



DAILY LIVES OF

Civilians in
Wartime Modern
America

**Recent Titles in the
Greenwood Press “Daily Life Through History” Series**

Cooking Europe, 1250–1650

Ken Albala

The Black Death

Joseph P. Byrne

Cooking in America, 1590–1840

Trudy Eden

Cooking in America, 1840–1945

Alice L. McLean

Cooking in Ancient Civilizations

Cathy K. Kaufman

Nature and the Environment in Pre-Columbian American Life

Stacy Kowtko

Science and Technology in Medieval European Life

Jeffrey R. Wigelsworth

Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Africa: From Slavery

Days to the Rwandan Genocide

John Laband, editor

Christians in Ancient Rome

James W. Ermatinger

The Army in Transformation, 1790–1860

James M. McCaffrey

The Korean War

Paul M. Edwards

World War I

Jennifer D. Keene

DAILY LIVES OF

Civilians in
Wartime Modern
America

*From the Indian Wars to the
Vietnam War*

EDITED BY DAVID S. HEIDLER
AND JEANNE T. HEIDLER

The Greenwood Press "Daily Life Through History" Series
Daily Lives of Civilians during Wartime
David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Series Editors



GREENWOOD PRESS
Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Daily lives of civilians in wartime modern America: From the Indian wars to the Vietnam war / edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler.

p. cm. — (The Greenwood Press Daily life through history series : daily lives of civilians during wartime, ISSN 1080-4749)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-313-33534-6 (alk. paper)

1. United States—History, Military—19th century. 2. United States—History, Military—20th century. 3. United States—Social conditions—1865-1918.

4. United States—Social conditions—20th century. 5. War and society—United States—History—19th century. 6. War and society—United States—History—20th century. 7. Combatants and noncombatants (International law)—History. 8. Civil-military relations—United States—History.

I. Heidler, David Stephen, 1955- II. Heidler, Jeanne T.

E181.C58 2007

973.8—dc22

2006030434

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright © 2007 by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2006030434

ISBN 10: 0-313-33534-6

ISBN 13: 978-0-313-33534-1

ISSN: 1080-4749

First published in 2007

Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881

An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

www.greenwood.com

Printed in the United States of America



The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

| | |
|---|-----|
| Series Foreword | vii |
| Introduction | xi |
| <i>David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler</i> | |
| Chronology of Principal Events | xix |
| 1. Civilians and the Indian Wars in the American West, 1865–90 | 1 |
| <i>Susan Badger Doyle</i> | |
| 2. Daily Lives of Civilians in World War I | 35 |
| <i>Michael S. Neiberg</i> | |
| 3. Home-Front Americans at War, 1941–45 | 67 |
| <i>Judy Barrett Litoff</i> | |
| 4. A Cold War Home Front, 1945–63 | 105 |
| <i>Jon Timothy Kelly</i> | |
| 5. Vietnam War and American Life | 141 |
| <i>James Landers</i> | |
| Index | 173 |
| About the Editors and Contributors | 181 |

Series Foreword

Few scenes are as poignant as that of civilian refugees torn from their homes and put to plodding flight along dusty roads, carrying their possessions in crude bundles and makeshift carts. We have all seen the images. Before photography, paintings and crude drawings told the story, but despite the media, the same sense of the awful emerges from these striking portrayals: the pace of the flight is agonizingly slow; the numbers are sobering and usually arrayed in single file along the edges of byways that stretch to the horizon. The men appear hunched and beaten, the women haggard, the children strangely old, and usually the wide-eyed look of fear has been replaced by one of bone-grinding weariness. They likely stagger through country redolent with the odor of smoke and death as heavy guns mutter in the distance. It always seems to be raining on these people, or snowing, and it is either brutally cold or oppressively hot. In the past, clattering hooves would send them skittering away from the path of cavalry; more recently, whirring engines of motorized convoys push them from the road. Aside from becoming casualties, civilians who become refugees experience the most devastating impact of war, for they truly become orphans of the storm, lacking the barest necessities of food and clothing except for what they can carry and eventually what they can steal.

The volumes in this series seek to illuminate that extreme example of the civilian experience in wartime and more, for those on distant home fronts also can make remarkable sacrifices, whether through their labors

to support the war effort or by enduring the absence of loved ones far from home and in great peril. And war can impinge on indigenous populations in eccentric ways. Stories of a medieval world in which a farmer fearful about his crops could prevail on armies to fight elsewhere are possibly exaggerated, the product of nostalgia for a chivalric code that most likely did not hold much sway during a coarse and vicious time. In any period and at any place, the fundamental reality of war is that organized violence is no less brutal for its being structured by strategy and tactics. The advent of total war might have been signaled by the famous *levée en masse* of the French Revolution, but that development was more a culmination of a trend than an innovation away from more pacific times. In short, all wars have assailed and will assail civilians in one way or another to a greater or lesser degree. The Thirty Years' War displaced populations just as the American Revolution saw settlements preyed upon, houses razed, and farms pillaged. Modern codes of conduct adopted by both international consent and embraced by the armies of the civilized world have heightened awareness about the sanctity of civilians and have improved vigilance about violations of that sanctity, but in the end such codes will never guarantee immunity from the rage of battle or the rigors of war.

In this series, accomplished scholars have recruited prescient colleagues to write essays that reveal both the universal civilian experience in wartime and aspects of it made unique by time and place. Readers will discover in these pages the other side of warfare, one that is never placid, even if far removed from the scenes of fighting. As these talented authors show, the shifting expectations of governments markedly transformed the civilian wartime experience from virtual non-involvement in early modern times to the twentieth century's expectation of sacrifice, exertion, and contribution. Finally, as the western powers have come full circle by asking virtually no sacrifice from civilians at all, they have stumbled upon the peculiar result that diminishing deprivation during a war can increase civilian dissent against it.

Moreover, the geographical and chronological span of these books is broad and encompassing to reveal the unique perspectives of how war affects people whether they are separated by hemispheres or centuries, people who are distinct by way of different cultures yet similar because of their common humanity. As readers will see, days on a home front far from battle usually become a surreal routine of the ordinary existing in tandem with the extraordinary, a situation in which hours of waiting and expectation become blurred against the backdrop of normal tasks and everyday events. That situation is a constant, whether for a village in Asia or Africa or Europe or the Americas.

Consequently, these books confirm that the human condition always produces the similar as well the singular, a paradox that war tends to amplify.

Every war is much like another, but no war is really the same as any other. All places are much alike, but no place is wholly separable from its matchless identity. The civilian experience in war mirrors these verities. We are certain that readers will find in these books a vivid illumination of those truths.

David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Series Editors

Introduction

David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler

From the establishment of the first European settlements to the end of the American Civil War, a period spanning three and a half centuries, each generation of Americans has felt the hard hand of war. And though by the mid-nineteenth century the nature of war changed—most obviously to draw sharper lines between civilians and combatants—frontier regions would often revert to more primitive traditions that saw little difference between men under arms and those behind plows.

After the Civil War, American expansion into the West grew as a result of the Homestead Act, which opened vast tracts of free land. The first transcontinental railroad began to branch out with steel tributaries stretching to regions previously remote and dangerously isolated, and railroads made almost everything easier. With the help of the Iron Horse, settlers could converge on the heartland not only from the East but from the interior of California as well, doubly increasing pressure on Indians in the region. As Susan Badger Doyle points out in her essay on Indian wars of the late nineteenth century, the native people of the interior suddenly felt the onslaught of white immigration seemingly from all directions. For whites who saw the West as a land brimming with opportunity, western Native Americans were obstacles to the fulfillment of a dream. Eager settlers fueled their animus with prejudice while white friends of the Indians often indulged in a condescending paternalism, but neither presented a solution that could satisfy everyone forever, and the surge of immigration to the West made war inevitable.

Before that sad reality became apparent, the government tried to control events by sending commissioners among the western tribes to persuade them to move to reservations away from white settlement. Yet the plan to confine western Indians to reservations failed. Efforts to change Indian culture, similar to earlier futile programs, ignored venerable Indian traditions and presumed that Indians would want to emulate white customs. In addition, lands set aside for reservations were often marginal, and when those lands were later discovered to have hidden value, as happened when gold was discovered in the Black Hills of the Dakotas, the most solemn white promises became meaningless.

War sprang from misunderstandings, fraud, and unremitting white intrusion on Indian lands. In this regard, the causes for conflict repeated the sad chronicle of earlier times. Yet these latest Indian wars were unique in that civilians were infrequently in harm's way. Movies and popular fiction aside—depictions that have created the widespread perception that Indians commonly attacked isolated homesteads, mutilated their inhabitants, and left them for circling buzzards—the truth was that most whites attacked by Indians in the West were traveling somewhere away from settled areas. Hostile encounters were usually between Indians and the United States Army and occurred in the most unsettled regions of the West. Indians were almost always the losers in these episodes and suffered terribly. Warriors who died in battle or fell to capture left families without protection and bereft of provender. Entire tribes running from soldiers for hundreds of miles could see their young and old grow frail and die. Even tribes in villages were vulnerable, as was demonstrated at Sand Creek and on the Washita, where soldiers did not distinguish between warriors and their women and children.¹

White civilians traveling alone or in small groups were sometimes targets, but Indian wars more often affected most settlers and merchants indirectly. Communications with the East and California might be disrupted, transporting supplies overland could become more difficult, and settlement of desirable land could be postponed. On the other hand, the threat of Indian hostilities could have salutary effects. Towns originated as settlements near army forts where the presence of large numbers of soldiers stimulated local economies. And in the East, new bureaucracies sprang up to administer the reservation system, while new entertainment genres found easterners eager for news about the Wild West in general. The wildness of the American West spanned only about three decades, but a host of writers, artists, and photographers revealed and sometimes created American archetypes that proved as enduring as they were colorful: the dashing cavalry troop, the stoic and implacable Indian, the hardy pioneer, the taciturn cowpoke, and the tarnished girl with a heart of gold were forever etched into the American memory.

The Indian wars of the last half of the nineteenth century were the last real wars fought on U.S. soil. The Spanish-American War, the Filipino

Insurrection, and the so-called Banana Wars provoked vigorous debate and dissent among Americans, but they had relatively little impact on the day-to-day lives of civilians. Not until the United States entered what that generation called the Great War—what later would be called World War I—did American civilians again feel the direct impact of war on their daily lives.

The fighting in Europe had been going on for almost three years when the United States declared war on Germany in 1917. Before the American declaration of war, the average American was aware of what was happening in Europe but felt little distress over it. In fact, American industry's expansion to supply the antagonists provided more jobs for a population that increasingly needed them as it continued a trend of urbanization with steady migrations from farms to cities. The United States entry into the war in 1917 was not widely popular, as Michael Neiberg shows in his essay on World War I, because many Americans saw the conflict in Europe as a remote quarrel that posed no particular threat to their interests. In fact, some Americans found the decision to enter the war disturbing. German Americans with family in Europe objected to the vilification of their relatives, and Irish Americans opposed any assistance for the British, seen by them as oppressors of their native country.

Such checkered support for the war caused the government to take extraordinary steps, both to insure loyalty and to convince the public that the endeavor was worth American blood. Congress passed laws limiting dissent, and government propaganda painted the enemy as a savage menace to American values.² Technological advances gave the government new tools to drum up support for the war effort. The new motion picture industry that drew thousands of Americans into theaters every week encouraged audiences to cooperate with rationing and purchase war bonds. The government's propaganda also pushed civilians to become soldiers, an effort that was soon supplemented with conscription. Because the draft promised to remove many of the most productive young men in the country from the workforce, women and older men were to take their places, but unlike in previous wars, the country was more industrialized, and the strain on the American economy was proportionately greater. American civilians thus suffered shortages during World War I, for although the government did not resort to mandatory rationing, it did encourage the public to conserve food, fuel, and other essential items. Most Americans gladly gave up luxuries and even did without necessities, patriotic gestures that selflessly supported the soldiers overseas. Taxes increased for everyone, cutting buying power already reduced by inflation, an expected consequence of modern wars, but there were unintended consequences as well. For a time, America's farmers were among the most visible beneficiaries of American public spiritedness as prices rose with demand to generate sizeable profits. The boom, however, was not only short-lived but ultimately injurious because demand and prices dropped sharply after the

war, just as farmers were gearing up for even greater production. Many of the economic hardships associated with the Great Depression were to fall on farmers a full decade before they descended on the rest of the American people. Nevertheless, most Americans went about their daily routines much as they had before the war. They attended church, went to work, and enjoyed movies and sporting events as often as they could afford to.

Returning soldiers came home to riotous celebrations that exulted in America's contribution to this war that was supposed to end all wars, but messy diplomatic disputes in Europe and America's innate caution about foreign entanglements soon had people asking hard questions and harboring bitter regrets about the entire enterprise. Many pledged that they would never again allow the country to fall into such folly.

That resolve has created the perception that the interwar years in the United States were ones steeped in isolationism, but in many ways such a perception is too simplistic, for the United States government forged trade agreements and signed disarmament treaties. Yet it is also true that most Americans wanted to avoid any foreign dispute that could again draw the country into an overseas conflict. The Great Depression of the 1930s further steeled American determination in this regard, which was ironic, as Judy Barrett Litoff shows in her essay on World War II, for it was precisely the colossal undertaking of World War II that finally dragged the United States out of its economic misfortune as the country placed American soldiers, sailors, and marines in two hemispheres, employed almost everyone who could not don a uniform, and established a level of industrial productivity that stunned friend and foe alike.

In obvious ways, the civilian world of World War II mimicked that of World War I. The United States was again a latecomer to the worldwide struggle, and after the attack on Pearl Harbor, most American civilians did not feel the direct effects of combat as the American military again fought on foreign soil. But there were major differences as well. Far more men served during World War II, and the enormous number of young men away at war meant more women entered the workforce than ever before. Most of them returned to traditional roles at home after the war but not before altering women's roles in the American workplace forever. They not only demonstrated that they could fill the void left by men absent from the workforce but also participated in one of the most revolutionary events in the history of gender roles when they joined the armed services in significant numbers to fulfill indispensable support functions.

The United States supplied the war materiel for its huge military establishment and covered its allies' needs as well, a task that required the nation to mobilize on an unprecedented scale. In need of enormous revenues, the government raised taxes and initiated an unparalleled push to sell war bonds. Industry retooled to produce war materiel rather than consumer goods, leaving civilians who were enjoying full employment and better wages for the first time in a decade with little to buy. In fact, shortages

required government rationing, but Americans cheerfully accepted the policy in the knowledge that they were helping the war effort. Civilians also contributed to that war effort in more active ways. They held community paper and metal drives, planted Victory Gardens as they had in World War I, and volunteered for service organizations. Family farms received a much needed boost from the need to feed millions of soldiers overseas. Because farmers lacked laborers, the United States imported thousands of foreign workers, beginning an immigrant labor tradition that would survive the war.

None of these efforts, however, was spontaneous; government agencies worked ceaselessly to encourage civilians to do their part. As in World War I, the influential entertainment industry helped. Musicians wrote patriotic popular tunes, and war stories were standard fare on movie screens across the country. Newspapers that kept people abreast of the latest war news also explained how civilians could help support the men at the front.³

Meanwhile, the basic demographic character of the nation changed at a rapid pace. In addition to transformations wrought by having 16 million men and women in the military, the already rapid rural-to-urban shift accelerated as people moved to cities to work in war industries. Wives packed up their children to move near husbands at military bases or to live with parents or in-laws. Eventually, many found themselves running households alone, often working in defense plants or clerical jobs as well. African Americans found that war production centers away from the rural South offered better jobs than most blacks had ever enjoyed in the United States, with wages sometimes 10 times greater than prewar levels. Their improved standard of living was a tangible benefit, but the knowledge that black soldiers and civilians made significant contributions to the war effort formed the seedbed of the civil rights movement of the 1950s.

Even though celebrations by American civilians at the end of the war were appropriately festive, everyone realized that the nation faced a tremendous adjustment after such a staggering undertaking. Some also rightly suspected that American alliances forged by the necessity of defeating Hitler, particularly that with the Soviet Union, would not last. Even as Americans basked in victory, new conflicts loomed.

Jon Timothy Kelly's essay on the Cold War provides a look at how the country quickly returned to a state of readiness when the end of World War II ushered in the Cold War. Most Americans only gradually came to grips with this new struggle, but many civilian and military leaders perceived that the United States had entered a hostile relationship with the Soviet Union almost as soon as the guns fell silent in World War II. The elimination of a common enemy left little reason for the United States and the communist Soviet Union to cooperate, and efforts to reconstruct Germany and Japan exacerbated growing tensions. As Kelly points out, even though the Cold War never resulted in the feared Armageddon, it did produce a series of small wars throughout the world.

Soviet alliances that were clearly formed to challenge the West, the suppression of Soviet client states that dared to dissent from Moscow's directives, alarm that Soviets agents were working in the United States to infiltrate the U.S. government, and the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons technology understandably caused American civilians to deem the Soviet Union a physical threat. When hot wars broke out throughout the world, such as in Korea in 1950, Americans again felt the need to take up the burdens of defending freedom.⁴

During the Cold War Americans felt a more intense physical threat than in any conflict since the Civil War. The Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal and a growing arms race that featured missiles with an intercontinental reach were plausible reasons for the dread. As the potential for nuclear war made the stakes on the home front awfully high, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 made plain the realities of a new world in which oceans were no longer comforting barriers and once-distant enemies were distressingly near. Civil defense drills and bomb shelters were the consequences of a policy based on nuclear deterrence, a concept that rested on the belief that mutually assured destruction would assure restraint. Within the context of these tense and troubling times, both public and private entities committed excesses that impinged on American civil liberties, excesses that were not excusable, but at least are understandable.

Meanwhile the restoration of a peacetime economy meant seismic change in itself. African Americans found the adjustment especially difficult as many black men returned home from valiant service to find only low-paying jobs and inferior political and social status awaiting them. From their profound dissatisfaction with this status quo antebellum the modern civil rights movement was born. Many Americans realized the justness of the African American cause, especially in light of the inconsistency posed by criticizing Soviet human rights violations while discriminating against people at home. Yet fears that subversive communist influences could infiltrate the civil rights movement clouded what would have otherwise been a clear moral imperative. The Cold War thus became additionally complex, and many people dealt with their confusion by retreating into reflexive responses.

At first the shooting war in Korea presented a situation many Americans could understand. They strongly supported American involvement in the Korean War as a logical endeavor promoting containment, the U.S. government's policy to stop the spread of communism. As the war mired into a stalemate in Korea and the sacrifices of blood and treasure at home increased, however, Americans grew impatient with fighting merely to sustain containment rather than to achieve decisive victory. The price of containment elsewhere in the world also raised qualms about defense spending that was growing at a phenomenal rate. Despite those qualms, however, most Americans did not doubt the threat posed by world

communism, and when another war in Southeast Asia beckoned U.S. involvement, they did not question the government's response.

In a broadly conceived essay, James Landers describes how American involvement in Vietnam, the first televised war, profoundly changed American attitudes about war even as this particular conflict touched few Americans. For years, civilians went about their daily routines only vaguely aware that the nation was at war a half world away. Nonetheless, important changes were under way and would have weighty consequences. Industrial, technological, and agricultural innovations altered the fabric of life in the 1960s. Standards of living improved as consumer goods became inexpensive and ubiquitous. More Americans than ever owned automobiles and homes while enjoying increased salaries. Yet troubles came with progress. Improvements in communication diminished distance and condensed time with startling effects. News came to American households with breathtaking immediacy so that the same broadcasts that beamed live pictures of Neil Armstrong walking on the moon could also provide disturbing images from Vietnam that unmasked the brutality and uncertainty of war. While all previous wars had drawn criticism, Vietnam thus became a unique episode because of television coverage. As America's role in Vietnam grew, college campuses became centers of antiwar activity on the part of both faculty and students, and large cities as well as the nation's capital were the settings for examples of enormous popular dissent.

Television showed all this and more. It also showed Americans the increasing anger and frustration of the African American community. Leaders of the civil rights movement—Martin Luther King, Jr., most conspicuously—questioned the morality of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and argued that black Americans were doing a disproportionate amount of the dying in Southeast Asia.

By the early 1970s more than a few Americans were questioning the war in Southeast Asia. Ultimately the home front's collapsing support for the war compelled American withdrawal from Vietnam, but many civilians came away from this troubling episode quite troubled indeed. The war itself seemed a cautionary tale and led to a reflexive impulse to measure all American military activity by its peculiar benchmark. Moreover, the United States had failed to meet its stated goals in Southeast Asia, and the disquieting implications for a people who were accustomed to victory cast a shadow across American foreign policy for a generation.


Although experiencing the violence of combat has become unlikely for American civilians in the post-Civil War era, the home front nevertheless has been compelled to make significant sacrifices in both the epic and small wars of these latest generations. In the First and Second World Wars civilians held scrap metal drives, grew their own vegetables, and participated in voluntary and mandatory rationing as a way to do their part. During the Cold War, some Americans spent a small fortune on bomb shelters

and many saw their children conduct “duck and cover” drills in schools. During Vietnam, civilians digested daily reports in print and on television that depicted war vividly and gave dissidents an unprecedented forum. Thus do the wars of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries reveal both the similarities and differences of the American civilian experience during times of crisis. As Americans enter yet another time of international emergency in the post-9/11 world, the civilian response is an affirmation of the simple verity that despite an unprecedented material abundance and a broad enjoyment of liberty, being an American in the twenty-first century will present challenges just as demanding as those that confronted the huddled and forlorn colonists in Jamestown more than three centuries ago.

NOTES

1. See Jerome A. Greene, *Washita: The U.S. Army and the Southern Cheyennes, 1867–1869* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004).
2. See Geoffrey R. Stone, *Perilous Times; Free Speech in Wartime* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 184–91.
3. See David A. Copeland, gen. ed., *The Greenwood Library of American War Reporting*, vol. 5, *World War I & World War II, The European Theater* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005).
4. See Otis L. Graham, Jr., *A Limited Bounty: The United States since World War II* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 59.

Chronology of Principal Events



The United States from 1865.

INDIAN WARS

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| August 1854 | The Grattan Incident |
| July 1864 | Indian attacks occur on the Bozeman Trail |
| July 1866 | Red Cloud's War begins |
| December 21, 1866 | The Fetterman Massacre |
| January 1867 | Doolittle Report is published |
| February 1867 | U.S. Army issues rules governing travel on the Bozeman Trail |
| April 1867 | U.S. Army responds to attacks on the Smoky Hill route in Kansas |
| April 18, 1867 | John Bozeman killed in the Yellowstone Valley |
| January 1868 | Peace Commission report recommends reforms in Indian policy |
| April 1868 | Treaty of Fort Laramie ends Red Cloud's War |
| May 1868 | Indians raid Transcontinental Railroad workers in Kansas |
| November 27, 1868 | Battle of the Washita |
| December 25, 1868 | Comanche Village destroyed at Soldier Springs on the Red River |
| January 23, 1870 | Marias River Massacre |
| March 3, 1871 | The Indian Appropriations Act officially ends the recognition of tribes as entities and makes Indians wards of the state |
| May 1871 | Kiowas leave their reservation and mount raids in Texas |
| November 1872 | The Modoc Indian War begins in eastern Oregon and northern California and will continue until January 1873 |
| June 17, 1876 | Cheyenne and Oglala Sioux warriors defeat U.S. cavalry at Rosebud Creek north of the Platte River |
| June 25, 1876 | U.S. forces under George Armstrong Custer are annihilated on the Little Bighorn River by overwhelming numbers of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors |
| May 1877 | The Nez Perce War begins |
| October 5, 1877 | Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce is captured |

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| March 1883 | Apache bands begin raiding in New Mexico |
| March 1886 | Geronimo surrenders |
| February 8, 1887 | The Dawes Severalty Act provides for the grant of 160 acres of land to each Indian family |
| December 29, 1890 | Indian are massacred at Wounded Knee |

WORLD WAR I

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| August 1914 | As a result of international tensions exacerbated by the assassination of the crown prince of Austria, war breaks out in Europe between the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey) and the Allies (principally Russia, France, and Great Britain); the United States declares its neutrality |
| November 2, 1914 | Britain declares the North Sea a military area and deploys mines there |
| February 1915 | Germany adopts a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare for which President Woodrow Wilson promises to hold Germany accountable |
| May 7, 1915 | British passenger liner <i>Lusitania</i> is sunk by a German U-Boat; of the more than one thousand deaths, 124 are Americans |
| July 1915 | Extensive evidence of German subversive activities in the United States is discovered and excites public opinion |
| August 1915 | A military training camp is established at Plattsburg, New York, to train civilians in a preparedness program |
| January 7, 1916 | Germany agrees to cease unrestricted submarine warfare |
| June 3, 1916 | The National Defense Act authorizes a standing army of 175,000 men |
| November 7, 1916 | Wilson is reelected after having campaigned as keeping the United States out of the world war |
| January 22, 1917 | Wilson proposes that the warring powers open negotiations on the basis of "peace without victory" |
| January 31, 1917 | Germany announces its intention to resume unrestricted submarine warfare; Wilson breaks off diplomatic relations within days |

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| February 24, 1917 | Germany's attempt to persuade Mexico to attack the United States is revealed by the Zimmerman Telegram |
| April 2, 1917 | Wilson asks Congress for a declaration of war against Germany and is supported |
| May 18, 1917 | Congress establishes the draft |
| June 24, 1917 | The first elements of the American Expeditionary Force land in France |
| December 7, 1917 | The United States declares war against Austria-Hungary |
| January 8, 1918 | Wilson announces his plan for a peace settlement based on the Fourteen Points |
| May-June 1918 | American forces see fierce action at Cantigny, Bouresche, and Belleau Wood |
| September 1918 | America captures the important St. Mihiel Salient |
| November 11, 1918 | Germany agrees to an armistice |
| January-June 1919 | The Paris Peace Conference drafts the Treaty of Versailles, a punitive peace against Germany that ends the war in Europe; because of objections over the treaty's establishing a League of Nations, the United States fails to ratify the treaty and technically remains at war with Germany until July 2, 1921 |

WORLD WAR II

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| September 1, 1939 | After six years of domestic consolidation and menacing diplomacy, Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany invades Poland on the pretext of righting wrongs committed by the Versailles Treaty |
| September 3, 1939 | Britain and France declare war on Germany |
| September 8, 1939 | President Franklin D. Roosevelt declares a limited national emergency |
| November 4, 1939 | The Neutrality Act of 1939 repeals previous legislation that had prohibited the United States from selling arms to the Allies |
| May 1940 | Congress expands defense spending and Roosevelt sets up the Office of Emergency Management |

| | |
|---------------------------|---|
| September 3, 1940 | As a precursor to its Lend-Lease program, the United States arranges the exchange of 50 destroyers with Great Britain for military construction rights in specified British possessions |
| September 16, 1940 | Selective Training and Service Act goes into effect |
| November 5, 1940 | Roosevelt is reelected to an unprecedented third term as president |
| February 4, 1941 | The United Service Organization (USO) is established |
| March 11, 1941 | The United States establishes Lend-Lease, which authorizes the loan of war materiel to any nation deemed vital to American interests |
| April 11, 1941 | Roosevelt establishes the Office of Price Administration by executive order |
| July 25, 1941 | The United States freezes all Japanese assets in response to the Japanese occupation of French Indochina |
| August 14, 1941 | The United States and Great Britain issue the Atlantic Charter, which will later be the basis for the United Nations |
| October 17, 1941 | A German U-Boat torpedoes the USS <i>Kearny</i> in the North Atlantic |
| October 30, 1941 | A German U-Boat sinks the U.S. destroyer <i>Reuben James</i> in the North Atlantic |
| December 7, 1941 | Japanese forces attack the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor |
| December 8, 1941 | The United States declares war on Japan |
| December 11, 1941 | Germany and Italy declare war on the United States |
| December 19, 1941 | The Office of Censorship is established |
| December 20, 1941 | The Draft Act designates all males aged 20 through 44 as eligible for active military service |
| January 2, 1942 | Japanese forces take Manila |
| January 14, 1942 | All resident aliens must register with the U.S. government |
| January 28, 1942 | Office of Civil Defense established to coordinate civilian contributions to the war |

| | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| February 9, 1942 | Daylight Savings Time is decreed and will remain in place the rest of the war |
| February 20, 1942 | Roosevelt authorizes the internment of Japanese-Americans |
| February 27–March 1, 1942 | Japanese forces score a victory in the Battle of the Java Sea |
| April 9, 1942 | U.S. and Philippine forces surrender on the Bataan Peninsula |
| May 4–8, 1942 | The Japanese navy suffers significant losses at the Battle of the Coral Sea |
| May 7, 1942 | The island fortress of Corregidor in the Philippines surrenders to the Japanese |
| May 15, 1942 | The Women's Auxiliary Army Corps, forerunner of the WACs, is established |
| May 18, 1942 | Retail price caps are put into effect |
| June 1942 | Civilians throughout the country participate in a scrap-rubber drive |
| June 3–6, 1942 | The United States wins a significant victory in the Battle of Midway |
| July 30, 1942 | The Women's Naval Reserve (WAVES) is established |
| August 7, 1942 | A U.S. offensive begins in the Solomon Islands, including Guadalcanal |
| November 12–15, 1942 | The Japanese navy suffers a staggering defeat while attempting to support Japanese forces on Guadalcanal |
| November 28, 1942 | Coffee rationing begins |
| December 1, 1942 | Gasoline rationing instituted throughout the United States |
| February 7, 1943 | Shoe rationing begins |
| February 9, 1943 | Guadalcanal ultimately falls to U.S. Marines |
| March 1, 1943 | Coupon books are issued to ration processed foods |
| April 1, 1943 | Meat and dairy rationing begins |
| April 8, 1943 | Roosevelt institutes a wage-price freeze |
| May 1943 | Germany's North Africa campaign is defeated |
| May 27, 1943 | Office of War Mobilization is established |

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| June 9, 1943 | Withholding is introduced for taxable income |
| September 8, 1943 | Italy surrenders in response to the Allied invasion, but German troops quickly occupy the country to resist the Allied offensive |
| December 27, 1943 | The government takes control of railroads to thwart strikes but will relinquish control on January 19, 1944, after the labor dispute is resolved |
| May 3, 1944 | Major aspects of the meat rationing program are discontinued |
| June 6, 1944 | The massive Allied invasion of Europe begins |
| June 19–20, 1944 | The Battle of the Philippine Sea deals the Japanese navy a devastating blow |
| June 22, 1944 | The Servicemen's Readjustment Act, informally known as the G.I. Bill, becomes law |
| August 10, 1944 | U.S. forces take Guam |
| August 14, 1944 | Production of certain items not related to the war effort resumes |
| October 3, 1944 | The War Mobilization and Reconversion Act schedules the end of war-related government regulations |
| October 23–26, 1944 | The Japanese navy suffers another major defeat at the Battle of Leyte Gulf |
| November 7, 1944 | Roosevelt is elected to a fourth term |
| December 1944–January 1945 | The Battle of the Bulge stalls the Allied invasion of Europe until it finally ends in German defeat |
| February–March 1945 | After lengthy and vicious fighting, Iwo Jima finally falls to U.S. Marines |
| April–June 1945 | The island of Okinawa finally falls to U.S. forces after a protracted and costly fight |
| April 12, 1945 | Franklin Roosevelt suffers a stroke and dies; Harry S. Truman becomes president |
| May 7, 1945 | U.S. forces complete the liberation of the Philippines |
| August 6, 1945 | An atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima, Japan |
| August 9, 1945 | An atomic bomb is dropped on Nagasaki, Japan |
| September 2, 1945 | Japan surrenders |

| | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|
| October 30, 1945 | Shoe rationing ends |
| November 23, 1945 | Food rationing ends |
| December 20, 1945 | Tire rationing ends |

COLD WAR

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| November 1945 | Josef Stalin strengthens Soviet control in Hungary. |
| March 5, 1946 | Winston Churchill coins the term “iron curtain” in a speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, to describe the growing Soviet control of Eastern Europe |
| June 14, 1946 | The Soviet Union rejects an American plan to place atomic energy issues under the control of the United Nations |
| March 12, 1947 | The Truman Doctrine is announced |
| May 31, 1947 | Communists take over the Hungarian government |
| June 5, 1947 | The Marshall Plan is proposed to a multinational conference in Paris; the Eastern Bloc will refuse to participate |
| July–September 1947 | Under the National Security Act, the Department of Defense is established; the Army, Navy, and Air Force become separate departments; and the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency are created |
| October 1947 | The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc satellites establish the Cominform in response to the Marshall Plan |
| December 30, 1947 | Communists take over Rumania |
| February 22, 1948 | Communists stage a coup in Czechoslovakia |
| June 24, 1948 | The Soviet Union initiates the blockade of Berlin; the United States will respond with the Berlin Airlift |
| July 6, 1948 | North Atlantic defense conference in Washington |
| August 15, 1948 | Republic of South Korea established |
| September 9, 1948 | The Korean People’s Democratic Republic (North Korea) established |
| April 4, 1948 | The North Atlantic Treaty signed |

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| May 9, 1948 | Berlin blockade ends |
| August 1948 | The Soviet Union explodes an atomic bomb |
| September 1948 | German Federal Republic (West Germany) created when Allied occupation ends |
| October 1, 1948 | People's Republic of China (Communist China) is created |
| February 1950 | Sino-Soviet Pact |
| June 25, 1950 | North Korea invades South Korea; the United States responds with troops, beginning the Korean War |
| September 1951 | U.S. forges the ANZUS pact with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand |
| March 5, 1953 | Josef Stalin dies |
| July 27, 1953 | Korean Armistice |
| August 14, 1953 | Soviet Union successfully detonates a hydrogen bomb |
| May 1954 | The Soviet Union's proposal to join NATO is rebuffed |
| August 24, 1954 | The Communist Control Act outlaws the Communist Party in the United States |
| September 1954 | The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is established |
| May 5, 1955 | West Germany is admitted to NATO |
| May 14, 1955 | The Soviet Union forms the Warsaw Pact with Eastern Bloc nations |
| April 1956 | Cominform is dissolved |
| June 1956 | Riots in Poland |
| October–November 1956 | Hungarians rise up against communist rule and are brutally suppressed by Soviet intervention |
| August–November 1957 | Moscow successfully launches an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and places two Sputnik satellites into orbit |
| December 1957 | The United States launches the Atlas ICBM; reports raise fears of a "missile gap" between American and supposedly superior Soviet ICBM capabilities |
| January 1958 | Americans successfully place a satellite into orbit |

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| January 1959 | Fidel Castro overthrows Fulgencio Batista in Cuba |
| July 24, 1959 | Nixon and Khrushchev have the “kitchen debate” |
| May 1, 1960 | Soviets shoot down an American U2 reconnaissance plane |
| September 23, 1960 | Khrushchev bangs his shoe on the desk during a speech to the UN General Assembly in New York |
| November 8, 1960 | John F. Kennedy elected president |
| April 1961 | Bay of Pigs debacle |
| August 1961 | East Germany closes the border between East and West Berlin as a prelude to the Berlin Wall |
| October 1962 | Cuban Missile Crisis |
| November 22, 1963 | President Kennedy is assassinated |
| October 15, 1964 | Khrushchev ousted |
| October 16, 1964 | Communist China detonates an atomic bomb |
| August 1968 | Soviet and other Eastern Bloc forces suppress an anticommunist uprising in Czechoslovakia |
| March 1970 | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty |
| May 1972 | SALT agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed |
| June 1979 | SALT II agreement signed, but the U.S. Senate refuses to ratify it |

VIETNAM WAR

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| December 1961 | American military personnel arrive in South Vietnam to operate helicopters |
| January 1962 | Americans participate in combat missions against the Vietcong |
| October 18, 1963 | Antiwar protests at the University of Wisconsin |
| August 7, 1964 | Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passes Congress; over the next three years, the American military presence will steadily increase in the Vietnam theater |
| March 1965 | Operation Rolling Thunder begins |

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| April 1965 | Antiwar protests include “teach-ins” and a large student rally in Washington; pro-war rallies also draw large numbers |
| November 1965 | Another large antiwar rally in Washington |
| February 4, 1966 | The first of several hearings on Vietnam by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is televised |
| May 16, 1966 | Students stage an antiwar “sit-in” at the University of Wisconsin |
| January–May 1967 | North Vietnamese forces bombard American bases south of the DMZ; U.S. military responds with a series of offensive campaigns |
| May 1967 | A large pro-war rally is held in New York City |
| October 21, 1967 | Antiwar protest in Washington |
| January 30–31, 1968 | The Tet Offensive begins |
| March 16, 1968 | The My Lai Massacre |
| January–April 1968 | Significant attacks and a siege target Khe Sanh |
| April 23, 1968 | Antiwar student protesters take over buildings at Columbia University |
| May 1968 | Peace talks begin in Paris |
| June 5, 1968 | Robert F. Kennedy is assassinated |
| August 1968 | Antiwar protests disrupt the Democratic Convention in Chicago |
| November 1, 1968 | Operation Rolling Thunder ends |
| November 5, 1968 | Richard M. Nixon elected president |
| May 4, 1970 | Ohio National Guard kills four students at Kent State University |
| January 31–February 2, 1971 | Vietnam Veterans Against the War hold the controversial “Winter Soldier Investigation” |
| June 1971 | The Pentagon Papers are published in the <i>Washington Post</i> |
| July 1972 | Actress Jane Fonda tours North Vietnam and condemns the United States war effort |
| January 27, 1973 | Cease fire is signed in Paris |
| March 1973 | Virtually all American combat soldiers leave South Vietnam |

ONE

Civilians and the Indian Wars in the American West, 1865–90

Susan Badger Doyle

At the end of the Civil War, America continued expanding westward with renewed energy. People traveled in covered wagons on overland trails, on ships to the Pacific Coast, and on stagecoaches, steamboats, and railroad trains to settle and integrate new areas into the United States. However, the vast western territory was already occupied by American Indian tribes, and the overland travel routes and pressures from increasing settlement made armed conflict between the United States and Indian tribes inevitable. These armed conflicts between the U.S. Army and the western Indian tribes became known as the Indian wars in the American West. The Indians fought to defend their freedom to live in their homelands. For the U.S. government, the wars were the means to concentrate the western Indians on reservations and open lands for settlement.

Western Indians were, in fact, caught between two frontiers of white settlement. Expansion from the east, resembling earlier American frontiers, was a fairly continuous line of agricultural settlement pressing steadily westward. This frontier moved slowly enough to maintain relative population density as well as strong internal communications and transportation connections. The second frontier moved eastward from the areas settled in the 1840s and 1850s in California, the Pacific Northwest, and the Salt Lake Valley. This complex and noncontinuous frontier advanced by moving into new mining or farming and ranching areas, which resulted in scattered, sometimes isolated, settlements that depended on opening and maintaining connecting routes. As a result, a complex network of



Indians tried to impede the progress of railroad construction that promised increasing white settlement and the disruption of the Indian way of life on the Plains. (Library of Congress)

communication and transportation lines evolved that connected these two American frontiers and the developing settlement in between.

While overland travelers and settlers in the frontier areas were directly affected by the Indian wars, the whole nation was involved indirectly through the Indian and military policies of the federal government. Some civilians living in areas of Indian conflict were negatively affected in such ways as being victims of violence or having their mobility limited. For others the wars had positive effects, such as opportunities in supplying military posts and campaigns. In the broader American society, public awareness of the Indian wars was accomplished through newspapers, magazines, and books. Ultimately, civilians in all parts of the nation looked to the federal government to end the Indian obstacle to settling the West by any means possible.

Conflict in the Indian wars period was intermittent, and the location of warfare shifted as different tribes resisted the influx of population or being confined on reservations. While there were pockets of resistance in the West, the main arenas of warfare were the Great Plains and parts of the Great Basin and the Southwest. As the establishment of military posts and offensive campaigns opened new areas to settlement, people poured in. Twenty-five years after the end of the Civil War, the Indian wars in the West were over. In 1890 all native tribes were living on reservations, and the West was organized into states and territories of the United States.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM, 1865–1887

A significant factor in shaping the nature of the Indian wars was how Americans viewed the Indians in the West. In the post-Civil War era, the perception that Indians were obstacles to American westward expansion was widely known as the Indian problem, or the Indian question. Americans' attitudes toward Indians were polarized. Some romanticized

Indians as exotic, “noble savages,” as portrayed by writers such as Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and James Fenimore Cooper. More common was the view that Indians were fierce, wild, and inferior to whites. Consequently, American public opinion was divided between those who advocated a peaceful settlement of Indian-white disputes and the gradual assimilation of the tribes into American society and those who wanted to conquer and segregate the tribes. The most extreme group advocated exterminating the Indian populations. These were mostly westerners who were living in the midst of the Indian conflicts.

Following the Civil War, one of the greatest problems confronting Congress and the executive department was the complex Indian question. Both branches of government were torn between the conflicting approaches of settling the Indian problem by peaceful means or by force. In the executive branch, this conflict occurred between the Department of the Interior and the War Department. The Bureau of Indian Affairs had been a War Department agency before the creation of the Department of Interior in 1849. Many officials opposed the change, and for 15 years after the Civil War, supporters of the army backed legislation to transfer the Indian Bureau back to the War Department. Several times bills passed the House of Representatives that narrowly failed in the Senate, and the Indian Bureau remained in the Interior Department.

The full range of opinions on the Indian question was represented in Congress, but most members agreed with the approach of the Indian Bureau that civilian peace commissioners rather than army soldiers should achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflicts. As the Civil War was coming to an end in March 1865, Congress created a joint congressional committee to assess the causes of the Indian-white conflicts on the Great Plains. Senator James Doolittle from Wisconsin was appointed chairman of the committee that was authorized to investigate allegations of misconduct of Indian agents and other causes of western warfare. The report of the committee, popularly known as the Doolittle Report, was published in January 1867.

The Doolittle report enumerated several conclusions. First, the populations of all Indian tribes outside of the Indian Territory were rapidly decreasing due to disease, warfare, and white encroachment on their territory. Second, in a large majority of cases Indian wars were caused by the aggressions of “lawless white men.” Further, the report noted that the Indian wars, whether between Indian tribes or whites and Indians, were “very destructive, not only of the lives of the warriors engaged in it, but of the women and children also, often becoming a war of extermination.”¹ Third, a significant cause for the deteriorating state of the tribes was the loss of hunting grounds and the destruction of the game on which they subsisted.

Echoing a growing national sentiment, the committee determined that confining the Indian tribes to reservations was the only alternative to

extermination. The committee also took sides on the central issue in the controversy between peace and war factions and recommended that the Indian Bureau remain with the Interior Department. For one reason, the commissioners argued, it would cost the government far less for the Indian Bureau to administer a reservation system than to maintain a sufficient military force to keep the peace. For another, a system of checks and balances between the Interior and War Departments was already operating, and "neither are slow to point to the mistakes and abuses of the other."²

The Doolittle Report intensified the controversy between the military offensive forces and those of the peace initiative, and it was obvious that it was time to act on the Indian problem. The administration of Andrew Johnson clearly favored a peaceful solution, but support for military action was also strong. In this heated atmosphere, in February 1867 Johnson authorized a commission to investigate the attitude of the Northern Plains Indians and determine if they could be induced to settle on a reservation. The most important and explicit objective of their mission was to prevent a general Indian war in the aftermath of the Fetterman disaster, in which an entire command was defeated the previous December. Two of the commissioners published reports in June and July, both recommending finding a peaceful solution and designating a large area as exclusive Indian territory. A third commissioner dissented, and in his October report he advocated for a large military expedition to defeat the Sioux.

Congress responded to the mounting concerns about the Indian problem by calling a special session in summer 1867. Legislation was rushed through both houses in July providing for the creation of an Indian Peace Commission to make treaties with all the warring tribes on the Great Plains. It included the commissioner of Indian affairs, members of Congress, army officers, and civilians. The functions of the Peace Commission were to restore peace on the plains, to secure the unimpeded right of way for the transcontinental railroad that was being built, and to recommend a permanent Indian policy. The commission's first report was submitted in January 1868 by Nathaniel G. Taylor, chair of the commission and commissioner of Indian affairs. The report recommended reforming Indian policy and stressed the need for a Christian influence within the agencies and among the Indians.

Soon after the election of Ulysses S. Grant as president in 1868, two Quaker groups met with Grant and gained his support for Indian policy reform. By March 1869, when Grant took office, the foundation had been laid for a federal Indian program, known as the Peace Policy. The Peace Policy was the direct opposite of the extermination policy advocated by the army and frontier settlers. Its preliminary objective was to civilize the tribes through education and religion, with a final goal of full citizenship and cultural assimilation. Indians were to be settled on reservations and cared for by the federal government as wards of the nation until they became economically self-supporting and gained equal political rights.

During this period an event occurred that signaled a subtle but important change in federal Indian policy. Early in 1871 Congress ended the practice of negotiating treaties with Indian tribes as though they were independent nations, and thereafter negotiations between the United States and tribes were called agreements. Commissioners continued to visit tribes to negotiate the acquisition of land, and the existing treaties remained in effect. Ending the treaty system was one aspect of a growing effort at detribalization aimed at converting Indians from their communal tribal life to individualistic Americans.

Grant's Peace Policy faltered in the 1870s, in part because of widespread corruption in the Indian Bureau and resistance by Indians who did not want to give up their traditional nomadic hunting life and live on reservations. Also, Grant himself seemed to lose interest in the Indian question after Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ely S. Parker, the first Indian to hold the position, was forced to resign in 1871 amid allegations of corruption. Some in Grant's administration still favored the Peace Policy, while others advocated for military punishment of warring Indians. Despite a number of protests from Indian agents and reform groups, Grant allowed major military initiatives during his second term and refused to halt the blatant intrusion of miners into the Black Hills—Sioux treaty territory—after gold was discovered there in 1874.

By the time Grant left office, the Peace Policy was largely discredited. His successor, Rutherford B. Hayes (1877–81), publicly supported Indian policy reform but also recognized that armed force against aggressive Indians was sometimes necessary. Although he supported humanitarian principles, he believed that Indians were inferior to whites and stated that "it may be impossible to raise them fully up to the level of the white populations of the United States."³ Carl Schurz, the secretary of the interior in the Hayes administration, also supported humanitarian goals of Indian education, land in severalty, agriculture, and civil service reform.

Presidents Chester A. Arthur (1881–85), Grover Cleveland (1885–89), and Benjamin Harrison (1889–93) continued the trend of focusing on the humane treatment of Indians. During their administrations the objectives of federal Indian policy remained the same. The government still supported reducing the territory of the tribes to make more land available to whites and converting Indians into farmers and stock raisers who could be assimilated into the general population. Yet at the same time they advocated for "civilization and citizenship," the presidents in this period endorsed crushing Indian resistance. Late nineteenth-century presidents and key administrative officials agreed in principle with humanitarian and Indian rights reforms, but they had little understanding of tribal culture or traditions, which compromised the implementation of reforms. Thus any sympathetic efforts had little chance of success when most Americans encouraged the army to aggressively quell any Indian violence that threatened to stop white expansion.

At the same time federal officials were grappling with the Indian question in the years following the Civil War, critics of the government organized for the first time into national reform organizations. The peace commissioners' reports and the success of the antislavery movement provided impetus for the Indian rights movement. Indeed, many of these reformers were veterans of the abolition campaign. In 1869 Congress created the Board of Indian Commissioners, nonpolitical and independent of the Interior Department, composed of prominent religious people.

Popular fiction writer Helen Hunt Jackson responded to the plight of the Ponca Indians attempting to return to their homelands after their removal. Her book *A Century of Dishonor* (1881) condemned government cruelty and called for Indian citizenship. The book helped publicize the Indian rights cause and also brought a satisfactory solution for the Poncas. The Ponca case, the Nez Perce War in 1877, and the Meeker Massacre among the Ute in 1879 stimulated renewed public activism, resulting in a second major Indian rights movement in the 1880s. The new group of reformers focusing on the Indian problem differed from their predecessors in that they put less emphasis on the spiritual and more on the material and social progress of the Indians. They believed the way to civilize Indians was through schools, individual ownership of land, and the rights of citizenship.

Guided by these precepts, several influential organizations were formed. In 1882 the Indian Rights Association was founded to conduct independent investigations of conditions among the tribes and support a Washington lobbyist. In 1883 the Lake Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian began meeting at a resort in New York. The conference was chaired by a Quaker member of the Board of Indian Commissioners and brought together all the major leaders of the reform movement. Annual conferences were held at Lake Mohonk until 1917, which exerted a powerful influence on both official government policy and the private attitudes of many Americans.

The Lake Mohonk conferences served as a forum to discuss ways to improve the conditions of Indians, including the development of crafts and industry, improvement of education, control of liquor sales, and reform of the Indian Bureau. One of the most important programs supported by the conferences was a plan for allotment in severalty, or the abolition of the reservations and the distribution of tribal lands to individual Indians. Senator Henry L. Dawes, one of the many influential public officials who attended the conferences, introduced legislation in Congress to implement the severalty concept.

In 1887 Congress passed the General Allotment Act. Generally known as the Dawes Act, it included provisions for Indian citizenship, the allocation of reservation lands to individual tribal members, and the sale of surplus lands to settlers. However well-intentioned the motives of the activists were, their reforms often harmed the Indians. The severalty principle was

typical of unintended consequences of the good intentions of the activists. Much of the allotted land quickly found its way into the hands of white speculators, while Indians were inadequately compensated. The Dawes Act did not produce the result it was designed to achieve: the “civilizing” and ultimate assimilation of the Indians. Instead, it led to misuse and exploitation by unscrupulous whites. In the end, the Dawes Act failed the Indians, but it clearly benefited the civilians who gained land.

THE INDIAN WARS, 1865–90

“The Indian wars” is the general name for all of the battles, skirmishes, and campaigns between the United States Army and the western Indian tribes that occurred during the period following the end of the Civil War until the end of the western frontier in 1890. The Indian wars can be divided into three periods. In 1865–69 the conflicts centered on the Great Plains, in 1870–78 they occurred over a broad area from Nebraska to California and Arizona to Montana, and in 1879–90 they contracted to the Southwest, Colorado, and South Dakota.

Events in the 25 years before 1865 set the stage for the Indian wars over the next 25 years. Before 1865, conflicts with Indians occurred along the emigrant trails or the fringes of newly settled areas in the Far West. The most common pattern of army warfare against the Indians in this period is known as the incident-reprisal sequence. A classic example is the Grattan incident in August 1854, in which an entire army detachment was annihilated while attempting to reclaim a cow that strayed from an emigrant train. A sizable punitive expedition the following year culminated in the total destruction of a Sioux village. The swift repression in the aftermath of the Minnesota Sioux Uprising in 1862, Colonel John M. Chivington’s vengeful attack on the Cheyennes at Sand Creek in 1864, and the reprisal campaigns in western Kansas in the late 1860s all followed this pattern of immediate retaliatory response to acts of aggression.

At the end of the Civil War, it was apparent that reactive punitive campaigns were not the answer to defeating Indian resistance to western expansion. A broad, concerted effort was needed. On the surface it appeared that an effective military strategy was possible, with a massive army and war production capacity in place. In reality, as soon as the Civil War ended, the war machine soon disappeared, and a much diminished army was authorized by Congress in July 1866. The post-Civil War regular army was a peacetime army with the primary task of coping with Indians, but much of its force was drained off to handle Reconstruction and other problems. The challenges facing the army in the West were compounded by a totally different kind of warfare than in the Civil War. Few army officers understood the nature of Indian warfare, immense logistical problems hampered large-scale actions, and the reprisal campaigns often increased the danger to the overland routes they were meant to make safe.

Precipitating events along overland trails in 1864 led directly to the start of the Indian wars in 1865. One cause was the opening of the Bozeman Trail as a shortcut to the Montana goldfields. The Bozeman Trail had the potential to become a major link between the main overland route on the Platte River and the developing settlements in Montana Territory, but it went through the Powder River Basin in Wyoming that was occupied and contested by Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Crow tribes. To the Indians the trail was an invasion route as thousands of Americans poured through hunting grounds guaranteed to them by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851.

The 1864 travel season on the overland trails in Nebraska, Colorado, and Wyoming was a dangerous year. Indian conflict began with two significant Indian attacks in July. The first was on the newly opened Bozeman Trail to Montana. The Townsend train, the third wagon train to take the Bozeman Trail, was attacked by a large party of Northern Cheyennes and some Sioux on the Powder River on July 7. The train was forced to corral and in a siege that lasted for six hours, four men were killed. The Indians were driven off by the superior firepower and defensive position of the men in the train, and the next day the Townsend train continued on to Montana without further mishap.

A few days later, on the main overland road, an Indian attack occurred on July 12 against a small, isolated train. The Kelly-Larimer train was attacked on the south side of the North Platte River at the Little Boxelder Crossing by Northern Sioux from the upper Missouri River region. In the sudden, vicious attack four men were killed, two were wounded, and two women and two children were taken captive. One of the children escaped but was killed the next day, one of the women and her son escaped to safety, but Fanny Kelly was swiftly taken by her captors northwestward through the Black Hills to the Dakota badlands beyond.

Fanny remained captive with the Sioux for five months. She was in the large Indian village that General Alfred Sully attacked in August, and in September she was with the smaller band of Indians that attacked James L. Fisk's emigrant train on the northern route to Montana. Fisk tried to ransom her during truce talks, but the Indians refused, thinking she would be worth more at the Missouri River forts. In December a small party of Blackfeet Sioux brought Fanny to Fort Sully, where the soldiers secured her release and returned her to her husband.

The attacks on the Townsend and Kelly-Larimer trains in July were a prelude to a general uprising in August. Angered by indiscriminate military attacks against them in the spring, a number of small Cheyenne, Sioux, and Arapaho war parties targeted the Platte road. The Platte road was not only the main emigrant and freight route across the plains, but it was also the route of the overland mail. By 1864 the road was heavily settled with stage stations and road ranches every few miles. The raids began in July when Indians killed two men at one ranch and five emigrants at another, and drove off stock. The raiding escalated in August. In

a three-day rampage numerous war parties attacked freight trains, emigrant trains, stage stations, and road ranches for 250 miles along the Platte and Little Blue Rivers. More than 50 people were killed, many stage stations and road ranches were burned, and a great amount of property was looted or destroyed. In two of these attacks women and children were captured.

Lucinda Eubank was captured August 7 by Southern Cheyennes in a raid on her ranch on the Little Blue River in eastern Nebraska. During the attack the Indians killed her husband, three other men, and two children. Lucinda was one of two women and three children taken captive. She and her infant son were taken to the Southern Cheyenne camp. Later the Cheyennes traded them to an Oglala Sioux man who took them north to the North Platte River region, where she was traded to another Oglala man. When soldiers went to arrest her Sioux captors in May 1865 for raiding near Fort Laramie, Lucinda and her son were found in their camp and were rescued. Both of her captors were hanged at the fort later that month.

Nancy Fletcher Morton was taken captive along with a young boy on August 8 on the Platte road in Nebraska when Northern Cheyennes attacked the freight train she was traveling in to Denver. The Indians killed her husband and the other ten men in the train. She was taken first to the Southern Cheyenne camp where Lucinda Eubank and the other captives from the Little Blue raids were held, and then she was taken north to the Powder River. In late November traders on the North Platte learned of her presence among the Northern Cheyennes and notified the commander at Fort Laramie. After several attempts the traders succeeded in ransoming Nancy in January 1865, and she was brought to Fort Laramie. Her captor was arrested and hanged at the fort in April.

The Indian attacks on wagon trains along the trails in 1864 typify what was popularized in the contemporary media as the emigrant's greatest fear. In the case of the Townsend train, it was a wagon train forced to corral and fight off circling Indian warriors who were shooting arrows and setting fire to the surrounding grass. The attacks on trains and outlying settlements in which women and children were captured were even more terrifying to a public that considered Indian captivity "a fate worse than death." Even though wagon train attacks and Indian captivities were rare in the Indian wars period, they persist as central themes in the mythology of the emigrant trails experience to this day.

The Indian raids along the Platte road in August 1864 had far-reaching consequences. As the raids intensified, all travel on the road ceased and many abandoned their ranches. The last stagecoach from the East arrived in Denver on August 15. Freighters attempted to get through in large, well-armed bodies, but by the middle of the month they also had to corral and wait until conditions improved. The mail for Denver had to be sent by ship via the Isthmus of Panama to San Francisco and then back to Denver

by stage. No supplies could be freighted to Denver, and local crops could not be harvested for fear of Indian attacks. As food and supplies became scarce, prices soared.

In late September Ben Holladay organized the rebuilding of stations and corrals along the stage line, and stages began running again on October 3. By then the route was fortified with soldiers at every station and an escort accompanied each stage. Freight trains also began moving again, but Indians continued raiding targets of opportunity along the road. Reaction to the continuing Indian raids culminated in an attack by a large militia force led by Colonel John Chivington on Black Kettle's Cheyenne village on Sand Creek in southeastern Colorado at dawn on November 29, 1864. Nearly 150 Indians were ruthlessly killed, setting off a firestorm of retaliation by Plains tribes that swept north to the Platte road the following year.

In the first period of the post-Civil War Indian wars, 1865–69, warfare centered on the Great Plains. Anticipating increased Indian conflicts along the emigrant trails during the upcoming travel season, the federal government closed the Bozeman Trail to emigrant traffic in spring 1865 and began planning a massive punitive campaign against the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos that was intended to settle the threat of Indian danger on the trail. That summer four columns of the Powder River Indian Expedition commanded by General Patrick E. Connor campaigned in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming. Connor's command traveled over the Bozeman Trail and attacked and destroyed a peaceful Arapaho village on the Tongue River, while two other columns engaged in fights with a massive force of Sioux and Cheyennes farther east along the Powder River.


Although the federal government closed the Bozeman Trail to emigrants, one large civilian train traveled it in 1865. At the same time Connor campaigned in the Powder River Basin, James A. Sawyers of Sioux City, Iowa, led a government wagon-road expedition, accompanied by military escorts, over much of the Bozeman Trail. The Sawyers expedition was funded by Congress to survey a wagon road from Niobrara, Iowa, to Virginia City, Montana, on the route of the Bozeman Trail. While they were crossing the Tongue River, the train was attacked by Arapaho Indians who were angry that Connor had destroyed their village a few days earlier. Two men were killed in the engagement. The train corralled on the north bank of the Tongue for several days, waiting for reinforcements from Connor's command, which was camped many miles downstream. An escort eventually arrived, and the Sawyers train continued on the Bozeman Trail to the Gallatin Valley.

Connor's campaign initiated the Indian wars on the Northern Plains. The expedition broke up in September with little to show for the great amount of effort, manpower, and money expended on the disastrous campaign. Instead of making the Bozeman Trail safer for future travelers,

Connor's offensive incensed the tribes and guaranteed increased conflict over the trail. Even more troubling for the Indians was the establishment of Fort Reno on the Powder River. The permanent military presence in the heart of their lands reinforced their resolve to fight the invasion of Americans on the Bozeman Trail.

Despite the Indian campaign to the north, traffic continued on the main overland trail in summer 1865, although at only half the level of the previous year. The decrease in travelers resulted from the end of the Civil War, compounded by Indian raids on travelers and stage stations along the North and South Platte Rivers. Sioux and Cheyennes raided along the North Platte River after three Indians were hanged at Fort Laramie for their part in the captivities of Nancy Fletcher Morton and Lucinda Eubank, while Cheyennes raided along the South Platte in revenge for John Chivington's merciless militia attack on Black Kettle's peaceful Southern Cheyenne village on Sand Creek the previous November.

Overland travel dramatically increased in summer 1866, the first great postwar migration. An estimated 25,000 emigrants and freighters surged



Trans-Mississippi Indian Conflicts 1854–90.

over the western overland trails. Equally important, the first transcontinental railroad was being built westward from the Missouri River and eastward from California. In the spring General William T. Sherman prepared a comprehensive plan to protect the western overland routes. Weighing the numerous demands for services against the army's limited resources, he selected four routes to protect and closed all others. The four he chose to keep open were the Platte road, the Smoky Hill road, the northern route, and the Bozeman Trail. In February, General John Pope, whose department included these trails, issued a general order defining the rules for overland travel and directed all post commanders in the region to enforce them. By this means the army planned to control all civilian travel in the area of Indian conflicts.

In June Colonel Henry B. Carrington and the Eighteenth Infantry marched north on the Bozeman Trail from Fort Laramie with orders to establish three posts along the trail for the protection of emigrants. Carrington reinforced Fort Reno and established Fort Phil Kearny at Piney Creek in mid-July and Fort C. F. Smith at the Bighorn River in early August. Early Bozeman Trail travelers in 1866 experienced no Indian problems, but an attack on July 17, followed by seven days of raids along the trail from the North Platte to the Bighorn River, signaled the start of Red Cloud's War. Thereafter, military authorities required all trains to combine into huge trains for safety, and the Indians mainly raided military herds and trains.

The establishment of Fort Phil Kearny and Fort C. F. Smith began the transition of the Bozeman Trail from an emigrant to a military road, and the process was effectively completed by the end of the 1866 travel season. While military use of segments of the trail continued, after 1866 the Bozeman Trail was never again used in its entirety as an emigrant trail. The fate of the trail was sealed on the morning of December 21 when Sioux and Cheyenne warriors ambushed and wiped out a force of 80 men, including two civilian post employees, under Captain William J. Fetterman. It was the worst defeat of U.S. Army troops in the West up to that time.

In 1867–68 the Bozeman Trail was strictly a military road between the forts. Only one small emigrant train is known to have traveled the trail in 1867, none in 1868. The only civilian travelers during this period were a few tradesmen from Bozeman and some Montana Militia members who went east to Fort C. F. Smith. The Bozeman Trail was marked by two major fights near Forts Phil Kearny and C. F. Smith in summer 1867 and many minor engagements and sporadic raids as Red Cloud's War continued against the forts along the trail.

From the government's point of view, when the railroad was completed well past Cheyenne in spring 1868, the Bozeman Trail became obsolete. It was no longer being used as an emigrant road, nor were the soldiers needed to divert the Indians from the railroad construction to the south. The forts along the trail were abandoned during the summer, and by late

fall Sioux and Cheyenne leaders, including Red Cloud, signed the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, ending Red Cloud's War. The treaty stipulated a reservation in South Dakota, while the Powder River area would be unceded Indian territory set aside for those who did not want to live on the reservation.

Farther west, Northern Paiutes continued to raid unchecked in Oregon and Idaho as regular army troops replaced volunteers at the end of the Civil War. In 1866 General George Crook was assigned to command the regulars and combat the warring Paiutes. Crook's aggressive campaign of 1866–68 ranged across the plateau region of Oregon, Idaho, and Nevada, engaging the Paiutes in some 40 combat actions. The Paiute war leader was killed in one of the early fights, and finally tiring of the war, the new leader of the resistance surrendered to Crook 18 months later.

As Red Cloud's War on the Northern Plains was nearing an end, Plains Indian warfare shifted to the Central Plains, focusing on western Kansas. In the years after the Civil War, transportation routes and settlement advanced steadily westward across the state. The Smoky Hill Trail was the major route from Kansas City to Denver for emigrants, freighters, and the stage line, which now carried the overland mail. Construction of the Kansas Pacific Railroad along the route of the Smoky Hill Trail began in 1863 and was completed to Salina, in the center of the state, in 1867. Homesteaders settled along the major river valleys, establishing small, scattered communities. In the face of increasing Indian unrest in western Kansas, Fort Hays and Fort Wallace were built in 1865 to protect military roads and the Smoky Hill Trail, guard the overland mails, defend railroad construction crews, and protect settlers.

Indian attacks on stagecoaches and stations in western Kansas occurred immediately after the stage line to Denver began operations in September 1865. From October through December, Indians killed several stage station employees, burned station buildings, stole animals, and attacked stagecoaches. Theodore Davis, artist for *Harper's Weekly*, traveled by stagecoach to Denver in November and publicized the attacks and casualties he saw in articles and illustrations. Indian danger along the Smoky Hill Trail subsided temporarily but erupted again in October 1866, when two station employees were killed and the station buildings were burned. The following spring Indians burned another station and killed three employees.

In April 1867 General Winfield Scott Hancock led a large column of troops across Kansas in response to the Indian raids against travelers and stage stations on the Smoky Hill route. As the soldiers approached a Cheyenne and Sioux village, the alarmed Indians fled. Hancock ordered the village burned, destroying 250 lodges and immense quantities of property. Intended to intimidate the Indians, his campaign served more to enrage them. In retaliation Cheyenne and Sioux warriors raided mail stations, stagecoaches, wagon trains, and railroad workers along the Platte, Smoky Hill, and Arkansas Rivers.

Attacks along the Smoky Hill peaked in June. Every stage station was attacked, most more than once. A stagecoach was attacked en route and all passengers and army guards were killed. Service was suspended for a time when stage drivers refused take coaches on the route. That month an army lieutenant reported that nearly all the stations 150 miles east and west of Fort Wallace had been destroyed, many employees killed, and that the army was running the stagecoaches with mules. The attacks continued into August, and one war party killed seven railroad construction workers.

All summer, as Indians raided along the travel routes, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer and the Seventh Cavalry campaigned vigorously but inconclusively throughout Kansas and southern Nebraska. In October 1867 at Medicine Lodge Creek in Kansas, peace commissioners negotiated treaties with the Cheyennes, Arapahos, Kiowas, and Comanches, who all agreed to withdraw from Kansas and settle on reservations in Indian Territory. But the truce was precarious, and conflict erupted again in May 1868. Early in the month Indians attacked a railroad construction crew. The men escaped, and the warriors burned three railroad cars carrying building materials and destroyed telegraph lines. In spite of the attacks, railroad construction continued and the Kansas Pacific was completed nearly to the Colorado border that summer.

In a two-day raid in August, Cheyennes looted and burned cabins, ran off stock, raped several women, and killed 15 men in the Saline and Solomon Valleys in northwestern Kansas. In one of the attacks, Cheyenne raiders captured Sarah White at her family's ranch. They killed her father, but her mother and sisters escaped by hiding in the underbrush along the creek. In a second wave of attacks in October, Anna Morgan was taken captive and her husband severely wounded at their homestead.

While many settlers left the area during the raids, most returned to their claims. As a result of the Indian raids and crop failures many settlers in the region were destitute by fall, and people in the eastern part of the state quickly raised funds to support them through the winter. The settlers were also aided by the army's prompt response. In addition to sending more troops and building blockhouses in the Saline and Solomon region, General Sherman ordered General Philip H. Sheridan, the new commander in Kansas, to punish the Indian raiders. Sheridan organized a winter campaign in which army columns would move into the Indian Territory from Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico to confront all Indians who were not on their newly assigned reservations.

In November 1868 Custer's cavalry attacked and destroyed a Cheyenne village on the Washita River in Indian Territory. Among the dead was peace chief Black Kettle. A month later Sheridan and Custer found the bodies of captives Clara Blinn and her son in an abandoned Kiowa village on the Washita. They had been taken a month earlier in Colorado on the Santa Fe Trail when Indians attacked their wagon train. On Christmas

Day, Major Andrew Evans attacked and destroyed a Comanche village on Soldier Springs along the Red River. In March 1869 Custer rescued captives Sarah White and Anna Morgan, taken in the Kansas raids, when his command came upon a large Cheyenne village. In a council with the Indian leaders, Custer seized three of them and held them hostage until the captives were released.

By summer 1869 most of the Indians were on their reservations, except for the militant Cheyenne Dog Soldiers. Parties of Dog Soldiers had continued to raid settlers and railroad crews all spring. In May they raided settlements near Salina, killing several men and children and taking two women and a child captive. While Susanna Alerdice's husband went to Salina for supplies, she and her four children walked to a neighbor's to visit, where the group was attacked. The others escaped on horseback or by hiding, but Susanna and the children were caught. Two of the boys were killed, the third was wounded, and Susanna and her infant daughter were taken captive—although the baby was killed soon after. Nearby on the same day Indians attacked another homestead where settlers had gathered. Maria Weichell was taken captive, and her husband and four other people were killed.

In July Major Eugene A. Carr's Fifth Cavalry attacked a Dog Soldier camp at Summit Springs, Colorado, killing the renowned war leader Tall Bull. The two women taken in the May raids were in the camp during the attack. Susanna Alerdice was killed by her captors, while Maria Weichell was severely wounded but survived. Carr's victory at Summit Springs ended the Kansas Indian wars. Perhaps even more important in ending Indian resistance in western Kansas and eastern Colorado was the completion of the Kansas Pacific Railroad to Denver in August 1870. As soon as the railroad was completed the stage line ceased operations, greater numbers of settlers moved into western Kansas, and towns developed.

During the second period of the Indian wars, 1870–78, the nature of the conflicts changed and the areas of warfare spread more widely across the West. Most of the conflicts in the first period had centered on overland travel routes or western settlements as white population steadily moved west over the complex system of overland routes. The emigrant trails era ended with the completion of the first transcontinental railroad in May 1869, and western settlement occurred at a more rapid pace. In the second period of warfare, beginning in 1870, virtually every major conflict involved forcing Indians onto newly created reservations or making them go back to reservations from which they had fled. In addition, much of the warfare until the Indian wars ended occurred in unsettled or sparsely settled areas.

The second period of the Indian wars began with a conflict in Montana, where the growing white population caused tensions with the Blackfeet and Piegiens. In January 1870 troops of the Second Cavalry under Captain Eugene Baker massacred a camp of Piegiens on the Marias River, allegedly

in retaliation for the killing of a popular rancher. The Marias Massacre prompted a brief outcry in Congress and the eastern press, but military authorities maintained that the attack was necessary to preserve peace in the area.

The Apache Indians in Arizona and New Mexico were among the army's toughest opponents in the Indian wars. The Apaches excelled in guerrilla warfare, and U.S. military operations were hampered by the formidable terrain and great distances in the region. In the post-Civil War years, bands of Apaches and Yavapais raided farming settlements along the Rio Grande and in the mountains of New Mexico, travelers on overland roads across the region from Texas to Arizona, settlements south of Tucson and into Mexico, and mining camps north of the Gila River.

The raids resulted in civilians killed, loss of property, and general insecurity among the population, who viewed the military as ineffective. In retaliation for the incessant raiding, in April 1871 some civilians took matters into their own hands. A group of men from Tucson organized a "committee of safety" and attacked a peaceful Apache camp, killing more than a hundred Indians, mostly women and children, and taking 28 children captive. The attack horrified the nation, but Arizona citizens had the opposite reaction. When the perpetrators were tried, they were all acquitted.

To combat the raiding Western Apache and Yavapais and restore stability to region, General George Crook led the Tonto Basin Campaign in central Arizona. During the campaign in winter 1872–73, relentless pursuit by Crook's highly mobile forces wore down their opponents, and after 20 engagements during which some 200 tribesmen were killed, the Indians surrendered. Crook's campaign is considered one of the most brilliant and successful in the Indian wars. For the next few years Arizona was free of Apache raids against its citizens.

The Modoc War, 1872–73, also involved reservation issues. In 1864 the Modocs had agreed to leave their homelands on the Oregon-California border and live on a reservation with other tribes in Oregon. The Modocs did not get along with the Klamaths on the reservation and returned without permission to their home. When the army attempted to force them back to the reservation, fighting broke out and the Indians retreated into a natural rock fortress in the lava beds south of Tule Lake, California. The Modocs held their position for six months, during which time four engagements occurred in which army troops incurred heavier losses than the Indians. Peace commission efforts made little progress and ended when two of the commissioners were killed while meeting with the Indians. The Modocs finally surrendered and four of their leaders, including Captain Jack, were hanged.

On the Southern Plains, many Kiowas, Comanches, and Cheyennes resisted giving up their traditional way of life, and many of those living on the new reservations in Indian Territory continued raiding. In May 1871 a hundred reservation Kiowas raided into Texas, killing some teamsters with

a government freight train. General William T. Sherman was visiting Fort Sill at the time and had the responsible leaders arrested. But the army, hampered by the Peace Policy of the Grant administration, was unable to stop the raiding. In spring and early summer 1874, war parties began striking at the hunters who were slaughtering bison for their hides. In June several hundred Comanches and Cheyennes attacked a camp of bison-hunters at Adobe Walls in the Texas Panhandle. The hunters had high-powered rifles and repulsed the Indians, inflicting serious casualties.

In July General Philip H. Sheridan organized a multicolumn campaign to end the raiding in northwestern Texas. From August until the following spring, separate commands ranged through the Llano Estacado (the Staked Plains). During the conflict known as the Red River War, army troops engaged their opponents in more than two dozen fights and kept them constantly on the move. One of the most vicious attacks during this period occurred on the Smoky Hill Trail in Kansas. In September a party of Cheyennes attacked John German, his wife, and seven children who were traveling to Colorado. The parents, a son, and a daughter were killed in the attack, and five daughters were captured.

The Indians soon shot one of the girls and then took the other four south toward the Indian Territory. On the way two of the girls were abandoned and wandered for several weeks until they were recaptured. In November an army detachment discovered a Cheyenne village in the Texas Panhandle. The Indians fled as they approached, and the soldiers found the two youngest German sisters in the abandoned village. The Indians surrendered in February, and the remaining two German sisters were returned. By spring 1875 the last of the fugitives had surrendered. At the end of the conflict, the Southern Plains tribes were settled unhappily on their reservations and never again challenged the army.

On the Northern Plains, many Sioux, including Red Cloud, had settled on the Great Sioux Reservation in Dakota Territory created by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. Those who had not gone to the reservation were living in the unceded territory in the Powder River country as permitted by the treaty. Prominent leaders of these hunting bands included Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, American Horse, and Man Afraid of His Horse. During the years after the treaty, both the government and the Indians committed treaty violations. The hunting bands living off the reservation raided and killed whites far beyond the boundaries of the unceded territory. They went on horse-stealing raids into the settled Gallatin Valley of Montana to the west and raided settlers and travelers along the Union Pacific Railroad in Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado to the south. For its part, the government failed to provide the specified amounts of food and clothing to the reservation Indians.

The crux of the situation in the early 1870s was that the unceded territory was the last unsettled region in the West. The main factor leading to inevitable warfare was encroaching American expansion as those

interested in its potential focused on this attractive region from all sides. In 1873 the Northern Pacific Railroad survey of the Yellowstone Valley brought a large force of 1,500 soldiers and 400 civilians into the heart of the unceded territory for three months. Realizing the threat a railroad was to their way of life, the Sioux engaged the escort troops under Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer in two ferocious fights.

In spring 1874 an expedition of 147 men from Bozeman went down the Yellowstone Valley to prospect for gold and explore a wagon road route. Named the Yellowstone Wagon Road and Prospecting Expedition, the men hoped to open transportation routes to Montana and establish a town on the Yellowstone in the heart of the Indian country. Anticipating trouble, the men were well armed and had two pieces of artillery with them. The expedition traveled through the region for nearly three months. They had three stiff fights and one skirmish with Sioux. One man was killed, another was severely wounded, and a few sustained minor wounds. On the return trip the expedition began breaking up and the men straggled back to Bozeman. The expedition failed to accomplish any of its goals. They found no wagon road or gold, and they didn't establish a town. Yet the expedition shows what lengths the settlers would go to move into Indian territory.

In summer 1874 Custer came back with a military expedition to explore the Black Hills, which were part of the Great Sioux Reservation. Custer discovered gold, and the army was powerless to stop the immediate rush of miners into the region. Beginning in October hundreds of miners went into the Black Hills. Army troops were sent in to remove them but were unable to keep up the invasion. In summer 1875 a geological expedition led by Walter P. Jenney was sent to investigate the amount of gold in the hills, and his report confirmed Custer's assessment. By then thousands of miners were in the Black Hills, and in the fall the army stopped trying to evict them.

An estimated 15,000 gold seekers were in the Black Hills by winter. Stage and freight lines opened from several points and substantial mining settlements developed in the hills. The Sioux reacted violently to the invasion and attacked many miners. Contemporary newspapers are filled with reports of Indian raids. Although the total number of casualties is not known, it was considerable. The Indian conflicts did not stem the gold rush, and miners continued to go into the widely advertised region.

The government tried to solve the problem of a gold rush on the reservation by purchasing the Black Hills from the Sioux. After negotiations with the reservation Sioux for the purchase failed in fall 1875, government officials tried another approach. Measures were initiated that were intended to end the raids of the hunting bands and at the same time force them onto the reservation so as to diminish their power to obstruct a Black Hills settlement. In November the Indian Bureau ordered the hunting bands to leave the unceded territory and report to their agencies by January 31, 1876.

Runners carried the government's order to the winter camps, and not unexpectedly, they failed to comply. General Sheridan immediately began

organizing a campaign of converging columns, similar to the successful strategy of the Red River War. General Crook was to enter the Powder River area from the south, General Alfred H. Terry from the east, and Colonel John Gibbon from the west. The planned winter campaign was delayed until summer, and by then the Sioux and Cheyenne coalition had gathered on the Little Bighorn River in Montana, in an immense village that included 3,000 fighting men.

On June 17 a large warrior force turned back Crook at the Battle of the Rosebud, forcing him to retreat to a summer camp. On June 25 an arm of Terry's column, the Seventh Cavalry under Custer, attacked the village. In the now legendary Battle of the Little Bighorn, the Indians killed Custer and his entire command, about 225 troopers, and inflicted heavy losses on the balance of the regiment in a siege that ended the next day when the columns under Terry and Gibbons reached them.

The Indian victory ensured swift vengeance. Terry and Crook, heavily reinforced, campaigned into the fall, but by then the Indians had scattered. The campaign ended in a fight at Slim Buttes, north of the Black Hills, in September. The winter campaign of 1876–77 was more successful. Military pressure, combined with peace initiatives, induced bands to surrender or go back to the reservation. The surrender of Crazy Horse at Camp Robinson, Nebraska, in May ended the Great Sioux War. The one group still out was led by Sitting Bull. He and his people went into Canada and stayed there until he and the last of his followers surrendered in 1881.

Like the Modoc War, the Nez Perce War of 1877 was caused by attempts to force Indians to go to a reservation where they did not want to live. Some bands of Nez Percés had not signed the treaties that established the Nez Perce Reservation in Idaho. These nontreaty Indians wanted to live in their traditional homelands in Idaho and eastern Oregon. Threatened with military force if their people did not go to the reservation, in May 1877 the nontreaty leaders, including Chief Joseph, consented to go. En route some of the young warriors killed 19 white settlers. A cavalry detachment intercepted and attacked the Nez Percés in White Bird Canyon. The Indians repulsed the attackers, inflicting heavy casualties on them, and all-out war was ignited.

General O. O. Howard took command of the campaign. He ordered reinforcements and launched a pursuit of the Nez Perce. At the same time he sent a detachment to bring in the village of Looking Glass, another nontreaty band. A force of civilian volunteers accompanied the troopers. When the civilians attacked the village without waiting for orders, the Indians fled. By early July the nontreaty bands had coalesced, numbering about 800 people, with about 300 warriors. The Nez Percés moved up the Lolo Trail into Montana, where they were attacked on the Big Hole River. The Indians fought hard and defended their position, then continued their attempt to reach Canada and safety.

They crossed through Yellowstone National Park, where they captured two prospectors and nine tourists. The hostages eventually escaped or

were released. The Indians continued pushing north, alternately eluding army pursuers and fighting off attackers. Forty miles south of the Canadian border the Nez Perces stopped to rest. Here they were attacked, and the battle turned into a siege that lasted nearly five weeks. On October 5 Chief Joseph and about 400 people surrendered. The rest of the Nez Perces escaped to Canada.

Troubled by the Nez Perce War and an accumulation of grievances, the Bannocks living near the Fort Hall agency in southeastern Idaho revolted in spring 1878. The precipitating event was the destruction of fields of camas—camas roots were a staple of their diet—by settlers' livestock. The fleeing Bannocks were joined by Northern Paiutes. General Howard pursued the Indians into Oregon. Defeated in two engagements, the Indians scattered in small bands. Howard's troops pressed them until by the end of the summer, most of the Paiutes had returned to their reservations, and the Bannock fugitives had been apprehended.

The third and final period of the Indian wars, 1879–90, began in Colorado. The Utes lived on a large reservation in the western part of the state. Silver strikes during the 1870s brought many miners into their area, and the Utes were persuaded to sell large tracts of their land to accommodate the increasing population. The Utes resented the steady reduction of their hunting territory and the incoming settlers wanted ever more of the Indians' land. In 1878 Nathan C. Meeker was appointed agent at White River. Meeker turned out to be a poor choice for the agency.

Tensions between the whites and Utes were already high over land issues, and Meeker's efforts to make the nomadic Utes into farmers further incensed them. Their resistance to his methods prompted Meeker to call for military support in September 1879, which triggered a series of events that culminated in what is known as the Meeker Massacre. During an attack on the agency, Ute Indians killed Meeker and nine agency employees and took two women and three children at the agency captive. The army sent a large force into the area, but the outbreak was settled by negotiation and the captives were released three weeks later. As a result of the raid, the Utes were relocated on a reservation in Utah in 1881, freeing the land for white settlement.

By 1880 all western Indians were confined to reservations except the Apaches. In Arizona the Apaches had been sent to a number of small reservations after their defeat in General Crook's Tonto Basin Campaign, 1872–73. When Crook was reassigned to the Northern Plains in 1875, the Indian Bureau decided to close the numerous reservations in order to concentrate all Apaches west of the Rio Grande on a single reservation, the San Carlos Reservation on the Gila River. It was a particularly unpleasant place, and the Indian wars in Arizona in the next decade grew out of the refusal of two powerful Apache leaders, Victorio and Geronimo, to settle on the San Carlos Reservation.

When the Chiricahua Apache reservation was closed in 1876, about half of the Chiricahuas went to San Carlos, but the rest went to New Mexico or

into the mountains in Mexico. From their hideouts they raided and murdered on both sides of the border, attacking isolated travelers and outlying settlements. One of the principal leaders of the renegade group was Geronimo. In April 1877 Geronimo and a number of his followers were captured and taken to San Carlos.

From 1877 to 1879 Victorio, a Mimbres Apache leader, moved around Arizona and New Mexico, trying to find a satisfactory place to live on and off reservations. Fearing he was about to be arrested, in September 1879 Victorio and a war party attacked and killed a detachment of cavalrymen, opening the Victorio War. Victorio and his warriors, with army troops in pursuit, raided and murdered in New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico, killing more than 200 people. He was finally killed by Mexican forces in October 1880.

Following a violent uprising at San Carlos Reservation, Geronimo and other Chiricahuas fled to Mexico in September 1881. In April 1882 a raiding party from this group under Geronimo and others killed the police chief at San Carlos and forced Loco and several hundred Indians to return to Mexico with them. In raids through Arizona to the border, they killed as many as 50 white settlers. In July General Crook was reassigned to Arizona to control the reservation Indians, defeat the renegade Apaches operating out of Mexico, and protect the lives and property of the civilians in the area.

In March 1883 a small band of renegades under Chatto raided in southern New Mexico and Arizona for six days, looting and burning a number of ranches, killing 25 people, and capturing a young boy. In May Crook led an expedition into the Sierra Madre. In a three-week campaign, he forced the Indians to surrender. After a week of tense negotiations, he persuaded Geronimo and other Chiricahua leaders to return to San Carlos Reservation.

Dismal conditions at San Carlos led to another outbreak in May 1885. Crook again sent troops into Mexico, and after a grueling campaign Geronimo surrendered in March 1886. En route to Fort Bowie the Chiricahuas escaped back to the mountains in Mexico. In a disagreement with General Sheridan, now commanding the army, Crook asked to be replaced. His successor, General Nelson A. Miles, sent another command that pursued the Apaches for four months through the rugged terrain in Mexico. Geronimo was finally persuaded to give up, and he formally surrendered to Miles at Skeleton Canyon, Arizona, in September 1886. The surrender of Geronimo and his few remaining followers marked the end of Indian resistance to white encroachment in the West.

In the space of 25 years, post-Civil War westward expansion had overwhelmed all the western tribes, wrenched many from their homelands and traditional ways of life, and segregated them. In the midst of this cultural crisis, the Ghost Dance, a messianic movement that promised the restoration of the old way of life and the disappearance of all whites, swept across the reservations in 1889–90. The intensity and defiance of the Ghost Dancers alarmed many whites, and the government sent troops to some of the reservations to protect agency personnel.



The army often employed Indian scouts during the course of the western Indian wars. (Library of Congress)

On the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, relations were particularly tense. After a fateful series of misunderstandings and controversial events, Big Foot's band of Miniconjou Sioux with some Hunkpapas were surrounded by army troops on Wounded Knee Creek on December 29, 1890. While attempting to disarm the Indians, tempers rose. In a scuffle a rifle went off, and suddenly a fight that neither side intended or expected erupted. In the thunderous gunfire more than 150 Indians, including women and children, were killed and 50 wounded. Soldier casualties were 25 killed, 39 wounded.

Wounded Knee was the last major armed conflict between Indians and whites in North America. The few scattered incidents that occurred later were civil disturbances, not warfare. What happened at Wounded Knee was not warfare between combatants but a slaughter. It was the tragic last act of a dominant society crushing resistance, real or perceived. Wounded Knee was a momentous turning point, marking the end not only of the Indian wars but also of the Plains Indian way of life.

CIVILIANS AND THE INDIAN WARS

Beyond those civilians who were directly in the path of warfare, such as travelers, settlers, or government agents, many others were affected by the Indian wars. In the West, the Indian wars affected services and infrastructure, security and communication, and even the livelihoods of those

Table 1.1
The Indian Wars, 1865–90

| Warfare | Location | Tribes Involved | Impact on Local Civilians |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1865–69 | | | |
| Indian War of 1865 | CO, NE, WY, MT | Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho | raids, killings |
| Red Cloud's War, 1866–68 | WY, MT | Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho | raids, killings |
| Paiute War, 1866–68 | OR, ID, NV, CA | Northern Paiute | raids, killings |
| Southern Plains War, 1867–69 | KS, OK, CO, TX | Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, Comanche | raids, killings, captivities |
| 1870–78 | | | |
| Marias Massacre, 1870 | MT | Piegan | rancher killed |
| Tonto Basin Campaign, 1872–73 | AZ | Western Apache, Yavapai | raids, killings |
| Modoc War, 1872–73 | CA | Modoc | raids, killings |
| Red River War, 1874–75 | TX | Comanche, Kiowa, Cheyenne, Arapaho | raids, killings, captivities |
| Great Sioux War, 1876–77 | MT, WY, SD, NE | Sioux | raids, killings |
| Nez Perce War, 1877 | ID, MT | Nez Perce | raids, killings |
| Bannock-Paiute War, 1878 | ID, OR, WY | Bannock, Paiute | raids, killings |
| 1879–90 | | | |
| White River Revolt, 1879 | CO | Ute | killings, captivities |
| Victorio War, 1879–80 | TX, NM | Mimbres Apache | raids, killings |
| Geronimo War, 1882–86 | AZ, NM | Chiricahua Apache | raids, killings |
| Wounded Knee, 189 | SD | Miniconjou and Hunkpapa Sioux | |

distant from areas of conflict. Aside from their effects, in a fundamental way the Indian wars were caused by attitudes in American society.

One of the primary attitudes that shaped westward expansion was the American belief that land ownership was a basic right. In return for the power invested in the federal government to control acquired territory, Americans expected the government to make the land available, to aid in increasing its value and usefulness, and to protect travelers and settlers in newly opened areas. The prevailing view that government's primary responsibility was to provide service to its citizens mandated government action to solve the Indian problem. For its part, the primary objective of the federal government in regards to Indian affairs was to ensure the advance of western settlement.

One of the most basic ways the Indian wars affected civilians in the West was security. The postwar army was responsible for protecting western emigrant routes, stages, telegraph lines, railroads, survey and exploration parties, and settlements. The amount of manpower and equipment it would take to fulfill this responsibility in the face of mounting Indian unrest concerned military officials. The problem was, as General William T. Sherman wrote in 1866, "We cannot afford perfect protection."⁴ The undermanned army did not have the adequate strength or deployment to provide protection to everyone's satisfaction. During the entire Indian wars period the army, while appearing to be offensive, was more often defensive and reactive to immediate demands. As a result, wherever warfare occurred the safety and mobility of civilians were affected.

The army's security function was most needed in outlying areas. When regular army troops were not forthcoming, westerners sometimes found the use of volunteers against Indians tempting. The reliance on volunteer militia forces had long been accepted in American military tradition. Many in the West felt that armed citizens, riding their own horses, could deal with Indians more effectively than the army, and a few army officers agreed. Most regular army officers disagreed and were skeptical of the effectiveness and abilities of militia forces.

In one case of perceived Indian threat, Western citizens took it upon themselves to organize their own defense. In spring 1867 rumors spread in the Gallatin Valley in Montana that the Sioux were amassing to attack the settlements in the summer. On March 25, John M. Bozeman sent a letter to Governor Thomas F. Meagher that was printed in the *Virginia City Montana Post* in April. Bozeman wrote that the people in the Gallatin Valley were "in imminent danger" and urged Montanans to organize volunteer companies to assist them.⁵ Meagher telegraphed General Ulysses S. Grant requesting permission to raise a force of 1,000 volunteers to be financed by the federal government. Without waiting for his reply, Meagher ordered recruitment of the volunteers to begin.

The situation in the Gallatin Valley became critical when Bozeman was killed on April 18 in the Yellowstone Valley, while he and a business

partner were on their way to Fort C. F. Smith on the Bozeman Trail. The news of his death alarmed the settlers in the Gallatin Valley, which was just over the mountains to the west of where he was killed. In the uproar that ensued, no one questioned the fact he was killed by marauding Blackfeet, not Sioux Indians. Meagher continued to raise a militia in spite of the fact that military officials informed him that the governor had no authority to enroll troops. After Meagher died on July 1 when he fell off a steamboat deck, his replacement reorganized and strengthened the Montana Volunteers to 32 officers and 480 men.

The volunteers built defenses in the Yellowstone Valley, but no full-scale Indian uprising occurred. In fact, the militiamen did not encounter any aggressive Sioux at all. The volunteers were mustered out in October, leaving the problem of payment for those who had served as well as for those who supplied the horses, equipment, and supplies. A claim of nearly one million dollars was submitted to Congress. After investigations revealed that many of the vouchers were highly inflated and some were even held by speculators, Congress finally paid half of the claim in 1873. In 1869 Montanans again tried to solve their problems by organizing a local force of volunteers, but merchants who were still trying to collect on the 1867 vouchers were uninterested in prosecuting another war at their own expense.

The Indian-fighting army provided much more than just security. As the active, visible presence of the federal government, the army was instrumental in the development of the infrastructure of the West. The completion of transcontinental railroads and branch lines by the 1880s was possible because the army made their construction and protection a priority. Soldiers manned telegraph stations and repaired the lines. The frontier military posts displayed American power in Indian-occupied areas, were bases for offensive campaigns, and provided services to surrounding areas.

Civilians in the West—chiefly post traders, contractors, and merchants—profited from commercial opportunities presented by the army's presence during the Indian wars. The frontier army depended on the food, clothing, equipment, forage, building materials, livestock, and other supplies furnished by the government. Most of this material had to be transported great distances by freighting contractors who carried not only government freight but also private freight. Until the railroads were built, all freight was transported by wagons. Though the railroads greatly diminished the cost of wagon transportation, material still had to be transported from the nearest stations to outlying forts. Steamboats were also used on the major rivers to transport freight to posts.

While a few property owners made large sums from the sale or lease of land for military reservations, a highly lucrative source of civilian income for a multitude of workers came from the construction and repairs of the numerous forts throughout the West. Construction projects were so

profitable that the bidding process was extremely competitive. Federal construction funds were a genuine boon to western communities. Most of the money went into the local economies at the site, but some was widely spread when materials had to be brought from distant places.

The establishment of a military post in an area created a market for fresh produce, grains, horses, mules, and cattle. Ranches and farms were started near posts as soon as it was safe to do so. In some isolated areas, the forts were the only market for the surrounding settlers, and at the same time the only reason for their existence was to protect those settlers. This was the case in the late 1860s for many small posts in Arizona. Most of the military operations in the area were carried out to protect the civilians who were only there because of the army post. But in most cases, the communities that formed around the forts grew into towns or cities as the areas became settled.

The army bidding system for products and services—essentially a government subsidy program—brought incomes to a large number of western civilians that would not have been available otherwise. The army's system of contracting for goods and services amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars over the Indian wars period. A few contracts were awarded to large firms, but for the most part contracts went to large numbers of small entrepreneurs, spreading the flow of money into the West over a wide range of businesses and trades. In addition to the contractors, the army paid civilian employees at forts, including clerks, scouts, teamsters, telegraph operators, saddlers, blacksmiths, sawmill workers, herders, mail carriers, cooks, and domestic servants—all the occupations found in a small town at the time.

With such vast sums of money at stake in the contracting system and civilian payrolls, it is not surprising that profiteering, fraud, and corruption sometimes occurred. At the local level, army contracts were inflated, contractors delivered inferior products, and kickbacks and graft occurred. Malfeasance even occurred at the highest levels of government. One of the scandals that rocked the Grant administration involved graft in army and Indian trader appointments. Despite ongoing investigations of corrupt government officials, army officers, and Indian agents during the period, such behavior was a perennial problem.

In addition to contracts and civilian salaries, soldiers' pay also found its way into the local economies. Sometimes civilians sold products directly to soldiers. Peddlers and farmers brought fruits and vegetables, canned goods, butter, eggs, and poultry to the posts. At one fort a woman cooked meals for the bachelor officers. Stores and shops thrived in the local communities that grew around the forts. Most prevalent, however, were the saloons and brothels that sprang up near virtually every military post. Known as hog ranches, they drained most of the soldiers' monthly payroll and caused endless problems for army officials and local civilians. Yet the benefits to local and regional economies outweighed the problems

resulting from the permanent presence of the army in the West during the Indian wars, and the western army played a significant economic role in American expansion.

The presence of the army in the West in the post-Civil War years proved to be important for civilians in another way. Because it was already there, was organized, and had the resources, the army became the means for federal relief projects in response to natural disasters. During winter 1872 heavy snows stopped the movement of freight and passenger trains through western Nebraska and Wyoming. Local military units aided stranded victims with food and coal supplies. A destructive infestation of locusts combined with a severe drought on the Great Plains in 1874–75 devastated the region. The army responded with a massive relief program for the settlers. By the time the year-long operation ended, the army had issued tons of surplus clothing and a million food rations to more than 29,000 civilians. The army also responded to prairie fires that often swept the Great Plains. In many cases soldiers rode out to warn settlers of approaching fires and then helped fight them.

The army in the West was thrust into another role by unforeseen circumstances that were to have lasting consequences for the entire country. Yellowstone National Park was established in 1872 as the world's first national park. Congress made no funds available for administering the park, allowing only for the appointment of a civilian superintendent. Over the next 14 years a succession of superintendents were unable to control the rampant poaching of wildlife, destruction of unique geologic features, and unscrupulous business operators in the park. In 1886 the army was sent in to occupy and manage the park, which it ably did for the next 30 years. As a consequence, both Yellowstone and the concept of national parks were saved for the American people.

During the Indian wars, the federal government had a system for handling civilian claims for "depredations," or the forceful theft or destruction of property. The depredations claims system was enacted by Congress in 1796 to compensate both Indians and whites for depredations committed against them by the other, through a complex process involving all departments of government. Originally intended to prevent retaliation and maintain peace in frontier areas, Indians rarely benefited and by the mid-nineteenth century the system had become a compensation program solely for Indian depredation claims. During the 1860s the Indian Bureau settled most of the claims, but fraud and corruption had become widespread in the system.

To stop the corruption, in July 1870 Congress reformed the system and required special legislative appropriations for all payments of depredation claims. Between 1871 and 1885 Congress passed nearly two dozen appropriations, most of which were less than \$15,000, although some were as high as \$60,000. A few very large claims were hidden in appropriations bills having no connection to depredation claims. Fanny Kelly, Indian captive in

1864, was one of the few claimants to receive compensation under the new procedure. In 1870 and 1872 Congress passed appropriations for her claim against the Sioux totaling \$15,000. Kelly's case was an exception in another significant way. Congress and the Indian Office generally refused to compensate for personal suffering and only awarded claims for property stolen or destroyed.

Improvements in management of the claims, investigations, and funding began in 1885, but the system continued to be complicated and time-consuming. In 1891 Congress enacted the transfer of all claims to the Justice Department, ending the Indian Bureau's involvement with the system. Over the next three years 10,841 were transferred to the Court of Claims. The court tried 7,000 of the pending cases until the depredation claim system ended in 1920. During this period the court awarded approximately \$5.5 million of an estimated \$43.5 million in claims to about half of the tried cases.

Sadly, most of the claims filed as a result of the Indian raids in Nebraska in 1864 were not paid. Lucinda Eubank and other victims of the raids on the Little Blue sought compensation for decades but received nothing. Their cases highlight the great weaknesses of the depredation claim system. The process of filing claims involved years of investigations, bureaucratic procedures, and lengthy legal battles. Often the decisions of the Indian Office and the court were arbitrary. Most important, the law did not allow compensation for personal pain and suffering nor for claims against Indians who were at war with the United States when the losses occurred.

A significant force in shaping public perceptions about the Indian wars was the mass distribution of print media. During the post-Civil War years journalistic enterprises grew in number, circulation, and influence, stimulated in part by the immense curiosity that people in the East had about life on the frontier. Forming a broad base for the mass media were the local, regional, and national newspapers. Magazines proliferated, ranging in price and audience from elite journals like the *Atlantic*, serious weeklies like *The Nation*, to popular and sensational magazines like *Harper's Weekly* and *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*. Lithographs, photographs, fine art, and books were also important means of informing the public at large during this time.

Many soldiers in the field wrote for civilian newspapers. Some wrote under their own names, a few served as paid correspondents, but most used pen names and submitted only occasional articles. Articles about army life were always popular, but the articles that interested readers most were those sent in from the large-scale army campaigns against Indians. Newspapers often had their own staff members accompany campaigns to report back from the field. Some officers welcomed having such "attached correspondents" cover their campaigns because it brought them national attention. Lieutenant Colonel George Custer was perhaps the most publicity-seeking officer in the West. In 1876, despite orders to the contrary, he insisted that

the *Bismarck Tribune* send correspondent Mark Kellogg to cover his anticipated victory against the Sioux and Cheyennes. Kellogg sent his last dispatch four days before he was killed along with Custer's command in the Battle of the Little Bighorn.

Four civilian war correspondents in particular stand out. Charles F. Lummis, John Finerty, Henry Morton Stanley, and DeBennville Randolph Keim covered three of the most famous Indian campaigns. Lummis captured national attention for his exciting reports on the Apache Wars written while accompanying General George Crook's command as a field correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times*. Lummis later gained literary recognition as a Southwestern author. Finerty accompanied Crook's column during the 1876 Yellowstone expedition against the Sioux and Cheyennes as correspondent for the *Chicago Times*. Finerty was exceptionally accurate and proved to be one of the best writers about military campaigning. Stanley covered General Winfield Scott Hancock's 1867 expedition against the Southern Plains tribes and the Medicine Lodge treaty council as reporter for the *Saint Louis Missouri-Democrat*. The ultimate adventurer, Stanley rocketed to international fame in 1871 when he found David Livingstone in Central Africa and uttered the memorable words, "Dr. Livingstone, I presume." Keim, a skillful reporter, covered Gen. Philip Sheridan's 1868 winter campaign against the Southern Cheyennes and their allies as correspondent for the *New York Herald*.

Newspapers were the main venue, but army writers and civilian war correspondents also wrote articles about the Indian wars for large-circulation magazines and books about their army experiences. Lieutenant Col. George Custer wrote a series of 20 installments about his service in Kansas and Indian Territory in the late 1860s that was published in *Galaxy Magazine*. The articles and their republication in a book in 1874 gained him wide public support. Captain John G. Bourke, Crook's aide-de-camp in the 1870s and 1880s, wrote widely read articles and books encompassing all of Crook's campaigns. Better known today as a painter and sculptor, Frederic Remington was an accomplished journalist and artist of the Indian wars. As a young civilian war correspondent, he delighted *Harper's Weekly* readers with his sketches and articles about the Geronimo campaign in 1886.

While officers and enlisted men were writing about military life, campaigns, and battles, many officers' wives wrote articles and books detailing women's lives on the frontier during the Indian wars. Their autobiographies portrayed a frontier society in which officer's wives, at the top of the military social order, associated only with the civilians they considered their own social equals. Elizabeth Custer was the most prolific writer among the officers' wives. Her books exalting the heroic image of her husband George Armstrong Custer and the glory of the frontier army became classics within this genre of military literature and a model for other wives who wished to publish their memoirs. The writings of the officers' wives

in the Indian wars period gave civilian readers a glimpse into a privileged world in an extraordinary time.

The military writer who rose above all the rest was Captain Charles King, who by the end of his distinguished career had served 70 years of active duty. His first book, an account of Crook's operations against the Sioux and Cheyennes, was published in 1880. Three years later he published a novel, the first of 61 books mostly dealing with the frontier army. All were extremely successful. In addition to novels, biographies, and short-story collections, he contributed 250 articles to the major magazines and a variety of newspapers. King's contributions to Western literature instilled and perpetuated the romantic image of the frontier army during the Indian wars.

Realistic images of the Indian wars were sought after in the mass media. Many photographers produced pictures for mass distribution or publication, although photographic technology and photojournalism were still in their early stages. Photographic methods in the 1870s and 1880s required coating and sensitizing the glass plates and complete stillness for a length of time prior to exposure. The glass-plate negatives produced by the wet-process were used to make thousands of prints that were sold to the public and to magazines, which used the photographs to make wood and steel engravings. Because of the rudimentary technology, images of battles or any moving subjects were not possible. And the only Indians available as subjects were those on reservations or at treaty councils.

One of the earliest photojournalists in the Indian wars was Ridgway Glover, a young photographer from Philadelphia, who accompanied military troops sent to garrison the Bozeman Trail in summer 1866. Glover had arranged to be a special correspondent for *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper* and the *Philadelphia Photographer*. En route he tried to set up his equipment to photograph a battle between soldiers and Sioux Indians but was ordered to put his camera away. A few days later he was killed, by the very Indians he had hoped to photograph, near Fort Phil Kearny when he went walking away from the fort alone. Sadly, Glover has the dubious honor of being the first news photographer killed on assignment.

Given the difficulty and danger of photographing Indians in the field, some photographers concentrated on making pictures of the army. Western commanders were generally willing to let photographers accompany military campaigns. In 1872–73 two photographers made photographs of the Modoc War. In 1874 photographers accompanied Custer's Black Hills expedition and sold photographs to the press and the general public. No photographs exist of Custer's 1876 campaign, but two years later a photographer visited the battle site and made some memorable images, including several of the skeletal remains piled at the scene. Hampered by bulky equipment and the complicated wet-plate process, photographers nonetheless produced an impressive array of images of the frontier West.



An army inspection of a Sioux Indian camp in 1882. (Library of Congress)

Through their images the public learned more about the prominent military and Indian figures in the Indian wars.

CONCLUSION

The ultimate relation between civilians and the Indian wars was the land. The Indian wars removed the nomadic tribes to reservations and opened the West to settlement. The varied conflicts of the Indian wars had one underlying cause: American expansion across the West through the conquest of the native inhabitants. In the process, the Indian wars affected civilians at every level of American society. Those living or traveling in the areas of conflict were directly affected, those moving into the areas

once they were secured clearly benefited, and all of American society was informed through the mass media, art, and literature.

The irony of the Indian wars is they occurred in a nation that was technically at peace. Despite the widespread and continual conflict, the Indians in the West were not defeated by military conquest. To be sure, the army contributed to ending the warfare, but more than the military forts and battles, it was railroads, settlements, destruction of the bison herds, and advances of American society that overwhelmed and ultimately defeated the western Indians. In the end, it was the civilians of the dominant culture who conquered the West.

NOTES

1. *Doolittle Report*, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 1867, S. Rep. 156, serial 1279, 3–6.
2. *Ibid.*, 7.
3. Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 46.
4. Robert G. Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 43.
5. *Virginia City Montana Post*, April 9, 1867.

FURTHER READING

- Breakenridge, William M. *Helldorado: Bringing the Law to the Mesquite*. 1928. Reprints, Glorieta, N.M.: Rio Grande Press, 1970; Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1982.
The memoir of a teamster, rancher, and lawman who witnessed Indian conflicts in Colorado, Nebraska, and Arizona.
- Doyle, Susan Badger, ed. *Bound for Montana: Diaries from the Bozeman Trail*. Helena: Montana Historical Society Press, 2004.
A collection of diaries written by Bozeman Trail travelers in 1864 and 1866 during Red Cloud's War.
- Handbook of the North American Indians*, vol. 4, *History of Indian-White Relations*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1988.
A respected and comprehensive collection of topical articles on Indian-white relations.
- Keenan, Jerry. *Encyclopedia of American Indian Wars, 1492–1890*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1997.
A good reference work for the events and people in the Indian wars.
- Kelly, Fanny. *Narrative of My Captivity Among the Sioux Indians*. 1872. Reprints, Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1973; Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1990; and New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1994.
A remarkable account of her five months as a Sioux captive.
- Skogen, Larry C. *Indian Depredation Claims, 1796–1920*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.
A ground-breaking study of the complexities and abuses of the claim system.

- Stanley, Henry M. *My Early Travels and Adventures in America*. 1895. Reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
Describes his experience as a newspaper correspondent during the Indian war in Kansas in 1867.
- Tate, Michael L. *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. An outstanding overview of the army's role in western settlement.
- Utley, Robert M. *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891*. New York: Macmillan, 1973.
- . *The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846–1890*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984.
Utley's two indispensable books on the Indian wars cover both the military and Indian perspectives.
- Wooster, Robert. *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988.
An excellent study of Indian policy.

TWO

Daily Lives of Civilians in World War I

Michael S. Neiberg

THE CHANGING FACES OF AMERICA IN 1917

The outbreak of the war in Europe in 1914 did not immediately cause great changes in daily life in the United States. The crisis in Europe was far from the daily concerns of most Americans and until 1915 it appeared unlikely that America would become involved at all. Indeed, vociferous debate on the wisdom of American entry continued into 1917. At the time of the war's outbreak, however, America was already undergoing important transformations of its own; the war exacerbated and accelerated many of these changes, with attendant changes to the daily lives of American citizens. Although America's involvement in the war was brief, the war years greatly sped up the pace of political, economic, and social change.

Industrialization and the closing of the frontier in 1890 led to increasing urbanization in the years before the war. The 1920 census was the first to report more Americans living in cities than in the countryside. Most large American cities experienced dramatic growth. Chicago grew from 1,099,000 people in 1890 to 2,185,213 in 1910. In the same time period, the Manhattan borough of New York City grew from 1,441,216 people to 2,331,442. Labor unrest and problems associated with overcrowding plagued many of these cities, contributing to the rise of Progressivism as a political force for urban reform. World War I, with its heavy industrial demands, led to further growth in urban areas, accelerating a change that was already clearly under way.

Some of the growth in cities came from migration from the countryside, but most of the urban population growth was due to migration from overseas. New York's Ellis Island, opened in 1892, processed on average more than 5,000 immigrants per day. As the number of immigrants changed, so too did their places of origin. From the 1880s to the outbreak of the war, migration to the United States came increasingly from eastern and southern Europe. By 1890 migrants from these parts of the European continent constituted 70 percent of all migrants to the United States. In contrast to migration from earlier periods, these new immigrants were predominately Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Jewish. They formed ethnic enclaves in large cities that retained important cultural ties to their residents' countries of origin.

One of the first major changes the war brought to the daily lives of Americans (especially urban Americans) involved a dramatic halt in immigration and the attendant changes to the ethnic makeup of American cities. The outbreak of the war caused the flow of migrants from southern and eastern Europe to slow to a trickle, pleasing many nativists. Many native groups attempted to assimilate the immigrants as quickly as possible; the Ford Motor Company sponsored Americanization classes for its immigrant workers in Detroit and elsewhere. Others tried to slow or stop the flow of immigrants. Nativists had already succeeded in virtually shutting down Asian immigration through the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. Many saw the war as an excuse to shut down European migration as well. As discussed below, the war's environment of "100 percent Americanism" fed into nativist beliefs by pressuring immigrants to adopt American customs. By the 1920s nativists had succeeded in passing much more restrictive immigration laws that effectively ended immigration from eastern and southern Europe.

The end of overseas immigration created an unexpected opportunity for African Americans at a time of increasing segregation and deteriorating race relations. The public acclaim and enormous crowds that greeted D. W. Griffith's 1915 film *Birth of a Nation* revealed how little progress African Americans had made since emancipation. The film's biracial villain, Silas Lynch, conjured up the Black Peril that supposedly threatened white women. White America's willingness to embrace the stereotypes and images of the film spoke volumes about popular white attitudes and perceptions. As another reflection of these attitudes, the organization to which the film's heroes belonged, the Ku Klux Klan, was reborn and gained enormously in popularity in the years after the war. Despite its generally Progressive ideology, the Wilson Administration proved reluctant to challenge the Jim Crow segregation system. Wilson himself believed strongly in the racial inferiority of blacks.

The long-standing political disenfranchisement of African Americans left them in an extremely vulnerable position. Neither of the major parties championed civil rights, or made any sustained attempt to improve the

conditions of black Americans. Despite the development of a small black middle class, economic conditions for blacks remained abysmal. Most blacks were sharecroppers or subsistence farmers, and most were desperately poor, especially after the boll weevil infestation devastated southern cotton agriculture in the early twentieth century.¹

The years before World War I witnessed important changes in the roles of American women. Between 1870 and 1910 the percentage of women working for wages increased from 14.8 percent to 24 percent. Although most women stopped working outside the home when they married, the increased presence of women workers nevertheless began to change the face of the American workforce. In some industries, women's participation became indispensable. Between 1870 and 1910 the number of women employed in food processing increased from 2,460 to 48,099 and the number of women employed in printing in the same period jumped from 4,397 to 47,640. Women, who were just 2.6 percent of all office workers in 1870, were 37.7 percent of office workers by 1910.² The war intensified these patterns, if in some cases only temporarily, by giving women the chance to move into jobs previously dominated by men.

Growing pressure for the extension of the franchise to women (understood to mean white women) promised to give women a more direct role in the political process. In 1869 Wyoming became the first American state or territory to grant women the right to vote. By the turn of the century three other western states had followed Wyoming's lead. Although granting women the right to vote was a controversial political issue, the momentum to create a national suffrage law grew in the years prior to the war. In 1912 Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party made women's suffrage a part of its national platform.

As the example of women's suffrage shows, in politics, too, America was undergoing a transformation. The presidential election of 1912 was the first to use primaries, a change that gave the American electorate more power to determine the candidates fielded by the major parties. Because candidates now had to win votes in order to be nominated as well as elected, the change also meant that the campaign of 1912 featured more public debate than had previous American elections. Voters had the opportunity to choose between two different Progressive candidates, Democrat Woodrow Wilson and Bull Moose Party candidate Theodore Roosevelt, as well as the Republican William Howard Taft and the Socialist Eugene V. Debs. Roosevelt's candidacy split the Republican vote, allowing Wilson to win the election handily with 435 of a possible 531 electoral votes. Debs won 900,000 popular votes, the highest showing ever for a Socialist.

The 1916 elections returned Wilson to office with a Democratic congressional majority, but it also revealed the divisions in the American electorate. Despite reservations, Wilson campaigned on the slogan "He Kept Us Out of War," indicating the importance of neutrality for much of the Democratic political base, and for the nation more generally. The Republican

challenger, Charles Evans Hughes, played on northeastern discontent with Democratic financial policies, and nearly won the election. Wilson captured 277 electoral votes to Hughes's 254. Incomplete returns from California led one Parisian newspaper to declare prematurely that Hughes had won. Although Wilson's reelection seemed to promise sustained neutrality in American policy, the president knew that he would have difficulty keeping the United States out of the crisis in Europe.

PROPAGANDA, 100 PERCENT AMERICANISM, AND THE NEW PATRIOTISM

To thousands of American civilians, the Wilson Administration's decision to enter the war in Europe presented no special reason to rally to the president's call. Prior to 1917 few Americans felt the presence of the war in their daily lives. The nation itself was under no clear and immediate danger from Europe, and many Americans had as many doubts about America's new allies as they did about America's new enemy. The Wilson administration, itself suspicious of the secret diplomacy of the British and French, reflected this public doubt by not signing the Treaty of London that created the alliance and by insisting on being called an "associated power" of that alliance. Thus the Americans could claim that they were fighting with their European partners, but that they were doing so for the pursuit of American aims.

One of the first changes to American daily lives that the war brought about emerged from a concerted effort by politicians and journalists to convince Americans of the righteousness of their new cause. Shortly after the United States declaration of war, propaganda posters began bombarding Americans with negative images of Germany. One well-distributed example showed an enormous ape with Kaiser Wilhelm's mustaches and the characteristically German spike helmet stepping across the Atlantic from a scorched Europe to American shores. With a fearsome face, a bloodied club in one hand, and a virginal maiden in the other, the ape certainly presented an image of intimidating terror. The message of this and other posters was clear: once the Germans had completed their destruction of Europe they would turn their attentions to North America. The poster's text read: "Destroy This Mad Brute: Enlist in the U.S. Army."³

Even before American entry into the war, many Americans had displayed sympathies for the Allies that facilitated the transition from neutrality to belligerence. American poet Alan Seeger had been among those who had joined the French Foreign Legion (risking the revocation of their American citizenship by doing so) to fight for France. Seeger's death, along with eight of his comrades, during the storming of the town of Belloy-en-Santerre as part of the larger Battle of the Somme in 1916 made him famous on both sides of the Atlantic. Thirty-eight other Americans had formed a volunteer French air squadron, the Lafayette Escadrille. With financial backing

from industrialists like W. K. Vanderbilt, the Lafayette Escadrille soon built a reputation for military prowess while at the same time establishing an important symbolic link between the United States and France. It is worth noting that no organized groups of American civilians volunteered to fight for the Central Powers.

American propaganda and links between the American and British media reinforced these perceptions. Americans received most of their European news both before and during the war from British sources, in large part because the most direct way of transmitting news was through the trans-Atlantic cable from London to New York. Reports of German atrocities, both real and exaggerated, thus came to American audiences from British sources, coloring American views of both the Germans and the British who were trying to stop them. A British investigation into alleged atrocities in Belgium, known as the Bryce Report, was circulated widely in the United States and provided lurid details of German behavior through depositions taken from Belgian refugees. The report depicted Germany's behavior in Belgium as unusually cruel, widespread, and premeditated. It described in intimate detail intentional German shooting of civilians and of wounded soldiers as well as the systematic raping of women and killing of children.

Despite these horrific images and the criminal behavior of German armies in Belgium in 1914, few Americans seriously worried that their homes were in danger from the armies of the German empire.⁴ By the time of the American declaration of war in April, 1917, the largest number of Americans to have been killed during the war were trans-Atlantic passengers who died when German U-boats sank passenger ships like the *Lusitania*. Although 124 Americans had been among the 1,198 people who died when that ship went down off the Irish coast in May, 1915, the incident itself had not led Americans to scream for revenge or for the nation to join the war. Many isolationists reacted to the sinking by arguing that the best way to keep Americans safe was not belligerence, but an even stricter neutrality that kept Americans off the Atlantic and safe in their communities.

The *Lusitania* sinking had, however, created a great deal of anger and moral revulsion toward Germany; propaganda and news reports played on this revulsion. Most Americans saw the sinking as an act of barbarism unnecessary for the prosecution of war. The German government's celebration of the sinking appeared as a further insult to American honor. Germany's decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 played a primary role in the president's decision to ask Congress for a declaration of war. In the first year of the war, Harvard professor Josiah Royce had chosen to follow the president's call to remain neutral in thought and deed by not mentioning the war in his classes. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, and German submarine warfare more generally, forced him to reconsider. "I should be a poor professor of philosophy, and in particular of moral

philosophy," he declared, "if I left my class in the least doubt as to how to view such things." Royce viewed submarines as "these newest expressions of the infamies of Prussian warfare."⁵

Imperial Germany's clumsy foreign policy contributed to the growing anti-German sentiment in the United States. In April, 1917, just as Wilson and his cabinet were reacting to the German declaration that it would resume unrestricted submarine warfare, British intelligence handed the American government a telegram from German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman to the government of Mexico. The telegram promised German support for the recovery of Mexico's lost territories in the American Southwest in return for a Mexican invasion of the United States. Americans were offended at the audacity of the German government, but few seriously feared an invasion by a Mexican army, especially after the Mexican government showed little enthusiasm for Zimmerman's offer.

Because Americans were not worried about their own security, they had to find justifications for the war other than self-defense. The resulting idealistic rhetoric seemed as lofty to many of those who heard it as it does to our ears today. Wilson spoke of a "war to end all wars" and a "war to make the world safe for democracy." He told Americans that they had to risk their lives and treasure to remake a Europe that had become too corrupt and internecine to guarantee its own security. Once victory on the battlefield had been assured, Wilson hoped to remake Europe, and by extension much of the world, in accordance with what he believed were more moral and transcendent grounds than those common in contemporary Europe. Such ideals resonated with many Americans. In the words of one North Carolinian who answered Wilson's call, "We are to fight . . . that never again will we have to leave our peaceful pursuits and cross an ocean to fight such barbarians."⁶

Once the nation had decided upon war, many of those who had doubts changed their opinions and offered their wholehearted support, as the nearly unanimous vote in Congress in support of the declaration of war attests. Still, Wilson and others in the administration feared that support for the war might not survive the initial few weeks of enthusiasm and excitement. Less than a week after the declaration of war, Wilson created by executive order the Committee on Public Information (CPI) and named former muckraking journalist George Creel as its chairman. Creel called on the efforts of fellow journalists to use words and images to convince Americans to support the war. Creel hoped that if he and his committee could persuade Americans of the righteousness of the cause, then the government would not have to use the "European" method of direct government censorship of the press. Thus the nation could fight a war without infringing on the rights of American citizens.

Given a substantial budget, the CPI used all media forms at its disposal. Creel formed a CPI newspaper, the *Official Bulletin*, which distributed

government press statements and spoke of the justice of American war aims. The CPI also enlisted prominent academics to write 105 pamphlets explaining the necessity of American involvement in the war. Eventually over 75 million copies of these pamphlets were printed in seven languages. The CPI also took advantage of the new American fascination with motion pictures, making some of the first government-funded movies. The nation's first movie stars contributed their talents. Celebrities like Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks made patriotic "picturesses" in support of food rationing and the Marx Brothers began raising chickens as a publicity stunt to promote self-sufficiency.⁷ Posters, plays, and more than 750,000 short speeches by so-called Four Minute Men rounded out the CPI's activities. The armed services and several private pro-war groups followed the CPI's lead in developing their own propaganda. The result for most Americans was a steady barrage of words and images that depicted the war as an idealist crusade.

Much of this propaganda, aimed at convincing young men to enlist, played on highly gendered images. The Navy issued several such posters including one showing a uniform draped over a chair and reading "It takes a man to fill it." Another, more provocative, poster showed a woman in a Marine Corps uniform telling the viewer "If you want to Fight, Join the Marines." The connection between manly virility and military service was thus underscored along with the not so subtly implied message that a man not serving his country risked being associated with femininity. Women's groups used gendered images to suggest that their service in wartime should result in women receiving the same basic civic rights as men. A poster advocating women's suffrage read "We give our work, our men, our lives if need be. Will you give us the vote?" Thus civilians could use military service and support for the war to argue for fundamental political and social reform.⁸

THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT IN DAILY LIVES

Creel always emphasized that the CPI's role was not to coerce but to influence by presenting the American government's case for war in as positive a light as possible. Other arms of the government began from less lofty presumptions. Within two months of entering the war, the government passed the Espionage Act, which forbade any material "advocating treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States" from being transmitted via the U.S. mail. The man in charge of enforcing the law, Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson, used his new powers to deny mailing privileges to dozens of Socialist journalists. Since, according to one of his critics, Burleson "didn't know socialism from rheumatism," he came in for a great deal of criticism for denying mailings to publications that did not meet the standards of the law.⁹

Burleson received even greater authority to determine what American civilians did and did not read with the passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act, passed in October, 1917. The act required foreign-language publications to submit translations of their journals before being given mailing privileges. In practice, Burleson and local postmasters only imposed this demand on Socialist and other suspect journals. Even after receiving translations, postmasters commonly denied mailing privileges on the grounds of having to verify that the translations provided were accurate. The act drove many papers out of business because without the mail, they could not reach a national or even a regional audience. Other ethnic newspapers simply avoided discussing politics and the war in order to avoid any clash with federal authorities.

The government also used the act to censor views that were not necessarily antiwar but stood in conflict with official administration positions. Burleson stopped the mailing of an issue of the journal *Public* because it advocated raising more money by taxes and less by loans, a view that Burleson saw as being critical of administration financial policies. An issue of a Catholic newspaper was stopped for reprinting a quotation by Thomas Jefferson that argued for Ireland to be made an independent republic, despite the fact that the American government had no official position on the Irish problem. Burleson also concluded, without any legal authority, that any publication that missed an issue no longer qualified for second-class mailing privileges.¹⁰

These acts, however, pale in comparison to the power given to the state over its own citizens by the Sedition Act of 1918. This act made it a crime to "utter, print, or publish disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government, the Constitution, soldiers and sailors, flag, or uniform of the armed forces."¹¹ The act, which provided few guidelines as to which kinds of behavior qualified, gave local and federal authorities significant latitude to arrest dissenters. More than 2,000 Americans were prosecuted under the act and many more were arrested under the terms of the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, which allowed the government to detain aliens without a trial.

More than half of those prosecuted were convicted; some went to jail based on nothing more than words they uttered in public. Almost 100 Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) officials were among those convicted, including IWW leader William D. Haywood, who received a 20-year sentence. Socialist politician Eugene V. Debs, who received 900,000 votes in the presidential election of 1912, received a 10-year sentence on the basis of the following line from one of his speeches: "You need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder."¹² In another case, a New England minister received a 15-year sentence for stating in a sermon that Jesus was a pacifist. Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who sentenced Haywood and many others, became a national figure as a result of the trials and his toughness in dealing with presumed

national enemies made him the obvious choice of team owners to become commissioner of Major League Baseball in the wake of the "Black Sox" scandal of 1919.¹³

FOOD, FUEL, AND FUNDING

Court cases affected relatively few Americans. Within a few months of entering the war, however, large numbers of Americans began to see significant changes to their daily routines. An August 1917 law, the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act, permitted the government to regulate the production and distribution of both foodstuffs and fossil fuels, mainly coal. This system occasionally produced shortages, such as when the government purchased the entire 1918 sugar beet crop in the United States and Canada, as well as Cuba's entire sugar cane harvest. That decision limited the amount of sugar available to consumers. Despite these occasional inconveniences, Americans never faced shortages on a par with civilians in France and Germany, and the government never had to resort to rationing on a large scale. There is no evidence to suggest that the scarcities caused by the war led to a major decline in the quality of the American diet.

The shortages that most Americans faced were less a function of strict rationing than of the government's power to control the flow of raw materials. With most of those materials going to war-essential industries, consumer production in many sectors fell dramatically. With less money available to consumers as a result of inflation, production of non-war-related goods also became less profitable. Many companies therefore changed their production lines wholly or in large part to government contracts; Black and Decker, for example, greatly reduced its production of tools for the civilian market and made gun sights instead.

The result for many Americans was a reduction in the consumer choices available to them. To cite one example, whereas before the war there were 446 different types of washing machines available to the American consumer, during the war that number fell to just 18. Government boards used their power to distribute raw materials in order to gently coerce manufacturers to change the ways that they made their products. Clothing manufacturers removed lapels and pockets from men's jackets in order to conserve wool and cotton. Bicycle manufacturers responded to the reduction in metal available for consumer industries by redesigning their products in a way that saved an estimated 2,000 tons of steel. Corset manufacturers were denied steel altogether, leading to a dramatic reduction in that product's popularity. To cite one final example, the government greatly reduced the dyes available to shoemakers, resulting in shoes during wartime being available in just four colors.¹⁴

Rather than subjecting Americans to direct rationing, the government instead asked them to participate in voluntary programs. Herbert Hoover, who had previously chaired the Commission for Relief in Belgium, chaired

the United States Food Administration, which appealed to Americans to conserve, but rarely asked them to do without for significant periods of time. Hoover's agency asked Americans to participate in meatless and wheatless days and rewarded participants with buttons and stickers. Communal and social pressure rather than outright government coercion provided the mechanism for cooperation with the system. More than 20,000,000 Americans signed the Food Administration pledge: "Go back to simple food, simple clothes, simple pleasure. Pray hard, work hard, sleep hard, and play hard. Do it all courageously and cheerfully. We have a victory to win."

Hoover adopted the slogan "Food will win the war," but he was adamantly opposed to forced rationing. Instead, he relied on voluntarism and the lure of government spending to meet his goals. The increased power of government thus acted more as a means to spur Americans to increase production than to force Americans to live without the goods to which they were accustomed. The government, now the largest buyer of agricultural products, overpaid for its goods in order to give farmers an incentive to produce more short-term agricultural goods such as pork. Foodstuffs that took longer to develop also received funding assistance. To cite one example, the Food Administration capitalized a wheat corporation to peg the price of wheat at a very generous \$2.00 a bushel. The program provided a boon to American farmers, who now sold their goods at prices above market value. More production also meant less sacrifice from American consumers. Making more, rather than making do with less, became the main challenge issued to Americans.

Hoover also sought to use his powers to increase American food production in order to provide a surplus for America's struggling allies. Food Administration purchasing programs helped farmers and ranchers, two important parts of the Democratic party's electoral base. Even Mexican ranchers were able to use the war to make more money by driving their livestock north of the border and selling it to American purchasing agents. The increased competition created some tensions in border areas, but the government purchasing system ensured enough profit for all concerned to keep large-scale tension muted. Mexican and American cattlemen even found ways to work together to increase their combined profits.

The newly created United States Fuel Administration followed the same policies. Its head, Harry A. Garfield, son of former President James Garfield, had broad powers to control the production and distribution of coal and oil. He acted with a much heavier hand toward corporations than he did to American citizens. Most Americans agreed voluntarily to go without coal for one day per week, although the Fuel Administration made little effort to monitor this request, especially in northern cities in winter. Americans thus saw changes that were more subtle than coercive. Hoover and Garfield reflected the general American belief that heavy-handed government pressure was characteristic of Europe, not the United States. Many

changes therefore demanded few fundamental sacrifices from Americans. Daylight Savings Time is an illustrative example. The introduction of the new system of timekeeping saved energy but demanded minimal change in the daily lives of American civilians.

The management of the financial aspects of the war involved more government coercion, but the spirit of volunteerism was evident as well. Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo initially promoted a plan to fund 50 percent of the war through taxation, but direct taxation did not rise as much as he had wanted. McAdoo hoped that a reliance on taxes would relieve inflationary pressure and would also reduce the amount of money that Americans had available for consumer spending. Opposition to this plan combined with ever-increasing estimates of the war's costs forced McAdoo to reconsider. The only taxation plan he and Wilson believed the Congress might pass involved targeting the wealthiest Americans. Even McAdoo admitted that curbing the relatively modest consumer spending of middle- and low-income Americans would have little impact on the war.

Taxes, therefore, funded less than one-third of the total cost of the war. Those new taxes that Americans did see were generally progressive, meaning that they disproportionately affected the wealthiest Americans. Such taxation had long been a goal of Progressives; the war gave them an opportunity to implement it. The 77.7 percent of Americans earning less than \$3,000 per year paid just 3.6 percent of all individual taxes. In 1918, those making \$2,000 per year paid just 3.0 percent in taxes while those making \$100,000 paid 35.2 percent and those making \$1,000,000 paid 70.3 percent. The system compensated for the high tax rate by making income used to purchase war bonds tax exempt, providing an important loophole for wealthier Americans as well as ready customers for the government's financial plan.¹⁵

Direct taxation, initially designed as a temporary fix to solve the immediate pecuniary crisis created by the war, instead became a permanent fixture in the lives of Americans. The "Liberty Tax" plan that took effect in 1918 raised the number of American taxpayers from 500,000 to more than 7,000,000. Before the war the vast majority of government revenue came from customs and excise taxes. These forms of revenue tax consumption and thereby tend to impose a lower overall burden on the wealthy. After the war, taxation increasingly targeted income, profits, and estates. The nature of these taxes shifted the tax burden toward the wealthy.¹⁶ Perhaps most importantly, however, as a result of the war, taxes became more visible as a feature of the daily lives of Americans.


Although taxes did increase, the revenue so generated still fell well short of paying for the war. Instead of being asked to pay for the war through even more taxes, Americans were encouraged to "borrow and buy." Americans took out bank loans, then used that money to purchase war bonds whose interest rates were intentionally placed at a half percent



The government's campaign to discourage baking with wheat included the message that cornmeal, oats, and barley were palatable substitutes. (Library of Congress)

higher than the loan rate. By guaranteeing Americans a modest profit, the administration hoped to raise money at a rate advantageous to the government while simultaneously taking money out of the consumer market.

Americans saw a variety of methods designed to encourage the purchases of the bonds. Celebrities played on their fame through movies, posters, and personal appearances in big cities. Local orators called Four Minute Men appeared in town squares and on stages before movies to support what became known as Liberty Loans. Across the country thousands of Boy Scouts mobilized under the "Every Scout to Save a Soldier" program to sell bonds in their local communities. McAdoo was also not above using the new visibility of his office to send messages, declaring that "a man who cannot lend his government \$1.25 per week at the rate of 4 percent interest is not entitled to be an American citizen." The combination of patriotism,



American "Victory Gardens" were meant to decrease civilian food requirements, freeing supplies for the military. (Library of Congress)

communal pressure, and propaganda worked. Every Liberty Loan drive was oversubscribed and more than 30 percent of the money came from Americans earning less than \$2,000 per year.¹⁷

The federal government secured the Liberty Loan bonds by offering a preferential rate to banks that participated. The net result was the creation of new source of short-term funds, but one that proved unsustainable in the long run. With more money going into the system through this method, the end result, inflation, was predictable, but unavoidable. Although loans were more politically palatable to most Americans than taxation, the increase in inflation produced its own traumas.¹⁸

Inflation had been a problem in the United States even before the entry of the United States into the war. From 1914 to 1916 the cost of living rose an estimated 20 percent. The war greatly exacerbated these pressures.

From 1916 to 1920 food prices rose 63 percent, fuel prices rose 45 percent, and clothing prices rose 77 percent.¹⁹ Price fixing, an approach that European governments had used, was anathema to the Wilson administration, and therefore never implemented.

The impacts of inflation hit Americans unevenly. Many industrial workers, able to take advantage of both the reduction in the influx of immigrant labor and the demand for industrial workers, took on new, higher-paying jobs that compensated somewhat for the rising prices. The nature of government contracting also helped to keep wages in war industries high enough to offset much of the rising cost of living. Members of middle-class professions, by contrast, rarely saw a commensurate rise in their wages. Thus the relative value of their salaries, as well as their savings and pensions, fell dramatically over the course of the war. Farmers, too, often saw a relative decline in their economic status despite rising food prices, owing to the higher costs of agricultural labor, fertilizers, and farm equipment.

RELIGION IN WARTIME

"The clergyman who does not put the flag above the church," counseled Theodore Roosevelt in 1917, "had better close his church and keep it closed." Roosevelt had little reason to fear. The vast majority of American churches and synagogues supported the war. Many went so far as to conduct recruitment drives among their congregants, with one California preacher telling a rally that the enlistment of a young man into the army was the moral and spiritual equivalent to his volunteering for missionary service in Burma. Enlistments were particularly high at drives attended by Billy Sunday, one of the nation's most charismatic preachers.²⁰

One scholar has recently described the mood of churches during the war as one of "clerical nationalism." While most churches had avoided discussing the war during the period of American neutrality, they quickly changed their policies to support the war and American mobilization. Religious leaders had several motives for supporting the war, with patriotism being the most important. Many ministers, preachers, priests, and rabbis also hoped that the war might reverse trends in what they saw as an increasingly materialist and secularist society. Their sermons supported not only the righteousness of the American cause, but the duty of Americans of all faiths to fight on the American side.²¹

Support for the war did not come without some tensions and reconciling of contradictions. Although some pacifist churches simply refrained from discussing the war after the American declaration, others held firmly to the position that killing and war went against the teachings of the Bible. They were a minority movement, however, and were quickly drowned out by the widespread support of American religion more generally. The American Catholic Church supported the war despite the official neutrality

of the Vatican. For Jews, supporting the Allies posed potential problems because it also meant indirectly supporting Russia, understood by most Jews as the most anti-Semitic country in the world. Fighting on the Allied side also placed Jews in opposition to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, understood as one of the most tolerant states for Jews.²² Still, Catholics, Jews, and even many pacifists supported the war, indicating the powerful pull of nationalism on religious institutions.

Although religion surely helped many Americans to deal with the pressures of the war and the concern for loved ones, the war did not lead to the mass revival in religious feeling that many had anticipated. Nevertheless, religious figures played key roles on the home front in providing comfort, maintaining morale, and providing soldiers with religious services. Many clergy volunteered to work with the YMCA to provide men with wholesome recreation and enjoyment. Secretary of War Newton Baker personally asked the Fosdick brothers, both well-known moralists and preachers, to head the program. They delivered lectures on the evils of prostitution and alcohol and established a network of Hostess Houses, where men and women could meet in a "civilized" fashion. The army, always concerned with keeping its men in the field, nevertheless supplied prophylactics to its soldiers, especially those training near big cities.²³

RECREATION DURING WARTIME

The war years were not good ones for the American pastime, baseball. After years of stable attendance, the number of fans fell drastically in 1917 and 1918. Total major league attendance had risen in 1916 to 6,503,519 from the previous year's 4,864,826. But Opening Day 1917 came in the same month as the American declaration of war. Attendance in that year fell to 5,219,994 and the decline continued into 1918, when just 3,080,126 fans came to major league games. Only two cities, Pittsburgh and Washington, saw their attendance rise. Even the two World Series teams of 1918, the Boston Red Sox and the Chicago Cubs, saw attendance fall, although these drops were much less devastating than in Brooklyn, which had 447,747 fans in 1916 but just 83,831 two years later. In the same years St. Louis Browns attendance fell from 335,740 to 122,076.

One possible explanation for the decline in baseball attendance in 1917 revolves around the entry of so many young men into the armed forces. That process robbed major league franchises of their primary target audience. This hypothesis is supported by attendance figures from college football games. The University of Michigan, for example, averaged 21,000 fans per game in the years before the war, but in 1917 and 1918 never had a crowd larger than 16,733.²⁴ It is also possible that as the pace of war work increased more rigorous work schedules prevented men from attending baseball games, which were then played during the day. The decline in attendance at all public events in 1918 owes much

to the influenza epidemic, which forced Michigan to cancel four games that season. Sports attendance figures recovered nicely in 1919, lending more credence to the theory that the absence of young men played a central role in causing the drops. Total baseball attendance climbed by more than 3,000,000 fans in 1919 and Michigan football crowds returned to their prewar levels. The Brooklyn Dodgers saw their attendance rise from 83,831 in 1918 to 360,721 in 1919. The American League champion Chicago White Sox had 195,081 fans in 1918 but a major league high of 627,186 fans in 1919.

If the war reduced attendance at sporting events, it had the opposite effect for attendance at motion pictures. Although detailed statistics of movie attendance do not exist, one source claims that on average 10,000,000 Americans went to the movies per day during the war.²⁵ The war proved to be a tremendous boon to the American movie industry by virtually shutting down competition from Europe. The French and German movie industries, which had provided so much competition to the Americans in the prewar years, either converted to war-related work or had to close down because many of the same chemicals used to manufacture film were also needed to make explosives.

With less competition and with the movie industry in the government's good graces, American motion pictures thrived. D. W. Griffith's 1915 film *The Birth of a Nation* received worldwide acclaim for its technical proficiency, thus placing the American movie industry on a critical par with Europe. America also produced a new generation of stars, including Charlie Chaplin, whose two 1917 films *The Immigrant* and *Easy Street* made him a national and international celebrity. In 1918 Paramount Studios made 220 feature films and distributed them to a network of 5,000 theaters.²⁶ Some of the themes of these films had obvious connections to the war, but comedies, Westerns, and romance remained popular as well. Cinemas suffered from dramatic drops during the height of the influenza epidemic, but the war years cemented a place for the movies in American hearts and set up the 1920s as the golden age of American cinema.

Music fans saw more connections between art and the war than did moviegoers. George M. Cohan's "Over There" was the most popular American song of the war years, but others like "Hang the Kaiser from a Sour Apple Tree" and "Keep the Home Fires Burning" were also popular. Opera companies and symphonies stopped playing German music for the duration of the war and many began their performances with "The Star-Spangled Banner." The Boston Symphony refused to do so at a Rhode Island concert, creating a national scandal that led to the dismissal and deportation of its German conductor, Karl Muck. Other symphonies fired German-born musicians and several cities cancelled performances by symphonies led by German-American conductors.

The war years also witnessed an expansion of a prewar trend in Americans visiting national parks. From 1914 to 1916 American trips to

the national parks leapt from 240,000 to 358,000. With more automobiles and no outright restrictions of fuel consumption, American visits to the parks increased to 491,000 in 1917 and 455,000 in 1918. With inflation, taxation, and war bonds taking a larger share of American incomes, the parks undoubtedly represented a vacation bargain, especially for large families. Life thus continued, in line with the Food Administration's pledge to "play hard."

DIVERSITY AND DAILY EXPERIENCES

Members of a society as diverse as the United States experienced the war in highly varied ways. Class, race, gender, ethnicity, and region all played key roles in determining the quality of daily lives during wartime. Although the majority of Americans supported the war, their backgrounds conditioned the depth of that support. Radical groups like the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) had threatened antiwar strikes in the mining and lumber industries, leading one senator to quip that IWW stood for "Imperial Wilhelm's Warriors." The administration was sufficiently concerned to order surveillance by Justice Department agents and raids on IWW offices across the nation, but the IWW was a clear exception, and its ideology was not so much pro-German as it was antiwar. Open resistance to governmental policy and the war effort was not nearly as widespread as some Americans had feared.

America, then as now, was a nation of immigrants, and many did not immediately support the Allied cause. Many Irish-Americans in particular disliked the notion of fighting on the side of Ireland's hereditary enemy, England, especially after England's brutal suppression of the Easter Rising, the Irish rebellion of 1916. The Irish rebels, led by Sir Roger Casement, had raised most of the money for their revolt in Irish communities in the United States. That money continued to flow uninterrupted even as the United States joined the war on Britain's side, indicating an abiding ambivalence on the part of many Irish-Americans to fight alongside the British. One regiment of Irish-American recruits refused to wear their newly issued uniforms, which, because they were on loan from the British, had buttons bearing the British coat of arms. The incident was only resolved when General Pershing ordered a set of U.S. Army buttons rushed to the men, who had already taken the liberty of removing the British buttons.²⁷

America also had a large number of recent German immigrants. German-Americans were a key element of Hughes's political base, and he had spoken to them of his desire to avoid war. Although they later became targets of hyper-patriots and many no doubt had pro-German sympathies, many others had left Germany precisely to avoid the dominance of the Prussians. Most of the German immigrants were Catholics who had fled the persecutions of the *Kulturkampf* (Culture War), part of German

Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's policies in the 1870s and 1880s. Many Germans therefore had quite ambivalent feelings toward the "old country," which did not necessarily incline them to support America's new enemy. Their German origins did, however, make them easy targets for hyper-patriots seeking domestic scapegoats.

The daily lives of German-Americans were among the first to be directly affected by the war as local officials and private citizens followed the lead of the federal government. School boards across the country stopped teaching German, demanded loyalty oaths of teachers, and changed their curricula to demonize Germany and support the principles on which the nation had gone to war. One scholar estimates that half of the nation's state educational boards banned the teaching of the German language or literature by the end of the war. The governor of Iowa went so far as to ban the speaking of any language other than English in all public places. Ohio had 19 separate incidents involving the burning of German language books.²⁸

Communal pressure led non-German immigrants to extremes in order to prove their loyalty to the United States. The "100 percent Americanism" campaign led many immigrants to drop those features of their background that made them stand out. The campaign extended a main theme of one strand of the prewar Progressive movement, which emphasized the importance of assimilation. Americanization workshops opened across the country with the stated aim of teaching immigrants the history and culture of their new homeland. In one highly publicized case, the graduates of one of the schools were taken on a symbolic pilgrimage to Mount Vernon, in order to pay homage to the father of their new country, George Washington. Language also changed to meet the prevailing spirit and mood of the nation. Many Americans expunged even the most innocuous German phrases from their everyday speech. Sauerkraut became known as "liberty cabbage" and dachshunds temporarily became "liberty puppies" in changes reminiscent of the "freedom fries" of more recent times.

Government and private citizens often entered into quasi-legal cooperation in pursuit of common goals. Attorney General Thomas Gregory gave both covert and overt support to the American Protective League, a group of self-styled patriots who reported suspicious activity to the government and assumed the responsibility for rounding up men who had not registered for the draft. League members operated around the nation, barging into pool halls, train stations, hotels, and restaurants and forcibly dragging suspect young men into detention centers. The league's "slacker raids" netted 40,000 men, the vast majority of whom had legitimate draft deferments. Nevertheless, thousands of men sat in detention centers without lawyers or official charges for weeks or even months while paperwork was cleared up.

The "100 percent Americanism" sentiment at times took on violent tones. One of the most extreme incidents involved the lynching of Robert Prager,



Boosting and sustaining morale was an imperative task for civilians in supporting the military.

a German-American near St. Louis. Prager tried to enlist in the United States Navy, but had been denied because he was blind in one eye. A mob lynched him on the basis of nothing more than his German ancestry. More than 500 people watched the lynching of a man guilty of nothing more than being at the wrong place at the wrong time. Many in the crowd cheered. A trial to convict the leaders of the mob became a mockery as the defendants came to court dressed in red, white, and blue. Despite evidence that the victim had had no connection to any subversive group of any kind, the accused defended their actions as “patriotic murder.” The jury took less than half an hour to find them not guilty.²⁹ The result for the daily lives of many so-called hyphenated Americans during the war was an atmosphere of suspicion and what one study called “a period of mass hysteria.”³⁰

It is worth noting that the United States in 1917 did not have a sizable community of people who identified themselves ethnically as French. Thus there was not a large group calling for American entry into the war on the basis of protecting a motherland. The nation did, of course, have a large and cohesive Italian-American population, concentrated in East Coast cities. With Italy also fighting on the side of the British and French, the support of that group was assured. One of the leaders of that community, congressman and future New York City mayor Fiorello La Guardia, left the safety of his congressional seat and volunteered to become a pilot. He did so to keep a promise to his constituents that if he voted for conscription he would himself volunteer for military service.

Immigrant workers were integral elements in the American labor movement. The support of organized labor would be critical if American industry were to convert from peacetime production to wartime production. America would need extraordinary efforts from labor, including promises not to strike and a willingness to work long hours. Still, not all labor leaders welcomed the war, although few went as far as the IWW. The more conservative American Federation of Labor president Samuel Gompers, the most influential American labor leader, believed that the war had little support among American workers and that American entry into the war could offer nothing to organized labor. American Socialists went even further and pledged not to support the war.

The participation of African Americans, normally marginalized by organized labor, also remained an open question. The vast majority of African American leaders saw the war as an opportunity to prove their loyalty to the United States, in exchange, many hoped, for civil rights reform after the war. Others, like poet James Weldon Johnson, writing in the *New York Age*, saw the situation more negatively. They understood the consequences of African Americans appearing to be in opposition to the national war effort. Johnson warned blacks that the "the Negro cannot afford to be rated as a disloyal element in the nation." He feared that if African Americans did not demonstrate their support for the nation in a time of crisis, then race relations might take an unfortunate step backward.³¹ Thus Johnson's support for the war came less from a shared sense of national goals than from fears of additional racial persecution.

Other African Americans opposed serving in a war for a state that, in their eyes, represented oppression much more than liberty. Why fight for democracy abroad when it was denied at home? Why serve in a segregated army to give Europeans better and more just lives? William Monroe Trotter, editor of the *Boston Guardian*, believed that alleged German war atrocities in Belgium were the moral equivalent to the lynchings of African Americans. He also believed that Germany posed less of a threat to the African American community than white Southerners did. The editorial staff of the *Baltimore Afro-American* agreed, writing that since 1898 (when most African Americans had lent their support to the

Spanish-American War) 17 blacks had been lynched for every American who had died from German submarine attacks.³² If support for war in 1898 had not led to marked improvements in American race relations, many asked, why should they expect 1917 to be any different?

Still, the vast majority of African Americans supported the war. Their motivations included patriotism, the hope that support for the war might lead to civil rights gains, and fear of the consequences of opposition. Especially as more and more African Americans joined the armed services, opposition to the war came to be seen as self-defeating. Woodrow Wilson's public denunciation of lynching in 1918 seemed to hold out some small promise for an improvement in the nation's racial climate as a result of the war. Thus most African Americans, whatever their reservations about the wisdom of the war, heeded W.E.B. DuBois's call to "close ranks" and join in the fight to guarantee democracy in Europe.³³

THE CHANGING FACE OF THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE

One of the war's greatest effects on the daily lives of most civilians involved occupational changes. The United States began the process of industrial conversion from domestic consumer goods to military hardware with a labor force inadequate for the task. With many members of the American labor movement lukewarm to the war and thousands of mostly unskilled workers leaving factories to join the army, industry needed to find new and reliable sources of labor. Traditionally, American industry had found new sources of labor by hiring immigrants. In the decades before World War I, those immigrants had largely come from southern and eastern Europe, regions that in 1917 were ravaged by war, effectively shutting off the flow of immigration to the United States.

One source of labor to fill this gap came from African Americans who, even before the war, had begun to move to urban centers to avoid the worst aspects of the Jim Crow system and because of an economic downturn in American agriculture. The war vastly increased this trend, which began to change the face of the African American community, at least in part, from a Southern rural workforce into a Northern urban workforce. Seeing the possibilities of using African Americans to augment the urban workforce rapidly, the United States Department of Labor began programs to help blacks relocate to industrial centers like Detroit, St. Louis, and Chicago, but it soon suspended the program when Southern politicians complained that the South was being drained of its labor force. When government support dried up, companies took matters into their own hands, advertising in black newspapers like the *Chicago Defender* and the *Pittsburgh Courier*. Labor recruiters came to the South with promises of free transportation, better housing, higher wages, and good schools for the workers' children. Nearly 500,000 African Americans came North between the 1910 and 1920 censuses, indicating the general success of public and private

efforts to recruit black workers. More African Americans moved north between 1916 and 1921 than moved north in the previous 40 years combined.³⁴ Chicago's black population alone rose from 44,000 before the war to 109,000 after the war.

The movement north mostly involved young, single African American males and young families. For African American women, the move to industrial work offered an escape from the low-paying world of domestic service. Black women found jobs in a variety of war industries as well as such diverse jobs as railroad workers, meat packers, and candy makers. Many of these jobs were at the bottom of the occupational structure in terms of pay and prestige. Few African American women received pay commensurate with the pay given to white women, but virtually all industrial jobs paid more than domestic service. Hours were also more regular and, in many cases, much shorter.

The "Great Migration" dramatically changed the lives of many black Americans, but they soon found that the industrial North was not the paradise that labor agents had promised. Black workers typically received the dirtiest, lowest-paying jobs and in many cases unions refused to enlist them. Black workers had often been used in the prewar years to fill factories when white workers went on strike and therefore had the reputation among white workers of being strikebreakers and scabs. Housing, in short supply in many industrial centers, soon became a source of tension as whites resisted having blacks move into their neighborhoods.

The Great Migration thus had dramatic impact on the daily lives of both black and white Americans. East St. Louis, Illinois, where before the war black workers had helped to break a strike by aluminum workers, witnessed some of the most intense racial tension. The movement of almost 10,000 blacks into a town of less than 70,000 people created a powder keg that finally exploded on the night of July 1, 1917. A group of whites drove through a newly black neighborhood firing random shots into windows. The police car that came to investigate the incident bore an unfortunate resemblance to the one that the shots had come from. By the time of its appearance, moreover, the African American community had organized and armed itself. Believing themselves in danger, several African Americans fired on the car, killing two police officers. Racial tensions escalated across the city as word of the incident spread, leading to the deaths of 9 whites and 39 blacks. More than 300 buildings were burned over the next week, shocking the nation and leading to 6,000 additional, though less violent, incidents across the North. The riots proved that leaving the South did not necessarily guarantee an improvement in the quality of daily life for African Americans.

Racial tensions grew even more heated after the war as whites returned from their military service with the expectations of getting their jobs back and often became angry at the presence of blacks in formerly white neighborhoods. Lynchings rose during the war years, reaching an all-time high of 70 incidents in 1919. Still, it appears that few African Americans

returned to the South after the war and the flow of blacks to Northern communities continued (albeit at a slower rate) until the outbreak of the Great Depression.

As noted earlier, the war occurred at a time when women's economic and political roles were undergoing tremendous changes. Women had played key roles in supporting the nation's wars since the colonial period. Their support in this war was therefore nothing new, although the suffrage campaign placed it in a new context. Wilson's rather belated support for women's suffrage became rhetorically tied to the war with his statement to the Senate that the vote for women "is vital to the winning of the war."³⁵ The growing momentum of the suffrage movement after 1914 (culminating in the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920) connected women much more closely to the American polity and therefore implied that women's participation in the war effort would have special meaning.

Still, many of the most visible and important suffragists were also pacifists. Alice Paul, a cofounder in 1914 of the Congressional Union (which advocated an amendment to the Constitution in favor of women's suffrage rather than a state-by-state approach) was a Quaker. Others like Jane Addams and Crystal Eastman were committed pacifists who opposed American entry into the war. They remained in the minority, however, as most women's groups supported American belligerence. Politicians in turn recognized that support, as reflected in the House of Representatives' passing of the suffrage amendment in January 1918.

Most women appear to have understood their employment as a temporary stopgap measure to meet a national emergency. The war led to a slight increase in the number of women permanently working, but in 1920 the percentage of women in the American workforce was in fact smaller than it had been in 1910. Moreover, few women workers were entering the workforce for the first time. Still, as long as the manpower crisis existed, women had the opportunity to perform jobs normally understood to be in the male province, including streetcar drivers, factory workers, even police officers. Some professions, such as telephone operators, remained dominated by women after the war.

Not all Americans favored the influx of women into the workforce. Labor unions proved especially resistant, and without their support women had a difficult time attaining regular promotions and equal pay. One study found that only 9 percent of women working in New York City earned what a man in the same job earned. At war's end, most women left jobs that they were holding on a temporary basis, both to allow men returning from France to return to work quickly and as part of what became known as the "return to normalcy." Women's wartime contributions to the civilian workforce therefore had little long-term impact on female employment patterns, although it did establish a model for women in the World War II workforce.

The war also led to changes in the daily lives and occupational patterns of Mexican-Americans. Labor shortages led to legislation in 1917 that relaxed immigration restrictions substantially. The new law allowed Mexicans to come to the United States to work on railroads, on farms, and in mines. The combination of the pull of American jobs and the push of aftershocks from the Mexican Revolution led thousands of Mexican laborers to come north. In the period 1905–1909 only 21,732 Mexicans had migrated to the United States, comprising less than one percent of all immigration. By contrast, from 1915 to 1919, 91,075 Mexicans migrated, comprising almost eight percent of total immigration.³⁶ This movement increased tensions in the Southwest, with one Texan observing “a fear constantly stored away in the back of the El Pasoan mind that these Mexicans will take it in their head to have an especially-appointed uprising at the expense of the Americans.”³⁷ Despite increased concern after the publication of the Zimmerman Telegram, her fears proved unfounded, as little violence accompanied the Mexican migration north.

TURNING CIVILIANS INTO SOLDIERS

For the United States, turning civilians into soldiers presented a particular area of concern. The obvious answer to the army’s manpower dilemma was to introduce conscription, or what the administration tellingly called channeled manpower. Despite its evident advantages in filling the ranks quickly, conscription came with unpleasant associations to most Americans, including many members of Wilson’s own party. Conscription symbolized the very denial of freedom and excessive militarism that the Americans wanted to eliminate from Europe. To a people that valued their liberty as much as Americans did, the notion of the state compelling military service and thereby effectively choosing who would live and die seemed much more Prussian than American; indeed many German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian immigrants had come to the United States in part to avoid being forced into military service. Even many supporters of the war drew the line at conscription, just as they had resisted the notion of a European-style Universal Military Training system in the years before the war. Wilson began by drafting conscription legislation that removed the most odious and problematic features of the Civil War era draft. The new selective service system required men selected to serve in person for the duration of the war. Substitution, the system of hiring someone to serve in one’s place, was thereby ended; the administration hoped that a system without substitution would be less open to charges of class bias and underscore the image of the war as a national crisis requiring the efforts of all sectors of society.

Conscription affected American lives in a variety of ways. It removed thousands of young men from their local communities, placing strains on marriages and families. It also created economic opportunities for those

best positioned to change jobs. The administration of the draft itself rested in the hands of local civilian officials in order to avoid the appearance of a distant and heavy-handed government making capricious decisions on who would serve and who would not. Congress and the army set general guidelines regarding the kinds of men they did and did not want, but the ultimate decisions lay in the hands of over 4,000 local draft boards. Notably, these boards were composed of civilian leaders from local communities, not army officers. The members of these boards ensured that all men of draft age from their region made themselves available for military service. They also administered draft exemptions to men who were sole providers for dependents unable to care for themselves as well as exemptions based on occupation, physical or mental defect, or questions of disloyalty to the United States. The system also provided for conscientious objector status, whereby religious pacifists could accept noncombatant work either in the army or on the home front, at the discretion of the local boards.

Traditional civilian antipathy toward compulsory military service meant that not all American civilians accepted the draft. Several legal challenges ensued, most notably that by Minnesota socialist Joseph Arver, who had been arrested for refusing to register. Arver and others argued that the Constitution did not authorize the federal government to raise an army by conscription and also argued that compulsory military service violated the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude. Arver's case took just six months to reach the Supreme Court, which ruled unanimously that conscription was legal because the right of the government to compel military service fell under the constitutional mandate for Congress to raise an army.³⁸

Arver was not alone in his opposition to the system. More than 300,000 Americans refused to register for the draft and tens of thousands more deserted before reporting to their units. Organized resistance to the draft was rare, although it did exist. Most opposition to military service occurred in isolated and impoverished regions that saw little benefit to be gained from a war with Germany. In Eastern Oklahoma about 900 poor farmers were arrested without violence when they staged what became known as the Green Corn Rebellion against military service in the summer of 1917. Similarly, communities in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas often hid their young men and organized armed posses to prevent federal agents from enforcing the law. They succeeded in intimidating local sheriffs and federal agents alike into ignoring their unlawful behavior and succeeded in avoiding military service.³⁹

Despite these isolated incidents, the vast majority of Americans cooperated with the system, providing more than enough soldiers for the campaigns of 1918. Nevertheless, the selective service system faced other problems, including the potentially divisive issue of whether and how to draft African Americans. Several white Americans, North and South, argued against drafting blacks at all, either out of disregard for their potential

as soldiers or for fear of sparking a violent white reaction. One South Carolina congressman warned his colleagues against drafting blacks, telling them that if they did so, "you won't have to go to Germany to have a war. You will have it right here." His comments spurred shouts of support and rebel yells from many of his fellow congressmen.⁴⁰ President Wilson's own intense racism meant that African Americans could expect little sympathy from the White House.

Black leaders like the widely respected W.E.B. DuBois urged that blacks be included in the draft. As editor of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's newspaper *The Crisis*, he urged blacks to register for the draft. Citing emancipation during the Civil War as an example of how black service to the nation could lead to civil rights gains, he hoped that black military service could lead to similar gains. More importantly, blacks in uniform might demonstrate once and for all that racist stereotypes of black inferiority were based on nothing but unfounded prejudices.

Other black leaders, such as poet James Weldon Johnson, argued that black military service made a mockery of the administration's own goals to spread freedom and democracy. It was understood by all that even if the army did accept black soldiers, it would do so on the basis of segregated units commanded by white officers and sergeants, a principle that DuBois felt he lacked the political power to challenge. It was equally obvious that the army would make every effort to ensure that black sergeants and officers (if indeed the army would even commission blacks) had no authority over white soldiers. Johnson therefore demanded that civil rights reform and the commissioning of black officers come before, not after, black support for the war.

Despite such arguments, DuBois and his supporters were pleased with the efforts of blacks to register for the draft. They were less pleased with the way in which the draft system treated young black men. Local draft boards, almost exclusively white, proved significantly less willing to grant deferments to blacks, meaning that a higher percentage of blacks served in the military during World War I than whites. Black leaders complained especially vociferously about the willingness of draft boards to exempt whites who owned subsistence farms, but not blacks in the same situation.

Racial tension flared within the army, especially when black troops defied segregation ordinances near army posts. Such incidents were also a function of the rapid mobilization of American society and its impact on local communities. The most violent such incident occurred at Camp Logan, near Houston, in August, 1917. Black soldiers, protesting the beating and jailing of a black soldier by Houston police, armed themselves and soon grew edgy at the rumor (unfounded) that a white mob was coming to lynch the arrested soldier. Tensions mounted on both sides and violence soon ensued. Five police officers, eight civilians, and four black soldiers died as a result of the rioting. The army responded with 29 death

sentences and 53 life sentences for black soldiers involved. The case, with mounting calls for justice from the black community, remained a hot political issue until President Calvin Coolidge released many of the men still imprisoned.

The frequency of racial incidents also reflects the ways that the war impacted some communities more than others. The movement of African Americans, both soldiers and civilians, upset local race relations in a number of places. The East St. Louis riot, mentioned above, resulted from competition between blacks and whites for jobs and housing. In other places, the arrival of black soldiers posed a clear threat to segregation. Houston and Waco, Texas, were among towns that experienced racial tension and violence during the war years.

LIKE A BIBLICAL PROPHECY COME TRUE

Boston and Philadelphia were among the first American places to experience the influenza epidemic of 1918. It appears now that the disease most likely came to the United States through American soldiers returning from Europe in 1918. The first wave, in the spring, was relatively mild. The second wave, which began in August, had devastating effects. The flu made one in four Americans sick, killed 500,000 people in the United States alone, caused a drop in war production of more than one-third, and forced the cancellation of the September call-up of 142,000 men. As many as 10,000,000 people may have died worldwide.

The flu appeared to come out of nowhere, and struck some Americans as being "like a biblical prophecy come true."⁴¹ It caused a nationwide panic as it spread across the country, killing the young and the old, the sick and the healthy. More than 40 percent of the navy and 36 percent of the army caught the flu. Unsure of the virus's origins, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* speculated that it might have been intentionally planted by German agents anxious of disrupting Liberty Bond rallies. Although not true (the Germans were suffering as badly as the Americans), the severity of the ailment and the uncertainty surrounding its origins and methods of transmission added to the national anxiety. As noted earlier, the flu led to mass closings of public events; Philadelphia even banned church services. In Seattle, streetcar passengers were required to wear gauze masks, and in Washington the Supreme Court went into recess early.⁴² The remoteness of rural areas proved to be little protection. The disease spread faster than the nation's health system could track it and prepare for it, then it disappeared, as quickly as it came.

CONCLUSIONS

For most American civilians, the Great War involved much less sacrifice and much less change to daily lives than it did for Europeans. The physical

remoteness of the war and relatively limited food shortages meant that the war did not threaten the lives of Americans on the home front as it did Europeans. America's participation in the war, moreover, lasted just over a year and a half; American soldiers were only engaged in large combat operations during the last six months of the war. Had the war continued into 1919, as General John Pershing had expected, then the combat burden placed on American forces would have been substantially larger. It is reasonable to assume that sacrifices on the home front would have grown accordingly.

The most important impacts on civilians were therefore temporary. Americans did not face the monumental tasks of rebuilding their societies or of finding psychological mechanisms for dealing with mourning on the tremendous scale faced by the Germans, French, or British. Furthermore, the war had been too brief to have large-scale impacts on American political, social, or economic patterns. Most changes were accelerations of ongoing patterns such as industrialization, urbanization, and the growing role of African Americans in the northern economy.

Nevertheless, the war had given Americans their first taste of power on the European stage. The frustrations of the Paris Peace Conference and the inability of Woodrow Wilson to make good on his many high-minded promises led to considerable disillusionment in the years following the war. Although not all Americans became isolationists, the general American trend was clearly anti-European, as evidenced by the much more restrictive immigration laws passed in the 1920s. One of the era's most celebrated writers, F. Scott Fitzgerald, captured the mood of disillusion in an essay inspired by the violent dispersal of the 1919 May Day parade in New York City. Note Fitzgerald's identification of the protesters with military service as well as his belief that the demonstration had been broken up at the behest of powerful financiers and industrialists:

When the police rode down the demobilized country boys in Madison Square, it was the sort of measure bound to alienate the more intelligent young men from the prevailing order. . . . If goose-livered businessmen had this effect on the government, then maybe we had gone to war for J. P. Morgan's loans after all. But, because we were tired of Great Causes, there was no more than a short outbreak of moral indignation, typified by [John] Dos Passos' *Three Soldiers*.

"The events of 1919," Fitzgerald concluded, "left us cynical rather than revolutionary."⁴³ Even the rise of Nazism and Japanese militarism did not shake Americans from this attitude toward foreign affairs until the attack on Pearl Harbor forced American civilians to once again deal with the realities of war on a global scale.

NOTES

1. The boll weevil entered the United States from Mexico in 1892. It struck Louisiana's cotton fields severely from 1906 to 1910. Mississippi and Alabama

avoided the worst of the weevil's effects until 1913 and 1916, respectively. For a fuller discussion on the weevil's impact on black southerners and their increased migration north, see James Grossman, *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 28–30.

2. Maurine Weiner Greenwald, *Women, War, and Work: The Impact of World War I on Women Workers in the United States* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980), pp. 5–12.

3. A reproduction of the poster can be found in Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, and Paul Paret, eds. *Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 25.

4. The crimes of the German Army in Belgium were widely reported in the American media, leading to a great deal of sympathy for the Allied cause. Many of these incidents were faithfully reported, but many were also exaggerations or the products of the overactive salesmanship of eager journalists. For a detailed scholarly discussion of the German atrocities (real and imagined) see John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). A more negative treatment of German behavior is provided by Larry Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).

5. Quoted in Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), p. 167.

6. Willard Newton, "Over There for Uncle Sam: A Daily Diary of World War I," p. 90, typescript, Imperial War Museum, London, record location 78/51/1.

7. Meirion and Susie Harries, *The Last Days of Innocence: America at War, 1917–1918* (New York: Vintage, 1997), p. 159.

8. Paret, *Persuasive Images*, pp. 55, 65, and 66.

9. Norman Thomas quoted in David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 76.

10. Ronald Schaffer, *America in the Great War: The Rise of the Welfare State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 14.

11. The text of the act itself can be found at: <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/usspy.html>.

12. Quoted in Schaffer, *America in the Great War*, p. 15.

13. Eight players for the Chicago White Sox were accused of accepting money from gamblers to throw games during the 1919 World Series. The connection of baseball to gambling threatened to destroy the reputation of the sport and its rejuvenation after the low attendance figures of the war years. Landis accepted the job of commissioner on condition that he be given nearly unlimited powers. See Eliot Asinof, *Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and the 1919 World Series* (New York: Owl Books, 2000).

14. Meirion and Susie Harries, *The Last Days of Innocence*, p. 280; and Robert Zieger, *America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience* (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2000), p. 70.

15. Schaffer, *America in the Great War*, pp. 39–40.

16. Kennedy, *Over Here*, p. 112.

17. Quoted in Zieger, *America's Great War*, p. 76.

18. For a more detailed description of the system see Charles Gilbert, *American Financing of World War I* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1970).

19. Meirion and Susie Harries, *The Last Days of Innocence*, p. 285.

20. Quoted in Richard Schweitzer, *The Cross and the Trenches: Religious Faith and Doubt among British and American Great War Soldiers* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 8–9.
21. Schweitzer, *The Cross and the Trenches*, pp. 6–11.
22. The United States did not declare war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire until December 7, 1917.
23. Meirion and Susie Harries, *The Last Days of Innocence*, pp. 138–139.
24. See <http://www.umich.edu/~bhl/athdept/football/fbteam/>. My thanks to Greg Kinney of the Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor for helping me locate these figures.
25. Meirion and Susie Harries, *The Last Days of Innocence*, pp. 14–15.
26. Robert Stanley, *The Celluloid Empire: A History of the American Movie Industry* (New York: Communication Arts, 1978), p. 29.
27. Robert Bruce, *A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), p. 163.
28. Schaffer, *America in the Great War*, p. 20.
29. Kennedy, *Over Here*, p. 68.
30. Meirion and Susie Harries, *The Last Days of Innocence*, p. 293.
31. William Jordan, "This Damnable Dilemma: African-American Accommodation and Protest during World War I," *The Journal of American History* 81, no. 4 (March, 1995): 1562–83, quotation at p. 1575.
32. Jordan, "Damnable Dilemma," p. 1574.
33. W.E.B. DuBois, "Close Ranks," *The Crisis* 16 (July, 1918), p. 111.
34. Jacqueline Jones, *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present* (New York: Vintage, 1985), p. 156.
35. Quoted in Kennedy, *Over Here*, p. 284.
36. Leo Grebler, Joan Moore, and Ralph Guzman, et al. *The Mexican-American People: The Nation's Second Largest Minority* (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 64.
37. Carey McWilliams, *North From Mexico: The Spanish-Speaking People of the United States* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 108.
38. John Whiteclay Chambers, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: Free Press, 1987), p. 219.
39. "Uncle Sam's Little War in the Ozarks," in Peter Karsten, ed. *The Military in America from the Colonial Era to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 312–316.
40. Quoted in Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, p. 157.
41. Gina Kolata, *Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus That Caused It* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), pp. 4–5.
42. Kolata, *Flu*, pp. 4–5, 12, 18–19, and 53.
43. F. Scott Fitzgerald, "Echoes of the Jazz Age," in Arthur Mizener, ed. *The Fitzgerald Reader* (New York: Scribner's, 1963), p. 323.

FURTHER READING

Barbeau, Arthur and Florette Henri. *The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974.

- Analyzes the tensions in black society and the role of black soldiers in the United States Army.
- Chambers, John Whiteclay II. *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America*. New York: Free Press, 1987.
Remains the best source on the draft in this period.
- Coffman, Edward M. *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1968.
Primarily a military history, but it also connects American battlefield performance to larger societal patterns.
- DeBauche, Leslie Midkiff. *Reel Patriotism: The Movies and World War I*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997.
Describes the uses of a new medium for propaganda purposes.
- Ford, Nancy Gentile. *Americans All! Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2001.
Deftly handles the complex subject of immigrant soldiers.
- Gavin, Lettie. *American Women in World War I: They Also Served*. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 1997. Focuses primarily on women in uniform.
- Greenwald, Maurine Weiner. *Women, War, and Work: The Impact of World War I on Women Workers in the United States*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
The best of a surprisingly thin literature on women and the war.
- Grossman, J. R. *Land of Hope: Chicago, Southerners, and the Great Migration*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Provides an excellent case study of the Great Migration and its impacts.
- Gruber, Carol S. *Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of Higher Learning in America*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975.
Shows the many ways that scholars used their talents to support and justify the war.
- Harries, Meirion, and Susie Harries. *The Last Days of Innocence: America at War, 1917–1918*. New York: Random House, 1997.
Well-written and especially strong on cultural themes.
- Hawley, Ellis. *The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917–1933*. New York: St. Martin's, 1992.
An engaging and innovative study of the impacts of a changing society on the American people.
- Keene, Jennifer. *Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.
Presents a complex analysis of the meanings of military service and includes an important section on African Americans.
- Kennedy, David M. *Over Here: The First World War and American Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
The best single volume on the war and its impacts on civilians.
- Kolata, Gina Bari. *Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus That Caused It*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999.
One of the best sources for understanding the impact of the flu on the United States.
- McCartin, Joseph. *Labor's Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern American Labor Relations, 1912–1921*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Critical for understanding the role and reactions of organized labor.

Schaffer, Ronald. *America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Rates with Kennedy among the best surveys.

Wynn, Neil. *From Progressivism to Prosperity: World War I and American Society*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986.

Places the war into the important context of progressivism.

Zieger, Robert. *America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience*. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2000.

Provides a solid general introduction to the war and its impacts on American society.

THREE

Home-Front Americans at War, 1941–45

Judy Barrett Litoff

World War II presented unprecedented social and economic opportunities for civilians throughout the United States. When the Second World War broke out in Europe in September 1939, the decade-long Depression that had wreaked havoc on the nation's economy remained the primary concern of most Americans. At the height of the Depression, the national unemployment rate reached 30 percent. In inner cities and poverty-stricken rural areas, unemployment figures were even higher. Despite the 1932 campaign promise of Democratic presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt that he would provide a "new deal" for the American people, the imprint of the Depression was still very much a part of the American landscape in 1939. While the passage of a wide array of New Deal legislation that involved massive federal expenditures provided crucial aid to the nation's poor and unemployed, it did not solve the problems of the Depression. Only with the enormous public and private spending that occurred as the nation prepared for World War II would the Depression finally come to an end.

One of the most striking features of the American civilian experience of war is how radically it differed from that of the other major belligerents. For millions of civilians throughout the world, fear, suffering, and hunger dominated their lives. At least 50 million people died worldwide, including 27 million Soviet citizens and 20 million Chinese. Civilians throughout the world experienced the horrors of war firsthand as they witnessed family members being raped and killed, saw their homes and towns destroyed,

participated in hand-to-hand combat, and, in the case of some 6 million European Jews, were rounded up by Nazi authorities and deported to concentration camp hell-holes where they met horrific deaths.

The violence and bloodshed experienced by civilians around the world was truly appalling. Soviet citizens responded to the almost three-year siege of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) by engaging in desperate hand-to-hand combat in order to save their city from Nazi occupation. In Belarus, one out of every four citizens died. Within a few short weeks during late 1937 and early 1938, at least 300,000 Chinese men and women who lived in Nanjing were brutally raped and/or slaughtered by Japanese soldiers who had captured the city on December 13. During the London Blitz of 1940, when the German Luftwaffe launched bombing raids on London and surrounding areas for 57 consecutive days, British civilians responded with resilience and stoic courage. And, of course, the war's conclusion culminated with the dropping of two atomic bombs on August 6 and 9, 1945, nearly obliterating the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and instantly killing tens of thousands of civilians; by year's end, the death toll in those two cities had reached over 200,000.

By contrast, fear, suffering, and hunger were not normally a part of the American home front experience. The American military death toll of just over 400,000, out of an armed force of 16 million men and women, was a low casualty ratio compared to that of the other belligerents. This low casualty rate, coupled with the fact that only minor damage of property occurred within the 48 continental states, meant that the American experience of war was far different from that of other belligerents. Just as importantly, the democratic process continued without interruption in this country. While the exigencies of war forced the electoral process to be put on hold in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the United States held two presidential, three congressional, and hundreds of state elections.

PREWAR DECADE AND WARTIME YEARS

The contrasts between home-front America and that of the rest of the world are matched by the contrasts between the prewar decade and the wartime years. Throughout the 1930s, a strong isolationist sentiment prevailed throughout the United States. Despite the assurances of President Woodrow Wilson, World War I had not been the war to end all wars and to make the world safe for democracy. Polls from the 1930s showed that many Americans believed that intervention in the Great War had been a mistake. Thus, as German and Japanese aggression escalated, the response of Congress was to enact neutrality legislation intended to keep the United States out of future conflicts. However, the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 3, 1939 undercut much of the isolationist sentiment that had dominated the decade.

The “Phony War” of late 1939 and early 1940 provided a brief reprieve for disquieted Americans, but the blitzkrieg during the spring of 1940 when Nazi forces swept through much of Western Europe, followed by the Battle of Britain, brought the reality of war much closer to home. With the establishment of the National Defense Advisory Commission in May 1940, official mobilization for war began. Passage of the Selective Service Act in September 1940, the first peacetime draft in the history of the nation, virtually assured that the United States would be brought into the conflict.

Over the course of the next 12 months, a steady stream of events pushed the nation closer to war. On December 29, 1940, President Roosevelt addressed the nation over the radio and declared, “We must be the great arsenal of democracy.” Three months later, in March 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, which provided crucial aid to the Allies; during the latter part of May the Office of Civilian Defense was created; and, on May 27, President Roosevelt declared a “state of national emergency.” In August 1941, Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met at Argentia, Newfoundland, and issued the Atlantic Charter, proclaiming that the war was being fought “to ensure life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve the rights of man and justice.”

By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, American citizens had anticipated the nation’s entry into World War II for many months. Following Pearl Harbor, any remaining remnants of isolationism all but disappeared, and the American people emphatically supported the call to arms. The December 8 congressional declaration of war included only one dissenting vote, that of long-time peace activist, Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin of Montana. Military recruiting offices were flooded with volunteers. Every neighborhood had its own volunteer air raid warden. Women joined the Red Cross and other wartime social service organizations by the millions. Children participated in scrap metal and paper drives. With the exception of approximately 100,000 men who claimed conscientious objector status, 6,000 of whom went to prison for refusing to participate in either civilian or military alternative service programs, support for World War II was almost universal. However, established pacifist organizations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the American Friends Service Committee, the War Resisters League, and the Catholic Worker Movement actively opposed the draft, advocated the liberalization of immigration laws to help refugees, called for a negotiated peace, and condemned the incarceration of Japanese Americans. Whether one of the overwhelming majority of Americans who vigorously embraced the war effort or a member of the small pacifist minority, the scope of World War II was such that it directly touched the lives of almost every American citizen.

The contrast between the poverty of the 1930s and the prosperity of the World War II years is as striking as the shift from isolationism to

almost universal support for the war effort. At the height of the Depression decade, unemployment reached 30 percent, but during the war years unemployment averaged only 1 percent and consisted mostly of people moving from one job to another. Per capita incomes doubled, especially since workers discovered that they could work 50 or more hours a week and receive time-and-a-half pay for all hours over 40. Effective wage and price controls meant that inflation was moderate, and personal savings increased tenfold.

The experiences of Polly Crow, a young war wife who worked on the swing shift at Jefferson Boat and Machine Company in Anderson, Indiana, where landing ship tanks were built, illustrates how the war provided opportunities for personal savings to grow. On November 8, 1944, she wrote to her husband serving with the army in Europe and commented: "I like it here [at Jefferson Boat] . . . and am out for every penny I can get while the getting is good, right? We now have about \$780.00 in the bank and 5 bonds which sho looks good to me and as soon as I get the buggie in good shape and all the Xmas extras over then I can really pile it away."¹

TEAMWORK AND MAKING DO

During the Depression decade, people often felt isolated and alone, but the wartime years represented a time when the American people recognized that they were in this war together. The idea that "we can do it"—whatever the challenge—permeated the thinking of Americans. Nowhere was this spirit of togetherness better reflected than in the campaign to sell war bonds. To help finance the war, the War Finance Committee launched eight massive war bond drives between 1942 and 1945. Newspapers and magazines donated space to advertise these drives. Radio stations did likewise. Hollywood stars rallied to support the war bond campaign, and the well known and beautiful actress Dorothy Lamour was credited with selling 350 million dollars in war bonds. War bond booths were located in public buildings such as schools, movie theaters, and food stores. By the end of the war, about 190 billion dollars of bonds had been sold to some 85 million Americans, a record that has yet to be matched.

With breathtaking speed, the United States converted its industries to the production of military goods. The War Productions Board, established in 1942, set priorities and prohibited the production of "nonessential" civilian goods such as automobiles, home appliances, and a long list of other products. The automobile industry, in particular, produced tons of war materiel. Newly constructed aircraft plants and shipyards turned out military airplanes and warships in record-breaking numbers. Most war plants operated on a 24-hour basis, adding a swing shift from 4:00 P.M. to midnight and a graveyard shift from midnight to 8:00 A.M. Although there were occasional "wildcat" strikes and a major coal strike by the United Mine Workers in 1943, the labor movement as a whole united solidly behind

the war effort, agreeing to a “no-strike pledge.” By war’s end, the United States could rightfully claim that it had become the “arsenal of democracy,” providing vital military supplies to its allies around the world.

With the vast majority of the nation’s resources going toward war production, shortages and rationing of consumer goods were very much a part of the home front experience, and Americans quickly learned how to “make do with less.” Early in 1942, the recently created Office of Price Administration began to oversee the new rationing system as well as determine wartime price ceilings. Each month, families were given ration books filled with coupons that could be used to purchase certain foods such as sugar, butter, and meat. Each food had a certain point value. Once the coupons were used up, families could not buy additional rationed goods until the next month. In April 1943, Saidee R. Leach of Edgewood, Rhode Island, wrote to her son, Douglas, an ensign who served with the navy in the Pacific, and told him how in the absence of fresh meat, she discovered that “Spam friend in butter made a very tasty Easter dinner.” The following month she related how she and a neighbor arrived at the local Piggly Wiggly “just as five hams arrived so we pooled our ration points and bought one together having it split down length-wise so as to have it evenly distributed.” On another occasion she explained how she “bought a piece of beef called Utility Grade which is so far below Grade A that no points were required and by adding catsup to the kettle which helped to tenderize it we had one of the nicest stews I ever made.”²

Housewives came to understand that standing in long lines and spending hours in search of scarce consumer goods was now a standard feature of their lives. Audrey Davis wrote to her Navy husband at sea and exclaimed:

Honey, I’m a success. I got sheets! Such a time—went to four of the biggest stores first and was turned down cold. Finally ended up in the basement of J.C. Penny’s looking for seamless stockings . . . another extinct item—and saw some bedding so on the off-chance, I asked. The girl said, shh, and sneaked into a back room and brought out some carefully wrapped—I didn’t even know what I had bought, until I got home. I felt like someone buying hooch during Prohibition.³

Because of the shortage of rubber, gasoline was rationed in order to conserve tires. In addition, the wartime speed limit was set at 35 miles per hour to prevent tires from wearing out too quickly. “Joy rides” were discouraged, and along the East Coast pleasure rides were actually banned. Moreover, the automobile industry, which quickly shifted to the production of heavy military vehicles such as tanks and trucks, produced no new cars from 1942 until 1945. Consequently, automobile maintenance took on new importance.


Huge salvage drives also brought the American people together. Women saved fat drippings left over from cooking that could then be

used in making explosives. Nylons and silks were saved to make parachutes. Scrap metal and paper drives were held in communities across the country. In addition, Americans were encouraged to recycle almost everything from toothpaste tubes to waste paper. While these salvage and recycling campaigns did not always produce material of value to the war effort, they did help to boost morale and give home-front Americans the sense that they were contributing to the winning of the war.

In response to food shortages, Americans planted millions of Victory Gardens. At the height of war, nearly 20 million gardens were grown, yielding about 40 percent of all vegetables produced in the United States. At the end of the war, the Department of Agriculture estimated total production from Victory Gardens at over one million tons of vegetables valued at 85 million dollars.

Victory Gardens could be found everywhere, including private lots, public parks, schoolyards, and prison grounds. Planting a Victory Garden became a favorite household activity. Children, in particular, took pride in the crops that they produced. In June 1945, 11-year-old David Berman wrote to his father serving with the army in Europe about the progress of his Victory Garden: "My garden is coming along. The weeds are under control. I cleared away some more space and planted four rows of beans. My radishes are almost ready to eat."⁴

Of course, some Americans grouched about rationing and having to wait in long lines in order to purchase scarce goods. Others dealt in the black



In World War II, the government reprised from World War I its encouragement of local gardens to free up food supplies for the war effort. (Library of Congress)

market by purchasing goods without ration coupons or by buying goods above the established price ceilings. But most Americans adopted a can-do spirit by following the wartime admonition to “use it up, wear it out, make it do, or go without.”

The entertainment industry also rallied behind the war effort. The Office of War Information (OWI), established by Congress in 1942 to help gather support for the war, encouraged radio stations, songwriters, musicians, and the motion picture industry to promote wartime patriotism. By the 1940s, most American homes had at least one radio, and the radio proved to be a powerful tool for promoting support for the war. Americans gathered around their radios to hear “fireside chats” by President Roosevelt. They heard broadcast journalists like Edward R. Murrow report from the front lines of battle. Radio programs, such as the “Kraft Music Hall” featuring singer Bing Crosby, also helped to promote patriotism. Popular songs evoked wartime themes and included such favorites as “Remember Pearl Harbor,” “Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition,” “Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy,” “Don’t Sit under the Apple Tree with Anyone Else but Me,” and “It’s Been a Long, Long Time.”

Musicians, who were on strike during much of the war because they did not receive remuneration or compensation when their records played on jukeboxes and the radio, joined together in 1943 to produce special 12-inch V-Discs for the troops. This allowed artists who recorded on competing record labels and had not worked together for years to combine their talents for these special wartime releases. In total, about 900 V-Discs were produced, resulting in the recording of hundreds of rare jazz and big band tunes. Even after the musicians’ strike ended late in the war, artists continued to record V-Discs as part of their patriotic duty to the fighting forces.

The motion picture industry produced movies based on actual events including *Wake Island*, *Bataan*, and *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo*, as well as movies such as *Since You Went Away* that heralded women on the home front. Animated cartoons featured Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, Bugs Bunny, and Popeye drumming up support for the war. Documentary films included Frank Capra’s *Why We Fight* series and combat documentaries, including *The Battle of Midway*, *The Fighting Lady*, and *To the Shores of Iwo Jima*, all produced by John Ford. Moviegoers could also see actual war-time film footage on the “March of Time” newsreels that aired in theaters before feature-length films.

While the Office of War Information made certain that the war was marketed in a way that did not lower morale, censorship was relatively mild during World War II. The Office of Censorship focused most of its efforts on overseas communications, including telegrams, letters, and telephone calls. Moreover, there was a considerable degree of voluntary censorship, with newspapers and radio stations often withholding from the public information to which they had privy.

No wartime secret was more tightly kept than that of the research and development of the atomic bomb. Drawing upon the theoretical work of

European scientists, several of whom had fled Nazi and Fascist oppression and settled in the United States and England, a combination of scientists, engineers, and thousands of workers at three secret cities and several smaller facilities successfully developed the atomic bomb in less than three years.

Fearful that Nazi Germany might develop atomic weapons, the United States launched the Manhattan Project, the code name for its secret wartime atomic program, in August 1942. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was responsible for the project, with General Leslie Groves as its director. The three secret cities of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Hanford, Washington, and Los Alamos, New Mexico, were built with breathtaking speed. These atomic boom towns were home to tens of thousands of workers and their families. Oak Ridge, the largest of the three secret cities, employed more than 500,000 people over the course of the project. At its peak, 80,000 construction workers and 40,000 production or factory workers were employed at the same time in Oak Ridge.⁵

Secrecy was always of utmost importance. Workers could only be told that they were being hired to work on a "government project" for an unknown length of time. Outgoing mail was censored and telephone calls were monitored. At Los Alamos, incoming mail was addressed to "P.O. Box 1663, Santa Fe, New Mexico." Birth certificates of infants born at Los Alamos listed P.O. Box 1663 as their place of birth. Most employees of the Manhattan Project, both military and civilian, knew only about their particular job. Many scientific personnel had only a very general idea about the nature of their work.

At Oak Ridge, uranium was processed into the explosive material needed for the atomic bomb. Plutonium was produced at Hanford. The site at Los Alamos, under the direction of physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, actually designed and assembled the two bombs that were dropped on Japan: a uranium bomb, code-named "Little Boy," on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and a plutonium bomb, code-named "Fat Man," on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945.

In developing the atomic bomb with such spectacular speed and in great secrecy, Americans had once again demonstrated their can-do spirit. Intelligent and resourceful scientists and engineers were central to the Manhattan Project's success. But as Russell B. Olwell has demonstrated in his study of Oak Ridge, much of the success of the project was also due to "the skill and muscle of tens of thousands of construction workers, electricians, and production workers."⁶

A NATION ON THE MOVE

Geographic mobility was another distinguishing hallmark of the World War II years. Approximately 20 percent of the United States population was on the move as one of the major demographic shifts in American

history took place. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that 15.3 million civilians moved, over half of them across state lines. In addition, the 16 million American citizens who served in the military traveled to distant posts around the nation and the world. These statistics, as startling as they are, actually underrepresent the amount of travel that occurred as many persons moved multiple times during the war years.⁷

People who had barely ventured beyond the immediate vicinity of their hometowns crisscrossed the nation as they flocked to new job openings in shipyards and war plants located in cities like Detroit, Pittsburg, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego, Oakland, Portland, and Seattle. Southerners moved west or north where most of the war industries were located; westerners moved south where most military bases were located. Hillbillies from Arkansas, lumberjacks from Maine, Cajuns from Louisiana, Poles from Chicago, and Jews from Brooklyn, who would have otherwise never met, found themselves living and working together at locations far from their hometowns.

Service wives who followed their husbands to their military postings were also a part of this great migration. The wartime housing shortage, especially acute around military installations, presented special challenges to these women. The popular press frequently offered suggestions to non-military families on how to make space in their homes for service wives, who numbered about five million, or one wife in seven, at the peak of the war. Moreover, there were one million more marriages from 1940 to 1943 than would have been expected at prewar rates, which, in turn, ushered in a miniature baby boom and further exacerbated the housing shortage.⁸ Magazines encouraged women to practice “old-fashioned neighborliness” by inviting war brides and their young children into their homes. Nevertheless, service wives sometimes had to double and even triple in tight quarters.⁹

Not everyone agreed that service wives should follow their husbands to military bases. Citing the pressures on already overcrowded travel facilities, the Office of War Information urged wives to remain at home. At least some observers described those women who went anyway as “selfish,” pointing out that prices were high and conditions near military camps far too crowded. Nevertheless, most wives felt it was important to be with their husbands for as long as possible.¹⁰ In a November 1, 1944 letter to her Marine husband, in which she reminisced about their travels in Virginia, North Carolina, and California prior to his shipment to the Pacific Theater, Marjorie Killpack of Ogden, Utah, wrote: “Do you remember the broken bed at Mrs. Royens and how damn squeaky it was. Also, the bed we broke down at Mrs. Kelly’s in Quantico. Gee, we’ve sure left a ‘trail of broken beds’ behind us.”¹¹

The popular press discussed the subject of service wives and travel in minute detail. A reporter for the *New York Times Magazine* described these women as “wandering members of a huge unorganized club.”

They recognized each other on sight, exchanged views on living quarters, babies, and allotments, demonstrated pride in their husbands, and helped each other in times of difficulty.¹² Writing from the St. Louis Railroad Station on July 29, 1944, war bride Frances Zulauf emphasized the excitement of wartime travel when she reported to her husband, Bob, an Army Air Forces pilot stationed on the island of Corsica in the Mediterranean, that "[I]t's 1:25 a.m. and here I sit, practically alone, waiting for 8:00 a.m. . . . Oh yes, I missed my train in Cincinnati this morning by two minutes. . . . Another girl missed the train, too, and we had a gay time walking around Cincinnati. . . . All my life I've wanted something interesting like this to happen to me, and it has. . . . This is really a trip for the books."¹³

Women separated from their fiancés by wartime exigencies traveled alone to meet future in-laws, and wives made frequent journeys to the homes of their husbands' families. Women also traveled great distances for brief rendezvous with sweethearts and husbands. The lobby of the St. Francis Hotel in San Francisco and under the clock at New York City's Grand Central Station were two legendary meeting places. Perhaps the most poignant journeys of all were the hurriedly arranged and occasionally clandestine trips to ports of embarkation to say good-bye.

Women could find a great deal of advice in the press and even in books on how to ease the difficulties of wartime travel. The *Atlantic* magazine published articles condensed from Barbara Klaw's best-selling book, *Camp Follower: The Story of a Soldier's Wife*. Klaw reported on train travel, the difficulty of finding hotel rooms, the shortage of rental rooms, and the "camaraderie" she shared with others in the same circumstances.¹⁴ Wives were told what to pack and "how to live in a trunk." The many items to take included corduroy bed covers, valances, chintz curtains (which could be cut to any length), slipcovers for battered furniture, cocktail shakers, game boards, tablecloths, napkins, electric grills, clocks, radios, ashtrays, toasters, percolators, and folding ironing boards. This may seem like a lot, but paper products such as handkerchiefs, towels, and tablecloths were not widely used during this period.

Decorating and making a place homelike kept wives busy for a time, but filling the "daytime void" soon became paramount for most of these service wives. They joined the Red Cross, drove in motor pools, worked as volunteers in hospitals and military service centers, gave blood and helped at blood centers, and took nurses' aide courses. They attended lectures run by the extension services of the state universities, where they learned about first aid, treatment for common diseases such as colds, and how to provide proper nutrition in wartime. Many war wives found temporary employment; approximately one-half of service wives worked for wages at some point during the war. However, it was often difficult to find jobs because employers were hesitant to hire transients.¹⁵

Articles in the popular press also discussed the special hazards of traveling on crowded trains and buses with young children, exhorting

mothers to take extra precautions and carefully prepare for such trips. Mothers were told to avoid the logistical problem associated with carrying too much luggage, but, at the same time, they were reminded to bring sufficient diapers, bottles, baby food, and other necessities. The title of a wartime publication on this topic, issued by the federal government, *If Your Baby MUST Travel in Wartime*, emphasized the difficulties. Nevertheless, women continued to travel all over the country with their babies.¹⁶ As one young mother prepared for a long train trip with her two-month old daughter to her husband's posting in Louisiana, she wrote to him that she planned to make "a complete list of my clothes and everything, so that when I begin to pack I won't leave something out. I shall bring as little as possible—now, I *will* need the cover for her cradle, won't I?" Four days later she noted, "I need more than my two bags for both our things. I may send the coffee maker and bassinette on ahead of me. You have an alarm clock, don't you? Let me know."¹⁷

With some 12 million American servicemen assigned to overseas duty, millions of young women were left at home and forced to make do on their own. Women married to enlisted men received an average monthly allotment from the government of \$50—not nearly enough to make ends meet. Consequently, many service wives returned to their childhood homes to live with their parents; others moved in with other service wives.

During the dark days of separation from their loved ones, young war brides and war wives were forced to grow up, become adults, and take on tasks they would never have thought of earlier. They cared for their young children, became proficient cooks and housekeepers, entered the workforce for the first time, ably managed their finances on meager allotment checks, learned automobile maintenance, and demonstrated their maturity in many other ways. One young war bride wrote to her husband serving with the army in Europe in October 1944 and noted, "This War has certainly made me realize just how foolish I was about a great many things. Guess I just hadn't really grown up before."¹⁸ Another war bride confided to her husband, a pilot with the Army Air Forces in Europe in early January 1945, that "I think there's no doubt that this sacrifice we're making will force us to be bigger, more tolerant, better citizens than we would have been otherwise. . . . I'm learning—in this pause in my life—just what I want for happiness later on—so much different than what I wanted two years ago."¹⁹

MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE FIGHTING FORCES

Throughout these difficult separations, service wives maintained close contact with the fighting forces by listening to radio broadcasts about the war, watching newsreels and movies, and carefully reading newspaper and magazine articles that reported on the activities of United States forces scattered around the world. The columns of well-known journalists, such as the Pulitzer-prize winning reporter Ernie Pyle who wrote about life at

the battlefield, were scrutinized for information concerning the whereabouts of relatives and friends. In a January 31, 1945 letter, Catherine Pike of Esmond, Rhode Island informed her husband, who was engaged in heavy combat with the Allied forces in Europe, that "I even know where you are exactly by following the news closely." Seven weeks later she wrote, "George, you'd be surprised if you knew how much I know about the war, how much reading I do about it, and how well I can talk about it."²⁰ Distant geographical place names, such as Anzio, Okinawa, Dresden, Stalingrad, and Yalta, were incorporated into everyday vocabulary. People at home, whether wives, sweethearts, family members, friends, or "armchair generals," could and did follow the war in detail.

Newspapers and magazines regularly published maps of the events taking place in the various theaters of war. Public buildings, such as schools and post offices, featured war maps on their bulletin boards. Moreover, maps lined the walls of many American homes as armchair strategists marked the advance of Allied forces. Saidee Leach wrote to her son serving with the Navy in the Pacific about hanging "the new geographic map of your part of the world . . . in the 'bulkhead' over the kitchen radiator" and placing the pins in Leyte, but she also noted that "the unconquered territory still looks huge!"²¹ The war maps of Keith Frazier Somerville of Cleveland, Mississippi, even spread onto the walls of her bathroom, and she noted in her wartime journal, "Now I have to stand in the tub to follow the African campaigns and we . . . go so far as to conduct guests into the Maproom."²²

MAIL AND MORALE

In their efforts to bridge the miles which separated them from the fighting forces, mothers, fathers, war wives, sweethearts, and friends wrote billions of letters to loved ones stationed far from home. On the home front as well as the battle front, the mail was universally recognized to be the number-one morale builder. Service wives often set aside a special time each evening to compose letters to husbands, for, as one letter writer commented, this was "the best time of each twenty-four hours." From the seclusion of their bedrooms, women recalled past events, included information about the day's activities, discussed the whereabouts of relatives and friends, and even symbolically smoked "the last cigg before cutting the light off" just as they had done before the separation.²³

The 1942 *Annual Report of the Postmaster General* of the United States emphasized "that frequent and rapid communication with parents, associates, and loved ones strengthens fortitude, enlivens patriotism, makes loneliness endurable, and inspires to even greater devotion men and women who are carrying on our fight far from home and friends. We know that the good effect of expeditious mail service on those of us at home is immeasurable."²⁴

A widely displayed government poster exhorted friends and loved ones to “Be with him at every mail call.” War correspondent Ernie Pyle placed “good mail service” at the head of his list of soldiers’ needs.²⁵ *Woman’s Home Companion* underscored the importance of receiving mail from servicemen when, in May 1942, it began publishing a regular, monthly column, “Share Your Mail,” which continued throughout the war years. In launching this special feature, the editors of the magazine remarked: “This is directed to you proud and lucky receivers of mail from American boys fighting on all our far-flung fronts.”²⁶

Magazine cover art vividly portrayed the mail/morale motif with depictions of war brides, mothers, and men in combat receiving and reading letters. Popular songs, movies, novels, short stories, feature articles, advertisements, advice manual, greeting cards, and radio programs all accentuated the importance of the mail in maintaining morale.²⁷

Church, school, and community groups organized massive letter-writing campaigns in order to ensure that American men and women in the armed services regularly received mail from home. In Atlanta, Georgia, for example, Rusha Wesley, principal of the Lee Street Elementary School, located the names and addresses of more than 300 graduates of the school who served in the military. She and her students sent hundreds of handmade cards and letters to Lee Street graduates stationed at far-flung fronts. Even preschool children dictated letters to their fathers in the service. In May 1943, four-year-old Sammy Berman dictated a letter to his mother that included an innocent plea to his “Poppa” serving with the Army in Europe to “come back because I want you to. I wish you would come back right now. Are you going to come back some day? Poppa, are you, are you?”²⁸

Children’s wartime letters to absent fathers tell of participating in school scrap metal and paper drives, playing war games, planting Victory Gardens, purchasing war stamps and bonds, and helping with rationing. Children wrote of going to state fairs where they viewed American and German military equipment on display and enjoyed the “General Vitamin” food exhibit with its “armies” of fruits and vegetables divided into “companies” of vitamins A, B, and C. Older children kept themselves posted about the war and lined their rooms with world maps so that they could mark the advance of the Allied forces. And, of course, like Sammy Berman, many of the letters of children were filled with declarations of love, longing, and concern for the safety of their fathers. Indeed, the war-time letters of children demonstrate that they were actively engaged in the war effort, and they provide an important example of how World War II touched the lives of everyone—including America’s children.²⁹

The number of letters that were written during the Second World War was prodigious. From 1943 to 1945, the amount of mail sent overseas increased by 513 percent. During the entire period of American involvement in the war, the annual number of pieces of mail handled by the post office rose from almost 28 billion in 1940 to nearly 38 billion in 1945.³⁰

Given the sheer volume of mail that was produced, the American government began to experiment, in 1942, with the reduction of mail onto microfilm for shipping overseas and then enlargement of the film for distribution to the addressees. This not only saved space in scarce wartime transport, but it also helped to ensure that the mail was rapidly distributed. Victory Mail, or V-Mail as the procedure was more commonly called, allowed letters with a bulk weight of 2,575 pounds to be reduced to a mere 45 pounds. V-Mail letters were written on specially designed 8 1/2-by-11 inch stationery available at all post offices. Each piece contained space for about seven hundred typewritten words. After shipment, the letter was delivered to the recipient in the form of a 4-by-5 1/2 -inch photograph.

Because V-Mail letters contained space for only short messages, most wartime letter writers preferred conventional stationery. According to one combat veteran, V-Mail left the reader feeling incomplete, "like a postcard would." But with the help of government posters and well-illustrated magazine articles to explain the procedure, the misgivings of the public gradually subsided. Eventually, more than one billion V-Mail letters were dispatched during the war years.³¹

Civilians paid three cents for V-Mail postage and six cents a half-ounce for airmail letters sent outside the continental United States. This uniform postage rate was established to ensure the secrecy of troop locations around the world as well as to be fair to those whose loved ones were stationed in remote areas. Beginning in March 1942, all ordinary mail, that is, V-Mail and surface letters, sent by members of the armed forces was accorded free transmission.³²

On occasion, domestic mail was censored in an effort to locate saboteurs or to prevent sensitive information about troop training and transport, the location of war plants, and even the weather from reaching the enemy. Publications instructed letter writers on how to avoid running afoul of the censor and urged them to write only one side of the paper so that censorship cuts would not obliterate other parts of the message. During holiday periods, such as Christmas, an immense amount of information on how to package goods for overseas travel, when to mail in order that goods would arrive on time, and even what to put in the packages appeared.³³

The billions of letters that were posted during World War II were extraordinarily important to a nation on the move and in great turmoil. They represent honest accounts written "at the scene" and from the heart, and they capture both the most intimate details in the lives of the American people as well as the great transformations that society at large was undergoing.

ROSIE THE RIVETER

The mobilization of the nation's economy for war created an unprecedented demand for new workers. In response to this need, some 6.5 million women entered the work force. The proportion of women who were

employed increased from 25 percent at the beginning of the war to 36 percent at war's end—an increase greater than that of the previous four decades. The composition of the female labor force also changed as increasing numbers of married and older women found employment. More than 3 million of the new female workers were married. As Susan M. Hartmann has noted, “the percentage of all wives who worked outside the home grew from 13.9 in 1940 to 22.5 in 1944,” marking the “first time in the nation's history when there were more married women than single in the female labor force.” Older women over the age of 35 worked as well. The typical prewar wage earner had been young and single; now, she was older and married. This changing profile continued into the postwar era.³⁴

For the first time, women could find employment in heavy industry such as shipyards and defense plants. Women learned how to operate welding machines and rivet guns, read blueprints, maneuver heavy machinery, drive and maintain railroad engines, and even become lead “men” on assembly lines. In total, three million women were employed in defense-related industries. While defense work paid better than most other jobs available to women, such as service and office work, the wages of female industrial workers equaled only 60 percent of what men earned. This discrepancy reflected the fact that women were concentrated in lower-paying, less skilled positions; rarely did they qualify for skilled work.

In sharp contrast to the Depression years of the 1930s, when women were criticized for taking jobs away from men, the woman war worker was highly lauded and “Rosie the Riveter,” the generic term used to describe women workers during World War II, became a national heroine. Newspapers and magazines regularly published stories about strong, powerful women in overalls and hardhats performing “men's jobs” in behalf of the war effort. This image was reinforced early in 1943 when a recruitment poster, commissioned by the U.S. War Production Commission, featured a resolute female worker with upraised muscular arm that included the caption, “We Can Do It!” The May 29, 1943 issue of the *Saturday Evening Post* drew further attention to wartime working women when it published on its cover an extraordinary illustration by Norman Rockwell that depicted an imposing and self-assured riveter, clad in overalls with her shirtsleeves rolled up to reveal commanding, muscular arms. As many wartime writers emphasized, “womanpower is part of this war. . . . It is woman's war as no war has ever been.”³⁵

In a June 1944 letter to her army husband fighting in France, a young war bride proudly proclaimed: “You are now the husband of a career woman—just call me your little Ship Yard Babe!” In subsequent letters, she described the “grand and glorious feeling” of opening her own checking account, gas rationing and automobile maintenance, the many “wolves” on the swing shift, and what it felt like to join a union.³⁶ Betty Bleakmore, a 19-year-old blueprint supervisor at the Douglas Aircraft Plant in Tulsa, Oklahoma, wrote to her sweetheart and husband-to-be, a Marine Corps

pilot, and reported that she was responsible for keeping “all [blue]prints up to date so that the [workers] in the factory can build the planes perfectly for people like you to fly.” She then continued: “Imagine, [me], little Betty, the youngest in her department with seventeen people older than her . . . under her. Of course, I too have higher ups to report to—but I am the big fish in my own little pond—and I love it.”³⁷

As exciting as war work was for women, they often faced exhausting schedules that included a 40-hour-plus workweek, taking care of the many household chores, and, if they had children, finding appropriate child care arrangements. In fact, child care for working mothers was woefully inadequate. The 1942 Lanham Act provided federal funds for 3,100 child care centers that served about 600,000 children, but many more centers were needed. Unfortunately, private nursery centers, whether located in churches, housing projects, or elsewhere, were often overcrowded, ill equipped, and understaffed. The one notable exception was the Kaiser Corporation’s shipyard centers, which were well-staffed and open 24 hours a day.³⁸

Widespread segregation and racial discrimination meant that African American women faced even tougher obstacles as war workers than their white counterparts. Early in 1941, A. Philip Randolph, the president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, an all-black union of railroad workers, called for a massive Negro March on Washington to be held at the Lincoln Memorial on July 1 to protest job discrimination and segregation in the military. Fearful of the consequences of as many as 100,000 African Americans marching on Washington, President Roosevelt, on June 25, issued Executive Order 8802, banning “discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or Government because of race, creed, color or national origin.” The president also established the Fair Employment Practice Committee to oversee and enforce the order. The planned march was called off, but black women as well as men continued to face discrimination in the job market, and the military remained segregated throughout the war years.

As Karen Anderson has demonstrated, African American women were the last to be hired and the first to be fired as war workers.³⁹ Still, new opportunities in manufacturing enabled black women to leave low-paying domestic work, practically the only job available to them prior to World War II, for better-paying factory positions. In fact, the number of black women employed as domestics declined by 15 percent while their participation in factory work more than doubled. Although usually relegated to the lowest-paying jobs, such as janitors and sweepers, black women still preferred factory jobs over domestic work.

At the end of the war, most women left their jobs and resumed their traditional roles as unpaid housewives and mothers. For some women, this was a voluntary move that they readily embraced. After all, they had lived through almost two decades of crisis, first the Depression and then World War II, and they were eager to be reunited with their husbands and

resume a more “normal” family life. But not all women wanted to give up their relatively high-paying and satisfying jobs. Surveys conducted by the United States Women’s Bureau found that in certain war-impacted areas as many as three out of four women wanted to continue working after the war. One young war wife, after learning late in 1944 that the shipyard where she worked would be shut down within the next few months, wrote to her army husband in Europe and bemoaned the fact that her “greatly enjoyed working career will come to an end.” Peggy Meeker, who worked as an inspector at the Douglas Aircraft Plant in Long Beach, California, confided in a July 1945 letter to her fiancé, stationed with the Navy in the Pacific, that on her last day of work she “couldn’t even say goodbye . . . because I knew I would cry if I had to do that.”⁴⁰

War work allowed American women to become stronger, more self-reliant, more independent-minded individuals. Writing to their service husbands at the end of the war, they often commented about their growing sense of self and place in the world. Edith Speert, who served as the director of a Lanham Act child care center in Cleveland, Ohio, during the war, wrote to her army husband in Europe in October 1945 and remarked: “Last night . . . [we] were talking about some of the adjustments we’ll have to make when our husbands return. I must admit I’m not exactly the same girl you left—I’m twice as independent as I used to be and to top it off, I sometimes think I’ve become ‘hard as nails.’” Three weeks later, she reiterated: “Sweetie, I want to make sure I make myself clear about how I’ve changed. I want you to know *now* that you are not married to a girl that’s interested solely in a home—I shall definitely have to work all of my life—I get emotional satisfaction out of working; and I don’t doubt that many a night you will cook the supper while I’m at a meeting. Also, dearest—I shall never wash and iron—there are laundries for that! Do you think you’ll be able to bear living with me?”⁴¹

While many wartime women shared the sentiments of Edith Speert, they nonetheless saw their numbers dwindle immediately after the war. By 1947, the percentage of women in the workforce had declined to just under 28 percent. But at that point, working women began to regain their immediate postwar losses, and the percentage of women in the workforce has continued to climb. By 2000, women made up almost 50 percent of the workforce and 61 percent of all women worked. Nevertheless, throughout much of the postwar period, women viewed work as a job, not as a career, and they subordinated their paid employment to family needs.

When we look at women’s lives during the immediate postwar decade of the 1950s with its renewed interest in motherhood and family that resulted in a return to a more conventional way of life for many women, we might think that the changes wrought by World War II were only “for the duration.” But the extraordinary economic, social, and political changes experienced by wartime women—especially those women who worked for wages—were not forgotten. A generation later, these changes

would provide the foundation for the rejuvenation of the woman's movement in the United States as daughters drew upon the experiences of their wartime foremothers to demand better treatment of women in the workforce and in society at large.

AGRICULTURAL AMERICA IN WARTIME

The conversion to a wartime economy also meant dramatic changes for American agriculture. On Farm Mobilization Day, January 12, 1943, President Roosevelt delivered a nationwide address in which he underscored the important role to be played by American agriculture in the winning of the war. He told his audience that "food is the life line of the forces that fight for freedom. Free people everywhere can be grateful to the farm families that are making victory possible."⁴² Using the motto, "Food Fights for



Women workers were indispensable in war industries while massive numbers of men served in the military. (Library of Congress)

Freedom,” the Office of War Information (OWI) in conjunction with the War Food Administration produced posters, pamphlets, and short films emphasizing that “raising food is a real war job” and “bread is ammunition as vital as bullets.” One widely distributed poster proclaimed that “food is a weapon—don’t waste it,” while a 1945 OWI film, *Wartime Nutrition*, declared that the United States was *both* “the bread basket and the arsenal of democracy.”⁴³

Throughout the wartime years, the need for workers in agriculture, as well as in manufacturing and the military, was unprecedented. Balancing rival claims for labor presented an almost impossible challenge to a nation that had been plagued by the problem of high unemployment for over a decade. During the Depression years of the 1930s, farm labor had posed a difficulty only in its surplus of workers. At the end of the decade, few observers of the agricultural scene envisioned that labor shortages would be a significant problem—even if war were to come. But with the decline of the rural population as farmers joined the military or sought more lucrative work in war industries, an agricultural labor shortage soon materialized. By the end of the war, the farm population had declined by six million persons, yet wartime food production had increased by an astounding 32 percent over the years 1935–1939.⁴⁴

The women who lived on the nation’s six million farms readily accepted new responsibilities as they sought to alleviate the agricultural crisis, but the pressures of war required that new sources of farm labor be located. Nearly 230,000 foreign workers from Mexico, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados, and Canada were imported to perform farm jobs. Another 265,000 prisoners of war were involved in agricultural production. Eight thousand military personnel were furloughed to do emergency farm work, and 6,200 conscientious objectors worked at farm jobs. Another 26,000 Americans of Japanese descent were used on a furlough basis from their “relocation” centers. In addition, approximately 2.5 million young people between the ages of 14 and 17 worked for the Victory Farm Volunteers. Most important of all, however, were the millions of American women who came forward and helped to plant, cultivate, and harvest the nation’s crops.⁴⁵

The percentage of women engaged in agricultural production rose significantly during the war years, from 8 percent in 1940 to 22 percent in 1945. This included approximately three million nonfarm women, about half of whom were members of the Women’s Land Army (WLA), an organization established in 1943 by the Department of Agriculture as part of the Emergency Farm Labor Program to recruit mostly middle-class town and city women for farm jobs. Many WLA members lived at home and participated in day-haul programs in which they traveled back and forth to work each day in buses, trucks, or car pools. Recruits from distant cities lived either in camps or on farms. While some WLA workers participated in formal training programs, most received “on-the-job” training. Whether farm wives driving tractors, college women milking cows, housewives

picking apples, or secretaries spending summer vacations harvesting vegetables, these workers responded with energy and ingenuity to the war-time need for farm labor.⁴⁶

As the largely forgotten rural counterpart of “Rosie the Riveter,” farm and nonfarm women performed crucial agricultural work that had not been readily available to them in times of peace. For many of the women who joined the ranks of the WLA, the experience proved invaluable. In assessing her summer as a land army worker, one young woman remarked: “[It was] one of the best summers in health gained, new friends made, and perhaps most important of all, a conscience eased by doing something useful.” Another enlistee commented: “I would not have been happy had I not done this work. . . . We had long hours to work, but I was glad of that because it made me feel like I was helping the war effort that much more.”⁴⁷

While some farmers had initially disapproved of women working on the farms, they soon came to appreciate the important work of these rural “Rosie the Riveters.” A Midwestern farmer who had relied upon the help of WLA recruits spoke for many Americans when he said: “I will say that they were eminently successful and helped me to get the job done. . . . They drove tractors for me on side rake, pick-up baler, rotary hoe and trucks to pick up hay in the field. . . . The boys in the armed forces should know the remarkable work done by these women and farmer’s wives.”⁴⁸

At the end of the Second World War, there was little question but that the women of the United States had successfully come to “to the rescue of the crops.” Without their contributions, food would have been scarcer, both at home and on the fighting fronts. The physical well-being of the combat forces would have been less. America’s Allies would have suffered greater privations than they did. Rationing, price controls, and dietary changes designed to meet food shortages would have been harder to bear. That this did not happen is a remarkable tribute to these “soldiers in overalls” who planted, cultivated, and harvested the nation’s crops. Looking back on her WLA experiences from the perspective of nearly 50 years, Mary Ross recalled the remarks of her father, a North Carolina farmer who had depended upon land recruits: “Men may have fought to defend the land but women toiled it. Women saved our heritage.”⁴⁹

THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF WAR

Despite widespread prejudice and discrimination, African Americans on the home front made substantial economic and social gains during World War II. At the start of the war, 75 percent of all blacks lived in the rural, poverty-stricken, segregated South where they eked out their lives as sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and domestic servants. Thanks to the ongoing efforts of civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph, however, employment in defense factories in cities across the nation was opened

up to African Americans. Following the June 1941 issuance of Executive Order 8802, outlawing discrimination in defense industries, blacks left the South by the tens of thousands in search of better-paying war jobs. All told, some 700,000 blacks left the South during the war years. The black population of San Francisco increased by over 500 percent, and, in the three-year period between 1940 and 1943, some 50,000 blacks poured into the area around the huge defense plant of Willow Run just outside Detroit.⁵⁰

Black women who had earned around \$3.50 a week as domestic servants in the South made \$48.00 a week in aircraft plants in California. Black male income averaged \$460 in 1939, but by 1947 this figure had increased to \$1,279. By the war's end, African Americans held almost 8 percent of defense jobs, just 2 percent shy of their proportion of the total population.

Not only did African Americans benefit from well-paying defense jobs, they also were able to escape the oppressive segregation laws common to the South. After Marion Clark moved from St. Louis to Chicago in 1942, she wrote in a letter home that "it is fun, as you agree, to be able to breathe the freer air of Chicago."⁵¹ Housing was better in northern and western cities than in much of the South. In addition, the diet and health care of blacks significantly improved. Consequently, the black mortality rate dropped and the birthrate rose. All in all, African Americans who moved from the South to the North and West were far better off than their southern counterparts.

Yet the great black migration to the North and West, comingling with the wartime migration of whites from Appalachia, Arkansas, Texas, and elsewhere, often erupted into racial violence. In 1942, after the federal government in cooperation with the Detroit city government built the Sojourner Truth Housing Project for blacks, angry whites "formed a picket line, burned crosses, and used violence to turn the residents away." As Andrew E. Kersten has demonstrated, the "Sojourner Truth Housing controversy demonstrated not only how desperate the housing situation was but also how tense race relations were in America."⁵²

While lynchings remained a commonplace occurrence in the South in the 1940s, the migration of African Americans to the North and West resulted in racial violence outside the South as well. There were dozens of instances of wartime-related racial violence in areas such as New Jersey, Los Angeles, and New York's Harlem. But, by far, the worst race riot occurred in Detroit in June 1943, just one year after the Sojourner Truth Housing Project violence. Racial tensions were already teeming in this war-impacted city where 200,000 whites, many of them from Appalachia, and 50,000 southern blacks found themselves living and working in close proximity to each other. The racial explosion began on June 20, 1943, a hot Sunday summer day, at Belle Isle Park, a riverfront municipal park where about 100,000 people, mostly African Americans, sought refuge from the

sweltering heat. Fights broke out between African American and white teenagers. By the evening, the fighting had escalated into mob violence. Following several days of racial warfare, federal troops were called in to restore order. By that time, 25 blacks and 9 whites had died, 700 were injured, and 1,300 were arrested. Of the 25 blacks who died, 17 were killed by police. Property damage, including looted merchandise, burned cars, and destroyed stores, totaled two million dollars.⁵³

Despite these outbreaks of racial violence, African Americans remained strong supporters of the war effort, endorsing the Double V campaign, calling for victory over fascism abroad and victory over racism at home. To help bring about the end of racism at home, blacks joined civil rights organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Urban League, and the Congress of Racial Equality, all of which supported the Double V campaign. Moreover, there were other encouraging signs. African Americans were now significant voters in the northern states. In 1944, the Supreme Court ruled in *Smith v. Allwright* that the all-white primary in Texas was unconstitutional, thus paving the way for greater black voter participation in the South in the succeeding decades. The black press, including some 230 newspapers, had a readership of two million and could now provide African Americans with news of interest that was usually ignored by the white press.

At the end of the war, African Americans, both those who served in the segregated military and those on the home front, could be proud of their support for the war effort. The first part of the Double V campaign had been won. While victory over racism at home had not yet been achieved, segregation had begun to weaken. World War II had given African Americans the opportunity to reinvigorate the struggle against racism, and they would draw upon their wartime experiences to push for civil rights in the ensuing decades. Just three years after the war ended, on July 26, 1948, President Harry S Truman issued Executive Order 9981 calling for the end of segregation in the military, a telling example of the changes that were to come. Indeed, the legacy of the African American experience at war helped to fuel the civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s.

THE JAPANESE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF WAR

In December 1941, less than 300,000 Japanese Americans lived in the United States and the then-territory of Hawaii. About half of this number resided in Hawaii, where they made up about one-third of the population, and for the most part were not deprived of their civil liberties. Of the approximately 130,000 Japanese living in the United States, about 120,000 lived in California, Oregon, and Washington. Most of this number, about 90,000, lived in California. The remaining Japanese were scattered throughout the United States.

Less than three months after Pearl Harbor, on February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which resulted in the removal

and incarceration of the 120,000 Japanese living along the West Coast to “relocation” centers located in the interior of the United States. The decision to issue Executive Order 9066 was directly linked to the racist attitudes prevalent throughout the United States; however, the official rationale for issuing the order was “military necessity.” Within days of Pearl Harbor, songs such as “You’re A Sap, Mr. Jap” and “We’re Gonna Have to Slap the Dirty Little Jap” appeared. Wartime cartoons included “Bugs Bunny Nips the Nips” and the Popeye film, “Scrap the Japs.” Indeed, Americans commonly used the racial epithet, “Jap,” when speaking and writing about the Japanese.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, inflammatory rumors abounded that Japanese Americans living along the West Coast were engaged in espionage and sabotage. Fueled by wartime hysteria and the belief that Japanese Americans were disloyal and devious and had aided the “yellow-bellied murderers” who attacked Pearl Harbor, there was a loud outcry from the military, politicians, the press, and the public for drastic reprisals to be taken. In fact, Japanese Americans were law-abiding gardeners and truck farmers, and not one case of espionage or sabotage by a Japanese living in the United States occurred during World War II. But for General John L. De Witt of the Western Defense Command, the absence of espionage and sabotage along the West Coast was proof that a conspiracy had been planned and that the Japanese Americans were simply waiting for the moment when their blow would be most effective. Many others agreed with this twisted logic. California Attorney General Earl Warren, later to become chief justice of the Supreme Court during the 1950s when the famous 1954 decision, *Brown v. Board of Education*, was handed down outlawing segregation in the public schools, told a congressional committee on February 21, 1942 that “we are just being lulled into a false sense of security and that the only reason we haven’t had a disaster in California is because it is timed for a different date.”⁵⁴

Prior to the issuance of Executive Order 9066, beginning on the evening of December 7–8, 1941, some 8,000 first-generation Japanese, known as *Issei*, were interned. Most *Issei* had immigrated to the United States between 1890 and 1924. After the passage of the National Origins Act in 1924, however, Japanese were prohibited from immigrating to America. Once the war broke out, *Issei*, who were barred from becoming United States citizens, were classified as “alien enemies.” Their internment, as well as that of about 2,300 German nationals and a few hundred Italian nationals, conformed to the law of the land, for federal law dating back to the War of 1812 had provided for the wartime internment of “alien enemies.” By contrast, the much larger group of second-generation Japanese, known as *Nesei*, were citizens of the United States, although like African Americans, segregation and discrimination constituted a regular part of their lives. What happened to the *Nesei* living along the West Coast in 1942 was unprecedented in the history of the United States. Imprisoned and held without trial for the remainder of the war, this blatant denial of basic

civil liberties to almost 120,000 Japanese Americans represents a shameful episode in United States history.

Executive Order 9066 used nonspecific language allowing the military to exclude "any or all persons" from duly specified "military areas," but only Japanese Americans were affected by the decree. The actual relocation process began on March 31 and did not conclude until October. The Japanese were instructed to bring a few personal items, such as bedding, toiletries, knives, forks, bowls, and cups, but were also told to bring only what they could carry. Forced to leave their homes and farms on quick notice, their financial losses were incalculable.

The Japanese were incarcerated at 10 specially built prison camps, what the government called "relocation" centers, located in remote areas of the United States. The camps were administered by a newly created civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority (WRA). Life in the camps was not easy, and on three occasions unarmed inmates were shot and killed by soldiers who guarded the gates and towers around the camps. In May 1942, Sonoko Iwata and her three young children were sent to the Colorado River Relocation Camp near Poston, Arizona, while her husband, Shigezo Iwata, an "alien enemy," was detained at the Lordsburg, New Mexico Internment Camp. In letters written to her husband during their 16-month separation, Sonoko Iwata described the task of building a new community in the "barren" Arizona desert where the temperature inside her barracks reached "114 degrees." She wrote of the children's grief at being separated from their father, standing in long lines under the "hot sun" waiting to be served meals in a huge cafeteria that reminded her of a "cheap restaurant," an outbreak of measles that affected more than 200 people in her block, and the many difficult personal adjustments she encountered. Yet even in the face of these hardships, she, like many other inmates, demonstrated resiliency and emotional strength throughout the ordeal. In a March 5, 1943 letter, she wrote: "You know, I was thinking today that time marches on and if I'm to keep up, we should bury the past and always look toward what's coming." Eventually, after writing an appeal to U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle in which she "solemnly affirm[ed]" that her husband had "at all times been loyal to America and had always cooperated with our government," and that to be considered otherwise was "a dishonor which we cannot bear to face," the family was reunited at Poston in July 1943.⁵⁵

About 5,000 male prisoners made their way out of the camps by volunteering or being drafted for the famous Japanese American 442nd Regimental Combat team, which fought in Italy and France and earned the distinction of being the most highly decorated unit of World War II. Other Japanese, outraged at their incarceration, refused to be drafted and 261 were imprisoned for draft evasion. In addition, protests about camp conditions, especially at Tule Lake, contributed to the repatriation or expatriation of approximately 4,700 Japanese Americans to Japan after the war.

Fearing that camp life bred frustration and bitterness, the WRA released thousands of inmates to attend school or to work as seasonal agricultural laborers.⁵⁶

While the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans living along the West Coast received widespread approval during World War II and was upheld in three separate Supreme Court cases, this was not to be the case in latter decades. In 1983, the Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians issued a report that sharply criticized the treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II. The report, *Personal Justice Denied*, emphasized that exile and incarceration had occurred because of “race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership” not “military necessity” as had been argued at the time. Five years later, the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 offered opportunity for an unparalleled apology for the government’s actions during World War II and provided \$20,000 to each of the survivors of wartime incarceration.

PLANNING FOR PEACE

Even as World War II was raging, men and women throughout the United States began planning for peace. The magnitude of this effort was truly astounding. A variety of organizations, some with long histories and others founded for the specific purpose of promoting postwar peace, participated in this work. These organizations included the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Association for the United Nations, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the Foreign Policy Association, the War Resisters League, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the World Peace Foundation, and the Twentieth Century Fund.

Of particular significance were the efforts made by women to become active players in the peacemaking process. In September 1939, shortly after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Vera Micheles Dean, research director of the Foreign Policy Association, declared that “the women of this generation who are familiar both with the horrors of war and the errors of peace have an extraordinary opportunity today to plan for the kind of peace they would like to emerge from this war.”⁵⁷ Dean was not alone in her thinking. Throughout the wartime years, United States women assiduously lobbied for full participation in national policy-making councils and international conferences concerned with preparing for the coming of peace. Believing that the war against fascism presented an opportunity to press for major reforms at home and abroad that would guarantee equal rights and responsibilities for all people, women pushed for a place at the peace table so that they could more effectively work for the construction of a permanent peace that would protect the human rights of every person, regardless of gender, race, religion, or social class.

By the latter months of 1942 a coordinated campaign to assure the fair representation of women at postwar councils had materialized with the

founding of an interracial umbrella organization, the Committee on the Participation of Women in Post War Planning, which drew upon the support and membership of a wide array of leading women's organizations including the National Council of Negro Women, the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, the American Association of University Women, and the League of Women Voters. In their efforts to ensure that women would be fairly represented at the peace table, these mostly well-educated middle- and upper-class women organized special conferences, formulated rosters of women qualified to serve on postwar councils, sponsored national essay-writing contests, wrote articles for the press, and coordinated letter-writing campaigns to government officials.⁵⁸

The national dialogue on women's participation in postwar planning reached the highest levels of government when a special White House Conference, "How Women May Share in Post-War Policy Making," was convened on June 14, 1944, in response to numerous appeals by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt that women "be represented at the peace table . . . [and] in every international conference."⁵⁹ One of the First Lady's most widely circulated comments on this topic appeared in the April 1944 issue of *Reader's Digest*. Emphasizing that women and men held sharply divergent opinions about war, Roosevelt wrote, "Through the years men have made the wars; it is only fair to suggest that women can help to make a lasting peace."⁶⁰ Over 200 distinguished women from throughout the United States attended the gathering at the White House, described by conference organizer Charl Ormond Williams as "an historic milestone in women's contributions to society."⁶¹

Nonetheless, the nation's political leaders, consumed with military, strategic, and geopolitical concerns, demonstrated only lukewarm support for the inclusion of women on postwar councils. American women were excluded from the influential Dumbarton Oaks deliberations in the fall of 1944, which drew up a set of proposals that called for the establishment of a new international peacekeeping organization that would be called the United Nations, and they were woefully underrepresented at other postwar conferences and councils.

Although women's efforts to be included at the peace table were largely ignored by the political power brokers, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius and his associates had little hesitation in calling on women's associations to use their well-honed organizational skills to educate the American citizenry about the importance of supporting the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. In the hope that the mistakes that had occurred in the aftermath of World War I could be avoided, when isolationists mounted a campaign that led to the defeat of the League of Nations by the United States Senate in 1919, women's organizations enthusiastically responded to the State Department's request to help rally support for the proposed new peacekeeping organization.

The activities of the League of Women Voters were particularly noteworthy. The organization trained 5,000 members for a nationwide "Take

It to the People” campaign that involved the distribution of over a million pieces of literature. Of equal importance was the work of the National Council of Negro Women in ensuring that discussions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals extended to African American communities throughout the nation. These myriad activities culminated with the celebration of “Dumbarton Oaks Week” in mid-April 1945 when women’s organizations sponsored speeches, rallies, luncheons, teas, radio programs, and forums around the nation in behalf of the United Nations Conference to be convened on April 25 in San Francisco.

The State Department’s announcement of February 13, 1945, that Virginia Gildersleeve, dean of Barnard College, would be one of eight official U.S. delegates to the United Nations Conference rekindled hopes that women, in fact, would take their rightful place at the peace table. But at the end of the war, women continued to be underrepresented on postwar planning councils and conferences. Men might give lip service in support of the inclusion of women in the peace deliberations, but they also recognized that the participation of reform-minded women on post-war planning councils would, most likely, compound their problems. The male-dominated political establishment simply did not view the planning for peace as an opportunity to bring about significant reforms both at home and abroad with the same seriousness and urgency as did women. In fact, a common complaint expressed by these women was the lack of social thinking among the men. As citizens who remained on the periphery of the nation’s economic, political, and military infrastructure, women lacked the credentials needed to convince policy makers to accept them as major players in the international political arena.

On June 26, 1945, the United Nations Charter was signed by 46 members, of whom the United States was one of four sponsoring nations. By this time, Germany had surrendered (the previous May), and the post-war era had begun. Less than two months later, with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, the war in the Pacific ended and World War II was finally over.

END OF THE WAR

As the Second World War drew to a close in the summer of 1945, the political and social consequences of the war were very much on the minds of home-front Americans. After the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the larger meaning of the war took on even greater significance. While thankful and proud that the United States had developed a weapon of unprecedented power that would bring about a quick end to the war, home-front Americans also understood that the postwar world now faced enormous but still unknown challenges, as it addressed the difficult questions of how to maintain peace in the new atomic age. In their letters to loved ones stationed overseas, family members offered perceptive commentary about the historic significance of

these events. They wrote of the “terrible atomic bomb we have begun to let fall on Japan” while, in the same paragraph, they acknowledged how “awe-inspiring” the new weapon was.⁶² Letter writers expressed great relief that the suffering and pain of war would soon be over and that they would finally be reunited with loved ones, but they worried that this new and powerful weapon might not be properly controlled and harnessed in the future.⁶³

Mississippian Keith Frazier Somerville wrote a bi-monthly “Dear Boys” column that appeared from January 1943 through August 1945 in the *Bolivar Commercial*, a weekly newspaper published in the small Delta town of Cleveland, Bolivar County, Mississippi. Because so many Bolivar County citizens had worked at Oak Ridge, Somerville was especially interested in the news of the atomic bombs. In her August 31, 1945 column, written from her summer retreat in Monteagle, Tennessee, she reported:

I got a tremendous thrill over being here in Tennessee for the unveiling of “Project X” . . . on which so many people I know . . . have worked and which has been a mystery for so long. Wasn’t it wonderful the way the secret was kept? They say we’re a garrulous nation, but no one can say again that we tell all we know.⁶⁴

As proud as Somerville was that Mississippians and Tennesseans had played a role in the development of the atomic bomb, she quickly added:

The implication of the split atom being discovered and harnessed is awe-inspiring and terrifying, isn’t it? . . . Perhaps we have unloosed a Frankenstein which may eventually destroy us, but it’s here, and we should only be thankful its secrets were discovered first by a peace loving nation! . . . It did shorten the war, and with proper handling may help preserve the peace and bring to the world undreamed of luxuries.⁶⁵

Americans on the home front expressed apprehension about the unprecedented damage caused by the atomic bombs and questioned the morality of killing thousands of innocent civilians. Christine DiPompo, a member of the Women’s Army Corps stationed at Ft. Devon, Massachusetts, received an August 12, 1945 letter from her parents that directly addressed these concerns:

We can do anything to . . . [the Japanese], and we destroy a city with a population of a third of a million killing two thirds of them. . . . In the destruction are men, women, and children. Is this civilization? I know it can be justified by arguing that if we do not destroy [them] they will destroy us. We know that two wrongs do not make a right and . . . [we] cannot help feeling immoral in justifying it. . . . It’s so easy to justify what we do, but this kind of warfare perhaps will make pacifists of all the world.⁶⁶

Catherine Lange of St. Louis, Missouri also questioned the morality of the atomic bomb in an August 8 letter to her husband, a bomber pilot

in the Pacific. Although she expressed pride that the United States had discovered the weapon and relief that the end of the war was now “only days away,” she wondered if Americans could continue to call themselves “civilized” and wrote that “if it is as bad as we’re told, it is sickening to think of *any* people being victims of such a horrible weapon.”⁶⁷ Upon hearing the news of the dropping of the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki on August 9, one war wife commented: “Golly, the news sounds swell and yet pretty terrible too. When they announced the second bombing with the atom bomb my hair stood up on end and chills ran up and down my spine. I hope they give up before we have to destroy any more of them.”⁶⁸

Home-front Americans worried about the proliferation of atomic weaponry and offered prescient comments about what might happen if this new technology were not properly regulated and controlled. Twenty-one-year-old Frances Ricica of Ann Arbor, Michigan, wrote to her future husband, Rollin Zilke, stationed with the army in Europe, on August 11 and pondered:

What do you think of the atomic bomb dropped on the Japanese the other night? Powerful, isn’t it? I don’t like it one bit tho. It’s too powerful, and it won’t be long before other countries discover how to make it, and if even there’s a disagreement, I hate to think what will happen. I wish it hadn’t been ever discovered.⁶⁹

Stunned by reports of the atomic bomb and Japan’s initial surrender message to the Allies on August 10, home-front Americans expressed a sense of intense anxiety as they reflected on the significance of these extraordinary events. Writing to her army husband stationed in the Pacific on August 10, Anna Beadle of New Athens, Illinois, remarked: “The news has had me on edge all day. I nearly fainted when I first heard it this morning. . . . As the day went on I had quite a feeling of let down. I still feel like it is true but I think it will be a week before it’s really official.”⁷⁰ Women also wrote of how “tense” and “nervous” they felt during the period between August 10 and 14 as they waited for the official announcement that Japan had surrendered. One war wife wrote on August 13 that she was “slowly going batty” waiting for the official announcement of the end of the war and that she felt “drained, squeezed and limp from listening to the radio and waiting for an interruption.”⁷¹ Other letter writers groused that the “suspense” was “terrific” what with “news flashes, bulletins, etc. etc. just about every twenty minutes or so” and how they were afraid “to shut our radio off for one minute.”⁷²

At least one letter writer predicted the coming of the Cold War when she suggested in an August 18, 1945 letter that the development of atomic weaponry would lead to a new war between the United States and Russia. Writing to her future husband, Donald C. Swartzbaugh, stationed with the Army Air Forces in India, Constance Hope Jones of Kirkwood, Missouri commented: “Over the radio yesterday . . . I heard the starting of another war! All about how the U.S. was developing new and secret weapons and

how we should keep our secrets from the Russians! . . . Talk like that is a betrayal of those who died or were wounded in this war and of those who are working to make it possible for nations to live in peace with each other!"⁷³

The official end of the war on August 15 brought forth wild celebrations of joy and thanksgiving across the United States. Writing from Hazleton, Pennsylvania, Betty Maue told her fiancé, Ario Pacelli, serving with the army in Europe, how cars "kept passing the house and everyone tried to think of a louder noise than the other. They had old dish pans, wash tubs and oil cans tied on the back of cars and bicycles and wagons and the horns must be about worn out because they kept them blowing constantly. Oh, it is so wonderful to know it is over, and all praise to God that He has given us victory."⁷⁴ In an August 16 letter to her army husband stationed in France, war bride Barbara Wooddall Taylor exclaimed: "THE WAR IS OVER—oh, Charlie baby, this is what we waited for so long. Even yet, I can't believe it. I'm so grateful to God." She told of attending a community meeting at the local Baptist church where she "felt good all over singing 'My Country 'Tis of Thee.'" Following the church service, she and several other war brides went to a "real ole fashioned square dance" in the middle of town and didn't make it home until 2:00 A.M.

She continued: "Everyone has a holiday today of course—so we're going swimming this afternoon. And, gasoline is NOT rationed—man, that's wonderful. Honestly, things are happening so fast, well, I just can't grasp it all."⁷⁵

Doris Winiker of Brooklyn, New York, wrote to her army husband stationed in Hawaii on August 16 and proclaimed: "I'm drunk with joy and happiness because at least we're definitely on the path to our Utopia and our reunion that we've spent almost two years of our life waiting for." She related how the neighborhood children ran through the "dark street banging pots and pans, blowing horns and ringing bells." On August 15, she and several friends went to Manhattan to celebrate where "policemen and M.P.s . . . took no heed of the goings on like the sailors and soldiers standing in the gutter and grabbing every woman and girl in their arms and passionately kissing them. . . . People sat on the curbs of Broadway and Times Square right in front of the cops and necked—but most violently! Soldiers and sailors climbed on the hoods of passing cars and police and M.P.s just stood there smiling." She reported that the "confetti and streamers were ankle deep" and "if you haven't seen Broadway during the victory Celebrations then you've missed one of the most thrilling and most unbelievable sights in the whole world."⁷⁶

In the midst of their celebrations, home-front Americans also contemplated the more serious side of victory as they paused to thank the fighting forces for the sacrifices that they had made and to mourn the many lives that were lost. On August 15, war wife Marjorie Haselton of Athol, Massachusetts, penned a compelling letter to her husband, Richard, who

was part of a guerrilla navy unit operating behind enemy lines in China, which addressed these concerns. She wrote of how proud she was of the men of her generation who were “brought up like you and I, in false prosperity then degrading Depression, they have overcome these handicaps. And shown the world that America has something the world can never take away from us—a determination to keep our way of life.”⁷⁷

Marjorie Larson wrote to her army husband, John, who had engaged in fierce combat in Europe, about “the gold stars on our service flags over the country and what the gold stars mean in the hearts of those who loved and lost,” and of the “boys broken and maimed in mind and body.”⁷⁸ Another young woman, writing on August 14 to her fiancé stationed in the South Pacific, remarked: “It’s going to be quite an adjustment, this peace stuff. I can’t even remember a time that we weren’t in a war or preparing for one, or at least talking about it. . . . Just think, you’ll be coming home to stay! And, maybe our children will never have to know what war is. . . . Good *does* triumph over evil! How can we civilians ever repay the armed services? Yes, I feel most humble.”⁷⁹

On August 11, Jane Easton, a hospital volunteer for the American Red Cross, wrote to her army husband stationed in Europe that her work “at the hospital keeps me in touch with the reality which we must never forget.” She related how she “talked for a long time with a man who’d been horribly burned in a blast of some sort. Almost his entire face was scar tissue. And from it his eyes looked out like the millions upon millions . . . who’ve seen and suffered the ravages of war. Yet he was not bitter. Just subdued and so gallant! . . . But his spirit was so bright it gave me new courage and hope.” Three days later on August 14, she wrote: “How small words are tonight! The war is over—we can rejoice—soberly, gaily, madly, and still with thoughts of those who cannot come back. . . . It’s a lovely summer evening—and there is no war.”⁸⁰

In subdued but poignant language, Rose McClain of Snoqualmie Falls, Washington, wrote a powerful letter to her husband, Charles, serving with the navy in the Pacific, which captured the feelings of citizens throughout the United States and the world, both civilian and military, as they contemplated the coming of peace:

Today I cried and thanked God for the end of this war and I shall continue to pray this shall be the end of war for all time. That our children will learn kindness, patience, honesty, and depth of love and trust we have learned, from all of this, without the tragedy of war. That they shall never know hate, selfishness, and death from such as this has been.⁸¹

The postwar world that loomed before the United States presented a picture that was dim and unclear. The incredible devastation of the Second World War—culminating with the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—was such as to give serious persons much

pause for thought even as they joined in victory celebrations. The future was not known and the challenge of maintaining peace in the new atomic age would not be easy. But judging from the letters written during the final weeks of the war, Americans on the home front understood this well. As one letter writer succinctly put it, "Perhaps, the biggest job is yet ahead."⁸²

The United States emerged from World War II a much stronger, more confident, and richer nation. In the words of Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, Studs Terkel, the Second World War was a "good war" for many Americans.⁸³ However, for significant segments of the population, especially African Americans and Japanese Americans, the war represented an era when racism, discrimination, and prejudice remained very much a part of the American landscape. For the 400,000 individuals who sacrificed their lives for the war as well as for their families, it was anything but a "good war." Yet overall, the Second World War brought out the best in the American people as they joined together—women, men, and children—in overwhelming numbers to meet the extraordinary challenges that led to the defeat of fascism. The war also served as a great catalyst for social reform, especially with regard to civil rights for women and minorities, in the decades to come. Indeed, the legacy of the World War II continues to reverberate in the lives of the American people.

NOTES

1. Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, *Since You Went Away: World War II Letters from American Women on the Home Front* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 149.

2. *Ibid.*, 186–88.

3. *Ibid.*, 170.

4. Judy Barrett Litoff, ed., *Dear Poppa: The World War II Berman Family Letters* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1997), 290.

5. Russell B. Olwell, *At Work in the Atomic City: A Labor and Social History of Oak Ridge, Tennessee* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2004), 10.

6. *Ibid.*

7. See, for example, Vance Packard, "Millions on the Move," *American Magazine* (October 1944): 34–36, 97; and "Soldiers' Wives Give Up Home and Job for Camp Life with Husbands," *Life*, October 12, 1942, 56–62.

8. D'Ann Campbell, *Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 73. On the increase in the marriage rate in the early war years, see Karen Anderson, *Wartime Women: Sex Roles and Family Relations during World War II* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 76–79.

9. Ethel McCall Head, "Old-Fashioned Neighborliness," *American Home*, September 1944, 4, 6, 8; Dorothy Draper, "Share Your Home—Cut Your Rent," *Good Housekeeping*, January 1943, 133–35; "Tripling Up: Wives of Servicemen Pool Resources," *Life*, December 1943, 69–70, 72, 74; "Could You House a War Guest in Your Attic," *House Beautiful*, January 1943, 8; Elizabeth Gordon, "Nice People Everywhere Are Inviting War Guests," *House Beautiful*, February 1943, 30–31.

10. "A Question of Wives," *Magazine War Guide* (Office of War Information), October 1944, 27–29; Leslie B. Hohman, "Don't Follow Your Husband to Camp," *Ladies' Home Journal*, September 1943, 108–9; Helen B. Sweedy, "I'm Following You," *New York Times Magazine*, October 3, 1943, 32.

11. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 102.

12. Elizabeth R. Valentine, "Odyssey of the Army Wife," *New York Times Magazine*, March 5, 1944, 14.

13. Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, "'I Wish That I Could Hide Inside this Letter': World War II Correspondence," *Prologue* (Summer 1992), 106.

14. Barbara Klaw, *Camp Follower: The Story of a Soldier's Wife* (New York: Random House, 1943; reprint 1944). The articles appeared under the same title in *The Atlantic*, October, November, December 1943, but were severely condensed from the book. As Klaw explained in her preface, her title bore a double meaning, as prostitutes and "Victory Girls" also followed men to camp.

15. For statistical information on the number of service wives in the labor force during World War II, see Mary Elizabeth Pidgeon, *Changes in Women's Employment during the War*, Women's Bureau Special Bulletin no. 20 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 18–29.

16. *If Your Baby MUST Travel in Wartime*, Children in Wartime No. 6, United States Department of Labor, Children's Bureau Publication No. 307 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, [n.d.]). See also "Traveling with Baby," *Good Housekeeping*, January 1945, 59, 142–43; and Gladys Denny Shultz, "If Baby Must Travel," *Better Homes and Gardens*, July 1943, 30, 59–60.

17. Judy Barrett Litoff, David C. Smith, Barbara Wooddall Taylor, and Charles E. Taylor, *Miss You: The World War II Letters of Barbara Wooddall Taylor and Charles E. Taylor* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 74.

18. *Ibid.*, 146.

19. Litoff and Smith, "'I Wish That I Could Hide Inside This Letter,'" 111.

20. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 82–91.

21. *Ibid.*, 188.

22. Keith Frazier Somerville, 1943 unpublished journal.

23. Litoff, et al., *Miss You*, 143–45.

24. *Annual Report of the Postmaster General, for Fiscal Year Ended, June 30, 1942* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 3.

25. Ernie Pyle, *Here Is Your War* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1943), 35.

26. "Share Your Mail," *Woman's Home Companion*, May 1942, 37.

27. For additional information on the importance of the mail as a morale builder during World War II, see Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, see "'Will He Get My Letter?': Popular Portrayals of Mail and Morale During World War II," *Journal of Popular Culture* (Spring 1990): 21–44.

28. Litoff, *Dear Poppa*, ix–x.

29. See, for example, Litoff, *Dear Poppa*. Another good book about children and World War II is William M. Tuttle, Jr., *"Daddy's Gone to War": The Second World War in the Lives of America's Children* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

30. *Annual Report of the Postmaster General, For Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1944* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1945), 2–4; *Annual Report of the Postmaster General, For Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1946* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 5.

31. The standard source on V-Mail is George Rayner Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M. Oakes, and Dulany Terrett, *The Signal Corps: The Test* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1957), 407–8. See also Mary E. Boswell, *A Study of Signal Corps Contribution to V-Mail Through December, 1943*, Signal Corps Historical Monographs, F-4 [1944] and *Supplement, December, 1943 to August, 1945*, F-5 [1945].

32. *Annual Report of the Postmaster General, For Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1942* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 5–6; *Annual Report of the Postmaster General, For Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1944* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1945), 4.

33. For information on how not to run afoul of the censors, see Dick Gerry, "Stopped by the Censor," *American Magazine*, May 14, 1943, 100, 102–3; and Jonathan Wake, "The Censor Reads Your Letters," *Good Housekeeping*, November 1942, 117. On how to pack, wrap, and address packages, see Frank C. Waller, "Christmas Mail for Members of Our Armed Services Abroad," *Cosmopolitan*, November 1942, 138; Dorothy Marsh, "Christmas Boxes for the Folks Away from Home," *Good Housekeeping*, December 1942, 140–42; and "Will Your Gift Get There?" *Collier's*, September 8, 1945, 8.

34. Susan M. Hartmann, *The Home Front and Beyond: American Women in the 1940s* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982), 78.

35. Guilielma Fell Alsop and Mary F. McBride, *Arms and the Girl: A Guide to Personal Adjustment in War Work and War Marriage* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1943), 5.

36. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 147–49.

37. Betty Bleakmore to Kenneth J. Wilson, September 1, 1942, World War II Letters of United States Women Archive, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02917.

38. Anderson, *Wartime Women*, 46. William O'Neill, *A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home & Abroad in World War II* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 242.

39. Karen Tucker Anderson, "Last Hired, First Fired: Black Women Workers during World War II," *Journal of American History* (June 1982): 82–97.

40. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 149, 181.

41. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 157.

42. Quoted in Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, "'To the Rescue of the Crops': The Women's Land Army during World War II," *Prologue* (Winter 1993): 347.

43. Litoff and Smith, "'To the Rescue of the Crops,'" 348.

44. Wayne D. Rasmussen, *A History of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, 1943–1947*, Agricultural Monograph No. 13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1951), 20–21.

45. Litoff and Smith, "'To the Rescue of the Crops,'" 348.

46. *Ibid.*, 349.

47. Quoted in Litoff and Smith, "'To the Rescue of the Crops,'" 357.

48. Quoted in Litoff and Smith, *ibid.*, 357–58.

49. Marie Dawson, "Pitching In On the Home Front," *Countryside* (Winter 1990): 86. The Women's Land Army was discontinued in December 1945. Low farm wages, the decline in the rural population, the lure of better-paying and more prestigious jobs in urban areas, and the increased mechanization of farming militated against the employment of nonfarm women in farm jobs in the postwar years.

50. Andrew E. Kersten, "Africa Americans and World War II," *OAH Magazine of History* (Spring 2002): 14–15.

51. Quoted in Kersten, "African Americans and World War II," 15.
52. *Ibid.*, 15.
53. On the 1943 Detroit race riot, see Robert Shogan and Tom Craig, *The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in Violence* (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964); and Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York, Octagon Books, 1943).
54. Quoted in Roger Daniels, "Incarcerating Japanese Americans," *OAH Magazine of History* (Spring 2002): 20.
55. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 218–23.
56. Daniels, "Incarcerating Japanese Americans," 21–22.
57. Vera Micheles Dean, "Over European Horizons," *Independent Woman* (February 1940): 41.
58. Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, eds., *What Kind of World Do We Want? American Women Plan for Peace* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 1–36.
59. "Woman's Role in Peace Talk," *New York Times*, March 31, 1944.
60. Eleanor Roosevelt, "Women at the Peace Conference," *Reader's Digest*, April 1944, 48–49.
61. Quoted in Litoff and David C. Smith, *What Kind of World Do We Want?*, 14.
62. Dorothy Humphrey to Stanley G. Humphrey, World War II Letters of United States Women Archive, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02917.
63. For an examination of American thought and culture at the dawn of the atomic age, see Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).
64. Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, *Dear Boys: World War II Letters from a Woman Back Home* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), 244.
65. *Ibid.*
66. "Mother and Dad" to Christine DiPompo, August 12, 1945. World War II Letters of United States Women Archive, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02917.
67. Catherine Lange to Vernon Lange, August 8, 1945. World War II Letters of United States Women Archive, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02917.
68. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 273.
69. *Ibid.*, 271.
70. Anna Beadle to Clinton Beadle, August 10, 1945. Dorothy Heath Clary to John C. Clary, August 10, 12, 13, and 14, 1945. World War II Letters of United States Women Archive, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02917.
71. Catherine Lange to Vernon Lange, August 10, 12, 14, 1945. Irene Pennington Reifsnnyder to Charles Luther Reifsnnyder, August 14, 1945. World War II Letters of United States Women Archive, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02917.
72. Bobby Johnston to Warren Johnston, August 11, 12, 1945. Florence E. Webb to James M. Huston, August 10, 1945. World War II Letters of United States Women Archive, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02917.
73. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 280.
74. *Ibid.*, 270.
75. Litoff, et al., *Miss You*, 284–85.
76. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, pp. 268–69.
77. *Ibid.*, 276–77.
78. *Ibid.*, 279.
79. *Ibid.*, 52.

80. Robert and Jane Easton, *Love and War: Pearl Harbor Through V-J Day* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 365–66, 368.

81. Litoff and Smith, *Since You Went Away*, 273.

82. *Ibid.*, 279.

83. Studs Terkel, *“The Good War”: An Oral History of World War II* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

FURTHER READING

Brandt, Nat. *Harlem at War: The Black Experience in World War II*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966.

Using the Harlem Riot of 1943 as a case study, Brandt provides a useful overview of the treatment of African Americans on the home front during World War II.

Campbell, D’Ann. *Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.

This is an excellent study that examines the wide-ranging experiences of American women, from housewives to “Rosies,” during World War II.

Conant, Jennet. *109 East Palace: Robert Oppenheimer and the Secret City of Los Alamos*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

This is an important analysis of life at Los Alamos, the site where the two atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan were actually designed and assembled under the direction of physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Daniels, Roger. *Prisoners without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1993.

This is one of several important works written by Daniels that examines the incarceration of the 120,000 Japanese Americans living along the West Coast of the United States.

Gluck, Sherna Berger. *Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, the War and Social Change*. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1987.

Gluck uses oral histories to demonstrate that World War II had a powerful and far-reaching impact on America’s working women.

Goodwin, Doris Kearns. *No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front and World War II*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

This Pulitzer Prize-winning work is the best single volume about Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the American front.

Kennedy, David M. *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945*. New York: Free Press, 1999.

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize, this work serves as an excellent introduction to the topic of home-front America.

Litoff, Judy Barrett, and David C. Smith, eds. *Since You Went Away: World War II Letters from American Women on the Home Front*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Drawing from an archive of 30,000 wartime letters, Litoff and Smith demonstrate how World War II dramatically transformed the lives of a broad socioeconomic and geographic cross-section of American women.

Litoff, Judy Barrett, and David C. Smith, eds. *What Kind of World Do We Want?: American Women Plan for Peace*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2000.

This volume documents the efforts of American women to be fairly represented at the peacemaking deliberations during and immediately after World War II.

Takaki, Roger. *Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2000.

This work examines the Japanese American experience of war within a multicultural context.

Tuttle, Jr., William M. *"Daddy's Gone to War": The Second World War in the Lives of America's Children*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

This is an important study that examines the impact of World War II on the lives of America's children.

Winkler, Allan M. *Home Front, U.S.A.: America during World War II*, 2d ed. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2000.

This is an excellent, brief introduction to the topic of home-front America during World War II.

Winkler, Allan M. *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1941–1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.

This is a significant work on the government's effort to generate support for the war effort.

FOUR

A Cold War Home Front, 1945–63

Jon Timothy Kelly

Throughout World War II, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) served as an important agency to promote both home front protection and population mobilization for the war effort. Yet by May of 1945, with plans for the invasion of Japan in the works and the threat of Japanese attack against the American homeland remote, President Harry Truman abolished the OCD.¹ A year later, Miles Bell, chief property inspector for the District of Columbia, was the last of the OCD's 36,000 workers in the nation's capital. As far as Bell was concerned, the OCD would live on only until he could dispose of 33,206 armbands, 27,000 feet of hose, 9,469 helmets, 3,003 pumps, and 3,759 gas masks, in addition to first-aid kits and firemen's coats. He had grown rather attached to his diverse inventory, he told a reporter. "I feel like the man who always wore spurs on the grounds that he never knew when he might meet a horse."²

Bell's comments proved prophetic as fears generated by the Cold War would soon revive efforts at home-front protection, not just from an external military threat, but also a widely perceived threat of internal subversion. Americans were told to remain vigilant against Communism, and these warnings came not just from national politicians, but from all levels of society: school and community leaders, pastors, service clubs, newspaper editors, and other opinion makers. Anti-Communism was infused throughout American culture, and American media trumpeted this propaganda by drawing on the skills it had honed during World War II. In the fight against Communism, American civilians were urged to take on the role of citizen soldiers to protect the home front.

The Cold War was not a war in the traditional sense of the word. It had neither the intensity nor the concentration of time that can be used to describe previous world wars. There were, of course, limited wars in Korea and Vietnam, but if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was perceived as the enemy in this Cold War conflict (accused, as it was, of being both expansionist and the source of the worldwide Communist threat), it is worth noting that American and Russian forces never actually engaged one another on the battlefield. Thus the Cold War was a contest between ideological, economic, and political systems. In contrast to a "hot war," the Cold War was characterized by a heightened state of tension over a long duration, which was made all the more dangerous by the fact that after 1949, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. had the nuclear capability to lay waste to one another's cities within a matter of hours.³

Between 1945 and 1962, Americans were gripped by a sense of fear and insecurity that was more intense than in any other period in the Cold War era, and led both American policy makers and civilians to build a Cold War home front. While military conflict was always a possibility, the real goal of such a home-front atmosphere was to encourage civilians to participate in this contest with Communism as "citizen soldiers." Only after the United States and the Soviet Union nearly fell into the nuclear abyss at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 did both nations step back from the precipice and begin a sincere dialogue over how Cold War tensions could be reduced.

Yet by 1963, it was clear that the superpower contest had dramatically impacted American society in a variety of ways. The Cold War fueled a search for internal enemies at home that resulted in the hysteria of McCarthyism and a near stifling of political dissent. It encouraged the formation of families at a faster rate than ever before as individuals sought security in the nuclear age through marriage and children. It led America as a result of its role as "leader of the free world" to confront racial injustice against African Americans at home. It produced an unprecedented level of prosperity as the American economy was transformed into a partial but permanent wartime economy to fight a war in Korea and contain the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe. And finally, it forced Americans to try to come to terms with the unimaginable threat of nuclear war and what protective measures—if any—could be taken.

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

At its root, the Cold War was an international contest over power politics. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R., the two strongest nations at the conclusion of the Second World War, sought to refashion the world order in a way that promoted their own national and economic interests. Whereas the United States promoted free-market capitalism as a way to guarantee access of American goods to foreign markets, the Soviet Union

found it beneficial to keep markets under its occupational control weak and dependent on the U.S.S.R. by enforcing closed markets (except, of course, to Soviet trade). Such a situation was thus bound to create conflict between Russian and American policy makers, as was Josef Stalin's obsessive desire to create "friendly" governments (i.e., governments controlled by Moscow) in Eastern Europe. Since such regimes could only be imposed by Moscow through force, an American government committed to the spread of democracy could hardly support such a Soviet move. Nor would there be any U.S. advantage in doing so if these puppet governments would be hostile to American interests.⁴

With obvious justification, Americans viewed Stalin as leading a brutal regime that stifled any dissent through a policy of terror and purges that led to millions of Russian deaths in the 1930s. And the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, which divided Poland between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in the opening months of World War II, was still fresh in the minds of Americans. During the wartime alliance, the American public was bombarded with propaganda that portrayed "Uncle Joe" Stalin as abandoning Communist ideology and fighting for capitalism and democracy.⁵ But when it became apparent after the war that Russian liberators of Eastern Europe would be its occupiers, the media that once sang Stalin's praises during the war began to remind Americans of the brutal police state he led and now sought to impose on a devastated Europe. In the early postwar years, Americans became increasingly concerned that Russian totalitarianism was not much different from Nazi totalitarianism.⁶

Yet the Truman administration was initially divided over how to respond to the Soviet Union. Some called for a hard-line policy to stand up to the Russians, a view that the president found appealing. Yet if the United States was the sole nuclear power immediately after World War II, Truman could not ignore the fact that America was weak due to demobilization efforts that had reduced the U.S. armed forces from a high of 12 million soldiers in 1945 to less than 2 million in 1947.⁷ Threatening the use of force was out of the question since the Red Army in Eastern Europe had not demobilized. Thus Truman officials struggled for a coherent policy in which to deal with the Russians.

They found it in the writings of a young American diplomat named George Kennan, who was stationed in Moscow. Kennan argued that Stalin's regime would always remain hostile to the West because it depended on the existence of foreign threats to justify its tyrannical rule to the Russian people; but he also advised Western leaders not to expect the Kremlin to take any great risks in advancing Russian national interests. Guided by a Marxist ideology which predicted the eventual overthrow of capitalism through a proletarian revolution, Soviet leaders believed that time was on their side. Rather than a frontal assault against the United States and its allies, Kennan predicted a Soviet policy of constant pressure to subvert the West externally and internally. U.S. policy makers, therefore, should

resist Russian aggression until the Soviet state's own internal contradictions brought down the regime. In a recommendation that would serve as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy for the next four decades, Kennan counseled patience and caution through a policy to "contain" Soviet expansion.⁸ Truman embraced this policy of containment in his Truman Doctrine of March 1947 and Marshall Plan of 1948 in his efforts to provide military and economic assistance to European allies while also holding the Soviet Union at bay.

Anxieties in the United States spiraled upward in the following months and years as international events increased Cold War tensions between the superpowers. Seeking to tighten his hold on Eastern Europe, Stalin in February 1948 backed a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and in June 1948 blockaded supply routes into the U.S., British, and French occupation sectors of Berlin, leading to an 11-month airlift to supply residents of those sectors with food, coal, medicine, and other materials. These actions were followed in 1949 with the testing of a Russian atomic bomb and the seizure of power by Mao Zedong's Communist forces in China. Finally, in June 1950, North Korean Communist forces poured across the 38th parallel into South Korea, sparking fears that World War III had begun.

As the Cold War suddenly turned hot in Korea, U.S. policy makers in 1950 mobilized the nation's resources to fight the Cold War abroad. But on the home front, Americans had already embarked on their own witch hunt to root out "subversives."

COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS

The red truncheon fell early the morning of May 1, 1950 in the small town of Mosinee, Wisconsin, as the mayor was arrested in his bathrobe and the chief of police was "shot" by the Council of People's Commissars. With civic leaders of this town of 1,400 residents now out of the way, telegraph and telephone lines were seized, and roadblocks were set along the three access routes into the town where cars were searched and citizens harassed. Main Street was draped with propaganda banners proclaiming "Stalin is the Leader," and proclamations were issued that abolished private property and all debts and legal obligations. Restaurants limited their menus to black bread, potato soup, and coffee; groceries were rationed; and workers were required to devote four extra hours to the state without compensation or the right to strike.⁹

The dystopian fantasy that was staged for 48 hours by local civic leaders and the American Legion was promoted as a warning to Americans of what they would find under Stalinism and Communism, both of which were perceived as indistinguishable in assessing the threat to U.S. national security. *Readers Digest* that same year summed up this message by warning its millions of readers to remain vigilant and informed, because while Communists surely would never win any elections, their form of socialism

could “be put over by a small minority.”¹⁰ Why was Communism (and those who supported it) perceived as so dangerous? Why was there no distinction made between communism as an ideology and the national security threat that Soviet authoritarianism posed?

The answer partly lies in the roots of anti-Communism itself, which stems from what historian Michael Rogin has called a counter-subversive tradition, “the creation of monsters as a continuing feature of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanization of political foes.” Whether the target has been Native Americans, African Americans, or immigrants, the counter-subversive tradition in American history embraced the notion that an alien force was working to undermine the body politic from within.¹¹ FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover described Communism as “an evil and malignant way of life,” one that was “akin to disease that spreads like an epidemic. . . .” And George Kennan once explained, in a State Department memo infused with the kind of bigotry so present in the counter-subversive tradition, that Communism appealed only to “maladjusted groups” such as “Jews, Negroes and immigrants” and those “on the margin of human psychology” who represented “a natural mutation of the species” due to “jealousy, inadequacy and inferiority, bitterness, and above all escapism.”¹²

The views expressed by Hoover and Kennan in the post-World War II years were not new to that era. Indeed, after the 1917 Russian Revolution, American policy and public opinion makers denounced Russian Bolshevism as “a complete repudiation of modern civilization.”¹³ A rash of labor strikes and assassination attempts on prominent Americans following World War I led to a widely held belief that American democracy and capitalism were under assault from radical groups seeking to impose that Bolshevik model on American society. In the Red Scare of 1919–20, hundreds of aliens were rounded up and forcibly deported while thousands of suspected Communists were arrested without hearings.¹⁴

It was in this atmosphere of suspicion and repression that the American Communist Party (CP) operated throughout the 1920s. The American CP was, in the words of historian Ellen Schrecker, “a tightly organized, highly disciplined, international revolutionary socialist organization.” Its members were activists to the core and were expected to read party literature, regularly attend meetings, and join a labor union or other mass organization to spread the CP’s message. It was a movement that promoted political reform in the United States, but its relationship to the U.S.S.R., which provided both financial and organizational support, also contributed to its image as an alien group hostile to American values. Moreover, while its rigid discipline kept its members united, this devotion to the “party line” (regardless of its twists, turns, and contradictions) fueled the perception among most Americans that this was a movement consisting of mindless drones.¹⁵

And yet the Great Depression of the 1930s provided an opportunity for the American CP to broaden its appeal to a population whose faith in

capitalism had been greatly shaken. Capitalizing on the enactment of the social and economic programs of the New Deal, the CP grew in popularity through its organizational drive to unionize workers, in addition to the creation of a Popular Front, a coalition of Communist and Progressive groups working to oppose fascism. Whereas the CP had 40,000 members in 1936, this number swelled to 82,000 in 1938. But the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in 1939 was a serious blow to recruitment, alienating both party members and liberal allies who believed that the U.S.S.R. had lost its moral authority by dealing with Hitler. The number of new recruits to the CP stagnated and total membership began to decline with normal attrition.¹⁶

The goodwill generated by the wartime alliance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. helped to stabilize and even increase CP membership, which grew from 50,000 in 1946 to 75,000 in 1947.¹⁷ But international factors would once again work against the popularity of the CP. Its unwavering support for the U.S.S.R., even as the Cold War began in earnest in 1947–48, contributed to public perceptions that the American CP was oblivious to, or worse an agent of, Soviet aggression. The latter view took on greater credibility in the postwar years with increasing press reports of Soviet espionage in America, including the account of Elizabeth Bentley of New York, dubbed the “Red Spy Queen,” who confessed in 1945 to serving as a courier for a spy ring that included as many as 80 Americans.¹⁸ Accusations against government officials such as Alger Hiss, and revelations of atomic spy rings in both Canada and America, contributed to a public perception that the government was riddled with Soviet spies.

Indeed, Soviet era documents declassified in the 1990s show that the Soviet Union did have a small but effective network of agents in both private industry and government service that provided important technical and policy secrets. Not all of these Soviet agents were American Communists, of course; many, in fact, provided information for monetary gain rather than an ideological commitment to Communism. Nor were most Americans who belonged to the Communist Party agents for the Soviet security apparatus.¹⁹ But the secrecy practiced by so many CP members for fear that their exposure would result in government harassment and/or loss of employment fueled the perception in the minds of most Americans that Communists must have something to hide.

All of these elements worked to the advantage of an anti-Communist network in America that was composed of former party members, law enforcement, patriotic organizations, clergy, and business organizations. Conservative politicians also found this network useful for several reasons. Republicans and conservative Democrats could use anti-Communism as a way to bludgeon their liberal opponents who favored the expansion of New Deal reforms in the postwar years by branding their proposals such as national health care as “socialized medicine” or “creeping socialism.”²⁰ But it was the Republican Party that sought the greatest partisan

advantage by painting Democrats as the ones who “lost” Eastern Europe and China to Communism, while also not taking the domestic threat more seriously.

For their part, liberals were put on the defensive when trying to defend the political and civil rights of a group that justified the acts of the Stalinist regime, no matter how threatening these acts appeared to U.S. national security. Indeed, liberals in the Truman administration portrayed the emerging conflict with the U.S.S.R. as a life-and-death struggle in order to build support for their foreign policy initiatives. Faced with partisan attacks from the right after embarrassing revelations of Soviet espionage within his own administration, Truman took a number of actions to prove that liberals could also be tough on Communism, including establishing a Federal Employee Loyalty Program in 1947, unleashing the FBI to go after suspected subversives, and authorizing the U.S. attorney general to issue a list of Communist and subversive organizations (which by 1950 contained 197 groups) that employers were encouraged to reference when investigating the activities of their workers.²¹

Though Truman had hoped to undercut the efforts of conservative anti-Communists, in fact these actions laid the groundwork not just for the federal investigations by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (inaccurately labeled as HUAC) that followed, but also for state and local governments that implemented their own loyalty oaths and investigations. Working on the assumption that *all* Communists were potential enemy agents, school systems and universities, as well as media outlets and corporations, used the attorney general’s list to screen their employees on the basis of group membership. Independent professionals and businesspeople could lose their state-issued business licenses or have government contracts terminated if they refused to submit to a loyalty oath. The American Bar Association worked with the FBI and other anti-Communist groups to disbar radical members. An estimated 10,000 people were fired in the early 1950s as a result of the Communist witch hunt. Thousands more are estimated to have resigned under duress or were refused employment as applicants because of guilt by association.²²

One aspect of this witch hunt that has received scant attention by historians is the “Lavender Scare” that gripped Washington in these early Cold War years, as McCarthy and his allies often equated Communists with “queers” as an internal security threat. Because virtually all homosexuals employed by the government sought to hide their sexual behavior for fear of persecution, there was a general consensus among policy makers that gays and lesbians could be subject to blackmail by Soviet agents, thus making them security risks.²³ (Ironically, the American Communist Party, which was obsessed with internal security, also expelled homosexuals from its ranks for fear that they might be blackmailed into revealing party secrets.) But the gay-baiting rhetoric of the era also illustrates the moralistic tone of anti-Communism which often portrayed the fight with

Communism as one where American values were at stake. "Indulgence in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber of the individual," argued a U.S. Senate report in 1950, and that "[o]ne homosexual can pollute a Government office." Thousands of federal employees were fired or forced to resign when confronted with accusations of their sexual behavior. Moreover, this federal obsession with rooting out homosexuals was emulated at the state and local government levels, as well as in private industry, as an individual's sexual behavior became a legitimate area of investigation.²⁴

ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE SCHOOLS

Of particular concern to anti-Communist groups were the nation's schools because of their ability to shape young minds. Social studies programs throughout the nation focused on teaching anti-Communism in the 1950s as the federal Office of Education promoted its "Zeal for Democracy" program. American civics textbooks that spoke favorably of a progressive income tax or federal power projects could be banned from schoolrooms if they could not pass muster with local school boards under pressure from the American Legion, right-wing women's groups, and even HUAC (which was very interested in the textbooks assigned at colleges and high schools). The National Education Association in 1949 urged the exclusion of all teachers who were Communists, while New York State required public school administrators to dismiss any Communist or member of a front organization mentioned on the attorney general's list. Three hundred teachers in New York City alone lost their jobs.²⁵

The university's liberal politics and promotion of secular values also became a target for anti-Communist groups, ironically assisted by college administrators who found it in the university's self-interest to police itself in order to maintain government contracts. When the Regents of the University of California instituted a loyalty oath in 1949, 32 faculty members who refused to sign the oath were fired.²⁶ The administrations of 37 universities endorsed the 1953 statement by the American Association of Universities that faculty who were not loyal "to the country, and to its form of government" had no place in the university. Yale University refused to offer jobs to known or suspected Communists and kept close ties with the FBI. Said Yale President Charles Seymour, "There will be no witch hunts at Yale because there will be no witches."²⁷

The result of these anti-Communist efforts was a stifling of academic freedom among faculty throughout academia who feared that any statement they made that could be perceived as un-American might be reported by a student turned informer. Many tailored their lesson plans to conform to the rigid standards of Americanism, while others tape-recorded their lectures in case they were ever investigated. Such fears were not unfounded, as the FBI had stationed agents at 56 universities, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford, and Chicago. As early

as 1949 an Indiana University study found that teachers suffered from “fear and insecurity” due to the “repressive and restrictive rules and regulations” that were placed upon them.²⁸

ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE MEDIA

If education was a focus because of its influence on the young, the role of the media was of even greater interest to anti-Communists because of its importance as a weapon of mass culture. Hollywood, a liberal bastion that had portrayed the Soviet Union positively in a variety of films during World War II when Russians and Americans were allies, was a tempting target for congressmen in search of a spotlight. In May of 1947, HUAC began taking testimony from popular movie stars such as Robert Taylor, Gary Cooper, and Ronald Reagan, all of whom proved to be friendly witnesses willing to cooperate with HUAC’s investigation about Communist influence in the film industry. The proceedings were not without some comedy, however, as Walt Disney charged that the Screen Cartoonist Guild was infested with Communists who had attempted to subvert Mickey Mouse to the party line.²⁹

Headlines were made when the “Hollywood Ten” (a group of screen writers and directors) refused to respond to questions about their Communist Party membership by invoking their First Amendment rights to free speech and association. All 10 were imprisoned for contempt of Congress. Subsequent “unfriendly witnesses” therefore had a choice: invoke the First Amendment and risk imprisonment for contempt; invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and lose their jobs; or cooperate with HUAC by naming names. In fact, the committee had obtained all the names it needed from friendly witnesses through both public and private hearings. What these congressmen sought was a public confession by witnesses as to their past ideological sins. Only by naming names was a witness perceived as truly sincere in his repentance.³⁰

When HUAC began jailing witnesses for contempt, motion picture studios were thrown into a panic and sought to remove suspected Communists from their payrolls. By the end of the 1940s, 250 film artists had been blacklisted. But it wasn’t just congressional pressure that propelled these studio executives into action. The American Legion also played a part by staging protests around the country at theaters that showed films directed, written, or starring suspected Communist Party members or members of “front” organizations listed on the attorney general’s list. Even belonging to an organization associated with progressive causes could bring about suspicion. Writers, directors, and performers were all subjected to a smear campaign by both civic-minded groups and the FBI.³¹

Moreover, publications such as *Red Channels* (which provided updates on a regular basis to media executives of known or suspected Communists in radio and television), and the need to keep paid advertisers happy,

pressured networks to prove their anti-Communist credentials. In 1950, CBS required all of its 2,500 employees to sign a loyalty oath based on the attorney general's list. It also hired an outside consulting firm to investigate its employees. NBC justified blacklisting as a necessary "business safeguard," and even labor unions in the industry removed from their ranks anyone the FBI had fingered as a Communist or whom a congressional committee had deemed unfriendly. By 1954, 1,500 people were reportedly blacklisted from radio and television.³²

Yet even as they criticized the media for not policing its ranks with enough vigilance, anti-Communist groups found motion pictures, radio and television broadcasting, and the print media essential tools for the spread of their propaganda. Hollywood had joined the anti-Communist campaign in earnest by the late 1940s with films such as *The Iron Curtain* (which deals with the exposure of an atomic spy ring in Canada), *Woman on Pier 13* (in which Communists take over the New York Longshoremen Union), and *The Red Menace* (a film so "shocking," posters proclaimed, that "it was filmed behind locked studio doors").³³

A common theme throughout the media in the 1940s and 1950s was the portrayal of Communist cadres as gangsters and thugs. When one *New York Times* film critic was asked in 1950 whether such a portrayal was fair, he answered in the affirmative. "After all, outlaws are pretty much the same no matter what their objectives."³⁴ *Look* magazine agreed when it asked in a 1948 pictorial dramatization, "Could the Reds Seize Detroit?" As 3,000–6,000 "sinister" Communists take over the city, they are helped by prisoners from the Wayne County jail who are only too happy to join the Communist ranks in exchange for their freedom. A "blitzkrieg style" attack, the publication warned, could bring chaos and murder to the city.³⁵

The print media was particularly effective at heightening feelings of insecurity among Americans in the post-World War II decades as newspapers and magazines exploited these fears with headlines about atomic espionage, the Soviet crackdown in Eastern Europe, the Chinese Revolution, the invasion of South Korea, and the nuclear testing of larger and more destructive weapons. Just in the late 1940s, publishers signed up hundreds of authors, ranging from anti-Communist politicians to refugees from the Iron Curtain, to expound on the Communist threat with titles such as *The Red Plotters*, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*, and *Why I Escaped*. Magazines from *Catholic World* to *Business Week* captivated readers with stories about Communists in the labor movement, in government service, and even on Wall Street. In short, the public was fed a steady diet of shrill warnings, both real and exaggerated, to heighten its anxieties.³⁶

ANTI-COMMUNISM IN AMERICAN LIFE

It should be no surprise then that by 1948, the Gallup Poll showed "almost unanimous belief that Russia is an aggressive, expansion-minded

nation." And fewer than 5 percent of Americans believed that conciliatory steps towards Russia could improve relations between the two countries.³⁷ Such attitudes contributed to public support (or at least acquiescence) on the part of most Americans for anti-Communist efforts to limit the civil liberties of American Communists in the early Cold War years. And thousands of Americans around the country sought to do their part to help fight the Cold War at home. One such group was the Minute Women of the USA, formed in Norwalk, Connecticut, in 1949 on an "anti-labor, anti-income tax, and pro-segregation" platform. Members (of which there were 500,000 in 104 chapters in 46 states by mid-1952) wore pins proclaiming "Guarding the Land We Love," and took steps such as enrolling in college classes to root out Communists in academia.³⁸

Nevertheless, if thousands of civilians were ready to join the hunt for subversives, millions more were content to do nothing at all. Anti-Communist groups despaired at such complacency and sought ways to enlist Americans in the Cold War fight through increased patriotism. Civic-minded groups such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars initiated public celebrations such as Loyalty Day (which would be held on May 1 in an effort to counter May Day parades around the country) while also backing a nationwide drive to sing the National Anthem at sports events.³⁹ The Catholic Church in America, which had been committed to the destruction of Communism since the 1920s, disseminated dozens of pamphlets that equated Communism with fascism, or warned of the danger to American schools from Marxist secularism. Priests throughout the country spoke out against Communism from their pulpits, on the radio, and at public meetings.⁴⁰

If most Americans did not join their local anticommunist chapter, they did seek security in other ways. First and foremost was a rush into marriage by young people, a rush which sparked the beginning of a massive baby boom. During the war, thousands of women were brought into the paid labor force to replace the men who had entered the armed forces. A number of factors, including expanding job and educational opportunities, and increasing availability of birth control devices, could have led young people to delay marriage. But Americans were told by psychologists, advice magazines, and a wide range of other cultural and political figures that happiness and security lay not just in the building of a family, but also in the adherence of traditional gender roles to fight Communism which, these pundits argued, would destroy the family.⁴¹ After the trauma of Depression, world war, and the growing insecurities (both internal and external) of the Cold War, young Americans didn't need much convincing. The age for both marriage and motherhood fell to a 100-year low. A 1955 marriage study revealed that less than 10 percent of those polled believed that an unmarried person could be happy. Argued one popular advice book at the time, "The family is the center of your living. If it isn't, you've gone far astray."⁴²

This exhortation to Americans in the 1950s to return to traditional gender roles, while rooted in the promotion of domesticity in America's Victorian Age, also had a Cold War influence. Often portraying the fight with Communism as one where American values were at risk, individuals were told to strengthen their moral fiber by resisting the degenerative seductions of pornography, prostitution, and sexual deviancy. Popular culture, led by fiction writers such as Philip Wylie and Mickey Spillane, warned of overly assertive women and Communist seductresses that would lure men—and thus the nation—into destruction. Homosexual males in particular suffered persecution during these years because of the perception that they lacked the masculine backbone to fight Communism. As researchers such as Alfred Kinsey and E. Lowell Kelly who studied sexual relationships in the 1950s discovered, many gay men and lesbians entered marriages as a way to escape the stigma of homosexuality by passing themselves off as heterosexuals.⁴³

Related to this rush by Americans into marriage was also a rising interest in religion. Church membership rose from 50 percent of the population to 63 percent, and an astounding 96.9 percent of respondents to a Gallup Poll identified themselves as religious. Government leaders encouraged this return to God when Congress in 1954 added the phrase “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance and in 1957 stamped “In God We Trust” on all American paper currency. One toy company sought to profit from the rising interest in religion when it began selling a doll that had the ability to bend its legs and kneel in prayer. Thus, though the growth of suburbs and the recreation that churches and synagogues offered were important factors in the growth of religion, the prevailing Cold War mood cannot be ignored since Soviet Communism promoted atheism. As if to demonstrate this, HUAC published a pamphlet entitled *100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Religion*, while the American Legion specifically sponsored an annual “Back to God” program in its efforts to fortify the home front against Communists.⁴⁴

In any case, as international tensions rose and fell with each new crisis, so too did public attitudes about the Communist threat. Anti-Communist groups suffered a blow when Senator McCarthy was finally censured for his smear tactics, discrediting in tandem the anti-Communist work of HUAC and of state legislative committees.⁴⁵ Liberals argued that one could be anti-Communist without surrendering to McCarthy's mania for persecution, thus marginalizing the more reactionary anti-Communist groups to the political fringe.⁴⁶ Moreover, a thaw in diplomatic U.S.-Soviet relations after Stalin's death in 1953 was a hopeful sign to most Americans. By the late summer of 1959, 66 percent of those polled believed that “a peaceful settlement of differences” between Russia and the West was possible.⁴⁷ Even Attorney General Robert Kennedy by 1961 was telling a reporter that the American Communist Party “couldn't be more feeble and less of a threat, and besides, its membership consists largely of FBI agents.”⁴⁸ Only

in the American South did reactionary anti-Communism remain a powerful force as whites drew on its rhetoric to protect racial segregation, which came under assault after 1945.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE COLD WAR

World War II had a profound impact on how Americans viewed race relations in the postwar world. The crimes against humanity committed by both the German and the Japanese occupation forces in the name of strengthening racial superiority led delegates in 1945 to the United Nations to adopt a Human Rights Charter that discredited racism as both a doctrine and an instrument of national policy.⁴⁹ On the home front, American officials lavished praise on Japanese American soldiers (many of whose families had been interred in relocation camps) for their bravery during the war and called for the repeal of discriminatory laws against Asians along the West Coast. As the Cold War leader of the West, Americans became increasingly aware that their nation had to uphold in action the democratic ideals that it promoted to newly independent nations in Asia and Africa where the Cold War competition was fiercest.

But World War II had not abolished racism in America. In fact, the United States had fought German and Japanese racist regimes with military forces that were racially segregated between black and white. And in the postwar years, the democratic image that America sought to promote abroad was constantly undermined by the injustices that African Americans had to endure every day. In the South especially, most whites cared little about what the outside world thought of their racially segregated society, and a wave of violence against African American soldiers returning home swept the region.

After serving his country for five years in the U.S. Army, George Dorsey returned to his home state of Georgia in 1946 only to be shot along with his wife and two friends by a white mob along a country road. That same year Macio Snipes, the only African American in his district to vote in a state election, was murdered by four whites at his home. In Aiken, South Carolina that summer, Sgt. Isaac Woodward was beaten with a nightstick and blinded in both eyes by the chief of police. In the Dorsey and Snipes cases, the murderers were never brought to justice; and in the Woodward case, the sheriff was acquitted to public cheers in the courtroom. Between the summer of 1945 and the end of 1946, 60 known violent deaths were reported.⁵⁰

In the years prior to World War II, American officials would have expressed little concern about how these stories played outside of American borders. But in the midst of a Cold War in which the United States sought to promote its democratic values as superior to those of its Communist foes, these events and the criticism they evoked from foreign diplomats and journalists took on much greater significance. Well into

the 1960s, U.S. diplomatic posts frequently reported to the State Department adverse public and official opinion of the United States in regards to domestic racial matters. After returning from a goodwill tour around the world in February 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy reported that in every country he visited he was "asked about the question of civil rights."⁵¹ As the leader of the free world, the United States could not ignore such criticism, either from its allies or its Communist foes.

Not surprisingly, both the Soviet Union and China were particularly fierce in their criticism of America's "Negro Problem" as they successfully highlighted the contradiction between the rhetoric of American liberty and equality and the daily struggle African Americans faced from lynchings, poverty, racial indignity, and injustice.⁵² The underlying message of these reports was that if white America treated its own minorities so disgracefully, how could Third World nations truly believe that America would treat them as equals? Did such a racist nation really have the best interests of the nonwhite peoples of the world at heart? Soviet propaganda was effective not because it had to fabricate these stories about American racial intolerance but because they were true and were often gathered by Soviet journalists from the American press.

U.S. government officials were well aware that their promotion of democracy in the Third World was being undermined by racial intolerance at home, and they sought to respond through both action and words. Harry Truman saw both domestic and international advantages in promoting civil rights legislation in 1948. Politically he needed to win Northern black votes to beat off a political challenger on his left, but he was also sensitive to the negative publicity that discrimination generated in the international press. "If we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose freedom is in jeopardy," he told Congress when proposing a federal antilynching law, "[W]e must correct the remaining imperfections in our practice of democracy." By executive order Truman desegregated the armed forces and the civil service, though his legislative efforts were stymied by opposition from Southern congressmen in his own party.⁵³

Yet progress continued as a result of state and federal court decisions that struck down racial barriers, and this news was trumpeted by officials at home and American diplomats abroad to often favorable responses. When in 1954 the Supreme Court ruled school segregation unconstitutional in its *Brown vs. Board of Education* decision, the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency wasted no time in countering Soviet propaganda. Within an hour of the court's decision, the Voice of America broadcast the news into 34 languages, emphasizing that "the issue was settled by law under democratic processes rather than by mob rule or dictatorial fiat." Favorable reaction to the *Brown* decision spanned the globe, and it was especially greeted with enthusiasm throughout Africa. The federal government, American diplomats argued, was doing all it could



In Moscow, Vice President Richard M. Nixon argued with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev at an American exhibit of domestic conveniences during the height of the Cold War, an encounter that was quickly dubbed the “kitchen debate.” The dispute highlighted the differences between the prosperity of American material progress and the austerity of Soviet Communism, a major sore spot of the Cold War. (National Archives)

to achieve racial equality.⁵⁴ The only problem with this message was that most African Americans disagreed with it.

Among the reasons why Southern white violence increased in the postwar years was the fact that many African Americans who had experienced new opportunities during the war years refused to be relegated to the bottom of society once again. This was especially true for African American soldiers who had risked their lives on the battlefield and in return demanded the full benefits of citizenship and freedom they deserved. In 1946, 68 black men and women from Mississippi, led by World War II veterans, put their lives on the line by testifying in a U.S. Senate investigation

about voting irregularities to keep African American voters away from the polls.⁵⁵ That same year in Columbia, Tennessee, black residents fired into a white lynch mob that entered their neighborhood after dark. Hundreds of state patrol officers and National Guardsmen subsequently proceeded to destroy African American property, but these residents had shown their determination to defend themselves.⁵⁶

In the 1950s and early 1960s, African Americans continued to apply pressure on U.S. political leaders by drawing international attention to America's race problems through boycotts, sit-ins, and protest marches. Some also traveled the world to speak out against American racism, often sparking the wrath of the U.S. State Department, which sought to curtail their travels. Paul Robeson, an accomplished African American actor and fierce critic of American race relations, was roundly criticized for drawing attention to the mistreatment of African Americans. In 1950 the State Department labeled him as "one of the most dangerous men in the world" and confiscated his passport. But Robeson was not the only African American to face this abuse; W.E.B. Du Bois, expatriate Josephine Baker, and a host of civil rights leaders also faced government harassment for their efforts to highlight poor race relations in America.⁵⁷

Public figures both in and out of the government also made ample use of the anti-Communist rhetoric of the Cold War to smear supporters of civil rights. Most Southern whites mistakenly believed that the nation's oldest civil rights organization, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), was a Communist organization. Attempting to set up a chapter in a small town could be dangerous since any card-carrying member was considered by whites to be a traitor to the nation. In Mississippi, where segregationists fought the hardest to hold onto their institutions in the 1950s, a siege mentality developed in which many became convinced that integration was a Communist conspiracy. Book-burning rallies and the censorship of speakers were not uncommon. Television programs that reported negatively on the state's Jim Crow laws were cut off in mid-sentence.⁵⁸

In response to the growing influence of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Southern politicians circulated a 1957 photo of King attending a convention at Highlander Folk School in Tennessee which they identified falsely as a "Communist training school." King, of course, was not a Communist, but he felt sympathy to those who had been persecuted during the years of McCarthyism. He was also impressed with both the advocacy and practice of racial equality within the American Communist Party's political organization. Meanwhile, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover convinced himself that, whether a Communist or not, King was dangerous because he associated with "known" or "suspected" Communists. Hoover went so far as to argue that because King had met personally with both Kennedy brothers at the White House that the Communist Party had "access" to the highest levels of government.⁵⁹

While the Eisenhower administration avoided red-baiting the civil rights movement, it also chose not to embrace it. However, by 1957 the president realized that the only way to stop the drumbeat of international criticism was through firm government action against Southern segregation. This lesson had been learned when Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus sought to prevent the court-ordered integration of Central High School in Little Rock. The governor ordered the National Guard to bar nine black students from enrolling while a white mob taunted them mercilessly. International coverage and condemnation of the event was so extensive that American newspapers even wrote about the coverage abroad. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was reportedly “sick at heart” over the Little Rock crisis and feared the untold consequences this would have on American foreign relations with countries in Asia and Africa. “This situation,” he told an associate, “is ruining our foreign policy,” and he urged the president to find a way to resolve the crisis.⁶⁰

Eisenhower was no supporter of desegregation, believing that the Supreme Court had erred in its *Brown* decision. “I don’t believe you can change the hearts of men with laws or decisions,” he said.⁶¹ But Ike directed his fury at the governor of Arkansas for creating a stand-off that was garnering such bad international publicity *and* fueling a Soviet propaganda machine. He finally felt compelled to send 1,000 federal troops into Little Rock and to nationalize 10,000 members of the Arkansas National Guard, ordering them to protect the students. In his televised address to the nation, the president did not mince words about the international significance of this domestic crisis. Irreparable harm was “being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world” by the state and local actions taken against these black students, he said. America’s enemies must not be allowed to gloat over the incident and use it worldwide to misrepresent the United States.⁶²

The crisis also spurred Congress to pass the first civil rights legislation since the end of Reconstruction. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 created the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to study federal laws and policies dealing with equal protection. The 1957 act was weak in comparison to the legislation that would come in the following decade, but it was an important first step in recognizing that American race relations required greater federal involvement.

When the 1960s produced more attacks against nonviolent protesters who were staging sit-ins, leading the Freedom Rides, and marching in the streets of Birmingham, the Kennedy administration, like the Eisenhower administration before it, realized that it required strong federal intervention to stem the tide of international condemnation. Kennedy did not live long enough to see his civil rights legislation pass both houses of Congress, but substantial civil rights legislation was enacted under President Lyndon Johnson. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 signaled America’s determination to deal with its race problems,

with the ironic result that there was much less international interest in American race relations during the following decades.

CONTAINMENT AND THE KOREAN WAR

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, both early examples of containment, required little sacrifice on the part of the average American as long as American soldiers were kept out of harm's way. Domestically, both military and economic aid to U.S. allies could benefit American workers as long as this aid kept defense plants operating and rebuilt European markets for American-made goods. But after June 25, 1950, as North Korean troops overwhelmed South Korean defenses in an attempt to unify the Korean peninsula, civilians on the home front soon realized that containment would require much greater sacrifice than in the past.

When President Truman announced the next day that he was committing U.S. forces under the United Nations' banner to repel the North Korean invasion, the response on the part of the American public was overwhelmingly positive. Letters, telegrams, and phone calls of support flooded the White House. Though a June 1950 Gallup Poll showed a majority of Americans believed that World War III had begun, a July 1, 1950 poll revealed that 80 percent of the public approved of U.S. intervention, and 57 percent believed it could increase the chances for world peace by showing the Soviet Union that America would not stand idly by in the face of aggression. The public was gratified to see the United States finally push back after it had done next to nothing to stop postwar Communist advances in Eastern Europe and China.⁶³

Such support remained high in the early months of the war as long as hardship on the home front was minimal. One returning soldier later recalled his surprise at how "there was no rationing, no 'making do'" as there had been during World War II. "[I]t was as if Korea, that distant battlefield, did not exist at all. . . ." ⁶⁴ Truman himself wanted the public to understand that this was a "police action" directed by the United Nations. "We are not at war," he stated flatly to a reporter soon after the conflict erupted.⁶⁵ Truman sought to make the distinction between a "war" and a "police action" so as not to be forced into a position of instituting a full mobilization program rather than the more limited rearmament he sought. He also did not want to institute blanket controls on the economy in the form of price and wage freezes, nor did he desire adding new and inflationary war-related deficits on top of debts incurred during World War II.⁶⁶

Despite his public assurances that the Korean conflict would remain a "limited" war, Truman could not prevent the fueling of inflation by both consumers and producers through panic buying and hoarding in anticipation that the conflict would bring about shortages. But while the public continued to push the White House to control prices and profiteering,

Truman resisted these calls, hoping that the conflict in Korea would be short if United Nations (UN) forces could regain the initiative and restore the status quo antebellum at the 38th parallel.⁶⁷ And after General Douglas MacArthur's successful landing at the port of Inchon behind enemy lines in September forced North Korean troops into full retreat nearly to the Chinese border, Truman believed the general's pronouncements that American soldiers would be home by Christmas after reunifying the Korean peninsula.

Nevertheless, the war took a dramatic turn in November 1950 when 200,000 Chinese Communist troops poured across the Yalu River and drove UN forces into a 300-mile retreat to a line south of Seoul. American support for the war dropped precipitously and inflation spiraled upwards as consumers and producers faced the prospect of a much broader war against a formidable Chinese enemy. Truman was finally forced to take stronger action in controlling prices and a broader rearmament program. In December, he declared a national emergency and embraced full mobilization. A month later, he issued a mandatory wage-and-price freeze order to stem inflation.⁶⁸

United Nations advances northward stabilized the fighting in the spring of 1951, but Americans had by that time become deeply divided in their support for the war, as Truman was forced to once again limit American war aims to reestablishing the original boundary at the 38th parallel. Why were American boys dying in a war, many asked, that the United States seemingly did not want to win? By 1951 a majority of Americans considered entering the war a mistake and wanted to pull the troops out of Korea as soon as possible.⁶⁹ On the other hand, conservatives, including General MacArthur, argued that America should liberate not only North Korea, but all of China from Communism. When Truman relieved MacArthur of command in April 1951 for insubordination, he set off a firestorm of criticism: 66 percent of the public disapproved of his decision, and Republicans in Congress called for impeachment hearings. With his approval ratings in the low 20s by early 1952, Truman wisely decided not to run for reelection.⁷⁰

Agitated by inflation, higher taxes, mounting casualties, and a frustrating stalemate, the public was in an angry mood that election year. McCarthyism was at its peak, and American voters sought a president who was anti-Communist but who would also end the war in Korea. The Republicans nominated General Dwight D. Eisenhower, banking on his prestige and military experience as Allied Supreme Commander during World War II to win the White House. "I shall go to Korea," he told the country, leading many in the press corps to proclaim the election over two weeks before the voting even began. In Eisenhower, the public found a sense of security that this former war hero would resolve the Korean conflict.⁷¹

Ignoring those within his own party who called for an expansion of the war to roll back Communism in Asia, Eisenhower sought a quick end

to the fighting while maintaining American credibility around the world. On July 27, 1953, after three years of bloody conflict and 37,000 American deaths, a cease fire with the Chinese was finally agreed upon. Americans were relieved that the war was over, but they were also chastened by the experience, realizing that the United States had not actually “won” this war. Yet both civilians and their leaders remained determined to fight Communism at home and abroad, and that determination fashioned a military-industrial complex that kept the nation partially but permanently mobilized for war.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CONTAINMENT

After World War II, Truman had had little choice but to accede to the public’s demand for a return to normalcy on the home front. But policy makers had continued to be concerned over the nation’s defense posture against a well-armed Russian foe entrenched in Eastern Europe. Without the military power to back it up, could containment be anything more than a policy of bluff? Could America afford *not* to create a permanent mobilization base that would keep in reserve the ability to mobilize industrial capacity, war materials, and manpower if and when war broke out again?⁷² The Korean War provided the answer to these questions. Fearing the worst now, the Truman administration had launched a full-scale mobilization program at the end of 1950 in order to meet the Soviet threat head-on by building up its conventional and atomic forces. From 1950 to 1952, the defense budget ballooned from \$13.5 billion to \$52 billion.⁷³

Truman’s mobilization program had a lasting impact on the shape of the American economy and the government’s relationship to it. Prior to the Korean War, approximately 7–10 percent of business activity in the economy was defense related. By 1952, this number had risen to over 30 percent. Yet American corporations continued to produce consumer goods at record numbers throughout the 1950s even as they fulfilled defense orders for the Pentagon. This is because both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations proceeded to build an alternate defense economy that would create new industrial capacity to serve the nation’s military needs instead of converting existing facilities from consumer production as had been done in previous wars.⁷⁴

This alternate defense economy was partially the result of American fears that a garrison state would be the consequence of a permanent rearmament program led and maintained by the government. Total rearmament had been common in previous wars, but had been tolerated because of their expected short duration. The Cold War, policy makers argued, would be different, a conflict of undetermined duration. Would the loss of American democracy be the price for fighting Soviet totalitarianism? To be certain it was not, Truman’s mobilization program was intentionally decentralized to allow a variety of public and private entities to be

involved in the decision-making process. Government loans, subsidies, research grants, tax breaks, and guaranteed markets for specialty items would ensure that private industries would play an important role in creating and maintaining this mobilization base.⁷⁵

Critics at the time (and since) pointed to these policies as responsible for the rise of a military-industrial complex (MIC) that kept defense spending rising ever higher. The MIC was (and remains) a loosely structured network of national security officials in both government and the armed services, federal legislators, corporate executives, defense plant workers, university scientists, and even landlords and store owners who served the military bases and defense plants. Its emphasis was not on the mass production of tanks and guns to be used in a conflict, but rather on highly specialized atmospheric technologies such as bombers, satellites, and missiles that would serve to deter conflict (but were ready for use if conflict arose). Thus the Cold War would be won in the research labs of America, where weapons were constantly updated to maintain that deterrence.⁷⁶

The role the MIC played in America's Cold War mobilization reshaped the industrial landscape of the United States as the traditional industrial states of the North and East began to face competition from states in the West and Southwest, where there was an abundance of cheap land and open space available for research and testing, as well as a mild climate that was attuned to a leisure-oriented lifestyle. Add to this the generous tax rates and subsidies that the West and Southwest offered, as well as weak unions, cheap utility rates, and a low cost of living, and one can see why these were attractive regions in which to do business.⁷⁷ Indeed, military bases, supply depots, and major science research centers sprang up in California, Texas, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah. These areas also benefited from federal spending on infrastructure such as dams and highways, as well as the economic activity generated by consumer spending from new residents. As historian Gary Nash has written, military spending "served as both an accelerator for new industries and a people mover."⁷⁸

The once sleepy resort village of Colorado Springs, Colorado, is a model example of the transformative power on a community by the military-industrial complex in the 1950s. Thanks largely to the efforts of city leaders exploiting their ties to the Eisenhower administration, the city was transformed through the construction of military bases and airfields, the Air Force Academy, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command headquarters located in Cheyenne Mountain. Thousands of people flooded into the city, as did millions of dollars in military spending. But Colorado Springs also benefited from what it could offer potential employers. Seeing an opportunity to work closely with its military clients, big-name industries such as Kaman Sciences and Hewlett-Packard both relocated to the city in 1957 and 1962 respectively. So did other industries in the following decades that were attracted to the cheap land, beautiful surroundings, and flexible and abundant labor force, consisting of military

spouses who could serve as either part-time or full-time workers. By 1985, at least 50 percent of the city's \$4 billion economy was due to defense related expenditures.⁷⁹

But there were also long-term national consequences from the institutionalization of government-funded, high-tech innovation for military purposes that began in the 1950s. Diverting scarce scientific and technical labor into the MIC in time hurt commercial industries such as machine tools, steel, automobiles, and consumer electronics. Many of these domestic industries lost their comparative advantage in consumer products to European and Asian allies who devoted much less of their GNP to national defense than did the United States. Between 1945 and 1990, the Pentagon spent an estimated \$10.5 trillion to fight the Cold War. Federal deficit spending to fund this military buildup required higher interest rates, which further discouraged private investment in nonmilitary activities. As defense spending began to decline with the vanishing Soviet threat after 1990, aerospace, communications, and electronics industries that had become so dependent on military spending were faced with severe challenges as they sought to convert their plants to nonmilitary production.⁸⁰

CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

When spokesmen for the American Legion testified before the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1950 about the urgent need to "shock proof" American youth to fight in the next war, they were not referring to soldiers who would be sent overseas. The "shock troops" that America needed to train were civilians in Los Angeles, New York, Washington, D.C., and Detroit who would have to withstand the first blow of a technological war. Without any kind of survival training and a strong civil defense, the United States could not hope to win any future conflict. "Now is the time," they argued, "to adopt a permanent plan of training to provide real permanent strength, the strength of a trained citizenry."⁸¹

Throughout the Cold War as Americans searched for security from a nuclear threat that was nearly impossible to comprehend, proponents of civil defense encouraged them to take the initiative in providing protection from enemy attack for themselves and their families. Not only would civil defense strengthen the nation's nuclear deterrent, they argued, but it would provide insurance in case that deterrent failed. Moreover, advocates of home protection openly embraced the concept of a Cold War home front where civilians could play a part in the fight against Communism by "standing up" to nuclear war. Yet throughout the 1950s, these advocates would be frustrated time and again by the public's apathy and fatalism.

After learning that atomic weapons had been used against Japan in August 1945, Americans experienced a mix of emotions that gyrated between hope and fear. Many believed that atomic energy offered a bright future to American science, medicine, and agriculture. Could radiation

make crops grow more abundant? Would cars and airplanes run on “atomic fuel” the size of a pea? Would the crippled be able to walk with the advances that nuclear energy could provide? Indeed, American culture became so infused with the atom that its imagery appeared in movies, cocktail drink names, song titles, jokes, and even free cereal box toys such as Kix’s amazing Atomic “Bomb” Ring where onlookers could “See genuine atoms split to smithereens!”⁸²

But there was also fear fueled by the images and gruesome eyewitness accounts of the victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trying to imagine what the bomb would do to New York or Los Angeles generated a sense of numbness in civilians. Some Americans called for an urban dispersal policy that would make cities less vulnerable, while others demanded that the government begin a shelter-building program immediately. Many were much like the Denver man who was asked by a reporter in 1950 what he thought about the atomic bomb. “I just feel better when I don’t think about it,” he replied uncomfortably.⁸³

With the failure of efforts to internationalize atomic energy after World War II, American policy makers embraced a military strategy based on the assumption that the power to retaliate was the best deterrent of attack. If an opponent could be convinced that, even striking first, he would be annihilated, then the “game” of atomic war would not be worth playing. But because standing armies were expensive to maintain, nuclear weapons were also touted as a way to deliver “more bang for the buck” in any conflict. In its “New Look” defense policy and “Massive Retaliation” strategy, the Eisenhower administration committed itself to deterring Communist aggression around the world by threatening to use nuclear weapons. But such a threat, the administration noted, was only credible if the United States could prove that it was willing to absorb a nuclear attack on its own population if necessary. Thus civil defense was promoted as both an element of deterrence *and* a way to provide protection should war break out.⁸⁴

The challenge was convincing the public to prepare for an attack from a Russian enemy with whom America was not actually at war. Americans had to be told that they could no longer avoid the responsibility of learning everything possible about personal and community survival. “All 160 million Americans at home must accept an active part in civil defense preparedness,” read one 1955 Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) brochure. Whether they lived in the target area or well beyond it, every citizen had an obligation to know first aid, how to shelter the homeless, and how to help others less fortunate; in other words, how to do his part in fighting the Cold War through civil defense. American survival depended on it.⁸⁵

There was also a practical side to promoting self-help because Congress was uninterested in spending the billions of dollars that would be necessary to create a nationwide shelter system. Thus civil defense

advocates focused their attention on a family that would be self-reliant in the immediate aftermath of any nuclear attack, before state and local authorities could provide aid. By infusing civil defense with what President Eisenhower described as the “moral structure” of the family and the “spiritual strength” of American home life, a civil defense program could be sold on the basis that it strengthened the moral foundations of the American home.⁸⁶

While nuclear war was a difficult subject to discuss with children, civil defense officials encouraged parents to be open and honest with their kids about the bomb, and to devise tasks for them should an attack occur. One child could be put in charge of gathering blankets and games, while another’s duties could be keeping the radio and flashlight in working order. Public schools were enlisted in teaching children how to “duck and cover” should they see a flash of light.⁸⁷ The New York City Board of Education instructed teachers to avoid frightening children during air raid drills by being sure to smile when announcing the drill. The exercise should be treated as a game, accompanied with songs, dances, and other entertainment for the children during their time in the shelters.⁸⁸

Women in particular were seen as a natural constituency by civil defense advocates because it was thought that they embodied the traditional role of the homemaker; and the new task of these homemakers was to learn the proper methods to achieve home security in the nuclear age. One New York television station in early 1951 aired 15 ten-minute programs aimed at teaching housewives what they should do to prepare their family in case of attack, including learning first aid, storing food and equipment, fighting fires, and identifying the ideal spot for a family shelter.⁸⁹

Central to the success of a civil defense program constructed on the principle of self-help was that a majority of the population participate. Yet despite periodic upswings of public interest when international tensions increased, indifference to self-protection throughout the 1950s was notable. In fact, opinion polls suggested that fewer and fewer people felt there was a likelihood of war, from 53 percent in 1952, to 47 percent in 1954, and 38 percent in 1956. Other surveys indicated that while civil defense remained a popular program, most people believed that it was a task to be performed by the government—not the individual.⁹⁰

Moreover, fighting the perception of eccentricity was a constant battle for civil defense proponents because the popular press was filled with humorous stories of Americans doing more than their part to “stand up” to nuclear war. In 1951, Leo Pauwels of Los Angeles developed a suit of armor for his six-year-old son that weighed 10 pounds. Later, during a period of intense interest in protection from radioactive fallout, absurd stories about participants in shelter tests became common. In Miami, a newlywed couple spent their two-week honeymoon in a shelter (with a two-week vacation in Jamaica awaiting them if they could stick it out). Did they fight, one reporter wanted to know? Yes, they had had a small

argument over checkers the first day, but nothing else. The couple said their relationship was strengthened by the experience and both were “proud” that they were able to take part in the test.⁹¹

Though stories such as these did little to create a positive image of civil defense, advocates hoped that Americans could be motivated with a continuing process of education to overcome their fears and apathy. Yet local planners worried that the public’s lukewarm response to their calls for volunteers reflected not just apathy, but also fatalism. FCDA Director Val Peterson was sensitive to the belief that a nuclear attack on the United States would be so devastating that Americans could do nothing about it. “To be completely candid,” he said in 1953, “there is some truth [in] this attitude.” The obstacles faced by those in target areas under the shadow of the H-bomb were so vast and bewildering that it was difficult for civilians and local leaders not to conclude that any attempt at defense was futile.⁹²

In 1959, Hollywood contributed to this fatalism with its adaptation of Nevil Shute’s popular 1957 novel *On the Beach*. The film takes place in 1964 following a nuclear war in which all the earth’s inhabitants, save those in Australia, have perished from radioactive fallout. There are no scenes of fire and mushroom clouds engulfing American cities, only images of empty and lifeless streets in San Francisco and San Diego. The survivors in Australia are gripped by a sense of impending doom as the fallout from the northern hemisphere moves into their atmosphere. Everyone implicitly agrees that there is no escape from certain death, and so rather than suffer from radiation sickness, people line up to receive government-issued suicide pills. In the final scene, the viewer is shown an empty town square where a revivalist meeting was held earlier, now left with only a banner reading: “There is still time . . . Brother.”⁹³

On the Beach aggravated civil defense proponents because of what they considered its inaccuracies in dealing with the hazards of radiation. One New York civil defense director attacked the movie as lacking scientific basis for its views on radiation effects, while the *New York Daily News* charged the film with being both “defeatist” and treasonous. But whether scientifically accurate or not, one *New York Times* media critic opined, the film had an impact on its viewers, who left the theater sober and reflective; and perhaps it would even fuel the public’s desire to take more interest in civil defense. Indeed, a 1960 Gallup Poll conducted on the eve of reports that the Soviet Union had downed an American U-2 spy plane found 71 percent of those polled favoring a law that would require each community to build public bomb shelters, though 50 percent said they were uninterested in paying \$500 to build one for themselves.⁹⁴ Civil defense advocates could not ignore the fact that, despite all of their efforts at educating the public, Americans were even more lethargic at the end of the decade than they were at the beginning.

Still, popular attitudes changed dramatically after President John F. Kennedy went before television cameras on July 25, 1961 to rebuff Soviet

demands that the United States pull out of the divided German capital of Berlin. In so doing, Kennedy also urged every American to take the necessary steps to protect his or her family in case of attack. After Kennedy's address, nuclear war suddenly became the topic of discussion at cocktail parties, in church sermons, and in debating societies. Civil defense advocates were heartened with the thought that foreign policy issues could be made less remote by bringing these questions home to every household through shelters. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense Stuart Pittman said that building shelters gave Americans an "opportunity" to "demonstrate their will to face up to thermonuclear war."⁹⁵ Pittman and others looked back to the halcyon days of World War II when communities pulled together to form air raid committees and to conduct scrap drives; when people felt a sense of belonging and pride in their participation. Administration officials wanted to transfer that same "home front" spirit to the Cold War through civil defense.

With Kennedy's call to "act now," Americans were easy prey to the "survival merchants" who emerged to fill the vacuum created by the absence of a federal shelter construction program. A rash of shelter advertisements began appearing in newspapers soon after the president's July speech, and county fairs and shopping malls across the country quickly offered walk-through displays of shelter units. By September there were 120 shelter manufacturers who had government approval—and hundreds more who did not, many of them doing a brisk business. "My best salesmen are named Khrushchev and Kennedy," said Chicago's Frank F. Norton, president of the National Shelter Association. It was also possible to buy survival kits, burial bags (for anyone who died in a shelter), and "fallout suits." Perhaps the most innovative salesman was the Boston merchant who advertised a handy "shelter" for only \$4.50. In return for this sum, purchasers received a crowbar for use in opening manhole covers. The *Nation* was confident that survival merchants would continue to do well "barring a catastrophic breakout of peace."⁹⁶

In any case, as thousands of Americans responded to the president's call for civil defense, Kennedy officials became greatly dismayed at the quarrels and disputes that his warnings engendered. Only those who lived outside of the cities had the space to build backyard fallout shelters. Did this mean that urban dwellers were to be sacrificed? Residents outside of the expected urban target areas also worried that refugees would overwhelm their communities. A Riverside, California, man urged his neighbors to arm themselves in order to repel the possible "hordes" of Los Angeles refugees who would flood their county. Suburban residents worried that their neighbors might try to break into their shelters in time of attack. One Chicago suburbanite explained that he was going to put a machine gun at the hatch of his shelter. An acrimonious theological debate ensued as Rev. L. C. McHugh, editor of the Jesuit Magazine *America*, argued that Christians were entirely justified in killing their neighbors to protect their family shelter.⁹⁷



In the shadow of a possible nuclear Armageddon, some Americans planned to seek refuge in private fallout shelters. This model, constructed by the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), featured a two-week supply of water and nonperishable food, a transistor radio, battery lanterns, a first aid kit, and sanitary supplies. (National Archives)

Kennedy himself was distressed at the debate that his July 25 speech had caused. In an effort to deflate the crisis, he commented in late 1961, "Let us concentrate more on keeping enemy bombers and missiles away from our shores and concentrate less on keeping neighbors away from our shelters."⁹⁸ In fact, public anxieties had already begun to ease by August with the Communist construction of the Berlin Wall, an action which defused both the Berlin crisis and the urgency to prepare for war. When a November Gallup poll asked respondents whether they had made any changes in their home to protect themselves from a nuclear attack, 88 percent replied no, and by mid-1962 the media began to run stories about shelter manufacturers going belly-up. "Civil defense has won a few supporters here and there," *Newsweek* disclosed in June 1962, "but there is no upsurge of demand, no nationwide flood of public sentiment for fallout shelters."⁹⁹

A turn in international events in the fall of 1962 would once again drive civilian anxieties upward as the Kennedy administration threatened war

if the Soviet Union did not remove medium-range nuclear missiles in Communist Cuba. For 13 days in October, the United States and the Soviet Union stood “eye-ball to eye-ball” and Americans held their breath to see if the Russians would blink. They also realized how woefully inadequate were the nation’s civil defense preparations. In Miami, which would have been a prime target since the U.S. military assembled its invasion force there, residents discovered that the city had no officially designated shelters. The same was true in Washington, D.C., and in Boston. In Los Angeles, only two buildings had been stocked with survival supplies; and in Chicago, where the only survival plan was massive evacuation, the city’s civil defense chief had some very simple advice for the residents: “Take cover and pray.” Americans throughout the country emptied local supermarkets of bottled water and canned goods, but there was little else they could do in such a short span of time.¹⁰⁰

In the end the Soviet Union did blink, the missiles were removed, and the crisis passed; but so too did the heightened interest in civil defense. By mid-1963, the *New York Times* was reporting that a survey of cities found civil defense organizations around the country ranged in competence from “inadequate” to “hopeless.” The public was of two minds: either resigned to total destruction, or skeptical that there was any danger. Civil defense, the *Times* explained, remained a crisis-to-crisis proposition. “We are back where we were before the Cuban crisis,” said one Houston civil defense director. “Interest in civil defense comes and goes with tension.”¹⁰¹ Americans would continue to express their fears of nuclear war in the remaining decades of the Cold War, but a combination of apathy and fatalism continued to work against the creation of a home front where civilian “shock troops” could stand up to the bomb.

CONCLUSION

The Cuban Missile Crisis had a sobering effect on its participants, leading both American and Russian political leaders to begin to look for ways to ease Cold War tensions. In a widely praised speech at American University on June 19, 1963, President Kennedy called for an end to the Cold War when he asked each American to examine “his own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the Cold War, and toward freedom and peace.” A postcrisis détente led to an agreement to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere and the establishment of a hotline for direct communication between the Kremlin and the White House.¹⁰² It also led to the weakening of efforts to build a Cold War home front, as the United States and the U.S.S.R. strove to work towards cooperation.

Tensions did ease for a time, but the Cold War continued for another 28 years, leading to the rise and fall of public anxieties in tandem with the diplomatic confrontations between the United States and the Soviet

Union. But public attitudes about the Communist threat had changed by 1963. Diehard anti-Communist groups such as the John Birch Society warned the public to remain vigilant against the “Red menace” domestically and not to be deceived by Russian peace overtures on the international front; but these warnings from the most reactionary of groups in America fell on deaf ears.¹⁰³ Most Americans continued to perceive the Soviet Union as a threat, but one that was controllable and more external rather than internal. Perhaps this was due to the fact that after years of persecution and infiltration, the American Communist Party was by the mid-1960s a shadow of its former self, containing only a few thousand members who could no longer be perceived as a threat by most Americans. Another possible explanation may be that the zeal of domestic anti-Communism in the 1950s had simply burned itself out as Americans went on to worry about other domestic and international issues unrelated to the Cold War. Certainly public attitudes had changed with the coming of age of the baby boomers and the political activists of this generation who were willing to challenge Cold War policies both at home and abroad. Whatever the explanation, as American soldiers began to battle Vietnamese insurgents in the jungles of Southeast Asia after 1965, there were no witch hunts on the home front for Communists, as there had been during the Korean conflict.

After World War II, American policy makers had hoped that a Cold War home front could be created that would unite Americans against a common foe; but instead the opposite happened as an intense anti-Communist hysteria poisoned American politics and society. There were spies, to be sure, and political leaders had a responsibility to protect the national security of the nation. But even at the high point of Soviet espionage before Elizabeth Bentley’s defection to the FBI in 1945, the highest estimate of Communist participation in this spy network was in the hundreds.¹⁰⁴ Yet the government’s wide-ranging search for internal enemies in the form of a witch hunt destroyed the lives and careers of thousands of innocent Americans who were unjustly accused of being ideological outlaws, security risks, and/or sexual subversives. During the late 1940s and 1950s, fear and intolerance silenced critical voices in the formation of domestic and foreign policies that fueled an expensive arms race and contributed to the creation of an insecure world that dangled by a thread over a nuclear abyss.

NOTES

1. Executive Order 9562, *Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President* (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1961–1966), 30–31.

2. “OCD’s Last Man,” *Newsweek*, 30 September 1946, 25.

3. Keith Nelson, *The Impact of War on American Life: The Twentieth-Century Experience* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 173–74.

4. See Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992) for a discussion on the promotion of national security interests by U.S. policy makers.

5. Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 139–40.

6. Historians still debate as to what Stalin's intentions actually were. Was he simply seeking to promote security interests but was antagonized into more aggressive moves by the Truman administration? Or was Stalin always bent on expansion but was forestalled by a U.S. commitment to contain Soviet influence? John Lewis Gaddis in *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) agrees with the latter view but provides a fair assessment of the former in light of declassified Soviet documents in the 1990s.

7. Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, 8th rev. ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 76.

8. See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). Chapter 2, "George Kennan and the Strategy of Containment," provides an excellent analysis of Kennan's thinking in his formulation of containment.

9. Richard M. Fried, *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Pagantry and Patriotism in Cold War America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 67–74.

10. Quoted from Joanne Sharp, *Condensing the Cold War: Reader's Digest and American Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2000), 89.

11. Michael Rogin, *Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), xiii–xiv. Two additional sources focusing on the fear of radical subversion are Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), and David Bennett, *The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History*, rev. and updated (1988; New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

12. For Hoover, see Ellen Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford Books, 1994), 120. For Kennan, see "Memo from George F. Kennan to Robert G. Hooker," October 17, 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 404.

13. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 115.

14. Frederick Lewis Allen, *Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1931), 58.

15. Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1998), 5, 8.

16. *Ibid.*, 14–17, 19.

17. *Ibid.*, 19.

18. Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era* (New York: The Modern Library, 2000). Chapter 5 deals entirely with Elizabeth Bentley and her later defection.

19. See Weinstein and Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood*. Weinstein and Vassiliev were among the first historians to make use of declassified KGB documents.

20. Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 383–84.
21. Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism*, 167.
22. *Ibid.*, 76, 85–86.
23. For the most complete study of the persecution of homosexuals in government service, see David Johnson, *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
24. For Communist Party expulsion of homosexuals, see Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 20. For U.S. Senate Report, see Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 82–83.
25. Marty Jezer, *The Dark Ages: Life in the United States 1945–1960* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), 89; Derek Leebaert, *The Fifty Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Shapes Our World* (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2002), 79; Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism*, 71–73.
26. James Rawls and Walton Bean, *California: An Interpretive History*, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2003), 378.
27. David Montgomery, "Introduction: Prosperity Under the Shadow of the Bomb," in *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*, ed. Andre Schiffrin (New York: The New Press, 1997), xxii.
28. Lisle A. Rose, *The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 37; Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America* (London: Cassell, 1997), 131.
29. Victor S. Navasky, *Naming Names* (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), 79–80.
30. Navasky's *Naming Names* is an excellent resource regarding the Hollywood Blacklist Era. See especially part I, chapters 4–6.
31. David Cate, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 165–66.
32. *Ibid.*, 165–67.
33. Michael Barson and Steven Heller, *Red Scared: The Commie Menace in Propaganda and Popular Culture* (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2001), 74–76.
34. Cate, *The Dancer Defects*, 172.
35. Barson and Heller, *Red Scared*, 68.
36. Rose, *The Cold War Comes to Main Street*, 34–35.
37. Ralph B. Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918–1978* (New York: William Morrow Company, 1978), 97–98.
38. Ted Morgan, *Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: Random House, 2003), 516.
39. Fried, *The Russians Are Coming!*, 57, 97.
40. Rose, *The Cold War Comes to Main Street*, 34–35.
41. May, *Homeward Bound*, p. xiv. May argues that the domestic revival of the 1950s was due in large part to the insecurities caused by the Cold War.
42. Stephanie Coontz, *The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 24–25.
43. May, *Homeward Bound*, 82–86.
44. May, *Homeward Bound*, 20; Cate, *The Dancer Defects*, p. 178; Fried, *The Russians Are Coming!*, 96–97.
45. Morgan, *Reds*, 532.
46. Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land*. See chapter 8, "Liberal and Born-Again Anticommunism: Hubert Humphrey, Walter Reuther, and Arthur Koestler."

47. Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy*, 111, 113.
48. Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 564.
49. See Robert Harris, Jr., “Racial Equality and the United Nation’s Charter,” in *Race and U.S. Foreign Policy During the Cold War*, ed. Michael Krenn (New York: Garland, 1998), 2–24, for a good discussion of the debates over what the U.N. Charter should include regarding racial discrimination.
50. Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 18–23; Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 55.
51. Branch, *Parting the Waters*, 566.
52. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 45–46.
53. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 49, 60.
54. Branch, *Parting the Waters*, p. 113; Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 107.
55. John Dittmer, *Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 9.
56. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 54, 57.
57. Leebaert, *The Fifty Year Wound*, 209–210; Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 61.
58. Dittmer, *Local People*, 29, 58.
59. Branch, *Parting the Waters*, 209, 564, 853.
60. Leebaert, *The Fifty Year Wound*, 212; Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 119, 131.
61. Jacqueline Jones et al, *Created Equal: A Social and Political History of the United States*, vol. 2 (New York: Longman, 2003), 846.
62. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 193.
63. Paul Pierpaoli, *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 29–30; Rose, *The Cold War Comes to Main Street*, 192; David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 781.
64. Col. David Hackworth and Julie Sherman, *About Face* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 211.
65. McCullough, *Truman*, 782.
66. Pierpaoli, *Truman and Korea*, 33.
67. *Ibid.*, 29–30.
68. *Ibid.*, 30, 36, 42, 44.
69. Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy*, 102.
70. Jezer, *The Dark Ages*, 58; Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy*, 103.
71. Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President Elect, 1890–1952* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 569.
72. McCullough, *Truman*, 474; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 99; Pierpaoli, *Truman and Korea*, 44.
73. Ambrose and Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*, 111–112; Pierpaoli, *Truman and Korea*, 9.
74. Pierpaoli, *Truman and Korea*, 188.
75. *Ibid.*, 47, 189.
76. For discussions on the MIC, see also the following: Gary Nash, *The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century* (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1999), chapter 5; Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, *Dismantling the Cold*

War Economy (New York: Basic Books, 1992), chapters 1 and 2; Paul Koistinen, *The Military Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980).

77. Pierpaoli, *Truman and Korea*, 188; Nash, *The Federal Landscape*, 79.

78. Nash, *The Federal Landscape*, 80; Markusen and Yudken, *Dismantling the Cold War Economy*, 6.

79. Nash, *The Federal Landscape*, 82, 91–92.

80. Markusen and Yudken, *Dismantling the Cold War Economy*, xvii, 3, 7.

81. "Legion Asks Drill For Civilian Defense," *New York Times*, 21 March 1950, 12.

82. Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 10, 88, 155–56.

83. "A Week of Shock and Decision," *Life*, February 13, 1950, 36.

84. Ambrose and Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*, 130–33; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 149.

85. Federal Civil Defense Agency, "Facts About the H-Bomb . . . that could save your life," 1955, DDEL folder, Virgil Couch Papers, 1951–80, Folder Misc Materials, 1955–56, Truman Library.

86. Guy Oakes, *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 105–6.

87. See JoAnne Brown, "'A Is for Atom, B Is for Bomb': Civil Defense in American Public Education, 1948–1963," *The Journal of American History* 75 (June 1988), 68–90.

88. "Atom Raid Drills In Schools Scored," *New York Times*, 20 October 1950, 17.

89. Jack Gould, "Margaret Arlen Presents Civilian Defense Guide for Housewives in 'Course in Self-Preservation,'" *New York Times*, February 28, 1951, 37; May, *Homeward Bound*, 103, 105.

90. Stephen B. Withey, *The U.S. and the U.S.S.R.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1962), 36; Jiri Nehnevajsa, "The American Public and Civil Defense," in *Survival and the Bomb: Methods of Civil Defense*, ed. Eugene Wigner (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), 35.

91. "Atomic Suit of Armor Contains 5 Lbs. of Lead," *New York Times*, December 27, 1951, 10. Ralph Mahoney, "Pair Survive a Survival Honeymoon," *New York Journal American*, July 28, 1959 (found in an Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization scrapbook, NAI, RG396, Entry 1022, Box 1, OCDM Publications, 1950–1960, Box 1).

92. "Atomic Light on the Desert . . . and Answers to Fearful Questions People Ask," *Newsweek*, March 21, 1955, 31; Mary Simpson, "A Long Hard Look at Civil Defense," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1952, 346.

93. Stanley Kramer, dir., *On the Beach*, starring Gregory Peck and Ava Gardner, United Artists, 1959.

94. For press reactions, see Bosley Crowther, "On the Beach Scored," *New York Times*, January 6, 1960, 24; Bosley Crowther, "Liable to Fallout," *New York Times*, January 17, 1960, II, 1; George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971* (New York: Random House, 1972), 1671.

95. "The Sheltered Life," *Time*, October 20, 1961, 22.

96. Walter Karp, "When Bunkers Last in the Backyard Bloom'd," *American Heritage*, February/March 1980, 89; "Civil Defense: Boom to Bust," *Time*, May 18, 1962, 20; "The Sheltered Life," *Time*, October 20, 1961, 21–25; "The Shelter Racket," *Nation*, September 23, 1961, 169.

97. "Bakersfield No Refuge for L.A. Refugees," *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 23, 1961, 1.; "Fall-Out Shelters Speeded by Hundreds in Suburbs," *New York Times*, October 3, 1961, 41; L. C. McHugh, "Ethics at the Shelter Door," *America*, September 30, 1961, 824–26.

98. Ralph Lapp, *The Weapons Culture* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), 56.

99. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 1745, "Helter Shelter," *Newsweek*, June 11, 1963, 31–32.

100. Kenneth D. Rose, *One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture* (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 198–200.

101. Richard J. H. Johnston, "Doubt and Apathy Plague Plans of Civil Defense Groups," *New York Times*, June 2, 1963, 1.

102. Richard W. Stevenson, *The Rise and Fall of Detente: Relaxations of Tension in US-Soviet Relations, 1953–1984* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 119.

103. Barson and Heller, *Red Scared*, 146.

104. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 331.

FURTHER READING

Barson, Michael, and Steven Heller. *Red Scared: The Commie Menace in Propaganda and Popular Culture*. San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2001.

Barson and Heller provide a fascinating account of the Cold War through imagery. In addition to a detailed chronology of the Cold War, this book is filled with photos that range from anti-Communist movie posters to children's trading cards. Documents presented in the book include anti-Communist pamphlets, newspaper and magazine articles, and comic books.

Boyer, Paul. *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*. New York: Pantheon, 1985.

Boyer's book remains the classic study in explaining the atomic bomb's impact on both public discourse and popular mythology between 1945 and 1950. The bomb, he argues, radically transformed American culture and the nation's morals and values through its impact on music, literature, film, print media, and education. It was only by domesticating the bomb that Americans could deal with its horror.

Dudziak, Mary L. *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Dudziak's work is one of the first to deal with the relationship between the Cold War contest and the struggle for equality on the part of African Americans. She shows how concerned American policy makers were about the U.S. image abroad whenever it received critical press coverage detailing civil rights abuses in the South, and how those concerns pressured elected officials to push for civil rights legislation nationally.

Fried, Richard M. *The Russians are Coming! The Russians are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold War America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Fried offers a unique cultural and political history of the Cold War by focusing on American society at the grassroots level. He is particularly interested in showing the influence that patriotic and civic activists had through both local and national campaigns to reinvigorate a sense of national pride in America in order to fight the perceived threat of Communism.

Markusen, Ann, and Joel Yudken. *Dismantling the Cold War Economy*. New York: Basic Books, 1992.

The focus of Markusen and Yudken's book deals with the difficulties of retooling an American economy that is oriented towards Cold War defense. What will it take, they ask, to transform it into a post-Cold War world economy? In the process, they explain the history of the military-industrial complex, how it came to be, and which regions of the country benefited the most from it.

May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. New York: Basic Books, 1999.

Elaine Tyler May explores the relationship between Cold War insecurities and the American family of the 1950s by showing how cultural opinion makers sought to contain "explosive issues" such as sexuality and the bomb within the confines of the home. Relying in part on interviews from the 1950s that focused on the psychological and personality development of married couples, May seeks to explain why so many women chose to be homemakers in the postwar decade instead of seeking to advance the economic and social opportunities they had during World War II.

Navasky, Victor. *Naming Names*. New York: Penguin Books, 1980.

Navasky calls his book less of a history and more of a moral detective story, but in fact this work remains the best historical account yet of the Hollywood blacklist era. Navasky details the tremendous pressures faced by those who were brought before HUAC and eventually complied with HUAC's demands to name names of colleagues who at one time belonged to or associated with those who were members of the Communist Party.

Oakes, Guy. *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Oakes argues that even as U.S. policymakers under Truman and Eisenhower encouraged the public to participate in building a strong civil defense program, they knew that surviving a nuclear war was impossible. The real reason behind civil defense was to build within the civilian population the moral resolve necessary to face the hazards of the Cold War. Americans were told how to control their fears and what actions they would need to take in the days and weeks after a nuclear attack. Moreover, Oakes shows that policy makers promoted a Cold War ethic by rooting civil defense in the notion of family togetherness and self-protection.

Pierpaoli, Paul. *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999.

There are very few books that deal with the domestic impact of the Korean War, thus making Pierpaoli's work both unique and important. The Korean War, he argues, permanently altered the American economic and political landscape, making it a watershed event. The focus of the book is on the building of the national security state and the evolution of the political culture of the Cold War, with particular emphasis on the American fear of creating a garrison state to meet the Soviet threat.

Rose, Lisle A. *The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999.

In this social history of the Cold War, Rose focuses on the year 1950 as he shows how the hopeful mood Americans once shared in the early postwar

years was transformed into fear with the explosion of a Russian atomic bomb and the outbreak of the Korean War. Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-Communist crusade heightened these fears and bred public distrust in the liberal establishment of the New Deal. This period, Rose argues, laid the foundation for the ultra-Right's campaign in the years that followed to dismantle the foundation of modern American liberalism.

Schrecker, Ellen. *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1998.

Schrecker argues that McCarthyism should be viewed as more than just the actions of Senator Joseph McCarthy, but rather the actions of an entire anti-Communist network throughout American society. She provides an excellent historical overview, detailing both the breadth and the complexity of the McCarthy period. Her opposition to McCarthyism is obvious, but her assessment of the movement is analytical and fair.

Weinstein, Allen, and Alexander Vassiliev. *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in the Stalin Era*. New York: The Modern Library, 1999.

Weinstein and Vassiliev were among the first historians to view declassified KGB files in the Russian archives, and where appropriate they also integrate decoded VENONA transcripts, which tracked the movement of suspected Soviet agents and their American counterparts in the United States. The narrative they weave together shows the extent of Soviet espionage from the 1930s to the early 1950s. Without rendering any moral judgments, these authors also seek to explain the motivations for Americans who chose to spy against their own country.

Whitfield, Stephen. *The Culture of the Cold War*. 2nd ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Whitfield provides a civil libertarian and anti-Communist perspective to the Cold War as he demonstrates through a collection of essays the impact of anti-Communism in literature, movies, art, religion, and the media. Whitfield asks how and why were constitutional and democratic values trampled upon in the search for an internal "enemy," even while at the same time anti-Communists praised American civil liberties as a key difference between American democracy and Soviet Communism.

FIVE

Vietnam War and American Life

James Landers

Music played on radio stations during the Vietnam War certainly was no way to gauge public opinion about the war or anything else. Still, the most popular songs listed on the Top 40 *Billboard* chart for, respectively, March 1966 and August 1970 perhaps offered a clue to the national mood about Vietnam, because each song expressed a decidedly different perspective.

For five weeks starting in March 1966, the number one song in sales and radio airtime was *Ballad of the Green Berets*, an ode to the elite Special Forces of the U.S. Army, hundreds of whom then served in Vietnam. With sonorous lyrics set to martial cadence, the singer—himself a Special Forces sergeant—delivered a message about bravery and death in the war against communism and the expectation that Americans would continue the fight.

Four years later, the number one song in sales and radio airtime for August 1970 was *War*; the message, set within a strident tone, expressed anger toward the futility of the effort in Vietnam and its emotional and physical toll on the younger generation.

From the time *Ballad of the Green Berets* reached the top of the charts to the time *War* did, approximately 40,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians had died from warfare in Southeast Asia. The juxtaposition of these popular songs atop the playlist—one a warrior's tribute, the other an antiwar anthem—reflected the transition in attitude among Americans that had occurred from early

1966 to mid-1970, a shift from a sense of duty and purpose to a sense of disillusionment and frustration regarding war in Vietnam.

Media brought the war home to Americans from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s. Sights, sounds, and words from media created awareness about the Vietnam War among a population that otherwise had scant personal connection to the death, destruction, and trauma in an Asian nation eight thousand miles from California. The longest war ever fought by the United States involved a minority of Americans from early March 1965, when formal military intervention began, until late January 1973, when a ceasefire ended military participation. The direct effects from the war on a nation of 194 million citizens at the start and 212 million citizens at the end were felt by the 2.7 million men and 11,000 women who served military duty in Vietnam, by the families and closest friends of those who went to war, and, most obviously, by the 58,000 Americans who died in Vietnam and nearly 300,000 who suffered injuries there, which also caused terrible anguish for families and closest friends. To better understand these numbers, consider that only 1 of every 22 American adult males actually went to Vietnam, and only 1 of 4 American families actually had kin—a son or brother, a cousin or nephew—who served there.

Therefore, most Americans lived their lives without any personal involvement, knowledge, or sacrifice related to the war. Vietnam from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s was in the background of everyday life—at times too visible to ignore, but most often a shadow. For a majority of Americans, life's major concerns were the usual and routine aspects: work, family, school, vacations, social life, sports. Vietnam was a war that never required rationing of basic food items or gasoline to sustain military operations, nor conversion of factories and foundries from manufacturing consumer products to making weaponry and ammunition, nor the absence of a substantial number of men for military service to remind everyone else on a daily basis that indeed there was a war going on.

Certainly, the Vietnam War itself was a major effort by the United States. At the war's peak during 1968–69, almost 540,000 military personnel served in Vietnam, while combat operations consumed one of every seven dollars spent by the U.S. government—money that came from taxes paid by individuals and businesses. The United States was a rich and prosperous nation throughout the Vietnam War, a situation that allowed the financial burden to be tolerable; the actual cost of the war amounted to an average of \$24 a month for the typical American household, or equivalent to four-and-a-half hours' pay from the average paycheck of the era.

With war in the background, Americans coped with dramatic changes to national life from March 1965 through January 1973. Many changes generated conflict, doubt, enmity, and tension within families and among friends. However, the war in Vietnam contributed little to this overall situation; rather, a dynamic of economic, social, and technological developments prior to and during the era mattered most. Whatever the origin, a

profound transformation made the United States a much different place by the end of the Vietnam War than at the start.

AMERICAN LIFE, 1965–73

Economy and Technology

Communications, computers, and cars were among the sectors of the American economy dramatically transformed during the era. Incredible as it may seem, in 1965 one company controlled the telephone industry, another company built and sold most computers, and three companies in Detroit dominated the automobile industry. By 1973, competition and technology had altered each of these industries.

For the most part, though, the national economy changed incrementally, not rapidly, during the era. Fewer people would labor in factories, foundries, coal mines, shipyards, and other heavy industrial operations by the early 1970s; more people would work in banks, construction, government, hospitals, maintenance, technical services, and transportation.

The percentage of jobs not related to the manufacture of products rose to 68 percent by 1973, compared to 61 percent during the mid-1960s. Some manufacturers, such as steel and consumer electronics, would lose business to foreign competitors whose superior quality and lower prices won a larger share of the domestic market. American manufacturers of other products would adjust to competition from Asia and Europe by investing in technology, which resulted in massive layoffs and forced displaced workers to find employment elsewhere, usually for companies that distributed, maintained, repaired, or sold products.

The national workforce increased by 16 million people from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s; approximately three of every four new jobs pertained to administrative tasks, customer service, delivery or distribution of products, maintenance or repair duties, managerial or supervisory positions, skilled occupations, and technical specialties. Jobs decreased in basic industrial occupations, general laborers, and agriculture. Economists and journalists continued to refer to blue-collar workers and white-collar employees, although the traditional distinction between industrial workers who were paid an hourly wage and office workers who earned a weekly salary had faded with the diminution of the manufacturing sector and the rise of the service sector.

American agriculture also changed. Fewer farmers operated bigger farms by the early 1970s because fertilizers, pesticides, threshers, and tractors became much more expensive, thus necessitating greater revenue to repay the debt to purchase the modern equipment and essential chemicals. Agriculture improved its efficiency with fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery; each American farmer and rancher grew enough crops or livestock to feed 53 people, an astounding 61 percent rise in productivity

in less than a decade. The result was the elimination of 600,000 farms, or 18 percent of the total. Revisions in U.S. government policy reduced restrictions on acreage for specific crops to encourage maximum output, which brought both a surge in grain exports and a glut of grain that filled government surplus storage bins.

Dependence on oil from foreign producers would increase to a level that made the national economy dangerously vulnerable to an interruption of supply. Major industries relied on oil to power machinery. The number of automobiles and trucks increased faster than the population itself, and the need for gasoline required half the total petroleum usage. Farm equipment consumed fuel. Many residences and offices used heating oil. A vast array of consumer items contained petroleum by-products. As a result of heavy consumption and dwindling domestic petroleum output, foreign oil accounted for one-third of total supply by 1973.

Several months after the end of the Vietnam War the United States lost much of its oil imports, equal to one-sixth of the supply, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries stopped shipments to any nation that had supported Israel during its war with Egypt in October 1973. The six-month embargo by the organization, comprised mostly of Arab nations, forced many manufacturers to reduce operations, which caused layoffs of workers, and sent the price of gasoline upward by 45 percent. Motorists felt the pain at the pump, considering that the typical Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors automobile only went 14 miles on a gallon of gas.

Until the oil crisis alerted Americans to their precarious position, oil dependency and foreign competition had not received much attention. The structure of the American economy had shifted gradually, and many people did not realize the extent to which the preeminence of the United States in the global marketplace had lessened.

Basic industries were in transition. Competition and technology were shaking things up, as evident in three highly profitable and very visible industries from 1965 to 1973: communications, computers, and cars.

The launch in April 1965 of Early Bird, the first communications satellite to attain synchronous orbit with Earth, represented a revolution. Foremost, the satellite was accessible 24 hours a day, seven days a week—previous satellites were available for direct line-of-sight transmission only a few hours each day because lower orbital routes placed them beyond the horizon most of the time; next, Early Bird provided international communications service both for telephone calls and television broadcasts; finally, it was the first communications satellite not designed, manufactured, or operated by American Telephone & Telegraph, the company that had a virtual monopoly for telephone service.

Hughes Aircraft Company created Early Bird, then company engineers programmed a computer to solve difficult problems pertaining to launching it into a permanent orbit 22,300 miles above the equator, the altitude necessary to anchor the satellite at a site accessible to transmitters and

receivers in North America and Europe. Meanwhile, AT&T persisted with developing low-orbit satellites, and continued to lay cable on the ocean floor to connect the United States with Europe. Therefore, at almost the same time that Early Bird provided 240 communications channels in space, AT&T began to install a 128-channel deep-sea cable from the coast of France to New Jersey.

Early Bird could simultaneously receive and relay electronic signals for 240 separate telephone calls or devote all its channels to one television broadcast. Each minute on one voice channel cost a caller \$10, while a television network paid \$2,400 per minute to send or receive broadcast images. *Time*, the most popular weekly newsmagazine of the era, informed its four million subscribers about the potential benefits of communications satellites. "Worldwide telephoning will become as commonplace as the dialing of local calls," *Time* wrote in May 1965. "Facsimile transmission [via satellite] not only promises to eliminate the relative slowness of jet-carried airmail, it conjures up visions of home-printed newspapers."¹

The news media did not recognize the far-reaching consequences of Early Bird because AT&T remained basically the sole link between space and earth, but the new satellite did loosen the stranglehold of AT&T on the nation's telephone system.

Throughout the Vietnam era, AT&T essentially owned and operated the entire long-distance telephone network in the United States, while its individual Bell Telephone System companies across the country controlled 85 percent of all local telephone services, and its Western Electric subsidiary manufactured almost all the telephones and relay equipment for the entire system. If a person, business, college or university, hospital, or any other entity needed a telephone, an AT&T subsidiary leased it, installed it by appointment, connected it to the AT&T long-distance system, and collected monthly payments for local and long-distance calls. State agencies set rates for local service and the federal government set rates for long-distance service.

Prior to Early Bird, international telephone calls using the AT&T system required customers to reserve a time or hope one of the 412 channels on transoceanic cable was available. By the early 1970s, several satellites with thousands of voice-communication channels provided alternatives to AT&T for global communications. A possible downside to this was noted by *Time*, which reported a prediction by Arthur C. Clarke, the esteemed science fiction writer, that "every man on earth will eventually have his own telephone number and will carry personal apparatus that will permit him to be called even by people who have no idea where he may be."²

Communications satellites would transform the industry, but Americans cared more about sending astronauts into orbit and to the moon than how their telephone calls and television signals were transmitted. It was a testament to the national wealth of the United States that government could afford to wage war in Vietnam and finance a space exploration

effort that employed thousands of highly paid engineers, computer programmers, researchers, and scientists. The incredible culmination was the lunar landing in July 1969 by the crew of Apollo 11.

American society benefited from space exploration. Medical monitoring equipment, telemetry, special lightweight materials to clothe astronauts, navigational aids and global positioning systems, videotape cameras, and special ways to condense, liquefy, and dehydrate foods—all became consumer and specific industry items later.

Another benefit to the United States, and Americans, was psychological. The broadcast from the surface of the moon that showed astronauts walking on the powdery surface with the lunar module in the background both impressed and enthralled people around the world. The U.S. government produced informational movies for display in theaters worldwide. People in theaters who watched the scenes from the moon cheered and applauded wildly. War in Vietnam and several years of unrest in the United States had sullied the nation's reputation; Apollo 11 restored much of the luster.

Computers enabled engineers for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to plot the course of Apollo 11, just one dramatic example of the role computers played during the era. In the computer industry, International Business Machines produced mainframe computers for government and industry. IBM was known for its superior computers, its continuously updated operating programs, and its legion of technical advisors and technicians who kept the computers running. Nicknamed "Big Blue" because of its corporate logo, by 1970 IBM had built, sold, installed, and serviced 70 percent of the 30,000 operational computers in the United States and 80 percent of a much smaller number of operational computers in western Europe.

IBM so dominated the computer industry that the news media referred to its competitors—Sperry Rand, RCA, Control Data, General Electric, NCR, Burroughs, and Honeywell—as the "seven dwarfs."

Mainframe computers required enormous amounts of space, special heavy-duty electrical cables and connectors, constant maintenance, and regularly scheduled shutdowns for servicing. It was not unusual for a mainframe computer and its peripheral equipment to occupy half of an entire story of a multistory office building. Computer tasks, or "runs," had to be requested, assigned, and the results delivered or picked up.

A tenth of all mainframe computers in the United States belonged to the federal government; most performed tasks for the Department of Defense, Treasury Department, and Social Security Administration. Corporations employing thousands of people relied on computers for payroll, distributors and manufacturers tracked inventory, and researchers at colleges, universities, nuclear energy facilities, and pharmaceutical laboratories stored and analyzed data on computers, which kept information on reels of magnetic tape. Computers recorded flight reservations for American Airlines and United Airlines, billed policyholders for Allstate Insurance,

processed financial statements for customers of Chase Manhattan Bank, scheduled freight shipments for Union Pacific Railroad, tracked customer orders for Sears Roebuck, and coordinated assembly line tasks for General Motors and Ford.

Most corporations on the Fortune 500 list were IBM customers. The cost of the computers themselves and the expensive service contract that accompanied each purchase or lease restricted usage of mainframe computers mainly to major corporations.

College and university mathematics departments and engineering departments taught courses for students interested in careers with IBM and the Seven Dwarfs. Students learned the peculiar binary languages to instruct computers to perform tasks: COBOL, Fortran, and Michigan Algorithmic Decoder. *Time* referred to the “cybernated generation” in an April 1965 article, which had a photograph of a roomful of IBM engineers, ages mid-20s to mid-30s, dressed in the uniform of the day: dark suits, white shirts, and tightly knotted ties.³

In the automobile industry, change met strong resistance, not only from labor unions that recognized the threat posed to workers by computers and automated machinery, but from management that believed American consumers would not buy anything other than vehicles made by Chrysler, Ford, or General Motors—and therefore did not take seriously the initial penetration of the domestic market by Volkswagen cars and vans from Germany and Datsun and Toyota cars from Japan. The Big Three from Detroit captured 91 percent of automobile sales through the mid-1960s; two other auto manufacturers, American Motors—formerly Nash-Hudson—and Studebaker, together never had more than 5 percent of total sales.

Fuel efficiency was not an issue until 1973, so the better gas mileage obtained by most European and Japanese vehicles was not a selling point. Instead, some Americans disliked the poor quality of engines, transmissions, and exterior finish that afflicted Big Three vehicles. Shoddy workmanship on the assembly line at each of Detroit’s Big Three automakers also aggravated consumers, who accepted the fact that their new cars would be returned to the dealer to fix defects. Other people preferred the smaller, nimbler German and Japanese cars for driving in city traffic; in response, the Big Three introduced compact cars—among them Ford’s Maverick and GM’s Chevrolet Vega—and sales of these newer models exceeded those of the import cars. However, price was an issue; imports were much cheaper because the Big Three offered little variation on prices for their luxury, family, economy, and compact models.

The Big Three also ignored concerns and criticisms about design features that emphasized style over safety. Seat belts were an option that cost extra, until Congress mandated front-seat belts in 1968. Prior to this mandate, twice as many Big Three cars provided air-conditioning than had seat belts. Padded dashboards and impact-collapsible steering columns also were added to American cars years after becoming standard items on

some European automobiles. For the Big Three, a flashy appearance from chrome and body style meant more to consumers than a safer car.

Apparently, the Big Three knew what their consumers wanted, at least until the late 1960s. Import cars from Germany and Japan usually took less than 5 percent of total sales, but beginning in 1968 regularly garnered 10 percent of the market and reached 15 percent in 1973.

The automobile market for Big Three and imports grew phenomenally. The number of automobiles owned by Americans outpaced population growth: from 75.2 million cars in 1965 to 102.1 million in 1973—27 million additional automobiles, compared to 18 million additional people. Three of every seven families owned two cars. The typical car owner bought a new one every three years by the 1970s, compared with every four years several years earlier.

Among the buyers of new cars were young adults. Because of the baby boom generation, people in their twenties formed a huge market for products and services, including automobiles. The Big Three saw potential profits from young buyers. Ford produced the Mustang, which quickly became the hot car for young males for several years. Mustang set an all-time record for sales of a single model for 1965 and 1966; nearly one-tenth of all American cars sold those years were Mustangs. GM's Chevrolet followed with the Camaro and Pontiac with the Firebird and GTO; Chrysler with Plymouth Barracuda and Dodge Charger. Each of these cars featured big engines, sleek designs, bright colors, and affordable prices—from \$2,300 to \$2,800 for a basic model, or equal to about five months' salary for the typical age twenty-something adult.

People in their teens and twenties loved their music, so cars became rolling stereo-sound systems, sometimes with speakers mounted in each front door or on the rear shelf. One new audio device of the era was the eight-track tape player. A boxy, prerecorded tape cartridge slid into a dashboard slot to play an album's worth of music.

Economic growth also added delivery vans and trucks to the nation's streets and highways; vans and trucks had accounted for one-sixth of total vehicles in 1965, then accounted for one-fifth of total vehicles by 1973. The need for more delivery vehicles and cargo carriers represented the dispersion of businesses and residences. The suburbs grew fantastically during the era as families moved from crammed city neighborhoods to suburban homes with yards and two-car garages. Suburban shopping malls sprouted from former farm fields, and clusters of office buildings and small-industrial facilities replaced or supplemented traditional city-centered retail and commercial sites.

Of course, all these tens of millions of cars and millions of vans and trucks burned an immense amount of gasoline, equal to half of all petroleum consumption. Air pollution was a serious effect, and an orange-brown haze blanketed most metropolitan areas on hot summer days or whenever the wind was too weak to disperse the airborne gunk.

To handle the traffic volume that jammed urban roadways, state and local governments embarked on a massive effort to widen streets and construct new arterial roads in cities and suburbs, with wider connector highways elsewhere. The federal government continued to expand the interstate highway system from its original network of 41,000 miles to an updated plan for 55,000 miles, which included bypass routes to encircle major urban areas and six-lane routes through metropolitan areas.

Employment in the automobile industry, for highway construction, and other sectors related to transportation created many new jobs. Other employment derived from the vibrant computer industry; the creation of hybrid metals and new materials for automobiles, commercial and residential construction, furniture, home appliances, and packaging; the incredible expansion of airplane manufacturers; and the general increase in the variety of consumer products on the market. Engineers, electricians, mechanics, technicians, and truckers were among the many high-demand specialties of the era.

Government at all levels—local, state, and federal—was a major employer. A profusion of new agencies and departments appeared to administer and supervise myriad new programs for the environment, medical assistance, national defense, public safety, and social services. Total government employment increased by three million people, or 28 percent. Of all jobs added to the national workforce during the era, one of every five was with local, state, or federal government.

Most new jobs involved administrative or technical skills, which required better education than traditional jobs in manufacturing. By the early 1970s, almost 70 percent of high school seniors received a diploma, compared to 50 percent a decade earlier; also by the early 1970s, about 14 percent of adults had a college degree, compared to 9 percent a decade earlier.

National prosperity permitted a greater number of Americans to afford medical care. More physicians, nurses, and laboratory specialists were obvious additions to the workforce, as were receptionists and secretaries to maintain files for patients, schedule appointments, and arrange lab tests or x-rays. Insurers hired hundreds of thousands of people to process claims and other paperwork, which meant employment for accountants, auditors, clerical personnel, and typists to handle the tremendous volume of files from hospitals, medical practitioners, and policyholders.

Technology in health care and medical treatment made possible tremendous advances from the mid-1960s to early 1970s. Ultrasound was available in many hospitals for diagnostic service and treatment, laser surgery for eye conditions was more precise and less invasive, thermography pinpointed internal abnormalities, heart pacemakers regulated arrhythmia, and new intensive care units devoted exclusively to critically ill or injured patients allowed round-the-clock monitoring at a central console.

Treatment of wounded military personnel in Vietnam helped advance medical procedures in the United States by the end of the war. Helicopters

transported accident victims to hospitals, emergency room physicians adopted techniques for trauma patients previously successful with combat casualties, and new forms of physical therapy hastened recovery.

The latter factor had particular importance. Surgery and recovery from most conditions required a lengthy stay in a hospital; 10 days to 3 weeks were common confinements because surgery itself caused much damage to muscles and tissues, while the careful ministration of pharmaceuticals took days. Medical care was not overly expensive. The average hospital expense for a day was \$29 during the mid-1960s, or about a day's pay; in 1973, a day in the hospital cost \$90, or about two days' pay. The tripling of expense for a day's confinement reflected the tremendous cost of medical technology.

Medical insurance did not cover half the expenses for most people. Insurers usually provided policies with a high deductible, no payment for a physical examination or visit to a physician, and only partial reimbursement for pharmaceuticals. Naturally, many Americans only sought treatment when a crisis occurred, rather than preventative care.

Approximately 90 percent of nurses were women; nursing was the highest-paid profession available for most women then. Three of every seven people in the workforce were women, who held the overwhelming majority of clerical and typist jobs, as well as most jobs as retail sales personnel and teachers in elementary schools.

Women also had nearly all the jobs for data entry to computers, an occupation called keypunch operator. Mainframe computers received input from automated card readers that sorted data according to coded entries on cards; keypunch operators typed the data by rows and columns, with each keystroke punching a tiny rectangular hole. Cards then were stacked in a slot on a high-speed sorter to be "read" for the computer.

The percentage of married women employed in the workforce increased from 36 percent to 43 percent, half of them mothers of children under the age of 18. When considering only women who were mothers of preschool children, the proportion who worked outside the home increased from one of every four to one of every three. Two-income households enabled a majority of families to have a middle-class lifestyle, which primarily meant home ownership, cars, and household appliances—including an additional television; five of every nine households had two TV sets by the early 1970s.

The consumer society blossomed during the era. The obvious reason for consumer confidence was prosperity. Average household income was \$11,000 during the era. A majority of households spent nearly 55 percent of income on discretionary purchases: dining and entertainment, vacations, stereos, and similar nonessential items.

Consumerism took a giant step forward when credit cards became usable nationwide rather than locally or for specific products. Until the issuance in 1966 of the MasterCharge credit card, later renamed MasterCard, and in 1970 of the Visa credit card, originally named BankAmerica

Card, most consumers obtained credit cards from various local or national retailers, oil companies (for example, Standard Oil, Shell, Mobil) or credit card issuers such as American Express that required full payment of charges each month. But with the availability of credit cards acceptable at most retailers, hotels and motels, gas stations, and airlines, consumers had an easier time buying whenever and whatever they wanted. Also, with the option to pay only some of the bill each month, although at a high interest rate, consumers started spending disposable income at a pace not previously seen.

Only 1 of every 11 households had a MasterCard or Visa account in 1966, but six years later 7 of 9 households did. At the start of the 1970s, the average credit card debt for an American household was \$800—equal to a month's average household income.

Naturally, American families preferred to spend money rather than save it. The savings rate decreased within a few years from 7 percent of income to 4 percent.

Consumers were happy, but the economy showed signs of stress from higher spending and less saving. With many two-income households having more money to spend on products and services, the demand for household items, major appliances, and cars steadily increased. Because domestic producers could not keep up with demand from consumers and because price competition from foreign producers gave consumers cheaper choices, more imported products entered the United States: cameras, cars, clothes, oil, radios, shoes, tape recorders, televisions, and numerous other consumer items.

In 1971, the perennial trade surplus, which signified that more American-made products were exported to other nations for sale than imported products were sold in the United States, suddenly became a trade deficit. Years of international trade dominance ended, and the United States entered a long period of trade deficits.

Consumer demand, low saving rate, trade deficits, and the expense of the Vietnam War, which a federal income tax surcharge in 1967 failed to finance, ultimately created serious inflation. Throughout most of the 1960s, the annual inflation rate rarely exceeded 2 percent. Then in 1969 inflation reached 6 percent, and in 1973 rose to 8 percent. Higher prices affected consumers and businesses. The cost of borrowing money soared, with the prime loan rate rising from 5.5 percent in 1966 to 9.75 percent in 1973—making new home mortgages and car loans unaffordable for many families.

Economists of the era attempted to control inflation by government edict. President Richard M. Nixon imposed wage and price controls in August 1971. The presidential order froze the pay of most employees and compelled businesses to justify any raise in the price of products or services. Essentially based on the honor system, the controls mainly harmed labor union members and big businesses; most small businesses and their employees complied with the regulations, but enough allowable exceptions

and exemptions existed to enable evasion—an employee could receive a “promotion” and pay raise simply by giving a job a new description or title, and a business could divide services into very specific tasks rather than broadly defined categories, then create new prices for each task.

Inflation remained a serious problem for the American economy until the 1990s. Some economists blamed the extra cost of the Vietnam War as the main culprit for the initial burst of inflation.

Another significant development during the era was corporate mergers. Prior to the 1960s, most corporate mergers combined manufacturers, processors, suppliers, and providers of raw materials for specific products (automobiles, coal, foodstuffs, oil, steel); these mergers resulted in subsidiary businesses relevant to the final product. Beginning in the 1960s, cross-sector mergers dominated activity. An old word—“conglomerate”—acquired new meaning to describe a corporate structure that coordinated businesses in separate categories, each functioning on its own to make a profit.

The new conglomerates practiced diversification. International Telephone & Telegraph, for example, diversified from its core communications business to buy hotels, construction companies, a nationwide bakery, and a rental car business (Avis). None of these business operations benefited the others.

Economists and federal government antitrust specialists worried that a conglomerate could force an independent competitor of one of its subsidiaries—say, a hotel company with only several properties in a few big cities—out of business by temporarily lowering prices to lure customers while subsidizing the temporary losses with profits from its other subsidiaries. Executives of conglomerates argued that their corporate structures offered financial resources to expand and improve each acquisition. American conglomerates also could more ably compete financially in the global marketplace.

ITT, Gulf & Western, and Textron were among the conglomerates that entered a variety of industries, and initiated a requirement for each business within the conglomerate to achieve a specific profit margin. This would become the standard for numerous traditional corporations with multiple subsidiary operations.

Throughout the era the American economy adopted new technology, adjusted to domestic and international competition, and depended on consumer purchasing to sustain growth. Business and consumer debt, corporate mergers, computerization, innovation, multiplicity of choices among products and services, and transformation of the workplace became new features of national economic life.

Education

The end of World War II in summer 1945 returned millions of men from military duty to resume their former lives. Many men came home to

wives, while many men and women soon married as the readjustment to peacetime society progressed from 1946 through 1947.

The American economy also resumed its ordinary course after four years of war. The transition from a full-employment wartime economy to a peacetime economy happened much more smoothly than predicted, and general prosperity allowed most of these newly reunited or newly married men and women to have families. Also, the general prosperity of the 1950s permitted many young men (who were not veterans) and women to marry at a younger age than young adults of the 1930s, when the Depression had caused economic hardships.

The result was an extraordinary number of children born between 1946 and 1964, the years during which the wartime generation of young married couples advanced to middle age and stopped having children. This was the baby boom era, although most children were born from 1947 to the mid-1950s. Parents relied on traditional names. The most popular names of the 1950s and 1960s for boys were David, Michael, John, James, Robert, and Christopher; for girls Mary, Susan, Lisa, Jennifer, Michelle, Kimberly, and Karen.

The baby boom produced 300,000 to 1.2 million more infants each year than the previous generation, and the greatest number of children entered the school system from the mid-1950s until the early 1960s. These several million "extra" baby boom children surged into high schools, colleges, and universities, few of which were ready to handle the load.

Of course, the figurative tidal wave of baby boom children rolling into classrooms across the nation generated a demand for more instructors—730,000 additional teachers took to the classrooms during the era, a 32 percent increase in total employment, while colleges and universities hired an additional 140,000 faculty, a 27 percent increase. (Additional means precisely that: schools, colleges, and universities added those teachers and faculty, not merely replaced teachers and faculty who retired or resigned.)

An interesting aspect of educational careers then was the common policy in public schools that pregnant married women had to take a leave of absence prior to the sixth month, presumably so schoolchildren were spared the sight of an expectant mother. Another noteworthy fact was that only four of every nine women faculty at colleges and universities were married, while six of every seven male faculty were married.

Schools were unprepared in many ways to accommodate the new generation of schoolchildren. Crowded classrooms, inadequate gymnasiums, insufficient library space, and too few hall lockers affected the school days of the first baby boom children attending school.

Everywhere, schools requested and received "temporary" buildings until permanent facilities could be built. The military sold, for a dollar apiece, a huge quantity of Quonset huts, which were corrugated metal sheds with an arch-roof, and modular single-story storage shelters that

served as classrooms in many schools for years. These stand-alone buildings sat on concrete slabs or plywood floors, occupying space on parking lots or at the end of athletic fields on school property.

The realization that conditions would only worsen forced most communities to ask their citizens to finance additional schools and extensive renovation to existing schools. A building boom added thousands upon thousands of new schools across the country, either entirely new buildings or replacements for schools built decades earlier. This construction boom kept a goodly number of bricklayers, carpenters, electricians, plumbers, roofers, and other construction workers busy, and earning money, well into the 1970s.

Citizens, however, paid for all this with property taxes that financed the billions of dollars of debt for school construction. Some communities experienced ugly, divisive controversies when school-financing referendums appeared on the ballot. It got especially ugly in communities with a separate system of private schools, usually affiliated with churches. Parents of children in private schools also had to pay for new schools or school expansions to accommodate their share of the baby boom—and then were asked to pay for public schools, too. Also, older residents who did not have school-age children often voted against school referendums. The community school system, which rarely had inspired much debate, now was the focal point and the most important local issue.

Colleges and universities were similarly unable to find room for the boomers whose presence on campus was evident from the mid-1960s onward. College and university enrollment increased from 5.2 million students to almost 7.9 million students during the Vietnam era—an increase that surpassed enrollment growth for the previous 15 years. Shortage of classrooms and lack of rooms in dormitories were facts of campus life for several years.

A building boom soon altered the landscape of campuses everywhere, and entirely new campuses sprang up in cities and suburbs. At least 490 new two-year colleges and 120 new four-year colleges and universities opened their doors from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s. Some states restructured their higher education governance bodies to centralize administrative tasks and decisions by forming statewide university systems. In many states, formerly independent public universities were annexed or absorbed into a statewide system.

California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York each had to expand state university systems because total enrollment doubled within a decade. Despite expansion, some public universities had to restrict admissions for the first time; for example, freshmen who were not in the upper third or upper half of their senior high school class could not attend the so-called flagship campus of a state university system, but instead went to a smaller branch campus.

College and university administrators confronted more than swarms of new students. The young men and women who entered the hallowed

halls of academe had attitude. They expected some of the rules to change. Freshmen and sophomores often were required to reside in campus dormitories, which were segregated by gender. Women's dormitories usually had "hours," which set a curfew; typically, women students had to return to the dorms by 10 P.M. Sunday through Thursday and midnight or 1 A.M. Friday and Saturday. Men visitors to women's dorms had to register at the front desk, and sign out when they left the dorm.

Students focused on issues that affected them personally. "These are not rebels, at least in the conventional sense," *Newsweek* reported in 1965.⁴ An opinion poll two years later of students at two dozen campuses indicated that the top issues were: campus administrators did not listen to students; dorm hours for women were too strict; dorm food was bad; off-campus housing was too regulated (e.g., no loud parties or underage drinking); and, last, the Vietnam War.

One of the first rules to disappear was the requirement for sophomores to stay in dorms. Colleges and universities had to choose between building a whole lot of new dorms, or simply make more rooms available by limiting mandatory campus residency to freshmen. The next set of rules to go by the wayside was "hours"; many campuses imposed a dorm curfew for women at midnight Sunday through Thursday, with no curfew on Friday or Saturday.

Dress codes, official and unofficial, also became a thing of the past. Photographs in national magazines of college students depicted the uniforms of the day during the mid-1960s: men in open-collar dress shirts or pull-over shirts with collars, dress slacks or chinos, loafer-style shoes; women in skirts or slacks, button blouses or pullovers, low-heel or open-toe shoes. Photographs from the early 1970s showed: men in t-shirts, sleeveless shirts, jeans, cutoff jeans, gym shorts, sneakers, sandals, barefoot; women—the same.

The gender-segregated dorm was the next tradition to fade. Dozens of major colleges and universities created coeducational residence halls, mostly starting in 1969 and 1970. These residences, however, placed men and women on separate floors.

Curriculum changes swept through higher education, too. The ideal curriculum emphasized classical literature, foreign language, philosophy, and sociology. Students advocated "relevance" in the classroom, so revisions to curriculum reduced the classical components to make room for courses in contemporary subjects. One new aspect of higher education was the mass lecture course for hundreds of students in one session. An initial shortage of classrooms at most campuses forced administrators to cram freshmen and sophomore students into auditoriums or theaters for introductory courses in various subjects; later, the design of new buildings incorporated large-lecture amphitheater classrooms.

A sufficient number of baby boom children completed high school to become the first generation in which most males and females received a

diploma. The graduation rate for high school students passed 70 percent during the era, a considerable achievement compared to the 55 percent rate of the early 1960s. Then, at least half of each senior class enrolled in a college or university from fall semester 1965 to fall semester 1973, also a first. The college and university enrollment rate varied from 52 percent to 56 percent of graduating seniors, up from the previously standard 41 percent to 43 percent rate.

Not everyone enrolled for reasons pertaining to acquiring knowledge. Men students received a deferment from military conscription while they were full-time students enrolled with a course load of at least 12 credit hours and a minimum C average. Given the military's demand for personnel because of the Vietnam War and the large military presence in western Europe to deter the Soviet Union from a possible attack on U.S. allies, conscription was a constant concern for unmarried men between the ages of 19 and 26.

This new wave of collegians attracted media attention. *Newsweek* sent correspondents to 40 college and university campuses in 1965 to portray the scene. "Never have so many children been such complete strangers to famine, plague, want, or war," the article stated. "Theirs are the blessings of prosperity, theirs the spoils of peace."⁵ Students seemed aware of their privileged status, anticipated a bright future, expected to earn big money, and generally were optimistic, according to *Newsweek*.

Newsweek mentioned that many men students felt pressure to succeed academically in order to secure highly coveted jobs with computer, aerospace, and new technology companies. Women students were ambivalent about their future roles. A national opinion poll of freshmen women indicated that almost half believed women should "confine their activities to family and home."

These educated young adults entered a workforce that rewarded people who understood the role of computers and new technology, and would expect to attend workshops, seminars, or retraining programs. Revisions in curricula at high schools and universities prepared many graduates for these challenges. Calculus, trigonometry, physics, and other courses to boost math and science knowledge often were required for college-track students in high school, while algebra and chemistry were basic courses at many colleges and universities. Newly funded scholarships from the federal government went to students who scored well on math and science exams. Students in liberal arts or humanities had fewer scholarships available.

Not every family prized education, nor could afford to send a son or daughter to a college or university. Financial aid was available in some state universities, but usually paid for only tuition and fees, not books or dormitory costs or ordinary living expenses. Some academic scholarships awarded generous sums of money, but the typical scholarship covered basic items only. The majority of students paid their own way, which realistically meant parents paid.

The nearly half of all high school graduates who did not continue their education entered a prosperous economy for most of the era. Employment for laborers and menial occupations was scarce, so apprenticeships for skilled occupations and training for technical work were paths to long-term careers for young men; young women who did not continue their education tended to have dead-end jobs in grocery or retail stores, unless they learned to type and found jobs as secretaries or clerks who processed the volumes of paperwork for banks, government, hospitals, insurers, schools, and other employers that kept files and folders.

Media

Americans had few choices among entertainment and information media at the start of the Vietnam era.

A figurative handful of Hollywood studios—Columbia, MGM, Twentieth Century Fox, Paramount, Universal, Warner Brothers—produced and distributed nearly all the movies shown in theaters.

A trio of television networks—American Broadcasting Company, Columbia Broadcasting System, National Broadcasting Company—produced the only news programs and commissioned the development of comedy, drama, and musical variety programs seen by 93 percent of viewers during prime-time hours each night. The tiny percentage of viewers who did not watch programs on the three television networks could find reruns and old movies on the two or three independent TV stations in most metropolitan areas. Congress authorized money for the Public Broadcasting Service in 1967, to create a quality alternative to the predominately mediocre commercial fare on ABC, CBS, and NBC.

A couple of dozen magazines each distributed multimillion copies to subscribers and newsstand buyers: for news—*Newsweek* and *Time*; for women—*Cosmopolitan*, *Good Housekeeping*, *Ladies Home Journal*, *McCall's*, and *Redbook*; for pictorial essays and general subjects—*Life* and *Look*; for sports—*Sports Illustrated*; and for miscellaneous topics—*TV Guide* and *Reader's Digest*.

No national newspaper existed except the *Wall Street Journal*, and newspaper readers across the country received almost all national and international news from news services—Associated Press and United Press International.

Radio was an entertainment source, not a news source, except for a single news radio station in each major metropolitan city; most radio stations were Top 40, each playing the same songs to attract the coveted preteen and teenage listeners that advertisers desired.

One result of media dominance by relatively few media organizations in each mass medium was a certain sameness in movies, programs, and subjects. Media portrayed a very white world for much of the Vietnam era, one in which African Americans and Hispanics rarely existed and presentations of themes contrary to mainstream ideals or provocative scenarios

rarely appeared. Least-objectionable-programming was the principle for television networks, and most newspapers and magazines catered to the presumed preferences of readers who mostly were middle-income, middle-class whites.

A sense of the unhappiness and unrest within African American and Hispanic communities was evident to some whites, but most were oblivious or insensitive to the issues of economic and social injustice, police brutality, substandard housing conditions, and fundamental hopelessness that made second-class citizens of many nonwhites. Media typically ignored such issues until violent confrontations with police or large-scale riots made them apparent to mainstream society. Otherwise, most media avoided reality and relevance.

By the end of the Vietnam War, media would be very different, not so much in the material it delivered to Americans, but in the mode of delivery, means of production, and style of presentation. From black-and-white to color, from film to videotape, from a continental coaxial cable system to earth-orbit satellites, and from downtown movie palaces to suburban multiplex cinemas—media became modern.

Television changed the economics of media, the role of media, and the public perception of media's impact on society. From a benign medium of entertainment at the start of the era—a "vast wasteland," in the words of the Federal Communications Commission—to a controversial medium at the end, television entertained, informed, and sometimes enraged many Americans.

A writer for *New Yorker* coined the phrase "living room war" to describe Vietnam. Although a catchy term, it was inaccurate. Network television news programs did not bring the drama and trauma of war in Vietnam into American homes every night; rather, approximately 95 percent of all segments shown from Vietnam were generic scenes of soldiers on patrol, helicopters taking off and landing, artillery firing at unseen targets, and warplanes dropping bombs in the distance. Naturally, the few segments that depicted death, destruction, and injury were memorable, and the public concluded by the end of the war that television had an effect on opinion. However, technological limitations and basic business decisions by the television networks prevented news programs from instantaneously and thoroughly covering the war thousands of miles away.

First of all, only a dozen network news crews were in Vietnam for much of the war; the odds of a crew being on scene when combat occurred were extremely low given the nature of the war, which involved hundreds of patrols every day and few skirmishes. Because of this, network news crews filmed so-called stock footage of general military activity, which was shown on news programs while the anchorman recited facts and figures about combat.

Secondly, network news crews had film cameras the first few years, not videotape; film footage necessitated chemical development, delivery by

airplane to California, transmission by coaxial cable to New York City, editing, and then broadcast on the nightly news—a two-day process at best. When videotape cameras replaced film cameras and when satellite relay from Tokyo to the United States was possible in 1968, the process was reduced to several hours—the duration of an airplane flight from Saigon to Tokyo. But the cost of satellite relay was \$1,000 a minute, a fee business executives at the networks would not approve unless the video had truly compelling scenes. Still, television news programs offered a handy scapegoat for policy makers and military commanders who blamed the occasional nightmarish imagery for erosion of public support for the war.

News programs did bring scenes or information about racial riots, antiwar demonstrations, protests of inequality and injustice, political corruption, and other bad news, of which there seemed to be an abundance. A kill-the-messenger syndrome characterized public response to network news programs by the end of the era.

Beyond the news, television entertainment programs ranged from banal and insipid to creative and provocative, although programs in the latter category rarely appeared. Least-objectionable-programming was the standard for networks, which preferred not to antagonize, offend, or challenge their viewers.

Whenever a network program broke the banality barrier it attracted attention. *Laugh In*, a weekly humor show, dared to include a few topical jokes and satirical sketches within an otherwise traditional reliance on one-line jokes, slapstick humor, and sight gags. *Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour* blended satire in song and skits with a generally irreverent attitude to become a very popular weekly program on CBS from February 1967 until March 1969. CBS abruptly cancelled the Smothers Brothers contract for the 1969 season; the program's fans said it was because of political pressure, the network said the program's producers did not deliver final versions of each show sufficiently ahead of time to allow censors to review material for language and themes.

Some dramas tackled tough themes, including racism, incompetence among physicians, police misconduct, and corporate misdeeds; the preponderance of dramas dealt with crime, family tragedy, romantic problems, and medical emergencies.

Television comedies and dramas offered an almost all-white cast of characters. Only *I Spy*, an espionage thriller with Bill Cosby as costar, and *Julia*, a family scenario, with Diahann Carroll as star, placed African-American characters in leading dramatic roles.

Late in the era, a comedy managed to break the rules and score well with viewers. *All in the Family*, which had its debut in January 1971, featured a lovable bigot named Archie Bunker as the central character. Spewing ethnic and racial slurs, Archie nearly always would realize the error of his prejudices by the time an episode ended, although his behavior would not change. The language Archie used and the subjects the show

handled—racism, homosexuality, equality for women, birth control, sexuality—sparked controversy and debate about propriety. Whether actual bigots learned anything corrective from the program was not known.

Whatever its quality as an entertainment medium, television proved a formidable economic competitor to other media. Television's share of national advertising revenue sharply increased from the mid-1960s onward. ABC, CBS, and NBC had gotten about one-sixth of national ad revenue in 1965, newspapers about one-third of the revenue, magazines one-twelfth of revenue, and the remainder was divided among radio, billboards, and direct mail. Eight years later, television networks received about three-eighths of national ad revenue, much of the gain coming from newspapers and magazines.

The loss of advertising revenue to television caused *Life*, the venerable pictorial weekly magazine, to cease publication in 1972, its closure disappointing several million loyal readers. *Look* also fell victim to the drain of advertising revenue to network TV.

Movies had lost a sizable number of customers to television beginning in the mid-1950s. A decade later, movie studios and theater owners were desperate. To attract more customers, movies began to include nudity, profanity, and graphic violence. The idea was to show things television dared not broadcast. Rather than bring more people to theaters, the strategy brought criticism from clergy, Congress, and parents of preteen and teenage children. The end of the so-called Hollywood Code several years earlier now made it impossible for parents and others to know what a movie's content was before they bought a ticket or allowed children to spend an afternoon at the theater.

Congressional threats of censorship inspired Hollywood studios to create a new ratings system. Producers submitted final versions of movies to a review commission, which assigned a rating based on language, sexual imagery, and violence. The ratings system appeared in 1968 with "G" suitable for general audiences, "M" for mature audiences, "R" for restricted to viewers age 17 and older unless accompanied by a parent or guardian, and "X" for movies not to be viewed by anyone under the age of 17. The ratings system briefly restored the confidence of parents, until the profanity and sexual innuendo of "M" movies changed that category to "PG-13" for parental guidance for children aged 13 and under.

Radio also had lost a significant sum of ad revenue to television, but had survived by becoming a platform primarily for mainstream rock-and-roll music. Each city had several stations essentially playing the same music, a Top 40 format. By the late 1960s, station operators and dispirited disc jockeys found artistic salvation and economic opportunity on the FM spectrum. FM radio was the domain of classical music, jazz, blues, and other niche styles.

Within a brief period from the late 1960s to early 1970s, hundreds of new FM stations went on the air; most played long-form alternative rock

music, with songs of four- to eight-minute duration, compared to the two- and three-minute songs on Top 40 stations. More to the point, alternative rock was nothing like Top 40. Songs were political or expressed social messages, songs blended blues and rock, songs were rock opera, and songs displayed the artistry of musicians whose styles never fit the Top 40 format. The early phase of FM rock stations appealed to listeners because of the almost total absence of commercials.

Society

Undeniably, the United States experienced upheaval on a scale during the Vietnam era unknown since the battles between laborers and company goons during the 1890s, which included the Pullman strike in Chicago and the battle in Homestead, Pennsylvania; and the racial violence in East St. Louis, Illinois, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and other communities from 1917 to 1921 when mobs of whites attacked and murdered African Americans. For several years from the mid-1960s onward, numerous cities erupted in violence as African Americans rebelled against exclusion from employment and denial of basic rights. Dozens of people died, many blocks of stores and apartments burned to the ground, National Guard and Army troops patrolled city streets to restore order, and the White House itself was encircled by soldiers to protect it.

The racial disturbances, assassinations of a presidential candidate and a civil rights leader, a series of destructive antiwar protests on some college and university campuses, an upsurge in murders and crime in all major cities, seemingly sudden changes in morality and behavior among younger people—all these happenings convinced many Americans that the very fabric of society had unraveled.

However, despite the scenes of such tumult on network television news programs and dramatic photographs in newspapers and magazines, most of the nation watched from a distance, never actually a witness to similar events in their own communities or immediate neighborhoods. Yet, the specter—real or imaginary—of urban unrest accelerated the rate of so-called “white flight” from the cities to suburbia.

Much of the social transformation in the United States during the era was a matter of style rather than substance. Some young men grew their hair long—over their ears, or to the neck, or to the shoulders. Men’s facial hair—beards, moustaches, or both—was a political statement for some, simply because it was not favored by mainstream Americans and had been out of vogue for decades. Some young women stopped holding their hair in place with spray and adopted a natural look, others stopped wearing girdles and nylons. Some young men and women smoked marijuana on occasion, or regularly; older adults regarded this as immoral or decadent, while younger adults argued that marijuana was no more immoral than the martini or bourbon preferred by their elders.



By the late 1960s, increasing protests against the war in Vietnam began to erode public support for American policy, a harbinger of collapsing political resolve to sustain American involvement. (National Archives)

And although the media made much of the undercurrent of generational conflict and disaffection among younger adults toward the supposedly false or superficial values of their parents, not everyone believed the young were all that much different. At a national conference in Houston of newspaper advertising executives in 1973, a roomful of white men and a few white women watched a video-and-slide presentation on consumer attitudes among adults aged 25 to 34, the prime buyers for many household items; and what the marketing survey data told in graphs, pie charts, and percentages reassured everyone who sold advertisements: young adults wanted families, furniture, new cars, nice clothes, home ownership, dishwashers, stereos, and other manifestations of the good life.

Consumerism thrived for many white Americans and some African Americans, the two largest racial groups at 87 percent and 11 percent, respectively. But the gap between the comfort known by most whites and the destitution known by most African Americans led to the development of two separate societies, which had minimal contact economically or socially.

Anyone who watched network TV news and read a newspaper or a newsmagazine realized how horrible conditions were in Southern states, where laws segregated people on a racial basis in schools, jobs, hospitals, movie theaters, and restaurants, and where custom segregated people on a racial basis in neighborhoods and churches. What many of those TV viewers preferred to ignore was the similar segregation in Northern states, not by law but by bias and intolerance. Every major American city had its distinctive African-American sections and its white sections. With rare exceptions, suburban communities were almost exclusively white.

Summer 1964 had awakened white Americans to the depth of anger and frustration in African American sections of Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York City, each of which had widespread riots that lasted for days. Summer 1965 was the deadliest racial riot in decades when the Watts section of Los Angeles exploded in rage after a police car stopped an African American motorist. For five days, Watts burned as firefighters were kept away by snipers, and police officers could not prevent arson and looting; 34 people died. Summer 1966 brought riots to Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, and San Francisco. Summer 1967 riots erupted in Newark, New Jersey, killing 26 people, and in Detroit, killing 43 people and bringing army combat soldiers into the city to quell the mayhem. The phrase "long, hot summer" became associated with riots and numerous small-scale confrontations between police and African American residents in dozens of communities.

The riots were spontaneous events, not coordinated or planned. Leaders of African American civil rights organizations attempted to generate genuine political authority during the aftermath of the destruction. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Congress of Racial Equality, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference focused on voter registration, lobbying Congress and state legislatures for strict enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, and urging African Americans to seek elected offices.

A schism divided African American organizations by the late 1960s, however. Militant activists advocated "black power," a strategy of separation from whites to create, in effect, autonomous African American communities.

Language reflected the schism. At the start of the 1960s many white Americans had at last begun using the word Negro for a person of color. Militants preferred black to Negro, and media had adopted the word by the late 1960s. Then, briefly, Afro-American had become the popular choice. Later, black would return as the preference, remaining so for 20 years.

An argument can be made that 1968 was the worst year for the United States in terms of domestic divisiveness and damage to the national psyche since the Civil War, and Vietnam played its part. The trauma began at the end of January and continued for several weeks when Communist

troops launched the Tet offensive, a coordinated series of attacks on every major city in southern Vietnam that began during the lunar new year holiday. A Communist squad entered the compound of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, a symbolic if ultimately unsuccessful foray. Tet cost the U.S. military 2,000 dead in a matter of weeks. In April 1968, the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in Memphis, Tennessee, ignited riots by "African Americans, whose outrage damaged areas in dozens of cities. Americans watched in dismay as army soldiers encircled the White House to safeguard it. In June, Senator Robert F. Kennedy of New York, a candidate for the presidential nomination by the Democratic Party, was shot in the head moments after a victory speech as winner of the California primary. In August, network television showed bloody fights in the streets of Chicago as antiwar activists and police clashed near the site of the Democratic National Convention; later, an independent commission termed the collective action of officers a "police riot."

Television also showed the absolute chaos on the convention floor as Democrats—with traditionalists and party loyalists set against reformers and modernists—booed each faction's speakers at the podium, shouted down opponents, and jammed the aisles to protest policy proposals. For some viewers, the spectacle was a dark comedy in which demonstrators got what they deserved from police while liberal delegates on the convention floor did not get approval of the antiwar declarations they wanted; for other viewers, the entire episode inside the convention center and outside on the streets was a tragedy in which idealists were the object of ridicule and abuse by old political hacks and brutish police.

Many antiwar demonstrators in Chicago had prior experience with such conflict. War protests had begun on some college campuses within weeks after the first American combat troops deployed to Vietnam in March 1965. The initial protests consisted of several dozen students, or sometimes a few hundred, sitting in classrooms or auditoriums to listen to speakers criticize war policy. By autumn 1965, some protests involved crowds assembled in front of campus administration buildings; at about the same time, protests led by college students convened in a few cities, with marchers walking down city streets as they sang peace songs or chanted antiwar slogans.

Most protests were in eastern college and university communities, also New York City and Washington, D.C.; few protests disrupted daily life for city residents, except in the immediate area of the events. On the other side of the continent, San Francisco and Oakland were scenes of protest when demonstrators blocked access to or picketed naval facilities and Selective Service centers where young men reported for military conscription, known as "the draft."

Military conscription was a worry for men students who lost their deferments upon graduation, unless they went to graduate school. Prior to the Vietnam War, the military conscripted about 10,000 men, usually

unmarried and from age 19 to 26, every month; the monthly average reached 32,000 draftees in 1966 and leveled off at 24,000 draftees a month in 1968–69. The prospect of being conscripted compelled most men to enlist, which often meant avoiding infantry duty because an enlistment was a year or two years longer than the two-year conscription service and enlistees received training in noncombat specialties.

Larger protests attracting thousands of demonstrators began during 1966, the premier event in New York City where about 25,000 people marched along streets in Manhattan. The antiwar centerpiece event in Washington, D.C., in October 1967 attracted 40,000 people; it included a march on the Pentagon, which was ringed by soldiers carrying rifles with bayonets—and a classic news photo from the Pentagon protest showed an antiwar demonstrator placing a long-stem flower into the barrel of a rifle held by a soldier.

The vast majority of antiwar demonstrators were nonviolent; they expressed their opposition to the war through songs, slogans, and joining together in prayer or linking arms to show solidarity. A few demonstrators at some events attempted to provoke police by shouting obscenities, knocking over trash cans, breaking store windows, or even burning an American flag. Sometimes, police used excessive force to clear the streets of demonstrators.

Protests that turned violent were too fluid to assess blame. Over time, both the minority of demonstrators who sought violent confrontation to advance their cause or bring attention to it and police who angrily reacted to provocation shared responsibility for the occasional mayhem. In some respects, the confrontations were a sign of social-class tension because college and university students of the era were regarded as children of privilege and wealth, while police and National Guard soldiers, who were on duty for the larger protests, were from lower-income, working-class families.

No matter who was to blame, news photographers and television news camera operators were there to get pictures. Newspapers, magazines, and TV news programs often focused on violence at antiwar demonstrations, thereby giving the public an impression that demonstrators in general were irresponsible vandals and profane flag-burners. Whether a protest was in a city or on a college campus, violence became the focal point of news coverage, even if it involved only a couple dozen people out of hundreds or thousands of participants. Also, although most demonstrators were proverbial “clean-cut” men and women whose appearance and wardrobe conformed to mainstream acceptability, news coverage invariably portrayed antiwar activists as unkempt and long-haired, an appearance associated with those who had rejected or spurned mainstream values.

Not surprisingly, many Americans thought college and university campuses were a hotbed of radicalism. This was not accurate. A report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation concluded that only about 2 percent

of college and university students ever participated in an antiwar demonstration. Even at their peak, antiwar demonstrations at colleges and universities involving more than a handful of students were reported at about 300 of the nation's 2,600 campuses. (Later research by university scholars determined that more campus protests pertained to dorm hours, registration problems, housing regulations, and food quality than the Vietnam War.)

Perhaps the most meaningful and successful antiwar demonstration was Vietnam Moratorium Day in October 1969, a nationwide event. In communities across the country, ordinary citizens, high school students, clergy, a number of Vietnam veterans, and several dozen U.S. senators and representatives gathered quietly in small and large groups to signify opposition to the war simply by their presence. No accurate estimate of participants was available, but a tabulation of estimates from various newspapers indicated that at least one million people participated in peaceful vigils.

A month later an estimated 300,000 antiwar demonstrators converged on Washington, D.C. for a day of listening to speeches, songs of protest, and marches.

Opposition to the war by demonstrators had little effect on government policy. What mattered to policy makers and government officials was public opinion, and public opinion was shaped by the casualty toll and duration of the war. The Tet offensive severely harmed the U.S. government's credibility, because the Communist attacks across southern Vietnam came after an intensive four-month campaign to persuade Americans that military progress had secured crucial sectors and that the enemy was weakened from aggressive U.S. tactics. Americans did not lose faith in ultimate victory overnight, but when combat deaths surpassed 20,000 men and no triumph seemed in sight the erosion of public support for the war quickened.

President Lyndon B. Johnson sensed the shift in public support after Tet. Several weeks later, Johnson announced on national television that he would not seek reelection. Senator Robert F. Kennedy already had done well in primary elections, and Kennedy stood a good chance of receiving the Democratic Party's nomination for president in August. However, the senator's assassination in June made it likely that Hubert H. Humphrey, the vice president, would receive the nomination. Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, a liberal who opposed the war in Vietnam, challenged Humphrey for the nomination. The disastrous convention in Chicago, where many demonstrators in the streets and most of the liberal delegates in the convention center were McCarthy supporters, ended with Humphrey nominated for president.

Humphrey carried the burdens of a bitterly divided Democratic Party, his association with Johnson's war policies, and public displeasure with the Democrats for the tumult in national life, namely several summers of riots and a series of large-scale antiwar demonstrations. Because of the turmoil and war in Vietnam, Americans also blamed Democrats for

the nation's loss of international stature. Internationally, the image of the United States was tarnished by its aerial bombardment of northern Vietnam, which was governed by Communists, and the use of heavy artillery, B-52 bombers, and napalm in southern Vietnam, which was governed by non-Communists dependent on the U.S. military; also, the world image of the United States was diminished by its racial turmoil, public divisiveness over Vietnam, and political assassinations.

Humphrey's opponent in the 1968 election was Richard M. Nixon, a former senator from California and vice president. Nixon hammered home a law-and-order theme, promised to end the Vietnam War with honor—without providing details—and generally benefited from the social disorder that persuaded many Americans to vote for him.

Nixon won, but received only 44 percent of the votes to Humphrey's 43 percent; a third candidate, George Wallace, a segregationist governor from Alabama, accumulated 13 percent of the national vote, mostly from southerners who resented and resisted federal laws that compelled racial integration of public schools, universities, and other institutions. (Four years later, Wallace was shot in an assassination attempt as he prepared for another presidential campaign; he was paralyzed from the waist down.) To what extent Americans actually believed the nation was endangered by riots, antiwar demonstrations, and other apparently disturbing occurrences can be put in context by considering the voter turnout in 1968: 61 percent of eligible voters cast ballots, which was 1 percent less than the 1964 presidential election and 2 percent less than the 1960 election.

Nixon started the withdrawal of American soldiers from Vietnam beginning in summer 1969, and also greatly reduced the number of replacement personnel headed for Vietnam. Withdrawal proceeded in phases, with periodic reductions-in-force; by summer 1971, total military personnel assigned to Vietnam had declined to 175,000.

To achieve stronger security in southern Vietnam while Americans departed, Nixon authorized an invasion of Cambodia, west of southern Vietnam, in May 1970. Adjacent areas of Cambodia had provided sanctuary to Communist troops for years; Vietcong guerrillas and People's Army of Vietnam units would fight in southern Vietnam, then travel through the rugged terrain to Cambodia into territory they controlled, wait for reinforcements and supplies, then return to southern Vietnam. Cambodia was nominally a neutral nation, so the U.S. military could not attack the sanctuary areas. Unknown to the American public and world community, however, Nixon had authorized bombardment of sanctuary areas by B-52s since March 1969, and the huge bombers had dropped thousands of 750-pound bombs on the countryside, killing some Communist troops and Cambodian farmers and families.

The decision to invade the sanctuary areas, a military campaign that did not cause heavy casualties among U.S. soldiers but did rout enemy units and further devastate villages and farmland, provoked a firestorm

of protest on many college and university campuses in the United States. National Guard units helped police control the protests and protect campus buildings at many locations. Ohio National Guard soldiers at Kent State University opened fire on protestors, killing four students.

The deaths further inflamed already tense conditions. Dozens of campuses closed early for spring semester after damage to classroom buildings, fires at campus Reserve Officer Training Corps buildings where students trained for army and air force duty, and boycotts of classes.

In mid-May, police and highway patrol offices in Mississippi fired weapons into a dormitory at Jackson State University, an all-black campus, killing two students.

Except for a large-scale antiwar demonstration in Washington, D.C., in May 1971, which resulted in the arrests of nearly 11,000 people in wholesale roundups by police, the protests about the Cambodia invasion were the last serious demonstrations against the Vietnam War. The implementation of a lottery system for military conscription in 1969 and tremendously reduced monthly conscription requirements made the issue of war of less concern to many men students.

Nixon reacted strongly to antiwar demonstrations and congressional impatience with the continuation of the war well past the midpoint of his first term. Antiwar activists, political leaders, and some members of the public cited the election-campaign promise by Nixon to end the war.

A month later, Nixon's resentment toward his opponents and his genuine concern about preserving the confidentiality of peace negotiations to end the war prompted him to make a decision that would eventually force him from the presidency. In June 1971, the *New York Times* published articles on a secret government study of decisions that led to the Vietnam War and an internal debate among military commanders and civilian policy makers that revealed a serious disparity between public statements and private discussions. A former analyst for the Department of Defense had photocopied, over a period of weeks, thousands of pages of documents from the study; the photocopies eventually ended up at the *New York Times*. The U.S. attorney general obtained a court order compelling the newspaper to stop publication of the articles by alleging harm to national security. The newspaper appealed the decision, and a few weeks later the U.S. Supreme Court decided 6–3 that publication of the articles could resume because national security was not harmed.

Nixon, however, was infuriated by the "leak"—unauthorized disclosure—of the secret study, which became known as the Pentagon Papers report. Presidential aides created a special group to investigate the leak. Nicknamed the Plumbers, this group was responsible for the burglary in June 1972 at Democratic National Committee headquarters inside the Watergate apartment-office complex in Washington, D.C. The subsequent scandal concerning the Watergate incident was the reason Nixon resigned in August 1974, the only president to do so.

Congressional investigations of the Watergate scandal revealed other abuses of power related to actions involving antiwar and civil rights activists. FBI agents had infiltrated numerous organizations, and sometimes had placed wiretaps on telephones without authorization from a judge, as required by law. Agents also spread rumors to the news media about organization leaders. Investigations determined that some FBI agents acted as provocateurs to incite demonstrators. At the same time, many police departments maintained so-called "Red files" to track the activities of people the police believed were Communists or political subversives; local police departments and FBI exchanged information on these citizens, most of whom had no criminal record but merely had attended various demonstrations and marches relating to the war, civil rights, or other social issues, such as environmental concerns. Surveillance of individuals usually was done without court authorization.

Crimes in high places attracted public attention, although Americans worried more about crimes in their cities and neighborhoods. Newspapers, magazines, and the newly emergent local TV news programs focused on the apparent surge in crime from 1965 through 1973. Murders increased from 10,000 a year to 19,600 a year; forcible rapes from 23,000 a year to 51,000; robbery from 138,000 incidents a year to 384,000; burglary from 1.27 million crimes a year to 2.57 million. Police departments hired more officers, and private security companies expanded their operations from primarily guardians of industrial sites to patrolling retail centers, office parks, and wealthy residential neighborhoods.

Social and economic factors caused the crime rate increase. Hundreds of thousands of male teenagers and young adults were unable to find steady employment because they lacked the education or training for most of the jobs the healthy economy created. Menial and general labor did not pay well and were temporary rather than permanent. So, unemployment meant that some of these men made a living from crime.

Indeed, data support the higher incidence of violent crimes and property crimes throughout the era, but news media rarely provided perspective. Much of the crime occurred in the urban core, with African Americans as victims; statistics showed that crime rates in African American neighborhoods were double to triple the rate of white neighborhoods and suburbs. Yet, the media tended to dramatize the occasional white crime victim, and this heightened racial division and distrust, which further contributed to white flight to the suburbs.

Suburban communities added population at a five-to-one ratio to the cities they surrounded. At the start of the era, suburbs accounted for about one-fourth of national population; at the end, suburbs accounted for four-tenths of national population. The migration from cities brought federal and state expenditures on streets and highways, schools, and direct or indirect subsidies for development of office complexes, shopping malls, and other economic development. It also brought political clout with

more representation in state legislatures and reconfigured congressional districts. Suburban residents formed a broader base of support for the Republican Party as these predominately middle-income and more affluent families aligned with politicians who promised to reduce certain governmental social programs for poor people and to stop the growth of certain government agencies and departments.

Economic prosperity, population increase, and more people with a college degree resulted in the formation of 11 million new households during the era, increasing the number of individual residences—apartments, condominiums, duplexes, and homes—from 57 million to 68 million. Thirty-five percent of the new households were single-person category, meaning a man or woman lived alone, a category of households that demographers attributed to the many young adults of the baby boom generation who were able to afford their own place. Forty percent of new households were in the two-person category, and almost all were married couples, again signifying the effect of baby boom demographics. Census-takers did note the existence of about 200,000 households inhabited by unmarried men and women living together, a minuscule amount of national households.

The relationships of men and women started an evolutionary transformation during the era. The gradual process of achieving equality in society slowly progressed. The attendance of several million young women at colleges and universities certainly awakened some to career possibilities they had not considered. The responsibilities assumed during their careers definitely demonstrated, if only to themselves, a capability to manage tasks and supervise colleagues. Inequality of pay for similar work was an issue, as was the barrier to upper management positions at many corporations and government agencies. Finally, for women who had a career and a family, it took men a long time to share duties at home.

Federal laws made gender discrimination illegal. Enforcement of these laws was slow to develop, however. Other laws sought to provide equal opportunity for women in education. One noteworthy step for women was Title IX, passed by Congress in 1972. Title IX mandated equal funding of sports for men and women at all schools that received any federal money.

CONCLUSION

Documentary and retrospective programs on television, commemorative editions of magazines, and the collective memory of Americans who are old enough to be aware of the events and issues of the era typically consider the Vietnam War central to the era.

Important, yes. Central, no.

Economic, social, and technological dynamics transformed everyday life in the United States. These dynamics existed prior to the war or emerged during the war, and their effects were irrelevant to the war itself.

Whatever effect the war had on each dynamic was minimal. The cost of warfare and government's failure to finance it did play a role in inflation by the late 1960s. Public response to antiwar activists did not advance efforts to end the war; instead, the failure to achieve military victory gradually persuaded most Americans the war should end. Government statements about military progress and obvious discrepancies between the official version and reality in Vietnam increased public distrust toward government. Alienation toward society existed among many young adults who perceived the war as either immoral or unnecessary. Anger emerged among African Americans who saw the war diverting resources from more essential economic and social programs to bring equal opportunity. All were factors in a pervasive sense of disillusionment and despair resulting from the perception that national priorities were wrong.

Finally, the technology of war initially had scant application to civilian life, although various imaging devices, logistical methods, and navigational systems would transfer soon.

Vietnam cast a shadow on American life, especially during its most intense phase from autumn 1966 until summer 1969, the period when most deaths and injuries to U.S. personnel occurred. Awareness of the war's traumatic effects on people in Vietnam and Cambodia bothered many Americans, too. The result to the nation's psyche was, if only until collective memory faded, a reluctance to wage war again, unless a clear danger to the United States was evident or a clear purpose for warfare was apparent.

NOTES

1. "The Room-Size World," *Time*, May 14, 1965, 88.
2. Ibid.
3. "The Cybernated Generation," *Time*, April 2, 1965, 84.
4. "The College Generation Looks at Itself and the World Around It," *Newsweek*, March 22, 1965, 44.
5. "College Generation," *Newsweek*, March 22, 1965, 45.

FURTHER READING

Buzzanco, Robert. *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Civilian policy makers and military commanders disagreed about Vietnam War strategy and tactics. Military commanders worried about terrain and guerrilla warfare, while policy makers believed American weaponry and technology would prevail.

Farber, David, ed. *The Sixties: From Memory to History*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

A collection of essays on culture, society, and politics during the Vietnam War.

Farber, David, and Eric Foner, eds. *The Age of Great Dreams: America in the 1960s*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994.

The 1960s began with optimism that inequality and injustice would wane. The war in Vietnam and the reality of American society affected all.

Flamm, Michael W. *Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

Cultural, economic, and social factors contributed to serious crime in American cities. Murder, assault, robbery, and theft afflicted African American neighborhoods, and some crime spilled over to white neighborhoods and downtown business districts. Fear and misperception further divided society.

Gitlin, Todd. *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

Media's distorted coverage, manipulation of situations, and attention to certain individuals among antiwar organizations ultimately splintered efforts to end the war. Personal egos and too much attention to media coverage by activists rendered the movement ineffective.

Linden-Ward, Blanche, and Green, Carol Hurd. *American Women in the 1960s: Changing the Future*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993.

For a variety of reasons, women found jobs outside the home—while continuing to be primarily responsible for family care—and became more aware of pay inequity, limitations on career opportunity, and other fundamental issues. Gradually, women redirected law, government policy, and social attitudes to recognize the role of women as vital participants in the workforce.

MacDonald, J. Fred. *One Nation Under Television: The Rise and Fall of Network TV*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1990.

Commercialism, timidity, and simple stupidity turned television into a vast wasteland.

Reilly, Edward J. *The 1960s*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003.

Essentially an anthology of important political and social events of the decade. A timeline calendar and "documents" appendix add to the informative presentation.

Index

- Addams, Jane, 57
African Americans, xvi; during World War I, 54–55; during World War II, xv, 86–88
Alerdice, Susanna, 15
Alien Enemies Act (1798), 42
American Association for the United Nations, 91
American Association of University Women, 92
American Communist Party, 109, 111, 116, 120, 133
American Federation of Labor (AFL), 54
American Friends Service Committee, 69
American Horse (Sioux), 17
American Legion, 108, 112, 113, 115, 116, 126
Anderson, Karen, 82
Apache Indians, xxi, 16, 20, 21, 29
Arapaho Indians, 8, 10, 14
Armstrong, Neil, xvii
Arthur, Chester A., 5
Arver, Joseph, 59
Atlantic Charter, xxiii, 69
Baker, Eugene, 15
Baker, Josephine, 120
Baker, Newton, 49
Bataan Peninsula, xxiv
Batista, Fulgencio, xxviii
Bay of Pigs, xxviii
Beadle, Anna, 95
Bell, Miles, 105
Belleau Wood, France, xxii
Bentley, Elizabeth, 110, 133
Berlin Blockade, xxvii
Berlin Wall, xxviii
Berman, David, 72
Berman, Sammy, 79
Biddle, Francis, 90
Big Foot (Apache), 22
Bismarck, Otto von, 52
Blackfeet Indians, 15, 25
Black Kettle (Cheyenne), 14
“Black Sox” scandal, 43, 63n. 13
Bleakmore, Betty, 81
Board of Indian Commissioners, 6
Bouresche, France, xxii
Bourke, John G., 29
Bozeman, John, xx
Bozeman, John M., 24

- Bozeman Trail, xx, 8, 10, 11, 12, 25
Brown v. Board of Education, 89, 118, 121
 Bryce Report, 39
 Bulge, Battle of the, xxv
 Bull Moose Party, 37
 Bureau of Indian Affairs, 3, 4, 6, 27
 Burleson, Albert Sidney, 41

 Cantigny, France, xxii
 Captain Jack (Modoc), 16
 Carr, Eugene A., 15
 Carrington, Henry B., 12
 Carroll, Diahann, 159
 Casement, Roger, 51
 Castro, Fidel, xxviii
 Catholic Worker Movement, 69
 Central Intelligence Agency, xxvi
 Chaplin, Charlie, 50
 Chatto (Apache), 21
 Cheyenne Indians, xx, 7, 8, 11, 14, 16, 29
 Chief Joseph (Nez Perce), xx, 19, 20
 Chinese Exclusion Act, 36
 Chivington, John M., 7, 10, 11
 Churchill, Winston, xxvi, 69
 Civil Liberties Act (1988), 91
 Civil Rights Act of 1957, 121
 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 121
 Clarke, Arthur C., 145
 Cleveland, Grover, 5
 Cohan, George M., 50
 Cold War: anticommunism during, 108–12; bomb shelters during, 130; chronology, xxvi–xxviii; civil defense during, 126–32; civil rights during, 117–22; economy during, 124–26; education during, 112–13; homosexuals during, 111–12, 116; loyalty oaths during, 112, 114; media during, 113–14
 Colorado Springs, CO, 125
 Comanche Indians, xx, 14, 15, 16, 17
 Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 91
 Committee on Public Information (CPI), 40
 Committee on the Participation of Women in Post War Planning, 92
 Communist Control Act, xxvii
 Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 126
 Congress of Racial Equality, 88, 163
 Connor, Patrick E., 10
 Contract system, 26
 Coolidge, Calvin, 61
 Cooper, Gary, 113
 Cooper, James Fenimore, 3
 Coral Sea, Battle of the, xxiv
 Cosby, Bill, 159
 Council on Foreign Relations, 91
 Crazy Horse (Sioux), 17, 19
 Creel, George, 40, 41
 Crook, George, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 29
 Crosby, Bing, 73
 Crow, Polly, 70
 Crow Indians, 8
 Cuban Missile Crisis, xvi, xxviii, 106, 132
 Custer, Elizabeth, 29
 Custer, George A., xx, 14, 18, 28, 29

 Davis, Audrey, 71
 Davis, Theodore, 13
 Dawes, Henry L., 6
 Dawes Severalty Act (General Allotment Act), xxi, 6
 Daylight Savings Time, xxiv, 45
 D-Day, xxv
 Dean, Vera Micheles, 91
 Debs, Eugene V., 37, 42
 Department of Defense, xxvi, 146
 Department of the Interior, 3, 4, 6
 Department of War, 3, 4
 Depredation claims (Indian Wars), 27–28
 DiPompo, Christine, 94
 Disney, Walt, 113
 Dog Soldiers (Cheyenne), 15
 Doolittle, James, 3
 Doolittle Report, xx, 3–4
 Dorsey, George, 117
 Double V campaign, 88
 Draft Act, xxiii
 Du Bois, W. E. B., 55, 60, 120
 Dulles, John Foster, 121
 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 92

- Eastman, Crystal, 57
 Easton, Jane, 97
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 121, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128
 Ellis Island, 36
 Emergency Farm Labor Program, 85
 Espionage Act, 41
 Eubank, Lucinda, 9, 11, 28
 Executive Order 9066. *See* World War II, Japanese-Americans during

 Fairbanks, Douglas, 41
 Fair Employment Practice Committee, 82
 Farm Mobilization Day, 84
 Faubus, Orval, 121
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 120, 133, 165, 169
 Federal Civil Defense Administration, 127
 Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 91
 Federal Employee Loyalty Program, 111
 Fellowship of Reconciliation, 69, 91
 Fetterman, William J., 12
 Fetterman Massacre, xx, 4, 12
 Finerty, John, 29
 Fisk, James L., 8
 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 62
 Foreign Policy Association, 91
 Four Minute Men, 46
 Fourteen Points, xxii

 Garfield, Harry A., 44
 Garfield, James, 44
 German, John, 17
 Geronimo, xxi
 Geronimo (Apache), 20, 21, 29
 Ghost Dance, 21
 Gibbon, John, 19
 Gildersleeve, Virginia, 93
 Glover, Ridgway, 30
 Gompers, Samuel, 54
 Grant, Ulysses S., 4, 17, 24
 Grattan Incident, xx, 7
 Great Depression, xiv, 57, 67, 70, 81, 82, 85, 97, 109, 115, 153

 Green Corn Rebellion, 59
 Gregory, Thomas, 52
 Griffith, D. W., 36, 50
 Groves, Leslie, 74
 Guadalcanal, Battle of, xxiv
 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, xxviii

 Hancock, Winfield Scott, 13, 29
 Harrison, Benjamin, 5
 Hartmann, Susan M., 81
 Haselton, Marjorie, 96
 Hayes, Rutherford B., 5
 Haywood, William D., 42
 Hewlett-Packard, 125
 Hiroshima, xxv, 74, 93, 97, 127
 Hiss, Alger, 110
 Hitler, Adolf, xxii
 Holladay, Ben, 10
 "Hollywood Ten," 113
 Homestead Act, xi
 Hoover, Herbert, 43, 44
 Hoover, J. Edgar, 109, 120
 House Committee on Un-American Activities, 111, 112, 113
 Howard, O. O., 19
 Hughes, Charles Evans, 38, 51
 Humphrey, Hubert H., 166

 Indian Peace Commission, 4
 Indian Rights Association, 6
 Indians. *See* individual tribes
 Indian Territory, 3
 Indian Wars: chronology, xx-xxi; table of, 23
 Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), 51
 Iwata, Shigezo, 90
 Iwata, Sonoko, 90
 Iwo Jima, Battle of, xxv

 Jackson, Helen Hunt, 6
 Jane Fonda, xxix
 Java Sea, Battle of the, xxiv
 Jefferson, Thomas, 42
 Jefferson Boat and Machine Company, 70
 John Birch Society, 133
 Johnson, Andrew, 4
 Johnson, James Weldon, 54, 60

- Johnson, Lyndon B., 121, 166
 Jones, Constance Hope, 95
- Kaiser Corporation, 82
 Kaman Sciences, 125
Kearny, USS, xxiii
 Keim, DeBenneville Randolph, 29
 Kellogg, Mark, 29
 Kelly, E. Lowell, 116
 Kelly, Fanny, 8, 27
 Kennan, George, 107, 108, 109
 Kennedy, John F., xxviii, 120, 121, 129, 130, 132
 Kennedy, Robert F., xxix, 116, 118, 120, 164, 166
 Kent State University, xxix, 168
 Kersten, Andrew E., 87
 Khrushchev, Nikita, xxviii, 130
 Killpack, Marjorie, 75
 King, Charles, 30
 King, Martin Luther, Jr., xvii, 120, 164
 Kinsey, Alfred, 116
 Kiowa Indians, xx, 14, 16
 Klamath Indians, 16
 Klaw, Barbara, 76
 Korean War, xvi, xxvii, 106, 122–24
 Ku Klux Klan, 36
- Lafayette Escadrille, 38
 La Guardia, Fiorello, 54
 Lake Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian, 6
 Lamour, Dorothy, 70
 Landis, Kenesaw Mountain, 42
 Lange, Catherine, 94
 Lanham Act, 82
 Larson, Marjorie, 97
 “Lavender Scare,” 111
 Leach, Saidee, 78
 Leach, Saidee R., 71
 League of Nations, xxii, 92
 League of Women Voters, 92
 Lend-Lease, xxiii, 69
 Lever Food and Fuel Control Act, 43
 Leyte Gulf, Battle of, xxv
 Liberty Loans, 46
 Little Bighorn, Battle of the, xx, 19, 29
- Loco (Apache), 21
 Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth, 3
 Lummis, Charles F., 29
Lusitania, xxi, 39
- MacArthur, Douglas, 123
 Man Afraid of His Horse (Sioux), 17
 Manhattan Project, 74
 Mao Zedong, 108
 Marias River Massacre, xx, 15
 Marshall Plan, xxvi, 108, 122
 Marx Brothers, 41
 Maue, Betty, 96
 McAdoo, William Gibbs, 45, 46
 McCarthy, Eugene, 166
 McCarthy, Joseph, 111, 116
 McCarthyism, 106, 120, 123
 McClain, Rose, 97
 McHugh, L.C., 130
 Meagher, Thomas F., 24, 25
 Meeker, Nathan C., 20
 Meeker Massacre, 6, 20
 Midway, Battle of, xxiv
 Miles, Nelson A., 21
 Modoc War, xx, 16, 19, 30
 Morgan, Anna, 14, 15
 Morton, Nancy Fletcher, 9, 11
 Muck, Karl, 50
 Murrow, Edward R., 73
 My Lai Massacre, xxix
- Nagasaki, xxv, 74, 93, 95, 97, 127
 Nash, Gary, 125
 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 60, 88, 120, 163
 National Council of Negro Women, 92, 93
 National Defense Act, xxi
 National Defense Advisory Commission, 69
 National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, 92
 National Security Act, xxvi
 National Security Council, xxvi
 National Urban League, 88
 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 107, 110

- Neutrality Act of 1939, xxii
 Nez Perce War, xx, 6, 19
 Nixon, Richard M., xxviii, xxix, 151, 167, 168
 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 125
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), xxvi, xxvii
 Norton, Frank F., 130
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, xxviii

 Office of Censorship, xxiii, 73
 Office of Civil Defense (OCD), xxiii, 105
 Office of Civilian Defense, 69
 Office of Emergency Management, xxii
 Office of Price Administration, xxiii, 71
 Office of War Information (OWI), 73
 Office of War Mobilization, xxiv
 Okinawa, Battle of, xxv
 Olwell, Russell B., 74
 OPEC Oil Embargo, 144
 Operation Rolling Thunder, xxviii
 Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 74

 Pacelli, Ario, 96
 Paris Peace Conference, xxii, 62
 Parker, Ely S., 5
 Paul, Alice, 57
 Peace Policy, 4, 17
 Pearl Harbor, xiv, xxiii, 62, 69, 73, 88, 89
 Pentagon Papers, xxix, 168
 Pershing, John J., 51, 62
 Peterson, Val, 129
 Philippine Sea, Battle of the, xxv
 Pickford, Mary, 41
 Piegan Indians, 15
 Pike, Catherine, 78
 Pittman, Stuart, 130
 Ponca Indians, 6
 Pope, John, 12
 Popular Front, 110
 Prager, Robert, 52–53
 Pyle, Ernie, 77, 79
 Randolph, A. Philip, 82, 86
 Rankin, Jeanette, 69
 Rationing, xxiv, xxvi

 Reagan, Ronald, 113
 Red Cloud's War, xx, 12, 13
 Red Cross, 69, 76, 97
 Red River War, 17, 19
 Red Scare, 109
 Remington, Frederic, 29
Reuben James, USS, xxiii
 Ricca, Frances, 95
 Robeson, Paul, 120
 Rockwell, Norman, 81
 Rogin, Michael, 109
 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 92
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., xxii, xxiv, xxv, 67, 84, 88
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 37, 48
 Rosebud, Battle of the, xx, 19
 "Rosie the Riveter," 80, 81, 86
 Ross, Mary, 86
 Royce, Josiah, 39

 Sand Creek Massacre, xii, 7
 Sawyers, James A., 10
 Schurz, Carl, 5
 Sedition Act of 1918, 42
 Seeger, Alan, 38
 Selective Service Act (1940), 69
 Selective Training and Service Act, xxiii
 Servicemen's Readjustment Act (G.I. Bill), xxv
 Seymour, Charles, 112
 Sheridan, Philip H., 14, 17, 18, 21, 29
 Sherman, William T., 12, 14, 17, 24
 Shute, Nevil, 129
 Sioux Indians, xx, 4, 7, 8, 11, 29
 Sitting Bull (Sioux), 17, 19
Smith v. Allwright, 88
 Snipes, Macio, 117
 Sojourner Truth Housing Project, 87
 Somerville, Keith Frazier, 78, 94
 Somme, Battle of the, 38
 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), xxvii
 Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 120, 163
 Spillane, Mickey, 116
 Stalin, Josef, xxvi, xxvii, 107
 Stanley, Henry Morton, 29
 Stettinius, Edward R., 92

- Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), xxviii
- Sully, Alfred, 8
- Sunday, Billy, 48
- Swartzbaugh, Donald C., 95
- Taft, William Howard, 37
- Tall Bull (Cheyenne), 15
- Taylor, Barbara Wooddall, 96
- Taylor, Nathaniel G., 4
- Taylor, Robert, 113
- Terkel, Studs, 98
- Terry, Alfred H., 19
- Tet Offensive, xxix, 166
- Tonto Basin Campaign, 16, 20
- Trading with the Enemy Act, 42
- Treaty of Fort Laramie, xx, 8, 17
- Treaty of London, 38
- Treaty of Versailles, xxii
- Trotter, William Monroe, 54
- Truman, Harry S., xxv, 105, 107, 118, 122, 124
- Truman Doctrine, xxvi, 108, 122
- Twentieth Century Fund, 91
- U.S. Air Force Academy, 125
- U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 121
- U.S. Food Administration, 44, 51
- U.S. Fuel Administration, 44
- U.S. Information Agency, 118
- U.S. War Production Commission, 81
- United Mine Workers, 70
- United Nations, xxiii, 92, 93, 117, 122
- United Service Organization (USO), xxiii
- Ute Indians, 6, 20
- Vanderbilt, W. K., 39
- Veterans of Foreign Wars, 115
- Victorio (Apache), 20
- Victorio War, 21
- Victory Farm Volunteers, 85
- Victory Gardens, xv, 72, 79
- Vietnam Veterans Against the War, xxix
- Vietnam War, 106; antiwar protests during, 164–66; chronology, xxviii–xxix; conscription during, 164–65; economy during, 143–44, 148–49, 150–52; education during, 152–57; health care during, 149–50; media during, 157–61; music during, 141; public response to Tet offensive, 166; social upheaval during, 161–64; technology during, 144–48; women during, 150, 153, 170
- Voting Rights Act of 1965, 121
- Wallace, George, 167
- War Finance Committee, 70
- War Mobilization and Reconversion Act, xxv
- War Productions Board, 70
- War Relocation Authority (WRA), 90
- Warren, Earl, 89
- War Resisters League, 69, 91
- Warsaw Pact, xxvii
- Washita, Battle of the, xii, xx, 14
- Watergate scandal, 168–69
- Weichell, Maria, 15
- Wesley, Rusha, 79
- Wilhelm II, 38
- Williams, Charl Ormond, 92
- Wilson, Woodrow, xxi, 37, 40, 45, 55, 60, 62, 68
- Winiker, Doris, 96
- “Winter Soldier Investigation,” xxix
- Witt, John L. De, 89
- Women: during the Vietnam War, 150, 153, 170; during World War I, 41, 57–58; during World War II, xv, 69, 75–77, 80–84, 85–86, 91–93; suffrage movement, 37
- Women’s Army Corps (WACS), 94
- Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps, xxiv
- Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 69
- Women’s Land Army (WLA), 85
- Women’s Naval Reserve (WAVES), xxiv
- Woodward, Isaac, 117
- World Peace Foundation, 91
- World War I: African Americans during, 54–55, 55–57, 59–61; censorship during, 41–42; chronology, xxi–xxii; conscription during, 58–61; Daylight Savings Time during, 45; German Americans during, 51–54; inflation during, 47;

- influenza epidemic, 61; labor during, 54; Mexican Americans during, 58; propaganda during, 38–41; recreation during, 49–51; religion during, 48–49; taxes during, 45–46; women during, 41, 57–58
- World War II: African Americans during, xv, 86–88; African American women during, 82, 87, 93; agriculture during, 84–86; atomic research during, 74; censorship during, 73; chronology, xxii–xxvi; demographics during, 74–75; financing of, 70; Japanese–Americans during, 88–91; mail during, 78–80; motion pictures during, 73; music during, 73; racial tensions during, 88; rationing during, 71; reaction to peace, 95–97; reaction to the atomic bomb, 94–95; women during, xv, 69, 75–77, 80–84, 85–86, 91–93
- Wounded Knee, xxi, 22
- Wylie, Philip, 116
- Yellowstone National Park, 27
- Yellowstone Wagon Road and Prospecting Expedition, 18
- Zilke, Rollin, 95
- Zimmerman Telegram, xxii, 40
- Zulauf, Frances, 76

About the Editors and Contributors

Susan Badger Doyle is an independent scholar in culture studies living in Pendleton, Oregon, specializing in nineteenth-century Western overland trails and U.S.-Indian relations on the Northern Plains. Her Ph.D. dissertation in American Studies was on multicultural aspects of the Bozeman Trail era, 1863–68. She is the editor of a boxed two-volume set, *Journeys to the Land of Gold: Emigrant Diaries from the Bozeman Trail* (2000). A one-volume abridged edition, *Bound for Montana*, was published in 2004. Doyle has also authored journal articles; edited documentary editions; made presentations; taught continuing education courses; and completed grant, fellowship, and consulting projects.

David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler met as graduate students at Auburn University and married in 1981. Jeanne is currently professor of history at the United States Air Force Academy, where she is the senior civilian member of her department, and David is associated with Colorado State University–Pueblo. Together they have written and edited numerous books and articles on early-nineteenth-century American history, including *Old Hickory's War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire*, *The War of 1812*, *The Mexican War*, and *Indian Removal*. They are the editors of two definitive encyclopedias, *Encyclopedia of the War of 1812* and the award-winning *Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History*.

Jon Timothy Kelly received his master of arts in U.S. Studies from the University of London and his Ph.D. from the University of California,

Irvine, in U.S. Foreign Relations. His research primarily focuses on the foreign relations and domestic aspects of Civil Defense in the U.S. post-World War II era. He is currently an instructor of history and political science at West Valley College in Saratoga, California.

James Landers was a driver of a delivery truck, stockyard worker, U.S. Air Force sergeant, newspaper reporter and editor, magazine editor and copublisher, freelance writer, and now is on the journalism faculty at Colorado State University. He teaches communications law, computer-assisted reporting, media history, and media management. Landers received a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in December 2000 after 20 years as a journalist. He is the author of *The Weekly War: Newspapers and Vietnam*.

Judy Barrett Litoff is professor of history at Bryant University in Smithfield, Rhode Island, where she specializes in American women's history. She is the author of 13 books and more than 100 articles, book chapters, and book reviews, most of which focus on United States women and World War II. Many of her publications are based on her archive of some 30,000 letters written by American women during the Second World War. Her most recent book is *An American Heroine in the French Resistance: The Diary and Memoir of Virginia d'Albert-Lake* (2006).

Michael S. Neiberg is professor of history and codirector of the Center for the Study of War and Society at the University of Southern Mississippi. He is the author or editor of nine books and numerous articles, specializing in World War I and the global dimensions of the history of warfare. Before coming to the University of Southern Mississippi, Dr. Neiberg taught at the United States Air Force Academy and Carnegie Mellon University.

**Recent Titles in the
Greenwood Press "Daily Lives of Civilians during Wartime" Series**

Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Africa: From Slavery Days to the Rwandan Genocide

John Laband, editor

Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Early America: From the Colonial Era to the Civil War

David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, editors