

Civil Society, Religion, and the Nation



Modernization in Intercultural Context: Russia, Japan, Turkey

Editors:

Gerrit Steunebrink and Evert van der Zweerde

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I NTERCULTURAL
P HILOSOPHY

Civil Society, Religion, and the Nation

Modernization in Intercultural Context:
Russia, Japan, Turkey

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PREFACE

The chapters in this book are the final versions of a selection of the papers presented at the ‘Religion, Civil Society, and the Nation’ expert meeting, held 14–16 November 2002 at the Soeterbeeck Conference Center in Ravenstein, the Netherlands. The discussions sparked by this meeting occasioned most participants to revise their papers to a greater or lesser extent. We now present, with a slightly altered title, the results of this process.

We would like to thank the Soeterbeeck Center and its staff for their generous hospitality. We also extend tremendous thanks to the authors for their participation in the expert meeting, for their critical discussion of each others’ papers, and for their cooperation in preparing this volume. We especially thank Rikki Kersten, who did a tremendous job in editing the transliterated Japanese words in the texts on Japan. We also are very grateful to Christine Mitchell (Edmonton, Canada), who did an excellent job in correcting the texts written by non-native speakers, turning them into impeccable English and improving their clarity in many points. Further, we would like to express our gratitude to Wout Cornelissen (Nijmegen), whose many hours of very accurate work as assistant-editor proved to be indispensable for the production of this volume. Finally, we thank the Department of Social and Political Philosophy and the Department of Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Faculty of Philosophy, as well as the External Relations Office of the Radboud University Nijmegen for their financial support of this project.

Gerrit Steunebrink
Evert van der Zweerde

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INTRODUCTION

The relatively peaceful era following the Fukuyamian ‘end of history’ that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 seems to have ended on 11 September 2001, when the New York World Trade Center collapsed. The self-confidence shown by the West in the triumph of liberal democracy and market economy by the end of the Cold War has been challenged by the West’s new ‘enemy’, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, which appears to be a reaction to and rejection of Western Modernity as such. The majority of Western citizens are being pushed into assuming a defensive position, confronted with an imminent Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilizations’.

Modernity, the prime enemy of fundamentalists, has largely been identified with the West. Nevertheless, Modernity itself extends well beyond the present Western world. In fact, one should even say that fundamentalism itself is a distinctively modern phenomenon. In this volume, we address the following question: ‘What is the nature and fate of ‘modernization’ outside the Western world from which it arose?’ In posing this question, we hypothetically consider Modernity to be a particular type of civilization, comprising a variable constellation of three major factors, namely civil society, religion, and the nation, against a specific cultural background, and within the framework of a political order (a polity) usually called ‘the state’. Modernization, then, is the development, whether it be spontaneous or part of an explicit policy, towards this type of civilization, and modernism the positive appreciation and accompanying ‘ideology’ of both Modernity and modernization.

In Western models of Modernity, the concept of the ‘individual’, which necessarily accompanies the notion of ‘civil society’, plays a pivotal role. This volume examines whether the models and concepts that have been developed to account for Western modernization can also be applied to processes of modernization in Turkey, Russia, and Japan. What these three countries have in common, despite all their differences, is that they were never colonized, that they were all ‘empires’ for at least part of their histories, that they explicitly embarked, at different points in time, on the path of modernization, and that the pursuit of this modernization, in each of the three cases, stemmed from the political decision of a government or a ruler. Russia was the first to do so; in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Russia was forced to adopt West European civilization by Peter the Great, who regarded this westernization as the condition for pushing back Sweden, opening a window onto Europe (in the form of the new capital, St. Petersburg), and establishing the Russian Empire as the important European power it has since

remained. Japan entered a process of selective modernization after the Meiji revolution of 1868, and adopted, under allied pressure, the system of liberal democracy after World War II. Turkey, after attempts at modernization in the 19th century Ottoman Empire, was finally led to Modernity by Kemal Atatürk, founder of the secular republic of Turkey. Despite numerous differences, all three countries developed into relatively stable states that can be properly called 'modern', and, regardless of significant influences – notably that of Japan and Russia serving as an example for Turkey – all three did so independently from each other, and, to a large extent, voluntarily.

If this is the case, the question arises as to whether this 'Modernity' comes as a whole 'package' of elements that belong together, or whether, alternatively, the typically Western constellation must be seen as one possible variant, an historically contingent phenomenon, rather than a one-size-fits-all universal model. One way to get closer to an answer to this question would be to consider the following: if non-Western countries have adopted some, but not all elements of Modernity *and* were successful in doing so, this may be taken as an *ex negativo* demonstration of the contingent nature of the Western variant. The first question to raise, therefore, is: 'What does modernization mean, in all three cases, and to what extent was it successful?' A second, albeit somewhat traditional, question should also be posed: 'Is Modernity specifically Western, and is, therefore, modernization synonymous with westernization?'

In tackling these questions, this volume brings together specialists in the three areas concerned (Russia, Japan, and Turkey) as well as generalists who address topics that affect all three areas. In all cases, the combined competencies of historians, social scientists, and philosophers offer a perspective on the complexity of the issues at hand, and provide valuable feedback in response to the general questions and hypotheses. Historical knowledge is needed not only in order to know 'the facts', but also to counteract the 'historical myths' that accompany all social formations. 'Modernity' has been inscribed in a normative project of progressive modernization for so long that it can no longer be regarded as a viable neutral category. At the same time, there appears to be, to put it very cautiously, a relatively permanent and recognizable set of elements and features that justifies the use of a single term. So-called area studies (Russia studies, Japanology, and Turkology in this case), which link history to linguistics and social science – political science, sociology, anthropology – are indispensable to ensure a clear view of the specific constellation that is called 'Modernity' in every individual case. Such clear views are also the precondition for comparative analysis, and the latter is, obviously, necessary to arrive at concepts of Modernity and modernization 'as such'. Philosophers, finally, can offer conceptual clarity where confusion reigns, and they can also – and should – point out that, after all, Modernity is essentially

a *concept* and, moreover, one that itself is part of what it describes. A possible conclusion, therefore, is that 'Modernity' and 'modernization', rather than denoting a particular 'phenomenon' or a specific 'process', point to a number of family resemblances which, when applied to situations other than that from which they stem, are used in a selective manner by both local participants and Western on-watchers to indicate what they consider to be positive or negative elements in the situation in question. As a concrete example, it might well be argued that Japanese modernization is profoundly different from either Russian or Turkish modernization, and that these latter two display substantial differences as well, but that all three do refer to key elements adapted from Western Modernity.

We regard this volume as an exercise in intercultural philosophy, although we take a somewhat different stance on the subject than do other volumes in the series *Studies in Intercultural Philosophy*. The articles presented here do not primarily discuss and compare Russian, Japanese, and Ottoman-Turkish philosophy, and their different religious and cultural backgrounds. By developing an interdisciplinary perspective on the adoption of and reaction to modern philosophical ideas stemming from the West in the non-Western world, we hope to provide the reader with a sharpened and differentiated view on 'modernization', it being such a general and often ideologically charged concept. This approach is philosophical in that it tries to (re)introduce difference where identity is suggested with respect to the seemingly monolithic concept of Modernity. We consider this work to be intercultural in that it makes an attempt to free itself from an exclusively Western view on the nature of Modernity and modernization.

Summary of the articles

The book is divided into four parts. The first three sections, on Russia, Japan, and Turkey, respectively, are presented in the order in which, historically, they embarked on the road towards modernization; this is followed by a fourth section in which general questions are addressed. The three contributions which make up the final section address the phenomena of 'empire', 'nationalism', and 'globalization', respectively.

Russia

In the opening article, Pauline Schrooyen (Radboud University Nijmegen) observes that civil society is not easily taking root in the socio-political conditions of today's Russia. In order to search for the origin of civil society and the relation between state and society in Russian history,

she focuses on late imperial Russia. She attempts to evaluate the applicability of the modernization theories of Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, respectively, for the Russian case. Using Luhmann's systems theory, she arrives at the conclusion that Russian society at the end of the 19th century represents a combination of a stratificationally differentiated society and a functionally differentiated society, without implying a linear history with the West as a model.

Marina Bykova (North Carolina State University) starts from the observation that Russia has been in search of a national identity since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In her view, the only viable alternative to Russia's inherited imperial ideology and lurking ethnic nationalism would be some form of civic nationalism, which presupposes the creation of a civil society. This, however, would require a lengthy and difficult process of democratization, coupled with extensive social reforms.

Jonathan Sutton (University of Leeds) provides a description of the present post-Soviet social and cultural landscape in order to highlight concrete patterns of interrelationships between religion, civil society and the nation in the Russian Federation. The emphasis lies on Russian Orthodox religion and, in particular, its spiritual nature.

According to Hans Oversloot (Leiden University), present-day Russia defines itself as a multinational state, 'multinationalism' having traditionally been an attribute of empire. Under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation is being reorganized and reconstituted at the expense of the aspirations to self-rule of leaders of (ethnic) republics. This strong emphasis on the constitutional '*vertikal*' is not in itself anti-democratic. In fact, it could be argued that democracy in a number of subjects of the Russian Federation stands in need of help from above. However, Putin's primary concern is not democracy as such, but the state. Oversloot argues that we are witnessing the revival of the state as an ideology in Russia.

Japan

Paul Kevenhörster (University of Münster) provides a general sketch of (mainly) political developments in modern post-war Japan. He detects an ambivalence in cultural orientations, which evokes two conflicting perceptions. The first maintains that Japan is not yet sufficiently modernized, while the second points to the essential hybridity of Japanese culture. Still, he believes that open-minded orientations *vis-à-vis* foreign cultures are becoming more prevalent. This is illustrated by the fact that the postwar New Constitution, which embodies fundamental human rights and pacifism, is widely accepted by the people as an expression of shared values, and by

the fact that civil society movements, which are anti-authoritarian, are on the rise.

Tetsuo Najita (University of Chicago) elaborates on the theme of civil society by providing a genealogy of the different themes of civil society in Japan which illustrates the way they are entwined with Japan's modernity, a period extending over a hundred years. Historically, civil society in modern Japan has been identified with two positions: 'radical democracy' and 'social democracy', both situated on the left of the political spectrum. According to Najita, the question of civil society in contemporary Japan is not whether there was such a thing as civil society in the past, but whether the demands of large-scale organizations can be held at bay in terms of humane goals.

Rikki Kersten (Leiden University) provides a sketch of the role of 'public intellectualism' in postwar Japan, focusing on Maruyama Masao, whose formulation of state-society relations has had an enduring impact on Japan's postwar political culture. The experience of wartime Japan made him realize that valorising the private was the means through which the public could be resurrected in the postwar period as a democratic entity. According to Kersten, the dilemma that contemporary public intellectuals are facing today is whether they can navigate between an inherited discourse on the (power of the) state and a postwar discourse on the people, while still incorporating patriotism.

Inken Prohl (Free University Berlin) argues that in contemporary Japan, New Religions, so-called Japan Theory and the media play important roles in the creation of national identity. They seem to adapt better to the individualistic trends and needs of modern Japan than do the traditional religions. These new movements combine universalist and particularist features, the latter in the form of an affirmation of Japan's uniqueness and religious nationalism.

Turkey

Gerrit Steunebrink (Radboud University Nijmegen) deals with the reversed histories of liberalism and nationalism in Western Europe and in Turkey. While nationalism in Europe emerged as a correction to individualist liberalism, nationalism in Turkey was the context in which liberalism, individualism and human rights were to be implemented. Specifically, the particular character of the so-called '*millet* system' and its nationalist tendencies gave a collectivist and ethno-nationalist turn to the implementation of liberalism. According to Steunebrink, differences and tensions between Islam and Christianity have also always played a role in the reception of Western

liberalism, and continue to do so, particularly in the current debate on Turkey's participation in the European Union.

Yasin Ceylan (Middle East Technical University, Ankara) writes about the conflict between state and religion in Turkey. Ceylan states that although the secularization program that was initiated by Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish Republic, is relatively successful in comparison to those implemented in other Muslim countries, there still exists a conflict between state and religion. Firstly, there are problems arising in connection with the nature of Islam itself, which resists secularization. Secondly, difficulties emerge as a result of the strategies of secularization implemented by the Turkish government. Ceylan concludes that the modernization of Muslim societies can only be achieved through the application of a radical program whereby state and religious institutions parallel to those in the modern states are re-established.

Ayşe Kadioğlu (Sabancı University, Istanbul) addresses the relationship between citizenship and individualism in Turkey. In her paper, she argues that in the Turkish context the concept of modern citizenship evolved in such a way as to exclude a liberal individualist dimension. Whereas in Western Europe the notion of the individual appeared in philosophical writings prior to the emergence of modern citizenship, in Turkey the citizen precedes the individual. Hence, Turkish citizens found themselves in a position to be absorbed in grand social projects such as Kemalism, Socialism, and political Islam. In Turkey, civil and legal, political and social rights associated with citizenship were given from above, and not acquired as a result of struggles from below. She argues that in the founding years of the Republic, Turkish citizenship was defined from above by a state elite that emphasized duties over rights and disregarded the privacy of the individual. Hence, a political culture that prompted the will to follow rather than the courage to reason began to evolve in the Turkish Republic.

Akın Ergüden (Middle East Technical University, Ankara) tries to develop a new conceptual apparatus to account for modernization processes in Turkey. He underlines the role that creative aspects of knowledge and language play in the establishment of the 'grammar' of the Turkish public sphere. To begin with, he claims that most, if not all, of the common truths and societal facts constituting the grammar of the public sphere are not discovered, but rather, are created and formed, not necessarily by the closure of consensus over 'rational' (as in secularism) or 'divine' (as in islamism) truths, but also by the cunning of live metaphors, i.e., by their open, free, and even conflicting interplay. Secondly, he claims that communication in the public sphere includes a ghostly interaction of non-intentional, pre-propositional background practices which lie at the intersection of the creative aspects of language and knowledge. His central point is that any meaningful inquiry

into the formation of nation, religion or civil society must take this level of background practices into consideration. In doing so, he initiates the creation of a new 'grammar', a new conceptual apparatus.

General Perspectives

The last part of this volume comprises more general and conceptual contributions to the subject. The first contribution, by Peter van der Veer (Utrecht University), addresses the relation between religion, nation, and the public sphere, focusing on the formation of a transnational public sphere. He argues that the transnational public sphere today is successor to a public sphere that in many societies has been formed in the context of an interaction between empire and the nation-state. In the process of the formation of the nation-state, religion was nationalized and played an important role in shaping the modern subject, as well as in creating the public sphere. According to van der Veer, religion is a privileged site for examining the aspect of secrecy that is, simultaneously, the opposite of the public sphere and one of its foundational elements. The use of the rise of European Protestantism (connected to the creation of a religious (reading) public) as a model in accounting for developments in twentieth century Islam and Hinduism seems not entirely adequate, although religious issues and religious movements are crucial in the formation of the public sphere. Today, mass education, mass media (especially the Internet) and mass politics play an essential role in the formation of a transnational public sphere.

Machiel Karskens (Radboud University Nijmegen) focuses on the phenomenon of nationalism. He argues that nationalism continues to be a very strong and effective *political* strategy in state formation processes the world over, rightfully used by states or governments, as well as by ethnic groups. However, nationalism should not be considered a political goal in itself. Besides, nationalism can no longer be used as a *social* strategy. Civil society is indefinite by nature and has actually become global in practice. The core process of civil society is the reverse of the nationalism process: the former is making the private public and the latter is turning the public into a generalized private domain.

Evert van der Zweerde (Radboud University Nijmegen) also leaves the historical perspective behind, and addresses the question how, in a 'globalizing' world, the return of nationalism and religion as well as the rise of global civil society relate to the declining role of the (nation-)state. Problems and issues tend to transcend national levels, which calls for new forms of polity. The (nation-)state as the main type of polity is losing its central and exclusive position, but continues to dominate our thinking. Van der Zweerde further

argues that we need to avoid ‘occidentocentrism’ in order to be able to think globally. This can be reached by reflecting upon one’s own situation – as the point of departure for a dialogue with other cultural, intellectual and (post-)religious traditions.

Conclusion

In addition to the divergent themes and approaches that are explored in the different articles, this volume contains a few easily discernable and valuable threads. First of all, authors like Kant, Hegel, Weber, Durkheim, Habermas, and Luhmann are referred to in both the (more) empirical contributions and the (more) philosophical articles. More substantially, a notable tension in the approaches of Weber and Durkheim runs through this volume. Some contributions presuppose that both sociologists regard ‘modernization’ as an exclusively Western phenomenon (Steunebrink, Ceylan), while others use their theories to assess analogous processes of modernization in non-Western nations with respect to their own cultural conditions (Najita, van der Veer). This tension articulates the yet unclear relation between modernization and westernization.

The tension that emerges between the emphasis on the nation – with nationalism as its most influential form of expression, on the one hand, and civil society, with its emphasis on the value of the freedom of the individual, on the other (Karskens) – expresses itself in the clash between nationalism and citizenship in Turkey (Kadioğlu), national and religious self-affirmation and liberalism in Japan (Kevenhörster, Kersten, Prohl), and state-ideology and democracy in Russia (Bykova, Oversloot). The question remains as to what extent our understanding of modernization is bound up with the specifically 19th century constellation of citizenship, religion and nationalism. Basic changes in this constellation confront us with the need to redefine the concept of civil society on a global level (van der Zweerde). We are now dealing with a new phenomenon: a global economy as the domain of multi-nationals, on the one hand, and civil society organizations, on the other. Citizenship obtains a new dimension, one which requires a theoretical and practical reconsideration of the relationship between nation, state and religion. These questions, however, exceed the limits of this volume. In any case, we sincerely hope to contribute to the mutual understanding of experiences with modernization, an understanding that is a necessary condition for global intercultural enterprises in the future.

Wout Cornelissen
Gerrit Steunebrink
Evert van der Zweerde

PART I

RUSSIA

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MODERNIZATION IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA

SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY*

Pauline Schrooyen
Radboud University Nijmegen

ABSTRACT: Two modernization theories are discussed in this article that offer an explanation for the transition from traditional society to modern society in post-reform Russia: Jürgen Habermas' theory of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* and Niklas Luhmann's theory of social differentiation. The first part of this article approaches the emancipation of Russian society in the second half of the 19th century from a systems-theoretical perspective. By drawing on Luhmann's distinction of 'stratificatory' and 'functional' differentiation, it raises the hypothesis that Russian late imperial society is a combination of both. The second part explores Habermas' notion of the public sphere and the way in which historians have applied it to Russian 19th century society. The article seeks to demonstrate that rival models such as those of Luhmann and Habermas may both be of benefit in the analysis of the same (in this case Russian) society.

Introduction

The fact that a civil society is not easily taking root in the socio-political conditions of today's Russia¹ prompts questions about the origin of civil society and underlying questions about the relation between state and society in Russian history. I perceive a growing consensus among Western scholars

* I would like to thank Joseph Bradley, Ted Weeks and Frank Huysmans for their comments. Discussing first drafts with my Dutch colleagues helped me sharpen my ideas. For the English translation of Luhmann's terminology, I have consulted: Niklas Luhmann, *The Differentiation of Society* (New York, NY: Columbia UP, 1982) translated by Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore; Niklas Luhmann, *Social Systems* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1995) translated by John Bednarz, Jr., and Dirk Baecker; and Niklas Luhmann, *Ecological Communication* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) translated by John Bednarz Jr.

1. The literature on 'the problem' of civil society in present-day Russia is vast. For a philosophical discussion see van der Zweerde 1997 and 1998. A very rich account of the problem is provided by Gorškov et al. 1995. For a political-scientific discussion, see Sungurov 2000.

with regard to the fact that a civil society was taking shape in Russia on the threshold of the 20th century. They point to the existence of a critical potential to oppose the tsarist regime and to claim an autonomous public sphere, be it formed by discontent intellectuals, merchants, Old Ritualists, liberals, the reading public, professionals, clergy- and laymen, or peasants.² However, opinions differ as to how strong or weak this civil society actually was. Some argue positively, highlighting the public activity and free associations that Russian society had generated since the Great Reforms of Tsar Alexander II in the early 1860s, while others, noting the lack of public autonomy and political influence, contend that a civil society only existed 'in embryo'.³

Some secondary literature dealing with the problem of modernization in Russian late imperial society refers both directly and indirectly to Habermas' concept of *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit* [bourgeois public sphere] as a space, distinct from the private sphere and the state, of free expression and argument that is in principle accessible to any social group. Other literature alludes to the idea of civil society, often without providing any clear definitions. However, I hesitate to use such ready-made categories, especially when it means imposing present-day Western concepts and expectations on a foreign past, which is all the more true for the concept of civil society, which plays a pivotal role in contemporary discussions about the rebuilding of East European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition to this, the German concepts of *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit* and *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* [civil society] are so strongly interwoven with the German philosophical tradition and German socio-political development that their application to other cultural and linguistic contexts requires the utmost prudence and sensitivity.⁴ From a conceptual-historical perspective, it is worth noting that the Russian notion *obščestvennost'* entered the socio-political language at the end of the 18th century, but became relevant only towards the middle of the 19th century.⁵ The concept had

2. Among the many studies of Russian society which (in)directly deal with the question of the emergence of a civil society, see Bradley 1991, Bradley 2002, Brower 1990, Clowes et al. 1991, Engelstein 2000, Hagen 1982, Herlihy, 2002, Howe 1998, Lindenmeyr 1996, McReynolds 1991, Philippot 1991, Renner 1996, Renner 2000, Ruane 1994, Seregny 1992, Walkin 1962, Wartenweiler 1999.

3. Engelstein 2000, p. 31. According to Gregory Freeze, civil society in post-reform Russia was still too 'inchoate', see Freeze 1991, p. 216. Daniel Brower calls it a 'protocivil society' (Brower 1990, p. 107) and Joseph Bradley extends Gramsci's argument that 'not only was civil society unwilling or unable to defend the state, but it was also unable to defend itself.' (Bradley 1991, p. 148). cf. Bradley 2002.

4. Haltern 1985, p. vii.

5. Renner 2000, p. 149. Gleason 1991, p. 21.

multiple meanings, among which are the following: civil society, public opinion, society [*obščestvo*] and sociability [*social'nost'*].

All this brings us to larger, more fundamental questions concerning whether Western concepts and modernization theories apply to Russia at all, to what extent they might apply to Russian late imperial society, and whether they do justice to the specific complexity and dynamism of the Russian case. In an attempt to answer these questions, I will discuss two modernization theories that offer an explanation for the transition from traditional society to modern society: Jürgen Habermas' theory of *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit* and Niklas Luhmann's theory of social differentiation.

As recent scholarship indicates, Russian society was emancipating itself from the state since the time of the Reforms of Tsar Alexander II: certain groups in society could – and did – act more voluntarily, autonomously and publicly than has often been supposed. In this article, I will show how certain characteristics of this emancipation process, such as social mobility, the rise of voluntary associations, politicization, professionalization, the explosive growth of the press and the constitution of public opinion can be fruitfully explained with the help of Habermas' theory of public sphere and Luhmann's theory of social differentiation. As Luhmann's theory is still rather unknown in Russian studies, a considerable part of the article is dedicated to the introduction and application of this theory. The purpose of the first part is to demonstrate that Luhmann's distinction between 'stratificatory' and 'functional' differentiation helps us provide an adequate analysis of the modernization of Russian late imperial society.⁶ It shows the autonomy of and interdependence between different domains – or subsystems – of Russian society. As it is beyond the scope of this article to examine Russian society as a whole, I have selected three areas – religion, higher education, and the press – which are relevant for the discussion of Luhmann and Habermas. In the second part, I will consider Habermas' idea of a public sphere and explore the ways in which it has thus far been instrumentalized by historians in their study of Russian 19th century society. The concept of a bourgeois public sphere allows Habermas to give meaning to multiple developments, such as professionalization, the politicization of society, the rise of an urban Russia, the democratization of the press, the growth of educational opportunities, and the rise of institutions of self-administration (e.g. *zemstvo*). In the third part of this article, I will examine how plausible the claims of the aforementioned modernization theories are to the Russian situation and I will hazard some critical remarks and suggestions regarding the study of late imperial Russia.

6. Luhmann detects four forms of differentiation: segmentary, center/periphery, stratificatory and functional. The last two mark the transition from traditional society to modern society.

Far from being a specialist of Habermas or Luhmann, or an adherent of their theories, it is not my intention to decide which modernization theory suits Russia best, or to establish some kind of definitive interpretation of social developments in late imperial Russia. The modest purpose of this article is to problematize, from an interdisciplinary perspective, the application of the theories just mentioned to the Russian situation, as well as to point out possible approaches to the reader and raise new questions that may usefully impart a better understanding of this particular period.

Modernization

Modernization is a process of social change and economic development. The criteria of modernization can be divided into economic factors on the one hand, and non-economic factors, such as professionalization, education, public opinion, mass media, literacy, social mobility, population growth, and urbanization, on the other. The term modernization has a comparative connotation, referring to the changes that enable a country to compete effectively with more developed societies. This comparative element goes back to the time of imperialism when images and pictures of colonial societies were transmitted to less developed societies, which, in their turn, tried to transform their 'traditional' societies after the received role model.⁷

Although the Russian empire has never been colonized – with the arguable exception of the Mongol Yoke (1240–1480) – the question of competition looms large in Russian historiography, and is closely linked to the feeling that Russia is lagging behind the rest of Europe, a feeling which permeated Russian society especially acutely after its painful defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856). This war evoked a strong feeling of patriotism and created an awareness of the necessity of societal reforms.⁸ The 'Crimean syndrome', as one scholar put it, largely triggered the Great Reforms of 1861–64, which were initiated by 'Tsar-liberator' Alexander II, and which echoed until the late 19th century.⁹ Serfdom was abolished, peasants were

7. See Lerner 1968.

8. In her study *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Liah Greenfeld argues that modernization in Russia was defined by its nationalism, which developed on the basis of a strong feeling of *ressentiment* to the West, which it [Russia] acknowledged – and envied – as its superior model. See pp. 14–21, pp. 222–235.

9. Another important factor in the reforms was the problem of serfdom, which negatively affected the Russian economy and which in the 1850s gave rise to serf revolts. W. Bruce Lincoln points to the role of a group of 'enlightened bureaucrats' who had already prepared Russia for reform during the final decade of the reactionary reign of Tsar Nicholas I (see Lincoln 1982).

emancipated, a form of local self-government [*zemstvo*] was realized, the judicial system was liberalized, and the universities were reorganized. These reforms enabled Russian society to differentiate and emancipate itself from the autocratic state, which resulted in the emergence of considerably autonomous domains or, to use Luhmann's terminology, 'subsystems of society'. The central reforms 'from above', i.e. imposed by the tsar on society, conditioned and instigated a process of social emancipation 'from below', of which voluntarism, the rise of public opinion, social mobility, and professionalism bear testimony. All of these developments have been well documented of late by modern-day social historians whose investigations underlie my Luhmannian interpretation of Russian late imperial society.

1. Luhmann

The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) conceives of society as a social system that includes all other social systems.¹⁰ Besides society, Luhmann distinguishes two other types of social systems: interactions that emerge among those who are present to one another and organizations that reproduce themselves by way of membership and decision-making techniques.¹¹ Luhmann's theory of modern society is based on a combination of the theory of 'autopoietic' or self-referential social systems and the concept of functional differentiation. According to this theory, relatively autonomous 'function systems' develop in modern society as a result of functional differentiation. Function systems structure their communication through binary codes that divide the world into two values. For example, profit/loss for the function system economy, power/lack of power for politics, truth/falsehood for science, immanence/transcendence for religion, and news/not news for the press. These function systems develop their own irreplaceable specific functions and, in this way, demarcate themselves from their environment.¹²

The transition from a traditional and stratified society to one that is functionally differentiated marks the development towards modern society, the main difference being the absence of a central point – like the state or church – from which society as a whole, that is, the total network of subsystems, can be contained in an all-embracing vision. Put differently, modern society has no top and no center. Characteristic for the process of functional differentiation is that every societal subsystem has its own

10. Luhmann 1997, p. 78.

11. op.cit., pp. 812–847.

12. op.cit., pp. 743–776.

unique perspective and hence ‘observes’¹³ or describes its environment differently, depending on the distinction it applies. As a result, a ‘polycontextural’ worldview arises in which the definition of society has become contingent. The ontological statements of state and church authorities – so-called ‘observations of the first order’ – are no longer taken for granted and are even criticized by ‘observations of the second order’, which can observe the distinction applied by the observation of the first order, such as good or bad, Christian or pagan etc.¹⁴ Luhmann’s theory of the observation of the second order presents modern society as a horizontally differentiated unity, as a polycontextural world in which no meta-code predominates, but in which different perspectives based on different distinctions coexist.¹⁵

In anticipation of a more thorough investigation of the application of Luhmann’s theory of social differentiation to Russian society, I hypothesize that Russian late imperial society represents a combination of a stratified society and a functionally differentiated society: it was horizontally constructed with self-referential societal subsystems such as law, medicine, the press and education, while at the same time it was vertically divided into unequal social estates which were interconnected by a national perspective permeating the entire society. The struggle of the last tsars, Alexander III (r.1881–1894) and Nicholas II (r.1894–1917), with the rapidly growing complexity of society and the formation of cohesive new strata (professionals, industrialists, artists, workers) which no longer fit the traditional estate categories of nobility, clergy, merchantry, and peasantry, indicates the end of the stratified society and the emergence of a new society.¹⁶ In the next section, I will explore the domains of religion, higher education and the press successively, and sketch their development from serving as integral parts of the state to being relatively autonomous self-referential function systems of society. As we will see, the role of the Great Reforms proved pivotal in the functional differentiation of society as they encouraged individuals, groups and organizations to reflect upon themselves and their relationship to the environment, resulting in a more pluriform understanding of society.

13. In Luhmannian terms, ‘to observe’ means to indicate by drawing a distinction. See Luhmann 1990, pp. 68–121.

14. On secularization, see Luhmann 2000, pp. 278–319.

15. Luhmann 1997, pp. 766–768.

16. Although, according to Luhmann, an estate (gentry) cannot be replaced with a functional system (politics or science), a mix of different forms of differentiation is possible. Luhmann 1997, pp. 611–612.

Three Areas of Russian Society: Religion, Higher Education, the Press

Religion

The autonomization of religion in Russia was effected by two developments: first, the foundation of the Holy Synod, as a result of which the spiritual domain became clearly marked off from the secular domain; and second, the Great Reforms of Alexander II and the impact they had on the social consciousness of the clergy.

In 1721, under Peter the Great, the Moscow patriarchate was abolished and replaced by a body that later became the Holy Synod. From this time onward, the authority of the Church was strictly confined to the spiritual [*dukhovnyj*] domain. The Church was charged with four functions: educational, pastoral, sacramental and theological. Its activity embraced the liturgy, the preservation of the doctrine of Orthodox Christianity, the combating of heresy and schism, the supervision of preaching and of ecclesiastical schools and the selection of worthy hierarchs (bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans).¹⁷ The 'spiritualization' of the Church, as the church historian Gregory Freeze has called it, is displayed in the work of great missionaries and elders [*starcy*] who fulfilled a pivotal role in monastic life as well as in the increase of monasteries and the foundation of a distinct Orthodox theology.¹⁸

Arguing against the traditional view of a secularized and subordinated Church in Russia, Freeze has convincingly demonstrated that the Church enjoyed relatively substantial institutional (and hence operational) autonomy and independence from the state despite the earlier confiscation of church lands under Catherine the Great. The Holy Synod functioned independently from the state, having similar organs at its disposal such as censorship committee, schools and courts. The Church held a monopoly position in religious affairs ranking from dogma, liturgy and clergy to writings and education.¹⁹ The fact that many religious journals were founded in the wake of the Great Reforms also bears testimony to a spiritual revival.²⁰

The state's attempts to integrate the Church and also its intervention in ecclesiastical affairs dissociated the clergy from the state authorities.

17. Treadgold 1978, pp. 22ff. Originally from Gumilevskij, F. *Istoriija russkoj tserkvi*.

18. Ware 1997, pp. 117–125.

19. Freeze 1985. The author warns that the chief procurator's role as a lay supervisor who remained organizationally outside the Synod should not be exaggerated.

20. Robert Davis lists approximately 140 religious journals, almost all of which were founded in the second half of the 19th century (Davis 1989).

Clergymen grew more aware of their spiritual competence, of their loyalty to the Church, and became strong representatives of ecclesiastical interests and needs. In reaction to the reforms, a group of bishops advocated the idea of conciliarism [*sobornost'*], referring to the medieval system of Episcopal councils [*pomestnye sobory*] by which the Church's power would be re-allocated from the Synod to the regional level of the diocese. In line with this was the idea, put forth in 1905, to form a national council [*sobor*] of the Russian Orthodox Church to discuss church-state relations. Criticism from the parish clergy, evolving from their disillusionment with the reforms, which they had expected would improve their living conditions and professional status, also obtained a more radical political weight and gave rise to the movement of 'clerical liberalism'. The isolated position of the clergy as a whole is likely to have intensified their political and religious consciousness and strengthened their sense of collective social identity.²¹

In the spirit of the Great Reforms, heterodox and orthodox believers were equal before the law. Herewith came an end to the privileged position of the Russian Orthodox Church, as becomes clear from the church's struggle against non-Orthodox people. Whereas before, church authorities had found themselves assured of state support in the battle over religion, in the 1860s and 1870s the government's religious policy had changed and civil authorities were no longer involved in settling the religious question. An 'independent' judiciary and press opposed the establishment of a religiously homogenous Russia, propagated by Chief Procurator Konstantin Pobedonoscev (1827–1907).²²

Higher Education

In the second half of the 19th century, Russia's educational system was consolidated: science was further institutionalized and the school system, to a large extent, standardized. The educational system laid the necessary foundation for further professionalization and social differentiation. It gradually put an end to the relation between professional competence and descent; instead, students were recruited on the basis of their individual skills and talents without their social status playing a role.²³

In Russia, a Ministry of Education was set up only in 1802. Until then, education had been part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The main

21. Freeze 1985, and 1983.

22. Polunov 2001a, and 2001b.

23. The number of students from the middle and lower classes increased by 35 per cent between the middle of the 1860s and 1915. Vucinich 1970, p. 204.

universities, except for one, the University of Moscow, were founded in the course of the 19th century. Entirely in the libertarian spirit of the reforms, the university statute of 1863 provided universities with academic autonomy and administrative power. For example, it allowed universities to found academic societies as well as scholarly [*učënnnye*] societies with permission of the Ministry of Education.²⁴ On a broader scale, professionals (physicians, teachers, psychiatrists, jurists, scholars, etc.) who partly received their training at the universities, started to organize themselves, forming local and national associations and holding congresses.²⁵

Diametrically opposed to the liberal spirit of 1863, the university statute of 1884 virtually abolished academic autonomy and restored the state's controlling power over the universities.²⁶ Although this was initially a major setback to Russian academic life, the long-term effect showed the opposite; by the 1890s, university autonomy was at stake in the open battle against the state in favor of university emancipation, which was headed by professors and student organizations.²⁷ Academic autonomy was commonly perceived as a basic condition for the modernization of the university, which finally put an end to the understanding of education as a 'legitimate sphere of state influence'.²⁸

In her study on Plato-scholarship in Russia, Frances Nethercott challenges the more traditional perception of Russian intellectuals as amateurs – rather than experts – outside the university, by concentrating on professional scholars within an institutional framework and demonstrating how they coped with state interference, while advocating such values as academic liberty and the autonomy of science.²⁹ Recently, more studies have documented the professionalization of late imperial society for which the

24. According to Charles Timberlake, nearly 50 academic societies were founded between 1863 and 1917. Timberlake 1982, p. 338. However, the statute did not grant students the right to form independent associations. Vucinich 1970, p. 186.

25. Under Alexander II, the number of societies grew explosively. The Brokgauz-Efron *Encyclopedia* distinguishes 10 different categories of societies with a scientific or charitable character. For an overview, see Anonymous, 'Obščestva' in: Arsen'ev, K. (ed.) *Ėnciklopedičeskij slovar'* T. XXIIa (1897, SPb) pp. 614–628.

26. Nonetheless, the universities retained the right to establish associations. Timberlake 1982, p. 338.

27. Vucinich 1970, pp. 188–199.

28. Nethercott 2000, pp. 4–5.

29. op.cit., pp. 14–15.

educational system had laid the necessary foundations. Adele Lindenmeyr points out how the expertise and activity of professionals in law or other fields led to the rationalization, systematization, and organization of charity.³⁰ The contribution of doctors and priests to the awareness and investigation of the problem of alcoholism is yet another example of how the increase in knowledge and expertise among members of Russian society helped to develop a more professional approach to social problems.³¹ In this respect, the professional involvement in society, particularly of physicians, at the time of the famine (1891) should be mentioned.³²

The struggle for the emancipation of Russian universities also included a competitive element. Unlike the St. Petersburg Academy of Science, which merely aspired to bring science to Russia, Russian scientists, in the spirit of Mikhail Lomonosov, wanted to emancipate Russian scholarship from Western tutelage. Furthermore, they wanted to make science a part of Russian culture by recruiting Russian scientists.³³

The Press

The emergence of a literary culture was an important constitutive factor in the process of political and social change in Russia in the second half of the 19th century. Many historians attribute a central role to the periodical press, the so-called 'thick' journals [*tolstye zhurnaly*], as well as the newspapers, in the formation of a 'public opinion' that was independent and critical of the government.³⁴

The proliferation of newspapers and journals in the 1860s made a relaxation of censorship regulations for practical reasons almost inevitable.

30. Lindenmeyr 1996, pp. 142–167.

31. Herlihy 2002.

32. Frieden 1981, ch. 6 'The Cholera Epidemic of 1892–1893', pp. 135–160.

33. Vucinich 1970, pp. 196–197. The foundation of the first serious philosophical periodical *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii* illustrates very well the influence of both national and scientific aspirations to foster 'proper' Russian thought and educate Russian philosophers. See: Nikolaev 1889, p. 2, and Grot 1891, p. i–vi.

34. In his study on censorship policy, Charles Ruud describes the emancipation of the press from the state; this was fully realized in 1905–1906 when Russia finally granted 'freedom of the press.' Ruud 1982, p. 7. Louise McReynolds holds that despite censorship, public opinion in Russia could be institutionalized, because officials paid little attention to the commercial mass-circulation newspaper industry. McReynolds 1991, p. 4.

The 'Temporary Regulations' of 1865, which remained in force for forty years although they were repeatedly adjusted, almost entirely abolished pre-publication censorship.³⁵ The relaxation of censorship was conditional to the rise of public opinion. Scholars have demonstrated how Mikhail Katkov's editorials in *Moskovskie Vedomosti* [The Moscow News] and reports on the crises in the Balkans got readers involved in national political discourse and influenced national politics.³⁶ Louise McReynolds points out that because of this new interaction between journalism and politics, the relation between government officials and journalists changed.³⁷

Thanks to technological advances and improvements in distribution, the circulation of newspapers and journals gradually increased and periodicals began to reach a broader audience. The circulation of the weekly *Niva* [Field], for example, went from 9,000 copies/issues in 1870, to 55,000 in 1880, to 115,000 in 1890 and to 250,000 by the early 20th century.³⁸ The readership also expanded and diversified. The rise of the commercially-based popular press appealed to a broad, rather than an elite, readership. Several scholars have argued in favor of the middle-rank or common reader, who differed from the intelligentsia.³⁹ These newly arising middle groups put an end to the dominance of the aristocracy and the government over print communication. Beth Holmgren shows how intellectuals, critics, and writers as well as readers, publishers, and bookstore-owners, because of the commercialization of the press, set out to redefine the traditional categories of serious and popular literature and reevaluated literary standards.

35. According to Ruud, after 1865, censors saw many books and periodicals only after they had reached the public. A small number of radical publications were still subjected to preliminary censorship. Ruud 1982, p. 8, p. 181.

36. Renner 2000. McReynolds 1991, pp. 73–96.

37. McReynolds points to the unusual relationship between S.M. Propper, the publisher of *Birževye vedomosti* [The Stock Market Gazette] and S. Ju. Witte, the Minister of Finance, who provided Propper's newspaper with copies of his speeches. McReynolds 1991, pp. 126–130.

38. Belknap 1997, p. 95 and Ruud 1982, p. 201. According to Ja. Abramov, the total number of Russian-language periodical editions appearing in Russia in 1855 was 139, in 1859–220, in 1872–378, in 1882–554, in 1888–637, in 1895–841, and in 1900–1002. 'Bedstvujusšie literatory' *Nedelja* 1889 No. 46, as quoted in: Lejkina-Svirskaja 1971, p. 216.

39. See Brooks 1985, Durkin 1997, p. 241, and Holmgren 1998, p. 6.

The emancipation of the press was further strengthened by the functional differentiation of certain domains of society, such as science and publicism. To quote the leading Russian encyclopedia of that time:

Publicistika [publicism] is the discussion in the press of urgent questions of socio-political life. These questions can also be the object of scientific research, but a common object does not necessarily lead to a confusion of the fields of *publicistika* and science. (...) For *publicistika* investigation and theory are always merely means leading to a certain objective: a practical conclusion. (...) It takes from science generalizations and turns them into an instruction. The publicist does not popularize scientific consequences or report results of his own investigation for educational, but for edifying purposes, that is, not to report knowledge, but to exert influence over that political power which is called public opinion.⁴⁰

Luhmann Applied to the Russian Case

In his systems-theoretical study *Identität statt Differenz* [Identity Instead of Difference] Dirk Kretzschmar defends the thesis that Russia, in the 18th and 19th centuries, was still a traditional, stratified society and that it had not yet transformed into a functionally differentiated society like West-European societies. Kretzschmar founds his thesis on three arguments. First, the author contends that no process of secularization had taken place, as a consequence of which there was no social environment outside of the church, which meant that everything automatically belonged to the religious domain and that there was no freedom of religion. Secondly, the author points to the continuation of autocracy: the tsar was still perceived as the leading power, who created and maintained order. Hence, there was no separation between state and society as there was in the West. Thirdly, religion and politics in Russia hindered the differentiation of society into subsystems that concentrated on one specific and primary function. The author illustrates this by presenting the example of science, which was still regarded as totally subservient to politics. According to the 1820 edict from the Ministry of Education, scientists were forced to acknowledge the perfection and harmony of the divine creation of the world, as well as the unknowability of divine omniscience. Further, the author adds that due to the stability of the educational criteria, access to science was denied to other social groups and the development of a heterarchy, instead of a hierarchy, was thus blocked.⁴¹

40. Ar.G. 'Publicistika' in: Arsen'ev, K. (ed.) *Ėnciklopedičeskij slovar'* T. XXVa (SPB, 1898), p. 746.

41. Kretzschmar 2002, pp. 108–111.

In all, Kretzschmar concludes that because the aforementioned domains of religion, politics and science did not differentiate and develop into autonomous, self-referential and closed function systems, the emancipation and differentiation of art was also hampered. Herewith, Kretzschmar offers a different explanation for the multifunctionality of art in Russia as opposed to the functional limitation of art as an autonomous sphere in Western Europe. It is generally believed that art, in Russia, compensated a political, religious and scientific functional vacuum; Kretzschmar, however, points out that because a strict delineation of art, as well as politics, religion and science, was lacking, art did not compensate – for that presupposes the functional limitation of politics, religion, science and art on the basis of one single binary code –, but rather, overestimated itself and so fulfilled too many functions.⁴²

Kretzschmar's traditional view of Russia – though based on new arguments – might be true for pre-reform Russia, however I cannot subscribe to the author's interpretation of Russian society as far as post-reform Russia is concerned.⁴³ According to Luhmann, functional subsystems of society do not simply employ certain codes, but evolve from the use of certain codes. Therefore, they should not – or at least not exclusively – be understood as institutions or organizations, but rather, as 'communications'.⁴⁴ Thus, the example given by Kretzschmar of a ministerial edict stipulating a scientist's attitude towards the divine, and of censorship regulations determining for all domains what is publishable and what is not, do not fully cover or exhaust the communication science, and, what is more, do not attest to the absence of a binary code of science as such.⁴⁵

42. op.cit., pp. 113–116.

43. From a historical point of view, the 'sketchy' analysis – as the author himself writes – of the religious, political and scientific domain seems to me to be deficient. Among the books the author mentions is Richard Pipes' 1974 *Russia under the Old Regime*, whose reading of Russian church-state relations is strongly opposed by church historian Gregory Freeze (to whom I refer in the previous section). On the issue of secularization in Russia, Laura Engelstein contends that in Russia, as in Europe, religion evolved parallel to other domains of society, herewith putting an end to the assumption that religion still largely dominated social life in Russia at the expense of other cultural developments (Engelstein 2001).

44. Communications constitute the function systems, as they can only be followed by other communications. Scientific publications, for example, are a specific type of such communications, and constitute the function system of science. On communications, see Luhmann 1984, pp. 191–241.

45. cf. Kneer & Nassehi 1993, pp. 139–140.

Several developments point to the differentiation of the educational system. As we have seen earlier, the opposition of the Russian academic community to state interference was of considerable caliber, finally culminating in the resignation of several professors. For example, many of the founders of the liberal journal *Vestnik Evropy* [Messenger of Europe] were former professors who had resigned from St. Petersburg University in resistance to the state's harsh treatment of student activists.⁴⁶ The sheer fact of opposition proves that, contrary to Kretzschmar's statements, scientists were very much aware of the 'function' of science and of the 'efforts' evolving from its 'code'.⁴⁷ The problems Russian science was facing, such as state interference, lack of know-how, shortage of academics, restricted freedom of speech and the press, all affected the operability of the function system, but not necessarily the binary code by which it differentiated itself.⁴⁸ Once the 'programs', that is, the conditions under which systems operate, are determined by other function systems, the autopoiesis of a particular function system can be seriously hindered. In the Soviet Union, for example, the programs of science, its theories, methods and parameters, were determined by Marxist-Leninism, and yet even under those circumstances scholars managed to circumvent the barriers – in the most extreme case by going abroad – and in this way remained faithful to the binary code of truth/falsehood in their publications, which allowed them to communicate with other scientists.⁴⁹ Thus, while on the one hand, systems prove handicapped by their unique binary codes, which preclude them from operating outside of their operational spheres, on the other hand, it is precisely these binary codes that isolate and thus protect them – one could almost say 'make them immune' – from decisions motivated by other *Leitunterscheidungen* [distinctions directrices]. The aforementioned conflicts between the professorial body and the state indicate that each acted in accordance with its own binary code, from which their respective interests in this case derived.

Also, the emergence of the *raznočintsy*,⁵⁰ the foundation of learned societies and scientific periodicals, as well as the isolation of the scientific

46. Pogorelskin 1978, p. 93. On Moscow University, see Vucinich 1970, p. 196.

47. Kretzschmar 2002, p. 111.

48. It is even possible that government policy partly stimulated the creation of subsystems, as more secret communities emerged in reaction thereto. See for example Jovan Howe, who has pointed out that the persecution of the Old Ritualists spurred them to 'organize spiritually independent communities outside the control of the state and church.' Howe 1998.

49. cf. Kneer & Nassehi 1993, pp. 133–134, and Schimank 1996, p. 158.

50. Russian intellectuals not coming from the aristocracy.

community in Russia all fostered the differentiation of science into an autonomous, self-referential and closed function system.

2. Habermas

In his study *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* [Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit], the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1929-) explains the transformation of a society organized in estates into a 'civil society' [*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*] in Western Europe throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries with the concept of 'bourgeois public sphere' [*bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit*].⁵¹ The bourgeois public sphere is conceived as 'the sphere of private people, come together as a public; they claim the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor.'⁵² Habermas explains the emergence of a public sphere by showing how, in the mercantilist phase of capitalism economic activity, such as commodity exchange, expanded the boundaries of the self-contained household economy upon which the estate system was based, and became a subject of public interest. As broad strata of the population, especially in the towns, were affected by the regulations of mercantilist policy in their daily existence as consumers, these regulations became the object of public critical attention as the domain of 'common concern'.

Further, Habermas points out how, in the course of the commercialization of cultural production, a diffuse public formed in and around theaters, museums, concerts and other cultural sites. As a result of the democratizing effect of capitalism on culture, philosophical and literary works and works of art became generally accessible (although clearly not everybody could own them) so that the interpretation of these works in principle included everybody and was no longer reserved for state and church authorities coming from the aristocracy and higher clergy. Salons, coffeehouses, table societies, and literary societies in France, Great Britain, and Germany provided the proper context for organizing ongoing discussions focused on literary and political themes that were in principle open to everybody regardless of social status. These centers of critical reflection became the

51. This part is chiefly based on §3–7 of the 1990 edition of *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*. For Habermas' discourse in English, I have made use of the English translation by Thomas Burger.

52. Habermas 1989, p. 27.

institutions of the public sphere where a public of private individuals was created whose spearhead was the bourgeoisie (merchants, bankers, entrepreneurs, manufacturers).

The bourgeois public sphere appears as a field that mediates between state and society and as a subject identical to the educated people that carry public opinion.⁵³ It performs several functions; it can serve to legitimize political power, to rationally criticize something, to exercise civic authority, to create transparency, and to act communicatively. As we will see, the model of *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit* is not neutral, but carries a normative freight, emerging from the author's reflections on the values of Western enlightened and secularized society.

Habermas Applied to the Russian Case

A considerable number of social histories on late imperial Russia seem to effectively comply with the claims of Habermas' theory without making explicit reference to it. For example, the focus of recent studies on the development of a mass-circulation press in Russia, of a reading culture extending beyond the intellectual elite, as well as on the emergence of voluntary associations, the evolution of urban culture, and the foundation of *zemstvos* all fit very well into Habermas' core idea of the structural transformation of the public sphere, which conditions the emergence of a *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*.⁵⁴ From such a 'conditional' perspective, Miranda Beaven Remnek demonstrates the emergence of a public sphere in Russia in the first quarter of the 19th century by studying salons, cafés, circles, clubs, coffeehouses, theatres, lodges, and learned societies as public 'zones of intersection between social groups and the press.' Setting 'polite conversation' and 'reading of the press' as two main criteria constituting 'the new consciousness of the individual,'⁵⁵ Remnek argues that these public sites prepared the ground for the formation of public opinion, which, as the

53. These two meanings do not exhaust the possible meanings of *Öffentlichkeit*. For a historical survey of the various meanings of *Öffentlichkeit* (public, publicity, publicness, public sphere), see Habermas 1990, pp. 54–69 and Hölscher 1978.

54. I am thinking in particular of McReynolds 1991, Martinsen, 1997, Brooks 1985, Bradley 1991 and 2002, Philippot 1991.

55. Remnek 2002, p. 230, pp. 236–237. The author qualifies a third criteria – commercial interaction – as being poorly developed in Russian society, herewith pointing to the problem of the lack of a middle class in Russia.

author writes at the outset of her article, often precedes ‘the emergence of politicized civil society.’⁵⁶

A somewhat different approach is taken by Daniel Brower, who draws on Habermas’ theoretical model, taking the semantic and etymological resemblance between the Russian *obščestvennost’* and the German *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* as his point of departure. Brower uses Habermas’ concept of *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit* to outline the development of a municipal public sphere separate from the state and also the extent to which it played a meaningful role in public life in Russia by the end of the 19th century.⁵⁷

In his study *Russischer Nationalismus und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich 1855–1875*, Andreas Renner ascribes the development of Russian national consciousness in the 19th century to the constitution of a national discourse community. He points to the correlation between nation-building and civil society, as both developments contributed to the ideal of a (politically) informed opinion.⁵⁸ According to Renner, the basic structure of a public sphere was in place in Russia by 1850, even though the public sphere was neither political nor civil [*bürgerlich*], and lacked institutional and juridical status.⁵⁹

Renner sees his research on nation-building as supplementary to the present study of civil society in 19th century Russia. First of all, he makes a clear distinction between the liberal ideal of an economically independent *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* and the somewhat diffuse concept of civil society as a sphere between economy and state politics, which is based on a many-voiced process of *Selbstverständigung* [communication and understanding] fostered by the press. In his perception, civil society can be understood from the perspective of developing autonomous organizations and voluntary associations based on the free economic participation of individual citizens, or it can be understood as a measure for determining the degree to which society has emancipated from the state (*Zivilgesellschaft*). According to Renner, the second understanding of civil society best fits Russian society, although it remains unclear what separates this from the liberal-democratic ideal of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*.⁶⁰ A second research

56. op.cit., pp. 224–247. Louise McReynolds has studied the importance of the development of a mass-circulation press for the emergence of a public sphere in Russia. McReynolds 1991.

57. Brower 1990, pp. 93–95.

58. Renner 2000, pp. 16–17.

59. op.cit., p.16–18, 64ff. Laura Engelstein also points out that the role of society is limited depending on the extent to which the state holds power. Engelstein 2000.

60. Renner 2000, pp. 157–160.

contribution is apparent in Renner's investigation into the integrative role of newspapers and journals. Thirdly, a wide variety of discourses and operational correlations [*Handlungszusammenhänge*] are studied, including notions such as nation, people, and society. Renner demonstrates how the *Öffentlichkeit* of nationalism went beyond political *Räsonnement* [rational-critical debate] about concrete issues, and rather, selected the issues and gave them political meaning, thereby urging the state to act.⁶¹

These thematically differing studies show us three examples of Russian contexts in which Habermas' ideas have been fruitfully applied: public social life, municipalities, and nationalism. A striking difference between these studies is their assessment as to how far a public sphere had actually been realized in Russia. Renner argues that the public sphere could not be designated as bourgeois or middle class [*bürgerlich*] due to both its social composition and the existence of a variety of discourses other than rational. The latter resulted, Renner writes, in a coexistence of fragmented – in Habermas' sense, non-discursive – public spheres rather than a self-conscious political discourse community based on *Räsonnement* as Habermas would have it.⁶² Secondly, the public sphere in pre-reform Russia was not political, because open critical reasoning could only be conducted in the fields of literature and art. So, arguing with Renner, the public sphere that Remnek describes is actually a literary public sphere, which, according to Habermas, precedes the political public sphere.⁶³

My critique of studies such as Remnek's, which only make eclectic use of the concept of *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit*, is that they do not do justice to Habermas' theory. By failing to take the element of *Räsonnement* into account, any 'polite conversation' among the reading public bears witness to the constitution of a public sphere; whereas, according to Habermas, it is exactly the public use of reason that turns polite conversation into criticism and *bon mots* into arguments.⁶⁴ Also, downplaying the role of the middle class upon whose economic autonomy Habermas' theory is based means not acknowledging the importance of its appeal to a general and common interest, which is of utmost significance in the appropriation of the state-governed public sphere and the establishment of a public sphere that is critical of public authority. In their study *Between Tsar and People*, editors

61. op.cit., pp. 16–19, pp. 136–160. On the selective function of public opinion, cf. Luhmann 2000, ch. 8.

62. Renner 2000, p. 65.

63. Habermas 1990, §7.

64. op.cit., p. 91.

Edith Clowes, Samuel Kassow and James West try to overcome the problem of the missing middle class in Russia by examining disparate groups that are negatively defined as not belonging to the existing traditional legal, social or cultural categories.⁶⁵ But although these groups articulate common concerns and their loyalties transcend the traditional estates, their formation is not based on the psychological and political-economic emancipation characteristic of Habermas' category of the bourgeoisie. From Habermas' point of view, then, it remains unclear why these groups of non-owners would spearhead the formation of a public sphere, as they lacked control of private property and therefore would have had no obvious interest in maintaining society as a private sphere.⁶⁶ In addition to this, Habermas' public sphere is based on the psychological emancipation of the bourgeoisie, whose autonomy as property owners was reflected in their enlightened self-perception as independent human beings.⁶⁷ In all, the double process of polarization, first between state and society and then within society itself,⁶⁸ which is fundamental to Habermas' understanding of the bourgeois public sphere, proves problematic in the context of Russian 19th century society, where private autonomy – economic, social, religious, as well as political –, was a rarity as opposed to the norm.

3. Toward New Perspectives in the Study of Russian 19th Century Society

Scholarly interest in the late imperial period was initially aroused by questions about the roots of the Russian revolution. With historical hindsight, the determining factors of the revolution were explained and potential alternatives, such as liberalism, detected (not uncommonly with an envious look to the West). The question has been posed more than once as to why the autocratic regime did not pull back in order to give rise to a democratic representative government. Recently, some scholars have pointed out that such an approach is no longer sufficient, and that, instead, social developments in the period prior to the revolution are worthy of separate attention and call for independent explanation.⁶⁹

65. Clowes et al. 1991, p. 6.

66. The professional middle class was the largest component of the Russian middle class, larger than the commercial and industrial middle classes. Balzer 1996, p. 293.

67. Habermas 1990, §6.

68. op.cit., p. 88.

69. See Bradley 2002, p. 1097 and Haumann & Plaggenborg 1994, pp. 9–12.

In this article, I have brought together two rival authors, Luhmann and Habermas, whose theories help us to gain better insight into the dynamism of late 19th century Russian society. Coming from different academic backgrounds, they developed different theories about the modernization of society, theories which do not necessarily complement each other and, at some points, even oppose each other.⁷⁰ The reason I have brought them together is to highlight their specific value for the study of Russian 19th century society and to draw new perspectives from them.

As we have seen, in Habermas' theory the concept of *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit* serves as the organizing principle in the development of a new social and political order. Once applied to Russia, however, some of the theory's claims prove to be problematic. Besides the problem (addressed earlier) of a missing middle class, there is the assumption of a rationalized public sphere. Habermas' idea of *öffentliches Raisonement*, that is, people's public use of their reason, presupposes three developments: the fall of representative publicness [*repräsentative Öffentlichkeit*], the privatization of religion and the emergence of a liberal and humanist bourgeois culture.⁷¹ In Russia however, where the principles of personal rule remained very much in force up until the last tsar,⁷² where Russian Orthodoxy was commonly accepted as the national (i.e. state) religion, where a liberal culture only marginally existed and the people were first of all loyal to God, religion was *not* a private matter and could therefore not be excluded from public debate. As far as the authority of reason is concerned, it should be noted that there was a strong current in religious philosophy in Russia, as well as in social and political thought, that did not accept the rule of rationalism. On top of this, there was the widely accepted view that religion was innate to the Russian mind and that rationalism was foreign and (therefore) repugnant.⁷³ The ambivalent attitude of Russian society to (the authority of) reason is reflected in its understanding of public opinion. While some understood public opinion as 'collective thought about matters of public interest guided by reason', others saw it as something 'suspicious' and 'unreliable',

70. For example, according to Habermas' theory, the politicization of the literary public sphere gave rise to the formation of a political public sphere, whereas for Luhmann, politicization, like commercialization nowadays, signifies the predominance of one particular function system over others.

71. Habermas 1990, §2, §6.

72. Figs 1996, pp. 6–15.

73. On Russian religious thought, see Kornblatt 1996. Leonard Shapiro distinguishes two groups of political thinkers in 19th century Russia: the rationalists and the nationalists. See Shapiro 1967.

‘harmful’ and ‘irrational’, while yet others perceived public opinion as ‘the voice of God’.⁷⁴ Such an understanding does not only run counter to Habermas’ idea of public opinion as a critical instrument of reason, it also challenges Habermas’ ideal of the moral authority of reason.

Does this mean that Habermas’ theory of the bourgeois public sphere is of no use in the study of late imperial Russian society and that we should therefore subscribe to Luhmann’s theory? The answer is no: despite the incompatibility of some of the theory’s claims with the Russian situation, I acknowledge the importance of the category ‘public sphere’ as a paradigm for analyzing the relationship between state and society at a specific moment in social development, hereby focusing on the active role of people in social change. Further examination of this category in the Russian context, both in the sense of a sphere mediating between state and society and in the sense of a subject (the public, the nation), as Renner has convincingly done, is likely to bear fruit.⁷⁵ However, as we have seen in the first section of this paper, Luhmann’s theory of modern society provides a theoretical framework within which many of the developments characteristic of Russian post-reform society become accessible and comprehensible.

To approach Russian society as a society that was undergoing the process of functional differentiation and hence a transformation from a stratified society into a modern society imparts a different understanding of those emancipating developments described in the first part of this paper. Conceiving of social processes and practices as communications (rather than persons or organizations) leads to a refined, subtle understanding of this period. It allows us to demonstrate that certain sectors of society began to describe themselves as independent function systems of society and, at the same time, described society as a whole on the basis of their binary code. As a result, the rise of a more complex polycentric society becomes visible – one which can no longer be grasped from a mono-centric world-view like that of the state or church, but which is characterized by many different viewpoints. Another consequence of shifting the focus from subject (Habermas) to communication is that while it is still possible, in a stratified society, to divide people according to the social strata to which they belong (aristocracy, clergy, people), it is obvious that people in a functionally-differentiated society no longer belong to one single subsystem, but take part in several (pedagogy, politics, economy, religion) by way of

74. V.V. [Vodovozov, V.V.] ‘Obščestvennoe mnenie’ in: Arsen’ev, K. (ed.) *Ėnciklopedičeskij slovar’* T. XXIa (1897, SPb), pp. 604–605.

75. On the possibilities of the application of Habermas’ theory to the historical context of the 19th century, see Eley 1992.

communication.⁷⁶ In the case of Russia, the coexistence of two forms of social differentiation gives insight into the search for new social identities, which is typical of Russian post-reform society.⁷⁷ On the one hand, people's social ranking, which determined their position and function within society, depended on the estate into which they were born; on the other hand, their new identities were based on their professional careers.⁷⁸ And yet, although this idea of Russian society as both functionally and stratificationally differentiated certainly does justice to its paradoxical dynamism, further study needs to be done to determine how these different forms of differentiation developed and exactly how they coexisted.

Another valuable aspect of Luhmann's theory of functional differentiation that I would like to highlight is that it is free of any normative-teleological element. Therefore, once it is applied to the Russian context, it results in a more 'fair', that is, more objective, assessment of Russian society.⁷⁹ Unlike Habermas, who sets liberal democracy as the end goal, Luhmann does not conceive of evolution as a 'goal-directed progress toward ever-increasing understanding'; rather, he understands 'the process of socio-cultural evolution as the reshaping and widening of the chances for foreseeable communication, as the consolidations of expectations out of which society can form its social systems.'⁸⁰ Although Luhmann chronologically – and geographically – grounds this evolution in archaic tribal societies in Europe, which change in the middle ages and pre-modern age into stratified societies, which, in their turn, change (by the end of the 16th century and, at the latest, by the mid-19th century) into functionally differentiated societies, he is opposed to any progressive-linear idea of social evolution.⁸¹

76. 'Sie [PS: die konkreten Individuen] müssen an allen Funktionssystemen teilnehmen können, je nachdem, in welchen Funktionsbereich und unter welchem Code ihre Kommunikation eingebracht wird.' Luhmann 1997, p. 625.

77. Clowes et al. 1991.

78. cf. Luhmann 1997, pp. 771–772.

79. For Luhmann's view on evolution, see Luhmann 1997, Kapitel 3. It should be noted that Kretzschmar provides Luhmann's social theory with a normative-teleological element, which can be explained by the fact that Kretzschmar begins his argument with a description of Western modern society as a sort of guiding blueprint for Russia, which strongly deviates from the historical situation of that time.

80. Luhmann 1995, p. 159.

81. Luhmann 1997, p. 615. On segmentary societies, see pp. 634–662; on stratified societies, pp. 678–706, on functionally-differentiated societies, see pp. 743–776.

In this respect it seems worthy to note that Luhmann has more than once stated that his theory offers descriptions and no solutions or explanations. He is concerned with how society becomes aware of problems and instances of communication that arise in response to these realizations, but not with how these problems should be managed. His theory applies to an extraordinarily wide variety of topics ranging from politics, science, education and the press to religion and aims to provide a general approach to the empirical and historical study of modern society.

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NATION AND NATIONALISM

RUSSIA IN SEARCH OF ITS NATIONAL IDENTITY

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ABSTRACT: The Russian Empire, whether Tsarist or Soviet, was an ideological, rather than a national, construct. Neither the Tsarist Empire, nor the USSR, undertook the building of a Russian nation. Russian national identity was imposed from above and shaped as an imperial identity, one adequate to maintaining an empire or great state as a supranational imagined community. The fall of the Russian (Soviet) empire and subsequent dismantling of imperial ideology has caused a (national) identity crisis that necessitates the nurturing of a new state of the nation, one that is able to identify and manifest itself socially and politically. While discussing some of the main approaches to the development of a new national identity, this article demonstrates that in today's Russia, ever-present post-communist ideological imperialism and ethnic nationalism are sharply opposed to a newly emerging civic nationalism. Built on the basis of Western civic qualities (such as the development of the state, the presence of a civil society, etc.), the latter promotes a 'civic' national identity instead of one that is based solely on ethnicity.

1. Introduction

The defeat of communism and the dismantling of the Soviet empire in August 1991 marked one of the most euphoric and significant moments in Russian history. The end of the Soviet dictatorship, however, did not lead immediately to the creation of a Russian democracy. The destruction of autocracy did not result in the immediate emergence of a civil society. The collapse of the Soviet-centralized 'managed economy' neither automatically nor smoothly led to the establishment of a free market economy. Having rejected communism, Russians are now on the verge of damning capitalism. Even those who are most optimistic today about the prospects for social and economic reforms in Russia offer only the faintest echo of the August 1991 euphoria.¹ Obviously, Russia is now in a transitional state. However, it remains unclear where this transition will lead or what is yet to come.

1. See Colton & McFaul 2001, pp. 5ff, McFaul 2000, Kupchan 2000, and Rupnik 1999.

Lurching from one crisis to another, the country now faces many problems and challenges of an economic, social, political and ideological nature. One of the biggest and most fundamental challenges is the search for national identity.

Today's Russians are far from certain as to what kind of country is now emerging from the ruins of one of the last great empires of the 20th century.² For those who inhabit this multicultural country, the changes have been dramatic and painful. Yet the main problem is that Russians are now incapable of defining themselves and their origins. What Russia is dealing with presently is a lack of national self-sufficiency in its people, a kind of emotional and moral emptiness, an inability to identify themselves with, and be proud of, something just and moral. There is a crisis of identity. What on the surface appears to be only an individual emotional problem (the need for the Russian people to regain self-respect, national pride, and national confidence), is, in fact, a large-scale problem affecting the entire nation. There is an urgent need to nurture a new state of the nation, one with the capacity to identify and manifest itself socially and politically.

In this paper, I would like to address the concept of a national vision for Russia, approaching this problem from a methodological (philosophical) point of view. The issue of the highest concern is that of Russian national identity. It seems obvious that what Russia needs today, above all, is to identify itself as a nation. Even if the term 'nation' is used in the traditional, more fundamental sense, meaning a group of people with a shared history and a sense of group identity, it remains unclear what this 'group identity' is and where to find the main criteria that will allow it to be defined. In multi-ethnic Russia, such criteria are used to define nationalities and designate their status by granting or refusing national recognition. Should they be sought in ethnicity, blood ties, and cultural affiliations? Or are they to be found in something determined by 'outer forces' (the *socium*), such as society or state? What is nationalism and how does it refer to national identity? Is national identity possible without promoting nationalism? What is this patriotism that is, according to President Putin, the only valuable and productive basis for creating national identity? Does patriotism always lead to chauvinistic extremism and is it nationalistic by definition? This is the set of questions on which this paper will focus, in an attempt to provide a methodological basis for a more fundamental approach to the concept of national identity for Russia.

2. The People's Republic of China can be counted as the single last great empire that retains its power in the 21st century.

2. The Russian National Idea in the Context of Russian Intellectual and Political Discourses

2.1 *Russia's Historical Legacy and the 'Formula' of the Russian Idea*

The issue of Russian national identity is not new for Russia or Russian intellectual discourse. It was first introduced and discussed in terms of what is sometimes grandly called the 'Russian (National) Idea'. Russia is a country in perpetual search for a national idea. This quest goes back to the turmoil of the Middle Ages when, after the failure of Constantinople, an influential Orthodox monk, Philotheus of Pskov, proclaimed Moscow and Muscovy to be the 'Third Rome', the successor to Rome and Constantinople that was to serve as the guardian of Christ's truth and its purity.³ The prophecy ran further: 'there will never be a fourth', that is, the Russian Empire would endure until the end of the world. This dictum served as a sort of messianic national idea that justified the Tsarist Empire and the superiority of Russia and Russians to other countries and nations. Attempting to further increase the political and military strength of the state and to consolidate the unity of its citizens, Tsar Nicholas I (1825–1855) replaced the initial dictum in the 19th century with the triad 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality'.⁴ For those who thought this formula too vague, Count Alexander Benckendorff, the chief of the secret police, issued clarifying interpretive guidelines that emphasized Russia's greatness and its historical vocation in his well-known words: 'Russia's past was amazing, its present is more than marvelous, and

3. It is worth mentioning that by proclaiming Moscow to be the Third Rome, Philotheus of Pskov, also known as *starets* Filofej, had no intention of sketching out a new state theory or taking part in creating an imperial national idea. Rather, this concept was introduced as a purely religious idea meant to promote the independence and 'holy' messianic role of the Russian Orthodox Church. Over time, however, the dictum gained political and social significance, becoming an ideological theory justifying the empire and the imperial national idea. Such a drastic change in the character of the dictum has led some scholars to conclude that the 'Moscow – Third Rome' theory 'was elaborated in the nineteenth century by conservatives to legitimize absolute autocracy, ... rather than [being] the original product of the sixteenth century *starets* Filofej'. Cornelia Soldat, in: Franz 2002, p. 301. See also van den Bercken 1999, pp. 145–167. This approach is perhaps quite plausible and realistic, especially if the dictum is interpreted in terms of the imperial idea. Yet, this analysis does not appear to be unconditionally sound. Contemporary scholarship is still unable to arrive at a final conclusion concerning the dictum's origin and its historical development. It should, however, be clear that an eschatological idea of 'Moscow – Third Rome' does have the potential to evolve into an imperial nationalistic idea.

4. The term 'nationality' is used here in the meaning of '*narodnost*'.

as for the future, it is greater than anything the wildest imagination could picture; that is the point of view for examining and writing Russian history'. Hence no room was left to doubt the greatness of Russia. Pride in the country and *imperial* patriotism were introduced and promoted as central concepts that built and unified the national vision at that time. These concepts also laid the framework for approaching Russian history, its past, present and future.⁵ For decades, Nicholas I's formula worked well, justifying and strengthening the Russian monarchy and its obsession with power and status. It also left its mark on the development and vocabulary of 19th century Russian philosophy and Russian intellectual discourse.

It is somewhat paradoxical that at the time of Nicholas I, when the persecution of advanced ideas had reached its height,⁶ critically propounded social and political concepts and theories came to life. The deeply felt need for modernization found its expression in intense intellectual debates on fundamental issues regarding the philosophy of history, such as the meaning of history, the notion of progress, as well as more concrete questions concerning Russia's place in universal history. The need for modernization stemmed from an increasing awareness of the disparity between Russia's political power and its social backwardness, as well as from the disintegration of Russia's eclectic culture taking place at that time. Divided into two conceptually opposed intellectual streams, *Westernism* and *Slavophilism*, Russian intellectuals were occupied with the problem of Russia's 'whence and whither'. Westernism linked universal progress to the rationalization of society, and the progress of Russia to developing its national identity in accordance with the European (Western) pattern. In contrast, Slavophilism was strongly opposed to all things Western and deeply believed in the uniqueness of the Russian legacy and its messianic future. Hence, in the middle of the 19th century, the means to define Russia's national identity became the focus of a passionate search for the meaning of history.

A strong practical motif within Slavophilism was the urge to comprehend and define what is often called the 'Russian spirit', as well as to foster the spread of a Russian national identity in the multinational Tsarist Empire. As a well-established theory, the philosophy of Slavophilism surfaced in the 1830s. However, as a distinctive worldview [*Weltanschauung*], it existed

5. About the development of the 'national idea' in 18th century Russia and the use and abuse of the national idea in Russian history, see Volodina 2001.

6. Nicholas I was not the first Russian monarch to condemn freethinking among the Russian intellectuals. For decades prior, those who belonged to the 'Russian Enlightenment' were severely punished, even when they simply cited philosophical sources that attempted to criticize the political status quo.

in the national and social mind long before it was crystallized in public doctrines.⁷ It was Peter the Great who unconsciously awoke these latent, unexpressed Slavophile feelings and moralities when he charmed the chieftains of Western European industry to follow his trail into Muscovy and regenerate on Russian soil.

The Slavophiles declared that Russia had true freedom, faith and brotherhood, which other (Western) lands sadly lacked. It also had an ancient and splendid heritage of a communal life and land system, wherein the inherent justice of the Russian peasant's heart was exemplified by the voluntary and brotherly division of land among his fellow countrymen. While the Westernists believed that an 'integral worldview' and a unified vision of historical progress was the essential framework by which to theorize Russia's legacy and destiny, the Slavophiles strove to promote *sobornost'*, Russian spirituality in the purity of its origin, as the unique Russian identity and the only means of escaping Western decline. In Russian, the term '*sobornost'*' means 'togetherness', 'spirit of communality' and has theological origins and connotations. It accounts for the spiritual experience of religious faith in its purest form, namely Russian Orthodoxy. The Slavophiles introduced this Orthodox spirit of organic 'togetherness', uncontaminated by Western rationalism and immorality, as the only model for Russian society and as an ideal for mankind. The Slavophiles thereby laid the foundations for a distinctively Russian tradition of cultural and religious messianism, one which includes Dostoevskij (especially his political writings), the Pan-Slavist and Eurasian movements, and the apocalyptic visions of Nikolaj Berdjaev.

It would be incorrect, however, to assign only a preliminary role to Slavophilism in elaborating the messianic Russian idea. Prophetism was extremely characteristic of many of the writings of the Moscow Slavophiles, however, it appears in a much more demanding form in texts by (later, non-Slavophile) authors such as Vladimir Solov'ëv and, later, Semën Frank, Sergej Bulgakov and Nikolaj Berdjaev. Furthermore, some of the Slavophiles, working on political issues concerning the Russian state and its role in preserving social order in multi-ethnic Russia, urged the Tsarist state to use its power to eradicate any and all challenges to the supremacy of Russian culture within the boundaries of the Tsarist Empire, as well as to impose the Russian identity on Russia's borderlands.⁸

7. This worldview continues to exist, largely in its more unworded or instinctive form. And although it is not identical to nationalism or messianism as such, many pro-Russian and nationalist-oriented concepts and doctrines are built upon it.

8. Jurij Samarin, for instance, defending Russia's acquisition of the Baltic provinces at the beginning of the 18th century as a 'historically necessary event', argued

Still, there is no agreement among scholars of Russian intellectual history as to whether Slavophilism as an intellectual and philosophical movement was messianic and chauvinistic in its main motifs and concepts, or whether it simply started to foster these ideas in its own depths. Pavel Miljukov observed that the ideas propounded by the members of the original Slavophile circle underwent a process of disintegration and decay in the years following their deaths, as the memory of their original ethical and moral teachings faded, leaving only a residue of chauvinism.⁹ In contrast, some scholars point out that the Slavophiles shared a rather generously-minded sense of national identity, one which emphasized the value of Russia's historical legacy.¹⁰ Whatever the rights and wrongs of this complex debate, it is nevertheless clear that there were sentiments in the writings of at least some Slavophile thinkers, such as Jurij Samarin and Ivan Aksakov, which leaned toward fostering the use of state power to promote a program of 'Russification' designed to marginalize the influence of non-Russian minorities (such as the Poles and the Baltic Germans) within the Tsarist Empire.¹¹ Yet the messianic and chauvinistic ideas had just taken shape in the writings of the Slavophiles and were developed a few decades later by Russian religious philosophers. In contrast, the imperial or totalitarian tendency in its well-established form was a central topic in Slavophile intellectual discourse. It asserted the primacy of generalization and unification as tools for the religious and historical transformation of reality. This tendency was introduced and developed under various names, such as *sobornost'*, *celostnost'* [integrality, wholeness], 'national unity', 'national identity', etc., and promoted the ideals of autocracy and imperial nationalism. These ideals proved to be extremely durable in Russian history, leading to ideocracy and totalitarianism in the first half of the 20th century.

Both Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin actively promoted the national idea for Bolshevik Russia. Although it was introduced as a fundamentally novel idea, it was, in fact, not new at all. No matter how paradoxical it may appear, the idea of Bolshevik Russia was inherited from the Tsarist Empire.

that this region should be fully integrated into the administrative structures of the Tsarist Empire. Even though he rejected the complete Russification of these provinces as a general policy, he believed that its weaker model, namely an administrative and legal uniformity, was necessary.

9. See Miljukov 1918. For a very similar view on the Moscow Slavophiles, see Hughes 1993, pp. 66–68.

10. See Raeff 1968, Riasanovskij 1952, Walicki 1975.

11. See, for instance, Samarin, 'Letters from Riga,' in: idem 1877–1911, vol. 7, pp. 16–18; cf. Aksakov, vol. 3, pp. 30–31, 88–92.

The wily communist ideologues took Tsar Nicholas I's slogan and simply modified it. Orthodoxy was replaced with Marxism (in later versions, Marxism-Leninism), autocracy with the leader's iron rule, and nationality [*narodnost'*] remained in place. For more than seven decades of the Soviet regime, the iron fist wielded by men of steel was the dominant ideology governing life in the multinational empire. The historical social project (communism and its design) was supposed to be the idea that would unify the people and give them some sense of national pride and self-respect.

2.2 The Search for a National Idea in Post-Soviet Russia

After destroying communism and dismantling the Soviet empire, the Russians found themselves in an 'ideological vacuum': the old national idea had collapsed and a new one had not yet been created. The people lost their national identity and national vision.

It is obvious that the country is in need of a new national idea. One of the major motivations for developing a national idea is the need to combat the 'psychological depression' that has taken hold of the Russian people; pessimism and social apathy stem from lacking a sense of national self-sufficiency. Some analysts also point to the lack of a 'mobilizing ideology' as another reason to account for Russia's dejected state. The crisis of national identity is so deep that people are unable to define themselves or their origins. They speak of the Russian 'complex', a simultaneous sense of superiority and inferiority with respect to the West¹²: superiority, insofar as Westerners supposedly cannot grasp the depth and complexity of the Russian soul, and inferiority, because Russia clearly lags so far behind materially. This is perhaps the same complex that lies behind the messianic streak that periodically grips Russian society. This is also the complex that results from a lack of national self-esteem and self-sufficiency. It reflects the inability of Russians to redefine themselves and their place in this new historical and social situation. Restoring a Russian sense of identity and national pride has become, therefore, a burning issue in present-day Russia. It is introduced and discussed in terms of the search for a new national creed and a new national idea.

The notion of a national idea is not completely new for post-Soviet Russia. Shortly after his victory in the 1996 elections, President Boris Yeltsin convened a meeting of top Kremlin advisers, academics, and other prominent members of society to come up with visions for a possible 'Idea

12. The West remains the measure of Russia's success; it is the same marker of success that has obsessed Russia and Russian leaders since Peter the Great.

for Russia'.¹³ However, after a brief flurry of activity, this project petered out and was eventually shelved. President Vladimir Putin, with the aid of Gleb Pavlovskij,¹⁴ his main strategist and adviser, put the concept of a national vision for Russia back on the political agenda. Believing that reforms in Russia needed to have a unified theme, he emphasized the need to create a new national idea that would be based on 'patriotism in the most positive sense of the concept.' Following the main principles of Gleb Pavlovskij's 'Russian project', Putin has insisted on creating a national idea free of ethnic connotations; that is, an idea for Russia that will be able to unify not only those who are Russian according to national affiliation, but all those who live in the country. Putin's revival of the scheme is largely seen as an interesting point for discussion, but most observers, including some Western political and social analysts, either emphasize the dangers associated with such a plan or believe it is impossible to achieve. Critics of the scheme can be divided into three camps according to their positions and main arguments against Putin's (Pavlovskij's) proposal and the concept of a national idea for Russia:

1. There are those who understand the need for a unifying concept, but are concerned with the danger of heavy nationalist overtones. They believe that the patriotism emphasized by Putin is a kind of national patriotism; an *imperial* patriotism that calls for nationalism and promotes the domination of one nation over all others.¹⁵
2. Some liberals and their supporters dismiss Putin's proposal altogether, pointing out that a Presidential request for a unified national idea essentially means creating some kind of national ideology for Russia. They warn that a proposal for a state ideology actually contradicts the Russian Constitution which protects (and guarantees) a plurality of ideologies over a single national ideology for the country.

13. Of course, Yeltsin's initiative was heavily influenced by the Russian intellectual and philosophical tradition and its passionate search for a Russian idea as a means to define Russia's national spiritual identity.

14. In March 2000, Gleb Pavlovskij, chief adviser to President Vladimir Putin, proposed a project for centralizing Russian power, naturally, in Putin's hands. Pavlovskij was exceedingly forceful in pushing this project forward during 2000 and up until mid-2001. Although the project focused primarily on economic and political reforms and transformations, ideologically it was supposed to promote the creation of a national idea, or as Pavlovskij put it, a 'Russian national idea'. At the end of 2001, this part of the project obtained an independent status. Now it is known as 'the Russian project'.

15. This position is most clearly represented by radical (or ultra-) liberals who see in 'national' patriotism a source for chauvinist extremism.

3. Some fear that in a state as diverse as Russia, where people exist on so many different social, regional and ethnic-cultural layers, it is impossible to conceive of a common idea suitable for everyone.¹⁶ It is simply unrealistic to formulate an idea of national identity in a society as complex as Russia.

Although these positions appear to be very critical of Putin's project, arguing against it and offering different reasons for rejecting it, they are not wholly opposed to the concept of a national idea for Russia. Rather, the great polyphony of positions and opinions reflects the lack of new conceptual foundations for approaching this issue. The new social and political context requires that a new conceptual framework be created, one that can be used to approach current social and political issues. Those who are active in politics in present-day Russia understand very well the great political and social challenge that Russia is now facing. Russia must redefine itself, must renounce ideocracy and totalitarianism once and for all, as well as past messianic and chauvinistic pretensions, and must start building a society in which the welfare and rights of the individual (of *each, single* individual independent of his ethnic, national or social affiliation) are respected, protected, and guaranteed. This is an unprecedented historical undertaking of great, novel character that involves not only the dismantling of old political and social structures that well served autocracy and totalitarianism, but also the redefinition of basic notions and concepts that are used to theorize social and political issues.

It should be clear that this project does not only involve redefining the vocabulary that is used in discussions on such issues; rather, it is about redefining a substantial context that has changed dramatically. The content of the old concepts of state, civil society, nation, nationality, and nationalism has been devalued and exhausted by pro-ideocratic and pro-autocratic use. In post-Soviet Russia these concepts should first be reintroduced in their authentic and adequate meanings; only then can they be applied to the new social reality.

In current political and social debates in Russia, it is evident that there is a tendency to recycle the old notions and concepts and put them to work in today's situation. Not only is this unproductive, it is also dangerous in terms of unstable political relations and social ties that are just becoming visible. This conceptual and factual discrepancy that exists today is one of the main

16. This position is represented, for instance, by the members of 'Scenarios for Russia', a group that examines what the country might look like in 15 years. Denis Dragunskij, a prominent author and journalist, is the speaker and one of the founding members of this group.

obstacles encountered when dealing with issues of Russian national identity. The challenge is thus to 'rediscover' the concepts of 'nation' and 'national identity' and to redefine them in terms of the full complexity of the new political and social situation in which today's Russia is entrenched. It is worth clarifying first what the term 'nation' means, then looking at how 'nation' and 'national identity' were defined in Soviet Russia.

3. The Concept of Nation and the Soviet Definition of Nationalities

The concepts of nation and nationality are relatively new – at least in the sense in which they are understood and used today. Most scholars agree that the term 'nation' in its current, general meaning has only been in use since the late 18th century. The political significance of the term developed step-by-step with the advancement and growth of the concept itself. Nation and nationality became the focus of political thought, thus explaining why the study of nations was seen as being primarily concerned with the political structures and processes of modern states and was, until recently, carried out principally by political scientists. In contrast, social anthropologists mainly concerned themselves with so-called traditional societies or with minorities within nation-states. The situation, however, has changed of late; political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists have begun to focus on the relationship between ethnic groups and nations. Their main interest has shifted to the relationship between ethnicity and nationality.

It has been argued that the ethnic group is a stage in the development of all nations.¹⁷ In a similar vein, ethnicity has been understood as 'a form of stagnant nationalism which may eventually ... become manifest as nationalism.'¹⁸ Essentially, the major difference between ethnicity and nationalism is seen in their different relationships to the state. The former socialist multi-ethnic states actively promoted conferring nationality status to some ethnic groups within their borders. This policy had very important consequences for local understandings of national identity. However, the literature on these issues often ignored or paid little attention to this new development. For some time, ethnicity was mainly related to self-definition, while nationality was associated with whatever group the state decided one belonged to.¹⁹

17. See Smith 1986.

18. Eriksen 1991, p. 265.

19. See Gladney 1991.

Discussions on ethnicity or nationalism, as far as the anthropologist is concerned, focus primarily on questions of ethnic or national identity. Yet many scholars have failed to question the basic premise of such terms as 'ethnicity' and 'nationality'. In social science literature, 'ethnicity' is used as an analytical tool. Ethnicity, as a concept, is closely linked to what Linnekin and Poyer call a Western ethno-theory, which, they argue, is based on the premise that cultural affiliations reflect blood ties and have a predetermined quality of inevitability.²⁰ This theory assumes that one is a certain person because one was born as such, and that membership in a certain group is thus determined at birth and can never be changed. This is only one of many possible models with which to conceptualize and experience cultural difference and similarity. Different people have different ideas about the sort of criteria that may be used to define what kind of person one is or what group of people one belongs to. Both national and ethnic identity depend on ascription (i.e. self-definition) and description (i.e. definition by others). People define and construct their identities according to their own experiences and perceptions locally, in interaction with and in relation to members of neighboring groups and with respect to official state classifications.²¹ For the sake of the argument proposed in this paper, it is useful to examine the concept of national identity that was cultivated in Soviet Russia.

A typical feature of multi-ethnic socialist states (such as the former Soviet Union) was the prominent role of the state in defining nationalities within its borders. This objectification of national identity was realized 'through conferring nationality status or contesting the group's ethnicity by refusing recognition'.²² In the Soviet multi-ethnic state, 'national policy' was one of the tools employed by the state to legitimize and strengthen its structure and, thus, its power. In contrast to the West, where ethnic and national identities can be imagined and manipulated by individuals and communities, in socialist regimes, the state does the imagining; the people have only to contest, resist, or acquiesce.

A key concept within socialist national policy is denoted by the terms 'nation' [*nacija* or *narod* in Russian] and 'nationality' [*nacionalnost*]. Both terms are most commonly translated as 'ethnic group' in Western literature. As several scholars have noted, this has led to some confusion among English speakers, given that one's 'nationality' in the multi-ethnic socialist

20. See Linnekin & Poyer 1990.

21. See Harrell 1990.

22. Gladney 1991, p. 76.

state was a state-assigned status.²³ However, there is a hierarchy of national categories and the Russian term closest to the idea of 'ethnic group' is *narodnost*'. From a Marxist viewpoint, a *narodnost*' is smaller than a *narod*, does not have a working class of its own, and exists only in relation to the larger nation.

The concept of 'nationality' in a socialist state differs significantly from the concept as it is understood within Western Europe, America, and other capitalist countries, where citizenship and nationality are synonymous, and nationality refers to the affiliation of a person to a particular state. In the multi-ethnic socialist state, national identity is different from, and exists in addition to, citizenship. On an individual level, it leaves room for manipulation and choice, since self-ascription and self-identification are the ultimate decisive factors. It is not necessarily a question of a person's 'home' state or place of residence. It is, in short, an identity a person can either inherit or adopt.²⁴ These conceptual differences, and not only the role of the state in conferring nationality status to ethnic groups, are keys to understanding the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in Russia and all other former socialist states.

As part of their 'nationalities policy', the former socialist states employed a hierarchy of 'national' categories, according to which people were representatively grouped together and then collectively granted (or denied) national rights. The Soviet Union was a multinational federation with a three-tier system of national rights: 1) the '*nations* of the USSR' [*nacii* or *narody Sovetskogo Sojuz*], 2) the '*nationalities* of the USSR' [*narodnosti Sovetskogo Sojuz*], and 3) the '*other* nationalities and *ethnic groups*'. The 1989 official Soviet census listed over 100 nations and nationalities within the Soviet Union. Each had its own history, culture and language and each possessed its own sense of national identity and national consciousness. The position of each nation and nationality in the Soviet Union's national hierarchy depended to a large degree on size, the percentage of people who used the national language as their primary language, the degree of integration within Soviet society, and the nation/nationality's territorial-administrative status. The various nationalities differed greatly in size. On the one hand, the Russians, constituting 50.8 percent of the population, numbered approximately 145 million in 1989. On the other hand, one half of the nationalities listed in the census taken together accounted for only 0.5 percent of the total population, most counting fewer than

23. See Gladney 1991, and Bromley & Kozlov 1989.

24. See Shanin 1989.

100,000 people. Only 22 nations and nationalities had more than 1 million people each.

At that time, 15 nations existed as union republics; together, they comprised the federation known as the Soviet Union. The nations having union republic status commanded more political and economic power than other nationalities, and therefore found it easier to maintain their own language and culture. Each of these nations had a 'national home' based in one of the republics and a constitutional right to equal political representation. Their constitutions stated that these republics were the republics of that particular nation. The nations that had a significant political and economic presence in the Soviet Union included the Slavic nations (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians), the Baltic nations (Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians), the nations of the Caucasus (Armenians, Georgians, and Azeri), the Central Asian nations (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tadzhiks, and Turkmen), and the Moldavians.

Seven ethnic groups were officially recognized as '*nationalities*' [*narodnosti*], the largest of these being the Tatars, Jews, Chuvash, Bashkirs, and Mordvins. None of these nationalities had 'nation' status, yet each occupied a significant position in the complex fabric that made up the multinational Soviet state, due to either a large population (each numbered over 1 million people in the 1989 census) or some other critical factor (such as having played a crucial role in the historical and social development of Russian society). These nationalities each had their own territorial unit, either an autonomous republic, autonomous region [*okrug*] or autonomous district [*oblast'*]. The remaining (so-called 'other') nationalities and ethnic groups did not have territorial units of their own and, in most cases, constituted minorities within the Russian Republic.²⁵

The category of '*narod*' was heavily influenced by Stalin's definition of 'nation', which characterized it as 'a historically formed and stable community of people which has emerged on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, the latter being manifested in a common shared culture'.²⁶ These four criteria outlined by Stalin in his 'national policy' were the main guidelines that shaped the Soviet federal

25. About two dozen other nationalities and numerous subgroups reside in the Caucasus region alone. Most of these nationalities live in the Dagestan Autonomous Republic, located to the northeast of the Caucasus Mountains in the Russian Republic. In 1989, the people of this autonomous republic, numbering over 2 million, ethnically and linguistically constituted one of the most diverse populations in the world. (See data on the 1989 census in *Natsionalnyj sostav naselenija, Čast' II* (Moskva, 1990).

26. Bromley & Kozlov 1989, p. 426.

state's attitude towards its various ethnic communities, including nationalities and nations. It is helpful to consider some important contrasts between the term '*nacija*' and the term '*narod*', which are usually translated into English using the single word 'nation'. Both terms are common in Russian and are used frequently in everyday speech, but they are not interchangeable. While the term *narod* is used more generally to refer to 'the people' as a collective unit without any national (ethnic) differences (e.g. *Sovetskij narod* (the Soviet people), *Russkij narod* (the Russian people)), the term *nacija* is used more specifically and refers to ethnic identity (in the sense of national affiliation). Within the Russian context, this ethnic identity (one's *nacija*) is also a person's national identity, whether he or she is a Russian, a Jew, a Tatar, etc.

In the multinational Soviet Union, a person's national identity was of even greater importance than in the Russian Empire. In the USSR, each citizen was officially identified by his or her nationality at birth; one's national identity was inscribed on one's identity cards, including birth certificate and passport. This national (ethnic) affiliation was also the individual's national identity and, in contrast to the situation in some other socialist states (such as Yugoslavia), was permanent, that is, could not be changed for the duration of a person's life.²⁷ The only exception to this provision was made for children of mixed marriages. Parents were required to designate one nationality (typically the father's) for the child until such time (supposedly) as the child was old enough to choose for him- or herself.²⁸ This is the concept of national identity that present-day Russia has inherited from the USSR.

4. Russians: Who Are They? The Phenomenon of Russian National Identity

If you ask someone from outside of Russia 'Who is 'Russian'?', you will be told that a Russian is a person who lives in Russia, and is thus a citizen of Russia. A simple, but incorrect response! A Russian is not simply 'an

27. It was Joseph Stalin who decided in 1934 that ethnicity had to be marked on identification papers, set according to one's parents' ethnicity and could not be challenged or changed. Every Soviet citizen had to provide his or her 'nationality' on all official documents. This was the notorious 'fifth entry' in internal Soviet passports, which has entered Soviet folklore as a symbol of ethnic discrimination, particularly with regard to Jews.

28. In new identification documents (internal Russian passports) issued by the Russian Federation (which have replaced Soviet-era ID papers), all reference to 'nationality' as ethnic identity has been eliminated.

inhabitant or citizen of Russia'. In the Russian language, there is a specific word that is used to represent this designation: *Rossijanin* (an inhabitant of Russia and a citizen of the Russian Federation). *Russkij* [Russian] has a different meaning, especially for those who are non-Russians: 'Russian' is a designation of nationality, existing in addition to notions of citizenship and place of residence. Since socialist and communist 'national policies' always emphasized the ethno-racial nature of nationality, national affiliation became mainly an ethnic characteristic. However, because they lack a national state 'area' or 'territory' to which they are tied, whether it be physically or psychologically, and, thus, also lack a national self-consciousness, those possessing ethnic identities other than 'Russian' find it difficult to define themselves as people *of Russia*.

Furthermore, even people defined as 'Russians' in census and passport entries have difficulty recognizing themselves as affiliated with the Russian nation. This problem will not be resolved by simply assigning a Russian designation to individuals (or by individual self-assignment as such). It should first be defined what it means to be Russian and where the borders of the Russian nation lie. These questions are very complex and implicate a great number of political and social issues of both a theoretical and practical character. The task is not just in finding an adequate term or correct definition for something that already exists; it is rather about 'creating' the Russian nation.

Neither the Tsarist Empire nor the USSR undertook the building of a specifically *Russian* nation. At the same time, the Russian state, the standard-bearer of the 'Russian Idea', never allowed periodically emerging 'Russian' social and civil structures to exist or function autonomously. Citizens were kept from organizing themselves spontaneously outside of state-sanctioned lines. Russian identity was constructed by the state to fit the mould and borders of the empire as a supra-national imagined community. In this manner, Russians have been oppressed much more than other groups in other nations that have also suffered under autocracy and totalitarianism, for instance the Serbs, who, after a century of independence, finally succeeded in founding Yugoslavia as a nation [*narod*]. The attitude of Russians towards their state, as well as their view of themselves, has traditionally been shaped by the existence of the empire (not just a state, but an all-powerful *imperial state*).

Some scholars argue that Russians have failed to acquire a properly developed ethnic national identity as opposed to, or in addition to, their imperial 'Soviet' personality. Without a doubt, Soviet political authoritarianism and social oppression heavily contributed to the 'twisted' Russian national identity. The Soviet reality, however, is not solely to blame for this unfortunate development, which can be explained in a more fundamental

way. In the absence of necessary political freedoms and civil society, civil identity, which is based on inclusive citizenship, could not emerge among the different peoples of the empire.²⁹ This peculiarity of Russia and the Russian situation was well understood by those Russian thinkers belonging to the first wave of emigration. Echoing the Slavophiles, they believed that Russians created a new, unique type of community, in which people of different ethnic origins and cultural and religious backgrounds co-existed peacefully, retaining their essential ethnic characteristics. This argument was adopted and developed further by Soviet ideologists who propagated a so-called 'new community of the united Soviet people'. As a result, only a small number of those who live in Russia today look upon the Russian Federation as their 'homeland' since the latter was never promoted as such in the Soviet era. Many Russians saw the entire USSR, rather than the Russian Federation (RSFSR), as their homeland. They simply ignored the fact that they lived in a multi-ethnic empire. The borders of the huge Soviet empire served for them as the 'just' borders of the Russian state. This had a very negative impact on establishing ethnic national identity: since there was no demand to be specifically identified within the multi-ethnic community (the USSR), the cultivation or nurturing of single nations was not undertaken at that time. After the demise of the Soviet Union, it was persistently believed that Russians were ultimately an imperial nation and could survive as a distinct community only within some form of union. At the same time, politicians and intellectuals, who argued that the time had come for Russians to put the 'imperial temptation' behind them and build a modern national state, could not agree on matters involving the geography of the state and membership of particular nations.

Post-communist ideological imperialism is best represented by neo-Eurasianism,³⁰ which emerged in the early 1980s and gained momentum in the first half of the 1990s. Neo-Eurasianists see Russia's future as exclusively imperial. As the philosopher Jurij Borodaj put it: 'I can say frankly and openly that I am an imperialist; I believe in the resurrection of the Russian state after Golgotha.'³¹ The imperialists' project and the first necessary step towards recreating a full-fledged union on the territory of the

29. See Hosking 1997.

30. This group reiterates the ideas of an immigrant intellectual movement of the 1920s known as Eurasianism. The Eurasianists argued that a unique civilization of 'Russia-Eurasia' emerged from the different nations of the Russian empire. The distinct features of this civilization lie neither in its European, nor its Asiatic, nature; rather, this civilization possesses the most advanced characteristics of both cultures.

31. *Naš Sovremennik*, 7 (1992), p. 130.

Soviet Union is to incorporate into the Russian state the non-Russian newly independent states wherein Russians and those who speak Russian as their first language constitute a majority. In 1994–1995, the tendency to include Russian speakers living outside the borders of the Russian Federation into the Russian nation became very popular among some high-ranking politicians. The idea that all Russian speakers conceive of the Russian Federation as their homeland and that the Russian government must protect them from discrimination formed the core of Yeltsin's foreign policy towards non-Russian independent states (former Soviet Republics). By 1995 it was clear that any swift recreation of the union was not going to be forthcoming. Some Russian intellectuals abandoned their pro-Soviet sentiments and turned to the East Slavic lands, claiming the creation of a Slavic state as their ultimate goal. In the political establishment, this idea was used to justify the need to form social, political, and economic ties with Belarus and Ukraine.³²

Both the pro-Soviet and pro-Slavic variants of ideological imperialism have their roots in either the pre-revolutionary empire or the Soviet past, and their advocates draw on concepts which were developed for entirely different circumstances. For this reason, imperial ideology is unable to furnish a concept of national identity that fits into the contemporary practical framework. However, because it promotes a rather generous-spirited and non-extremist sense of national identity (at least in the forms in which it exists in present-day Russia), the imperial ideology continues to enjoy more popularity, especially among politicians and intellectuals, than does the ideology of pro-nationalist groups and movements.

The proliferation of nationalist groups in the post-communist period clearly indicates that another tendency, one involving the promotion of nationalist ideology, has also gained popularity.³³ Nationalist ideology, rather than being central to official politics and social life, exists on the margins of Russian political and intellectual discourses. However, because of the populist character of nationalist propaganda, nationalist groups attract a substantial amount of media attention and often win the sympathy of some sections of the population, particularly those who live in the country's central regions, where significant numbers of refugees from non-Russian independent states

32. From 1997 to 2000, twelve different charters and contracts were signed with respect to unions with the two Slavic states.

33. This tendency is best represented by the Russian Party and its leader Nikolaj Bondarik, by some members of the National Republican Party of Russia and one of its unofficial speakers, Nikolaj Lysenko, as well as by Vladimir Žirinovskij's Liberal Democratic Party.

and provinces have fled. Nationalist leaders generally try to appeal to popular resentment over the growing wave of refugees and exploit people's frustration over economic hardships. Those who advocate an ethnic definition with regard to being Russian argue that Russians, in order to survive, should safeguard themselves from harmful influences of other 'ethnoses', especially the Jews and people from Central Asia. It should be clear that we are dealing here with so-called '*ethnic nationalism*': in order to unite, people have to resort to *ethnos* in absence of other tools. This nationalism is built upon the ethnic definition of a nation as a community of people united by a common culture, religion, language, and shared historical lineage. According to this type of nationalism, national identity is reducible to ethnic identity, identity 'by blood and spirit'³⁴ and cannot be expanded to incorporate any other characteristics. This nationalism is most violent and sometimes concurs with racism.

Ethnic nationalism is opposed by *civic nationalism*, which emerged in Russia in the late 1980s – early 1990s. This kind of nationalism, which is very well-known in the West, is quite new for Russian intellectual discourse.³⁵ Civic nationalism is built upon *civic qualities* used in the West, such as the development of the state, the presence of a civil society, and the modern concept of citizenship. In Russia, civic nationalism made its appearance alongside the introduction of a new idea concerning Russian national identity. This is the idea of a civic Russian [*Rossijskaja*] nation [*narod*], whose members are all citizens of the Russian Federation *regardless* of their ethnic origin and cultural background and are united by loyalty to the newly emerging political institutions and the Constitution.³⁶

The first attempt to forge a composite civic identity among the people of the Russian Federation was undertaken by Yeltsin and his government in the early 1990s. In 1991 Russian citizenship law, neither specifically Russian ethnic characteristics nor a basic knowledge of the Russian language were listed as prerequisites for obtaining Russian citizenship. In addition, the 1993 Russian Constitution referred to the Russian nation [*Rossijskaja nacija*] as a civic (not ethnic) phenomenon, defining it as a community of all citizens of the Russian Federation. This situation changed in the mid-1990s

34. In one interview, N. Bondarik states, 'In Russia, there must be only a Russian government, a Russian parliament consisting of ethnic Russians belonging to the Great Nation by blood and spirit.' (*Reč*, 1 (1994), p. 4).

35. The concept of civic nationalism was not introduced in Russia until the late 1980s, when Western scholarly literature on civic forms of nationalism became accessible and started to be translated into Russian.

36. See Tishkov 1997, p. ix.

when elements of ethnic nationalism regained strength and ethnicity-related issues once again became dominant in Russian political discourse. In official policies from 1994–1996, the Russian nation was again defined as a community of Russian speakers throughout the former USSR, and the search for national identity became a search for common ethnic characteristics among those holding Russian to be their native language.

Putin's policies of the last few years mark a strong return to civic nationalism and civic qualities being the only acceptable ground for a new national creed for Russia and a new national identity for Russians. A new Russian citizenship law currently being proposed reiterates the 1991 citizenship law in making civic characteristics and values the most fundamental requirements for national identity. However, supporters of a civic Russian nation constitute a minority among Russian political and intellectual elites. Moreover, the real situation within the country, i.e. the current level of political and social maturity of the Russian state and especially civil society, does not provide a good foundation for any rapid growth of civic nationalism on Russian soil. Although growth in civic nationalism is dependent upon the development of a modern state, the elements that fuel the continuation of this type of nationalism cannot be merely reduced to the level of state development. State is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for the formation and stabilization of a nation. A nation is a social construction. Therefore, the relative strength or weakness of a society is more critical for a nation and its progress because this is what determines the impact the state and culture will have on individuals and their lives. In other words, the functioning of a society is more important than that of the state, because it is the society, and not the state, that determines the ultimate direction of its members.

It should be clear that societal strength cannot emerge on its own. Being a mediated reflection and manifestation of the presence of civil society, it depends upon the level of development and strength of civil society. According to a common definition, civil society is a 'set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of the society.'³⁷ Clearly, this is unlikely to exist in developed form in the presence of an authoritarian regime. With the collapse of authoritarian rule, there is real potential for a civil society to emerge. However, only if the country or region has some past experience with democratic culture, which is conducive to the development of civil society, can this happen relatively quickly and smoothly.

37. Gellner 1994, p. 5.

Unfortunately, this is not the case with Russia, which has never had an historical experience with democracy, as have some other Eastern European countries that suffered under socialist and communist regimes (such as the Czech Republic and Poland). Hence, the emergence and development of civil society in Russia will run a completely different course than it has in both Western countries and Russia's East European neighbors. Furthermore, this process will likely be notably prolonged in Russia and may be more controversial and painful than it has been elsewhere.

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CIVIL SOCIETY, RELIGION, AND THE NATION

REFLECTIONS ON THE RUSSIAN CASE

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ABSTRACT: Russian culture is marked by a particularly strong predisposition towards introspection, as articulated in its literature, philosophy and spirituality. Hence, the special authority attributed to creative writers and poets as bearers of an inner moral vision. This article seeks to draw out the importance of inner values or an inward orientation for the individual citizen, in whose name civil society is generally promoted and for whom religion and the nation provide frameworks for flourishing. It argues that it is necessary to distinguish between 'strong' and 'weak' forms of religious affiliation and national affiliation and applies this distinction to specific voluntary sector organizations and pressure groups. The article considers certain implications of the strictly enforced state registration of religious communities, and it picks out recurrent patterns in the Russian Orthodox Church's and the state's treatment of religious minorities. While using Mikhail Epstein's reflections on 'minimal religion' and its relation to the private and the public sphere, the article concludes with a suggestion of how poetics tends to affirm the individual's religious apprehension of the world.

Introduction

The quotation with which I begin these reflections is spoken by a character in Fëdor Dostoevskij's final novel *The Karamazov Brothers*. Foretelling an eventual fundamental change in people's outlook, this character, Mikhail, speaks as follows:

'You ask me when all of this will come about, but first there must be an end to the habit of self-imposed *isolation* [*uedinenie*] of man.' 'What isolation?' I asked him. 'The kind that is prevalent everywhere now, especially in our age, and which has not yet come to an end, has not yet run its course. For everyone nowadays strives to dissociate himself as much as possible from others, everyone wants to savor the fullness of life for himself, but all his best efforts lead not to fullness of life but to total self-destruction, and instead of ending with a comprehensive evaluation of his being, he rushes headlong into complete isolation. For everyone has dissociated himself from everyone else in our age, everyone has disappeared into his own burrow, distanced himself from the next man, hidden himself and his possessions, the result being that he has

abandoned people and has, in his turn, been abandoned. He piles up riches in solitude and thinks: "How powerful I am now, and how secure", and it never occurs to the poor devil that the more he accumulates, the further he sinks into suicidal impotence. For man has come used to relying on himself alone, and has dissociated himself from the whole; he has accustomed his soul to believe neither in human aid, nor in people, nor in humanity; he trembles only at the thought of losing his money and the privileges he has acquired. Everywhere the human mind is beginning arrogantly to ignore the fact that man's true security is to be attained not through the isolated efforts of the individual, but in a corporate human identity [*v ljudskoj obščej celostnosti*]. But it is certain that this terrible isolation will come to an end, and everyone will realize at a stroke how unnatural it is for one man to cut himself off from another.¹

There are seven strands to the argument set out in these reflections. These strands address the following matters: (1) Russia's culture of introspection; (2) Russian writers and the question of 'Who speaks for Russia?'; (3) religious affiliation and national affiliation within Russia's voluntary sector; (4) history and the Russian Orthodox Church; (5) Mikhail Epstein's 'minimal religion', the private sphere and the public sphere; (6) the market, market pressures and the authority of Russian writers; (7) poetics affirming religious apprehension. Like my first quotation, many, though not all, of my chosen examples and source materials come from the 19th and 20th centuries.

Beginning with what I call Russia's culture of introspection and ending with a section on 'poetics affirming religious apprehension', which strives to be close in spirit to Andrew Shanks' 'theological poetics',² I seek to affirm the inherent worth of the individual citizen (whether religious believer, agnostic or hard-line secularist) *in whose name* civil society is usually promoted, and to consider her/his perspective and experience in interacting with the community around her/him, whether supported by the dynamics of a nascent civil society or acting in their absence. It seemed important, along the way, to take account of the highly positive status attributed to the creative writer and the poet in Russia specifically *as bearers of moral responsibility* and, likewise, to give due weight to the history of the country and of the Russian Orthodox Church in particular. What I write on voluntary sector organizations, NGOs and pressure groups, is intended to highlight some contrasting kinds of religious affiliation and national affiliation in late-Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. All of this, including Mikhail Epstein's and Zygmunt Bauman's contributions to contemporary debate

1. Dostoevskij 1994, pp. 379–380; for the Russian, see Dostoevskij 1972, pp. 275–276.

2. Shanks 2001.

on the 'public sphere' and the 'private sphere', is describable through the metaphor of 'cultural landscape'. Then, in the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins's notion of 'inscape' I found an eminently suitable way to affirm the individual's recognition of *inwardness*, the positive and negative aspects of which provide the 'dynamic' for all of Dostoevskij's fiction.

1. Russia's Culture of Introspection: In Literature, Spirituality and Philosophy

Having begun with Dostoevskij's highly didactic reflections on the self-imposed isolation of individuals, portrayed so memorably in the character Raskolnikov in the mid-1860s, I feel that it would be useful to present three other models of individual *inward-orientation* which could be deemed significant for Russian culture. I have in mind the following: firstly, a short poem by the Romantic-inspired poet Fëdor Tjutčev (1803–1873), which very emphatically affirms the worth of the individual's inner life; secondly, a model of inwardness very different in kind from the Romantic-inspired model of Tjutčev and which, crucially, was never intended to be individualistic, namely, the monastic type of contemplative inwardness of Hesychast spirituality, using regular repetition of a short prayer known as the 'Jesus Prayer'; then, thirdly, individualism and the conscious, deliberate acceptance of individualistic values as a reaction against the enforced collectivism of the Soviet period. For this third mode of affirming the individual I turn to Joseph Brodskij's collection of essays *On Grief and Reason*, written in English and published in 1996, the year of the poet's death.

In translation, Fëdor Tjutčev's poem 'Silentium' reads as follows:

Speak not, lie hidden and conceal
the way you dream, the things you feel.
Deep in your spirit let them rise,
akin to stars in crystal skies
that set before the night is blurred:
delight in them and speak no word.

How can a heart expression find?
How should another know your mind?
Will he discuss what quickens you?
A thought once uttered is untrue.
Dimmed is the fountainhead when stirred:
Drink at the source and speak no word.

Live in your inner self alone.
Within your soul a world has grown,

the magic of veiled thoughts that might
 be blinded by the outer light,
 drowned in the noise of day, unheard. ...
 Take in *their* song, and speak no word.³

Brodskij's essay, 'Spoils of War', is not as obviously inward-looking as Tjutčev's poem; nevertheless, here we find an attempt to describe a certain mindset. The mindset which Brodskij describes is directed towards two goals: the goal of nourishing the individual and that of wholly undercutting and rendering obsolete or 'beside the point' the *official*, imposed account of reality. My quotation from Brodskij's essay reads as follows:

(...) And the more I think of it, the more I become convinced that this *was* the West (...) I may even insist that we were the real Westerners, perhaps the only ones. With our instinct for individualism fostered at every instance by our collectivist society, with our hatred towards any form of affiliation, be that with a party, a block association or, at that time, a family, we were more American than the Americans themselves. And, if America stands for the outer limit of the West, for where the West ends, we were, I must say, a couple of thousand miles off the West Coast. In the middle of the Pacific.⁴

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3. *Molči, skryvajsja i tai*
I čuvstva i mečty svoi –
Puskaj v duševnoj glubine
Vstajut i zakhodjat one
Bezmolvno, kak zvezdy v noči, –
Ljubajsja imi i molči.
- Kak serdcu vyskazat' sebja?*
Drugomu kak ponjat' tebja?
Pojmet li on čem ty živeš'?
Mysl' izrečennaja est' lož'.
Vzryvaja, vozmutiš' ključ, –
Pitajsja imi i molči.
- Liš' žit' v samom sebe umej –*
Est' celyi mir v duše tvoej
Tainstvenno-volšebnykh dum;
Ikh oglušit naružnij šum,
Dnevnye razgonjat luči, –
Vnimaj ikh pen'ju – i molči.

F. Tjutčev, 'Silentium!', in: Tiutchev 1957, p. 126; translation by Vladimir Nabokov (Nabokov 1985, pp. 27–28).

4. Brodsky 1996, pp. 13–14.

The culture of introspection among Russians should very definitely be considered as a factor in our discussion. As my argument unfolds, I trust that it will become clearer just why that is so. I refer not only to the deeply introspective works of Dostoevskij and Tolstoj, but also to the philosophical writings of Lev Šestov (1866–1938) who demonstrated a singularly sustained concentration on the inner life of the individual, in the name of a principled resistance to systems-thinking in general and – apparently – to the point of excluding all social and political philosophy whatsoever.

2. In Conditions of Social Decline or Disruption, Who is Entitled to ‘Speak for Russia’?

In an essay entitled ‘Self-Knowledge’ [*Samopoznanie*] B.P. Vyšeslavcev (1877–1936) affirmed the following:

This summons to one’s self sounds loudest of all when danger threatens an individual or a people, when a culture encounters the threat of decline.⁵

Dostoevskij’s creative imagination was uniquely well attuned to the tensions of cultural decline; indeed, that was his very *subject matter* and also the existential core of his words on the page. Central to his writing was the metaphor of uprootedness. The malaise of uprooted, city-bound and alienated 19th century humankind fuelled his personal ‘furnace of doubts’ and yielded pages as bleak (yet compassionate) as Baudelaire’s *Tableaux Parisiens*,⁶ as he worked to retrieve a Christian vision *for himself and for his readers*.

Here I need to draw attention to the status of the creative writer and the poet in the country. In the 19th century the creative writer and the poet came to acquire a moral stature that might be the envy of writers anywhere and in any age. A civil society was patently lacking, and writers faced the certainty of state and church censorship and the real possibility of prison or internal exile. They came to be seen as speaking for the nation. Writers had the ‘voice’ which uttered criticism in the absence of a civil society and – crucially important – they had a highly expectant and receptive readership, avidly prepared to find authority-challenging *sub-texts* in whatever they read.

5. Vyšeslavcev 1955, ch. 9; the translation here is based on Vysheslavtsev 1994, p. 257.

6. See the 1861 edition, and subsequent editions, of Baudelaire’s *Les Fleurs du Mal*.

Aleksandr Solženicyn viewed himself very consciously as heir to that 19th century tradition, no doubt feeling that the position of the independent-minded creative writer in the Soviet Union was every bit as embattled, ‘under siege’ and morally exalted as it had been in the 19th century, if not more so. Solženicyn was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1970. As became clear in his lecture upon accepting the prize, he understood literature as having one key task, that of preserving the *national memory*.⁷ In the situation where a state took active steps to silence authors and poets it remained for other authors and poets to ‘bear witness’ and thus to preserve the national memory. This was imperative, argued Solženicyn, because generations seem unable to learn from history, and seem fated to repeat the historical experience (particularly the mistakes) of foregoing generations. It was Solženicyn’s conviction that if any force on earth could help counter-act the repetition of the mistakes of history, it was literature.

3. The Voluntary Sector and Pressure Groups in Contemporary Russia – Some Religious and National Affiliations

Here I have chosen six specific voluntary sector organizations, NGOs or types of pressure groups from the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods, describing them in terms of their religious and national affiliation or, rather, self-identification. This highlights possible patterns of interrelationship between civil society, religion and the nation, allowing us to avoid unsubstantiated generalizations and heightening our own sense of specific, existing ‘threads’ between our three key terms.

Nočlěžka/Na dne, St Petersburg

This is a ‘single-issue’ campaign organization/charity promoting the interests of homeless people. It comprises a hostel [*nočlěžka*] and reception-point open to all homeless people of the city without distinction, and *Na dne*, a street newspaper, a direct source of income for the homeless people who sell it each week. The campaign is not aligned to any one church, denomination or religion; on the other hand, it is not in itself incompatible with religious affiliation, nor indeed with national affiliation. Specifically, ‘Russian’ identity is not important, though appeals to donors abroad do, in effect, say: “By making a donation to this charity you’ll be helping Russia/ one Russian city to overcome its social problems.” The ‘national’ message

7. Solženicyn 1973; for a Russian edition, see Solženicyn 1995, Vol I, pp. 7–25.

is there, but is not a 'strong' one. The appeal is more general and humanitarian than national. In that sense, the 'civil society' element is dominant. Further, it is worth noting that there is also a globalization element present with this particular organization. The newspaper *Na dne* was created in St Petersburg and was consciously modeled on the award-winning British street paper *The Big Issue*. Like its British counterpart, *Na dne* now belongs to a recently created body called the International Network of Street Papers (INSP). In June 2003 the paper was renamed *Put' domoj* (*The Way Home*).

Open Christianity [Otkrytoe khristianstvo], St Petersburg

This is an educational charity which, at the beginning of the 1990s, made it a central aim to make possible open communication specifically with atheists and, thus, to help create a climate that was tolerant of atheists rather than intolerant, critical or vengeful.⁸ The charity's concern for the well-being of society informed a number of initiatives including the setting up of a school and an adult institute of religious philosophy. It had an Orthodox Church affiliation but not a *strongly* Russian affiliation. In time, the need for a secure source of funds obliged the charity to turn to Western sponsors, and the most ready and generous sponsors were Dutch Protestants. Orthodox Christian observers – and others, including myself – noted a gradual change of ethos within the religious life of the charity: as I was able to observe in May 1993, a conference convened at the charity's headquarters was far more Protestant than Orthodox in feeling. Specifically, the manner in which Bible study was pursued there was Protestant. This religious reorientation dismayed some people in the city, but the criticism which arose on this account was not sufficient to impede the charity's activities. The school and the religious-philosophical institute were widely deemed to be very successful.

Orthodox Brotherhoods and Sisterhoods

The beginning of the post-Soviet period witnessed a revival of the phenomenon of lay brotherhoods and sisterhoods [*bratstva* and *sestričestva*, respectively] within the Russian Orthodox Church.⁹ This manifestation of strong religious commitment among lay believers was taken to be yet one more sign of a religious 'renaissance' in Russia. The brotherhoods and sisterhoods, each under the spiritual direction of a particular priest, were active in such fields as visiting the sick, working as volunteers in hospitals, orphanages and old people's homes, teaching in Sunday Schools and religious

8. On Open Christianity, see Sutton 1996, pp. 21–23, p. 27, p. 31, p. 77 and pp. 106–107.

9. Antic 1992.

publishing. Many of them engaged in, and still engage in, truly useful work. However, the revival of brotherhoods and sisterhoods had itself barely got underway when an exceedingly unfortunate development took place, namely the formation of a centralizing association of brotherhoods, the initiators of which had a distinct political agenda. What took place was a deliberate *politicization* of this historically-rooted lay movement. The political position of those wielding power in the association was extreme, right-wing and openly anti-Semitic. Just how far the Orthodox brotherhoods and sisterhoods are imbued with the association's extreme political views *at a grassroots level* is hard to assess.¹⁰ When describing Orthodox brotherhoods and sisterhoods, one can confidently affirm at least the following two points: firstly, their religious affiliation is 'strong' and very committed; secondly, their charity work is a direct and conscious expression of their religious faith and is inextricable from that faith. Members are highly *likely* to have a 'strong' sense of Russian identity, but not necessarily so. Their politics may be conservative and, in cases, even extremely right-wing, but generalizations regarding this particular point are unreliable.

Memorial

In 1988 this non-governmental organization was founded in order to retrieve, mark and honor the history of those millions who perished in the camps of the Soviet Gulag.¹¹ It is religiously unaligned, though its activity is not *incompatible* with religious affiliation. The 'national' element is present, in the sense that the organization's work is based on the conviction that the nation's health will be restored by retrieving the history of those interned in the camps. *Memorial* is not exclusively 'Russian': the histories of non-Russian peoples of the former Soviet Union are researched and retrieved as assiduously as those of Russians; no distinction is made between Russian and non-Russian victims. Two figures closely associated with the early history of this NGO were Aleksandr Solženitsyn and Andrej Sakharov. The former expressed strongly religious, nationalist and conservative views, the latter expressed secular, non-nationalist and politically liberal views. What does this strong divergence of views tell us about *Memorial*? Is it justifiable or methodologically sound to identify this organization more with Solženitsyn? Or more with Sakharov? Or is it indeed best to 'read' this as evidence of a healthy pluralism within the organization, as I myself am most inclined to do?

10. But see Stella Rock, 2003.

11. *Memorial* (with its regional branches) is listed in Holt Ruffin &c 1996, p. 190.

Memorial, still very active today, was especially active during the four final years of Soviet rule, from 1988–1991, and it acted as an effective pressure group. By documenting the scale of officially enforced injustice, false imprisonment and arbitrary executions stretching across all the decades of Soviet rule, *Memorial's* work represented a challenge to the very basis of the *legitimacy* of the Soviet government. It worked for a *non-selective*, all-inclusive and uncensored reading of Russian/Soviet history in the interests of restoring the nation's health and integrity.

Pamjat'

This organization, whose name means 'memory', emerged in 1979/1980 as a more-or-less official society for the preservation of historical monuments and the recording of local history. From 1982 onwards, this body, together with another kindred association, unofficially used the name *Pamjat'*, and by 1983 had effectively dropped their concern with the preservation of historical monuments, being primarily concerned with the study of history and national culture. In late 1985 this *Pamjat'* became an overtly political organization espousing extreme right-wing, anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist ideas. In this later incarnation it attracted a significantly wider following than seasoned observers of the Soviet scene had thought possible or likely, and was the most high-profile of the growing number of extreme right-wing groups in Russia. With *Pamjat'* it is crucial to emphasize that its members' 'Christian' and 'Orthodox' identity is claimed solely on the basis of how *they* identify *themselves*, for, in the eyes of many (if not most) others, including Orthodox believers, *Pamjat'* members' anti-Semitism alone would be sufficient grounds to bar them from recognition as either 'Christian' or 'Orthodox'.

The entities known as *Memorial* and *Pamjat'* both bear names which implicitly allude to history. What is noteworthy here is the absolute contrast between their respective 'readings' of Russian history. *Memorial* works for a *non-selective, all-inclusive* reading of that history; *Pamjat'*, on the other hand, goes by a reading of Russian history which is *highly selective*, to the extent that properly documented history is almost entirely eclipsed by *mythology*. This more mythological reading of Russia's past is intended to affirm and idealize virtues which are, supposedly, 'Russian'.

Ecology Pressure Groups

Ecology pressure groups of the late Soviet period are highly significant for our cultural survey, for at least four reasons:

1. they reflected the concerns of an uncommonly wide constituency in the Soviet Union, which was appalled by the irresponsible manner in which the Communist Party (CPSU) had handled environmental issues. These

pressure groups consisted of law-abiding citizens (including pensioners) who would not, as far as one can tell, have protested publicly over *any* other issue;¹²

2. the combined 'voice' of these groups became very loud and influential, especially after the Chernobyl accident of 26 April 1986, and contributed significantly to the steady erosion of the Soviet government's authority;
3. the Soviet government had a long-established policy of not releasing any details of natural catastrophes and accidents into the public domain. Because of the abnormally high levels of radiation obviously spreading over northern Europe and Scandinavia, the Chernobyl accident absolutely forced Gorbachev's hand into 'going public'. Gorbachev turned this need to drop official secrecy to long-term and general good effect: having had his hand forced by this calamitous accident after little more than one year in office, Gorbachev saw the potential merits of governmental 'openness' and proclaimed what came to be his historically momentous policy of *glasnost*;
4. the whole theme of the *environmental* health of Russia has a direct connection with themes that were important for Russians at the level of culture. In particular, the Village Prose Writers' movement in literature (writers of the 1960s and 1970s known as *derevenščiki*) expressed, albeit obliquely, a fundamental disenchantment with officially imposed definitions of progress and social well-being, and sought a recovery of rural values and of the moral integrity and simplicity which they believed to exist in country life.¹³ There was also an over-lapping of attitudes among the Village Prose Writers and those of the celebrated literary scholar akad. Dmitrij Likhačev (1906–1999) who, in his last years, spoke increasingly about 'cultural ecology'. Likhačev's definition of this is as follows:

Ecology cannot be restricted only to the tasks of preserving the natural biological environment. No less important for human life is the environment created by the culture of our ancestors. The preservation of the cultural environment is a task no less essential than the preservation of nature's environment. (...)

12. In September 2002 Britain saw a mass demonstration protesting against the government's perceived failure to understand and deal with the problems of rural areas. In this case as well, demonstrators included the elderly and a large number of people who regarded themselves as law-abiding citizens, people who would never have 'taken to the streets' in support of any other issue.

13. On the Village Prose movement see, in particular, Gillespie 1984, as well as Hosking 1980, pp. 50–83.

Thus, there are two sections in ecology: biological ecology and cultural, or moral ecology. (...) Between them there is no deep divide, just as there is no sharply defined border between nature and culture.¹⁴

It is vital to stress the distinction between *strong* and *weak* forms of religious and national affiliation. It emerges that, in order to arrive at a sound methodology regarding *national* self-identification, one has to distinguish between ‘strong’ national self-identification (as in the case of the members of *Pamjat’* and some Orthodox brotherhoods and sisterhoods) and ‘weak’ national self-identification (as in the case of people working for the St Petersburg charity *Nočležka* and members of *Memorial*.)

4. History and the Russian Orthodox Church: Whither *Sobornost’* or Wither *Sobornost’*?

In his book *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture* (1995), the historian Nicolai Petro describes the Russian Orthodox Church as the ‘brake’, the constraining hand, which prevented the rule of at least the early princes of Russia from becoming absolute.¹⁵ As the historical record shows, the Church did not prevent absolutist rule; at best, one could say that it contributed to delaying it, itself becoming subjugated to the needs of the state by Peter the Great’s measures of 1721. Lacking space, here, for a fuller review of church-state relations, I will confine myself to highlighting three revealing episodes which merit discussion.

1652

In 1652 a schism within the Russian Orthodox Church was brought about by the then Patriarch, Nikon, who was determined to introduce certain liturgical reforms based on the liturgical rites of the Greek Orthodox Church. The state and the Russian Orthodox leadership joined forces in immensely heavy-handed, punitive action against the Old Believers, the defenders of the existing, that is Russian, liturgical rite. This punitive action continued in waves right into the 20th century. Right from the outset a numerically significant section of the Orthodox church-going public, which, on the face of it, was conservative, law-abiding and potentially loyal to the state, was profoundly alienated from the authorities and was – quite *unnecessarily* – driven into adopting a position of uncompromising resistance to ‘the center’. The intervention of the state in the enforcement of

14. Cited in Petro 1995, pp. 104–105.

15. op.cit., pp. 28–87.

Patriarch Nikon's liturgical reforms was seen by the Old Believers themselves as nothing other than the work of the Antichrist.

Historical Parallel, 1954–1987

Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev in particular, but effectively right up to the mass release of religious prisoners in February 1987 and thereafter, *all* expressions of religious belief were seen by the Soviet authorities as equally challenging to the *status quo* and, therefore, unacceptable. Too little was done, at official levels, to differentiate between religious denominations or to identify among them degrees of acceptance of the secular norms for society established by the Communist Party. Again, through wholly *unnecessary* heavy-handed, punitive treatment, the government drove very large numbers of law-abiding and potentially 'loyal' citizens into uncompromising resistance. The Soviet authorities' treatment of Baptist communities is particularly revealing. Baptists in the Soviet Union were conspicuous for their sober life-style, law-abiding demeanor and deeply engrained work ethic. What is significant for our present discussion is the Khrushchev administration's hard-line insistence on the state registration of religious communities. Also significant is the way that state registration proved to be *the* issue which, in 1961, split the Baptists of the Soviet Union into two camps. One camp accepted state registration, albeit grudgingly. The other camp moved decisively to a position of uncompromising opposition. It was the *unregistered* Baptist communities who suffered most at the hands of the KGB. State registration of religious communities remains a thorny and much-disputed issue even today. Registration is required in the still-disputed 'Law on Freedom of Conscience and of Religious Associations' of 1 October 1997, and the Russian Orthodox Church sees this as going at least some way towards protecting *its* rights on what it calls 'the canonical territory' of Russia.¹⁶

Taking these two historical episodes into account, one is obliged to note that, in the first (1652) case, Orthodox Church leaders asked for and received the state's *full* assistance in punishing those believers who refused to accept the Greek liturgical rites; in the second (1954–1987) case, Orthodox Church leaders remained consistently and shamefully silent about the facts and the extent of religious persecution, be it in their own church or among non-Orthodox communities. In the context of Orthodox hierarchs' complicity with the Soviet state, I will cite one very illuminating comment made to me in 1997 by Maksim Ševčenko, at that time Senior

16. The draft stages of this law, its passage through the Russian Parliament and early months of its enforcement were comprehensively covered by journalist Lawrence Uzzell, who received an award for his coverage of the human rights issues involved.

Editor of *NG-Religii*, the Religion Supplement of the national newspaper *Nezavisimaja gazeta*. I would naturally have expected Ševčenko, a man then in his early thirties, to have found the bishops' collusion with the KGB both hypocritical and highly distasteful. His attitude was apparent in his words to me: 'Their collaboration is a matter to which I am indifferent. What they did manage to do was to ensure the continuing celebration of the Divine Liturgy on Sundays and feast-days.' By this comment alone Ševčenko highlighted for me the absolute centrality of liturgical worship for the Orthodox believer. It is precisely *there*, at the Liturgy celebrated in church, that the believer can, today, experience any measure of *sobornost*'.¹⁷

2000–2002

There is one more observation to make in the general area of state registration. In a move to set up a properly functioning tax system in Russia, the country's tax authorities sought to assign a personalized tax code (known as INN) to all gainfully employed citizens. In some quarters of the Russian Orthodox Church this purely administrative measure elicited a hostile reaction which was as strong as it was unexpected: surprisingly large numbers of believers claimed that, in one combination or another, these personalized tax codes contain the number 666, the 'Number of the Beast', the Antichrist.¹⁸ Their vociferous rejection of personalized tax codes was related to their perception that: a) these very codes would bind them into the controlling networks of global organizations and multinational corporations, which would include people's personal details in *their* information storage systems; and b) globalization itself was just one new manifestation of the Jewish-Masonic 'world-conspiracy', described in the document known as 'The Protocols of the Elders of Zion' around the turn of the 20th century. Outlandish as this latter claim may appear to commentators beyond post-Soviet Russia's borders, the INN protest nevertheless required high-level intervention on the part of Russian Orthodox hierarchs, in terms of issuing public statements, and engaging in speedy negotiation with the tax authorities to induce them to amend their system for recording tax payments. To their credit, church leaders acted quickly in response to the protest.

17. The Russian word *sobornost* resists easy translation into English. Meant to express the *freedom* of individual believers *within* the congregation or communal group, *sobornost* has been translated by words as various as 'community', 'communality' and 'conciliarity'.

18. This INN protest was the subject of a paper delivered at the University of Sussex on 10 April 2002 by Aleksandr Verkhovskij, principal researcher at the Moscow-based organization *Panorama*.

5. Mikhail Epstein's Essay 'Minimal Religion' (1982) – Some Observations: From Epstein to Bauman?

In 1982 Mikhail Epstein, a commentator on cultural matters, wrote 'Minimal Religion', a very noteworthy essay, available in English translation since 1999.¹⁹ Epstein's essay highlights certain cultural developments in the late Soviet period which should concern us here. I will treat these briefly and suggest one possible counter-argument. Epstein, having touched on Protestant notions of 'find[ing] faith in the midst of worldly life', goes on:

In ethics, this transition from pre-atheistic Protestantism to post-atheistic minimalism presupposes a spiritual concentration on one's immediate surroundings. This can be called 'neighbourhood thinking' and 'neighbourhood feeling' [*bližnemyслие* and *bližnečuvstvie*], meaning that one's thoughts and feelings should be dedicated in the first instance to one's own 'neighbours', to those who are nearest and closest to oneself. (...) Atheism introduced the ethical imperative of love for 'the distant one'. In practice this meant, for example, that a Soviet citizen should feel more compassion for the suffering nations of Africa than for his own neighbours incarcerated in a concentration camp (...). In the spirit of religious minimalism no human being claims to be universal in his/her ethical responsiveness and responsibility. Instead, each individual is dedicated to the sanctification of his immediate vicinity, which he attempts to widen. The space of the minimalist church grows out of that point occupied by *each individual in the centre of his neighbourhood*, until it reaches its maximum, which is coextensive with 'communality'. Hence, personal life and familial relations are the focus of religious life, expressed as love and brotherhood [*italics mine*, JS].²⁰

Epstein goes on to show how 'minimal religion' is able to give direction to theological reflection:

As minimal religion spreads into the theological field, the specific object of theology becomes *the particular*. Each individual and each thing, in its singularity and particularity, becomes a kind of revelation about God. ... Certainly this kind of theology runs the risk of becoming a pantheism that borders on atheism. ... Minimalist theology, however, eschews pantheist assumptions. God is not in everything, but in each thing, in the *eachness* of every thing. He is in that which distinguishes one thing from another. God is not in the continuity of things, but in their discontinuity. It is in separating one thing from

19. See Epstein 1999, pp. 163–171; in the same collection, see also his essay 'Post-Atheism: From Apophatic Theology to «Minimal Religion»', pp. 345–393.

20. Epstein 1999, pp. 167–168.

another, in grasping its uniqueness in the universe, that we reveal its theological aspect, its likeness to God.²¹

It is noteworthy that for Epstein ‘the new religiosity is “poor” because it has no worldly possessions: neither temples, nor rituals, nor doctrines’.²² At this point does Epstein’s essay reflect a wholesale *disenchantment* with organized religion, with the institutions of religion?²³ Is it a further manifestation of the privatization of religion? If so, this would be wholly consistent with the recent growth of New Age spirituality and neo-paganism in Russia. Such developments are widely observable in the West as well. They are far from being confined to ‘post-Communist’ societies.

On the basis of personal observation in Russia, Ukraine, Romania and, to a lesser extent, in Bulgaria, I would describe as significant the following phenomenon: amid the general sea of deeply-engrained distrust towards church-oriented religious life, it is possible to find particular *concentrations* of attachment to church and church rites and structures, with some people effectively living their entire social lives within a church environment. For some communities and individuals this will truly be the outer reflection or manifestation of a full and authentic Christian commitment. In its most *negative* form, though, this attachment betrays a degeneration, described memorably by the late Metropolitan Anthony of Sourozh as ‘Christianity degenerating into Churchianity’.²⁴ What occurs, in this case, is that the rites and traditions of the Church become *ends in themselves*.

Epstein strongly affirms that in the ‘post-atheistic’ climate in which Russians now find themselves, relationships with family and friends really *are* the locus for spiritual values and living. Or, at the very least, they are the locus for the possible *retrieval* of such values and living. For him this is a positive, indeed promising, situation.

A kind of counter-argument may be found in the opening chapters of Zygmunt Bauman’s book *Liquid Modernity*, published in 2000. Bauman is anxious about a marked shift in the interrelationship between the public

21. op.cit., p. 168.

22. op.cit., p. 165.

23. On the Church as ‘the least *distrusted*’ institution in post-Soviet society, see Sutton 1997, p. 2. Hervieu-Léger (2000), refers to ‘a general uncertainty regarding all references, itself an expression of the *mistrust felt for the dominant traditions and their claim to permanence and stability*’, p. 164.

24. ‘Christianity or Churchianity?’ was the title of an address given in London by Metropolitan Anthony to members of the Sourozh Diocese in the early 1980s.

sphere and the private sphere and about all that follows from that shift. He writes as follows:

It is no more true that the 'public' is set upon colonizing the 'private'. The opposite is the case: it is the private that colonizes the public space, squeezing out and chasing away everything which cannot be fully, without residue, expressed in the vernacular of private concerns, worries and pursuits. Told repeatedly that he or she is master of his or her own fate, the individual has little reason to accord 'topical relevance' (Alfred Schütz's term) to anything which resists being engulfed within the self and dealt with by the self's faculties; but *having* such a reason and acting upon it is precisely the trademark of the citizen. For the individual, public space is not much more than a giant screen on which private worries are projected without ceasing to be private or acquiring new collective characteristics in the course of magnification: public space is where public confession of private secrets and intimacies is made. ... And so public space is increasingly empty of public issues. It fails to perform its past role of a meeting-and-dialogue place for private troubles and public issues. On the receiving end of the individualizing pressures, *individuals are being gradually but consistently stripped of the protective armour of citizenship and expropriated of their citizens skills and interests* [italics mine, JS].²⁵

The juxtaposition of Epstein's and Bauman's respective understandings of the private and the public spheres is certainly illuminating and, furthermore, is not confined solely to the specifically Russian, late Communist and post-Communist contexts.

6. The Market, Market Pressures and the Authority of Russian Writers

Evert van der Zweerde's and Machiel Karskens' foregoing work on civil society treats 'the market' as a significant constituent part of civil society. I follow their lead in accepting this particular view of the market and civil society.

Here I will confine myself to one point. Given the existing commercial pressures in contemporary literature and in the publishing of literature, I find it very hard indeed to envisage any way at all of safeguarding – or, more exactly, restoring – the moral authority of the creative writer and the poet, which was so distinctive a feature of Russian culture during the

25. Bauman 2000, pp. 39–40.

19th century and at the turn of the 20th. Considering that period, Sir Isaiah Berlin put the matter this way:

Every Russian writer was made conscious that he was on a public stage, testifying; so that the smallest lapse on his part, a lie, a deception, an act of self-indulgence, lack of zeal for the truth, was a heinous crime.²⁶

Thirty or so years ago, in an era of censorship and extreme political pressure, Solženitsyn had a genuine faith in literature's capacity to preserve the national memory. But one really wonders how today's milder and ostensibly more auspicious conditions shape writers' understanding of their own activity, and one also wonders how very hard it must be for them to withstand the seemingly relentless pressure of commercialization. Now, Western and multinational capitalist companies, rather than the Party, award literary prizes in Russia, and one could be forgiven for being slightly cynical about the introduction of the Booker Prize for Russian Fiction and the motives of those awarding it. It is true, one could be cynical, and even defeatist. ... *Until* one recalls how extraordinarily elevated and inspiring a conception of the poet was presented to the world by Joseph Brodsky [Iosif Brodskij] as recently as 1987 in his Nobel Prize lecture.²⁷ Surely, Brodskij's life-long hymn to language cannot remain without heir or cultural residue. ...

7. The Landscape and the 'Inscape' We Find Now: Poetics Balancing Out and Affirming Religious Apprehension

I have, so far, presented six approaches (or partial approaches) to the theme of civil society, religion and the nation in Russia. Using these, it has been my intention to provide a sufficient description of the late Soviet and post-Soviet cultural landscapes to generate probing questions about the interplay between civil society, religion and the nation. I end with a few brief reflections on the position of the individual religious believer *here and now*. Their denominational affiliation is not nearly as significant, here, as what I shall call the 'texture' or 'weave' of their religious lives. The person I have in mind is far from being a believer *faute de mieux*; nor is this person someone who has remained stably within the faith tradition of their childhood years. Indeed, she or he may have tried Buddhism, Taoism, Tantric

26. Berlin 1979, p. 129.

27. cf. Brodskij 1990; for the Russian original, see Brodskij 1992, Vol. I, pp. 5–16.

Yoga or Tolstoianism in a search for ultimate meaning. They may be actively aware of *all* the grounds for *not* believing. ... And yet, and yet. ... they believe. Theirs is a *spirituality despite everything*, a *dukhovnost' vopreki vsemu*. Despite all their knowledge of the forces working against religious belief, including quite sophisticated, refined forms of reductionism, they themselves *believe*. In Russia this may be defined as the situation of the '*believing intelligentsia*', in particular. And it is certainly mirrored in the West, though in a diffuse way, not concentrated in a specific, identifiable '*believing intelligentsia*'. As believers (and/or persons engaged in a *philosophical* quest), they may adopt a 'way' or ethically-grounded personal discipline of *sustained reflection* and *inwardness* as *their* fundamental response to the world in which they find themselves.

As for 'inscape': it is a term made current in English by the Catholic poet Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844–1889). In his study of Hopkins's poetics, A *Preface to Hopkins*, Graham Storey explains the poet's use of the term:

'Inscape' he uses to describe the beauty of pattern which expresses a thing's inner or essential form; or, as he puts it in a *Journal* entry: '... the immediate scape of the thing, which unmistakably distinguishes and individualizes things', the quality which gives it its selfhood ... From now on [May 1870] Hopkins clearly identified the word with a beauty – or reality – which alone gives things meaning.²⁸

I am very struck by the closeness of sensibility apparent in Hopkins's explanation of his term 'inscape' and the following lines from Mikhail Epstein's essay:

Each individual and each thing, in its singularity and particularity, becomes a kind of revelation about God (...) God is not in everything, but in each thing, in the *eachness* of every thing. He is in that which distinguishes one thing from another. (...) It is in separating out one thing from another, in grasping its uniqueness in the universe, that we reveal its theological aspect, its likeness to God.²⁹

Here joy arises as an eminently natural response to the singularity of people and of things, to their particularity. The theologian Alistair McFadyen writes:

What is the significance of joy in relation to the concern for autonomy and integrity? First, joy is intensely particularizing – indeed, joy intensifies

28. Storey 1981, p. 62.

29. Epstein 1999, p. 165.

particularity. Our joys characterize our personhood (...) the things that we most desire and enjoy become foundational for our being-in-the-world.³⁰

Hopkins's use of the notion of 'inscape' allowed him to hint at the Transcendent which is *at the same time* immanent in the very core and *eachness* of things. I suggest that, today, the poetic-religious conception underpinning Hopkins's own poems is far more accessible to us than the poems themselves. Far more accessible to us, I suggest, are the poems of the contemporary Irish poet Micheal O'Siadhail, for whom the sheer *particularity* of a moment can be 'voiced' and celebrated – relished by reader and poet alike – in a jazz improvisation:

... Nothing show off. Lean flightlines. Grace to soar.
Shaping and shaped by a promise at the music's core.³¹

O'Siadhail offers a poetics where 'Every image is trying to widen *trust* [*italics mine, JS*].'³² And, finally, consistent with the spirit of Epstein's essay and with Hopkins, O'Siadhail affirms:

Some uniqueness of self I think I need to prove.³³

If we turn back once more to the Russian cultural landscape, it is possible to find two striking versions of the O'Siadhail motif 'Some uniqueness of self I think I need to prove.' Its darker, 'underground' aspect is to be seen in the Dostoevskij quotation with which I began these reflections, in the hyper-sensitive, calculatingly self-isolating person who disappears into her/his burrow and attempts to shore up her/his precarious sense of self-worth with accumulated wealth and possessions. Its light and eminently celebratory aspect can be found in the first two stanzas of a poem which Osip

30. McFadyen 2000, pp. 212–213.

31. O'Siadhail 1998, p. 100. Improvisation, as exemplified by jazz above all, is a dominant theme in O'Siadhail's poetry, whose point is itself very fitting for the contexts of civil society and spirituality (see the Gospel according to St John, 3, v.8: 'The Spirit bloweth where it will'). As in O'Siadhail's poetry, the themes of improvisation and of feasting come together in the final section of David Ford's recent study *Self and Salvation: Being Transformed* (Ford 1999).

32. O'Siadhail 1998, p. 97. Emphasis added so as to highlight a term, trust, which is especially important for the growth and health of civil society.

33. op.cit., p. 50.

Mandel'shtam composed in 1909, at the age of eighteen, 'I have been granted a body...':

I have been granted a body, but what am I to do with it,
So unique it is and so much mine?

Who, tell me, am I to thank for the quiet joy
of breathing and living?³⁴

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34. I have used and slightly adapted David McDuff's translation, which appears in Mandel'shtam 1983, pp. 10–11. The Russian original reads as follows:

*Dano mne telo – čto mne delat' s nim,
Takim edinyim, takim moim?
Za tikhuju radost' dyšat' i žit'
Kogo, skažite, mne blagodarit'?*

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TOWARDS A REVIVAL OF THE STATE AS AN IDEOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

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ABSTRACT: Contemporary Russia has defined itself as a multinational state. Multinationalism has traditionally been an attribute of empire. Multinationalism and democracy are much harder to combine, to which the history of the Russian Federation also bears witness. It is argued that the Russian Federation, under V.V. Putin, is being reorganised and reconstituted, at the expense of aspirations to self-rule of leaders of the (ethnic) republics. This strong emphasis on the constitutional ‘*vertikal*’ is not in itself anti-democratic, according to this article. On the contrary, it could be argued that democracy, in a number of subjects of the Russian Federation, stands in need of help from above. However, V.V. Putin’s primary concern is not democracy as such, but the state. Thus, the article raises the hypothesis of the revival of the state as an ideology in Russia. Popular authoritarianism would fit this ideology quite well.

It has always been the intention of classical Marxists to do away with the nationalities question; or rather: classical Marxists foresaw the demise of the political importance of the nationalities question. Whether nationalism was essentially a by-product of capitalism or had other roots was a matter of dispute in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; however, there was no dispute that the nationalities question would be resolved by the transition from capitalism to socialism/communism. The only ‘true’ enmity was that between exploiters and exploited, between capitalists and proletarians – not between citizens of competing or even warring states, not between creeds and colors, not between nationalities vying for statehood or vying for supremacy within a state. Socialism would be international and would overcome nationalism, or it would not exist at all.

It was one of the particularities of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism as it developed in the late 1920s that developing socialism or ‘socialism under construction’ would be national, i.e. would no longer imply or require the demise and transcendence of nations and nationalism. In the 1930s it became a matter of doctrine – received wisdom, if one prefers – that the construction of socialism would transform, bring life to, and develop nationalism; nationalism would be elevated by socialism, in that all nationalisms would be ‘polit-economic’, which is to say that they, as far as ‘substance’ is concerned,

would become socialist, and would thereby be developed and (re)vitalized as a form or 'mode of expression'. One could say that nationalism was, in fact, reduced to, as well as cherished and stimulated as, folklore.

In the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) and in the Soviet Union, the issue of nationalism – the nationalities question – was taken very seriously. (The USSR would not have survived for long if the actual importance of this matter had simply been denied.) The USSR's and, more specifically, the RSFSR's 'state-construction' was developed and (re)organized with reference to the 'level of development' attained by the nationalities living on Soviet territory. For example, the degree of autonomy 'granted' to territorial-administrative 'units' of the RSFSR was related to, among other things, the level of development of the nation (nationality) in question at the start of the socialist /communist project. Thus, the Nentsy, a nomadic and illiterate nation living in Siberia (to be made literate and sedentary as part of the socialist project), were accorded a low degree (status) of autonomy; or rather, as this (degree of) autonomy was not granted to the nationalities themselves, but by proxy to the territorial-administrative units in which these nationalities lived, the Nentsy-*territory* was accorded a low level of 'self-rule'. At the other end of the autonomy scale stood the titular nations of the Union Republics, such as, from the very start of the USSR, the Ukrainians. A 'status-rise' *after* the further development of the nation (nationality) in question, led by the Party under Soviet rule, was also possible (at least until the 1930s), as is illustrated by the rise to Union-Republican status (after having been a complex of territorial-administrative (sub)units of the RSFSR) of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kirgizia, and Uzbekistan.

While some nationalities were indeed assisted in developing the essentials of fully civilized nations (e.g., by the introduction of a written language and literacy-programs), some nationalities were put under severe pressure to acquiesce to being Russified. Some minor nationalities (as well as some major ones, e.g. the Ukrainians) were pressured into becoming Russified *sooner than others*, as the political and cultural (including linguistic) superiority of Russia was more openly celebrated, especially in the 1940s and early 1950s. The idea that a transformed, cultural nationalism would thrive under the aegis of socialism was not totally abandoned, but there was little doubt that the developing Soviet people, the future 'Soviet nationality', would be Russian-speaking and Russian-socialist in its overall cultural outlook. One could say that *slijanie*, the 'fusing' of the nationalities on Soviet territory, was expected to result in an enlarged, not a diluted, socialist Russian nation.

In fact, Soviet ideology on the question of nationalities and their development remained incoherent. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, the

idea of special representation rights for nationalities – as far as nationalities were coupled with territorial-administrative units – was adhered to. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR was a bi-cameral body, with each chamber having identical powers. The Soviet of the Union was directly elected (or ‘collected’, if one prefers) without formal reference to the ethnicity of either constituencies or representatives, while the Soviet of Nationalities was elected in reference to ethnic (i.e. national territorial-administrative) units, with each Union Republic divided into an equal number of single-member electorates, each Autonomous Republic (the highest territorial-administrative status within a Union Republic) divided into an equal number of single-member districts, each Autonomous Province [*oblast’*] divided into an equal number of districts, and each National Area [*okrug*] forming a single district.

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU as of March 1985, attempted to revitalize socialism, and tried to democratize the state’s representative institutions in the late 1980s. He instituted elections for a new Congress of People’s Deputies, intending to establish much of a re-styled Supreme Soviet. The USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, which was elected in March 1989, held its first session on 25 May–9 June of that year. In March 1990, the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies was elected, and convened for the first time on 16 May–22 June 1990. The USSR Congress and the RSFSR Congress each elected more permanent bodies – the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR – from among its members. We will focus now on the RSFSR. The Supreme Soviet was to divide itself into two chambers, each with equal rights. One chamber was to be elected (from the Congress Deputies) on the basis of territorial-administrative units with no ‘ethnic’ denomination, and the other explicitly on the basis of ‘ethnic’ constituencies. The best way to explain this new representative system is to quote Richard Sakwa:

Russia was the only post-Soviet republic to retain the cumbrous two-tier system for the elections of March 1990. The Russian Congress was made up of 1,068 constituencies, of which 168 (15.7 per cent) were national-territorial and 900 (84.3 per cent) were territorial. The Congress was to meet twice a year to legislate on the most important constitutional and other issues. (...)

The Congress elected a smaller Supreme Soviet (...) to examine current legislation and debate policies. By September 1993 the Supreme Soviet contained 248 voting members and 138 non-voting members working in committees and commissions, and thus a total of 384 officially worked in parliament on a permanent basis, although a quarter of the Supreme Soviet deputies were inactive. All Congress deputies over a five-year period were to have the opportunity of becoming members of the Supreme Soviet (...). (...)

The Supreme Soviet was divided into two chambers with equal rights, the Council of the Republic (...), and a smaller Council of the Nationalities (...). Because of the smaller pool of deputies on which it drew, almost all the deputies from the national territories entered the Supreme Soviet.¹

Gorbachev, elected president of the USSR by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on 14 March 1990, had little or no feel for the potential political force of 'old style' nationalism in 'new style' soviet politics. Gorbachev's attempt to revitalize socialism was in part thwarted by the nationalistic upsurge in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The dotted pencil-lines demarcating the boundaries between Union Republics were being retraced with ink as serious borders between sovereign states, most of them professing to be nation-states. Within the RSFSR (renamed the Russian Federation on 25 December 1991), quite a number of territorial-administrative units rushed to acquire a higher position for themselves in the RSFSR's (RF's) national-territorial hierarchy, simply by assuming a higher designation. Autonomous Provinces upgraded themselves to Autonomous Republics, and a number of Autonomous Republics seriously attempted to upgrade their position up and out of the RF's national-territorial hierarchy altogether (Chechnya, Tatarstan).²

The first president of the RSFSR /RF, Boris Nikolaevič Yeltsin (titular president of the RSFSR as Chairman of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR as of June 1990 and the directly elected President of the RSFSR/RF as of June 1991), had stimulated this process of decentralization and downright usurpation of power by lower-level territorial-administrative

1. Sakwa 1996, pp. 118–119.

2. In article 65 of the 1993 RF Constitution the 89 'subjects of the Russian Federation' are listed, of which 21 have the status of 'Republic'. As 'subjects' of the RF, all 89 'territorial-administrative units' are equal, but some are both formally and in fact more equal than others. Subjects with republican status have 'constitutions'; other subjects have 'charters'. The leader of the executive branch of government is usually called 'president' in a republic, and is known as 'governor', 'mayor' (St.Petersburg and Moscow), or differently in other subjects. Members of governments of Republics may call themselves 'ministers'. Non-republican subjects do not have 'ministers'. These are some indicators of the equal but elevated status of the Republics. Tatarstan and Chechnya are among these 21 Republics. Moscow's position is that the outcome of the referendum on the Constitution of the Republic of Chechnya, which was held in March 2003, again clearly places Chechnya within the RF framework as part of the RF and subject to the RF Constitution. Tatarstan has been able to negotiate with Moscow for substantial self-rule (more than most others), even referring to itself as a sovereign Republic. Its claim of sovereignty was later disputed by Moscow, but Tatarstan was never actually or formally 'outside' the RF.

units by his repeated invitation to regional politicians to assume as much autonomy as they could manage, thus rallying support for himself, in opposition to Gorbachev, President of the USSR. Major General Džokhar Dudaev, leader of Chechnya, was among Yeltsin's staunchest supporters in terms of this politics of devolution.

The devolution of state power implied a re-nationalization in the sense of a 're-ethnization' of politics on the territory of the RSFSR/RF, as many of these territorial-administrative units had been created and maintained in association with one of the non-Russian nationalities. Although not all of the national territorial-administrative units, which were soon becoming serious political units, were created with respect to the majority non-Russian nationality in each particular area, each was nevertheless formed with respect to a specific non-Russian nationality as the titular nationality (ethnicity).

Even the titular nationalities that were numerically weak as compared to one or two other nationalities living in 'their' territory, or at least their leaders, tended to behave in some instances as if entitled to political domination (and to the spoils of political office). This was most often the case in the more populous national territorial-administrative units which were accorded the status of Republic in the December 1993 RF Constitution. In national territorial-administrative units in the North and in Siberia, the indigenous populations were often too few in number to be able to dominate the political scene.

RF President Yeltsin ordered the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies in Decree No.1400 of September 1993. At the same time, elections for a new parliament were announced. Much remained unclear about the nature of that new parliament, but the fact that the new parliament should have two chambers was never in dispute.

In the upper chamber, the Soviet of the Federation, each of the 89 'subjects of the Federation' was to have two representatives. One could say that the Soviet of the Federation was the successor to the Soviet of Nationalities, since the very existence of quite a number of these subjects can only be explained in reference to the politics of 'honoring' nationalities' claims to a 'territory of their own'. The people of the RF were defined in art 3.1 of the December 1993 RF Constitution as a 'multinational people' [*mnogonacionalnyj narod*], and according subject-status to home-territories was widely considered to be one of the ways to express this multinational character. In the Constitutional Conference [*Konstitucionnoe soveščanie*] that discussed the electoral system for the State Duma, the parliament's other chamber, it was taken for granted that a substantial number of State Duma members would be elected in single-member districts, and that each

subject of the Federation would constitute as a minimum one single-member district.³

It was finally decided that the State Duma should have 450 seats, 225 of which were to be filled via a system of proportional representation with the entire RF counting as a single district and with a 5 percent electoral threshold, and 225 single-member district seats to which the first-past-the-post principle would apply.

The basic democratic rule to which both electoral systems explicitly refer is that of one man (woman) – one vote. It is furthermore stated that votes should be of equal value. Electoral districts should therefore be of about equal size, i.e. districts should count about the same number of people entitled to vote. However, even if we allow for a most generous deviation of plus or minus 15 percent, we note that over 28 percent of single-member districts have an actual number of voters (far) outside this range. Taking the 1999 State Duma elections as our point of reference, we notice that the actual weight of individual votes is quite unequal. The largest district, the single district of Kurgan in the province [*oblast*] Kurgan, counted 782,641 voters. The smallest, the Evenk district, the single district of the Evenk Autonomous Area [*okrug*], counted a mere 12,749 people entitled to vote. The Kurgan district thus had 61.4 times as many voters as the Evenk district. In fact, the Kurgan district had more voters than the eleven smallest districts taken together. In short, there is massive inequality in the weight of the individual vote in the State Duma single-member district elections, added to the immense inequality between the constituencies of the 89 subjects of the Federation, each of which bears the same formal weight in the Soviet of the Federation.⁴ Evenkija and Moscow City each have two seats in the Soviet of the Federation, while Moscow counts some 500 times more voters.

The equality of the vote per subject of the RF in the Soviet of the Federation can be attributed to the federal character of the RF. The location of the Russian Federation's subjects' borders – and the very existence of quite a number of these subjects – can only be explained in reference to the idea that nationhood at some point in its development must be expressed by some form of self-rule within a specific territory which the dominant (titular) nationality on that territory should be able to consider and effectively

3. While the subjects of the RF were already granted their own Soviet of the Federation, representatives of the RF's subjects also took part in deliberations at the Constitutional Conference on the choice of electoral systems for the State Duma. Thereby it was ensured that the subjects' interests would also – again – be taken into account in devising an electoral system for the State Duma. cf. de Bever 2002.

4. cf. Oversloot 2002.

hold as its 'home-territory'. We could argue that this phenomenon is a contemporary articulation of the remnants of empire. We can surely also say that the concept of a multinational people – to which the RF Constitution refers in Article 3 – is excruciatingly hard to reconcile with the basic democratic idea that each member of the political community should have a vote and that these votes should be of equal weight.⁵

In international law, existing states' rights trump claims of nations without a state of their own. This prevalence of existing states over nationalities (nations) aspiring to or claiming statehood in opposition to existing states, was restated and underlined in the 1960s at the express wish of the then newly independent African states. Since the 1980s the idea has gained ground that certain 'collective rights' or 'group rights' should be elevated to the level of human rights, whereby these collective rights would also be recognized as having universal validity.

The experience of the RF points to the difficulties that necessarily arise when the *a priori* legitimacy of collective rights (in this case, rights of nationalities) is stressed even further. For example, the Bashkirs are the *raison d'être* of a political entity called the Republic of Bashkortostan, but the Bashkirs are the third largest minority in this subject of the Federation. Both the Russians and the Tatars outnumber the titular nation. Why then should the Bashkirs prevail? The Jews of the RF have their 'home-territory' in the 'Jewish Autonomous Province' Birobidzhan, but much less than 1 percent of Birobidzhan's population is in fact Jewish. Russians account for over 80 percent of Birobidzhan's population. The rather perverse effect is that the Russians in Birobidzhan have a much weightier vote than Jews in, for example, Moscow, while the Jews of each separate district of Moscow considerably outnumber the Jews in the whole of Birobidzhan.

Another, perhaps even more interesting case is the Republic of Dagestan. This Republic is, one tends to say, extremely multinational in itself. None of the many important nationalities of Dagestan have a home-territory elsewhere (such as the Russians and the Tatars of Bashkortostan could be said to have). Therefore, it was felt that some power-sharing arrangement had to be made and kept in place. This power-sharing arrangement, in fact, tends to limit the choice of voters of a particular nationality to candidates for office of that same nationality. This can be done when a number of seats or offices are available for distribution or 'election' among the nationalities. A single head

5. Both Kymlicka 1995 and Miller 1995 tend to regard 'self-government rights' or 'devolution' or 'federalization' as a democratic solution to problems posed by the cohabitation of distinct nationalities within the confines of one state. I would maintain that there are democratic drawbacks to this solution as well.

of the executive branch of government (whether he or she be called 'governor', 'head', 'president' or by any other title) cannot be distributed in this way. When distribution is required, there are three options: (i) this important single office is 'distributed over time' (for example, two years for the representative of nationality A, followed by two years for nationality B, two years for C, two for D, and back again to A); or (ii) the importance of this single office is reduced by devising other offices which are of similar significance (for example, the presidency is to be filled by nationality A, the premiership, which should then be of sufficient importance, is to be filled by B, the speaker of parliament by C), or this single office is to be held by a collective body. Membership of a committee constituting a 'collective presidency', so to speak, *can* be apportioned to different nationalities, and 'the presidency' can thus be held simultaneously by different nationalities. Dagestan opted for such a collective presidency in order to attempt to solve (or at least acquiesce to) the 'multinational constituency problem'. However, this solution suggests, or rather makes clear, that (a) the 'multinational' character of 'the people' is not necessarily a celebratory attribute, but a major question that politics must deal with and a major and enduring concern for politicians, and (b) that such a solution falls short of honoring the most basic democratic principles. Democratic elections in 'consociational democracies', such as the Republic of Dagestan could be,⁶ tend to be reduced to a mere census, in which national minorities are each represented in proportion to their size. Change and choice are precisely those elements which present the most formidable challenge to this type of system.

President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin had invited regional and local leaders to take as much autonomy as they could handle. It appeared that some regional leaders had rather large appetites. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin tried to reverse this actual devolution in order to save the state unity of the RF. Much was done to dissuade, discourage and deter regional leaders from striving for more autonomy within the RF framework. However, the central government at that time was too weak to impose a general and uniform set of rules that would regulate and clarify the relationship between the political center of the RF and all 89 'subjects' of the RF. The central government opted for a policy of negotiating the terms of each subject's adherence to the RF bilaterally, starting with some, and ending up with most, but not all subjects, resulting in what was aptly

6. I should add that I think that Dagestan is, or could be, a 'consociational democracy' *in principle*. Election fraud, extreme corruption, and disrespect for 'procedural niceties' actually make it difficult, if not impossible, to call Dagestan a democracy at all.

called an asymmetric Federation. Some subjects were allowed to collect federal taxes and keep them for their own use, while other subjects were obliged to transfer these monies to federal coffers; some subjects negotiated for substantial transfer-payments, whereas others were to be net contributors; some subjects organized for 'their' draftees to serve their obligatory military service in their home-republics, while others did not, etc. Moscow concluded (separate) special agreements [*dogovory*] with over half of the subjects of the Federation.

However, this policy was reversed in the late 1990s. No new agreements have been concluded since 1999 and quite a number of the original agreements have expired; the number of agreements still in effect has been reduced to approximately one dozen. Vladimir Vladimirovič Putin, a leading figure in the presidential administration in the late 1990s, then head of the Federal Security Service (*FSB*) for little over a year, Prime Minister since August 1999, and first Acting President and then President of the RF since January 2000, has always been a firm opponent of the continuation – let alone extension – of this asymmetry in the structure of Russia's '*vertikal*' of power.⁷ As president of the RF, Yeltsin reiterated time and again that the power *vertikal* needed to be reconstituted, and that the power *vertikal* was indeed in the process of being strengthened, while at the same time allowing further extension of this policy of bypassing and weakening Russia's federal law. New agreements [*dogovory*] were concluded until well into Yeltsin's last term in office, and in the juridical hierarchy these agreements and the terms of these agreements were routinely placed in between the Constitution of the RF and the Federal Laws of the RF. President Yeltsin likely had to allow loyal regional, and especially republican elites to 'have it their way', as he was dependent upon these regional leaders' support to stay in power as President of the RF. The leaders of the 'ethnic' subjects of the RF, which had been treated most leniently by (the administration of) the President, were indeed very supportive of Yeltsin when he sought re-election in 1996.

President Putin's position was quite different from Yeltsin's. In the December 1999 State Duma elections, Putin (still as Prime Minister) showed that he, aided by some regional leaders, could bypass and prevail over the combined influence of the most important of Russia's regional leaders. Immediately after these elections, the most important 'oppositional' regional leaders, who were united in the 'Fatherland' and 'All Russia' coalitions, started courting Putin. No longer in doubt as to who would be Russia's next president, Russia's regional leaders were eager to

7. On V.V. Putin 's career see, e.g., Mukhin 2002.

please; their efforts were clearly directed towards ingratiating themselves with Putin, as opposing him would only cost them in the future.

Putin perhaps spoke less frequently about the necessity to restore and strengthen the *vertikal*, but he made much more effective moves in this direction than his predecessor had ever accomplished. Besides discarding the *dogovory*, a second move toward 'recentralization' may prove to be Putin's appointment in 2000 of seven presidential plenipotentiaries [*polpredy*] in seven regions, together encompassing all 89 subjects of the Federation. At first these seven presidential representatives had little staff and no budget of their own, and although the *polpredy* were nominally quite powerful, the major regional politicians were not required to take much notice of them. However, it seems that this is changing. Federal ministries and federal services used to have local branches in the capitals of each of the subjects of the Federation. In some respects, these branches were rather dependent (some federal ministerial branches more so than others), both directly and indirectly, upon regional governments and local administrations to enable them to function properly. For example, the local administration may choose to offer or withhold housing for employees of the federal services. Recently one can discern (the beginnings of) a tendency to concentrate the regional branches of federal ministries and services in the 'capitals' of the seven 'new regions', *i.e.* the seats of the *polpredy*. If the *polpredy* manage to put themselves at the helm of these newly concentrated regional branches of federal ministries and services, they instantly become powerful administrators to which the heads (governors, presidents, mayors) of the subjects of the Federation would have to turn, creating competition between themselves and their colleagues – the local leaders. It is even imaginable that these seven 'super subjects' would develop into political entities of their own, therefore requiring separate parliaments and elected, rather than appointed, heads (of their executive branches). If such 'super subjects' were to develop, the present national coloring of the 'minor subject' would lose much of its political importance. None of these seven 'super subjects' would have titular nationalities.

Thirdly, the power of leaders in the existing subjects has already been reduced by changes in the way the seats are filled in the Soviet of the Federation. As was noted above, the two seats allocated per subject used to be assigned directly to the heads of the executive and legislative branches. More recently, the heads of the executive and legislative branches of the subject each appoint a representative to the Soviet of the Federation. The direct, personal presence of subject leaders has thus been removed from one of the major federal institutions of the RF. (And one suspects that the Soviet of the Federation, for this same reason, may itself lose some of its authority.) In return for their acceptance of 'resignation' from the Soviet of

the Federation (a resignation at the end of their term in office), the subjects' 'heads of the executive branches' were accorded membership in the newly created 'State Council'. The State Council was created by the president of the RF, is headed by the president of the RF, its tasks are decided upon by the president, and it can be dissolved by the president. Thus, the leaders of the subjects find themselves even closer to the president of the RF, but are solely dependent upon his desire to maintain or dispense with the State Council.⁸

A fourth indicator that nationality in the sense of ethnic/national identity [*nacionalnost*] may lose its political-juridical importance is that it is no longer registered in new RF internal passports, as it was in USSR internal passports and first-issue RF passports. This amendment was instituted to the chagrin of the leaders of some Republics, most notably President Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan, who surmised that this would ultimately undermine their claims to leadership of an entire nation (nationality) and possibly even their claim to leadership in their (still) national territorial-administrative units. It is also curious to note that in the first census conducted in the RF, held in the fall of 2002 (the last census in the USSR was held in 1989), respondents had the option of whether or not to register their nationality (and, for that matter, religion), as opposed to previous censuses where this was required. Moreover, 'nationality' as registered in the 2002 census was considered the nationality of the citizen's own choice, to the extent that one could even opt for a nationality that had not featured on the 'official list'.⁹ To the extent that nationality (as ethnicity) will lose its politico-juridical importance (though this is in no way certain), the Russian Federation will become more 'Russian by default' in a non-ethnic sense. Until now, both presidents of the Federation, Yeltsin and Putin, have presented themselves as Russians (e.g. one way to express that they are Russian is by attending Russian Orthodox church services). However, both have also been careful to address the citizens of the RF as citizens of the

8. The State Council is not mentioned in the Constitution of the RF and its existence and functioning is not regulated by federal law.

9. Until 1989 one could only select one's nationality from the list of the USSR's 'registered' nationalities. It could be that one's previous nationality was no longer available (because it had been discarded, because it was no longer thought of and registered as a nationality) and one had to opt for a nationality 'close to' one's previous nationality. The reverse could also occur, in that what had been registered as one nationality was entered as two separate nationalities in the next census. The 2002 census allowed citizens to register as belonging to a nationality that had not been previously listed. E.g., in the 2002 census, a number of people were permitted to be registered as 'Scythian' by nationality.

RF (as *rossijane*), not limiting their address to *russkie*, i.e. they have been careful not to exclude non-Russian ethnicities. The RF is a multi-ethnic state, but *if* ethnicity were to lose some of its political meaning, the RF would most likely ‘revert’ to being more Russian (*russkij*, ethno-culturally Russian) than it is at present.¹⁰

Part of Putin’s agenda is focused on the reorganization of the RF. He is working towards an effective restatement of the RF’s constitutional hierarchy, wherein the subjects of the RF, be they Republics or not, will not be ‘sovereign’ as some have claimed to be (and Tatarstan continues to be adamant in this regard; Chechnya is a special case because of the civil war), but will remain subjects. As subjects, they are therefore subject to the Constitution of the RF and the RF’s federal laws, neither of which can be overruled by the subject’s own constitution or statute, or discounted by any *dogovor*.

While it may be true, as the saying goes, that ‘all politics is local’, it is definitely not true that all local politics is democratic. The reconstruction and re-imposition of the political-institutional *vertikal* is not in itself anti-democratic or inescapably anti-democratic in its consequences. The most stubborn and the most stubbornly ethnic subjects of the Federation do not stand out as vestiges of regional (local) democratic politics. It is not true per se that Moscow’s interference with politics in, e.g., Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, is to the detriment of democracy in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Kalmykia. The reverse is not altogether true either: the strengthening of the position of the center is not necessarily and exclusively beneficial to democracy in Russia. It is of interest to note that Putin – by which I mean Putin, as person and President, the Putin administration and the ‘Putin Parties’ – is not an ‘ideological democrat’. I would not say that Putin is fully committed to democracy. One trusts that most leading politicians in established democracies would not be active in politics if politics were not to a large extent democratic. One further suspects that some politicians now practicing their trade in established democracies as democrats would also be politically active in full support of non-democratic politics, if the political regime were to change. Focusing on Russia once again, we do know that one-time staunch supporters of one-party rule, i.e. Communist Party rule, can be motivated to continue and to further their political careers by turning into democrats, at least in the sense of demonstrating an ability to adhere to basic democratic procedures (often converting to, or ‘returning to’, the Russian Orthodox faith at the same time, to show that they are ‘real Russians’). Most Russian politicians that have

10. See also the papers by Bykova and van der Zweerde in this volume.

gained prominence since the early 1990s have shown exactly this ability. Putin is not unique in this respect, though it is unique, perhaps, that Putin comes from a specific background, having served as a *KGB* officer for fifteen years. The *KGB* was an institution of ill repute, a despicable and terrifying institution in the eyes of many, if not most, anti-communists. Employees and collaborators of the *KGB* and its direct predecessors (*Cheka*, *NKVD* etc.) bear direct responsibility for the murder of millions of people. Furthermore, Putin was not pressured into *KGB* service; he served the *KGB* voluntarily. What kind of democrat, what kind of rule of law adherent can such a man be, and what democratically-minded people can garner a majority vote for such a man as their president and, once president, support him in even larger numbers?

The adaptability of so many (former) *KGB* employees, developing in no time from defenders of communist rule to players in the capitalist game and defenders of democracy, may point to a high degree of cynicism among former *KGB* men. It may point to the self-serving purposes of their ideology, be it their present ideology or their ideology of twenty years past. I think this partly accounts for the adaptability of many *KGB* people, but leaves the most interesting reason unexplained. Putin is not a (liberal-)democrat first and foremost, nor is he primarily an adherent of capitalism or the market-ideal. Putin's popularity does not rest on the (mistaken) belief that he is a true democrat or that he has been reborn as a defender of capitalism. (It is also strange to surmise that the majority of the Russian populace has itself undergone a similar, substantial transformation.) Many major changes, truly revolutionary changes, have taken place in Russia in the economic sphere, the political sphere, in ideology and in the psychology of people. Along with change, however, there remains a certain continuity and even some degree of reaction, *i.e.* an attempt to restore what has been lost. Putin stands for continuity and even reaction, both ideologically and psychologically; Putin, first of all, is a *gosudarstvennik* and was quite probably primarily a *gosudarstvennik* as a *KGB* employee as well. (Nothing in Putin's *KGB* career, as far as we know now, would contradict this characterization.) A *gosudarstvennik* is someone who values, even reveres, the (Russian) state and the 'stateness' [*gosudarstvennost'*] of the polity;¹¹ a *gosudarstvennik* appreciates in the society and of the society the contribution it makes or may make to the

11. The following quotation taken from then Prime Minister and Acting President Vladimir Putin's article of 31 December, 1999, entitled 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium', helps to illustrate this point. The article first appeared on www.gov.ru, website of the government of the RF, and is cited here from www.publicaffairsbooks.com/booksfir-exc.html (19-12-02). Putin rejects the advocacy of an 'official Russian state ideology', but advocates 'patriotism', and states that 'Russia was and will remain a great power'.

society's 'highest expression', i.e. *the state. Gosudarstvennost'*, inaptly translated as 'statism' or '*étatisme*', links Putin-in-Soviet-Russia to Putin-in-present-day-Russia. The transformation from *gosudarstvennik*-communist to *gosudarstvennik*-democrat is a major transformation, but not a total makeover, as the state was held in reverence and is still being held as the highest value. It may well be that one conceives at one point in time that being a true 'man of the state' implies (demands) professing to be a communist (being a communist) and at another point in time it implies professing to be (transforming into) a democrat. Most fundamental here is one's (permanent) attitude towards the (idealized) state. This state can be very abstract or, alternatively, may be viewed as requiring incorporation or personification. For many people Putin personifies the state; he does so to a much greater extent than Yeltsin had ever, or could ever have achieved.

This notion of 'the state' is not uncommon in (the history of) Russian political thought. One could go as far as to say that it is part of 'the Russian idea'.¹² However, this ideology of *gosudarstvennost'* is not fiercely nationalist per se; it may define 'Russian' in a very ecumenical (non-racist) way. The 'Russianness' of its adherents may be taken for granted and, in most cases, would not require further testing: this idea, this 'ideology of the state' has an imperial, and much less so a national (ethnic), tinge to it. However, the 'default' position of this 'statist' or 'ecumenical' stance is still a Russian nationalist [*ruskij*] position. If and to the extent that 'the state as an ideology' fails to help provide the support that the president of the RF may at some point require, support can be rallied by stressing the specific qualities and aspirations of (ethnic) Russians and of Russia as the state of the Russians. This chauvinistic stance may be tinged either 'red' or 'brown', but will definitely not be 'liberal'.

The State *is* (the center of) the ideology. We are not – if I am correct – dealing here with a revival of *a* state ideology, but with a revival of *the state as ideology*. 'Socialism', 'capitalism', 'market-society', and 'the dictatorship of

He goes on to say that:

'Our state and its institutions have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly to be gotten rid of. Quite the contrary, it is a source of order and main driving force of any change.

Modern Russia does not identify a strong and effective state with a totalitarian state. We have come to value the benefits of democracy, a law-based state, and personal and political freedom. At the same time, Russians are alarmed by the obvious weakening of state power. The public looks forward to a certain restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state, proceeding from Russia's traditions as well as the current state of the country.'

12. cf. McDaniel 1996.

the law' can be more or less substantive attributes of this ideology, but this solely depends on what, under specific circumstances and at some specific point in time, is considered to be beneficial to the state. A more authoritarian style of leadership could most easily be combined with this state ideology, the style and ideology of which, moreover, could well be popular. Putin's appeal rests on his being a strong man, promising to bring order to Chechnya and to the whole of Russia. He personifies the state to the extent that he succeeds in bringing in and enforcing, if need be, that order.

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PART II

JAPAN

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CIVIL SOCIETY, RELIGION, AND THE NATION

THE CASE OF JAPAN

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ABSTRACT: Japanese national identity has changed after the war in two different perspectives. The first is a change in political identity (a human being, rather than God, represents national integration). Secondly, there is a growing interest in the cultural foundations of national identity. Nationalistic orientations still exist (*Nihonjinron*, ‘New Asianism’) and correspond to a quasi-religious administration of the *Tennō* [Emperor] and a ‘grassroots conservatism’ which aspires to protect his dignity and authority. Religious belief systems, however, are traditionally weakly-rooted in Japanese society, in which a tendering of syncretism prevails. In the debate on educational reform, the terms ‘individualism’ and ‘liberalization’ have played an important role for many years. The idea of a civil society [*shimin shakai*] has been widely understood as a society of urban people and a system of cooperative democracy. It is based primarily on citizens’ protest movements. The article ends with the observation that the activities of civil society organizations (especially non-profit- and non-governmental-organizations) have expanded considerably in recent decades.

1. Foundations of a Modern Nation-state

The Japanese nation-state was established in the Edo-Tokugawa era after an extended period of disorder and turbulence.¹ Like all nation-states, Japan was built on the basis of centralized political power and the development of an ethnic polity.² This traditional homogeneous state lasted for about three centuries until the Meiji revolution (1868). With this revolution [*ishin*], a wide-ranging process of political, economic and social modernization was initiated, as the Meiji-government attempted to establish a *modern nation-state*.

The ‘revolution’ has, in fact, been a ‘restoration’ as well – incorporating traditional elements and a return to the ancient Tennō-system, while at the

1. Tokuyasu 2002.

2. Smith 1991.

same time adopting Western institutions – constituting both a paradoxical and pragmatic approach to modern nation building. Because of the isolation policy of the Tokugawa-shogunate, a national identity could be formed on ethnic grounds. On the other hand, foreign expertise on European administration and capitalism was welcomed, and the print media supplied information and knowledge from Dutch (Dejima-Nagasaki) and Korean missions.

During the Edo-Tokugawa era, Japanese ethnic identity was formed on the basis of *Kokugaku* (Japanese classic literature), a revitalized ancient spirit (*Yamato-gokoro*), common ancestry myths and historical memories, myths in *Kojiki* and *Nihon-shoki*, and, finally, on the basis of syncretic religious orientations. The process of Japanese ethnic identity formation was ambivalent from the very beginning, and these divergent ideological orientations continue to persist at the beginning of the 21st century: positive vs. negative attitudes toward foreign cultures, acceptance vs. rejection, curiosity vs. hostility, etc. More than half of a century after World War II, however, one must admit that positive and open-minded orientations have increased vis-à-vis foreign cultures in an age of globalization and internationalization (*kokusaika*).

Japanese national identity has changed since World War II in two different perspectives. The first has been the change in political identity: under the New Constitution, a human being, rather than God, represents national integration.³ The role of the Tennō [Emperor] has been framed by the principles of a democratic constitution. The second perspective involves a growing interest in the cultural foundations of national identity ('the discourse of the Japanese'). These foundations have been explained by various concepts: the household society [*Ie Shakai*], the vertical society [*Tate Shakai*], collectivism [*Shūdan-shugi*], contextualism [*Kanjin-shugi*], culture of shame [*haji*], etc. Sociologists have criticized these terms as evidence of the deficits of modernization, while business leaders see them, rather, as symbols of excellence in Japanese management [*Nihon-teki Keiei*]. Both perspectives persist in the age of globalization. Together they demonstrate a continuing ambivalence regarding cultural orientations in modern Japanese society.

This ambivalence evokes two conflicting perceptions. The first maintains that Japan is not yet sufficiently modernized, nor did it develop into a rational and universalistic state. The second one (Katō Shūichi) points to the *hybridity* of Japanese culture. Since the Meiji revolution, Japan has selectively accepted and, finally, integrated elements of foreign cultures.

3. Tokuyasu 2002, p. 210.

Its religious syncretism, in particular, provides a new opportunity for a national culture in the age of internationalization.⁴

The New Constitution is widely accepted by the people as an expression of shared values.⁵ Most Japanese approve of fundamental human rights and pacifism as embodied in the Constitution. This is largely a consequence of people's attitudes towards the damaging effects of their pre-war experiences such as the launching of a war of aggression, the rigid curtailment of freedom of expression and the suppression of human rights.

2. Political Culture

Modern political ideas became more and more important after the Tokugawa period (1600–1867): the idea of Enlightenment (during the first years of the Meiji-era (1868–1912)), movement for liberty and civil rights (in the second decade of that same era) and ideas of Christianity and socialism (in the later years of the Meiji-era). These ideas became even more significant in the years of Taishō Democracy (1912–1926).⁶ This integrative approach to the Japanese way of thinking tried to absorb Western ideas as much as possible according the principle of 'Japanese soul, Western talent' [*wakon yōsai*]. The Liberal Party [*Jiyūtō*] and the Party of Constitutional Progress [*Rikken Kaishin Tō*] supported the principles of people's sovereignty and local self-administration. Religious beliefs of Shintō, Buddhism and Christianity were pragmatically adapted and integrated into this framework of political ideas.

Political scientists have defined the term 'culture' as the aggregate of expressed 'individual attitudes and orientations toward politics.'⁷ Such attitudes and value orientations change over time. Political reforms during the post-war American occupation have had a positive impact on people's belief in the legitimacy of their political institutions and their motivations for political participation.⁸ By the establishment and acceptance of new institutions, vested interests (i.e. numerous interest groups) have been integrated into the political process in a legitimate way, and the perpetuation of these political institutions and structures has affected political attitudes

4. Robertson 1992.

5. Sonoda 1985, p. 216.

6. Kano 1988, p. 260.

7. Almond & Powell 1966, p. 23.

8. Curtis 1999, p. 15.

and value orientations towards politics. Therefore, political orientations have become, over time, more open, more flexible and more critical – a process which finally resulted in an increasing *volatility* of political attitudes as manifested by a flexible and rather unpredictable voting behavior.

In the nationalistic sphere of the political spectrum, a strong belief in ‘Japanese Uniqueness’ [*Nihonjinron*] still exists.⁹ This is an ethnocentric orientation that sees Japanese culture as superior and the cultures of other nations as inferior. The basis of this ethnocentrism is the idea of cultural homogeneity [*tōshitsu, dōshitsu*] and the prevailing harmony of territory, people, culture and language [*bunkaron*]. The politico-ideological implications of this orientation are still remarkable: According to opinion polls, 50% of respondents continue to believe in Japanese uniqueness. This leads to a paradoxical conclusion: while Japanese society is perceived, on the one hand, as a modern, internationally-oriented society with modern structures, it is still culturally based on ideas of ‘cultural nationalism’, on the other. From education, to business management, to politics, this pattern of orientation remains strong. It corresponds to ideas of a ‘New Asianism’ as an ideology of supremacy of Asian cultures vis-à-vis Europe and America. This could become a new barrier to international understanding and cooperation and foster a political ideology consisting of a new kind of nationalism.

These nationalist orientations correspond to both a quasi-religious admiration of the Tennō and the foundation of both an old and a new ‘Tennō-nationalism’, as symbolized by the Yasukuni Shrine. This Tennō-nationalism is based on a ‘grassroots conservatism’ [*kusa no ne-hoshushugi*] that attempts to protect the dignity and authority of the Tennō and to build a status-oriented society [*mibun shakai*] with the Tennō as its leading institution.¹⁰

The political orientations of Japanese society continue to be government-centered. However, this does not equate with apathy, authoritarian expectations, or even cynicism. Particularly at the local level, opportunities for political participation are most welcome: traditional group-orientations and ‘group-consciousness’ in general manages to support the development of local political orientations and, finally, political activities. Thus, local political networks are formed, either as support organizations for candidates in election campaigns [*kōen-kai*] or as highly influential neighborhood associations [*jichi-kai, chōnai-kai*].

9. See Inken Prohol’s contribution to this volume.

10. Kevenhörster &c 2002.

In this context, liberal orientations – in the European sense of the word – are rather weak: the Japanese word ‘liberal’ [*jiryū*] carries connotations of self-interest and self-centrism. Liberty, therefore, does not ultimately guarantee the freedom of individuals, but rather, reciprocal relations between individual citizens and groups. These traditional orientations correspond to a recent change in value orientation within the Japanese public: self-interested hedonistic attitudes have become increasingly prevalent, and social institutions have tended to become less cohesive. This tendency is, finally, a trend of social modernization, whereby societal values tend to diversify and become more pluralized. At the same time, new challenges for social equality appear as a consequence of these new tendencies towards economic and social disintegration.

3. Religion and Politics

In the 19th century, philosophers such as Yokoi Shōnan and Fukuzawa Yukichi integrated religious ways of thinking (Confucianism, Buddhism) into a frame of reference shaped by the principles of modern civilization, such as competition among individuals and independence [*dokuritsushin*].¹¹ They understood politics to be an instrument by which to constrain the power of the state and, thus, to guarantee individual freedom, and felt that a free society should be formed on the basis of plural values.

Politics and religion are closely connected historically. As demonstrated by Inken Prohl in her contribution to this volume, Buddhism and Shintōism have been associated with the state and national identity from their very beginnings. While Shintō has been used for nationalist purposes, the New Buddhism contains nationalist images as demonstrated by the theories of *Nihonjinron*, *Nihonbunkaron* and *Nihonkyōron* (superiority of Japanese culture) as social perspectives with xenophobic cultural traditions.

The *kami*-creed (i.e. the Japanese way of revering a supreme being), first influenced by Chinese and Buddhist thought, has remained constant for centuries.¹² Even if terms and notions from Buddhism and Confucianism have been incorporated, the purity of the creed has not been greatly affected. In accordance with the Chinese model, the ruling family, connected to the Sun Goddess, was established as the Imperial dynasty, which has reigned over Japan for 125 generations. *Kami* became the sole gods of Japan,

11. Minamoto 1988, p. 251.

12. Lidin 1988.

worship of the Sun Goddess the national duty, and the Imperial Family an incarnation of the Sun Goddess and heaven on earth, i.e. Japan.¹³ German philosophy dominated from the very beginning of the 20th century, but American and British empirical thought prevailed after 1945. This contributed to a 'relative pragmatism' – a big step towards a second modernization of politics and society in Japan.

Religious belief systems are traditionally weakly rooted in Japanese society, in which a tendency of *syncretism* prevails. Since the Meiji-revolution, Buddhism has lost its formerly dominating influence and Shintō, as a basically animistic religion that perceives the presence of gods in nature, has not been an official, state supported religion since the occupation after World War II and the inauguration of the New Constitution.¹⁴ Most Japanese integrate parts of these traditional religions beliefs into their social lives and many people adhere, by means of this pragmatic system of orientation, to two or more old or new religions, including Christianity. As Shintō is a religion that asserts the supremacy of nature, new methods of biotechnological research and innovation are widely accepted. On the other hand, however, this religion presumes an aversion to death, sickness and aging, and liberal social reformers try to take these tendencies into account in order to solve the problems of an aging population [*kōreika shakai*].

Besides Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō, politics and religion constitute separate spheres of influence. Still, the Nichiren-Buddhism dominated sect Sōka Gakkai forms a strong social basis (with more than 6 million families) for the 'Clean Government Party' [*Kōmeitō*]. While, in the pre-war period, the state made Shintō the official religion in its drive for total mobilization, the New Constitution required the separation of state and church. For this reason, the state cannot offer support for religious organizations. These, of course, may recommend candidates for public office or support political parties. While many religious organizations support the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Sōka Gakkai is the only religious group which has established its own political party.¹⁵

While the LDP, inspired in part by the gas attack in the Tokyo subway by members of a sinister sect (Aum Shinrikyō) in March 1995, initiated legislation that would give power to the state to force religious organizations to disclose details regarding their internal operations and finances, the party eventually shelved this legislation. Nearly all religious organizations were concerned about this new approach to state control over religion.

13. Lidin 1988.

14. Kreiner 1995, p. 505.

15. Curtis 1999, p. 103.

Successfully, they started a campaign against the proposed legislation, and the Liberal Democrats finally retreated.

4. Decisions by Consensus in Civil Society

Japanese society may be characterized to a greater or lesser extent by four – essentially controversial – propositions:¹⁶

1. Japanese society is *group-oriented*: Identification with groups forms the basis of group loyalty and a certain degree of exclusivity [*uchi/soto*].
2. Social relations are essentially based on *hierarchy*; however, such relations (determined on the basis of relative status) are difficult to manage. This is demonstrated by a complex set of distinctions, for example, in polite language [*keigo*].
3. Norms of *mutual obligation* [*on* and *giri*] in Japan, as a gift-giving society, are demonstrated by everyday practices and play an important role in forming and stabilizing – even cementing – social relations.
4. Majority decisions are not very popular. Instead, there is a strong preference for reaching decisions by consensus. This proposition is very important for the political decision-making process and can be illustrated and explained by the *ringisei*-system.

The *ringisei* system strengthens the power position of bureaucrats as opposed to the power and responsibility of politicians. Seikei University political scientist Kawanaka Niko describes the political position of the Japanese bureaucracy:

In Japan administrators are deeply involved in the political activities of the government; ‘professional’ administrators recommend policies, see to it that they are adopted, integrate them, and move them forward (...) Major obstacles to their policy-making activities lie within the administrative branch itself; they face obstacles raised by various bureaus and departments within ministries, the Budget Bureau, and the Legislation Bureau. Once these internal obstacles are overcome, they may still face some resistance from other interested groups but this can be crushed (...) The role of bureaucrats replaces the political role of those political leaders who are accountable to the people.¹⁷

This analysis sees *ringisei* as the *displacement of politics by bureaucratic power*, as interpreted by Pempel. However, there is no single pattern of

16. Stockwin 1999, p. 27.

17. Pempel 1977, p. 28.

policy-making, even for issues within the same functional category. At least three different types of policy-making exist; these vary with respect to degrees of conflict, political alliances, organs of decision-making, and degrees of political involvement. The characteristic features of these types of policy-making depend very much, of course, on the nature of the issues concerned, namely, their ideological content and scope.

Within the complex system of roles and rationales in Japanese policy-making, the roles of 'advocate' and 'politico' are carried out by the representatives of interest groups and bureaucrats, but the roles of 'decider', 'ratifier', 'implementer' and, very often, 'interpreter' are, to a large extent, carried out by bureaucrats. Therefore, in policy areas characterized by medium intensity conflicts, central bureaucracy provides the locus of resolution, very often by public-private agreements and, in cases of less intensive conflicts, bureaucratic agencies. On the other hand, in the case of policy problems characterized by high-intensity conflicts, it is even more necessary for administrators to cooperate intensively with the respective committees of the LDP.

At present, the social basis for political consensus is disintegrating. For decades, opinion polls have shown that a vast majority of Japanese consider themselves members of the middle class, but this consciousness has been crumbling since the late 1980s.¹⁸ There are symptoms of a steady breakup of mass society, and a new expression – *bunshū* ['divided masses'] – has been coined to describe this tendency. Regional identity is the goal of prefectural governments rather than the former, centrally-controlled standardization. In the debate on educational reform, the terms 'individualism' and 'liberalization' have played an important role for many years.

In Japan, the term 'civil society' is mainly associated with the emergence of citizens' protest movements [*shimin undō*] in the post-war era.¹⁹ The idea of a civil society [*shimin shakai*] has been widely understood as a society of urban people and as a system of cooperative democracy (Maruyama Masao). As explained by Tetsuo Najita in his contribution to this volume, civil society movements have basically encouraged the social and political equality of individuals in a mutual, cooperative relationship by addressing specific social issues for a limited period of time. The social issues addressed have accompanied the process of industrialization from its very beginning. As Maruyama pointed out especially well, the internal freedom of the individual must be secured against external collective entities such as the state. Civil society movements were directed against hierarchy,

18. Japan Echo 1988, p. 160.

19. See the contribution of Tetsuo Najita in this volume.

permanent authoritative leadership and fixed ideology and encouraged the participation and equality of individuals.²⁰

In the past few decades, the activities of civil society organizations – especially non-profit organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – have considerably expanded. They increased their activities after the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995, in particular, and continue to carry out humanitarian projects in the field of development aid in cooperation with NGOs in Southeast-Asia. This process has been supported by legislation passed by the Japanese parliament, which aimed to promote non-profit activities.

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20. idem.

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CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN'S MODERNITY – AN INTERPRETIVE OVERVIEW

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ABSTRACT: The genealogy of themes related to 'civil society' in Japan, as provided in this article, demonstrates that they are entwined with Japan's modernity, which extends over a hundred years. Historically, civil society in modern Japan has been identified with two positions: 'radical democracy' and 'social democracy' or 'cooperative democracy'. The key turns in this history are (i) the Meiji Enlightenment and then Taishō Democracy, followed by (ii) the great debates, especially among Marxist scholars, over the 'social problem' and (iii) the new democracy of the post-war era. As ideas of civil society are identified with the left of the center, there is also a good deal of resistance to them. Still, the ideas of civil society exist and continue to exist as practice. The question of civil society in contemporary Japan is not whether there was such a thing as 'civil society' in the past, but whether the demands of large-scale organizations can be held at bay in terms of humane goals.

In modern Japan, the ideas and practices of 'civil society' developed under two distinct, yet related, ideological systems: one served as an overarching national purpose from the era of the revolutionary Meiji Ishin to the Pacific War (1868–1940) and was termed 'Wealth and Power' – *Fukoku kyōhei*; the other conceived wealth *as* power and was articulated with the slogan of the 1960's – 'Double the National Income' – *Shotoku baizō*. Both ideological regimes, encompassing over one-hundred years of history, were fundamentally 'capitalist'. We may say, therefore, that capitalism defined and regulated the distribution of wants and the exchange of needs in Japanese society and, of course, it continues to do so today.

The term 'civil society' in Japan is identified mainly with the postwar era and especially with the 1960's, and gained prominence with the emergence of 'citizens' protest movements' – *shimin undō* – directed against the economic policy just noted and the international relations this entailed, principally through the U.S. – Japan Mutual Security Treaty. While the subject of 'civil society' may thus be seen as primarily part of 'contemporary history', I find as a historian that valuable intellectual linkages with the prewar ideological system should be brought into view in our discussion here, for the subject is part of Japan's modern history itself.

I might add at the outset, that 'civil society' still marks a contested terrain over the meaning of political culture in Japan's modernity. It is not a theoretical basis for political consensus, as it is in the United States, for example, where civil society suggests a reality that once was (the reference to confirm this often being de Tocqueville) from which criticism is made as to how this reality somehow went astray due to political, economic, moral and other failings, but that with proper care may still be rectified or renewed. In Japan 'civil society', while much in current use, is thought of primarily as an ideal being realized rather than one that is to be 'renewed'. It also retains within it the memory of past tragedies and the vision that through critical thinking and practice the violent excesses of the past will not be repeated. The question of civil society in contemporary Japan, therefore, is not whether there was such a thing as 'civil society' in the past, but whether the demands of large-scale organizations can be held at bay in terms of humane goals.

The term for 'civil society' in Japanese is *shimin shakai*, or 'society of urban people', which is a translation of *bourgeois* or *bourgeoisie* or *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. Although it is not clear exactly when this translation was made, most likely in the 1890's, it became synonymous with 'bourgeois', and various meanings attached to it, as in *bourgeois class*, *bourgeois democracy*, *bourgeois revolution*, and so forth. Simultaneously, it gradually expanded in scope to mean not just 'bourgeois', but 'citizen' or 'civil', and in more recent times 'citizens' movement'. As early as 1906 when Abe Isoo, the Christian Socialist and pacifist, used the term *shimin*, meaning 'citizen' in his *The Ideal Person*, he did so without any doubt that the readership would understand its meaning. There are no footnoted or parenthetical explanations inserted to indicate that *shimin* literally meant 'bourgeois', but that it signified 'citizen', in the individual sense as well as the citizenry as a whole – *shimin zentai*. Over the next several decades, the implication of *shimin* as bourgeois would remain primary, but it would also turn to be inclusive of the people in general, or, as entered in the Iwanami philosophical dictionary of 1930, of *shimin*, as being identical in meaning to 'commoner' society – *shomin to onaji*. Today, the term *shimin* resonates with Abe's use of it as it no longer carries the connotation of 'bourgeois', even though the original ideographs indicating that meaning remain unchanged, there being no cognate for 'civil' that extends across national boundaries as in the West. Indeed, the subject of 'civil society' reminds us that modernity in Japan is part and parcel with the process of translation – *Translation and Japan's Modernity*, as a recent dialogue between two distinguished intellectuals called it.¹

1. Maruyama and Katō 1998.

Historically, civil society in modern Japan has been identified with two, often overlapping, positions that I shall refer to as ‘radical democracy’ and ‘social democracy’, with a less known variant of this latter sometimes termed ‘cooperative democracy’. Such conceptual boundaries are, of course, unstable, as there are many diverse parts involved, but I shall rely on them here for our discussion, and to underscore my interpretive perspective that the narrative does not encompass the entire political spectrum as a consensus, but is located sharply to the ‘left’ of center.

‘Radical democracy’, which would come to be identified especially with the postwar critic Maruyama Masao (1914–1996), is linked to the very beginning point of Japan’s modernity. Civil society ideas were first introduced within the context of the country’s modern revolution, the Meiji Ishin (1868), when the feudal order and its status structure and ideological underpinning, Confucianism, were overthrown. It was then that Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901) and his colleagues of the ‘Enlightenment’, called for an independent-minded citizenry that would make the nation strong so as to withstand colonization by ambitious Western powers. No government, however powerful, could maintain independence for the people, it was theorized. It was imperative, therefore, that there should be a well-educated citizenry prepared to be critical of the government, and to guide the nation toward the cause of independence. Fukuzawa argued the point that carefully reasoned minority views must be allowed to be stated freely and not be suppressed, as someday these views might turn out to be accurate. Likewise, absolute claims to truth, as in religious and state orthodoxies, ought not to be uncritically embraced, as they may turn out to be false; and these authoritative impositions of truth upon the citizenry were inimical to civilizational progress based on science and reason. Fukuzawa presented these views in two best-selling works in the 1870’s: *An Encouragement of Education* [*Gakumon no susume*] and *A General Outline of Civilization* [*Bunmeiron no gairyaku*]. The former drew on the ideas of John Stuart Mill (*On Liberty* was translated in 1872) and the latter was based on Thomas Buckle’s *History of Civilization in England*.²

The idea of an independent-minded citizenry, turned quickly to a critique of the newly emerging Meiji state as unacceptable because of its arbitrary use of power. Such was the view advanced in the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement – *Jiyūminken undō*, by leaders such as Ueki Emori (1857–1892). As a matter of principle, Ueki argued, there was no such thing as a ‘good’ government anywhere in the world and, therefore,

2. Howland 2002.

the new Meiji government should not expect absolute or blind loyalty from its citizenry; and, more importantly, no individual citizen in Japan should alienate the self in such a manner to the state. All human beings, Ueki argued, possessed within themselves an autonomous space that did not owe its existence to the government, and allowed individuals, therefore, to criticize the existing regime. Ueki called this autonomous inner space a 'gift of Heaven' – *Tenpū*, that was innate with birth, and which was a natural 'power' and hence a 'right' – *kenri*. The conceptual ideographs were drawn from the political discourse of the old Tokugawa regime, but through 'translation' was now being used to articulate the new natural right theory regarding the capacity of citizens to protest.

The other legacy of the Meiji era that remains a touchstone for 'radical democracy' is identified with Nakae Chōmin (1847–1901) especially through his translation in 1882 of Rousseau's treatise on 'social contract'. Here the primacy of the people over governments was emphasized. The existence of governments was always conditional, and what mattered most was the welfare of the people, not the glory of the state. True to Rousseau, Nakae presented the theory that humans had left the state of nature and entered a human order. Nakae rendered *l'état civile* as 'the human world' – *hito no yo*, and did not use the term for citizen or *shimin*. However, in introducing the idea that governments are conditional, never absolute, and that the people in general maintain the prerogative to place limits on governance, Nakae contributed enormously to the discourse on civil society. Despite his seeming optimism regarding a 'social contract' for modern Japan, Nakae left another more sobering legacy to modern Japanese intellectuals. This was his profound ambivalence about the future and he envisioned devastating wars for 'survival' on a global scale.

Following the Meiji Enlightenment, the idea of an independent citizenry came to be articulated in the early 20th century movement known as Taishō Democracy, or 'people-based' politics – *minponshugi*. This too left a lasting and distinct impact in the shaping of 'radical democracy'. The ideographs for 'people-based' politics, although traceable to the classic of *Mencius* of ancient China, were intended in the Taishō era to describe the emergence of democratic consciousness as expressed in the form of mass demonstrations against a corrupt and elitist government. While conservatives viewed the new development with great anxiety, and called for a renewed moral commitment to the nation, one that would reach back into their spiritual heritage to the ideal of loyalty, the leaders of Taishō Democracy saw this as an awakening of the common citizenry, and an expression of a new political consciousness. In the language of its principal spokesman, Yoshino Sakuzō (1878–1933), a scholar of the earlier Freedom and Popular Rights Movement, the people had begun to define their ideals

for a better future against the failings bequeathed from the past. Yoshino's conceptual understanding of the process was 'neo-Kantian', with some mediation from T.H. Greene, namely that each politically conscious individual in concert with others of like mind could act on an imperfect and unjust present, and thereby transcend the limitations of the past to bring about a better future.

Taishō Democracy introduced the new theme of critical idealism, which is a distinctive addition to Meiji political thought. While the Meiji Enlightenment and the politics of reason that informed the proposal for an independent-minded citizenry remained a basic starting point, Taishō Democracy added the dimension of dialectical engagement with the present to produce a better future.

As mentioned earlier, this genealogy of 'radical democracy' is most often identified in the post-war era with the brilliant political critic, Maruyama Masao, and to influential figures of similar mind, such as Ienaga Saburō, Tsurumi Shunsuke, Katō Shūichi and Ōe Kenzaburō. Maruyama, I should point out, avoided the use of the term 'civil society', preferring, according to his most senior protégé, Ishida Takeshi, Habermas' term 'public sphere', and emphasizing the concept of the 'unending revolution' for democracy. For Maruyama, 'civil society' was not part of an historical achievement, but a continuing struggle that had ended more often than not in failure. As expected, his critique of contemporary culture in this regard was very harsh.³

It is clear, however, that Maruyama identified his intellectual position with the two very precise moments in modern history that I have sketched, the first being the Meiji Enlightenment of the 1870's and 1880's (one of his last works was a three-volume critical commentary of Fukuzawa's work on 'civilization'); and the other, the idealistic democracy identified with Taishō Democracy. The principal legacy for Maruyama was the commitment of individuals to hold to minority and unpopular positions against the totalizing forces of politics and culture. In his most provocative and pioneering historical analysis, Maruyama even went as far back to the early 18th century and the writings of Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) to explicate philosophical roots in the pre-modern context for this spirit of intellectual resistance to all-encompassing metaphysical constructs. It was, however, the critical dialectic in Taishō idealism that was especially vital to his thinking.

Maruyama refers to his mentor at Tokyo Imperial University, Nanbara Shigeru, as a 'neo-Kantian', and to himself, as distinct from his mentor, as a 'Hegelian'. This latter he used in a specific sense. In his introduction to

3. Barshay 1988, Tsuzuki 1995, Kersten 1996, Iida 1997.

Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (1963), Maruyama referred to his dual identification with the Meiji Enlightenment and to Taishō idealism. As he once put it, '[I am] happy to consider myself a follower of the 18th century Enlightenment who still holds to its "obsolete" idea of human progress,' and then he went on to say: 'It was not in his glorification of the state as the embodiment of morality, but in his idea that "history is the progress towards consciousness of freedom" that I saw the kingpin of Hegel's system, however much he himself was a critic of the Enlightenment.'⁴ Maruyama further noted that his own work on Tokugawa political thought (on the theme of Sorai's resistance to orthodoxy noted above), was written under the influence of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, although he credited other themes, notably those drawn from Max Weber and Karl Mannheim, and with Anglo-American political science theory on a broad scale. We see in Maruyama ideas about civil society that underwent substantial intellectual enrichment due to the intervention of a dialectic that added an expansive theoretical range to the earlier Meiji politics of reason.

It was during the era of Taishō Democracy in the 1910s and 1920s that the term for civil society, *shimin shakai*, gained special prominence as being interchangeable with *bourgeois* society, *bourgeois* class, and *bourgeois* revolution, thus linking it with an emerging radical left. It also appears that the language of 'civil society' gained prominence within the widespread acceptance of the term 'social' as a conceptual category. It was a term that the Meiji translators agonized over, initially calling the social 'corporation' or 'company' – *kaisha*, and finally reversing the ideographs to render the 'company' social, in *shakai*. During the period of Taishō Democracy, the 'social' came to mean, more pointedly and dramatically, the 'social problem' – *shakai mondai*. It was a code-compound meaning social *dys-function* under conditions of rapid industrialization, especially the dislocations that were visible in cities and industrial sites. Urban riots, union strikes, suffrage movements, all converged to substantiate the language of the 'social problem' as a dislocation of unexpected magnitude. Tanaka Shōzō (1814–1913) led a movement against mercury poisoning in the rice fields, died in those fields, and remains a patron saint today as Japan's first deep ecologist. Kotoku Shūsui (1871–1911), a brilliant student of Nakae Chōmin (mentioned earlier), was executed by the state for advocating anarchism and for allegedly plotting the assassination of the monarch. Kawakami Hajime (1879–1946) wrote his famous serial 'Tales of Poverty' – *Binbō monogatari*, and then went on to translate *Capital*. Civil society – bourgeois

4. Maruyama 1968, p. xvi.

society, bourgeois class, bourgeois revolution – all came to the surface in the historical context of the unprecedented ‘social problem’ of early 20th century industrial society.

From the many complex debates on the fundamental nature of the ‘social problem’ there emerged a position that would have far-reaching consequences in the transformation of the meaning of *bourgeois* into *civil* society. The debate centered on the question, ‘what went wrong?’ and on the issue of the nature of the authoritarian regime at hand, that is, its basic and defining character: was the Meiji Ishin that produced this regime a revolution or an *abortive* one; and, in turn, did the nature of capitalism in the industrializing present reflect an incomplete *bourgeois* or *shimin* revolution. The debates, especially among Marxists, were intense and led to the production of a prodigious amount of scholarship over the nature of the old regime, and on feudalism and commercial and industrial capitalism, to which historians of all political shades remain profoundly indebted.

The group that is especially pertinent for our discussion here insisted that the material conditions of the present were fundamentally capitalist in nature, and that all human and institutional nexes and interflows were informed by that empirical reality. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the Meiji Ishin was, a ‘*bourgeois* revolution’, and the course of strategic political action must be defined in accordance with such historical conditions. This view stood in opposition, at first only obliquely, but subsequently explicitly, to the thesis advanced by the Comintern that the Meiji Ishin was an *abortive* revolution. A group of theorists, economists and historians, among them the leading ideologue Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880–1958), proceeded to sketch an alternative, revisionist Marxist vision of bourgeois civil society.

Beginning with the ground-breaking essay ‘On a New Direction for the Proletarian Movement’ – *Musankaikyū undō no hōkō tenkan* – written in 1922, Yamakawa set in motion an interpretive projection that would have far-reaching consequences. Turning away from direct anarchist action and also elitist vanguardism (known as Fukumoto-ism after its chief proponent), Yamakawa proposed a new course of action that involved going directly to the people, an approach that came to be known as the popular, or mass, line. The implication of this position was that, contrary to orthodox theory, social change through class dialectics was not inevitable, nor could it be fixed or adapted by human intervention so as to trigger dialectical change. Heroic interventionism was an elitist idea that should be abandoned; waiting for the dialectic to fire was also futile. Through a variety of means, therefore, the people in all quarters of society must be approached and their consciousness addressed so that they might act to advance the cause of social democracy. Modern capitalism was inescapable. The imperial state was not an amalgam of feudal and capitalist elements, but fundamentally capitalist, and, therefore,

the people must encounter the entire system, and not be drawn into debates as to whether the bourgeoisie was historically developed or underdeveloped.

As a logical extension of this theory, Yamakawa and his colleagues formed a Labor Farmer Party in 1926 and published a journal – *Rōnō* – named after this political coalition. This position was to be distinct from the rival Lecture School – *Kōza ha* – that argued, as alluded to above, the Meiji Ishin to be an incomplete *bourgeois* revolution. The School was named after the extensive lectures [*kōza*] on the history of capitalism in Japan given by Noro Eitarō and his colleagues (*Nihon shihonshugi hattatsushi kōza*), which characterized the Meiji Ishin as abortive, and the nation-state that followed it as a ‘mixed’ feudal-capitalist regime, requiring accordingly a carefully recruited and tightly organized political party that committed itself to this view of history.

The *Rōnō* group rejected this position and called for the formation of a united front among oppressed persons in city and country. The ‘proletariat’ was not only in the cities but everywhere within the modern capitalist system, and with this revision, the term *shimin*, or bourgeois ‘city dweller’, was expanded to include everyone, and certainly country folks. Farmers were no longer feudal remnants, but, along with workers in cities, were equally exploited by capitalism. The proletariat, in short, was the ‘people’, and the *shimin* meant commoners in general or the entire citizenry – *shimin zentai* – in the wording of Abe Isoo noted earlier. The logical extension of this theoretical line was Yamakawa’s formation (which included Abe, Ōyama Ikuo and others) of the Social Mass Party – *Shakai taishū tō* – in the early 1930’s, followed by the ‘Popular People’s Front’ – *Jinmin minshu sensen* – directed against fascism at home and abroad.

Yamakawa’s position was criticized for being permissive, as it could incorporate a wide variety of intellectuals and groups. But this was also its strength over the long haul for it claimed a theory that social justice would be realized by various people who were organized in different ways and doing different kinds of work in daily life. The dialectics of dysfunction were to be located in many places, uppermost being, for him, the warring and expansive state.

In his essay ‘The ‘Civil Society’ Ideal and Wartime Resistance’, the intellectual historian of politics, Hashikawa Bunsō wrote of this coalition as follows:

They believed in a militant democracy and liberalism and fought against an indiscriminate political authority which threatened the individual’s personal and spiritual values. This group had a diverse roster. Some were members of the Non-Church [Christianity] movement, such as Yanaihara Tadao and his followers. There were liberals like Minobe Tatsukichi, Kawai Ejirō, Ishibashi Tanzan and Kiyosawa Kiyoshi. Marxists such as Nakae Ushiki and Ozaki

Hotsumi were also adherents. Though the spectrum reached from Christians to members of the People's Front, a common trait was that none had accepted the Marxist dogma on the nature of revolution. Unlike many of the political apostates of the Communist Party, they were able to continue their battle with the authorities without losing their integrity (...)⁵

The regime suppressed the 'popular front' in 1938, expelling the professors among them from their university positions, sending others, like Yamakawa, to prison and dissolving the Popular Front. As soon as the War was over, however, Maruyama, representing the 'militant democracy' just noted, would write his famous denunciation of 1930's 'ultra nationalism'; Yamakawa would issue a declaration calling for people from all walks of life to devote a portion of their daily lives to bring about the new democracy and resist authoritarian bureaucratic statism. Democratic parties, labor unions, farmer groups, cultural organizations and individuals from all walks of life, he noted, should now form a 'united democratic front' or 'united popular front' to transcend received history and bring about a new democratic and humane order.

The position enunciated by Yamakawa and his colleagues of the 'labor-farmer' alliance would gain further credence in 1955 with the so-called 'Critique of Stalin' – *Stalin hihan*. The new democracy would not be realized through the dictatorship of a tightly organized, centralized party armed with an official ideology, but rather by informally organized and diverse citizens' groups and individuals. This served as the basic premise for 'citizens' movements' in the 1960's and onward to the present. These are issue-oriented movements, seen most dramatically in the 1960 opposition to the U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Pact, which swear no allegiance to a permanent organization or dedication to charismatic leadership, but consist in shared commitments. It is a form of citizen protest in which scholars and specialists have no egregious claim to authority.

Drawing on Yamakawa's theoretical legacy outlined previously, the political scientist Takabatake Michitoshi described the movements for civil society in the following terms. The participants, he observed, were ordinary 'citizens' who normally were not 'political' individuals but who felt it important to act in a 'political' way for values such as equality or freedom, even though such 'political' acts may not have seemed directly related to that person's everyday work. How one took part may also be in the form of contribution of money, kind, or labor. Participation neither precluded one's normal activities, nor did it require one to become a 'professional' within

5. Koschmann 1978, p. 131.

an organization. Civil action could be within small groups or large ones, but was always marked by the agreement that the principles of equality among members would be respected, that there would be no central control, and that the organization would not be oriented towards maintaining the authority of a single individual or group of individuals within a hierarchy. It meant creating a space within one's political self to act on behalf of a concrete cause deemed to be just, which could include such issues as education, environmental pollution, political corruption, food poisoning, housing, and other quality of life issues. Any individual from whatever walk of life could claim within the self the capacity to act in a critical way against a modernity that seemed to have gone awry.⁶

It is also worthy to note here that Takabatake and Hashimoto, previously quoted, both make reference to the non-sectarian Christianity of Uchimura Kanzō (who, as I mentioned earlier in passing, was a pacifist). While this is a roundabout way to introduce religion, as it is one of the themes highlighted in this volume, I should also say that most historical accounts in Japan do not turn their attention to religion, Christian, Buddhist or otherwise, mainly because modernization in terms of civil society is thought to be a secular process, as prioritized in the intellectual history of civil society in the West as well. Uchimura gained notoriety for refusing, as a middle school teacher in 1891, to bow with respect to the image of the Emperor and the newly promulgated Rescript on Education. Uchimura claimed that such allegiance should be directed only to God and not to the state or other organizational forms, including sectarian Christianity.

Uchimura's influence reached into the intellectual stratum in subtle and complex ways. Maruyama's mentor, Nanbara Shigeru (noted earlier as a 'neo-Kantian'), was a disciple of Uchimura. Takabatake relies on Uchimura to argue for a pluralistic and 'non-sectarian' organizational format to engage individuals in promoting civil society. Uchimura's thinking is also evident in Japanese intellectuals and their attraction to Weber's thesis on Protestantism and religious transcendence.

The thinking of Uchimura, a non-sectarian Christian, Maruyama the 'radical democrat', with firm ties to Meiji Enlightenment and Taishō idealism, and Yamakawa, the revisionist Marxist and atheist, thus co-mingle in the civil society movements of the 1960's following the demise of Stalinism. The examples often cited are the Voice of the Voiceless Society [*Koi naki koi no kai*], and the Peace in Vietnam Alliance [*Beheiren*] led by Tsurumi Shunsuke, and his colleagues.⁷

6. op.cit.

7. Sasaki-Uemura 2001.

I should like to emphasize here that the theme alluded to above – that civil society movements in Japan emphasized the absence of hierarchy, permanent authoritative leadership, and fixed ideology, and encouraged instead the equality of individuals in a mutual and cooperative relationship – addressed specific issues and for a limited duration. This perspective draws on a political position which is related to ‘social democracy’, but is referred to in the postwar period as ‘cooperative democracy’ [*kyōdō minshushugi*]. Backed by Yamamoto Sanehiko (1885–1952), editor of the reformist and pioneering journal *Kaizō* that began in 1919, an attempt was made by leaders of various cooperative movements in the late 1940’s to establish a ‘cooperative democratic party’, though the attempt was suppressed by the military regime in 1942. The project was disbanded by the occupational Supreme Command as potentially subversive. Although the movement did not survive as a political party, the cooperative and associational practices underlying the rationale for such a party persisted unabated and remain a ubiquitous presence. It informs the nature of informal, egalitarian organization dedicated to specific protest efforts addressing issues such as quality of life, or industrial pollution, as in the Minamata mercury poisoning case.⁸

The history of cooperative practices, of course, goes back to the old Tokugawa regime, and certainly much beyond that, with roots and continuing practices in Buddhism in its efforts to maintain temples and carry out compassionate work to save others – *jihī*. As I have found in my own readings in ‘commoner economic thought and practice’, they became especially widespread in the 18th century in village mutual aid insurance and contractual credit and loan and investment cooperatives, as well as in better-known formats to fund religious pilgrimages. Cooperatives in and of themselves, being so widespread and diverse in purpose, are not properly speaking a structure of civil society.

They are perhaps best thought of as a mode of ‘organizational consciousness’ rather than an explicit political theory. They overlap nonetheless with the social democratic precepts set forth by Yamakawa and reformulated later by Takabatake, emphasizing that through cooperative practice citizens join hands, minds, and energies to achieve certain humanitarian ends. The volunteer work taken on by thousands of university students in the aftermath of the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 is a recent example of this.

In the prewar period, I shall add parenthetically, the cooperative format was put to particularly energetic use by the Christian socialist Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960), who organized a cooperative movement in the

8. Kurihara 1999.

poverty-stricken slum areas of inner city Osaka and Kobe, and then again in the ravaged conditions of the immediate post-war years. Kagawa endorsed cooperative practices throughout the country as an approach to the modern 'social problem'. He drew inspiration from the indigenous legacy of mutual insurance cooperatives, as well as from cooperative movements in Denmark, and those identified with the Christian humanitarian Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen (1818–1888).

I have emphasized in my overview that the themes of 'civil society' are entwined with Japan's modernity, which extends over one hundred years. I have referred to key turns in this history, beginning with the Meiji Enlightenment and then Taishō Democracy, followed by the great debates, especially among Marxist scholars over the 'social problem', and, of course, the new democracy of the post-war era. Because civil society ideals in this intellectual genealogy are identified with the left-of-center, there is also a good deal of resistance to them. There are those who argue strenuously against the appropriateness of civil society values for Japan because they are of foreign origin and should not be furthered at the expense of national history, morality and identity. Scholars and critics of this persuasion are dedicated to rewriting history from a national perspective, and to address openly the problem of national morality and national history. In their view, the war that Japan lost was not the war itself, but the spiritual defeat that followed in the post-war era.⁹

In a recent roundtable discussion on 'The Nation State and War',¹⁰ the participants affirmed national morality, placed the war experience in this perspective, and, in the course of developing this theme, quickly singled out the Nobel Laureate Kenzaburo Ōe as an enemy of patriotism. Ōe had rejected the highest cultural achievement prize awarded by the imperial crown on the ground that he grew up in the post-war movement to realize democracy in Japan and would not compromise his deep commitment to that vision. Ōe is also castigated for being an uncritical admirer of Maruyama Masao, who is accused of not priding himself in being Japanese and who embraced Euro-centric ideas that were irrelevant to the development of Japanese history.

In a separate discussion of 'civil society', a completely opposite view is advanced.¹¹ Here, Ōe is presented as being exemplary of the values of

9. Nishibe 2000, Nishio 1999.

10. Kobayashi et al. 1999.

11. Hara 2000.

civil society precisely for having turned down the aforementioned cultural prize. This is seen as an instance of bold and uncompromising resistance to the pattern of cultural control and domination from above and from the center. Alongside Ōe, several athletes (whose names I will here forgo) are mentioned, two of whom won five gold medals at the Nagano Olympics, and managed, subsequently, to avoid a personal meeting with the Emperor due to 'a prior engagement', and another who chooses not to sing the national anthem before soccer games because, for him, the tune is not conducive to competitive play.

In a related example, the patriotic historicism of the neo-nationalists just mentioned is taken to task by a group of scholars touting a 'thorough-going criticism' of the advocates of national morality and history.¹² These scholars clearly identify with the values of civil society: the citizenry, or people, over the nation-state; global over national citizenship; the principles of individual rights and of freedom and equality over the idealization of the monarchy and centralized political culture; valuation of the 'peace constitution'; the renunciation of war as an extension of popular sovereignty; the endorsement of an open society where criticism and action for the betterment of society are encouraged. In sum, these scholars affirm a modernity in which citizens live and work together for a better future, not a situation in which a homogenous people strive to confirm their common identity as a moral certitude.

In the past decade or so there has been an expansion of NPO and NGO activities in Japan. Volunteer groups proliferated, especially after the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995, and NGO associations are linked quite significantly with comparable groups in Southeast Asia to carry out humanitarian projects. The organizational principles are similar to those of the citizens' movements mentioned earlier, suggesting a continuity with the 'Peace in Vietnam' movement and support of war refugees movements in the 1960–1970's. It remains to be seen how these citizens' organizations will fare in the future, which is to say, whether they will flourish as privately funded, volunteer-type associations, or whether they will find support and stability under the administrative umbrella provided by the state.

In 1998 the Diet passed legislation 'to promote specified non-profit activities'. This piece of legislation that grants, among other things, tax exemption status to 'non-profit organizations' is interpreted positively by some as it encourages and legitimates citizen participation in social reform issues. It is also viewed in a far less sanguine manner by others as an indication

12. Hamabayashi et al. 2001.

that the managerial state feels it is necessary to 'allow' or 'regulate', in terms of formal law, that which is a social reality, thus blurring the separation between state and society that is basic to the intellectual history of civil society. In the legislation just noted, the idea of 'citizen', not unexpectedly, is downplayed, and 'non-profit' is the preferred terminology over 'non-government'. The discourse on 'civil society', as the autonomy of individuals and citizens in general relative to the nation-state, will thus persist as a subject of contestation – an 'unending struggle' in the process of Japan's modernity, as Maruyama expressed.

Despite this complex legislative intervention, my informal observations of citizen movements in regional towns and cities suggest that the ideas of civil society exist as practice, for example, in 'common sense' protests against the impositions of large-scale organizations. The history that I have spoken of in this paper continues as part of a political culture, informed by a long and subtle history, no longer marked by the debates over ideological disagreements that once held sway in citizens' protests against industrial pollution and in defense of the human and natural environment. Citizens, in their everyday, and usually apolitical, lives, do reserve a portion within themselves with which to participate in and promote causes that are just, not-for-profit and not commanded by the government. With or without legislative regulation, citizens act for a more humane and democratic future within various regions that are national and, at the same time, global.

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MARUYAMA MASAO AND THE DILEMMA OF THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL IN POSTWAR JAPAN

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ABSTRACT: The predicament of public intellectuals in post-WWII Japan is examined in this article through the case of one of Japan's leading postwar thinkers, Maruyama Masao (1914–1996). The complexities of the transwar environment for intellectuals such as Maruyama are outlined, and indicate that readings of the war experience became a core indicator of political legitimacy in the postwar period. An important consequence of Maruyama's interpretation of Japan's war experience was that he believed that distance between state and society was a necessary prerequisite for meaningful democracy to take root in postwar Japan. This complicated enormously the thoughts and behavior of engaged intellectuals such as Maruyama, as they could not afford to completely ignore the political realm. Following Maruyama through three crisis periods – 1945 (defeat), 1960 (the security treaty crisis) and 1968–69 (the university riots) –, this chapter illustrates how this essential dilemma constrained and shaped public intellectual activity in the postwar period.

The intellectual in politics is always 'unbalanced' in the estimation of his colleagues. He peers around the next corner while they keep their eyes on the road; and he risks his faith on unrealised ideas, instead of confining it prudently to humdrum loyalties. He is 'in advance', and, in this sense, an extremist. If history justifies his premonitions, well and good. But if, on the contrary, history takes the other turning, he must either march forward into the dead end, or ignominiously turn back, repudiating ideas which have become part of his personality.

Richard Crossman, 'Introduction', *The God that Failed* (1950)¹

Introduction

Intellectuals acquire pivotal significance in historical circumstances of dramatic change or crisis. The intellectuals whose lives straddled war and peace in 1940s Japan confronted the task of not only making sense of historical crisis and national collapse, but also outlining convincing visions

1. Crossman 1950, p. 8.

for the postwar future. Many of Japan's transwar intellectuals were indeed instrumental in articulating the value system of the postwar world. In an atmosphere of amazing vitality, these thinkers deliberately crafted their postwar socio-political ideals as value-opposites of the past. Distorted, reactive and emotional, their readings of the wartime past – particularly their explanations for the nature of the authoritarian state – would function as a kind of *continuo* beneath the future-focused idealism of the postwar era. The flavor of postwar idealism was that of democracy, encompassing a vision of societal empowerment and state emasculation that spoke of a very particular reading of the war. The most creative and influential voice of postwar democratic idealism was that of political scientist and intellectual historian, Maruyama Masao (1914–1996).

Maruyama's postwar democratic vision fused war guilt with postwar democratic legitimacy in a very specific manner. Preventing the re-emergence of the authoritarian state in postwar Japan required the existence of defensive distance between state and society because, in his view, war had primarily been an act of state. Active value-creation on the part of autonomous individuals in society would underpin postwar democracy; activism in the name of pacifism would represent the triumph of this democratic vision. Maruyama's role as a public intellectual in postwar Japan involved nothing less than quarantining a discredited 'public' (official) sphere from a liberated 'private' (social) sphere. The modern state's absorption of the individual and the community into the ideology of the wartime Emperor System had paralyzed the generative core of democratic values – the autonomous individual. Sanitizing the realm of society from that of the state in postwar Japan demanded a concurrent exercise in decontamination – the differentiation of 'the private' from 'the public'. If 'the public' implied the umbrella entity of politics, bureaucracy and official collectives, it would always – in Maruyama's estimation – necessarily fall into second place behind the realm of 'the private'. Only then could 'the public' be refashioned into the driving force behind what he called 'healthy nationalism'² and the democratic reconciliation of the private and the public be realized in the 'autonomous society'.³ For Maruyama, valorizing the private was the means by which the public could be resurrected in the postwar as a democratic entity.

'Public intellectuals' in postwar Japan acted as negative mediators between these two alienated spheres of public and private. In the eyes of intellectuals, acts of resistance and criticism on the part of society against

2. See Maruyama Masao, 'Nationalism in Japan: its theoretical background and prospects', in: Maruyama 1969, pp. 135–156.

3. This thesis is elaborated in detail in Kersten 1996.

the state were indicators of enhanced democratic legitimacy in postwar Japan. Yet, in the flood of publishing concerning the life work of Maruyama Masao that has appeared since his death, few writers have explicitly lauded Maruyama's postwar contribution as a 'public intellectual'. Maruyama's remarkable theoretical contribution to the study of politics, and his highly original methodologies for interpreting the history of political thought, were acknowledged even during his lifetime. But this represents only an implied estimation of his public contribution. Amongst the less rosy evaluations of Maruyama, both during his lifetime and since his demise, we encounter an uncomfortable burr of disappointment. Maruyama has, in effect, been painted by his critics as 'the god that failed'. Despite a record of lifetime activism in the realms of protest and academe, and a sizeable body of contemporary commentary throughout the second half of the 20th century, Maruyama has been portrayed in tones ranging from the peevish to the openly hostile as an elitist who failed to follow the dictates of his own intellectual logic. As absurd as it may sound, Maruyama has been condemned for being what he was – a professional public intellectual.

Accusations of 'failure' connote the existence of an ideal, or an alternative vision, of what a public intellectual should be. Was there a prevailing notion of 'public intellectuals' in postwar Japan? If so, how did this notion develop? Through considering three episodes of crisis in postwar Japan – defeat, the security treaty crisis of 1960, and the university uprisings of 1968–1969 – we will identify disparate notions of the proper role for public intellectuals and compare them with Maruyama's own view. We can then examine what Maruyama did, and how it meshed with his own ideas. This paper thus seeks to evaluate Maruyama Masao as a public intellectual in his own terms. Maruyama cherished his intellectual 'imbalance' in favor of the private over the public and, despite his own uncomfortable excursions into popular activism, emerged with his vision of the public firmly centered on the paramountcy of the private. His formulation of state-society relations has had an enduring impact on Japan's postwar political culture. Despite the tumultuous events of postwar in his lifetime, it was a vision from which Maruyama never 'turned back'.

1. Intellectuals in Modern Japan

The role of the intellectual in Japan is a slippery subject for several reasons. The difficulties begin with the conceptual spectrum within which we seek to locate the intellectual. Intellectuals were expected to define their role between two conceptual anchors, state and society. The problem is that these anchors were for the most part adrift in transwar Japan, with intellectuals

deriving their identities via associative or dissociative means between anchors in a scene that was constantly changing. This dilemma of definition mirrors the confusion surrounding the meanings invented to associate with 'the people'. In fact, these dilemmas are intrinsically interconnected. Between 1930 and 1960, 'the people' moves from its official 1930s definition, where nation (society) and state are fused (denoted in the term '*kokumin*'), to a militant liberal insistence on a narrower entity excluding the state in the Occupied Japan of the late 1940s (citizens '*shimin*' or ordinary folk '*shomin*'), until in the 1950s and 1960s we find the undifferentiated entity of 'the masses' [*taishū*], from which intellectuals such as Maruyama ultimately found themselves expelled.

The irony is compounded when we realize that, of course, it is the intellectuals themselves who are devising and propagating these readings of 'the people'. How, then, did it come about that intellectuals were themselves being demonized during the university riots of 1968–1969? The answer in part lies with the splintering of the postwar intellectual community. Tsuzuki Tsutomu launches a powerful case for generational difference as the explanation for this, pointing out that it is the 'war generation' [*senchū-ha*] that comes out on top over Maruyama's 'civil society youth' [*shimin shakai seinen*] generation, who were in their thirties when the war ended.⁴ According to Tsuzuki, it is Maruyama's most vehement critic, Yoshimoto Takaaki and his war generation cohort, who ultimately win an insider role with youth in the future: 'at the end of the 1960s, what happened amongst the students of Japan was a shift from the Maruyama paradigm to the Yoshimoto paradigm.'⁵ This paradigm shift represented more than generational change, however. It was also a sign of impatience on the part of a postwar generation of public intellectuals with the influence of war-weary paradigms in their postwar world.

Of course ideology was also a divisive element in Japan's postwar intellectual culture, which was further complicated by the ethical absolutes of postwar discourse. A small number of leftists, particularly communists, emerged from prison in September 1945 as the only identifiable group of intellectuals who had shown any form of resistance to the absolutist wartime state. By the 1950s both Maruyama and Yoshimoto would decry the misplaced heroic image that came to be attached to the communist left in postwar,⁶ and

4. Tsuzuki 1995, pp. 13–14.

5. op.cit., p. 448.

6. See for instance Maruyama Masao, 'Sensō sekininron no mōten' (The blindspots of war responsibility discourse), in *Maruyama Masao shū* Vol. 6, pp. 159–165; and Yoshimoto Takaaki, 'Bungakusha no sensō sekinin' (The war responsibility of writers), in *Yoshimoto Takaaki zenchosakushū* Vol. 13, pp. 416–424.

both were forced to navigate between the poles of left and right in a Cold War world. The pacifist-democracy paradigm operated in the context of a leftist cohort splintered into communist and non-communist streams, a dissonance that intensified when postwar intellectuals turned a critical eye towards those self-proclaimed communist wartime heroes. Added to the uncomfortable fact of passive or active collaboration on the part of many wartime intellectuals, the majority of communists of the 1930s and 1940s had committed apostasy [*tenkō*] and abandoned their communist beliefs in favor of a publicly-stated loyalty to the Emperor. In the critical environment of postwar debate over intellectuals' war guilt, even those communists who had chosen the noble path of rotting in jail appeared lamentably ineffectual and unqualified to lead social autonomy from the state in postwar.

Several jarring notes are struck as we follow the tumultuous history of Japan from defeat in 1945 through to the 1970s: the traumas of a pacifist nation being allied to one side in the Cold War; the subsequent advent of peace activism and mass society in the 1950s; the schism of the anti-security treaty riots of 1960; the high growth decade of the 1960s; and onwards to the blunt anger of the 1968–1969 university riots [*daigaku funsō*]. Japanese postwar values were articulated in an atmosphere of crisis and socio-political dislocation.

The reorientation of 'public intellectualism' in the transwar period reflects this sea change in ethical intellectual discourse that accompanied the move from evaluating war to articulating peace. According to Barshay, prewar public intellectuals existed in the zone between 'official' and 'private', with the proviso that 'public' suggested affinity with the state. Public intellectuals could be differentiated only by their degree of connection to the official sphere i.e. through being a relative 'insider' as opposed to an 'outsider'.⁷ Postwar, the mark of public intellectualism was that of resistance to the state, of critical non-interaction and opposition. It is fascinating that in Japan today, historical revisionists such as Katō Norihiro are attempting to resurrect the prewar ideal where there was no discernible space between public [*ōyake*] and private [*watakushi*], even presenting the private sphere as a lesser component of the public one.⁸ Nothing could be more alien to the flavor of public intellectualism in the immediate postwar period.

In the midst of the shattered value systems of the early postwar years, Maruyama and his peers set out to redraw and rehabilitate the intellectual landscape. The key to intellectuals' role in the early postwar years was

7. Barshay 1988, pp. XIII–XV.

8. Katō 1999, pp. 191–192, p. 196.

mediation, in the sense of deciphering the war experience for society at large, and building foundations for a postwar polity that took its cue from outside the realm of formal politics. This mediator role came to develop interventionist dimensions through activism and leadership, and also in symbolic ways through representing how society could engage with politics. Whether depicted in disparaging terms as ‘enlighteners’ or as ‘progressive intellectuals’, none can dispute that in this company Maruyama Masao had an explosive impact.

Edward Said posited that true intellectuals are those who exist on the brink of orthodoxy, who ‘speak the truth to power’ and choose the life of marginality, dissent or opposition.⁹ Maruyama emerged into the postwar intellectual arena convinced that conformism on the part of intellectuals with the state, or with any fixed ideological universe, had been the cause of intellectuals’ failure in wartime. In postwar, intellectuals’ responsibility was towards society, with the weight of their wartime failure a constant intellectual companion. After 1945, ‘underneath intellectuals’ determination to make a new start, flowed a blend of hope for the future and regret for the past,’ wrote Maruyama in 1982. ‘In other words, a sense of liberation and a sense of responsibility that was difficult to disentangle.’¹⁰ This ‘community of regret’ was the emotional and ethical universe within which postwar public intellectuals performed their social responsibility. In the Meiji era (1868–1912), Fukuzawa Yukichi had posed the question to the intellectuals of his day – should an intellectual be on the side of government, or committed to life in the wilderness?¹¹ For Maruyama, the answer had a dialectical ring to it – one had to be both engaged, and disengaged. Unashamedly proclaiming the importance of objectivity in mediating reality, Maruyama believed that:

by separating one’s cognitive self from reality as directly given, and standing for a moment in a relation of acute tension with it, one reconstructs the world logically, which is what makes it possible for theory to act as a lever to move reality.¹²

Maruyama chose as a postwar public intellectual to live on the cusp of boots-and-all involvement. As we saw in 1960, this did not mean that he

9. Said 1994, p. XIV.

10. Maruyama Masao, ‘Kindai Nihon no chishikijin’, in Maruyama 1982, pp. 114–115.

11. Quoted in Tsuzuki 1995, p. 94.

12. Maruyama Masao, ‘Nihon no Shisō’, quoted in Irokawa 1985, p. 264.

remained aloof; but it did mean that Maruyama consciously believed he should ‘stand on the brink between complete commitment and complete irresponsibility.’¹³ This was Maruyama’s self-prescribed role for public intellectuals in postwar Japan.

2. Maruyama Masao and 8.15 (15 August 1945)

On 15 August 1945 (8.15), WWII came to an end with the conclusion of the conflict in Asia and the Pacific. The defining event was the announcement made by Hirohito, the Emperor of Japan, broadcast over the radio at midday on that day to the people of Japan. In a speech filled with allusions and layered meanings, the Emperor declared his decision to bring hostilities to a close without mentioning the word ‘defeat’, or the fact that Japan was following the dictates of what the rest of the world regarded as an unconditional surrender. Rather, the underlying message of this speech was the pursuit of one objective, namely that of continuity. The continuity of the Imperial House, the Imperial family, and, by implication, the cultural integrity of the Japanese race, was Hirohito’s primary concern. Yet for the intellectuals who emerged into the reality of Occupied Japan (1945–1952), 8.15 represented a decisive break from an authoritarian, imperialist past. Defeat represented the dawn of postwar democracy, and 8.15 was a date to be celebrated in terms of its discontinuity from a discredited past. Maruyama Masao was a proponent of this latter position, and indeed, came to be associated with it as its most high profile representative in the academic world.

Maruyama’s understanding of public intellectualism stemmed directly from, and was a necessary extension of, his reading of the war. In brief, Maruyama concluded that for democratization to have a chance after 1945, society had to be quarantined from the state, and the individual quarantined from society, before a democratic polity could be constructed. Maruyama’s normative starting point was that above all, the internal freedom of the individual had to be secured from external collective entities, primarily the state. The *tokkō*’s harassment of Maruyama during his time at Tokyo Imperial University in the late 1930s hammered this defensive individualism into his brain.

In this way I came to know about the character of the Japanese state, which did not distinguish between internal thought and external action and so would

13. Maruyama Masao, ‘Gendai ni okeru ningen to seiji’, in: *Maruyama Masao shū* Vol. 9, p. 44.

invade one's spirit without restriction, and while it may be retrospective wisdom, I think that this influenced my subsequent academic interests in a profound way.¹⁴

The need to sanitize the private sphere was likewise intimated by the way in which Maruyama and his peers rationalized the lack of effective resistance to the wartime state in Japanese society. With the shadow of the 1930s *tenkō* experience looming large, by 1960 Maruyama reasoned that successful rebellion depended on militant individualism. In *Chūsei to hangyaku* [Loyalty and Rebellion], Maruyama stated that while revolution is a social phenomenon, effective resistance depends not on any single group but on continuing distance between the collective and the self. If a revolutionary movement stems from a group that does not comprise individuals who have internalized the kernels of rebellion, the group will be prone to apostasy as *a group*. Revolutionary social change on a national scale emanates from the private self, the active generative core and carrier of rebellion.¹⁵

Maruyama's negative view of the state was already evident in the 1930s. In his prize-winning essay on the concept of the state, Maruyama declared his academic hostility to authoritarianism:

The individual can gradually develop concretely by using the state only as an agent, and by tirelessly standing in a relation that guarantees negative independence from the state.¹⁶

The works for which Maruyama was to gain enduring renown, written in the first postwar years, sought to establish a critical discourse regarding the state utilizing the language of psychology rather than that of Marxist historical materialism. *The Logic and Psychology of Ultrationalism* and *The Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders* described the 'all-pervasive psychological coercion' that the state had exerted over the people of Japan, 'forcing' them to follow the state's war.¹⁷ The theme of a lack of agency on the part of wartime actors is consistent in this area of Maruyama's work. Not only were the people 'deceived and

14. Maruyama Masao, 'Nanbara sensei o shi toshite', in Maruyama &c 1989, pp. 440–441.

15. Maruyama Masao, 'Chūsei to hangyaku', in Maruyama 1960, pp. 464–467.

16. Maruyama Masao, 'Seijigaku ni okeru kokka no gainen' [The concept of the state in political science], in Maruyama 1976, p. 32.

17. Both essays appear in translation in Maruyama 1969.

misled', to borrow the terminology of the Potsdam Declaration, but so too were the military leaders themselves. According to Maruyama, these leaders were victims of the 'system of irresponsibility' that typified Japan's power structure in the authoritarian state. Power and ethics were interchangeable, but ethics were dissociated from actual formal positions of authority. This led to the ludicrous situation in which military leaders regarded themselves as 'following established reality', or as being fundamentally uninvolved with the making of history.

Maruyama's methodology in these early postwar years was informed by an implied victimhood on the part of individuals that was premised, in turn, on an absence of subjectivity, where ethics and responsibility did not coexist. We can now better understand Maruyama's chosen methodology in his early postwar work. Marxist notions of the inevitability and agency of history offended Maruyama's insistence on active value-creation as the basis for postwar social ascendancy. This neo-Kantian premise played an important part in the estrangement of communists from the wider intellectual community in the second decade of postwar, and was a major factor in persuading Maruyama to adopt the language of pathology instead of Marxism in his initial analyses of the dynamics of war.¹⁸ If postwar society depended on the establishment of subjectivity, any idea that history was a force that moved men, rather than the other way around, threatened the integrity of postwar democracy.

When seeking out explanations for this curious pathology of power in the wartime state, Maruyama turned to the idea of incomplete modernity for answers. His first postwar essay, *Kindaiteki Shii* [Modern Thinking] stated clearly that the debacle of the wartime state had been facilitated by the incomplete nature of Japan's modernity. 'Rather than overcoming modern thinking in our country, it is evident to everyone that it is more a question of whether we have grasped it at all.'¹⁹ The single most obvious indicator of 'completed' modernity was the autonomous individual. Once again, postwar enmity between state and society was underscored by a particular reading of the war experience. And yet, postwar society needed to implement its sovereignty over the state; total quarantine was thus not viable. The question was: how could society re-connect with the postwar state, without unleashing undesirable patterns from the past?

Associating value-creation with autonomous individuals in society instead of the state was Maruyama's tentative postwar formula, although he

18. Maruyama 1986, postscript, p. 495.

19. Maruyama Masao, 'Kindaiteki shii' [Modern Thought], in *Maruyama Masao shū* Vol. 3, p. 4.

was not entirely comfortable with it. The impetus towards the private as the medium to the public was undoubtedly a personal issue for Maruyama. Like his mentor Nanbara Shigeru, Maruyama preferred the study to the soapbox. And yet, both for Maruyama and Nanbara, there came a time when it was impossible to remain behind one's desk. For Nanbara, it was the catastrophic fire-bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 that catapulted him into the dangerous role of clandestine agitator for peace.²⁰ For Maruyama, it was the forcing through of legislation on the revised security treaty between Japan and the United States in May and June 1960 that tipped the scale in favor of unprecedented public activism. Maruyama and Nanbara both revealed that their academic excursions into the history of Japanese political thought were provoked and guided by a fundamental concern with the problems of contemporary society. But as Katō Takashi astutely observes, they differed in one essential way. Whereas Nanbara emerged from his activism with his heart still focused on notions of an ideal cultural collective (*minzoku kyōdōtai* and *minzoku kokka*), Maruyama was fixed unswervingly on the individual as the apex of history.²¹

Interestingly, none of Maruyama's peers expected Maruyama (or Ōtsuka Hisao, another pioneering postwar thinker) to become an actual 'leader' of a mass movement. It was assumed, even on the brink of the security treaty crisis of 1960, that this was the task for Maruyama's successors: 'Japanese social science will intellectually be developed when the intellectual successors of Ōtsuka and Maruyama appear everywhere, and somehow use the content of their ideas to create a movement.'²² Maruyama's gesture to the soapbox in 1960 was astonishing not only to himself, but to all who knew him.

3. Maruyama and 5.19 (19 May 1960)

The events of May and June 1960, when the security treaty between Japan and the U.S. was revised, can rightly be regarded as Japan's greatest postwar political crisis. The government of Prime Minister Kishi advocated revision in order to lend more equality to Japan within the terms of the treaty. However, in the eyes of Japan's pacifist intellectuals, any treaty at all amounted to a violation of the spirit and letter of the 1947 pacifist constitution. Pacifist activists even preferred the original treaty to the proposed revised version, because at least the original treaty had been signed in 1951

20. Nanbara Shigeru in Maruyama &c 1989, pp. 269–270.

21. Katō 1998, p. 45.

22. Fujita Shōzō in Kuno &c 1959, p 160.

under duress while Japan was still an occupied country, relieving the Japanese from responsibility for it. The clash between the forces for and against treaty revision reached its peak on 19 May 1960 (5.19), when, in a series of devious yet legal moves, Kishi's administration manoeuvred the treaty through the Lower House of parliament. For many thinkers, protesters and pacifists, this was the moment when the focus of protest shifted from 'oppose the treaty' to 'protect democracy'. For Maruyama, it seemed that the opportunities afforded Japan by defeat in 1945 (8.15) were being put at risk by the tactics of Kishi, and that Japan's postwar democracy was being fatally undermined. This was the nature of the link between '8.15' and '5.19' in the minds of many who were caught up in this moment of intense political conflict.

Maruyama's journey from enlightener on democracy for society at large in 1945, to street marching protester in 1960, involved following his own democratic logic to the point where activism seemed a matter of course. By 1949 Maruyama keenly felt the weight of the Cold War and its implications for Japan. His subsequent pacifist activism through the comfortable surrounds of intellectual organizations such as the Peace Problems Discussion Group [*Heiwa Mondai Danwakai*] helped turn his pen to contemporary political commentary for the rest of the decade. Importantly, activism in the name of peace was also a form of 'postwar responsibility' for Maruyama.²³ It was the first indication that Maruyama had, temporarily at least, crossed the line from 'complete irresponsibility', to a new manifesto for public intellectualism. Having survived and not resisted during the war, Maruyama cast his accountability as an intellectual into a different temporal zone. He could influence the future in favor of pacifism, even though he and his fellow Japanese had failed to control the past.²⁴

Maruyama's leap from the round table of the Heidankai to the street achieved something more important. It lent credibility to his formulation of Japanese democracy up to that point. For Maruyama, the popular activism of 1960 was akin to passing the baton to the people of Japan, for whom activism was the expression of a maturing individualism thriving in healthy, negative tension with the state. It is supremely ironic that just at the moment when mass democracy took center stage in Maruyama's democratic formula, the rattle of opprobrium from his critics reached a crescendo. In the

23. See Kersten, 'Pacifism, autonomy and the logic of democracy', in Kersten 1996, pp. 164–198.

24. Even here, however, we find Maruyama disappointed by his failure to live up to his own expectations. He later said that he regretted not using his experience in Hiroshima to more effectively promote the cause of peace. See Kersten 1996, p. 17.

eyes of certain people, Maruyama and the 'progressive intellectuals' he epitomized were fatally responsible for the failure of the anti-treaty movement. When the slogan switched from 'oppose the treaty' to 'protect democracy' on 19 May 1960 (5.19), it was regarded as the beginning of the end, a lost opportunity. Another irritant for Maruyama's younger critics was his desire to lend depth to the 1960 movement by evoking the moment of democratic imminence on 15 August 1945 (8.15), when defeat delivered the democratic opportunity that now lay before them.²⁵ The notion of transforming 'defeat democracy' into a noble, defensible entity seemed to his skeptics to be too far removed from the realities of the postwar society.

The despair and blame-laying that followed the ineffectual protests led to the disintegration of Maruyama's intellectual peer group. One might also say that after 1960, intellectuals stopped setting the agenda, and began merely to react to it. Maruyama claimed that he never regarded the outcome of 1960 as a 'failure', and he continued thereafter to put his name and pen behind movements such as Beheiren. But he never again embraced the protest podium, and the focus of his intellectual endeavors departed from the present for the nuanced realm of the ancient past. But does this mean that Maruyama abandoned the role of public intellectual?

There is no doubt that Maruyama raised popular expectations of himself as an inspiration for popular activism in 1960. One has only to read the speech he gave on 24 May, a performance that crackles with the kind of feisty intellect reminiscent of *The Logic and Psychology of Ultrationalism*, to feel his impact. Referring to the events of 19 May, he asked his listeners 'will we consent to this action or not', and continued:

With that moment as the borderline everything changed. ... This is the moment in our people's democratic history of greatest danger and greatest opportunity. All the major issues of postwar have become concentrated. On one extreme naked power was concentrated in Kishi's hands, on the other the principles and ideals of the postwar democratic movement became concentrated in our hands. ... At this moment in our history, let us rise above our differences and join hands so that the security of our nation may be guaranteed, not against any foreign country but first of all against the authorities.²⁶

It is no wonder that this speech became the catalyst for another march to the parliament.

25. See Maruyama Masao, 'Fukusho no setsu' and '8.15 to 5.19', in: *Maruyama Masao Shū* Vol. 8, pp. 351–358 and pp. 359–377.

26. Translation from Kersten 1996, pp. 217–218.

Yet, towards the end of 1960, Maruyama's most vitriolic critic emerged. Self-styled as the champion of 'realism' as defined in the 'thought produced through the daily lives of the people' [*taishū no seikatsu shisō*], Yoshimoto Takaaki (1924–) set about bringing Maruyama (or at least his admirers) down to earth. In his widely-read treatises on Maruyama, *Gisei no shūen* [The End of Fiction] and *Maruyama Masao ron* [Concerning Maruyama Masao], Yoshimoto declared that 1960 finally exposed the 'fiction' of post-war democracy as packaged by Maruyama. As Yamashita Akiko puts it, 'according to Yoshimoto, compared to the natural process of the masses' existence, any politics or system is fundamentally a fictional process.'²⁷ The autonomy that Maruyama spent 15 years incubating in Japanese society was under his nose all the time. Why didn't Maruyama realize that it was not authority that defined the *taishū*, but the *taishū* who determined authority?²⁸

In Yoshimoto's view, part of the reason flowed from the very elements through which Maruyama defined his intellectual role. Maruyama neither dwelled in the light nor the shade. What for Maruyama was commendable objectivity was for Yoshimoto proof of irredeemable elitism. Maruyama 'neither resists nor joins in wholeheartedly' [*teikō mo shinakereba nomerikomi mo shinai*]. Because Maruyama experienced the war 'only in his head', he could not understand a necessary truth about the bearers of Japanese democracy, i.e. the masses; that on some level, the Emperor System had actually resonated with the people.²⁹ By basing notions of democracy on 'historical abstractions', instead of the actual reality of Japanese society, Maruyama had created a mere fictional democracy.

Yoshimoto's writings are permeated with the niggling sub-theme of deciphering the implications of wartime *tenkō* for the postwar era. His interpretation of why masses protested in 1960 is brimful with allusions to *tenkō*. Having existed in the numbing expansiveness of conservative political dominance since 1955, Yoshimoto believed that in 1960 the masses 'for the first time grasped the opportunity that would disseminate their own feelings of alienation' about postwar society.³⁰ The theme of *tenkō* as symbolic of a 'return to the masses' on the part of intellectuals who had hitherto been alienated by communist ideology was, accordingly, embraced

27. Yamashita 1988, p. 39.

28. Washida 1992, p. 196.

29. Yoshimoto Takaaki, 'Maruyama Masao ron', in: *Yoshimoto Takaaki zenshōsakushū* Vol. 12, pp. 28–29.

30. Yoshimoto Takaaki, 'Gisei no shūen', in: *Yoshimoto Takaaki zenshōsakushū* Vol. 13, p. 70.

by Yoshimoto. As Mamiya puts it, 'the pattern of *tenkō* that keeps being repeated in Japan is a shift in emphasis from the non-everyday life world to the world of everyday life; from, as Maruyama says, faith in the realm of theory to faith in the realm of practice.'³¹

Yoshimoto essentially admitted that his own identity as a public intellectual depended on quarantining the masses from the insidious presence of intellectuals, and on subsuming his own existence into that of the people. It is an uncomfortable identity, as his language reveals: Yoshimoto dances from the third person to the first person plural in his writing, consigning the masses to objects one minute, and to the status of fellow travelers the next. For Yoshimoto, everyone could naturally belong to the masses; one merely had to want to do so.³² This was the damning accusation that returned to haunt Maruyama in 1969:

I think that through delving deeply into their everyday experiences, the *shomin* and the *taishū* must become independent of the world, atmosphere, and culture of intellectuals. The masses must avoid the intellectuals' culture and ideology, as the stuff of fiction.³³

4. Maruyama and 1969

The university riots of 1968 and 1969 literally shattered Maruyama's private realm. On 29 January 1968, the students at the medical faculty of Tokyo University rebelled against what they saw as the unacceptable, elitist nature of their faculty and the quality of education it offered. The dispute led to students invading the central university building (Yasuda Kōdō), forcing the university managers to call in the riot police. The disturbance eventually spread to the prestigious Faculty of Law on 21 October of that year, and lasted in that Faculty until 19 January 1969. The university dispute [*daigaku funsō*] was a traumatic rite of passage from the world of progressive, elitist intellectualism, to the postwar world where intellectuals were blamed for the failure of postwar democratic idealism.³⁴

In a curious publication that appeared after his death, *Internal Conversations* [Jikonai taiwa], Maruyama recounts in his diary the deteriorating

31. Mamiya 1999, pp. 163–164.

32. Yoshimoto Takaaki, 'Chishikijin to wa nani ka', in: *Yoshimoto Takaaki zenchosakushū* Vol. 13, pp. 505–506.

33. op.cit., p. 505.

34. For information on the *daigaku funsō*, see Tsuzuki 1995, pp. 439–449; and Inoue 1969.

situation in his lectures in 1969.³⁵ Protesting students would invade the classroom, then harangue him. He would debate with them despite his poor health, but then the tactic turned to an ordeal of endurance, stretching for several hours as his classroom became a cell. Maruyama's attempt to intellectually intimidate and humiliate his foes won him applause and contempt in equal measure. The Law Faculty was finally barricaded, and the studies of professors ransacked. The physical and emotional shock upon entering his office after the siege ended is conveyed by paraphrasing the *Mainichi Shimbun*: speechless, his shoulders slumped, he noticed the bookshelf was missing from the middle of the room; he muttered about the destruction of culture, and checked each book by the dim light of a torch, his lips trembling with rage.³⁶

The war was a tangible presence in this drama. During Maruyama's confrontation with helmet-wearing students at the entrance to the Law Faculty on 23 December 1968, he famously enquired whether the students intended to commit an act that not even the fascists had attempted.³⁷ This phrase soon mocked him in graffiti around the Faculty. His intelligence alone had not been enough to help him when he was arrested by the *tokkō* in 1933, and it was equally useless in 1969. In a phrase that reveals much, Maruyama retold how he had regarded his study as a haven, an 'internal exile' during the war.³⁸ What had been a mere divide between academia and 'the public' in 1945, by 1969 had widened into a chasm between intellectuals and 'the people'.

In 1969 it was no longer Maruyama's credentials as a public intellectual that were at issue, but rather, that the reconstituted 'people' no longer required his services. Instead of the state constituting the negative objective of post-war defensive liberalism, it was now wider society that had been transfigured into the 'public' realm. Maruyama was now the 'contaminant' that had to be expelled from the intellectual leadership of society. Maruyama did indeed 'retreat' to his study, retiring four years early on 24 March 1971 for health reasons. In his 'privatized' life thereafter, he retained his keen eye and engagement with contemporary politics, and sharpened his historical inquiry into the 'deep layers' [*kosō*] of Japanese culture. In a perverse sense, Maruyama's fall from the ranks of intellectual heroes in that brief episode of 1968–1969 represented success. Discourse had finally moved

35. Maruyama 1998, pp. 131–140.

36. Tsuzuki 1995, p. 445.

37. See Sasaki Takeshi's account in Misuzu 1997, pp. 130–132.

38. Maruyama 1998, p. 176.

on beyond the reach or rule of the intellectual leaders of transwar Japan, and achieved a new degree of autonomy. The university disturbances of 1969 might after all represent the positive culmination of the logic of postwar subjectivity.

Towards the end of the century, however, as the economic miracle faltered and conservatism regained its stranglehold on the Japanese polity, Maruyama's premise for a powerful democratic society – personal autonomy – remained elusive. The final irony is that the language of failure we employ when we interrogate Japanese democracy would not have been possible without the academic, engaged and provocative intelligence of that 'failed' public intellectual, Maruyama Masao.

Conclusion

Public intellectualism in the first 25 years of the postwar period in Japan proceeded along an exciting and ruthless trajectory. The disillusionment accompanying the failure of popular and intellectual protest against renewing the security treaty between Japan and the U.S. in 1960 without doubt had far-reaching consequences. Amongst the most significant consequences was the shattering of postwar intellectual consensus on the nature of state-society relations, and the pivotal role played by intellectuals associated with the aggressive defense of postwar democratic idealism. The political ramifications were also extensive and remain part of the contemporary political landscape (for example, the notion of the tyranny of the majority and the unacceptability of forcing through legislation on the basis of majority vote, if strongly-felt minority dissent is evident).

The development of the idea of civil society in postwar Japan after 1970 was heavily influenced by the advent of the problems accompanying Japan's rapid industrialization in the first decade of the economic miracle. New and terrible diseases (e.g. Minamata disease – mercury poisoning), air and noise pollution, etc., were catalysts for serious, organized protest on the part of what came to be called 'civil society'. Interestingly, Maruyama almost never used the term 'civil society' in his postwar writing, although there is little doubt that he was implicitly dealing with this as one of the core concepts in his intellectual arsenal.³⁹

Maruyama's central thesis concerning the wartime state was at the heart of his postwar democratic idealism, primarily as a negative influence. His conceptual parameters of modernity (incomplete modernity) and subjectivity hovered around the brooding, threatening presence of the wartime

39. Ishida &c 1997, pp. 11–12.

state. It is fascinating that the state has remained primarily a marginal or negative presence in postwar discourse, including in neo-nationalist discourse. Even neo-nationalists are careful to distinguish between state-centered nationalism, and nation-centered nationalism. In this sense, attempts by contemporary essayists such as Katō Norihiro and Fujioka Nobukatsu to appeal to popular patriotism through a rehabilitated state do not resonate with the predominant thrust of postwar political discourse. Historical revisionism is the latest manifestation of the attempt to rehabilitate the image of the state in the present by restoring its status in the wartime past. It is too soon to judge whether or not this most recent revisionist push is reaching the post-postwar generation of young Japanese.

In the disturbing twenty-first century context of sustained economic decline, the familiar ideological touchstones of national pride – the state, and culture – have acquired an ambivalent hue in the eyes of many Japanese. The weak state of today bears little resemblance to the ogre of the war era, yet society remains lukewarm in its interactions with the state. Resistance, critical distance and skepticism are the most obvious manifestations of state-society relations, and apathy is its passive counterpart. State-society relations in present-day Japan are, in effect, facing a conceptual black hole. Historical revisionism is only the latest tool utilized by the post-postwar generation of public intellectuals to inspire a jaded society, and it is far from representative of intellectual culture. The dilemma facing contemporary public intellectuals in Japan today is whether they can navigate between an inherited discourse on the state, and a postwar discourse on the nation (the people) and still incorporate patriotism. The 21st century finds Japan in a transitional phase in its conceptualization of state-society relations that may yet see history take a new, and unexpected, turn.

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RELIGION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

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ABSTRACT: If one is to consider the relationship between religion and national identity in contemporary Japan, neither the institutionalized religions of Buddhism and Shintō, nor religion in practice, need to be taken into account. What must be considered, however, are the teachings, formulated by the founders of the New Religions, as well as the discourse created by scholars of religion and individuals and journalists interested in religion. This article will therefore introduce the ideas promoted by several New Religions, some of which contain strikingly nationalistic images, and will then turn to a body of literature known as ‘Japan Theory’ and its latest development, i.e. the writings of a group of academics, journalists and artists who might be called ‘spiritual intellectuals’. As it will be shown, these writings assert the cultural superiority of Japan with reference to the characteristics of Japanese religion. The article makes clear that images of religion used in the media, particularly in advertising, also play an important role in the creation of national identity in contemporary Japan.

Introduction

For a very long time in Japanese history Buddhism and Shintō have been very closely associated with the state and questions of nation and national identity. Parts of Shintō, Japan’s so-called ‘native’ religion, focus on the creation and salvation of the nation and have often been used for nationalist purposes. When Buddhism moved into Japan, it propagated itself as the nation’s protector. The relationship between Buddhism and the state and Shintō and the state, as well as the relationship between Buddhism and Shintō, is a troubling problem in Japanese historical studies and remains unresolved. In this paper, therefore, the relationship between religion and national identity will be considered, within the framework of contemporary Japan.

Japan’s post-war Constitution incorporated two fundamental principles related to religion: freedom of religion and the separation of religion and state. As a result, religion was able to become the subject of an elaborate discourse characterized by highly individual interpretations of, for example, the meaning of Shintō throughout history or the ideas of Zen Buddhism. These interpretations, formulated by the founders of the New Religions, as well as scholars of religion and individuals and journalists

interested in religion, essentially constitute the religion that needs to be taken into account if one is to consider the relationship of religion and national identity in contemporary Japan. Hence, the religion that remains important for the identity of the Japanese today is one that manifests itself in two ways: in the form of some of the New Religions of Japan and in the form of a discourse on religion.

I will begin by examining the New Religions and their promise of a new Buddhism – one which contains some strikingly nationalistic images asserting Japan as the center of a new Buddhist transformation – and will provide some further examples of Buddhist-inspired instances of national self-assertion. I will then turn to a body of literature known in Japan as ‘Japan Theory’ [*nihonjinron*], or ‘Theory of Japanese Culture’ [*nihon bunka ron*] and its latest development, the writings of a group of academics, journalists and artists who I refer to as the ‘spiritual intellectuals’. These intellectuals assert a kind of Japanese cultural superiority with reference to the characteristics of Japanese religion. The third section focuses on the relationship between Shintō and national identity.

In my conclusion, I will demonstrate that images of religion used in the media, particularly in advertising, also play an important role in the creation of national identity in contemporary Japan.

1. National Self-assertion in the Case of the New Religions

When I visited the star-festival [*hoshi matsuri*] of the New Religion Agonshū¹ in the hills above Kyoto in the winter of 1993, I was very surprised to hear announcements in English, German, Italian and French, as there were hardly any foreigners among the 500,000 participants. From huge loudspeakers it was announced that Agonshū welcomed visitors from countries outside of Japan and that Agonshū was happy to be contributing to world peace with its festival. Members of the Agonshū Youth Association, who were glad to finally find a foreigner, interviewed me during the festival. They asked me what I thought about Agonshū’s peace activities and its efforts to save mankind through Buddhist teaching. I answered that of course I supported their commitment to peace, but that I was not altogether sure whether I wanted to be saved by their Buddhist teaching, let alone whether I wanted to be saved at all. The interviewers were perplexed by my hesitant attitude – they were convinced that everybody would welcome their contribution to the well-being of mankind by spreading the message of Agonshū.

1. On Agonshū and the star festival, see Reader 1991, Prohl 1995.

The writings of Kiriya Seiyū, founder and leader of Agonshū, might assist in explaining their attitude. According to Kiriya, disasters and catastrophes (which he predicted would occur at the end of the 20th century) are caused by the collective karma of humankind, which includes all the spirits of the dead that remain unsettled and cause unrest.² Kiriya claims to have discovered rituals in the Agon-Sutras that are able to put these spirits to rest and, hence, to eradicate the collective 'bad karma' of mankind. At the same time, it is claimed that the enactment of these rituals assists in eliminating individual bad karma and affords access to divine energy to be directed towards worldly concerns. These discoveries, along with powerful symbols (a Buddha relic from Sri Lanka and a spiritual transmission from the Buddha himself), are central to Agonshū's proclaimed mission to the world and serve to legitimate the restoration of Agonshū's 'original Buddhism' that will spread from Japan and across the entire world.

Despite the universalizing dimension of Agonshū's mission, it is possible to discern a rather nationalist and Japan-centered undertone. This tendency can not only be seen in the assertion that Japan is to be the new center of Buddhism, but also in the fact that the *hoshi matsuiri* is held on a public holiday (11 February, which is now known as Constitution Day), quite obviously to maximize public attendance. The holiday was formerly called National Foundation Day; according to Shintō myth, it was the day on which Jimmu Tennō, the legendary first Emperor of Japan and descendant of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, descended to earth to create Japan. The flags and speeches replete with nationalist imagery, as well as the addresses made to a (conspicuously absent) foreign audience, reveal the nationalist undertone of the festival. The announcements delivered in foreign languages are directed at Japanese participants in order to emphasize Agonshū's universal mission. The festival's goal is to enhance collective karma, while offering a wide range of rituals that translate into worldly benefits for members of Agonshū. Thus, its universal meaning is tied to individual needs and concerns. In his analysis of the festival, Ian Reader concludes:

As I have indicated elsewhere, the festival reflects a central theme in Agonshū's dynamic, in which the movement affirms a particularistic focus of Japanese identity framed around major nationalist symbols, and strengthens that message in the eyes of its followers by placing it in the context of a universal message. Agonshū's followers can, by participating in its festivals and rituals, 'touch base' with the roots of their culture and affirm the unity of their

2. Kiriya 1981.

faith and national sense of belonging, yet also feel they are doing ‘something’ for world peace and harmony: they are taking part in a mission to save the world and spread Agonshū’s newly revived Buddhism across the globe, while emphasising the centrality of Japan and of their identity as Japanese in the process.³

Agonshū is not unique in 20th century Japan in asserting that it is teaching a new form of Buddhism – one that would bring about universal salvation. Similar claims have been an important feature in the rhetoric of several of the ‘New’ New Religions of Japan, movements that flourished in the final decades of the 20th century, including Kōfuku no kagaku [The Institute for Research in Human Happiness] and Aum Shinrikyō.⁴ Scholars of religion estimate that between 10 and 20 percent of the Japanese are members of one of the New or New New Religions. The New New Religions have been widely regarded as appealing especially to younger, well-educated and urban Japanese who are often dissatisfied with modern scientific rationalism and materialism. Some of the older religions, e.g. Mahikari,⁵ also link particularistic and universal themes and are often solidly underpinned by a strong nationalist agenda. The Bakkyō Shinkokai, another older New Religion, expresses concern for world peace through its rituals and prayers in order to enable its Japanese members to adjust to the fact that they are not the only inhabitants on earth.⁶ The fact is stressed in these movements that the Japanese, in particular, are able to bring about world peace; their universalism is therefore linked to an affirmation of the unique quality of ‘Japaneseness’.⁷ Furthermore, even outside of the New Religions, as the Dutch scholar Ian Buruma points out, many Japanese feel a special calling to act as prophets of peace.⁸

2. National Self-assertion in Japan Theory

When I was a graduate-student in the department of religious studies at Tokyo University in the mid-1990s, one book was particularly popular

3. Reader 2002, p. 21.

4. On the nationalist images of some of the New Religion see Reader 2002 and Shimazono 1993.

5. See Cornille 1999, p. 6.

6. See Pye 1986.

7. On prophets of peace in the New Religion of Japan see also Kisala 1999.

8. Buruma 1994.

among the students. It was a book by the religious scholar Nakazawa Shin'ichi entitled *Mori no barokku* [The Baroque of the Forest].⁹ The book came highly recommended by my fellow students for an understanding of the nature of Japanese religion. Nakazawa is a supporter of the idea of Shintō as the primeval religion of Japan and sees early Shintō as a religion of the forest. Entering a Japanese forest begets purification and a 'mystical' [*shinpigi*] experience. According to the author, the Japanese people learned to understand the so-called *logos* according to which human beings should live from the network of relationships existing in the forest; this *logos* forms the foundation of social life. However, Nakazawa claims that the Japanese have lost touch with this *logos* in modern times. Nakazawa is critical of 'aggressive' Christian thought and identifies himself as Asian. In his thought, the gap between East and West is very deep and the differences between Christianity and Buddhism testify to the profundity of this gap: where the former is simple and bewitching, the latter is deep and complex and much nearer to absolute truth.

I was very surprised that a scholar, a professor in a department of religious studies, should assert such a supra-historical notion of Shintō and talk about its 'mystic' dimension and its 'spirituality'. I soon discovered, however, that he is by no means the only one who holds such views about Japanese religion. Another very popular supporter of such notions is the religious philosopher Umehara Takeshi, who believes that the foundational base of Japanese religion, which he claims to be Shintō, goes back to the Jōmon age.¹⁰ This early Shintō (*koshintō* in Japanese), which is still expressed in the religion of the Ainu and the Okinawans, is characterized by a belief in the spirit of trees, the idea of reincarnation, the equality of all beings, and an emphasis on vitality. Umehara depicts Japanese religion as 'animism' and 'polytheism', wherein worship of the gods of nature plays an important role. He argues further that these characteristics must be rediscovered. Shintō is portrayed as a religion of the forest (particularly of trees), a factor that, together with the coexistence of all beings in nature, constitutes its most significant element. The worship of nature and the idea of the coexistence of all beings have allegedly been preserved in Japanese Shintō up to the present. It is in this connection that Japan is purportedly able to make an important contribution to the solution of the problems that afflict modern society. This argument informs the title of Umehara's book *The Philosophy of the Forest Will Save the Human Race*. The author further stresses his opinion that Asia, and particularly Japan, will save the world

9. Nakazawa 1992.

10. Umehara 1991.

because of its Buddhist traditions. He contrasts the harmonious Buddhist tradition with the putatively Christian tradition of the West, in which he claims to have discovered a 'germ of destructive thinking'.

With the help of terms like 'animism', 'polytheism', 'mysticism' and 'spirituality' – terms which lack clear definition and serve ideological purposes – Nakazawa and Umehara effectively reinterpret Japanese religious tradition.¹¹ Problems arise from the way in which they envision the role of Shintō in Japanese history. Although research on the role and significance of Shintō in the history of Japanese religion remains diverse and highly contradictory,¹² these authors cling to the interpretation that Shintō forms the essence of Japanese culture. The idea of the divinity of nation and state, seen as one of the classical notions of Shintō tradition and put into political practice as official state ideology during the first part of the 20th century, seemed to fall into oblivion with Japan's military defeat in 1945. However, the vision of Shintō elaborated in the writings of Nakazawa and Umehara implies a certain superiority of Japan due to the characteristics of Shintō. Since their texts proclaim a homogeneity which is based on a vision of a unified and supra-historical Shintō that has shaped the Japanese mind, they generate ideological effects and can thus be productively treated as a kind of Japan Theory.

The body of literature known as Japan Theory [*nihonjinron*] is difficult to describe to a foreign audience. This theory (though often not very theoretical) encompasses a wide range of popular books, newspapers and magazine articles, as well as scholarly works, devoted to such questions as 'Who are we (the Japanese)?', 'What makes the Japanese unique?', 'Why are the Japanese so successful?', 'What makes the Japanese spirit so special?' and more recently, 'What characteristics of Japanese religion form the basis for the superior Japanese spirituality?'.¹³

Most Japanese seem to be affected by the images generated by Japan Theory. Harumi Befu and Kazufumi Manabe have shown that as many as 82 percent of the residents of suburban Nishinomiya (located between Osaka and Kobe) have read some Japan Theory (mostly in newspapers) and that they largely approve of its content.¹⁴ The search for Japanese identity is clearly a national pastime in Japan. Books, newspapers and magazines dealing with the uniqueness of Japan and its special features are read

11. For an analysis of their writings, see Prohl 2000.

12. As contributors to this debate, see Naumann 1988, Kuroda 1993, Antoni 1998, Bocking 2001.

13. On Japan Theory, see Aoki 1996, Davis 1998.

14. Befu and Manabe, quoted after Davis 1998, see also Befu 1993.

widely, for instance, by commuters on their long daily train rides from work and home. Ian Buruma notes:

The Japanese spirit. It is a subject of almost obsessive anxiety. The national soul – how it must be revived, defended, even held up as a model to the outside world – this nebulous soul is endlessly discussed by politicians, journalists, and scholars. *Nihonjinron*, or defining Japaneseness, has grown into a huge intellectual enterprise, responsible for hundreds of books, thousands of articles, TV programs and radio shows. The key word is ‘uniqueness’; the ‘uniqueness’ of Japaneseness which is beyond understanding in terms of Western logic, even though it can serve as the premise for scientific research.¹⁵

Shimazono Susumu has pointed out that a special type of discourse on Japanese culture has intensified since the beginning of the 1990s – the *nihonkyōron* – writings in which the superiority of Japanese culture is explained by Japanese religion.¹⁶ The roots of this discourse can be traced back to the history of the debate on Japaneseness, which was initiated by Motoori Norinaga and other early *kokugaku* (National School) scholars. Yamamoto Shichihei, who saw a religion itself in the characteristics of the Japanese, coined the term *nihonkyōron*. The term, as it is used here, may be translated as ‘discourse on Japanese religion’. The main features of this discourse are the special Japanese ‘animism’ and ‘shamanism’ and their potential for the worship of nature, a vision of *koshintō*, and a critique of Western logic that contrasts with Eastern ‘spirituality’. Shimazono Susumu summarizes this discourse under the term ‘self-assertive discourse on Japanese religion’ [*jiko shuchōteki nihonkyōron*].

In addition to Umehara Takeshi and Nakazawa Shin’ichi, scholars such as Saeki Shōichi, Yuasa Yasuo, Kamata Tōji and Yamaori Tetsuo also engage in this kind of discourse by attributing the superiority of Japan to Japanese religion. One can also include authors such as Ōhashi Ryōsuke, Ueda Shizuteru and Sonoda Minoru, who do not only publish their books in Japanese, but also in Western languages, and thus act as representatives of Japanese culture for foreign audiences.¹⁷ Both the categorization of religion and this particular view of Japanese Shintō are revitalized with borrowings from New Age thought in order to make claims about the superiority of Japanese religion. In this sense, these authors’ texts belong to the current discourse on Japanese religion, one which has strongly affirmative,

15. Buruma 1989, p. 238.

16. Shimazono 1997.

17. See Prohl 2002.

as well as nationalistic tendencies. In declaring the superiority of Japan with regard to the salvation of the world, these authors contribute to a xenophobic cultural nationalism. This is a primary characteristic of all discourses on Japaneseness, a fact that has already been remarked upon by Yoshino Kosaku.¹⁸

Authors such as Umehara, Nakazawa and others who participate in the 'spiritual discourse' on Japanese religion are not located on the fringes of Japanese society. Rather, they occupy prominent positions in the cultural mainstream. Ian Buruma notes on Umehara:

Umehara, a jolly, smiling man with a shock of unkempt hair, often appears on TV or in popular magazines expounding upon the roots of Japaneseness. To add drama to his often mystical points, he likes to be photographed in mystical poses, examining ancient rocks at country shrines, lit by the first beams of dawn or the red glow of sunset.¹⁹

The authors of Japan Theory on religion are highly visible in the Japanese media; their books are published by powerful publishers, such as PHP. Like the Japan Theories themselves, their writings and performances have become a part of mass culture.

Peter Dale describes the *nihonjinron* as a 'commercialized expression of modern Japanese nationalism,'²⁰ a depiction which is also true for the self-assertive discourse on Japanese religion, especially when the authors publish their views in glossy magazines such as *Bungei Shunjū* or *Taiyō*. As Shimazono points out, the discourse on Japanese religion popular during the nineties bestows its readers with a feeling of safety and group belonging. According to Winston Davis, the *nihonjinron* acts as a civil religion for Japan; he notes:

Many of the functions of the civil religion of pre-1945 Japan – the generation of national purpose, symbolic self-defence, value-consensus etc. – are now being assumed by the symbols, values, and imagery produced by the literature of Japan Theory.²¹

In Japan Theory, this distinctive interpretation of Japanese religious history continues to be used to assert the superiority of Japan.

18. For instance, Yoshino 1992.

19. Buruma 1989, p. 239.

20. Dale 1986.

21. Davis 1992, p. 269.

In this sense, one may regard the Nichibunken in Kyoto – a very influential institution with which many of the authors who participate in the ‘spiritual discourse’ are affiliated – as the temple of the truly living Japanese religion of the 21st century. One could argue that some of the authors of self-assertive discourse on Japanese religion act like priests in a cult at the Nichibunken, an institution that provides ‘a façade for the promotion of ideas of cultural supremacy,’ as Buddhologist Matsumoto Shirō contends.²² The cult they are engaged in is the cult of superiority of the Japanese nation. Like a religious cult, the ideas formulated by this cult affect the resolution of social conflicts. Religion helps to balance these conflicts by transposing their solutions onto the transcendental plane. The texts of the self-assertive discourse on Japanese religion perform a similar feat. The quest for harmony with nature can be construed as a criticism of such negative aspects of modernization as alienation and rationalization.

The nationalistic tendencies in these authors’ visions have parallels not only with some older and newer (New New) Buddhist religions, but also with the teachings of some very popular New New Religions that proclaim an orientation towards Shintō. One such example is ‘World Mate’. The leader of World Mate, Fukami Tōshū, claims that Japan has a very special relationship with the world of gods. He postulates that universalistic values developed under the roof of Shintō which will bring salvation to mankind. It seems safe to argue that the self-assertive discourse on Japanese religion provides the ideological foundations for the nationalistic notions of some of the New New Religions. Likewise, the New Religions support the activities of authors and academics who contribute to the self-assertive discourse on Japanese religion. The best example is the International Shintō Foundation [Shintō kokusai gakkai], an academic association that intends to enlighten the world about Shintō, both as Japan’s indigenous religion and as a salvational religion for the world. Fukami Tōshū notes in a Foundation newsletter:

Shintō has been the essence of Japanese Culture, and yet for the half century that has elapsed since the last war, Shintōists have been reticent in presenting their faith to the world, and seem to have been content to allow the word ‘Shintō’ itself to go misunderstood or at least partially understood, in other Asian countries as well as in the West. A system of beliefs comparable to the great religions, Shintō has for two thousands (sic!) years been practised and respected by the Japanese people, influencing their daily life and providing the source of their culture, but its true face has been allowed to go unrecognised. I perceived that there was a ground swell of feeling among serious practitioners

22. Matsumoto 1997, p. 359.

and genuine scholars of Shintō that a way through this situation must be found to arouse international interest in Shintō. It was in February of 1994 that I resolved to take action, and began to consult with like-minded people.²³

Fukami Tōshū seems to have been very successful with his intention, as he was able to win over many respected scholars to become members of this association, i.e., Sonoda Minoru (mentioned above), Ueda Kenji (former president of Kokugakuin University), John Breen (University of London), as well as Kamata Tōji and Yamaori Tetsuo. The fact that the New Religion World Mate financially sponsors this organization is dubious at best. The fact that these scholars are willing to accept Fukami, the leader of a New Religion, as their Vice-President, might demonstrate the profundity of the need for cultural self-ascertainment among scholars of religion in Japan.

3. Shintō and National Identity

The discourse on religion, and on Shintō in particular, seems to influence politics as well. On 15 May 2000, former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro suggested in his speech to some 400 participants of the Shintō Political Federation of Diet Members [*Shintō seiji renmei kokkai giin kondankai*] that Japan is a divine nation centered around the Emperor. This statement revived memories of wartime ideology, infringed upon the constitution and provoked outrage in Japan, as well as abroad. Mori's remark led to a fiery debate on Japan's role in the 21st century.²⁴ During his speech Mori referred to the meaning of his family name – Mori means 'forest' – to draw attention to his efforts to reduce environmental pollution in Japan. With this remark he was making an implicit reference to Umehara Takeshi (mentioned above), who spoke before him. Apparently Prime Minister Mori tried to adjust his speech to meet the expectations of those who spoke before him. Umehara stressed the importance of the internationalization of Shintō in his speech. According to Umehara, this process is necessary in order for Shintō to assume a universal leading role in the coming era of world globalization. It would seem that religious Japan Theory serves as an ideological foundation for remarks such as the one made by Mori and assists in making these remarks socially respectable, however fierce the debate surrounding them might be.

Murakami Masakuni (another speaker preceding Mori) described the work of the Shintō-Federation, another organization which is worth

23. Fukami 1996, p. 3.

24. See Nawrocki 2002.

mentioning in the context of the relationship between religion and national identity. With regard to future plans, he discussed what was felt to be the overdue requirement to nationalize the Yasukuni Shrine.²⁵ Sections of the nationalist right would like to breach the separation between religion and the state, for example, by providing state support to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. The Yasukuni Shrine enshrines the souls of the Japanese killed in the war and has long been a symbol of nationalism. Although it remains a site of contention and dispute, the Yasukuni Shrine plays little, if any, symbolic role in the lives of young Japanese, which is why it has been necessary for efforts to focus on the shrine in an attempt to awaken a sense of its meaning and significance in the Japanese youth.²⁶ For an understanding of what 'nationalism' can mean in a country such as Japan, one that was confronted with Western imperialism and embarked on a process of modernization without having been colonized by the West, it is worth quoting from the 'Child's Guide to the Yasukuni Shrine' from 1992:

The Yasukuni Shrine is a shrine with a long tradition and was built over 120 years ago in 1869. Throughout the time of national seclusion before the Meiji period, Japan did not have relations with the other countries of the world. But the people of foreign countries gradually took a critical attitude towards Japan and pressured Japan to open itself to the outside world.

Wondering 'what in the world should we do' the whole country was in an uproar (...). In this situation the Tokugawa Bakufu, which had been entrusted with governing Japan for over three hundred years, lost the power to quell this disturbance and so returned the authority to govern to the emperor.

At this point was born the idea of everyone in Japan becoming of one heart and mind under the emperor in order to restore the beautiful traditions of Japan, create a splendid modern nation, and become good friends with all the people of the world.

(...)

However, to protect the independence of Japan and the peace of Asia surrounding Japan, there were also – though it is a very sad thing – several wars with foreign countries.

(...)

War is a truly sorrowful thing. But it was necessary to fight to firmly protect the independence of Japan and to exist as a peaceful nation prospering together with the surrounding countries of Asia. All those who offered up their noble lives in such disturbances and wars are worshipped at Yasukuni Shrine as gods.²⁷

25. op.cit., p. 294.

26. Gardner 1999.

27. Gardner 1999, pp. 336–339.

My intention is not to comment on these passages, but instead, to stress the fact that debates on the Yasukuni Shrine issue, as well as on the role of both the Emperor and State Shintō, are met with indifference by many Japanese, although they certainly approve of constitutional control that guards against the fusion of religion and the state, such as that which existed in the earlier part of the century in the form of State Shintō.²⁸ The main function and the importance of both Shintō and Buddhism in the lives of ordinary Japanese people are not associated with political issues, but with issues of social identity and belonging in terms of local community and household. Buddhist temples and Shintō shrines play an important role in aligning human life with the passage of time and offer a 'spiritual care system',²⁹ for contemporary Japan. However, belonging to a local community, household or even family is often no longer able to foster a feeling of identity in contemporary Japan. Shintō's continuing veneration of traditional ritual, which emphasizes the needs of the group rather than the individual, and the Buddhist preoccupation with rituals for the dead are contributing to the loss of parishioners from both religions. This might be one reason why millions of Japanese have turned to the New Religions. The founders of the New Religions, as well as the authors of religious Japan Theory, seem much better able to respond to the needs of the Japanese people than is institutional religion.

Conclusion

Terms like 'group building' and 'group identity' have served as keywords for the understanding of Japanese society for a considerable period of time. However, at the beginning of the 21st century, the Japanese are currently in search of meaning and identity as *individuals* in what is primarily a secularized Japanese society. In this sense, Japan bears many similarities to societies of the so-called Western world. However, in contrast to societies such as the German or (as far as I am able to judge) the Dutch society, Japanese national identity plays a very important role in the search for identity in general. National identity in Japan seems to have relatively little to do with conventional, institutional religion. As we have seen here, however, this is not to say that religion does not play an important role in contemporary Japan.

28. See Reader 1991, p. 56.

29. See Reader and Tanabe 1998.

Religion remains important in contemporary Japan in the form of the New Religions. Their teachings have been able to adapt to changing needs and are especially oriented towards the needs of the individual. At the same time, they integrate what they regard as elements of the traditional religions of Japan and very often bestow new meaning to their physical remnants – the shrines and temples. In organizing festivals and pilgrimages, they also contribute to the general trend for nostalgia in Japan. In doing so, some of the New Religions also exhibit nationalist orientations; in any case, they convey feelings of belonging to a great cultural and religious tradition.

While Japanese identity does not necessarily depend on ‘traditional’ religion, religion (i.e., reflection on religion) continues to be exercised to bear witness to the alleged uniqueness of ‘Japanese spirituality,’ be it Buddhist or Shintō spirituality. It is no longer necessary to enter a New Religion, to visit a shrine or temple or even, for that matter, to talk to family members or friends to feel some emotion of belonging, to learn something about what it means to be Japanese, to understand the meaning of life or to get in touch with what the future might bring. Instead, it is simply a matter of visiting a bookstore, strolling around the section on Japan Theory and buying a book that contains expressions of national self-assertion, praise for the uniqueness of Japanese culture and the superiority of Japanese ‘spirituality’.

The subject of religion is very much suited to providing a reassuring and refreshing read. The term ‘spiritual,’ in particular, has proved highly useful because of its ambiguity and its reference to a certain state of mind. It indicates a special sort of experience and, in doing so, allows the reader to retreat into the last bastion of resistance against scientific analysis: the personal self. Speaking about religion possesses a certain degree of entertainment value. The history of religion offers a wide variety of works of art that convey aesthetic expressions about the world beyond. These expressions can be used to increase the entertainment value [*Erlebniswert*] of religion. Pictures of and references to Buddha-statues, mandalas or Shintō-shrines can stir up particular emotions and create special frames of mind – feelings that should not, however, be confused with religion itself. The subject of religion also offers performative qualities, which are particularly suitable to the discourse on Japanese religion acting as a kind of experiential science [*Erlebniswissenschaft*]. Speaking about religion not only bestows upon its audience the feeling that something new is being learned, but it also makes for good entertainment. The Japanese audience is assured that whatever problems the 21st century and globalization may bring, Japan will be able to cope with them thanks to its unique religion, which has a salvational potential, not only for the Japanese, but for the entire human race.

Of course, participating in annual events and festivals at local shrines and temples also offers some kind of belonging and conveys some assurance

of what it means to be Japanese. New Year's rites (among others) seem to fulfill this function particularly well. Although the actual *practice* of religion certainly contributes to the cultivation of feelings of national identity, it seems to me that the use of religion in Japan Theory (as described above) and, finally, the use of religion in the media are even more important in this regard.

Elements of religious architecture, art and ritual are widely appropriated by Japanese advertisers to generate nostalgic images. Produced in response to a dissatisfaction with the present, images of nostalgia, which can best be grasped through the Japanese term *furusato*, meaning 'old village', 'home' or 'native place', are widespread in post-war Japan and are also used by politicians and city planners.³⁰ Advertisers attempt to sell green tea, soft drinks and noodle soups with the help of religious symbols. Japan Railways used pictures of temples and shrines in its 'Discover Japan' and 'Exotic Japan' advertisement campaigns. A 1990's television advertisement showed *tatami* [straw matting], a Buddha statue, the roof of a temple and the silhouette of a pagoda in the red light of the evening sun and a gentle voice announced: 'Kyoto: here you can find the key to esoteric Buddhism'. Again, the aesthetic expressions of religion are being used to create the expectation of tradition and to reassure people that such aspects still exist in Japan. These expressions denote a sense of belonging, a cultural and emotional 'home' intrinsic to the Japanese experience. From the perspective of Japan Railways, these expressions are used in order to persuade people to buy their tickets and travel to Kyoto. The use of religious symbols in the media contributes to the Zeitgeist of nostalgia by idealizing Japan's past and Japanese religious history. This idealized view of Japanese religious history and a proclaimed Japanese 'spirituality' helps to conceal their rather problematic aspects. Japan Theory on religion and images of nostalgia consisting of religious symbols promise a kind salvation on the basis of Japanese 'spirituality' and on the foundation of the 'Japanese spirit,' which is often declared to be superior. However nicely it may be phrased, this promise implies the inferiority of other religious worldviews and can therefore be seen as a kind of religious nationalism. Even if national identity seems to have relatively little to do with conventional, institutional religion in contemporary Japan, religion – in the form of the New Religions and as expressed in the diffuse forms of Japan Theory and in the media – remains fundamentally important for Japanese identity and, quite often, the expression of a nationalist orientation.

30. On the culture and politics of nostalgia, see Reader 1987, Robertson 1988.

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PART III

TURKEY

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LIBERALISM AND NATIONALISM IN EUROPE AND TURKEY

ON THE RECEPTION AND APPLICATION OF MODERN EUROPEAN IDEAS IN A NEW HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

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ABSTRACT: While nationalism in Europe emerged as a correction to liberalism and existing individualism, in Turkey nationalism was the context in which liberalism and individualism were to be implemented. By this reversed history of liberalism and nationalism, however, collective ideas have tended to overwhelm individualist ideas in the construction of modern Turkey. This becomes especially clear in the interpretation and application of the sociology of Durkheim by Ziya Gökalp, the ideological father of modern Turkey. But, of course, the reception of liberal ideas by the Young Ottomans in the 19th century was already determined by nationalism. The dynamics of the transition from the multi-religious Ottoman Empire into central nation-states explains this collectivist shift that continues, even now, to determine Turkey's problems with religion and civil society. In the reception of Western liberalism, differences between Islam and Christianity also play a role. They determine Turkey's interpretation of modern European culture as primarily a Western, and not a Christian, culture. The article ends with some reflections on the problematic social consensus underlying Turkey's application of Western models and its relation to the European Union.

Introduction

This article is written from the perspective of the history of philosophical ideas and their relation to religious and political realities in modern Western Europe ["Europe" in what follows, GS], the Ottoman Empire and in modern Turkey. In short, my thesis is that in Europe nationalistic ideas developed after the emergence of liberalism, while in Turkey nationalism was the context of implementation of liberalism and human rights. In Europe nationalism emerged as a communitarian reaction to liberal individualism as a social and economic reality.

By this, I want to say, too, that liberal individualism was never an undisputed fact in Western history itself. Not only Herder, the romantic father of nationalism, but also thinkers like Hegel and Durkheim thought that the foundation of society and the state on an individual basis was impossible. Liberal individualism produced a crisis in Western culture that

repeatedly provoked communitarian reactions, even in violent forms such as fascism and communism. In the case of Turkey, the nationalist context of modernization was the breakdown of the *millet* system – in which non-Muslims had their own specific group rights, but were second-class citizens at the same time – into nations. Most *millets* had a local character, but others, such as the Armenians were spread all over Turkey. This *millet* system in fact blocked the centralization of the Empire itself, preventing it from becoming a modern central state. It prevented the rise of a capitalist bourgeoisie and its nationalist turn forced thinkers and politicians to look for a new, ethnic-linguistic substratum of the Ottoman government. This nationalism entered into a conflict with individualism.

The different religious histories of Turkey and the West play a role as well. But at the same time, Western culture is not identical to Christianity. This fact is still of vital importance for the Turks, the Europeans themselves and continues to impact relations between the two.

I will first provide a description of the problems of empire as they relate to the idea of the central state. I will then continue with a discussion that highlights the Ottoman reception of Western political ideas on an Islamic basis and compare this with the Western integration of its own modernity. After that, I will present Ziya Gökalp's fascinating reinterpretation of Durkheim in order to clarify the specific problems of Turkish nationalism and secularism. I will end with a treatment of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union.

1. An Empire, the Central State and Islam

Backed by the idea of the absolute sovereignty of the monarch, the central state appears as the first modern political phenomenon in Western society. Through sovereignty, that is, the centralization of jurisdictions in one hand, the absolute monarch distinguishes himself from the pre-modern king or emperor. This centralization resulted from a conscious endeavor to coordinate the several jurisdictions of the lower and higher courts, which, in the end, placed ultimate jurisdiction into the hands of the sovereign as the source of legislative power. This process led to a decline in power held by the old mediaeval intermediary groups because it situated all of them at an equal distance from the absolute monarch. In this way, however, centralism eventually produced legal equality for all as individual subjects.¹ But although centralism indeed produced equality, it did not produce equal

1. Benois 1999, pp. 99–119. For the history of the idea of sovereignty, see the fundamental book by Quaritsch 1986.

freedom from the state. This next step, equal freedom from the state, resulted in the European case from a reaction against absolutism that reproduced the former mediaeval liberties on the level of individual human rights. Individuality generally speaking is the sign of modernity.

First of all, the central state was the principal obstacle to the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and of Islam, for it presupposes that the state itself is the ultimate source of law, and not, as in Islam, the *ulema* as interpreters of Islamic law. Of course, the sultan had his own specific legislative power on the field of public and criminal law (*kanun*). But *centralization* would mean that the state takes Islamic law into its own hands and out of the hands of the *ulema*. Sovereignty is the problem. The consequence is, as the discussions in the Ottoman world served to demonstrate, that the idea of an Islamic constitution produced by the state (now often considered to be a sign of backwardness) is essentially a modern idea, because it presupposes the sovereignty of the state.² Therefore, Niyazi Berkes is right in suggesting that the sultan's taking of the *shari'a* into his own hands in the 19th century was the first sign of secularization and modernization in the Islamic countries.³

The Ottoman sultan, however absolute his power may have been, was not an absolute sovereign of a central state like those in Europe.⁴ I would rather not enter into tangential discussions about the centralizing and decentralizing tendencies of the Ottoman Empire.⁵ Rather, I simply want to show that the Western process of centralizing jurisdictions was not possible in the Ottoman Empire, not only because of the special position of the *shari'a* and the *ulema*, but particularly because of the unique *millet* system. While the latter process (which results in only one source of legislation) presupposes a common worldview, making a common conception of justice possible, the *millet* system was, rather, based on the contractual recognition of the relative juridical autonomy of peoples with different worldviews within the Empire, as long as they accepted the Islamic context.

When, in the 19th century, Western nations pressed the sultan to give equal rights to Christians, they automatically forced him into the position of absolute sovereign within a central state who should create legal equality of all citizens. Thus, the process of modernization began with the concentration of all power in the hands of the sultan and the destruction of the

2. Berkes 1998, pp. 232–250.

3. *op.cit.*, p. 94ff.

4. Zürcher 1993, pp. 13–17.

5. Meeker 2002, pp. xvii–xxii, p. 395, Barkey 1994, pp. 1–23.

intermediary powers, including the *ulema*.⁶ Because of the potential for the Empire to lose its Islamic identity and because the modernization process was unsuccessful, Young Ottomans, such as the poet and thinker Namık Kemal, protested against this centralization and therefore introduced the idea of human rights into the Islamic world for the first time.⁷ At this point, it is very seductive to draw a parallel with Western developments, in which centralization also provoked the quest for human rights. Thus, Islam would produce its own John Locke in the person of Namık Kemal. We do, however, encounter some problems in so doing. Most importantly, there were no mediaeval liberties that could be reinstated as individual rights, with the exception perhaps of the position of the *ulema* as an independent source of law. In the West, human rights are based on the idea of natural law as a product of reason that transcends all religions, an ideal which was absent in Islam. And the *millet* problem put the quest for Islamic parallels of modern liberal ideas in an Islamic-nationalistic context.

2. Young Ottoman Reforms and the Idea of the Social Contract

Among the Young Ottomans, Namık Kemal (1840–1888) in particular is known for his attempt to implement modern political ideas on the basis of Islam. He was the first herald of human rights in the Ottoman Empire. But here, too, we clearly perceive the discrepancy between the universalist content of these ideas and the particular character of Islamic concepts. This problem appears in the reinterpretation of the two basic elements of the social contract: the contract between citizens that constitutes society and the contract with the sovereign that constitutes legitimate authority. Kemal reinterprets the pledge of allegiance made by the military class and the *ulema* to the sultan, as a social contract between all citizens and the sultan. This pledge is conditioned by the promise of the sultan to rule according to Islamic law. The question is not whether this reinterpretation is possible; it *is* possible, for Kemal merely universalizes the aspect of mutual recognition, through which power ceases to be brute power but becomes legitimate authority, to all members of the state. But what is the sense of having an Islamic contract based on Islamic rule of law, when the aim is to unite Muslim and non-Muslim citizens on an equal basis in a state? We encounter the same problem in the reinterpretation of the social contract between all individuals on an Islamic basis. Like modern natural law thinkers, Kemal reconstructs a state of nature

6. *ibid.*

7. Berkes 1998, p. 210.

as a situation of war between individuals, but in such a way that Islamic law, as the necessary law of nature that ends all conflicts, emerges directly. Kemal never wanted to do away with the *shari'a*. He praises the special characteristics of Islamic law, especially the close relation it forges between morality and law. Interestingly, he tries to universalize Islamic law by Islamic mysticism.⁸ Mysticism compensates for the lack of the idea of natural law as a real universal theory.

We encounter the same problem in Kemal's reinterpretation of the independent position of the *ulema* as the source of law. In his criticism of centralization, Kemal uses this idea, comparable to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudential law, to support the legitimacy of a free dimension in the state. It is in this independent position of the *ulema* that Şerif Mardin detects an original Islamic conception of the idea of a 'civil society'.⁹ This may well be true, but what purpose can this independent *ulema* serve in a modern, religiously plural state?

Here we can say that the absence of the idea of natural law and a general philosophical theory of the nature of human beings and their rights forced Kemal into making these kinds of reinterpretations. As Şerif Mardin correctly pointed out, Western Christian thinkers could combine the autonomous rational nature of man with his creational dependence in their theory of natural law.¹⁰ However, there are basic differences between medieval and modern theories of natural law, especially with regard to pluralism. Both types of philosophy pretend to speak by reason alone about the nature of human beings as such, without relying on faith and revelation. This was not possible in Islam. Thus, Namık Kemal was forced into the paradoxical position of having to found a law of nature that transcends all specific religions on a specific religious worldview that excludes other religions. This question becomes more complicated when we consider, as Bernard Lewis remarks, that the Ottomans could accept modern political ideas precisely because they were based on natural law and therefore not specifically Christian.¹¹ In a reply to Lewis, Mardin claims that this was true for the elite, but not for the majority of the people; therefore, an Islamic reinterpretation was necessary.¹²

8. Mardin 2000, p. 288.

9. Mardin 1984, p. 64, Mardin 1988, p. 26, Mardin 1995, p. 287.

10. Mardin 2000, p. 86ff.

11. Lewis 1953, p. 105, Lewis 2002, p. 504.

12. Mardin 2000, p. 169 footnote 1.

Nevertheless, this specific Islamic rethinking occurs within a nationalist search for a specifically Muslim state identity and conflicts with the pluralist character of the modern state.

3. Nationalism and Modernization on an Islamic Basis

The question of equal rights and the ambiguous behavior of the Christians, who wanted both equal individual rights and the advantages of their old collective rights, caused a great deal of irritation and provoked questions about the Islamic identity of the Empire. The confusing transformation of the Empire into several nation-states is reflected itself in Namık Kemal's defense of the specific Islamic identity of the Ottoman Empire by means of nationalist ideas. Romanticism is introduced, along with the concept of the fatherland, *vatan*, in which the Turkish identity is still exchangeable with the Ottoman one.¹³ This Romantic nationalism explains his defense of the *millet* system as the Ottoman form of religious tolerance that could be accepted by different religious groups as well as the best system for them to engage in.¹⁴ This system, however, although it afforded semi-autonomy to several religious groups, was not based on individual freedom and equality. Namık Kemal searches for a unified national-Islamic consciousness behind the Ottoman system that was in fact not necessary within the imperial *millet* system itself, for this was based on contractual relations between the emperor and other groups. Because Kemal's 'Ottomanism' presupposes a unified national consciousness, it is itself really no longer Ottoman, but nationalist.¹⁵ This Ottoman, as well as the later pan-Islamic solution to the identity crisis illustrates the difficulties associated with the idea of the modern central state and the nation-state, for Ottomanism interprets empire in nationalist, state-related terms, and pan-Islamism consciously transcends nation-state frontiers.¹⁶ The dynamics of the transformation of a traditional, locally organized empire into centralized nation-states determined the course of Kemal's ideas. The idea of a linguistically and ethnically determined 'Turkish' nation-state was the next logical step for a continuing state-structure and its elite, which was looking for a new substratum; this step itself would, at the same time, change the form of the state.

13. Kemal 1999, pp. 201–213, Kemal 1942, pp. 60–61.

14. Berkes 1998, pp. 220–222.

15. See Mardin 2000, p. 330ff.

16. *ibid.*

We clearly see here that nationalism is the context of implementation of liberalism, while in Europe this nationalism emerged after liberalism was implemented in order to correct some effects of individualism, especially the loss of religious bonds. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, however, the real problem consisted in a collective identity crisis that necessitated a new collective identity. Not only did the absence of natural law prevent real individualist pluralism, but this identity crisis contributed significantly to its absence. However, individualistic ideas and ideals were there in intellectual circles.¹⁷

Does this mean, however, that the idea of an Islamic reinterpretation of modern concepts is a meaningless endeavor? The question is whether those reinterpretations were intended to yield an Islamic parallel to those modern liberal ideas, or whether they sought to provide traditional Islamic citizens with a bridge by which to close the gap between an Islamic past and a new reality of non-Islamic origin. The first, 'Ottoman' option proved to be impossible, but the second option continues to be a possibility. By showing that modern secular Turkey has its roots in Islamic reformist thinking, for example, Mardin's historical analyses restore, for Muslim citizens, the Islamic past of their secular present. The cleft between past and present can thus be bridged in this manner.

To highlight these specifically Ottoman-Turkish difficulties in coping with cultural change, I will now compare them with a European example in which modernity, particularly individualism, was integrated in its past. Similarly, individualist modernity represented a break with tradition that had to be bridged at the same time. Modernity and Western culture may appear to be reducible to one another from a Turkish or Japanese perspective, but not from the perspective of Europe itself! Its history is greater than the history of its modernity. Religion and traditional community-based ethics were a living source of criticism of modernity that constantly demanded reconciliation, as will be clarified in the next section.

4. Hegel and the Western Adoption of its Own Modernity

As for Herder, for Hegel the emergence of individualism and large central states was a new and disturbing phenomenon. In his youth he was, like all Romantics, interested in small communities like the Greek city-state with a religion that, unlike the spiritual and supernatural Christianity, was engaged in practical political life. Herder's most influential idea, that of the large

17. Berkes 1998, p. 295ff.

nation-state, was for himself only a secondary option.¹⁸ Herder conceived of national culture primarily in relation to small, family-like societies as a radical critical alternative to modern individualist societies and large states.¹⁹ He defended the European Middle Ages against modernity and rehabilitated the concept of tradition. More concerned with their religious foundation than with nationalism, Hegel accepted these same modern realities. Nonetheless, he never accepted the idea that individual, contractual relations as such could form the basis for social and political life. Because of their individual arbitrariness, they cannot constitute the state. These individual relations are specific phenomena of civil society, which is itself the really new phenomenon. It is a domain of individual freedom created by and within the state. The basis of this free domain is capitalist free enterprise on the basis of free labor, a system that emerged after the breakdown of the mediaeval guilds. It is further based on the split of traditional ethics in individual morality and abstract law. Hegel sees the dangers of individualism: he fears an atomistic individualist society and a breakdown of traditional community-based ethics. Modern morality, as distinguished from communal ethics, is based on individual free conscience that can abuse its autonomy by standing in opposition to the community. Therefore, individual morality as such cannot constitute the state. But although individual moral freedom can present a threat to all substantial ties, at the same time it can, according to Hegel, afford the chance to internalize these ties. Modern people do not 'follow the rules' only because they are traditionally given in the community, but because they are personally convinced of their rationality. This personal consciousness – as a unity of individual freedom and common rules – is the basis for the state. The state is already present in civil society in the form of corporations, i.e. collective unities that replace, to a certain extent, the mediaeval guilds.²⁰ The state itself, according to Hegel, is molded in line with Hobbesian concepts of sovereignty without human rights in the sense of Locke.

Christian religion becomes important for Hegel as the common religion of individual freedom. A society without religion is an impossibility and, hence, a society of free individuals is an impossibility without a religion of individual freedom. Hegel rediscovers Christianity as the common morality, and hence, the ethics of modern society. Individual freedom and

18. Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, pp. 223–224, pp. 243–244.

19. Berlin 2000, p. 181ff.

20. Hegel 1976, p. 382, especially p. 393ff.

equality made its first historical appearance in Christianity, and not in Greek philosophy or oriental religions. This idea of individual freedom lost its social impact in authoritarian and monastic Catholicism. But Luther rediscovered the principle of individual freedom. Therefore, the Reformation is a basic precondition of modern politics. Luther's Reformation is the spiritual condition of the French Revolution: No revolution without Reformation, as Hegel claims.²¹

Thus, Hegel attempts to explicitly legitimize modernity by means of Christianity. His endeavors resemble the thoughts of those Ottomans who tried to find a connection between old Islamic ideas and modern realities. It is by no coincidence that a reformist thinker such as al-Afghani remarked that Islam needed a Luther. But this new reformist thinking, inspired by Christian Reformation, often had fundamentalist consequences.²² For Hegel it was of vital importance to reintegrate modern developments into the traditional basis of Christianity. For this reason, Hegel could not even accept the separation of church and state. To a certain extent, he believed that the state itself was the real church or the real incarnation of Christian ideas! This rechristianizing, which is certainly not self-evident, shows how many difficulties Hegel had with modern culture, especially with individualism. He used corporate structures and an authoritarian state to master its consequences.

The differences between his adaptation of modernity and the Ottoman endeavors are obvious. Hegel's philosophy is a reaction to a real, existing individualism in its capitalist form, while individualism in the Ottoman Empire was only an emerging phenomenon. Because the members of the Christian *millets*, benefiting from their relations with the West, developed themselves as capitalists, the new economic developments produced a so-called 'ethnic division of labor' instead of an individual one.²³

In Europe, religious difference in the end promoted individualism. As a means to settle the religious wars, a state church was the first solution, even for Hegel. But eventually Europe made religion a private affair and restricted its institutional presence to civil society. In the Ottoman Empire, religious differences had no individualizing function within a state, but produced monoreligious nation-states. Nationalism prevailed over individualism here. Hegel and others used Christianity as an *internal* instrument to react to *internal* developments to safeguard Europe's moral basis. By contrast, the Ottoman Empire had to use an *internal* instrument, Islam,

21. Hegel 1970, p. 534. See also Shanks 1995, pp. 109–114, pp. 159–186.

22. Tibi 1991, p. 128, p. 183ff.

23. Özbudun 2000, p. 126.

to react to *external* developments that were imposed on the Islamic world with power and violence.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey faced these same problems once again. Ziya Gökalp, the country's most important philosopher, tried to implement Western civilization in the new, Turko-Islamic situation. He was inspired by Durkheim who, like Hegel, was concerned about modern individualist society. Hegel rechristianized the French Revolution, while, for Durkheim, the ideas of the French Revolution served as an alternative to the supposed death of Christianity. With regard to individualism, however, a comparison between Gökalp and Durkheim reveals the same differences as does a comparison between the Ottomans and Hegel. The transformation of an Empire into different nation-states again determines the course of ideas.

5. Durkheim: Individualism, Nationalism and Religion

In studies on nationalism and the sociology of religion, Durkheim is mostly known as a collectivist thinker, for whom religion was the expression of group identity and social cohesion. However, the key interest of Durkheim's sociology is the possibility of an individualist society. In his *De la division du travail social* [On the Division of Labor in Society, 1903] he does not oppose the social to the individual, but explores the social conditions of an individualist society. Of course, individuals do not make up a society. Therefore, like Hegel, he strongly criticizes the idea of the social contract. He argues that it is 'the social' itself that makes individuality possible.²⁴ He explains the emergence of individualism through the social phenomenon of the modern 'organic' division of labor. The fact that each individual has a specific profession is the first source of social ethics in modern society. The danger of the loss of social cohesion can be compensated by organizations that express this division of labor, the groups of people that share the same profession. This solution is called corporatism and fosters a kind of family feeling in an individualist society.²⁵ The modern way in which an individualist society develops new forms of social cohesion is a new kind of ethics, the specific ethics of professional groups functioning within a process of mutual interaction. Patriotism/nationalism is Durkheim's other attempt to solve the problem of individualism. But this solution functions within a cosmopolitan context, for, as he confirms explicitly in his *De la division du*

24. Durkheim 1996, p. XLIII, Préface de la première édition. See Cladis 1992, pp. 1–11.

25. Durkheim 1996, p. XX, p. XXXIII, Préface de la seconde édition.

travail social, it is the idea of the individual, produced by the division of labor, that revitalizes the old dream of the brotherhood of man, of a world society. When it is not possible to realize this world society, one should try a small scale union of nations with the common social structure of the division of labor and individualism like, for example, a united Europe!²⁶

The idea that collective political ideals can stand in as the functional equivalent of religion in the service of social cohesion appears in the last chapter of his *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* [Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 1912]. A society without religion cannot exist, according to Durkheim, for society recreates itself by re-establishing its values in its individual members through religious symbols and rituals. In the symbols of transcendence, such as God, for example, religion expresses the transcendence of society over individuals. After this discovery, however, Durkheim is confronted with the problem that in Europe, in his opinion, religion is fading away. He maintains that the traditional gods are growing old or are already dead and others have yet to be born.²⁷ But how can such a society survive? Perhaps national reunions, commemorating the important facts of national life, can do the work of religion (as, for instance, in the times of the French Revolution, which had its own religious fervor)? Could not political ideas be as 'sacred' as religious ones?

Nowadays many theorists rely on this aspect of Durkheim's theory for an explanation of nationalism in general, including an ethnic-linguistic nationalism which can even use religion for its own purposes. But this is not the nationalism Durkheim himself is concerned with!²⁸ As becomes manifest in his *Leçons de sociologie* [Lectures on Sociology, unedited courses given with interruptions from 1890 until 1916, for the first time edited 1950] Durkheim's concept of nationalism, or patriotism as he calls it, is strictly related to the ideals of the French Revolution, and so to a nationalism based on human rights! It is a constitutional patriotism.²⁹ As in *De la division du travail social*, individualism is the specific point of departure from which he develops his ideas about civil society, the state and the international community.

26. op.cit., p. 401.

27. Durkheim 1991, p. 710.

28. For an elaboration on this problem, see Smith 1998, pp. 14–16.

29. In his *Leçons*, Durkheim always uses the word '*patriotisme*' without explicitly opposing it to ethnic, cultural and linguistic nationalism. But his '*patriotisme*' is, in fact, real patriotism, meaning pride in having the best political constitution as opposed to nationalism (pride in a certain ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity). In his opinion, the only legitimate form of nationalism is patriotism.

In his *Leçons de sociologie*, Durkheim makes clear that since the Declaration of Human Rights of the French Revolution, exaggerated as it may be in its individualism, the process of individualization is destined to go on. Therefore, individual morality should be institutionalized in the modern state in a proper way. To prevent both individual atomism and state despotism, Durkheim promotes the idea of intermediary groups, which give moral support to individuals and mediate between individuals and the state. On the other hand, the state in its law-giving function guarantees individual liberty within groups.³⁰ Therefore, the state is the warrant of individual freedom within a civil society consisting of intermediary groups.

It is because of this individualism that the problems of nationalism and cosmopolitanism arise. For individualism is intimately linked up with the idea of humanity as such and therefore with cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism, however, bypasses the specific social form that binds egoistic individuals together in a moral community. Since religion can no longer be the morality of society, the patriotic interpretation of nationalism presents itself as a solution. This patriotism cannot stand in contradiction to the idea of universal humanity. Therefore, patriotism/nationalism is only acceptable in the form of competition between nations regarding which of them is the best guarantor of freedom. Durkheim had already developed this patriotic position in *De la division du travail social*, but elaborated on it further in his *Leçons de sociologie*.³¹ Patriotism in the context of internationalism was a constant subject for Durkheim from the beginning of his career until the last chapter of his last most substantial work, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, where he even speaks about individual religion and religious cosmopolitanism too.³²

With this patriotism, which is constitutional, and not ethnic or cultural-linguistic, Durkheim, like Herder and Hegel before him, seeks to answer the typically European problem of individualism. As mentioned above, the present-day use of Durkheim's theory always stresses collective ideas as such instead of the collectivism of individual human rights.

6. Ziya Gökalp: Culture, Nationalism, and Religion

It is interesting to consider the work of Ziya Gökalp, an excellent scholar on Durkheim; in it we see the inevitability of this collectivist turn in the

30. Durkheim 1995, pp. 91–99.

31. op.cit., pp. 100–109. Durkheim 1996, p. 401ff, p. XXXVIII. Préface de la première édition.

32. Lukes 1975, p. 350. Durkheim 1991, pp. 705–709.

interpretation of Durkheim, when his ideas are used to understand the genesis of modern Turkey out of the old Ottoman Empire. In his influential *Principles of Turkism*, this practical application of Durkheim to the Turkish situation reveals a relevant shift in attention from the problem of the individual to national group building, and discloses the very real reasons that underlie this shift.

Ziya Gökalp applies Durkheim's theory of the division of labor to explain the nationalist potential of the *millet*s, which eventually produced Turkish nationalism. According to Gökalp, this division of labor caused religion to lose its binding force in the Christian communities.

Within the Christian groups, new professional groups emerged with a new collective consciousness. The language of society, newspapers, schools, literature and poetry replaced the language of the religious community. These language-bound communities, like the Armenians, the Serbs, the Greeks and so on, became very important and separated themselves from the Patriarchate. This secession proves, according to Gökalp, that the separation of the Ottoman Empire was due to purely cultural reasons, not political ones. The same process occurred within Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Albanians, Arabs and Kurds. Here too, religious solidarity began to weaken and was replaced by cultural-linguistic cohesion. Turkism, in its turn, started out the same way as an intellectual endeavor at the universities. Gökalp's analysis demonstrates that cultural identity is not just spontaneously present in the people, but has to be developed on behalf of the people by a university-trained elite. The most important issue, however, is that Durkheim's theory of the division of labor is used to explain the existence of collective cultural-linguistic consciousness after the fall of religion, and not the emergence of individuality.

When Gökalp explains Durkheim's principles in general, he demonstrates that he knows very well that the modern division of labor produces individualism. He is aware that one cannot speak about a kind of ethnic division of labor by which different national groups are united to one other. This 'division of labor' is called 'reciprocal parasitism'.³³ He knows that an individual personality could not emerge in the Ottoman Empire.³⁴ But when he applies Durkheim's theory practically to the Turkish situation, he has to reflect on the reality of the emancipating nations as collectivities. Just as was true for Namık Kemal, national identity – and not an individualist society – is the first problem. It therefore makes no sense to reproach Gökalp, as Berkes has done, claiming that one cannot trace his theory

33. Gökalp 1968, p. 65.

34. op.cit., p. 44.

of nationalism back to Durkheim's works.³⁵ Gökalp analyses the Turkish situation of emancipating *millet*s with his Durkheimian instruments. What else could he do? The real problem was the quest for a new collective identity to back the new Turkish state, one that also wanted to become the legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire.

Nonetheless, because of this situation Gökalp's application of Durkheimian corporatism to Turkey would have had quite a different effect than it did in Europe. Gökalp's new Durkheimian corporations were to replace the old guilds of the Ottoman society.³⁶ But like Hegel, Durkheim saw corporations most of all as the solution to the problem of individualism after the breakdown of mediaeval corporate structures. In Gökalp, however, new corporations simply follow the old ones – the guilds. But what happened in the meantime in the Ottoman Empire? Not an internal crisis of individualism caused by capitalism, but a crisis of collective, national identity. Thus, by means of the corporations, Gökalp had built a new collective structure for Turkey outside the context of real existing capitalism and individualism. Whether his corporatism was liberal or not is therefore not the key issue.³⁷ The main question is whether the reality in which he wanted to implement Durkheim's corporatism was individualistic and capitalistic or not! Therefore, Durkheim's ideas about nationalism and cosmopolitanism were not applicable to the Turkish situation. But Gökalp was able to use Durkheim's ideas about the social function of religion and the equivalence of political ideals, without relating them specifically to individualism. As we shall see, he combines Durkheim's idea of the sacredness of society transcending individuals not only with ethnic-linguistic and cultural conceptions of identity, but also with the sacredness of the state. As I have already mentioned, this is not unusual among present-day scholars of nationalism.³⁸

For Gökalp, in the German tradition of Hegel, Tönnies and Scheler, individualism belongs to a very specific dimension of society which is called 'civilization'. But it should, according to Gökalp, be compensated by collective dimensions like 'culture' and state. He views culture as essentially collective and uniquely national. Civilization, on the other hand, is at the same time international and individual. Gökalp wants to be an internationalist at the level of civilization, but, contrary to Durkheim, he detests

35. Gökalp 1959, Introduction by Berkes, p. 22.

36. Parla 1985, pp. 62–63.

37. Gökalp 1959, Introduction by Berkes, p. 22.

38. See footnote 28.

cosmopolitanism, because he defends a state based on a ethnic-linguistic and cultural identity.

For Gökalp it is important that civilization be independent of religion. That is, Western civilization is not a Christian civilization, but an offspring of Roman civilization. The Ottoman civilization is not essentially an Islamic civilization, but an Eastern civilization inherited from Byzantium. The old civilization of the Turkish tribes is a Far Eastern civilization. It is not possible to change culture, but it is possible to change civilization. Therefore, it is possible to adopt other civilizations, like Tsar Peter the Great did in Russia.

Gökalp enthusiastically praises Japan because it succeeded in adopting Western civilization, while maintaining its cultural identity. Religion is again a separate dimension. Becoming Western is quite different from becoming Christian; it does not even imply that one should adopt Christian elements. The road is free, so to speak, for a Muslim to adopt Western civilization. A Turk belongs to Turkish culture, has a Muslim faith, but a Western civilization. The West even dechristianized itself by internationalizing its civilization. Thus, Gökalp confirms in the 20th century what Bernard Lewis said about the first Westernizers in the 19th century: that they were able to adopt all things based on 'natural law' and 'the nature of man', precisely because this concept of general human nature guaranteed that one did not have to assume specifically Christian ideas.

The next question is, of course, whether every religion is compatible with every civilization? Gökalp did indeed reflect on the relationship between Islam and the modern state. In contrast to Christianity in its monastic Catholic form, Islam is far more compatible with the modern state. It most resembles Protestantism, because Protestantism left the monastery and went back into the world. It resembles Islam in this respect to such a degree, that Gökalp posits historical influences from Islam in Protestantism. But why exactly is Islam in harmony with the modern state? Because, according to Gökalp, in Islam the state is 'sacred'.³⁹ The Durkheimian concept of 'sacredness' of the transcendence of society over the individual fuses with the sacredness of the traditional Islamic state. Here again we meet the collectivist interpretation of Durkheim's equivalence of religious and political ideas in uniting a society which nevertheless disregards Durkheim's individualist point of departure.⁴⁰ This becomes very apparent in Gökalp's comparison of the function of religious rituals with nationalism: 'In short, the social function of rituals expresses itself as the renunciation of individuality,

39. Gökalp 1959, pp. 215–217.

40. Heyd 1950, p. 124.

and the social function of positive ritual as the fulfillment of nationality.⁴¹ But now another aspect of Durkheim's concept of nationalism becomes important. He developed his nationalism as an alternative to religion. But what to do when the old gods are *not* dead? Do genuine religion and nationalism really coincide as Gökalp intended them to?

7. Nationalism, Religion, and Secularism

After the emancipation of the *millet*s and the emigration of many non-Muslim citizens, Turkey, like its former *millet*s, in fact became a nation-state with one predominant religion. This fact also determined the rights of the remaining Christian minorities in Turkey. For their rights were guaranteed as group-rights after the Liberation War (1923), by treatises that until the present day restrict their activities in civil society. They are not constitutionally guaranteed as individual rights with no restrictions in civil society. Islam thus obtained a privileged position with regard to other religions in Turkey. By means of tolerance and secularization, European states realized a society in which people with different confessions or religions could live together peacefully. In the new mono-religious Turkey, this problem of pluralism did not exist in the same way, for it was 'solved' in the manner mentioned above.

Thus, the principles of tolerance and secularization also function in a different way. Secularization or *laiklik*⁴² does not guarantee religious peace, but first of all the independence of the state from Islam, the same Islam that became dominant by the historical events just referred to. It functions within the context of the introduction of modern civilization and legitimizes the right to a non-religious, secular way of life as such. Because the French materialists and positivists very much influenced the Young Turks, *laiklik* defended modern scientific culture, especially in its materialist and atheistic shape. In Europe, the history of acceptance of religious differences cleared the way for the acceptance of a non-religious way of life and of atheists as reliable citizens. In new Turkey, however, a large majority of traditional Muslims was confronted directly with secularism in its most acute form. That traditional Muslims would have difficulties with this secularization is obvious. One should recall that even John Locke, the

41. Gökalp 1959, p. 192.

42. *Laiklik* is the Turkish version of the French word *laïcité* as it is used for the principle of the separation of church and state. It is translated into English as 'secularization'. See Berkes 1998, p. 5.

father of the idea of religious tolerance, did not want to tolerate atheists in society. For Locke, as for many traditional Muslims, atheism signified the absence of all moral reliability.⁴³ Because 'the old Gods were not dead' in Turkey, secularism, a modern scientific culture and nationalism together came to constitute a competing source of morality to Islam.

But when religion is still the dominant source of morality, the modern state has to reconcile itself with religion to a certain extent if it does not want to be cut off from the people. The state is dependent on a moral consensus of the people that is formulated in civil society and the public domain. This has a substantial impact on the possibility or impossibility of an official state ideology. As a modern state, Turkey was and is essentially in the same position that all modern European secular states found themselves in. After the abolishment of state churches and official religions, the modern state cannot rely on a specific religion or ideology for backing in terms of legitimacy and identity. It is dependent on a moral consensus that it can no longer guarantee on its own.⁴⁴ This holds for every kind of state ideology. The modern state is dependent on a tradition in which historical experiences, religious beliefs, a community's basic political ideas and their successful implementation build a reliable, but always dynamic consensus. The institutional presence of Turkish nationalism and the military class represents Turkey's uneasiness with this position. With nationalistic education Turkey, like many other states, tries to determine and reinforce the consensus it relies upon. The position of the army is used, however, to guarantee its basic secular identity. Because there are unresolved problems related to Islam, the state does not want to rely on the dynamics of civil society and the public domain: this is the most significant difference between Turkey and Europe.

On the other hand, not only do secularists, but many Muslims also accept the position of the military as protection against political Islam. Thus, there is a *modus vivendi* between the military, the secularists and many Muslims with regard to the restriction of Islam to civil society. The real issue, therefore, is the transition of this *modus vivendi* to a real recognition of the restriction of Islam to civil society. This presupposes that Muslims must attune their traditional anti-secularist views to their real lives in a secular situation, and accept the latter as being, in fact, not so anti-Islamic after all.⁴⁵ In this respect, the scholarly work of Şerif Mardin and

43. Locke 1999, p. 64.

44. Böckenförde 1991, p. 112.

45. Berkes 1998, p. 5. See Özdalga 1997, p. 83.

others about the Islamic past of Turkish modernization is very important. As the example of European Christian institutions illustrates, this acceptance could imply a certain dominance of Islam in civil society that has to be respected by the secularists.

Only on this basis would a real consensus be possible. This consensus consists of practical-political consent to a modern political structure, not a theoretical interpretation of whether or not Turkey is culturally a Western country. (This question is politically irrelevant.) Thereby one could leave the ideological battlefields of Islamism, nationalism and Westernism, and concentrate instead on the political and social conditions that would bring about a socially and economically successful implementation of the modern state.

8. Turkey, Religion and the European Community

Not only have the old Gods proven to be still alive in Turkey, but they are in Europe as well, as the discussion about the Christian identity of the European Union serves to illustrate. As Bernard Lewis' and Ziya Gökalp's remarks about the non-Christian character of natural law and of Western civilization show, it is of vital importance for both Islamic and secular Turks that Western culture be just Western, and not Christian.

But do Europeans see themselves in this way? The example of Hegel showed that this is not always the case. For many Europeans, believers or nonbelievers, the roots of even modern Western culture are Christian. Mardin and Berkes have also referred to the Christian elements in Western culture. The transition of the European Market into a political Union has confronted Europe with the question of its identity.

By the apparent use of religion as a criterion of entry, Europe seems to confirm the old feelings of Ziya Gökalp, whereby Europeans in practice restrict the use of their universal ideas, such as humanity and brotherhood, exclusively to Christians. So, Turkey confronts Europe in a very interesting way with its own pretensions of the universality of some basic ideas like human rights. However, there is a difference between origin, validity and the universal adaptability of these ideas.

The origin can be partly Christian, but the universally valid content of these ideas means that man has rights regardless of race, culture or religion. These ideas therefore proclaim universal humanism. Regardless of its origin, this universal content can be appropriated by European non-believers and by non-Western worldviews alike. Therefore, Europe did not dechristianize, as Gökalp claimed it did; conversely, the universal humanism it generated was emancipated from its Christian origins. Therefore, the

Report of the European Parliament of 2003 does not identify, but juxtaposes the ideas of humanism and Judaeo-Christian tradition as important elements of European culture, remarking that no religion whatsoever can claim this humanism and human rights exclusively for itself.⁴⁶ Turkey's entrance can therefore not be refused on religious grounds, for by this refusal Europe would degrade its own Muslim inhabitants to second-rate citizens and so contradict its own secularist principles. But Turkey has also been asked to guarantee individual religious freedom. It is asked, like its former *millet* Greece, to put an end to the discrimination of other religions, and to give them full access to civil society. It is ironic that Turkey's entrance to the European Union will put an end to the remaining effects of the *millet* system.

Conclusion

Turkish secularism and nationalism are still haunted by problems of collective identity that emerged as a consequence of the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's reversed history of liberalism and nationalism reinforced collectivist ideas rather than individualism. Upon entering the European Union, it will be forced to rethink its conception of citizenship on an individual basis.* This entrance will renew the problem of the social consensus on which Turkey is based. This social consensus has to consist in practical, political consent to, and support of, basic liberal ideas, regardless of their origin, and does not amount to a theoretical agreement about Westernism. This consent cannot be guaranteed, but depends on the dynamics of the civil society and the public domain.

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46. Oostlander Report 2003, p. 7/18. Compare Steunebrink 2000, pp. 31–53, pp. 50–53.

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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND RELIGION IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT: The modernization strategies launched by Muslim states at the beginning of the 20th century confronted many setbacks. A range of interpretations have been provided to account for the causes that led different secular governments to abort their attempts to implement reforms. Many scholars, of both Eastern and Western origin, have pointed to Islam as the single responsible phenomenon for the failure of Westernization programs. There is also an ongoing controversy as to whether or not the secularization of Islam and affiliated institutions is necessary for modernization. This article, however, attempts to situate the clash between the reformist governments of the Republic of Turkey and the conservative infrastructure of the Turkish nation in a wider context, one in which the characteristics of Asiatic statecraft and the mentality of Oriental people in general are interrogated alongside Islam, and a specifically Islamic mentality.

The secularization policies implemented by Muslim states such as Turkey, Egypt and Iran at the beginning of the 20th century caused serious conflicts between state and religion. Attempts to resolve these conflicts by either state or religious bodies necessitated, in turn, certain modifications to both the state mechanism and religious institutions. However, some major issues still persist, awaiting resolution. In this short article, I have attempted to outline the basic elements of the conflict in the case of the Republic of Turkey, adding a philosophical analysis to the sociological narrative of events.

The need to revise the role of religion in the state mechanism was first documented in the Gülhane Imperial Charter of 1839, which, as a written manifestation of modernization, contained, among other things, several articles concerning the civic rights of non-Muslim subjects of the empire, which could be interpreted as a departure from Islamic law, or *shari'a*. On the basis of the Charter, certain other reforms were also implemented in the fields of international commerce and navigation. In the decades that followed, a new educational reform program was enacted, with the aim of establishing new schools for military personnel and bureaucratic functionaries after a European model, alongside the *medreses*, the traditional Islamic schools.¹ All such modifications indicated that Islamic law and

1. Mardin 1989, p. 120.

institutions were no longer sufficiently equipped to handle the problems facing the Ottoman administration in the 19th century. It was due to this apparent inefficiency of the *shari'a* that a reinterpretation of the basics of Islamic law was deemed necessary. A group of expert jurists was commissioned by the political authorities in 1868 to revise (under the supervision of Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, renowned scholar of that time) the existing codes and to formulate a new legal resource to be used in *shari'a* courts. After years of coordinated study, the document emerged in half-completed form with the title *Mecelle*, and is regarded as the first example of reform or renovation in Islamic law.²

The modernization program, which was also called westernization or Europeanization, progressed at a more rapid pace in the newly founded Turkish Republic after the Ottoman Empire fell during World War I. The new state was both a republic and a nation-state, a new government was established in 1920, and the National Assembly was convened by the time the Republic was declared in 1923. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) was the first elected president and initiated a radical program of secularization. He first abolished the monarchy (1922) and then the caliphate (1924). Other reforms came soon thereafter: the abolishment of Arabic script and the adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928), the prohibition of traditional headgear and dress, the closure of *medreses*, *tekkes* and *sufi* orders, the closure of *shari'a* courts (1925), and the implementation of the Swiss Civil Code (1926). These and many other related reforms are, for brevity's sake, referred to as the 'Atatürk Reforms'. Islam was endorsed as the official religion of the Republic in the first constitution of 1924. Four years later, this article was removed from the text, and replaced with the following sentence: 'Turkey is a secular country.'³

The secularization policy initiated by Atatürk was wholeheartedly resumed by his successor İsmet İnönü after the former died in 1938. Tight control was maintained by the single-party regime of the Republican People's Party over all types of religious activities, with the exception of rituals in mosques, until the newly established Democratic Party came to power in 1950. The new government, whose success was brought about by the votes of the discontented masses, loosened its grip over the religious expressions of intellectuals and even members of outlawed religious groups. The call for prayer [*ezan*] was once again recited in Arabic instead of Turkish, as had been made compulsory by previous governments as part of secularization policy and a requirement of Turkish nationalism. One can

2. op.cit., p. 115.

3. For detailed information on the Kemalist reforms, see Mumcu &c 1986.

speak of a discourse (albeit with certain limitations) between state and religion only after this event, i.e. the change of power in 1950. This date is still celebrated as the beginning of religious freedom. However, despite the lifting of the ban on religious publications and the abandonment of strict regulations on the activities of religious groups, no settlement has been reached between the state and the Muslim masses that regard Islam as their integral identity.⁴

Has the secularization program, as a part of a modernization project that has been in force for eighty years, reached its objective? It would be unjust to answer either 'yes' or 'no' to this question. There are many arguments supporting the thesis that the modernization policies of Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan and North African states, as well as Turkey, have failed. This conviction is further strengthened by the widespread resurgence of Islam as political parties or protest movements. Causes for the failure of modernization projects have been analyzed from various perspectives. Some explanations refer to Max Weber's doctrine that modernization is the result of the culmination of a range of conjunctures that took place in Western Europe, a phenomenon that does (did) not necessarily replicate itself in other cultures. Another of Weber's observations is cited by Bryan S. Turner: 'The historical uniqueness of Europe is summarized by Weber under the concepts of rationality and rationalization. Rationality was manifested in growing calculability and systematic control over all aspects of human life on the basis of general rules and precepts which ruled out appeals to traditional norms or charismatic enthusiasm.'⁵

This Weberian stance, together with his well-known theory that secularism is a social product of capitalism and Protestantism can, in a sense, be reconciled with Ernest Gellner's view that Islam, despite being a religion that has always preserved an element of protest and reform, has, nonetheless, retained throughout history an 'essence' that has safeguarded it from substantial changes in the face of new circumstances.⁶

In laying blame for the failure of modern Muslim states to successfully realize their modernization and secularization projects, some critics point to certain features particular to Islamic governments, such as totalitarianism and patrimonial administration, which leave no room for public discourse.⁷ They also claim that the secularization of traditional institutions

4. See Boztemur 2001.

5. Turner 1998, p. 151.

6. Gellner 1985, p. 22, Zubaida 1993, p. XV.

7. Zubaida 1993, p. 139.

was carried out through official decrees and strict regulations, without attempts to preliminarily enlighten the public on the issue. Rather than being a principle of separation between religion and state, this imposed secularism was an anti-religious secular ideology.⁸

Another line of thought on the issue is that modernization does not necessitate secularization.⁹ Exponents of this view claim that secularization is a product of the conflict between the Church and the state in Western Europe and emphasize that an analogous situation has not developed in the Muslim world. Islam already allows its followers to adopt a secular outlook on issues that have nothing to do with religion. Therefore, all secularization strategies applied in Muslim nations were perceived by Muslim societies as representing a pack of alien values being imposed upon them without the people's consent. This, they argue, is why these strategies have been unsuccessful. As evidence of a successful modernization process implemented without a secularization policy, they point to the example of Iran after the revolution of 1978.¹⁰

After this brief survey of the various views held by different parties on the question of secularization in the Muslim states, we are now better prepared to discuss the nature of the conflict between state and religion after the implementation of the westernization program in 1923, of which the secularization of the old institutions bequeathed from the Ottoman period formed an integral part. Thus, we will be able to identify which explanation is applicable to the Turkish case, or determine whether it requires special treatment, perhaps leading to conclusions that differ from those mentioned above.

First of all, unlike the situation in some Muslim states, such as Egypt, Pakistan and Iran, secularization policies in Turkey have been somewhat successful. Besides the state institutions, such as the military, bureaucratic and educational systems, which are generally secular, a considerable portion of educated people have a secular mentality, though not exactly of the European variety. They may still identify themselves as Muslims, but they are not traditional believers who are conscious of practicing Islamic rituals and following Islamic norms in their daily lives. Instead, they regard religion as a choice belonging to the private sphere, just as European citizens may do, or they avoid any intellectual attempt to reach satisfactory answers as to whether or not their acts are in harmony with Islamic rules. They are simply carried along by the attractions and distractions of natural life where pleasures are sought, and any interference, be it from state or religion, is

8. Esposito 2000, p. 7.

9. Davutoğlu 2000, p. 200.

10. Esposito 2000, p. 3, Zubaida 1993, p. 181.

unwelcome. Thus, Islamic movements in Turkey do not only confront the secular state and its network, but also a proportion of secular-minded people who are against the Islamic type of government, in which the *shari'a* is applied and modern citizenship, with its basic rights and freedoms, is denied. Still, popular support for secular values is much more apparent in Turkey than it is in other Muslim countries. This is a victory on the part of the Turkish secularist state, despite the fact that what was envisioned as an objective eighty years ago has not yet been achieved.¹¹

Many aspects of the conflict between the state policy of secularization and Islam deserve attention. However, two main perspectives can be given priority over the others: first, problems associated with resistance to secularization arising from the nature of Islam itself; and second, problems arising from the secularization strategies implemented by the Turkish governments over the last three quarters of the 20th century.

That Islam maintains an 'essence' which prevents it from undergoing radical changes when confronted with alien circumstances is an acute observation made by Gellner.¹² However, what that 'essence' is requires a separate analysis. Islam, like other Abrahamite religions, bestows an all-encompassing way of life and worldview upon its followers. Unlike its sister religions, however, it has shown hardly any internal development for the last eight centuries. The first four centuries of interplay with alien cultures, especially the Greek, came to a standstill in the 11th century, with al-Ghazali's declaration that philosophy and the Greek way of thinking were contrary to the spirit of Islam. Later, after the catastrophic destruction of the Arabic lands with their capital Baghdad by the Mongols in the middle of the 13th century, faith gained priority over discursive knowledge, and blind allegiance to the original revealed message came to outweigh any doctrine that was arrived at through the skeptical and selective methods of the human mind. Literature and the arts, which are primarily the fruits of an affluent economy, also ceased to develop as a result of the disintegration of the Islamic Empire that followed the occupation. Since that time and up to the 20th century, nearly all subsequent Muslim states adopted an orthodoxy that banned any new interpretation of the *Qur'an* or the *Hadith* [Sayings and Deeds of the Prophet Muhammad], on charges of heresy. In fact, this was a political strategy supported by the official *ulama* which aimed for unity among believers at the expense of renovating the religion. The expression 'the gate of *ijtihad* (interpretation of the *Qur'an*) is closed' was the motto most frequently used by state authorities and those clergymen

11. See for a relevant analysis on the issue Kepel 2001, pp. 383–403.

12. Zubaida 1993, p. 130.

who were appointed by the state to minister religious affairs in accordance with state politics.¹³

As Islam is the sole criterion used to establish legitimacy in the Muslim world, any endeavor, whether scientific or social, has to have religious approval. All individual and societal acts have been brought under religious surveillance. There is hardly an area that Islam has nothing to say about, and it does so operating on its own rules. While Islam was, and continues to be, manipulated by the ruling classes in some Muslim states as an instrument of oppression, it has also been used by underground organizations as the emancipator of the oppressed and discontented masses. Even in those Muslim states where the *shari'a* is applied, outlawed Islamic factions work against their governments on the grounds that true Islam is not being practiced and that a distorted version of Islam is in force. An ideal Islam has always remained in the minds of the faithful, causing disillusionment and resentment towards any act taken by Muslim governments that they feel is unsatisfactory. Thus, these idealist Muslims are not only opponents of the so-called secular regimes in their own countries, but are also enemies of the so-called Islamic regimes; any achievement accomplished by such a regime must be considered imperfect when compared with the ideal. A well-organized, virtuous society based on any worldview, even one with an Islamic background, will still be rated lower than that ideal, imaginary society which they believe only existed during the lifetime of the prophet Muhammad. Of course, if they were properly informed by a more realistic history – yet to be written – of the events that took place during Muhammad's reign, of which evil was naturally a part, they would not be so enthusiastic about that golden era. The ideal Islam or ideal Islamic society cherished by ordinary believers is the magical measurement whereby any grand achievement of human endeavor falls short of approval; just like the comparison of the concept of perfect beauty with any beautiful object, something better can always be envisioned. This characteristic of Islam has made it a religion of protest throughout the centuries.¹⁴ It has also to do with Muslim ethics, which can be defined as a transcendental pragmatism.¹⁵ In this type of morality, consequences for the acts of believers are postponed until the afterlife. Thus, this actual life and the life to come are considered on a linear plane. In this way, the factual and the ideal, the certain and the uncertain, the contingent and the transcendent, are brought together as if they were discernable peers.

13. Mardin, 1986, p. 143.

14. cf. Gellner 1985, pp. 1–9.

15. Ceylan 2001, pp. 155–159.

Undisturbed by internal radical change for an extended period, Islam has assumed a unique position in Muslim culture. It encompasses almost all the elements that constitute a worldview, leaving no space for an alien item to creep into the mind of the believer. Islam is a self-sufficient way of life in the sense that it provides answers to all the metaphysical questions that man may possibly ask, leading the believer into a state of mental complacency. The believer's worldly engagements are also credited with religious blessings, a metaphysical framework that brings him under the total determination of a dogmatic architectonic system. He is apparently free, since he will account for his deeds in the afterlife. But this freedom, according to orthodoxy, does not go beyond the will to act: the act itself is performed by God.¹⁶ Any doubt about the veracity of a dogma, or any search for truth without the guidance of the scripture is considered to be a satanic preoccupation. This is of course not unique to Islam, but as regards the degree of tolerance granted to believers, Islam is probably more authoritarian than the other monotheistic religions. This is not because other religions allow their adherents to be skeptical of their faith due to some essential peculiarity, but rather, they have been exposed more intensively to the critical thought of Modernity and to the deconstructive process of the Enlightenment. This is probably why it is easier for a Christian to leave his religion than it is for a Muslim to leave Islam. This phenomenon is obvious in the case of intermarriage between Christians and Muslims. In such marriages, it is most often the Christian party who converts to the religion of her/his spouse, not vice versa. One may interpret this in favor of Islam, but it is also indicative of the fact that Islam wields a huge psychological weight in the mind of the Muslim, and that when a Christian exits her/his religion there is an alternative worldview to adopt consisting of a secular value-system, a provision that is not available to the Muslim. For a European citizen, religion has become an individual choice which governs only a limited portion of his life. Even if he converts to Islam, this new choice will not dominate all of his activities: it will only fill the space allocated thereto.

Another feature of Islam that challenges the modern worldview is its God-centered outlook on the universe. It may share this characteristic with other Semitic religions to some extent, but the emphasis it places on the divine role in natural and historical events is unsurpassed. An ordinary Muslim begins any activity with the name of God, and ends it with Him, too. This may appear to be quite a holy observance, but it has, over time, led to a sort of fatalism whereby the believer relegates many aspects of an

16. An elaborate exposition of the problem of human freedom as a crucial controversial issue among Islamic sects is provided by Watt 1948.

issue, which could otherwise be solved through hard work, to God. The *raison d'être* of man on Earth is to worship God. Thus, man's relationship to nature and his relationship to other human beings, i.e. the two basic areas that make up the crux of any formulation of a worldview, are not treated by Islam as being of primary importance. Probably, this situation may partially explain why Muslims lack motivation and enthusiasm for discovering nature and producing scientific values. A similar situation is prevalent on the social plane. As the ultimate norms of social interaction are already prescribed by God in the scripture and through the exemplary acts of the Prophet, there is virtually no need for the creation of new social values to replace the old ones. This situation is further attested to by the reserved attitude of contemporary Muslim jurists toward *ijtihad*. The traditional Muslim's mental disposition presents a sharp contrast to that of a secular-minded Westerner, in that the latter starts with himself and launches his potential abilities to create a world of his own acumen, governed by values of human origin. To be truly a secular person would involve leaving all traditional concepts aside and removing God from both the realm of necessity and that of freedom – a kind of conversion – more difficult for a Muslim to accept than converting to another religion. This difficulty is treated extensively by Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, a contemporary theologian who has committed himself to the revival of the Islamic heritage. He has presented a detailed critique of Western Civilization and secularism, appropriating science and technology of Western origin to Islamic culture with new interpretations under the general title 'Islamization of Contemporary Knowledge'. He has also shown in his works how secularism leads to irreligion and godlessness, and why a Muslim cannot be secular.¹⁷

After this short presentation on the internal conditions of Islam that contributed to nearly a century of continued resistance against the secularization strategies of Muslim governments, let us now turn to the other aspect of the conflict, i.e. the state. It would not be a fair assessment to lay all the blame for the failure of modernization and secularization programs on the essential characteristic of Islam and its institutions. Nor would it be realistic to blame the secular regimes of the developing Muslim states, especially that of Turkey, for implementing a secularization program as a prerequisite of modernization. There are some Muslim intellectuals who contend that secularization is not a necessary condition for modernizing the basic institutions of a Muslim society, on the grounds that historical circumstances characterized by the rift between the state and the Church, did

17. For an extensive study of al-Attas' understanding of Islam in modern times, see Wan 1998 and al-Attas 1993.

not manifest themselves in the Muslim world.¹⁸ Therefore, they assert that although *modernization*, in the sense of industrialization and the rationalization of a nation's work force, on liberal terms, independent of religious, ideological and cultural prejudices, can be considered to be a 'universal value' applicable everywhere, *secularization*, in the sense of accommodating both the religious convictions of believers and the institutions which represent the dogmatic outlook of that religion to the radical changes brought about by modernization, is peculiar to a specific culture, i.e. Western Europe, and therefore does not assume a universal status.¹⁹

This judgment would have been justified if the modernization and westernization efforts of secular governments in the Muslim world had not been impeded by the *ulama* and the institutions that represent *shari'a*. There is ample evidence from the last three-quarter century of Turkish history, however, to claim that Islam and its rank and file resisted modernization in the full sense of the word. Of course, those intellectuals who wish to perpetuate the Islamic worldview forever, believing that its divine nature can absorb any and all changes, will not accept this argument, and will hold governments and their corrupt regimes responsible for the dire conditions of the Muslim community today. This is partially true: who would deny the role of the undemocratic, authoritarian and despotic regimes of the Muslim states in the misery of Muslims all over the world? Nonetheless, should this recognition blind us to the fact that Islam did resist, and is still resisting, modernization policies?

As for the share of blame that falls on the governments of the Muslim states for the delayed and mishandled project of modernization, it is commonplace that the kind of administration that is conducted in most Muslim countries is undemocratic. Various labels have been used to define the regimes in power in Muslim nations: 'authoritarian state', 'undemocratic state', 'patrimonial state', 'pillage state', 'neo-patrimonial state', 'peripheral state', 'oil state', etc.²⁰ Whatever term is used to describe the use of administrative power in the Muslim world, one can hardly deny the worldwide allegations that Muslim regimes violate basic human rights, deny freedom of expression to their people, fail to distribute wealth fairly among their citizens, and support corrupt minorities as guarantors of their decadent statecraft. However, the Turkish regime, despite many shortcomings, can be exempted from these general allegations for the following reasons: free

18. See Davutoğlu 2000, pp. 179–200.

19. See Zubaida 1993, p. 181, and Saeed 1994, p. 198.

20. See Zubaida 1993, p. 162.

elections have been held for half a century, freedom of expression is less restricted than it is in other Muslim states, Turkey is presently undergoing radical change mainly in order to gain access to membership in the European Union, and, finally, Turkey can be regarded as a '*Rechtsstaat*' in spite of certain criticisms that can be made in this respect.

The progress made in secularizing many state institutions since the declaration of the new Republic in 1923 can hardly be underestimated. However, the distrust, caused by the 'Atatürk Reforms', that the religious masses feel toward state policies has not yet faded. The state, in turn, does not feel secure enough to leave religious affairs to independent bodies. All mosques and religious functionaries are attached to the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a state department administered by a state secretary. It is apparent that this is a different application of secularism, one in which state and religion are not separated. The state still maintains the fear that if religious affairs are disconnected from state supervision, and handed over to an independent body, religion will become a political instrument against the secular state. As a matter of fact, the government headed by İsmet İnönü (a close colleague of Atatürk who succeeded him as the second President of the new Republic) opened new schools [*imam-hatip okulları*] in 1949 to recruit modern clergymen who were secular-minded and loyal to the state. The number of new schools increased after 1950, when the conservative Democratic Party came to power. The number increased even further as a consequence of the populist policies of right-wing parties such as the Justice Party [*Adalet Partisi*] and the various parties founded by Necmettin Erbakan between 1970 and 1977. The number of new schools eventually reached 450, and graduates were allowed to enter any department in the state universities, a right that was denied them until 1975.²¹ Parallel to this development, the number of faculties of theology grew to 22 after the military coup in 1980, at which time a new university law was enacted by the generals in power.

After the military forced the government headed by Erbakan of the Welfare Party [*Rafah Partisi*] to resign on 28 February 1997, the National Security Council took a decision which contained measures to curb the intrusion of religious personnel in state mechanisms and elsewhere. A portion of these new schools was closed and the right of graduates to enter universities was repealed: they were now only permitted to enter the faculties of theology. This was, in fact, a delayed decision, since it became obvious that the system of dual education engendered by this model was in

21. For chronological information about *imam-hatip* schools and political parties founded by Erbakan, see Shankland 1999, and Bahattin 1991.

opposition to the secularist strategies of the state²² and, moreover, these religious schools were recruiting students who were paying allegiance to traditional Islam, rather than to a westernized worldview, wherein religion is devoid of political aspirations. Graduates of these religious schools have also been exploited by Islamic political parties. The current problem of headscarves worn by female students as a sign of their commitment to Islamic dress is partially the effect of girls graduating from these schools and entering other educational institutions. They were permitted to wear the veil in the classroom as secondary school students, but were not, and are still not, allowed to do so when attending university classes due to a statute regulating the types of outfits students are permitted to wear on university campuses. Thus, it is apparent that the state itself has given rise to some of the issues that have erupted between the secular state and the religious community by enforcing certain policies in an injudicious manner, as, for instance, in this case, by establishing a system of dual education which ultimately produces two types of graduates with opposite mentalities.²³

The Turkish secular state has committed other fatal errors in its strategies of secularization. First of all, it has adopted an authoritarian policy of modernization from the very beginning, allowing no space for a discourse in which the arguments of different parties might be discussed in an atmosphere of mutual respect, possibly offering a means to consensus. The state has maintained the traditional despotic rule of the Ottoman administration, wherein all good things can be conceived only by the state, and are imposed on the masses by any means and without consideration for public opinion. The ruling class dislikes internal conflict, on the ground that public debate on major issues is detrimental to national unity. An obsession with the concept of unity and the security of territorial borders has yielded serious consequences for the Turkish people. In order to preserve a homogenous nation-state, citizens have been denied freedom of expression, despite the fact that the nation consists of many different ethnic and religious groups. They have neither benefited from the public spending typical of modern states, nor from a just distribution of national wealth, circumstances that have forced millions of citizens to be content with a life of misery and poverty, a compromise that has secured them from possible enemies, but has left them with empty stomachs.

22. Saeed also criticizes the two different systems of education in Egypt and Pakistan, see Saeed 1994, p. 196.

23. See İlyasoğlu 2000. In this work, the author defends the possibility of a dialogue between the secularist state and religious groups who are not necessarily using Islamic symbols for political purposes. See also: Tanyol 1999.

Although it can be conceded, despite counterarguments, that modernization cannot be complete without secularization, it would be unsubstantiated to assert that modernization can only be achieved by means of secularization. Modernization, coinciding with a revolutionary mentality, in fact necessitates not only the reshuffling of religious institutions, but also the overhaul of state mechanisms. The appropriation of democratic rules, respect for basic human rights, the creation of a public sphere that can function as a mediating plane between the people's demands and the ruling class, and the elevation of the happiness of the nation's citizens as the state's primary objective, are among the prerequisites for any program of modernization. The Turks have ignored all of these requirements, cherishing the illusion that they can be a modern nation without altering the network left in place by an authoritarian, repressive Asiatic state that looks down on its people as herds to be guided by a shepherd. Such a state can assume any primary target except for the well-being of its people. In this model of statecraft, there is no respect for humanity – the basic relation between the ruler and the ruled being the use of power. This phenomenon partially explains the widespread anti-etatism of the Middle-Eastern people. Lack of solidarity between the state and the masses is one of the reasons why economic, social and educational projects do not materialize in Muslim countries, including Turkey. The rulers demand that the people change their minds, but they have not changed their own. Unfortunately, they have always laid the blame for the failure of state projects on the people, exempting themselves from the guilt for which they are, in fact, responsible.

Another serious mistake committed by the secular governments of Turkey is their application of a distorted version of Modernity. Rather than conceiving of this revolutionary worldview of European origin as a cluster of principles of universal validity, they have identified it with the 'Atatürk Reforms'. Although Atatürk was a true and fearless believer in the Western way of life, a fact that he proved by carrying out the so-called Kemalist reforms, it is against the spirit of Modernity to link the concept with the charisma or heroism of any given leader. The main claim of this secular worldview was to detach the mind of the individual from religious, ideological and traditional loyalties, so that he may become a free, autonomous person. The Turkish strategists of the modernization movement, however, attempted to replace Islam with ideology, i.e. another religion that exerted new constraints on the minds of the people.²⁴ They were not allowed to freely choose new values at their own discretion. The old patrimonial Islamic state was reemerging in a neo-patrimonial communalist fashion,

24. Esposito 2000, p. 7.

with a new, grand mission, namely: to impose a new system of values in the name of modernization on the Turkish people, to save the nation from backwardness, and to put it on equal footing with civilized Western states. There was no adequate rhetoric in place to explain the merits of the new system, nor was there a substantial critique of Islam and its obsolete institutions.

Thus, it never occurred to the strategists that modernization was, first of all, a mental issue that demanded that its adherents relinquish their allegiance to old values and adopt new values that would create a completely new worldview. As Modernity is a human-centered project of life on Earth, man assumes first priority as an object of respect and inquiry, at the expense of the mythological entities of the medieval imagination. However, it can easily be noticed that those secularist reformers in the Muslim world, including Turkey, who identify themselves as the followers of Western civilization, and who act as self-appointed missionaries in civilizing their people, in fact, have no respect for their people. This can be attested to by the treatment they adopt toward the people they rule.

The concept of the nation-state that was incorporated into the new Republic also caused unexpected consequences. The model for new citizenship as defined in the constitution did not materialize in practice. Turkish nationalism as a new creed alongside Kemalism has not garnered the consent of the Kurdish minority. They feel they have been alienated, since there is no mention of Kurdish existence on Turkish soil in any official document. The Kurdish conflict in southeast Turkey, which has culminated in the death of thousands of people over fifteen years, has not yet yielded a political or social solution. The right to speak ethnic languages and practice minority cultures is on the agenda of the new government of the Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*] as a precondition to be met before Turkey is allowed membership in the European Union. Demands for new rights and regulations put forth by various factions within the nation are not heeded by the ruling class, which serves to indicate, once again, that Turkey is not yet a modern state, and continues to display the characteristics of Asiatic authoritarian rule. Despite unwillingness on the part of the ruling elite, changes do take place, though only through external enforcement. Internal debates on serious issues, such as the subject matter for discourse in the public sphere, are not encouraged, nor are the conclusions of such debates, if any, endorsed by legislators.

The relationship between the secularist hardliners (consisting mainly of army generals or state functionaries in high-level positions, particularly judges in the Supreme and Constitutional Courts) and the political parties of Islamic background has always been troublesome, ending with the dissolution of the latter. But after such parties are disbanded, new ones – under new names but with the same mission – appear on the scene. The Justice

and Development Party, founded in 2001 by a faction of the outlawed Virtue Party, is currently in power, having won 363 out of 550 parliament seats in the election of 3 November 2002. Is this victory by an Islamist political party an indication of the resurgence of Islam in Turkey? The founders of the party have denied any link to political Islam, but the voting public knew very well that they were previously members of the Virtue Party, which was forced to disband by the Constitutional Court on charges of anti-secularist actions. Is this the end of the secularization strategies that have been in force since the establishment of the Republic? The answer to both questions is not definitively 'yes' or 'no'. The Islamist party is well aware that it cannot change many state institutions that have long acquired a secular character. The army considers itself not only the guardian of territorial borders, but also the custodian of the 'Atatürk Reforms', in which secularism has top priority. Thus far, they have not dared to lift the ban on the use of headscarves in universities. They can do very little to make the state an Islamic one. Moreover, their efforts on the international plane to make Turkey a member of the European Union create the impression that their conception of Islam is different from that of the mullahs in Iran, i.e. that they have been secularized to some extent.

The victory of the Justice and Development Party is rather suggestive of a defeat for the secular-minded Kemalists. It signifies that a huge part of the Turkish population still adheres to traditional values as the only available ones to be trusted. It also demonstrates that the masses have not been sufficiently exposed to secular values, or rather, that secularism in its European model has never been genuinely represented in modern Turkey.

Conclusion

Islam, in its resurgent character as the culture of Muslim communities in determining a way of life, and as a political movement in responding to various inroads from alien, especially Western, cultures, is no doubt a historical continuity. But whether this continuity is an 'essence' that resists all challenges without ever undergoing change itself, is controversial. This continuity is partly due to the fact that no other 'essence' has yet been introduced into the Islamic world. Islam has survived, thus far, as the only criterion of legitimacy in the lives of Muslims. Modernization policies introduced at the turn of the 20th century by some Muslim states, including Turkey, have been incomplete and piecemeal. Such policies have not established a new tradition of secular values as an alternative to the Islamic tradition and corresponding values. Muslim people have not experienced the blessings of modern states, where man occupies the central place and

enjoys basic rights. It is natural that they are hostile to what they do not know, as they have not been properly enlightened. To depart from accustomed values and adopt new ones can be viewed as a change of identity. However, it is precisely that venerated concept of *fixed* identity which prevents man from taking on novel forms of life that originate from the healthy nature of some members of the human species and delay him in his vocation of furthering his humanity.

Islam, as a system of values of medieval origin, cannot equip its adherents with the guidelines necessary for a modern person to maintain an undisturbed life. Justified knowledge has left little room for unquestioned faith in the mind of modern man. The attraction of the unlimited worldly pleasures of our time has rendered the maintenance of a moral life based on belief unrealistic. Ideal man as configured by the understanding of Modernity and the Enlightenment is contrary to the ideal man as exemplified in the Semitic religions. The former is his own master, free, mobile, self-reliant, rational, pragmatic, curious, skeptical and this-worldly; the latter is a selfless servant of God, ashamed of his instinctive desires, fatalist, otherworldly, and quietist.

The modernization of Muslim societies can only be achieved through the application of a revolutionary program, whereby state and religious institutions which parallel those in the modern states are reestablished. Secularization, as part of such a comprehensive program, will not succeed unless Islam comes under decisive criticism on the basis of the fundamentals of Modernity. Thereafter, robbed of its traditional political claims, Islam can be reduced to the observance of certain rituals in the modern Muslim's private sphere. This expectation will still be abortive if the infrastructure of state mechanisms in present-day Muslim nations does not undergo a deconstructive process in accordance with modern concepts of statecraft.

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CITIZENSHIP AND INDIVIDUATION IN TURKEY

THE TRIUMPH OF WILL OVER REASON*

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ABSTRACT: Today, the notion of ‘modern citizenship’ is in the process of becoming divorced from that of ‘nation-state’. In the Turkish context, the urgency to revise and redefine the notion of citizenship stems from the visibly enhanced expression of women’s, as well as Islamic and Kurdish, identities in the late 1980s and 1990s. This article portrays the evolution of the concepts of ‘citizen / individual’ and ‘will / reason’ in Turkey as binary opposites that have created a tension between the notions of ‘republic’ and ‘democracy’. It does so particularly by referring to the works of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, a self-proclaimed Turkish liberal, who expounded on the concept of ‘the individual’ in Turkey in the 1930s. The article contends that the concept of modern citizenship in the Turkish context evolved in such a way as to exclude a liberal individualist dimension.

Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of Enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!

Immanuel Kant¹

Introduction

In a short essay that I wrote in 1996, I argued that the limitations of feminist arguments in Turkey basically stemmed from an assumption that women were citizens prior to being individuals.² Feminist demands in Turkey are usually posed by way of attachment to grand social and political projects

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1. Kant [1784] 1970, p. 54.

2. Kadioğlu 1996a, pp. 12–15.

such as Kemalism and socialism, as well as Islamic identities.³ Kemalist feminists emphasize women's public visibility in modern attire, especially in the political arena, such as when they are present and visible in parliament and within the political party structures. In the course of the 1970s, socialist women emphasized a view of equality of women which came to mean 'similarity with men'. Hence, they denounced their sexuality and femininity and posed as 'sisters' of socialist men.⁴ Islamic women, on the other hand, have been staging a fight with regard to dress since the early 1980s. With the advent of political Islam, the covered bodies of Muslim women are presented in stark contrast to the bodies of modern women. These women resort to veiling in order to emphasize their personality, rather than their sexuality.⁵ Veiling, then, has become a way of denouncing sexuality outside of the confines of marital arrangements. Turkish women, in the course of serving such grand social and political projects, have thus denounced their individual identities. The trajectory of Turkish men is not too different from that of Turkish women in terms of denouncement of individuality. Hence, Turkish men and women first and foremost perceive themselves as Turkish citizens who are responsible for performing certain duties.

In the course of the past few years, there has been an increase in academic efforts in the West to critically examine, and perhaps redefine, the notion of modern citizenship. Feminist literature has contributed a great deal to academic discussions on the notion of citizenship. Today, the notion of modern citizenship is in the process of being divorced from its inherent attachment to the nation-state. In other words, we live in an era in which increasing demands are being expressed with a view to widening the public realm to include differences that were previously relegated to the private realm. These demands for opening up the public realm to differences pertain to women, immigrants, blacks, as well as ethnic and religious groups.

In the present article, first of all, a brief review of the existing literature that classifies and critically discusses the modern notion of citizenship will be presented, while keeping an eye on the Turkish notion of citizenship. The main thesis of this article is that 'the citizen precedes the individual' in Turkey. In other words, as it is expressed in the title, 'will has triumphed over reason' in the Turkish context. Secondly, the article attempts to portray the validity of this thesis by referring to the works of a self-acclaimed Turkish liberal, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who dealt with the concept of the individual in Turkey in the 1930s.

3. See Kadioğlu 1993a, pp. 58–62.

4. Berktaş 1990.

5. Göle 1991, p. 125. See also Kadioğlu 1994, pp. 645–661.

The notions of citizenship and individualism can be studied in various ways. One could study Constitutions and other legal documents, such as property laws, and their role in delineating the category of citizenship in a particular context. One might also study certain critical texts written by philosophers, political thinkers or founders of a certain political regime, or regimes, that focus on the ‘concept’ of citizenship and individualism. The following text approaches the notions of citizenship and individualism from this latter angle. Hence, rather than reviewing legal documents, it focuses on the concepts of citizenship and individualism.

1. The Citizenship Problematic

The origins of the concept of citizenship can be traced back to the Roman and Greek civilizations and the evolution of the city-states. The concept of citizenship, in Antiquity, alternated between a collective conscience based on virtue and a more individualist, cosmopolitan notion. The problematic of citizenship in Antiquity revolved around its ethical versus non-ethical dimensions, acceptance versus rejection of the authority of the state, and an emphasis on collective versus individual conscience. Similar issues constitute the basis of citizenship debates today. Nevertheless, in order to comprehend citizenship debates in the 1990s, we must acknowledge the modern character of the concept, and thus move away from the city-state and towards the nation-state.

The roots of the modern concept of citizenship can be located in the French Revolution and its immediate aftermath. Citizenship is a modern concept that evolved alongside various nationalisms in Europe following the French Revolution. In fact, the beginning of immigration control in Europe was an outcome of the French Revolution. In England, for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a direct response to the flight of French refugees (numbering approximately eight thousand) from the French Revolution.⁶ In America and Switzerland too, immigration control was implemented as a reaction to the French Revolution and fears that Jacobin emissaries had infiltrated immigrant groups.

The modern concept of the citizen is closely associated with the notion of civilization, which entails a movement from rural to urban centers. A citizen is someone from the *cité* [city]. In the course of the 18th century, *cité* was a place where individual freedoms were pushed to the forefront and feudal hierarchical structures were destroyed. Accordingly, the *citoyen* [citizen] was the driving force behind these changes away from relations of

6. Plender 1972, p. 43.

feudal bondage towards capitalist contractual relations. The 19th century, by contrast, was characterized by many romantic views of the *cité* as a center of decadence and deterioration. The most important reaction to the French Revolution and Napoleon's conquests in the German states was felt not in political, legal or institutional realms, but in literature. Accordingly, 19th century German Romanticism was characterized by a yearning for the province and rural life away from the *cité*.

Today, with increasing scrutiny of the basic categories of modernity, there is an increasing tendency to view the modern notion of citizenship outside of its inherent attachment to the nation-state. The need to revise the modern category of citizenship is an implication of the process of globalization. Globalization and the transfer of images and populations have prompted an opening up of the public realm to differences that were earlier relegated to the private realm. Such differences are usually expressed in terms of discourses pertaining to gender, race, religion, and ethnicity. In the wake of the twenty-first century, the notion of citizenship is undergoing a transformation, at the same time that other conceptual investigations are taking place within democratic theory. The dissolution of the supremacy of nation-states has captured the attention of many future-oriented researchers who emphasize the increasing importance of regional cooperation as well as globalization. At the same time, however, Europeans are witnessing a remarkable resurgence of nationalism. Hence, our times are characterized by conflicting trends which signal the demise of the nation-state, as well as the resurgence of nationalisms characterized by an inclination to define national identities by way of reference to an Other. Perhaps one of the distinguishing features of our times is a conflicting duality which tears down established barriers impeding communication among the peoples of the world while simultaneously erecting new ones. Hence, while some of the historical motivations that have paved the way to racism in the European context are being eliminated, new impulses towards racism are unfortunately mushrooming in political contexts, which have become laden with racial motifs.⁷ Present debates regarding citizenship revolve around similar themes. While, on the one hand, there are arguments for the dissolution of the modern concept of citizenship, along with the nation-state, and its replacement by a broader category of human rights, there is, likewise, a desire for pre-modern, organic communities to form the basis of citizenship, along with authoritarian nationalisms. Hence, while the modern notion of

7. In an earlier article, I referred to the coexistence of globalization and 'Germanization' (exclusionary and non-assimilationist attitudes towards the Other) as the two paradoxical trends of our times (Kadioğlu 1993b).

citizenship, on the one hand, is expanding to include human rights, it is, at the same time, becoming increasingly narrow as the significance of identity politics intensifies, along with the urge to glorify and abuse private identities. Hence, a revision and redefinition of the modern notion of citizenship involves a 'rearticulation of the public and private realms' that were separated in modernity and fused in pre-modern societies.⁸

In the Turkish context, the urge to revise and redefine the notion of citizenship stemmed from a visible accentuation of the expression of women's, as well as Islamic and Kurdish, identities in the political context of the late 1980s and 1990s. Differences that were earlier relegated to the private realm began to make their debut in the public realm. The absolute, homogeneous, all-encompassing category of Turkish citizenship was demystified and began to crumble due to the predominance of an 'identity politics' in Turkey that was based on gender-related, religious and ethnic identities. While the issue garnered increased attention in academic circles,⁹ a new notion called 'Constitutional citizenship' began to be discussed in political circles and the expression was even used by President Süleyman Demirel.¹⁰ In the midst of these debates on Turkish citizenship, some people began to declare, with reference to themselves, 'I am from Turkey' [*Türkiye'liyim*] rather than 'I am a Turk' [*Türküm*]. This changeover symbolized the demystification of the official view of Turkish citizenship as exemplified in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's famous expression 'Happy is he who calls himself a Turk!' [*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!*]. I believe the issue of citizenship approaches the question of democratization in Turkey from the perspective of modernity in general, rather than focusing on the specific features and problems of the Turkish modernization project. The modern notion of

8. Kadioğlu 1996.

9. Many national and international conferences held in Turkey began to be organized around the themes of citizenship, identity, multiculturalism, etc., especially in the latter half of the 1990s. A pioneer international symposium organized by the International Relations Center of Marmara University in Istanbul (held on March 28–29, 1996) was entitled 'Redefinition of Nation, State and Citizenship'. A subsequent national conference (held from April 10–12, 1996) was organized by Ege University in Izmir and entitled 'Republic, Democracy and Identity'. [The papers were collected in Bilgin 1997]. A similar international conference was organized by Mersin University and Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung zum Sozial-und Geisteswissenschaftlichen Austausch in Mersin (held from October 28 to November 1, 1997), and was entitled 'Multiculturalism, Immigration and Globalization'.

10. On the debates on 'Constitutional citizenship' in Turkey, see Vergin 1996, and also Üstel 1996b.

citizenship has come under intense scrutiny; this is not particular to Turkey. Rather, this process was unleashed worldwide as a result of the dynamics set in place by globalization.

2. Various Classifications of Modern Citizenship

Almost all new analyses dealing with the modern notion of citizenship refer to T. H. Marshall's classic works.¹¹ Marshall refers to three dimensions of citizenship: civil and legal, political, and social. First of all, civil and legal rights of citizens evolved in the course of the 17th century vis-à-vis the absolutist states. Accordingly, courts and individual legal rights began to appear. Secondly, political rights evolved in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries alongside the evolution of modern parliamentary systems. Thirdly, the social dimension of citizenship is a phenomenon of the 20th century and is related to the welfare state. This dimension paved the way to certain individual social rights such as employment, health, and education. Marshall thus pointed to a uniform, evolutionary and a teleological history of the notion of citizenship. As a result, his citizenship theory has been criticized extensively in recent academic literature for failing to account for various types of modern citizenship.¹²

Still, the sequence in the emergence of the three dimensions of citizenship can be utilized in accounting for different trajectories towards modern citizenship. In cases where democratization preceded bureaucratization, civil and legal rights are predominant to the detriment of social rights. In the United States, for instance, the notion of 'social citizenship' is an oxymoron.¹³ Citizens relate to the state via contractual arrangements or they receive aid from the state in the form of charity. Hence, recipients of welfare state benefits are usually viewed as lazy parasites who are unworthy of the honor of citizenship. On the contrary, in Germany, where bureaucratization preceded democratization, citizens (the members of the *Volk*) benefit from welfare state provisions as 'rights'. In Turkey, the distinguishing feature of civil and legal, political and social rights is the fact that they were initially granted from above, rather than being acquired as rights from below in the aftermath of demands and struggles. Hence, citizenship was

11. Marshall 1950; Marshall 1977.

12. See, for instance, Turner 1992. See also Turner 1993, and van Steenbergen 1994.

13. Fraser & Gordon 1994.

bestowed from above prior to the birth of a bourgeoisie that posed demands and ignited the fire that culminated in constitutionalism.¹⁴

In what follows, three major classifications that have appeared in recent scholarly literature with respect to the modern notion of citizenship will be reviewed while keeping an eye on the trajectory of Turkish citizenship:

1. Different Nationalisms, Different Conceptions of Citizenship

The years between 1789 and 1815 signaled the emergence of both French and German nationalism.¹⁵ German nationalism emerged alongside a literary tradition called Romanticism. One of the most distinguishing features of this tradition was its critical attitude towards French cosmopolitanism. German Romantics thought that the rationalism of the 18th century was artificial, and thus relied on intuitions and emotions rather than reason and intellect. The German Romantic tradition reveals the dark and anti-rational aspects of German nationalism. The notion of a German nation that evolved in the course of the 19th century stemmed from a *völkisch* ideology which later formed the basis of the National Socialist worldview. German Romantic literature became the medium of expression for German nationalism in the course of the 19th century, prior to the formation of a German nation-state. Since German nationalism preceded the nation-state, it was expressed in ethnic and cultural terms. Accordingly, William Rogers Brubaker refers to an ‘ethnocultural conception of nationhood’ in Germany.¹⁶ In comparing the German and French conceptions of nationhood and citizenship, Brubaker remarks:

It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, and quite another to want to make all Utopiphones citizens of Utopia. Crudely put, the former represents the French, the latter the German model of nationhood. Whether juridical (as in naturalization) or cultural, assimilation presupposes a political conception of membership and the belief, which France took over

14. Hasan Bülent Kahraman refers to the construction of all the Marshallian aspects of citizenship in Turkey as having taken place ‘in a dash’, rather than as a process, by means of a gradual ‘completion’ (Kahraman 1996, p. 6). See also the papers and discussions in *Türkiye’de İnsan Hakları Semineri* [Seminar on Human Rights in Turkey], 1970, esp. p. 65.

15. Hans Kohn considers these years the formative years of French and German nationalisms (Kohn 1967).

16. Brubaker 1992, p. 10. See also Brubaker 1990, and Brubaker 1989.

from the Roman tradition, that the state can turn strangers into citizens, peasants or immigrant workers into Frenchmen.¹⁷

Hence, while the French conception of citizenship evolved in an assimilationist and state-centered manner, the German conception acquired an organic, differentialist, dissimilationist and *Volk*-centered character. French nationhood evolved in a predominantly political way while the German variety became predominantly ethnocultural. As Brubaker puts it:

In fact, traditions of nationhood have political and cultural components in both countries. These components have been closely integrated in France, where political unity has been understood as constitutive, cultural unity as expressive of nationhood. In the German tradition, in contrast, political and ethnocultural aspects of nationhood have stood in tension with one another, serving as the basis for competing conceptions of nationhood. One such conception is sharply opposed to the French conception: according to this view, ethnocultural unity is constitutive, political unity expressive, of nationhood.¹⁸

Hence, the temporal distance between state formation and nation building processes, as well as their sequence of events, gave shape to the conceptions of nationhood and citizenship in France and Germany.¹⁹ Since French nationalism appeared at about the same time as the emergence of the French nation-state, political and social unity was the work of statesmen. German nationalism, on the other hand, preceded the formation of the German nation-state by half a century. The German Romantic tradition was laden with motifs of yearning for a national state. This temporal disparity made ethnic and cultural unity constitutive of German nationalism and heralded the significance of blood ties and/or descent as the basis for modern German citizenship.

The distinction between the French and German nationalisms and conceptualizations of citizenship is significant in understanding Turkish nationalism in two respects: First of all, Turkish nationalism displays characteristics of both French and German nationalisms; embracing both Civilization and Culture, it is of a paradoxical nature.²⁰ The paradox between Civilization and Culture is nowhere better expressed than in the writings of

17. Brubaker 1992, p. 8.

18. *op.cit.*, p. 10.

19. I have studied the origins of German nationalism and citizenship extensively in earlier work. See, for instance, Kadioğlu 1996d; Kadioğlu 1993b; Kadioğlu 1993c; Kadioğlu 1992; Kadioğlu 1991.

20. Kadioğlu 1996c.

Ziya Gökalp. The type of nationalism described in his writings was individualist and cosmopolitan, yet also espoused the preservation of a local, pristine identity. Hence, the concepts of Civilization and Culture were not antithetical, mutually exclusive entities in Ziya Gökalp's thought; rather, he tried to synthesize the two. In an analysis of Ziya Gökalp's thought, Niyazi Berkes maintains that:

If his analyses are taken as a whole, however, these two concepts (Culture and Civilization) do not represent antithetical and mutually exclusive entities, but rather two closely related and complementary traits of social reality (...). Civilizational elements assume meaning and function in the life of men only when they enter into the service of culture. Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes merely a matter of mechanical imitation; it never penetrates into the inner life of a people and never gives fruit of any kind.²¹

Secondly, it is important to point to the sequence by which the state and nation emerged in Turkey. Whereas, in the German case, it is possible to refer to a nation preceding a state, i.e. 'a nation in search of its state', in the Turkish instance, the historical order of things is reversed. In the case of modern Republican Turkey, one can refer to a state preceding a nation, i.e. 'a state in search of its nation'.²² Hence, political unity appears as the constitutive unit of the Turkish nation-state. In short, the indivisibility of the Turkish state from its nation and the irreversibility of its holy borders – as opposed to the case in Germany – constitute the cornerstones of Turkish national identity. Hence, Turkish citizenship appears as a notion defined from above by state authorities. The distinguishing features of this notion of citizenship were delineated in the 1931 Congress of the Republican People's Party and were formulated as the 'six arrows' that became the Party's insignia. These were: Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Republicanism, Etatism, and Revolutionism. These principles became Constitutional liabilities by 1937 and Turkish citizens were expected to internalize them.

2. Liberal-Individualism and Civic-Republicanism

A second classification of the modern notion of citizenship is also found in the academic literature. This classification stems from a philosophical distinction between the liberal or liberal-individualist and the classical or civic-republican traditions. Adrian Oldfield, who classifies modern citizenship

21. Berkes 1959, p. 23.

22. See Kadioğlu 1995.

on the basis of these philosophical traditions, refers to the differences between citizenship as 'status' and citizenship as 'practice'.²³ Liberal individualism has been the dominant strain of thought in Anglo-American political thinking since the 17th century, roughly from Hobbes onwards. According to Oldfield, liberal individualism accords the individual an ontological, epistemological and moral priority.²⁴ Liberal individualism defines citizenship as a status conferred on the basis of 'rights', and hence gives rise to a language of citizenship in terms of needs and entitlements. The 'status of citizenship' imposes no 'duties' on individuals beyond minimally civic ones. Individuals relate to each other on a contractual basis. Any other form of public involvement and political activity is a matter of 'choice'. Hence, in the liberal-individualist tradition, the conception of citizenship generates no social bond other than contract. It prompts no type of social solidarity, cohesion, nor any sense of common purpose.²⁵ It produces an individual which is deficient and impoverished as a social being.

The classical or civic-republican tradition has its origins in the ethical and political thought of Aristotle. It was reinforced and modified by a succession of political thinkers from Machiavelli to Rousseau and beyond. In the words of Oldfield, 'it addresses much more cogently the twin themes of citizenship and community.'²⁶ In the classical tradition, citizenship appears as an activity or practice, whereby failing to engage in the practice is, in important senses, failing to be a citizen.²⁷ Citizenship, in this tradition, is expressed in terms of a language of 'duties' and/or obligations to the community. Practices empower individuals to act as citizens. It is the shared commitment to these practices which makes individuals citizens. It is action in such spheres as military service which both constitutes citizenship and sustains the community of which the citizen is a member. In this view, individuals are not thought of as logically prior to society.²⁸ Moreover, they have no moral priority. As a result, claims may be made with respect to community members' time, resources, and lives for the morally superior entity – the community.²⁹ Oldfield's major endeavor is to instigate an articulation

23. Oldfield 1994; Oldfield 1990.

24. Oldfield 1990, p. 1.

25. Oldfield 1994, p. 190.

26. Oldfield 1990, p. 5.

27. Oldfield 1994, p. 192.

28. *op.cit.*, p. 191.

29. *ibid.*

between these two traditions and redefine the notion of modern citizenship in such a way that would benefit from the positive aspects of each. As he puts it:

In the Western world, the ideal of citizenship as status is one which it is not difficult to think of as achievable, even if vigilance is required to ensure that the achievement is sustained. Our confidence here is in large part a product of the sheer amount of thought and struggle which have been invested in the ideal. The same cannot be said of the ideal of citizenship as practice, and in large part this reflects the very success of the liberal-individualist achievement, which was to liberate the individual from the constricting influences of society and the state. The thinking has been there, but the struggle has not. The question, therefore, is whether the struggle is worthwhile. *We must not expect to displace the idea of citizenship as status, but we can use elements of this conception to further the project of citizenship as practice* [my emphasis, AK].³⁰

The Turkish notion of citizenship in the aftermath of the proclamation of the Republic evolved in a manner that is more akin to the civic-republican tradition. Accordingly, Turkish citizenship is based more on ‘duties’ than on ‘rights’. In a study surveying the books used in citizenship education courses in primary and secondary schools in Turkey in the Republican era, Füsün Üstel underlines the evolution of a notion of citizenship that is based on duties.³¹ Accordingly, the primary aim of citizenship education appears to be the achievement of civilization and the inculcation of patriotism. Üstel refers to a ‘militant’ citizen that evolved up until the end of the 1940s, one who was ‘burdened with duties’.³²

Fuat Keyman presents a notion of Republican citizenship that is constituted by means of duties in order to promote a sense of ‘common good’ to the detriment of individual rights.³³ He interprets the concept of citizenship in Turkey within the framework of the Platonic nature of the Kemalist project of modernity. Accordingly, ‘common good’ is defined by reference to a ‘will to civilization’ on the part of state elites. Hence, politics in this context does not entail the articulation of different demands within the decision-making process and, therefore, their representation, but rather, involves the steering of society towards a common good defined by the state elite in accordance with their will to civilization. This common good

30. op.cit., p. 193.

31. Üstel 1996a.

32. op.cit.

33. Keyman 1997.

has ontological priority over demands that derive from the society.³⁴ As a result, the citizen appears to be both the object of the Kemalist modernization project and its carrier. S/he is not only expected to internalize this project, but also to reproduce the sovereign position of the state.³⁵

3. Modern Citizenship Based on the Axes of Active-Passive and Private-Public Realms

Bryan Turner forwards a classification of the modern notion of citizenship based on the two axes of active/passive citizenship and public/private space.³⁶ Turner's analysis contains a critique of Marshall's evolutionary and uniform trajectory of modern citizenship. As he puts it:

The point of this historical sketch has been partly to provide a critique of the monolithic and unified conception of citizenship in Marshall and partly to offer a sociological model of citizenship along two axes, namely public and private definitions of moral activity in terms of the creation of a public space of political activity, and active and passive forms of whether the citizen is conceptualized as merely a subject of an absolute authority or as an active political agent.³⁷

According to Turner's classification, there are four types of modern citizenship that each evolved in four different contexts: first of all, in revolutionary contexts, citizenship involves a struggle from below (active citizenship) with an emphasis on the public arena (citizenship evolved in the public realm). As a result, the private world of the individual is regarded with suspicion. Secondly, in liberal pluralist contexts, citizenship once again involves a struggle for rights from below (active citizenship), yet there is also a continuing emphasis on the rights of the individual for privatized dissent (citizenship evolved in the private realm). Thirdly, in passive democratic contexts, citizenship rights are bestowed from above – in the absence of, or prior to, a struggle from below (passive citizenship or citizen as subject) – along with the legitimacy of representative institutions, courts and the welfare state system (citizenship evolved in the public realm). Fourthly,

34. op.cit., p. 92.

35. op.cit., p. 93. See also Kahraman 1996.

36. Turner 1992; Bryan Turner, 'Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship', in Turner 1993.

37. Turner 1992, p. 55.

in plebiscitary authoritarian contexts, citizenship rights are once again granted from above (passive citizenship). Yet, although the state invites the citizens to periodically elect leaders, the latter is not responsible to the electorate on a daily basis, and therefore, private life emerges as a 'sanctuary from state regulation' (citizenship evolved in the private realm).³⁸

Turner refers to the French conception of citizenship within the revolutionary tradition, which involved an attack on the private space of family and religion. The American conception of citizenship, by contrast, exhibited motifs from the liberal pluralist solution since participation was emphasized, although this was contained by a constant emphasis on privacy and the sacredness of individual opinion. The English case under the conditions of colonial settlement in America in the 17th century, in Turner's opinion, was an example of the passive democratic solution, since citizens appeared as mere subjects, and acknowledged passively the legitimacy of the representative institutions. German fascism constitutes a degeneration of plebiscitary democracy where 'the individual citizen is submerged in the sacredness of the state which permits minimal participation in terms of election of leaders, while family life is given priority in the arena of personal ethical development.'³⁹ The failure of a radical bourgeois revolution in Germany in the 1840s and the realization of unification from above in 1870 by means of Bismarckian legislation paved the way for passive citizenship, which became the main carrier of social rights. The absence of a successful liberal revolution produced an underdeveloped public realm in Germany.⁴⁰

The Turkish conception of modern citizenship, when viewed in terms of Turner's classification, seems akin both to the revolutionary French tradition – since it similarly involves an attack on the private space of family and religion – and the German passive tradition. In Turner's formulation, the former tradition may collapse into totalitarianism when the 'state in pushing egalitarianism to the extreme closes off the private sphere from influencing the course of political affairs'.⁴¹ The Turkish conception differs from the French one insofar as it was defined from above and was therefore passive. It is similar to the German conception since the absence of a successful liberal revolution and, hence, participation, resulted in an underdeveloped public realm. Turkish citizenship is defined from above (passive) within an exaggerated public space which smothers the individual and invades the

38. op.cit., p. 46.

39. op.cit., pp. 55–56.

40. Turner 1993, p. 10.

41. Turner 1992, p. 56.

private space of family and religion. Üstel notes efforts to supervise and regulate the private realm by means of citizenship education (such as the listing of appropriate fun and recreational activities, the regulation of health and hygiene as well as dress codes) until the end of the 1940s.⁴²

Perhaps what most distinguishes the Turkish notion of citizenship from the French tradition is the absence of Enlightenment prior to the establishment of citizenship. If, following Immanuel Kant, Enlightenment is defined as ‘man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’, the Turkish notion of citizenship presumes an unenlightened, immature individual.⁴³ Hence, the notion of Turkish citizenship was constructed prior to the emergence of an enlightened, ‘free’ individual capable of producing demands, and purports to steer the common lives of immature beings by means of duties. Turkish citizens are not expected to reason. Rather, they are expected to follow. In elaborating on national morals, Atatürk remarks:

In a nation which is developed and has reached a perfect level, the requirements of national morals are undertaken by the individuals in that nation - *without resorting to reason- by means of the voice of their conscience and emotional instinct* [my emphasis, AK].⁴⁴

Writing in 1929–30, Atatürk acknowledged the immature state of the Republic and argued that what is usually relegated to individual initiative in developed countries should be considered a vital state undertaking in our country. As he put it:

Our Republic is very young; it is not yet capable of contemporary undertakings or all the grand tasks that it has inherited from the past. As in political and intellectual life, in economic undertakings too, it would not be correct to wait for the results of individual initiatives. Significant and grand tasks will be realized in a successful way only by a government that relies on national wealth and organizes the dispensing and bearing of national sovereignty by relying on all the institutions and power of the state.⁴⁵

Ironically, the state elite’s will to civilization received almost no fundamental criticism from the liberal opposition in Turkey in the 1930s. The priority of will over reason is also evident in some of the liberal texts of that

42. Üstel 1996a.

43. Kant [1784] 1970, *ibid.*

44. Atatürk, quoted from Tezcan 1996, p. 17 [my translation].

45. *op.cit.*, p. 54. [my translation].

era. In what follows, I will fortify this argument by briefly focusing on the liberalism and the particular brand of individualism of Ahmet Ağaoğlu.⁴⁶

3. Limits of Individualism

Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) is one of the most interesting thinkers of the early Republican era. He was actively involved in the formation of a legitimate opposition party in 1930, the Free Republican Party [*Serbest Fırka*], which lasted for less than four months. The Free Republican Party was founded upon the wishes of Atatürk, who wanted to create a controlled opposition. In his memoirs, Ağaoğlu describes how he was assigned to be one of the founders of such a party.⁴⁷ The political impact of the Free Republican Party was quite limited, though this experience had a significant influence on Ağaoğlu's thought. After this episode, he did not return to the ranks of the Republican People's Party [*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*] and spent his final years producing a fascinating body of literature that propounded a particular brand of liberalism.

In his search for the causes of the backwardness of Ottoman society, Ağaoğlu laid primary emphasis on the lack of individualism in Ottoman culture. He thought that individuals in the East, in general, were not given the opportunity to live. Rather, they were drowned by despotic regimes:

In the Orient, the individual was drowned, in the Occident he was able to unbind himself; on one side the individual was squeezed, weakened, and made into a meager being under increasingly ferocious despotism and put into his own narrow and constricted sheath. In the Occident, on the other hand, the individual gradually took hold of his freedoms and, by constantly opening up, felt the pleasure of living and working as a result of the weakening of despotism. As a result, the Oriental societies composed of constricted individuals put into their own sheaths also became constricted and weakened.⁴⁸

Ağaoğlu believed that the lack of basic freedoms in Oriental cultures was the immediate cause of the backwardness of the Orient.

Ağaoğlu envisioned a type of individualism that would open up Eastern societies to a vision of freedom. This individual was quite different from the egoistic individual described in classical liberal texts. Ağaoğlu described this

46. I have elaborated on Ahmet Ağaoğlu's thought in greater detail in Kadioğlu 1997.

47. Ağaoğlu 1994.

48. Ağaoğlu 1933a, p. 27 [my translation].

liberalism in a book entitled *Ben Neyim?* [Who am I?], which was originally published in 1936, three years before his death.⁴⁹ In this book, Ağaoğlu pointed to a distinction between egoism and altruism; he detested the former and advocated the latter. Ağaoğlu felt that egoistic individuals typically existed in the Orient, that these individuals did not care about the good of others and that they were, in other words, 'put into their own sheaths'.

Ağaoğlu offered three conditions that accounted for the emergence of such selfish individuals in the Orient. The first was the family structure and the position of women within the family in Eastern societies; the second was the educational system and underdeveloped state of the existing literature; the third was the existence of long-lasting despotic regimes in the East.⁵⁰ He argued that since family structures necessitated the separation of men's and women's physical realms, there was a lack of solidarity between them. This, in turn, nurtured egoism.⁵¹ Moreover, he placed blame on literary figures for being alienated from society and for failing to provide society with suitable role models.⁵² Hence, virtues such as altruism or selflessness were not provided with fertile ground in which to blossom in the Ottoman-Turkish context. In placing his hopes in the development of an altruistic, selfless individual, rather than a selfish one, Ağaoğlu displayed his longing for a solidarist structure in society.

In *Ben Neyim?*, Ağaoğlu portrays a series of fascinating dialogues between his selfish outer self and his selfless inner self. His individualism did not glorify the selfish, egoistic man represented in the outer self. On the contrary, his individualism bore the traits of the inner self, and was therefore laden with altruistic and solidarist motifs. Hence, it may be referred to as solidarist individualism.

Ağaoğlu did not place undue emphasis on the role of institutions and laws in giving birth to selfless individuals. In the tradition of Montesquieu and Tocqueville, and because he believed that despotic frames of mind lingered on in the Turkish Republic despite the Kemalist reforms, Ağaoğlu rested his hopes not on institutions and laws, but rather, on the adoption of certain moral values.⁵³ Moral, virtuous individuals were to be created by the following two methods.

49. Ağaoğlu 1939.

50. op.cit., p. 15.

51. Ağaoğlu 1993b.

52. Ağaoğlu 1993e.

53. This feature of Ağaoğlu's thought is depicted in a very eloquent article by François Georgeon (Georgeon 1996), esp. p. 32.

First of all, Ağaoğlu placed a great deal of importance on the role of leading literary figures of his time, such as poets, novelists and intellectuals. He promoted a view of literary figures and intellectuals as motors of progress. Accordingly, at times he voiced a major disillusionment with the works of such figures in Ottoman-Turkish lands.⁵⁴ His vanguardism is nowhere more clearly expressed than in his utopian novel, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde* [In the Land of the Free Men].⁵⁵ Here, he describes the process by which an egoistic individual becomes a selfless man. He is guided all along by a group of intellectuals which he refer to as the ‘*pirs*’.

Secondly, selfless individuals were to be created by their own internal selves. The inner self was expected to tame the outer self. In this instance, Ağaoğlu’s thought was influenced by the works of Henri Bergson, which contained a metaphysical dimension.⁵⁶ Followers of Bergson, in their journal, *Dergah*, argued that the success of the Independence War was due to something more than simply technical advances in the military, and that this ‘something’ could not be measured by the categories available within the positive sciences. Rather, this success spilled forth from a basic instinct belonging to all living creatures that was called *élan vital* [elan of life].

In a fascinating book by Samet Ağaoğlu (Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s late son), which describes the life and works of Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s friends, the author pointed to a difference between his father’s and Ziya Gökalp’s ideas.⁵⁷ He argued that the individual, in Ziya Gökalp’s thought, had to surrender to the state entity; hence there were no rights, but only duties. Ağaoğlu, on the other hand, brought the individual to the forefront, outside the realm of the state. Nevertheless, Ağaoğlu still placed more emphasis on duties rather than on rights. What distinguished Ağaoğlu, however, was his vision of an individual who would eventually grasp an awareness of his duties by means of the efforts of his own inner self. Hence, Ağaoğlu underlined the significance of will over reason. Since spirit was made up of both reason

54. Ağaoğlu 1933d. See, also, the allegations that he directed against one of the key literary and political figures of his time, Yakub Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, in Ağaoğlu 1933a, pp. 119–125.

55. Ağaoğlu 1936.

56. Henri Bergson’s works became quite influential among the intellectuals in Istanbul in the 1920s. On ‘Bergsonizm’, see Ülken 1979. One of the common denominators of the followers of Bergson was their stance against the positivist views of Ziya Gökalp. Although Ağaoğlu embraced this positivism, he at the same time harbored some Bergsonian ideas. This should account for some of the apparent paradoxes in Ağaoğlu’s thought such as his love and hate relationship with both the intellectuals and the people.

57. Samet Ağaoğlu [no date].

and will, reason had to surrender to will for the achievement of a solidarist social structure composed of selfless, responsible individuals. Given all his descriptions of duty-oriented, moral, selfless individuals led by the '*pirs*', Ağaoğlu's land of the free man seems rather like a dystopia where moral despotism reigns. The selfless individuals of this puritan free land seem to have undergone what he calls the three types of cleansing, that of the body, heart and spirit.⁵⁸

It is clear that Ağaoğlu's individualism carried both vanguardist and solidarist motifs due to its emphasis on intellectuals and altruism at the expense of egoism. His individual was not someone who was expected to use his own reason but, rather, was to be dragged into an 'ordered freedom' under the guidance of intellectual leaders.⁵⁹

Conclusion

The main contention of this article is to portray that the concept of modern citizenship, in the Turkish context, evolved in such a way as to exclude a liberal-individualist dimension. Whereas in Western Europe the notion of the individual appeared in philosophical writings prior to the emergence of modern citizenship, in Turkey the citizen preceded the individual. Hence, Turkish citizens found themselves in a position to be absorbed in grand social projects such as Kemalism, Socialism, and political Islam. Trapped in the missions of such projects, they were unable to recognize the significance of becoming individuals prior to becoming Kemalists, socialists, and political Islamists.

In Turkey, the civil and legal, political and social rights associated with citizenship were granted from above. They were not acquired as a result of struggles initiated from below. The notion of Turkish citizenship evolved within the civic-republican tradition by emphasizing practices that were viewed as duties. In the early years of the Republic, Turkish citizens were geared towards embracing the fundamental tenets of the Turkish revolution, namely, Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Republicanism, Etatism and Revolutionism. The association of such aspects of the Republican ideology with citizenship paved the way to its definition by disregarding a distinction between the public and the private realms. The Republican elite not only defined the public duties of citizens, but also their private roles, by

58. Ağaoğlu 1936, p. 75; see also Ağaoğlu's description of the cleansing of the spirit in *Tanrı Dağında* [On God's Mountain], (text attached to Ağaoğlu 1939), p. 61.

59. Ağaoğlu 1933c.

stipulating dress codes and recreational activities. In summary, it is possible to argue that in the founding years of the Republic, Turkish citizenship was defined from above by a state elite within the civic-republican tradition, by emphasizing duties over rights and by disregarding the privacy of the individual.

Ironically, Republican epistemology also shaped the contours of liberal arguments in the Turkish context. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, for instance, one of the self-acclaimed liberals of the 1930s, formulated an individualism which was delimited by a Republican epistemology that had two distinguishing features. First of all, it was essentialist, that is, based on an essentialist distinction between the East and the West and/or the Orient and the Occident, i.e., the Self and the privileged Other. Secondly, it was based on a managerial attitude on the part of the Republican elite who identified civilization as a societal goal and who initiated a process of social engineering geared towards the construction of a modern national identity at the expense of traditional, local and religious identities.⁶⁰ Ağaoğlu's liberalism, defined within the confines of a Republican epistemology, was laden with positivist, vanguardist, solidarist, and moralist motifs. Ağaoğlu's individual was quite similar to the Republican citizen; s/he was a militant follower, and not a reflective, reasoning being.

In sum, the Republican citizen was expected to 'follow' rather than to reach certain decisions through reflection. S/he was the subject of another's will. According to Hans Reiss, who interpreted Kant's definitive study on Enlightenment:

He (Kant) does not consider it to be the purpose of politics to make people happy. Happiness is subjective ... This argument, of course, does not mean that he does not wish people to be happy. It only means that *political arrangements should not be organized in such a way as to aim at promoting happiness, but that they should permit men to attain happiness in their own way* [my emphasis, AK].⁶¹

Accordingly, Turkish citizens were discouraged from pursuing their own happiness. Rather, they were integrated into a grand plan of civilization which was intended to promote collective happiness. The individual, as defined in some liberal texts, was quite delimited. S/he did not differ to any significant extent from the citizen envisioned by the state elite. Hence, a political culture that prompted the 'will to follow' rather than the 'courage

60. I have elaborated on the notion of 'Republican epistemology' in Kadioğlu 1998.

61. Hans Reiss (ed.), 'Introduction', in: Kant (1784) 1970.

to reason' began to evolve in the Turkish Republic. Will triumphed over reason. Perhaps the most revealing metaphor pertaining to the triumph of will over reason in Turkey is the location that was deemed appropriate for erecting a replica of Auguste Rodin's renowned sculpture, *The Thinker*, which depicts a male nude deep in thought. The most distinguished Turkish replica of *The Thinker* is situated in the yard of a mental hospital in Istanbul, as if signifying a tribute to the discouragement of the naked moment of reflection (the Enlightenment tradition) in Turkey.

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DOING THINGS WITH METAPHOR

THE RU(O)LE OF METAPHOR IN THE FORMATION OF THE GRAMMAR OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT: The creative aspects of knowledge and language play an important role in the establishment of the grammar of the Turkish public sphere. By underlining this role, this article claims firstly that most, if not all, of the common truths and societal facts constituting the grammar of the public sphere are not discovered, but are rather created and formed, not necessarily by the closure of consensus over ‘rational’ or ‘divine’ truths, but also by the cunning of live metaphors, i.e., by the open, free, and even conflicting interplay of live metaphors. Secondly, the article claims that communication in the public sphere includes a ghostly interaction of non-intentional, pre-propositional background practices which lie at the intersection of the creative aspects of language and knowledge. Thirdly, it argues that any meaningful inquiry into the formation of nation, religion or civil society must take this level of background practices into consideration.

Introduction

It is commonplace that philosophy, ever since Plato, has excommunicated the creative (i.e., metaphoric) aspects of *language*, reducing it to being merely a passive carrier of ideas in propositional form. It is also commonplace that philosophy, since Aristotle, has excommunicated the creative (i.e., non-propositional) aspects of *knowledge*, reducing it to merely propositional logos. We still conduct our intellectual discussions through this double logic of logos (*logos* meaning both language and knowledge). The fact that our way of looking at the world is closely connected to the way we look at knowledge and language is a relatively recent discovery in philosophy, dating back to the Kantian Copernican Revolution. What is even more recent is our discovery that the creative aspects of language and knowledge *change* the world we live in. This latter realization, which dates back to Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, is nevertheless not yet fully reflected in our intellectual discussions. In our public discussions over issues such as religion, nation and civil society, we continue to operate with some such unfortunate, unquestioned assumptions about the nature of language and

knowledge. Public discussions on the issues of civil society, religion and nation in Turkey are no exception: we Turks, as any 'good old Westerner' would do, still operate with these assumptions. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, nation building and religion have been the two cardinal issues dominating public sphere arguments in Turkey. Discussions concerning civil society issues such as democracy, secularism, human rights, etc., entered the public agenda only after the 1950s, along with the initiation of the pluralism of political parties and free elections. From the 1950s onward, the two major ideological actors constituting these public discussions also took shape. The two fundamentalisms (each having its own variations) governing these public sphere discussions were the republican-rationalist-monist fundamentalists, on the one hand, and the religious-monist-fundamentalists, on the other. Even though their views were, and are, diametrically opposed to one another on almost every issue concerning religion, civil society or the nation, the proponents of each of the two fundamentalisms (which today, constitute the bulk of intellectuals in Turkey) base their discussions on some deep-seated, but mistaken, assumptions concerning the nature of language, knowledge, communication and society. Most philosophers and social scientists in Turkey also share these unquestioned assumptions in their reflections over these issues. In their research, they choose to focus on the differences of opinion between these two fundamentalisms, without ever questioning their own implicitly shared assumptions concerning the nature of language, knowledge and society. In this paper, I will not launch an inquiry into the differences of opinion between these two major fundamentalisms, but rather, I will undertake a critical inquiry into the implicit assumptions that they all share. In claiming that these assumptions concerning the nature and meaning of language, communication, knowledge and society are mistaken, I wish to show, first, that there is *something more* to knowledge, language, communication and social ontology than what they commonly think, and second, that this 'something more' is the difference that *makes a difference*, so to speak, in our (philosophical and social scientific) way of looking at these public discussions. In order to save time and space, I will first cast these implicitly shared assumptions into the terminology used in this paper, and provide a synopsis of my backbone argument. I will then proceed, throughout the paper, to develop and discuss what I call a *micro-philosophical* 'look and see' approach to the grammar of the Turkish public sphere, at the same time providing some illustrations of its grammatical formation.

These two groups of fundamentalists in Turkey (the religious and the rationalist republicans) share, *first of all*, the view that there is a 'public sphere' that exists as a somewhat non-private sphere where *communication* is conducted, and where the process of reaching consensus over 'truths' of

some universal ('divine' or 'rational') nature takes place. In doing so, they also necessarily share the view that the differences and pluralism of truths are confined to the so-called private sphere. *Secondly*, they share a naive view of *communication*, regarding it merely as a process, wherein a conscious and homogeneous subject packages and sends *propositional* knowledge content ('s' or 'S is P') or an integral substance called 'X means Y in context C' to another conscious and homogeneous subject waiting to unpack it. Within this conception of communication, defenders of each type of fundamentalism try to sell their respective pre-fixed, conscious meaning-intentions to one another in the name of some ideal, rational, or divine truth. *Thirdly*, both forms of fundamentalisms share the commonsensical Aristotelian conception of knowledge as reduced to propositional knowledge. (I will call this kind of knowledge '*context as framework*'.) Thus, both forms of fundamentalism implicitly reject the existence of a non-cognitive, non-intentional context of meaning outside the boundaries of traditional epistemology. (I will call the 'knowledge' remaining outside the boundaries of traditional epistemology '*context as background*'.) *Fourthly*, both versions of fundamentalism share the following social ontology: societal facts are simply 'out there' waiting to be discovered, and are not 'made or created'. This view excludes the creative aspect of language from the realm of politics and society. *Finally*, both fundamentalisms share a view of metaphor which naturally extends from the traditional Aristotelian conception of knowledge. According to this conception, a metaphor has, in addition to its *literal* sense or meaning (which can and must be expressible in propositional form), an additional sense or meaning which is non-literal, figurative, symbolic, and so forth. This view excludes the possibility of *diaphora*, i.e., live metaphor, which *lets things be*, and expels *oratio obliqua* from the realm of ordinary language and the public sphere.

The synopsis of my argument runs as follows: once we, as onlookers, that is, as philosophers and social scientists, free ourselves from the above-mentioned web of assumptions, we will be able to gain a better and clearer perspective from which to survey these public discussions. Such a repositioning, I assert, will enable us to better comprehend why both forms of fundamentalism, along with their alternatives (such as pluralism), fail to address some serious problems that exist at the intersection of philosophy, religion, language and politics. Hence, the main points of my argument are: (a) that the majority of common truths and societal facts are not discovered, but rather, are created and formed, not necessarily by the closure of consensus over 'rational' or 'divine' truths, but also by the cunning of metaphor, i.e., by an open, free and even conflicting interplay of live metaphors; (b) that communication in the public sphere includes, in addition to the exchange of sentential-intentional messages at the propositional level, a ghostly interaction

of non-intentional, pre-propositional background practices; (a sort of practical 'knowledge' beyond that of traditional epistemology); (c) that the proper level of analysis is the *level of these practices* themselves, for it is at this level where the creative aspects of language and knowledge coalesce; (d) that discussions over the level of practical pre-knowledge center around the concept of *rule following*, since the problems posed in this paper seem to be instantiations of a more general problem of the later Wittgensteinian sort: if language is rule-governed, where does its creativity lie?

1. 'Doing Things with Metaphor'

The public sphere, or the social sphere where 'public' (in some sense of 'non-private') talk is conducted, seems to be at the heart of many recent discussions within socio-political philosophy, for example, those instigated by Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, Hannah Arendt and many others. These thinkers assume that a purification and amelioration of the public sphere (which, in the West, has been gradually contaminated and deteriorated since the beginning of the 20th century) is imperative so that a 'discursive will formation', which is the backbone of liberal Western democracies, can be conducted in a more 'rational and enlightened' way.¹

Two very important assumptions underlying this monistic epistemological foundationalism (or, in Ernest Gellner's words, 'the Enlightenment Rationalist Fundamentalism')² are: (a) the epistemological canon that knowledge is but propositional knowledge and its adjacent theory of metaphor; (b) the assumption that a rational consensus can and should be achieved through the exchange of such propositional knowledge (Habermas, et al.) Let us consider how sustainable these canons may be.

One of the fundamental canons of philosophy is its traditional assumption that philosophy can only be practiced within the confines of propositional knowledge. This is the tradition initiated by Aristotle which has remained authoritative until the mid-20th century. In his *De interpretatione*, Aristotle writes:

Every sentence is significant, but not every sentence is a statement-making sentence but only those in which there is truth or falsity. There is not truth or

1. See for example, Habermas 1989.

2. Gellner 1992, p. 57: 'rationalism looks as if it might be the offspring of monotheism: a single and exclusive deity leads us to the notion of a unique and homogeneous font of truth.' Gellner considers Wittgenstein's concept of language game as 'one of the most bizarre and extreme forms of irrationalism of our time' (p. 121). The main argument of this paper may be considered as an answer to Gellner, in defense of Wittgenstein.

falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false. The present investigation deals with the statement-making sentence; the others we can dismiss, since consideration of them belongs to the study of rhetoric or poetry.³

Although several attempts were made prior to the mid-20th century to shake this Aristotelian tradition, it is really with the later Wittgenstein's work that this tradition was truly challenged. Before I examine the significance of this challenge for the main argument of this paper, let me quote Donald Davidson, in order to consider the way this prevailing conception of knowledge fits neatly into a notion of 'metaphor', a prejudice equally dominant in the Western mind since Aristotle:

The central mistake (...) is the idea that *a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning*. This idea is common to many who have written about metaphor: it is found in the works of literary critics like (...); philosophers from Aristotle to Max Black; psychologists from Freud to (...); and linguists from Plato (...) to Lakoff [italics mine, AE].⁴

Davidson goes on to indicate that this definition is shared both by those who think that metaphor can be literally paraphrased (in propositional form, as in 'S is P'), and those who think that no such paraphrasing is possible because of the nature of metaphors (poetic, exotic, etc.). The crucial point of this definition is its implication that metaphor is simply another way of conveying ideas, existing alongside ordinary communication. In Davidson's words, the mistake of this view lies in its shared assumption that 'metaphor conveys truth or falsehood about the world much as plainer

3. Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 17 a 1–5, translation by Edghill.

4. Davidson 1984, p. 246. The term 'live metaphor', which I will be using throughout this paper, is borrowed from the French title of Ricœur's book, *The Rule of Metaphor: La métaphore vive*. My meaning of live metaphor does not overlap with his, however; rather, it is closer to the meaning of the term 'order-word' (*mot d'ordre*), as used in Deleuze & Guattari 1987, pp. 75–149. For Aristotle's description of metaphors, see: Ricœur 1978, pp. 9–44. On Derrida's view of metaphor, see Derrida 1974, pp. 5–74. It may be interesting to see how Hobbes uniquely incorporates the Aristotelian view of knowledge and metaphor, into his authoritarian theory of politics. Ryan shows how, in Hobbes, the 'absolutist theory of meaning ... hinges with an authoritarian theory of law': 'The authority of the sovereign's law depends on the establishing of unambiguous proper meanings for words. Perhaps this is why Hobbes associates ambiguity, equivocation, an improper metaphor with sedition. Such absolute meaning requires the possibility of absolute knowledge, of a logos in which meaning and word coalesce as law.' (Ryan 1982, p. 3, and pp. 40–42).

language does, though the message may be considered more exotic, profound, or cunningly garbed.⁵

Paraphrase, Davidson remarks, 'is appropriate to what is *said*: we try, in paraphrase, to say it another way. But ... a metaphor doesn't say anything beyond its literal meaning (nor does its maker say anything, in using the metaphor, beyond the literal).'⁶ A less analytical philosopher such as Gilles Deleuze puts the problem (of the creative aspects of language) in terms of the conceptual difference between 'repetition' and 'generality'. In repetition, Deleuze says, a repeated term is non-exchangeable and non-substitutable, whereas in generality, one term may be exchanged or substituted for another. Deleuze adds that in repetition, the repeated does not add a second and a third time to the first, but is carried the first time to the 'n'th' power: 'Reflections, echoes, doubles and souls (and I might add metaphors) do not belong to the domain of resemblance or equivalence; it is no more possible to exchange one's soul than it is to substitute real twins for one another.'⁷ So the central mistake in this commonsense view of metaphor, to use Wittgensteinian terminology, lies in confusing the grammar of the word 'metaphor' with that of, say, 'chair'. The following is an example that illustrates this confusion: 'all of southeastern Turkey is a military camp'; 'the entire second floor is a military camp.' The difference between the expression (metaphor) 'military camp' in the first sentence, and the expression 'military camp' in the second sentence is that while the latter simply means what it literally means, the former (still meaning what it means literally) is put to use *to do* something. If I wish to put the expression 'military camp' into some other (i.e. more radical) use, I might say, for example, that 'George W. Bush turned all of southeastern Turkey into a military camp.' It is not that a word 'took off' its literal meaning and 'put on' its figurative meaning; words don't wear pullovers. Davidson summarizes this point by saying that 'metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use.'⁸

Let us now examine the second canon of the rationalist foundationalism, namely, the assumption of rational consensus. According to this monistic canon of the traditional vision of modernity, which dates back to Socratic method, in matters of genuine dialogue the parties concerned must submit to the power and authority of rational argument. During the natural course of communication, reason asserts its own rational authority, thus leaving no

5. Davidson 1984, pp. 262–263.

6. *ibid.*

7. Deleuze 1994, p. 1.

8. Davidson 1984, pp. 262–263.

room for distorted communication, that is, for the partisan doctrines and sophistic claims of the parties concerned. Distorted communication, on its due course towards ideal communication, and, without being colored by the biased opinions of the defender and the opponent, becomes dominated by the sole force of reason. And once the rule of reason is dominant in discussions, all parties concerned will inevitably agree upon the particular 'truth' or 'falsity' or 'right' or 'wrong' or 'good' or 'bad' that the rational argument forces them to see.⁹

Let us take a closer look at the rational consensus model in its contemporary form, as an illustration of rationalist fundamentalism. Defined in terms of the communication ethics of Habermas, democracy is the knowledge (or competence, as Habermas himself would prefer) of communication, and democratization refers to the process, or degree, of the knowledge of democratic communication in a particular society. Here, knowledge is seen within the framework of the traditional Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian epistemology where a theory of knowledge is an attempt to understand the relationship that exists between a subject and an object. In the public sphere, the subject is 'the people' or the citizen. Here both the subject (people) and the object (issues at large over which people are supposed to reach rational-consensual decisions) are assumed to be *independent* of the acts of doing and processes of making-knowing. Hence, problems of the public sphere (such as democratization, secularization, modernization, etc.) become that of people's reaching rational-consensual decisions over these issues. For example, within this framework, discussions on the problems of democratization turn into discussions on the people's competence to communicate, and discussions on problems of human rights shift to become discussions on the people's right to communicate, etc. The problem becomes the

9. Habermas assumes a conscious, self-identical subject with an originary 'communicative intention' built into it. I, together with Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Derrida and Deleuze, argue against such a pre-fixed and conscious concept of meaning-intention: in order to be able to operate at all, a conscious meaning-intention must already give a 'context', namely, a package of signification, which is itself prior to this meaning-intention. Here, communication is mistakenly confined merely to a propositional level of exchange where a conscious and homogeneous subject packages and sends an integral substance called 'X means Y in context C' to another homogeneous-conscious subject, assumed to be waiting to 'unpack' it. Habermas, together with Austin and Searle, shares such a view of communication. See Wittgenstein 1958, *passim*; Gadamer 1975, ch. 3–4; for Derrida's view on this, see May 1991, pp. 104–113; Deleuze & Guattari 1987, pp. 75–111; Heidegger 1962, sec. 32. For Austin's, Searle's and Habermas' views of communication see Austin 1962, *passim*; Searle 1983, ch. 5–6; Habermas 1979, pp. 50–58.

following: at any time and place in a society called 'democratic', 'secular', 'modern', etc., (in some senses of these words), that which is explicitly presupposed in any discussion on democratization, secularization, modernization, etc., is the idea of a 'real' (i.e., existing, *de facto*) community of communication. However, in the very same discussions, that which is *implicitly* presupposed about the validity of our assertions is the idea of the 'ideal community of communication' whose operations are assumed to be governed by the so called 'ideal speech situation'.¹⁰

In the ideal speech situation, the knowledge or competence of the people centers around four validity claims. These four validity claims are: (a) a truth condition: the validity of an assertion as *true* in relation to the objective world (i.e. the proposition 'the cat is on the mat' is true if and only if there are both a real, visible, touchable cat and mat and if the cat is, in fact, on the mat); (b) a sincerity condition: the validity of an assertion as *sincere* in relation to one's subjective world (i.e. when one promises something with the *intention* of fulfilling it); (c) a truthfulness condition: the validity of one's assertion as *truthful* in relation to one's social life (i.e. I cannot assert truthfully, for example, that 'A thief can become Prime Minister' or 'A crook like Nixon or a man of low morals such as Clinton can become President'); (d) a comprehensibility condition: the validity of one's assertion as *comprehensible* in relation to one's linguistic world (i.e. I cannot assert an incomprehensible proposition such as 'All green ideas sleep furiously!').¹¹

In the existing, 'real' community of communication, the four validity claims stipulated by the rational consensus model are claimed to be met. This is normal: in our public sphere discussions on the problems of democratization, modernization and secularization, we usually pretend to be right, true, sincere, etc. This is a human predicament and a natural characteristic of human speech. However, the ideal speech situation is a kind of yardstick or ideal standard by which we measure our alleged validity claims. To put it in Wittgenstein's terminology, it is a 'sign post' that tells the speaker unquestionably which way he or she must go. If an emancipatory democratic society is desirable, then this 'language game of all language games' must be considered imperative by all the players in the public sphere.

10. Habermas admits this 'dogmatic core' of his own position, stating that his theory involves a ground-level of autonomy, where agents are considered to be free *only if* they obey a law they give themselves. See Habermas 1996, pp. 445–446. The irony in such a view becomes manifest as Habermas sees his theory as responding best to the needs of a society marked by a high degree of pluralism.

11. Cooke 2000, pp. 51–95.

Philosophers, social scientists and policy makers must take the lead in promoting this communicative competence, in order that the patterns of distorted communication and false validity claims lurking behind most public sphere discussions be recognized, identified, and unmasked. In doing so, they contribute to the 'emancipation' of society.

Here is the dual problem with the rational consensus model: if we take into consideration (as all rational consensus theories do in general, including that of Habermas), all the public sphere discussions considered merely from the view point of the doctrine of rational consensus over universal ethics of communication, we face the danger of excluding from the grammar of our public sphere (a) the creative aspects of language and knowledge (the rhetorical context); and (b) the possibility of the Other. This dual exclusion, as I will try to show throughout this paper, is a common flaw shared by both forms of fundamentalism (religious and rational), as well as their supposed alternatives, the doctrines of pluralism.

I will now attempt to elaborate on this dual problem of exclusion shared by all three groups (and their countless variations) and account for the reasons why they fall short of solving these problems. Let me begin with pluralism.

It is commonplace that pluralism, as a fundamental philosophical postulate (not in the ontological sense), has been frequently situated as a viable alternative to the monistic canon of the traditional vision of modernity. This patchwork theory of pluralism extends from the classical religious and political pluralisms of Anglo-Saxon liberal constitutionalism,¹² to recent discussions on so-called 'radical democracy'.¹³ Can we say that pluralism

12. I exclude the ontological version of pluralism (i.e. the problem of one and many) from consideration here. The main representatives of contemporary pluralism, in the sense it is used in this paper, are Berlin and McKeon. See McKeon 1956, pp. 88–89, and Berlin 1992. Berlin traces the origins of Western pluralism back to Herder, who sees it (although reluctantly) as a necessary alternative to extremes of both anarchy and totalitarianism. Berlin acclaims pluralism as a high point in the process of overcoming the traditional monism of Western thought which involves various versions of the 'pursuit of the ideal'. Berlin sees himself (together with the ancient skeptics and the modern romantics) as having the courage to face the pluralistic truth. See Berlin 1992, pp. 79–80. My aim in this paper is to show that pluralism, even in its Rawlsian, Habermasian and Mouffean forms (see notes 10 and 13) is not much of an improvement in overcoming rationalist monistic thought.

13. Mouffe 1999, pp. 745–758. The form of pluralism emphasized by Mouffe is a form of anti-liberal leftist politics based on 'agonistic' contestation and conflict, rather than consensus, among rival individuals and groups. Radical democrats appeal to the concept of 'homogeneity' (borrowed from C. Schmitt) as the basis for a pluralistic

solves the dual problem of the rational consensus model? I answer this question in the negative. Allow me to explain: as for the first part of the problem, we can say that by destroying the idea of universal consensus over *a priori* truths (which in itself is not a bad thing), pluralism also renders rhetoric relative, thus reducing it to bad (i.e., unethical) sophistry.¹⁴ It is no coincidence that in the U.S., where pluralism was held to be one of the great strengths of the American political system, a rhetoric of aggression reached its highest level. Following the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the U.S. government responded with compensation programs and deliberately emphasized racial awareness, ethnic identity, and group preference. These programs eventually included not only black Americans, but also

demos. See Mouffe 2000, ch. 2. In my opinion, Mouffe's substitution of the concept of consensus with that of homogeneity makes the situation much worse than does Habermas, for homogeneity is a very dangerous concept, as its original inventor Schmitt professes: 'A democracy demonstrates its political power by knowing how to refuse or *keep at bay* something *foreign and unequal* that threatens its homogeneity [*italics mine*, AE].' (Schmitt 1985, Preface). Schmitt's words 'keep at bay' and 'foreign and unequal' sound very much like the words of former French President, Giscard d'Estaing: 'Turkey's entrance into the European Union means the end of Europe.' These words were uttered by d'Estaing during recent (December 2002) discussions on Turkey's initiative to become a EU member. On the perception of the West's Other, see note 28 below.

14. Liberal constitutionalism in the West in general, and in the US in particular, until the early 20th century, has, for the most part, been successful in overcoming the perils of pluralism, by establishing constitutional mediators or brokers between the individual and the state, and by relegating religious and moral issues or group conflicts to the 'private sphere'. However, deeper ethical conflicts, with the emergence of high technology, the giant corporate economy, multinational corporations and mass communication (TV and the Internet), keep surfacing in the public sphere, not only at the national level, but also at the global level: for instance, the 1974 UN declaration on the 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO) is actually a global admission, on the part of rich nations, of economic injustice perpetrated on poor nations. Another example of an affirmation of injustice on the global level is the 1980 UNESCO declaration on the 'New World Information and Communication Order' (NWICO), which is a protest from poor nations against the world-wide monopoly of information flow and technology by rich nations. Following this declaration, then-US President Reagan launched a rhetoric of threat and blackmail against UNESCO. Upon UNESCO's resistance to this rhetoric, the U.S. cancelled its UNESCO membership in 1985, followed by Great Britain in 1986. Liberal constitutionalism also fails to deal with the dilemma of religious pluralism, especially in so-called developing countries, such as Turkey, where religious sectarianism and factionalism, with their group fanaticism, lead to dangerous political consequences. Hobbes, from centuries back, draws attention to the deadlock of political and religious pluralism by refusing to locate pluralism as an alternative to the extremes of anarchy and totalitarianism. See Boyd 2001, pp. 392–413.

other ethnic and gender categories. This emphasis on pluralism in the form of an assertion of sub-national loyalties naturally threatened the 'Americanness' of traditional American nationality or identity. With the disappearance of the communist 'enemy', new enemies had to be created in order to cultivate American national identity. Unfortunately, as each new enemy was created for this purpose, the situation deteriorated further. It is no coincidence that racial tensions have worsened subsequent to each major war that the U.S has engaged in. To cite just one example, the Los Angeles riot of 1991 took place just after the national celebration of victory in the Persian Gulf. And now, following the September 11th terrorist attack, a new enemy has been invented (Islamic fundamentalism) and a witch hunt is being carried out at the global level, turning the operation of 'Infinite Justice' (the name given to the Afghanistan military operation) into an unprecedented rhetoric of aggression. A specter is haunting not only the Middle East but the whole world, this time not in the guise of communism, but in the guise of Pax Americana and the New World Order. This specter has already taken its toll in Europe, by sharply dividing EU members over the possible war with Iraq. It is not difficult to predict that in the world and in the U.S, more turbulent and racially-motivated storms will follow the imminent war with Iraq (which was taking place as this paper was being edited). This is no coincidence, as I will try to show with the sign-post argument below, since there is an internal connection between the logics of pluralism and totalitarianism.

As for the second part of the dual problem, we must ask the same question: can one solve this problem of the exclusion of the 'other' by simply situating 'pluralism' as an alternative to the rational consensus model? My answer to this question is also in the negative since such a strategy leads one to a deadlock. Let me explain: pluralism as a doctrine states that no single philosophical or other system of thought has a monopoly of truth over any other. When applied to different fields of human relations, a convenient prefix is attached to the word 'pluralism', hence 'moral pluralism', 'cultural pluralism', 'democratic pluralism', 'economic pluralism' and so on. If we take pluralism to be an alternative doctrine to the rational consensus model, we come up with something like the following: if the pluralist perspective is assumed to be right, then no one is justified in imposing on others 'the right path of reason', even and especially in the name of 'rational argument'. So far, this is fine, but pluralism, in this sense, requires that there can be no peaceful way of getting everybody to agree with the statement: 'on a particular issue, solution A, but not solution B, is true'. Pluralism takes the world in its plurality of interpretations, where any interpretation is but one of many contributions, all of which are on equal footing; hence, a deadlock of disintegration, anarchy and even chaos. We can illustrate this deadlock with the tragedy of the commons: if every peasant in the village grazes his animals

without restraint on the village's common land, the commons will be ruined and the peasants will be worse off than before. In the U.S., by the 1980s, the majority of the American population fell under the rubric of 'disadvantaged minority', creating the belief that Americans, by emphasizing their disadvantaged status, can gain great political and economic benefits. Political and economic rights thus came to be seen as group benefits, rather than universal rights to which all Americans were equally entitled. This stimulated further assertions of sub-national loyalties. Rationalists such as Habermas and Rawls fail to overcome this vicious circle and deadlock situation. Deleuze describes the aforementioned deadlock as a 'danger of pluralism' as follows:

The greatest danger is that of lapsing into the representations of a beautiful soul: there are only reconcilable and federative differences, far removed from bloody struggles. The beautiful soul says: we are different, but not opposed (...). The notion of a problem, which we see linked to that of difference, also seems to nurture the sentiments of the beautiful soul: only problems and questions matter (...). Nevertheless, we believe that when these problems attain their proper degree of positivity, and when difference becomes the object of a corresponding affirmation, they release a power of aggression and selection which destroys the beautiful soul by depriving it of its very identity and breaking its good will. (...): every thought becomes an aggression.¹⁵

In sum, I have thus far argued that rational or religious fundamentalism and pluralism will eventually face the same deadlock or dilemma. By way of concluding this argument, let me rephrase the deadlock that these three groups of doctrines (religious fundamentalists, rational fundamentalists and pluralists) face in Wittgensteinian terminology, in order to show the common internal nexus behind their logics.

The rational consensus model stipulates that the aim of democracy is a final, rational consensus over rational truths and principles. Such a consensus can be achieved through rational deliberation. Rational deliberation gives us a non-partisan, impartial point of leverage that provides equality and justice for all participants. Each logical participant (those who have normal and reasonable control over their mental faculties) will realize that there is only one rational way of following, say, a 'rule', or a decision. Here is where the deadlock begins. An insight Wittgenstein gives us makes this deadlock clear: the heterogeneity of language games (this is not another doctrine of pluralism) and the variety of the standard uses to which they are put in a society do not permit us to postulate an impartial 'language game of all language

15. Deleuze 1994, p. xx.

games'. To put it differently, in following a rule, there is a fundamental undecidability that can not be completely erased. Within the framework of the rational consensus model, it would make no sense to ask what the difference is between 'obeying an order' and 'violating it', since what to obey and how to proceed thereafter is fixed and given beforehand. Here, rule-following is reduced to 'acting in accordance with a rule.' If the 'sign post' is (\rightarrow), it will exclude all other possible directions. But what if the sign post is turned (i.e. by a gust of wind overnight) in some other direction? It is this 'Jacobin' quality (to use a phrase Hans-Georg Gadamer used for Habermas' theory) of the rational discourse model that causes the problem. I will raise this question below, within the context of Turkish politics, when I discuss the Jacobin rhetoric of republican-rationalists and religious fundamentalists in Turkey. The same argument can be repeated (though I will not) for any version of either rationalist or religious fundamentalist views.

The deadlock faced by the philosophy of pluralism can also be rephrased in Wittgensteinian terminology. As I mentioned above, pluralism takes the world in its plurality of interpretations, where our interpretation is but one of these interpretations on equal footing. If we use Wittgensteinian terminology, we can say that this time there is nothing but the plurality of language games. We destroyed 'the language game of all language games' and thus, this time, we are left with nothing but a floating, idle crowd of language games. In this case, the deadlock is more obvious than that of the rational consensus model: the prospect of disintegration and even anarchy and chaos. In Wittgenstein's terminology, too, it makes no sense to ask what the difference is between 'obeying' an order and 'violating' one; this time, not because what to obey and how to proceed is fixed and given beforehand (as it was in the rational consensus model), but because what to obey and how to proceed are arbitrary and relative to one another. Here too, rule-following is reduced to acting in accordance with a rule, but this time with many conflicting interpretations. To use the sign post terminology again, what we have is something like this: *

I will mention this problem within the context of Turkish politics as well.

As a final thread in my argument, let me clarify the second deadlock that all three groups of doctrines face (the problem of the Other) in Wittgensteinian terminology. If my 'essence' is here, fixed, pre-given (i.e. 'rational, modern, Western', etc.) and the 'essence' of the Other is out there, also fixed, pre-given (i.e., 'non-rational, pre-modern, oriental', etc.), the sign post arguments given above can be repeated (which I will not do) leading to the conclusion of the road sign (\rightarrow). To put it differently, we do act (and judge) in this case in accordance with a rule, thus reducing difference to the logic of the same: 'I will teach you the differences'. (Shakespeare, *King Lear*, 1. 4. 100).

The problem at this stage of the argument becomes that of looking for ways to avoid the dual deadlock faced by both forms of fundamentalism and by pluralism. The solution I propose to this problem lies in finding some satisfactory answers to the following questions: (a) how can we include (or not exclude) the creative aspects of language and knowledge into (from) our perspective; (b) how can we include (or not exclude) the differences of the Other? (The search for an answer to the second question will remain on the periphery of this paper: see footnotes 12 and 28.) We must also keep in mind the necessary connection between the traditional view that knowledge is but propositional knowledge and the view that metaphor belongs to the grammar of meaning rather than use (hence another definition of metaphor by Aristotle as 'saying something and *meaning* another'). Let us consider now how a perspective inspired by Wittgenstein's later work challenges this view and, at the same time, offers some answers to the two questions mentioned above.¹⁶

According to Wittgenstein, the unit of meaning is not 'word' or 'proposition', but language game, or, as it is later called, 'speech act'. A language game or a speech act is, in Austin's words, 'doing things with words'. An expression, such as a word, derives its meaning within the context of the language game in which it is put to use. Outside such a context, the word becomes 'an idle wheel'. Language games themselves (or speech acts), however, must be considered within, and regarded as part of, a larger context called 'forms of life' [*Lebensformen*]. Wittgenstein's concept of forms of life is a very controversial one. Without going into the details of these controversies, I wish to merely indicate how this, and some other concepts belonging to the later Wittgenstein, can be employed to challenge the traditional view that knowledge is only propositional knowledge and the theory of metaphor that is adjacent to this view. To this end, we can clarify Wittgenstein's concept of forms of life using two seminal concepts: *framework* and *background*.¹⁷

16. Wittgenstein 1958.

17. Searle, a Wittgenstein student, coins the words 'framework' and 'background' in order to elaborate on Wittgenstein's concept of forms of life. See: Searle 1995, Ch. 6. My usage of the concept of 'framework' coincides with that of Searle's, but my usage of the concept of 'background' differs from his in that Searle considers background within the confines of intentionality and propositional knowledge, whereas my usage of background is cut off from these two fundamental canons of traditional epistemology (see note 8 above). My usage of the concept of background seems closer to what Deleuze and Guattari call 'collective assemblage of enunciation': according to Deleuze and Guattari, once we move to the societal level, subjective intentionality recedes and a collective assemblage of enunciation takes over. See Deleuze & Guattari 1987, pp. 3–5, and Goodchild 1996, pp. 151–156. Before *A Thousand Plateaus* was written, Deleuze used

Let us imagine several language games in which the expression (or word) 'cut' is used: 'cut the cake'; 'cut the mountain'; 'cut the sun'. As soon as you had uttered these sentences, I, with an irresistible Aristotelian impulse, would 'cut' you off and say 'Yes! I've got it! In the second and the third sentences, you did not use the word 'cut' in a literal, but in a metaphorical (i.e. figurative) meaning or sense, and in the first instance you used it in the literal sense.' You would say 'Wait!' and continue, 'Last night we had a birthday party for my daughter Ayşe'. Now, what do you understand when I say 'Cut the cake'? My reply would be to insist that I was right in my diagnosis that you used the word 'cut' literally. You would continue with a stone face, asking 'What other things can you tell me about this language game?' I would answer, 'Well, you asked your daughter to cut the birthday cake; it was not a custom in Turkey to eat 'birthday cakes' before Turkey was Westernized; birthday celebrations were never practiced in Turkey prior to Westernization; even now only a minority of the Turkish population celebrates and/or eats birthday cake...' I could continue, adding perhaps a hundred or more sentences in answer to your question. Let us call all of this a kind of propositional knowledge *framework*. In this language game, it is this framework that allowed me to understand your utterance. But you would continue, 'What can you say about 'cut the mountain' and 'cut the sun'?'. I would answer: 'I already told you. In both sentences you used the word 'cut' in a metaphoric sense. No! Wait a minute! You may have been using the word 'cut' in the sentence 'cut the mountain' in the literal sense, but 'cut' in the sentence 'cut the sun' is absolutely in the metaphoric sense.' You ask me to explain. I explain that you certainly cannot cut the sun like you can cut a cake, provided we are talking about the sun we all know, but I guess it is possible, with the technology that we have in the present day and age, to 'cut' a mountain, for instance, for the purpose of building a tunnel. Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, we have had a means of transportation called trains. With the giant machines we have invented, we can indeed 'cut the mountain'. I could continue giving you hundreds of sentences justifying my assertion that the word 'cut' in the sentence 'cut the mountain' can be used in the literal sense. Again, as in the language game of the birthday party, here too, all the knowledge I have been offering, in reply to your question, belongs to the level of propositional knowledge called *framework*. But you continue: 'Now imagine that you and I were born in the 19th century, and I asked you the same question: what can you say about cut the 'mountain'?'. My initial Aristotelian reaction would be 'the word 'cut' cannot be used

the Stoic notion of the 'incorporeal event', a non-existing entity, to explore meaning and sense. Sense, as it is non-corporeal, is pre-propositional. See Deleuze 1990, pp. 28–38.

either in the literal or the metaphorical sense. You cannot cut a mountain like you can cut a cake. Hence this sentence is nonsense! I don't understand it.' To put it into Habermasian terminology: this sentence is 'incomprehensible', i.e. it violates the fourth validity condition discussed above. On second thought, recalling the Jules Verne novels I have read, I change my mind. 'Oh! *Now* I understand! The sentence 'cut the mountain' makes perfect sense, since there may come a time when giant 'bird-machines' cut mountains, there may come a time when..., there may come a time when...' I may continue giving you many such sentences to justify my understanding of your utterance 'cut the mountain.' What was I doing while I was trying to understand? I was simply creating a *background*. It is against this background that my understanding of this sentence is made possible. It is against this background that the word 'cut' is literally *put to use*. Meaning is use. One may object that the sentences I uttered were in propositional form anyway. Yes, that is true, but what else could I do? As soon as I utter propositions – sentences – I *turn* the invisible (i.e., pre-propositional, pre-intentional) background into a visible (i.e., propositional, intentional) framework, but this doesn't mean that there is no *background*. The background is like my eyeball: I can't see it, but it makes me see things. Background exists in a 'spectral' sense, to use a Derridean term: it is a kind of 'knowledge' which is not logos; it was ghostly (background) *before* I called it forth; *I called it forth* ('enter the ghost, exit the ghost, re-enter the ghost.' Hamlet) and thus it came alive, became a spirit and logos (framework); thus making meaning possible.

So far, we haven't discussed the third sentence: 'Cut the sun!' How would you cut the sun? I leave the answer to your *imagination* (dear reader). A Turkish proverb says: 'one lives as long as one imagines!'

Let us rephrase the abovementioned argument for the paradoxical existence of the *background* in some Deleuzian terminology of temporality. Deleuze, using Bergson's concept of *durée*, attempts to show that time is always an incomplete, heterogeneous and continuous emergence of novelty. Duration in this sense inheres (in a latent manner) past, present and future. The past ceases to act, but while it has ceased to act, it has not ceased *to be*. The past now acquires the status of being itself. In the terminology used above, it recedes into the background. It is not that the past is constituted after it has ceased to be present, but rather, that the past coexists (as background) with every new present. Deleuze calls this past-present nexus 'the paradox of co-existence': the present is constituted as past while the past is constituted as present.

The story does not end here. Deleuze contends that the particular old present, while receding into background, becomes transformed into a background of generality: the past in general, the pure past. This creates what Deleuze

calls 'the paradox of contemporaneity'; this background of generality – the pure past – cannot be represented, but without it no representation is possible. This pure past is the condition of all pasts and of the passage of each particular present. Moreover, this *a priori* past, which is inhered in the old present and in the actual present, also pre-exists every present in general, creating the 'paradox of pre-existence': the entire past is preserved in, and hence, coexists with every present. In this sense, 'the past has never been present, since it cannot be constituted after the constitution of the present.'¹⁸

To confirm whether the view proposed above is a viable alternative both to the rational consensus model and to pluralism, one should be able to answer the following question in the affirmative: would it make sense to ask what the difference is between 'to obey an order' and 'to disobey an order'? (A question I asked above for both the rational consensus model and pluralism.) In this view (as different from the other views) it would make sense legitimately to ask such a question. Let me explain: an explicit order such as 'No one should wear a scarf in the public sphere!' belongs to the *framework* or the realm of propositional knowledge. It obviously wouldn't make sense in this case to differentiate between 'obeying an order' and 'disobeying an order' since, assuming that we defined what a 'scarf' is, what a 'public sphere' is etc., we can clearly make an exhaustive list of the cases where that particular order could be 'obeyed' and 'disobeyed' in that particular 'public sphere' (Here, we are acting in accordance with a rule.) The 'deadlock' of both the rational consensus model and pluralism is overcome at this point: live metaphor's from the realm of *background* begin to be *put to use* by many invisible hands: 'scarf', 'public sphere', 'private sphere', etc. It is in this realm of fact and truth-making that it would make sense *legitimately* to differentiate between 'obeying an order' and 'disobeying an order' since here the rules of the game are still being tested, retested, formed and re-formed; it is here that there is fundamental 'undecidability' (Derrida) which would forbid one (as yet) to make an exhaustible list of what counts as 'obeying' or what counts as 'disobeying' a rule; it is *after* this process is completed (which will never be 'completed') that one can talk about what counts definitely as 'obeying' and 'disobeying' an order. The *background* will never be 'closed', since, within the heterogeneity of language games, there are countless ways a metaphor *is put to use* that are not known beforehand. It is in this realm that one can legitimately say that rule-following cannot be reduced, *without remainder*, to acting in accordance with a rule. The rule-following which is crucial here is not the rule-following

18. C. Boundas, 'Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual,' in: Patton 1996.

which is made possible by a fixed, *a priori* 'language' (as it is in Chomsky or Habermas), but a rule-following which makes meaning or language (grammar) possible: here, a prior 'correctness' or 'incorrectness' of the notion of rule-following does not make sense.

To recap: the argument against the traditional view that knowledge is only propositional knowledge and the theory of metaphor that is adjacent to this view affords fresh possibilities and viable alternative ways of looking at political and social life beyond monistic-rationalist and pluralist theories. We need not necessarily see the discursive will formation within the confines of the rational consensus model. To put it differently, we must recognize the crucial role that a non-cognitive, pre-intentional and pre-propositional plane of knowledge plays in the discursive will formation. We must also recognize that this crucial role is carried out mainly through the interplay of living metaphors within the heterogeneity of language games. Within such heterogeneity, what I call 'the grammar of the public sphere' is formed and re-formed by a special sort of praxis called 'doing things with metaphors.'

2. The 'Grammar' of the Turkish Public Sphere

What can we say about the formation of the 'grammar' of the Turkish public and/or political sphere, when viewed from the 'look and see' perspective developed above? The remainder of this paper attempts to answer this question. Let me first say a few words on the notion of 'grammar'.

By 'grammar', I understand not some fixed, *a priori* system of rules (à la Chomsky), but a process of creation, formation and construction, in a piecemeal way, of innumerable social facts, values and truths.¹⁹ These truths, facts and values are created, made, differentiated, sorted, arranged and even ordered through innumerable (rational or irrational) decisions that people make. Here, there is no fixed, *a priori* blueprint or translation manual against which we can measure whether a fact is a real fact, a value is a real value, or a truth is a real truth. What we have is, rather, a 'framework' and a 'background' against which we identify a fact as fact, a value as value, a truth as truth, etc. The relevant features of framework and background make and create the fact(s) in question, as I have discussed above. In this revolutionary process of the formation of the grammar of the public sphere, no one has a monopoly over the 'truth', the 'right answer' or the 'right question'. That is, no one can predict which theories of modernism,

19. For Chomsky's views on rule and grammar, see Chomsky 1980, pp. 89–140.

nationalism, secularism, etc., will work. The grammar of the public sphere is an endless, spectral process of making facts and truths.

Democracy within this framework is not viewed as an external norm whose aim is to establish a final consensus over some rational truths and principles (see above for such a view). In this sense, democracy is the effect of the cumulative formation of the grammar of the public sphere of a particular society. This cumulative effect is created by the rhetorical performance of the citizens. This performance includes all the creative aspects of language and knowledge; it is always implicated and potentially transformed by the judgments and decisions we make in our public discussions. These judgments and decisions are ethical aesthetes in the sense that they emerge as the stake for a rhetorical perspective in public arguments. Rhetorical performance in this sense needs no transcendental (Habermas) or quasi-transcendental (Laclau) points of reference. 'Consensus' and 'agonistic conflict' do not have any privileged status in the formation of a grammar of democracy; they are merely two additional metaphors hovering around in the skies above the public sphere (just like 'the scarf', as will be discussed below), the existence or lack of which affect our ordinary public discussions. Consensus and agonistic conflict are everywhere and nowhere in our everyday lives. Via these and other such metaphors, we form and reform our argumentations, make particular judgments, displace and replace other forms of decisions and judgments and create new events, truths and objects.

The field of international politics gives us ample examples of the way this rhetorical effectiveness, i.e. the way in which live metaphors form and construct the grammar of public spheres, comes about. During the 1970s in Poland, Lech Wałęsa's metaphor of 'solidarity' played a great role in creating new facts and truths, leading to the 'emancipation' (ironically a Habermasian term) of the Polish people. Other examples of such metaphors are 'perestroika' and 'glasnost'. We all remember how these two metaphors did their 'job' by creating and forming new facts and truths leading not only to the 'emancipation' of many peoples in the former Soviet Union, but also the Russians themselves. Recent leaders of Iran are attempting to form such metaphors aiming at establishing 'close ties' between the 'peoples' of Iran and the U.S. (This attempt, however, failed to a great extent due to the September 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. and the ensuing rhetoric of aggression initiated by U.S. President George W. Bush.). Many more examples of such live metaphors can be found in the global public sphere; presenting them all, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. In the remainder of the paper, therefore, I will provide some illustrations of 'doing things with metaphor' from Turkey, and emphasize the role of live metaphor in the formation of the grammar of the public sphere.

The first illustration of the role live metaphors play within this process of forming the public sphere can be provided by referring to the work of some Turkish scholars. Here I will choose two: Şerif Mardin and Yaşar Nuri Öztürk. Şerif Mardin, a well-known Turkish social scientist, has spent almost his entire life inquiring into the framework knowledge and background practices of Turkish culture and religion; an inquiry which goes beyond the confines of traditional Aristotelian epistemology and ‘God’s eye’ approaches such as the rational consensus model. Using a pragmatic ‘invention of new tools’ model, (in *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey*, these tools are ‘idiom’ and ‘discourse’), Mardin attempts to demonstrate how social change (transmutation) evolves in Turkey.²⁰ By ‘idiom’ he means ‘a special language used in a specific sphere of social relations’ and by ‘discourse’ he means ‘the way in which this idiom is structured by a more specific set of practices’.²¹ The concept ‘root paradigm’ is a constituent part of ‘idiom’: “‘Root paradigm’ is a term used by Victor Turner to characterize clusters of meaning which serve as cultural “maps” for individuals; they enable persons to find a path in their own culture’.²² Mardin quotes Turner in order to clarify this concept as follows (due to its importance for my argument, I take this quote, with apologies, from Mardin’s own book):

Where processes are unconditioned, undetermined or unchallenged by explicit custom and rules, my hypothesis would be that the main actors are nevertheless guided by *subjective paradigms* which may derive from beyond the mainstream of socio-cultural process with its socializing devices such as education and imitation of action models in stereotyped situations. Such paradigms affect the form, timing and style of behavior of those who bear them.²³

An important example of such a root-paradigm which has, in Mardin’s words, a ‘special place in Turkish culture’ (in my terminology, is a potential or prospective ‘live metaphor’) is that of *gazi* (Arabic: *Ghazi*). In Mardin’s words, *gazi* ‘is used to describe fighters for the faith who are considered to have laid the foundations of the Ottoman Empire’.²⁴ Mardin also indicates that this term has never lost its force and has made its way

20. Mardin 1989.

21. op.cit., pp. 2–3.

22. op.cit., p. 7.

23. op.cit., p.3.

24. op.cit., p. 4.

through the modern Turkish Republic, adding that the prefix *gazi* is added in front of names of people (such as Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, a name given to Atatürk, in view of 'his victory over the Greeks and the fact that he had saved the Muslims of Anatolia from conquest by the infidel') and towns (such as *Gaziantep*; a town famous for its resistance against the French during World War I).²⁵ In addition to the root-paradigm *gazi*, Mardin cites some other root-paradigms such as: *haram-harem* [Arabic: *haram-haram*: (1) forbidden by religion, hence unlawful, illegitimate, wrong; (2) sacred, inviolable place], the core of one constellation of social behavior; *namus* [honor]; *hürmet* [respect]; *kanaat* [frugality], for the sphere of economics]; *hak* [right] and *adalet* [justice] for the sphere of politics.²⁶

These root-paradigms function at two levels: first, as 'maps' providing personal guidance in and projecting a picture of an ideal society; and second, as 'items in a cultural knapsack which integrated the individual's perception of social rules and positions with signifiers for images, sounds and colors.'²⁷ Mardin adds that it is this latter function of the root-paradigm that has the potential to promote the voice of the periphery or the underprivileged:

Latife Tekin, a contemporary Turkish novelist who has tried to describe the culture of the Turkish periphery, underlines the same idea when she says to a Turkish intellectual during an interview: 'You shall never understand the type of knowledge that underlines the signs with which I communicate with the poor, with the people of my quarter of town.'²⁸

25. *ibid.*

26. *op.cit.*, p. 5.

27. *op.cit.*, p. 7.

28. *ibid.* It is proper here to mention how Gellner misconceives the role of the Other in deconstructionism and in Wittgenstein (see note 2 above). Deconstructionists, Gellner says, 'agonize so much about their inability to know themselves and the Other ... that they no longer need to trouble too much about the Other.' (Gellner 1992, p. 45). As a typical rationalist fundamentalist, Gellner argues that deconstructionists do not face the problem of the Other. The issue here is not how the deconstructionists deal with the problem of the Other, but rather, the way the rationalist fundamentalists mishandle this problem. The traditional rationalist fundamentalist's treatment of the problem of the Other extends from Max Weber to the ethnologist and anthropologists of the West on the one hand, and to the Orientalists on the other. Their commonly shared assumption is the idea that the West has an 'essence' (i.e. rational), and the Other, non-West has a different essence (i.e. non-rational, mystic, etc.) waiting to be discovered. Abaza and Staught summarize this point as follows: 'It was the declared aim of early 19th century anthropologists and Orientalists (Bachofen and Nöldecke might be quoted here as examples) to understand more deeply the 'soul' of the cultural other.' (Abaza & Staught 1990, p. 210).

Mardin's description of the functions of the root-paradigms introduces the voice of 'the Other' into the public sphere, thus correcting the rational consensus model's confinement of the Other's difference to the private sphere (see above). At the heart of this correction lies the way in which live metaphors do things (i.e. make facts) in the public sphere. In Mardin's words:

The most important effect of such a fund (i.e. the functioning of root paradigms) was in its *use*, i.e., in the way in which it not only functioned as a directive but constituted the materials for personal strategies aiming to promote one's welfare, deflect dangers and engineer coalitions. This is what Michel de Certeau has named knowledge for a 'doing' (*un faire*).²⁹

The second tool Mardin invents in his linguistic framework is that of 'discourse'. Distinguishing his use of the term from that of Foucault, Mardin states that he uses this concept

to delineate an aspect of increasingly wide access to the use of an idiom which exists in the *background* of discourse. Foucault's stress is on the discursive in its classical sense as well as on the discursive as a derivative of discourse. My use covers this area and even more, that of *metaphorical practices*. The overlap between my use and his consists of seeing discourse as practice and thus constantly mobile and transformational [*italics mine*, AE].³⁰

In my opinion, another 'tool' should be added to Mardin's pragmatic 'invention of new tools' model: a non-Aristotelian conception of metaphor. I tried to develop this in the first section above, utilizing Wittgenstein's and Davidson's ideas. It is this public 'fund' or 'knowledge as doing' which continuously creates, makes and shapes the new facts and truths called the grammar of the public sphere. A God's-eye view such as the rational consensus model would miss the point!

Another illustration of the use of rhetoric in the formation of the grammar of the Turkish public sphere is that of Yaşar Nuri Öztürk's. Öztürk is a theologian-turned-politician who won a CHP (Atatürk's traditional Republican People's Party) seat in the parliament in the November 2002 elections. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923 and over the course of the past eighty years, the relatively 'educated', 'enlightened', 'republican', 'secular' and 'pious' segment of Turkey's population had to gradually face

29. Mardin 1989, p. 7.

30. *ibid.*

and come to terms with the following dilemma: they are ‘religious’ in their private sphere (in the context of a religion that explicitly claims the public sphere as its proper sphere of activity), but strongly secular in the public sphere. This perceived dissonance naturally creates a tension that this segment of the population finds difficult to handle. Öztürk’s ‘success’ lies in his skillful use of a kind of deliberative-entertainment rhetoric that provides relief for this tension. Let us consider how this is done.

Öztürk himself had to live with this tension: he is a follower of both Islam and the secular republic of Atatürk. Rejecting the classical solution imposed by the rationalist republicans (separating the public and private spheres and trying to live with the tension), he preferred a traditional ‘reformist’ approach. Before we look into Öztürk’s solution, let us examine how the early reformists dealt with this tension. Ceylan, a theologian-turned-philosopher, succinctly summarizes the way these reformists of the past contribute to the transmutation process called Westernization:

Some (reformist) thinkers like Jamal al-Afgani and Muhammad Abduh set about with the idea and belief that the Islamic world view is the ideal one, and therefore, every kind of benefaction, be it native or foreign, is already embedded in Islam, namely, in the Koran and Hadith (sayings of the Prophet). If this truth is not manifest, it is the duty of Muslim scholars to make it manifest. In order to make it manifest, these scholars attempt to look for elements of Western science and culture within the Koran and Hadith. If they cannot find these elements in these sources, they resort to the sayings of the founders of religious sects.³¹

Ceylan thinks that Öztürk’s position represents a contemporary version of this traditional reformist movement. Öztürk believes, according to Ceylan, that Islam offers all the answers and solutions to the problems of modern societies such as ‘democracy, human rights, women’s rights, social justice, global economic problems, environmental ethics, etc.’ The way Öztürk practices his deliberative rhetoric of transmutation (i.e. fact-making) is also succinctly summarized by Ceylan:

if a foreign element enters into our life one way or another (a scientific knowledge, a hi-tech know-how, or a foreign cultural value), and if this new element gains some recognition, the process (of deliberative rhetoric) starts: one must find an expression that would approve of the new element in question with a clear or reasonable interpretation firstly in the Koran verses. If no such interpretation is found, then all known Hadith books are scanned. If we cannot find it there, it is time to refer to opinions and *fatwas* of scholars of canonical

31. Y. Ceylan, ‘The Mission of Yaşar Nuri Öztürk’ (unpublished paper), p. 2.

jurisprudence or those who have done exegesis of the Koran and have come across with similar problems in the past. Should this attempt fail, then the Koran verses and Hadith books should be re-looked. At this stage, even 'unreliable' resources can be scanned. If still a clear and distinct or reasonable hint is not found, the method of linguistic games is put into operation: by playing with the etymology and syntax of the Arabic, the hint sought is finally obtained. This is a great success on the part of the interpreter, and the mastery over such linguistic techniques indicates great scholarship. If someone claims that the judgment obtained is in contradiction with the explicit statements of the Koran and Hadith, the answer is that those statements are not what Allah and the Prophet originally 'meant'.³²

Öztürk, as opposed to his predecessors, who did not have the eye of the TV camera on their side, combined his rhetoric of deliberation (described so well by Ceylan) with a rhetoric of entertainment unique to his style and personality, thus appearing widely on TV, appealing to both the daytime and late night TV talk show audience. In these talk shows, he skillfully sugar-coated the Western and Turkish rationalist-republican ideas into the rhetoric of the Koran, using almost all the residual root-paradigms mentioned above in the quotation from Mardin (*gazi, namus, hak, haram*, etc.), thus providing relief for the aforementioned tension felt by the secular, enlightened, but religious population. In addition to this tension-resolving mission, this popular-reformist approach, by playing the role of 'catalyst' between the two 'fundamentalisms' namely the religious fundamentalists and the rational republicans, provoked endless public discussions on TV and in the mass media generally. Over the past fifteen years, continual debates on private televisions have taken place between the two traditional hard-liners (religious fundamentalists and Jacobin-rationalist republicans, who both reject such a reformist approach) on the one hand, and between these religious-rationalist fundamentalists and the reformists, on the other. It is from these discussions that many live metaphors have emerged, creating, forming and reforming new societal facts (around the notions of republic, democracy, human rights, minorities, ethnicity, globalization, representation, women's rights, private, public, etc.). What created these new facts and truths of the public sphere was not a deliberative process of rational consensus or

32. op.cit., p. 3. A humorous example of the fact that even absurdities may be a significant part of the grammar of the public sphere occurred quite recently. Following the tabloid news appearing in the media concerning Öztürk's hair implants, the nation's official head of the Governance of Religious Affairs gave a *fatwa* (decision) that according to Koran, it is a sin to have hair implants. This initiated heated discussions among scholars about what is and what is not sinful concerning changes we make to our bodies. See *Hürriyet*, February 10, 2003, p. 17.

any other God's-eye viewpoint, but rather, these live metaphors as seen through the eye of the camera. I will conclude my paper with the story of *one* such live metaphor called 'headscarf'.

'Headscarf', as a live metaphor, entered the Turkish public sphere in the early 1980s. Scarf, according to the Turkish religious fundamentalists, is a 'symbol' of freedom, human rights, pluralism, etc. Similarly, according to the rationalist republicans from the Atatürk tradition, 'scarf' represents a denial of everything that Turkey has gained since the establishment of the republic in 1923: secularism, modernization, human rights, right to equal education, etc. Moreover, both parties agree that there exists a 'scarf crisis'. They also claim that this crisis 'must be resolved or solved' in accordance with their own respective doctrines. Over the past fifteen years, many new facts, truths and values have been tested, retested, created, modified or left behind, consciously or unconsciously throughout the heated public discussions over this 'crisis' in newspapers and on TV. In these public discussions, both parties conceive the word 'scarf' in the traditional Aristotelian sense of metaphor (as I discussed in the first section above), in that there is a 'literal' meaning or sense of the word, plus an additional ('metaphorical', 'figurative', 'non-literal') meaning or sense of the word. It is this additional sense or meaning which both parties have been trying to erase from the face of the public sphere. This is normal: we all do futile things, and we will continue to do so in public discussions on any controversial issue – not because we all are Aristotelians, but because of the 'cunning of metaphor'. It is the 'double logic' of the live metaphor 'scarf' that makes us act the way we do.³³ Scarf circulates (hovers around) without landing on either side, thus making communication (or miscommunication) possible. It is through such communication or miscommunication that

33. Gilles Deleuze refers to 'sense' as that paradoxical entity (or non-entity) having two sides, one of which always lacks the other (see footnote 17 above). We can put his description of a 'structure' into the terminology of the 'crisis of the scarf' as follows: there must be a 'sense' of the 'scarf' between two heterogeneous series, one signifier (χ 1, χ 2, χ 3,...) and the other, signified (y 1, y 2, y 3,...). Here for example, for the religious fundamentalists, 'scarf' and, say, 'freedom' constitutes $X1/Y1$, and for the rationalist republicans, 'scarf' and, say, 'anti-secularism' forms χ 2/ y 2. The important point is that each series must be constituted with a single term existing through relations they maintain with one another: so, χ 1, χ 2, χ 3,... are always 'the scarf'. Secondly, these relations must form a singular point, each of the two parties (i.e., two groups of fundamentalist, religious and rationalist) declares that each of the units ' χ 1/ y 1', ' χ 2/ y 2' ... , forms an inseparable, singular point. (just as in differential calculus dy/dx shows a 'relation' where the terms ' y ' or ' x ' do not exist outside of this relation, but they both form a singular point.). See: Deleuze 1990, pp. 48–73.

new facts and truths are made and created. This *thing* called 'scarf' ('Marcellus: What! Ha's this thing appear'd againe tonight?' Hamlet) is paradoxical, since it is at the same time a word and a thing, a name and an object. This live metaphor not only plays with the two sides, but also plays with itself; it is never where we think it is. This double logic ensures that what 'lacks' on one side, is always on the other side and vice versa. This continues until the live metaphor is no longer, so to speak, 'in circulation'. Without repeating what I have said in the first section, suffice it to say that scarf, as a live metaphor, is 'put to use' in the Turkish public sphere. It has a 'messianic' mission³⁴ that no one is aware of as yet. We will know it when it 'dies' and fades away, thus completing its mission, like a coin or a stamp that is no longer in circulation. It will then 'speak to us' no more. All one can say at this stage is that it is still 'alive' and it still speaks to us, since both parties claim that there is a 'crisis'. We can also add that not all crises are bad after all; if one day we decide that the crisis is over (i.e. stop searching to uncover the veiled essence of the scarf), we will be able to happily look at the skies and say to the 'scarf' (now 'veiled' behind the clouds): 'Allah bless you for bringing so many new facts and truths into our public sphere!'

What I have said above about the 'headscarf' can also be said about hundreds of other such ghostly metaphors hovering about the skies of the Turkish public sphere.³⁵ Philosophers should pay close attention to this phenomenon. They must teach us, in close cooperation with social scientists, how to 'look and see' the way our discursive and non-discursive practices are *put to use* in actual problems and crises. Such a view of rhetoric as a practice of world-disclosure (which I label *micro-philosophy*) is anti-foundationalist in the sense that it rejects the notion of giving a final, indubitable, and exhaustive account of the phenomena under consideration. It also leaves open the question of whether, for whom, in what way, when or where these discursive and non-discursive practices may work.

34. This mission may also be called scientific, legal, political, etc., considering the voluminous research, legal and political arguments and document that the scarf has generated during the past fifteen years or so. See Aksoy.

35. Among them are 'republic' (as the 'murderer of democracy'), 'democracy' (as the 'killer of republic'), 'middle' (once a political yard-stick), 'public sphere' (a newcomer), 'earthquake' (with which we are still learning 'to live with'), 'laicism' (not secularism), 'army' (a taboo). The religious fundamentalists in Turkey, since the November 2002 elections, have been trying to develop new forms of public discussion including concepts such as 'democratic Muslim', 'liberal Muslim' and 'conservative Muslim.' See *Hürriyet Pazar*, Feb. 16, 2003, p. 9. It remains to be seen whether these and other such concepts will become live metaphors.

Lastly, I would like to respond to a potential critique to the approach developed above, namely, that this approach may seem to imply a kind of political quietism or even fatalism of some sort. On the contrary, I believe that live metaphors, to use a Habermasian term, are the most 'emancipatory' spirits of society: we can always call them forth if we know how to speak to them: 'Thou art a Scholler – speak to it, Horatio!'³⁶

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36. Quoted from Derrida 1993, p. 33; this quotation from Hamlet and those I mentioned on p. 228 and p. 238 above are used by Derrida in numerous places in the book, in order to remind us of those 'scholars' who remain within the confines of the mistaken assumptions (or some other versions of them) I listed at the beginning of this paper.

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PART IV

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

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RELIGION, NATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

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ABSTRACT: Religion, nation and empire are the subjects of this article. It examines similarities and differences between the development of religion and nationalism in Britain and India. Imperial encounters have been of great importance for the historical development of the public sphere in the metropolis as well as in the colony. To understand current transformations of the public sphere from a transnational perspective, it is important to be aware of its imperial history. A major transformation in this regard is the development of new technologies of mass communication, but it raises older questions about the nature of religious communication and the dialectics between openness and secrecy in critiques of the state. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of religious movements and religious issues for the mobilization of political dissent, both in the national and transnational public sphere.

Introduction

In 1988, when British Muslims petitioned their government to ban Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*, they discovered that the existing blasphemy law did not prohibit insults to the Prophet Muhammad. It only applied to Christianity and, accordingly, the government rejected the petition. The home minister for race relations, John Patten, subsequently wrote a document, lecturing the Muslims and the general public, 'on being British'. Talal Asad has brilliantly analysed the political implications of the liberal views expressed in this text. One of the crucial aims of Patten's text was to delineate 'a common national culture'. According to Patten, this commonality was to be found in 'our democracy and our laws, the English language, and the history that has shaped modern Britain.'¹ In this paper I want to address two things which are erased in Patten's discussion of 'being British': Christianity and Empire. It is, of course, quite understandable that a politician would not mention Christianity as a major component of British culture at the height of the 'Rushdie-affair'. Nevertheless, the laws to which

1. Quoted in Asad 1993, p. 224.

Patten referred included a blasphemy law which only protected Christian sentiments. Moreover, no one will doubt that Christianity is a crucial element in the history that shaped Britain.²

Similarly, there is a silent assumption in Patten's document that 'being British' has nothing to do with Empire. In other words, the problem of conflicting values, as it emerged in the Rushdie case, was a new problem, brought to Britain by immigration; it only had to do with Empire in so far as the immigrants came from the former empire, another instance of 'the empire strikes back'. Nevertheless, it could well be argued that Patten's arguments, calling for acceptance of a common, national culture, as well as those of Muslim leaders, calling for the religious neutrality of the state, as shown by the political protection of the beliefs of all religious communities, are rooted in the same history of empire but as experienced on opposite sides of the colonizing process. It is sometimes said that the British are unaware of their history, because it took place elsewhere. My own reading in British history suggests that the imperial connection is indeed too seldom consciously reflected upon by historians of Britain, let alone British politicians. Historians of India are much more aware of the imperial connection, but tend to ignore the developments in the metropolis, afraid of making the history of the colony into a footnote of European history. In this chapter I will attempt to show some structural similarities and differences between the development of religion and nationalism in Britain and India.

That Mr Patten could get away with not mentioning Christianity as a component of Britain's national culture is due to the fact that organized Christianity has been gradually marginalized in British society over the course of the 20th century. Britain is now a so-called secular society, in which Christianity, allegedly, has become a private matter for individuals with no political relevance in the public sphere. Without denying significant changes in the location of religion in British society in this century, I am wary of the assumptions inherent in the concept of 'secularity'. One major element in that concept is the separation of Church and State. However, as we know, this element is not found in Britain. The Church of England is an established church. The Queen is still head of that state church and the bishops, appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, are present in the House of Lords. As recently as 1980, a leading article in *The Times* argued that it would be undesirable for the Prince of Wales to marry a Roman Catholic.³ In the meantime, a number of undesirable things

2. See McLeod 1999.

3. Quoted in Robbins 1982, p. 465.

appear to have happened in the British royal house and one wonders whether this particular opinion would be expressed today. Nevertheless, this quite recent opinion from a leading newspaper in a so-called 'secular' society is quite remarkable in its insistence on the Protestant nature of the nation. The opposition between Protestants and Catholics is, obviously, much less important in the 20th century than in previous centuries, but it is precisely in oppositions such as these that the religious nature of the nation-state is expressed. Despite Patten's omission of Christianity in his definition of 'being British', there is sufficient evidence that the arrival of Muslim immigrants in Britain has made Christianity once again an important element in the defence of national identity.⁴

In my view the crucial relation that must be analyzed is that of state, nation and religion. The modern state is a nation-state and the hyphen indicates that the modern state requires a nation and vice versa. In the colonial period only Britain was a nation-state, while India was a colony that in the 20th century struggled against Britain to gain independent status as nation-state. This, at least, seems to indicate a time-lag, in which colonizing Britain was an established nation-state and colonized India became one, – perhaps as a result of colonization. However, one has to remember that the nation is a 19th century historical formation, so the time-lag is a relatively minor one. Another way of putting this is to say that in the same period that Britain was colonizing India, England was colonizing Great Britain, trying to unify what was not yet (and would only partially be) the United Kingdom.⁵ We can see the historical outcome of the latter process even today in Northern Ireland and Scotland.⁶ I do not want to make too much of this, but wish to simply point out that Benedict Anderson's notion of time-lag, in which blueprints of a finished nation-state are exported to less-evolved societies via colonialism, may lead us to miss the processual and differential nature of nation-state formation.⁷ We also run the risk of overlooking the fact that this process involved Britain and India simultaneously, within the same historical time.

Often the question is raised: what comes first in this hyphenated phenomenon, nation or state? Does the state produce the people or the people the state? I am in agreement with Marcel Mauss who, in his unfinished work

4. Eade 1997.

5. Hechter 1975.

6. Nairn 1981.

7. Anderson 1991.

on 'the nation', argues that the idea of the 'nation' combines in the collective spirit the idea of the 'fatherland' (*patrie*) and the idea of the citizen:

(...) these two notions of fatherland and citizen are ultimately nothing but a single institution, one and the same rule of practical and ideal morals and, in reality, one and the same central fact which gives the modern republic all its originality, all its novelty and its incomparable moral dignity (...). The individual – every individual – is born in political life (...). A society in its entirety has to some extent become the State, the sovereign political body; it is the totality of citizens.⁸

In his provocative and profound way, Mauss does away with any sharp distinction between state and society. Where Renan had suggested that the nation was a daily plebiscite, a deliberate choice, Mauss argued that it was a collective belief in homogeneity, as if the nation were a primitive clan, supposedly composed of equal citizens, symbolized by its flag (its totem), having a cult of the fatherland just as the primitive clan has its ancestor cults. In Mauss's view the modern nation believes in its race, ('it is because the nation creates race that one believes that the race creates the nation'),⁹ its language, its civilization, its national character. This collective belief is recent, modern and to a very considerable extent the result of public, obligatory education. The idea of national character is intimately tied to the idea of progress.¹⁰

What we find in Mauss is a rejection of the common distinction between civil ties and primordial bonds, between citizenship and ideas of ethnicity, race, language and religion.¹¹ In his view, they all go together in a complex transformation of society into the nation-state. For Mauss, one of the most interesting aspects of this process is that it produces simultaneously the individual and the nation. In Foucault's terms, the state is totalizing and individualizing at the same time. The boundaries of the state are notoriously difficult to define. The state appears to be a sovereign authority above and outside society, but Foucault has pointed out that the modern state works internally through disciplinary power, not by constraining individuals and their actions, but by producing them. The individual, civil political subject is produced in churches, schools and factories. Timothy Mitchell has argued that it is the peculiarity of the modern state phenomenon that 'at the

8. Mauss 1969, pp. 592–593.

9. op.cit., p. 596.

10. op.cit., p. 604.

11. Such a distinction is central in Geertz 1973.

same time as power relations become internal in this way, and by the same methods, they now appear to take the novel form of external structures.¹² The state is thus to be analyzed as a structural effect.

Where does this leave religion? In Mauss (as in Durkheim) there are constant allusions to the idea that nationalism is the religion of modern society, just as clan totemism is the religion of primitive society. If this is the case, could one then say that Christianity (or Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism) is the religion of the ancient regime and nationalism the secular religion of modern society? Our previous argument about the secularization thesis has already shown that this is a much too simple idea of one thing replacing another. An implication of Mauss's argument appears to be that what happened to race and language in the age of nationalism also happened to religion. That is, it becomes a defining feature of the nation and, for this purpose, is transformed in a certain direction. Religion is nationalized, so to say. It becomes one of the fields of disciplinary practice in which the modern civil subject is produced. Obviously not the only one, however, since language, literature, race and civilization are other fields producing what Mauss called 'the national character'.

That religion is important in producing the modern subject should not sound too strange to those familiar with Weber's discussion of the Protestant Ethic. That it also is important in producing the modern public is perhaps more startling, especially if one stresses that, in the 19th century, it is not only Protestantism that is nationalized, but also Catholicism and many other religions, such as Islam and Hinduism in India. One can hear the immediate objection that Protestantism had already become the national religion of England and the Low Countries in the 16th century. However, I would suggest that there were Protestant state churches in these countries in the early-modern period, but since the countries were not yet nation-states, there was no national religion. In other words, major changes in religion are underway in the 18th and 19th centuries, those that will affect its organization, its impact and its reach. These changes have to do with the rise of that hyphenated phenomenon: the nation-state.¹³

Implicit in my argument thus far is that 'the modern subject' is produced together with 'the modern public'. Consequently, religion is not only important in the shaping of 'individual conscience' and 'civilized conduct', but also in the creation of the public sphere. Some authors conflate the notions of civil society and public sphere, while others distinguish them

12. Mitchell 1991, p. 93.

13. See for The Netherlands, Van Rooden 1999.

sharply and argue for one against the other.¹⁴ I think that the two belong together. In my reading, civil society stands for institutions and social movements that are independent enough from the state to be critical of it and public sphere stands for spaces, sites and technologies available for public discourse that is critical of the state. Both concepts carry overtones of liberal political theory. This is especially true for Habermas's understanding of the public sphere, with its emphasis on a particular kind of secular rationality and subjectivity with the exclusion of the not-yet-modern subject. Despite Habermas's training in the Frankfurt School, there is much in his analysis of the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere and its transformations that is close to liberal political thought.¹⁵ His emphasis on freedom of expression combined with that on the rationality of debate reminds one of John Stuart Mill's famous essay *On Liberty*. For both Habermas and Mill it is clear that only rational adults can participate in this debate. Habermas speaks about the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in England with no reference to the Empire. Mill, a colonial administrator, is more direct in his denial of the possibility of the colonized world to create and participate in orderly, public debate; the colonized are like children who have to be educated before they can engage in rational debate. Postcolonial studies have sufficiently shown that this 'little England' perspective is a nationalist fallacy.¹⁶ As I have argued before, imperial encounters have been of great importance for the historical development of public debate in the metropolis as well as the colony.¹⁷ The imaginary of the nation-state itself is a product of global history. It is important to highlight the imperial genealogy of the public sphere in order to better understand the current transformation from the national public sphere to a transnational public sphere. Keck and Sikkink, for instance, rightly point to the anti-slavery societies of the 19th century as precursors to present-day transnational movements and advocacy networks.¹⁸

Another significant congruence between Habermas's thought and that of J.S. Mill is that neither sees a place for religious argumentation or

14. Calhoun 1993, Dean 2001.

15. Habermas [1962] 1989. Horkheimer refused to accept it as a *Habilitationschrift* and Habermas defended it in Marburg under Wolfgang Abendroth, see Calhoun 1992.

16. For a discussion of Edmund Burke's thoughts on freedom and of the Trial of Warren Hastings in the 18th century, see Suleri 1992.

17. See Van der Veer 2001, for a discussion of Habermas and J.S. Mill.

18. Keck &c 2000.

religious movements in the public sphere. Religion, in their view, is an obstacle to the freedom and rationality of debate, because of its absolutist claims on truth. Their assumption is that society has to be secular before one can have a critical, public debate. Habermas's public sphere is an ideal-typical construction that corresponds to elements of liberal political thought and this would explain that his later writings, focusing on procedural democracy, are close to Rawls, but antithetical to Foucault.

The limits of liberal political theory for understanding the world do not have to be outlined here, but, nevertheless, it may still be useful to retain some aspects of the notions of civil society and the public sphere as far as they are productive in interpreting the social sources of self, community and imagination. It is especially the aspect of communication and the role of technology therein that seem crucial for civil society and the public sphere, but also for religion. In this connection it is interesting that Benedict Anderson has argued that one particular media revolution, the rise of print capitalism, has had a profound impact on the way human societies imagine themselves. While his interest is in the rise of a secular national consciousness – crucial to the formation of civil society and the public sphere – he also pays some attention to the ways in which religion has been transformed by this and later media revolutions.¹⁹ However, not only the imagination of community is important here, but also the imagination of 'the self'. The mediation and virtuality involved in new technologies of communication, such as the book and now the internet, may have a profound impact on religious communication. Religion is not only mediated, but is also crucially concerned with the forms and practices of mediation. According to William James, religion is founded on the subjective experience of an invisible presence. This may be true, but we only have access to that subjective experience through the mediation of concrete practices, such as speaking, writing and acts of worship, while, at the same time, these acts may be considered to produce the experience. There is a whole range of activities that induce religious dispositions and are about the relation between human subjects and that which I would like to call provisionally, for lack of a better term, 'the supernatural'. Crucial in that mediation is the relative invisibility of the supernatural or, perhaps better, its virtuality. In religious mediation there is always an ambivalence – about the addressee and about the arrival of the message – which is connected to epistemological uncertainty.

An element that is not sufficiently discussed in the literature on the public sphere is publicity's opposite: secrecy. Reinhart Koselleck has argued, in a book that appeared three years earlier than that of Habermas and

19. Anderson 1991 and Anderson 1999.

became almost as influential, that the emergence of secret societies of freemasonry were crucial in the development of the Enlightenment critique of the absolutist state.²⁰ In the mid-18th century, the masonic lodges saw an immense increase in membership and can be regarded as having been the most important sites for the new sociability of the Enlightenment, besides those which were more public, such as coffeehouses, clubs, salons, and literary societies. To my mind, the important point here is that these lodges were able to erect a wall of protection for their debates and rituals against intrusion from both the state and the 'profane' world. Religion is a privileged site for examining this aspect of secrecy that is simultaneously the opposite of the public sphere and its foundation. Religious movements and religious sites are often suspected of secret conspiracy by the powers that be. It is precisely in moving away from state institutions and official politics that possibilities for fundamental moral critique emerge. It should be clear that such critique can take an unpleasant and terrorist form as it did in the Jacobin ideology of the French Revolution. This uncomfortable dialectic is exactly what German theorists like Koselleck and Habermas were interested in after the Nazi period.

It is striking to what extent religious movements in South Asia, such as the Sinhalese Buddhist Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya, the Jama'at-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jama'at, as well as the Viswa Hindu Parishad, are the principal agents of moral criticism of the state.

1. Protestantism as a Model

Historical sociology has always highlighted the profound effects of the rise of the market for printed books on Christianity in Europe. The expansion of Protestantism is generally thought to be connected to that historical phenomenon. Benedict Anderson highlights how central Luther was to the great expansion of the market for printed books in Germany in the early decades of the 16th century. Protestantism was the main commodity on the vernacular print-market and created new reading publics, essential for the rise of national consciousness. Before the novel, we have the printed bible and the huge proliferation of religious tracts which enabled Christians to have direct, personal access to religious truth without the mediation of a class of priests and even involving, in some cases, the abolition of a priesthood. What is important here is that the modern reading public is a religious public. This is true not only for the period of early Protestantism in the 16th and

20. Koselleck [1959] 1988. Habermas has sharply criticized Koselleck's view that totalitarianism finds its roots in the dialectic between absolutism and Enlightenment critique, see Habermas 1973.

17th centuries, but also for the 18th and 19th centuries, those that witnessed the emergence of both a national and an imperial consciousness. Protestantism plays a role in the shift from hierarchical, mediated-access societies to horizontal, direct-access societies. As Charles Taylor argues, hierarchy and mediated access went together in the *ancien régime*, and modernity implies an image of direct-access.²¹ Like Habermas and Anderson, Taylor understands this within a larger narrative of liberation from religion. Protestantism is then seen as a step in the unfolding story of secularization. However, if one does not accept this story, it is possible to arrive at a better understanding of the religious public sphere and the religious subject under modern conditions of direct-access through literacy and mass education.

Not enough has been done to understand the effects that literacy and the availability of printed religious literature have had on the construction of the Christian subject and his or her communication with the supernatural. The effects of developments such as print and literacy on the construction of the Hindu subject or the Muslim subject have, however, hardly begun to be examined. Furthermore, the consequences of low and gendered literacy rates like those in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India on the spread of certain forms of religiosity as opposed to others are underexamined. What we find in South Asia is an as yet underdeveloped market for reading which competes with a rapidly expanding market for viewing films, videos and television. In this and other cases, the ideal-typical comparison with Protestantism opens up certain questions, but might foreclose others.

Nevertheless, there have been a great number of interesting attempts to use the sociological interpretation of the rise of Protestantism as a model for understanding transformations in Hinduism and Islam. These studies emphasize the commonality of the search for the authentic authority of the basic texts and the circumvention of received authority by reading these texts directly or by reading pamphlets which refer to them. Crucial to this search is a religious notion of Scripture as the ultimate source of truth. This notion is readily available in religions in South Asia such as Islam and Sikhism, and to a lesser extent in Buddhism and Hinduism. According to Gombrich and Obeyesekere, who use an explicit Weberian approach, Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka derives its authority from the teachings of the Buddha as given in the Pali Canon.²² At the same time, however, they acknowledge the fact that the religious life of Sinhalese Buddhists has always included belief and action which was not authorized in Buddhist scripture. They describe the development of what they call a Protestant

21. Taylor 1998, p. 39.

22. Gombrich &c 1988.

Buddhism, which stresses the authority of Scripture as against that of monastic hierarchy, as well as the development of what they call spirit religion, in which divine possession is central and positively valued. The status of Scripture in Hinduism is even more complicated than in Buddhism. On the one hand, there is the great authority of the Vedic tradition, but, on the other hand, that tradition can hardly be made available for moral guidance outside of the strictly ritual sphere which is dominated by highly specialized priests. Something similar can be said about more regional scriptural traditions, such as the Agamas, which are crucial in South Indian temple practice. Nevertheless, even Hinduism has witnessed some quasi-Protestant movements, such as the successful Arya Samaj, which advocates a return to the Vedic tradition, while at the same time completely transforming it. Similarly, in South India there has been a strong lay movement to force Brahman priests to make a scriptural knowledge of the Agamas more central to their practice.

The comparison with Christian Protestantism is often forcefully made in the case of Islam. It is especially the attack on traditional Islam, characterized by the worship of Sufi saints, which may strike us as a Protestant iconoclasm. This attack also entails the undermining of the traditional authority of Sufi Shaikhs and *ulama* with the ascendancy of the literate middle class. Islam has in the Quran something similar to the Bible, a central Scripture which can be used to give moral guidance; however, it is important to observe that Quranic interpretation has never been carried out in one centralized authority-structure like a church.

It is striking that the Islamic world rejected the printing of religious books until the 19th century and that it was only in the 1920s that the Egyptian standard edition of the Quran started rolling from the presses. Francis Robinson argues that the negative Muslim response to printing must be explained by the nature of the Islamic transmission of knowledge.²³ He neglects the extent to which imperial structures like the Ottoman and Mughal empires have been obstacles for the spread of print, but he certainly brings out an important element: for Muslims, the Quran is God's very word, and this had always been transmitted orally. Learning the Quran by heart and reciting has always been the defining feature of Islamic education in *madrasas*. This system is also the basis for the transmission of other knowledge. Written texts are only used as memory aids (often in rhyme) for learning by heart. The oral tradition which transmits knowledge from person to person, always referring back to the original author, is superior to writing. According to Robinson, Muslims only adopted print when it was felt to be a necessary weapon in the defense of Islam against attacks from

23. Robinson 1993.

Christian missionaries. This brings out the point that the ideal-typical comparison with Protestantism should not obscure the real influence of Christianity on other religions in the colonized world.

Islamic books were first printed in South Asia (where one-fourth of the world's Muslims live) in the early part of the 19th century. The earliest of these were revivalist books by Saiyid Ahmad Bareilvi. In the latter part of the 19th century, revivalists at Deoband in Northern India started a great program of translating Arabic and Persian works into Urdu. Along with the emergence of Muslim newspapers, this facilitated a fostering of interest in things Islamic which extended beyond the South Asian region to a larger part of the Muslim world. The most important change was, however, the decline of the authority of the *ulama* in relation to the well-educated laity. Their challengers were modernists like Saiyid Ahmad Khan, founder of Aligarh Muslim University, and Islamists like Saiyid Abu Ala Maududi, founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami. Both were laymen who were not traditionally educated.

Although the ideal-typical comparison with Protestantism offers a number of important parallels with the history of other religions, such as Islam and Hinduism, it is crucial to recognize that the place of scriptural authority and the nature of Scripture is quite different in different religions and thus cannot be easily compared. If we can demonstrate that the authority of Scripture becomes more important in a kind of Protestant revolution in a number of religions in the modern period, it does not imply that the construction of scriptural authority therefore has the same or even similar religious and political effects. Not only is the text different, but the context also differs. The Protestant Revolution is a 16th century phenomenon in Europe which is not easily comparable to 19th or 20th century developments elsewhere.

2. Modern Religion and Mass Communication

It seems to me that there are at least two major developments that affect the relation between modern society and modern religion: mass education and mass communication. These developments result in a certain measure of objectification and packaging of religion. Dale Eickelman calls 'objectification' 'the process by which three kinds of questions come to be foregrounded in the consciousness of large numbers of believers: What is my religion? Why is it important to my life? and, How do my beliefs guide my conduct?'²⁴ Eickelman argues that the fact that numerous people are debating these questions is a distinctively modern phenomenon. He observes that engineers (like the leaders of the Refah party in Turkey), journalists (like

24. Eickelman 1992, p. 643.

Maududi), literary critics (like Qutb in Egypt), Sorbonne-trained lawyers (like the Sudanese leader Hasan al-Turabi) have replaced the *ulama* as leaders of religious opinion. Islam (like Sinhalese Buddhism) has now seen the emergence of the notion of a religious curriculum and of a catechism. These developments are crucial to the 'objectification' of religion. Religious statements become more explicit, and less contextualized when broadcast on television and radio or incorporated into general textbooks.

It is interesting that the new media are simultaneously building on the earlier Muslim preference for orality and presence, while enabling the decontextualization and objectification of religious messages. Eickelman points out that Islam becomes a subject that has to be explained or understood. A local group's particular understanding of Islam can become a subject of transnational debate thanks to the new media. As everywhere, states try to limit and control these debates, but they face great difficulties in doing so. Since it is often religious and political activists who try to dominate the debate about religion in the new media, control over the media is of paramount political significance.

The objectification of Islam in mass education is paralleled by the packaging of Islam on television. In a penetrating analysis of the emergence of commercial television in Turkey in the 1990s, Ayse Oncu speaks of the 'issuetization' of Islam on television: 'Islam, as packaged for consumption by heterogeneous audiences, becomes an "issue" – something that has to be addressed and confronted – demanding each and every member of the audience to make a choice and decide where they stand, for or against.'²⁵ While secular state television made Islam invisible, as it were, commercial television packages it either as 'a viewpoint' on a number of issues and thus as part of a democratic debate, or as a 'global machination' that is a matter of international conspiracies. Oncu's general point is that Islam is no longer something relegated to tradition or to 'the bazaar mentality of small town shopkeepers'; rather, by means of its packaging on commercial television, Islam is part of the culture of the present. The effects for Turkish politics, but also for the Muslim subject, are significant.

Conclusion

Let me end with some final reflections on the material I have presented:

1. The transnational public sphere today is the successor of a public sphere that in many societies is formed in the context of the interaction between

25. Oncu 1995.

empire and the nation-state. When one examines the colonial context of British India, one finds a public sphere that is perhaps better characterized as a public arena in which religious movements challenge the colonial state, as well as each other. The form of criticism is not only debate, although public oratory (as, for example, in religious polemic, such as *shastrartha* in Hinduism) is crucial, along with pamphlets and lithographic posters, but also religious symbolism and ritual processions. Gandhi was a genius in articulating such criticism, as, for example, in the Salt March where he criticized colonial taxation. Hindu nationalists today have adopted his repertoire of symbolic action and have simultaneously given Hindu-Muslim relations a severe blow and gained considerable electoral success.

2. Religious issues and the movements that articulate them are crucial in the formation of the public sphere. Within democratic politics of a colonial or national state, the context of the articulation of religious issues such as conversion is especially a politics of numbers. The debates around these issues do involve critical, rational discussions of history and geography, but also violent attacks on the symbols of the other community. It is striking to what extent the forms of mass mobilization in South Asia are prefigured in the colonial period.
3. Mass education, mass media, and mass politics are essential elements of the transformation of the public sphere. Transnational migration is a defining element in these new religious movements and in the emergence of a transnational public sphere. The technologies of transport and communication that have developed under the present conditions of global forms of production and consumption define the transformation of the lifeworld of growing numbers of people, as well as their religious responses to it. It is especially the constant shuttling between countries of origin and countries of immigration that constitutes such a transnational field.
4. Technologies of communication, such as print and the internet, do not only create a new sense of community and of the public sphere, but also of the self. The act of reading in private shields individuals from direct interactions with the immediate lifeworld, while linking them to a larger world of virtual interactions. The same seems to be true for the internet; the act of reading and writing constitute the world of the internet as well as the world of print. The kinds of virtual interactions that are enabled by the Web are characterized by indeterminacy and secrecy. The decentralized nature of the internet allows for secrecy even at the level of authorship; copyright has made this difficult in the world of print. Again, in cybersalons as in religious movements, it seems that it is the play between publicity and secrecy that constitutes the critical debate.

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NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL STRATEGY CONTRARY TO CIVIL SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT: The vast amount of literature on nationalism demands to be assessed from a political point of view. In this article, nationalism is considered to be an ‘ism’, i.e. the more or less coherent set of beliefs, feelings and practices that works as an ideology and as a strong incentive to political action for a particular group or people. With the help of distinctions between state, civil society and the private sphere, the specific political role of nationalism can be clarified as a valuable strategy in state formation processes. For nationalism, as an ideological set of beliefs, actions and incentives, helps to turn the public sphere into a private domain. However, from the point of view of civil society, which transforms the private sphere into public behavior, this process proves to be disastrous. Nationalism is still a very strong and effective political strategy that can be used rightfully by states as well as by ethnic groups. But it is not more than a strategy – nowadays related to global civil society – and certainly not a goal in itself.

Introduction

In this article, I want to provide an assessment of the vast amount of literature on nationalism from a political point of view. My object is nationalism as an ‘ism’, i.e. the more or less coherent set of beliefs, feelings and practices that works as an ideology and as a strong incentive to political action for a particular group of people. I will use the distinctions between state, civil society and the private sphere as heuristic instruments in order to show the specific *political* role of nationalism. I will argue that nationalism is a valuable strategy in state formation processes, but a disastrous process within the domain of civil society.

1. A Threefold Distinction: State – Civil Society – Private Sphere

‘Public’ means, in general, ‘open to all’. In order to explain this meaning and the different ways in which ‘open to’ can be filled in, we must use a *threefold* distinction between the public and the private sphere.

1.1. The *private (sphere)* is the contrasting notion of the public (sphere).¹ It includes the set of private places. A private place or domain is always occupied by a 'private person'; this person can be a human individual (body), a family, a group, or a corporation (legal body). Each person develops and constitutes the unique 'filling' of this domain by which it is limited from the inside. This material content is not only the effect of a particularization of general goods (e.g. wealth and health), but also the result of singularization, i.e. individual-identity formation. The main public characteristic of private domains is that they are morally closed to outsiders: they cannot be entered without the permission of the insider(s). In other words, these domains are non-public. Privacy is recognized nowadays as a basic human right and states must legally protect the private domain against interference.²

Yet, a private domain is not invisible or imperceptible to outsiders. Private affairs always have a public appearance that is 'perceptible to all'; private actions, moreover, nearly always have consequences in the public domain, where they can trigger reactions. These facts are a source of tension or of possible (moral) conflicts among people. For example, so-called 'mandated privacy' tries to regulate intimate private actions, such as sex or defecation, with the help of good manners, social expectations and obligations regarding private behavior in public places. Furthermore, public affairs and common goods very often clash with private interests and opinions. Law must regulate public interference in privacy matters, but political discussion on this point is ongoing.

In Western countries, religion is generally considered to belong to the private domain. In my view, however, religion is a phenomenon typical of the domain of civil society inasmuch as most religious practices entail membership of some voluntary association (church or congregation) and are performed in public. Moreover, most churches claim to provide ethical guidelines for one's life, private as well as public, and churches also actively interfere in public opinion in order to promote their moral worldviews.

1. Recent literature on privacy and the private domain is reviewed in Wacks 2000, especially 'What is 'Privacy'?' in 'Should the Concept of Privacy Be Abandoned?'; Wacks argues that the concept of privacy is too broad and too unclear in order to be used as a juridical concept. Etzioni 1999 offers another recent review and discussion of privacy from a communitarian point of view; Moore 1984 provides an anthropological and historical approach; the most recent philosophical analysis is offered by Geuss 2001; general philosophical considerations in Arendt 1958, §§ 8–10, and Sennett 1976.

2. See the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (Treaty of New York, 1966), article 17; *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights* (Treaty of Rome, 1950), article 8.

1.2. I have discussed the private first, because it is the counter-notion of the public, but the notion of 'public' is itself used in two different contexts:

The *formal or political public sphere* of a state or other polity is, by definition, open. This means that it is accessible to all, directed towards all, and shared by all (i.e., by the members of the polity). In most modern states this sphere is regulated by the rule of law, and it therefore constitutes a rather stable and centralized domain.³ However, this domain is not open to all without qualification: each state has territorial borders and formal rules of citizenship. Moreover, within each state, public action is always strictly divided into governmental rights and duties and the rights and duties of its subjects. Finally, the application of the rule of law in society by public authorities leads to a centralizing and increasingly intrusive state power. Therefore, I call the public sphere of the state a *formally limited, open sphere*.

The public morals of this political public sphere are mostly procedural, because they are tied to the juridical way of thinking and handling conflicts, which is characteristic of the rule of law. Constitutions and legal systems of different states or nations of course show particular juridical differences, but large portions of the laws of different states are materially alike, and are interwoven with international law. Another part of the public morals of a particular state are the actual ethical choices or moral values of the ruling power (s); national(istic) values or morals can be part of them. A third part consists of the particular or singular manners, values and customs (the culture) of a nation, people or community. The common good [*bonum commune*] of a state is, in fact, a composite of all three. The common good is a good *to* and a good *of* all individuals within the state *as* citizens; they are tied to it or aspire after it as a *common* goal, not as private individuals.

1.3. There is yet another public sphere, the sphere of public social life, which nowadays is called *civil society*. The most significant and paradoxical characteristic of civil society is that it is a private and public sphere at the same time. People act, behave and appear in civil society as private individuals, not as citizens or officials, and every person is considered and respected as an autonomous individual.⁴ However, the (inter)actions of these individuals are joint actions which are performed in public, i.e., they do not remain within the private domain. Civil society is by nature open and visible to all. Its most important characteristic is that it is an infinite space, or 'system of systems', as Michael Walzer calls it, in which all sorts

3. See, for example, Habermas 1992 for a lengthy overview and discussion of the role of justice and rights in modern state and society.

4. See Habermas 1989, § 4.

of free or voluntary associations are presently possible and should be possible in the future.⁵

Civil society is both an all-invasive sphere of human interactions and a distinctive domain. It includes a geographical or local space, and a meta-topical or global public sphere. In fact, its space is very often limited or filled, for example, in traffic-jams on highways, but as a sphere it is, in principle, indefinite. In contrast to the public sphere of a state, which is always locally limited to a particular territory and hierarchically ordered by a particular government, civil society as such is indefinite and horizontal; it does not respect state borders or political hierarchies, unless they are imposed by states. As a sphere or category of its own, civil society, rather, is a medium or an indefinite potentiality that offers room to all sorts of associations, groups or corporations. Therefore, civil society is plural par excellence and in order to remain an 'area anyone can enter', it may never be definitely occupied.⁶ Over and again it offers room for free and voluntary associations. Consequently, the space of civil society can never be claimed, whether it be by some effective global corporations or associations (this is called McDonaldization or McBuck),⁷ the state (this is called Big Brother, but is also an effect of nationalism, which is the topic of this article), or, finally, particular cultural, religious or ethnic communities (this is called Jihad, but is also connected with nationalism). The price for this openness is the structural instability of civil society: it has to be made anew and organized each time by the people who are active in its space.⁸

This last point makes it clear why the morals and manners of civil society must insist on transitory and momentary actions, and why, at the same time, in order to allow for basic respect to be shown toward each individual as an autonomous actor, they demand a certain 'civil inattention or disattendability.'⁹ Any substantive claim or action must be modest and must avoid becoming obtrusive. In this situation procedural ways of behaving are more likely to develop than substantive ones. This proceduralism is often criticized as liberal indifference,¹⁰ but, in my opinion, proceduralism is a

5. Walzer 1992.

6. Geuss 2001, p. 13.

7. See Barber 1995; Etzioni uses the metaphors of McBuck and Big Brother (Etzioni 1999, p. 10).

8. See Van der Zweerde 1999, p. 25.

9. Geuss 2001, p. 14.

10. For a communitarian example, see Etzioni, who uses as a maxim: 'social and public decision making is substantive, not merely procedural' (Etzioni 1999, p. 269).

necessary condition of civil society as an indefinite, open social sphere. Phrased in a Hegelian way, one could say that the morality [*Sittlichkeit*] of civil society is its non-identity with itself.

1.4. In contrast to civil society, the formal public sphere of the state or polity is a public sphere with great stability. Therefore, it is and must be the backbone and guard of the structurally unstable civil society. A strong civil society needs a strong state authority and sound laws, and vice versa, but the two shall never coincide. This statement, however, is in fact a shorthand expression for a permanent political discussion as well as a social problem in any state and civil society. As I shall discuss below, nationalism is a position in this discussion which tends towards a disastrous identification of state and civil society. A similar argument can be phrased about the role of the state in the private sphere, but in this case the point of nationalism is more complicated (as we shall see below).

2. Nationalism

2.1. *Nationalism: some general features*

As general characteristics of the phenomenon of nationalism, I would like to mention four points:

1. Nationalism is not a general social process, but a *strategy* or set of intended actions within processes of group and identity formation (see also 3.3.).
2. It uses a set of *ideological* beliefs, feelings and practices, which, *in a horizontal way*, i.e., common to all the members of the group, constitute the identity of the group and of the group members. In doing so, nationalism creates a feeling of belonging.¹¹ Horizontal bonds are typical to nationalism, and they can function as a counter-balance against both differentiating social processes (castes, social classes, elites) and the fragmentation generated by individualization or by free associations in civil society. Moreover, this horizontal way of connecting people can easily be linked with democratization. According to Adrian Hastings, the most influential nationalistic beliefs, feelings and practices are a written vernacular, some territory (real or imagined), and some history, myth of origin, or religion.¹² I call this set ‘ideological’, because it organizes a

11. See Anderson 1983, p. 7, and Hastings 1997, p. 25.

12. See Hastings 1997, ch. 7.

core worldview centered on the identity of the group, which claims truth and moral value and refuses a critical or objective testing of this claim.

3. Nationalism is only a generic name; actually, we will always be confronted with particular *nationalisms*, since one of the most outstanding features of nationalism is its *singularizing* effect on the two foregoing characteristics.¹³ Nationalism uses substantive characteristics, which are derived from the unique (differential) context, history, culture or nature of the particular group. Therefore, national identities will completely differ from one another even if they use common characteristics such as (Christian) religion and its Bible, or a shared territory. The identities of a Catholic Flemish nationalist and a Catholic Walloon nationalist, for example, are entirely different and, as individuals, they can scarcely understand the unique meaning of the identity of the other party.

Therefore, I think it is important to distinguish singularity from particularity. The latter entails particular characteristics having a relationship with a general principle, whereas the former denies this relationship and underlines the (monadic) uniqueness and self-sufficiency of the characteristics that are at stake. As a consequence, singularizing processes become exclusivist, whereas particularizing processes do not necessarily produce a similar effect. In section 2.1, I discussed singularization as a phenomenon intrinsically related to the private domain. Therefore, we now can regard nationalism as a privatization of the public domain of the state. The mechanism employed here is that of ethnicity and racism. As Étienne Balibar phrases it: 'the racial community has a tendency to represent itself as one big family or as the common envelope of family relations', and: 'today it is the state which draws up and keeps the archive of filiations and alliances.'¹⁴ As such, nationalism is a systematic distortion of the threefold distinction between private and public, which was discussed in section 2; in section 5, I will elaborate this point further.

4. Finally, this unique valuation of group characteristics in nationalism is, in my opinion, entirely different from 'glocalization', i.e. the adaptation to local or so-called *parochial* values or manners by the associations or institutions of civil society, which is complementary to processes of globalization processes in civil society.¹⁵

13. Hastings 1997, p. 32 calls this the 'inherent particularism' of nationhood.

14. Etienne Balibar, 'The Nation Form' (ch.5 of Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991), p. 100 and 101. See also Isaiah Berlin's second characteristic of nationalism 'that the pattern of life of a society is similar to that of a biological organism' in Berlin 1979, p. 341.

15. See Van der Zweerde in this volume.

2.2. *Nationalism as a historical phenomenon*

2.2.1. Nationalism is a long-term historical trend or process. In my opinion, this process is not in the first place a consequence or mode of appearance of modernization and democratization in general. It has to do, first of all, with the formation of new states and governments after the disappearance or fragmentation of political empires as the leading political and governmental units in world politics. As a consequence, the idea of 'the Nation' as the natural political unit has developed in the course of the fragmentation of the 'grand narratives', i.e. the worldviews, ideologies and religions of the empires. The processes of empire-dissolution and empire-building are still taking place in present-day world politics.¹⁶ The dissolution of the Russian empire, for example, occurred just twelve years ago; and when might the Chinese empire begin to collapse? And isn't the new American empire, along with its corresponding grand narrative of the American way of life, continuing to install itself today?

Yet another issue is the disappearance of the representative theocratic state or polity and of the theological-political legitimization of the absolute power of the state. This is the most peculiar factor in the historical process of state formation in the West as far as religion is concerned.¹⁷ However, this process also remains incomplete: the secularized model of the theocratic polity, the sovereign and independent 'Westphalian' state, is still a standard in international politics and is therefore adopted by all new states. Furthermore, theocratic political ideas are presently undergoing a revival in Christian Orthodox and Islamic countries. I consider, therefore, the formation of (nation) states and the transformation of the theological-political legitimization of the state power as very relevant to our time and its world politics.

2.2.2. Nationalism is particularly considered to be a singularization of general theological-political legitimizations. In this respect, Christian religion is a very important factor in nationalism. According to the thesis of Hastings: 'the nation and nationalism are both . . . characteristically Christian things.'¹⁸ The worldview of the Old Testament has become crucial to our understanding of the world as a place of nations: 'indeed they [the Jews, MK]

16. This point is controversial, see Hobsbawm 1992, i.e. the 2nd edition, ch. 6; this chapter was revised completely after the fall of the USSR; cf. Delanty & O'Mahony 2002.

17. I know of only one book which deals with this point, not in relation to nationalism, however, but connected with the formation of civil society: Colas 1992.

18. Hastings, 1997, p. 186.

may be well called the true proto-nation in that the Old Testament provided the model in ancient Israel which Christian nations have adopted.¹⁹ Among the six factors mentioned by Hastings, I would like to underline in particular the 'contested frontier' as the wide-ranging context for the religious shaping of nationalism, and the development of autocephalous state churches, especially in Orthodox countries.²⁰ From the Middle Ages onwards, the universal, catholic values of religion, including the theological-political idea of the all-embracing almighty God, were singularized in this way in Europe into a multitude of 'God's Own Countries' and 'Chosen Peoples' with messianic missions.²¹ The ideas of the nation and the people could, therefore, easily be developed into secularized or modernized *transcendent* principles, which are represented by the real existing nation-states and peoples themselves.

Democracy can very easily be connected to this process. The idea of the democratic sovereignty of the (chosen) people is a perfect mutual reinforcement of two transcendent principles, 'the nation' and 'the sovereign'. Moreover, the ideology of democratic equality within the people is a sound political elaboration of the horizontal bonds of cohesion characteristic of nationalism.

2.3. *Nationalism and the modern rational state*

2.3.1. From the moment the idea of 'the nation' as a particular political unit and principle took shape, it has been the object of political action. In the 19th century, the idea that 'each nation should have its own state' was a widely accepted political goal, although this idea was never fully accepted, nor foreseen, by political philosophers.²² The theory as such was strongly criticized in the late 20th century, but the practice of nationalism remained and is perhaps still the most influential political practice.²³ I propose that this practice can be understood as a (power) strategy that can be used for

19. *ibid.*; see also p. 195f.; see also Arendt 1948, ch. 8, pp. 233f: tribal nationalism is a perversion of the Chosen People, God chooses his own nation, that is a people with a divine mission; and this implies a natural inequality of men.

20. Hastings 1997, p. 190, p. 196.

21. Perhaps Islam is a counterexample in this respect, see the contributions on Turkey in this book.

22. Berlin 1979, sect. I and II.

23. According to Gershon Weiler, nationalism is a justificatory doctrine of rulership, which is very successful in comparison with social ideals and indoctrinations. See Weiler 1994.

different goals. On the one hand, it has been used by already-existing states not only for their defense, glorification and expansion, but also for their modernization as a rational form of government. On the other hand, ethnic groups have used it as a self-protective reaction to external threats and, primarily, to the intrusive state-formation of these modernizing states.²⁴

By calling the politics of nationalism a strategy, we can refrain from an a priori and intrinsic valuation of nationalism. Now the question can be raised as to whether this practice is still a predominant political strategy and whether it is still effective? Has it not been replaced by the processes of globalization and by the formation of civil societies? The answer is no, because the formation of intrusive, centralized, rational modern state administrations continues to take place, and the reactions of minorities, ethnic groups and colonized peoples against the dominant states still account for a large portion of the political issues of present-day world politics.

Furthermore, the strengthening of the identity between state and nation is very often a central goal of both the rulers claiming centralized power and of the ethnic groups claiming political autonomy. Nationalism can be positively valued in this context as a successful means of reaching different political goals and objectives. It is very useful in creating horizontal group cohesion, collective opinions and collective actions, in the (vertical) processes of state formation and centralization, and in the emancipation movement of ethnic groups.

2.3.2. Perhaps nationalism can also be seen as a necessary means in the processes of legitimating modern rational state power, and in creating a hegemonic culture. Here I would like to refer to Max Weber's analysis of nationalism, which has almost been forgotten in studies of nationalism.²⁵ Weber states that in rational government [*rationale Herrschaft*] the feeling of prestige [*der ideale Pathos des Machts-Prestiges*] is important as an emotional, non-economic grip that the government has on civil servants and power-elites.²⁶ In nationalism, this prestige is fused with a feeling of responsibility for and attachment to our own society [*Gemeinschaft*] against foreign states or societies. Care for the individual characteristics or particular culture of one's own state or society is regarded as a mission by cultural power-elites, and, in this way, pure power can be transformed into

24. This is a key point made by Hastings 1997, pp. 27–31 and *passim*.

25. Weber 1980, ch. 8, § 5: 'Die Nation'.

26. Immanuel Wallerstein, who follows the same line of argument, states that this process is basically 'an essential pillar' of the capitalist world system. See 'The Construction of Peoplehood', in Balibar & Wallerstein 1991, ch. 4.

the cultural ideal of 'our Nation' or 'our national culture'. In fact, it was often the clergy that functioned as cultural elite and civil servant simultaneously, 'mediating identity between rulers and ruled', as Hastings shows.²⁷ During the secularization of political power, the clergy was replaced by civil servants and intellectuals.

In short: within limits (for the limits see section 4), the strategy of nationalism can be used successfully in order to establish (a) a coherent state order, which (b) can be recognized by the citizens as their own nation, because (c) it offers the people the opportunity for emotional identification. And, finally (d), nationalism provides prestige and material means for state officials and elites.

This pragmatic political view on nationalism as a hegemonic strategy of the government and power-elites, however, does not cover the theory of nationalism as a counterstrategy of cultural minorities or ethnic groups against the intrusive pressure of modern states and governments. In this context, nationalism is not merely a strategy, but the substantive goal of group politics and emancipation.

3. The Public Character of Nationalism as a Political Strategy

There is a basic tension in state-nationalism. On the one hand, nationalism has a public mission, insofar as it is an ideology for all members or citizens of the political group, which binds them in a horizontal way. On the other hand, nationalism is a process of privatization, turning the members of the group into an extended family and giving them a singular home(land) of their own which is closed to others. In other words: nationalism creates a *public domain made private*. The question is now whether this privatization is permissible from the moral viewpoint of what a good state or government ought to be. I would like to argue that indeed it is, inasmuch as the nation represents the *limited*, local and contingent character of any state or polity, including the socio-geographical and particular historical characteristics of its territory. Phrased in a more general way, it is a moral good when people realize in a positive way that state politics and the state itself are contingent facts.²⁸ Nationalism can be helpful in this respect, provided that it is not exclusivist, but always *one* historically and locally limited nationalism among many other nationalisms.

27. Hastings 1997, pp. 191f.

28. Cf. the contingency in the ideal of 'action', which is the same as political life, proclaimed by Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1958); note, however, that for Arendt plurality is 'the *conditio per quam* of all political life' (p. 7).

Another positive feature of state-nationalism is that private-political or national identity is a necessary condition in identification processes – or the need for attachment, as communitarians would say – realizing *political* citizenship.²⁹

The negative point, however, is that nationalism is contrary to the formal and general conditions of openness, equality and justice of the rational, modern state, and to rule of law. Moreover, as far as nationalism seems to be a strategy in the formation of a hegemonic culture and elite, it has to be morally and politically opposed, because it masks social differences and antagonisms within states or polities by means of an ideology of horizontal ties binding all different groups into one people.

In short: nationalism threatens the public character of government and is therefore a political strategy that must be carefully exercised. Other social and political forces should always serve as a counterbalance, and civil society is such a counterweight. How can we appreciate nationalism from this point of view?

4. Nationalism as a Threat to Civil Society

Civil society is an alternative mix of the private and the public (see section 2.3); it is a *private domain made public*. This is the clue for our rejection of nationalism in the public domain of civil society. For nationalism is exactly the reverse process: it *privatizes and closes the public domain*, as was discussed in section 3. In other words, indefinite openness, which is an axiom of civil society, is systematically threatened by nationalism. In civil society, therefore, the political strategy of nationalism cannot be used at all.

Moreover, people, as far as they are involved in civil society, do not act as citizens, but as private actors. But they must be careful: in civil society their private qualities are transformed into public joint actions or social interactions, and thus these qualities are no longer protected as inalienable or inalterable private possessions. If an actor uses the national identity as his or her own personal identity, then she or he can only use it as one particular identity among other (possible) ones, and not as an exclusive identity. Political parties, for example, as well as ethnic groups or elites, can act in civil society as associations with a definite national identity, and they can use the means of the mass media in propagating this identity, but it will always remain one identity among (many) others. Parties or ethnic groups cannot claim exclusive rights based on this national identity. From the moment they gain

29. Here I am using the ideas of Chantal Mouffe, which she herself does not apply to nationalism, see Mouffe 1993, ch. 9.

political power, however, the status and meaning of this national identity is completely transformed. Furthermore, civil society can never accept the state as an authority which prescribes a nationalistic worldview as a guideline for society (*Weltanschauungs-state*). Civil society is constructed as a *modus vivendi* of incompatible worldviews, and cannot accept one substantive, dominant worldview.³⁰ This means that a state or government that backs up civil society by its laws and peacekeeping power may well be very nationalistic, but it cannot provide this backup *as* a nation. This is why John Keane states that democracy and national self-determination must be disconnected: (only) in this case can nationalism be replaced by decentralization and international recognition of national identities, provided that each of them and all of them are taken as particular identities among others.³¹

Finally, I would like to underline the possibility, and even the need, for singularization within civil society. Contrary to nationalism, which privatizes the public sphere, in civil society private singularities, local characteristics, and parochial values can easily be made public without losing their singular characteristics. Civil society, after all, is an indefinite space of appearance precisely of individual differences and singularities.

Conclusion

Nationalism cannot simply be rejected as an old-fashioned and misguided political idea or ideology. It is still a very strong and effective *political* strategy in our time and world. It can be rightfully used by states or governments, as well as by ethnic groups. However, nationalism is and should not be considered a political goal in itself. It is not *more* than a strategy.

Furthermore, nationalism can no longer be used as a *social* strategy. This is due to the development of modern civil society as an alternative model of public life. Civil society is indefinite by nature, and has become global in actual practice. Therefore, it can never accept national boundaries as fixed and closed frontiers.

Most important, however, is that the core process of civil society is the reverse of the nationalism process: the former is making the private public, while the latter is turning the public sphere into a generalized private domain.

Cultural nationalism does not exist as a separate process or phenomenon on its own, but can be considered as a useful group strategy within the domain of civil society. If it is used as a political strategy, for example by ethnic groups or minorities, then it *eo ipso* turns itself into political nationalism.

30. See John Gray's first characteristic of civil society in Gray 1993.

31. See Keane 1998, esp. ch. 6, 'The Nation'.

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... BUT WHERE IS THE STATE?*

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ABSTRACT: Against the backdrop of globalization, and subscribing to the conviction that the modern nation-state has ceased to be the exclusive unit in the world political system, this article seeks ways to conceptualize the political at a global level by confronting the topics of nation, civil society, and religion with the idea of a world polity. Far from embracing the idea of a world government or a world republic, it tries to prepare the ground for new forms of polity that escape the logic of an exhaustive territorial division of the Earth's surface by sovereign states. The world is not only in search of 'politics', but also of a 'polity' or polities to form the institutionalized place of politics. Because the political always returns (Chantal Mouffe), we are in search of politics (Zygmunt Bauman), but to reclaim the state (Noreena Hertz) will not do if that state retreats (Susan Strange).

'Our 'obvious' views will not stand the test of time either.'

'What views, for example?'

'I have no such examples.'

'Why not?'

'Because I would be exemplifying things that are already undergoing a change.'

Jostein Gaarder, *Sophies World* (1994) ¹

Well I know one thing that really is true:

This here's a zoo, and the keeper ain't you.

Lou Reed, 'Sick of you' (1989)²

This contribution confronts the three topics of our conference – nation, civil society, and religion – with the current problematic status of the

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1. Gaarder 1994, p. 367.

2. Lou Reed, 'Sick of you,' on: *New York* (Sire Records, 1989).

state.³ The (nation-)state as the main type of polity is losing its central and exclusive position, but still dominates our thinking. While ‘globalization’⁴ calls for new polities to address problems and issues that transcend the national level, ‘we’ are a far cry from conceptualizing these new forms. This embarrassing situation stems from the fact that the search for ‘new forms’ is not a technical or theoretical task, but is itself profoundly political. Discussions in the West, inspired by Immanuel Kant, tend to circle around ideas of a ‘world government’, and focus on questions of democracy, sovereignty, and human rights.⁵ Far from questioning their relevance, I believe that these discussions suffer from an inbred occidentocentrism, which can be overcome *neither* by a leap to abstract cosmopolitanism, *nor* by a multiculturalism that borders on cultural relativism and in the end reinforces particularism, but only by reflecting on one’s own situation as the point of departure for a dialogue with other cultural, intellectual, and (post-)religious traditions.

Why is it a problem when the state becomes problematic? Is not its ‘withering away’ a dream come true, one which realizes the replacement of the state by society, or even community? It is not, to my mind, the state which is indispensable, but the polity. If one aspires towards something of a just society and realizes that this ambition must be situated on a global scale, it follows that if we speak about universal human rights, they should apply to

3. By ‘state’ I refer to the modern nation-state as it came into being in Europe and North America in the 17th–19th centuries and spread across the world in the 19th and 20th centuries. The origin of the modern state is often situated in 13th century Sicily.

4. The concept of ‘globalization’ is rightly questioned by several authors, including Jacques Derrida, who with good arguments prefers the French ‘mondialisation’ which, however, is difficult to render in English: Borradori 2003, p.121, and note 191, where Derrida is cited as saying ‘I am keeping the French word *mondialisation* in preference to ‘globalization’ or *Globalisierung* so as to maintain a reference to the world – *monde*, *Welt*, *mundus* – which is neither the globe nor the cosmos.’ – like Borradori, we retain here ‘globalization’, since *mondialisation* is difficult to translate: ‘mundialization’ probably comes closest of all. To distinguish *mondialisation* from globalization does not mean that the latter term makes no sense, but it is important to make the difference between the ‘material’ processes that make up globalization, and the ‘cultural’ or ‘mental’ realization that is ‘mondialisation’ – the ‘world that we are’ is not identical with the coming-to-be of ‘global phenomena’ because our ‘being the world’ is not of the phenomenal order but of the order of how we relate to this order – and the writing and reading of this sentence is a case in point, because it – what the sentence tries to express – is not identical with the printed words on paper nor with the neuronal movements in the reader’s mind, i.e. with its phenomenal being.

5. See, for example, Höffe 2002, and Held 1995.

all inhabitants of the planet Earth. If we include in these rights minimal social rights, roughly equivalent to what Vladimir Solov'ëv called an 'unmolested *worthy* human existence', claiming that society must provide every person with 'the means of existence ... and sufficient physical *rest* ... , and that he should also be able to enjoy *leisure* for the sake of his spiritual development,'⁶ and if we agree that it is among the jobs of *polities* to reach 'a balance, acceptable to all sides, of economic efficiency and distributive justice (social well-being),'⁷ then this implies a search for new governing bodies, *polities* strong enough to realize these objectives.

Following Niklas Luhmann and Anthony Giddens, I employ the notion of 'world society' to denote the set of individuals that, interrelated through communication, is ontologically prior to notions such as country, nation, people, or state.⁸ The world's population has never been divided, because every part of it stands in relation to at least one other part, and potentially to every other part of the world, a fact currently materialized by the internet: every human with internet access can communicate with any other human with the same. The division into distinct entities – 'countries' – is a human artefact: why is there any territorial division *at all*, and why *this* territorial division? The second question can be answered by investigating the contingent factors that have led to this particular 'map of the world', but the first question is a philosophical one. According to Luhmann, the main reason this territorial division exists is that, in a world society that depends on communication, every part of the world must have an address, the address of the political and juridical authority under which it falls: a multitude of *polities* that together exhaust the space of the globe is thus a condition for the smooth functioning of other social systems.⁹ Luhmann seems to follow Carl Schmitt's idea of a political 'pluriverse' [*Pluriversum*], based on his idea that 'political unity' presupposes the actual possibility of an enemy and thus implies the coexistence of other *states*.¹⁰ However, although it does

6. Vladimir Solov'ëv, *Opravdanie dobra* [The Justification of the Good], III, 16, v, in: idem, *Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh* (Moskva: Mysl', 1988), vol. i, p. 421 and 423, quoted from Solov'ëv 1918, p. 343.

7. Zürn 1998, p. 13.

8. See Luhmann 2000, p. 220, and Giddens 1999, p. 16.

9. Luhmann 2000, pp. 222ff.

10. Schmitt 1987, p. 54: 'Die *politische Einheit* setzt die reale Möglichkeit des Feindes und damit eine andere, koexistierende, politische Einheit voraus. Es gibt deshalb auf der Erde, solange es überhaupt einen *Staat* gibt, immer mehrere Staaten und keinen die ganze Erde und ganze Menschheit umfassenden Welt 'staat' geben. Die politische Welt ist ein *Pluriversum*, kein *Universum*. [*italics mine*, EvdZ]'

follow from the notion of the political that there must be a plurality of political entities, it does not follow that these must be mutually exclusive territories 'vertically' dividing the world.

Following Carl Schmitt, Chantal Mouffe, and others, I distinguish between *the political* and *politics*. The first is the ubiquitous and ineradicable possibility of a real, i.e. potentially violent conflict between finite beings that cannot be resolved on the basis of shared norms or procedures.¹¹ Politics is the set of ways of dealing with and giving form to the political. A polity is, finally, any established political order resulting from politics and, at the same time, its proper place: it denotes a domain in which there is unity of (sovereign) power and accountability. The political is 'ontologically prior' and inevitable, whereas politics and polities are perhaps desirable, but not necessary. Political chaos, i.e. the absence of all 'polity', remains a possibility, but human society needs *some* form of political 'order' in order to be a safe place for its inhabitants. This polity has not always been and must not necessarily be the (nation-)state: empires, federations of autonomous regions, city-states, and horizontal networks are alternatives. Therefore, a retreat or even disappearance of the state does not imply the obsolescence of the polity as such; on the contrary: its recession leaves behind a vacuum that can and will be filled by alternative forms of 'polity'.

1. Three Recent Developments

Nationalism

Since the end of the Cold War, several remarkable processes have taken place. The first to be noted here is the widespread return of nationalism. At

11. See Lyotard 1983, p. 9. I use Schmitt's notion of the political in amended form, replacing his binary opposition friend/enemy (Schmitt 1987, p. 26) by that of the amicable/the inimical, accepting friend/enemy, i.e. the identification of the amicable/inimical with a concrete entity – an individual, an institution, a state, etc. – as a limit case; this replacement of friend/enemy by the amicable/inimical bypasses the restriction, by Schmitt and many others, of the political to a specific place (to do so is a political move *par excellence*): the political is not limited to a specific part of society, but a universal feature of all human reality, which is why *anything* can be politicized, and the possibility of a real conflict *à la* Lyotard is ubiquitous. Cf. Mouffe 1993, p. 3: '... the political cannot be restricted to a certain type of institution, or envisaged as constituting a specific sphere or level of society. It must be conceived as a dimension that is inherent to every human society and that determines our very ontological condition.' The restriction of the political to a specific institution or sphere is *itself* political and *therefore* cannot neutralize the political or preclude its 'return'.

the core of nationalism is the idea that a particular nation has privileged interests that it is entitled to realize at the expense of others, if necessary. Consequently, nationalism – as opposed to patriotism – is always ‘offensive’ and potentially ‘aggressive’.¹² The late 20th Century has seen a resurgence of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. A clear case is Russia, a multinational and multireligious empire, comprising not only troublesome areas like Chechnya, but also the republic of Tatarstan, with an Islamic majority and two national languages, and the republic of Kalmykia, the only country in the world to have Buddhism as its official religion. Here, the search for a national idea became ‘official’ when, in 1996, President Boris Yeltsin called upon intellectuals to provide a ‘national idea for Russia’. It is important to note the difference between a *rossijskaja ideja*, pointing to a political national identity, and a *russkaja ideja*, giving this identity an ethnic flavor: the first would have to be an idea for all citizens of the Russian Federation, the so-called ‘*rossijane*’ (in line with the notion of a ‘*rossijskaja nacija*’ in the 1993 *Konstitucija*), which includes the non-Russian population (17% in 1993), whereas the second focuses on ethnic Russians, *russkie*.¹³

Humans need identities in order to *be*. While some identities exclude each other, others can be combined, and the more people are aware of the need to be this or that person, the more they can challenge or change identities. Increasingly, we *have* a set of identities, organized around the ‘empty place of the subject’, rather than *are* a certain identity, i.e. filling that empty place with a ‘true self’. Obviously, every identity must have a basis in ‘material’ reality, but no identity, with the exception of some corporeal characteristics, is ever ‘given’. As a result, identity is increasingly the result of both a choice and individual or collective identity politics, which explains why it has to be backed by ideology: ‘I am a Chechen, and my sister was raped by a Russian soldier; therefore, I fight Russian oppression’.

National identity is a major case of identity politics, and the problem is that, while the ‘nation’ is one of the clearest examples of a construct, people’s desire to have a sense of belonging to a group or a place is genuine. National identity does not have clear-cut limits, nor can it be given in a natural manner, because nations are themselves products of history. Nation-building goes along with the destruction or suppression of ethnic and religious minorities

12. A clear distinction between nationalism and patriotism was made by Vladimir Solov’ev: nationalism – ‘false patriotism’ – is a love of one’s own nation which entitles one, if necessary, to serve national interest at the expense of others, whereas patriotism is a love of country that obliges one to love other nations as one loves one’s own: see Solov’ev, op.cit., III, 14, i, and v, in: idem 1988, vol.i., p. 358 and p. 379; English translation Solov’ev 1918, p. 277 and p. 298; cf. also Solov’ev 2000, p. 37 and p. 53.

13. See Bykova and Oversloot in this volume.

and regional identities, e.g. local dialects,¹⁴ and national identity is thus bound up with the polity that corresponds to it: 'In order to turn that which is to be a nation from imagination into reality, one has to provide, with political (state-) means, a linguistic and religious, cultural and organizational unification in the territory claimed by the nation-state.'¹⁵

National identity, too, needs to have some basis in reality. This basis can be ethnic, religious, historical, cultural, linguistic, political, or any combination of these. In all cases, there must be particular features that differ from others (e.g. a certain community speaks a given language, and a neighboring community a different one). In world society, none of these features is homogeneous, and they are becoming more, rather than less, heterogeneous. As a consequence, ethnically founded national identity cannot be the basis of statehood in the plural: too many nations are mixed, too much 'diaspora' would have to be reversed, and too much ethnic cleansing and deportation would be required. If, alternatively, national identity is purely political, it excludes no one from the polity and knows no intrinsic limitation, as historical examples (post-1789 France, post-1917 USSR, the European Union) demonstrate.

Civil society

A second remarkable phenomenon has been the revival of 'civil society'. This notion started its career as an ideal in formerly 'socialist' countries, both in Central Eastern European Countries and in Russia. Since then, it has become a predominant 'vision of the good life', especially today in the form of a 'global civil society'. The contemporary idea of civil society results from a double split: the first split was that of *civitas civilis* (as opposed to *civitas Dei*) into civil society – *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* – and the state, the second that of the economic sphere and civil society proper.¹⁶ This split has made possible the elevation of civil society to the level of a social ideal, both at the national and transnational levels, where it is considered a major counterweight against the forces of global capitalism and the vices of corrupt and oppressive regimes. Ranging from the anti-globalist movement and transnational one-issue movements – Amnesty International, Transparency International etc. – to religious movements and intellectual networks, global civil society is a sizeable novelty indeed. Neither novelty nor size

14. De Landa 2000, pp. 227–234.

15. Luhmann 2000, p. 210.

16. See Van der Zweerde 1999.

should, however, be exaggerated: the contemporary world-wide English-speaking scientific community is not unlike the Latin and Arab-speaking networks of the Middle Ages, and the quickly growing global civil society still includes only a tiny part of world society: total worldwide INGO-membership numbered a mere 255,432 in 2000, an average of 43 per 1,000,000 inhabitants, with very uneven distribution from 280 per million in Oceania, i.e. 0.028%, to 6 in South Asia, i.e. 0.0006% of the population.

I share the view, elaborated by Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, that it is necessary to distinguish between civil society and political society.¹⁷ Political society is the field of political parties, political organization and movements, and political opinion-making, i.e. the sphere of debate and discussion which transcends the public–private distinction. Political society is that part of civil society which is turned towards the polity, having (in democratic polities) the parliament and elections as an institutionalized turning table between it and the polity, and political parties or organizations as the turning table between it and civil society. One of the problems the world is facing today is that while the political and politics have transcended national borders in many respects, there is still no such thing as a transnational, global ‘agora’, a ‘space neither private nor public, but more exactly private and public at the same time.’¹⁸ Perhaps it is in the making, arguably CNN and Al-Jazeera are nuclei of it, but I think it is still fragile; moreover, while it may be a part of global civil society, it is not connected to a global polity. As a result, a global *agora* is a threat to *all* polities, because it no longer identifies with any one of them.

Global civil society, finally, is primarily an idea, born in the heads of intellectuals who perceived that that which they had labeled ‘civil society’ at a national level, in fact, exceeded that level. It is an *idea at work*,¹⁹ but ideas can have both an articulate, propositional form, and an inarticulate form (the ‘live metaphor’).²⁰ The two forms can coexist and can *both* be effective. ‘Global civil society’ is, in its propositional form, the subject of debate among intellectuals, while, at the same time, in its metaphorical form, it is effective in motivating people in their activities and in channeling substantial amounts of money from national governments and IGO’s to NGO’s and INGO’s.

17. See Cohen and Arato 1997, pp. 75f.

18. Bauman 1999, p. 3.

19. I derive this notion from Motrošilova 1991, p. 6 and *passim*; see also Van der Zweerde 1996, pp. 192–197.

20. See the elaboration of the idea of ‘live metaphor’ by Akın Ergüden in this volume.

Religion

A third remarkable phenomenon is the rehabilitation of religion among 'secularized intellectuals'. One possible explanation is that secularization, understood as the transition from a situation in which 'this world' and 'the other world' (state and church, emperor and pope) existed side by side within 'the *saeculum*', to one in which 'the secular sphere [is] the all-encompassing reality, to which the religious sphere will have to adapt,'²¹ has been so effective that the opposition of the religious and the intellectual spheres, formative for generations of intellectuals since the Enlightenment, has become obsolete, thus creating room for a recognition of the non-disappearance of religion. In the post-Christian West, religion is no longer anathema, a phenomenon that may have its parallel in other parts of the world.

Simultaneously, religion has returned – in different forms – to the public sphere: fundamentalism and theocracy²² are perhaps the most striking, though not the only manifestations of this return, which, moreover, is not limited to Islam, but also involves Hinduism, Christianity, and Judaism. From the perspective of the historical domination of 'modern society', including the secular state, the market and civil society, both fundamentalism and the new public roles acquired by religious associations within civil society are reactions to, and form part of, this historical process.

Islam-related issues, which used to be an issue only for Islamic and religiously mixed countries (e.g. India, Nigeria), have indeed become 'global issues', and the construction of a major opposition between Christianity and Islam has strong ideological efficacy in legitimizing new 'crusades' and 'jihad'. This is not an isolated case: *many* local issues are becoming global, because the phenomena are global. This causes a broad paradigm shift: while intellectuals in different parts of the world used to focus on local, 'national' issues, and then ascribe universal significance to the solutions they found, today intellectuals increasingly perceive local issues as concretizations of global issues. And it is clear that to begin to think about possible solutions is to go beyond the national level. What we are witnessing here is a particular case of 'glocalization', a term from the field of marketing, which denotes the process of 'adaptation of a global perspective to local circumstance.'²³ This

21. Casanova 1994, p. 15.

22. As Marin Terpstra has shown, much of what goes under the name of theocracy, including the ayatollah-regime in Iran, is not theocracy in the traditional sense, but hierocracy, 'rule by priests' – since the Enlightenment critique of the secular power of the clergy, the two (theocracy and hierocracy) are often identified (Terpstra 2000, p. 413).

23. See Robertson 1998, pp. 197f.

is what intellectuals are doing when they try to think of ways to establish or secure political freedom, pluralism, civil society, human rights, etc. in different local circumstances, against different cultural backgrounds and on the basis of different religious and non-religious worldviews.

All three phenomena briefly outlined here came as a surprise for political philosophy: religion had been seen as something pushed into the private sphere; civil society was either taken for granted, i.e. as synonymous with modern, Western society, or limited to its use in neo-Marxist and neo-Hegelian circles; nation and nationalism, finally, were regarded as outdated, 19th Century phenomena that perhaps still played a certain role in post-colonial national liberation. All three present an embarrassing return from that which had been believed to be long since past, changing and challenging our perception of the world.

What they have in common is a *return of the political*: religious difference that claims to be absolute and, hence, a ground for exclusion and killing, global civil society as *the* counter-force against both wild capitalism and authoritarian, oppressive, or corrupt states, and nationalism as a prime motivation and legitimization for territorial claims, genocide and criminal business interests. This return of the political in new, global forms is met with *politics* in its familiar forms of war, diplomacy, pacification, and legislation. But the real problem is with the institutional basis of these politics, the *polity*. The politics put in place to deal with global phenomena and issues is *international*, based on the idea of the territorial division of the world into a multitude of sovereign states, but this idea no longer corresponds to our global reality.

2. ... Where is the State?

Paradoxical developments are taking place with respect to the modern (nation-)state. On the one hand, a strong polity is a prerequisite for a stable and peaceful situation in which civil society can flourish and in which polity and society stand in a relationship of antagonistic balance. At the same time, the modern nation-state, serving as the exemplary polity since its rise in the 17th century, seems to have lost most of its significance, and theoreticians speak about its 'retreat' or 'decline'.²⁴

First of all, there has been an increase, in absolute numbers, of statehood: since 1945, according to Martin van Creveld, the number of states 'has more than tripled.'²⁵ Many of these states are very small and very poor,

24. See Strange 1996 and Van Creveld 1999, respectively.

25. Van Creveld 1999, p. 332.

with GNPs smaller than those of Western universities, and are largely dependent on other states or on multinationals.²⁶ The fact that the *number* of states has significantly increased over the past two decades is a sign of the *perceived* significance of statehood, but not necessarily of its actual relevance. Vanuatu, a sovereign state in the Pacific with 200,000 inhabitants,²⁷ holds a full seat in the United Nations' General Assembly and is thus on equal footing with, for example, Japan and Turkey. This has not led to any protest from other member-states, which says enough about both the impact of Vanuatu's statehood and the political power of the UN. The proliferation of nation-states stems from a logic that once had its basis in historical reality, but no longer does. It is not at all clear why there should be artificial post-colonial states in Africa, which cut almost systematically across ethnic and religious determinations, the five states of Central Asia, whose borders are the consequence of Stalin's policy to spread the largest ethnicity (the Uzbeks) over as many republics as possible, or even small European states that are incapable of dealing with the transnational problems of their societies.

Indeed, processes of economic and political integration are under way, a prime example being the European Union. The need to transfer sovereign power to a polity which, though formally inter-national, is supra-national with respect to the vast majority of sovereign states, is clear, but integration faces two problems. The first is the question of its societal basis and its limit. A European nation is not a given and would have to be constructed, but any attempt to define it in ethnic or religious terms, e.g., as 'Christian' in a broad sense, will exclude substantial groups of people, while a 'political' definition in terms of democracy and human rights is, because of the very universal pretension of these notions, an open invitation in the direction of a Kantian *civitas gentium*.²⁸ The other problem of European integration is the question of its democratic caliber. As Anthony Giddens states: '... the European Union isn't itself particularly democratic. It has famously been said of the EU that if it applied to join itself, it wouldn't get in.'²⁹ Europe faces a fundamental problem here: if democratic representation shifts from the level of the nation-state to that of the EU, only a one-(wo)man-one-vote system will satisfy Europeans' sense of democracy. But can this work when Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey are included, together bringing in 263

26. op.cit., p. 333.

27. See <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/nh.html>

28. See Van der Zweerde 2003. On the idea of an expanding *civitas gentium*, including in the end all peoples of the world, see Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, in: idem, *Werke* 1977, vol. xi, p. 212. [BA 38]

29. Giddens 1999, p. 80.

million citizens? Hypothetically, a solution must be sought in a simultaneous strengthening of, on the one hand, forms of local government, and a horizontal differentiation of polities, on the other.

Thirdly, the sovereign power of the state is decreasing. Many states are 'weak' polities, incapable of fighting corruption and organized crime, withstanding the actions of large multinational corporations, collecting taxes, or ending civil war: '... fifty-one of the hundred biggest economies in the world are now corporations, only forty-nine are nation states. The sales of General Motors and Ford are greater than the GDP of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa; ...; and Wal-Mart, the US supermarket retailer, has higher revenues than most Central and East European states...' ³⁰ Sovereign power no longer resides with the state, as is shown by the fact that contemporary states spend considerable energy on claiming that it *does*. The sole remaining state with a claim to sovereignty, the USA, is precisely the polity which treats other states not as equals, but as potential objects of police action.

'Old' states face the problem of decreasing popular support. It has become part of the job of members of parliament to make citizens not only vote for *them*, but to raise public interest in politics at all. At the same time, the decreasing power of the state does *not* mean that government, i.e. what people usually call 'the state', has less impact on people's lives: attempts to make government retreat and the privatization of some of its functions have not reduced bureaucracy, but have fuelled the idea that an accountable authority is no longer in place. The 'state' has disappeared as the central recognizable institution, as the core of political decision making, as the source of legislation, and as the focus of democratic control: citizens in different parts of the world see themselves confronted with the decisions of different political bodies, they see their 'own' governments overruled by transnational quasi-political bodies – ranging from the EU and the IMF to the World Wildlife Fund and GazProm – and they feel that politics is decreasingly relevant in their lives.

On the whole, 'vertical' relations of power give way to 'horizontal' ones, but the state can only operate vertically, leaving the horizontal structures to economic and civil society: among the latter, economic relations of power tend to be asymmetrical, those of civil society more symmetrical, but both escape political articulation when there is no corresponding polity. The development of civil society and market economy has thus 'absorbed' the modern state. Hegel foresaw this development, defining the state as a means to contain it. ³¹ It is precisely at this point that many contemporary

30. Hertz 2001, p. 7.

31. See Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §§243–246 and §258, Anm., in: idem, *Werke*, vol. vii, pp. 389–391, and p. 399.

theorists perceive the need to counter such depolitization and to reclaim the state,³² or to work towards new forms of democratic representation.³³

The developments outlined take place against the backdrop of, and form part of, so-called *globalization*, an umbrella notion for a complex set of economic, social, cultural, and political processes. Most problems that world society is facing (organized crime, drug trade, migration, arms trade, environmental problems), are *transnational* in nature, and international politics is incapable of dealing with them, precisely *because* it is *international*: the sum total of national interests is not, and will never be, the interest of humanity as a whole. In fact, most of these phenomena thrive precisely because of the incapacity of the international community to deal with them: differences in legislation, as well as controversies concerning the rules that determine legitimate police action, are as much to the advantage of parasitic capital as the spread of civil war is to the legal production of arms, or as discrepancies in ecological policies invite waste-dumping by otherwise decent companies.

Many people feel that they are losing control over the processes governing their lives, which leads to indifference with respect to politics. As Zygmunt Bauman and Saskia Sassen show, globalization, implying the concentration of economic, social, cultural, and political activity in ever fewer places, creates new forms of locality everywhere, new ways of 'being stuck in a place' without access to those things, facilities and activities that make up modern social, cultural, and political life.³⁴ Political philosophy must, among other things, focus on the new forms and mechanisms of exclusion that are generated by globalization and its new forms of 'locality'. A person without internet access is more isolated and excluded today than (s)he was 10 years ago – and most inhabitants of the world do *not* have internet access, or even a telephone.³⁵ So, while the costs of instant communication (internet, telephone) continue to drop, a new division is emerging between those participating in the 'society' created and reproduced by these media, and those who rely on 'traditional' forms of communication.

32. For example Hertz 2001, ch. 11, 'Reclaim the state' (pp. 197–212).

33. For example, Mouffe 1993, Höffe 1999, Zürn 1998, or Held 1995.

34. Bauman 1998, Sassen 1998.

35. In November 2000, 407,100,000 people worldwide were internet-users, i.e. less than 10% of the global population; moreover, this percentage is distributed very unevenly: from 41.05% in the USA and Canada to less than 0.59% in the Middle East; the number of telephone mainlines per 100 people varies from 99 in Monaco and 64 in the USA to 0.3 in Bangladesh and 0.2 in Uganda. See Noughton 2001, p. 149, p. 157.

A parallel development is the coming-to-be of what Zygmunt Bauman has labeled 'extraterritorial elites' – a transnational layer of business-people, journalists, diplomats, intellectuals, IGO- and INGO-workers – who live in a uniform world of airports, hotel chains, protected compounds, and holiday resorts, eat in similar outlets all over the world, speak the same reduced form of American English that is the new *lingua franca*, and whose activities no longer depend on the location in which they find themselves.³⁶ Perhaps this extraterritorial elite is a basis for a global *agora*, but where is the polity for which it would be the *agora*? If the idea of a global polity is not viable, are we then moving towards a plurality of horizontally organized coexistential polities, e.g. a global 'police force', a global banking system, global environmental protection, etc.? Against the backdrop of the global return of *the political*, the world is not only in search of *politics*, but also of a *polity*, or *polities*, to form the institutionalized place of politics. It is because the political always returns (Chantal Mouffe) that we are in search of politics (Zygmunt Bauman), but it will be futile to reclaim the state (Noreena Hertz) if that state retreats (Susan Strange): what is needed is a different kind of polity.

3. Towards 'Global' Political Philosophy

In world history, there were two situations in which 'the world became one'. The first was the rise of the Hellenistic empire, accompanied by cosmopolitan philosophies.³⁷ The second was the rise of Modernity, when the discovery and conquest of the world by European powers was accompanied by Western scientific theories and philosophical systems with claims to universality. In both cases, a local model of the polity – the ancient polis and the modern state, respectively – was transposed onto the (known) world as a whole, and actual political domination was matched with the development of political ideas and forms intended for all people. The present situation is different, however, for three reasons. First of all, today's 'globalization' does not signify that the world is becoming a single space (it already is), but rather, that it is becoming a space in which all places are, in principle, interchangeable. Secondly, it has become clear that the world, economically and ecologically, has reached its limit: there are no major explorable or exploitable resources left, and the physical limits of the planet

36. Bauman 1998, p. 3, and pp. 18–26.

37. Reportedly, it was Diogenes of Synope who first used the notion of a 'citizen of the world [κοσμοπολίτης]' (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI, 63); cf. Höffe 2002, pp. 230–240.

Earth have become the limits of humanity's 'expansion'. In the third place, it has become evident that even if 'the West' dominates economically and politically, humanity will have to deal with irreducible social and cultural differences. The questions traditionally raised by political philosophy, such as: what is the political? what is power? what is freedom? what is the (good) state? what is democracy? what is justice? have to be asked again, this time on a global scale. We can only develop the idea of a polity that is sure to correspond to global reality if the discourse of political philosophy itself becomes 'global', in the sense of becoming a single-yet-locally-differentiated discourse.

To overcome the determination of one's own intellectual tradition involves two things: to reflect critically upon that tradition, and to be open to voices that come from elsewhere. In the early 19th Century, Hegel suggested that 'negroes [*Neger*]' were not capable of thinking objectively.³⁸ Two centuries later, people engage in intercultural and 'world philosophy', and these discussions include conceptualizations of society and of the political by non-Westerners, including Hegel's 'negroes'. Hegel, advocate of the modern state, was also the thinker who claimed: 'Wenn die Philosophie ihr Grau in Grau malt, dann ist eine Gestalt des Lebens alt geworden, und mit Grau in Grau läßt sie sich nicht verjüngen, sondern nur erkennen . . .'.³⁹ Could this not apply to his conception of the state as well? Should we not say that a major task for political philosophy today is to clear the ground for new conceptualizations rather than claim a new synthesis? We cannot develop an understanding of a new political order until it is taking shape, but we can reflect critically upon the conceptualizations of the old order, knowing that it has had its time, and try to retain its 'positive' results. But, as Alberto Knox explained to Sophie, we cannot know which of our received views will have to be abandoned,⁴⁰ and the only way to find out is to question them all.

Lou Reed's lyrics, quoted at the beginning of this article, reflect the predominant feeling of the average citizen towards today's global risk society. People increasingly experience the world as a single place and are instant witnesses of major events occurring elsewhere on the planet: we see missiles at the very moment they strike, we are there when villages are flooded. On the other hand, people decreasingly feel that the 'global village' they inhabit has a 'keeper', i.e. a power which can protect them against the

38. See Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, in: idem, *Werke* 1970, vol. xii, p. 122.

39. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, in: idem, *Werke*, vol. vii, p. 28.

40. Gaarder 1994, p. 367.

threats they perceive as coming from the outside. Francis Fukuyama may claim that 'trust' is the emotional basis of modern society, but the predominant feeling, unfortunately, is 'fear': clearly, the apprehension of well-to-do Dutchmen that Eastward extension of the European Union may reduce their wealth is not the same as the dread that Liberians feel when a column of rebel 'technicals' approaches their village, but what they do share is fright. The point is not whether a frightful picture of the world is realistic, but that people now, less than before, relate themselves, their safety, and their future to a single powerful polity, a 'sovereign state', which will effectively protect them if need be.

To aspire to contribute to a political philosophy for the world as a whole also implies acknowledging one's own occidentocentrism. And while manifest hegemonial elements can be fairly easily diagnosed and repaired, this is much less obvious with those that are hidden. For this reason, political philosophy must not only be open-minded, but also open-ended, inviting reactions from other positions. Hegel developed, in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, the basic model of emancipation, and its elementary truth that liberation, emancipation, and universality always find their origin in the servant, not in the master, can be easily transposed to the relationship between men and women, black and white, rich and poor, etc.: the call for universality always comes from the oppressed, the excluded, the have-nots.⁴¹ The problem of Western political philosophy currently dominating the global arena is the paradox of the master who understands this dialectic: 'our' political philosophy claims to be universalistic (e.g. when it embraces universal human rights); however, at the same time, it cannot claim itself to be the unique vehicle of universality.⁴² Sailing between the Scylla of occidentocentric chauvinism and the Charybdis of 'unhappy consciousness [*unglückliches Bewußtsein*]', the only viable position is 'negative universalism', a position which aims at universality while refraining from giving a positive determination of the universal, a position which brings in rationality not as *mine*, but as concretized in me ... and every other human being.⁴³ This model can be applied to political philosophy itself, notably to conceptualizations of the political, politics, and the polity.

41. See Halsema 1998, pp. 152–161.

42. Cf. Butler, Laclau, and Žižek: 'All three of us . . . maintain that universality is not a static presumption, not an a priori given, and that it ought instead to be understood as a process or condition irreducible to any of its determinate modes of appearance.' (Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 2000, p. 3).

43. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in: idem, *Werke* 1970, vol. iii, pp. 163f, p. 177.

For example, definitions of politics and polity as the totality of ways of dealing with and giving form to the political are profoundly 'Western'. As Julien Freund stated insightfully: 'Le démiurge est le maître des formes and non des essences.'⁴⁴ This is indeed the case – but this demiurge is a central figure of Western, Graeco-Christian mythology. Merab Mamardashvili said: '... la culture européenne est basée sur l'idée de l'accompli, sur l'idée de donner forme à tout, à la vie politique, à la vie spirituelle, *donner forme*.'⁴⁵ Not concealing his Westernism (*basée* vs. *obsédée*), he contrasts it with the Orthodox-Christian and Russian tradition: 'La culture orthodoxe est *obsédée par l'idéalité*. La chose ou la forme concrète n'est jamais l'idéal.'⁴⁶ This is an excellent explanation of the difference between West Europeans and Russians in their relation to politics and the polity, power and rule of law: for 'us', they are realities, for 'them' they do not really exist at all and can disappear in the blink of an eye. It also explains the near absence of political philosophy in the rich Russian philosophical culture: it is implicit and can only be made manifest in the form of a reconstruction on the basis of Western models. Now, if one regards the political as being ontologically prior to politics and polity, this means that it is not *obvious* that form must be given, that man *must* act as demiurge. However, Westerners are not likely to be able to think differently, and even to think the necessity of a different way of thinking is not necessarily to be able to do so.

In the age of globalization, any attempt to think the present in terms of political philosophy must focus primarily on the world as a whole, and *then* proceed to the forms in which global phenomena manifest themselves locally. It must take all parts of the world equally seriously, on grounds of both principle and fact. To think in terms of one's own state, nation, history, or region is a form of 'provincialism', but its opposite, abstract cosmopolitanism, is equally unfounded. Therefore, it is imperative to enter into a discussion with other political and intellectual traditions, taking as a starting-point one's proper situation. This movement is, as far as 'we' Westerners are concerned, mainly *negative*, since it means de-colonizing our vision of the world and overcoming the occidentocentrism in 'linear' world history.⁴⁷ Hypothetically, one can claim that no X has ever overcome X-centrism on its own, but only under external pressure. Hence, this 'de-colonization' is something to *undergo* rather than *do*. To borrow Luce Irigaray's expression, it means to

44. Freund 1986, p. 45.

45. Mamardashvili 1991, p. 61.

46. *ibid.*

47. De Landa 2000, Chakrabarty 2000, Spivak 1999.

drop the Christian mythology of the West,⁴⁸ and, most of all, to look critically at the fact that much of political and social theory is implicitly founded on the history of one's own particular region. One thing that needs to be done in the field of political theory/philosophy is to develop a conceptual apparatus, one that is able to articulate the political in the present world and that is neither limited to one area or region, nor derived from one of them and then applied in universalist terms to all others, nor which, finally, projects a presupposed essential human nature onto the citizens of the world. The point is universality, not universalism, and the content of the universal is to be left open – which is a political decision within political philosophy.⁴⁹

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48. Whitford 1994, pp. 384f, referring to Irigaray 1980, p. 179.

49. cf. Žižek 1999, p. 36: 'In Hegelese, *the existence of the true Universal* (as opposed to the false 'concrete' Universality of the all-encompassing global Order of Being) *is that of an endless and incessantly divisive struggle*; it is ultimately the division between the notions (and material practices) of Universality: those who advocate the positivity of the existing global Order of Being as the ultimate horizon of knowledge and action, and those who accept the efficiency of the dimension of Truth-Event irreducible to (and unaccountable in terms of) the Order of Being.'

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