CLASSICAL ARABIC HUMANITIES IN THEIR OWN TERMS

FESTSCHRIFT FOR WOLFHART HEINRICHS ON HIS 65TH BIRTHDAY

PRESENTED BY HIS STUDENTS AND COLLEAGUES

Edited by

BEATRICE GRUENDLER

With the Assistance of

MICHAEL COOPERSON



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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume is the work of many hands. Wolfhart Heinrichs' 65th birthday, on October 3rd, 2006, seemed a propitious occasion to pry loose articles that might otherwise never have seen the light of day. The list of contributors is long and varied: it includes Wolfhart's colleagues and doctoral students at Harvard University as well as his former colleagues in Europe. A tribute to Wolfhart by Shukri B. Abed, entitled *Focus on Contemporary Arabic* (New Haven and London, 2007), has appeared separately. Two articles by Emeri van Donzel on Abraha the Ethiopian (under review for *Aethiopica*, Hamburg) and by Estiphan Panoussi on the Senaya verbal system will appear separately. Wasmaa Chorbachi contributed the artwork for the cover. The editor apologizes to those friends and colleagues who could not be included—and acknowledges the good intentions of those whom circumstances forced to withdraw.

Wolfhart is an encyclopedist three times over. His foundational articles in poetics and law cover a range of critical Arabic terms (*badīʿ, istiʿāra, muḥdath, majāz, naqd, naẓm, takhyīl, sariqa* and the like), reconstructing what the thinkers who coined the terms are likely to have had in mind when they did so. Second, for a quarter of a century, Wolfhart oversaw as editor and author the completion of the second *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Finally, Wolfhart's encylopedic knowledge, though carried lightly, becomes evident to anyone who asks him about even the remotest corners of Arabic-Islamic civilization. For these reasons, it seemed only fitting to offer him a gift in the form of a mini-encyclopedia, or rather a *kashkūl* of terms from *-aat* to *zarāfa*, gleaned in what I hope is a pleasantly haphazard manner from many fields of pre-modern Near Eastern studies.

The terms derive mainly from the areas of linguistics, literature, literary theory, and prosody, with a few items from religion, ritual, economics, and zoology. The contributions deal not only with Arabic but also with the adjacent fields of the Old Iranian, Persian, Greek and Byzantine written traditions. Some take as their point of depar-

ture a particular Arabic word—such as cat (*qiṭṭa*) or giraffe (*zarāfa*)—or morpheme (*bi-*). Others explore literary genres and subgenres, including the oration (*khuṭba*), the ode (*qaṣīda*, *qaṣīda ghazaliyya-khamriyya*), the macaronic poem (*mulammaʿ*), and the travel narrative (*safar*); figures within them, such as the trickster (*ʿayyār*) and the devil (*iblīs*); motifs such as clothing (*libās*); and poetic or musical meter (*hazaj*, *īqāʿ*). Here too are cultural concepts such as wishing (*tamannī*), gift-giving (*tahādī*), and discourse (*khiṭāb*), along with aspects of broader phenomena, such as the role of gender in dream interpretation (*taʿbīr al-ruʾyā*) or the relative merits of luxury goods and mass-produced commodities in economy (*iqtiṣād*). For some authors, the lexicon format made it easier to focus on a specific problem, as Benedikt Reinert describes in his letters: "Die Arbeit drehte sich ja eigentlich nur um das Vorstrafenregister eines Metrums, das längst den Status einer unantastbaren prosodischen Diva erlangt hat, und ich gebe zu, daß mir das Wühlen in diesem Sündenpfuhl nicht nur Mühe sondern auch Spaß gemacht hat.... Ich war daher sehr dankbar, mit meiner Genese eines neupersischen Metrums an einer kleinen, aber überschaubaren Ecke einmal beginnen zu können und nicht gleich mit Ṭālib Āmulīs Türe in den komplexen motivgeschichtlichen Palast fallen zu müssen." As a result, not a few of the contributions are the first fruits of larger monographs.

It is certainly in the spirit of the honoree, who has fruitfully used Harvard's Widener Library for three decades, to thank those individuals whose long-standing professionalism, dedication, and expertise in changing technologies have placed the books we depend upon at our disposal. I gratefully acknowledge my debt to Harvard's librarians, among them Michael Hopper, head of the Middle Eastern Division, and Thomas Bahr, Brenda Briggs, Mary E. Butler, Mike Currier, Linda DiBenedetto, Eugenia Dimant, Edward Doctoroff, Ellen Harris, Larisa Kurmakov, Walter Ross-O'Connor, and Shoban Sen at the Access Services.

It remains for the editor to thank all those who had a share in bringing this volume into being. I thank Alma Giese for her invaluable advice on all matters. If anything can make editing a pleasure it is a dependable production editor, and I have been more than spoilt in this regard by the technical expertise, elegant layout and unfailing precision of Thomas Breier. I am grateful to Gudrun Schubert for turning Benedikt Reinert's typescript into computerized form, to Tara

Zend for smoothing the English style in record speed, to Olaf Köndgen for facilitating the volume's acceptance by Brill, and to Trudy Kamperveen for directly supervising its production and for keeping her eye on the deadline. Due to factors beyond the control of these good people, this volume arrives (as some of our term papers did) a year after the due date, a delay for which I ask our honoree's well-known lenience.

Beatrice Gruendler

PREFACE

Scholars in our field are often asked why they chose to study Arabic, or Persian, or Islam, or whatever the case may be. Many of us find the question irritating. For one thing, an honest answer often requires us to bare our souls—or, worse yet, to attempt to bare the soul of the person we were twenty or thirty or forty years ago. For another, it implies that our choice of subject matter somehow requires an explanation or, worse yet, a defense. We cannot speak for all of Wolfhart Heinrichs's colleagues and students, but, speaking only for ourselves, we cannot recall him ever asking us this question, or offering any explanation for his own choice of vocation. From our first encounter with him, we understood—without having to do anything so awkward as discuss the matter—that, whatever the contingent details of personal circumstance, all of us were studying Arabic philology because it was worth studying for its own sake. In this respect, it was no different from other linguistic and literary traditions—a good many of which, as we learned, Professor Heinrichs had also studied. The biographical sketch that follows will necessarily present a good many contingent details of personal circumstance, but disavows any attempt to explain the origins of a scholarly commitment that has always been sufficient unto itself.

Wolfhart Heinrichs was born on October 3rd, 1941 in Cologne into a family of philologists. His father, H. Matthias Heinrichs, was professor of ancient Germanic studies at the University of Giessen and the Freie Universität Berlin, and his mother, Anne Heinrichs, was a lecturer on Old Norse. Anne Heinrichs completed her licentiate thesis (*Habilitation*) at the age of 70, and was made professor at the Freie Universität at the age of 80.

Wolfhart Heinrichs attended the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Gymnasium in Cologne, where he studied English and French in addition to Latin and Greek. For Hebrew he took lessons with Hans Kindermann. In 1960, he embarked on his university career. His major field was Islamic studies, with a first minor in Semitic languages and a second in

philosophy. At Cologne, where he spent three semesters, he studied Arabic with Werner Caskel, Islamic legal texts with Erwin Graef, Hebrew with Hans Kindermann, and African languages with Oswin Koehler; he also studied Persian with Otto Spies in Bonn. At Tübingen, where he spent two semesters, he studied Arabic theological texts and Syriac with Rudi Paret, ancient Arabic poetry with Helmut Gätje, Semitics with Otto Rössler, and Old South Arabian and Ethiopic with Maria Höfner. After receiving a scholarship from the King Edward VII British-German Foundation, he spent a year at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. There, his teachers included R.B. Serjeant, with whom he read Jāḥiẓ's *Book of Misers*; John Burton, with whom he studied radio Arabic; Walid Arafat, who taught Islamic studies; and Bernard Lewis, who taught Arab history. He also read ancient Arabic poetry with David Cowan, Persian texts with Ann Lambton, Ottoman texts with C.S. Mundy, and modern Arabic literature with Jarir Abu Haidar.

In the meantime, Wolfhart's parents had moved to the University of Giessen. He was unable at first to continue his studies there because the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, including the Department of Oriental Studies, had been closed by the Americans after World War II and was only gradually being re-opened. He therefore continued his studies at Frankfurt, where he studied Arabic with Rudolf Sellheim and medieval Hebrew with Ernst Ludwig Dietrich. After one term in Frankfurt, he was able to begin a new round of studies in Giessen. His teachers there included Ewald Wagner, in Arabic, Islam, Persian, Syriac, Ethiopic, and Semitics; Klaus Roehrborn, in Old Uigur; and Helmut Brands, in Ottoman. He also began working with Fuat Sezgin on the *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, consulting manuscripts in Istanbul and Damascus, and proofreading the volumes in the series. (Volume II of the *GAS*, on poetry, is dedicated to him.) In 1967, he received his doctorate, for his dissertation on Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī's reception of Aristotelian poetics. He spent the next year at the Institute of the German Oriental Society in Beirut. On the way, he stopped in Istanbul to read Helmut Ritter's manuscript work on Ṭūrōyo (Neo-Aramaic) with the author. After listening to tapes and meeting speakers of Ṭūrōyo, he joined the Institute in Beirut and saw part of Ritter's work through the press. After his return, he assumed a post at Giessen, first as an assistant professor (*Assistent*; 1968-72) and then as associate profes-

sor (*Dozent*; 1972-8), teaching Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Syriac, and Ethiopic.

In 1971, he was invited by Gustav von Grunebaum to attend the Third Levi Della Vida conference at UCLA, where he delivered a paper on "Literary Theory: The Problem of Its Efficiency." Six years later, he was invited by the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at Harvard University to spend a year as visiting lecturer in Arabic. The purpose of the invitation was to determine his suitability for the position vacated by George Makdisi. On the strength of his lecture on "*Istiʿārah* and *Badīʿ* and Their Terminological Relationship in Early Arabic Literary Criticism," he was offered a full professorship in Arabic.

In 1980, Wolfhart married Alma Giese. The two had met for the first time in London, at a party held by a mutual friend, but neither realized this until, years later, they discovered that they had been in London at the same time and had attended the same event. Alma is a fellow scholar: she studied Islamic cultures, Semitic linguistics, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, anthropology, and psychology at the universities of Freiburg and Giessen, and received her doctorate from Giessen in 1980. Working as an independent scholar, she has produced acclaimed German translations of some of the most daunting Arabic authors, including al-Jīlānī, al-Qazwīnī, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn ʿArabī, as well as studies of literary, mystical, and zoological topics. A bibliography of her work is appended.

With the retirement of Muhsin Mahdi in 1996, Wolfhart was appointed to the James Richard Jewett chair in Arabic. During the 1980s, he served as department chair for three years, and as acting chair for one. Beginning in 1989, he served as co-editor of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, a position that necessitated travel to such picturesque destinations as Leiden and Morigny (south of Paris) where, however, enjoyment of the local attractions was attenuated by the need to complete enormous quantities of proofreading. In addition to his editorial work, he wrote fifty articles himself; these include not only major topics such as *naqd* (literary criticism) but also such rarities as *taʿawwudh* (saying *aʿūdhu bi-llāh*, "I take refuge in God") and *washm* (tattooing).

Those fortunate enough to have studied with Wolfhart Heinrichs credit him with instilling a sense that all linguistic behavior, no matter what its source, or how recalcitrant its appearance, is rule-

governed, and therefore amenable to analysis. Put differently, if one human being can say it or write it, another human being can figure it out, and—if properly trained—appreciate it. Admittedly, we cannot claim to have heard Prof. Heinrichs articulate this principle in so many words; rather, it was simply assumed, and acted on, in the little classroom on the third floor of the Semitic Museum on Divinity Avenue. It has often been remarked that Edward Said's critique of Orientalism fails to address the study of Near Eastern traditions in the German-speaking world. Without insisting that Prof. Heinrichs be labeled a German Orientalist, one might nevertheless note that his approach to texts was based on the (as usual, tacit) principle that meticulous reading, far from being an exercise in "mastery," is the highest form of respect one can show to the products of another human mind. Understood in this sense, philological rigor has nothing in common with pedantry; rather, it is the only adequate response to what James Baldwin once called the "human weight and complexity" of others—or, to use a term Prof. Heinrichs would doubtless regard with genial skepticism, the Other.

As for the substance of a fledgling thesis, for a long time no guiding comment would come forth—until one was deep into the middle of writing. This silence was not uncaring, nor was it part of a considered strategy; rather, it reflected a trust in graduate students' intellectual creativity as well as a desire to give them the space to develop it. When it came, the comment (in our minds, the Comment) forced us to revisit our new-fangled ideas and decide whether we actually believed in them and could stand up for them. Then, after much ink had been spilled on a problem, a student's direct question (summoned up with much courage) would pry loose an offhand comment, lapidary as a caliphal apostille (*tawqīʿ*), that would unfailingly strike at the core of the conundrum.

In inverse proportion to pronouncements on content, dissertation chapters came back adorned with penciled lacework that would have made any medieval *ḥāshiya* pale with envy. Occasionally the entire rewriting of a translation would end with the comment "I do not mean to imply that your translation was incorrect." More commonly, the annotations were reticent, using the conditional, the subjunctive, or other modes of understatement—"less than crystal clear" and the like—but which the students well knew how to translate. (Wolfhart is, after all, what he himself calls a metaphorologist.) In some cases, *ījāz*

(abbreviation) might take the form of a targeted lapse into the vernacular: Alma reports finding comments such as "Whazzat?" "Whaddayakno!" and "Peleeze!" on the margins of her manuscripts. On occasion, Wolfhart had a co-author named Oskar, who left a Qurʾānic type of brown diacritic dotting on the page, glossed by the impassive adviser as "Cat spilled coffee and was severely reprimanded."

Idiosyncratic annotations aside, Wolfhart is a prolific *Doktorvater*. The number of his advisees and the diversity of their research attest to his wide-ranging expertise and his willingness to let his students develop and identify their own interests. Here is a list, with published theses given in their published form and ordered accordingly.

- Kevin Lacey (1984), *Man and Society in the Luzūmiyyāt of al-Maʿarrī*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
- Pauline E. Eskenasy (1991), *Antony of Tagrit's Rhetoric Book I: Introduction, Partial Translation and Commentary*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
- Shoukri Boutros Abed (1991), *Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in Alfārābī*, Albany: SUNY Press (Ph.D. thesis 1984).
- Lisa A. Karp (1992), *Sahl b. Hārūn: The man and his contribution to adab*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
- Magda al-Nowaihi (1993), *The Poetry of Ibn Khafājah: A literary analysis*, Leiden and New York: Brill (Ph.D. thesis 1987).
- Peter Heath (1996), *The Thirsty Sword: Sīrat ʿAntar and the Arabic popular epic*, Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press (Ph.D. thesis 1981).
- Kristen Brustad (2000), *The Syntax of Spoken Arabic: A comparative study of Moroccan, Egyptian, Syrian and Kuwaiti dialects*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press (Ph.D. thesis 1991).
- Michael Cooperson (2000), *Classical Arabic Biography: The heirs of the prophets in the age of al-Maʾmūn*, Cambridge UK and New York: Cambridge University Press (Ph.D. thesis 1994).
- Stephanie B. Thomas (2000), *The Concept of Muḥāḍara in the Arab Anthology with Special Reference to al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī's Muḥāḍarāt al-udabāʾ*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
- Beatrice Gruendler (2003), *Medieval Arabic Praise Poetry: Ibn al-Rūmī and the patron's redemption*, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon (Ph.D. thesis 1995).

– Bruce G. Fudge (2003), *The Major Qurʾān Commentary of al-Ṭabrisī (d. 548/1154)*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
– Bazat-Tahera Qutbuddin (2005), *Al-Muʾayyad al-Shīrāzī: A case of commitment in classical Arabic literature*, Leiden and Boston: Brill (Ph.D. thesis 1996).
– Ahmad Atif Ahmad (2005), *Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A study of Takhrīj al-Furūʿ ʿalā al-Uṣūl literature*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
– Sinan Antoon (2006), *Poetics of the Obscene: Ibn al-Ḥajjāj and Sukhf*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.

Wolfhart also served as second advisor on the following theses:

– David Grochenour (1983), *The Penetration of Zaydī Islam into Early Medieval Yemen*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
– Aron Zysow (1984), *The Economy of Certainty: An introduction to the typology of Islamic legal theory*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
– Sandra Naddaff (1991), *Arabesque: Narrative structure and the aesthetics of repetition in The 1001 Nights*, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press (Ph.D. thesis 1983).
– Nargis Virani (1999), *"I am the Nightingale of the Merciful": Macaronic or Upside-Down? The Mulammaʿāt of Jalāluddīn Rūmī*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
– Chase F. Robinson (2000), *Empire and Elites after the Muslim Conquest: The transformation of northern Mesopotamia*, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press (Ph.D. thesis 1992).
– Angela Jaffray (2000), *At the Threshold of Philosophy: A study of al-Fārābī's introductory works on logic*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
– Maria Mavroudi (2002), *A Byzantine Book on Dream Interpretation: The Oneirocriticon of Achmet and its Arabic sources,* Leiden and Boston: Brill (Ph.D. thesis 1998).

These notes are written in the past tense only because their authors completed their studies with Wolfhart some time ago: longer, indeed, than we enjoy admitting. As of this writing, he is still teaching and writing with undiminished vigor, and—at the all-too-infrequent occasions when conferences bring all of us together—appears hardly to have aged. We delighted by the thought that new generations are,

even now, trooping up to the third floor of the Semitic Museum, where their transliterations will be picked apart, their translations chuckled over, and their flights of fancy checked with a reminder that certain questions pertaining to the nature of the circumstantial clause remain unresolved. Equally delightful is the thought that the newcomers will be initiated into the arcana of click languages and the Harvard Yard Joke—both fixtures of the dissertation defense "roasts" where recent graduates are honored (or lampooned, or both) by limericks of Wolfhart's own composition.

It is a commonplace of classical Arabic biography to remark of a great scholar that *intahā ilayhi l-ʿilm*, "all the knowledge available in his generation ended up with him." From an American perspective, it certainly seems that much of twentieth-century Arabic philology (among other fields) ended up with Wolfhart Heinrichs, who, most fortunately for us, has always been willing to share, no questions asked.

Beatrice Gruendler and Michael Cooperson

TABULA GRATULATORIA

Shukri B. Abed, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.
Ali Asani, Harvard University
Ahmad Atif Ahmad, University of California, Santa Barbara
Sinan Antoon, The Gallatin School, New York University
Maroun Aouad, CNRS, Paris
Thomas Bauer, Universität Münster
Peri Bearman, Harvard University
Thierry Bianquis, Université Lumière-Lyon II
C.E. Bosworth, Emeritus, University of Manchester
Annabelle Böttcher, Freie Universität, Berlin
Hans Hinrich Biesterfeld, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Kristen Brustad, University of Texas
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Wasmaa Chorbachi, Cambridge, Mass.
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Alnoor Dhanani, Institute of Ismaili Studies
Emeri van Donzel, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New. Ed., Leiden
Gerhard Endress, Emeritus, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
John Flanagan, Bensenville, Illinois
Bruce Fudge, Ohio State University
Geert Jan van Gelder, University of Oxford
Isabella Gerritsen, Brill Publishers
Lois Giffen, Emerita, University of Utah
Matthew S. Gordon, Miami University
William A. Graham, Harvard University
William Granara, Harvard University
Beatrice Gruendler, Yale University
Dimitri Gutas, Yale University

Jo Ann Hackett, Harvard University
Wael Hallaq, McGill University
Andras Hamori, Princeton University
Peter Heath, The American University in Beirut
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James Montgomery, University of Cambridge
Roy Mottahedeh, Harvard University
Suleiman Mourad, Amherst College
Sachiko Murata, Stony Brook University
Sandra Naddaff, Harvard University
Eckhart Neubauer, Emeritus, Universität Frankfurt
Racha El Omari, University of California, Santa Barbara
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Alexander Treiger, Yale University
Nargis Virani, The New School of Social Research
Frank Vogel, Emeritus, Harvard University
Ewald Wagner, Emeritus, Universität Gießen
Robert Wisnovski, McGill University
Aaron Zysow, Princeton University

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-ĀT
DRINK YOUR MILKS!
-ĀT AS INDIVIDUATION MARKER IN LEVANTINE ARABIC

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The suffix *-āt* is well known as a plural marker across varieties and registers of Arabic[1] for many feminine nouns, words of foreign origin, and certain other morphological classes of nouns with a fair degree of predictability.[2] Levantine Arabic yields, for example, *ḥayawān* 'animal' pl. *ḥayawānāt* and *bsayne* 'cat' pl. *bsaynāt*.[3] Two additional Levantine examples demonstrate the use of *-āt* as a plural for singulative nouns formed by adding *tāʾ marbūṭa* to generic and abstract nouns: *samke* 'a fish' pl. *samkāt* 'fishes' and *ṭabkha* 'a cooked dish' pl. *ṭabkhāt* 'dishes.'[4] The singulative form and meaning of nouns like *samke* and *ṭabkha* gives their *-āt* plurals a relatively high

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[1] This essay focuses on urban Levantine Arabic and relies exclusively on Lebanese informants, but occasional references will be made to other registers and varieties of Arabic for comparative purposes. I am grateful to the Al-Batal and Kasbani clans, Amina Mouazen, and Kamil Hamade for their enthusiastic participation as informants, thank Mahmoud Al-Batal and Rima Semaan for additional examples as well as invaluable comments and corrections, and retain responsibility for all errors myself.

[2] See Wright 1898, 197 and Fischer 2002, 39 and 126 for the classes of nouns that take *-āt* plurals in Classical Arabic. Wright remarks that some grammarians permit any word ending in feminine singular *-a(t)* to take the plural *-āt*.

[3] The transcription here is roughly phonemic, owing to the wide range of vowel phonemes in Levantine speech, and follows most of the conventions of Cowell 1964. On the phonetics of Levantine Arabic see Cowell 1964, 1–33 and Fischer and Jastrow 1980, 174–182. The symbol * indicates structures that informants rejected as ungrammatical or not used.

[4] Cowell uses the term singulative as an umbrella term for both the unit noun (*ism al-waḥda*) and the instance noun (*ism al-marra*), 1964, 297. It is convenient to group singulative nouns together in opposition to generic or collective nouns, and unnecessary for our purposes here to distinguish subcategories of either group; we are likewise not concerned here with abstract nouns; this *-āt* is not an abstract plural, as we shall see.

degree of individuation, meaning that they will tend to refer to specific, prominent, individual entities.[5] Each singulative noun has a corresponding generic or abstract noun from which it was formed; in formal Arabic, this generic noun often has its own broken plural (*jamʿ taksīr*). A full set of concrete nouns in formal Arabic thus includes a count singular and plural and a collective or mass singular and plural: *samaka* 'a fish' pl. *samakāt* 'fishes,' in contrast to *samak* 'fish (collectively)' pl. *asmāk* 'groups or types of fish.' Of these two types of plurals, *-āt* is associated with individuals and small numbers, the so-called *jamʿ al-qilla* 'the plural of paucity,' whereas broken plurals tend to refer to groups as collectives or large numbers, *jamʿ al-kathra* 'the plural of abundance,' in both Classical and Levantine Arabic.[6] In Levantine, *-āt* sometimes constitutes one of a pair of plurals of the same singular noun that have little apparent distinction in meaning and usage, such as *meṣriyyāt* or *maṣāri* 'money,' both plural forms of the obsolete Levantine singular *meṣriyye* 'an Egyptian coin.' Even if we identify the former as a plural of paucity and the latter as a plural of abundance, what does that mean? Is there some amount of money below which one uses *meṣriyyāt* and above which one uses *maṣāri*?

More often, Levantine generic nouns tend to take *-āt* plurals rather than broken plurals. A number of broken plurals of the pattern *afʿāl* are judged by my informants not to belong to the colloquial Levantine register: **asmāk* '(types of) fish' and **awsākh* '(piles of?) dirt' are both deemed to belong to the formal register only. A more typical Levantine pattern of generic word formation is a singular collective or generic noun, a singulative formed from that generic noun if appropriate semantically, and an *-āt* plural:

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[5] The individuation continuum is a proposed cluster of features of which nouns have a greater or lesser degree depending on both context and speaker perception. The features that constitute individuation include definiteness, specificity, agency, contextual (textual or physical) prominence, qualification, and quantification. Speakers tend to mark nouns that have a relatively high degree of individuation with certain "optional" nominal markers such as definite and indefinite specific articles or plural forms and agreement. See Khan 1988 and Brustad 2000, 18–26 and 52–61 for a more detailed discussion of these concepts.

[6] See for Levantine, Cowell 1964, 369, and for Classical Arabic, Fischer 2002, 53–64 and Wright 1898, 1:233–4. The paucity vs. abundance distinction in Classical Arabic is also associated with different types of broken plural patterns, with the patterns *afʿāl*, *afʿul*, *afʿila*, and *fiʿla* classified as plurals of paucity and the rest as plurals of abundance.

samak 'fish'	*samke* 'a fish'	*samkāt* 'fishes'
wasakh 'dirt'	*waskha* 'a spot of dirt'	*waskhāt* 'dirt'

The plural *samkāt* is semantically logical, since individual fishes can be counted; the plural *waskhāt* is a bit less so, since it does not refer to quantifiable 'spots of dirt,' and begs explanation. The function of *-āt* in Levantine Arabic in the title expression of this essay makes even less sense:

> *shrāb ḥalībātak!*
> Drink that milk [literally, your milks]!

The use of *-āt* on this generic noun seems to fly in the face of reason: *ḥalībāt* 'milk(s)' is not by nature a countable substance, unless one were referring to servings, or glasses, or perhaps cow "milkings," but here it surely does not refer to more than one serving of milk that the poor addressee must consume. Why does the speaker of this imperative choose to use this form rather than *ḥalīb* 'milk'? Moreover, if *-āt* constitutes a plural of paucity or a count plural, then it is difficult to explain the choice of *samkāt* in the following expression, the point of which is that the fish are too many to count:

> *bḥibbik ʾadd il-baḥr u-samkātu!*
> I love you as much as the sea and its fishes!

The function of *-āt* in these two contexts seem quite different, since one refers to a small quantity of a substance and the other to an infinite amount of individual entities. Do these two plurals have anything in common?

Wright remarks that broken plurals differ "entirely" in meaning from sound plurals, "for the latter denote several *distinct* individuals of a genus, the former a number of individuals viewed *collectively*, the idea of individuality being wholly suppressed."[7] This observation provides an important clue to the distinction in meaning between *-āt* plurals and broken plurals. This statement may be reformulated as a general principle in Arabic, that plurals formed by suffixation tend to be marked for individuation. In the case of Levantine *-āt*, however, individuation does not appear to include quantification, and if this *-āt* is a plural of paucity, its function does not extend to count plural.[8]

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[7] Wright 1898, 1:233, emphasis in original.

[8] This finding provides strong counter-evidence to the role of quantification in the continuum of individuation as described in Brustad 2000.

My informants confirm that these plurals may not occur with numerals, and reject forms such as **tlatt waskhāt* 'three piles of dirt' and **tlatt ḥalībāt* 'three milks.' Cowell gives for *laḥmāt* a meaning my informants reject, 'pieces of meat,[9] (e.g., **tlatt laḥmāt* 'three meats') in favor of *tlat shuʾaf laḥᵉm* 'three pieces of meat.' Similarly, they corrected **tlatt khubzāt* 'three breads' to *tlat tirghfit khubᵉz* 'three loaves of bread.' Cowell also cites two plurals for *ramᵉl* 'sand': *rmāl* 'sands' and *ramlāt* '(a batch, or batches, of) sand,' but notes that **tlatt ramlāt* 'three batches of sand' is not permissible. He assigns the meaning *'grains of sand' to *ramlāt* as a count plural, a meaning not recognized by my informants, who prefer *ḥabbāt ramᵉl* 'grains of sand.'[10] They assign the meaning 'a particular patch of sand' to *ramlāt*, as in:

> *mā ʾidirna nuˣud ʿa ha-r-ramlāt laʾinnon wiskhīn.*
> We couldn't sit on this (particular patch of) sand because it is dirty.

In addition, they attest that *ramlāt* cannot be used to specify quantity; though one may say, for example, **shwayyit ramlāt* 'some sand,' the preferred form is *shwayyit ramᵉl*. But if the function of *ramlāt* is not to specify count or quantity, then what is its function? Other particles are available to mark specificity; why the plural?

A number of Levantine *-āt* plurals are formed from generic nouns like *ḥalībāt* that have no singulative. Levantine Arabic in particular allows this formation of *-āt* plurals from generic nouns; examples include *zarrīʿāt* 'plants,' from the generic singular *zarrīʿa* 'plants,' and *ḥummṣāt* 'hummus.' Cowell identifies this plural as one of "identification and indefinite quantification" and observes that these generic nouns "have plurals (in *-āt*) designating a certain batch or indefinite quantity of that substance."[11] He explains the difference between the singular and the plural forms as one of classification (the singular) as opposed to indefinite quantification or identification (the *-āt* plural). His explanation is partly right: the plural does identify a "certain batch" of the substance. In the title example, 'Drink your milk(s)!,' the speaker is clearly referring to a particular 'batch' or serving of milk that is definite and very specific. Other generic nouns with *-āt*

[9] Ibid.
[10] Cowell 1964, 368.
[11] Ibid., 370.

occur in similar contexts; the next example highlights a very specific batch of bread:

> *ḥammṣī-li ha-l-khubzāt.*
> Toast this bread for me.

In this idiomatic expression, *zāytātu* 'his oil' is used metaphorically, but it is nonetheless a very specific "batch:"

> *khilṣu zaytātu.*
> His oil is all used up (i.e., he died).

The prominence and specificity of these nouns makes them highly individuated, and hence good candidates for some kind of individuating marking. It is this role that *-āt* appears to play here, and it is precisely because generic nouns are uncountable that the choice of the *-āt* plural provides a felicitous form to express individuation, since *-āt* is not serving in any other capacity in these contexts. These nouns will be called here *ḥalībāt* plurals.

It will be argued here that *ḥalībāt* nouns constitute a functional category rather than a lexical or semantic category. It is important to note that a few count *-āt* plurals serve both as *ḥalībāt* plurals and as regular count plurals. The noun *shaʿrāt* 'hair(s),' for example, can be used either as a count plural, as in (a), or a *ḥalībāt* plural, as in (b):

> (a) *bāʾī-lu tlatt shaʿrāt ʿa rāsu*
> He has three hairs left on his head.
>
> (b) *lēsh ʾaṣṣetīhon la-shaʿrātik ya Rīm?*
> Why did you cut your hair, Rime?

Here, the number 'three' in (a) identifies *shaʿrāt* 'hairs' as a count plural, whereas *shaʿrāt* in (b), although highly individuated, does not refer to a quantity of hair but to a specific "batch." For *-āt* nouns formed from singulatives, then, it is thus the context that will determine their interpretation as count plural, the primary function of *-āt*, or a *ḥalībāt* plural, a secondary, extended function.

The primary function of *-āt* as a count plural occurs in grammatically obligatory contexts. In other words, when counting hairs, one must use *shaʿrāt*. In contrast, the *ḥalībāt* plurals constitute optional forms. As such, they are under the control of the speaker; that is, the speaker chooses to use a *ḥalībāt* plural rather than another plural or a generic noun. The remainder of this essay will explore the features that motivate speakers to choose this form of a word. From approxi-

mately forty examples elicited from Lebanese speakers, several features emerge:

1. Plural *-āt* nouns must be modified with plural verbs and adjectives.[12] Feminine singular agreement is deemed ungrammatical by my informants, who confirm *hawayāt ḥilwīn* 'beautiful breeze,' reject **hawayāt ḥilwe*, and verify the following judgments:

> *il-ḥalībāt illi bi-l-barrād ḥayintizʿu!* (not **ḥatintiziʿ*)
> The milk that's in the refrigerator will spoil!

> *lēk, iz-zarrīʿāt ʿam bimūtu!* (not **ʿam bitmūt*)
> Hey, the plants are dying!

The use of plural verb forms rather than feminine singular underscores the specificity and contextual prominence of 'this milk' and 'these plants.'

2. As Cowell points out, the *-āt* plurals tend to occur on nouns modified with possessive pronoun suffixes, such as *trābātu* 'its dirt' and *meṣrīyyātna* 'our money' in the following:[13]

> *trābātu mnāh—mā beddon taghyīr!*
> It's [the planter's] dirt is good—it doesn't need changing!

> *ḥaṭṭayna meṣriyyātna bi-l-bank.*
> We put our money in the bank.

In fact, informants confirm that the second example cannot be expressed with the plural *maṣāri*:

> **ḥaṭṭayna maṣārīna bi-l-bank.*
> We put our money in the bank.

Nor is it permissible to say **maṣārīhon* 'their money,' or **maṣārīkon* 'your (pl.) money,' or assign any specific monetary possession with *maṣāri*. Conversely, *meṣriyyāt* is not used to refer to money in general, only to a particular "pot" of money belonging to a known person or institution, and it carries no implications about the amount of money involved. The high degree of correlation between possessive marking and *-āt* provides further evidence that the individuation of a noun plays a role in the choice of plural marking in spoken Arabic,

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[12] Cowell attests that plural agreement "almost always" goes hand-in-hand with paucal plurals, "especially plurals of unit nouns," 1964, 425.

[13] Ibid., 371.

and that, in cases where two plurals exist of the same noun,*-āt* marks a relatively high degree of individuation rather than paucity.[14]

3. *ḥalībāt* plurals are regularly modified with the anaphoric demonstrative article *ha*, [15] which marks entities that are exactly identifiable to both interlocutors and that have contextual prominence:

> *khayy! ma-aḥla ha-l-brūdāt!*
> Ahh! How beautiful this cool air is!
>
> *shīlū-li ha-l-waskhāt min hōn!*
> Get this dirt out of here (for me)!

Similarly, *ḥalībāt* plurals are occasionally marked with the "ethical dative" *la-*:[16]

> *lēsh ʾaṣṣetīhon la-shaʿrātik ya Rīm?*
> Why did you cut your hair, Rime?

The ethical dative indicates the speaker's empathy as it elicits empathy on the part of the hearer; in other words, it invokes a shared point of view or attitude among interlocutors. Its use here on *shaʿrāt* draws attention to this noun and signals some kind of attitude or feeling toward it.

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[14] That a similar relationship between the plural of paucity and individuation may be at work in Classical Arabic is suggested by an anecdote in which al-Nābigha al-Dhubyānī criticizes Ḥassān b. Thābit's use of paucal plural forms *jafanāt* 'bowls' and *asyāf* 'swords' to refer to a large number in the following line (Yaʿqūb 1998, 301):

> *la-nā l-jafanātu l-ghurru yalmaʿna bi-l-ḍuḥā*
> Ours are the white bowls glistening in the midmorning sun,
> *wa-asyāfunā yaqṭurna min najdatin damā*
> and our swords drip blood from [our] heroism.

Yaʿqūb notes that others disagreed with this criticism on the basis that the pronoun suffix *-nā* on *asyāf* "turns it into the [plural of] abundance," and that *al-jafanāt* can function as either paucal or abundant precisely because it is a sound plural (*jamʿ sālim*) *(ibid.*). The implication of this reasoning is that a highly individuated plural of paucity (as indicated by, e.g., the definite article or a possessive pronoun) provides a kind of emphasis similar to that of a plural of abundance. Disagreements over the usage of plurals of paucity and abundance may result in part from an incomplete definition of the function of plurals of paucity. It may be that *jamʿ al-qilla* functions as an individuated plural as well as the plural of a small number. In this case, then, the paucal plurals of swords and bowls would not refer to a small number but rather highlight their specificity and importance. Sībawayh (d. ca. 795) cites this verse as a counter-example to the principle that *-āt* functions as a paucal plural, without mention of al-Nābigha or his criticism (3:578).

[15] Discussed in Brustad 2000, 115–7.

[16] Described in Cowell 1964, 483.

4. These plurals normally refer to a noun in the immediate vicinity of the speech act and are contextually important. In fact, it is precisely because speakers understand the *-āt* plurals to have this function that they can use it to invoke an entity as if it were present. One might say about a mutual friend,

> *shift dyān il-yōm, shaʿrāta shu ṭawlānīn!*
> I saw Diane today, her hair has gotten so long!

These *ḥalībāt* plurals allow speakers to describe something unseen, but which they want their interlocutor(s) to imagine. One might describe a lovely summer day to someone who was or was not present by saying,

> *ʾaʿadna bi-ha-sh-shamsāt!*
> We sat in that sun![17]

Obviously, the use of the plural *shamsāt* 'sunrays' has nothing to do with either identification or quantity, since the sun is a unique entity known to all parties, but it does have to do with invoking the beauty of the sun and the day, as if the speaker would like to transport his or her listeners to that exact time and place. Likewise, an unrealized event can be evoked: here, the co-occurrence of the anaphoric demonstrative *ha-* and the plural *shamsât* combine to summon the image to the present in a speech act meant to make us wish we were already there:

> *taᶜu u u ʾᶜudu maᶜna bi-ha-sh-shamsât ...*
> Come and sit with us sit in that sun …

The shared features of *ḥalībāt* plurals, specificity, contextual prominence, and plural agreement patterns, all constitute features of the individuation paradigm. Examples and informant judgments adduced so far support three claims: (1) Speakers use the *-āt* plural suffix to highlight very specific entities central to the speech context. (2) Although the entities so designated normally constitute a small amount—if only because they are physically present—this plural has no intrinsic relationship to a small number or count plural. (3) These plurals do not usually refer to more than one "batch." However, in some contexts, the "batch" referred to by *ḥalībāt* plurals is not contextually promi-

[17] We might paraphrase the English in a colloquial register: 'We caught some rays!' with the caveat that this American English expression has a more limited sociolinguistic register than the Arabic.

nent and can be rather abstract. Informants agree that the following compliment constitutes a general statement that does not necessarily refer to cooked food immediately present or even to a specific dish:

> *ṭabkhātik shu ṭayybīn!*
> Your cooking is [always] so tasty!

Although *ṭabkhātik* is specified with a highly animate second person possessive, the fact that it does not refer to anything specific in the immediate context would seem to lower its overall individuation and make it a counter-example to our theory. A similar example refers to the local grocer's yoghurt cheese (*labne*) in general, not to a specific batch:

> *Abu Jiryes labnātu ṭayybīn!*
> Abou Jirius' yoghurt cheese is delicious!

If *-āt* does not emphasize specification in this particular type of context, what nuance does it add? The plurals in both examples appear to be closely linked with their possessors, as if the human element were an important factor in the choice of form here.

It may be stated with some confidence that these plurals are not used in indefinite noun phrases or to express a small but unspecified quantity. Several informants judged the following examples to be ungrammatical:

> **fī shwayyit laḥmāt beddi sāwi minnon bāmye.*
> There is a little bit of meat I want to make okra with.

> **baʿd fī nitfit ḥummṣāt, beddik tāklīhon?*
> There is still a tiny bit of hummus, do you want to eat it?

Rather, the indefinite generic nouns are used to express an unspecified small quantity. Contrast the preceding examples with the following accepted versions:

> *fī shwayyit laḥm beddi sāwi minnon bāmye.*
> There is a little bit of meat I want to make okra with.

> *baʿd fī nitfit ḥummuṣ, beddik tāklīhon?*
> There is still a tiny bit of hummus, do you want to eat it?

A *ḥalībāt* plural may be used to indicate a small amount only if it is definite, specific, and immediately present. The context of the following utterance appears to emphasize the smallness of the quantity as well:

ha-sh-shwayyit il-laḥmāt mish ḥarzānīn baʾa, khallṣīhon!
This tiny little bit of meat is not worth [keeping], finish it!

It remains to explain what particular nuance is added to expressing a small quantity by the use of *laḥmāt* 'meat' here. The smallness of the quantity is exaggerated as if to enhance the appeal to the listener to eat the meat, as if the speaker were using a diminutive. The embellished emphasis on the small here suggests that this type of phrase represents a kind of periphrastic diminutive. But does this mean that we can claim a diminutive meaning as a secondary function of this *-āt* plural?

Traditional descriptions of the Classical Arabic diminutive list, in addition to its primary function indicating smallness, secondary functions that include endearment or tenderness (*tamlīḥ*), contempt or disdain (*taḥqīr*), and enhancement (*taʿẓīm*).[18] These secondary functions are all closely related in that they express speaker attitude. In fact "enhancement" subsumes both distaste and endearment, which are after all merely opposite ends of the same emotional continuum, one that represents the speaker's feelings about an entity. The specific value of the "enhancement" may depend either on context or on the particular lexical item, or both. The diminutive form is an optional way to name or identify an entity; hence, speakers choose to use it, and they do so in order to express a particular attitude or feeling toward it. Similarly, speakers of Levantine Arabic choose to use an *-āt* plural in its secondary role—that is, not to express a count plural but as a marker on a generic noun—in order to convey an attitude about it. It has been argued that point of view or empathy plays a role in sentence role marking in Levantine Arabic;[19] here it will be argued that part of the function of *-āt* is to express feeling in a way similar to the diminutive in those varieties and registers of Arabic in which it is productive.

[18] Wright 1898, 166 and Fischer 2002, 51. Fück finds these functions for the diminutive of paucal plurals as well, 1936, 636. In addition, these functions are catalogued in several dialect descriptions, such as Masliyah's study of diminutives in Iraqi Arabic, 1997, 68–9. He includes in this category a wide range of morphological forms, perhaps a bit too wide at times, but his argument that diminutive meanings are conveyed by a wide range of morphological forms deserves consideration. However, he does not include *-āt* in his survey.

[19] Brustad 2000, 359–60.

Some circumstantial evidence for a linkage between the diminutive and *ḥalībāt* plurals is found in their distribution. In spoken Arabic, morphological diminutive forms and the *ḥalībāt* plurals as productive categories appear to lie in complementary distribution with each other: the former is productive mainly in bedouin and western sedentary dialects, whereas the latter is found mainly in the urban Levant, where there exists no productive form to express diminutive meaning other than a periphrastic ~ *ṣghīr* 'a small ~.' [20] More significant is the contextual distribution of both forms. Rosenhouse notes that North African sedentary dialects employ "diminutive patterns in great frequency, and in women's speech, especially, these patterns are used both for endearment and for contempt, according to needs."[21] It is true that a large percentage of these elicited examples of the *ḥalībāt* plurals belong to the category of foods, from *ṭḥīnāt* 'flour' to *fūlāt* 'fava beans' to *rezzāt* 'rice,' but while this observation might bring to mind the centrality of food in Levantine culture, closer inspection of the situations in which they occur reveals that it is the *acts* of cooking and eating that stimulate the production of *ḥalībāt* plurals. These acts take place in the intimate setting of the home among family, a context that allows free emotional expression. Moreover, they often appear in imperatives, in which their role may to be to emphasize the smallness of the object of the command, thereby softening its tone. The following imperatives contain *-āt* plurals used in interactions among family members. The occurrence of the ethical dative *-li* 'for me' on the first two makes overt a heightened degree of speaker attachment; here, it is argued that the use of the *-āt* plural forms plays a similar role. In effect, the *-āt* plurals here function as a kind of tenderness from speaker to addressee:

nazzil-li ghasīlātak ḥabībi.
Bring me your dirty laundry, dear.

ḥuṭṭi r-rezzāt ʿa n-nār.
Put the rice on the stove.

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[20] Cowell 1964, 310 notes that "only a few Syrian Arabic nouns have diminutives," and Rosenhouse 1984, 23 considers the diminutive as a productive category to be a feature of bedouin and western sedentary dialects. De Jong, however, reports that evidence of its productivity among Sinai bedouins is "inconclusive" (2000, 38). Moreover, I cannot claim that the function of *ḥalībāt* plurals as I describe them here are limited to the urban Levant, merely that I have enough data to attest to them and analyze them in this region.

[21] Rosenhouse 1984, 24.

khalli s-sekkrāt ʿa janab.
Leave the sugar aside.

Many of the sentences cited previously provide stronger evidence, since they constitute speech acts in which the speaker seeks to elicit a reaction (rather than an action), which is usually an emotion: 'Your cooking is so tasty!' 'Look—the [poor] plants are dying!' or 'Why did you cut your [pretty] hair?!' Thus, although it may be the case that morphological forms expressing an emotional "enhancement" occur more often in women's speech, it may also be argued that it is the intimate context rather than the speaker's gender that provides the motivation for choice of such forms. This certainly appears to be the case for Levantine, in which my male informants easily produce the *-āt* forms without any apparent apprehension that they are producing "women's speech."

More significantly, *ḥalībāt* plurals and diminutives share the same semantic functions. The primary function of the diminutive is, of course, to express a small size or amount, and *-āt* fulfills that function in contexts such as this one (cited previously):

ha-sh-shwayyit il-laḥmāt mish ḥarzānīn baʾa, khallṣīhon!
This tiny little bit of meat is not worth [keeping], finish it!

The next sentence, like many other examples here, is understood to refer to a very specific small amount that is immediately at hand:

ghasslī-li ha-l-baʾdūnsāt.
Wash this (bit of) parsley for me.

"Smallness" is, of course, relative; hence it is natural that the function of diminutives would extend semantically to include other judgments associated with small size, such as tenderness or disdain. Similar extensions of meaning occur with *ḥalībāt* plurals.

The secondary function of the diminutive to express tenderness is paralleled by Levantine *-āt*. Many of the examples cited in this essay find their natural occurrence in tender or intimate situations, such as the pleasure of the speaker enjoying cool mountain weather, 'Ahh! How beautiful this cool air is!' and the evocation of a beautiful setting, 'We sat in that sun!' Our title phrase, 'Drink your milks!' would normally be heard among family members, and especially from a parent to a child, in a situation calling for tenderness, concern, or cajoling. Likewise, the use of these plurals in imperatives—this is quite

literally "kitchen Arabic"—may be a way of softening the tone of the verb, as in this gentle directive not to add the sugar just yet:

> *khalli s-sekkrāt ʿa janab.*
> Leave the sugar aside.

In addition, Levantine speakers often use *arḍ* 'land' and *ahl* 'family' with *-āt*: *arḍāt* 'land(s)' and *ahlāt* 'family (members) in particular kinds of contexts,'[22] such as inquiring about each other's families:

> *kīfon ahlātik? shu akhbāron? sallmī-li ʿalēhon ktīr.*
> How is your family? What's new with them? Please give them my best.

Here the use of *ahlāt* enhances the speaker's solicitousness of her addressee's loved ones.

Another secondary role of the diminutive is to express disdain or distaste, and this function can be carried out by Levantine *-āt* plurals as well:

> *laḥmāta mbayynīn*
> Her flesh is showing (she is improperly dressed).

> *emta ḥa-tshīl ha-l-waskhāt?*
> When are you going to clean up this dirt/mess?

The idiom *ʾeṣaṣ u khabriyyāt*, which can mean either 'tall tales' or 'troubles and hardships, trials and tribulations,' expresses either disapproval or aversion:

> *mā ʿād ili jlāde iḥki maʿu, zhiʾt ha-l-ʾeṣāṣ wi-l-khabriyyāt.*
> I no longer feel like talking to him, I'm fed up with those tall tales.

It often occurs in narratives about loathesome experiences as a catch-all of distaste:

> *ṣār maʿi khabṭ u ḍarb ... u ʾeṣaṣ u khabriyyāt*
> I underwent bumping and hitting … and trials and tribulations.

The plural diminutive *wlaydāt* 'little children' (or perhaps 'little brats?') is cited by informants in reference to immature children or young people who are misbehaving or misspeaking, as in:

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[22] It is interesting that Classical grammars admit both sound plural endings *-ūn/-īn* and *-āt* on both of these nouns: *arḍ* pl. *arḍūn* or *arḍāt* 'land' and *ahl* pl. *ahlūn* or *ahlāt* 'family' (Fischer 2002, 66 and Wright 1898, 1:195, 198). According to the grammars, these *-āt* plurals should be plurals of paucity, but it is difficult to imagine such a context and meaning for them.

shu beddak fīhon, haydōle wlaydāt mā byaʿrfu shi
Never mind them, they are little children who don't know anything.

The same idea can be—and often is—conveyed by the phrase *wlād ṣghār* 'little kids:'

shu beddak fīhon, haydōle wlād ṣghār mā byaʿrfu shi
Never mind them, they are little kids who don't know anything.

However, the "enhancement" of *wlaydāt* in the former expresses contempt on the part of the speaker. The next example expresses a very gentle criticism in which the "enhanced" *-āt* of *il-mayyāt* works with the adjective *mbaḥbaḥ* 'generous' to soften the phrase. The addition of diminutive 'a bit' to the English translation conveys a similar softening:

il-ʿadsāt mā raḥ yistwu hēk—il-mayyāt mbaḥbḥīn
The lentils will never cook like that—the water is a bit too "generous."

This comment may be contrasted with a more direct and harsh alternative:

lēsh kattarti l-mayy?
Why did you put so much water?'

The word "contempt" might be a bit strong for the word *shawbāt* 'hot weather,' but informants confirm its negative connotation:

maraʾ ʿalāyna shwayyit shawbāt byiʾtlu!
We had some killer hot weather!

The unpleasantness of the hot weather stands in complete contrast to the very pleasant nature of cool weather:

ha-l-brūdāt shu ḥilwīn!
This cool air is so nice!

This last pair demonstrates another feature of the "enhancement" function of this marking, namely, that the positive or negative connotations of words that commonly take *-āt* plurals appear to be constant for most words. Informants agree that, for example, *brūdāt* means 'cool air' rather than 'cold air'(*bard*), while *shawbāt* is universally detested as unpleasantly hot. Even the word *laḥmāt*, which at first seems to be an exception, is actually used in two different senses, effectively making them two different words: the first, 'meat,' indicating food, has a positive connotation, while 'flesh' in reference to hu-

man beings is disdainful. However, this is not always the case. The negative emotion expressed by *-āt* plurals, such as impatience, may be directed not at the object itself but rather at the situation or the interlocutor. A frustrated parent might yell,

> *khalliṣni shrāb ḥalībātak ta-nrūḥ ba'a!*
> Hurry up, drink your milk so we can go!

Context thus remains the key determinant in interpreting the emotional value of the *ḥalībāt* plurals.

If this analysis is correct and *-āt* does, in fact, have a secondary enhancement function, where did it come from? Is it a Levantine innovation? In Classical Arabic, *-āt* represents one possible pattern for the so-called *jamᶜ al-jamᶜ* 'plural of a plural.' Sībawayh and Wright both list several examples of this form, such as *jimālāt* 'camels,' *rijālāt* 'men,' and *kilābāt* 'dogs,' but do not specify their meaning;[23] Fischer offers an "enhanced" meaning for the plural of *buyūt* 'houses:' *buyūtāt* 'noble families.'[24] This lone clue to the function of the plural of the plural provides just enough of a toehold to speculate that Classical *-āt* as the plural of a plural might have had a secondary function of "enhancement"—a function not entirely different from its Levantine use on generic nouns. In both cases, *-āt* is superfluous as a plural marker: in the case of Levantine, because the original noun is generic, and in the case of Classical Arabic, because it represents an "extra" layer of plurality. The word *wlaydāt* 'little kids, brats' (above) and the contemptuous *klaybāt* 'little dogs' underscores an association between *-ât* and the diminutive in emotionally enhanced contexts in Levantine Arabic. An example of this same association with an intimate, tender meaning is a Lebanese expression for 'Home Sweet Home:'

> *bayti yā bwaytāti yā msattir-li ʿwaybāti*
> My house, my little house, you cover up my little faults.

Within the spoken register, Rosenhouse notes the use of *-āt* as plural of a plural in bedouin dialects, listing examples *alf* 'thousand' pl. *ulufāt* and *farg* 'difference' pl. *furugāt*, both of which are words that

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[23] Sībawayh 3:618–20; Wright 1989 1:232. Wright restricts the use of "secondary plurals," as he calls *jamᶜ al-jamᶜ*, to numbers nine or greater or an indefinite number (*ibid.*), but does not distinguish between broken and sound secondary plurals.

[24] Fischer 2002, 68.

can conceivably be semantically "enhanced."[25] Less clear are examples given by de Jong from a northern Sinai bedouin dialect that contrast paucal plural and broken plural nouns only in count noun contexts. Most of his examples consist of the expected contrast between count (sound) and non-count (broken) nouns, but this one contains an unexpected broken plural with the number five:

> *itfarrig itwaddiy lēhin iḥṣaṣ laḥam ... inkān ikhwānhiy thalāthih, talga thalath ḥuṣṣāt, w inkānhum khamsah, khamas iḥṣaṣ*
> You will distribute and send them portions of meat … if she has three brothers and sisters, you will find three portions, and if they are five, five portions.[26]

This last utterance suggests that the contrast between these two plural forms does not always rest on quantity alone. However, more contextualized non-count examples are needed to establish an "enhancement" function.

So far we have examined only substantives. The relationship of substantive plural marker *-āt* to the use of *-āt* on attributive adjectives and participles presents another problem; unfortunately, it is one for which little data is available. Cowell mentions an attributive use of *-āt* in urban Syrian on "some" adjectives "when attributive to a plural in *-āt* of a feminine count noun: *banadōrāt māwiyyāt* 'juicy tomatoes' (or, more usually, *banadōrāt māwiyye*)."[27] My Lebanese informants categorically reject both forms, a judgment that underscores the well-known dialect variation within the Levant region. The construction *banadōrāt māwiyyāt* is more likely to be found in bedouin dialects, which make greater use of *-āt* as an option for plural concord of all types. Rosenhouse reports attributive *-āt* plurals in both female human and feminine non-human contexts and, conversely, records that human feminine plurals take either feminine plural or masculine plural agreement, as in *bgarāt guwiyyāt* 'strong cows' and the variant forms *niswān zēnāt* or *zēnīn* 'good women.'[28] Ingham's Najdi examples include three possible attributive agreement patterns with *byūt* 'tents/houses:'[29]

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25 Rosenhouse 1984, 102 and 271.
26 De Jong 2000, 242–3.
27 Cowell 1964, 201.
28 Rosenhouse 1984, 46, citing also Johnstone 1967, 165–6.
29 Ingham 1994, 51, 64, and 63.

byūt-in ṭuwāl 'tall houses'

al-byūt mafrūshāt 'the tents (were) carpeted'

byūt-in zēnah 'good houses'

Existing data indicate that attributive *-āt* is always optional. For female humans it is usually paired with *-īn* or a broken plural, and for nonhuman plurals, it may be paired with a broken plural or collective *-a*. Examples containing female human plural nouns with collective feminine singular agreement seem not to exist, and this gap suggests that *-āt* implies a degree of individuation. Also, Ingham's examples *ādhānu mitsaddidāt* 'his ears (were) closed (he was deaf)' and *al-arḍēn mitjāwirāt* 'the two plots were adjacent' score high on the individuation scale, and contrast with *as-sinīn is-sābgah* 'by-gone years' and *maghātīr zēnah* 'good white camels.'[30] The individuation analysis finds support in Ingham's observation that "[t]he use of the feminine plural in reference to an inanimate (nonhuman) plural is very common when a pronoun affix is involved"[31]—in other words, when the noun is highly individuated. Thus attributive *-āt* may function as a marker of individuation for nonhuman nouns in those varieties of spoken Arabic in which it is productive. Without a body of contextualized examples, however, this remains mere speculation.

Available data thus support the thesis that Levantine *-āt* plurals function on three levels: first, as a count plural for singulative nouns; second, as a highly individuated plural for generic nouns in which the important features are specificity and contextual prominence, and third, in some contexts, as an "enhancer" that expresses either tenderness, in positive contexts, or distaste, in negative ones. Evidence has shown a high degree of correspondence between the secondary functions of the diminutive on one hand and those of the Levantine generic *-āt* plural on the other: both mark high specificity, contextual prominence, and enhancement on an emotional scale. While Classical grammars express the "disparaging" function of the diminutive in a stronger term (*taḥqīr*) than those used here for the *ḥalībāt* plurals, it is not qualitatively different. Hence, although it would be rash to call the *ḥalībāt* plurals diminutives, they can be said to fulfill functions similar to those of the morphological diminutives in those registers and varieties in which they exist.

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[30] Ibid., 64.
[31] Ibid.

We are now in a better position to appreciate the full meaning of the phrase *bḥibbik ʾadd il-baḥr u samkātu*, in which *samkāt* is the plural of *samke*, but its meaning here goes beyond "fishes," even highly salient ones. It is clearly not an individuated plural with emphasis on the quantity, nor a diminutive of smallness—in fact, its connotation is quite the opposite, since the phrase clearly aims to express an immeasurable amount. In this context, *-āt* clearly functions in its secondary role as "enhancer," echoing the tender meaning of the endearment, and amplifying it.

The *ḥalībāt* plurals thus provide further evidence of the importance of individuation features in explaining nominal marking in Levantine Arabic. More importantly, the parallels in function between *ḥalībāt* plurals and diminutives, added to the prevalence of the ethical dative in spoken registers, indicate that the attitude of the speaker toward nominal entities is expressed morphologically in spoken Arabic, and suggest that some kind of "speaker attitude" may belong to the constellation of features in the individuation continuum. In addition, this study of Levantine *-āt* plurals calls for further exploration of the relationship between number and individuation in all registers of Arabic. Such a study will need contextualized examples in order to provide the pragmatic and functional meanings of the forms. Did plurals of paucity in Classical Arabic have a secondary function to mark a high degree of individuation, or even enhancement? These questions await further exploration; meanwhile,

bsaynātak l-ḥilwīn ʿam yishrabu ḥalībāton.

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ʿAYYĀR
THE COMPANION, SPY, SCOUNDREL IN PREMODERN ARABIC POPULAR NARRATIVES

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An early series of episodes in *Sīrat ʿAntar* describes how ʿAntar ibn Shaddād is transformed from a young slave herding his master's flocks to a hero whose goals are to win his freedom and the hand of his beloved cousin, and to achieve wide renown as the most powerful warrior of his age. In these episodes, the young ʿAntar slays first a wolf and then a lion attacking his flocks, gains a special sword and a mighty steed, protects his tribe against numerous attacks, wins freedom and paternal acknowledgment, achieves fame as a warrior and poet, and finally—after many trials—marries his beloved, ʿAbla. Simultaneously, a concurrent narrative unfolds, that of ʿAntar's half-brother, Shaybūb. Unlike his brother ʿAntar, whose father is Arab, Shaybūb is the child of two black slaves, and throughout the *Sīra* he has a lower social status. Yet in its own way, his story parallels that of ʿAntar. If the *Sīra* assigns ʿAntar the role of hero and main protagonist, it assigns to Shaybūb the secondary although still significant role of ʿAntar's companion and helper, a role that the *Sīra* terms *ʿayyār*. Like ʿAntar, Shaybūb displays distinctive characteristics and abilities. On the same day that ʿAntar kills a wolf that has attacked the flocks and recites his first poem, Shaybūb spends the whole day running down a fox. His speed of foot remains a primary characteristic throughout the story; in all of his extensive journeys, Shaybūb always travels by foot. While ʿAntar demonstrates his prowess with lance and sword, Shaybūb emerges as unrivaled in his skills with

bow and arrow. If ʿAntar is the "brawn" who wins battles through courage and strength in arms, Shaybūb is the "brains," who scouts out terrain and spies on the enemy, who is courageous in battle but prefers to rely on cunning and stealth. While ʿAntar is impetuous, willing to rush into battle no matter what the odds, Shaybūb is practical and offers his brother commonsensical—if rarely heeded—advice about how to solve problems without plunging into full-scale battle. In other words, if the figure of ʿAntar recalls Homer's mighty Achilles, Shaybūb's character echoes the *Iliad*'s cunning Odysseus.

Narrative focus in *Sīrat ʿAntar* centers on ʿAntar and his heroic deeds, but interwoven in these events is a delineation of Shaybūb's personal story and actions. As with ʿAntar, Shaybūb also grows to manhood, travels widely and braves many adventures (with and without his brother), falls in love, marries and has children, and finally dies and is mourned near the end of the narrative. Nor is Shaybūb the only example of this character-type in the story. Just as the *Sīra* duplicates the structure of ʿAntar's story in those of other heroes, including the accounts of ʿAntar's various children, who black like him must prove their worth in battle, it replicates that of Shaybūb as well. One example of this is the account of Shaybūb's son, Khudhrūf, who inherits his father's skills and becomes a companion and helper to his cousin and ʿAntar's son, the hero al-Ghadbān.

This character type—cunning helper and companion to heroes, spy, trickster, and master of disguises—is the figure that M.C. Lyons in his study, *The Arabian Epic* (I:118-27), aptly terms "the man of wiles." My purpose here is to build on and expand Lyons's useful discussion of this character-type—the *ʿayyār*—and in the process to add several permutations beyond those which Lyons mentions. Specifically, I will broaden his description to analyze more completely the roles that this character-type plays in these popular epics.[1]

The word *ʿayyār* has a historical as well as a literary existence. In premodern Muslim Arab societies, the term *ʿayyār* was applied to groups of urban low-class ruffians, or local toughs, and vigilantes, or gangsters. These were young men who "protected" low-class city quarters and who on occasion became active participants in the struggles and conflicts of rulers. This group also came to have asso-

[1] Summaries of major Arabic popular epics may be found in volume III of Lyons 1995. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to this work hereafter. Another summary of *Sīrat ʿAntar*, based on the same Arabic text, is contained in Heath 1996.

ciations with the *futuwwa* movement in later medieval times (Taeschner 1960; al-Najjār 1981, 109-258; Irwin 1994, 140-58). The present study restricts itself only to manifestations of the character-type in Arabic popular fictional works and will not attempt to draw connections with any of the historical activities of this social group, although it will become evident that some such connections may have existed in the minds of the audience of popular *sīra*s. This matter, however, must remain the subject for a separate investigation.

One meaning of the root from which the word *ʿayyār* stems is "to frequently come and go, or wander" (among other things, as is the case with many Arabic words; see Ibn Manẓūr n.d. 4:622-3). From this root sense the word *ʿayyār* assumes the connotations of vagabond, rogue, or scoundrel. In narratives of urban tricksters, such as the stories surrounding the figures of ʿAlī Zaybaq or Aḥmad al-Danaf, terms such as *shāṭir* (sharper, conman) or *azʿar* (ruffian, rogue) also appear, but more on this later.

M. C. Lyons describes the "man of wiles" in the following way: "as guide and resolver of difficulties he embodies the hero's good fortune and his character lies at the heart of the favorite paradox of the cycles, the relationship between superhuman and miraculous virtue and lies, theft and deception" (Lyons 1995 1:118) In his discussion of these characters—helpers, guides, spies, tricksters—Lyons includes the figures of al-Baṭṭāl in *Sīrat Dhāt al-Himma*, ʿUthmān and Shīḥa in *Sīrat Baybars*, ʿUmar in *Sīrat Amīr Ḥamza*, Bihrūz in *Sīrat Fīrūz Shāh*, Shaybūb in *Sīrat ʿAntar*, and ʿAlī Zaybaq in the story of same name. He also notes that in regard to *Sīrat Banī Hilāl* "in the absence of an acceptable substitute, the qualities of guide are attached to Abū Zayd. Here ... we have a full-fledged paladin, who is also "a master of wiles," and who lays claim to a thousand tricks" (Lyons 1995 I:126). I will expand on Lyons's admirable discussion in four ways. First, I will argue that this character-type, and certain underlying narrative principles of the Arabic popular epics themselves, may be better understood if we initially expand the dichotomy of brave hero and cunning helper to include a third party, that of their ruler/liege. For just as the helper serves the interests of the hero, the hero serves those of the ruler. Second, I will illustrate how in certain narratives *ʿayyār*s attain significant levels of autonomy from the hero. Third, I will suggest that in many *sīra*s, such figures may be best considered in terms of their personal traits and actions rather

than which particular master they serve. Once one considers these three aspects, a certain moral ambiguity emerges, since it becomes clear that in many cases one side's perfidious and vile spy is the other side's brave and loyal undercover agent. In other words, characters whom Lyons in a later discussion terms "villains" (Lyons 1995 I:127-32) are in fact reflections of certain manifestations of the "man of wiles." Finally, I will propose that we can expand the concept on "man of wiles" to encompass not only men but also "women of wiles"—and mainly old women at that.

I. *Ruler, Hero,* ʿAyyār

In general, characters in Arabic popular epics are what T. Todorov termed "narrative-men" (Todorov 1977, 66-70). These are basic, one-dimensional figures possessing limited sets of characteristics and functions who play specific roles in the narrative. They become individualized and assume distinct personalities partly due to their varied social roles, partly due to their specific experiences in the narrative, and sometimes, in pseudo-historical works, due to the audience's historical background knowledge that tends to imbue characters with individual connotations. Characters with culturally and historically famous traits—the wise Shah Anūshīrwān or the great Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd—evoke particular audience responses. There is little internal character development, however, and characters in Arabic popular epics tend to remain what E.M. Forster termed "flat characters" (Forster 1977, 73-81). For example, despite the fact that a king of a tribe in a work such as *Sīrat ʿAntar* differs in rank from the ruler of the city of Hira, the Persian shah, or the Byzantine emperor, all play similar roles in regard to their narrative function and their relationship with other characters. They may differ in terms of social status or narrative scope—some make short appearances while others are more enduring—but their personalities and main characteristics show similar traits.

In analyzing the role of the helper, it is useful to view it in terms of its relationship with the hero. First, however, it is equally useful to analyze the hero in regard to his, or her, relationship with the ruler.

Regardless of social status or narrative importance, rulers tend to exhibit the following sets of characteristics. They are usually male (unlike heroes, who can be of either sex) and present themselves as

imperious, arrogant, and jealous of their authority. Autocratic and often rash, they need be neither wise nor brave, since they depend on others for these traits. Wisdom and mental agility (whether virtuous or ill-disposed) are key characteristics of the minister or vizier who advises the ruler, while in battle rulers depend on the hero for courage and prowess. Confronted with the military aptitude of heroes, rulers may become suspicious, since the hero can easily be viewed as a potential rival. Heroes often unwittingly exacerbate this suspicion by their capability in battle. Although heroes tend to be loyal and courageous, they are also inclined to be personally impetuous and politically naïve, and thus unsettling for the ruler. Heroes can be very aggressive in offering solutions, direct confrontation being their default strategy, and this aggressiveness tends to worry the ruler, who fears its being turned on him.

The hero's relationship with his or her liege lord is therefore often tumultuous. In *Sīrat ʿAntar*, ʿAntar's primary allegiance belongs to the leader of ʿAbs. Over time the identity of this person changes as one king succeeds the other. Yet the nature of the relationship between ruler and hero remains consistent, whether it involves the first king of ʿAbs, Zuhayr b. Jadhīma, or his successor, his son Qays. In both cases, the ruler views the hero as an important tool of royal power and as a potential source of trouble for himself and the tribe. Zuhayr is generally suspicious of ʿAntar and resents him as an uncontrollable upstart, although ʿAntar remains loyal and rescues the tribe numerous times. The younger king Qays is generally friendly toward ʿAntar. Nevertheless, toward the end of the *Sīra*, even he comes to resent ʿAntar and eventually exiles him because ʿAntar is a magnet for trouble who continually involves the tribe in war and conflict. ʿAntar's presence is just too dangerous.

ʿAntar serves other, loftier rulers as well: King al-Nuʿmān of Hira, King al-Ḥārith of Damascus, the Persian shah Anūshirwān and the Byzantine emperor, among others. In these relationships, the patterns of interaction described above persist. Despite the hero's martial prowess and personal virtue, his power elicits in the mind of the ruler not only admiration and appreciation, but also suspicion and distrust. This dichotomy stems from the fact that even when rulers themselves lead their armies into battle, it is clear that they could not defeat the hero in single combat if such a situation should arise. Hence we have the contradiction that the person with the higher and more powerful

social status is personally weaker than those who serve and protect him in war. This leads to a contrast between the hero's absolute devotion and the ruler's attitude of support and alienation. Fear counterbalances appreciation. Fear is also spurred by rival heroes, royal ministers and advisors, noble courtiers, and other attendants who oppose the hero and compete for royal favor. As a result of these mixed feelings, rulers often send the hero on quests against formidable enemies. This is a win-win situation for the ruler. If the hero succeeds, so much the better, but if he or she is defeated, then the ruler has one less potential challenger to worry about. When heroes return victorious from such apparent suicide missions, their very success only aggravates royal concern and suspicion. There are also times when heroes will directly disobey the ruler. Heroes follow a set code of honor, and when they believe that a ruler has acted in contravention of it, they go their own way and at times even fight against the ruler. This tension between ruler and hero is also present in other heroic literatures; it lies at the heart of the *Iliad*, for example, when war between Trojan and Greek becomes secondary to the angry struggle between the great king Agamemnon and the "godlike" Achilles. It also appears in Firdausi's *Shāhnāma*, in which the relations between the hero Rustam and the successive rulers that he serves are often strained.

Just as ʿAntar is periodically mistrusted by those rulers to whom he is the closest, so are Dhāt al-Himma and her companions alternatively hailed and feared by the successive caliphs whom they serve. Similarly, in the beginning of *al-Mālik Baybars*, the honest and loyal young slave Baybars must overcome the suspicions of a succession of masters whom he serves. The hero is thus a socially liminal character whose great utility in battle provokes the very mistrust that he or she assumes will be assuaged by success on the battlefield.

The ruler has other "helpers" besides the hero. There are, for example, rival heroes. Also prominent is the figure of the royal minister, who embodies intellectual activity—whether benevolent or malicious. "Good" ministers are friends and supporters of the hero, but "evil" ministers also exist (Aybak in *Baybars*, for example), and they often plot with the hero's rivals against him or her.

From an analytic point of view, it is helpful to view the ruler, minister, and hero as three aspects of a single powerful entity, such as the god, king, and warrior of myth. This mythic entity combines royal

authority with characteristics of divine might and supernatural wisdom. The popular epic has divided these three aspects into separate character-types with distinct, limited spheres of activity. This division becomes a useful device for structuring and developing narratives, since popular epics can align these three character-types or set them at odds. When the ruler is in harmony with the wisdom and knowledge of the minister and the military might of the hero, the kingdom is well served and internal peace prevails. Just as often, however, the ruler is at odds with one or both of these aspects; in these cases, conflict arises and narrative resolution occurs only when harmony is restored.

In like fashion, it is possible to view the duo of hero and helper as complementary aspects of heroic action: prowess in battle but also stealth and cunning when necessary (again, the Achilles/Odysseus dichotomy). However different, both character types serve the same ends, and therefore their personal relationship tends to be more straightforward and harmonious. The helper remains unquestionably loyal. No matter how often a falling out occurs between ruler and hero, the helper remains at the hero's side. Indeed, it is often the helper who serves to clear up misunderstandings between ruler and hero by using his wits to uncover the truth about the false charges that rivals make against the hero. The helper also relies on guile in ways that are very useful, although apparently viewed as "unheroic" by these narratives. He scouts out foreign terrain, sneaks into enemy camps or cities, tricks foes, and frees captives. All this he does on behalf of the hero and whomever the latter is serving at the time. Ironically, therefore, the loyalty of this character type, whose personality is permeated with cunning and craftiness, remains unequivocal. His relationship with the hero is never sullied by antagonism or suspicion, ostensibly because the hero can prevail if any conflict were to arise, but really because the hero needs the helper to perform tasks generally beneath his or her dignity. Furthermore, as the loyalty or service of the hero shifts from one ruler to another, the loyalty of the *ʿayyār* follows accordingly.

One should not assume that such characterizations are completely uniform in all the stories. After all, narratives sometimes create and increase dramatic tension by working against audience expectations. Yet in a general way, these characterizations comprise the structural template that underlies the introduction of new characters in these

stories. Let us take the story of *Dhāt al-Himma* as an example. The main protagonists are Arab tribal leaders who spend most of their time waging *jihād* against the forces of the Byzantines, as well as competing against each other. At the story's beginning, the protagonist is Jundaba, the leader of the Kilāb tribe during the Umayyad period. Upon his death, the focus shifts to his son Ṣaḥsāḥ, whose helper is Najjāḥ. Tellingly, when Ṣaḥsāḥ dies, his companion Najjāḥ commits suicide, since he is bereft of a role to play. Upon Ṣaḥsāḥ's death, the story turns briefly to the affairs of his son, Maẓlūm. Yet these episodes serve mainly as a prolegomenon to introduce the latter's daughter and the story's namesake, the warrior princess Fāṭima Dhāt al-Himma. In turn, her major heroic supporter becomes her black son, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, and their helper, ʿUbaydallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Thaʿlab, nicknamed al-Baṭṭāl, who furnishes the most prominent example of the *ʿayyār* in the narrative. These three figures become the protagonists for the remainder of the lengthy tale. In their battles against the Byzantines, they serve a succession of Umayyad and ʿAbbasid caliphs, from al-Saffāḥ, through Hārūn al-Rashīd, to al-Wāthiq. But throughout this time, their relationship with each caliph remains essentially the same: long periods of service interrupted by shorter periods of alienation due to royal mistrust or displeasure.

An exception in the relationship between hero and helper is the figure of Abū Zayd al-Hilālī, who as Lyons notes is both a fearsome fighter in battle and the tribe's main scout and spy. When King Ḥassān ibn Sirḥān contemplates leading his Banī Hilāl tribe to Tunis in search of more fertile grazing lands, it is Abū Zayd to whom he assigns the task of charting their course and scouting the new lands. In later events, Abū Zayd continues to play the dual roles of mighty warrior and cleverly disguised spy. On the battlefield he leads troops into battle and defeats mighty warriors in single combat. At other times he assumes disguises as an itinerant poet or a wandering dervish to infiltrate enemy councils behind the lines of battle. In contrast, Abū Zayd's heroic counterpart among the Banī Hilāl, Diyāb ibn Ghānim, is limited to the primary role of warrior. In many important respects, therefore, the *ʿayyār* is the alter-ego of the hero, just as the brave hero and the wise minister are alter-egos of the ruler. Yet at times the *ʿayyār* assumes a measure of independence, as we shall see below.

II. *The Independent* ʿAyyār

In the preceding discussion of the character of Shaybūb in *Sīrat ʿAntar*, I focused on his role as loyal companion to ʿAntar to clarify basic aspects of the relationship between hero and *ʿayyār*. Yet in other *sīra*s, the *ʿayyār* moves from trusty sidekick to loyal colleague and ally. In such cases, as with such figures of al-Baṭṭāl in *Sīrat Dhāt al-Himma* or Shīḥa in *Sīrat al-Mālik al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, the role of spy or trickster definitely overshadows that of companion. For example, in order to steal a precious lamp from the Byzantines, al-Baṭṭāl on his own initiative disguises himself as a monk, infiltrates their court, and impresses all with his saintliness (Lyons 1995 III:328). At times he drugs his enemy (Lyons 1995 III:335, as does Abū Zayd al-Hilālī at times); opens the gates of enemy fortresses (Lyons 1995 III:339); or rescues prisoners (Lyons 1995 III:340). During these same episodes both Dhāt al-Himma and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb maintain traditional but distant roles as heroes who prevail in single combat.

Baybars is fortunate to have two helpers, ʿUthmān and Shīḥa. The first joins Baybars as his trusted groom, but also acts as messenger, spy, and trickster who ridicules and terrorizes religious judges (cf. also Herzog 2003). He thus plays the traditional role of companion and helper. This role is superseded and expanded, however, with the appearance of Jamāl al-Dīn Shīḥa. This figure is notable in that he becomes the leader of the Ismaʾīlī sect in Syria, and hence he brings the support of a whole group with him. Shīḥa is small and dark-hued. He "cannot fight, is not a skilled rider, and 'were you to walk beside him, you would find that his head only came up to your chest.' But he will appear wherever his name is mentioned and can make himself look like 'your mother, sister, son, or daughter'." (Lyons 1995 3:124-5) The consummate spy, Shīḥa is both a source of information and master of stealth and disguise. He is less a companion and helper like Shaybūb than a trusted ally in battle and combination of wise counselor and secret agent throughout the political intrigues and personal rivalries that inform this popular epic. His death toward the *Sīra*'s end presages that of Baybars himself.

The shift in the role of the character-type that Shīḥa exemplifies suggests another way in which we might understand the figure of the *ʿayyār*: as the more independent rogue, trickster, and secret agent personified for example by the characters of Aḥmad al-Danaf and

‘Alī Zaybaq. From one perspective, these two figures can be studied as a separate character type, the playful and criminally inclined scoundrel. In this context such characters are petty criminals who lead the city’s low-class gangs of ruffians (usually forty in number). In some stories these characters appear indeed as conmen, thieves, and gangsters who prey on hapless peasants and merchants. But they also play another, competing role: they aid rulers by acting both as the police force (following the rule that it takes a thief to catch a thief) and as counter-intelligence operatives, uncloaking and thwarting the pernicious plans of foreign agents sent by enemy rulers to disrupt the affairs of the city. In such cases, the military role of the hero, which popular epics focus on, disappears. The helper character type now operates fully independent from any hero, working instead directly for himself, or herself, and the ruler. Like Shīḥa, however, this figure does not act alone but commands a group in the service of the ruler.

Let us pursue this point by examining the story of Aḥmad al-Danaf as presented in Manuscript 203 (untitled), part of the very rich collection of Arabic popular narratives in the Bibliotheca Lindasiana now housed in the John Rylands Library in Manchester, England. This text contains a cycle of rogues’ tales with a series of interlocking narratives focusing on Aḥmad al-Danaf and his companions. The manuscript begins by relating Aḥmad al-Danaf’s early career, then introducing the stories of many other rogues, including Ḥasan Shumān, Dalīla the Crafty, and ʿAlī b. al-Zayyāt, and concluding with a version of ʿAlī Zaybaq’s story. This text, which was copied in 1210 AH or 1794, thus provides a detailed account of the narrative world of these rogues and how their tales interrelate. Equally important, by providing us with the individual stories of a series of characters, it constitutes an excellent source for understanding how narrators of this type of story tended to structure their tales.

Manuscript 203 is episodic yet cohesive in structure. Its major episodic breaks are often structured around the appearance of a new central character, usually a young man who aspires to join the society of rogues or scoundrels (*azʿar*, pl. *zuʿr*). The first such character is Aḥmad al-Danaf (folios 1-10, Cairo), then Ḥasan Shumān (10-14, Baghdad), then a number of others: ʿAlī b. Wajh al-Furaṣ (folios 24-8, Basra); ʿAlī b. al-Zayyāt (28-32, Baghdad); ʿAlī b. al-Khayyāṭ (32-8, Baghdad); ʿAlī al-Ḥajjār (38-43, Baghdad); Ṣālih ibn al-

Rammāḥ (43-50, Cairo); Ṣāliḥ al-Sarrāj (55-62, Basra); Bākir al-Kūfī (62-5); ʿAlī al-Busūṭī (65-73, Baghdad); ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Dimashqī (73-87); ʿAlī al-Manāwī (87-97, Baghdad); and finally ʿAlī Zaybaq (ʿAlī in Cairo, 105; ʿAlī goes to Baghdad, 108; ʿAlī with Dalīla, 113-32).

Interspersed are several episodes of adventures of Aḥmad al-Danaf or another of the characters: Aḥmad visits the lands of Qāf (14-17); Hārūn al-Rashīd becomes angry with Ahmad and sends him into exile (17-24); ʿAlī b. Wajh al-Furaṣ falls captive in Tiberias (50-5); the tale of al-Dāmiriyya, princess of Antioch (97-105).

These tales portray a society of rogues similar to the societies of rulers, heroes and helpers depicted in popular epics. Gaining admittance to and even leadership in this society is the quest of such characters. Success is achieved by out-maneuvering more experienced scoundrels or by saving the city in some way. In these narratives, the social, geographical, and political framework is well-established. The Caliph of Baghdad is Hārūn al-Rashīd, his vizier Jaʿfar al-Barmakī, and his executioner Masrūr. Here one recognizes the pseudo-historical socio-political world of the stories of *The Thousand and One Nights* or such popular epics as *Dhāt al-Himma*. The narrative geography of the surrounding areas is the same as that of the *Nights* and popular epics such as *al-Mālik Baybars*: Cairo, Damascus, Basra, Kufa, Antioch, and Tiberias all figure as prominent provincial capitals, each with its own ruler, who in some cases, such as that of Aḥmad b. Ṭulūn of Cairo, is identified. Constantinople is the capital of the Byzantine empire, which is more or less viewed neutrally; that is, the Byzantines are not represented as active foes. Enemies come instead from the East. These are the *ʿajamī* (Persian) Khans, leaders with names like Azdashīr. It is these eastern rulers who send rival groups of rogues to act as spy and *agent provocateur*. In sum, a relatively fixed political world provides the context of the rogues' tales.

Aspiring young tricksters gain entrance into Aḥmad's group in three ways: first, by exhibiting their talents against already established scoundrels, such as the rivalry of Aḥmad and Dalīla, or Ḥasan Shumān against Aḥmad's group, or ʿAlī Zaybaq against Dalīla's daughter Zaynab. Second, they save the day by detecting and foiling the machinations of *ʿajamī* spies or even invading armies; third, they gain entrance as a result of successfully fulfilling a quest, which sometimes involves magic. These narrative motivations recur, with

variations making each story an individual entity. Aḥmad al-Danaf's own story, for instance, will clarify this point.

Aḥmad is the son of a well-to-do merchant of Cairo. When the merchant dies, leaving a fortune, Aḥmad becomes head of a household that consists of his mother and his sister Fāṭima. As many a merchant's son in the *Nights*, Aḥmad is foolishly profligate. He falls into bad company and squanders his inheritance in the span of a few years. Penniless, Aḥmad turns to crime. He spends his last few *qurūsh* to purchase a staff, finds a mosque that is empty of worshippers, and promises the imam that he will fill the mosque for him. Accordingly he shames those passing by the mosque into entering and praying, and when they leave he forces them to "donate" alms to him by threatening them with his staff. This extortion embarrasses the imam, who shuts the mosque. Undeterred, Aḥmad moves from mosque to mosque continuing his collection tactics until all the mosques of Cairo are closed. Seeking other sources of funds, Aḥmad steals a cow from a peasant who had brought it to town to sell. It is at this point that he encounters the chief of the rogues of Cairo, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Kalbī, and his forty companions.

Ṣalāḥ and his men are dressed as dervishes. When they see young Ahmad with the cow, they decide to steal it from him. Ṣalāḥ convinces Aḥmad that he will buy it for his dervishes' dinner. He takes the cow but doesn't return with the payment as promised. Having cheated worshippers by pretending to be pious, Aḥmad has now been cheated by scoundrels pretending to be dervishes.

Aḥmad learns who has cheated him and vows revenge. He discovers their lair and disguises himself as a young girl after he has heard Ṣalāḥ ask his men to procure a girl for him. Aḥmad manages to lock the men in their sleeping quarters, then drugs, binds, and beats Ṣalāḥ, and runs away. Aḥmad continues to play tricks on and torment Ṣalāḥ until the latter recognizes him as his superior and relinquishes leadership of the rogues to him. Eventually, Aḥmad is appointed by Aḥmad b. Ṭulūn, governor of Cairo, as leader of all the rogues in the city.

Ṣalāḥ grieves that he has lost his leadership. An old friend returning from Baghdad finds him in this state and promises to restore him to his former position. He and Ṣalāḥ tell Aḥmad that an old woman, Dalīla the Crafty, has managed to become chief of the rogues of Baghdad. Outraged that a woman would gain this position, Aḥmad

vows to defeat her in a contest of knavery. He travels to Baghdad, challenges and defeats Dalīla (as we shall discuss below), and becomes both the leader of the ruffians and the chief of police.

Rogues in these stories tend to follow Aḥmad's pattern. They are children of merchants with a natural inclination toward crime. As adults, they remain liminal characters who both serve the populace and fleece it. They live in their own society with its rules of admittance based on its specific definition of merit. And they entertain an official relationship with governmental figures who employ them as policemen and as counter-espionage agents.

This pattern of character motivation is comparable to that of the heroes of popular *sīra*s and contrasts with that of the protagonists of the *Nights'* tales of magic and romance. Protagonists of the *sīra*s are heroic by nature. Their martial abilities and their commitment to ideals of honor compel them to behave as they do; intrinsic character traits determine action and fate. Mature and recognized, such heroes enjoy a well-developed relationship with the rulers of society in exchange for service and protection. The hero is accepted by society as a valuable although dangerous entity, but he or she is never incorporated into it; at most heroes create their own micro-societies by forming bands of heroic companions who are their peers and helpers.

The rogue shares a similar marginal social position, even if he relies more on guile than raw strength of arm. Like the hero, the rogue remains on the margins of society. Rogues also have their own bands of companions, with their own tales and individual backgrounds, who serve their chiefs, whether Aḥmad or later ʿAlī Zaybaq, as henchmen and friends. Even if many stem from the merchant class, rogues aspire only to be rogues. They do not regret becoming criminals; for in doing so they have followed their natures and desires. They feel only satisfaction that they have found their rightful social position. Like the hero, the rogue begins at the bottom of the social ladder and then moves up to find a position in a marginal social subgroup, that being the only role to which he can attain.

What has happened to the role of the martial hero in these narratives? Has the helper lost the hero whom he once served, or has he replaced him? Just as the hero Abū Zayd al-Hilālī takes over some of the functions of the *ʿayyār*, has the above-described *ʿayyār* completely superseded the hero? Or is this form of the *ʿayyār* a fundamentally different character-type? Whatever one's views on this mat-

ter, these examples show the varied manifestations of the "man of wiles" in Arabic popular literature; there is little doubt that in many ways their spheres of activity overlap. If one removes the dimension of service to the ruler from these tales of urban scoundrels, then one might justifiably argue that we are dealing with a different type of story as opposed to a variant of a larger category. But service to the ruler appears to be an intrinsic element of stories such as those of Aḥmad al-Danaf or ʿAlī Zaybaq. These are "good rogues" whose activities are socially redeemed by their service to the authorities.

III. ʿAyyār *as Friend and Foe*

Examining these tales of urban rogues, with their clearly extra-legal inclinations, raises one's awareness of the moral ambiguity involved in the character-type of the resourceful helper who is a master of guile and subterfuge. In this context, one notices that such characters often function on both sides of conflicts. Just as the hero type appears on either side of the battle line, since a favored hero must have a dangerous foe to fight, so must both sides engage the services of spies and infiltrators. Two notable examples of such antagonistic *ʿayyār* characters are ʿUqba in *Sīrat Dhāt al-Himma* and Juwān in *al-Mālik Baybars*.

Sīrat Dhāt al-Himma purports to relate the battle between Muslim and Byzantine armies along their frontier. Even prior to the appearance of the traitor, ʿUqba, the narrative mentions Byzantine agents who seek to spread chaos among their Arab foes. One example of these is the monk Shammāsh, who infiltrates the Arab forces by assuming the appearance of a Muslim holy man (Lyons 1995 III: 313-15). Just as Shammāsh is unveiled and executed, ʿUqba, the most perfidious of these enemy *ʿayyār*s, is born to an Arab woman. ʿUqba begins his traitorous career by counseling Dhāt al-Himma's cousin and husband, Ḥārith, whose sexual advances have been resisted by the unwilling bride, on how to drug and rape her. For the first part of the narrative, ʿUqba remains a prominent counselor among Arab tribal leaders, but when his patrons, Ẓālim and his son, Ḥārith (Dhāt al-Himma's husband), defect to the Byzantine side, ʿUqba joins them. Ẓālim and Ḥārith soon meet their ends but not ʿUqba, who converts to Christianity (Lyons 1995 III:328). Throughout the remainder of the narrative, he plays a major role, clandestinely serving the Byzantines while he purports to remain on the Arab side. He and al-Baṭṭāl vie

constantly with one another in espionage and subterfuge, each assuming multiple disguises to infiltrate and disrupt the enemy's ranks.

In *Sīrat al-Mālik Baybars* the character who corresponds to the evil ʿUqba is Juwān. The narrative even identifies Juwān as ʿUqba's offspring. Born on a storm-filled night of an ill-omened day of the month, Juwān is so ugly as a baby that he must be suckled by a cur and "grows up to be 'an affliction'" (Lyons 1995 III:80). Just as ʿUqba continually matches wits with his counterpart, al-Baṭṭāl, so does Juwān spar with Baybars's helpers, first ʿUthmān and then the cunning Shīḥa. Both Juwān and Shīḥa are masters of languages, learning, and disguise. Juwān, for example, spends a good part of the narrative disguised as the learned qāḍī Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, whose knowledge he mastered and whom he subsequently murdered in order to assume his identity. In this guise, Juwān alias Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn becomes the helper of Baybars's court rival, the minister Aybak, and continually tries to have Baybars sentenced to death on false charges, just as his plans are continually thwarted by Baybars's friends.

When the *Sīra* formally introduces Baybars's helper Shīḥa into its narrative, it provides a background story that indicates that Shīḥa and Juwān are locked in a struggle that has been predicted by heavenly forces (Lyons 1995 III:113). When Baybars finally assumes royal power, having resisting its call despite many opportunities, the narrative shifts towards wars between the Muslims and their enemies. At this point, Juwān moves back to the Christian side to direct operations. He constantly plots war and intrigue against Baybars, but is defeated by Baybars's prowess on the battlefield and by Shīḥa and his Ismaʾīlī forces off it. For much of the narrative, Shīḥa pursues Juwān doggedly from place to place and finally assists in his execution, at which point Shīḥa's own death is presaged (Lyons 1995 III:225).

In his analysis of *sīra* characters, M.C. Lyons places helpers of foes, such as Shammās, ʿUqba, and Juwān, among the villains (Lyons 1995 I:127-32). There is justification for this determination. As Lyons notes, characters such as Juwān are not only cunning and duplicitous, but ugly and sinful as well. Juwān is persistently godless, "lascivious" and "ill-omened," bringing "destruction with him" wherever he goes (Lyons 1995 I:132). ʿUqba similarly has a "bedrock of pure, impartial wickedness." He is a "man with no friends" who boasts that "throughout his life he had never kept his word and 'there is not in my heart so much as a grain of pity'" (Lyons 1995 I:130). Yet

Lyons also notes the similarities of these characters with those who join the *ʿayyār*s and whom he terms "men of wiles."

It is true that these villains and helpers mirror each others' skills in many ways. Yet beyond this, they also fill the same functions in the narrative, albeit on opposite sides. Although the villains are portrayed as treacherous, this depiction rests largely on the religious antagonism that permeates and motivates the wars in both *Dhāt al-Himma* and *Baybars*. It is clear which side is favored in this antagonism and this favor sometimes justifies acts on the Muslim side that are not ethically defensible. To cite one example, Shīḥa at one point kills a pederast and then falls in love with his daughter. She in turn "addresses him by name, telling him that she has been shown by al-Ṣāliḥ in a dream that she would become a Muslim and marry Shīḥa. Shīḥa tells her to prove her sincerity by killing her mother, which she does" (Lyons 1995 III:122). Shīḥa's provocation of this deed hardly seems the act of a virtuous man. This suggests that wiles are a two-sided weapon. How one evaluates their use and effect depends on the side of the struggle one espouses.

IV. *Women of Wiles: The Female Trickster*

Heroes can be male or female, whereas rulers and ministers are almost uniformly male. The assumption of rule by the princess Shajarat al-Durr in *Baybars*, for example, is a historically driven incident. Even so, it is presented in the narrative as a source of contention. She only succeeds by appointing Baybars as her chief minister, designating him as her successor, and finally by agreeing to marry him (Lyons 1995 III:116-17). There are cases, however, of female characters of great cunning and guile. These characters are never termed *ʿayyār*. Yet they are comparable to the independent *ʿayyā*r character-type who has gained some level of autonomy in service to the ruler. Such a figure is Dalīla the Crafty, mentioned above as a secondary character in the stories of Aḥmad al-Danaf and ʿAlī Zaybaq. A review of the contest she engages in with Aḥmad al-Danaf illustrates this point.

Aḥmad comes to Baghdad after being outraged that Dalīla has been appointed by the Caliph as chief of police. Tracked down by him, Dalīla hosts Aḥmad for three days before their contest. As an initial test, she asks him to figure out how to release the catch of a trick sword scabbard. When he succeeds, she decides that he is a

worthy rival and agrees to compete with him in a dual of chicanery. She takes the first turn.

She tricks the servant of Shāh Bandar, a noble, to give her the noble's newborn child. She then leaves the infant as collateral at a Jewish goldsmith from whom she obtains gold jewelry, claiming the mother wants to inspect it; she also takes the jewels with which the parents have adorned the child. Shāh Bandar sends guards to search for the baby; the Jewish goldsmith, who has lost his merchandise, joins the search. Dalīla then goes to the goldsmith's house and tells his wife that she is the old woman who left the child with him. The wife permits Dalīla to enter the house. Dalīla ascends halfway up the stairs when the goldsmith appears. She grabs him and causes them both to fall down the stairs; she then pretends to have died from the fall. The goldsmith decides to bury her in secret and gives her body to a gravedigger, claiming that she is his mother. When they reach the graveyard, Dalīla urinates on the gravedigger, pretends to have returned from the dead, and sends him to tell the goldsmith. Then she steals the cloak and tools that he, in his haste, has left behind.

The next morning she visits a rich merchant's house. He has married a beautiful but stupid young girl. The marriage is not happy and Dalīla convinces the wife to leave her house and advise Dalīla's son against marriage. Then she brings the girl to the shop of a dyer and tells the handsome youth minding the shop that she has a daughter who has seen him and wants to marry him. She takes them both to an empty house and tells them to undress and puts them in different rooms. Then Dalīla returns to the shop to steal cloth from it. Hailing a porter, she convinces him to use his donkey to carry the cloth. She then tricks the porter into breaking all of the earthenware in the dyer's shop, claiming that she is going out of business and doesn't want to leave any wares behind. While he breaks pottery, she steals his donkey laden with cloth. Meanwhile the young wife and the young shopkeeper discover they have been tricked, as does the porter. Everyone searches for Dalīla.

Wandering the market calling "My donkey, my donkey!" the porter finds Dalīla and she promises to lead him to his donkey. Instead she takes him to a doctor and tells the latter that the porter is her son who has gone mad and only calls for his donkey. She asks the doctor to extract the porter's teeth so he does not embarrass her anymore. The doctor complies. Then the goldsmith and the dyer catch her and

take her to the governor's guards. The guards fall asleep, so Dalīla enters the governor's house and offers his wife two disobedient slaves (the guards) Dalīla claims she has inherited and now wants to sell. The governor's wife agrees to buy them and gives Dalīla some of her clothes so she can escape. More characters are now in pursuit of Dalīla. When they finally catch her, she explains who she is, why she played all these tricks, and then returns everyone's goods.

Now it is Aḥmad's turn so demonstrate his cunning. Dalīla instructs him to bring her 100 Rashīdī dinars without stealing them. While Aḥmad is out and around the city that night, he sees a man taking a case out of Jaʿfar the Barmakī's house. Following the man to a cave, Aḥmad sees him open the case. It conceals Jaʿfar the Barmakī's daughter, who has been abducted by this man, a slave who has fallen in love with her. The girl demands that he take her back. The slave is on the point of raping the girl, when Aḥmad intervenes and kills him. Aḥmad then returns her home and a grateful Jaʿfar rewards him with 100 dinars. Jaʿfar also uses his influence to have the Caliph appoint Aḥmad as chief of police, replacing Dalīla. Dalīla is appointed head of the royal carrier pigeons instead. In this duel of wits, Dalīla is cunning but Aḥmad is lucky. Aḥmad prevails, but there is little doubt which of them is clever and has played the better tricks.

Dalīla is not the only example of a crafty old lady. Another example appears in the story of ʿAlī b. al-Zayyāt (folios 28-32) in the same manuscript. In this case, it is ʿAlī's mother who watches over her son as he seeks to join the *ʿayyār* band of Aḥmad al-Danaf. Several times during the episode, she appears in disguise to help or save her son.

A final example of the crafty old woman figure is the villain character of Dhāt al-Dawāhī in the story of *ʿUmar al-Nuʿmān*, a combination of *sīra* and love story included in the *Thousand and One Nights* (Nights 60-176 in the Bulāq edition). Once again, the story centers, initially at least, on the struggle between the Muslims and the Byzantines. Dhāt al-Dawāhī is the grandmother of Princess Ibrīza, daughter of the ruler of Diyarbekr. Portrayed as a lesbian, an evil advisor to her son, and a teacher of tricks who is much disliked by her granddaughter, Dhāt al-Dawāhī disguises herself several times in the course of the story to infiltrate the Muslims' leadership and create chaos amongst them. She also becomes a valued advisor to both her son and the Byzantine emperor, devising stratagems for them to defeat their enemy. The story concludes in Baghdad with her execution

for her many crimes. Although she is portrayed as evil, she shares the characteristics of cunning and guile with the figures of al-Baṭṭāl, Shīḥa, ʿUqba, and Juwān.

V. *Conclusion*

It has become clear from the discussion above that one can consider these examples of the *ʿayyār* character-type—companion, helper, spy, strategist and man or woman of wiles—as variants of the trickster character present in almost all folk literatures. What characterizes these particular figures is their added role of service, either directly to the hero, or to the ruler himself when the hero plays a lesser narrative role. But, just as I have argued that it is useful to view the characters presented above as variants of a single type, one may treat them as separate character-types due to the differences in detail and personality that distinguish them. Despite such differences, however, these characters are united by their use of guile, cunning, and duplicity in the service of their masters. They add a dimension of narrative activity that differs from and complements the pristine heroism of the hero or the pure but somewhat passive authority of the ruler. At times, they become so interesting that they take over the story itself.

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BALĀGHA
RHETORIQUE ARISTOTELICIENNE (*RETHORICA*) ET FACULTE ORATOIRE (*ORATORIA/BALĀGHA*) SELON LES *DIDASCALIA IN "RETHORICAM* (SIC !)*" ARISTOTELIS EX GLOSA ALPHARABII*

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Parmi les obstacles que rencontre le lecteur des *Didascalia in "Rethoricam" Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabii*,[1] il en est un de particulièrement gênant: la différence entre *rethorica* et *oratoria.*[2] En effet, malgré les apparences, il ne s'agit pas de synonymes:

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[1] Conservés dans BnF Lat. 16097 (Sorbonne 954) et, pour certaines parties, dans une version imprimée de la renaissance [voir al-Fārābī (1971), *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la Rhétorique*. I. *Kitāb al-Khaṭāba,* éd. et trad. J. Langhade (*FḪL*). II. *Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabi(i)*, éd. M. Grignaschi (*FDG*), Beyrouth, 142-7]. Les *Didascalia* ont été édités dans *FDG*, mais les citations en français qui seront données dans la présente contribution seront empruntées à la nouvelle édition et traduction que préparent M. Aouad et Fr. Woerther et qui doit paraître prochainement (*FDAW*). *FDAW* a la même division en paragraphes que *FDG*. Seront ici signalés en notes les cas où *FDAW* a une autre lecture des mots latins que *FDG*, mais non les différences de ponctuation.

[2] Selon F. Gaffiot (1934), *Dictionnaire illustré latin-français*, Paris, 1088, *Oratoria* signifierait "l'art oratoire" et l'adjectif *oratorius*, "oratoire".

> La rhétorique (*rethorica*)[3] est une certaine [faculté] oratoire (*oratoria*), le rhéteur (*rethor*) un certain orateur (*orator*) et le propos rhétorique (*rethoria*) ou (*seu*) discours (*sermocinatio*) un certain dire (*ditio*) ou (*sive*) langage oratoire (*locutio oratoria*). Cependant, tout dire ou (*vel*) langage oratoire n'est pas un discours, ni tout orateur un rhéteur (*FDAW* §28).

Passons rapidement sur un premier type de distinction apparaissant dans ces quelques lignes. Il est facile à comprendre: *rethorica* et *oratoria* se distinguent de *rethoria*, *sermocinatio*, *ditio* ou *locutio oratoria* en tant qu'il s'agit, d'un côté, de puissances, voire d'*habitus* ou capacités stables et, de l'autre, d'actes, de réalisations des puissances en question dans des propos (voir, par exemple, *FDG* §§13 et 15).

On se concentrera ici sur l'autre type de distinction que met en avant le passage précité: la différence entre *rethorica* et *oratoria*.

On ne pourra pas l'expliquer par un recours à la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote,[4] car, si l'on trouve dans cet ouvrage un concept correspondant à *rethorica*, à savoir *rhètorikè*, on en a aucun pour *oratoria*. Pourtant, la difficulté mérite qu'on s'y arrête, et cela pour plusieurs raisons: la fréquence des occurrences des concepts en question[5]; leur centralité, puisqu'ils concernent manifestement l'objet même de l'ouvrage; l'importance de celui-ci dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Rappelons, en effet, que les *Didascalia in "Rethoricam" Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabii* sont la traduction du début du *Grand commentaire de la "Rhétorique"* (*Sharḥ "Kitāb al-Khaṭāba" li-Arisṭūṭālīs*) par al-Fārābī (m. 339/950). De ce *Grand commentaire* non conservé dans son entièreté, il ne reste que quelques brèves citations latines et arabes, les *Didascalia*, ainsi que des fragments récemment découverts dans l'œuvre du médecin Ibn Riḍwān (m. 453/1061 ou 460/1068) et

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[3] Le correspondant latin des termes qui importent à l'argument de cet article est donné lors de leur première apparition. Il ne l'est ailleurs que lorsque cela est vraiment nécessaire.

[4] Aristotle (1960-87), *Aristotelis Opera* ex recensione I. Bekkeri edidit Academia regia Borussica, accedunt Fragmenta Scholia Index Aristotelicus. Editio altera addendis instruxit fragmentorum collectionem retractavit O. Gigon, 5 vols., Berolini, II, col. 1354a-1420b 4 (*Rhét*).

[5] Ainsi, par exemple, on trouve *oratoria* dans la préface introductive (par Hermann) des *Didascalia* et *FDG* §§ 1, 2 (3 fois), 12, 13, 20, 28 (4 fois), 31 (5 fois), 32 (5 fois), 33, 34 (3 fois), 35, 37 (2 fois), 40, 42, 50, 54. *Orator*: *FDG* §§13, 14, 20, 28 (2 fois), 30, 31, 33, 42 (3 fois).

ayant un correspondant dans les *Didascalia.*[6] Ceux-ci sont plus précisément la traduction latine, entreprise par Hermann l'Allemand, au cours de la période 1243–56, du prologue (composé selon un schéma alexandrin) du *Grand commentaire*, du *textus* du commencement de *Rhét* (I : 1354a 1-4) et d'une explication générale, puis terme à terme de ce dernier. Ajoutons que le *Grand commentaire de la "Rhétorique"* a été massivement utilisé par Averroès (520-95/1126-98)[7] et que les *Didascalia* l'ont été assez souvent par les auteurs latins médiévaux, notamment Jean de Jandun (*c.* 1285-1328).[8]

Enfin, s'il est vrai, comme cela apparaîtra à la fin de cette contribution, que le couple *rethorica*, *oratoria*, n'est pas étranger aux concepts de *khaṭāba*, par lequel les philosophes arabes ont désigné la rhétorique de tradition aristotélicienne, et de *balāgha*, qui entre dans la dénomination même du *ʿilm al-balāgha*, science de tradition surtout arabe de l'éloquence, nous aurions ainsi de précieuses informations sur la conception qu'avait al-Fārābī des rapports entre ces deux disciplines.

La perte de l'original arabe des *Didascalia* rend particulièrement ardue le problème que l'on se propose de traiter. Malheureusement, les concepts qui nous occupent ici n'apparaissent dans aucun des fragments retrouvés dans Ibn Riḍwān.

Mario Grignaschi, le premier éditeur des *Didascalia*, évoque, dans une note (*FDG*, 152-3, n. 11) à la fois riche et confuse, la question des rapports de *rethorica* et *oratoria*. Al-Fārābī "parlait d'*oratoria* à propos des différentes composantes du discours rhétorique. En d'autres termes l'*oratoria* était pour F. une forme imparfaite de la rhétorique et

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[6] État de la question dans M. Aouad (1997), "La doctrine rhétorique d'Ibn Riḍwān et la *Didascalia in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabii*," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy. A Historical Journal*, VII: 164-172. Sur les fragments d'Ibn Riḍwān et son rapport à la doctrine rhétorique d'al-Fārābī, voir *ibid*, 163-245, ainsi que M. Aouad (1998), "La doctrine rhétorique d'Ibn Riḍwān et la *Didascalia in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabii* (suite)," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy. A Historical Journal*, VII: 131-60.

[7] Averroès [Ibn Rušd] (2002), *Commentaire moyen à la* Rhétorique *d'Aristote*. Édition critique du texte arabe et traduction française par M. Aouad, 3 vols., Union Académique Internationale, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Averrois Opera, Series A: Averroes Arabicus, XVII, coll. " Textes et traditions " 5, Paris : Vrin (*CmRhét A*), I: 20-31.

[8] Voir E. Beltran (1998), "Les *Questions sur la Rhétorique* d'Aristote de Jean de Jandun," dans G. Dahan et I. Rosier-Catach, éds., *La "Rhétorique" d'Aristote. Traditions et commentaires, de l'Antiquité au XVIIe siècle*, Paris, 153-67.

non pas une éloquence d'un genre différent." De cette explication, Grignaschi distingue une autre: *oratoria* rendrait *balāgha*, *rethorica khaṭāba*. *Balāgha* serait le genre dont *khaṭāba* serait l'une des espèces. Cette hypothèse est étayée sur le passage suivant du *Traité du Recensement des sciences* (*Maqāla fī Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*):

> Dans la septième partie, se trouvent les règles par lesquelles sont mis à l'épreuve et testés les énoncés rhétoriques (*al-aqāwīl al-khuṭabiyya*) et les diverses sortes de discours (*al-khuṭab)* et d'énoncés tenus par les orateurs (*al-bulaghāʾ*) et les rhéteurs (*al-khuṭabāʾ*), en sorte que l'on sache s'ils sont ou non conformes à la méthode de la [faculté] oratoire (*al- balāgha*).[9]

Mais Grignaschi écarte aussitôt sa deuxième explication au motif que *balāgha*, attesté dans le ms de l'Escurial et l'édition Palencia, ne l'est pas dans le ms du Caire, l'édition Amīn et la paraphrase d'Ibn Ṭumlūs (qui ont *al-khaṭāba*), que *facundia* serait le terme correspondant à *balāgha*[10] et non *oratoria* et que, de toute façon, l'explication en question serait infidèle "aux enseignements des *Didascalia*," qui indiqueraient clairement qu'*oratoria* est une forme imparfaite de la rhétorique et non pas son genre. Il est dommage que Grignaschi n'ait pas plus tenu à sa deuxième hypothèse. En effet, nous le verrons: ni *facundia* ni *eloquentia* ne rendent forcément *balāgha*; le passage du ms de l'Escurial n'est pas le seul à évoquer *balāgha* comme un concept plus général que *khaṭāba*; enfin et surtout, un examen attentif des *Didascalia* nous montrera qu'*oratoria* est bien le genre de *rethorica*.

Pour tirer les choses au clair, on essaiera d'abord de repérer les explications générales que donnent les *Didascalia* de la différence entre *rethorica* et *oratoria* et, ensuite, de trouver des indices sur leurs correspondants arabes.

I. *Distinction par les parties du discours*

Une première explication met en jeu la doctrine aristotélicienne des parties du discours. De fait, Aristote classifie celles-ci en exorde, narration, but, vérification et épilogue, et soutient que seuls le but et la

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[9] Al-Fārābī, *Catálogo de las ciencias*, éd. et trad. esp. Angel González Palencia, 2e éd., Madrid, 1953, p. 49, 4-6 (ar.); al-Fārābī (1968), *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, éd. ʿU. Amin, 3e éd., Le Caire, p. 88, 10-12.

[10] Ailleurs (*FDG*, p. 169, n. 3), Grignaschi donne *eloquentia* comme correspondant de *balāgha*.

vérification sont nécessaires au propos (*logos*) (*Rhét* III: 1414a 30-1420b 4). Mais il n'a rien qui corresponde à la distinction entre *rethorica* et *oratoria* comme dans le passage suivant des *Didascalia*:

> Les hommes croient au sujet du propos rhétorique ce qu'ils disent de toute personne qui prolonge son propos (*sermonem*), à savoir que c'est un rhéteur, sauf qu'ils définissent la quantité de longueur par laquelle le propos (*sermo*) devient propos rhétorique, mais en tout cas le propos rhétorique est pour eux un certain dire digne, excellent.[11] Cependant, il est manifeste que le propos induisant la croyance (*oratio inductiva credulitatis*), puisqu'il est singulier (*singularis*), ne sera pas ce propos rhétorique parce que de nombreux propos simples (*plurimum orationis simplicis*) qui induisent la croyance consistent en deux propositions (*propositionibus*) et que le propos qui induit la croyance comprend deux choses (*res*): la chose à partir de laquelle (*ex qua*) la croyance est produite et celle dans laquelle (*in qua*) la croyance est produite. Ces deux parties (*partes*) sont nécessaires (*necessarie*) dans tout dire oratoire. Le propos rhétorique ne devient pas complet (*completitur*) par ces deux parties seulement, mais il faut que ces deux parties soient précédées de l'exorde et suivies de la conclusion. Donc, le propos (*oratio*) qui devient complet par l'exorde, le propos induisant la croyance et la conclusion est le propos rhétorique. […]. Tel est donc le plus petit nombre de parties dont le propos rhétorique a besoin.
>
> Dans certains propos (*orationibus*), celui qui tient le discours (*sermocinator*) est forcé de disposer la narration. Mais la narration doit être disposée entre l'exorde et le propos convaincant (*orationem creditivam*) ou (*seu*) induisant la croyance (*inductivam credulitatis*). La narration est pour ainsi dire le propos (*oratio*) par lequel on saisit sommairement une certaine prolixité qui se présente dans le propos convaincant. Certains hommes joignent ainsi la narration au propos convaincant. Aristote l'en sépare. Les propos (*orationes*) de la cause de l'établissement[12] et de la cause judiciaire ne peuvent nullement, selon Aristote, se passer de narration, mais la cause délibérative n'en a pas selon lui profondément besoin[13]. En effet, plusieurs parties sont nécessaires (*necessarie*) au propos (*orationi*); elles sont au nombre de quatre: l'exorde, la narration, le propos qui fait croire (*oratio credere faciens*) et la conclusion. C'est pourquoi le propos rhétorique (*retho-*

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[11] Pour un essai d'identification des auteurs auxquels al-Fārābī fait ici allusion, voir M. Aouad (2006), "La rhétorique d'origine aristotélicienne et la science de l'éloquence (*ʿilm al-balāgha*): le cas d'al-Fārābī," Colloque international "Rhétorique littéraire et rhétorique philosophique dans les mondes grec, syriaque et arabe," organisé par Fr. Woerther, Beyrouth, 3-4 juillet 2006.

[12] C'est-à-dire le genre épidictique: voir *CmRhét A*, III : 76-7.

[13] *Rhét* III: 1416b 16-1417b 20.

> *ria*[14]) ou (*sive*) discours rhétorique (*sermocinatio rethorica*) est le propos (*sermo*) composé de ces quatre parties. Aussi pense-t-on qu'il est un propos (*sermo*) ayant en soi une prolixité parce que, en lui, seul ceci – à savoir le propos qui produit la créance (*oratio fidem faciens*) – est nécessaire (*necessarium*) au propos (*sermonem*). Ce qui précède et ce qui suit [le propos produisant la créance] ne sont pas nécessaires (*necessarium*) (*FDAW* §28).

La thèse de ce paragraphe est que le propos rhétorique est à distinguer du dire oratoire en tant que le premier comporte nécessairement une certaine prolixité, alors que le second n'en comporte pas une nécessairement.

La démonstration de cette thèse s'appuie sur certains caractères du "propos induisant la croyance". Mais qu'est-ce que cette "croyance," qu'est-ce que ces "propos" et sur quoi portent-ils? Pour comprendre ces trois points, il convient de rappeler ce qu'al-Fārābī écrit ailleurs dans les *Didascalia*.

Croyance équivaut, dans le vocabulaire d'Hermann, à conviction. Il écrit par exemple, dans *FDG* §2: "Certaine conviction (*creditionis*) ou (*seu*) croyance (*credulitatis*)." La conviction[15] peut relever de la certitude, de ce qui est proche de la certitude ou de la persuasion. Ces trois subdivisions sont ainsi définies:

> Ce qui relève de la certitude est ce au sujet de quoi on croit qu'il est ainsi sans rien qui le contredise et qu'il n'est pas possible qu'il soit autrement. Ce qui, relevant des deux espèces restantes, est autre que la certitude, est ce dont on croit qu'il est ainsi sans son contraire et qu'il peut être autrement qu'il n'est, c'est-à-dire qu'il est possible qu'avec lui il y ait son contraire. Ce qui est proche de la certitude est ce dont le contraire n'est pas pensé ou est admis avec difficulté, alors qu'il a en vérité un contraire. Quant au persuasif, c'est ce sur quoi l'âme se repose; cela consiste en ce que l'âme donne son assentiment à une certaine chose, à savoir qu'elle est ainsi sans son contraire; et pourtant son contraire pourrait exister avec elle. L'âme admet celui-ci facilement, sauf que l'esprit incline plus vers l'un des contraires que vers l'autre. Mais quand [le contraire vers lequel l'âme incline] prend le dessus, cela se fait en fonction du grand nombre et du petit nombre, de la force et de la faiblesse des inclinations de l'âme vers l'autre contraire. Et généralement il y aura croyance relevant de la persuasion (*persuadibilis*), c'est-à-dire satisfaisante (*sufficiens*),[16] quand il y a in-

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14 En lisant *rethoria* (BnF Lat. 16097, fol. 191rb) et non *rethorica* (*FDG* §28).

15 En arabe *taṣdīq*. Sur ce concept, voir n. 27.

16 *Persuadibilis seu sufficiens* est sans doute une traduction double pour *iqnāʿi*, qui signifie "persuasif" et, littéralement, "ce qui satisfait": voir *FḪL,* 32-3.

> clination de l'esprit vers l'un de ces deux contraires et si l'inclination est modérée, pourvu qu'il y ait dans l'esprit un certain excédent en faveur de l'un des deux contraires relativement à l'autre (*FDG* §2).

La conviction dont il s'agit dans le présent contexte est bien entendu de l'ordre de la persuasion.

Par "propos," on entendra [voir *FDG* §§3, 4, 9, 10, 35, 36, 43 (p. 225, 4-6)], dans l'expression "propos induisant la croyance," l'enthymème (ou syllogisme rhétorique: syllogisme moins rigoureux que le syllogisme démonstratif du point de vue de ses prémisses et/ou de la composition de celles-ci entre elles) et l'exemple. Les prémisses comme telles ne sont pas des propos. Seuls le sont les raisonnements fondées sur les prémisses.

Maintenant sur quoi portent les raisonnements induisant la persuasion? Pour répondre à cette question, il convient de se reporter à la doctrine farabienne des moyens de la persuasion rhétorique, doctrine qui s'appuie sur celle d'Aristote, mais lui fait subir une profonde réélaboration. On se contentera ici d'un bref aperçu tiré de *FDG* §§4-9, 17-23:

– Les raisonnements qui conduisent "en premier et par soi" à la conviction relative à l'objet visé. Il s'agit d'une conviction établie par les propos eux-mêmes directement et sans le concours d'autres procédés. N'entrent pas dans cette catégorie: des procédés extérieurs aux propos du locuteur, mais suffisant à remporter la conviction (une convention, par exemple); des propos établissant la valeur de ces procédés extérieurs (montrer que la convention a été correctement faite la renforce, mais il n'en reste pas moins que c'est cette convention qui remporte directement la conviction relativement à son objet et non les raisonnements qui établissent sa rectitude); des propos ne remportant pas la conviction, mais servant à y préparer le terrain (comme le recours aux passions). Aux raisonnements se rattachent, mais comme un élément extérieur, la beauté de l'expression et la bonne élocution.
– L'excellence du locuteur peut par elle-même suffire à persuader de l'objet visé. Quand on établit cette excellence par des propos, ceux-ci entrent donc dans la catégorie des propos qui produisent la conviction – indirectement sans doute.
– Les passions inclinent seulement à la conviction quant à l'objet visé et ne la produisent pas. Quand les passions sont induites par

des propos, ceux-ci n'entrent pas pour autant dans la catégorie des propos qui produisent la conviction.

– Les caractères de l'auditeur inclinent seulement à la conviction quant à l'objet visé et ne la produisent pas. Quand les caractères sont induits par des propos, ceux-ci n'entrent pas pour autant dans la catégorie des propos qui produisent la conviction.
– Les huit choses qui ne sont pas des propos de l'orateur : le témoignage; les convictions induites par l'affirmation d'une personne, le récit de ses paroles ou par les lois particulières; les conventions; le serment; les paroles et les faits quasi-miraculeux ou miraculeux par lesquels l'adversaire est défié; la torture; la réputation d'honnêteté; le visage, l'aspect, le corps. Ces choses peuvent par elles-mêmes établir l'objet visé. Quand la rhétorique, le propos (*allocutio*), le raisonnement (*ratiocinatio*) interviennent pour conduire à croire à ces choses et les renforcer, ces propos entrent dans la catégorie des propos qui produisent la conviction – indirectement sans doute.

En conséquence, les propos qui induisent la persuasion sont des enthymèmes ou des exemples établissant soit directement, soit indirectement la chose dont on cherche à persuader. Dans le deuxième cas, ces raisonnements serviraient à l'établissement ou à la valorisation soit de l'excellence de l'orateur, soit de l'un des huit procédés externes. Les raisonnements qui peuvent inciter à une passion ou à un trait de caractère ne relèvent pas des propos qui induisent la croyance.

Revenons au passage qui nous arrête ici (*FDG* §28). "Le propos qui induit la croyance" serait "singulier." *Singularis* rend sans doute *mufrad*. C'est le cas dans *FDG* §15, où, dans la définition de la rhétorique qui reprend celle que donne la traduction arabe anonyme,[17] on a *singularium* pour *mufrada*, qui ne peut dans ce contexte signifier que "séparé."[18] En conséquence, dire que le propos induisant la croyance, à savoir le raisonnement établissant l'objet même de l'allocution, est "singulier," c'est-à-dire séparé, signifie qu'il constitue une entité indépendante. Et al-Fārābī de mettre en avant deux caractères de ce rai sonnement: 1) quand il est simple, c'est-à-dire non constitué d'une chaîne de raisonnements, il se limite souvent à deux propositions,

[17] Aristotle (1982), *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*. A new edition, with Commentary and Glossary by M. C. Lyons (*TAL*), 2 vols., Cambridge, I: 7, 11.

[18] Voir *CmRhét A* III: 31. *FDG* 194, n. 3, donne un exemple qui conduit au même résultat.

c'est-à-dire sans doute les deux propositions de l'exemple et de l'enthymème,[19] qui est, selon *FDG* §36, un syllogisme formé d'une conclusion et d'une prémisse, l'autre étant sous-entendue; 2) de toute façon – et donc même lorsqu'il n'est pas borné à un seul enthymème, mais qu'il est constitué d'une chaîne d'enthymèmes - le propos induisant la croyance ne comporte que "deux choses." Ce sont "la chose à partir de laquelle la croyance est produite et celle dans laquelle la croyance est produite," c'est-à-dire une vérification (un raisonnement ou une chaîne de raisonnements) et un but. Bref, le propos induisant la croyance est formé seulement de "deux parties,"[20] qui peuvent fusionner en un seul raisonnement ou être présentées séparément. Or, et c'est le point important, ces deux parties sont "nécessaires" à la constitution d'un propos oratoire, alors que, dans le propos rhétorique, sont "nécessaires" les deux parties en question, mais aussi un exorde, un épilogue et, dans le cas du discours judiciaire, une narration.

II. *Distinction par les opérations et raisons profondes de la distinction.*

Mais al-Fārābī donne aussi une autre explication de la distinction entre *rethorica* et *oratoria.* Elle ne se borne pas aux parties du discours, mais elle met en jeu aussi d'autres facteurs de différenciation. Elle présente, en outre, l'intérêt de comporter une analyse des raisons profondes de la différence.

II.1. *Les opérations du discours rhétorique*

> Considérons donc maintenant quelles sont les conditions et les choses qu'il faut observer, choses qui, une fois qu'elles ont été trouvées dans le propos (*oratione*) ou l'orateur (*oratore*), comme le propos (*oratio*) composé de ces quatre ou trois parties, deviennent le propos rhétorique, c'est-à-dire le discours rhétorique (*i.e. sermocinatio rethorica*). Disons donc que les conditions – à savoir que le propos (*oratio*) soit adapté au fait de parler (*loquendum*), par son moyen, à un rassemblement,[21] ou au fait de le lire aux gens eux-mêmes – sont celles dont la

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19 *Pace* Aouad, 1997, 229-30 (comme n. 6).

20 Si l'on considère les deux choses dont le propos induisant la croyance est constitué, on a "deux parties," mais si l'on envisage ce propos qui les englobe, on n'a plus qu'une partie: c'est ce qui se passe dans l'énumération de la fin de *FDG* §28.

21 *Ad collegium* quoique BnF Lat. 16097, fol. 191va, et *FDG* §30, aient *collegium*.

possession a pour conséquence qu'il y ait[22] dans le propos (*oratione*) complet, au moyen des parties que nous avons énumérées, plusieurs opérations (*operationes*). Plus le rassemblement de toutes sortes d'individus s'accroît, plus il rassemble des hommes d'intellects divers. Celui qui prononce un discours (*sermocinator*) aura donc besoin de faire entendre à chacun d'eux ce qu'il comprend et ce en quoi il croit, jusqu'à ce qu'il les rende tous égaux sous le rapport de la compréhension de ce qu'il dit et de la croyance en ce qu'il dit, ou qu'il se rapproche de cette égalisation. Si la persuasion n'est pas possible pour tous ceux qui sont rassemblés, qu'elle se produise du moins pour la majorité d'entre eux. Les hommes dont les intellects sont différents diffèrent soit dans la compréhension, soit dans la croyance. C'est pourquoi, quand ils diffèrent dans la compréhension, on a besoin d'appliquer à chacun d'eux un mode, ou l'intellect de chacun d'eux doit être instruit par des moyens différents du mode par lequel l'autre doit être instruit. Mais quand ils diffèrent dans la croyance, on a aussi besoin de divers modes relativement à chacun d'eux, selon ceux qu'on induit à la croyance. Pour cette raison, il est donc nécessaire que le propos (*sermo*) conçu ou obtenu pour présenter un discours (*sermocinandum*) à une réunion ou une multitude, au fur et à mesure que cette multitude s'agrandit, ait un grand nombre de méthodes ou inductions[23] préparant à la compréhension ou à la croyance et à la conservation [par la mémoire] de ce qui est dit par celui qui tient le discours (*sermocinante*). Car d'une grande réunion, on cherche à obtenir trois choses: que les hommes comprennent, qu'ils croient et qu'ils retiennent. Les méthodes ou inductions menant à chacune de ces trois choses sont nombreuses. Elles sont seulement définies en fonction de la multitude en question. Il est donc évident que l'assemblée ou multitude à laquelle le propos (*sermo*) est adressé est d'un nombre indéterminé. Cependant les méthodes persuadant la multitude sont elles-mêmes définies et les nombres qui les contiennent sont déterminés. Puisqu'il en est ainsi, le propos rhétorique sera un propos (*oratio*) composé de quatre ou de trois parties. Ce qui est utilisé en lui en fait de modes induisant la compréhension et la croyance ne sera pas uniquement un seul mode. Bien au contraire, beaucoup de modes divers sont rassemblés en une somme unique. Mais quand [le propos] ne réunit qu'un seul mode, [l'orateur] ne pourra, par ce [propos], adresser convenablement un discours (*sermocinari*) qu'à une personne ou à une certaine multitude[24] dont l'attitude est uniforme quand elle reçoit et croit ce qui est dit. En effet, il n'y a pas de différence entre cet homme unique et une telle multitude. La similitude qui est posée comme condition quand il

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22 *Sint* quoique BnF Lat. 16097, fol. 191va et *FDG* §30 aient *sit*.

23 *Inductiones:* il s'agit d'inductions à la compréhension, à la conviction…

24 En éliminant *vel* que *FDG* §30 et BnF Lat. 16097, fol. 191va ont ici, mais qui n'a pas de sens dans le contexte.

> s'agit de propos rhétorique ou discours est telle que cette similitude rassemble les hommes dont l'attitude diffère quand ils reçoivent, comprennent, croient et retiennent ce qui est dit. C'est pour cette raison qu'il faut donc que le discours remplisse les conditions énoncées précédemment,[25] à savoir: qu'il soit un propos (*oratio*) prolixe, qu'il comprenne plusieurs modes divers induisant la compréhension, la croyance et la conservation [par la mémoire]. Or, dans chaque discours, la définition de ces modes dépend de ceux que contient la multitude à laquelle on doit s'adresser (*FDAW* §30).

Les opérations du discours rhétorique envisagées dans ces lignes découlent d'un caractère essentiel de celui-ci: il s'adresse à une assemblée.[26] En effet, la persuasion d'un public élargi implique plusieurs opérations: la constitution des parties du discours certes, mais aussi d'autres facteurs. Pour démontrer ce point, al-Fārābī remarque que, dans les assemblées, les membres ont en général des intellects différents aussi bien quant à leur capacité de comprendre les concepts qu'à celle de croire, d'être convaincus.[27] Des procédés adaptés à ces variations doivent donc être utilisés par celui qui prononce un discours. En somme, l'égalité du résultat – la compréhension et la conviction – requiert une diversité d'opérations. Le discours devra donc comprendre toutes ces opérations.

Qu'est-ce que ces "opérations"? Il s'agit non seulement des "parties" structurant le discours (exorde, narration, but, vérification et épilogue), mais aussi de tous les autres moyens de persuader par celui-ci, qui ont été passés en revue plus haut.

Ailleurs, al-Fārābī donne une autre justification de la complexité des opérations mises en œuvre par la rhétorique. Comme elle vise à persuader et que la persuasion, contrairement à la certitude, est sus-

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25 Au début de cette citation.

26 Voir aussi: "La plupart des hommes n'appellent [en lisant *nominant* (BnF Lat. 16097, fol. 191va) et non *nominantur* (*FDG* §29)] discours que le propos (*orationem*) composé de ces quatre ou trois parties, quand elles ont été inventées pour qu'on les lise ou qu'on les récite dans quelque réunion (*collegio*) ou (*vel*) rassemblement (*congregatione*)" (*FDAW* §29).

27 La distinction entre la compréhension (*fahm*, *taṣawwur*) d'une part et la conviction (*taṣdīq*) d'autre part est un thème récurrent de la philosophie arabe (voir Deborah L. Black (1990), *Logic and Aristotle's* "*Rhetoric*" *and "Poetics" in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Leiden-New York-København-Köln, 71-8). Il est évoqué dès *FDG* §2. Il s'agit, pour dire les choses très brièvement, d'un côté, d'une conception qui, pour être correcte, doit respecter certaines règles, mais qui n'est pas encore un jugement se donnant comme vrai et, de l'autre, d'une adhésion à un jugement prétendu vrai.

ceptible d'être plus ou moins forte, il ne suffira pas de produire une preuve objective pour obtenir la meilleure persuasion possible, mais il faudra la renforcer par un maximum d'autres procédés:

> En tout cas, comme la nature de cette puissance ou faculté est telle qu'elle ne confère pas de certitude au discours qu'elle produit, mais seulement une croyance au sujet de quelque chose, de quelque manière que ce soit – bien que rien n'empêche cette chose d'être autrement qu'elle n'est – et que cette croyance est susceptible d'être plus ou moins forte ou faible, elle a besoin d'être fortifiée par n'importe quelle chose qui permet de la fortifier, et cela jusqu'à ce que la chose par laquelle on cherche à induire une croyance devienne plus persuasive et plus acceptable par l'auditeur et afin que le discours soit plus complètement en acte et exerce une impression plus forte sur l'âme de celui auquel on adresse un discours. Pour cette raison, Aristote a dit dans la définition de la rhétorique qu'elle est une "puissance qui s'efforce d'obtenir la persuasion possible,"[28] et le sens du mot "s'efforce," c'est parvenir à la possibilité ultime de l'effort ou au-delà d'elle. En effet, ce mot est utilisé dans les situations difficiles où il existe, espère-t-on, une possibilité d'atteindre la fin qu'on vise; et l'homme s'efforce, autant qu'il peut – il voudrait même pouvoir davantage – de parvenir à la chose désirée et recherchée. L'expression "persuasion possible" soutient[29] qu'il vise par là le sens suivant: il s'efforce d'atteindre le possible dans la persuasion ou satisfaction. Évidemment il l'atteint de la manière qu'il peut et induit ce qu'il peut et au sujet des choses par lesquelles la persuasion propre est destinée à se réaliser. L'une des choses par lesquelles il est possible de renforcer le discours rhétorique jusqu'à ce que la croyance produite par lui soit renforcée est que le contradicteur soit incliné à résister au dire par lequel on adresse un discours et dont on cherche la persuasion – ainsi, quand le contradicteur est affaibli dans son effort pour résister au locuteur ou à celui qui prononce un discours ou qu'il résiste, mais que le locuteur s'oppose à lui par quelque chose par quoi il défend son dire et désapprouve l'attaque qu'il subit, la persuasion de l'auditeur devient plus complète et plus efficace – et qu'avec cela, le juge soit incliné à comprendre et accepter avec clairvoyance ce que celui qui adresse un discours propose, ce par quoi celui qui adresse un discours propose, ce

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[28] *Rhét* I: 1355b 26-7, telle que rendue dans la traduction arabe anonyme (*TAL* I, 7, 10-11). Voir, sur la traduction de la définition de la rhétorique, *CmRhét A* III : 31 et, plus généralement, sur l'usage par al-Fārābī de la traduction anonyme de *Rhét*, *FDG* 133-7, et M. Aouad (1992), "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī, ou le concept de point de vue immédiat et commun," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy. A Historical Journal* II: 159-63.

[29] *Sustinet*. En arabe, sans doute *yaḥtamil*, qui signifie littéralement "supporte," mais qui a aussi le sens de "il est possible que".

> par quoi le contradicteur s'oppose à lui et ce par quoi le locuteur réfute le dire de ce dernier, afin que le juge écoute les deux dires exposés par l'une et l'autre personne, et qu'il juge ce qu'exige le plus efficace des deux dires pour la persuasion (*FDAW* §16).

II.2. *L'habitus rhétorique comme puissance de produire toutes les opérations du discours rhétorique*

Si le discours ou acte de la rhétorique consiste en une conjugaison de toutes ces opérations, la rhétorique sera un *habitus* permettant de produire ces diverses opérations.

> Puisqu'il en est ainsi, le propos rhétorique complet (*completa*) ou parfait (*perfecta*) est celui qui est composé des parties que nous avons énumérées et dans lesquelles sont réunis tous les modes induisant à la compréhension et à la croyance. C'est pourquoi un tel propos rhétorique sera valable pour tous les hommes. Ensuite, sera toujours plus complet le propos rhétorique qui embrasse de nombreux modes. Celui-ci dépend des manières d'être[30] de tous les hommes. Puisqu'il en est ainsi, il faut donc que la rhétorique soit un *habitus* par lequel l'homme a la puissance de tenir un discours (*sermocinationem*) dans chacune des choses singulières selon tous les modes de la persuasion. Et peut-être faut-il poser comme condition pour les choses singulières, qu'il s'agit des choses singulières dans les affaires humaines. Par conséquent, elles sont celles qu'il est nécessaire d'avoir dans le propos (*oratione*) en raison des conditions connues[31] afin que le propos (*oratio*) devienne un propos rhétorique (*rethoria*). Ce qui suit nécessairement de ces conditions connues, pour le locuteur (*dictore*), est l'*habitus* du propos rhétorique dont nous avons parlé. C'est ainsi qu'on doit comprendre le terme [d'Aristote] de "puissance."[32] Celui qui a en effet l'*habitus* parfait ne se heurte à aucun obstacle quand il adresse un discours (*sermocinando*) à une grande multitude. Car l'obstacle n'arrive principalement à l'homme qu'à cause du manque de confiance en soi. Celui qui a l'art parfait est confiant ou sûr de lui-même à cause de la science de la puissance qui est en lui. C'est pourquoi il ne se heurte à aucun obstacle (*FDAW* §31).

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[30] En lisant *manieries* (BnF Lat. 16097, fol. 191vb) et non *maneries* (*FDG* §31).

[31] Les conditions requises par la nature de l'auditoire en rhétorique, à savoir le fait qu'il est constitué d'assemblées de personnes : voir *FDG* §30, cité ci-dessus.

[32] Voir ci-dessus, n. 28.

II.3. *Comparaison de la rhétorique et de la faculté oratoire*

Le rapport de la rhétorique à la faculté oratoire est un rapport d'espèce à genre. Ainsi, al-Fārābī soutient que la rhétorique est l'espèce la plus utile et la plus dignes des espèces de la faculté oratoire en tant que la rhétorique est, à la différence des autres espèces de la faculté oratoire, éminemment politique:

> Avec cela, puisqu'Aristote a cherché par l'art de la [faculté] oratoire à le poser comme ce qui prépare à ce qui est utile à l'homme, il a posé son propre dire (*ditionem*) à ce sujet comme s'il préparait à une espèce plus utile et plus digne de propos relevant des [facultés] oratoires (*ad utiliorem specierum orationum oratoriarum et digniorem ipsarum*), ce qui est le propos rhétorique. En effet, la rhétorique est, parmi les autres (*ceteras*) espèces ou parties de la [faculté] oratoire, subordonnée aux cités et c'est là l'un des instruments de cette [faculté]. Car les principales puissances des activités dans les cités sont ces deux choses: la prudence et la rhétorique ou (*seu*) éloquence (*eloquentia*). De fait, la suprématie du philosophe est extérieure à cette matière. Mais les autres puissances et arts profitables dans les cités sont subordonnés à la suprématie de la prudence et de la rhétorique. C'est pour cette raison qu'on entend souvent les orateurs (*oratoribus*) dire: "L'épée est sous le pouvoir du calame, et non le calame sous le pouvoir de l'épée."[33] Mais ce n'est pas ici le lieu de discuter de ces sujets. Pour cette raison, la rhétorique a été rendue utile, nécessaire et honorable, et en raison de cette considération, Aristote a appelé son livre du nom de *Rhétorique* (*FDAW* §31).

De même, quand il examine le statut de l'oral et de l'écrit, al-Fārābī est amené à envisager le rapport des propos rhétoriques aux propos oratoires comme un rapport d'espèce à genre. Évoquant le propos rhétorique, il écrit:

> Et cela, parce que ce propos (*oratio*) est le seul qui réunisse les conditions des espèces de tous les propos oratoires (*specierum orationum oratoriarum omnium*). Une fois que l'homme sait les règles de ce propos (*orationis*), il pourra transférer ce qu'il veut de ces règles vers les autres espèces de propos oratoires (*ceteras species oratoriarum orationum*), sur n'importe quel point (*FDAW* §31).

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[33] Sur ce thème courant dans la littérature arabe, voir M. Aouad et M. Rashed (1997), "L'exégèse de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote: recherches sur quelques commentateurs grecs, arabes et byzantins. Première partie," *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale*, XXIII: 102-4.

Les propos rhétoriques sont une espèce parmi d'autres de propos oratoires. Mais cette espèce a ceci de particulier qu'elle réunit en elle les caractères de toutes les autres, alors que celles-ci n'ont que certains caractères à l'exclusion d'autres.

En conséquence, chacune des puissances constitutives de la rhétorique est aussi une faculté oratoire, bien qu'aucune d'entre elles, prise séparément, ne soit une rhétorique. C'est ce qui apparaît dans ce passage où al-Fārābī montre que l'on possède généralement naturellement l'une ou l'autre des puissances en question.

> On a déjà mis aussi en évidence que l'œuvre (*opus*) ou (*sive*) l'acte (*actus*) de la rhétorique est le discours, c'est-à-dire que l'acte de la rhétorique est ce par quoi on vise ce dont la détermination est déjà en nous[34]. Les modes de cette rhétorique sont nombreux et il n'arrive pas que[35] chaque homme ait par nature la puissance de tous les modes du discours. Mais il se peut qu'un homme atteigne l'un de ces modes et un autre [homme], un autre mode. Les puissances particulières qui concernent l'un ou l'autre des modes particuliers de ce discours sont les parties de l'*habitus* de la rhétorique. Donc, en d'autres termes, n'importe lequel des modes utilisés dans les matières de la [faculté] oratoire – et selon la matière de celle-ci, la détermination précède – est un certain acte parmi les actes de la rhétorique; par exemple, dans les propos rhétoriques, la plupart [des modes] qui concernent les mots et la réception.[36] En effet, ces actes sont certains des actes de la rhétorique. Mais la [faculté] oratoire embrasse toutes ces puissances, car toute puissance selon l'un des modes de la rhétorique appliqués aux choses de ce type et tendant vers l'un des buts qu'on a rappelés est une certaine [faculté] oratoire. Aucune de ces puissances cependant n'est une rhétorique complète. Voilà donc les puissances qui sont dans la plupart des gens et par lesquelles la plupart adresse des discours (*sermocinantur*) quand ils communiquent ensemble dans leurs affaires réciproques. En conséquence, tous utilisent certaines des actions du pro-

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34 Avant de produire les actes de la rhétorique, nous possédons une puissance déterminée de les produire.

35 En lisant *quod* (BnF Lat. 16097, fol. 192ra) et non *semper* (*FDG* §32).

36 *Acceptatio*. Il s'agit sans doute, comme le soutient Grignaschi (*FDG* 203, n. 2), des procédés acoustiques et des gestes qui visent à capter l'attention de l'auditeur. En effet, ils sont subsumés ailleurs sous le terme au sens voisin de *receptio:* "La manière d'être du visage, la disposition du corps et les choses qui y sont apparentées se rapportent à la réception (*receptionem*) des modes de la controverse et des gestes qu'[Aristote] mentionnera dans le troisième traité" (*FDAW* §39). Ces différents procédés sont subsumés par la tradition arabe sous la catégorie d'*al-akhdh bi-l-wujūh* (la saisie des visages), expression qui correspond à l'*hupokrisis* d'Aristote ("action," "jeu des acteurs"): voir à ce sujet *CmRhét A* III: 348-51.

> pos rhétorique et il y a en eux des puissances particulières qui sont des parties de l'*habitus* de la rhétorique (*FDAW* §32).

Al-Fārābī établit d'abord ici que l'on peut posséder naturellement l'une ou l'autre des puissances qui font partie de l'*habitus* rhétorique. Puis évoquant, à cette occasion, la faculté oratoire, il note que ces puissances sont aussi des puissances de la faculté oratoire. Mais chacune d'entre elles constituera une faculté oratoire, car chacune est une espéce de faculté oratoire, alors qu'aucune n'est la rhétorique et que seule l'est leur réunion. L'exemple des mots et de la "réception" n'est pas anodin. C'est ce qui est le plus couramment pratiqué et connu indépendamment même de l'art rhétorique hérité d'Aristote.

En somme, la faculté oratoire ne serait pas un *habitus* constitué du système des puissances de produire les différentes opérations qui peuvent concourir, dans l'allocution, à la persuasion – ce qui est le cas de la rhétorique – mais le genre sous lequel ces puissances sont subsumées. En conséquence, alors que la puissance de l'une ou l'autre de ces opérations ne saurait pas à elle seule constituer l'*habitus* rhétorique, elle pourrait en revanche être dite faculté oratoire. La faculté oratoire ne conjuguant pas toujours l'ensemble des puissances nécessaires à persuader les foules, elle sera moins utile à la politique que la rhétorique.

Cette détermination de la faculté oratoire ne couvre pas tout à fait celle que nous avons rencontrée au début de ce travail à propos de *FDG* §28. En effet, selon cette dernière, ce n'est pas n'importe laquelle des puissances susmentionnées qui suffit à constituer une faculté oratoire, mais, pour posséder celle-ci, il faut *au moins* que l'on ait la capacité de produire les deux parties centrales du discours, le but et la vérification. Toutefois, quelle que soit la détermination de la faculté oratoire, elle apparaît comme une sorte de genre de la rhétorique et ne saurait être confondue avec ce qu'al-Fārābī appelle ailleurs la rhétorique incomplète.

III. *La rhétorique complète, la rhétorique incomplète ou nécessaire, la rhétorique défectueuse*

"La rhétorique complète" concerne *toutes* les capacités conduisant à la persuasion au moyen de propos, à savoir la maîtrise des procédés de la persuasion que l'on peut rencontrer dans n'importe laquelle des parties du discours, ainsi que la capacité de structurer celui-ci en ses

différentes parties (*FDG* §§24 et 26). Or, nous avons vu que lorsqu'al-Fārābī présente la rhétorique absolument (c'est-à-dire sans accompagner ce mot d'un qualificatif), il la caractérise précisément par le fait qu'elle réunit toutes les puissances de la persuasion par des propos. Dans certains passages, rhétorique et rhétorique complète apparaissent même explicitement comme équivalentes (voir, par exemple, *FDAW* §§28 et 31, cités ci-dessus). Celui qui maîtrise la rhétorique (ou rhétorique complète) est le rhéteur (*rethor*). Le produit effectif, en acte, de la rhétorique (ou rhétorique complète) est le propos rhétorique (*rethoria*). En revanche, le propos en général, quel qu'il soit, est rendu par les mots de *sermo* ou de *ditio* (voir, par exemple, *FDAW* §28, cité ci-dessus).

De la rhétorique complète, al-Fārābī distingue "la rhétorique incomplète" et "la rhétorique défectueuse." Il ne s'agit pas des mêmes réalités. La rhétorique incomplète est

> la puissance de certains de ces discours au moyen de très peu de parties, par lesquelles on atteint le but recherché par le discours. Cela consiste en ce que l'homme a une puissance de discourir au moyen de deux propositions seulement, dont l'une est que la persuasion d'une certaine chose se trouve accomplie, et en ce que cet homme exprime ces propositions en respectant les conditions d'une construction, d'une inflexion, d'une composition et d'un ordre corrects, selon les possibilités de ceux qui parlent cette langue ou cet idiome. Quand l'homme a donc la puissance de faire un discours composé de mots ayant cette disposition et ces significations, on dira d'un tel homme qu'il est[37] rhéteur selon la rhétorique nécessaire bien qu'il n'ait pas la puissance d'induire, pour renforcer sa persuasion, les autres choses extérieures que nous avons énumérées (*FDAW* §23).

Les deux propositions dont il est question dans ce passage sont vraisemblablement, comme dans *FDAW* §28 (voir ci-dessus), les deux propositions de l'enthymème ou de l'exemple quand elles établissent l'objet même de la recherche. Elles contiennent déjà par elles-mêmes une vérification et un but. La rhétorique incomplète est une puissance bornée à la capacité de produire, pour établir l'objet du propos, des raisonnements formés de ces deux propositions formulées dans une expression correcte. La rhétorique incomplète est aussi dite "rhétorique nécessaire," sans doute parce que les raisonnements qui la

[37] En lisant *sit* (BnF Lat. 16097, fol. 190rb) et non *si* (*FDG* §23).

constituent sont nécessaires au propos oratoires (*FDG* §28). Aristote (*Rhét* III: 1414a 30-6), qui soutient aussi que le but et la vérification sont nécessaires au propos (*logos*), n'intègre pas cette thèse à une distinction entre rhétorique complète et rhétorique incomplète.

La rhétorique défectueuse est une puissance limitée à la production de l'un ou l'autre des moyens concourant à la persuasion au moyen des propos. Mais il ne s'agit pas forcément des raisonnements servant à établir l'objet même du discours. Cela peut être, par exemple, les propos induisant une passion:

> Il se peut qu'un homme n'ait la puissance de son discours que dans un certain genre de choses seulement, et non dans un autre; il se peut qu'un homme n'ait la puissance de discourir qu'au moyen de propos passionnels et relatifs aux caractères; il se peut enfin qu'un homme n'ait la puissance de discourir que par les seuls propos induisant la croyance. Quand donc il a la puissance de discourir dans un certain genre de choses par lesquelles on recherche la persuasion, sa rhétorique sera défectueuse (*FDAW* §23).

Il est intéressant de noter qu'al-Fārābī soutient que l'usage par les sciences de la rhétorique incomplète (ou nécessaire) peut être légitime. Ce n'est pas le lieu ici d'examiner en détail les rapports de la rhétorique et des sciences selon les *Didascalia.*[38] On se contentera de présenter de manière très résumée un point tiré de *FDG* §§11, 15 et surtout 27. La rhétorique peut légitimement intervenir dans les sciences à condition qu'il s'agisse de la rhétorique incomplète (ou nécessaire) et que le savant ne dispose pas encore de démonstrations pour établir son objet de recherche. Il peut alors provisoirement recourir à des arguments non certains, d'ordre persuasif, relevant de la rhétorique nécessaire (ou incomplète). C'est ce qu'aurait fait Aristote, dans *Le Livre des animaux*, à propos de la génération des abeilles. En d'autres termes, l'usage des enthymèmes serait parfois admissible en sciences, mais jamais l'incitation aux passions. De même que l'insistance sur la complexité de la rhétorique par comparaison à la moindre complexité de la faculté oratoire n'est pas fondée seulement sur un souci de clarification lexicale ou de classification, mais sur des raisons plus profondes (le caractère politique de l'auditoire de la rhétorique et les degrés d'intensité de la persuasion), de même l'élaboration des concepts de rhétorique complète et de rhétorique in-

[38] Voir, pour de plus amples explications, Aouad 1997, 220-42 (comme n. 6).

complète (nécessaire) semblent renvoyer, en dernière instance, aux tentatives d'al-Fārābī de préciser les rapports de la rhétorique avec les sciences.

IV. *Le substrat arabe*

Quels sont les termes arabes auxquels correspondent *oratoria* et *rethorica*?

Les correspondants de *rethorica* et des mots de même racine sont généralement *khaṭāba* et des mots de même racine dans les traductions d'Hermann. En voici quelques exemples: *al-aqāwīl al-khuṭabiyya*/*sermones rethoricae* [extrait du *Commentaire moyen à la* "*Rhétorique*" d'Averroès inséré par Hermann dans sa traduction de la version arabe de *Rhét:* vir W. F. Boggess (1971), "Hermannus Alemannus's Rhetorical Translations," *Viator* II: 240]; *khaṭīb*/*rethor* (traduction de *Rhét*: *TAL* I: 119, 23/BnF Lat. 16673, fol. 109ra); *khaṭāba*/*rethorica* [*Commentaire moyen à la* "*Poétique*" d'Averroès: Arisṭūṭālīs (1973), *Fann al-shiʿr maʿa l-tarjama al-ʿarabīyya al-qadīma wa-shurūḥ al-Fārābī wa-Ibn Sīnā wa-Ibn Rushd*, éd. ʿAbdarraḥmān Badawi, 2ème impression, Beyrouth, 250, 20/BnF Lat. 16673, fol. 171vb].

S'agissant d'*oratoria*, il est plus difficile de retrouver le terme arabe sous-jacent. Nous avons vu en effet qu'*oratoria* signifie toujours un propos dans lequel on utilise des procédés produisant un effet sur l'auditeur. Il y a, dans l'*oratoria*, une recherche de l'efficacité que l'on n'a pas dans les termes de *qawl* et *kalām*, qui désignent le propos en général et qui sont sans doute les mots qu'Hermann rend par *sermo* ou *oratio*. En revanche, l'idée de parole efficace semble plus présente dans le terme de *balāgha*.[39] On peut donc raisonnablement supposer qu'*oratoria* traduit *balāgha*.

Pour renforcer cette hypothèse, il n'est pas indispensable de s'appuyer sur le passage, d'ailleurs ambigu, du *Traité du Recensement des sciences*, cité ci-dessus et évoqué puis révoqué par Grignaschi. D'autres textes, assez nombreux dans la tradition arabe de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote, exhibent clairement le couple *balāgha*/*khaṭāba* dans le sens où le premier de ces concepts aurait une extension plus large que le second.

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39 Voir *CmRhét A* III: 8-9.

Le plus pertinent de ces passages est le début de la traduction arabe anonyme de *Rhét*. Voici ce qu'on lit au début de celle-ci: en titre, au haut de la page, *Rīṭūrīqā ay al-Khaṭāba*; et, dans la marge, *al-rīṭūrīqā balāgha fī al-ḥukūma*. *Khaṭāba* apparaît ainsi comme l'équivalent exact de *rhètorikè*, alors que *balāgha* est présentée comme plus générale: elle n'est rhétorique que lorsqu'elle concerne la *ḥukūma*. Ce terme est ambigu. Son sens de gouvernement (ministres dirigés par un premier ministre) est moderne. Dans la langue classique, il s'agit plutôt du procès judiciaire. Mais *ḥakīm*, de même racine, peut signifier aussi bien le juge que le chef qui décide.[40] Comme le contenu de *Rhét* porte clairement non seulement sur le genre judiciaire, mais aussi sur les genres délibératif et épidictique, l'annotateur de la traduction arabe ancienne ne devait pas viser, pour le titre de celle-ci, le seul genre judiciaire, mais tout ce qui concerne la gouvernance. *Balāgha fī l-ḥukūma* est donc à rendre par "[faculté] oratoire dans les affaires de gouvernance." Certes, bien qu'il soit établi qu'al-Fārābī a eu recours à la traduction arabe ancienne,[41] on ne peut assurer que la note marginale de celle-ci ait été connue de lui: elle est peut-être postérieure. Mais il n'empêche qu'il y a là un témoin d'une manière de comprendre les rapports de la *balāgha* et de la *khaṭāba* qui devait être courante dans les milieux philosophiques médiévaux.

D'autres traités de la tradition arabe de *Rhét* entendent d'ailleurs aussi *balāgha* en un sens plus large que *khaṭāba*. Ainsi, Averroès, au début de son *Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique*, dans lequel il utilise beaucoup le *Grand commentaire d'al-Fārābī à la Rhétorique,*[42] soutient que la *balāgha* peut être jusqu'à un certain point le fait de tout homme mais aussi un art dont les règles sont systématiquement saisies dans un livre, ce qui est précisément la *khaṭāba.*[43]

Cette détermination des rapports de *khaṭāba* et de *balāgha* est parfaitement en harmonie avec celle des rapports de *rethorica* et d'*oratoria*, quoi qu'en dise Grignaschi. En effet, nous avons vu plus haut qu'*oratoria* ne concerne pas seulement des formes imparfaites

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[40] Sur la remarque marginale (non signalée dans *TAL*) de la traduction arabe anonyme et sur *ḥukūma*, voir *CmRhét A* III: 1-6. Mais alors que je crois toujours que *ḥukūma* signifie, dans les passages d'Avicenne que je cite dans ces pages, les affaires judiciaires, je pense maintenant que ce mot a, dans la traduction arabe anonyme, le sens général de gouvernance.

[41] Voir, ci-dessus, n. 28.

[42] Voir, ci-dessus, n. 7.

[43] *CmRhét A* II, §1.1.2.

de *rethorica*, mais qu'elle en est le genre en tant que *rethorica* est une *oratoria* à l'usage des foules et donc une *oratoria* politique.

Du point de vue du contenu des notions, il semble donc qu'*oratoria* soit, en droit, parfaitement susceptible de rendre *balāgha*. Mais Hermann n'a-t-il pas en fait eu recours à d'autres termes pour traduire *balāgha*?

Ainsi, il arrive assez souvent que *balāgha* et les mots de cette racine soient rendus par *rethorica*. C'est, par exemple, le cas de *balīgh* de la traduction arabe anonyme rendu par *rethor* (*TAL* I, p. 85, 20 correspondant à BnF Lat. 16673, fol. 96ra) et de *anḥāʾ al-balāgha* des extraits du *Commentaire moyen à "La Rhétorique*" d'Averroès rendu par *rethoricales* (Boggess 1971: 240-1). Mais il s'agit toujours d'un contexte où il n y a pas à distinguer *balāgha* de *khaṭāba*. En revanche, dans les cas où la distinction s'impose, on voit mal comment il aurait été possible de traduire les deux termes de la même manière.

Qu'en est-il de *facundia*, que l'on rencontre dans *FDG* §14? Rien n'indique que ce terme ait été le mot utilisé par Hermann pour rendre *balāgha*: il peut très bien avoir servi à traduire *faṣāḥa* (éloquence verbale), comme le reconnaît Grignaschi lui-même (*FDG*, p. 172, n. 3).

Quant au mot *eloquentia*, j'en ai relevé trois occurrences dans les *Didascalia*, deux dans *FDG* §13, et une dans *FDG* §31.

> Comme nous avons désormais mis ces choses en évidence, il faut que nous disions ce qu'est le but de la [faculté] oratoire (*oratorie*) ou (*sive*) de l'éloquence (*eloquentie*) chez Aristote. Or au sujet de l'éloquence (*eloquentia*) ou (*seu*) rhétorique (*rethorica*), il apparaît à tout le monde que son acte est un certain discours (*sermocinatio*) (*FDAW* §13)
>
> En effet la rhétorique (*rethorica*) est, parmi les autres espèces ou parties de la [faculté] oratoire (*ortorie*), subordonnée aux cités et c'est là l'un des instruments de cette [faculté]. Car les principales puissances des activités dans les cités sont ces deux choses: la prudence et la rhétorique (*rethorica*) ou (*seu*) éloquence (*eloquentia*) (*FDAW* §31).

Il ressort de la dernière de ces occurrences que *eloquentia* n'est pas un synonyme de *oratoria*, mais une espèce politique de celle-ci, nommée aussi *rethorica*. En conséquence, dans la citation de *FDG* §13, l'expression *eloquentia seu rethorica* signifie des termes synonymes, alors que *oratorie sive eloquentie* n'en signifie pas. Il semblerait donc finalement que *rethorica seu eloquentia* soit une traduction double de *khaṭāba*.

Maintenant si l'on admet que *rethorica* rend *khaṭāba* et *oratoria balāgha*, *rethoria* traduirait *qawl khuṭabī* et *ditio sive locutio oratoria*, *qawl balīgh*.

La détermination des rapports de *l'oratoria*/*balāgha* avec *rethorica*/*khaṭāba* ne permet pas seulement de clarifier le sens des concepts et de souligner la fonction surtout politique de la rhétorique, mais elle est aussi solidaire des jugements d'al-Fārābī, dans les *Didascalia*, sur les points de vue de certains lettrés qu'il n'identifie pas explicitement. Comme j'essaie de le montrer ailleurs,[44] les affirmations attribuées à ces lettrés indiquent qu'il s'agit de personnalités généralement considérées comme traitant du *ʿilm al-balāgha* (la science de tradition essentiellement arabe de la *balāgha*) et le reproche qui leur est fait est de n'avoir donné qu'une détermination partielle de la rhétorique. Or, s'il est vrai que *balāgha*, outre son espèce rhétorique, comporte surtout des espèces n'ayant que l'un ou l'autre des caractères de la rhétorique, il ne faut pas s'étonner que la science qui s'est consacrée à cette *balāgha* se soit le plus souvent limitée à certains de ces caractères.

[44] Aouad 2006 (comme n. 11).

BI-
SOME MORPHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF ARABIC *BI-*: ON THE USES OF GALEX, II[1]

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Prepositions are vital elements of a language; they are, essentially, the cement that keeps it together. They have numerous functions which the genius of each language has assigned to them to perform as a first recourse when other means of expressing the desired meaning are lacking; as such, they are paragons of multitasking, to apply this new term to a reality that has existed from the very beginning. Classical Arabic prepositions are no exception, as is evident to anyone (and baffling to the beginner) looking at an entry on any preposition in, say, Lane's *Lexicon*; each preposition, it seems, means itself and all the others.

Arguably one of the most talented, if not the most talented, Classical Arabic preposition in this regard is *bi-*. The great Sībawayh laconically, but very appositely, simply said that *bi-* had essentially one function, to express adherence and combination, from which all others derive.[2] Medieval grammarians are deserving of our eternal gratitude for expanding upon Sībawayh's terse statement and analyzing in detail its various uses, conveniently summarized by Wright: it is used to express adhesion (*ilṣāq*), time and place (*ẓarfiyya*), swearing (*qasam*), companionship (*muṣāḥaba*, *mulābasa*), transitiveness (*taʿdiya*, *naql*), instrument (*istiʿāna*), cause (*sababiyya*, *taʿlīl*), and recompense

[1] It is a great pleasure to offer this minimal congratulatory token of my esteem to a colleague and friend, Wolfhart Heinrichs, in appreciation of his lasting contributions to Graeco-Arabic studies. For *GALex* see G. Endress and D. Gutas, *A Greek and Arabic Lexicon*, Leiden 1992ff. A first contribution on its uses has appeared in the Festschrift for Hans Daiber, ed. A. Akasoy (Leiden 2007): "Arabic Particles and Graeco-Arabic Translations. On the Uses of *GALex*, I."

[2] *al-Kitāb*, ed. ʿA. M. Hārūn (Cairo 1975), IV,217: *innamā hiya li-l-ilzāq wa-l-iḫtilāṭ ... fa-mā ttasaʿa min hāḏā fī l-kalāmi fa-hāḏā aṣluhū.*

or price (*taʿwīḍ, ṯaman*).[3] This is all well and good (*fa-bihā*, as the expression with *bi-* has it), and certainly correct, but it is not sufficiently discriminating or explanatory of the particular functions of the preposition in each case. Some greater clarity of analysis is needed. In anticipation of thorough and truly authoritative studies of Arabic prepositions, this can be achieved by comparing *bi-* with what it translates from another language that was translated into Arabic: classical Greek.

In the traditional enumeration of the uses of *bi-* just listed, it is to be noted that they do not all belong to the same category of function. In all but one the preposition has a semantic function, expressing a certain meaning, whereas in one, that of transitiveness (*taʿdiya* or *naql*), it functions as a morphological element of verbs: it is a feature that makes intransitive verbs of motion transitive, as in, to cite the Qur'ānic example given in the traditional grammars, *ḏahaba llāhu bi-nūrihim* (Q. 2:16), "God removed (took away) their light." In other words, the preposition *bi-* here has no other function than to make *ḏahaba* transitive; in itself it has no (or ceased to have any) meaning. This morphological function of *bi-* was quite well known to traditional grammarians, who rightly equated it to an essential morphological element of verbs, the duplicated middle consonant of the *faʿʿala* (II) form and the initial hamza of the *ʾafʿala* (IV) form, which make a verb causative or factitive.[4]

Other, and similar, morphological functions of *bi-* become apparent when the uses to which it is put in translating Greek are examined. The *Greek and Arabic Lexicon* (*GALex*), in this as in many other cases, offers ample illustrative material. In general, these uses in the case of *bi-* are six, if one excludes the *bi-* that makes verbs transitive (since this goes with the individual verbs) and the *bi-* that introduces the predicate in nominal sentences or after copulative verbs (for which see immediately below). *Bi-* is thus used to translate

(1) individual Greek prepositions, either alone or as part of a compound word;

(2) the verb ἔχω (to have) as well as suffixes of verbs, adjectives, and substantives that denote "having" a disease or a condition;

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[3] W. Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, Cambridge 1898, II,163-4. Cf. the entry in Lane's *Lexicon*, I,141-4, which, given its sources, also follows the traditional classification of these uses.

[4] See Lane's *Lexicon* I,141c for references.

(3) the morphology of Greek adjectives, pronominal adjectives, and reflexive pronouns, by making adjectives out of Arabic nouns or nominal phrases;

(4) the morphology of Greek cases with an adverbial signification and, by extension, the morphology of Greek adverbs;

(5) the adverbial or other modal sense of Greek primitive adverbs and prepositions by making adverbs out of Arabic nouns or nominal phrases;

(6) the adverbial sense of circumstantiality or instrumentality implied by the Greek syntactic structures known as the genitive absolute and participium coniunctum.

From this it is seen that *bi-* is used in its semantic function, that is, to translate a Greek word with a specific meaning, only in cases (1) and (2); in the remaining four cases it functions as a morphological feature of Arabic, in particular as a marker for adjectives and adverbs. The first two cases need not detain us, for they are transparent enough, except to note briefly that in (1), *bi-* translates various Greek prepositions denoting all the usual meanings of the preposition itself as catalogued by the Arab grammarians and listed above (viz., accompaniment or association, instrument, means or manner, cause, agency or origin, accordance or conformity, place or time, respect, direction or extent, and distance or difference), and that in (2), the preposition with an attached pronoun and the name of a disease or condition, in the well-known expression *bi-hī dāʾun* (he suffers from a disease), translates not only the verb ἔχω (to have, sc. a disease), but also verbal and adjectival suffixes expressing the same concept, like -ιάω in λεπριάω (to suffer from leprosy) = *man bi-hī ǧarabun*,[5] or -ικός in ἐπιληπτικός (epileptic) = *man bi-hī ṣarʿun*.[6]

In case (3) we observe the transition of the function of *bi-* in (2), as just mentioned, from the semantic to the morphological arena, for here it functions as a marker for adjectives; i.e., it translates the morphology of Greek adjectives, pronominal adjectives, and reflexive pronouns (in essence, the suffixes of these groups of words) by mak-

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[5] Diosc. *Mat. med*. I,144.13 = *WGAÜ* (M. Ullmann (2002), *Wörterbuch zu den griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungen des 9. Jahrhunderts*, Wiesbaden) p. 231.15. For the abbreviations and references to the Greek and Arabic editions cited see the List of Sources in *GALex*.

[6] Diosc. *Mat. med*. I,144.13, 145.18-19 = *WGAÜ* p.231.15, Ibn al-Bayṭār *Ǧāmiʿ* IV,95.2.

ing adjectives out of Arabic nouns or nominal phrases. Adjectives indicate the quality possessed by a substantive, and the preposition *bi-* attaches itself to the quality the subject has or is "with," as in ἀναγκαῖος (necessary) = *annahū bi-ḍṭirārin*,[7] or ἀρχοειδής (having the nature of a principle) = *bi-manzilati l-aṣli*.[8] The practice is particularly common in the translation of compound adjectives formed with the alpha privativum, as in ἀήθης (without character) = *bi-lā ʿādatin,*[9] ἄμετρος (without metre, prosaic) = *bi-ġayri waznin,*[10] ἀρρίζωτος (*not rooted*) = *bi-ġayri uṣūlin*.[11] Similarly *bi-* is also frequently used in the translation of Greek pronominal adjectives, as in ὅσος (as much as) = *bi-miqdāri mā*[12] and *bi-mablaġi mā*,[13] ὅλος and πᾶς, ἅπας (whole, entire) = *bi-asrihī*[14] or *bi-l-ǧumlati*,[15] ὁ αὐτός (the same) = *bi-ʿaynihī* (used ubiquitously), etc.

This function of *bi-*, as marker for adjectives, may incidentally throw some light on its well-known duty of introducing the predicate in nominal sentences or after copulative verbs, whether affirmative, negative, or interrogative.[16] The predicate in such sentences (e.g., as in the Qurʾānic *mā rabbuka bi-ġāfilin*, Q. 11:123) is essentially a predicate *adjective*, and the *bi-* can be taken as the morphological element that lends this quality to a participle or any other noun that constitutes the predicate.

Cases (4) through (6) all show *bi-* in its most common function, as marker for adverbs, translating different expressions of adverbial usage in Greek, as specified above. Greek cases frequently have adverbial function, so it is natural to see *bi-* used in their translation, and especially in the translation of the Greek dative which shows amazing

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7 Arist. *Part. anim*. III 4, 665b12 = 70.3.

8 Nicom. *Arithm*. 27.14 = 30.5.

9 Arist. *Poet.* 6, 1450a25 = 232.21 / fol. 134a21.

10 Arist. *Poet.* 9, 1451b1 = 238.20 / fol. 135b20.

11 Arist. *Hist. anim*. V 15, 548a5 = 233.11.

12 Arist. *Poet*. 15, 1454b3 = I, 252.23 / fol. 139a23.

13 Arist. *Poet.* 9, 1452a7 I, 242.6 / fol. 136b6

14 Arist. *Phys.* III 5, 205a11 = 238.7; IV 1, 224a26 = 489.10; IV 4, 211b22 = 310.12; IV 4, 212a19 = 325.1.

15 Arist. *Poet.* 18, 1456a16 = I, 260.11 / fol. 141a11.

16 Cf. H. Reckendorf (1895-8), *Die syntaktischen Verhältnisse des Arabischen*, Leiden, 241-3. It is to be noted that the example given at the very top of p. 242 from Ṭabarī is inaccurate and mistranslated. The preposition does not introduce the predicate but goes with *awlā bi-*, "most likely to be [true]," not "the first one is right," as Reckendorf has it.

correlation in its meanings with that of the preposition *bi-*, such as the instrumental dative (ταῖς πτέρυξιν, with the wings = *bi-ǧanāḥihī*[17]), dative of cause (νόσῳ, through sickness = *bi-maraḍin*[18]), the dative of measure of difference (δυάδι ἐλαττόνως, less by two = *yakūnu aqalla bi-ṯnayni*[19]), etc.

There is little need to document the use of *bi-* in the translation of Greek adverbs, either those with a specific adverbial morphology, where *bi-* translates the adverbial suffix -ως (παθητικῶς, in an affective way = *bi-l-alamiyyati*[20]) or the primitive adverbs (ἀνάπαλιν, conversely = *bi-ʿaksi ḏālika*[21]). More interesting is the use of *bi-* in the translation of the Greek circumstantial structures known as the participium coniunctum and the genitive absolute, as in, respectively, κάμψασα (having bent) = *bi-nawʿi nṯināʾin* (ἡ γὰρ φύσις παρὰ τὸ στόμα τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦ περιττώματος συνήγαγε κάμψασα, for nature brought the exit of excretion round near the mouth, having bent [it] = *min aǧli anna l-ṭibāʿa ǧamaʿa āḫira l-faḍlati qarīban mina l-fami bi-nawʿi nṯināʾin*),[22] and ἐντεμνομένου (as it is incised) = *bi-an tušraṭa* (τὸ δὲ ὀποβάλσαμον λεγόμενον ὀπίζεται ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ κύνα καύμασιν ἐντεμνομένου σιδηροῖς ὄνυξι τοῦ δένδρου, the so-called juice of the balsam-tree is extracted during the heat waves at the time of the Dog-star as the tree is incised with iron claws = *wa-ammā duhnu l-balasāni fa-innahū yuḫarraǧu baʿda ṭulūʿi l-kalbi bi-an tušraṭa l-šaǧaratu bi-mišrāṭin min ḥadīdin*).[23] And finally, *bi-* figures even in the translation of the adverbial prefixes δυσ- (with difficulty) and εὐ- (well, easily), as in δυσοικονόμητος (manageable with difficulty) = *lā yudabbaru illā bi-ġammin*,[24] and in εὐσυνάρμοστος (easily joined together), with an affirmative-negative semantic metathesis = *lā yalta'imu bi-ʿusratin*.[25]

As a whole, Sībawayhi is perhaps right in saying that the fundamental function of *bi-* is to express adherence (*ilzāq*); but a distinction must be made between semantic adherence and morphological

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17 Arist. *Hist. anim*. IX 33, 619b17 = 415.16.
18 Arist. *Metaph*. E 3, 1027b2 = 729.9.
19 Nicom. *Arithm*. 95.7 = 75.16.
20 Arist. *Rhet.* III 7, 1408b12 = 191.15; III 17, 1418a19 = 217.17
21 Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I 4, 1095b1 = 119.15.
22 Arist. *Gener. anim.* I 15, 720b19 = 18.13.
23 Diosc. *Mat. med.* I, 24.10 = Ibn al-Bayṭār, *Ǧāmiʿ* I, 107.33.
24 Artem. *Onirocr.* 186.20 = 338.10.
25 Arist. *Gener. anim*. I 7, 718a29 = 11.2.

adherence. It would improve the analysis and help the understanding of this difficult but crucial preposition if in the future its morphological functions were listed and discussed in the morphology section of grammars rather than in that of syntax.

HAZAJ
GENESE EINES NEUPERSISCHEN METRUMS

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I. *Präambel*

I.1. Den Ausgangspunkt des folgenden Beitrags bildet die alte Frage nach den Kräften, die die äussere Form der neupersischen Dichtung bestimmt haben, so wie uns diese in den Zeugnissen ihrer formativen Periode 850 – 950 unserer Zeitrechnung entgegentritt. Neu ist nur die Beiziehung einer persischen Koran-Paraphrase, die spätestens zu Beginn des erwähnten Zeitraums in Bukhara entstanden ist, im Folgenden BQP genannt, und von Aḥmad ʿAlī Rajā'ī anno 1974 herausgegeben wurde[1].

[1] Unter dem Titel *Poli meyān-e sheʿr-e hejā'i o ʿarūżi-e fārsi dar qorun-e avval-e hejri*, Teheran 1353/1974. Es handelt sich um das Fragment einer Abschrift, die mit Q. 10:61 beginnt und mit Q. 14:25 endet. Das Buch wurde mir liebenswürdigerweise von Herrn Dr. Johannes Thomann zur Ausleihe beschafft. Herzlich danken möchte ich an dieser Stelle auch meinem verehrten Kollegen Prof. Dr. Bo Utas, dass er mich über eine Xerokopie in seinen grundlegenden und wegweisenden Beitrag „Prosody: Metre and rhyme" zum ersten Band der *History of Persian Literature,* ed. H. de Bruijn (2007), New York, Einsicht nehmen liess. Zu danken habe ich ferner Frau Prof. Dr. B. Gruendler für ihre wertvollen Anregungen bei der Durchsicht des Manuskripts, ganz besonders aber auch meiner hochgeschätzten Kollegin Dr. Gudrun Schubert, der ich die Erstellung der Computer-Version übergeben durfte. Für den geneigten Leser vorwegnehmen möchte ich eine Bemerkung zur Umschrift. Bei der Wiedergabe der Konsonanten folge ich den Regeln der Herausgeber, wobei ich mich in der Orthographie an das Manuskript halte. Die Vokale bezeichne ich bei modernen Texten und Namen nach der in Iran üblichen Weise, in klassischen Werken jedoch nach der vermutlichen damaligen Aussprache, Kurzvokale einfach als a, i, u,

I.2. Die Beschäftigung mit der Frage nach der Vorgeschichte der neupersischen Dichtung litt bisher unter dem Umstand, dass diese nur durch einige wenige, örtlich und zeitlich disparate, eher zufällig erhaltene Fragmente bezeugt war, die über die Tatsache einer Existenz hinaus nur vorsichtige Aussagen erlaubten[2]. Erschwerend kam dazu, dass diejenigen Bereiche der Dichtung, deren Entwicklung während der formativen Periode im Vordergrund des Interesses standen, nämlich Lyrik und Panegyrik, zuvor als Gelegenheitsdichtung gar nicht aufgezeichnet wurden, sondern der Mündlichkeit überlassen blieben[3]. Dies im Gegensatz zu der entsprechenden arabischen Dichtung, deren Schriftlichkeit schon zwei Jahrhunderte früher anfing.

I.3. Nach der islamischen Eroberung des Sasanidenreichs hatte man sich dort des Arabischen zu bedienen, wenn man etwas offiziell zur Sprache bringen wollte. Die unterworfene Bevölkerung nahm die entsprechende Anregung, sich die Kenntnis des Arabischen anzueignen, in einer uns aus der Kolonialzeit bekannten Art und Weise auf. Grob gesagt nahm die Bereitschaft, die persische Muttersprache von dem fremden Idiom beeinflussen, beherrschen oder gar ablösen zu lassen, von Westen nach Osten ab. Am deutlichsten zeigte sie sich im Irak, der Residenz der Sasaniden, dessen grossteils semitische Bevölkerung jedoch nur oberflächlich iranisiert worden war und z.T. auch noch dem Arabischen verwandte Sprachen wie Aramäisch sprach. Zentren der Arabisierung, aber vor allem auch des arabisch-persischen Kulturaustauschs und Ausgangspunkte der Eroberung und Verwaltung Irans wurden dort die institutionalisierten Heerlager Basra und Kufa. Die Methode, ausserhalb der eroberten Städte Heerlager als Macht- und Verwaltungszentren einzurichten, die den Kulturaustausch förderten, bewährten sich auch im Westiran, wo zur Zeit der Eroberung noch von Adharbayjan im Norden über Medien und Khuzistan bis in die Persis zoroastrische Hochburgen blühten. Hervorzu-

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wobei die Färbung offen bleibt, Langvokale als ā (im Falle einer metrisch lang zu sprechenden Endung -a als ä), ē, ī, ō, ū. Bei der Unterscheidung von *maʿrūf-* und *majhūl*-Vokalen versuche ich in klassischen Texten dem Stand der Forschung gerecht zu werden, folge aber bei Eigennamen – wie übrigens auch im Falle der Konsonanten – der Gebräuchlichkeit, schreibe also Rūdakī, nicht Rōdhakī.

[2] Genaueres zu ihrer Publikation in den Anmerkungen 1, 11, 12-13, 16-18, 24, 38, 52.

[3] Der älteste *dīvān* eines Einzeldichters, der ausdrücklich in den Quellen erwähnt wird, scheint der von Ḥanẓala-e Bādhghēsī zu sein (Niẓāmī-i ʿArūżī, *Chahār maqāla*, ed. Qazvini/Moʿin (1334), Teheran, 49).

heben sind Hamadan und Isfahan, wo die persische Siedlung mit dem ursprünglich getrennt angelegten arabischen Heerlager allmählich zusammenwuchs. Wieder anders gingen die Eroberer im Ostiran, dem dritten iranischen Bereich, vor. In der Südhälfte, z.B. in dem schwer zu beherrschenden Sijistan (Sīstān), einst Land der halbnomadischen Saker, wo man auch die neue Darī-Panegyrik erfunden haben wollte[4], verfuhren die Araber wie in Westiran. Hingegen kamen sie in dem nördlich gelegenen, weiten Khorasan auf den Gedanken, sich im Falle der Hauptstadt Marv einmal nicht konzentriert einzunisten, sondern – wie die dortigen Grossen selbst – auf die zahlreichen Gehöfte der Umgebung zu verteilen. Hierbei verfestigte sich nicht nur der Kulturaustausch in Konversionen und Verschwägerungen, sondern erhob sich auch die Frage, ob man den Koran in persischer Übersetzung rezitieren dürfe[5].

I.4. Damit wären wir bei unserem Thema. Die Antwort fiel vorwiegend negativ aus. Doch schon aus dem noch zum dritten Bereich gehörigen Khorasan hat sich in dem von ʿAlī Ravāqī 1364/1985 herausgegebenen *Qor'ān-e Qods* ein bejahendes Zeugnis erhalten. Wie nicht anders zu erwarten, eine Interlinearübersetzung[6], die noch älter ist als die freie, metrisch gebundene Paraphrase der BQP, die Urtext und Übersetzung stückweise in getrennten Blöcken liefert und aus Transoxanien stammt, das mit Khᵛārazm im Norden und Baktrien samt dem heutigen Afghanistan im Süden den vierten Bereich bildet, also schon seit Pērōz I. (459-84) nicht mehr zum Sasanidenreich gehörte, sondern selbständigen Fürsten unterstand und erst durch die Kriegszüge Qutayba b. Muslims unter Walīd I. (705-15) wieder einem Grossreich eingegliedert worden war. Jetzt machte sich ein Problem bemerkbar, von dem man mehr als zwei Jahrhunderte verschont geblieben war, nämlich Untertan einer Obrigkeit zu sein, die religiös gebunden war, ja neuerdings sogar eine bestimmte Religion als solche zu vertreten hatte, und das noch in einer Fremdsprache, die als Medium einer letztgültigen Offenbarung geheiligt sein wollte. Betroffen davon war in erster Linie Samarqand, ehemaliger Zufluchts-

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[4] So nach der entsprechenden Provinzgeschichte *Tārīkh-i Sēstān*, ed. Bahār (1314 sh.), Teheran, 209f.

[5] Vgl. van Ess, J. (1992), *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert der Hidschra*, Berlin/New York, II: 491.

[6] Einschlägige Photokopien aus diesem wichtigen Werk verdanke ich der Liebenswürdigkeit der Herren Dr. J. Thomann und Dr. H. Hosravi.

ort und Missionszentrum der Heterodoxen, vor allem der Manichäer. Dort konnten aber auch Konkurrenten wie Zoroastrier und Buddhisten friedlich nebeneinander agieren.

I.5. Hierzu eine kleine Randbemerkung. Die BQP richtet sich an die Bevölkerung von Bukhara. Dort blühte noch in der Mitte des 10. Jhts. ein zoroastrischer Kult, der der Passion Siyāvushs galt und in den ʿĀshūrāʾ-Feierlichkeiten der Schiiten weiterleben konnte. Ich habe in der BQP jedoch keine antizoroastrischen Bemerkungen gefunden, wohl aber solche, die sich auf den Buddhismus beziehen lassen. In den Suren des BQP-Fragments wird immer wieder gegen die Verehrung eines anderen als Gott polemisiert, und wo diese andere Wesenheit mit Namen genannt wird, heisst sie *but*, worin unschwer Buddha zu erkennen ist. Konkret geht es um die Verehrung von Buddha-Statuen[7], z.B. Q. 11:111, wo dem Erstaunen Ausdruck gegeben wird, dass es Leute gibt, die

> Das verehren, was sie (selbst) zurechtschnitzen
>
> *mē bi-parastand ān-ch bi-tarāshand*

Doch wird andererseits auch versucht, im Koran Gedanken nachzuweisen, die buddhistischer Weltsicht entsprechen. So spiegelt sich das buddhistische Gebot der Erhaltung und Unverletzbarkeit jeglichen Lebens etwa darin wider, dass die BQP den koranischen Gott in dem berühmten Vers Q. 11:6 explizit sogar das Weiterleben der Ameise als kleinstes und nicht immer willkommenes Tierchen garantieren lässt:

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[7] Der Verfasser verwendet für die Buddha-Verehrung gerne den Terminus *tashbīh*, „Anthropomorphismus". Inwieweit er damit auch theologisches Wasser auf seine Mühle leiten konnte, wäre noch zu untersuchen. Für seine Predigt selbst geradezu klassisch ist seine Paraphrase von Q. 13:14 („Das wahre Gebet gilt ihm (Gott). Diejenigen aber, zu denen sie beten statt zu ihm, schenken ihnen in nichts Gehör. (Es ist) vielmehr, wie wenn einer seine Hände nach Wasser ausstreckt, damit es seinen Mund erreicht; doch es erreicht ihn nicht ...", zitiert nach Paret, R. (1983), *Der Koran*), was er so wiedergibt (187, 9-12):

> Bete zum Wahren! Denn der Wahre hört (dich).
> Von anderen als Ihm etwas zu wünschen, ist sinnlos.
> Der Buddha weiss nichts, noch hört er etwas.
> Der Buddha kann auch keinen Wunsch erfüllen.
> Den Buddha anzurufen ist genau so, wie wenn
> ein Durstiger mit seiner Hand das Wasser herruft.
> Sooft er herruft oder seine Hand bewegt,
> schlussendlich bleibt er ohne Zweifel durstig.

junbanda ma-dān tu dar zamīn yaksar
illā bar mā-k ō-rā bi-dārēm
ān-jā ki ō būdh z-ān-jā ki āyadh[8]
bi-kull-i makān az ō khabar dārēm
rōzī hama-rā jarīda dārēm
mōrē bi-mathal żāyiʿ na-gyārēm

Wisse, dass auf der ganzen Erde es kein Tier gibt,
das Wir nicht zu betreuen hätten,
wo es auch sein mag und woher es kommt,
an jedem Ort haben Wir Kunde von ihm.
Der Unterhalt von allen ist registriert bei Uns.
Auch keine Ameise z.B. käme bei Uns zu kurz.

Doch kehren wir zum Thema zurück.

I.6. Etwas gab es, das der Bevölkerung der ganzen vier oben erwähnten Bereiche gemeinsam war, nämlich die Koine einer Verkehrssprache, die zwar aus dem Irak stammte, aber bis in den Osten der iranischen Oikumene verstanden und gepflegt wurde. Man nannte sie Darī, „Residenzsprache", weil man sich zunächst in der Reichshauptstadt (Madā'in), besonders auch bei Hofe darin unterhielt. Linguistisch betrachtet stellte sie eine neupersische Erbmischung aus südwestpersischem Pahlavi und nordwestpersischem Parthisch dar, den Sprachen der beiden vorausgegangenen Dynastien. Nach dem Zeugnis des Westpersers Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (st. 756) wurde sie in Ostpersien, dem Entstehungsort der neupersischen Dichtung, von den Balchern geprägt[9], also dort, wo einst das buddhistische Missionszentrum Navavihāra (Nawbahār) geblüht hatte, bis es von den Arabern zerstört wurde. Aber man scheint sich im Ostiran des 8. Jhts. auch allgemein des Darī bedient zu haben, wenn man auf eine gewisse Breitenwirkung zielte, nicht nur in der Poesie – in der nach den arabisch orientierten Ṭāhiriden, bei denen sogar ein Abū Tammām auf eine Stellung als Hofdichter hoffen konnte, ihre politischen Nachfolger, die Ṣaffāriden, eine Blütezeit neupersischer Panegyrik ins Leben riefen – son-

[8] Ich gebe die zweite und die dritte Zeile des Textes in der Umschrift so wieder, wie die Handschrift sie festhält, würde aber dem Metrum zuliebe in der zweiten Zeile lieber lesen: *illā bar mā-k * ō-rā bi-dārēm*, obwohl deutlich *ki* vokalisiert wird, und in der ersten Hälfte der dritten lieber *ān-jā ki buvadh* anstelle von *ān-jā ki ō būdh*; der Sinn wäre derselbe, doch bliebe die normale metrische Gestalt der ersten Halbzeile erhalten. Die Form *buvadh* passt besser zu *āyadh* und das *ō* kommt schon in der zweiten Zeile vor, wäre in der dritten somit verzichtbar.

[9] Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, Druck 1348, Kairo, 19.

dern vor allem auch in der Prosa. Und hierfür sorgten in Marv besonders die Abbasiden, die während ihrer Umsturzplanung sogar ein grundlegendes astrologisches Werk wie das *Kitāb al-Mawālīd* aus dem Mittelpersischen nicht nur ins Arabische übersetzen liessen, sondern gerade auch in Darī.[10] Enge Beziehungen zu Marv – vielleicht noch mehr als zu Samarqand – pflegte man aber auch in Bukhara, und damit kommen wir wieder zur BQP.

II. *Die Verlockung des Reims*

II.1. Die Perser lernten also nun Arabisch, die Sprache des Korans und ihrer neuen Herren. Falls sich darüber hinaus mit diesem Entschluss auch ein persönliches Erlebnis verband, dürfte es akustischer Natur gewesen sein, mag es sich nun um eine Koran- oder Gedicht-Rezitation, eine Ansprache oder auch nur eine Exklamation wie *Allāhu akbar!* gehandelt haben, d.h. einerseits der prägnante Sprachrhythmus und andererseits der Reim. Wenden wir uns nun dem letztern zu.

II.2. Reim als bewusst eingesetztes Kunstmittel ist keine Selbstverständlichkeit, ergibt sich aber in gewissen Sprachen aus dem Wesen der Wortbildung wie im Chinesischen, während es in anderen – und dies ist uns von europäischen Sprachen her vertraut – durch Übernahme aus einem fremden Idiom zustande kommen kann. Bei der dem Arabischen über die Morphemtypen der Wortbildung geläufigen vokalischen Assonanz wäre zu erwarten, dass diese die künstlerische Rolle, die sonst der Reim ausübt, übernimmt. Dies scheint ursprünglich auch der Fall gewesen zu sein. Durchgesetzt hat sich aber eine Reimkonzeption, bei der die entscheidende Rolle einem Konsonanten, genannt *rawīy*, zukommt. Was auf diesen an Lauten noch folgt, muss durch alle Reimglieder gleich tönen. Kurzer Vokal vor dem *rawīy*, kann wechseln, langer nur zwischen *ū* und *ī*. Die persische Dichtung hat diese Regeln während der formativen Periode verschärft, vor allem postuliert sie nicht nur einen (oder mehrere) Reimkonsonanten, sondern eine Reimsilbe, deren Vokal durch alle Reimglieder hindurch gleich bleiben muss, wobei auch *ī* und *ē, ū* und *ō* sowie sämtliche kurzen Vokale von einander unterschieden werden, im Prinzip also nicht reimen.

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[10] Gutas, D. (1998), *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, London/New York, 37f.

II.3. Die Perser scheinen den Reim in der skizzierten Weise als Kunstmittel vor dem Islam noch nicht verwendet zu haben. Die Gedichte, die sich seiner bewusst bedienen, stammen – soweit sie nicht direkt oder indirekt datierbar sind – mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit alle aus islamischer Zeit, mögen sie nun Darī oder noch Pahlavi als Sprache benützen[11]. Zu ihnen zählen einerseits die in Abschnitt 1.2. erwähnten Darī-Fragmente und andererseits, im Mittelpersischen, ein von Henning ans Licht gezogenes Andarz-Fragment[12], eine von Tavadia bearbeitete Bahrām-Ballade[13] und ein Garshāsp-Hymnus aus dem sistanischen Heiligtum von Karkōy[14]. In allen wird gereimt, aber auf unterschiedliche Weise.

II.4. Die Verschiedenheit bezieht sich einerseits auf die Länge der Reimglieder und andererseits auf die Art und Qualität des Reims. Was den ersten Punkt anbetrifft, so ist zwischen Versen, d.h. Doppelzeilen, Halbversen, d.h. Zeilen, und Viertelversen, d.h. Halbzeilen, zu unterscheiden, wobei der Versbegriff aus dem arabischen Prosodiebereich stammt. Henning stellt denn auch beim Andarz-Fragment fest, dass es Qasiden-artig mit Binnenreim beginnt und mit entsprechendem Versendreim weiterfährt. Auch die BQP reimt vielfach Doppelzeilen aufeinander und nur in gewissen Fällen Zeilen[15]. Noch seltener stösst man auf Binnenreim zwischen Halbzeilen.

II.5. Facettenreicher ist das Problem von Art und Qualität des persischen Reims. Normalerweise endet ein persischer Satz mit dem Verbum. So erstaunt es nicht, dass –wie schon Benveniste feststellte – die Karriere des persischen Reims bescheiden mit gleichen Verbalendungen beginnt[16]. So auch noch oft in der BQP. Bald ist es dann einmal dasselbe Verbum, das sich im ältesten Darī-Zeugnis dieser Art zusätzlich mit einem Fragewort verbindet[17]:

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[11] Hierzu Bo Utas, *Prosody*, Kap. 5 („The Persian version of the ʿarūż system“).

[12] Henning, W.B. (1950), „A Pahlavi Poem“, BSOAS XIII/3, 641-648.

[13] Tavadia, J.C. (1955), „A Rhymed Ballad in Pahlavi“, JRAS, 28-36.

[14] *Tārīkh-i Sēstān*, 37. Die Lesung ist im Einzelnen umstritten.

[15] Ein charakteristisches Beispiel bildet der in Abs. 3.3. zitierte Vierzeiler.

[16] Benveniste, É. (1932), “Le mémorial de Zarēr“, Journal asiatique 220, 245-293; z.B. in einer pentadischen Strophe (entsprechend fünf Halbzeilen in der BPQ) mit den Verben *nišīnet, hilēt, ōžanēt, rasēt, vēnēt* (S. 280).

[17] Vgl. hierzu den grundlegenden Aufsatz von G. Lazard (1970), „Ahu-ye kuhi ... le chamois d’Abu Hafs de Sogdiane et les origines du robâi“, in: M. Boyce und J. Gershevitch (eds.), *W.B. Henning Memorial Volume*, London 238-244. Beide Zeilen endeten ursprünglich wohl auf *davadhā*, „läuft“, was auch der Gangart einer eilen-

āhū-yi kōhī dar dasht chigōnä davadhā
yār na-dāradh bē yār chigōnä davadhā

Wie kann die Berggazelle laufen in der Steppe?
Keinen Freund hat sie. Wie kann sie laufen ohne Freund?

Der nächste Schritt auf dem Entwicklungsweg dieses „Reimrefrains" ist dann die „Verbzusammensetzung", eine Technik, die schon im Mittelpersischen beginnt, um schliesslich im Darī auszuufern, und die darin besteht, dass man anstelle semantisch prägnanter Verben jeweils Nomina desselben semantischen Inhalts als Objekt eines blassen Verbums wie *kardan, sākhtan, numūdan* verwendet und damit einen „Pseudoreim", beruhend auf dem Gebrauch desselben Verbums, gewinnt. Sofern man sich überhaupt noch die Mühe eines richtigen Reimens macht, kann man sie an der Wahl des Objekts, häufig eines arabischen Verbalnomens, abreagieren, wie man dies seit der formativen Periode praktiziert hat. Aber die BQP verzichtet oft auch auf diese Beschwerlichkeit.

II.6. Unter solchen Umständen versteht man, dass nominale Reime in der BQP seltener sind als verbale. Umso mehr fällt auf, dass die drei in Abs. 2.3. erwähnten mittelpersischen Gedichte trotz ihren relativ zahlreichen Reimgliedern nominal reimen. Zwei davon, das Andarz-Fragment und die Bahrām-Ballade, begnügen sich zwar mit der häufigen Silbe *–ān*, aber das dritte, aus Sīstān stammende, verwendet achtmal *-ōsh*, und dies noch bei einem Halbzeilenreim, der ohnehin anspruchsvoller ist als der Reim von Zeilen und Doppelzeilen. Dementsprechend gering ist denn auch der Bestand an korrekten Halbzeilenreimen in der BQP. Doch umso näher liegt es andererseits, auf den exquisiten Gegenstand noch näher einzugehen (Kap. 6).

II.7. Sehr oft haben wir es in der BQP aber gar nicht mit Reim zu tun, sondern mit dessen Vorläuferin, der Assonanz. Auch dies wird durch die erwähnten neupersischen Kleinode in den ersten beiden muslimischen Jahrhunderten eingeläutet. Da ist einmal als eine Art Vorzeigemodell volkstümlicher Darī-Dichtung das berühmte Spottliedchen zu nennen, mit dem die Balcher Jugend anno 726 und 737

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den Gazelle entspricht. Um den Regeln der klassischen Reimtechnik zu genügen, die eine derartige Wiederholung im Reim nicht zuliesse, hat die Überlieferung das zweite der beiden *davadhā* durch *ravadhā*, „geht", bzw. *buvadhā*, „ist", ersetzt, beides blass gegenüber *davadhā*.

den arabischen Statthalter Asad b. ʿAbdallāh begrüsste, wenn er von einem Feldzug geschlagen zurückkehrte, eine Halbzeilen-Quartine, die ich dem Leser nicht vorenthalten möchte[18]:

az Khuttalān āmadhēh
ba-rō tabāh āmadhēh
ābār bāz āmadhēh
khushk nizār āmadhēh

Da kommst du ja von Khuttalān;
Kommst mit Gesichtsverlust nun an;
Kommst jetzt zurück als Obdachloser:
Dürr ausgemergelt kommst du an!

mit klassischem Reimrefrain und davor einer Assonanz-Silbe mit langem *ā*-Vokal, geschlossen jedesmal mit einem anderen Konsonanten, ein Schulbeispiel, das man nicht besser hätte erfinden können, um den Weg der Entwicklung mit Belegen zu pflastern. Noch nicht mit Reimrefrain verziert sind drei ein paar Jahrzehnte ältere, unseriöse Halbzeilen, mit denen der arabische Dichter Ibn Mufarrigh in Basra vor persischen Zuhörern die ihnen vertraute Assonanz mit den Zeilenenden ... *nabīdh-ast,* ... *zabīb-ast* und ... *sapēdh-ast* verulkte, denn die Araber hatten die Assonanz schon in vorislamischer Zeit dem Fortschritt des Reims geopfert, auch wenn sie noch gelegentlich im Koran anzutreffen ist[19]. Wie geläufig sie aber noch dem Verfasser der BQP war, zeigt die Gewitterschilderung in der danach benannten *Sūrat al-Raʿd* (Q:13:13). Der Passus beginnt und schliesst, reimtechnisch korrekt, im Prinzip nur jede zweite Zeile reimend, in den beiden ersten und der vierzehnten, letzten Zeile mit dem Reimrefrain *padīdh āradh* und einem vorausgehenden langen *ā* der Reimsilbe selbst, lässt jedoch die vierte und die zehnte auf *ḥarīq āradh*, die sechste und achte auf *tasbīḥ āradh (*bzw. *ārand*) und die zwölfte auf *tashbīh āradh* enden. Formal betrachtet liegt also die spätere persische Ghazal-Form

[18] Die Begebenheit mit dem Spottliedchen erzählt Ṭabarī in drei Varianten. Zweimal im Jahre 108/726 und einmal 119/737. Die Versionen von 726 erwähnen nur zwei Halbzeilen, mit gleicher ersten und ungleicher zweiten (*Annales,* ed. de Goeje (1885-9), Leiden, 2, 1492 und 1494). Die dritte Version (von 737) nimmt die beiden Halbzeilen der erstgenannten Fassung auf und fügt zwei neue hinzu (*ibid.* 1602f.), wie es sich für eine Halbzeilen-Quartine gehört. Im Ganzen waren also fünf Halbzeilen im Spiel; *in concreto* gab man aber offenbar nur zwei oder vier zum Besten. Eine Neigung zur Binarität der Reimglieder, die auch in der BQP auffällt.

[19] Als Beispiel sei hier nur Sure 78 erwähnt, wo sich der Reim erst von Vers 19 an auf *–ābā* festzulegen beginnt, aber mit kleinen assonantischen Unterbrechungen.

vor, nur eben mit Assonanz statt Reim, und den *makhlaṣ*-Vers füllt am Schluss die „Moral der Geschichte“:

> Betrachte diese Blitze als ein kleines Zeichen,
> Bis Er ein hartes Strafgericht erscheinen lässt!

II.8. Abschliessen möchte ich das Reim-Kapitel mit einer Bemerkung zum Ursprung des paarweisen Wechselreims, arabisch belegt in der *muzdawija* und persisch im *mathnavī*, beide als metrischer Träger langer epischer Gedichte berühmt geworden, beide aber erstmals in kurzen Zweiverslern bezeugt. Auf den arabischen hat Manfred Ullmann hingewiesen[20]. Es handelt sich um 2 x 2 *rajaz*-Verse, die Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd anno 715 gesprochen haben soll, als er auf der Suche nach dem Kopf des ermordeten Qutayba b. Muslim war[21], nachdem er sich an dessen Tätigkeiten in Khorasan und Sogdien beteiligt hatte. Aus derselben Gegend stammt aber offenbar auch der älteste bekannte *mathnavī*-Zweiversler, eine Elegie auf Samarqand, das nach dem Straffeldzug Qutaybas wüst geworden war. Überliefert wird er vom Enkel eines von dort Vertriebenen und darf als klassisches Beispiel für die Metrik der ostiranischen Darī-Poesie vor der formativen Periode und sogar der BQP gelten[22]. Ob und wie die beiden Urzeugen für den arabischen und persischen Wechselreim zusammenhängen, muss vorläufig eine offene Frage bleiben. Der makabre Anfang hat dem Aufblühen der Gattung jedenfalls nicht geschadet, und ich kann mich nun dem eigentlichen Thema meines Beitrags zuwenden.

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[20] Ullmann, M. (1966), *Untersuchungen zur Rağazpoesie*, Wiesbaden, 50.

[21] Ṭabarī, *Annales*, 2, 1299.

[22] Der Überlieferer hiess Abū l-Yanbaghī ʿAbbās b. Ṭarkhān und lebte im späten 8. Jht. als gefürchteter Satiriker in Baghdad, dichtete zwar arabisch, liess aber gelegentlich auch persische Wörter in seine Verse einfliessen (ein Beispiel bei Ibn al-Muʿtazz, *Ṭabaqāt al-shuʿarā'*, ed. Farrāj (1956), Kairo, 131,10f.). Der Name seines Vaters war der Titel des Fürsten von Samarqand, als Qutayba b. Muslim bzw. sein Bruder dort aufkreuzte. Vermutlich schloss sich Ṭarkhān später in Marv der abbasidischen Bewegung an und gab seinem Sohn den Namen ʿAbbās. Dass dieser selbst noch persisch dichtete, ist unwahrscheinlich. Eher noch sein Vater. Wahrscheinlich aber stammen die Trauerzeilen vom Grossvater, der die Pracht Samarqands noch bewusst erlebt haben dürfte. Vgl. Meier, F. (1963), *Die schöne Mahsatī*, Wiesbaden, 11f.

III. *Das schwarze Schaf im Stall Khalīls*

III.1. Von den fünf epischen Gattungen einer Khamsa nach Niẓāmīs Vorbild hat jede ihr eigenes, gattungsspezifisches Metrum: die höfische Romanze *hazaj* und das Heldenepos *mutaqārib*, beide anstandslos als katalektische Varianten ihrer Khalīl'schen Idealform identifizierbar, d.h. als v – – – / v – – – / v – – für *hazaj* und als v – – / v – – / v – – / v – für *mutaqārib*. Eine gewisse Abweichung von der Khalīl'schen Urform zeigen die Metren von Lehrgedicht und Erzählungsheptade, die eine Rahmengeschichte verknüpft, jenes *sarīʿ* – vv – / – vv – / – v – und dieses *khafīf* v̲v – – / v –v – / vv – , wiederum beide dem Khalīl'schen Ideal gegenüber katalektisch, nur dass der *sarīʿ* zudem jede zweite Versfusssilbe kürzt und der *khafīf* jeweils die erste, sie aber im ersten Fuss mehrheitlich lang lässt, d.h. letztlich als *anceps*-Silbe behandelt[23]. Allen vier Metren gemein ist die Elfsilbigkeit, in der Bo Utas ein altes Erbgut iranischer Metrik erkennt.

III.2. Umso eigenwilliger gibt sich das fünfte Metrum, in der Khamsa-Ordnung das dritte, dessen sich die bürgerliche, aber umso leidenschaftlichere Romanze bedient. Schon seine Silbenzahl zehn setzt es von den andern vier epischen Metren ab. Offensichtlich handelt es sich um eine neupersische Neuschöpfung. Denn auch in Khalīls System lässt es sich nur einschmuggeln, wenn man es als arg verstümmelten *hazaj* betrachtet. Im ersten Versfuss verliert er seinen Kopf, die einleitende Kürze, und wird sein Fuss, die letzte Länge, zur Kürze deformiert. Im zweiten Versfuss packt man seinen Bauch, die mittlere der drei Längen, zur Kürze zusammen und im dritten teilt er das Schicksal der vier anderen Metren, indem er durch Katalexe seine letzte Silbe verliert, also

– – v / v – v – /v – –

In dieser Gestalt ist das Metrum bereits in einem Lobvers von Abū Sālik-i Gurgānī, d.h. noch vor Rūdakī, bezeugt[24]:

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[23] Zum Weiterleben der im Prinzip in der neupersischen Metrik eliminierten arabischen *anceps*-Silbe vgl. Utas, B., *Prosody*, Kap. 5, nach Tabelle 5. Khalīl selbst kennt den Begriff der *anceps*-Silbe nicht, sondern geht von prosodischen Längen aus, die – einem erschöpften Kamel ähnlich –zur Kürze erschlaffen (*ziḥāf*). Hierzu Weil, G. (1958), *Grundriss und System der altarabischen Metren*, 12f., 25.

[24] Lazard, G. (1964), *Les premiers poètes persans* II, Teheran/Paris, 21, Vs. 1.

Dar janb-i ʿulūv-i himmat-at charkh
mānanda-i vushm pēsh-i chargh-ast

Vor deinem hohen Streben gleicht der Himmel
Der Wachtel gegenüber dem Turmfalken.

III.3. Auf die Rhythmus-ästhetische Seite dieses im Khalīl'schen System schwarzen Schafes komme ich im fünften Kapitel noch zurück. Hier sei nur darauf hingewiesen, dass auch eine akatalektische Variante verwendet wurde, die an und für sich die Elfsilbigkeit hätte, nämlich – – v / v – v – / v – – –, dass aber die vorgestellte zehnsilbige Form sich auch in der Epik gegenüber ihrer elfsibigen Schwester durchsetzte, obwohl diese ebenfalls schon in der Ṣaffāridenzeit beliebt gewesen sein muss, jedenfalls in einem gnomischen Verspaar von Fīrūz-e Mashriqī (st. 896) Karriere machte[25]:

murghē-st khadhang ay ʿajab dīdhī
murghē ki hamä shikār-i ō jānā
dādhā par-i khᵛēsh kargas-ash hadyä
tā bachcha-sh-rā baradh ba-mihmānā

Ein Vogel ist der Pfeil; wie seltsam! Sahst du schon
Je einen Vogel, dessen Beute immer Seelen sind?
Der Geier gab ihm seine Feder als Geschenk,
Damit er ihm sein Junges für die Gäste nehme.

Auch in der BQP kommt die akatalektische Variante nicht zu kurz, wenngleich sie eher verschämt gebraucht wird: etwa, wenn man einmal mit zehn Silben nicht durchkommt. Doch gibt es markige Ausnahmen, in denen mehrere Zeilen hintereinander dem akatalektischen Elfsilbler folgen, z.B. Q. 13:26 und 27[26]. Vor allem greift der Verfasser gelegentlich zur akatalektischen Form, wenn es ihm gefällt, eine Koran-Stelle in einen Vierzeiler einzukleiden, so z.B. bei Q. 11:11 („Ausgenommen diejenigen, die geduldig sind und tun, was recht ist. Die erhalten Vergebung und grossen Lohn"), den er folgendermassen wiedergibt[27]:

ānān-k da[r]balā az ṣābirān bāshand
v-andar naʿmā az shākirān bāshand
v-andar kirdār az ṣāliḥān bāshand
āmurzīdhagān-i ma'jūrān bāshand

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25 *Ibid.* 19, Vsse 1-2.

26 Im Ms. 198,1-6, vermutlich dem Reimrefrain *būdh* zuliebe, dem jeweils ein arabisches Wort mit der Femininendung *–at* vorausgeht..

27 *Ibid.* 36,6-8. Zur Lesung der ersten Zeile vgl. Anm. 50.

Jene, die in der Prüfung zu den Ausharrern gehören,
Und die im Wohlstand zu den Dankbaren gehören,
In ihrem Tun zu den Rechtschaffenen gehören,
Sie sind's, denen Verzeih'n samt reichem Lohn gehört.

Inhaltlich haben wir es mit dem vom Koran vorgegebenen Schema aaab zu tun, ebenso auch rhythmisch-metrisch, was türkische Reminiszenzen hervorruft[28]. Ganz klar auf persischem Wege sind wir mit Reim und Reimrefrain.

III.4. Aber noch etwas anderes, das dem metrischen Bereich angehört, setzt unser schwarzes Schaf deutlich vom arabischen *hazaj* ab und knüpft an die iranische Vergangenheit an. Es besteht nicht aus einer Dreiheit von Versfüssen wie *sarīʿ* und *khafīf* oder auch der *hazaj* der höfischen Romanze, sondern wird nun auch zweiteilig skandiert mit einer mehr oder weniger deutlichen Zäsur nach dem Anapäst des ersten Teils, also da, wo diese schon in der altiranischen Poesie ihren Platz hatte und bis in die Neuzeit in gewissen volkstümlichen Gattungen bewahrt hat[29]. Wir haben es offenbar im ersten Teil mit einem vier- bis fünfsilbigen und im zweiten mit einem fünfsilbigen prosodischen Gebilde zu tun[30]. Die akatalektische Variante wiederum ist wohl eher als verlängerter rhythmischer Ausklang zu deuten denn als Nachwirkung des arabischen *hazaj*.

IV. *Das Erlebnis der Überlänge*

IV.1. Eine nähere Betrachtung der in den Abschnitten 3.2. und 3.3. zitierten Verse von Fīrūz und Abū Sālik zeigt, dass die prosodische Folge – v an drei Stellen nicht mit zwei Silben, einer langen und einer kurzen, wiedergegeben wird, sondern mit einer einzigen, die wir in quantitierender Metrik gegenüber „Kürze" und „Länge" als „Überlänge" qualifizieren müssen. Im Falle von *vushm* und *khadang* mag man dies noch mit der Zäsur in Verbindung bringen, doch im dritten

[28] Ich denke hier an die von Maḥmūd al-Kāshghārī (1072-77), *Dīvān lughāt al-Turk*, Facsimile (1941), Ankara gesammelten volkstümlichen Vierzeiler, die eine längere Vorgeschichte haben dürften.

[29] Hierzu Lazard, *Ahu-ye kuhi* 242.

[30] Die Zäsur läge also ungefähr in der Mitte der Zeile. Bo Utas stellt die Tendenz zu einer Zeilenmitte-Zäsur auch in der mittelpersischen Dichtung fest (*Prosody*, Kap. 3). Zum Schwanken der Silbenzahl um eine Silbe vgl. 3.3. und 5.7.

Fall, *murghē-st*, fällt diese Erklärung dahin[31]. Vielmehr haben wir es mit der Folge einer Verfeinerung des Silbenbewusstseins zu tun, die auf die aktive Beschäftigung mit dem Arabischen zurückgeht und im Lichte dieser Erfahrung die eigene Muttersprache neu zu erleben und betrachten lehrte.

IV.2. Des arabischen Pudels Kern hat Dmitry Frolov in einer einfallsreichen, brillant durchgeführten Studie über Ursprung und Wesen der arabischen Silbenbildung und der darauf gegründeten Metrik untersucht und ist dabei zu Resultaten gekommen, die auch für die Analyse und das Verständnis der neupersischen Prosodie wichtig sind[32]. Er stellt fest, dass sich das Arabische unter den anderen semitischen Sprachen durch eine einschlägige Scheidung der Silben in einmorige kurze und zweimorige lange profiliert hat, was dann in der mittelalterlichen Orthographie dadurch zum Ausdruck kommt, dass man eine kurze Silbe mit einem und eine lange mit zwei Buchstaben schreibt; denn ein Buchstabe zählt als More, unabhängig davon, ob er unvokalisiert (*sākin*) oder mit einem kurzen, in der Schrift normalerweise nicht festgehaltenen Vokal versehen (*mutaḥarrik*) ist.

IV.3. Um den persischen Verhältnissen gerecht zu werden, muss man das System erweitern; denn dort gibt es auch Silben, für deren schriftliche Fixierung man drei oder sogar vier Buchstaben braucht, die also drei- bzw. viermorig sind, jene entweder langvokalisch einfach geschlossen (KWK) oder kurzvokalisch doppelt (KVKK), diese nur langvokalisch doppelt geschlossen (KWKK), während die Variante kurzvokalisch dreifach geschlossen (KVKKK) der neupersischen Dichtung fremd geblieben ist. In der Aussprache wurde allerdings auch die langvokalisch doppelt geschlossene Silbe, wie sie in *murghē-st* vorliegt, manchmal kurzvokalisch gesprochen und in Handschriften gelegentlich auch ohne Alif, Wāw oder Yā' geschrie-

[31] Die von Theodor Nöldeke einmal geäusserte Vermutung, bei der Überlänge handle es sich im Prinzip darum, dass eine ehemalige Flexionsendung unbewusst noch nachwirke und dies in einem Murmelvokal zum Ausdruck komme, hat der grosse Altmeister später revidiert. Doch stellte Bo Utas fest, dass die „Nöldekesche Praxis" noch heute unter Türken und Indern anzutreffen sei, wobei der Murmelvokal als *nim-fatḥa* bezeichnet wird (*Prosody*, nach Tabelle 7). Vielleicht ist auch Nöldeke durch einen nicht-persischen Gewährsmann zu seiner Überlegung inspiriert worden.

[32] Frolov, D. (2000), *Classical Arabic Verse*, Leiden, Teil I, Kap. 2. Den Hinweis auf dieses Meisterwerk verdanke ich Herrn Dr. Johannes Thomann.

ben[33]. Jedenfalls unterscheidet weder die Praxis noch die Theorie zwischen „einfachen“, dreimorigen, und „doppelten“, viermorigen Überlängen, sondern behandelt beide prosodisch als dreimorig, d.h. als Realisierung von – v.

IV.4. Tendenziell verfuhr schon die BQP nach den klassischen prosodischen Regeln. Allerdings mit gelegentlichen Freiheiten bei der Behandlung von Überlängen als blosse Längen. So z.B., wenn deren Endkonsonant mit dem Anfangskonsonanten des folgenden Wortes übereinstimmt[34]. Auch bei einem Ausruf kann das Engagement eine Überlänge zur Länge degradieren.[35] Relativ häufig machen es sich langvokalische, geschlossene Silben vor der Zäsur gemütlich[36], obwohl gerade hier die Überlängen etwa ebenso oft mit ihrer dritten More die Zäsur als Anfangskürze der zweiten Halbzeile überbrükken[37]. In der prosodischen Diplomatie besonders geschmeidig zeigt sich der Konsonant Dhāl, der nach Langvokal oft nur noch fakultativ gesprochen wurde[38] und im gleichen Wort bald geschrieben, bald wieder nicht geschrieben wird (z.B. *zūdh* und *zū*). Eine Silbe wie – *ādh* kann dann in der gleichen Zeile je nach Bedarf als Länge oder Überlänge fungieren[39]. Überhaupt werden Überlängen in der BQP des

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[33] Auch einfach geschlossene langvokalische Silben werden manchmal – offenbar mündlichem Sprachgebrauch entsprechend – defektiv geschrieben, so z.B. *mahtāb* anstelle von *māh-tāb*. Auch das Umgekehrte kommt vor, dass die Schrift eine Vokallänge festhält, wo das Metrum einen kurzen Vokal verlangt. In diesem Sinne möchte ich etwa in der ersten Hälfte der in Anm. 57 zitierten Zeile das *ī* von *gīr* kurz lesen und dafür das *khalq* in der zweiten Hälfte regulär als Überlänge bewerten.

[34] Etwa Bā’ in der Paraphrase *ar kufr ārand * ʿadhāb bi-chashand* von Q. 14:7 (... *wa-la-’in kafartum ‘inna ʿadhābī la-shadīdun*).

[35] So z. B. in der Paraphrase von Q. 11:72 (*qālat yā waylatā* ...): *guftā: kāshkē * ki īn chunīn būdhē* („sie sprach: ‚ach, wäre dem doch so!‘“), wo die Überlänge von *kāsh* sich zur Länge verdichtet.

[36] Desgleichen doppelt geschlossene, kurzvokalische, z.B. Q. 12:22 (... *ātaynāhū ḥukman wa-ʿilman* ...) paraphrasiert als ...*nubūva u ʿilm * har dū bi-dādhēm* ...

Das *ḥukman* des Koran-Textes ist wohl *metri causa* durch *nubūva* wiedergegeben.

[37] So in der Paraphrase von Q. 11:122 (*wa-ntaẓirū ‘innā muntaẓirūn*):

*īn har du gurōh * chashm mē dārand*

*thawāb u ʿiqāb * kay padīdh āradh*

beide Zeilen bedienen sich effektvoll der besagten Zäsurüberbrückung.

[38] Vgl. Lazard, G. (1963), *La langue des plus anciens monuments de la prose persane*, Paris, 144f.

[39] So ergibt die Paraphrase von Q. 14:5 (... *wa-dhakkir-hum bi-ayyāmi llāhi* ...): *vā yādh mē dādh * shān qiyāmat* nur dann die erwünschte Normalform – – – – * v – v – –, wenn man das Dhāl von *yādh* in der Aussprache ignoriert und das von *dādh* zur Überbrückung der Zäsur deutlich artikuliert.

öftern noch als gewöhnliche Längen behandelt, die Folge KWK allerdings häufiger als KVKK, vielleicht weil man beim Sprechen den Langvokal leichthin kürzte[40]. Diese Erklärung mag zwar in einzelnen Fällen richtig sein, genügt aber nicht für alle. Wenn beispielsweise *rāst* verschiedentlich als gewöhnliche Länge auftritt, bleibt diese Silbe nach der Kürzung des *ā* theoretisch immer noch eine Überlänge des Typs KVKK, und um hier eine prosodische Längenbewertung zu rechtfertigen, bedarf es eines zweiten Grundes, z.B. dass die beiden Konsonanten *s* und *t* an derselben Stelle im Mund entstehen, also weniger Zeit brauchen als etwa die Folge *l* und *q* oder sogar *gh* und *r*[41].

V. *Das Phantom des metrischen Formenreichtums*

V.1. Was dem an die Metrik der formativen Periode gewöhnten Leser bei der Lektüre der BQP vielleicht als erstes auffällt, ist die aussergewöhnliche Vielfalt an Einzelformen des Versmasses. Bei Lichte besehen entspringt diese allerdings weniger dem prosodischen Bewusstsein des Verfassers als vielmehr dem morenzählenden Vorurteil des Lesers, der im Text einmorige Kürzen, zweimorige Längen und dreimorige Überlängen als metrische Bauelemente diagnostiziert. Auf dieser Basis lässt sich die Vielzahl der Varianten sogar mit genau 355 beziffern. Dass dem geneigten Leser nicht damit gedient ist, dass sie alle aufgelistet werden, versteht sich von selbst. Aussagekräftig dagegen ist ihre äusserst unterschiedliche Häufigkeit. Fast die Hälfte – ich habe 170 gezählt – treten nur einmal auf, andere dagegen wieder – hier sind es vier – in dreistelliger Zahl. Es versteht sich, dass man – um das Geheimnis des BQP-Versmasses zu lüften – zunächst von diesen ausgeht, während die Eintagsfliegen als zufallsverdächtig zwar einen Möglichkeitswert, aber keinen genusbestimmenden haben. In minderem Masse gilt dies auch für die 62 zweimal verwendeten. Ge-

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[40] So wird *gīr* in der ersten Halbzeile der Paraphrase von Q. 12:3 (zitiert 6.3., Anm. 57) als Länge behandelt, das *khalq* in der zweiten Zeilenhälfte jedoch als Überlänge.

[41] Ein typisches Beispiel für *rāst* als einfache Länge in derselben Sure bildet Q. 12:39:

*ki chūn rāst gōyand * javāb dānand*,

„Wenn man die Wahrheit sagen will, kennt man die Antwort“,

was die fast vierzigmal belegte Variante v – – – – * v – v – – ergibt, während überlang gesprochenes *rāst* die sonst nur noch zweimal fassbare Seltenheit v – – v – – * v – v – – bringt.

wicht haben auf jeden Fall die in zweistelliger Zahl benützten Formen. Zwischen 50 und 100 fehlen solche merkwürdigerweise, dafür gibt es acht zwischen 40 und 50 und sechs zwischen 30 und 40. Aber auch unter den noch weniger häufigen gibt es Zeilen, die weniger durch ihre abstrakte metrische Form auffallen als vielmehr durch ihren konkreten, unmittelbar überzeugenden Sprachrhythmus. Hierauf kann ich jedoch in diesem Aufsatz nicht eingehen. Kernfrage bleibt, welche prosodische Kraft hinter den vier Hauptvarianten steht.

V.2. Hier also seien sie in der üblichen Zeichensprache vorgestellt, wobei rechts die Zahl ihrer Belegzeilen vermerkt ist.

A.	– – – –	* – – v – –	184
B.	– – vv –	* – – v – –	163
C.	– – – –	* v – v – –	155
D.	– – vv –	* v – v – – //	155

Gemeinsam ist allen vier Varianten, dass sie mit zwei Längen beginnen und enden. In der zweiten Halbzeile steht vor der Doppellänge gewöhnlich eine Kürze. In C und D nimmt sie den jambischen Anfang nach der Zäsur wieder auf, sodass ein hyperkatalektischer Doppeljambus entsteht. Dies wirft nun auch ein Licht auf die Länge, mit der die zweite Halbzeile von A und B beginnt. Offenbar ist sie unbetont leicht, während die folgende Länge schwer, betont ist. Dieser Gegensatz aber führt uns in den von G. Lazard beschriebenen Bereich der parthischen Metrik[42]. Aus dem Anapäst am Ende der ersten Halbzeile von B und D können wir dann weiter schliessen, dass auch die Länge unmittelbar vor der Zäsur iktustragend war, denn die Doppelkürze stellt in der persischen Metrik, soweit ich sehe, ein leichtes Element dar. Nicht eindeutig festgelegt scheinen die Gewichtsverhältnisse nach der Kürze in der Mitte der zweiten Halbzeile zu sein. Von der jambischen Idee her müsste die erste Länge die schwere sein, nach dem in Absatz 3.3. zitierten Vierzeiler sogar im akatalektischen Fall. In machen katalektischen Zeilen trägt aber deutlich die letzte Länge den Ton. Vielleicht war dessen Ort nicht festgelegt. Dasselbe scheint nun aber auch für die beiden Anfangslängen der ersten Halbzeile zu gelten. Hierzu muss ich etwas weiter ausgreifen.

[42] Lazard, G. (1985), „La métrique de la poésie parthe“, *Acta Iranica, Papers in Honour of Professor Mary Boyce*, Leiden, 374. In diesem Sinne sind wohl auch die sporadisch auftretenden Formen der zweiten Halbzeile zu erklären, die vor den beiden abschliessenden Längen anstelle der Kürze eine Länge aufweisen.

V.3. Zu dem bisher besprochenen Normalfall, der mit einer Doppellänge beginnt, gibt es nämlich zwei markante Varianten, die so beliebt sind, dass sie sich auch mit allen einschlägigen Varianten der zweiten Halbzeile verbinden. Die eine beruht offensichtlich auf einer Gewichtung der zweiten Länge und erleichtert die erste zu einer Kürze, sodass die beiden Varianten v – – – und v – vv – entstehen. Dies mag an den formativen Versfuss des arabischen *wāfir* erinnern, hat sich jedenfalls in der BQP-Wiedergabe der Basmala niedergeschlagen, deren erste Zeile in den vier erhaltenen Suren-Anfängen jeweils *judhā vā kun* * *miyān-i sūrat* lautet, die erste Hälfte der zweiten dann *bi-nām-i khudhāy* * und der Vers schliesslich mit einer Suren-bezogenen Qualifikation Gottes endet * *valīy-i ḥikmat* (Hūd) * *sazāy-i midḥat* (Yūsuf), * *mālik-i mulkat* (Raʿd) und * *munʿim-i niʿmat* (Ibrāhīm):

„Lege nun frei * der Sure Inneres!/ Im Namen des Herrn * des Vertreters der Weisheit / des Lobeswürdigen / des Herrn der Herrschaft / des Wohltatentäters!“ Programmatisch, d.h. auf die Absicht der Paraphrase bezogen, ist das „Freilegen des Sureninnern“. Der Verfasser will nicht einfach Übersetzen, sondern die Neubekehrten Sinn und Gebot der Heiligen Schrift erleben lassen. Doch zurück zur Metrik.

V.4. Gibt sich somit die erste markante Variante der ersten Halbzeile gegenüber deren achtmorigen Urform wie eine Reverenz vor Khalīl zu erkennen, so räumt die zweite nun umgekehrt mit solchen Vorstellungen auf. Sie eröffnet die mit einer Länge beginnenden verschiedenen Formen der ersten Halbzeile mit einem Kürzen-Vorschlag, einer Art Auftakt. Ähnlich wie in den Varianten A und B der vier Hauptformen die zweite Halbzeile zählt nun auch die erste ihre neun, nicht nur normale acht Moren. Rein formal handelt es sich um jene vier Hauptformen mit einer Vorschlagskürze. Und ähnlich wie jene dominieren auch diese ihre gleichmorigen Verwandten, wobei die Variante mit der Doppelkürze jeweils deutlich weniger beliebt ist als die mit der Länge. Bei den Varianten mit achtmoriger zweiter Halbzeile ist das Verhältnis 40:24, bei denen mit neunmoriger zweiter Halbzeile 35:26. Um die trockenen Zahlen etwas mit der poetischen Wirklichkeit zu befeuchten, führe ich für alle vier Varianten ein Beispiel an:

Q. 12:31: *dar ān mihmānī takallufī kard* v – – – – * v – v – –
„Viel Mühe gab sie sich für jenes Gastmahl“

Q. 10:101: *bi-gō mē chi baradh u mē chi āradh* v – – vv – * v – v – –
“Sprich: Was denn nimmt es und was bringt es?”

Q. 11:33: *khudhāy bih dānadh dil-hāy-i ēshān* v – – – – * – – v – –
„Gott kennt ja ihre Herzen besser!“

Q. 11:11: *fulān chīz ḥarām dīgar ḥalāl-ast* v – – vv – * – – v – –
„Dies Ding da ist verboten, das andere erlaubt.“

Nachzutragen wäre noch, genau wie übrigens auch bei den vier Hauptformen, dass auch die entsprechenden akatalektischen Varianten mit Vorschlag alle belegt sind, allerdings nur mit fünf oder sechs Zeilen, während es bei den katalektischen Entsprechungen zu den Hauptformen A, B, C, D jeweils um die zwei oder drei Dutzend sind.

V.5. Besonderes Interesse verdient eine Variante der zweiten Halbzeile, auch sie in katalektischer und akatalektischer Ausgabe gebraucht, nämlich ... * – vv – – (–). Man könnte sie als trochäisches Gegenstück zur jambischen Normalform bezeichnen. Begegnet ist sie uns in der ersten zitierten Zeile von Abs. 1.5. sowie in zwei Basmala-Varianten als ein zügiger, markanter Rhythmus ohne arabisches Vorbild[43]. Iktusschwanger bleibt die erste Länge nach der Doppelkürze und wird es nun auch die erste Länge nach der Zäsur. Dass sich die Form nicht stärker gegen die jambische durchgesetzt hat, liegt vielleicht an ihrem energischen Charakter. Dabei fällt auf, dass die trochäische Variante häufiger verwendet wird, wenn die dritte Länge

[43] Der Verfasser benützt ihn gerne, wenn er gebieterisch, warnend oder polemisch wird, etwa in Zeilen gegen die Verehrung von Buddha-Statuen (Vgl. hierzu 1.5. Q. 11:111). Eine geradezu exemplarische Verwirklichung findet der Rhythmus in der Formel *vā bi-muḥāyēm*, die dreimal in der Paraphrase von Q. 13:39 (*yamḥū llāhu mā yashā'u wa-yuthbitu wa-ʿindahū ummu l-kitāb*) auftritt. Wie das Mīm des Verbums zu vokalisieren ist, bleibt unklar. Die BQP verwendet das Wort nur gerade in der Paraphrase dieses Koranverses. Die sechszeilige Strophe lautet:

ān-ch mā khᵛāhēm vā bi-muḥāyēm
payghām bi-dādhē sākin hamē bāsh
chu tavba kunand vā bi-muḥāyēm
bi-sabab-i tavbä ṭāʿat bi-nibēsēm
uṣūl-i kutub ba-kas na-dādhēm
az nuskhat-i aṣl vā bi-muḥāyēm

Wir abrogieren, was immer Wir wollen.
Du brachtest die Botschaft; sei du nun ruhig!
Bekehren sie sich, dann radieren Wir aus (sc. ihre Sünden im Sündenregister)
Und notieren Gehorsam ihrer Umkehr wegen.
Die Basisbücher geben Wir keinem:
Im Basis-Exemplar (auch) löschen Wir aus.

Paret gibt den arabischen Text folgendermassen wieder: „Und Gott löscht (seinerseits), was er will, aus, oder lässt es bestehen. Bei ihm ist die Urschrift (in der alles verzeichnet ist)“.

der ersten Halbzeile als Doppelkürze realisiert ist, als wenn sie Länge bleibt: – – vv – * – vv – – [44]. Sicher ist die jambische Variante mit ihren beiden einfachen Kürzen geschmeidiger zu handhaben, zumal sie Platz für zwei Überlängen bietet und die erste sogar das Überbrückungsspiel der Zäsur erlaubt[45]. Vor allem lässt die konsequente silbische Binärmorigkeit (nur Längen und Doppelkürzen) den Reiz des Wechsels zwischen Zweier- und Dreier-Rhythmus in der Zeilenmitte dahinfallen und rückt, wenn nicht auf die Wahrung der Zäsur geachtet wird, das Metrum in die Gruppe jener Versmasse ein, die einfach zwei Längen mit zwei Kürzen abwechseln lassen. Um einen Anapäst erweitert hat es sich als Variante des Rubāʿī-Metrums durchgesetzt.

V.6. Weniger Glück war vier anderen Halbzeilen-Varianten beschieden, die seit der formativen Periode vom Gebrauch suspendiert wurden, aber gerade deshalb Erwähnung verdienen. In allen vier Fällen geht es um dieselbe Erscheinung, nämlich das Einfügen einer Schmarotzer-Kürze zwischen ein Längenpaar, genau gesagt, zwischen das Längenpaar am Anfang oder Ende der Zeile oder zwischen die als Länge realisierte Doppelkürze und Länge vor der Zäsur in der ersten Halbzeile oder schliesslich das mögliche Längenpaar am Anfang der zweiten Halbzeile, das wir im letzten Abschnitt als Daktylos kennen lernten[46]. Den konkreten Grund für solche metrischen Lizenzen bildet vor allem die sprachlich geforderte Stellung der Schlüsselwörter im Satz. So beginnen manche Zeilen mit *kāfirān*, „Ungläubige“, von deren Tun die Rede ist. Metrisch hätte man sie erst über die Zäsur hinweg oder in der zweiten Halbzeile unterbringen können[47] und ähnlich erging es den *āmurzidhagān* in dem Vierzeiler von

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[44] Die Bewegung in der ersten Halbzeile scheint eine entsprechende in der zweiten zu provozieren. Vgl. hierzu 5.8.

[45] Hierzu 4.4. Anm. 37.

[46] Nicht als Schmarotzerkürze zu deuten ist wohl das gelegentliche Auftreten einer Kürze nach der zweiten Länge in der ersten Halbzeile, wenn die Doppelkürze als Länge realisiert wird. Hier liegt eher eine Verwendung der Zweithalbzeilenform der Hauptvarianten A und B vor (vgl. 5.2. und 5.8.).

[47] Als metrisch brauchbare Alternativen hätten sich für den Zeilenbeginn gebrochene Pluralformen wie *kuffār* oder *kifār* angeboten, doch das Zielpublikum der BQP, die soghdischen Neubekehrten, waren in der überwiegenden Mehrheit mit dem Arabischen nicht über einen regulären Sprachunterricht bekannt geworden, sondern durch das Hören einzelner Wörter, Floskeln und Wendungen, die man allenfalls noch in das Netzwerk der eigenen Sprache einflocht, und machten deshalb den „Ungläubigen“ *kāfir* über eine heimische Pluralendung zu einer Mehrheit.

Abs. 3.3. Die Wiedergabe von Q. 13:30 Ende verlangte sogar gleich zwei Sprosskürzen in einer Halbzeile, da das, was zu sagen war, in der zweiten stehen musste:

*muʾminān-rā bi-gō * yaqīn bi-dānēdh*
Den Gläubigen sage: Wisst mit Gewissheit![48]

Im Hintergrund des Sprosskürzenproblems lauert natürlich die Frage, ob hier noch mittelpersische Iktus-Gewohnheiten nachgewirkt hatten, die erst in der formativen Periode endgültig liquidiert wurden.

V.7. In denselben Problemkreis führt letztlich auch die Frage nach dem Umgang der BQP mit der Doppelkürze. Seit der formativen Periode kann im Prinzip jede prosodische Doppelkürze sprachlich als Länge realisiert werden. Mit einer Ausnahme allerdings: am Vers- oder Zeilenanfang zieht man die Folge – v vor, wohl um die Zweisilbigkeit zu wahren[49]. Das Umgekehrte jedoch, dass man eine prosodische Länge als Doppelkürze realisiert, stand damals nicht mehr zur Diskussion. Dies ganz im Unterschied zur BQP. Hier erscheinen oft zwei kurze Silben, wo die Prosodie eine Länge oder eine Einzelkürze verlangt, jedenfalls eine leichte Silbe, aber auch Doppelkürzen sind ja leicht, und wir spüren wieder einen Hauch mittelpersischer Metrik. Auf solche Weise können dann bis zu drei Doppelkürzen in einer Zeile auftreten, die für Bewegung und Erregung sorgen, und in der Tat handelt die Hälfte der betreffenden Zeilen von *fasād*, sittlicher Verdorbenheit, und will die äussere Bewegung vielleicht die innere zum Ausdruck bringen, etwa wenn in Q. 11:85 nach der Aufforderung zu Ehrlichkeit in Handel und Wandel die Bemerkung folgt: *da[r] zamīn-i Khudhāy fasād ma-kunēdh*: „Fröhnt nicht auf Gottes Erde dem Laster!“[50]. Dagegen begnügt sich die Polemik gegen die

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[48] Man beachte, dass das an und für sich verzichtbare Verbalpräfix *bi-* dem Verfasser wichtiger war als die Morenzahl des Metrums, die er schon mit dem *muʾminān* gestört hatte.

[49] In der persischen Metrik eines der wenigen Überbleibsel der arabischen *anceps*-Silbe (vgl. Utas, *Prosody*, Kap. 5, nach Tabelle 5).

[50] Hier zwei Bemerkungen zur Orthographie der Handschrift. Die Präposition *dar* wird an verschiedenen Stellen nur durch Dāl ohne Rāʾ bezeichnet. An anderen Stellen, die metrisch ebenfalls eine Kürze verlangen, steht das Rāʾ zwar, doch ist das Dāl mit einem Fatḥa markiert. Ich setze das Rāʾ in der Umschrift in solchen Fällen in eckige Klammern. Ein Beispiel in der ersten Zeile der in Abs. 3.3. zitierten Quartine. Gleich davor wird dort auch das zweite orthographische Problem berührt. Es betrifft die Schreibung der Pronomina bzw. Konjunktionen *ki* und *chi*. Die Pleneform mit Hāʾ oder Yāʾ tritt zwar immer wieder auf. Häufiger jedoch, besonders bei

Verehrung von Buddha-Abbildungen mit zwei gereizten Doppelkürzen. Zu der bereits erwähnten Paraphrase von Q. 11:111 (in 1.5.) tritt hier noch Q. 12:39:

*az mis bi-kanand * az zar bi-zanand*
„Aus Kupfer schneiden sie sie aus und schlagen sie aus Gold!"

V.8. Der geneigte Leser hat vielleicht mit Befremden festgestellt, dass in der soeben zitierten Zeile die zweite Hälfte nach dem Schema der ersten Halbzeile gestaltet ist. Dies geschieht des öftern genau so wie das Pendant, dass beide Halbzeilen einer Form der zweiten Halbzeile folgen, widerspricht in gewissem Sinne jedoch der Absicht des Erfinders. Denn der Anapäst vor der Zäsur sorgt für einen dynamischen Schwung, der auf diese zusteuert und über den Doppeljambus der zweiten Zeilenhälfte in deren abschliessenden Längen ausklingt. Auch die in Abs. 5.5. erwähnte Daktylus-Variante der zweiten Halbzeile scheint eine ähnliche Wirkung auszuüben: In beiden Fällen findet eine rhythmische Bewegung in einer Doppellänge ihre Ruhe[51]. Dieser Konzeption und Erfahrung widerspricht allerdings eine Vertauschung der beiden Halbzeilen, die aber vielleicht gerade deshalb ihren Reiz hat, jedenfalls immer wieder vorkommt. Ähnliches gilt auch für die bereits im letzten Abschnitt begegnete Verwendung der Ersthalbzeilenform in beiden Zeilenhälften, besonders effektvoll, wenn sie sich der Doppelkürze bedient und dann erst noch reimt. Weniger aufregend wirkt sie bei ausschliesslicher Verwendung langer Silben, was mehr als doppelt so häufig eintritt (42 gegen 17). Was aber der ersten Halbzeilenform recht ist, kann der zweiten billig sein, sodass auch deren Form sporadisch beide Halbzeilen beherrscht, in achtmoriger Gestalt v – v – – achtmal und in neunmoriger – – v – – doppelt so oft. Als „single" hat allerdings nur die achtmorige Karriere gemacht; wie es sich gehört, in der zweiten Halbzeile, aber nicht nur im „schwarzen Schaf". Vielmehr missbrauchte sie auch der pro-

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ki wird nur ein Kāf bzw. Chīm geschrieben. Kāf wird dann entweder an das vorausgehende Wort angehängt oder dem folgenden verbunden vorgesetzt oder gelegentlich als Einzelbuchstabe geschrieben. Im ersten Fall blieb es, offensichtlich aus metrischen Gründen, wie in der erwähnten Quartine wohl ohne Vokal gesprochen; desgleichen Chīm. Interessanter ist der zweite Fall. Hier erhält das Kāf oft ein Kasra-Strichlein.

[51] Verstärkt wird diese Wirkung in der akatalektischen Variante. Die Toleranz gegenüber deren beliebigem, manchmal eher zufälligem Auftreten hat vielleicht hierin ihren unbewussten Grund.

sodische Tausendsassa Masʿūd-i Saʿd (st. 515/1121) dazu. in einer 98-versigen Repräsentationsqaside die zweite Hälfte des vierfüssigen *mujtathth*-Halbverses v – v – / vv – – / v – v – /vv – auf die zweite Halbzeile unseres schwarzen Schafes v – v – – zurückzustutzen, eine Leistung, auf die er im übrigen sehr stolz war[52].

VI. *Die Symbiose von Metrum und Reim*

VI.1. Anders als die altarabische Dichtung, für die im Rajaz die Einzelzeile Reimglied ist und im Qarīḍ die Doppelzeile, lässt die BQP beliebig Zeile oder Doppelzeile reimen. Doch hie und da profiliert sich, wie wir sahen, auch die Halbzeile als Reimglied, vorwiegend in Einzelzeilen, gelegentlich aber auch in einem Zeilenpaar. Formal resultiert hieraus dann eine Halbzeilenquartine, die zwar in den Text eingebunden bleibt, aber manchmal einen künstlerischen Eigenwert erhält. Dies allerdings in der Regel deshalb, weil der Verfasser vornehmlich an inhaltlich pikanten, wichtigen oder kritischen Stellen zur Halbzeilenquartine greift. So, wenn sich Josephs Brüder in Q.12:9 beraten, wie sie diesen Liebling ihres Vaters loswerden könnten, und zum Schluss kommen:

*ō-rā bi-kushēdh * yā z ō bi-duzdēdh*
*jāyē bi-barēdh * pinhān bi kunēdh*

Tötet ihn oder nehmt ihn ihm (Jakob) weg!
Bringt ihn irgendwo hin! Lasst ihn verschwinden!

Auch das Strafgericht über die Leute von Sodom und Gomorrha bietet eine willkommene Gelegenheit in Q. 11:82:

*ān khāksārān * u ān nigūsārān*
*kardēm hama-rā * mā sang-bārān*

Jene mit dem Kopf im Staub und jene mit dem Kopf nach unten
Begossen Wir alle mit Steinregen.

Dann natürlich die Verehrung von Buddha-Statuen und -Blattgravuren. Hierzu Q. 11:111 (s. Kap. 1.5) und die erst zur Hälfte zitierte Paraphrase von Q. 12:39:

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[52] Es handelt sich um die Qaside Masʿūd-i Saʿd, *Dīvān*, ed. Yasemi, R. (1339 sh.), Teheran., 234-8, wo er im achtzigsten Vers (237,-4) hervorhebt:

*mafāʿilun faʿilātun mafāʿilun faʿ **
zi vazn-i mujtath bāshad bi-vazn(-i) kamtar

...* gehört zum Metrum *mujtath*, ist metrisch aber kürzer.

*khudhāy mīhīn * dīgar kīhīn*
*az mis bi-kanand * az zar bi-zanand*

Gott ist ganz gross, das andere ganz klein:
Sie schneiden es aus Kupfer und schlagen es aus Gold.

Selbstredend fehlt auch das *ceterum censeo* von der Verstocktheit früherer Völker gegenüber der Botschaft ihrer Propheten nicht unter den Halbzeilen-Quartinen. So Q. 13:42:

*ʿajab bi-mah-mān * az makr-i īnān*[53]
*ki ān pēshīnān * ham makr kardand*

Wund're dich nicht so sehr, dass die da Ränke schmieden;
Wo doch vor ihnen jene schon das Ränkespiel betrieben!

VI.2. Dem geneigten Leser wird nicht entgangen sein, dass jede der vier zitierten Quartinen einem anderen Reimschema folgt. In der ersten ist es das uns vom Balcher Spottlied (s. 2.7.) her bekannte „persische" aaaa, in der zweiten das vom Qasiden-Anfang vorgezeichnete „arabische" aaba, in der dritten dann das im Soghdien des frühen achten Jahrhunderts ungefähr gleichzeitig arabisch und persisch bezeugte, binär wechselreimige aabb (s. 2.8.) und in der vierten schliesslich das aus Mittelasien vertraute, möglicherweise von dort nach Soghdien gelangte „türkische" aaab, bei dem das dem Binnenreim fremde Glied b die Einzelquartine als Reimglied höheren Grades in eine strophische Ordnung einbinden kann[54]. In der BQP treten noch weitere Quartinenreim-Schemata auf, die für die vorliegende Studie aber keine Bedeutung haben[55].

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[53] Ich betrachte das *mah* (in der ersten Halbzeile) als Prohibitiv-Partikel *ma-*, die hier *metri causa* plene geschrieben ist, möchte aber mögliche andere Deutungen offen lassen.

[54] So offensichtlich in verschiedenen Gedichten des *Dīvān lughāt al-Turk* von Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, vgl. Anm. 28 zu 3.3.

[55] Z.B. baaa, was manchmal dadurch zustande kommt, dass die erste Halbzeile ein Subjekt erwähnt, dessen Wesen oder Tätigkeit die drei nächsten Halbzeilen gewidmet sind, z.B. Q. 13:28:

*qavmē ki ēshān * ba-mā bi-gravand*
*Qur'ān shinavand * dil-rā dar ō bandand*

Leute sind sie, * die an Uns glauben,
die, hören sie Koran, * an ihn die Herzen binden.

VI.3. Was uns hier als nächstes interessiert, ist die Frage, inwieweit das Faktum einer Reimbeziehung auch die metrische Struktur im Sinne einer Angleichung beeinflusst. Bei grösseren Reimgliedern wie Zeile oder gar Doppelzeile bedarf es hierfür rhetorisierender[56] Ambitionen. Bei kleineren dagegen, angefangen mit Halbzeilen, drängt sich eine rhythmische Angleichung natürlicherweise auf. Schon bei den beiden Hälften einer Einzelzeile lässt sich dies beobachten[57], erst recht bei Quartinen von Halbzeilen wie den in 6.1. zitierten. Eine vollständige metrische und reimtechnische Parallelität der vier Halbzeilen konnte ich jedoch in keiner BQP-Quartine dingfest machen. Die vier in 6.1. erwähnten sind in dieser Hinsicht paradigmatisch. Im ersten Beispiel, vom Reim her aaaa, setzt sich die zweite Halbzeile mit dem – an und für sich angemessenen – Zweithalbzeilentyp – – v – – von den übrigen drei Halbzeilen ab, die der klassischen Ersthalbzeilenform – – v v – folgen, liegt metrisch also abaa vor. Im dritten Beispiel hätte das Wechselreimschema aabb zwar eine metrische Entsprechung dadurch, dass die erste Zeile nach dem Ersthalbzeilentyp ohne Doppelkürze und die zweite mit Doppelkürze gebaut ist, doch ist in der ersten Halbzeile ein v – – – gegeben und in der zweiten ein – – – – . Metrisch haben wir es also nicht mit aabb sondern mit abcc zu tun. In prosodische Minne löst sich das Problem auf, wenn wir einmal mehr nicht vom neupersischen Quantitieren, sondern vom mittelpersischen Iktuieren ausgehen. Dieselbe Konzilianz verlangt auch ein metrisches Verständnis unseres vierten Bei-

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[56] Ich gebrauche den Ausdruck „rhetorisierend“ hier in dem von Jacobi, R. (1987), „Frühabbasidische Dichtung. Der neue Stil (*al-badīʿ*)“ in Gätje, H. (ed.), *Grundriss der Arabischen Philologie*, Wiesbaden, II: 43f. verwendeten Sinne, weil die poetische Tendenz bei Mukhtārī dieselbe ist (vgl. Abs. 6.7.).

[57] Ein charakteristisches Beispiel stellt die Paraphrase von Q. 12:3 dar, wo Muḥammad aufgefordert wird, „die schönste Erzählung“, d.h. die Geschichte Josephs, seinem Publikum vorzutragen:

*yādh gīr zi Qur'ān * bar khalq bar khᵛān*

Lern' vom Koran sie! * Trag sie den Leuten vor!

Die je nach Lesung neun- bis elfmorige erste Halbzeile ist am besten der neunmorigen zweiten entsprechend zu skandieren. Für die dort verlangte Kürze zwischen zwei Doppellängen sorgt der „Entstehungsabstand“ zwischen den Lauten Lām und Qāf in der Überlänge *khalq* (vgl. 4.4. Ende). Eine metrische Angleichung der ersten Halbzeile an die zweite via Aussprache (Wegfall des Dhāl von *yādh* und Kürzung des *ī* von *gīr*) liegt schon deshalb nahe, weil die dadurch entstehende Form in der BQP noch weitere fünfzehn Male belegt ist, während die Varianten mit ungekürzter Überlänge in der ersten Zeile sonst überhaupt nicht oder nur einmal vorkommen.

spiels. Im Gegensatz zum durchwegs ersthalbzeiligen dritten ist es ausschliesslich zweithalbzeilig, wobei die erste Hälfte der beiden Zeilen jeweils mit einer Kürze und die zweite mit einer Länge beginnt. Nur in der dritten Halbzeile steckt der Iktus-Kobold in der langen ersten Silbe von *pēshīnān*, die das erwünschte metrische abab zu abcb macht. Metrisch ganz aus den Fugen neupersischer Ordnung geht das zweite Beispiel. Die erste und die vierte Halbzeile lassen sich als neunmorige Zweithalbzeilenvariante verstehen und die dritte als Ersthalbzeilenform mit Doppelkürze, wenn man es nicht vorzieht, *khāksārān* als Folge von drei Längen zu betrachten und dann die beliebte Längenvariante der ersten Halbzeile erhielte. Ganz über die Stränge schlängt aber die 8+2-morige akatalektische zweite Halbzeile. Als Schema erhalten wir somit entweder abca oder abcd. Nach diesem ganzen metrischen Gerangel möchte ich den geneigten Leser zum Abschluss noch zum Genuss einer seiner reifsten und schönsten Früchte einladen.

VI.4. Zwölf Jahre vor der Veröffentlichung der BQP wies Jalāloddīn Homā'ī in seiner gelehrten und gedankenreich kommentierten Ausgabe von Mukhtārīs (st. vor 548/1154) *Dīvān* auf einen Zweiversler Rūdakīs (st. 329/941) hin, in dessen ungewöhnlichem Metrum jener zweieinhalb Jahrhunderte später eine zehnversige Lobqaside gedichtet hat[58]. Für Shams-i Qays ist das Metrum „lästig" und wird nur durch den Binnenreim erträglich[59]. Homā'ī vermutet, dass solche „ausgeflippten" Metren eng mit gesungenen Zweiverslern verbunden waren[60]. Dies könnte sehr wohl auch für unser Gedicht gelten, in dem der Sänger-Dichter Rūdakī nach einem alten persischen, auch in die arabische Poesie eingegangenen Brauch einen Schenken auffordert, ihm in üppiger Weise Wein zu kredenzen:

gul-ī bahārī but-ī tatārī
nabīdh dārī chi-rā na-yārī
nabīdh-i rōshan chu abr-i Bahman
ba nazd-i gulshan chi-rā na-yārī

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58 Mukhtārī, ʿUthmān, *Dīvān*, ed. Homā'ī (1962), Teheran, 221f.

59 Shamsuddīn Muḥammad b. Qays ar-Rāzī (Anf. 13. Jh.), *al-Muʿjam fī maʿāyīr ashʿāri l-ʿAjam*, ed. Qazvini/ Rażavi (1338/1959), Teheran 179.

60 Mukhtārī, *Dīvān*, 375, Anm. 1.

Du Frühlingsrose[61], Tataren-Idol!
Du hast doch Wein[62], warum bringst du ihn nicht?
Den leuchtenden Wein, warum bringst du ihn nicht
Wie die Bahman-Wolke zum Rosenhain?

Wie man sieht, formal einfach eine Kombination von „persischer" und „türkischer" Halbzeilen-Quartine. Inhaltlich bildet die zweite Zeile den Ausgangspunkt des Gedichts, und ihre zweite Hälfte (*chirā na-yārī*) qualifiziert sich dann in der vierten Zeile als „Reimrefrain". Dies erinnert an den Zweizeiler, den Rūdakīs Landsmann Abū Ḥafṣ-i Sughdī der Berggazelle gewidmet hat (Abs. 2.5.), und der Rūdakī sicher bekannt war, wenn es sich nicht sogar um eine dort gebräuchliche Vorstufe des Reims handelt. Ebenso typisch für die persische Dichtung ist die Wiederaufnahme eines Begriffs (hier *nabīdh*) des einen Verses in syntaktisch gleicher Stellung im folgenden, um ihn näher zu bestimmen oder zu qualifizieren, hier durch das Epitheton *rōshan*, „leuchtend", das die Perser dem Wein nicht nur als lichtbedingtes Akzidens zubilligen, sondern als inhärente Kraft und Fähigkeit. Er ist gewissermassen „leuchtend rot"[63], sodass sich Azraqī (st. vor 465/1172-3) zur Hyperbel versteigt[64]:

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[61] Dies ist die normale Bedeutung von *gul-ī bahārī*. Im buddhistisch beeinflussten Soghdien könnte *bahār* allerdings im Sinne von *vihāra*, „buddhistisches Kloster" gemeint sein und die „Klosterrose" eine züchtige dortige Schönheit bezeichnen, was nicht schlecht zum Vollmondgesicht einer tatarischen Buddha-Statuette passen würde.

[62] Das altpersische Wort *ni-pīta* bezeichnet zunächst den Obst-, vor allem Traubensaft. Die Araber lernten den Ausdruck in seiner mp. Form *nibīdh* kennen, machten daraus eine *faʿīl*-Form der Wurzel *n-b-dh*, „werfen, hin-, wegwerfen", bezogen auf die Trauben, die man zwecks Gärung in ein Becken wirft. Das islamische Weinverbot sorgte für eine neue Karriere des Ausdrucks, da im Koran ja nur der „Wein" (*khamr*) als etwas alkoholisch-Vergorenes verboten ist, nicht etwas „Hingeworfenes".

[63] Die Farbe des Weins ist in Soghdien wie in Ostiran generell immer rot, während der irakische Wein die Farbe des Goldes hat und erst einige Zeit nach Rūdakī in der persischen Dichtung auftritt. Hierzu gibt es ein Motivspiel zwischen Abū Nuwās und Rūdakī. Jener räsoniert über iraqischen Wein in einer goldenen Trinkschale (*Dīvān*, ed. Ghazzālī (1953), Nachdruck Beirut, 5, 3f.):

Ich fragte, da sie sich dank Ähnlichkeit so glichen:
„Wer denn von euch ist in dem Gleichheitsschein (*tashābuh*) das Gold?"
Sie steh'n auf gleicher Ebene, nur unterscheidet sie,
Dass fest die eine ist, der andere noch flüssig".

Mutatis mutandis klingt dies bei Rūdakī so:

Es griff zur Harfe Rūdakī und spielte.
Setz du nun Wein ein, wie er Lieder einsetzt!

Huscht eine Fee des Nachts in seinem Licht vorbei,
Kann sie dem Menschenauge sich nicht mehr verbergen.

VI.5 Unverkennbar bildet Rūdakīs Gedicht ein formal und inhaltlich abgeschlossenes Ganzes. Nichts weist darauf hin, dass noch weitere Verse folgten. Schon die älteste Quelle, Shams-i Qays, erwähnt ausdrücklich die Zweiversigkeit. Die erste Zeile ist dem Schenken gewidmet, die zweite spricht das Anliegen aus, die dritte und vierte schliesslich präzisieren die Qualität des Weins, seine erwünschte Fülle und den Ort des Zechens. Alles in einem ausgewogenen, flüssigen Satz, der durch die Wiederholung des Reimrefrains und verschiedenen Binnenreim sinnfällig zweigeteilt wird. Wesentlich zu seiner Eleganz trägt der Umstand bei, dass die in den Reimgliedern verwendeten Wörter im ersten Vers von Zeile zu Zeile, im zweiten sogar Halbzeile um Halbzeile nicht nur syntaktisch, sondern auch wortartlich verschieden angelegt und gebaut sind. Diese einfallsreiche Form der Intensivierung fällt vor allem auf, wenn man zum Vergleich das Gedicht von Mukhtārī beizieht, das demselben Reimprinzip folgt und Homā'ī zum Hinweis auf das Meisterwerk Rūdakīs angeregt hat. Gewiss, es handelt sich im Unterschied zu diesem um eine zehnversige Lobqaside, die sich nicht wie ein Zweiversler in einem sprühenden Formenspiel verzetteln darf, und die auch – im Unterschied zum au-

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Den karneolfarbenen Wein, den jeder, der ihn sieht,
Nicht unterscheidet von geschmolz'nem Karneol.
Von gleichem Wesen sind die zwei, doch von Natur
Ist dieser starr, jener geschmolzen.

(Ed. Nafīsī, S. (1319 sh.), *Aḥvāl u ashʿār-i Rūdakī*, Bd. 3, Teheran, 974). Ein konkretes, sichtbares Erlebnis, nämlich gelber Wein in einer goldgelben Schale, wird bei dem blinden Rūdakī zu einer abstraken Vorstellung. Während hier eine Bezugnahme auf Abū Nuwās offenkundig ist, hat man in anderen Fällen immer zu untersuchen, ob bei Parallelerscheinungen nicht beide von derselben kulturellen Tradition zehren, die wie die Darī-Sprache selbst von Soghdien bis in den Irak reichte.

[64] Azraqī-i Hiravī, *Dīvān*, ed. Nafīsī, S. (1336 sh.), Teheran, Vs. 1622; derselbe Gedanke auf Ahriman bezogen Vs. 1482. Nawājī schreibt Abū Nuwās einen Vers zu, der möglicherweise auch die Leuchtkraft des Weins im Auge hat (*Ḥalbat al-Kumayt*, Bulaq 1859, 90):

lā yanzilu l-laylu ḥaytu ḥallat.
fa-dahra sharrābihā nahāru

Nicht steigt die Nacht ab, wo der Wein wohnt:
So ist es immer Tag, wenn man ihn trinkt.

Wenn nicht einfach an ein Dauertrinken gedacht ist. So oder so wird der geneigte Leser schmunzelnd festgestellt haben, dass hier dasselbe Metrum zu Ehren kommt wie im Zweiversler Rūdakīs, nur ohne Binnenreim.

tonomen Zweiversler Rūdakīs – nicht gleich mit viertelversigem Binnenreim beginnt, sondern – wie eine ordentliche Qaside – mit Halbversreim, sodass erst vom zweiten Vers an der Quartinen-Binnenreim herrscht.

VI.6. Doch bevor wir das Problemfeld der Qaside berühren, müssen wir nochmals zu unserem Ausgangspunkt, dem Schwarzen Schaf, zurückkehren. Verschiedene Möglichkeiten, seinen Vorder- und Hinterteil zu verändern und zu kombinieren, haben wir in der BQP kennen gelernt und zuletzt noch die Verdoppelung seines Hinterteils in einem *sahl-i mumtaniʿ*, einem unnachahmlich eleganten Meisterwerk Rūdakīs bewundern können. Hier hat sich dem Leser vielleicht die Frage gestellt, ob etwas Ähnliches auch bei der Verdoppelung des Kopfteils zustande kommt. Ansätze dazu sind uns in der BQP ja mehrfach begegnet. In der folgenden Periode dagegen fehlen sie. Nun mag dies daran liegen, dass der Rhythmus – – vv – Initialcharakter hat, der Rhythmus v – v – – hingegen eher finalen[65]. Beider Verdoppelungsform liess sich auch gar nicht ohne weiteres im Khalīl'schen System unterbringen. Bei – – v v – * – – v v – störte dies nicht weiter, weil diese Variante sowieso nicht gebraucht wurde. Aber v – v – – * v – v – – war nun einmal belegt bei Rūdakī. Als Heimatschein stellte ihr Shams-i Qays den eines „zusammengepackten, schartigen *mutaqārib*s aus[66]. Er hatte sich zwar zu Beginn des 13. Jhts. noch einige Jahre in Bukhara aufgehalten[67], aber mit der BQP war er dort sicher nicht mehr in Berührung gekommen, umso aktueller muss sie zu Rūdakīs Zeit gewesen sein, aus der – nach der Manuskript-Beschreibung des Herausgebers – auch das erhaltene Fragment einer Kopie stammt[68].

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[65] Vgl. hierzu Abs. 5.8.

[66] Die Deutung geht davon aus, dass bei einem normalen *mutaqārib*-Halvers v – – / v – – / v – – / v – – // im ersten und dritten Versfuss die zweite Länge „zusammengepackt" i.S. v. gekürzt wird und im zweiten und vierten Versfuss die einleitende Kürze wegfällt, sodass eine „Scharte" im prosodischen Silbengefüge entsteht, in Zeichen v – v / – – / v –v / – – //. Vom Zweiversler Rūdakīs her einleuchtend wäre dies nur im Hinblick auf die dritte Halbzeile *nabīdh dārī*, wo nun tatsächlich der Gedanke des Gedichts seinen Anfang hat. Von der Idee eines hyperkatalektischen Doppeljambus sind wir dann freilich weit entfernt.

[67] *Muʿjam*, Einleitung *wāw*.

[68] BQP, Einleitung, *sī u haft*.

VI.7. Mit einer völlig anderen Welt als bei Rūdakī haben wir es im Falle der Qaside Mukhtārīs zu tun. Hier ist alles auf jene Rhetorisierung der Sprache angelegt, die drei Jahrhunderte früher in der arabischen Dichtung einen neuen Stil hervorgebracht hat. Mit der leichtfüssigen, musikalisch inspirierten und diskret eleganten Ausdruckskunst eines Rūdakīs hat dies nichts mehr zu tun, und doch könnte dessen Zweiversler bei der Gestaltung von Mukhtārīs Qaside eine Rolle gespielt haben. Hier fügen sich nämlich dreimal zwei aufeinander folgende Verse zu einem Verspaar zusammen[69], das jeweils im Qasiden-Verlauf eine bestimmte, formal-inhaltliche Aufgabe wahrnimmt, während die übrigen vier Verse als Einzelverse zur Verbindung und Abrundung dienen. Nach einem Eröffnungsvers, der das Herz zum Reden auffordert, würdigt das erste Verspaar (Vsse 2-3) die Redekunst des Belobigten:

*chu jān na-mīrad * bahā padhīrad*
*chu nūr gīrad * bi-ṣadr-i ān bar*
*ki nāma-yī ō * bi-kāma-yī ō*
*zi khāma-yī ō * girift gavhar*

Unsterblich ist sie * und gewinnt an Pracht,
wenn sie erleuchtet wird * am Busen jener Brust[70],
dessen Epistel * nach seinem Wunsch
von seinem Schreibrohr * sich Perlen nimmt[71].

Dichte und Intensität des Gleichklangs steigern sich im zweiten Vers wie in keinem anderen des ganzen Gedichts: die ersten drei Reimglieder unterscheiden sich nur durch verschiedene Anfangskonsonanten der jeweils ersten zwei Wörter. Nachdem sich Mukhtārī von diesem sprachlichen Furioso im vierten Vers bei einem der üblichen Vergleiche des Belobigten mit dem Himmel kurz erholt hat, setzt er im

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69 Hiervon abgesehen gibt es nichts, was darauf hinwiese, dass Mukhtārī den Zweiversler Rūdakīs überhaupt gekannt hat. Sicher wollte er keine „Antwort“ darauf schreiben, sonst hätte er nicht nur dasselbe Metrum, sondern auch denselben Reim verwendet, wie er dies in seiner berühmten Antwort (*Dīvān* 391-8) auf Rūdakīs Qaside *mādar-i may-rā bi-kard bāyadh qurbān* getan hat und wie dies allgemein üblich war.

70 Das arabische Wort *ṣadr* und das persische *bar* bezeichnen beide zunächst die Brust, doch hat sich *ṣadr* bis zum Begriff „Vorsitz“, „Vorsitzender“ etc. hochgearbeitet.

71 *Gavhar* bezeichnet oft Wesen und Essenz einer Sache, auf die Muschel bezogen die Perle, die darin ist. Selbstverständlich gibt es wie bei uns auch „Redeperlen“.

mittleren Verspaar (Vsse 5-6), dem *gurīzgāh*, zur Präsentation und Namensnennung des Belobigten an, und zwar in einer an Rūdakī erinnernden wortartlichen und syntaktischen Buntheit der Reimglieder:

*tu ay mubāriz * ba-justan-ī ʿizz*
*bi-dān ki hargiz * ba-faẕl u gavhar*
*dar īn ḥavālī * na-khāst ʿālī*
*chu Bū-l maʿālī * jihān-i mafkhar*

Du grosser Kämpfer * voll Drang nach Ehre,
wisse dass niemals * an Wert und Wesen
in solchen Zeiten * ein Hoher auftrat
wie Bū-l maʿālī, * die Welt des Ruhmes!

Das hieran unmittelbar anschliessende dritte Verspaar (Vsse 7-8) sorgt dann wieder für rhetorisierende Zucht und Ordnung mit einer beliebten Methode, die darin besteht, dass ein paar spezifische Qualitäten oder Tätigkeiten des Belobigten in formal parallel strukturierten Halbversen, in unserem Fall Viertelversen, aufgezählt werden. Dergleichen schreit dann geradezu nach Reim der betreffenden Glieder:

*ʿadū gudāzad * walī navāzad*
*sukhan ṭirāzad * chu durr u shakkar*
*bihī panāhad * niyāz kāhad*
*ba-ʿudhr khᵛāhad * ki bakhshadat zar*

Er schmilzt den Feind weg, * hätschelt den Freund,
macht schmuck die Rede * wie Perlen und Zucker.
Er schützt die Güte * und mindert die Not,
erbittet Nachsicht, * wenn er dir Gold schenkt.

Es folgen noch zwei abschliessende single-Verse, in deren erstem die vorausgegangenen Parallelismen wenigstens auf Halbversebene noch nachwirken, während sich im Schlussvers alles in einem Treuebekenntnis zum Belobigten normalisiert.

VI.8. Der steinige, manchmal auch dornige oder überwachsene Pfad des BQP-Metrums hat uns schliesslich zu Rūdakīs goldenem Eingang in den Zaubergarten manieristischer Dichtung geführt, aus dem ich mir in Form von Mukhtārīs Lobqaside eine kleine Blume zu pflücken erlaubte, wohl wissend, dass eine fruchtbare Betreuung dieser Gartenpracht den kundigen Händen unseres hochverdienten Jubilars am besten ansteht. Aber gelegentlich wetzt sich ein Sperling den Schnabel auch da, wo man gewöhnt ist, dem Gesang der Nachtigall zu lauschen.

IBLĪS
IBLĪS AND THE JINN
IN AL- FUTŪḤĀT AL-MAKKIYYA

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A few years back Professor Heinrichs was teaching a course on Iblis in Arabic literature. During that semester, we happened to meet on several occasions and he recounted a number of interesting texts. I recall that he asked me if I knew of any good material from Ibn ʿArabī. I believe I responded that nothing stuck in my mind, though I had many references in my notes. The invitation to contribute to his Festschrift seemed like a good opportunity to give some order to those notes.

Although Iblis or *al-shayṭān*, "the Satan," is one of the jinn, not a fallen angel like Lucifer, the distinction between angel and jinn is not especially clear. In Christianity, once Lucifer fell, he became a demon, devil, or evil spirit. When Iblis fell he became the first satan—a word the Qurʾān sometimes uses in the plural. Not all the jinn became satans, however. "The 'satans' among the jinn are specifically the wretched (*shaqī*), those driven far from God's mercy, and the name 'jinn' remains for the felicitous (*saʿīd*)."[1]

[1] Ibn ʿArabī (1911), *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya*, 4 vols., Cairo, II: 466, line 30. Those passages also found in ʿUthmān Yaḥyā's partial edition of the *Futūḥāt* (1972-92), 14 vols., Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, are indicated hereafter as "Yaḥyā."

Iblis might be called an evil spirit, but the believing jinn are not evil, nor are they angels. Rather, they are good spirits, but the sense in which they are "spirits" needs to be clarified. And we cannot say that "satans" are simply the evil jinn, because the Qurʾān uses the expression *shayāṭīn al-jinn wa-l-ins*, "the satans of jinn and mankind" (Q. 6:112). So the satans are not only evil jinn but also evil people, just as believers are not only good people but also good jinn. Ibn ʿArabī makes these points as follows:

> God created the jinn both wretched and felicitous, and so also mankind, but He created angels felicitous without any portion of wretchedness. The wretched jinn or human being is named an "unbeliever," and the felicitous jinn or human being is called a "believer." God also made mankind and jinn share in satanity. He said, "the satans of jinn and mankind."[2]

To understand the distinction that Ibn ʿArabī draws between angels and jinn, we need to examine how he fits them into the structure of the "cosmos" (*al-ʿālam*, defined as "everything other than God," *mā siwā llāh*). The nearest thing to a cosmological scheme that he provides is found in chapter 198 of the *Futūḥāt* on the Breath of the All-merciful, one of the longest chapters of the book. There he describes the cosmos as the articulation of twenty-eight divine letters arranged phonetically. The first is *hamza*, the First Intellect, and the final two are *mīm*, man (*al-insān*), and *wāw*, the levels, stations, and waystations (*al-marātib wa-l-maqāmāt wa-l-manāzil*). By this last he means the differentiation of human beings into a vast range of types and individuals according to their degree of achieving the perfections of the human state. In this scheme angels and jinn are respectively the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth letters of the alphabet.[3]

This depiction of the universe is a version of the notion of *al-mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, "the origin and the return," much discussed in philosophy. In Sufism the same topic is commonly dealt with in terms of the "two arcs" (*qawsān*) of the circle of existence, an expression derived from the Qurʾān's account of the Prophet's *miʿrāj*

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[2] *Futūḥāt* III: 367.34.

[3] For the overall scheme, see William C. Chittick (1998), *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-ʿArabī's Cosmology*, Albany: State University of New York Press, xxviii-xxxii and Titus Burckhardt (1977), *Mystical Astrology According to Ibn ʿArabi,* Gloucestershire: Beshara Publications.

(Q. 53:9).[4] The descending arc traces of the emergence of all creatures from God, and the ascending arc maps out the stages of their return. In Ibn ʿArabī's twenty-eight letter scheme, the descending arc includes the first twenty-one letters, from the First Intellect down to the four elements. As we will see shortly, Satan's role is prefigured in the eighth level of manifestation, the Footstool, where the pure mercy of the previous level, the Throne, branches into two sorts of mercy, one of which is mixed with wrath. Without the repercussions of divine wrath in the cosmos, there can be no distinction between good and evil, no revealed laws, and no place for Iblis to act out his role as enemy to the prophets.

The ascending arc includes minerals, plants, animals, jinn, angels, and human beings, and it reaches its culmination with those human beings who achieve perfection. By placing angels and jinn right before humans, Ibn ʿArabī is indicating that each designates a major category of creatures, like plants or animals, and that both play important roles in bringing about the full actualization of "the Intended Entity" (*al-ʿayn al-maqṣūda*), which is perfect man (*al-insān al-kāmil*). This generic term designates those human beings who achieve the divine purpose in creating the cosmos, a purpose announced in the famous hadith of the Hidden Treasure—for God to be known. Angels, however, in contrast to the jinn, also play an important role in the descending arc, given that the arc's differentiation depends on their intermediacy between God and the creation. The first two stages of cosmogenesis are the First Intellect (the Highest Pen) and the Universal Soul (the Guarded Tablet), both of which are angels.[5]

I. *Spirits and Angels*

The Qurʾān divides the cosmos into two realms, unseen and visible, or heaven and earth, and these are frequently glossed as the world of spirits and the world of bodies. Ibn ʿArabī and many others, however, were not inclined to take this as a stark dualism. They typically added an intermediate realm, to which they saw reference in the Qurʾānic expression, "what is between the two," that is, between heaven and earth. They called this realm the *barzakh* or isthmus. For

[4] On the two arcs in Ibn ʿArabī, see Chittick 1998, 233ff.
[5] *Futūḥāt* I: 148.13; Yaḥyā, II: 349.

Ibn ʿArabī, it is the *mundus imaginalis* (*ʿālam al-khayāl*), the world of imagination that is neither spiritual nor bodily but partakes of the qualities of both sides.

Angels and jinn pertain to the realm of unseen things, though both have the ability to appear in the sensory world through imaginalization (*tamaththul*). Both are spirits, but Ibn ʿArabī differentiates between them by calling angels "luminous spirits" (*al-arwāḥ al-nūriyya*) and jinn "fiery spirits" (*al-arwāḥ al-nāriyya*). As for satans, he sometimes contrasts them with angels by speaking of pure, angelic spirits (*al-arwāḥ al-ṭāhira al-malakiyya*) and impure, satanic spirits (*al-arwāḥ ghayr al-ṭāhira al-shayṭāniyya*).[6]

The fact that angels are luminous and jinn fiery is supported by Qurʾānic verses and a well-known hadith: "God created the angels from light, God created the jinn from fire, and He created man from what you have been told." The light from which angels were created is "natural," says Ibn ʿArabī, though this certainly does not mean physical. In his vocabulary, nature (*ṭabīʿa*) has two basic senses. It refers either to the Breath of the All-merciful itself, within which the divine words become imprinted (*ṭabʿ*), or to everything below the Universal Soul, whether spiritual, imaginal, or corporeal.[7]

Ibn al-ʿArabī uses the words *malak* and *rūḥ*, angel and spirit, interchangeably. He points out that when a distinction is drawn between the two, it is done because the word *malak* derives from a root meaning "message," so this specific quality is being taken into account.[8] Spirits that carry messages are angels, and those that have other functions should not properly be called by this name. He classifies angels/spirits into three sorts: enraptured (*muhayyam*), governing (*mudabbir*), and subjected (*musakhkhar*), but he adds that only the third sort are angels in the strict sense.[9]

The enraptured angels are so totally engrossed in the contemplation of God that they have no awareness of themselves. The First Intellect was originally one of them, but God turned its attention away from himself and employed it to create the universe. The governing spirits are put in charge of all bodies in the cosmos, whether these be

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[6] *Futūḥāt* III: 390.33. For the whole passage, see Chittick 1998, 366-8.

[7] On his use of the word, see Chittick (1989), *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, Albany: State University of New York, 139-43.

[8] *Futūḥāt* II: 255.22, 254.8, 254.12; Yaḥyā XIV: 567, 556-7.

[9] *Futūḥāt* II: 250.2 (Yaḥyā XIV: 527); III: 38.2, 209.10.

luminous, fiery, or elemental. They are the spirits of all "living things" (*ḥayawānāt*), a word which means, in the view of "the folk of unveiling" (*ahl al-kashf*; Ibn ʿArabī's term for those who achieve visionary knowledge), every natural and elemental body. The subjected spirits are the angels properly so called, because they alone act as messengers. Unlike governing spirits, they are not limited to a single body. They have been entrusted with specific affairs in the cosmos, for God wanted to give them "leadership" (*imāma*) over all things. Highest among them is the First Intellect. Among their functions are revelation, inspiration, provision, taking spirits, giving life to the dead, asking forgiveness for believers, and cultivating the plots of the Garden.

II. *The Jinn*

Ibn ʿArabī is well aware that there is much confusion about the difference between angels and jinn. The Qurʾān does not always distinguish between the two, because it uses both terms in broad and narrow senses. Sometimes it uses angel in the literal sense of "messenger" and includes the jinn, and sometimes it uses jinn in the literal sense of "concealed" and includes the angels.

> God made angels and satans share in being curtained (*istitār*), so He named both of them "jinn." He says concerning the satans, "[I take refuge ...] from the evil of the slinking whisperer, whether jinn or man, who whispers in the breasts of men" (Q. 114:1-6). Here by "jinn" he means the satans. He says concerning the angels, "They have set up a kinship between Him and the jinn," i.e., the angels, "and the jinn know that they shall be arraigned" (Q. 37:158).
>
> The angels are messengers (*rusul*, s. *rasūl*) from God to man, given charge of man, guardians, and writers of our acts. The satans are given authority over man by God's command, so they [also] are envoys (*mursalūn*, s. *mursal*) to us from God... . Since God made Iblis share messengerhood (*risāla*) with the angels, He included him with the angels in the command to prostration.[10]

Ibn al-ʿArabī devotes the ninth chapter of the *Futūḥāt* to the "true knowledge of the existence of the flaming, fiery spirits." As usual, the chapter begins with a Qurʾānic verse, in this case Q. 55:15: "He created the jinn from a flame of fire." He explains that after God had

[10] *Futūḥāt* III: 367.18.

created the four elements, smoke (*dukhān*) rose up to the inside surface of the sphere of the fixed stars, and inside the smoke, God unstitched (*fataqa*) the seven heavens. To each heaven he revealed a command (Q. 41:12), and then he brought about the marriage of heaven and earth. Heaven "cast" (*alqā*) into earth something of the commands that God had revealed to it, "just as the man casts water into the woman in intercourse," and the result was the birth of the progeny (*muwalladāt*)—minerals, plants, and animals. To create the jinn, God heated air to produce a "flame" (*mārij*). The first dictionary meaning of this word is "mixture," and Ibn ʿArabī says flame is called by this name because it is fire mixed with air.

The jinn were created of two elements, air and fire, and Adam was created from the other two, dust (*turāb*) and water. Ibn ʿArabī does remind us, however, that elemental creatures are by definition created from all four elements, so the issue is rather the predominance of one or more elements over the others. In Adam's case, water and dust were called "clay," and in the jinn's case air and fire were called "flame." Air gives jinn the ability to take any shape (*tashakkul*), and fire makes them insubstantial (*sakhīf*) and subtle (*laṭīf*). Fire also drives them to subjugate (*qahr*) others, claim to be great (*istikbār*), and consider themselves exalted (*ʿizza*). Iblis refused to prostrate himself before Adam precisely because of fire's exalted place among the elements. He did not understand that clay is more excellent than fire, because water extinguishes fire and dust is more fixed than fire. Fire bestows arrogance (*takabbur*), and clay humility (*tawāḍuʿ*).

In support of water's superiority, Ibn ʿArabī comments on a hadith that tells us that God created water stronger than fire, air stronger than water, and the children of Adam stronger than air. Fire's weakness explains why "Satan's guile is ever feeble" (Q. 4:76). The strength of clay allows man to achieve unhurriedness, deliberation, reflection, and circumspection. "He has ample intellect, because dust hinders and restrains him, and water softens and smoothes him." When Iblis said about Adam, "I am better than he" (Q. 7:12), he combined ignorance and ill manners because of the lightness of his intellect.[11]

The importance of air in the jinn's make-up is suggested by Ibn ʿArabī's statement here that "Angels are spirits blown (*manfūkh*) into lights, jinn are spirits blown into winds (*riyāḥ*), and mankind are spir-

[11] *Futūḥāt* I: 133.33; Yaḥyā II: 287.

its blown into apparitions (*shabaḥ*)."[12] That the in-blown spirit (*rūḥ*) has qualities associated with air and wind (*rīḥ*) is shown, of course, by its very name, as in the case of *spiritus*. When God blows the spirit into wind and fire, which are already characterized by constant agitation (*iḍṭirāb*), the agitation increases. This provides another key to the constantly shifting and changing shapes that characterize the jinn.

When the jinn engage in sexual intercourse, this takes the form of twisting (*iltiwāʾ*), "like the smoke you see coming from a furnace or a potter's kiln. Each of them interpenetrates the other, and both derive pleasure from the interpenetration."[13] Procreation takes place through "casting air" (*ilqāʾ al-hawāʾ*), just as in the human case it takes place through casting water.[14] "What they cast is like the pollen of the palm tree, which emerges with the slightest breeze."[15]

The food of the jinn is the aroma of grease from bones. Ibn ʿArabī cites two hadiths to this effect and the words of one of the folk of unveiling, who reported to him that he saw some of the jinn coming to bones and sniffing them, like wild animals. Then they went away, having taken their provision.[16] The fact that the jinn take nourishment is alluded to in the story of Solomon (Q. 21:8), and this helps differentiate them from angels, who do not take food, as we know from the story of Abraham and his guests (Q. 11:70).[17]

The first jinn, Ibn ʿArabī recounts, was created 60,000 years before Adam. According to one report, it had the sexual organs of both male and female; in order to reproduce, one part of it copulated with another part, and children were born as either male or female. Some people say that reproduction among jinn comes to an end after 4,000 years and among mankind after 6,000 years, but in fact this has not yet happened and reproduction continues in both races. No one has any verified knowledge as to how many years ago Adam was created, nor as to how many years remain until the end of this world. People who claim to know such things "are a little gang whose words are of no account."[18]

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[12] *Futūḥāt* I: 132.20; Yaḥyā II: 281.
[13] *Futūḥāt* I: 132.31; Yaḥyā II: 283.
[14] *Futūḥāt* I: 132.14; Yaḥyā II: 280.
[15] *Futūḥāt* I: 132.33; Yaḥyā II: 283.
[16] *Futūḥāt* I: 132.30; Yaḥyā II: 282.
[17] *Futūḥāt* I: 133.13; Yaḥyā II: 284.
[18] *Futūḥāt* I: 132.20; Yaḥyā II: 281.

As for Iblis, Ibn ʿArabī rejects the common idea that he was the first of the jinn. Rather, he was like Cain among humans, the first sinner.[19] All the jinn continued to worship God until the creation of Adam. Then one of them, called al-Ḥārith, was overcome by hatred for him, and it is he who came to be known as Iblis.[20]

The jinn have many tribes and families, though it is said that originally there were twelve tribes, which then became subdivided. Tremendous wars take place among them, and some, but not all, storms and whirlwinds are the result of their wars. There is the "well-known and often retold" story about ʿAmr al-Jinnī, who appeared after having been mortally wounded in a storm that had been a battle among the jinn. Ibn ʿArabī does not go into details, however, and he tells us why: "Were this work based on the telling of reports and stories, we would mention a few, but this book is only the science of meanings (*ʿilm al-maʿānī*), so you can look for stories about the jinn in the chronicles of literature and poetry."[21]

When Ibn ʿArabī does tell stories about the jinn, he typically has a clear teaching in mind. In a later chapter, for example, he tells an anecdote in order properly to cite a hadith that is *gharīb* or unattested by any other line of transmission. The context concerns a point he often makes: The believing jinn were better than people at listening to the Qurʾān when the Prophet recited it.[22]

> I have recounted a *gharīb* hadith from one of the community of the jinn. It was narrated to me by the blind man, Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān in my home in Aleppo. He was from Dayr al-Rummān, one of the districts of Khābūr. He had it from a trustworthy man, a woodcutter, who had killed a serpent. He was then abducted by the jinn, who brought him before a very old shaykh, the leader of the people. They said, "This man has killed our uncle's son."
>
> The woodcutter replied, "I do not know what you are saying. I am a woodcutter, and a serpent interfered with me, so I killed it."
>
> The group said, "That was our uncle's son."
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> Then the shaykh—God be pleased with him—said, "Let the man go and take him back to his place. You can do nothing against him, for I heard the Messenger of God say, while he was speaking to us, 'He

[19] *Futūḥāt* I: 134.13; Yaḥyā II: 289.
[20] *Futūḥāt* I: 133.25; Yaḥyā II: 286.
[21] *Futūḥāt* I: 133.3; Yaḥyā II: 283.
[22] See, for example, *Futūḥāt* II: 467.9, III: 3.20, 48.24.

> who assumes a form other than his own form and is slain had no intellect, and there is no retaliation.' The son of your uncle assumed the form of a serpent, which is one of the enemies of human beings."
>
> The woodcutter said, "I said to him, 'Sir, I see you saying that you heard the Messenger of God. Did you meet him?' He said, 'Yes. I was one of the jinn of Naṣībīn who went before the Messenger of God. So we heard from him. But I am the only one of that group left. I judge among my companions according to what I heard from the Messenger of God.'"
>
> But the narrator did not mention the name of this great man [*rajul*, i.e., the shaykh] of the jinn, nor did I ask it from him.[23]

III. *Shape Shifting*

In chapter 198 on the Breath of the All-merciful , Ibn ʿArabī associates each of the twenty-eight cosmic levels with a divine name. Angels manifest the properties of the Strong (*qawī*), and jinn those of the Subtle (*laṭīf*). As a divine name, *laṭīf* is usually understood to mean Gentle or Kind and is taken as the complement of *qahhār*, the Severe or Subjugating. In the cosmological sense that Ibn ʿArabī has in mind here, *laṭīf* is opposed to *kathīf*, dense or solid. The elements are ranked in degrees of increasing subtlety in the order dust, water, air, and fire. The unseen worlds are subtle in relation to the visible realms. The jinn are subtle compared to creatures of clay, but dense relative to angels. Their intermediacy means that they pertain to the *barzakh* or isthmus.

> They are a creation between angels and man. They are elemental, which is why [Iblis] showed arrogance; had he been purely natural, without any property of the elements, he would not have shown arrogance and would have been like the angels. Their configuration is *barzakhī*: It has a face turned toward the luminous spirits through fire's subtlety, and thereby they possess the veil (*ḥijāb*) and the assumption of shapes; and it has a face turned toward us, through which they are elemental and a flame. The name Subtle gives the jinn the ability to flow in the children of Adam like blood without their being aware of this.[24]

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[23] *Futūḥāt* III: 49.3.
[24] *Futūḥāt* II: 466.31.

Because of their subtlety the jinn can take on any sensory form they desire.[25] This form is called *jasad*, "tangible body," as opposed to *jism*, the ordinary, corporeal body possessed by creatures of the visible world (cf. Q. 38:34, where the jinn appears as a *jasad*). "The name Subtle makes the jinn heirs to being curtained from the eyes of people, so eyes do not perceive them unless they become tangibly embodied (*tajassud*)."[26]

The jinn can be seen only if they choose to be seen, "unless God desires to bestow unveiling upon one of His servants, who then sees them."[27]

> When God desires a person to see them even though the jinn do not desire it, He lifts up the veil from the eye of him whom He wants to perceive them, and he perceives them. God may command angels or jinn to become manifest to us. Then they become tangibly embodied for us and we see them. Or, God unveils the covering from us, and we see them with the vision of the eye. We may see them as tangible bodies in forms, or we may see them not in human form, but rather in their own forms in themselves, just as each of them perceives himself in the form that he possesses.[28]

In chapter 51, "On the Knowledge of Certain Men among the Folk of Abstention (*waraʿ*) who have Realized the Waystation of the Breath of the All-merciful," Ibn ʿArabī mentions some of the dangers posed by the jinn for travelers on the path to God. The chapter describes various sorts of ascetics or renouncers (*zuhhād*, s. *zāhid*). The lowest ranking group of these ascetics sit with the jinn to their own detriment:

> Some of them become sitting-companions (*julasāʾ*) of the spirituals (*rūḥānī*) from among the jinn, but these are the lowest of this group in level—if this should be their only state. The reason for this is that the jinn are very near to mankind in meddling (*fuḍūl*). The clever person flees from the jinn just as he flees from people, since sitting with them is extremely vile; few people gain any good from it. This is because their root is from fire, and fire has a great deal of movement. Anyone with a great deal of movement is quick to meddle in everything. Hence as sitting-companions they are a more severe trial than people, for they may come together with people to unveil shameful things of which it behooves the intelligent person not to gain cognizance.

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[25] *Futūḥāt* I: 132.8; Yaḥyā II: 278.
[26] *Futūḥāt* II: 467.4.
[27] *Futūḥāt* I: 132.9; Yaḥyā II: 278.
[28] *Futūḥāt* III: 367.27.

Moreover, if someone sits with people, this will leave no trace of arrogance in him, in contrast to sitting with the jinn. By nature they leave in their sitting-companion the trace of displaying arrogance over people and every servant of God. If any servant of God arrogantly sees himself superior to others, God has hated (*maqata*) him in Himself while he is unaware. ... He imagines that he has gained, but he has lost.

Know also that the jinn are the most ignorant of the natural world about God. They report to their sitting-companion about the occurrence of events and what transpires in the cosmos, and they acquire this by eavesdropping on the Higher Plenum (cf. Q. 15:18). Then he [sc. the *zāhid*] imagines things, and he supposes that God is honoring him, but he should beware of what he supposes! This is why you will never see any sitting-companion of the jinn who has gained any knowledge of God whatsoever. The furthest limit of the man to whom the spirits of the jinn show their concern is that they grant him knowledge of the characteristics of plants, stones, names, and letters. This is the science of *sīmiyāʾ*.[29] Hence he will not acquire from them anything but knowledge blamed by the tongues of the religions (*al-sharāʾiʿ*). So if someone claims to be their companion—and if he speaks the truth in his claim—ask him a question in the divine science (*al-ʿilm al-ilāhī*). You will find that he has no taste (*dhawq*) of that whatsoever.

The Men of God flee the companionship of jinn more than that of people, for [the jinn's] companionship cannot but bring about in the soul of him who is their companion an arrogance by nature (*bi-l-ṭabʿ)* toward others[30] and a disdain for anyone who has no share in their companionship.

I saw a group who really were their companions and who made manifest demonstrations of the soundness of the companionship that they claimed. They were all folk of diligence, effort, and worship, but on

[29] *Sīmiyāʾ* (Gk. *semeia*), one of the occult sciences, is exemplified by the activity of the sorcerers in the time of Moses (*Futūḥāt* III: 288.9; Chittick 1998, 356).

[30] In other words, the individual nature of the person is changed by his consorting with the jinn. This can happen because the soul (*nafs*) is the least fixed and most prone to change of the three main components that make up the human individual (the other two are the body (*jism*) and the divine spirit blown into it (*al-rūḥ al-manfukh fīh*)). The discussion of how the soul changes often falls under the rubric of *khuluq* (character—and note the close connection of this word with *khalq*, creation; and *khilqa*, created nature). *Akhlāq*, the plural of *khuluq*, is typically translated as ethics. In both philosophy and Sufism, the process of moral and spiritual training aims to reshape the soul by eliminating blameworthy character traits (*akhlāq madhmūma*) and replacing them with praiseworthy ones (*akhlāq maḥmūda*). Ibn ʿArabī is saying here that associating with the jinn changes character traits for the worse.

> their own they had not the slightest whiff of knowledge of God. I saw in them exaltation and arrogance. I did not leave them until I came between them and their companionship with the jinn, for they were just and sought the best. But I have also seen others who were not like that.
>
> So, he who speaks the truth in claiming to have this attribute has not prospered, nor will he prosper. As for him who is lying, we do not concern ourselves with him.[31]

In chapter 283, on the "shatterers" (*qawāṣim*), Ibn ʿArabī tells us more about the dangers of consorting with the jinn. At the outset, he says that when he entered this waystation, he saw "the transmutation of sensory forms within corporeal forms, just as spirituals assume shapes in forms." He goes on to explain various sorts of transformation perceived or created by travelers on the path. One of the several methods that certain shaykhs use for manipulating imagination is precisely what is done by the jinn.[32]

> Another way is that the individual makes the air surrounding him take the shape of any form that he wills, while he stays on the inside of this form. Hence perception falls on that airy form that has been shaped in the form in which he desired to become manifest. However, if that form should speak, this occurs only in the tongue recognized by the viewer. He hears the sound and recognizes it, but he sees the form and does not know it. The person who has this state cannot get rid of his own voice.
>
> The jinn's power over those who recognize them is of the same sort, for they become manifest in whatever form they desire, but the voice is the voice of the jinn. They have no power over anything else. He who does not know this much about the jinn knows nothing.
>
> There are certain people with whose intellects the jinn play games. They make their eyes imagine forms, just as the sorcerers [in the time of Moses] made people imagine that they saw ropes in the form of sliding serpents. Such people reckon that they are seeing jinn, but they are not jinn. The forms that they are made to imagine speak to them, but the forms are not speaking, in contrast to the jinn when they tangi-

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[31] *Futūḥāt* I: 273.28; Yaḥyā IV: 232.

[32] Part of what he has in mind in this chapter is the sort of assumption of forms ascribed to Sufi shaykhs like Qaḍīb al-Bān of Mosul, whom Ibn ʿArabī sometimes mentions in similar contexts. For a long anecdote that he relates from the Persian Sufi poet Awḥad al-Dīn Kirmānī about the ability of some shaykhs to assume forms, see chapter 311, translated by Chittick in Ibn al ʿArabi (2002), *The Meccan Revelations*, New York: Pir Press, 169-80.

bly embody themselves. Those of the gnostics who recognize the voice of each tribe recognize what they see and are never overcome by confusion (*talbīs*) in what they see.

I knew a group of people in Andalusia who used to see the jinn whether or not they assumed shapes. Among them was Fāṭima bt. Ibn al-Muthannā of Cordova,[33] who recognized them without any confusion.

In the city of Fez I saw a group whose eyes the jinn would make imagine to see forms. The forms would address them however they liked so as to enthrall them, though the forms were not the jinn, nor were they the shape of the jinn. Among them was Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Zaqqāq in Fez. The whole situation was confused for him. He was made to imagine that jinns' spirits were addressing him, and he was convinced of that. The reason for this was his ignorance of their voices. When he sat with me and was present in my session, he would be stupefied (*baht*). Then he would describe what he had seen, so I knew that he was being made to imagine things. In this he reached the point of play, companionship, and conversation. Sometimes there would be quarrel and hostility between him and what he witnessed. The jinn would harm him in one way, and he would imagine that the harm had issued from those forms. He was completely overcome by this—God have mercy upon him! Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Dahhān and all of our companions used to witness that from him.

He who recognizes the voices will never suffer confusion by a form, but there are few who recognize them. So, people are often deluded as to the truthfulness of what becomes manifest from these forms.[34]

IV. *Suggestions of Angel and Satan (Satan's Cosmological Dimension)*

Most people may not need to worry about encountering jinn, but this does not mean that they pose no danger, particularly the satans. In strictly cosmological terms, everyone interacts with angels and satans because they play an essential role in the deployment of the possibilities latent in the twenty-eighth and final letter of the All-merciful Breath, "the levels, stations, and waystations." Both are present in the unseen realms of the human substance. Satan "runs in the blood of Adam's children," as the Prophet put it. Ibn ʿArabī agrees

[33] One of Ibn ʿArabī's important early teachers. See R.W.J. Austin (1971), *Sufis of Andalusia*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 143-6.

[34] *Futūḥāt* II: 621.22.

with the common notion that each person has his own satan and angel, or rather, it seems, several of each. In any case, angels and satans are antagonists inside the human soul. Each offers "suggestions" (*lamma*), which the soul is free to follow or ignore. The term derives from this hadith:

> The satan makes a suggestion to the son of Adam and the angel makes a suggestion. The satan's suggestion promises evil and denies truth. The angel's suggestion promises good and affirms truth. When a person finds the latter, he should know that it is from God, so he should praise God. If he finds the former, he should seek refuge in God from the accursed Satan: "Satan promises you poverty and commands you to indecency" (Q. 2:268).

Ibn al-ʿArabī makes a brief reference to the "angels of suggestion" (*malāʾikat al-lammāt*) in chapter 160. This is the third of three chapters dealing with messengerhood (*risāla*), first in a general sense, second as a human role, and third as an angelic role. The discussion is put into the context of cosmology when Ibn ʿArabī says toward the beginning of the first of these three chapters (158), "The station of messengerhood is the Footstool, because from the Footstool the divine Word becomes divided into reports (*khabar*) and rulings (*ḥukm*)."[35] Theologically, he is clarifying the distinction between two sorts of divine command (*amr*), the creative or engendering (*takwīnī*) and the prescriptive (*taklīfī*).

"Our command," says God in the Qurʾān, "is but one, like a glance of the eye" (Q. 54:50). This one command is precisely the divine Word that becomes divided at the Footstool. Ibn ʿArabī calls it *kalimat al-ḥaḍra*, "the word of the [divine] Presence," and explains that it is the command "Be!" (*kun*). It is addressed to the entire cosmos and becomes manifest as the infinite words articulated in and by the All-merciful Breath.

As the command descends through the First Intellect, the Universal Soul, and the higher levels of the cosmos, it retains its oneness as far as the Throne, the seat of the All-Merciful. Then the All-merciful puts his "two feet" on the Footstool. These are the "foot of firmness" (Q. 10:2), also called the "Foot of the Lord,"[36] and the Foot of the Compeller (*qadam al-jabbār*), a term that derives from a hadith in

[35] *Futūḥāt* II: 257.17; Yaḥyā XIV: 580.
[36] *Futūḥāt* III: 202.32.

which the Prophet says that God will put it in hell to make hell stop saying, "Are there any more?" (Q. 50:30). The Foot of Firmness is pure mercy, but the Foot of the Compeller is mercy mixed with wrath. Appropriately, the word *jabbār* has both wrathful and merciful connotations, given that it has the double sense of compeller and restorer (from the latter sense we have *jābir*, bonesetter).

At the Footstool, the engendering command is supplemented by the prescriptive command, which embraces all the commandments and prohibitions that God addresses to human beings. The prescriptive command can be disobeyed, in contrast to the engendering command. The fact that disobedience comes into play here allows for the appearance of wrath, for wrath has no other object. Mercy, however, takes precedence over wrath, so disobedience also plays the more important role of actualizing the attributes of forgiveness and pardon. Ibn ʿArabī likes to cite the sound hadith, "If you did not sin, God would replace you with a people who did sin, and then He would forgive them."

At first glance, the prescriptive command seems to pertain simply to law and morality, but in fact it is an extension of the engendering command, for it results in the existence of paradise and hell, which have no raison d'être outside of free choice and responsibility, attributes that appear only in human beings and jinn. Moral agency actualizes a variety of existential and ontological possibilities demanded by divine attributes such as love, generosity, justice, and compassion. So basic are these attributes to the nature of things—to the real world—that they determine the way in which the cosmos unfolds not only in society and the environment, but also in the unseen realms that are experienced after death.

Ibn ʿArabī summarizes the cosmology of the prescriptive command and the reason why it becomes differentiated into detailed prophetic messages in terms of two sorts of mercy, nondelimited (*muṭlaq*) and delimited (*muqayyad*), also called *raḥmānī* (pertaining to the All-merciful) and *raḥīmī* (pertaining to the Ever-merciful). He commonly cites Q. 7:156 to make the distinction: "My mercy embraces everything," i.e., it is nondelimited in keeping with the engendering command that is addressed to all things, "and I write it for those who are godfearing and pay the alms... ," i.e., it is delimited on the basis of the prescriptive command. The nondelimited mercy becomes manifest as the entire cosmos—the Breath of the All-merciful—and the delimited

mercy finds its full actualization in paradise. The delimited mercy has its counterpart in wrath, which becomes manifest cosmologically as hell. For paradise and hell to appear, choice must be offered to those who have free will, and this is precisely the function of prescription, with all its differentiated details.

> God let down the two feet from the Throne to the Footstool, and mercy split open like a seed. The attribute of mercy branched into nondelimitation and delimitation. The delimited mercy, which is one foot, became manifest, and the nondelimited mercy became distinguished from it by the manifestation of this other foot. The division of the One Word of the Throne thereby became manifest in this foot as report and ruling, though no division had been manifest in the Throne itself. Ruling became divided into commandment (*amr*) and prohibition (*nahy*). Commandment became divided into necessity (*wujūb*), recommendation (*nadb*), and indifference (*ibāḥa*). Prohibition became divided into precaution (*ḥaẕar*) and reprehensibility (*karāha*). Report became divided into many kinds, including question, statement, supplication, denial, story, and teaching.[37]

In his brief reference to the angels of suggestion in chapter 160, the third chapter in this series, Ibn ʿArabī explains that their role pertains to the five rulings of the Shariah, and the satans get into the act by offering contrary suggestions. Like mercy and wrath, angels and satans are complementary, even if they appear to be antagonistic. Interestingly, he does not connect the Shariʿite rulings here and in some other relevant passages with prophetic messages, showing that he considers them part of the cosmic order itself. He mentions that people become aware of the suggestions through "passing thoughts" (*khawāṭir*), and he alludes to how one can distinguish between the angelic and the satanic sort.[38]

Passing thoughts are a common topic in Sufi texts. As Ibn ʿArabī indicates in chapter 55, "On the Knowledge of Satanic *Khawāṭir*," the traditional discussion typically addresses how people can distinguish among four basic sorts: Lordly (*rabbānī*), angelic (*malakī*), soulish (*nafsī*), and satanic (*shayṭānī*). Other contexts make clear that he considers the angelic and satanic sort to include the "suggestions" mentioned in the hadith. He connects the angels of suggestions with passing thoughts in chapter 260, whose topic is self-disclosure (*ta-*

[37] *Futūḥāt* II: 676.9.
[38] *Futūḥāt* II: 259.31; Yaḥyā XIV: 598.

jallī), which he defines as "the lights of unseen things that are unveiled to hearts."[39] Among the various sorts of lights, some pertain to the "winds" (*riyāḥ*), and it is these that come by way of these angels.

> The lights of the winds are elemental lights hidden by the intensity of their manifestation, so eyes are prevented from perceiving them. I have witnessed them only in the Isthmus Presence (*al-ḥaḍra al-barzakhiyya*), even if God did give me a vision of them in sensory form in the city of Cordova one day, as a divine designation and a prophetic inheritance from Muhammad. These wind lights have an authority and power over all the children of Adam except the Folk of God... .
>
> These are specifically the angels of suggestions and inspiration. In this self-disclosure, the casting is to the souls. From this self-disclosure arise passing thoughts, and all of these pertain to the winds, since the winds pass quickly and do not become fixed. If someone says they are fixed, that is not wind.[40]

Ibn ʿArabī devotes chapter 262 to passing thoughts, which he defines as "that which enters in upon the heart" (*mā yaridu ʿalā l-qalb*). He explains that this means everything that comes to mind without self-conscious effort (*taʿammul*). God sends passing thoughts in keeping with the five rulings of the Shariah, and the angels and satans play a role in how the heart receives them.

> Know that God's emissaries (*sufarāʾ*) to the heart of His servant are named "passing thoughts." They stay no longer in the heart than the time it takes them to pass through it and convey to it that with which they were sent, without taking up residence. God created them in the form of the message (*risāla*) with which they were sent, so each passing thought is itself identical with His message. When the eye of the heart falls upon it, he understands it, and then he either acts in accordance with what has been brought to him, or he does not.
>
> God appointed between Himself and the heart five paths upon which these passing thoughts walk to the heart. God originated these paths when He originated the religions (*al-sharāʾiʿ*). Were it not for the religions, He would not have originated the paths... . He named the first path "necessity" and "obligation" (*farḍ*), the second "recommendation," the third "precaution," the fourth "reprehensibility," and the fifth "indifference." He created the angel put in charge of the heart so that [the angel] would guard the person by God's command, and He designated for him the paths of necessity and obligation. He placed

[39] *Futūḥāt* II: 485.20.
[40] *Futūḥāt* II: 487.35, 489.8.

> counter to the angel a satan to hold him back on his side without God's Shariʿite command; [the satan] acts in envy, because he sees that God is concerned for this human configuration rather than for him and that the human is superior to him; [for the satan] knows that the person will reach felicity if he performs what is rightfully due (*ḥaqq*) in the Shariʿite acts and avoidances.
>
> God also placed the like of these on the paths of both precaution and reprehensibility. On the path of indifference, He placed a satan without an angel counter to it.[41]

V. *Iblis*

If we look at the "divine roots" (*al-uṣūl al-ilāhiyya*) of creation, which are the divine names, then the prophets make manifest the name *hādī*, the Guide, and Iblis manifests the properties of the name *muḍill*, the Misguider. In the Qurʾān, God is the usual subject of the verb "to misguide," but Satan and not God is described as "misguider" (Q. 28:15). Ibn ʿArabī does not list this word as a divine name in his lengthy chapter 558 on the ninety-nine most beautiful names, perhaps because it is not so beautiful, but he does mention it in chapter 362. There he sets down the principle at work, briefly and clearly: "If you move toward Him, He is the Guide; if away from Him, that is from His name the Misguider."[42]

That God should be both Guide and Misguider follows from *tawḥīd*, which does not allow for any real agency outside the activity of the Real. Ibn ʿArabī cites an anecdote and then a few Qurʾānic verses to make the point:

> Iblis asked for a meeting with Muhammad. When permission was given to him, it was said to him, "Speak the truth to him." The angels surrounded him, and he was in the station of meekness and abasement before Muhammad. He said to him, "O Muhammad! Surely God created you for guidance (*hidāya*), and there is nothing of guidance in your hands. He created me for leading astray (*ghawāya*), and there is nothing of leading astray in my hands." Thus he spoke the truth to him, and he acknowledged his truthfulness.
>
> God says, "You do not guide whom you love, but God guides whomsoever He will" (Q. 28:56). He says, "He inspired [the soul] with its lewdness and its godfearing" (Q. 91:8). He says, "All is from God"

[41] *Futūḥāt* II: 564.4.
[42] *Futūḥāt* III: 304.28.

> (Q. 4:78). And He says, "There is no crawling thing but that He takes it by the forelock" (Q. 11:56).[43]

As this little dialogue suggests, Ibn ʿArabī holds that Satan accepted *tawḥīd*. On several occasions he insists that the sin of Iblis had nothing to do with *shirk* or associating others with God, such as in the following example:

> The most disobedient of creatures is Iblis, but the limit of his ignorance was that he saw himself better than Adam because he was from fire and he believed it to be the most excellent of the elements. The limit of his disobedience was that he was commanded to prostrate himself before Adam, and he claimed to be too great to prostrate himself because of what we mentioned, and he refused, so he disobeyed God's command. Hence God named him an unbeliever, since he combined disobedience and ignorance.[44]

Such passages seem to imply that Ibn ʿArabī wants to offer a defense of Satan in the manner of al-Ḥallāj and others, but he does not go that far. Certainly he acknowledges the necessity of Satan's activity not only for human wretchedness, but also for felicity. He does not, however, defend Satan's motivations. His theological position can again be clarified in terms of the distinction between the two commands and their connection with the two sorts of mercy, nondelimited and delimited, also called the mercy of gratuitous favor (*minna* or *imtinān*) and that of necessity (*wujūb*). The first sort of mercy is none other than *wujūd* (being, existence), which is bestowed on all things by the Breath of the All-merciful and the engendering command. "The abode of mercy is the abode of *wujūd*."[45] This cosmic mercy is nondelimited because it reaches everything without exception. As for the delimited kind, God makes it obligatory on himself through his promises to reward those who do good works, but not others.

That this distinction is the key to Ibn ʿArabī's understanding of Iblis seems to be suggested by the longest anecdote about Iblis in the *Futūḥāt*, an account related from Sahl al-Tustarī, whom Ibn ʿArabī considered one of the greatest Sufi shaykhs. In his introduction to and commentary on the anecdote, Ibn ʿArabī wants to explain that God's nondelimited *wujūd* includes in its nondelimitation the assumption of every delimited form, a point that is basic to his ontol-

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[43] *Futūḥāt* II: 89.13; Yaḥyā XII: 413-14.
[44] *Futūḥāt* II: 95.34; Yaḥyā XII: 459-60.
[45] *Futūḥāt* IV: 4.32.

ogy.[46] This means that the (delimited) mercy of necessity is in fact a form taken by the (undelimited) mercy of gratuitous favor, just as the prescriptive command is a form taken by the engendering command. From the human point of view, it may seem that faith and good works necessitate the delimited mercy, but if we are strict in our *tawḥīd*, nothing can impose necessity on God except God himself. Hence, as Ibn ʿArabī writes, "He attracts His munificence (*jūd*) through His munificence," which is to say that the nondelimited mercy drives the servant to seek out the delimited mercy. Grace always precedes faith.

> Know that God has a delimited munificence and a nondelimited munificence, for He has delimited some of His munificence by necessity. He says, "Your Lord has written upon Himself mercy" (Q. 6:54). In other words, He has necessitated and obligated (*farḍ*) Himself to be merciful toward a specific people whom He describes with specific attributes, which are that, "Whosoever of you does something ugly in ignorance, and then repents and makes well, He is Forgiving, Ever-merciful" (Q. 6:54). This is the munificence delimited by necessity for those who have this attribute. It is a compensation for this specific work.
>
> Repentance and making well, however, derive from the nondelimited munificence. Thus He attracts His munificence through His munificence. So, no one determines His properties except He, and no one delimits Him but He. As for the servant, he is a vanishing accident and an object on display.
>
> Our scholar and leader Sahl b. ʿAbdallāh said, "I encountered Iblis and recognized him, and he knew that I had recognized him. There occurred between us a debate. He spoke to me, and I spoke to him, and the discussion became intense. The quarrel was drawn out until I stopped short and he stopped short. I was heated and he was heated. One of the last things he said to me was this:
>
> 'O Sahl! God says, "My mercy embraces everything" (Q. 7:156), so He made it general. It is not hidden from you that I am a thing, without doubt, for the word *thing* demands encompassment and generality. *Thing* is the most indefinite of the indefinites, so His mercy embraces me.'"
>
> Sahl said, "By God, he silenced me and bewildered me with the subtlety of his argumentation. He won with verses like this. He understood from them what we had not understood. He knew what we did not

[46] For details, see Chittick 1989, 109ff.

> know about them and their significance. So I remained bewildered and thinking. I began to recite the verse to myself, and when I came to His words in it, 'So I shall write it' etc., I became happy. I imagined that I would win the argument by making manifest to him what would break his back. I said to him, 'O accursed one! God has delimited it with specific descriptions that remove it from generality, for He says, "I shall write it."'
>
> Iblis smiled and said, 'O Sahl! I did not think you were so ignorant. I did not think that you did not know, O Sahl, that here the delimitation is your attribute, not His attribute.'"
>
> Sahl said, "So I returned to myself and I choked on my spittle, and the water caught in my throat. By God, I found no answer, and I did not shut the gate in his face. I knew that he was craving something, but he turned away, and I turned away. By God, I did not know what would come to be after that. For God did not state plainly anything that would eliminate this ambiguity. So, for me the situation stayed with His will in His creation. I do not judge that He gives it a duration that comes to an end or that does not come to an end."
>
> Know, brother, that I [sc. Ibn ʿArabī] have gone deeply into the arguments recounted from Iblis, and I have not seen anyone who falls shorter than he in arguments or who is more ignorant than he among the *ʿulamāʾ*. So, when I came to understand this question from him as told by Sahl b. ʿAbdallāh, I was surprised. I came to know that Iblis may have some knowledge in which there is no ignorance, for he is the teacher of Sahl in this question.
>
> As for me, I do not take it except from God, so I do not owe a favor to Iblis in this question or in any other—praise to God. And I hope it will be so for the rest of my life.
>
> This is a question of roots, not branches. Iblis is expecting to reach God's mercy from gratuitous favor and nondelimited munificence itself, through which He necessitated for Himself what He necessitated and with which He turns toward those who repent and make well. So the property belongs to God, who is High and Great beyond delimitation in the midst of delimitation. So, nothing is necessitated for God other than what He necessitates for Himself.[47]

Human beings, then, play a role in cosmogenesis, because their works "necessitate" God's recompense. In fact, however, the necessity derives from God's delimitation of himself, not man's influence on God. In effect, God creates paradise and hell through human ac-

[47] *Futūḥāt* II: 662.7. For two briefer mentions of this meeting in similar contexts, see II: 45.12 (Yaḥyā 12, 92); III: 466.21.

tivity. "If not for us," says Ibn ʿArabī, "the next world would not become distinct from this world."[48]

Given the repercussions of human activity in worlds that extend indefinitely beyond the visible realm, it is impossible to understand the full implications of human nature without receiving knowledge from God, e.g., through prophecy, which comes in the form of reports and rulings, the latter being the specific realm of the prescriptive command. In order for prophetic guidance to be meaningful, however, there must also be a call to misguidance, or there would be no reason to turn away from God in the first place. This is to say that God's mercy and guidance demand the existence of Iblis. As Ibn ʿArabī puts it, "Were there no prescription, no satan would ever come near a human being to lead him astray, for that would be useless (*ʿabath*), and the Real does nothing useless, for all is His act 'and to Him the whole affair is returned'" (Q. 11:123).[49]

Ibn ʿArabī reminds us that it is prescription itself that brings the satans into existence while advising "courtesy" (*adab*) in dealing with God. Even though everything comes from God, directly or indirectly, people should acknowledge that good (*khayr*), but take evil (*sharr*), if they must, from Iblis.

> If the Real makes you blind and deaf and uses you in the grip of evil, it is part of courtesy that you do not take it from the hand of the Real. Take it from the hand of the one named "Satan," for evil comes to you on his hand. Were this postman (*barīd*) to disappear, the property of evil would not occur in existence. And, the only thing that made evil itself manifest from this Satan is prescription.[50]

The cosmic role of Iblis allows us to recognize that Adam, Eve, and Satan did not fall (*hubūṭ*) from the Garden for the same reasons. Adam and Eve were not being punished. Rather, they were being honored, for God created Adam to be his vicegerent and Eve to be the mother of his children. Only Iblis was being punished, but he was also being sent to lead people astray.[51] Nonetheless, he is held accountable for his blameworthy activity, for God did not force him to do what he did. Ibn ʿArabī makes this point in a number of ways, for example in a little dialogue:

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[48] *Futūḥāt* III: 253.21.
[49] *Futūḥāt* III: 527.6 (Chittick 1998, 120).
[50] *Futūḥāt* IV: 223.25.
[51] *Futūḥāt* I: 231.34 (Yaḥyā 3, 404-5); III: 143.33, 382.3; IV: 4.26.

> Iblis said to the Real, "You commanded me to do what You did not desire to occur from me. If You had desired that I prostrate myself before Adam, I would have prostrated myself."
>
> God said to him, "When did you come to know that I did not desire prostration from you? Was is after the occurrence of your refusal and the elapse of the time of the command, or before it?"
>
> [Satan] said to Him, "After the occurrence of the refusal, I came to know that, if You had desired me to prostrate myself, I would have prostrated myself."
>
> God said to him, "That is why I took you to task."[52]

The conclusion that Ibn ʿArabī immediately draws is typical of his perspective: "No one is taken to task for anything but ignorance." The way to salvation lies in knowledge, specifically knowledge of *tawḥīd*. He often quotes or refers to the sound hadith, "Those who know that there is no god but God will enter the Garden." One might respond that if this is the case, Iblis has nothing to worry about, because he certainly knows that much. Ibn ʿArabī writes, "Iblis knew that Gehenna does not allow the folk of *tawḥīd* to stay forever within it and that God will never leave a *muwaḥḥid* in it, whatever may be the path of his *tawḥīd*. Iblis depended on this in his own case, so in one respect he had knowledge, but in another respect he was ignorant."[53]

Some of his ignorance was his belief that the people of *shirk* will suffer forever. This is why his goal is not simply to get people to disobey the prescriptive command, but rather to become *mushrik*s. Iblis knows that God has denied the *mushrik*s entrance to paradise, and like many theologians, he takes this to mean that their suffering will never end. Ibn ʿArabī, however, offers numerous scriptural and theological arguments to show that the suffering will eventually cease. [54] *Mushriks* will not leave hell, but they will find that it is a pleasant and appropriate place for them to be. Ibn ʿArabī makes some of these points while explaining the significance of the verse, "Satan promises you poverty and commands you to indecency, and God promises you forgiveness from Him and bounty" (Q. 2:268).

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[52] *Futūḥāt* III: 124.15.

[53] *Futūḥāt* III: 382.20.

[54] See William C. Chittick, "Ibn al-ʿArabī's Hermeneutics of Mercy," in: Stephen Katz, ed. (2000), *Mysticism and Sacred Scripture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 153-68 and idem (2005), *Ibn ʿArabī: Heir to the Prophets*, Oxford: Oneworld, 2005, chapter 9.

> The fall of Iblis was for the sake of leading astray. Then, when God's mercy becomes all-inclusive, everything by which he leads astray the children of Adam will recoil upon him. For God made man's every opposition (*mukhālafa*) to derive from the casting and leading astray of the Enemy. He says, "Satan promises you poverty and commands you to indecency," that is, [he commands you] to make it manifest, which is to say that it should occur from you. For Satan knows that the Real relieves man from [responsibility for] what his own soul says to him and from the ugliness within him, unless he manifests it with his own limbs through activity. That is "indecency."
>
> Thus God says, "And God promises you forgiveness from Him" for the indecency that occurs from you because Satan has commanded you to do it; "and bounty," because of the poverty that Satan has promised you.
>
> This is the most enormous and difficult verse heard by Iblis, because he knows that his leading astray will not profit him. This is why he is eagerly desirous only of *shirk* specifically, for he has heard the Real say, "Surely God does not forgive that anyone be associated with Him" (Q. 4:48). He imagines that the duration of punishment for *shirk* is endless, but God did not say that. The *mushrik* has no escape from punishment or from dwelling in Gehenna, for he will not emerge from the Fire (Q. 2:167), so he will dwell there everlastingly. But God did not remark upon the end of the duration of chastisement and wretchedness within it. There is nothing to be feared except that—not the fact that it is an abode of staying for those who inhabit it.
>
> So, God declared it true that the *mushrik* will be taken to task for his *shirk*. This is like the enactment of a penalty for those who are designated for it, whether it be in this world or the next world. These are divine penalties that the Real enacts on His servant if He does not forgive their causes. Iblis was ignorant of the end of the duration of the punishment of the *mushrik* for his *shirk*.[55]

Ibn ʿArabī mentions that Iblis was a *muwaḥḥid* and not a *mushrik* on a number of occasions, but he maintains nonetheless that Iblis will suffer the punishment of the *mushrik*s and something additional as well. His chastisement in hell will be more severe than that of any other creature,[56] and he will stay in hell forever. Ibn ʿArabī explains the severity of his punishment in terms of the hadith, "He who sets down an ugly sunna will carry its burden (*wizr*) and the burden of those who act by it."

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[55] *Futūḥāt* III: 382.4.
[56] *Futūḥāt* I: 300.8; Yaḥyā IV: 382.

> The fall of Iblis was a fall of abandonment, punishment, and acquiring burdens, for disobedience does not demand the everlastingness of wretchedness. After all, he was not a *mushrik*. Rather, he was proud of the way God had created him. God, however, wrote him down as wretched, and the abode of wretchedness is singled out for the folk of *shirk*. So, God sent him to the earth to set down the sunna of *shirk* by whispering in the hearts of the servants. When they associate, Iblis declares himself quit of the *mushrik* and *shirk* (Q. 59:16). But, declaring himself quit has no profit for him, for he is the one who said to him, "Disbelieve!," as God has reported (Q. 59:16). Hence the burden of every *mushrik* in the world recoils upon him, even though he is a *muwaḥḥid*, for he set down an ugly sunna, and upon him is its burden and the burden of those who acted by it.[57]

Ibn ʿArabī continues this passage by telling us that the only way Satan can instill *shirk* in people, given that it goes against human nature, is to keep it firmly fixed in his own imagination. In effect, he is participating in *shirk*, even if he knows it theoretically to be false.

> So Iblis is never separate from *shirk*, and that is why God made him wretched, for he cannot conceive of *tawḥīd* for a single breath, because he clings to this attribute and eagerly desires that it persist in the soul of the *mushrik*. Were it to leave the soul [of Iblis], the *mushrik* would not find anyone to speak of *shirk* in his soul, so *shirk* would leave him.[58]

VI. Waḥdat al-Wujūd *Revisited*

In the Muslim popular imagination and much of the secondary literature, Ibn ʿArabī's name is inseparable from *waḥdat al-wujūd*, "the Oneness of Being." It is not difficult to see why his metaphysics and cosmology might be given this label. He commonly uses the basic philosophical term *wujūd* as a designation for God, and he often returns to God's creation of the universe by means of the command "Be!" This is what he calls an "existential utterance" (*lafẓa wujūdiyya*), because its fruit is "being" (*kawn*) as a whole, the *wujūd* that is given to every word articulated in the All-merciful Breath. Nonetheless, given the diverse ways in which people have understood *waḥdat al-wujūd* over history, the statement that he believed in it is a frequent and gross misrepresentation of his teachings. Suffice it to re-

[57] *Futūḥāt* I: 232.3; Yaḥyā III: 404-5.
[58] *Futūḥāt* I: 232.14; Yaḥyā III: 406.14.

member that the first person to claim he supported it was the Hanbalite polemicist Ibn Taymiyya, who considered it synonymous with *kufr* (unbelief) and *ilḥād* (heresy). For Ibn Taymiyya, as for some supporters of Ibn ʿArabī in the past and not a few aficionados in the present, *waḥdat al-wujūd* means "All is He" (*hama ūst*)—to use the gloss of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī.[59]

There is no doubt that Ibn ʿArabī asserts the Oneness of the Real Being (*al-wujūd al-ḥaqq*), but so does every other Muslim theologian. More importantly for the human situation, Ibn ʿArabī also asserts the multiplicity of the Real's manifestations and the necessity to differentiate among them. As he says in a typical passage,

> Were we to halt with "Be!" we would see nothing but One Entity (*ʿayn wāḥida*). But we halt only with the traces (*āthār*) of this word, and these are the engendered things (*mukawwanāt*). So they become many, numerous, and distinct through their individuals.[60]

The fact that Ibn ʿArabī halts with the traces of the One Word has been lost on most of those who categorize him under *waḥdat al-wujūd*, whether as praise or blame. If we look carefully, we can see that for him, claiming that "All is He" is the pretext offered by Iblis, who thinks that he can depend on the engendering command to reap the fruit of God's nondelimited mercy. The key to people's existential and ontological situation lies not in the oneness of *wujūd* that is affirmed by the engendering command, but in the diversity of manifestation and the delimitation of mercy affirmed by the prescriptive command. Only prescription allows people to reap the fruit of their freedom. This is the point that Ibn ʿArabī is making in this passage:

> God gives to His servants by Himself and on the hands of His messengers. If something comes to you on the Messenger's hand, take it without any scale (*mīzān*), but if something comes to you on God's hand, take it with a scale. For God is identical with every giver, but He has forbidden you to take every gift. This is why He says, "Whatever the Messenger gives you, take; whatever he forbids you, forgo" (Q. 59:7). Hence, if you take from the Messenger, this will be more profitable for you and better for achieving your felicity. Your taking from the Messenger is nondelimited, but your taking from God is delimited.

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[59] See William C. Chittick (1994), "Rūmī and *Waḥdat al-wujūd*," in: A. Banani, R. Hovannisian, and G. Sabagh, eds., *Poetry and Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage of Rūmī*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 70-111 and idem (2002), "*Waḥdat al-Shuhūd*," EI^2 XI: 37-9.

[60] *Futūḥāt* III: 284.16; Chittick 1998, 197-8.

> The Messenger himself is delimited, but taking from him is nondelimited. God is not delimited by any delimitation, but taking from Him is delimited.[61]

Ibn ʿArabī did not employ the expression *waḥdat al-wujūd*, and there is no reason to suppose from his own writings that he would have considered it an appropriate designation for his perspective. His preferred term for his activity was *taḥqīq*, "realization." The word means to understand and actualize *ḥaqq*. As a Qurʾānic divine name, *ḥaqq* means the Truth and Reality, that is God, the Real *wujūd*. As a human attribute, it designates the right, the true, the worthy, the appropriate, and the just, as well as duty and responsibility. The *ḥaqq* that is accessible to human beings appears by means of the delimited disclosure of the nondelimited One, for the Real created everything with a reality (*ḥaqīqa*) appropriate (*ḥaqīq*) to its own niche in the Divine Breath. Everything is a disclosure of the Real, and as such everything is real, right, appropriate, and true.

For people to make good use of their embodiment in clay, they need to recognize the differing *ḥaqq*s of things, that is, the diverse demands that things make upon them. These are determined not by the fact that things manifest the One *wujūd*, but by the fact that each is a unique and delimited disclosure representing a specific *ḥaqq* that must be understood if one is to act appropriately and rightly. Thus the basic human task is encapsulated in the sound hadith, "Give to everything that has a *ḥaqq* its *ḥaqq*." In order to do this, people need to recognize things for what they are in the context of the *ḥaqq* of God, the *ḥaqq* of the cosmos, and the *ḥaqq* of the knowing self. Having gained this understanding, people need to act *bi-l-ḥaqq*, appropriately and rightly. It is precisely the prescriptive command that provides the guidance for discernment and activity.

In short, Ibn ʿArabī's cosmology attempts to clarify not only the structure of the cosmos, but also its relationship with *al-wujūd al-ḥaqq* and the human self. The mythic language of the Qurʾān—angels and jinn and satans—helps bring home the fact that the world out there is not distinct from the world in here. Given the real presence of Iblis in both the cosmic process and the human soul, ethics and morality cannot be placed into the category of the conventional or the subjective, but instead must be recognized as having an objec-

[61] *Futūḥāt* IV: 186.22.

tivity at least as real as our own physical embodiment. Making a sharp distinction between self and other, subject and object, values and facts, is contingent upon ignoring the *ḥaqq* of things. It is true that such dualistic thinking has dominated the Western mindset since the Enlightenment and has made possible the appearance of modern science, but this historical fact says nothing about whether or not this way of looking at things is *ḥaqq*—true and appropriate to the cosmic and human situation.

ĪQĀʿ
MUSIKALISCHE METRIK BEI AL-FĀRĀBĪ (GEST. 950) UND IHR EBENBILD BEI THOINOT ARBEAU (GEST. 1595)

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Mit zu den frühesten Zeugnissen der arabischen Literatur in islamischer Zeit gehören Bücher über die Theorie der Musik. Sie entstanden seit dem 2./8. Jahrhundert und sind uns in Zitaten oder auch vollständig erhalten. Bereits die älteste bekannte Musiktheorie in arabischer Sprache umfasste die drei Aspekte „Töne" (*nagham)*, musikalische Metrik (*īqāʿ*) und „Komposition" (*taʾlīf*), die für die musikalische Praxis grundlegend sind.[1]

Die Lehre vom *īqāʿ*, wörtlich das „Fallenlassen" eines Stabes (*qaḍīb*) zum Markieren von Metrum und Rhythmus, war in Analogie zur prosodischen Metrik (*ʿarūḍ*)[2] gebildet. Zwei musikalische „Perioden" (*dawr*, pl. *adwār*) bilden eine metrische Einheit (*īqāʿ*) wie zwei Halbverse (*miṣrāʿ*) den Vers (*bayt*) eines Gedichtes. Danach bestand das arabische Kunstlied (*ṣawt*) offenbar in der Regel aus geradzahligen musikalischen Perioden. Als metrisches Skelett der Lieder war der *īqāʿ* Hilfe bei der Komposition und Mittel musikalischer Analyse.

Die sechs zentralen Metren der Kunstmusik (*ghināʾ*) bildeten je drei „schwere" (*thaqīl*) und drei „leichte" (*khafīf*) „Gattungen" (*ajnās*, sing. *jins*) mit jeweils langen oder kurzen Grundschlägen im Verhältnis 2:1.[3] Hierunter fiel der auch als Versmass bekannte *ramal*,[4] der zu-

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[1] Farmer, H.G. (1965), *The Sources of Arabian Music*, 2. Aufl., Leiden, 1 ff.; Neubauer, E. (1998), *Arabische Musiktheorie von den Anfängen bis zum 6./12. Jahrhundert,* Frankfurt, 43 ff.

[2] Zur arabischen Prosodie s. Heinrichs, W. (1987), „Poetik, Rhetorik, Literaturkritik, Metrik und Reimlehre", in: H. Gätje (ed.), *Grundriss der Arabischen Philologie*, II: *Literaturwissenschaft*, Wiesbaden, 177-207, hier 190-200.

[3] Dazu zählen das „erste schwere" Metrum (*al-thaqīl al-awwal)* und seine „leichte" Form (*khafīf al-thaqīl al-awwal*) mit Folgen von „schweren" bzw. „leichten" Schlägen, die in westlicher Notation als 4/2- bzw. 4/4-Takte darstellbar sind, sowie das „zweite schwere" Metrum (*al-thaqīl al-thānī*) mit seiner „leichten" Form

sammen mit *hazaj* und *rajaz* einen der Metrenkreise des al-Khalīl b. Aḥmad bildet.[5] Der *hazaj* hatte im *īqāʿ* zunächst, wie auch in der frühen prosodischen Metrik,[6] eine Sonderstellung als Aussenseiter oder sogar als Teil einer eigenen *hazaj*-Familie,[7] während der *rajaz* im *īqāʿ* ganz fehlt. Dieser gehörte nicht in den Bereich des metrisierten Gesangs im professionellen *ghināʾ*, sondern zur metrisch freien Kantillation (*tarannum*) von zunächst Arbeitsliedern[8] und später auch Lehrgedichten, die nicht Sache der städtischen und höfischen Musik waren.

Analog zu den Versmassen bestanden die Grundformen der musikalischen Praxis aus bestimmten Folgen von Kürzen und Längen. Beim „schweren" *ramal* beispielsweise waren es eine Länge und zwei Kürzen, gefolgt von einer Pause.[9] Die Grundform wurde in der Praxis vielfach modifiziert und bildete so das metrisch-rhythmische Gerüst einer gesungenen Melodie oder auch eines Tanzes. Ein dem „schweren" *ramal* vergleichbares Metrum liegt noch der Sarabande (pers. *sar-band*) zugrunde, deren charakteristischer „schwerer" zweiter Taktteil ein der westlichen Musik fremdes Element bildet.

Zur Bestimmung und Benennung eines Liedes wurde im frühen Islam an erster Stelle das Metrum genannt. Es wurde als wichtiger angesehen als der melodische Modus. Dieser war dem Metrum untergeordnet.[10] Die musikalische Metrik der Bagdader Hofmusik unter Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī (gest. 188/804) und seinem Sohn Isḥāq al-

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(*khafīf al-thaqīl al-thānī*), darstellbar als 5/2- bzw. 5/4-Takte, s. Neubauer 1998, 202-5.

[4] Der „schwere" ramal (*al-ramal al-thaqīl*) entspricht einem 3/2-Takt, seine „leichte" Version (*khafīf al-ramal*) einem 3/4-Takt, s. Neubauer 1998, 200-1.

[5] Heinrichs 1987, 197.

[6] Ebd. 192.

[7] Als einzelnes, ins *īqāʿ*-System integriertes Metrum lässt sich seine Schlagfolge einem 6/8-Takt vergleichen, s. Neubauer 1998, 205-7.

[8] Heinrichs 1987, 192.

[9] In seiner auf die Schläge der „Periode" reduzierten Form, die aus einer Länge und zwei Kürzen besteht, entspricht der *ramal* der Praktiker dem gleichnamigen Versmass. Dessen Silbenfolge *fāʿilātun* hat analog zwei gleichwertige Teile: *fāʿi* (eine Länge = 2) + *lātun* (zwei Kürzen = 1 + 1). Der prosodische *ramal* ist hier also nicht als „hinkende" Sequenz stereotyper Längen und Kürzen der Form 2 (*fā*) + 1 (*ʿi*) + 2 (*lā*) + 2 (*tun*) zu werten, sondern als die rhythmisierte Folge 1 1/2 (*fā*) + 1/2 (*ʿi*) + 1 (*lā*) + 1 (*tun*). In Notenwerten ausgedrückt sind das ein punktiertes Viertel mit einem Achtel (oder das erste und dritte Viertel einer Vierteltriole), gefolgt von zwei Vierteln, s. Neubauer 1998, 200-1, 206.

[10] Ebd. 16-18, 104-5.

Mawṣilī (gest. 235/850) fand nicht nur Eingang in das bedeutende „Grosse Buch der Lieder", das *Kitāb al-Aghānī al-kabīr* von Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī (gest. 356/967),[11] sondern blieb auch bis ins 5./11. Jahrhundert in den östlichen islamischen Ländern[12] und bis ins 7./13. Jahrhundert im muslimischen Spanien[13] grundlegend für die musikalische Praxis und die dieser verbundenen Kompositionslehre.

Im Unterricht war die musikalische Metrik ein wesentlicher Bestandteil des Stoffes für Sänger, Lautenisten und Komponisten beiderlei Geschlechtes. Nach heutigem Wissen kann sie, auch wenn gewisse griechisch-byzantinische[14] und sasanidisch-persische[15] Anregungen verarbeitet wurden, als eine im wesentlichen autochthon arabische Disziplin angesehen werden und scheint in ihrer Art einzig gewesen zu sein. Praxis und Theorie des *īqāʿ* gelangten nach Nordafrika und al-Andalus, über Iran nach Zentralasien und von dort ins muslimische Indien und westlich bis ins Osmanische Reich.

Die einheimische Metrenlehre wurde auch von Universalgelehrten wie Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (gest. nach 256/870) aufgegriffen, wenn diese im Rahmen ihrer Schriften über Musik handelten,[16] und sie wurde von Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (gest. 339/950) einer kritischen Prüfung unterzogen und dem Leser in einer eigenen Darstellung vor Augen geführt, die in der islamischen Musikliteratur nicht ihresgleichen hat. Das in mehreren Anläufen entstandene[17] und mehrfach modifizierte

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[11] Ebd. 187.

[12] Ibn Zayla (gest. 440/1048), *al-Kāfī fī l-mūsīqī*, ed. Z. Yūsuf, Kairo 1964, 44-63.

[13] Muḥammad b. Tāwīt al-Ṭanjī (1968), „al-Ṭarāʾiq wa-l-alḥān al-mūsīqiyya fī Ifrīqiya wa-l-Andalus", *al-Abḥāth* 21:93-115, speziell 98-102.

[14] Bei al-Fārābī, s. Neubauer 1998, 192-5.

[15] Ibn Khurradādhbih (gest. 300/913) schreibt den Persern bereits in vorislamischer Zeit die Verwendung von Metren zu, s. ebd., 16-17, 64.

[16] Neubauer 1998, 78-80.

[17] Zunächst zwei Kapitel in seinem *Kitāb al-Mūsīqī al-kabīr*, ed. Gh. ʿA. Khashaba und M. A. al-Ḥifnī, Kairo 1967, 435-81, 983-1055; franz. Übers. R. d'Erlanger, *La musique arabe*, Paris 1930, 1: 150-7, ebd. 1935, 2: 26-48. Anschliessend seine erste Monographie *Kitāb al-Īqāʿāt*, Text in Faksimile und Übers. bei Neubauer 1998, 128-84. Schliesslich seine zweite Monographie zum Thema, *Kitāb Iḥṣāʾ al-īqāʿāt*, Text und Übers. ebd., 185-308. Für Studien über al-Fārābī's Metrik s. G. Sawa (1983-4), „Al-Fārābī's Theory of the *īqāʿ*: An Empirically Derived Medieval Model of Rhythmic Analysis", *Progress Reports in Ethnomusicology*, Baltimore, Maryland (Department of Music, University of Maryland Baltimore County), 1,9: 1-32; ders., *Music Performance Practice in the Early ʿAbbāsid Era 132-320 AH/750-932 AD*, Toronto 1989, 2. Aufl., Ottawa 2004, 35-71; ders. (2002), „Theories of Rhythm and Meter in the Medieval Middle East", *The Garland Encyclopedia of World Music*, 6: *The Middle East*, New York und London, 387-93.

Gebäude der musikalischen Metrik al-Fārābī's trug gegenüber der einfachen Lehre der Praktiker der musikalischen Realität besser Rechnung. Das der Prosodie entlehnte metrische Paar der kurzen, „leichten“ und der langen, „schweren“ Silbe, das den Musikern in der Regel zur Darstellung der Metren ausreichte, erweiterte al-Fārābī zu einer Trias von drei „Zeiten“ (*zamān*), in der zum kurzen (*khafīf*) und dem langen (*thaqīl*) Zeitwert ein mittellanger (*mutawassiṭ*) hinzukam. Er vereinheitlichte die Schlagfolgen der Praxis und reduzierte sie zu taktartigen Gebilden in Gruppen mit jeweils gleichlangen, kurzen, mittleren oder langen Schlägen. Aus dem „schweren“ *ramal* der Praktiker mit einer Länge, zwei Kürzen und anschliessender Pause wurde so bei al-Fārābī eine Grundform mit zwei Längen und einer Pause, in der die ursprünglichen beiden Kürzen die zweite Länge ergeben. Die Form der Praxis (2+1+1+Pause) war nach seinem System bereits eine Modifikation der Grundform (2+2+Pause), in welcher der zweite Schlag verdoppelt wird. Al-Fārābī stellte auch die Schläge und ihre Zeitwerte durch Merksilben dar. Diese Merksilben oder Lautsymbole der musikalisch-metrischen Fachsprache sind es, die uns hier interessieren. Bei al-Fārābī lauten sie:[18]

ta- oder *na-* für den kurzen Zeitwert	=	1,
tan für den mittleren Zeitwert	=	2 und
tannan oder *tanna* für den langen Zeitwert	=	4.

Diesen „in allen Sprachen“[19] artikulierbaren Tonsilben, wie al-Fārābī sagt,[20] entsprachen aber nicht, wie man erwarten würde, von der menschlichen Stimme gesungene Töne unterschiedlicher Länge, sondern „Schläge“ (*naqra*, pl. *naqarāt*) auf dem Hauptinstrument der arabischen Hof- und Kunstmusik, der Laute (*ʿūd*). Wie das Tonsy-

[18] Genauer gesagt ist *ta* (1) bei al-Fārābī die Umsetzung der prosodischen Kürze, *tan* (2) die Umsetzung der prosodischen Länge als kleinster „schwerer“ Schlag gegenüber einem mittleren „schweren“ Schlag der Länge *tannan* oder *tanna* (4), s. Neubauer 1998, 206.

[19] Eine Folge nahezu identischer Silben mit einer Mischung aus metrischen und lautmalenden Elementen verwendete schon der römische Dichter und Vermittler griechischer Sprache Quintus Ennius (239-169 v.u.Z.). In seinen der römischen Geschichte gewidmeten *Annales* charakterisierte er den kriegerischen Klang der *tuba* mit dem Wort *taratantara*, s. J. Vahlen (ed.) (1903), *Ennianae poesis reliquiae*, Leipzig, 2. Aufl., Nachdr. Amsterdam 1963, 140; Günther Wille (1967), *Musica Romana*, Amsterdam, 77.

[20] Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Īqāʿāt*, in: Neubauer 1998, 179 (arab. Text), 142 (Übers.).

stem der arabischen, persischen und türkischen Kunstmusik bis ins 9./15. Jahrhundert hinein auf der Laute dargestellt wurde, so war zunächst auch die musikalische Metrik auf dieses Instrument bezogen. Erst im 7./13. Jahrhundert wird die Rahmentrommel (*daff*) ausdrücklich als „Hüter" (*nigāh-dār*) des Metrums gegenüber den Melodieinstrumenten genannt,[21] und erst im 10./16. Jahrhundert zeigt sich diese Funktion der Rhythmusinstrumente in einer wesentlich veränderten metrischen Fachsprache (s. unten).

Al-Fārābī stellt die grundlegenden Zeitwerte der drei „schweren" Metren als vierwertige *tannan*-Schläge dar, die Grundschläge der drei „leichten" Metren als zweiwertige *tan*-Schläge und diejenigen des schnellsten der Metren mit Namen *hazaj* als einwertigen *ta-* bzw. *na*-Schlag. Danach stehen die Zeitwerte der Schläge in folgendem Verhältnis zueinander:

tannan		*tannan*		4	4
tan	*tan*	*tan*	*tan*	2 + 2	2 + 2
ta-na	*ta-na*	*ta-na*	*ta-na*	1+1+1+1	1+1+1+1

Die „Grundformen" (*uṣūl,* sing. *aṣl*) der Perioden der einzelnen Metren bestehen, bei den Musikern wie bei al-Fārābī, aus einer Anzahl von Schlägen und einer abschliessenden Pause oder „Trennung" (*fāṣila*), die streng genommen nicht mehr zur Periode zählt. Das „erste schwere" Metrum (*al-thaqīl al-awwal*), das wir als vier Halbe (4/2) notieren würden, ist eine Folge von drei *tannan*-Schlägen und einer von al-Fārābī durch Punkte (.·.) oder kleine Kreise (o o) dargestellten Trennpause:

tannan *tannan* *tannan* o o

In seiner Beschreibung der Metren verzeichnet al-Fārābī im Anschluss an die Grundform eine Reihe charakteristischer „Veränderungen" (*taghyīrāt*) oder „Modifizierungen" (*maʿdūlāt*). Zunächst kann die Pause, deren Länge derjenigen eines der Grundschläge entspricht, durch einen „Übergang" (*majāz*) genannten Schlag ausgefüllt werden:

tannan *tannan* *tannan* *tannan*

Der „Übergang" verbindet die erste mit der zweiten Periode. Der gleiche Schlag nach der zweiten Periode, der den *īqāʿ* abschliesst, heisst „Stütze" (*iʿtimād*).

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21 ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlīshāh al-Munajjim al-Bukhārī (schrieb 686/1287), *Ashjār wa-athmār*, Hds. Teheran, Majlis 6400, fol. 133a, mit Dank an Amir Hosein Pourjavady.

Als nächstes können Schläge verdoppelt werden. Im zweiten *īqāʿ*-Kapitel seines *Kitāb al-Mūsīqī al-kabīr*[22] und den nachfolgenden monographischen Schriften zum Thema, dem *Kitāb al-Īqāʿāt*[23] und dem *Kitāb Iḥṣāʾ al-īqāʿāt*[24] nennt al-Fārābī die folgenden Beispiele für Modifikationen der Grundform des „ersten schweren" Metrums (*al-thaqīl al-awwal*) in lockerer Reihenfolge:

Zunächst können alle Schläge verdoppelt werden:

tan tan tan tan tan tan tan tan

Anschliessend kann der jeweils zweite Schlag des verdoppelten ersten, zweiten und vierten Schlages fortfallen:

tan o tan o tan tan tan o

Diese Möglichkeit wird nur einmal erwähnt, ist aber sicherlich analog anwendbar. Anschliessend folgt die Verdoppelung des ersten, zweiten und dritten Schlages. Der vierte Schlag kann dabei „angedeutet", „gehaucht" oder als kürzerer Schlag gespielt werden (wofür es noch keine spezielle Merksilbe gibt):

tan tan tan tan tan tan tan o

Möglich ist weiterhin die Verdoppelung des zweiten und des vierten Schlages („angenehm für das Ohr"):

tannan tan tan tannan tan tan

Oder die Verdoppelung nur des zweiten Schlages (auch „angenehm für das Ohr"):

tannan tan tan tannan tannan

Es folgt die Verdoppelung des vierten Schlages:

tannan tannan tannan tan tan

Die Verdoppelung des dritten Schlages:

tannan tannan tan tan tannan

Die Verdoppelung des zweiten und des dritten Schlages:

tannan tan tan tan tan tannan

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[22] al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Mūsīqī al-kabīr*, 1045-8; franz. Übers. d'Erlanger 1935, 45-6.

[23] Text und Übers. in Neubauer 1998, 150-1, 176.

[24] Text und Übers. ebd. 227-30, 287-91.

Die Verdoppelung des ersten Schlages:

tan tan tannan tannan tannan

Die Verdoppelung des ersten und des zweiten Schlages:

tan tan tan tan tannan tannan

Die Verdoppelung des ersten, zweiten und dritten Schlages:

tan tan tan tan tan tan tannan

Und schliesslich die Verdoppelung des zweiten, dritten und vierten Schlages:

tannan tan tan tan tan tan tan

Al-Fārābī beschreibt auch zahlreiche weitere Möglichkeiten, die Grundformen zu modifizieren oder auch unterschiedlich strukturierte Perioden miteinander zu verbinden, die in unserem Zusammenhang nicht weiter von Interesse sind.

Die metrische Silbensprache, die uns bei al-Fārābī entgegentritt, wurde im Prinzip bis ins 9./15. Jahrhundert hinein verwendet. Die Entwicklung hin zu längeren und komplizierteren Metren, die zwischen dem 5./11. und 7./13. Jahrhundert stattfand, machte es allerdings erforderlich, die Fachsprache der Musiker der neuen Situation anzupassen. Die Silbenfolgen wurden jetzt konsequent nur noch additiv quantitierend verwendet, so dass eine Form wie *tanan* jetzt nicht mehr zwei Töne mit den Zeitwerten 1 und 2, sondern einen Ton des Zeitwertes 3 bezeichnete. Das Resultat, zuerst fassbar im Werk von Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Urmawī (gest. 693/1294)[25], lautet:

ta oder na	=	1 Zeiteinheit
tan	=	2 Einheiten
tanan	=	3 Einheiten
tananan	=	4 Einheiten

Jetzt wurde das Metrum *ramal*, je nachdem ob „leicht“ oder „schwer“, mit zehn, zwölf oder gar vierundzwanzig Zeitwerten (etwa

[25] S. sein *Kitāb al-Adwār* und die *al-Risāla al-Sharafiyya*, Faksimile-Ausgabe (der Handschriften Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye 3653 und Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III, 3460) Frankfurt 1984, 74-89 (1. Titel) und 123-9 (2. Titel); entsprechend *Kitāb al-Adwār*, ed. Gh. ʿA. Khashaba und M. A. al-Ḥifnī, Kairo 1986 und ed. H. M. al-Rajab, Bagdad 1980; franz. Übers. R. d'Erlanger (1938), *La musique arabe*, Paris, 3: 474-515; *al-Risāla al-Sharafiyya*, ed. H. al-Rajab, Bagdad 1982, 198-207; franz. Übers. d'Erlanger 1938, 161-72.

tan ta-na tan tan ta-na tan = 12, mit Verdoppelung des zweiten und fünften Schlages) dargestellt.

Das neue System der erweiterten Metren wurde nach wie vor auch in der traditionellen, von al-Fārābī eingeführten Silbensprache überliefert. In dieser Form gelangte es von Persien in die osmanisch-türkische Musikpraxis, wie es aus den Schriften von Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Lādhiqī (gest. nach 890/1485)[26], Maḥmūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Marāghī (um 900/1500)[27] und den türkisch schreibenden Theoretikern des 9./15. Jahrhunderts aus Anatolien[28] hervorgeht.

Spätestens seit dem 4./10. Jahrhundert gab es noch andere Methoden, die Länge der Schläge und die Grundformen der Metren darzustellen, was hier der Vollständigkeit halber erwähnt sei. Entweder verwendete man die Buchstaben des arabischen Alphabets in ihrem Zahlenwert. Das ergab für die obigen vier verschiedenen Längen, mit der kürzesten beginnend, *alif* (= *ta* = 1), *bāʾ* (= *tan* = 2), *jīm* (= *tanan* = 3) und *dāl* (= *tananan* = 4). Oder man bediente sich der aus der Prosodie bekannten Silbenfolgen der Wurzel f-ʿ-l.[29] Der oben genannte, „moderne" zwölfwertige *ramal* (der mit dem ersten schweren Metrum der frühen Theoretiker nur noch den Namen teilt) lautete danach entweder *muftaʿilātun faʿilun* oder *muftaʿilun muftaʿilun*.[30] Zusätzlich gab es noch die ebenfalls der Prosodie entlehnten und für den musikalischen Bereich uminterpretierten Begriffe *ḥaraka* oder *sarīʿ* (= *ta* = 1), *sabab* oder *khafīf* (= *tan* = 2), *watid* oder *khafīf al-thaqīl* (= *tanan* = 3) und *fāṣila* oder *thaqīl* (= *tananan* = 4).[31]

Ein später Ableger der metrischen Silbensprache al-Fārābī's im europäischen Raum findet sich in verblüffend ähnlicher Form in der *Orchésographie* des französischen Geistlichen und Musikliebhabers

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[26] S. seine *al-Risāla al-Fatḥiyya*, ed. H. M. al-Rajab, Kuwait 1986, 220-63; franz. Übers. d'Erlanger (1939), *La musique arabe*, Paris, 4: 460-98.

[27] S. seinen *Mukhtaṣar dar ʿilm-i mūsīqī*, Hds. Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye 3649 (datiert 908/1502), fol. 48b-54b.

[28] S. z.B. E. Popescu-Judetz und E. Neubauer (Ed. und Übers.) (2004), *Seydī's Book on Music. A 15th Century Turkish Discourse*, Frankfurt, 113-23.

[29] Heinrichs 1987, 196-7.

[30] Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Urmawī, *al-Risāla al-Sharafiyya*, ed. H. al-Rajab (wie Anm. 25), 206, 207.

[31] Neubauer 1998, 86; Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Urmawī, *Kitāb al-Adwār*, ed. H. M. al-Rajab (wie Anm. 25), 139-53 passim; ders., *al-Risāla al-Sharafiyya*, ed. H. al-Rajab (wie Anm. 25), 192-3, 198 ff.

Thoinot Arbeau (Anagramm für Jehan Tabourot, 1520-1595).[32] Obwohl dieses Buch, das sein Autor in hohem Alter und mit grosser Zuneigung zum Thema schrieb, der Darstellung der zeitgenössischen Tänze gewidmet ist, beginnt es mit einer Einleitung über Militärmusik und ist zu nahezu einem Viertel der Marschmusik gewidmet. Der Grund dafür liegt offensichtlich darin, dass Arbeau in der militärischen Trommelpraxis eine Methode gefunden hatte, Metrik und Rhythmus mit Hilfe eingängiger Merksilben zu beschreiben. Er wollte die Methode ursprünglich wohl auf die verschiedenen Tänze anwenden, hat es dann aber nur bei zweien wirklich getan. Arbeau übernimmt die mnemotechnischen Silben der Trommler für die drei grundlegenden Tonlängen, die er *pesant*, *moyen* und *concité* nennt[33] – man vergleiche *thaqīl*, *mutawassiṭ* und *khafīf* –, und verwendet daneben die musikalische Notation seiner Zeit in dem uns bekannten System aus fünf Linien, die wir hier, der Einheitlichkeit halber, in Zahlen umsetzen (1 = eine Achtelnote):

tan	=	eine halbe Note	=	4
tere	=	zwei Viertelnoten	=	2 + 2
fre	=	vier Achtelnoten	=	1 + 1 + 1 + 1

Arbeaus *tan* ist ein „schwerer“ Wert, dem langsamen Marschschritt der Zeit entsprechend. Seinen Werten lassen sich al-Fārābī's Silbenmuster wie folgt zuordnen:

bei Arbeau:				bei al-Fārābī:
tan	=	eine halbe Note	=	*tannan* oder *tanna*
tere	=	zwei Viertelnoten	=	*tan tan*
fre	=	vier Achtelnoten	=	*tana tana*

Arbeaus *fre* fällt jedoch als Abkürzung für einen kurzen Wirbel methodisch aus dem Rahmen. Seine Möglichkeit, eine lange Silbe durch zwei kurze im Verhältnis 2 : 1 zu unterteilen, ist mit der Silbenfolge *tere* als Unterteilung von *tan* bereits erschöpft. Hier wirkt die ältere, trotz al-Fārābī's Reform verbreitetere Methode nach, die musikalischen Zeitwerte analog zu den prosodischen auf das Paar Länge und Kürze zu reduzieren. Soll auch die Unterteilung der musikalischen

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[32] Thoinot Arbeau (1589), *Orchésographie, et traicté en forme de dialogue, par lequel toutes personnes peuvent facilement apprendre et pratiquer l'honneste exercice des danses*, Langres, die Edition ist foliiert. Nachdr. Hildesheim, New York 1980.

[33] Ebd., fol. 7b.

Kürze durch sprachliche Hilfssilben ausgedrückt werden, so muss man zu anderen Mitteln greifen. Daher ist Arbeaus Darstellung, semantisch gesehen, um einen Zeitwert gegenüber al-Fārābī's System verschoben, das seinerseits in sich schlüssig ist:

bei Arbeau:				bei al-Fārābī:
				tannan (4)
tan	=	eine halbe Note (4)	=	*tan* (2)
te	=	eine Viertelnote (2)	=	*ta* (1)
fre	=	vier Achtelnoten (à 1)		

Als Alternative für *tan* nennt Arbeau die Form *plan*, verwendet sie aber in seinen Beispielen nicht. Er beschreibt nun seitenlang und auf gleiche Weise wie al-Fārābī ein metrisches Grundmuster im vier-Halbe-Takt (4/2) und seine Modifizierungen.[34] Auch er nimmt zwei Takte als metrische Einheit, mit dem Unterschied allerdings, dass aus Gründen geregelten Marschierens nur die Schläge des ersten Taktes modifiziert werden, während es im zweiten Takt stets bei dem einen Schlag auf der „Eins“ bleibt. Vor dem fünften und letzten *tan* aller seiner Beispiele haben wir uns daher einen imaginären Taktstrich zu denken.

In penibler Vollständigkeit beschreibt Arbeau alle denkbaren Verdoppelungen und gibt sie in Noten und metrischer Silbenschrift wieder. Er beginnt mit den unverdoppelten Grundschlägen. Nach al-Fārābī's Metrenlehre wäre dies das „erste schwere“ Metrum (*al-thaqīl al-awwal*) mit „Übergangs“-Schlag:

tan tan tan tan tan

Als erste Modifikation folgen die vier Möglichkeiten der Verdoppelung jeweils eines Schlages. Der abschliessende *tan*-Schlag bleibt auch in allen folgenden Beispielen als einzelner und betonter Grundschlag bestehen:

tan tan tan tere tan
tan tan tere tan tan
tan tere tan tan tan
tere tan tan tan tan

Dann werden je zwei Grundschläge verdoppelt:

[34] Ebd., fol. 9b -14a.

tan tan tere tere tan
tan tere tere tan tan
tan tere tan tere tan
tere tere tan tan tan
tere tan tere tan tan
tere tan tan tere tan

Als Nächstes kommt die Verdoppelung von je drei Schlägen:

tan tere tere tere tan
tere tan tere tere tan
tere tere tan tere tan
tere tere tere tan tan

Abschliessend zur einfachen Verdoppelung gibt Arbeau die innerhalb seines Systems einzig mögliche Verdoppelung von vier Schlägen, d.h. aller vier Schläge des ersten Taktes, da der abschliessende und betonte *tan*-Schlag auf dem Beginn des zweiten Taktes als solcher bestehen bleiben muss:

tere tere tere tere tan

Es folgen die weiteren Unterteilungen, die Arbeau ebenfalls systematisch und ausführlich darstellt. Es sind Verbindungen des Grundschlages *tan* (4) mit der Schlagfolge *fre* (1+1+1+1). Zunächst wird wieder nur einer der Grundschläge unterteilt:

tan tan tan fre tan
tan tan fre tan tan
tan fre tan tan tan
fre tan tan tan tan

Dann folgt die Unterteilung von je zwei Grundschlägen:

tan tan fre fre tan
tan fre fre tan tan
tan fre tan fre tan
fre fre tan tan tan
fre tan fre tan tan
fre tan tan fre tan

Vier Möglichkeiten ergibt die Unterteilung von je drei Grundschlägen:

tan fre fre fre tan
fre tan fre fre tan
fre fre tan fre tan
fre fre fre tan tan

Abschliessend zu dieser Abteilung folgt die Unterteilung aller vier Grundschläge des ersten Taktes, wieder unter Beibehaltung des abschliessenden *tan*-Schlages:

fre *fre* *fre* *fre* *tan*

In der nächsten Gruppe werden je drei *tere* (2+2) und ein *fre* (1+1+1+1) mit abschliessendem *tan* (4) kombiniert:

tere *tere* *tere* *fre* *tan*
tere *tere* *fre* *tere* *tan*
tere *fre* *tere* *tere* *tan*
fre *tere* *tere* *tere* *tan*

Es folgen je zwei *tere* (2+2) und zwei *fre* (1+1+1+1) mit abschliessendem *tan* (4):

tere *tere* *fre* *fre* *tan*
tere *fre* *fre* *tere* *tan*
tere *fre* *tere* *fre* *tan*
fre *fre* *tere* *tere* *tan*
fre *tere* *fre* *tere* *tan*
fre *tere* *tere* *fre* *tan*

Zum Schluss dieser Abteilung kommen je ein *tere* (2+2) und drei *fre* (1+1+1+1), wieder mit abschliessendem *tan* (4):

tere *fre* *fre* *fre* *tan*
fre *tere* *fre* *fre* *tan*
fre *fre* *tere* *fre* *tan*
fre *fre* *fre* *tere* *tan*

Nun folgen, das abschliessende *tan* nicht gerechnet, die zwölf möglichen Kombinationen von je zwei *tan* (4) sowie einem *tere* (2+2) und einem *fre* (1+1+1+1), beginnend mit:

tan *tan* *tere* *fre* *tan*

und endend mit:

fre *tan* *tan* *tere* *tan*

Anschliessend bringt Arbeau die zwölf Kombinationen von je einem *tan* (4), zwei *tere* (2+2) und einem *fre* (1+1+1+1), beginnend mit:

tere *tere* *tan* *fre* *tan*

und endend mit:

fre *tere* *tere* *tan* *tan*

Zum Abschluss kommen die acht möglichen Kombinationen von einem *tan* (4), einem *tere* (2+2) und zwei *fre* (1+1+1+1), beginnend mit:

fre fre tere tan tan

und endend mit:

tan fre fre tere tan

Mit unbedeutenden Abweichungen werden hier am Beispiel einer metrischen Periode, eines Taktes, die Möglichkeiten, oder besser ein Teil der Möglichkeiten durchgespielt, die in der musikalischen Metrik al-Fārābī's angelegt sind, so als gäbe es eine direkte Verbindung zwischen den beiden Autoren, die es nach Lage der Dinge nicht gegeben haben kann. Doch ist der Fall äusserst ungewöhnlich. Aus den wenigen Beispielen, die al-Fārābī seinen Lesern gegeben hat, entsteht bei Arbeau in Form eines Kompendiums für angehende Trommler die ganze Palette der möglichen Modifikationen innerhalb der drei Tonlängen „schwer", *thaqīl* oder *pesant* (4), mittel, *mutawassiṭ* oder *moyen* (2) und „leicht", *khafīf* oder *concité* (1). Bei der verblüffenden Ähnlichkeit der Systeme und ihrer Darstellungsweise fragt sich natürlich, welchen Weg diese spezielle Metrik von al-Fārābī zu Arbeau genommen haben kann, nachdem eine direkte Verbindung auszuschliessen ist. Al-Fārābī's zwei Schriften zu diesem Thema wurden bis in Arbeaus Tage weder ins Lateinische noch in eine andere westliche Sprache übersetzt. Das gleiche gilt für sein „Grosses Buch der Musik". Der Weg führte demnach nicht über die Theorie, sondern offensichtlich über die Praxis. Arbeaus Quelle, die Militärmusik, gibt dabei die Richtung an.

Im Anschluss an die lange Reihe der Modifikationen seines Hauptmetrums kommt Arbeau auf die vergleichbare Silbensprache der Schweizer Trommler zu sprechen.[35] Damit weist er einen möglichen Weg über Italien in die Türkei als möglichen Ursprungsort der militärischen Trommelpraxis. Ein anderer führte direkt von Istanbul nach Paris im Rahmen des Bündnisses zwischen François Ier und

[35] Im Gegensatz zu den Franzosen (und in Übereinstimmung mit der *fāṣila* in al-Fārābī's Grundform) machten sie auf dem vierten Schlag des ersten Taktes grundsätzlich eine Pause. Er notiert also drei halbe Noten mit einer halben Pause für den ersten Takt und eine abschliessende halbe Note im zweiten Takt. Das als schweizerisch empfundene Silbenmuster, das er unterlegt, lautet *Colin tan plon*, s. ebd., fol. 15b.

Ḳānūnī Süleymān von 1543, das sowohl auf dem Gebiet der Militärmusik (s. unten) als auch der höfischen Kammermusik seine Folgen hatte.[36]

In der osmanischen Türkei war die altertümliche Silbensprache al-Fārābī's mit ihren Modifikationen im 9./15. Jahrhundert noch allgemein bekannt, jetzt erweitert durch Silben wie *tān* und *tāran*.[37] Sie wurde erst später durch die bis heute üblichen Silben *düm*, *tek*, *tāhek* und *tekke* abgelöst, mit denen nun nicht mehr, wie seit al-Fārābī, die Quantität, also die Länge der Schläge, sondern ausschliesslich ihre Qualität, die „Hoch"- und „Tiefschläge" in der Mitte bzw. am Rand von Trommelinstrumenten bezeichnet werden. Eine Übergangsform begegnet uns bei Evliya Çelebi. Er notierte im Jahre 1048/1638 bei einem Umzug der Gilden in Istanbul den Rhythmus beim Baumwollschlagen als Metrum *düyek* mit der (noch quantitativ scheinenden) Silbenfolge *tār teke tār tek tār tār tek teke*. In der osmanischen Musikpraxis wurde die Silbe *tār* durch *düm* ersetzt,[38] und Evliyas Metrum endet bereits mit *tār tār tek teke* wie das spätere türkische, rein qualitativ ausgedrückte *çifte düyek* (*düm tek tek düm düm tek teke* mit den Zeitwerten 1+2+1+1+1+1+1). Hier sind die Zeitwerte der Schläge aus ihrer Silbenstruktur nicht mehr ableitbar.

Im Hinblick auf die bis ins 10./16. Jahrhundert hinein noch verbreitete ältere Terminologie ist ein Weg der Trommelsilben vom Osmanischen Reich nach Europa über die Praxis der Militärkapellen denkbar. Die europäische Militärmusik verdankt bekanntlich dem islamischen Orient wesentliche Impulse seit der Zeit der Kreuzfahrer und bis zur Imitation der Janitscharenkapellen im 18. Jahrhundert.[39] Die zweifellige türkische Militärtrommel erscheint in Europa in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts, kurz bevor die Militärmusik hier von Grund auf umorganisiert und Marschmusik als eigene Disziplin in französischen (und Schweizer) Militärkapellen eingeführt

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[36] de Laborde, J. B. (1780), *Essai sur la musique ancienne et moderne*, Paris, 1:117-8; Kösemihal, M. R. (1939), *Türkiye-Avrupa musiki münasebetleri*, Bd. 1: *(1600-1875)*, Istanbul, 49-51.

[37] S. z.B. Fatḥ Allāh al-Shirwānī, *Majalla fi l-mūsīqī*, Faksimile-Druck Frankfurt 1986, 144.

[38] Sanal, H. (1964), *Mehter musikisi. Bestekâr mehterler – mehter havaları*, Istanbul, 53.

[39] Kösemihal 1939, 24-33; Panoff, P. (1938), *Militärmusik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Berlin, 71-9.

wird.[40] Arbeau unterscheidet die von den Deutschen gespielte „persische Trommel“ (*tambour des perses*), nach seiner Beschreibung eine Pauke, von der zweifelligen französischen Militärtrommel, auf die sich seine metrisch-rhythmische Lehre bezieht.[41] Es bot sich jedenfalls an, mit den Instrumenten auch die griffige östliche Lehrmethode zu übernehmen, deren Merksilben, wie al-Fārābī so richtig bemerkt, „in allen Sprachen“ artikulierbar sind. Die Ähnlichkeit der Tonsilben bei al-Fārābī und Arbeau, das gleiche System, die gleiche Methode und beider nahezu identische Art der Präsentation der Metren machen ein ganz und gar unabhängiges Entstehen der jüngeren Methode von der älteren sehr unwahrscheinlich.

Gestützt wird unsere Vermutung aus einem Gebiet der musikalischen Praxis, die viele Jahrhunderte lang vor allem in der persischen, der mogul-indischen und der osmanisch-türkischen Musik gepflegt wurde und bis heute in abgewandelter Form noch als metrische Fachsprache der Trommler in Indien lebendig ist,[42] während sie in der Türkei nur noch historisierend in bestimmten Kompositionen der Kunstmusik angewandt wird.[43] Es ist die Praxis der im Persischen *al-fāẓ-i naqarāt* („Lautenschlag-Silben“), im Türkischen *terennüm* („Kantillation“, arab. *tarannum*) und im heutigen Marokko *tarātīn* genannten Gesangsmanier.[44] Sie besteht darin, dass an bestimmten Stellen in einem Kunstlied statt Versen des Liedtextes Silbenfolgen gesungen werden, die aus der metrischen Fachsprache (*ta*, *na, tā, nā, tan, nan,* mit Komposita wie *tannā, tananan* etc.) und weiteren tonmalenden Silben (*dir*, *dirī*, *dara*, *dilī, lil, lan, hā, yal, lala, la, lallī, lā*, mit Komposita wie *lālī*, *taralālī, tarallī*, *dirilī* etc.) gebildet wer-

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40 Farmer, H. G. (1912), *The Rise and Development of Military Music*, London, 16-21 passim.

41 Thoinot Arbeau 1589, fol. 6b-7a.

42 S. z.B. Powers, H. S. (1980), „India: Ancient Indian drums and drumming“, in: *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, London, 9: 133-9.

43 S. die älteren Liedertexte in den *Türk musikisinin klasikleri*, İstanbul: İstanbul Konservatuvarı neşriyatı o.J., 180 Nummern, davon Nr. 1-120 in arabischer Schrift, Nr. 121-80 in Lateinschrift, vgl. Öztuna, Y. (1990), *Büyük Türk mûsikîsi ansiklopedisi*, Ankara, 2: 390, s.v. *terennüm*.

44 Zur älteren persischen und türkischen Praxis s. Neubauer, E. (1973-4), „Tarannum und terennüm in Poesie und Musik“, *Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph* 48:139-53. Zur heutigen marokkanischen Praxis s. das entsprechende Kapitel der kürzlich vollendeten Dissertation von Carl Davila, *Al-Mūsīqā al-Andalusiyya in Fez: The Preservation of a Mixed-Oral Tradition*, doct. thesis, Yale University 2006, auf die mich freundlicherweise Beatrice Gruendler aufmerksam gemacht hat.

den.[45] Mit den onomatopoetischen Silben werden vornehmlich Vogelstimmen, insbesondere der Schlag der Nachtigall, imitiert. Dabei können auch Text- und *naqarāt*-Silben miteinander abwechseln. Zudem gilt das *naqarāt*-Singen als vokaler Ersatz für das Instrumentalspiel.[46]

In einer Komposition des oben genannten Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Urmawī, die zu den frühesten erhaltenen Beispielen für das *naqarāt*-Singen gehört und von Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (gest. 710/1311) aufgezeichnet wurde, finden wir die Silbenfolge *tili lili lara dirnā, tili lili lara dir tān tān tādir dirnā tānā tara diri tala nala dili* und so fort[47]. In einer Komposition von ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Marāghī (gest. 838/1435) heisst es später *tanan tanan tānānā tanan tanan tānānā tan dir dir nā tan tan tan tannā*.[48] Ein im vergangenen Jahrhundert publiziertes ostarabisches *tawshīḥ* beginnt mit dem gesungenen *naqarāt*-Teil *tānā tānā dīdīrītān darah dillar larī dīrītān darah dillar larī dirtān nanna darah dillītān dīrī dīrī tān tillīlān ah darah dillār larī dīrītān*

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[45] Die verbreiteten Artikulationssilben der Blasinstrumente wie *tara, dara, tere, lere, tacha, teche* etc. (Silvestro Ganassi, *Fontegara*, Venedig 1535), *ler, der, ter, tere, teche* etc. (Girolamo dalla Casa, *Il vero modo di diminuir*, Venedig 1584), *te, de, ler, ter* (Richardo Rogniono, *Passaggi per potersi essercitarsi nel diminuir*, Venedig 1592) oder *lere, dere, tere* (Francesco Rogniono, *Selva de varii passaggi*, Mailand 1620), *ta* und *ra* (Marin Mersenne, *L'harmonie universelle*, Paris 1636) sind zwar verwandt, dienen aber dem speziellen Zweck des Anblasens und bleiben daher hier ausser Betracht, s. Horsley, I. (1960), „Wind Techniques in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries", *Brass Quarterly* 4:49-63, hier speziell 57-8, 63.

[46] Über die formalen Aspekte und die Funktion des *naqarāt*-Singens im persisch-türkischen Repertoire des 15. und frühen 16. Jahrhunderts s. Wright, O. (1992), *Words Without Songs. A musicological study of an early Ottoman anthology and its precursors*, London, 90-1 und passim. Überlegungen zum instrumentalen Aspekt, bezogen auf Frankreich, s. Phan, Ch. (1990), „Les refrains onomatopéïques en ancien français comme indicateurs de techniques instrumentales", in: *Atti del XIV Congresso della Società Internazionale di Musicologia. Trasmissione e recezione delle forme di cultura musicale*, Bd. 3: *Free papers*, Turin, 647-51.

[47] Nach Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Durrat al-tāj li-ghurrat al-Dubāj*, ed. M. Mishkāt, Teheran, 5 Bde., 1939-45, hier Bd. 5, 148-9 und Wright, O. (1978), *The Modal System of Arab and Persian Music A.D. 1250-1300*, Oxford, 236-7, 240-2.

[48] ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Ghaybī al-Marāghī, *Maqāṣid al-alḥān*, ed. T. Bīnish, Teheran 1344/1965, 102, vgl. Land, J. P. N. (1885), „Essais de notation musicale chez les Arabes et les Persans", in: *Études archéologiques, linguistiques et historiques dédiées à M. le Dr. C. Leemans*, Leiden, 315-6, hier 316; ders. (1886), „Tonschriftversuche und Melodieproben aus dem muhammedanischen Mittelalter", *Vierteljahrsschrift für Musikwissenschaft* 2:347-56, hier 355; Wright, O. (1994), „ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Marāghī and ʿAlī b. Muḥammad Binā'ī: Two fifteenth-century examples of notation", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 57:475-515, hier 502 u.ö.

darah dillār larī dīr tān nannā dārah dillītān.[49] Auch in marokkanisch-hebräischen *baqqashot* können längere Vokalisen mit derartigen Silben vorkommen. Sie lauten *nanana teretay tananay tananana tay tay nananay* und ähnlich.[50] Unter den orientalisierenden nonsense-Silben der Moresken von Orlando di Lasso (gest. 1594) finden sich neben dem Geklimper des *gimbrī* (*tam bi-li-li-li lī* mit den Zeitwerten 2+1+1+1+1+2)[51] oder einem mauresken Gestammel (*cu-cu-ru-cu* mit den Zeitwerten 2+1+1+4)[52] auch Silbenfolgen eines Lauteninterludiums (*don don don diri-diri don* mit den Zeitwerten 2+2+4+1+1+1+1+2)[53] sowie eine sechsstimmige Passage, in der mit den Silben *tron* (4), *tron tron* (2+2) und *tiri tron* (1+1+2) ebenfalls das Lautenspiel imitiert wird.[54] Es gibt dort auch die an ein türkisches Wiegenlied erinnernde Wendung *cian cian nini* (neutürk. *can, can, nenni*).[55]

In italienischen oder spanischen volkstümlichen Liedern sind *naqarāt*-Silben im Refrain, in metrisch freien Passagen (*latelera* in einem Arbeitslied) und namentlich im galizischen *alalá* (*tailalila tailalá*) zu finden.[56] So auch in einem französischen Gedicht über orientalische Frauen, dessen Refrain *laire la, laire lanlaire* // *laire la* // *laire*

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[49] d'Erlanger, R. (1959), „Deuxième album musical. Les diverses formes classiques de composition artistique connues en musique arabe moderne de tradition orientale. Transcription musicale de 30 morceaux de chant et de musique instrumentale", in: ders., *La musique arabe*, ed. Muḥammad al-Mannūbī al-Sanūsī, Paris, 6: 443 ff., hier 470-1.

[50] Seroussi, E. (1990), „La música arábigo-andaluza en las baqqashot judeo-marroquíes: estudio histórico y musical", *Anuario musical* 45:297-315, hier 310. Zur marokkanischen Praxis jetzt auch Davila 2006.

[51] Sandberger, A. (ed.) (o.J. [1898]), *Orlando di Lasso. Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 10: *Madrigale: Fünfter Teil*, IV: *Libro de Villanelle; Moresche ed altre canzoni (1581)*, 87 (Nr. 8) und 97 (Nr. 13); vgl. Sandberger, A. (1903-4), „Roland Lassus' Beziehungen zur italienischen Literatur", *Sammelbände der Internationalen Musikgesellschaft* 5:402-41, hier 414-20.

[52] Sandberger o.J., 120 (Nr. 19). Mit *cucurucu* ist hier nicht das Gurren der Tauben gemeint, eher ein „maurischer" Name, s. Sandberger 1903-4, 416.

[53] Sandberger o.J., 92-7 (Nr. 12), hier 94-7.

[54] Ebd. 112-9 (Nr. 18), hier 113-4.

[55] Ebd. 104-7 (Nr. 16); vgl. Valenza, L. (1896), „Ninne-nanne di Tunisi", *Archivio per lo studio delle tradizioni popolari. Revista trimestrale* 15:82-4; Canova, G. (1980), „Immagini e motivi ricorrenti nelle ninnenanne dell'Alto Egitto", *Annali di Ca' Foscari* 19,3:15-23.

[56] S. z.B. Anglès, H. (1938), „Das spanische Volkslied", *Archiv für Musikforschung* 3:331-62, hier 358, 362.

lanla lautet.[57] Ältere französische militärische vaudevilles enthalten Refrains wie *dondaine, don don*, oder *ran tan plan tire lire*, oder *tarare pompom*, oder *turlututu*, oder *lanturlu lanture*,[58] denen allen, neben ihrem lautmalenden, ein deutlich metrisch-rhythmisches Element innewohnt. Die Volksetymologie, die den Tanz und den Namen der süditalienischen *tarantella* vom Biss der Tarantel ableiten will, woran man heute sowohl von der Sache her als auch etymologisch zweifeln darf,[59] entstand ohne Berücksichtigung des in Liedern und Tanzliedern rund ums Mittelmeer[60] verbreiteten *naqarāt*-Singens.

Als ein spezielles Gebiet dieser Praxis können im europäischen Bereich die vokalen Schlachtenimitationen gelten, in denen sich, ganz wie im islamischen Orient, mnemotechnische Silben der musikalischen Metrik mit Klangimitation mischen. Die bisherige Interpretation dieser Stücke ging eher vom klangmalenden Element aus,[61] das zwar vorhanden, aber in diesem Fall zweitrangig ist. Die metrisch-rhythmische Abstufung und Unterteilung der langen Schläge steht auch hier im Vordergrund. Ein sinnfälliges Beispiel unter den sogenannten *battaglia*-Kompositionen,[62] in dem das metrische Element überwiegt und sich ähnlich wie bei Arbeau darstellt, ist der berühmte vierstimmige Satz *La guerre* von Clément Janequin (ca. 1485-1558), der wohl an die Schlacht von Marignano (1515) erinnern soll, in der der französische König François Ier durch seinen

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[57] Martino, P. (1906), *L'Orient dans la littérature française au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris, 237.

[58] Kastner, G. (1855), *Les chants de l'armée française ou Recueil de morceaux à plusieurs parties composés pour l'usage spécial de chaque arme et précédés d'un Essai historique sur les chants militaires français*, Paris, 39.

[59] Man beachte die *naqarāt*-Form *ntarantantera*, die in der Schrift *La tiorba a taccone* von Filippo Sgruttendio (Neapel 1642) vorkommen soll und auf die im *Vocabolario delle parole del dialetto napoletano* der Academici Filopatridi (Neapel 1789) im Zusammenhang mit der Etymologie des Wortes *tarantella* hingewiesen wird, s. Cofini, M. (1998), „Tarantella", in: *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Sachteil*, 9: 1998, Sp. 409.

[60] S. z.B. Bonifačič, R. (1988), „Tar'ankanje na otoku Krku" [über das Tanzlied *tar'ankanje* auf der Insel Krk, dessen „Text" aus *naqarāt*-Silben wie *tanana*, *tarara* etc. besteht], *Zbornik radova XXXV kongresa SUFJ* [= Saveza Udruženja Folklorista Jugoslavije], Titograd, 357-65.

[61] S. z.B. Brenet, M. (1907-8), „Essai sur les origines de la musique descriptive", *Rivista musicale italiana* 14 (1907): 725-51, 15 (1908): 457-87, 671-700, hier 15:468-72.

[62] Zum Genre s. Gläsel, R. (1931), *Zur Geschichte der Battaglia*, Leipzig, und das Schlagwort in den neueren Musik-Enzyklopädien.

Sieg über die Schweizer das Herzogtum Mailand zurückeroberte. Im zweiten Teil der Komposition[63] werden *naqarāt*-Silben in folgender metrischer Verteilung gesungen, wobei die Zeitwerte von einer ganzen Note (16) über Halbe (8) und Viertel (4) bis zu Achteln (2) und Sechzehnteln (1) reichen:

fan								16	
fan				*fan*				8	8
fan				*fey-*		*ne*		8	4 + 4
fa	*ri*	*ra*	*ri*	*ra*	*ri*	*ra*	*ri*	2 + 2 + 2+2	2 + 2 + 2+2
frere	*le le*	*lan*	*fan*	*frere*	*le le*	*lan*	*fan*	1+1+1+1+2+2	1+1+1+1+2+2

Ob die Hauptsilbe nun *tan*, *plan* oder *fan* lautet spielt keine wesentliche Rolle. Das französische *fan* wurde vermutlich an das Wort *fanfare* angeglichen, welches das arabische Wort *anfār*, den Plural von *nafīr* (Fanfare, Trompete) wiedergibt. Daher lassen sich auch Silbenfolgen wie *fa-ri-ra-ri* und *frere le le lan fan* als sängerische Umsetzung von Trompetenstössen interpretieren.[64] Der eigentliche Ursprung der lautmalenden *battaglia* dürfte jedoch im Bereich der musikalischen Metrik zu suchen sein, also bei den Schlaginstrumenten, angereichert durch das lautmalende Element von *naqarāt*-Silben der Blasinstrumente.

Auch in anderem Zusammenhang stossen wir auf Reminiszenzen aus der ehemals weit verbreiteten, ursprünglich orientalischen Praxis des *naqarāt*-Singens, vom '*Tandaradei*, schône sanc die Nachtigall' im Gedicht „Unter der Linden" des Jerusalemfahrers Walter von der Vogelweide[65] bis zum *Tri-tra-trallala* (2+2+1+1+2) im Auftrittslied des deutschen Kaspers[66]. Selbst das die Dorfkapelle kennzeichnende *Dum-didel-dum* (2+1+1+2) enthält so viel metrische wie lautmalende Elemente.[67] Arbeau ist nur die akademische Spitze einer Tradition ost-

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[63] Clément Janequin (c. 1485-1558), *Chansons polyphoniques*. Édition complète publiée avec une introduction par A. T. Merritt et F. Lesure. Vol. I: *Période Bordelaise* [= 1505-31], Monaco 1965, 33(-9).

[64] Brancour, R. (1906-7), „Les Maîtres musiciens de la Renaissance française et leur historien", *Sammelbände der Internationalen Musikgesellschaft* 8:115-35, hier 120; Farmer, H. G. (1950), *Military Music*, New York, 16; vgl. Brenet 1908, 486.

[65] In einem anonymen, vielleicht von Jean Vaillant stammenden Lied singt die Nachtigall, ähnlich „orientalisch", ihr *tan-ti-ny tan-ti-ny tan-ti-ny tan, li-ry li-ry li-ry* ..., s. Brenet 1907, 745.

[66] Im türkischen Schattenspiel (*karagöz*) ist das Auftrittslied des Hacivat, mit dem jedes Spiel beginnt, ein Lied der Form *semâî* mit *alfāẓ -i naqarāt*, türk. *terennüm*.

[67] Ohne ersichtliche metrische Komponente, trotz *naqarāt*-identischer Silben, und auch als Artikulationssilben nur beschränkt geeignet sind die Silbenfolgen in

westlicher *naqarāt*-Praxis, deren Ursprünge für uns gemeinhin im Dunkel liegen, da sie schon seit langem Allgemeingut geworden ist.

Das Erscheinen des metrischen Systems im Werk des Thoinot Arbeau, das sich wie eine Kopie der musikalischen Metrik al-Fārābī's liest, erweckte meines Wissens kein Interesse in der europäischen Musikliteratur. Die Anregung, spät wie sie kam, ging ins Leere. Auch dies dürfte ein Zeichen dafür sein, dass hier ein für die allgemeinere Musiklehre fremdes Element auftaucht, das lediglich in der Praxis der europäischen Militärmusik eine Heimat gefunden hatte. So kennen nur Spezialisten wie Georges Kastner (gest. 1867), der Chronist und Lehrmeister der französischen Militärmusik, die Trommelsprache mit Silben wie *ta* (kurzer starker Trommelschlag rechts), *da* (kurzer schwacher Trommelschlag rechts), *ra* (kurzer Wirbel), *fla* (Doppelschlag, rechts leicht, links stark), *tra* (Schlag mit Vorschlag) und dem Kompositum *rataplan*.[68]

Die heutigen Basler Trommler haben ihrerseits Klangsilben wie *tlém* (dem französischen *fla* entsprechend), *drréng* (für eine Quintole), *dlédebe* (für eine Triole mit betonter Eins), *dledebéng* oder *dledebem* (für zwei Sechzehntel mit folgendem betontem Achtel), *bataflafla* (vom Französischen: vier Sechzehntel, zwei leise, zwei laut), *dlédéng* oder *déléng* (betonter Schlag mit zwei kurzen Vorschlägen), *tleng* („Doppelstreich“ mit Vorschlag, franz. doublé) oder *dédebede* (Übungsmuster für vier Sechzehntel).[69] Im 17. Jahrhundert trommelten die Schweizer noch *biri bamb bamb*,[70] ein Berner Trommelsignal aus dem 18. Jahrhundert wurde *Prran-prran-prran-Tan-prran-Tan-prran-tan* notiert,[71] Schlusstakte eines Marsches markierte man im späten 19. Jahrhundert noch mit *drréng dedetlém drréng*,[72] und der

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den Trompetenlehrbüchern von Cesare Bendinelli (*Tutta l'arte della trombetta*, Manuskript von 1614, gedruckt Kassel u.a. 1975): *da* (4) *ten* (4) *te* (4) *na* (4) *da* (2) *te* (2) etc. und Girolamo Fantini (*Modo per imparare a sonare di tromba*, Frankfurt 1638, Repr. Nashville 1976): *da* (1) *ton* (1) *del* (1) *la* (1) *da* (1/2) *ton* (1/2) *da* (1/2) *ton* (1/2) etc., hier auch wieder auf der Basis 1 = eine Achtelnote dargestellt, beide zitiert von Squire, W. B. (H.G. Farmer, E.H. Tarr) (1980) im Artikel „Military calls“, in: *The New Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, London, 12: 318.

68 Kastner, G. (1848), *Manuel général de musique militaire à l'usage des armées françaises*, Paris, Notenteil im Anhang, 19 ff.

69 Berger, F. R. [1928], *Das Basler Trommeln nebst vollständigem Lehrgang und einer Sammlung aller Trommelmärsche*, Basel, 49-59.

70 Duthaler, G. (1985), *Trommeln und Pfeifen in Basel*, Basel, 26.

71 Ebd. 85.

72 Ebd. 26.

Beginn des „Alten Berner“ Marsches wurde mit den Merksilben *trem trem träre didi* (4+4+1+1+2+4) tradiert,[73] womit wir wieder im Bereich der *naqarāt*-Silben wären.

Noch im modernen Schlagzeugspiel erinnern Termini für bestimmte Schlagfolgen wie *flam*, *flamacue*, *pataflafla*, *paradiddle* und *ratamacue* an die *naqarāt*-Tradition der Trommel- und Paukenspieler im Militär und weisen indirekt auf die seit den Kreuzzügen in die westliche Militärmusik eingegangenen Einflüsse aus dem seinerzeit tonangebenden islamischen Bereich.

[73] Ebd. 108.

IQTIṢĀD
LA CONFRONTATION EST-OUEST EN MEDITERRANEE AUX VIIe/XIIe ET VIIIe/XIIIe SIECLES

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On distingue dans le travail de l'historien deux temps successifs, le temps du rassemblement des données, textuelles ou autres, et de leur analyse, puis le temps de la confrontation entre le matériau ainsi rassemblé et les écrits des historiens qui l'ont précédé ou qui lui sont contemporains, confrontation critique qui aboutit à proposer un nouveau modèle censé rendre mieux compte de l'enchaînement des événements étudiés en éclairant les situations qui y prévalaient. Bien que ma recherche ait surtout porté sur l'Orient arabe entre le début du IVe/Xe siècle et la fin du Ve/XIe siècle, je m'intéresse ici aux VIe-VIIe/XIIe-XIIIe siècles, période durant laquelle les rapports, tant conflictuels et militaires que politiques et commerciaux, entre l'Orient arabe et l'Europe méridionale et occidentale ont pour la première fois atteint un niveau élevé et une continuité certaine et sur laquelle, on dispose de bien plus de documents tant orientaux qu'occidentaux que sur l'époque précédente.

I. *Axiome initial: divergence accrue entre deux sociétés*

Une opinion courante, non démontrée, nous tiendra lieu d'axiome initial: ces deux siècles virent le décollage de la civilisation occidentale face à l'embourbement relatif de la civilisation de la Méditerranée orientale. À l'arrivée des Croisés à Antioche à la fin du Ve/XIe siècle, la vie sociale et économique et la civilisation matérielle comme intellectuelle, paraissaient plus avancées dans les provinces arabes et turques de l'Est et du Sud-est de la Méditerranée, qu'en Europe Occidentale, notamment au Sud, en bordure de cette même Méditerranée, alors qu'à la fin du VIIe/XIIIe siècle, un gigantesque mouvement de bascule s'était accompli. Durant ces deux siècles, la remise en cause des pesanteurs traditionnelles et la transformation de la vie sociale, économique et politique de la société, s'étaient considérablement accélérées en Europe occidentale et méridionale, alors qu'un ralentissement certain des évolutions pouvait se constater dans l'ensemble du monde musulman en Méditerranée.

En Occident, les fondements institutionnels des nouveaux États en voie de constitution témoignaient d'un désir de vivre ensemble, d'un projet politique tourné vers un avenir prévisible, d'un juridisme de plus en plus efficace face à l'arbitraire des seigneurs féodaux, puis des souverains urbains, impliquant notamment une ébauche de contrôle par les sujets des prélèvements et des dépenses publics; parallèlement, se manifestait le souci de séparer plus nettement le domaine profane du domaine religieux. Les puissants et les riches, pour se faire mieux accepter par des populations urbaines, de plus en plus nombreuses et instruites, consacraient une partie de leurs revenus à des ouvrages édilitaires destinés à assurer le bien-être au quotidien de tous et à affirmer l'identité souveraine des cités (la place centrale ouverte à tous et le beffroi élevé en étaient les signes évidents), ou des États, ainsi qu'à afficher une chrétienté unitaire triomphante.

En Orient, à la même époque, on remarquait surtout une militarisation et une personnalisation accrues du pouvoir, retranché à l'abri de puissantes citadelles urbaines, élevées entre la fin du Ve/XIe siècle et la fin du VIIe/XIIIe siècle, à Alep, à Damas, au Caire et ailleurs. Les seuls vastes espaces ouverts en ville, ou à proximité de celle-ci, étaient les *mīdān*s, ces Champs de Mars destinés à faire manoeuvrer la cavalerie des émirs.

La population musulmane, majoritairement sunnite, n'était plus consultée sur les décisions politiques des *malik*s et des sultans. Durant les siècles précédents, chaque vendredi, les notables et chefs de famille de la cité, avaient été réunis par le calife ou par son représentant local dans la grande mosquée de la cité, pour la prière du *jumʿa*, afin qu'après celle-ci, ils soient informés et, au besoin, consultés. Cette coutume disparut partiellement au cours du Ve/XIe siècle; chaque canton des villes importantes disposait désormais de sa grande mosquée où les notables du quartier se réunissaient pour le *jumʿa*. Les civils musulmans manifestaient un désintérêt de plus en plus évident envers une vie politique gérée par des militaires, en général turcs ou kurdes, sur lesquels ils n'avaient aucune prise.

L'action du souverain était désormais jaugée par les civils à l'aune du respect qu'il témoignait à l'égard de la tradition sunnite; était également prise en compte, la manière dont il remplissait certaines obligations religieuses, choix et financement des cadis, organisation du *ḥajj*, entretien généreux des hommes de mosquée, des enseignants des *madrasa*s et des soufis des *khānqah*s. L'activité édilitaire s'exerçait avant tout par l'institution privée de *waqf*s, constitués par des souverains locaux, leurs épouses, leurs émirs ou quelques puissants marchands, permettant la construction et le financement du fonctionnement d'édifices à fonction religieuse, de bains et, quelquefois, de *khān*s commerciaux. Le financement de ceux-ci était souvent prélevé sur la rente agraire, appauvrissant encore plus les campagnes au bénéfice des cités.

II. *Origines de cette divergence*

Les quelques pages schématiques qui suivent ne prétendent pas apporter des informations nouvelles sur une époque déjà bien décrite par les spécialistes, tant pour l'Occident que pour l'Orient. En partant de cet axiome non démontré, la séparation et l'inversion des évolutions, elles formulent quelques interrogations quant aux causes possibles de ce mouvement de bascule dont les effets se lisent encore aujourd'hui dans la vie politique internationale et dans les relations entre l'Occident et le monde arabo-musulman. Il reviendra aux futurs étudiants avancés, débutant des recherches approfondies après avoir rassemblé et analysé l'énorme corpus de textes tant orientaux qu'occidentaux disponibles, de proposer de nouvelles grilles d'ana-

lyse et d'inventer des modèles pour expliquer comment l'avantage décisif est passé de l'Est à l'Ouest.

III. *Homme et nature*

L'espace conquis par l'islam entre le Ier/VIIe et le IIe/VIIIe siècles formait une vaste mais relativement étroite ceinture de terres; cet espace recoupait de l'Atlantique aux confins de la Chine, un grand nombre de méridiens mais ne s'étendait guère en latitude que de la Géorgie au Yémen. De ce fait, malgré son immensité, le monde musulman ne connaissait, hors quelques rares régions océaniques ou caucasiennes, qu'une faible variété de climats, allant du climat tempéré, aride l'été, ou méditerranéen, au climat steppique à très longue saison sèche et, enfin au climat désertique totalement aride. Au Nord, il n'atteignait pas la zone de climat océanique, très arrosé, ni celle du de climat continental froid accompagné de pluies d'été. Au Sud, il connaissait au Yémen un climat tropical à courte saison humide mais ne s'étendait pas jusqu'au climat tropical à longue saison humide, ni encore moins au climat équatorial humide.

De ce fait, les forêts y couvraient de faibles superficies et étaient dispersées; le bois d'oeuvre comme le charbon de bois furent toujours rares et chers dans le monde musulman jusqu'à la conquête des Balkans par les Ottomans. On trouvait quelques couvertures végétales très typées, riches plaines littorales, flancs montagneux arrosés et verdoyants, vallées de grands fleuves générant sur leurs lits majeurs d'immenses oasis, plus quelques oasis autour de nappes d'eaux endoréiques dispersées, chacune de ces couvertures n'occupant que des espaces réduits, à la façon d'un archipel aux îles nombreuses mais dispersées sur les immenses steppes à faible pluie d'hiver et sur les véritables déserts.

Les peuplements sédentaires étaient particulièrement denses sur ces espaces discontinus, arrosés ou irrigués, réduits mais très fertiles, puis la densité humaine s'abaissait rapidement vers les grandes plaines sèches. La steppe et le désert étaient le domaine de populations nomades allant d'oasis en oasis, soit pour y transporter de lointaines marchandises soit pour percevoir un tribut sur les sédentaires. Ces nomades constituaient pour les sédentaires tout à la fois un lien indispensable avec les autres taches de développement et une menace sur leurs biens et leurs vies.

Le peuplement par taches avait facilité la forte concentration de populations sur des espaces réduits, riches en eau et fertiles. En général, dans chacune de ces taches de peuplement, quelques communautés coexistaient, protégeant leur homogénéité par un recours renforcé à l'endogamie. Durant le millénaire précédant l'apparition de l'empire musulman, ces communautés avaient en général résisté avec succès aux efforts d'uniformisation du statut de la religion et de culture auxquels s'étaient livrés les grands empires occidentaux, grec, hellénistique, romain, enfin byzantin, ou orientaux, perse achéménide, parthe arsacide, puis perse sasanide.

Lors de la conquête arabe, ces petites unités de peuplement ne virent pas avec hostilité venir ces envahisseurs, car, contrairement, aux Byzantins ou aux Sasanides, les musulmans n'essayaient pas de leur imposer une religion d'État unique aux dogmes et rites prédéterminés. Les indigènes préservaient également, à l'abri de leur endogamie, leur statut familial, leur droit domestique et l'organisation de leurs communautés autour de conseils de notables civils ou religieux. En contrepartie, ils acceptaient de payer une double imposition, *dhimma* pour leurs vies dont les envahisseurs leur faisaient grâce, et *kharāj* pour leurs champs qu'ils pouvaient continuer à cultiver. Ils ne demandaient pas à participer aux décisions politiques autres que locales car ils ne se sentaient pas concernés; écartés par les Arabes, du service armé, ils y voyaient l'avantage de ne pas être envoyés combattre au loin.

Les produits récoltés sur l'ensemble de terres dominées par ce nouveau pouvoir musulman étaient, tout à la fois, abondants, variés et souvent de haute qualité. Les régions régulièrement arrosées par les pluies, Jabal al-Akhḍār en Libye, reliefs occidentaux du Yémen, montagne syro-palestinienne, reliefs situés au Sud et au Sud-est de la Caspienne, ou les régions munies d'un réseau soigné d'irrigation, oasis persans, grandes vallées fluviales, par exemple celles du Tigre et de l'Euphrate, du Nil et dans l'Occident musulman, du Guadalquivir, assuraient une production abondante de fruits et de légumes, consommés frais, ou séchés pour être exportés, ainsi que des céréales, notamment le blé et le riz. Un élevage intensif était pratiqué et dans cet environnement, l'empire musulman put voir se développer très rapidement un grand nombre de villes bien approvisionnées et installées sur les principaux itinéraires d'échange. La végétation était moins exubérante dans les régions, pré-steppiques et steppiques à précipita-

tions de saison froide, soumises d'une année sur l'autre aux aléas du climat, mais, grâce à l'irrigation dont les Umayyades et les premiers ʿAbbāsides financèrent les installations, la ceinture de terre immédiate des cités était travaillée en jardins, vergers et potagers, alors que plus loin on trouvait des cultures sèches extensives de céréales, notamment du blé, des plantations espacées d'oliviers, d'amandiers, de pistachiers, ou l'élevage de troupeaux de moutons et de chèvres, en semi-liberté. Un va-et-vient permanent permettait aux troupeaux, conduits par des semi-nomades, de pâturer, l'été après la moisson, sur les terres cultivées à proximité des villes ou dans les montagnes, pour s'éloigner, l'hiver venu, dans la steppe à la recherche de dépressions verdissantes sous l'effet des pluies. Pour bien fonctionner, ce système s'appuyait sur une entente constamment renégociée, entre des groupes humains très variés. Il ne pouvait subsister sur le long terme que si l'accroissement du nombre des citadins, et par voie de conséquence l'augmentation de leur consommation, étaient suffisamment lents pour être gérables.

IV. *Sources de revenu et financement public*

Le prélèvement fiscal et la rente foncière des propriétaires étant élevés, aucun surproduit ne pouvait être accumulé par les agriculteurs qui dépendaient des citadins pour leurs investissements, aménagement de l'irrigation, achats de bêtes, longue attente des récoltes après la plantation d'arbres fruitiers, etc.

L'artisanat ne produisait pas non plus de capitaux importants. Les artisans, s'appuyant sur une habileté et une inventivité rares, devaient faire face en permanence à la pénurie, celle du bois de chauffe et d'oeuvre, celle des métaux, dont la production, bridée par la rareté du minerai et surtout du charbon de bois, connaissait un coût élevé, celle des oxydes variés, indispensables pour les teintures, en général importés de loin. Même le travail des textiles, lin, coton, chanvre, laine, produits en abondance dans nombre de régions, ou importé comme la soie, dépendait du bois d'oeuvre pour ses métiers à tisser et des importations de teintures végétales ou animales. Les artisans avaient su s'inspirer des cultures précédentes, byzantine ou sasanide, ou voisines, indienne ou chinoise, pour maintenir une production relativement abondante aux motifs variés, éloignée en général de toute répétitivité. Pour imiter la porcelaine ou le grès chinois ou la vais-

selle d'or byzantine, ils avaient su créer de nouvelles techniques, notamment les pâtes composées, la faïence, le lustre, qui, plus tard, connurent en Europe un grand succès. Mais chaque atelier, dont le développement était bridé par la modicité des ressources naturelles locales, n'occupait qu'un petit nombre d'ouvriers et répondait aux commandes sans pouvoir accumuler de stocks. Il fonctionnait sur un mode familial fragile dans le temps. Les cours des souverains et la bourgeoisie urbaine la plus aisée constituaient la principale clientèle; la qualité de l'objet, le renouvellement des formes et des décors, étaient privilégiés sur la capacité de produire des quantités abondantes d'objets identiques ou de faire baisser le prix de revient.

À l'inverse, une activité économique assurant souvent un enrichissement important était le commerce au long cours. Vu la dispersion des productions à travers l'espace musulman, le rôle des marchands était de faire circuler les produits du lieu où on les trouvait à meilleur compte pour les envoyer dans les cités où on les consommait au plus haut prix. Le long d'itinéraires souvent très étirés, bien identifiés par les géographes, les transports, principalement terrestres, qui usaient de chameaux, de mulets ou d'ânes portant une charge modeste, connaissaient un coût élevé; de ce fait, le négociant, pour maximaliser son profit, jouait davantage sur la rareté et la différence des prix d'achat et de vente que sur la quantité présentée au marché. La spéculation sur la durée de la pénurie de tel produit et de l'importance de la demande solvable étant constante, le fonctionnement de l'économie était aléatoire, les fortunes commerciales pouvant être aussi rapidement amassées que dispersées.

La mainmise sur la rente foncière et/ou sur la rente fiscale était un moyen plus sûr de s'enrichir. Dans les premiers siècles de l'islam, le *kharāj*, impôt sur la terre cultivée, avait constitué le socle du financement des structures 'étatiques'; à partir du IIIe/IXe siècle, les délégations de perception concédées par *iqṭāʿ* aux grands officiers en guise de soldes avaient diminué la part du *kharāj* revenant au pouvoir central qui, pour se financer, s'était tourné vers les taxes diverses, péages, droits d'enregistrement, droits de marché, ventes obligées de tel ou tel produit dans un ensemble de bâtiments contrôlés par les percepteurs du souverain. À compter des croisades et du développement en Méditerranée orientale du commerce maritime italien, provençal et catalan, un système complexe de douanes fut institué dans les grands ports de Syrie et d'Égypte; à l'époque mamluke,

ce système, avec les monopoles concédés sur certaines fabrications comme le sucre, assurait le revenu le plus important et le plus régulier du pouvoir central au Caire.

V. *Aléas du système agricole*

Le système de production agricole, décrit plus haut, semble avoir fonctionné sans heurt jusqu'au milieu du IVe/Xe siècle, puis il s'est grippé. Plusieurs témoignages nous signalent la diminution des surfaces arborées et des vergers autour des cités de la zone d'agriculture sèche, notamment en Jazīra. Le développement d'immenses conurbations à Basra, puis à Bagdad et à Samarra en Iraq, au IIIe/IXe siècle, exigeait un approvisonnement quotidien en céréales panifiables de plus en plus considérable alors que les révoltes des Zuṭṭ, puis des Zanj, enfin des Carmates, mettaient à mal la riche agriculture de l'Iraq méridional et créaient une tension sur le prix des céréales et des autres denrées d'usage courant. Pour répondre à une demande très solvable grâce aux achats publics au profit des citadins, et sous la pression des émirs locaux, notamment ḥamdānides, l'agriculture diversifiée et soignée des zones irriguées autour des villes d'Iraq, de Jazīra et de Syrie du Nord, fut remplacée par une monoculture des céréales, conduite sans prendre en compte la fragilité des sols soumis à des climats à longue saison sèche. La grande révolte, qui en 415/1024-5, vit les tribus nomades ou semi-nomades, kurdes, arabes ou berbères, de la Jazīra à l'Ifrīqiya, sortir de la zone aride pour envahir les terres cultivées plus proches du littoral, les piller et les ravager, s'explique avant tout par la montée du prix du blé. Grâce à l'historien Fāṭimide al-Muṣabbiḥī (d. 420/1030), nous pouvons suivre avec précision la rapide montée, cette même année, des prix, soit au détail, soit en gros, des pains, de la farine et du grain, pour la grande conurbation Miṣr al-Qāhira.

Il est probable que l'on assista à un phénomène de rendements décroissants, aggravé au début du Ve/XIe siècle par une série d'anomalies météorologiques, vents violents, crues, sécheresses, que nous signalent après 430/1038-9 les chroniques. Quelques années plus tard, au milieu du Ve/XIe siècle, les difficultés sur le marché international des céréales expliquent la rupture entre les Byzantins et les Fāṭimides, et la marche des Banū Hilāl d'Égypte vers l'Ifrīqiya.

Des désordres s'ensuivirent en Égypte et en Syrie; de plus, cette dernière province fut envahie par les Turcomans, puis par les Turcs saljūqides qui mirent à sac la plus grande partie des régions fertiles. Les villes et les campagnes de la vallée de l'Oronte et la région d'Alep furent particulièrement ravagées par les nomades turcs.

On peut dire que les Croisés francs arrivèrent dans une Syrie, qui sortait à peine d'une très grave crise agricole, économique et démographique. L'Égypte avait connu, de 457/1065 à 464/1072, sa pire famine; par la suite la situation s'était améliorée, le calme étant revenu dans les campagnes. Les campagnes iraqiennes, moins ravagées que les campagnes syriennes, étaient pourtant elles-aussi, au cours de la deuxième partie du Ve/XIe siècle soumises aux méfaits de groupes nomades bédouins, kurdes, turcomans.

VI. *Sorties de crise en occident et en Orient*

Certes, durant ces mêmes périodes, l'Occident avait également connu des crises graves mais les sorties de crise en Orient et en Occident étaient très différentes.

Dans le monde musulman, les espaces, intensément cultivables, étaient nombreux, mais de taille limitée et de nature fragile, et largement artificiels, car résultant d'un travail intense et régulier de l'homme. Pour une production abondante, il fallait en général recourir à l'irrigation; hors l'Égypte qui, grâce à sa crue annuelle régulière, constituait un cas spécifique, les ouvrages principaux, murs de soutènement, canalisations, digues, partages, devaient être entretenus avec soin. Le surproduit accordé aux paysans étant très faible, une part importante de ces travaux devait être financée au départ par le détenteur du bien, un propriétaire citadin ou un attributaire d'*iqṭāʿ* ou encore par le pouvoir politique ou des institutions pieuses. Or, après des famines, des épidémies et surtout des massacres militaires, la main d'oeuvre comme le financement venaient rapidement à manquer. L'entretien des canaux et des digues étant abandonné, la partie haute des versants était ravagée par l'érosion mettant à nu le sous-sol infertile et la roche en place, alors que les terres les plus fines étaient entraînées au fond des thalwegs qu'elles colmataient, créant des nappes d'eau stagnante et des marécages facilement colonisés par les fauves et les insectes nuisibles. De même, dans les plaines sèches, les oliviers, amandiers, pistachiers, coupés par les envahisseurs nomades

pour cuire leur nourriture ou pour se chauffer ne pouvaient être remplacés que par des nouvelles plantations qui mettaient une quinzaine d'année avant de produire des fruits. Le bétail était également mis à mal et à cause des famines les semences manquaient souvent. Tout cela accentuait les mouvements de population des campagnes appauvries vers les grandes cités autour desquelles d'immenses ceintures de misère se développaient, mettant gravement en cause la sécurité urbaine. Ces populations urbaines parasites ruinèrent Basra et Bagdad, et envahirent le Qarāfa et de vastes quartiers de Fusṭāṭ-Miṣr. La bonne volonté de populations paysannes désireuses de recoloniser l'espace abandonné à la friche ne suffisait donc pas, tant que la sécurité ne revenait pas et que des financements importants n'étaient pas consentis.

En Occident, le cycle de réappropriation des terres, après une désertification due à une épidémie ou à une guerre, était tout autre. En zone atlantique, les champs abandonnés étaient envahis d'abord par les broussailles, puis par la forêt, qui constituait un conservatoire idéal des sols, empêchant l'érosion et enrichissant chaque année les sols de ses feuilles mortes. Dès qu'une situation meilleure le permettait, la population revenait, abattait et brûlait les arbres et remettait à découvert, un sol profond et riche qui pouvait immédiatement être labouré grâce aux chevaux puissants, bien nourris, attelés par un collier d'épaule rigide à une charrue avec grand soc en métal. Cela nécessitait un financement d'une année, le gibier, les baies et les racines naturelles pouvant être consommés avant la première récolte.

Des charrettes construites en bois pouvaient transporter des charges incomparablement plus élevées que ce que pouvait supporter le dos des chameaux, des mulets et des ânes des pays musulmans pour une consommation identique d'un fourrage récolté bien plus aisément en Occident. Les eaux courantes toujours abondantes faisaient tourner des moulins aux engrenages de bois dur et de métal de plus en plus perfectionnés. En effet, contrairement au monde musulman, le bois était partout présent, bois calciné pour le charbon de bois indispensable à la fusion des minerais métalliques, bois d'oeuvre pour fabriquer les manches d'outils, pour lancer des ponts, produire des engrenages de moulin, des voitures tirées par des chevaux ou des boeufs, des embarcations spacieuses en rivière ou en mer. Enfin, avantage ultime, les variations climatiques d'une année sur l'autre n'avaient pas l'ampleur de celles que l'on connaissait au Sud-est de

la Méditerranée et en Asie occidentale; en général, la terre qui avait été bien cultivée tenait ses promesses.

VII. *Deux rythmes: désordre maîtrisé en Orient*

L'Orient musulman, pour sa production agricole et artisanale, ne pouvait guère compter sur un retour régulier des mêmes conditions d'année en année. Pour surmonter ce handicap, né d'un climat variable, de transports terrestres vulnérables et d'un coût élevé, et pour contourner des lacunes d'approvisionnement, souvent imprévisibles, paysans et artisans ne ménageaient pas leur peine. Ils cherchaient à trouver une solution pour affronter chaque difficulté nouvelle à laquelle ils se heurtaient. Malgré ce contexte difficile, l'Égypte retrouva dès la fin du Ve/XIe siècle, puis dépassa le niveau de production qu'elle connaissait avant la grande crise sous al-Mustanṣir.

Quant à la production d'objets de haute qualité, en verre, en cristal, en bois, en ivoire, en céramique ou en bronze, elle s'accrut considérablement à compter du VIIe/XIIIe siècle pour répondre à la demande très solvable des sultans, des émirs et des notables religieux ou civils. D'autres objets de qualité étaient exportés en Occident, les étoffes précieuses et ces tapis somptueux qu'on trouve représentés sur les portraits des nobles et des riches bourgeois d'Occident, dans leur cadre domestique. On en retient l'image d'un artisanat d'Orient, brillant et inventif. Vivant constamment sous la menace de manquer de tel ou tel élement nécessaire à la fabrication, il était peu soucieux de produire en abondance mais de résoudre chaque problème qui se posait. La qualité artistique de l'objet produit, sa capacité de répondre à l'exigence esthétique de celui qui le commandait, entraînaient très souvent un long temps de travail, minutieux et incompressible, ne permettant aucun gain sur le prix de revient, ni la mise en route d'une production régulière et abondante. C'était le règne de l'hétérogénéité, du discontinu, de l'imprévisible. Aucun projet à long terme ne pouvait être monté; d'ailleurs, dans l'espace dominé par l'islam, l'artisan et sa famille se déplaçaient au gré de l'installation de nouveaux pouvoirs aux moyens de financement assurés.

VIII. *Deux rythmes: ordre rationnel en Occident*

À ce désordre harmonieux de l'Orient, on peut opposer une mise en ordre toujours plus rationnelle de la production en l'Europe méridionale et occidentale. S'appuyant sur l'abondance des près et des terres arables, du bois d'espèces variées, du fer de qualité toujours supérieure, des plantes textiles, lin et chanvre, des toisons de moutons et du cuir, l'Occident put organiser sur le long terme ses structures de production dans des ateliers de plus en plus vastes. Grâce à l'action avisée des donneurs d'ordre, la production fut normalisée, des consignes de fabrication, édictées et appliquées. Ainsi, après 494/1100, s'appuyant sur la maîtrise d'une nature moins capricieuse et plus généreuse, l'accroissement de la population a pu être accompagné en Occident d'une croissance régulière de la production de denrées alimentaires et d'objets utilitaires. A la fin du VIe/XIIe siècle, on voit se développer dans les églises et sur les manuscrits des figurations d'hommes au travail, paysans labourant ou fauchant, vignerons, tonneliers, menuisiers et charpentiers, effectuant leur tâche avec des gestes précis et des outils minutieusement détaillés par le sculpteur ou le mosaïste. Cela témoigne d'un intérêt de la société à l'égard de ceux qui produisaient des biens de consommation plus abondants en usant d'un outillage perfectionné qui s'adaptait toujours mieux aux métiers divers. Ces artisans étaient respectés et glorifiés, car ils éloignaient le spectre de la disette et de la famine. En Orient, à la même époque, la représentation des métiers manuels est rare et peu précise.

Les progrès réalisés en Occident dans la production des céréales, l'élevage de puissants chevaux de guerre, l'acheminement des denrées et des bêtes sur de vastes navires, ainsi que les perfectionnements de la charpenterie navale, de la taille de la pierre, de la métallurgie pour produire des armes défensives et offensives toujours plus efficaces, apparaissent particulièrement bien lorsqu'on compare la description donnée par les chroniques arabes des combats de la première croisade à la fin du Ve/XIe siècle et de ceux de la troisième croisade en 585-87/1189-91.

Ces progrès, ainsi que tout ce qui touche la filature et le tissage, se répandent en Europe occidentale grâce aux foires et à la circulation plus aisée des artisans. Les financements, rendus possibles par l'accumulation d'une partie du surproduit agricole ou des bénéfices du commerce, qui contrairement à ce qui se passe alors dans le

monde musulman, n'étaient pas immédiatement confisqués par le pouvoir local, permettaient une rationalisation de l'outil de production. On passe de l'artisanat individuel ou familial à des ateliers collectifs où les tâches sont distribuées par un donneur d'ordres, disposant de ressources financières assurées et connaissant les attentes du marché; parfois, la tâche put être répartie par le maître d'oeuvres aux paysans qui occupaient leurs soirées ou leur inactivité d'hiver à filer et à tisser. On abandonna à l'Orient la production des tapis ou des étoffes précieuses mais on gagna beaucoup d'argent en fabriquant et en exportant en grande quantité des tissus courants solides, faciles à transporter et à vendre.

En Occident, la richesse de la couverture agricole, la régularité relative du climat, l'abondance de l'eau, la disposition de bois de chauffe, de bois d'oeuvre et de charbon de bois à volonté, l'existence de mines assurant une fourniture régulière en minerais métalliques, permettaient la prévision d'actions répétitives. On pouvait donc construire sur la longue durée un projet d'accroissement de la production, de l'amélioration de la qualité des objets et de l'abaissement des coûts.

IX. *Vers un monde régulé, porteur de projets d'avenir*

Notre hypothèse est la suivante; l'esprit qui a présidé à la création de ces entreprises conçues pour durer et pour progresser, a été le modèle sur lequel se sont organisés à la même époque des pouvoirs souverains de nature et d'étendue variées. Le maître d'oeuvre évaluait le marché qu'il voulait occuper sur une période prolongée; en fonction de son projet, il recrutait des compagnons, rédigeait des consignes strictes de fabrication, récoltait des capitaux et prévoyait avec précision, dépenses et recettes. C'est en transposant ce modèle que les bourgeoisies d'Italie et de Flandres ont lentement édifié des structures étatiques organisées et durables, aux ressources et aux dépenses financières prévisibles et contrôlées et surtout dotées d'un projet d'avenir. Ce type de souveraineté partagée et rationnelle a mis un demi-millénaire à s'imposer à la totalité de l'Europe occidentale, puis à l'Amérique du Nord, pourtant ce fut véritablement au VIe/XIIe siècle que le mouvement se mit en branle pour la première fois.

X. *En Orient, gestion des possibles et adaptation aux contraintes*

Le terme État, utilisé en Occident, vient du latin et désigne quelque chose de fondé et de durable qui transcende le pouvoir de chaque souverain succédant à son prédecesseur. Le terme arabe *dawla*, par lequel on le traduit parfois, renvoie à l'inverse à la roue qui tourne, au pouvoir qui, comme un furet, passe de souverain en souverain, de famille en famille, de dynastie en dynastie (autre signification du terme *dawla*). Celui qui tient le plus fermement cet élément essentiellement volatil en est le plus digne. La seule véritable preuve de la légitimité d'un pouvoir est que son détenteur l'exerce pleinement et le conserve à travers la tourmente. Pour cela, le souverain, comme l'artisan qui doit s'adapter aux matériaux que lui a livrés la dernière caravane, doit faire face avec habileté ou avec brutalité aux circonstances, inventer des solutions, contourner les obstacles, résoudre au quotidien les conflits et les rivalités qui déchirent sa cour, éliminer sans pitié les rivaux possibles. On n'attend pas de lui qu'en plus il construise un projet d'avenir pour établir une prospérité sur le long terme pour ses sujets. La structure familiale du pouvoir, quand le souverain comptait nombre d'épouses ou de concubines et que la succession n'était pas gérée par une loi claire de primogéniture, remettait en cause gravement, à chaque décès de sultan, de *malik* ou d'émir, l'équilibre de la chose publique. De plus, l'endogamie dominante, la tradition de la famille élargie exerçant naturellement ses droits à l'égard des membres de celle-ci ayant accès à un revenu conséquent, accroissait le nombre de parents proches ou lointains susceptibles de parasiter l'accès à la rente d'État ou à la dépense publique.

Un certain nombre d'autres éléments fragilisaient le pouvoir s'exerçant dans le monde arabe d'Orient. Le souverain n'avait pas la légitimité pour produire de loi, dont la révélation avait été achevée à la mort de Muhammad. Il ne pouvait qu'implorer ses juristes de trouver dans le Coran, dans le *ḥadīth* et dans l'importante jurisprudence accumulée depuis le IIe/VIIIe siècle, la faille, la ruse qui permettait de résoudre tel ou tel problème de société ou de l'exercice politique, à première vue insoluble, ou qui lui ouvrirait une voie légitime vers une réforme du système d'imposition.

XI. *Porosité des frontières: la corruption, outil de domination*

La fin du Ve/XIe siècle avait vu les Croisés se lancer à l'assaut de l'Orient arabe; grâce à leur puissance militaire, ils imposèrent assez rapidement leur pouvoir sur la façade méditeranéenne du Bilād al-Shām sans pouvoir dominer les grandes villes, Alep, Homs, Damas, situées à l'Est, à l'intérieur des terres, sur l'itinéraire Nord-sud. De jeunes chercheurs s'interrogent sur les motifs réels, tout à la fois, de ces premiers succès militaires, et de leur rapide limitation continentale. Près d'un siècle plus tard, en 583/1187, la bataille de Ḥaṭṭīn et les défaites enregistrées à sa suite, ouvrirent une seconde phase, celle d'une présence franque moins étendue territorialement mais mieux intégrée en Orient arabe grâce au développement des échanges humains et commerciaux. Ce n'est qu'un nouveau siècle plus tard, en 690/1291, que toute présence d'un pouvoir franc autonome disparut du littoral du Bilād al-Shām.

Les Italiens avaient transporté les Croisés sur leurs navires et avaient financé certaines expéditions; en contrepartie, ils avaient pu installer des centres importants d'achat et de vente dans les grands ports croisés de Syrie. Mais après l'échec des croisades de 616-18/1219-21 et de 646-48/1248-50 en Egypte, ils avaient modifié leurs projets. La guerre coûtait cher et son résultat était aléatoire. Plutôt que de continuer à soutenir l'installation croisée en Orient, ils avaient préféré utiliser les ports égyptiens pour leurs échanges, acceptant de payer aux sultans des droits de douanes d'un montant élevé mais bien moins ruineux que le financement d'actions militaires.

En acceptant les avanies que leur imposaient les fonctionnaires des sultans, chargeant toujours plus les droits de douane et exigeant des pots de vin pour mener à bien les opérations d'entrées et de sorties des marchandises, les marchands italiens paraissaient perdants sur le court terme mais s'assuraient une situation d'avenir. En effet, le *kharāj* étant en grande partie dépensé par les émirs pour l'entretien de leurs soldats et de leurs chevaux mais aussi pour leurs dépenses somptuaires personnelles, l'État ayyoubide puis l'État mamlūk ne purent compter pour assurer leur ordinaire que sur le revenu des taxes perçues localement, des droits de douane et des monopoles. Le fait que le taux de change des monnaies musulmanes était établi en Italie, que les Italiens, par les droits de douane qu'ils versaient, finançaient partiellement l'État dominant la Syrie et l'Égypte et que

par ailleurs ils prêtaient parfois de fortes sommes aux sultans, doit se lire comme le signe précurseur d'un nouveau modèle de rapport international, inconnu jusque là. Les frontières de l'espace politique et celles du champ économique ne coïncidaient plus. Le pouvoir financier des Italiens dépassait largement le territoire de l'Occident chrétien. Pour ce faire, ils devaient user de leur position de créditeurs pour enserrer les souverains d'Orient dans leur filet, leur proposer des avantages comptants et trébuchants immédiats, pour se voir promettre en contrepartie, plus ou moins sincèrement, des facilités futures. Le sultan, les fonctionnaires des douanes pensaient ainsi rouler leurs partenaires alors que ceux-ci les tenaient toujours plus étroitement dans leurs rets.

La réussite de ces nouveaux États, fortement structurés, apparus en Italie, puis en Europe occidentale durant l'époque des croisades, grâce à la révolution agraire et surtout à la préindustrialisation de l'artisanat, leur permettait de lancer des projets dépassant l'espace qu'ils contrôlaient politiquement ou militairement; un nouveau type de domination immatérielle était en train d'apparaître, que six siècles plus tard on qualifiera d'impérialisme économique et financier.

XII. *Faible perception immédiate du phénomène*

L'acquis de l'Orient arabe pendant les cinq premiers siècles de l'islam, sa propre faculté de récupération après les crises (l'Égypte était alors particulièrement prospère et la Syrie avait retrouvé ses capacités anciennes sous Nūr al-Dīn et les avait largement dépassées sous Salāḥ al-Dīn), étaient tels que les contemporains continuaient à percevoir la richesse et le luxe du monde musulman comme immensément supérieurs à ce que pouvait connaître alors l'Occident. Jusqu'à la fin du VIIe/XIIIe siècle on ne peut diagnostiquer en Occident qu'un changement rapide et complexe des rapports sociaux, économiques et surtout politiques, entre les différents éléments de la société alors qu'en Orient, les avantages acquis par ceux qui détenaient le pouvoir et les armes ne paraissaient plus pouvoir être remis en question que par d'autres militaires du même statut et qui conserveraient après leur victoire la même stratification sociale et politique.

Avec la diffusion de la peste en Orient et en Occident au milieu du VIIIe/XIVe siècle, les deux mondes connurent à nouveau une chute démographique et économique brutales, aggravée en Orient par la

menace mongole et en Occident par les conflits incessants qui opposaient les nouveaux pouvoirs en cours d'édification. Les deux mondes connurent à nouveau disettes et misère.

Ce n'est que bien plus tard, une fois la Méditerranée abandonnée au profit du grand large atlantique, que des rapports d'inégalité complexes s'établirent à nouveau, faisant appel à la corruption 'passive' des États et des souverains de l'Orient musulman, avides de profiter dans l'immédiat de tous les avantages qu'on leur offrait et de tous les gains faciles qu'ils pouvaient réaliser en négligeant de respecter le principe de continuité des règles établies. En face, les États d'Occident recouraient à la corruption 'active' en consentant tout de suite de fortes libéralités et en feignant de fermer les yeux sur les infractions aux règles établies et aux contrats, pour, dans le futur, mieux enfermer leurs partenaires dans une contrainte financière irrésistible dont ils comptaient tirer un très large profit. La culture occidentale de la construction d'un projet, fondée sur la reproductibilité régulière des circonstances dans le futur, l'emportait irrésistiblement sur la culture orientale de l'immédiat, de l'adaptibilité instantanée et de la spéculation constamment recalculée.

XIII. *Conclusion rapide*

Que le lecteur qui, abandonnant son exigence habituelle de références fournies renvoyant à des textes anciens et à des analyses contemporaines, a accepté de nous suivre jusque là, veuille bien nous excuser pour ces quelques pages de 'para-histoire'. Notre but était de creuser le lit du temps pour faire apparaître des interrogations nouvelles concernant ce premier essor de l'Occident et ce premier envasement de l'Orient arabe; en aucun cas, nous nous sentons capables d'y apporter des réponses cohérentes et fondées sur des documents irréfutables, mais, heureusement, de nombreux jeunes chercheurs sont prêts à le faire.

KHIṬĀB
"DISCOURSE" IN THE JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORY OF IBN ʿAQĪL AL-ḤANBALĪ

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I. *Introduction*

In the Islamic sciences ordinary conversation is the dominant model for understanding all forms of communication. The concept of *khiṭāb* is the very basis of the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, though it is a term whose proper locus is literature and linguistics. Here we offer a very brief survey of the concept of discourse (*khiṭāb*) in one medieval scholar's work on Islamic legal theory.[1] To do full justice to the topic is not possible here; a full treatment of the notion of *khiṭāb* would require an expertise in law, grammar, literary theory and literature found perhaps uniquely in the honoree, Professor Wolfhart Heinrichs.

I have chosen here to work mostly from *al-Wāḍiḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh* by Ibn ʿAqīl (513/1119).[2] He is interesting because, as G. Makdisi

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[1] *"Khiṭāb"* is directed discourse, an address to someone. But it may be to someone present or someone absent (apostrophe). As such it may have any of the features of speech, whether imperative or narrative. Hence, what is true of directed discourse is true of discourse in general. For the most part, we will translate the term *khiṭāb* as "discourse", bearing in mind that it may have more or fewer features of *addressed* speech. For a brief overview of the scope of the root, see Ibn Manẓūr (d. 710/1311), *Lisān*, s.v. *kh-ṭ-b*.

[2] Circumstances compel me to cite from two different versions: George Makdisi's monumental edition Ibn ʿAqīl, *al-Wāḍiḥ* (abbreviated "Makdisi") and ʿAb-

has shown in countless venues,[3] Ibn ʿAqīl attempted to straddle the line between the sophistication of philosophy and *kalām*—as seen in his near contemporaries Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (478/1085) and al-Ghazālī (505/1111)—and the scripto-centrism and religious populism of Baghdādī Ḥanbalism. He is generous in citation and discusses precisely the differences between *madhhab* doctrines that allow us to understand something of how central *khiṭāb* is for the Shāfiʿīs, and the Ḥanbalī school that clearly derives from it, though Ibn ʿAqīl appears at times not to agree with his own school.

Ibn ʿAqīl's *Wāḍiḥ fi-uṣūl al-fiqh* is a curious work. One wonders whether it is really a book at all (much less a great *summa*), or whether it is instead something like curriculum notes for his lectures.[4] However, the book's repetitious quality allows us to see how *khiṭāb* functions in several different domains so that we might begin to understand the scope of this crucial concept in the literature of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

The centrality of the concept is clear from Ibn ʿAqīl's assertion that a discussion of *khiṭāb* must precede every topic—including obligation, the Book of God, and the acts of the Messenger, because "[*uṣūl al-fiqh*] is constructed (*mabnī*) from the *khiṭāb*."[5] This means that *uṣūl al-fiqh* is constructed from a study of the *khiṭāb* of

> God, and the *khiṭāb* of His Messenger, and their implicature (*faḥwá*) and their evidence (*dalīl*) and their unstated assumptions (*laḥn*) and the semantic senses (*maʿānī)* derived from them, and the analogized [instances] about which they are silent, grounded in those about which they do speak (*qiyās al-maskūt ʿanhu ʿalá l-manṭūq bih*); these [in particular] require inference from the *ratio* [of the analogized assessment].

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dallāh al-Turkī's very fine 2 volume edition Ibn ʿAqīl, *al-Wāḍiḥ*. (abbreviated "Turkī"). On Ibn ʿAqīl see EI^2, s. v. "Ibn ʿAqīl.".

[3] E.g., Makdisi 1963.

[4] Whatever it it is, it is certainly not a *summa* as Professor Makdisi proposes. There are such works—the *Mughnī* of ʿAbdaljabbār would certainly qualify—but the repetitiveness, the cursory and unfinished quality of some of Ibn ʿAqīl's discussions, and the lacunae in citation suggest we have something more like the *Musawwada* of the Āl Taymiyya than a finished work like the *Rawḍa* of Ibn Qudāma (Āl Taymiyya, Majdaddīn (d. 653/1255), Shihābaddīn (d. 682/1283), and Taqiyyaddīn (d. 728/1326), *al-Musawwada*, Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223), *Rawḍat al-Nāẓir*). What is one to make, for instance, of what appears to be a kind of table of contents for an essay (Turkī 2: 191-2)? Topics are addressed, then addressed again, as if previously unmentioned. The work is invaluable, but I am far from certain that it is a deliberately authored work.

[5] Makdisi 4/1:1.

> Because of all this, one must present a definition of the *khiṭāb* and present in detail a discussion of it.[6]

It is clear that Ibn ʿAqīl does not understand by *khiṭāb* only the *speech* of God but all aspects of a communication that can, using any possible analytic tool, be understood to convey information. "Discourse" comes closest to approximating the semantic field of the word *khiṭāb* as it is used in Islamic jurisprudence.

The *khiṭāb* has all the features of ordinary speech; it includes commands, information, and everything derived from these two species of communication.[7] This divine discourse is conveyed in three modes. (1) All messengers received God's discourse through angels. Ibn ʿAqīl is at pains to insist that this angelic translation is

> sounds and words (*ḥurūf wa-aṣwāt*) that frame the concepts of the discourse. These either summon to action (or to refraining from acting), or provide knowledge of the past or future; [they are] imparted from the very presence of God (*ladun allāh*), or from the angel.[8]

That the discourse is conveyed by intermediary of angels compromises in no way the exactitude and literalness of the *khiṭāb* that originates from God.

(2) Messengers may also receive inspiration in their minds (*qulūb*) either while waking or sleeping. This too is discourse from God. (3) And finally, two privileged prophets, Moses and Muḥammad, audited the discourse of God directly without intermediary.[9] Indeed, Muḥammad in particular was graced with all three modes of discourse as the Qurʾān and sunnic texts establish.[10] So *khiṭāb* is both heard and 'felt.' It is conveyed not only in words, but also in concepts that need to be given words.

In keeping with Ḥanbalī originalism, Ibn ʿAqīl asserts that the "discourse [of God] from the Prophet comes in one manner—speech and comprehensible signs—to those present with him; it is given in a categorically different manner—writing—to those absent (*al-ghāʾibūn*)."[11] Additionally, God's *khiṭāb* is conveyed in practices (*iqrār*)

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[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Makdisi 4/1:1-2.
[11] It is part of this mythic construct that Muslims are either present with the Prophet or absent from him. In other Ḥanbalī constructs, particularly those that empha-

seen as direct permissions for others' acts or practices that were permitted by default; these become thereby indicants, and form part of the discourse of God to humankind.[12]

This broad understanding of discourse comprises the semantic scope of a term we might otherwise be inclined to misunderstand—*lisān*, language, in the Qurʾānic passage, {We did not send a Messenger except with the *lisān* of his people to make it clear to them (Q. 14:4)}. "The Messenger clarifies for them what is scattered about in the *khiṭāb* and what is gathered together (*manthūr al-khiṭāb wa-majmūʿih*)."[13] Consequently *lisān* is not purely lingual, but includes practice—both implicit and explicit— and the implications of speech and practice. It is not just the Prophet's Arabic that was comprehensible but his action as well, and the sum of all the actions he permitted.

II. *Apprehending the* khiṭāb

To apprehend discourse is a process. First comes form—the sounds of words arranged together—then the concepts associated with them. There is no spontaneous apprehension here, and the conceptual space between sound, as such, and comprehension, might be seen to allow the possibility of an arbitrary value for the sounds and the words they form. On the question of convention versus revelational determination of language values (*tawḍīʿ/tawqīf*), Ibn ʿAqīl takes the position that language is conventional while also a part of the creation process; sound and concept may be inseparably bound together, but they also may not be.[14] As someone schooled in the science of language, he can hardly deny the dynamism of language. But as a committed Ḥanbalī Scripturalist he cannot deny God's sovereign dispositional power. Hence Ibn ʿAqīl asserts that both are features of the *khiṭāb.* Some *khiṭāb* language occurs by inspiration to some creatures not normally gifted with speech, whereas other *khiṭāb* language conveys its meaning by analogically extending language through human tal-

size the "pristine early community" in Hodgson's phrase—versus the corruption of the times (*fasād al-zamān*)—it is temporality that estranges rather than lack of propinquity; later scholars are understood to have had categorically less knowledge than earlier ones.

[12] Makdisi 4/1:2.

[13] Makdisi 4/1:3.

[14] See Weiss 1974 and 1984 and Versteegh 1997, 101-14. Makdisi 4/1:3-4.

ent (*qarāʾiḥ*) to frame through the use of words a meaning that had not conventionally had that meaning previously. The possibility of linguistic innovation does not exclude the idea of language's inspirational origins. Ibn ʿAqīl seems rather impatient with this whole argument. "There is no resolving it!"[15] Both positions can be justified, on the one hand by God's ability to inspire non-speakers to speak—infants, or the primordial Adam—and on the other hand, by the observed extension of terms like *baḥr—ocean*—to refer to generosity, learning, heroism, or liberality.[16] Likewise, the question of the *priority* of convention in speech or inspiration is of limited consequence to him.[17] What matters is that from diverse origins and in diverse ways, the auditor apprehends concepts intended by another, in this case God, or His Messenger.

III. *The Quality of Discourse*

Following apprehension of the concept comes the listener's belief or positive disposition toward what is said (*iʿtiqād*). Then comes resolution (*al-ʿazm*), followed by action or inaction (*al-fiʿlu awi l-tark*) in response to commands, or evaluation and acceptance (*taṣdīq*) in response to information. At this point there is no affect. Emotional response follows, Ibn ʿAqīl explicitly says, with the sentiments of hope in response to a promise or fear in response to a threat.[18]

There is a sense in which God's communication with humankind is needlessly obscure. He could, indeed, have implanted His speech directly in those whom He addressed and compelled them to understand it.[19] Instead, he supererogatorily (*khāriqa*) used indicants to convey His meanings as an occasion to reward those who take the trouble to infer knowledge from the signs provided. [20]

Unique features distinguish the address of God (*khiṭāb allāh*) from ordinary speech. It may not be manifestly self-contradictory (as

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15 Makdisi 4/1:4, *lā yumkinu sadduhu!*
16 Makdisi 4/1:4-5.
17 Makdisi 4/1:4-12.
18 Makdisi 4/1:3.
19 Makdisi 4/1:12.
20 This is analogous to the way in which He provided indisputable signs but not direct knowledge of the existence of a single Creator in nature; but instead He provided the minimum of instinctual knowledge. He could have done otherwise but, again, the effort to infer the existence of God is an occasion for reward.

in "Zayd is alive not alive,") or implicitly self-contradictory (as in "Zayd is alive, dead"). This unique feature of God's discourse is known not just from Scriptural evidence but from a reasoned understanding of the nature of God—His perfection requires His non-self-contradiction since speech is of His essence and His essence is without flaw.[21]

Yet God's discourse can be figurative (rather than straightforwardly literal) and of potentially uncertain meaning (*al-ishtibāh*). It may not be *utterly* uncertain—capable of any possible meaning—but it may be susceptible of at least two meanings, or even more. Example: "Or you have touched woman (Q. 4:43; 5:6)." *Lāmasa* (to touch another) can mean merely touch (literal) or sexual congress (figurative). This figurative possibility makes the Qurʾānic text by itself indeterminate (*mutashābih*).[22] Likewise there are terms that are multivocal, and some, such as the "mysterious letters" at the beginning of some *sūra*s, that are incomprehensible.[23] Some ambiguities are reduced through rational reflection, some through proof texts, others not at all.[24] One tries to understand, and for that effort, there is reward; if, further, one understands correctly there is a further reward; if one misunderstands though, there is no fault to the scholar.[25] Here Ibn ʿAqīl slides off into general features of language of which Divine Discourse is a species but not different in genre. The Qurʾān and other features of the Divine Address are, in the end, Arabic, and so, having addressed its unique qualities, Ibn ʿAqīl then discusses the features shared with all other Arabic "speech."[26]

IV. *Indirect Discourse*

The discourse Ibn ʿAqīl describes is not the sort of "the cat jumped on the table" information conveyance normative for linguists and certain sorts of linguistic philosophers. Discourse can occur obliquely or, in a sense, illocutionarily in (at least) three ways; we may call

[21] Makdisi 4/1:14.
[22] Makdisi 4/1:15.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Makdisi 4/1:18.
[25] Makdisi 4/1:19.
[26] Makdisi 4/1:32.

these processes implicative, indicative, and semantic, translating, respectively, the Arabic terms *faḥwá*, *dalīl*, and *maʿná al-khiṭāb*.[27]

(1) *Faḥwá al-khiṭāb* is often understood by the logic-oriented as *a fortiori* extension of an utterance, and in such a way some *uṣūlī*s also understood it. In logic, *a fortiori* arguments assert that when something exists, something less remarkable than that which exists has an even stronger likelihood of existence. It is an argument usually understood to belong to the domain of logic. It it is quite significant though that many, especially textually-oriented *uṣūlī*s like Ibn ʿAqīl, understood *faḥwá al-khiṭāb* to be a feature solely of language, not a form of syllogistic extension.[28] In both cases, the idea is that the utterance that calls attention to one thing, calls attention also to another thing belonging in the class where the first is higher (*aʿlá*), that is, more tangentially a member of the class, and the second is lower (*adná*), that is, more certainly a member of that class. The classic example is the proscription on making disrespectful sounds to one's parents (Q. 17:23) which precludes also more extensive harm (*adhāyā*), because of the implicative features of its language.[29] Others referred to this process as "manifest analogy" (*qiyās jalī*). Yet Ibn ʿAqīl persists in seeing it as a feature of linguistic implication rather than either logical or analogical extension. He argues that the Arabs had conventionalized *faḥwá* usage in rhetoric, and so it is best understood as an aspect of linguistic conveyance-of-meaning.

(2) The indicative aspect of language (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*) establishes that, as well as *including* implications, discourse can *exclude* as well. When the text of the Qurʾān says "If they be pregnant, then support them (Q. 65:6)" it thereby establishes also that divorced women who are not pregnant are not supported.[30] Similarly, [the *ḥadīth*] "the whole of the earth has been made for me a place of prostration and its soil ritually pure"[31] indicates to the Ḥanbalīs that substances other

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[27] See e.g., Turkī 1:36-38.

[28] Turkī 1:36-37. More elaborately Turkī 2:41-43.

[29] In one place (Turkī 1:42), Ibn ʿAqīl allows *faḥwá al-khiṭāb* to go only from the *aʿlá* to the *adná*. In another (Turkī 2:42), however, he allows it to work in both directions, making it more clearly linguistic implicative rather that *a fortiori* logical extension. On this understanding, one may not make rude noises to one's parents; one also may not, because of this prohibition, feel annoyed with them or be exasperated with them (Turkī 2:42).

[30] Turkī 1:37.

[31] Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ,* "*Masājid*" 1.

than soil are not ritually pure.[32] It appears that this concept is peculiar to the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī schools.[33] The Ḥanafīs in particular sometimes accept this kind of linguistic formulation as a method of proof, but deny that there is really a silent indicant that is at work. Rather, they say, such a conveying of information is simply a function of the very nature of the words employed. In the famous proof text the Prophet says, "Whoever sells a palm tree after it has been pollinated—its fruits belong to the seller, unless it has been otherwise stipulated. [34]" The Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs say, "We understand by indication of the discourse (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*) that therefore if the tree has not been pollinated, the fruits consequently belong to the buyer." But others object to the argument though they agree with the underlying legal reasoning. "It is not," the Ḥanafīs say, "some kind of unsaid indicant that moves one to the conclusion that the un-pollinated palm's fruit belongs to the buyer, but it is part of the straightforward meaning of the 'address' itself." "Whoever" (*man*) is a stipulative word (*min ḥurūf al-sharṭ*)," they say, "and therefore pollination is the stipulation for the seller to get the fruit." The Ḥanbalīs and Shāfiʿīs, however, deny that *man* is a stipulative word.[35] Other attempts to suggest that the ruling results from an implicit *ratio* (*ʿilla*) or implication itself (*faḥwá*) are likewise rejected since it is precisely silence about the inverse of the linguistic assertion that ends up being used as an indicant. Since this is what the Ibn ʿAqīl believes to be the case in a *dalīl al-khiṭāb*, he asserts that one might as well call it what it is.[36]

Yet it is a notable inconsistency of his school's position that not all utterances imply, in their absence, the inverse of the normal stipulation. The Qurʾān stipulates that "if you are ill or traveling [and find no water for ablutions] then perform *tayammum* (Q. 4:43)." For the Ḥanafīs, this means (also inconsistently) that one can *only* perform *tayammum* when ill or traveling. The Ḥanbalīs and Shāfiʿīs, however, say that "*in kuntum ...ʿalá safarin*" is not an indicant such that its absence is also an indicant. Rather this is just *something mentioned* (*dhikrun*) since most of the time when one might not find water, one is traveling. Therefore, one can perform *tayammum* if there is no

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32 Turkī 2:45.
33 Turkī 2:186-7.
34 al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, "*Buyūʿ*" *bāb* 90.
35 Turkī 2:188.
36 Turkī 2:188-9.

water, even if one is not traveling. Likewise, when one is told to free a slave (as expiation, *kaffāra*) for killing someone errantly (Q. 4:92), the Ḥanafīs see this as a qualification (*takhṣīṣ*) that limits expiation to cases of manslaughter. The Ḥanbalīs and Shāfiʿīs see this text rather as a kind of supplement that reminds one to expiate even when the killing is inadvertent, since it is obvious that one owes expiation for deliberately killing someone.[37]

Dalīl al-khiṭāb, the bi-directional indicative quality of discourse, is not without its controversies. It is not obvious to everyone that tying a command to some attribute or condition or threshold implies the absence of the command in the absence of those qualifying features. In short, is absence or silence in all circumstances a positive indicant as most Ḥanbalīs claim? Ibn ʿAqīl sometimes seems equivocal.[38] Yet elsewhere he defends the school's position.[39]

(3) Finally, the semantic of discourse (*maʿná al-khiṭāb*) refers to the method of analogy that stands at the center of the legal process. *Maʿná al-khitāb* is a view of discourse that is open-ended, so that if more than one thing can be understood from a stipulation, both possible things are understood to be included in the single discourse-statement. The simple analogy makes the basic (*aṣl*) extend analogically to the derived (*farʿ*), which is also a purely linguistic process.[40] So something true of rice will be true of wheat, since both are foodstuffs.[41] By asserting that analogy is a function of speech, Ibn ʿAqīl defends the use of *qiyās* against those—including other Ḥanbalīs—who deny that it is part of *fiqh* epistemology. He is also thereby reining in the logicians like his contemporary al-Ghazālī who would see logic and not language as the prolegomenon to the study of Islamic law.

The reason "analogy" is a linguistic process is that it is precisely the linking of common meanings that makes legal extension possible, in the view of "right-thinking" (*muḥaqqiqūn*) jurists. *Qiyās* here is defined as the attribution of the derived to the original by means of a concept (*maʿná*) common to the two of them. There are several sorts of this kind of analogy, says Ibn ʿAqīl: the analogy by *ratio* (*ʿilla*), the

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37 Turkī 2:189-90.
38 Turkī 2:43-44.
39 Turkī 2:188.
40 Turkī 1:37-8.
41 Turkī 2:47-8.

analogy by indicant (*dalāla*), and the analogy by similarity (*shibh*), in addition to categorizations of analogies as sound or false.

The classic form of analogy links a common *ratio* found in both the original and the derived ruling. The leads to the ruling of the original being applied to the derived case. Ibn ʿAqīl is emphatic that this is the best form of analogy and he has heard it defended by the most outstanding teachers.[42] The classic example is cited: *nabīdh* is banned because, like *khamr* (which is forbidden in the Qurʾān) it is intoxicating (Ibn ʿAqīl calls it "powerful delight" *shidda muṭriba*), and intoxication is the *ratio* for the banning of *khamr*.

Indicative analogy rests not on a *ratio* but on a particular feature found in both original and derived case. This particular feature (*khaṣīṣa*) is an *indicant* of their meaningful, and in the context of a legal ruling, functional, similarity. So, prostrating during recitation of the Qurʾān (at certain specified parts) is optional—good to do, but there is no harm in not doing it. This optionality allows us to call it a supererogatory act (*nāfila*) and therefore all the other features of supererogation apply to it too. Likewise *ẓihār* oaths forbidding sexual relations[43] are forbidden to Muslims and analogically to non-Muslims[44] since in both cases it creates an impediment to marital relations by placing the genitals of the wife off-limits. The oath then, in both cases, is an indicant of the divorce.[45] The relation between the prostration and other supererogatory acts, or between the *ẓihār* of a Muslim and a *ẓihār* of a non-Muslim can be seen as a logical analogy (it is expressible syllogistically), but for Ibn ʿAqīl it is simply that two cases have a similar linguistic indicant that ties the two together.

The final kind of analogy, thought by some to be a species of indicative analogy, is called by Ibn ʿAqīl an analogy of similarity (*qiyās al-shibh*). Here, the similarity seems to be more general, and there is no one indicant that links the two. For example, both worship and rituals of purification must be done in sequence and without interruption. One analogizes from the one to the other because either is

[42] Turkī 2:47.

[43] Literally, the oath that "you are to me as my mother's back" that is, sexually off-limits; by this declaration a marriage is voided.

[44] It is not clear if this means that a Muslim who swears *ẓihār* to his non-Muslim wife is divorced irrevocably from her, or whether the Muslim courts will enforce a *ẓihār* between two non-Muslims.

[45] Turkī 2:48-9.

invalidated by a minor impurity (*ḥadath*). But in Ibn ʿAqīl's view, this shared vulnerability to a *ḥadath* is not, strictly speaking, an indicant but a simple similarity between the two.[46]

V. *Conclusion*

From the initial point in the *fiqh* process to its furthermost extension, from the moment of revelation to the scholar's attempt to discern God's intention for a novel case, the key to all legal epistemology is the *khiṭāb* and the rules for understanding it. For Ibn ʿAqīl, revelation and its interpretation is a process of linguistic apprehension, and there is no need for extra-linguistic tools like logic or metaphysics. God's speech has several unique features, and humankind's response to it too is unique. Yet in the end, the complex process of discourse links God to humanity such that He becomes immanent in the process of Muslims' apprehending His speech. Inferring that a new intoxicating substance is also prohibited is like re-reading a letter and finding a new nuance, another layer in it. In this way, God remains speaking long after the event of revelation, to those separated in time and in space from the revelation event.

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[46] Turkī 2:49.

KHUṬBA
THE EVOLUTION OF EARLY ARABIC ORATION

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> We know of no orations (*khuṭba*s) except by the Arabs and Persians. As for the Indians, they have inscribed themes, ageless books, that cannot be ascribed to any known man … The Greeks have philosophy and the craft of logic, but the author of the Logic [Aristotle] himself … was not described as eloquent … The Persians have orators, except that the speech of the ʿAjam … derives from long contemplation and … the studying of books … [As for] the [speech] of the Arabs it is all extemporaneity and spontaneity, as though it is [simply] inspiration …
>
> (al-Jāḥiẓ, d. 255/868 or 9, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*)[1]

In the seventh and eighth centuries C.E., rather than painting or sculpture or music, the peoples of Arabia assiduously cultivated the

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* This paper is dedicated with deep gratitude to Wolfhart Heinrichs, a true mentor and a rare scholar, whose many works on classical Arabic literary theory have been foundational in the field.

** Many of the *khuṭbas* cited in this article derive from the following three anthologies: Ṣafwat 1933-4; al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1015), *Nahj al-balāgha*; Ṭayfūr (d. 280/893), *Balāghāt al-nisāʾ*.

*** "Oral literature," being equivalent to "oral writing" (Latin: *littera:* a letter), is a contradiction in terms, but for lack of a more precise expression, I use in this paper the terms "literature," "literary," and "belles-lettres" to include the written and the oral artistic productions of language.

[1] al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 3:27-9.

art of the spoken word—the eloquently, metaphorically, rhythmically, appositely spoken word. It is well known that a major genre of this oral tradition was poetry; it is less well known that the primary prose form of that art was the *khuṭba*, or oration.

The *khuṭba* was a crucial piece of the Arabic literary landscape, and a key component of political and spiritual leadership. In both the pre-Islamic and early Islamic phases of Arabian life, it had significant political, social, and religious functions. It roused warriors to battle, legislated on civic and criminal matters, raised awareness of the nearness of death and the importance of leading a pious life, called to the new religion of Islam, and even formed part of its ritual worship. For a long time, it was the only prose genre in existence; it included both speeches and sermons, and partially subsumed proverbs (*amthāl*)[2] and the rhymed pronouncements of the soothsayers (*sajʿ al-kuhhān*). Written epistles and treaties, although existent, came a distant second in terms of volume, and did not pretend to high style. The *khuṭba* texts extant in the medieval Arabic sources form some of the most beautiful and powerful expressions of the Arabic literary canon.

Moreover, the early *khuṭba* had enormous influence on subsequent artistic prose. Indeed, the Qurʾan itself contained many of the stylistic features of the oration, such as parallelism, vivid imagery, direct address, rhyme, and assonance. For over a century, alongside the Qurʾan—without its divine authority, certainly, but with a great deal of spiritual and temporal clout—the *khuṭba* reigned supreme as the preeminent prose genre of the Arabic literary corpus. Towards the end of the Umayyad period, a vibrant new genre of written epistolary prose, called the *risāla*, emerged.[3] The *risāla* was greatly influenced by Persian and Greek administrative writings, but it was also largely shaped by the form, themes, and style of the Arabic *khuṭba*.[4] The

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[2] Proverbs, sometimes derived from poems, were at other times single sentences wrested from a *khuṭba* or a *khuṭba*-like speech.

[3] On the transition of Arabic culture from oral to written, see Toorawa 2005, 34; Schoeler 2006.

[4] One indication of the influence of oratory on chancery prose is the direction given by writers of important chancery manuals to secretaries, to study and memorize *khuṭbas*: Abū Hilāl (d. after 395/1005), *Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 64; al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/1418), *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, 1:210, quoting Abū Jaʿfar al-Naḥḥās (d. 338/950) and Abū Hilāl.

*risāla'*s chancery prose style of *inshā'*,[5] as it came to be called, gave rise in turn to the major fictional genres of medieval times, particularly the *maqāma*.[6] The *maqāma*, in its own turn, partially inspired the modern Arabic novel. In this context, then, the early *khuṭba* may be called the mother of the prose genres of Arabic literature.

Compared to other world cultures that produced orations still extant, such as the Greek and the Israelite, pre-Islamic and early Islamic society appears to be at a point on the oral-written continuum closer to a pristine primary orality.[7] The Arabic orations under study in this paper thus form an important and perhaps unique set of materials for the study of this genre in its largely oral stage.

In light of its literary and cultural importance, it is surprising that Western critical scholarship on the early *khuṭba* has been reticent. Several studies have been published in Arabic (mostly descriptive rather than analytical),[8] but almost none outside it. In European languages, the only monograph is Stephan Dähne's published dissertation, *Reden der Araber*, which focuses on the rhetorical features of Umayyad and Abbasid political speeches.[9] Encyclopedia entries that touch on the *khuṭba*, though useful, are brief,[10] as are book subchapters on oratory.[11] Just a handful of articles analyze specific *khuṭba*s (these articles are footnoted at relevant points in this paper). Moreover, as Philip Halldén correctly pointed out, the numerous modern European studies of Arabic *balāgha* (rhetoric, eloquence) have generally ignored the *khaṭāba* (oratory) tradition.[12]

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[5] On the *inshā'* style, see Meisami 1998a 1:105-6.

[6] Particularly in the 10th century, the genre that rendered poetry into prose named "loosening the rhyme," or "*ḥall al-naẓm*," also played a part in giving literary prose its ornate character, by importing into it a large number of poetic motifs. Cf. Sanni 1998.

[7] A comprehensive study of orality/literacy issues is Ong 1982.

[8] Arabic monographs on the early *khuṭba* include: al-Nuṣṣ 1963 & 1965; Darwīsh 1965; al-Ḥāwī 1970; al-Ḥūfī 1972; Manṣūr 1979; Abū Zahra 1980; Ḥasan 1980; Shalabī 1983; Maḥfūẓ 1984; Jabr 1988; Ramaḍān 1998; Badrān 1999. See also Ḍayf 1960, 27-41, 52-95.

[9] Dähne 2001.

[10] The more recent encyclopedia articles that touch on the *khuṭba* are by Meisami 1998b, Leder 1998, and Bosworth 1998 in the *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature*. Earlier ones are by Wensinck and Pederson in the *EI*[2].

[11] Subchapters on oratory in books include Mez 1937, 317-32, Serjeant 1983, 117-28.

[12] See Halldén 2005, 19-38. He finds that no European studies on *balāgha* have commented significantly on *khaṭāba*, from the earliest European exposition in 1853

This lack of interest in a major genre of Arabic literature may be attributed partly to the fact that the medieval Arabic critics presented no sustained treatments of oratory. It may also reflect modern Western perceptions that the *khuṭba* is undeserving of serious attention, being of inferior quality,[13] that *khaṭāba* belongs to the realm of philosophy, not literature,[14] or that the early *khuṭba*s are—this, according to the eminent historian Albrecht Noth—"fictions from beginning to end."[15] The first perception is disproved quite easily, by referring the reader to the texts themselves (see Appendix). The second is refuted equally effortlessly, by referring the reader to the numerous medieval belletrist anthologies that made a point of including examples of *khuṭba*s, thus demonstrating its validity as a literary genre; and by calling attention to the fact that, although Muslim philosophers used the term *khaṭāba* in discussing the Aristotelian syllogism, literary critics used it to denote the art of oratory, independent of philosophy. As to the third perception, it should be noted that Noth's opinion does not reflect a consensus among scholars. R.B. Serjeant, in contrast, holds that the early orations could well be authentic in gist and even in some of their language.[16] Noth's negative assessment of the genuineness of the early *khuṭba* material seems to be based solely on the fact that speeches made in late (Western) antiquity are known to be inauthentic. He does not provide further justification, apparently admitting no possible effect of the indigeous Arabian culture of memorization and transmission. The question of authenticity that he raises, however, is a grave one. Its ramifications will be examined later in this paper, where it will be shown that although a definitive authentication of individual orations is not possible because of the problems raised by its oral transmission, a genuine core of early

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by Mehren and forward, including the writings of the leading scholars in the field today, namely, W. Heinrichs and S.A. Bonebakker. He advocates a synchronized look at the two sister sciences.

[13] A blithe unawareness of the literary qualities of pre-Islamic *khuṭbas*, or perhaps of their very existence, is suggested in a comment in the (otherwise quite excellent) anthology of classical Arabic literature by Robert Irwin 2001, 29, who states that "no literary prose worthy of the name has come down to us from the pre-Islamic period." See also Swartz's 1999, 36 discussion of scholars' unfavorable assessment of the style of the later homily.

[14] Cf. discussion of this perception in Halldén 2005.

[15] Noth and Conrad 1994, 87-96, esp. 87. Noth refers the reader to the case of the 6th century Byzantine historian Procopius.

[16] Serjeant 1983, 118.

khuṭba material clearly exists, and even the possibly forged texts conform, by and large, to earlier conventions. Thus, a collective study based on the corpus of *khuṭba* materials as a whole rather than on single, individual texts, allows for a meaningful assessment of the genre.

Using a broad sampling of early *khuṭba* texts, this paper examines the evolution of its types and characteristics, focusing on the two centuries of the pre-Islamic, early Islamic, and Umayyad periods; the paper makes a brief foray into the subsequent Abbasid period, when the term came to denote solely the ritual sermon delivered with the prayer on Friday and the two Eids. Sections I, II, and III of the study present respectively a prefatory discussion of the denotations of the terms *khuṭba* and *khaṭāba*, our sources for the early *khuṭba*, and the issues of oral transmission and authenticity. Section IV traces the development of the various types and subtypes of political, religio-political, religio-ethical, legislative, and civic *khuṭba*s. Section V describes the *khuṭba'*s characteristics, analyzing its structure and setting, as well as its literary traits. Finally, the Appendix presents the texts and translations of some of the most famous *khuṭba*s of pre-Islam and early Islam, with brief comments pointing out the categories and attributes isolated earlier.

I. *Denotations of the Terms* khuṭba *and* khaṭāba

The early Arabic *khuṭba* (pl. *khuṭab*[17]) may be defined as an official discourse (for various purposes and containing diverse themes) which was extemporaneously composed and orally delivered in formal language to a large, live public audience, with the orator—with some exceptions—standing on a high place (later, the pulpit) and facing the audience. These characteristics may be considered prerequisites for classification as *khuṭba* (historical details follow in Section IV).

The term "oration" appears to be the best available one-word English equivalent for the Arabic term "*khuṭba*." According to the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)*, the oration is "a formal discourse delivered in elevated and dignified language, especially one given on a

[17] A less common plural form is *makhāṭib*, which is also said to be a plural of *makhṭab*, a noun of place, meaning the place where the *khuṭba* is delivered.

ceremonial occasion such as a public celebration."[18] It subsumes meanings conveyed by multiple English terms—exhortation, admonition, discourse, sermon, homily, debate, and speech—which also express the wide range of applications of the *khuṭba*. The definition of the term *khuṭba* by E.W. Lane, based on the medieval lexica, includes the umbrella category of "oration," as well as the subcategories mentioned in the *OED*.[19]

All these applications of *khuṭba* (and several others, such as the proposing of marriage), are associated with the underlying denotation of "direct address" of the root *kh-ṭ-b*. The scribe and critic Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Kātib (wrote in or after 335/946 or 7) as well as the famed lexicographer Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1311) offer an alternative derivation from "*khaṭb,*" which means "an important event" or "a calamity," saying the *khuṭba* was thus named because the Arabs only delivered it on momentous or catastrophic occasions.[20]

The morphological classifications of the relevant derivatives of *kh-ṭ-b* are as follows: The form I verb "*khaṭaba*" (with a *fatḥa* on the 2nd root letter), according to the medieval lexicographers, means to deliver an oration, while "*khaṭuba*" (with a *ḍamma* on the 2nd root letter), means to become a preacher. To indicate the orator, the intensive noun form (*ism al-mubālagha*) "*khaṭīb*" (pl. *khuṭabāʾ*) is generally used in place of the active participle form (*ism al-fāʿil*) "*khāṭib*." However, the intensive sense of *khaṭīb* is not completely lost, for the term is also used to connote a superb orator or a professional preacher. The word "*khuṭba*" is most commonly categorized as a form I verbal noun (*maṣdar*). Alternatively, it is categorized as a substantive used as a *maṣdar* or passive participle (*ism al-mafʿūl*) equivalent to *makhṭūba*.[21]

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[18] The *OED* also offers two other specialized meanings of the word "oration:" a derogatory usage, denoting "any impassioned, pompous, or long-winded speech;" and, in the 15th-19th centuries, "a prayer or supplication to God," derived from the Latin etymon *orare* = to pray; this latter usage is now rare, and confined chiefly to the Roman Catholic Church.

[19] Lane 1863, *kh-ṭ-b*. Lane leaves out the *OED*'s (internet site) oration subcategory of debate; but, as we shall see in Section IV, this was a valid subtype of the *khuṭba*.

[20] Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Kātib (d. after 335/946), *al-Burhān fī wujūh al-bayān*, 192; Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab.*

[21] Lane 1863 says it is "a word of the measure *fuʿla* in the sense of the measure *mafʿūla*, like *nuskha* in the sense of *mansūkha*."

The term "*khuṭba*" secondarily denotes the written *taḥmīd* preface of a book or epistle (*risāla* or *kitāb*), which contains mainly praise of God and blessings on the Prophet.[22] This naming is probably due to its adoption of three visible features of the oral *khuṭba*: a formulaic structure, parallelism, and *sajʿ*. The sense of direct address conveyed by the root *kh-ṭ-b* would appear at first sight to be the connecting feature between the epistle and the oral *khuṭba*; but this is not the case, for although the epistle has a direct addressee, the *taḥmīd khuṭba* of the epistle often takes the third grammatical person. Regarding parallelism and rhyme, the celebrated critic ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 474/1081) stated that the epistle's *khuṭba* should "deliberately include parallelism and *sajʿ*-rhyme."[23] Ibn Manẓūr emphasized the connection between rhyme and the term *khuṭba* even more strongly, claiming that *any* rhymed prose (*al-kalām al-manthūr al-musajjaʿ*) may be denoted by the term *khuṭba*.

The second form I *maṣdar* "*khaṭāba*," which denotes the act (and sometimes the art) of oratory, is often placed by the critics alongside the term "*balāgha.*" The eminent belletrist al-Jāḥiẓ used the two terms ambiguously; seemingly assuming them to be identical, he switched back and forth between them without apparent distinction.[24] Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm, on the other hand, characterized *balāgha* mainly as the use of *sajʿ*, and deemed it a necessary component of *khaṭāba* (and of epistle-writing).[25] Yet a third manner of characterization is represented by Ibn al-Nadīm (d. between 380 and 388/990 and 998), who deemed both *khaṭāba* and *balāgha* to be expressions of eloquence, differentiating between them along the fault line of oral (=*khaṭāba*) versus written (=*balāgha*); in his *Fihrist*, he listed the names of orators under the term "*khuṭabāʾ*" and scribes (*kātib*s) under the term "*bulaghāʾ*."[26]

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22 See examples in al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, 1:302, 14:353; al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:9.

23 al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078), *Asrār al-Balāgha*, 9.

24 See, for example, al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:92. Moreover, under his category of "the best person in terms of *khaṭāba*," (*akhṭab al-nās*), he often mentions the popular preacher and story-teller (*wāʿiẓ* and *qāṣṣ*; see discussion of these two terms in next section) indicating that he considers *khaṭāba*, at least in this context, to be the more general concept of eloquence, rather than one defined within the narrower context of the ritual sermon (ibid., 1:291, and elsewhere).

25 Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm, *al-Burhān*, 191.

26 Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 181.

In contrast to the critics, Muslim philosophers followed the Greek rhetorical tradition in characterizing *khaṭāba* as focusing on logic and syllogism, alongside subordinate concerns about style and delivery.[27] The philosopher al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* titled by the very term *al-Khaṭāba*, in which he defined it as "a syllogistic skill (*ṣināʿa qiyāsiyya*), the goal of which was persuasion (*iqnāʿ*)." He went on to say—highlighting an aspect of Greek rhetoric that overlaps with Arabic oratory—that *khaṭāba* used modes of persuasion that were "not specialized, but shared by all."[28] The Arabic lexicographer al-Fīrūzābādī (d. 817/1415), after defining *khaṭāba* in its oratorical aspect as "a literary prose art, whose purpose was the persuasion of the audience, or [its] counsel," added that "in the science of logic, [*khaṭāba*] was a syllogism consisting of premises"—also touching on an aspect overlapping with Arabic oratory—"that were axiomatic or assumed" [Aristotle's enthymeme].[29] Ibn Manẓūr wrote a slightly longer but similar definition of the philosophical *khaṭāba* in his *Lisān al-ʿarab*, in which he included examples of syllogisms. He stated that the active participle of *khaṭāba*, its agent, was, like the orator, called a *khaṭīb*.

"*Khiṭāba*" (with a *kasra* after the *kh*), yet another form-I *maṣdar*, is described in Lane's *Lexicon* and the *Lisān al-ʿarab* as "the office of the preacher of a mosque." In modern times, some collapsing and modification appears to have taken place in the denotations of the three *maṣdar*s, and both *khaṭāba* and *khuṭba* have relinquished to *khiṭāba* some of their semantic implications. Hence, Hans Wehr's dictionary of Modern Standard Arabic describes *khiṭāba* in terms as-

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[27] Cf. Aristotle (d. 322 B.C.), *Rhetoric* I:1: "… rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs; … the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism [from which part of the logical sequence is omitted, because of its obvious, or dubious, nature]."

Deborah Black (1990, 4), critiques what she calls "the current annexation of [the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*] to the realm of literary studies," and attributes this "annexation" to modern sholarship's dismissal of the medieval (Greek and then Arabic) viewing of those texts as part of the logic-focused Aristotelian *Organon*.

[28] al-Fārābī, *al-Khaṭāba*, 1, 25. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I.2: "Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion. This is the function of no other art; for each of the others is instructive and persuasive about its own subject: for example, medicine about health and disease … But rhetoric seems to be able to observe the persuasive about "the given," so to speak. That, too, is why we say it does not include technical knowledge of any particular, defined genus [of subjects]."

[29] For some of Aristotle's comments on the enthymeme, see n. 27.

sociated with medieval *khaṭāba* (rhetoric, oratory, art of eloquence), as well as terms connected with the medieval *khuṭba* (speech, lecture, discourse).

II. *Sources*

Of the two major literary genres of the early Arabs, much poetry was preserved, but the majority of early orations were lost. Poetry benefited from inbuilt mnemonic devices of rhyme and meter, multiple recitations such as the ones at the annual fair at ʿUkāẓ, and the personal and collective transmitter (*rāwī* and *rāwiya*), who were the sources for the earliest *dīwān* collectors. Although the *khuṭba'*s rhythm and partial rhyme helped to some extent, it lacked poetry's other aids to memorization, and thus did not fare as well. *Khuṭba* texts from the pre-Islamic period, in particular, were mostly lost, because, among other things, they experienced the longest time lag before being written down. To be sure, hundreds of oratorical texts derive from the early Islamic period, but this abundance is just a fraction of the *khuṭba*s that must have been delivered before and after the coming of Islam. Al-Jāḥiẓ correctly stated that "what we have remaining of the early Arabs' spontaneous literary production—of *khuṭba*s, battle-verses in *rajaz*, and camel driving chants—is but a fraction of the whole, of which none but the God who is cognizant of the number of water-droplets in the rain-clouds, and the number of sand-particles in the world, is aware."[30]

Diverse literary, historical, and jurisprudential sources contain large numbers of early *khuṭba* texts and related material, including reports (*akhbār*) framing the orations, anecdotes about the orators, and some critical evaluations of the genre. The major genres and works from which the texts and culture of the early *khuṭba* may be culled, are the following:

- Al-Jāḥiẓ's literary critical text-cum-anthology *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* is particularly useful for anecdotes and analysis as well as texts.
- Medieval compilations of the orations of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, the *Nahj al-balāgha*, compiled by al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1015), being the best known. Its major commentary by Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd (d. 655 or

[30] al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 3:29.

6/1257 or 8) contains more *khuṭba*s by ʿAlī and other early personages. Other extant collections include al-Qāḍī al-Quḍāʿī's (d. 454/1062) *Dustūr maʿālim al-ḥikam wa-maʾthūr al-shiyam min kalām amīr al-muʾminīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib*; and al-Qāḍī Abū l-Fatḥ al-Āmidī's (d. 550/1155) *Ghurar al-ḥikam wa-durar al-kalim*.[31]

– Literary anthologies, such as Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr's (d. 280/893) *Balāghāt al-nisāʾ*, Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih's (d. 328/940) *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*, the two *Amālī* works of al-Qālī (d. 356/967) and al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044), Abū al-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī's (d. ca. 363/972) *Aghānī*, Ibn Qutayba's (d. 276/889) *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*[32] and *al-Maʿārif*, and al-Mubarrad's (d. 285 or 6/ 898 or 9) *al-Kāmil*. Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām's (d. 224/838) early anthology of orations of the prophets, *al-Khuṭab wa-l-mawāʿiẓ*, is an interesting source, although the Arabic *khuṭba*s attributed therein to Abraham and Moses are either apocryphal, or translations.
– Historical texts, such as the works of al-Wāqidī (d. 207/823), Naṣr b. Muzāḥim al-Minqarī (d. 212/827), Ibn Hishām (d. 218/833), Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/845), pseudo-Ibn Qutayba, al-Balādhurī (d. 279/892), Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī (fl. 2nd-3rd/8th-9th c.), al-Ṭabarī (d. 314/923), al-Masʿūdī (d. 345/956), al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d. 363/974), and Ibn al-Athīr (d. 650/1233).
– Chancery manuals, such as al-Qalqashandī's (d. 821/1418) *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī ṣināʿat al-inshā*, Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Kātib's (d. after 335/946) *al-Burhān fī wujūh al-bayān*, and Abū Jaʿfar al-Naḥḥās's (d. 338/950) *ʿUmdat al-kātib*.
– Critical works, such as al-Bāqillānī's (d. 403/1013) *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* and Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī's (d. after 395/1005) *Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn*.
– Proverb collections, such as Abū Hilāl's *Jamharat amthāl al-ʿarab*, and al-Maydānī's (d. 518/1124) *Majmaʿ al-amthāl*.
– Jurisprudential (*fiqh*) works and Ḥadīth compilations yield various kinds of information on the *khuṭba* in their sections on the Friday and Eid prayers, such as Mālik's (d. 179/795, Sunnī Mālikī) *al-Muwaṭṭaʾ*, al-Kulaynī's (d. 329/941, Twelver Shīʿī), *al-Kāfī*, and al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān's (Fatimid-Ismāʿīlī) *Daʿāʾim al-Islām*.

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[31] 22 compilations of ʿAlī's *khuṭbas* and *rasāʾil* compiled before the *Nahj al-balāgha* (some extant, some lost) are listed in ʿAbd al-Zahrāʾ 1975, 1:51-86.

[32] See Marshall 1972, 91-110, in which he translates and briefly describes a selection of the orations in Ibn Qutayba's *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*.

– An *adab al-khaṭīb* treatise from later medieval times by Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār al-Dimashqī (d. 724/1324) offers details of the requirements for an official ritual preacher and his *khuṭba*.

Most of the extant *khuṭba* texts are fragmentary, probably because of their oral transmission; of the few intact ones, some, or even most, may have been compiled from earlier fragments. Also, most of our extant texts are rather short—perhaps due to their fragmentary nature, or because the early orations were, indeed, short (a prophetic Ḥadīth praises brevity in the *khuṭba*).[33] However, we do have some texts and reports of longer orations. A very long *khuṭba* is attributed to Muḥammad himself—he is said to have begun preaching immediately after the ritual prayer of late afternoon, and to have ended three to four hours later at the time of the sunset prayer.[34] Two long *khuṭba*s named *al-Ashbāḥ* (Phantasmic Beings) and *al-Qāṣiʿa* (The Striker or Thirst-Allayer) are attributed to ʿAlī.[35] The Muʿtazilite theologian Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ reportedly delivered long *khuṭba*s.[36]

There are several modern anthologies of early *khuṭba*s. These anthologies include Aḥmad Zakī Ṣafwat's three-volume *Jamharat khuṭab al-ʿarab*, which deals with the pre-Islamic and early Islamic, Umayyad, and early Abbasid periods. Other scholars have published collected volumes of the *khuṭba*s of Muḥammad,[37] Abū Bakr (d. 13/634),[38] ʿUmar (23/644),[39] and numerous tomes of *khuṭba*s attributed to ʿAlī.[40] They have also published *khuṭba* anthologies for the early caliphs,[41] the collected *khuṭba*s of al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī (d. 61/680),[42] and his great-grandson Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765).[43]

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33 Cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:303. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, section on "*Jumʿa*," (internet Ḥadīth site).

34 Ṣafwat 1933 1:151, #6; after al-Bāqillānī, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*.

35 al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha: al-Ashbāḥ*, 188-209, #90; *al-Qāṣiʿa*, 394-413, #190.

36 al-Mubarrad (d. 286/899), *al-Kāmil*, 3:193.

37 al-Khaṭīb 1983; al-Zanjānī, [1985]; al-Aʿlamī 1988.

38 M. ʿĀshūr and al-Kūmī [1994].

39 M. ʿĀshūr 1984.

40 An 8-volume collection is al-Maḥmūdī 1965. See also n. 31 above.

41 Ṭāsīn [1966]; Qumayḥa 1985; Q. ʿĀshūr 1998.

42 al-Mūsawī 1961; Bayḍūn 1974; Sharīfī 1995.

43 al-Wāʿiẓī 1988.

III. *Authenticity*

Since the early Arabic *khuṭba*s were initially transmitted orally, none can be definitively authenticated, nor can individual lines or words. Yet, given the large corpus of multiply transmitted and distinctly archaic orations extant, the body of early *khuṭba* material, as a whole, gives an approximate picture of the typology and characteristics of the genre in its early stages. The oral transmission took place over over two to four generations. A few *khuṭba*s were written prior to delivery;[44] others may have been recorded in writing soon after being delivered.[45] However, as far as we can tell, the majority were recorded in the late Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, a hundred to a hundred and fifty years after their original delivery, after the proliferation of paper and the (relative) spread of literacy.[46] This long period of oral transmission raises questions about the reliability of the extant materials, questions which will probably never be fully answered. Later individuals certainly had incentives to fabricate *khuṭba*s and attribute them to their predecessors. Some put words in the mouths of religious leaders like Muḥammad (d. 11/632) or ʿAlī (d. 40/660) to bolster sectarian and other views.[47]

Nevertheless, we have ample evidence to suggest that the Arabs consciously made an effort to memorize and transmit those *khuṭba*s—or, more accurately, those parts of a *khuṭba*—that they found

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[44] Cf. some records in the sources, from varying periods in early Islamic times, of orators writing a *khuṭba* prior to delivery (a systematic search would probably yield many more): 1) Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 655/1257, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*, 2:88) recounts that in the wake of the attack on Anbār, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib wanted to encourage the Kūfans to fight Muʿāwiya, but he was unwell and unable to deliver a speech, so he wrote a *khuṭba*, gave "the *kitāb"* (written text) to his *mawlā* Saʿd, and had him read it out aloud to the people. 2) We can extrapolate that some early *khaṭībs* wrote their *khuṭbas* in advance, from al-Jāḥiẓ's (*al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:124) comments lauding orators who did not write down their *khuṭbas* beforehand: he thus cited verses by Bashshār praising Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ for never writing down his *khuṭbas* beforehand; he also stated (ibid., 1:331) that Dāʾūd b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās always delivered extemporaneous orations, that he "never ever wrote down a *khuṭba* ahead of time". 3) Verses by Abū Mismār al-ʿUklī (ibid., 1:133) mention orators writing down *khuṭbas* ahead of time.

[45] On Arabic writing in pre-Islamic and early Islamic times, see Abbott 1967, 5-63; Pederson 1984, 3-11.

[46] On oral transmission in early Islam, see Vajda 1983; Schoeler 2006.

[47] On the phenomenon of attributing apocryphal material to founding figures, see Mourad 2006.

remarkable from a literary, tribal, political, and/or religious point of view. Muḥammad's frequent injunctions to the early Muslims to remember and pass on his words are evidence of this conscious effort. For example, he is reported to have said in a *khuṭba* at al-Khayf during his last pilgrimage, "May God refresh the face of the servant [of God] who hears my speech and takes it in, then conveys it to one who has not heard it. For many a carrier of knowledge is not knowledgeable, and many a carrier of jurisprudence carries it to one who has more understanding than he."[48] In his famous *khuṭba* at ʿArafāt in the same pilgrimage, he is reported to have said: "Let those present convey [this speech] to those absent."[49]

Moreover, the public setting of the *khuṭba* meant that there were many potential first transmitters. In one report, when a man asked ʿAlī to explain the concept of belief (*īmān*), ʿAlī directed the questioner to come back the next day to receive the answer "in a public audience (على أعين الناس) so that if he forgot [ʿAlī's] speech, others would remember," and, presumably, pass it on.[50] The fact that we have many different versions of the better attested orations results from this multiple mode of transmission, and supports their authenticity.

It is well known that the early Arabs routinely memorized enormous amounts of literary material, thousands of verses of poetry, and the entire 114-*sūra*, 6236-verse long Qurʾan; it is therefore entirely believable that they could memorize orations as well. We know that a parallel history of oral transmission belongs to pre-Islamic poetry[51] and prophetic Ḥadith,[52] yet many recent scholars agree on the credible existence of a genuine core. So why should we not accord a simi-

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48 Ṣafwat 1933 1:151; after al-Bāqillānī, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*; also in al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d. 363/974), *Daʿāʾim al-islām*, 1:80, *The Pillars of Islam*, 1:99; and al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), *al-Risāla*, 401.

49 فليُبَلِّغ الشاهد الغائب Ṣafwat 1933 1:155, #13. In a similar vein, an Umayyad governor of Medina named Abū Bakr b. ʿAbdallāh is reported to have begun a long *khuṭba* by saying: "I am about to deliver a speech. Whosoever takes it in and conveys it, God will reward him." إني قائل قولا فمن وعاه وأدّاه فعلى الله جزاؤه, Ṣafwat 1934 3:227; after al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*; and al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*.

50 al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 687, #267.

51 Writings against the possibility of any kind of poetic material existing from pre-Islamic times include Ḥusayn 1926 and Margoliouth 1925. Works arguing for the existence of a genuine core include al-Asad 1956, Arberry 1957, Monroe 1972, Shahīd 1996 and Schoeler 2006. On the transmission of this poetry and its recording in the early Abbasid period, see Drory 1996, 38-49.

52 Cf. Motzki 1991.

lar degree of acceptance to the corpus of *khuṭba* materials, which represent another oral genre from the same time?

Even in the case of those *khuṭba*s which are later forgeries, they conform closely to early conventions of style and theme. For the perpetrators were near in time to the early orators, familiar with the conventions of pre-Islamic and early Islamic oratory, and successful in passing off their creations as earlier productions to a likewise knowledgeable audience. Even though this complicates our detective work in determining the provenance of individual *khuṭba*s, the possibly fabricated *khuṭba*s, when taken together, lend themselves effectively to a study of the earlier period.

IV. *Types:*[53]

Political; Soothsayer's Utterance; Religious (Pious Counsel); Civic (Marriage); Religio-Political (including Legislative and Ritual)

The *khuṭba* appears to be an old, indigenous genre, attested in the Arabian Peninsula from about the late sixth century C.E., when it had numerous applications. Sifting through the Arabic historical and literary sources, we can identify distinct types of early orations based on function and theme. These types and their subtypes experienced modification in response to the changing literary, social, political, and religious scene. Some earlier subtypes gradually merged, resulting in the materialization of new ones. With the coming of Islam in the early seventh century C.E., the various types of *khuṭba* continued to develop under the aegis of the pre-Islamic oratorical tradition combined with the relevant doxology and praxis of Islam, especially its ritual prayers, ethical teachings, and the Qurʾān.

Not surprisingly, since it was a genre so deeply rooted in the native culture, there are few perceptible foreign influences on Arabic oratory. Neither before nor after the coming of Islam did the rhetorical traditions of the Greeks, the Persians, the Indians, or the Byzantines have much influence on the development of the *khuṭba*. During the period of intensive Greek-to-Arabic translation in Baghdad from

[53] Cf. discussions of the types of the early *khuṭba* in some of the Arabic monographs on the subject, such as al-Nuṣṣ 1963, 145-260; al-Ḥāwī 1970, 29-52; al-Ḥūfī 1972, 62-119; Shalabī 1983, 77-118.

the 8th through the 10th centuries C.E. (2nd-4th c. H.),[54] none of the works containing the famous speeches of the Greeks appear to have been translated: not the speeches of Demosthenes and other Attic orators, nor Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian war, nor the epics of Homer. To be sure, Aristotle's theoretical work on oratory, the *Rhetoric*, was rendered into Arabic by an anonymous translator in the early part of the 3rd/9th c.[55] But, although this book—along with his other logical and ethical works—greatly influenced Islamic philosophy,[56] it had little impact on Arabic literature, and none on the practice or theory of the *khuṭba*.

As is well known to classicists, the Greek and Latin rhetorical corpus is generally viewed through the lens of Aristotle's division of oratory into the categories of forensic (court), epideictic (exhibition), and deliberative (political assembly) oratory, dealing respectively with past, present, and future events, in which the syllogism played a critical role.[57] In contrast, in the early Arabic *khuṭba* tradition, the forensic and epideictic oration is completely missing. However, the category that Aristotle had termed deliberative oratory developed—without reference to Aristotle—in a large number of original directions. In addition, several completely new and primarily ritualistic categories unknown to the Greeks emerged.

The major types of the early Arabic *khuṭba* are the political and religio-political speech (which include the Islamic ritual sermon delivered on Friday and the two annual Eid days), the pre-Islamic soothsayer's utterance, the religious sermon of pious counsel (*khuṭba* of *waʿẓ*), and the civic category of the verbal marriage contract. Details of their development and particulars of their subtypes follow.

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54 For information on the Graeco-Arabic translation movement and the impact of Greek philosophical and ethical thought on Islam, see Rosenthal 1965; Gutas 1998.

55 Aristotle, *al-Khaṭāba: al-tarjama al-ʿarabiyya al-qadīma*. The work was probably translated before the movement's best-known translator, Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq, arrived on the scene. In the fourth/tenth century, the bibliographer Ibn al-Nadīm stated that he had seen a 100-page copy of the translation, and he mentioned Isḥāq and Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbdallāh as possible translators (*al-Fihrist*, 349)—cf. details in al-Badawī's introduction to *al-Khaṭāba*, z.

56 Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was commented on, as mentioned earlier, by al-Fārābī, *al-Khaṭāba*, and Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), *Kitāb al-Majmūʿ aw al-Ḥikma al-ʿarūḍiyya fī maʿānī kitāb riṭūrīqā*, and abridged by Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), *Talkhīṣ al-Khaṭāba*.

57 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I.3, 1-4. For an overview of Greek, Roman, and European rhetoric, see Russell 1996, Winterbottom 1996, Herrick 2001.

Table 1: Typology of the Early Arabic *khuṭba*

period	*types*	*subtypes*	*delivered by*
Pre-Islamic	1. political speech	a. during *ayyām* battles	a. tribal chiefs & nobles
		b. blood money (*diya*) negotiations	b. tribal chiefs & nobles
		c. social rank dispute (*munāfara*)	c. (i) nobles (ii) contenders for leadership
		d. judgment of social rank dispute	d. (i) tribal chiefs & nobles [(ii) soothsayers]
		e. addressed to Persian monarch	e. Nuʿmān b. Mundhir & nobles
Pre-Islamic & Islamic	2. soothsayer's utterance (*sajʿ al-kuhhān*)	a. interpretation of dreams b. divination of future events c. adjudication	soothsayer
	3. religious sermon of pious counsel (*khuṭba* of *waʿẓ*)	a. containing general themes of piety, contemplation of the imminence of death, obedience to God. [Also testament (*waṣiyya*)]	a. religious or religio-political leaders (including Muḥammad and his Companions, esp. ʿAlī)
		b. containing specific themes of (i) condolence, (ii) revering of the Kaʿba, etc.	b. (i) prominenent tribe members (ii) Banū Hāshim
	4. marriage *taḥmīd* & contract		person officiating at the marriage
Islamic	5. religio-political speech (including ritual sermon)	a. ritual sermon Friday—Eids (al-Fiṭr, al-Aḍḥā) [drought relief (*istisqāʾ*)—eclipse *(kusūf*)]	a. (i) Prophet Muḥammad, (ii) caliph, (iii) governor, (iv) official preacher or *khaṭīb* (Abbasid period ff.)
		b. legislative speech (laying down laws)	b. Prophet Muḥammad
		c. speech delivered at various religious occasions	c. Prophet Muḥammad
		d. accession and policy speech	d. (i) caliph, (ii) governor
		e. battle oration	e. (i) caliph, (ii) commanders, (iii) rebellion leader
		f. sectarian sermon	f. sectarian leader
		g. elite women's speech (in special circumstances)	g. noblewoman

The evolution of Arabic *khuṭba*s begins in pre-Islamic times, when the most common type was apparently the political speech.[58] In general, tribal leaders were expected to possess spontaneous eloquence, a quality necessary in their roles of verbally provoking the tribe's members to certain forms of action, social or military. In addition to leaders' speeches, we have some indication that just as a tribe often had a designated poet or *shāʿir*, it may have had a designated orator or *khaṭīb*, whose function was the vocal and eloquent promotion of the tribe's glory and valor. An anecdote about early Islamic times could reflect pre-Islamic practice, in which a delegation from Tamīm to the Prophet Muḥammad in Medina asked him permission for "their poet, and their orator" to hold forth in a nobility-cum-eloquence contest with the early Muslims.[59] Several observations by al-Jāḥiẓ support this hypothesis. He asserts that the standing of the pre-Islamic orator was slightly less than that of the poet, which indicates that such an institution probably existed.[60] He states that Thābit b. Qays b. Shammās al-Anṣārī was Muḥammad's official orator, who defended his cause just as his official poets did, a practice that could, again, reflect earlier practice.[61] He names a few early Islamic poet-orators—Ṭirimmāḥ b. Ḥakīm, Kumayt b. Zayd, Quss b. Sāʿida, ʿAmr b. al-Ahtam, al-Baʿīth al-Mujāshiʿī, ʿImrān b. Ḥiṭṭān, Daghfal b. Ḥanẓala, al-Qaʿqāʿ b. Shawr, Naṣr b. Sayyār, Zayd b. Jundub, ʿAjlān b. Saḥbān, and ʿImrān b. ʿIṣām.[62]

One of the contexts of pre-Islamic political speeches was intertribal revenge killing (*thaʾr*) and subsequent negotiations over blood money. The orations exchanged by members of the tribes of Taghlib and Bakr about *thaʾr* initiated the bloody forty-year War of Basūs (494-534 C.E.).[63] Tribal wars and battles (*ayyām*, sing. *yawm*) were

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[58] Perhaps because of the predominance of the political oration in early times, Bosworth, in his brief entry on "*khuṭba*" (1998), confines the pre-Islamic and early Islamic oration to this type, saying the *khuṭba* at that time "was … a tribal political or sectarian rallying cry." Note that these "political" speeches could well have had a religious element to them that invoked pagan gods, and which the early Muslims purged, but since the texts at hand do not mention religious entities, the term religio-political would be speculative.

[59] Ṣafwat 1933 1:163 #17; after al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*; Ibn Hishām, *Sīra*; and al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*.

[60] al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:241.

[61] Ibid., 1:201.

[62] Ibid., 1:45-50.

[63] Ṣafwat 1933 1:40-1, #24; after Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*; Abū l-Faraj, *al-Aghānī*.

themselves a fertile environment for producing rousing military orations, such as the said War of Basūs and the famous Battle of Dhū Qār (late 6th or early 7th c. C.E.) The speech of Hāniʾ b. Qubayṣa during the latter battle inciting the Shaybān to fight is a prime example.[64]

Other settings for the political speech were struggles over leadership (*munāfara*). These orations were couched in the framework of proving oneself nobler and abler than one's opponent. Public debates on this issue survive in the sources, such as the debate between two paternal cousins of the Banū ʿĀmir over the leadership of their tribe.[65] Judgments of these *munāfara*s are also in the form of public speeches, such as the judgment of Harim b. Quṭba al-Fazārī arbitrating between the same ʿĀmirite cousins, equating them in nobility. The *munāfara* judgements were sometimes pronounced by a *kāhin*, such as the pronouncement of the Khuzāʿī *kāhin* favoring Hāshim (d. 524 C.E.) over Umayya;[66] they were also delivered by other persons of consequence, such as the same Hāshim judging between the tribes of Quraysh and Khuzāʿa.[67]

A subtype of political orations is the set of speeches addressed by the Lakhmid king of Ḥīra, al-Nuʿmān b. al-Mundhir (r. ca. 580-602 C.E.) and other Arabian nobles to the Persian monarch Kisrā and his court in praise of the Arabs, to avert the covetous eyes of the Persians from Arabian lands.[68] Even if Kisrā did not understand Arabic, as is most likely the case, we can surmise that given the lively trade, cultural, and political contact between the Arabs and the Persians at the time, he would have had translators.

Many political speeches were delivered not singly, but in packages, often constituting some kind of eloquence-cum-politics contest, one speech on the heels of another, often as a response.

The formal, rhymed pronouncements of pagan soothsayers (*kāhin*, pl. *kuhhān*, fem. pl. *kawāhin*), may be categorized as a second type of *khuṭba*, as they are sometimes delivered to what appears to be a fairly large public audience. A number of texts in the sources are credited to female soothsayers, being the only *khuṭba*s in pre-Islamic times at-

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64 Ibid., 1:37, #18; after al-Qālī, *al-Amālī*.

65 Ibid., 1:41-5, #25; after Abū l-Faraj, *al-Aghānī*; al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*; Ibn Nubāta, *Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn*; Ibn Rashīq, *al-ʿUmda*.

66 See text in Appendix.

67 Ṣafwat, 1933 1:75-6, #48; after al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-arab*.

68 Ibid., 1:50-64, #31-41; after Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*.

tributed to women. The soothsayer's *khuṭba* is always conspicuously and completely in rhymed prose (*sajʿ*) and therefore commonly named the *sajʿ* of the *kuhhān*. Its themes, after the initial divining-of-secrets test ("what's hidden in my bag?" … "a locust"), include the interpretation of dreams, the divination of momentous future events, the arbitration of high status mentioned earlier (*munāfara*), and the adjudication of guilt. Many of these themes have a strong political underpinning.

A connection can be hypothesized between the domain of the *khuṭba*, particularly that of the soothsayer, and the judgment of a case in pre-Islamic times. C.H. Becker and A.J. Wensinck have pointed out the influence of the setting of pre-Islamic judgment pronouncements on the practices of the later Islamic ritual sermon. They explain that a) like the old Arabian judge, the Muslim preacher delivering the sermon is required to sit down between the two *khuṭba*s, and b) to lean on a staff or sword during them.[69] To these points may be added the observations that c) the judges (including the soothsayers) perhaps pronounced judgments in a *khuṭba* format, d) some of the most famous orators of the *jāhiliyya* were also judges, such as al-Aktham, and e) the term *khiṭāb*, which is derived from the same root as *khuṭba* (in addition to its more commonly known meaning of direct address or epistle), denotes the act of judging. Lexicographers and exegetes discuss at great length the exact nature of the quality that God bestowed upon the Prophet David expressed in the Qurʾānic phrase "*faṣl al-khiṭāb,*"[70] and they proffer the following meanings, all variations on the theme of judging:[71] deciding a case, passing sentence, judging; deciding between truth and falsehood; understanding, intelligence, sagacity, or knowledge in judging or passing sentence.

This category of *khuṭba* is adjudicatory, consisting of a judgment pronounced by an arbiter.[72] It differs from the Greek forensic category where a plaintiff and a defendant each present their case.

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69 Wensinck, "Khuṭba," in: *EI*[2]; Becker 1906, 331.

70 Qurʾān 38:19 وآتيناه الحكمة وفصل الخطاب

71 Cf. Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab*, "*kh-ṭ-b*," al-Qurṭubī, *Tafsīr*, and al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl*, both accessed from <http://www.alwaraq.net>.

72 Modern Arab scholars categorize these as "legal orations" (*khuṭab qaḍāʾiyya*, cf. al-Ḥāwī 1970, 24).

A third type of pre-Islamic oration is the *khuṭba* of pious counsel, either generic (more common) or specific. The generic subtype concentrated on reminding the audience of the inevitability of death, and subsequently, the necessity of leading a pious life; it focused on individual morality and ethical issues like truthfulness. The most famous orator of pious counsel is an Arab Christian, Quss b. Sāʿida al-Iyādī (d. ca. 600 C.E.), who is known as "the orator of the Arabs."[73] Other well known orators of pious counsel are al-Maʾmūn al-Ḥārithī, the *muʿallaqa* poet ʿAmr b. Kulthūm (d. 584 C.E.),[74] and al-Aktham b. Ṣayfī (d. 9/630) who preached mostly in the *jāhiliyya* but lived to embrace Islam. Some of these pious counsel sermons are condolences (*taʿziya*),[75] a context in which one would expect the speaker to dwell on death. But rather unusually, one sermon about the inevitability of Fate is addressed by a marriage suitor to his lady's tribe.[76]

Other pious counsel sermons are attributed to Muḥammad's forebears, Kaʿb b. Luwayy (7th generation forebear), Hāshim (great-grandfather), ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib (grandfather, d.ca. 579 C.E.), and Abū Ṭālib (uncle, d. 620 C.E.) As keepers of the Kaʿba in Mecca, they exhorted the Quraysh to revere the Sacred House,[77] and urged them to provide provisions for Ḥajj pilgrims.[78] The Banū Hāshim appear to have been an eminent pre-Islamic (and early Islamic) clan of orators. Once at the Umayyad court, when a prominent partisan of ʿAlī named Ṣaʿṣaʿa b. Ṣūḥān expounded on the oratorical abilities of his own tribe of ʿAbd al-Qays, Muʿawiya (d. 60/680) jibed that Ṣaʿṣaʿa had left nothing for the Quraysh; Ṣaʿṣaʿa responded by saying that (the Qurashite clan of) Hāshim were the best orators. (He deliber-

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[73] Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab, "kh-ṭ-b*." See entry on Quss and his eloquence in Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449), *al-Iṣāba fī tamyīz al-ṣaḥāba*, 7:253-6. A Polish monograph on Quss and his literary output is by Dziekan 1996. See also articles by Dziekan 1997 and Chraïbi 1996. See text of Quss's famous ʿUkāẓ oration in Appendix.

[74] Ṣafwat 1933 1:37, #19; after al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn.*

[75] Ibid., 1: 17-18, #6, 7 (after al-Qālī, *al-Amālī*); Ṣafwat 1933, 1: 37-38, #20 (after Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*).

[76] Ibid., 1:19-20, #9; after al-Maydānī, *Majmaʿ al-amthāl*; al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*.

[77] Ibid., 1:73-7, #46-50 (after al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*; al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-arab*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; Ibn Ẓafar, *Anbāʾ nujabāʾ al-abnāʾ*); Ṣafwat 1933 1:161, #16 (after al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-arab*); all treat the *ḥaram* in some respect.

[78] Cf. *khuṭba* of Hāshim, Ṣafwat 1933 1:74, #47; after Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*; see also extract in al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), *Asās al-balāgha*, "*ḍ-ʾ-ḍ-*".

ately left out Muʿāwiya's Qurashite clan of the Banū Umayya).[79] The prominence accorded by the sources to the orations of the Banū Hāshim should be viewed, on the one hand, in the light of their known leadership role prior to Islam, but also with regard to their genealogical relevance, first to Muḥammad, and then to the Abbasids, and their importance to the Shīʿa in general. This importance could be viewed as a motive for fabrication, or it could have been the catalyst that prompted the sources to preserve a relatively greater number of Hāshimite orations.

Some testaments (*waṣiyya*) may be categorized as a subtype of the sermon of pious counsel or a quasi-*khuṭba*. *Khuṭba* anthologists, such as al-Raḍī[80] in medieval times and Ṣafwat[81] today, often include them, perhaps because even if the two appear to be separate genres, there is significant overlap. For even though most testaments are not technically *khuṭba*s—in that they are made to a small, private audience usually comprised of the offspring of the legator—some are delivered to a larger, public audience consisting of several members of the legator's tribe, such as the testaments of Abī Ṭālib to the Quraysh,[82] and the testament of Qays b. Zuhayr to the Banū al-Namir.[83] In many cases, testaments were delivered standing, but on the death bed, they were presumably delivered sitting or lying down.

A fourth type of pre-Islamic *khuṭba* is the marriage contract (*khuṭbat al-nikāḥ* or *al-zawāj*). This *khuṭba* begins with praise of God, then identifies the bride and groom and mentions the dower. It is delivered by the person officiating at the ceremony. The text of Abū Ṭālib's *khuṭba* during Muḥammad's marriage to Khadīja is one of few

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[79] Ṣafwat 1933 1:442, #341; after al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*; al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*.

[80] In his section on the *khuṭbas* of ʿAlī, al-Raḍī (*Nahj al-balāgha*, 33) includes non-*khuṭba* material, that he considers similar to the *khuṭba*, indicated in the (long) chapter title: "Chapter one, containing selections from the *khuṭbas* of Amīr al-Muʾminīn (AS) and his commands; included in this are selections from his words that are like *khuṭbas* [uttered] in specific situations (*maqāmāt*), particular circumstances (*mawāqif*), and momentous affairs (*khuṭūb*)."

[81] Ṣafwat 1933 1:20-5, #10&11, 1:41-9, #25-30, 1:66-72, #43-5 includes artistic oral prose, mostly fully *musajjaʿ*, that does not possess the formal features of the *khuṭba* genre, dialogues, debates, disputations, such as were said in the courts of kings, caliphs, and chieftains He claims (ibid., 1:4) that they "enter into the field of *khuṭbas*, and are threaded in their necklace."

[82] Ṣafwat 1933 1:161, #16; after al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-arab*.

[83] Ṣafwat 1933 1:127-9, #81; after Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, *al-Amālī*; Ibn Nubāta, *Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn*.

existing examples of what could have been a common type.[84] After the initial praise formula, it outlines the merits of both parties to the marriage. Al-Jāḥiẓ cites a short formulaic version of the pre-Islamic marriage *khuṭba* used by the Quraysh: "In your name, O God. Such-and-such a woman has been mentioned. Such-and-such a man is enamored of her. In your name, O God. For you, what you ask for; for us, what you give."[85] The application of the term "*khuṭba*" to the marriage contract could indicate the public nature of the ceremony; or perhaps it indicates the *taḥmīd* opening of the oral text of the contract.

Apart from these four major pre-Islamic types, a few miscellaneous *khuṭba*s have also come down, including a *khuṭba* of congratulations (*tahniʾa*) upon military victories by ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib b. Hāshim.[86]

After the coming of Islam, a few types and subtypes of the *jāhiliyya khuṭba* died out, such as the *munāfara* boast and the rhymed prose of the soothsayers (with the exception of the rhymed pronouncements of pseudo-prophets, such as Sajāḥ and Musaylima). Other *khuṭba* categories continued to be regularly utilized, albeit with significant, mostly religious, modifications. The political khuṭba was adapted to a new imperial political milieu, and a new religious setting, with the inclusion of Islamic themes and Qurʾānic vocabulary. It evolved into the Islamic religio-political *khuṭba* (fifth type) which was delivered during battles and power struggles. The sermon of pious counsel also continued to be an important part of the literary landscape, taking on several additional religious hues. It now contained—in addition to reminders about death, similar to pre-Islamic times—injunctions to follow the example of the Prophet, and detailed advice about leading a pious life (rarer in pre-Islamic times); a familiar phrase in these sermons was "I enjoin you to be pious" (اوصيكم بتقوى الله). The marriage *khuṭba* also continued to be used. The Islamic marriage *khuṭba* included a modified praise formula to encompass blessings on the Prophet, and an invocation of the Islamic *sharīʿa*.

Most importantly in early Islam, the political speech and the sermon of pious counsel came together in Medina to form the major new Islamic type of religio-political *khuṭba* that accompanied the rit-

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84 See text in Appendix.

85 al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:408.

86 Ṣafwat 1933 1:76, #49; after Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; Ibn Ẓafar, *Anbāʾ nujabāʾ al-abnāʾ*).

ual prayer. The first Friday *khuṭba* was delivered by Muḥammad in Medina in the year 1/623.[87] It displayed many of the features that were to become standard in the later Islamic Friday/Eid sermon, viz., *taḥmīd*, numerous Qurʾān citations, counsel to be God-fearing, and other moral advice.[88] Although in large part moralistic, the ritual *khuṭba* in this earliest manifestation already contained some critical political material, such as injunctions to obey God and His Prophet. Moreover, the moral code was cast in a religio-political frame, equating virtue with Islam. In the verse: "Call to the path of your Lord through wisdom and good counsel" (ادْعُ الى سبيل رَبِّكَ بالحِكمة والمَوْعِظَةِ الحسَنَة), the Qurʾān had enjoined Muḥammad to conduct the call (*daʿwa*) to the new religion and to the state it had established with moral advice (*mawʿiẓa*). The preaching of virtue was intrinsically connected with his religious and political mission, and the religio-political ritual sermon was one expression of this relationship.

It is somewhat more problematic to categorize as a *khuṭba* proper the oration-cum-prayer that went along with the ritual prayer (*ṣalāh*) in two special cases—asking God for rain in times of drought (*istisqāʾ*), and for protection in times of eclipses (*kusūf*). Although both medieval and modern scholars refer to these texts as *khuṭba*s, they do not completely fulfill its formal requirements: according to most reports, they are almost entirely prayers addressed to God rather than to a large public audience,[89] and at times are delivered sitting down facing the Kaʿba in Mecca (*qibla*), rather than standing facing the audience. There are, however, accounts to the contrary. These include one of a rain *khuṭba* ascribed to ʿAlī, in which he ini-

[87] Ṣafwat 1933 1:148-9, #3; after al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2:394-6, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, 7:2-4.

[88] In Islamic practice, the Friday and Eid *khuṭbas* are considered a segment of the ritual prayer, the two-part Friday *khuṭba* taking the place of two *rakʿas*. The *khuṭba* itself comprises of two sub-*khuṭbas* separated by a short interval, and is delivered by the prayer-Imam before the *ṣalāt al-jumʿa*, and after the *ṣalāt al-ʿīd*. The first *khuṭba* contains mainly pious counsel (*waʿẓ*), the second, mainly supplication (*duʿāʾ*). It was the second *khuṭba* that, from the Umayyad period forward, contained the key political feature of praying for the reigning caliph's long life. The Friday *khuṭba* is introduced by a *taḥmid*, whereas the Eid *khuṭba* is introduced by *takbīr*. *Fiqh* manuals and Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār's work detail the content and format of these ritual *khuṭba*s.

[89] Cf. a rain-prayer *khuṭba* by Muḥammad in Ṣafwat 1933 1:154-5, #12 (after Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*); and one by ʿAlī in al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 253, #114.

tially addressed the audience in the second person, reminding them that the sky and the earth bend to God's will, informing them of the fact that droughts and similar natural disasters are a result of collective sins perpetrated by the people of the time, and counseling them that the current calamity could be alleviated by asking God for forgiveness; only after this *khuṭba*-style advice did he turn to the prayer section, in which he beseeched God for rain.[90] The preface of another rain *khuṭba* attributed to Muḥammad states that he climbed atop a pulpit (thus, probably standing facing the audience) in which he then prayed for rain.[91] Hence, the large, public audience, even though not always addressed and faced directly, connected the format of the rain and eclipse prayer-orations with the *khuṭba*. Moreover, the ritual nature and the *duʿāʾ* component of the rain and eclipse prayer-orations were common to the ritual Friday/Eid *khuṭba*.

Al-Jāḥiẓ says that an Umayyad Syrian governor, al-Walīd b. al-Qaʿqāʿ, would pray for rain (*kāna yastasqī*) in every *khuṭba*. Here the prayer for rain becomes a component in *khuṭba*s of all types, versus being a stand alone type of quasi-*khuṭba*.

A new component in Arabic *khuṭba*s was the laying down and explication of civic and criminal laws. This legislation included prohibitions on usury and blood revenge, penalties for murder or manslaughter, and regulations regarding fasting. The lawmaking function of the oration was restricted to the Prophet, and legislation is found, for example, in Muḥammad's *khuṭba*s at the conquest of Mecca,[92] during his last pilgrimage,[93] and at the onset of Ramaḍān.[94]

The majority of extant Islamic *khuṭba*s of all types dating from Muḥammad's lifetime are his own.

In the three decades between the death of Muḥammad and the death of ʿAlī, and continuing into the Umayyad and early Abbasid period, the *khuṭba* genre developed in response to the changing political and sectarian climate. Other than the legislative feature which

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[90] al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 291, #141.

[91] Cf. n. 96.

[92] See text in Appendix.

[93] Ṣafwat 1933 1:155, #13; after al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; al-Bāqillānī, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*; al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*; Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya.* Studies of this *khuṭba* include: Blachère 1956; Alwaye 1975; Serjeant, 1983, 119-22; Sah 2000.

[94] al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, *Daʿāʾim al-islām*, 1:268-9.

died out with Muḥammad, the categories established in his lifetime continued to be used and elaborated upon, viz., religio-political,[95] ritual, pious counsel, and marriage[96] *khuṭba*s. Like Muḥammad before, caliphs delivered speeches containing military instructions and injunctions, as well as some homilies of pious counsel.

The largest number of *khuṭba*s from the early Islamic period, the most thematically varied, are attributed to the caliph ʿAlī.[97] Al-Jāḥiẓ cites Abū al-Ḥasan saying that among the early caliphs, ʿAlī was "the best orator."[98] Saḥbān Wāʾil[99] (d. 54/674 C.E.) also serves as a proverbial model of oratory, even though just one sermon of pious counsel is attributed to him; an eloquent person is described idiomatically in classical sources as "*afṣaḥ min Saḥbān*" or "*akhṭab min Saḥbān*" more eloquent or a better orator than Saḥbān)."[100] A third distinguished orator of pious counsel was al-Aḥnaf b. Qays (d. 72/691).[101]

New subcategories of the religio-political *khuṭba* emerged. Caliphs delivered accession speeches—of which there are several extant—delineating their future policies in kernel form. Army chiefs, such as Khālid b. al-Walīd (d. 21/642) in ʿUmar's time, and Ṭāriq b. Ziyād[102] (d. 102/720), the Umayyad general who first entered Spain, delivered impassioned exhortations to their legions. Newly appointed provincial governors, such as the Umayyads Ziyād b. Abīhi[103] (d. 53/673) and al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī[104] (d. 95/714), used eloquent, strongly worded speeches to introduce their policies to the people. Sectarian leaders delivered speeches calling to rebellion and uprising. The Khārijites produced fiery specimens, including Abū Ḥamza al-Shārī's[105] (d. 130/748) famous address to the residents

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95 On the Umayyad political *khuṭba*, see al-Nuṣṣ 1965; Dähne 2001.

96 Cf. section on marriage *khuṭbas* in Ṣafwat 1934 3:344-9, #2-13 (all Islamic except #4, which is pre-Islamic).

97 Cf. Qutbuddin 2005a, 68-76. A translation and commentary on one of ʿAlī's *khuṭbas* is contained in Ousseiran 1994.

98 al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 2:353.

99 See text in Ṣafwat 1933 2:482, #455; after Ibn Nubāta, *Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn*.

100 Cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*. See verses by Saḥbān boasting of his oratorical skills in Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab*, *"kh-ṭ-b*".

101 On al-Aḥnaf, see al-Nuṣṣ 1963, 367-400.

102 See text in Appendix.

103 See text in Appendix.

104 On al-Ḥajjāj's *khuṭbas*, see Oseni 1994. See text of his famous *khuṭba* in Appendix.

105 See text in Appendix.

of Medina. The early Qadarī ascetic al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī[106] (d. 110/728) and the Muʿtazila leader[107] Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ[108] (d. 131/748) gave sermons skirting overt politics (interestingly, Wāṣil delivered only *rāʾ*-less *khuṭba*s, as he could not pronounce that letter.) Proto-Shiʿite ʿAlid leaders included al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī, who delivered moving orations to his supporters and enemies in Kerbala. His grandson, Zayd b. ʿAlī, was likewise a powerful orator.[109] Anti-establishment commanders, such as al-Mukhtār al-Thaqafī (d. 67/687), urged revenge for the killing of al-Ḥusayn.

As mentioned earlier, female soothsayers had delivered *khuṭba*s in the *jāhiliyya*, but no women among the tribal nobility appear to have done so. In contrast, in early Islam, women from prominent religio-political families are reported to have delivered public *khuṭba*s in exceptional circumstances. Among them is an extraordinarily strong and eloquent *khuṭba* by Fāṭima (d. 11/632), daughter of the Prophet and wife of ʿAlī, delivered from behind a curtain to Abū Bakr and the assembled Companions defending her husband's greater right to the caliphate, and claiming her own inheritance of the lands of Fadak from her father.[110] ʿĀʾisha (d. 58/678), widow of the Prophet and daughter of Abū Bakr, delivered several *khuṭba*s in Medina defending her father, and later, instigating the populace against ʿAlī before and during the Battle of the Camel.[111] Zaynab (d. 62/682) and Umm Kulthūm (d. ca. 65/685), daughters of ʿAli, delivered a number of bitter, threatening *khuṭba*s to the Umayyad governor and caliph after the martyrdom of their brother al-Ḥusayn in Kerbala.[112]

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106 On al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's life and legacy, see Mourad 2006. See text of his famous *khuṭba* in Appendix.

107 For a study of a Muʿtazilite *khuṭba*, see van Ess 1983.

108 See text in Appendix.

109 See oration by Zayd b. ʿAlī in al-Naḥḥās, *ʿUmdat al-kātib*, 400.

110 See text in Appendix.

111 Cf. texts of ʿĀʾisha's *khuṭba* in Ṣafwat 1933 1:207-10, #73, 74; after al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*; al-Ḥuṣrī, *Zahr al-ādāb*; al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*. Some *khuṭbas* by her also in Ṭayfūr, *Balāghāt al-nisāʾ*, 35-53.

112 Cf. text of Zaynab's *khuṭba* in Appendix; her biography in Qutbuddin 2005b. See Umm Kulthūm's *khuṭba* in Ṣafwat 1933 2:134-6, #123, after Ṭayfūr, *Balāghāt al-nisāʾ*, 74-7.

During the Abbasid, Fatimid,[113] and Spanish Umayyad[114] periods, and forward through modern times, as mentioned earlier, the term *khuṭba* came to denote solely the ritual Friday/Eid *khuṭba*.[115] Although the Fatimid caliphs continued to deliver the Friday/Eid *khuṭba* themselves,[116] the Abbasid caliphs gradually handed over the responsibility of delivering the Friday *khuṭba* to an officially appointed preacher, and the word *khaṭīb* came to indicate him exclusively. Hand in hand with this shift in denotation, the focus of later scholars writing about the "*khuṭba*" came to dwell squarely on the ritual sermon, in stark contrast to the contextually and thematically eclectic presentations of earlier scholars, such as al-Jāḥiẓ and Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih. The earliest *fiqh* manuals had already dealt in detail with the content and form of the ritual *khuṭba*, but now, model (ritual) *khuṭba* works were composed, such as the one by the Aleppo preacher Ibn Nubāta al-Khaṭīb (d. 374/984-5),[117] as were *mawāʿiẓ* (pious counsel) works such as the one by al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144).[118] In the appointment letter of a judge (who was also presumably to fill the office of the Friday *khaṭīb*), the late Fatimid chancery scribe al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil (d. 596/1200) described the "*khuṭabāʾ*" as "knights of the pulpits, tongues of assemblies, interpreters of feelings, imāms of prayer-gatherings, and ambassadors of hearts."[119] In the course of his praise, he went on to outline common expectations from them: eloquence, good articulation, emotive arousal skills, dignified demeanor, and, above all, the art of effective moral counseling.[120] Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār laid out dos and don'ts in his full-blown *adab al-khaṭīb* work, whose high level of prescriptive detail demonstrates the increasingly rigid thematic and formal parameters of the ritual *khuṭba*.

Despite the takeover of the term *khuṭba* by the ritual *khuṭba*, many other earlier categories persisted under a different name. At some

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113 Cf. forthcoming monograph on the Fatimid *khuṭba* by Paul Walker.

114 On Andalusian sermons, see Jones 2004.

115 Numerous collections have been published of modern Friday/Eid *khuṭbas*. See for example, Azharite scholars 1986, topically organized model *khuṭbas*); Khayyāṭ [1968] (collection of sermons delivered in Mecca).

116 Cf. Mez 1937, 319; after al-Maqrīzī, *al-Khiṭaṭ*; and al-Suyūṭī, *Ḥusn al-muḥāḍara*.

117 Ibn Nubāta, *Dīwān Khuṭab Ibn Nubāta* (including the sermons of his son Abū Ṭāhir).

118 al-Zamakhsharī, *Aṭwāq al-dhahab fī l-mawāʿiẓ wa-l-khuṭab*.

119 al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, 10:432.

120 Ibid., 10:433.

point, the *khuṭba* of pious counsel lost the appellation "*khuṭba*" and came to be progressively represented by the term "*waʿẓ*" (rather than "*khuṭba* of *waʿẓ*"). The change was not solely in name, for many of the formal requirements of the *khuṭba*, including its official nature, and the orator's standing on a pulpit or high place, also ceased to apply. Side by side with the official ritual *khuṭba*, the new sit-down *waʿẓ* developed as a non-ritual, semi-official branch of preaching, with its own set of regulations and features, until the Seljuks institutionalized the position of the *wāʿiẓ* (preacher) at the Niẓāmiyya in 5th/11th century Baghdad.[121] Perhaps the most famous *wāʿiẓ* of the later Abbasid period was the Ḥanbalite Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1097), who preached abundantly to large audiences up to a reported number of 300,000 (*sic*) listeners, and also wrote copious model *waʿẓ* texts in full rhyme.[122] A parallel oral genre of storytelling that existed in the Umayyad period and enjoyed high visibility in late Abbasid times was promulgated by the *qāṣṣ*, a popular (as opposed to scholarly) preacher.[123] However, the related verbal noun *qaṣaṣ* (and its verb *qaṣṣa ʿalā*) might have been used much earlier to mean a *khuṭba*; the term occurs in Ṭabarī's *Taʾrīkh* of the year 76H to denote what appears to be an oration by the Khārijite Ṣāliḥ b. Musarriḥ. To complicate matters still further, Ṭabarī relates that this *qaṣaṣ [=khuṭba]* was sent by a man named Qubayṣa b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān to some fellow Khārijites in written form (*kitāb*).[124] The religio-political *khuṭba* also persisted after the end of the Umayyad period, and we see it today in the speeches of modern Arab leaders who consistently invoke Islam in the validation of their policies;[125] the term *khiṭāb*, rather than *khuṭba*, is generally used for these. Similarly, the marriage *khuṭba* (exceptionally, still called by that name) continues to be pronounced across the world.

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[121] Cf. Radtke and Jansen, "Wāʿiẓ," in: *EI²*. A biographical work on preachers is Ibn al-Jawzī's (d. 597/1201) *Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ wa-l-mudhakkirīn*. On the origins of the institutions of *qāṣṣ* and *wāʿiẓ*, see Berkey 2001, 22-35.

[122] Ibn al-Jawzī divided the sit-down *waʿẓ* into four segments: 1) the *khuṭba*, a stylized *taḥmīd*, in the sense of the ornate prelude mentioned earlier; 2) the *waʿẓ* or *tadhkīr*, pious counsel or contemplation of mortality; 3) the *qiṣṣa*, or story; and 4) the *khawātim*, verses of poetry used to end the session. Cf. Swartz 1999, Hartmann 1987-8; Seidensticker 1998.

[123] Cf. Pellat, "Ḳāss," in: *EI²*.

[124] al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 6:216 (year 76H), *The Marwānid Restoration*, 22:33. I thank Professor Rowson for bringing this denotation to my notice.

[125] Cf. collected speeches of the late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt 1971.

In this way, the manifold types of religious, political, religio-political, and civic orations developed through the pre-Islamic and early Islamic eras. Some forms died out, others changed or fused, and new forms emerged, until, from the Abbasid period forward, a new nomenclature evolved.

V. *Characteristics: Structure, Setting, and Style*

There was a noticeable degree of evolution in the structure, setting, and style of the oration, as generation after generation of orators exhibited new sensibilities of literary taste, as well as changing social, religious, and political mores. Key impulses to change were the coming of the new religion of Islam, the shifting political climate from a tribal to an imperial setting, and most significantly, the gradual transformation of the literary culture from a primarily oral to a primarily written one. While some features such as direct address and public audience persisted, others, such as spontaneous improvisation, the use of Qurʾānic and poetic quotations, and the format of the praise introduction, were modified.

Data about the characteristics of the oration have to be gleaned from here and there. In contrast to their expositions on poetry[126] and chancery prose, medieval Arabic literary critics did not present a systematic, normative exposé of oratory. However, their works contain comments pertinent to the subject. Al-Jāḥiẓ's long exposition in the *Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, in his typically rambling style, is probably the fullest.[127] Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih in his anthology *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*,[128] and Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm, in his chancery manual *al-Burhān fī wujūh al-bayān*,[129] also offer brief analytical remarks. Morever, the *khuṭba* texts themselves, along with adjacent anecdotes and comments, yield relevant information, both about expectations from an orator, and the standard features of a *khuṭba*.

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126 On medieval Arabic poetics, see ʿAbbās 1986.

127 See index entry on *khaṭāba* in al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 4:107-8.

128 Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*, introduction of chapter titled "*Kitāb al-Wāsiṭa fī al-khuṭab*," 4:51-3.

129 Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm, *al-Burhān*, 191-216.

Table 2: Structure, Setting, and Style of the Early *Khuṭba*

Period	*Structure*	*Setting*	*Style*
Pre-Islamic (circa last quarter of 6th c.-610)	Fixed format: 1. Probable praise formula (*taḥmīd*). 2. "… and after that" phrase (*ammā baʿd*). 3. Body of *khuṭba*.	1. Large public audience. 2. Orally delivered. 3. Delivered standing from high ground, or back of camel (except marriage *khuṭba*); facing the audience. 4. Official setting.	Extemporaneously composed. Aimed to persuade. Features included: 1. Rhythm: strong parallelism (*izdiwāj*), assonance (*muwāzana*), and repetition (*takrār*); brief sentences; sporadic rhyme (*sajʿ*); some paronomasia (*jinās*) and antithesis (*ṭibāq*). 2. Audience engagement: direct address; oaths and other emphatic structures and exclamations; rhetorical questions; imperatives. 3. Imagery of the desert, animals, and cosmos (both metaphorical and literal) 4. Citations of poetry. 5. Formal language; simple syntax and vocabulary.
Muḥammad (610-632)	Same as above, plus: 4. Military instructions at end of ritual *khuṭba* (sometimes). 5. Prayer (including asking God for forgiveness).	Same as above, plus: 3. Also delivered from ad hoc pulpit (*minbar*).	Same as above, plus: 4. Qurʾān citations.
Early caliphs (632-661)	Same as above, plus: 1. Praise formula modified to include Islamic creed of faith. 5. Prayer for forgiveness often used the phrase: "I say these words and beg forgiveness from God for myself and for all believing men and women."	Same as above.	Same as above.
Umayyad (661-749)	Same as above, plus: 5. Prayer for caliph introduced at end of ritual *khuṭba*, and, less consistently, cursing of enemies.	Same as above, plus: 3. Permanent pulpit in mosque.	Same as above.

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Period	*Structure*	*Setting*	*Style*
Later--Abbasid forward (749 ff.)	Same as above.	Same as above.	Often composed in writing prior to delivery, or prepared based on model *khuṭba*s. 1. Longer sentences; more *sajʿ*, often completely rhymed; more *jinās*. 3. Imagery/vocabulary no longer of desert and animals. 4. More Qurʾān quotations; fewer citations of poetry.

The format of the oration became gradually established during early Islamic times.[130] By the end of the Umayyad period, the *khuṭba* always began with a formulaic *taḥmīd* introduction, which generally encompassed most or all of the following:[131] the name (*basmala*) and praise (*ḥamdala*) of God;[132] the double testimonial (*shahāda*), that "there is no god but God and Muḥammad is the Messenger of God"; glorification of God (*subḥāna*) and an entreaty for His aid (*istiʿāna*); and invocation of blessings upon the Prophet (*ṣalawāt*).

The essential nature of the *taḥmīd*, particularly the naming and praising of God, is underscored by the Muslims' coining of the negative term "maimed oration" (*khuṭba batrāʾ*) for the anomalous *khuṭba* that opened without it, an epithet given to Ziyād's famous Basran *khuṭba*, which begins directly with the address "O people of Iraq."[133]

The *taḥmīd* was followed by the phrase *ammā baʿd* ("… and after that"), or, more rarely and only in pre-Islamic times, by a simple *thumma* ("then"). According to some reports, Quss was the first orator to have used *ammā baʿd.*[134] Later, the use of this oratorical phrase

[130] Cf. *taḥmīd* openings of Muḥammad's *khuṭbas* in Ṣafwat 1934 3:361, after Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*; see also al-Naḥḥās, *ʿUmdat al-Kātib*, pp. 344-5. Cf. openings of ʿAlī's *khuṭbas* in al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 222, 358-9, 388, #100, 111, 176, 188.

[131] For details of the evolution and role of the *taḥmīd* formula in Arabic literature, see forthcoming doctoral thesis by Aziz Qutbuddin, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

[132] In a boast situation (*munāfara* or *mufākhara*), the *khaṭīb* often used the divine praise formula to introduce praise of his own tribe (cf. Ṣafwat 1933 1:163-4 #17).

[133] al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 2:6.

[134] Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba*, 7:254, #7334. The *ammā baʿd* phrase is also attributed to the prophet David, in one explanation of the Qurʾānic phrase *faṣl al-khiṭāb* (Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab*, *kh-ṭ-b*).

following the prefatory *taḥmīd* became *de rigueur* in epistolography as well.

The existence of the transition phrase in pre-Islamic times may be taken as an indication that the Islamic *taḥmīd* formula had a precursor therein, in the form of a formulaic opening of sorts, perhaps even a *taḥmīd*. We cannot be sure of this, because rather than full orations, only parts of pre-Islamic *khuṭba*s survive, and the preserved pieces, with one exception, lack a formulaic opening. The *khuṭba* pronounced by Abū Ṭālib at Muḥammad's marriage to Khadīja before the coming of Islam represents the only surviving example of a pre-Islamic *taḥmīd* (and it might not be genuine). But if there was an *ammā baʿd* (what comes after), there must have been an *ammā qabl* (what comes before). The pre-Islamic *taḥmīd* probably invoked the pagan gods, and was, in consequence, deliberately excised by early Muslims.

The *ammā baʿd* phrase was followed by a phrase of direct address to the audience, and often by instructions to the audience to listen. The main body of the *khuṭba* followed, and it contained different themes, depending on the occasion, including moral counsel, exhortations to battle, other political issues, or legal maxims. Ritual *khuṭba*s of early Islam often contained military instructions towards their end. The *khuṭba* often concluded with prayer (*duʿāʾ*) for the orator, the audience, and all Muslims,[135] in some variation of the phrase "I say these words and beg forgiveness from God for myself and for all believing men and women" (*aqūlu qawlī hādhā wa-astaghfiru llāha lī wa-li-jamīʿ al-muʾminīna wa-l-muʾmināt*.)[136] In later times, the supplication also included a prayer for the caliph's long life. The naming of the caliph (e.g., Fatimid vs. Abbasid) publicly proclaimed the townspeople's allegiance, making the final segment of the *khuṭba* an important religio-political implement.[137] Ibn Khaldūn (d. 780/1378) reports that ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, who was ʿAlī's governor in Basra, was the first to include this formula, saying in his orations, "O God, help ʿAlī, who represents the truth!"[138] Also,

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[135] Cf. endings of *khuṭbas* by Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿAbd al-Malik, in Ṣafwat 1934 3:361; after Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*.

[136] Cf. ending of Abū Bakr's *khuṭba*, in Ṣafwat 1933 1:180; from al-Ḥuṣrī, *Zahr al-ādāb*. Cf. also ending of ʿĀʾisha's *khuṭba* in Ṣafwat 1933 1:209, #73; after al-Qalaqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*.

[137] Cf. Ali 1979.

[138] Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*, 2:71.

the final segment occasionally included curses upon the enemies of the state. The Umayyads used to curse (*al-laʿn* or *al-sabb*) ʿAlī in their *khuṭba*s.[139] Later, the Fatimids publicly cursed the Umayyads.

The fixed structure of the *khuṭba* worked to the advantage of the orator by setting up and fulfilling expectations in the audience.

Significant aspects of the setting of the early *khuṭba* are: public audience, oral delivery, official nature, and (physically) high placement of the *khaṭīb*.

The audience of the *khuṭba* was a general, public one. Any person from the community, regardless of social standing or gender, could attend. However, a significant segment of the audience was composed of men with religious, social, political, and military weight. In many cases, the phrase "*al-ṣalātu jāmiʿa,*" literally meaning "Ritual prayer gathers," was proclaimed loudly to gather people for a *khuṭba*, either by the orator himself or an aide.[140] According to Ibn Saʿd,[141] the phrase was originally used as a call for the ritual prayer; when the *adhān* replaced it, its own use shifted to collecting all the people around to listen to a *khuṭba*. The open spaces outside the dwelling areas, and later the mosque, were used to deliver *khuṭba*s, and both were public spaces. The sources tell us that at its largest, the audience could number in the thousands (probably a rare occurrence). Muḥammad's audience for his sermon on Mount ʿArafāt during his last pilgrimage was enormous, according to some reports, ten thousand, when most of the Muslims of the Arabian Peninsula are said to have attended. Although the orator presumably had a bold voice, clear diction, and mastery over the art of voice projection, one wonders how such huge audiences could have heard the speaker. These numbers are probably not meant to be taken literally—historians

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139 Cf. the following records of the Umayyads' cursing of ʿAlī: al-Muʾayyad al-Shīrāzī, *al-Majālis al-Muʾayyadiyya*, 3:119, # 227; Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-buldān*, 3:191 ("Sijistān"); verse by Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī re. ʿAlī, in Muḥammad al-Samāwī, *al-Ṭalīʿa min shuʿarāʾ al-shīʿa*, bio. #157, retrieved from the *alwaraq* internet site: "Do you curse him on the pulpit, when it was by his sword that its planks were erected for you?" أ على المنابر تعلنون لسبه – وبسيفه نصبت لكم أعوادها ; al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, *al-Majālis wa-al-musāyarāt*, 176.

140 Cf. *khuṭba* of Muʿāwiya II, in al-Ṭabari, *Taʾrīkh*, 5:530; a search of the phrase on the alwaraq website yields 255 hits in 79 different classical texts, including early works of Ibn Saʿd, al-Wāqidī, and al-Balādhurī.

141 Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt, "Dhikr al-Adhān*."

could have used them to emphasize the large size of an audience. But several reports explain how such a vast audience could indeed be addressed satisfactorily; they point out that a second, loud-voiced person often stood by the orator, or at a short distance from him, and repeated his words to the farther audience. Rabīʿa b. Umayya b. Khalaf, a Companion who possessed a resounding voice, stood just below the neck of Muḥammad's camel to thus broadcast the pilgrimage *khuṭba*.[142] Reports of similar broadcasting appear in later Ḥadīth dictation assemblies, in which one or two people would relay the lecture at intervals to those sitting at a distance from the professor.[143]

The orator addressed his audience directly. Accordingly, a pleasing physical appearance and a powerful manner of delivery were essential to the effectiveness of his presentation. Medieval critics discussed at some length the expected demeanor of the orator while delivering the *khuṭba*, as well as desirable physical traits. Al-Jāḥiẓ, for example, praised loud voice, wide mouth, and stillness of deportment.[144] He deplored trembling, excessive sweating, and missing teeth,[145] and disapproved of coughing and blowing one's nose.[146] Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm added to the list of disapproved physical expressions playing with one's beard, as well as hemming and hawing.[147]

The stylized government epistle (*risāla*) that appeared in the late Umayyad period was composed in writing, but influenced in part by the oral oration, and adopting some of its functions, it was likewise delivered orally to a large public audience. So was the appointment letter (*taqlīd*). The oral delivery was probably more efficient in ensuring the message reached the populace, which was still largely unlettered.

Other than the marriage *khuṭba*, which was delivered sitting down, the orator maintained a physically higher position vis-à-vis the audience. He stood on a rise or mound in the ground, on an ad hoc pulpit facing the audience,[148] or sat on the back of a camel (or a horse

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142 Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 4:448.
143 Cf. al-Samʿānī (d. 562/1166), *Methodik des Diktatkollegs*.
144 al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:58-64, 120-3, 127, 132-3.
145 Ibid., 1:134.
146 Ibid., 1:40.
147 Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm, *al-Burhān*, 213.
148 Cf. al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 1:120-1; al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:118, 1:333; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha,* 2:76.

in battle).[149] Besides enabling the audience to better see and hear the speaker, this bodily elevation could have symbolized the elevated status of the orator. Exceptionally while delivering his last *khuṭba*, because of his illness, Muḥammad sat down on the pulpit.[150] According to al-Qalqashandī, Muʿāwiya was the first to routinely preach seated because "his fat increased."[151] The expression "*qāma khaṭīban*" (he stood up orating), which is common in the medieval historical and literary sources, indicates that a standing position was typical for the orator (except when he sat on his mount, of course).[152] The earliest sermons were delivered from the location of the prayer-leader/preacher's place of prayer (*muṣallā*) standing in front of and facing the congregation, without being higher than them, or just slightly raised. Muḥammad's pulpit in Medina was said to be two or three steps high, which was increased in the early Umayyad period to six.[153] According to al-Qalqashandī, Tamīm al-Dārī built the first pulpit for the Prophet, having seen the church pulpits of Syria.[154] According to other reports, Marwān (r. 64-5/684-5) may have been the first to build a permanent pulpit.[155]

The setting of the *khuṭba* was in all cases a formal, official one. As mentioned earlier, the political and religio-political speech provided a vehicle for tribal or state policy from the earliest times, and was delivered only on momentous or catastrophic occasions. In the case of apolitical sermons of pious counsel, the setting was still formal and serious, and the orator a person of spiritual authority, whether endowed with political weight or not. In all cases, unwritten regulations regarding silence and close attention of the audience prevailed. The location of *khuṭba* delivery from the pulpit of the mosque also lent it authority. Another visual symbol of the orator's authority was the

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149 Cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:309, 3:7; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*, 4:117.

150 Ṣafwat 1933 1:158, #14; after al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil.*

151 al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, 1:421.

152 Cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 2:55.

153 Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār, *Adab al-khaṭīb*, 208.

154 al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, 1:421.

155 Cf. Wensinck, "Khuṭba," in: *EI²*. Wensinck does not indicate his primary source, which is probably Muslim's chapter on "Going to the prayer-place in the two Eids" in the *Ṣaḥiḥ*, the source he cites for statements before and after this. Muslim's chapter does contain a reference to Marwān building a pulpit of bricks and clay for the Eid prayer; although the report admits of the possibility of Marwān's being the first to build a permanent pulpit, the wording is ambiguous.

staff or sword upon which he leaned during the *khuṭba*. Quss is said to have been the first to preach leaning on a sword or staff (or mounted on a camel).[156] The pre-Islamic judge supposedly also did the same. Muḥammad is said to have leaned on a staff during the Friday *khuṭba*, and on a sword during *khuṭba*s delivered in battle.[157] The custom prevailed in al-Jāḥiẓ's time (and later as well), and he defended it, citing the Qurʾānic examples of Solomon and Moses.[158]

The early Arabic *khuṭba* displayed five kinds of literary characteristics:[159] (1) heavy use of brief, parallel sentences, and repeated phrases, as well as the sporadic utilization of rhyme (*sajʿ*)—which yielded a strong rhythm in the *khuṭba* and facilitated its comprehension; (2) frequent direct address, emphatic structures, and rhetorical questions—which engaged the audience in the speech act; (3) vivid imagery to portray abstractions as observable, desert phenomena—which gave physical form to theoretical concepts; (4) citation of Qurʾanic and poetic verses—which anchored the orator's words in the sacred or semi-sacred literature of pre and early Islam, bestowing divine or semi-divine authority to them; and (5) employment of dignified yet simple language—which rendered the oration formal and made it understandable to its public audience.

The consistent, almost relentless use of the first feature of parallelism (*izdiwāj*), in which two or more adjacent phrases, clauses, or sentences, show identical or near identical syntax, is one of the most conspicuous features of the early Arabic *khuṭba*.[160] Additionally, parallel phrases commonly display repetition (*takrār*) of expressions, which added emphasis and created a refrain. Parallel clauses were also concise, mostly limited to two to four words. (Non-parallel clauses were usually brief too, but not as consistently as parallel ones.) Parallelism

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156 Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba*, 7:254, #7345; al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, 1:421.

157 Ibn Māja (d. 273/887), *Sunan*, section on "*iqāma*" from internet Ḥadīth site; Abū Dāʾūd (d. 275/889), *Sunan*, section on "*ṣalāh*," from same.

158 al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 3:28. Elsewhere, he says in a tongue-in-cheek assessment that if the *khaṭīb* used a staff, it was a sure sign that the *khuṭba* would be long.

159 Cf. discussions of the characteristics of the *khuṭba* in some of the Arabic monographs, such as al-Ḥāwī 1970, 53-64, and literary analyses of particular *khuṭbas*; al-Ḥūfī 1972, 5-38, 146-205; Shalabī 1983, 23-60; Dähne 2001, 141-210.

160 Cf. Beeston 1983, 180-5; O'Connor 1993, 877-9; Dähne 2001, 179-88; Scheindlin 1974. For a detailed linguistic analysis of parallelism in Arabic literature, see Johnstone 1991.

was often combined with the use of rhyme (*sajʿ*), paronomasia (*jinās*), and assonance (*muwāzana*). The critic Abū Hilāl directs "writers" of (*risāla*s and) *khuṭba*s (sic) to focus on parallelism, and not to force rhyme.[161] An example of parallelism is an oration by Abū Ṭālib, in which, after advising reverence for the Kaʿba, he explains his reasons for this counsel in the following three syntactically parallel lines "*faʾinna fīhā marḍātan li-r-rabb, wa-qiwāman li-l-maʿāsh, wa-thabātan li-l-waṭʾa*." (Indeed, in it is pleasure for the Lord, stability for livehood, and pacification for violence.)[162] In each of these three phrases we observe a *maṣdar* in the accusative case, followed by the particle "*li*", followed by a noun.

Syntactical parallelism was sometimes enhanced by the use of either synonymous or antithetical pairs (*ṭibāq*). The subcategory of synonymous parallelism can be observed in the many orations with two or more adjacent phrases of almost the same meaning. This type of parallelism, in which the second, parallel phrase echoed the first, displayed rhetorical skill. More practically, as mentioned earlier, it also facilitated aural comprehension. For if the audience did not catch the first sentence, they would probably grasp the second, and they would thus be able to follow along. An example is the following set of lines in an oration by ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, in which he said, describing a dying man's last thoughts, "*yufakkiru fīma afnā ʿumrah, wa-fīma adhhaba dahrah*."[163] (He thinks about the things he used up his life [doing], and squandered his allotted span [achieving].) Synonymous pairs here are: *afnā* (spent)/*adhhaba* (squandered); *ʿumrah* (his life)/*dahrah* (his span); note that the two phrases also rhyme in "*r*." The parallel structure can be presented as *fīma* +verb+direct-object+pronoun suffix.

Antithetical parallelism can be observed in the many orations that have two adjacent phrases of opposite meaning. An example is the set of opening lines in the oration of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, in which he addressed the "son of Adam," "*al-thawāʾu hāhunā qalīl*, *wa-l-baqāʾu hunāka ṭawīl*."[164] (Residence here is short, and remaining there is long.) The antithetical pairs here are: *hāhunā* (here)/*hunāka* (there); *qalīl* (little, i.e., short)/*ṭawīl* (long); the parallel words either share a

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161 Abū Hilāl, *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 165.

162 Ṣafwat 1933 1:161, #161; after al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-arab*. Here and in the following example, the translation is literal, to mirror parallelism in Arabic text.

163 al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 239, #108.

164 See text in Appendix.

morphological pattern (*thawāʾ* and *baqāʾ*; *qalīl* and *ṭawīl*), or a deictic element (*hunā*); note also the rhyme in "*l*." Overall, the layered parallelistic construction of the early Arabic oration endowed it with a compelling, rhythmic cadence.

The rhythmic, crisp, concise, and eloquent nature of the *khuṭba* phrases produced many proverbs (*amthāl*). Therefore, many of the extant *khuṭba*s survive in etiologies of proverb collections.[165] Even modern Arabic proverbs might have their roots in the pre-Islamic *khuṭba*: for example, the Egyptian colloquial proverb "*illī māt fāt*" (He who dies is lost [forever]) was perhaps influenced by Quss's identical phrase in classical Arabic: *man māta fāt*.

Regarding the feature of rhyming prose *(sajʿ)*—in which the last word of two or more succeeding sentences, clauses, or phrases, contained the same consonant—the early *khuṭba* used it only sporadically.[166] The intermittent and unforced usage of *sajʿ* kept the pre-Islamic and early Islamic *khuṭba* relatively unstylized. Usually, two or three consecutive phrases would be rhymed, after which the rhyme would either cease, or be replaced in the next few lines with a different rhyme letter. In most types of orations, the full *khuṭba* was never rhymed. The use of *sajʿ* abounded only in the formulaic *taḥmīd* preface of the *khuṭba*. An example is the oration by Muḥammad delivered to the Quraysh upon the conquest of Mecca. Four of the five opening clauses describing God, end in the letter "*d*" with the pronoun suffix "*h[ū]*" (note also the full parallelism in clauses three and four, followed by the partial parallelism of clause five): "*lā ilāha illa ʿllāhu waḥdah, lā sharīka lah, ṣadaqa waʿdah, wa-naṣara ʿabdah, wa-hazama l-aḥzāba waḥdah*." (There is no god but God, one; He fulfilled his promise; aided his servant; and defeated the confederates, alone).[167] Pre-Islamic sermons of pious counsel sometimes used full *sajʿ* in their early segments, if these segments referred to natural phenomena. Such prefaces usually led to the affirmation of a Creator, and a reminder of coming death. (Examples follow in the paragraph on natural imagery).

One type of early *khuṭba* was entirely *sajʿ*-focused and usually fully rhymed, namely, the pre-Islamic rhymed prose of the soothsay-

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165 Cf. Ṣafwat 1933 1:43, 65-6, #25, 42-3.

166 There is significant overlap between the *sajʿ* of the early *khuṭba* and Qurʾānic *sajʿ*; a detailed analysis of the latter is Stewart 1990.

167 See text in Appendix.

ers, the *sajʿ al-kuhhān*. An example is the following warning to the Banū al-Ḥārith by their *kāhin* not to fight the tribe of Tamīm, in a seven-line rhymed (and parallel) pronouncement, with the first six ending in the "*b*" rhyme "*ābā*": "*innakum tasīrūna aʿqābā, wa-taghzūna aḥbābā, Saʿdan wa-Rabābā, wa-taridūna miyāhan jibābā, fa-talqawna ʿalayhā ḍirābā, wa-takūnu ghanīmatukum turābā.*"[168] (Indeed, you will walk one after the other; fight loved ones; [the clans of] Saʿd and Rabāb; come to water at deep, full wells; then meet upon them battle-thrusts; your booty will be dirt.) The preface of these *kāhin* pronouncements was mostly in the form of oaths by natural objects and phenomena (examples follow in paragraph on nature imagery).

More common than *sajʿ* was assonance or balance (*muwāzana*), meaning rough rhyme similarity, in which vowel sounds resembled each other in the last words of the sentence, clause, or phrase, with changes in the intervening consonants. Assonance was often created through morphological balance. One example is found in a speech by al-Nuʿmān b. Mundhir: "*...maʿa maʿrifatihimi l-ashyāʾ, wa-ḍarbihim li-l-amthāl, wa-iblāghihim fi ṣ-ṣifāt, mā laysa li-shayʾin min alsinati l-ajnās.*"[169] (…along with [the Arabs'] knowledge of things, their citing of proverbs, and their accuracy in descriptions, which is not found in the tongues of [other] races). The assonance is created by the words *ashyāʾ, amthāl, ṣifāt,* and *ajnās* occuring at the end of four successive phrases; they all have a long *ā* sound before their final consonants, which differ: *ʿ, l, t,* and *s*. Three of the four words (all except *ṣifāt*) are also morphologically identical, being broken plurals in the form *afʿāl*.

The second large category of the *khuṭba*'s persuasive literary techniques is represented by the devices it used to encode the live audience into its linguistic format.[170] The most obvious of these was direct address, *de rigueur*, and used throughout the oration. The term

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[168] Ṣafwat 1933 1:80, #53; after Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*; Abū al-Faraj, *al-Aghānī*. Note that the next line, the seventh and last, does not rhyme: "*faʾaṭīʿū amrī wa-lā taghzū Tamīmā*." (So obey my command and do not fight Tamīm).

[169] Ibid., 1:52, #31.

[170] Cf. comments to that effect by Jones 2005, 42: "The ultimate aim of the sermon was to elicit audience response (conversion, repentance, *jihād*, etc.), and thus one must be attuned to the rhetorical and narrative devices the preacher uses towards this end."

khuṭba and its derivatives all tapped into the root meaning of direct address, which was particularly visible at the commencement of each new thematic section and served as a section marker. The orator addressed the audience in the second person plural, in the vocative (*nidāʾ*) form. Sometimes he overtly used the particle (*ḥarf al-nidāʾ*); at other times, he implied it. He usually used the masculine gender in the plural form, often to encompass both sexes. The address was sometimes to all people (O people)—generic forms of address include (*nās* and *qawm*) words: "*ayyuhā al-nās*," "*yā ayyuhā al-nās*," "*maʿāshir al-nās*";[171] at other times, the address was to Muslims "*maʿāshir al-muslimīn*," and servants of God "*ʿibāda llāh;*"[172] at yet other times, the address was to the people of a particular country or town, "*yā ahl al-ʿIrāq*" (O people of Iraq!) and "*yā ahl al-Madīna*" (O people of Medina!).[173] Sometimes, a single person could be the overt addressee, with a larger secondary audience present, particularly in the *munāfara* debates and addresses to kings and caliphs. In such a circumstance, that single person was addressed by name, as in Zaynab's address to Yazīd, and Fāṭima's address to Abū Bakr.

After the address, the orator often directed the audience to listen, bend ears and hearts, and pay heed. Examples abound in the orations of pre-Islamic Maʾmūn al-Ḥārithī, who said "Heed me with your ears!" (*arʿūnī asmāʿakum*),[174] and Quss, who said "Listen and retain!" (*ismaʿū wa-ʿū*),[175] as well as Islamic orators such as Muḥammad, who said "Listen to me, so that I may explain to you!" (*ismaʿū minnī ubayyin lakum*).[176]

The orator would often refer to himself in the first grammatical person. Alternatively, he used the third grammatical person, often, but not always, in an oath format. Quss says of himself, "Quss swears an oath by God …"[177] Other examples are found in several orations by Muḥammad, in which he says "I bear witness that Muḥammad is [God's] servant and His messenger,"[178] "… He who prays [for God

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171 Cf. al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 157, 222, 357, 385, #79, 100, 174, 186.
172 Ibid., 139, 315, #65, 155.
173 Ibid., 144, #70; Ṣafwat 1933 2:469.
174 Ṣafwat 1933, 1:39, #22.
175 Ibid., 1:38, #21.
176 Ibid., 1:156, #13.
177 Ibid., 1:38, #21.
178 Ibid., 1:155, #13.

to] bless Muḥammad…,"[179] and "By Him, in whose hands Muḥammad's soul lies."[180] ʿUmar proclaimed in one speech: "Suffice ʿUmar as a grievous affair, [his] awaiting of … the Reckoning…"[181] One of ʿAlī's orations has the following reference to himself: "By the [God] in whose hands lies the life of Abū Ṭālib's son…"[182]

The orator also encouraged the audience's involvement with numerous emphatic structures. He applied the *nūn al-tawkīd* to the end of verbs, the *lām* of emphasis to the beginning of verbs, and the particles *inna* (Verily!) and *alā* (Lo!) to the beginning of sentences.[183] He also interjected into sentences fervent exclamations such as "*hayhāt*" (Far be it!) and "*qabbaḥakumu llāh*" (May God disfigure you!). In an eleven line oration of ʿAlī, no less than seven sentences begin with *alā* (Lo!), the first of which runs "Lo! Today is the day for preparing [the horses], and tomorrow is the race."[184] In a protracted use of the emphatic *nūn* and *lā* (combined with some graphic similes and strong parallelism) al-Ḥajjāj threatened his recalcitrant Iraqi subjects, saying: "I shall skin you (*la-alḥuwannakum*) as I would skin a rod. I shall strike you (*la-aqraʾannakum*) as I would strike a flint. I shall wrap you up (*la-uʿṣibannakum*) as I would wrap a *salama* tree. I shall beat you (*la-aḍribannakum*) as I would beat alien camels."[185] Orators also incorporated strong oaths, such as the following pronouncement by the female soothsayer Zabrāʾ: "By the sky-wind blowing, by the night pitch-dark, by the morning shining forth, by the star night-rising, by the white rain-cloud pouring…"[186]

Yet another device the orator used to encourage audience engagement was questioning. Sometimes, the orator asked of the audience real questions and they responded with short answers such as "Yes, by God" (*allāhumma naʿam*). But mostly, the questions were rhetorical, with obvious answers. Rather than as a means of eliciting information, they served to emphasize. Ṭāriq b. Ziyād began his address rousing his army to fight the Andalusians by saying "Where is

179 Ibid., 1:150, #14.
180 Ibid., 1:152 #8.
181 Ibid., 1:212, #77.
182 al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 268, #122.
183 Ramaḍān 1998, 54-6.
184 al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 93-4, #28.
185 See text in Appendix.
186 Ṣafwat 1933 1:111, #68.

the escape?"[187] The answer is implied: "There is none." In sermons of pious counsel, rhetorical questions were often in the *ubi sunt* mode that emphasized the inevitability of death by asking "Where are the kings? Where are those who ruled the earth?" The obvious response would be: "They are dead. They are gone. They no longer rule." Wāṣil proclaimed "Where are the kings who built Ctesiphon? And strengthened palaces? And fortified gates? And kept masses of chamberlains? And trained purebred horses? And possessed [all] the lands? And made use of inherited cattle and slaves?—[This world] grabbed them along with their carrying litters, it crushed them with its breast, it chomped on them with its canines! …"[188]

A more direct method of persuasion was through normative, prescriptive phrases. The imperative form "Do this! Do not do that!" recurs in *khuṭba*s of all types, but most heavily in the sermon of pious counsel. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī began one oration with a string of four imperatives, in the first of which he commanded the "son of Adam," "Sell this world of yours in return for your hereafter!"[189]

The third category in the *khuṭba'*s stylistic repertoire was vivid imagery. The early oration used metaphorical expressions derived mostly from desert flora, fauna, and natural phenomena. Much of this imagery (as in early poetry) was related to animals like the camel, the horse, predatory birds and beasts, the sand-grouse, the ostrich, and the lizard. It also referred to water courses and rain/cloud formations, as well as the dry desert landscape, with its distinctive plants, its twisted sands, and winding dune-valleys. The use of these dramatic images well known to the early Arabs helped the orator bring abstractions into the realm of the immediate audio-visual. The lines of Wāṣil quoted earlier which described death as a beast that "crushed [people] with its chest, bit into them with its canines," are a clear example of animal imagery, as are the following lines of ʿAlī warning his people of brewing agitation, in which he used a camel image to drive home the urgency of his message: "Ask me! [before it is too late] … before a sedition rushes in raising its hind-foot, stepping in its nose-rein."[190] In this last example—and this is typical in

[187] See text in Appendix.
[188] See text in Appendix.
[189] See text in Appendix.
[190] al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 387, #187.

early oratory—the word camel is not used, but rather, its image is evoked by the use of words specific to it, here the words "hind-foot" and "nose-rein." Similarly, Fāṭima, in her speech, did not mention the camel directly, but used the camel-related word *al-ṭarq*, meaning water in which camels had bathed and urinated.[191]

In addition to metaphors and similes, the orator also referred to natural objects and events literally. In sermons of pious counsel, the orator commonly used images signifying the all-encompassing and all powerful character of the forces of nature, to remind his desert-dwelling nomadic audience of the inevitability of death. Quss, in his famous *khuṭba* of counsel, said: "A dark night…a bright day…a sky that has zodiacal signs…stars that shine…seas [whose waters] roar…mountains firmly anchored…an earth spread out…rivers made to flow…" The following phrases indicated to the audience his reason for mentioning these objects—to remind them of the coming of death: "Indeed, there are signs in the sky. There are lessons in the earth. What is the state of the people—going and never returning?…"[192]

These natural images also helped the orator lead his audience to affirming the necessity of the Creator of the objects. Another pre-Islamic pious counsel orator, al-Maʾmūn al-Ḥārithī, said (in full *sajʿ*) "… Indeed, in what you see is a lesson for one who would take heed. An earth, laid out…a sky, elevated…a sun, that rises and sets…a youth, dying…an old man, gone… Indeed, in [all] this is the clearest of proofs of the [existence of] the Planner, the Destiny-Writer, the Creator, the Shaper."[193]

The oaths used by the soothsayers in the preface of their pronouncements almost exclusively invoked natural objects and phenomena. This is illustrated by the earlier cited pronouncement of the *kāhina* Zabrāʾ. Most widespread were auspicious cosmic images of light and fertility, such as stars and rain, which would evoke feelings in the audience of bliss and of hopeful expectations for a bright future.[194]

The nature imagery of the soothsayers, like all their pronouncements, was rhymed, as were the nature-invoking prefaces ascribed to Quss and al-Maʾmūn cited above. It is likely that the model of the

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191 See text in Appendix.
192 See text in Appendix.
193 Ṣafwat 1933 1:39-40, #22.
194 E.g. Ṣafwat 1933, 1:78, #51.

soothsayers prompted other pre-Islamic orators, particularly those who preached pious counsel, to combine natural images and rhyme in their opening statements.

The fourth set of stylistic tools employed by the orator was the frequent citing of poetic, and later, Qurʾānic verses, and, less frequently, proverbs (the last, in this context, a component of the *khuṭba*, rather than a product as mentioned earlier). Since both poetry and the Qurʾān were beloved to the Arabs, and because the audience had large quantities of verses committed to memory, their mention evoked strong associations. The orator stacked the odds in favor of a positive response by linking his current agenda to literary instruments that were part of the audience's cherished heritage. Qurʾānic citation became particularly widespread in ritual sermons and sermons of pious counsel;[195] there are fewer quotes in political and religio-political *khuṭba*s. Gradually, the choice of Qurʾānic verses cited in the ritual sermon became quite standardized. Citation of poetry too, had been, and continued to be, a common practice in all types of *khuṭba*s. Half-lines, single lines, or two or three lines, were cited, and they occured anywhere in the oration, at the beginning, somewhere in the middle, or at the end. Examples are the multiple lines of poetry, perhaps his own, cited by Quss;[196] the single line by Suḥaym b. Wathīl al-Riyāḥī and the cluster of lines by Ruwayshid b. Ramīḍ al-ʿAnbarī cited by al-Ḥajjāj;[197] and the half verse by Imruʾ al-Qays cited by ʿAlī.[198] Although the citing of poetic verse was common in practice, the theorists and the jurists—particularly the latter, and mostly in the ritual sermon—appear to have disapproved, comparing it unfavorably with the citing of the Qurʾān.[199] Less often, proverbs were quoted. ʿAlī, for example, used in his oration the proverb: "In the morning, night-travelers will be praised."[200]

In a similar exploitation of the known and accepted, the orator connected universal themes such as the inevitability of death and the merit of honor with an immediate, particular, context, with a view to

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195 Cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 1:118; Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār, *Adab al-khaṭīb*, 128; Dähne 2001; al-Jomaih 1988.

196 See text in Appendix.

197 See text in Appendix.

198 al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 326, #158.

199 Cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1:118; Ibn al-ʿAṭṭar, *Adab al-khaṭīb*, 122.

200 al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 323, #160.

persuading the audience to action. In the many sermons of pious counsel, the abstract concept of death is always anchored in the here and now, in the reality of the audience's own mortality, as in the sermon where Muḥammad said: "O people! [You behave] as though death in this world is decreed for people other than us! … [You behave] as though the dead whose biers we carry are travelers who will soon return to us …"[201] An example of invoking honor is ʿAlī's *khuṭba* urging the Iraqis to rise up and defend their religion, their women, and their property, in which he opened his address by comparing his soldiers to women and children: "O parodies of men, not men! Minds of children and intellects of canopy-covered ones!"[202] Such an address would presumably shame the audience, galvanizing them to fulfil their knightly roles.

The fifth stylistic category of the *khuṭba* is that of its language register, where simplicity and dignity were the rule. Straightforward syntax prevailed, particularly in comparison with the more complex syntax of early poetry. The diction was at all times formal and elevated.[203] The lexicon should have been perfectly clear to the orator's contemporary audience; the scribe of the Abbasid caliph al-Mahdī is reported to have censured the use of rare words (*gharīb*) in oratory.[204] The reason the modern reader finds the early oration less accessible is that, like early poetry and the Qurʾān, it contains numerous words and idioms long since fallen out of use. An example is the following phrase in the oration of al-Ḥajjāj: "*lā yughmazu jānibayya ka-taghmāzi t-tīn*"[205] ("My sides cannot be squeezed to test for freshness like the squeezing of figs," which uses the word *taghmāz* that is here taken out of its more common context of the good health of fatty sheep, and associated with the uncommon one of squeezing figs for freshness.

The *khuṭba*'s stylistic features reflect its extemporaneous composition. In contrast to the Greek way of prior preparation and writing, the early *khuṭba* was typically generated spontaneously. The early literary anthologies and chancery manuals unanimously stressed spontaneous,

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201 Ṣafwat 1933 1:153, #9, after al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*.

202 See text in Appendix.

203 On the careful choice of vocabulary in the *khuṭba*, see Abū Hilāl, *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 64-5.

204 Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*, 4:52.

205 See text in Appendix.

natural orating. Al-Jāḥiẓ, as we saw in the anti-*shuʿūbiyya* passage cited at the beginning of this paper, lavishly praised this feature, stating that the Persians, Indians, and Greeks did not possess the art of oratory—the only people in the world with real *khuṭba*s were the Arabs, because they spoke spontaneously through inspiration without lengthy preparation. He went on to claim that no formal training was required, that orators acquired their skills by pure inspiration and osmosis.[206] Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih and Abū Hilāl cited the following remarks which also emphasized lack of artifice: "Oratory's head is a suitable natural disposition. Its backbone is practice. Its wings are the narrating of [wise] sayings. Its ornament is correct vocalization. Its splendor is the appropriate choice of words—for appeal comes with a reduction in forcedness."[207] Extemporaneity, then, according to the early critics, was the true hallmark of eloquence.

This extemporaneous composition was not of the formulaic, stock-phrase based, oral composition kind detailed by Albert Lord and Milman Parry for Homeric and Balkan epic poetry, then proposed by James Monroe and Michael Zwettler for pre-Islamic poetry (and refuted in this context by Gregor Schoeler).[208] Unlike epic poetry, the *khuṭba* did not contain a fictional, narrative sequence, nor was it metrical. However, it did reflect many of the stylistic features that one would expect from orally composed literature in general, such as short sentences, much repetition, additive rather than subordinative phrases, aggregative rather than analytic expositions, and closeness to the human lifeworld.[209]

Later, oratory became associated with the chancery (*kitāba*), and the same Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih prescribed scribal training for the orator.[210] From the Abbasid period onward, the preacher often wrote the *khuṭba* beforehand, or had someone (often a chancery official) write it for him; he then read it out on the pulpit, or memorized it and delivered it pseudo-extemporaneously. Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170-93/786-809) is said to have been the first who committed to memory sermons pre-

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206 al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 3:12-3, 27-8.

207 Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*, 4:53; Abū Hilāl, *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 64. The cited scholar is "Abū Dāʾūd"—perhaps the Basran Hadith scholar Abū Dāʾūd Sulaymān b. al-Ashʿath al-Sijistānī (d. 275/889).

208 Lord 1960; Zwettler 1978; Monroe 1972; Schoeler 1998 and 2006.

209 For details of the characteristics of primarily "orally based thought and expression," see Ong 1982, 31-76.

210 Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*, 4:52.

pared by others. His son, al-Amīn, had his teacher, the grammarian al-Aṣmaʿī, prepare for him ten model sermons.[211] At this time, many preachers began relying partially or completely on model *khuṭba*s.

VI. *Conclusion*

The *khuṭba* was a preeminent genre of early Arabic literature, with diverse functions. A reflection of these numerous functions can be found in the varied types of the oration, and its multiple characteristics. Both the types and features of the oration evolved over time, with the changing religious, political, and social milieu. The numerous manifestations of the political speech, the religio-political discourse, the sermon of pious counsel, the religious sermon, and the marriage *khuṭba* developed through pre-Islamic and early Islamic times in step with the changing lifestyle, values, and aesthetics of the increasingly Islamicate and imperialist Arabic-speaking world. The terminology was altered too, and in the Abbasid period, the word *khuṭba* came to denote almost exclusively the ritual sermon of Islam. The literary features of the oration were also modified over time, in response to the transition from an oral and spontaneous culture to an increasingly written and stylized aesthetic, and from a tribal, nomadic lifestyle to a progressively urbanized way of life.

The characteristics of the early *khuṭba*—particularly its style, but also its setting and structure—reflect its overall literary purpose: convincing the audience of the validity of a course of action, a mode of behavior, a way of thought, or a type of belief. To this end, the early oration used logical and emotive persuasion. It combined rational argumentation with the evocation of emotions like anger, shame, fear, and hope. The *khuṭba* evoked these emotions chiefly through literary techniques such as parallelism and citation of poetry, which, combined with an orator's high status and powerful delivery, rendered an oration effective. Those orators who succeeded in fully exploiting these features, the ones who took the persuasive characteristics of the oration to the heights of sophistication, were recorded in history as models of Arabic eloquence, each a brilliant orator, a *khaṭīb miṣqaʿ*.

[211] Cf. Mez 1937, 318; from al-Tanūkhī, *al-Faraj baʿd al-shidda*.

VII. *Appendix*
Some Famous Early Khuṭbas

The following are some of the most famous *khuṭbas* of pre-Islam and early Islam, full pieces or excerpts. They illustrate the typology and characteristics of the genre at that time.

As mentioned earlier, there are several versions for most of these *khuṭbas*. Since the purpose of their citation here is to provide an overall sense of the famous *khuṭbas* rather than a comparison of the different versions of each, I have noted the sources but not the variants, and have mostly based the transcription of the text and its translation, on Ṣafwat's anthology.

1. *Quss b. Sāʿida al-Iyādī*
(Bishop of Najran or *ḥanīf*, d. ca. 600 C.E.)[212]

Type pre-Islamic sermon of pious counsel delivered at the Great Fair of ʿUkāẓ in Mecca.

Features large, public audience; delivered sitting from back of his camel; direct address; mention of natural objects and phenomena as signs; swearing of oath in the 3rd person; syntactic and antithetical parallelism; some *sajʿ*; short sentences; simple syntax; citing of poetry.

أيها الناس، اسْمَعُوْا وَعُوْا. مَنْ عَاشَ مَات، ومَنْ مَاتَ فَات، وكُلُّ ما هو آتٍ آت، لَيْلٌ دَاج، ونَهَارٌ سَاج، وسماءٌ ذاتُ أَبْرَاج، ونجومٌ تَزْهَر، وبِحَارٌ تَزْخَر، وجِبَالٌ مُرْسَاة، وأرْضٌ مُدْحَاة، وأَنْهارٌ مُجْرَاة، إنَّ في السماءِ لَخَبَرا، وإنَّ في الأرْضِ لَعِبَرا، ما بالُ الناسِ يَذْهَبون ولا يرجِعون، أرَضُوْا

O People! Listen and retain! He who lives dies. He who dies is lost [forever]. Everything that could happen will happen. A dark night…a bright day…a sky that has zodiacal sign…stars that shine…seas [whose waters] roar…mountains firmly anchored…an

[212] Ṣafwat 1933, 1:38 #21; after al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*; al-Bāqillānī, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*; al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*; Abū al-Faraj, *al-Aghānī*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; al-Maydānī, *Majmaʿ al-amthāl*. Also in Ibn Isḥaq al-Kātib, *al-Burhān*, 197-8. Al-Qalqashandī recorded a sermon by Kaʿb b. Luwayy in *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, 1:211, which contains some of the identical phraseology, "a dark night …" etc. As noted here, he recorded the Quss *khuṭba* as well.

فأقاموا، أم تُرِكُوا فَنَامُوْا . يُقْسِمُ قُسٌّ بالله قَسَمًا لا إِثْمَ فيه، إنّ لله دِيْنًا هُوَ أَرْضى له، وأفضلُ مِن دينكِم الذي أنتم عليه، إنكم لَتأتون مِن الأمْرِ مُنْكَرا .

earth spread out…rivers made to flow. Indeed, there are signs in the sky. There are lessons in the earth. What is the state of the people—going and never returning? Have they been satisfied, thus choosing to reside [there]? Or were they abandoned, [are they] sleeping? Quss swears an oath by God in which there is no sin: God has a religion that is more satisfactory to Him and better than the religion in which you believe. Indeed, you do evil deeds.

في الذاهِبِيْنَ الأَوَّلِيْـــنَ مِنَ الْقُرُوْنِ لَنَا بَصَائِرْ

In those that went before
in eons past, are instances for us to take heed.

لَمّا رأيتُ مـَوَارِدًا – لِلموتِ ليس لها مَصَادِر

When I looked at the watering holes of death,
from which there is no returning—

ورأيتُ قَوْمي نَحْوَهَا – تَمْضِي الأَكَابِرُ والأصاغِر

[When] I saw my people towards them
going, young and old—

لا يَرْجِعُ الماضيْ إلَـــيَّ ولا مِنَ الْبَاقِيْنَ غَابِر

The one who passed not coming back to me
and not from those who remain, he who goes.

أَيقَنْتُ أَنّي لا مَحَـا–لَةَ حَيْثُ صَارَ الْقَوْمُ صائِر

I became convinced that I—without a doubt—

will go[213] where the people have gone.

2. *Kāhin* of Khuzāʿa (6th c. C.E.)[214]

Type political *khuṭba*, sub-type *munāfara* judgment in favor of Hāshim b. ʿAbd Manāf over Umayya b. ʿAbd Shams (the persons, not the clans); contains anti-Umayyad material—could be later propaganda; this *khuṭba* is not famous, but no specific surviving piece of the *sajʿ al-kuhhān* appears to be better known than another, so this is as good a sample as any.

Features oaths by auspicious natural objects (moon, stars, rain) followed by a judgment; full *sajʿ*; syntactic parallelism; short sentences.

والقَمَرِ الباهِرِ، والكَوْكَبِ الزَّاهِرِ، والغَمَامِ الماطِرِ، وما بِالْجَوِّ مِن طائِرٍ، ومَا اهْتَدَى بِعَلَمٍ مُسَافِرٍ، مِنْ مُنجِدٍ وغائِرٍ، لَقَدْ سَبَقَ هاشِمٌ أُمَيَّةَ الى الْمَآثِرِ، أَوَّلٌ منه وآخِرٍ، وأَبُوْ هَمْهَمَةَ بِذلك خابِرٍ.

By the glorious moon, by the shining star, by the rain-pouring cloud, by the bird[s] in the air, by the beacon that guides the traveler,[215] one going to Najd and another to Ghawr: Indeed, Hāshim has outstripped Umayya to glorious deeds. There is a first in this and a last.[216] Abū Hamhama[217] knows this.

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213 Read *ṣāra* here as *tāmma*, meaning *intaqala*.

214 Ṣafwat 1933 1:78; after Ibn Athīr, *al-Kāmil*; al-Ḥalabī, *al-Sīra al-ḥalabiyya*; al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*.

215 There is one problem if the text is read this way with the *mā* taken to be a relative pronoun (*mā mawṣūliyya*), for the required referent pronoun in the *jumlat al-ṣila* is missing. An alternative reading would be "as long as the beacon guides the traveler" with the *mā* being *maṣdariyya* (*ẓarfiyya zamāniyya*). But the first reading is more likely because a) the *wāw* of *ʿatf* connects it to the previous oath sequence, b) it is syntactically parallel to the previous phrase, and c) the meaning of the passage is unclear if read in the "as long as" mode.

216 "*Awwal*" could also be read in the genitive case, as a *badal al-juzʾ min al-kull* of *maʾāthir*. Thus, "Hāshim has outstripped Umayya to glorious deeds, the first of them and the last." But the problem here is that the pronoun *hu* of *minhu* is in the

3. *Abū Ṭālib*
(Muḥammad's uncle and guardian, d. 620 C.E.)[218]

Type pre-Islamic marriage *khuṭba*, on the occasion of Muḥammad's marriage to Khadīja, about 15 years before his message of Islam, and 28 years before Hijra.

Features *taḥmīd* formula, tracing Abū Ṭālib's genealogy to Abraham and Ismāʿīl, followed by a "then" clause (*thumma* rather than *ammā baʿd*); strongly parallel, a sprinkling of *sajʿ*; mention of Kaʿba; short sentences; simple syntax; many elements of the later Islamic marriage *khuṭba* present, such as naming of the two parties and a clear expression of their desire to wed, as well as the dower.

الحمدُ للهِ الذيْ جَعَلَنا مِنْ زَرْعِ ابراهيم، وذُرِّيَّةِ اسمعيل، وجَعَلَ لَنا بَلَدًا حَرَاما، وبَيْتًا مَحْجُوْبا، وجَعَلَنا الحُكَّامَ على الناس.

Praise be to God, who made us from the seed of Abraham and the progeny of Ismāʿīl; who made for us a sacred city and a veiled House; who made us rulers over the people.

ثُمَّ إنَّ محمدَ بْنَ عبدِ اللهِ ابْنَ أخيْ مَنْ لا يُوازَن به فَتًى مِن قريشٍ إلاَّ رَجَحَ عليه برًّا وفَضْلا، وكَرَماً وعَقْلا، ومَجْدًا وبُلا. وإنْ كانَ في المالِ قُلّ، فإنّما المالُ ظِلٌّ زائِل، وعَارِيَةٌ مُسْتَرْجَعَة. وله في خديجةَ بنتِ خويلد رَغْبَةٌ ولها فيه مثلُ ذلك. وما أحْبَبْتُمْ مِنَ الصَّدَاقِ فَعَلَيَّ

Then: Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, my nephew, is one with whom no youth of Quraysh can be weighed without finding [Muḥammad's scale] heavier, in goodness and merit, generosity and intelligence, glory and nobility. If there is scarcity in wealth, wealth is but a passing shadow, a loan that is to be returned. He desires [to wed] Khadīja b. Khuwaylid, and she him. Whatever you [plural] wish in terms of dower, I take upon myself.

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masculine, and *maʾāthir* is a broken plural, thus denoted by the feminine. Its singular is also feminine, *maʾthura*.

217 Abū Hamhama was Umayya's father-in-law and present at the arbitration.

218 Ṣafwat 1933 1:77, #50; after al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*; al-Bāqillānī, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*; al-Mubarrad (?), *Tahdhīb al-kāmil*; al-Ḥalabī, *al-Sīra al-ḥalabiyya*.

4a. *Muḥammad*
(the Prophet of Islam, d. 11/632)[219]

Type religio-political *khuṭba*; first *khuṭba* in Islam addressing the Quraysh at Mecca, calling them to Islam in the early part of his mission; Muḥammad's uncle Abū Lahab is reported to have responded to this *khuṭba* by damning Muḥammad, which is when the Qurʾānic *sūra* 111 damning Abū Lahab was revealed.

Features direct address; rhetorical questions; exclamations; simple syntax; vivid imagery of tribe's battle-readiness reflecting life in pre-Islamic Arabia; no *sajʿ*.

يَا صَبَاحَاه، ... يا بني عبد المطلب، يا بني عبد مناف، ... أرَأَيْتُمْ لَوْ أخْبَرْتُكم أنَّ خَيْلاً تَخْرُجُ بِصَفْحِ هذا الجبل، أكُنْتُمْ مُصَدِّقِيّ [قالوا "ما جرَّبنا عليك كذبا" قال] فإنِّي نَذِيْرٌ لكم بَيْنَ يَدَيْ عَذَابٍ شَدِيْد .

A grievous morning! … O sons of ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. O sons of ʿAbd Manāf. … If I informed you that horsemen are riding out [to attack you] from behind the foot of this mountain, would you believe me? [They said: "You have not lied to us in our previous experience."] [He said:] Indeed, I am a warner to you before a harsh chastisement!

4b. *Muḥammad*
(the Prophet of Islam, d. 11/632)[220]

Type religious, ritually prescriptive, early Islamic *khuṭba*, delivered at the onset of the holy month of Ramaḍān.

Features direct address; repetition of the word "month;" brief sentences.

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[219] al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2:319; also cited in Ramaḍān 1998, 55 (from al-Ḥalabī, *al-Sīra al-ḥalabyiyya*; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*); and in Ṣafwat 1933 1:147, after the same sources, in a slightly varied form; the web-based search engine alwaraq brings up nineteen sources for this *khuṭba* (with slight variants in each), including al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya*; and Ibn Saʿd, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*.

[220] al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, *Daʿāʾim al-Islām*, 1:268-9.

أيها الناس، إنه قد أَظَلَّكم شَهْرٌ عظيم، شهرٌ فيه ليلةٌ العملُ فيها خيرٌ من العملِ في ألفِ شهر، مَنْ تَقَرَّبَ فيه بِخَصْلَةٍ مِنْ خِصالِ الخيرِ كان كمن أدَّى فريضةً فيما سِوَاه، ومن أدَّى فيه فريضةً كان كمن أدَّى سبعين فريضةً فيما سواه، وهو شهرُ الصَّبْر، والصبرُ ثَوَابُه الجَنَّة، وشهرُ المُوَاسَاة، شهرٌ يُزادُ فيه في رزقِ المؤمن، مَنْ فَطَّرَ فيه صائما كان له مغفرةً لِذنُوْبه وعِتْقَ رَقَبَتِه من النار، وكان له مِثْلُ أَجْرِه مِنْ غيرِ أن يَنْقُصَ من أجره شيءٌ.

O people! An exalted month has come nigh to you; a month that contains one night in which good deeds performed [count for more] than good deeds performed over a thousand months. Whosover performs in [this month] a non-mandatory act in order to achieve closeness to God, is like one who performs a mandatory act at other times. Whosoever performs in it a mandatory act, is like one who performs seventy mandatory acts at other times. It is a month of forbearance, and the reward of forbearance is Paradise. [It is] a month of charity.[221] A month in which the believer's decreed sustenance is increased. Whosoever feeds a fasting person at the time of breaking fast, will gain forgiveness for his sins and the freeing of his neck from Hellfire; he will have the like of [the fasting person's] reward, without any decrease in [that person's] reward.

[221] Cf. Hava 1986, gives the meaning of *āsāhu muwāsātan* as: "He gave him a part of his goods; he was munificent to him."

4c. *Muḥammad*
(the Prophet of Islam, d. 11/632)[222]

Type religio-political early Islamic *khuṭba* containing legislative material; address to Quraysh upon the conquest of Mecca in 8/630.

Features *taḥmīd* preface; no *ammā baʿd*, but the marker *alā* (Lo!); parallelism but no *sajʿ*; short sentences; final direct address; interactive—real questions with audience answering in chorus.

لا إلهَ إلا الله وَحْدَه لا شَرِيْكَ له، صَدَقَ وَعْدَه، ونَصَرَ عَبْدَه، وهَزَمَ الأَحْزَابَ وَحْدَه،

There is no god but God, [He is] one, He has no partner. He has fulfilled His promise, aided His servant, and defeated the armies Himself alone.

أَلَا كُلُّ مَأْثُرَةٍ أَوْ دَمٍ أَوْ مَالٍ يُدْعَى فهو تَحْتَ قَدَمَيَّ هَاتَيْن، إلَّا سِدَانَةَ البَيْت، وسِقَايَةَ الْحَاجّ، أَلَا وقَتْلُ الخطأِ مِثْلُ العَمْدِ بالسَّوْطِ والعَصَا، فيهما الدِّيَةُ المُغَلَّظَة، منها أربعونَ خَلِفَةً فِي بُطُوْنِهَا أَوْلادُها،

Lo! All claimed honors, blood-revenge, and property are below my two feet here, except for the caretakership of the House, and the watering of the pilgrim. Lo! Unintentional murder is like deliberate [murder] by whip and staff; in both there is strict blood money; forty pregnant she-camels whose young are in their womb.

يا مَعْشَرَ قريش، إنّ اللهَ قد أَذْهَبَ عنكم نَخْوَةَ الجاهليّة، وتَعَظُّمَها بالآباء، الناسُ مِنْ آدمَ وآدمُ خُلِقَ مِنْ تُرَاب، "يايها الناسُ إنّا خَلَقْنَاكم مِنْ ذَكَرٍ وأُنْثَى وجَعَلْناكم شُعُوبًا وقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوْا إنّ أَكْرَمَكم عندَ الله أَتْقَاكم" يا معشرَ قريش، ما تَرَوْنَ أَنِّي فاعِلٌ بكم؟ [قالوا: خيرًا] [قال] اذْهَبُوْا فأنتم طُلَقَاءُ.

O assembly of Quraysh! God has removed from you the arrogance of the *jāhiliyya*, and its boasting about forefathers. People are from Adam and Adam was created from dust. "O people! We have created you male and female, and we have made you peoples and tribes so that you may know one another. Indeed the

[222] Ṣafwat 1933 1:154 #11; after al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*; al-Bāqillānī, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*; Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*.

most honored among you near God is the most pious."[223] O assembly of Quraysh! What do you think I shall do with you? [They said: "You will do good."] [He said:] Go, for you are free men.

5. *Abū Bakr b. Abī Quḥāfa* (1st Sunni caliph, d. 13/634)[224]

Type religio-political accession speech followed by pious counsel; delivered in 11/632; lays out his policy, explaining to the community his personality and weaknesses, and instructing them as to how they should behave with him; the pious counsel consists of a reminder about death, and encouragement to do good deeds.

Features direct address; heavy use of emphatic particles *inna* and *alā*; short sentences; simple syntax; imperatives.

يأيها الناس، إنما انا مِثْلُكُم، وإني لا ادري لعلكم سَتُكَلِّفُوْنِيْ ما كان رسولُ الله يُطِيْق، إنّ الله اصطفى محمداً على العالمين، وعَصَمَه من الآفات، وإنما انا مُتَّبِعٌ، ولستُ بِمُبْتَدِعٍ، فإنِ اسْتَقمتُ فَتابِعُوْنِيْ، وإنْ زغتُ فقَوِّمُوْنِي، إنَّ رسول الله قُبِضَ، وليس احد من هذه الأُمَّةِ يطلُبُهُ بَمَظْلِمَةٍ، ضَرْبَةِ سَوْطٍ فما دونَها، ألا وإنَّ لي شيطاناً يَعْتَرِيني، فإذا غضِبتُ فاجتنبوني، لا أُؤَثِّرُ في اَشْعاركم وأَبْشَارِكم

O people! Indeed, I am like unto you. I do not know whether you will burden me with [responsibilities] which the Messenger of God (God's blessings upon him!) was capable of bearing. Indeed, God chose Muḥammad over all the worlds, and rendered him immune from [perpetrating] injuries. Verily, I am a follower; I am not one to devise new things. If I stay straight, then follow me. If I go astray, then

223 Qur'ān 49:13.

224 Ṣafwat 1933 1:181, #37, after al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd*.

straighten me. Indeed, the Messenger of God (God's blessings upon him!) was taken away, while no single person from this community was claiming restitution from him for an injustice, a single whip stroke or less. Lo! I have a satan[225] who possesses me. If I get angry, avoid me, [such that] I do not leave a mark on your hair and skins. … (one paragraph pious counsel)

…

6. *Fāṭima bt. Muḥammad* (Muḥammad's daughter, ʿAlī's wife, d. 11/632)[226]

Type religio-political speech; addressed to Abū Bakr and his assembly of Companions; arguing for ʿAlī's right to the caliphate and for her own right to inherit from the Prophet her father the lands of Fadak; delivered in 11/632.

Features many Qurʾānic quotations; archaic vocabulary; strong, rhythmic parallelism with short sentences and almost no *sajʿ*; profusion of camel imagery; some proverbs cited.

[Praise of God, blessings on the Prophet]. "A messenger from among you came to you, [a man for whom] your suffering is painful; [one who is] concerned for you; for believers, [a

"لقد جاءكم رسولٌ مِنْ انْفُسِكُمْ عَزِيْزٌ عليه ما عَنِتُّمْ حَرِيْصٌ عليكم بالمؤمنين رَؤُوْفٌ رَحِيم" فإنْ تَعْرِفوه تَجِدوه أبي دُوْنَ آبائِكم، وأَخَا ابْن عَمّي دونَ رجالكم.

[225] A literal (and negative) explanation of the word "*shayṭān*" is offered by most Shīʿīs. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, a Muʿtazilite Sunni, interprets the "satan" metaphorically as "anger." Ṣafwat 1933 1:181, n. 2; after Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*.

[226] Ṭayfūr, *Balāghāt al-nisāʾ*, 54-8. Two other, similar, versions of the same *khuṭba* are provided in ibid., 58-66. In those versions, Fāṭima cites the Qurʾānic verse "And Solomon inherited from David" (16:27) in support of her right to inherit from Muḥammad. Cf. same *khuṭba* with variants in al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, *Sharḥ al-akhbār*, 3:35-40.

man who is] compassionate, merciful."[227]—If you know him, you will find that he is my father, not yours; my cousin [ʿAlī]'s brother, not yours.[228]

فَبَلَّغَ النَّذارَة، صادِعاً بالرسالة، ماثلاً على مَدْرَجَةِ المُشركين، ضارِباً لِثَجِهِمْ، آخِذاً بِكُظْمِهِمْ، يَهْشِمُ الأصْنام، ويَنْكُثُ الهام، حتى هَزَمَ الجَمْعَ وولَّوا الدُّبُر، وتَعَرَّى اللَّيْلُ عن صُبْحِه، وأَسْفَرَ الحَقُّ عن مَحْضِه، ونَطَقَ زَعِيمُ الدين، وخَرَسَتْ شَقاشِقُ الشياطين، وكنتم على شَفا حُفْرَةٍ من النار، مَذْقَةَ الشارب، ونَهْزَةَ الطامِع، وقَبْسَةَ العَجْلان، وموْطِئَ الأقدام، تشرَبون الطَّرْق، وتَقْتاتون الوَرَق، أَذِلَّةً خاشعين، تخافون أنْ يَتَخَطَّفَكُمُ الناسُ من حَوْلِكم.

[The Messenger] delivered warning, publicly announcing his message, blocking the path of the polytheists, striking their backs, seizing their necks, crushing the idols, breaking crowns [of heads]—until he defeated them all and they [fled] showing their backs; night divested itself and gave way to morning, pure Truth gleamed forth, the leader of religion spoke, and the camel-frothings of the satans subsided. You were [then] at the lip of the precipice of Hell-fire, a draught for the drinker, an opportunity for the covetous, a thing easily grasped by the speedy, a trampling place for feet; you drank camel-urinated water and ate leaves; [you were] lowly, humbled, fearful that the people around you would swoop down on you.

227 Qurʾān 9:128.

228 Refers to Muḥammad's pairing of ʿAlī with himself, when he paired his Companions in twos as "brothers." Cf. al-Qāḍī al-Nuʾmān, *Sharḥ al-akhbār*, 1:193-4.

فأنْقَذَكم اللهُ بِرسوله "بَعْدَ اللَّتَيَا والَّتِيْ،" وبَعْدَ ما مُنِيَ بِبُهَمِ الرجال، وذُؤْبانِ العَرب، ومَرَدَةِ أهل الكتاب، كُلَّما حَشَوْا "نارا للحرب أَطْفَأَها،" ونَجَمَ قَرْنٌ للضَّلال، وفَغَرَتْ فاغِرةٌ من المشركين، قَذَفَ بأخيه في لَهَوَاتِها، فلا يَنْكَفِئُ حتى يَطَأَ صِماخَها بأَخْمُصِه، ويُخْمِدَ لَهَبَها بِحَدِّه، مَكْدُوْداً في ذاتِ الله، قريباً مِن رسول الله، سَيِّداً في أولياءِ الله، وأنتم في بُلْهْنِيَةٍ وَادِعُوْن آمِنُوْن.

Then God saved you through his Messenger, "after the small [calamity] and the big one,"[229] after [Muḥammad] was tried with [attacks by] brave warrior men, Bedouin wolf-bandits, and unbelieving people of the Book. Each time they kindled "a fire for battle, he extinguished it."[230] [Whenever] a horn of error appeared, and a polytheist maw opened wide, he would throw his brother [ʿAlī] into its jaws—[ʿAlī] would not return until he had stamped on its ear with his soles, and dampened its blaze with his [sword] edge, toiling for God,[231] being near to the Messenger of God, a leader among the friends of God. [All this,] while you were in ample circumstances, calm, secure.

حتى إذا اختارَ اللهُ لنبيّه دارَ أنبيائه، ظَهَرَتْ خُلَّةُ النِّفاق، وسَمَلَ جِلْبَابُ الدِّين، ونَطَقَ كاظِمُ الغَاوِين، ونَبَغَ خامِلُ الآفِلين، وهَدَرَ فَنِيْقُ المُبْطِلين، فَخَطَرَ في عَرَصاتِكم، وأَطْلَعَ الشيطانُ رأسَه من مَغْرَزِه، صارخاً بِكُمْ، فَوَجَدَكم لِدُعائه مستجيبين، وللغِرَّة فيه

Until, when God chose for His Prophet the abode of His prophets, the thorny tree of hypocrisy appeared, the robe of religion decayed, the anger-suppressing one [ʿUmar? Abū Bakr?] belonging to the covetous evil-mongers spoke up, the obscure person [Abū Bakr] of the

229 Proverb, signifying all sorts of calamities. See its etiology in al-Maydānī, *Majmaʿ al-amthāl*, 1:92, #440.

230 Qur'ān 5:64.

231 Literally, "for the essence of God."

مُلاحِظِيْن، فاسْتَهَضَكم فَوَجَدَكم خِفَافاً، وأَجْمَشَكم فألْفَاكم غِضَاباً، فَوَسَمْتُمْ غَيْرَ إبلكم، وأَوْرَدْتُموها غيرَ شِرْبِكم. هذا والعَهْدُ قريبٌ، والكَلْمُ رحيبٌ، والجُرْحُ لم يَنْدَمِلْ.

transient ones emerged, the camel stallion of the error-mongers bellowed and wagged its tail[232] in your courtyards. Satan raised his head from sleep, shrieking out at you, and he found you quick to answer his call and attentive to his deception; he aroused you and found you quick to rise; he toyed with you and found you easy to anger. So you branded [as your own] camels that were not yours, and brought them to drink at a watering hole that was not yours. This, when the age [of the Prophet] is still recent, the gash still vast, the wound not yet healed.

بَدَار، زَعَمْتم خوفَ الفتنة، "ألا في الفتنةِ سَقَطُوْا وإنَّ جَهَنَّمَ لَمُحِيْطَةٌ بِالْكَافِرِيْن،" فَهَيْهاتَ مِنْكم، وأَنَّى بِكُمْ، وأَنَّى تُؤْفَكُون، وهذا كتابُ اللهِ بَيْنَ أَظْهُرِكم، وزَوَاجِرُه بَيِّنَةٌ، وشَوَاهِدُهُ لائِحَة، وأَوَامِرُه وَاضِحَة، أَرَغْبَةً عنه تُدْبِرون، أَمْ بِغَيْرِه تَحْكُمُون، "بِئْسَ للظالمينَ بَدَلا،" "ومَنْ يَبْتَغِ غيرَ الإسلامِ دِيْناً فَلَنْ يُقْبَلَ منه وهو في الآخرةِ مِنَ الخاسرين."

O haste! You claimed that [your assumption of leadership] was from fear of dissension. “Lo! Into dissension they have fallen, and Hellfire is all-encompassing for disbelievers!”[233] May you be thrown far! Where is it that you are going?! How you do lie!—when this, the Book of God, is before you, its warnings unmistakable, its proofs bright, its commands clear! Do you turn away from it in dislike? Or do you judge by another [book]? “O what an evil exchange

232 I.e., being completely at ease.
233 Qur’ān 9:49.

the oppressors will obtain!”[234] “Whosoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted from him, and he will be among the losers in the hereafter.”[235]

ثُمَّ لَمْ تَرْبَثُوْا إلاَّ رَيْثَ أَنْ تَسْكُنَ نَغْرَتُها،

You did not wait even for the boiling [of grief] to subside,[236] “drinking in big gulps while hiding your true intentions, pretending to sip froth,”[237] while we forbore your [misconduct, which was] like the slashing of a dagger. And now you claim that we have no inheritance. “Do you seek the judgments of the jāhiliyya? Who is a more favorable judge than God, for those who possess conviction!”[238] Woe [to you] O assembly of Emigrants! Am I to be stripped of my father’s inheritance?! Is it said in the Book that you inherit from your father, and I do not inherit from mine? “You have come up with a remarkable lie!”[239] Take it then! Muzzled and saddled, it will meet you on the day of your resurrection. Then what a good

تَشْرَبُوْنَ حَسْواً وتُسِرُّون في ارْتِغاءٍ، ونَصْبِرُ مِنْكُمْ على مِثْلِ حَزِّ الْمُدَى، وأنتمُ الآنَ تَزْعُمُون أنْ لا إرْثَ لَنَا، "أَفَحُكْمَ الجاهلِيةِ تَبْغُوْنَ وَمَنْ أَحْسَنُ مِنَ اللهِ حُكْماً لِقَوْمٍ يُوْقِنُوْن،" وَيْهاً مَعْشَرَ المُهَاجِرِين، أَأُبْتَزُّ إِرْثَ اَبِيْ، أَفِي الكِتَابِ أَنْ تَرِثَ أباكَ ولا أَرِثُ أَبِيْ، "لقد جِئْتَ شيئاً فَرِيًّا"، فَدُوْنَكَها مَخْطُوْمَةً مَرْحُوْلَةً تَلْقَاكَ يومَ حَشْرِك، فَنِعْمَ الحَكَمُ اللهُ، والزعيمُ محمدٌ، والمَوْعِدُ القيامةُ، وعندَ السَّاعَةِ يَخْسِرُ المُبْطِلون، و "لكلِّ نَبَأٍ مُستقَرٌّ وسوفَ تَعْلَمُوْن."

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234 Ibid., 18:50.
235 Ibid., 3:85.
236 I.e., after Muḥammad’s death.
237 Proverb, said of one who pretends one thing when he means another. Cf. Lane 1863 (*r-gh-w*).
238 Qur’ān 5:50.
239 Ibid., 19:27.

judge will God be; the leader, Muḥammad; the meeting-time, the day of reckoning! At the Hour, the impostors will lose. "For each report there is an appointed time, and you will indeed know."[240]

7a. *ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib*
(Muḥammad's successor according to Shi'a, 4th Sunni caliph, d. 40/661)[241]

Type sermon of pious counsel about this world and the hereafter, warning of the nearness of the Reckoning; perhaps part of a Friday *khuṭba*.

Features two-fold division, and *taʿmīm baʿda takhṣīṣ*; direct address in beginning and throughout; short sentences; vivid physical imagery; no *sajʿ*; short sentences, with slightly longer ones interspersed; prescriptive; some antithetical and syntactic parallelism in last few lines; emphatic structures.

أيها النَّاس، إنَّ أخْوَفَ ما أخَافُ عليكم اثْنَتَان، اتِّبَاعُ الهوَى وطُوْلُ الأَمَل. فأمَّا اتِّبَاعُ الهوَى فَيَصُدُّ عَنِ الحَقّ، وأمَّا طُوْلُ الأَمَلِ فَيُنْسِي الآخِرة. ألا وإنَّ الدُّنْيَا قَدْ وَلَّتْ حَذَّاءَ فَلَمْ يَبْقَ منها إلاَّ صُبَابَةٌ كَصُبابةِ الإناءِ اصْطَبَّها صَاحِبُها. ألا وإنّ الآخرةَ قد أقْبَلَتْ. ولِكُلٍّ منها بَنُوْن. فكونوا من أبناءِ الآخرة ولا تكونوا من أبناءِ الدنيا، فإنَّ كلَّ وَلَدٍ سَيُلْحَقُ بأُمِّهِ يومَ

O people! The most fearful thing I fear for you is twofold: following your desires, and lengthy yearning. As for the following of desire, it stops [you] from Truth. And as for lengthy yearning, it makes [you] forget the hereafter. Lo! This world has turned away in speed, and nothing remains of it except for a residue like the residue in a vessel which a pourer has emptied.

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240 Ibid., 6:67.

241 al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 116, #42; also in al-Minqarī, *K. Ṣiffīn*; al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*. Cf. similar *khuṭba* in al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 93-5, #28; also in al-Bāqillānī, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*; al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*; al-Ḥarrānī, *Tuḥfat al-ʿūqūl*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*.

القيامة، وإنَّ اليومَ عملٌ ولا حساب، وغداً حسابٌ ولا عمل.

Lo! The hereafter has come forward. Each of the two has children. Be you from the children of the hereafter; do not be from the children of this world, for each son will be returned to his mother on the Day of Resurrection. Today is action and no reckoning, and tomorrow is reckoning and no action.

7b. ʿ*Alī b. Abī Ṭālib*
(Muḥammad's successor according to Shi'a, 4th Sunni caliph, d. 40/661)[242]

Type religio-political *jihād khuṭba*; excerpt from one of ʿAlī's poignant orations to the people of Kūfa, who were unresponsive to his calls for battle; delivered in the wake of the post-Ṣiffīn attack on Anbār by Muʿāwiya's commander Sufyān b. ʿAwf al-Ghāmidī, who killed and looted with a free hand.

Features direct address; some *sajʿ*; exclamations; rhetorical questions; vivid metaphorical language; short sentences; strong parallelism.

يا أَشْبَاهَ الرِّجَالِ وَلاَ رِجَال، حُلُوْمُ الأَطْفَال، وعُقُوْلُ رَبَّاتِ الْحِجَال، لَوَدِدْتُ أَنِّي لم أَرَكُمْ ولم أعْرِفْكم، معرفةً واللهِ جَرَّتْ نَدَما، وأعْقَبَتْ سَدَما، قاتَلَكُمُ اللهُ، لقد مَلَأْتُم قلبي قَيْحا، وشَحَنْتم صَدْري غَيْظا، وجَرَّعْتُمُوْني نُغَبَ التَّهْمامِ أنْفاسا، وأفسدْتم عَلَيَّ رَأْيِيْ بالعِصْيَانِ

O parodies of men, not men! Minds of children and intellects of canopy-covered ones! Would that I had never seen you, had never known you, a knowing that has, by God, yielded regret and ended in grief. May God fight you! You have filled my heart with purulence and

[242] al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 92, #27; also in al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*; al-Dīnawarī, *al-Akhbār al-ṭiwāl*; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*; al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*; Ibn Qutayba, ʿ*Uyūn al-akhbār*.

weighted my breast with ire. You have made me swallow the drink of anguish with every breath. You have subverted my judgment through disobedience and desertion, so that the Quraysh have begun to say, "Abu Talib's son is indeed a brave man, but he has no knowledge of warfare." May God [forgive] their father! Is there any one among them more experienced and of longer standing in it than I? I was active in it when I was not yet twenty, and here I am, over sixty. But one who is not obeyed—his opinion carries no weight.

والخِذْلان، حتّى قالت قريش "إنَّ ابنَ أبي طالبٍ رَجُلٌ شُجاعٌ ولكنْ لا عِلْمَ له بِالْحَرْبِ." للهِ أبُوهُمْ، وَهَلْ أَحَدٌ منهم أشَدُّ لها مِرَاساً وأَقْدَمُ فيها مَقَاماً مِنّيْ، لقد نَهَضْتُ فيها وما بَلَغْتُ العشرين، وها أنا ذا قد ذَرَّفْتُ على السِّتِّين، ولكِنْ لا رأيَ لِمَنْ لا يُطاع.

8. *Ziyād b. Abīhi*
(Umayyad governor of Iraq, d. 53/673)[243]

Type religio-political *khuṭba*; announcing to the people of Baṣra his policies as the new governor, with regard to crime and anti-government activities; the harsh punitive measures for anti-Umayyad activity, theft, and rape that Ziyād outlined in this *khuṭba* appear to have been effective—al-Ṭabarī reports that "a thing would fall from [the hand of] a man or a woman, and nobody would approach it until its owner came back to it; a woman would sleep without locking her door; …"[244]

Features known as the "*khuṭba batrāʾ*," literally, an amputated or maimed oration, meaning that it does not contain a formulaic praise intro-

[243] Ṣafwat 1933 2:270-4, #259; after al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 2:62-5; al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 5:220-1; al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*, 1:216-7; al-Qālī, *Dhayl al-Amālī*, 3:185-6; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*; Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*; al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*.

[244] al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 5:222.

duction;[245] direct address; Qur'ānic allusions; emphatic structures; oaths; idioms; weapon imagery; parallelism; rhetorical questions; some *saj'*; short sentences; repetition of key vocabulary; antithesis; imperatives.

فإنّ الجَهَالَةَ الجَهْلاَء، والضَّلاَلَةَ العَمْيَاء، والغَيَّ المُوْفِيَ بأهْلِه على النَّار، ما فيه سُفَهَاؤُكم، ويَشْتَمِلُ عليه حُلَمَاؤُكم، مِنَ الأمورِ العِظَام، يَنْبُتُ فيه الصَّغِيْر، ولا يَتَحَاشى عنها الكبير، كأنَّكم لم تَقْرَؤُوْا كتابَ الله، ولم تَسْمَعُوْا ما أعَدَّ اللهُ مِنَ الثوابِ الكريمِ لأهلِ طاعته، والعذابِ الأليمِ لأهلِ معصيته، في الزَّمَنِ السَّرْمَدِيِّ الذي لا يزول. أتكونون كَمَنْ طَرَفَتْ عينيه الدنيا، وسَدَّتْ مَسامِعَه الشَّهَوات، وَاخْتَارَ الفانيةَ على الباقية، ولا تذكرون أنّكم أحْدَثْتم في الإسلام الحَدَثَ الذي لم تُسْبَقُوا اليه، مِنْ تَرْككم الضعيفَ يُقْهَرُ ويؤخذ مالُه، هذه المَوَاخِيْرَ المنصوبةَ، والضعيفةَ المسلوبة في النهار المُبْصِر، والعددُ غيرُ قليل، ألم يكن منكم نُهاةٌ، تمنع الغُواةَ عن دَلَجِ الليل وغارة النهار. قَرَّبتم القَرَابةَ وبَاعَدْتم الدِّين، تعتذرون بغيرِ العُذْر، وتُغْضُوْنَ على المُخْتَلِس، كُلُّ امْرِئٍ منكم يَذُبُّ عن سَفِيْهِه، صَنِيْعَ مَنْ لا يخاف عاقبةً ولا يرجو مَعاداً. ما أنتم بالحُلَماء، ولقد اتَّبَعْتم السفهاء، فلم يزل بكم ما تَرَوْن من قيامِكم دونهم، حتى

Indeed, the most ignorant ignorance, the most blind straying, the transgression that will certainly lead its people to Hellfire, is that in which the fools among you are [entrenched], and that which the mature among you subscribe to. [These are] grave matters, the young grow up in them, and the old do not avoid them. It is as though you have never read the Book of God, have never heard about what God has prepared, of generous reward for the people who obey Him, and of painful punishment for the people who disobey Him, in time eternal which will never cease. Will you be like the one whose eyes were made too watery by this world to see? Whose ears were blocked by desires? Who chose the transient [abode] over the everlasting one? You do not bear in mind that you have done something new and impure in Islam, something unprecedented. For you have let the weak man be subjugated, his property

245 According to some reports, Ziyād did praise God at the beginning of the oration, and thus the *khuṭba* was not *batrā'* at all (ibid.)

انْتَهَكُوا حُرَمَ الأسلام، ثم أطْرَقوا وراءكم، كُنُوْساً في مَكانِسِ الرِّيب. حَرَامٌ عَلَيَّ الطعامُ والشراب حتى أُسَوِّيَها بالأرض هَدْماً وإحْراقا.

seized, [you have let] brothels be set up, and the weak woman be robbed in broad daylight. This, when [your] numbers are not small! Were there not forbidders among you who could prevent offenders from going abroad at nightfall and attacking in the day? You have brought nigh your relatives and distanced religion! You proffer unacceptable excuses, and avert your eyes from the furtive thief! Each man among you defends his own fool, this being the act of a person who does not fear a Reckoning, and does not hope for a Return. You are not mature people; rather, you have followed the fools! You continued to shield them, until they rent [the fabric of] that which is inviolable in Islam. Then, sheltering behind you, they silently crept into shady hiding places. May all food and drink be unlawful for me until I level them to the earth, demolishing and burning!

إني رأيتُ آخِرَ هذا الأمرِ لا يصْلُحُ إلا بما صلُحَ به أولُه، لِيْنٌ في غيرِ ضَعْف، وشِدّةٌ في غيرِ عُنْف. إني أُقْسِمُ بالله لآخُذَنَّ الوَلِيَّ بالمَوْلَى، والمُقيمَ بالظاعِن، والمُقبِلَ بالمُدْبِر، والمُطِيْعَ

I see that the end of this affair will not be resolved except by that with which its beginning was resolved: gentleness without weakness, and strength without violence. Verily, I swear

بالعاصي، والصحيحَ منكم في نفسه بالسقيم، حتى يَلْقَى الرَّجُلُ منكم أخاه فيقول "انْجُ سعدُ فقد هَلَكَ سعيد،" أو تستقيمُ لي قَنَاتُكم. إنَّ كِذْبَةَ المنبرِ بَلْقَاءُ مشهورة، فأذا تَعَلَّقْتم عليَّ بِكِذْبَةٍ فقد حَلَّتْ لكم معصيتي. فإذا سمعتموها مني فاغْتَمِزوها فِيَّ، واعلموا أنَّ عندي أمثالَها.

by God that I shall punish the owner for [the offences of] the slave, the resident for [the offences of] the one who has fled, the one who comes forward for [the offences of] the one who runs away, the one who obeys for [the offences of] the one who disobeys, the sound of soul among you for [the offences of] the diseased, until [each] man among you, when he meets his brother, will say "Save yourself, Saʿd, for Saʿīd has perished"[246]—[this,] or [until] your spear shaft becomes straight for me. Indeed, a falsehood spoken on the pulpit is [as recognizable as] a horse with white in its feet up to its thighs.[247] If you find that I have lied to you, consider it legal to disobey me. If you hear [this resolve] from me, blame me, but know that I have others like it.

مَنْ نُقِبَ منكم عليه فأنا ضَامِنٌ لِمَا ذَهَبَ منه.

Whosever['s property] among you is broken into, I will be the guarantor for that which he has lost.

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[246] Saʿd and Saʿīd were the sons of Ḍabba b. Udd who left home in search of their father's camels. Saʿd found them and brought them back, but Saʿīd was killed (cf. Ṣafwat 1933 2:272, n. 2). Cf. etiology of this proverb in Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab*, "*s-ʿ-d*".

[247] Presumably because such a horse visibly stands out.

فإيايَ ودَلَجَ الليل، فإني لا أُوتَى بِمُدْلِجٍ إلا سَفَكْتُ دَمَه، وقد أجَّلْتُكم في ذلك بمِقْدارِ ما يأتي الخَبرُ الكوفةَ ويرجِع إليكم. وإيايَ ودَعْوَى الجاهليّة، فإني لا أَجِدُ أَحَداً دَعَى بها إلا قَطَعْتُ لِسَانَه، وقد أحدثْتم أحداثا لم تَكُنْ، ولقد أحدثْنا لِكُلِّ ذنْبٍ عُقوبةً، فمَن غَرَّقَ قَوْماً غَرَّقْنَاه، ومَن أَحْرَقَ قَوْماً أَحْرَقْنَاه، ومَنْ نَقَبَ بيتاً نَقَبْنا عن قلبه، ومَنْ نَبَشَ قبراً دَفَنَّاه حَيًّا فيه. فَكُفُّوْا عنّي أيدِيَكم وأَلْسِنَتَكم أَكُفُّ عنكم يدي ولساني، ولا تَظْهَرْ من أحدٍ منكم رِيْبَةٌ بِخِلافِ ما عليه عامَّتُكم إلّا ضَرَبْتُ عُنُقَه.

Beware of me if [you go] abroad at nightfall! No person who goes abroad at nightfall will be brought to me without my spilling his blood. I am granting you a respite in that,[248] of the time a report takes to reach Kūfa and come back to you. Beware of me if [you give] the call of the *jāhiliyya*![249] I will not find any who has called to it, but I will cut out his tongue. You have done new things which were not existent, and we have laid down new punishments for every transgression: Whosoever drowns people, we shall drown him. Whosoever burns people, we shall burn him. Whosoever breaches a house, we shall breach his heart. Whosoever digs up and robs a grave, we will bury him alive in it. Restrain your hands and tongues from me, and I will restrain my hand and tongue from you. Let there not appear from any one of you a doubt that is contradictory to what the majority of you are agreed upon, or else I shall behead him.

248 In implementing the curfew and the fatal consequences of breaking it.

249 I.e., evoking the tribal solidarity of the pre-Islamic period (cf. Ṣafwat 1933 2:272, n. 8).

وقد كان بيني وبين قومٍ إحَنٌ فجعلْتُ ذلك دَبْرَ أُذُني و تحتَ قدمَيَّ. فمَن كان منكم مُحْسِناً فَلْيَزْدَدْ إحسانا، ومَنْ كان منكم مُسِيْئاً فَلْيَنْزِعْ عن إساءَتِه. إني لو عَلِمْتُ أنَّ أحَدَكم قد قَتَلَه السِّلُّ مِن بُغْضِي لم أَكشفْ له قِنَاعاً، ولم أهتِكْ له سِتْرا، حتى يُبْدِيَ له صفحتَه، فإذا فَعَلَ ذلك لم أُناظِرْه. فاستأنِفوا أمورَكم، وأعِينوا على أنفسكم، فَرُبَّ مُبْتَئِسٍ بِقُدُوْمِنَا سَيُسَرُّ، ومسرورٍ بقدومنا سَيَبْتَئِس.

There have been feuds between me and certain people, and I have put them behind my ears and beneath my feet. Whosoever among you is a doer of good, let him increase his beneficence. Whosoever among you is a doer of evil, let him desist from his evil mongering. If I find out that all-consuming enmity for me is killing one of you, I will not expose his weapons and will not rent his cover, until he shows me its blade. But if he does that, then I will not grant him a delay. So continue with your affairs, and help yourselves. Perhaps one who was made despondent by our arrival will be gladdened, and one who was pleased by our arrival will be made despondent.

أيُّها الناسُ، إنّا أصْبَحْنا لكم سَاسَةً وعنكم ذَادَةً، نسوسُكم بسلطانِ اللهِ الذي أعطانا، ونَذُوْدُ عنكم بفَيءِ اللهِ الذي خَوَّلَنا، فَلَنَا عليكم السَّمْعُ والطاعةُ، ولكم علينا العَدْلُ فيما وَلِيْنَا. فَاسْتَوْجِبُوا عَدْلَنا وَثِقَتَنا بِمُنَاصَحَتِكم لنا.

O people! We have become your directors and your protectors. We direct you by the power of God which He has granted to us, and protect you through the tax monies that belong to God, which He has bestowed on us. Incumbent upon you, for us, is to listen and obey in [all] that pleases us. Incumbent upon us, for you, is justice in [all] that we have charge of. So become

deserving of our justice and our tax monies by your sincere counsel for us.

واعلموا أني مَهْمَا قَصَّرْتُ عنه، فَلَنْ أُقَصِّرَ عن ثلاث، لَسْتُ مُحْتَجِبا عن طالبِ حاجةٍ منكم ولو أتاني طارقاً بِلَيْلٍ، ولا حابِساً عَطَاءً ولا رِزْقاً عن إِبَانِه، ولا مُجَمِّراً لكم بَعْثاً. فادْعُوا اللهَ بالصَّلاحِ لأئمَّتِكم، فإنَّهم سَاسَتُكم المُؤَدِّبون لكم، وكَهْفُكم الذي اليه تأْوُوْن، ومتى يَصْلُحُوْا تَصْلُحُوْا، ولا تُشْرِبُوا قُلُوْبَكم بُغْضَهم، فَيَشْتَدَّ لِذلك غَيْظُكم، ويَطُوْلَ له حُزْنُكم، ولا تُدْرِكُوْا له حاجَتَكم، مع أَنَّه لو اسْتُجِيْبَ لكم فيهم لَكَانَ شَرّاً لكم. أَسْأَلُ اللهَ أَنْ يُعِيْنَ كُلّاعلى كُلٍّ.

Know that whatever I fall short of, I will not fall short of three [things]: I will not veil myself from any seeker of a request among you, even if he comes knocking [on my door] at night. I will not withhold any salaries and allowances beyond their due date. I will not [inordinately] detain in enemy lands a battalion [made up of people] from among you. So pray to God for the soundness of your Imāms. For they are your directors who discipline you, and your succor--cave, in which you take shelter. When they are sound, you are sound. Do not make your hearts drink of enmity for them, such that your rage, because of that, becomes severe; because of which your grief becomes prolonged; because of which you do not achieve your desire. In addition to which, if your prayer [for their downfall] were answered, it would be the worse for you. I ask God to aid each [person] against each other.

وإذا رأيتموني أُنفِذُ فيكم الأمرَ، فَأَنْفِذُوْهُ على أَذْلالِه. وَأَيْمُ اللهِ، إنَّ لِي فيكم لَصَرْعَى كثيرة،

If you see me executing a command among you, then execute it in all its little paths. An

فَلْيَحْذَرْ كُلُّ امْرِئٍ منكم أنْ يكونَ مِنْ صَرْعايَ.

oath by God! Indeed, there are among you numerous people whom I will fell! Let each man among you beware of being among the people I fell!

9. *Zaynab bt. ʿAlī*
(Muḥammad's granddaughter, ʿAlī and Fāṭima's daughter, d. 62/682)[250]

Type religio-political *khuṭba*; addressed overtly to Yazīd, but simultaneously to all people present in his court; denouncing him and his killing of her brother al-Ḥusayn at Karbala, and his humiliating and cruel treatment of the women of the Prophet's family; together with no. 6, one of the few women's *khuṭbas* in early Islam.

Features direct address; many Qurʾānic citations; synonymous parallelism; idiomatic phraseology; short sentences; rhetorical questions; *taḥmīd* closure.

صَدَقَ اللهُ ورسولُه يا يَزِيد، "ثمَّ كانَ عاقبةَ الذين أَسَاؤُوا السُّوْءَى أنْ كَذَّبُوْا بآياتِ اللهِ وكانوا بها يَسْتَهْزِؤُوْن" أظَنَنْتَ يا يزيد أنَّه حينَ أُخِذَ علينا بأطرافِ الأرض، وأكنافِ السماء، فأصبحْنا نُسَاقُ كما يُسَاقُ الأَسَارَى، أنَّ بِنَا هَوَانًا على اللهِ وبكَ عليه كرامةٌ، وأنَّ هذا لِعظيمِ خَطَرِك، فشَمَخْتَ بأُنفِك، ونَظَرْتَ في عِطْفَيْك، جَذْلانًا فَرِحا، حينَ رأيتَ الدُّنيا مُسْتَوْسِقَةً لك، والأُمُوْرَ مُتَّسِقَةً عليك. وقد

God and his messenger spoke truth, O Yazīd: "Then the outcome of the evildoers was the most evil, because they disbelieved the signs of God and ridiculed them continuously."[251] Did you think, O Yazīd, when we were forced to the ends of the earth, [under] the shelter of the sky, being driven as prisoners are driven, that we were insignificant to God and you were honored? And that this was because of your im-

[250] Ṣafwat, 1933 2:136-138, #124; after Ṭayfūr, *Balāghāt al-nisāʾ*, Cairo Hindāwī ed., pp. 70-73, #3. Also in al-Ṭabarsī, *al-Iḥtijāj*, ed. Muḥammad Bāqir Khurāsānī, Najaf: Dār al-Nuʿmān, 1966, 2:34.

[251] Qurʾān, 30:10.

mense stature? You raised your nose and looked around yourself gay and happy when you saw this world gathered to you, all affairs flocking to you [like camels]. Indeed, you have been given a respite [before punishment] and a breathing space, for He says "Let not the disbelievers think that our giving them a respite is a good thing for them, indeed we give them a respite so that they increase in trespass and a shameful punishment awaits them."[252]

أُمْهِلْتَ ونُفِّسْتَ، وهو يقول "ولا يَحْسَبَنَّ الذين كَفَرُوْا أَنَّما نُمْلِيْ لهم خيرٌ لأنفسِهم إنَّما نُمْلِيْ لهم لِيَزْدَادُوْا إثْما ولهم عَذَابٌ مُهِيْن."

Is it justice, O son of freedmen,[253] your veiling of your women and concubines, and your herding forward of the daughters of the Messenger of God, having torn their veils and made hoarse their voices [with weeping], grieving, camels speeding with them, enemies herding them from town to town, unguarded and undefended, the near and the far speaking to them directly, [and they] without a protector (*walī*) from among their men? How to stop in loathing of

أَمِنَ العدلِ يابْنَ الطُّلَقاءِ تَخْدِيْرُكَ نساءَكَ وإماءَكَ وسَوْقُكَ بَنَاتِ رسول الله قد هَتَكْتَ سُتُوْرَهُنَّ، وأَصْحَلْتَ صَوْتَهُنَّ، مُكْتَئِباتٍ تَخْدِيْ بهنّ الأَبَاعِر، ويَحْدُوْ بهن الأعادي من بلدٍ الى بلد، لا يُراقَبْنَ ولا يُؤْوِيْنَ، يَتَشَوَّفُهنَّ القريبُ والبعيد، ليس معهن وليٌّ من رجالهن، وكيف يُسْتَبْطَأُ في بِغْضَتِنا مَنْ نظر الينا بالشَّنَق والشَّنَآن، والإحَنِ والأَضْغَان.

[252] Ibid., 3:178.

[253] Derogatory term, referring to those of the Quraysh who remained committed enemies of Islam until forced to capitulate upon the Muslims' conquest of Mecca. On that day, they would have been forced into captivity according to their standard warfare practices, but Muḥammad pardoned them and granted them their freedom—thus, "freedmen." Cf. Muḥammad's *khuṭba* to the Meccans on the day of the conquest, in which he says to them "You are free[d] men" (Appendix, text #4c).

us, the one who looks at us with coveting and rancor, with hatred and malice!

أتقول "لَيتَ أشْيَاخي ببدرٍ شَهِدُوْا" غيرَ متأثّمٍ ولا مُستعظِمٍ، وأنت تَنْكُتُ ثَنَايَا أبي عبدِ الله بمخْصَرَتك، ولِمْ لا تكون كذلك وقد نَكَأْتَ القَرْحَة، واسْتأصَلتَ الشَأْفَة، بإهراقِك دماءَ ذُرِّيَّةِ رسولِ الله، ونجومِ الأرضِ من آلِ عبد المطلب. ولَتَرِدَنَّ على الله وشِيكاً مَوْرِدَهم، ولَتَوَدَّنَّ أنَّك عَمِيْتَ وبَكَمْتَ وأنك لم تقل "فاستهلُّوا وأهِلُّوا فَرَحاً."

Do you say "Would that my venerable forefathers at Badr had witnessed …"[254] without considering it a sin, without thinking it a major concern? You strike Abū ʿAbdallāh [al-Ḥusayn's] teeth with your cane?! Why should this not be, when you have picked the wound and extirpated the root by your spilling of the blood of the progeny of the Messenger of God, the stars of the earth from the line of ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib! You shall come before God soon, as they have. And you will wish that you had been blind and dumb [earlier], that you had not said "Praise God and shine forth in joy!"[255]

اللهُمَّ خُذْ بحقّنا، وَانْتَقِمْ لنا ممن ظَلَمَنا. والله ما فَرَيْتَ إلا جِلْدَك، ولا حرزتَ إلا في لَحْمِك، وسَتَرِدُ على رسولِ الله برَغْمِك، وعترتُه ولُحْمَتُه في حظيرة القدس، يومَ يجمع الله شملَهم

O God, give you us our right[s], and exact vengeance for us from those who oppressed us. By God, you [O Yazīd] have pared naught but your own skin. You have incised naught but

[254] At the Battle of Badr, on Muḥammad's side, Ḥamza and ʿAlī had killed Yazīd's forefathers, ʿUtba b. Rabīʿa, Walīd b. ʿUtba, and Shayba b. Rabīʿa (prominent members of the opposing pagan Meccan side) in a duel; Yazīd recited the verses cited here indicating that he has taken blood vengeance, by killing al-Ḥusayn, the grandson of Muḥammad and the son of ʿAlī, and his entire family.

[255] Part of the verses that Yazīd had recited, addressing his pagan forefathers who had been killed opposing the Muslims during the Battle of Badr.

your own flesh. You will come before the Messenger of God despite your [wishing the contrary]. His offspring and his family will be with him in the garden of Paradise, on the day that God brings them together, gathered after being scattered. That is the word of God Almighty, "Do not think those who have been killed in the path of God dead; rather, they are alive near their Lord, sustained."[256] He who put you in this place and gave you charge over the necks of the believers, [i.e. Muʿāwiya], will know—when the judge is God, the protagonist Muḥammad, and your limbs bear witness upon you, "What a terrible exchange for oppressors!"[257]—"which of you is the most terrible of abode, and the weakest of army."[258]

ملمومين من الشَّعَث، وهو قولُ الله تعالى "ولا تحسبن الذين قُتلوا في سبيل الله أمواتاً بل أحياءٌ عندَ ربهم يُرْزَقُون." وَسَيَعْلَمُ مَنْ بَوَّأَكَ ومَكَّنَك مِن رِقابِ المؤمنين إذا كان الحَكَمَ اللهُ والخَصْمَ محمدٌ وجَوَارِحَك شاهِدةٌ عليك، "بِئْسَ للظالمين بَدَلا،" أيُّكم شَرٌّ مكاناً وأضعفُ جُنْدا."

With all this, I, by God—O enemy of God and son of His enemy—find your value little, and your oppression great. But eyes are full of tears, breasts are on fire, and that, nevertheless, does not do anything for us when al-Ḥusayn has been killed, when the party of Satan takes us

مَعَ أني واللهِ يا عدُوَّ الله وابنَ عدُوِّه أستصغِرُ قَدْرَك، وأَسْتَعظمُ تقريعَك، غيرَ أنَّ العُيونَ عَبْرى والصدورَ حَرَّى، وما يَجْزِي ذلك وما يُغْني عنا وقد قُتِل الحسينُ، وحزبُ الشيطانِ يُقَرِّبُنا الى حزب السفهاء، لِيُعْطُوْهم أموالَ الله على انْتِهَاكِ مَحَارِمِ الله. فهذه الأيديْ تَنْطِفُ

256 Qurʾān 3:169.
257 Ibid., 18:50.
258 Ibid., 19:75.

من دِمَائِنا، وهذه الأفواهُ تتحلّب من لُحُوْمِنَا، وتلك الجُثَثُ الزَّوَاكِيْ يَعْتَامُها عسلانُ[259] الفَلَوَات.

before the party of fools, so that the [latter] give them wealth that belongs to God, for violating sanctities proclaimed by God. These hands drip with our blood; these mouths milk our flesh; and those pure bodies!—wolves of the wilderness come to them in the dark.

فلئن اتّخذتَنا مَغْنَماً لتتخذنَّ مَغْرَماً حينَ لا تَجِدُ إلاّ ما قَدَّمَتْ يَدَاكَ، تَسْتَصْرِخُ "يابنَ مرجانة" و يستصرِخُ بك، وتَتَعَاوَى وأتباعَك عند الميزان، وقد وجدتَ أفضلَ زادٍ زَوَّدَكَ معاويةُ قَتْلَك ذريةَ محمد. فوالله ما اتَّقَيْتُ إلّا الله، ولا شكوايَ إلا إلى الله. فَكِدْ كَيْدَكَ، وَاسْعَ سعيك، وناصِبْ جُهْدَكَ، فوالله لا يَرْحَضُ[261] عنك عارَ ما أتيتَ إلينا أبداً.

If you have taken us as booty, indeed, you will find that a sin, at a time when you will not find anything except that which your two hands have submitted. You will scream [for help] "O son of Marjāna" [ʿUbayd Allāh b. Ziyād], and he will scream for you. You, with your followers, will howl at the Scale,[260] when you find that the best provision that Muʿāwiya has provided you with is your killing of the progeny of Muḥammad! By God, I do not fear but God, and my complaint is to none but God. Plot your plot, extend your efforts, and wage

[259] I am not certain of the vocalization of the word عسلان ; Lane states that *ʿassāl* means wolf, but he gives its plural as *ʿussal* and *ʿawāsil*. The plural of *ʿasal* (meaning honey) is *ʿuslān*, which could also be the vocalization for our word.

[260] I.e. when actions are weighed on the Day of Judgment.

[261] The text edition contains يرخص which means "to permit," which does not give us any clear meaning here; it is clearly a typographical error, with the dot of the *ḍād* shifted to the *ḥāʾ*. On the other hand, the word يرحض "to wash away" works well with "shame," the two forming an idiom.

your war! By God, the shame of what you have done to us will never be washed away!

والحمدُ لله الذي خَتَمَ بالسعادة والمغفرة لِسَادَاتِ شُبَّانِ الجِنان، فأوجبَ لهم الجنة. أسْألُ اللهَ أنْ يرفعَ لهم الدرجات، وأن يوجبَ لهم المزيدَ من فضله، فإنه وليٌّ قديرٌ.

Praise be to God who gave an ending[262] of felicity and forgiveness to the chiefs of the youth of paradise[263] and affirmed for them heaven. I ask God to raise their standing, and to affirm for them yet more, by his grace. He is a loving, all-capable [God].

10. *Ṭāriq b. Ziyād* (Umayyad general who first invaded Spain, d. after 95/714)[264]

Type religio-political *khuṭba* delivered 92/711, urging his men to fight; the Umayyad governor of North Africa, Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, sent Ṭāriq with a Berber army to raid the Iberian peninsula of coastal Andalusia; when the Visigothic king Roderic (Ludhārīq) learnt of Ṭāriq's landing at Gibraltar (Jabal Ṭāriq), he came forth with a large army; Ṭāriq's own men, perhaps twelve thousand, were vastly outnumbered; to motivate them to fight, he burnt his own ships, cutting off the possibility of retreat, and delivered the following speech.

Features rhetorical questions; direct address; antithetical and other parallelism; *sajʿ*; Qur'ānic phraseology; imperatives; short sentences; emphatic structures.

أيها الناس، أَينَ المَفَرُّ، البَحْرُ من وَرَائكم، والعدوُّ امامَكمْ، وليس لكم واللهِ إلا الصدقُ

O people! Where will you flee? The sea is behind you, and the enemy in front. There is

262 I.e. death.

263 Meaning al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, referring to the prophetic Hadith in this vein: "Al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn are the chiefs of the youth of paradise." Cf. al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, *Sharḥ al-akhbār*, 3:76; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf,* 2:368.

264 Ṣafwat 1933 2:314-5, #302; after al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ al-ṭīb*; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-aʿyān*.

والصبر. واعلموا أنّكم في هذه الجزيرة أضْيَعُ من الأيتَامِ في مآدِبِ اللّئام.

naught for you but truth and patience. Know that you, in this [peninsula], will gain fewer [favors] than orphans at the table of the base.

وقد استقبلَكم عدوُّكم بجيشه، وأسْلِحَتُه وأقواتُه موفورةٌ، وأنتم لا وَزَرَ لكم إلا سيوفُكم، ولا أقواتَ إلا ما تستخلصونه من أيدي عدوكم. وإن امْتَدَّتْ بكم الأيامُ على افتقاركم، ولم تُنْجِزوا لكم أمراً، ذهبتْ ريحُكم، وتَعَوَّضَتِ القلوبُ من رُعْبِها منكم الجُرْأَةَ عليكم. فادفَعوا عن أنفُسكم خِذْلانَ هذه العاقبةِ من أمرِكم بمُناجَزَةِ هذا الطاغية، فقد ألقتْ به إليكم مدينَتُه الحصينة، وإنَّ انتهازَ الفُرصةِ فيه لَمُمْكِنٌ إن سمحتم لأنفُسكم بالموت. وإني لم أُحَذِّرْكم أمراً أنا عنه بنَجْوَةٍ، ولا حَمَلْتُكم على خُطَّةٍ أَرْخَصُ مَتاعٍ فيها النفوسُ أَرْبأُ فيها بنفسي.

The enemy has confronted you with his army. His weapons and provisions are abundant. You have no refuge except your swords, and no provisions except those which you wrest from the hands of your enemy. If days go by with you still in poverty, without your executing your affair, your breath will disperse, and hearts will exchange their awe of you for acts of boldness. Cast off the humiliation of such an end to your affair by battling this tyrant. His fortified city has thrown him out to you, and it is possible to snatch the opportunity if you put your lives on the line. I do not warn you of something while I myself stand on a safe hillock, nor do I urge you to a line of action in which the cheapest commodity is lives from which I excuse my own life.

واعلموا أنكم إن صبرتم على الأشَقِّ قليلا، استمتعتم بالأَرْفَهِ الأَلَذِّ طويلاً. فلا ترغبوا بأنفسكم عن نفسي فيما حظُّكم فيه أوفر من حظي. وقد بَلَغَكم ما أنشأتْ هذه

Know that if you are patient with the difficult for a short time, you will enjoy the luxurious and delectable for a long time. So do not turn away from me regarding something in which

your share of fortune will be more abundant than mine. It has surely reached you what manner of beautiful sloe-eyed women this peninsula has nurtured—daughters of Greece, proudly trailing long skirts, wearing pearls and coral and garments woven with pure gold, secluded in the palaces of crowned kings.

الجزيرةُ من الحُوْرِ الحِسَان، مِنْ بَنَاتِ اليونان، الرافلاتِ في الدُّرَرِ والمرجان، والحُلَلِ المنسوجةِ بالعِقْيان، المقصوراتِ في قصور الملوك وذوي التيجان.

Al-Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik, the Commander of the Believers, has chosen you, single men, from among all the warriors. He has selected you as sons and relatives in-law for the kings of this [peninsula], trusting that you will be at ease with spear thrusts and generous [with your lives] in fighting warriors and knights; such that his share of fortune, through you, be God's reward for raising His word, and making His religion manifest in this peninsula; and so that its booty be for you, solely, not for him, and not for believers other than you. God Almighty is the giver of aid in this [endeavor] which will remain a memoriam for you in both abodes.

وقد انتخبكم الوليدُ بن عبدِ الملك أميرُ المؤمنين من الأبطالِ عُزْباناً، ورَضِيَكم لملوكِ هذه الجزيرةِ أصهاراً وأختانا، ثِقَةً منه بارْتِيَاحِكم للطِّعَان، وإسماحِكم بمجالَدَةِ الأبطالِ والفُرْسان، لِيَكونَ حظُّه منكم ثوابَ الله على إعلاءِ كلمتِه، وإظهارِ دينه بهذه الجزيرة، وليكونَ مَغْنَمُها خالصاً لكم مِنْ دونه ومن دونِ المؤمنين سِوَاكم. واللهُ تعالى وَلِيُّ إنجادِكم على ما يكون لكم ذِكْراً في الدَّارَين.

Know that I will be the first to answer that which I call you to. When the two armies meet, I shall attack the [Andalusians'] tyrant Lu-

واعلموا أني أوَّلُ مجيبٍ إلى ما أدعوكم إليه، وأني عند مُلْتَقَى الْجَمْعَيْنِ حَامِلٌ بنفسي على طاغيةِ القومِ لُذَرِيْق، فقاتِلُه إنشاء الله.

فاحمِلوا معي، فإنْ هلكتُ بعدَه، فقد كُفيتُم أمرَه، ولن يُعْوِزَكم بَطَلٌ عاقلٌ تُسْنِدون أمورَكم إليه، وإنْ هلكتُ قبل وصولي إليه، فَاخْلُفُوني في عزيمتي هذه واحمِلوا بأنفُسكم عليه، واكْفُوا المُهِمَّ من فتحِ هذه الجزيرةِ بقتله، فإنهم بعدَه يُخْذَلون.

dharīq [Roderic], and, God willing, kill him. Attack with me! If I die afterwards, you will have been sufficed his affair, and will not have difficulty finding a sensible, heroic warrior to whom you can entrust your affairs. If I die before reaching him, then succeed you me in this my firm intention, and attack him. Undertake the essential part of the conquest of this peninsula by killing him. For after him they shall be subjugated.

11. *al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī* (Umayyad governor of Kūfa, d. 95/714)[265]

Type political *khuṭba*, delivered to the people of Kūfa, who were largely pro-*ahl al-bayt* and anti-Umayyad, when he arrived there in 75/695 as the city's new governor; probably a full *khuṭba*.

Features use of desert imagery such as dry water skins; strong, metaphorical language; direct, emphatic address with *nūn al-tawkīd* and particles of emphasis; proliferation of oaths; parallel syntax; poetry and Qurʾān citation; short sentences; military draft instructions in final segment.

أَنَا ابْنُ جَلا وَطَلاَّعُ الثَّنَايَا

"I am a son of the morning, an [intrepid] climber of narrow mountain paths,[266]

[265] Ṣafwat 1933 2:288-91, #276; after al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*; al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*; al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*; al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā*; Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*; al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*; al-ʿAbbāsī, *Maʿāhid al-tanṣīṣ*; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*; Ibn Nubāta, *Sarḥ al-ʿUyūn*; Ibn ʿAsākir, *Taʾrīkh*. In another *khuṭba* delivered three days later, al-Hajjāj addressed his audience again as "people of dissension and hypocrisy," Ṣafwat 1933 2:291-2, #277.

[266] Connotes an able man and experienced manager.

مَتَى أَضَعِ العِمَامَةَ تَعْرِفُوْنِي

When I don my turban, you will know me."[267]

يا أهلَ الكوفة، أَمَا واللهِ إنّي لَأَحْمِلُ الشَّرَّ بِحِمْلِه، وأَحْذُوْهُ بِنَعْلِه، وأجزيه بِمِثْلِه، وإنّي لأَرَى أبصاراً طامحة، وأعناقا مُتَطاولة، ورُؤُوْساً قد أَيْنَعَتْ وَحَانَ قِطَافُهَا، وإنّي لَصاحِبُها، وكأني أنظرُ الى الدّماءِ بين العَمَائِمِ واللِّحَى تَتَرَقْرَق. [شعر].

O people of Kufa. Indeed, by God, I contain evil by its [own] scabbard. I shoe it with its [own] shoe. I reward it with its like. Indeed, I see ambitious eyes, long necks, and heads that have ripened, the time for whose plucking has arrived. I am the person for it. I am like to see blood dripping between turbans and beards. [Several verses of poetry].

إنّي واللهِ يا أهلَ العراق، يا أهلَ الشِّقاقِ والنِّفاق، ومَسَاوِي الأخلاق، ما يُقَعْقَعُ لي بالشِّنان، ولا يُغْمَزُ جانِبَيَّ كَغَمْزِ التِّين، ولقد فُرِزْتُ عن ذَكَاء،وفُتِّشْتُ عن تجربة، وجَرَّيْتُ الى الغاية القُصْوى. وإنّ أميرَ المؤمنين، أطال اللهُ بقاءَه، نَثَرَ كِنانَته بين يَدَيْه، فعَجَمَ عِيْدَانَها، فَوَجَدَنِيْ أمَرَّها عُوْدا، وأَصْلَبَها مَكْسِرا، فَرَمَاكم بي، لأنكم طَالَمَا أَوْضَعْتُم في الفِتَن، وَاضْطَجَعْتُم في مَرَاقِدِ الضَّلال، وَسَنَنْتم سُنَنَ الغَيّ.

By God—O people of Iraq, O people of dissension and hypocrisy and wicked morals—I am not one to [be spooked] by the rattling of dry water skins. My sides cannot be squeezed to test for freshness like the squeezing of figs. Verily, I have been examined [like horse's teeth] for maturity, and checked for experience—and I have galloped to the final goal post. To be sure, the Commander of the Faithful [ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān]—may God prolong his life—strewed his quiver in front of him and bit down on its shafts—he found me the strong-

267 The verse al-Hajjāj quotes is by Suḥaym b. Wathīl al-Riyāḥī.

est[268] of them in wood, the most solid of them in column. Then he shot me at you, for you have long been quick to sedition. You have lain down in the couches of error. You have walked the paths of transgression.

أَمَا واللهِ لأَلْحُونَكم لَحْوَ العَصَا، ولأَقْرَعَنَّكم قَرْعَ المَرْوَة، ولأَعْصِبَنَّكم عَصْبَ السَّلَمَة، ولأضرِبَنَّكم ضربَ غرائبِ الإبل. فإنكم لَكَـ "أَهْلِ قريةٍ كانت آمنةً مطمئنةً يأتيها رزقُها من كلِّ مكانٍ فَكَفَرَتْ بِأَنْعُمِ اللهِ فَأَذَاقَهَا اللهُ لِبَاسَ الجُوْعِ والخَوْفِ بما كانوا يَصْنَعُوْن." وإني واللهِ لا أَعِدُ إلاّ وَفَيْتُ، ولا أَهُمُّ إلاّ أَمْضَيْتُ، ولا أَخْلُقُ إلا فَرَيْتُ. فَإِيَّايَ وهذه الشُّفَعَاءَ، والزَّرَافاتِ والجماعات، وقالاً وقيلاً، و"ما تقول" و"فِيمَ أنتم وَذَاك." أَمَا واللهِ لَتَسْتَقِيْمُنَّ على طريقِ الحقِّ أَوْ لأَدَعَنَّ لِكلِّ رَجُلٍ منكم شُغْلاً في جَسَدِه.

Indeed, by God, I shall skin you as I would skin a rod. I shall strike you as I would strike a flint. I shall wrap you up as I would wrap a salama tree. I will beat you as I would beat alien camels. Indeed, you are like "the people of a town that was protected, at ease, its sustenance coming to it lavishly from every place, then it showed ingratitude for the favors of God, so God made it taste the garments of hunger and fear because of what they had been doing."[269] Indeed, I do not make a promise without carrying it out. I do not intend [a thing] without following it through. I do not measure without cutting. So beware of me, and beware of these intercessors and groups and assemblies, of speaking this and that, of "What do you say?" and "Where do you [stand] in that?" Indeed, by

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268 *Amarr* is an elative of *mirra*, indicating strength and firmness.

269 Qur'ān 16:112.

God, you shall stay on the path of Truth, or I shall bequeath to each man among you some preoccupation in his body.

The Commander of the Faithful has commanded me to give you your pay, and to send you to battle your enemy [the Azāriqa Khārijites] with al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra. I swear by God that I shall not find a man who has stayed behind after taking his pay by three days but I will spill his blood, seize his property, and demolish his house.

وإنّ أميرَ المؤمنين أَمَرَنِيْ بإعْطائِكم أَعْطِيَاتِكم، وأنْ أُوَجِّهَكم لِمُحَارَبَةِ عَدُوِّكم، مع المُهَلَّبِ بْنِ أبي صُفْرة، وإني أُقسمُ باللهِ لا أجدُ رَجُلاً تَخَلَّفَ بعدَ أَخْذِ عَطَائِه بثلاثةِ أيامٍ إلاّ سَفَكْتُ دَمَه، وأَنْهَبْتُ مالَه، وهَدَمْتُ مَنْزِلَه.

12. *al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī* (ascetic preacher of Basra, d. 110/728)[270]

Type excerpt from a sermon of pious counsel, urging *zuhd* and reflection on death

Features direct address; refrain "O son of Adam!"; prescriptive; many rhetorical questions, oaths, and exclamations; simple, repetetive syntax and vocabulary; syntactical and antithetical parallelism.

O son of Adam: sell this world of yours in return for the hereafter and you will profit in both. Do not sell your hereafter for this world, or you will lose both. O son of Adam: if you see people doing good, compete with them for it. If you see them doing evil, do not envy them

يا بْنَ آدم، بِعْ دُنْيَاكَ بِآخِرَتِك تَرْبَحْهما جميعا، ولا تَبِعْ آخرَتَك بِدنياك فَتَخْسَرْهما جميعا. يابنَ آدم، إذا رأيتَ الناسَ في الخيرِ فَنَافِسْهم فيه، وإذا رأيتَهم في الشَّرِّ فلا تَغْبِطْهم عليه. الثَّواءُ ههنا قليل، والبقاءُ هناك طويل، أُمَّتُكم آخِرُ الأمم، وانتم آخِرُ أُمَّتِكم، وقد أُسْرِعَ بخِياركم،

[270] Ṣafwat 1933 2:485-7, #459; after al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*; Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*.

for it. Residence here is short, and the abode there is long. Your community is the last of communities, and you are the last of your community. The best among you have been quickly [taken], so what do you await? Seeing [the hereafter] with [your own eyes]? It is as though indeed—Far be it! Far be it!—this world has gone, along with the one who ornaments oneself with it, and deeds remain as collars around the necks of the sons of Adam! O what a counsel it is, if only it would find life in hearts! Indeed, by God, there is no community after your community, no prophet after your Prophet, and no Book after your Book. You drive the people forward and the Hour drives you. Indeed, the first among you is made to wait so that the last among you can catch up with him.[271] Whosoever saw Muḥammad—May God bless him—saw him coming and going without laying brick upon brick, or stick upon stick. A banner

فماذا تنتظرون، المُعاينة، فَكَأَنْ قَدْ، هَيْهَاتَ هَيْهَات، ذَهَبَتِ الدُّنْيَا بِحَالِيْهَا، وبَقِيَتِ الْأَعْمَالُ قَلَائِدَ فِي أَعْنَاقِ بَنِيْ آدَم. فَيَا لَهَا موعظةً لَوْ وَافَقَتْ من القلوب حَيَاةً، أَمَا إِنَّه والله لاَ أُمَّةَ بعدَ أُمَّتِكم، ولا نبيَّ بعدَ نبيِّكم، ولا كتابَ بعد كتابِكم، أنتم تَسُوْقُوْنَ الناسَ والساعةُ تَسُوْقُكم، وإنَّما يُنْتَظَرُ بِأَوَّلِكم أنْ يَلْحَقَه آخِرُكم. مَنْ رَآى محمدًا فقد رآهُ غاديًا ورائحا، لم يَضَعْ لَبِنَةً على لَبِنَة، ولا قَصَبَةً على قَصَبَة، رُفِع له عَلَمٌ فَشَمَّرَ اليه. فَالْوَحَاءَ الوحاء، و النجاءَ النجاء، عَلامَ تُعَرِّجون، اِثْبُتم وربِّ الكعبة، قد أُسْرِعَ بِخِيَارِكم، وأنتم كُلَّ يومٍ تَرْذُلُوْن، فماذا تنتظرون، .....

[271] Cf. similar phrase in ʿAlī's *khuṭba* (al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha*, 79, #21)—Could this be possible influence from ʿAlī? Or is it a back projection of al-Ḥasan's words on ʿAlī's? Or could it be a common sentiment expressed by both? Double attribution appears to be a common problem. For a list of words attributed to both ʿAlī and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, see Mourad 2005, 85-7, who points out that al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (*al-Amālī*, 1:153) claimed that al-Ḥasan commonly borrowed from ʿAlī, the latter being the unanimously acknowledged model [of eloquence].

was raised for him and he strove towards it. So, quick, quick! Escape, escape! What are you stopping for? You have been come upon, by the Lord of the Kaʿba! The best among you have been quickly [taken], and you, every day, became more lowly! What do you await? …..

O son of Adam! Tread the earth [gently] with your foot, for it will soon be your grave. Know that you have been using up your lifespan ever since you dropped from your mother's womb. May God have mercy on a man who looks and reflects, reflects and pays heed, perceives and is patient. For many a people perceived but did not have patience. Then [their] trepidation took away their lives[272]—they did not obtain what they sought, nor did they return to what they left behind …

يابنَ آدم، طَأِ الأرضَ بقدمك[273]، فإنّها عن قليلٍ قبرُك، واعلمْ أنك لم تزل في هَدْمِ عُمْرِك مُنْذُ سَقَطْتَ من بَطْنِ أُمّك. رَحِمَ اللهُ رَجُلاً نَظَرَ فَتَفَكَّر، وتَفَكَّرَ فَاعْتَبَر، وأبصرَ فَصَبَر، فقد أبصرَ أقوامٌ ولم يَصْبِرُوْا، فَذَهَبَ الْجَزَعُ بقلوبهم، ولم يُدْرِكُوْا ما طَلَبُوْا، ولم يَرجِعُوْا الى ما فَارَقُوْا …

272 Lit., their hearts.

273 Perhaps a word is missing here, conveying the meaning "gently."

13. *Abū Ḥamza al-Shārī*
(Khārijite commander, d. ca. 130/748)[274]

Type religio-political speech, threatening the people of Medina, and laying out in detail the Khārijite view of the historical caliphate—namely, that Muḥammad was the Prophet of Islam, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar were his rightful successors and righteous caliphs, ʿUthmān was good and bad, ʿAlī was not good, the Umayyads after him stained the name of Islam, the Shiʿites were misguided in their doctrine of allegiance to the family of the Prophet, whereas the Khārijites were the only real Muslims, because they prayed, fasted, and gave their lives for God; my excerpt.

Features Qurʾānic references and vocabulary; direct address,; parallelism; full *sajʿ* in some passages; cursing of the Umayyads; short sentences; simple syntax; graphic descriptions; rhetorical questions; exclamations.

يأهلَ المدينة، قد بَلَغَنِيْ مَقَالَتُكم لأصحابي، ولو لا معرفتي بِضَعْفِ رَأْيِكم وقِلَّةِ عقولِكم لأَحْسَنْتُ أَدَبَكم.

O people of Medina! Your words about my companions have reached me. If I had not been aware of the weakness of your opinions, and the littleness of your brains, I would have taught you a good lesson.

وَيْحَكم. إنّ رسولَ الله أُنزِلَ عليه الكتابُ، وبُيِّنَ له السُّنَن، وشُرِعَ له فيه الشَّرَائع، وبُيِّنَ له فيه ما يأتي وما يَذَر، فلم يكن يتقدَّم إلا بأَمْرِ الله، ولا يُحْجِمُ إلاّ عن أمرِ الله، حتى قَبَضَه اللهُ إليه وقد أَدَّى الذي عليه، وعَلَّمَ المسلمين مَعَالِمَ دينهم.

Woe to you! Indeed, the Book was revealed to the Messenger of God (God's blessings upon him!), the paths (*sunan*) were disclosed to him in it, the ways (*sharāʾiʿ*) were laid out for him in it, and what he should do and what he should leave was explicated for him in it. He did not

[274] Ṣafwat 1933 2:469-76, #449; after Abū al-Faraj, *al-Aghānī*; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*; al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, *al-ʿIqd al-farīd*.

go forward except by God's command, and he did not desist except by God's command, until God took him back (God's blessings upon him!), after he had discharged all that was incumbent upon him, after he had taught the Muslims the signposts of their religion.

He did not leave them any doubt in their affair. He charged Abū Bakr with leading them in their ritual prayer, so they charged him with their worldly matter[s], when the Messenger of God charged him with their religious matter[s]. [Abū Bakr] acted according to the Book and the Practice [of the Prophet] (*sunna*), fought the people who turned away (*ahl al-ridda*), and tucked up his garments in the affair[s] of God, until God took him back, the community being pleased with him—may he have God's mercy and forgiveness.

ولم يَدَعْهم مِنْ أَمْرِهم في شُبْهَة، ووَلَّى أبا بكرٍ صَلاتَهم، فَوَلَّاه المسلمون أمرَ دُنْيَاهم، حين ولَّاه رسولُ الله أمرَ دينهم. فَعَمِلَ بالكتاب والسُّنّة، وقاتَلَ أهلَ الرِّدَّة، وشَمَّرَ في أمرِ الله، حتى قَبَضَه اللهُ إليه، والأُمَّةُ عنه رَاضُوْن، رحمةُ الله عليه ومغفرتُه.

Then ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb [became caliph] after him. He followed the path (*sīra*) of his companion, acted by the Book and the Practice [of the Prophet] (*sunna*), mobilized the armies, settled

ثم وَلِيَ بعده عمرُ بْنُ الخطاب، فَسَارَ بِسِيْرَة صاحبه، وعَمِلَ بالكتاب والسنة، وجَنَّدَ الأجناد، ومَصَّرَ الأمصار، وجَبَى الْفَئ، ... وجمع الناسَ في شهر رمضان، ...

cantonments, collected taxes, … assembled the people in the month of Ramaḍān,[275] …

ثم وَلِيَ من بعده عثمانُ بْنُ عفان، فَسَارَ سِتَّ سنين بسيرةِ صاحِبَيْه، وكان دونهما، ثم سار في السِّتِّ الأَوَاخِرِ بما أَحْبَطَ الأوائل …

Then ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān [became caliph] after him. He followed the path of his two companions for six years—although he was less [able] than them—then did in the last six years that which cancelled the first [six] …

ثم وَلِيَ عليُّ بْنُ أبي طالب، فلم يَبْلُغْ مِنَ الحقِّ قَصْداً، ولم يرفعْ له مَنَارا، ثم مَضَى لسبيله.

Then ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib [became caliph]. He did not reach the goal, in terms of Truth, and he did not raise up a guiding lantern to it. Then he went on his way.

ثم وَلِيَ معاويةُ بْنُ أبي سُفْيَان، لَعِيْنُ رسولِ الله وابْنُ لعينِه، وجِلْفٌ من الأعراب، وبَقِيَّةٌ من الأحزاب، مُؤَلَّفٌ طليق. فَسَفَكَ الدَّمَ الحرام، واتَّخَذَ عِبَادَ الله خَوَلا … حتى مَضَى لسبيله. فَالْعَنُوْهُ لَعَنَهُ اللهُ.

Then Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān [became caliph]—a man cursed by the Messenger of God (God's blessings upon him!), son of the man cursed by him, a dry water skin of the Bedouins, a remnant of the Confederates (*aḥzāb*),[276] a man whose loyalty was bought by money, a man freed [after being imprisoned fighting Islam]. He spilt sacred blood, made slaves of the

[275] Refers to the *tarāwīḥ* prayed introduced by ʿUmar, which is prayed by Sunni Muslims nightly in Ramaḍān after the *ʿishāʾ* prayer communally, led by an Imām.

[276] Reference to the coalition of Arab tribes lead by Muʿāwiya's father against Muḥammad and the Muslims in the year 5/627; the ensuing battle is known as the Battle of the Confederates (*al-Aḥzāb*) and also as the Battle of the Trench (*al-Khandaq*), after the trench dug by the Muslims around Medina to stop enemy forces from entering it.

servants of God … until he went on his way. Curse you him!—May God curse him!

Then his son Yazīd [became caliph] after him—Yazīd of the wines, Yazīd of the hawks, Yazīd of the leopards, Yazīd of the hunting parties, Yazīd of the monkeys, a man licentious of stomach, blameworthy of genitals. He contravened the Qur'ān, followed the soothsayers, took the monkey as a boon-companion, and followed his pleasures, until he died doing that. May God curse him, and do countless [bad things] to him!

ثم وَلِيَ بعده أبْنُه يزيد. يزيدُ الخُمُور، ويزيدُ الصُّقُوْر، ويزيدُ الفُهُوْد، ويزيدُ الصُّيُوْد، ويزيدُ القُرُوْد، الفاسقُ في بَطْنِه، المأبونُ في فَرْجِه. فخَالَفَ القرآن، واتَّبَعَ الكُهَّان، ونادَمَ القِرْد، وعَمِلَ بما يَشْتَهِيْه، حتى مَضَى على ذلك، لَعَنَهُ اللهُ، وفَعَلَ به وفَعَل.

Then Marwān b. al-Ḥakam [became caliph], a repudiated man, a man cursed by the Messenger of God (God's blessings upon him!), son of the man cursed by him, a man licentious of stomach and genitals. Curse you him and curse his forebears!

ثم وَلِيَ مروانُ بْنُ الحَكَم، طريدٌ لعينُ رسولِ الله وابنُ لعينه، فاسقٌ في بطنه وفرجه. فَالْعَنُوْهُ والْعَنُوْا آباءه.

Then the sons of Marwān tossed around [the caliphate] among them, after him—people of the house of accursedness, men repudiated by the Messenger of God (God's blessings upon him!), a group of men freed [after being imprisoned fighting Islam], who were neither from

ثم تَدَاوَلَها بنو مروانَ بعده، أهلُ بيتِ اللعنة، طُرَداءُ رسولِ الله، وقومٌ من الطلقاء، ليسوا من المهاجرين والأنصار، ولا التابعين بإحسان، فأكلوا مالَ الله أَكْلا، ولَعِبُوْا بِدِينِ الله لَعْبا …

the Emigrants or Helpers, nor from "the successors in the good." They devoured the property of God, and played games with the religion of God … (3 pages on the Umayyads omitted).

As for our brothers, these Shīʿa—they are not our brothers in religion! But I heard God Almighty say in His Book, "O people, we have created you peoples and tribes such that you get to know one another." They are a sect which pretends to follow the Book of God, but manifests falsehood against God … (one page omitted) … they have charged the people of an Arab house with their religion, and they think that their allegiance to them absolves them of the need to perform good deeds, that it will save them from retribution for evil deeds. May God fight them! How they do falsify!

So which of these sects, O people of Medina, will you follow? Which of their denominations will you conform to?

I have heard that you criticize my companions. You have said they are youths of tender age and harsh Bedouins. Woe to you, O people of Medina! Were the companions of the Messenger of

وأَمَّا إخوانُنا من هذه الشيعة، وليسوا بإخواننا في الدين، لكني سمعتُ اللهَ عز وجل قال في كتابه "يأيها الناس إنَّا خلقناكم من ذَكَرٍ وأُنثى وجعلناكم شعوبا وقبائل لتعارفوا،" فإنها فِرْقَةٌ تَظَاهَرَتْ بكتاب الله، وأَعْلَنَتِ الفِرْيَةَ على الله، ... قد قَلَّدوا أهلَ بيتٍ من العربِ دِيْنَهم، وزعموا أنَّ مُوالاتَهم لهم تُغْنيهم من الأعمال الصالحة، وتُنْجيهم من عِقَابِ الأعمالِ السيئة. قاتَلَهم الله أَنَّى يُؤْفِكون.

فأيُّ هذه الفِرَقِ يا أهل المدينة تَتَّبِعُوْن، أم بِأَيِّ مَذَاهِبِهم تَقْتَدُوْن.

وقد بلغني أنكم تنتقصون أصحابي، قلتم هم شبابٌ أحداث، وأعرابٌ جُفاة. وَيْحَكم يا أهلَ المدينة، وهل كان أصحابُ رسولِ الله المذكورون في الخَبَرِ إلا شَبَاباً أحداثا، ...

شبابٌ واللهِ مُكْتَهِلُوْنَ في شبابهم، غضيضةٌ عن الشر أعيُنُهم، ثقيلةٌ عن الباطل أرْجُلُهم، أَنْضَاءُ عبادة، وأَطْلاحُ سَهَر، بَاعُوْا أنفساً تموت غدا، بأنفسٍ لا تموت أبدا، ... آهِ آهِ على فراق الإخوان، رحمةُ الله على تلك الأبدان، وأَدْخَلَ أرواحَهم الجِنان.

God (God's blessings upon him and his progeny!)—people mentioned in the [Hadith]—other than youths of tender age? … [My companions] are youths who have attained the maturity of the old in their youth, their eyes are averted from evil, their feet are heavy [and hold back] from the path of wrongdoing, they are emaciated by worship, gaunt from night vigils. They traded lives that will end tomorrow for souls that will never die … (one and a half pages omitted) … Alas! Alas! For the loss of brothers! God's mercy upon those bodies! May He admit their souls into Paradise!

14. *Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ* (Muʿtazilite leader, d. 131/748)[277]

Type sermon of pious counsel with Muʿtazilite ideas; my excerpt.

Features *rāʾ*-less *khuṭba*; Muʿtazilite ideas of God's justice, creation *ex nihilo*, and the importance of rationality; extended *ubi sunt* segment with rhetorical questions; syntactical parallelism; powerful animal imagery; graphic descriptions; repetition; Qurʾānic citations.

الحمدُ للهِ القديمِ بلا غاية، والباقي بلا نهاية، الذي عَلا في دُنُوِّه، ودَنَا في عُلُوِّه، ولا يَئُوْدُهُ

Praise be to God! Timeless without [beginning], eternal without end. Elevated in His

[277] Ṣafwat 1933 2:501-3, #475; after Aḥmad Miftāḥ, *Miftāḥ al-afkār*. Cf. also text and translation of another of his sermons in Wāṣil, *Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ als Prediger und Theologe*, 21-37.

nearness, near in His elevation. Time does not contain Him, Place does not compass Him, the protection of His creation does not tire Him. He did not create it based on a prior model. Rather, he produced it from nothing, and made it even (*ʿaddalahū*) while crafting it. He made beautiful each thing he created, completed his intent, made clear his wisdom, and thus demonstrated his divinity. Glory be to God! There is nobody who can refute His command; there is nobody who can prevent the execution of His decree. Every thing humbles itself in the face of His greatness. Every thing is subservient in the face of his power. His generosity extends to every thing. A grain weight does not escape His notice. He is the all-Seeing, the all-Knowing. I bear witness that there is no God but God, One, a God whose names are blessed, whose favors are great, who is exalted above the characteristics of every creature, and is disassociated from similarity with every crafted thing. Thoughts cannot reach Him. Neither intellects nor cognitive faculties can compass Him. When He is disobeyed he forbears. When He is invoked He

حِفْظُ ما خَلَق، ولم يَخْلُقْه على مثالٍ سَبَق، بل أَنْشَأَ ابْتِدَاعًا، وعَدَّلَه اصْطِنَاعا، فأَحْسَنَ كلَّ شيءٍ خَلَقَه، وتَمَّمَ مَشِيئَتَه، وأَوْضَحَ حِكمته، فَدَلَّ على أُلوهيَّته. فسبحانه، لا مُعَقِّبَ لِحُكْمه، ولا دافعَ لقضائه. تَوَاضَعَ كلُّ شيءٍ لعظمته، وذَلَّ كلُّ شيءٍ لسُلطانه. ووسِعَ كلَّ شيءٍ فضلُه، لا يَعْزُبُ عنه مِثْقَالُ حَبَّة، وهو السميعُ العليم. وأشهدُ أنْ لا إلهَ إلاّ اللهُ وَحْدَه، إلهاً تَقَدَّسَتْ أسماؤُه، وعَظُمَتْ آلاؤُه، وعَلا عن صفاتِ كلِّ مخلوق، وتَنَزَّهَ عن شبيهِ كُلِّ مصنوع. فلا تبلغه الأوهام، ولا تحيط به العقول ولا الأفهام، يُعْصَى فَيَحْلُم، ويُدْعَى فَيَسْمَع، ويَقْبَلُ التوبةَ من عِبَادِه، ويَعْفُوْ عن السيئات، ويَعْلَمُ ما تفعلون.

hears. He accepts repentance from his servants, forgives transgressions, and knows what you do.

… (praise of Muḥammad and prayer for him, one paragraph omitted) …

I counsel you, servants of God, and myself, to be God-fearing (*taqwā*), to act in obedience to Him, to avoid disobeying Him. I urge you to do what brings you close to Him, what takes you near to Him. For piety in fear of God is the best provision, and the best end in [the] Returning. Let not worldly life distract you with its ornaments and deceptions … (censure of the world omitted) … Where are the kings who built Ctesiphon? And strengthened palaces? And fortified gates? And kept masses of chamberlains? And trained purebred horses? And possessed [all] the lands? And made use of inherited cattle and slaves?—[This world] grabbed them along with their carrying litters, it crushed them with its breast, it chomped on them with its canines! It gave them in exchange for vast space, narrow confines; for might, humility; for

…

أُوصيكم عبادَ اللهِ مع نفسي بتقوى الله، والعملِ بطاعته، والمجانبةِ لمعصيته. وأَحُضُّكم على ما يُدْنِيكم منه، ويُزْلِفُكم لَدَيْه. فإنّ تقوى الله أفضلُ زَاد، وأحسنُ عاقبةٍ في المَعَاد. ولا تُلْهِيَنَّكم الحياةُ الدنيا بزينتها وخُدَعِها … أينَ الملوكُ الذين بَنَوا الْمَدَائِن، وشَيَّدُوا المصانع، وأوثقوا الأبواب، وكَاثَفُوا الحُجَّاب، وأعَدُّوا الجياد، ومَلَكوا البلاد، واستخدموا التّلاد. قبضتْهم بَمَحْمِلِها، وطَحَنَتْهم بِكَلْكَلِها، وعَضَّتْهم بأَنْيَابها. وعاضَتْهم مِنَ السَّعَةِ ضِيْقا، ومن العِزَّة ذلًّا، ومن حياةٍ فناء. فَسَكَنُوْا اللُّحُوْد، وأَكَلَهم الدُّوْد، وأصبحوا لا تَرى إلا مساكنَهم، ولا تجد إلا معالمهم، ولا تُحِسُّ منهم من أحد، ولا تسمع لهم نَبْسا. فتزوَّدوا، عافاكم الله، فإنّ أفضلَ الزادِ التقوى، "واتقوا اللهَ يا أُولي الألباب لعلكم تُفلحون." جَعَلَنا اللهُ وإيّاكم ممن ينتفع بمواعظه، ويَعْمَلُ لِحَظِّه وسعادته …

life, perishing. They went to reside in graves. Maggots ate them. They became such that you see only their abodes, and you find only their signposts. You do not sense [the presence] of any one of them. You do not hear a single sound from them. So assemble provisions—May God protect you! The best provision is piety, fearing God: "Fear God, O people of intelligence, such that you prosper."[278] May God place us, and you, with one who benefits from his counsels, and acts for his good fortune and felicity … (prayer and Qurʾānic verses, one paragraph omitted).

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LIBĀS
DIE ENTLIEHENEN KLEIDER DES ABŪ NUWĀS

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Wir haben schon den *ṭaylasān* des Ibn Ḥarb.[1] Jetzt gibt es auch die entliehenen Kleider des Abū Nuwās. Der *ṭaylasān* des Ibn Ḥarb war kaputt und veritativ. Kaputte veritative Kleider finden sich bei Abū Nuwās auch. Es handelt sich dabei zumeist um zerrissene Hosenbänder (*tikka*) und Schurze (*izār*), weil das Aufknoten dem Liebhaber nicht schnell genug ging. Doch davon soll hier nicht die Rede sein. Im folgenden geht es um metaphorische Kleider. Das paßt besser zu dem Gefeierten.

Im *Dīwān* des Abū Nuwās kommen knapp fünfhundert Erwähnungen von Kleidern und vom Bekleiden vor. Gut zweihundert davon sind veritativ und zweihundert sind metaphorisch. Beim Rest handelt es sich um Vergleiche und andere bildliche Ausdrücke. Eine genaue Statistik ist schwer möglich, da manche Textilien mehrdeutig sind (*liḥāf* z.B. „Überwurf" und „Bettdecke") und bei einigen Verben die Metaphorik stark verblaßt ist (z.B. *satara* neben „verschleiern" auch „verstecken, behüten").

Meine Stellensammlung zu den Kleidermetaphern soll einerseits für einen Teilbereich die Metaphorik des Abū Nuwās darstellen, andererseits soll sie auch – vor allen in den Appendizes – einen kleinen Beitrag zur Lexikographie liefern, der allerdings umso kleiner ausfällt, als die beiden wichtigsten Bekleidungswurzeln *ksw* und *lbs* bereits im WKAS erschienen sind, wobei auch die metaphorische Verwendung ausgiebig belegt ist.[2] Mein Nachtrag kann also nur noch zeigen, welche Möglichkeiten von einem einzelnen Dichter genutzt wurden.

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[1] van Ess 1979.

[2] *WKAS*, 1: *Kāf*, 197b-99b; 201b; 2: *Lām*, 125b-27b; 133a-34a; 139b; 140b; 141b-42b; 143b-44a; 145b; 147b-48a. Weiteres findet man in den kürzeren Stichwörtern, in denen die Metaphern nicht gesondert aufgeführt sind.

Mit der Metaphorik ergeht es mir nicht viel besser. Die zahlreichen Arbeiten von Wolfhart Heinrichs zu diesem Thema lassen einem nicht mehr viel übrig. Zwar gilt das Interesse von Heinrichs primär der Entwicklung der Terminologie der arabischen Literaturwissenschaftler zur Metapher und anderen rhetorischen Figuren. Da aber die literaturwissenschaftliche Terminologie nicht völlig unabhängig von der Entwicklung der Literatur ist, zeichnen Heinrichs' Werke, vor allem in ihren Beispielversen, doch auch die Geschichte der Metapher selbst nach. Eigentlich alle Typen von Metaphern werden von ihm analysiert. So besteht mein Beitrag auch hier in erster Linie in der Konzentration auf einen semantischen Bereich und einen Dichter.

Da es Heinrichs um Terminologiegeschichte geht, arbeitet er diachron. Das ist bei einem einzelnen Dichter wenig sinnvoll. Ich habe deshalb vor allem grammatische Kategorien zugrundegelegt. Um allerdings die Geschichte nicht völlig auf den Kopf zu stellen, beginne auch ich mit dem, was Heinrichs die „alte Metapher"[3] nennt, zumal sie bei Abū Nuwās besonders häufig belegt ist. Sie beruht auf einem Gleichnis (*tamthīl*)[4] und hat somit eine verhältnismäßig komplizierte grammatische Struktur. Am Ende steht auch bei mir die „neue Metapher", die auf einem Vergleich (*tashbīh*)[5] beruht und grammatisch nur aus einem einzigen Wort besteht. Sie kommt bei Abū Nuwās – vor allem im Kleiderbereich – noch nicht so oft vor.

Eine bei Abū Nuwās recht häufig vertretene „alte Metapher" ist dreigliedrig. Sie ist folgendermaßen strukturiert: Eine verbale Bekleidungsmetapher generiert ein zugehöriges metaphorisches Objekt aus dem Kleiderbereich, von dem dann im Genitiv ein Abstraktum auf veritativer Ebene abhängt:[6]

1. *fa-lammā raʾaytu l-ṣabra laysa bi-nāfiʿī * labistu thiyāba l-jahri in amkana l-jahrū* (3:422, 1).[7]
   Als ich sah, daß Selbstbeherrschung mir nichts nutzen würde, kleidete ich mich mit den Kleidern der Offenheit, wann immer Offenheit möglich war.

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[3] Heinrichs 1977, 1.
[4] Ibid., 7.
[5] Ibid., 13.
[6] Heinrichs 1984, 206-8.
[7] Alle Stellenangaben hinter den Verszitaten beziehen sich auf Abū Nuwās (gest. um 814), *Dīwān*. Auf die Bandangabe folgt nach einem Doppelpunkt die Seitenzahl und dann nach einem Komma die Zeilenzahl. a bedeutet erster Halbvers und b zweiter Halbvers.

2. *labista ridāʾa l-fakhri fī ṣulbi Ādamin* (1:294, 9a).
   Du bekleidetest dich bereits in den Lenden Adams mit dem Mantel des Ruhms.

3. *muʿaqrabu l-ṣudghi malbūsun ʿawāriḍuhū * jilbāba ḥusnin ʿalayhi l-nūru maʿṭūfū* (4:257, 9).
   Einer mit skorpionförmigen Schläfenlocken, einer, dessen Wangen mit einem Gewand von Schönheit bekleidet sind, einer, dem das Licht zugetan ist.

4. *wa-ʿtamma minhu bi-thawbi l-dhulli wa-ltafaʿā* (2:139, 8b).
   Er „beturbante" sich durch sie (die Spottgedichte) mit dem Kleid der Erniedrigung und hüllte sich (in es) ein.

5. *muqannaʿatun bi-thawbi l-ḥusni tarʿā * bi-ghayri takallufin thamara l-qulūbī* (4:16, 4).
   (Er ist ein) mit dem Kleid der Schönheit Verschleierter, der ohne Mühe die Früchte der Herzen abweidet.

6. *rakhṣu l-banāni badīʿu l-shakli multaḥifun * bi-ḥullati l-ḥusni yaḥkī mubhija l-ṭāsī* (3:193, 6)
   Einer mit zarten Fingern, mit bewundernswerter Figur, gehüllt in das Kleid der Schönheit, er gleicht dem, was den Becher erfreut (Wein).

7. *ḥattā idhā alqā qināʿa l-ḥayā* (3:429, 11a).
   Bis er dann den Schleier der Scham abwarf.

8. *idhā ḥaddathtahū fa-ksu l-ḥadītha l- * ladhī ḥaddathtahū thawba khtiṣārī!* (3:364, 2).
   Wenn du ihm (dem Zechgenossen) etwas erzählst, dann kleide die Geschichte, die du erzählst, in das Kleid der Kürze![8]

Labistu thiyāba l-jahri usw. entsprechen in der Konstruktion völlig dem von Heinrichs behandelten Abū Tammām-Zitat *lā tasqinī māʾa l-malāmi!* „gib mir nicht das Wasser des Tadels zu trinken!"[9] In beiden Fällen würden geläufige verbale Metaphern *saqā l-malāma* bzw. *labisa l-fakhr* genügen, um das Gewünschte zum Ausdruck zu bringen, und nicht selten begnügt sich Abū Nuwās auch damit:

9. *la-qad albasa llāhu l-karāmata ummatan* (1:135, 10a).
   Gott kleidete eine Gemeinschaft mit Adel.

10. *tirbāni qad kusiyā l-malāḥata kullahā* (4:407, 6a).
    Zwei Gefährten, die mit der ganzen Anmut gekleidet wurden.

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[8] Weitere Beispiele zum Schema Bekleidungsverb – Kleiderobjekt – abstrakter Genitiv im Appendix A.

[9] Heinrichs 1986, 6. Zu diesem oft zitierten und zumeist getadelten Vers vgl. auch Schippers 1981, 257-60.

Fälle, bei denen konkrete Kleidungsstücke bereits in der Bedeutung des Verbs enthalten sind, kann man von der Semantik her vielleicht als Übergang zu den dreigliedrigen Konstruktionen betrachten:

11. *taʾazzara bi-l-malāḥati wa-rtadāhā * wa-surbila bi-l-jamāli wa-bi-l-kamālī* (4:303, 12).
    Er „beschurzte" sich mit Anmut und „bemantelte" sich mit ihr, und er wurde mit Schönheit und Vollkommenheit „behemdet".

12. *wajhuhā bi-l-ḥusni muntaqibū* (4:14, 5b).
    Ihr Gesicht verschleierte sich mit der Schönheit.[10]

Häufiger aber noch ergänzt Abū Nuwās wie in den Beispielen 1-8 die schwache verbale Metapher mit Substrat („erwerben, besitzen, verleihen") durch ein substratloses Kleidungsstück und verstärkt dadurch die Imagination. Allerdings können Kleidermetaphern nicht den gleichen Effekt erreichen wie manche andere sustratlose Regentia, die die Dichter den Abstrakta voranstellen und die nicht selten eine Belebung der Abstrakta bewirken (*qalūṣ al-ḥamd*,[11] *sāʿid al-dahr*,[12] *kāhil al-dahr*,[13] *thaʿlab al-ṣudūd* und *kalb al-wiṣāl*,[14] *anf al-kibriyāʾ*,[15] *kaff al-dahr*[16]). Eine solche Belebung ist mit leblosen Kleidern nicht möglich; aber immerhin wird der abstrakte Begriff in die menschliche Sphäre erhoben, da normalerweise nur Menschen Kleider tragen. Belebende Metaphern kommen zwar auch in Versen mit Kleidermetaphern vor. Ihre Metaphorik liegt dann aber außerhalb des Kleiderbereichs:

13. *kasathu yadu l-hawā thawba l-sulālī* (4:305, 2b).
    (Ein Verliebter,) den die Hand der Liebe mit dem Kleid der Auszehrung bekleidet hat.

14. *a-wa-mā tarā aydī l-saḥāʾibi raqqashat * ḥulala l-tharā bi-badāʾiʿi l-rayḥānī?* (3:338, 5).
    Und siehst du nicht, daß die Hände der Wolken die Kleider der Erde mit wundervollem Duftkraut verziert haben?

Hier ist allerdings der vom Kleid abhängige Genitiv konkret.

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[10] Weitere Beispiele zum Schema Bekleidungsverb – abstraktes Objekt im Appendix B.
[11] Heinrichs 1984, 194.
[12] *Ibid.*, 194.
[13] *Ibid.*, 195.
[14] *Ibid.*, 196. Die beiden Beispiele stammen von Abū Nuwās (5:286, 7).
[15] *Ibid.*, 206.
[16] *Ibid.*, 207.

Nach Heinrichs ersetzen die *muḥdathūn* häufiger als die Alten in der imaginären Genitivmetapher das Abstraktum durch ein Konkretum.[17] Dadurch entstehen oft abenteuerliche Kombinationen wie al-ʿAbbās b. al-Aḥnaf's „Hinterbacken der Tränen" und „Hälse des Blutes". Abū Nuwās ist hier entschieden vorsichtiger. Er läßt Konkreta nur dann folgen, wenn hierdurch identifizierende Genitivmetaphern entstehen. Er nimmt damit eine Minderung der Imagination in Kauf:

15. *kasathā l-khamru ḥullata zaʿfarānī* (3:329, 5b).
    Der Wein kleidete ihn (den Becher) in ein Safrangewand.

Hier ist das Kleid mit dem Safran identisch. Diese Identität wird gelegentlich noch deutlicher, wenn der Genitiv durch ein *min* mit Materialangabe ersetzt wird:

16. *nasajtu lahā ʿamāʾima min turābin * wa-māʾin muḥkamātin mūthaqātī* (3:68, 2).
    Ich wob für ihn (den Wein) starke, feste Turbane aus Erde und Wasser (den Tonverschluß des Kruges).

17. *ḥattā narāka wa-qad darraʿtahū qumuṣan * mina l-ṣadīdi makāna l-līfi wa-l-karabī* (2:56, 15).
    Bis wir dich sehen, wie du es (das Holz des Kreuzes) mit Hemden aus Eiter bekleidest anstelle von Bast und Blattstrünken.

Besonders beliebt – nicht nur bei Abū Nuwās – und entsprechend matt sind die identifizierenden Genitivmetaphern bei der Beschreibung des Tagesanbruchs:

18. *wa-kharraqa l-ṣubḥu qamīṣa l-dujā * fa-lāḥa min jilbābihī l-fajrū* (4:214, 8).
    Und der Morgen zerriß das Hemd der Finsternis, und die Morgendämmerung erglänzte in ihrem Gewand.

19. *ḥattā afāqa wa-thawbu l-layli munkhariqun* (3:254, 9a)
    Bis er erwachte, als das Kleid der Nacht bereits zerrissen wurde.

Kein identifizierender, sondern ein attributiver Genitiv[18] liegt vor, wenn Personen von dem Kleid im Genitiv abhängig sind:

20. *fa-lbas thiyāba muwaddiʿin!* (4:61, 14a).
    Kleide dich in die Kleider eines „Lebewohl"-Sagenden! (d.h. benimm dich wie...)

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[17] Heinrichs 1986, 10-11.
[18] *Ibid.*, 5.

21. *lābisa sīmā qāʾilin ṣādiqin* (4:169, 11a).
Einen, der sich mit dem Zeichen eines die Wahrheit Sagenden kleidet.[19]

Etwas anders ist das folgende Beispiel konstruiert:[20]

22. *qad labista l-dahra lubsa fatan * akhadha l-ādāba ʿan ghiyarih* (1:151, 13).
Du kleidetest dich mit dem Schicksal in der Art eines ritterlichen Mannes, der (seine) Lehren aus den Wechselfällen des Schicksals zog.

Fällt in dem dreigliedrigen Schema das Kleidungsstück als Objekt fort und wird der bisherige konkrete Genitiv zum Objekt, bleibt nur das Verb metaphorisch. Semantisch ändert sich dadurch kaum etwas, wie wir das bereits bei den Bekleidungsverben mit abstraktem Objekt gesehen haben. Ob sich der Garten mit Blumen oder dem Kleid der Blumen bekleidet, ist bedeutungsmäßig gleichgültig. Die Bildhaftigkeit verliert aber stark, da die verbleibende verbale Bekleidungsmetapher meist ein fast synonymes Substrat hat:

23. *kasā l-wākifu l-ghādī lahā waraqan khuḍrā* (3:142, 8b).
(Ein Garten,) den der morgendliche Regen mit grünen Blättern bekleidete.

24. *albisi l-māʾa l-mudāmā!* (3:428, 16a).
Bekleide den Wein mit Wasser (mische ihn)!

25. *wa-salājimun kusiyat qawādima liqwatin* (1:370, 9a).
Und lange Pfeile, die mit Schwungfedern eines Adlers bekleidet sind.

Bildhafter wird die Metapher auch hier, wenn das Verb des Bekleidens ein bestimmtes Kleidungsstück beinhaltet:

26. *idh kāna khammāruhā bi-l-qāri raddāhā* (3:22, 13b).
Weil sein Weinwirt ihn (den Wein) mit Pech „bemantelte“.

27. *wa-sarbalahā lawnan min al-rāḥi aḥmarā* (3:161, 5b).
Und er (der Schenke) „behemdete“ ihn (den Becher) mit der roten Farbe des Weins.

Die Bildhaftigkeit des Ausdrucks wird noch erhöht, wenn er in einen größeren Verbund von Bekleidungsmetaphern eingebettet ist (vgl. auch Beispiel 11):

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[19] Weitere Beispiele zum Schema Bekleidungsverb – Kleiderobjekt – konkreter Genitiv im Appendix C.

[20] Vgl. *WKAS*, 1: *Lām*, 126.

28. *wa-yā ridāʾa l-bahāri azzarahū * mukallilūhū shuqāqa nuʿmānā!* (5:78, 4).
Oh Mantel des Frühlings (= der Geliebte), den die ihn Krönenden mit Anemonen „beschurzten"!

Gelegentlich ist das Konkretum, das das Objekt zum Bekleidungsverb bildet, wiederum eine Metapher:

29. *fa-idhā ʿalāhā l-māʾu albasahā * namashan ka-mithli jalājili l-ḥajlī* (3:235, 13).
Wenn das Wasser über ihn (den Wein) gerät, bekleidet es ihn mit Sommersprossen (Bläschen) wie die Glöckchen am Fußring.[21]

Fällt in dem dreigliedrigen Schema das Bekleidungsverb fort,[22] bleibt eine reine Genitivmetapher übrig. Das Kleid kann hier wiederum einen abstrakten Genitiv regieren und ist dann substratlos:

31. *wa-lākinnanī stashʿartu thawba stikānatin* (1:282, 10a).
Aber ich fühlte das Kleid des Elends.

32. *bāraka llāhu li-l-Amīni wa-abqā- * hu wa-abqā lahū ridāʾa l-shabābī!* (1:301, 1).
Gott segne al-Amīn und lasse ihn lange leben und bewahre ihm den Mantel der Jugend![23]

Identifizierende Genitivmetaphern liegen in folgenden Fällen vor:

33. *wa-shamsu nahārin fī qamīṣi zujājī* (3:413. 1a).
Manch eine Sonne des Tages (Wein) im Hemde des Glases.

34. *min sābiriyyi l-khubzi barrāqī* (2:109, 3b).
Von dem sābirischen Kleid (Kleid aus sehr dünnem Stoff) des Brotes, dem glänzenden (wohl: durchsichtigen, es ist vom Brot eines Geizhalses die Rede).

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[21] Weitere Beispiele zum Schema Bekleidungsverb – konkretes Objekt im Appendix D.

[22] In einem Fall wird die Genitivkonstruktion nicht von einem metaphorischen Bekleidungsverb regiert, sondern von einem metaphorischen Verb aus einem anderen Bereich:

30. *ṣababtu ʿalā l-amīri thiyāba madḥī* (1:323, 11a).
Ich goß über den Emir das Kleid meines Lobes aus.

Der Halbvers wechselt also in der Metaphorik bzw. metaphorisches Gießen steht für wiederum metaphorisches Kleiden oder ein metaphorisches Kleid für metaphorisches Wasser.

[23] Weitere Beispiele zum Schema Kleidermetapher – abstrakter Genitiv im Appendix E.

Auch hier finden wir die Materialangabe durch *min*:[24]

36. *barāqiʿuhā min saḥīqi l-ʿabīri * wa-min yāsamīnin wa-sīsanbarī* (3:165, 9).
Seine (des Weins) Schleier sind aus zerstoßenen Duftstoffen und aus Jasmin und Thymian.

37. *lahā dirʿāni min qārin wa-ṭīnī* (3:302, 10b).
Er (der Wein) hat zwei Hemden aus Pech und Ton (den verpichten Krug).

38. *fa-kaʾannī fīkum ghadan * fī thiyābin mina l-madar* (2:165, 12).
Und als ob ich unter euch morgen in Kleidern aus Erde (im Grabe) wäre.

Im attributiven Genitiv kann hier ebenfalls eine Person stehen:

39. *abʿada sirbāli mriʾin ʿālimin * aṣbaḥta fī sirbāli marrāqī* (2:108, 14).
Weit entfernt von dem Hemd eines Gelehrten gerietest du in das Hemd eines vom Glauben Abgefallenen.

40. *qahwatan tatruku l-ṣaḥīḥa saqīman * wa-tuʿīru l-saqīma thawba l-ṣaḥīḥī* (3:85, 4).
Einen Wein, der den Gesunden krank werden läßt und dem Kranken das Kleid des Gesunden verleiht.

Gelegentlich ist hier der Übergang zur veritativen Bedeutung des Kleides gleitend:

41. *ghadā fī thawbi fattānin rabībī* (4:168, 5b).
Er kam im Kleide eines wohlerzogenen Verführers.

Vielleicht hatte der Knabe sich besonders verführerisch gekleidet.[25]

Nicht selten besteht der metaphorische Ausdruck bei Abū Nuwās nur aus dem Bekleidungsverb und dem Kleid als Objekt, also ohne folgenden Genitiv:

42. *min qahwatin jāʾatka qabla mizājihā * ʿuṭlan fa-albasahā l-mizāju wishāḥā* (3:77, 9).

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[24] Aus grammatischen oder metrischen Gründen kann die *min*-Konstruktion auch bei Abstrakta vorkommen:

35. *bi-qināʿin mina l-shabābi ladhīdhin * lam turaqqiʿhu bi-l-khiḍābi l-nisāʾū* (3:404, 12).
Mit einem süßen Schleier der Jugend, den die Frauen noch nicht mit Farbe ausbessern mußten.

[25] Weitere Beispiele zum Schema Kleidermetapher – konkreter Genitiv im Appendix F.

Von einem Wein, der vor dem Mischen nackt zu dir kam, und den dann das Mischen mit einer Schärpe bekleidete.

Man kann diesen metaphorischen Ausdruck so erklären, daß dem Dichter zunächst eine „neue“, auf einem Vergleich (*tashbīh*) beruhende Metapher, wie sie im *badīʿ*-Stil der *muḥdathūn* immer häufiger wurde,[26] vorschwebte (Kranz der Bläschen am Glasrand wie eine Schärpe), aus der dann die verbale Metapher generiert wurde. Das Vergleichsmoment ist offensichtlich auch Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī als dominant aufgefallen, denn er kommentiert: *ay ṣāra ʿalayhā min mizājihā zabadun ka-l-wishāḥi*. Ähnlich erklärt Ḥamza folgenden Vers:

43. *yaqtarī l-qawma bi-kaʾsin * tulbisu l-khamra izārā* (3:136, 12).
Er bewirtet die Leute mit einem Becher, der den Wein mit einem Überwurf bekleidet.

Ḥamza kommentiert: *shabbaha l-kaʾsa bi-l-izāri li-l-khamri*. In folgendem Falle:

44. *wa-tuballī ʿimāmatī l-sawdāʾū* (3:404, 15b).
Und Trübsinn nutzt meinen Turban ab = Trübsinn läßt mich altern.

kann man vielleicht besser von einem Gleichnis (*tamthīl*) ausgehen, wobei, wie in Abū Dhuʾayb's „der Tod läßt seine Klauen fest eindringen“[27] das Thema[28] (Tod bzw. Trübsinn) erhalten bleibt und nicht durch eine Genitivkonstruktion in die Metapher einbezogen wird („Löwe des Todes“ und vielleicht „Motten des Trübsinns“).[29]

Im Vorangegangen kamen bereits einige Beispiele vor (3; 5; 6; 12; 19; 21), in denen das Bekleidungsverb durch ein Partizip vertreten wurde. Steht das Partizip nun in einem Satz wie:

45. *wa-l-shaʿru mulbisuhū* (4:181, 6a).
Und das Haar bekleidete es (das Gesicht)

kann man *mulbisuhū* nicht nur als Transformation von *yulbisuhū* auffassen, sondern in ihm auch ein Prädikatsnomen sehen: „das Haar war ein es Bekleidendes“ bzw. „sein Bekleidungsstück“. Dann liegt in dem Satz das Muster „der Held ist ein Löwe“ für „der Held ist wie

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26 Heinrichs 1977, 13.
27 Zu dem Vers vgl. *ibid.*, 6 und Heinrichs 1984, 197.
28 Bei Heinrichs topic, vgl. Heinrichs 1977, 8, Anm. 18.
29 Weitere Beispiele zum Schema Bekleidungsverb – Kleiderobjekt im Appendix G.

ein Löwe“ („das Haar ist wie sein Bekleidungsstück“) vor. Al-Jurjānī[30] betrachtet das als Vergleich und nicht als Metapher, allerdings als einen Vergleich mit Steigerung (*mubālagha*). Ein solcher Vergleich ist nach al-Jurjānī vor allem dann möglich, wenn das Prädikatsnomen (Löwe) auch als Metapher gebraucht werden kann, und damit meint er die Metapher, die Heinrichs als „neue Metapher“, die auf einem Vergleich beruht, bezeichnet (etwa „der Löwe zieht in den Kampf“ bzw. „das Bekleidungsstück bedeckt seine Wangen“). Bei Abū Nuwās sind die reinen Nominalsätze nach dem Schema A = Bekleidungspartizip nicht sehr häufig.[31] Ein weiteres, allerdings in einen Objektsatz gerücktes Beispiel wäre:

46. *lammā raʾaytu l-layla munshaqqa l-ḥujub* (2:276, 4a).
Als ich sah, daß die Nacht zerrissene Schleier hatte.

Häufiger bildet das Nomen, das durch das Partizip vertreten wird, nicht das Subjekt eines Nominalsatzes, sondern steht bereits vorher in demselben Vers oder einem vorangehenden. Der Bezug bleibt aber klar, so daß al-Jurjānī wohl eher von einem Vergleich als von einer Metapher sprechen würde:

47. *mudaththarun lam yabdu min ḥijābihī* (2:323, 5a)
Ein Eingehüllter, der nicht aus seinem Schleier hervorkommt.

Obwohl das Partizip die Nacht in die menschliche Sphäre erhebt, steht es doch in einem appositionellem Verhältnis zu dem vorigen Vers genannten *layl*.

48. *mubarnasi l-hāmati aw mutawwajī* (2:228, 9a).
Eines mit „beburnustem“ Haupt, eines Gekrönten (Falken, der zuvor durch ein Farbadjektiv genannt ist).

Selten geht dem Partizip kein Bezugswort voraus:

49. *ʿalayhi min manṣūḥati l-qalānisī* (2:252, 15b).
Über ihr (der Eichel) befindet sich eine gut genähte Kappe (= Vorhaut).[32]

Hier könnte man bereits von einer „neuen“, auf einem Vergleich beruhende Metapher sprechen ([nicht genannte] Vorhaut wie eine ge-

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30 al-Jurjānī (gest. 1078), *Asrār*, 227ff.; al-Jurjānī, *Geheimnisse*, 267ff.

31 Auch außerhalb der Bekleidungssphäre sind sie selten, vgl. Wagner 1965, 392.

32 Der Vers stammt aus einer Beschreibung des männlichen Gliedes in Form einer Jagdurjūza auf einen Falken. Legt man den Falken zugrunde, ist die Kappe veritativ. Es handelt sich dann um den *burqaʿ* oder die *kumma*, vgl. F. Viré 1960, 1154.

nähte Mütze). Wie gesagt, sind diese Partizipien ohne Bezugswort bei Abū Nuwās selten. Das gleiche gilt für aus einen genuinen Substantiv bestehende „neue Kleidermetaphern“.[33]

50. *ḥattā idhā mā nshāma fī mulāʾihī* (2:278, 3b).
Bis er (der Hund) in seine Umhänge (= Staub) eindrang.[34]

52. *narā bayna thintay kasrihā jullatan ramkā* (3:224, 6b).
Wir erblicken zwischen ihren (der Nacht) beiden Falten ein graues Kleid (= Morgengrauen).

Zumeist sind Kleider nur als Metaphern für Haut, Fell und Federn tauglich. Diese Metaphern sind dann wenig ausdrucksvoll und kommen nahe an die mißbilligten ausdruckslosen Metaphern heran, die al-Jurjānī *ghayr mufīda* nennt,[35] obwohl es sich hier immerhin noch um den Ersatz eines belebten Überzugs durch einen unbelebten handelt:

53. *munaqqaṭin sirbāluhū bi-l-miskī* (1:420, 10a).
(Eines Merlin), dessen Hemd (= Federkleid) mit Moschus gepunktet ist.

54. *raqmu dabābīja ʿalā athwābihā* (2:286, 2a).
Die Zeichnung von Brokat ist auf ihren (der Gepardin) Kleidern (= Fell).

55. *khafīfi l-khamīṣati wa-l-libdah* (2:36, 18b).
(Eines Adlers) mit dünnem schwarzgeränderten Umhang (= Federkleid) und schütterer Mähne.[36]

56. *hattaka ʿan ḥujbi l-ẓibā l-qamīṣā* (2:273, 7a).
(Der Hund) riß das Hemd (= Fell) von den Verhüllungen der Gazellen.

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[33] Mit meinem Weg über die Partizipien wollte ich keine historische Entwicklung aufzeigen. Das ist mit dem Material aus dem Werk eines einzelnen Dichters ohnehin kaum möglich. Ich wollte nur zeigen, daß es im Bereich der Kleidermetaphern, in dem verbale Metaphern eine bedeutende Rolle spielen, eine Reihe von Zwischenstufen zwischen dem verbalen Ausdruck in der „alten Metapher“ und den zumeist nur aus einem Substantiv bestehenden „neuen Metaphern“ gibt.

[34] Es handelt sich hier um eine typisch manieristische Metapher der *muḥdathūn*, bei der der Dichter „nicht die Wirklichkeit, sondern die vorhandene Literatur zum Vorwurf“ (Heinrichs 1974, 127) gemacht hat. Verständlich wird die Metapher durch die Kenntnis der identifizierenden Genitivmetapher von ʿAdī b. al-Riqāʿ al-ʿĀmilī in dem Halbvers:

51. *yataʿāwarāni min al-ghubāri mulāʾatan* (2:278, 6a).
Sie (die beiden Stiere) tauschten einen Umhang aus Staub aus.

[35] Heinrichs 1977, 10, Anm. 20.

[36] Bei *libda* handelt es sich um eine wirkliche *istiʿāra ghayr mufīda*.

Angesichts der dürftigen Ausbeute bei den „neuen Kleidermetaphern“ sei darauf hingewiesen, daß auf anderen Gebieten Abū Nuwās durchaus von „neuen Metaphern“ Gebrauch macht. Berühmt ist das von Heinrichs zitierte und von G. Schoeler in einem gesonderten Artikel[37] behandelte Gedicht, das den Vers enthält:

57. *yabkī wa-yadhrī l-durra min narjisin * wa-yalṭimu l-warda bi-ʿunnābī* (4:15, 7).
Er (der Mond = die Geliebte) weint und verstreut Perlen (= Tränen) aus Narzissen (= Augen) und schlägt die Rosen (= Wangen) mit Jujuben (= Fingerspitzen).

Auch im Zusammenhang mit Kleidern sind „neue Metaphern“ bei Abū Nuwās nicht selten, aber dann sind die Kleider veritativ und das Substrat der Metapher steckt in ihnen:

58. *shamsun tajallat ʿan athwābihī* (3:55, 6b).
Eine Sonne (=Zechgenosse), die sich zwischen ihren Kleidern zeigt.

59. *wa-aṭlaʿa min azrārihī qamaran badrā* (3:141, 5b).
Er ließ aus seinen Knöpfen einen Vollmond erscheinen.

60. *idhā mā badat azrāru jaybi qamīṣihī * taṭallaʿa minhā ṣūratu l-qamari l-badrī* (3:151, 11).
Als die Knöpfe seines Hemdausschnitts sichtbar wurden, da blickte aus ihnen die Gestalt eines Vollmondes hervor.

Zum Schluß noch fünf Beispiele für Personifikationen von Kleidern. Hier bleiben die Kleider zumeist veritativ, denn sonst würde es ja keinen *taʿajjub* hervorrufen, daß sie sich wie Menschen benehmen bzw. in einem Verwandtschaftverhältnis zu ihnen stehen:

61. *tabkī l-thiyābu ʿalayhi muʿwilatan* (2:152, 3).
Die Kleider weinen klagend über ihn.

62. *bakā ʿalayhā l-dirʿu wa-l-khimārū * wa-l-qulbu wa-l-khalkhālu wa-l-siwārū* (5:528, 10).
Über sie weinen das Hemd, der Schleier, der Armreif, der Fußreif und das Armband.

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[37] Heinrichs 1977, 48; Schoeler 1978. Im Index zum *Dīwān* des Abū Nuwās habe ich 52 Stellen aus der Sekundärüberlieferung zu Beispiel 57 zusammenstellen können. – Auch auf anderen Feldern des *badīʿ*-Stils wie der Harmonisierung ganzer Metaphernreihen hat sich Abū Nuwās hervorgetan, nicht ohne dabei gelegentlich Kritik zu ernten, vgl. dazu Heinrichs 1989.

63. *qabāʾuhū yukhbiru ʿan qaddihī* (4:255, 9a).
Sein Obergewand berichtet von seiner Gestalt (, weil es so eng anliegt).

64. *ishrab fudīta ʿalāniyah * ummu l-tasatturi zāniyah* (3:340, 6).
Trink – mögest du ausgelöst werden – öffentlich! Die Mutter der Verschleierung ist eine Hure.

Nur einmal benimmt sich ein metaphorisches Kleid wie ein Mensch:

65. *wa-hamma qamīṣu l-layli an yatamazzaqā* (3:222, 6b).
Das Hemd der Nacht befürchtete, daß es zerrissen würde.

Vergleicht man die Kleidermetaphern des Abū Nuwās mit den Zusammenstellungen im WKAS unter *ksw*, *lḥf* und vor allem unter *lbs*, so wird man feststellen, daß die meisten ihrer Elemente (Verben, Kleider, abstrakte oder konkrete Objekte, abstrakte oder konkrete Genitive) auch anderweitig belegt sind.[38] Abū Nuwās war in seinen Kleidermetaphern nicht besonders originell. Dabei ist allerdings zu bedenken, daß ein Teil der ohne weiteres datierbaren poetischen WKAS-Belege aus der Zeit nach Abū Nuwās stammt. Im übrigen gilt der Vorwurf der mangelnden Originalität – so er denn einer ist – natürlich auch für andere am Metaphernpool des WKAS beteiligte Dichter. Der Grund für die weite Verbreitung der Kleidermetaphern ist wohl die Kombination von umfangreicher Anwendbarkeit und leichter Bildbarkeit. Die verbalen Bekleidungsmetaphern haben Substrate allgemeinster Bedeutung. „Anziehen“ und „ausziehen“ können für „hinzutun“ und „wegtun“ verwendet werden. „Mit etwas bekleidet sein“ kann für „haben“ stehen. Die Kleidungsstücke sind metrisch leicht untereinander austauschbar (*libās*, *kisāʾ*, *thiyāb*, *ridāʾ*, *izār*, *ḥijāb*, *wishāḥ* und auch *sutūr*). Wie seine Kollegen hat Abū Nuwās die Vielseitigkeit der Kleidermetaphern genutzt, um in Lobgedichten seinen Gönnern positive und in Spottgedichten seinen Feinden negative Eigenschaften zuzuschreiben, um in Weingedichten dem Wein Krüge und Bläschen anzuziehen, um in Wein- und Jagdgedichten Nacht und Tag zu schildern, um in Liebesgedichten über weiße Haare, Wangenflaum und gelüftete Geheimnisse zu klagen,

[38] Allerdings meist in anderen Kombinationen. Meinen Versuch, Entsprechungen zu den Metaphern des Abū Nuwās im *WKAS* nachzuweisen, habe ich aufgegeben. Genaue Entsprechungen von vollständigen Metaphern sind zu selten, um ein zutreffendes Bild von der Menge der Übereinstimmungen von Einzelelementen zu geben. Diese aber alle anzuführen, hätte zu weit geführt.

um im *nasīb* den Verfall der Wohnstätten und im Gegensatz dazu in Weingedichten die Pracht der Gärten auszumalen, um in Jagdgedichten das Gefieder der Vögel zu beschreiben und vieles mehr.

Appendizes

Der folgende Katalog ist sehr knapp gehalten und stark schematisiert. In der Reihenfolge, in der die einzelnen Metapherntypen im Aufsatz vorkommen, gebe ich weitere Beispiele, wobei ich nur die einzelnen Elemente des metaphorischen Ausdrucks in Zitierform anführe. Passive Konstruktionen des Originals habe ich dabei ins Aktiv umgesetzt. Der Begriff Objekt ist sehr weit gefaßt. Unter ihm stehen auch präpositionale Ausdrücke. Ist in einer Genitivmetapher der Genitiv durch ein auf ein zuvor genanntes Nomen bezügliches Pronomen vertreten, habe ich das Nomen für das Pronomen eingesetzt. So steht *lammā tabaddā l-ṣubḥu min ḥijābihī* (2:187, 3a) unter *ḥijāb – ṣubḥ*. Auch adverbielle Akkusative habe ich umgesetzt. *wa-tasarbala l-maʿrūfa dirʿā* (1:322, 11b) steht unter *tasarbala – dirʿ – maʿrūf*.

Appendix A: Bekleidungsverb – Kleiderobjekt – abstrakter Genitiv:

labisa – thawb – naʿīm (1:206, 17b); *labisa – ʿudhur* (kein Kleid) – *fasād* (5:230, 9b); *albasa – thawb – ḍurr* (3:14, 2b); *albasa – thawb – madhalla + ṣaghr* (4:64, 4b); *albasa – thiyāb – radā* (4:196, 2a); *albasa – thiyāb – maḥl* (1:234, 5b); *albasa – libās – ẓarf + milḥ* (5:159, 3); *albasa – ḥilya – riyab* (4:386, 14b); *albasa – jilbāb – dhilla* (5:84, 7): *libās* (Nomen)[39] – *thawb – ṣudūd* (4:232, 13b); *kasā – thawb – sawād* (der Tod die Wangen) (4:202, 7b); *kasā – thawb – dhull* (5:512, 1b); *kasā – ajniḥa* (kein Kleid) – *ʿamr* (der Regen die Braut = Wein) (3:421, 2b); *kasā – shiʿār – ḥusn* (3:136, 10b); *kasā + raddā – ḥilya + ḥulal - jamāl* (4:301, 14); *sarbala + azzara + raddā – thawb – bahja* (3:20, 13); *tasarbala – thawb – ḥusn + ṭīb* (3:51, 2b = 4:169, 1b); *tasarbala – dirʿ – maʿrūf* (3:322, 11b); *saḥaba – dhayl –*

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[39] Der vollständige Halbvers lautet:

66. *wa-thawbu ṣudūdihī abadan libāsī.*

Und das Kleid seiner Abweisung ist ewig mein Gewand.

Ich habe den Halbvers so eingeordnet, als ob *libāsī* ein *albasu* verträte. Man könnte in dem Nominalsatz aber vielleicht auch einen als ganzes in die metaphorische Ebene erhobenen A = B-Vergleich sehen, wobei sich durch die Synonymität von *libās* und *thawb* ein quasi-tautologisches B = B ergäbe.

mujūn (3:165, 5); *saḥaba – dhayl – lahw* (5:518, 5a); *saḥaba – dhuyūl – ṣibā* (5:218, 10a; ähnlich 5:213, 14a); *jarra – ardiya – fakhr* (3:421, 11b); *jarrara – adhyāl – fusūq* (3:129, 2b); *alqā – thiyāb – radā* (3:165, 4a); *kashafa – qināᶜ – ṣibā* (4:67, 9a); *hattaka – sitr – ḥayā* (4:145, 6b).

Appendix B: Bekleidungsverb – abstraktes Objekt:

labisa – shabāb (1:127, 9b); *labisa – kibr* (1:385, 2b); *albasa – niᶜam* (1:280, 14a); *kasā – shajw* (1:158, 1b); *kasā – bilā* (4:202, 7a); *kasā – dhuᶜr* (4:62, 9b); *iktasā – ṭarāʾif al-ḥusn* (4:14, 9a); *iktasā – ḥusn al-zukhruf* (3:20, 2a); *tasarbala – bilā* (1:325, 3a); *taraddā – mulk* (1:128, 2b); *taraddā – fusūq* (5:39, 9b); *irtadā – jamāl* (3:234, 3a); *muntaqib – ḥusn* (4:14, 5b).

Appendix C: Bekleidungsverb – Kleiderobjekt – konkreter Genitiv:

albasa – khilᶜa - kaʾs[40] (3:347, 7a); *lābis – shiᶜār – ḥummā*[41] (4:154, 10); *iktasā – khilaᶜ – yāniᶜ al-zahr* (1:328, 5); *ghaṭṭā – mijwal – layl* (3:94, 8a); *asbala – thawb – dujā* (4:161, 15a); *ishtamala – burd – ẓalām* (3:327, 4a); *shammara – miʾzar – nawm* (5:288, 9); *akhlaqa – burdān – dār* (3:402, 13); *hataka – sutūr – dujā* (3:339, 4a); *hataka – sutūr – ẓulam* (3:331, 2); *farā – ḥujub – dinān* (3:116, 7); *salaba – qināᶜ – ṭīn* (3:207, 7a); *inkashafa – astār al-athwāb – ẓalām al-dujā* (3:55, 10); *inḥasara – athwāb – dujā* (3:339, 4b); *ṭawā – ḥawāshī l-burd – layl* (2:289, 10a); *mulqin – sudūl – layl* (3:142, 5a); *murkhin – sudūl – layl* (5:49, 10a); *ṣabagha – thawb – khamr* (3:116, 8a).

Appendix D: Bekleidungsverb – konkretes Objekt:

labisa - ḥummā (4:154, 10b); *albasa – rīsh* (1. Objekt: Pfeile) (1:367, 9a); *albasa – ᶜidhār* (Subjekt: weißes Haar) (3:404, 15a); *kasā – waḥf* (1:367, 6a); *iktasā – zabad* (1:144, 14a); *iktasā – qatīr* (1:196, 8b); *iktasā – jasad* (Subjekt: Seele) (4:63, 12a); *iktasā – rīsh janāḥay Jaᶜfar* (d.i. Jaᶜfar b. Abī Ṭālib al-Ṭayyār) (1:314, 14); *taraddā – ḥabāb* (1:159, 4a); *laḥafa – maᶜzāʾ* (1. Objekt: die Hufe, die hier durch die

[40] Die ganze Genitivverbindung *khilᶜat al-kaʾs* ist hier offensichtlich Metapher für „Schlaf“.

[41] Auch nicht greifbare Begriffe wie „Fieber“, „Schlaf“, „Tag“, “Nacht“ habe ich unter den Konkreta eingeordnet.

Metapher *mijmara* ersetzt sind) (1:200, 4a); *alḥafa – ẓill* (3:31, 15); *taghaṭṭā – ẓill* (1:239, 16).

Appendix E: Kleidermetapher – abstrakter Genitiv:

libās – tuqā (1:272, 1b); *libās – ṭūl al-baqāʾ* (1:344, 10b); *qamīṣ + ridāʾ – jamāl* (4:374, 7); *ridāʾ + miʾzar – mulk* (1:271, 8).

Appendix F: Kleidermetapher – konkreter Genitiv:

thawb – zīnat al-khamr (3:87, 8a); *sarāwīl + zunnār – khamr* (= Braut) (3:150, 6); *izār – layl* (3:182, 2b); *jilbāb – layl* (3:318, 1a); *ṭurrat al-jilbāb – layl* (1:419, 3a); *ḥulal – rabīʿ* (3:260, 11b); *liḥāf – ẓalām al-layl* (5:50, 11); *ḥijāb – shams* (1:417, 13a = 2:285, 1); *ḥijāb – ṣubḥ* (2:187, 3a); *ḥijāb – fuʾād* (1:418, 7a); *naʿlān – amʿāʾ* (die Eingeweide des Fisches bilden die Schuhe des Wasservogels) (2:234,4a).

Appendix G: Bekleidungsverb – Kleiderobjekt:

albasa – khuff Ḥunain (der Wein ließ mich mit leeren Händen dastehen) (3:335, 9b); *kasā – thawb* (= Licht; der Morgen die Nacht) (3: 182, 3b); *iktasā washya barūdin takhāluhā ḥulalan* (= Pflanzen; Subjekt: die Erde) (3:243, 4); *multaḥif – thawb amsāḥ* (= Dunkelheit; Subjekt: Nacht) (3:92, 12b); *murkhin – hudub al-sutūr* (Subjekt: Nacht) (2:264, 16b); *nāṭa – wishāḥ* (= Bläschen) (3:116, 10a); *kashafa – khidr* (den Krug des Weins = Braut öffnen) (3:24, 1a); *hataka – sitr* (= Geheimnis) (3:146, 7b; ähnlich 2:7, 5b; 3:333, 13a; 4:279, 13b); *inhataka – sitr* (4:209, 7b); *ḥasara – qināʿ* (öffentlich handeln) (3:205, 10b; ähnlich 4:4, 11b); *arkhā – izār* (desgl.) (4: 67, 9b); *saḥaba – dhayl* (sich begeben) (2:79, 9a); *saḥaba – adhyāl* (desgl.; der Wein zum Becher) (3, 220, 11a).

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MULAMMAʿ IN ISLAMIC LITERATURES

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Mulammaʿ as a form of poetic composition is not discussed in the earliest Arabic literary critical writings. The following essay, which traces the first definitions of *mulammaʿāt* in Persophone literatures, offers possible reasons for either the complete absence or limited discussion of this form by Arabic sources. The essay delineates two specific practices that simultaneously contributed to the partial mixing of languages whilst inhibiting the full-fledged practice of composing mixed-language or macaronic pieces. The high, almost sacred, status of Arabic influenced Muslim *littérateurs* from non-Arabic-speaking lands to include Arabic insertions in their non-Arabic compositions predominantly to invoke *baraka* (blessing), as well as to gain linguistic and consequently religious legitimacy among the learned. However, such insertions were generally restricted to quotations from the Qurʾān, *aḥādīth* (Prophetic sayings), and well-known proverbs. Any other kind of linguistic blend was deemed less than desirable and, at best, ignored if not outright condemned. This practice of combining languages by including quotes from "high status sources" did not qualify as *mulammaʿ* due to two factors.

Literary critics had already defined particular tropes that included the mingling of languages within the repertoire of acceptable rhetori-

cal practices and designated such tropes by terms such as *taḍmīn* and *iqtibās* (see section V). These tropes account for most of the linguistic inclusions within monolingual poetic compositions of Muslim *littérateurs*.

In the classical period, literary critics, starting with Persian critics, formulated a technical definition of *mulammaʿāt* that imposed restrictions on the length and form of mixed-language compositions. The strict parameters of this definition technically excluded the established rhetorical devices (also) used for mixing languages, with the result that very few prose or poetic compositions qualified as *mulammaʿāt.*

I. *Problems of the* Mulammaʿ*'s Definition and Its Discussion in Literary Sources*

Mulammaʿ as a technical term referring to a form of poetic composition is notably absent from Arabic dictionaries as well as from the discussions of Arab literary critics. It may be that since this form of poetic composition dealt with more than one language, the Arab philologists and critics considered it outside the domain of their literary interests and endeavors. However, the greater probability is that due to their strictly monoglot disposition, the Arab philologists did not deem it worthwhile to study literary productions that were presumably *less than pure or not of considerable linguistic or literary worth*. Thus, the Arabic works of *badīʿ* that recorded innovative and unusual uses of rhetorical devices and tropes totally ignore the *mulammaʿ*.[1] Even modern comparative literary studies undertaken in Arabic do not acknowledge the phenomenon.[2] That every kind of hybridity and

[1] Al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868) and Ibn Dāʾūd al-Iṣbahānī (d. 254/868 or 296/909) document early examples of mixed Arabic and Persian compositions (cf. van Gelder 1998, 549). However, they note the bilingual poetic compositions more as a literary curiosity, an expression of the bilingualism of some of the Eastern poets like Abū Nuwās (d. 194/810), rather than as a type of poetic composition to merit discussion. At this early stage, they are not formally referred to as *mulammaʿāt.* Standard works on Arabic literary criticism between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries do not discuss the *mulammaʿ* form at all.

[2] Medieval and modern Arab critics have, by and large, not been interested in undertaking comparative literary studies of Islamic literatures in languages other than their own. Ḥusayn Mujīb al-Miṣrī seems to be an exception among contemporary Arab scholars in so far as his interest in the comparative study of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish poetry is concerned. This is apparent from the list of his publica-

multivocality was frowned upon by the classical Arab literary critics in the Islamic East as well as the Islamic West is evident from the sarcastic remark of the Cordovan poet and critic Ibn Shuhayd (d. 425/1035) concerning other non-classical forms such as the strophic *muwashshaḥs* and *zajals*.[3] James Monroe argues that Ibn Shuhayd was referring to these forms when he talked of "verses such as greengrocers and butcher chiefs are attracted by."[4] Thus, the absence of a discussion on *mulammaʿ* in Arabic literary writings indicates indifference, possibly disdain, for this form. This observation is borne out by the fate suffered by the aforementioned strophic bilingual poetic form, the *muwashshaḥs,* whose presence was completely ignored by the literary critical works on Andalusian literature primarily due to their 'popular' origins and links. Samuel Stern (d. 1969), with several other researchers, has posited that the earliest *muwashshaḥs* originated around mid to late ninth century. However, a discussion of its form and features does not appear until mid twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, in the works of Ibn Bassām (d. 542/1147) and Ibn Sanāʾ al-Mulk (d. 608/1211).[5] As Stern observes:

> These sources for the study of the *muwashshaḥ,* as compared with those available for Andalusian poetry in Arabic in general, are very scanty indeed. This is due mainly to the pedantic attitude of the Andalusian authors of the earlier period, who considered the *muwashshsaḥ,* as a half-popular genre, unworthy of inclusion in their anthologies and biographical or historical works.[6]

The less monoglot Persians acknowledged the *mulammaʿ* form in their writings from the eleventh century onwards. We find the techni-

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tions which include titles such as *Fārsiyyāt wa-turkiyyāt, Shamʿ wa-farāsha, Ward wa-bulbul,* etc. In his 1986 study he discusses in considerable detail certain forms of poetry that exist only among the Persians and the Turks, and not among the Arabs; ibid., 8-21. However, he too fails to mention the *mulammaʿ* form.

[3] The *muwashshaḥāt* (sing. *muwashshaḥ)* is a multi-lined strophic verse poem written in classical Arabic or Hebrew. It consists of five stanzas. It was customary to open with one or two lines that matched the second part of the poem in rhyme and meter. The *kharja*, called *jarcha* in Spanish, is the final refrain of a series of a *muwashshaḥ*. The *kharjas* were in a Romance vernacular, blended with some Arabic expressions and words, known as *Mozarabic.*

Zajal is a very traditional form of popular Arabic poetry. It is mostly improvised, and comes in the form of a debate between *zajjāla* (poets who improvise the *zajal*).

[4] Ibn Bassām (d. 541/1147), *Dhakhīra,* I.1: 120, also cited in Monroe 1976, 113-25.

[5] Stern 1974, 3-12, 50-51.

[6] Ibid., 3.

cal meaning of the term defined for the first time in Rādūyānī's *Tarjumān al-balāgha*, written between 481-538/1088-1114, and subsequently in many Persian literary works. Rādūyānī defines *mulammaʿ* as a poetic composition, such as a *qaṣīda,* containing verses in Arabic and others in Persian, with the same rhyme and meter but not the same meaning. In other words, a repetition of what has already been said in one language by way of translation into another language, i.e., *tarjama,* does not qualify as a *mulammaʿ*.[7] The 12th century Persian literary critic Rashīd al-Dīn Waṭwāṭ (d. 572/1177 or 577/1182) in his *Ḥadāʾiq al-siḥr fī daqāʾiq al-shiʿr* repeats Rādūyānī's definition of the *mulammaʿ* with the additional requirement of the maximum allowable length for each portion of the languages used in this kind of a poetic composition. This later became the standard definition adopted by most dictionaries. Thus, according to Waṭwāṭ, *mulammaʿ* is a poetic composition that is composed in a mixture of Persian and Arabic. It is permissible to have one hemistich in Persian and another hemistich in Arabic, or a verse in Persian alternating with a verse in Arabic, or two in Persian and two in Arabic, up to ten verses in each language.[8]

Two modern Persian dictionaries by ʿAlī Akbar Dihkhuda (d. 1955) and Francis Joseph Steingass (d. 1903), make note of other meanings of *mulammaʿ* whose feminine and singular form is *mulammaʿa* and plural *mulammaʿāt.* It means:

> ([A] Horse) of different colors; hence, the Turkish language as being a mixture of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish; a poem, the hemistichs or distichs of which are written in Persian and Arabic alternately, and which is allowable as far as ten distichs in each language; bright; gilded; plated; electro-plated; a coating of gold and silver; speciousness; imposition.[9]

The following examples from the *Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn* by Muḥammad ʿAlī b. ʿAlī al-Tahānawī (d. 1158/1745) also emphasize that there be an equal number of verses in Persian and Arabic (up to ten) in alternation:

> *ṣabā bi-gulshan-i aḥbāb agar hamī guzarī*
> *idhā laqīta ḥabībī fa-qul lahū khabarī*[10]

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[7] Rādūyānī, *Tarjumān,* 107.
[8] Waṭwāṭ, *Ḥadāʾiq,* 263.
[9] Steingass 1992, 1310-11.
[10] For mixed language quotes, Arabic, in both the original and translation, will henceforth be underlined.

O Zephyr, when you blow through the garden of friends,
if you meet my beloved, do convey to him my news

(Anonymous)

bi-nādānī gunah kardam ilāhī
walī dānam ke ghaffār-i gunāhī

rajaʿtu ilayka fa-ghfir fī dhunūbī
fa-innī tubtu min kulli l-manāhī[11]

O my Lord! Foolishly, I have sinned,
but I do know that You are [indeed] the Forgiver of sins

I have returned to you, so forgive my sins,
for truly, I repent for all my excesses.

(Anonymous)

Other notable Persian verbal and nominal compounds related to *mulammaʿ* are *mulammaʿ-sāz, mulammaʿ-kār, mulammaʿ-gar,* a "gilder," "plater," "hypocrite," "dissembler," "traitor" and *mulammaʿ-kāri shayṭānī,* "one who makes falsehood appear as truth, an imposter." It also means "to make gleam, glitter or flash, to possess a variety of shining colors," thus *mulammaʿ shudan* means "to become colorful."[12] *Mulammaʿ-i qabāʾ* means "a colorful gown" and *dalaq-i mulammaʿ* "a patched frock; a frock, which is stitched together from a variety of materials of different colors, usually signifying asceticism and poverty." Thus, it became a common term for the cloak of the Sufis.[13] Edward G. Browne and Clifford E. Bosworth's translation of *mulammaʿāt* as "patchwork verses" is probably based on this last meaning of *dalaq-i mulammaʿ,* "a patched frock."[14]

Friedrich Rückert repeats the basic definition of *mulammaʿ* from Rādūyānī and Waṭwāṭ but makes a distinction between *mulammaʿ-i makshūf* and *mulammaʿ-i maḥjūb,* whereby the former refers to a poem in which Persian and Arabic alternate in each hemistich, whereas the latter refers to a poem in which Persian and Arabic alternate in each verse.[15] Rückert draws this distinction based on his source, the *Haft qulzum*, which is the only medieval Muslim source to do so.

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11 Dihkhuda 1970 XIII:18990.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Browne 1964, I: 467; Bosworth 1990, 495.
15 Rückert 1874, 184.

In Arabic *mulammaʿatun* means "shining, sparkling," often referring to the desert in which a mirage occurs. Manfred Ullmann further defines *mulammaʿ* as "songs in several languages": *yughannūna bi-l-ʿarabiyyi wa-yusammūnahu l-qaula, thumma bi-l-fārisiyyi wa-t-turkiyyi wa-yusammūnahu l-mulammaʿ*. "They sing in Arabic and call it *qawl,* then in Persian and Turkish and call it *mulammaʿ*."[16] It seems that, based on his source, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's *Tuḥfa,* Ullmann has added the requirement of singing in a mixed language to the definition of *mulammaʿ*.[17]

None of the medieval Persian literary critics' definitions pursues poetic compositions beyond the bi-lingual Arabic and Persian, to the tri-, and quadrilingual poetic compositions that occur beginning in the 13th century and possibly earlier. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn b. al-Athīr (d. 637/1239) mentions a poem mixing Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Greek, and Armenian, with twenty lines in each language.[18] Manṣūr Fasāʾī Rāstgār, a contemporary Persian literary critic, documents a form of poem called *muthallath* combining three languages, viz. Arabic, Persian, and Shīrāzī dialect, in the case of the two examples he cites from Saʿdī (d. 692/1291) and Ḥāfiẓ (d. 792/1392).[19] Most of the late medieval examples of *mulammaʿāt* from the Muslim world come from beyond the lands of the Arabic and New Persian speaking peoples. These are essentially mixed-language compositions by Muslim *littérateurs* from the Turko-Persian and Indo-Persian world, the former Yugoslavia, and the Indonesian Muslim world.[20] Amila Buturovic has analyzed bi-, tri-, and quadri-lingual lyrics that originated in former

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16 *WKAS* II: 1434.

17 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 756/1377) II: 371, cited in *WKAS* II: 1434 and Dozy 1967, Supplement II:551.

18 van Gelder 1998, II: 549 mentions it without providing a source. Whether Ibn al-Athīr calls this poem a *mulammaʿ* and discusses it is difficult to determine. I have not been able to locate the reference in Ibn al-Athīr's *al-Mathal al-sāʾir.* The reference is important because these are precisely the same languages that Rūmī uses for his *mulammaʿāt,* so this is presumably an earlier example from a similar region. Note also that Ibn al-Athīr's example does not adhere to the earlier mentioned stipulation of maximally ten verses in each language.

19 Rāstgār 1993, 645 ff.; however Rückert 1874, 189 refers to *muthallath* as the three line stanzaic poem as opposed to *murabbaʿ* (four lines), *mukhammas* (five lines), etc., without any mention of mixed-language compositions.

20 I have begun to prepare a catalogue of *mulammaʿāt* from different parts of the Muslim world.

Yugoslavia. They were composed in Bosnian, Ottoman Turkish, Persian and Arabic. Prior to the break-up of this region they formed the common cultural heritage of all the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliations and reflected "the polyvalent character of Ottoman culture and its negotiation of local sensibilities and poetic tastes."[21]

Dihkhuda mentions that a poem in which a few verses or hemistichs are in a language other than the source, or the main, language of the poem is called *rikhtā,* meaning "spoiled," "corrupted," "hodge-podge," by the people of India and Pakistan.[22] Both Rückert and Garcin de Tassy give examples of two-language combinations, other than the standard Arabic/Persian from Amīr Khusraw (d. 725/1325), whose poetic compositions sometimes mixed Persian and Hindawī. However, neither of them refers to these poems as *mulammaʿ*.

Amīr Khusraw was a prolific classical poet associated with the royal courts of more than seven rulers of the Delhi Sultanate. He is popular in much of North India and Pakistan because of the many playful riddles, songs and legends attributed to him. With his enormous literary output and legendary folk personality, Khusraw represents one of the first (recorded) Indian personages with a truly multicultural, pluralistic identity. He wrote in both Persian and Hindawī and his poetry is still sung today at Sūfī shrines throughout Pakistan and India.[23]

Following is one of Amir Khusraw's best known *ghazals,* which happens to be a *mulammaʿ* in Persian and Hindawī. Not surprisingly, it is not found in any of the poet's *Dīwāns* and not documented until the eighteenth century. However, it boasts a strong oral transmission and attribution to Amīr Khusraw. In the first couplet, the first hemi-

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[21] Buturovic 2000, 73.

[22] Dihkhuda 1970, 13:18990. *Rikhtā* is the name by which the Urdu language was referred to in early times. The Turko-Persian elite resented the introduction of the local language, Hindi, in the Mughal camps even in the seventeenth century. As late as early nineteenth century, poetry written in Urdu was called *rikhtā*, "hodge-podge." Amīr Khusraw, called this newly emerging "mixed language" *Hindawī,* Abū-l Fazal (d. 1010 /1602) called it *Dihlawī,* and in the Deccan it was called both *Dakhnī* and *Hindī*. When Muḥammad b. Tughlaq (d. 752/1351) made Daulatabad the capital of his empire, it was called *Hindī* and occasionally *Gujarī* (not *Gujarati,* which is a different language). *Hindī* was taken to the Deccan first by Alāʾuddin's (d. 716/1316) armies, before Muḥammad b. Tughlaq.

[23] Qureshi 1995, 17-76.

stich is in Persian, the second in Hindawī (underlined), the third again in Persian, and the fourth in Hindawī. In the remaining couplets, the first verse is in Persian, the other in Hindawī. The poem showcases Amīr Khusraw's mastery over both languages.

zi-ḥāl-i miskīn makun taghāful
duraye nayna banāye batiyan

ki tāb-i hijrān nadāram ay jān
na leho kāhe lagaye chhatiyan

shabān-i hijrān darāz chun zulf
wa-rūz-i waslat chun ʿumr kutā

sakhi piyā ko jo main na dekhun
to kaise kātun andheri ratiyan

yakāyak az dil du chashm-i jadū
bāshad faribam baburd taskin

kise pari hai jo jā sunāve
piyāre pī ko hamāri batiyan

chu shamā suzan chu zarra ḥayran
hamisheh giryān bi-ʿishq-i ān mah

na nīnd nayna na ang chaynā
na āp-āveh na bhejeh patiyān

ba-haqq-i rūz-i wisāl-i dilbar
ki dād marā gharīb Khusraw

sapet man ke warāye rākhun
jo jāye pāun piyā ke khatiyān.

Don't be heedless of my abject state,
he rolls his eyes, he makes excuses,

For I cannot bear this separation,
why doesn't he take and embrace me?

The nights of separation are long like tresses,
and the days of union short like life,

Girlfriend, if I don't see my beloved,
how can I get through the dark nights?

All at once, two spellbinding eyes
ruined my heart's composure a hundred times,

Who cares enough to carry
my words to my beloved?

Like a burning candle, like a dazed atom,
always crying, for the love of that moon,

No sleep for the eyes, no rest for the limbs,
he doesn't come, he doesn't send letters.

For the sake of the day of union with
my beloved who deceived me, Khusraw,

I will keep myself prepared until
I can go to my beloved's abode.[24]

II. *Is* Mulammaʿ *Translatable as "Macaronic"?*

In the *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* van Gelder defines *mulammaʿ* as "a poem in which more than one language is used" and translates it as "macaronic" verse without the stipulation of any further requirements.[25] *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* defines macaronic verse as "the mixing of words, sometimes whole lines, of more than one language in a poem, most often for comic and satiric effect though sometimes (and more recently) with serious intent."[26] In Western literatures, the most famous and self-conscious expression of the macaronic practice in poetry was found around the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was definitely so named by Teofilo Folengo (1491-1544) after his famous mock-epic *Maccaroneae* or *Opus Macaronicum,* which was first published in 1517 in Venice followed by several editions and a French translation. Folengo, whose pseudonym was Merlinus Coccanius, was a learned and witty Benedictine monk descended from a noble Mantuan family.[27]

Based on Folengo's work and at his insistence, the form of the macaronic was required to be Latin mixed with another language, Latin being the source language and the vernacular usually the language of the poet in Latinized inflections. Once again, based on the content of the *Maccaroneae* of Folengo, the content of the macaronic form was assumed to be necessarily vulgar, bawdy, and obscene.[28]

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24 See Sharma 2005, 75, for the English translation and transliteration.
25 van Gelder 1998 II: 549.
26 *New Princeton Encyclopedia*, 730.
27 Dobson 1880, 87; Morgan 1872, 148-9. On Folengo see also Curtius 1979, 249, with an example of how the Muses feed him macaroni and polenta!
28 van Grundy 1906, 21, quoted in Sullivan 1932, x.

The form derived its name from the Italian macaroni, the favorite pasta dish of the peasants, which, according to Folengo, indicates a crude mixture—like that of flour, cheese, and butter in macaroni—and its burlesque appeal.[29]

The history of 'macaronic' in Western literatures demonstrates that over the course of several centuries, its definition was extended to designate mixed-language compositions with or without the requirement of Latin as the source language. A similar phenomenon occurs in the context of the definition of '*mulammaʿ*' within the Islamic literary traditions. It seems to have been amplified to accommodate poetic compositions in mixed-language with or without Arabic or Persian as a *source* language, even though the sources do not explicitly acknowledge the fact. However, the issue of whether the term *mulammaʿ* is accurately translatable as "macaronic" remains open. With reference to Western literatures, Siegfried Wenzel argued for the broadening of the earlier definition of macaronic form, which allows only a strictly formalized and limited combination of Latin and other vernacular languages in Latinized inflections. Wenzel argues that the existence of even *one* word foreign to *any* source language qualifies a poem as macaronic.[30] As noted earlier, Islamic literatures had already developed other rhetorical devices to accommodate foreign words, even entire sentences, defining them by technical terms other than the *mulammaʿ*.[31] Thus, in order to accurately represent the phenomenon of what is now referred to as "macaronic" in Western literatures, which includes what may be called "macaronicisms" (a one or two foreign-word interference), the term *mulammaʿ* falls short. This is particularly so because technical terms such as *taḍmīn, iqtibās,* and others, represent mixed-language combinations and only part of what is understood as macaronic. Therefore, technically, in contemporary times, the term macaronic has a wider reach in Western literatures than *mulammaʿāt* in Muslim literatures, unless one includes within the definition of *mulammaʿ* the various rhetorical devices that allow mixing of two or more languages. In addition, as noted earlier, the predominant content definition of macaronic in Western literatures, until recently, was necessarily vulgar, obscene,

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29 *New Princeton Encyclopedia*, 730.

30 Wenzel 1994, 14.

31 A discussion of these rhetorical devices follows later on in this essay.

and ribald, at least as commonly understood.[32] However, the various *mulammaʿāt* documented in this study and Rūmī's *mulammaʿāt* in particular do not reflect this content requirement of the term macaronic. Although *mulammaʿ* as defined by the medieval Muslim *littérateurs,* particularly the Persian critics, falls short of all that the macaronic has come to mean, it has now become a standard term in Western languages to describe the *mulammaʿ* form, and, to some extent, other more standard forms of mixed-language compositions by Muslims. Therefore, the current study uses *mulammaʿ* and 'macaronic' interchangeably, though with the aforementioned caveat.

III. *The Purity of the Arabic Language*

A discussion of the purity of the Arabic language is necessary for several reasons. First, it is important to acknowledge the "purist" impulse present in all analyses of the Arabic language by Arabs as well as those non-Arabs who constituted the upper echelons of Muslim societies. The claim that Arabic enjoys a superior status arose in conjunction with the Muslim dogma of the "inimitability" of the Qurʾān *(iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*); it is a recurrent claim that has persisted into modern times. Second, one must acknowledge the desire on the part of most non-Arab Muslim literary figures to produce some work in Arabic, or at least incorporate Arabic into their work, to gain linguistic and religious legitimacy, as well as to gain *baraka,* blessing. It is important to keep these aspirations in mind when analyzing various *mulammaʿāt,* particularly those of Rūmī, in which references to the status of Arabic and Persian are juxtaposed.

The question of mixing languages for poetic compositions needs, first of all, to consider the issue of the purity of any of the languages that might be designated as a "source language." In the case of Islam, Arabic, with its theological status as God's chosen tongue of communication for His last and final revelation to humankind, leaves little doubt of its consensual designation as the "source language." Nevertheless, the issue of the "foreign vocabulary" of the Qurʾān was hotly debated in early commentaries. Ironically, Arabic philological

[32] This requirement has been changing recently even within Western literatures as discussed in Virani, 1999, chapter two. However, popular notions of what macaronic stands for are still colored by its vulgar and bawdy content requirement.

works, which themselves grew out of the recognition for a need to interpret the Revelation, including its difficult and "foreign" words after the Prophet's death, propounded the dogma of the unmitigated purity of the Arabic language. Although they would never be referred to as such, from the conceptual and linguistic perspectives, the borrowed foreign elements in the Qurʾān could, arguably, be termed "macaronicisms" in accordance with the more general definition of the usage of the term "macaronic."

IV. *The Arabic Language and the Muslim Dogma of the Qurʾān as God's Word*

It was realized, early on, that the question of the presence of "foreign" words and terms in the Qurʾān had grave implications for the issue of "borrowed materials" of religious import and, to a lesser extent, of cultural import as well. It also had significant consequences for the discussion of the "informants" of Muḥammad and the "sources" of the Qurʾān. Linguistic and interpretive scholarly studies of the Qurʾān thus had ramifications that went far beyond the linguistic realm into matters of doctrine and dogma: the origins of Islam itself, the dominant influences that had supposedly shaped Muḥammad's prophetic mission, and by implication, the divine revelation during different periods. Such questions bore upon the very foundation and nature of revelation and spiritual experience. Opinions on the linguistic purity of the Qurʾān could not remain dispassionate or distant; they were necessarily affected by these extra-linguistic considerations.[33]

It is clear that the earliest circles of exegetes fully recognized and frankly admitted the existence of foreign words in the Qurʾān.[34] At the beginning of his *Muʿarrab*, Mawhūb b. Aḥmad al-Jawālīqī (d. 539/1144) lists foreign words on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 68/688) and his circle of alleged disciples, such as ʿIkrima (d. 14/636), Ibn Jubayr (d. 95/714), Mujāhid (d. 104/723), and ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ (d. 115/747). Tradition credits Ibn ʿAbbās and his school with cultivating a special interest in seeking the origin of foreign words in the

[33] Jeffery 1938, 31 n. 4 notes that "the philologers (sic.) did much better in dealing with such foreign words *outside* the Qurʾān, i.e., with later borrowings of Islamic times" (italics mine).

[34] al-Jawālīqī, *Muʿarrab*, 5-14, also discussed by Jeffery 1938, 10ff.

Qurʾān. *Al-Muʿarrab* recognizes the antiquity of many borrowings and exhibits no doctrinal inhibitions in admitting the existence of pre-Islamic loan words in the vocabulary of the Qurʾān. Eventually, however, as the dogma of the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān and its eternal nature was formulated and elaborated, the existence of foreign words came to be vehemently denied. Based on a reading of the verse "Verily we have made it an Arabic Qurʾān," the text's entirely Arabic nature acquired creedal status; to deny it was tantamount to questioning God's word. Al-Jawālīqī quotes "Abū ʿUbayda as given by al-Ḥasan, 'I heard Abu ʿUbayda say that whoever pretends that there is in the Qurʾān anything other than the Arabic tongue has made a serious charge against God...'."[35] The fundamental argument of the early commentators who denied foreign elements in the Qurʾān is that the text refers to itself as an "Arabic Qurʾān" in many passages. The commentators also emphasize 41:44, "Now had we made it a foreign Qurʾān they would have said, 'Why are its signs not made plain? Is it foreign or Arabic?'"[36] This line of argument was primarily based on the fact that the Arabs were expected to understand this revelation and they could not do so if it were not in Arabic.

The theologians argued in a similar vein based on their belief that the Qurʾān is the final and perfect divine revelations. That being the case, they contended, God would naturally choose to send the final revelation in the perfect language. Thus, to imply that Arabic was lacking in the necessary religious vocabulary, and that God had to borrow Nabatean, Persian, Syriac or Hebrew words to express His purpose would be blasphemous. The difficulties encountered by early authorities in interpreting certain words in the Qurʾān were explained away by the richness and copiousness of the Arabic language, which ordinary mortals could not be expected to master in all its variety.[37] The only exception to this rule, as maintained by al-Shāfiʿī (d.

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[35] al-Jawālīqī, *Muʿarrab*, 4 also cited in Jeffery 1938, 5. Jeffery (n. 8) identifies Abū ʿUbaida Maʿmar b. al-Muthannā as the great humanist of the reign of Harūn al-Rashīd (d. 195/809). The former was of Judaeo-Persian origin and a student of rare words in Arabic.

[36] As Jeffery 1938, 6 n. 6 notes, the last sentence can be variously translated as, "Is it a foreign Qur'an and they to whom it is sent Arabs?" or "Is it a foreign Qur'ān and he who speaks an Arab?" *wa-law jaʿalnāhu Qurʾānan aʿjamiyyan, la-qālū law lā fuṣṣilat āyātuhu a-aʿjamiyyun wa-ʿarabiyyun...*

[37] al-Suyūṭī, *Itqān*, 315, as quoted by Jeffery 1938, 7.

204/820), was the prophet Muḥammad: "None but a prophet thoroughly comprehends a language."[38]

The philologists, too, jealously guarded the perfection of the idiom they studied and, therefore, were unwilling to accept any ascription of deficiency to the Arabic language. When hard pressed to admit the presence of foreign words, they produced the coincidence theory, according to which Arabic and other tongues happened to use the same words for the same things—words which, in the case of Arabic, happened to be used for the first time in the Qurʾān. Abū Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) took this position, which is summarized by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 910/1505) in the *Itqān.*[39] This position, as Jeffery puts it, "is even seriously defended at the present day by the ultra-orthodox in spite of the overwhelming weight of the probabilities against such a series of coincidences, not to speak of the definite linguistic evidence of borrowing on the part of Arabic."[40] The other position claimed in cases where the two languages agree is that it is Ethiopic, or Nabatean, or Syriac, or Persian, which has borrowed from Arabic since the latter is the most perfect and richest of all languages. The more popular view in this regard was that since the Qurʾān was sent to the Arab people and since it says in 14:4 "We have sent no Prophet save in the tongue of his own people that (his message) might be plain to them," the text must be entirely in Arabic. However, since the Qurʾān sums up and completes previous revelations, it is to be expected that technical terms of Hebrew, Syriac or other origin that appeared in previous revelations be included in this final revelation.[41]

According to Jeffery a synthesized account of this issue appears in al-Suyūṭī's *Itqān* (316) and is expounded by the North African exegete ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Thaʿālibī (d. 872/1468) in his *Jawāhir* (1, 17):

> In my opinion the truth of the matter is this. The Qurʾān is in plain Arabic containing no word which is not Arabic or which cannot be understood without the help of some other language. For these (so-called foreign) words belonged to the language of the ancient Arabs,

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38 al-Shāfiʿī, *Risāla,* 89, as quoted by Jeffery 1938, 8.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 "Ibn Naqīb claimed that one of the *khaṣāʾiṣ,* distinguishing characteristics, of the Qurʾān is that, while it was revealed in the tongue of the people to whom it was first sent, it also contains much of the tongues of the three great Empires of Rūm, Persia, and Abyssinia"; al-Suyūṭī, *Itqān,* 316, as quoted in Jeffery 1938, 9 n. 3.

> in whose tongue the Qurʾān was revealed, after they had had contact with other languages through commercial affairs and travel in Syria and Abyssinia, whereby the Arabs took over foreign words, altering some of them by dropping letters or lightening what was heavy in the foreign form. Then they used these words in their poetry and conversation so that they became like pure Arabic and were used in literature and thus occur in the Qurʾān. So if any Arab is ignorant about these words it is like his ignorance of the genuine elements of some other dialect, just as Ibn ʿAbbās did not know the meaning of *fāṭir,* etc. Thus the truth is that these words were foreign, but the Arabs made use of them and arabicized them, so from this point of view they are Arabic. As for al-Ṭabarī's opinion that in these cases the two languages agree word for word, it is far-fetched, for one of them is the original and the other a derivative as a rule, though we do not absolutely rule out coincidence in a few exceptional cases.[42]

When challenged as to how, on this view, the Qurʾān could be called "a plain Arabic Qurʾān," its proponents, among them al-Suyūṭī, replied that the presence of a few foreign words no more makes the text non-Arabic than the presence of many Arabic words in a Persian ode makes the ode non-Persian.[43] This last response reveals a fluid attitude towards mixing languages, if al-Suyūṭī's opinion is at all representative of contemporary Muslim theological and linguistic views. Thus, al-Suyūṭī, along with al-Jawālīqī and Ibn al-Jawzī, affirms the opinions of both parties to the quarrel. The great philologists were right in claiming that there are foreign words in the Qurʾān, for, in regard to their origin, these words are Persian, or Syriac, or Ethiopic. However, al-Shāfiʿī and his followers were also right, for since these words had been adopted into the Arabic language and polished by the tongues of the Arabs, they are indeed Arabic.[44]

Al-Suyūṭī gives the longest list of the various languages from which the borrowed words in the Qurʾān may have originated: Ethiopic, Persian, Greek, Indian, Syriac, Hebrew, Nabatean, Coptic, Turkish, Negro *(zanjiyya),* and Berber. Jeffery's analysis shows that Ethiopic, Persian, Greek through Syriac, "Indian" (referring to the languages of Southern Arabia), Aramaic (the most copious source of Qurʾānic borrowings), and Hebrew, may indeed have affected the Qurʾānic vocabulary. As for the other languages in the list, he main-

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42 Jeffery 1938, 10.

43 Ibid., 11.

44 al-Suyūṭī, *Itqān*, 1961, 318 and al-Jawālīqī, *Muʿarrab*, 5, both quoted in Jeffery 1938, 11.

tains that it was more a question of utter non-comprehension coupled with the tendency to attribute words to the farthest and the most exotic source. Both Jeffery and Ignaz Goldziher seem inclined to believe that:

> to attempt to explain all that has been set forth (by these authorities) as Hebrew, Syriac, Nabataean, etc. from one's knowledge of these tongues would be undertaking a fruitless task. These languages, like the people who spoke them, belong to a grey antiquity, and are merely general terms for anything mysterious, esoteric, and ununderstandable, and to which belongs everything of whose origin there is no certainty, but whose great age is obvious.[45]

The above discussion explains how the issue of foreign words in the Qurʾān became a matter of doctrine. Once the creed of the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān *(kalāmu llāhi ghayru makhlūq)* proclaimed by Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 240/855) gained ground through the well-formulated and well-articulated doctrines of Abū l-Ḥasan b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī (d. 323/935), the status of the Qurʾān and, with it, that of the purity of the Arabic language, commanded uncontested supremacy. Thus, the period of Arab and Arabic hegemony in Islamic literatures began very early. Within the Muslim milieu, it has never been possible to discuss the status of Arabic as a language *per se* as distinct from it being the language of the Qurʾān. In fact, the claim that critics made to specialization and authoritative knowledge in the field of Arabic literary criticism as the over-arching criterion for aesthetic judgment was certainly influenced by the whole notion of "authoritative knowledge" and the "authority of specialists," developed in connection with the interpretation of the Qurʾān.[46] Arabic has always enjoyed privileged status among both the highly educated and the less educated, as well as the totally illiterate. The prevailing sense of the degree of its superiority was such that even the *Shuʿūbiyya* movement, which claimed equal status for Arab and non-Arab Muslims, paradoxically felt compelled to adopt Arabic as its tool of expression to prove the equality, or even relative superiority, of the non-Arab peoples through their mastery of the superior language: Arabic. Among the varied field in which the Shuʿūbī and his pro-Arab opponent competed, language and lineage stood out. As H.T.

[45] Goldziher 1872, 31.
[46] Abu Deeb 1990, 348.

Norris notes, "Yet even the most fanatical Shuʿūbī expressed his sentiments in the tongue first spoken by the Arabian lizard-eaters he so despised."[47]

The above discussion has traced the course of how Arabic, from the time of the Muslim revelation, and because of it, gained the status of a sacred language whose purity had to be guarded at all costs. Therefore, it is understandable that Arab literary critics and philologists as well as Muslim theologians all frowned upon attempts to compromise the purity of Arabic, including experiments such as the *mulammaʿ* and *muwashshaḥ* forms. Arabic dictionaries and literary critical writings may thus have ignored the *mulammaʿ* form because they considered it a "travestying form" that would subvert the ideal of the purity of the Arabic language.[48]

V. *Rhetorical Devices That Lend Themselves to Multilingual Compositions*

Macaronic compositions in Western literary traditions developed over several centuries, and "macaronic" came to mean any combination of Latin and vernacular language. Vernacular insertions consisted of a word, sentence, or a verse, or several sentences or verses within the larger body of composition in the source language, Latin. The themes of such macaronic compositions, as has been recently recognized, ranged from hymns and sermons to ribaldry and satire.

Unlike these Western traditions, Arabic and Persian traditions, particularly poetry had, early on, developed various devices through which compositions incorporated quotations and insertions from, or allusions to, the Qurʾān, the *Ḥadīth,* poetry, proverbs, and the like. Several modern scholars have elaborated with examples the range of rhetorical devices used in Arabic and Persianate poetic traditions.[49] Therefore, we do not need to treat all the common rhetorical devices employed by Persian poets. However, I would like to discuss briefly those rhetorical devices that offered bilingual and multilingual poets the opportunity to blend different languages without having to compose mixed-language poetry according to the strict and limiting for-

[47] Norris 1990, 43.

[48] Bakhtin 1981, 61-8.

[49] See bibliography for works of Rādūyānī, Waṭwāṭ, Rückert, Rāstgār on the subject. Also Browne 1914 I: 445-80 and Schimmel 1982 and 1992, 10ff.

mal definition of *mulammaʿ*. I hope to illustrate through examples that these devices enabled the poets working within a Muslim milieu to introduce foreign language(s), elements, and ideas that may justifiably be called "macaronicisms."

Here I am interested in the combination of macaronic verse, that is, *mulammaʿ,* with macaronicisms created through the use of various rhetorical devices. I argue elsewhere that the use of both the rhetorical devices and the bi- and trilingual composition creates a more nuanced text for the reader when compared to a monolingual text.[50] Such a text, then, liberates the reader from the tyranny of the constraints imposed by one language, setting her free to explore the ambiguity of a multilingual text by filling in the blanks that the various rhetorical devices, or foreign language insertions, evoke for a monolingual reader or listener.

Foremost in the category of the rhetorical devices that allow a combination of two or more languages are those that enable writers and poets to insert direct quotes from the Qurʾān, the *Ḥadīth,* poetry, and proverbs. *Taḍmīn,* or insertions from religious, ethical, or secular literature including ancient poetry, is the summary designation of this category to which also belong *iqtibās,* the insertion of verses or fragments of verses from the Qurʾān; *irsāl-i mithāl (mathal)* or *tamthīl,* insertion of proverbs; and *talmīḥ,* allusions rather than direct quotes or insertions.[51]

As early as the lifetime of the Prophet, the primary status of the Qurʾān was recognized and its use as a proof text to impart legitimacy to a particular point of view was widespread. After his death, this practice, legitimized as the *sunna,* or custom, of the Prophet, gained more frequency. *Iqtibās* is the corresponding poetic device whereby poets inserted verses or fragments of verses from the Qurʾān mostly to impart legitimacy to their point of view. Annemarie Schimmel's assumption that every well-educated Muslim would generally recognize such insertions is well founded for the medieval and even for the pre-modern periods. However, one cannot expect the same degree of familiarity from non-Muslim scholars or many "secularly well-educated" Muslims in modern and contemporary times. As far as the understanding and translation of these insertions

[50] See my forthcoming monograph tentatively entitled *The Macaronic Rumi.*

[51] Cf. also the contribution by Bruce Fudge on *taḍmīn* in Qurʾānic exegesis in this volume.

is concerned, Schimmel's suggestion that one may treat an entire Arabic sentence like a single Persian word regardless of Arabic grammar is invaluable. For example "By the Morning Light!" is the beginning of Sūra 93, which was often quoted in connection with the Prophet's radiant face, but was also used for the beloved in general.

rukh-i chūn wa-l-ḍuḥā[52]

A face like "By the Morning Light!"

The incidences of *iqtibās* in Arabic and Persian mystical verse multiplied over time and mirrored a phenomenon which Paul Nwyia has aptly termed the *qoranisation de la mémoire* "the quranization of memory," as opposed to the "memorization of the Qurʾān," within the Muslim milieu, particularly among mystics.[53] The prolific use of *iqtibās* in poetic compositions, particularly of a mystico-didactic nature, rendered them equivalent to the Qurʾānic commentaries *(tafsīr)* written in prose. In such mystico-didactic texts, Qurʾānic insertions were often followed or preceded by explanations and interpretations of the verse in poetic form. Some of the poems by Mawlānā Rūmī (d. 671/1273) thus qualify as *tafsīr* in poetic form. Following is an example of Rūmī's treatment of Sūrat al-Aʿlā/87 in a short five-verse poem (*Dīwān* no. 247), which starts out with the mystic understanding that all of creation is perpetually engaged in the act of praising God by saying *tasbīḥ*. Thus he says:

bāng-i tasbiḥ bishnaw az-bālā
pas tu ham sabbiḥi smahu l-aʿlā[54]

gul u-sunbul charad dilat chun yāft
marguzārī ka akhraja l-marʿā[55]

yaʿlamu l-jahra naqsh-i īn āhūst
nāfi mushkīn-i ū wa-mā yakhfā[56]

nafas-i āhwān-i-ū chu-rasīd
rūḥ-rā sūy-i marguzār hadā[57]

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52 Schimmel 1992, 42.
53 Nwyia 1970, 1-17.
54 Q. 87:1, "Glorify the name of your Lord, Most High."
55 Q. 87:4.
56 Q. 87:7
57 Q. 87:3

tishna-rā kī buwad farāmūshī
chun sa-nuqriʾuka fa-lā tansa[58]

Listen to the cry of glorification from above,
then you, too, "glorify His name, the most High."

Your heart grazes upon the rose and hyacinth,
since it found the meadow where
"He brings forth the [green and luscious] pastures."

"He knows what is manifest," is the [outer] form of this gazelle,
its musk-filled navel "and what is hidden."

When the breath of his gazelles reached the soul,
He "guided" it towards the meadow [of Right Guidance].

How can the thirsty one forget?
Since "We shall make you recite, so that you do not forget!" [59]

The message in the above poem is one of hope and its intent is obviously didactic. It relies almost totally on the first seven verses of Sūra 87, which evoke the reciprocal relationship between God and humanity. In Rūmī's understanding, then, it is for humans to praise and glorify God. God leads them to "guidance, fresh pastures, and constant companionship," never leaving them to fend for themselves, and compensating them for their forgetfulness *(ghafla)*. Rūmī conjures the image of the thirsty one, who cannot forget his thirst, and reminds his readers and listeners that God ensures that humans "do not forget" by bestowing constant favors on them as well as by creating need. The Qurʾān underscores God's knowledge of both "the manifest" and "the hidden." Rūmī further clarifies this concept of God's omniscience through the image of the (manifest) gazelle and its (hidden) musk. His poem poignantly expresses his deep faith in God and his understanding of nature as a manifest sign of His abundant gifts. It can be seen as a form of Qurʾānic *tafsīr* that aims at practical results: to ensure believers let the message of the Qurʾān resonate in their daily lives. Many abstract concepts, such as God's

[58] Q. 87:6.

[59] Following is a translation of the relevant verses from *Sūrat al-Aʿlā/* 87: 1-7: "Glorify the name of your Lord, Most High/Who has created and given you proportion/Who has decreed and guided/And who brings forth the (green and luscious) pastures/And then made it (but) swarthy stubble/We shall make you recite so you shall not forget/Except what God wishes. For it is He who knows what is manifest and what is hidden."

omnipotence, omniscience, grace, and care for humanity are explained at a concrete and practical level through palpable images of pastures, gardens, thirst, gazelle and musk.

The second device, *irsāl-i mithāl,* the insertion of proverbs, both Arabic and Persian, is quite common, but sometimes proves difficult for the uninitiated to unravel. In poem no. 1015, a *mulammaʿ,* Rūmī uses a proverb to play a variation on a recurrent message in his didactic poetry: the obligation to express repeated gratitude for blessings copiously received from God. He maintains, in line with Qurʾānic teaching, that *kafara,* instead of the commonly understood meaning of not believing in God, really means, *not acknowledging* His gifts or "covering them up," which is the root's basic meaning.

ay khurda-i jām-i dhū l-manan
tashnīʿi bīhūda mazan

zīrāka fāza man shakar
zīrāka khāba man kafar

O one who has drunk the goblet of the Possessor of Favors,
don't reproach in vain.

For "whoever is grateful wins";
For "whoever is ungrateful loses."

Scholarly studies of such rhetorical devices as *iqtibās, irsāl-i mithāl* or *tamthīl, taḍmīn,* and *talmīḥ* have tended to adduce only monolingual examples. Most studies thus ignore the 'macaronisms' that result even within the parameters of permissible usage of the various rhetorical devices. What is missing is any consideration of the visual, aural, and cognitive impact of the insertion of Arabic or other phrases in poems composed primarily in Persian, Turkish, Bosnian, Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Gujarati, Swahili, Hausa, and others in use among Muslims. The use of Arabic *taḍmīn* within these compositions is distinct from that within an all-Arabic composition. First, in a poem whose source (i.e., main) language is other than Arabic, an Arabic insertion provides an opportunity to pause, if not to stumble, and then reflect on the status, use, and meaning of such an insertion in that particular context. In an all-Arabic composition, insertions neither stand out nor demand a pause; regardless of their comprehensibility to the reader, they are more likely to blend with the rest of the piece. Thus, a non-Arabic poem acquires a more complex texture through the use of Arabic *taḍmīn* than an all-Arabic poem does. Insertions

may provoke a moment of reflection, or create blank spaces to be skipped over when the reader lacks the linguistic skills required for comprehension and translation.

To the category of direct quotes also belong *ʿaqd* and *ḥall,* which are technically direct quotes whose endings or inflections are adjusted in accordance with the requirements of the meter and rhyme of the poem.[60] For example, all of Rūmī's *mulammaʿāt* follow Persian meters. [61] One of the chief characteristics of classical Persian poetry is its extreme regularity. No variants are permitted. Thus, a *mathnawī* may contain thousands and thousands of completely regular lines. Arabic rules of prosody, on the other hand, allow variants. Rūmī can thus take liberties in mixing variants of the same meter in the Arabic portion of his poems. Like other poets, he also manipulates the rules of Arabic pronunciation, sometimes arbitrarily. For example, the Qurʾān contains the following passage:

> *kullu shayʾin hālikun*
> *illā wajhah* (28:88) [62]

In the verse below, Rūmī has shortened *hālikun to hālik*, suppressed the *hamza* of *illā,* and restored the ending of *wajhah,* generally dropped in pause, because the meter and rhyme require *wajhahū.* That is, he pronounces *wajhahū* as if it were not the final word in the verse and *hālikun* as if it were:

> *w-az malak ham bāyadam jastan zi jū*
> *kullu shayʾin hālik illā wajhahū*

> and, as an angel, too, I must leap over the river,
> [for] "all things perish except His face." [63]

The device of *tarjumān* or *darj u-tarjuma-i āyāt u-aḥādīth,* translations of Qurʾānic verses and the traditions of the Prophet, as well as proverbs into Persian and other languages, do not technically qualify and, therefore, should not be confused with the *mulammaʿ* form. Nonetheless, "one of the greatest living authorities on Rūmī in Persia today, Hādī Ḥāʾirī, has shown in an unpublished work that some 6,000

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60 Heinrichs 1997, 270 defines *ʿaqd* as the solidification [of prose] as opposed to *ḥall* the dissolution [of poetry].

61 Virani 1999; for a detailed breakdown of the meters Rūmī uses for his mixed verse, please refer to the appendices.

62 Thiesen 1982, 70.

63 Ibid.

verses of Rūmī's Dīw*ān* and *Mathnawī* are practically direct translations and renderings of Qurʾānic passages into Persian poetry."[64]

The device of *ishtiqāq,* paronomasia, the use of words which are formed out of the same root or which contain the same three Arabic root consonants in different sequence, likewise allowed poets to combine languages.[65] These usually occur in instances where two words look as if they were derived from the same root but belong in reality to different roots; or in cases where one word is Arabic and the other Persian. *Rūyat,* "your face" and *riwāyat* "report," would form, according to Schimmel, such a false *ishtiqāq*.[66] Amīr Khusraw wrote verses in which certain words yield different meaning[s] in Arabic and Persian respectively:

> *naqd-i dilī ki sikka-i waḥdat nayāft ast*
> *ān qalb-rā ba-hīch wilāyat rawāj nīst*
>
> The cast coin of a heart that has not found the stamp of unity,
> such false money has no value in any country.

Qalb means "counterfeit, false," especially in connection with money, but in Arabic it means "heart," so that one can also read "Such a heart has no value," especially because he mentions *dil*, "heart" in Persian in the first hemistich.

As noted earlier, Amīr Khusraw's verses occasionally contain word play even between Persian and Hindawī, the colloquial language of Delhi. When he asked a beautiful Hindu woman the price of one of her hairs, she answers, *dur mūyi!* which means in Persian "Every hair a pearl!" but in Hindawī "Get lost!"[67]

> I went for a stroll by a stream
> And saw a Hindu woman on the water's edge.
> I asked, "Pretty one, what is the price of your hair?"
> She cried out, "Every hair a pearl [Persian]/Get lost, you lout! [Hindawī]."[68]

In certain cases passages can be meaningfully interpreted independently in more than one language. Such passages demonstrate learned playfulness and conscious intention rather than frivolity on the part

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64 Nasr 1975, 45.

65 Many of the following examples derive from the discussion of the various rhetorical devices in Schimmel 1982 & 1992.

66 Khusraw, *Dīwān,* no. 1107, cited in Schimmel 1992, 48.

67 Khusraw, *Dīwān,* no. 271, cited ibid., 49.

68 Sharma 2005, 80.

of their creators. Rückert calls this form *mutaḍamminu l-lughatayn,* "containing two languages." Most of his examples derive from Amīr Khusraw, who championed this device. Here is another example of a Persian-Hindawī combination:

> *dārīm ārzū ki ḥikāyat kunīm bāt*
> *lāla ghulām rūy-i tu ṣad barg zīr-i pāt*
>
> *har barhman ka rūy-i tu dīdast ay ṣanam*
> *zunnār-rā gusist lagad zad ba-rūy-i lāt*
>
> We have a wish to relate a story to you:
> Tulip, a slave [compared to] your face, a hundred leaves under your feet [leaf].
>
> Every Brahman, who sees your face, O idol,
> throws off his girdle, and kicks it on the face of al-Lāt [kick].

In this verse, *bāt* can mean *bā tu* "with you" (Persian, underlined in the quote) or "speech, talk" (Hindawī, given in brackets). Similarly, *pāt* can mean, *pāy-i tu,* "your feet" (Persian) or *pāt* (Sanskrit) from *pattra,* or *patra,* "leaf." *Lāt* in the last verse with the mention of idol, *ṣanam,* reminds one of the pre-Islamic goddess *al-Lāt;* it also means "kick" (Hindawī), which plays on the Persian meaning of *lagad,* "kicking," as well.

Amīr Khusraw also composes the following verse in which three different readings, one Persian and two Hindi, are possible:

> *guftam ki darīn khāna-i māmūn-i tu bāsham*
> *guftā ki darīn khana balā'ist mamānī*
>
> I said: "In this house I shall remain totally secure."
> He said: "In this house there is affliction; don't stay." (Persian).
>
> Or:
> He said, "In this house is a cat, don't stay" [Hindawī: *bilā'ī* or *bilādī*].
>
> Or:
> He said, "In this house the maternal aunt [wife of one's mother's brother] spells misery" [Hindawī: *mumānī*].[69]

Thus, as seen above, by a clever formulation of the rhetorical device *dhū l-ru'yatayn,* "double-faced," one could even change a Persian verse, or hemistich, into Arabic by placing the vowel marks differently as Khusraw does for Hindawī and Persian.

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[69] All the examples of *mutaḍamminu l-lughatayn* derive from Rückert 1874, 187ff.

Tajnīs or *jinās,* homonyms, include a very common group of devices. Arabic and Persian words, in Arabic lettering, are often alike or look alike, and can easily be combined. In a perfect *tajnīs*, or *tajnīs-i tāmm,* two words are absolutely identical, e.g., *shahr* meaning in Persian "town" and in Arabic "month."[70] *Tajnīs-i murakkab* occurs when recurring strings of words sound or look alike, or both, but have a completely different meaning in the same or a different language, such as the famous beginning of Rūmī's *Mathnawī:*

atash ast īn bāng-i nay u nīst bād
har ki īn ātash nadārad nīst bād

Fire is the call of this flute, not wind!
Whoever possesses not this fire, may he not be![71]

The pun here is on the word *nīst bād,* which means, "not wind" in one verse but "may he not be" in the next. Other forms of *tajnīs* include *tajnīs-i khaṭṭī*, an imperfect *tajnīs,* where one vowel may differ in two words that look otherwise alike such as *shīr,* "milk" and *shēr,* "lion." *Tajnīs-i murakkab* yields fascinating results when Arabic and Persian words that look and sound alike are used, such as when Jāmī (d. 902/1492) says:

tu humā-ī u nīst ẓill-i humā
juz du zulfat dāma zilluhumā

You are Humā (Phoenix), and the shadow of the Humā is
nothing but your two tresses—may their shadow last!

In the above verse Persian *ẓill-i humā,* "shadow of the Huma" is converted in the second hemistich into a frequently used Arabic blessing formula: "May the shadow of both of them last forever!"[72]

Edward G. Browne and Clifford E. Bosworth, in their discussion of Arabic influences on Persian literature and vice versa, have noted that from the second/eighth century onwards many poets and writers of Persian origin and writing in Arabic doubtless also knew both the literary and spoken early New Persian of the time. Thus, we find poets introducing into their Arabic verses not only common Persian words, which had been arabicized early and were thus part of the

[70] Schimmel 1992, 47.
[71] Rūmī, *Mathnawī* I: 9 also cited in Schimmel 1992, 48.
[72] Schimmel 1992, 48.

common Arabic lexical stock, but also other Persian words that would be incomprehensible to a non-persophone reader.[73] According to Bosworth, this trend eventually led to the composition of "macaronic poetry with Persian words inserted into the Arabic or with alternate verses, of differing meanings, in Arabic and Persian *(mulammaʿāt* "patchwork verses")."[74] Thus, for example, Jāḥiẓ cites an anonymous poet who uses in one hemistich the word *mardā,* "O man!" (Persian), and *mard,* "a youth having downy cheeks" (Arabic).[75] Within these examples then, we find presupposed a knowledge of the Persian language only Persians could be expected to possess. Similarly, in the following riddle, Abū al-Sājī praises the city of Marw:

> Earth, which in fragrance of ambergris excels,
> a country fair, where cool, sweet waters flow:
> and when the traveler seeks its bounds to leave,
> its very name commands him "not to go."

The poet here plays on the two senses of the consonants, *mrw*, signifying the town of Marw in Arabic, and the negative imperative *maraw,* "don't go!" in Persian.[76] An Arab reader or listener, unless he knew Persian, would miss the point of the verse entirely.

Tanāsub or *murāʿāt-i naẓīr,* "the harmony of similar things" is a rhetorical figure in which the poet assembles in one *bayt* (verse) expressions from one specific sphere of meaning so that they form an inseparable unit.[77] *Tanāsub* was a widely used rhetorical device among Arab poets. However, the development of this kind of simple *tanāsub* into *īhām-i tanāsub,* "amphibological congruence," gave non-Arab poets ample opportunities to create verbal plays that brought together several linguistic and cultural spheres of meaning and experience in their poetry. In the case of *īhām-i tanāsub* the deliberate use of a particular expression that has a double meaning often puzzled the listener or reader momentarily as to the particular meaning the poet intended. Often, of course, it was precisely the poet's intention to produce such an ambiguity. An ingenious example is the verse by ʿImād-i Faqīh (d. ca. 552/1157):

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[73] Browne 1914 I: 474; Bosworth 1990, 493.
[74] Bosworth 1990, 494.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid. and Browne 1914 I: 475.
[77] Schimmel 1992, 40.

When the heart saw the reflection of your lovely cheek in running water
It became confused and cried out: *"Māhī!"*

Māhī means in Persian both "a fish," as the semantic range implies, and "you are the moon!" and in Arabic *mā hiy(a)*, "what is this?!"[78]

In strophic poetry such as the *tarkībband,* the *band* that connects a Persian or Turkish *ghazal* into a unit is sometimes in neither of these languages but in Arabic. A good example is Hātif's mystical *tarjīʿband* with its recurrent statement that there is no deity save God. Another is the great *tarjīʿband* by the nineteenth-century Turkish poet Ziya Pasha, who describes the unfathomable greatness of the divine and the confusing state of the world by using as the *band* of his Turkish poem the Arabic verse:

subhāna man tahayyara fī sunʿihi l-ʿuqūl
subhāna man bi-qudratihi yaʿjuzu l-fuhūl

Praised be He about whose work intellects are stunned.
Praised be He concerning by whose power the heroes are incapacitated.

Poetical thefts, *sarīqāt-i shiʿrī,* meant a poet might insert a verse, a hemistich, or simply three or four words composed by an earlier poet. For a Persian poet to insert "stolen" Arabic lines would not be as easy as it would be for an Arab poet. Sometimes the source is acknowledged; at other times, it is simply assumed that the well-read reader or listener will recognize and admire the poet's skill. Rūmī inserts a phrase *lā tasʾal* from Ibn al-Muʿtazz's (d. 296/908) famous *Dayr ʿAbdūn* poem without acknowledging the source:

kāna ma kāna mimmā lastu adhkuruhū
ẓunna khayran wa-lā tasʾal ʿani l-khabari

Whatever it was, was, of which I shall not speak.
Think well of it, and do not ask about the details.

Ibn al-Muʿtazz composed this verse originally to describe a homoerotic encounter with a youthful Christian monk. However, al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), before Rūmī, had already used the same phrase in his *Deliverance from Error* to express the ineffability, yet complete certainty, of his spiritual experience, thus bringing this image from the sphere of homoerotic love to the spiritual sphere of hu-

[78] Ibid.

man-divine love.[79] Rūmī inserts himself into this mystical tradition by saying in one of his *mulammaʿāt:*

> That was the garden without fruit,
> that was the treasure without gold
>
> That was the night of pleasure without sweetmeats and conversation.
> "Don't ask," for that is something else.
> (D 2121, 3202-M)

However, true plagiarism did occur, giving an opportunity for satirists to lampoon their opponents.

Rūmī makes ingenious use of the traditional form of *suʾāl-u-jawāb,* "question and answer," to accommodate dialogues in different languages. The reader or listener needs to master several languages, because the questioner asks questions in one language and hears replies in a different one; if a third person becomes involved in the dialogue, a third language is likely to be incorporated as well. The insertion of a divine dialogue or a divine intervention via a Qurʾānic quotation *(iqtibās)* provides an opportunity to include yet another language, in this case Arabic. The *suʾāl-u-jawāb* form also allowed poets to impart a dramatic character to their poetic compositions. This rhetorical device combined with the mix of languages in the *mulammaʿ* form allows one to apply Mikhail Bakhtin's insights about literary travesty to Rūmī's *mulammaʿāt.* The use of multiple languages not only serves to heighten the dramatic effect of this rhetorical device, but also foregrounds the 'travestying' character of the macaronic form, as Bakhtin has demonstrated. Additionally, the switch of language brings alive the inherently dialectical nature of dialogue, where one perception of truth is contested by another person or voice.[80] Rūmī often avails himself of multilinguality to represent mimetically the dialogic understanding and quest for truth, whilst simultaneously undermining the prevalent monologic approach. In the following, Rumi resorts in the Bakhtinian vein to a dialogic discourse wherein competing notions of truth and reality vie with each other through the medium of different languages and the different personae of the lover and beloved:

> I said, "Show us the tumult."
> He said, "Here it is! But you are still in a sack (i.e. the human body).

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[79] al-Ghazālī 1953, 61.
[80] Bakhtin 1981, 275ff.

rip off that sack and bring out your head,
so that you see for yourself that you are already in [the state of] union.

Don't drag your feet on the path of the spirit,
because you're a phoenix (*humā*) with feather and wings."

I said, "The lover looks for a companion?"
He said, "No, no, if you were to ask me."

I said, "You kill innocent people."
He said, "That's how it is! Union is expensive!"

I asked, "How do I partake of that honey?"
He said, "A candle wax doesn't come into being unless you roll it."

A few verses later the dialogue continues with the juxtaposition of the two languages further heightened:

I said, "Listen to a secret from this slave (sc. me)."
He said, "Be quiet, O babbler!"

I said, "Silence is difficult."
He said, "O master of speech, become master of things exalted.

No one is intimate here *(maḥram),* [so] cut short your talk
And God knows better and God is the reader." (3201-M)

Another figure, the anaphora, or repetition of one word or expression, often an exclamation, at the beginning of the line, is often found in eulogies, especially in the monorhymed ode, the *qaṣīda,* where the poet tries to emphasize his topic or describe his patron's, or *mamdūḥ's,* power, beauty, and generosity from various perspectives. It is also found in the chains of oaths that *qaṣīda* writers sometimes insert toward the end of their poem, or in the repeated *tā... tā...tā...,* "as long as...," when they enumerate contrasting pairs, which will last "forever (or so they think) in order to wish the patron everlasting happiness."[81] Rūmī uses the similar device of epiphora to introduce another language, for example, in poem no. 1364, a *mulammaʿ,* alternating between Arabic and Persian with the Arabic epiphora *taʿāl*, "come." The combination of the epiphora and the foreign language is doubly effective and produces a haunting and lasting impression. Rūmī seems very conscious of the effect it creates without compromising the sincerity of his tone and the plea directed to his beloved to return:

[81] Schimmel 1992, 49.

O light in my heart, come!
The goal of felicity and intention, come!

You know, our life is in your hands,
don't be hard on the worshippers, come!

O Love, O beloved,
desist from rejection and obstinacy, come!

O Solomon, here are *hudhud*s (hoopoes) for you,
examine thoroughly, come!

O preceeding one, from whom preceded
the truth of love, come!

Souls clamor from separation,
fulfill [the promise of] the return, O Place of Return, come!

Conceal the faults and give generously of the good [*bi-l-maʿrūf, i.e.,* in accordance with the acceptable custom]
That is the tradition of the generous ones, come!

What is *taʿāl,* [come] in Persian?[82] *Biyā!* [come]
Either you come, or [at least] call out, come!

If you come, how wonderful will joy and desire be!
If you don't come, what a disappointment! Come!

O happiness of the Arabs, Qubād[83] of the Persians,
you open my heart with memories, come!

O my inner being, come! Saying, "You,
woe to your existence, and may it be [so]," come!

I circled the country with you,[84] O moon,
who encompassed [both] me and the country, come!

You are like the sun, when it draws near and moves away,
O you, who are close to the one far away, come!

Finally, poets were often able to combine languages through learned allusions, especially in Arabic, since it was accepted as the language of religious, juridical, philosophical and scientific discourse. Poets

[82] The Persian-Arabic combination seems to be particularly well thought out in this poem, because Rūmī shows off his linguistic skills and brings in the controversial topic of Arab and *ʿAjam* [foreigner]. Over the next three verses Rūmī elaborates upon the similarities and differences between Arabs and Persians.

[83] Qubād is the name of a king of Persia (father of Anūshirwān) and of a hero in the army of Minūchihr; see Steingass 1992, 951.

[84] If he intends the dialect usage of this preposition it signifies "with you" rather than "in you."

frequently alluded to books with their Arabic titles or pointed out those Arabic grammatical terms on which their word plays depended. Persian poets inserted well-known *incipits* of poems into their verse, such as *qifā nabki* "Let us stop and weep, O you two companions," from the *muʿallaqa* of the greatest pre-Islamic Arab poet, Imruʾ al-Qays. Inclusion of such verses often served as a way of expressing the intertexuality of the cumulative tradition of the Arabo-Persian and later Turkish and Urdu poetic worlds. Both Rūmī and Ḥāfiẓ (d. 792/1392) inserted *yā ayyuhā l-sāqī adir kaʾsan wa-nāwilhā,* from the *Dīwān* of Yazīd, the second Umayyad caliph (r. 60-4/680-3), in many of their Persian poems and *mulammaʿāt*.

The foregoing discussion, which has traced the earliest definitions of *mulammaʿāt* in Persian literature, has highlighted the presence of two specific attitudes that simultaneously contributed to, and inhibited, the practice of composing macaronic pieces. The high, almost sacred, status of Arabic encouraged Muslim *littérateurs* to include Arabic insertions into non-Arabic compositions to invoke *baraka* (blessings) as well as to gain legitimacy. However, such insertions generally restricted themselves to the Qurʾān, the *aḥādīth,* and well-known proverbs. On the one hand, the Arab and Persian literary critics confined this practice of mixing languages under the rubric of certain permissible rhetorical devices, in particular *taḍmīn.* On the other hand, they devised a strict technical definition of *mulammaʿāt* for mixed language compositions, one that excluded the use of these rhetorical devices, meaning that very few prose or poetic compositions qualified as *mulammaʿāt.* Thus, the proliferation and legitimation of an oral and textual memory, particularly scriptural memory, in literary writings hindered a freer use of mixed-language compositions. Against this background, Rūmī's *mulammaʿāt* stand out for their sheer number and variety.

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QAṢĪDA
ITS RECONSTRUCTION IN PERFORMANCE

Beatrice Gruendler

> L'intangibilité du poétique est une idée "moderne" qu'il est temps de bousculer un peu.
> (The intangibility of the poetic is a "modern" idea it is time to ruffle a bit.)
> Gérard Genette 1982, 281/1997, 445.

In recent scholarship the classical Arabic ode (*qaṣīda*) has gained recognition for its multiple identities and inner logic; even medieval Arabic poetics has been shown to give sporadic attention to its composition as a whole. In this enterprise, the early Abbasid ode with its articulated larger forms has rightly received special attention.[1] The

[1] Salient studies (whose bibliographies may be consulted for further literature) are Jacobi 1971, Bauer 1992, J. Stetkevych 1993, Sperl 1998, Sperl and Shackle 1996, Montgomery 1997, Meisami 2003, S. Stetkevych 1993 and 2002, specifically on Ibn al-Rūmī, Gruendler 1993 and McKinney 2004, and recently on the *nasīb,*

focus of this article[2] is quite the opposite: not whole odes as they are preserved in *dīwān*s but rather the "fragmentary" versions in which they appear in *akhbār* devoted to "modern" (*muḥdath*) poets of the third/ninth century and collected by Ibn al-Jarrāḥ, Ibn al-Muʿtazz (both d. 296/908), Abū Bakr al-Ṣūlī (d. 335/946), and Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣbahānī (d.c. 363/972). These compilations were designed only secondarily to record poetry. Ibn al-Muʿtazz stated this in his entry on the poet Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa the Elder (d.c. 182/798):

> I have mentioned only passages and brilliant verses (*fiqaran wa-ʿuyūnan*). For him who desires people's poetry in its entirety (*ʿalā l-wajh*), their *dīwān*s exist, and those of the famous [poets in particular] are owned by most. As for those whose poetry is found only among the nobles, we will include in our book a good share and ample portion, in order that its benefit to us be more complete....(TSh 47-8).[3]

If *akhbār* collections were not meant to duplicate modern poets' *dīwān*s, what then was their purpose? Elsewhere I have proposed two motives for their composition. First, *akhbār* championed a controversial new poetic style by documenting its popularity among those sections of the public that mattered, to wit, the urban upper classes and the ruling elite of 3rd/9th century Baghdad and Samarra. Those two groups supported the practitioners (*muḥdathūn*) of the "new style" (*badīʿ*) both financially and critically and ensured its transmission by preparing, copying and memorizing selections of modern poets' *dīwān*s. Second, the collections implied that poetic criticism of this

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Khankan 2002. For the ode in classical Arabic poetics, see van Gelder 1982, Meisami 2003, 9-13, and recently Hussein 2004. Ironically my discussion below of fragmented *qaṣīda*s will document an awareness of their wholeness precisely along the lines suggested by Meisami (2003:11). In this context, Ibn Qutayba's description has been continuously over-interpreted and misused as a *qaṣīda* blueprint; see Jacobi 1982, Meisami 2003 and Montgomery 2004.

[2] Originally delivered as "The *Qaṣīda* in Action," at the 21st UEAI Congress, Palermo, September 27-30, 2002. The title plays on the closing line of one of Wolfhart Heinrichs's limericks on occasion of my thesis defense, creating a formal unity between literary theory and architecture, "...Deconstruction and construction in one household." I will never be able to repay Wolfhart's support, mentorship, generous criticism, respect for the Arabic sources, openness to accepting new interpretative ideas, and above all allowing his students to encounter problems themselves at first.

[3] For abbreviations of primary sources used in this article, see the bibliography. Other abbreviations are "S" for an ode's strophe or introductory part, "AS" for the antistrophe or main section, such as praise, lament, or apology, and "MS" for the metastrophe or dedication section. The rationale for these terms is given in Gruendler 2003, 52-9.

modern style constituted its own scholarly venture—a new discipline, distinct from the philologically-based expertise of older poetry.[4]

For the topic at hand, namely the odes' fragmentation in delivery and reception, the *akhbār* narratives on the *muḥdathūn* contain a wealth of detailed information. The *qaṣīda*s that appear in these accounts differ dramatically from the versions recorded in the poets' *dīwān*s. In the long odes these changes are most incisive, for which reason they have been selected for discussion here. The *akhbār* staged the odes and anchored them within a historical context; thus they became part of a larger literary interaction. By the same token, the *qaṣīda*s themselves were altered.[5] The writers of such *akhbār* took liberties with the poems in recasting a situation as narrative. Instead of faithfully transcribing an entire ode, which might be nearly a hundred verses long, they selected only a few lines. These sufficed to identify the (often famous) ode and carry the action, which usually hinged on an issue expressed in the verse. This judicious editing of whole poems interrupted by prose passages, a dramaturgy of sorts, drastically abridged the *qaṣīda*s. At the same time a *khabar* included an ode within specific details of a scene, such as the poet's means of access to his addressee and the ode's delivery with the reactions of the recipient and other audience members during and after the recital; in other words, those elements that constituted the events of the ode's first performance and the accomplishment of its declared poetic act. This "staging" connected the shortened ode to the circumstances that were expanding around it.

I will approach these *akhbār* from a dramaturgical perspective. I do not have in mind the narrow definition of drama,[6] as used in theater studies, but a broader understanding developed in sociology and cultural anthropology as a way to explain the rise and effect of ex-

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[4] Even though many philologists who would not discuss modern poetry linguistically or poetically transmitted *akhbār* about it and appreciated it privately; see Bonebakker 1971, 87. For material support by the elite, see Gruendler 2005a; for the elite's critical acclaim, see Gruendler, forthcoming; and for the rise of a *muḥdath* poetics, see Gruendler 2005b, 59-88 and Ouyang 1997, 110-12 and 130-46.

[5] This also applies to the editing in the process of written transmission, which follows earlier alterations of *qaṣīda*s in performance, discussed below. Both stages become indistinguishable when the editing is part of the story.

[6] "The choice, organization and arrangement of persons and materials to perform a drama, viz., the transposition of a dramatic text which relies on linguistic signs to a multimedia performance, which uses diverse sign systems and offers multifarious perceptions accordingly"; Kolesch 2004.

pectations and demands that govern public behavior, or "the individual's presenting an appearance of himself/herself, seeing himself/herself with the eyes of others, and reflecting himself/herself in the eyes of others."[7] This performative approach has the benefit of including the concept of social role and allowing space for non-verbal phenomena and a variety of media that often suffer from the dominance of written culture. It is true that Arabic-Islamic culture lacks the proscenium theater as a model for such an analysis, but the dramaturgical perspective is applicable to the *akhbār* inasmuch as they depict rituals. This term is likewise intended in the broader understanding derived from cultural studies, as a "scenic performance of society," divorced from the religious sphere and taken as a basis for deciphering social and cultural dynamics.[8] In this sense ritual serves less to transfer information than to build relationships, while the actors involved simulate their experience of past emotions rather than living the actual history of an emotion or their private feelings.[9] What further justifies the dramaturgical treatment is the fact that poetic recitations require an audience for whose exclusive audition they are being performed. As in a theater, this audience adopts the double role of participating in the unreal world of the emotions the poet enacts, as well as in the real world of the poet's skill, in his (or a transmitter's) delivery of the poem, and in the poem's claim to reward.[10]

I. *The Audience's Interaction with Odes*

The most frequent situation captured in *akhbār* involves the recitation of a panegyric ode to an addressee, be he a caliph, a governor, an aristocrat, or an urban notable. But there the commonalities between *akhbār* end. The order of events was not fixed; reward often followed the recitation but might precede it.[11] If it followed it might be offered immediately, sent to the poet's home that evening, or described as on its way (which gave rise to *istiṭāla* poems). The

[7] Ibid., 282a and Hare and Blumberg 1988, 11.
[8] Kolesch 2004 and Tambiah 2002.
[9] Tambiah 2002, 219-21 and 229.
[10] Hare and Blumberg 1988, 47-53.
[11] In a couplet ʿAlī b. Jabala al-ʿAkawwak (d. 213/828) acknowledged al-Ḥasan b. Sahl's rewarding him for his poetry without any prior encounter; Wqa 116 not part of a *khabar*. Cf. ʿAlī b. Jabala, *Shiʿr*, no. 59, based upon Wqa.

reward could be material, disbursed either as a one-time prize in gold or silver coin, or allocated as a yearly stipend (tied to a yearly reception); or as a gift of robes, mounts, slaves or other luxury items, which the poet might resell. Addressees with discerning taste accompanied their awards with rejoinders in their own verse or prose, or tailored their non-verbal responses to the text of the panegyric. Furthermore, recipients might volunteer criticism or request that an ode be repeated, dictated or partially set to music. In a variation involving general Yazīd b. Mazyad and Muslim b. al-Walīd, no meeting occurred; instead the poet circulated his praise in public to attract the attention of the addressee who then acknowledged and rewarded him by proxy.[12] In the following I focus on a third option, in which the two distinct processes of recitation and reward merge and the audience's response accompanies, interrupts or ends the delivery or replaces it with an enactment.

The audience members and the patron in a *khabar*—more precisely, the literary characters who correspond to these historical figures—did not politely await an ode's conclusion to react to it. Rather, they responded viscerally to passages as they were recited, interrupting the performance with criticism, rewards, cheers, tears or expressions of awe. Such discontinuous or unfinished recitals of odes show the space given to sundry audience participation with little regard for the complete poetic text. These live performances "in the rough" were themselves turned into literature during the multigenerational composition, compilation and editing of *akhbār*. They add a parallel strand to the taciturn and pristine versions of odes handed down in poets' *dīwān*s (not to mention those textual variants or inconsistencies *dīwān* editors ironed out). Such interruptions take manifold shapes and bring home the fact that poetry, in particular the elaborate *qaṣīda*, was a powerful living art form with a purpose, and not (only) the venerated artifact and ingredient of the educated canon it was to become to subsequent centuries. The contemporary success of a *qaṣīda* depended not on its self-contained artistry but on the cooperation of the hearers and on their attention, their discernment and their identification with what the ode said. In accepting or evaluating the verse, different hearers played as much of a public role as the poet

[12] Agh 18:323-4 version d. This *khabar* is discussed in sections III and V below and translated in Appendix A.

did, even if some of them, including general Yazīd, needed a little coaching.

I.1. *Reward and applause*

Reward interrupts *qaṣīda*s in some *akhbār*. At a formal audience with poets who had been waiting for entry at his gate, al-Rashīd (r. 170-93/786-809) listened to many recitations, but trembled with pleasure (*ihtazza*) at one couplet of Abū l-ʿAtāhiya (d. 211/826), "Every tongue within his realm is a pledge for his munificence (*iḥsān*)." The caliph took the cue from the poet's own words and interjected "By God, you have excelled (*aḥsanta*)." Abū l-ʿAtāhiya was the only one to receive a prize on that day.[13] Though the couplet is the sole part preserved, Abū l-ʿAtāhiya most likely presented a *qaṣīda*, as customary in formal audiences for panegyrists.[14] But the caliph reacted to one particular image that resonated with his desire for self-portrayal and affirmed it by his immediate (verbal and material) response.[15]

In a gathering of Arab and Persian nobles at the palace of the famous Arab general and patron of the arts Abū Dulaf al-ʿIjlī (d. 226/840-1), Abū Tammām (d. 231/845) recited to him an encomium in the presence of the Banū ʿIjl. Abū Dulaf stopped the recitation at a passage (27-30) extolling the ancestral achievements of the clan with a fantastic image.

> *makārimu lajjat fī ʿuluwwin kaʾannahā*
> *tuḥāwilu thaʾran ʿinda baʿḍi l-kawākibi* [*ṭawīl*]
>
> Noble deeds soaring ever higher as if they were
> trying to take revenge from some star (15:30).

Abū Dulaf praised the verse and exhorted those present, "O clan of Rabīʿa, never have you been praised with such poetry! What do you offer him who said this?"[16] Unprepared but no less enthusiastic, the

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[13] Agh 4:44-5. Cf. Abū l-ʿAtāhiya, *Dīwān*, 664 no. 280 of appendix, after Agh.

[14] Cf. the audience granted Ashjaʿ al-Sulamī (d.c. 195/811); Awq 75-6.

[15] Al-Rashīd preferred the modern fantastic *madīḥ* to the more realistic Umayyad style; see Gruendler, forthcoming.

[16] The ʿIjl (together with the Thaʿlaba and the Ḥanīfa b. Lujaym clans) form one of the tribes of Bakr b. Wāʾil who, combined with ʿAbd Qays, constitute Rabīʿa, the non-Muḍarite branch of the Northern (ʿAdnānī) Arabs. In the legendary battle of Dhū Qār (c. 604-11 C.E.) the Bakr b. Wāʾil put to flight other Arabs, such as the

nobles followed the host's invitation by removing their shawls and turbans and flinging them at the poet's feet. Abū Dulaf then allowed them to retrieve their attire and pledged its value to the poet in hard currency. Only then was Abū Tammām asked to resume the recitation. At the end Abū Dulaf ordered the poet to receive an additional 50,000 *dirham*s, commenting that this (for *akhbār* extraordinary) sum still fell short of the ode's worth.[17]

Both interruptions occur at a high point in the *qaṣīda*'s antistrophe section, which conveys its main purpose of *madīḥ*, and both are provoked by particularly striking fantastic images as were *en vogue* among modern poets—Abū l-ʿAtāhiya explains people's grateful tongues as tokens, and Abū Tammām visualizes the extent of tribal glory as quest for revenge in the firmament. Each interruption is a distinct mark of appreciation on the part of a caliph and a general respectively, and both are followed by rewards that distinguish one poet from the other members of his guild.

A third example varies this picture. Here Abū Tammām praises the vizier Ibn al-Zayyāt (d. 233/847). As he reaches a four-verse passage (21-4) that extolls the vizier's generosity and protection and casts his worthiness in the mock etiology that praising him is a religious duty (*farīḍa*) whereas praising others a supererogatory act (*tanafful*), the vizier halts the performance. Commending the quality and innovativeness of the praise, he gently admonishes the poet that it will spoil for him any lesser *madīḥ*, whereas Abū Tammām is cheapening his verse by lavishing it on an undeserving subject. Abū Tammām refuses to retract it, saying: "Tied is the tongue of excuse" (*lisānu l-ʿudhri maʿqūl*), and resumes the recitation, which the *khabar* omits, to receive 5,000 *dirham*s. This sum befitted an official and kept clear of the 10,000 *dirham*s customary for caliphal rewards in this period. Afterwards the vizier restated his advice in a verse epistle to the poet, "Merchandise...is paid highly for only as long as its seller does not part with it easily").[18] This interruption conveys a warning that the

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Taghlib, with their Sasanian allies. The leader of the ʿIjl, Ḥanẓala b. Thaʿlaba, was instrumental in encouraging the Arabs to fight and commanded the right wing in the battle; EI² I:962-3, II:241, III:1022-3.

[17] AAT 121-44. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* I, no. 15 in 45 vv., 1-13 (S: *nasīb* with *aṭlāl* motif), 14-39 (AS), 40-5 (MS). The *khabar* selects vv. 1, 7, 14, 19, 21-3, 27-30, and 42-3.

[18] AAT 118-20. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* III, no. 128 in 52 verses. The *khabar* selects 1a and 21-4 (AS).

high tone of the praise, however excellent in its own terms, overshot its goal and elevated a vizier to a hyperbolic register restricted to caliphs. Perhaps Ibn al-Zayyāt recalled ʿAlī b. Jabala al-ʿAkawwak (d. 213/828) whose nearly blasphemous praises for al-Maʾmūn's generals Abū Dulaf al-ʿIjlī and Ḥumayd al-Ṭūsī (d. 210/825) could not be outdone, and he had to desist from praising the caliph himself.[19] For Abū Tammām the vizier's warning turned out to be unnecessary; he had the greatest success with officials, while caliphs found his intricate style too taxing. But by interrupting the praise and assigning a relatively low prize, the vizier dissociated himself from the hyperbolic portrayal *and* avoided overstepping his rank, since the scale of public gifts had to reflect the political hierarchy.[20]

A dedicatee's reception of verse was complemented by that of the audience members. In Abū Dulaf's case, the attending clansmen benefited from the tribal praise and, upon his prompting, naturally applauded and rewarded it. The audience might even take the initiative. Upon Abū Tammām's arrival at the court of ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir (r. 214-30/828-45) in Khurasan, the local poets were anxious to listen to "the Iraqi." After he had put them off until the official reception on the following day, they interrupted his recitation in the middle of the antistrophe and confirmed both ʿAbdallāh's worthiness of the praise and Abū Tammām's worthiness of the reward. The (otherwise unknown) poet al-Riyāḥī even ceded his own reward to the visitor. ʿAbdallāh followed suit, having 1,000 *dīnār*s sprinkled over Abū

[19] Wqa 113-14.

[20] Viziers, judges and other notables had to keep the sums of their rewards lower than those of the caliphs. For instance, the vizier al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā rewarded Muslim with 80,000 *dirham*s, at a ratio of a thousand per verse, with the excuse that he could not exceed the record award of the same sum by al-Rashīd for Marwān the Elder (d. 182/797) (Agh 18:340-2). Ibn al-Muʿtazz reports the slightly higher sum of 100,000 *dirham*s as Marwān's standard fee (*rasm*) for caliphal odes (TSh 48-51). One reward sum by al-Rashīd to Abū l-ʿAtāhiya for 20,000 *dirham*s was accompanied by the much lower sum of 5,000 *dirham*s from his vizier al-Faḍl b. al-Rabīʿ (Agh 4:69). Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Muṣʿabī, the governor of Baghdad, when cashing Abū Tammām's cheque given in payment for the Amorium ode, added an unspecified lower sum to the caliph's *dirham*s, regretting that it had not been issued in *dīnār*s, which would have increased the value twenty-five-fold and allowed him to be more generous (AAT 143-4 after 223/838). Ibn Abī Duʾād (d. 240/854) was reprimanded by al-Wathiq for rewarding Abū Tammām with 1,000 *dīnār*s (c. 25,000 *dirham*s), a caliphal prize amount, and the chief judge defended himself as having spent only half of this and the poet as deserving it for having extolled al-Wāthiq's caliphate (AAT 144-5).

Tammām, though the poet's nonchalant response soured their relationship thereafter.[21] Whether audience or dedicatee prompted the respective other party depended on who had the greater familiarity with the modern style; in the earlier example, the expert was Abū Dulaf, an educated *adīb*; and above, the experts were the Khurasanī poets, who were avid to experience the acclaimed Abū Tammām.

Usually large audiences were not themselves implicated as addressees, but merely as witnesses. Nevertheless they might participate by singing along with the recitation, as did the ʿAmr b. Tamīm Bedouins in the Baṣrian countryside. They were listening to a performance of a *nasīb* by al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī (d. 171-9/787-95)[22] and joined in at an innovative image of the beloved's tears, "She signaled to me with glances, her tears//like a necklace of silver beads, betrayed by the string and scattered" (*ashārat bi-aṭrāfin ilayya wa-damʿuhā//ka-naẓmi jumānin khānahu l-silku fa-ntathar*). The reciter had secretly slipped in the verse of a contemporary poet unknown to them with that of canonized Umayyad luminaries, and the tricked Bedouins perceived in al-Sayyid a "natural" (*maṭbūʿ*) style they had come to miss in their day, and they could not contain their emotions, even if their response was a rather artless, popular kind of singing.[23]

I.2. *Expression of awe*

In contrast with Abū Dulaf's boisterous cheering, other patrons, among them al-Ḥasan b. al-Rajāʿ,[24] maintained a more respectful manner. He listened to Abū Tammām's panegyric during a drinking session, and when the poet described his struggle against the vicissitudes as days turned black like nights (4), interrupted the recitation and cried, "May they no longer be black from this day forth." Moving to the antistrophe, the poet explained the generosity of al-Ḥasan (who was known to be stingy) by a mock etiology with natural

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[21] AAT 115-18 and var. AAT 212:1-213:2. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* I, no. 16 in 44 vv. The *khabar* reproduces vv. 1(S) and 8-12(AS) in a continuous passage.

[22] Agh 7:232-3. Cf. al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī, *Dīwān*, no. 103 in 8 vv. cited after Agh. The *nasīb* theme with *aṭlāl* and morning of separation motifs suggests that the passage originally belonged to a *qaṣīda*.

[23] *Tamrīq* is explained variously as the singing of Bedouins or the lower classes; Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān* 10:341a and b.

[24] Governor of Shiraz under al-Maʿmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim. See also n. 73.

phenomena and equated it with the ongoing poetic offering in an antithetical parallelism.

> *lā tunkirī ʿaṭala l-karīmi mina l-ghinā*
> *fa-l-saylu ḥarbun li-l-makāni l-ʿālī*
>
> *wa-tanaẓẓarī khababa l-rikābi yanuṣṣuhā*
> *muḥyī l-qarīḍi ilā mumīti l-māli* [*kāmil*]
>
> Do not blame the noble's being stripped of wealth:
> the stream is averse to lofty places.
>
> Look at the trot of the camels, driven to their utmost
> by the reviver of poetry towards the killer of wealth (125:5-6).

Al-Ḥasan physically responded to this perfect fit between patron and poet by rising and listening to the remainder of the ode standing. The poet likewise stood up. More innovative images followed in the ode, which the editor al-Ṣūlī transcribed to the end: for instance, the image of a virgin with a large dowry for the dedicated ode and its reward (9). After the recitation patron and poet embraced and the governor reused the image in his approving comment, "How well you conducted these brides [to their grooms]." The poet topped him on the figurative level, "By God had they been virgins of paradise, your standing up would have been the best fulfillment of their dowries." This conversation inaugurated a windfall of 10,000 *dirham*s for the poet during his two-month stay in Shiraz.[25] The patron had immediately grasped the poet's strategy of placing them both on a par as paragons of generosity and literature, and he hastened to act out their compatibility face to face with the poet in word and gesture. Each validated the other, using the ode as a script for live performance.

But even a larger audience could be awed into immediate action by poetic images. The fervent anti-Alid stance of the poet ʿAlī b. al-Jahm earned him powerful enemies, notably the Ṭāhirids. They conspired to have al-Mutawakkil exile him in 239/853-4 to Khurasan, where governor Ṭāhir b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir had him exposed naked for a whole day on the city gate of al-Shādhiyākh (Nishabur) before the thronging crowd. However, ʿAlī's defiant verse pronounced on this occasion, comparing his nakedness to the terrifying bared blade of a sword (6), connected with the onlookers. They took him down

[25] AAT 167-70. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* III, no. 125 in 13 vv., 1-4 (S) and 5-13 (AS). The *khabar* reproduces all but verse 3.

and showed him respect, overturning the verdict of the authorities, just as the poet had inverted his shameful nakedness into an image of intimidating awe.[26]

I.3. *Tears*

Lamentations (which the medieval sources likewise call *qaṣīda*s), produced visceral reactions of grief. Abū Tammām once expressed condolence to ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir for his loss of two young sons on the same day.[27] In the second verse of the lamentation proper (14), the poet deplores the loss of young men of great promise.

lahfī ʿalā tilka l-makhāyili (D: shawāhidi) fīhimā
law umhilat ḥattā takūna shamāʾila [*kāmil*]

Oh, sorrow for those virtues in both of them foretold!
If only they had been given the time to become character traits!
(200:14)

Here the grieving father interrupted the poet. He admired the verse, but complained that instead of offering consolation it intensified his pain. This reaction Abū Tammām had anticipated, for he proceeded with a passage vaunting both the unique intensity of ʿAbdallāh's bereavement as well as his peerless strength of heart in bearing it (15-17). The following lines are skipped in the *khabar,* which continues with the penultimate couplet, joined by enjambment.

shamakhat khilāluka an yuʾassiyaka mruʾun
aw an tudhakkara nāsiyan aw ghāfilā

illā mawāʿiẓa qādahā laka samḥatan
isjāḥu lubbika sāmiʿan aw qāʾilā.

Too lofty are your virtues for anyone to console you
or remind you, as if [you were] forgetting or uncaring,

Except for the admonition, freely offered you,
by the kindness of your own listening or speaking heart (200:23-4).

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[26] TSh 319-20. Cf. ʿAlī b. al-Jahm, *Dīwān*, no. 82 in 18 vv. after Agh and al-Thaʿālibī, *al-Muntaḥal*, 266-7, citing vv. 1-2, 6 and 8-17. The *khabar* in TSh cites 1-2 and 6, the last containing the sword image. Agh (10:219-20) provides a parallel version focused on the conspiring enemies and citing vv. 1-11 and 18 as composed after the fact. Ullmann (1995, 119-25) cautions that the event, reported only in Agh, may be secondarily derived from the poem.

[27] AAT 217-20. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* IV, no. 200 in 25 vv.

At this the bereft father rejoined, "Now you have given me consolation." He has the *qaṣīda* recorded in writing and the poet remunerated. ʿAbdallāh's two interruptions show how he responded to a cycle of grief and consolation that the lamentation had mapped out. His emotions followed the course the poet had paced for him, and he yielded to them, confirming both his deepest pain and the regaining of self-control. As this addressee steps into the role the poet has created for him, the piece of pre-composed literature becomes a working-through of personal loss. With its interruption, the lamentation illustrates the unique capacity of poetry to prompt human emotion more powerfully than if it had been transcribed intact and the father's interjections omitted.

Two lamentations for the Alids drew similar reactions. They differ from the preceding personal laments in that they mourn a dynasty of martyrs before a surviving relative, and one of them (by Diʿbil) even voices hope for a better future. When the Kaysānī poet al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī (d. 171-9/787-95) was admitted to recite to the sixth imam, Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), the women of the house listened from behind a curtain. He began with a double exhortation to greet the tomb of al-Ḥusayn (martyred 61/680) and to linger and weep there.

umrur ʿalā jadathi l-Ḥusay-
ni fa-qul li-aʿẓumihi l-zakiyya

yā aʿẓuman lā zilti min
waṯfāʾa sākibatin rawiyya

wa-idhā mararta bi-qabrihī
fa-aṭil bihī waqfa l-maṭiyya

wa-bki l-muṭahhara li-l-muṭah-
hari wa-l-muṭahharati l-naqiyya

ka-bukāʾi muʿwilatin atat
yawman li-wāḥidihā l-maniyya [*kāmil majzūʾ muraffal*]

Pass by the grave of al-Ḥusayn
and say to his pure bones,

"O bones, may you forever be beneath
a trailing, quenching cloud!"

When you pass by his tomb,
prolong the stopping of [your] mount

and weep for the pure [son]
of the pure [father] and the pure lady

as a wailing mother weeps
whose single child death has taken.

Here Jaʿfar's tears well up, screams and cries are heard from inside the house, and Jaʿfar orders the poet to stop reciting (*amarahu bi-l-imsāk*). Thus concludes the *khabar* without any mention of reward.[28] The audience never hears the remainder of the ode, which contains, according to later sources, a curse on Fāṭima's attackers, the narrative of al-Ḥusayn's death, and another exhortation to weep. Both the Alid descendant and his household replace the poem's end with their reactions; they transform the literary description of mourning with an actual performance that dispenses with the poetic text. As the audience adopts the role traced by the verse, the poet likewise steps into a role,[29] for he was not a follower of Jaʿfar but an adherent to the *Kaysāniyya* movement that awaited the return (*rajʿa*) of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya (d. 81/700). This duplicity is pointed out and criticized in the commentary to the *khabar*. In the actual situation, however, this is not seen as hypocrisy, as the poet temporarily takes on the ideal role of a Jaʿfarī loyalist. This priority of a publicly-played political or moral role over privately held convictions and behavior is accepted by Jaʿfar and his womenfolk. In two variants of this *khabar,* Jaʿfar or the women respectively praise his verse and dismiss the charge that the poet's wine drinking invalidates it—rather to the contrary, his greater merit of loving ʿAlī is deemed to outweigh his smaller sin.[30]

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[28] Agh 7:234; in variant Agh 7:235-6 an anonymous man recites the ode. Cf. al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī, *Dīwān*, no. 210 in 23 vv. after Agh (vv. 1-2, 7-9) and al-Amīn 1381/1961, 12:121-2 (from Agh 7:234) and 12:162-3 (where the whole poem is cited in a *dīwān* on the Alids, assembled by the editor from the *Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib* by the Imāmī theologian Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192) and other unnamed medieval sources; ibid., 12:127.

[29] See the excursus at the end of this section for a discussion of social role.

[30] Agh 7:235-6, Agh 7:245 (in the second variant a different poem is used); al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī, *Dīwān*, no. 108 in 55 verses of which 43-6 are cited in the *khabar*. The lament recurs in Agh 7:266 in a recitation by al-Sayyid to the prophet Muḥammad in a dream. At the moment in the poem when al-Sayyid quotes the unbelievers asking the prophet:

"If you wish, inform us," they said to him,
"who holds the ultimate destiny and terror?" (9)

The prophet cuts the poet short, commenting:

A later Alid reacted with equal force. When Diʿbil al-Khuzāʿī (148-246/765-860), who relates this event himself as an old man, meets the then heir-designate ʿAlī al-Riḍā (d. 203/818) he is asked to recite some of his own verse and performs his famous ode rhyming in *t*, which begins:

> *madārisu āyātin khalat min tilāwatin*
> *wa-manzilu waḥyin muqfiru l-ʿaraṣāti* [*ṭawīl*]
>
> Obliterated signs that have readers no longer,
> a home of inspiration with courtyards deserted (3).[31]

The ode varies the classical *aṭlāl* motif by describing tombs not encampments, their destruction as wrought by humans not time, and their era of habitation as one of fasting and prayer, not amorous adventure (continued in 4-12, which the *khabar* skips). Turning then explicitly to the Alids, Diʿbil describes them as scattered in distant tombs, but also as death-defying warriors who boast the prophet and the Qurʾān as their singular claims to honor (16-37). Finally the poet speaks of his own loyalty, love and compassion for the Alids, and their exemplary endurance of injustice and refusal to stoop to its level (35-53):

> *idhā wutirū maddū ilā wātirīhimū*
> *akuffan mina l-awtāri munqabiḍāti*
>
> When they suffer brutality, they extend to their tormentors
> hands that shirk brutality (53).

Here ʿAlī breaks into uncontrollable weeping and a servant signals the poet to be silent (*awmaʾa l-khādimu ilayya an askuta*). After a new start, the reaction recurs at the same line. Only after a third start can the poet continue through the rest of the ode, which adds a tone

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"This is enough." Then he gestures as if to wash his hands of them and says [confirming the verse's truth], "By God, I did inform them."

[31] Agh 20:102-3, var. Agh 20:68-9. Cf. Diʿbil b. ʿAlī al-Khuzāʿī, *Dīwān*, ed. Yūsuf Najm. Beirut 1962, no. 44; vv. 3 and 53 are cited in the *khabar*. I follow the version of Yūsuf Najm, rather than the one by ʿAbd al-Ṣāḥib al-Dujaylī (al-Najaf 1382/1962, 85-97) augmented from later Shiite sources to 115 vv., whereas Najm limits himself to 69 verses recorded in Muslim b. Maḥmūd al-Shīrazī's *Jamharat al-islām dhāt al-nathr wa-l-niẓām* and, in brackets, 14 verses from both Muʾmin al-Shabalanjī's *Nūr al-abṣār fī manāqib Āl Bayt al-Nabī al-mukhtār* and Yūsuf b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣanʿānī's *Nasimat al-saḥar fī dhikr man tashayyaʿa wa-shaʿar*, namely vv. 1-2, 6-9, 14-15, 21, 51-2, 54-5; cf. *Dīwān*, ed. Najm, 35 n. For easy reference I retain Najm's numbering but disregard the bracketed verses, which are mostly anaphoric epithetical clauses or elaborating paraphrases.

of hope for a future Alid imam, God's righting of the Alids' sufferings, and the poet's declared goal to persuade those unconvinced of the Alids' legitimacy (54-69, especially 56-7, 60, 65-6). ʿAlī's interruption precedes the poet's mention of his own tears on behalf of the Alids; he also stops the poem at the pivotal moment of Alid suffering before an upswing toward a more positive future—in a way similar to that in which ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir had let out his grief at the moment in the text when the poet depicted its greatest intensity. ʿAlī's grief, however, is dramatized as more devastating, for it takes three starts to regain composure, and the part of the ode invoking consolation is neither cited nor paraphrased in the *khabar*. Both listeners (ʿAlī al-Riḍā more radically so) alter the process of performance by their expressions of grief, and both enact the role that the lamentation scripts for them. This dramatic takeover of the poetic text differs from the reaction of caliph al-Maʾmūn.[32] In this variant of ʿAlī's story, the caliph insists on listening to the same ode (which he already knows) from the poet's own mouth. He also weeps to the point of drenching his beard, as the *khabar* specifies, but is able to listen to it all (*fa-anshadahu iyyāhā ilā ākhirihā wa-l-Maʾmūnu yabkī ḥattā akhḍala liḥyatahu bi-l-damʿ*). This emotional distance to the text makes the caliph's grief a studied public performance rather than the visceral participation manifested by ʿAlī al-Riḍā.

Like al-Sayyid above, Diʿbil also performed his role on different levels. His devotion to the Alids is borne out by his poetic oeuvre, which is exclusively dedicated to ʿAlids and those caliphs who endorsed their legitimacy. But with all his protestations of love and loyalty for the Alids, he accepted a reward of jewelry (presumably from the households' women[33]) and 10,000 of the first *dirham*s struck in ʿAlī's name, which he then resold at a tenfold profit to interested Shiites. This is not to suggest that his ode had less meaning, but the demonstration of allegiance and the transaction of praise and reward were two compatible dimensions of the public role of an Alid panegyrist into which Diʿbil here stepped.

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[32] Agh 20:138-9. The *khabar*'s dating is uncertain, but if it falls after ʿAlī's sudden passing away then the caliph used Diʿbil's lamentation to include ʿAlī along with his martyred ancestors and to disavow publicly any involvement in his death.

[33] In var. Agh 20:68-9 an additionally given robe of honor is stolen by Shiites and after negotiation restored to the poet in coin (30,000 *dirham*s) together with one sleeve.

Excursus on the Poet's Role

A study of interaction through *qaṣīda*s cannot cannot dispense with some brief remarks on a poet's public role, which was far too sophisticated to fit the narrow moral categories of sincerity or mendacity.[34] Poets and high-ranking patrons understood the difference between official role play and privately entertained beliefs and habits, and the poet was held responsible primarily for those views he advertised. Of this the above-discussed Abū l-ʿAtāḥiya and al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī and some of their contemporaries leave behind instructive accounts.

A poet's advertised political and religious stance needed not reflect the actual truth. The better to perform the praises of the extremely loyal and protective Yazīd b. Manṣūr, the maternal uncle of al-Mahdī, Abū l-ʿAtāhiya falsely claimed the status of a *mawlā* of the Yemenī tribes. After the patron's death he acknowledged this strategy as "something I needed at that time" (*dhālika shayʾun iḥtajtu ilayhi fī dhālika l-zaman*).[35] Regarding his religious stance, the poet displayed with remarkable dexterity a pious asceticism (*zuhd, tanassuk*) while shunning affiliations with specific theological positions, such as those of the Muʿtazilites.[36] Al-Manṣūr showed himself a sophisticated patron in this regard. Laughing with enjoyment about al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī's panegyric describing him as having captured the kings of India, China and the Turks, he was unmoved by the accusation of the attending judge Sawwār b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAnbarī (d. 157/780)[37] that the poet was "giving with his tongue what is not in his heart...not telling you the truth about what is in his heart" namely an allegiance not to the caliph but the Kaysāniyya movement.[38] But to al-Manṣūr only the poet's public endorsement mattered. He eschewed discussion of al-Sayyid's Alid sympathies and defended to the judge the

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[34] For a definition of social role, see Goffman 1959.

[35] Agh 4:34-5.

[36] Asked by a friend of the Muʿtazilite judge Aḥmad b. Abī Duʾād, whether the Qurʾān was created or not, he countered with another question, "Are you asking me about God or something else?" (Agh 4:10) only implying that the Qurʾān is "something else." Upon receiving a petition for help from the imprisoned Muʿtazilite Bishr b. al-Muʿtamir he sent a couplet advising him to accept his fate; Agh 4:82.

[37] He is the protagonist of al-Jāḥiẓ's anecdote of the *qāḍī* and the fly, in which he appears as a model of dignity; Pellat 1953, 240 after al-Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān* 3:106-7.

[38] His verses together with those of Kuthayyir ʿAzza are the only direct sources on the *Kaysāniyya*; see Halm 1988, 25. Cf. also nn. 28 and 30.

poet's "devotion and pure intention" on a personal level. In the ensuing hostilities between poet and judge, the poet insulted the latter as incompetent and as descended from a goat thief, and the judge rigged a trial of the poet for alleged theft. The caliph eventually stepped in to strip the judge of legal authority over the poet and had the poet apologize.[39] In the whole affair the caliph was unconcerned with the poet's true religious preferences, while the judge could not tolerate what he saw as duplicity. The Baṣran governor ʿUqba b. Salm (r. 147-51/764-8) likewise passed over the poet's Alid leanings and justified rewarding him on account of his companionship and service. The governor even reformulated al-Sayyid's pro-Alid stance as praiseworthy "loyalty to those whose right and protection we must ensure." He allowed the poet to respond to a tribal chief's accusation that he had insulted Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. Thus the governor tolerated al-Sayyid's endorsement of ʿAlī's legitimacy in return for his efficacious praises.[40] Conversely a poet's public show of his piety had therefore little credibility for religious authorities. A denunciation of Abū l-ʿAtāhiya as a heretic (*zindīq*) required an investigation through a spy.[41] Precisely for its public nature, a poem he was advised to compose about his orthodox belief to be passed on to the heresy official (*ṣāḥib al-zanādiqa*) would not have satisfied the purpose.[42]

The same understanding of a poet's public persona governed his moral behavior. Caliphs took different stances in what they countenanced (as they themselves differed in doing in private what they banned publicly). Thus al-Saffāḥ tried (in vain) to force Abū Dulāma to abstain from wine,[43] and al-Mahdī wanted to punish Bashshār for what he saw as a proof of his drinking (a strikingly realistic *khamriyya*).[44] Al-Manṣūr again showed himself savvy in dealing with poets' layered personalities. Appreciating in al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī a prolific

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[39] Agh 7:252-4. In two variants the cause of the hostilities is the judge's rejection of the poet's testimony; one ends with al-Manṣūr chastising the judge for upbraiding the poet (Agh 7:247-8), the other with his ousting the judge and indemnifying the poet with a fief (TSh 33-5). For the praise poem, see al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī, *Dīwān*, no. 187 with 3 verses preserved; for the satire of the judge, ibid., no. 32, based on Agh and TSh.

[40] Agh 7:254-5.

[41] Agh 4:37.

[42] Ibid.

[43] TSh 60-1.

[44] Agh 3:258-9.

natural talent coupled with an addiction to wine, he agreed to convert a 10,000 *dirham* reward for an ode into a license to drink with impunity. The caliph wrote to the Medinan governor prescribing eighty lashes for the poet should he be found intoxicated, and a hundred for whoever turned him in.[45] Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and the women of his household (to whom the poet also showed allegiance) gave proof of the same insight. When reminded of the poet's drinking habits, they dismissed this private shortcoming as a small evil in comparison with a publicly professed love for ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib; the women defended him by saying: "Even if one foot slipped the other one stood firm."[46] The governor of Ahwāz, Sulaymān b. Ḥabīb b. al-Muhallab, was even more accommodating by providing the wine himself. He noticed the pallor of the poet, who had abstained in his company and admitted his state to be due to withdrawal. The governor, who himself proscribed wine, ensured his poet's well-being by ordering two hundred amphoras of date wine from Jabal province. His outward justification echoed that of the Alids, though personal friendship and the fact that he owed to the poet his appointment by al-Saffāḥ certainly played a role.[47]

The poet's performance of select beliefs and moral virtues was part of a circumscribed salaried function whose details were carefully regulated. Poets waited at a specific spot at the gates of caliphs and high officials until granted admission.[48] In assemblies they occasionally wore special attire, and they had to receive permission before speaking, even when attacked.[49] Some patrons demanded their constant company and entertainment at home and on travels. In return poets received yearly stipends (*jirāya*, *waẓīfa*) in addition to occasional prizes and other assistance, and they felt entitled to call these in when forgotten.[50] This amount of "trouble, exertion and watchfulness" required in caliphal service was unbearable for Abū

[45] Agh 4:376; for the poet's addiction, see Agh 4:372-3 and 375.

[46] Agh 7:245; cf. n. 30.

[47] TSh 32-3. For the poet's request for his appointment in lieu of monetary reward for an ode, see Agh 7:234, al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyārī, *Dīwān*, no. 106, and EI^2 VII:359b. See n. 102 for his releasing the poet from prison after a drinking bout.

[48] Agh 4:77, TSh 60-1. Cf. also Gruendler 2005b.

[49] See for example Bashshār; Agh 3:160.

[50] Al-Rashīd granted Abū l-ʿAtāḥiya 50,000 *dirham*s yearly (Agh 4:65-6), al-Maʿmūn 20,000 (Agh 4:55-6).

Dulāma (d. 161/777) and Abū Nuwās (d. 215/800) who fled palace duties to spend their time drinking in taverns with their companions.[51] For Abū l-ʿAtāhiya, whom al-Rashīd kept close at all times except on pilgrimage, the turn to piety and abstention from *ghazal* may have had a similar motive.[52]

The poet's construction of his public role was not without clashes, for allegiance to a past caliph could complicate that owed to his successor,[53] and conflicting loyalties to rival factions, such as Alids and Abbasids, posed a risk to al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī. (Diʿbil al-Khuzāʿī represents an exception in his satires of the Abbasid caliphs after the death of ʿAlī al-Riḍā.)

A poet might also overstep his role. This is the case of Muslim, who refused payment for not satirizing general Yazīd.[54] An affirmative answer to this not uncommon practice of purchasing another man's honor would have given al-Rashīd an occasion for excessive generosity. Surprisingly the poet preferred the luxury of his private convictions. This was unexpected and embarrassing to the caliph who saved face by threatening the poet's life in the case of renewed satire.

Engaging with a poet's public persona was of interest to paying patrons. It had little effect on the lower authorities (judges or competitors), who exposed duplicities such as the notorious stinginess of the pious Abū l-ʿAtāhiya.[55]

II. *The Poet's Cuts and Additions*

Both poet and audience let their actions be guided by the text of the ode—but without the ode (literally) dictating the procedure. The *akhbār* cited so far give ample proof of the extent to which an audience took public recitation as an opportunity to participate individually or

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[51] TSh 60-1 and 202.

[52] Agh 4:65-6.

[53] Abū l-ʿAtāhiya and Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī refused a request by al-Rashīd to compose and sing *ghazal* poetry because of their loyalty and gratitude to the caliph's predecessor Mūsā al-Hādī; Agh 4:74-5.

[54] Agh 18:320-3 and Appendix A, version c.

[55] See his refusal to share his wealth (Agh 4:77-78, 97), his eating of bread with milk and other modest food, refusing to give alms to his neighbor or to a beggar, and the starving to death of his black slave (Agh 4:18-21).

as a group. Interruptions of odes and enactments of their scripted emotions by the audience show poetry to be a performance art, an element which the subsequent and enduring textual authority of *dīwān*s tends to veil. This participation of the audience was anticipated by poets, who, like Abū Tammām, could respond to it creatively. But poets also took the initiative themselves to adjust an ode to the sudden needs of a situation and did not shy away from reducing it to its parts. (Since the following story will be referred to repeatedly in its different versions, the reader is advised to peruse the Appendix before proceeding.)

II.1. *Emotional effect*

The first encounter between the *avant garde badīʿ* poet Muslim b. al-Walīd (d. 208/823) and the general Yazīd b. Mazyad al-Shaybānī (d. 185/801) was brought about by al-Rashīd. When the Arab leader finally crushed a Khārijite rebellion that had stymied two previous generals, Muslim circulated an ode in praise of him,[56] but it was al-Rashīd who first alerted the general to this. He recited two of the verses and scolded the general as *aʿrābī* for not knowing the identity of their brilliant author. Back at his palace, the general asked his chamberlain to identify among the people at the gate the creator of the cited couplet. Muslim meanwhile had been tarrying there on the chamberlain's advice until the cash-strapped general would be flush again. When Muslim was led before the general, he recited part of the ode that the caliph had quoted, choosing, however, not the praise but the *nasīb*'s morning-of-separation motif. From this passage Muslim selected and juxtaposed two separate couplets on the poet's weeping eyes and the beloved's piercing glances and promising winks that leave the poet heartbroken. Muslim, who had so far vainly exerted himself with innovative fantastic *madīḥ* in the modern style, left aside the *qaṣīda*'s main part here and chose instead the emotional approach of touching Yazīd with the *nasīb*.[57] Beyond its psychologi-

[56] Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* VI:328.

[57] Agh 18:319-20 and Appendix A version b. Cf. Muslim, *Sharḥ Dīwān*, no. 1 in 79 vv. Al-Rashīd cites vv. 40 (with the motif of vultures following the army) and 43 (on Yazīd's refraining from perfume). Muslim recites to Yazīd vv. 1-2 and 6-7 from the *nasīb*. On this poem, see Heinrichs 1994.

cal dimension, the *nasīb* also offered a more familiar thematic repertoire for an unsophisticated patron.[58] One recalls the similar choice of the *rāwī* who had touched rural Bedouins with Bashshār's (anonymously presented) *nasīb*.[59] Especially with the emotional eye images of the *nasīb*, Muslim hoped to make the connection his praise had failed to establish. He succeeded indeed in prompting the general to pawn away an estate and to award him 50,000 *dirham*s (later restored and doubled by al-Rashīd whose spies informed him of what Yazīd had done).

II.2. *Timing*

More often, however, it was the *nasīb* that fell victim to the cut as the poet focused on the official purpose of his ode. Here the timing often pressed him to chose the essential over the beautiful. When al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā was set to depart for the governorship of Khurasan and hosted a final reception for panegyrists, Muslim learned of this only when the official had already retired to his private drinking *majlis*. When Muslim was admitted to recite his pre-composed ode in praise of al-Faḍl, he began in the middle with the *madīḥ* proper (30). The inebriated Faḍl was moved to rapture, had the ode's verses (all 80 of them) repeated and counted, and rewarded the poet with 1,000 *dirham*s per verse and moreover a slave-girl. The *khabar* shows precisely how the abbreviated presentation does not destroy the poem but rather presents an edited form of what is then acknowledged in its totality.[60]

Time constraints also affected an ode by Ashjaʿ al-Sulamī (d. 195/811). He went to find the caliph al-Rashīd in his capital of Raqqa to present him with praises. The *khabar* details the young poet's dire finances and his need for a patron to save himself from abject poverty. But the occasion's solemnity allowed for little room to try his luck; the waiting poets were screened and selected ahead of time and

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The *khabar* is one of five versions (Agh 318-24, see Appendices A-B) on the education of general Yazīd b. al-Mazyad in literary patronage further discussed in sections III and V; see also n. 123 below.

58 On him see n. 144. Cf. also nn. 126 and 147.

59 Agh 7:232-3 and nn. 22-3.

60 Agh 18:340-2. Cf. Muslim, *Sharḥ Dīwān*, no. 45 in 79 vv. Cited are 30 then 33-6, 43-4, 50 (all AS).

given an appointment at the caliphal residence for one Friday morning before the noon prayer. They were instructed to recite in the order of seniority, which placed the indigent young protagonist at the end. The caliph meanwhile was seated at a distance between two rows of dignitaries listening attentively to the poets' recitations. Suspense was heightened as the six senior poets took their time. The sun rose to the zenith and the prayer call was about to be heard, when Ashjaʿ finally reached his turn. Lacking the time to present the whole *qaṣīda*, the young poet faced missing the unique chance of gaining his caliph's ear. In this quandary he decided to cut *nasīb* and *raḥīl* and limited his performance to the praise proper, beginning in mid-sentence.

> *...ilā malikin yastaghriqu l-māla jūduhu*
> *makārimuhū nathrun wa-maʿrūfuhū sakbu* [*tawīl*]

> ...Towards a king whose magnanimity exhausts wealth,
> whose noble deeds are spread wide, whose kindnesses flows freely.

The radical cut allowed Ashjaʿ to present the entire antistrophe, crowned with a cosmic hyperbole of personal understatement in the dedication.

> *jahadtu wa-lam ablugh ʿulāka bi-midḥatin*
> *wa-laysa ʿalā man kāna mujtahidan ʿatbu*

> I tried to reach your height with a praise—and failed.
> But he who has struggled meets no blame.

The poet's quick reaction benefitted him twofold; the *muḥdath* style of praise with its cosmic hyperboles was known to be to al-Rashīd's taste.[61] Moreover the caliph misread Ashjaʿ's haste as a pious desire not to miss prayer, and he rewarded him doubly for the halved poem.[62]

Cutting the *nasīb* met with another patron's approval. ʿUmar b. al-ʿAlāʾ the general and companion of al-Mahdī (r. 158-69/775-85), was the object of much praise and once rewarded Abū l-ʿAtāhiya with the outrageous sum of 70,000 *dirham*s. Other poets questioned such favoritism toward "that Kufan," and challenged ʿUmar: "What is the yardstick for his poetry?" (*wa-ayyu shayʾin miqdāru shiʿrihi?*). One

[61] On al-Rashīd's taste see n. 15.
[62] Awq 75-6.

of the two reasons ʿUmar gave was that Abū l-ʿAtāhiya did not waste time on *tashbīb* but proceeded directly to the praise.[63]

Another case of a truncated *qaṣīda* is reported of al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī. He had studied ʿAlī's pious miracles (*faḍāʾil*) with a trusted Kufan traditionist, al-Aʿmash (d.c. 148/765),[64] and composed poetry about their themes (*maʿānī*). One day, newly mounted and robed by an Alid Kufan *amīr*, al-Sayyid went into town claiming that he could cite his own poetry on every one of ʿAlī's *faḍāʾil.* He challenged people to test him, promising his robe and mount to anyone able to fault him. Indeed one man caught him unawares with the tale about a raven saving ʿAlī from being bitten by a snake hidden in his shoe (the bird snatched the shoe from ʿAlī and in midair dropped the snake to the ground). On the spur of the moment al-Sayyid cast the tale in verse.[65] The poet departed with his gifts and added the *nasīb* later. (Not all of al-Sayyid's verse on ʿAlī need have been in *qaṣīda* form).

Muslim and Ashjaʿ shortened pre-composed odes at their initial delivery; al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī inversely began to improvise a *qaṣīda* from its praise part, leaving the beginning temporarily aside. These poets did not consider the *qaṣīda* form inviolate but subjected it to the dictates of the moment and the perceived desire of the audience. These temporary performance versions, however, did not displace the complete texts; Muslim's poem was widely cited even before he could deliver it in person, and al-Sayyid, having won his wager, still felt the need to complete his ode with a *nasīb*.

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[63] ʿUmar cited as second reason that Abū l-ʿAtāhiya did not circle around motifs but brought them together; Agh 4:39-40. Cf. Abū l-ʿAtāhiya, *Dīwān*, appendix, no. 191 in 14 vv. based on literary sources. The *khabar* contains vv. 10-11 (beginning of the AS; motif of free men offering their cheeks to his sandals); 13-14 (motif of camels complaining about being loaded with gifts) were set to music and appended by Abū l-Faraj. ʿUmar had been sent in 141/758 by al-Manṣūr to join forces with prince Muḥammad (the later al-Mahdī)—then residing in Rayy after having crushed a revolt in Khurasan—to campaign in Tabaristan. From 155/772 ʿUmar governed Tabaristan and later also Ruyan for both caliphs; EI^2 VI:744b, 941a, VIII:650b, al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh* VII:510-11, VIII:149, 166.

[64] Sulaymān b. Mihrān, a Kufan traditionist and Qurʾān reader who followed Ibn Maṣʿūd and Ubayy; EI^2 I:431b.

[65] Agh 7:249-50, var. Agh 7:250. Cf. al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī, *Dīwān* no. 24 in 27 vv. after Agh and later sources. Cited are 16, 18, 20-1, 23-4, 27, stripping the antistrophe to its storyline. Abū l-Faraj appends the *incipit* of the *nasīb*.

II.3. *Retort*

Critical feedback could not only interrupt an ode but change it for good. When Abū Tammām recited a praise poem to Aḥmad b. al-Muʿtaṣim (the later al-Mustaʿīn, r. 248-52/862-6), the attending philosopher al-Kindī (185-252/810-66),[66] who was the prince's companion, stopped the poet at verse 23 to criticize his pedestrian similes, "The prince is greater than everything you are comparing him with." The poet had likened Aḥmad to ancient Arab figures proverbial for courage (ʿAmr b. Maʿdīkarib), generosity (Ḥāṭim Ṭāʾī), and other cardinal virtues. Abū Tammām paused and reflected before retorting with an improvised couplet in the *qaṣīda*'s rhyme and meter. Pretending to accept the criticism, he inverted it to a causal hyperbole for the prince's singularity and bolstered this with an analogy to the Qurʾānic light verse—its religious argument certainly being intended as a stab against the philosopher:

> *lā tunkirū ḍarbī lahū man dūnahū*
> *mathalan sharūdan fī l-nadā wa-l-bāsi*
>
> *fa-llāhu qad ḍaraba l-aqalla li-nūrihi*
> *mathalan min al-mishkāti wa-l-nibrāsi* [*kāmil*]
>
> Do not blame my using for him someone who is beneath him,
> as a widespread simile for generosity and courage.
>
> God used for his light as a simile
> the lowest [light] of niche and lantern (81:24-5).

Prince and philosopher were equally impressed with Abū Tammām's quickness of mind (*fiṭna*), and Aḥmad doubled his prize. The poet had both defeated the critical remark in a pseudo-rational manner and added a religious defense. His improvised couplet has become part of the *dīwān* version of the *qaṣīda* by al-Ṣūlī, who transmits this *khabar* and insists on its being the only correct version of the event.[67]

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[66] A companion of al-Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim, he dedicated his *First Philosophy* to the latter's son Aḥmad, the subsequent al-Mustaʿīn, then fell into disfavor under al-Mutawakkil; EI^2 V:122-3.

[67] AAT 230:1-232:2. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* II, no. 81 in 34 vv. with var. *min dūnihi*. The *khabar* contains vv. 1-2 (S), 22-3 (AS), and 24-5 (inserted improvisation).

III. *Later Editing of* Qaṣīdas *in Literary Debates*

With one exception, examples so far have shown events that affected odes at their first recitation before a named dedicatee. Reactions tended to concern the odes' declared purpose of praising or mourning, and they occurred at no more than one or two points in the text, after which the recitation was usually resumed and completed. On these occasions the ode, like a theatrical script, invited participation. Not all of the ode's parts were equal in this respect; hyperbolic praise or exhortations to weep were most likely to stir the listeners to action. Poets themselves cut either the entire *nasīb*, or less often the ode's main section or added verses to counter criticism. In all cases, however, the passages selected for performance (whether fully reproduced in the *khabar* or not) retained their original sequence intact. This is different in the next example (a variant of general Yazīd's lesson in patronage, discussed in section II.1.), which anticipates the alterations typical of the later reception history; an ode is presented directly to its addressee after first being circulated publicly. Before being given to the recipient the ode undergoes a transformation, which forms the *khabar*'s main event.[68]

When general Yazīd first became the object of Muslim's praises the poet received no acknowledgment and had to wait unrecognized outside the general's palace, wondering whether to abandon his unremunerative profession. A transmitter identified only by the nickname Baydaq ("chess pawn") overheard his disheartened soliloquy and inquired about his compositions; he asked the poet to recite not a *qaṣīda* but only a sample of his work (*anshidnī baʿḍahu*). Muslim complied with a sample of verses from the antistrophe of his first ode and presented these as a cohesive piece. Only four of the lines were originally contiguous, four others unconnected. From the resulting eight lines, the transmitter selected a mere couplet. Baydaq then requested the poet's latest composition, and Muslim recited another ode to him.[69] These verses (including an unspecified portion of the

[68] Agh 18:323-4 version d. Cf. Muslim, *Sharḥ Dīwān*, no. 1 in 79 vv. Selected are 30 (Yazīd's deadly ferocity), 37, 43-6 (his deadliness in battle, austerity (scent motif), simultaneous kindness and frightfulness, and lion-like vigilance), 73 (mountain-like reliability), 79 (his generosity vouched for by the poet).

[69] Muslim, *Sharḥ Dīwān*, no. 6 in 37 vv. Cited are vv. 1 (on the positive *khayāl*), 9 (comparing Yazīd to almighty fate).

new poem) Baydaq presented to the general who rewarded the poet for both odes with 500 *dirham*s. But this modest sum did not even meet the level of reward customary among urban professionals, and Baydaq explained this to the general at a subsequent meeting in Raqqa; Yazīd parted with another 500 *dirham*s, still below his rank but just in time to let Muslim retrieve his pawned coat. The *khabar* illustrates the practical transformation of an ode in two steps. An initial selection by the poet was reviewed and reduced further by a *rāwī*, who altered the *qaṣīda* radically to assure its positive reception—a double editing of sorts. The resulting couplet provides a legitimate parallel for the practical purpose of quick conveyance and presentation, that is a text that exists in its own right but does not replace the ode from which it derives. Much to the contrary, only the couplet allows the ode to secure reception.

This *khabar* details a procedure more often tacitly assumed or alluded to in *majālis*, when literati debated an already well known *qaṣīda*. The first performance of an ode was only the beginning of a long history of reception. Depending on its fame it might be repeated by the poet, the recipient, or the *udabāʾ*. Later recitations by amateurs and professionals of *muḥdath* verse shifted the emphasis from a poem's official purpose to its literary dimension and performed more invasive alterations as an implied, unacknowledged form of practical criticism.

III.1. *Suppression*

When ʿUmāra b. ʿAqīl (d.c. 232-47/847-61), the last epigone of the archaic style, appeared in Baghdad, he made a perfect umpire for Abū Tammām's verse, which was contested among other things for its yoking together archaisms and modern rhethorical figures. The prestigious visitor listened to an ode praising general Muhammad b. Yūsuf al-Ṭāʾī recited in its actual verse order, but in installments. Each time the reciter stopped, ʿUmāra approved and demanded, "Give us more of this." At verses 5-6, he vaunted the poet's refreshing reinvention of the commonplace complaint of exile as something the poet actually desired.

wa-lākinnanī lam aḥwi wafran mujammaʿan
fa-fuztu bihī illā bi-shamlin mubaddadi

wa-lam tuʿṭinī l-ayyāmu nawman musakkanan
aludhdhu bihi illā bi-nawmin musharradi [*ṭawīl*]

But I possess no collected wealth
to call my own save a scattered assemblage.

Nor did the days grant me restful slumber
to savor except for slumber chased (46:5-6).

Listening thereafter to the next couplet, ʿUmāra found this theme likewise brought to perfection.

wa-ṭūlu muqāmi l-marʾi fī l-ḥayyi mukhliqun
li-dībājatayhi fa-ghtarib tatajaddadi

fa-innī raʾaytu l-shamsa zīdat maḥabbatan
ilā l-nāsi idh laysat ʿalayhim bi-sarmadi

A man's long lingering in his quarter wears
on his decorum—travel and renew it!

I found that the sun is more beloved by people
for not shining upon them in perpetuity (46:7-8).

This sample sufficed for ʿUmāra to designate Abū Tammām as the best poet, based on criteria seldom conceded him, such as good wording, beautiful motifs, consistent intent, and uniform language (*jawdat al-lafẓ, ḥusn al-maʿānī, iṭṭirād al-murād, ittisāq al-kalām*).[70] In this literary debate the ode is no longer recited in toto, as done in the preceding examples, even if the complete text had been represented by stage directions. Rather, the critical approach requires the highlighting of certain aspects of the *qaṣīda* and produces a reduced text that stands in for it. ʿUmāra's treatment thus cuts the ode down to its strophe, but observes the verse order of the excerpt, only interrupting each couplet with commentary. This kind of dropping of an entire section will be referred to as "suppression."[71]

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[70] AAT 59-61. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān*, II, no. 46 in 55 vv. praising Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Ṭāʾī. The *khabar* cites vv. 1-4, 5-6 and 7-8 (all S).

[71] This term is adopted as a synonym for Genette's *excision* (1982/1997, chap. 47), i.e. the reduction of a text by "scissor cuts and crossouts" as opposed to *concision* (chap. 48), in which a reduced text is entirely reformulated. In the case of Abbasid odes, the great majority of editing is done by excision, whether of a single large chunk, Genette's *excision, suppression*, or of numerous smaller passages throughout the work, Genette's *élagage, émondage* ("trimming, pruning"), on which see below n. 75.

Another suppression of a *qaṣīda*'s part for critical purposes figures in a *khabar* on Diʿbil. He seeks out al-Ḥasan b. Wahb with a request but is confronted by an uniden-

III.2. *Acceleration*

In another instance ʿUmāra handled an ode by Abū Tammām more freely. While at the home of Muḥammad b. Manṣūr [b. Ziyād Fatā l-ʿAskar], ʿUmāra was reciting his own ode in *r* in praise of al-Wāthiq (r. 227-32/842-7) and the visiting poet Abū l-ʿAynāʾ (d. 280/893) admired the piece. ʿUmāra, however, dismissed the praise with the remark that Abū Tammām's satire of general Afshīn, executed for high treason in 226/841, topped anything achieved in this rhyme and meter (*laḥn*). To prove his point he asked for a volunteer to recite it. (As in the previous *khabar*, he did not remember Abū Tammām's ode himself but relied on an amateur transmitter.) After hearing the incipit, ʿUmāra cut the reciter off and had him skip ahead to the "evocation of fire" (*dhikr al-nār*). The reciter obliged, reciting the verses that described the fire devouring the crucified corpse of Afshīn (21-2, 25, 28) and then jumped further ahead to the mocking description of Afshīn, his co-conspirer Māzyār, and the rebel Bābak (whom Afshīn had once defeated in 220-2/835-7), hanging on their crosses like sun-scorched travelers atop meagre mares (47-9, 51). Here ʿUmāra suspended the recitation without awaiting the ode's ending and commented that its author "had found what eluded other poets." This confirmed to Abū al-ʿAynāʾ that Abū Tammām was truly the best modern poet.[72] ʿUmāra did not intend to discuss the entire ode but rather to highlight its unusual fire and crucifixion imagery, and therefore had the ode literally "fast-forwarded" to the two respective passages, which themselves were shortened by several verses. This focusing on select, largely intact passages is hereafter labeled "acceleration."

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tified visitor for having disparaged Abū Tammām's poetry. The man forces Diʿbil to listen to a recitation of Abū Tammām's apology to Mūsā b. Ibrāhīm al-Rāfiqī, and Diʿbil acknowledges its excellence after the fourth hemistich of the strophe (vv. 1-10), which he repeats admiringly with the admission, "If he had left me some of his poetry, I would have declared him the best poet." The extreme shortness of the excerpt that convinced Diʿbil is a dramatic abbreviation, though the dating of the event after Abū Tammām's death certainly softened his former critic; AAT 202:1-10. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān*, II, no. 56 in 38 vv. of which the first couplet is cited in the *khabar*. A longer excerpt of this ode appears in a *khabar* discussed in section III.3.

[72] AAT 93-6. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* II, no. 72 in 61 vv. The *khabar* cites vv. 20-2, 25, 28 (the burning crucified Afshīn) and 47-9, 51; see Ullmann 1995, 55-68.

III.3. *Trimming*

Going even further, critics trimmed odes down to motif-size bits of one to several lines, which they rearranged into one continuous passage, even if the chosen lines had been far apart in the original ode. An example is the response to another skeptical voice cited by al-Ṣūlī, to wit, the poet, critic and biographer of poets, Diʿbil al-Khuzāʿī (whom we have already encountered as an Alid loyalist in section I.3.). Unlike ʿUmāra, Diʿbil had no literary motive for criticizing Abū Tammām, since he adhered to the modern style himself and was a disciple of Muslim b. al-Walīd. Rather, he made judgements on religio-political and professional grounds. In the presence of al-Ḥasan b. Rajāʾ,[73] Diʿbil berated Abū Tammām, but the attending poet ʿIṣāba al-Jarjarāʾī (fl. 218-227/833-842) countered by reciting to him the poet's praise of general Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Thaghrī. At verse 28 Diʿbil surrendered and conceded Abū Tammām's excellence (*faḍl*), though finding his supporters guilty of exaggeration, whereas ʿIṣāba called Diʿbil simply envious. The reciting ʿIṣāba took the liberty of selecting four separate verses from the ode and recomposing them as a quatrain.[74] The first is the opening verse of the praise section, or antistrophe, introducing the victorious general, the three others striking images describing him. This is both a suppression of the *nasīb* and a proportionate reduction of the ode's main section in structure and content. The latter procedure is hereafter referred to as "trimming": ʿIṣāba, a poet in his own right, did not simply cut and fast-forward the ode from passage to passage but reconstructed it from separate salient images into a four-line "trailer" of highlights.[75]

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[73] On him see n. 24.

[74] AAT 181-2. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* II, no. 91 in 51 vv. Cited are, after the incipit, vv. 20 (beginning of the AS), 22 (stream analogy), 23 (the patron's dual nature), 28 (his generosity as paradise on earth).

[75] For this term, see Genette 1982/1997, chap. 47. This reductive technique serves the function of what Genette calls digest (ibid., chap. 50), to wit, the substantial reduction and refocusing of a work according to one aspect, except that trimming differs from digest by resulting from mere subtraction and requiring no rewording beyond minor variants. Genette also points to numerous amplifications and reductions by authors themselves for a variety of uses and audiences (ibid., chap. 56).
For the trimming of the Amorium ode to foreground its fantastic imagery, see AAT 108-14 and Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* I, no. 3 in 71 vv. Quoted are 11-16, 18, 17, 21-3, 26-9, 32-5, 37, 39-40, 50, 55, 68-70 (all AS); see Gruendler, forthcoming.

A poem of apology by Abū Tammām to his patron Abū l-Mughīṯh Mūsā b. Ibrāhīm al-Rāfiqī meets a similar fate but with a different agenda on the part of the editor. Al-Mubarrad had been confined to the palace of Ibn al-Muʿtazz, when a man from the Banū Nuʿmān challenged him to suggest any poet who could have outdone the apology. To underscore his case, the Nuʿmānī recited it to the grammarian, suppressing the strophe and carving out the poet's defense from the antistrophe to show off its construction. In the recomposed version, Abū Tammām first tells about learning of the false accusation that he had satirized al-Rāfiqī (24); then the poet dismisses such alleged ingratitude (25, 27-8), and demonstrates with two rhetorical questions and a fantastic causal hyperbole the absurdity of the charge from the standpoints of both poet (31) and public (32-3). An excuse for any unintended offense (38, the ode's last verse) concludes the excerpt. The tight, logical defense created by the streamlining is further accentuated by a variant of verse 28, "I am to have *disacknowledged* (*jaḥadtu*) so many a favor of yours," which is stronger than the *Dīwān*'s "I am to have *forgotten....*" The apology's effect on the listening grammarian was immediate and total. He admitted that people who slighted Abū Tammām were either ignorant of the "discipline of poetry and speech" (*ʿilm al-shiʿr wa-maʿrifat al-kalām*) or scholars who had not themselves heard and examined (*tabaḥḥara*) his poetry in depth. Al-Mubarrad's recanting his earlier criticism of Abū Tammām late in life not only delighted the princely host but proved how well a trimmed recitation made a poem's case.[76]

The last two transformations result in radical contractions, or collages, of a praise poem and an apology respectively. They point towards and promote an original without superseding it; in this they compare to film previews or demonstration tapes of performing artists. While Abū Tammām's whole odes led a parallel life in the (lost) edition of his *Dīwān*, originally appended by al-Ṣūlī to his *akhbār* collection (from which many of the present examples derive), the trimmed versions acted as hypertext to the odes' hypotext, to use terms coined by Gérard Genette.[77] Reduced *qaṣīda*s brought out those dimensions of imagery or structure that a reciter deemed most

[76] AAT 202-6. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān*, II, no. 56 in 38 verses. The *khabar* cites vv. 1-2 (*incipit*), 24-5 (24 var. *ẓanantuhu*), 27-8 (28 var. *jaḥadtu*), 31-3 (32 var. *usarbalu*), 38.

[77] Genette 1982, 11-17/1997, 5-10.

attractive. Herein he was invested creatively beyond merely picking out verses; he reorganized them and established links and associations *not present* in the original but which amplified those aspects he wanted to demonstrate.

The *udabāʾ* performances studied here highlight specific passages and skip others but they all recall and acknowledge the odes as wholes. Certainly, the reduced versions stand in for the odes under situational and conversational constraints that preclude lengthy recitals. But there is more to the "less" of poetry. All of the partially suppressed, accelerated or streamlined *qaṣīda*s are aimed at skeptical listeners, and they are judged by their reciters more apt to make the case for the originals than the originals themselves. In other words, the shortening makes an ode "more like itself"—akin to a preview that sensationalizes, or misrepresents, a film to attract viewers. Another effect of this tactic is the ingenious cloaking of the reciter's advocacy in letting a *qaṣīda* ostensibly speak for itself. But we know with Genette that summaries (which the *qaṣīda* samples resemble in this respect) belong to the discourse of commentary: "Tell me how you summarize and I tell you how you will interpret."[78]

III.4. *Pre-Selection*

In at least one instance, an *adīb*'s trimming of a *qaṣīda* had been prepared ahead of time. The exercise was supposed to demonstrate the sustained excellence of Abū Tammmām's Amorium ode as a whole. Al-Ḥasan b. Wahb made the case, which has been discussed elsewhere for its practical endorsement of *takhyīl*.[79] The *khabar*'s author and eye-witness al-Barbarī (d. 294/907)[80] is quoted by al-Ṣūlī as commenting on the *adīb*'s perceptive trimming of the ode: "Al-Ḥasan knew by heart most of Abū Tammām's poetry and apparently made selections from each *qaṣīda* to memorize (*kaʾannahu yakhtāru mina l-qaṣīdati mā yaḥfaẓuhu*)." Al-Barbarī does not explicitly identify the abridged Amorium citation as al-Ḥasan's work, but he implies that abridgement was the courtier's habit. Indeed the citation of forty of

[78] Ibid., 286/1997, 243.
[79] See n. 75.
[80] Abū Aḥmad Muḥammad b. Mūsā b. Ḥammād; see Fleischhammer 2004, 95-6.

the ode's seventy-one verses, atypically long in al-Ṣūlī's collected *akhbār* on the poet, suggests that he had received the *khabar* from al-Barbarī in this form.[81]

It is likely that trimmed odes existed in written form. One such example might be the selection of Abū Tammām's verse which an unidentified member of the Banū Nawbakht prepared for Thaʿlab to allow him to participate actively in the literary gatherings of the official Ibn Thawāba (d. 277/890). The Nawbakhtī is quoted as saying, "We selected some of it for him and handed it to him (*dafaʿnāhu ilayhi*)." Thaʿlab's refusal to take credit for the selection in the face of the host's applause shows that selecting verses presupposed a critical expertise of *muḥdath* poetry he did not want to arrogate to himself.[82] The *khabar* leaves open the exact format of the selection, but like al-Ḥasan's performance above, it might also have consisted of trimmed *qaṣīda*s. This agrees with Kushājim's advice in his handbook for boon-companions to the effect that reciting entire *qaṣīda*s was considered rude in convivial sessions, for it broke the rhythm of drinking and conversation.[83] All one may conclude is that some *udabāʾ* wrote down excerpts of modern *qaṣīda*s for private use and oral perfomance.[84]

The sources for Abū Tammām's verse in the debates are no professional *ruwāt* but rather poets or *udabāʾ* who thus gave proof of their *avant garde* taste. ʿUmāra relied on the memory of Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Jahm to reproduce the satire on Afshīn for Abū l-ʿAynāʾ.[85] The reciter of the trimmed apology, identified only as a member of the Banū Nuʿmān,[86] and the anonymous challenger of ʿUmāra regarding the panegyric of al-Ṭāʾī[87] were most likely also amateur transmitters. Except for the poet ʿIṣāba al-Jarjarāʾī who re-

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[81] AAT 114.

[82] AAT 15-16. Al-Ṣūlī praises him and al-Mubarrad for such scholarly integrity; ibid., 7-9.

[83] Kushājim, *Adab al-nadīm*, 24. Extant early *Ikhtiyārāt* prepared of Abū Tammām's odes (e.g., MSS Berlin 7537 and Oxford, Bodl., Marsh. 64/7,1), need to be reviewed in this light; cf. GAS II:557.

[84] They thus qualify as notebooks for private use (*hypomnemata*), as opposed to finally redacted authorial works destined for publication (*syngrammata*); see Schoeler 2002, 22.

[85] See n. 72, esp. AAT 94.

[86] See n. 76.

[87] See n. 70.

cited for Diʿbil another panegyric of al-Ṭāʾī,[88] all reciters were amateurs who championed Abū Tammām's poetry in keeping with the fashion of the time. Their generation antedated the formation of *muḥdath* criticism as a discipline but already signaled the attraction of a new aesthetic that would give rise to it. It went with the *ad hoc* character of the discourse (itself an accoutrement of elite culture) that these early "practical critics," instead of theorizing, let the *qaṣīda*s speak for themselves. In this sense the trimmed performances bore within themselves the germ of *muḥdath* poetics.

IV. *Staging* Qaṣīdas *in* Akhbār

If an audience could interrupt an ode, a poet cut or enlarge it during its first performance, an *adīb* excise it in subsequent literary debates, it should come as no surprise that the authors and compilers of *akhbār*, who were themselves poets and men of letters, would feel no compulsion to retain odes intact.

A word of caution: in texts that underwent changes by generations of unacknowledged authors it is often impossible to distinguish what each one contributed. In some cases, however, the existence of variants helps narrow down the candidates. In two of the five variants of general Yazīd's education, most poetic editing was probably done by the original author and guarantor, e.g., al-Qaḥdhamī in version a (not identical with the narrating general, who is unsavvy in literary matters).[89] The *akhbārī*s Ibn Mihrawayhi in versions c and d and al-ʿAnazī in versions a, b and e each assembled various earlier versions and Abū l-Faraj ultimately collated these side by side in his chapter on Muslim.[90] Inversely a later editor could expand a poetic quotation, as

[88] See n. 74.

[89] In version b (which survives with a different dramaturgy but the same poetic selection in *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*), the author may also be al-Qaḥdhamī who was otherwise known as arranger of *akhbār*; cf. n. 143. In version d the literary quality and reception history of the selection makes it the likely product of a professional, either the *rāwiya* al-Baydaq or the historical person on whom his character is modeled; cf. n. 159. For a systematic classification of transmitters, see Günther 2005.

[90] See beginning of section V. On Ibn Mihrawayh and al-ʿAnazī, see nn. 140 and 155. From the viewpoint of writerly contribution I distinguish sources of single *akhbār* from collectors, i.e., professional *akhbārī*s with attested writings that were used in turn (directly or indirectly) by the compilers of the third/ninth and early fourth/tenth century. The attempt to identify an original author is in most cases a

did al-Marzubānī in the example of al-Buḥturī's ingratitude. He restored many verses omitted from two *qaṣīda*s to a *khabar* received from al-Ṣūlī.[91] A prudent strategy is to limit interpretation to the last two stages of *akhbār* collectors and compilers, whose frequent (if minor and unacknowledged) interventions show recognizable trends.

Despite their concise prose, the *akhbār* about *udabāʾ* from the preceding section give clues about the critical stances of those who recited odes (or asked others to do so). More significantly, the critics' way of trimming an ode sheds light on what they desired to show their audiences, be it surprising novel imagery, a well-argued defense, or the sustained excellence of a long ode. Such judicious reduction has revealed itself to be the indirect defense of an ode by its own (best) verses. Narrators of *akhbār* on modern poets, who took over the practical side of the literary debate between the ancients and moderns, would likewise accelerate the flow of a *qaṣīda* to support their own attitudes (literary or otherwise). They did not violate their audience's expectations but rather conformed to accepted conventions of how *qaṣīda*s were discussed in gatherings.

There exist multiple ways of integrating odes into *akhbār*, depending on a book's general format and scope, the poetry's currency and availability in written form, and the (literary, historical or situational) aspect of an ode important to the *khabar*'s events. The scope of included quotation varies from a short reference to full citation, with many nuances in between.

IV.1. *Reference*

For an ode that was famous and available (*mashhūra, sāʾira, fī aydī l-nās, min al-ummuhāt/al-qalāʾid*), and thus sometimes called *kalima,*[92]

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fruitless exercise, while one stands on firmer ground with the major collectors. See Fleischhammer 2004.

[91] See n. 106.

[92] WKAS I:333a. See for example TSh 27-8, Agh 3:190-2 and 231-2, and Bashshār, *Dīwān*, I:323-40 for his panegyric for Marwān II and the Qays ʿAylān in 85 verses, which occasioned his first large reward. *Kalima* also designates a panegyric of al-Saffāḥ by Sudayf b. Maymūn (TSh 39-40) and one for the general Maʿn b. Zāʾida by Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa the Elder (TSh 46). In medieval sources, lament and satire likewise fall under the umbrella of *kalima* (and *qaṣīda*); see for example TSh 51-2 for a lament of Maʿn b. Zāʾida by Marwān and TSh 62 for a satire of the executed Abū Muslim by Abū Dulāma.

authors of *akhbār* contented themselves with citing the half or full *incipit* (*maṭlaʿ*) in lieu of a title. Ibn al-Muʿtazz used the first option for eleven famous *qaṣīda*s of Abū Tammām[93] and the second for a praise of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya by al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī.[94] Another option was to refer to a *qaṣīda* by its rhyme letter (*qāfiya*). When border guards accused the governor of Ahwāz, Abū Bujayr b. Simāk al-Asadī, of Shiite leanings, he had three entire *qaṣīda*s by al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī recited to them, in order to convince the guards of ʿAlī's right to succession. They remained unimpressed and the exasperated governor insulted them by calling them asses, followed by the offended al-Sayyid who called them Christians and Jews. The use of references by incipit and rhyme letter, placed in the governor's mouth, permitted al-Nawfalī (d. 204/819)—if he was indeed the *khabar*'s original author—to narrate the entire event in nine lines.[95]

IV.2. *Quotation*

Beyond the reference, selections varied, depending on the intention of the author. If a poem served to document a statement or event, the incipit and the relevant verse(s) were the preferred mode of citation, popular with al-Ṣūlī, as in the above-discussed *khabar* of the Ṭāhirid governor's loss of his two sons.[96] This procedure may be called "topical." But if the quality of the ode itself was the focus of the plot, more verses were kept. This occurred in the *khabar* where Ibn Harma presents three panegyrics to Manṣūr's governor of the Yamāma, al-Sarī b. ʿAbdallāh (r. 146-58/764-75). The eye-witness Ibn Zurayq (a *rāwiya* and companion of al-Saffāḥ), presented all odes by citing passages of at least four verses from strophe and antistrophe respectively. This resembles the acceleration technique (see III.2.) except that two major sections, not thematic passages within them, become

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93 TSh, 284-5.

94 Ibid., 33.

95 Agh 7:263. Cf. al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyārī, *Dīwān*, no. 158 in 9 vv. (1-4, S: *nasīb*; 5-9, AS: praise of ʿAlī and Faṭima); the *nūniyya* no. 189 in 11 vv. (1, S: *aṭlāl* motif; 2-11, AS: the Alids' right to succession for their bravory at Badr, ʿAlī's designation and challenge to Abū Bakr's succession). The "Refuting Ode in r" is probably identical with no. 65 in 9 vv. (1, S: morning of separation motif with Fāṭima's tribe; AS: 2-9: designation of ʿAlī); cf. Agh 7:239-40 and 7:240. The *Dīwān* versions are based on Agh and al-Marzubānī's *Akhbār al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī*.

96 AAT 217-20; cf. n. 27.

the basis of selection.[97] With this longer format of citation, the narrator (and likely author) Ibn Zurayq takes six pages to do what al-Nawfalī accomplished with a paragraph, though the narrated time of several *qaṣīda* recitals must have been roughly equivalent.[98] Each had a different aim: Ibn Zurayq, an acclaimed transmitter and companion of al-Manṣūr, desired to display the panegyric offering to his caliph's relative and governor, whereas al-Nawfalī merely wanted to document governor Abū Bujayr's intrepid support for the Alids.

The other end of the spectrum was an ode's citation in full, difficult to integrate into the terse early *khabar*. Exceptions were *qaṣīda*s composed as dramatic dialogues or epistles that told part of the story. Abū l-Faraj, for instance, used verses of Ibn Abī ʿUyayna (d.c. 170-93/786-809) in this manner. The compiler merged two overlapping accounts from al-Mubarrad and Aḥmad b. Yazīd al-Muhallabī,[99] including the complete poetry from the latter source. The prose introduction recounts how the poet is stationed with his cousin Khālid (governor of Jurjan under al-Mahdī) and then stripped of his military stipend and forced to pay back his first month's salary. Here the citation of the poet's satire of his cousin in dramatic dialogue takes over the narrative. Following declarations of loyalty to his beloved Dunyā (an alias for his married cousin Fāṭima, 1-3) and his complaint of exile to a dove (4-6), he addresses Khālid to curse and chastise him for his misdeeds and threaten him with future satires (which in fact followed).[100] In a variant the poet awaited the accession of the new caliph al-Hādī to send him a praise poem via a family member employed in the palace. Within it he explained (ostensibly to fictive female characters) that one may hold a secret only for limited time (7-13), then he praises the caliph and begs him to put an end to his wretched state (14-21).[101]

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[97] Agh 4:383-8. Cf. Ibn Harma, *Dīwān*, no. 65 in 12 vv. (1-4, S: *nasīb;* 5-12, AS: *madīḥ*); no. 186 in 11 vv. (1-4, S: *nasīb*; 5-11, AS: *madīḥ*), no. 34 in 5 vv. (1a, S: *nasīb*; 2-5, AS: *madīḥ*), and no. 41 in 12 vv. (1-4, S: *nasīb*, 7-12, AS: *madīḥ*). All texts are fragments culled from literary sources, and the *akhbār* context allows us to identify them as excerpts from odes, especially no. 34, which is explicitly described as a long *qaṣīda*.

[98] See Genette 1972, 122-44 on narrated time (as opposed to the time of the narrative act; ibid., 228-50).

[99] Important transmitter in Agh mostly from his father and often to al-Ṣūlī; see Fleischhammer 2005, 80.

[100] Agh 20:55-6. Cf. Ghadīra 1965-6, no. 5 after Agh.

[101] Agh 20:65-6. Cf. Ghadīra 1965-6, no. 39 after Agh.

In one variant of al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī's arrival in Ahwāz, poetry likewise takes over the narrative. Rounded up and jailed by the night guard after carousing with his brethren, the inebriated poet sent a petition to the governor Abū Bujayr al-Muhallabī (who esteemed al-Sayyid's poetry), addressed to the governor's *rāwī* and including exact instructions for how to present it.[102] This dialogical style lends itself to story-telling, but in its absence, and in view of the author's desire to include an entire ode, he placed it before a *khabar* or appended it without attempting to integrate the two.[103]

IV.3. *Paraphrase*

Later *akhbārī*s took even greater liberty in abbreviating and referring to odes than did contemporary *udabāʾ*. The main difference was in the moment of the trimming relative to the performance. The *adīb* presented the actual shortened version of an ode in the event itself, irrespective of whether this reduction was made *ad hoc* or prepared in advance. But *akhbārī*s often dealt with situations that presupposed an ode's full delivery, especially its first performance, which was a standard item in the *akhbār* of poets, since it showed their literary arrival and official recognition. Only at the later fitting of an ode to a *khabar*'s swift pace, did authors tend to replace the suppressed performance text with narrative links or paraphrases, comparable to the stage directions in a dramatic text. With or without the *incipit* as a reference, the links variously replaced the entire performance, internal passages, or the ending.

Full paraphrase. An entire ode might be replaced by a one-sentence paraphrase. When al-Maʾmūn asked Diʿbil to recite his praise of ʿAlī al-Riḍā (d. 203/818), the poet feared this to be a trap to

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[102] Agh: 7:258. Cf. al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī, *Dīwān* no. 109:1-5 (*tashbīb*), and 6-10 (praise and intercession invoked on behalf of love for Muḥammad and ʿAlī), and 11-18 (the poet's plea). For variants on the poet's arrival and imprisonment, see Agh 7:262-3 and 264.

[103] Preceding a *khabar* is Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa's panegyric of Maʿn b. Zāʾida in 45 verses, which Ibn al-Muʿtazz cites for its rarity; TSh 48-51 and Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa, *Shiʿr Marwān*, no. 55. Appended is Ibn al-Zayyāt's panegyric of al-Maʾmūn recalling Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī's high treason, which he showed to the pardoned prince, threatening to publish it lest he return formerly requisitioned funds. As the deal succeeded and Ibn al-Zayyāt withheld publication until the caliph's death, the poem was doubtless forgotten; Awq 26-30.

implicate him for his Alid leanings; but the caliph (who knew the poem already) calmed him and said that he simply wished to hear it from the poet's mouth. This entire performance is conveyed in one sentence, "He recited the [*qaṣīda*] to him until its end." Since the *khabar*'s author, Diʿbil's contemporary Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Ḍabbī, told it mainly for the sake of poet's satires of (this and other) caliphs after they had shown him lenience and generosity, there was no reason to dwell on the Alid ode. Abū l-Faraj had also treated it in other *akhbār* of the same chapter (discussed above) and avoided a duplicate citation.[104]

Paraphrased middle. If not paraphrasing the entire ode, an *akhbārī* might skip beginning and middle passages that contributed nothing to the plot. In Ibn al-Zayyāt's conveyance of Abū Tammām's panegyric to al-Wāthiq, al-Ṣūlī skipped straight to the poem's concluding dedication section, which imaginatively describes the poet's oeuvre and effort on behalf of the caliph and prompts a handsome reward. Al-Ṣūlī indicates this moving ahead by, "The [*qaṣīda*] was recited to him, and when he reached his words, 'You received a necklace strung by the tongue in two strands of hidden pearls....'"[105] The *khabar* should document the ode's successful conveyance and reception. This is achieved with the final section, the metastrophe, which is devoted to the patronage relationship, while earlier sections could be dispensed with.

Paraphrased end. Inversely, an ode's ending could be omitted and replaced with prose. Al-Ṣūlī illustrates al-Buḥturī's ingratitude to his erstwhile supporter, al-Mustaʿīn's official Aḥmad b. al-Khallād, after this caliph's ouster by al-ʿMuʿtazz. The poet's former recitation of a panegyric to al-Mustaʿīn is indicated with the cited opening couplet and the resumptive phrase "and he continued to the end" (*wa-tammama l-qaṣīda*). That this dramaturgic abbreviation was by the original author's hand is demonstrated by the variant of al-Marzubānī, who related the *khabar* on the authority of his teacher, but restored some

[104] For the ode and the *khabar* treating it, see nn. 31-2. Al-Ḍabbī was a transmitter of the *kātib*-poet al-ʿAttābī and familiar of ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir to whom he relates this *khabar* during a discussion of poetry and *adab*; Agh 20:135-9.

[105] AAT 207:1-209:9. Cf. Abū Tammām, *Dīwān* III, no. 167 in 48 vv. Cited are 39-48 (MS), omitting vv. 42 and 47; 40 has the variant *ajābahā*.

of the cut verses and replaced a circumlocution of another ode with the suppressed satirical passage.[106]

If the ode's end mattered for the narrative, citation could be limited to the last verse, as occurs in a further *khabar* on the mistreatment of Ibn Abī ʿUyayna by his cousin, the governor of Jurjan (see preceding section). In each of the *khabar*'s three versions, a satire by Ibn Abī ʿUyayna begins on a jocular tone but ends by denying his cousin any standing or generosity. This shocks the listener (Diʿbil or his teacher Muslim) as being too serious and damaging for a member of one's own family, and he regrets having solicited the recitation. While the version of Aḥmad b. Yazīd al-Muhallabī showed the satire's progress from jest to earnest by reproducing it entirely,[107] the version of ʿAlī al-Munajjim (d. 275/888)[108] (transmitted by Ibn ʿAmmār, d. 314/926 or 319/931) reduced it to all but the first and last verses of the satire, bridging the cut with the sentence, "Muslim smiled about his satire of [Khālid] until [Ibn Abī ʿUyayna] went through all of it and concluded with his words

> *wa-idhā taṭāwalati l-ruʾū-*
> *su fa-ghaṭṭi raʾsaka thumma ṭāṭih* [*kāmil*]
>
> When heads are held high [vying in glory],
> cover you your head and keep it low.[109]
>
> "Stop it!" Muslim said to him. "We belong to God, and you have dishonored and embarrassed [your cousin]. I had thought you would jest and joke until the end of your words, but you concluded [the satire] in ugly earnestness and exaggerated in taking it so far with him."

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[106] AB no. 47. Cf. al-Buḥturī, *Dīwān* I, no. 220 in 19 vv. (cited are 1-2) and no. 71 in 44 vv. (cited are 1a, 29). In the variant al-Marzubānī restores, in place of the resumption phrase, no. 220:5-8 (praise of al-Mustaʿīn) and no. 71:14-20, 24-26, 28 (satire of al-Mustaʿīn); *Muwashshaḥ*, 373-5. Al-Ṣūlī could be brief since his *akhbār* collection prefaced his edition of the poet's *dīwān*. Al-Marzubānī's book chapter in turn focused on the poet's missteps, which only a fuller quote illustrated.

[107] Agh 20:59-60. Cf. Ghadīra 1965-6, no. 25 after Agh. See also nn. 100-1 on this affair.

[108] Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Yaḥyā al-Munajjim was an important *akhbārī* and author of a book on Jāhilī and early Islamic poets; see *Fihrist* 160, GAS II:95. Aḥmad b. ʿUbaydallāh b. ʿAmmār al-Thaqafī was an author of *akhbār* and teacher and informant of Abū l-Faraj for his *Maqātil* and Agh; see Günther 2002, 151 and Fleischhammer 2005, 37-8.

[109] Agh 20:59. The third version, based on Ibn Mihrawayh, skips the recitation, varies Diʿbil's response and adds Ibn Abī ʿUyayna's gleeful repetition of the pernicious last hemistich (ibid., 20:60-1). Cf. Ghadīra 1965-6, 101, no. 25 in 13 vv. after Agh, TSh and al-Marzubānī's *Muʿjam al-shuʿarāʾ*.

The two preceding cases show cuts to be an author's creative choice. Al-Munajjim in particular accentuates the point of his account by speeding up the poetry's pace and interrupting it with the listener's reactions.

In quite a different context it was precisely the complete recitation that mattered. Several *akhbār* feature people's dreams about the prophet Muḥammad endorsing odes by al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī on the Alid succession by listening to them from beginning to end. "In my sleep I saw the prophet with al-Sayyid before him, who recited 'Morning arose for [the departure of] Fāṭima's kin...' until he had recited it to the end, with the prophet listening." Another man to whom the author al-Nawfalī related this tale at ʿAlī's tomb in Ṭūs claimed to have had the same dream and been converted overnight into an Alid supporter.[110] In a variant related by Aḥmad al-Khaffāf (alive beg. 4th/10th c.), a man not only heard in his dream a full recitation of al-Sayyid to the prophet, "He recited it to him in its entirety not leaving out a single verse," but the poem miraculously enabled him to recite it afterwards "without stuttering or misspeaking," although he was a poor reciter and known to commit linguistic barbarisms.[111]

In the hands of *akhbārī*s the narrated odes acquired a new existence, different both from the odes as performed and as recorded and collected in *dīwān*s. For the *akhbārī*s refocused and trimmed them down to what they saw as defining contours or required plot elements. Excised, reconstructed and paraphrased, the voluminous poems turned into lightened, optimized hypertexts. The early narrators thus accomplished the double *tour de force* of encapsulating in one of the shortest genres of Arabic prose the longest genre of Arabic poetry and continuing the history of the odes' reception. Yet this was not the end of the odes' transformation; the first authors of *akhbār* were followed by collectors who gave those distinct bits of prose a compact textual shape, and by compilers who assembled, arranged, prefaced, and commented upon the prose accounts.

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[110] Agh 7:239-40, related on the authority of the *akhbārī* and author Ibn Abī Saʿd al-Warrāq (d. 274/887). Cf. al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī, *Dīwān*, no. 65 in 9 vv. (cited is 1a). See also nn. 28 and 95.

[111] Agh 7:244. Cf. al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī no. 108:1a (see n. 30 on Agh 7:235-6 and 7:245 for the original performance of this ode). Aḥmad is the brother of al-Ḥasan al-Khaffāf, on whom see n. 139. The prophet might of course interrupt the poet, as he did to confirm the truth of one verse; see ibid., on Agh 7:266 translated in n. 30.

V. *The Performance of the Compiler*

In the preface of his *Encyclopédie,* Denis Diderot defends his creative role as an editor in arranging and presenting the contents of the compilation. Jean Jacques Rousseau in his *Nouvelle Héloise* goes further in using his role as unreliable editor to veil the factual or fictional status of the love letters he publishes. This playful misdirection, or negative performative gesture, as Uwe Wirth labels it, by an editor, is no invention of the 18th century.[112] Medieval Arab compilers, who worked with a voluminous centuries-old heritage, likewise understood their work to be creative. Their historical removal from the *akhbār*'s content and oral techniques of transmission gave them room for intervention. This freedom applied to the smaller, visible part of direct authorial statements as well as to the larger, silent part of selecting, editing and arranging extant material.[113]

Abū l-Faraj's editorial interventions in his *Book of Songs* remain mostly on the side of Diderot. He contributes introductory essays on poet's vitae, orders *akhbār* and adds occasional comments.[114] Other interventions are not explicit but manifest themselves through his selection and disposal of texts, notably the clustering of *akhbār* on one person or the juxtaposition of different narratives of one event, a process that will be further examined below.[115]

Abū l-Faraj (d. 356/967) precedes the time when works, such as al-Hamadhanī's (d. 398/1008) *Maqāmāt*, Ibn Shuhayd's (d. 426/1035) *Risālat al-Tawābiʿ* and Ibn Sharaf al-Qayrawānī's (d. 459/1064) *Masā'il al-intiqād,* would openly declare their fictional status. Nonetheless earlier authors and readers knew well the fictional underbelly of alleged accounts about historical personages. To the conventions of *adab* literature belonged for instance the alleviated force of the *isnād*. This authentication technique of the legal tradition acquired a lighter flavor when applied to *adab* literature, the genre to which *akhbār* on poets belonged. Abū l-Faraj lived in the flourishing book culture of the fourth/tenth century and used extensive written sources for his book of songs. His distance in time and in media technique allowed

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112 Wirth 2002.

113 For a definition of "unacknowedged authorship" in this context, see Stefan Leder 1998.

114 Kilpatrick 1997 and 1998, 107-8 and 114.

115 Kilpatrick 2003, 89-127.

him to retool those conventions of oral transmission that no longer reflected a reality and had turned into narrative deadwood. Often he simply adopted the *isnād* to indicate written sources in a manner akin to that of a bibliographical reference.[116] Leon Zolondek and Manfred Fleischhammer have identified many of his sources as written works.[117] But the presence of the *isnād* also reminded the reader of the conditions of transmission and its potential unreliability and thus relieved the compiler from taking responsibility for the facts he presented. Occasionally the conventions of transmission were manipulated for literary effect, and playfulness lurked behind a straight-laced *isnād*, as for example in the story of a man whose dream about an ode turned him overnight into a perfect *rāwī*.[118] Thus the ostensibly scholarly *isnād* could be turned upside down to show an event's fictitiousness.[119] Still, outright fantasy remains rare in Abū l-Faraj's accounts on early modern poets, who predate him only by circa one century. The tales' mere verisimilitude to historical reality, i.e., their fictive character, is also indicated by larger structures.[120] One of these is the already mentioned treatment of parallel accounts. Because of the proliferation of oral accounts, editors frequently found several variants of one event, which they might group side by side, or even rewrite as one narrative. Like al-Ṣūlī above (II.3.), the editor could endorse one of the texts as most authentic or leave the judgement to the reader. With his chronological hindsight an editor who retained alternate possible plots refracted an event in multiple versions and challenged the reader with competing possibilities of how things might have been.

Abū l-Faraj does not give attention to all stories that have oscillating versions. The three variants of al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī's imprisonment for drinking in Ahwāz are left separate and scattered throughout the entry.[121] Where he juxtaposes variants, Abū l-Faraj uses an order

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116 Kilpatrick 1989, 115.

117 Zolondek 1960 and Fleischhammer 1979 and 2004.

118 See n. 111.

119 An inverted *isnād* either fades away before the last guarantor or ends with a notably untrustworthy one; Kilpatrick 1998, 113, 115, 117. Other *isnād*s testify only to the wide circulation of an account not its veracity; ibid., 116.

120 Leder 1998, 50-9.

121 They all end with his release, in one variant after a poetic petition dispatched to the governor's *rāwī*. In another the poet asks for the release of all inmates, a request the governor hastens to fulfill, fearing the sharp-tongued poet will next demand rewards for all of them; Agh 7:258, 262-3, 264.

of increasingly complex dramaturgy or decreasing probability; both can be found in the chapter on the brigand poet Tawba b. al-Ḥumayyir (d. mid-first/mid-seventh century) and his beloved, the poet Layla al-Akhyaliyya (d.c. 85/704).[122] The reader re-experiences the event each time anew with added detail, scenic narration, and plot twists, enjoying the contrastive overlay of the subsequent renditions. In Layla's two juxtaposed death accounts, Abū l-Faraj qualifies the second, less realistic but more poetic tale of the lovers' posthumous reunion as "the true story." In the varying reports, placed side-by-side, of Yazīd's apprenticeship as a patron, Abū l-Faraj withholds comment and simply presents a collage of texts (translated and tabulated in appendices A and B.). Versions b, c, and d have been considered earlier for their internal aspects.[123] Here their sequential placement will be interpreted as a negotiation among three competing interests of the compiler. Among the five versions, four cover the entire episode; a fifth version reproduces a segment and seems appended merely for the sake of completeness. The remaining four are ordered in such a way as to show (1) developments in the dramaturgy, (2) the fit between poetry and reality, and (3) supporting characters.

V.1. *Dramaturgy*

The sequence from first to third account exhibits an increasing artfulness in the dramaturgy. The first version (a), after a brief dialogue, simply relates most events in a terse first-person voice. The second (b) sets the events into four different scenes: three dialogues between the general and the caliph, the chamberlain, and the poet respectively, and a fourth dialogue between chamberlain and poet. The third version (c) adds a second frame of dialogue reported within the first, creating successive levels of telling that gradually reveal themselves to the poet from whose perspective the *khabar* is narrated. Interrupted over dinner behind closed doors at his Kufan home by a mysterious emissary, he is taken to Baghdad and ushered into general Yazīd's boudoir. The general tells him that he has summoned him as

[122] For increased dramatic detail (direct speech, character development, verisimilitude) in three subsequent versions of their last encounter, see Agh 11:194-5; for increased fantastic elements (his greeting her from his grave), see her death account; Agh 11:228-9.

[123] See nn. 57 (for version b), 54 (version c), and 12 and 68 (version d)

the result of a conversation with the caliph. This version adds an elaborate description of the poet's penury and his pawning off of his attire to host a friend, a motif that recurs in version d. A second internal dialogue tells of the subsequent souring of the relationship between general and poet and the latter's spurning of the caliph's attempt at reconciling them. The fourth version (d) substitutes for the elaborate structure by focusing on one key scene between transmitter and poet featuring a creative contraction of his first ode.

V.2. *Poetry and reality*

The second and third trends compete in Abū l-Faraj's ordering of the versions. The second concerns the way in which poetry and reality match. To a third/ninth century audience, the public role performed by an individual in the patronage game was more important than the details of private behavior, and the semantic fit of poetic description to reality had been replaced by a more complex relationship between an individual and his poetic portrait. General Yazīd offers a startling exception to this sophisticated understanding. Of noble Shaybānī Bedouin descent, he adhered to an outdated literary aesthetic. For instance, he criticized Muslim's verse describing his perpetual readiness as wearing a double shirt of mail (1:41) by saying he would have preferred to be described as fighting completely without armor, in the way that Aʿshā Bakr (also Aʿshā Maymūn, d.c. 5-9/625-30) depicted the South Arabian hero ʿAmr b. Maʿdīkarib. Muslim corrected the general, saying that his own motif was superior because it conveyed resolve, whereas Aʿshā's motif showed foolishness.[124] In another instance of misunderstanding poetry, the general strove to match the letter of his panegyric depiction. Three versions include an episode of this kind. In the first, it is the caliph who tests the general's perpetual readiness by summoning him at an unusual hour, and true to character Yazīd appears in full armor.[125] In the third version, when the poet praises him as scorning the use of perfume, the general, who is engaged with his toilette, removes all utensils and declares, "Muslim has proscribed (*ḥarrama ʿalaynā*) perfume to us."

[124] Ibn ʿAbdrabbih, *ʿIqd* VI:165, also cited in Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* VI:334: 1-11 as commentary to version a; ibid., VI:332-3.

[125] See also a variant in which the Yazīd's uncle Maʿn b. Zāʾida tests him in this way; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* VI:333.

The incomplete fifth version (e) has him wash off his perfume and explain, "I hate to give the lie (*karihtu an ukadhdhiba*) to the words of Muslim b. al-Walīd." But Abū l-Faraj presents another way of honoring one's *madīḥ* than by literally conforming to a physical description. The character of the caliph in the third version hints already at such a different attitude when he accuses the general of "persisting in his Bedouin habits (*aʿrābiyya*)."[126] This term can be positive, denoting pure ancient Arab stock, but the caliph uses it in the sense of boorishness, censuring the general for his ignorance in the etiquette of patronage: a leader of people must be aware of any praise about him that is circulated publicly and acknowledge it by a reward to the poet. The general, however, is a quick study. In the second version, he corrects the oversight and admits his earlier neglectfulness in his apology to the poet. Version four gives full depiction to this different type of truth in the conclusion of the poet's trimmed antistrophe for the transmitter Baydaq, "You proved true (*ṣaddaqta*) my thought and others' thoughts about it." This refers precisely to the general's successful performance of his duties *as a patron*, not his foreswearing perfume or sleeping in his armor. At the moment of the poet's saying this, the verse still remains a pledge, for the general has not yet done so, and his failure to enact the role of the generous patron makes Muslim call into question his own performance as a panegyrist. It is not the physical accuracy of the poetry that matters but its enactment through patronage. Literal truth has been replaced by performance.

V.3. *Supporting characters*

The question of fit between poetry and reality, which is the ordering principle from the first to the fourth versions is joined in the fourth by another interest, to wit, the creation of a character who serves as intermediary between poet and patron. In each of the versions, a different personage ensures the poet's reward. In the first two it is the caliph, though in the second, he does so behind the scenes. In the third it is the general, who has the poet identified and summoned. In all but the first version, intermediary figures, such as a spy, an agent or a

[126] Al-Rashīd also calls him an *aʿrābī* when appointing him as the third general in a row to fight a Khārijite-Shaybānī rebel; ibid., VI:327.

chamberlain assist in connecting the panegyrist with his addressee but they do so at the bidding of one of the main characters. In the first version, in a reversal of hierarchies, the caliph himself assumes the role of an intercessor between poet and patron. However, in subsequent accounts, a separate character is invested with this function. In the second version, a chamberlain appears, but he is a rather obstructing, negative figure, while the ever-informed caliph choreographs the poet's initial reward, the reprimand of the cash-strapped general for not knowing that he has been praised, and the reimbursements of his debts. In the third version, a chamberlain travels incognito from Baghdad to Kufa to convey a travel allowance to the penniless, terrified poet and bring him to Yazīd. (His identity the narrator reveals only halfway through the story after their arrival in the capital.) But the chamberlain still acts upon the higher orders of the general, who has therewith proved himself a worthy patron. Only in the fourth version does the go-between take center stage in the person of the *rāwiya* Baydaq.[127] The initiative is entirely placed in the hands of this professional transmitter, whose expertise must needs be in modern poetry, for Muslim represents this style's *avant garde*. Baydaq recognizes the despairing poet in the waiting crowd, tests his verse and selects only one couplet, which he knows will please the general. Then he conveys it and twice collects rewards on behalf of the poet. The *rāwiya*'s entrée and his familiarity with the patron make the poet's presence superfluous, and the reward is given without their having to meet. This is also the only version in which the caliph makes no appearance; the *rāwiya* has taken over all of his and the other intermediaries' functions and integrated them into a new professional role. By placing this version last, Abū l-Faraj gives the transmitter the greatest weight in the poet's success. The importance and historical reality of this role is confirmed by the numerous comparable accounts of such personages illustrating this period's shifting literary taste.[128]

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[127] On him see n. 159.

[128] Cf. Ibn Madhʿūr, *rāwī* for Abū Bujayr, who memorizes al-Sayyid al-Ḥimyarī's work and to whom the imprisoned poet appeals (Agh 7:258), and Ibn Zurayq, *rāwī* and *akhbārī*, who invites Ibn Harma on behalf of the wavering governor of Yamāma (Agh 4:383-8).

V.4. *Reception of trimmed odes*

Returning to the initial question of what happens to *qaṣīda*s in this process, the variants use mainly one ode (*Dīwān* no. 1), but in drastically different ways. Due to the multistep nature of the transmission process, the ultimate origin of the selections remains uncertain, but since both collectors, al-ʿAnazī and Ibn Mihrawayh, already assembled differing versions, those versions must have pre-existed. The most striking case is version b, in which the character of the poet selects and trims the love prelude down to motifs of weeping and gesturing eyes when presenting it to the general in person. This *nasīb* topic both had emotional appeal and was more familiar to a person of conservative taste.[129] The selection probably derived from the otherwise unattested "Wearer of the Two Rags."[130] However, the later reception of the *qaṣīda* ignored the *nasīb* and turned instead to the *madīḥ* (as did Ibn Khallikān, who cut the *nasīb* verses from his reproduction of version b). Of the *madīḥ* part, the verses on permanent readiness (41) and scorn of perfume (43) gained support in the narrative from the general's anxiously conforming to them (versions one, three and five), but their choice cannot be traced beyond the collectors al-ʿAnazī and Ibn Mihrawayh, for their guarantors are not known as writers or transmitters of Abū l-Faraj. Version four provides the reduction of the *qaṣīda* that would have the most lasting effect. It concentrates on Yazīd as a brave warrior and leader in battle, and is attributed in the *khabar* to the elusive contemporary poetic professional Baydaq. Whoever the originator may be, this choice influenced subsequent citations of the ode by poetic critics and *udabāʾ*, such as Ibn al-Muʿtazz, Ibn Qutayba and Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī.[131] The selections thus targeted specific audiences; the *nasīb* was designed to mollify a conservative and neglectful patron at a particular occasion, after which its purpose was fulfilled and it lost its relevance. Instead the portrayal of the military chief became a model in the poetic-critical tradition. Whether al-Baydaq is fiction or fact, his actions forecast the critical reception of Muslim's most famous ode. While

[129] See nn. 22 and 58.

[130] He is the last-mentioned transmitter in common with the b variant of *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 14:334.

[131] See n. 160.

the trimmed antistrophe preserved the official purpose of Muslim's ode and his role as panegyrist, it disseminated those lines that would perdure in the critical tradition. Ibn ʿAbdrabbih accordingly classified the first verse (1:30), together with the partial rephrase of the following one, among the "best modern analogies for war,"[132] and Abū Hilāl used Baydaq's (slightly expanded) passage for his chapter on human character as the "best modern description of a war hero and military leader."[133]

The "fragmented" ode acquired several simultaneous and subsequent lives, in which its parts eclipsed the whole. Versions a and c illustrate how an ode's part in the interaction with the audience is preserved and recreated by the narrators, transmitters and compilers of *akhbār*, who thus enshrine its contextual, or pragmatic, meaning for subsequent audiences.

Versions b and d exemplify exactly how contemporary courtiers optimized *qaṣīda*s by turning them into trimmed "hypertexts" that promoted and defended the longer originals. This process occurred in encounters with an adverse reigning aesthetic, such as the conservative taste of general Yazīd. Narrators and compilers of *akhbār* most clearly demonstrate the editing of *qaṣīda*s and the selecting of their verses to be a creative process. Abū l-Faraj's interventions as a compiler are perhaps best studied in this still much neglected terrain[134] and his final placement of version d highlights the importance he places upon the courtier critic. Baydaq is shown discovering Muslim, the later paragon of the *muḥdath* style, and soliciting and choosing a couplet (most certainly including either of vv. 43 and 73 also figuring in versions a-c) that effectively ensures his first reception. The first contact with a patron is indeed a salient topic in *akhbār* and much reported by compilers.[135] But Abū l-Faraj's version d gives the literary impresario, *rāwiya*, and connoisseur of *badīʿ* a literary face; he has him ensure the breakthrough of the key representative of modern poetry with (what later becomes) his most famous ode. The "Baydaq version" lays the ground for the subsequent reception of this ode in

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132 Ibn ʿAbdrabbih, *ʿIqd* I:78. Also cited is Muslim, *Dīwān*, no. 20:34, 59 for Dāwūd b. Yazīd al-Muhallabī.

133 al-ʿAskarī, *Dīwān al-maʿānī*, I:278-9. Cf. also ibid., II:811 for verse 37b.

134 But see Franz 2004 on historical *akhbār*.

135 See Gruendler 2005b.

later *adab* works. The last in the line of Baydaq's successors to turn attention to the ode is this volume's honoree Wolfhart Heinrichs, who demonstrates its richness in innovative tropes in the terms of medieval poetic criticism, which he carefully reconstructs and by which he brings the debate about them up to the present.[136]

VI. *Conclusion*

The *akhbār* on modern poets show that from the earliest moment of performance whole odes were broken up by their authors and audiences, and later by critics and compilers. At a first chronological stage, those transformations resulted from the enactment of the odes, then from the dynamics of literary debate, and finally from the generic constraints of prose narratives that turned the events themselves into literature. Freed from the original performance context, the hypertexts traveled lightly and kept alive the memory of the entire odes which, for the major poets at least, remained available in their collected *dīwān*s. In this sense, the fragmentation of the *qaṣīda* became a creative reconstruction.

[136] Heinrichs (1994, 243-5 and nn. 24-5) identifies the *istiʿāra* (*tamthīl*-based metaphor without substratum) with twenty-four instances as the salient *badīʿ* figure of the ode, and it is also given prominence in Baydaq's version, where it occurs five times in seven verses (45 [twice], 47, 73, 79).

Appendix A
"A Lesson in Patronage" (Translation)

Version a
(Agh 18:318-19/19:34-35)[137]

Isnād: al-Ṣayrafī (d. 325/937)[138] and al-Khaffāf (alive beg. 4th/10th c.)[139] < al-ʿAnazī (d. 290/903)[140] < Qaʿnab b. al-Muḥarrar[141] and Ibn al-Naṭṭāḥ (d. 252/866)[142] < al-Qaḥdhamī (d. 222/837)[143] < general Yazīd b. Mazyad (d. 185/801):[144]

Al-Rashīd sent for me at an unusual time for [him to summon] someone like me, so I met him wearing my armor and prepared to handle anything if he were to require it. When he saw me he laughed at me and then said, "O Yazīd, tell me who is the one who said about you

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[137] Double references to Agh indicate the Beirut (Dār al-Thaqāfa) edition, followed by the Cairo (Dār al-Kutub) edition. The version is reproduced from Agh by Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* 6:332-3.

[138] Muḥammad b. ʿImrān al-Ṣayrafī is a frequent direct informant of Abū l-Faraj, and recensor of the work of al-ʿAnazī (on him, see note after the next); Fleischhammer 2004, 62. Note that depending on the aspect of his activity highlighted, a collector of a given *khabar* is also a "guarantor" in respect to his source and an "informant" in respect to his subsequent transmitter or compiler; see Günther 2005.

[139] Al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Khaffāf is the most frequently cited informant of Abū l-Faraj; ibid., 46-7.

[140] Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan b. ʿUlayl al-ʿAnazī was an *akhbārī*, *adīb* and philologist. He composed the *Akhbār al-Aʿshā*, and Abū l-Faraj cites him repeatedly via the recension of al-Ṣayrafī (see the note before the previous); GAS I:374, Zolondek 1960, 218, Fleischhammer 1979, no. 44 and 2004, 86.

[141] Qaʿnab b. al-Muḥarrar (following the spelling by al-Dhahabī vs. al-Muḥriz in the Agh editions) was a Baṣran transmitter and guarantor of the informants of Abū l-Faraj; Fleischhammer 2004, 101.

[142] Muḥammad b. Sāliḥ b. al-Nattāḥ was an *akhbārī*, genealogist and author of *Kitāb al-Dawla*, the first book on the Abbasid caliphate; Fleischhammer, 98.]

[143] Al-Walīd b. Hishām al-Qaḥdhamī from Baṣra wrote the *Akhbār manẓūma* on Qays b. al-Dharīḥ. He is likely the author and original source of the *khabar*, though Ibn al-Naṭṭāḥ, the next transmitter in the chain and likewise author of *akhbār*, may have revised it; ibid., 130.

[144] Abū Khālid Yazīd b. Mazyad b. Zāʾida al-Shaybānī (d. 185/801) served the Abbasid caliphs from al-Rashīd to al-Amīn as general, quelling rebellions, and from the end of the 2nd/8th century (183/799) as governor of Azarbayjān, Arran, Armenia and the eastern Caucasus. A celebrated hero and Arab noble, he patronized Muslim b. al-Walīd, who dedicated four panegyrics to him (Muslim, *Sharḥ Dīwān* nos. 1, 6, 10, 46) as well as poems of advice (139), satires (49?, 96) and laments (18, 103); see EI^2 VII:694a, Muslim b. al-Walīd, *Sharḥ Dīwān*, 31-3, Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, VI:327-42, al-Ziriklī, *Aʿlām* VIII:188.

tarāhu fī l-amni fī dirʿin muḍāfaʿatin
lā yaʾmanu l-dahra an yudʿā ʿalā ʿajali

ṣāfī l-ʿiyāni ṭamūḥu l-ʿayni himmatuhu
fakku l-ʿunāti wa-asru l-fātiki l-khaṭili

lillāhi min Hāshimin fī arḍihi jabalun
wa-anta wa-bnuka ruknā dhālika l-jabali [*basīṭ*]

You see him safe in a double shirt of mail
— never safe from suddenly being summoned (1:41).[145]

With a clear gaze and avid eye, his zeal
is to free sufferers and bind the sinning evildoer (1:42).[146]

How excellent is Hāshim [as] a mountain on his earth,
and you and your son are the foundations of that mountain (1:73)."[147]

"I do not know him, O Commander of the Faithful."

"What a disgraceful leader of people you are, praised with poetry of this caliber, but you do not know the author!"

The poetry had reached the Commander of the Faithful and he had learned it and given a prize to the poet, who was Muslim b. al-Walīd. So I departed and summoned [Muslim], gave him a gift, and kept him close to me.

Version b
(Agh 18:319-20/19:35-6)[148]

Isnād: same as version a up to the collector al-ʿAnazī[149] < father of Abū ʿAbdallāh Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Ḥanafī "Wearer of the Two Rags" (Dhū l-Hidmayn):

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145 Selected as one of the best verses from this ode by Ibn al-Muʿtazz; TSh 236.

146 Verse only contained in the Cairo edition.

147 The occasion of this ode was Yazīd's final crushing of the Khārijite revolt by his fellow-tribesman al-Walīd b. Ṭarīf al-Shaybānī in 178-9/794-5 after two prior campaigns against him had failed; cf. Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* VI:328. Cf. n. 68.

148 Cf. the b variant in al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071), *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 14:334-5 and reproduced without the *nasīb* verses by Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* VI:331 (from Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Anbārī, d. 328/940 via al-Hasan b. ʿAbdallāh al-Rabaʿī). The *Taʾrīkh*'s variant reduces the role of the chamberlain by replacing him with the general in the dialogue.

149 Al-ʿAnazī gave this *khabar* the final shape, as his guarantor Dhū l-Hidmayn is cited in *Taʾrīkh Bahgdād* for a slightly different version, which, however, contains the same verses.

Yazīd b. Mazyad entered al-Rashīd's presence and the latter said to him, "O Yazīd, who is the one who says about you

lā yaʿbaqu l-ṭību khaddayhī wa-mafriqahū
wa-lā yumassiḥu ʿaynayhi mina l-kuḥuli

qad ʿawwada l-ṭayra ʿādātin wathiqna bihā
fa-hunna yatbaʿnahu fī kulli murtaḥali

No perfume pervades his cheeks and the part of his hair,
nor does he daub his eyes with antimony (1:43).

He gave birds [i.e. vultures] habits that they trust.
So they trail him in every campaign (1:40)."[150]

"I do not know the author, O Commander of the Faithful."

"How can poetry of this caliber be composed about you without your knowing the author!"

Mortified, Yazīd departed, and when he arrived home he summoned his chamberlain.

"Which poet is at the gate?"

"Muslim b. al-Walīd," the chamberlain responded.

"How could you keep him from me and not inform me of his whereabouts?"

"I informed him that you are in dire straits and have nothing to give to him, but I asked him to hold off and stay for a few days until you[151] will have come into money."

Yazīd scolded him and said, "Bring him to me."

The chamberlain brought him inside and Muslim recited to Yazīd the verses

ujrirtu ḥabla khalīʿin fī l-ṣibā ghazili
wa-shammarat himamu l-ʿudhdhāli fī ʿadhalī (D: *l-ʿadhali*)

radda (D: *hāja*) *l-bukāʾa ʿalā l-ʿayni l-ṭamūḥi hawan*
mufarraqun bayna tawdīʿin wa-muḥtamali

a-mā kafā l-bayna an urmā bi-ashumihī
ḥattā ramānī bi-laḥẓi l-aʿyuni l-nujuli

mimmā janat (D: *janā*) *lī wa-in kānat munan ṣadaqat*
ṣabābatan khulasu l-taslīmi bi-l-muqali[152]

The rope of one lost in love and stricken was loosed for me,
and accusers tightened their resolve to accuse me (1:1).

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150 Selected as one of the best verses from this ode by Ibn al-Muʿtazz; TSh 236.

151 Var. "until he [the general] will have come into money"; Beirut edition.

152 Var. *janā* in *Dīwān*.

Tears were brought again (D: roused) to longing eyes,
[by a passion] divided between taking leave from loved ones
and mounting them [on their camels] (1:2).[153]

Is it not enough that separation hits me with its arrows
that I should be hit anew with the glances of large eyes? (1:6)

What brought me pangs of love—even if it was a hope come true—
were glimpses of farewell from her pupils (1:7).[154]

"We have ordered you to receive 50,000 *dirham*s," the general said to Muslim, "take them and forgive me."

The chamberlain came out to Muslim.

"The general ordered me to mortgage one of his estates for a loan of 100,000 *dirham*s, 50,000 for you and 50,000 for his own expenses," he said, and disbursed the amount to the poet. The caliph's informant wrote about this to al-Rashīd, who ordered Yazīd to receive 200,000 *dirham*s with the stipulation to "pay back the 50,000 *dirham*s the poet took, give him the same sum once again, and use the other 100,000 for your own expenses." Yazīd redeemed his estate and gave Muslim another 50,000.

Version c
(Agh 18:320-3/19:36-9)

Isnād: al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Khaffāf < Ibn Mihrawayh (d.c. 275/888)[155] < ʿAlī b. ʿUbayd al-Kūfī and ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan < ʿAlī b. ʿAmr < Muslim b. al-Walīd, known as "Slain by the Beauties":

One day I was sitting in a tailor's shop opposite my home when I saw someone knocking at my door. I went to meet him and he revealed himself

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153 The *khabar* skips vv. 3-5 (on the unreciprocated nature of the love, the poet's refusal to be consoled, and his guarding of the secret) to continue the theme of the eye with vv. 6-7.

How can there be consolation for a heart gone mad that raves
about the owner of a heart not touched with madness (1:3).

Resignation was barred on the day of separation
by cascading tears that washed over cascading tears (1:4).

Were it not for dissimulating the tears of my eyes,
secrets would be divulged about me that are neither seen nor fathomed (1:5).

154 The quotation ends before the *nasīb* transitions with a blame of fate (1:8-9) to a boast of past love conquests (1:10-15).

155 Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim b. Mihrawayh was probably the author of multiple works, one of them about poets. Direct informants of Abū l-Faraj frequently cite him as guarantor. Since none of his guarantors are known as writers or transmitters, he probably gave the *khabar* its written form, GAS II:95, Zolondek 1960, 219 and 224, Fleischhammer 1979, no. 74 and 2004, 96-7.

to be a friend from Kufa, who had arrived from Qumm. I was glad to see him but felt as if I had been slapped in the face because I did not have a single *dirham* to spend on him. So I rose and greeted him and escorted him into my house. Then I took a pair of fancy dress boots I owned and handed them to my maidservant. I wrote an accompanying note to one of my acquaintances in the market, asking him to sell them on my behalf and purchase meat and bread for an amount I named. The servant went and returned, my acquaintance having bought for her what I had specified to him. He had sold the boots for all of nine *dirham*s, as if she had brought them to him all but brand new.

My guest and I sat down to cook. I asked a neighbor to give us a carafe of date wine, which he sent to me. I asked the servant to lock the door for fear an intruder might arrive and partake in our repast, so I and he would have sustenance until he departed. Thus we were sitting and cooking, when someone knocked on the door, and I said to my servant, "See who it is." She peered through a crack in the door and saw a man with [a commander's] black garb, turban, and belt, accompanied by a squire. She described his appearance to me, and I had a bad feeling about him[156] but then I recovered my sangfroid and thought, "I am not a reprobate and the authorities have nothing on me." So I opened the door and stepped out. He dismounted from his beast. "Are you Muslim b. al-Walīd?"

"Yes."

"How do I know who you are?"

"He who pointed out my residence to you will confirm to you who I am." He turned to his aide, "Go to the tailor and ask about him." He went to inquire on my behalf and affirmed "Yes, he is Muslim b. al-Walīd." The newcomer took out a letter for me from his boot. "This is the letter of Yazīd b. Mazyad to me, and I am to break its seal only after meeting you." The letter read, "When you meet Muslim b. al-Walīd disburse to him these 10,000 *dirham*s that I have provided so they may be deposited in his house, and disburse to him another 3,000 *dirham*s for the expenses of his travel to us." I took the three and the ten and entered my home in the man's company. We consumed the meal and I added more food and wine and bought fruit. I was in an expansive mood and offered my guest *dirham*s to present to the members of his household and began to pack. Then I traveled in the emissary's company until we reached Raqqa and the gate of al-Yazīd. The man entered; it became apparent that he was one of the general's chamberlains. He found Yazīd in the bath, came out again and sat with me for a while. Later the chamberlain was informed that Yazīd had left the bath and sent me inside to him. Yazīd was seated upon a chair, with a female attendant behind him holding the cover of a mirror, while Yazīd himself held mirror and comb, combing his beard.

"O Muslim," he said to me, "what has kept you from coming to me?"

"O *amīr*, it was dire straits," I answered.

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[156] Var. *amrī* "my affair" in the Beirut edition.

"Recite for me," he said and I recited to him my ode in praise of him:

ujrirtu ḥabla khalīʿin fī l-ṣibā ghazili
wa-shammarat himamu l-ʿudhdhāli fī ʿadhalī

The rope of one lost in love and stricken was loosed for me,
and accusers tightened their resolve to accuse me (1:1).

And when I reached my verse

lā yaʿbaqu l-ṭību khaddayhi wa-mafriqahū
wa-lā yumassiḥu ʿaynayhi mina l-kuḥuli

No perfume pervades his cheeks and the part of his hair,
nor does he daub his eyes with antimony (1:43).

He replaced the mirror in its cover and said to the maidservant, "Leave, for Muslim has proscribed perfume to us." When I had completed the ode he said, "O Muslim, do you know what impelled me to send for you?"

"No, by God, I do not."

"Several nights ago I was with al-Rashīd, massaging his feet, when he said to me, 'O Yazīd, who is the one who said about you

salla l-khalīfatu sayfan min Banī Maṭarin
yamḍī fa-yakhtarimu (D: *yakhtariqu*) *l-ajsāda wa-l-hāma*

ka-l-dahri lā yanthanī ʿammā yahummu bihī
qad awsaʿa l-nāsa inʿāman wa-irghāma

The caliph drew a sword from among the Banū Maṭar
that cuts and rends (D: pierces) bodies and skulls (6:8).

Like fate he does not swerve from what (D: whom) he pursues,
having engulfed people in his grace and force.' (6:9)

I said, 'No, by God, I was not aware.' The caliph retorted, 'God be praised, you are stuck in your Bedouin habits (*aʿrābiyya*). Poetry of this caliber is composed about you, and you do not know its author!' So I inquired about the author and heard it was you. Rise, so I may lead you inside to the Commander of the Faithful." Thereupon he stood up and entered al-Rashīd's presence. Soon thereafter admission was granted and I was ushered in. I appeared before al-Rashīd and recited to him [all] the poetry I had composed about him and he ordered me to receive 200,000 *dirham*s. When I proceeded to Yazīd, he in turn ordered me to receive 190,000 remarking, "I am not permitted to grant you the same that the Commander of the Faithful has granted you." But he accorded me fiefs whose yield amounted to 200,000 *dirham*s.

Muslim went on to say: Thereafter he did something to make me angry and I satirized him.[157] The general complained about me to al-Rashīd who summoned me and said, "Will you sell me the honor of Yazīd?"

"Yes, O Commander of the Faithful."

"For how much?"

"For a round loaf of bread." The caliph became so furious that I feared for my life.

"I was prepared to purchase it from you for a handsome price, but by no means will I do this, for I have known Yazīd's munificence towards you,[158] may I be disowned by my father! By God, should I hear at any future time, by God, that you have satirized Yazīd, I will pull your tongue from your jaws." So I never mentioned Yazīd again for good or for ill.

Version d
(Agh 18:323-4/19:39-41)

Isnād: al-Khaffāf < Ibn Mihrawayh < Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Yaʿqūbī < the *rāwiya* al-Baydaq[159] from Niṣībīn:

I entered the palace of Yazīd b. Mazyad one day when it was thronged with people, and among the unknown people there was a young man sitting whom Yazīd did not yet know. He was none other than Muslim b. al-Walīd.

"I cannot find it in my soul to compose poetry ever again," he said to me.

"Why not?" I asked.

"I praised this man with poetry of a kind he has never been praised with, but I find no one to convey it to him."

"Recite some of it for me!"

He recited to me

mūfin ʿalā muhajin fī yawmi dhī rahajin
kaʾannahu ajalun yaṣʿā ilā amali (1:30)

yaqrī (D: *yaksū*) *l-suyūfa nufūsa* (D: *dimāʾa*) *l-nākithīna bihī*
wa-yajʿalu l-rūsa (D: *l-hāma*) *tījāna l-qanā l-dhubuli* (1:37)

lā yaʿbaqu l-ṭību khaddayhi wa-mafriqahū
wa-lā yumassiḥu ʿaynayhi mina l-kuḥuli (1:43)

idhā ntaḍā sayfahu kānat masālikuhū
masālika l-mawti fī l-ajsāmi (D: *l-abdāni*) *wa-l-qulali* (1:44)

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[157] Cf. Agh 18:331-2 and Muslim, *Sharḥ Dīwān* no. 49; Agh 18:336-7 and *Sharḥ Dīwān* no. 96.

[158] The general paid Muslim a salary (*jirāya*) and awarded him a yearly prize (*jāʾizat thawāb*); see Agh 18:337-8.

[159] The nickname signifies "chess pawn" (*baydhaq, baydaq*; Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān* 10:14a), or "hawk" (*baydaq*). Baydaq may have given the *khabar* its first oral shape.

wa-in khalat bi-ḥadīthi l-nafsi fikratuhū
ʿāsha (D: *ḥayya*) *l-rajāʾu wa-māta l-khawfu min wajali* (1:45)

ka-l-laythi in hijtahu fa-l-mawtu rāḥatuhū
lā yastarīḥu ilā l-ayyāmi wa-l-duwali (1:46)

lillāhi min Hāshimin fī arḍihi jabalun
wa-anta wa-bnuka ruknā dhālika l-jabali (1:73)

ṣaddaqta ẓannī wa-ṣaddaqta l-ẓunūna bihī
wa-ḥaṭṭa jūduka ʿaqda l-raḥli ʿan jamalī (1:79).[160]

Looming over the hearts on a day of battle dust
as if he were death in hot pursuit of hope (1:30).

He serves to the swords the souls of traitors
(D: He dresses the swords in the blood of traitors)
and crowns pliant lances with human heads (1:37).

No perfume pervades his cheeks and the part of his hair,
nor does he daub his eyes with antimony (1:43).

When he draws his sword, its pathways are
the pathways of death through bodies and crowns of heads (1:44).

When his thoughts converse with his soul in solitude,
hope lives and fear perishes from fright (1:45).

Like a lion, when you rouse him only death brings him rest.
He is not lulled by days and turns of fate (1:46).

How excellent is Hāshim as a mountain on his earth,
and you and your son are the foundations of that mountain (1:73).

Thus you proved true what I and others thought of him,
and your munificence untied the bundle from my camel (1:79).

Baydaq continued: I selected two of these verses and then said, "Recite to me what else you have about him."

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[160] Of these eight verses, four (italicized) coincide with Ibn al-Muʿtazz's selection of seven "best verses" from this *qaṣīda* (1:*30*, 35, *37*, 40-1, *73*, *79*; TSh 235-6). Two further verses selected by Ibn al-Muʿtazz are identical with those cited by al-Rashīd in versions a (41) and b (40); see nn. 145, 150. Ibn Qutayba essentially reproduces Ibn al-Muʿtazz's selection, adding two verses (31, 36) *Shiʿr*, ed. de Goeje, 530. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī also expands on the core of Ibn al-Muʿtazz (italicized) in his selection exemplifying the "best modern poetry on the description of a courageous hero and military leader (20, 64, 25, *30*, 31, *37*, 38, *40*, 44, 52-4, 71, *73*). Ibn Khallikān produces his own selection (vv. 64, 22-3, 29, 31, 35, *37*-9, *41*) repeating only two lines from Ibn al-Muʿtazz, but following Abū Hilāl's reordering of v. 64; *Wafayāt* VI:332. All authors restrict themselves to the *madīḥ*, and all but Ibn Khallikān retain from Baydaq's version the focus on passage 35-46 and the addition of vv. 30 and 73.

He recited to me another ode, beginning

ṭayfa l-khayāli ḥamidnā minka ilmāma
dāwayta suqman wa-qad hayyajta asqāma [*basīṭ*]

Specter of fantasy, we praise your brief visit,
you healed one illness only after causing us many more (6:1).

In it he says

ka-l-dahri lā yanthanī ʿammā yahummu bihī
qad awsaʿa l-nāsa inʿāman wa-irghāma

Like fate he does not swerve from what (D: whom) he pursues,
having engulfed people in his grace and force (6:9)

[Baydaq] continued: I recited these verses to Yazīd b. Mazyad and he ordered Muslim to receive 500 *dirham*s. Later I mentioned Muslim in Raqqa and said to Yazīd, "For this poet who praised you so highly, you limit yourself to a mere 500 *dirham*s," and the general sent him another 500 *dirham*s.

[Baydaq] continued: Muslim told me, "The sum arrived after I had pawned my cloak in full [and shaming] view of my friends; and I highly appreciated it."

Version e
(Agh 18:324/19:41)

Isnād: al-Ṣayrafī < al-ʿAnazī < Muhammad b. Badr al-ʿIjlī < Ibrāhīm b. Sālim < Abū Firʿawn, *mawlā* of Yazīd b. Mazyad:

One day Yazīd rode to al-Rashīd having splashed himself with perfume. Before long he returned, called for a bowl and washed off the perfume. "I hate to give the lie," he said, "to the words of Muslim b. al-Walīd

lā yaʿbaqu l-ṭību khaddayhi wa-mafriqahū
wa-lā yumassiḥu ʿaynayhi mina l-kuḥuli

No perfume pervades his cheeks and the part of his hair,
nor does he daub his eyes with antimony (1:40)."

Appendix B.
Synopsis of Versions

Narrative

Version	**a** Agh 18:318-19/19:34-5 var. *Wafayāt* VI:332-3	**b** Agh 18:319-20/19:35-6 var. *Taʾrīkh Baghdād,* 14:334-5, *Wafayāt* VI:331	**e** Agh 18:324/19:41	**c** Agh 18:320-3/19:36-9	**d** Agh 18:323-4/19:39-41
Collector	al-ʿAnazī (d. 290/903)	~	~	Ibn Mihrawayh (d.c. 275/888)	~
Narrator	general (d. 185/801)	father of Dhū l-Hidmayn "Wearer of the Two Rags"	Abū Firʿawn, the general's client	poet (d. 208/823) (+ general in reported dialogue)	Baydaq "Pawn"
Perspective	1st pers. account	3rd pers. account	3rd pers. account	1st pers. account	1st pers. account
Dramaturgy	brief dialogue ending with terse report	dialogue scenes	terse report + one quote	dialogue scenes (+ reported dialogue scenes)	dialogue scenes

Dramatis personae

Caliph	knows the poetry	knows the poetry	knows the poetry	knows the poetry	-
	directly involved with poet	not directly involved with poet	-	directly involved with poet	-
General	unaware of the poetry	shielded from the poetry	unaware of the poetry	unaware of the poetry	unaware of the poetry
Chamberlain/ transmitter	-	advises poet; keeps poet from general	-	does not know poet; escorts him to general	knows poet; selects and conveys his verses and extracts his reward
Poet	does not speak	performs for general upon request	-	performs for general upon request	complains, performs for Baydaq upon request

Reward (in dirhams)

By caliph	unspecified	100,000 (half of which as reimbursement to general and 100,000 more for general)	200,000	-
By general	unspecified	50,000 (reimbursed by caliph)	10,000 advance 3,000 travel allowance 190,000 200,000 fief income	2 x 500

Poetry (by section)

Recitation		S *2nd quote* 1:1-2, 6-7 (lover's tears; beloved's glances)		S *1st quote* 1:1 (*incipit*: lover's tears)	S *2nd quote* 6:1 (*incipit*: Phantom
	AS 1:41, [42,] 73 (readiness; justice; loyalty)	AS *1st quote* 1:43, 40 (perfume motif; vulture motif)	AS 1:43 (perfume motif)	AS *1st quote* 1:43 (perfume motif) 6:8-9 *2nd quote* (sword metaphor; fate analogy)	AS *1st quote* 1:30, 37, 43-6, 73, 79=ult. (ferocity, deadliness in battle; perfume motif; kindness and fruitfulness; vigilance loyalty; poet's attestation) AS *2nd quote* 6:9 (fate analogy)
Function in account	caliph tests accuracy of praise	1. caliph informs general of praise 2. poet affects general's emotions	-	1. general obeys poetic description 2. caliph informs general of praise	1. sample for transmitter 2. new ode to be conveyed
Type of reduction	topical verses	1. topical verses 2. accelerated S (eye motifs)	topical verse	1. *incipit* + topical verse 2. topical verse	1. trimmed AS 2. *incipit* + topical verse

Bibliography

AAT: see al-Ṣūlī, *Akhbār Abī Tammām*

AB: see al-Ṣūlī, *Akhbār al-Buḥturī*, ed. Ṣāliḥ al-Ashtar, Damascus: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī.

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QAṢĪDA GHAZALIYYA–KHAMRIYYA: TWO LYRICAL POEMS BY ḤĀZIM AL-QARṬĀJANNĪ (d. 684/1285)

Geert Jan van Gelder, University of Oxford

The thirteenth-century poet Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī is one of the most original literary critics in the history of Arabic literature. At the time when I wrote my doctoral thesis on medieval Arabic poetics,[1] I became aware that he stood out in giving ample attention to the structure of the poem as a whole and the coherence of its parts, in his poetics entitled *Minhāj al-bulaghāʾ wa-sirāj al-udabāʾ* (Path of the Eloquent and Lamp for the Lettered), in which he attempted a unique synthesis of traditional Arabic criticism with Aristotelian poetics. At the time I was greatly helped by two excellent German monographs on Ḥāzim's poetics, by Wolfhart Heinrichs and Gregor Schoeler.[2] Both books incorporated translations of chapters of the *Minhāj al-bulaghāʾ*. Years ago I decided to do my bit and translate (into English) some further chapters, those directly relevant to the topic of my first book (*Minhāj*, Part Three, chapters Three and Four, 287-324). It would have been fitting if for this occasion I could have turned my long-neglected hand-written draft, a quarter-century old by now, into a contribution dedicated to Wolfhart Heinrichs, the great master of the history of Arabic literary theory, and a dear friend. Alas, a full translation, properly annotated, would have been far too long for the present collection; I hope to turn to it on another occasion.

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[1] Published as Geert Jan van Gelder (1982), *Beyond the Line: Classical Arabic Literary Critics on the Coherence and Unity of the Poem*, Leiden.

[2] Wolfhart Heinrichs (1969), *Arabische Dichtung und griechische Poetik: Ḥāzim al-Qarṭāǧannīs Grundlegung der Poetik mit Hilfe aristotelischer Begriffe*, Beirut; Gregor Schoeler (1975), *Einige Grundprobleme der autochthonen und der aristotelischen arabischen Literaturtheorie: Ḥāzim al-Qarṭāǧannī's Kapitel über die Zielsetzungen der Dichtung und die in ihm dargelegten Gedanken*, Wiesbaden.

Nevertheless, I decided to stick with Ḥāzim. He would have thought of himself, above all, as a poet, not a literary theorist, and he was certainly famous as a poet in his time. Originally, as his name betrays, from Cartagena in Spain, he was forced by the Christian conquests to emigrate.[3] Much of his poetry is devoted to the rulers of the Ḥafṣid dynasty of North Africa, in present-day Tunisia and part of Algeria. His most famous poem is an extremely long panegyric, all of whose 1,006 verses rhyme in the long vowel *–ā* (an ending called *alif maqṣūra* in Arabic,[4] from which the poem derives its name: *al-Maqṣūra*). In modern scholarship his poetry has received less attention than his poetics.[5] In his poetry Ḥāzim does not display the same originality as he does in his poetics, but his collected works contain some good specimens. In one respect we ought to be glad that Ḥāzim the theorist is not too much in evidence in his poetry: his prose is ponderous, difficult and scholarly, with long sentences, and far from elegant. Apart from their style, however, there are some indications that his poetics and his poetry are in harmony, which cannot always be said of Arabic literary critics who were also poets.

The poems presented here together with a translation and with a short analysis are two of the three pieces by Ḥāzim of some length that are wholly devoted to lyrical themes.[6] It looks as if they are

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[3] On his life and his works, see Wolfhart Heinrichs (1998), "Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī," in: Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature*, 2 vols., London, 280-1, with more references.

[4] I take this opportunity to point at the odd misunderstanding prevalent among western Arabists and even found in some reference works, as if *alif maqṣūra* referred only to the ending *–ā* when spelled with the letter *yāʾ*. This is incorrect, for the term is also used when the ending is spelled with *alif*; it is to be distinguished from the ending with *alif mamdūda*, i.e. *–āʾ* (with final *hamza*).

[5] To my knowledge, three relatively long poems have been published in English prose translations, see James T. Monroe (1974), *Hispano-Arabic Poetry: A Student Anthology*, Berkeley, 322-31, Geert Jan van Gelder (1979), "Critic and Craftsman: al-Qarṭājannī and the Structure of the Poem," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 10: 26-48 (see 45-8), Julie Scott Meisami (1997), "Imruʾ al-Qays Praises the Prophet," in: Issa J. Boullata and Terri DeYoung (eds.), *Tradition and Modernity in Arabic Literature*, Fayetteville, Arkansas, 223-45 (see 226-31). On the relationship of his poetry and his poetics, see also Geert Jan van Gelder (in press), "The Lamp and Its Mirror Image: Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī's Poetry in the Light of his *Path of the Eloquent and Lamp of the Lettered,*'" in: idem and Marlé Hammond (eds.), *Takhyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics, vol. 2: Studies*.

[6] The third is the Bacchic poem with the rare rhyme *–ẓī* (*Dīwān*, ed. Belkhodja, 161-2). There is also one lengthy religious poem (ibid., 188-93, of 166 verses, most of which begin with *subḥāna...* .) and one didactic poem (ibid., 223-33, in 219 lines

complete, not having lost a panegyric or other continuation. Although the esteemed recipient of this Festschrift may frown at compromising, to some extent, scholarly exactness for the sake of a literary rendering, I have used an iambic pentameter, not eschewing a somewhat old-fashioned diction at times. The rhyme and the many cases of assonance and paronomasia of the original had to be sacrificed, although at times alliteration or punning has been used to compensate for this. I have stayed as close as possible to the original: I do not approve of modernizing paraphrase, or presenting medieval Arabic verse in the guise of modernist or post-modernist poetry. In the belief that it is not a wholly vain attempt to translate poetry as poetry, which may be appreciated, it is hoped, by those who do not know Arabic, I have provided some notes that are obviously superfluous to specialists, for which I ask their indulgence.[7]

I.

Sources: Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī (d. 684/1285) (1972), *Qaṣā'id wa-muqaṭṭaʿāt*, ed. Muḥammad al-Ḥabīb b. al-Khōja (Belkhodja), Tunis, 105-6 (henceforward indicated as B); *Dīwān* (1964), ed. ʿUthmān al-Kaʿʿāk, Beirut, 28-30 (indicated as K); see also al-Maqqarī (d. 1041/1632) (1939), *Azhār al-riyāḍ fī akhbār al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ*, Cairo, III: 173-6.

Ḥāzim is said to have made this poem as an emulation (*ʿāraḍa bihī*) of a famous ode by Ibn ʿAmmār (d. 479/1086) which begins with *Adiri l-zujājata fa-l-nasīmu qadi nbarā* ("Pass 'round the glass, for the gentle breeze has begun to blow"),[8] even though it does not adopt its rhyme (the meter is the same); Ḥāzim has chosen a rather uncommon rhyme. Moreover, Ibn ʿAmmār's poem, after a short lyrical introduction of six lines, is a panegyric for al-Muʿtaḍid (r. 461-84/1069-91), king of Seville, whereas Ḥāzim only includes lyrical

on grammar (*naḥw*) in *basīṭ* metre, not an *urjūza*). All the other poems are either short or a mixture of lyrical themes combined with *madīḥ* or *tahni'a*.

[7] For my views on translation, see also Geert Jan van Gelder (2006), "An Experiment with Beeston, Labīd and Baššār: On Translating Classical Arabic Verse," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 36: 7-15.

[8] See al-Fatḥ b. Khāqān (d. 529/1134) (1283 A.H.), *Qalā'id al-ʿiqyān*, Bulaq, 96-7 (37 vss.); al-Maqqarī (1855-61), *Nafḥ al-ṭīb*, ed. R. Dozy *et al.*, Leiden, I: 434-5; Ibn Bassām (d. 542/1147) (1975-9), *al-Dhakhīra fī maḥāsin ahl al-jazīra*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās II, 1: 382-3 (19 vss.), etc.; with a translation in Monroe 1974, 188-93.

themes, with some echoes of Ibn ʿAmmār's introduction. Throughout the poem, the beloved is described in grammatically masculine terms. The somewhat effeminate descriptions (see lines 7, 15-18) do not necessarily exclude that the poet is thinking of a boy. However, when in lines 22-7 the poet uses the old Bedouin motif of the parting of the beloved, carried on camel-back with the tribe, this strongly suggests a girl. The poem, in its fusion of urban and desert motifs, seems to fuse the male and female genders too. The meter is *al-kāmil*, which may be represented as SSLSL SSLSL SSLSL / SSLSL SSLSL SSLSL, where S and L stand for short and long syllables, respectively; SS may be replaced by L.

adiri l-mudāmata fa-l-nasīmu muʾarrijū
wa-l-rawḍu marqūmu l-burūdi mudabbajū

1 Pass round the wine,[9] the gentle breeze smells sweet,
the garden is adorned with patterned cloaks,

The earth, in beauty's mantles clothed, is like
a young, full-breasted girl, showing her charms,

And on the river,[10] when its coat[11] is pleased
to meet the breeze, the waves are billowing,

The early evening, with its golden rays,
embroidering its surface with brocade.

5 The wind's hands want to rob the clothes it wears,
thus with their weaving adding to its charm.

Therefore be pleased to drink glasses[12] of wine,
its light, no, fire,[13] blazing liquidly.[14]

Get drunk, be tipsy from your sweetheart's glance,
or from the wine, mixed from his dark red lips,

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[9] B *al-mudāma*; K *al-zujāja*, 'the glass.'

[10] B *nahr*; K *nahy*, "pond."

[11] The word is voweled in the edition as *miʿṭaf* ("coat"), which is likely to be correct (cf. the following verse with its sartorial imagery); but a pun is probably intended with *maʿṭif* ("neck, bending of the body" and here possibly "bend in the river").

[12] B *li-shurbi kuʾūsi rāḥin*, K *li-shurbika kaʾsa rāḥin* "your drinking a glass of wine."

[13] B *nūruhā bal nāruhā*, K *nawruhā bal badruhā* "its blossom, no, its full moon."

[14] Literally, "blazing in its water"; the water is either the liquid of the wine itself or the water with which it is customarily mixed.

And listen to the lute's tunes that invite
a carefree heart to love, inciting it;

The lowest and the highest strings that help
the second and the third, treading the scales:

10 The man whose heart will not be stirred by this,
his heart will never once be moved or stirred.

So answer it: for Time has called, as if
with speech,[15] for company,[16] dispelling cares.

Things lifeless are enraptured, dumb ones speak
distinctly, happy, singing from delight.

Shall lifeless things be gladder than who lives
whereas the living have more need of joy?

The only Life is that which you enjoy,
as when a black-eyed fawn hands you the glass,

15 One who has heavy haunches that delight
you, and a firm but slight and slender waist.

Thus, if you see the locks, the forehead white,
the cheeks of him that seem to be on fire,

You know for sure those three, with what below
weighs heavily down or sways in waves, are these:

A night upon a dawn, on a full moon, upon
a branch, carried upon a quivering dune.[17]

A glass and a beloved, with his glance
enticing towards love the carefree heart:

20 My heart, friend, has not sobered up from love
of two things that between them yield desires.

I'd give my soul for that gazelle, who sets
alight the blazing fire within my ribs.

I shouted to his cameleer, the day
he left, the loaded camels urged with song:

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[15] Literally, "it has called with the tongues/languages of its circumstance"; the expression "tongue/language of circumstance" (*lisān al-ḥāl*) is used for the metaphorical "speech" of telling situations and significant objects.

[16] B *uns*, K *amn* "security, peace."

[17] The metaphors (or, according to many traditional Arabic critics rather similes, *tashbīhāt*, with the primum comparationis omitted) stand for black hair above a shining forehead, above a bright face, on a slender upper body, on heavy buttocks.

Stop, cameleer, a soul I'd bid farewell
inside a howdah held, not in my breast!

And when we halted, while on camel-back
there was a radiant moon with crescent crowned,[18]

25 I shouted at them, Tell that moon of yours,
whose light will guide the caravan at night,

That he revives the sick with glance or word,
and slakes the raging thirst that burns in breasts!

They said, We fear he'll scorch your heart yet more!
I answered them, Let scorching love-pains scorch!

I cried and made the others cry, until
our tears were mixed together, sea with sea.

When they had gone, I now unlocked the door
of hope for us, then barred it yet again,

30 And said, My soul, be patient, for a dawn
of nearness may yet break in absence's night:

Look out for joy from grievous Time,[19] for Time
moves on from opposite to opposite.

Keep hoping for relief from every grief:
all worries, in due course, will be relieved.

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Medieval critics would have called this poem a *qaṣīda*, though not with the meaning modern scholars attach to it, namely a polythematic poem consisting of a mostly lyrical introduction, possibly followed by descriptions implying a journey, and a concluding section which may deal with any, often wholly unrelated, matter. The present poem could also be said to have more than one theme, since it is about wine and love; but the two are so obviously integrated that it does not seem proper to speak of a polythematic or composite poem (*qaṣīda murakkabat al-aghrāḍ*, as Ḥāzim would call it).[20] Such integration of wine and love is very common in Arabic poetry since the time of the pre-Islamic al-Aʿshā (d. ca. 7/629) and especially, of course, Abū Nuwās (d. ca. 198/813) in early Abbasid times.

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18 Perhaps referring to the beloved with radiant face and bright forehead.
19 B *dahrin shajā*, K *dahrin dajā*, "gloomy Time."
20 *Minhāj al-bulaghāʾ*, 303.

The first five lines of the poem, which could be termed a "section" or *faṣl* (to use another term used by Ḥāzim the critic)[21] provide the setting: a garden scene, strongly unified by a profusion of sartorial imagery, found in every line (cloaks, mantles, clothed, coat, embroidering, brocade, clothes, weaving). Wine is introduced in the first line, and an erotic element appears in the animating imagery in the following lines that speak of a young full-breasted girl and of the robbing of clothes. A *faṣl* containing poetic imagery, Ḥāzim argues in his *Minhāj*, is often effectively rounded off by a more rhetorical, maxim-like statement. Line 6 does this by offering a provisional conclusion: the particle *fa-*, "therefore," followed by an imperative reintroducing the Bacchic theme, closely associated with the erotic theme and accompanied with music, which often completes the trinity of hedonism. Just as line 6 is both a conclusion and a beginning, so do lines 10-11 conclude the present section and start a new one, by means of a general statement ("The man …" meaning "any man") followed by another *fa-* with imperative. This introduces a rhetorical passage that serves to justify the invitation to indulge in pleasure. Its argument that even lifeless things are enraptured and animated, and that animate beings should therefore not lag behind, is a rhetorical utterance that is the counterpart of the poetic imagery of lines 1-6: a neat illustration of Ḥāzim's own recommendation of alternating in a poem utterances that are poetic (*shiʿrī*) and which evoke the imagination (*mukhayyil*) with statements that are rhetorical (*khaṭābī*) or persuasive (*iqnāʿī*). The conclusion, line 14, recommends love and drinking as the one and only life worth living. This, in turn, triggers a description of the beloved (lines 15-19), again concluded (lines 20-1) by stressing the close link between the "two things," erotic love and love of wine.

At this point, however, the tone changes. The address to the friend (line 20) reminds us by means of a play on words (*ṣāḥi* "friend," *ṣāḥin* "sober") that it is time to sober up, even though the poet will not hear of it. The heart that is ablaze (line 21) makes it clear that the timeless scene of the first part of the poem—it is not explicitly set either in the past or in the future—is in fact no longer present. The beloved has gone, as is explained by the following apostrophe to the

[21] Ḥāzim's concept of the *faṣl* has been taken up and applied to older Arabic poetry in a recent article by Ali Hussein (2004), "Classical and Modern Approaches in Dividing the Old Arabic Poem," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 35: 297-328.

camel-driver (line 22). We are back with the old Bedouin motif of the departing of the beloved and her clan, which used to be found at, or near, the beginning of a polythematic *qaṣīda*. Seas of tears (line 28) now replace glasses of wine and garden brooks. The final section (lines 29-32) leaves a shimmer of hope: Time or Fate is fickle and things may take a good turn. The expected rhetorical closure consists not of one but two lines that could both serve as a maxim or wise saying (though in a context hardly compatible with religion), thus emphatically closing not only the section but the poem as a whole. We must conclude that not only is the poem well-crafted and carefully structured, it also seems that, for once, poetics and poetry go hand in hand.

II.

Sources: *Qaṣāʾid wa-muqaṭṭaʿāt* (Belkhodja), 209-11, *Dīwān* (al-Kaʿʿāk), 117-18 (with some textual variants that generally look inferior and will not be considered here). In the latter edition, lines 14-22 are missing, and Belkhodja's poem no. 51 is joined to this poem, as if they formed one ode. One could understand that a copyist or redactor believed that poem no. 50 was the *nasīb* or lyrical introduction of the following one, which has the same meter and rhyme. Nonetheless, as Belkhodja argues convincingly, this is unlikely, for the present poem seems to form a complete piece, and poem no. 51 opens with what seems to be a proper opening line, with internal rhyme (*Bushrā bi-bayʿati mawlānā bni mawlānā / fa-kam ayādin bihā l-Raḥmānu awlānā*). Moreover, it contains a congratulation, and it was customary not to introduce congratulatory poems with a lyrical prelude, unlike odes of a more general panegyric character. The present poem uses many conventional motifs of love poetry, including the stock personages of the reproacher and the spy. The beloved is here unambiguously female. The meter is *al-basīṭ* (NNSL NSL LLSL SSL / NNSL NSL LLSL LL, where N is a position taken by either a short or a long syllable).[22]

[22] Again, I take the opportunity to mention a common misunderstanding: many handbooks and discussions on Arabic metrics state or suggest that the third and seventh feet of the *basīṭ* meter may be SLSL as well as LLSL. This idea is no doubt inspired by a longing for symmetry and may be traced back as far as al-Khalīl in the eighth century. But, to my knowledge, SLSL in this position is virtually absent from

Yā ẓabyata l-rabrabi l-ḥālī sawālifuhū
man qallada l-ḥalya ārāman wa-ghizlānā

1 Gazelle with jewels on its temples! Who
has put these jewels on the herd's gazelles?[23]

Full moon's full sister—save that moons when full
will not be safe from waning, as you are:

Far be it that your glance be called a fawn's,
when, drowsy, it is turned towards the herd;[24]

Or that your smile should be compared to flowers,
when lush and fresh with fallen dew at dawn:

5 A mouth in which sweet water has formed gems,
appearing as moist pearls and coral drops.[25]

I never thought, before you, I would see
a moon adorned with stars and meteors.[26]

Your beauty's sovereignty, having subdued
all lovers' hearts, will not be disobeyed.

Would that these eyes that gaze, bewitching us,
would love us just as we're in love with them!

You who reproach me for my love, please stop,
I'll not stop short of Ghaylan's mark in love.[27]

10 We, sons of Love, won't listen to reproof
and to reproachers won't incline our ears.

Since we're in love, reproach cannot invade
our ears; if it were heard we would be hurt.[28]

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classical Arabic poetry, with the odd exception of the famous mystic Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), in whose *Dīwān* it is very frequent.

[23] Perhaps two different kinds of animals are meant by *ghizlān* (gazelles) and *ārām* (white antelopes or white gazelles). The line illustrates a figure much favored for openings: *tajāhul al-ʿārif* (feigned ignorance): the poet pretends not to know that his bejeweled beloved is a girl rather than a beautiful gazelle.

[24] A languid, drowsy look is considered sexy in the beloved; cf. line 32.

[25] Sweet water: literally, "the sweet water of saliva" (the beloved's saliva is very often described in erotic poetry as being sweet and cool). The word *marjān* means either pearls or coral; see Q. 55:22 (where, like here, it is linked with *luʾluʾ* "pearls") and 55:58 (where it is linked with rubies); the girl's pearly teeth and coral gums are being described.

[26] Apparently meaning a bright face adorned with starry eyes.

[27] Ghaylān b. ʿUqba, known as Dhū l-Rumma (d. ca. 117/735), last of the great desert poets, was famous for his love of Mayya.

[28] A feeble attempt to render the paronomasia of *ādhāna* (ears) and *ādhānā* (hurt us).

How could you blame a love whose clear excuse
is the beloved's face, like Joseph's fair?[29]

Gazelle that grazes on his sweethearts' hearts,[30]
not oxeye or wild jasmine in the steppe;

Or rather a wild oryx cow who, for
her pillow, likes an ardent lover's heart.

15 Her glances, whether she is pleased or cross,
at times revive and kill at other times.

May God keep near the days and times we spent
together, joined in constant union.

So often close to her! When I think back,
yearning, my eye-wells[31] stream with copious tears.

These good old days: whenever I, by chance,
remember them, it adds new griefs to old.

The day we met, fearing the cunning of
the spy who always kept an eye on us,

20 Our souls spoke secretly, with lowered eyes:
the eye conveyed the secrets of our talk.

During our rendezvous, our stopping place,
our closeness, our soft whisperings, our plaint,

I asked her for a date, a meeting soon,
and she gave me good tidings: Now's the time!

She let me know we were to meet at night
and I awaited eagerly our tryst.

At last, night's darkness hiding every shape,
a man unable to discern a man,

25 I went to where she lived, seen by the Star,[32]
–I almost thought the Star knew jealousy–

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[29] Joseph, son of Jacob, was a paragon of male beauty (see e.g. the twelfth Sūra of the Qurʾān).

[30] Literally, "grazes on the seeds/grains of hearts (*yartaʿī ḥabba l-qulūb*)," with a pun since the singular *ḥabbat al-qalb* can mean "darling, sweetheart."

[31] *ʿuyūn al-ʿayn*: the word *ʿayn* means both "eye" and "well."

[32] The singular *najm* "star" can also mean "constellation, asterism" and conventionally, in poetry, stands for the cluster of stars known as the Pleiades.

And spent the night unveiling a full moon,
plucked apples, granates in her garden fair.[33]

At last, when bracelet's coolness had announced
the face of morn, kindling the heart with fire,[34]

She bent to bid farewell, her words o'erwhelmed
by tears, unable to articulate.

Embracing brought our bodies close and joined
them as the gentle winds twist twig round twig.

30 Ah what a night; how short it was in time,
but in its charm, how spacious and how wide!

As soon as the horizon's face was wrapped
in darkness, I perceived morn's naked face.[35]

O you who with a drowsy eye keeps me
awake, and makes me drunk with drunken glance:

Your glance, inebriated constantly,
forever will inebriate me, too.

You spend the night in calm and blessed sleep:
how many eyes will you have kept awake!

35 Hard-hearted and soft-bodied one: I wish
your hard parts with your soft parts were not joined.

Do what you want, be with me or break off:
but losing you I'll never be consoled.

*

Again, we have a *qaṣīda*, but this time it is a monothematic one (*basīṭat al-aghrāḍ* in Ḥāzim's terminology). The theme is *ghazal*, or love poetry.[36] The bucolic opening passage, in which the beloved is

[33] Apples and pomegranates conventionally stand for cheeks and breasts.

[34] Ḥāzim apparently liked the motif of the cold bracelet late at night, announcing dawn, for he used it on two other occasions (in his *Maqṣūra*, vs. 696, and poem 46, vs. 15, pp. 54 and 200 in Belkhodja's edition).

[35] B reads *mā alḥafat awjuha l-āfāqi ghayhabahā*; I believe sense and syntax require reading *mā ulḥifat awjuhu l-āfāqi ghayhabahā*.

[36] Numerous modern scholars would call the poem "a *ghazal*." In traditional Arabic critical language, however, unlike Persian and Ottoman (or German, with its *Ghasel*) *ghazal* is a generic term denoting a theme, not a poem, more or less analogous to *rithāʾ*, "elegy (as a theme)," as distinct from *marthiya* "elegy, elegiac poem." Thus the present poem should properly be called a *qaṣīdat ghazal* or a *qaṣīda*

addressed (lines 1-8) expertly strings together a number of familiar motifs, employing familiar figures of speech,[37] such as "feigned ignorance" (*tajāhul al-ʿārif*) in line 1, where the poet pretends not to know that his beautiful beloved is a gazelle, "differentiation" (*tafrīq*) in line 2, where she is compared to a full moon but immediately declared superior, and so on. The direct address ends in line 8, an exclamation that could be considered the rhetorical utterance concluding a section. The following section also begins with an apostrophe (line 9), this time to the familiar "reproacher," and it introduces a brief justification of the poet's love, soon taking the form of a description of the beloved (lines 12-15), again in bucolic vein (gazelle, oryx cow), echoing the opening line. A prayer (line 16) is a suitable conclusion of the section (it is recommended as such by Ḥāzim in his poetics).

The same line also provides the turning point in the poem, the change from what seems to be the present (suggested by line 1 and what follows) to what appears to be the real state of affairs: all is past. Just as the first poem, the second ends with a *nasīb*-like passage of elegiac reminiscing. It is suggested that the lovers met often (line 17: "So often …"), although only two meetings are referred to in what follows, one in the daytime when a secret meeting was arranged and the other the following night in which the lovers appear to have gone somewhat further than merely exchanging whispered words and stealthy glances. The narrative is concluded with an exclamation ("Ah, what a night") and a reflection on the night's shortness (lines 30-1). The poem's final section (lines 32-6) brings us back to the present, but this time it is no longer pleasant but sad. It echoes the beginning of the poem by being an apostrophe to the beloved, who is

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ghazaliyya, not "a *ghazal*." One could also speak of "a *muʾannatha*" (a love poem on a woman), compare e.g. Ḥamza's redaction of the *Dīwān* of Abū Nuwās, with chapters containing *muʾannathāt* and *mudhakkarāt*. Admittedly, the "Persian" use of *ghazal* (with a plural *aghzāl*) was adopted by later Arab critics, already in Ḥāzim's time; see, e.g., Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239) (1959-n.d.), *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*, ed. Aḥmad al-Ḥūfī and Badawī Ṭabāna, Cairo, III: 104, "*wa-hādhā min al-aghzāl al-ḥulwa al-rāʾiqa*."

[37] For a useful brief survey, see W.P. Heinrichs, "Rhetorical Figures," in: Meisami and Starkey 1998 II: 656-62; for more details and examples, see *al-Nābulsī* (d. 1143/1731) (1998), *The Arch Rhetorician, or The Schemer's Skimmer: A Handbook of Late Arabic Badīʿ Drawn from ʿAbd al-Ghanī an-Nābulsī's* [sic] Nafaḥāt al-Azhār ʿalā Nasamāt al-Asḥār, summarized and systematized by Pierre Cachia, Wiesbaden.

now addressed as being aloof and hard-hearted, even though she seems to have been willing enough before and loath to part. The cruelty of the beloved is demanded by the conventions of the genre and serves as a contrast with the constancy of the lover, which is asserted in the closing line.

There is no point in speculating whether Ḥāzim wrote these poems to vent his innermost feelings, referring to a real love, a real beloved and events that really took place, or whether they are "merely" exercises in beautifully crafting traditional themes and motifs (or a combination of these two things, which is by no means unthinkable). The poems can stand by themselves and speak for themselves.

Appendix: Arabic texts

Poem I

أَدِرِ المُدامـــــةَ فالنـــــسيمُ مـــــؤرّجُ والـــروضُ مرقـــومُ الـــبرودِ مـــدبَّجُ

والأرض لابـــسةٌ بُـــرودَ مَحاســـنٍ فكأنمـــا هـــي كاعـــبٌ تتـــبرج

والنـــهر لمّـــا ارتـــاح مِعْطَفُـــه إلى لُقْيـــا النـــسيم عُبابُـــه متمـــوّج

يُمـــسي الأصـــيلُ بعَـــسْجَديّ شُـــعاعِه أبـــدًا يُوَشّـــي صـــفْحَه ويـــدبّج

(5) وتـروم أيـدي الـريح تـسلُب مـا اكتـسى فتزيـــده حُـــسْنًا بمـــا هـــي تُنْـــسج

فـــارتحْ لـــشُرْب كـــؤوسِ راحٍ نورُهـــا بـــل نارُهـــا في مائهـــا يتـــوهج

واســـكُرْ بنـــشْوة لحـــظِ مَـــن أحببْتَـــه أو كـــأسِ خمـــرٍ مِـــن لَمـــاه تُمْـــزَج

واسمـــعْ إلى نغمـــات عُـــودٍ تطّـــبي قلـــبَ الخلـــيّ إلى الهـــوى وتُهـــيّج

بَـــمٌّ وزيـــرٌ يُـــسْعِدان مَثانيًـــا ومَثالثًـــا طبقاتُـــه تتـــدرج

(10) مـــن لم يُهـــيّج قلْبَـــه هـــذا فمـــا للقلـــب منـــه محـــرّكٌ ومهـــيّج

فأجِـــبْ فقـــد نـــادى بألـــسُنِ حالِـــه للأُنْـــسِ دهـــرٌ للـــهموم مفـــرّج

طربتْ جَماداتٌ وأفصحَ أعجمٌ فَرَحًا وأصبح من سُرورٍ يهزج
أفيَفْضُلُ الحيَّ الجمادُ مَسَرّةً والحيُّ للسرّاء منه أحْوَج
ما العيش إلا ما نعِمتَ به وما عاطاك فيه الكأسَ ظَبْيٌ أدْعَج
(15) ممن يَروقك منه رِدْفٌ مُرْدَفٌ عَبْلٌ وخَصْرٌ ذو اختصارٍ مُدْمَج
فإذا نظرتَ لطُرّةٍ ولغُرّةٍ ولصفحةٍ منه بدتْ تتأجج
أيقنْتَ أن ثلاثَهنّ وما غدا من تحتِها يَنْآدُ أو يتموج
ليلٌ على صُبحٍ على بدرٍ على غُصنٍ تحمّله كثيبٌ رَجْرَج
كأس ومحبوب يظلّ بلحظه قلبُ الخليّ إلى الهوى يُسْتدرج
(20) يا صاحِ ما قلبي بصاحٍ عن هوى شيئين بينهما المُنَى تُستنتج
ومُهْجتي الظبْيُ الذي في أضْلُعي قد ظلّ وَهْو يشُبّها ويؤجّج
ناديتُ حادِيَ عِيسِه يومَ النوَى والعيسُ تُحْدَى والمطايا تُحْدَج
قفْ أيها الحادي أُوَدّعْ مُهْجةً قد حازها دون الجوانح هوْدج
لمّا تواقفْنا وفي أحداجها قمرٌ مُنيرٌ بالهلال متوّج
(25) ناديتُهم قولوا لبدركمُ الذي بضِيائه تَسْري الركابُ وتُدْلج
يُحْيي العليلَ بلحظةٍ أو لفظةٍ تُطْفي غليلاً في الحَشا يتأجج
قالوا نخاف يزيد قلْبُك لاعجًا فأجبتُهم خَلّوا اللواعجَ تلْعَج
وبكيتُ واستبكيتُ حتى ظلّ من عَبَراتنا بحرٌ ببحرٍ يُمْزَج
وبقيتُ أفتح بعدهم بابَ المُنَى ما بيننا طورًا وطورًا أرتِج

(30) وأقـول يـا نفـسي اصْـبِري فعـسى النـوى بـــصباح قُـــرْبٍ ليلُهـــا يتـــبلج
فتَرَقَّـــبِ الـــسرّاءَ مـــن دهـــرٍ شـــجا فالـــدهرُ مـــن ضـــدٍّ لـــضدّ يخـــرج
وتـــرجَّ فُرْجـــةَ كـــلّ هـــمٍّ طـــارقٍ فلكـــلّ هـــمّ في الزمـــان تفـــرُّج

Poem II

يـــا ظَبْيـــةَ الرَّبـــرَبِ الحـــالي ســـوالفُهُ مَـــن قلّـــدَ الحَلْـــيَ آرامًـــا وغِزْلانـــا
ويـــا شـــقيقةَ بـــدْرِ الـــتّمّ لـــو أمِنـــتْ كمـــا أمِنْـــتِ بُـــدورُ الـــتمّ نُقْـــصانا
حاشـــا لِلَحْظِـــكِ أن يُعْـــزَى إلى رَشَـــأٍ إذا تَلَفّـــتَ نحـــوَ الـــسّرْبِ وَسْـــنانا
ولابتـــسامِكِ أن يُعْـــزَى إلى زَهَـــرٍ إذا غـــدا بـــسقيطِ الطَّـــلّ ريّانـــا
(5) ثغـــرٌ تَجَـــوْهَرَ سَلْـــسالُ الرُضـــابِ بـــه حتّـــى بـــدا لؤلـــؤًا رطْبًـــا ومَرْجانـــا
مـــا خِلْـــتُ قبلـــكِ أن أرنـــو إلى قمـــرٍ مقلَّـــدٍ أنجُمًـــا زُهْـــرًا وشُـــهْبانا
ســـلطانُ حُـــسنِك مـــذ دانـــت بطاعتـــه قلـــوبُ أهـــلِ الهـــوى لم تثْـــوِ عِـــصْيانا
ليـــتَ العيـــونَ الـــتي ترنـــو فتَـــسْحَرنا كانـــت كمـــا نحـــن نهـــواهنّ نَهْوانـــا
يا عاذلي في الهوى أقْصِرْ فلستُ أرى مقصّرًا في الهـــوى عـــن شـــأْوِ غَيْلانـــا
(10) إنّـــا بـــني الحُـــبِّ لا نُـــصْغي إلى عَـــذَلٍ ولا نُميـــلُ إلى العُـــذّال آذانـــا
ولم يلِـــجْ منـــذ هِمْنـــا في مَـــسامعنا عَـــذْلٌ ولـــو ولج الآذانَ آذانـــا
فكيـــف تعْـــذُلُ صَـــبًّا عُـــذْرُ عاشـــقِه في وجهـــه اليوســـفيّ الحُـــسنِ قـــد بانـــا
ظَـــبيٌ غـــدا يرتعـــي حَـــبَّ القلـــوب ولا يرْعَـــى عَـــرارًا بمَوْمـــاةٍ وظَيّانـــا
لا بـــل مَهـــاةُ صُـــوارٍ لـــيس يُعْجِبـــها إلا توسُّـــدُ قلـــبٍ كـــان حَرّانـــا

(15) لهـا لِحـاظٌ إذا تَرْضَـى وإن غـضِبتْ تُحْيـي وتقتـل أحيانًـا وأحيانـا
لا يُبْعِـد اللهُ أيامًـا مواصَـلةً بوصْـلها قـد قطعْناهـا وأزمانـا
كم لي بها من عهودٍ ما حننتُ لها إلا اسـتهلّتْ عيـونُ العـينِ تَهْتانـا
ولا كسالفِ عهـدٍ كلّمـا سـنحتْ ذِكـراه زادت إلى الأشـجان أشـجانا
لمّـا التقيْنـا وقـد خِفْنـا مكايـدةً مـن الرقيـب الـذي قـد ظـلّ يرْعانـا
(20) ظلّـت تَنـاجَى بكسْر اللحـظِ أنفُسُنا والعـينُ تُعْـرِب عـن أسـرارِ نَجْوانـا
وفي خِـلالِ تلاقينـا وموْقِفنـا وقُرْبنـا وتناجينـا وشَـكْوانا
سـألتُها موْعـدا للوصـل مقتربًـا فبـشّرتْني بـأنّ الوقـت قـد آنـا
وأعلمـتْني بـأن الليـل موعـدُنا فظلْـتُ مرتقبًـا مِيقـاتَ لُقْيانـا
حتـى إذا الليـلُ أخفـى الـشخصَ غَيْهَبُـه فلـم يكـن يُبْـصر الإنـسانُ إنـسانا
(25) وافيـتُ منزلَهـا والـنجمُ يـرمُقني حتـى لكِـدْتُ أظُـنّ الـنجمَ غَيْرانـا
فبِـتّ مجتليًـا للبـدر مجتنيًـا مـن روْضـة الحُـسن تُفّاحًـا ورُمّانـا
حتـى إذا الـصبحُ أنبانـا بطَلْعتـه بَـرْدُ الـسُوار فـأذكى القلـبَ نِيرانـا
مالـت تُـوَدّعني والـدمعُ يغلبُـها علـى الكـلام فـلا تـسطيع تِبْيانـا
أدنـى التعـانُقُ شخـصَيْناوضَمَّهما لـفَّ النواسـمِ بالأغـصان أغـصانا
(30) فيـا لهـا ليلـةً مـا كـان أقْـصَرَها وقتًـا وأفْـسَحَها في الحُـسن مَيْـدانا
مـا ألْحِفَـتْ أوجُـهُ الآفـاقِ غَيْهَبَهـا حتـى تبيّنـتُ فيهـا الـصُّبحَ عُرْيانـا

يـا مُـسْهِرًا لي بطَـرْفٍ منـه ذي وَسَـنٍ ومُـسْكِرًا لي بلحـظٍ منـه سَـكْرانا

إن كـان لحظُـك لا ينفَـكُّ منتـشيًا فـأنني منـه لا أنفـكّ نَـشْوانا

وإن تَبِـتْ نـائمَ الأجفـانِ في دَعَـةٍ وفي نعـيمٍ فكـم أسـهرْتَ أجفانـا

(35) يـا قاسِـيَ القلـبِ لَـيْنَ العِطْـفِ ليتـك لم يُقْـرَن بمـا قـد قَـسا منـك الـذي لانـا

كـنْ كيـف شـئتَ وِصـالاً أو مقاطَعـةً فلـستُ عنـك أُطيـق الـدهرَ سُـلوانا

QIṬṬA
ARABIC CATS*

John Huehnergard, Harvard University

bass, biss; ḫaydaʿ; ḫayṭal; dimm(a), dumm, dam(m); sinnawr; ḍaywan; qiṭṭ(a); al-māʾiʾa (also al-māʾiyya); hirr; har(i)s

It is a great pleasure to dedicate this note to Wolfhart Heinrichs, Arabist *par excellence*, fellow Semitist, wise colleague, good friend, and lover of cats.

While a common word for 'dog' appears in nearly all of the Semitic languages, allowing us to reconstruct a Proto-Semitic word **kalb-*, there is no pan-Semitic word for 'cat'; instead, a variety of terms is attested. The situation is similar in Indo-European, where again a word for 'dog' may be reconstructed, but not a word for 'cat.'[1] The absence of common Semitic and common Indo-European words for 'cat' undoubtedly reflects the fact that the cat was domesticated much later than the dog, long after common Semitic and common Indo-European had begun to split into their descendant branches.

It is generally agreed that the cat was first domesticated in Egypt, some four thousand years ago,[2] and that the domestic cat, *Felis silvestris catus*,[3] descended from the African wildcat, *F. s. lybica*, which is still found in much of Africa (except in rainforest regions) and

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1 See, e.g., Hommel 1879, 315; Buck 1949, 178–82.

2 See Malek 1993, Sunquist and Sunquist 2002, 101.

3 The taxonomy of small cats is much debated, and is well beyond my expertise; other designations of the domestic cat in recent scientific literature include *Felis catus* and *F. domestica*.

parts of the Middle East.[4] The domestic cat spread beyond Egypt only many centuries later, around the turn of the era.[5]

A number of recent finds in Cyprus of cat skeletons associated with human burials has led to the suggestion that the cat may have been tamed there as long as 9,500 years ago.[6] This suggestion has been disputed.[7] Even if it proves to be correct, however, it may be an isolated phenomenon; domesticated cats do not seem to appear elsewhere until several millennia later.

Not only is there a variety of words for 'cat' in the Semitic languages, there is a large number of terms in Arabic alone, as illustrated by the following delightful story found in Annemarie Schimmel's *Die orientalische Katze*:[8]

> Ein Beduine erjagte eine Katze und wußte nicht, was das war. Da traf er einen Mann, der fragte: »Was ist das für ein *sinnawr*?« Und er traf einen anderen, der fragte: »Was ist das für ein *hirr*?« Und dann traf er einen, der fragte: »Was ist das für ein *qiṭṭ*?« Und er traf wider einen anderen, der fragte: »Was ist das für ein *ḍaywan*?« Und der nächste fragte ihn: »Was ist das für eine *ḫayda*ʿ?« Und der nächste, den er traf, fragte: »Was ist das für ein *ḫayṭal*?« Und der nächste, den er traf, fragte: »Was ist das für ein *dam*?«
>
> Da dachte der Beduine bei sich: »Ich will hingehen und sie verkaufen; vielleicht hat mir Gott einen großen Gewinn durch sich zugedacht!« Als er zum Markt kam, fragte man ihn: »Wieviel kostet die?« Er sagte: »Hundert!« Das sagten sie: »Die ist einen halben Dirham wert!« Da warf der Beduine die Katze weg und rief: »Gott verfluche sie—so viele Namen und so wenig Wert!«

In what follows we consider the possible sources and etymologies of these, and several other, Arabic words for 'cat.' The words are presented in (Arabic) alphabetical order.

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[4] Kitchener 1991, 51; Sunquist and Sunquist 2002, 93; World Conservation Union 1996.

[5] Zeuner 1963, ch. 16; Sunquist and Sunquist 2002, 102.

[6] Vigne et al. 2004; see also Pickrell 2004.

[7] Rothwell 2004.

[8] Schimmel 1983, 17–8. (I have harmonized the transcription of the Arabic words with the system used elsewhere in this study.) Still more forms glossed 'felis,' in addition to those considered in the present note, are listed by Freytag 1830–37: *bāzibāzi* (and variants, 1.171b), *muḫādiš/muḫaddiš* (1.465b), *ḫizbāz* (1.482a), *rubya* (2.117a), *azram* (2.235b), *šubruma* (2.389b), *šanṣar* ('animal feli simile'; 2.456a), *qayʿam* (3.477a), *hazij* (4.389b); Freytag also lists a pair of words for 'kitten,' *darṣ/dirṣ* (2.23a) and *šibriq* (2.389a). To these many terms Viré 1997 adds also *qalaṭi* and *nuwwa*.

bass, biss

These forms, attested in a number of Arabic dialects for both 'cat' and 'sound made to a cat,'[9] are found elsewhere in Semitic only in Amharic *bis(s)* and Tigrinya *bäs/bəs* 'sound made to shoo away cats.'[10] They are similar, of course, to English *puss* (also in other Germanic languages[11]) and to Berber *mušš* (found also in Moroccan Arabic),[12] all of which are probably onomatopoetic imitations of feline hissing.[13] It is likely that colloquial words for 'cat' such as Syrian *b(u)sayn* and Iraqi *bazzūn(a)* (and similar forms in a few other dialects) belong here as well.

ḫaydaʿ

This form is noted by several lexica,[14] and is one of the words for 'cat' mentioned in the story quoted above. It does not have any Semitic cognates with a similar meaning, and presumably is a derivative of *ḫadaʿa* 'to hide, deceive.' The word also denotes 'wolf (that acts deceitfully),' a person 'in whose love no affection, no confidence is placed,' and 'mirage,'[15] and stories of the guileful and thieving nature of cats abound.[16] The *fayʿal* pattern, probably with a diminutive (and pejorative?) nuance,[17] is also found in *ḫayṭal*, immediately following, and the word *qayʿam*, another term for 'cat' listed by Freytag under a verb *qaʿama* 'to call, cry' (of a cat).[18]

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[9] E.g., Egyptian (Hinds and Badawi 1986, 74), Yemeni (Piamenta 1991, 1:30); see also Freytag 1830–37, 1:119b: *bass* 'Felis domestica.'

[10] Kane 1990, 895; Kane 2000, 1138.

[11] See, e.g., Skeat 1910, 488.

[12] See, e.g., Cortade 1967, 96; Dallet 1985, 42; Dray 1998, 102; for Moroccan Arabic, see Harrell et al. 1966, 88.

[13] Note also perhaps the name of the Egyptian cat-goddess, Bastet (cf. Zeuner 1963, 390).

[14] E.g., Freytag 1830–37, 1:466a; Lane 1863–93, 710c; see also Viré 1997.

[15] Lane 1863–93 710c.

[16] See, e.g., Schimmel 1983, 27–35.

[17] See Fleisch 1990, 1:353 §77h. As noted by Barth (1894, 54 §38; see also p. 169 §116), the *fayʿal* pattern is at best rarely attested elsewhere in Semitic.

[18] Freytag 1830–37, 3:477a. Note also *ḍaywan*, on which see further below.

ḫayṭal

This word is glossed by Freytag and Kazimirski as both 'cat' and 'dog.'[19] It seems reasonable to associate the word with the verb *ḫaṭila* 'to prattle, talk nonsense' and its adjective *ḫaṭil* 'garrulous, foolish,' although a form with the first radical voiced, *ġayṭal*, is also recorded.[20] One also wonders whether the word is connected with Mishnaic (and later) Hebrew *ḥātûl* and Jewish Aramaic *ḥtûlā*, despite the non-emphatic medial *-t-* of those forms.[21] All of these may have been influenced by medieval Latin *cat(t)ulus* 'kitten,' i.e., small *cat(t)us*.[22]

dimm(a), dumm, *dam(m)*

These forms are associated especially with Yemeni Arabic,[23] and are in all likelihood loans from Ethio-Semitic; note Gəʿəz *dəmmat*, Amharic *dəmmät*, Tigre and Tigrinya *dəmmu*, all 'cat.' It seems likely that the latter forms, in turn, are loans from Cushitic. Militarev and Kogan, following Hommel and others, suggest that Akkadian *dumāmu*, a late and rare word for a type of wild animal, denotes a wild cat, and is thus also related to the Ethiopian forms.[24] Akkadian *dumāmu* does appear in a lexical list immediately following *mindinu* 'tiger(?)';[25] but that does not necessarily indicate that *dumāmu* is a feline rather than some other sort of predatory or otherwise dangerous animal.[26] Further, the pattern of the Akkadian word is at variance with the Ethiopian and Arabic forms.

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19 Freytag 1830–37, 1:502a; Kazimirski 1860, 1:596a.

20 Freytag 1830–37, 3:283b; Kazimirski 1860, 2:481a.

21 A different derivation of these forms was suggested by Levy (1876–89, 2:127a), who compared Arabic *ḫatūl* 'deceiving, one who outwits'; cf. the discussion of *ḫaydaʿ* just above.

22 See Du Cange 1937–38, 2:231–2; Latham 1975–, 2:302. In earlier Latin, the word *catulus* denotes 'a young dog,' 'dog (of any age),' and also 'the young of any land animal' and 'the young of other creatures' (Glare 1982, 286b); this form may have common Indo-European roots: Pokorny reconstructs **kat-* 'Junge werfen; Tierjunges' (Pokorny 2002, 1:534).

23 See Piamenta 1991, 1:156.

24 Militarev and Kogan 2005, 102; cf. Hommel 1879, 319.

25 Landsberger 1934, 84; 1962, 12, lines 75–6.

26 Note the cautious gloss '(a wild animal)' in Gelb et al. 1956–, D 179a, vs. 'cheetah' in von Soden 1965–81, 175b.

sinnawr

The unusual *fiᶜᶜawl* pattern of this, the most common term for 'cat,' is also found in a couple other animal names, *ʿijjawl* 'young calf' and *ḫinnawṣ* 'piglet,' which suggest that the pattern may be an old diminutive, as noted by Fraenkel (1886: 112).[27] The pattern was presumably applied to an earlier form *sun(n)ār*, also rarely attested.[28] The latter in turn was borrowed from an Aramaic source. Several eastern Aramaic dialects, namely, Syriac,[29] Babylonian Jewish Aramaic,[30] and Mandaic,[31] have a form *šun(n)ārā* 'cat.'[32] This form is a metathetic variant of *šurānā*, which is also attested in Babylonian Aramaic.[33] The latter first appears in the consonantal writing *šrn* in the eighth-century BCE Aramaic inscription from Sefire, where it probably denotes a local wildcat;[34] it occurs in a curse formula alongside other animals that frequent abandoned sites:

> *wthwy ʾrpd tl l[rbq ṣy w]ṣby wšʿl wʾrnb wšrn wṣdh w[ ] wʿqh*
>
> 'May Arpad become a tell for [the habitation of the *ṣî*,] the gazelle, the fox, the hare, the wildcat, the owl, [...], and the magpie!'[35]

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[27] The unusual pattern also makes it obvious that the Modern South Arabian words for 'cat'—Mehrī *sənnáwrət* (Johnstone 1987, 351), Ḥarṣūṣī *sennōreh* (Johnstone 1977, 112), Jibbālī *sínórt* (Johnstone 1981, 231)—are borrowed from Arabic.

[28] Fraenkel 1886, 112; Viré 1997. Note also the transcription "*sooner mousch*" recorded as the name of the African wildcat in "Arabic: Sahara region" in World Conservation Union 1996.

[29] Brockelmann 1928, 791b; the feminine is *šnārtā* (ibid.; Payne Smith 1879–1901, 4246). Payne Smith also cites a masc. form *šānurā* (4243), as well as forms with initial *s*, *sannur(t)ā* (2680), the latter presumably borrowed back from, or at least influenced by, Arabic.

[30] Sokoloff 2002, 1121b; note also the feminine forms *šunārtā* (ibid.) and *šinurtā* (ibid. 1137b).

[31] Drower and Macuch 1963, 455; the female cat is *šinarta*. The modern Mandaic forms in the dialect of Khoramshahr are similar: Charles Häberl, who is preparing a grammatical study of that dialect, kindly informs me (p.c.) that his informant, Mr. Nasser Sobbi, says *šenartā* for 'cat' and *šenārā* for 'male cat.'

[32] A rare Arabic biform that mimics the Aramaic exactly, *šunārā(y)*, is also attested in the *al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ* by al-Fīrūzābādī, according to Hommel 1879, 314, Fraenkel 1886, 112.

[33] Sokoloff 2002, 1125a. Syriac also attests a rare form *šurnā* (Payne Smith 1879–1901, 4107; Brockelmann 1928, 809a).

[34] Greenfield 1966, 98–100.

[35] Fitzmyer 1995, 44–7, 90.

We may note, in passing, that animal names seem to be subject to metathesis rather frequently;[36] sometimes, undoubtedly, this due to taboo-deformation. The Aramaic *šurānā* is related to the earliest-attested Semitic word for '(wild)cat,' Akkadian *šurānum*, which appears already in an Old Babylonian text from the time of Hammurapi (early 18th century B.C.E.), in which one person says he has provided another person with 'ten birds, two turtles, (and) one *šurānum*,'[37] the last perhaps for its pelt.[38] Still earlier, in Old Akkadian texts of the third millennium, *šurānum* is attested as a personal name.[39] The *šurānu(m)* also appears in a number of first-millennium omen texts; a few examples:[40]

šumma šurānu ina bīt amīli ibki
'if a cat cries in a man's house'

lumun šurāni ša ina bīt amīli innamru
'evil of a cat that is seen in a man's house'

šumma šurānu pâšu iptē-ma kī/itti amīli idabbub
'if a cat opens its mouth to speak like/with a man'

Unfortunately it is not possible to determine whether the Akkadian and Aramaic terms are cognate, thus reflecting an early common Semitic term, or whether, as seems more likely, the Aramaic is borrowed from the Akkadian.[41]

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36 Militarev and Kogan 2005, xlix–lii.

37 Scheil 1918.

38 Note the following equation in a Sumerian–Akkadian lexical text: kuš sa-a = *mašak šurāni* 'cat hide'; see Salonen 1976, 264. The Sumerian for 'cat,' as here, is sa-a (earlier su-a); for attestations of 'cat' in Sumerian literature, search "su-a" at the Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature (http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/).

39 Gelb et al. 1956–, Š/3 339–40.

40 Cited from Gelb et al. 1956–, Š/3 340a. These examples, and others, do not support the claim of Heimpel (1980) that the *šurānu* could be a domestic cat as well as a wildcat.

41 If Akkadian *šurānum* derives from an earlier **sur-* with the common Semitic nominal ending *-ān*, perhaps we should consider the possibility that the Akkadian is cognate with the West Semitic forms such as Arabic *hirr* and Ethio-Semitic **hurr-*, on which see further below. This would, admittedly, be a very rare instance of a content word showing the change of Proto-Semitic **s* to West Semitic **h* that is known from a number of grammatical forms, such as the third person pronouns (e.g., 3ms Proto-Semitic **suʾa* > Akkadian *šū*, West Semitic **huʾa*, etc.) and the causative stem marker; see Voigt 1987.

ḍaywan

The word *ḍaywan*, though sometimes glossed simply 'cat,'[42] is more properly 'wildcat.'[43] The Arabic dictionaries derive it, as another *fayʿal* form,[44] from a root *ḍāna* (*ū*) 'to have numerous offspring.' Militarev and Kogan, however, following a number of dictionaries of Biblical Hebrew,[45] compare *ḍaywan* with Hebrew *ṣî*, which denotes some type of wild animal, and propose very tentatively that both may derive from a common Semitic form **ṣayw-*.[46] If so, the Arabic word exhibits, historically at least, a *faʿlan* pattern. However, as Militarev—Kogan note, the reconstruction is "highly uncertain" because the meaning of the Hebrew word is not clear.

qiṭṭ(a)

Dialectally *qaṭṭ* and *quṭṭ* are also attested. These are connected with Syriac *qaṭṭā/qaṭṭu*[47] and unavoidably, it seems, with Greek κάττος, κάττα and Latin *cat(t)us, catta* from the early centuries C.E. (the latter replacing *feles* when the domestic cat was introduced into Rome), and the wide array of similar forms in European languages.[48] The word *qiṭṭ* was considered a borrowing already by some of the Arab lexicographers.[49] Because of the likely Egyptian origin of the domestic cat, the source of all of these terms has sometimes been sought in a language of Africa, though this was clearly not Egyptian itself, where no analogous form is attested; rather 'cat' in Egyptian was the imitative form *miw*, Coptic *emou*.[50] When an African origin is mooted, the reference is usually to "Nubian *kadīs*" and sometimes also to

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[42] E.g., Freytag 1830–37, 3.33a; Kazimirski 1860, 2:46a; Lane 1863–93, 1810–1; and the story quoted above from Schimmel 1983.

[43] Specifically 'male wildcat' according to Hommel 1879, 317.

[44] See above, under *ḫaydaʿ*.

[45] See, e.g., Brown, Driver and Briggs 1907, 850.

[46] Militarev and Kogan 2005, 290 No. 224.

[47] Brockelmann 1928, 656–7.

[48] An extensive list of European words appears in the etymology section s.v. 'cat' in the *Oxford English Dictionary.*

[49] Freytag 1830–37, 3:462b; Hommel 1879, 315 with n. 2; Fraenkel 1886, 113.

[50] Crum 1939, 55b; other Coptic words for 'cat' are *klē*, *šau* (ibid. 102a, 601a).

"Berber *kaddiska*."[51] But the African forms cited are a poor phonetic match for the Arabic and Syriac; further, M. L. Bender, an authority on Nilo-Saharan, writes that Nubian *kadīs* is "an obvious loan from Arabic."[52] Finally, since the domestic cat was largely confined to Egypt until it began to be imported into Rome at the beginning of the common era, there is no compelling reason to look to languages such as Nubian for the origin of the Semitic and Indo-European words.[53] It is equally likely that the forms might derive from an ancient Germanic word, imported into Latin and thence to Greek and to Syriac and Arabic.[54]

The *i*-vowel of standard Arabic *qiṭṭ*, as opposed to Syriac *qaṭṭā*/*qaṭṭu* and the Latin and Greek forms with *a*, may be due to assimilation to the pattern *fiʿl* that is used for many animal names,[55] as also with *hirr*, below.[56] It is noteworthy that the form *qaṭṭ* is found in Syrian Arabic,[57] perhaps still reflecting the Aramaic (Syriac) vocalization.

al-māʾiʾa (also *al-māʾiyya*)

This obviously has the form a participle of the onomatopoetic verb *māʾa* 'to mew.'[58] Perhaps, however, it also reflects a vestige of the ancient Egyptian word for 'cat,' *miw*.

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[51] E.g., Onions 1966, 151; Barnhart 1988, 149. The often-cited Nubian form *kadīs* may have been taken from Murray 1923, 88. I have not been able to locate *kaddiska* in a Berber dictionary.

[52] M. Lionel Bender, in an email of 28 October 2005; he also notes that his files on Nilo-Saharan languages show, for 'cat,' "either (a) no word given or (b) a loan from Arabic, Oromo (usually *adurre*) or other dominant language."

[53] This is also the opinion of Prof. Bender, ibid.

[54] Note the proposal of Kluge and Mitzka 1963, 357–8: "Das späte Auftreten im Latein, die Art der Verbreitung und die Mannigfaltigkeit der germ. Bildungen (s. Kater, Kitze) lassen germ. Ursprung erwägen." The Arabic/Syriac forms are not noted there, however. See also Hehn 1885, 350–1 and 492–3, n. 83.

[55] W.P. Heinrichs apud Fox 2003, 144.

[56] Cf. the interesting Arabic plural *qatusin*, borrowed directly from *catus*, discussed by Tirosh-Becker 1990, esp. 50–2. A similar form derived directly from the Latin is Syriac *qaṭ(ṭ)ustā*, glossed *sinnawr ṣaġīra* (cited in Payne Smith 1879–1901, 3572; Brockelmann 1928, 657a).

[57] Stowasser and Ani 1964, 36b.

[58] See, e.g., Freytag 1830–37, 4:218b.

hirr

Arabic *hirr* has a cognate in the rare Syriac *harrārtā* 'cat.'[59] Similar forms are found in Ethio-Semitic, namely, Amharic *wərr(o)* 'kitten, sound to call a cat'[60] and Gafat *urrä* 'cat,' and in Cushitic in Somali *(h)urri* 'cat.'[61] Syriac and Arabic also share a verbal root *h-r-r* : Syriac *har(r)* is 'to yelp (of a dog); to quarrel, fight,' while Arabic *harra* is 'to growl (of a dog), purr (of a cat).' It is difficult to decide whether the substantive denoting 'cat' or the verbal root is primary, or, indeed, if they were originally related at all. It seems possible that the verbal root is denominative, originally in the sense 'act like a cat' (and hence, in Syriac, also 'to spat, fight'), in which case the Arabic and Ethiopian nouns denoting 'cat,' and perhaps the related words denoting 'sound of a cat' (e.g., Syriac *hrārā*, Arabic *harīr*) are simply onomatopoetic, mimicking the sound of purring.[62] The Syriac *harrārtā*, however, has the appearance of a deverbal form, perhaps reshaped by folk-etymology as the feminine of the adjective *harrār* 'quarrelsome, contentious,' itself obviously derived from the verb *har(r)* in the meaning 'to quarrel.' Further, the Arabic form, like *qiṭṭ*, shows the pattern *fiʿl* that is frequent in animal names. The Ethio-Semitic and Somali forms of 'cat' may be thus be closer to the original, viz., **hurr*-.[63]

The form *hārūn* '(tom)cat' (Syrian and other dialects) may be related to *hirr*, although it is difficult to account for the form and its derivation. Militarev and Kogan (2005, 11) tentatively associate *hārūn* with Akkadian *mīrānu* 'puppy, cub,' Ugaritic *inr* 'dog,' and Amharic *anär* 'wildcat,' all of which, they suggest, may derive from an early Semitic form **ʾVnar*- or **ʾVran*-.

har(i)s

This word seems to have no cognates of similar meaning elsewhere in Semitic. In view of the fact that *haris*, and *hurās* and *harrās*, also

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59 Brockelmann 1928, 183; see also Payne Smith 1879–1901, 1047.

60 See Kane 1990, 1500. Compare also *wärr* 'sound for calling animals' (ibid.).

61 Leslau 1979, 3:328. Also noted in Cohen 1970–, 1(5):459.

62 So also Hommel 1879, 316; Fraenkel 1886, 113.

63 See also above, n. 41, for a tentative suggestion that these forms may ultimately be related to Akkadian *šurānum* and its loan-descendants in other Semitic languages.

denote 'lion impétueux, rapace, vorace,' the word may be derived from the verb *harasa* 'manger quelque chose avec avidité; battre, piler avec force' (also *harisa* 'être très vorace, glouton'), which, at least in the meaning 'beat, crush,' has cognates in Hebrew *hāras* and Tigre *haršä*,[64] although it is at least possible that the meaning 'devour' is denominative, indicating the action of a feeding lion. In the latter case, *har(i)s* may simply be an otherwise unaffiliated word for a type of wildcat.[65]

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[64] See Cohen 1970–, 1(5):456.

[65] As suggested already by Hommel 1879, 315.

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SAFAR
THE EARLY HISTORY OF TIME TRAVEL LITERATURE: AL-MUWAYLIḤĪ'S *ḤADĪTH ʿISĀ B. HISHĀM* AND ITS ANTECEDENTS[1]

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I. *Introduction*

Modern Arab culture stands in a much-debated relationship with the trappings of modernity. It is therefore not surprising that modern Arabic literature should boast a relatively large number of time-travel stories. More than any other genre of fiction, time-travel stories—that is, stories in which a character travels physically from one clearly defined period of history to another—foreground historical change and our perception of it. In a 1998 article, I offered a tentative overview of the genre as it exists in Arabic.[2] Since then, many more examples, including films and plays, have come to my attention. In a forthcoming monograph on time travel as a literary device, I hope to present these works along with their counterparts in other literary traditions in a comparative and historical context. The present essay offers a preview based on one line of inquiry: the antecedents of

[1] This essay is dedicated to Wolfhart Heinrichs, who has both practiced and encouraged the comparative study of literary traditions; and who, despite personifying the most rigorous standards of philological inquiry, has with characteristic good humor indulged explorations of non-canonical topics, of which time travel is undoubtedly an example.

[2] Cooperson 1998.

Muḥammad al-Muwayliḥī's (1858?-1930) *Ḥadīth ʿĪsā b. Hishām*, the first time-travel story in Arabic.

Al-Muwayliḥī's *Ḥadīth* was first published in serial form beginning in 1898 under the title *Fatra min al-zaman*. It tells the story of the Bāshā, a Mamluk-era military official who returns to life during the British Mandate and wanders around Egypt getting into trouble. In a 1944 study, Saadeddine Ben Cheneb suggested that the *Ḥadīth* may have been inspired by two works by Edmond About: *L'homme à l'oreille cassée*, about a man roused from suspended animation; and *Le fellah*, about a Frenchman's visit to Egypt.[3] In another 1944 study, Henri Pérès found parallels to the *Ḥadīth* in the wave of social-reformist publications that appeared in Egypt beginning in 1880.[4] He also supplied a long list of antecedents for the idea of raising a character from the dead and using him as a protagonist. Some of these antecedents are classical Arabic, such as the Qur'ānic sleepers in the cave and al-Maʿarrī's *Risālat al-Ghufrān*; while others, including About's story, are European or American.[5]

The most recent contribution to the search for al-Muwayliḥī's antecedents is that of Roger Allen, who, following a suggestion he credits to Nadia Farag, proposes that the Egyptian journalist's immediate inspiration was a book by Constantin-François Volney (1757-1820) called *Les ruines*. Volney's work, first published in 1791, begins with a visit to the ruins of Palmyra, where the narrator converses with an apparition. The *Ḥadīth*, similarly, begins with a visit to a graveyard, where a specter rises from the tomb to interrupt the narrator's meditations. Resurrection is of course commonly discussed in religious contexts, and Arabic biographies abound with visions of the dead; but the number of verbal parallels between *Les ruines* and the

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[3] Ben Cheneb 1944; cf. Allen 31.

[4] Pérès 1944. The episodes of *Fatra min al-zaman* began appearing in 1898 (Allen 1992: 32) before being published in book form in 1907. Pérès, however, knows only the latter date, meaning that some of his suggested influences drew on the *Ḥadīth* instead of the other way around. The earlier date also explains the fact (astonishing to Pérès) that Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm's *Layālī Saṭīḥ* (1907), like the *Ḥadīth,* has a resurrected protagonist.

[5] Pérès also notes that Muḥammad's father Ibrāhīm al-Muwayliḥī published a serial entitled *Ḥadīth Mūsā b. ʿIṣām*. Judging from the title and from the one installment he was able to see, Pérès suggests that the father's work may have inspired the son's. In 1954, Gottfried Widmer clarified this last problem by publishing a German translation of several episodes of the *Ḥadīth Mūsā b. ʿIṣām*, which turns out not to contain any resurrected characters (Widmer 1954: 78-81).

Ḥadīth tends to confirm Allen's suggestion that al-Muwayliḥī read *Les ruines* either in French or in Arabic translation (under the title *Āthār al-umam,* by Shākir Shuqayr, d. 1896) and used it as a model.[6]

The present article will not pursue the matter of influence, which, given the available state of the evidence, probably cannot be pursued any further than it has been. Rather, this essay will address the broader question of shared themes, particularly those that recur in stories about time travel and other kinds of displacement. One such theme is that of the specter. Time-travel stories are full of spectral creatures, no doubt because such creatures provided a familiar way of representing the novel idea of displacement in time. In Charles Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* (1843), the miserly protagonist meets four spirits and in two cases accompanies one of them to a time not his own. During these visits to the past and to the future, the miserly Scrooge becomes something like a ghost, since he cannot be heard or seen. In their *Communist Manifesto* (1848), Marx and Engels call Communism a specter (*Gespenst*). This is a ghostly creature of a different kind, since it can be heard and seen; indeed "all the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance" to drive it away.[7] But the *Gespenst* does resemble the ghostly Scrooge in one respect. It is a disembodied representative of another time, in this case the future—or, more exactly, the future as it will be after the triumph of socialism, a triumph which in some passages seems inevitable and in others contingent upon whether the reader—like Scrooge—can effect a change of heart. (Like many time-travel writers, Marx and Engels tend to fudge the matter of free will and predestination.)

In Volney's *Ruines*, the apparition is the omniscient spirit of History. In one long monologue after another, it explains why civilizations rise and fall. It knows everything, but cannot do anything but talk. Al-Muwayliḥī's Bāshā, by contrast, is resurrected but not disembodied, and can interact—usually painfully—with the world around him. Far from being omniscient, he is unaware of the changes that have taken place in Egypt since his death, and suffers one indignity after another in the strange new world of 1898. He is, in other words, a figure ripped out of a real history, as opposed to Volney's apparition, who is transhistorical. Unlike Volney's creation, furthermore, the

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[6] Allen 1992: 28-30.

[7] http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm.

Bāshā is no mere expository device. Rather, he accompanies the narrator through a densely described social world where his misadventures serve as a pretext for satirizing contemporary institutions. In this respect, the Arabic work revives a kind of time-travel literature that antedates Volney: namely, the tradition of the uchronic traveler that goes back to the founder of the genre, Louis-Sébastien Mercier.

II. *The First Time Traveler: Louis-Sébastien Mercier*

Nineteen years before the Bastille was toppled by the French Revolution, a novel published in Amsterdam predicted that earthshaking event. The novel, mysteriously entitled *L'An 2440*, begins with a conversation between the anonymous narrator and an English guest who is outraged at the "monstrous inequality of fortunes" on display in Paris. The Englishman observes that wealthy citizens become so by defrauding the public under color of law while the poor spend their lives in backbreaking toil only to perish in destitution. The government, he adds, does nothing more than bankroll the follies of kings, starve the peasants, and declare war upon other states as rapacious and corrupt as itself. After delivering his diatribe, the Englishman departs and the narrator goes to bed, where (for reasons left unexplained) he remains fast asleep for the next 669 years.

When he wakes, the narrator finds that the Paris so deplored by the Englishman has vanished. In its place stands a new city where the streets are broad and properly aligned; the traffic moves in opposing lanes and proceeds in an orderly manner through the intersections. Though lively and animated, the citizens are well mannered: none shout abuse or threaten to crush him with their carriages. Eventually the narrator learns that the Paris he knows has vanished long ago and been replaced by a community of reason, virtue, and shared prosperity. The king, a benevolent monarch who rules by consultation, enjoys strolling among his subjects and stopping to chat with tradesmen. The laws are few enough to fit onto a single sheet of paper and simple enough to be understood by every citizen. Crime is rare, and a cause for public mourning. A similar reign of virtue extends over the world: Europe's former colonies have been liberated by an African, whose monument graces a public square in Paris.

Awed by these developments, the narrator travels to Versailles to view the relics of his own century, but finds nothing but ruins. Amid

the debris, he sees "an old man sitting upon the capital of a column." The old man launches into a bitter lament against the extravagance of kings, who plundered their nations to raise monuments to their pride, and concludes as follows (in the language of Hooper's 1799 English translation):

> "O, may these ruins cry aloud to all sovereigns; that they who abuse a momentary power, only discover their weakness to future generations."—At these words, he shed a flood of tears, and turned his eyes to heaven with a mournful, repenting look. Why do you weep? I said.
>
> …He raised his voice and said: "Oh, how wretched is my fate! Know that I am Lewis XIV, who built this rueful palace… O, that I had but known!"[8]

Suddenly the narrator is bitten by an asp, and wakes to find himself still in bed in 1771. Realizing that his glorious new world was only a dream, he rebukes the friend who has just pinched him awake:

> Ah, what an injury hast thou done me! Thou hast snatched me from a dream, whose sweet illusions were to me more desirable than the importunate light of truth. How pleasing was the deceit! Would that I were plunged in it for the remainder of my days! But alas! I am again surrounded by that frightful chaos from which I thought myself delivered.[9]

In *L'An 2440*, then, we find two specters. One is the narrator, who awakens to find himself in the future. Since he has no real business being there, he is an uncanny sort of creature, at least from the point of view of the temporal natives. The other is the ghost of Louis XIV, who is brought to life in order to denounce the follies of his time. He and the narrator are literally the spirits of their age—over-literal anticipations of the Hegelian *Geist*. There is, nevertheless, a difference between them. The king is the ghost of a man who is dead in the narrator's native time. Like his descendant, Morley's ghost in Dickens' *Carol*, he cannot atone for the crimes he has committed, and so can express only remorse. The narrator, on the other hand, can return to a time when he is still alive and work to bring the jubilee. In this respect, he resembles his descendants: Scrooge and the sympathetic reader of the *Communist Manifesto*.

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[8] Mercier 1795: 360.
[9] Ibid., 1795: 3.

The author of *L'An 2440*, Louis-Sébastien Mercier (1740-1814), was in his own day known as an intermittently successful playwright; today he is most familiar to historians as a rabblerousing journalist of the Revolutionary era.[10] His *L'An 2440* is the first novel in which a character travels physically from one defined moment in history to another. [11] Though banned in France, it was reprinted in several editions, translated into four languages, and widely imitated by generations of writers in Europe and elsewhere.[12] Postulating, as it does, a world where the suffering of man has been abolished by enlightened government, it stands in the tradition of such works as More's *Utopia* (1516), Campanella's *City of the Sun* (1623), and Bacon's *The New Atlantis* (1626). Unlike his predecessors, however, Mercier placed his ideal society not in some remote geographical location but at a specific date in the future.

This "passage from utopia to uchronia"[13]—that is, the construction of a utopia that stands at a historical rather than a spatial distance—reflects the convergence of a number of factors. The first was the appearance of alternatives to cyclical and apocalyptic notions of history. In 1687, Isaac Newton had proposed an "absolute, true, and mathematical time," which by nature flows "equally without relation to anything external."[14] Rather than circling back on itself or ending with a bang, time was now understood as an infinite series of numbered slots extending into the future and the past. Of these slots, Mercier may have chosen 2440 precisely because it lacked any numerological or apocalyptic significance.[15] The meaning of absolute time did not really sink home until the nineteenth century, with its ubiquitous clocks and its standardization of global time zones. But the eighteenth-century Enlightenment seized on the idea because it dovetailed with the new idea of gradual and cumulative change, whether in the natural world or in human society.

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[10] On Mercier's life, see Monselet 1876: 43-83; Béclard 1903; Bonnet 1995: 465-83.

[11] One story in his *Songes philosophiques*, first published in 1768, anticipates the time-travel device by having the narrator flash forward to the Last Judgement (Mercier 1788: 41-64).

[12] Wilkie 1986.

[13] Baczko 1978: 155-66; Mercier, ed. Trousson 1971, introduction; Trousson 1999: 161-62; Hudde and Kuon 1988.

[14] Cited in Kern 1983:11.

[15] Alkon 1987: 122-3.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the discovery of the New World and the voyages of exploration had brought Europeans into contact with people who appeared to be at a different stage of development.[16] In 1750, Jacques Turgot (1727-81) argued that such "savages" could become civilized: after all, Europeans had once been savages themselves. By the same token, Europe itself had the potential to scale new heights of achievement. Turgot's vision of history, along with that of Mercier's contemporary Condorcet (1743-94), amounted to "reasoned demonstrations that the utopia of progress was either inevitable or at least highly probable."[17] As a result, it was no longer necessary to seek utopia on a desert island. In this regard, the most immediate influence on Mercier was his older contemporary Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), who preached the natural virtue and the eventual perfectibility of man.[18]

Mercier's projection of utopia into the future also made sense in another way. His predecessors had placed their ideal societies on distant continents or even on other planets. By his time, however, cartography and astronomy had filled in many of the blanks: the New World had already been mapped, and the moon was now visible through a telescope.[19] Of course, putting utopia in the future still required putting it somewhere; and behind Mercier's choice of France there appears to be a nationalist impulse that would have been quite foreign to his predecessors. His aim may have been "to waken the masses aslumber in their misery and ignorance, and to demonstrate for their emulation the coming triumph of universal reason and happiness,"[20] but, in an anticipation of French revolutionary ideology, he hoped that France would reach perfection first and then export it to other nations.

For all these reasons, it is not surprising that Mercier should have written a uchronia (and indeed he was not the first to do so).[21] But why time travel? Why not simply describe Paris as he imagined it might be in the year 2440? The answer seems to be that he was reluctant to dispense with one of the most felicitious conventions of the

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16 Fabian 1983: 1-35. I thank Carol Bardenstein for this reference.

17 Manuel and Manuel 1979: 459; cf. Baczko 1978: 153ff.

18 Béclard 1905: 83-149.

19 Alkon 1987: 11-114, 117-20.

20 Ibid., 40.

21 A handful of "future histories" had already been written in England, although Mercier does not seem to have known about them; see Alkon 1987: 17-44; 112-14; 92-111.

utopian genre: the presence of a displaced observer. Traditionally, utopists had adopted the rhetoric of the travelogue, relying on narrators who could express surprise at the practices of the natives, elicit explanations, and return to report to their countrymen. In *L'An 2440*, there are two displaced observers: the scandalized English visitor to Paris, and the awestruck traveler to the future. Like older utopist travelers, the latter undertakes a long journey and arrives in a strange community whose many virtues are gradually revealed to him. Unlike his predecessors, however, he feels remarkably at home in utopia. For one thing, he is in Paris rather than in the South Pacific or on the moon. For another, the world he finds is precisely the one he and his contemporaries have already imagined as the ideal human community. At the end, he returns to fulfill the typical duties of the utopist narrator: he leaves paradise (expelled, appropriately enough, by a snake) and returns to report to his countrymen how unreasonable their social arrangements appear by comparison.

Because of his reluctance to renounce the advantages of the traditional displaced observer, Mercier was forced to invent time travel. Of course, his narrator does not really travel through time—he merely dreams that he does. By modern standards, this is a very timid sort of time travel. Yet anything more radical would have exceeded the capacities of the age. If modern readers accept the idea of voyaging back and forth through time on demand, they do so only by virtue of repeated exposure to a literary convention. And they do so even though a moment's thought can usually explode any of the pseudo-scientific rationales offered for fictional time travel. Except for occasional hard-core science fiction novels, most new offerings in the genre no longer bother with explanations of the impossible (impossible, at least, given our inability to harness infinite energy, travel at the speed of light, or survive passage through a worm hole).[22] For Mercier, physical impossibilities of this sort were still inconceivable. Fortunately, his age had an equally useful type of absurdity: protracted sleep, a device with a long and distinguished history in European folklore.

During his dream, Mercier's narrator believes himself to be in a real place. When he awakens, he looks on 1771 in horrified disbelief.

[22] For details see Nahin 1993 and Davies 2001. I thank Jay Phelan for this reference.

For the first time, he is able to see his own present as "frightful chaos." He has learned the causes and the remedies for all the ills of his age, but he has also learned that centuries will pass before the remedies are adopted. His once-familiar world now seems an age of irremediable barbarism, destined to be tossed into the junkyard of history. In his essay on the historical novel, Georg Lukács calls the ability to recognize historical forces at work while immersed in their effects "a sense of the present as history."[23] In time-travel novels, this historicity of the present is experienced directly by one of the characters. Such experiences are often the most compelling element of the uchronist novel, far more so than the detailed descriptions of the various authors' ideal societies. Mercier's future is not very convincing (for example, the Parisians of 2440 still ride carriages), but his idea of what future generations would think of 1770 is arguably very close to the mark. For him, as for us, the past—his present—has become a foreign country.[24]

L'An 2440 proved memorable less for its intrinsic merit than because of what in retrospect seemed its strikingly prophetic character. For it did not require seven hundred years, or even seventy, for Mercier's initial predictions of sudden and momentous change to come true. When in 1789 Louis XVI summoned the Estates General to convene in Paris, the representatives of the Third Estate echoed many of Mercier's demands, including the abolition of gaming houses, lotteries, and boulevard theaters.[25] On July 14, the Parisians stormed and later razed the Bastille, a monument which in Mercier's 2440 had long before been demolished.[26] The cancellation of monastic vows and the emptying of the abbeys had also been prefigured in *L'An 2440*, where Mercier imagines that one day monks, freed of the obligation to remain in cloister, would "issue forth in crowds, with the highest demonstrations of joy."[27] At the end of 1789, he declared that his dream was close to becoming a reality, six and a half centuries in advance of his expectations.[28]

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[23] Lukács 1965: 19-88. I thank Stuart Semmel for drawing this argument to my attention.

[24] On this theme, see Lowenthal 1985.

[25] Schama 1989: 322.

[26] Mercier 1795: 32.

[27] Ibid.: 88.

[28] Mercier, 1789: 3.

If Mercier's narrator may fairly be called the discoverer of uchronia, Mercier himself may be called the discoverer of dyschronia. That is, he was arguably the first person to find himself living in a bad future: not simply in a bad time, but in a time that was bad because of its divergence from the ideal collective future that he had imagined. Eager to build the new utopia, he had agreed to serve as a delegate to the National Assembly. He also founded a newspaper, the *Annales patriotiques et littéraires*, whose early issues are full of breathless descriptions of revolutionary triumphs. But he was disillusioned by the events of late 1792 and early 1793: the September massacres, the execution of Louis Capet, the bread riots, the attacks on the press, and the collapse of the revolutionary government into warring factions. In June 1793, he was arrested and imprisoned after signing a protest against the condemnation of the Girondist deputies. He remained in confinement for a year, fully expecting to be executed at any moment. On one occasion, he was led to the guillotine and lashed to the plank, only to be sent back to his cell. He was finally released after the counter-coup of Thermidor, which purged the Jacobins and ended the Terror.[29]

In later years, Mercier continued to claim credit for having foreseen the Revolution. In the preface to the 1799 edition of *L'An 2440*, he wrote: "I hereby reprint a dream that announced and prepared the way for the French Revolution." He remained fascinated by the future, and insisted that history was bunk. "Let us exert as much effort to organize tomorrow as we do in our vain attempts to know the past, which is nothing but a ghost and an illusion."[30] In his later years, he devoted himself to physiognomy and Swedenborgian mysticism, publishing a *Satire contre les astronomes* (1803), and five years later a 300-page "refutation" of Copernicus and Newton. His biographer Monselet not implausibly suggests that his revolutionary experience must have "damaged some of the fibers in his brain."[31] "In his last days," wrote one observer, "one could hardly look at him without laughing." Dressed in worn, unfashionable, and ill-fitting clothes, he made regular appearances in a café in the Marais until his death in 1814.[32]

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[29] Monselet 1876: 62-3; Schama 1989: 669-70.
[30] Béclard 1905: 86.
[31] Monselet 1876: 67.
[32] Charles Nodier, cited in Rufi 1995: 21-2.

III. *Time-Traveling Ghosts: Genius and Lumen*

Twelve years after the publication of Mercier's *L'An 2440*, Constantin-François Chassebeuf, better known as Volney, set off on a three-year voyage to Egypt and the Levant. The son of a provincial bourgeois, Volney had hoped to study Hebrew and Arabic in Paris. Disappointed in the quality of instruction, he took up medicine instead. Then, an unexpected windfall allowed him to continue his language studies by traveling abroad. His journey took him to Alexandria, Cairo, Damietta, Jaffa, Acre, Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli, Antakia, Aleppo, Palmyra, Damascus, and Jerusalem. In the mid-eighteenth century, such a journey was a wild leap into the unknown; and the travel account he published after his return to France in 1787 made him a celebrity. His biographer, Jean Sibenaler, speculates that the windfall that made the trip possible was actually a government grant given in return for a commitment to collect military intelligence. Indeed, Volney's account offers remarkably detailed descriptions of the fortifications of Alexandria and other eastern Mediterranean ports—descriptions which were still useful two decades later when Napoleon launched his invasion of Egypt.[33]

In addition to his travelogue, Volney published a second book after his return to France: *Les ruines*, a thinly fictionalized meditation on history. Struck during his visit to Palmyra by the transitoriness of human achievement, the narrator protests the severity of God's treatment of man. A specter called "the Genius" then rises from the ruins to rebuke him for his stupidity. Man, the Genius explains, is responsible for himself. Prompted by the narrator's questions, the Genius explains the reasons for the rise and fall of civilizations and outlines a program for human self-improvement.[34] To drive the lesson home, he gives the narrator a look at the congress at which the nations of the world will one day assemble to settle their differences. Such scenes, like the visit to Palmyra, involve the narrator in a sort of time travel by bringing him face to face with a historical moment different than his own.[35] Although he can only observe that moment, and in that sense is not a proper time traveler, he does have access—in the person of the Genius—to one of history's first time machines.

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[33] Sibenaler 1992.
[34] Volney 1796: 13 and passim; Allen 1992: 28-30.
[35] Volney 1796: 111.

Instead of waiting to fall asleep for centuries, the Volneian time traveler need only apprentice himself to a creature that can traverse the centuries at will.

In the period preceding the invention of the real time machine—first by the Spanish diplomat and playwright Enrique Gaspar in 1887,[36] and a year later by H.G. Wells[37]—Volney's time-traveling specter was put to work, most notably by the French astronomer and popular-science writer Camille Flammarion (1842-1925). Flammarion does not appear to have gotten the specter directly from Volney but rather from a book called *Consolations in Travel, or the Last Days of a Philosopher* (1829), by the English chemist Humphry Davy (1778-1829). Flammarion describes Davy's phantom as follows:

> Sir Humphry Davy raconte que se trouvant un soir au clair de lune, assis sur les ruines du Colisée à Rome, il fut enveloppé comme d'une fleuve de lumière, entendit des sons mélodieux analogues à ceux d'une harpe, et s'endormit dans une sorte d'extase pendant laquelle un Esprit lui *montra* successivement les différentes époques de l'humanité depuis les sauvages de l'âge de pierre jusqu'aux brillantes productions de la civilisation moderne. En même temps que l'ésprit lui montra ces spectacles et même l'état actuel d'habitation de plusieurs planètes de notre système, il lui *expliqua à haute voix* l'histoire de l'humanité terrestre et celle des autres humanités des sphères voisines.[38]

Davy makes explicit what was only implied by Mercier's passage through Newtonian time: namely, the possibility of seeing "the different ages of humanity one after another, from the savages of the stone age to the brilliant products of modern civilization." Beyond that, however, his "spirit" is essentially identical to Volney's: it serves as the producer of a sound-and-light show, staging exotic scenes and providing appropriate commentary. These attributes were not enough for Flammarion, who in his novel *Lumen* (1865) gave the specter powers that would make Albert Einstein proud. The novel's title character, a recently deceased scientist, explains that after the soul leaves the body, it can travel through space at the speed of thought. Lumen describes watching the Earth (spirits can also see across immense distances) from a planet circling a distant star. Because of the distance between the Earth and the star, he sees the Earth as it existed 72 years

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36 Gaspar 1887. I thank Lorraine Pratt for this reference.
37 Wells 1888.
38 Flammarion 1865: 187.

ago, in 1793. Launching himself toward the Earth at the speed of light, he watches the events of history—including his own life—unfold at an accelerated pace. Then, moving away from the Earth, he watches history run backwards. Steam engines and telegraph lines disappear, Napoleon falls and rises, the splendor of Versailles is restored, and so on back through medieval and ancient history. He witnesses the burning of Rome and the crucifixion, the fall and rise of ancient civilizations, the gradual disappearance of human life, and the reunification of the earth and the sun.

In *Lumen* we find the spectacular presentation of history told from the spirit's point of view. Now we know how and why a spirit of the type first imagined by Volney is able to travel at will through space and time. We are also told what it feels like to visit scenes where one never imagined that one had any right to be. When, for example, he visits the Paris of seventy-two years before, Lumen calls it "another world."[39] The sight of his childhood self, far from being comforting and familiar, is uncanny. Looking down from space upon his six-year-old self, with his lacy collar and crumpled cuffs, he remarks: "Ah! jamais, non, jamais, dans mes soixante et douze ans d'existence terrestre... parmi tous les événements, toutes les surprises, tous les hasards de la vie, jamais je n'ai éprouvé pareille commotion à celle dont je fus traversé, lorsque dans cet enfant je reconnus...*moi-même!*"[40] This scene represents a compaction of Mercier's encounter with Louis XIV. In *L'An 2440,* the narrator meets a sort of double: a fellow representative of the bad old days. In *Lumen*, he literally meets himself.

Because he is a disembodied spirit, Lumen is able to visit himself at intervals. Somewhat in the manner of Molière's bourgeois, who one day discovers that he has spent his life speaking in prose, he realizes that he has spent his life living through history: "Tout en suivant ma propre personne, dans mon marriage, mes entreprises, ma vie de relation, mes voyages, mes études, etc., j'assistais au developpement de l'histoire contemporaine."[41] The non-spectral self participates in history without knowing it; the spectral self stands outside of history and thereby knows what the corporeal self does not. It is, furthermore, only by virtue of being observed by the time-traveling spirit

[39] Ibid., 22-3.
[40] Ibid., 37-8.
[41] Ibid., 42.

that the temporal self can represent a particular period of time and thus a particular stage of historical development. In other words, the specter is a metaphor for that sense of history whereby one has a sense not only of the present as history but also of oneself as present *in* history. In a proper time-travel novel, one can achieve this effect simply by moving the protagonist physically to another time. The multiplication of selves, and the realizations that follow from it, can thus be achieved without the use of specters and apparitions. Certainly, being pulled out of one's native time makes one more representative of one's native time than one can ever be while one is in it. Indeed, it is likely that, without resort to some form of temporal displacement—if only in the form of a spectral tour of history—the act of representing a historical period would be impossible.

IV. *A Spectral Traveler: al-Ṭahṭāwī*

In the real world of the nineteenth century, there were, of course, ways of approximating a spectral tour through time and space. You could, for example, visit a *panorama*, "which is a place where you can look and see the city you wish to imagine," including, for example, Cairo, where "you seem to be on the minaret of Sulṭān Ḥasan, with Rumayla and the rest of the city below you"; a *cosmorama*, "which contains the image of one country and then another," or a *uranorama*, "which contains the image of the largest celestial sphere and all it contains." Most memorably, one could attend the theater, "where imitations of past events are played out":

> Should [the players] wish to imitate, for example, a sultan and his deeds, they arrange the stage in the manner of a palace, and make an image of him, and recite his poems...If they wish to play the Shah of the Persians, they dress a player in the clothes of the Shah and bring him out and seat him on a chair, and so forth. These spectacles can be used to represent anything that exists, even Moses parting the sea, with the water rippling and resembling the sea in every respect.[42]

The descriptions are those of Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī (1801-73), the Egyptian who led a delegation of students to France, where he spent five years, from 1826 to 1831. He does not describe these spectacles as glimpses of past worlds, as indeed in many cases they seem not to

[42] al-Ṭahṭāwī 2002: 139-41.

have been. Of his examples, only the parting of the Red Sea is "historical"; the others—Cairo, a sultan, the Shah—were evidently contemporary. These particular spectacles may have caught his attention because they were examples of "Eastern" or "Islamic" civilization detached from their native environment and placed before the gaze of French audiences. To a certain extent, then, they resembled al-Ṭahṭāwī himself.

Yet the situation is actually more complicated than this comparison would suggest. Al-Ṭahṭāwī had been sent to France in order to observe the French, not to be observed himself. Most of his account, accordingly, is taken up with his comments on the history, manners, customs, sciences, and government of France.[43] Occasionally, however, he mentions incidents in which he himself becomes the spectacle, as when he is accosted in the street by a drunkard who calls him a Turk.[44] Despite the paucity of references to such incidents, it is clear that his experience abroad enabled him to observe himself with a certain detachment. Describing his first meal in France, for example, he conveys—through his detailed account of the unfamiliar vessels, utensils, and table manners—what seems to have been a sudden realization that eating with one's hand out of a common dish is not the only way to eat, and might indeed seem unsanitary to a Frenchman.[45]

Given the complexities of observation and self-observation that characterize al-Ṭahṭāwī's account, one finds emblematic significance in the description, given at the beginning of the book, of his first encounter with a full length-mirror. He and his companions have just entered a café in Marseilles:

> When I first entered the café, and for some time afterwards, I thought it was a long, extended enclosure, because of the large number of people it appeared to contain. Whenever a group entered or left, a similar group seemed to enter from the other sides of the glassed-in space, with everyone appearing multiple times, whether walking, sitting, and standing. I only realized it was an enclosed space when I saw our own images in the mirror, and understood that [the multiple images] were a property of the glass.[46]

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[43] Among these comments is one to the effect that Paris is "Heaven for women, Purgatory for men, and Hell for horses" (ibid., 100), an aphorism quoted from Mercier's *Tableau de Paris* (1998: 31).

[44] al-Ṭahṭāwī 2002: 136-7.

[45] Ibid., 66.

[46] Ibid., 68.

Evidently, al-Ṭahṭāwī cannot immediately distinguish between Frenchmen and their reflections. He can, however, recognize the image of himself, which is so out of place in a Marseilles café that it breaks the spell and allows him to orient himself within a space whose special property it is to generate spectacles. Like Mercier's narrator, who meets the ghost of Louis XIV and shortly thereafter wakes from his dream, al-Ṭahṭāwī catches sight of his own image and suddenly understands himself as someone out of place. Writ large, this process is essentially the same as the one that allows him to diagnose "the East" as backward vis-à-vis "the West." This diagnosis requires him to play two roles. In one sense, he is the representative of a civilization whose chief glory lies in the past: "In the time of the Abbasid caliphs, we were the most civilized, prosperous, flourishing, and respendent of countries."[47] At the same time, he is the transhistorical observer of the spectacle of history, and thus qualified to make recommendations to the East about how to catch up. In other words, he is both himself and Volney's Genius.

To help them reclaim their vanished glory, al-Ṭahṭāwī exhorts his countrymen to acquire the sciences of the French and thus to enable the good old days to come again. In the meantime, he has to put up with the harangues of Muḥammad ʿAlī, who rebukes the Egyptian delegation for slacking off:

> We have received your monthly reports and the schedules where the period of your study is recorded, but the schedules that cover the last three months are garbled, such that we have been unable to determine what you have learned in that period, despite your being in Paris, the wellspring of arts and sciences. Judging from the little you have accomplished during this interval, you have little enthusiasm for learning, and this realization causes us great distress... [48]

Not only are al-Ṭahṭāwī and his colleagues forced to play catch-up to all of Western civilization, they must also suffer the rebukes of a sovereign who has evidently internalized an important component of the post-Newtonian sense of time, namely, the idea of efficiency—that is, of measuring work in terms of the amount of it performed over a specified period of time. Whether with respect to history or with respect to Muḥammad ʿAlī's expectations, al-Ṭahṭāwī suffers

[47] Ibid., 28.
[48] Ibid., 200.

from a *décalage*, that is, a gap between where (or when) he is and where (or when) he is supposed to be. In this respect, he may be the likeliest antecedent of al-Muwayliḥī's Bāshā.

V. *Stumbling into the Future: Robida and de Tocqueville*

Al-Ṭahṭāwī's allusions to the difficulties of getting along in a new and unfamiliar place remind us that all travelers, no matter how seriously they may take themselves or their mission, will inevitably make fools of themselves because of their ignorance of local manners and customs. Similarly, time travelers, despite the high seriousness of the utopist project that spawned them, persistently skirt the edge of comedy. For the first hundred years of time-travel writing, authors largely managed to keep a straight face. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a few time-travel writers were letting the comic possibilities run riot. In the United States, Mark Twain lampooned the medieval romanticism of William Morris by sending a modern man back in time to King Arthur's court. In France, the illustrator and futurist Albert Robida (1848-1926) knowingly or otherwise did just the opposite: in his comic sketch "Jadis chez aujourd'hui" (1892), he brings people from the past forward into the present.

The hero of Robida's tale is Célestin Marjolet, a scientist who turns to supernatural inquiries when he can no longer afford the equipment needed for conventional experiments. On the premise that the past never disappears but is somehow stored in the present, like "le son emmagasiné dans le phonographe,"[49] he manages to build a time machine, which he tests by bringing Louis XIV and his court from the seventeenth century into the present. The king and his resurrected courtiers mistake the people of the 1890s for uncouth and poorly dressed provincials. Leaving the palace of Versailles, the time travelers are stupified by the sight of bicycles and omnibuses. In Paris, they gape at such spectacles as women's clothing and the Eiffel Tower. The king's ministers blame each other for initiating these changes without his approval. After a demonstration of the telephone and the phonograph, the ministers try to use the telephone to issue orders to the provinces, and Mme de Sevigny records a message to her daughter saying that she will phone her from now on. Finally,

[49] Robida 1892: 193.

Marjolet invites the king and his courtiers to board a balloon. Unfortunately, the balloon's tether breaks and the time travelers, along with Marjolet, vanish into the sky.

Robida's story illustrates the extent to which the conventions of the time-travel story had been naturalized. A century after Mercier, readers had become accustomed to characters who move back and forth along the time line. Louis and his court are not specters, and there is nothing eerie about them. On the contrary, their insistence on explaining everything in seventeenth-century terms makes them ludicrous. At the same time, the very fact that they do try to understand what has happened—and never question that all of it is somehow being staged for their benefit—confers upon them a sort of pathetic dignity. In this respect, Louis and his court resemble al-Ṭahṭāwī, who a half-century before had also visited the France of the future, no doubt considering himself—and being considered—a sort of *jadis chez aujourd'hui*. In another respect—the bruising of their aristocratic sensibilities at the hands of their enlightened children—they resemble al-Muwayliḥī's Bāshā, the resurrected nobleman who greets the manners and customs of the late nineteenth century with a mixture of astonishment and indignation.

That these attitudes were not confined to literature—much less to something as rarefied as "science fiction"—is evident from their crystallization of a sensibility whose origins can be traced back not only to Mercier's post-Revolutionary hangover but also to another, equally archetypal French experience of visiting the future: Alexis de Tocqueville's 1831 tour of the United States. For de Tocqueville, post-revolutionary America offered an opportunity to play the role of Mercier's voyager in time. The chronokinetic character of his trip to America follows naturally from his vision of history, according to which societies progress gradually but irresistibly toward democracy. In 1831, the great revolution is not yet complete, but "its results admit of no comparison with anything the world has before witnessed." The nation that best exemplifies the coming order is the United States, where "equality of condition" has spread further than anywhere else. Because the collapse of social distinctions is already underway in Europe, a visit to the United States amounts to a visit to the future.[50]

[50] de Tocqueville 1990 II: 331, I: 3-16.

Like Mercier's narrator, and Mercier himself, de Tocqueville finds the experience of historical change profoundly unsettling. At home, he says, the old order is visibly slipping away. Saddled with the relics of a history it has destroyed but not replaced, Europe is lurching forward with the whip of history at her back. Having studied the past and (by the time he wrote his account) glimpsed the future, de Tocqueville at least understands what is going on, but his compatriots do not. Yet his superior understanding makes their pain and bewilderment no easier to contemplate. In America, meanwhile, a new generation is being born into blissful ignorance of the burden of history. Instead of being torn between the past and the present, new Americans belong wholly to the future. "No man on the earth can as yet affirm, absolutely and generally, that the new state of the world is a better one, but it is already easy to perceive that [it] is different."[51]

Among the people he deems representative of the future, de Tocqueville finds much to admire and a few things to regret. He is favorably impressed by the "general equality of condition in America." Extremes of wealth and poverty still exist, but the principle of innate equality encourages every man to believe he can better his lot. "Great wealth tends to disappear, the number of small fortunes to increase; desires and gratifications are multiplied, but extraordinary prosperity and irremediable penury are alike unknown." Conceding that such a society is "more just," he is nevertheless dismayed by the progressive leveling of nearly everything. While few Americans are notoriously vicious, ignorant, or coarse, equally few are conspicuously virtuous, learned, or refined. "When I survey the countless multitude of beings, shaped in each others' likeness, amid whom nothing rises and nothing falls, the sight of such universal uniformity saddens and chills me and I am tempted to regret that state of society which has ceased to be."[52]

In many passages, de Tocqueville—unlike his time-traveling counterparts—confesses his attachment to the vanishing world that formed him. In America, "where the privileges of birth never existed and where riches confer no particular right on their possessors," a French retainer of the old school would be as incomprehensible as a Roman slave or a medieval serf. This change in sensibilities is to be

[51] Ibid., II: 333.
[52] Ibid., I: 3; II: 331-2.

applauded, or at least accepted as inevitable. But de Tocqueville's concession to the historical process is tempered by melancholy. With their frank and natural manner, Americans will never know servility. By the same token, they will never know nobility either. In pre-Revolutionary France, one could still be moved by the sight of "a numerous and powerful class of men whose every outward action seemed constantly to be dictated by a natural elevation of thought and feeling." However, the democratic Revolution has broken the chain of social reproduction. It is not that Americans have rejected "urbanity of manners." Rather, they have never heard of it. "It is to their minds as if such things had never been."[53]

For all his sentimental allegiance to the old order, de Tocqueville himself does not appear to have been incomprehensible to his American hosts. Even so, his figurative displacement in time can make him into a kind of apparition. This spectral quality is most evident in his account of a visit to a pioneer cabin in the wilderness—to the cutting edge of the future, so to speak—where the wildness of the place disturbs him less than the sense that he is a stranger in the Americans' world. As he approaches the cabin, the children bolt and the dogs growl—just as they will do when Washington Irving's Rip Van Winkle reappears in his ancestral village after an absence of twenty years. Similarly unsettling is the indifference displayed by his rustic host. Having asked a few questions about "what was going on in the world," he falls silent "as if he were tired of the noise and importunity of mankind." Like the denizens of Mercier's future, the American pioneer cares little for the vanished past his visitor represents.

In some ways, of course, the pioneer's world is a recognizable extension of de Tocqueville's own. Though immured in primeval solitude, his American host appears to have spent "his earlier years… in the midst of civilized society" and his wife displays "a lingering taste for dress." But the resemblances only heighten the nearly nightmarish sense of difference. The healthy and boisterous children, upon whom the careworn mother gazes "with mingled melancholy and joy, "are true children of the wilderness." One wonders what they will make of the Bible and the volumes of Milton and Shakespeare that de Tocqueville notices inside the cabin. Placed side by side with the family's rifle, deerskin, and eagle plumes, even these familiar relics

[53] Ibid., II: 169, 180, 220.

only emphasize the gulf between the ages. In this context, de Tocqueville's description of the mother and children seems to apply equally to the relationship between the old world and the new: "To look at her strength and her languor, one might imagine that the life she has given them has exhausted her own, and still she does not regret what they have cost her."[54]

By hauling the Sun King's court unceremoniously into the future, Robida confirms—albeit in a crude and overblown way—de Tocqueville's claim that the representatives of an aristocratic order have no place in the modern world. Unlike de Tocqueville, Robida tries to play the situation for laughs. Yet there is something cruel and strained about his laughter, as when his protagonist explains to the king's chef that in the modern world, live animals are fed into machines and banquet-ready dishes emerge. As if the telephone, the phonograph, and the balloon were not impressive enough, Marjolet must lie to impress his visitor, who achieves a certain dignity by replying that the machines are all very well but he prefers his little oven. For the embittered narrator of *L'An 2440*, the sooner one made it to the future the better. For Volney and Flammarion, one might see the future while nevertheless keeping one foot in the past—a past that, thanks to spectral time-travel technology, could always be revisited. It fell to de Tocqueville to explain that the headlong rush to utopia entailed an irretrievable loss. In the brave new world, survivors from the *ancien régime* can barely escape being figures of fun.

VI. *The Doubled Self: al-Muwayliḥī and al-Ṭahṭāwī*

As the preceding sections have shown, the constitutive ideas of Al-Muwayliḥī's *Ḥadīth* --spectral visitation, temporal displacement, and the use of one historical order as the basis for criticizing another—were well-established tropes in the late nineteeth century, and likely to be familiar to anyone who could read French. Al-Muwayliḥī could read not only French and Arabic, but also Italian, and probably Ottoman Turkish and English as well. I have not been able to determine whether he knew the work of Mercier, Volney, Flammarion, or Robida, or indeed whether the evidence exists to make such a determination. In all probability, he was familiar with al-Ṭahṭāwī's account

[54] Ibid., II: 362-5.

of his stay in France. What is clear, in any event, is that the *Ḥadīth* partakes of the same approaches to temporal and historical displacement as its predecessors and contemporaries. To say this is not, however, to diminish the work in any way, especially since it uses these themes in ways that are altogether unanticipated.

Muḥammad al-Muwayliḥī was born around 1858 to a family of silk merchants originally from Arabia. He was home-schooled in Arabic by an Azharite shaykh and in French by the director of the state academy of foreign languages before taking a position in the Ministry of Justice. In the aftermath of the ʿUrābī revolt of 1882, he was sentenced to death for distributing lithograph copies of a letter written by his father Ibrahim exhorting the Egyptians to stand firm against the British. When the death sentence was commuted to one of exile, he left Egypt and traveled to join his father in Europe, where he remained for three years. In Paris he befriended the younger Alexandre Dumas and helped Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī edit an Arabic newspaper. After his return to Egypt in 1887, he was appointed to a provincial administrative post but resigned to devote himself to writing. On November 17, 1898, his father's newspaper *Miṣbāḥ al-sharq* carried the first installment of his time-travel story, *Ḥadīth ʿĪsā b. Hishām*.[55]

In one of his letters to the religious reformer and political activist Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-97), al-Muwayliḥī discusses the fate of Islam in the modern world. Imagine, he says, a childless widow who has despaired of happiness and seeks solace only in death. When she looks into a mirror, she realizes that she is beautiful, and "her morbid imaginings vanish and her sorrow takes flight." This, says al-Muwayliḥī, is what has happened to Islam, which had lost its great men and fallen into despair, but then "looked into the mirror of the Caliph's favor toward [al-Afghānī]... and saw the world in all its splendor, and faith in all its grandeur."[56] In other words, Islam must confront a simulacrum of itself in order to understand itself. Perhaps it should replay al-Ṭahṭāwī's encounter with the mirror: that is, to learn from its sudden encounter with its own image the nature of the confined space in which it finds itself. Alternatively it might replay Lumen's spectral encounter with his six-year-old self, an incident that

[55] This sketch follows Rāmitsh 1980: 91-103.
[56] Ibid., 306-7.

seems to have restored a sense of unexplored possibilities. Whatever the nature of the confrontation, it is striking that the image of the mirror should recur in so many of the iconic productions of the so-called literary revival of the late 19th and early 20th centuries: *Mirʾāt al-ʿālam*, "Mirror of the World," the title of Ibrāhīm al-Muwayliḥī's *maqāmāt;* and *Mirʾāt al-sharq* or "Mirror of the East," the title of the newspaper Muḥammad al-Muwayliḥī co-edited with al-Afghānī.

In a second letter to al-Afghānī, al-Muwayliḥī uses another spectral metaphor, this one reminiscent of the title character of Flammarion's *Lumen*. Two things, he says, never cease to amaze him: the earth's revolution around the sun and al-Afghānī's tireless voyaging across the earth. Indeed, the earth itself seems too small to contain him; he belongs in the heavens. "I swear that if the stars were thinking creatures, they would weave a ladder of starlight and descend from their stations in order to bear you aloft, like a necklace at their throats, to the utmost extreme of glory and the highest pinnacle of greatness."[57] In other words, al-Afghānī should be allowed to transcend the mortal coil altogether and join the celestial intelligences who observe the earth from their lofty post in outer space, just as Flammarion's Lumen is able to do after his death.

Given his penchant for spectral metaphors, we should not be surprised to find that al-Muwayliḥī uses a ghost to open his *Ḥadīth ʿĪsā b. Hishām*. The work begins with the narrator's meditations on the evanescence of human achievement:

> ...I lay asleep and dreaming, and saw a graveyard by moonglow gleaming; so bright was the night, that one could thread pearls by the light, or catch sight of dust-motes streaming. Gravely I roamed through the graveyard alone; and as I trod upon the marker-stones, I bethought myself of man: his petty glory and his foolish pride, his vanity and his pompous stride, his self-indulgence and his self-conceit, while the grave-shaft yawns beneath his feet. He lifts his nose as if the tip could pierce the skies, but his arrogance crumbles when he dies; and his nose, once held aloft with pride in his worldly hoard, blocks up a crack in his coffin-board. Thus wrapped in thought and contemplation, I pursued my pensive perambulation...

And then the specter appears:

> ...Suddenly from behind me came a convulsion that stunned me. I turned in fear at that sound of thunder, to find that one of the tombs

[57] Ibid., 305.

> had split asunder; and from it came a man tall and fine of head, with a kingly bearing that inspired dread...[58]

The apparition turns out to be a military commander, Aḥmad Bāshā al-Maniklī, who distinguished himself in the Syrian and Crimean campaigns and was appointed Minister of War in 1862.[59] The time elapsed between his death and his resurrection by al-Muwayliḥī would seem to be some two decades. Like Mercier's time traveler, the Bāshā has slept through a major social upheaval. The most important single event would be the ʿUrābī revolt of 1882 and its aftermath, although a great many other changes, including cultural and linguistic shifts, have taken place while he was asleep. His guide through this not-so-brave new world is the narrator, ʿIsā b. Hishām, a thinly disguised surrogate for the author.

At first the Bāshā does not realize what has happened to him. He does not believe that a password is no longer necessary to re-enter the city or that the houses in Cairo are now known by numbers rather than by the names of their residents. A relic of the time when the military elite ruled with casual brutality, the Bāshā strikes a persistent donkey-driver and gets himself arrested. He spends some time in a police lock-up and is later convicted of assault. With ʿIsā's help, he secures the services of a lawyer and is acquitted on appeal. In need of funds, he tries unsuccessfully to reclaim his ancestral home and gain access to his familial endowment. Throughout these misadventures, he delivers eloquent speeches in Arabic and Turkish protesting the lack of proper respect for his person and the dismal state of Egypt in general. After the conclusion of his various lawsuits, the Bāshā recedes in importance as a character, serving as a pretext for ʿIsā to visit and comment on contemporary institutions. Although the he remains a speaking voice in the latter part of the work, his role is largely taken over by the ʿUmda, a provincial rustic who is equally prone to disastrous mishaps in his encounters with modernity.

Unlike most of its French counterparts, the *Ḥadīth* does not involve a trip by the narrator to the past or the future. Instead, like Robida's "Jadis chez aujourd'hui," it brings a personage from the past into the author's present. As an apparition raised from the dead, the

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[58] Muwayliḥī 1330/1912: 6-10 (my translation). An accurate and well-annotated translation appears in Allen 1992. Here I have preferred to reproduce the rhyming prose of the original.

[59] Rāmitsh 1980: 400-1.

Bāshā can trace his lineage back to the spectral creations of Mercier, Volney, Davy, and Flammarion, although, as Pérès notes, he is not a very good ghost: "Un ressuscité peut-it manger, boire, dormir, comparaître en justice, courir de lieux de plaisir en lieux de plaisir, faire des excursions, contracter une maladie et en réchapper, s'embarquer pour aller visiter l'Exposition Universelle de 1900 et revenir au Caire? Voilà qui ne préoccupe nullement l'auteur."[60] Despite, then, being a more complex and interesting figure than his bloodless predecessors, he is (as Lewis Carroll would call him) a mere device. At first glance, he might be read as a metaphor for the Egypt of 1898: a bumbling relic bewildered by modernity. But the story already contains many Egyptians native to 1898, including the narrator. Therefore, the Bāshā must serve another (not necessarily exclusive) purpose. One might then guess that he represents Egypt's recent and relatively glorious past and that his misadventures in the 1890's are meant as a critique of that period, not his own.

As it happens, both readings can be sustained. Unlike any of its French predecessors, the *Ḥadīth* places past and present in a relationship of dialogue that valorizes neither, at least not for long. In the following passage, for example, the Bāshā draws on his memories of a more dignified age to point out the sad state of Egyptian affairs in 1898. After he sees a drunken member of the judiciary fall off his bicycle, the Bāshā exclaims:

> If only I could go back to where I came from! … What kind of a judge can this be, if such is his appearance, and such his entourage, in full view of the common people! How can one rule a people without a grand and prepossessing appearance, an impressive array of bailiffs, and a splendid cavalcade? In my day, no judge or ruler would ride out without an entourage of servants and retainers, with soldiers and riders parading before him...[61]

Soon afterwards, the tables are turned. When the Bāshā reminds his friends that he was a rich man in his own time, his lawyer puts him in his place:

> Yes, we know that you princes and potentates spent your lives piling up the goods of this world…You wrung coins from widows and widowers, and tore food from the mouths of babes and orphans...If only your children and grandchildren had atoned for the blood you

[60] Pérès 1944: 116.
[61] Muwayliḥī 1330/1912: 73.

> squeezed from Egypt by spending their inheritance among Egyptians and thus returning to the people some of what was theirs to begin with! Instead, all of it has gone to foreigners and strangers, as if God had first sent the Mamluks to loot the country and starve its people, then sent you to pillage what the Mamluks had stolen, and finally sent your descendants to steal it from you—so that foreigners can now enjoy it full view of Egyptians who are more deserving than they of a little of it, at least... [62]

Al-Muwayliḥī's extended dialogue between past and present, of which the preceding is but one of many examples, admits the decline of Egyptian prestige since the days of Muḥammad ʿAlī. At the same time, it identifies the shortsighted policies of the Bāshā's day as the cause of the decline. In this connection, the resurrection-device works more effectively than the voice-over device beloved of Volney, Davy, and Flammarion. Rather than deliver expository monologues, the Bāshā accurately embodies (in the story-world, at any rate) the manners and morals of the people of his time. In some instances, those manners and morals inspire admiration and respect; in others, outrage and scorn. Instead of comparing a complex present to a banal utopia of his own devising, al-Muwayliḥī compares it to an equally complex past.

The *Ḥadīth* may well owe a debt to Volney's *Les ruines* for the appearance of the specter, although, as we have seen, there were several other works where such a specter might have been found. More important, however, than the question of influence is the unique reconfiguration of well-known themes and devices. Like Mercier's *L'An 2440*, the *Ḥadīth* uses temporal displacement to defamiliarize the present and thus to foreground its absurdities. Unlike any of its French counterparts, however, the *Ḥadīth* uses time travel to juxtapose two orders of history and satirize *both* of them. In this respect, it is both formally and thematically irreducible to any of the sub-types of time-travel writing practiced in French in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Bāshā resembles his spectral antecedents by mere fact of being a sort of ghost, but the similarity ends there. In the French tradition, his closest relatives are Mercier's bewildered visitor to the future and the seventeenth-century courtiers of the *roi soleil* brought to the present by Robida.

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[62] Ibid., 81-2.

In the Arabic tradition, the Bāshā has a closer relative, one whose real-life experience may have influenced, consciously or otherwise, al-Muwayliḥī's characterization: the awestruck, indignant, and eloquent observer Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī, who, like his fictional counterpart, undergoes a relatively short—though still disconcerting—translocation. Watching the Bāshā make his way through the strange new world of 1898 is quite a bit like watching al-Ṭahṭāwī learning his way about Paris. Admittedly, the two cases are different because the Ḥadīth relies on two figures, a traveler and an observer-narrator, while al-Ṭahṭāwī's travel account relies on only one. Yet the latter account is again more complex than it may seem. To achieve its balance between defamiliarization and instruction, the narrative requires two figures: a young al-Ṭahṭāwī to travel to France and an older one to describe the voyage. When, for example, al-Ṭahṭāwī reports that he did not at first understand the words of French songs,[63] there are two selves: the self who does not understand the words, and another self who—having learned French—can describe the experience of not understanding them. Just as the mirror produces a second, spectral self, certain experiences both produce and require a doubling of the self. Among these experiences is time travel, which as we have seen is no more and no less than a technique for narrating the passage of the self into modernity.

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[63] al-Ṭahṭāwī 2002: 142.

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TAʿBĪR AL-RUʾYĀ AND *AḤKĀM AL-NUJŪM* REFERENCES TO WOMEN IN DREAM INTERPRETATION AND ASTROLOGY TRANSFERRED FROM GRAECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY AND MEDIEVAL ISLAM TO BYZANTIUM: SOME PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERATIONS[1]

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The study of civilizations with a "classical" tradition is bound to reveal certain analogies between them, both in the way these civilizations approached their own past and in the way modern scholarship has dealt with them and their use of their older heritage. Among such civilizations, the combined study of medieval Islam and Byzantium can be particularly illuminating, since the medieval Arabic civilization is heir to a double "classical" tradition: its own, and that of Graeco-Roman antiquity, to which its contemporary Byzantine civilization was also heir. An important problem that modern scholars have discussed in connection with both the Greek and the Arabic Middle Ages is whether, when, and how, the existence of a "canon" of authors helped maintain intellectual continuity and a higher standard of civilization, or became a hurdle inhibiting this civilization's forward mobility. The present essay offers certain small-scale considerations fitting into this larger topic. Though it focuses on Byzantine texts, it is hoped that, for the reasons just outlined, some of its observations and conclusions can be usefully applied to the study of

[1] Offered to Wolfhart Heinrichs with gratitude and fondness for the endless intellectual stimulation that his classes and discussions have always provided, his kindness, generosity, and patience in training and mentoring an "outsider" to the field of Arabic philology, and the immense erudition, curiosity, insight, and sense of humor with which he approaches not only the Semitic world but also things ancient, medieval, and modern Greek. I have always counted my blessings for being his student, and know I will continue to do so in years to come.

medieval Arabic texts on divination and in this way help us understand classical Arabic humanities in their own terms.

Modern scholars have used with great profit texts on divination as a source for the social history of Graeco-Roman antiquity. In his *History of Western Astrology,* Jim Tester provides a fascinating two-page discussion of such issues as the social definition of mental disease, the social evaluation of heterosexual and homosexual relations, slavery, and anxiety about the dangers of travel and the varieties of violent death, all based on chapters from Ptolemy's astrological work, the *Tetrabiblos*.[2] Outside the field of strictly ancient history, Michel Foucault begins his *Care of the Self* (the third and last volume of his *History of Sexuality*) with a close reading of chapters on dreaming about having sex from Artemidoros' treatise on dream interpretation. By comparison, Byzantinists and Arabists have barely sought to answer similar questions based on texts on divination, and some reasons for this neglect can be pointed out. The most obvious one is the relative inaccessibility of these texts. In the Greek case, they tend to survive in late Byzantine and post-Byzantine manuscripts written in dense and difficult hands and remain to a large degree partially or completely unpublished. As for Arabic texts on divination, they have generally been neglected because the modern study of Islamic science has mostly focused on the "rational," rather than the "pseudo" sciences.

A second reason is the degree to which modern scholars understand ancient, Byzantine, and medieval Arabic texts as representing their contemporary reality or as repeating received tradition. For example, based on evidence from within their treatises, we know that both Ptolemy and Artemidoros lived in the second century C.E.,[3] the first in Egypt and the second in Asia Minor, though it is evident that the latter traveled widely throughout the Roman empire. To a modern scholar's mind, there is no doubt that each of these authors reflects the intellectual and social conditions of the second century directly,

[2] Tester 1987, 79-80.

[3] For the date of Ptolemy, see the introduction by Robbins in Ptolemy (1940), viii. The most recent edition of the *Tetrabiblos* (under the title *Apotelesmatika*) is Ptolemy (1998); discussion of the work's title ibid., xxxvi-xxxix. For the date of Artemidoros, see the references collected in Artremidoros (1963), xxiv. For a recent summary of the discussions aiming to date and place Artemidoros, see the introduction to Artemidoros (2002), 9-10.

and not through a distorting mirror.[4] Artemidoros, in particular, though he acknowledges his debt to an earlier tradition on dream interpretation, insists on his own critical intervention regarding the older material: he states that he recorded only what was still valid, and corrected what was inaccurate based on field work, firsthand observation, and practical experience.

The problem of the interplay between contemporary reality and received tradition, so clearly resolved for Artemidoros, must be counted as a reason for the neglect of Byzantine texts on divination as a source for social history, one that involves what Byzantinists understand as representative of Byzantine science and scientific practice, whether "rational" or "pseudo-science" (to use a distinction that is more current among modern scholars than among the Byzantines themselves). The history of Byzantine science is generally viewed as adhering to ancient authorities for its most important concepts, a phenomenon that modern scholars understand as intellectual subservience and blame for Byzantine science's lack of "originality," "innovation," and, ultimately, "progress."[5] However, as Ihor Ševčenko recently explained for Byzantine literature,[6] evaluating Byzantine cultural achievement by applying the criteria of originality and innovation is beside the point, because Byzantine intellectuals did not use these criteria as a measure in evaluating the success of their own intellectual endeavors. Ancient authorities did play a role in Byzantine scientific discussions and training; the Byzantine scientific manuscripts that preserve ancient treatises, in excerpts or in their entirety, and the quotation of ancient texts by Byzantine authors indicate as much. But how much of the activity of Byzantine scientists is an exercise in antiquarianism, and how much is it active engagement with

[4] I am referring to the famous and influential essay by C. Mango (1975), "Byzantine Literature as a Distorting Mirror"; it argues that highbrow Byzantine literature is written in a dead language that creates a certain distance between the author and the subject discussed; the result is a lack of specificity (i.e. Byzantine texts are generally deprived of markers that would betray the time and place of their production) and a dichotomy between literature and a changing reality, which, according to Mango (ibid., 17) is one of the salient features of Byzantine culture in general.

[5] Regarding Byzantine medicine in particular, see the recent summary evaluating Byzantine medical practice (where the issue of lack of originality and innovation is still brought up as a negative aspect of Byzantine medicine) by Bennett 2000, 279-91.

[6] Ševčenko 2001, 57.

the scientific problems of their day? Due to century-old developments in the field of classical philology, the student of antiquity is used to considering the texts written by ancient authors as stable, in spite of the multiple permutations of ancient technical treatises evident in medieval Greek manuscripts. Classical philology has devised a system of careful comparison and logical deduction in order to enable modern scholars to bypass the mistakes and changes that medieval scribes introduced to ancient texts and arrive as closely as possible to what came out of the pen of the ancient author. However, texts on divination belong to a larger category of technical treatises that were subject to far greater scribal intervention than the various ancient literary classics for which the editorial criteria of classical scholarship were developed.[7] Byzantine scribes, who were often copying technical treatises for their personal use, tended to excerpt, rephrase, and incorporate their own comments on ancient texts, practices which account for the fragmentary state in which some of the ancient technical authors survive, to the frustration of classical scholars. Similar scribal practices were already current in antiquity, as some comments by at least two second-century authors, Galen and Artemidoros, indicate.[8] What has not been fully realized and certainly not exploited enough by Byzantinists is that much of the history of Byzantine science, including divination, can be gleaned from exactly the same characteristics of Byzantine manuscripts containing technical treatises that may cause a classical scholar's frustration. Further proof of the active engagement of Byzantine scientists with the problems of their day and their desire not to limit themselves to what they had received from antiquity are the Byzantine translations of Arabic scientific texts from Arabic, Latin, and Persian, from the tenth century until the end of the Byzantine period.[9] It is hoped that

[7] See Beck 1961, 425-510; also the comments in Mavroudi 2002, 91-2.

[8] Galen complains that scribes have mistreated his works by adding, subtracting, or changing the text; see Galen (d. ca. 200 C.E.), XIX *De libris propriis* 8, 1-12, 2; for a French translation of the Greek text, see Moraux 1985,153. In the final paragraph in Book II of his *Oneirokritika,* Artemidoros requests of those who will hold his treatise in their hands not to add or remove passages and consider that the god Apollo is guardian of the work's integrity; see Artemidoros (1963), 203; Artemidoros (2002), 204 (with further comments).

[9] For a discussion of Byzantine translations from Arabic into Greek, mainly until the tenth century, see Mavroudi 2002, 392-429; for the later period, see Mavroudi in press A.

the role of these translations for the history of Byzantine science will come into sharper focus as more of them are published.[10] But, for the social historian who would attempt to use scientific texts, not only those produced, but also those used by the Byzantines, the ancient and the Arabic material pose the following problem: there is evidently a great difference between the social reality of ancient and medieval times; and Christian Byzantium and Medieval Islam did subscribe to different social practices. Is it true then that Byzantine scribes and practitioners of the applied sciences considered it worth their while to copy, study, and evidently rely on, texts applicable to situations indeed divorced from Byzantine reality?

For Arabists, the degree to which texts reflect reality versus received tradition is a less acute and somewhat different problem than for Byzantinists. Part of the explanation for the discrepancy is, of course, the fact that Byzantine texts and manuscripts have been heavily used as a warehouse for the recovery of ancient Greek material, while Arabic texts and manuscripts have served the same goal less frequently.[11] The effort to retrieve ancient material from medieval manuscripts implies a modern expectation that medieval scribes and scholars would have done no more than simply copy and rehash ancient authorities; the advantage of operating under this assumption is that it facilitates the process of salvaging "pure" ancient material from the medieval sources. Since Arabists rarely have the luxury of a critical edition at their disposal, they resort to manuscripts more frequently than Classicists or Byzantinists and as a result tend to be more attuned to problems of textual criticism and the intersection between written and oral tradition.[12] For this practical reason, as well as a host of theoretical considerations, it has been easier for Arabists

[10] A major step forward is the publication of the "Corpus des astronomes byzantins" under the directorship of A. Tihon since 1983; nine volumes have appeared to date. For the scope of the project, see the introduction by Tihon in N. Gregoras (d. ca. 1360), *Calcul*, 7-8; also Tihon 1981 and Browning 1981, 3-64.

[11] For example, see the debate on whether or not the ninth-century Arabic translation of Artemidoros (known to us from a single Arabic manuscript of the thirteenth or fourteenth century) could be of value for a critcal edition of the Greek text. Rosenthal (1965) argued that the Arabic translation is practically useless for textual criticism; however, other scholars have repeatedly used the Arabic text in order to emend the Greek; see Pack 1967, Pack 1976, Browne 1984, Browne 1990, Breen 1988, Bowersock 1995, 145-7.

[12] For a discussion, see Humphreys 1991, 34-6.

than for Byzantinists to identify and discuss the "originality" of the civilization they are studying. Regarding medieval Arabic technical treatises, the question whether isolated authors (or even the body of this literature as a whole) reflect "original" thinking based on real practical experience or tradition received from a revered authority cannot be addressed without reference to the Greek texts translated into Arabic in the course of the 9th and 10th centuries. Modern surveys of medieval Arabic technical literature emphasize its indebtedness to ancient Greek (that is, "Western") sources and, in spite of focusing on instances demonstrating its "originality," tend to interpret them as the result of isolated ingenious individuals whose writings did not resonate widely in the Islamic world.[13] Taking exception to this line of thinking, Dimitri Gutas has recently asserted that the Greek-to-Arabic translation movement was inspired not by a rapprochement with Greek ideas but by the Abbasid emulation of Iranian (therefore "Eastern") political ideology; and that its most important result was not the translations themselves, but the ideas and works generated as a consequence.[14] This thesis removes the implication that the Arabic-Islamic civilization is culturally dependent on or indebted to the West.[15] Evidently, a major difference between the Byzantinist and Arabist discussion of "originality" is that, for Byzantinists, the problem never becomes one of juxtaposing the "foreign" with the "indigenous," although the existence of Byzantine translations of Arabic texts into Greek could generate such a consideration.

Technical literature and within it texts on divination can be very telling about social attitudes. They inform us what their authors (and by implication the society around them) considered ideal about its male and female members in terms of outward appearance, moral standards, sexual behavior, and attitudes towards money and material possessions (though not necessarily in that order). They also include deviations from the ideal norm that evidently did occur within the same society. Further, they allow us to conclude whether the clientele

[13] See, for example, Ullmann (1978, 64-71) on the movement of the blood and the contribution of Ibn al-Nafīs; anatomy and the understanding of the skull's bone structure by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf.

[14] Gutas 1998.

[15] For a more detailed discussion of this thesis and its implications, see Mavroudi 2006.

expected to request a diviner's services is male or female (though sometimes, given the types of questions asked, the sex of the inquirer is immaterial). In my attempt to discuss this information I will concentrate on examples regarding women taken from a limited number of treatises on divination, dealing with only two of its many facets, dream interpretation and astrology. These represent an arbitrary selection from among several possibilities, chosen mainly for their availability and accessibility due to their publication; the ability to date them to a given century; and finally, the advantage of knowing something about their sources, knowledge necessary for navigating the complexity of the issues just outlined.

I will start with books on dream interpretation and compare the second-century treatise by Artemidoros (also referring to elements of Foucault's discussion on the same text) with two Byzantine works: the so-called *Oneirocriticon of Achmet*,[16] a tenth-century book on dream interpretation compiled on the basis of at least two, and possibly three, different Arabic dreambooks (*kutub fī taʿbīr al-ruʾyā*), at the same time adapting the Muslim interpretations for Christian readers of Greek; and the dreambook of emperor Manuel II Paleologos (r. 1391-1425).[17] The *Oneirocriticon of Achmet* and Artemidoros share a number of similar interpretations, but these ended up in the medieval Greek text in a round-about manner. Artemidoros was translated from Greek into Arabic in the ninth century and was widely used as a

[16] Achmet (pseudo-, d. ca. tenth century), *Oneirocriticon.*

[17] Manuel Paleologos (d. 1425), *Oneirocritēs Manuēl tou Palaiologou*, ed. Delatte. Modern scholars have expressed doubts about emperor Manuel's authorship of this work because the rest of his surviving literary production is more "high-brow" in its content and linguistic register. The fragmentary state of the dreambook's manuscript tradition indicates that the surviving text might be a version considerably removed from the original; see Mavroudi 2002, 142. The title of the work is not particularly helpful in illuminating this problem: the genitive case in *Oneirocritēs Manuēl tou Palaiologou* can be understood as "dreambook for" or "dreambook by Manuel Paleologos"; see also the arguments in Calofonos 1990, 454. However, there can be no doubt that this dreambook, even if not written by Manuel, was produced and used in Byzantine courtly circles, especially as it mentions names and incidents in the lives of known Byzantine aristocrats; for example, the dreambook tells us that Alexios Apokaukos was warned in a dream about the imminent unexpected death of his son-in-law (chapter 11, ed. Delatte 514, 10-18); the circumstances of this death (without the dream) are described by Kantakouzenos (d. 1354), *Historiarum* 3.71, ed. Schopen, 435 and can be dated to the year 1343 (seven years earlier than Manuel's birth in 1350).

source by Arabic authors on dream interpretation whose works, in their turn, became the source for the *Oneirocriticon*.[18] Manuel Paleologos, on the other hand, seems to have relied directly on the Greek Artemidoros for all elements that the two have in common.[19]

Artemidoros addressed the first three of the five books constituting his treatise to his friend Cassius Maximus, whom modern scholars have identified as the distinguished orator Maximus of Tyre; the remaining two he addressed to his own son by the same name, Artemidoros, evidently a professional dream interpreter like his father, who was advised to keep their content to himself in order to have a comparative advantage over his colleagues and professional rivals. The identity of the dedicatees notwithstanding, the average client that Artemidoros' father had in mind was, as Foucault already pointed out,[20] male and relatively well off (that is, he owned a household, slaves, and a business). However, Artemidoros (and every dream interpreter in his tradition, including the medieval Arab dream interpreters, the author of the *Oneirocriticon of Achmet* and Freud himself) emphasizes that the correct interpretation of a dream is completely dependent on the sex and social position of a dreamer;[21] therefore, the dreams of women, as well as those of the immensely rich, the excessively poor, and slaves, are also recorded, even if only occasionally and as an aside.

The same can be said of the average dreamer in medieval Arabic dreambooks (including the early 11th c. work by al-Dīnawarī ad-

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[18] For references to modern literature on the Arabic translation of Artemidorus and a summary of the conclusions by contemporary scholars, see Mavroudi 2002, 135-42; also Lamoreaux 2002, 47-51. For a detailed discussion of the connections between Artemidoros, Arabic dream interpretation, and the *Oneirocriticon,* see Mavroudi 2002.

[19] To cite but a few examples pertinent to women: Manuel's chapter on wells, cisterns, and vessels (Manuel, ed. Delatte, 512) interprets these dream symbols as women; the same is done in Artemidoros i.66 (wells), ii.27 (cisterns), i.66 (vessels). Manuel interprets partridges as women (ed. Delatte, 513, 19), as in Artemidoros ii.46. Manuel interprets apples and peaches as an amorous affair (ed. Delatte, 514); this is similar to Artemidoros i.73. Manuel interprets an oil lamp (*kandēla*) as a woman (ed. Delatte, 519, 27); similarly Artemidoros i.74.

[20] Foucault 1992, 7. For a summary of Foucault's discussion and a comparison with medieval Arabic books on dream interpretation, see Mavroudi in press B.

[21] On the importance of knowing the identity of the dreamer for ancient, Byzantine, and medieval Arabic dream interpretation, see Mavroudi 2002, 151-6. On the importance of knowing the identity of the dreamer for both Artemidoros and Freud, see Artemidoros (2002), 39-40; and Chrysanthopoulos 2005, 175-6.

dressed to the reigning caliph)[22] and in their Byzantine offspring, the *Oneirocriticon of Achmet* (even though this compilation, based on material translated from Arabic into Greek, was likely commissioned by a tenth-century Byzantine emperor).[23] The dreambook of Manuel Paleologos, significantly shorter than Artemidoros and the *Oneirocriticon,* also addressed a primarily male dreamer (a female dreamer is mentioned only twice),[24] though its target audience seems to be members of the aristocracy resident in Constantinople: in other words, a much more limited social stratum than the other dreambooks.[25]

Artemidoros, toward the end of his book one, gives a series of chapters on sexual intercourse that Foucault used to great advantage in order to dissect second-century attitudes towards sex.[26] Briefly, explicitly, matter-of-factly (the way a good technical manual is expected to do) and without passing moral judgement, Artemidoros discusses dreaming of heterosexual or homosexual intercourse and other forms of sexual encounter with a wide array of partners, including spouses, prostitutes, other known and unknown men and women (either dead or alive), male and female slaves, one's children, one's siblings, one's mother, and animals. Artemidoros organizes these chapters according to what he considers as natural and licit, illicit, and unnatural, and makes it clear that he only condones the missionary position.[27]

Ptolemy, Artemidoros' contemporary, covers some of the same ground in a chapter of his *Tetrabiblos* titled "On partnerships" (*peri synarmogōn,* book 4, ch. 5). In the first two thirds of this chapter Ptolemy explains how to cast astrological predictions regarding prospective partners in the legal institution of marriage (which he calls "*nomimous symbiōseis"*). In Tester's words, "the virtues of a good

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[22] al-Dīnawarī, Abū Saʿīd (or Saʿd) Naṣr b. Yaʿqūb (d. ca. 1020 C.E.), *Kitāb al-Qādirī fī l-taʿbīr*; see the discussion of this author by Lamoreaux 2002, 59-64.

[23] See Mavroudi 2002, 59-62.

[24] Chapter 32, on a woman ornamenting herself (Manuel, ed. Delatte, 520); chapter 39, on being pregnant (ibid., 522), though the indefinite pronoun "*tis*" could be applied to both a man and a woman dreamer.

[25] Cf. chapter 6, ed. Delatte 512, 8-11; chapter 8, ibid. 512, 27-28 (visiting the imperial palace); chapter 27, ibid. 518, 15 ff. (visiting the church of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople); ibid. 519, 6-15 (receiving orders or honors from an imperial or aristocratic person); etc.

[26] Foucault 1992, 3-36.

[27] Artemidoros i.78-80.

wife are dignity, industriousness, and managerial ability; it is a bonus if Venus makes her also beautiful and charming, or Mercury bestows intelligence. Husbands should also be dignified and industrious, and practical; the corresponding bonus is to be neat and handsome. And thrift is a virtue in both husband and wife."[28] In the last third of the same chapter Ptolemy envisages the possibility of a man having incestuous intercourse (*synerchesthai*) with his mother, maternal aunt, stepmother, daughter, daughter's sister, or daughter-in-law, and of a woman doing the same with male relatives of the equivalent degree. Male and female homosexuality and bisexuality are also discussed, though definitely not condoned. Sex with a social inferior, a slave, or a foreigner is clearly disapproved of. The ideal sexual behavior, according to Ptolemy, is for men to be "cleanly and decorous in love and [...] aim only at its natural use" or at least be "easily roused and passionate, [but be], however, continent, hold themselves in check, and avoid unseemliness,"[29] though men who are "cautious, hesitant, and frigid"[30] do not make the cut; for women the ideal is to be "temperate and pure in love," or at least "easily aroused and full of desire, but generally cautious, hesitant, and avoiding turpitude."[31] Effeminate men, eunuchs, sterile women and "women without passages" (*atrētoi*) are lumped together in one group; men who have lost their genitals (*apokopoi*) and lesbians (*tribades*) are together in another.[32]

Compared with Artemidoros and Ptolemy, Byzantine texts on dream interpretation and astrology are more reticent, though they do not, of course, completely shrink from treating topics considered taboo by a strict Christian moralist. The topic of sexual intercourse in the *Oneirocriticon of Achmet* is discussed not in a separate section as in Artemidoros, but in two lengthy chapters titled "On women according to the Indians" and "On women according to the Persians and Egyptians."[33] Sexual intercourse is also occasionally mentioned in chapters that have nothing to do with women, such as in the two chapters on dreaming of "the dead, and death, and burial";[34] or the

[28] Tester 1987, 79.

[29] Ptolemy (d. second century C.E.), *Tetrabiblos,* ed. Robbins, 405. The English translation quoted here is the one by Robbins.

[30] Ibid., 405.

[31] Ibid., 407.

[32] Ibid., 404.

[33] Chapters 127 and 128, Drexl 76, 10-82, 8.

[34] Chapter 131, Drexl 85, 26-86, 2; 88, 23-4.

two on bestiality;[35] or in the chapter titled "On faith, according to the Egyptians," that includes dreaming about having intercourse with the Pharaoh.[36] In the two chapters of the *Oneirocriticon* on women, sex is an important, though not the only, activity connected with them. These two chapters discuss women in order of social importance: older women first, younger next, and then prostitutes and concubines. Occasionally men and children (though not necessarily in a sexual context) appear in the two chapters on women. One's lawful wedded wife is discussed in the same paragraph as prostitutes and concubines, though she does receive more attention further in the chapter as mother of the dreamer's children, or as someone whom the husband adorns, or at least clothes (Drexl 81, 8 ff.). A fornicating wife and a fallen virgin daughter are also mentioned (Drexl 80, 24-81,2). Dreaming of having sex with one's mother and sister is briefly interpreted (Drexl 81, 3-4). Homosexual sex with a young man or a eunuch is a possibility, though it is best not to be caught (Drexl 79, 1-4); another possibility is finding out that a woman one is having intercourse with has male, instead of female, genitals (Drexl 77, 20-24). Maxims summarizing the relation between husband and wife are offered a few pages apart. They are seemingly contradictory, but to this day anyone familiar with Mediterranean societies knows that both of them can be true at the same time: "A woman is a man's power and authority" (Drexl 74, 8: *Hē gynē tou andros dynamis kai exousia esti*); and "and the head of the woman is the man" (Drexl 81, 14-15: *Kephalē gar tēs gynaikos ho anēr*), a statement lifted almost word-for-word from St. Paul (1 Corinthians, 11:3: *kephalē de gynaikos ho anēr*). It is significant to point out that the neighboring chapters in the *Oneirocriticon* discuss flirtation and matchmaking, as well as the wedding party, vaguely linking the sexual with the legal and ceremonial aspects of marriage (a logic that the *Oneirocriticon* clearly inherited from its Arabic sources).[37] Unlike this arrangement, Artemidoros discusses intercourse in the context of a series of chapters on things that make life pleasant and are connected with evening symposia: food, perfumes, dancing, singing, wearing a wreath, copulating, sleeping; end of Book One. Women and matrimony belong to

[35] Chapters 133 and 134, Drexl 89, 12-90, 5.

[36] Chapter 14, Drexl 11, 24-6. The reason for this peculiar placement is discussed in Mavroudi 2002, 147.

[37] See Mavroudi in press B.

a totally different part of the work. The aristocratic dreambook of Manuel Paleologos is less clearly arranged, at least in the version that we have it, so no conclusions can be drawn from the position of chapters relevant to women;[38] in addition, it contains no explicit reference to sexual intercourse. Sexual desire (implicitly heterosexual) is discussed as a generally pleasant experience, though acting on the impulse of and fulfilling this desire is a folly; especially in women, but also in men, it is synonymous with moral destruction.[39]

In all three Greek dreambooks vessels, wet cavities or cavities holding water, beds and bedding, stools and, generally, objects on which one sits or mounts are, as a rule, interpreted as women. This, of course, does not qualify Artemidoros and the Byzantine authors as pre-Freudians; it only demonstrates the degree to which Freud himself was influenced by the symbolic language developed by his predecessors, and especially Artemidoros, whom he mentions explicitly in his *Interpretation of Dreams*.[40] The inferior social position of women with regard to men is reflected in the fact that a woman

[38] Manuel's *Oneirokritēs* survives in two MSS: *Paris. gr.* 2419, on which Delatte's edition of the text is based; and *Leidensis Voss.* 49, where the sequence of chapters is different than the one in the Paris MS; see the comments in Mavroudi 2002, 142.

[39] For example: "Apples and peaches are interpreted as an amorous affair. But for the prudent (*sōphronas*) they can indicate the pleasure and delight derived from something else that is desirable, or an attraction (*kinēsin*) even in their case, resulting from a chance narration of the said amorous affair" (Manuel, ed. Delatte 514, 29-515, 3); "Rose bushes indicate women who are desirable (*gynaikas erōtikas*) and whose joy is infectuous through their words alone, not by way of their deeds" (ibid. 515, 14-16); "an oil lamp (*kandēla*) is interpreted as a woman; if it is extinguished, the woman is either going to die or lose her virtue (*sōphrosynēn*); if a virgin lives in the house and the oil lamp is extinguished by a flying bird, the virgin will be corrupted by a stranger, because the light of the oil lamp represents the lit torch (*lampada*) of her soul" (ibid., 519, 23-8); "if someone dreams that he lost his broad-brimmed hat, if he is still a virgin he will lose what constitutes his virtue (*to tēs sōphrosynēs eidos autou*) and will fall into debauchery (*akolasia*)" (ibid., 521, 9-14). Cf. also kissing the child of a woman who is not one's wife (ibid., 522). The English translation of Manuel's text by Oberhelman (included in the bibliography) was unavailable to me; the above translations are my own.

[40] Older scholarship in the twentieth century had observed the similarities between Artemidoros, Freud, and Jung and interpreted them not as the result of Freud's and Jung's direct knowledge of Artemidoros, but as elements of modern "truth" that Artemidoros managed to approach, even if imperfectly, eighteen centuries ago; see, for example, Bender 1965, 355-69. For a critique of this teleological approach, see Price 1986, 3-37; see also the discussion in the introduction to Artemidoros 2002, 40-1.

wearing male clothes and holding male paraphernalia, such as arms, is generally interpreted positively; however, if a woman carries out exclusively male tasks that would make her the focus of public attention, such as the duties of a priest, it signifies a scandalous divorce and/or public ridicule, the implicit social expectation evidently being that a decent woman keeps away from the public eye.[41] A man wearing female clothing and carrying out female tasks is considered inauspicious.[42] It is also significant that in all three Greek dreambooks, from the ancient to the Late Byzantine, the interpretation of genitals pertains exclusively to the male pudenda, with the sole exception of Artemidoros, who mentions female genitals in passing twice, and even then they occur in the dreams of men.[43]

Predictably, given the *Oneirocriticon*'s textual derivation from Arabic sources, the content and organization of Arabic dreambooks on the topic of women is closest to the equivalent chapters of this Byzantine work than to Artemidoros;[44] yet, since Artemidoros is directly or indirectly at the background of both the medieval Arabic and Byzantine Greek manuals, there is considerable overlap in the ancient, Byzantine Greek, and medieval Arabic attitudes towards women. Undoubtedly, the experience of sexuality and gender was very different in the Graeco-Roman, Byzantine, and Islamic world. At the same time, dreambooks from all three civilizations consistently convey the importance of male dominance and sexual penetration, and a different degree of social acceptance reserved for the ac-

[41] Chapter 11, Drexl 7, 11-12; chapter 139, Drexl 92, 1-7. For an analysis of this last instance in the context of Arabic dreambooks, see Mavroudi 2002, 298-9.

[42] For men and women wearing each other's clothes, see chapter 266, Drexl 218, 1-24. For men carrying out female tasks, see chapter 262, Drexl 215, 20-216, 6.

[43] A man dreamt that his wife lifted her dress and showed her genitals to him, a gesture indicating contempt and signifying the troubles that she brought upon her husband (Artemidoros iv.44); for a man, dreaming that he was completely transformed into a woman has the same significance as dreaming that he only had female genitals, or clothes, or shoes, or ornaments (ibid., iv.83).

[44] For an extensive presentation of the portrayal of women in two medieval Arabic dreambooks based on the chapters on birds and humans, see Lutfi 2005. The author draws her observations from the fifteenth-century manual by Ibn Shāhīn and the *Muntakhab al-kalām fī tafsīr al-aḥlām* attributed to Ibn Sīrīn, in fact a work by Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn b. Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm al-Khalīlī al-Dārī that was written some time between the early eleventh century and 1214; for further clarifications and bibliography on this author, see Mavroudi 2002, 27-8. For a considerably shorter discussion of women in Arabic dreambooks and comparisons with Artemidoros, see Mavroudi in press B.

tive and passive role in male homosexuality, which can partly explain why and how it became possible for both the Byzantine and the Islamic civilizations to appropriate not only Artemidoros, but also a large body of Graeco-Roman medical and other technical literature.[45]

If we now turn to astrology, compared with Ptolemy, Byzantine astrologers also appear to be more reticent (though not exactly prudish) and divide their attention differently. To pick an example at random, John Kamateros' twelfth-century political verses titled *Eisagōgē kata meros astronomias dia stichou* ("Partial Introduction to astrology through verse," evidently a mnemonic device to help comit to memory condensed and elementary astrological principles) and dedicated to emperor Manuel I Komnenos (r. 1143-80), include four different chapters titled "On marriage" (*Peri gamou*), a term very different from Ptolemy's title "On partnerships (*Peri synarmogōn*).[46] The first three of these chapters (vv. 1789-1814;[47] 2559-90; 2591-2614), each approximately 25-30 verses long, concentrate exclusively on what a man would want to know about his future wife that could make marrying her pleasant, difficult, or impossible; besides contracting a good and socially and financially advantageous marriage, there is talk of wives who do not love their husbands, plot against and cheat on them, and in the end desert them (1789-92); wives who are arrogant, prone to anger, disobedient and disrespectful, sometimes calling names, beating, or pulling their husband's hair (1797-1801); there is talk of "having" a slave or a concubine and marrying a virgin or a widow (1802-8). Particular attention is devoted to the couple's prospect of having children, the possibility of divorce and of the woman presenting herself and passing as a virgin,

[45] For a summary of the attitude on gender evident in Byzantine books on dream interpretation, see Oberhelman 1997, a study that does not spell out the textual connection between Artemidoros, the *Oneirocriticon,* and Islamic manuals on dream interpretation, yet is useful for its broad discussion, abundant references to secondary literature, and appendix with translations from the Byzantine sources. On gender in Arabic dreambooks, see Lutfi 2005.

[46] Kamateros, *Eisagōgē astronomias,* ed. L. Weigl. The earlier sources of each section in Kamateros' work are noted by Weigl in the critical apparatus to this edition.

[47] The source of this section of Kamateros' work is Maximus, *Peri katarchōn,* though not the Homeric hexameters directly, but most likely the Byzantine prose paraphrase "a", ed. Radici Colace 1988 (on the basis of several manuscripts); earlier edition only from MS *Laurent. gr.* 28.34 by Ludwig 1877, 79-96. The prose paraphrase "a" is, in terms of both structure and vocabulary, particularly close to Kamateros' text in this chapter.

though she is not one (2614). Kamateros' fourth chapter on marriage (2615-2727), significantly longer than the other three at 112 verses, pays some attention to eliciting from the stars information that the bride would wish to have, but again the main point of view espoused is that of the groom. Successful and unsuccessful childbearing and rearing, as well as negatively evaluated sexual appetites of the partners are mentioned (the woman can be "*polykoinos kai sichantos,*" i.e. "sleeping with many men and disgusting" and the man a homosexual, "*arsenokoitēs*"). It is also possible to cheat on one's spouse with a boy. But the main preoccupation of this chapter seems to be the legal and financial consequences of marriage, including the transfer of the bride's dowry and divorce.

The issue of the differencies and analogies between Ptolemy and Kamateros (who wrote yet another treatise on astrology in classicizing language and is known to have used ancient astrological authors)[48] is too complicated to be discussed here. One might be ready to recognize in John Kamateros' predictions preoccupations that can be understood as particularly fitting for the bourgeois and the urban aristocrats of the Comnenian era, in other words Kamateros' expected clientele.[49] At the same time, one cannot fail to notice that even today somebody contemplating marriage (or a long-term relationship for that matter) might consider it advantageous to have in advance the same type of information regarding a prospective partner.

The question of whether the situations discussed in texts on divination correspond to Byzantine reality becomes especially interesting in the case of translations from Arabic into Greek and, as far as women in particular are concerned, the treatment of polygamy, an institution

[48] Among Kamateros' sources one can count the aforementioned Maximus, author of the *Peri katarchōn,* an astrologer alive between the second and the fourth century (it is unclear whether Maximus the astrologer is the same as Maximus of Ephesus, the neoplatonist philosopher and teacher of Julian the Apostate); Hephaistion of Thebes, a fourth-century epitomist of earlier astrological authors, including Ptolemy; John the Lydian, a sixth-century bureaucrat at the court of Justinian; and the seventh-century astrologer Rhetorios of Egypt. For references to studies discussing Kamateros' sources, see Kazhdan 1991.

[49] It would be easier to imagine Kamateros' clientele if his own identity could be ascertained; this task is made difficult by the fact that the name Kamateros is quite common. John Kamateros is usually identified with the imperial bureaucrat who became archbishop of Bulgaria ca. 1183 and/or the rhetorician by the same name who wrote an address to the emperor ca. 1186; see Kazhdan 1991. On Kamateros, see also Radici Colace 1988, 29-30.

known in the Islamic world, where up to four legal wives are allowed, but not practiced as such in Christian Byzantium. I will focus on two texts, the aforementioned *Oneirocriticon of Achmet* and, for astrology, the Greek translation of Abū Maʿshar's *On the Revolution of the Nativities (Peri tēs tōn etōn enallagēs),*[50] prepared, like the *Oneirocriticon,* in the tenth century, and chosen for discussion here because it is the only one among several such astrological translations to have received a critical edition of its full text.[51] Polygamous relations are mentioned in both Greek texts, and are immediately detectable by anyone familiar with this Islamic institution; this seems to be the reason why references to polygamy are generally left out (along with a lot of other material) of the *Oneirocriticon*'s abridgement that survives in an eleventh-century Greek manuscript.[52] In the full version of the *Oneirocriticon*, references to polygamy are not limited to the chapters attributed to the "Persians" and "Egyptians" (which openly advertise that they contain "pagan" material), but also extend to the chapters attributed to the "Indians" (chapters that generally set forth a number of overtly and recognizably Christian interpretations).[53] Abū Maʿshar's *On the Revolution of the Nativities* does not make distinctions concerning the provenience of its material in its chapter titles, though it explicitly states that it incorporates Indian (in this case Hindu, not Christian) methods.[54] In order to review a sample of how

[50] On Abū Maʿshar, see Sezgin 1979, 139-51 and 328-9; for a list of his works and an identification of the Arabic originals with the surviving Byzantine translations into Greek, see Pingree 1970.

[51] Abū Maʿshar 1968, ed. Pingree. This edition comprises the tenth-century Byzantine translation of the first five books (from among the originally eight or nine) of Abū Maʿshar's work titled *Kitāb Taḥāwīl sinī al-mawālīd*; see Pingree 1970, 37, no. 19. On the thirteenth-century Latin translation of the Greek version and its sixteenth-century printed edition, see Abū Maʿshar 1968, ed. Pingree, vi. For a brief discussion on how Islamic religious terms were rendered from Arabic into Greek in the Byzantine translation, see Mavroudi 2002, 252-4.

[52] See Mavroudi 2002, 92-8.

[53] E.g., chapter 68, Drexl 43, 13-24. On the purportedly Persian, Egyptian, and Indian sources of the *Oneirocriticon,* as well as the "pagan" attitudes registered in its Persian and Egyptian chapters and the Christian point of view espoused in its chapters labeled as "Indian," see Mavroudi 2002, 41-62.

[54] Abū Maʿshar, ed. Pingree, 170, 6-180, 11; ibid., 12, 6-7 mentions the use of astrology by the Babylonians, Persians, Indians, and Egyptians. Throughout the body of his work, Abū Maʿshar refers to Indian and Persian sources; these designations do not belong to a realm between reality and literary phantasy, as in the case of the *Oneirocriticon,* but are applied to genuine such material.

its references to polygamy read (at least in its Greek rendering, since the Arabic text remains unpublished), it is advantageous to focus on the chapter explaining the astrological influence of planet Venus when it is dominant (*chronokratōr*) and subject to no malignant influence (*akakōtos*), because this planet is understood as bestowing a predominantly feminine influence when present in a nativity (ed. Pingree, 96, 18 ff.): "When Venus is dominant [...] ‹the person under its influence› will be in good cheer (*en euphrosynē*) and ‹will enjoy› amusements, listening to music, having intercourse, wearing clothes, and using perfume; he will be in the company of friends, will make additional friends, marry a woman (*syzeuchthēsetai gynaiki*) and adorn himself (*chrēsetai kallōpismois*)." Under the influence of Venus and Mercury together, he will "welcome amusements and delights (*paidias kai hēdonas*) and his children and women will multiply. He will also be in the company of educated and beautiful women, and will merrily occupy himself with them and with adornment [...]." Under the combined influence of Venus and the Moon (a doubly feminine influence), "he will enjoy himself with his own and other women, and might even fall in love with boys and take part in amusements." Depending on the position of the Moon in relation to Venus, "his wealth will increase but he will be grieved because of women and pleasures." Alternatively, "he will be loved by many and will do well financially; but again he will be grieved because of marriage and women,[55] will have intercourse (*synousiasei*) with women of humble birth, and will do well as far as his mother is concerned." Or "he may be grieved because of women and children," or "he will be cheerful and easy to amuse and will struggle for women besides his own (*agonisthēsetai peri allotrias gynaikas*), disdaining and neglecting his own women."

As mentioned earlier, passages such as these immediately speak volumes about the Arabic provenience of the text to anyone familiar with the institutional structure and culture of Islamic societies, and especially to anyone already aware that this is indeed a translation from the Arabic language. But does this render the results of the astrological influences expounded in this chapter useless in the context of Byzantine society? Though in Byzantium only one legal marriage was recognized, the institution of concubinage (*pallakeia* or *agra-*

[55] In Greek: *lypēthēsetai dia gamon kai gynaikas*; no definite article or possessive pronoun, grammatical markers that could serve as allusions to a monogamous situation, are provided in the Greek text.

phos gamos), a stable sexual relationship, often between a married man and a woman of lower status, did exist.[56] Roman law considered it legal, though Byzantine emperors and jurists from the early to the late Byzantine period adopted changing policies regarding concubines and their offspring, recognizing their rights to a varying degree. However, the continuous mention of the phenomenon in legislation, either to forbid it or to delineate its legal implications, is certain proof that it never ceased to exist, if not always as a valid legal category, at least as a constant social reality, achieving, no doubt, varying degrees of social recognition depending on the social status of the parties involved, regardless of what strictly legal sources decreed about its validity in any given century. Specifically in the environment of the imperial court, it is well known from the narrative sources that Byzantine emperors time and again used their illegitimate children to contract marriage alliances for diplomatic purposes. So in reality a Byzantine man could have more than one woman. The language of astrological and divinatory treatises was often deliberately opaque for more than one reason (much like the language of diviners today). Through its vagueness, it allowed for a number of different yet similar situations to be described under the same rubric and therefore eased the transfer of the translated treatises from the Muslim cultural and institutional context to the Christian one.

The same qualities in the language of ancient Greek treatises on divination must have made it possible for their predictions still to make sense in the changed institutional, societal, religious, and legal reality of the medieval period. The texts' continuous ability to function practically even within the context of Byzantine society, and not their antiquarian pedigree, must have been the reason why Byzantine practitioners of dream interpretation, astrology, and other forms of divination, returned to ancient texts time and again, in order to study and excerpt them, and even use them as sources for their own compositions. The same reasoning can help explain the continued presence of excerpts from Artemidoros and al-Dīnawarī in later Arabic literature on dream interpretation, as well as the constant recourse to Abū Maʿshar's authority by astrologers writing or practicing in Arabic a few or even several centuries later.

[56] Herrin and Kazhdan 1991.

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TAḌMĪN
THE NOTION OF "IMPLICATION" ACCORDING TO AL-RUMMĀNĪ

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ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā al-Rummānī (d. 384/994) was a Muʿtazilī grammarian whose major extant work is *al-Nukat fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, a treatise on Qurʾānic stylistics and an early elaboration of the doctrine of the Muslim scripture's "inimitability" (or "incapacitation"). *Al-Nukat* was significant for several reasons, one being the formulation of metaphor involving a transfer between a basic, original meaning and a new usage of a word based on a similarity.[1] "For the first time," in the words of Wolfhart Heinrichs, "we come upon the characteristic terms 'basic, or proper, meaning' (*aṣl al-lugha*) and 'transference' (*naql*) which became prominent and almost ubiquitous with later authors."[2] This theory of metaphor is one of several ways in which al-Rummānī, throughout his writings, explores and emphasizes the semantic ranges of words and expressions.

Among the rhetorical features comprising the Qurʾān's eloquence (*balāgha*) in *al-Nukat* is one al-Rummānī calls *taḍmīn*. Literally "inclusion" or "insertion," it is commonly used to indicate poetic enjambment or the poet's insertion of another's words into his verse. In some instances it was used for the incorporation of Qurʾānic verses or

[1] al-Rummānī, *Nukat*, 79. On his other works, see GAS VIII: 112-4; GAS IX: 111-13.

[2] Heinrichs 1977, 40.

references, while other scholars of grammar and rhetoric used it to explain certain semantic changes.[3] Al-Rummānī's *taḍmīn* is something quite different, more a property of language than a rhetorical device. In *al-Nukat* he defines *taḍmīn* in speech as "the occurrence of a meaning contained within [the speech] without the mention of any noun or adjective that can be taken to express it" (*ḥuṣūlu maʿnan fīhi min ghayri dhikrin lahu bi-smin aw ṣifatin hiya ʿibāratun ʿanhu*). There are, he says, different types of "inclusion," one of which is unique to divine speech, and he claims to have explored this for every verse of the Qurʾān in a work entitled *al-Jāmiʿ li-ʿilm al-Qurʾān*. [4] Some modern discussions of *taḍmīn* have considered the theory proposed by al-Rummānī, and in doing do have had to rely on *al-Nukat*.[5] His Qurʾān commentary (*tafsīr*), which goes by several titles (including *al-Jāmiʿ* , mentioned above), has been neglected. What follows is an examination of an extant MS fragment of that commentary. The first part is a general discussion of the MS; the second is an exploration of what it may tell us about al-Rummānī's concept of *taḍmīn*.

I. *Extant Manuscript Fragments of al-Rummānī's* Tafsīr

The Muʿtazilism of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā was nothing unusual for his time; in fact that affiliation was quite common among scholars of language in the Iraq of the fourth/tenth century. Al-Rummānī, however, was regarded with suspicion not for his theological views but for his strange views on language and the often convoluted ways in which he expressed them. Chief among the complaints was the apparent use of logical and philosophical ideas in grammar. As Yāqūt (d. 626/1229) reports: "He mixed his discussion of grammar with logic such that Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī (d. 371/981) said, 'If grammar is as al-Rummānī says, then we know nothing of it, and if grammar is as we say, then he knows nothing of it.'"[6] One of his extant works, the *Kitāb al-Ḥudūd fī l-naḥw*, a short work on grammatical terms, demonstrates al-Rummānī's divergent conception of many basic features of Arabic

[3] See van Gelder 2000; Sanni, 1998, Gully, 1997.

[4] al-Rummānī, *Nukat*, 102-4.

[5] The best discussion of al-Rummānī's *taḍmīn*, which does make use of his other works, is that of Carter (1984), 228-30.

[6] Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-udabāʾ*, XIV: 74-5.

grammatical theory.[7] Whatever his idiosyncrasies, however, there is nothing to suggest that he was considered beyond the boundaries of acceptable orthodoxy; on the contrary, he was very much a member of the contemporary intellectual milieu of Baghdad, and counted among his teachers and students some of the most important figures of the time.

Although he is best known today for *al-Nukat fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, in the biographical dictionaries pride of place seems to go to his *tafsīr*.[8] This Qurʾān commentary goes by slightly varying titles: *K. Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-majīd*,[9] al-*Jāmiʿ fī ʿilm al-Qurʾān*,[10] or simply *al-Tafsīr*[11] or *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr*[12] and al-Rummānī himself, in *al-Nukat*, referred to it as "*al-Jāmiʿ li-ʿilm al-Qurʾān*."[13] but in no source is there more than one such work listed. However, in 1963, Māzin Mubārak published a useful work on al-Rummānī as a grammarian. There he listed two separate works, one a *tafsīr*, the other with *ʿilm* in the title, a work on qurʾānic philology.[14] This listing of two titles subsequently found its way into the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* and elsewhere.[15] It is, I think, clearly an error that has no basis in the sources, and seems to have been provoked by the idea that *ʿilm al-Qurʾān* in the title suggests something broader than *tafsīr*. The most appropriate conclusion is that of Sezgin, who sensibly lists it as "*al-Ǧāmiʿ fi ʿilm* (oder *tafsīr*) *al-Qurʾān*."[16]

Al-Rummānī's Qurʿān commentary has not been published and is not known to have survived in its entirety. There are five existing fragments thought to be from Rummānī's *tafsīr*.[17] Each covers a different portion of the qurʾānic text. Of the five, one said to contain the tenth section of the *tafsīr* is in Tashkent, and I have no further infor-

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[7] See al-Rummānī, *Ḥudūd*, and examples in Carter 1984. The *Ḥudūd* has been translated with numerous suggested emendations and very useful indices arranged by root in Troupeau 1985 and 1983.

[8] The *tafsīr* is singled out by Ibn al-Anbārī (d. 577/1181), *Nuzhat al-alibbāʾ*, 318, and in Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437), *Ṭabaqāt al-muʿtazila*, 110.

[9] Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-udabāʾ*, XIV: 75.

[10] Ibn al-Qifṭī (d. 646/1248), *Inbāh al-ruwāt* II: 295.

[11] al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), *Bughyat al-wuʿāt* II: 181.

[12] Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 874/1470), *al-Nujūm al-zāhira,* Cairo, IV:168.

[13] al-Rummānī, *Nukat*, 103.

[14] Mubārak 1974, 56, 94-99.

[15] Flanagan 1995, 614.

[16] GAS VIII: 112.

[17] *Ibid.*, 112-13, 270.

mation on it. A second exists in Cairo, in the Khizāna Taymūriyya (tafsīr 201), bearing the title *Tafsīr juzʾ ʿāmm*. A third is from Jerusalem (Masjid al-Aqṣā 29), available on microfilm in Cairo (Maʿhad al-makhṭūṭāt, Microfilm Collection 18), covering the twelfth section of the tafsīr. More will be said about the Cairo and Jerusalem MSS below. A fourth is owned by the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (arabe 6523), treating the seventh part. An apparently recent discovery is the existence of a fifth fragment, in the British Library, which I have not been able to investigate.[18]

The Jerusalem and Cairo MSS have been studied, or at least perused, by a handful of Middle Eastern scholars, none of whom were able to look at the Paris fragment. For my part, I have seen only the Bibliothèque Nationale MS, which was put to good use by Daniel Gimaret in his attempted reconstruction of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī's (d. 303/915) *tafsīr*, but to the best of my knowledge has been otherwise ignored.[19]

BN arabe 6523 consists of 190 folios in generally legible, pointed *naskh*. The title appears only as "Tafsīr al-Rummānī" and "Tafsīr al-Qurʾān lil-Rummānī." An ownership statement claims that it was acquired in Aleppo in the year 700/1300-1. It is the seventh part (*juzʾ*) of the *Tafsīr*, covering the qurʾānic text from Q. 3:55 (*idh qāla llāhu yā ʿĪsā bna Maryama innī mutawaffīka*) to Q. 4:11 (*yūṣīkumu llāhu fī awlādikum lil-dhakari*).

Al-Rummānī presents his exegetical material in dialectal form, that is, each point is discussed in a loose question-and-answer format (*yuqālu….wa-l-jawāb…*). There are no *isnād*s. Names of very familiar early exegetes appear, such as Ibn ʿAbbās, Mujāhid, al-Suddī, Qatāda and Ibn Jurayj. Another frequent name is a Muʿtazilī figure of a later generation: Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī. There is some treatment of variant readings of the Qurʾānic text, but usually this is related to a grammatical point, and not presented merely for the sake of preserving the correct reading, as one finds in other commentaries. Occasions of revelations are given frequently, inserted into the question-and-answer framework, introduced by the phrase, "Was this verse sent down for a [particular] reason?"

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[18] I am informed that it may be found in *Arabic Manuscripts in the British Library* (Leiden: IDC Publishers, 2002), which to date I have not seen.

[19] Gimaret 1994. Cook 2000, 201, referred to the MS for al-Rummānī's verdict on Q. 3:104.

As we would expect from a Muʿtazilī grammarian, the vast majority is devoted to theological and philological topics. In terms of theology, not every verse of the Qurʾān is directly relevant to Muʿtazilī doctrine. The main or predominant dogma, occurring with the greatest frequency, is the justice of God, and to a lesser degree, the denial of anthropomorphic interpretations (although al-Rummānī does not always address these issues[20]).

Al-Rummānī's Qurʾānic exegesis is of interest (like all of his writings) for its illumination of the intersections of grammar, language and Muʿtazilism in the fourth/tenth century. However, it is also important for its place in the history of scriptural interpretation in Islam, especially for our knowledge of Muʿtazilī approaches to the Qurʾān and for Imāmī Shīʿī exegesis, which was shaped significantly by Muʿtazilī commentaries. It has been variously claimed, for instance, that al-Rummānī's *tafsīr* was the basis for the *Kashshāf* of al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) as well as the *Tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān* of Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī (d. 459/1067), the great Imāmī scholar. If al-Rummānī's own commentary did not achieve the fame and longevity of these and others, it nonetheless played a formative role in later tradition, which has preserved many of his exegetical opinions, and it is worthwhile to consider that role.

The claim that al-Rummānī's *tafsīr* formed the basis for the much better known Muʿtazilī commentary of al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, has been based on the MS of the Taymūriyya collection in Cairo, the *tafsīr juzʾ ʿamm* attributed to al-Rummānī. Passages of this work correspond very closely to the *Kashshāf*, and this has led several scholars to suspect that al-Zamakhsharī made extensive use of al-Rummānī's commentary.[21] That there is a connection between the Taymūriyya MS and the *Kashshāf* seems beyond doubt, to judge from the snippets reproduced in the secondary sources. What these snippets also reveal, however, is that it is highly improbable that the attribution to al-Rummānī is correct, and although some have accepted it, most have been suspicious of the attribution.[22]

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[20] For example, the "hand of God" [Q. 3:73] goes unaddressed in the *Tafsīr*, ff. 23a-24b.

[21] Makram 1970 is the most unambiguous, accusing al-Zamakhsharī of unconscionable plagiarism.

[22] Al-Juwaynī, *Manhaj*, 85-9 and Makram 1970 accept the attribution, although the former expresses some reserve. More skeptical are Mubarak 1974, 97-9 and al-

The Taymūriyya MS demonstrates a lack of Muʿtazilī content and a reliance on ḥadīth that we would not expect from al-Rummānī. Another, even more decisive reason for rejecting the attribution becomes evident when one looks at the Jerusalem microfilm. The form and content of the microfilm fragment, again to judge from the snippets in the modern secondary sources, are perfectly consonant with that of the Paris MS, and both of those fit what we know of al-Rummānī's *tafsīr* from its citation in other sources. Further, these two fragments bear little *direct* resemblance to al-Zamakhsharī's *Kashshāf*.

The alleged connection between al-Rummānī and al-Zamakhsharī may be in part a matter of association. The field of "Muʿtazilī *tafsīr*" is a small one, dominated by the *Kashshāf*, but one name that appears consistently alongside al-Zamakhsharī's, as a perpetrator of this dangerous practice, is that of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā al-Rummānī.[23] It would seem that it was this association, rather than direct dependence, that lay behind the remark of the historian Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 874/1470), that al-Rummānī wrote a *tafsīr* that was very valuable despite its frank Muʿtazilism, and that "al-Zamakhsharī followed his path and exceeded him" (*salaka l-Zamakhsharī sabīlahu wa-zāda ʿalayhi*).[24] Given the lack of direct evidence, one should not assume that "*salaka ... sabīlahu*" indicates anything more than composing a *tafsīr* with a Muʿtazilī orientation.

This is not to deny that there may be some reliance by al-Zamakhsharī on the exegesis of al-Rummānī, but the efforts necessary to establish such a connection have not been made. A comparison of the two works is complicated by the fact that the *Kashshāf* is a very different type of *tafsīr*, not least in its being considerably shorter and not aiming to present an encyclopedic commentary on the Qurʾānic verses. Also, the *Kashshāf* is so distinctive in its own style; it is not readily apparent how the equally distinctive thought of al-Rummānī might be manifest in some tangible way. At least one modern scholar, Murtaḍā Āyat Allāh-Zādah al-Shīrāzī, has claimed that

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Shīrāzī 1977 (324). All of these include citations from the MS in question. GAS VIII: 270, also called it an error, but did not elaborate.

23 E.g., al-Suyūṭī, *Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn*, 10.

24 Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira* IV: 168, and taken up by GALS I: 175, "Sein *al-Ǧāmiʿ fī tafsīr al-qorʾān* wurde seiner muʿtazilitischen Tendenz wegen von az-Zamaḫšarī benutzt und erweitert."

al-Zamakhsharī made extensive use of al-Rummānī on linguistic and theological matters, but presented them in "simple and elegant style." He bases this judgment on a comparison of the *Kashshāf* with al-Ṭūsī's *Tibyān*, the latter thought to depend heavily on al-Rummānī.[25] The claim is certainly worth consideration, but would require a more sustained investigation than al-Shīrāzī provides.

The view that Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī relied heavily on al-Rummānī in composing the Imāmī commentary *al-Tibyān* brings us to MS arabe 6523 of the Bibliothèque Nationale. Daniel Gimaret is the only scholar, as far as I am aware, to have made significant use of the Paris manuscript, and he was seeking only to reconstruct the lost *tafsīr* of the early Muʿtazilī Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī. He extracted all references to al-Jubbāʾī's exegetical opinions from later, mostly Muʿtazilī and Imāmī works such as that of al-Ṭūsī, al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101), al-Ṭabrisī (d. 548/1153), al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044), and Ibn Ṭāwūs (d. 664/1266). In doing so, Gimaret made the discovery, which he voiced in strangely vehement terms, that the content of al-Ṭūsī's *Tibyān* corresponded to that of al-Rummānī's *Tafsīr* ("…ce commentaire [*al-Tibyān*] n'est en grande partie qu'un plagiat pur et simple de celui de ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā al-Rummānī…"). Gimaret did admit that the "plagiarism" was not consistent, and that al-Ṭūsī had added other material, and in some areas, was quite different.[26]

Gimaret is correct in that al-Ṭūsī's *tafsīr* is virtually identical to that of al-Rummānī for this section (Q. 3:55 to 4:11). Al-Ṭūsī (barely) disguises the question-and-answer format, abbreviates some discussions, uses different terminology and naturally includes specifically Imāmī material, but there can be no doubt that he was basing his commentary on al-Rummānī's text.

There is nothing so unusual about this. Another of Gimaret's main sources for his reconstruction and the other major work of Imāmī exegesis, al-Ṭabrisī's *Majmaʿ al-bayān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān*, is similarly composed almost entirely of passages from al-Ṭūsī's *Tibyān* and *al-Tahdhīb fī l-tafsīr* of al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī. Such borrowing was clearly quite commonplace and unobjectionable. Moreover, al-Ṭūsī announced in the introduction to the *Tibyān* that of the commentaries including a variety of exegetical material from a range of Islamic sci-

[25] Shīrāzī 1977, 326-32.
[26] Gimaret 1994, 24.

ences, "the most proper" are those of Muḥammad b. Baḥr Abū Muslim al-Iṣfahānī (d. 322/934) and ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā al-Rummānī.[27]

As Gimaret admitted, the "plagiarism" was not constant, and one of the most interesting differences is that despite the nearly identical texts, al-Ṭūsī occasionally refers to the opinion of al-Rummānī. That is, it appears al-Ṭūsī was able to distinguish between a common pool of exegetical material and statements that could be attributed specifically to ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā himself. A similar situation obtained with al-Jubbāʾī's lost *tafsīr*. It is not readily apparent from Gimaret's reconstruction, but in the Arabic texts one can usually tell the difference between an interpretation of Jubbāʾī himself, and his support or approval of someone else's gloss, so clearly the lost *tafsīr* of al-Jubbāʾī resembled in composition the one of al-Rummānī in that it was composed only in part of "original" material attributable directly to the author of the commentary. (This is not, of course, to deny the role of the exegete in selecting, organizing and editing the contents.)

Another indication that there are two types of content is terminology. Al-Rummānī in his grammatical works used a number of idiosyncratic grammatical terms. These do not appear consistently throughout the *tafsīr* fragment, indicating that some of the exegetical material did not originate with al-Rummānī. But if the nature of the composition of this *tafsīr* is less than clear, it nonetheless does not seem to be unusual. Ibn al-Nadīm in the *Fihrist* says that most of what al-Rummānī wrote was taken down by dictation,[28] and perhaps this was a significant factor in the composition of the *Tafsīr*, though it is difficult to attain any measure of certainty here.

II. *Features of the Content of al-Rummānī's* Tafsīr

Turning to the contents of al-Rummānī's *Tafsīr*, one finds, as expected in a commentary from a Muʿtazilī grammarian, a deep interest in language. Now, obviously the majority of Qurʾān commentaries display an appreciation for questions of language. The Muʿtazilī ap-

[27] al-Ṭūsī, *Tibyān* I: 1-2. Abū Muslim al-Iṣfahānī was an important Muʿtazilī figure of his day; his *tafsīr* has not survived but as with al-Jubbāʾī and al-Rummānī, his opinions are found throughout later texts. See GALS I: 334-5; Madelung 1982, 340-1.

[28] Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 385/995 or 388/998), *al-Fihrist*, 69 (*wa-aktharu mā yuṣannifuhu yuʾkhadhu ʿanhu imlāʾan*).

preciation shows itself in a concern with the origins and nature of speech.[29] There are three main areas or themes: (1) the designation of names, the potential variation of the meanings of names and, to a lesser degree here, the relation of names to the things named; (2) the treatment of speech as a human action, not a divine act; and thus (3), logic and rationalization of the rules governing human speech, and apparently governing God's speech and actions as well.

That al-Rummānī's *Tafsīr* displays these qualities and addresses these themes one could probably guess without having seen the MS. More useful, and more difficult, is to describe how these tendencies appear in the commentary itself. The following remarks are an attempt to give some idea of the contents in the context of what we might call Muʿtazilī philology. Al-Rummānī is said to have described his Qurʾān commentary as "a garden from which one may gather such fruits as one desires."[30] I cannot describe all the different fruit samples growing in al-Rummānī's exegetical garden, but I will make some general observations before moving to the topic of *taḍmīn*.

The individual. Among the notable features of the *Tafsīr* is that the point of view or frame of reference is the individual, by which I mean that al-Rummānī's comments on the Qurʾānic verses deal with the import of God's word from the perspective of the individual reader/auditor or believer. References abound to what goes on inside hearts and minds. This contrasts with the *tafsīr* tradition at large, which pays greater attention to the Muslim *umma* in general or to the Muḥammadan context of the revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*, prophetic history or other forms of transmitted knowledge). These elements (prophetic history, consciousness of the *umma*) are of course present in al-Rummānī, but they occupy a subordinate place.

Choice. A constant refrain in these folios, and one related to the focus on the individual believer, is the matter of one's choices, the intellect's choices, in determining the correct path to the truth. "The intellect is the path of knowledge," he says in various formulations, and knowledge is the way to the truth.[31] Similarly, those who have gone astray, the unbelievers, have not followed the given indications, or in some instances, have consciously suppressed them. The consis-

[29] See on this topic, ʿAbbās 1971, 66-8; Versteegh 1977, 149-61; Versteegh 1997, esp. 127-39, and, on al-Rummānī's own interests in these areas, Carter 1984.

[30] Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Ṭabaqāt al-muʿtazila*, 110.

[31] See, for example, his commentary on Q. 3:63, 64, esp. 65, 73, etc.

tent terms are *dalla* / *yadullu* and *dalāla* recurring throughout, indicating the need for some kind of intellectual exertion, some process of inference.[32] The *Tafsīr* expresses a familiar theme of Muʿtazilī exegesis: the reliance on transmitted materials is frowned upon; those who do this are like the ass carrying books.[33]

Rhetorical effect. Another, related, way in which al-Rummānī treats the individual is his analysis of rhetorical effects. In his treatise on *iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, he defined eloquence (*balāgha*) as "the conveyance of meaning to the heart in the most beautiful verbal form" (*īṣālu l-maʿnā ilā l-qalbi fī aḥsani ṣūratin mina l-lafẓ*).[34] This emphasis on the form (*ṣūra*) in which meaning is conveyed is quite evident in the *tafsīr*. For example, at Q. 3:159 he discusses cases in which a particle such as *lām* has been inserted for unclear reasons. There are two levels of explanation here. On the one hand, it may be for emphasis (*tawkīd* or *taʾkīd*); in a line of poetry it may be for metrical reasons. These reasons are not quite enough for al-Rummānī; these devices, he says, "are all in the service of making stronger the meaning in the heart." [35] Similarly, he often discusses words and their semantic significations in terms of their effects on the *nafs* of the auditor.[36] This is especially important because it reveals a very active view of semantic range, one that is quite clearly based on a deep attachment to conventionalism of designation in language, whereby utterances may take on differing significations according to a variety of circumstances, including the level of the individual speaker.

II.1. *The Notion of* Taḍmīn *in al-Rummānī's* Nukat *and* Tafsīr

But one of al-Rummānī's most interesting and original propositions was his notion of *taḍmīn*. This term was most commonly used to indicate poetic enjambment or more precisely, the occasion in which the meaning or signification of a verse is made apparent only in the succeeding line or lines. Amidu Sanni calls this feature, which may be syntactic or semantic, "grammatical *taḍmīn*," to be distinguished from

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32 See on Q. 3:61, 65, 77, etc.

33 *Nukat* on Q. 62:5.

34 *Nukat*, 75. On al-Rummānī's use of the term *ṣūra*, see Tüske 1995, 253-5.

35 On Q. 3:159, see al-Rummānī, *Tafsīr*, f. 127b. See also al-Ṭūsī, *Tibyān* III:31.

36 E.g., *ẓuhūr al-maʿnā fī l-nafs* (*Tafsīr*, f. 7b); *ḥuḍūr al-maʿnā fī l-nafs* (*Tafsīr*, f. 9a), etc.

two other types. The second he labels "rhetorical *taḍmīn*," which is the insertion of quotations (from others' poetry or prose, or the Qur'ān), and the third, "hermeneutical *taḍmīn*," or, "entailment,"[37] which has also been translated as "implicitness."[38] This last type was the topic of much discussion among grammarians and rhetoricians. Adrian Gully calls it "implication of meaning," and while it could take a variety of forms, it basically consisted of a word (usually a verb) taking on the meaning of another. One of the most common types is a verb becoming transitive by the use of a preposition that does not usually have that effect. The varieties of "implication of meaning" share qualities with other concepts such as restoration (*taqdīr*), suppression (*iḍmār*), elision (*ḥadḥf*), and metonymy (*kināya*). It is interesting that many examples of this *taḍmīn* are found in the Qurʾān, and at least in part it may have been devised to deal with Qurʾānic anomalies.[39] Al-Rummānī would not use *taḍmīn* for such examples, as seen in his treatment of the preposition *ilā* in Q. 4:2, *wa-lā taʾkulū amwālahum ilā amwālikum*. Here the meaning of *ilā* (usually "to" or expressing an end or limit of space or time) should be understood as *maʿa* ("with"), and this is *taqdīr* (restoration) as opposed to *taḍmīn*.[40]

However, there is a particular kind of this "implication" whose origins lie solely (as far as we know) with al-Rummānī, and which is associated in a very important way with God's language in the Qurʾān. There are, as we shall see, fundamental differences between the "implication" of al-Rummānī and that of others: Michael Carter called al-Rummānī's *taḍmīn* "the most original and potentially the most fruitful (or dangerous)" of the ideas put forth in the *Nukat*.[41]

For most grammarians and literary theorists, *taḍmīn* is a rhetorical device. For al-Rummānī it is a property of language. There is an aspect of *taḍmīn* which is unique to God's speech, as we shall see, but the term is also applicable to the language of mortals. In one of his grammatical works, the *Ḥudūd*, he discusses "the indication by

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37 Sanni 1998.

38 al-Jemaey 1987, 75-6, 171-3.

39 Gully 1997, *passim*. Gully's useful article, which does not mention al-Rummānī, concentrates on grammarians and rhetoricians; interestingly, Gully and Sanni (1998) have almost no sources in common.

40 al-Rummānī, *Tafsīr*, f. 175b. The same explanation, including the term *taqdīr*, occurs in al-Ṭūsī, *Tibyān* III: 101, and in al-Rummānī's own *Maʿānī l-ḥurūf*, 115.

41 Carter 1984, 228.

speech of what is elided: indication of implication exacts a meaning that is not mentioned but which one understands to be present" (*dalālatu taḍmīnin taqtaḍī maʿnan mā lam yudhkar mimmā taqdīruhu an yudhkara*). This is followed by both Qurʾānic and mundane examples, such as *And they say, 'Be Jews or Christians and you shall be guided'* Q. 2:135. Implied here in the words *be Jews or Christians* (*kūnū hūdan aw naṣārā*) is the meaning "Follow Judaism or Christianity."[42] Not a very satisfactory discussion, but these ideas are elaborated in the chapter on *taḍmīn* in *al-Nukat,* best translated in full:[43]

> "Implication" in speech is the occurrence of a meaning contained within [the speech] without the mention of any noun or adjective that can be taken to express it" (*ḥuṣūlu maʿnan fīhi min ghayri dhikrin lahu bi-smin aw ṣifatin hiya ʿibāratun ʿanhu*). Implication is of two types. [1] One is indicated by the formal context of speech (*dalālat al-ikhbār*); [2] the other is indicated by analogy (*dalālat al-qiyās*).
>
> [1] The first type is like your mentioning that something is "created" (*muḥdath*). This indicates the existence of a "creator" (*muḥdith*) by way of the formal context. There is implication in both terms, although it is clearer in the manner we have explained. Likewise in the way of [different terms for] "broken" (*maksūr wa-munkasir*) or "fallen" (*sāqiṭ* [*wa-*]*musqaṭ*).
>
> [This type of] implication is of two sorts:
>
> 1.1. Implication required by structure (*tūjibuhu l-binyatu*); and
>
> 1.2. Implication required by the meaning of an expression [i] that would not be sound without it [the implied meaning], or [ii] that is customarily attached to it.
>
> [1.1] As for that required by the same structure: the adjective "known" (*maʿlūm*) indicates that there must be "one who knows" (*ʿālim*). Likewise one who is honored (*mukram*) [requires "one who honors" (*mukrim*)].
>
> [1.2.1] As for [the implication] that is required by the meaning of an expression that would not be sound without it, it is as the adjective "killer" (*qātil*) indicates "one killed" (*maqtūl*), insofar as the idea of a "killer" does not make sense without "one killed," which is indicated by implication.[44]

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[42] al-Rummānī, *al-Ḥudūd*, 48-9, with a slightly different version on 47. See also the indices of Troupeau 1983 and 1985, s.v., *ḍ-m-n*, for other instances where meaning or function is "implied."

[43] al-Rummānī, *al-Nukat*, 102-4. I have drawn on the paraphrase from Carter 1984, 228-9, and the unpublished translation of al-Jemaey 1987, 171-3.

[44] *Ka-l-ṣifati bi-qātilin yadullu ʿalā maqtūlin min ḥaythu lā yaṣiḥḥu maʿahu maʿnā qātilin wa-lā maqtūlin fa-huwa ʿalā dalālati l-taḍmīn*. Al-Jemaey translates,

> [1.2.2.] As for the implication that is required by the meaning of an expression by way of customary usage, it is like your words, "a *kurr* [unit of measure] for sixty." The meaning here is "for sixty *dīnār*s." That is an example of something elided whose meaning is implied in speech by way of customary usage.
>
> All implication is a form of brevity (*ījāz*) that does not require detail, for it is indicated by formal context in people's speech.
>
> [2] As for the implication indicated by analogy, it is specifically a form of brevity (*ījāz*) in the speech of God, because no possible aspect of [semantic] indication can escape Him. His displaying of any aspect necessitates that He has indicated all possible aspects. This is not the case with other speakers' use of an expression, because there may be attributed to them some other meaning by way of analogy, without excluding the possibility that they had intended a conventional designation and without corruption of the normal expression.[45]
>
> Each Qurʾanic verse has an implication not conveyed by noun or adjective. Among them is *In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful*, which implies the instruction to begin one's affairs by asking for a blessing and by glorifying God through the mention of His name, and that it is among the practices of religion and a mark of the Muslims, and that it is a declaration of worship and an acknowledgment of the most supreme grace, and that it is a refuge for the fearful, and a support for the seeker.
>
> After [commenting on] each verse of the Qurʾān, we have explained [its implied meanings] in the book *al-Jāmiʿ li-ʿilm al-Qurʾān*.

The single example of Qurʾānic *taḍmīn* here, that of the *basmala*, is quite intriguing, although the treatment of the topic overall is generally terse and at times rather difficult. Al-Rummānī gives the reader more in the *Nukat*'s subsequent chapter on "distinctness of expression" (*bayān*), in which he repeats the example of *qātil* indicating a *maqtūl* as an example of structural *taḍmīn*, and I shall discuss that section below. First, though, one would like to turn immediately to the *Tafsīr* and ask if al-Rummānī actually did explain the "implication" of each verse and how he did so.

"…since *qātil* is meaningless without a *maqtūl*, although neither a "killer" nor a "killed one" may exist. This type of explicitness occurs semantically" (al-Jemaey 1987, 172). A simplified version is found in al-Sijilmāsī's (d. 704/1304) *al-Manzaʿ al-badīʿ*: *…min ḥaythu lā yaṣiḥḥu maʿnā qātilin wa-lā maqtūlin illā bih* (216).

[45] *Wa-laysa ka-dhālika sabīlu ghayrihi mina l-mutakallimīna bi-tilka l-ʿibārati liʾannahu qad tudhhabu ilayhi dalālatuhā min jihati l-qiyāsi wa-lā yukhrijuhu dhālika ʿan an yakūna qad qaṣada bihā l-ibānata ʿammā wuḍiʿat lahu fī l-lughati min ghayri an yulḥiqahu fasādun fī l-ʿibāra*.

Looking at the Paris MS of the *Tafsīr*, one finds that he indeed concludes the commentary on each verse with a sentence invariably beginning "and the verse implicitly contains / contains the implication …" (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu…*). These "implications" are independent from the glosses that precede them, although there is naturally some overlap. From more than one hundred and fifty verses, there is obviously a range of material; here follow translations of a variety of implications.

Q. 3:58

This we recite to thee of signs and wise remembrance.

[al-Rummānī, *Tafsīr* f. 7b] The verse implicitly contains the clear expression of the benefit of reciting the circumstances of the prophets and past nations, for the lessons therein, and for the reminder thereby of the wisdom and reason.

(*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu l-bayāna ʿan fāʾidati l-tilāwati li-aḥwāli l-anbiyāʾi maʿa umamihā l-khāliyati limā fī dhālika mina l-ʿibrati wa-fī l-tadhkīri bihi mina l-ḥikma*).

Q. 3:74

He singles out for His mercy whom He will; God is of bounty abounding

[f. 25b] The verse contains the implication that it is possible that [God] grants favour to some of His servants that He does not grant to the remainder of them. This is because that which is beneficial can take various forms, and because wisdom has its subtleties, without any constraints on its power (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu annahu yajūzu an y[u]nʿima ʿalā baʿḍi ʿibādihi bimā lā y[u]nʿimu bihi ʿalā sāʾ[ʾ]irihim limā fī dhālika min wujūhi l-maṣlaḥati wa-laṭīfi l-ḥikmati dūna ḍīqi l-maqdura*).

Q. 3:77

Those that sell God's covenant, and their oaths, for a little price, there shall be no share for them in the world to come; God shall not speak to them nor look at them on the Resurrection Day, neither will He purify them; and for them awaits a painful chastisement.

[f. 29b] The verse implicitly contains the threat, against the breaking of God's covenant, of a variety of punishments such as forbidding the share of the bounties and preventing their being looked upon with mercy or the favor of purification, and the execution of painful chastisement in the fire of Hell (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu l-waʿīda ʿalā naqḍi ʿahdi llāhi ʿazza wa-jalla bi-anwāʿi l-ʿuqūbati min ḥirmāni l-naṣībi mina l-khayrāti wa-manʿi l-naẓari ilayhim bi-raḥmatin aw nayli l-tazkiyati wa-īqāʿi l-ʿadhābi l-alīmi fī nāri l-jaḥīm*).

Q. 3:86

Whoso desires a religion other than Islam, it shall not be accepted of him; in the next world he shall be among the losers.

[f.41a] The verse contains the implication that every religion other than Islam is false, and one who belongs to it, shall be a loser in the next world (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu anna kulla dīnin ghayri islāmin bāṭilun wa-anna ṣāhibahu fī l-ākhirati khāsir*).

Q. 3:88

[*Their recompense is that there shall rest on them the curse of God and of the angels and of men, altogether,*] *therein dwelling forever; their chastisement shall not be lightened for them; neither will they be reprieved.*

[f. 44b] The verse implicitly contains clear expression of the eternity of the curse of the unbelievers, without lightening of the punishment or granting of respite in order to return to God (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu l-bayāna ʿan khulūdi l-kuffāri fī l-laʿnati min ghayri takhfīfin lil-ʿuqūbati wa-lā imhālin lil-ināba*).

Q. 3:94

Whoso forges falsehood against God after that, those are the evildoers.

[f. 91b] The verse implicitly contains the threat, against lying to God, of being labeled an evildoer, by way of condemnation, because anyone deserving of condemnation is among the people of the threat (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu l-waʿīda fī l-kadhibi ʿalā llāhi bi-iṭlāqi ṣifati ẓālimin ʿalā jihati l-dhammi li-anna kulla mustaḥiqqin lil-dhammi fa-huwa min ahli l-waʿīd*).

Q. 3:131

And fear the fire prepared for the unbelievers

[f. 95b] The verse implicitly contains a warning of the fire that God has prepared for him who conceals His graces, that they are deserving of it for their sins of usury and the like, that they should not delude themselves that the punishment is for the unbelievers and no others from among the sinful (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu l-taḥdhīra mina l-nāri allatī aʿaddahā llāhu jalla thanāʾuhu liman kafara niʿamahu an yastaḥiqqūhā bi-maʿāṣīhi min akli l-ribā wa-naḥwihi li-allā yaghtarrū bi-anna l-ʿadhāba innamā huwa lil-kāfirīna dūna ghayrihim mina l-ʿāṣīn*).

Q. 3:138

This is a clear expression for mankind, and a guidance, and an admonition for those who are god-fearing.

[f. 104a] The verse implicitly contains the identification of the path of guidance along with the clear expression that invites what is proper and rails against shameful acts, along with the lesson to be learned (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu taʿrīfa ṭarīqi l-hudā bimā fīhi mina l-bayān alladhī yadʿū ilā l-ṣawābi wa-yazjuru ʿan qabīḥi l-afʿāli bimā fīhi mina l-ittiʿāẓ*).

Q. 3:149

O you who believe, if you obey the unbelievers, they will turn you on your heels, and you will turn about, as losers.

[f. 116a] The verse contains a warning of the wiles of the unbelievers, for what they invite of error that they disguise and the falsehood they forge, with the despair that will follow and the punishment of the fire that will be bestowed (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu l-taḥdhīra min kaydi l-kāfirīna fīmā yadʿūna ilayhi mina l-ḍalāli lladhī yumawwi-hūnahu wa-l-bāṭili lladhī yuzawwirūnahu bimā yuʿqibu mina l-khusrāni wa-yūrithu min ʿadhābi l-nār*).

Q. 4:11

God charges you, concerning your children: to the male the like of the portion of two females, and if they be women above two, then for them two-thirds of what he leaves, but if she be one then to her a half; and to his parents to each one of the two a sixth of what he leaves, if he has children; but if he has no children and his heirs are his parents, a third to his mother, or, if he has brothers, to his mother a sixth, after any bequest he may bequeath, or any debt. Your fathers and your sons – you know not which out of them is nearer in profit to you. So God apportions; surely God is All-knowing, All-wise.

The verse implicitly specifies the inheritance of the offspring who is a parent, to individuals and to the group, following [the payment of] the bequest and the debt, in order that people deal with it in the apportioning of the legacy according to current benefit and future recompense (*wa-qad taḍammanati l-āyatu mīrātha l-waladi al-wālidi ʿalā l-ifrādi wa-l-jamʿi min baʿdi l-waṣiyyati wa-l-dayni li-yaʿmala l-nāsu bihi fī qismati l-tarikati limā fīhi mina l-maṣlaḥati l-ʿājilati wa-l-mathū*[*bati*] *l-ājila*).

The method here is indeed consistent with the concept sketched in *al-Nukat*. From the Qurʾānic wording al-Rummānī produces a meaning or an understanding not found directly in the words or expressions of the verse. The resulting implications are not as numerous as in his example of the *basmala* given above, in which he gave at least four and perhaps as many as eight different "implications." However, in each case he succeeds in clarifying or classifying a message that is

inherent in the verse but not stated explicitly (although on occasion, as with Q. 3:86 above, it amounts to little more than a paraphrase.)

As al-Jemaey put it, the hallmark of al-Rummānī's work is the idea that there remains "some meaning unexpressed at the verbal-literal level,"[46] and thus al-Rummānī demonstrates scriptural *taḍmīn* in two ways. He provides additional information regarding the verse, usually but not always relating to theological dogma. In addition, he provides a kind of semantic qualification regarding its intended purpose. For example, on *People of the Book! Why do you dispute concerning Abraham? The Torah was not sent down, neither the Gospel, but after him. What, have you no reason?* (Q. 3:65), al-Rummānī claims that the verse "implicitly contains decisive proof against the claims of the Jews and the Christians that Abraham followed their way (*kāna ʿalā sharīʿatihim*), because the Torah and the Gospel came only a long time after [Abraham]."[47] On one level, there is some elucidation here of the contents of the verse, that Jews and Christians claim Abraham as one of their own. On another level, he gives the verse its rhetorical purpose: it is to decisively disprove their claims about Abraham. These two elements, the clarification and the description of rhetorical effect, are found consistently throughout the commentary.

There is a notable repetition in the terms al-Rummānī applies to his implications. One may sort the most prominent into a few categories: admonition (*inkār*, *taqrīʿ*, *tawbīkh*), warning (*taḥdhīr*, *waʿīd*), exhortation (*waʿd*, *ḥaḍḍ, targhīb fī*), and argumentation (*ḥujja*). Thus, in addition to the information provided by the verse and that carried by way of *taḍmīn*, al-Rummānī informs of the function, or speech act, of its utterance on the reader/auditor, which is of course the basis of his elaboration of eloquence ("the conveyance of the meaning to the heart") in his *Nukat*.[48]

The reader of al-Rummānī will find here familiar ground, for the terminology and methodology recall another chapter of the *Nukat*, that on "distinctness of expression" (*bayān*) in which he expands the above-given categorization of *taḍmīn*. This *bayān* is not limited to that which can be expressed by noun or adjective; it may also be found in the arrangement (*taʾlīf*), where for example, "the servant of

[46] al-Jemaey 1987, 58.
[47] al-Rummānī, *Tafsīr*, f. 15a.
[48] al-Rummānī, *Nukat*, 75.

Zayd" (*ghulāmu Zaydin*) indicates ownership but does not mention it explicitly. It may also be found in the derivation of forms (*dalālat al-ishtiqāq*). For example, implied (*muḍamman*) in the word "killer" (*qātil*) are the words "killed" and "killing" (*maqtūl*, *qatl*). This latter example was used earlier in his definition of semantic *taḍmīn*; both indicate that language contains a surplus of significations that are not given verbal expression. The existence of one "killed" or the act of "killing" is basic informational meaning. Slightly further along, al-Rummānī presents the rhetorical classification of the types of discourse involved:[49]

> *They left how many gardens and fountains, sown fields, and how noble a station* [Q. 44:26-7]. This is an example of extraordinary distinct expression, imposing a warning (*al-taḥdhīr*) against the self-delusion that there will be granted a delay.
>
> *Surely the Day of Decision shall be their appointed time, all together* [Q. 44:40] and *Surely the godfearing shall be in a station secure* [Q. 44:51]. This is of the most beautiful examples of the promise and the threat (*al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd*).
>
> *And he has struck for us a similitude and forgotten his creation; he says, 'Who shall quicken the bones when they are decayed?' Say, 'He shall quicken them, who originated them the first time; He knows all creation'* [Q. 36:78-9]. This is the most eloquent possible expression of argumentation (*ḥijāj*).

Other examples are deemed "the most intense possible expression of censure (*taqrīʿ*)" [Q. 43:5]; "the greatest possible causing of grief and regret (*taḥsīr*)" [Q. 43:39]; "the most evident sign of [divine] justice (*ʿadl*)" [Q. 6:28]. Other key terms here are deterrence (*tanfīr*), incitement (*targhīb*) and debasement (*idhlāl*). Although this list is short, most of these terms reoccur, some more than once: *taḥdhīr, waʿīd, tanfīr, taqrīʿ, taḥsīr* and *ḥijāj*.[50]

These descriptions of *bayān* are, of course, the same terms al-Rummānī uses in the *taḍmīn* sections of his *Tafsīr*. The "implied" meanings of the Qurʾān are also those that serve to demonstrate its distinction of expression. What seems to interest al-Rummānī is less the grammatical or morphological features than the semantic range

[49] Ibid., 107.
[50] Ibid., 108-9.

of Qurʾānic expression along with its effectiveness in conveying a particular rhetorical effect, or act of speech.[51]

In the context of the *tafsīr* genre this type of comment on scriptural verses is independent of other Islamic sciences that invariably inform exegesis. Al-Rummānī's evocation of Qurʾānic implication is not backed by a scientific tradition in the way of most commentarial activity. It is a kind of speculation whose bases lack the certainty and the acceptance of other interpretational activity. It is perfectly understandable and its logic is clear, but it is al-Rummānī's own logic, not that of the community.

Michael Carter, having stressed the importance of this doctrine of *taḍmīn* in the *Nukat*, suggests that it was intended as the means "to create a systematic justification for *taʾwīl* on the grand scale," and that al-Rummānī's choice of method was "an outright rejection of the authority of exegesis *bilā kayf*."[52] I think that the *Tafsīr* supports this judgment, although with the caveat, which Carter already suggested, that despite the different method, the conclusions often did not differ substantially from much "orthodox" commentary. This is, though, a common feature of the genre, in which method and procedure are at least as important as conclusions.

While some of al-Rummānī's ideas on metaphor and Qurʾānic stylistics were influential, his "implication," unsurprisingly, was not warmly embraced. While al-Ṭūsī borrowed liberally from al-Rummānī's *Tafsīr*, he did not make use of the *taḍmīn* sections, and the concept had limited influence in subsequent generations of exegetes and literary theorists. Analysis of other forms of "implication of meaning" continued but these treated *taḍmīn* as a device with a decidedly informational function and not as a property of language. Among both grammarians and literary theorists, there was a tendency to see *taḍmīn* in strictly formal terms, with a minimal semantic import.[53]

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[51] These types of utterances come surprisingly close to John Searle's direct and indirect speech acts; see his *Speech Acts* (1969). Implication as part of a speech act has been discussed by Paul Grice, who calls it "implicature" and explains it as "the various kinds of calculations by which we make sense of what we hear"; see Grice 1975, esp. 49-58.

[52] Carter 1984, 228, 230.

[53] Sanni's "grammatical" and "rhetorical" *taḍmīn* are formal in nature (Sanni 1998), while most of the example discussed by Gully (1997) have a more prominent semantic component.

Al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) includes an abbreviated version of the *Nukat*'s chapter on *taḍmīn* in his important work on the inimitability of the Qurʾān.[54] This section was reproduced by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1506) in two of his works, *al-Itqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* and *Muʿtarak al-aqrān fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*,[55] although he gives the source only as al-Bāqillānī. But in these works al-Rummānī's *taḍmīn* is but one of a variety of concepts featured under that term.

The intervening centuries had seen al-Rummānī's *taḍmīn* appear in the works of two theorists from the Western regions of the Islamic world. These were al-Qāsim al-Sijilmāsī (d. 704.1304) in *al-Manzaʿ al-badīʿ* and Ibn al-Bannāʾ al-Marrakushī (d. 721/1321) in *al-Rawḍ al-murīʿ*. It is unlikely a coincidence that these two authors were influenced by Greek philosophy and logic.[56] Of these two, al-Sijilmāsī cites al-Rummānī by name and includes the different kinds of *taḍmīn* in his discussion, [57] while Ibn al-Bannāʾ defines *taḍmīn* in a manner similar to al-Rummānī; but he does not mention ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā specifically and seems to be providing an independent example of that theory's application: [58]

> It (*taḍmīn*) is the meanings (*maʿānī*) that are taken from what is understood of the words and their rational indication, rather than what is uttered. Some of the meanings of the utterance will be indicated by utterance (*bi-malfūẓihi*), others by understanding (*bi-mafhūmihi*), and others by intellectual discernment (*bi-maʿqūlihi*), such as His words *to the male the like of the portion of two females* [Q. 4:11]. The utterance indicates that the portion of the male is equivalent to the portion of two females. It is understood from it (*yufhamu minhu*) that the portion of the two females is to be shared equally, for the sake of separation. It is rationally discerned that the male receives the likes of two shares of the females, and to the female one half the share of the male.

Obviously, this resembles the formal *taḍmīn* of *al-Nukat* (types 1.- 2. above) in which the implication is required for the expression to retain its meaning (1.1.1., above], although Ibn al-Bannāʾ uses very different (and vague) categories. Al-Rummānī's comment on this verse

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[54] al-Bāqillānī, *Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, 412-4. Although al-Bāqillānī cited, in abbreviated form, much of *al-Nukat*, al-Rummānī is not identified but referred to only as *baʿḍu ahli l-adabi wa-l-kalām* (396)

[55] al-Suyūṭī, *Itqān* II: 817, 919; al-Suyūṭī, *Muʿtarak* I: 304.

[56] Smyth 2006, 411-2.

[57] al-Sijilmāsī, *al-Manzaʿ al-badīʿ*, 215-7.

[58] Ibn al-Bannāʾ, *al-Rawḍ al-murīʿ*, 134.

(Q. 4: 11) was given above, and the key difference is the moral message underlying the verse: "…in order that people deal with it in the apportioning of the legacy according to current benefit and future recompense."

The version of Ibn al-Bannāʾ, which uses only the informational *taḍmīn*, may be compared with a much later explanation found in the *Ṭirāz al-majālis* of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Khafājī (d. 1069/1659). Here this particular form of implication is but one (and a minor one at that) of the many types of grammatical and rhetorical *taḍmīn*, but it is very close in spirit to that of al-Rummānī. Al-Khafājī writes that "the utterance is used according to its original meaning … but there follows another meaning related to it, but not used itself, neither explicitly mentioned nor by way of restoration from another utterance, nor is it metonymy or suppression" (*ghayra an yustaʿmala fīhi dhālika l-lafẓu aw yuqaddara lahu lafẓun ākharu fa-lā yakūnu mina l-kināyati wa-lā l-iḍmār*). The literal meaning (*al-ḥaqīqa*) is retained, but there is another, related meaning or idea that takes precedence and which is conveyed by the way of its presentation (*ʿarḍ*). The first example is "you have wronged me, so you will know [that]" (*ādhaytanī fa-sataʿrifu*). The implied meaning here is a "threat" (*tahdīd*). The second is "Surely Zayd is standing" (*inna Zaydan qāʾimun*), in which the implied meaning is a "retort to the addressee" (*inkāru l-mukhāṭabi*).[59] The use of *tahdīd* and *inkār* here is closest to the *taḍmīn* of al-Rummānī, in that it goes beyond the purely informational to the effect of its conveyance or presentation on the auditor.

Al-Rummānī's implication differs from these others in several important ways. First, it is based firmly on the semantic. Al-Rummānī's attempt to distinguish between structural and semantic indications of *taḍmīn* is more theoretical than tangible, as seen by his use of virtually identical examples to illustrate each.[60] Other grammarians and theorists, though, saw "implication of meaning" as having much more formal characteristics, either by classifying shifts of verbal meaning and function according to the use of prepositions, or by classifying *taḍmīn* alongside apparently similar rhetorical features such as elision, suppression, reconstruction, figurative language, etc. Like these features, implication (especially with respect to the Qurʾān) is a strat-

[59] al-Khafājī, *Ṭirāz al-majālis*, 25.

[60] The examples using the active and passive participles, translated above, from al-Rummānī, *Nukat*, 102-3.

egy: it is used to explain a feature found in speech or in a text. It is applied in certain discrete instances of grammatical or syntactic peculiarity. While al-Rummānī too intended an "implication of meaning," it was for him a quality inherent in language, not something applicable to isolated cases.

Second, there is the matter of God. While many of the examples of this *taḍmīn* are drawn from the Qurʾān, the grammarians and rhetoricians did not consider it to be unique to divine speech. Al-Rummānī, though, states that there is a kind of *taḍmīn* that is found only in the word of God. Because God must be aware of any and all potential aspects (*wujūh al-dalāla*) of His words, each of these possible significations must be indicated. The distinction between divine and human speech, then, rests on the speaker's awareness of the possible interpretations of His or her words. (Al-Khafājī refers to intention or design,[61] but al-Rummānī does not.) It is clear from al-Rummānī's comments in the *Ḥudūd*, as well as from other grammarians' remarks, that the Qurʾān also manifests the other type of *taḍmīn*, that common to human speech. The creation of the divine category, though, is remarkable in its audacity, for it amounts to flinging wide the doors of *taʾwīl*. It appears to open up a potentially vast range of interpretation without providing sufficient critical tools for establishing the soundness of exegetical claims. If God is aware of all possible aspects, and each then seems to have legitimacy, how then to differentiate between them, and how to determine the limits of what al-Rummānī call *wujūh al-dalāla*?

It is all the more surprising (or reassuring?) then, coming to the final point, that the meanings al-Rummānī found implied in the Qurʾān were of a limited distribution. Muʿtazilism and his own logic aside, there is little that is radical or problematic. The most striking feature is the moral, if not moralizing, vocabulary that is used to describe the "implications of meaning." The terms repeated throughout (indicating admonition, warning, proof, exhortation) are those which demonstrate the "beauty of the distinctiveness of expression" (*ḥusn al-bayān*) of the Qurʾān, according to al-Rummānī in the *Nukat*.

Although one would not want to deny the radical nature of al-Rummānī's thought, his potentially dangerous hermeneutics and his fondness for shifting semantic ranges appear to be effectively held in

[61] al-Khafājī, *Ṭirāz al-majālis*, 25.

check by his fidelity to a limited number of moral tropes. (Of course, it is possible to see the moral vocabulary as mere cover for his more subversive designs, but this would be a strained interpretation: all evidence suggests that al-Rummānī was definitely not one to disguise his true intentions or to mask his differences of opinion.) At the same time, the paraenesis of the Qurʾān is supported on al-Rummānī's own rational and logical grounds.

One should consider al-Rummānī's *taḍmīn*, then, in terms of both theory and practice. On the theoretical level, his definition and discussion in the *Nukat* and elsewhere illustrate and support his rigorous if idiosyncratic logic, his understanding of the semantic levels of words and expressions, and what might be called an overall willingness to depart from tradition. Various scholars have mentioned his labored, often pedantic insistence on maintaining logical structures of his own devising.[62] These features are seen throughout al-Rummānī's extant works.

But he was equally consistent on the practical level, and one finds that when he applies his principle of *taḍmīn* to the Qurʾān, he invariably evokes one of a number of familiar modes: usually exhortation or admonition as a means inherent in the speech acts' form; at the very least a comment on the moral implications of the information conveyed in the verse. Here the "implied meanings" of the Qurʾān have the same function as the other rhetorical components of eloquence such as "distinctness of expression" (*bayān*). In practical terms, *taḍmīn* and the other elements of eloquence serve to express these Qurʾānic lessons.

That al-Rummānī saw the paraenetic nature of the scripture as paramount is clear from his writing, and it appears as well in the biographical data. It is reported that he was asked, "Every book has an epitome (*tarjama*), so what is the epitome of the Book of God?" Al-Rummānī replied, "*This is a Message to be delivered to mankind that they may be warned about it* (*hādhā balāghun lil-nāsi wa-li-yundharū bih*) [Q. 14:52]."[63] The implication of this response is manifest in his *Tafsīr* and elsewhere: that the Qurʾān is foremost a set of clear messages, and it is the purpose of its eloquence, including the special

[62] Sanni 1998, 18; Carter 1984, 219-20, 230-1; Neuwirth 1983, 177.
[63] Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-udabāʾ* XIV: 76; al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-wuʿāt* II: 319.

quality of divine *taḍmīn*, to convey these messages to the heart in a form that is both beautiful and persuasive.

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TAHĀDĪ
GIFTS, DEBTS, AND COUNTER-GIFTS IN THE ANCIENT ZOROASTRIAN RITUAL

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I. *The Avestan Ritual;* II. *Debts and Payments;* III. *The Ultimate Gifts;* IV. *The Exchange Value of Ahura Mazdā's Counter-gift*

The ancient Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism or Mazdaism, is known primarily from a collection of texts referred to as the *Avesta*. This collection contains a miscellany of orally transmitted texts—hymns to various gods and other ritual texts—that were committed to writing only toward the end of the Sasanian era, not long before the Arab conquest of Iran. The texts were composed orally, most probably ca. 1500-600 BCE, in the northeast of the Iranian-speaking territories, in the area of the modern Central Asian republics, Afghanistan, and eastern Iran. These oral compositions were at some stage memorized and then transmitted in unchangeable form for a long time after the languages in which they were composed had ceased being spoken or even understood by those who recited and heard them.[1]

The texts as known from extant manuscripts (from the 13th century CE and later) are composed in two forms of Old Iranian, one older and one later, which are therefore referred to as Old and Young

[1] See the overview in P. O. Skjærvø (2003-4), "The Antiquity of Old Avestan," *Nāme-ye Irān-e Bāstān. The International Journal of Ancient Iranian Studies* 3/2:15-41. Throughout the generations, as the Avestan languages were no longer spoken and understood, explanations of the texts must have been made in local languages. By Sasanian times, this tradition had resulted in a Middle Persian (Pahlavi) "translation" with glosses and commentary (the so-called *zand*), which, in certain manuscripts, follows each unit (sentence, part of sentence) of the Avestan text. See Skjærvø (1999), "Avestan Quotations in Old Persian?" in: S. Shaked and A. Netzer (eds.), *Irano-Judaica* IV, Jerusalem, 8-9.

Avestan. The Old Avestan texts, which are the focus of this discussion, comprise six hymns of different length, similar in form and contents to the Old Indic *Rigveda*.[2] Five of them are referred to in the *Young Avesta* as "the five *Gāθā*s [= songs] of Zarathustra" (*Yasna* 57.8)[3] and the sixth, which in the tradition is divided into seven sections (*hāiti*s), is referred to as the *Yasna haptaŋhāiti*, "the sacrifice (*yasna*)[4] in seven sections (*hāiti*)."[5] All six are ritual texts that must have accompanied sacrifices (rituals) whose purpose was to renew the existence of either the new day or the new year with their light,

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[2] The Old Avestan texts form the central part of the *Yasna*, the text that accompanies the morning ritual (*yasna*). In modern editions, it is divided into 72 sections, *Yasna* 1-72. The Old Avestan texts are *Yasna* 28-41, 43-51, 53, the Young Avestan texts the rest. Among other Avestan texts are the *Videvdad*, a mythical-ritual text dealing with pollution and cleansing; the *Yašt*s, hyms to individual deities (e.g., Miθra); and the *Xorde Avesta*, the Zoroastrian "prayer book." The *Gāθā*s are metrical poems composed in a compact elliptical and allusive style, while the *Yasna haptaŋhāiti* (*Yasna* 35-41) is in simpler non-metrical strophic form. All six have similar thematic structures, see, e.g., Skjærvø (1996), "The Literature of the Most Ancient Iranians," in: S. J. H. Manekshaw and P. R. Ichaporia (eds.), *Proceedings of the Second North American Gatha Conference. Houston, Texas, 1996*, 230-231. The much simpler Young Avestan texts are mostly composed in an octosyllabic meter. On the literary structure of the *Yašt*s, see Skjærvø (1994), "Hymnic Composition in the Avesta," *Die Sprache* 36:199-243; on the *Videvdad*, see Skjærvø (2006), "The *Videvdad*: Its Ritual-Mythical Significance," in V. S. Curtis and S. Stewart, eds., *The Age of the Parthians. The Idea of Iran, 2*, London and New York, 105-41.

[3] The "historical Zarathustra" is a left-over from pre-20th century Western historical thinking that all or most local traditions, including the Biblical and old Iranian ones, reflect actual history, beginning with the Creation and the Flood. While these early Biblical events are no longer seriously considered for historical reality, among Iranists, the *earliest* Iranian texts are still thought to detail real history, though not necessarily the *later* texts. There is, however, no objective basis for Zarathustra's historicity, nor is there any advantage in postulating it, as individual scholars will reconstruct the missing history differently. According to the Avesta itself, the sacred *Gāθā*s originated in the "world of thought" with Ahura Mazdā and were first uttered there by the deity Sraosha (*Yasna* 57.8) and were then uttered by Zarathustra in the "world of the living" (*Yasna* 9.1).

[4] Note that the term *sacrifice* is used here without the necessary implication of *immolation* of a sacrificial victim; rather it is used to denote ritual offerings to gods and other entitites in the divine world. See, e.g., J. Henninger (1987), "Sacrifice," in: M. Eliade (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. 12, London, 544-557, esp. the definitions pp. 544-545.

[5] Recent editions and translations include H. Humbach (1991), *The Gāthās of Zarathustra and the Other Old Avestan Texts*, 2 vols., Heidelberg; H. Humbach and P. Ichaporia (1994), *The Heritage of Zarathushtra: A New Translation of his Gāthās*, Heidelberg; J. Narten (1986), *Der Yasna Haptaŋhāiti*, Wiesbaden. All the translations in this article are my own.

warmth, and fecundity after periods of darkness and infertility. These texts are therefore expressions of the relationship between man and god and the role of men and gods in the functioning of the world. As in other ancient religions, this relationship is one of mutual dependency, in which each of the two parties needs the other for the world to go on as desired.[6]

I am pleased to offer this study to Wolfhart Heinrichs, who conducted the search that brought me to Harvard and whose expertise, collegiality, and friendship I have enjoyed for many years.

I. *The Avestan Ritual*

The guardians of the cosmic *order* (Avestan *aṣ̌a*)[7] are the supreme deity Ahura Mazdā, "the all-knowing (ruling) Lord,"[8] and the other deities allied with him, as well as the humans who offer him sacrifices (*mazdaiiasna*). The agents of *chaos* are the deities and other evil beings who reject Ahura Mazdā's supremacy, among them the "Lie," the cosmic deception that misinforms about the true nature of the world; the "old gods," the *daēuua*s; and the humans who offer them sacrifices (*daēuuaiiasna*). The two groups have been in conflict from before the world was made and will remain so until evil is permanently defeated and undone.

In the Zoroastrian world scheme, as represented in the *Avesta*, man in general and the poet-sacrificer (*Dichterpriester*) in particular must make a choice between which of the two sides in the universal conflict he wants to be on. The act of choosing plays a crucial role in the texts, as in the following Young Avestan text, often referred to as the Zoroastrian "profession of faith," the *Frauuarānē*:

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[6] See also P. O. Skjærvø (2005), "The Achaemenids and the *Avesta*," in: Vesta Sarkhosh Curtis and Sarah Stewart (eds.), *Birth of the Persian Empire*, London and New York, 54-9.

[7] For a survey of opinions on the meaning of this word and arguments for the meaning "(cosmic, ritual, etc.) order," as opposed to "truth," see P. O. Skjærvø (2003a), "Truth and Deception in Ancient Iran," in: F. Vajifdar and C. Cereti (eds.), *Jamshid Soroush Soroushian Commemorative Volume*, vol. II: *Ātaš-e dorun – The Fire Within*, 1st Books Library, 383-434.

[8] On the meaning of these epithets, see P. O. Skjærvø (2002a), "Ahura Mazdā and Ārmaiti, Heaven and Earth, in the Old Avesta," in: J. P. Brereton and S. W. Jamison (eds.), *Indic and Iranian Studies in Honor of Stanley Insler on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday* (Journal of the American Oriental Society 122/2), 399-410.

Yasna 11.19-12.1

staomī aṣ̌əm nāismī daēuuō
frauuarānē mazdaiiasnō zaraθuštriš vīdaēuuō ahura.ṯkaēšō
staotā aməṣ̌anąm spəṇtanąm yaštā aməṣ̌anąm spəṇtanąm

I (herewith) praise order. I scorn the old gods.[9]
I shall (now) make my choice to be someone who sacrifices to Ahura Mazdā in the tradition of Zarathustra,
discarding the old gods and choosing Ahura (Mazdā) as my *guide,[10]
a praiser of the Life-giving Immortal (gods),
a sacrificer to the Life-giving Immortal (gods).

Once he has taken sides, man and god become linked by bonds of mutual possession,[11] but the poet-sacrificer is not yet assured of success. His sacrifice must travel up to the deities in the world of thought in competition with those of rival poet-sacrificers,[12] and the outcome of the ritual and the competition determines the *rewards* for gods and men, good and bad, as established by Ahura Mazdā at the beginning of the world:

Yasna 43.5 (*Uštauuaitī gāθā*, 2nd *Gāθā*)

spəṇtəm aṯ θβā mazdā mə̄ńhī ahurā
hiiaṯ θβā aŋhāuš zą̄θōi darəsəm pauruuīm
hiiaṯ dā̊ ś̌iiaoθanā mīždauuąn yācā uxδā
akəm akāi vaŋ^{v}hīm aṣ̌īm vaŋhaoē

Thus, I (now) think *you* as life-giving,[13] O all-knowing Lord,
as I have seen you at the engendering of the new existence, when you established,

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[9] On this terminology, see P. O. Skjærvø (2002b), "Praise and Blame in the Avesta. The Poet-Sacrificer and His Duties," in *Studies in Honour of Shaul Shaked*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 26), Jerusalem, 29-67.

[10] An asterisk (*) marks more or less conjectural translations. Parentheses contain additions to make the text legible and to enhance grammatical features not in English.

[11] See Skjærvø 2005, 57-59.

[12] See P. O. Skjærvø (2001), "Rivals and Bad Poets: The Poet's Complaint in the Old Avesta," in: M. G. Schmidt and W. Bisang, eds., *Philologica et Linguistica. Historia, Pluralitas, Universitas. Festschrift für Helmut Humbach zum 80. Geburtstag am 4. Dezember 2001*, Trier, 351-76.

[13] The root *spā-/sū-/sau-* (Old Indic *śvā-/śū-/śav-*) denotes "swelling," i.e., in religious contexts, "swell with the juices of fecundity and life," hence my translations: *spəṇta-* "life-giving," *sauua-*, *sauuah-* "life-giving strength," and *sūra-* "rich in life-giving strength," causative verb *sāuuaiia-* "to make swell with life-giving strength" and its future participle *saošiiaṇt-* "revitalizer."

for the first (time), actions as fee-earning, as well as (the words) to be uttered,
(and established) a bad (fee/existence) for the bad (but) a good reward for the good.[14]

This scenario is not, however, simply a matter of *do ut des*, that is, since *I* give, *you* should also give. Rather, the mutual gift-giving, the gift exchange, is a part of a universal "deal" (*uruuāta-*) obtaining between Ahura Mazdā and his followers and constitutes an unending series of *quid pro quo* or *do et das* in mutual indebtedness between god and his creatures, starting and ending with Ahura Mazdā's cosmogonical and eschatological sacrifices.[15]

The *uruuāta*s, the mutual agreements, or deals, between gods and men, are one kind of rules that regulate the relationship between the poet-sacrificer and the divine world (adjective *uruuaθa* "someone who abides by the deals," not simply an "ally," as often translated). The others are the *dāta*s, the established rules, "laws," sets of rules for the functioning of the ordered cosmos in general, notably the natural cycles and social relationships (adjective *dāθa*), the *miθra*s, pacts or contracts between men, as well as the prototypes in the divine world (*ratu*s, adjective *ərəθβa*), to which all things in the human world must conform.

Once the poet-sacrificer in particular, but also man in general, has chosen his sides and is performing *his* part of the "deal" with the gods, he expects Ahura Mazdā and the other divine beings to be on *his* side, as well, to perform *their* part of the deal with him, and to grant him his heart's desire :

Yasna 28.10 (*Ahunauuaitī gāθā*, 1st *Gāθā*)

aṯ yəṇg aṣ̌āaṯcā vōistā vaŋhəušcā dāθəṇg manaŋhō
ərəθβəṇg mazdā ahurā aēibiiō pərənā āpanāiš kāməm

Thus, those whom you know (to be) on the side of order and good thought, following the established rules,
(and so) according to the models—fill for them, O all-knowing Lord, with attainments (their) wish! [or: I shall fill for them ...]

According to this deal, the poet-sacrificer will— most importantly— produce, by his hymns of praise, for Ahura Mazdā the *royal com-*

[14] That is, for the one of bad/good thought, speech, acts.

[15] See P. O. Skjærvø (2006), "The Avestan Yasna: Ritual and Myth," in: *Religious Texts in Iranian Languages. Symposium held in Copenhagen May Month 2002*, Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Copenhagen, 53-80.

mand (*xšaθra*) and, by the sacrificial food, the sustenance needed to invigorate the divine sphere and its inhabitants. Finally, in order for the new, re-ordered, cosmos to be born as a full-grown new living being (*ahu*), the new existence, he offers up himself and his community, their "life breaths and bones," to serve as the substance of life of the newly ordered cosmos that god is about to engender (see below).[16]

In return, Ahura Mazdā is to bring about the rebirth and revitalization of the cosmic order and the stabilization of his daughter Ārmaiti, the Earth, that is, the return of the sun, which represents the cosmic order, together with peace and well-being on earth.[17] This return of order and life will supply the material world and its inhabitants with well-being, provided by the fecundity of the earth and living beings, as well as absence of illness and untimely death and freedom from war and destruction. Because of the resulting abundance of livestock, it also guarantees that the poet-sacrificer will be paid a handsome fee (cf. *Yasna* 46.19, below).[18]

Thus, Ahura Mazdā and the poet-sacrificer constitute the two points of the ritual-mythical universe between and around which everything else is arranged. In this bipolar structure of relations between the divine and human worlds, each has his assigned job, and, until the job is done, the two remain *in mutual debt*.[19] Thus, the job is part of the elaborate system of *gift exchange* (Avestan *maga*)[20] found in

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[16] I do not know in what form the offering of bones and life breath was made. Probably, it did not, at this time, involve a realistic sacrifice of the sacrificer or of any of his parts, such as blood, as, for instance in the Mayan royal sacrifices, which were also celebrated to produce the new day. Rather, I assume that some of the items offered to the deity represented his bones and life breath, although I am unable to identify them at present.

[17] Skjærvø 2002a, 407-408.

[18] Presumably by the patron, that is, the person who pays for the sacrifice. On this individual, who is conspicuously absent from the Old Avestan surface text, at least, see Hintze (2004), "'*Do ut des*': Patterns of Exchange in Zoroastrianism," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 14:31-40. Hintze finds the patron among the individuals named in the *Gāθā*s, whose historical reality she postulates, as well as that of Zarathustra, both of which I reject.

[19] On the role of the debt in ancient Indic religion, see, e.g., Ch. Malamoud (1989), *Cuire le monde: Rite et pensée dans l'Inde ancienne*, Paris, chap. 5: "La théologie de la dette dans le brahmanisme."

[20] See M. Molé (1963), *Culte, mythe et cosmologie dans l'Iran ancien*, Paris, 156-164; H. P. Schmidt (1991), "Gathic *maga* and Vedic *maghá*," in: *K. R. Cama Oriental Institute International Congress Proceedings (5th to 8th January, 1989)*,

both ancient and modern societies and which has been identified and well studied for instance in the Greek and Old Indic literatures, but also in the wider Indo-European context.[21]

The ritual, with its acts and words, therefore represents the poet-sacrificer's and, through him, his entire community's, supreme gift to Ahura Mazdā and the other gods. By the deals determining the gift and counter-gift, the poet-sacrificer and Ahura Mazdā become mutually indebted *friends* (*friia*) and guest-friends (*asti*),[22] and Ahura Mazdā, the friend and host, is therefore obliged to provide a counter-gift that matches the gift of *his* friends, the poet-sacrificer and his community:

Yasna 43.14 (*Uštauuaitī gāθā*)

hiiaṯ nā friiāi vaēdəmnō isuuā daidīṯ
maibiiō mazdā tauuā rafənō frāxšnənəm

That which a man *obtains (and is) in possession of, may he give (it) *to a friend*.
(So give) to *me*, O all-knowing one, *your*[23] support (and) foreknowledge (of the result)...

Yasna 46.2 (*Uštauuaitī gāθā*)

vaēdā taṯ yā ahmī mazdā anaēšō
mā kamnafšuuā hiiaṯcā kamnānā ahmī
gərəzōi tōi ā īṯ auuaēnā ahurā
rafəδrəm caguuå hiiaṯ friiō friiāi daidīṯ
āxsō vaŋhəuš aṣ̌ā īštīm manaŋhō

Bombay, 220-239; and Hintze 2004 (with references). On the Avestan vocabulary for various types of rewards, see also A. Hintze (2000), *'Lohn' im Indoiranischen*, Wiesbaden.

[21] The classic work on gift-giving and the sacrifice as a gift-exchange is M. Mauss (1923–24), *Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques*, Année Sociologique, 2nd series, 1; repr. in *Sociologie et anthropologie*, Paris, 1950; transl. by W. D. Halls (1990), *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*, New York and London. A more recent work, containing a critical assessment of Mauss, is M. Godelier (1996), *L'énigme du don*. Paris; Eng. transl. N. Scott (1999), *The Enigma of the Gift*, Chicago. On the Indo-European vocabulary for the mechanisms of the excange of commodities, including gifts and counter-gifts, see E. Benveniste (1969), *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, Paris, vol. 1.

[22] On this Indo-European-type guest-friendship, see Benveniste 1969, 94-100.

[23] Note that *tauuā*, here presumably "your," is also a verb "be able" used together with *isa-* in *Yasna* 50.11, below.

I know the reason why I am weak, O all-knowing one:
(it is) because of my lack of cattle and because I have few men.
I am complaining to you: look hither at it, O Lord,
at (the kind of) support that *a friend*, having *offered (it), may give *to* (his) *friend*!
You (now) look hither (down) through order (or: because of (its) order) at the *ritual of (my) good thought!

In most cases, god's counter-gift is contingent upon his pleasure in and acknowledgement of the poet-sacrificer's performance in the ritual.[24] Thus, in return for all that the sacrifice gives him, god gives the poet-sacrificer what he needs and desires, and, once found deserving, he will be welcomed in god's house as a guest-friend:

Yasna 31.22 (*Ahunauuaitī gāθā*)

ciθrā ī hudåŋ́hē yaθənā vaēdəmnāi manaŋhā
vohū huuō xšaθrā aṣ̌əm vacaŋhā šiiaoθanācā haptī
huuō tōi mazdā ahurā vāzištō aŋhaitī astiš

They (are) brilliant for the giver of good gifts who finds by (his) *effort, by (his) thought
good (things). He there is (here and now), by (his) command, *strengthening order, by (his) speech and action.
He there, O all-knowing Lord, will be your most invigorating guest-friend.

The poet-sacrificer's gifts are material or immaterial, although the latter are, of course, no less *real* than the former. Both are elements of his conception of total reality. The immaterial offerings consist of the mental and verbal parts of the ritual, first and foremost the poet-sacrificer's good thought and everything produced by it: the perfectly ordered sacrifice; the songs and hymns of praise, which announce god's fame and thereby strengthen him and the divine realm; and the material objects offered up in sacrifice, the libations and food stuff, which also serve to re-invigorate god and the divine powers and place them in command of the universe.

Since the entire universe was originally made and ordered by Ahura Mazdā in a divine sacrifice, all these objects, as well as all human knowledge, including that of the mysteries of the sacrifice and the cosmos, were originally given to men by him. Once made by Ahura Mazdā, the ingredients of the sacrifice were brought down to

[24] See Hintze 2004, 35-36, on the verb *xšnu-*.

earth by Zarathustra,[25] and, in every sacrifice, the poet-sacrificers, like Zarathustra, consecrate and *return* to Ahura Mazdā what *he* gave to the world to use, but which, in fact, still belongs to him, as expressed in the *Yasna haptaŋhāiti*:

Yasna 39.4

yaθā tū ī ahura.mazdā məṇghācā vaocascā dåscā varəšcā yā vohū
aθā tōi dadəmahī aθā cīšmahī.
aθā θβā āiš yazamaidē aθā nəmaxiiāmahī
aθā išūidiiāmahī θβā mazdā ahurā

In the same way that you, O all-knowing Lord, have thought them and spoken, established and performed what (are) good (thoughts, etc.),
in that way we are giving (them) to you, in that way we are assigning (them to you).
in that way we are bending down (to you with them),
in that way we are repaying you (with them), O all-knowing Lord.

Thus, all these objects, which originated with Ahura Mazdā and so are sacred, are returned to him, in one form or another, during the sacrifice, and, by their going back and forth between the divine and human spheres as gifts and counter-gifts, they confer upon these two spheres all the benefits of the gift exchange. Failure to match a gift by a gift of equal or greater value would nullify the relationship and allow the forces of chaos to replace the forces of order, either temporarily or, in the worst case, permanently. The theme of *mutual gifts and rewards* therefore constitutes the pragmatic axis, not only of the Old Avestan poems, but of the poet-sacrificer's conceptual universe.

Some of the gifts offered to Ahura Mazdā have puzzled scholars in the past, because of a failure to realize that the Old Iranian god depends on his creatures to support him to stay in power and, in particular, to return to life and health or wholeness after periods of darkness and decay (cf. *Yasna* 34.1, below).[26] Thus, in the Old Avestan sacrifice, objects are offered to Ahura Mazdā that he already has:

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[25] See P. O. Skjærvø (2003b), "Zarathustra: First Poet-Sacrificer," in: S. Adhami (ed.), *Paitimāna: Essays in Iranian, Indian, and Indo-European Studies in Honor of Hanns-Peter Schmidt*, Costa Mesa, Calif., 157-94.

[26] Cf. *Videvdad* 22.1-2, where Ahura Mazdā asks the "life-giving poetic thought" (*mąθrō spəṇtō*), one of the entities that help the sun rise and move across the sky, to heal him from the 99,999 illnesses the Evil Spirit inflicted upon him.

Yasna 35.5 (*Yasna haptaŋhāiti*)

huxšaθrō.təmāi bā aṯ xšaθrəm ahmaṯ hiiaṯ aibī
dadəmahicā cišmahicā huuąmahicā
hiiaṯ mazdāi ahurāi aṣāicā vahištāi

Indeed, (it is) for one with best command (that)—to the extent we can—
we are (now) establishing, assigning, and generating (royal) command,
when (we establish, etc., it) for the all-knowing Lord and for best order.

Similarly, although god has given in the past, he is asked to give again, although the gift has not necessarily been squandered:

Yasna 43.2 (*Uštauuaitī gāθā*)

aṯcā ahmāi vīspanąm vahištəm
xᵛāθrōiiā nā xᵛāθrəm daidītā.

And, thus, (you now give) to this one (i.e., me) the best of all (things): may a man receive well-being (even if already) in well-being!

This process is probably an expression of the cyclical nature of the sacrifice, the fact that it is not taking place for the first time: Ahura Mazdā has already received the command before, the sacrificer has already been blessed with Ahura Mazdā's gifts before. There is presumably also the idea that Ahura Mazdā can never be completely deprived of his powers or, at least, it would not be appropriate for humans to suggest he might have been.

The poet-sacrificer approved by Ahura Mazdā is also the one who knows what was, is, and will be, knowledge imparted to him by Ahura Mazdā:

Yasna 51.8 (*Spəṇtāmaniiū gāθā*, 3rd *Gāθā*)

aṯ zī tōi vaxšiiā mazdā vīdušē zī nā mruiiāṯ

For thus I shall tell you, O all-knowing one — for a man may tell the one who (already) knows...

This also puts him in eternal obligation to god to return this gift of divine knowledge and its products to him who gave it to him in the first place, which he does by recounting in his hymns the primordial divine acts and the divine cosmic order of the world.

The sacrifice is therefore conceived as a great offering of *gifts* to Ahura Mazdā and the other gods together with their creations. Its

purpose and function is to support the gods and especially Ahura Mazdā in sustaining and maintaining the ordered cosmos. Moreover, the sacrifice performed by humans reproduces Ahura Mazdā's primeval sacrifice, by which *he* established the ordered cosmos, and its aim is the revitalization of this cosmos, now constantly under attack by the forces of darkness and destruction.[27]

Thus, the sacrifice and other rituals are the poet-sacrificer's contribution to the cosmic struggle between good and evil, for either of which he has to take sides. The partisans of order, the "sustainers of order," will side with Ahura Mazdā and everything he stands for: truth, peace, fertility, etc., while the partisans of evil, those "possessed by the Lie," by advocating and supporting the other side, contribute to all that is bad: lies, strife and war, sickness and death, both in the world of living beings and in that of thought.

The textual references to gift-giving in the *Old Avesta* and the basic technical vocabulary are by now well known, as are their parallels in Old Indic poetry, especially the *Rigveda*.[28] In the rest of this contribution, I shall therefore focus on some special aspects of the Old Avestan gift exchange that have not yet, as far as I know, been noticed or described.

II. *Debts and Payments*

In this situation of mutual dependence and obligation, when, according to the established rules and deals, each part fulfills its obligations in the form of an exchange of gifts, then each of them is also put back in debt, and each expects to be paid back. Thus, current debts when paid in turn generate new ones. Mutual gift-giving, in fact, does not necessarily *cancel a debt*, more often it establishes or strengthens *mutual indebtedness*. This is what keeps the divine and human gifts going back and forth between heaven and earth. If it

[27] See Skjærvø 2006.

[28] See, e.g., A. B. Keith (1925), *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads*, 2 vols., Cambridge, Mass, vol. 1, 259 (citing Rigveda 1.54.9, 3.36.3, 9, 7.32.6, 10.49.1): "...where the sacrificer is promised wealth both temporal and in the world to come in return for his sacrifice, and his gifts to the priests, and where the gods are invoked to delight themselves with the offering and to reward their votaries ... this theory of the sacrifice and its result as an exchange of gifts, of strength for strength, is the fundamental fact of the whole Vedic religion."

were not so, obviously the cosmos would come to a standstill (as it *will* after the *final* sacrifice has been performed).

The simplest way of matching the divine gifts is to return precisely what was given. This is what we see, for instance, in the following passage from the *Yasna haptaŋhāiti*:

> *Yasna* 35.9-10
>
> *imā āṯ uxδā vacå ahura.mazdā ... frauuaocāmā*
> *aṣāaṯcā hacā vaŋhəušcā manaŋhō vaŋhəušcā xšaθrāṯ*
> *staotāiš θβāṯ ahurā staotōibiiō aibī uxδā θβāṯ uxδōibiiō yasnā θβāṯ yasnōibiiō*
>
> Thus, these words to be uttered, O all-knowing Lord, we will (now) proclaim ...
> in accordance with order and good thought and good command—
> be it through praises, O Lord, for (your) praises, be it through an utterance for (your) utterances, be it through a sacrifice for (your) sacrifices.

The human sacrificer will always remain one behind, however, and in eternal debt to the deity.[29] but he can try and match god's gift by increasing his own numbers:

> *Yasna* 34.1 (*Ahunauuaitī gāθā*)
>
> *yā šiiaoθanā yā vacaŋhā yā yasnā amərətatātəm*
> *aṣəmcā taibiiō dåŋhā mazdā xšaθrəmcā hauruuatātō*
> *aēšąm tōi ahurā əhmā pourutəmāiš dastē*
>
> The action, speech, and sacrifice through which you now receive deathlessness
> as well as order for yourself, O all-knowing one, and the command of wholeness —
> (the foremost share) of these is being given to *you*, O Lord, by us (gathered here) *in greatest numbers*.

The Avestan terms for debt and paying one's debts are apparently *išud* and *išūidiia-*.[30] The meaning of these words is not unambiguously evident in the texts themselves, but the Sasanian exegetes thought that

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[29] Godelier 1999, 185 (= 1996, 257): "From the outset mankind is therefore indebted to the powers that fashioned man and bequeathed him the world he lives in, and this debt is ineffaceable. No counter-gift can measure up, be its equivalent, there is none that can efface it."

[30] See J. Kellens (1974), *Les noms-racines de l'Avesta*, Wiesbaden, 18-21 (where all the attestations of Rigvedic *iṣudhya-* are cited); Narten 1986, 159-163 (Kellens and Narten prefer the interpretation as "strengthening").

this was about debts when they rendered the texts into Middle Persian (Pahlavi), giving as the equivalents of the Avestan terms Pahlavi *ābām*, "debt, loan" and *ābāmēn-* "put in debt."[31] Since their interpretation makes perfect sense and agrees with Old Indic conccepts, we have no good reason to doubt them in this particular case. Whether *išūidiia-* means "repay a debt" or "place in debt" is unclear; it could also, perhaps, mean "place in situation of mutual indebtedness."

Repayment of debts is stressed repeatedly in the *Yasna haptaŋhāiti*, which is a hymn in praise of Ahura Mazdā's gifts to the world:

Yasna 36.5

nəmaχiiāmahī išūidiiāmahī θβā mazdā ahurā
vīspāiš θβā humatāiš vīspāiš hūxtāiš vīspāiš huuarəštāiš pairi jasāmaidē

We are bending down (to you), we are repaying you, O all-knowing Lord,[32]
we are circumambulating you with all thoughts well thought (by us), with all words well spoken, with all actions well done .

Yasna 38.4

yā və vaŋᵛhīš ahurō mazdå nāmąn dadāṯ vaŋhudå hiiaṯ vå dadāṯ
tāiš vå yazamaidē tāiš friiąnmahī tāiš nəmaχiiāmahī tāiš išūidiiāmahī

Those names, which the all-knowing Lord establishes for you (all), O good (waters),
when he establishes you (all) as givers of good things,
with those we are sacrificing to you (all), with those we are making (you our) friends,
with those we are bending down (to you), with those we are repaying (you).

Yasna 39.4 (see below)

aθā išūidiiāmahī θβā mazdā ahurā

in that way we are repaying you (with them), O all-knowing Lord.[33]

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[31] The Pahlavi renderings of the Avestan texts as a whole, however, are of little help for their understanding, as the intended syntax of the Pahlavi versions is often quite unclear.

[32] As an example, the Pahlavi of this clause is *u-m <u>ābāmēnē tō</u> ohrmazd kū-m ābām pad tō bawād* "and you, Ohrmazd, make me indebted, i.e., my debt will be to you."

[33] Remarkably, in the exegesis on the *Yasna haptaŋhāiti* in the *Bag nask* of book 9 of the Pahlavi *Dēnkard* (9.57.23), the term *ā-tān* is found, which is a legal term

References to debts are found twice in the *Ahunauuaitī gāθā* (*Yasna* 28-34), first, in the section where the poet-sacrificer asks Ahura Mazdā about the origin and functioning of the world and, second, in the conclusion to this *Gāθā*, where he asks Ahura Mazdā to give him the counter-gifts he deserves for his own gifts to the god:

Yasna 31.14

tā θβā pərəsā ahurā yā zī āitī jəṇghaticā
yå išudō dadəṇtē dāθranąm hacā aṣ̌āunō
yåscā mazdā drəguuō.dəbiiō yaθā tå aŋhən həṇkərətā hiiaṯ

I ask you here and now, O Lord, about those (things, namely, those) that are now coming and (those that) shall come:
the repayments in gifts that shall be given on the part of the sustainer of order
and (those), O all-knowing one, that shall be given on the part of those possessed by the Lie—how those shall be when (totalled) in the *account/record.

In the conclusion of this *Gāθā*, the poet sacrificer asks Ahura Mazdā one last time what he would like to receive in order for him to give rewards in return, as well as how to convey the gifts up to him:

Yasna 34.12

kaṯ tōi rāzarə̄ kaṯ vašī kaṯ vā stūtō kaṯ vā yasnahiiā
srūidiiāi mazdā frāuuaocā yā vīdāiiāṯ aṣ̌īš rāšnąm
sīšā nå aṣ̌ā paθō vaŋhəuš x^{v}aētəṇg manaŋhō

What (is) a straight *utterance for you? What do you want: What of praise or what of sacrifice?
Say forth (to us that word) for it to be heard, O all-knowing one, on account of which he may distribute the rewards for (my) straight *utterances.[34]
Teach us the paths through order,[35] the ones easy to go on (for one) of good thought.

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meaning "solvent," i.e., able to pay a debt. Unfortunately, it is at present unclear precisely to what part of the *Yasna haptaŋhāiti* this refers, but it is clearly related to the use of *ābām*.

[34] Cf. *Yašt* 13.157 "let them bring songs of praise and straight *utterances (*staomāca rāzarəca*) to Ahura Mazdā, who has set (all things) in place."

[35] That is, either through the sun-lit spaces of "order" or easy to go on because of the order of the ritual. See Skjærvø 2003a, 409-11.

He then recalls the successes of his predecessors, the former "revitalizers," the *saošiiaṇt*s, that is, the successful poet-sacrificers, whose gifts have already contributed to the regeneration of the world:

Yasna 34.13

təm aduuānəm ahurā yəm mōi mraoš vaŋhəuš manaŋhō
daēnå saošiiaṇtąm yā hū.kərətā aṣ̌ācīṯ uruuāxšaṯ
hiiaṯ ciuuištā hudåbiiō mīždəm mazdā yehiiā tū daθrəm

(Teach us) that road[36] which you, O Lord, told me (is that) of good thought,
the well-made one along which the vision-souls (*daēnā*)[37] of the revitalizers strode, precisely (the one) through order,
(toward) the fee which was (first) assigned to those of good gifts (and) whose depository you (are), O all-knowing one.

He then reminds the gods that he deserves a reward for the supreme sacrifice of himself (see below):

Yasna 34.14

taṯ zī mazdā vairīm astuuaitē uštānāi dātā
vaŋhəuš šiiaoθanā manaŋhō ...

For, O all-knowing one, you all shall give to (my) life breath together with (my) bones that well-deserved (fee)
on account of the action of my good thought...

Finally, he expresses the hope that his counter-gifts have had the expected result and that they are superior to those of his rivals, so that Ahura Mazdā will make him the winner in the competition:

Yasna 34.15

mazdā aṯ mōi vahištā srauuåscā šiiaoθanācā vaocā
tā tū vohū manaŋhā aṣ̌ācā išudəm stūtō

O all-knowing one, thus say *my* poems conferring fame (and my) actions (are) the best!
(Say), you, (that my) *repayment* (in the form) of praises (is best) on account of that good thought (of mine) and the order (of my ritual).

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[36] Cf., e.g., *Vīdevdad* 2.10 "Then Yima went forth toward the lights, at noon, on the path (*aδβanəm*) of the sun."

[37] The *daēnā* is what *sees* in the beyond and is the guide for the sacrifice on its way up to god.

The following Young Avestan passage, uttered toward the end of the *yasna* ceremony, insists on the same elements of guest-friendship, indebtedness, and gift-giving:

> *Yasna* 65.9
>
> *kuθra tå friiō bauuąn kuθra tå išudō bauuąn kuθra tå rātaiiō bauuąn*
> *yą ahurō mazda zaraθuštrāi frāuuauuaca*
> *frā zaraθuštrō gaēθābiiō astuuaitibiiō*
>
> Where shall those friendships[38] be? Where shall those repayments be? Where shall those gifts be?—
> (all the words) which Ahura Mazdā pronounced to Zarathustra
> and Zarathustra to living beings with bones.
>
> Pahlavi:
>
> *<u>čiyōn pad awēšān</u> kunišn ka ōh kunēm <u>franāft bawēm</u> kū-mān dārišn bē kerd hād*
> *<u>čiyōn pad awēšān</u> ōh kunēm ā-mān <u>ābām bawād</u> kū-mān tarsagāhīh andar yazdān ēdōn kerd ēstād kū yazdān pad ān pādāšn nēkīh abar ō amāh ēdōn āward ēstād kū-mān andar yazdān ābām hād. abarg guft hād har kas andar yazdān ābām*
> *<u>čiyōn pad awēšān</u> yazišn ōh kunēm ā-mān <u>rādīh bawād</u> kū-mān tis dād bawād*
> *<u>kē ohrmazd frāz guft ō zardušt</u>*
> *<u>ud zardušt frāz guft andar gēhān ī astōmand</u>*
>
> <u>How</u> should one act <u>toward them</u>? — When we act in the appropriate manner, <u>we become *promoted</u>, i.e., we will have provided support.
> <u>When</u> we act <u>toward them</u> in the appropriate manner, then <u>we will have a debt</u>, i.e., we will have shown such respect to the gods that the gods, as counter-gift, will have have conferred goodness upon us, so that we will be in debt to the gods. Abarg says: Everybody is in debt to the gods.
> <u>When</u> we perform a sacrifice <u>to them</u> in the appropriate manner, then we <u>will experience generosity</u>, i.e, something will be given to us, (that) <u>which Ohrmazd said forth to Zarathustra</u>
> <u>and Zarathustra said forth in the world of the living with bones</u>.[39]

The accumulation of the debts was apparently counted—as still today—on a monthly basis:[40]

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[38] I.e., with the gods.

[39] The underlined text directly renders the Avestan, the rest are glosses and commentary.

[40] Cf. the Pahlavi *Māh niyāyišn* 3.4: "15 (days) when the moon waxes, 15 when the moon wanes. [Commentary:] For 15 days it receives the good deeds of beings in the world of the living and recompense and counter-gifts (*mizd ud pādāšn*) from those

Yasna 48.2

vaocā mōi yā tuuəm vīduuå ahurā
parā hiiaṯ mā yā məṇg pərəθā jimaitī
kaṯ aṣauuā mazdā vəṇghaṯ drəguuaṇtəm
hā zī aŋhəuš vaŋ^{v}hī vistā ākərəitiš

Tell me (now) those things which *you*, O Lord, know,
before the *debts,[41] which (are those) of the moon, come to *me* (for settling ?):
Shall, O all-knowing one, the sustainer of order overcome the one possessed by the Lie?
For that (is what has been) found (to be) the good *record(er) of (this) existence.[42]

Thus, as the moon measures out the months and years, into which the cyclical existence is divided, the balance of good and bad deeds, that is, also the number of individuals belonging to one or the other group, will determine which side will win in the cosmic competition.

The divine counter-gift matches or, rather, *surpasses* the poet-sacrificer's ritual gift *in exchange value* (*vasnā*, see below), since god's power is so much greater than that of the poet-sacrificer and the size of the universe so much greater than the sacrificial area. This seems to be expressed in the continuation of *Yasna* 65 (cf. above):

Yasna 65.13-14

imaṯ mē āpō dāiiata ...
yaṯca ahmāṯ asti maziiō yaṯca ahmāṯ asti vaŋ́hō
yaṯca ahmāṯ asti sraiiō
yaṯca ahmāṯ asti parō.arəjastarəm
taṯ nō dāiiata yūžəm yazata aṣauuanō
xšaiiamana isāna mošuca āsuiiāca
haθra ana gāθβiia vaca
haiθiiā varəštąm hiiaṯ vasnā fərašō.təməm

---

in the world of thought; and for 15 days it delivers the good deeds to the beings in the world of thought and the recompense and return-gifts to those in the world of the living," etc.

[41] Rather than taking *pərəθa-* from *par-* "fill," I prefer deriving it from *par-* "promise, commit oneself to," from which are derived words meaning "debt" in several Iranian languages (e.g., Pahlavi *pār* "debt," *purdag* "indebted"). I would not like to exclude a pun on "full" moon (YAv. *pərənō.māh*), however.

[42] For the connection of "moon" and *ākərəiti-* cf. OInd. *ā́kṛti-* in *Rigveda* 10.85.5 "The moon is *the *record(er)* of the years."

Give me this, O waters,
Both whatever there is greater than this and whatever there is better than this,
and whatever there is more beautiful than this
and whatever there is much more valuable[43] than this,
that give us, you, O you who sustain order, O you worthy of sacrifice,
being in command and having possession (of it), both soon and with speed
at the same time as this word of the *Gâthâ*s:
"On account of (my) true (action/utterance) may what is most full of life-giving juices in exchange value be produced!" (from *Yasna* 50.11)

III. *The Ultimate Gifts*

To fulfill the ultimate purpose of the sacrice, the rebirth of the cosmos, something more is needed than songs and food offerings, however. To produce life, the constituents of life are needed. For Ahura Mazdā to engender the new life, the sacrificer has to return to Ahura Mazdā his own life, which Ahura Mazdā gave him in the first place.[44] This aspect of the gift-exchange has not been focused on, yet it is as clearly stated as the ordinary exchange of praise and rewards:

Yasna 31.11 (*Ahunauuaitī gāθā*; cf. *Yasna* 39.4, cited below)

hiiaṯ nə̄ mazdā pauruuīm gaēθåscā tašō daēnåscā
θβā manaŋhā xratūšcā hiiaṯ astuuaṇtəm dadå uštanəm

When, O all-knowing one, you for the first time fashioned for *us* (our) *living parts and vision-souls
by *your* thought, as well as (our) guiding thoughts, when you would place (in us) life breath[45] with bones ...

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[43] Av. *arəja-* "be valuable, be worth" is etymologically the same as Greek *alphoi* in *Odyssey* 15.450-53 cited below.

[44] See also S. Lévi (1898), *La doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brâhmanas*, Paris; 2nd ed., Paris, 1966, 130-132, on the human sacrifice according to the Old Indic *Brāhmaṇa* texts.

[45] I assume *uštāna* is from **ušta* "invigorated, instilled with life force" + *Hna-* "breath," with **ušta-* from the root *vaz-* (see on Old Persian **vazar/n*, below) from Indo-European **weǵ-* in *vigor*, *vegetal*, etc. See P. O. Skjærvø (2005), "Poetic and Cosmic Weaving in Ancient Iran. Reflections on Avestan *vahma* and Yasna 34.2," in: D. Haug and E. Welo (eds.), *Haptačahaptāitiš. Festschrift for Fridrik Thordarson*, Oslo, 268, footnote 4.

The life breath and bones that were given by god in the beginning need to be re-given by both god and men to produce the new micro- and macro-cosmos. When we make god praiseworthy, etc., god gives us life and bones:

Yasna 41.3 (*Yasna haptaŋhāiti*)

humāīm θβā īžīm yazatəm aṣaŋhācim dadəmaidē
aθā tū nə gaiiascā astəṇtåscā x́iiå ubōiiō aŋhuuō
hātąm hudāstəmā

We regard you as having good *creative power, as worthy of *prayers, worthy of sacrifices, as being with order.
And so may you be our *life and boniness* in both existences,
O (you) *who give the best gifts* among those who are.

And the sacrificer gives his bones and life force in return for lifespan or the fee promised by Zarathustra:

Yasna 43.16 (*Uštauuaitī gāθā*)

aṯ ahurā huuō maniiūm zaraθuštrō
vərəṇtē mazdā yastē cišcā spəništō
astuuaṯ aṣəm x́iiāṯ uštānā aojōŋhuuaṯ
xᵛāṇg darəsōi xšaθrōi x́iiāṯ ārmaitiš
aṣīm šiiaoθanāiš vohū daidīṯ manaŋhā

Thus, he there, Zarathustra, O Lord, prefers your spirit/inspiration whichever, O all-knowing one, (is) most life-giving for you.
May order have bones (and) have strength with life breath!
May Ārmaiti (the Earth) be in (your) command (and) in full) sight of the sun!
May she by (her) actions [or: on account of (my) actions] give (me my) reward for (my) good thought!

Yasna 46.18 (*Uštauuaitī gāθā*)

yə̄ maibiiā yaoš ahmāi ascīṯ vahištā
max́iiå ištōiš vohū cōišəm manaŋhā

He who (assigns) to *me* (the best things) of a (full) *lifespan*, to *him*, (as) the best (things)
of *my* ritual, I have (now) assigned by/with (my) good thought even *my bones*.

Yasna 51.15 (*Spəṇtāmaniiū gāθā*)

hiiaṯ mīždəm zaraθuštrō magauuabiiō cōišt parā
garō dəmānē ahurō mazdå jasaṯ paouruiiō
tā və vohū manaŋhā aṣāicā sauuāiš cəuuīšī

The fee which Zarathustra assigned before to the masters of the gift exchange,
in the House of Song, the all-knowing Lord comes forward (with it as) the first (in line).
On account of that (fee) *I have assigned myself* by/with (my) good thought with life-giving strengths to you (all) and to order.

In fact, the current ritual act follows the prototypical act of Zarathustra, with whom the poet-sacrificer of the Old Avesta identifies himself:

Yasna 33.14 (*Ahunauuaitī gāθā*)

aṯ rātąm zaraθuštrō tanuuascīt xᵛaǵiiå uštanəm
dadāitī pauruuatātəm manaŋhascā vaŋhəuš mazdāi
šiiaoθanahiiā aṣā yācā uxδaǵiiācā səraošəm xšaθrəmcā

Thus, Zarathustra is giving as gift the life breath of his own body
as the foremost share (of his sacrifice) and (the gift) of (his) good thought to the all-knowing one,
as well as what (is the foremost share) of his action through order
(and that) of (his) utterance: (his) readiness to listen and the (royal) command (generated for the all-knowing Lord by his sacrifice).[46]

Moreover, the participants in the sacrifice join the sacrificer in offering themselves as counter-gifts for god's primordial gifts to the world:

Yasna 37.1-2 (*Yasna haptaŋhāiti*)

iθā āṯ yazamaidē ahurəm mazdąm
yə gąmcā aṣəmcā dāṯ
apascā dāṯ uruuaråscā vaŋᵛhīš
raocåscā dāṯ būmīmcā vīspācā vohū
ahiiā xšaθrācā mazənācā hauuapaŋhāiščā

Thus, in this manner we are sacrificing to the all-knowing Lord,
who set (in place) both the cow and the order,
(who) set (in place) both the good waters and the plants,
(who) set (in place) the (heavenly) lights, the earth, and all good (things in between),
by his command and greatness and artistries.

Yasna 37.2-3

təm aṯ yasnanąm pauruuatātā yazamaidē
yōi gəuš hacā šiieiṇtī

[46] See Skjærvø, 2002a, 400-4.

tə̄m aṯ āhūriiā nāmənī
mazdā varā spəṇtō.təmā yazamaidē
tə̄m ahmākāiš azdəbīšcā uštānāiščā yazamaidē

Thus, to him we are sacrificing with the foremost (share) of the sacrifices
(of these) who dwell (here) on the side of the cow.
Thus, up to *him* we offer up in sacrifice (his) lordly names:
O all-knowing one, O *bridegroom, O most "life-giving one"!
To *him* we are offering (them) up in sacrifice (together) *with our bones and life breath*.

IV. *The Exchange Value of Ahura Mazdā's Counter-gift*

In the *Old Avesta*, the term for the (proper) exchange value, the value of the exchange gift, is *vasna-*,[47] from Indo-European **wesno*/ **wosno*.[48] Let us briefly review the comparative evidence.

Young Avestan *vasna* is clearly "price":

Videvdad 16.14

yō nāirikaiiå ... vohunauuaitiiå
pauruuō.vasna šiiaoθna tanūm iriθiiāṯ

whoever mingles his body in "action" at a pre(arranged/paid) price (*vasna*) with a woman in menses ...

In the *Rigveda*, *vasná-* clearly means "value" of goods offered in exchange, cf.:

Rigveda 4.24.9

He has offered something of lesser value (*vasnám*) for something (worth) more (*bhū́yasā*).
Unsold (*ávikrīto*), I (Indra) was happy as I went back.
He did not redeem (*arirecīd*) the lesser (value) for something (worth) more.

The verb *vasnayá-* probably means "demand the exchange value for (haggle over the price?)," hence "ransom" (*Rigveda* 6.47.21 in un-

[47] The possibility that the word is identical with OInd. *vasná* "price, value" was mentioned by Humbach 1991, II, 115; in Humbach and Ichaporia 1994, it is simply translated as "value." A. Hintze (1998), in her review of this book in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 10, 245 wondered what "selling price" could possibly mean and refer to in this context. Neither the Avestan nor the Rigvedic term is discussed in Hintze 2000 or 2004.

[48] See Benveniste 1969, 129-31.

clear context), and the adjective *vásnya* seems to mean "offered in exchange":

Rigveda 10.34.3

I find nothing to appreciate (*bhógam*) in the gambler, like an old horse offered in exchange.

Such also seems to be the original meaning of Latin *vēnum dare*/*ire* "sell/be sold," literally give/go as exchange value" (e.g., into servitude) and Greek *ônon dō-*. The meaning of the Greek word is clear in several Homeric passages, where we again see how the whole process is linked to the notion of guest-friendship:

Iliad 21.40-42

For at that time he sold (*epérasse*) him (Lukaon) into well-built Lemnos,
carrying him on (his) ships, and the son of Iason (= Euenos) *gave exchange value* (*ônon édoke*; for him).
From there a guest-friend (*kseínos*) released (*elúsato*) him, but he gave a lot!

Odyssey 15.450-53

There is a child of my noble master ...
Him I would bring on board, and *he would be worth* (*álphoi*)[49] for you an enormous *exchange value* (*muríon ônon*)
wherever you might take him for sale (*perásēte*) among men of other speech.

The strophes that conclude *Gāθā*s 1-3, which all contain *vasnā*, are therefore evidently prayers to Ahura Mazdā that he now should give a counter-gift whose exchange value at least matches that of the gifts offered by the poet-sacrificers and his group of worshippers, but, preferably, exceeds this value. In fact, what Ahura Mazdā is asked to do is to regenerate the ordered cosmos, the sun-lit world of the living, swelling with the juices of fecundity and life (*fraša*),[50] and so deliver it from its captivity by the powers of chaos, of darkness and death.

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[49] See ibid.

[50] Since one of the goals of the sacrifice is to make order "full of swelling" (*Yasna* 51.21: *aṣ̌əm spənuuaṯ*), I assume *fraša-* (if connected with OInd. *pŕ̥kṣ-* *and* if this is "liquid strengthening" of some sort) means "full of the juices of life and vitality." See the elaborate and exhaustive discussion in Narten 1986, 199-203.

In *Yasna* 34.15, the concluding strophe of the *Ahunauuaitī gāθā* (see *Yasna* 34.14, above), we find accumulated all the elements of the sacrificial gift-exhange. The poet-sacrificer's sacrifices and praises, cast in perfect form by his good thought, confer fame and so also the royal command on Ahura Mazdā. In this way he has repaid his previous debt to the god, and the god must now repay *his* new debt to the world by regenerating it:

Yasna 34.15

mazdā aṯ mōi vahištā srauuåscā šiiaoθanācā vaocā
tā tū vohū manaŋhā aṣ̌ācā išudəm stūtō
xšmākā xšaθrā ahurā fərašəm vasnā haiθiiəm då ahūm

O all-knowing one, thus say *my* poems conferring fame (and my) actions (are) the best!
(Say), you, (that my) *repayment* (in the form) of praises (is best) on account of that good thought (of mine) and the order (of my ritual).
You (now) establish by *your* (plur.) command, O Lord, this existence as full of life-giving juices in matching value, the *true* one.

Yasna 46.19, the concluding strophe of the *Uštauuaitī Gāθā* (cf. *Yasna* 46.18), incorporates the elements of both *Yasna* 34.14 and 15:

Yasna 46.19

yə mōi aṣ̌āṯ haiθīm hacā varəšaitī
zaraθuštrāi hiiaṯ vasnā fərašō.təməm
ahmāi mīždəm hanəṇtē parāhūm
manə.vistāiš maṯ vīspāiš gāuuā azī
tācīṯ mōi sąs tuuəm mazdā vaēdištō

He who shall (now) produce for me the *true* new existence in accordance with order
[or: He who shall produce the *true* new existence on account of *my* order, (the one) which (he produced)]
for Zarathustra, the one which is the most full of life-giving juices in matching value,
(shall produce it?) for this one (= me), who earns (it as his) fee, a higher new existence:
a bull and a cow together with all (things to be) found in/by (one's) thought.
You, O all-knowing one, appear to me as the one who finds (for me) most often just those (things).

In *Yasna* 50.10-11, the concluding strophes of the *Spəṇtāmaniiū gāθā*, it is stated explicitly what the counter-gift should be, namely the heavenly light, the sun, and the light of the new day:

Yasna 50.10

aṯ yā varəšā yācā pairi.āiš šiiaoθanā
yācā vohū cašmąm arəjaṯ manaŋhā
raocå xᵛəṇg asnąm uxšā aēuruš
xšmākāi aṣā vahmāi mazdā ahurā

Thus, (the actions) that I shall now perform, both those that you have wished for
and those that, on account of (our?) good thought, are worth (our) eyes (? are
the bringing back of) the lights of the sun. The bull of the days is the *impeller
for the hymn to you (plur.) through order, O all-knowing Lord.

Yasna 50.11

aṯ və staotā aojāi mazdā aŋhācā
yauuaṯ aṣā tauuācā isāicā
dātā aŋhəuš arədaṯ vohū manaŋhā
haiθiiā varəštąm hiiaṯ vasnā frašō.təməm

Thus, I shall declare myself *your* (plur.) praiser, O all-knowing one, and I shall be—
to the extent I by the order (of my ritual) can and am able—
the establisher of the new existence *successfully by (my) good thought!
On account of (my) true (action/utterance) may what is most full of life-giving juices in matching value be produced!

The Pahlavi commentary on the last line also emphasizes rewards and counter-gifts:

čiyōn <u>āškārag warzīdārān</u> ēd-išān <u>kē kāmag frāztom</u> kū-šān abāyist wēš kū kerd ā-šān mizd pādāšn dahēd ō man-iz kē zardušt ham dahēd ō man-iz kē zōd ham

As it is evident to those who perform it (bring it about), this which is their foremost wish, i.e., (when) that which they deserve is more than (what is) done, then give them their fee (and/as) counter-gift (*pādāšn*); give it to me too, who am Zarathustra, and to me, the sacrificer.[51]

[51] In the *Avesta*, including the *Gāθā*s, and the Pahlavi literature, Zarathustra is the mythical first sacrificer, soldier, and farmer, fighter of evil and promoter of peace and fertility in the world of living beings. The current sacrificer will be successful only if he imitates Zarathustra perfectly, which may imply being reborn in the persona of Zarathustra during the ritual. See Skjærvø (2003), "Zarathustra: First Poet-Sacrificer," in: S. Adhami (ed.), *Paitimāna. Essays in Iranian, Indian, and Indo-European Studies in Honor of Hanns-Peter Schmidt*, Costa Mesa, 157-94.

The formula with *vasnā* is not found in the conclusions of the *Vohuxšaθrā* and *Vahištōišti*, the 4th and 5th *Gāθā*s (*Yasna* 51.22 and *Yasna* 54.1), where Ahura Mazdā's gifts are probably already on their way, but the Pahlavi version of *Yasna* 51.22 insists on "fee (and/as) counter-gift," and, in *Yasna* 54.1, where the world has been healed, only the fee is mentioned:

> *Yasna* 51.22
>
> *yehiiā mōi aṣāṯ hacā vahištəm yesnē paitī*
> *vaēdā mazdå ahurō ...*
>
> He who knows the best (thing that is in store) for me in accordance with order in return for (my) sacrifice to him, (is) the all-knowing Lord.
>
> Pahlavi
>
> *<u>ōy kē az ahlāyīh abāgīh pahlom</u> kū az yazdān ān pahlom <u>man yazišn abar</u>*
> *<u>āgāh Ohrmazd</u> mizd ud pādāšn*
>
> He whose company is the best from (among the things of) order, i.e., he is the best among the gods, to him I should sacrifice.
> Ohrmazd is aware (i.e., of) the fee and counter-gift.
>
> *Yasna* 54.1
>
> *ā airiiəmā išiiō rafəδrāi jaṇtū*
> *nərəbiiascā nāiribiiascā zaraθuštrahē*
> *vaŋhəuš rafəδrāi manaŋhō yā daēnā vairīm hanāṯ mīždəm*
> *aṣahiiā yāsā aṣīm yąm išiiąm ahurō masatā mazdå*
>
> Let speedy Airiiaman [god of healing] come here to provide support for (our) men and women, to provide the support
> of Zarathustra's good thought, by which (his) vision-soul may gain a well-deserved fee.
> [Or: for support / for Zarathustra's men and women, / for support for (his/my) good thought, by which ...]
> I am now asking for the reward of order, which the all-knowing Lord shall *deem worthy of being sped (hither).

Traditionally, Avestan *vasnā* has been equated with Old Persian *vašnā* in the expression *vašnā auramazdāha* and been derived from the verb *vas-* "wish."[52] It has been translated variously as "by the will

[52] In my opinion, Old Persian *vašnā* is the instrumental(-ablative) of *vazar/n* "greatness," also seen in *vazarka* "great." The root is again **weǵ-*, which signifies "invigorate," etc., and Old Persian *vazarka*, used predominantly about Ahuramazdā,

of" or "by the grace of" (Ahura Mazdā). The latter term, which is borrowed from Christian terminology, is obviously inappropriate for the Avestan scenario. The term "grace" normally implies a benevolent action on the part of god to the benefit of mankind although *un*-deserving of it, while the Avestan poet-sacrificer is rewarded precisely because he has fulfilled god's purpose and so is *deserving*. Similarly, "by the will/wish of" implies some arbitrariness on the part of the deity, that, no matter what has happened, god makes his own decision and simply wills the outcome. Again, this is counter to the chain of events that we observe in the *Avesta*.

Moreover, in later Zoroastrian thought, Ahura Mazdā's will does precisely not enter into the decisions to be made in the universal conflict between good and evil to solve an existing conflict. It is true that what he did was according to his "wish" (*kām*), but Ahura Mazdā's deployment of his omnipotence does not depend upon his *will*. In fact, confronted with the question of why Ahura Mazdā did not use his omnipotence to overcome evil then and there, Sasanian Zoroastrians responded that Ahura Mazdā does not *think* that which is impossible, nor does he *wish* it:

> *Bundahišn* 1.57
>
> *ohrmazd ān tis nē menēd ī-š kardan nē tuwān*
> *ganāg mēnōy ān ī-š nē tuwān kardan menēd ud padist-iz abar barēd*
>
> Ohrmazd does not think that which he is not able to do,
> (while) the Foul Spirit thinks what he is not able to do and even insists on doing it.
>
> *Škand-gumānīg-wizār*
>
> *čiyōn tuwān sāmānōmand ōwōn-iz aziš kām*
> *čē frazānag ud kām ī frazānag harw ō ān ī šāyēd būdan*
> *u-š kām ō ān ī nē šāyēd nē widerēd*
> *čē har ān kāmēd ī šāyēd sazēd būdan*
>
> In the same way that what is possible is circumscribed, so too is (his) *wish* to do it,
> for (god) is wise, and the wish of the wise is entirely toward that which *can* be.

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may originally have been close in function to Avestan *spəṇta*. The change in meaning would be similar to that of Old Indic *śūra*, "rich in life-giving strength," applied specifically to Indra in his cosmogonic activities, but later simply "heroic, strong."

And no wish toward that which can *not* occurs to him,
for he wishes all that which *can* be (and) which it is proper that it should be.[53]

The "ethical" veil drawn over the Old Avestan religion and ascribed to the assumed reform of Zarathustra is a Western invention.[54] The religion we observe in the *Avesta* when we accept the meaning of the words (and the mythical realities they express) and do not arbitrarily assign modern ethical qualities to them is one based on social mechanisms,[55] the rules obtaining between rulers and the ruled, where good rulers need to be strengthened by the praise and gratitude of those ruled and in turn show *their* gratitude by maintaining the well-being of their subjects.[56]

Yasna 48.5 (*Spəṇtāmaniiū gāθā*)

huxšaθrā xšāṇtąm mā nā dušə.xšaθrā xšāṇtā
vaŋhuiiå cistōiš šiiaoθanāiš ārmaitē
yaoždå maṣiiå aipī ząθəm vahištā
gauuōi vərəziiātąm tąm nā xᵛarəθāi fšuiiō

Let (now) those of good command be in command! Let not those of bad command (now) command *us*!
By the actions of (my/your?) good *insight, O Ārmaiti (= the Earth),
you make mortal women ritually pure after birth. May the best (things)
be produced for the cow! You keep tending *her* for food for *us*!

Yasna 48.6

*hā zī nā *šōiθəmā hā nā utaiiūitīm*
dāṯ təuuīšīm vaŋhāuš manaŋhō bərəxδē

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[53] After P. J. de Menasce (1945), *Škand-gumānīk vičār: La solution décisive des doutes: Texte pazand-pehlevi transcrit, traduit et commenté*, Fribourg en Suisse, pp. 38-39.

[54] See, for instance, Hintze's (2004, 44) conclusion: "... the exchange taking place on the spiritual, ethical level ... The spiritual exhange pattern is what we may consider as Zarathustra's own and new message."

[55] Note the use of the terms *lašno* and *palašno* (Pahlavi *dāšn* and *pādāšn*) "gift and counter-gift" in the Medieval Bactrian documents for payment and what is being paid for. The term *lašno-palašno-bōstigo* "sales contract" means literally "document about gifts and counter-gifts."

[56] Cf. Malamoud 1989, 116: "Mais s'agissant du *Ṛg*-Veda, texte fondamentalement et presque exclusivement religieux, produit d'une société où les notions économiques, sociales et juridiques n'étaient pas vraiment dégagées de la sphère des représentations religieuses..."

aṯ aχiiāi aṣ̌ā mazdå uruuarå vaxšaṯ
ahurō aŋhəuš zq̨θōi pauruiiehiiā

For *she* (= Ārmaiti) (has given) *us* *wealth, *she* (has given) *us* *tissue-connectedness.
She has given (us) *solidity (of body)—you, O (Ārmaiti), the *esteemed one of (my) good thought!
Thus, for *her* the all-knowing one, in accordence with order, shall (now) make plants grow,
he, the Lord, at the (re)birth of the first existence.

When we approach the Old Avestan texts as ancient ritual texts, rather than as the obscure teachings of the Prophet Zarathustra, what emerges is a well-known type of archaic human interaction with the divine. The gods need the humans and the humans need the gods for goodness to overcome evil so that life may go on in an acceptable fashion.[57] The relationship between the two spheres is the common one of the guest-friendship, which is maintained through the unending cycle of mutual gift-giving.

[57] M. Biardeau and Ch. Malamoud (1996), *Le sacrifice dans l'Inde ancienne*, Louvain and Paris, 24: "Si les hommes ne sacrifient pas, les dieux s'affaiblissent et ne peuvent donner la prospérité au monde terrestre."

TAMANNĪ
IF WISHES WERE…:
NOTES ON WISHING IN ISLAMIC TEXTS

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"You're a man, Father. You probably can't always control what you wish."
"But I must try," the priest said. "I am not just a man. I am a man of God."
Robert B. Parker, Thin Air, 1995.

I. *Introduction*

The undoubtedly universal human practice of making wishes could not fail to attract the attention of Muslim thinkers and scholars. For one thing, both the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* make mention of wishing and address the appropriateness of making certain wishes. Moreover, in the particle *layta*, the Arabic language possesses a grammatical device specifically suited for making wishes.[1] Wishing thus has a small

[1] On the syntax of *layta*, see W. Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 1967, 1:290, 2:82-3, where a derivation from the verb *raʾayta* is suggested; see further H. L. Fleischer, *Kleinere Schriften*, Leipzig, 1885-8, 1:468. On the acceptability of the usage of *layta* with two accusatives, which this derivation seeks to explain, see Abū Ḥayyān, *Manhaj al-sālik*, ed. S. Glazer, New Haven, 1947, 72; the chapter on *inna* and its "sisters" has been separately edited and translated into German by A. Bergter, Hildesheim, 1988, 28-9, trans. 54-6. Wishes can, of cour-

but distinct place in the exegesis of the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* and in Arabic philology. Interest in wishing was not, however, limited to these disciplines. Theologians, jurists, ascetics, and mystics also had something to say. Not surprisingly the evidence in the available literature for the discussion of wishing is uneven, and the earliest period is, as one might expect, the least amenable to probing. Nonetheless enough exists to warrant an overview. These notes do not purport to represent more than a survey of some salient features of the treatment of wishing in Islamic literature.[2]

II. *Wishing as a Speech Act*

One obvious starting point is the nature of wishing: how is wishing to be categorized? One common answer, not in itself very revealing, is that wishing is a speech act in the sense made familiar by the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin (d. 1960).[3] In fact, wishing already appears in one of the earliest lists of speech acts that has come down to us, that of the grammarian al-Akhfash al-Awsaṭ (d. 215/830), a student of Sībawayh (d. 180/796). Al-Akhfash reportedly identified six speech acts (*aqsām al-kalām*): statement (*khabar*), question (*istikhbār*), command (*amr*), prohibition (*nahy*), interjection (*nidāʾ*), and

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se, be expressed other than by use of *layta*: for example, with *law*, *hal*, *hallā*, *allā*, *lawlā*, *lawmā* (al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm,* ed. Naʿīm Zarzūr, Beirut, 1407/1987, 307, trans. Udo Gerald Simon in *Mittelalterliche arabische Sprachbetrachtung zwischen Grammatik und Rhetorik,* Heidelberg, 1993, 316), and *laʿalla* (al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī, *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ*, in *Shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ,* Beirut, n.d., 2:245), as well as perfects used as optatives (*duʿāʾ*) and with such verbs as *aḥabba*, *wadda*, and *tamannā*.

[2] An important omission from the material covered is poetry and more generally literary texts. Suggestive remarks on the role of speech act theory in the study of Arabic praise poetry can be found in Beatrice Gruendler, "ʿAbbāsid Praise Poetry in Light of Dramatic Discourse and Speech Act Theory," in Beatrice Gruendler and Verena Klemm, eds., *Understanding Near Eastern Literatures: A Spectrum of Interdisciplinary Approaches*, Wiesbaden, 2000, 157-69, esp. 161-2, and in her *Medieval Arabic Praise Poetry*, *Ibn al-Rūmī and the Patron's Redemption*, London, 2003, 27-9, 36-9.

[3] The study of speech acts now forms a central part of the linguistic discipline of pragmatics. For a survey of the by now extensive work on speech acts, including questions of taxonomy, see Jerrold Sadock's chapter "Speech Acts" in Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward, eds., *The Handbook of Pragmatics*, Malden, MA, 2004, 53-73. Ancient and medieval categorizations of speech acts, including wishing, are treated in Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*, Amsterdam, 1973, 63, 97-100, 147.

wishing (*tamannī)*. His contemporary and another student of Sībawayh, Quṭrub (d. 206/821), is said to have identified four: statement, question, demand (*ṭalab*), and interjection.[4] These lists should not mislead us. Even a cursory examination of Sībawayh's *al-Kitāb* is enough to show that he and his predecessors, including his teacher al-Khalīl b. Aḥmad (d. 175/791-2), were already familiar with wishing as a speech act that might be performed by means of a number of locutions, not solely by the use of *layta*. In such cases the utterance was said to have acquired the force of a wish (*fī maʿnā l-tamannī, ʿalā l-tamannī*).[5] Having acquired the force of the speech act of wishing, an expression might then exhibit the syntax characteristic of wishing, for example, the use of the subjunctive after *fa-*. [6] The possibility of such an acquired force as a wish was not in principle disputed even when there was disagreement as to its syntactic implications.

The early recognition of wishing as a distinct speech act is all the more noteworthy when we take into consideration that, according to the Andalusian philologist al-Baṭalyawsī (d. 521/1127), the majority of Baṣran grammarians in his day had come to hold that the number of speech act types (*maʿānī l-kalām*) in Arabic was beyond enumeration.[7] One might even venture to say that the identification of wishing as a speech act was inevitable given the available Arabic vocabu-

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[4] al-Zajjājī, *Tafsīr Risālat Adab al-kuttāb*, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Salīm, Cairo, 1993, 111-2; al-Suyūṭī, *Hamʿ al-hawāmiʿ*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn and ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Sālim Mukarram, Kuwait, 1394/1975, 1:34.

[5] *al-Kitāb,* ed. H. Derenbourg, Paris, 1881, 1:314, trans. Jahn, Berlin, 1900, vol. 2, part 1:71-2. The discussion of sentence types in early grammar in Rafael Talmon, *Eighth-Century Iraqi Grammar*, Winona Lake, IN, 2003, 275-6, does not shed light on our topic.

[6] On a dispute between Sībawayh and al-Mubarrad on the implications for syntax of a locution that admittedly had acquired the force of a wish, see Ibn Wallād, *Kitāb al-Intiṣār*, edited in Monique Bernards, *Changing Traditions*, Leiden, 1997, 99-101; cf. al-Mubarrad, *Kitāb al-Muqtaḍab*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Khāliq ʿUḍayma, Cairo, 1388, 4:382-6.

[7] *Al-Iqtiḍāb fī sharḥ Adab al-kuttāb*, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Saqqā and Ḥāmid ʿAbd al-Majīd, Cairo, 1981, 1:58. Richard Frank identifies the expression *maʿānī l-kalām* as that of the grammarians, *aqsām al-kalām* as that of the theologians, "Meanings are Spoken of in Many Ways: The Earlier Arab Grammarians, *Le Muséon* (78) 1981, 269, n. 29, reprinted in Richard M. Frank, *Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism in Medieval Islam: Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kalām,* vol. 1, ed. Dimitri Gutas, Ashgate, 2005

lary. When in a Qurʾānic passage (19:23), Mary says, "Would that I had died before this, and had become a thing utterly forgotten" (*yā-laytanī mittu qabla hādhā wa-kuntu nasyan mansiyyā*), what could be more natural than for a commentator to report that she had made a wish (*tamannat*)?[8]

Although wishing seems to have been identified as a type of speech act as far back as our knowledge of Arabic philology goes, determining its place in a taxonomy of speech acts was another matter entirely. It seems that substantial stability in the classification of speech acts, wishing among them, was ultimately reached only in the wake of the widespread influence of the rhetorical third part of *Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm* of al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229) and its popularization in the abridgement of al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338) with its many commentaries. Both these authors employ a dichotomy of speech acts with truth-value and those that are not so evaluable. The former are statements (*khabar*). For the latter al-Sakkākī uses the term *ṭalab* (demand) and al-Qazwīnī *inshāʾ* (peformative), the label that has become standard.[9] For al-Sakkākī the five subcategories of *ṭalab* that he enumerates—wish, question, command, prohibition, and interjection—play the role of basic speech act types from which other speech act types can be generated (*tawlīd*), whereas al-Qazwīnī, who refers to many performative subcategories (*anwāʿ)*, blurs al-Sakkākī's line between basic and generated speech acts.[10]

While both the dichotomy of *khabar* and *ṭalab/inshāʾ* and the classification of wishing under the latter might appear intuitively obvious, these intuitions were not shared by many of the theorists who preceded al-Sakkākī. A list of speech act types that apparently was popular for a time among philologists has four classes—command, question, statement, and petition (*raghba*)—as does another list that enjoyed authority among legal theorists—command, prohibition, state-

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[8] For example, Ibn ʿĀdil, *al-Lubāb fī ʿulūm al-Kitāb*, ed. ʿAbd al-Mawjūd et al., Beirut, 1419/1998, 13:41. The labeling of a speech act introduced by *layta* as a wish is already found in the Qurʾān (28: 79, 82). This does not, of course, exclude the use of other verbs to report wishes, e.g. *yaddaʿūna* in Q. 36:57 according to some exegetes (Ibn ʿAṭiyya, *al-Muḥarrar al-wajīz*, Beirut, 1423/2003, 1067).

[9] On this distinction see Pierre Larcher, "Quand, en arabe, on parlait de l'arabe…(II). Essai sur la catégorie *inšāʾ* (vs. *khabar*)," *Arabica* 38 (1991), 246-73.

[10] al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm,* 164-5, 302-7; trans. Simon, 65-8, 309-17; al-Qazwīnī, *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ*, 1:163-5, 2:234-8.

ment, and question.[11] In the case of the legal theorists we can readily grasp that they were more interested in commands and prohibitions than in statements, an interest reflected in their approach to speech act classification. And there is no obvious reason at all for them to have been interested in wishes.[12]

In an unusually full discussion of the question of the classification of speech acts, the Shāfiʿī jurist and Ashʿarī theologian Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) gives legal theorists the credit for classifying speech acts in the first place, a task they undertook for their own purposes in distinction to the classification of parts of speech (noun, verb, and particle) produced by the grammarians. According to al-Juwaynī. The fourfold classification of the early legal theorists—command, prohibition, statement, and question—was expanded upon by later legal theorists, who among other new elements added wishing. Rejecting some criticisms of this expanded list made by another Ashʿarī Shāfiʿī, Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027), al-Juwaynī proposes his own new fourfold classification: demand, statement, question, and intimation (*tanbīh*). Wishing is to be put under the new heading of *tanbīh*. *Tanbīh* can be a speech act directed at others as in the case of interjection or at oneself as in the case of wishing.[13] Al-Juwaynī's list was given great currency by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), who adopted it in his major work on legal theory *al-Maḥṣūl*. In this list, the primary division is between speech

[11] The former list is that given by Ibn Qutayba (d. 270/889), al-Baṭalyawsī, *al-Iqtiḍāb*, 58-9; the speech act types in this list are identified as the four *daʿāʾim al-kalām* in a gloss to Abū Ibrāhīm al-Fārābī (d. 350/961-2), *Dīwān al-adab*, ed. Aḥmad Mukhtār ʿUmar, Cairo, 1394/1974, 1:73 n. 4.

[12] Some copies of Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī's *al-Waraqāt* omitted mention of wishing, inviting and swearing (Ibn Qāwān, *al-Taḥqīqāt fī sharḥ al-Waraqāt*, ed. Saʿd b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥusayn al-Sharīf, Amman, 1419/1999, 158: e.g., the text in al-Mārdīnī, *al-Anjum al-zāhirāt,* ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Namla, Riyad, 1416/1996, 109. Such speech acts were not germane to legal theory (Ibn al-Firkāḥ, *Sharḥ al-Waraqāt*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl, Beirut, 1424/2003, 28).

[13] *al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Dīb, al-Manṣūra, 1420/1999,1: 146-8. Al-Jawālīqī (d. 540/1145), *Sharḥ Adab al-kātib*, ed. Muṣṭafa Ṣādiq al-Rāfiʿī, Cairo, 1350, 38, similarly presents wishing as an addition to the same four-fold classification, which he attributes to *al-awāʾil*. In his early work *al-Mankhūl min taʿliqāt al-uṣūl*, al-Juwaynī's student al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) limits *al-tanbīh* to *nidāʾ*, while adding a fifth class *taraddud*, which includes wishing and anticipating. He does, however, admit the possibility of reducing the classes to *tanbīh* and *khabar*, the *taraddud* category falling under *tanbīh* in a sense (ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Hītū, Damascus, n.d., 102).

acts that constitute demands, those of primary interest to the legal theorists, and those that do not. Among the latter are statements and also the speech acts classed under *tanbīh*, a term that al-Rāzī explains as having been introduced simply to provide a label for wishing and anticipating (*al-tarajjī*) and other such speech acts.[14]

It was only with the Mālikī Ashʿarī Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249) that the *khabar/inshāʾ* dichotomy was adopted in Islamic legal theory.[15] Ibn al-Ḥājib distinguished between statements and speech acts not truth-evaluable. The latter, he noted, are termed *inshāʾ* and *tanbīh*. The *inshāʾ/tanbīh* category included the speech acts such as command and prohibition that al-Juwaynī had classified as demands, as well as questions and the speech acts, including wishes, that al-Juwaynī had included under the category of *tanbīh*. In Ibn al-Ḥājib's terminology the label *tanbīh* functions as a synonym for *inshāʾ*.[16]

It took somewhat longer to win over the philologists to the new *khabar/inshāʾ* dichotomy. The renowned grammarian Ibn Hishām (d. 761/1360) continued to present in his writings a classification of speech acts as demands, statements, and performatives (*inshāʾ*), the latter in the narrower sense of performatives like the formulas for offer and acceptance *biʿtu* and *ishtaraytu* (I [hereby] sell and I [hereby] buy) used by parties contracting a sale. But this classification, which he labels as "well known" (*mashhūr*), he came to reject. According to Ibn Hishām, the sound view was that statement and performative (in the wider sense) formed a dichotomy. This was the opinion of the leading scholars (*muḥaqqiqūn*).[17]

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[14] *al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh,* Beirut, 1408/1988, 1:82.

[15] The *khabar/inshāʾ* dichotomy is already taken as standard and discussed at great length by another Mālikī Ashʿarī, al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285), *Kitāb al-Furūq*, ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Sarrāj and ʿAlī Jumʿa Muḥammad, Cairo, 1421/2001, 1: 92-150.

[16] *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā*, Bulāq, 1316, reprinted Beirut, 1403/1983, 2:45. The commentator al-Taftāzānī (margin 2:49) notes that Ibn al-Ḥājib's terminology is not standard and also not a borrowing from logic as al-Ījī states. The terminology of the logicians is discussed by Ibn al-Ḥājib's commentator al-Rahūnī (d. 774/1372), *Tuḥfat al-masʾūl fī sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Muntahā al-sūl*, ed. al-Hādī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Shubaylī, Dubai, 1422/2002, 2:309. On the influence of Ibn al-Ḥājib's terminology on the Ḥanbalīs Ibn Mufliḥ (d. 884/1479) and al-Mardāwī (d. 885/1480), see al-Mardāwī, *al-Taḥbīr sharḥ al-Taḥrīr*, ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-Jibrīn et al., Riyad, 2000, 4:1709.

[17] *Sharḥ al-Lamḥa al-badriyya*, ed. Hādi Nahr, Baghdad, 1397/1977, 1:232-3.

The ultimate adoption throughout Islamic thought of the *khabar/inshāʾ* dichotomy as the basis for classifying speech acts was most likely encouraged by the increasing interest in logic.[18] The role of al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) in attempting to encourage the study of logic is well known. His example of prefacing his work of legal theory *al-Mustaṣfā* with an introductory section on logic was followed by others, most importantly by Ibn al-Ḥājib, whose *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā* enjoyed unparalleled popularity. Thus even legal theory, in which a classification of speech acts on another principle was firmly rooted, eventually adopted the point of view natural to the logician, whose main interest was in the deductive preservation of truth.

Although the ascendancy of a dichotomous classification of speech acts based on their assessability as true or false was the outcome of a long process, the categorization of the various speech acts as truth-evaluable was an early concern. This is evident from the dispute over whether or not wishes were statements.[19] This dispute is noted by the philologist Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004), who explains that some philologists (*ahl al-ʿarabiyya*) regarded wishes as tantamount to negative statements. "Would that I had wealth" (*layta lī mālan*) amounts to an admission that one has no wealth (*laysa lī māl*). Others argued that if wishes were statements, truth and falsehood should be imputable to those who utter them.[20]

There is evidence to suggest that the view that wishes were statements was dominant for a time.[21] The grammarian al-Zajjājī (d. 337/949) thus informs us that Quṭrub's fourfold classification of speech acts was of greater scope than might initially appear, for it included command and prohibition under demand, and wishing under state-

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[18] A dichotomy of speech acts into *khabar* and *ṭalab*, the latter including wishes, can already be found in Ibn Wahb, *al-Burhān fī wujūh al-bayān*, ed. Aḥmad Maṭlūb and Khadīja al-Ḥadīthī, Baghdad, 1387/1967, 112-3. The text was written after 335/946-7.

[19] The dispute primarily concerns wishes expressed with *layta*. The topic is dealt with briefly by Richard Frank ("Meanings are Spoken of in Many Ways," 269-70, n. 30)

[20] Ibn Fāris, *al-Ṣāḥibī*, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr, Cairo, 1977, 304, cited by al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān*, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, 1376/1957, 1:322. An implied negation in wishes is urged by al-Farrāʾ (Naphtali Kinberg, *A Lexicon of al-Farrāʾs Terminology in his Qurʾān Commentary,* Leiden, 1996, 779).

[21] al-Qarāfī, *Kitāb al-Furūq*, 1:101, inaccurately asserts that there was always a consensus on the classification of wishes under *inshāʾ*.

ment.[22] Adverting to the four-fold classification (command, prohibition, statement, and question) popular among legal theorists, the Shāfiʿī Ashʿarī ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037), who attributes this list to the students of rhetoric (*aṣḥāb al-maʿānī*), tells us that they understood wishing to fall under statement.[23] The information from these sources is likely to be reliable. Given the early recognition of wishes as speech acts, it is difficult to conceive that any plausible scheme of speech acts could entirely fail to take them into account.

In addition to the analysis of wishes as negative statements mentioned by Ibn Fāris, other considerations may have motivated the classification of wishes as statements. One is the common use of an explicit performative verb for making wishes. One finds wishes introduced by the imperfect and perfect first person singular of *tamannā* (*atamannā* and *tamannaytu*) as well as by the perfect of *wadda* with and without *la-* for oaths (*wadidtu*, *la-wadidtu*).[24] The analysis of wishing as an utterance essentially conveyed by a verb whether expressed or not is, in fact, common among the grammarians.[25] On their face, wishes so formulated do appear to be making statements.

A second consideration may have been the appeal of reducing all, or as many as possible, speech acts to statements. Al-Juwaynī criticizes this tendency on the part of al-Isfarāyīnī, according to whom regretting (*talahhuf),* wishing, and anticipating were all forms of statement. In each case the speaker was making a statement to the effect

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22 al-Zajjājī, *Tafsīr Risālat Adab al-kuttāb*, 112. There is a fuller discussion by al-Zajjājī in his *Isthiqāq asmāʾ Allāh*, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn al-Mubārak, Najaf, 1394/1974, 294-5, cited by Richard Frank from a Dār al-Kutub manuscript ("Meanings are Spoken of in Many Ways," 269 n. 30), according to which Quṭrub and those who followed him explained that wishes, as reports about the mind (*ḍamīr)* of the speaker, ordinarily inaccessible to others, were usually not subject to affirmation or denial. But if the hearer knew of the speaker's aversion (*karāhiyya*) to what he had wished for (for example, in a wish to be ill), he was justified in labeling the wish as false.

23 al-Baghdādi, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, Istanbul, 1346/1928, 215.

24 On the absence of *qad* after *la* as characteristic of "state verbs," see Naphtali Kinberg, *Studies in the Linguistic Structure of Classical Arabic*, ed. L. Kinberg and K. Versteegh, Leiden, 2001, 28 n. 20, 123-4. The corpus of wishes in Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-Mutamannīn*, ed. Muḥammad Khayr Ramaḍān Yūsuf, Beirut, 1418/1997, has appoximately seventy-six instances of wishes introduced by *wadidtu* as opposed to forty-six introduced by *layta* (numbers culled from *fihris al-aqwāl wa-l-akhbār*, 98-107).

25 E.g., Ibn al-Khashshāb, *al-Murtajal*, ed. ʿAlī Ḥaydar, Damascus, 1397/1972, 179.

that his mind (*nafs*) was in the state designated by the utterance in question. "But this is not sound (*sadīd*)," al-Juwaynī argued, "since on this interpretation (*taʾwīl*) there is no utterance (*kalām*) that might not fall under statement. For it could be said that one commanding is making a statement about the demand being made by means of the command to bring about the action, and something similar could be said about prohibition."[26]

The position that in making a wish one is making a statement subject to assessment as true or false requires facts to which the statement can correspond or fail to correspond.[27] Putting aside the argument that wishes are disguised negations, the most obvious candidate for the truth-maker of wishes is an inner state of wishful thinking. The uttered wish would then simply report on the existence of that state. Al-Juwaynī rejected the reduction of his *tanbīh* utterances to truth-evaluable statements, because while they may inform us of the mental state of the speaker, they apparently do not describe that state but rather express it.[28] According to this account, the existence of the mental state is not the content of the speech act of wishing, although it may be a condition for the sincere utterance of a wish. These reflections bring us to a consideration of the conditions for the proper utterance of a wish (its felicity conditions, to use Austin's terminology). Assuming that wishes are speech acts, and leaving aside the question of their possible truth or falsity, what more can be said to characterize them?

In general, the early grammatical literature is remarkably silent on this question. In the early works of grammar *layta* is typically identified as a particle of wishing, but no further details on wishing are

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[26] al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, 1:197. Cf. R. M. Frank, "Al-Ustādh Abū Isḥāq : An ʿ*Aqīda* Together with Selected Fragments," *MIDEO* 19 (1989), 191, on al-Isfarāyīnī's reduction of speech to *khabar*. A reduction of all speech acts to statements is, in fact, attributed to the grammarian ʿUbayd Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Fazārī (d. 381/991) (al-Jawālīqī, *Sharḥ Adab al-kātib*, 38-9). On al-Fazārī, see al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-wuʿāt*, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, 1384/1968, 2:126; Kaḥḥāla, *Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn,* Damascus, 1381/1961, 6:237.

[27] On the question of whether wishes are expressive or descriptive see Friedrich Waismann, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, ed. Rom Harré, Basingstoke, 1997, 289.

[28] al-Juwaynī's Mālikī commentator al-Māzarī (d. 536/1141) still argues that wishes can be construed as statements that report the mental state of the speaker (*iʿrāb ʿammā fī l-nafs*) (*Īḍāḥ al-maḥṣūl min Burhān al-uṣūl*, ed. ʿAmmār al-Ṭālibī, Beirut, 2001, 163).

provided.[29] It appears that wishes were too familiar to require analysis, at least outside of particular contentious contexts. That some discussion of the nature of wishing did occur is, however, beyond doubt. This is evidenced by Ibn Fāris's mention of the interpretation of the wish as a negative statement in connection with the assessability of wishes as true or false. Early definitions of the wish seem to have been proposed in connection with the exegesis of Q. 22:52, a key verse in the highly sensitive matter of the so-called "Satanic verses." These definitions point in the direction that was to be taken by later discussions of the nature of wishing. Analysis of wishing would come to focus on its accompanying mental act or state, one primarily characterized either by the nature of its object, what is wished for, or by its distinct conative quality. In the classical literature of rhetoric the inner act of wishing is typically discussed in terms of both its object and its conative character.

According to Thaʿlab (d. 291/903-4) a wish is "a suggestion of the mind concerning what can be and what cannot be" (*ḥadīth al-nafs bimā yakūnu wa-bimā lā yakūnu*).[30] Ibn Durayd (d. 321/933), on the other hand, offered an overtly etymological derivation of the term *tamannī*. "I wished for something, that is, I determined it [in my mind] and wanted that it happen to me, from *al-manā* in the sense of a determination (*tamannaytu al-shayʾa ay qaddartuhū wa-aḥbabtu an yaṣīra ilayya min al-manā wa-huwa al-qadar*)."[31] Both definitions

[29] For example, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAlī al-Ṣaymarī, *al-Tabṣira wa-l-tadhkira*, ed. Fatḥī Aḥmad Muṣṭafā ʿAlī al-Dīn, Damascus, 1402/1982, 1:205.

[30] Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab*, Cairo, n.d., 6:4283; al-Zabīdī, *Tāj al-ʿarūs*, ed. ʿAlī Shīrī, Beirut, 1414/1994, 20:201. On *ḥadīth al-nafs*, see Josef van Ess, *Die Erkenntnislehre des ʿAḍudaddīn al-Īcī*, Wiesbaden, 1966, 240-1, to whose references may be added Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, Leiden, 1881, reprinted Beirut, 1968, 1:259; al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Mutashābih al-Qurʾān*, ed. ʿAdnān Muḥammad Zarzūr, Cairo, 1969, 1:125; al-Qushayrī, *al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya*, Bulāq, 1284, 56. *Tamannī* as a form of *ḥadīth al-nafs* is also reported on the authority of Thaʿlab's Kufan predecessors al-Kisāʾī (d. 189/805) and his student al-Farrāʾ (d. 207/822) (al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, Cairo, 1387/1967, reprinted Tehran, n.d., 12:85 on Q. 22:52. Al-Qurṭubī attributes the same notion to a *tafsīr* transmitted by ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭalḥa (d. 143/760-1) (on him see al-Mizzī, *Tahdhīb al-kamāl fī asmāʾ al-rijāl*, ed. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, Beirut, 1418/1998, 6:262-3) and known to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal in an Egyptian copy).

[31] *Lisān al-ʿarab*, 6:4283; *Tāj al-ʿarūs*, 20:201. The etymological derivation from *al-many* in the sense of *taqdīr* is developed by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Muʿjam mufradāt alfāẓ al-Qurʾān*, ed. Nadīm Marʿashlī, Beirut, 1392/1972, 496.

present wishing as an essentially mental act, although they differ as to what characterizes this mental act. For Thaʿlab it is the modality of the object of the wish: it may even be something impossible. For Ibn Durayd it is the conative dimension, the wanting, that distinguishes wishes.

Once the grammarians do come to advert, however briefly, to the nature of wishing, it is the example of al-Thaʿlab that they persistently follow. Wishes, characteristically introduced by *layta*, are distinguished from anticipations, characteristically introduced by *laʿalla*, in terms of their respective objects.[32] Thus Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 769/1367) in his classic commentary on *al-Alfiyya* of Ibn Mālik (d. 672/1274), explains that "the difference between anticipating and wishing is that wishing can be for what is possible (*al-mumkin*), for example 'would that Zayd were standing up' and for what is not possible, for example 'would that my youth might one day return,' whereas anticipating can only be for what is possible, so that you cannot say 'perhaps (*laʿalla*) one day my youth will return.'"[33] This explanation, however, can hardly claim to provide an adequate distinction between the two speech acts, since it fails to indicate how wishes for what is possible differ from anticipations.[34] An attempt to remedy this defect would be to specify that one anticipates what is proximately possible (*al-mumkin al-qarīb*) and wishes for what is only remotely possible (*al-mumkin al-baʿīd*).[35] A further refinement

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[32] al-Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, Cairo, 1387/1968, 4:177 contrasts hoping with wishing, in that in wishing the means to attainment (*asbāb)* are neither known to exist nor not to exist, whereas hoping requires known means. In both cases there is some expectation (*intiẓār*). The distinction between wishes and invitations *(ʿarḍ)* is discussed in al-Aḥmadnagarī, *Jāmiʿ al-ʿulūm*, Hyderabad, Deccan, reprinted Beirut, 1395/1975, 1:350.

[33] Ed. Fr. Dieterici, Leipzig, 1851, 90; this is the definition cited in Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, London, 1893, reprinted Beirut, 1968, 8:3025. Along the same lines Ibn Hishām in his *Mughnī al-labīb* (Cairo, 1305, 2:69) notes that *layta* is predominantly used for what is impossible, less frequently for what is possible. Al-Jāmī (d. 898/1492), *al-Fawāʾid al-ḍiyāʾiyya sharḥ Kāfiyat Ibn al-Ḥājib*, ed. Usāma Ṭāhā al-Rifāʿī, Baghdad, 1983, reprinted Istanbul, n.d., 2:350, repeats the standard explanation.

[34] On the overlap of wishing and hoping, see Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Tanūkhī (d. 748/1347), *al-Aqṣā al-qarīb fī ʿilm al-bayān*, Cairo, 1327, 7-8, cited by Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 763/1363), *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ* in *Shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ,* 2:240-1.

[35] al-Iṣfahānī, *al-Kāshif ʿan al-Maḥṣūl*, ed. ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and Muʿawwaḍ, Beirut, 1998, 2:59.

would be to add that the sense of possibility used to define wishes excludes necessity. One cannot properly wish for something that is necessary, for example, "would that tomorrow might come."[36]

Such distinctions between wishing and anticipating based on the nature of their objects were categorically rejected by the grammarian Raḍī al-Dīn al-Astarābādhī (d. ca. 686/1287). In his commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib's work on syntax *al-Kāfiya*, al-Astarābādhī insisted that wishing and anticipating differed in their essence (*māhiyya*) and not merely in the one dimension on which the commonly accepted account focused. The essence of wishing according to him is "wanting (*maḥabba*) the happening of something whether you expect (*tantaẓiru*) and await (*tartaqibu*) its happening or not, whereas anticipating is awaiting something which you have no confidence will happen. Hence one does not say 'perhaps the sun will set.'" "Hoping (*al-ṭamaʿ*) and apprehension (*al-ishfāq*)," he went on to say, "both fall under awaiting. Hoping is awaiting something wanted (*maḥbūb*), for example 'perhaps you will make me a gift,' whereas apprehension is awaiting something unwelcome (*makrūh*), for example, 'perhaps you will die right now.'"[37]

Like that of Ibn Durayd before him, al-Astarābādhī's explanation of the difference between wishing and anticipating characterizes wish-

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[36] al-Ḥasan b. Qāsim al-Murādī, *al-Janā al-dānī fī ḥurūf al-maʿānī*, ed. Fakhr al-Dīn Qabāwa and Muḥammad Nadīm Fāḍil, Aleppo, 1393/1973, 491-2.

[37] *Sharḥ al-Kāfiya*, Beirut, n.d., 2:346. Note that *maḥabba* is commonly regarded as a form of willing (J. R. T. M. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, Leiden, 1976, 220; Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad maqālāt al-shaykh Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī*, ed. D. Gimaret, Beirut, 1986, 45. For the view that *maḥabba* applies only to the future unlike *mawadda* and wishing, see Nūr al-Dīn b. Niʿmat al-Dīn al-Jazāʾirī, *Furūq al-lughāt,* ed. Muḥammad Riḍwān al-Dāya, Tehran, 1415, 82. The Zaydī imam al-Muʾayyad Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza (d. 745/1344), however, defines wishing as "the aspiration for something wanted *in the future*" (*tawaqquʿu amrin maḥbūbin fī l-mustaqbal*) (*Kitāb al-Ṭirāz*, Beirut, n.d., 3:291). The definition of wishing as directed to the future is not uncommon in the exegesis of Q. 4:32: Ibn al-ʿArabī, *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bijāwī, Cairo, 1972, 1:412, omitting *bi-l-māḍī* in line 17 as in al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 5:162; al-Shawkānī, *Fatḥ al-qadīr*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra, al-Manṣūra, 1415/1994, 1:547, and al-Ṣāwī, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā tafsīr al-Jalālayn*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī, Beirut, 1419/1999, 2:27. The definition of wishing as a future-directed form of willing *(irāda*) in all of these commentaries appears to reflect the influence of Ashʿarī theology, as discussed below. The restriction of wishing to the future is asserted without argument by al-Qarāfī, *Kitāb al-Furūq*, 1:189. The lexicographer Majd al-Dīn al-Fīrūzābādī (d. 817/1414-5) defines *tamannāhu* as *arādahū* (*al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ*, Beirut, 1406/1986, 1721).

ing in positive terms, as "wanting" the occurrence of something. The rhetorical tradition going back to al-Sakkākī begins with a negative definition of wishing. Wishing does not require that its object be possible, nor does it admit of the expectation (*tawaqquʿ)* or hope (*ṭamaʿiyya*) that its object will occur. Wishing is defined negatively by reference to anticipating, the object of which must be possible and where expectation and awaiting are in place.[38] This means that the only positive element in wishing is its character as a "demand" (*ṭalab)*. The commentators need repeatedly to remind their readers and themselves that despite the negative formulation of the nature of wishing in relation to anticipating, as a demand wishing is entirely distinct from anticipating, which is not a demand.[39] Unfortunately al-Sakkākī is not very forthcoming in telling us what constitutes a demand, inasmuch as he regards it to be too well known to merit definition.[40] The only thing clear for al-Sakkākī seems that a demand is a speech act.

While some commentators dispute whether demanding is an appropriate classification for wishing, others, notably al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390), draw upon al-Astarābādhī for a more positive characterization of wishing within the colorless class of demands.[41] Al-Taftāzānī thus defines wishing as "the demand for the occurrence of something by way of wanting *(ʿalā sabīl al-maḥabba*)."[42] Despite incorporating this reference to the mental state of the one making a wish, al-Taftāzānī clearly indicates that he continues to regard the discussion of wishing as primarily directed at utterances, either in the

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[38] Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355) already noted that "absence of expectation" was the common denominator of the examples of wishing adduced by al-Sakkākī (quoted by his son Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Subkī, *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ*, 2:238).

[39] E.g., *Ḥāshiyat* al-Dasūqī on al-Taftāzānī's commentary on *Mukhtaṣar al-Miftāḥ*, in *Shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ*, 2:239 bottom; Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Maghribī, *Mawāhib al-fattāḥ* in *Shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ,* 2:245, but cf. 2:238.

[40] *Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm,* 302, trans. Simon, 309; cf. 165*,* trans. 68,

[41] On the view that would exclude wishing from *ṭalab,* see al-Subkī, *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ*, 2:240 (prefering the *tanbīh* classification of al-Rāzī and his followers), cited by al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān*, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, 1387/1967, 3:244, cited in turn by al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn wa-l-ʿulūm*, ed. Rafīq al-ʿAjam, Beirut, 1996, 1:509, *Ḥāshiyat* al-Dasūqī, 2:238. Al-Qarāfī, *al-Iḥkām fī tamyīz al-fatāwā ʿan al-aḥkām*, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda, Aleppo, 1416/1995, 62, places wishes and hopes in the second rank (*al-rutba al-thāniya*) of *ṭalab* after commands and prohibitions.

[42] *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ*, 2:238.

sense of the act of uttering or, more significantly for the study of rhetoric, in the sense of the products of such acts.[43]

Al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) entirely departs from this position. In seeking to identify the proper sense of wishing, he introduces a series of distinctions. In the utterance of "Would that Zayd might stand," one can immediately distinguish between the relation in the mind that predicates standing of Zayd (*nisbat al-qiyām ilā Zayd fī l-nafs*) and the mental attitude (*hayʾa nafsāniyya*) that attaches to this relation of predication and prevents it from bearing the qualities of truth and falsehood. One can further distinguish the performative utterance constituted by the words spoken, the meaning of that utterance, the production (*ilqāʾ*) of the utterance, and the origination *(inshāʾ*) of the mental attitude. From among all these distinct elements, al-Jurjānī argues, it is to the mental attitude itself that wishing corresponds.[44]

Once wishing was identified with a mental state, the question of the possible truth-value of wishing could be more precisely articulated. The late commentator al-Dasūqī (d. 1230/1815), who assumes the correctness of the results of an analysis like al-Jurjānī's, writes that *layta* was adopted for wishing itself, which is the mental state (*al-ḥāla al-qalbiyya*), that is, the mental demand (*al-ṭalab al-qalbī*):

> Thus from an utterance of 'Would that I had property (*layta lī mālan*)' one can gather (*ustufīda*) that the speaker has wished for the existence of property, but this is not a statement (*ikhbār*) of the wish when you say "I wish" (*atamannā*) and so forth. Otherwise *layta* would be a sentence *(jumla*), whereas it is actually a particle by which the predicative relation in the utterance is rendered performative so as not to bear truth and falsehood and to convey (*tufīd*) that the speaker is demanding [the realization of] that relation. Hence one cannot say to the speaker of our utterance 'Would that I had property so as to make the Pilgrimage' that he is speaking truthfully or falsely in predicating existence to the property, for he is wishing that relation, not stating its realization in external reality. Nonetheless [*layta*], in consideration of what it was adopted for, does imply (*mustalzima*) a statement, namely, that the speaker does wish for that relation [to be realized]. For this reason it is said that a performative implies a statement.[45]

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43 *Kitāb al-Muṭawwal*, Qumm, 1409, 224.

44 *Ḥāshiya* on *Kitāb al-Muṭawwal*, 224.

45 *Ḥāshiyat* al-Dasūqī, 2:238. This passage coincides virtually verbatim with the explanation in Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Maghribī (d. 1128/1716), *Mawāhib al-fattāḥ*, 2:238-9.

III. *Wishing in Islamic Theology*

Although the Arabic rhetorical literature came to see in wishing primarily an inner conative act or state, an important segment of Muslim theologians insisted that wishing was exclusively a speech act.[46] They vehemently denied the existence of any inner act or state of wishing. The definition of wishing purely as a speech act can be found in a number of works written within a Baṣran Muʿtazilī framework. Thus the Twelver Shīʿī Quṭb al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī (6th/12th cent.) in his valuable book of definitions defines wishing as "one's saying with respect to what has occurred 'Would that it had not occurred' and with respect to what has not occurred 'Would that it had occurred.' Others say it is an act of the heart (*fiʿl min afʿāl al-qulūb*), but the correct view is what I have told you."[47] Virtually the same formulation can be found in other writings.[48]

A somewhat fuller account is furnished by the Twelver Shīʿī Qurʾānic exegete al-Ṭabrisī (d. 548/1154), who provides the additional information that "Abū Hāshim [al-Jubbāʾī] (d. 321/933) stated in one of his writings that wishing is an accident (*maʿnā*) of the heart. Those who hold this view claim that wishing is not in the nature of appetite (*shahwa*) nor of will (*irāda*). For will cannot attach except to what can occur and appetite, like will, cannot attach to what has already occurred, whereas wishing can attach to what has occurred. The philologists (*ahl al-lugha*) have, in fact, mentioned wishing as among the kinds of speech (*aqsām al-kalām*)."[49] A final crucial bit of infor-

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Cf. the attribution in *ḥadīth* of wishing to the heart (al-Nawawī, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim bi-Sharḥ al-Nawawī*, Cairo, n.d., 16: 206).

[46] Such distinctions are not foreign to modern discussions of wishing. The linguist Anna Wierzbicka, in her valuable discussion of wishing in *English Speech Act Verbs*, Sydney, 1987, 227, recognizes that the verb "wish" can be used for a mental act as well as for a speech act. The philosopher Mark Platts regards wishing as an expression of desire "under certain specific circumstances, of which the most central is that in which the agent believes it beyond his capacities to realize the object of his desire" (*Moral Realities: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology*, London, 1991, 43). But he admits that "the phenomenon to be accounted for is a messy one."

[47] *al-Ḥudūd*, ed. Maḥmūd Yazdī, Qumm, 1414, 51.

[48] Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī, *al-Muqaddima fī l-kalām*, ed. M. T. Dānish'pazhūh, in *Chahār farhangnāma-i kalāmi*, n.p, n.d., 201, offprint from *al-Dhikrā al-alfiyya li-l-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī*, Mashhad, 1972, vol. 2.; Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, Najaf, 1376/1957, 1:357 on Q. 2:94).

[49] *Majmaʿ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, ed. Hāshim al-Rasūlī al-Maḥallātī, Beirut, 1406/1986, 3:53 on Q. 4:32.

mation is added by the Yemeni Zaydī Imām al-Mahdī Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437), who contrasts the accepted Muʿtazilī view, which follows Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/915), that wishing is a speech act, with the view of the Najjāriyya and other determinists (*mujbira*) that wishing is "willing what cannot occur (*irādat mā lā yaḥṣulu*)."[50]

Both the position on wishing espoused by Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī and that attributed to his son Abū Hāshim emerged in the context of anti-determinist arguments. Enough of the pertinent dialectic survives for at least a broad reconstruction of the debate. The heart of the dispute was the nature and scope of the divine attribute of will. The Muʿtazilīs were engaged on the one hand in attacking the doctrine of God's will held by determinists such as the Najjāriyya and on the other in defending their own position on God's will against the critiques of the determinists. In responding to the arguments of the determinists, Muʿtazilī theologians took the analysis of wishing beyond that of the philologists to whose authority they appealed.[51] The argumentation throughout assumes that God is above making wishes.[52] Thus any doctrine that can be shown to imply God's wishing must be rejected.

In one line of argument the Muʿtazila attacked the doctrine of the Najjāriyya, the followers of al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Najjār (first half 3rd/9th cent.), that God wills by His essence and that of the followers of al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935) and al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), who held that God wills by virtue of an eternal attribute of will.[53] The Muʿtazila urged that on either of these accounts of God's will, it should attach to every possible object of willing, even to such objects as are incompatible. The determinist positions thus implied self-destructive chaos in God's actions. To counter this argument, the de-

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[50] *Riyāḍat al-afhām fī laṭīf al-kalām*, in *Muqaddimat Kitāb al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār*, ed. al-Jirāfī, Cairo, 1366/1948, reprinted Ṣanʿāʾ, 1409/1988, 141.

[51] I refer only to the nature of wishing itself. The rhetorical literature is obviously far richer in its examination of how wishes may be expressed.

[52] See Tafsīr Abī l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balkhī, ed. Khiḍr Muḥammad Nabā, Beirut, 1428/2007, 253 on Q. 16:90 (this is a modern collection of citations); al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *al-Iʿtiqādāt*, ed. Shamrān al-ʿIjlī, Beirut, 1988, 174-5; Ibn Ḥamdān, *Nihāyat al-mubtadiʾīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Naṣr b. Ṣaʿūd b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Salāma, Riyad, 1425/2004, 24.

[53] The motivation for al-Najjār's doctrine on God's will is discussed by Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-adilla*, ed. Claude Salamé, Damascus, 1990, 1:378. Abū Hāshim is reported to have responded to an anti-Muʿtazilī argument on God's will of al-Najjār's student Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā al-Burghūth (d. 240 or 241/855 or 856) (al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, ed. Georges Anawati, Cairo, 1362/1962, 6/2:197).

terminists appealed to God's knowledge. God's foreknowledge of how the world will be eliminates some possible objects of willing and prevents the unacceptable consequence of self-destructive chaos in God's actions.[54] They rejected the possibility that God could will what He knew would not occur. To will what will not occur is wishing, and wishing is impossible in the case of God.[55] The Muʿtazilī response was to insist that wishing was not willing, thus preserving their objection to the determinist positions, since wishing, agreed to be inapplicable to God, was not at issue.

In the second line of Muʿtazilī anti-determinist argument, the Muʿtazila were called upon to defend their doctrine that God wills the acts that He has commanded, even when He knows that in some cases His commands will not be obeyed. The determinists argued that insofar as God wills what He knows will not occur, He is wishing, a consequence unacceptable to all, including the Muʿtazila.[56] Once again the Muʿtazila countered that willing was distinct from wishing.[57]

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[54] *al-Mughnī*, 6/2: 124. ʿAbd al-Jabbār focuses his attack on the position of the Najjāriya as does Mānkdīm Sheshdīv (d. 425/1034), *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-khamsa*, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān, Cairo, 1384/1965, 440-47. But the same issues could be raised by and against the Ashʿarīs (al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al-aqdām*, ed. Alfred Guillaume, London, 1934, 249-50 [Arabic], 87 [trans.]). That ʿAbd al-Jabbār discussed wishing was already briefly noted by George Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār,* Oxford, 1971, 85,88, and J. R. T. M. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, 221.

[55] *al-Mughnī*, 6/2:127.

[56] al-Ashʿarī, *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ,* ed. Richard J. McCarthy, Beirut, 1953, 30 (Arabic), 42 (trans.); Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, Cairo, 1357/1938, 10:80 on Q. 4:32. This argument was attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa (al-Bayāḍī, *al-Uṣūl al-munīfa*, ed. Īlyas Ġelebi, Ankara, 1420/2000, 76, cited in al-Māturīdī, *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, ed. Topaloğlu and Aruçi, Ankara, 1423/2003, 483 n. 3). In the version given by al-Bayāḍī the opponent is said to render God wishing and regretting (*mutamanniyan mutaḥassiran*), which amounts to unbelief (*kufr*). A different version of Abū Ḥanīfa's argument, in which the opponent is said to render God ignorant, was familiar to Central Asian Ḥanafī theologians including al-Māturīdī (*Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, 483, ed. Fathalla Kholeif, Beirut, 1970, 303-4; al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-adilla*, 2:705 (who has al-Muʿtazila in place of al-Qadariyya as in al-Māturīdī, his source); al-Ṣābūnī, *Kitāb al-Bidāya min al-Kifāya*, ed. Fathalla Kholeif, Cairo, 1969, 123. In his *Ishārat al-marām*, ed. Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Cairo, 1368/1949,304-7, al-Bayāḍī incorporates this version in his comments. Al-Māturīdī's own version of the argument from wishing is found in *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, 467, ed. Kholeif, 293.

[57] This still leaves open the possibility of the non-literal use of "willing" for "wishing" (cf. al-Karājikī (d. 449/1057-8), *Kanz al-fawāʾid*, Tabriz, 1322, 28). Abū

For the Baṣran Muʿtazila the crucial point was to insist that certain cases of willing did not constitute wishing: God's willing incompatible objects and His willing acts of obedience that He knows will not occur. Willing of the former sort, they argued, followed from determinist doctrine and could not be avoided by claiming that it was not willing in the strict sense but only wishing. Willing of the latter sort they defended against the determinist argument that this amounted to the attribution of wishing to God.

Having surveyed the theological background, we can now turn to the analyses of wishing that emerged from these debates. Whereas Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī, except in one of his writings, took the view that wishing was a speech act, Abū Hāshim recognized a mental state of wishing that was, however, entirely distinct from willing.[58] Abū ʿAlī's view became the mainstream Baṣran Muʿtazilī position.[59] For

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ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī in fact interpreted *yurīdūna* in Q. 5:37 as *yatamannawna* (al-Ṭabrisī, *Majmaʿ al-bayān*, 3:238-9).

[58] Ibn Mattawayh (d. 469/1076), *al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-l-aʿrāḍ*, ed. Sāmī Naṣr Luṭf and Fayṣal Budayr ʿAwn, Cairo, 1975, 383. Abū Hāshim enunciated the position attributed to him in his *al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr* (Anon., *Sharḥ al-Tadhkira*, Facsimile Edition of Mahdavi Codex 514, introduction and indices by Sabine Schmidtke, Tehran, 2006, 61a. (my thanks to Dr. Alnoor Dhanani for making this text available to me some years ago). Abū ʿAlī held the same position in some copies of his *Jawābāt al-Khurāsāniyyīn*, but not in his other writings (*al-Tadhkira*, 383, cf. *al-Mughnī,* 6/2:37 [where the title of Abū ʿAlī's work is given as *Jawāb al-Khurāsāniyyīn* and no mention is made of variant copies]). For Abū Hāshim wishing was thus a "kind unto itself" (*jins bi-raʾsihī*), whereas for Abū ʿAlī it was "of the kind 'speech'" (*min jins al-qawl*) (Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Dāmigh al-awhām fī sharḥ Riyāḍat al-afhām*, British Library Or. 3807, f. 196a).

[59] It is identified as the view of the majority of theologians by al-Ṭabrisī (*Majmaʿ al-bayān*, 1:208 on Q. 2:94. The leading Baghdādī Muʿtazilī Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931) defined wishing as a "particular form of willing attaching only to what does not exist" (*irādatun makhṣūṣatun lā tataʿallaqu illā bi-maʿdūm*) (Ibn al-Murtāḍā, *Dāmigh al-awhām*, f. 196a); this is one of the definitions given without attribution by Nashwān al-Ḥimyarī, *Shams al-ʿulūm*, ed. Husayn b. ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAmrī et al., Beirut, 1420/1999, 9:6394. See also al-Māturīdī, *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, 477, ed. Kholeif, 300, according to whom al-Kaʿbī identifies the willing of Iblīs with wishing. The disadvantage of Abū Hāshim's opinion on wishing was that it could be used by opponents of the Muʿtazila, such as the Ashʿarīs, in their arguments in favor of an uncreated Qurʾān constituted by God's "inner speech" (*kalām al-nafs*). To forestall these arguments the Muʿtazila denied the existence of any such inner speech for humans as well as for God. Cf. Ibn Mattawayh, *al-Tadhkira*, 383. Abū Hāshim was in any case perceived by Ashʿarīs as having conceded the existence of inner speech with his doctrine on *khawāṭir* (Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād,* ed. Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Cairo, 1369/1950, 104).

Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī wishing was a speech act characterized by (1) the utterance of an expression such as "Would that it had been so" or "Would that it had not been so" accompanied by (2) the belief (*iʿtiqād*) that the speaker would have gained some benefit (*nafʿ*) had it indeed been so or avoided some harm (*ḍarar*) had it not been so and by (3) the intention (*qaṣd*) to make the utterance.[60] The element of will enters into the analysis in the requirement that the utterance be intentionally made, but there is no inner act or state to which the utterance corresponds.

Abū Hāshim reportedly argued that the psychological state of wishing was as accessible to introspection as the state of willing.[61] No precise characterization on his part of this inner state of wishing is reported, other than that it "corresponded to an uttered wish in its attachment to the object wished."[62] We do, however, have a definition of wishing as a mental state from Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. after 395/1005), who contrasts his definition with that of Abū ʿAlī. Abū Hilāl defines wishing as "a mental accident (*maʿnā fī l-nafs*) that occurs upon the non-occurrence of an act in the occurrence of which the wisher had some benefit or in the cessation of which some harm, whether this act is in the future or the past."[63] This definition in terms of benefit and harm recalls the cognitive condition that Abū ʿAlī had set on the speech act of wishing, and may reflect the doctrine of Abū Hāshim, whom, however, Abū Hilāl does not mention.[64]

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[60] Ibn Mattawayh, *al-Tadhkira*, 383; Anon, *Sharḥ al-Tadhkira*, f. 61a; wishing is labeled *qawl ʿalā waṣf* in al-Qaḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6/2:37.

[61] Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Dāmigh al-awhām*, f. 196a. This opinion and the Ashʿarī opinion that wishing is a form of willing favor the universality of wishing, as against the view that it is merely a speech act, which may or may not be provided for by the resources of a given language.

[62] al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6/2:37 (*yuṭābiqu fī taʿalluqihī bi-l-mutamannā hādhā al-qawl*).

[63] Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, *al-Furūq al-lughawiyya*, ed. Bāsil Muḥammad ʿUyūn al-Sūd, Beirut, 1421/2000, 140 (*al-tamannī maʿnā fī l-nafs yaqaʿu ʿinda fawt fiʿl kāna li-l-mutamannī fī wuqūʿihī nafʿ aw fī zawālihī ḍarar mustaqbalan kāna dhālika l-fiʿl aw māḍiyan*). The considerable significance of Abū Hilāl's work for the study of theology does not seem to have been adequately exploited.

[64] According to Abū Hilāl, Abū ʿAlī held that wishing is uttering "Would that the matter had been so," but in one place stated that wishing was this utterance together with the representation of its meaning in the mind (*wa-iḍmāru maʿnāhu fī l-qalb*), a doctrine he also attributes to Abū Hāshim's rival Abū Bakr Ibn al-Ikhshīdh (d. 326/936) (Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, *al-Furūq al-lughawiyya*, 141). It is not clear whether the second opinion he attributes to Abū ʿAlī is a formulation of the condi-

The definition of wishing in terms of willing that both Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim opposed was that of al-ʿAshʿarī among others.[65] For al-Ashʿarī, wishing was a variety of willing characterized as "willing what one does not know will occur or believes will probably not occur."[66] As such wishing is "a mark of the inferiority (*naqṣ*) of the one so willing, his incapacity (*ʿajz*) and inadequacy in attaining what is willed."[67] For this reason wishing is impossible in the case of God.[68]

Although the definition of wishing as a form of willing was adopted by al-Ashʿarī himself, it was eventually abandoned by his later followers. Still supported by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, it was contrasted by the Shāfiʿī Ashʿarī Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) with the opinion of the best Ashʿarī and Muʿtazilī theologians that wishing was not a form of willing.[69] The arguments against identifying wishing with willing, of which al-Āmidī gives three, were simply too compelling to leave any room for doubt. After examining three opinions on

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tions for the speech act of wishing or whether it states the other opinion attributed to him in the Muʿtazilī sources, in which he recognized an inner state of wishing as did Abū Hāshim. If the latter is the case, then even when recognizing an inner state corresponding to wishing, Abū ʿAlī may have regarded it as not amounting to wishing without the utterance. Abū Hāshim, on the other hand, may have treated the mental state of wishing as complete even when not articulated.

[65] al-Māturīdī recognizes a use of "will" (*mashīʾa/irāda*) for wishing (*Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, 468, ed. Kholeif, 294); this passage is cited in al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-adilla*, 2:291-2.

[66] Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad*, 45. The formulation in *Mujarrad*, 75, is significantly different in that it takes wishing to be "willing what one knows will not occur or believes will probably not occur." The former definition is supported by *Mujarrad*, 16, which states that "a living being cannot possibly will what it does not know without that willing amounting to wishing." The latter is found in al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 10:80 (*irādatu mā yaʿlamu aw yaẓunnu annahū lā yakūnu*) on Q. 4:39. Ibn Fūrak himself defines wishing as willing, the object of which one does not know will occur or not occur (*al-irādatu allatī lā yaʿlamu anna murādahā yaqaʿu aw lā yaqaʿu*) (*Kitāb al-Ḥudūd fī l-uṣūl*, ed. Muḥammad al-Sulaymānī, Beirut, 1999, 101). Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, *Abkār al-afkār*, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Mahdī, Cairo, 2002, 1:301, has the definition *irādatu mā ʿalima annahū lā yaqaʿu aw shakka fī wuqūʿihī*, and a virtually identical formula was known to al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-adilla*, 2:692, who explains that willing what one does not know will occur is weakness (*ḍuʿf*), willing what one has doubt will occur is ignorance (*jahl).* I read the verbs of these definitions as active against my own intuition and the vocalization of the editors on the basis of *qalbihī* (variant *ẓannihī*) in *Mujarrad*, 75, where the pronoun has no explicit antecedent (*Mujarrad*, 45, has *al-qalb*).

[67] Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad,* 75

[68] Ibid., 45.

[69] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 10:80 on Q. 4:32; al-Āmidī, *Abkār al-afkār*, 1:302.

the nature of wishing, all of which he maintains were held at one time by Abū Hāshim: that it is a speech act, that it is a form of belief, that it is regret (*al-talahhuf wa-l-taʾassuf*), al-Āmidī concludes that it can be none of these. Beyond that he is not prepared to go, claiming that there is no need for a definition (*taḥdīd*). The important point was to establish that wishing is not willing. Al-Āmidī's conclusion was summarized and adopted in the widely studied *al-Mawāqif* of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355).[70] The Ashʿarīs had evidently come to find other responses to the anti-determinist arguments of the Muʿtazila than those that required taking wishing to be a form of willing.

The differences between wishing and willing pointed to by al-Āmidī were, in fact, those noted by the Muʿtazilī critics of the determinist identification of wishing with willing. Among the differences mentioned by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) is that wishing unlike willing can attach to what is past (*al-māḍī*) and to the non-existence of something (*bi-an lā yakūna*), but not to what already exists (*al-mawjūd*). Unlike willing, wishing exercises no effect (*taʾthīr*) on its object.[71] A further difference is that one can will what is harmful but not wish it.[72]

IV. *Wishing in the Exegesis of the Qurʾān*

From the rarefied, not to say arid, inquiries of the philologists and theologians, we now turn to the more animated discussions of the interpreters of the Qurʾān. Of the Qurʾānic passages bearing on the subject of wishing, several are of particular importance in raising the very issues that engaged the philologists and theologians and in exhibiting them in a new light. It will emerge that the interpretation of these verses raised significant obstacles to the consistency with which philological and theological positions were upheld.

An obvious starting point for an examination of wishing in the context of Qurʾānic commentary is Q. 2:94-6.[73] In these verses the Jews of the Prophet's time, who rejected his message and insisted on

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[70] *Kitāb al-Mawāqif*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra, Beirut, 1417/1997, 2: 109-10.

[71] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī,* 6/2:37.

[72] Ibn Mattawayh, *al-Tadhkira*, 383.

[73] The parallel verse Q. 62:6 raises the same issues.

their own special standing with God, are challenged to stand behind their claims, and a prediction is made that they will never do so. "Say: 'If an afterlife with God is to be for you alone, to the exclusion of all other people, then wish for death (*fa-tamannawi l-mawt*), if what you say is true.' But never will they wish for it, because [they are aware] of what their hands have sent ahead [in this world]; and God has full knowledge of the evildoers."[74]

The standard interpretation of these verses understands the Jews to have been challenged by Muḥammad, as instructed by God, to wish for their own death. A wish of this sort would demonstrate that they were fully confident of the truth of the special standing with God that they claimed. The Qurʾān accurately predicts that the Jews will not make a wish of this sort. This prediction is among the miracles confirming Muḥammad's prophetic office.[75]

The discussion by the Ḥanafī Muʿtazilī al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) of the nature of the wish for their own death that the Jews were called upon to make was highly influential. In answer to the question of how can one know that the Jews never, in fact, did wish for death as Muḥammad challenged them to do, al-Zamakhsharī states that had they made such a wish it would have been widely reported, given the many opponents of Islam who would have been only too happy to narrate this fact. Al-Zamakhsharī then addresses a further question: inasmuch as wishing is one of the acts of the heart (*aʿmāl al-qulūb*) and is thus a private matter (*sirr*), how can one know that the Jews did not in fact wish to die?

> I answer: Wishing is not an act of the heart but a person's uttering with his tongue: "Would that I had such." When one utters this, it is said that he has made a wish, and *layta* is an expression for wishing. It is

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[74] The translations of the Qurʾān here and elsewhere are taken from *The Message of the Qurʾān*, translated and explained by Muhammad Asad, Gibraltar, 1980, with such modifications as suit the present context.

[75] The miracle is particularly significant as Qurʾānic, cf. Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Muḥallā*, Beirut, n.d., 1:8; al-Karājikī, *Kanz al-fawāʾid*, 77. Less common, but well attested, is the interpretation that the Jews were challenged to wish death upon their Muslim opponents in mutual execration (*mubāhala*). This interpretation avoids some of the psychological obscurities raised by the notion of wishing for one's own death. It is given prominence in a number of Twelver Shīʿite commentaries and was favored by Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm* among the Sunnīs, ed. Sāmī b. Muḥammad al-Salāma, Riyad, 1418/1997, 1:332, in reliance on an interpretation attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās.

> impossible that the challenge [to the Jews] concerns what is in the mind and heart.[76] Furthermore, if wishing were a matter of the heart and they did make a wish, they would have said that "We have wished for death in our hearts." But it has not been reported that they said this. If you respond that they did not say this because they knew that they would not be believed, I reply: How many things have been related of them in their arguments with the Muslims in the way of fabrications against God and the distortion of His scripture and so forth in which they knew that they would not be believed. They had no other inducement for what they did other than unvarnished lying, and yet they paid no heed. So why would they possibly refrain from saying that wishing is an act of the heart and we have performed it, in addition to the possibility that they might be telling the truth in what they reported of what was in their minds. A man reports that he has faith and is believed despite the possibility that he may be lying, since it is a private matter to which no one has access.[77]

Al-Zamakhsharī's extended discussion is directed at upholding the miraculous quality of the prediction made in the Qurʾān that the Jews will not wish for their death. His immediate aim is to establish that there is no evidence that they ever responded to this challenge, for had they done so, it would be widely known.

The notion that the wishing called for from the Jews must have been a verbal act was by no means original with al-Zamakhsharī. It is, in fact, already attributed to the leading early exegete Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 68/687).[78] Even Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, who takes wishing to be a mental state, acknowledges that the wishing called for by Q. 2:94 must be an utterance (*qawl, lafẓ*). He is constrained to admit that Arabic speakers (*ahl al-lisān*) take an utterance introduced by *layta* as a wish without regard to what is in the speaker's mind. To challenge the Jews to make a wish to die in their hearts would be absurd, since everyone knows that a challenge turning on what is in the heart is within everyone's capacity to take up. To meet such a challenge the Jews would merely have had to claim that they had, in fact, wished to die in their

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[76] This passage is borrowed by al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī (d. 977/1570), who relies heavily on al-Zamakhsharī in his interpretation of Q. 2:94 in his *Tafsīr,* ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn, Beirut, 1425/2004, 1: 90. Al-Shirbīnī's comment is cited, but inaccurately rendered, by Michael Carter, *Arabic Linguistics*, Amsterdam, 1981, 229.

[77] *al-Kashshāfʿan ḥaqāʾiq al-tanzīl*, ed. W. Nassau Lees, Calcutta, 1856, 1:91.

[78] al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, Cairo, 1388/1968, 1:426. Al-Ṭabarī himself interprets "wish" in the verse to mean "Long for it and will it!" (*tashahhawhu wa-arīdūhu*), that is, as demanding an inner act.

heart. Such a claim could not be disproved and would go no distance in establishing which of the disputants was in the right.[79]

Al-Zamakhsharī's originality, if any, lies in his argument that the miraculous quality of the Qurʾānic prediction stands even on the mistaken view that wishing is an act of the heart. For then why is there no report of their having responded in any way at all to the challenge so construed? This line of argument is foreign to Abū Hilāl, whose focus is on the rationality of the challenge at the time it was made.

Abū Hilāl readily admits that the label wishing is commonly applied to certain utterances without regard for the existence of the mental state that he regards as true wishing. Not all Qurʾān commentators were as forthright. Among these is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. In his large commentary on the Qurʾān, al-Rāzī makes a number of inconsistent statements concerning wishing. In his comments on Q. 4:32, in Ashʿarī fashion, al-Rāzī defines wishing as a form of willing. He takes an entirely different position in his discussion of Q. 2:94. There he responds to a series of six critical queries that he has posed. The fifth of these suggests that the Jews properly abstained from responding to a challenge that was framed in the ambiguous language of wishing. Wishing, according to the query, is ambiguous (*mushtarak*) between a mental state and an utterance expressing that state. Al-Rāzī denies that there is any ambiguity: "Wishing in the language of the Arabs is unknown except with reference to what is apparent [in speech] just as 'making a statement' is unknown except for what is apparent in speech. What corresponds to this in the heart is not referred to with this name."[80] The Ashʿarī definition of wishing as a form of willing survived in Qurʾānic commentaries for centuries after al-Rāzī and long after it had been given up by Ashʿarī theologians such as al-Āmidī, and the exegesis of Q. 2:94 continued to draw commentators into inconsistency whether openly acknowledged or not.

The nature of the utterance that the Jews were challenged to make presents a problem even for the view that wishing is a speech act. It would seem to have been sufficient, as al-Zamakhsharī suggests, for

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[79] Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskari, *al-Furūq al-lughawiyya*, 141.

[80] *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 3, 190-1; al-Rāzī's discussion was used by Ibn ʿĀdil, *al-Lubāb*, 2:297, without attribution. One could, of course, argue that al-Rāzī distinguishes between an everyday sense of wishing as speech and a technical theological sense as willing, but there is no evidence in his commentary of such a distinction.

the Jews simply to have made an empty verbal wish in order for them to have met Muḥammad's challenge. The question of what kept them from doing so receives various answers. But apart from this, one can question whether had they done so, they would have properly be said to have made a wish. Some commentators clearly formulate the challenge to the Jews as including both an inner element of willing and the appropriate utterance. One of these is the Andalusian exegete Ibn ʿAṭiyya (d. 542/1148), who paraphrases the Qurʾānic imperative "wish" (*tamannaw*) as "will it with your hearts and ask for it" (*arīdūhu bi-qulūbikum wa-sʾalūhu*). He contrasts this interpretation with that attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās, according to whom all that was required was the asking even without the mental element.[81]

The view that what was at issue in the Qurʾānic challenge to the Jews was more than a merely mental wish follows directly from the context of a public debate assumed by the traditional interpretation.[82] The Yemeni al-Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834) regards wishing as a form of willing directed to the future.[83] But with respect to Q. 2:94 he insists that the only sense of wishing appropriate to the polemical context is that of "a verbal utterance together with its meaning, not the mere occurrence of this meaning to the mind and the inclination of the soul to it." The miracle is that the Jews, despite their history of making aggressive, albeit unfounded, claims against God and His followers, in this instance departed from their custom. This was because they had somehow come to know that had they made a wish to die, they would, in fact, have died.[84]

Germane to the question of whether wishes are truth-evaluable is Q. 6:27, which depicts the reaction after death of the unbelievers: "If thou could but see [them] when they will be made to stand before the fire and will say, 'Oh, would that we were brought back [to life] and not give the lie to the signs of our Lord and be believers.' " The difficulty is that the next verse appears to label the unbelievers who have made

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[81] Ibn ʿAṭiyya, *al-Muḥarrar*, 113.

[82] This is so whether the Jews were challenged to wish death upon themselves or upon their Muslim opponents.

[83] *Fatḥ al-qadīr*, 1:547. In this definition as elsewhere al-Shawkānī's commentary shows the influence of al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 2:33.

[84] *Fatḥ al-qadīr*, 1:179. Al-Shawkānī also admits the possibility that God directly intervened to keep the Jews from wishing (*li-l-ṣarf min Allāh),* cf. al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 2:33.

this wish as liars (*kādhibūn*), an obvious problem for those who regard wishes as performative utterances that are not truth-evaluable.[85] One solution is to read verse 27 so as to limit the scope of the wish to the first verb after *layta*: what the unbelievers wish is to be brought back to life, a wish they follow by a statement that they will then not give the lie and will be believers. Such an interpretation finds support in variant readings of the Qurʾānic text. One can also claim that the label of liars does not look back to their wish. A different approach is taken by al-Zamakhsharī, whose interpretation here also proved to be influential. He argued that the wish of verse 27 implies a promise *(ʿida*) and so could be labeled false, "just as when a man says 'Would that God grant me wealth so that I might do well by you and recompense you for your favors.' The man who makes this wish falls under the category of promising (*fī maʿnā l-wāʿid*), and so were he to be granted property and not do well by his friend and not recompense him, he can be labeled a liar, for he said 'If God grants me property, I will recompense you for having done well by me.'" [86]

The interpretation of Q. 22:52 appears to have presented a problem for the common Baṣran Muʿtazilī view that wishing was a speech act. This verse, key to the story of the so-called Satanic verses, states: "Yet whenever We sent forth any apostle or prophet before

[85] A wish, whether realized or not, is not truth-evaluable (al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tanzīh al-Qurʾān ʿan al-maṭāʿin*, Beirut, n.d, 129; Ibn Shahrāshūb, *Mutashābih al-Qurʾān*, Tabriz, 1328, 1:127).

[86] *al-Kashshāf*, 1:399 (cited in al-Subkī, *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ*, 2:245-6), followed by al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 12:191 (al-Rāzī finds in the wish an implicit statement that one wills the object of the wish); al-Kaʿbī also regarded the wish as amounting to a statement about the resolve *(ʿazm*) of the unbelievers to become believers if they were brought back (al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān*, 4:119), an interpretation consistent with his view that wishing is a special form of willing. In keeping with his position that there can be no lying in the hereafter, al-Kaʿbī held that although the unbelievers were sincere when they made their wish, its object was unrealizable and thus false (criticized by al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān*, 4:119; cf. D. Gimaret, *Une lecture muʿtazilite du coran*, Louvain-Paris, 1994, 297-8, on Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī's denial of the possibility of lying in the hereafter). Al-Kaʿbī apparently further held that wishes could not be made for what was known to be impossible. He thus argued that the unbelievers did not have full knowledge that their being brought back was inconsistent with the finality of their punishment in hell. Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī by contrast found no problem in the unbelievers wishing for what they knew to be impossible (al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān*, 4:116). Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā suggested the possibility that the lying of the unbelievers is figurative, in that that their wishes were disappointed (*Amālī al-Murtaḍā*, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Beirut, 1387/1967, 2:273).

you, and he was wishing (*tamannā*), Satan would cast into his wish (*umniyyatihī*), but God renders void whatever Satan may cast…." The classical commentaries commonly give two possible senses for *tamannā* in this verse: its ordinary meaning of wishing and the less well attested meaning of reciting. We can further distinguish between the purely philological preference for the sense of wishing and the theological. Some commentators, including al-Zamakhsharī, favor the sense of wishing but locate the Satanic interference in the Prophet's recitation of the Qurʾān: Satan took advantage of the Prophet's wish to win over his pagan opponents and interfered with his recitation.[87] By contrast another group of commentators, including Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286), develop a theologically more defensible account of the background of the verse, one in which there is no Satanic interference in any Qurʾānic recitation but exclusively in the Prophet's wishing.[88] The Twelver Shīʿī al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1045) also offers this interpretation but merely as an alternative to a theologically acceptable interpretation of *tamannā* in the sense of reciting: the Satanic interference is the distortion of the meaning of the recitation by its human listeners.[89]

What is common to these different interpretations is that they all take wishing to refer to a mental not a verbal act. In connection with the interpretation of Q. 22:52, even those like al-Zamakhsharī who otherwise follow the Baṣran Muʿtazilī view that wishing is a speech act take wishing to refer to an inner act.[90] Since one can imagine Sa-

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87 al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 2:911; Ibn ʿAṭiyya, *al-Muḥarrar*, 1317.

88 al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 23:53, al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-tanzīl*, ed. H. O. Fleischer, Leipzig, 1846, 636-7. Among modern translators this interpretation has been followed by Maulana Muhammad, *The Holy Qurʾān*, Lahore, 1917 (reprinted Columbus, Ohio, 1991), 658, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qurʾan*, Lahore, 1934 (reprinted Elmhurst, N.Y., 1987), 865; Muhammad Asad, *The Message of the Qurʾān*, 514.

89 al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, *Tanzīh al-anbiyāʾ*, Beirut, 1409/1989, 152-3, summarized in al-Ṭabrisī, *Majmaʿ al-bayān*, 7:122-3, followed by Ibn Shahrāshūb, *Mutashābih al-Qurʾān*, 2:4-5.

90 al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 2:911 (*fī nafsihī*), following an interpretation attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās (al-Thaʿlabī, *al-Kashf wa-l-bayān ʿan tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, ed. Abū Muḥammad Ibn ʿĀshūr, Beirut, 1422/2002, 7:29). The Muʿtazilī exegete Abū Muslim al-Iṣfahānī (d. 322/934) invoked the notion of wishing of the heart (*tamannī al-qalb*) in the interpretation of Q. 2:78 (cited by Abū Ḥayyān, *al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ*, Beirut, n.d., 1:276).

tanic interference with a prophet's verbally formulated wishes, the absence of interpretations to this effect requires some explanation.[91] Apparently the interpretation of *tamannā* as recitation, that is, a verbal utterance, came to relegate the alternative sense of wishing to an entirely inner act.[92] Yet taking the wishing as unexpressed presented the difficulty that the trial (*fitna*) of those in whose hearts is disease (Q. 22:53) occasioned by Satan's interference would appear to require a verbal or other overt expression as its source.[93]

V. *Wishing in Islamic Law*

Any attempt to survey the legal and moral dimension of wishing in Islamic thought encounters several obstacles. The first is the absence of an agreed-upon concept of wishing. There is thus no consistent treatment of wishing over the centuries. What we find is that writers, with a particular kind of wishing in mind, approached the subject from diverse vantage points. Many moralists, for example, focused on wishing as an element of envy (*ḥasad*). A second important obstacle to the study of wishing is its failure to develop into a significant legal category.[94] For this reason the meager discussions of wishing

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[91] The *umniyyatihī* of Q. 22:52 is rendered as "formulation" by Richard Bell, *The Qurʾān*, Edinburgh, 1937, 1:322, cf. Regis Blachère, *Le Coran*, Paris, 1966, 364 ("formulaient"). Both Bell and Blachère, however, see the reference as to revelations, not ordinary wishes.

[92] Theologically, any Satanic interference with the Prophet's non-Qurʾānic utterances, including his expressed wishes, might cast doubt on the integrity of the Qurʾānic text.

[93] Cf. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, *al-Muḥarrar*, 1317 (it is undisputed that the trial followed upon audible words). Al-Rāzī addresses this difficulty by suggesting that the Prophet's preoccupation with his Satanically inspired wishes would lead him to distraction in his external acts, and that this, not the inner wishes, would occasion the trial of the unbelievers (*al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 23:54).

[94] A discussion of wishing within the larger category of envy is sometimes treated as complementary to law in the narrow sense. See, for example, Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *al-Takmila li-l-aḥkām wa-l-taṣfiya min bawāṭin al-āthām*, in *al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār*, 5:497; see also separate ed. by ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥammūd al-ʿIzzī, Ṣaʿda, 1422/2002, 68, undoubtedly the model for Aḥmad b. Ismāʿīl al-ʿUlufī (d. 1282/1865), *al-Mukhtaṣar al-mufīd*, Ṣaʿda, 1421/2000, 92-3, which, however, has a more elaborate analysis of the possible contents of wishes. The failure of wishing to find a fixed place in Islamic law does not mean that jurists were not willing to consider arcane questions on wishing: for example, what is the status of someone who wishes to be a prophet (al-Ḥalīmī, *Kitāb al-Minhāj fī shuʿab al-īmān*, ed. Ḥilmī Muḥammad Fawda, Damascus, 1399/1979, 3:106).

from the legal point of view have to be gleaned mainly from non-legal texts such as commentaries on the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*. These discussions are largely constructed upon prohibitions in the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* of wishes for particular objects. The less prominent positive dimension of wishing is supported by wishes attributed to Muḥammad and other authorities.

The most important passage addressing the practice of wishing is the prohibition found in Q. 4:32: "Do not wish (*wa-lā tatamannaw*) for the bounties which God has bestowed more abundantly on some of you than on others.…" The occasion *(sabab*) for the revelation of this prohibition is commonly said to have been the wish made to the Prophet by some women for equal treatment with men in the distribution of decedents' estates and in participation in raids on the enemy.[95] The continuation of the verse corroborates the connection of the revelation to issues of gender: "Men shall have a benefit from what they earn, and women shall have a benefit from what they earn." The verse concludes by enjoining "Ask, therefore, God [to give you] out of His bounty: behold, God has indeed full knowledge of everything."

In accordance with the principle that the legislative scope of the verse is determined by its wording not its occasion, the verse was understood to deal generally with wishing to have what others have. But precisely what this means was not free from doubt.[96] In one interpre-

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[95] Some accounts have the women wishing that they were men so as to enjoy these privileges. Other accounts have the men also wishing for the privileges of women.

[96] The majority view is that whatever the verse does condemn is prohibited. According to al-Farrāʾ, the wishing condemned by the verse is merely discouraged, not prohibited (al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān*, 5:184). The Ibāḍī commentator Aṭṭafayyish (d. 1332/1914) spells out the range of things falling under the prohibition (property, marriage, offspring, status, health, learning, acquired and inborn talents) (*Taysīr al-tafsīr li-l-Qurʾān al-karīm*, Muscat, 1981-94, 2:311). The common view is that the prohibition, as indicated by its occasion, extends beyond mundane matters to distinctions based on religion (Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr,* 2:287; cf. the view of al-Muhallab [d. 433/1041-2] that it is limited to the things of this world [al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 5:163]). A religiously motivated wish that another be deprived of some benefit is not reprehensible: for example, the wish that a sinner be deprived of the means to sin, since the wisher in this case does not envy the other's advantage (Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, *al-Zawājir ʿan iqtirāf al-kabāʾir*, Cairo, 1400/1980, 78). According to Ibn ʿAṭiyya, *al-Muḥarrar,* 429, followed by Ibn Juzayy, *al-Tashīl li-ʿulūm al-tanzīl* (ed. Muḥammad Sālim Hāshim, Beirut, 1415/1995, 1:187), wishing to contravene any rule of the *Sharīʿa* falls under the prohibition of Q. 4:32. It is interesting to note that Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī justified the Prophet's wish to be in a position to marry

tation the verse condemns envying others for what they have, with envy commonly defined as wishing for others to lose something they have so that the wisher or another may acquire it.[97] Envy is understood on the basis of other texts to constitute a major sin (*kabīra*).[98] It is condemned as tending to rancor (*tabāghuḍ*) or as the mark of a base nature.[99] The question then arises whether the Qurʾānic prohibition extends to wishing for the kind of thing another has without wishing for him to lose it. A wish of this sort is termed an "unenvious or generous emulation" (*ghibṭa*, *munāfasa*).[100] The majority view is that such emulation is not blameworthy.

While the main interest of the Qurʾānic commentators is in the relation of this key verse to envy, other issues that the verse raises are

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Zayd's beautiful wife as an unobjectionable characteristic of human nature (*Tafsīr*, 278, on Q. 33:37)

[97] al-Ṣāwī, *Ḥāshiya*, 2:27. On the possibility of envy leading to killing, see al-Biqāʿī (d. 885/1480), cited in Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-karīm (Tafsīr al-Manār)*, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn, Beirut, 1420/1999, 2:47.

[98] al-Haytamī, *al-Zawājir*, 78. It should be noted that the sin lies in envying a fellow Muslim (cf. al-Ḥalīmī, *Kitāb al-Minhāj*, 3:103).

[99] Aṭṭafayyish, *Taysīr al-tafsīr*, 2:311; al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān*, 5:184 (*min danāyā al-akhlāq*). According to a *ḥadīth*, envy is characteristic of the hypocrite (*munāfiq*), unenvious emulation (*ghibṭa)* of the believer (al-Haytamī, *al-Zawājir*, 78).

[100] I adopt the renderings of Lane in his *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 6:2226, 8:2826. Al-Bukhārī uses the term *ightibāṭ (Bāb al-ightibāṭ fī l-ʿilm wa-l-ḥikma* in *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* of his *al-Ṣaḥīḥ*). The permissibility of *ghibṭa* was attributed to the Prophet in the form of a *ḥadīth* (al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 2:1066, cf. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *al-Kāfī al-shāf fī takhrīj aḥādīth al-Kashshāf*, Beirut, 1418/1997, 1:215). It was also derived from the wording of Q. 4:32 "Ask, therefore, God [to give you] out of His bounty" (al-Ṭaḥāwī, *Sharḥ Mushkil al-āthār,* ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ, Beirut, 1415/1994, 1:402; for other interpretations of this wording in the direction of purely religious concerns, al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, Cairo, 1388/1968, 5:49). On the other hand, al-Ḍaḥḥāk (d. 105/723) cited Q. 28:79 (where the wish is for the *like* of what Qārūn has) to show that it was not permitted for a Muslim to wish for what another had (al-Thaʿlabī, *al-Kashf wa-l-bayān*, 3:300). Al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), *al-Riʿāya li-ḥuqūq Allāh*, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir Aḥmad ʿAṭā, Cairo, 1390/1970, 570, uses the term *munāfasa* for all forms of envy that are not prohibited. Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 502/1108) requires for *munāfasa* some positive steps (*saʿy*) to obtain what one wishes beyond simple *ghibṭa* (*Kitāb al-Dharīʿa ilā makārim al-akhlāq*, ed. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿd, Cairo, 1393/1973, 182). According to the physician Saʿīd b. Hibat Allāh al-Baghdādī (d. 495/1101), the difference between *ḥaṣad* and *ghibṭa* is that in the former the person envied merits what he has, whereas in the latter he does not (*al-Ḥudūd wa-l-furūq*, ed. Ghulām ʿAlī al-Yaʿqūbī, Beirut, 1416/1995, 79-80. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, al-*Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf,* ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Juyūshī, ʿAbidīn, 1419/1998, 253 confines *ghibṭa* to wishes for religious attainments and condemns as ignorance wishes for wordly success like that of others.

not entirely neglected. Thus the wishing prohibited by the verse is understood to amount to a rejection of the way God has bestowed His benefits.[101] Wishing for what has not fallen to one's lot is profitless.[102] To al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) the thought is ascribed that the fulfillment of a wish for someone else's property might in fact lead to the wisher's ruin.[103] The same point was developed by the Muʿtazilī al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931), according to whom God always acts in the way most advantageous (*aṣlaḥ*) for His creatures. To wish to change God's disposition of things amounted to wishing for what was not most advantageous and in fact might prove to be disadvantageous (*mafsada*).[104]

Commentators commonly read the prohibition of Q. 4:32 in light of clear cases where the Prophet made various unrealizable wishes, such as for his uncle Abū Ṭālib to become a believer,[105] and, in fact, came to see the Qurʾānic prohibition as providing the essential criterion for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable wishes. All wishes not involving envy were in principle permitted.[106] The basic law on wishing could thus be summed up by the Mālikī jurist Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ṣāwī (d. 1241/1825) as providing that wishes tainted by envy were prohibited, wishes amounting to unenvious emulation with respect to pious deeds were recommended, and wishes simply to obtain wealth were permitted.[107]

This simple but essentially adequate statement of the law pertaining to wishes must, however, be supplemented by provisions in the *ḥadīth* that concern wishes to die (*tamannī al-mawt*). A number of traditions report that the Prophet instructed that one should not wish

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101 al-Shawkānī, *Fatḥ al-qadīr*, 1:547.

102 Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr,* 2:287.

103 al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, 10:47.

104 al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān*, 5:184.

105 al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān,* 5:163. Among the wishes reported of the Prophet is the wish he expressed to Gabriel that the direction of prayer be changed from that of the Jews (al-Wāḥidī, *al-Wajīz fī tafsīr al-Kitāb al-ʿazīz*, ed. Ṣafwān ʿAdnān Dāwūdī, Damascus, 1415/1995, 1:136 on Q. 2:144).

106 al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān,* 5:163, who develops Ibn ʿAṭiyya, *al-Muḥarrar*, 429; al-Kiyā al-Harrās, *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān,* ed. Mūsā Muḥammad ʿAlī and ʿIzzat ʿAlī ʿĪd ʿAṭiyya, Beirut, 1424/2004, 1:198 (there is no prohibition against even unrealizable wishes to achieve learning or power since no envy is involved).

107 al-Ṣāwī, *Ḥāshiya*, 2:27. A more highly developed and broader discussion, including instances of wishing that are obligatory, appears in al-Muḥāsibī, *al-Riʿāya*, 572-74.

to die.[108] While some versions place no condition on this injunction, others make reference to wishes for death as a response to affliction (*ḍurr*).[109] Taken together, the traditions indicate that the affliction intended is affliction in body or property, that is, a wordly affliction. The predominant view is thus that to wish for death as a result of some worldly affliction is discouraged (*makrūh*).[110] Some versions of the tradition add that as long as a believer is alive he inevitably accumulates good deeds. This has been taken to explain the prohibition.[111] But other explanations are possible: such wishes are profitless since the time when death occurs is ordained by God, and such wishes evidence dissatisfaction with what God has ordained.[112] By contrast, wishes for death prompted by a fear that one's faith may be put to the test (*li-khawf al-fitna fī l-dīn*) are permitted.[113] This reli-

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[108] The interplay between this prohibition of wishing for death and the Qurʾānic challenge to the Jews to wish for death is fully developed in the texts and worthy of a separate study. An important element in the treatment of the topic is the attempt on the part of Muslim scholars to provide psychologically plausible interpretations of the phenomenon of wishing for one's own death in various circumstances. Thus, for example, the obvious disinclination of Muslims to wish for their own death despite their faith suggests that the Jews might be expected to be equally averse to such a wish (cf. al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, ed. Ahmet Vanlioğlu, Istanbul, 2005, 1:181 with note 10 from the commentary of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī). Some writers, however, found no difficulty in wishing for one's own death (e.g., the Ḥanbalī Ibn al-Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132), *al-Īḍāḥ fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. ʿIṣām al-Sayyid Maḥmūd, Riyad, 1424/2003, 512).

[109] Many of the relevant traditions are collected in Ibn al-Ṣiddīq al-Ghumārī, *Qamʿ al-ashrār ʿan jarīmat al-intiḥār*, published with his *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn al-ghumāriyya fī shukr al-niʿam*, n.p., n.d., 90-8. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, *Aḥkām tamannī al-mawt*, ed. ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. Muḥammad al-Sadḥān and ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jibrīn, n.p., n.d., begins with a few of these traditions (3-5) but otherwise collects traditions on death in general. The attribution of this work to Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb has been disputed by Ṣāliḥ b. Fawzān Āl Fawzān, *Ibṭāl nisbat kitāb Aḥkām tamannī al-mawt*, Mecca, 1410/1990, who reproduces a retraction by the editors of the work (p. 30).

[110] Walī al-Dīn al-ʿIrāqī, *Kitāb Ṭarḥ al-tathrīb fī sharḥ al-Taqrīb*, Aleppo, n.d., 3:253, cites his father's claim that interpretation of the Prophet's prohibition as importing *karāha* rests on consensus, but he questions this in light of Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr's explicit statement that wishing for death is prohibited. A minority denied that such wishes were discouraged (al-Faqīh Yūsuf, *Tafsīr al-thamarāt al-yāniʿa*, Ṣaʿda, 1423/2002, 5:377). On the wish for death when passing a grave as an eschatological sign, see al-ʿIrāqī, *Ṭarḥ al-tathrīb*, 3:258-61.

[111] al-ʿIrāqī, *Ṭarḥ al-tathrīb*, 3:355.

[112] Ibid., 3:357.

[113] Ibn ʿAṭiyya, *al-Muḥarrar*, 1021 on Q. 12:101. According to Ibn ʿAllān, *Kitāb al-Futūḥāt al-rabbāniyya ʿalā l-Adhkār al-nawawiyya*, n.p., n.d., 4:81, such wishes

gious justification was invoked to explain wishes for death on the part of pious individuals, including the prophet Joseph and Mary as reported in the Qurʾān (12:101 and 19:23).[114] A further *ḥadīth*-based exception to the rule against wishing for death is the wish for martyrdom (*tamannī al-shahāda*).[115] This is to be distinguished from simply wishing to encounter the enemy (*tamannī liqāʾ al-ʿaduww*), which was discouraged by the Prophet.[116]

The foregoing legal guidelines on wishing represent a middle-of-the-road evaluation of wishing in relation to both morality and theology. According to the common legal opinion, the appropriateness of most wishes is gauged by a moral standard: wishes are permitted unless they evince envy in the narrow sense. The major exception to this principle concerns wishes for death, to which a theological standard is applied: wishes to die are as a general rule not permitted because they reject God's determination of the span of life and its incidents. An exception is made when the wish for death amounts to a wish to uphold God's religion and thus to fulfill the purpose of life. The rules for wishing are thus framed in terms of rather narrow considerations.

Readily identified are other evaluations of wishes that turn on different considerations and in some cases exhibit a more consistent application of a moral or theological standard. Thus on the question of the permissibility of non-envious wishes to have what someone else has, there is a minority opinion prohibiting such wishes. Fakhr

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are, in fact, recommended (*yundabu*), not merely permitted. Al-ʿIrāqī mentions wishing for death out of longing for God and the Prophet as also permitted (*Ṭarḥ al-tathrīb*, 3:257).

[114] al-ʿIrāqī, *Ṭarḥ al-tathrīb*, 3:252-3; al-Qurṭubī, *al-Tadhkira fī aḥwāl al-mawtā wa-umūr al-ākhira*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā, Cairo, 1406/1980, 12-13. On Joseph as the first to ask to die on the spot as claimed by Qatāda (d. 118/736) and the question of the applicable law, see Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr,* 4:414 on Q. 12:101. The explanation of Mary's wish is usually but not always couched in terms of the applicable Islamic law, and a religious motivation is identified (ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Tanzīh al-Qurʾān*, 247; Ibn Shahrāshūb, *Mutashābih al-Qurʾān*, 1:256; al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, *al-Furūq*, 305).

[115] Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Fatḥ al-bārī sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Riyad, 1421/2000, 13:267-8. Wishing for martyrdom is a recommended act (Ibn ʿAllān, *al-Futūḥāt al-rabbāniyya*, 4:81).

[116] On the distinction between wishing for martyrdom and wishing to encounter the enemy, see Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Ṣanʿānī, *al-ʿUdda*, ed. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Hindī, Cairo, 3:500-1. Some extended this prohibition to all trials (*makārih*) where one might fail (al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, *Ikmāl al-muʿlim bi-fawāʾid Muslim*, ed. Yaḥyā Ismāʿīl, al-Manṣūra, 1419/1998, 6:43).

al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his commentary on Q. 4:32, identifies this as the view of the best authorities (*muḥaqqiqūn*). To receive what one wishes for may in fact prove harmful to one's faith and a detriment in life (*mafsada fī ḥaqqihī fī l-dīn wa-maḍarra ʿalayhi fī l-dunyā*).[117] In his comment on the same verse, al-Shawkānī takes the position that the general language of the verse prohibits wishing for anything in which some have been favored over others (*mā waqaʿa bihī l-tafḍīl*), for this amounts to dissatisfaction with God's allocation.[118]

On the question of wishes for death the Yemeni Zaydī jurist Yūsuf b. Aḥmad (d. 832/1429), known as al-Faqīh Yūsuf, gives three further opinions in addition to the common legal doctrine.[119] One view, which he attributes to al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101), is that such wishes are permitted where death can be known to be for the best (*maṣlaḥa*). A second view, which he attributes to the Companion Abū l-Dardāʾ (d. 32/653), is that wishing for death is unconditionally permitted.[120] Death is best for both believers and unbelievers as indicated by the Qurʾān: "And that which is with God is best for the virtuous (3:198)"; "We give them [the unbelievers] reign only to let them grow in sinfulness (3:178)." The third view, that of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār and al-Zamakhsharī, is that those who are confident of their place in heaven are permitted to wish for death.

Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī and his followers are sometimes misleadingly reported to have regarded it as not permitted to wish for martyrdom.[121] In fact Abū ʿAlī regarded it as not permitted to wish to be killed by the unbelievers, since their act of killing was an act in support of unbelief. To wish for the unbelievers to kill amounted to wishing for the victory of unbelief. What was permitted was to wish to die in

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117 *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 10:81-2.

118 *Fatḥ al-qadīr*, 1:547.

119 *al-Thamarāt al-yāniʿa*, 1:171-4.

120 See also al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, 4:218 on Q. 3:199; Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr,* 2:192-3 (naming also Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) as taking this view) on Q. 3:198; al-Suyūṭī, *al-Durr al-manthūr*, Beirut, 1421/2000, 2:392 on Q. 3:178.

121 al-Saksakī, *al-Burhān fī maʿrifat ʿaqāʾid ahl al-adyān*, ed. Bassām ʿAlī Salāma al-ʿAmūsh, al-Zarqāʾ, 1408/1988, 51 (what is obligatory according to the Jubbāʿītes is *ḥubb al-ṣabr ʿalā l-jirāḥ*); Abū Muḥammad al-Yamanī, *ʿAqāʾid al-thalāth wa-l-sabʿīn firqa*, ed. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh Zarbān al-Ghāmidī, Medina, 1414, 1:327; ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Fakhrī, *Talkhīṣ al-bayān fī dhikr firaq ahl al-adyān*, ed. Rashīd al-Bandar, London, 1415/1994, 85. These heresiographical works are all of Yemeni origin.

battle against the unbelievers; death itself, being an act of God, was distinct from the unbelievers' act of killing.[122]

VI. *Theological and Moral Opposition to Wishing*

Just as there was no single shared understanding of the nature of wishing, there was no common position on the value, if any, to be accorded the common human practice of wishing. What we find is a spectrum of opinions that focus on one or another dimension of wishing. The state of the evidence sometimes makes it difficult to identify the reported positions with a specific authority or circle, and for the early period we are often left with the task of attempting to reconstruct a coherent point of view from scattered, sometimes apparently inconsistent reports.

The most important source for the practice of wishing in the early period is *Kitāb al-Mutamannīn* of Ibn Abī l-Dunyā (d. 281/894).[123] Ibn Abī l-Dunyā's short work is, however, no more than a compilation of traditions and sayings without any marked effort at thematic organization. Quite different is the other important source for the early period, *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), which includes a "Book of Wishing" (*Kitāb al-Tamannī*), unique in the standard Sunnī compilations of *ḥadīth*.[124] While al-Bukhārī's collection of materials is far narrower than that of Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, it provides a precious glimpse into a further dimension of wishing in Islamic thought.

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[122] al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Tafsīr,* ed. ʿĀdil b. ʿAlī al-Shidī, 1424/2003, 2:890-1 on Q. 3:143; the same position is taken by the Twelver Shīʿī al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-taʾwīl*, ed. Muḥammad Riḍā Āl Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ, Beirut, 1406/1986, 5:256-7. Al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān*, 3:5, supports the view, apparently that attributed by al-Saksakī to the Jubbāʾītes, that martyrdom involves *al-ṣabr ʿalā l-jihād ilā an yaqtulūhu*). Niẓām al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī, *Tafsīr gharāʾib al-Qurʾān*, ed. Zakariyyā ʿUmayrāt, Beirut, 1996, 2:269, attributes al-Jubbāʾī's doctrine to the leading scholars and contrasts it with that of the Ashʿarīs. The issue in any case concerned the precise object of one's wish when one wished for martyrdom, not the nature of wishing, since it was equally prohibited for one to will the unbelievers to kill him.

[123] For example, the practice of invitations to make a wish, directed at individuals and groups (Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-Mutamannīn*, 35, 38). Such invitations might, of course, be refused (52).

[124] al-Bukhārī's *al-Adab al-mufrad* contains a short section on *mā yukrahu min al-tamannī*, which includes a *ḥadīth* in which the Prophet warns against wishing, for one does not know what one may be given (Faḍl Allāh al-Jīlānī, *Faḍl Allāh al-ṣamad fī tawḍīḥ al-Adab al-mufrad*, Ḥimṣ, n.d., 2:337).

The obvious difficulty presented by al-Bukhārī's *Kitāb al-Tamannī* is that it includes material without any immediately obvious bearing on wishing.[125] In addition to adducing traditions on wishing for martyrdom, death, and encountering the enemy, al-Bukhārī also includes traditions in which the Prophet utters affirmative and negative counterfactual conditions introduced by *law* and *lawlā* respectively. For example, the seventh chapter in *Kitāb al-Tamannī* is headed "A man's saying: 'If not for God (*lawlā Allāh*), we would not have been rightly guided,'" while the ninth chapter is devoted to the permissible uses of *law* (*bāb mā yajūzu min al-laww*).[126] There is, in fact, no reason to doubt that al-Bukhārī understood wishing to include the use of such counterfactual utterances. This is made clear by the rubrics of his second and fifth chapters, which explicitly apply the label *tamannī* to such expressions. Equally, there is no reason to think that this expansive use of the term "wishing" was original with al-Bukhārī. It appears rather that al-Bukhārī was responding to theologically motivated hostility to any and all expressions with counterfactual significance, i.e., wishes in the broad sense.[127] Such expressions were theologically offensive in that they appeared to reject God's predetermination of everything that occurs.[128] Given predetermination, to invoke what might have been or might not have been was out of place. Al-Bukhārī sought to demonstrate from the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*

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[125] This difficulty was even, somewhat surprisingly, perceived in connection with the very first tradition that al-Bukhārī cites (al-Kirmānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī maʿa sharḥ al-Kirmānī*, Cairo, 1381/1962, 25:3).

[126] On the doubling of the *wāw* in *al-laww*, see Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Fatḥ bārī,* 13:277-8,280.

[127] It may be significant that al-Bukhārī's *Kitāb al-Tamannī* begins with traditions on wishes for martyrdom. Presumably the permissibility of such wishes was universally endorsed. Cf. al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 5:163 (the first tradition in al-Bukhārī's *Kitāb al-Tamannī* points to *tamannī al-khayr wa-afʿāl-birr wa-l-raghba fīhā*). Some of the cognitive and emotional dimensions of counterfactual thinking are treated in a recent collection of papers, David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton, and Patrizia Catellani, eds., *The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking*, London, 2005.

[128] Cf. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 386/996), *Qūt al-qulūb fī muʿāmalat al-maḥbūb wa-waṣf ṭarīq al-murīd ilā maqām al-tawḥīd,*, Cairo, 1893, reprinted Cairo, n.d., 2:36, trans. Richard Gramlich, *Die Nahrung der Herzen*, Stuttgart, 1992-5, 2:396-7: were the enlightened, from whose hearts the veil has been lifted, to be granted whatever they wished, they would prefer God's decree. The passage refers to Q. 53:24-5 as a rebuke by God of wishing and to Q. 23:71 as indicating the ruinous consequences for heaven and earth were they to be governed by human wishes.

that a blanket prohibition of wishing was not warranted. His commentators are fully aware of the theological significance of the topic, but unfortunately they make no reference to specific circles in which general hostility to wishing was current.[129]

Al-Bukhārī's treatment of wishes represents a mild endorsement of their role in Islamic life. Its very moderation apparently created an ambiguity surrounding the overall purpose of his work, which we find subject to quite inconsistent interpretations. On the one hand, Ibn Baṭṭāl (d. 449/1057), an Andalusian Mālikī commentator of al-Bukhārī's *al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, finds in *Kitāb al-Tamannī* encouragement to wish for good deeds even when one knows they are unattainable, for wishes of this sort evince a noble ambition.[130] By way of contrast, another Andalusian Mālikī, al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148) commends al-Bukhārī for recognizing the rationale for God's prohibition of wishes, as distractions from reality, and for devoting a book of his *ḥadīth* collection to the topic.[131]

The notion that wishing represents a radically destructive human inclination can be supported from such verses as Q. 4:119, which has Satan swearing that he will lead humans astray and inspire them with wishes (*la-umanniyannahum*). This verse, according to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, "suggests that Satan has no more effective device for leading people astray than putting wishes into their hearts." Wishes put humans under the sway of greed and hope. In their greed they can easily come to violate God's law and to injure their fellows. In their hope they forget the world to come and become enmeshed in the affairs of this world.[132]

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[129] E.g., Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Fatḥ al-bārī*, 13:282-3, where it is clearly recognized that al-Bukhārī is presenting evidence against a blanket rejection of the use of *law*. Cf. the statement attributed to al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), "If not that we would sin in wishing, we would wish that such and such" (Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Fatḥ al-bārī*, 13:271), a statement interpreted, however, to refer not to all wishes but only to those that lead to envy. Earlier al-Shaʿbī (d. 103/721) reportedly taught that one ought not say of what had already taken place "*law lam yakun*" (al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Kitāb al-Faqīh wa-l-mutafaqqih*, ed. ʿĀdil b. Yūsuf al-ʿAzzāzī, Dammam, 1417/1996, 1:461.

[130] Ibn Baṭṭāl, *Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, ed. Abū Tamīm Yāsir b. Ibrāhīm, Riyad, 2000, 10:286-8.

[131] al-Qāḍī Ibn al-ʿArabī, *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 1:412 (omitting *al-māḍī* after *bi-l-bāl* as in al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān,* 5:162).

[132] al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 11:48. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, *al-Muḥarrar*, 482, comments on the range of wishes Satan has at his disposal to suit every disposition and every circumstance (adopted by al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān,* 5:389).

The ascetic tradition (*zuhd*) came to distance itself from wishing in its various forms. Needless to say, the ascetics held in contempt the conventional wishes for wealth and power.[133] But their contempt equally extended to wishes to attain heaven. Such wishes bred spiritual laziness to the extent that those who entertained such wishes relied upon them and not on right conduct. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī is thus reported to have said: "They wished and they wished, and then when it was too late, they exerted themselves."[134] Ironically, when faced with their end, ordinary Muslims would, in fact, wish to be like the ascetics.[135]

Wishing for death represented a special case. The ascetics saw life as the setting in which one might gain or lose one's place in heaven. With death there was no longer any hope of gaining the merit to enter heaven if one had not already done so. Wishing for death was appropriate only for those who knew that they were assured of a place in heaven.[136] The extent to which wishing for death was the province of a spiritual elite is evidenced by the claim that the prophet Joseph was the first person to wish for death.

Quite distinct from wishing for death was wishing for obliteration as an escape from the intolerable uncertainty of not knowing if one was doing enough to gain a heavenly seat.[137] This was sometimes expressed as a wish never to have been created at all, but also as a wish to have been created in some nonhuman form. Wishes of the latter sort are sometimes couched in extravagant language such as the wish attributed to Kaʿb al-Aḥbār (d. 32/652): "I wish that I was my family's ram, and that they had slaughtered me and cooked me and eaten me."[138] Wishes for obliteration are also found in the form of wishes to

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[133] One thus finds "counter-wishes" expressing the ascetics' low esteem for the riches of this world (Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-Mutamannīn*, 52-3).

[134] Ibid., 60.

[135] Ibid., 90-1.

[136] This principle is expressed in a Prophetic tradition reported by al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (ibid., 78).

[137] Of an entirely different character is the heroic self-sacrificial wish of Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 122/740) reported in Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣbahānī, *Maqātil al-ṭālibiyyīn*, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr, Cairo, 1368/1949, 129: "I wish that my hand might be joined to the Pleiades and that I might fall to earth or wherever and shatter to pieces that God might reconcile the nation of Muḥammad" (cited in Zayd b. ʿAlī, *al-Majmūʿ al-ḥadīthī wa-l-fiqhī*, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥammūd al-ʿIzzī, Ammān, 1422/2002, 9, 45).

[138] Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-Mutamannīn*, 34-5; cf. Abū ʿUbayda's wish to be his family's ram and for them to sip the broth prepared from his flesh (30).

die and be reduced to nothing. These echo the language of the Qurʾān (19:23) when it reports the wish of Mary in the throes of giving birth to Jesus: "Oh, would that I had died before this, and had become a thing forgotten, utterly forgotten (*nasyan mansiyyā*)." Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī is said to have labeled one who wished for obliteration as better informed about God than one who hoped for God's mercy.[139] Wishes for obliteration were attributed to such leading figures as Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, and ʿĀʾisha.[140]

It is likely that this broad rejection of wishing is the background for traditions that promise the believer a virtually unlimited power of attaining wishes in the afterlife. "The lowest rank of one of you in heaven will be that it will be said to him 'Make a wish,' and he then wishes and wishes. And then it is said: 'Have you made a wish?' He answers, 'Yes.' Then it is said: 'You will have what you wished for and as much again.'"[141] In the matter of wishes as elsewhere, Muslims will have in heaven what has been denied them on earth.[142]

Religious scruples concerning wishes undoubtedly also explain the development of the idiom of "wishing from God" (*tamannā ʿalā Allāh*) that we find throughout the texts.[143] The addition of God's

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139 Ibid., 37.

140 Ibid., 26 (Abū Bakr), ʿUmar (26-7), ʿĀʾisha (32-4). Such wishes were understood to bespeak a commendable humility by Ibn Baṭṭāl (*Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, 287-8). The Twelver Shīʿī al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1023) cited these utterances of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar as evidence that they had no knowledge of having been promised heaven, as the Sunnīs alleged, and contrasted their fear of what awaited them with ʿAlī's calm (*al-Ifṣāḥ*, in *Muṣannafāt al-Shaykh al-Mufīd*, Qumm, 1413, 8:73).

141 This tradition from Ibn Ḥanbal's *Musnad* and others like it are cited in Aḥmad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bātilī, *al-Tamannī*, Riyad, 1424/2003, 107-8. My translation, like the original, leaves open the identity of the speaker in heaven. God is sometimes depicted as calling for a wish to be made (*tamannā ʿalayya*, Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-Mutamannīn*, 20, where the wish to return to earth and die a martyr's death a second time cannot be granted).

142 One of the traditions cited in al-Bātilī, *al-Tamannī*, 107, grants the believer what he has wished for and the entire world ten-fold (*ʿasharat aḍʿāf al-dunyā*).

143 The formula appears, in fact, in a tradition from al-Dārimī cited by al-Bātilī, *al-Tamannī*, 107. Its modern equivalent seems to be *tamannā min Allāh*, recently heard in a radio interview. *Tamannā ʿalā Allāh* also appears in a negative sense of vain wishing for unearned salvation. In this distinctly religious usage the object of the wish is understood to be something like God's forgiveness or heaven itself (Ibn Mufliḥ, *al-Ādāb al-sharʿiyya*, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ, Beirut, 1417/1996, 1:163; cf. the explanation in ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Munāwī, *Fayḍ al-qadīr sharḥ al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr*, Beirut, 1391/1972, 5: 67 [*tamannā ʿalā Allāh al-amānī*]). Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī reports that, according to some scholars, whoever thinks that he will enter heaven without works (*ʿamal*) is a wisher (*mutamannī)*, whoever thinks that he will enter it by means

name as the granter of wishes gave the practice of wishing a religious color. It is possible that this expression, used for even the most mundane wishes, ultimately derives its authority from Q. 4:32 ("Ask, therefore, God [to give you] out of His bounty)," understood to offer an alternative to the envious wishing condemned in the same verse.[144] Once wishing was directed at God, it was even encouraged, since there was no limit to God's bounty.[145]

The negative attitude toward wishing that we find among the early ascetics survived into later times in various forms. We have already had occasion to note the condemnation of even apparently harmless wishes on the part of the Ashʿarīs al-Qāḍī Ibn al-ʿArabī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Their objection to the practice appears to reflect in part an intellectualist rejection of wishes as a useless distraction from pursuing what is in one's rational interest.[146] The Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) similarly offers a prudent argument against selfish wishes for events such as an increase in the price of grain. Such wishes will not change the course of events but merely disturb one's peace of mind and bring punishment for wishing what will harm others. One should instead wish for what will benefit the public, for this will merit reward and lead to ease of mind.[147]

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of works is a drudge (*mutaʿannī*) *(Qūt al-qulūb*, 1:100, 104, trans. Gramlich, 1:342, 352); cf. the interpretation of the *ḥadīth* of ʿUthmān (*mā taʿannaytu wa-lā tamannaytu*) in Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Nihāya fī gharīb al-ḥadīth wa-l-athar*, ed. al-Atharī, Jedda, 1421, 885). *Tamannā* alone acquired in some circles the sense of making an unsubstantiated claim in a debate. It appears with this meaning throughout al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, *al-Ifṣāḥ*, e.g. 8:73.

[144] On asking God as an antidote to the human frailty of wishing, see the Twelver Shīʿī commentary of al-Mashhadī, *Tafsīr Kanz al-daqāʾiq*, Qum, 1414, 2:435. The tradition from ʿAlī there cited is found in a number of variants, envy (*ḥasad)* being more common in these than wishing (e.g. Abū l-Layth al-Samarqandī, *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muḥammad al-Wakīl, Jedda, 1400/1980, 1:189). Muḥammad b. Sīrīn (d. 110/729) is reported to have directed those he heard *yatamannā fī l-dunyā* to something better, namely, asking God (al-Suyūṭī, *al-Durr al-manthūr*, 5:508), advice that he claimed to follow himself (Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-Mutamannīn*, 47).

[145] Thus the tradition *idhā tamannā aḥadukum fa-l-yukthir fa-innamā yasʾalu rabbahū* (cited and discussed in relation to Q. 4:32 by Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām (d. 224/838), *Gharīb al-ḥadīth*, Hyderabad, Deccan, 1384/1965, 2:14-5.

[146] See, however, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's confession of his disenchantment with the pleasures of this world and his longing for death, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr* (18:221) on Q. 12:101.

[147] *Kitāb al-Akhlāq wa-l-siyar*, ed. Eva Riyad, Uppsala, 1980, 66, trans. Muhammad Abū Layla, *In Pursuit of Virtue*, London, 1411/1990, 127-8.

A far more poetic depiction of the state of one addicted to wishing comes from Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), who in his *Madārij al-sālikīn* speaks of "riding on the ocean of wishes" (*rukūb baḥr al-tamannī*) as one of the traits that ruin the heart: "The ocean of wishes has no shore. It is the ocean that the penniless (*mafālīs)* of the world ride, for, as has been said, wishes are the capital of the penniless, and the stock of its riders are the promises of Satan and impossible and false fantasies. The waves of vain wishes and empty fantasies ceaselessly play with their rider as dogs play with a carcass."[148] The wishes that Ibn al-Qayyim condemns are those that evince a base soul: wishes for power, travel, wealth, women and attractive boys. By contrast, the wishes of those with a lofty ambition (*ṣāḥib al-himma al-ʿāliya*) focus on knowledge and faith and such acts as bring them close to God and lead them to His presence. Such wishes are "faith, light and wisdom." Ibn al-Qayyim does not reject the practice of wishing as such but only its baser manifestations. His position toward wishes is thus reminiscent of that of Ibn Baṭṭāl, who also lauded the lofty spiritual qualities that might be found in the most unrealistic wishes.

To some extent the scruples that al-Bukhārī addressed and that located wishing in the theologically suspect realm of the counterfactual survive in *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1792), which contains a short chapter on the theologically improper use of *law.*[149] In this chapter Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb adduces two Qurʾānic verses: 3:154 and 3:168, in which the hypocrites in the wake of the battle of Uḥud show their imperfect faith by utterances that suggest that not all those who died in the battle on the Muslim side need have died. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb also cites a tradition from *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim (d. 261/875) in which the Prophet encourages

[148] Beirut, 1419/1999, 1:346. In his *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, Hyderabad, Deccan, 1357, 298-301, Ibn al-Qayyim develops some of the same themes but more consistently contrasts wishes, which breed spiritual laziness, with hopes *(rajāʾ*) (cf. al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, *al-Furūq*, 148-151; al-Qushayrī, *al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya*, 82). Some wishes, in fact, disguise themselves as hopes.

[149] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, *Fatḥ al-majīd li-sharḥ Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, Riyad, 1420/1999, 445-51. The chapter bears the heading *bāb mā jāʾa fī l-laww*, which the commentator, the grandson of the author (d. 1285/1869), glosses with the words: *ay min al-nahy ʿanhu ʿinda l-umūr al-makrūha*.

concern for what is useful and condemns the use of *law* as opening the way for Satan to do his work.[150]

VII. *Wishing in Modern Writers*

Muslim writers in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have continued to be interested in wishing. While they have sometimes simply taken over earlier discussions on the subject, they have also to one degree or another looked at the phenomenon of wishing in light of issues that have emerged with new urgency in modern times, issues such as the weakness of the Muslim world vis-à-vis the West, the distribution of wealth among the social classes, and the relation of the sexes. Examples of the place of wishing in modern Muslim thought can readily be gleaned from the exegesis of the Qurʾānic passages with which we have already become familiar. A particularly noteworthy recent development is the publication of books that aim at presenting organized accounts of the place of wishing in Islamic law as guidance for believers.

The commentary *Tafsīr al-Manār* of the reformers Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905) and his disciple Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1354/1935) stands out for the attention it gives to wishing as a force in human development. The wishing of interest to ʿAbduh and Riḍā is not verbal but mental. A forceful reassertion of wishing as an inner state can be found in their interpretation of Q. 2:94-6. This interpretation sharply breaks with the notion that there was a miracle in the failure of the Jews to meet the challenge posed by Muḥammad. The actual point of the verse is understood to be entirely moral. It challenges the Jews to look into their own hearts and take the true measure of the sincerity of their claims to a special relation with God. If their claims were really the expression of an unshakable conviction, they would, in fact, wish for death. There is no prediction in Q. 2:95 that the Jews will not utter a wish, for the Qurʾān is not urging against them that by some miracle they will be unable to move their tongues. Rather the Qurʾān clearly states that they will not wish for death "because of what their hands have sent ahead in this world," that is, they will not wish for death because they know that

[150] On the reconciliation of the tradition with the Prophet's own practice, see al-Nawawī, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim bi-Sharḥ al-Nawawī*, Cairo, n.d., 16:216.

they are sinners who merit God's punishment. The lesson that the Qur'ān teaches is universal and fully applicable to Muslims. True faith will express itself in word and deed. Muslims, too, need to look into their hearts and take the measure of their claim to certainty in their belief in God and in the discharge of their obligations to him.[151]

Like al-Ṭabarī (d. 335/946) centuries earlier, ʿAbduh felt called upon to challenge the interpretation attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās that wishing is merely asking and demanding (*al-suʾāl wa-l-ṭalab*).[152] According to ʿAbduh, the correct definition of wishing is "the delight of the mind in, and its anticipation of, a thing that it wants and desires to attain." Echoing al-Ṭabarī, he claims that Ibn ʿAbbās's definition is not attested on the authority of any other Arab. Perhaps, he suggests, Ibn ʿAbbās explained wishing in terms of what is typically associated with it, demanding by word or deed or both. Expanding on his teacher's observation, Riḍā acknowledges that Ibn ʿAbbās's interpretation, as explained by ʿAbduh, adequately addresses the problems that can be raised against taking wishing to be purely internal. But ʿAbduh's own interpretation of wishing in terms of its true nature (*ḥaqīqa)* meets every objection.

Riḍā's interpretation of the prohibition of wishing for what others have in Q. 4:32 leads him to an extended discussion on the inestimable value of wishing where wishing is appropriate.[153] Addressing the question of how there can be a prohibition of wishing at all given that wishing is involuntary, Riḍā vehemently rejects this premise, which he attributes to those who have not developed self-control.[154] For such persons it is true that wishes assail them as dreams assail the sleeper. But Muslims are expected to develop their willpower to the point that they can appropriately direct their wishes away from what belongs to others and cannot be theirs. Riḍā calls upon them to dwell instead on such lofty topics as the rise and fall of civilizations and the relation of this world to the next and to act in accordance

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151 *Tafsīr al-Manār*, 1:318. Cf. Aḥmad Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (d. 1371/1952), *Tafsīr al-Marāghī*, Cairo, 1365/1948, 1:465, who also takes the message of measuring one's faith by one's readiness to act for it as applicable to Muslims.

152 al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, 1:426 (not known in this meaning in Arabic; al-Ṭabarī then offers an explanation of what Ibn ʿAbbās may have meant).

153 *Tafsīr al-Manār*, 5:47-52.

154 Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) did, in fact, regard responsibility for envy as extending to words and deeds but not thoughts (*Ṣayd al-khāṭir*, ed. Ādam Abū Sunayna, Ammān, 1987, 428, trans. Daniel Reig, *La pensée vigile*, Paris, 1986, 294).

with their reflections. He sees in the Qurʾānic verse a call to each Muslim to strive to develop to the fullest his or her own God-given potential and not let it go to waste in the vain hope of enjoying the fruits of the labor of others. Both men and women must devote themselves to productive labor, each sex within its own sphere.[155] Riḍā contrasts the spirit of independence in thought and action of the West with the sorry state of the Muslims, who have fallen from their former greatness to vassaldom. The message of the verse is that they can regain their rightful place if they realize and develop what lies within them.

In his commentary *Fī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān*, Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1387/1967) takes a strikingly negative view of wishing as entirely unproductive. In his comments on Q. 4:32 he defines wishing as "a powerless negative aspiration (*al-taṭalluʿ al-ʿājiz al-salbī*) that does not prompt any effort or endeavor." He contrasts wishes with genuine desire (*raghba)* that leads to productivity, growth and well-being. Quṭb understands the verse to be directed to the have-nots in society. They are counseled to look to productive labor to improve their circumstances, not to empty wishes. Only those who work for it merit the bounty of God.[156]

The leading Twelver Shīʿī Qurʾān commentator of the twentieth century, al-ʿAllāma Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1402/1981), incorporates both new and old elements in the discussions of wishing in his *al-Mīzān*. In one place he defines wishing as "a person's uttering: 'Would that such and such were such and such' (*layta kādhā kāna kādhā*)."[157] He goes on to state, "It appears that calling the utterance wishing is a case of labeling the expression with the label of the meaning (*min bābi tawsīfi l-lafẓi bi-ṣifati l-maʿnā*), for wishing is actually the origination of a sort of intention (*taʿalluq*) in the mind, analogous to the intention of love, toward what the mind regards as

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155 ʿAbduh sees the verses as directing women away from their shared role with men in all affairs, characteristic of Islam in its infancy, to activities at home more appropriate to their gender (*Tafsīr al-Manār*, 5:48).

156 *Fī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān*, Cairo, n.d., 5:12. Because Quṭb takes Q. 2:94 to refer to a mutual cursing between the Jews and Muslims, he does not address the nature of the wish the Jews were called upon to make *(Fī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān*, 1:107). Although he does interpret Q. 22:52 as referring to the Prophet's wishing for the success of Islam, he readily slips into using the—for him positive—term "desire" in writing of the Prophet's "human desires" (*al-raghabāt al-bashariyya*).

157 On al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī's life and thought, see now Reza Hajatpour, *Iranische Geistlichkeit zwischen Utopie und Realismus*, Wiesbaden, 2002, 160-179.

impossible or difficult to obtain, whether this intention is expressed in words or not."[158] In keeping with this definition, al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī understands, like ʿAbduh and Riḍā, that the challenge to the Jews in Q. 2:94 was for them to evidence the natural consequence (*lāzim fiṭrī*) of their belief. Given the choice between the hardships of this world and the comfort of the next, their response, if not for their past bad actions, should have been immediate. The natural wish would display itself in the mind, tongue, and limbs (*janānan wa-lisānan wa-arkānan*).[159]

Al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī departs from the conventional interpretation of Q. 4:32 in that he finds in the prohibition of wishing for what others have merely a guiding prohibition (*nahy irshādī*), not an authoritative prohibition (*nahy mawlawī*). The Qurʾānic prohibition is not meant to institute an independent rule of law against envy but rather to safeguard the body of existing Islamic rules that regulate the respective entitlements of men and women. Wishing by members of one gender to enjoy the legal privileges enjoyed by the other can grow into envy and eventually into action that can be disastrous for society.[160]

In his discussion of Q. 22:52 al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī addresses both senses of *tamannā* mentioned in the classical commentaries: that of wishing and that of reciting. His treatment of the verse is conservative, to the point that, ignoring his earlier definition of wishing in connection with Q. 4:32, he falls back on the ancient definition of wishing in terms of its alleged etymology. To wish is to determine (*taqdīr*) in one's mind what one wants whether it is possible or impossible. The imagined form in the mind from which one derives pleasure is the wish (*umniyya*). If the verse means that the Prophet entertained a wish in his heart (*tamannī al-qalb*), that wish was for the success of his religion. The Satanic interference was to prevent the reception of his message. If the verse refers to the Prophet's recitation, then the Satanic interference was once again the prevention of its reception by raising doubts in the minds of those who heard the Prophet.

Two recent books by Saudi Arabian scholars provide broad treatments of the place that wishing should hold in the life of Muslims.

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158 *al-Mīzān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, Beirut, n.d., 4:336, on Q. 4:32.

159 Ibid., 1:227.

160 Ibid., 4:336. On the terminology *nahy irshādī* and *mawlawī,* see Muḥammad Ḥusayn Mukhtārī, *Farhang-i Iṣṭilāḥāt-i uṣūlī*, Qum, 1419, 254-5. The sanction for the breach of the *nahy irshādī* in this case would be the breakdown of the social order, not divine punishment for breach of a *nahy mawlawī*.

Both authors begin from the recognition of wishing as an inevitable human inclination. The earlier of these two books, *al-Tamannī* by ʿAbd al-Salām b. Barjas b. Nāṣir Āl ʿAbd al-Karīm (d. 1425/2004), focuses on the distinction between praiseworthy and condemnable wishes.[161] The former category is larger than one might anticipate, chiefly because the author employs an expansive notion of wishing, which includes a variety of mental states including resolve *(ʿazm*).[162] This broad notion of wishing permits the author to adopt a generally favorable position on wishing. The second work is *al-Tamannī fī l-Kitāb wa-l-Sunna: anwāʿuhū wa-aḥkāmuhū* by Aḥmad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bātilī (b. 1384/1964-5). This book, as its title might suggest, is richer than its predecessor in its treatment of the material on wishing in the Qurʾān and traditions and correspondingly less narrowly legalistic in its aim. It, too, takes a broader view on the scope of wishing than the one of this paper. Al-Bātilī's work has as one of its stated objectives to remind its readers, enmeshed as many of them are in worldly wishes, to turn their attention toward "wishes relating to the world to come for which they will be rewarded and which bind them to God and the *sunna* of His Prophet."[163] Although al-Bātilī explicitly sees his book as following in the line of the writings on wishing of Ibn Abī l-Dunyā and al-Bukhārī, it is perhaps more pertinent to regard his work and that of Āl ʿAbd al-Karīm as examples of a discernable tendency on the part of Muslim scholars to examine the standpoint of Islam on the widest possible range of contemporary concerns. The fact that both authors saw fit to adopt broader notions of wishing than found in the classical sources only corroborates the observation that the topic of wishing was never extensively developed within Islamic law.

VIII. *Summary*

Wishing was recognized as a distinct speech act from the very beginnings of Arabic philology. It was a matter of some centuries, however, before general agreement was reached that wishes, at least

[161] Riyad, 1413.

[162] The failure to discriminate among these unfortunately vitiates the legal analysis.

[163] al-Bātilī, *al-Tamannī*, 4.

those expressed with *laysa*, were not truth-evaluable and were to be classed as performatives in the dichotomous categorization of speech acts either as statements or performatives that became standard. The analysis of wishes by rhetoricians led them to identify an inner act of wishing as fundamental, a position also held by some theologians, including many Ashʿarīs, who regarded wishing as a form of willing. The Baṣran Muʿtazilīs, responding to determinist arguments, insisted that wishing was essentially a speech act. Although these philological and theological disputes are reflected in Qurʾānic commentaries, exegetical pressures of various sorts worked against a consistent treatment of wishes in these works. Despite objections on the part of some early Muslims to wishes and to counterfactual utterances in general, Islamic law came to validate a broad range of wishes, but no substantial body of law on wishing was ever developed. The negative and positive evaluations of wishing discernable in medieval sources continue to be found in modern writings, even as the context for such evaluations has significantly changed.

ZARĀFA
ENCOUNTERS WITH THE GIRAFFE, FROM PARIS TO THE MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC WORLD

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I. *Introduction*

On a cold Christmas Day in Paris in 2004, we decided to go and visit the Jardin des Plantes. Having recently read Michael Allin's *Zarafa*, the entertaining account of how a giraffe, christened Zarafa by Allin, traveled from Sennar (a town on the White Nile ca. 150 miles south of Khartum) to Paris in 1827, we wanted to see the place were the animal was housed until its death in 1845. The giraffe had been a present from the Egyptian ruler Muḥammad ʿAlī to King Charles X.

Naturally, not only the zoo, which no longer houses giraffes, but also the impressive buildings of the Jardin des Plantes, was closed on Christmas Day. No chance even to see a giraffe's skeleton. Attracted by cheerful noises coming from a corner of the park, however, we suddenly found ourselves face to face with something that looked like giraffes: a carrousel with exotic animals, giraffes among them, with children riding on their backs. But were the animals really giraffes? We were not sure. In fact, they looked like a mixture of animals: okapi (a kind of giraffe), deer, and panther. "They must be deer, look at their antlers," said my companion. This did not convince me, because I remembered Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868-9), who says in his *Book on Animals* that the hooves and horns of the giraffe are like those of the deer. This confusion was maybe the best proof that giraffes were intended, for since time immemorial the giraffe has been interpreted as the result of successive mating of different animals and cross-breeds.

Our visit, even though we had to make do with wooden giraffes, connected us to a long line of visitors who had come to see giraffes in the Jardin des Plantes, starting with the arrival of "Zarafa" in 1827. Among those visitors were at least two nineteenth-century travelers from Arab lands who mentioned the giraffe in their travel accounts. One was the Egyptian scholar Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī, who, in 1826, departed from Egypt and study in Paris; the other was the Moroccan scholar Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār, who, then about thirty-five years old, traveled to France in December 1845 as part of a delegation sent by the Moroccan sultan Mulay ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān (1822-59).

Al-Ṣaffār's role in the delegation was that of secretary to the sultan's envoy, ʿAbd al-Qādir Muḥammad Ashʿāsh. Al-Ṣaffār returned to Morocco in the spring of 1846 and used the summer to record his experiences. For this, he made extensive use of Ṭaḥṭawī's account of his stay in Paris, *Takhlīṣ al-ibrīz fī talkhīṣ Bārīz*, which he often cites, or rather copies.

Ṭahṭāwī, in his chapter devoted to the high level of the sciences and crafts in France, speaks extensively about the Jardin des Plantes and the wonderfully useful combination of reference works, museum collections and living specimens that it has to offer to the scientist as well as to the general public. In this context, he also briefly makes mention of "the giraffe from Sennar," without giving further details as to its origin or appearance.[1]

Among al-Ṣaffār's many interesting experiences was also a visit to the Jardin des Plantes. The Jardin had benefited from the Moroccan diplomatic mission because among the presents which were offered to the French king there were a number of North African animals: a lion, two ostriches, three gazelles, and a special kind of Barbary sheep.[2] These animals were destined for the Jardin des Plantes, to be added to its collection of exotic animals. Whether al-Ṣaffār's visit to the Jardin had anything to do with this gift we do not know. He does not mention these animals in his enthusiastic account, which includes, among other things, a description of the giraffe.

The giraffe which al-Ṣaffār saw, however, cannot have been Zarafa: Zarafa died in 1845, and al-Saffār did not arrive in Paris until the beginning of 1846. The animal that he saw (or, at least, described)

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[1] Ṭahṭāwī, *Takhlīṣ*, 262.
[2] Miller 1992, 26-7.

must have been a second giraffe, a gift from Clot Bey, Muḥammad ʿAlī's physician, which in 1839 was sent to keep Zarafa company.[3]

Al-Ṣaffār's passage on the giraffe is interesting for several reasons. One of these is that it is an intriguing mixture of traditional Arabic lore and direct observation. The passage treats the characteristics and habits of the giraffe, and connects remarks about its peculiar appearance to the strange story that the animal was a mixture of species. This idea was widely spread in the Arabic tradition. Al-Ṣaffār's comment on this is that the idea that giraffes originated from the successive mating of a number of different animals is nonsense, and that they are a species of their own.

The latter in particular may strike the reader as a pleasantly rational view, the view of a man on the threshold of modernity. As such it would fit in well with the nature of al-Ṣaffār's visit to France. But is that view justified? In the following, I will give an overview—without any claim at exhaustiveness—of the role that the giraffe played in medieval Arabic culture: how it was appreciated, how it was described in natural history works and *adab* literature in general, and the strange theories that circulated about its procreation. Apart from supplementing what is said about the giraffe in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Viré 2002), this may also help us to evaluate al-Ṣaffār's account of the giraffe.

I. *A Choice Gift for Rulers*

The possibility cannot, of course, be excluded that al-Ṣaffār had seen a giraffe once before, for giraffes were transported far and wide, a practice known even in antiquity. Allin tells us that Julius Caesar brought a giraffe to Italy in 46 BCE,[4] which finally was offered up to be killed by lions in one of the spectacles staged for the benefit of the Roman people. Many more giraffes are reported to have suffered a similar fate in the centuries that followed.

The interest in the giraffe (*zarāfa* or *zurāfa*) that we encounter in medieval Arabic sources is, fortunately, of a different nature. Giraffes were certainly able to draw huge crowds, but not to see them killed. They were even such a beloved spectacle that an artificial gi-

[3] Allin 1999, 195.
[4] Ibid., 96-7.

raffe, together with an artificial elephant, was made to parade through the streets of Baghdad during festivities in the year 488/1095, as we can read in Ibn al-Jawzī's *Muntaẓam.*[5] Animal spectacles of the type favoured by the Romans, however, were not part of Arab culture. When giraffes were killed, it was not for fun but for their meat and skins, or in order to capture their young. Medieval Arabic sources mention that in regions where they were abundant, such as Nubia, giraffes were killed for their meat and for their skins. Qazwīnī (d. 682/1283-4), for instance, tells us in his *Āthār al-bilād* about Takrūr, by which often West-Africa in general is meant: "One says that there are many giraffes there, which they herd away (*yajlabūnahā*) and slaughter like cows,"[6] and Yāqūt (d. 626/1228-9), in his *Muʿjam al-buldān*, speaks about the giraffe trade in his entry on al-Jubb, a well in the land of the Berbers. Noteworthy is that he specifically mentions giraffe skins, which the Persians, he says, use to make shoes. [7]

Giraffe meat is not likely to have become an export product, so it would have been only Muslims in the area where the giraffe lived who bothered about the lawfulness of eating it. Naturally, the point was not overlooked by Muslim jurists, always fond of casuistry. Herbert Eisenstein reports that the giraffe was sometimes considered as a beast of prey, and as such, forbidden as food.[8] The giraffe's ambiguous position has to do with the strange views that circulated about its origin. If one took it to be a crossbreed with a beast of prey as one of its progenitors, one would have to consider it unlawful as food. The views of the different law schools, however, vary on this point. Damīrī (d. 808/1405-6) discusses the opinions of the jurists in the entry on the giraffe in his *al-Ḥayawān al-kubrā* and raises interesting points, which we must leave aside here.[9] The outcome is that Jāḥiẓ's rejection of the crossbreed theory, about which we will speak later, greatly helped to sway the opinion of many jurists towards declaring the giraffe to be a grazing animal, and accordingly, its meat a lawful food.

Where Arabic sources speak about the giraffe trade, it is often without specification, as when (pseudo)-Jāḥiẓ in *al-Tabaṣṣur bi-l-*

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[5] Ibn al-Jawzī, *Muntaẓam* XVII: 16.
[6] Qazwīnī, *Āthār*, 17.
[7] Yāqūt, *Muʿjam* II:100.
[8] Eisenstein 1991, 16-17.
[9] Damīrī, *Ḥayāt* II: 5-7; trans. Jayakar 1908, II(1): 8-10.

tijāra mentions it among things imported from Yemen,[10] as does Masʿūdī (d. 345/956-7) in his *Tanbīh*.[11]

In a number of these cases the trade must have been in live giraffes, and these definitely were not transported for their meat and skins. They were a rare and costly commodity, appreciated for other reasons. Their amazing appearance made them a coveted asset for animal collections. Exotic animals were frequently included in gifts sent to kings and sultans. The reports in medieval Arabic chronicles about these presents make fascinating reading. In the year 674/1275, for instance, a completely unexpected delegation arrived at the court of Sultan Baybars (r. 658-76/1260-77) with a gift including an elephant and a rhinoceros.[12] This must have presented some practical difficulties. Fifteenth-century chroniclers mention a Stable of the Giraffe in the Cairo cemetery: "Muḥammad al-Shafī was buried within the gate of the Qarāfa Cemetary, next to the Stable of the Giraffe, at what was formerly the turba of ʿUmar al-Kurdī",[13] but a rhinoceros must have presented quite different problems.

Many rulers or other important people in the Islamic world are known to have had private zoos or to have kept at least some exotic animals. Eisenstein gives an overview.[14] The zoo that existed at the Cairo Citadel in Mamluk days was a source of wonder to foreign visitors,[15] who sometimes included notes on it in their travel accounts. An example is Pierre Belon, who visited the Citadel in 1547.[16] He calls the animal *zurnapa*, which is his rendering of *zurāfa*. He presents a detailed and fairly accurate description of the animal, including a drawing, but like all the Arabic sources, he stumbles at the giraffe's gait. According to him, the giraffe puts its forelegs forward simultaneously, a variation not yet encountered in the Arabic accounts.[17]

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10 Jāḥiẓ, *Tabaṣṣur*, 27; see also Pellat 1954, 159.

11 Masʿūdī, *Avertissement,* 36.

12 Nuwayrī, *Nihāya* XXX: 221.

13 Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʾ* X: 123, no. 496.

14 Eisenstein 1991, 213-4.

15 For reports of European travelers about the collection, see Keimer 1949, 123, n. 3.

16 Belon, 1970, 118a-b.

17 I regret that I did not have the opportunity for an extensive comparison of medieval travel accounts in order to check whether Belon's account is original or copied from an earlier source, as is so often the case in this type of literature.

The *n* in Pierre Belon's rendering *zurnapa* for *zurafa* very likely goes back to a misreading of the *u*, *n* and *u* being practically indiscernible in medieval handwriting. We can see it in the editions of the travel account of Johannes Schiltberger, who traveled extensively in the Middle East between 1394 and 1427, and who mentions the giraffe among the animals of India, together with the elephant. The edition of 1859[18] speaks of *surnafa*; that of 1885, made from a different MS, has *suruafa.*[19]

Belon's traveling companion Pierre Gilles d'Alby, as well as André Thevet, another Frenchman traveling in their company, report that they saw three giraffes at the Citadel. The collection of animals there must have been quite amazing, including even seals and a rhinoceros, according to Thevet's travel account.[20]

A remark in Qalqashandī's (d. 821/1418) *Ṣubḥ* offering veterinary details about the giraffe indicates a long-standing experience with captive giraffes in Egypt: old animals have black teeth, young ones white. Among the diseases that giraffes may suffer from is *kalab*, a sort of madness, similar to rabies in dogs; it is a fatal illness. They may also suffer from angina and gout.[21]

Captive giraffes in Egypt must often have been animals in transit, for giraffes made wonderful and prestigious presents for kings and rulers. Allin's Zarafa, Muḥammad ʿAlī's present to Charles X, forms part of a long tradition. Allin's account, however, brings into focus what the old sources neglect to tell; the enormous difficulty of capturing and transporting the giraffes and keeping them alive. The giraffes were mostly young, because younger ones could be handled comparatively easily; and they doubtless suffered greatly. For every giraffe that made it to its final destination, many more must have died. The Parisian giraffe is a case in point: Zarafa and another baby giraffe, two months old, were, at the order of Muḥammad ʿAlī, captured 200 miles south of Sennar. The mother giraffes were killed and yielded four camel loads of meat.[22]

Once the baby giraffes had been captured, there came the risky process of getting them to settle down and making them accept food.

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18 J. Schiltberger 1859, 103.
19 H. Schiltberger 1885, 61.
20 Keimer 1949, 123 n. 3.
21 Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ* II: 39.
22 Allin, 68.

This was traditionally attempted with cow's milk, as we can see in a report found in various Mamluk chroniclers, among them Maqrīzī (d. 845/1441-2). In his *Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk* he mentions among the remarkable events of the year 1271 the birth of a giraffe in Qalʿat al-Jabal, the Citadel fortress. This giraffe was fed with cow's milk. It was clearly a very exceptional event, on the same scale as the other remarkable occurrence mentioned: "In the same year, a woman in Damascus brought forth in one go seven boys and four girls. She was four months and ten days pregnant. They all died, but the mother lived."[23]

The two baby giraffes in Allin's account were also made to accept cow's milk. Once the feeding problem was solved, transport could start. The little giraffes were loaded on camels and brought to Sennar. From there, Allin guesses, they were probably transported further by felucca to Khartum, and maybe even all the way to Cairo. By then they were eight months old and needed twenty-five gallons of milk a day. Of course the milk had to be fresh, which meant that cows had to be transported along with the giraffes, even on the ship which took Zarafa to Marseille, and then Paris. Zarafa walked all the way, 550 miles, meekly following the milk cows walking in front. It took them 41 days, a quite impressive daily average. Zarafa wore a specially made rain coat, and stabling was ordered along the way, which often meant that roofs had to be raised.

Zarafa's guards, Hassan and Athir, so we hear, came with her all the way from Sennar to Paris. Hassan was especially well equipped for the task, because he had already accompanied another giraffe sent as a present from Muḥammad ʿAlī to the Ottoman sultan on the occasion of the circumcision of one of his sons. Regrettably, that poor giraffe did not make it to Constantinople because her Turkish guards were careless about feeding her, neglecting to give her milk,[24] confirming how essential the cow's milk was.

All this is something to keep in mind when we read the reports in medieval Arabic sources about the giraffes presented to sultans, and the lofty *qaṣīda*s prompted by these remarkable presents.

The giraffe which Muḥammad ʿAlī sent to Constantinople also had precursors recorded in Arabic literature. Marwazī (fl. first half

[23] Maqrīzī, *Histoire*, I(2) : 106-7.
[24] Allin 1999, 73.

sixth/twelfth century), the court physician of the Seljuq sultan Malikshāh (r. 465-85/1072-92), quotes in his *Book on the Natures of Animals* a passage from Timotheus of Gaza's animal book, dating from the fifth century CE. Timotheus describes how a giraffe passed through Gaza (Marwazī, *K. Ṭabāʾiʿ al-ḥayawān*, MS UCLA, Ar. 52, 151a8-15):

> There came to us a man from India, a messenger of the king of India, with two giraffes, covered with cloths and harnessed with many bridles and nose straps, that he wanted to bring to the king of Constantinople. He came to our house, and I was full of amazement about what I saw of their nature and shape. They had the stature of a camel in height, a skin like that of the panther, long forelegs, a prominent breast and a slender neck. Their head was like that of a camel, and so was their mouth. Their teeth were like those of a cow, and their tails were the size of a gazelle's. A rider (*sawwād*) sat upon them,[25] and they walked by pushing forward their right foreleg and then their left foreleg and then their left hind leg (In the two London MSS, BM Delhi Ar. 1449 f. 136b11 and BM Add. 21102 f. 90b14: "legs")."

The original Greek text quoted here by Marwazī, Timotheus of Gaza's book on animals, is lost. Only a late Byzantine paraphrase from the eleventh century exists, plus a number of quotations in Syriac and Arabic texts.[26] The text on the giraffe found in the paraphrase translated by F.S. Bodenheimer and A. Rabinowitz (1949), is much shorter than Marwazī's quotation but contains the added remark of the paraphrast, making two points:[27]

1. The giraffe is an Indian animal; and it is born from the intercourse of different animals.
2. A man dealing in Indian products (or: "a man (coming) from India" according to Bodenheimer and Rabinowitz's note) and hailing from Ayla[28] passed through Gaza, bringing two giraffes and an elephant to the Emperor Anastasius (r. 491-518 CE).

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[25] After this article was submitted, Dr. Philip Rance (Berlin), who studied Greek Timotheus fragments not included in my own research, has on the basis of a Greek parallel come up with the very plausible suggestion that this passage, which is rather unclear in Arabic, might be taken to mean: "(Their tails) being black at the tips". He will discuss this in a forthcoming article, and kindly gave me permission to include the reference here.

[26] See Kruk 2001.

[27] Bodenheimer and Rabinowitz 1949, 31.

[28] Bodenheimer and Rabinowitz, n. 5, explain that this was Aelisios, the biblical Elath, near today's Aqaba.

To this, the paraphrast adds the following remark: "This was seen in our times too: for also to the Emperor (Constantine) Monomachus (r. 1041-54 CE) were these two animals (i.e. giraffe and elephant) brought from India. They were at each opportunity in the theatre of Constantinople shown to the people as a marvel."

Two giraffes, a rider, and they were supposed to come from India. The connection to India, also repeatedly found in Arabic sources, is curious. Apparently this idea was prominent in people's minds, although others knew perfectly well that the animal came from East Africa. In this context, it is noteworthy that Tawḥīdī, in the chapter on animals in his *Imtāʿ*, has a passage on the giraffe which is a parallel to Marwazī's sequel of the Timotheus quotation, but has "Abyssinia" where Marwazi speaks of India: (Marwazī's text) "They live in a region (a16) of India (Tawḥīdī: Abyssinia)[29] where there is little water, and when they are thirsty they gather together and walk around and look for (a17) a well from which they all drink, and then they go away." (Marwazī, *K. Ṭabāʾiʿ al-ḥayawān*, MS UCLA Ar. 52, 151a15-17).

The somewhat vague "India" may even become a more specific place in the same direction, such as in Dimashqī's (d. 727/1326-7) *Nukhbat al-dahr*, where it is said that the giraffe lives on Ceylon.[30] To the confusion further contributed the fact that some authors, such as Buzurg b. Shahriyār (fl. 4th/10th century) in his *ʿAjāʾib al-Hind* speak about a huge and ferocious animal, the *zarāfa*, that lives on the island Lāmirī.[31] It is an enormous animal, and people avoid walking during the night out of fear of it, for it only appears during the night. This *zarāfa*, as P.A. van der Lith and Marcel Devic point out, is a transcription of *sarabha*, the Indian name for this fabulous animal.[32]

The exact whereabouts of the giraffe's country of origin may also have been obscured by the trade routes from Africa and India. Regarding the occurrence of Ayla in the passage from the Timotheus paraphrase mentioned above, Bodenheimer points out that in Byzantine times Ayla was the main harbour for trade with India as well as

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[29] Kopf 1956, App. III: 458: "The giraffe is found only in the country of the Abessynians." Cf. the edition by Aḥmad Amīn et al., Beirut-Ṣaydā, 1953, II: 104.

[30] Dimashqī, *Cosmographie*,160; trans. Mehren, *Manuel*, 112.

[31] Buzurg, *ʿAjāʾib*, 125.

[32] Ibid., 97.

Ethiopia.[33] The fact that giraffe and elephant, most likely the fairly easily tamed Indian elephant, were often combined as gifts to foreign rulers may further have contributed to the confusion about the giraffe's original habitat.

The confusion about Yemen as the giraffe's country of origin may have a similar background: the fact that some of the ports of call on the way from East Africa to the Arab and Byzantine countries were situated in Yemen gave birth to the notion that giraffes originated from Yemen.[34]

As the paraphrast of Timotheus' text availed himself of the opportunity to include a personal observation, Marwazī, in his entry on the giraffe quoting Timotheus, likewise adds a personal account, namely his studies of the giraffe in Isfahan, when the vizier Nizām al-Mulk ordered him to observe the animal, "an excellent specimen of its kind" that had been brought to Sultan Malikshāh in 474/1081-2. He states that he could see no resemblance between the giraffe's skin pattern and that of the panther, contrary to what is said in most of the Arabic natural history books. Marwazī's giraffe most probably belonged to the northernmost variety, the *reticulata*, which has a very regular, net-shaped pattern and lives (or at least lived) in Nubia and Ethiopia. Varieties from southern regions of Africa show irregular vine leaf- or star shaped patterns, which are more similar to a panther's skin. It is difficult to imagine, though, that live specimens from these regions were ever transported to the Middle East.

Like Muḥammad ʿAlī, Mamluk sultans considered giraffes to be appropriate presents for foreign rulers. During the years-long preliminaries to the conclusion, in 1489, of a commercial treaty between the Mamlūk sultan Qāʾitbāy and the Republic of Florence, Qāʾitbāy sent a royal gift to Lorenzo de Medici which included, among many other exotic things and curious animals, a giraffe. The animal made a big impression, and is repeatedly mentioned in Italian sources.[35]

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[33] Bodenheimer and Rabinowitz 1949, 31, n. 5; For the overland travel routes from Hadhramaut and Jemen to Syria, see also Sprenger 1864, repr. 1962, map 16.

[34] See, for instance, Pseudo-Jāḥiẓ (*Tabaṣṣur*, 27) who mentions that giraffes were brought from Yemen, and Thaʿālibī (*Thimār*, 535): "One of the special things of Yemen is the giraffe, just as the rhinoceros is one of the special things of India." Qalqashandī (*Ṣubḥ* II: 38) says that they come from Nubia and Yemen; elsewhere (ibid. V: 275) he mentions *zarārīf* as animals typical for Nubia. For more references, see also Miquel, 1975, II: 182-3 and index.

[35] Wansbrough 1965, 40.

Quatremère, in his extensive and useful footnote on the presence of giraffes in the Arab world,[36] gives further instances of giraffes received and sent by Mamluk sultans. In some of these cases elephants were also included, for instance in the gift sent in 795/1392 by the prince of Dahlak, an island between Yemen and Ethiopia, to Egypt. Most prominent in Quatremère's list is Baybars, who is reported to have sent a giraffe to the German emperor in 660/1261, and in 661/1262 several giraffes to Berke, Khan of the Qipcaks.

In addition to this we may mention a giraffe sent in 666/1267 to Tatar country, specifically to the chief al-Anbrūr. The report tells that the messengers did not have to wait at all to be admitted, but were received straight away because al-Anbrūr was greatly interested in their mission.[37] We may suspect that the giraffe had something to do with this.

Quatremère also mentions that the treaty concluded in 674/1275 by Baybars with the king of Nubia stipulated the obligation of a yearly delivery of giraffes, in addition to other animals and slaves. This, as we can read in Nuwayrī, had been an established practice since the first raids into Nubia in early Islam. Four hundred slaves and one giraffe are mentioned as a yearly tribute. The Abbasid caliph al-Mahdī demanded a yearly tribute of 360 slaves and one giraffe, Nuwayrī tells us on the authority of Balādhurī (d. 279/892).[38]

Masʿūdī in his *Murūj* notes how widespread and ancient the practice of sending giraffes as royal presents was: "The giraffe (…) was conducted to their (i.e., the Persians') king from the land of Nubia, as it was brought to the kings of the Arabs, to previous Abbasid caliphs, and to the governors of Egypt."[39]

The sultans of the Maghrib also received giraffes: there is a fascinating report in Ibn Khaldūn's *Histoire des Berbères.* In 762/1360 a giraffe arrived in Fes, part of a present sent by the sultan of Mali to the Marinid sultan of Morocco. The gift was intended for Sultan Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī (r. 732-49/1331-48), but unfortunately he had passed away before the present arrived. The affair was most complicated,

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36 Maqrīzī, *Histoire*, I(2): 106 n. 128. I have traced some of the references to the printed editions and included them in this article.

37 Nuwayrī, *Nihāya* XXX: 56.

38 Ibid. XXX: 338-9.

39 Masʿūdi, *Prairies* III : 3-4.

because this was in fact an answer to a present sent by Abū l-Ḥasan to the Malinese ruler Mansā Sulaymān, who, however, had also died before the present arrived. The arrival of the giraffe created an enormous sensation. It was brought outside the city for people to see, and huge crowds assembled, people climbing on hills and even on each other's shoulders to get a glimpse of the "curious looking, enormous creature, that resembled various animals."[40]

An intriguing reference to the presence of a giraffe at a North African court is found in an account involving the philosopher Ibn Rushd and his fall from favour with the Almohad ruler Yaʿqūb. The more elaborate version of the story is reported by al-Dhahabī, in his *Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ*.[41] Al-Dhahabī tells how Ibn Rushd inadvertently remarked that he had seen a giraffe belonging to "the king of the Berbers". This way of referring to the king was taken by some people (in the version of Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī: by the ruler himself) as an insult, and it instigated them to question Ibn Rushd's orthodoxy with the ruler by showing him, in Ibn Rushd's handwriting, a remark about the veneration of the planet Venus. This led to Ibn Rushd's banishment. In the other version, the sultan directly reacts to the unintended slur by having Ibn Rushd publicly humiliated and subsequently banished.

I have not come across reports about giraffes sent as gifts by Maghribine rulers. Possibly only the Egyptian sultans could afford such presents, because they had lines of supply that were short and efficient enough to warrant a continuous import of these animals.

As indicated earlier, the arrival of the remarkable animal was sometimes celebrated by poets. An example is the *qaṣīda* Ibn Rashīq al-Qayrawānī (d. 456/1064) composed at the occasion of a giraffe presented to his royal master. He includes it, together with a short poem in *mutaqārib* on the same subject, in his *ʿUmda fī maḥāsin al-shiʿr wa-ādābihā*.[42] More instances of poems on giraffes can be found in Nuwayrī (d. 733/1332).[43] But he does not mention the occasions of these poems, except in one case: the poet ʿUmāra al-Yamanī (executed 569/1174) is reported to have written his poem in order to

[40] Ibn Khaldun, *Berbères* II: 459.
[41] al-Dhahabī, *Siyar* XXI: 317.
[42] Ibn Rāshiq, *ʿUmda*, 1064-6.
[43] Nuwayrī, *Nihāya* IX: 319-22.

describe a giraffe that he had seen depicted, among other images, on the walls of a house.

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Let us return to al-Ṣaffār's description of the giraffe in the Jardin des Plantes. The translator's footnote connects the account to Qazwīnī's entry on the giraffe in his *ʿAjāʾib al-makhlūqāt*, which was still a common natural history reference work in al-Ṣaffār's day. More research would be needed to see whether it was actually that widely read in early nineteenth-century Morocco. Be that as it may, a substantial part of al-Ṣaffār's description certainly overlaps with Qazwīnī's, but then Qazwīnī himself, like many of his fellow encyclopedists, heavily depended on older sources. Al-Ṣaffār thus may have obtained his knowledge from earlier books.

In order to compare al-Ṣaffār's observations against the traditional Arabic lore on the giraffe, a brief overview is opportune. I do not intend to be exhaustive, but rather give a selective and (I hope) sufficient view of what was said and believed about the giraffe. Jāḥiẓ with his *Ḥayawān* and Masʿūdī with his *Murūj al-dhahab* form the starting point. The later encyclopedic works depend almost exclusively on these sources, and need not be quoted in full.

II. *Looks and Origin*

Most noteworthy for the modern reader is al-Ṣaffār's critical observation: "They say that it is the offspring of three animals: the wild she-camel, the wild cow, and the hyena. The hyena mated with the she-camel, producing a male, and this male mated with the cow, producing a giraffe. But," he continues, "the truth is that this is a completely separate creature, having both male and female gender, like all other living things."[44]

The word *zarāfa* means "group" in Arabic, and many authors connect the Arabic name of the giraffe to the fact that it practically represents a group of animals, namely those whose successive mating produced it. Damīrī, quoting, as he says, Ibn Khallikān's (d. 681/1282) biography of the poet al-Akhbārī, states: "The hyena

[44] Miller 1992, 139-40.

mounts the she-camel, which then begets an animal between a she-camel and a hyena; if the offspring is a male animal, it mounts the cow, which then begets the giraffe. This occurs in Abyssinia, and on account of what is mentioned above, it is called *zarāfa*, which originally means a collection; and because this animal is the product of several animals, it is thus called."[45]

The sources differ in their presentation of the animals involved in creating the giraffe. Camel and cow are fairly standard, but for the hyena the panther is often substituted. Ibn Qutayba (d. 282/889-90) even once translates *ushturgāvpalang* as "between a camel and a rhinoceros".[46] A textual corruption? He continues, anyway, with the more usual account involving a hyena. The hyena was chosen for its sloping back, a characteristic that it has in common with the giraffe, whereas the panther was suggested for its spotted skin. A complication is that the Persian word *palang*, which is part of the Persian word for giraffe, *ushturgāvpalang* "camel-cow-panther," is repeatedly taken to mean hyena as well. Another complication is the existence of two species of hyena, the spotted and the striped.

Al-Ṣaffār's skepticism regarding the giraffe as a crossbreed is in line with the author most often quoted in Arabic texts dealing with the giraffe, namely Jāḥiẓ. He expounds on the giraffe and the strange ideas regarding its origin in his *Ḥayawān*, and since his views were so influential in Arab-Islamic culture, I summarize them here:

> Its Persian name is *ushturgāvpalang*. *Ushtur* means camel (*baʿīr*), *gāv* means cow, and *palang* hyena (*ḍabuʿ*)... Persians often give that sort of names to animals on the basis of their similarity to other animals. They call the ostrich, for instance, *ushturmurgh*, camel-bird (I, 152: and the buffalo *gāvmāsh*, cow-goat). This does not mean for us that the ostrich is a crossbreed of camel and bird.... But people ventured to come up with the following story to explain the Persian name of the giraffe and giving it a composite nature: the male hyena (*dhaykh*) in those countries happens upon a female wild camel and mounts her. If she produces young, the young will be something between a camel and a hyena. If the young is female and is mounted by a wild bull, the result is a giraffe. The same happens if the young is male and mounts a wild cow (*mahā*, which is more often used for the oryx antelope). Some people absolutely deny the possibility that a female giraffe could be impregnated by a male giraffe: they say that every giraffe on

[45] Damīrī, *Ḥayāt* I (1): 8.
[46] Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn* II: 83.

> earth is brought forth in the way they have thought up, and they claim that this is well known in Abyssinia and the outskirts of Yemen. Others say that it is not true that crossbreeds do not procreate... People of this kind corrupt science and do not care about books. What leads them astray is the large number of followers that are eager to hear strange and curious things. If only these people received some sound information together with these curious stories, much corruption in books could be avoided (*Ḥayawān* I:143-4).

> The giraffe is one of the animals noted for their amazing composition, like the peacock, the pheasant and the ostrich (V:151).

Elsewhere occurs an enumeration of animals "that have nothing but beauty" such as the peacock, the pheasant, and the giraffe, which has as its only asset its elegant appearance and its strange way of procreation (*nitāj*) (VII: 38-9).[47]

> The giraffe only occurs in Nubia. The Persians call it *ushturgāv-palang*, which is like saying camel-cow-panther, for *ushtur* means camel (*baʿīr*), *gāv* means cow (*baqar*), and *palang* means panther (*namir*). They say that the giraffe is the young of a female panther and a camel. If they just suggested that a camel could mount a hyena (*ḍabuʿ*) or a some animal with hooves it would not be unlikely, for mating between such animals occurs. Only they would have done better in that case to make it a male panther and a female camel, for that would have been easier to imagine. But not every male that mounts a female also impregnates her. Many men have sex with beasts out of sheer lust, and herdsmen are well known to have sex with sheep and goats. But no impregnation results from that (VII: 241-3).

> One should imagine the various problems involved in producing such a crossbreed: first, the unlikely event that a male beast (i.e. a grazing animal, *dābba*) should feel lust for a female beast of prey (*sabuʿ*), and one of the fiercest at that. Secondly, that it is unlikely that this beast of prey should conceive from the union. And thirdly: even if this should happen, there is the problem that the young of a camel would not fit into the womb of a panther. They may say that the panthers there are very big and the camels small, and that after all the young of Bactrian camels fit into the wombs of Arabian camels, so why would this not be possible in the case of [male] camel and female panther?

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[47] In Hārūn's edition, this passage falls under the heading of "animals that are *muḥammaq*," and this may have suggested that the giraffe was considered foolish in Arab-Islamic culture (see for instance Viré 2002). However only the animals mentioned directly at the beginning of the chapter are thought foolish, others are noted for one or two very specific characteristics, such as the elephant and the parrot for their cleverness.

> Then they say that in the upper regions of Nubia numerous beasts of prey, wild animals and beasts come together in the heat of summer at watering places and mate with each other, and what is impregnated is impregnated, and what comes to nothing comes to nothing. Animals in all forms, shapes and sizes come forth from this, and the giraffe is one of them.
>
> The giraffe has the muzzle of a camel, the skin of a panther, the hooves and horns of a deer (*ayyil*, which also means mountain goat), the tail of a gazelle, and the teeth of a cow. If this should be taken to imply that its mother is a camel that successively was mounted by a panther, a gazelle and a deer, that would be wholly nonsensical.
>
> The giraffe has long hind legs (sic) that are bent backwards. Its hind legs have no knee joints, as opposed to its forelegs, which have knee joints, like in all grazing animals. Some say: the spots on the giraffe's skin are not like those of the panther (*namir*) at all; he looks more like the tiger (*babr*). So the panther is not more entitled to this than the cheetah (*fahd*).

Although Jāḥiẓ traces the story of the giraffe's strange origin to conclusions drawn from its Persian name, the Byzantine paraphrase of the Timotheus of Gaza quoted earlier shows that the idea goes back to the Greek tradition, if we may trust Timotheus' paraphrast: "It is born from the intercourse of different animals".[48] A more extensive Timotheus quotation, however, is preserved in Qazwīnī's entry on the *zarāfa*, which I translate here. I am using the Cairo edition of the *ʿAjāʾib al-makhlūqāt*, printed in the margin of Damīrī's *Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān al-kubrā* (Cairo 1348/1963, II: 204) with a few emendations based on the parallel in Ibn al-Athīr's (fl. probably first half of 8th/14th century)[49] *Tuḥfat al-gharāʾib,* MS Berlin, Ar. 6163, f. 236b:

> Giraffe. Its head is like the head of the camel, its horns like the horns of a cow, its skin like the panther, its legs like the camel, and its hooves like the cow. It has a very long neck, long forelegs and short hind legs. It most of all resembles the camel. Its skin is very similar to that of the cow (Ibn al-Athīr: panther), and its tail is like the tail of a gazelle. They say that the giraffe is brought forth by the Abyssinian she-camel, the wild cow and the hyena. This means that the hyena in the land of Abyssinia mates with the she-camel, which results in an animal that is something in between a camel and a hyena. If the young

[48] Bodenheimer and Rabinowitz 1949, 31. See also n. 26.

[49] He is not to be confused with one of the famous three brothers carrying this name.

> is male and meets a wild cow, the result is a giraffe. Ṭihmān (Ibn al-Athir: Ṭīmān, i.e. Timotheus) the Sage reported that in the direction of the South, close to the equator, animals of various kinds come together in the summer at watering places because they are very thirsty, and then sometimes animals mate with animals from other species, which results in animals such as the giraffe and the *simʿ* (Ibn al-Athīr: *sabuʿ*. The *simʿ* is a crossbreed of male hyena and female wolf, tr.) and the *ʿisbār* (crossbreed of male wolf and female hyena, tr.) and similar creatures.[50]

The same is told in Qazwīnī's *Āthār al-bilād*.[51] There, the last part of the Timotheus quotation runs as follows:

> ... which results in animals such as the giraffe, for it comes forth from the Abyssinian camel, the wild cow and the hyena. This happens because the hyena mounts the Abyssinian camel, and the result is curious looking offspring... The giraffe is one of the amazing creatures whose only assets are its elegant appearance and its strange way of procreation. [52]

Jaḥiẓ's scepticism did not survive at the hands of later authors, medieval or modern. Masʿūdī, as will be seen below, arranges his information on the giraffe in such a way that the opinion the giraffe is not a crossbreed but a separate species is not credited to Jāḥiẓ, but to unspecified "other people." Richard Foltz, in a recent book on animals in the Islamic tradition, even gives the impression that Jāḥiẓ advocated the "mixture" idea.[53]

Masʿūdī says about the giraffe:

> (*Prairies* III, 3-5): "The beast known as giraffe is very common in the region of the Zanj, although it generally lives in Nubia, and not in any other (sic) part of Abyssinia. People disagree as to the procreation (*nitāj*) of this kind of animal known as giraffe: some people think that it originated from a camel, while others think that a camel and a pan-

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[50] In Alma Giese's translation of this passage in Qazwīnī (1986, 199-200), the name of Timotheus is given as Taimāth.

[51] Qazwīnī, *Athār*, 12-13.

[52] The textual tradition of Timotheus of Gaza's animal book is closely tied up with that of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Naʿt* (or *Nuʿūt*) *al-ḥayawān*, a very influential text in Middle Eastern animal lore. The Tunisian MS of the *Naʿt* (MS Tunis BN 16385, fol. 16a-17a) is one of the few MS belonging to this tradition which has a passage on the giraffe. I have translated the (very corrupted) passage in Kruk, forthcoming.

[53] Foltz 2006, 15.

> ther have come together and that the giraffe is the result of that union. Others think that it is a species all by itself, just like the horse, the donkey and the cow, and that it is not a case like the mule, which comes forth from a horse and a donkey. The giraffe is called in Persian *ushturgāv*. It was conducted to their (i.e. the Persians') king from the land of Nubia, as it was later offered to the kings of the Arabs, previous Abbasids caliphs, and the governors of Egypt. This animal has a very long neck and forelegs and hind legs that are much shorter and lack knee joints. Only the forelegs have knee joints.
>
> Jāḥiẓ, upon discussing the giraffe in his *Book on Animals*, speaks at length about its procreation: in the upper regions of Nubia numerous beasts of prey, wild animals and beasts come together in the heat of summer at watering places and mate with each other, and what is impregnated is impregnated, and what comes to nothing comes to nothing. Animals in all forms, shapes and sizes come forth from this, and the giraffe is one of them. The giraffe has cloven hooves, and it is a beast whose back slopes backwards, so that its back connects to its hindquarters. This is because of its short hind legs. People have said many things of the kind just mentioned about the origin of the giraffe, such as that the panthers in Nubia are of huge size, while the camels are very small with short legs.

Continuing, he refers to Aristotle:

> Many things are told about the giraffe, and the author of the Logic (i.e. Aristotle) has mentioned in his great book about animals and the uses of their parts and other things about all the other animals. We have mentioned the necessary information about that in our book *Questions and Experiences.*

Aristotle, however, did not include the giraffe in his zoological works. Most likely Masʿūdī here confuses the traditions of Aristotelian zoology and the pseudo-Aristotelian *Naʿt/Nuʿūt al-ḥayawān*. This is supported by Masʿūdī's reference to "the uses of its parts". For although most zoological works do not mention any medical uses (*manāfiʿ*) of the giraffe, or even, like Marwazī (MS UCLA , Ar. 52, 151a) explicitly discount them, the entry on the giraffe in the Tunisian MS of the *Naʿt/Nuʿūt* includes a short passage on the *manāfiʿ*: MS Tunis BN 16385, fol. 17a says that eating giraffe increases heat and irascibility, and that its meat is very cold and dry because it is composed from two different natures.

Finally, Masʿūdī adds something on the giraffe's character:

> Remarkable aspects of the giraffe's behaviour are its gentleness and affection for its people [*ahlihā;* Barbier translates "sa famille"; but I

> think that what is meant are her human keepers]. As with the elephant, there are among the giraffes both wild and tame, domesticated specimens.

As we see, Masʿudī's account of the giraffe strongly depends on Jāḥiẓ, even where he does not specify it. He adds a few details of his own: that giraffes were sent to kings from Sassanid times on, and that the giraffe is a very gentle creature. This pattern recurs in most of the later literature: the information provided on the giraffe usually goes back to Jāḥiẓ, whether directly or not. Authors may or may not agree with the "mixture" theory and occasionally add unspectacular snippets. Curiously, they come up with all sorts of theories about the giraffe's walk, except for the correct one: the giraffe has an ambling gait, advancing simultaneously the two legs that are on the same side. This sort of information typically becomes corrupted in the manuscript tradition, as does the mating position of hedgehogs: there, too, multifarious combinations are found, but not the correct one.

Two examples suffice to illustrate this. The Mamluk-era Dimashqī reports in his cosmography, where the giraffe is said to live on Ceylon:[54]

> The giraffe lives there. It is an amazing creature. It has the neck of a camel, the skin of a panther and a deer (*ayyil*), the horns of a gazelle, the teeth of a cow, the head of a camel and the back of a *dbk*.[55] It has very long forelegs and a very long neck; together they are ten cubits long. Its hind legs are very short and have no knee joints, but the forelegs have them, just like in other grazing animals. When it eats from what is on the ground its neck is shorter than its forelegs. It is his habit to put forward first its right foreleg and its left hind leg, unlike other quadrupeds. It is in its nature to be sweet and loving, and friendly towards its people. It ruminates and voids globular dung.

The only elements that we have not encountered before is the measured length of the forelegs and neck; the problem it has reaching the ground; that it ruminates and produces globular dung, demonstrating that it is a real grazer. Dimashqī, however, is not at all unique in mentioning those things, as we can see below, and also in Damīrī.

As a sample from the later encyclopedists, I give the entry on the giraffe in the *Mabāhij* (sometimes read *Manāhij*) *al-fikar* by the

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[54] Dimashqī , *Cosmographie*, 160; trans. Mehren, *Manuel*, 112.

[55] Mehren, obviously reading *dīk,* translates: *coq*, rooster. Most likely the text should read *dhaykh*, male hyena.

roughly contemporary al-Waṭwāṭ (d. 718/1318), who largely reproduces the zoological information from Ibn Abī l-Ḥawāfir's (d. 701-1301) *Badāʾiʿ al-akwān*, as does Ibn al-Athīr in his *Tuḥfat al-gharāʾib*. There is, however, no entry on the giraffe in the work of Ibn Abī l-Ḥawāfir.[56] Ibn al-Athīr (fl. probably in the first half of the 14th century)[57] who clearly thought that a zoological survey without information on the giraffe was incomplete, solved this problem by taking over Qazwīnī's entry on the giraffe. I have not found a direct source of al-Waṭwāṭ's entry, but he notes mainly familiar material. I translate his text as it appears in the facsimile edition (1990, 82-3; and not 2000, 257-8):

> About the natures of the giraffe. In the language of the Bedouins giraffe means collectivity, because the characteristics of many animals are joined in it: the neck of the camel, the skin of the panther, the horns of the gazelle, the teeth of the cow, the head of the deer. For that reason one of the naturalists says that it is generated among animals. He says that the cause of this is that wild animals and grazing beasts (*dawābb*) come together in the heat of summer at watering places and mate, and what is fertilized is fertilized, and what comes to no avail comes to no avail. Sometimes a female animal mates with various animals and the seminal fluids (*miyahuhā*) mix, which results in creatures of different appearance, color and form. The Persians call the camel *ushturgāvpalang*, i.e., "camel-cow-hyena". This agrees with what you saw the Arabs say about the existence of various composite animals. Jāḥiẓ is not (sic) surprised about what they say, and calls it the utmost stupidity, something that cannot derive from someone knowledgeable, because God Most High creates what He wills and as He wills, and it is a separate kind of animal like the horse and the donkey. This is confirmed by the fact that it begets its like, something that has been observed. It has long forelegs, a very long neck, and no knees. But it has knees in its forelegs like all other grazing animals. When it eats what is on the ground it spreads its legs because its neck is shorter than its forelegs. It walks by putting forward its right foreleg and left hind leg, as opposed to other quadrupeds. They all put forward [simultaneously] their right foreleg and their right hind leg. It is by nature sweet and loving, and man tames it. It ruminates and voids globular dung.

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[56] See also n. 50.

[57] Ullmann (1972), 37-38. The name "Ibn al-Athīr" is given in the Berlin MS, Ahlwardt Ar. 6163. Nothing is known about this author; Ullmann usually refers to him as pseudo-Ibn al-Athīr.

Only two points have not been encountered before: the idea of a two-stepped crossbreed production of the giraffe is replaced by the idea that the seminal fluids of various sexual partners mix and produce a mixed animal, and that the giraffe has to spread its forelegs in order to reach the ground. Both items are included in Damīrī, the second one on the authority of Qazwīnī, of which he evidently used a different recension than the one quoted earlier, which lacks this item. Damīrī quotes Qazwīnī's *ʿAjāʾib* as follows: "As God knew that it would derive its sustenance from trees, He has created its forelegs longer than the hind ones, to enable it to graze easily with them".[58] The connection of the long neck to the feeding on trees seems to be a new element here, but it is a familiar bit of giraffe lore already found in Ibn al-Faqīh al-Hamadhānī's (fl. 3rd/9th century) *Buldān*. A textual corruption, however, has made *al-shajar* appear as *al-baḥr,* the sea, in de Goeje's edition of 1885.[59]

Among the Mamluk-era authors, Damīrī's entry subsumes all the information on the giraffe's natural characteristics that we have seen above, plus his own specific interests, such as legal issues and dream interpretation; dreams about giraffes, according to him, rarely bode well.

One last giraffe entry deserves special mention, namely that in the Persian Pierpont Morgan MS of the *Manāfiʿ al-ḥayawān*, famous for its illustrations. This passage is somewhat of a *Fremdkörper* in Islamic giraffe lore. It describes the habit of the young of the giraffe to hang from its mother's womb during pregnancy in order to graze, a story more often told about the rhinoceros.[60]

The giraffe's many fascinating aspects could not fail to catch public imagination and enter the realm of popular fiction, like so many elements of the *ʿajāʾib* literature. In Arabic popular *sīra*, heroes are repeatedly confronted by enemies mounted on giraffes. Alexander, in *Sīrat al-Iskandar*, encounters a rider mounted on an animal which has

> hooves like the cloven hooves of a cow. It had an onager's body, and the tail of a gazelle. It had the leap of a camel and its head looked like a horse's head with gazelle's horns. Its forelegs were taller than its hind legs. The saddle was stuffed on the rear side more than on the

[58] Damīrī, *Ḥayāt*, II: 6; tr. Jayakar II(1): 8.

[59] Ibn al-Faqīh, *Buldān*,77.

[60] New York, Pierpont Morgan Library MS 500. Prof. Anna Contadini kindly placed a copy of the relevant entry, ff. 15b-16a, at my disposal.

> front side, for the animal's back was sloped because of the different length of the legs.[61]

In the *Sīrat ʿAntara ibn Shaddād*, ʿAntar, too, meets a redoubtable giraffe rider, named al-Khaṭīf, during his expedition to the land of the Blacks:

> Al-Khāṭif only used to enter battle seated on a giraffe. He had collected a couple, male and female, and they gave birth in his realm. He began to ride their offspring and to combat knights. No horse could look at the giraffe. It shyed and bolted from the battlefield.[62]

This returns us to the far more harmless giraffe riders of our Christmas day, and to the Jardin des Plantes where the nineteenth century Arab travelers looked at the giraffes, noting down—at least in al-Ṣaffar's case—their impressions:

> They also have a giraffe there. It is an animal with a wondrous shape. His forelegs are longer than his hind legs, and if you place something on the ground for him to eat, he will seize it with his forelegs. He is gentle and has a handsome appearance: his neck is long, like a camel's, but even longer; his head is elongated, like a horse's, but even narrower; on his forehead are two short hornlike things, except that they are of flesh and hair, like cut-off ears. His tail begins like the tail of a cow, but becomes hairy at the end. His coat is beautiful; it is not one color, but spotted both white and red. The giraffe is clean—you will not see the marks of dung on his hind parts—and his nature is tender, kind and affectionate. A person can feed it by hand and it will come up close to eat, and if he turns his back it will not kick or harm him. They say that it is the offspring of three animals: the wild she-camel, the wild cow, and the hyena. The hyena mated with the she camel, producing a male, and this male mated with the cow, which produced a giraffe. But the truth is that this is a completely separate creature, having both male and female, like all other living things.[63]

Apart from reporting and rejecting the mixture theory the passages owes nothing to traditional Arab-Islamic giraffe lore. Al-Ṣaffār watched closely, if not always accurately, and recorded what he saw. He thus proves true his image of an intellectual on the threshold of modernity, eager to learn from personal observation instead of depending solely on book learning.[64]

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61 Aerts (also: Doufikar-Aerts) 2003, 279, English edition forthcoming.
62 Norris 1980, 151.
63 Miller 1992, 139-40.
64 Ibid., 57.

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