forces was one of the few issues to bring these factions together. In January 1990, the State Council repealed the section of Article One of the 1971 Constitution that had institutionalised the exclusive political role of the BCP in the armed forces and replaced all BCP political organs with education work organs. This was

followed by a specific decree ordering the complete depoliticisation of the armed forces. The Military Administration Department of the BCP Central Committee and the Main Political Administration of the BAF were removed from the Ministry of Defence, and Party cells and the Komsomol were removed from the army. In September 1990 an additional law was passed requiring the army to respond to the Bulgarian government rather than the ruling party and soldiers were further required to relinquish their membership of political parties. In addition, participation in meetings and demonstrations organised by political parties, coalitions or trade unions was forbidden. As a result, the BAF were removed from domestic politics.

Legislation to depoliticise the armed forces was quickly followed by the enactment of a new Constitution in 1991, which established the powers of the executive, legislature and judiciary and outlined the rights of the citizenry. It also detailed the relationship of the military to Bulgarian state and society, and established a system of executive control and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces. The President of the Bulgarian Republic is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his rights and responsibilities are commensurate with those held by most West European heads of state. The President is both supported and checked in the execution of his duties by the legislature, the National Assembly. Parliamentary oversight is exercised through a variety of means which include the adoption of relevant legislation, the development of long-term plans, the execution of budgets, and the promotion of transparency in all matters relating to the armed forces.[13] Although the 1991 Constitution provided the basic framework for democratic civilian control, the political consensus needed to promote other aspects of professional armed forces proved short-lived and defence reform languished until the election of the Kostov government in 1997.

Prime Minister Kostov pledged to bring Bulgaria into the twenty-first century through closer cooperation and integration with the EU and NATO. Velizar Shalamanov, then Deputy Minister of Defence, argued that the Kostov government treated membership in these organisations not only as a matter of political consideration, but as a consequence of a long-lasting transformation of Bulgarian society.[14] Since 1997, the BAF has been the subject of a range of legislative activity. Through the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), the plans for the years 2004 and 2010, as well as a range of legislation on social and economic issues, the government has sought to define the political context and devise the legal framework for the military's place in society.

The UK Ministry of Defence's Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services (DMCS) conducted a number of studies on the progress of defence reform in Bulgaria. In its 1998 study it concluded that the 'legislative framework, governmental systems, controls and structures … would appear to provide entirely adequate democratic control and oversight of the armed forces' but noted it required all the systems and procedures to be followed.[15] The points of concern identified generally related to the lack of a supportive culture required for democratic control of the armed forces, but they also had the potential to impinge upon attempts to professionalise those forces in the sense understood by Forster et al. Questions centred on lines of communication, levels of accountability, and the absence of a culture of critical dissent.[16]

To varying degrees the President, Council of Ministers, Prime Minister and National Assembly all have responsibility for the BAF. Initially, however, determining the levels of responsibility and the manner in which that should be communicated to other interested parties proved problematic. Through a process of trial and error, guidance from external organisations and the codification of good practice, the potential for improper management was reduced. Since 1997 President Petar Stoyanov has restricted his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief to those set out in the Constitution. During the Kostov premiership from 1997 to 2001 the executive and legislature became increasingly engaged in the development of military reform programmes and their implementation. The Kostov government tended to set the pace and target of reforms in accordance with external NATO obligations, while the Ministry of Defence provided the detail of policy and the National Assembly ensured its accountability.

Within the BAF itself it has taken some time to address a number of issues. There was some concern that the Ministry of Defence and General Staff were working at cross-purposes, and while the Ministry of Defence pursued a programme of greater transparency the activities of the General Staff remained secret. Frequently activities were duplicated by the two institutions and attempts to communicate reports or initiatives were hindered by secrecy regulations. Following the DMCS's 1998 report which highlighted these issues, a number of steps were taken to rectify the situation. First, since 1998 both the Ministry of Defence and General Staff have been restructured in order to better meet the demands of civilian control and future threats to security. In the process the duplication of responsibilities has been reduced. Second, secrecy regulations have been reviewed thereby allowing a freer flow of information.

Third, the offices in which the Ministry and General Staff work have been remodelled, allowing greater integration of staff. This has taken two forms, the intermingling of General Staff and Defence Ministry personnel and the incorporation of an increasing number of civilian employees into the Ministry. It is hoped that the presence of civilians in posts formerly held by service personnel will reduce the filtering of information flowing to and from the Minister of Defence, which was a feature of the Bulgarian defence bureaucracy before 1997. In 1998 there were 1181 people working in the Ministry of Defence and the ratio of military officers to civilian employees was 1:2. By March 2000 there were 28 civilian chiefs of departments and sections in posts formerly occupied by service personnel.[17] In its 2001 report on Bulgarian defence reform the DMCS concluded that sufficient steps had been taken within the BAF to ensure a more cooperative and coordinated approach to defence reform.

Creating the new model army

Having made real progress in subordinating the BAF to democratic civilian control, since 1997 attention has focused on developing a military organisation capable of carrying out its mission and role in an effective and efficient way. Thus professionalisation now encompasses the five 'Rs': reductions, restructuring, retraining, retention and recruitment.

Force reductions began in 1990 with the signing of the CFE Treaty. At that time, with a population in excess of 8.3 million, the armed services stood at over 100,000. By 1998 that number had been reduced to approximately 75,000. The 1999 Plan for Organisational Development of the Ministry of Defence by the Year 2004 sets a target of 50,000, but this has subsequently been revised to 45,000.[18] In reducing to this level, emphasis has been placed on both increasing the number of combat-ready formations for defence of the national territory and improving Bulgaria's ability to contribute by means of rapid reaction forces to multinational peacekeeping missions.

Defence of the national territory is achieved through the concerted efforts of the General Staff, logistical command, land forces, air force, navy and specialised troops. The land forces have always been considered the main service of the BAF, comprising approximately half of the total force. Prior to the implementation of the CFE Treaty the land forces stood at 50,400 men, of which 33,300 were conscripts. This is compared to the air force which totalled 19,300, of which 14,000 were conscripts, and the navy which had 6100 men, of which 2000 were conscripts.

All branches of the BAF are being reduced and restructured so that they can better contribute to the new defence forces, territorial defence forces and rapid reaction forces (RRF). The defence forces are expected to be interoperable with NATO defence forces and able to conduct joint operations. They will consist of land force tank and mechanised brigades, aviation bases, air defence and missile technical brigades and navy formations. The territorial defence forces are also land force formations, and will consist of nine regiments for concealment and territorial defence.

Although the development of the defence forces and territorial defence forces is viewed as important, the priority to date has been the establishment of rapid reaction forces. Throughout the MAP, in the Plan for Organisational Development and in the statements of senior personnel, emphasis is placed on peacekeeping, rapid reaction forces and crisis management. In seeking membership of NATO the government feels obliged to demonstrate its commitment to the principles and goals of the existing members. However, reference to peacekeeping, rapid reaction forces and crisis management is not just lip service. Restructuring along these lines is viewed as a matter of necessity given the state's close proximity to the FRY and anxiety about the domestic implications for continued stability in the Balkans.

The RRF consist of army, air force and navy components, none of which can be manned with less than 70 per cent of required personnel and 100 per cent of the necessary combat equipment. Since the RRF are viewed as a necessary element for both NATO accession and national security it will be the first force to be manned by volunteers and will receive priority funding for equipment purchases. In February 2000, the then Minister of Defence, Boyko Noev, commented that there could be no alternative to volunteer forces for Bulgarian contributions to future multinational operations.[19] Part of the motivation for this is the view that conscripts should not be committed to peacekeeping missions abroad and a feeling that volunteers might better face the challenges of these missions. Public opinion supports this policy. The majority wish the current system altered, with 39.6 per cent opting for a mixed force and 33.7 per cent preferring an all-volunteer force. No more than 15.4 per cent would wish the current system to be retained.[20] Unsurprisingly, those in favour of retaining conscription tend to be over the age of 45 and in most cases they are men who believe that military service strengthens both the character and physical condition of the conscripts.[21] For many of the older generation military service is viewed as a patriotic duty and one that should be fulfilled by all who are able.

For those under 45, the predominant view is that the adoption of a volunteer format will provide greater opportunities for personal and professional development and should therefore be welcomed rather than resisted.

The transition to an all-volunteer force began in 1997 with the immediate reaction forces (IFR) and those forces participating in PSOs. Once the IFR are fully manned by volunteers the air force and the navy will be targeted. Special purpose chemical, engineer, and signals units in the land forces will then be prioritised and the BAF will be predominately a volunteer force by 2010.[22] By the end of 2000, 1336 soldiers had signed contracts.[23]

In order to reduce the potential for increased unemployment, and tensions between civil and military authorities caused by the restructuring of the BAF, a Social Adaptation Programme has been established. With 4000 service personnel being dismissed in 2001, and another 20,000 being cut in the next $2^1/_2$ years, a good deal of attention has been paid to retraining issues, but opportunities for improving the qualifications of those remaining in the armed forces have not been overlooked. The Social Adaptation Programme is managed by the ministries of Defence and Finance and the National Employment Office (NEO). Their aim is to assist commissioned and non-commissioned officers who will soon leave the forces in identifying appropriate civilian careers and providing them with the skills necessary for employment in the civilian sector.

The Bulgarian government is placing some emphasis on developing an effective NCO cadre. While the proportion of NCOs in the BAF has remained at 24 per cent, their role is being significantly strengthened.[24] Specific emphasis is being placed on developing the abilities of the NCO cadre.[25] In addition professional and language training has been developed at the existing military academies, while long term the aim is to restructure the system of military education and to overhaul the curriculum so that it meets NATO standards. The old curriculum was limited in scope and concentrated solely on what was contained in the field manuals and the history of the Second World War. Politics, sociology, international relations and law, leadership and management studies and information technology were not considered suitable subjects for study.[26] The intention now is to make these subjects available and to utilise both military and civilian experts to develop well-educated military personnel capable of meeting the challenges of the BAF's new missions.

Recruiting civilians with good educational qualifications is important in further developing the expertise of the BAF. At present 39.6 per cent

of all military personnel on active duty are university graduates.[27] The BAF would like to increase this number and distribute individuals more widely at junior, mid-level and senior positions. A system is being devised to accomplish this and special attention is being paid to the selection of the best professional soldiers for senior NCO appointments.

The overhaul of the military education system is a cornerstone of Bulgaria's plans to modernise the military. Not only is there a desire to recruit better educated soldiers, but there is the expectation that recruits will continue to pursue educational opportunities throughout their careers and promotion is now explicitly linked to the attainment of further qualifications. The Ministry of Defence seeks to make the process of promotion as objective and transparent as possible. A register of vacancies is published annually and all personnel meeting the requirements of the post are entitled to apply. Applications are reviewed by a committee and the individual with the highest evaluation score is appointed.[28]

In elevating the importance of education, linking it to recruitment and career progression, the Ministry of Defence is seeking to develop a truly professional force. However, full implementation of the various initiatives is dependent on continued civilian political interest in such reforms and a willingness to provide adequate funding.

Factors influencing professionalisation

There are two forces at work with respect to Bulgarian professionalisation. External forces, in the form of NATO and the EU, are exerting pressure on Bulgaria to professionalise its armed forces and develop a modern political economy. Political instability and economic crises within the country result not in the derailing of professionalisation, but in its sporadic progression. This force and counter-force reflect the competition between hard and soft security issues. Although NATO and the EU are increasingly concerned with non-military threats to security, they still embody traditional security guarantees. At present Bulgaria is unable to provide adequately for its own defence, and clearly NATO membership would alleviate some concern over this matter. Inclusion within the EU could, if plans for a European defence force mature, provide a similar level of assurance. However, Bulgaria faces a twin challenge. First, in terms of its military development, the nearer it is to providing for its own defence the better its chances of NATO membership. Second, for EU membership, Bulgaria must first tackle a range of non-military threats to security that threaten to destabilise the country: unequal rates of economic growth, high levels of poverty, racial and

ethnic tensions and political corruption. Bulgaria has experienced difficulty in prioritising these complementary agendas, and reform, on all fronts, has tended to be reactive rather than proactive.

The initial period of military reform, from 1989 to 1991, resulted from changes in the international security environment, the collapse of the WTO and the Soviet Union and the need to implement the CFE Treaty. During the second phase, from 1991 to 1997, little effort was made to professionalise the military, though significant progress was made in establishing the legislative framework for civilian control. In the third phase, from 1997, legislation was revised extensively in order to meet the standards required by NATO and the EU. Throughout this period, and particularly between 1989 and 1997, Bulgarian defence reform suffered as a result of its deprioritisation on the domestic political agenda. In particular, political instability, a lack of shared views on governing priorities – and especially military priorities – has been an important factor in undermining and setting back the reform process. While the 1997 decision to apply for NATO membership did serve to concentrate Bulgarian policy-makers' minds around defence reform issues, defence remains a relatively low priority in relation to other issues on the Bulgarian political agenda.

Despite this, the aspiration to join Western institutions and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia have provided important external incentives to further professionalise the BAF. NATO and the EU as institutions are keen to develop and deploy rapid reaction forces and crisis management systems (CMS) and it is clear that future applicants must adopt systems and structures which are compatible. Given Bulgaria's close proximity to the FRY and its own ethnic tensions, the establishment of an RRF and a CMS has been of particular concern. However, economic constraints limit the Bulgarian government and military's ability to promote reform as rapidly as accession to NATO and the EU would require. Between 1991 and 1997 economic collapse was the predominant issue. From 1989 to 1993 GDP declined 27.7 per cent and there was a negative trade balance until 1994.[29] Economic decline was in part due to the effects of stagnation prior to 1989 and the general difficulties of transition; however, Bulgaria was also deeply affected by the restrictions on trade with the countries of the former Yugoslavia. These general economic conditions had a severe impact on the defence budget. Between 1990 and 1998, defence expenditure declined as a percentage of GDP from 3.70 to 2.10.[30] While the latter figure is close to the average for NATO countries, a combination of lengthy budgetary negotiations and inflation has significantly reduced the Ministry of Defence's purchasing

power. Parliament has tended to approve only a portion of the defence budget: 50 per cent in 1995 and 46.6 per cent in 1996.[31] Ninety per cent of the approved budgets have been used to cover personnel costs. Investment in new armaments and equipment or, indeed, general restructuring has been significantly curtailed. In the White Paper on Defence (2001) it was suggested that by 2015 there would be a significant increase in GDP and that in turn defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP would also rise. The White Paper, however, was drafted prior to the onset of the global economic downturn. It is unlikely, therefore, that the financial situation of the BAF will improve dramatically in the near future.

To deliver all the planned reforms to the BAF, and especially those to the IRF, appropriate levels of funding and stable budgetary planning are absolutely necessary. However, the defeat of Prime Minister Kostov's ODS party and the election of the newly formed National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) in the parliamentary elections of 2001, has cast doubt on whether this will be possible. The NDSV were elected on a simple platform of improving the average standard of living in Bulgaria within 800 days. Defence reform was a minor issue in the elections, and the new government clearly has budgetary priorities in other areas. The NDSV remains committed to NATO and EU membership, but has been explicit in its view that this should not be at any cost. Thus, instead of importing US-made F-16 fighters, Bulgaria will now upgrade its MIG-29s. Moreover, General Dimitar Georgiev, commander of the Air Defence Corps, has indicated that Bulgaria cannot afford the costs of 180 flight hours a year per pilot required by NATO standards. More widely, this frugal approach to the defence budget has led to a strategy in which forces identified for assignment to NATO operations will get funding priority, while the rest are increasingly starved of funds.[32]

Conclusions

Since 1989, Bulgaria has undergone important processes of professionalisation and civil–military reform, and while progress has been made in some areas, significant challenges remain in others. Bulgaria has focused particularly on one aspect of professionalisation: the implementation of effective mechanisms for democratic, civilian control of the armed forces. In this respect, there have been some notable successes. Successive Bulgarian governments, and particularly that of Prime Minister Kostov between 1997 and 2001, have succeeded in defining the country's national security interests and outlining the role that the

military is to play in achieving these in peacetime and in war. They have established a normative framework which delineates the rights and responsibilities of every citizen, including those on active duty. This same framework clearly identifies the armed forces as the legal representative of the national security framework. The Bulgarians have also succeeded in depoliticising the military which is now a politically neutral instrument of the state. However, Bulgaria has made less progress in developing the ability of its armed forces to conduct military activities in an effective and efficient manner. In practice, defence policy and defence reform have been deprioritised by successive governments, at least relative to other areas such as the economy. In this context, professionalisation has been constrained by limited and unpredictable defence budgets and a lack of political consensus on the direction of reform. A coherent vision of the future shape of the BAF – together with an agreed strategy of how to achieve this within current resource limitations – has been lacking. Consequently, a succession of reform plans have been let down by inadequate funding and the absence of any effective agents of change to promote ongoing reform.

While the 1997 election of the Kostov government, and Bulgaria's subsequent decision to pursue NATO membership, alleviated some of these problems and added focus and momentum to professionalisation processes in the BAF, this has brought its own problems. In particular, reform has concentrated on developing NATO interoperability and power projection capabilities among particular elements of the BAF, but only at the expense of the holistic professionalisation of the armed forces along the lines of the Post-Neutral model. Resources and effort devoted, for example, to the reform of elite cadres for participation in NATO-led peacekeeping operations, have been resources that have not been allocated to the professionalisation of the military as a whole. Thus, the professionalisation of the BAF has proceeded in an uneven manner. Prior to the 2001 elections there was a growing sense within the BAF that an internal motor for reform had developed. The change of government and bureaucratic administration has slowed that motor, but not yet stalled it.

Whether the new NDSV government can redeem the situation will depend on whether it can offer a consistent political commitment to reform, and whether it can stabilise and improve the Bulgarian economy. Most importantly, attitudes towards reform within the political sphere must become proactive instead of reactive. Bulgaria cannot continue to rely solely on external factors to drive its reform process, certainly not if it wishes to develop its own internal security framework and become an integral part of the European security infrastructure.

Notes

1. *White Paper on the Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria*, 3.4.1 (Sofia, 2001) (http://www.md.government.bg/_en_/index.htm).

2. As I have noted in a previous article, this claim could be open to interpretation. See Cleary, 'Out with the Old, in with the New: the Challenge of Asserting Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Bulgaria', *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2001). See also V. Ratchev, 'Impact of Defence Reform on Civil–Military Relations in the Case of Bulgaria', Paper for the Conference on Post-Communist Civil–Military Relations at the University of Glasgow, 22–23 March 2000. Permission to cite this paper is gratefully acknowledged.

3. Ratchev, 'Impact of Defence Reform'.

4. V. Ratchev and S. Tassev, 'Civil–Military Relations in Bulgaria', in Laura Richards Cleary and the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria (eds), *Civil–Military Relations: a Guide* (Sofia: ISV, 1999), 56.

5. Ratchev and Tassev, 'Civil–Military Relations', 56.

6. Ratchev and Tassev, 'Civil–Military Relations', 56.

7. Ratchev and Tassev, 'Civil–Military Relations', 56–7.

8. *Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria* (8 April 1999).

9. *National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria*, General Provisions, Art. 1 (1998).

10. *Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria*, Art. 44 (1999).

11. *Military Doctrine*, Art. 46.

12. Ratchev, 'Impact of Defence Reform'. Although the military as an institution did not intervene, senior military personnel, most notably Defence Minister Dobri Dzhurov, did apply pressure on Todor Zhivkov to resign.

13. For further details, see P. Plantev, 'The Changing Nature of Civil–Military Relations in Post-Totalitarian Bulgaria', in A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forster (eds), *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

14. V. Shalamanov, 'Changing the Strategic Culture: Political and Military Aspects of Defence Reform in Post-Communist Bulgaria', Paper for the Conference on Post-Communist Civil–Military Relations at the University of Glasgow, 22–23 March 2000. Permission to cite this paper is gratefully acknowledged.

15. UK Ministry of Defence Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services (UK DMCS), *Study No. 3/98: Parliamentary Oversight and Democratic Control of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence.*

16. Ratchev and Tassev, 'Civil–Military Relations', 69.

17. V. Shalamanov, 'Changing the Strategic Culture'.

18. *Plan for the Organisational Development of the Ministry of Defence by the Year 2004* (1999). Revised figures can be found in Ratchev, 'Impact of Defence Reform' in note 2.

19. B. Noev, Speech to the 36th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 4–6 February 2000. (http://www.md.government.bg).

20. Ratchev and Tassev, 'Civil–Military Relations', 73.

21. Ratchev and Tassev, 'Civil–Military Relations'.

22. *White Paper*, 4.1.

23. *White Paper*, 4.1.

24. *White Paper*, 4.1.
25. *Résumé of Programme Y2000 of the Bulgarian Membership Action Plan* (1999).
26. Correspondence from Colonel Valeri Ratchev, 25 March 2001.
27. *White Paper*, 4.3.7.
28. *White Paper*, 4.3.8.
29. G. Minassian, 'The Road to Economic Disaster in Bulgaria', *Europe–Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1998), 331.
30. Ratchev, 'Impact of Defence Reform'.
31. Ratchev, 'Impact of Defence Reform'.
32. *RFE/RL*, Vol. 5, No. 164, Part II (29 August 2001).

10
Professionalisation of the Slovenian Armed Forces[1]

Igor Kotnik-Dvojmoč and Erik Kopač[2]

The context within which professionalisation has taken place in Slovenia has been shaped by three factors. First, the struggle for independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which culminated in the ten-day 'mini-war' of June and July 1991 with few casualties and a swift political settlement. This has left a number of lasting legacies of which the most important is a diminishing public concern about military threats to Slovenia and as a consequence little public interest in the professionalisation of the Slovenian armed forces. Second, Slovenia has a distinct non-militaristic culture which has been quite a distinctive feature of Slovenian civil–military relations.[3] Finally, while there has been a desire to develop the capacity to defend Slovenian territorial integrity, the last decade has seen the principal focus of effort directed towards socio-economic rather than military reforms.

In professionalising the Slovenian armed forces, the state inherited ill-equipped Territorial Defence Forces (TO) and some equipment from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), but no fully operational JNA military units. After several years of searching and numerous weaknesses and mistakes, the Slovenian government has opted for the formation of small, inexpensive armed forces, primarily oriented towards territorial defence, but with some professionalised units able to operate with NATO forces. With the emergence of a settled view as to the mission and role of the Slovenian armed forces, the government has turned its attention to developing a military organisation and forces structure capable of fulfilling the demands of the government in an effective and efficient way. However, four challenges have presented themselves. First, without coherent development guidelines and goals, it has not been possible to determine the structure of the Slovenian armed forces. Second, the military education system has failed to produce an officer

corps with sufficient levels of expertise. Third, ineffective command and control, inefficient use of resources and inappropriate personnel policy in the military have encouraged a poor selection of professional soldiers. Finally, professionalisation of the Slovenian armed forces has been restricted by low popular threat perceptions and economic constraints.

Despite these serious challenges, some professionalisation processes took place in the absence of a well-considered doctrinal framework. However, as this chapter analyses, until recently the effect of this has been uneven and has had serious consequences for the ability of the Slovenian armed forces to fulfil the demands of the civilian government in an effective and efficient way. Without serious professionalisation, the Slovenian armed forces therefore ran the risk of being seen as merely decorative rather than functional.

Characteristics of the Slovenian armed forces[4]

The role of the armed forces

The adoption of the new Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (1991) and specific legislation governing the defence area (the Defence Law, 1994) and the Law on Military Duty (1991, amended 1995), created a broad constitutional and legal framework for Slovenian security. In this framework, the National Assembly performs legislative functions and exercises control over the adoption and implementation of defence policy. The influence of the executive over the regulation of defence issues has also been increased, and it has responsibility for formulating defence budget proposals and implementing regulations for defence preparations. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the administration of the Slovenian armed forces, under the guidance of the Defence Minister. The status of military personnel is equivalent to that of administrative employees – though the nature of military service means that certain actions such as strikes are prohibited.[5] The titular Supreme Commander of the Slovenian armed forces is the President of the Republic of Slovenia. The government, based on a proposal submitted by the Minister of Defence, appoints the Chief of the General Staff. Legally, the Slovenian armed forces are an apolitical, non-partisan institution, and service personnel are prohibited from joining political parties. Individual soldiers can vote, but cannot be elected to office. The total wartime strength of the Slovenian armed forces (including reserves) at the beginning of 2001 was 76,000; 94 per cent of this figure was drawn from the reserves, and 6 per cent from active units.[6] At the end of 2001 the total wartime strength of the Slovenian armed forces

had been reduced to 47,000. The government plans to downsize the armed forces even further by the end of 2004, with the total wartime strength of the armed forces being reduced to 30,000.[7]

During their process of formation and later reorganisation in the period 1991–99, the Slovenian armed forces suffered from a number of problems, most notably: the lack of a strategic approach to their development, an absence of operational and doctrinal documents, funding constraints and poor human resource management. In this policy vacuum, functional solutions were often adopted without reference to clear political and doctrinal guidelines, adapting documentation to existing practice rather than vice versa. This approach 'put the cart before the horse' and reinforced the way in which existing practice had dictated subsequent thinking on national security in Slovenia. As a result of this confusion, progress in the reform of the Slovenian armed forces particularly in the areas of size, structure, organisation, functions and military education, progressed slowly. Indeed, in the period 1991–99 the Slovenian professionalisation process was characterised by a lack of clearly defined goals and priorities, and disorientation and a lack of motivation among those involved. Thus, while the Slovenian government and armed forces had been keen to try and develop a high level of interoperability with NATO armed forces as part of its military reform efforts, in practice this only occurred at a declaratory level with a significant gap between rhetoric and reality.[8]

Slight progress in long-term planning was made in 1999, with the adoption of the document on the Size and Structure of the Slovenian Armed Forces 2010 and the Basic Long-Term Programme for Developing and Equipping the Slovenian Armed Forces (SDPROSV). Plans and expectations from those two documents subsequently proved to be unrealistic, leading to the establishment of a new political and doctrinal framework. Consequently the revised and amended documents were adopted in 2001: the National Security Strategy and new SDPROSV. A new Defence Strategy and Defence Law will be adopted in the beginning of 2002.

Expertise in the Slovenian armed forces

Standards and formal qualifications for entry into the military

Recruiting personnel to the Slovenian armed forces proved a major challenge in the period 1991–99. In particular, officers, NCOs and soldiers in the military tended to come from different socio-economic groups and their general educational background differs widely. For example,

in practice there are five different groups of Slovenian officers. First, there are those former active officers of the JNA, who acquired their military education at Yugoslav military academies. Second, there are former active officers of the regular TO, several of whom acquired their military education in the military academies or at one of regular reserve officer schools. Third, there are former JNA and TO reserve officers who obtained their rank by graduating from reserve officer schools. Fourth, there are officers who obtained their rank through participation in the current Slovenian armed forces educational system, including defence studies graduates. Finally, there are officers who joined the TO as through their membership of the Slovenian police force. As a result, much of the Slovenian officer corps has been subject to different educational experiences and military educational socialisation processes, which have not been unified at any point.[9] This has created a variety of professional identities, subcultures and value systems in the military. The situation has been further complicated by the influence of those individuals who were sent abroad for education and training.[10] Because of an absence of appropriate control and regulatory mechanisms, this variety of staffing has led to a lack of cohesive thinking among the officer corps and a degradation of the cohesiveness of the military organisation more widely.

An additional problem stemmed from the fact that after the war for Slovenian independence, appointments to senior command positions were in some cases awarded to 'heroic' commanders, who often had only limited general or military-professional education. The effect of this has been far reaching. The 'heroic' commanders of 1991 had found it difficult to adapt to the technical, diplomatic and managerial demands placed on them by the peacetime missions and tasks of the armed forces. While attempts were made to offer additional education for these senior commanders, in many ways they represented a quite different philosophy of the professional military officer and were therefore an influential constraint on the extent to which military education and professional development were valued, and played a key role in channelling the reform process until 1999.

The military education system

After independence, Slovenia adopted a civilian-based approach to military education, rather than establish a specialist military academy. This decision was based on two factors, an assessment of the future requirements of the Slovenian officer corps in terms of expertise, and the small size of the officer corps. Officer training is therefore carried out in

a unique way, and is based on supplementary military training, after potential officers have completed their higher education programmes. Officers in the Slovenian armed forces are required to obtain a degree from one of the civilian professional or university programmes, and then to attend a one-year military professional education course conducted within the Military Education Centre of the Ministry of Defence.[11] In a number of ways this military education system based on the civilian education system is well suited to Slovenian requirements, but problems persist in its practical application. Thus, for example, the system works well for those officers who see military duty as one phase of a varied career path – and prepares them well for civilian life after they have completed their service. However, this approach does not usually result in committed career officers who consider the military service as a profession, not just another job.[12] This further serves to undermine the formation of a specific military culture and value system within the Slovenian armed forces – the absence of which remains one of its greatest deficiencies.

Training

The quality of training for the Slovenian armed forces is dependent on a variety of factors. Perhaps most significantly there was an excess of unstructured time for personnel, as well as a lack of training assets, above all insufficient opportunities for live firing exercises. For example in 1997 in one unit, out of the 227 days of the entire period of military service, only 110 days were spent on rehearsals and training in operational procedures with the remaining 117 days comprised of drill, vacation and weekend absence, sick leave and guard duty. Moreover, each conscript fired only 26–30 live rounds during their seven-month period of service.[13] Most conscripts in the Slovenian armed forces were therefore inadequately trained with low levels of fitness and motivation.

The reserves suffered from similar problems, both in terms of access to *matériel* and quality of training. Indeed, evidence indicates that Slovenian reserve units in 1999 were in some aspects in a poorer state of operational readiness than a decade ago. This stems from several sources. Until 1999 there was little awareness in Slovenia of the importance of the reserves in providing for Slovenian defence, and even less interest in taking part in reserve training – not least because of the weak sanctions against those who did not respond to the call-up. Having too large a reserve structure was also a key factor since it prevented adequate targeting of investment in reserve training and personnel.

Sources of recruitment

Through a system of compulsory military service for men, the Slovenian armed forces are staffed primarily by conscripts and active NCOs and officers, with a very small number of volunteer privates. The current Drnovšek government is in principle committed to increasing the ratio of volunteer personnel to conscripts. However, there has been no wide public discussion on the most appropriate manning method for the armed forces.[14] Even at the time of their establishment in 1991, the appropriateness of the conscript-based model was not widely discussed. Somewhat surprising were the findings of a survey in 1999 that found that among the Slovenian public, half of the population were in favour of the continuation of compulsory military service in its present form, while less than one-third of the population were in favour of a shift to an all-volunteer system for the armed forces.[15]

The principal pressure for reform from a conscript to a volunteer force therefore comes from the Slovenian political parties. The largest parliamentary party – the Liberal Democratic Party of Slovenia – argues that an increase in the number of volunteer soldiers is the natural direction for the Slovenian defence system to develop in. In addition, other parties of the governing coalition – the Associated List of Social Democrats, the Slovenian People's Party and the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia – have through the Coalitional Agreement all committed themselves to depoliticise the armed forces and introduce more volunteers. Indeed, this declaration has at last begun to stimulate a political debate in Slovenia about the future of conscription in the country.[16] The largest opposition party – the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia – is also in favour of shifting to an all-volunteer structure with a large volunteer reserve. Similarly the New Slovenia Party supports an increase in the number of volunteer soldiers and the development of further interoperability with NATO. The Slovenian National Party is in favour of the development of a volunteer cadre supported by conscripts, while the Youth Party of Slovenia – in part because its supporters are often most affected by conscription – supports the further use of volunteers in the military.[17]

This divergence between popular and political support for an all-volunteer military for Slovenia results above all from the importance placed on NATO accession at a political level. In general, official policy results from a perception among politicians that the all-volunteer model is the one most suited to NATO membership, and the model which other recent NATO members and prospective NATO candidates are increasingly gravitating towards. In contrast, the instinct of the

Slovenian public is that the current system of military organisation in Slovenia is already proven and functional, and that as such there is no pressing need to change it.

Responsibility of the armed forces

Effective command and control mechanisms

Until 1999 many officers in the higher organisational commands of the Slovenian armed forces considered that control was exercised through negotiation rather than command. Clearly in a military organisation this raises quite profound questions concerning the efficient operation of such a complex and mission-orientated system in challenging circumstances. There were two factors which underpinned negotiation rather than command. First, senior officers were often unable to provide subordinates with either the forces or assets to complete a mission – which resulted in the need for an agreement on the feasible range within which the task could be accomplished. Second, the lack of overtime payment routinely required a superior to ask subordinates to complete a task knowing that they would not be paid appropriately.[18] The practice of 'evading' the chain of command by using direct communication among individual superior and subordinate staff was also common. Typically the need to secure timely action encouraged senior commanders to negotiate directly with subordinates without using the chain of command, leaving intermediate headquarters staff unaware of the activities of their subordinates and the nature of the agreement struck.

(In)Efficient use of human resources

In Slovenia in the period 1991–99, human resources and personnel management presented key challenges for the professionalisation process. Successive governments capped the number of new military personnel that could be recruited, and as a result, regular formations experienced considerable manning problems. Temporary reassignments and absences from regular units – mainly as a consequence of education courses and training at home and abroad – further reinforced these difficulties. This shortage of manpower had particularly detrimental effects in specialised (predominantly technical) units, where effective training requires adequate manning of posts. Commanders were therefore placed in a difficult position since they had to provide a suitable level of operational readiness, while carrying out routine duties with insufficient manpower. Even though the consequences of this workload were

not evident at the time, it had a negative influence on moral and on personal identification with the military profession.

Promotion and career development mechanisms

The inappropriate personnel structure in the Slovenian armed forces is also partly the result of inappropriate personnel policy regulations in the first years after independence. There was no comprehensive and formalised evaluation and selection system for recruitment to positions within the Ministry of Defence or the armed forces. Often, for example, personnel with no previous experience of defence or military issues were appointed to positions at the Ministry of Defence – contributing to the lack of expertise in the organisation.[19] Moreover, an objective assessment of promotion tended not to be based on professional qualities and aptitude for higher rank, but rather on party affiliation and connections and informal networking inside the Slovenian armed forces. Thus, there was a tendency for capable and qualified personnel to be underutilised, often leading to a loss of motivation and resignation. The absence of clear criteria for promotion continued at least in part through the fear of some senior officers that developing and applying such criteria would leave them open to critical scrutiny. In the period 1991–95 this malaise in the personnel structure led to some of the more capable young officers leaving the armed forces in favour of careers in the civilian sector where their skills were valued and working conditions better.[20] While many committed personnel did still remain, human resource management problems were a major obstacle to the development of effective professional standards.

Factors influencing the professionalisation of the Slovenian armed forces

International factors

Threat perceptions

The perception of threat to Slovenian national security can be analysed at the public and state levels. Public opinion polls show a gradual change in threat perceptions after the conclusion of the 1991 war for Slovenian independence. While in 1990 and 1991, polls showed that the primary threat to Slovenia was seen to be the JNA, subsequent polls showed that non-military threats were viewed as increasingly significant. Thus, for example, a 1995 public opinion poll carried out by the Defence Research Centre found that military threats were no longer

considered important. Instead, economic problems, crime, environmental destruction and the selling of social property were identified as the most pressing sources of threat.[21] In 1999, the major threats to the national security of Slovenia were social, political, economic and environmental in character. On a scale of one to four, military threats were considered to be the least important, with a score of 2.21, while crime (3.46), drugs (3.46), the deterioration of the environment (3.35), unemployment (3.35), the low birth rate (3.29) and economic problems (3.23) score halfway between medium and high threats. The potential of military spillover from conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was also only perceived as a medium threat (2.75).[22]

At a state level, the previous Drnovšek government in 1999 was explicit in arguing that Slovenia was no longer directly threatened by the crises and wars in other parts of south-eastern Europe.[23] Military threats to Slovenian national security are therefore threefold: first, threats of military force without encroachment on Slovenian territory; second, conventional and non-conventional warfare with limited goals; and finally, aggression with the broader goal of the wider destabilisation of Europe.[24] State documents identify the main future threats to Slovenia as being unresolved issues that state and non-state actors are willing to address through the use of force.

Military missions other than defence of national territory

The Slovenian armed forces are also responsible for missions other than the defence of national territory. Public perceptions of the military's role in these missions were assessed in a survey carried out by the Defence Research Centre in 1999. This found that the traditional national defence mission was the one most valued by the Slovenian public. However, assistance in the event of natural disasters and the armed forces' participation in international peace and humanitarian support operations were also supported in the poll. Greater scepticism emerged over the use of the military for public works, and the use of the armed forces to replace workers in the event of a strike was strongly disapproved of.[25]

In practice, since independence, the Slovenian armed forces have been active participants in international PSOs in line with their capabilities. They have, for example, contributed to the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFCYP) (29 people) since 1997, to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East (UNTSO) (2 people) since 1998, and to the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) (1 person) since 1999. In addition, the Slovenian

contribution to SFOR has included 3 helicopters, 1 transport aircraft and 44 personnel since 1997. Slovenia has also provided two military police platoons as part of the Multinational Specialised Unit (52 people), and a medical unit (12 people) to SFOR. The Slovenian armed forces also contributed a group of six officers to Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo in 2000.[26] In all, a total of 117 Slovenian military personnel were deployed abroad in April 2000.

The participation of Slovenian personnel in international operations has important symbolic and practical implications. First, it illustrates Slovenia's commitment to the aims of NATO, and its willingness to make a military contribution to the wider goal of European security and stability. Second, it provides Slovenian military personnel with the opportunity to work with, and learn from, the professional standards and operating procedures of other NATO armed forces. While the 'trickle down' effect of this participation is perhaps overplayed – it is generally individuals from elite cadres or units rather than units from the core of the military who take part in these power projection missions – they do play an important role in introducing key elements of the Slovenian armed forces to Western practice.

External pressures

Membership of NATO – alongside the EU – remains a key foreign and security policy goal for Slovenia. As a result, reforms in the security and defence sphere with the aim of meeting NATO membership criteria have received a higher priority in recent years. Indeed, defence reform lies at the heart of the NATO accession process. In particular, Western institutional expectations of military reform in potential future member states revolve around the development of efficient, mutually inter-operable military forces – 'professionalisation' in the terms outlined in Chapter 1 of this volume. In one sense, the professionalisation of the Slovenian armed forces has been on the agenda since the very first days of independence, in no small part because such a move would represent a complete break with the old Yugoslav system of military organisation which was largely dependent on conscripts. As early as 1993, the Resolution on Guidelines for the National Security Concept of the Republic of Slovenia advocated 'well trained peacetime armed forces, consisting of professionals and conscripts'.[27] While the scope and pace of a move towards greater professionalisation were not defined, this statement was made before the Slovenian decision to apply for NATO membership was announced in 1994. Once the goal of NATO member-ship was declared, the question of professionalisation was pushed

further up the national agenda. Thus, for example, the Military Defence Doctrine of 1995 addresses cooperation with NATO, and lays down the importance of 'adaptation to NATO standards and procedures'.[28] The 1998 National Strategy for the Integration of the Republic of Slovenia into NATO is even more explicit in linking the process of professionalisation with prospective NATO membership. It envisages the 'restructuring, reorganisation, modernisation … of the permanent composition of the Slovenian armed forces'.[29]

Recent long-term planning activities also focus on increasing the effectiveness of the armed forces and improving their structure to make them more professional and more interoperable with NATO.[30] Indeed, one of the main justifications for an increase in the number of volunteer personnel in the Slovenian armed forces is to increase their ability to contribute to various missions abroad under the authority of NATO, the UN or the EU. From the outset, all Slovenian troops who have been deployed abroad have been volunteers. In 1997, a special unit – the 10th Motorised Battalion – was formed, whose main purpose is international cooperation, and which is expected to be entirely composed of volunteer soldiers by 2002. This battalion has priority in the military in the acquisition of equipment, armaments and personnel.[31] In the future, key units of the reaction force will be all-volunteer. The 17th Military Police Battalion and the 20th Motorised Battalion are both earmarked for this transition.[32]

The further development of these battalions will in the short term continue alongside a conscript force for the remainder of the main defence forces and almost all of the support defence force, with the Ministry of Defence focusing on improving general levels of effectiveness of the Slovenian armed forces as they are currently constituted.

Domestic factors

Economic constraints

The professionalisation of armed forces is clearly influenced by the economic context within which it takes place. In Slovenia, a key question is the degree to which a more professionalised military – with a greater emphasis on all-volunteer personnel – would cost more than existing structures – and whether or not Slovenia's current economic circumstances allow for such a transition. In 1999, Slovenia allocated USD38,333 for each soldier in the regular military – in comparison to the NATO average of USD93,015.[33] In part low levels of per capita funding stem from the small size of the Slovenian economy, and the fact that it

only allocates 1.5 per cent of GDP to defence – one of the lowest levels of any European state.[34] These figures suggest that Slovenia will not be able to conduct transformation of its armed forces to all-volunteer forces without a further increase in the defence budget and more efficient usage of the resources already in place. Moreover, adequate funding is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for continued reform, and it is essential that future defence budgets are also consistent and predictable if defence planning is to be effective, and future reform successful.

Conclusion

An analysis of the professionalisation of the Slovenian armed forces over the past decade highlights some important issues. In the period 1991–99 Slovenian military development took place in the absence of a well-thought-out framework for reform. This situation was compounded by the military's personnel structure and management processes which were diverse and rather haphazard in their application. The use of military service for the professional training of conscripts was also rather limited, with much of their time being spent on peripheral activities such as free weekends, holidays and sentry duty. The quality of the reserve units was also questionable as a consequence of their large size, limited training and inadequate military equipment. Due to a lack of resources, command and control in the military was sometimes based on a process of negotiation between superiors and subordinates. Moreover, many active units were undermanned and ill-equipped. The personnel policy of the Slovenian armed forces was rather incoherent, and there was no comprehensive system for the assessment and selection of personnel. This in turn had a negative impact on promotion, which often did not occur purely on the basis of professional suitability for the job. In general, there remains a need for a thorough and genuine reform of the Slovenian armed forces – possibly involving their transformation to an all-volunteer force. Despite economic difficulties, this issue has returned to the political agenda with the election of the new government in 2000, and is now being seriously debated in political and professional circles.

Looking back over the period between 1991 and 1999, a number of issues are striking. First and foremost, the absence of any real desire by the political elite to embark on a coherent, well-thought-out programme of military professionalisation had quite far-reaching consequences. The long-term effect of decisions taken during and in the immediate aftermath of the ten-day war with Yugoslavia in the summer

of 1991, had been felt in a number of areas. First, the absence of a sufficiently strong reforming group of senior officers to promote and drive military professionalisation stymied even modest initiatives in military education. The unwillingness to introduce robust objective mechanisms for the promotion of officers, NCOs and civilians working in the Ministry of Defence further undermined the reform process. Second, over the last decade the absence of adequate resources to fund any serious initiatives – and even to maintain a modicum of military effectiveness of existing forces – weakened the ability of the Slovenian armed forces to conduct military activities in an effective and efficient way. Starved of resources and operating under a series of complex and multiple constraints, the key characteristics of a professional military – expertise based on qualifications and training, and the development of technical skills; clear command and control mechanisms; and promotion based on merit – were either non-existent or fatally flawed. While the armed forces survived by sidestepping the need to professionalise, consecutive Slovenian governments played important supplementary roles. First, elected politicians allowed a growing gap to exist between public statements, policy programmes and specific initiatives, and reality in the Slovenian armed forces. Second, previous governments attempted to resolve the need to play an active role in NATO PfP activities by developing a showcase unit to carry out these tasks with greater resources and levels of operational effectiveness, while the remainder of the main defence and supplementary defence forces suffered from underfunding and other resource constraints. As with many other central and eastern European states, so long as there is no direct military threat to the territorial integrity of Slovenia, this might be considered to be an acceptable risk to take. However, as this chapter has argued, this selective approach to professionalisation combined with little or no attempt to develop professionalism in the remainder of the Slovenian armed forces raises a number of serious questions: the extent to which the Slovenian armed forces as a whole meet the requirements of NATO's MAP; and the sustainability of such a policy in the short to medium term with one small professional formation and an unprofessionalised rump.

One other issue requires brief comment. Over the last ten years, Slovenia has done a great deal to identify the role and mission of its armed forces as principally an instrument for defence of its national territory with a very limited capability to engage with NATO forces and operate under NATO command. However, it is worth noting the paradox that Slovenian politicians have seen some element of the

politicisation of the armed forces – principally through the promotion system – as a necessary means of securing the acceptance of the armed forces to the demands of the civilian democratically elected government. It is this approach alongside an unwillingness to provide sufficient political leadership and financial resources, which has been instrumental in undermining the ability of the armed forces to conduct military activities in an effective and efficient way, and to develop its organisational and internal structures accordingly.

The policies of the new Slovenian government – elected in November 2000 – have gone some way towards addressing these problems, and the professionalisation process in the Slovenian armed forces has received a new momentum as a result. In particular, a new Defence Strategy has been prepared and Parliament has passed a two-year budget and the extended the Arms and Military Assets Procurement Act, which lays out a special funding arrangement for defence for the period to 2007. This is regarded as a stable source of funding the Slovenian armed forces, and supplements defence expenditure from the regular budget. Priority has been given to those units which are assigned for participation in NATO-led PfP operations and collective defence operations. The new Slovenian government has also declared its intention to increase the proportion of volunteer forces in the Slovenian military, with 270 new volunteers being recruited in 2001. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence has initiated a comprehensive study of the future structure of the armed forces, which will form the basis for a professional and political debate on the preservation or abolition of conscription. The new Defence Act sets in place an improved personnel policy for the armed forces that is due to enter into force in 2002. This will provide a legal basis for the management of officers and NCOs, harmonise the ranking system with that of NATO member countries and amend the military education and training system. It will also address the quality of life issues and improve recruitment policy.

This recent focus on defence reform has resulted from an emerging political consensus on the need for a serious, coherent and coordinated approach to the professionalisation process in Slovenia. It is to be hoped that this will continue, and that these new reforms will address some of the problems inherent in the defence reform process of the past ten years.

Notes

1. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Slovenian government or the Defence Research Centre.

2. The authors would like to express their gratitude to their colleagues at the Defence Research Centre at the University of Ljubljana, Marjan Malešič, Iztok Prezelj, Vinko Vegič and Uroš Svete, who contributed significantly to this chapter.

3. M. Malešič, 'Slovenian Security – a Transition Process', in L. Jelušič and J. Selby (eds), *Defence Restructuring and Conversion: Sociocultural Aspects* (Brussels: European Commission, 1999), 183.

4. Most of the presented characteristics of the Slovenian armed forces were studied during research work in the period from spring 1995 until autumn 1999.

5. *Defence Law* (Ljubljana: National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 1994), Article 99.

6. Slovenian army website, at: http://www.mo-rs.si/mors/eng/tipicnasveng.htm. *The Military Balance 2001–2002* gives slightly lower figures than this, and suggests that the Slovenian armed forces number 68,600, of whom 7600 are active. *The Military Balance, 2001–2002* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 98.

7. *Annual National Programme of the Republic of Slovenia for the Implementation of the Membership Action Plan in NATO 2001–2002* (Ljubljana: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 2001).

8. Thus, for example, a Slovenian battalion for 'international cooperation' was formally established in 1995 but is still not fully operational, although in 2001 considerable progress has been made with the employment of an additional 250 soldiers.

9. I. Kotnik-Dvojmoč, *Preoblikovaje oboroženih sil sodobnih evropskih držav – študija primera Slovenije* (Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Science, 2000), 326.

10. Since 1994 more than 310 officers and NCOs of the Slovenian armed forces have participated in educational and training programmes abroad, in the US, Germany, UK, Canada, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and the Czech Republic.

11. *Defence Law*, Articles 88 and 92.

12. Kotnik-Dvojmoč, *Preoblikovaje oboroženih*, 343.

13. Kotnik-Dvojmoč, *Preoblikovaje oboroženih*, 369.

14. Kotnik-Dvojmoč, *Preoblikovaje oboroženih*, 385.

15. N. Toš, *Slovensko javno mnenje – Nacionalnovarnostni sistem* (Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Science Institute of Social Science, 1999).

16. M. Malešič, *Slovenian Security Policy and NATO* (Groningen: The Centre for European Security Studies, 2000).

17. Malešič, *Slovenian Security Policy*.

18. Kotnik-Dvojmoč, *Preoblikovaje oboroženih*, 367.

19. Kotnik-Dvojmoč, *Preoblikovaje oboroženih*, 332.

20. Kotnik-Dvojmoč, *Preoblikovaje oboroženih*, 335.

21. 12.2 per cent of respondents identified military threats as strong, 28 per cent as medium and 32.8 per cent as weak. A. Grizold and I. Prezelj, 'Public Opinion and the National Security of Slovenia', in M. Malešič (ed.), *International Security, Mass Media and Public Opinion* (Ljubljana: ERGOMAS/University of Ljubljana, 2000).

22. A. Grizold and I. Prezelj, 'Public Opinion'.

23. *Size and Structure of Slovenian Armed Forces 2010* (Ljubljana: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 1999).

24. *Military Defence Doctrine* (Ljubljana: National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 1995).
25. *Defence Research Centre Poll* (1999).
26. Information provided by the General Staff of the Slovenian armed forces in April 2001.
27. *The Resolution on the Guidelines of the Concept of National Security* (Ljubljana: National Assembly of Republic of Slovenia, 1993).
28. *Military Defence Doctrine.*
29. *National Strategy for the Integration of Slovenia into NATO* (Ljubljana: Government of Slovenia, 1998).
30. The so-called Garrett Study, a joint Slovenian–US project to develop Slovenian defence structures in the period until 2010, was, according to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, guided by the purpose of shaping the Slovenian armed forces into an appropriate NATO state partner. *Slovenska Vojska*, No. 17 (2000).
31. *Slovenska Vojska*, No. 14 (2001).
32. *Basic Long Term Programme of Developing and Equipping the Slovenian Armed Forces* (Ljubljana: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 2001).
33. Calculations based on data from *The Military Balance 2000–01*(Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001).
34. *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, at: http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php?send (15 April 2001).

11

A Revolution in Civil–Military Affairs: the Professionalisation of Croatia's Armed Forces

Alex J. Bellamy

Unlike the revolution in military affairs in the West, the revolution now under way in Croatia is profoundly changing the mission, structure and constitution of its armed forces.[1] Croatia's revolution in civil–military affairs is based upon an attempt to move from an incomplete Territorial Defence model towards the Post-Neutral type of armed forces, with priority given to the defence of national territory but with a willingness to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. This process of professionalisation is framed by two issues. First, the economic and social environment, and second, the perception of threat. These issues frame both the material and ideational contexts in which processes of professionalisation take place.

The scale of Croatia's economic problems is central to any analysis of the professionalisation of the Croatian armed forces. In 1999, GDP began to decline from USD21.7 billion the previous year to USD19.5 billion and this trend looks set to continue.[2] Official unemployment stood at 20 per cent in 2000 and shows no sign of falling. Nevertheless, during the war of national survival the defence budget accounted for 9 per cent of GDP in 1994, amounting to 32 per cent of the total state budget. Since this time the defence budget has fallen to 5 per cent of GDP and 19 per cent of the state budget, though it remains considerably higher than other European states.[3] The current government has pledged to bring defence spending as a proportion of GDP to below 3 per cent in line with the European average. The government is therefore committed to a process of professionalisation that not only requires new investment in education, training and procurement at the same time as it adopts new roles, but this also needs to take place in a context where

defence spending is falling both as a proportion of GDP and the state budget.

The widespread fear caused by the recent experience of war and continuing regional instability means that while the military generally supports the principle of moving towards a professional Post-Neutral type of force structure, in practice there must be no diminution of war-fighting capability either as the result of – or during the period of – transition to Post-Neutral professionalism. Reluctance to countenance an end to conscription is prompted by fears of diminishing the pool of trained reserves. This is based on a perception within the General Staff that conscripts offer greater territorial defence war-fighting capability than a smaller professional army.

Croatia gained its independence in 1991 and for the first four years of its existence was engaged in a war of national survival and territorial expansion in Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH). It built the Croatian armed forces from manpower and equipment obtained from the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army – Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija), volunteers who wanted to defend the homeland and arms illegally imported during the UN and EU imposed arms embargoes.[4] Between 1991 and January 2000, Croatia was ruled by a nationalist authoritarian regime under President Franjo Tuđman most aptly described as a 'dictatorship with democratic legitimacy'.[5] Until 1998, defence policy was shaped entirely by Tuđman and his nationalistic Defence Minister, Gojko Šušak. Under their tutelage, the Croatian armed forces (HV – Hrvatska Vojska) were deliberately politicised, with ruling party and state being regarded as synonymous.[6] In January 2000 the ruling HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica) was defeated in both parliamentary and presidential elections. A coalition of six centre-left parties came to power and Stipe Mesic of the HNS (Croatian People's Party – Hrvatske Narodna Stranka) won the presidency.

Against this background, there are three interrelated imperatives driving processes of professionalisation in Croatia. Firstly, the current government envisages the armed forces as having a wide international function, supporting foreign policy objectives that have as their purpose swift integration into the Euro-Atlantic system, which would in turn facilitate domestic policy imperatives such as economic reconstruction. Jožo Radoš, the current Defence Minister, insists that creating new roles for the armed forces are not only important additions to the HV's main task, which will remain that of defending the state against external aggression, but are integral to what the armed forces should be about. Radoš argues that the fulfilment of these roles is a vital aspect of

asserting Croatian citizenship in the society of states.[7] The second imperative concerns international conditionality. Within government there is widespread agreement that Croatia should positively respond to the political and economic conditions set by international organisations, individual states and international financial institutions. Within the defence sector such conditionality includes cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and English language training to improve NATO interoperability. The final imperative for professionalising the Croatian armed forces is the desire to improve military capability while simultaneously reducing the financial cost to the state. This raises both the issue of conscription and broader questions of whether Croatia should retain a balanced force structure or embrace role specialisation.

This chapter first analyses the changing Croatian conception of professionalisation. It goes on to evaluate the nascent programmes of professionalisation in three areas: establishing new force structure roles, reform of education and training, and confronting problems of recruitment and promotion. This chapter argues that the nature and consequences of reform are framed by economic and social concerns and the continuing perception of threat to Croatia's territorial integrity. The conclusion suggests that the challenge of transforming the type of force structure from a focus on defence of national territory missions to a Power Projection type, at the same time as professionalising the armed forces, has led to a process of 'piecemeal professionalisation' in Croatia, whereby some elements of the armed forces are making significantly more progress than others.

Changing Croatian perceptions of professionalisation

One of the distinct aspects of the Croatian professionalisation debate is the changing nature of what professionalisation means. In both the Tuđman and Mesić periods, there was broad agreement that professional armed forces were militaries that accepted that their role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government and are able to undertake military activities in an effective and efficient way and whose organisation reflects these twin assumptions. How this was operationalised differed widely in the Tuđman and Mesić periods, however.[8] As a result of the EU arms embargo, Croatian thinking on issues related to defence policy and management was significantly informed by the United States. In 1994, confronted by general embargo and acting on the advice of the US State Department, the Croatian government approached

a military consultancy firm, MPRI. This organisation was contracted to provide military training and education, which included a programme on the democratic control of armed forces and a Long Range Management Programme. MPRI made an important contribution to the way in which the security community in Croatia understood the concepts of democratic control, strategic management and professionalisation. As a consequence of this relationship, the Croatian defence establishment developed a very narrow interpretation of a professional armed force as simply one entirely composed of volunteers, that performed well in war at the tactical level.

Since the end of the war of national survival and more particularly the election of the new coalition into office, this perception is beginning to change. The new Defence Minister, Jozo Radoš, and the Presidential Advisor on Defence Policy, General Imra Agotić, argue that professionalism and professionalisation are functions of education, in both its civil and military forms. While ideal professional armed forces are made up of volunteer soldiers, the process of professionalisation requires a more clearly defined role in relation to external factors and domestic society, the development of expertise and skills, the development of rules for the effective operation of the Croatian armed forces and promotion based on merit.

The implications of the Mesić government's understanding of professionalisation are stark, and suggest five critical areas for reform. First, there is the problem of continuing confusion over the relationship between the President, government, Ministry of Defence and General Staff. Second, the need to ensure effective and efficient implementation of government demands. Within this governmental nexus, inter-bureaucracy communication is laborious and time-consuming. The HV has limited material and capability for tasks other than land-based territorial defence. Third, organisation and internal structures need reform. These continue to reflect the politicisation of the armed forces enacted by the former regime and the rapid promotion of wartime officers, which has created overstaffing at the level of middle and senior ranks. This has also resulted in a high average age of more junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who, through lack of educational opportunities and a blockage of upward or outward movement of their seniors, are now unable to advance their careers in comparison with their contemporaries in other armies.[9] Fourth, under the previous regime there was no systematic consideration of the functions and capabilities of the armed forces, and such thought was actively discouraged. The teaching of 'defence studies' was abolished in 1993

(for resembling a 'communist field of study') and has not yet been reinstated, resulting in a lack of civilian (and military) defence experts educated in the post-Yugoslav era.[10] Following the change of government there has been a resurgence in defence studies both in the Ban Jelačić War College and in the Defence Ministry's Strategic Studies Institute, but these programmes are still in their infancy.[11] Finally, the structure of the armed forces in Croatia is not solely a function of their role and nor can they be without a significant economic recovery. Another important function is the social role of armed forces in providing employment, social goods, and incomes to active personnel and war veterans as well as supporting the local economy in regions with important military garrisons such as Knin.

New roles

According to the ideal type outlined at the beginning of this volume, 'Post-Neutral' armed forces give priority to the defence of national territory but demonstrate 'a modest willingness to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks'.[12] As Croatia's armed forces were built in time of a war of national survival it is unsurprising that between 1991 and 2000 its role was seen solely in terms of territorial defence, with some limited defence diplomacy roles that were in no way integral to the defence mission. Two issues present themselves when thinking of Croatia's relationship with the ideal type. Firstly, there is undoubtedly a willingness to participate in new tasks among the defence community but a lack of capacity to do so, particularly if it means detracting from war-fighting capability. Secondly, peacekeeping and humanitarian roles are only part of the new roles agenda for an armed force whose role was solely the protection of the state.[13] The new roles that the HV is taking on as part of its Post-Neutral type professionalisation include peacekeeping, defence diplomacy and responding to threats from the new security agenda.

In terms of the peacekeeping role, participation in UN operations is viewed as an important new role for the armed forces. It provides the most obvious form of international legitimation, conferring the legitimacy of the UN and other participating states. Additionally, it is widely thought that participation alongside NATO member states in peacekeeping operations will assist in moves towards interoperability. Currently, Croatia contributes 12 military observers to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and has recently dispatched five observers and a medical team to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). There are also plans for Croatia to train

around 60 peacekeepers to participate in international peacekeeping operations, though the UN has not yet confirmed this participation and there may be problems in the short term in ensuring that an adequate number of troops (estimated at three times the number deployed at any one time) are fully trained to participate.

With financial assistance from Germany over a three-year period, the HV has set up a peacekeeping training facility on the same site as a Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) centre at Rakitje. Although rapid progress is being made in this area it will be some time before Croatia is able to offer anything other than the smallest of contributions, as a consequence of the generally low standard of training within the military and also financial constraints. Because the general contribution of combat and non-combat units to UN peacekeeping will impose unwelcome financial burdens on the armed forces, the government's strategy for national security is to identify two areas in which Croatia's armed forces are particularly well placed to make a distinctive contribution. These are de-mining and medical support. Croatia has around 800,000 mines deployed on its territory and as a result has had to develop expertise in both military and humanitarian de-mining – a task which has also facilitated bilateral and multilateral cooperation with states, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.[14] Civil and military medical training in socialist Yugoslavia was widely recognised to have been of a high standard, and while provision for such training declined in the 1990s as a result of the general reduction of funding for higher education establishments, there remains a solid skill base with extensive practical front-line experience gained during four years of war.

Peacekeeping training is therefore conducted on a small scale with elite elements – a practice which contributes to Croatia's 'patchy professionalisation'. Because of financial constraints, training is only provided in a centre paid for by the German government and is offered solely to the small number of soldiers earmarked for these duties. Moreover, the continuing perception of threat means that there is little room or resources in general basic training for a peacekeeping element and because most full-time soldiers were wartime volunteers, there is no reservoir of knowledge and experience of peacekeeping. As a result, the government has focused on medical support and de-mining – where civilian and military expertise, and the burden of training costs, overlap.

Croatia's emerging new defence policy is oriented towards forging bilateral and multilateral cooperation at three levels: global,

Euro-Atlantic and regional. In terms of global cooperation, participation in peacekeeping operations aims to secure both global recognition of Croatia, and cooperation with armed forces from friendly states. Euro-Atlantic cooperation takes place at a number of levels and is intimately linked with the promotion of regional cooperation, particularly through the South-East European Stability Pact, as it is a widely held view that Croatia's position vis-à-vis the West is intimately linked with its role as a force for stability in the region. It is US training assistance which is a key feature of bilateral cooperation. Since the January 2000 elections, this has increased from a total value of USD65,000 in 1995 to USD500,000 in 2000, principally as a consequence of Croatian eligibility for funding from the International Military Education and Training (IMET) fund.[15]

It is in the field of regional cooperation that some of the most interesting developments are taking place. Current thinking within the Croatian government acknowledges interdependence between the extent to which Croatia is allowed to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions and the contribution Croatia makes to regional stability and long-term security. Regional cooperation through defence diplomacy is seen as the best means of reducing the perception of threat by contributing to the de-securitisation of aspects of defence, such as arms control and de-mining.[16] The government has therefore dramatically reduced the amount of funding given to Bosnian Croat elements of the armed forces in BiH, freeing up resources for other purposes.

Another important aspect of regional cooperation is the work of the National Arms Control Verification Centre. One aspect of the Dayton peace agreement was a series of arms control agreements aimed at preserving the 1995 military balance while reducing the overall number of weapons in the region. To ensure compliance and to facilitate confidence building between Croatia and the FRY, an arms control verification centre has been established near Zagreb. This has led to the training of arms control inspectors within the HV capable of carrying out these tasks. Likewise, the Croatian government has created a de-mining action centre (CROMAC) to promote regional and international cooperation between states and organisations involved in both military and humanitarian de-mining.

International cooperation is therefore becoming a core function for the HV, legitimating the state at the global level and acting as a conduit between the global and regional in promoting long-term stability strategies. One innovative way of overcoming the financial costs is through the development of multinational forces with neighbouring states. To this end, Ozern Žunec has argued that Croatia's close relationship

with Hungary should be developed to include the formation of combined land-based units, possibly for use in peacekeeping operations. Another potential area for exploitation lies in the possibility of maritime cooperation with Italy in the Adriatic. Such units could reduce perceptions of threat by tying NATO states more fully into Croatia's defence while offering greater capability at less cost. However, this has required a differentiated 'binary' approach to professionalisation. The modest external contribution to education and training is focused on a small number of soldiers engaged in addressing the new roles, with the majority of forces untouched by these professionalisation processes. The creation of multinational brigades will further exacerbate this trend.

The starting point for Croatia's transition to a Post-Neutral type professional armed force is the assignment of new roles to the HV. While the primary role of the armed forces will remain the defence of the state, Croatia's armed forces will take on three new roles in the fields of UN peacekeeping, defence diplomacy and combating threats covered in the rubric of the 'new security agenda'. These new roles are aimed at promoting state legitimation by increasing the degree of integration on a variety of levels. Given the overriding economic and social concerns and continuing perception of threat, the government has had to look towards innovative solutions, particularly emphasising areas where military and civilian expertise overlap, and opportunities presented by the training at Rakitje. What this mix produces are small sections of the HV trained in peacekeeping, English language, de-mining and intelligence who are earmarked for overseas operations, while the rest remain relatively untouched. The scale of these problems is exemplified by attempts to reform military education and training.

Education and training

The state of military education and training at the end of the 1990s was chaotic. It was influenced by two primary factors. First, the experience of war and second, the HDZ government's attitude towards the armed forces. Because the HV was born in time of war, educational standards or military skill levels were not criteria that were taken into consideration at that time. Many citizens joined the armed forces without any formal civil education let alone military education and training. During wartime, promotion was based upon tactical ability in the field rather than education, training or other attributes. These promotions were recognised after the war, creating an overly large officer cadre with a high proportion of officers having no military training and education or civilian education beyond the most basic level. While JNA officers were

well educated and trained, their education was based upon outdated ideas of 'self-management socialism' which had little relevance for the circumstances and role of the newly founded Croatian armed forces.[17]

From 1994 military education was offered under the guidance of MPRI's Democracy Transition Assistance Programme. This involved an ad hoc collection of workshops, seminars and courses that ranged in duration from several hours to seven weeks. This military training produced officers and soldiers capable of using basic equipment and solving tactical problems, as Operations Flash and Storm testify.[18] Moreover, officers attended a particular course once they attained a particular rank in the field, although they appeared not to have any impact on an officer's career.

Since January 2000, reform of the military education system has become a key priority for the government. The first challenge is in confronting the lack of necessary civilian and military expertise needed to create an effective military education system. The government in 1993 abolished the study of defence on the grounds that it had an inappropriate ideological affiliation with the past regime. The abolition of defence studies and the reduction of funding for the study of political science and international studies for a seven-year period meant that there was very little independent thought about the direction of Croatia's foreign policy, the nature and management of defence policy, or the role of the armed forces. One such attempt at independent strategic thinking came with the publication of *Croatian Army 2000: National Security, Armed Forces and Democracy* in 1999. This study, written by a team led by General Anton Tus and Professor Ozren Žunec, reviewed the contemporary situation before offering policy suggestions. Indicative of the time in which it was published, this book was totally ignored by the government and the military establishment.[19]

Since the election of the new government, the Ministry of Defence has begun the process of exploring a range of possibilities for the restructuring of military education, though it has yet to devise or implement a coherent strategy. The first goal is to provide general education to those who missed out on civilian education as a consequence of the war. Radoš has argued that a transitional solution is needed to bring those currently in service as full-time volunteer soldiers up to the standards expected from new volunteer recruits. The second transitional goal involves providing proper military education for those already serving in the armed forces. However, before this can take place at a systematic level, it will be necessary to develop a civilian expertise base.

In parallel to the transitional arrangements, foreign education packages for Croatian officers are being offered. As well as the American IMET programme discussed earlier, the US is providing a four-man military liaison team, which since 1996 has organised over 300 events 'designed to present the US armed forces as a role model of a capable military under effective civilian control'.[20] The shift towards Europe that has accompanied membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme has facilitated more appropriate military education links. The joint US/German Marshall Centre in Garmisch, Germany, has received over 50 students from Croatia on its courses on foreign and security policy management. In addition, Germany accepts Croatian students at its military schools (for tactical level training) and its command and staff college (for higher level education). In total, the German government has spent around USD2 million on training and education in Croatia since the change of government in early 2000. The UK has also been active in this regard, providing teacher training in three English language schools as well as several English language courses in the UK that are vital if Croatia is to reach the required levels of interoperability for participation in PfP and peacekeeping. Turkey, Italy, Hungary, Poland, France, Norway and Spain have also assisted in the provision of training and education either through direct activities such as the provision of places at a command and staff college or indirect support.[21]

The government is currently evaluating the alternatives for creating a coherent and structured system of military education. Minister Radoš's preferred alternative is the creation of a faculty of defence along the lines of the one that existed prior to the education reforms in 1991. The primary role of such a faculty would be to educate the future educators and to create a body of knowledge, research and debate on key issues and aspects of defence. Consequent to this, the Minister believes, will be the creation of a national security college that will provide courses suited to all those involved in defence policy – including civilians and those from other interested ministries. However, the central problem with these plans is that of funding. While limited international funds for educational projects are available through programmes such as PHARE, it is unlikely that the finance needed for such wholesale reform will be forthcoming in the near future. In the mean time, interim measures using the facilities and expertise in the University of Zagreb alongside experts in the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs will, in all likelihood, be adopted over the coming months.

Military education is an important area where professionalisation is taking hold. Prior to 2000 there was no systematic attempt to think

about educational issues, and if anything the Tuđman government acted to deter such thought. As a result, there has been a 'hollowing out' of expertise in the defence studies field. Once again, the prospects for developing a system of military education capable of contributing towards the development of a Post-Neutral type professional armed force are dependent on sufficient financial returns to make progress. As a result, the government is again looking to a civilian partnership at the University of Zagreb using a handful of defence experts who have been or are currently engaged in the formulation of policy.

Recruitment and promotion

Issues of recruitment, retention, promotion and the size of the armed forces are clearly interrelated. Ostensibly, there are no problems on the recruitment and retention front because the Croatian armed forces are overstaffed. The total size of the armed forces is around 55,000 person-nel, of which around 24,000 at any one time are conscripts. This still leaves a volunteer army substantially larger than is needed to fulfil the roles of the Croatian armed forces. The scale of the problem is best understood by an analysis of the defence budget. Around 68 per cent of the budget is spent on direct personnel costs, 20 per cent on the provision of services and infrastructure support and only around 7 per cent on procurement.[22] In an environment where the overall defence budget is being reduced by up to 17 per cent and planned reform of military education and the fulfilment of new roles all require new investment, this requires an overall reduction of service personnel.

The first and least problematic way that the government has tried to address this problem is through the reduction of the length of national service from ten to six months. This will allow for four smaller intakes of up to 6000 recruits each year and will reduce the number of conscripts in the armed forces at any one time by about one-half. However, the financial savings may not be commensurate with the reduction of manpower because the reduction in period of service will reduce the total amount of labour provided by conscripts. In addition, it will increase the flow of conscripts through the national service system, and so increase the frequency of the most resource-intensive phase of conscription – the initial few weeks. Although some in the General Staff believe this reduction will cause a decline in general skill levels, and war-fighting capability, few external commentators concur since most conscripts perform menial tasks more and receive very little good quality training.

Within a ten-year time-frame leading to NATO membership the government wants to abolish conscription altogether. There would be

an immediate financial saving, the number of serving personnel would be reduced to the target of 35,000–40,000, and it would make a genuine contribution to the development of a professional armed force. However, imperfect national service arrangements will undermine any call for mass mobilisation against an external attack on Croatia. Moreover, one manifestation of the weak economy is a youth unemployment rate around 25 per cent, and abolishing national service will increase this further in a very visible and immediate way.[23]

Moreover, the problem of overmanning can only be addressed in any serious way by reducing the number of full-time volunteer soldiers, by around 10,000–15,000. The need to reduce the number of full-time volunteers is widely understood, but the financial and social obstacles appear insurmountable in the short or medium term. There are principally two issues: first, given the weakness of the Croatian economy, dismissing 15,000 soldiers would add to the pool of unemployed. Even if, as some suggest, those dismissed were offered incentives and grants to start their own enterprises, the economy would not be able to sustain such a growth in the number of enterprises and all but the very best would soon be driven out of business. Dismissals from the armed forces would only exacerbate the problem. The second issue is primarily political. Although the dogmatic nationalism of the Tuđman government has collapsed, the armed forces continue to be held in high esteem by a majority of people. Although polls suggest that over 60 per cent of Croats support the prosecution of Croatian soldiers by the ICTY on the condition that only individual criminals and not the state as a whole are prosecuted, there is also a general belief that war veterans should be looked after by the state. Given that the vast majority of full-time volunteers in the HV are war veterans, any mass compulsory dismissal of soldiers would be deeply unpopular and would be liable to split the coalition of six parties that currently forms the government.

The need to reduce the number of personnel in the armed forces is intimately linked to the dysfunctional structures of command caused by the haphazard system of promotions put in place by the previous government. Although the defence law mandates the promotion system, in effect the General Staff under the authority of Defence Minister Šušak and President Tuđman controlled promotions on the basis of political or tactical merit.[24] As a result of the HDZ's idiosyncratic promotion system, Croatia's armed forces have become decidedly top-heavy. Lastly, the Ministry of Defence is faced with a problem of what to do with nearly 3000 officers who are 'long-term' sick and are still drawing pay and benefits without working. For legal, as well as for social and

political reasons, it has proved difficult to discharge them and they continue to make a sizeable claim on limited defence resources.

The government is currently revising its policy on promotions and as a result all promotions have been temporarily suspended. In theory, the President formally makes senior appointments based on the advice of his defence advisor and on the recommendation of the General Staff. The General Staff in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence decides upon minor promotions. In practice, while there is common agreement among the institutions that whatever system is adopted should be transparent and open to democratic control and scrutiny, uncertainty remains in the day-to-day administration of the promotion system.

A final issue is that of recruitment. Because of overmanning, there is no active policy on recruitment and hence no consideration of developing professional career paths. In part, this is linked to the problem of having uneducated officers already holding posts in the armed forces and defence establishment. The government has given priority to providing education to those already in service rather than devising structures for educating future officers. In relation to recruitment, its objective has been to reduce the number of soldiers rather than devising career paths for those in service. A crisis of recruitment may well follow, with a number of implications both for the quality of recruits and at a later date a critical skills shortage in the Croatian armed forces.

Factors influencing professionalisation

In examining the principal factors influencing professionalisation of armed forces in Croatia, the economic situation and the perception of threat are most significant. However, three further factors are the legacies bequeathed by the JNA and HDZ, the ongoing debate over the political control of the armed forces, and the influence of foreign states and international organisations.

The Ministry of Defence and armed forces were identified by the incoming government as an area in which there was profligate spending. The removal of privileges such as government-serviced credit cards used extensively for entertainment, mobile telephones, car accessories and gifts, has led to immediate savings. However, the economic situation continues to affect progress towards professionalisation in a number of ways. First, the defence budget will suffer year-on-year reductions both relative to other ministries and in real terms. This means that although military education has been identified as important, investment will have to come from savings within a rapidly shrinking defence budget.

The HV is an important social institution, and the downsizing needed to reduce the proportion of the defence budget spent on personnel will also have a significant social and political impact. There is widespread concern for the welfare of war veterans, and since the government is already committed to cooperation with the ICTY there is little public support for future economies in this area. Moreover, the civilian economy is in no position to sustain the expansion of activity needed to accommodate up to 20,000 ex-service personnel. As a result, downsizing is likely to be a protracted process. Economies will need to be made in other areas of the defence budget and in all likelihood financial resources will remain very limited in delivering a professional force.

The changing perception of threat underpins the reform process and offers succour to those who oppose elements of reform such as downsizing and the reduction of conscription. The primary threat is still perceived to emanate from the FRY. However, there is no agreement within the defence community as to the salience of that threat. Some, such as Žunec, argue that the threat of direct aggression by the FRY is low and that in any case, Croatia's situation today – a recognised sovereign state, member of the UN and PfP – is very different from that in 1991, meaning that substantial external support in the event of aggression could be expected. For the General Staff, the new government in Serbia is not much different from the old one in terms of its external ambitions.[25] They also point to the unresolved issue of ownership of the Prevlaka peninsula, which is claimed by Serbia because it controls access to the Kotor Bay where the bulk of the Yugoslav navy is based. There is also a demilitarised zone policed by the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP). An additional source of future threat remains in Bosnia and Hercegovina. As a result, the General Staff argues that the government should resist the urge to downsize rapidly and should maintain balanced and sizeable forces capable of defending the territorial integrity of Croatia's considerable eastern and southern borders.

In many ways the JNA legacy is benign, but it is creating problems in the fields of institutional reform, threat perception and moves towards interoperability. The legacy is benign because soldiers who joined the HV from the JNA were on the whole professional officers who understood the importance of civilian control of the military, had a tradition of understanding military ethics, and promoted a professional identity similar to that deemed so important by Samuel Huntington.[26]

The HDZ legacy is arguably far less benign. First, many senior officers remain closely associated with the opposition party in part because they were promoted to senior rank during the Tuđman presidency. Second,

many in the armed forces remain convinced that Serbia/FRY continues to harbour hostile intent, and they therefore challenge the reorientation of the HV to a Post-Neutral role which downgrades this threat. Third, the nature of the professionalisation process now under way directly and indirectly threatens the position of many officers, secured in circumstances quite different from those in which they now find themselves. Finally, since the election the HDZ has been instrumental in forming the Organisation for the Protection of the Dignity of the Homeland War, which has opposed the proposed reforms and the government's cooperation with the ICTY. At the beginning of 2001, the organisation organised a mass rally in Split ostensibly campaigning against the decision to try General Norac in Zagreb for war crimes.

The confusion surrounding the relative power and responsibilities of the Presidency, Ministry of Defence and General Staff has been alluded to throughout. In the Tuđman governments, the whole apparatus of government revolved around the President and the elite networks gathered around him. The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, wielded direct control over all aspects of defence. In addition, Tuđman's control was reinforced through informal power networks which circumvented formal constitutional provisions that proved inconvenient.

The presidential election in 2000 can be characterised as a contest over who would be least like President Tuđman and who would relinquish the most of these formal and informal powers. Stipe Mesić won this contest, and although he has divested himself of most of his powers and abolished institutions such as the national security committee, the President retains a role as Commander-in-Chief. This has brought him into conflict with the government and the Ministry of Defence, which have also claimed primary responsibility for the military. This institutional competition has delayed reform and damaged its coherence.

This chapter has identified the importance of the international community as a key factor in promoting the professionalisation of Croatia's armed forces. The US led the way in attempting to promote military reform in the seven years from 1993. MPRI was instrumental in providing tactical training for soldiers and the subsequent establishment of military training schools and academies at all levels. These included NCO training schools, basic officer training, staff college and a senior officers' war college within the Croatian Military Academy. Since the 2000 election and membership of PfP a new range of opportunities have presented themselves. These offer a more decidedly European perspective.

The new Defence Minister has argued that on the path to professionalism such interventions enable more effective goal setting and allow Croatia to measure its performance against other transitional states. However, the nature of this external assistance has also contributed towards the uneven nature of the professionalisation process in several key ways.

Conclusion

Croatia has only recently begun its process of professionalisation, but some patterns are already emerging. First, there is consensus across the defence community about the need for transformation, but little consensus about how it can be achieved. While there are strong imperatives for transformation, the twin issues of the economic and social context and continuing perception of a threat to Croatian territory act as powerful barriers to progress towards the creation of post-neutral armed forces. The General Staff is keen to ensure that defence reforms do not lead to a diminution of fighting capability, but in a context in which defence spending is rapidly shrinking this is a difficult task. The government has attempted to square the circle by a mixture of policies. On one hand it is pressing ahead with defence cuts. The difficulties this produces are only partly mitigated by a concentration on eliminating the profligate spending and corruption endemic in defence throughout the 1990s. On the other hand the government has sought to identify areas where military and civilian expertise overlap. As a result, it is turning to the University of Zagreb to provide defence education and emphasises de-mining and medical support as two areas to which it could contribute most effectively in peacekeeping operations.

This strategy contributes directly to very uneven professionalisation. There is a striking correlation between a small element of the armed forces selected for de-mining activities, English language training for peacekeeping and overseas higher command training and those tasked with participation in international peacekeeping and humanitarian duties and NATO operations. The consequence of this binary approach to professionalisation is a very small showcase set of forces capable of participating in international operations, and a large less professional mass armed forces, capable of little more than territorial defence missions. Given the economic and social constraints analysed in this chapter, this may be an inevitable consequence of current Croatian circumstances. The new Croatian government has recognised that professionalisation is not simply a debate focused on conscript and volunteer

forces and embarked on reform on quite a broad front, albeit one targeted at a small element of its armed forces. Provided there is no serious threat to Croatian territorial integrity, this strategy might well deliver significant Croatian foreign policy goals, and provide the best means of addressing some key aspects of professionalisation. If this proves to be the case, it will indeed be a revolution in Croatian civil–military affairs.

Notes

1. See L. Freedman, *The Revolution in Military Affairs*, Adelphi Paper 318 (1998).
2. I. Bičanić, 'Croatia', in T. Veremis and D. Daianu, *Balkan Reconstruction* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 167.
3. These figures are taken from M. Ogorec and R. Barić, 'Republic of Croatia in Security Constellation of South Eastern Europe', unpublished paper.
4. I explore the development of Croatia's armed forces in more detail in A. J. Bellamy, 'Like Drunken Geese in the Fog: Developing Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Croatia', in A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forster (eds), *Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: Guarding the Guards* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
5. See V. Pusić, 'Dictatorships with Democratic Legitimacy', *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1994). For more details on Franjo Tuđman's nationalist ideology and method of governance see A. J. Bellamy, 'Breaking the Curse of King Zvonimir: Franjo Tuđman's Nationalist Narrative', *Slovo: Journal of East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 12 (2000).
6. On politicisation see O. Žunec, 'Democracy in the "Fog of War": Civil Military Relations in Croatia', in C. Danopoulos and D. Zirker (eds), *Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States* (Boulder: Westview, 1996).
7. Defence Minister Jožo Radoš put forward this view in an interview with the author, Zagreb, 27 February 2001. The legitimating role of the armed forces in socialist Yugoslavia is explored by J. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: the Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter, 1992).
8. S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).
9. I owe this point to Simon Cleveland.
10. It should be noted, however, that while there are a small number of defence experts there are several extremely able experts who provide the intellectual driving force for defence reform. These include Ozren Žunec, Robert Barić

(Advisor to General Agotić) and Dragan Ložancičć (Head of International Cooperation in the Ministry of Defence).

11. Thanks to Simon Cleveland for this point.

12. See Chapter 1.

13. Though between 1991 and 2000 the protection of the state and the protection of the regime were often conflated. See Bellamy, 'Like Drunken Geese in the Fog', and Žunec, 'Democracy in the Fog of War'.

14. It should be noted, however, that in line with the British army's policy, the Croatian armed forces do not undertake humanitarian mine-clearing operations.

15. K. J. Wheaton, 'Cultivating Croatia's Military', *NATO Review*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2000), 11. For further details on the scope of the IMET programme in Croatia see 'Foreign Military Training and Engagement Activities of Interest', Vol. 1, Joint Report to Congress (1 March 2000).

16. I use de-securitisation to mean the reverse of the process of 'securitisation' outlined by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jappe de Wilde in *Security: a Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Riener Publishers Inc., 1998). If processes of securitisation are ones where political issues are taken out of the public realm by making them a security issue and thus perceived by the political community as immune to the censure and scrutiny of normal politics because they concern the very survival of the community itself, 'de-securitisation' is a process whereby an issue returns to the realm of 'normal' politics.

17. Such as manoeuvre, economy of effort, concentration of force, etc. On the basic concepts that underpinned the JNA approach to war-fighting, such as the general peoples' defence, see A. Roberts, *Nations in Arms: the Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1976), 124–217 and the opening chapters of Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military*.

18. Operations Flash and Storm were the offensive operations which defeated the Croatian Serb forces in summer 1995.

19. Author's correspondence with Ozren Žunec, 20 March 2001.

20. Wheaton, 'Cultivating Croatia's Military', 11.

21. Wheaton, 'Cultivating Croatia's Military', 11.

22. The Office of the President and the Ministry of Defence agree on the breakdown of these figures.

23. By January 2001, the partial conscription reforms had had the effect of putting 12,000 men aged 18–28 into the civil sector.

24. See Žunec, 'Democracy in the Fog of War'.

25. This is a fair point if we consider the positions taken by Yugoslav President Vojislav Koštunica and Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić. See R. Thomas, *Serbia under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1999).

26. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. For more on the JNA legacy see James Gow's contribution in this volume.

12
Professionalisation and the Yugoslav Army

James Gow

As in other areas of civil–military relations, professionalisation questions in the Yugoslav case are different from those in most other former communist countries. Whereas professionalisation has been an important topic in other former communist countries in terms of developing relations with Western militaries and transitions to democracy, in the Yugoslav–Serbian context, the topic has been framed by atrocity-ridden war. While discussion in the Yugoslav context has certainly emphasised military professionals in the sense of having a paid volunteer element in the army, it poses significant question marks against those aspects of professionalism that embrace ethics and notions of responsibility. As is argued below, however, the competence and expertise developed in the Yugoslav army (Vojska Jugoslavije – VJ) may be the instrument by which it may as yet be able to forge cooperation with Western armed forces.

The evolution of professionalisation

Although the post-1945 Yugoslav federal military always had career officers – ones very much vested in the vocational mission of defending Tito's communist way – the term 'professionalisation' made its first significant appearance in 1987.[1] This was in the context of a decision to begin limited recruitment of contract non-commissioned officers, increasing the regular component of the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija – JNA). Prior to this, the Yugoslav military had two main characteristics – its political mission and its emphasis on universal male service. Yugoslav defence operated on two tiers. The first of these was the JNA, the regular army. The JNA had a career cadre office corps, but otherwise relied on conscription to fill the ranks.

After military service, an individual would either become part of the territorial reserve of the JNA, or of the second tier of defence. This was the Territorial Defence Forces (Teritorijalne Obrane – TO) organised in each component part by the states and provinces that comprised the Yugoslav Federation. This meant that there was the potential to mobilise almost the entire male population, depending on need.

While this system was always present in some form throughout the Tito period, for much of that time it had more meaning in theory than in practice. The reality was that until 1968, the territorial component of the doctrine of All-People's Defence had little real meaning and all territorial units, if they had any substance, were subordinate to the JNA. This ensured the superior position of the JNA and reinforced its own sense of its competence and importance. However, in terms of the strategic conception underpinning the territorial defence system, this structure was ineffective and not seriously capable of being the deterrent to Soviet (or, in principle, NATO) attack that it was claimed to be.

The territorial arrangement was given greater strength and credibility under the 1969 doctrine of General People's Defence. This move was unpopular with the JNA, but was necessary if the deterrent posture of peoples-in-arms was to be made credible. This shift was made necessary by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which sharpened minds to the possibility of having to defend Yugoslavia for real. Thus, considerable reality was given to the defence in depth that the territorial system ostensibly offered, as planning, command and control of the territorial units were given substance at the republican level. In effect, under communist rule, each state in the federation had its own armed force. This was deeply unpopular with the JNA, but the regular army leadership could not deny that the previous arrangements were weak. However, in principle under this arrangement, the relative superiority of the JNA was emphasised. It was to be the front line of defence, holding back an invader for 48 hours to allow mobilisation, and then, where circumstances permitted, taking the lead. This leading position was based on an understanding of the JNA's greater expertise and competence in the planning and execution of military operations – what might otherwise have been called its 'professionalism'.

Despite the growing importance of 'professionalism' and expertise in the context of a conscript army, the political characteristic of the JNA was paramount. Tito's partisans were responsible for the formation of the communist federation after 1945, having effectively won the Second World War on the Yugoslav lands. Transformed into the Yugoslav army at the end of the war and renamed the JNA after 1948,

it always had a significant political aspect. It was inherently connected to the creation of communist federal rule. Even in its least obviously political phase during the 1990s, as the 'school of the nation' in a composite federal country composed of diverse countries and 'nations', the JNA fostered 'Yugoslavism'. This was both among its officer corps, where it became an important part of their self-image (despite continuing Serb, Croat, Slovene and so forth identities), and among the conscripts, who were subject to indoctrination, based on the notion of 'Brotherhood and Unity' – that is, the forming of one Yugoslav identity from the various communities woven into and across the fabric of the federation.

When the term 'professionalism' began to be more widely used after 1987, it was primarily with reference to contract soldiers who received salaries. However, two factors underpinned this move, each of which implied concern for qualities that would ensure the expertise and competence of the armed forces – that is, its professional qualities in the broader sense identified in the introduction to this volume. One concern was the demands of contemporary warfare pitched against decreasing periods for mandatory service under the conscription system – a trend that was to create pressures for moving towards more volunteer forces across the modern world during the 1990s. Modern military technologies require greater expertise, with longer periods of training, than was traditionally the case for conscript-based infantry forces. An essentially conscript army could only gain and retain skilled personnel in certain areas by paying them on a regular basis, even if they were not officers. The second factor was the need for greater reliability in an environment increasingly characterised by nationalist tensions, which inevitably spread into the conscript ranks of the JNA, whether through poor call-up rates (for Slovenes, especially) or through inter-ethnic incidents within the JNA. The JNA would only be reliable if it had personnel whose loyalty was to the organisation and the Yugoslav Federation.

The latter was essential to the JNA. From its role in creating the federation, the Yugoslav army had come to have a peculiar, formal role within the political system in protecting and preserving it. Although the political importance of the JNA had always been great as the one pan-Yugoslav institution, from the late 1960s onwards this became an official function, with the JNA formally embedded in the communist federal constitutional and party composition. Under arrangements formalised by the 1974 Constitution, the JNA, while notionally subordinate to political leadership in terms of military operations, was given a clear and official role within the political system, making Yugoslav civil–military relations unlike any other. The Constitution itself gave the JNA a formal mandate

within the political system to maintain and preserve the Yugoslav Federation and the socialist constitutional order. Moreover, as the only 'Yugoslav' element within the federation, it was given a formal role in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, where it was a ninth formal constituency within the Central Committee, alongside those of the six states and the two autonomous provinces within Serbia.

Professionalism – in terms of contract, volunteer service to meet the JNA's practical needs for reliability and expertise – became a more prominent concern in the late 1980s. Once the years of war began in 1991, the notion of professionalism took on new dimensions. It became an especially prominent theme after the JNA ceased to exist and its core became the VJ in May 1992. The armed forces of the newly proclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were, it was claimed, to be more professional – in all senses.

Professionalisation through the years of war

At the outset of the war, the professional character of the JNA gained emphasis, both in terms of discourse in defence circles and as a response to the emergence of official, semi-official and even a few unofficial competitors in the security sector. The regular forces' insistence on professionalism – which, despite its political heritage, appeared to imply corporate self-governance over military affairs with an integral civil–military boundary, rather than the deeply perforated one that was present in reality – was among the reasons for Belgrade's nurturing alternatives to the JNA and its successors, whether criminal battalions, paramilitary forces or locally recruited territorial forces. In terms of strategic deception and ambiguity, this meant that supposedly independent forces could be blamed for atrocities, the appearance of chaos could be maintained in the field and the army's professional reputation could be bolstered as a contrast.

By the time the division of the JNA occurred, this represented an apparent success for those such as the youngest of the generals at that time, Colonel General Vuk Obradović. These were 'young Turks' who, looking to the future, argued that realities would have to be accepted. These included recognition that the army's responsibility was to get on with securing its own future on the basis of the new state – with Serbian identity at its core, a new doctrine and greater professionalisation. Obradović appeared to be the leader of a faction that, by its open position, was seeking to change the political leadership, as well as the army's own. Among Obradović's concerns was the apparently ad hoc character

of JNA operations in Croatia. He was particularly troubled by the conduct of the campaign in Croatia – both by the JNA's relatively weak performance, which undermined its standing, and the apparent absence of clear political leadership and military goals for the campaign. Tito and Titoism were integral to the ideological underpinning of the Yugoslav military's notion of professionalism. In its wake, there appeared to be eternal tactics, no strategy and unreliable political manipulation that were no substitute for political leadership.[2]

Notwithstanding resignations, retirements and purges, the character of the VJ has allowed some moves towards the new professional character for which Obradović had argued. In this context, the appointment in 1993 of General Momčilo Perišić, at 49, and with a proven record in the field, represented a new generation of militarily competent officers to shape a professional army. During active service in artillery, staff and command appointments, he held 15 posts including corps and army commander prior to being promoted to Chief of Staff in the VJ. However, Milošević was later to make appointments to the senior ranks because of political and family connections rather than military expertise. Despite the fact that Perišić was a respected technically capable soldier – and that as the VJ transformed itself from the multi-ethnic, communist-led JNA to an essentially Serbian and professional army that would be expert, corporate and would increasingly comprise volunteers, professional military leadership would be necessary – he became a casualty of this process. His replacement in 1998, General Dragoljub Ojdanič, was part of a cadre loyal to the FRY President. But Ojdanič was also from a war-experienced strand of officers, whose professional expertise had developed strongly, and was reinforced formally by the language of professionalism.

The formalities and philosophies pertaining to a professional army

The professional dimension of the VJ is set down in the FRY Constitution, where Article 134 determines that the army comprises a regular and a reserve component, with the former comprising professional soldiers and conscripts. The same article concludes that the VJ should be regulated by federal law. Thus, in keeping with what might be seen as a regional tradition, the Constitution is used to affirm a desideratum, as much as it establishes the framework of arrangements and rights for political life. As with many other elements in the FRY Constitution, this assertion of professionalism has to be understood as something combining aspiration and appearance. On one level, there

has been and will be further development of the volunteer element in the VJ. On another, in parts of the army there are levels of expertise, competence and corporate character that compare well with those of almost any professional armed forces. However, on yet another level, in terms of restraint and responsibility, the record of the VJ has been poor.

The assertion of a professional army offered by the Constitution is bolstered by the laws on defence and on the army. The same formulation as in the Constitution is repeated in Article 7 of the Law on the Yugoslav Army. It is supplemented in the same article by an expansion to define civilians working as part of the army or in the Ministry of Defence as part of the volunteer cadre, as well as the regular component of the army. The latter body includes officers and non-commissioned officers, both of which are vocational in this context and have signed long-term contracts. The volunteers in the army are found in all services and at all ranks, which is regulated by their terms of service.[3] These confirm the range of professional duties, the need for training and education relevant to individual service branch, various levels of command responsibility and rank. In addition to having completed formal training, posting and promotion are stipulated to be made on the basis of technical preparation, service assessment and experience in carrying out duties and responsibilities. The normal expectation is that volunteer soldiers will work a 40-hour week, which cannot be allocated in such as way as to involve fewer than five days' work. Vacation is determined by the length of pensionable service. The high quality of employment conditions illustrates that being professional has more to do with being a paid volunteer, with some attention to qualification, competence and expertise.

While a sense of ethics and responsibility could be argued to be at the core of being professional, this has not been so in the VJ. Throughout the war of the 1990s, the VJ always appeared to be the more responsible element at the side of various other armed groups fighting for Belgrade's cause – the paramilitary groups and the Serbian Interior Ministry Forces (*Ministarstvo unutrasnijih poslova* – MUP). However, there should be no doubt that this is, at best, a relative judgement. The VJ organised and supported paramilitary groups, it operated jointly with the MUP and both supplied special forces personnel to those forces engaged in ethnic cleansing operations. This is a dark legacy that has to be addressed in any enhancement of VJ professionalisation.

After the Bosnian Dayton Agreement in November 1995, the VJ launched an investigation into the professional character of its officer corps.[4] A balance had to be sought from a series of ideal, sometimes conflicting, traits for future recruits. These were a capacity for foresight,

intellectual qualities, fundamental social views, motivation and interest, personal maturity and leadership qualities. However, despite the desire to make changes in terms of both personnel and education, under Milošević's leadership the scope for implementation was constrained. Moreover, further issues connected to the ethical integrity and responsibility of the VJ had to be faced, particularly but not exclusively during the 1997–99 Kosovo campaign.

Revising military doctrine and professionalisation

Over a period of more than a decade, Milošević promoted a series of wars, but until shortly before the Kosovo campaign of 1999 had never had either absolute control over, or trust in, the Belgrade military.[5] The appointment of friends and relatives by marriage of him and his wife to some of the most senior positions gave him the personal control he had long desired. The introduction of a new military doctrine in autumn 2000 was based on the FRY President's reliance on and confidence in the VJ. It was suggested by former VJ Chief of Staff Perišić, by now the leader of one of the opposition movements in Serbia, that the adoption of the new doctrine by Milošević was a gimmick for the September 2000 elections. However, the new doctrine, while retaining central elements from the Belgrade military's tradition, placed key emphasis on internal and non-conventional forms of defence. The doctrine maintained an existing commitment to defence of the FRY through appropriate use of armed force. However, it was notable for three distinct though apparently minor augmentations of this concept: emphasis on the use of 'other forms of resistance'; and, most significantly of all, explicit mention of Montenegro and Serbia, the two states that form the FRY, rather than of the FRY per se and mention of working in alliance with 'friendly states and nations'.

The first of these probably referred to the conduct of war by non-conventional and indirect means and was the least interesting of the three, although it was a complement to the implicit concerns for internal security and relations between Serbia and Montenegro, indicated by the naming of both states in the doctrine. It was this part of the doctrine that was highlighted by VJ press releases. Whereas a commitment to protect the constitutional order was consistent with previous Yugoslav constitutions, the specific mention of the two states and their relationship was ominous at a time where there was much concern about Serbian or VJ action against Montenegro.

By declaring the commitment of the Montenegrin people to defend the sovereignty of the FRY, the doctrine constituted a commitment to VJ

action, based on maintaining territorial integrity, in the event of a move by the Montenegrin government to leave the FRY. The same provision regarding constitutional order was also capable of being invoked in the event of a victory for the opposition in the coming FRY elections. A further implication of the new doctrine was a stronger relationship between the VJ and the Serbian Interior Ministry Forces. Although there was doctrinal work on joint operations prior to the Kosovo campaign, the potential for internal action in the new doctrine implied even greater coordination and cooperation between the two organisations, based in part on experience gained in Kosovo. It seems likely that something akin to a fusing of some parts of the VJ and MUP structures was anticipated, at the time. However, the fall of Milošević went some way towards preventing full implementation of the doctrine in the way intended. Nonetheless these were important developments in practical, professional – expertise and management – terms, as will be seen below, even if the political context and the political purpose of joint operations had changed.

According to the VJ, military doctrine should be understood to play a direct role in the activities of the state and military leaderships. Milošević and some of his generals clearly interpreted this to mean protection of their own leading positions. This implication in the direct partisan service of one political leader was clearly a challenge to certain aspects of any VJ claim to professionalism. It also risked damaging the army's standing with the Serbian people. This was a factor that seems to have become patently clear when the electorate had clearly voted against Milošević to such an extent that he could not simply fix the vote. As public pressure grew the VJ abandoned Milošević, choosing to be politically non-partisan and highlighting their professional qualities, political neutrality and integrity. Thus, the doctrine that seemed to be the epitome of the VJ's political corruption, developed to help maintain Milošević in power, ultimately proved central to the fall of the Milošević regime. The VJ survived to begin on a new path – one that would be marked, ironically, by professionalism based on the joint elements of operations with the MUP introduced in the new doctrine. The VJ's role, played in the interests of security policy, and the messages sent about the VJ possibly changing identity and quality, were signalled by events in the Preševo Valley.

The Preševo Valley: opportunity knocks – the virtue of professionals

In October 2000, politics in Serbia was transformed. Public pressure and protests forced Slobodan Milošević to concede that he had lost elections

two weeks earlier to the candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, Vojislav Koštunica, on 5 October. The VJ was crucial in this context, with the Chief of Staff General Pavković obliging Milošević to meet his opponent and to concede defeat – or else be arrested by the army. This intervention in politics set the VJ on a new political course – one that would not be easy, but was surprisingly easier, in the earlier stages, than might have been expected. The expert and corporate aspects of professionalism were crucial to this.

Given its record over the previous ten years, the VJ entered the new democratic era in Serbia in a curious position. On one hand, senior figures had been decisive in the fall of the old regime by refusing to protect Milošević. On the other hand, they were tarnished somewhat with the record of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by members of the VJ directly or as accomplices. With the VJ more isolated from the mainstream of European security than any other military on the continent, the chances of gaining some form of rehabilitation swiftly were slim. However, insurgency by ethnic Albanians in southern Serbia provided what turned out to be an opportunity for the elite of the VJ to use its professional qualities to win some respect from NATO-led forces as the two sides cooperated over a strip of land affected by the insurgency. VJ professionalism was the key to the way out of isolation if not shame.

The relationship established over problems in the GSZ – the Ground Safety Zone in southern Serbia which surrounds Kosovo – was deemed to be a success, on all sides. Belgrade had scored a major success with the Ćović plan. The chief objective – both for symbolic political purposes and practical security objectives – was the return of its forces to the GSZ. The EU and OSCE military monitors deployed in cooperation with the Joint Security Forces (JSF) praised the professionalism of Serbian forces – and senior military figures acknowledged that their performance had been shaped by the fact that 'we knew that we would be observed'.[6] The key condition for this success was the further consolidation of the positive relationship that was emerging between the government and commanders of the security forces in Belgrade. The VJ and MUP saw that the government's approach brought rewards. And in the disciplined professional and restrained manner of the deployment into the zone, despite the record of some of the forces included in the JSF, they have demonstrated to the government and to NATO a change of character that, if maintained, bodes well for the future.

This triumph for the professional qualities of the VJ elite became the hope for a better future for all concerned.[7] Professionalism opened the way not only to stability in a troubled part of the country, but also to

the prospect of a successful new pattern of Serbian civil–military relations. Moreover, despite the limited focus of many in the VJ on developing professionalism in the sense of becoming an expert, paid, volunteer force, in practice, elements of responsibility, education and a changing corporate identity seem set to be central parts of an expanded conceptualisation of professionalism. This has already been recognised by senior VJ officers who have a clear sense of the future and see reform of military education and training as central elements of this process.

Conclusion

Over the last decade, the course of professionalisation in the VJ has been perverted by its experience of war. Formally emerging as the core successor to the old JNA, its professional identity was corrupted by association with war crimes and crimes against humanity. While its creation was accompanied by ideas about and arguments for professionalisation, these lacked any significant prospect of being realised during the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, at several levels the VJ was professional: the army consisted in part of volunteers, both as career soldiers and as contract personnel; there was also attention to the development of an expert, corporate and responsible force, in contrast to the deeply politicised army that had been the JNA. However, it is equally clear that Belgrade generals could not wholly avoid involvement in political affairs, as professional judgement and professional self-interest clashed with the FRY President's intentions.

In a new political climate, cooperation with NATO-led forces over the Preševo Valley and the GSZ, less than two years after the end of hostilities between them and NATO over Kosovo, has been a major opportunity to promote a broad-based notion of professionalism. However, the extent to which professionalisation in the VJ will more closely resemble the challenges and opportunities in other central and eastern European states over the last decade is an open question – raising broader issues concerning the long-term impact of the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation and Serbian exceptionalism.

Notes

1. For more extensive treatment of the JNA from the Second World War to the end of the Yugoslav federation, including the professionalism and the military role of the JNA, see J. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: the Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter, 1992), where there is more extensive treatment of the material covered in the present section.

2. Although, in practice, there were both political leadership and strategy – however, they were disguised in an attempt to maintain the deception that the direction of the war was 'chaotic'. Obradović wrote a series of newspaper articles on this period in Belgrade's *Danas* (11, 12, 13 and 14–15 June 1997).

3. Chapter VI of the Law on the Yugoslav Army (Zakon of Vojsci Jugoslavije *Službeni List*, No. 67/93, 24/94 ND 43/94).

4. L. Kasagić, 'Transformacije Duha Profesionalne Vojske', *Vojno Delo*, Vol. XLVIII, Nos 4–5 (1996).

5. This is treated in greater detail in J. Gow, *The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: a Strategy of War Crimes* (London: Hurst and Co., 2001), Ch. 3; see also the linked work for an earlier stage of the ESRC project from which the present volume arises: J. Gow, 'The European Exception: Civil–Military Relations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', in A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forster (eds), *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

6. A senior military figure involved in the GSZ operation, to the author.

7. General Ninoslav Krstić, who headed the JSF and was close to Ćović, at a later stage noted that the strength of the approach was restraint and attention to human rights – and even suggested that the model might be transposed to other situations, such as the conflict and problems that had emerged in neighbouring Macedonia (in discussion with the author, in September 2001).

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Part IV
The Former Soviet Union

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13
Deprofessionalising the Russian Armed Forces

Dale R. Herspring

It is the argument of this chapter that while the Russian High Command still aspires to a Power Projection type of military, the 'real' situation within the Russian armed forces more closely resembles what Forster et al. called a Territorial Defence type of military.[1] Indeed, this chapter suggests that the situation within the Russian army is so bad – and getting worse – that the Russian armed forces are better conceptualised as a 'deprofessionalising Territorial Defence' type. The Russian military is only capable of power projection if it receives assistance from outside the country. Even more serious, it is increasingly unable to provide even for the territorial defence of the country. In short, in spite of Sergei Ivanov's appointment as Defence Minister in March 2001, the outlook for the Russian military appears to be worsening on a daily basis.

As a consequence, a professional Russian military – an idea that has been around for several years – is unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future. Indeed, while Moscow recognises that a professional military is preferable and indeed has tried to move in that direction, it lacks the funds to make this aspiration a reality. Until Vladimir Putin's government can penetrate Russian society, collect taxes, fund the armed forces at an appropriate level and carry out a meaningful reform plan, the situation will only get worse.

Professional armed forces

Russians understand the idea of professionalism as a combination of two concepts. The first is that a professional military is one that is 'all-volunteer' as distinct from one that relies on conscripts. This is the way in which Russian and Soviet writers have traditionally utilised the term.

The second aspect of Russian military usage of the term 'professionalism' is that Soviet and Russian officers have always felt that the military should be as autonomous as possible when it comes to decision-making – at least in those areas the generals consider the army's 'professional pre-rogative'. The Russian definition of the latter term has changed over time as Timothy Colton's now classic work demonstrates.[2] While the Soviet armed forces passed into history, this second view of profession-alism remains strong among many Russian army officers.

Most average officers see no contradiction between the use of a mixed system of conscripts and professionals, and the demand that the armed forces should enjoy professional autonomy. Indeed, while the army fully accepts the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief, Russian military officers continue to believe that they – not the President, or members of the Duma, should make the key decisions when it comes to personnel, tactics, doctrine and strategy. The idea that a civilian should have the authority to intervene in these four areas is a concept that the vast majority of Russians simply do not understand or accept. This may change with a new generation of defence ministers, but it remains a key factor in analysing Russian conceptions of professionalism.

Finally, it is also critical to note that the Russian military mind is different in other ways. For example, if there is one concept that defines how Russian military officers think about doctrine, force structure and war-fighting, it is 'predictability' (*predvidenie*) – or foresight, especially when it comes to the budget. The Russian military mind also places far more emphasis on doctrine than is the case in the West. For Russians, doctrine is a carefully worked out set of principles that defines how a war is fought, how forces are trained and how they deal with day-to-day problems. Military doctrine is 'a system of official views on: the application … of coercive force to achieve political goals, the character of military tasks as well as the means for their resolution, and the basic direction of military development'.[3] In noting the importance of doctrine, this demonstrates just how structured and interrelated Russian military thinking has been – and continues to be.

To the Russian High Command, the combination of doctrine and pre-dictability is thus key to reform and restructuring. The problem that remains is that for either of these two elements to be useful there must be a predictable military budget. Doctrine tells the military what kind of a force structure it needs. That, in turn, translates into different kinds of weapons, personnel and equipment – provided of course the generals know what kind of a military budget to expect. More so than in the American or British systems, when Russian generals get less money than

expected, there are profoundly destabilising consequences. During the Cold War the Russian military requested a specific budget based on its doctrine, and by and large was extremely successful in securing appropriate resources. More recently, not only are there insufficient resources, but when the budget is passed by the Duma, this often bears no relation to actual resource allocation. Since a fixed part of defence expenditure is the feeding and clothing of the armed forces, this routinely requires a reallocation towards these costs. Nothing of significance will happen in relation to Russian military reform until the military is able to equate its doctrine to its budget in a systematic fashion.

The heart of the situation facing the Russian military today is that the all-volunteer force they seek demands professionals, officers and NCOs who possess high levels of expertise, responsibility and a system of promotion based on merit. Unfortunately, the reality in Russia today is that professional standards are decreasing rather than increasing. Those who dealt with Russian military officers during the Cold War were impressed by their standards of competence but this is now a thing of the past.

After analysing the historical context of the Russian armed forces, this chapter will explore the Russian concept of professionalism. It will briefly examine the main reasons why a professional military is an unlikely prospect, before suggesting that the concept of a deprofessionalising military is the best means to understand and explain the Russian experience.

The historical background

The Kremlin has always relied on conscripts – especially during periods of crisis. During the early years of the Soviet Union, there were many who opposed the creation of such armed forces for ideological reasons. These party members favoured a militia approach – a cadre army comprising professionals – defined as individuals who served in the military full-time – backed up by a citizen army.[4] In time, however, it became clear that this structure would be problematic. The consensus focused on forming a regular army, but one which combined conscripts with officers and NCOs who would serve full-time.

From the Soviet perspective, a conscript army had a special advantage. The country had millions of citizens who were not only illiterate in Russian, but knew nothing of the new country's ideology and government structure. This offered the Kremlin a mechanism to use the military as a tool for political socialisation and state building. As a consequence, the idea of a conscript army met both political and military objectives. If anything, the Soviet experience during the Second World

War further convinced the USSR's generals that it was only through a mass army that the country had any chance of protecting itself in the event of a major war. Not even the development of nuclear weapons and high-technology systems changed this assumption. The potentially massive numbers of casualties meant that large numbers of soldiers – conscripts – would be critical in a future war.

The mindset of the Soviet High Command remained unchanged on this subject until shortly before the end of the Soviet regime. Soon after coming to power, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that the Soviet Union's only hope was the adoption of a policy of *perestroika* to restructure the entire political and economic system. Initially, the Kremlin's generals supported him. In fact, Sergei Akhromeyev was one of his early supporters.[5] However, before long the High Command recognised that Gorbachev's strategy for restructuring the country had very negative aspects. First, for example, to reform the country's economy and political structure, Gorbachev needed a peaceful outside world. This was predicated on reducing the perception that the USSR was a military threat, and this translated into his successful efforts to cut the Soviet armed forces. Second, Gorbachev decided that he had to get control of the military budget at a time when the country's generals and marshals did not know how much was being spent on the armed forces. In turn, this meant that the secure and predictable world that Russian generals had been used to would inevitably be disturbed. No longer could the generals count on unlimited resources for their doctrine and force structure. Third, and simultaneously, the Kremlin was faced with increasing hostility to conscription on the part of much of the populace. There were calls for it to be disbanded and for soldiers to serve only in their home district. The military as a whole recognised these problems, and this led to a major debate during the closing days of the Soviet regime.

Finally, Gorbachev also led an attack on military autonomy. When he came to power in 1985, the 'military's prerogative' was extensive. Generals decided doctrine, strategy and tactics, and internal matters. Military matters were for military professionals. For example, it was often easier for American officers to obtain information from Soviet military officers, than it was for Russian civilians. As the late General Dmitri Volkogonov put it in 1988 at the height of *perestroika*, 'ten years ago people like Alexei Arbatov would have never dared to write on military issues. First, they would not have had the information, and second, we would have stopped it; it was none of their business.' However, Gorbachev accepted the challenge, and by the end of his regime, he had made considerable inroads into military autonomy.

Factors influencing professionalisation

Within this historical context, there have been a number of obstacles to the Kremlin's efforts to professionalise its armed forces. These include: the failure of the contract system, the lack of a meaningful plan for military doctrine and/or reform, the collapse of cohesion, discipline and morale within the armed forces and, underpinning much of this, the lack of a budget sufficient to fund both a professional military as well as to operate the country's force structure.

Building expertise

When it was founded in May 1992, the Russian army was in disarray. The air defence forces had lost the majority of its bases, and according to informed sources, the army had lost most of its first-line troops and up to 70 per cent of its latest weapons.[6] To make matters worse, many of the units resembled ' … Swiss cheeses because of all the holes there are after non-Russians simply went back to their home countries in the Caucasus or Central Asia'.[7] Military expertise was at an all-time low. The better part of the Soviet Union's highly trained officer and warrant officer corps had left the service. Similar problems applied to conscription. 'In Russia draft avoidance during the 1992 spring induction period was roughly double what it had been the previous year, and in Moscow the rate of fulfilment was reported to have been only 7 per cent.'[8]

Faced with these problems, the armed forces introduced the so-called contract system. The process began in December 1992 and focused on men with badly needed specialties, and plans called for 10 per cent of the Russian military to be on contract by the end of 1993. By June 1993, the number serving on contract stood at 110,000, with some 32 per cent of the army's non-officer component serving under contract, and it looked as if the military would be able to begin to fill the gaps in its ranks.[9] However, around one-quarter of those selected to serve have had to be discharged early either because of discipline problems or because they were not suited for military service.[10] Furthermore, between 1993 and 1995 about 50,000 contract servicemen resigned.[11]

The reason for these resignations was not difficult to understand. The average monthly wage in Russia in September 1995 was 550,000 rubles. Meanwhile, a contract serviceman earned 278,000 rubles (including supplements). The subsistence minimum per person in Russia was 300,000 rubles – and in some regions two or three times as much as this.[12] By mid-1997 there were 231,000 contract servicemen on duty in the military, but given the dangerous conditions and low pay faced by many

contract soldiers, the chief of recruitment remarked that a person who volunteered for such service 'would either be one of the long term unemployed or someone who has already poisoned his mind with alcohol'.[13]

In terms of the quality of conscripts, the situation has deteriorated further. By 1998 it was reported that 40 per cent of new recruits had not attended school or held a job in the two years prior to their military service. One in 20 of them had a criminal record. Some 71,000 individuals who had committed crimes were not drafted, but 20,000 who had been given suspended sentences were enlisted.[14] To make matters worse, draft dodging appears to be growing at an alarming rate.[15] By the end of 2000, there were reports that the army was rounding up young men on the streets 'in a desperate attempt to fulfill quotas for its conscript forces'.[16] During his 1996 presidential campaign, Boris Yeltsin promised to end conscription by the year 2000. However, Yeltsin had not taken the hard economic facts into consideration. According to senior officers, a volunteer army is 300 per cent more expensive than a conscript one. As Colonel General Vladislav Putilin noted, 'A conscript costs us 17,900 rubles a year, while a professional soldier costs 32,000 rubles. A professional army would require the corresponding infrastructure, which would also cost a lot. It's not realistic now.'[17]

Given the situation with regard to conscripts, one would expect the Kremlin to increase its efforts to enlist contract personnel in spite of money problems. Unfortunately, the situation appears to be getting worse. In 1997, for example, it was reported that while 'some 30,000 contract personnel had left the armed forces so far' that year, 'only 15,000 had been enlisted'. In February 2001 it was reported that '49.9 per cent of contract servicemen have an income lower than the official subsistence minimum'.[18] Those who did join under this system came from 'the most unfortunate layers of the population who were least prepared for market conditions and, on the other hand, young people easily adaptable to conditions of barracks life'.[19] To make matters worse, the mass exodus of young officers has had a very destabilising effect. Once very intense competition for officer schools has dropped sharply. By 1999, some educational institutions reached the point where they would accept any applicant merely to fill their vacancies – and this at a time when the number of such establishments had been reduced from 101 to around 50.[20] The result was that approximately 10 per cent of all officer posts in the armed forces were vacant. As far as young officers were concerned, nearly one-half of all new lieutenants wanted to resign as soon as they graduated from an officer school.

The military's role and function

Ever since it was created, the Russian army has been in search of a mission which in Russian terms means a military doctrine. A coherent post-Soviet doctrine has yet to be defined, and even its general outline has changed several times. As a result, Russia's generals have found it impossible to construct a meaningful military reform plan.

The draft doctrine issued in May 1992 contained a number of new aspects. First, it noted that modern war was so destructive that it would have catastrophic consequences. Second, it omitted any reference to the class struggle. Finally, for the first time, it linked the military doctrine directly to the concept of national security. However, this doctrinal statement was clearly transitional. It contained some of the harsh language common to the Soviet past together with suggestions for the future. As the generals explained in a statement issued in 1993, the country was committed to creating a power projection force with smaller, more professional, more mobile and modern military. Calling for such a military was one thing, creating one would be something else. There were two problems with the 1993 doctrinal statement. To begin with, it provided only a broad guideline on how to proceed with force planning. What, for example, were meant by the terms flexible? Or compactness? Or even mobility? To be sure, one could assume that the new Russian army would be smaller, less rigid in structure and more mobile, but in practical terms it was unclear what this would mean. What kind of weapons systems would be required? And would it give the country the power projection military that it seemed to want?

In April 2000 a new military doctrine was signed into law by President Yeltsin. The new doctrine differed from both the 1993 statement and the 1997 National Security Concept. This doctrine viewed the outside world in a much more threatening fashion – a result of Russian unhappiness over NATO enlargement as well as events in Kosovo and Bosnia. It clearly showed the heavy hand of the Russian military, which had a major role in drafting it. For example, in contrast to the 1997 document – which focused on economic and socio-economic problems – this document had a more Cold War tone to it, and repudiated the idea of 'partnership with the West'. In this case, however, it described an international environment in which 'the level and scale of threats in the military sphere is increasing'. It also identified the West as a potential threat to Russian security and it broadened the guidelines under which nuclear weapons may be utilised. The 1997 concept spoke vaguely of using nuclear weapons 'in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation as

a sovereign state'. The new document maintained that nuclear weapons could be used 'in the case of the need to repulse an armed aggression if all other methods of resolving the crisis situation are exhausted or have been ineffective'.[21]

Speaking in 1997 (when the more benign defence document was in vogue) Defence Minister Sergeyev argued that 'a large scale war is hardly possible in the near future'. If there were to be a threat it would occur in the next century, when energy resources would become depleted. By that time, the Russian army 'should be strong and should possess high combat efficiency'.[22] The key point was that Russia had a long time to get its military house back in order. As a result, there was a lessened sense of urgency when it came to military reform. It would take place, but it was expensive, and getting it to work would take time. In fact, this laissez-faire attitude indefinitely postponed reform and one officer noted that, 'military reform is replaced by endless conversations about it'.[23]

Two years later the situation had still not improved – in spite of the constant talk about the need for military reform. For example, in 1997 there were '90,000 officers and warrant officers without housing and just as many in need of improvements in their living conditions … and that figure remains unchanged to this day'. As far as other changes were concerned, 'the measures being pursued did not disclose one substantial source of reform – additional funds for defence'. In short, reform costs money, and there was none available.[24] In the mean time, it is unclear what the long-term implications of Putin's announcement in March 2001 that he was putting a 'civilian' in charge of the armed forces will be. Sergei Ivanov, the former Secretary of the Security Council, is widely respected and may begin the real process of military reform. However, in the interim, the situation within the Russian armed forces is steadily worsening – to the point where the country's military may not be combat capable. The internal cohesion that is so important to militaries has been so badly undermined that it will take years to put it back together again.

Destroying internal cohesion

Three elements are central to any understanding of the internal cohesion of the Russian armed forces. Discipline has been declining steadily since 1991. During the first eight months of 1992 there were 854 crimes compared to 498 the previous year in the Moscow military district. The number of premeditated homicides increased (by 71.4 per cent), as well as rapes (up by 60 per cent), thefts of state property (by 125 per cent) and personal property (by 300 per cent), and crimes associated with the acquisition, possession and sale of narcotic substances (by 80 per cent).[25]

The crime rate includes officers as well. In December 2000, for example, the military prosecutor's office opened several criminal cases against a number of senior Strategic Rocket Force officers in the Archangel Region.[26]

Discipline problems have led to a number of serious accidents. In early 1993, several Russian sailors starved to death on a remote island base in the Far East. This was followed by charges from civilian authorities in the Far East that the navy was not complying with safety standards for storing nuclear waste in the region – resulting in a rise in radiation levels. The situation continues to deteriorate. In 1997 the chief military prosecutor noted that 50 soldiers were shot that year by their fellow servicemen. In May 1998, four soldiers in the Far Eastern Military District shot and killed their commanding officer. Disciplinary problems have also spread to nuclear weapons facilities and from 1997 to 1999, the Russian military dismissed 20 soldiers who had access to nuclear weapons because of 'psychological problems'.[27] Furthermore, 'The number of drug addicts drafted into the army and navy has increased. More than 200 crimes registered during the first half of 1999 were linked to drug trafficking.'[28] The situation has reached the point where the members of the Duma described the crime level 'as alarming and in need of emergency measures'.[29] Most surprising has been the high rate of crime among what many have considered to be Moscow's elite, those serving as peacekeepers in Kosovo. According to Russian statistics,

> An inquiry has been conducted that discovered a number of cases where servicemen with low moral and work ethics, inadequate professional training, alcohol or drug problems or criminal pasts were deployed with the Russian army contingent, military sources have told Interfax. As a result, 286 servicemen – 184 airborne, 77 Moscow district, and 25 Volga district troops – have been sent back to Russia.[30]

It is proving difficult to maintain a high level of combat readiness when crime and corruption are major problems. Indeed, questions related to *dedovshchina* – the beating (and sometimes killing) of more junior servicemen by more senior ones – has continued to be a major problem. It is one the Russian military recognises, but has been unable to come to grips with. In 1999, the Military General Prosecutor's Office reported that 57 soldiers died and 2735 were injured from *dedovshchina* during the first 11 months of the year. Another 300 committed suicide.[31] Given the pervasiveness of this phenomenon, it is not surprising that draft avoidance is endemic.

A second problem undermining combat readiness is training, the level of which is central to developing effective armed forces. By the end of 1994, senior generals were complaining that the Russian army was not capable of carrying out the tasks assigned to it.

> …the actual situation is as follows; the troops are manned by 45 to 50 per cent: troops material provision has been cut by nearly 60 per cent, as a result of which approximately 70 per cent of games and maneuvers had to be scrapped: combat flying practice has been reduced sharply; from 100–120 hours to 30–35 hours a year; and only one to two divisions are deemed fully combat ready in each military district, and one to two ships in each fleet.[32]

By 1996 the situation had deteriorated to the point where senior officers complained that there were almost no reserves. This was particularly true of areas such as air defence and aviation.[33] In 1998 Sergeyev noted that 53 per cent of aircraft and 40 per cent of the anti-aircraft systems, helicopters, armoured equipment and artillery were in need of repair.[34] The navy was in even worse condition, with more than 70 per cent of its ships in need of major overhauls.[35] This lack of equipment has had a disastrous impact on the Kremlin's two wars in Chechnya.

In 1998 the State Duma Security Committee Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin commented that the armed forces could no longer serve as a guarantor of security.[36] What was most interesting is that senior military officers agree. A month later, General Vladimir Potemkin stated publicly that 70 per cent of the equipment used by land troops was outdated.[37] Sergeyev painted an even more bleak picture in December when he noted that:

> about one third of the armed forces' military hardware is not combat ready and some 60 per cent of the country's strategic missile systems have been in service for twice their service life. Some 70 per cent of the ships in Russia's navy require repair, he continued, while in the air force about two thirds of all aircraft are incapable of flying. So far this year, Sergeyev said, the armed forces had not received a 'single nuclear submarine, tank, combat plane, helicopter, or piece of artillery'.[38]

When it came to new equipment, the situation was so bad that young men who had been through four years of training to be air force pilots were sent 'to the infantry, the armored troops, artillery, and communications'.[39] There were not enough aircraft fit to fly for these young men, and according to Colonel General Leon Shevstov, the commander of the Moscow Military District, 'The Russian ground forces with their

current strength of personnel are incapable of defending the operative and strategic direction from the coalition forces of NATO.'[40]

In September 1999, Sergeyev noted that the economic situation in Russia was so bad that the country would not be able to increase military spending to the level needed to re-equip the military until 2006.[41] By 2001, that date had slipped to 2008–10.[42] Putin has given public recognition to the problems, but the challenge is enormous. The size of the armed forces is being significantly reduced and this will help the military deal with some of its financial problems. However, since 1992, the Defence Ministry has been fighting the Finance Ministry simply to ensure that it receives that which the Duma assigns to it, which suggests downsizing is only part of the solution.

It is clear especially in view of the poor level of operational readiness that in the absence of discipline, training and resources, the opportunity to professionalise is based upon weak foundations. When the additional factor of a breakdown in the concept of professionalism as delimiting the area where military judgement should apply is considered, the nature and scale of professionalisation become evident. A final element that is undermining the internal cohesion of the Russian armed forces is the politicisation of the role of senior Russian military officers and the breakdown of existing concepts of professionalisation – that the military should be as autonomous as possible in areas of their professional prerogative. One dimension to this is that a number of military officers have entered politics to challenge military expertise in a way that was not previously possible. Former General Alexander Lebed's appointment as Vice-President and his request that seven deputies of Defence Minister Pavel Grachev be dismissed and a new Defence Minister appointed was a key indication of this trend. A second dimension to this has been the use of the Russian armed forces in the context of the struggle between different political factions and parties within Russia. The deployment of Russian forces to storm the Russian Parliament building in October 1993 in particular broke a taboo that the armed forces stood apart from internal struggles. Finally, the senior military officers have themselves openly challenged both civilian authority in the area of military reform, and engaged in very public disputes with each other over its direction, as public arguments between Marshal Sergeyev and General Kvashnin highlighted above testify.

Conclusion

In evaluating the processes at play in professionalising Russian armed forces, it is clear that while Russia aspires to a power projection military, it has not put in place the necessary mechanisms to deliver this aspiration.

The Russian army lacks not only sufficient personnel, it is losing the little expertise it has. In the case of the Russian armed forces, not only is there a mismatch between aspiration and reality, the dynamic now in play suggests that a deprofessionalisation process is now in train for five reasons.

First is the issue of budgetary restraints. Given the Russian military mindset which demands a predictable budgetary process in order to design a meaningful doctrine and reform plan, until such time that Russia develops a firm budget for the armed forces little will be accomplished. Moreover, the size of the defence budget, which, at about USD5 billion (compared to the American defence budget of about USD300 billion), is neither adequate to fund existing requirements nor is it capable of sustaining the expense of restructuring. Even with an increased budget, the nature and scale of reversing a deprofessionalisation trend will take decades. Second, leadership is necessary in directing the process of restructuring and putting in place the foundational elements to begin a professionalisation process. Third, and related to this, is the need to re-establish the appropriate boundaries within which military expertise should predominate. Fourth, there is also a need for a behavioural reform of the Russian military. The Russian military has had great difficulties in developing a viable non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. Russian officers do jobs which in Western militaries are assigned to NCOs, and the concept of delegating authority is something that they appear to be unable to accept. Yet, without a well-trained, reliable NCO corps they will be unlikely to be able to develop the kind of highly mobile, competent, well-trained army they seek. Fifth, there is need for Russian officers to psychologically adapt to Russia's position in the post-Cold War world. Most officers understand that Russia is no longer a superpower, but fully understanding the changing nature of conflict and the nature and appropriate response to new threats requires a significant investment in military education.

As a consequence of these five factors, the Russian armed forces can best be considered as a deprofessionalising territorial defence force structure with aspirations to power projection, but with a decreasing ability even to provide security for the territory of the Russian federation. For many who worked closely with the Soviet army, its technical competence and levels of training matched their Western counterparts, albeit in a different political culture. This comparison no longer stands. Moreover, not only is deprofessionalisation evident in relation to Russia's own history, but also in comparison with the armed forces analysed in this volume. As a consequence of the magnitude and nature of the challenge of modernising Russian armed forces, deprofessionalisation will be a dominant feature of this period of Russian military history.

Notes

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14
Professionalisation of Armed Forces: the Case of Ukraine

James Sherr

Even before Ukraine's President, Leonid Kuchma, issued his 15 December 1999 decree launching the country's latest and most serious programme of defence reform, few were prepared to argue that Ukraine's armed forces could respond to the country's novel and complex security challenges 'in an effective and efficient way'. Almost three years previously, the National Security and Defence Concept of Ukraine (14 January 1997) defined a set of security problems fundamentally different from those which the Soviet armed forces were designed to address. In setting out their vision of a volunteer force by 2015, the authors of Ukraine's State Programme of Armed Forces Development and Reform 2001–5 (May 2000) recognise that a conscript-based force will not be able to address these challenges effectively, whatever other reforms take place. They also recognise that these other reforms – in operational concepts, force structure, command and control, training and education – must take place. Critically, they also recognise that without the establishment of a coherent and professional defence and security system, these reforms will not achieve their potential. Nevertheless, the fact remains that beyond 'leading' and expert circles, most of Ukraine's military and political establishment underestimate the incongruity that exists between state policy and the unofficial norms, attitudes and working cultures which define 'life itself' in the armed forces. They also underestimate just how far the project of professionalisation must extend before these forces are able to fulfil the demands of a civilian and democratic government and provide security for the country.

'Professional' armed forces

The role of Ukraine's armed forces

Compared to the depressing post-Soviet norm, Ukraine has been remarkably impressive in defining roles which accord with the radically changed circumstances of the country; with somewhat less realism and consistency, roles are gradually being refined to reflect economic possibilities. In terms of an ideal type, Ukraine possesses Territorial Defence armed forces 'primarily orientated towards national defence but also capable of contributing in a limited way to multi-national power projection operations'. In a military establishment which numbered 310,000 as of 1 January 2001, 1895 servicemen were deployed in peacekeeping or peace support operations under NATO, UN or OSCE auspices.[1]

Nevertheless, Ukraine diverges from this ideal type in two respects. First, defence is no longer conceived primarily in terms of repelling conventional military attack at operational and strategic scales. According to the State Programme 'the use of full-scale military force [against Ukraine] has little probability'. Rather, like the National Security Concept, the State Programme puts emphasis on 'local' and 'small scale' conflicts, typically arising from a mixture of internal and external factors. Second, and for this very reason, defence is conceived in terms of 'multi-component' operations involving a mixture of armed forces and non-Ministry of Defence (MOD) formations, subordinated to a common command and control structure.[2] This scheme of defence is considered essential in a country where 'emergency situations' can lead to civil conflict – and in which MOD armed forces are prohibited from directly engaging internal opponents. Therefore, any scheme of professionalisation or defence reform which excludes non-MOD formations risks failing in its objectives.

Ukraine is taking rigorous steps to define the role of its armed forces, according to a strict hierarchy of documents and 'normative acts', beginning with the first principles of state security (the 1997 National Security Concept (NSC), scheduled for revision in 2001), proceeding to the purpose and priorities of armed forces (the military doctrine, nearing completion, but still in draft form as of October 2001), the overall scheme for armed forces development (the State Programme of Armed Forces Development and Reform 2001–5, replacing the much criticised 1996 State Programme of Armed Forces Reform), as well as more detailed schemes for implementation (the State Programme for Weapons and Military Equipment Development, programmes for individual armed services and programmes for non-MOD military forces).

The 1997 NSC, a document of exemplary clarity and realism, not only defines the goals of reform, but sets out the criteria against which 'professionalism' should be measured. The preoccupation at the core of the NSC is the relationship between internal weakness, international pressure and threats to the integrity of the state. This relationship demands that attention be focused on three dangers: that Ukraine's economic, civic and institutional weaknesses might become vulnerabilities; that these vulnerabilities might be exploited by internal or external actors with harmful political ends; that thanks to the intervention of such actors, crises and 'emergency situations' – industrial, financial, social or ecological – could escalate horizontally or vertically into civil conflicts putting the cohesion of state and society at risk. In the view of the NCS's authors, the analytical staff of the National Security and Defence Council, it will not be possible to forestall let alone counter such dangers unless Ukraine constructs an integrated national defence and security system. Such a system must possess the following attributes:

1. A rational and cost-effective division of labour between armed forces and other power structures who need to interact in complex emergencies;
2. A high level of trust between central, regional and local governments, as well as those who command military units and other power structures;
3. A high level of knowledge on the part of these structures, such that the armed forces and other military establishments understand the non-military dimensions of security; and such that other arms of the state understand the defence aspects of their responsibilities;
4. A high level of transparency in the security sphere, so that there is no confusion as to what decisions are made, where they are made and by whom they are made;
5. A high level of congruence between state policy and operational practice: in short, a strict correspondence between official objectives, force structures, the training and education of servicemen – and an equally strict correspondence between these objectives and the informal loyalties, values and codes of practice of those who must carry them out.

To deliver these attributes Ukraine requires professionals trained to understand 'complex emergencies' and who accept that the main task of armed forces may not be to conduct force-on-force operations, but 'operations other than war'. By the same token, these professionals must be trained to interact with civilian authorities at many levels and

accept them as *authorities*. By training and instinct, they must also recognise that it is more important to share information than conceal it. What is more, the system that produces these professionals must establish linking mechanisms between the armed forces and other power structures and, for the sake of flexibility, economy and effectiveness, establish integrated programmes of military development, compatible concepts of operations and common elements of training. In sum, as far as possible, the defence and security system must be 'joint'.

But where does this leave MOD armed forces? By law, these forces may not be employed in civil conflicts. The law, however, does not prevent their employment in order to prevent such conflicts from escalating to the international level or, alternatively, to ensure that foreign conflicts (in Moldova, the north Caucasus or elsewhere) do not spread onto Ukrainian territory. In the words of one General Staff representative, in the event of civil or local conflict, the role of the armed forces would be to 'set up a zone which would make it possible to direct or influence the processes occurring outside it'.[3] This is an acute concern for a country which perceives that internal or foreign actors might wish to provoke or exploit such conflicts – and which is obliged, by treaty, to host the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea, which in the view of a large part of that autonomous republic's population, and a prominent group of Russian politicians, should not be part of Ukraine.

Given the delicacy of these challenges and the controversies they might evoke, even the 1997 NSC defined them in highly generic and diplomatic language. Albeit a far less crisp document than the Concept, the State Programme outlines a force structure which is generally consistent with these goals. Its four key themes are as follows:

1. *Joint command and control*: Ukraine's three operational commands, established in 1998 – strategic joint commands in NATO parlance – are to become the operational lynchpin of the defence and security system by 2005. By then they must be transformed into structures capable of mobilising, commanding and supporting military forces in the tasks of responding to peacetime emergency, as well as preventing, containing and 'neutralising' armed conflict. This means they must acquire the capability to command 'multi-component' forces, including formations not subordinated to the MOD in peacetime.
2. *A three-tier force structure*: placing key emphasis on advanced defence forces, comprising strategic non-nuclear deterrent forces, rapid reaction forces (RRF) and covering forces. RRF, drawn from all four armed

services, must be professional, 'combat ready', 'capable of acting autonomously' in any single direction in order to eliminate 'low intensity military conflict' and 'neutralise a threat and prevent it escalating into local or regional war'. It is privately acknowledged that the other two components of the structure – main defence forces (against the remote and 'improbable' prospect of large-scale aggression) and strategic reserves – cannot receive adequate attention until economic circumstances improve.[4]

3. '*Resolute reductions*': 'rational' as opposed to 'even' reductions, focusing on 'eradication of duplication and excess structures', 'unification' and 'standardisation', but to the (possibly misplaced) dismay of Western analysts, not necessarily deep reductions. 'Resolution' means concentrating resources where they are needed and imposing deep cuts where they are not.

4. *International cooperation*: primarily 'gathering and analysing international [and largely NATO] experience … developing strategy, operational art and tactics … [and] developing and updating military science, military education and personnel training systems'.

In the first year of the State Programme's period of implementation, the roles of the armed forces are for the most part goals, rather than realities. It is widely conceded that following the post-independence period the armed forces entered a period of stagnation. On the eve of President Kuchma's December 1999 decree, which established the interdepartmental commission which drafted the State Programme, Ukraine's most authoritative critic of state defence policy, Anatoliy Grytsenko, warned that 'the military organisation of Ukraine is in deep crisis'. Yet even this critic acknowledges that there has been definite, if uneven, progress on several key fronts since January 2001. In the view of NATO specialists who participate in Ukraine's efforts to define and implement defence goals, an energetic and purposeful spirit is much in evidence. NATO, however, remains convinced that the State Programme grossly overestimates what can be achieved with a defence budget of approximately USD500 million per annum, and privately this point is conceded by NATO's Ukrainian interlocutors. After all, as Chapter 5 discusses in more detail, with a budget 75 per cent larger than Ukraine's, Hungary is reducing its armed forces to 42,900 (compared to Ukraine's 200,000) and faces significant challenges to its professionalisation process.[5]

The reasons behind the mismatch between resources and ambition are geopolitical, in part based on political prudence – and, paradoxically, in part economic. In the first place, Ukraine is a non-aligned country

bordering seven states (and the Black Sea) and lying in the vicinity of several conflict zones. Even Grytsenko believes that the strength of MOD armed forces should not fall below 150,000 – though he also believes that the defence budget should not fall below 2.5 per cent of GDP.[6] In the second place, conscripts are an extremely cheap component of Ukraine's armed forces with the wage per conscript USD50 per annum. Ukraine's entire conscript cohort of 130,000 (nearly half the army) costs the defence budget USD6.5 million, roughly 1.5 per cent of the total. It is reductions rather than force levels that are expensive, because any serious reduction scheme must involve reorganisation, base closures and the retraining and resettlement of officers. Creating a volunteer force will require service wages of USD50 per month, along with vastly improved housing and training. Thus, while force levels as low as 200,000 are under discussion, the Ministry of Defence will not commit itself to reduce below 295,000 until the government provides a defence budget projection to 2005. But unless the budget is steadily and substantially increased, these plans will remain no more than aspirations.

Expertise, promotion and retention

The creation of armed forces which could address the ambitious agenda set by the State Programme will be a long-term objective in circumstances where resources are substantially more plentiful than those which are now available. The former Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Volodymyr Shkidchenko, argues the 2001 budget of 2.7 billion *hryvnya* (USD517 million) is 'only enough to sustain the armed forces'.[7] It is therefore to the credit of the military establishment that important modernisation initiatives in training, education and recruitment have already been launched.

The current system provides rudimentary military training to the conscript intake at minimal cost. Such a system might provide an excellent basis for one component of the envisaged force structure, a strategic reserve. It should also provide an adequate basis for servicemen assigned to the main defence forces, but it is deficient preparation for service personnel in advanced defence forces obliged to deal with complex emergencies. The establishment of a Western-style non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps does not fully alleviate this problem. Given the rigidities of the training system, such a corps would not do much to strengthen the effectiveness of conscripts, but alleviate the burden upon junior officers, who in the absence of versatile, technically skilled and long-term NCOs, are obliged to perform tasks which corporals and sergeants perform elsewhere in western Europe. For this reason, Ukraine is beginning to

address the NCO deficit. As of early 2000, it established two NCO academies, and additional NCOs are being trained in US facilities under the Ukraine–USA bilateral programme of cooperation.

The long-term solution stipulated for the deficiencies of conscription is its replacement by *kontraktniki* ('contract' soldiers), with enhanced salaries (currently 12 times more than the wage paid to conscripts) and allowances and housing provisions attractive enough to keep volunteers in the service. Yet this definition of professionalisation is seriously wanting. Even *kontraktniki* recruited on this basis undergo the same training regime as conscripts, based on simple, rudimentary 'drills', inculcated by rote. Thus, the training makes no provision for continuous training and the progressive widening of skills, responsibility and knowledge of the overall context within which the service personnel must perform their duties. The reality is that by the end of 2001, *kontraktniki* comprise less than 19 per cent of 'other ranks', the vast majority of them lacking many of the privileges and provisions now envisaged. Moreover, as Dale Herspring argues in the Russian case, there are numerous indications that many of these volunteers are individuals with an eye for short-term opportunity, lacking a serious commitment to military service. In addition, training is impossible without resources. In 1999, military units received only 5–15 per cent of the fuel they required. According to the experts at the Ukrainian Centre of Economic and Political Studies:

> It has become normal in Ukraine that combat training is held with limited use of equipment and personnel, restrictions are imposed that make full-scale training impossible, exercises and training are held at permanent bases, mainly without the use of vehicles.[8]

In contrast, the tendencies discernible in the system of officer education are becoming distinctly more favourable. Soviet military officers were commissioned by a network of single-service *voyenniye uchilishcha* and *viyshchie voyenniye uchilishcha* (military schools and higher military schools) providing a four- or five-year education, culminating in a degree of BA equivalent. This was a highly specialised education, strictly confined to the tactical level of 'military art' and entirely focused upon preparation for general war. By comparison with NATO military academies, Soviet military schools placed strong emphasis on scientific and mathematical competence, but had almost no interdisciplinary content, the latter being restricted to highly formalised courses in Marxism-Leninism and the international situation, seen through the prism of Soviet military doctrine. Like the military system as a whole, the system

of education was an All-Union system, with admission to each school based upon specialisation rather than nationality or place of residence. Between their late twenties and mid-thirties the most capable Soviet military officers entered a second tier of education, one of 16 single-service *voyenniye akademii* (military academies) on the basis of a highly competitive examination. These provided a three- to four-year 'higher military education' at the higher tactical and operational levels, including the history of war and the history and principles of 'military art'. A third tier of students at the level of lieutenant colonel, colonel and major general (brigadier equivalent), designated for the most senior command positions, went on to attend the two-year courses offered by the joint service Academy of the General Staff, dedicated to the study of military strategy and military doctrine.

This system has changed in two significant respects. In the first place, it is now an integrated Ukrainian system, providing instruction in all components of the curriculum, from the tactical to the operational–strategic level. Second, there have been very deliberate efforts to broaden the content of military education and depart from the general war ethos, away from 'sitting in classes … rehearsing a situation in which a coalition of western and southern states comprising 50 divisions attacks Ukraine'.[9]

At present, over 3000 officers a year enter military schools on the basis of a secondary education certificate and a Military Institute exam, covering physical training, mathematics, physics, essay writing and dictation. There are now three variants of officer commissioning courses: junior specialist (three years), bachelor officer (four years) and specialist (masters') (five years), the latter two conferring degrees accredited by the Ministry of Education. In addition to military tactics, all must study Ukrainian history and culture, ethics, psychology and, from autumn 2000, all must master a foreign language. In addition, the curriculum emphasises local conflicts and peacekeeping, rather than general war. The current Head of Personnel and Education, Lieutenant General Neshadim, has played an instrumental role in driving these changes forward.

The National Defence Academy (NDA) offers two four-service courses: a one-year operational–strategic course (30 officers per year at the rank of colonel with regimental command experience or equivalent) and a two-year operational–tactical course (200 officers per year, principally for majors). Selection is made by a Senior Attestation Committee, chaired by the First Deputy Defence Minister. Since 2000, the NDA has also offered short-term courses for MOD civilian officials of whom there are 90,000.

Apart from the chronic deficiency of funding, which undermines all aspects of the military system, there remain two persistent long-term

problems. First, in view of the budgetary deficiency – and in defiance of the principle of 'resolute reductions' – there is too much duplication at single-service level, as well as between separate force ministries. Second, the greater proportion of faculty members of military education establishments are products of the Soviet military system and its still potent biases.[10] In practice, therefore, the curriculum changes are implemented in a mixed spirit and to a highly variable standard. Nevertheless, there is a growing congruence between official military policy and the realities of service life. In Ukraine, military education is still regarded as effective. However, many military schools attract a high number of students who lack a long-term commitment to military service and who depart within a few years of receiving their qualifications.

The system of promotion, based on semi-annual personal reports, is well regulated and has been periodically refined, most recently by the presidential decree of 7 April 2001. Despite the requirement for attestation commissions at all ranks, local commanders play a considerable role in the process. At lower to middle officer ranks, the system is regarded as reasonably transparent and fair, but the picture changes at higher levels. In contrast to their counterparts in NATO military establishments, and despite institutionalised Party controls, senior Soviet officers grew accustomed to choosing their own circle of deputies and maintaining their team with them as they transferred from post to post. To a considerable degree, the expectation and the practice survived in the Ukrainian armed forces. At its best, this informal system enables a good team to stay together and has a positive impact. However, it also produces clans in the armed forces. There is now far greater promotion on merit, but appointments to desirable posts still tend to occur on the basis of patronage. The chronic shortage of housing is a further curb on meritocracy. Whatever their merit, officers are unlikely to be appointed to a particular post if there is no housing for them in that location.

As retention figures have not been published since 1998–99, there is no firm basis for establishing whether current levels of retention have improved in the light of the reforms. Presumably it has to some degree, but more substantial change is clearly still needed. In 1998–99, for example, 1700–2000 officers under 30 left the armed forces – compared to an annual intake of 4500. The result of this erosion is an inverted hierarchical pyramid: in Ukraine as in Russia, senior officers substantially outnumber their juniors, the result being that the shortage of lieutenants in all military formations is 30–40 per cent.

Some 57 per cent of officers and warrant officers describe their service in terms of depression, despite a good military education and a reasonably

fair system of promotion; 45 per cent cite the lack of housing, basic amenities and 'lack of social protection' as the reason for this; 25 per cent cite 'loss of the moral value of military service' and 23 per cent cite the low calibre of the country's military leadership. Since 55 per cent cite general conditions in the armed forces as poor, it is clear that well-trained junior officers quickly lose enthusiasm once they are posted to a unit which lacks the equipment, fuel, provisions and manpower to perform the functions assigned to it. Depleted as officer ranks are, the officer corps amounts to 28 per cent of the armed forces, some three times the optimum picture for conscript armies. 'More than 18,000 men are evading military conscription, despite the fact that some 90 per cent of conscripts are either released from duty or enjoy postponement rights.'[11]

Responsibility, communication and command and control

Ukraine's armed forces have an abundance of 'impersonal rules that explicitly state duties' and regulations carefully drawn up to conform 'to international laws of war and the Geneva Convention', as well as international standards of human rights. The problem – though it is far less striking in the armed forces than in many other state institutions – is the fact that many of these rules are 'virtual' in character and fail to conform to codes of practice and the tacit norms which give life and character to institutions. In MOD armed forces, the most obvious discontinuity lies in *dedovshchina*: the informal but systematised brutality against younger recruits by those more senior and which stands in contradiction to the professional ethos which Ukraine seeks to develop in its armed forces.[12]

The second obvious discontinuity is the deficiency in the sphere of finance. The limited nature of resources available to fund the armed forces is one aspect. Arguably more pernicious in its effects is the dominance of 'shadow structures' in the economy, the prevalence of 'subjective agendas' in public institutions and hence the de facto authority of money. Despite these weaknesses, criminality in the armed forces is probably less extensive than in many other state institutions – and Ukraine's other force ministries. In Ukraine's armed forces, patriotism and the ethos of service are strong among younger officers, and demoralised officers are more likely to leave the service than try to profit from it. Moreover, and very wisely, Ukraine's armed forces have the legal right to enter into economic relationships and the armed forces are obliged in 2001 to raise 900 million *hryvnya* (USD165 million) from 'non-budgetary sources'.[13] Despite high moral standards in the forces, economic deprivation creates a vulnerability to temptation, one that is certainly enhanced by the high market value of military equipment and *matériel*.

Other contradictions between defence policy and 'life itself' are more subtle. Forces designed to operate in unconventional contingencies, in support of the civil population and in close coordination with civil authorities must be responsive to conditions which are often more accurately perceived from bottom up than from top down. Such forces require a radically different attitude to information and communication than their Soviet predecessors, a fundamentally different ethos of command and control and a degree of trust in the judgement of subordinates which was unheard of in the Soviet system. In headquarters and in elite formations, inter-rank relationships are very different from what they were in Soviet times. But in most field formations, including peace support units, command and control remains rigid by standards already becoming accepted in many parts of central and eastern Europe, and hierarchy stifles initiative and communication.

Yet the discontinuity between new security requirements and the ethos of military forces is more stark in other military formations than it is in armed forces subordinated to the MOD. Experts estimate the number of uniformed and 'civilian', 'military' and police employed by Ukraine's Ministry of the Interior (Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Sprav – MVS), is between 400,000 and 600,000. The same is true for the Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeki Ukrainiy – SBU), which includes communication troops and the Alpha anti-terrorist subunit within its fold. Whereas the State Programme of Armed Forces Development and Reform 2001–5 was forwarded to NATO and subsequently published in Ukraine, reform and development programmes for these ministries, mandated at the same time, have not been published even in excerpted form.

The discrepancy between the operational codes of these services and the more westernised norms gradually appearing in MOD armed forces have implications not only for democracy, but Ukraine's security in the complex emergencies which the country's defences are intended to address. If Ukraine is to have a cost-effective defence and security *system*, it will require integrated programmes of military development, compatible concepts of operations, common elements of training and the establishment of linking mechanisms between the armed forces and other power structures. These features are urgently required, but they are still largely absent.

Factors influencing professionalisation

The international context

Ukrainians as a people are very conscious of the fact that the country's strategic orientation has rarely depended on its wishes. The political,

military and security establishments of the country proceed from the assumption that the country's geopolitical vulnerabilities will, over the long term, act as a powerful constraint on 'the art of the possible'. Ukraine borders seven countries and one unrecognised political entity (Transniestria), not all of whom have been stable or friendly; it is the northern littoral of the Black Sea; it is also a rear area of the Caucasus and the Balkans, and it has been subject to external pressure in both the Balkan and Chechen conflicts.[14] Moreover, its most influential and closest neighbour in terms of cultural affinity, the Russian Federation, is reconciled to Ukraine's independence *de jure* more than it is de facto. The Russian Federation refuses to demarcate the border between the two states, many of its official representatives speak of Ukraine as an 'ally' thus refusing to recognise the country's non-aligned status, and several of its actions, notably the use of Crimean bases to train troops for combat duty in Chechnya, suggest limitations in the exercise of Ukraine's sovereignty. More fundamentally, the Russian authorities see no contradiction between independence and 'integration'. The basing of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as its air, intelligence and naval infantry components in Crimea (until at least 2007) adds to other concerns that Ukraine could be involuntarily drawn into conflict with third parties.

The dominant 'centrist' forces in the country, as well as a majority of the electorate, believe that non-alignment is indispensable to good relations with neighbours, as well as political stability. Since the election of President Kuchma in July 1994, Ukraine has pursued a 'multi-vector policy', with shifting degrees of emphasis accorded to each vector in response to internal and international circumstances. In this context, the NATO–Ukraine relationship – put on a solid footing when Ukraine joined Partnership for Peace (PfP) in February 1994 and enhanced by the signing of a Charter on a NATO–Ukraine Distinctive Partnership in July 1997 – has had a unique importance. It is also distinctive in that it is unmatched in scope and intensity by any other non-candidate state and, by most measures, equal to that which exists between NATO and the three Baltic candidates. Despite a marked enhancement of the priority of the Russian vector from summer 2000, the NATO relationship has continued to be firmly supported by President Kuchma.[15]

Prior to the Kosovo conflict, the NATO relationship was first and foremost a political association, cemented by a web of military to military contacts. Since then, it has become an overwhelmingly military–technical relationship. The principal reason for this is that for joint operations, management of complex emergencies and the conduct of operations other than war, NATO possesses the most relevant expertise.

The days are therefore over when NATO was seen as Ukraine's primary vehicle for 'entering Europe'. Today the purpose of the relationship is 'supporting defence reform in the country'.[16]

NATO now plays a considerable role in the reform process, a role institutionalised by the establishment of several mechanisms unique to the NATO–Ukraine relationship. The principal such mechanism, the NATO–Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, was established under the Distinctive Partnership, but energised by the State Programme. Within this framework, cooperation has now moved beyond the formal exchange of ideas to a scheduled process of audit and consultation. In 2001 Ukraine became an active participant in NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP), a PfP programme requiring each participating country at regular intervals to supply NATO with a detailed inventory of its military assets and, jointly with NATO, identify real costs, as well as capabilities in short supply or surplus to needs.[17] Ukraine will also draw up a detailed package of National Defence Reform Objectives for initial review by NATO in December 2001. Several additional mechanisms (notably the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv) have also been devised for keeping NATO engaged on a regular basis in the Programme's implementation. Notwithstanding the challenges, these are significant steps for a military establishment schooled to regard transparency as a threat to departmental interests and national security.

Domestic factors

Clearly to some extent the legacies of the Soviet system and the malignancies of the postcommunist order have combined in ways to hinder the development of professional armed forces in Ukraine. Nonetheless, despite the unfavourable inheritance, Ukraine has tackled professionalisation as an important issue.

First, it has created a national army, reliably subordinated to state authority. Ukraine did not inherit an army in 1991, but a force grouping – without a Defence Ministry, without a General Staff and without central organs of command and control.[18] Moreover, this grouping, its formidable inventory of equipment and its highly trained officer corps were designed for one purpose: to wage combined arms, coalition, offensive (and nuclear) warfare against NATO on an external front and under Soviet direction. In 1991 these formations were not equipped, deployed or trained to provide national defence. Moreover, a large proportion of officers in these formations were loyal either to the Russian Federation, or to the USSR – a state which no longer existed. Second, it has chosen to break with the general war tradition, and done so in a remarkably methodical

way by identifying new security needs and then translating them into the specific concepts of military operations, force structure, command and control, training and education – and, in contingencies of financial stringency, discernible efforts to realise these concepts in practice.

Moreover, the Ukrainian government has avoided politicisation of the military at a time when the MVS and SBU had been drawn into politics. This has benefited the professionalism of the armed forces, and it benefits the country. The government has also avoided ethno-nationalism. In the post-independence period, there was much concern about the proportion of ethnically Russian officers in the forces. A decade later most of the armed forces now view Ukraine as their country and, with increasingly rare exceptions, have spent most of their lives in it. But they have not become ethnically Ukrainian. In Ukraine, a country in which most 'ethnic Russians' arrived generations ago and have long since become assimilated, not to say ethnically mixed, people have long learnt to distinguish between *poskhodzhennya* (origin) and *nalezhnist'* (belonging).[19] Fortunately, this has also been true of the civilian authorities of the state.

As the NSC notes, the principal factor obstructing professionalisation is the weakness of civil society. This civic deficit is intimately related to two others. The first is the absence of a civic state, which we may define as the domain of state institutions governed by a coherent and transparent body of rules, subordinate to codified, limited authority and influenced by an ethos of professionalism and 'rightful conduct'.

The second is the de facto privatisation of the state. 'Shadow structures' in every sphere of public activity are taken for granted. These structures are less dominant, more disciplined and more restrained in Ukraine than they are in several other states of the former Soviet Union, but the dominance of covert, 'subjective agendas' over open and official ones is a key reason why only 11.8 per cent of the population trust the police and 11.9 per cent trust the courts.[20] Some 32 per cent of the electorate trust commanders and officers of the armed forces more than any other state institution, as they appear more resistant to corrupt influences than their counterparts in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, customs services and other state bodies. But this is not an environment in which propriety flourishes.

Institutional culture

Armed forces and other force structures are not just 'tools of policy', but institutions. As such, they bond their members to a code of values and practices, formal and implicit. Armed forces, police and security services are subcultures in their own right, and transformations of the political

order will be incomplete, indeed at risk, if they are not accompanied by measures to transform the character and ethos of the institutions which are called upon to defend it. It is fanciful to suppose that institutions schooled according to a prior, antagonistic scheme of interests and values will transform themselves. It is equally fanciful to suppose that a limited number of high-level and high-profile command changes will substitute for a searching review of the way services recruit, train and promote personnel, define and develop professionalism, relate to the civilian population and answer to civilian authority.

In response to the domestic defence reforms, and NATO cooperation, the working culture of the Soviet armed forces is clearly under assault in Ukraine. But the same is not true of the wider bureaucratic and political culture responsible for the framing of defence policy and its oversight. Almost lacking in the MOD is any notion of *civilian* professionalism. The deficiency manifests itself in two respects.

First, Ukraine lacks a professional civil service. What it has is 90,000 civilian functionaries in its MOD and armed forces. There is still limited awareness of the need for a corps of experienced administrators to advise and implement government policy. The administrative culture of Ukraine – hierarchical, closed, distrustful of initiative – weakens transparency; and by weakening transparency, professionalism. It also deprives institutions of horizontal integration and, at mid level, the sense that decisions are partially 'owned' by those who participate in implementing them.

Second, despite the impressive growth in the quality and standing of NGOs in recent years, there remains a serious deficit of civilian expertise in the fields of security and defence. Even the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) – which has a Standing Commission on Questions of Security and Defence and budgetary powers denied to the British Parliament – suffers from this deficit, for the Commission does not employ specialist advisors, its relationships with NGOs are far from systematic, few of its own members can be considered experts, and not all of them are committed to exercising the prerogatives which they have. The Rada might have powers, but it has little capacity, and it is likely to be a long time before a critical mass of Ukrainians understand that their declared objectives are undermined by these shortcomings and by the administrative culture that underpins them.

Conclusion

Despite several years of modernisation, Ukraine's military establishment continues to bear the imprints of its Soviet and communist past.

Given this provenance, governmental efforts to re-examine the country's security needs and, out of this re-examination, draw methodical, often radical and occasionally painful conclusions about the ends and means of military reform command attention and respect. In terms of military policy, Ukraine has made a substantial, if still not conclusive break with the Soviet military legacy. In terms of policy implementation, the record is less methodical and far less radical, but no less painful for a bloated, still conservative and chronically underfunded military force. These shortcomings are not surprising. Throughout the former Soviet Union, the collapse of public finance, the weakness of public institutions, the prevalence of 'subjective agendas' – and the general deficit of legitimacy, probity and trust – have combined to produce a glaring gap between policies and their realisation. What is surprising is the fact that Ukraine is taking deliberate steps to turn aspiration into reality and in the brief period of time since a State Programme was approved, it has made tangible progress.

The requirements stipulated by the NSC and the recently approved State Programme not only call for professional armed forces, but for a very different notion of professionalism from that which existed in the Soviet era. To a considerable extent, these points are understood in Ukraine: an understanding reflected in efforts to downsize the forces, phase out conscription, transform the curriculum of officer education and absorb the experience which NATO has to offer in managing local conflicts and 'operations other than war'. Yet a great deal is not understood. *Kontraktniki*, even if housed in good accommodation and encouraged to stay in the service by decent rates of pay, cannot be turned into professionals by a dilapidated Soviet era training infrastructure. Second, the content of training for these other ranks must change as radically as the system of officer education, because rudimentary, rote drills will not produce proficiency in 'non-standard' conflict situations. Finally, without a more flexible and devolved system of command, control and communication, it could prove very difficult to stay abreast of the dynamics of conflict on the ground, let alone one step ahead of them. Progress in these areas will depend upon cultural change as well as organisational improvement, and for this reason, it is certain to be slow.

But the more serious shortcomings in professionalism relate to the wider context in which the armed forces function. The results of military reform might be questionable, but there can be no doubt that a reformist impulse exists in the armed forces. The same impulse can be found in several quarters inside the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Border Troops, but in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SBU

this impulse is all but absent. No less detrimental to the professional functioning of the military establishment is the civic deficit in Ukraine, including the deficit in civilian expertise and, throughout society, the prevalence of an administrative culture which discourages initiative and stifles talent. The growing fortitude of NGOs, journalists, graduates and younger officers suggests that this fact of life is changing, but it is still a fact of life.

Professionalisation through military reform advances in Ukraine, but it is a long-term enterprise, punctuated by many short-term battles.

Notes

1. Ukrainian peacekeeping forces are deployed in 18 foreign countries. The largest contingents are a 650-strong engineer battalion in south Lebanon and a 310-strong specialised unit in Kosovo, operating as part of the Ukrainian–Polish Joint Peacekeeping Battalion. The overall numbers include 231 specialised and civilian police officers.

2. Non-MOD armed forces include the 'military' and policy of the Interior Ministry, and the troops of the Security Service of Ukraine. See below for further details.

3. The full comment of Rear Admiral Yuriy Shalyt, while Deputy Commander of Sea Breeze in 1997 was:

> In local conflicts or national disasters, which can also provoke conflicts, it is precisely military units with the right training that can and should set up a zone *which would make it possible to direct or influence the processes occurring outside it*, promote the consolidation of stability and order in the country or region and create the necessary conditions for the work of units from the Ukrainian Emergency Situations Ministry.

4. As the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS) has noted, 'the reserve component has become imaginary and exists on paper only....No training assemblies for reserve officers have been held since 1992.' 'Why does Ukraine Need Military Reform so Badly?', *National Security and Defence*, No. 1 (2000), 9.

5. In a country whose black economy is at least as large as the legal economy, the armed forces benefit from a number of hidden subsidies, many of them perfectly legal. Much of the accumulated armed forces debt – an estimated UAH10–15 billion since 1991 – has been effectively written off. Military forces legally – and without charge to the state budget – provide services to regional authorities and farming cooperatives in exchange for provisions, food and occasionally petrol. In addition to these activities, the armed forces raised USD65 million and are required to raise USD165 million in 2001 from non-budgetary sources.

6. *National Security and Defence*, No. 1 (2000), 32–3.

7. Schkidchenko was appointed Defence Minister on 13 November 2001.

8. *National Security and Defence*, No. 1 (2000), 8.

9. O. Mykolayeva, 'Servicemen Say: He Who Has Not Been in the Army Has Lost', *Zerkalo Nedeli* [Mirror of the Week] (15–21 June 1996).

10. The author was exposed to the virulence of the biases when lecturing at the NDA as recently as May 2001.

11. *National Security and Defence*, No. 1 (2000), 10–12.

12. It is estimated that between 60 and 70 Ukrainian soldiers committed suicide in 1999 (50 per cent of all military deaths for that year). In Ukraine, as in Russia, there is an active 'Organisation of Soldiers' Mothers', headed by Valentina Artamonova. There is also an ombudsman in the Verkhovna Rada, Nina Karpachova, whom soldiers have the right to address even in wartime.

13. For example, military forces legally – and without charge to the state budget – provide services to regional authorities and farming cooperatives in exchange for provisions, food and occasionally petrol.

14. Russia's dispatch of a 'humanitarian' convoy to Yugoslavia (halted on the Hungary–Ukraine border) in April 1999, its redeployment of the intelligence ship *Liman* (and initial preparation to redeploy other vessels) from Sevastopol to the Adriatic and its plans to transit Ukraine with airborne troop reinforcements after the 'brilliant dash to Pristina' in June 1999 provoked anxiety and, in some quarters, alarm. For a more comprehensive discussion, see James Sherr and Steven Main, *Russian and Ukrainian Perceptions of Events in Yugoslavia*, Paper F64 (May 1999), 2, 17–24 (Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, Camberley).

15. More than 500 bilateral activities are scheduled between NATO allies and Ukraine in 2001, as well as 250 multilateral activities with NATO.

16. Statement to the NATO–Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, October 2000.

17. In the former USSR only the Baltic countries participate more intensively in PARP. Out of 27 partners, 19 participate to some degree.

18. This was not true for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, which had branches at Union Republic level and therefore survived relatively intact after 1991. The Soviet Ministry of Defence and the Soviet General Staff had no such branches. With one exception, the organisation of the Soviet armed forces was functional and operational, not territorial. The one territorial component of defence organisation, the USSR's 15 military districts, grouped together entities responsible for conscription, training and mobilisation. But these districts were not territorially coterminous with Union Republics, and they did not possess the capabilities and command structures required to plan or conduct coordinated military operations. What Ukraine inherited in 1991 were limbs without brain or body: three military districts and the forces which happened to be stationed in them.

19. The author has not seen polls investigating the correlation between the ethnicity of officers and their loyalties. But a number of such polls have been taken of the civilian population. In 1994, 84 per cent of the inhabitants of the eastern region of Donetsk described themselves as 'Soviet people', but characteristically the number of ethnic Ukrainians adopting this appellation was almost identical to the number of ethnic Russians who did so. Hence, in a very different region, Kyiv, a 1995 Democratic Initiatives poll revealed 62 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians and 58 per cent of ethnic Russians firmly in

favour of independence; on the other hand, 16 per cent of Ukrainians and only 10 per cent of Russians pronounced themselves against it.

20. According to a UCEPS poll taken shortly before the tape scandal, the largest percentage of citizens expressed trust in the armed forces (30.2 per cent). The level of confidence in the SBU was 20.1 per cent. Only 11.8 per cent expressed trust in the militia (civil police, subordinate to the MVS), just 0.1 per cent less than they trusted the courts and just 0.1 per cent more than they trusted the Office of Public Prosecutor. *National Security and Defence*, No. 11 (Kyiv: UCEPS, 2000), 10.

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Part V
Conclusion

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15
Reforming Postcommunist Militaries

Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey

The case studies in this volume have examined the challenges facing the countries of postcommunist Europe in reforming and in particular professionalising their armed forces. The context within which the processes of reform and professionalisation take place is an extremely challenging one. The economic problems of postcommunist transition impose severe constraints on the resources available for defence reform. In common with all European states, electorates in central and eastern Europe appear reluctant to give priority to defence transition, particularly at a time when more pressing demands are being made for economic transition and welfare reform. Modern militaries are responding to the revolution in military affairs that is focusing their attention on the application of advanced communications and sensor technologies and precision strike capabilities to warfare. West European armed forces are also struggling to respond to three other challenges: the need to build consensus for appropriate levels of defence expenditure to provide effective national security; the need to recruit personnel with a high level of technical skill and to further develop them in response to the introduction of increasingly complex weapons systems; and the need to becoming learning organisations capable of adapting rapidly to new and often unforeseen challenges such as those posed by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001.

The process of professionalisation also takes place in a complex military–strategic environment in which the role and utility of military force appear to be undergoing profound re-evaluation. Since the end of the Cold War the dominant spectre of a major European land war between East and West has dissipated and the principal role of armed forces has shifted from the traditional military mission of defence of national territory towards new missions, notably peacekeeping and

peacemaking operations. This requires a profound reorientation of force structures away from existing tank-based military formations, manned by conscript armies with a volunteer cadre, towards smaller more rapidly deployable volunteer forces capable of projecting power beyond national territory. Military force is also increasingly being recognised as only one element in a package of conflict prevention and crisis management measures that include international development aid, assistance in nation-building and support for public administration and the rule of law. Moreover, as the fight against terrorism becomes a more pressing priority in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the USA in the autumn of 2001, it is likely that this will lead to a further process of adaptation of the roles of armed forces. In this post-Cold War context, the states of central and eastern Europe are faced with quite fundamental questions concerning the nature and utility of military force and the future shape of their military establishments, upon which issues of professionalisation are dependent. Building and modernising professional armed forces in both West and East thus takes place in a context that has never been so challenging.

In central and eastern Europe, transforming the military and its related institutions has been part of a broader process of postcommunist transition under way for over a decade. The postcommunist states have faced the challenge of removing the influence of the Communist Party within the military, and introducing new mechanisms for democratic civilian control of the armed forces. In most states the armed forces bequeathed by the communist period are inappropriately organised, equipped and staffed to face new security challenges. In the Baltic states, Croatia, Slovenia and Ukraine, the scale of the task is even greater. Here governments have had to build armed forces where none previously existed or where there were only the fragmented remnants of pre-independence Soviet or Yugoslav institutions. Constraints on public expenditure are even greater than in western Europe, creating major budgetary problems in the defence area.

As we note in the introduction to this volume, the notion of professional armed forces and professionalisation are problematic concepts that are often used to describe different end states and processes. Nevertheless, in responding to the challenges of the contemporary postcommunist period, in almost all central and eastern European states there has been agreement in principle that military reform requires more professional armed forces. There is also widespread acceptance that the aim of professional armed forces is threefold: that the military accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the democratic civilian

government of the state; that armed forces are able to undertake military activities in an effective and an efficient way; and that the organisation, ethos and internal structures of the armed forces reflect these twin assumptions. There has, however, also been a tendency to equate professional armed forces with an all-volunteer, non-conscript military and understand professionalisation in terms of moving towards such a military. In the introduction to this book we argue that professional armed force – understood in terms of the three characteristics just noted – need not necessarily be all-volunteer and that equating military professionalism with non-conscript armed forces can be misleading. Instead, we argue that professional armed forces are defined by four core functional characteristics:

1. Clearly specified and widely accepted roles in relation to both external functions and domestic society;
2. The maintenance of the expertise necessary to fulfil their external and domestic functions effectively and efficiently;
3. Clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military as an institution and of individual soldiers;
4. Promotion based on achievement.

Within this approach we argued that it is possible to distinguish both different models of professional armed forces and different degrees of professionalism.

Within the context of post-Cold War Europe, we argue there are four distinct models of professional armed forces: a Power Projection model, a Territorial Defence model, a Post-Neutral model and a Neutral model. These models reflect wider strategic political defence policy choices for countries, relating in particular to the appropriate balance between preparation for defence of national territory and the development of capabilities for projecting military power beyond national territory, and the extent to which the countries' defence should be integrated into international structures such as NATO and the EU. These strategic defence policy choices in turn have major implications for the structure and organisation of armed forces and hence how a country approaches professionalisation. While the four models are ideal types and therefore do not necessarily exactly reflect the complex individual experiences of each country, they nevertheless provide a useful framework for analysing the strategic defence policy and professionalisation choices facing countries and for comparing emerging patterns of professionalisation in postcommunist Europe.

This framework has a threefold advantage over the existing debate on professionalisation. First, it avoids arguing that one ideal type or model is superior to another. This has been a particular weakness of the contemporary debate, which has tended to privilege the creation of a Power Projection model over the other three types of armed forces that have often not been considered as professional armed forces. The professionalisation debate has been narrow as a consequence of several factors. Military restructuring in the early 1990s in the USA and later in the UK, corresponded to the Power Projection model comprising all-volunteer forces with joint force integration and deployability out of area. These developments therefore established an important trend for others to follow in military modernisation, especially because of the prominent role that the armed forces of both states play in multinational operations. Second, in western European states the financial cost and ineffectiveness of conscription in a post-Cold War environment added momentum to a search for an alternative model that did not rely on a large manpower requirement. Finally, NATO and more specifically the EU's European Security and Defence Policy, have given further impetus to developing expeditionary force capabilities including long-range transport, satellite intelligence and high levels of interoperability. By 2003, the EU's 15 governments have committed themselves to creating a military force of 60,000 troops capable of deployment on operations within 60 days and sustainable for one year. This brings additional pressure to bear on West European governments and those that aspire to EU membership to create power projection forces at a national level.

A second advantage of our definition of professionalisation is that it does not assume that armed forces must be all-volunteer to be professional. In many states, and particularly in postcommunist Europe, professionalisation has been used as term that is synonymous with the creation of volunteer armies. Our approach avoids such an excessive focus on the issue of changing armed forces from conscription to volunteer forces. In all four models this is only one aspect of the professionalisation process. Even in the model that places the greatest amount of emphasis on volunteer forces – the Power Projection model – this aspect is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for achieving a high degree of professionalism.

There is a third advantage of defining professionalisation through four functional and normative characteristics of role, expertise, a rule-based structure defining responsibilities, and promotion based on achievement. This allows us to distinguish between different *degrees* of professionalism both within and between different force structures.

For example, both the UK and the USA have volunteer forces, yet there is a wide divergence in professional standards between these armed forces depending on the particular aspect of professionalisation that is the focus of attention. In central and eastern Europe, many states have to varying degrees embraced parts of a Power Projection model, yet they demonstrate quite widely divergent levels of professionalisation within their force structures. For example, some armed forces have high standards of military education and training, but comparatively low standards in relation to other characteristics of a professional force.

Drawing on the case study chapters that have formed the core of this volume, this conclusion first explores the patterns of professionalisation in postcommunist Europe before examining the range of factors that have directly and indirectly shaped these patterns. The concluding section reflects more broadly on the link between professionalisation and defence modernisation now under way in Europe.

Emerging patterns of professionalisation in postcommunist Europe

The country studies in this volume suggest that three patterns of professionalisation are evident among the armed forces of postcommunist Europe. The first and largest cluster of states are those that aspire to the Territorial Defence ideal type. This group comprises the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine and joining them later Romania, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). During the communist period, most of these states had national armed forces whose mission combined a national defence role with wider Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) responsibilities. In organisational terms, the military legacies of communism in this group of states included large, primarily conscript-based armed forces, high defence budgets and, in general, a history of supranational Soviet-dominated command and control structures. In the postcommunist period, to varying degrees all of these states expressed their national security priorities in terms of reformed national defence and closer integration with the West.

Although the Territorial Defence model is currently seen as the ultimate objective of the reform process, different states within this group exhibit different approaches to professionalisation. For example, over the last decade the Polish government has made great strides in professionalising its armed forces towards the Territorial Defence type largely as a result of particular historical, societal and military experiences that place a premium on the defence of Polish territory. In the Polish case,

professionalisation has not therefore fundamentally changed the role of the armed forces, but as Paul Latawski suggests, it has been interpreted quite narrowly as a twin goal of reducing the size of the armed forces and creating all-volunteer armed forces. While to some degree this has been successful – the Polish armed forces are now 60 per cent of their 1989 size – this has clearly been at the expense of the other three other elements of professionalisation. For example, command and staff training has been neglected, military command and control remain largely unmodernised and NCO training and promotion systems require significant reform to provide armed forces capable of effective national defence.

Marybeth Ulrich argues that the objective of Slovak professionalisation has been to create armed forces capable of defending the territorial integrity of the state from conventional attack as well as from new threats such as international terrorism and crime. As long as Slovakia is a NATO aspirant, successive governments have also felt under an obligation to develop a limited capability to contribute to non-Article 5 missions. Although this has involved a costly diversion of scarce resources, the political dividend – the prospect of NATO membership – is seen to make this worthwhile.

A distinct subgroup of states within this overall Territorial Defence group are those who are undertaking a professionalisation process at the same time as the mission of their armed forces has undergone a radical transformation from one role to another. This marks some states out within the Territorial Defence cluster since the challenges they are facing are more profound than those countries which already had essentially Territorial Defence-based armed forces. As Marian Zulean makes clear, the direction and speed of change in Romania have been uneven and erratic, but from 1995 it has become increasingly apparent that the objective of reform has been to move from a Neutralist model based on a doctrine of national mobilisation to a Territorial Defence model with some limited power projection aspirations. Here the challenges have been profound, requiring a major reorientation of almost every aspect of the armed forces – from its role, the type of expertise and command mechanisms required of its personnel through to the promotion system. Both the slowness with which Romania has embraced the need for change and the shift in role has ensured that this will be a lengthy process. In the case of Croatia, there has also been a major shift from one type of role for the armed forces to another – from a Neutralist type during the Yugoslav period to a Territorial Defence type today, but with aspirations towards reform along the lines of the Post-Neutral type. However, Croatia's war of independence from 1991 to 1995 and the

continuing imperative of national survival thereafter, have left little opportunity for professionalisation to take place. Since 2000 peace and political stabilisation in the Balkans have provided a context in which serious attempts have been made to professionalise the armed forces in the direction of the Post-Neutral type.

Among all these states, the appropriate balance between forces designed primarily for defence of national territory and those allocated to peacekeeping and peacemaking roles has been a key question. Since the early 1990s, the relative balance of priority and resources allocated to these two roles has shifted towards the latter in all these states. Indeed, some analysts have argued that the changes in several of these states are so profound as to mark the start of a transition from the Territorial Defence model and to the Power Projection model, with the Czech Republic and Hungary appearing to have moved furthest in this direction.

In all cases the development of power projection capabilities has proven expensive and difficult. Hungary, for example, has cultivated a small, professionalised elite within the armed forces that is interoperable with NATO forces and to a modest degree is able to participate in expeditionary multinational military operations like that in Kosovo. However, away from this small elite core, the majority of the Hungarian defence force remains conscript based and focused on the defence of national territory. As a consequence of these investment decisions, the bulk of the Hungarian armed forces suffer from a chronic lack of resources, poor equipment, low morale and a limited operational capability. This has been damaging in terms of the overall development of cohesive and effective armed forces operating to professional standards. For example, the Hungarian military reform process in the 1990s saw the degradation of the country's defence of national territory role to the extent that the Hungarian air force was not able to patrol its own airspace during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Indeed, it is a paradox that for Hungary and the Czech Republic – the first central European states along with Poland to join NATO in 1999 – one consequence of the drive for NATO membership appears to have been a downgrading of the priority attached to defence of national territory and a growing interest in developing power projection capabilities which have arguably been developed at great cost to general military effectiveness.

The Czech Republic's concentration on the professionalisation of an elite cadre within the military has been driven by a widespread societal antimilitarism and resistance to conscription, and further reinforced by the aspiration to be part of the first wave of NATO enlargement to the east. In the Czech Republic this has strengthened the case of those who

argue that the future shape of the armed forces should be focused around the Power Projection model. Indeed, in August 2001 the Czech government approved a major reform plan to create smaller, more mobile units capable of rapid deployment beyond national borders.

A second distinct group of states within the Territorial Defence cluster have faced a quite different set of defence reform challenges since the collapse of communism. This group consists of Russia, Ukraine and the FRY, with strong prima facie evidence that beyond the case studies in this volume states such as Belarus, Moldova and the former Soviet Caucasian and central Asian republics can also to varying degrees be considered in this category. In the main, these countries inherited significant military structures from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and in the cases of Russia, Ukraine and the FRY presently have armed forces numbering 977,100, 303,800 and 105,500 respectively.[1] The sheer size of these forces brings distinct challenges in the professionalisation process. In general, these military institutions are both large and unwieldy, and will require significant financial investment if any meaningful reform is to take place. Moreover, these states also have large, alternative military structures, such as Interior Ministry forces, which are themselves going through processes of change. These states remain firmly wedded to the Territorial Defence type. Significantly, however, the extent to and context in which they have developed power projection forces differs radically from that of the countries discussed above. First, territorial defence rather than power projection has been relatively a higher priority in these countries than for states such as the Czech Republic, Hungary or Slovakia, largely because of stronger perceptions of a continuing threat to national territory. Second, Russia and the FRY have developed power projection forces – or perhaps more accurately adapted existing forces to power projection roles – in the context of their involvement in the wars in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. Third, Russia and Ukraine have contributed limited forces relative to their size and strategic weight to the NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia as a means of asserting their major power status and gaining influence with NATO, rather than as part of bids for NATO membership. In contrast, until the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, the FRY's pariah status meant that it had no interest in, or prospect of contributing to, international peace support operations.

In Russia, Dale Herspring argues that severe underfunding and poor conditions in the armed forces have led to a rapid deterioration in both the quality of personnel and combat effectiveness. Endemic draft avoidance – caused in large part by the brutal nature of Russian military

service, the persistence of practices such as *dedovshchina* and the conflict in Chechnya – have led to chronic undermanning throughout the military. Low pay, housing shortages and a decline in prestige have resulted in a precipitous decline in the attractiveness of the career of military officer and caused a corresponding deterioration in the quality of the Russian officer corps as a whole. The Ukrainian military has suffered from similar problems, though its experiences have been perhaps less severe than those of its Russian neighbour. The accidental shooting down of a civilian aircraft by Ukrainian forces during an exercise in the Black Sea in October 2001 and the resultant resignation of the Ukrainian Defence Minister sharply illustrated the parlous state – and lack of professionalism – of the country's military. As James Sherr points out, while Ukraine inherited one of the largest armed forces in Europe from the Soviet Union, in practice this was functionally piecemeal and organisationally fragmented. As a result – and while a strong domestic consensus exists as to the primary defence of national territory mission of the military – moulding Ukrainian armed forces into a coherent, professionalised whole has been a difficult task, complicated further by Ukraine's continuing economic difficulties. Future plans for military reform envisage the development of attributes associated with the Power Projection model, but in practice and for the foreseeable future neither the funding nor the political commitment exist to make these a reality.

In Russia, Ukraine and the FRY the collapse in resources to fund professionalisation of the armed forces has not just limited steps forward but actually triggered a process of deprofessionalisation in which the armed forces are now less able to fulfil their roles than they were a decade ago. James Gow argues that military transition in the FRY in the 1990s has also been shaped by the Yugoslav army's involvement in the succession of wars in the former Yugoslavia. As a result, its military development has occurred along the lines of the Territorial Defence model, although any progress towards further professionalisation has been stalled. It remains to be seen whether – as has been the case in Croatia – peace in the Balkans, the apparent demise of authoritarianism and the development of more normal relations with the West will reinvigorate processes of professionalisation.

Professionalisation has taken a different direction in a third group of states comprising Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovenia. In terms of population and territory, these states are generally smaller than those in the first and second groups. Moreover on gaining independence they faced the task of building national armed forces where none – or only very limited territorial defence forces – had previously existed.

With the exception of Bulgaria, this group did not inherit substantial military *matériel* or infrastructure from the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. As a consequence, they have adopted Post-Neutral type military force structures based on relatively lightly armed territorial defence forces, supplemented by large reserves and small armoured and/or power projection forces. As both Robertas Sapronas and Jan Trapans note, this model of military organisation is particularly suited to small states with few military traditions and limited economic resources. The purpose of the military strategy of these states is not so much to inflict military defeat on what is presumed will be a far superior enemy, but to make any invasion and subsequent occupation as difficult and costly as possible. The Post-Neutral model requires the widespread engagement of society as a whole in the task of national defence, with largely conscript armed forces, the development of a capacity for organising societal resistance should an invasion actually take place and a low-technology approach to equipping the military.

As with states in the first cluster, however, the focus and character of the military reform processes in this third group of states have been heavily influenced by the perceived need to acquire some form of power projection capability. Thus, states in this group – and particularly the Baltic states – have concentrated on the cultivation of professional, elite cadres within their militaries. In contrast to the bulk of the armed forces in these countries, the elite cadres often take the form of externally deployable 'rapid reaction' or 'immediate reaction' forces. The Baltic states have been particularly active in these roles, supplying forces for the NATO-led missions in the former Yugoslavia. Involvement in these power projection missions has had some positive military and political 'trickle down' effects. Exposure of units to NATO military and technical standards and the development of interoperability, as well as significant political prestige, have been important gains. So too has the rotation of personnel exposed to these experiences into other units of the armed forces. At a political level it also sends a positive message and puts pressure on NATO allies to allow these states to become full members, having proved themselves active partners.

However, as with the first group of states, this two-pronged approach to military reform has not been without its problems. Perhaps most significantly, the challenge of introducing a power projection capability into a Post-Neutral force structure generates tensions in terms of the allocation of scarce resources. As the Baltic states have discovered, the development of rapidly deployable forces even when the units are quite small can be expensive, especially when they appear to be incompatible

with the core role of building up conscript-based structures for the defence of national territory. In Latvia, as Jan Trapans argues, there is a danger in 'giving priority to international objectives which can put national requirements in a subordinate position', especially if such activities 'consume a disproportionate amount of the limited defence budget'.

Moreover, professionalising forces for Neutral and Post-Neutral force structures require quite different means of developing expertise, responsibility and promotion mechanisms. One paradox of this situation is particularly noteworthy. Conscription is clearly a key element of the Post-Neutral and Neutral models. The participation elite cadres of these states in multinational operations is playing an important role in raising the military's standing among the public, and is often increasing the popular legitimacy of military reform processes as a whole. In this respect some international role is clearly important for sustaining reform and conscription, but the opportunity cost is high and arguably distorts reform priorities and expenditure plans.

The case of Bulgaria is distinctive within this Post-Neutral cluster for three reasons. First, it is not a geographically small state and its armed forces remain numerically large in size (around 77,000 strong at the end of 2001, broadly similar in size to the armed forces in the FRY, though smaller than those of Poland and Ukraine).[2] Second, as Laura Cleary notes, between 1990 and 1997 Bulgarian professionalisation had a very slow start, in striking contrast to other states in the Post-Neutral typology. Third, what marks out Bulgaria is the willingness of its governments since 1997 to resist the temptation to approach professionalisation in too narrow a fashion. In this respect Bulgaria appears to be willing to think through the appropriateness of its professionalisation plans in relation to their economic sustainability. It has cancelled a number of equipment purchases that do not directly contribute to its reform plans and is approaching the issue in a medium- to long-term time frame rather than a quick-fix solution. In focusing the reform programme on a broad rather than a narrow front, the introduction of NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) has provided a much more focused and more widely cast set of objectives for the military reform process; most notably, Cleary observes that the overhaul of the military education system is 'a cornerstone of Bulgarian' plans to modernise the military. Cleary argues that Bulgaria's limited commitment to the development of power projection capabilities places it in the Post-Neutral category. At the same time, however, unlike the Baltic states and Slovenia, Bulgaria continues to rely on relatively heavy armoured formations (rather than lightly armed territorial defence forces) for the defence of national territory.

Bulgaria, therefore, also shares important characteristics with the Territorial Defence model of armed forces explored in this volume.

In summarising patterns in the development of professional armed forces in postcommunist Europe, a number of points are noteworthy. First, the majority of countries have sought to develop a form of Territorial Defence type of armed forces, supplemented by power projection capabilities. Within this group of states, however, the extent to which countries have sought and succeeded in developing these capabilities varies significantly. The case studies in this volume suggest that the Czech Republic and Hungary have gone furthest in this direction and are likely to make the transition from the Territorial Defence to the Power Projection model in the next few years. The varying degrees to which states have developed power projection forces, however, highlight the point that the Territorial Defence and Power Projection models are ideal types and that in reality there are a spectrum of possibilities open to states in terms of the balance between Territorial Defence and Power Projection. This also suggests that the relative balance between Territorial Defence and Power Projection that states choose may well shift over time.

A second group of states – Slovenia and the Baltic states – have broadly adopted the Post-Neutral model. This reflects their small size and the fact that they have had to create armed forces from scratch. This in turn has dictated that a more conventional defence of national territory against much larger adversaries is often not credible. Again, however, these countries have also sought to supplement their primary force structures with limited power projection capabilities.

Third, in almost all cases the strong allure of developing a limited power projection capability is evident. The perceived political value of being able to actively engage with NATO forces through a military contribution to international peacekeeping is an influential factor, despite creating often quite small 'islands' of professional forces with higher standards of training and technical expertise than the bulk of the armed forces.

Finally, one other clear development is the distinction between professionalising and deprofessionalising armed forces which marks out Russia, Ukraine and the FRY as a distinctive group. In these countries the 1990s witnessed a collapse in the ability of the armed forces to undertake military activities in an effective way. This was a consequence of a dramatic change in the military's roles, large reductions in defence spending and a resultant deterioration in the organisation, ethos and internal structures of the armed forces.

Factors influencing professionalisation in postcommunist Europe

The three patterns of military professionalisation identified above have developed as a result of a variety of influences. Broadly, these can be considered at two different levels. First, there are those influences which have stimulated military change and military reform in general. Second, there are those which have shaped the particular direction of defence reform in each country.

Geopolitical, technological and social factors all fall into the first category. The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War removed the political and geostrategic bases on which defence policies and armed forces had previously been founded. This new postcommunist environment meant that the defence policies and force structures developed since the late 1940s were no longer relevant to the changed circumstances facing the countries of the region. Second, advances in military technology have meant that a degree of military reform has been necessary for national armed forces to remain effective in their war-fighting roles. While this factor has perhaps had less of an influence on central and eastern Europe than it has on western Europe and North America, new technologies – and particularly complex ones which require specialist skills to utilise – have made new demands on existing patterns of military organisation and military professionalism. Finally, as developments in the Czech Republic exemplify, societal changes can alter the bases of legitimacy for particular military roles and forms of military organisation. Thus, for example, analysts suggest that across central and eastern Europe young people are less deferential today than in the past and increasingly resistant to conscription as a consequence. This change in popular attitudes (or at least popular willingness to vocalise dissent) towards military service stems partly from the freer political environment brought about by the collapse of communism and the introduction of democratic reforms. It also results – to varying degrees between countries – from greater affluence and a revolution in rising expectations among much of the population on the one hand, and from the unattractive nature of military service conditions in some central and eastern European armed forces on the other.

This first category of general motivations for change – radical domestic political and geopolitical change, technological factors and societal factors – have all necessitated military reform of some sort among the armed forces of postcommunist Europe. At an important general level, the first of these factors – radical domestic and geopolitical change – has

been the key driver of change. Thus, the new international situation, changed threat perceptions and new relationships with Russia, the West and neighbouring states have fundamentally shaped military reform. Indeed, the majority of central and eastern European states rapidly took steps to abandon their old WTO/Soviet/Yugoslav defence policies and reorientate their armed forces to *tous azimuts* defence policies dealing with new perceived threats. In this context, the technological and societal factors noted above have been secondary general factors influencing reform. In terms of more specific defence policy and professionalisation choices, however, other factors have shaped which models have been chosen. Four influences have been pivotal in shaping defence reform processes in individual countries: historical legacies in terms of the armed forces and force structure each country inherited when communism collapsed; the size of the country concerned; the impact of Western multinational institutions; and the extent and nature of distinctive national threat perceptions.

The context in which countries inherited pre-existing armed forces (if they inherited armed forces at all), and the character of these armed forces, have had a significant impact on states' subsequent defence policy and professionalisation choices. Thus, the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states including both the Czech Republic and Slovakia inherited militaries based on relatively heavy armoured forces designed for a combination of national defence and limited offensive operations within Soviet/WTO planning. Given this legacy, these countries have in effect chosen to adapt their armed forces by overall reductions in the size of the military (reducing heavier and more offensive forces), reorientating plans for defence of national territory away from their Cold War western focus, and adding limited power projection capabilities. This defence policy choice was to a significant degree driven by the military legacy these countries inherited – and the obvious practical and economic obstacles to more rapid or radical change. Thus, while entirely abandoning armoured forces in favour of a territorial defence based on mass conscription and light forces or a wholesale move to power projection forces were both theoretical choices open to these states, they were never very realistic options given the military legacy they inherited. In contrast, those countries which have had to develop armed forces from scratch – such as the Baltic states or Slovenia – have faced very different constraints that have drawn them towards developing light forces focused around the defence of national territory mission. Similarly, the legacies that Russia, the FRY and the other former Soviet and former Yugoslav states inherited – the cores of the old Soviet and Yugoslav militaries in the

cases of Russia and the FRY, disembodied elements of these armed forces in the cases of the other republics – have informed their subsequent defence policy and professionalisation choices.

A second factor that has shaped the defence policy and professionalisation choices of central and eastern European states has been their size. The former NSWP states are all arguably large enough in terms of territory and population that they have at least the prospect of developing a credible policy of defence of national territory based on armoured forces and efforts to repel or expel any aggressor. In contrast, the smaller size of the Baltic states and Slovenia means that this option is less viable or credible for them and has pushed them towards the Post-Neutral model of armed forces. At the other extreme, as Herspring argues, Russia's size has pushed it towards a de facto model of fragmented, regionalised armed forces, overstretched in attempting to provide territorial defence for the entirety of a very large country.

A third factor that has had a decisive influence on the direction of specific military reform programmes throughout much of central and eastern Europe has been the attraction of closer integration with Western political and security institutions. The desire of most central and eastern European states to join NATO in particular has given that organisation considerable leverage in shaping the defence policies of those countries, with NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and related activities providing a strong functional impetus shaping partners' military reform processes. Moreover, there is a widespread perception in the region, reinforced by implicit and explicit conditionality, that a country's prospects for NATO membership are dependent on adopting NATO-compatible military reforms. This involves the ability to operate alongside NATO at both technical and professional levels, and the development of armed forces that are able to participate in NATO-led multinational operations. Following the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Alliance in 1999, these dynamics have been reinforced by NATO's adoption of the MAP and PARP initiatives which have focused attention on helping to prepare candidates militarily for membership.

Significantly, the armed forces required for these kinds of tasks are largely analogous to the Power Projection model identified above. Moreover, it is the attributes of the Power Projection type of professional armed forces (largely or all-volunteer, focused on missions beyond defence of national territory, capable of both inter-service and multinational operations and high technology in character) that currently dominate thinking about military modernisation in western Europe and North America. From a NATO perspective, therefore, 'ideal' professional

militaries tend to be equated with the Power Projection model. As a consequence, this model has been strongly promoted in bilateral and multilateral Western efforts to support defence reform in the postcommunist region. This Western message, and related aid and cooperation, have had a very significant impact. Central and eastern European governments aspiring to NATO membership have concluded rightly that their countries' prospects for membership of NATO depend to a significant degree on their ability to contribute Power Projection type forces to NATO-led operations, and to operate alongside NATO forces in complex multinational frameworks. As a consequence, the majority of central and eastern European states have sought to develop power projection capabilities alongside territorial defence forces and emphasised interoperability with NATO in their military reform efforts.

For many of the countries in the postcommunist region, the impact of this power projection bias has been significant. It is noticeable, for example, that Lithuania and Latvia's military reform programmes really only began in earnest once the political momentum behind efforts to join NATO intensified. With largely conscript-based forces focused on the defence of national territory, most progress has been made in the professionalisation of a small elite cadre of the armed forces, focused around power projection missions. Similar dynamics are visible in all those countries that aspire or aspired to NATO accession. Thus, in Hungary, military reform efforts have been targeted on a small section of the Hungarian defence forces, largely as a consequence of the country's particular strategy for achieving NATO membership. Similarly, Alex Bellamy argues that the change in Croatian approaches to military reform and professionalisation – Territorial Defence in form, but led increasingly by aspirations towards the Power Projection type – have largely resulted from Croatia's decision to seek closer integration with the West.

Further east, the impact of NATO norms has had a more limited impact on professionalisation processes. In Ukraine – where the country's future strategic direction remains ambiguous and membership of NATO is at most only a remote prospect – the need and incentives to tailor military reform to particular Alliance requirements is distinctly limited. Similarly, although Moscow has sought a special bilateral relationship with NATO, such factors have not had much impact on the direction of Russian military reform. Thus, while the influence of Western and particularly NATO thinking on military modernisation is not entirely absent in Russia and Ukraine, these factors have had nothing like the powerful impact of the desire and prospect of NATO membership in other central and eastern European states.

A fourth factor shaping military reform has been the extent of threat perceptions in each country. For example, FRY and Croatian experiences of war in the 1990s, have made the maintenance of territorial defence capabilities a priority and put other elements of defence reform on hold, while Power Projection type forces have been used more in the context of protecting ethnic kin or retaining/regaining territory than in the NATO peace support role. In contrast, Slovenia's relatively easier secession from Yugoslavia and lower threat perceptions since the early 1990s have meant that the country as a whole has attached a lower priority to national defence than Croatia or the FRY. Elsewhere, Poland's historically troubled relations with Russia, its geostrategic position and perceptions of at least a potential Russian threat, help to explain the higher priority attached to the defence of national territory in Warsaw than in Prague or Budapest.

Conclusion

The case studies in this volume and the arguments of this conclusion suggest that three distinct patterns of defence policy and military professionalisation are emerging in postcommunist central and eastern Europe. First, the majority of central and eastern European states have adopted something akin to the Territorial Defence model outlined earlier. Significantly, however, perceptions of military professionalism continue to be heavily influenced by the perceived value of some sort of power projection capability. This has resulted in a concentration of military reform efforts on the development of a small elite cadre within the military as a whole. As a consequence, professionalisation of the military has increasingly been understood in terms of developing Power Projection type armed forces capable of operating alongside NATO and moving away from conscription and towards volunteer forces. In contrast, the other three of the four characteristics of professionalisation – the maintenance of the expertise necessary to fulfil these roles effectively and efficiently; clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military; promotion based on achievement – have received much less attention.

Second, in Russia, Ukraine and the FRY, armed forces remain focused on the Territorial Defence type, and defence policy has been shaped much less by the desire to integrate with NATO or develop power projection forces. At the same time, the problems of reforming very large militaries, together with economic constraints, have meant that their adaptation to the post-Cold War environment has been characterised more by processes of deprofessionalisation than by professionalisation.

Finally, the Baltic republics and Slovenia have adopted the Post-Neutral model as their main reference point. As with the first group, however, these states have tended to embrace key aspects of the Power Projection model as their guide for professionalisation, and so have concentrated their military reform efforts on a small, elite cadre within the armed forces, though remain committed to conscription as a core element of their force structure and ground forces.

In terms of the factors that have driven these patterns of professionalisation, we suggest that while the need for military reform has been driven by general factors such as the collapse of communism and military–technological and societal change, the actual models of defence policy and professionalisation adopted by each country can only be explained by reference to a number of more specific factors. These include historical legacies, size, the impact of Western security institutions and national threat perceptions.

These patterns of professionalisation and the factors driving them suggest tensions between the political and military imperatives shaping defence policy. A military imperative – the attempt to address national security concerns primarily through military means, by developing indigenous armed forces capable of defence of national territory in a changed strategic environment – has been one important motivation for change. In the case of Territorial Defence and Post-Neutral groups this military imperative has resulted in the development of primarily conscript-based armed forces structured along Territorial Defence and Post-Neutral lines respectively. The second imperative influencing military reform and professionalisation in these states has been a political–foreign policy one that attempts to address national security indirectly through political means. This has involved attempting to use the military as a means to facilitate closer integration with the West, and particularly accession to the NATO Alliance. This political imperative has helped to entrench the influence of the Power Projection model, by encouraging states to concentrate on the development of cadres within their armed forces which are able to contribute to and participate in NATO-led multinational missions.

Indeed, partly as a consequence of the influence of the West, there is a danger that professionalisation processes in central and eastern Europe are occurring in a somewhat piecemeal fashion. This has resulted from reform efforts following political foreign policy rather than military defence policy imperatives – concentrating on the development of small, elite 'showcase' cadres capable of rapid deployment alongside NATO forces, with the remainder starved of resources. The problem with this

approach is that it militates against a more broadly conceived reform process. The channelling of resources into a small section of the military while overlooking other important components of professionalisation such as military education, training, the development of command and control mechanisms and effective personnel policies creates a risk of a two-tier military with a well-funded, professionalised elite core and a cash-starved conscript rump. Moreover, this two-tier professionalisation threatens to seriously damage the effectiveness of the military in its defence of national territory role.

The extent to which this constitutes – or may become – a major problem or is largely a transitional issue is a matter for debate. The chapters in this volume suggest that there are quite serious causes for concern about the operational effectiveness of the majority of central and eastern European armed forces in a defence of national territory context. However, most of the countries in the region are unlikely to face serious threats to their national territory for the foreseeable future, and focusing on contributing to wider international security through peace support operations while integrating with the West may well be a sensible and stabilising choice. In addition, the development of an elite core within the armed forces may have positive trickle-down effects on the military as a whole as particular units and individual soldiers are rotated and promoted. In the longer term it is possible that the countries of central and eastern Europe will gradually increase the size of these core forces and hence the professionalism of their militaries as a whole. Serious questions also remain about the future of professionalisation of armed forces after NATO accession. Political pressure for defence reform may decline and political willingness to invest scarce resources in further professionalisation may be lessened, as has arguably been the case in Hungary and the Czech Republic. The lopsided nature of reform processes noted above may also mean that the overall effectiveness of the military – whether in or out of NATO – may be seriously compromised. Thus, some argue that one consequence of the Visegrad Three's membership of NATO appears to have been a downgrading of overall levels of military effectiveness. It might be countered, however, that in the absence of the prospect of NATO membership the political and economic resources devoted to professionalising an elite core of the armed forces would most likely have been directed not towards a wider model of defence reform but towards other goals entirely, with the armed forces simply left to deprofessionalise still further.

A strong case can be made that the extension of NATO values, and especially the development of shared understandings of what is meant

by democratic civilian control of armed forces and the normalisation of the relationship of the armed forces to society, is one of the major achievements of NATO in central and eastern Europe over the last decade. For its part, however, NATO governments need to think hard about the applicability and appropriateness of the Power Projection role for the states of central and eastern Europe. There is also a need to recognise that professionalisation is above all else a process concerned with the maintenance of the expertise necessary to fulfil the external and domestic functions of armed forces effectively and efficiently; the development of clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military as an institution and of individual soldiers; and promotion based on achievement. This recognition would allow NATO to more effectively engage with the reform and professionalisation processes now under way in states that have as their goal Territorial Defence and Post-Neutral force structures by promoting standards rather than a particular model of military organisation.

In general, there is a continuing need across the region for a more holistic approach to military reform and professionalisation. Fundamental questions need to be asked about the role of armed forces in the post-Cold War environment and the appropriateness of particular models of military organisation to fulfil these roles. Until these questions are seriously addressed, piecemeal professionalisation is likely to remain the norm among the armed forces of postcommunist Europe.

Notes

1. *The Military Balance, 2001–2002* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 101, 103, 112.
2. *The Military Balance, 2001–2002*, 85.

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