THE GEOPOLITICS OF EUROPE'S IDENTITY

Centers, Boundaries, and Margins

Edited by
Noel Parker

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

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Preface

Noel Parker

The idea for this book came first from a seminar in Copenhagen in November 2004, within the EU-Commission-funded *EuroBordCon*f program, where the primary aim was to examine how the EU was handling various conflictual borders within and around its territory. A number of participants, who are now also contributors to this volume, were pursuing the idea that there were "margins" around Europe that interact amongst themselves, and with the identity of Europe as an international actor, a system of governance, and a cultural whole. We sensed, in other words, that Europe's geopolitical identity was in play in a host of interactions with its margins. That is the basis upon which we have prepared this book.

Much of the discussion at that meeting turned on a rather skimpy essay of mine published in 2000. There was, that is to say, a great deal still left to do: there was a need to refine the theoretical basis for our shared suspicion, and to explore cases more thoroughly from the point of view of their "marginality." This book offers a thorough, and to some extent, tested account of margins, marginality, and Europe's geopolitical identity—setting out theoretical underpinnings for our interest in margins as both necessary and dynamic factors in sociopolitical identities; developing specifications of the nature of margins and their interactions with centers, in this case Europe; and examining shifting margins on all sides of Europe. We are confident that it substantiates our belief that there is much to learn about Europe by understanding its margins and their relationships. The book thus addresses a number of questions that prompted our interest in margins: What interactions occur between Europe and its margins, and with what kinds of impact?; What do marginal actors do in their capacity as marginal?; What conditions affect the impacts and the degree that marginal actors achieve their purposes?; How do the identities of Europe and its margins interact and evolve, and with what consequent shifts of geopolitical identity?

The interested reader who has taken in the contents list will immediately stumble on something that may seem surprising. We permit ourselves to analyze as "margins" of Europe entities, such as Russia and the United States, which one ordinarily has difficulty thinking of as *mere* margins.

While it would be fair to respond that both of these have at one time or another been margins in the familiar sense of peripheries dependent upon a European center, that response hides the scope of our agenda. For we use the term "margin" in a *positive* sense, avoiding any presuppositions about the marginal entity's standing, autonomy or impacts, and allowing for the possibility of *its* impacting *upon the center*. The use of the term, which is further explored in the introduction, makes it perfectly sensible to analyze those imposing entities Russian and the United States as "margins" in relation to Europe. There is an established trend in post-colonial studies to challenge Europe's historic centrality (Chakrabarty 2000). In order to understand Europe's evolving place and identity, we return it to center stage, but do so with an unusual perspective, which removes the primacy of the "center," leaving the center—Europe—fully exposed to impacts from its many margins.

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Part I

The Nature of Marginal Formations

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A Theoretical Introduction: Spaces, Centers, and Margins

Noel Parker

> [W]isdom is customarily granted to the great centers of human affairs which are the generators of information and knowledge. It also might be argued in just the opposite vein that all wisdom, being perspectival, is peripheral. Objectivity, one might say, presumes peripherality. It might be argued even that the real wisdom, the most percipient and sensitive, like peripheral vision, is peripheral.
>
> *James Fernandez (2000, 118)*

This book begins with an idea of something which easily goes unnoticed: forces and processes at work on the disregarded margins of highly visible orders, such as in Europe and the other visible blocs of our world, which may challenge, or even reshape, those apparently given realities. The expectation that we could find forces and processes on the margins underpinned our project. Properly considered, that thought suggests that if we look carefully at the margins of larger, substantial entities, such as the socio-political order called "Europe," we can find interactions between the margins and the center. As I seek to demonstrate in this introduction, we can anticipate that, in such interactions, margins will exhibit three surprising types of effect: dynamics peculiar to their marginality; independent scope vis-à-vis the ostensibly dominant center or centers; and/or a potential to impact on the center(s), perhaps even to the extent of "reshaping" it.

Such an inquiry belongs to the field of geopolitics: the study of geography as the political, societal, and historical shaping of space. Associated for more than a century with competing states' mapping the world as it suited

them (Taylor 1990, 1–5), geopolitics was re-evaluated in the 1990s from the perspective of World-System Theory (Wallerstein 1991), and for a "globalized" setting where states might count for less. David Neuman has called this setting "the context of the post-modern debate concerning territory, boundaries and sovereignty, and the role of the State in a world which has been impacted by globalization on the one hand, and the resurgences of ethnic and national identities on the other" (Newman 1999, 1). These re-evaluations of geopolitics opened up the possibility of various counter-movements to the dominant geopolitics of states and post-cold war ideologies (Ó Tuathail 1996), which we explore on the basis of the idea of margins in tension with the centers that otherwise appear to constitute the identities on the grand geopolitical canvas.

So the approach of this book starts in marginality, and pursues the insights which that approach yields for a geopolitical entity that is strikingly, but not uniquely, hard to determine: Europe. The following section—defining margins and centers, and anticipating their interactions—indicates how the spaces of the sociopolitical order can be understood from the perspective of marginality. The section thereafter sets out a "theory of marginality" as such, together with the possibilities it suggests for marginal entities and players, either through tactical devices or through shifts of identity that may be anticipated at the margin. Finally, I summarize some of the interplays with the margins that are found in the case studies that make up the bulk of the book.

What Human Beings Do with Space

Our theoretical premise for this style of analysis is that the space of sociopolitical orders is not given, but constructed by will and/or process. Whereas much of socio-political discussion and research chooses, or cannot avoid but choose, to take for granted established, ostensibly clear-cut entities, we try to bracket out that assumption and find a jumping-off point instead, in what can be called the "geometry" of centers and margins. This means no more than geometry in the most general sense: the study of "the relative arrangement of objects or parts" (Oxford English Dictionary 1997) that exists within, or in relation to, entities.[1] If we are thinking of geometry in this sense, space and the entities "in" it can be conceived as "arrangements of objects or parts." Furthermore, unless there is perfect equality between entities, some of the positions in the geometry in and around them (and/or in and around the field of effects created by their presence) will be *central*, and some *marginal*. We focus upon those in marginal positions, and the effects of their marginality, in order to show how

the "geometry" within or around socio-political entities is constructed—and may be being *re*constructed—at the margins.

The qualification "*and/or in and around the field of effects created by their presence*" is necessary in order not to limit in advance the spaces with edges that we envisage and the possible marginal positions associated with them By way of comparison, consider a space vehicle traveling from the earth's surface, through its atmosphere, then through and beyond its gravitational pull: it would be unrealistic in this case to define the earth without including "the field of its effects," such as atmosphere or gravity. Likewise, from the field of international politics, to assert—plausibly enough—that a state such as Uzbekistan is "moving" from being an *integral part of* the USSR to being within the United States' *sphere of influence*, requires that *both* integral entities *and* fields of their effects are included in the picture.

Spaces and Centers

The claim that the spaces of socio-political orders are constructed by will and/or process is very open as it stands. What is more contentious is the nature of the activities and/or the processes involved. Yet, there are numerous intellectual sources for an examination of the construction of socio-political orders.

Historical and sociological studies of modern statehood have, for example, exposed how rising sovereign states sought to extend their spatial reach, on the basis that, as Sack puts it: "Territoriality is a spatial strategy that can be employed to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area" (Sack 1986, 72). From the mid-seventeenth to the mid-twentieth century, European states manifested their power territorially, by marking out frontiers (Fèbvre 1973). For this period, the dominant development, then, is the organization of space by the *deployment*, over geographical space, of sovereign-state order, variously understood as the will of the sovereign him- or herself, the strength of the state's organizing capacities (Tilly 1990, Spruyt 1994), or the practices developing within modernity itself (Foucault 2004). The earlier sovereign monarch will evolve over time into something else: a national sovereign will with an analogous impulse to mark out territory, albeit in the name of something new (Rokkan 1987; 1999, 97–107, 153–79).

Processes to organize space in competition with the sovereign state have long been identified in thinking about modernity. The best known is the development of market relations (as understood from Adam Smith on) in tension with the territorial boundaries of the political order. The latter's efforts to enclose the market is what Smith dubs "mercantilism." This tension

engendered, largely via the oftentimes Marxist idea of the state as an *agent* for capital, a range of accounts of how capitalism reaches out to organize territory with the help of the political order. Later, post-Marxist theorizations placed European statehood itself into the global process of territorial organization—as the product of the differentiation of functions within an overarching world market (Wallerstein 1979, 1984). In a tour de force of post-Marxist thinking, Lefebvre extended this type of analysis to make capitalism a determinant of the historically evolving *nature* of space itself, thus incorporating state coercion, and the spatiality of the entire institutional and ideological superstructure, into the evolution of capitalism (1991, 292–351).

A common feature of this line of thought has been that something—a sovereign will, the state, the market—has been imagined at the center, extending outwards to engulf the space on its periphery. In the latter decades of the twentieth century, a very considerable sociological and anthropological literature has, however, examined borderland and boundary societies in their own right (Barth 1969; Barth 2000; Power and Standen 1999; Sahlins 1989; O'Dowd and Wilson 1996; Lundén 2004; Ganster and Lorey 2005). Such accounts of independent human behavior at the borders of states' territorial reach suggest a contrasting story, in which ostensibly marginal zones impact upon the spatial formations at the territorial edges of states' organizing capacities. Barth's work, in particular, opened up the possibility that, away from the capital centers of space, there are behavior patterns that transcend borders and modify territorial space, regardless of what sovereign states and markets seek to impose from the center. These borderland studies posed anew, that is to say, the question of the exact relationship between territorial "centers" and what lies on the edges of their territory; hence, the need to pursue a geometry of centers *and* margins.

Centers and Margins: Action and Reaction

If borderland societies have autonomous life, we must expect powers extending their reach over territory to meet dissidence as they go. Studies of imperialism have thus reflected both their authors' own revolutionist roots,[2] and simple common sense in anticipating points of breakdown on the edges of empire, where the forces of market and state pushing the power of the center outwards are at their most extended (Pieterse 1990; Wolf 1997; Wallerstein 1991; Maier 2006, ch.2). More broadly, common sense nourished by a critical perspective suggests that the geometry of space ordered from the center will be met by an alternative ordering (or

*dis*ordering) impulse from the margin: reactive pressure against the center's ordering what lies around it.

While late twentieth-century world-level developments have left the Marxist terminology for this looking out-of-date, it has not invalidated the expectation underlying the theory. The critique of imperialism has thus been comfortably adapted to postulate counterforces from the edge of the ostensibly quite different world of globalization (Pieterse 2000; Wallerstein 2000). Marxist successor philosophies have fruitfully developed the potential of situationism's concept of the *dérive* transgressing organized space (Hardt and Negri 2000). Situationist-influenced works, such as that of the pseudonymous "Hakim Bey," have given marginal cultures that refuse the order of the center a positive political twist (Bey 1985).[3]

In abstract terms—and shorn of presuppositions about the priority of the economic—this expectation regarding the organization of space can be stated thus: if centers extend their ordering capacity over space, there will be disruptive counterforces on the edges of their reach. It is likely, then, that the center-orientated ordering of space is unstable in principle, and intermittently susceptible to competing formations not made after its own model. Lefebvre captures this in political-economic terms with his conception of the "contradictory space" of the modern world (1991, 352–400). Capitalism's constitution of space as a force of production managed from the center—to be exploited as a productive resource or as a setting for the consumption of commodities—has entailed that space be uniform, seamless, and open. This abstract, "true space is a mental picture whose dual function is to reduce 'real' space to the abstract and to induce minimal differences" (1991, 398). In what Lefebvre calls, by contrast, "the truth of space," abstract space is disrupted by the variety of social practices transcending this "dogmatism [that] serves the most nefarious enterprises of economic and political power." In Lefebvre's Hegelian terminology, "quality" resists "quantity." Centrality may thereafter remain an essential frame for action—a site for the agent and the field of his/her/its impacts—but no center can any longer lay claim to being *the* center of *the* totality. "Centrality is movable" (Lefebvre 1991, 332), that is, a center is in a continual dynamic relationship with that according to which it locates itself as central.[4] This challenge to the priority of the center was naturally reiterated by avowed "post-modernist" commentators (Jameson 1991). From this perspective, the fluidity characteristic of the postmodern can be seen in the unanticipatable intrusion of the periphery into the territorial order constructed from the center: where space is opened up in this way we can see that there are "spaces" that "make a difference."[5]

Centers' Ordering Capacities Meet the Margin

This discussion is the background for our conception of the "margin" as that space where the space ordered from a center is subject to challenge. The distinguishing feature of centers, that which places them "at" the center, is their capacity to organize space around them to enclose other entities. Any capacity has limits, however, and the margin is where the center's ordering capacity begins to ebb. This does not mean, of course, that the center's ordering capacity will actually fail, much less be overridden by some other order. It may go unchallenged, or win the day, or make nothing more than minor adjustments to accommodate what is met at the margin. Nonetheless, the margin is a particular kind of space in the geometry in which "objects and parts are arranged." On the margin there arise possibilities not present where the writ of the center knows no weakness. Looked at from the other end of the telescope, entities at the margins have prospects and possibilities not given to others, which we could refer to as qualities of "marginality."

We may see signs of centers' ordering capacities in many levels of human organization. So, an entity may be a center by virtue of ordering compliance to force of arms, obedience to rule, political loyalty, economic relationships, cultural affinity, or various combinations of these. It is, therefore, not unusual for the ordering capacity of one center to be crisscrossed, or even challenged by that of another with ordering capacity at a different level—as, for example, when the political dominance of France in the EU was crossed by the economic magnetism of the German Federal Republic. But some centers will be effective on many levels, as the United States, arguably, is today.

We may likewise see the ordering capacity of a center in the plain exercise of power. Indeed, in the context of a debate that has progressively widened the concept of power to embrace less and less plain forms with less and less visible wielders of power (Allen 2003; Foucault 1986; Hirst 2005; Lukes 2005; Morriss 2002), this should not surprise us. The exercise of power is, we can say, a sufficient condition of centrality, but not its essential character, hence, my choice of the expression "ordering capacity" to define the character of a center in the geometry of centers and margins.

A further terminological point concerns the deliberate choice of the expression "margin"—for what interests us at the edges of centers and their effects—in preference to terms such as "edge," "border," "boundary," "front," "frontier," "periphery." The term "margin" is used to focus attention on the possibility that what lies on the edge has autonomous, active effects beyond its marginal space, including upon what is central in the space

where it is marginal. In this sense, "marginal" is distinguished from "peripheral," a more passive condition of being shaped by and/or excluded from the center. This does not mean that others have used these terms in the same way. Some—notably the author in my opening quotation—prefer to speak of analogous effects as the impacts of "the periphery."[6] Many other writers—in common sense, in anthropological and social psychology usage—take the "marginal" to be equivalent to the "peripheral, and equally passive." In the usage here, what is "peripheral" exhibits features arising *passively* from being on the edge—dependency, perhaps, or feelings of inferiority. Features that arise from a position on the edge of the center's identity and its effects, *and* which have the potential to impact beyond the edges, are referred to here as features of "a margin."

The margin was previously defined ("where the space ordered from a center is subject to challenge") by peculiar features rather than clear-cut edges. It follows that it is neither confined to the inside nor the outside of a center's order. Marginality can be present with those that are formally inside—member states of the EU inclined to operate independently of the center, such as Britain or Denmark—or formally outside (Russia). In either case, the entities in question have features associated with marginality. The term "othering" can be understood in this context. In commentary on the EU and international relations more generally, this term refers to discourse that emphasizes the outsider's difference, often with the effect of turning it into a security threat.[7] It thus amounts to driving some of the margin into the clear-cut outside. Where those on the margin are "othered," the similarity of the marginal is denied, lessons from them are precluded, and they may be constructed as objects of fear or preemptive attack.[8]

Finally, it must be emphasized that the margin as defined here does not depend upon the term "territory." The "relative arrangement of objects and parts" may, of course, be realized via Sack's territorial "spatial strategy" of plotting space on the earth's territorial surface. But the space where centers and margins coexist can be either territorial or non-territorial; indeed, the two can interact. As far as theorizing marginality is concerned, marginal entities, processes, and phenomena may be found in relation to many different *types* of entity. As Bourdieu (1990) argues, in the social field there is no fundamental difference between the territorial and other kinds of space. Non-territorial spaces may be more or less integrated with territorial ones. The market, for example, can be understood both in terms of territorial boundaries (the property market in France), non-territorial boundaries (the market for "tweeny" fashion), or a mix of the two (the market for higher education amongst the French middle classes). In geopolitics, then, we can seek positions on the margin in relation to interstate alliances,

social groups, geographical zones, patterns of behavior, sets of linguistic expressions, and so on and so on.

From a starting assumption that space is constructed—and its corollary that space is subject to *re*construction—we have come, via the conception of centers' reaching out to order space, to focus upon the centers' endeavors' meeting what lies on the margins. At first sight, this is a perverse move. Yet there are commonsense, epistemological, and ontological grounds for it. Common sense suggests that, in a world where centers can bang the loudest drums, margins are too easily overlooked. In a globalizing world, the number of potential centers falls, consigning more and more to "the margin." At their margins, then, where top-down powers and processes will be at their most extended, we can expect to find a rich seam of hidden dynamics in the formations of space.

Centrality and Marginality in Post-structuralism

The further point can be made—as an epistemological claim—that if "the . . . arrangement of objects or parts" is constructed around centers, we can expect to learn by focusing upon processes and actions that will *not* sit comfortably with the constructions dominated by centers. Margins become privileged sites for observing the formation and re-formation of space. This notion is expressed in sophisticated form in post-structuralism's claim that knowledge centered in structured wholes, with concepts, methods, and sources orientated around that totality, misses whatever does not fit the whole. Understanding from the margin's point of view thus reveals what is otherwise obscured.[9]

Alternatively, our focus can be grounded in ontology, from the presupposition that socio-political identities are not as substantial as first appears. States, regions, and groups of all sorts engage in asserting substantial identity. This claim holds for margins as well as centers they are related to. But the margin is that which challenges the center-organized order, whose identity can most be expected to break with it. The dynamics of the margins (their relationships, motives, and potential), and *their* impacts upon the spaces that centers construct, show margins not only as construct*ed* by centers, but also construct*ive* in the overall center-and-margin order.

The significance of the marginal in post-structuralism was most explicitly explicated from a philosophical point of view by Derrida. His *Margins of Philosophy* aimed to further Heidegger's program for philosophical renewal by insisting on the decisive meaningfulness of the margin that escapes rational formulation (Derrida 1972). There is, that amounts to saying, a

symbiosis between center and margin, between centrality and marginality. Without margins (edges), centers (metropolises, capitals) could not be centers; without centers, margins' marginal position(s) could not be identified. Yet the margins' very existence holds up to view the center's incompleteness.

A number of international relations thinkers have found a theoretical basis in post-structuralism for thinking about identities in a dynamic way, comparable to what we aim at with the concept of the marginal.[10] The reason for this is that post-structuralism leaves in question the solidity of entities themselves. For post-structuralism, no structure—be it a scientific system, a discourse, a person, or a socio-political entity—can be definitively closed off. As Ole Wæver puts it, the poststructuralist challenge "lies . . . in more elaborate and systematic understandings of identity . . . an insistence on the contingency and fragility of all conceptual closure" (Hansen and Wæver 2002, 23). Albert and his co-workers, for example, describe a three-way tension between political orders, their borders, and their identities, which sustains identities in the international arena (Albert, Jacobsen, and Lapid 2001, 1–49). The marginality approach explores, in a distinctive way, the potentialities opened up by post-structuralism. By beginning with the margin's distinctive potential for independent action in tension with the logic of the center, it makes the margins themselves a point of entry for inquiry, and a source of autonomous effects, including upon the center. In the spirit of Derrida, and bearing in mind the fluidity of space constructed around centers, we turn to margins as sites where the fluidity of identities will surface and be played out. Our starting point in the constructedness of space leads to a distinctive post-structuralist analytical triad: the indeterminacy of identities in space, with *two* opposing dynamics contending over them, that from centers and that from margins.

A Theory of Positive Marginality

With that theoretical background in mind, I now set out the scope of a theory to capture and analyze marginality as a "positive," that is, to capture marginality not as mere inadequacy, but rather as substantial qualities associated with being on the edge of (and/or the fields of effects of), and *prima facie* subject to something more obviously significant, a center. Starting from *position* and its implications, the business of the theory of positive marginality is focused upon phenomena, processes, and actors that occupy a position *on the margin*, and expound specific characteristics and potentialities entailed in that position. If *a margin* is defined as a space

(where the center's space is challenged), then *marginality* refers to the characteristics associated with being in that space.

From that characterization of "being" marginal, we can identify *a marginal entity or actor* as one which can be plausibly perceived to occupy a position on the edge of a prima facie bigger, more coherent, and/or more influential other's ("center's") space and/or concentration of resources. "Resources," here, can refer to a range of capacities with ordering capacity that is ostensibly concentrated in the center(s): power in its many forms; financial or material goods; ideological/cultural/religious impact; structural coherence; identity, in the sense of capacity to be an actor with sovereign identity; hold over discursive forms; and so on.

It is implicit in the opening definition that both margins and centers are defined via their *relationship*, and hence that what are deemed the capacities of the center are already, in some sense, hostage to the margin.[11] As previously argued, in order to be defined as central, a center must have something(s) on its edges. The capacities, extent, and identity of both center and margin are, therefore, determined to some degree in their interrelationship. We are used to the margin's relationship with the center impacting upon the margin. But we are less accustomed to the equivalent, and equally plausible claim that the center's relationship(s) with its margin(s) can impact upon it in its centrality. Yet, from this unexceptionable starting point, we can extrapolate a number of potentialities for the marginal as such.

The potentialities on the margin can be identified via two, not mutually exclusive, routes: some may be *tactics* for a marginal entity vis-à-vis the center, whilst others put at issue the marginal entity's *identity*—and potentially, therefore, that of the center as well. Where the identity of the marginal entity remains more or less stable and acknowledged, possibilities appear that can be mapped out in a basically game-theoretical manner: a marginal actor possesses this or that potential *tool* or *tactic* to use in pursuit of definable gains in its relationship with center(s). Where the margin's identity is opened up, however, game-theoretical tools for determinate players are best put aside to focus, instead, upon possibilities where the identity of the margin(s) and the center(s) may be altered in their relations with each other.

Tactics of the Margin

The structuring parameters of the game-theoretical possibilities can be derived from a plan of the players arranged as central and marginal, plus the numbers of such players in the overall situation. Some tactics are then available where the margin may convincingly claim the potential to shift

from association with one center to another. Under those conditions, marginal players possess various options for gain:

1. Obtaining loyalty rewards. That is, benefits from the center in return for not moving and enhancing another center. Benefits are offered by the center out of fear of the margin's separating off. This situation occurs, for example, where Germany obtained privileges in the United States-led West after World War II, to ensure that it did not "fall" into the Soviet bloc. Less obviously, over the course of history, many states have granted privileges to outlying rural populations—up to and including the EU's Common Agricultural Policy—to prevent their weakening the center by shifting, splitting off, or becoming lawless.
2. *Obtaining intermediation rewards*. Obtaining benefits by becoming important at the boundary between the center's sphere of influence and one or more others. Turkey's case for membership in the EU includes the notion that it can act as a medium of communication and negotiation with the Middle East and Islam, which lie beyond the EU's sphere, cannot be ignored, but are difficult for the EU to deal with. In such cases, the leverage of the margin is that it can offer the center a better relationship with others outside.
3. *Competing for rewards in 2*. Where more than one marginal player may lay claim to the intermediation function, leap-frogging another, so as to act as and enjoy the rewards that go with being the point of contact or defense on the edge of the center's field of influence. After joining the EU, for example, Finland has sought to demonstrate to its EU partners that it is the best intermediary with Russia.
4. *Playing one center off another*. This creates an auction of benefits and concessions for the rewards of 1 or 2. It is more easily available to a margin that appears loosely attached and/or located between two or more approximately evenly matched centers.[12]
5. *Manifest emulation*. Here, a marginal player pretends to adopt characteristics from the identity of the center(s) in what Merje Kuus (2004) has dubbed "selective appropriation." Central European marginal actors ape the West's values so as to appear familiar, reliable, and easy to deal with, and to obtain favorable terms for cash injections. Many a Western journalist, statesman, or, indeed, academic, returns blithely from the East convinced that people wish only to become as the West already has the good fortune to be—what Anatol Lieven, in a cutting phrase, called "a real mirror-game, a copulation of illusions" (1993, 214). Employing this tactic *may* open up the identity of the marginal player, but does not necessarily do so. It would be unusual if "selective"

appropriation by some were not accompanied by a measure of *real* appropriation (*genuinely* seeking to adopt values from the center) by others. But that is not in the nature of the tactic, and may put the margin at a *dis*advantage, competing with the center's strengths.

6. *Rent-seeking* as payment for movement in or out of the center's space. Cases in point were the gains that Denmark made from being at the mouth of the Baltic Sea (see Chapter 6).
7. *Guaranteeing order beyond* the center's sphere. Its post-1990 situation, as Maxine David analyses it in Chapter 4, has allowed Russia to present itself as a force against instability and "terrorism" in the Caucasus and Central Asia—in other terms, to ground relations with the West on its capacity to organize the space that lies beyond the West's reach.

As suggested earlier, in the previous sequence, the number and nature of that that is other to the given center alters the possibilities. At a schematic level, the previous list moved from situations with two or more comparable centers; to those with one dominant center plus others of markedly lesser standing; to those where the margin is located on or beyond the boundary between the center's field and an indeterminate and potentially unmanageable unknown beyond.

Identities at the Margin

As already mentioned, where changes to identities are likely, the calculation of goals and payoffs to fixed entities is inadequate. If how players act at the margin is altered by how they, the center(s), and marginality, *as such*, are understood by those involved, then the identities of marginal and central actors are altered in the course of their interaction. There are two initial issues: *whether* the margin(s) possess fixed self-identity, and *how* they conceive whatever self-identity develops. A negative answer on "whether" sidelines game-theoretical dynamics. The "how" question then comes to the fore. Answers stretch from the virtual absence of self-identity, to conscious awareness on the marginal entity's part of its marginality, and of the potential entailed in that marginality. Where identity is, indeed, open, the signs of potential appear in discourse, understood as a connected series of expressions that, inter alia, continuously defines and redefines subjects in their relationships to each other. For, identity-as-marginal, like any other identity, will be articulated in discourse.[13]

We can name six degrees of identification as a margin:

I. *being* in a marginal position;
II. *seeing oneself* in a marginal position;
III. being *conscious of potentialities* that are, in fact, implicit in being marginal;
IV. *using those potentialities* to advantage;
V. on the basis of one's marginality seeing a *potential to redefine* received patterns; and
VI. including *others'* identities in such redefinition.

The first degree is merely the precondition of our interest in a case. The second embraces a considerable range: the marginal entity may, for example, see itself with no identity in its own right, merely with the center's identity, drained of the center's strengths.[14] The third incorporates a sense that identity on the margin may be modified, while the fourth includes, inter alia, the notion of that identity's offering "tools" in the sense that I have already spoken of them. The final two extend the awareness of marginal identity to two further potentialities—that of modifying one's own identity on the margin; and that of modifying others' identities, including that of the center.

Where the margin's identity is open to modification, we may then look for further potentialities over and above those already named (1–7):

8. *Asserting relative autonomy on the margin*. Some degree of autonomy is implicit in any actor's use of tactics of the margin. The greater the autonomy, the more plausible the marginal actor's use of them at both the margin(s) and the center(s).
9. *Competitive emulation*. Adopting items from the identity of the center(s) in the expectation of competing or outdoing it (them).
10. *Developing oneself as an alternative center*: This enhances a margin's room to maneuver by leaving third parties uncertain about the dominant center(s) of the future. During the twentieth century, Sweden, and to some extent the Nordic countries, promoted themselves as a benign alternative center to the foreign relations and market-driven prosperity of the liberal United States and West (Parker 2002).
11. *Legitimizing oneself by difference*. The marginal entity may constitute itself as distinct from, *and better than*, the dominant center, even attracting others as an alternative center. In the first half of the twentieth century, the United States promoted itself by *not* being a colonial power in the then-dominant European sense.
12. *Redefining others*: If to determine one's own identity entails determining others', the marginal entity's self-identification may be parasitic on, or

disruptive of, the identity of others deemed to be like or unlike it. Over the centuries, Russia has been a shifting alternative to Europe and the West (Neumann 1999). Redefinition of this kind may take the form of a projection and counter-projection of identities by margin or center—as argued in Chapter 7. The way the United States recently tried to determine a new margin in Europe ("New Europe," as it was called) is likewise a type of projection, which Pertti Joenniemi (2005) dubs "altercasting" by the center upon its European margin.

Understanding Europe in Its Margins

This, then, is the first yield from a theory of positive marginality: twelve potential maneuvers and/or impacts that may be found on the margins, pursued by marginal actors, and called characteristics of marginality, *as such*. The theoretically generated list provides a starting point for the empirical examination of cases that occupies Part II of this book. On that foundation, we can formulate a number of broad hypotheses as to what, following our approach, may be discovered about the geopolitical identity of Europe in flux:

1. that a number of actors located on the margins of Europe do, in fact, pursue the kinds of tactics we have postulated on the basis of marginality. Evidence for this would, for example, be that different marginal actors exhibit comparable potentials, behaviors, and impacts of the types derived from a position on the margins;
2. that, in their marginal positions, actors may possess more power than hasty assumptions on the basis of their being marginal would suggest;
3. that, in their interactions with center(s) in Europe, the identities of some marginal entities change along the lines derived from their marginality or their response to it;
4. finally, as a consequence of the first two hypotheses, that its interrelationships with its margins are significant in the geopolitical identity of Europe *as a whole*.

The remainder of this theoretical part of the book extends the theoretical perspective. In Chapter 2, Sergei Prozorov brings a properly philosophical insight to bear upon the meaningfulness of margins. He critiques the widespread presumption against boundaries, as such (what he calls their "de-limitation"), on the grounds that it contains a self-contradicting "immanentist" aspiration for plenitude, which is hostile to the otherness of difference in

"the other." To be truly *anti*-immanentist requires us to recognize the primacy of the boundary in determining any order, while keeping in sight the possibility of *transgressing* that boundary. This, argues Prozorov, is the basis of real pluralism, human freedom, and history itself. To study the possibilities at the margins is, thus, to illuminate practices (re)constituting marginal entities as positive effects in a world of bounded orders. Next, in Chapter 3, Pertti Joenniemi and I theorize the way in which the margins have been articulated in the principles underpinning different "international" orders over historical time. In the light of this account, the classic "modernist" system of sovereign states can be seen to have been undermined by its inability to handle its own margins, which have progressively surfaced over the twentieth century to produce a still evolving "post-modern" international set-up—which has also been referred to as "post-national" and "globalized."

In developing our study, we have, of course, chosen suggestive cases on Europe's margins, a choice that calls for explanation. While it is no requirement of analysis in terms of the margins, all our cases are, in fact, identifiable by territorial location—albeit some more loosely than others. On presentational grounds, though, the contents of Part II prescribe a *tour d'horizon* around Europe. Consistent with our approach, however, the marginal entities are themselves diverse: states large and small, empires, cultures loosely attached to states (American, Central Europe), nationalities (Croatian, Estonian), "regions" large and small (from Russian *oblasts* to the southern Mediterranean), and exclosures or colonies (Kaliningrad, Gibraltar). Our claim is, though, that all these impact upon Europe through the dynamics of the margin.

Part 2 begins with Chapter 4's analysis of the successes of Russia's strategic posture during a period of rapid internal decline. It emerges that, by positioning itself on the margins of Europe, Russia has obtained rewards for continued loyalty to its European links, and for intermediation with the world beyond—maneuvers that could develop into *competitive* emulation, were it to make its hold on vital resources and its greater coherence count *against* Europe. Where Maxine David's chapter addresses Russia's relationship with other states to which it is potentially marginal, Andrey Makarychev's considers how various discourses constitute margins in Russia's borderlands. *Within* Russian territory, he finds St Petersburg's idea that it is an alternative center to Moscow; the "go-North" narrative of an uncorrupted space of opportunity on the periphery; and the discourse of the loyal province conveying the nation's identity to the world beyond. In its *external* environment, on the other hand, Moscow tries to cast its new

neighbor countries to the west as margins in the *negative* sense of weak troublemakers. To develop this analysis, Makarychev employs Ernesto Laclau's idea of chains of equivalence through which actors struggle to represent cogent marginal identities, and draws conclusions about the scope and limits of this struggle to represent a margin as a generality. My own Chapter 6 reverts to the longer historical view, and a more elementary category of geographical marginality on the northwestern margins of the European mainland. It demonstrates how—with differing results—the potentialities and temptations of this (for rent-seeking, obtaining intermediation rewards, and playing centers off against each other) have marked Denmark and Britain in the past, and have given rise to long-term path dependencies loosely captured in the expression that both are now "awkward partners" in the EU. My Chapter 7 refers to the greatest of all rags-to-riches competitive emulations: the way the United States transcended its original marginality vis-à-vis Europe, to formulate its own identity in a globalized version of originally European values, with which it now constructs a world geography that includes Europe *as a part*. Whereas, I argue, Europeans originally "projected" their values onto the North American margin, now that former margin "counter-projects" Europe's "own" values back upon it, in a psychological, discursive play of identities that produces the awkward love-hate relationship between the two. Christopher Browning and Pertti Jeonniemi's Chapter 8 radically switches scale to further develop the conceptual apparatus used in addressing margins. It takes three anomalous territories, whose size alone assigns them to the margins—Kaliningrad, Gibraltar, and Jerusalem—and considers the conflicts generated around their status along a three-point scale: from peripherality, to marginality, to "hybridity." The entities' hybridity surfaces *both* for those who live there *and* in some of the solutions to the problems they give rise to, as discussed by international actors (such as Britain, Russia, Spain, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the European Union). The chapter argues, then, that to acknowledge and see the merits of the hybrid would offer solutions not attainable under a still dominant modernist conception, in which peripheries and margins are mere negations that need to be brought into line.

With Chapter 9 we move south and eastward. Michelle Pace analyzes the Mediterranean margin, which has become the most testing location for the European Union's attempts to lay down a clear boundary between itself and "neighbors" with whom it can enjoy a benign relationship. The Mediterranean countries' positions on the margin are, however, ambiguous at best: Morocco has established a niche of influence and cooperation in the European Union (EU), but the Egyptian and Algerian governments have instead exploited their marginal potential to defend their anti-democratic

closure, whilst Turkey's position (also considered in Chapter 12) remains in the balance. Given the importance of this problematic margin, Pace advocates that the European Union follow normative principles for a *heteroglossic* margin-center dialogue, which she derives from Bahktin's and Derrida's philosophies of discourse.

Chapters 10 and 11 analyze instances of the discourses of the margin on Europe's central, eastern, and Balkan boundaries, where competition for marginal loyalty rewards, manifest emulation, and legitimizing self-definition are repeatedly found. Merje Kuus shows how Eastern and Western European "intellectuals of statecraft" have colluded to offer a narrowed, Western-friendly construction of Eastern European countries' identities: a tactic that exploits the Central and Eastern European Countries' (CEEC's) marginal position by conveying a vision well adapted to obtaining favorable treatment from the West. Nicole Lindstrom's Chapter 11 tells the story of two neighbors in the central European margins—Croatia and Slovenia. The two competed to establish Europeanness in their own identities that would mark out their difference from "non-European" identities further east (anti-democratic, Serbian, Orthodox, Muslim, what have you). As can be seen today, the two neighbors' self-identification strategies met with sharply differing success in Western Europe: the EU embraced Slovenia as a bridge to the east, but kept out Croatia, which saw itself as a bulwark against the east. Chapter 12 returns to Turkey, the hottest hot spot for Europe's identity in relation to the outside world—especially the Muslim parts of it—*and* to itself. Fabrizio Tassinari shows how debates under the EU's jargon expression "variable geometries" try to embrace different manifestations of Turkey's marginal relationship with Europe. In the protracted process of seeking membership, Turkey pushes as best it can for loyalty rewards, regardless of its distinctness. Its strategic position, by contrast, allows Turkey to act as a center in its own right, and play off various other centers, Europe included, against each other. Most awkward for Europe's identity, however, is the way that Turkey challenges Europe's patents on modernity and democracy, and stretches Europe's capacity to accept difference *within*. Ironically, furthermore, Turkey's experience of how to become democratic may have more relevance than Western Europe's for the future of Muslim countries that Europe has to find a way to live with.

By the time that these various analyses have been completed, the interpretative and explanatory capacity of a positive theory of marginality stands clear enough, though not without extensions and qualifications to the theoretical starting point in this chapter. That, in turn, bears out our claim that we must consider Europe's integration, identity, and geopolitical relations more generally via an understanding of the dynamics at its various margins,

both internal and external to the EU. Furthermore, it suggests the scope and limits of the application of a theory of marginality. But these issues must await the book's conclusion.

Notes

1. This sense of geometry is not confined to the geometry of flat spaces and three-dimensional volumes of the Euclidean heritage.
2. The idea of territory on the margins of European imperialism, notably Russia itself, as the weak link in capitalism, whence the whole could be overturned, is prominent in Lenin's *Imperialism: the Highest Form of Capitalism*.
3. In Bey's "broadsheet of ontological anarchism" the chaos of such "temporary autonomous zones" was defended as is a perfectly normal state of affairs that ought not to be feared.
4. Heideggerian ontology gives grounds to hold that a more dynamic conception of space and its centers was prevalent before modernity made space uniform and Galilean (Casey 1997). It follows that, with modernity, there began a continuous interplay between (any) center and its/their periphery/ies: "Centrality may give birth to an applied logic (a strategy); it may also burst asunder and lose its identity utterly" (Casey 1997, 333).
5. Soja, Edward W. and Barbara Hooper "The Spaces that Difference Makes. Some Notes on the Geographical Margins of the New Cultural Politics" (Dear and Flusty 2002, 378–89).
6. Rokkan likewise states that: "Paradoxically the history of Europe is one of center formation at the periphery of the network of strong and independent states; this explains the great diversity of configurations and the extraordinary tangles of shifting alliances and conflicts" (Rokkan 1999, 160–61).
7. Henrik Larsen: "The Discourse on the EU's Role in the World," (Hansen and Heurlin 2000, 217–44). See also the debate on Europe as a "Normative Power" (referred to in chapter 7), with the implication that it would *not* engage in "othering."
8. Neil Harvey, "The Political Nature of Identities, Borders and Orders: Discourse and Strategy in the Zapatista Rebellion," (Albert, Jacobsen, and Lapid 2001, 249–74)
9. Michel de Certeau coined the term "heterologies" for such non-center-orientated discourse and illustrated repeatedly what can be discovered via the discourses of the dominant, reshaped amongst marginal populations (Certeau 1984, 115–30; 1985, 225–33).
10. Richard Devetak, "Incomplete States: Theories and Practices of Statecraft" (Macmillan and Linklater 1995, 19–39); Matthias Albert "On Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity: An International Relations Perspective" (Newman 1999, 53–68)
11. This move is, again, far from new in itself. In the analysis of power, and of international relations, it has long been argued that what appears a quality of the holder is in fact relational and situational (Morriss 2002; Lukes 2005;

Guzzini 2005, 8–10). The claim can even be extrapolated from principles of Hegelian dialectic as set up in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

12. I am grateful to Michael Emerson for pointing out that this constituted a separate category of the margin's tools.
13. Neumann concisely summarizes the theoretical basis and methodological implications of this claim in (2001, 116f).
14. This is what Friedman (1992) analyzes as "narcissism" when he finds it in a third-world African capital.

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2

De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity[1]

Sergei Prozorov

Introduction: Politics Unbounded

In 2002, the Spanish prime minister Aznar praised Jürgen Habermas's idea of "constitutional patriotism" in the "post-national constellation" and proposed, hopefully not entirely seriously, to declare Habermas Spain's "state philosopher." However absurd this proposal would be in practice, it would probably be not too far-fetched to suggest that, in a certain sense, Habermas already *is* a "state philosopher" of the entire European Union, insofar as his prescriptions for the emancipatory "post-national" project function as the regulative idea for the process of European integration. I cannot do better than open discussion of the denigration of boundaries in contemporary political thought with Habermas's designation of the present "'post-national constellation": "As we consider the "disempowerment" of the nation-state, we think in the first instance of the long-established transformations of the modern state that first emerged with the Peace of Westphalia. The features of this system are reflected in the requirements of classical international law just as much as in the descriptions of realist political scientists . . . This conventional model is less and less appropriate to the current situation" (Habermas 2001, 69). This chapter poses a very simple question of this diagnosis, which has arguably become a hegemonic commonplace in today's Europe: why is it that the "conventional" model of the Westphalian pluralistic system of sovereign statehood is "less and less

appropriate"? While the usual answer to this question would consist in an impatient and hurried enumeration of the "global transformations" of the past century (globalization, integration, global civil society, international public opinion, decentering of economic governance, the decline of the nation-state, etc.), I propose to bracket off this epochal discourse, which is little more than the proliferation of abstract conceptualizations under the guise of empirical description.

In contemporary political discourse, the transcendence of boundaries functions as a teleological and axiological presupposition, rather than an empirical observation. Irrespective of the empirical indications of the problematic status of boundaries, the denigration of boundaries—that is, the claim that they are *inappropriate*—cannot be empirically inferred, but is already present as a constitutive presupposition of the discourse. We hardly ever encounter an empirical analysis of the problematic status of sovereign statehood, made from a normatively "statist" perspective. The empirical problematization of boundaries is only thinkable on the basis that they are always-already ontologically and axiologically problematic. The developments cited as empirical proof of this discourse are frequently nothing other than its own political consequences. Many innovations of contemporary neo-liberal governmentality arise in response to the theoretical discourse on globalization and are likewise *effects* rather than *causes* of the global denigration of boundaries (cf. Dean 2002a, 2002b). The discourse of denigration of boundaries is thus a form of wishful thinking that is vindicated by the gradual fulfillment of its own wishes. Instead of revisiting familiar discussions of the epochal transformations of late or postmodernity, I will focus on the basic presuppositions of this discourse and account for the hostility of contemporary political discourse toward boundaries.

This hostility is best exemplified by the denigration of *territorial* boundaries in contemporary political and international relations (IR) theory. The disposition that I have elsewhere, termed "integrationism" (a more general concept than that of "integration theory"), characterizes a wide array of theoretical orientations, from the more traditional liberal internationalism (or "idealism" in IR theory) to contemporary constructivist and "postmodernist" approaches (Prozorov 2006, ch. 4). Moreover, it may be argued that, at present, it is precisely the diverse strands of cosmopolitan "integrationism"—from Habermasian discourses on the "post-national constellation" to Fukuyama's "post-historical" universalization of liberalism—that constitute the mainstream of IR theory. The function of realist approaches has shifted from hegemonic delineation of the discipline's problem-space to periodic disruption of its overarching narrative (cf. Petito 2004).

"Integrationism" may be defined as the normative-teleological project of transcending the division of the world into plural, territorially bounded entities by a variably construed form of world unity. International integration has historically been advanced as a peace project, i.e., as a means to make obsolete the occurrence of wars between sovereign states through the creation of a common structure of authority that may eventually dispense with the logic of sovereignty, paving the way for the emergence of world unity in various forms, depending on the political orientation of the observer: world government, a world community of citizens, a worldwide communist revolution, etc. Thus, the integrationist project seeks to dismantle the structure of pluralistic and potentially antagonistic state identities through the creation of a meta-identity of world community, which has dispensed with boundaries, and, thereby, with political division.

A highly illuminating example of the denigration of boundaries is European integration, which is explicitly theorized not merely in empirical terms of the increasing "fuzziness" of borders *inside* the European Union (which is quite irrelevant to the theorization of boundaries as such), but also axiologically as a new form of political community that has dispensed with the logical principle of the need for the other to define the self. According to Ole Wæver (1998), the contemporary other of Europe is *its own past*, i.e., the Europe of "modern" sovereign nation-states. Similarly, Thomas Diez (2004) has argued that a temporal, rather than territorial, "othering" has been the prime modality of identification of the postwar Europe. The profound philosophico-political implications of this discursive move have not yet been fully comprehended. To proclaim that the other is history is to pronounce history itself as the other. In this way, contemporary Europe becomes a profoundly ahistorical, or even an *anti-historical* project, more eschatological than teleological. According to this logic, all history is recast as a primitive period of error, madness, and violence, whose transcendence ushers in a new order of freedom, security, and justice that marks a veritable end of history. Perhaps then, the quick descent into obscurity of Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis is due not to its controversiality, but to its self-evidence.

Yet, what is this history that is presently "othered"? It is nothing other than a history of spatial "othering" of the division of Europe into a plurality of sovereign states separated by territorial boundaries, which have also served as the boundaries of identity, containing particularistic political communities, whose sovereign equality precluded the possibility of the existence of any overarching political identity above them. From this perspective, the title of the present volume appears an incongruous oxymoron—to what extent does Europe, which historically was the locus of

emergence of territorial statehood, still possess anything like a "geopolitics" in a serious sense of the word? Whereas the presently "othered" Europe was constituted by the principle of politico-territorial *delimitation*, where a complex geometry of boundaries established a pluralistic structure of coexistence of particularistic political communities, the contemporary European project is also constituted by division of a highly paradoxical kind. A strict boundary is drawn between the past age, in which boundaries of various kinds were constitutive of the necessarily particularistic identities, and the present moment, in which boundaries must be effaced in the project of the unbounded expansion of the universalist liberal-democratic identity. Moreover, this universalist identity apparently exists outside both space and time, since it no longer practices spatial "othering," and has dispensed with history in a *temporal* "othering."

Let us call the principle of this foundational division of contemporary politics with its denigration of boundary *de-limitation*, where the prefix "de-" designates the negation of the limit, or the transcendence of the boundary. At the same time, the hyphen in this term focuses on the paradoxical character of the denigration of boundaries in contemporary political thought: its dependence on drawing its own, quasi-eschatological borderline between the politics constituted by boundaries, and the politics of their ultimate transcendence. In other words, while delimitation installs a limit to a phenomenon and thereby constitutes it as a positivity by way of its distinction from the exterior, de-limitation is, in a strict sense, nothing other than a *delimitation of the limit itself*, whereby the boundary is paradoxically granted a positivity only for the purpose of its transcendence.

As I will argue, the contemporary discourse of denigration of boundaries is singularly paradoxical in its ceaseless reification of the ontological condition of possibility of order that turns it into an empirical object of transcendence. In the next section, I will provide a brief overview of the operation of this discourse of de-limitation at various sites in contemporary political thought, and identify its condition of possibility in the metaphysical disposition that I term "*immanentism*." The final section is devoted to articulating an "anti-immanentist" form of criticism of the contemporary denigration of boundaries, dissociating it from mere conservative nostalgia for the "age of boundaries" and illuminating its relation to the ethico-political problematic of the limit-experience of transgression. In this way, my critique of the discourse of de-limitation in late-modern political thought provides a philosophical counterpart to the empirical studies in this volume, which reassert the significance for the contemporary geopolitics of Europe of boundary experiences on the margins.

Beyond Division: De-limitations in Politics, Culture, and Ethics

The denigration of boundaries is not restricted to the cosmopolitan project of transcending the pluralistic structure of international space, but is also observable in various discursive domains, where the notion of a boundary is deployed both literally and metaphorically. Turning from IR to the "domestic" realm, we can observe that contemporary political theory, both mainstream and critical, has all but abandoned the theme of social class and class struggle. Instead, we have a proliferation of discourses which seek to erase class boundaries, as well as other divisions that cut across the social body, or at least re-inscribe them in the neutral and depoliticized terms of systemic stratification or functional differentiation. Despite their evident differences, positions in the "Great Debate" between liberal cosmopolitanism and communitarianism are almost identical in effacing social division (Rawls 1999; Sandel 1982). Liberal cosmopolitan individualism effaces both societal boundaries (in its ontological prioritization of the individual as the foundation of the liberal order), and interstate boundaries (in postulating the monistic identity of humanity ontologically prior to particularistic identities in political communities [Mouffe 2000]). In both cases, liberalism's self-proclaimed affirmation of pluralism is rendered problematic by the simultaneous introduction of a more fundamental ontological sameness—between individuals as subjects of the liberal order and between individuals as members of humanity (cf. Schmitt 1976, 1999).

Various strands of communitarianism are, at first glance, not as hostile to boundaries. Their resistance to abstract individualism and their valorization of the necessarily particularistic political community presupposes the existence of boundaries and substantive divisions between such communities (see e.g., Sandel 1982; Walzer 1983). However, communitarianism effaces division within the community, deproblematizing the power relations, asymmetries, and hierarchies that constitute any community as a substantive unity (Ojakangas 2004, 19). The community thus becomes a phenomenon as abstract and ahistorical as the liberal individual, an unproblematic collective being, within which all traces of division and difference have been erased. Ironically, when read together, cosmopolitanism and communitarianism exemplify the overall tendency of the global denigration of boundaries. Is not the logical conclusion of the cosmopolitan project the emergence of a global communitarian structure, a "world state," in which division and conflict have been suppressed and all identities are reconciled in the manner of the conventional "domestic" communitarian utopia (see Wendt 2003; cf. Prozorov 2006, ch. 6)?

Another important symptom of the erasure of societal division is the displacement of the theme of class struggle in "left-wing" critical theory. The discourse of the Third Way is most emblematic of this tendency, not merely in its reluctant acceptance of the maxims of neo-liberal capitalism, but also in its communitarian pathos of inclusion, solidarity and democratic equality (Giddens 1998; cf. Rose 2000). The same tendency is at work in more "radical" tendencies of critical theory, e.g. Hardt and Negri's Deleuzian Marxism, which supplants the concrete image of class struggle with a highly abstract vision of the resistance of the global "multitude" to the mechanisms of the empire, posited not as a social class, but as a self-propelling abstract machine of capitalist expansion (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; cf. Thoburn 2003). The multitude, undifferentiated in its plenitude of absolute diversity, faces not its social antagonist, but an anonymous network of subjection. Both forces are in Hardt and Negri's account *unbounded*, constituted by the dissolution of identities, fragmentation of communities, and the erasure of boundaries. The same unbounded political imagination characterizes much of contemporary left-wing thought: from the naïve valorization of "electronic democracy," "cyber-communism," and other derivations of a better future via technological innovations, to more sophisticated Derridean visions of the perpetually deferred "democracy to come," whose central feature is a non-exclusive and limitless orientation more cosmopolitan than cosmopolitanism itself (Derrida 1996, 2005; Nancy 1991).

The last approach is clearly attuned to the paradoxes and aporias that plague any cosmopolitan project; yet, this awareness does not lead it to abandon the ideal, but rather to maintain it in a deconstructed, destabilized state so that any discourse on "democracy to come" "will always be aporetic in its structure (force *without* force, incalculable singularity *and* calculable equality, commensurability *and* incommensurability, heteronomy *and* autonomy" (Derrida 2005, 86). For all their philosophical sophistication, the political significance of these formulas for critical thought is exhausted in reiterating the anti-exclusionary, universalist, and cosmopolitan maxims of contemporary global liberal-democratic capitalism in the vain hope that their left-wing context will somehow enhance their subversiveness. In fact, we may observe a striking parallel between the "alternative" forms of sociopolitical order articulated in contemporary critical thought, and the object of their criticism: a universal non-exclusive community of cosmopolitan democracy is an *ideal form* of the political organization of liberal capitalism, which, as we know from Marx, abhors all boundaries and distinctions and *excludes nothing* from its *modus operandi*.

The denigration of boundaries is also evident in the contemporary discourse of multiculturalism. As Slavoj Žižek (2006) has argued, Western multiculturalism with its self-proclaimed respect for the other actually consists in *stripping the other of its "otherness"* through its reduction to safe little eccentricities and folkloristic customs that the Western self may easily appropriate in the construction of its own identity as a "multiculturalist." Hence, the popularity of "ethnic" food, music, and esoteric practices in the enlightened circles of the cosmopolitan intelligentsia. "otherness," in the sense of existential difference that demonstrates the irreducible division of the world, is thus incorporated into a system of hierarchically distributed identities, dominated by the meta-identity of multiculturalism itself. Indeed, multiculturalism might be read not as the affirmation of the irreducible pluralism of cultural practices that may be irreconcilably different, but as in many ways an entirely opposite phenomenon: the dissolution of these cultural boundaries under the aegis of the universalized liberal tolerance. In this constellation, the cultural identity of Western liberalism is elevated from its necessarily particularistic, historically contingent status to the universal frame of reference (see Rasch 2003). The apparent relativization of one's own standpoint functions to conceal its own opposite—the endowment of a Western liberal standpoint with privileged enunciative modality that allows one to adjudicate freely between cultures on the basis of their relative tolerance.

As cultural boundaries and the legitimate pluralism of cultures are effaced, multiculturalism does not fail to produce its own divisions: this time not between self and other but between tolerant and intolerant selves. The hierarchical and universalist nature of this should be evident: what is presently viewed as illegitimate intolerance, a self-exclusion from the global order of multiculturalism, is frequently little more than the affirmation of a difference with regard to the Western liberal identity. Such an act is entirely unproblematic in relation to any particularistic identity, but foreclosed in relation to the meta-identity of universalized liberal tolerance. In this constellation, the denigration of boundaries is simultaneously the denigration of the other.

However, it is also possible to combine denigration of boundaries with the elevation of the other to a position infinitely superior to the self. This is most strikingly exemplified by the Levinasian "postmodern" ethics of the later works of Derrida, which establishes an asymmetric relationship between the self and the other, whereby it is precisely the other who calls the self in question, and paves the way for the assumption of infinite responsibility of the self to the other, which in fact constitutes the self as an ethical subject (cf. Levinas 1969; Derrida 1992; 1996). The very borderline

between self and other thus evaporates in the reconstruction of this relation in terms of radical dependence. Insofar as every self is presumably someone's other, we arrive at *radical interdependence*. Contrast Schmitt's (1976) construction of self-other (friend-enemy) relations in terms of existential equality, in which both figures emerge simultaneously and do not preexist the act of their discrimination. A Derridean postmodern ethics posits the self as an effect of the encounter with the other and conditions the ethicality of the self by the assumption of infinite responsibility before the other (see Moran 2002; Sharpe 2002). This difference from Schmitt is highly illuminating in the context of de-limitation. Schmitt resisted the absolutization of the other, because for him the elimination of boundaries that divide the self and the other would bring about not absolute hospitality but *absolute hostility*, the desire for the elimination of the other (see Ojakangas 2004, ch. 4). This logic is far easier to grasp than the assumption of infinite responsibility of the self to something that is not merely different but, in the Derridean axiom, "wholly other"—with which one logically can have no common identity and, therefore, no possibility of empathy or, for that matter, any relation at all.

It is, therefore, hardly puzzling that all empirical concretizations of postmodern ethics easily fall short. At its worst, the ethics of responsibility to "otherness" turns out just as hypocritical as liberal multiculturalism, depriving the other of its "otherness" through a kind of forced empathy: a demand for the inclusion of the other into the liberal-democratic order of tolerance that is oblivious to the fact that it is frequently the very resistance to this inclusion that constitutes the other as other. At its best, this ethics is resigned to indecision and passivity, doomed to the endless contemplation of its own momentous impossibility (see Prozorov 2005). In either case, however, we observe an elementary gesture of the effacement of boundaries between the self and the other through the postulate of their radical interdependence.

The Reign of Pure Immanence: Immanentism and the Denigration of Boundaries

This discussion of the denigration of boundaries in political philosophy, IR theory, cultural studies, and ethics demonstrates that nothing is more unfashionable these days than a discourse on boundaries that does not teleologically and axiologically posit the possibility of their being overcome. It also points to the fact that the phenomenon we are dealing with cannot be restricted to any single problematic. Instead, these strategies of de-limitation appear to be determined by an underlying political ontology that I will term "immanentism."

Immanentism may be understood as an attempt to efface, from human existence, every dimension of transcendence, exteriority and difference, i.e., to recast the social order as a closed universal self-propelling system with no outside. Immanentism posits the fantasy of a social order that lacks nothing, i.e., is characterized by unity, fullness, plenitude, and completeness, and is, therefore, logically unbounded and unlimited (see Nancy 1991; Ranciére 1995; Lefort 1988). In accordance with the contemporary rhetoric of non-exclusion and non-discrimination, immanentism excludes nothing from its frame of order. It abhors the exception as a challenge to its phantasm of completeness. What defines immanentism is the presupposition that a social order has a substantial existence, a foundation or a ground *of its own*, and is thus not constituted by a distinction or delimitation from its outside. For Lefort, the immanentist disposition of modern politics, which he labels "totalitarianism," is incapable of coming to terms with the fundamental undecidability of social life in the aftermath of the demise of absolutism, and therefore seeks "to give power a substantial reality, bring principles of law and knowledge within its orbit, to deny social division in all its forms and to give society a body once more" (Lefort 1988, 232). Incapable of recognizing *absence as transcendence* in the sense of the impossibility of a fully sutured self-enclosed society (cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985), immanentism affirms the *absence of transcendence* and so obscures the radical dependence of any order on its prior delimitation from its outside. A self-immanent "social body" is thus deemed *ontologically prior to the boundary that delimits it*.

Paradoxically, this disavowal of boundaries goes hand in hand with their constitution as positive objects. As I argued in my introduction, the contemporary discourse of de-limitation applies the act of demarcation to the boundary itself, delimiting the limit and thereby endowing it with a positivity that it does not itself possess. A boundary drawn between any two objects constitutes these very objects as distinct positivities but, precisely by virtue of its constitutive function, it must itself remain without ontological substance. Strictly speaking, the boundary does not exist at all in the same sense as the objects, which it delimits. Drawing on Kantian aesthetics, Jens Bartelson defined this paradoxical ontological status of the borderline in terms of *parergonality*, a function of framing that itself remains unframed and therefore deprived of ontological substantiality (see Bartelson 1995, 50–51). It is this parergonal function that grants the boundary ontological priority over the objects it delimits, since the being of these objects is entirely conditioned by their prior demarcation from their exterior. What takes place in the delimitation of the limit in the critical discourse on boundaries is thus a reification of the condition of possibility of positive objects that turns the boundary itself into such a positive

object. Political immanentism may thus be grasped as the reification of boundaries that reduces their ontological function of framing to the status of a positive (i.e., framed) object, whose existence may then be devalued as unnecessary. Paradoxically, it is only by granting positive presence to boundaries, which never possessed it in the first place, that one may then promote an interminable discourse on their disappearance.

The connection between modern political thought and the philosophical or theological doctrines of immanence is the fundamental insight of Carl Schmitt's *Political Theology* (1985), which established a systematic correspondence between the rise of deistic theological doctrines, that banished the miracle and other acts of divine grace from the world, and the disavowal of sovereignty in legal positivism and liberal pluralist theory:

> The sovereign, who in the deistic view of the world, even if conceived as residing outside the world, had remained the engineer of the great machine, has been radically pushed aside. The machine now runs by itself . . . Everything in the nineteenth century was increasingly governed by conceptions of immanence. All the identities that recur in the political ideas and in the state doctrines of the nineteenth century rest on such conceptions of immanence: the democratic thesis of the identity of the ruler and the ruled, the organic theory of the state with the identity of state and sovereignty (Schmitt 1985, 49–50).

For Schmitt, the immanentist orientation of modern political theology, through the effacement of sovereign transcendence, inevitably renders it anti-political by virtue of its negation of any outside to the immanent order of being (cf. Ewald 1992; Ojakangas 2004). This negation of the outside may be conceptualized at two levels. In terms of political ontology, immanentism necessarily disavows its own origins, which must logically be decisionist and exceptional, i.e., exterior to the plane of immanence of the internal organization of order. Every order is constituted by a founding rupture that dispenses with the previously existing order and inaugurates the new order, without itself being part of either. In the ontological sense, the outside of order, disavowed in immanentist thought, is that marginal excess that constitutes the form of order by escaping from it, that supplement which simultaneously sustains and undermines the existence of order, the sovereign decision that institutes order, while remaining unsubsumed under its principles (see Schmitt 1985; Derrida 1992). The disavowal of the sovereign foundation is thus the negation of the boundary that ultimately *separates order from itself*, and thus, in the well-known Derridean argument, prevents its closure and consolidation into a "self-propelling machine."

On the ontic level, the negation of the outside takes place through the effacement of the fundamental spatio-temporal pluralism of political orders in the project of world unity, for which there are no longer "friends" and "enemies," both of whom are legitimate equals to the self in the pluralistic domain of the international. What remains is only the self-immanent self that is to be elevated to the universal status and the obscene excess of the "foe," whose resistance to forcible incorporation into world unity serves as a justification for its annihilation. The logic of world unity is marked by a persistent attempt at the erasure of all dividing lines between individuals and political communities and, thus, the merger of the self and the other in the final reign of benign universality. There is no longer a place (literally as well as figuratively) for the exclusion of the other, simply because there is no longer any "otherness" in the system which operates with the all-inclusive category of humanity (Schmitt 1976; Kervegan 1999).

For Schmitt, the horrifying consequence of world unity would be the elimination of all pluralism and, hence, the impossibility of difference, "otherness," and, in concretely spatial terms, the outside. A unified world is a world, which is impossible to leave in any other manner than by discontinuing one's own existence. "Freedom is freedom of movement, nothing else. What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer space for measuring and testing one's strength freely?" (Schmitt 1988, 243). The problem with world unity, however, is more than the sacrifice of pluralism. The world, "in which there is only a homeland," is, in Schmitt's diagnosis, a dystopic "world police power," to which the romantic connotations of "homeland" barely apply: "The day *world politics* comes to the earth, it will be transformed in a *world police power*" (Schmitt, cited in Petito 2004, 6).

For Schmitt, pluralistic antagonism between states in an international society is infinitely preferable to the technological nihilism of world domination, which mindlessly pushes for ever-greater integration, oblivious to the fact that world unity can serve the most obscene of purposes: after all, "the Kingdom of Satan is also a unity" (Schmitt, cited in Ojakangas 2004, 80). "In a spiritual world ruled by the law of pluralism, a piece of concrete order is more valuable than any empty generalizations of a false totality. For it is an actual order, not a constructed and imaginary abstraction . . . It would be a false pluralism, which played world-comprehending totalities off against the concrete actuality of such plural orders" (Schmitt 1999, 206). The effacement of the outside only serves to endow a necessarily particularistic unity with a universality that elevates it above its numerous equals in the pluralistic ontology of the international, and consequently opens a path for global police domination by what, by logical necessity,

remains merely one political force in the world. The borderless world, teleologically presupposed in much contemporary political discourse, is, in a Schmittian analysis, a world of infinite self-certitude and arrogance, unbounded violence of the subjection of particular political entities to the pseudo-universal ideal and unlimited "world police power" over a world that remains ontologically pluralistic and, thus, will inevitably resist its subjection.

The fundamental feature of the immanentist logic of de-limitation is therefore its intolerance of difference, unless the latter is first identified and secondly included into the immanent unity. Irrespective of all proclamations of pluralism, multiculturalism, and decentralization that characterize the contemporary globalist discourse, this logic only accepts that difference that it incorporates in its own system and does not tolerate the existence of either pure difference outside it or unidentified, "blind-spot" difference within it. It would nonetheless be facile to suggest that immanentism simply excludes difference, which would, in fact, have relatively benign consequences of letting difference be. On the contrary, whereas contemporary critical discourse remains focused on the "exclusionary" mechanisms of power, the key feature of the immanentist rationality is that it excludes nothing at all. Rather, it subsumes all differences under its overarching identity, thereby depriving all difference of its extra-systemic character (cf. Ojakangas 2005). Difference is thus subsumed under identity, and pluralism becomes conditioned by monism.

The theme of resistance to the immanentism in modern politics and social life runs through the entire critical tradition from Nietzsche's assault on the life-negating nature of Western metaphysics and morality; to Heidegger's concerns with regard to the technologization of the world and the oblivion of Being; to Foucault's genealogy of biopolitical governmental rationalities immanent in the social body; to early Derrida's deconstructive subversions of the closure of metaphysical systems into self-immanence; to Laclau and Mouffe's analysis of the operation of hegemony as the disavowal of the "impossibility of society"; to Žižek's reaffirmation of the "death drive" inherent in the human condition; and so on. All of these different approaches point in distinct ways to the fact that "no human society, whatever it may be, can be organised in terms of pure self-immanence" (Lefort 1988, 29).

Liberty at the Limit: Boundaries, Finitude, and Transgression

As I have demonstrated, the persistence of the denigration of boundaries in the contemporary political discourse is only a symptom of a more fundamental

metaphysical orientation that subsumes transcendence under immanence, difference under identity, and particularity under universality. The immanentist disposition seeks to erase the dependence of every identity, unity, and universality on the prior act of division, whereby identity is little more than a difference, delimited from other differences. Yet, when it comes to challenging this metaphysics, there inevitably arises the question of whether it can be resisted by a simple *reversal* of the binary oppositions of immanentism. Arguably, an alternative political ontology, founded on the valorization of transcendence, difference, distinction, and particularism, does not so much resist as *sustain* immanentism by functioning as its impossible opposite in a binary structure, which is itself constituted within the immanentist system of thought. Such an ontology of pure difference, whose contours we may discern, e.g. in Hardt and Negri's Deleuzian Spinozism, would be heterogeneous to the very principle of order, and thus equally hostile to boundaries.

The critique of the denigration of boundaries must therefore practice a double gesture of Derridean deconstruction, complementing the *reversal* of the opposition with its general *displacement* (Derrida 1988, 21). Immanentism must not be opposed by asserting *pure* transcendence, but by demonstrating the irreducible *interdependence* of the two. In this way, any assertion of immanence is both sustained and undermined by the constitutive outside of the foundational transcendence. Any transcendence is made meaningful in turn by the existence of a certain positivity, a structure of immanence that is being transcended. *Anti*-immanentism may be defined as the assertion of the ontological primacy of delimitation over the existence of any positive order, i.e., of the constitutive character of the boundary in relation to the unity it delimits. Schmitt's thought may be approached as the precursor to a deconstructive engagement with immanentism, as witnessed in the spectral presence of Schmitt in the work of such different philosophers as Derrida, Agamben, and Žižek. Schmitt owes his timeliness to his critical strategy, which does not merely reverse the hierarchy between immanence and transcendence, but restores the transcendent dimension inherent in immanentism as its transgressive foundation (see Derrida 1996, 2005; Agamben 1998, 2005; Žižek 1999, 2006). What all the diverse orientations of anti-immanentist criticism assert is the radical dependence of order on what is external, transcendent, or excessive in relation to it, i.e., the ontological primacy of division and difference, and, first and foremost, the division and difference of order *from itself* (see Prozorov 2004, 2005; see also Rasch 2000, Ojakangas 2004). While the immanentist phantasm posits an ontology of plenitude that lacks nothing, anti-immanentist criticism finds in this phantasm no appreciation of that nothing, the void or negativity that precludes the identity of order with

itself, and renders any unity always already torn from within, never entirely closed upon itself.

What then becomes of boundaries in an anti-immanentist turn in political ontology? Should we simply reaffirm the ontological necessity of boundaries and their irreducible presence even in the immanentist designs for the unity of the world? Indeed, the argument that boundaries are ontological preconditions rather than merely ontic phenomena points to the impossibility not merely of dispensing with boundaries in practice, but also of transcending them in thought. As I have argued, it is only by a prior reification of the boundary that disavows its spectral parergonal ontology, and endows it with empirical presence that the discourse of denigration of boundaries becomes possible in the first place. A crucial distinction must be drawn, though, between the ontological function of boundaries and the empirical positivities of bounded entities. While the existence of *some or other* boundaries must be viewed as an ontological necessity, it does not follow from this that particular orders, bounded in historically specific ways, are in any way necessary. There can be no "natural" boundaries, just as it is impossible to legitimize the location of a boundary with reference to the limits of ethnic or political identity that it bounds, if only because this very identity is a contingent effect of the boundary itself. To argue for the ontological primacy of boundaries is therefore to reject the ontologization of identities that they delimit, i.e., to assert that *a boundary* is not *a ground*. It is precisely this ontological stance that permits the ontic discernment of the diverse potentialities at the margin, analyzed in this volume—the reaffirmation of the parergonal status of the boundary necessarily focuses our attention on concrete practices of (re)constituting marginal entities as positive effects of delimitation.

In other words, anti-immanentist discourse must not merely displace the utopian pathos of overcoming boundaries in global, self-immanent unity, but also problematize and disturb the existence of such unities *within* the pluralistic international order. From this perspective, a critique of the state may well be *derived* from the critique of globalism rather than function as its opposite. Our critique of immanentist tendencies in political thought, which is necessarily a critique of any postmodern delusion of a borderless world, must therefore not be equated with a shallow conservatism of the defense of the *status quo* or a nostalgia for the Westphalian nation-state. Just as Schmitt's (1976, 2003) argument about the impossibility of the negation of the political did not entail for him the impossibility of the demise of the nation-state, we must not equate the ontological status of the borderline with the historical immutability of the modern embodiment of the boundary in the nation-state border. New forms of delimiting difference may well be invented, just as new forms of antagonism are certain to appear.

Thus, boundaries are neither natural givens nor superficial social constructs, but rather markers of the fundamental ontological division of the world, its difference from itself that precludes its closure into self-immanence.

There is another reason not to equate the ontological reaffirmation of boundaries with a conservative argument for their immutability. The existence of boundaries is logically proven not by their inviolability but by their *transgression*. If the boundary were never crossed, we would never know of its existence; it is precisely transgression that illuminates the existence of the boundary in the moment of crossing it. The difference between transgressing boundaries and transcending them as a class in the project of a borderless world should be evident: transgression is made possible and meaningful precisely by the existence and persistence of the boundary, otherwise it collapses into self-parody. Thus, in specifying ways to transgress the existing modes of framing particular orders and the identities they prescribe, none of the twelve "potentialities" of marginal politics set out in the introduction seeks to dispense with the parergonal function of delimitation. The aim of transgression is never to dispense with the limit, but to violate it, to momentarily *suspend* rather than *negate* its existence. In this suspension, we may observe a simultaneous demonstration of the existence of the boundary and of the ever-present possibility of crossing it. Far from denying boundaries' legitimacy, a transgressive disposition demonstrates that they do not separate self-contained unities, closed identities, and local universalities, but delimit one difference from another. The objective of the anti-immanentist critique is not to fortify the self-other distinction, but, on the contrary, to demonstrate that *the self itself is nothing but difference*.

For a transgressive disposition the *disappearance* of boundaries would entail the disappearance of the very object of transgression. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine an act of transgression motivated by the passion for a united world without borders. Transgression contains the desire to break from the transgressed order, to pass to elsewhere, desire for *another place* beyond the borderline. The central critique of the immanentist designs for world unity is the *absence* in them of the possibility of exit from this system, hence, the impossibility of transgression, from which we infer as well the impossibility of meaningful transformation. Whereas history may be *denied* by the immanentist denigration of boundaries, history has so far been *made* by their transgression. The argument that boundaries are ineradicable makes transgression a never-ending project of confronting limits, a project that, in Foucault's famous phrase, "has its entire space in the line that it crosses" (Foucault 1977, 34).

Pace the facile criticism of transgression of boundaries as meaningless due to the impossibility of their final transcendence (see e.g., Wolin 1992),

I assert that this "meaninglessness" is not a flight of fancy but an inherent feature of the human condition, which is necessarily bounded by finitude that cannot be overcome: "Man does not begin with liberty but with the limit" (Foucault 1997, 76). At the same time, the very awareness of this finitude, which is unique to human beings, animates freedom as a force that confronts the limits of finitude in a desperate attempt to overcome them, to maintain itself in history, to resist enslavement and domination. From Nietzsche to Deleuze, vitalist thought has asserted that confrontation with the limits that define us as the very content of human existence: "Is not life the capacity to resist force?" (Deleuze 1988, 93). Moreover, this struggle is never a metaphysical abstract confrontation with limits *per se*, such as the inevitability of death. It is a concrete antagonism between particular differences, a transgression of a concrete boundary: "life struggles not with death, spirit not with spiritlessness; spirit struggles with spirit, life with life" (Schmitt 1993, 9).

I may, therefore, conclude that the immanentist denigration of boundaries exemplifies a metaphysical disposition that is unable to come to terms with human finitude, but ventures instead to perpetuate both spatial and temporal human order into infinity. Immanentism may thus be understood as a metaphysical consolation in the face of the limits of being: if our existence *in the world* is necessarily finite, might we not at least make *our world* (which can only be a metaphysical ideal) infinite in time and space? The attraction of immanentism is only thinkable from the perspective of an "infinite," transcendental subject, who necessarily perceives finitude in terms of heteronomy, and attempts to efface it in a phantasm of a spatio-temporally infinite world community, an order that has embraced global space and withdrawn itself from time. In contrast, the stakes of anti-immanentist criticism consist in the reaffirmation of the ontological priority of the boundary, no longer conceived as an inert, immutable limit but rather as the clearing, in which a finite being experiences its freedom in crossing the limits that contain it.

Note

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3

Power and Marginality in the International System: A Historical Perspective

Pertti Joenniemi and Noel Parker

The Changing Scope for the Marginal

It was argued in Chapter 1 that a political entity—Europe or any other—possesses a certain geometry deploying its components in a certain "space." Hence, the relations of margins and centers can be used to understand the natures, roles, and mutual impacts of both Europe and its margins. The different political orders' distinct geometries bear witness to the interactions between centers and margins. A further theoretical question therefore arises: does the impact of the margins on the center vary systematically over time. This is the focus of this chapter. What accords more or less standing to marginality? What are the broader conditions for the margin to be thought of as a significant position? How do different discourses for the international system entail different possibilities for how margins may address, or impact upon, their respective center(s)? We probe what significance is assigned to the margins, as embedded in broader sociopolitical and discursive structures; capture general trends to account for changes in their meaning; and shed light on why marginality has recently resurfaced.

Using broad-brush ideal types, we first analyze how the relationship to the margins figures in the space of different "international" orders.[1] Within the geometry of each order, there are entities that are "marginal," "peripheral," and so on, that lie on the edge, with ostensibly lesser impact in the

overall order. These may be states with seemingly negligible resources in the great games of power politics; tribes living "beyond the pale," making hardly any incursions into the ordered space; or rootless or delinquent groups living on the edge, "outside" the social order. We first correlate the placing of the margin in the orders in different broad-brush ideal orders whose names are familiar: empires, city-states, territorial sovereign national states, and recent, postmodern political arrangements, such as networks, regions, and diasporas. Each ideal type of international order has a characteristic geometry, including articulations of the boundaries and the meaning of that on either side of them, the margins. In this way, we develop the supposition that the scope for the marginal to impact upon the center is historically framed.

The "post-modern" refers here to something difficult to determine that comes *after* the modern.[2] The order between "world" cities, rivaling or shaping that of national states, for example, has become a major object of study in the wake of "globalization" and the networks that that enables (Sassen 1996; Sassen 2003; GaWC 2007; Taylor 2004). Likewise, the orders developed around ethnic groups and subordinate cultures, ostensibly marginal in a negative sense, have been considered with fresh eyes, up to and including the potential of "hybrid" cultures to remain aloof from the binary, either/or constellations prioritized in customary international relations theory (Bauman 2003; Norval, 1999), and reconfigure central national-state identities (Robertson 1995; Pieterse 2000).[3]

Developments associated with postmodernity were first noticed in connection with European integration in the mid-1990s (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Guéhenno 1995), when some began to speak of a postmodern European order (Caporaso 1996). The term continues to function as loosely descriptive of the European political order (Cooper 2003). The appearance of "new regionalism" in Europe was also a sign of the national-state order's weakness (Cottey 1998; Joenniemi 1997; Keating 1998), a continent where national-state geometry had come under a cloud, by virtue of European integration and its "multilevel" geometry.

In addition, we hold that margins contribute to breakdowns and/or transitions between geometries of the international order. Hence, we argue that in the mid- to late-twentieth century, the "modern" order of sovereign states gradually collapsed under the weight of its unrecognized margins, to produce a "post-modern" world, where, inter alia, marginality is ascribed renewed meaningfulness. We then look at the relation between centers and margins as international relations theory has envisaged it. Finally, we conclude with a reflection on how marginality may evolve within international relations more broadly, and the geopolitical identity of Europe in particular.

The Margin in the Discourse of the Political Order

What parameters are we to use in order to examine the geometries of the different political orders, and establish variations of significance for their understanding of boundaries and marginality? We employ the following:

- The political orders' constitutive principles.
- The locations within them where power is assumed to be found.
- The manner of exercising power practiced within them.
- Their characteristic geometrical figure.
- The vectors implicit in their power relations.
- The articulation given to the boundary.
- The meaning ascribed to the margin.

The types of political order we take are, as already indicated, familiar from Weber onward, well established, and even conventional (Mann 1986, 1993). In the period of classical history, we find tribute-seeking empires—latterly the Roman and the Persian—alongside numerous independent communities, including city-states, which were in some ways their complement. The first made usually limited demands—for suzerainty and tribute—and the second could often conduct their own autonomous affairs peacefully within that framework. The "modern" era is dominated by independent sovereign and latterly "national" states—though we have to note the presence of many hybrid, transitional instances where monarchical regimes confounded personal or family-based order with sovereign independence delineated on a coherent national territory. Against this, mid- and late-twentieth-century history suggests the new impacts of a variety of overlapping configurations: blocs, ideological camps, federations, regions, networks, hybrids, diasporas, etc., which infringe the autonomy principle of the sovereign state in the modern order.

By the constitutive principles of an order, we refer to the formal basis of the order, which also marks out holders, and targets of power within it. In other words, the expression refers to the deepest level of patterning that structures the given order: that which both defines what counts as an entity within the order, and, by the same token, determines the scope of what any entity can do.[4] The tribute-seeking empire, for example, conventionally accords to its power-holders a relationship to what Anthony Smith (2004) calls "the celestial," a transcendent real above and beyond life on earth. Such authority is on the one hand unchallengeable, but on the other, unspecific: the gods having little to say about tax levels, civil disputes, and so on. While this constitutive principle is certainly also present in the small city-state, in that holders of power may have their authority as a blessing

from above, they are also known by more personal capacities and preferences. The range of persons deserving of authority can accordingly be extended more widely across the society: hence the association between small city-states and democracy. In the national state, the basis of authority lies in the state itself, its *raison d'état*, or interest expressed as the best interests of the "nation." It thus has a domestic manifestation (the state's legitimate right to legislate over society), and an external one (the state's sovereign territoriality vis-à-vis other states). Under postmodern conditions, however, that self-enclosure is infringed, bringing a multiplicity of interests and identities in as the basis for conducting government: from regions' or *ethnies*' demands and entitlements at one end of the scale, to the rights of humanity, as such, or of the Gaia of the earth at the other.

The form of authority underpinning each political order suggests a characteristic *location of power* matching the form and type of power it deploys. By power, we mean something which is frequently observable in the daily business of the political order: the ability of some parties to force, cajole, or inveigle others into fulfilling the demands of the power-holders, or what suits them. But, as the theories of power developed over the last thirty years all agree (Lukes 2005; Bourdieu 1991; Foucault 1986), such abilities are deeply embedded in the structures and the discourses within which they can be realized. We can then observe actors' insertion into the frameworks that underpin their use of power. Thus, a tribute-seeking empire's power center is remote—and maintains the remoteness of the semi-divine by intervening little at the lower level. In the city-state, by contrast, power is nearby, and/or even diffused amongst the elites and citizenry. Whereas a national state once again locates government distinct from society, focused at a center, it is a much more knowable kind of center than that of the earlier empire: a national capital with numerous, widely distributed public servants whose authority and activities can be felt daily across the rest of society. National government explicitly locates both the center and the edges of the power contained within political orders. Where, in recent times, this national-state self-enclosure has broken down—notably in European integration—there is no longer an undisputed center where power resides. Instead, it is dispersed across a multiplicity of focal points, whose mutual relations and relative authority is uncertain and shifting.

When we consider the activities of government under the different forms of political order, we register a characteristic *manner of exercising power*. The imperial center practices the rituals symbolizing its special, celestial status, evoking in its subject a distant awe at the majesty of the emperor. In an age when god(s) were usually seen as fearsome, the power

of the center, overwhelming by comparison with what local forces could muster was periodically visited upon dissidence in the remote margins in exemplary shows of untrammeled strength. In the more intimate conditions of the city-state without the aura that distance can give, governors must practice persuasiveness and/or "political" negotiating skill. By contrast, even where the national state obtains regular democratic endorsement for the person of the power-holders, much of its government is exercised at a distance—*im*personally, applying formally sanctioned rules, and deploying effective management of administrative resources or rational knowledge about the workings of society. In more fluid recent conditions, other activities become associated with power: negotiating mutually agreeable courses of action, promoting semi-autonomous action in others, persuading parties by highlighting shared criteria of success such as benchmarks; hence, the recent preference for the term "govern*ance*," with its suggestion that top-down power is replaced by mediation between actors of equal status (Bang 2003).

The combination of its constitutive principles, and the manner in which power is exercised within it, yields a *geometrical figure* that encapsulates each political order. This can be seen in two ways: the predominant pattern the elements are placed in, and the *vectors* between them. By the term vector, we refer to the typical *direction* of power within the order. Thus, the empire places its components in a radial form around its center of authority, extending power outward from center to margin—in principle, indefinitely, but in reality, greatly attenuated by increasing distance. This is perhaps the reason why empires can apparently exist over the top of networks of relations—both in small cities and in subordinate clans—with different geometrical figures and vectors. The geometry of the national state is likewise radial, with a vector of power from center outwards. But it seeks to operate with undiminishing force right up to its territorial limits, and then drops all formal claims to power beyond its internationally accepted boundaries. It has accordingly been much less tolerant than empires of networks that might exist beneath its centrally orientated authority (Walzer 1997, 24–30). We could characterize its power vector as an even, lateral movement across territory up to its clearly defined limits. With the diminishing integrity of the national state, links of power and influence exhibit multiple geometry of different shapes overlaid upon each other, and vectors of power crossing or intersecting.

We come now to the discursive *articulation of the boundary* of the political order and *its margins*. Much of this is implicit in the previous parameters. In an environment of relatively mobile tribal and nomadic populations, the border of the tribute-seeking empire is in any case not easy to lay down

definitively. On the other hand, while there is no a priori limit to power from a supernatural source, the center's relation to the parts of an empire is expressed in forms quite distant from the local societies, such as sending tribute or repeating rituals to distant authority. Neither empires nor their subordinate parts can, or need to, determine clearly the boundary of the empire. The empire is at one and the same time an imprecise zone and one easily extended should opportunity arise. While the imperial center could not precisely control what lay on its further edges, it could demonstrate overwhelming coercive capacity. Indeed, ancient empires were often dependent on booty and slaves from military campaigns. The city-state drew its members together at the center and sought to protect the lands around. It could force some into exile, but it could not hold them within, hence, the possibility of Hansen's "city state cultures," in which citizens from *different* cities shared culture, religion, and rituals (Hansen 2000, 11–34).[5] National states have, on the other hand, been marked by extreme sensitivity over their boundaries, since they mark the line between their own sovereign authority and its theoretical negation—the authority of adjacent states. They investigate their boundaries, map them, mark them, and scrap with their neighbors over where they should be located. The meaning of this boundary hovers around various kinds of threats: it must be defended against neighbors; territory and people near to it must be kept within the national fold; and if power is exercised beyond it, that power has different usually military, mechanisms, and is endowed with a radically different basis in law—usually, self-defense. As the postmodern geometry and vectors of power appear, influences and people flow over boundaries, making them appear more and more fluid. They can represent a threat of dissolution, but, conversely, they can—precisely because they are easily traversed lines of contact with that beyond—also be sites of opportunity for meeting, influence, or gain.

The *meaning* that an order attributes to the margin—that is, its understanding of what the margin is, its significance, and worth—will match its articulation of the boundary. Tribute-seeking empires mixed ignorance and unconcern regarding that which lay on their margins. Formal acknowledgement of the center's standing was what was asked. If need be, the margin could be suppressed or bought, in either case the price was low. City-states, defined by their show of loyal membership, and able to exist embedded in the bigger cultural community, could tolerate differing degrees of commitment and side shifting at their margins. It is national states that are least able to take a positive view of that which is marginal to them. The margin is a zone of uncertainty, working against the cut-and-dried geometry of the different states' territorial boundaries. It may peel off, or be occupied by an enemy power, or be a seat of disorder beyond the

state's controlling hand. If the margin is acknowledged by the center to have a certain autonomy, it may use that to pressure the center. Where, conversely, boundaries are easily traversed, the margin has to be understood and handled with political skill. The margin may thus be a site from where order seen from the center is renegotiated or—with or without the center's assent—recast. It may thus convey more possibilities, both as threats and as opportunities.

The geometries of the different political orders, their handling of space, together with their understanding of boundaries and margins, are summarized in Table 3.1. In our next section, we will amplify the exposition of the coming of the postmodern type, at the same time providing empirical support to the model as a whole, by exploring the history of the twentieth century as a shift in the geometry underpinning the international system. The earlier national-state system contained a highly restricted articulation of the marginal, which it sought to suppress within the national-state space itself and ignore at the level of the international system as a whole. As margins bear in upon the system, the twentieth century sees the breakdown of this order and the development of an alternative order. By the end of the century, this gave way to a visibly fluid order, in which the marginal has a persisting role.

The Margins, the European State System, and the Appearance of the "Post-modern"

The sovereign state, its autonomy, and its territoriality reach their height as the constitutive elements of the "modern" European pattern in the nineteenth to early twentieth centuries (Tilly 1990; Holsti 1996). As we argue, the sovereign-state understanding of political order implied a very definite position on territory and a fortiori on margins: one in which both were seen as functions of the will and interest of states. The sovereign quality of states, as exclusive actors and judges of right, entailed that it fell to them, acting singly or together, to wield the power to determine the boundaries of their different territories and subject populations. In principle, this was to be done in such a way that each state could enjoy unqualified, exclusive right in its own territory. The margins around states' territorial boundaries and separate nations' identities were accordingly diminished or rendered invisible. At best, there could be provisional irregularities in the boundaries or over the identity of subjects, which the nation-state could be expected to resolve in due course. At worst, there were defense weakspots, or threats from minorities to the body politic itself.

In the course of the twentieth century, we see the emergence of counter-pressures from the various margins of this Europe-based system. These are contained over the medium term by a new, extra-European, supra-state

Table 3.1 Summary table for section "The margin in the discourse of the political order"

	Features of given order						
Historical epoch	*Constitutive principles*	*Location of power*	*Manner of exercising power*	*Geometrical figure*	*Vectors of power*	*Articulation of the boundary*	*Meaning of the margin*
Pre-modern: *1. Empire* *2. City-state*	1. celestial awesomeness 2. personal authority	1. remote capital 2. the city	1. ritual, overweening force 2. "political" persuasion	1. radial 2. spreading	1. diminishing with distance 2. multiple	1. imprecise 2. indeterminate	1. little known 2. negotiable
Modern: *National state*	sovereignty	intrusive state	impersonal effectiveness	radial	undiminishing from center to border	crucial to integrity	source of threat
Post-modern: *Different, global-level orders*	varied identities	dispersed	negotiation	multiple, overlaid	to-and-fro, intersecting	open, potentially beneficial	site of wider threats and opportunities

ideational order resembling, in some respects, the earlier imperial principles of cohesion. By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the fundamentals of the Europe-centered international order are overturned: individual European states are engaged in an integration quite unlike their earlier practice of sovereignty; and Europe as a whole is manifestly identifiable in relation to what lies outside of it.

This modern system's articulation of the boundary necessarily contained little or no provision for that above the state, the supra- or transstate level, and much less for the globe as a whole. There, the extent of the state system was undetermined. In the classic system of international relations, there were three bases of whatever supra-state order might exist. The sovereign autonomy and independence of the separate states entailed an "anarchic" order organized by the parties' continually balancing each others' power. From this principle were derived all the fundamental rules of behavior in the system of states as understood in international relations (Morgenthau 2005; Waltz 1959). In addition, the hegemonic role of Great Britain (exercised through its maritime dominance and possession of the prime currency of exchange) and the shared values of what the "English school" of international relations dubbed "international society" (Bull 2002) functioned as, albeit weaker, organizing forces.

The paradigms of this setup recognized, or rather *avoided* recognizing, the margin by constructing it as an insignificant edge to the state's sovereign territorial existence. This was at once dismissive of any substantial effects that might originate from the margins, and unspecific about where to locate them. *Within* sovereign states' territory, the margins were transitory exceptions for the state(s) in question to bring into line; *around* the system as a whole, the margins were indeterminate, open spaces upon which it was natural for sovereign states to impose a territorial organization and a social order. These latter margins surface in the issues of new members in the state system, and of the territory and population outside Europe as a whole. The gradual breakdown of the system, including the two world wars, can be seen to arise with the intrusion of these two types of marginal entity: marginal *states*, not easily admitted into the system, and marginal *territories and populations*, unassimilated into the different states.

The system itself generated an intermediary concept, "neutrality," which permitted a state to satisfy the requirements of statehood without being party to any given conflict between others. This possibility relies purely on the idea that each state is sovereign and has its own interests. It follows that where there are conflicts, any third state might not find it commensurate with its interests to join in. The position of neutral could be hard to sustain if conflicting parties saw others' neutrality—entailing, for example, a refusal

of transit for military purposes—as favorable to one or other side. In practice, certain states—Switzerland, Scandinavian and Benelux states, Ireland—came to occupy neutral positions on principle, partly because their positions and resources had fewer implications for warring parties, and partly because it fitted their strategic identity to stay out of most military conflicts (Goetschel 1999). Hence, an affinity grew up between regular "neutral" states and lesser military weight. Recognized neutrality, however, represented no *contradiction* of the system's logic regarding margins: the neutrals were also states, and their neutrality could be located in relation to other members of the system.

The marginal "states" referred to earlier were not, however, held in place under the concept of neutrality. In the first instance, it was Germany, Italy, and Japan that functioned as marginal states: each developed later in the nineteenth century upon the model of the established European states, and each provoked large-scale wars in Europe or elsewhere. Yet, in the early nineteenth century, the system in Europe did succeed in inducting two new *republican* states, the United States and France, into its norms of behavior (Armstrong 1993). One of these, the United States, also went through a substantial period of neutrality. But by the end of the century, the system's resources were overstretched (Holsti 1991), as more aspirants appeared for recognition and equal status in the system. Even late in the nineteenth century, one could have believed that both Prussia/Germany and Italy would be allotted a place—not least because European powers had inexhaustible marginal territory to grab in Asia and Africa, with political orders and populations too weak to resist. This gave established and aspirant members improved economic prospects, and diverted pressures emanating from unintegrated domestic populations. But the pressure from the two late arrivals, plus an unstable Russia and declining Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, proved too much.

The outcome in WWI and its aftermath is well known. In spite of some grounds for optimism after 1918,[6] an upgrade of the nineteenth-century congress system in the form of the League of Nations proved again inadequate to maintain the order. The new arrivals rejected the established boundaries of their territories and subject populations; and the hands-off financial hegemony of Britain and the United States worked negatively, if it worked at all (Polanyi 1957, ch. 2). By the middle of twentieth century, the European state system was not only incapable of organizing its own membership, but had also run out of passive space in the margins beyond Europe. Africa was all taken, and Asians were resisting in India, China, and, most evidently, Japan. The impact of its margins then began to be felt *within* the system. In the absence of free space beyond Europe, Germany

and Russia clashed over territorial expansion in central Europe. The post-WWII national liberation movements continued the reflux by undermining the European colonialist states' integrity and, once their new state had joined the state system, rendering impractical its practice of balancing interests (Jackson 1990). Post-WWII Europe thus comes to be organized by two non-European states (Mazower 1998): as the system's mastery and use of its own marginal spaces failed, the cold war managed it from *outside* its core territory.

In context, the cold war can then be seen as an attempted resolution by other means of the problems emanating from the margins in the modern sovereign-state system—most evidently those on the edges of the system as a whole, but also those of marginal minorities within separate states. While it is proper to trace the cold war in the pre-existing rivalries between Russia and either Britain (Neilson 1995; Neilson 2006) or the United States (Gaddis 1990), the new mechanisms deployed by the parties in managing the state system at the global level—i.e., nuclear threat and universal ideological claims (Halliday 1989, ch. 1)—made the cold war something beyond the modern system's traditional power-balancing. Mutual assured destruction meant that the entire globe had to share the risks of the conflict, and the parties themselves engaged in a peculiarly intimate mutual coordination. Universal ideological claims heightened domestic control in the name of secular values sharper than had been seen since the religious confrontations of the Reformation (Mitter and Major 2004; Medhurst et al. 1990; Walker 1993, 58–92). The parallel beyond the domestic sphere was the tendency of each side to construe local conflicts exclusively in terms of the clash of these universal values (Halliday 1999; Wahl 1976). Europeans' nineteenth-century justification for colonialism as some kind of civilizing mission was further universalized by cold war superpowers.

These means of control were necessary to compensate for the failures of the European state system in the first place; that is, it's underplaying the problem of its boundaries and the very existence of its margins. Much of the ideologically justified military control went on outside of Europe, of course, because its non-European margins had been least effectively managed by the nineteenth-century system. The Third World was engaged in a process of simultaneously escaping European control and adopting European models of order (Parker 2000, ch. 4). Its political development was accordingly particularly unfathomable: a problem which the cold war ideological formulas solved by providing blueprints to global actors to interpret, and to proffer to local political actors. In the original European hinterland of the state system, ideological control was exercised via aid, political manipulation, and the encouragement of integration (Chace and

Ravenal 1976; Milward 1992; Stirk 1997): largely, that is, without military means—though clearly less so in the eastern, Soviet zone. The cold war patched up at the universal, global level, the weaknesses of the state system as practiced in Europe. In the partial dissolution of the system, states' strategic disharmonies continued, notably in the different perceptions of Yalta (Walker 1993, 8–58). But the change of structure—Europe managed from outside, by transformed military threat and ideological control—are undeniable.

Two important theories make a comparable interpretation of late twentieth-century global order, so that their findings may also be adduced in support of the previously mentioned account. An institutionalist historical sociology has tracked the evolution of the supra-national institutions that sought to supersede the European system (Deutsch 1957; Deutsch 1954; Ikenberry 2001). It recognizes the inadequacy of the modern state system to sustain order, and advocates supervening shared values.[7] Another current, inspired by Wallenstein's World-System Theory, sees "the long twentieth century" (Arrighi 1994) as the breakdown of the Europe-centered mechanisms ordering the territories and governments of the wider world according to the requirements of capitalism. Taylor has perceptively set out the dynamics by which—as the victorious power sought to sustain global-level domination each within its sphere—a world system-level shift was articulated in the strategic balance of the cold war (1990).

The end of the cold war can then be seen to *extend* the breakdown of the European state system to realize, in full, the last setup in our account, the postmodern. The formal end of the Soviet Union made open its defeat in the global rivalry between two sets of values, and, of course, the dominance of one (Fukuyama 1992). This is also met under the title "globalization," but inherent counter-tendencies toward opposition from the margins and separation into communities soon emerged (Falk 1999; Berger and Huntington 2002). The term "globalization," deeply ambiguous in itself (Scholte 2000; Youngs 1996), covers not so much a new order held together by one, liberal set of universal values, as a flux of contending orders and identities (Hassner 2003, 219–235).[8] This state of affairs is better captured by the—albeit originally rather celebratory—term the "post-modern," which gives prominence to the occurrence of indeterminate boundaries, the corollary of perpetual transitions in the territorial order, and the consequent necessity for two-way interaction and negotiation with the margins.

In this way, the post-cold war era emerges as the fulfillment of trends undermining the logic of the state system's organization of boundaries. Over the course of the twentieth century, marginal players can be seen, in the language of Chapter 1, to have been seeking loyalty and intermediation rewards, practicing emulation, asserting relative autonomy, and redefining

the center: that is to say, Europe's state system itself. The long-term outcome of this has left a postmodern setup, in which the sole aspirant to global-level control struggles to territorialize the threats it feels across the globe (Barnett 2004; Fukuyama 2004), and the deterritorialized conception of a global economic arena struggles to mask its inherent tensions. Europe itself, its state system crucially undermined, tries to belong both to the new universal order and to European parochialism (Ross 1998).

International Relations Readings of the Margins

If the end of the cold war brought, in Pierre Hassner's phrase, "the sudden disappearance of the international community's conceptual and international bearings" (2003, 49), then, naturally, political space and forms of agency must look less authoritative and permanent (Buzan 2004, ch. 4). In this context, we expect to see the reappearance of the margins in international relations thinking. And, indeed, there are signs of margins and marginality obtaining conceptual recognition. In discourses on integration, centrality and distance are now being read in terms of their interconnectedness. But some theories are more open than others to the inclusion of marginality.

Standard realist/neorealist theories, where power (defined as state's ability to influence outcomes) is the point of departure, display little willingness to go beyond the conventional categories. Rather, they dispose of ambiguity so as to sustain a homogeneity in international affairs that bolsters control. Margins are treated as mere deviations. They reveal, to be sure, the contingency behind the "pure" categories; so, the prevalent reading is that they represent a loss and/or a degeneration toward ambiguity and uncontrollability. In this conceptualization, identities and subjectivities conceivable on the margins remain constrained. Space is divided into clear-cut territorial units with no mixing of colors or blurring—or tolerance—of borders by overlapping spaces between states (Ruggie 1998a). A state's power, centered in its capital, flows out evenly across its whole territory. The "edge" of states is therefore absolute difference, a break with what lies beyond, where "us" and "them" are clearly distinct (cf. Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 80–99). If recognized, marginality is thus taken to be subordinate to the center, entailing a certain disenfranchisement (Browning and Joenniemi 2004, 702). Yet, even this reading has a positive account of the margin as "edges": margins fortify realist readings rather than challenge them. As mere outposts, if they are to contribute to the predictable established order, they must abide by the commands from the center and minimize their own subjectivity. This makes them objects of others' actions, with little interest for international relations analysis or theory. By appearing as a

deviation, they strengthen the center's standing and the reification of the characteristics of centrality, *reinforcing* the aspiration for control.

Various liberal theories, including liberal institutionalism, are more open to marginality. They recognize that power is not simply a function of the different material and structural power-capabilities of actors, but inheres in norms of acceptable behavior (Browning 2006). Norms point to a unifying framework setting limits on the use of power at the center, and permitting marginal actors to enjoy equal rights. They may influence policies by acting as norm entrepreneurs. Under the shared norms, marginal actors have a right to challenge realist assumptions favoring "great powers." No longer mute or obliged to reflect the approaches of central actors, marginal actors can acquire subjectivity and influence. Centrality may be favored by one aspect of power, but marginality may capitalize on others.

Because cognitivist analysis, along with various constructivist and post-positivist approaches, focuses on *self*-perception, it allows more scope for subjectivity than either realist or liberal theories. Marginal actors may be defined in terms of how either they or others perceive them—rather than in terms of what they are *not*, i.e., central. They are not, therefore, merely a derivative, residual reflection of the category of core. Yet, marginal actors who understand themselves within the realist framework are *objects* of power, with no prospect of impacting on crucial relations and the system at large, fighting a battle for survival at the mercy of the powerful actors in international affairs. They either have to acquiesce in the demands of central actors, or stay in the shadows. The emphasis on perceptions, on the other hand, invites us to link a particular type of policy or behavior to a particular mentality (cf. Browning 2006), in that marginal actors may be *perceived* differently—and may perceive *themselves* differently. Among other things, they may consider that the changing, more pluralist structure of the international system favors them, while the great powers lose out. Marginality *may* be thought more positively, then, dissociating it from inferiority and permitting power to reside also *at the margins*.

Conclusion: The Current/Future Powers of the Margins for Europe

Even when the national-state-based geometry's negative take on the marginal was at its most powerful—that is, during the period that European powers played the game of balancing each others, or when the cold war blocs engaged in the game with two players—there have always been some who stood outside, in terms that realist and liberal accounts of international relations can grasp well enough. There were neutral states (Switzerland, for example) that did well for themselves by staying on the margins. There were

groups of states (the Nordic countries) that operated in a different way: ceasing to compete amongst themselves and able to remain aloof from the rivalries between higher-profile actors. There were provinces (Quebec, Hong Kong, South Africa) and cultural/ethnic groupings (the Jews, the Mormons, the Irish) that maintained a separate identity or a degree of independence in spite of the dominance of the discourse of the national state.

Even within the modern state system's geometry, then, there has always been scope for some margins to exploit opportunities built into the formal structure. Swiss neutrality was happily permitted by the bigger players because they could use the country as a point of contact or a repository for valuables. Small states, which found themselves in between others seeking to balance each other, could play the rivals off against one another. There are numerous examples: from Denmark in the late nineteenth century to federal Germany or Cuba in the cold war. So, even where the dominant geometry of political order works to obliterate the marginal, there exist gaps in the dominant geometry, for the margins to exploit for survival or for gain. Such marginal maneuverings are conducted in a fashion implicit in the logic of the system itself, and have little impact upon the system's dominance, or the dominance of the bigger, powerful states—that is to say, upon the players who constitute the basis for the dominant geometry. So long as the discourse about the margins derives from that geometry, the marginal may be acknowledged, but it will remain a sideline.

But the post-cold war period and growing globalization give positive encouragement to an alternative geometry of overlapping spaces and *multiple* networks. These developments revive questions about the role, power, and influence of marginality and marginal actors, and prompt reconceptualization of borders as sites of ambiguity and interaction. Clear-cut delineations of political space are undermined. Consequently, conceptual innovations permitting a lack of "purity" and the contamination of the established categories of international relations may capitalize on the situation. That may in turn bolster resistance at the margins, or even convert marginal actors into valued partners for central actors trying to cope with the new ambiguities.

Marginality and marginal actors are no longer to be simply set aside as inferior and provincial, or suppressed by hegemonic forms. With the exhaustion of previous certainties, they have moved to a more significant position challenging order-building and clarity. Given marginality's weak standing in the ontology of the international order, one may wonder why international actors define themselves in the first place through their connectedness to one or more centers. Some answers emerge from our account of how marginality is constructed differently in different orders, and how

these appear at different times and places. This suggests how these geometries, including the roles they offer the margin, have evolved with the rise of different patterns of order throughout world history.

In the course of this chapter, we have developed a model of why the margins figure differently in the geometries and the discourses of the international system at different times and places. We have substantiated our model by an account of the evolution of the system in the twentieth century. This indicates how the earlier geometry of the modern state system lost its dominance. In the evolving international situation, geometry therefore needs to be thought in different terms, drawing, perhaps, on the time *before* the national-state system rose to dominance. Nowhere does this thought have more relevance than in respect of Europe, where the modern state system was established first and most fully; whose subsequent twentieth-century disorder evoked the adaptations of the cold war; where a plethora of formally sovereign states currently exist loosely covered by a new, *sui generis* political order of uncertain character and indeterminate capacity. Of all regions of the contemporary world, then, the identity of Europe can most obviously be sought in *interactions* between its various centers and margins.

By exploring how marginality manifests itself at different times and places, and the consequent possibilities of those on the margins, we have a model for prognoses of what the future might hold for the ever larger number of marginal players on the international scene. The model has linked a familiar account of the evolution of forms of human political order to a variation in the significance of marginality. The purpose has been not only to further demonstrate that marginality is a dynamic factor under various regimes, but also to indicate how it evolves. This last helps us to look for margins that can have significant impacts, and to anticipate in what ways to expect that they may do so.

Notes

1. The term "international" should not be taken to presuppose that the orders in question comprise nations or states of any other particular *kind* of entity. But since the available alternatives ("global," "world," etc.) make analogous assumptions, "international" is chosen in the absence of any term that is genuinely open to all possible kinds.
2. "Post-modern" is not the favored term of all who refer to these developments. Some (notably, Anthony Giddens [1990]) stress continuity by speaking of "late-modern"; others emphasize the depth of change with the term "globalized."
3. Further considered in Chapter 8
4. The idea that there are constitutive principles or rules has a history in English school and neo-realist international relations theorizing (Bull 2002; Buzan

2004, ch. 6; Ruggie 1998b), but can be quite properly be applied, as here, to orders *before* the modern state system and *without* the international-domestic divide that is fundamental in "international relations" theory.

5. Notably, a city state could *exclude* citizens from it relatively limited space (Hansen 2000, 54).
6. Armstrong, for example, regards the integration of post-revolutionary Russia as initially successful (Armstrong 1993, ch. 4).
7. Ikenberry couches the issue in the terms experienced by the United States as victor, arguing that only the "constitutional" variety of order can guarantee it continuing control. We argue, on the other hand, that the supra-state constitutional order seeks to overlay the state-centered mechanisms that were bankrupt by 1945.
8. Fukayama himself made a substantial concession to the communitarian counter-tendency in his study of the virtue of trust generated within limited communities (Fukuyama 1995).

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Part II

Margins around Europe

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4

Exploiting Marginality: The Case of Russia[1]

Maxine David

Introduction

The title alone of Odom's 1998 article, "Russia's Several Seats at the Table," raised intriguing questions about the nature of the table and how, given its status as a defeated state after 1991, Russia had managed to acquire those "several seats." Certain assumptions underlie these questions: that Russia does have those seats, that they are meaningful, and that Russia is a defeated state after 1991. Accepting the truth of these, the problem is firstly to understand how Russia managed to acquire the seats. The second question is how to reconcile Russia's reduced global and European influence with the fear and skepticism many neighbors still exhibit in their relations with Russia. How can we see a state as both weak and strong?

Given the nature of the problem, marginality provides a useful framework through which to find answers. It seems self-evident that states will appear weak in respect to certain states, and strong in respect to others. But how, in relation to the same actor, can a state appear simultaneously weak and strong? Marginality helps to understand this dilemma, as it "implies a site where bold innovation and nimble action are possible" and so requires us to see that some strength lies in weakness (Hartnell 2000, 29). Additionally, it provides a framework for understanding the intensity and scope of the effects of an enlarging Europe: effects felt in the center and in the old and new margins. While marginality refers to distinctions between the (dominant) center and the margins, these distinctions are subject to change. Clearly, margins are affected by the actions of the center, but reactions on the

margins have consequences for the center, too. From marginality, we can infer fluidity and leverage. I treat Russia as a margin, and in this framework its acquisition of the several seats is less puzzling.

This chapter examines the progress of Russia's foreign policy after 1991 to discover how Russia managed to extract concessions and compromises, within Europe, not simply there for the taking. I employ Hermann's concept of foreign policy, whereby "the essence of foreign policy is a sequence of exchanges"(1995, 256). This is in the tradition of the early Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954) work on action-reaction-interaction modeling, which emphasized the importance of understanding the way actors define their situation. With foreign policy as a "sequence of exchanges," how other actors define Russia's international position in relation to them is as crucial as how Russia defines its position. I argue that where Russia's foreign policy objectives are at stake, the *European* definition of self sets the context for Russian maneuvering. Russia claims the right to seek influence within Europe but this right is not necessarily acknowledged by "Europe," since Russia's Europeanness is disputed. Russia may consider itself to be an integral part of Europe, but does Europe concur?

I first set out my main hypotheses, claiming that Russia has found, in relative weakness, a high degree of strength, maneuvering effectively in Europe, and taking advantage of opportunities to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Next, I discuss the treatment of "Europe," seen as representing a postmodern order where traditional norms and values are challenged (Cooper 2004). Russian maneuvering in relation to the European Union (EU) is then examined in respect to economics, political strategies, and norms. The final section examines Russia-NATO relations during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, arguing that Russia successfully walked a fine line between traditional loyalties and the necessity of keeping the door open in its relations with NATO. Despite appearing weak relative to NATO, Russia proved it could continue to play an important role in Europe.

Strength in Weakness

Three hypotheses underpin the argument presented in this chapter: (1) Russia is simultaneously weak and strong; (2) a position on the margins does not confine the margins' room for maneuver, indeed it might bring new opportunities; and (3) extension of the center results in a dispersal of power, weakening the center and strengthening the position of the margins.

Taking the first of these, two major changes highlighted Russian weakness relative to Europe: Russia's cold war "defeat," and European enlargement. The accession to the EU particularly of central and eastern European

countries (CEECs) rendered these states more European, by contrast pushing Russia even further to the margins of Europe.[2] But if Russia was weak, how *had* it won those seats *within* Europe? On this basis, I hypothesize that, in relation to Europe, Russia appears *simultaneously* weak and strong. Some insight into this puzzle lies in the enlargement experiences of the CEECs.

The European enlargement process had clearly shown that weak states (the CEECs) could maneuver themselves into an improved situation, achieving concessions in their weak condition more normally associated with a strong state's negotiations. A place on the margins, so often equated with weakness, was turned to one of strength and influence (Parker 2000; Browning and Joenniemi 2004). Hence, the second hypothesis, that, prima facie detrimental effects notwithstanding, Russia gained new opportunities for maneuver as a consequence of enlargement and other changes. In terms of hypothesis 1, it is no surprise that Russia has found strength in weakness.

The inference from hypothesis 2 is that the center is vulnerable to limits on how far it can extend its power without risking its own security (hypothesis 3). Success in exporting political models can serve both as the center's weakness and its strength. As more states adopt these principles, and so create more linkages (Andreoli, cited in Jussila et al. 2001, 10), distinctions between center and margins are less pronounced, making the margins *less* marginal. As the center expands, it encounters new margins, offering them opportunities for maneuver. This potential for insecurity has not gone unrecognized by the EU: "The bigger the Union is, the greater its global interests will be. We will have new neighbors and longer borders with old ones. At the same time, we will be getting nearer to zones of present or recent instability" (Verheugen 2003, 3). The third hypothesis, therefore, informs the first, showing how a margin can be simultaneously strong and weak, as well as the second, revealing the scope for maneuver that exists on the margins.

Russia is treated as a margin to Europe, which after 1991 has enormous potential "impact upon" the center, as Noel Parker puts it in the introduction to this book. Russia has led recent debate about contemporary challenges to states. It has raised the specters of religious fundamentalism and terrorism in relation to its wars in Chechnya, and put a question mark against the relative priority of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention in the international system as a result of Kosovo.

Determining the Center: Europe

What, however, is this center upon which Russian actions have so much scope for impact? That Europe exists, with extensive power resources, is

clear. It thus deserves its designation as a "center." Any discussion of what *constitutes* "Europe," however, is problematic, for "Europe" is an undefined actor, lacking autonomy over a homogenous, clearly bordered space. Aalto speaks of the "non-fixed" nature of the boundaries of "Europe," a consequence of "the constant negotiation between the EU, member states and the accession countries" (2002, 150–51). Even the commonality of its history, experiences, culture, etc. is disputed, too (Crampton 1997; Schöpflin 1993). Yet, mid- to late-twentieth-century developments culminated in a sense of shared experience in which the beginnings of a European society were discernible based on shared values and concerns, and recognition of the benefits of cooperation. Schimmelfennig speaks of the EU as "the main organization of the European international community . . . based on a European and liberal collective identity" (2001, 59). This need to define "Europe" suggests scope for exploiting its "fuzzy identity." Some analysts, for instance, argue that the EU's enlargement eastwards is explicable by "kinship duty" (Fierke and Wiener 1999, Sjursen 2002). But risks are attached. Subjectivity is a double-edged sword. The EU might not be willing to engage in "navel-gazing" and decide what it *is*, but, vis-à-vis Russia, it might venture to say what it is *not*.

The EU is not the only, or even the most important, actor in Europe. For many of the CEECs, NATO was the flipside of the coin of EU membership. Despite U.S. dominance in NATO and the EU's developing Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), NATO continues to play its most important role in Europe, and so is seen as an actor constituting part of this center. The final consideration in defining the center relates to Russia's own perceptions and actions. Accordingly, I treat the EU *and* NATO as Europe.

Russia on the Margins of Europe

Next, I examine Russian objectives. Hypothesis 1 suggests that both losses and gains are identifiable. The strategic possibilities open to Russia are considered within this framework before discussion moves to other aspects of Russian maneuvering.

Since 1991, many of Russia's most important preferences in regard to Europe have not been met. NATO was not disbanded, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was not elevated in the security hierarchy. EU enlargement of former Warsaw Pact countries was not prevented. NATO also enlarged. The critical blow here was delivered by the Baltic states' accession, which crossed Primakov's "red line" and removed these states firmly from Russia's sphere of influence. Further, Russia could not protect its diaspora within them or convince the Council

of Europe to act decisively to do so. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) proved to be a shadow of Russian ambitions for it, and Russia and the United States became competing centers of gravity for Ukraine, Moldova, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus (Trenin 2004, 19). Internal problems also played their part in Yeltsin's various illnesses, symbolic of the country's disrepair. Symbol turned to reality with the 1998 financial collapse. Finally, the century ended with Russian humiliation complete, as it failed to protect a fellow Slavic country, Serbia, against NATO bombardment.

Despite and because of these bitter experiences, Russia continues to set its sights westward to Europe to achieve its ambitions. Russia argues that its place in Europe is based on historical, economic, and cultural factors. "Relations with European states are a traditional priority in Russia's foreign policy" (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2000). Former Russian foreign minister Ivanov spoke of a "big Europe" of which Russia is a part, saying that while Russia was not seeking full membership of the EU, it "was and will be a European power" (Ivanov 2003a). Putin, too, referred to Russia's European credentials: "Russia is a member of the 'European family' in spirit, history and culture" (Putin 2006). More pragmatically, the EU is a crucial player in the European security architecture, vital to Russia's economic interests and the enhancement of its image (Russia's Middle Term Strategy). While NATO undoubtedly has the potential to subvert Russian ambitions, it is the EU that is the bigger threat. Foreign minister Lavrov acknowledged that, materially and economically speaking, the consequences of EU enlargement could be more damaging than NATO enlargement (Rossiiskoi Gazete [Russian Newspaper] 2004). But Russia has faced the challenge head on. As with NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) before it, Russia refused membership of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),[3] instead negotiating a separate arrangement—the Four Common Spaces. In 2005, amid suggestions that the EU was "soft" on Russia, the two concluded the bilateral deal required by World Trade Organization (WTO) entry criteria (Kernohan and Vinokurov 2005). How has this been possible, given that for so long after 1991, Russia looked weak—economically, politically, and in relation to the norms/value base?

Economic Maneuvering

In trade terms, the Russia-EU relationship is heavily imbalanced. The EU currently accounts for 50 percent of all Russia's export trade, and Russia for only 5 percent of the EU's total exports. In 2005, EU exports to Russia

totaled 56.4 billion Euros, imports from Russia 106.7 billion, an imbalance of 50.3 billion. In the same year, the EU GDP was $13,400 billion, compared to Russia's at $764 billion (Barysch 2006, 12). Until the early 2000s, Russia was heavily dependent on foreign loans, while lack of confidence in the Russian market meant it failed to attract foreign investment.

However, Russian energy resources have driven Russian economic recovery, and contributed to an image of Russian-EU interdependence, not to say dependence. Since 1998, Russia has repaid $15 billion in foreign debt on the back of rising oil export revenue. Benefiting from new confidence in its market, the Central Bank has reported $41 billion in net imports of capital for 2006, compared to $1 billion in 2005 (Zykova 2007, 2). Energy is increasingly used as a weapon against non-compliant states in Europe, and increasing economic strength has put Russia on a more equal footing.
"The emergence of Russia as an energy superpower" (Wagstyl 2006, 4) has given Russia leverage in its relationship with Europe, although it is sending out mixed messages. Identifying energy as "one of the most acute questions worrying everyone today" and as "the key to progress in the modern world" (Telekompanuu Ren TV [Telecompany Ren TV] 2006), Lavrov also referred to European dependency: Finland, for instance, relies 100 percent on Russian supply (Lavrov 2006). Rhetoric interpretable as threats, and cutting off energy supplies are not good, long-term cooperative strategies. The chairman of Russia's Council for Foreign and Defense Policy warns of the dangers: "Unexpectedly rapid growth of Russia's international influence frightened many people, not least because our achievements may have gone to our heads and tempted us to behave arrogantly" (Karaganov 2007, R3). Karaganov might have added that real economic strength should not be based on one industry. Russia's recovery relied on energy and changes in that market, from which we must infer vulnerability to further change. However, Russia's bullying tactics must be considered alongside one of its most important foreign policy objectives: the establishment of a multipolar international system. Russia seeks to ensure that it is not marginalized. And its analysis of the necessity for joint, cooperative solutions is not mistaken. The threats ensure that the analysis is taken seriously, and energy resources should be sufficient to win time for the building of a stable, durable relationship.

Following EU enlargement, Russia has again been presented with new opportunities. EU expansion emphasizes differences likely to be found in any international organization, but more so in the context of Russia's historical relations with the CEECs. The energy issue gives Russia room to maneuver, demonstrating the dangers the center faces when it expands and meets not only new margins, but old enmities: "Russia has successfully exploited tensions within the EU, by playing members off against each

other, notably over the Baltic Sea gas pipeline which will supply Germany but circumvent Poland and other transit states" (Wagstyl 2006, 4). Consequently, even greater opportunities for influence exist in respect of Europe precisely because that center is so ill-defined, encompassing many different outlooks, particularly in the crucial area of foreign policy.

Political Strategies for Overcoming Weakness

Politically, Russia again combines weakness and strength. Prima facie, with no veto in the EU or NATO, it has little influence over decision-making in Europe. However, opportunities still exist. With no application for EU membership in sight, Russia is not susceptible to tactics used by the EU against the CEECs. But it does have similar weapons to the CEECs at its disposal, and more. The CEECs "forced" enlargement through "rhetorical action," reminding the EU of its founding ethos and shaming it into committing to its own rhetoric (Schimmelfennig 2001). In promoting itself as a values actor, the EU had little choice but to enlarge (Fierke and Wiener, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Sjursen, 2002). Russia has played on the fact that the logic of integration comprises arguments that can be harnessed by "outsiders" and "insiders." It has used rhetoric most successfully to underline Europe's vulnerability to a variety of challenges and problems, such as terrorism and organized crime. In speaking of the "increasing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure . . . dominated by the economy and power of the United States" (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2000), Russia draws attention to its weakness so as to emphasize the inherent dangers to *all* states in a unipolar system.

Russia's purpose in setting out these challenges is clear. It points to the existence of common threats *to Europe* in order to emphasize that they are best faced within an EU-Russia cooperative framework. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, Russia also applies something of the politics of fear. There are two aspects to this. First, in emphasizing weakness, Russia points out that strength can be found through multilateral efforts, which coincidentally affords the EU reason to pursue a relationship on a pragmatic basis, rather than on the troubled issue of shared identity. Second, Russia reminds the EU of European history's darker aspects and of the solutions found: "It was in Europe that military-political coalitions and alliances arose and fell apart, the fight between which led to the bloodiest of wars. On the basis of this tragic experience a unique culture of regulating problems and conflicts on a collective lawful basis, in a spirit of tolerance, mutual respect and a balance of interests was formed in Europe" (Ivanov 2003b). Ivanov further referred to Europe's potential as a global force for

good, and to its security system as an example for the international system. And he underlined Russia's place in the system as a partner, not an opponent. As was previously said of Lavrov, Ivanov combined the positive with an implicit threat: that history can be repeated when past lessons are forgotten.

Russia's most effective strategy in "winning its seat" with the EU has lain in forcing it to confront Russia as marginal. There are limits as to how much the EU can afford to let Russia be marginalized. Margins can "bite back" (Parker 2000, 8), and Russia is of lethal size, with unpredictable tendencies. It, too, is faced with unstable borders and uncertain relations with its close neighbors. The Russian logic of interdependence is too persuasive to be ignored, and demands the EU respond with strategies to prevent large-scale Russian marginalization. The weakening of the Russian state would invite disaster for Europe itself. Full integration is not on the agenda, but cooperation has intensified—a relationship underpinned most recently by the "Four Common Spaces" arrangement.

Values and Norms: Strength, or Just Weakness?

In speaking of potential for material and economic losses, Lavrov did not speak of the challenge EU enlargement represents in terms of norms and values; but Russia's marginality must also be considered in relation to the center's values. Germani concluded that marginalized populations within states were usually disassociated from nationally accepted values and standards of conduct. Thus, "the very lack of national identification appeared to many observers as a distinctive feature of the marginal condition" (1980, 4). Applied to the Europe-Russia relationship, Germani's point also suggests a lack of wider European identification for Russia. Russia's belonging in Europe, and its right to influence there is disputed. The very appearance of a Russian discourse placing Russia firmly *within* Europe, as Andrey Makarychev discusses in Chapter 5, suggests that Russia is *not* accepted. In terms of how others perceive it, Russia remains on Europe's margins, and even acts as "the other" in European definitions of self (Sjursen 2002).

In a sense, Russia is marginal to the *idea* of "Europe." Belief in "European" norms and principles is manifested in the existence of a highly institutionalized Europe, where Russia's place is not assured. European institutions are reluctant to extend full participation rights because "its locus of power, institutional design and conceptual basis places [Russia] at some remove and thus in a position where it is constantly trying to catch up with the evolution of European affairs" (Norman Davies in Webber 2000, 52). And Russia has to overcome its own perceptions. Baranovskii confirms both Russia's marginalization and its own recognition of it (1999, 9).[4]

Russia is relatively "disassociated" from the center's norms and standards, and is deemed different on cultural grounds (Neumann 1996; Hosking 2005). The CEECs' ability to overcome such disassociation, however, tells us something about the surmountable character of marginality. The EU's refusal to define what type of political entity it is, and to set clear boundaries leaves the margins room to maneuver. Development of the ESDP and deployment of troops to Bosnia, for instance, also represent a challenge to the EU's image as a civilian actor. If the EU will not say where Europe begins or ends, room is left for Russia to claim itself as European, forcing the EU to consider whether it wants Russia as friend or foe. Russia wants to be part of Europe, and there are sound reasons why Europe should engage with Russia on those terms.

Any change in EU attitudes will be dependent on Russia's behavior, however. If Karaganov's warning is ignored, Russia could forfeit valuable opportunities. This is particularly so given recent developments within Russia, where liberties are being withdrawn and democracy appears to be under attack. Russia has, however, exploited one situation very effectively. In values terms, Chechnya represents a vulnerable spot for Russia. In response, Russia has cast it as an example of terrorism. But it has employed, too, another strategy — rueful critique of Europe, reminding the EU of its own imperfect record. At a meeting of the EU Troika, Lavrov fended off questions about human rights violations in Chechnya by pointing out that certain acceding states still had not signed the European Convention on Human Rights and National Minorities, breaching the EU's own standards (Lavrov 2004). That Russia looks weak on the Chechen and human rights issue is hardly disputable, but it has pointed at the danger of any political actor taking the moral high ground. And the EU, its legitimacy based in the rule of law and the protection of rights, has, through eastward enlargement, opened itself up to attack on precisely these issues.

The 1999 Kosovo Crisis

Hypothesis 1: Strength and Weakness

The decade that had begun so badly also ended on a distinctly sour note when the Kosovo crisis emphasized Russia's inability to achieve its objectives in a traditional area of interest. It was not just the failure to protect fellow Slavs—Kosovo was the final proof that NATO was *the* forum for deciding the European security structure (Webber 2000, 31). Russia watched the rewriting of European security architecture from the outside. The effects, Russia feared, would be felt beyond Europe: "The Yugoslav

crisis and the subsequent events in Kosovo abruptly changed the global environment and placed the future of all existing systems of international relations under a big question mark . . . after NATO's war with Yugoslavia the possibilities of preserving . . . a multipolar world in its traditional understanding, have sharply narrowed" (Fedorov 1999, 19). Judging from this, Russia would seem to have little scope for demonstrating strength or capacity for maneuver. Yet, though it may not have achieved its immediate foreign policy objectives, in 1999 Russia did demonstrate the ability to adapt swiftly to changing circumstances and find a new role.

The beginnings of the crisis lay in the 1990 Serb attempt to claim Kosovo as a region within a Serbian republic—a move rejected when the Kosovo parliament declared its independence. By September 1998, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1199, calling for a ceasefire and dialogue between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Kosovo. The differing Russian and NATO strategies were immediately obvious—Russia demanding continued diplomacy, and the United States ordering NATO Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark to begin garnering support for military intervention (Smith 1999). Milosevic made few concessions to international pressures, and the violence continued until in January 1999, when the Albanian and Kosovan leaderships asked NATO to intervene. The Serb failure to sign the Rambouillet Accords resulted in commencement of NATO air strikes on March 24.[5] Signaling its extreme displeasure, Russia withdrew its representative at NATO headquarters, ceased participation in the Permanent Joint Council, and froze activities within the PfP.

The air strikes were a powerful marker of Russia's marginalization. Humiliating moments—such as when the Hungarians held up a Russian relief convoy bound for FRY (Leurdijk & Zandee 2001, 192), and when, under pressure from NATO, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania refused use of their airspace to the Russians (Simic 2001, 111)—underlined Russia's marginalization. In arguments with NATO about the relative priority of state sovereignty versus human rights, Russia was also sidelined: "In our eyes, an extremely dangerous precedent for the resolution of situations of conflict has been established—not on the basis of the UN Charter, of international law, the principles and norms of the OSCE, but on the basis of a primitive law of force" (Yelstin 1999, 62). NATO argued that the magnitude of human rights breaches made human rights first priority. Faced with Russian and Chinese intransigence, NATO acted without UN authority. The debate has resurfaced, of course, with the 2003 Iraq war. While Russia, in 1999, found itself marginalized in a value debate, in 2007,

Russia's stance looks far less marginal. Why was Russia not able to gain more from this debate in 1999?

"Europe" had already suffered heavy criticism for failure to prevent the worst occurrences of the earlier Yugoslav civil war. No discourse permitting further escalation of violence was going to be accepted by the center. The nature of the actor also reduced opportunities. Naturally attracting controversy, military actors tend to be less susceptible to attacks on their norms/values base. Finally, there was the matter of Russia's own "bad reputation."[6] Who—in the context of the Chechnya conflicts and, before that, of Afghanistan, the Prague Spring, and the 1956 Hungarian revolution—was going to take lessons in values from the Russians? Under these conditions, Russia had little room for maneuver. The fact that NATO escaped formal censure from the international community highlighted Russia's relative weakness even further.

Russia resorted to implicit threats to get NATO to recognize its own folly: "Attempts to organize European security on a so-called NATO-centric model, ignoring the national and political interests of Russia, bring with them the threat of instability not only for Europe, but for the world as a whole" (Yeltsin 1999, 62). References by the Russian Department of Foreign Affairs regarding the need to strengthen the Moscow-Peking-Delhi triangle were frequent and easily interpreted as a warning. But here, too, Russian weakness was evident—domestic problems turned such threats into bluster. Yeltsin was undergoing impeachment, relations between him and his Prime Minister—Primakov—were strained, and Russia was heavily indebted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Few were taking Russia seriously. In the midst of the crisis, the United States announced that it intended to take the Baltic states into NATO. Russian journalists greeted this news with the comment, "they are trying to damage Russia on all fronts" (Gornostaev and Sokolov 1999).

Bradshaw (1999, 8) explains Russian inconsistencies by its prospects of receiving money from the IMF or World Bank. Fedorov[7] is more blunt, saying, "it is difficult to speak and to be heard when your voice is first and foremost the voice of a petitioner" (1999, 19). That Russia *was* a "petitioner" is clear. After the 1998 financial crisis, the World Bank committed $6 billion and the IMF $11.2 billion to rescue Russia, as a result of pressure exerted by the Clinton administration (Stiglitz 2002, 148–49).[8] Yeltsin's reliance on foreign assistance heavily constrained Russia's opportunities, and was proof enough for NATO that Russia did not represent any kind of military threat. Russia's marginalization, therefore, carried few risks. There was one incident, though, where NATO's analysis looked flawed, and showed that unpredictable behavior could in itself be a useful strategy for those on the margins.

Hypothesis 2: Finding Room for Maneuver

Belgrade's decision, in early June, to comply with international demands gave rise to more difficulties. Russia's concerns now centered on ensuring its role in the ensuing peacekeeping mission. Fearing that NATO would control the operation and leave no role for Russia, the Russian General Staff[9] ordered its Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) unit, to march to Pristina airport in Kosovo, strategically important as the conflict zone's only large airport. Analysis of Russian motivations must take into account a number of factors. Only a small number of troops was involved and it would have been almost impossible to send in reinforcements. Ultimately, Russia was desirous of partnership within Europe, not enemy status, and in any case, at this time was far too reliant on Western aid to take any action that would stem that supply. All these factors suggest that the march to Pristina was not intended as a direct military challenge to NATO. Certainly, the arrival of Russian troops on June 10, before NATO, forced the latter to decide between confrontation and acceptance, but Pristina is best understood as a Russian reminder of the dangers of marginalization, rather than as any serious threat to NATO. The final decision on Russian participation in Kosovo Force (KFOR) operations may have been achieved even without events at Pristina airport, but the swiftness of the decision—Russia and the United States hammered out the agreement between June 16 and 19 (Leurdijk & Zandee 2001, 202)—suggests otherwise.

It was in its diplomatic efforts, however, that Russia displayed the most strength. Russian diplomacy was vital to the final cessation of violence and peace arrangements. Despite the weakness previously identified, Russia trod a delicate line between expressing extreme dissatisfaction and playing a decisive role on the "right" side, as will be discussed.

In a 1998 UN press release, Sergei Lavrov (Russian Permanent Representative to the UN) referred to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, calling for peaceful resolution through a negotiated political settlement. He made clear that use of sanctions or force would require a further resolution, and that unilateral intervention should be avoided, lest it destabilize the entire region. The Chinese, with far *less* to lose in terms of regional influence, abstained from supporting Resolution 1199, taking the view that it was an internal matter, and any intervention a breach of sovereignty. The contrast between the Russian and Chinese rhetoric is marked: Russia did not completely preclude use of sanctions or military action, it did not emphasize the internal nature of the conflict, and it supported the resolution. Lavrov also referred to "serious humanitarian consequences," while the Chinese made little or no reference to them. Lavrov's measured and conciliatory discourse contrasted sharply with the Chinese attitude.

During and after the air strikes, Russia used its relations to good effect, becoming an important player in the cessation of hostilities. Appointed the President's Special Representative, Chernomyrdin was very active, meeting regularly with Milosevic to mediate between Belgrade and NATO. In so doing, Russia began to be seen more favorably by NATO and other interested parties—except the Serbs themselves. Certainly, the EU representative, Finnish President Ahtisaari, spoke of Chernomyrdin's "central, key role" (Pyadishev 1999, 3). At the core of Russian success was its relationship with Belgrade; Defense Minister Sergeev's claim that only Russia was capable of renewing dialogue between the West and Belgrade was not an entirely idle boast (Rusanova 1999, 1). While Russia expressed its dismay at NATO's actions, it nevertheless worked hard to persuade Milosevic to comply with UN demands. In so doing, Russia sent two messages: the Serbs could not rely on Russia for support against NATO, and it was time to recognize that states were not fully sovereign, that they were sometimes held accountable to "higher authorities." The first message reflects Russian weakness. The second reflects Russia's capacity to draw strength from that weakness: "Russian diplomacy avoided the twin traps of outright defiance and abject dependency: a state with far fewer power resources than it desired nevertheless managed to assert its interest" (Lynch 2001, 24).

Hypothesis 3: The Weakness of the Center?

This third hypothesis is harder to prove in relation to Kosovo, since NATO clearly held the upper hand. Without Russian diplomacy, however, would NATO action alone have brought an end to the conflict, and when? More "mistakes," like the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, may have occurred; NATO may have been forced to send in troops, further escalating the violence; and certainly, more casualties would have been sustained. Setting aside United States-Russia differences, and seeing the air strikes as a necessity to loosen Milosevic's resolve, the United States and Russia actually made an effective team in bringing about the final June peace settlement—the one, militarily, and the other, diplomatically. Any weakness in the center was an inevitable consequence of the limited range of solutions open to it as a security actor. Russia, accepting marginalization in military terms, managed to insert itself into the few openings there were in European strategies.

In sum, Kosovo made clear that a new European security architecture had been established with NATO topping the hierarchy. With the UN sidelined, and the OSCE restricted to missions of a very particular type, this hierarchy did not seem to leave much room for Russian input or influence. Notwithstanding the special NATO-Russia relationship, Russia had no

power to effect change within the organization. This sent Russia a very clear message about the constraints within which it would now have to work, but it also created new opportunities for Russian influence. Diplomacy was the platform for Russian successes in Kosovo—a different role for this former superpower, but one that, if followed by similar successes, may cause a shift in outside perceptions of Russia, especially as it is combined with evidence of military weakness (notwithstanding the Pristina airport incident).

Conclusion

I began by asking two questions: how did Russia get its "several seats at the table," and how can we see a state as both weak and strong? The answer to the second lies in the marginality framework. Here, weakness and strength combine as change occurs that gives margins increased latitude for action. Post-1991 European changes brought uncertainty and shifts in inter-state relations. On Europe's margins, Russia looked weak; but it played on this to underline the necessity of it being allowed a voice in Europe. European enlargement brought Russia even more opportunities. This time the center looked weaker, meeting new neighbors and opportunities, but new dangers, too. In expanding, the center became vulnerable to maneuvering from new margins on the "outside" and those newly on the "inside." For margins, the center-margin relationship is an easier one: the center faces many margins, but each margin only one center.

The type of actor affects Russia's scope for making gains. It has won more concessions from the EU than NATO. This is partly a consequence of the EU's broader range of activity, but reflects also the fact that the avoidance of conflict is the EU's *sine qua non*. We must remember how margins may "bite back": Russia will not just disappear, and weak margins bring unsafe boundaries and more uncertainty. So Russia has unprecedented opportunity to demand and receive concessions from the EU. Finally, the EU's relative indistinctness is beneficial to Russia. Faced with a strong Russian discourse of belonging to Europe, the EU is not prepared to deny the claim openly. First, not all member states would agree, and second, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have put the EU on a weaker footing in this regard—Russia can make as good a claim as Bulgaria for "belonging" to Europe. The EU has very little choice *but* to engage with Russia, and hence "nimble action" by Russia is made possible.

Kosovo was proof of Russia's losses in its sphere of influence, and enlargement looked like legitimacy for NATO, at Russia's expense. Here, it was Russia's weakness, rather than the center's, that was the strongest catalyst for

change. Through Chernomyrdin's work, however, the Russian state became an effective diplomatic actor, capitalizing on a role, networks, and knowledge not available to NATO. This was "bold innovation" that made Russia and NATO look like good partners, with complementary rather than unequal strengths.

Having exploited its uncertain position on the margins, Russia has won seats at the most important European tables. For all sides, there is hope that continued cooperation will build trust and understanding. For Russia, this may be the only way to overcome the legacy of its past actions, and to meet Europe with policies of cooperation, rather than obstruction. Outcomes here will ultimately be best tested in the CIS arena, where fear of Russia's power and ambitions, and a high level of mistrust have led to a failure to fulfill Russian expectations. A continued course of cooperation with "Europe" might lead CIS states to conclude that business can be equitably done with Russia, too. Marginality, in respect to Europe, could make Russia look like a friendlier center for those currently on *its* margins.

Notes

1. My thanks to Noel Parker and Roberta Guerrina for their comments and suggestions.
2. Although Russia remained strong relative to CIS states, their status within Europe is also undefined.
3. This 2003 initiative does not solely reflect desire for new markets and influence. It acknowledges that centers of power are a target for resentment and aims to offset that resentment.
4. Of the Institute of World Economy & International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
5. The course of the crisis is well documented. See, for instance, Smith 1999; Leurdijk and Zandee, 2001
6. Modelski (1962) argues that certain actions of states result in "power liabilities," where a state's past constrains its future power output. One type of liability is bad reputation, here considered as the biggest constraint on Russia.
7. President of the Foundation for Political Research, director of the political programs of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy.
8. From a marginality point of view, it is interesting to note that Stiglitz explained this action on the basis of the Clinton administration's desire to "maintain Boris Yeltsin in power, though on the basis of all the principles which should have guided lending, it made little sense" (2002, 166). Stiglitz was World Bank Chief Economist from 1997–2000.
9. Precisely who gave the orders is disputed, but there is agreement that neither the Foreign Ministry nor Chernomyrdin were aware of the proposed action.

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5

An Encounter of Two Marginalities: EU-Russia Transborder Relations in Russian Discourse

Andrey S. Makarychev

Introduction

This chapter is an attempt at giving a Russian perspective on EU-Russia transborder relations, which metaphorically could be described as an encounter of two patterns of "border marginalities" exemplified, on the one hand, by a variety of border-located subnational regions in Russia's northwest, and, on the other, by a group of the new EU members sharing common borders with Russia. Each of these actors develops its own *strategy of marginality*, aimed at exerting some influence upon the two cores (Moscow and Brussels).

In theoretical terms, my analysis is based upon a combination of two broad approaches: one is grounded in the concept of *marginality*, while the second one is rooted in the concept of *representation*. Both will be briefly introduced in this chapter.

The concept of *marginality*, as developed by Noel Parker, focuses on the questions that the transborder relations raise for the understanding of political space in general, and the construction of Europe in particular. As fairly autonomous spaces, margins are able, under certain circumstances, to develop strategies of their own. Marginality provides new opportunities and openings for regional actors. Thus, territories located at the intersection

of different polities and identities are capable of making a better use of their resources through inclusive cooperation with adjacent territories. Margins are important components of different policy constellations because they usually have room to maneuver and a meaningful degree of freedom in exploiting their location. Margins are reluctant to accept that the core speaks for them; moreover, they may participate in defining the nature of the core itself (Parker 2000).

The story of marginality is part of a post-structuralist conceptualization of territoriality. Being on the margin underwrites a specific potential impact upon neighboring areas. Margins always have a choice to make, and the cores may compete for their loyalties. A strategy of marginality becomes conceivable whenever a region starts to treat the outside world as a source of opportunities, instead of being fearful of its neighbors.

Marginal territory may enjoy some freedom because of the mere possibility of existing outside the center's sphere of influence. Tensions between centers and margins are inevitable, but the marginal position might be turned into an advantage in a variety of ways, including rent-seeking, charging the center in return for remaining inside, and so on (Parker 2004). By use of external connections—"a vaccination from the outside" (Treivish 2003)—margins try to insure against political losses and economic setbacks. The discourse of marginality may also encompass compatible potentials for more than one center, or a division of roles between them. The search for positive "in-between" solutions is an intrinsic part of a set of "marginality strategies" that some border regions endeavor to implement.

The concept of *representation* is closely interconnected with two further notions, *equivalence* and *hegemony*. There are, by and large, two traditions of theorizing about representation in political theory. One of them is ideational in a sense that it is a certain set of ideas that have to be represented by the political subject. For example, Carl Schmitt related representation to the power manifested in the ability of certain institutions to represent the most persuasive social or religious ideas (Schmitt 2000). In the Russian literature, similar ideas can be found in Dmitry Zamiatin's conceptualization of geo-cultural images as specific forms of representation: in this sense, for example, Kaliningrad may represent the idea of enhanced EU-Russia relations.

Another reading of representation approaches it as interest-based. The precondition for representation here is the existence of what might be called a "chain of equivalence": a group of actors that share a number of essential characteristics, such as geographical location, which prioritizes transborder issues for both Russian northwest regions and the "new" European countries bordering on Russia. Here, we are dealing with a subtle form of representation grounded not in formal conventions but in the

multiplicity of image-building resources. This interpretation is grounded in Ernesto Laclau's approach, according to which "the means of representation are . . . only the existing particularities. So one of them has to assume the representation of the chain as a whole. This is a strictly hegemonic move: the body of one particularity assumes a function of universal representation" (Laclau 2000a, 303). One can discern two "chains of equivalence" in the area of EU-Russia relations. On the one hand, the EU countries bordering on Russia constitute a specific group of state actors that are equal to each other in at least one sense: all are geographical neighbors of Russia. On the other hand, another imaginary "chain of equivalence" is formed by Russian subnational regions, located on the other side of the border. Laclau's scheme is grounded in the existence of an external other, that is, a center outside that legitimizes the association within a "chain of equivalence" and might lead to the appearance of its hegemonic representative.

In this chapter, I seek common ground between these approaches to representation: the countries and regions that I study can be seen to represent both certain ideas (such as the Euroregion-type transborder cooperation) and a certain group of border-located units. I use the concepts of marginality and representation to explain the specificity of the Russian discourse on a variety of transborder issues in general, and discuss, in particular, the possibilities of grounding this discourse in the concept of hegemony.

There are both promise and problems in involving the concept of representation in the study of border marginalities within EU-Russia relations. On a positive side, the concept seems to offer additional insights in approaching marginality. There are a variety of marginalities, and for each case of marginal actors, we need to discern the messages they convey and the identities that frame these messages. More problematically, projecting the concept of representation into transborder relations requires certain readjustment to the transnational roles played by non-central actors. The story of marginality may be premised on actors' location at the interface of two competing political entities. The margin is a zone of "binary identification" that might lead to either "double belongingness" (exemplified in the concept of "overlapping near abroads" in the EU-Russian neighborhood), or to a "double non-belongingness"—allowing not only maneuvering/balancing between two centers, but also margins' autonomy (Kaganskii 1996, 48).

Marginalities at Work: Russian Border Regions' Discursive Strategies

In this section I chart discourses of marginality in Russia-EU transborder relations. The diversity of marginalities, as seen from the Russian side, can

be explained by how characteristics of marginality are intertwined with those of provinciality, peripherality, and alternative centrality. This diversity, as I will argue, precludes the border-located regions from generating a pattern of hegemonic relations.

The first chain of equivalence seems to comprise subnational units within Russia sharing common border with the EU: the Republic of Karelia and the oblasts of Kaliningrad, Pskov, Murmansk, and Leningrad. Within this group, there arise regions seeking competitive advantage through effective models of transborder cooperation. It is within this semantic context that one should read the expressions "pilot region" (pertaining to Kaliningrad), "Europe's doorstep" (emerging within the Pskov political milieu), and others.

Marginality plus Alternative Centrality: The St. Petersburg Discourse

A proliferation of "*secondary capitals*" reflects a tendency amongst Russia's largest cities to raise their voices as "subcenters," reproducing features of centrality as they do so. Thus, the main cities of Russia's domestic republics may officially promote themselves as their capitals (as, for example, Petrozavodsk). Ivan Mitin calls the small city of Olonets not only "the capital of Southern Karelia" but a "provincial capital." He treats Belomorsk in the same vein, as "the Northern capital of Karelia" (Mitin 2004). Yet the formula of *marginality plus alternative centrality* can best be deciphered with St. Petersburg, seemingly the only Russian city capable of simultaneously pursuing both discursive strategies.

"Secondary capitals" pop up in non-central discourses infused with a political longing for centrality. On the one hand, there have been projects to transfer administrative functions from Moscow to other cities eager to develop their "strategies of centrality." In the meantime, there is grassroots activism for implementing strategies of "secondary capital-ness," especially in St. Petersburg. Some politicians lambast these endeavors as "capital-mania" or even "epidemics of capital city proliferation." The reasons for bids for alternative centrality vary: from the search for politically appealing ideas, to a need for private capital, to a desire to distinguish the region from its neighbors, etc.

The proliferation of various "strategies of centrality" seems in tune with a postmodernist conceptualization of "dispersed centrality." Yet most "alternative centrality" discourse belong to a modernist pattern of territoriality, merely contesting established centrality. In their relations with neighboring territories, "regional capitals" tend to imitate a centralized

administrative model practiced by Moscow in relation to the rest of Russia, draining resources from "non-central" areas with the resulting polarization of wealth. Regional capitals duplicate the behavior of the federal center as they deal with each other.

In its pursuit of centrality, St. Petersburg can be called an "ex-centric city," one located geographically at the edge. "Ex-centricity" makes St. Petersburg irreducible to "Russia's average" and dissimilar to other Russian territories. From its "off-center position," St. Petersburg has become an "internal analog of an external center" (Koroliov 1997). Sometimes, the city appears foreign, an outsider in comparison with adjacent provinces (Lehti 2001). With its Dutch or German associations, the name seems to give "some degree of mental openness" (Joenniemi 2001) to the city's discourses.

This is how marginality comes to complement the "alternative centrality" of St. Petersburg's inclination toward Europe. St. Petersburg's multiple images are reinforced by outward-oriented and retrospective discourses taking advantage its European pedigree. The local authorities frequently use symbols to corroborate their international credentials. The result is that St. Petersburg has surrounded itself with multiple myths, each consonant with the city's ambitions to design its own version of marginality as an "alternative centrality."

Thus, St. Petersburg is dubbed "Russia's window to Europe,"—while other cities may interpret St. Petersburg as a symbol of the empire's foreign priorities, the local discourse stresses the city's European heritage. Secondly, St. Petersburg proclaims the images of "Northern Palmyra" or "Northern Venice": a depository of world-class art and architecture. Reviving cultural capital and exporting it to the West has been a successful enterprise.

Alternative/secondary centrality might eventually entail domestic consequences for Russia, including deconcentration of financial flows, growing mobility of resources within the country, and the formation of new "growth poles." On the other hand, "strategies of centrality" do not automatically make the EU agenda attractive in Russia. Attempts to reverse the national ranking of Moscow and St. Petersburg are "hardly conducive to opening up and stressing the significance of links with Europe. It may suggest a vision of St. Petersburg as a truly Russian configuration unfolding along old imperial lines" (Joenniemi 2003, 598).

Marginality and Peripherality: Images of Northernness

Periphery, in Kaganskii's conceptualization, is a dependent resource base for the center: inconveniently positioned, exposed to external dangers, and subordinated. It is usually an underdeveloped economic backwater with a

"satellite mentality"—the "crippled, inferior, deficient and defensive identity of incomplete" (second-rate) membership in the national political community (Sztompka 2004). The periphery acquires a group of meanings, "deviation," "imitation," "jealousy," and the like. Peripheries have been expropriated or colonized by the center, which established its "zone of preponderance." For the center, peripherality is an excuse for the exploitation of resources, the space of a single culturally and politically dominant vector imposed from outside, void of comprehensive self-description. The periphery is a place rather than a space, and in its most radical versions, comparable with social emptiness. Connections between the periphery's Fragments, bypassing the center, are highly complicated. Decision-making procedures are "a-geographic" in the sense that they may be mechanically reproduced regardless of the local specifics.

Relations of dependency turn the periphery into a "client" with limited capacity to affect processes beyond its boundaries (Kosonen 1997). Peripheral development will be "subordinating adaptation," since the periphery is utilized by the center and is constrained in any policy of self-reliance (Kakonen 1998). Peripheries are objects of expansion for the center, destined to live by its imposed predispositions. This may foster conflicts between the periphery, which sees itself disadvantaged in the receipt of public goods, and the center's elites, "seen as bestowing negative externalities by their influence over public goods allocation policies" (Cox and Reynolds 1974, 33).

This is not to say that the periphery is incapable of producing its own strategies. At least three may be hypothesized: making use of the periphery's few advantages, cheap labor, rich mineral and energy resources, and relatively decent environment; living on external resources (a possibility widely explored by the Russian peripheries); and keeping aloof of conflict so as to gain peaceable reputation and protect themselves from extremist policies by not participating in international conflicts.

The periphery is sometimes praised for being "under-explored," "untouchable," and even "unknown." The dynamism of this lies in the periphery's capitalizing on its discursive essence—distance from power centers, and avoidance of negative externalities from the center. The discourse of peripherality then merges with that of marginality, producing a number of noteworthy combinations. In Kaliningrad, in particular, one may discern some more optimistic formulations of identity in terms related to marginality.

Perhaps the most interesting peripherality-cum-marginality discourse is articulated by Russian thinking where the North, in the domestic sphere, is peripheral, but is labeled a margin when entering the transnational scene. The North had a reputation for dependency on the center's infrastructure and guarantees of a degree of social protection. Yet, the northern regions

are eager to come up with their own ideas of their future. Here is one striking narrative in praise of peripherality as a lifestyle: "Forget about Moscow. Moscow is but a greedy hole in the infinity of Russian ice . . . Why do we need a Moscow that sold the country for 'plastic bags' [a metaphor for Western-style merchandise]. To the North, go to the North (Tovarish 2000)." This type of discourse may attract enthusiasts in many northern regions of Russia.

A number of features in this "go-North" narrative can be placed at the intersection of peripherality and marginality. First, it contains strong political arguments: Russia's capital, compared to a "concentration camp" full of police, is accused of extracting resources from northern territories rich in minerals and energy. Moscow is lambasted as an administrative center, and deligitimized as a hotbed of Russian statism. Moscow politics is associated with futile "moaning," garrulousness, haughtiness, and aimless convulsions. Secondly, the discourse simultaneously appeals to a nationalist mindset over Russia's prospective leadership in a circumpolar civilization. In particular, it claims that the values of democracy have been introduced into Russia through indigenous parliamentary institutions, known as *veche*, with roots in the North. A democratic message seems to be quite visible in the repeated appeals to revive the North by the concerted efforts of free people. Thirdly, the "go-North" discourse deproblematizes an old opposition between "Eurasianists" and "Atlanticists," by introducing a new vector for Russian self-identification. Similarly, it seeks a compromise between globalization (a new "world order" based on a northern way of life) and regionalization (transborder cooperation and federalism). Fourthly, despite its a-centricity, the discourse contains strong components of longing for a peculiar version of centrality, which surfaces each time Russia is called upon to turn to the northern expanses so as to become the most influential country in the world.

Marginality and Provinciality: The Pskov Oblast Discourse

The province, in Kaganskii's interpretation, is a self-sufficient area, where the indigenous population dominates the cultural landscape and saturates the cultural milieu with meaningful images. The province is a "nucleus" of the country's self-identification, and usually presents itself as "typical" for the whole nation. Without the province, a spatial system would become an amorphous entity between core and borderlands (Kaganskii 1997). Politically, the province remains loyal to the center and plays by its rules. But, culturally, it may challenge the center's hegemony with alternative identities, and contest the center's assumed right "to realize the fullness of society (to

fill 'the empty place') through the development of a particular political project" (Daly 1999). Patriotism may well develop outside the core areas, as in the example of Pskov, whose discourse exemplifies the province, from contesting the center's innovative societal role (e.g., the civic law in medieval Russia), to accusing the center of indifference to the oblast (Pskovskaya 2004).

The idea of a province prioritizes liaisons between the center and noncenters. It is therefore inward-oriented, focused not only on international recognition of border regions as actors but also on domestic subjectivity. Hence, it is in tune with treating borders not only as instruments of interstate relations, but also as constructs for national consolidation. Provincial identities need borders to mature. Pskov oblast's discourse is exemplary. Depending on the contextual frame, two different stories—one of marginality, one of provinciality—may co-exist and intermingle.

A chain, a transit territory, a guard post, a point where Russia ends, "almost Europe": Pskov has repeatedly experimented with all these metaphors in a bid for a strategy of marginality. That is how one should interpret the meanings of Pskov's "in-between" identity, on which the city's 1,100-year anniversary celebration was grounded. The most stimulating message, politically, was that Pskov must become "Russia's face turned toward Europe."

To see deeper into Pskov's marginality discourse, we must look outside the domestic core. Subtle policy frameworks emerged as Pskov offered opportunities for transborder interactions. The Nordic countries, in particular, are an important pole, which Pskov has (re)interpreted as a story of commercial and intercultural communications between "West" and "East." The "Nordic lesson" of pacification has been accepted, not least because Pskov has been seized many times by Western powers.

However, there are factors to hinder Pskov's marginality discourse. First, neither Estonia nor Latvia—the neighboring countries—nor the EU always allow Pskov the role of a margin. Secondly, Moscow is also suspicious of external activities by regions. In the Kremlin, these can be interpreted as undermining Russia's geopolitical position and as detrimental to security. Thirdly, though many local experts deem connections with the EU the only reliable source of development, most regional decision-makers appear to have only a vague knowledge of the EU (Shlosberg 2004).

The Pskov region therefore tries to gain subjectivity vis-à-vis Moscow, through its own game on the border with Estonia and Latvia, while simultaneously seeking leverage with Brussels. In Europe, the oblast finds itself in a controversial, though stimulating, environment of conflicting external influences. By virtue of its location, it is destined to find identity in a complex of different spatial and temporal orders. It has not only to distinguish itself from spaces where it does not belong, but also to adopt the best of the new geometries of regionalism that pertain to Europe-building.

Margins and provinces may be regarded as two sides of the same coin. However, the strategies are different in terms of their vectors: marginality discourse is externally oriented and usually concerns borders; provincial discourse is directed toward the domestic core. Another difference is that margins look for a niche in between competing centers, while provinces tend to remain politically loyal to the center, while manifesting cultural distinctness. The discourse of provinciality (roughly associated with Pskov) highlights political loyalty but cultural difference; marginality (Kaliningrad and the northern territories) aims gradually to influence Moscow's policy-making machinery; alternative centrality (St. Petersburg) plays the game of cultural and political rivalry with the capital. However, it remains debatable whether Moscow is interested in recognizing these self-attributed roles. The border-located regions composing, in Laclau's terms, the "Russian chain of equivalence," are clearly heterogeneous: each comes up with its own discourses and identity. Given this, we can expect that the federal center under Putin will succeed in imposing its political agenda through hegemonic interventions, to strengthen what is known as the "vertical of power" and centralization.

Unfriendly Margins: Russian Discourses on the "New Europe"

Whereas on the Russian side marginality is ideational, on the EU side it is institutionalized. In this section, I analyse Russian discourses on Europe via the "New-Old Europe" debate.

The second chain of equivalence previously discussed comprises five countries (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) and contains intrinsic dynamics related to these countries' self-positioning toward Moscow. There has been a tacit competition between some of them to be considered the most able to represent the EU in the East. EU enlargement could even be interpreted as a loss to Finland's monopoly (e.g., the "Northern Dimension") as the only EU country bordering Russia and, hence, a privileged representative of the EU approach to its largest neighbor.

However, the new EU members were keen to reposition themselves vis-à-vis Russia, following Finnish experience, and play the role of "useful" newcomers, best fulfilled by *representating* the EU. The most pronounced instance was the Polish "Eastern Dimension" initiative (ED).

"New Europe" in the Russian Foreign Policy Discourses

Structural preconditions for analyzing the hegemonic framework of Russian discourse on the "New Europe" can be found in multiplicity and

vagueness about Europe. Russian discourse paints several conflicting pictures of Europe, which makes debate on which represents Europe indispensable. "Europe does not perform as a subject, she needs to be kidnapped" (Maler 2005): this remark is the most concise articulation of the argument pointing to the inevitability of "anchoring" Europe as a floating signifier. Russian positions are nicely confirmed by the logical link drawn by Baltic authors to "the Baltic states' struggle to be recognized as true Europeans," and their influence upon EU policy vis-à-vis Russia (Malksoo 2006, 279).

The Russian discourse contains the view that "Europe is structured by its own dislocation . . . There is nothing within Europe . . . except for multiple testing of different borders" (Kralechkin 2005, 3). This indicates a special role for border-located (and therefore marginal) actors in defining Europe; it is these actors that institute Europe's new borderlines. On a theoretical level, "this amounts to . . . the very undecidability or indeterminacy of the limit itself, and, if we accept that political identities are only constituted in relation to this limit, this means that these identities themselves are indeterminate and unstable" (Newman 2004, 151).

Most Russian conceptualizations set more or less fixed geographic parameters for "New Europe." For many commentators, the difference between "Old" and "New" Europe roughly coincides with the continent's West-East cleavage (Kazin 2004). In this vein, "Old Europe" appears to embrace the "New" one (Shastik 2003). Russia's territorial understanding of the "New Europe" could be explained by the conflictual nature of Russia's relations with countries at Europe's margins that joined the "New Europeans." The uneasy relations with Poland are indicative, as Polish writers themselves confirm: the country "is trying for regional hegemony" (Bukalska 2003, 5). The ED initiative sharpened the Russian debate on the EU's selectively offering partnerships to eastern countries. In so far as commentators in Warsaw even try to make the granting EU's neighbor status depend upon normative criteria (Cichocki et al. 2002), Filip Kazin reasons that "the Poles . . . fix the 'weight categories' and put one of the players [Russia] out of the competition, while the EU bureaucracy wants to place everybody on a level playing field, hold a training exercise and see what comes out of it" (Kazin 2003, 96). There is a feeling in Russia that Poland is reluctant to accept the common "rules of the game" offered by the EU to all adjacent countries, and eager to distinguish Ukraine (plus potentially Moldova and Belarus) from other eastern neighbors (Kazin 2003), thus shifting the issue to power politics. Hence, margins might be sources of political exceptionalism directed against Russia's interests.

Yet, Russia itself does not seem free of exceptionalism in framing relations with its immediate western neighbors. This is clear in Russia's

demands to Baltic neighbors. It would be unthinkable to extend, to countries like Germany or France, Russian demands for bilingual education in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (though Russia appears unable to obtain the demands) i.e., to eradicate the sources of xenophobia and foster ethnic minorities' cultural rights. Russia is eager to adjust "New Europe" to her own needs and frame the debate so as to justify geopolitical moves identifying Russia's friends and foes. It is in this sense that one can discern a Schmittian heritage in the Russian perception of its margins. Headlines like "A Smelly Country"(Russkii kurier 2005) for the state of affairs in Latvia are not rare in a Russian media full of clichés indicating that "on the other side of the border things are getting even worse" (Izvestiya 2005). Russian media coverage of the post-accession period is framed by descriptions of the "vodka tourism" and gasoline smuggling (Ivanov et al. 2004).

Security issues were also divisively actualized in the framework of the "Old-New Europe" debate. As the three Baltic republics celebrated their double accession in Spring 2004, Russian media were full of stories of possible NATO deployment in the vicinity. The war of words reached its apex in the decision of Riga authorities to bar Dmitry Rogozin, a former presidential envoy on Kaliningrad affairs, from Latvia (Riekstins 2004). The dominant Russian discourse therefore seems highly critical of the "New European" margins—very much so with regard to the Baltic countries. In 2003, Sergey Glaziev and Dmitry Rogozin, then leaders of the "Rodina" party, suggested that Russia must threaten Lithuania by raising territorial claims and refusing to ratify the bilateral border treaty (Mayak Baltiki 2003).

Having lambasted the "newcomers," Russia tries to address the EU as a whole. Two arguments stand out. First, "New Europe" is represented as a group of troublemakers annoying *both* Russia *and* the EU. The accession of former socialist countries in 2004 was repeatedly depicted in the media as an "invasion" likely to stimulate rising prices and threaten EU agriculture (Privalov and Sychova 2004). "Europe became larger and poorer," ran the headline reflecting many opinion makers in Moscow (Tsvetkova 2002). Secondly, Russian politicians characterized the newcomers as "America's fifth column in Europe" (Ekho Moskvy 2004). The heart of today's Europe, the argument ran, is to be found in the United States, which creates the "New" and "Old" Europe clash. Some Russian analysts equate "the New Europe" with a "New Atlanticism" (Fiodorov 2004).

Russian attempts to discredit the "New European" nations may resonate with the opinion of European policy analysts that the "three Baltic republics and Poland will definitely turn into a complicating factor in EU-Russia relations. Nevertheless, the political elites of France and Germany willing to keep working with Russia will not allow the small countries to spoil significantly the work so far done" (Kromme 2003, 4).

The conflict with "New Europe" was manifest in Russia's reaction to attempts to rewrite the script of the Second World War. Russian official discourse placed responsibility for questioning the liberating role of the Soviet Army on the shoulders of Baltic political elites. Latvia appeared to be blamed most for its reluctance to acknowledge that the USSR had saved Eastern Europe from fascism. Symbolic gestures equating Hitler and Stalin, or undermining the consensus interpretation of the war's outcomes, were seen in Moscow as "New Europe's" transgressing the fundamental principles of the post-Second World War setup. Russia used this situation as illustration of "New Europe's" intentions to distort the European idea. Concomitantly, Moscow suspects the "New Europe" of undermining Russia's international position. It is against this background that Russia reacts to the rising activism of countries like Estonia in the Caucasus, an area thought to lie in the sphere of Russia's vital interests.

Conclusion

We can conclude that the concept of marginality may be analytically extended to include Laclau's "chains of equivalence." I have argued that EU-Russia relations can be viewed as a terrain of encounter for two "chains of equivalence." The first is found in Russian regions bordering the EU. A number of discursive moves at subnational level—such as Pskov's self-presentation as "a doorstep to Europe"—could be described as "relations by which particular identities take up the representation of something different from themselves" (Laclau 2000b, 56). A particular unit in a regional "chain of equivalence" claims a function pertinent for *all* the units. Regional agents are thus "constitutively overdetermined—that is, they . . . represent something more than their mere particularist identity" (Laclau 2000b, 58). This potential "hegemonic move" could also be discerned in the discourse about Kaliningrad as a "pilot region," which is about a particular regional experience's being extendable to other regions. Thus, border regions appeal to a wider meaning for the whole "chain of equivalence." In Laclau's terms, "the sectorial aims" of a unit operate "as the name for a universality transcending them—this is a synecdoche constitutive of the hegemonic link" (Laclau 2000b, 57). Reformulating Laclau, a border region's agenda is split "between its own particularity and a more universal dimension" (Laclau 2000a, 302). As Laclau specifies: "If the equivalential chains extend to a wide variety of concrete demands . . . the resulting collective will will find its anchoring point on the level of the social imaginary . . . It is the empty character of these anchoring points that truly universalizes a discourse, making it the surface of inscription of a plurality of demands beyond their particularities" (Laclau 2000a, 211; 2000c, 210).

Within Russia's regions, there were multiple attempts to produce "empty signifiers" that reach semantically beyond a given territory. What is important is that "there is a gap between its concrete content and the set of equivalential meanings associated with it" (ibid.). Presumably, *all* regions bordering on the EU could have interpreted their roles as "doorsteps to Europe," just as *all* border regions could have been called "laboratories" for EU-Russia interactions. Therefore, we have a set of discursive constructs free of rigid territorial determinacy, transferable templates that could fit a number of regional strategies. To quote Laclau: "Once they become the generalized language of social change, any new demand will be constructed as one more link in the equivalential chain" (Laclau 2000c, 86).

Yet, limitations to the formation of hegemonic relations are also discernible. Each of the border-located regions of Russia is eager to reposition itself as either the sole or the best representative of transborder innovation, and to project its particular experiences onto the wider regional environment. This particularization makes relations of hegemony unsustainable (Gololobov 2003).

Laclau's theory defines another problematization: that "pure particularisms" may be absorbed by the dominant system. Hence, "the logic of equivalence" clashes with the "logic of difference," in that the discursive strategies of border regions are so "specific that they could be transformistically integrated into the system, and cease to be the bearers of a more universal, emancipatory meaning" (Laclau 2000a, 303). Such "a proliferation of particularisms" is logically linked with "their correlative side—authoritarian unification" (Laclau 2000b, 86). This is exactly what is happening in Russia under Putin: Moscow is imposing its political will upon subnational units and preventing the emergence of discursive practices with universalizing effect. The federal government declared that it needs neither subnational regions as "intermediaries" with the EU, nor "policy brokers" from the other side of the border. The second logic of equivalence previously depicted is discernible as well, with the EU members bordering Russia: "the chains of equivalence are always disturbed, interrupted by other hegemonic interventions that construct meanings and identities through different equivalential chains" (Laclau 2000b, 55). These chains of equivalence may be deployed in a logic of the sovereign decisions. In this setting, one may assume that the claims for Polish hegemony within the EU chain were damaged by political interferences from *competing* but *symmetrical* moves by Moscow and Brussels. Russia was extremely reluctant to accept Poland's self-attributed role as the voice of countries in geographical proximity to the CIS. Conversely, the EU was not willing to entrust to Poland the role of an *exceptional* country articulating the union's eastern policy. In addition, Polish ambitions were challenged by the joint Russian-German platform on a North European Gas pipeline.

The scope of the domestic "chain of equivalence" seems to be constrained by Putin's restoration of the "vertical of power," which entails the removal of subnational units' autonomy. Putin's alleged decisionism seems to leave little room for claims for the discursive hegemony of one region as representative of the wider group.

At this point, Laclau's scheme could be reversed: what if the so-called "general equivalent" is *not* a "natural" result of hegemonic moves undertaken by a number of singularities, but an initial step in constructing what might be turned into "the chain of equivalences"? The pilot region project might not be an outcome of the representation of interests of a group of border regions, so much as a move imposed from the outside by one or two centers in order to form a group of regions that might reproduce the experience—exactly as a well marketed product creates its consumers.

Within this context, one may question the simplistic assumption that there is *always* a room for the self-assertion of geographically marginal territories based upon their "in-between" potential. EU-Russian relations suggest that the appearance of intermediaries, such as regional actors to facilitate dialogue between two centers, is by no means automatic. It is conditioned by a number of factors, the most important being two types of recognition. To become facilitators, countries like Poland or regions like Kaliningrad have to be recognized by both centers, domestic and foreign. In the absence of such legitimation, individual attempts to occupy a potential empty niche for in between actors playing on the margins most likely fail.

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6

Denmark's and Britain's Marginality Strategies Compared

Noel Parker

Introduction: Shifts of Power in Europe

The idea pursued in this chapter is that, observed on the large historical canvas, Denmark and Britain can be seen to have reacted in comparable ways to a marginal position in Europe. The cases of Denmark and Britain offer possibilities for analysis from our theoretical starting point in the relations between Europe and its margins. The analysis of Denmark and Britain here suggests that, via our conception of dynamic interplays between margins and centers, continuities can be found that can be expected to modulate the future shape of Europe's geopolitical identity.

Both Denmark and Britain can be regarded as geopolitically marginal in Europe in a clear-cut geographical sense, because each holds a position between the North Sea and an adjacent sea: the Baltic, in Denmark's case,[1] and the Atlantic, in Britain's case. From the fourteenth century, the North Sea had become the primary outlet to the north and west of the European continental land mass. Hence, Denmark and Britain (or England until the eighteenth century)[2] occupied crucial positions on the periphery of European space.

Taking that positional point as a constant,[3] the historical thrust of this chapter is to pick out the scope for action that the two countries had in the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries, by virtue of their marginality. The different trajectories that each has taken do not efface the commonalities in

their situation—with its characteristic scope for power, gain (or loss), and potential domestic political forms. Their common ground can be found both in the earlier postures vis-à-vis Europe's other powers and in the two countries' approaches to twentieth-century integration. This account is suggestive both for the future position of those two countries, and more generally for understanding the future shape and future center(s) of gravity in Europe. Circumstances at the end of the cold war, and following the military surge by the United States after 9/11, leave as yet unclear what changes are now taking place in comparison with the late twentieth century.

Seventeenth Century Moments of European Restructuring

The widely agreed pattern of this period is of new, absolutist states asserting themselves and defining, or extending, their borders. The loser was the Holy Roman Empire, confined in the form of absolutist state in less space. The centers of gravity of Europe were thus relocated, away from Rome, Madrid, and Vienna and toward Paris. Stockholm, Potsdam, and Moscow appeared in the picture for the first time. But England/Britain and Denmark found themselves more or less unwillingly left on the margins. In due course, Britain, however, obtained a powerful position on the margin; Denmark, a weak one.

Denmark's Room for Maneuver: Rent-seeking and Making Enemies

In the seventeenth century, Denmark maintained a form of medieval monarchy already in decline. Like England/Britain, it was, and would remain for some time, a contracting multiethnic empire (Rasmussen 1995). But its peak, the dominance of the Kalmar Union (wound up in 1523), remained a measure of its ambition (Oakley 1993, 17f). As Baltic trade into Europe increased during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, the Danish monarchy could expect benefits—as it had had at the head of the Union—from being at the mouth of the Baltic.

Rent-seeking, and other ways of extracting value from the center were alternatives to costly direct power over the Baltic littoral. In the terms set out in Chapter 1, Denmark was well placed to obtain intermediation rewards from an expanding northern Europe. Exploiting Denmark's position by raising Sound Dues, the levy on ships passing in and out of the Baltic, was a tactic the Danish monarchy repeatedly reverted to. Better still from the monarchy's point of view, as offshore excises the dues could more easily evade domestic constraints upon taxation by the crown.

But rent-seeking was to have significant adverse consequences for Denmark. First, it had rivals in the rent-seeking strategy. England had suppressed or united with its rivals in the British Isles; Denmark had not first overcome its rivals: Poland was still a force; and Sweden and Russia were to prove more effective militarily. This exposed Denmark to leapfrogging by others, notably Sweden.

Secondly, exploiting Denmark's position was unpopular with those nearer the center. In particular, the Netherlands and England/Britain—determined not to leave the power to rent-seek at the mouth of the Baltic in the hands of one state—intervened at various points to restore a balance of power to the *dis*advantage of Denmark. Notably, after the Kalmar War of 1611–13, the Netherlands provided Sweden's first diplomatic treaty, and financed the repurchase of its west coast access to the North Sea, at Götheborg (Oakley 1993, 53). Likewise English good offices then and after the ignominious 1659 defeat were used to weaken Danish power along the shores of the Baltic. Most decisively, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the winning powers decided that Denmark should lose its remaining territory east of the Sound.

The third drawback is not so obvious. The freedom of Sound Dues from domestic controls encouraged the Danish state along the wrong path. Sound Dues, the most reliable third of royal income throughout the seventeenth century, appeared (with loans and subsidies raised abroad) to offer the monarchy financial freedom from the Council of the Realm's suspicions of military adventures abroad (Petersen 1982). For Denmark, the rent-seeking option nurtured the *illusion* of an income base to fund an aggressive monarchy. With his temporary financial strength, Christian IV felt able to engage in a short-lived and very costly intervention in the Thirty Years War, from which he anticipated swift gains on the battlefield. In defeat, Christian found himself increasingly subject to the limitations of the domestic political order. The financial strategy behind the monarchy offered enough to egg on, but not enough to support the monarchy's ambitions: "Ironically, Danish commercial and fiscal policies, after engendering so much international antipathy toward Denmark, were unable to provide for a military establishment capable of defending Denmark's borders against those very powers which had the greatest reason to fear, hate, or distrust Christian IV" (Lockhart 1996, 260). When the constitutional balance between monarchy and council broke down, it was replaced by an extremist, but ineffective, absolutism that offered an alternative promise of power (Schulze 1996, 61–62). But external pressure against Denmark's position and the decline of Danish power continued under absolutism. The crown's intermittent financial independence was inadequate and costly in relations with other states.[4]

Denmark also had rivals in the business of exploiting a position via-à-vis the Baltic (Oakley 1993, 22). Sweden was able to pursue the same marginal strategies more successfully. One early reason for this may have been Sweden's *greater* marginality: a large, inhospitable territory further away from other centers of power that Denmark was unable to put out of action (Jensen 1976, 22–23). Another reason for Sweden's success was its bargaining chip in the form of direct control of strategic resources for Europe. Away from Europe's centers of religious conflict, the Swedish monarchy presided over a subservient church and peasant forces that could be mustered at little cost (Roberts 1973).[5] As its domestic resources did run short, Sweden had won enough to extract wealth from trade on the southern shore of the Baltic (Oakley 1993, 67, 71f). For over a century, it could "punch above its weight," until still larger rivals (Russia and Prussia) pinned it back to the northern Baltic coast (Åström 1973).

Marginal gains that prove unrealizable at one time may, however, be obtained with a different strategy under changed circumstances. By the eighteenth century, single-handed Danish aggressiveness had to be acknowledged impossible, and the Swedish version had run its course. Denmark settled instead into the game of juggling stronger forces with an interest in the Baltic. As Holbraad (1991) shows, this "aligned neutrality" worked well for Denmark because there were various equally matched powers to protect its commercially profitable neutrality. Denmark was then able to enjoy the benefits of Baltic commerce and rent-seeking, as well as diplomatic patronage, from larger powers (Britain, France, and Russia) with an interest in Denmark as a *guarantee* of the openness of the Baltic. In 1857, Denmark even closed a deal with the Europe's commercial powers and the United States to surrender Sound Dues for cash, which was used to finance new banking and commercial growth exploiting Denmark's strategic position (Lange 2006, chs. 5–6). It also undertook the maintenance of sea routes in and out of the Baltic. A reforming Danish monarchy at peace was able to quietly reorganize aristocratic power, leaving rural elites economically content and politically supportive (Munck 1990), and prioritizing agricultural trade until late in the twentieth century.

Britain's Room to Maneuver: Lion in the World, Sheepdog in Europe

As I have already pointed out, in the seventeenth century, England obtained a domination of its access to the North Sea, which eluded Denmark.[6] Beyond the British Isles, it was the Netherlands that competed with England/Britain for domination over Europe's trade. On Tilly's account of state formation, Britain and the Netherlands also exhibited the

commercial classes' strongest brake on developing monarchy. But after the unique political settlement in 1688, it was Britain that emerged with a propitious mix of commercial strength and a state to wield world-wide military power (Tilly 1990).

This mix was to determine Britain's relations to Europe and the wider world. A brief intervention in the Thirty Years War was, like later seventeenth-century entanglements on the mainland,[7] militarily unrewarding and politically embarrassing. Prompted by hostility to any wars in support of the king's continental relations, the parliamentary classes developed a stronghold on military spending and the monarchy. By the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, Britain's military vocation—to fight trading and colonizing rivals in the extra-European world—had achieved striking results. But Britain fought hardly at all on the mainland of Europe until 1914, though it often clashed with others over *extra*-European territory.

In short, in the seventeenth century, England/Britain pulled off the trick that eluded Denmark: unrivalled gains from a marginal position vis-à-vis Europe. But this was only possible because the state and its posture toward Europe developed in a way distinct from dominant continental models. With the profits of world commerce in its grasp, and colonial expansion the most obvious source of finance, the state struck a bargain with its commercial classes: to be strong and efficient on the seas, but limited and cheap at home. Thus, while in Denmark absolutism was being *introduced* in the forlorn hope of effectiveness against rivals in the Baltic, England/Britain was adopting the minimal state and low-cost naval forces to guarantee its commercial interests. "[T]he way was prepared for the erection, during the century following 1688, of an extraordinarily powerful centralized state, organized for the more or less explicit purpose of enhancing England's international power" (Brenner 1993, 713–14). This ran deeper than foreign policy. The paucity of land forces under the control of the crown underlined the monarchy's limited *domestic* power.[8] Political, judicial, and administrative power at home was left in the hands of provincial landed classes, who imposed the law and called out the militia when the need arose. The state's character was adapted to its position as sovereign for the commercial capital between Europe and the world market.

This reorganization expressed a marginal strategy more successful than others. Without the need to get directly involved in the rivalries "on the continent," the British state strategy was cheap. Britain could discount costs that the continental powers were burdened with. And it had the military clout and financial invention to leapfrog Dutch financial rent-seeking (Arrighi 1994; Taylor 1999). From the late seventeenth century, London became a prime location for the recirculation of the finances underpinning

all Europe's colonial trade, and Britain began the path to hegemony over the world system.

All this entailed abiding differences between Britain and much of Europe, which we rediscover in the twentieth century. To be sure, over time, the internal political balance did change: notably, urbanization together with an increased military presence in society demanded of the state greater popularization and legitimization (Tilly 1995). But that did not prompt Britain to follow Europe and construct a "developmental state" (Marquand 1988) with the task of actively reorganizing socioeconomic life. Assertiveness in foreign relations has a place; but in its marginality vis-à-vis Europe, the optimal long-term strategy for Britain has been that of the sheepdog: maneuvering more costly states by playing them off against each other, so that they cannot interfere as Britain makes the most of its position as a "world" power on the margins.

Twentieth-century Terms for Integrating from the Margins

I now trace continuities in Britain's and Denmark's distinct adaptations to their marginal positions as seen late in the twentieth century in the two states' reactions to European integration. For both Britain and Denmark, membership of the community/union has been a way of *continuing* to exploit marginality as best they can. Within the broader reorganization of Europe, the issue facing both has been how to adjust structures to optimize their marginal positions.

Britain: The City, the State, and Europe

Rather than abandoning the earlier posture toward the rest of the world, Britain's twentieth-century history repositions it. For most of the twentieth century, harmony survived between the state's economic and financial policy and the "gentlemanly capitalism" that the city of London had inherited from the seventeenth century (Cain and Hopkins 1993). There continued to be real prospects of maintaining Britain's global position—particularly after America's 1929 crash again left Britain the world's largest foreign investor (Cain and Hopkins 1993, 46). Given a hegemony founded in the oxymoron of "free trade imperialism," relative military and economic *weakness* need not imply an end to the benefits of marginality: namely, extensive commerce with limited state power. The Sterling Area was invented as a regionalized version of the earlier global financial imperium embracing both the empire and other parts of Britain's sphere of influence. Global *financial* power remained an inexpensive way to profit from other states, and continued as a useful instrument in Britain's sheepdog role: e.g.,

with the re-floating of the German and Soviet currencies (Cain and Hopkins 1993, 97).

Likewise, the dominant "Treasury view," opposed to domestic intervention, maintained the low-cost state in a setting of global commerce. The global economic environment, rather than the state, was expected to regulate the domestic economy. The pre-1914 dollar exchange rate, for example, was a "means of disciplining all those, capitalists and workers alike, who apparently wished to use state economic power for their own, obviously selfish ends" (Cain and Hopkins 1993, 69). The three postwar decades of "Butskellite" consensus around "Keynesian" intervention, and limited corporatism with organized labor, was an aberration in the long-term pattern of London-centered financial power, and a centralized, but non-intrusive state (Gamble 1994, 218–25). When *world* conditions wavered in the 1970s, Butskellite politics ended. There was no radical break in the British state tradition: a distinctive, global role for Britain and a shallow economic intervention without continental-style national planning.

But in the U.S.-dominated post-World War II world, the cost of surviving as a world currency in a protected subzone became gradually clearer. By the 1960s, allaying suspicions that balance-of-payments difficulties might lead to devaluation of overseas holdings had created a "stop-go" economic cycle at odds with domestic economic growth (Cain and Hopkins 1993, 281–291). The Sterling Area was not even providing investment opportunities or demand for British exports. The eyes of the city began to turn back to where the story had begun in the seventeenth century, continental Europe. A Bank of England report of 1963 argued that "the UK should play a useful part by acting as a financial entrepôt."[9] A 1966 publication by the then financial editor of *The Times* proposed London for the role of Europe's banker (Clarke 1966, 104–120): "[T]he City has been dusting off the old machinery and seeing whether if cannot really play an old role in a new way, to everyone's benefit. Europe, it is said, now has the savings and the spare money, but no capital market to speak of; London, on the other hand, has a market, the mechanism and the old skill, but hardly enough spare capital" (ibid., 107).[10] The city and the *financial* economy of Britain discovered another new stomping ground as the hegemonic trading point for *European* money: another predominant role for London's financial business, implying the same state-society relationship in a new edition of Britain's marginality.

The story of the subsequent love-hate relationship between Britain and its European Community/European Union (EC/EU) "partners" is familiar. During most of its membership, under Thatcher and post-Thatcher governments, the British have been what Rasmussen and Sørensen call "hesitant Europeans" (1997, ch. 3), clashing over political values inherited from Britain's formative experience of imperialism and free trade: "value for

money" in government; the freedom of the market from needless regulation; the "single market" agenda in the 1980s; and "widening" as against "deepening" the EU market in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, Britain even acted as an alternative value-center to the core EU states when the Thatcherite vision of Western society was widely embraced amongst elites freshly freed from eastern European socialism. To be sure, post-Thatcher Britain's rhetoric on Europe changed; but the role of financial entrepôt on the margin continued to be promoted by "pro-Europeans" (Barber 1997; Royal Institute of International Affairs 1997, ch. 5; Grant 1999).

The British preference for "negative integration" (Wallace 1997, 688) is not accidental, therefore, but grounded in the way the United Kingdom developed to exploit its marginal position. While clashes between Britain and the rest of the EU may give the *impression* that membership is dysfunctional, Britain is simply continuing from *within* formal integration its long-standing marginal strategy vis-à-vis Europe. Benefits of marginality are now sought in a combination of access to the European market and resistance to whatever might impede Britain's strategies of financial rent-seeking, discounting governmental costs and alternative centrality. Britain, in Europe, pursues commercial profit backed by inexpensive political influence, as it had under "free trade imperialism."

Britain's military evolution exhibits a comparable marginal strategy of "re-entry" into Europe, while exploiting worldwide possibilities away from the mainland. But there has been, and is another, world center, the United States, in relation to which Britain can sustain itself. Following World War II, Britain found a snug place for its reduced empire in U.S. world dominance (Taylor 1990). During the cold war, it used its post-imperial diplomatic credibility with "Commonwealth" connections in the interests of the West, and was staunchly *Atlanticist* in competition with Germany's position as the United States' mainland ally on the frontier proper. With the global centers rebalanced after 1990, military leadership *in* Europe (including NATO)—with a pronounced Western/U.S.-centered bias—became a cheap and attractive option (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1997, ch.8).[11] The possible drawbacks of this have always been the costs of military engagement, which were, however, agreeable to substantial post-imperial arms industry. This has been evident following the United States' escalation of military expectations after the millennium, with Britain again seeking to rebalance its limited military resources.[12]

Denmark: Juggling Others to Maintain a Position

Earlier Danish adaptation to marginality had entailed acknowledging dependence, and *using* it as best as may be (cf. Petersen 2006). While the

eighteenth century found Denmark well placed between bigger powers with interests in the Baltic, late nineteenth and early twentieth century changes made that position harder to sustain. Denmark then alternated between disappointed expectations of the rule of international law, and a gloomy apprehension of powerlessness (Holbraad 1991, 36). Yet, by the end of the twentieth century, it could once again use its position to juggle bigger forces around.

What undermined Denmark's neutrality was a decline in the number of significant allies, alongside the rise of one overwhelming power to the south, Germany (Holbraad 1991, 20–107), further complicated by larger states' periodically reducing the German threat. Denmark was misled by the late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century international environment into dependence, first upon Nordic neutralism, and then on "world" norms and institutions with neither power nor will to supplement its weakness. By the late 1930s, the price for Danish cooperation had fallen to the point where others no longer found its integrity worth defending (Andersen 1998, Lidegaard 1998, Seymour 1982).

During the twentieth century, Denmark learned a new marginal strategy: to optimize its position by appearing to practice sovereign self-defense while participating in arrangements to obtain defense "indirectly" from an optimal, but "Nordic" posture *within* Europe (Wæver 1993). Post-World War II Denmark abandoned neutrality to become a deliberate player within *and* between alliances. As the big power strategy toward Europe as a whole—notably Germany—switched from suppression to integration, Denmark made good use of *dependence* upon external arrangements. When unable to persuade the Western powers of the benefits of a Nordic arrangement, it abandoned that in favor of NATO membership (Petersen 1991), and an advantageous compromise with the growing reality of German power (Meyer-Höper 1998, Villaume 1991). Denmark's position at the mouth of the Baltic began to pay off again when *joining* with existing centers of power. An "alliance-worthy" Denmark (Holbraad 1991, 103) was, for example, permitted to hold back on some of the commitments of NATO membership.[13] Denmark, on the margins, changed from being, as Poul Villaume (1998) puts it, a "frightened rabbit" to being a "hedgehog." Neither posture is dignified, but the latter makes better use of the possibilities that do exist.

As cold war tension declined, the possibilities of a position between East and West, Europe and Scandinavia, revived (Heurlin 1989). Denmark moved quickly to become the advocate for the Baltic states in the corridors of Europe and NATO, and to provide a human rights policy framework for the area (Nørgaard 1993). It used its established position *inside* Western military structures in an "activist adaptation" to the dissolution of cold war

certainties: first a cautious "pragmatic functionalism," and later a more creative "active internationalism" (Kelstrup 1991). The new military role in the UN and NATO presented Denmark as a civilizing influence in future security structures (Villaume 1999). No longer threatened with attack, it could use NATO membership as a basis for assertiveness (Viggo Jakobsen 2000). By not belonging solely to either a Baltic, or a transatlantic, or a northern European strategic system, Denmark discounted costs of belonging to each of these.

Mutatis mutandis, that marginality strategy holds equally for Denmark's post-World War II *economic* approach in Europe: optimizing its position *in between* others. Its problem was to maneuver away from the inherited position between Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia, and toward Europe's late-twentieth century structure *within* the EU (Hansen 1969, 20–21). It was clear that Britain had neither the capacity nor the will to consider Danish economic welfare (Mariager 1998; Sørensen 1991, 106–111). Denmark lacked natural resources and inherited a dependence on agricultural exports without sufficient outlets, while the postwar global trade regime eroded protection for small-scale industries (Hansen 1969, 18–22; Laursen 1993, 66–68). But Denmark made a successful adaptation and joined the EC as alternative, "universalist" strategies ran up against persistent trade imbalances (Hansen 1969, 168): "trading dependence as much on the UK/Scandinavia as on the continent (especially Germany) [explained] . . . Danish commercial diplomacy, to . . . build bridges to the Six" (Laursen 1993, 68). The will to build bridges made Denmark an attractive partner for others to woo.[14] But, while Denmark used "Scandinavian cooperation . . . as an instrument to strengthen Danish bargaining power at the international level" (Sørensen 1991, 110), internationalism was also strategy to maintain options between courses that could not yet be decided upon (Branner 1993). Once inside the EC/EU, Denmark could, like the United Kingdom, act as "odd man out" (Thomsen 1993) or "naughty boy" (Mouritzen 1993).[15] Most prominently, the opt-outs following the anti-Maastricht referendum vote in 1991 rewarded Denmark with concessions to compensate for the doubts of its domestic public (Petersen 1993), and the event itself was widely taken as a sign of a legitimacy crisis for "Europe," as such. The episode reinforced the perpetual current in EU internal politics opposing central power.

The claim to "bridge-build," though it may overstate Danish influence, captures the way Denmark has pragmatically kept open political and economic options in a number of concurrent "bridges" (Wiberg 1989; Makarychev 2006). This has been Denmark's late twentieth-century marginal strategy. By contrast, Sweden, its erstwhile rival on the Baltic margin, has latterly found itself in retreat, economically, and had to fight its way out

of strategic isolation (Dörfer 1997; Ingebritsen 1998, 93–111; Miljan 1977, 231–74; Rieker 2006, ch. 4).

The post-millennium environment is, however, posing problems for this marginal strategy in its turn. The dominance of military alliances at the world level, greatly enhanced by U.S.-led engagement in a "War on Terror," has upped the cost of involvement in the world outside Europe (Viggo Jakobsen 2000; Rynning 2003). The limited size of Denmark's (and others') contributions to multinational forces already suggests this (Kiærskou 2007).[16] But in the early 2000s, there are signs that this would, in due course, exclude Denmark, both because of limitations on the country's means for military modernization, and because of the strain that war puts on state-society relations (Knudsen 2004; Holm 2002). As in the case of Britain, these effects may be catching up with strategies of low-cost military involvement. Meanwhile, another strand of the same development has downgraded the multilateral order of, for example, the UN, where Denmark could otherwise use it bridge-building skills (Olsen 2007).

Conclusion: The Awkward, the Small, and the Marginal in Europe's Geopolitical Identity

Various *continuities* in the marginal strategies emerge from the discussion, which give rise to further observations about the permanence, meaning, and evolution of location as a factor in geopolitical identity, and about present and future "awkward" and "small" states on the margins of Europe. A number of marginal strategies have been pursued by Denmark and Britain from the seventeenth to twentieth centuries. In the seventeenth century, there was rent-seeking; in the twentieth, leapfrogging and competitive emulation. Rent-seeking took a back seat in the later period (at least as openly pursued).[17] These marginal strategies are rooted, I have argued, in the countries' analogous geographical positions, which have offered determinate potential benefits to each from being on a margin. We can conclude that the marginality of the two is likely to remain a factor in Europe's geopolitical identity.

This straightforward-sounding conclusion is, however, subject to three qualifications. First, the number, character, and reactions of other players in the environment affect the outcomes. Denmark's failure to overcome Baltic rivals undermined its position. Secondly, attempts to exploit a marginal position may be successful or unsuccessful, which has implications, including for size. Whereas wealthy, powerful Denmark *under*performed in the seventeenth century, and shrank, England/Britain made gains, and grew. In the late twentieth century, however, now-little Denmark made

gains, while big Britain declined relative to the EU norm and acquired a bad name as an incurable "awkward partner." Thirdly, changes in the practices of international actors alter the impact of marginal tactics. This may explain the shift away from direct financial strategies (rent-seeking, charging the center): late twentieth-century European states abandoned import levies and subsidies for fighting. The preference for integration over mutual coercion is a new perception, which has prioritized the politics of *maneuvering while belonging* over the politics of *maneuvering from the outside*. On that ground, Denmark has, perhaps, played better than Britain, acquiring a (maybe undeserved) reputation as a good cooperator compared to Britain.[18] Finally, the post-9/11 militarization of international relations has again altered the modes of center-margin relationships, and may have made Denmark's post-cold war strategic adjustment—also Britain's, perhaps—too costly.

What I have analyzed as the common marginality of Denmark and Britain has also been referred to implicitly as "awkwardness" (classically employed by Stephen George[19]) and its cognate terms. According to the approach adopted here, "awkwardness" and the like refer to visible markers of a misfit inherent to the strategies of states that are marginal to Europe in relation to those at its "core." "Awkwardness" becomes noticeable when marginal states' strategies tug visibly at the center's norms. As George acknowledges by the time of the third edition (1998, 275ff), changes in domestic politics and officials' attitudes have altered British "awkwardness" over time. Yet, these changes have the effect of situating a "marginal" state, and changed centers of gravity *inside* Europe. Competitive emulation for the British economic and social model, for example, has impacted on the *whole* of integrated Europe. The push toward subsidiarity provided by the Danish "No" to Maastricht is a further instance. Even if marginality is a constant positional "unit attribute" of some European states, then, the implication remains that "awkwardness" and the like, just like marginality, are here to stay. Were space to allow, a parallel analysis might be undertaken for other European states, such as those in the Hispanic or Hibernian peninsulas. The permanent effects of marginality must thus include a deep tendency in Europe, as a whole, toward internal multi-polarity, and the peculiar inside-outside dynamic of the continent.

Notes

1. This claim has, strictly speaking, to be qualified insofar as Danish territory has included an Atlantic extension, in Iceland and Greenland. However, those possessions have not been significant from the point of view of the present analysis

until the late twentieth century—by which time, of course, Iceland was no longer Danish. See also note 13.

2. Formally speaking, England, Wales, and Scotland could be referred to as "Britain" from the accession of the Scottish king to the English throne in 1604, more so after the 1707 Act of Union between the two countries. It is, though, more usual to speak of Great Britain as the two societies were united during the eighteenth century (see Colley 1996). The "British Isles" is a strictly geographical expression for territory occupied by England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Thus, England/Britain is not without rivals for the geographical position that I emphasize, but this point is dealt with later in the chapter.
3. This assumption, of course, simplifies the position, but not crucially, for present purposes. While the geographical facts are constant, their *significance* varies according to sociopolitical factors. I will take up this point in the conclusion to the book.
4. In comparison, the poorer English monarchy also sought financial independence, but suffered such a reversal in the revolution of the mid- seventeenth century that it conceded a new, distinctive accommodation of state and society. This is discussed in the next sub-section.
5. Gustavus Adolphus could "reorganize the national army in Sweden, uninfluenced by petty considerations of the demographic and economic costs" (Petersen 1982, 293).
6. This was no foregone conclusion. Scotland was long a base for French military interference, and, bolstered by Calvinism from the European mainland, could impose upon its larger neighbor. The lowland elites were, however, bought by the English state in 1707—though Highland resistance continued. The story of Irish resistance to centuries of English intrusion needs no retelling.
7. "King William's War," in the 1690s, and the War of Spanish Succession in the first decade of the eighteenth century
8. Anderson (1974) explains the failure of absolutism from the absence of a pretext for a standing army—a hobbyhorse of the crown's parliamentary opponents throughout the eighteenth century.
9. Bank of England *Quarterly Bulletin*, June 1963, quoted in Clarke (1966, 109).
10. In a book published in 1968 (Cooper 1968), the then foreign-exchange manager of Schröder-Wagg merchant, bankers likewise set out a number of strategies to get Britain painlessly off the hook of the Sterling Area.
11. This has included some cozying up to a similar post-colonial military power, and former rival, France, e.g., in the 1998 St. Malo declaration.
12. For example, Prime Minister Blair's speech to the military in Portsmouth, December 1, 2007. United Kingdom Government, 10 Downing Street pages [British Prime Minister's office]. http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page10696.asp.
13. Foreign troops on home territory, joint air defense, active defense of partner states, and nuclear weapons—though the last was more apparent than real when it came to Greenland (Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut 1997), another asset that Denmark could offer the NATO alliance.

14. As the ECSC High Authority did to impede any Nordic agreement obstructing its main source of raw materials (Sørensen 1991, 123). And France did the same when de Gaulle had decided to veto British membership of the EC (Skak-Nielsen 1993, 102–103).
15. Exploiting its position inside of the EC/EU, while other Nordic countries have to be "model children."
16. This author is director of the Danish army's operational command.
17. This claim looks different if we include state-*sanctioned* activities, such as the direction of economic development. Compare, for example, the development of London's airports as a transit point to and from Europe, and that of Copenhagen, with bridges linking it to Sweden/the east Baltic coast and Jutland/Germany.
18. Compare the "instrumental" discourses by which the two countries articulate pragmatic positions with respect to Europe (Larsen 1999).
19. George once related in conversation that the Danes had objected to his book on Britain as "an awkward partner" because they claimed that "they could be every bit as awkward as the British!"

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7

Europe and a Globalizing United States: Political Ideals Projected and Counter-projected

Noel Parker

Introduction: Cross-Atlantic Projections

Europe's identity exhibits a dynamic with that considerable part of the world where its colonial expansion impinged. This has been read back into Europe's relationship to its more recent colonial and semi-colonial territories via the concept of "orientalism" (Said 1978), and in the wealth of post-colonialism studies emerging with it. By showing America and Europe functioning as each other's "other," I will argue that an analogous complex is present in the interplay between Europe's identity and that of North America.

The concept of marginality shows how this might be so. During its expansionist phase, Europe made many places and peoples marginal to itself: they became areas or cultures where Europe saw itself intruding, steering things, reshaping, pushing toward modern, civilized life, and pushing back what was primitive and backward. And, of all the areas in which Europe made margins of itself, none has run the gamut of possibilities that the North American continent has. Originally, the continent was regarded as territory empty of significant culture, to be peopled by Europeans. These "Europeans" then split from their own place of origin, the "homeland" that had remained their center, and defined themselves as a distinct "European" society. In due course, that society came to be the

dominant center in terms of which Europe itself was marginal. In the twentieth century, another "Europe" returned from across the Atlantic, as it were, to dominate the world, including Europe.

On my submission, the history of those interactions can be divided into two periods, roughly according to who is a margin of whom. One runs to the end of nineteenth century, when the "colonial" relationship on the American side is fully superseded. The United States then ceases to ground its self-identity in its *likeness to*, or *distinctiveness from* Europe—including its virtues *due to* the distance. America is seen less *apart*, on the margin of a world dominated by Europe; rather, it is the new center. Yet, America continues to define itself *to itself* in terms originally given to it—or, as I shall argue, "projected" upon it—from Europe, terms that also "belong" to Europe's self-identity. America took those "European" terms and "counter-projected" them to define itself in the world as "European," yet different from "Europe."

Projection, Counter-projection, and Otherness

On this interpretation, numerous politically significant thinkers construed their "home" society with reference to another space, where they chose to see certain possibilities beyond those "at home." Initially, it was Europeans thinking Europe *with reference to* North America; but, soon Americans began construing America *with reference to* Europe. The possibilities might be the realization of some *good*—sharpening the claim for what *could* and/or *ought* to be the case at home, or gratifying the sense that a supposed good from home *could* or *would* be instituted at the other site. Or, the possibilities could be a potential *bad* found in the other site—illustrating what we should *avoid* or *eradicate*. In order to envision, advocate, or condemn these possibilities, they are projected in thought to the other location, there to be sketched out freely, thanks to distance. In that sense, North America/United States has been an other for Europe, and vice versa: something distinct, but close enough to matter in defining oneself.[1] The other of North America/United States long performed an important function for European thinking: it has allowed Europeans to contemplate how their identity either includes certain, as yet, unrealized virtues, and/or possesses characteristics that deserve to be reproduced. I apply the term "projection" where European thinkers practice this play with the idea of North America/the United States (or Americans *mutatis mutandis*): for reasons having to do with their own thinking and purposes, they *project*, beyond the immediate reality they experience, to conditions which *may* hold or come about in the other society as it is imagined.

Advantageous—or unavoidable—as this strategy may be, it courts problems. Notably, the other, whose identity is infused with projections from the first, comes to have its own conceptions of reality and of itself: adopting the other's conceptions, with modifications, as exemplified *in itself*, and "counter-projecting" the content of the initial projections. I consider how projections "bite back" in interconnections between European political thinkers' projections onto North America, and the analogous U.S. projections onto Europe. This clearly creates tensions in the self-conception of the original projector, Europe, which become especially marked, as the counter-projected material is reimported to Europe. The originally projected material, as amended by the other (Unites States), appears to the originator as both its own and somehow different. This dynamic makes for a complex relationship between the identities of the projector, Europe, and the original object of projection, North America/United States. One could summarize—over-graphically—by saying that North America/United States has been Europe's "child," which grew up, broke away from its parents (as children do), and then returned home, full of ideas adapted from those of the parents' about who the parents are and how they should behave.

I will focus on two value pairs that have been particularly significant elements for the identity of both Europe and North America/United States: individualism and the market (the individual as an independent self-interested being, and the market as the space where such beings relate to one another [Elias 1991]); and democracy and revolutionary change. Since the American Revolution, there have been states in the Western world legitimized by a supposed national will to choose their political order. There has been much conflict between competing claims to represent these values, but the values themselves have remained decisive (Parker 2000; Heller 1993). Both value pairs are hard to realize, which only encourages their projection onto elsewhere: the liberal individual and the liberal market are idealizations; revolutionary demands for "democracy" are hard to identify and manage in practice.

While positive expectations of the liberal market and of democracy are common ground between Europeans and Americans, I argue that differences arise according to which location one thinks the ideals are from, and what imagined space they are projected onto. The differences arise as America moves from being an open margin for Europe's Enlightenment ideals, to being a dominant center vis-à-vis the globe, including Europe. Where North America is Europe's margin, open to the void of virgin territory, the ideals are adopted by the "Europeans" on the margin. Where Europe is on the U.S. margin to a fully occupied world, Europe cannot so easily locate its identity or its own role in the world. This is the insight captured by

considering how values are projected and counter-projected between center and margin.

The Origins of Twentieth-century Cross-Atlantic Projections

As I have said, this story properly covers two periods. The first stretches from North America's growth as a colony to its separation and its rise to equal status with European national states. The second begins with the U.S. extension beyond its own territorial sphere to become a center of the global, as such. Space only permits a discussion of the second period, which is the currently significant one for Europe's geopolitical identity.

The first period can nonetheless be summarized. America initially appealed to European thought because it could be regarded as a blank, devoid of any specific content. Hence, the soubriquet "the noble savage" for the human beings imagined in that space (Ellingson 2001; Gillespie 2002). In that undefined space, natural human propensities could be imagined and purportedly observed, substituting the "natural" for the authority of God and Church, in an epistemological move often essential to Enlightenment thinking (Saint-Amand 1992). As political thinkers considered European sociopolitical conditions, the imagined condition of North America appeared at crucial points in their arguments as a malleable site to imagine what might otherwise be unimaginable.

Liberal thinkers in particular, such as John Locke and Adam Smith,[2] projected a vision of naturally prosperous free-market individualism in North American space *rather than* in Europe. The freedom and openness of America's apparently virgin territory on the margin was crucial to the plausibility of the idea of free-market individualism. It made it possible to envision free individuals working on nature and voluntarily exchanging their products and property as best suited them, unhampered by the clutter of the sociopolitical constraints in European societies. European ideas of revolution and democracy underwent a parallel projection. Whereas Europe's late eighteenth-century experience left a memory of popular power as dangerous in itself and likely to evoke powerful opposition from established authority, the United States was thought to be—notably in the works of Thomas Paine and Alexis de Tocqueville—a place where a revolutionary drive for freedom from authority could succeed without cataclysmic collapse (see also Kahler and Link 1996). In this way, North America/the United States possessed key elements of various thinkers' notion of their own *European* society.

In its formative period, America was peopled by Britons and other Europeans, who regarded themselves as such.[3] With separation, then, the

"Europeans" in the colonies were happy to adopt into their self-identity, the positive view projected from Europe. As they sought to become "Americans," they could likewise turn that image *against* Europe: finding in themselves "European" virtues that Europe itself lacked, and that gave them the capacity to survive. Americans took these ideals to themselves with a sense of peculiar advantages of North America's space: that what was being realized amongst them could not have been realized in Europe. Their "European" identity was thus counter-projected *against* Europe's own.

After a period of around 150 years, when American society could see itself as the realization of the European picture of individual and commercial development, a crisis is signaled by Frederick Jackson Turner's "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" (1893). Turner reacted to the United States' running out of its own "virgin' territory."[4] He sensed that this would end the strength that America enjoyed by comparison with Europe: the "key to the historical enigma which Europe has sought for centuries in vain, and the land which has no history [the United States] reveals luminously the course of universal history" (Turner 1947, 11). If they were to survive, the ideals of individualism and democracy had to be embedded in a new setting without the advantages of uncontested territory. For Turner, this turn of events would undermine American democracy, for that had fed on the way that "native settler and European immigrant saw . . . the chance to break the bondage of social rank" (Turner 1947, 154). Turner worried over the way that big capitalism stultifies (Turner 1947, 155), and defensive legalism replaces, the free spirit where territory was being opened up (Turner 1947, 269–89). For, the American democracy that had been so prized had depended on the independence of the small town. America was built on what Paul Hirst described as ordinary citizens' "ability to move, to escape local control . . . to shape their own destiny" (2005, 78). It had been this possibility which offered escape to Paine, and which Tocqueville presented so positively.

The Ideals of the Globalizing United States in the Twentieth Century

In different ways, then, both Americans and Europeans had imagined positive North American versions of individualism in the market, and of democracy, conditional on the open, undisputed territory of the colonial margin into which "European" society had extended. But in the twentieth century, as North America definitively ceased to be a margin of Europe, both ideals were reconfigured in an American thinking imprinted upon the wider world, with Europe as a part. From about 1890 to 1917, the United States became increasingly active on the international scene beyond its

own borders (Weidenfeld 1996, 26–34). On the one hand, it pursued its interests militarily in the wider world: the Phillipines, Mexico, Cuba, China.[5] In the process, it came into conflict with European colonial powers (Spain, Prussia, and Great Britain). But by 1910, it had placed itself somewhat hesitantly amongst the friends of the most successful colonial power, Britain, and joined her in war (Kahler and Link 1996, 7–10). Its proximity to European imperial power called for a new configuration of American identity that could underpin this world role without contradicting the earlier identity.

America's Post-World War I World Début: Isaiah Bowman

Versailles was the first occasion when the United States came visibly of age as a principle player in a world-level settlement. President Wilson gave to the world, and the U.S. public, a universally replicable version of American identity, with which the world might be reorganized: the "American Dream of freedom & self-determination" (Weidenfeld 1996, 29). In Wilson's formula, we find the earlier two values from shared European thinking: the capacity of a people to reform their society from below—the revolutionary democratic strand; and the private pursuit of the good life through commerce—the liberal-market strand.

Neil Smith's 2003 study has shown Isaiah Bowman, who was chief U.S. adviser at the conference, to have been a key figure in this reconfiguration of the world in the United States' dominant official thinking. An adviser to presidents from Wilson to Roosevelt, Bowman recast the geography of the world in terms adapted to America's rising world power and the slow collapse of Europe's world role. He constituted, then, what Smith calls the "prelude to globalization" in American thinking. Bowman's single most influential text, *The New World: Problems in Political Geography*, which went through many editions in the 1920s and 1930s, pursued an agenda to provide "the men who compose the government of the United States" with "scholarly consideration to the geographical and historical materials that go into the making of . . . foreign policy" (Bowman 1928, iii). Bowman conveyed a "political geography" for the United States new international position.

The book surveys the zones of the world with a view to the problems they present. In effect, this means the risk of impediments to U.S. trade arising from conditions on the ground following World War I: the threat of war, civil disturbance, failure of credit, blockages to transport and trade, and so on. In this formulation, the commercially minded American's impatience with obstructive Old World attitudes can already be heard. On boundaries, for example, Bowman notes "that people are more inclined to

fight about differences arising from contrasts in language, religion, nationality, and race than about economic objects" (Bowman 1928, 33).

The point becomes clear in Bowman's last chapter, on the problems of the United States itself. The opening poses the frontier experience of the United States' earlier self-concept: "independence and self-reliance . . . are especially helpful when pioneers are breaking down the obstacles of a wilderness. Can they now be turned . . . [to] the subtler problems of national spirit and of foreign relationships?" (Bowman 1928, 685). The need to confront those problems arises from the transformation to industrial economy, where the impediments become "world problems" of resources and trade. It is the business of the United States to ensure "steady and rapid advance into all the world's markets to satisfy both our needs and our desires" (1928, 691–93). The image of America as a haven from European obstructions to normal (that is to say, commercial) development, emerges as clearly as for Federalist writers of the American Revolution: "distance from older European communities gave the United States a detached view of conditions and quarrels that repeatedly shook Western Europe to its foundations" (Bowman 1928, 705). Under these conditions, the United States had already developed a relationship to the Western Hemisphere which was *innocent* because it was commercial: "[T]he early international life of the nation was remarkably simple . . . Indeed the whole world was young" (Bowman 1928, 710). Deriving his position from Fraser, Bowman reasons that by the time "the pioneer had occupied most of the empty spaces and pretty well rounded out the inhabitable world," the United States had a national unity founded upon Enlightenment ambitions of legality and means of communication. Fraser "finds at work two great forces which . . . leave the nation stronger . . . the often rival and divergent sectional interests, and . . . a common historical inheritance, a common set of institutions, similar laws, a common language, a truly American spirit, and a body of American ideals" (Bowman 1928, 707).

Under the heading "Foreign Relations Imposed by Civilization," Bowman then expounds a *world* role for the United States, founded on relationships unlike the colonial ones of the European powers: "While the world basis on which commerce had been organized to serve a complex civilization had largely displaced the purely nationalistic basis of commerce, the World War interrupted the natural trends of commerce . . . The European nations have become so absorbed in their mutual relations" (Bowman 1928, 732). This, however, is not the way that the U.S. will act in the world: "This state of affairs may be expected to have little effect upon the extension of American influence abroad." Americans are heedless of

territorial aggrandizement: "The American habit of thought in relation to international things is not imperialistic; it is commercial and it seeks above all commercial equality" (Bowman 1928, 732). Provided equal access to commercial possibilities, Americans can extend their trade with minimal top-down order.

The advice of George Washington . . . is still a widely held principle in our public life. No government will be supported that advocates intimate relationship with European problems, which are interpreted as quarrels (Bowman 1928, 745). Hence, the modest commercial egalitarianism that informs the U.S. post-WWII stipulations to the European powers: "the same trading rights and privileges as the subjects of the mandatory powers"[6] (Bowman 1928, 739). But this commercially inspired egalitarianism in international relations can only work in a world of independent states, which freely choose a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States, i.e., a world of (in Wilson's formulation) self-determined nations seeking beneficial commercial relationships with others.

For the United States' entry onto the world stage, Bowman relocated the frontier-grounded image beyond to North America's territorial limits. The earlier "natural" extension of willing, mutually beneficial relationships between parties pioneering virgin territory recurs in analogous relationships between commercial actors and between nations. Reading Bowman, we can see how America's inherited self-identity, with its "European" elements, was transposed from the free edges of the known world to the totality of the globe. The freedoms envisaged at the frontier were preserved: to decide for oneself, to shift one's trading relationships, and to alter things around. Thus, the two key value-sets adopted from the Enlightenment persisted in an American identity for the new global setting. They survive with their failings in tact: notions of individualism, the market and democracy, made credible by being spared any specific context, which can thus be realized more easily because they are imagined without the constraints of real location or a real framework.

America's Post-World War II Leadership: Morgenthau

The inter-war history of America's involvement with the wider world is familiar. On the one hand, U.S. political institutions themselves got cold feet when it came to institutionalized commitments, notably to the League of Nations. On the other hand, the hands-free steering of American finance drew in upon itself after 1929, leaving frightened national governments to fall back dysfunctionally upon the deflationary disciplines of the Gold Standard (Kindleberger 1973). From that experience, Karl Polanyi drew the

conclusion that a global financial framework without an institutional/political one could not maintain market society, domestic or international.[7]

Yet the adventures of the European/American ideal of individuals in democratic market society were not over. After World War II, the United States was at the center of forming the United Nations (UN), the system of military alliances, and the multilateral "Bretton Woods" system, all to: defend "democratic, capitalist systems tied . . . into an international economic order led by the United States."[8] Bowman's account of America's role in the wider world survived. But a significant layer was added: U.S. engagement in world-level institutions and world-wide use of military power were no longer avoided. The United States chose the integrative route: accepting involvement in multilateral global institutions (though it chaffed at them); and even fostering the subsidiary integrations of other parts of the world—notably Western Europe (Kahler and Link 1996, 35–95). This produced a new ambivalence in the U.S. position: it was *both* an innocent party in a world à la Bowman, *and* a party with a hegemonic role overstepping its own and others' boundaries in the global institutions of finance, government, and military power. The individual interests of free parties had previously appeared as sufficient to organize the globe. Now U.S. national interests could no longer be fulfilled in the type of association envisioned in marginal societies. The U.S. was forced to seek its individual interests, while standing as promoter of a *universal* good.

This creates a peculiar situation for *Europe's* self-identity as earlier projected across the Atlantic: "our" ideals were now promoted, imposed even, by something that is not "us," but another "us." Before I address European reactions, I want to show how the problem in the universalized version of American ideals was reflected in the development of American international relations thinking after World War II. This can be read in its central figure, Hans Morgenthau, and the elite debates he was party to.

Notwithstanding its status in American *realism*, Morgenthau's thinking engages seriously with universal values (Little 2003).[9] This side of Morgenthau can be seen in the very structure of his classic *Politics among Nations*, with its telling subtitle: *The Struggle for Power and Peace*. After seven parts on the struggle for, and limitations of, national power, Morgenthau reaches a turning point in his logic. The potential for perpetual, mutually destructive war appears so awful that players in international politics have to set their minds to achieving peace (Morgenthau 2005, 396–97). The remaining three parts of the book consider peace through agreed self-limitations, through transformation,[10] and through accommodation. Like Hobbes, Morgenthau the realist commends institutions to realize the universal value of peace in a world preoccupied with the pursuit

of power. Morgenthau is left acknowledging the primacy of disorder (individual national power), but hoping that it may be softened with justice from universal institutions.

The tension between individual nations' values and universal values is very present in Morgenthau's contributions to debates on American foreign policy. While American interests are bound to be uppermost, he wanted the United States to straddle its interests and the claims of universal peace. In contrast to the inter-war thinking of a Bowman, individual interests are no longer innocent and sufficient for the global order *à l'américain*. On the other hand, a truly universal alternative good is simply not achievable. So the best one can hope for is to limit the damage: while the moral man in politics "is precluded from acting morally, the best he can do is to minimize the intrinsic immorality of the political act: (Morgenthau 1958, iii,16). Hobbes, you might say, without the Leviathan to resolve the war of all against all,[11] but with plenty of room for "national moralities . . . which endeavor to invest the interests of a particular nation with the sanction of universal moral principles" (Morgenthau 1958, iii, 18), that is, to unscrupulously *lay claim* to the universal.

This world picture demands only that the national interests that America deployed over the wider world should *chime advantageously* with the universal. A 1951 essay, "A Positive Approach to Democracy" (Morgenthau 1958, iii, 237–47), makes explicit America's dilemma, and advocates an understanding of others' positions that is decent, possible to legitimize, *and* advantageous: "To define [the absolute good] is the job of philosophy; it is for politics to understand, *and to make use of*, [the relative good]" (Morgenthau 1958, iii, 237; emphasis added). Since democracy, for example, is *not* universal currency, the aim of foreign policy should be first to understand its meaning to others,[12] and then to make U.S. foreign policy *appear* consistent with those other meanings. "The ability of Western democracy to speak effectively to the peoples of Europe and Asia is dependent upon its ability to establish two different relationships: one between the aspirations of those peoples and the political policies of the West, the other between those policies *and their verbal propagation*" (Morgenthau 1958, iii, 245; emphasis added).

Morgenthau's thinking is aware then, as Bowman's was not, of an fundamental cleft between U.S. national interests, others' national interests, and truly universal interests. He appreciated that, as world hegemon, the claim of the U.S. values to universality was most probably synthetic. This remains a tension in Morgenthau's thinking, though. In a work only two years later (1960), he sought to show that America's distinctive character was of universal value. His compromise with the problem, one could say, was to advocate the pursuit of the United States' own advantage in international

politics by promoting its values *as universal values* for the wider world—even though on his own analysis such a thing could hardly exist.[13]

"Europe" in the American Centuries

What conditions does the United States' rising universalistic hegemony in the wider world pose for Europe's self-identity? Or, in the manner that I have formulated that issue here, how do those living in Europe negotiate an identity for Europe, where some of the most attractive ideals have been bequeathed on to the now increasingly dominant North American center, Europe's "child" and other? In the initial European projections of the liberal market society, and of democracy, North America functioned as the void where ideals could be projected. But in the twentieth-century American projection of those same ideals, the open space envisaged is not a "void," but the opening of the global as such. So, whereas America had earlier to *acquire* for itself a definite identity and location, Europe has rather had to *adjust* its previous identity to a location on the edge of the open space. In twentieth- and early twenty-first-century projections, Europe is defined from the U.S. perspective as a margin *en route* to the global space where those same ideals are to be realized. The United States today projects an identity upon Europe as a supplement in the transfer of "American/European" values to the unbounded global.

Market and Democracy as World Order after the Cold War

The disappearance of the United States/West's only military challenger seemed for a while to mean that the ideological control—which (as Chapter 3 argues) under American hegemony had papered over the decline in the order of the European state system—could bear the main burden in ensuring world order. The West's values could now be thought undisputed throughout the entire world (Fukuyama 1992). Amid expectations of a "New World Order," a considerable literature appeared from foreign policy elites, optimistically propounding how the harmony of U.S.-European values could be articulated in the U.S.-Europe relationship (Haftendorn and Tuschhoff 1993; Haley 1999; Weidenfeld 1996, 100–107; Kahler and Link 1996, 29–107). There was disagreement over institutional mechanisms, but consensus over the core content.

Even then, though, some American voices anticipated that consensus around American/European values could not alone contain contention or eclipse the potential for armed conflict between empire and nationalism (Snyder 1991; Motyl 1999), or between competing civilizational blocs

(Huntington 1996). By the late 1990s, the coercive dimension of U.S.-centered global power revived, and with it notions of a subordinate and militarily limited role for Europe. Given the common ground, coercion was not to be directed against Europe (if we except ex-Yugoslavia, in the southeast borderlands), though a sharp eye was kept on its integration in a refocused NATO. In relation to Europe, proponents of the U.S.-led global order updated Morgenthau's solution to the tension between nation-state interests and universal values. They defined Europe as a particular kind of supplement to American-led global power, bringing precisely ideology/values, money, and institutional mechanisms to supplement the United States' coercive power (Brzezinski 1997, 2005). As earlier, in opposition to Communism, ideological legitimation continued to stem from the idealized values articulated across the European-American relationship: liberal, market individualism, and democracy.

It is plain enough that 9/11, and the construction put upon it have reinforced the conception of U.S.-led world order after the model of the cold war (Buzan 2006). "Terrorism" and "terrorists" fulfill a role analogous to that occupied earlier by the worldwide threat of communism. The War on Terror is waged against a new limit to the U.S.-led liberal global order (Barnett 2004). The U.S. decision to concentrate on military and security countermeasures was bound to reinforce the American trend to define Europe as an *ideological* partner with a distinctive, but less coercive role. Notions of the subordinate military function for Europe have accordingly been rehearsed, with somewhat more rancor than earlier: as in the controversy unleashed by U.S. defense secretary Rumsfeld's "New vs. Old Europe" remarks when some European countries' refused to join in the Iraq war; and in Robert Kagan's Mars vs. Venus analogy (Kagan 2003). But while such talk caused offense amongst many Europeans, it was always grounded in the belief in a common trans-Atlantic *value*-base. "Americans believe in power," argued Kagan (2003, 41), "they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world order." The problem was that Europeans had lost sight of the necessity to maintain the global order with *both* common ideals *and* coercion (Kagan 2003, 57). Apart from these flash points, however, over much of the period since the cold war, the United States' picture of Europe as a lesser, ideological partner in the world has not provoked visible dissent from the European side.

Ideals Counterprojected from Europe

One finding from this chapter's readings has been that "American/European" ideals are natural material for projection and counter-projection,

for that recourse was encouraged from the start by the limitations of the ideals if contained within spaces bounded by territorial or societal limits. "American/European" values are best projected into unbounded space: at one time the empty frontierlands, and latterly, the globe, as such. Once they are projected onto the globe, however, the identity of both America and Europe must be placed *within* this new global framework. As the center, America's position is easy to determine. But the European identity is more problematic: bearing the same universal values, but likely to be swept up as the margin of the U.S.-centered global construction.

For a margin, the order of the center is (to extend the thinking of my introduction) an inescapably external order, which must nonetheless be negotiated with. Accordingly, typical reactions of marginal identities are rejection, emulation, or aspiring to be an alternative center. Counter-projection is an important discursive move in any of these. For Europe, the first of those responses is awkward due to the European margin's historical commitment to the same value-order as the new American center. Emulation is a possible course, though it entails "learning" from outside that which already "belongs to us." This leaves the alternative of defining oneself as an alternative center, which also involves the highest degree of counter-projecting an identity upon the intruding center. At the end of a century of rising U.S. global dominance, there are Europeans pursuing all three strategies.

Rejection and emulation can be grasped with the widely used, though sweeping and loose pair, "anti-" and "pro-"Americanism. The expressions capture a range of positions critical of, or hostile toward (or favorable to) what is deemed to be typical of American society, culture, politics, and foreign policy (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, ch.1). The addition of "-ism" in the terms suggests its analytical limitations: it lumps together many diverse positions, and is frequently used to *undermine* opponents' views as unreasoned, ideological postures (Hollander 1992). Nonetheless, we can track Europeans' views under both headings as reactions to a perception of America's position in relation to Europe (Meunier 2005; Nolan 2005). Both positions entail projection of a certain identity onto "America," and an implicit positioning of Europe as better (or worse) in relation to that (Rensmann 2006).

A natural corollary, consistent with a more measured anti-Americanism, is renewed idealizations of a Europe that possesses the same universal values as America, only better. The most favored ingredients for that strategy recently have been the European social model, and "soft" or "normative" power—the latter notably including Europe's way of promoting in the wider world "American/European" ideals of democracy and human rights.[14]

The notion of a specifically "European Social Model" was especially canvassed in the 1990s to identify *European* market society as against the more liberal version of the United States and, to some extent, Britain (Holland 1994). Researchers even assigned it an integral status in Europe's history (Klausen and Tilly 1997) and social structure (Galbraith, Conceição, and Ferreira 1999). A string of policy or charter documents promoting a European welfare version of the market economy has likewise been a feature of EU-level politics. But these have frequently been bones of contention between the different EU member states, and their impact on both national welfare states and on the advance of liberal globalization remains doubtful (Kuhnle 2000; O'Connor 2005). As an idealization, however, it is fair to say that the specifically European version of the market society, in which equality and welfare are explicit objectives of government, appears in a European self-identity that is contrasted with that of the United States.

Notwithstanding, U.S. suspicion that Europe is merely finding excuses for ignoring the need for hard power with soft (Kagan 2003; Nye 2004), soft power is often celebrated as a *distinctive* feature of Europe's manner on the world stage as against that of the United States. The claim is made that Europe enjoys a particular kind of international influence precisely *because* it is not motivated by a narrow, national will, backed with military capacity and coercive diplomacy. Hence, the effectiveness attributed to initiatives such as the 1993 "Copenhagen criteria" of good governance. This "normative power" (Manners 2002) reverses the problem of Europe's lack of unified identity (especially compared with the United States), by making it the very foundation of Europe's unique position in the world, and a *basis* for European self-identity. A parallel route to the same goal has been to argue that Europe's identity lies in its very *lack* of singular, state-like identity. This distinguishes Europe's identity as perceived by third parties from the all-too-monolithic United States, and construes Europe as a model for politics in a globalized world (Haseler 2004; Cooper 2003, 153–72).[15]

European philosophers have shown the deeper thinking that can underpin these political balances. Jürgen Habermas, long chary of the nation-state framework for democracy (Habermas 1996), developed a political theory adapted to the "post"-national state arguably found in Europe (Habermas 2001, 58–113; Goode 2005). At the time of the 2002 Iraq war, he joined Jacques Derrida,[16] doyen of French post-structuralist thought, in a public statement of Europe's proper identity in the world (Habermas and Derrida 2003). They recognized that it was difficult for Europe to be the special site for cosmopolitan values now proclaimed throughout the world. The force of national perspectives in Europe was a problem for any lessons in compromise-building (Habermas and Derrida 2003, 294). Yet, Europe,

having overcome so many authoritarian national governments in the past, nonetheless proclaimed a special role for Europe, as against the United States, in advancing these values: "At the international level . . . Europe has to throw its weight on the scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States . . . [I]t should exert its influence in shaping the design for the coming global domestic polity" (Habermas and Derrida 2003, 293). In the same context, Etienne Balibar has also sought to turn Europe's apparent weakness into a force for good in the world. Europe can best satisfy the calls of American liberal opinion *and* the wider world by living out its status as a "borderland," where agency does not arise in the form familiar to the international arena, from prior identity and exclusive command of resources (Balibar 2003, 323). In place of the competitive players of power politics, the very indeterminacy of Europe enables it to promote "ensembles" capable of mediating across the fault lines of the globe (Balibar 2003, 323f.).

Conclusion: Europe's Future as a Margin of the United States

In this chapter, we have seen how the globalizing twentieth-century United States sought to reshape the identities in the world, leaving Europe as a margin of its own earlier projected idealizations. The U.S.-centered reconfiguration of ideals of liberal market individualism and of democracy, projected those ideals onto a global space, as an organizing principle for world order. The original conception of democracy, as supposed to exist in North America, had relied upon its occurrence in autonomous margins harmless to overall order. Recycled to its role in the cold war order and after, the ideal of the liberal market *with* democracy has extended over the world in a way that makes it hard for Europe to place itself. Europeans sometimes seek to define Europe as an alternative, better rooted ideological center—though, if put to the test, this might replicate the universalizing American version. It is clear from history and the analysis of this chapter that tensions over claims to "own" the European/American heritage of values will continue. The success of the ideals in defining an American *or* a European identity in the world will be constrained by two aspects of the ideals themselves: the paradox inherent in any claims to "own" *universal* ideals; and the way the ideals have, all along, leaned on being projected onto an indeterminate space where the absence of boundaries and sociopolitical framing lends them credibility.

Notes

1. This notion of the other is wider than that classically used by Iver Neumann in regards to Russia, but also more positive (1999). For the other is not only an object of fear or a target of security measures; it is also a source of lessons to be followed and the object of love-hate feelings, such as envy or emulation.
2. In distinct ways: Locke wanted to spread a good setup he finds already in parts of England; Smith wanted Europe to copy what he held to be already manifest in North America. But that is another story.
3. "Revolutionary founding father" though he was, Benjamin Franklin long harbored hopes for reform of the entire English empire led from the American colonies (Morgan 2003, ch.3).
4. A fact signaled, Turner noted, by the U.S. census' no longer recording westward expansion.
5. Where it joined the European powers in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion.
6. That is, the European powers granted defeated states' territories under a mandate.
7. "[T]he origins of the cataclysm [of between the wars] lay in the utopian endeavour of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system" (Polanyi 1957, 29).
8. Catherine Mcardle Kelleher, "America's European Agenda: Learning from the Past and Creating a Future" in Haftendorn and Tuschhoff 1993, 151.
9. The insightful analysis of Tjalve (2005) shows how Morgenthau can be seen in the Christian utopian American tradition as a sort of "Jeremiah," advocating what he knows to be an unachievable human perfection.
10. Morgenthau is especially impressed by functional integration in Europe; see ch. 30.
11. Compare the moment in *Leviathan*, ch.14, when Hobbes introduces the Nature Law "to seek peace" where means are available.
12. Morgenthau has in mind aspirations for interventionist progressive governments in the Third World. See also "The Decline of Democratic Government" (Morgenthau 1958, iii, 90–100).
13. See, e.g., "The Decline of American Power" (Morgenthau 1958, ii, 46–55).
14. *Either* Western European Christianity *or* secularism might be added, but the recent EU debate on Christianity in the EU's constitutional convention proved indecisive. Some commentators have gone so far as to see incapacity to deal with religion as the peculiar feature of Europe (Weigel 2005).
15. It remains arguable whether even this softened form of Europe's international identity can escape the tension that Morgenthau described, between speaking for a general good and serving one particular "national"/European interest (Diez 2005).
16. Whose own later philosophical inquiries also addressed the discourse underpinning soft-power activities such as peace-building (Derrida 2001).

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Gibraltar, Jerusalem, Kaliningrad: Peripherality, Marginality, Hybridity

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Introduction

As stated in Noel Parker's introductory chapter, a position in the margins is not limited to states. Other subject positions, such as social groups, geographic zones, and various non-state actors can also be covered by the term. Since marginality is not an objectively definable category, it may therefore also be extended to cover relations between states and entities at the edge of states.

In this chapter, we therefore analyze how marginality is understood in the various contests over Gibraltar, Jerusalem, and Kaliningrad. We explore how these three interstices—which each blur spatially and conceptually established borders and borderlines—are located in spatio-temporal terms, and highlight the different logics applied in articulating what is at stake and in the search for possible solutions. Are they merely to be viewed as anomalies to be incorporated into a broader and basically homogeneous political landscape or, in contrast, acknowledged not just as epitomizing something exceptional, but also as representative of alternative, upcoming ways of viewing political space?

The sites are quite topical and have recently been the focus of much debate. They are exceptional, as demonstrated by the Spanish sanctions directed against Gibraltar (despite its status as an EU Territory), the Facilitated Transit

Document negotiated between the EU and Russia regarding Kaliningrad, or the security wall being erected in parts of Jerusalem. Gibraltar and Kaliningrad are clearly contested extra-territorial zones, while both are also "spaces of legal exception" (Kaliningrad as a "Special Economic Zone" and Gibraltar in the form of a tax haven outside the EU's Customs Union, and therefore exempted from various EU-practices and policies).[1] Jerusalem, for its part, has worldwide symbolic connotations, but also lies at the heart of the Arab-Israeli sovereignty-related conflict.

Unifying the cases is that they put a question mark against the traditional Westphalian model of the homogeneous nation-state with continuous clear-cut borders. They are in some sense sites *in-between*, where sovereignty is in question. Power and space intersect in special ways and, in that regard, even if they are not necessarily located within the same discursive fields, they resemble each other. For example, Gibraltar is not simply the internal affair of one state, or simply a matter of relations between two states, but increasingly has impinged on intra-EU relations as a contested case between Spain and the UK. Solutions therefore require the application of the logic governing relations within the EU, where the logic of integration entails a multilevel geometry, rather than a purely sovereignty-driven frame. For its part, Kaliningrad exists as a *both-and* case: at the crossroads between Russia and the EU, and influenced by both of them. As a result of the 2004 enlargement, it is partly on the EU inside—a "little Russia" surrounded by EU-member states—and partly outside—an integral part of Russia with no membership prospects. Jerusalem, in turn, is a bone of contention between two rather unequal parties, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. A divided city, it stands out as a key issue in the discussions of solutions to the bigger conflict. Each therefore escapes clear-cut dualisms: neither completely inside, nor completely outside. Thus, what unifies the cases is that they problematize *clarity* in the deployment of political space.

Peripherality, Marginality, Hybridity

To highlight the different discursive frames through which these margins are perceived and debated, we distinguish between three concepts: peripherality, marginality, and hybridity. These concepts refer to the different ways in which people, both within the margin in question and in the core states to which they are marginal, view the nature of those entities or try to tackle the issues they raise. Before we focus on the individual cases, a few words about these concepts are necessary.

The concepts of peripherality and marginality can be taken together, since they both derive from modernist understandings of political space. In

modernist understandings of the world, space is understood as divided into neatly defined territorial units: as on a political map with its multicolored patchwork of states enjoying sovereignty over clearly defined territorial spaces. Within this view, the boundaries between states are clearly defined. Moreover, in modernism, the sovereign state is rendered distinct from the international system and seen as the highest political authority.

Within such a state-based system, borders clearly demarcate what belongs to the inside and what is on the outside, and little tolerance is shown toward overlapping spaces. The prospects for the existence of identities and subjectivities located on the margins or detached from states—i.e., not fully included conceptually or territorially in the modernist configuration—are constrained. This is not surprising, given that sovereignty, as a core concept of world politics, is dependent on mutual recognition, which requires states to exercise authority over their affairs, including control of territory. The stance thus forecloses *both-and* solutions, not to speak of "third spaces" located beyond the ordinarily constitutive points of departure. Control over undivided territory stands as a central criterion of sovereignty, and there is, hence, a certain rigidity in conceptualizing world politics and political space (Storey 2001; Delany 2005). On the world political map, a state's power appears to flow evenly across its territory: there is no mixing of colors or blurring of borders between states by the creation of overlapping spaces (Ruggie 1998, 139–74). The idea that margins like Gibraltar or Kaliningrad lie *at the edge* of states conjures up absolute finality and difference: a break with what lies beyond, which is a point where "us" and "them" are clearly distinct (cf. Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 80–99).

In this regard, we suggest the concepts of peripherality and marginality represent alternative strategies for dealing with the margins of a state's territory. Peripherality expresses a complacent perspective about margins, where particular margins are not problematic or especially challenging to order. Instead, they are seen, both in the marginal area and by the state, as firmly subordinate to the interests, authority, and governance of the sovereign state of which they are part (Parker 2000, 7). Indeed, to the extent that such a relationship develops, it may not be relevant to speak of the margin as a distinct entity with its own subjectivity, as it will simply have been absorbed into the whole. Therefore, the "problem of the margin" as an exception to modernist territorial politics will have been solved. Peripherality implies a view that the margin is inconsequential and subordinate to the center, that the standard modernist logic applies, indicating disenfranchisement and a lack of any independent voice for the margin (Browning and Joenniemi 2004, 702).

In contrast, marginality reflects an understanding of the *constitutive* role of the margin, and the need to constantly reaffirm the modern world. From this perspective, deviant cases and odd, contested, or self-assertive spaces on the margins are viewed as genuinely problematic and needing to be disciplined if modernist homogeneity is to be reasserted. Ambiguity is to be eradicated by the imposition of the sovereign state's control. Deviant cases are threatening due to their ability to transcend established borders, territorially and conceptually, and to destabilize prevailing identities and hierarchies. The prevalent reading is that such cases represent a danger, a loss and/or degeneration toward increased ambiguity and uncontrollability.

Even from this perspective, however, marginal spaces can be read more positively. Through the challenge of "sorting them out," such anomalies may actually contribute to a reassertion of the modernist vision of political space. In tackling the anomaly and disciplining it, sovereignty is allowed to prevail once more, even in complex situations that, by their nature, challenge sovereignty and unambiguous territorial control. The margins are thus not thought to be sites displacing the dominant categories and contaminating their "naturalness" and "purity," but as deviational resources awaiting resolution, which allow the modernist project to show its strength in re-producing certainty and predictability.

Again, a preference for what could be called "modernist marginality" may come either from within the margin or from the center. For example, margins may perceive considerable benefits in reasserting their position on the edge in modernist terms. This can be seen in the way marginal actors pursuing the "tactics" set out in Noel Parker's introduction often depict themselves as defensive outposts facing the threatening other, or as the first line of defense (Browning and Joenniemi 2004, 707).

The concept of hybridity is quite different. Here, the difference and ambiguity of the margin is not seen as threatening or to be sorted out so as to reestablish a modernist order. Instead, ambiguity and the blurring between inside and outside is embraced as a resource, and the margin can speak with its own voice. Given this, we suggest emphasizing hybridity (for example, the creolization of the margin's culture in a relationship with both the inside and outside) should be seen as an alternative way of claiming subjectivity out of marginality. We suggest, furthermore, that at times the center might even see benefits in promoting the margin as a space of hybridity in order to promote innovation and the development of an alternative politics: a strategy that may be particularly attractive in an era of globalization.

Hybridity, therefore, indicates how the "sovereignty game" might be becoming more flexible as postmodernization and globalization allow solutions of territorial issues over sovereignty and identity. Diez (2002), for example, notes how the European Union protects and recognizes minorities

and regions as political subjects within the *acquis*. Arguably, therefore, territory is losing some of its significance as the EU emerges as an actor defying boundedness and the categorical centrality of the state. Within the EU, while being subverted by increasing cross-border flows, borders are becoming less distinct, thereby encouraging more flexible solutions. The stronger standing of the less sovereignty-geared EU-logic has prompted scholars like Diez to be optimistic about the options for conflict settlement in tricky cases like Cyprus. The contention here is that the same may also be the case with Gibraltar, Kaliningrad, and Jerusalem.

A hybridity perspective, therefore, implies that it might be possible to locate cases like Gibraltar, Kaliningrad, and Jerusalem quite differently from heretofore. In particular, they do not have to be viewed as merely national issues located in inter-state relations, but may also be related to broader constellations. Rather than issues to be resolved between neighboring states, they may gain legitimacy as political spaces that are part of emerging, more differentiated constellations like the EU. With traditional notions of sovereignty becoming relativized as a result of globalization, new options and solutions might become visible. Although a hybridity approach might be seen to imply a loss of standing for states, it also indicates that space for compromise between states might be found in conflicts over margins like Gibraltar, Kaliningrad, and Jerusalem. Indeed, approving of, and contributing to flexible solutions even in such spaces might be a way in which states can demonstrate that they are in tune with globalization. In what follows, we provide an overview of the different ways that the cases of Gibraltar, Kaliningrad, and Jerusalem have been framed by relevant actors. To what extent, we ask, can one identify discourses in which these margins are perceived through the frames of peripherality, marginality, and hybridity?

Gibraltar

Gibraltar has been a problem in UK-Spanish relations since it was ceded from Spain to the UK by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. More particularly, it has become a problem of territorial sovereignty, with Spain claiming territorial rights over Gibraltar, the UK traditionally defending their ownership of "the Rock," and Gibraltarians stuck in between. The aim here is not to explore the relative merits of the competing sovereignty claims. Instead, it is to outline how Gibraltar is perceived in the discourses of the relevant actors: Spain, the UK, and Gibraltar.

One thing is clear: neither side views Gibraltar in terms of peripherality. The status and ownership of Gibraltar has been a matter of dispute for centuries. To the extent that it is modernist understandings of political space that have dominated, then, contesting claims have turned Gibraltar

into a conceptual problem. The failure to "sort Gibraltar out" according to modernist premises, and the perception of it as a problem was made clear by Peter Hain—then UK minister for Europe—in the House of Commons in 2002: "the *status quo* is not sustainable, because Gibraltar's relations with Spain are *abnormal* and will remain so if the *status quo* prevails."[2] In other words, there is a need to "fix" Gibraltar in line with sovereignty.

In Gibraltar, such comments have traditionally fueled suspicions that the British government will do a deal with the Spanish government over their heads—that ultimately the UK is willing to hand over this "anomaly" to Spain. Such concerns were reinforced in July 2001, when the UK Foreign Office, under foreign minister Jack Straw, recommenced the 1984 Brussels Process of talks with Spain over Gibraltar's future. Significantly, the talks were initially kept secret, with the government of Gibraltar excluded. When they were informed of the talks, the Gibraltarians were offered the right to sit in, but not as an equal party. Denied equal subjectivity alongside the states, they refused.

It has always been clear that Spain views the issue in either/or modernist terms, and perceives Gibraltar as a problematic space that needs sorting out in line with the doctrine of sovereignty. Spain's bottom line is that Gibraltar should be returned to full Spanish sovereignty. The Spanish government, therefore, consistently refuses to consider Gibraltar as an overlapping space that may be amenable for more postmodern solutions. Spain has long imposed sanctions on Gibraltar, establishing one of the toughest border crossing points in the EU, to make the point this is not an issue where sharing territory or other innovative solutions will be considered.[3] Indeed, in some respects, Spain even denies the existence of Gibraltar: despite skirting just past the Rock, Spain's new coastal road lacks a single road sign to Gibraltar (Mohr 2005). Also notable is the way Spain has frequently declared Gibraltar a site of organized crime, smuggling, and money-laundering to enhance its claim to sovereignty. The implication is that only by bringing the Rock under full Spanish jurisdiction, will law and order (but also Westphalian territorial order) be restored.[4] Gibraltar's indeterminate status is, therefore, presented as a negativity escaping the control of the statist center—with standardization then offered as the recipe for achieving a more orderly life.

However, while modernist perspectives of marginality emphasizing the need to sort out Gibraltar in terms of sovereign visions of spatial ordering remain prominent, more innovative ideas can also be identified. These to some degree support ideas of conceptualizing Gibraltar as a hybrid space and that see such hybridity as a resource, rather than something to be disciplined.

Thus, although the British government has been concerned about the "abnormality" of Gibraltar, the UK's proposed solution is not a traditional

Westphalian sovereignty transfer, but has involved discussions with Spain on *joint* sovereignty, proposed as a permanent solution, not a step to full Spanish sovereignty. This would include Gibraltarians' holding dual British/Spanish nationality and a largely devolved government for Gibraltar. Even this proposal remains stuck in the discourse of sovereignty and, since sovereignty is an all-or-nothing category, it is unclear that joint sovereignty makes much sense. It does, however, represent more innovative thinking.[5] Indeed, Gibraltar's current position partly inside the EU (in territorial terms), and partly outside (in terms of things like the Customs Union and Common Agricultural Policy) already indicates more flexible approaches to territoriality and governance in the EU.

The "abnormality" seen by the British government is viewed differently by most Gibraltarians, who do not usually see their situation as one of abnormality requiring sovereignty-directed solutions. They are quite happy with the *status quo*, formally under British sovereign rule, but with significant autonomy. Discussion of "joint sovereignty" has particularly rankled. They have keenly asserted that under modern international law: "The people of Gibraltar, like all colonial peoples before them, enjoy the inalienable right to self-determination, that is, the right to determine their own future."[6] This view was upheld in an unofficial referendum in November 2002, which overwhelmingly rejected joint sovereignty.

Spain's strict border regime and its generally disruptive policies toward the territory have also contributed to promoting a distinctive Gibraltarian identity, significantly built around anti-Spanish themes, which has fostered a strong attachment to Britain. Indeed, a distinct Gibraltarian identity only really emerged with Spain's harsh sanctions against the territory. This, more than anything, promoted notions of Gibraltar as a British territory, and further helped frame the construction of Gibraltarian identity in terms of sovereignty (Holtom 2002, 236; Jackson 1987, 319). Thus, if the UK government worries about the abnormality of Gibraltar, Gibraltarians rather worry that normalization of relations between Spain and Gibraltar might undermine its cultural authenticity—nurtured not least by forced isolation.

However, Gibraltarians also know that autarky is not an option. Rather, there is a desire to gain full access to the European market, which ultimately means finding some kind of accommodation with Spain. Thus, also on the Gibraltarians' side there is a need to escape the confines of a solely sovereignty-driven discourse and to play up the resources deriving from a hybrid identity. This is not straightforward, however. To the extent that Spain pressures Gibraltar with aggressive sovereignty-driven tactics, this seems to enhance Gibraltarians' notions of themselves as archetypal "Brits," and, hence, to impede efforts to install any hybrid, in-between or third-space identities.

Significantly, however, Gibraltarians are also keen to highlight their distinctiveness—their hybridity—from the British "mainstream." Despite concerns about Spanish intentions, an embracing of British-Spanish hybridity is also evident when Victorian cast-iron balconies, iconic British phone booths, mailboxes, pubs, and Sunday lunches are mixed with Spanish cuisine and "Spanglish" expressions (see Mohr 2005). Likewise, Gibraltarians tend to be very pro-European. Partly, this has been a tactic to distance themselves from the Spanish; but it also challenges notions of Britishness constructed *in opposition to* Europe, insofar as the EU is seen as a *defense* against Britain's trampling on Gibraltarians' rights in the EU (Muller 2004, 44). It is therefore surprising that the EU has so far been unwilling to embrace hybridity in Gibraltar, or to become actively engaged in resolving the dispute.

Although this hybridity perspective remains in the background, even on the Spanish side possibilities for Gibraltar's distinctiveness, which avoid sovereignty-driven discourses, are also evident. These do not come from the central government, however, but from within the Spanish region of Campo, bordering Gibraltar. This Spanish margin has perceived advantages in trade and tourism from an open border with Gibraltar: the mayors of towns and villages in the Campo continually attempt to develop joint projects in spite of opposition in Madrid (Holtom 2002, 237).

In the case of Gibraltar, therefore, sovereignty-geared frames have been prominent. Overall, the perspective has been one of marginality, expressed in a desire to "fix" the Gibraltar "anomaly" in line with modernist conceptions of space. This is clearest on the Spanish side, but also evident in the UK and even in Gibraltar, where identity has often been built through asserting Spain's otherness. However, Gibraltar only appears as an anomaly when perceived through modernist lenses. Shifting the frame means Gibraltar is no longer a space to be disciplined into line. The option of normalizing its hybridity as a space-between is there, and may offer considerable resources, especially if this hybridity is constituted in terms of a mixing of British, Spanish, and EU elements.

Kaliningrad

In the run-up to the EU's 2004 enlargement, Russia's Kaliningrad *oblast*, located between Poland and Lithuania, assumed an important place on the agenda of EU-Russian relations. The problem was that, as a region geographically separated from the rest of Russia, Kaliningrad would be surrounded by new EU member states that, in line with accession preconditions, would be required to impose the EU's stringent border regimes and other regulations

associated with the *acquis*. Concern that Kaliningrad may find itself isolated behind new trade regulations and the Schengen visa regime was palpable, with many worrying that Kaliningrad would slide into a cycle of instability and impoverishment.[7] This has resulted in considerable debate since the 1990s about Kaliningrad's status, and how developments there may affect EU-Russian relations. However, the problem has not only concerned the character of EU-Russian relations, but also the constitution of EU and Russian subjectivity. As such, the Kaliningrad issue has become one that significantly problematizes how the EU and Russia understand political space and the borders distinguishing inside from outside in Europe.

Moscow and Kaliningrad have generally approached the issue through modernist perspectives. At times, Kaliningrad has clearly been viewed through the frame of peripherality, denied its own unique status, and instead seen as simply a constitutive element of Russian territory. However, in general, marginality frames have dominated, with Kaliningrad's exclave status becoming a reason for the active reassertion of a modernist ordering of political space. Throughout the 1990s, for instance, the idea of Kaliningrad as a Russian military outpost remained important. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been important in this regard since Kaliningrad is now all that remains of the territories acquired by Russia during the "Great Patriotic War" of 1941–45 (Wellmann 1996, 172). The symbolic link between great Russia and Kaliningrad, which reproduces binary thinking of the past, where space is "ours" or "theirs," has become stronger with the shrinking of Russia's sphere of influence (Janusauskas 2001, 236). Throughout the 1990s, the result was that many in Kaliningrad and Moscow became suspicious of talk of opening up Kaliningrad to the external environment, since this was seen as endangering Russia's geographical and political integrity (Joenniemi 1996, 95–96).

These concerns have made both Kaliningraders and Moscow sensitive to claims of German, Polish, and Lithuanian nationalists, who have occasionally claimed territorial rights over Kaliningrad. Indeed, in the 1990s, such concerns even resulted in official suspicions of foreign (especially German) investment in the territory, particularly land purchases (Oldberg 2000, 279). However, although the emphasis on Kaliningrad as a military outpost has generally reflected defensive concerns for preserving Russia's territorial sovereignty, it has also had a more proactive element to it. Some Russians see Kaliningrad's unique position as a resource to reassert Russia's geopolitical presence in the Baltic region. This was evident during debates about NATO enlargement to the Baltic states, where Russia explicitly threatened further militarization of Kaliningrad to derail the enlargement

process. Thus, in 2002, just before the decision on NATO enlargement was made, defense minister Sergei Ivanov visited the Baltic fleet in Kaliningrad, warned that NATO enlargement might destabilize the region, and proclaimed Moscow was committed to defending Kaliningrad from external attacks and that new ships would be provided to keep the Kaliningrad fleet battle ready (Felgenhauer 2002).

For its part, the EU has also emphasized a traditional discourse in which the border with Kaliningrad is depicted as a security border and line of control and exclusion, demarcating our space from theirs (Browning 2003). The EU has generally viewed Kaliningrad as a source of soft security threats, typically an almost anarchic zone or developmental sink-hole threatening the EU with smuggling operations, economic instability, and public-health problems. Kaliningrad has therefore figured as an entity to be firmly differentiated and isolated from European space.

This also explains the EU's insistence that the Schengen visa regime be applied to Kaliningrad. The Schengen issue has been important because, as noted by Russia, it implies Russians traveling to or from Kaliningrad by land would need a visa, which in principle could be denied by an EU visa official, creating a situation in which a foreign official could prevent a Russian traveling between two parts of their own country. Meanwhile, for Kaliningraders, the visa regime has threatened to disrupt local trade patterns with Lithuania and Poland, and become a significant obstacle to economic development.

However, despite this emphasis on modernist understandings of sovereignty, openness to the idea of Kaliningrad as a hybrid space can also be discerned. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, the idea that Kaliningrad could be a test case of EU-Russia relations was sometimes aired: Kaliningrad could be seen as an experimental "third space," partly integrated into EU practices while remaining a sovereign territory of Russia. Such ideas have been a direct response to Kaliningrad's isolation from the developing common market and the need to prevent EU enlargement from further impoverishing the territory because its neighbors are now required to comply with EU standards and border policies.

Ideas that Kaliningrad could become an economic pioneer, a "New Hansa," "pilot region," "bridge," "meeting place," or "test case" for the future of European governance, and a "cradle for Russia's internationalization," have been commonly mooted (Browning and Joenniemi 2004, 719). Parallels have been drawn between Kaliningrad and Hong Kong, the idea being that Kaliningrad, too, could be an innovative space and "five star hotel" where one country experiments with two systems (Khlopetsky 2001, 55; Oldberg 1998, 9). Some Kaliningrad politicians have argued that Kaliningrad should be granted an autonomous status enabling it to join the EU economic area without ceding from Russia (Oldberg 2002, 67).

Significantly, the region has now been integrated into three of the EU's Euroregions (Baltica, Niemen, and Saule), thereby to some extent blurring the inside/outside nature of the EU's external border.[8]

As with Gibraltar, these ideas have been accompanied by a growing identification of Kaliningrad with a hybrid and mixed culture. After the Soviet Union appropriated Kaliningrad following World War II, Stalin instigated a systematic program of de-Germanization. This entailed renaming towns and cities (e.g., Königsberg became Kaliningrad) and geographical features; the forced deportation of the surviving German inhabitants and their replacement with Soviet citizens; the Sovietization of Kaliningrad's architecture, with Prussian buildings torn down and replaced with Soviet-style blocs; and even Kaliningrad's twisting medieval cobblestone streets being straightened into wide asphalt-covered Soviet avenues. Today, however, there is greater willingness to emphasize the region's mixed cultural heritage, clearest in the return of Prussian/German architectural styles, and a growing interest in the diverse history of the region under Lithuanian, Polish, German, Soviet, and, most recently, Russian rule (Browning and Joenniemi 2004, 719–21; Sezneva 2002).

Elements of Kaliningrad's multiple heritages are therefore being raised, providing space for conceptualizing Kaliningrad as transcending Russian/European divides, neither fully inside nor outside of either. This shift toward a hybridity perspective is far from comprehensive, and faces opposition not only within Kaliningrad, but also in the EU and Moscow. In Moscow, a desire to develop Kaliningrad into a linking space with Europe is easily represented as secessionist and destructive of Russia's territorial integrity. Moscow's fears of rampant regionalization (particularly during the Yeltsin years) are well documented, and not least manifest in Putin's centralizing reforms of 2000, which have seen regions like Kaliningrad subordinated to newly Kremlin-appointed federal governors. For its part, the EU has worried about being seen to interfere in Russia's internal politics, and has been wary of opening up to Kaliningrad, which, it is also feared, may give Russia another lever into the EU's own internal politics.

Jerusalem

Jerusalem's recent history appears to testify to a change from peripherality to centrality, and the *strengthening* of a statist logic. However, Jerusalem's symbolic connotations also continue to impact on the deployment of political space.

Prior to the creation of Israel in 1948, Jerusalem had not played any major role in the struggle for territorial control. The city was undoubtedly

perceived as being historically and symbolically significant, but it was not a center of political or economic activity. This role was—even according to the Zionist leadership—reserved for Tel Aviv, the first "Hebrew, city of the nationalist movement and center of activity during the pre-State years."[9] Considerable flexibility prevailed even as attention shifted toward Jerusalem. The Jewish Agency tabled a partition plan in 1937 based on open boundaries and free movement between the two parts of the city. With the British Mandate of Palestine expiring in 1947, the United Nations recommended "the creation of a special international regime in the City of Jerusalem," i.e., ordinary statist logic should not be extended to cover Jerusalem. This plan, however, did not materialize, and at the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jerusalem—then still a part of the British Mandate and in that sense part of a non-statist logic—was divided between Israel and Jordan. The next year, Israel designated West Jerusalem its capital, while Jordan held and eventually annexed East Jerusalem, including the Old City. In 1988, Jordan decided to "disengage" from the West Bank, and threw its support behind the claims of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO claimed statehood throughout the occupied territories and identified Jerusalem as the capital of the prospective state entity.

Openness continued to be the constitutive argument in the Israeli discourse of complaints about Jordan blocking access to holy places and cultural institutions in the eastern city—above all to Mount Scopus and the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. These arguments were then used in waging war and unilaterally legitimizing annexation of the eastern parts of the city in 1967. The claim was that Israel, unlike Jordan, would respect all religious beliefs and allow free access to all holy sites under its sovereignty. A statist takeover was there in order to protect the basically *non*-statist nature of the city. It was said to be particularly important to do away with the boundary that had separated the eastern and western parts. In short, the argument for the creation of an open and unrestricted space was not at the expense of statist logic. The claim was that Jerusalem had now been turned into a multi-religious city, a place of harmony where Jews, Muslims, and Christians could live peacefully side-by-side. This was qualified, though, by a modern logic: no national identity other than "Israeli" was acknowledged, and the city was to remain undivided in the sense of not hosting two different capitals. The argument of openness was also one of exclusion, in that it acted to try to prevent any potential competing statist configuration from emerging (Klein 2005, 54).

Consequently, rather than bridging and building on hybridity, over time Israel has been constructing barriers, fences, and walls. Overall, Jerusalem has grown into a complicated, concentric configuration based

on segregation, compartmentalization, and enclaves for various ethnic groups and nationalities. The configuration—with security high on the agenda particularly during the Intifada years—does not merely impact on the city, but extends its influence over the West Bank more generally.

The notion of openness is qualified by Israeli sovereignty and applies only within the annexed city itself, plus the nearby settlements, as well as in the view of the rest of Israel and the worldwide Jewish community.[10] The eastern parts have been largely cut off from the surrounding Palestinian areas through various kinds of closure, curfews, roadblocks, and so forth. They are not to host a competing statist configuration. The "separation barrier," constructed since 2003 between Israel and the West Bank and now largely completed, constitutes the most visible and concrete manifestation of the restrictive policies pursued.[11] While the initial claim was to be doing away with various borderlines and restrictions separating the eastern and western parts from each other, in practice, various ethnic-national, political, communal, religious, historical, and cultural walls have nonetheless restricted exchange to a minimum. A declaratory policy of openness and non-bordering on the state level has been complemented by a restrictive and exclusive one on the local level. Moreover, since 2000, Israel has also used mobile roadblocks and police checkpoints to create a soft border regime along the seam between East and West Jerusalem.

The controls are mainly territorial and related to Jerusalem's frontier-nature, but they also cover some symbolic and temporal issues. With the Temple Mount and the Western Wall being important religious sites, for example, questions of sovereignty—in terms of the right to decide upon excavation—have been of importance. The policies pursued in this regard have been restricted and cautious, although at times also active and conflictual, amounting at some junctures to proposals in the context of the peace talks, such as dividing sovereignty "vertically and horizontally" (i.e., the Palestinians would control everything above ground, while Israel would have sovereignty over everything below) (e.g., Gold 2001, 50).

While closure rather than openness has over time enjoyed most prominence in the various parties' agendas on Jerusalem, the parties have, on occasion, signaled that they might reconsider their positions. (The international community, not to mention various religious actors, such as the Vatican, have largely continued to pursue hybrid approaches, however.) In the context of the Oslo Accord of 1993, the Camp David summit of July 2000, the "Clinton Parameters" of December 2000, and the Taba talks of January 2001, the message was that the boundaries are not holy, but man-made, and may change as part of a negotiated peace. In fact, the various Jerusalem-related issues (such as sovereignty and the establishment of a

border between east and west of the city along ethnic-national lines) turned out to be negotiable. The "Clinton Parameters" were explicitly based on the modern idea that Jerusalem should encompass the internationally recognized capitals of two states—Israel and Palestine—and that what is Arab should be Palestinian and what is Jewish, Israeli.[12] In other words, the aim was to start with space divided unambiguously, and then sort out the remaining issues on a practical basis. Yet, besides full sovereignty, the discussions encompassed ideas of functional, shared, residual, or postponed sovereignty. The airing of a variety of ideas and proposals previously "unthinkable" did not, however, result in a meeting of minds or formal agreement.

Although the various elements are still there, the rift between the parties appears to have grown over time. With the collapse of the exploratory talks, negotiations over the final status are no longer on the agenda. Israel, particularly with Ariel Sharon at the helm, concluded that the prospects for negotiated solutions were slim. The emphasis moved instead to implementing unilateral solutions, such as the withdrawal from Gaza. A similar emphasis on unilateralism has been discernible in Jerusalem, where various local measures were pursued establishing "facts on the ground," which reduce considerably the options of the city simultaneously hosting two capitals, or of sovereignty being granted to all the areas with an Arab population. The local policies thus strongly reflect statist endeavors to strengthen primordial and divisive identities. This seems to be the case on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

The increasing stress on fences and borders, and reduced emphasis on openness, may yield the political and symbolic constellations that centrality sought. But the economic and social costs of the policies pursued remain considerable. Jerusalem remains one of Israel's poorer cities, with considerable unemployment and welfare dependency. Visibly, Tel Aviv remains the social and economic center of the country, and is also the site of almost all foreign embassies, while Jerusalem remains a contested site, also from a diplomatic perspective. More generally, the efforts to quell Jerusalem as a site in-between, undermine its heritage as a center in religious, symbolic, and historical terms, and favor more statist, sovereignty-related centrality with considerable costs, both human and material.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how margins like Gibraltar, Kaliningrad, and Jerusalem have been approached through different spatial lenses. In each case, it has been shown how modernist frames, viewing the margin in

terms of either peripherality or marginality, have been discernable, even dominant, in political discourse. In terms of these frames, the marginality of each of these entities is a problem in need of remedial action to discipline the marginal back into conformity with principles of sovereign territoriality. However, the analysis has also illustrated how such modernist perceptual frames for political space and subjectivity are in themselves constitutive of some of the problems faced at the margins in question.

The chapter has further shown how, in each case, different conceptual possibilities are present, moderating modernist frames occasionally with a view of the margin in terms of hybridity. Hybridity entails a rejection of the neat territorial packages of the modernist frames. We argue that hybridity retains interesting possibilities for creativity, and for conceiving subjectivity outside the either-or strictures of sovereignty. In each case, it has been shown that the novelty of hybrid identity has been recognized to some extent, albeit weakly. This indicates that it is not enough simply to recognize the novelty of hybridity. Salient parties must also have the competence and interest to develop the possibility with a view to exploiting the situation and breaking out of the confines of the established political order and the narratives underpinning it. To the extent they are able to do this, entities like Gibraltar, Kaliningrad, and Jerusalem may gain some agency themselves. This is so because—as stated at the beginning—whereas modernist perspectives deprive odd spaces of subjectivity from the start, by dividing them and enforcing an entrenched binary, either-or hierarchy (cf. Norval 1999, 107), hybridity perspectives offer the possibility for more diffuse and heterogeneous subjectivity distinct from that of states. Following Pieterse (2001, 221), we would argue that although hybridity is nothing new, the scope for thinking in terms of hybridity is widening as a result of globalization. Indeed, in an era of globalization, to understand the possibilities of hybridity might be a considerable resource.

Notes

1. For example, Gibraltar is also outside the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, Common Fisheries Policy, and the tax system (Muller 2004, 44).
2. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Gibraltar: Eleventh Report of Session 2001–02*, HC973, November 7, 2002.
3. Sanctions have included restricted use of phone lines, slow border crossings, and the fact that planes and boats visiting Gibraltar are not permitted thereafter to stop in Spain.
4. Whether Gibraltar is a site of organized crime in the way Spain claims, is a contentious issue, and is denied by the Gibraltarians, while there have been

moves in recent years by the Gibraltarian government to bring the territory into line with EU practices in this regard (Muller 2004, 45).

5. On the British government's proposals, see: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Gibraltar: Eleventh Report of Session 2001–02*, HC973, November 7, 2002.
6. Government of Gibraltar quoted in *BBC News Online*, "Analysis: Gibraltar not done deal yet," 1207/2002 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2125161.stm. Interestingly, they argue the principle of self-determination needs to be seen as trumping the clause within Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, which states that, should Britain ever give up sovereignty of Gibraltar, it must be offered back to Spain first. In the British view, this has meant there can be no independence for Gibraltar, which also explains Britain's emphasis on joint sovereignty in their proposals.
7. For an overview, see Fairlie and Sergounin (2001).
8. For a series of innovative recommendations proposed by both European and Russian scholars, see Birkenbach and Wellmann (2003).
9. See Newman (2002a, 48).
10. On this latter point, see Newman (2002b, 630).
11. For a balanced description of the situation, see the International Crisis Group (2005).
12. For a detailed description of the proposals and the parties' different positions, see Gold (2001).

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9

Notions of "Europe" : Where Does Europe's Southern Margin Lie?[1]

Michelle Pace

Introduction

In the beginning of this book, Noel Parker introduces a "positive theory of marginality," explicating core categories for understanding center-margin relations. Europe's capacity to order its environment marks it out as a center in global geopolitical structures. In an attempt to test this formulation against the potentialities of margins *around* Europe, this chapter focuses on interactions between Europe and its southern periphery; more specifically, the settings of EU-Mediterranean relations as exposed through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Process) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). It highlights that the marginal potentialities in the Mediterranean remain largely unrealized: Mediterranean partners have so far been unable either to obtain loyalty or intermediation rewards in their relations with the EU, or to establish any competitive emulation of European values. In narrating this story from the position of Europe's self-assertion vis-à-vis its southern neighbors, the chapter advocates that for this long, "problematic" margin, more normative principles have to be instilled into the Med-Euro margin-center relation. Drawing upon Bakhtin's (1991) and Derrida's (1992) discursive tools, it argues that the present dysfunctional interplay in this context can be pursued through an emancipatory dialogue between Europe and its southern margins.

Europe's Ordering Capacity on its Southern Margin

In seeking to order its Mediterranean space, perceived as one of conflict, instability, insecurity, and so on, Europe has faced some serious challenges. The delineation of a Mediterranean space has been crafted through a construction of a Euro-Mediterranean "region," which was initiated in 1995 with the EMP. The path to this construction has been a bumpy one. From its inception, the European integration process included a "Mediterranean" element in the framework. The Rome Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC), left the door open to other "European" countries that wished to become members (Article 237). The phrase in Article 237 stipulates that "any European nation can apply." It was quite ambiguous what "European" in this context meant, and it was therefore left up to countries to test this out over the years. Greece joined in 1981; Portugal and Spain joined in 1986. Turkey applied for European Community membership in 1987, but given that it has been construed to be neither completely European nor Middle Eastern (nor Asian), it had to wait until October 3, 2005 to start accession negotiations! In 1987, Morocco also sent a membership application to Brussels, but was told that since Morocco was *not a European country*, it could not join the club. Cyprus and Malta applied for Community membership in 1990, and joined in May 2004.

The treaty also contained a section (Articles 131–136) pertaining to the *association* of "non-European countries and territories which have *special relations*" with the founding members. The concept of "association" with the then EEC referred to a set of initiatives promoting multilateral dialogue and cooperation between European and individual southern Mediterranean countries. Prior to 1989, the European Communities (EC) addressed the Mediterranean only in the context of bilateral agreements. Throughout the 1960s, the EC signed trade agreements with various Mediterranean countries granting manufactured products free, or preferential access to the EEC, and limited access for some specified (albeit crucial) agricultural products. It proceeded to sign cooperation and association agreements with various Mediterranean Non-member Countries (MNCs). Through these paths of association, the EEC attempted to map out which neighboring countries can be linked to the center, and which must remain on Europe's outer margins (Pace 2006).

The May 1, 2004 enlargement prompted the EU to rethink its relations with its southern (and eastern) neighbors that have no prospect of entering the EU in the foreseeable future. The EU attempted to offer some consolation to its "new" margins through its Wider Europe scheme, which eventually developed into the ENP (Commission of the European Communities

2003, 2004). The ENP was clearly a response to the changing composition of the EU, its shifting borders, and altered geopolitical outlook. Further enlargement, possibly to include Turkey, would mean that the EU will have borders with Syria, Iran, and Iraq (Joenniemi 2005). Thus, the ENP is a result of the EU's own internal dynamics following its largest enlargement round to date. Hence, the policy is about protecting the EU's internal and external borders, by deploying the EU's ordering capacity over its southern (as well as eastern) margins (Pace 2005a).

Mediterranean Countries Accept Their Marginal Position but Fight for Loyalty Rewards

Throughout the various waves of EU enlargement, and against the background of the European integration process, a suppressed narrative about the exclusion of some Mediterranean states has been forged. In the case of Morocco's bid for EC membership: "[T]he challenge was simply refused in the shape that it was given by the challenger. In this case, the relationship between the EC and Morocco was reduced by the EC itself as being a digital one between zero and one, between non-Europe and Europe" (Neumann in Pace 2006: preface, xiii). However, by accepting non-membership as its fate, Morocco sought rewards in a continued special relation with Europe. Morocco moved on following the EC's rebuff, to earn a reputation for being the best negotiator in dealings with Brussels as an associated partner. The relatively harmonious relations between Morocco and the EU have often been disrupted by disputes where Morocco expressed her concern over European Union fishing in her waters, which created contentious and heated discussions—specifically with Spain. The conflicts stem directly from Spain's fishing in Moroccan waters. First in 1992, and again in 1995, Morocco objected to the presence of Spanish boats. In 1995, the government of Morocco claimed that Spanish boats were responsible for the depletion of the fish stock in Moroccan waters. The concern over a potential scarcity led Morocco to revoke a four year agreement, and necessitated rounds of negotiations. But, eventually, a new agreement was reached, and Morocco could feel confident that the agreement would decrease over-fishing by Spanish boats, thereby allowing Moroccan fishermen to work their own waters and not worry about the declining fish population (ICE Case Studies 1996).

Thus, even though it is marked as a margin of Europe, Morocco possesses a degree of freedom, and even a capacity to change the identity assigned it, such that it remains "constructive" vis-à-vis the center (Europe). Morocco has in fact benefited from the various interactions

between (former) colonial centers and (former) colonized margins during the course of the twentieth century, specifically between Spanish and French (ex-)colonial powers and the Maghreb. The firming-up of the EU's Mediterranean boundary reinforced the significance of the marginal. Today, Morocco is a crucial partner of EU member states. In many ways, the EU's relations with Morocco today marginalize other parts of Europe. This was recently highlighted by Ukraine's EU ambassador, Roman Shpek. He argued that the ENP, which covers sixteen states, stretching from Casablanca to Murmansk, has one main weakness—it puts all the neighboring states in one basket—and is not acceptable to Ukraine, which wants to become a full member of the EU club (Shpek 2007).

Given that the ENP is such a contentious policy "through the eyes of one neighbor," one may question why certain southern neighbors, like Morocco, accept their fate as margins under EU policy. According to 2001 data, the then EU-15's share of Moroccan exports amounted to 72.4 percent (Pace 2006). In November 2006, Morocco even earned itself the label of a model neighbor that, together with Jordan, should be emulated by other EU (ENP) neighbors (*EUObserver* 2006)! By way of a competition for loyalty rewards' discourse, the EU claimed that Morocco and Jordan did best in 2005, in terms of EU reforms in line with the ENP. With their questionable human rights records, poor governance structures, and failure with respect to other norms, the margins in the Mediterranean challenge, *and* guarantee, by seemingly falling into line—for the EU at least. The Moroccan king has craftily placed women at the top positions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to appease the EU's call for the advancement of women's rights and the development of civil society in the south.

Similarly Algeria, with its large oil resources, counters the (EU) center's model with its own form of economic power, negating the EU's soft power. Because of its heavy reliance on Algerian oil, to date, the EU has never implemented any sanctions against Algeria for its violations of human rights—a legal possibility available within Article 2 of all Mediterranean association agreements (Pace 2007). But even though Algeria has signed an association agreement (which in theory binds it to uphold European values), this does not prevent Algeria from seeking cooperation with centers other than Europe. Algeria's reluctance to engage in the ENP as a proper neighbor (Darbouche and Gillespie 2006) can be explained by its enhancement of economic relations with an alternative center, China, which (unlike the EU) does not ask any questions about human rights as a condition for its investments. When the Algerian President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, addressed the China-Algeria forum for economic cooperation

(of November 4–5, 2006), he stressed that cooperation between Algeria and China would serve as a model for Africa-China cooperation and South-South cooperation. Bilateral trade between Algeria and China topped $1.77 billion in 2005 (Chinaview 2006).

Egypt—where the authoritarian regime of President Hosni Mubarak responds to EU pressures for democratization through "cosmetic" reforms—is another good case in this context. In 2005, Mubarak announced the first multiple-candidate presidential election in his then twenty-four years in power. The *Kifaya* ("Enough!") coalition of opposition groups and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)—a banned, popular rival to Mubarak's regime—took to the streets in large numbers to seize the new "freedom." Although the MB gained eighty-eight parliamentary seats (candidates standing as independents), Mubarak managed to retain his hold and power, and get himself re-elected. Subsequently, he imprisoned Ayman Nour, a leading politician who had the courage to run against him. Despite Western protests, Nour is still in jail. Many of the MB's leading activists and business representatives are in prison, some facing military tribunals. The EU has the necessary legal provisions within the EU-Egypt Association Agreement (in force since June 1, 2004), as well as the EU-Egypt Action Plan, to suspend such agreements in case of violations. But, thus far, the EU has never contemplated such action against any southern neighbor.

Another case in point is Turkey. While Europeans continue to question whether Turkey belongs in the Union, the Turks question whether they really want to be a part of Europe. Support in Turkey for EU membership has dropped from close to 80 percent a few years ago, to lower than 40 percent today. A loss of mutual trust and understanding has been detected even between Turkey and the United States in recent years. Turkey's destiny in the EU has been a particular casualty of the conservative trend exposed by the disruption of the European constitution's ratification process. But, although Turkey's loyalty reward of membership at the end of its reform process is much less certain than for other candidates, it has the opportunity to bite back and turn to rhetorical action. Basing its claims on collective identity and the constitutive liberal values and norms of the EU, it has the potential to shame reticent member states into complying with community rules and honoring past commitments. Given EU self-projection as a normative power and economic giant, Turkey could emphasize the greater economic weight and geographical reach of an enlarged EU incorporating Turkey, as well as the greater geopolitical clout the EU would gain on the international stage. Alternatives to Europe are being contemplated and cultivated: perhaps Turkey should be leading the greater Middle East in a global powerhouse. Some strategists go further and recommend that

Turkey foster relationships regardless of values or common worldviews, nurturing issue-based alliances with countries like Russia or Iran (Turkish Policy Quarterly 2006).

These are some examples of how the margins in the south play off the European center by either seeking cooperative arrangements with alternative, external centers, or shaping their own version of European values that the EU seeks to export to the south. The paradoxes in guaranteeing order in EU-Med relations is again evident in the role in European thinking that a vibrant civil society in the south is expected to play as a crucial base for a well-functioning democracy—as in the case of Morocco. Although the EMP highlighted the role of civil society within the third chapter (social, cultural, and human area), and the Barcelona Declaration was adopted *unanimously* by all Euro-Mediterranean partners, the difference in opinion on how to put such a civil society dialogue into practice was striking. EU member states encouraged fairly free and self-sustained interaction between the variety of civil society actors across the Mediterranean. Southern governments insisted, however, that control was crucial on the grounds that third-sector associations needed to be carefully monitored due to the growth in "terrorist" groups and political opposition. Using the EU's own language on "countering terrorism threats," North African and Middle Eastern governments managed to get southern EU member states on their side, culminating in a fudged compromise on a very timid and gradual opening for growing civil liberties over an unspecified period of time. The EU seems happy to accommodate southern partners in this context, as when in 2003 the Commission—on the grounds that some of the actors involved in these projects were linked to Islamic terrorism—withdrew funding that had already been approved for civil society projects in Egypt, at the insistence of the country's authorities (Johansson-Nougés 2006). In the case of Morocco, the EU overlooks the true nature of co-opted NGOs whose directors report directly back to the King (Europe in the World Centre, University of Liverpool 2001).[2] Those thought of as marginal thereby cast their own anti-democratic rhetoric and actions back in the language of the EU's own values agenda!

There are different ways in which the margins can resort to power tactics, and can in fact, shape what counts as the center. In the case of Turkey, its tactics could enlarge the concept of the center to include the once excluded margin. As Ali Babacan, Turkish economy minister and chief negotiator with the EU announced on March 2, 2007 (following the EU's December 2006 decision to suspend eight out of thirty-five chapters of Turkey's membership negotiations): "Now we have developed a new strategy . . . It will be on the basis of our own priorities and our own deadlines, [Ankara would

work toward fulfilling EU criteria in] all the chapters, including the chapters which have been suspended." This announcement challenged the European Commission, which has the prerogative of monitoring progress and setting timetables in accession talks (*EUObserver* 2007).

If by margins we refer to symbolic geography, then a further range of possibilities on the margins emerges. The marginal can be a site of agency, engagement, and action, rather than for lamenting the marginalized condition. We can refer to this as a moment of transition or initiation, through which the margins subvert possibilities and affirm a new status, and through which the marginal is incorporated into, or blur what is conceived as, the center: a wider European space. In this way, southern Mediterranean neighbors open up possibilities for a new location within wider European space. Such a transformation is not limited to formal integration in the EU (in the case of Turkey), but is also possible through association agreements, bilateral agreements, and Action Plans with the EU.

Israel is another case to investigate, regarding how the margins bite back. Given Israel's reluctance to embrace the EU's Mediterranean logic, as embedded in the EMP,[3] and its preference for the "Essen rationale" (European Union 1994),[4] the ENP initiative was well received in Israel. Whereas the principle of *regionality* was inherent in the Barcelona Process, the ENP is based on the principle of *differentiated bilateralism*. The ENP's bilateral, individual, benchmarking approach offered a substantial advantage for Israel, whose Western orientation draws a cognitive border around the Arab world and emphasizes Israel's difference from its Middle Eastern neighbors (Del Sarto 2006). As Del Sarto claims, Israel "dislikes being considered a 'Mediterranean country.' Israeli officials prefer to stress that Israel has more in common with European states, in terms of economic and political features, than with the EU's southern Mediterranean neighbors" (Del Sarto 2006).[5] In terms of loyalty rewards, Israel is the only non-EU country that has been fully associated with the EU's FRAMEWORK Program since 1996—although its rewards stop short of the membership carrot. The renewal of the Science & Technology Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Israel was approved by the Council and the European Parliament, and concluded by the Israeli government in March 2004, although the provisional application of this agreement allowed Israeli research entities to participate in the EU's Sixth RTD FRAMEWORK Program (Framework Programme 6 2003–2006) activities from the beginning (Pace, Sept 2007).

Thus, the case of Israel challenges constructions of Europe's identity through EU normative power, exercised in the integration and association processes, within which multiple layers of identity can supposedly be forged.

According to the view from Israel, European and Mediterranean identities *cannot* coexist: the prevailing perception among the Israeli elite is that the two categories conflict rather than complement one another. The EMP *acquis* is supposed to enshrine EU norms, which should be emulated and adopted by EMP partners, and which should become the main focus around which identification processes are constructed. The EU's normative power is supposed to create informal habits, which in turn generate a common context for cooperation between conflicting parties, such as Israel and its Arab neighbors. But, in spite of having participated in the Barcelona Process since its launch in 1995, Israel has not internalized the EMP's underlying principles (Del Sarto 2006; Pace 2007). The ENP *acquis*, on the other hand, designates Israel as a special case, rather than one amongst several southern Mediterranean countries.

Add to this United States path dependency in respect to Israel: continued support for Israel even though it becomes a major burden at times (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). The EU is happy to respond in kind, due to Israel's ability to play the two external centers—the United States and the EU—against each other.

According to one of his close aides, EU special representative Marc Otte has opted for behind-the-scene efforts through regular meetings with Israeli officials, middle-rank leadership actors (academics, think-tank representatives, etc.), and civil society groups, to enhance the EU's image in Israel, making the EU an acceptable broker to both parties to the Israeli-Arab conflict, and establishing a relationship of trust. Given its economic relations with Israel and its aid to the Palestinians, the EU's credibility in the Middle East is particularly important in achieving a favorable outcome for all sides.[6] Since it is continuously engaged in reconstructing Europe's historical image in this region, these actions can also be explained as EU efforts to produce, reshape, and reposition Europe's southern margins from a distance, and thus to locate Europe strategically as a center to be reckoned with in the world.

How Europe Seeks Order in Its Margins

Given the competition in bidding for the EU's structural funds and neighborhood policies, it is no surprise that the southern neighbors were not originally on the radar screen of the Wider Europe/Neighborhood Policy.[7] Yet, following the EU's experience with the Western Balkan conflicts, the initial idea was to bring in these neighbors within the Wider Europe framework. The term "neighborhood" (coined at the Cologne European Council 1999) constituted a speech act affirming the continuing possibility of Europe's becoming, and its openness to the future: the possibility of Europe

"maturing" through developments, not just in Europe per se, but also in its neighborhood (though this was not clearly defined).[8] The Brussels Council meeting concluded that the Wider Europe initiative should, in addition, cover Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, as well as strengthen the EU's cooperative relations with the Russian Federation (Council of the European Union 2002). The Council also added that it might "subsequently reflect on those elements which could be relevant for relations with partners in other bordering regions"—a clear reference to the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans (ibid.; Johansson-Nogués, Sept 2007).

The Copenhagen European Council confirmed the membership perspective of the Western Balkan countries, and thus erased the southeastern European countries from the list of participants included in the Wider Europe policy (European Council 1993). This was received with great relief in the Western Balkans, as some elites feared that the policy would become an eternal waiting room for EU membership (Johansson-Nogués, forthcoming). At the Thessaloniki Summit (June 21, 2003), the EU sent a strong message that the Western Balkans are a crucial priority for Europe, marking the Western Balkans as inside the European space. The summit delivered a clear plan for the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU.[9] This is an instance where the designation "Europe" is precisely only that: an appellation (what Derrida [1992, 30] calls a "*paleonymic* appellation"), where naming is used only for strategic purposes. The promise enunciated at the summit attaches the Western Balkans as part and parcel of this promise. Whether this promise can be realized remains the challenge—witness the declaration by the European Union that "the Kosovo status process will challenge the stability we have achieved so far" (European Enlargement Newsletter 2005). But it is clear that, in these speech acts, "Europe" is thus primarily an appellation, containing at the same time a promise and impossibility. (A similar argument can be made of the naming of Turkey as a privileged partner.)

But what happened to the southern neighbors? Relations with the southern neighbors were deemed to be covered by the Barcelona Process, while EU relations with the countries of the Western Balkans have been managed in the framework of the so-called "Stabilization and Association process." Yet, less than a week after the Brussels ministerial meeting, the European neighborhood space was expanded beyond the eastern neighbors to include the Mediterranean (Prodi 2002). Thus, the south appeared as a crucial *supplement* to making a new Europe with a global reach after the 2004 enlargement. Somehow, Europe needs the south to make up for its deficiency or its *difference*. But the inclusion of southern neighbors within the ENP also reveals the EU's ordering capacity, structuring discussions with Mediterranean countries and thus generating a substantial order with

effects—for example, benefits for Mediterranean neighbors from the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. In this instance, the EU deployed a capacity to order, as well as social relations and social action in the Euro-Mediterranean space. With the exception of Algeria and Libya, Mediterranean partners barely challenge the EU's right to do this. On the contrary, they have taken the ENP as an opportunity structure that they can exploit for their own benefit.

There were internal disagreements over the name originally given to the new EU policy toward its new neighbors. The "Wider Europe" tag implied that, theoretically, Europe could expand infinitely. Hence, the possibility of EU membership would be implicit for those who were included under the policy. Jack Straw suggested that the term "Wider" be removed, and replaced by "New" Neighborhood Policy (NNP) so as to clearly flag that this was a policy for neighbors, which stopped short of EU membership.[10] Thus, the "Wider Europe" initiative became a "proximity policy" about what Romano Prodi famously called a "ring of friends" around the then EU-25's outer border, stretching from Russia (which refused the label) to Morocco (Johansson-Nogués, forthcoming). But, proximity to what, exactly? The underlying doctrine here is that of proximity to Europe, Europe designated as *cap*—Europe's projection as the capital, the head, the heading, the core, the center. Derrida challenges this because Europe is thus fixed throughout modernity. For him, this is "the moment of decision . . . the dramatic instant of a decision that is still impossible and suspended, imminent and threatening" (Derrida 1992, 31).

The looming May 2004 enlargement of the EU was indeed a dramatic and a threatening moment for Europe. This was reflected in the way the Wider Europe/NNP/ENP policy was articulated, and how it is unfolding: margins are constantly reminding the center that it needs them to get the job done at the margins. Thus, the center's (Europe's) undecidability, in particular with regard to its relations with its southern margins, is more than the impossibility of closure: it designates a "terrain of general openness and contestability, but a regulated tension and of suspension in the 'between,'" as regards the various margins of Europe, not just those to the south (see Pia et al., manuscript).

Dialogue as a Solution to the Dysfunctional Interplay of Europe and the South[11]

Given that this "problematic" margin of Europe remains challenging, the EU has attempted to manage and retain some order in the southern margins, through dialogue between North and South, in particular in the context of

the third basket of the EMP—which is conceived as a solution to the often dysfunctional interplay of EU-Mediterranean relations (Pace and Schumacher 2007). But, in practice, do participants really engage in processes that allow them to put themselves in each others' shoes? How can the participants create the sense of equality so necessary for dialogue, when the economic gap between the Mediterranean and European partners is so glaring? These southern peripheral partners, these other non-European states, these supplements of Europe, leave their mark on Europe by creating its *margins*. As mentioned earlier, in the case of Morocco, they constitute the necessary binary oppositions: inside Europe vs. outside Europe, European vs. non-European, and so on. From a Derridean perspective, what is of essence for the making of Europe is that these oppositions are located hierarchically, rather than being either unqualified opposites or equals. Europe is at the head—the top—and non-Europe on the levels below, signifying the corrupt, the *alter ego* of Europe. Thus, while dialogue could be a solution to the dysfunctional interplay between the EU and the south, the projection of weak states in the south in EU discourses hinders a true dialogic environment.

One route to a framework for critically thinking about Euro-Mediterranean dialogic relations is to draw upon the work of the critical thinker, Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin's literary theory focuses primarily on language (that is, any form of speech or writing) as a dialogue. Acknowledged as the philosopher of dialogue, then, he evolved a view of it as a human condition, an ethical imperative, and even a prerequisite for thinking (Neumann 2003).[12] Thus, his notion focuses attention to the social nature of dialogue, and the *struggle* inherent in it.

For Bakhtin, ideas about language have always postulated a unitary speaker, a speaker who has an unmediated relation to "his unitary and singular 'own' language." Like Derrida's "engineer," this speaker claims to "produce unique meaning in [my] own speech; [my] speech comes from [me] alone." Hence, according to Bakhtin, this way of thinking about language focuses on two pillars: language as a system, and the individual who speaks it. For Bakhtin, both pillars, however, produce monologic language: a language that seems to come from a single, unified source (Bakhtin 1981, 666).

Bakhtin further argues that there are two principal forces in operation whenever language is used, a centripetal and a centrifugal (ibid., 667–68): the centripetal force pushes things toward a central point, and the centrifugal force pushes things away from a central point, out in all directions. According to Bakhtin, monologic language (*monologia*) operates in accordance with centripetal forces: the speaker of monologic language attempts to force all the elements of language, and all its various rhetorical modes

(journalistic, religious, political, economic, academic, personal) into one single form of utterance, converging to one central point. The centripetal force of monologia tries to get rid of differences between languages (or rhetorical modes), so as to present one unified language. Monologia is a system of norms, of one standard language, or an "official" language—a standard language that everyone would have to speak, and would then be enforced by various mechanisms. An alternative form of dialogue is *heteroglossia*, which attempts to encompass a multiplicity of languages, including a wide variety of different ways of speaking, different rhetorical strategies, and vocabularies. In Bakhtinian terms, dialogue is therefore not understood in terms of multiple meanings for individual words or phrases, by disconnecting the signifier and the signified.

Transposed to the terms of Europe-South relations, this requires a pause for reflection on the *meanings* conveyed by the other. Bakhtin argues that in any utterance, both monologia and heteroglossia are at work, that is, both the centripetal and the centrifugal forces of language (ibid., 668). Language, in this sense, is always both anonymous and social, something formed beyond any individual, but also concrete, and filled with specific content that is shaped by the speaking subjects (Bakhtin 1984; Clark 1984). So how can meaning also manifest itself in the margins? Susan Gal argues that the linguistic practices of the European margins reveal diverse forms of consciousness: they are symbolic responses to the ways in which the peripheral communities are differentially situated within regions of the world system (Gal 1987).

But the tenth anniversary Barcelona Summit of November 2005 left analysts with little hope for the future of dialogic EU-Mediterranean relations. The prestigious event was originally designed to raise the profile of the EMP through the presence of premiers of its partner states. However, the incorporation of a Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism on the agenda—including the contentious issue of agreeing on a common definition of terrorism—led to a boycott of the event by most of the Mediterranean heads of state. The Summit delivered a five-year work plan with concrete commitments toward political, economic, and social reform in the Southern Mediterranean region. These commitments, as usual, remained pathetically vague and imprecise.[13]

These commitments, moreover, echo the limitations of the EMP in the lack of sufficient political reforms in the south, and highlight the challenges to a truly dialogic convergence of the two sides of the Mediterranean as the main pitfalls for the re-launch of the Barcelona Process. Critics interested in seeing the heteroglossia in Euro-Mediterranean relations would seek to encourage a dialogic relation embedded in social relations—a relation with a distinct social purpose. True communication then becomes a

possibility and postulates a "fusion of horizons," which signifies the growing "convergence of our *and* their perspectives through a process of reciprocal learning" (Dallmayr 2001, 341)

A good model for what a heteroglossic Euro-Mediterranean dialogue could look like is the language of democracy. There is not a single, unified language of democracy, but many languages (Garton Ash 2004a, 2004b). Using all of these languages would increase the options for southern, peripheral partners. The democratic norm would probably then contain some language that every Mediterranean partner has in its existing vocabulary or "horizon." Recognizing its post-colonial role, Europe has to bring together the best of Europe and the best of the south. It is therefore helpful for analytical, as well as practical purposes, to interpret dialogue not just as conversation but also as *process* (Guillaume 2002). The logic of a dialogic encounter is, then, an integrationist (not exclusionist) logic. Rather than claiming to have a dialogue on southern, peripheral issues, Euro-Mediterranean relations should aim for the point where dialogue converges.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on Europe's Mediterranean margins. It contends that the Mediterranean margin is disruptive of the EU's/Europe's efforts to act as a center. It has concluded that the southern neighbors' paths remain vague and largely uncharted. They have, so far, been unable to establish any emulation of European values of democracy, rule of law, good governance and good human rights records. Despite Europe's best efforts at ordering the southern space, this margin remains problematic. Thus, Europe cannot settle its geopolitical identity in relation to the Mediterranean without a developed dialogue along the lines of Bakhtin and Derrida. That is why this chapter has advocated a focus on normative principles for margin-center relations, embedded in a truly dialogic encounter. "This potential opening of Europe to its margins requires *an opening of identity to its very future*" (Derrida 1992, 35).

Notes

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2. Interviews carried out in Morocco during 2001 by the author, with donor and NGO representatives, for a MedaDemocracy Project. See report on this project at The Europe in the World Centre, University of Liverpool.
3. The Mediterranean partners of the EMP (after the 2004 EU enlargement) are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey (which started accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005), while Libya has observer status.
4. During the Essen European Council meeting, the EU acknowledged Israel as an "exception," giving it "special status." See European Union 1994.
5. Given that Israel is the most economically and politically advanced neighbor among all ENP partners, it is most likely that it will "shine" in the regatta-type race embedded in the ENP logic.
6. Interview conducted by the author, Council of the European Union (Brussels, February 2005).
7. Interview conducted by the author, European Commission, DG External Relations, (Brussels, January 20, 2004).
8. For the south, this has particular significance, given the emergence of new social movements, and moderate voices in the Arab-south. It is a "wise" decision on the part of the EU to make time for its responses to these developments in the south. Such time gaps have been termed "reflection" periods.
9. Although Croatia was identified as a candidate for EU membership, its failure to arrest, and send to the Hague tribunal, the indicted war criminal Ante Gotovina, held up accession negotiations until October 3, 2005. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) deposited an application for membership in early 2004, and won candidate status at the end of 2005. Along with the other countries of the Western Balkans, the EU regards Serbia and Montenegro as future EU members. The EU is, however, keen to support Serbia and Montenegro in making the full transition to an open market economy, with a vibrant private sector and a democratic civil society, through bringing its policies and legislation closer to those of the EU. EU assistance is therefore targeted to support reforms in line with the EU's economic and legal structures.
10. Interview conducted by the author, European Commission, DG External Relations, (Brussels, January 24, 2004).
11. This section draws upon a previous article. See Pace (2005b).
12. Communication between Neumann and the author of the present chapter (see also Neumann 2003).
13. On a more positive note, some of the substance of the Work Plan relating to education is more clear and includes a longer-term perspective as well as specific targets for the reduction of illiteracy rates in the region by 2015; for a 'benchmark standard' university education qualification transferable within the EU and the region; and for discussion of liberalization of trade in agriculture and services. The European Investment Bank also announced an additional 1 billion Euros in further lending to private investment in the Southern Mediterranean region.

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10

The Ritual of Listening to Foreigners: Appropriating Geopolitics in Central Europe[1]

Merje Kuus

> I had recorded what I later would call the Poles' ritual of listening to foreigners, in which the naïve but self-assured Westerner would encounter the shrewd Pole, who deftly charmed his guest while revealing nothing of what he truly thought . . . Many Poles had mastered the sophisticated art of impressing westerners while maneuvering to get what they wanted.
>
> *Janine Wedel (2001, 3)*

Janine Wedel pinpoints the widespread assumption, in Western accounts of EU and NATO enlargement, that Central European states, eager to integrate with the EU and NATO, closely follow Western policy recommendations. Accounts of security, in particular, presume that, as these states seek security from the West, they gradually adopt Western conceptions of security. This chapter destabilizes the convenient imagery of obliging Central Europeans. It underscores that the geopolitical scripting of Central Europe involves more than Westerners analyzing the region; it also involves local intellectuals of statecraft providing the data for these analyses. Taking a hint from the previous remarks by Wedel, I suggest that Central Europeans' apparent receptiveness is illusory. The region's intellectuals of statecraft do not simply adopt, but also construct, the Central Europe that emerges from Western security studies. Listening to foreigners is not simply a process of learning, it is also a strategy of telling Westerners what they want to hear, so as to attract or retain Western attention and money. There are Western stereotypes of Central Europe as "not yet" fully

mature or European, that allow, and indeed necessitate, that strategy. It is because of Western ignorance that Central European intellectuals of statecraft can assume the role of expert interpreters and storytellers.

To flesh out the role of Central European intellectuals of statecraft in shaping security discourses in the region, this chapter accentuates not what information Western experts gather, but rather the data that their Central European colleagues supply. In particular, I highlight the practice of Central European elites impressing and flattering their Western counterparts, while discreetly guiding these Westerners' interpretations of Central Europe. In so doing, I throw light on the citational practices through which geopolitics is constructed—the circulation and reverberation of assumptions, claims, and modes of analysis between Western and Central European intellectuals of statecraft. It is in such reverberation that some conceptions of security are coated with ever more layers of legitimacy, while others are gradually marginalized. My account is based on secondary data, specifically on a close and careful rereading of the primary and secondary accounts of the interaction between Western and central European intellectuals of statecraft in the 1990s. Such accounts have become numerous in recent years, as present and former high government officials reminisce about the challenging and exhilarating times of the early 1990s. My rereading does not reveal any previously unknown information. Rather, it highlights details about settings, contexts, and personal idiosyncrasies that have been there all along, so obvious as to be almost invisible.

The chapter substantiates the work that destabilizes the gently patronizing framework of a one-way power relationship in which geopolitics is fashioned in the power centers—such as Washington and Brussels—and then imprinted on the margins like Central Europe (Berdahl et al. 2000; Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Dunn 2005). It accentuates the way in which security is constructed on the margins of the Western academic and policy-making apparatus. True, intellectuals of statecraft from the core states have disproportionate influence over the writing of geopolitics and security. Their accounts of Central Europe carry more clout than local ones, and are more easily accessible internationally. They have the power to represent global politics in particular ways, and make peripheral states adopt these representations. Western intellectuals of statecraft in Central Europe define the parameters of what qualifies as security or threat, Europe or non-Europe. Central Europeans' power position vis-à-vis the West is weak. Most discursive analyses of geopolitics and security therefore rely empirically on elite representational strategies in the core states. By focusing almost exclusively on the core states, however, these analyses skate over the question of the manner in which intellectuals of statecraft in the relatively marginal states participate in security discourses. They thereby tend to

strengthen, rather than examine, the cliché that geopolitics is written in the concert of great powers, and then handed down to the smaller states. To emphasize the agency of Central European intellectuals of statecraft is not to deny the hegemony of the core states, but rather to argue that looking at the core states is not enough. Local expects do not simply bear witness to the "odious mixture of ignorant goodwill, hypocritical rhetoric and indifference" that has characterized the West's approach to Central Europe (Lieven 1993, xvi). They also use it for their own advantage. This chapter examines the way in which this process operates: how particular Western claims are appropriated and used by intellectuals of statecraft in Central Europe. It does not downplay the expertise of Western intellectuals of statecraft; it rather balances the emphasis on the West, with a closer attention to Central Europe.

Translators and Transactors

The neglect of the local context of security discourses is an integral part of transitologist conceptions of societal change in post-socialist Europe. These conceptions assume that it is both desirable and possible to convert Central Europeans into Western ways of thinking (Dunn 2005; Wedel 2001). The transition from socialism to a market economy was not only to change processes of production, but to also transform persons. It was to make East Europeans more like Westerners, to make them Western subjects. Although there was never one monolithic "Western" approach to Central Europe, Western experts tended to assume that if their Eastern counterparts listened and nodded, they were learning. This assumption was often incorrect. Central Europeans sometimes painted a rosy picture of learning to give Westerners a sense that they were being successful, and their advice was correct. Alternately, they conjured up grim images of local ineptitude to play to the Westerners' inflated view of their own usefulness (Wedel 2001, 90). Elizabeth Dunn's study of privatization in Poland gives an especially telling example of such practices. When Alima, a Polish manufacturer of baby food, was sold to the American company Gerber, American managers attempted to make Alima's management and production process similar to Gerber's. The Polish managers of Alima appeared to be acquiring the skills that the Americans bestowed on them. They hosted the Americans very well and made them feel comfortable. Yet, they also gave as little information about their own experience and objectives as possible, and indeed routinely misled their American counterparts. They listened to Gerber's directives, "nodding and acquiescing, and then doing whatever they had originally planned on." Dunn's informant tells here that

two of Alima's directors used to "leave board meetings and go behind their office door and giggle, because [another executive] was piling it on so thick and the Americans were just nodding along. It was either laugh or vomit" (Dunn 2005, 51).

A similar problem of oversimplifying local contexts and local networks plagues analyses of geopolitics. Most accounts of security in Central Europe conceive the matter in terms of a one-way process: produced in Western power centers and imprinted on, or adopted by, the margins. Both journalistic and academic accounts of Central Europe rest on the assumption of a feeble Central Europe wooing the West in order to gain NATO membership. The following remark illustrates the general tone: "[A]ll know that, notwithstanding the criteria for entry announced at the EU's Copenhagen Summit in 1993, it will not be by [the Central European countries'] own efforts, but by acts of grace in Brussels and Washington that they will be raised to what they perceive to be the twin paradise of EU and NATO membership" (Dawson and Fawn 2001, 3). Encounters between Western and Central European politicians and government officials thereby come to be viewed in terms of their "pedagogical component" (Moore 2003, 44). Sure enough, most studies recognize that the process is not smooth or linear, but they nonetheless adhere to the notion of learning by socialization. Especially before their membership in the EU and/or NATO, the Central European states were assumed to have little maneuvering space vis-à-vis Western norms, even less than either the member states or such "inescapable outsiders" as Russia (Wæver 2000, 261). Their elites were merely to bear witness to the transition, and to learn the craft from their Western counterparts.

Changing opinions and identities were certainly among the effects of their listening to foreigners. There were also other effects, however, like keeping Western attention and money, including Western research grants, exchange visits, and other such perks. Because Central European states depended on Western money, and were directly or indirectly monitored by several Western institutions throughout the 1990s, a great deal of their foreign policy rhetoric was directed to Western audiences. The stories told to foreign audiences did not necessarily reflect domestic debate, but served as sales strategies. The listening ritual was, in part, a performance for Western audiences. The Estonian writer Tõnu Õnnepalu's reflections of the climate of Western didacticism and Central European cynicism are telling. "As a true East European I sat bright-eyed and listened to his outrageous ideas about freedom . . . Why not? Especially for the promise of a delicious supper in the luxurious ambience of ancient Europe . . . From governments and university professors on to the last paperboy [East Europeans] are all

ready to listen to wonderful speeches about democracy, equality, whatever you please, whatever the customer wishes! As long as he pays" (Õnnepalu 2000, 20–21). Intellectuals of statecraft were also the gatekeepers in Western interactions with Central Europe. They were pivotal in interpreting and translating (figuratively and literally) Central European contexts to the West. These are not simply Western views, but a very narrow range of Western views that are influential in Central Europe. These views do not present themselves to the people in the marginal states; they are translated, literally and figuratively, by local intellectuals of statecraft. We must therefore analyze the way in which some Western views become "state-of-the-art," and other views do not even reach political debates in the margins. We need to reexamine the interpretations and translations to bring out the agency of those who undertook them. In so doing, we can offer an account of the way in which particular articulations from Central Europe came to function as authentic.

There is now an emerging interdisciplinary literature that exposes and problematizes assumptions of a passively receptive Central Europe (Kuus 2004; Wedel 2001). It shows that the narrative of the learning process was so prevalent, in part because Central Europeans supported it. Their obliging nodding was an integral part of the "actually existing transition." The key concepts of transition, such as civil society, return to Europe, Western superiority, and Eastern inferiority, would not have persisted without it. Janine Wedel's work on transactors is especially useful in this context. Wedel shows how government officials in Poland and Russia pleased their self-assured Western benefactors, while discreetly guiding their interpretations of the ways that aid money was spent in the recipient states. These local officials not only swayed the administration of Western aid in the recipient states, but also influenced the design of aid programs in the donor states. Their influence was effected through close-knit, flexible relationships among a small elite group—whom Wedel calls "transactors"—that included representatives from both donor and recipient states. Transactors were, in part, the West's own creation. In the West's search for representative heroes of transition, Western journalists and consultants relied on a handful of individuals whom they depicted as particularly competent and reformist. These individuals were promoted largely because of their Western experience, Western dress code and mannerisms, and fluent use of Western rhetoric—an ability to parrot the slogans of "market," "reform," and "democracy," and name recognition by well-credentialed fellow Westerners (Wedel 2001, 25). In both donor and recipient states, these persons became progressively more entrenched in the administration of aid, to the point where they effectively became the only legitimate representatives

of each side. They were able to claim privileged access to the "other" side as their key strength over other groups, and thereby advance their version of the interests of the other side. Both advice and money was thereby channeled to, and filtered through, these small groups of transactors, while dissenting voices on both sides were marginalized as backward and incompetent (Csepeli et al. 1996, 505).

Huntington's civilizational thesis illustrates a kind of intellectual transactorship in the scripting of geopolitics. It would not be so influential in Central Europe if it were not actively promoted by influential individuals in the region. Conversely, its being cited at a putative civilizational faultline has greatly enhanced the standing of Huntington's thesis in the West itself. It is Havel's observation that "cultural conflicts are increasing and are more dangerous today than at any time in history," that Huntington quotes to substantiate his claims (Huntington 1996, 160). He situates his argument explicitly in the context of European assertions. The civilizational thesis, Huntington claims, offers the answer about the border of Europe that various European intellectuals and political leaders have explicitly endorsed (Huntington 1996, 158). Conversely, Central European arguments about civilizational borders have been greatly strengthened and legitimized by Huntington's position at the center of the Western security establishment. Huntington offered an easy package of explanation to Central Europeans: they no longer had to convince their Western counterparts of civilizational conflict; they could instead simply refer to Huntington's work. When asked by a Western researcher about the cultural differences between Estonians and Russians, Mart Nutt, a conservative Estonian Member of Parliament (MP), chuckled and said, "They are well known. In general, it's religion, language, how the individual relates to the state, there are many differences . . . If you read Huntington, it applies to Estonia" (Feldman 2006). In the West, claims about Central Europeans' "natural" fears of Russia are often accepted as authentic, in part because Central European politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and pollsters say to Westerners that they are, and do so over and over again. In order to grasp the prominence of the concept of civilizational clash in Central Europe, one must therefore consider its influence in Western governmental, academic, and intelligence circles *as well as* its high-level promotion in Central Europe. It is through the combined clout and mutually lent legitimacy of Western and local intellectuals of statecraft that the notion of civilizational clash has been given mythical proportions in Central Europe (see Kuus 2004).

The persons who are best positioned to impress Westerners are those with fluent English and extensive Western experience. In the early to mid-1990s, as the Central European states built up or strengthened their foreign ministries and diplomatic corps, returning émigrés were well placed for

this role. Among high elected officials, Latvia's president, Vaira Vike-Freiberga; Lithuania's president, Valdas Adamkus; Estonia's president Toomas Hendrik Ilves; and Bulgaria's former prime minister, King Simeon II, are all returned émigrés. émigrés were also hired by Western embassies in Central Europe. One could have a situation in which a diplomatic meeting between representatives of, say, the United States and Estonia involved two people who were ethnic Estonians, had grown up in the United States, and were fluent in both English and Estonian. Anatol Lieven noted that American embassies in all three Baltic states regularly employed members of the diaspora in the early 1990s. In the domestic politics of the Baltic states, these individuals functioned both as representatives of the United States and as members of the titular nation. According to Lieven, they tended to lapse carelessly into "complete identification" with the Balts. A Western diplomat in Riga remarked to Lieven, "The Western diplomats here generally don't speak Russian and have never worked in Russia. They socialize entirely with Latvians, have Latvian girlfriends, and often seem to be competing to see who can be the biggest Latvian nationalist" (Lieven 1993, 420).

To underscore the agency of Central European intellectuals of statecraft is not to imply the existence of a Central European conspiracy or Central European exceptionalism. It is rather to emphasize that power relationships between Westerners and Central Europeans are *two-way*; that problematizations of security in North America and Western Europe are not only constitutive of security discourses elsewhere, but are also, in part, constituted by these other discourses. We need to examine the ways in which such broad politically charged categories as security, identity, and geopolitics are problematized and used by different groups in different circumstances. We need to ask not only what images are evoked but also, more pointedly, through what interactions and representational practices these images are woven into daily political practice.

"Those Goody-goody Estonians"

Estonia exemplifies the key role of local intellectuals of statecraft in scripting geopolitics, especially where a country enjoys an image as a particularly successful learner. Estonia was the first Soviet republic to be invited to accession negotiations in 1998. *The Economist* labels it as "goody-goody" (2001, 13) and the "most hyped" (1998a) of all the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe. The skill of Estonian intellectuals of statecraft is only a small part of that success but, as I will argue, it is a significant part. *The Economist* characterized the country's "disarmingly candid" two-time

foreign minister, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, as one of the most successful foreign ministers in Europe in the late 1990s (*The Economist* 1998b). President Meri, "charming in five languages," was elected European of the Year in 1998 (*The Economist* 1998c). The two-time prime minister, Mart Laar, was the only Baltic politician among Europe's fifty most influential leaders selected by *Business Week* in 2001 (*Postimees* 2001). This is how one high official of the European Commission explained Estonia's success in dealing with the Commission to Andres Tarand, a leading Estonian politician: "You [Estonians] should not become too full of yourselves. You come from you-know-where. But one thing that has especially impressed us and why we chose you from the Baltic states [to start accession negotiations in 1998] was that your people know already how to talk to us, while the Lithuanians don't and the Latvians often don't exist" (Berg 2002).[2] In part, because of Estonia's "star pupil" image, its small size, and the fact that the Estonian language—a Finno-Ugric tongue very different from the Indo-European languages—seems impenetrable to most foreigners, Western views of the country have tended to be bird's-eye perspectives. The former foreign minister Jüri Luik says that for a small state like Estonia, "its diplomat is often the state's only representative, only sign. The world's decision-makers, be it politicians, businesspeople, or other diplomats, frequently know only one or two Estonians. This is the limit of their knowledge" (Hvostov 2003). Especially in the 1990s, Western experts were not accustomed to paying attention to Estonia, and to the Baltic states more generally. Many, indeed, obtained their information about the Baltics from the Russian-language press (Danjoux 2002, 50). Their opinions of Estonia were often formed on the basis of the "Western" feel of Tallinn's Old Town, which dates from the Hanseatic period, and the Western mannerisms of their Estonian hosts.

In addition to its success-story image, Estonia is also interesting because of the substantial Western monitoring of its post-socialist transition. In the early to mid-1990s, there was considerable international concern about the rights of Estonia's Russian-speaking population, and various intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) regularly monitored Estonia's policies in these spheres. Consequently, a great deal of domestic policy-making was directed to Western audiences. Estonia revised its initially inflexible stance toward its Russian-speaking minority, and adopted legislative changes in line with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE) and EU recommendations. At the same time, given the context of intense domestic concern with the country's newly reestablished sovereignty, Estonian politicians had to be careful to appeal to this popular sentiment. They had to perform a careful balancing act between sufficient nationalism and "bravery" vis-à-vis Russia for domestic audiences, and sufficient Russia-neutral multiculturalism for

foreign audiences. In sum, then, Estonia offers fresh insights into the construction of security, habitually considered the domain of the powerful, precisely because the country is so small and powerless. As Estonia appears so self-evidently an eager apprentice of the West, it offers a particularly telling example of the ways in which local intellectuals participate in the making of the Western norms that they seem to passively adopt.

How to Entertain the Nuncio

This subtitle is borrowed from Andrei Hvostov, a prominent Estonian columnist. Hvostov used it in a newspaper article to underscore the efforts of Estonian foreign policy professionals to present a favorable image of the country to Western audiences. The phrase also illustrates the way in which these professionals project different narratives of security to (elite) foreign audiences, and to (popular) domestic audiences, depending on the expectations of these audiences. Such maneuvering is an integral part of Estonian security discourses, resulting in a discrepancy between (domestic) security debate and actual security behavior, a discrepancy that has been present since the mid-1990s (Kasekamp et al. 2003). In order to understand Estonian security discourses, we must understand how this discrepancy works.

In formal political statements, virtually no high-ranking government official has depicted Russia or the Russians as a threat to Estonia since the mid-1990s. Official proclamations construe security as a sphere of democratic values in the new borderless Europe, rather than a matter of military defense. They emphasize "constructive engagement" with Russia—this phrase has indeed been the official policy line since 1994. For foreign audiences, government officials invoke images of the New Europe and vibrant cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. They applaud multiculturalism, allude to rapid ethnic integration, and suggest major improvements in relations with Russia. They frame Estonia as a Nordic upstart and give scant mention to any threat from Russia (Ilves 1999; Ojuland 2002).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is central to this narrative, as it is that ministry in particular that projects this narrative to the domestic arena. The ministry's role was discernible throughout the 1990s, but it became especially visible after Estonia started negotiations for accession to the EU. Yet, the position of the ministry or its key professionals on some hot issues, such as Estonian-Russian relations or minority rights, was not necessarily in line with the position of the parliament. For example, a key breakthrough in Estonian-Russian border negotiations took place around 1994, when Estonia abandoned the position that the border must follow the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920. This breakthrough resulted from "improvisations" by key

foreign policy professionals (see Berg 2002). These professionals, however, did not always coordinate their statements with those issued by the parliament or even the foreign ministry. Thus, when prime minister Andres Tarand announced at a press conference in Helsinki in 1994 that Estonia had dropped its insistence on the Tartu Peace Treaty, he did not necessarily have domestic political backing for such a step. Tarand describes the Helsinki press conference in his characteristic folksy style: "The Helsinki adventure was entirely improvised. I think that had I tried to touch this topic in the government, I would have gotten nowhere. For especially Pro Patria [a leading nationalist party] was a bit stuck, imprisoned by its own 'brave' grassroots. We did not have coordination even with the foreign ministry, except that I knew [foreign minister] Mälk's thinking. At that time, Estonian politics was improvisational anyway. As soon as the Finnish journalist posed the question, I commenced my storytelling. The soil had been hoed and prepared and it all came out spontaneously" (quoted in Berg 2002, 110). From the mid-1990s onward, Estonia's foreign ministers have also promoted pragmatic policies toward Russia in the articles they have published in national newspapers. As early as 1997, for example, foreign minister Ilves reproached Estonian politicians for "un-European behavior" of fuelling unconstructive fear of Russia (Ilves 1997a; Rumm 1997). He insisted that Estonians should abandon the cliché that if someone talks about compromise, it is an immediate threat to Estonia's independence. Even when not taking explicit positions, various foreign ministers, especially Ilves, have emphasized the need to show the West that Estonia subscribes to "Western values." Commenting on an important speech by Ilves at the Humboldt University in Berlin in 2000, Andrei Hvostov praised Ilves' diplomacy:

> Finally, an important rule of salesmanship is to not say what the potential buyers do not want to hear. It is not a good tone to remind western politicians of Huntington's civilizational thesis. When Moscow claims that the expansion of western organizations to the east pushes Russia out of the common European forest, then the East European candidate states should argue the opposite to avoid further complications.
>
> Which is what Ilves did in Berlin. Answering a question about the mood of the nearby bear, he announced calmly that we have no problems with the bear. Not a word about the bear wanting to eat someone or displaying unpredictable behavior. As if he was talking about a panda. And this is how the European Union came a step closer to us (Hvostov 2001).

While the ministers of foreign affairs conjure images of cooperation in the New Europe, however, the domestic Estonian-language press operates with

images of an unstable and immature Russia lapsing back into imperial fantasies as the thaw in Europe comes to a close (Mihkelson 1998, 2003). Even though the EU is seen as an important provider of "soft," security, Estonia ultimately covets the "hard" security provided by NATO (Kasekamp 2001; Goble 2005).

The foreign ministers' Western-directed rhetoric was not always popular at home. Ilves, for example, was hailed internationally as one of the most imaginative Estonian politicians, but was criticized domestically for allegedly directing even the speeches delivered in the Estonian parliament to the foreign diplomats and press, rather than to the domestic electorate. Thus, in parliamentary discussions of the National Security Concept—a 2001 document that states that Estonia faces no threat—several MPs paid left-handed compliments to the foreign ministry for having developed a document that pleases the West. Ilves was repeatedly asked to clarify and specify Estonia's security risks, and he repeatedly circumvented these requests (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu 2001b; see also 2001a, 2001c). When, later that year, Ilves reminded the parliament that more liberal language laws would help Estonia's integration into the EU, Uno Laht, an opposition MP, noted that Ilves' remarks "give an impression that we are getting responses from some European bureaucrat who is defending Europe not Estonia" (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu 2001d). The issue is more complex, however, than a divergence of opinions among Estonian politicians. Whereas Ilves's statements abroad allude to improving relations with Russia, his interviews in the Estonian media express disbelief that Estonia could improve relations with Russia (Bahovski 2000). To use Hvostov's metaphors, while statements to foreign audiences sound as if he was "talking about a panda," statements to domestic audiences operate with a dangerously unpredictable bear.

To highlight these incongruities between foreign and domestic, as well as formal and informal, policy rhetoric is not to treat any of these rhetorical strategies as monolithic, to search for a "true" underlining position, or to imply that Estonia's foreign policy is purposefully designed to mislead any specific audience. I cannot infer, and am not interested in, any politician's intent. My point, rather, is that security debates in Estonia do not illustrate a contest between authentic and ready-made positions. They rather function as a malleable discourse in which different images and associations—New Europe, historical legacies, cultural affinities, and so on—are deployed flexibly and strategically. The significance of this positioning to different audiences is not that it exists—it is always a part of political practice. The significance, rather, is that its frequency and effects are frequently underestimated.

Don't Forget the Estonians . . . They Are the Best of Europeans

In early 1997, the then foreign minister Ilves began a speech at the European Commission representation in Bonn by quoting Dr. Otto von Habsburg of the European parliament. Von Habsburg had visited Tallinn in 1992, and had been presented with the original brass name plate of the interwar Tallinn office of the Pan-European Union. The plate had been kept hidden during the entire half-century of the Soviet occupation. Von Habsburg remarked later, "Don't forget the Estonians . . . They are the best of Europeans" (Ilves 1997b, 1).

Ilves's gesture of using a statement by a member of the European parliament to explain Estonia to the European Commission illustrates the way in which Estonians use utterances by Westerners to make claims about Estonia to Westerners. Due to the paucity of most Westerners' knowledge of Estonia, local experts are instrumental in writing the country onto their mental maps. Most Westerners rely on local experts to point out data sources, help with contacts, and provide insights into Estonian politics.[3] The circle of these experts is small, and tightly knit. Visiting Western consultants, journalists, scholars, and students proceed through a well-established routine of appointments. The individuals whom they interview are chosen because of their institutional location, language skills, savvy with Westerners, existing contacts in the West, and even office location (preferably in the capital city of Tallinn). These are the same persons who attend seminars in the West, and thus have the credentials that Westerners recognize. It is through these individuals, virtually all of whom know one another, that Westerners gain access to Estonian society. The acknowledgment lists and endnotes of research concerning Estonia indicate the few dozen Estonians consulted for most Western accounts of the country. In many cases, these consultations leave no trace in the final Western account beyond the initial polite acknowledgement of assistance.[4]

The influence of key Estonian intellectuals of statecraft is exercised not only through public statements, but also through informal conversations with their Western colleagues over many years. The recollections of both Estonian and Western officials speak fondly of colorful picnics, saunas, and walks in the Old Town. President Meri was known for his penchant for giving personal tours to foreign dignitaries in Tallinn's renowned medieval Old Town. Strobe Talbott, the U. S. undersecretary of state for European affairs, made his acquaintance with Meri on just such a tour. Talbott was on his first visit to (then) Soviet Estonia in the late 1980s. Meri took Talbott under his wing and showed him around in Tallinn, and they subsequently had a long, informative, and enjoyable conversation about Estonia (Talbott

2000). Ronald Asmus, Talbott's deputy at the State Department, likewise spoke of the hospitality and erudition of his Baltic counterparts, "especially . . . Meri and the Estonians." He spoke fondly of the day that he and Talbott spent at Meri's retreat on the Baltic coast—taking a sauna, swimming, and talking politics into the small hours of the morning. "You know," Talbott later remarked to Asmus, "we talk more openly to these guys than even some of our current allies" (Asmus 2002, 235). Former two-time prime minister Mart Laar stressed the importance of Robert Frasure, the first American ambassador to re-independent Estonia. Frasure was, according to Laar, so "engaged with Estonia's joys and worries," that "it sometimes remained unclear whether he represented the United States in Estonia or Estonia in the United States" (Laar 2000, 93). When Graham Avery, an advisor of the European Commission directorate for enlargement, visited Estonia, foreign minister Ilves, knowing that Avery was a fan of the world-famous Estonian composer Arvo Pärt, saw an opportunity to impress him. Ilves organized a casual drop-in at a rehearsal of the Estonian Philharmonic Chamber Choir, which was rehearsing Pärt. This kind of activity is easy to organize in Estonia: the city's main concert hall is within a five-minute walk from the Foreign Ministry and Ilves—naturally in the Estonian context—knew Tõnu Kaljuste, the conductor of the choir. Avery was very moved, saying, "You are not joining Europe; Europe is here already" (Ilves 2003, 13–18).[5]

Close contacts between Western and Central European intellectuals of statecraft are neither rare nor problematic. There is, likewise, nothing odd about Estonians wanting to make a favorable impression on foreign guests. Given the lingering negative stereotypes of this "post-Communist" or "post-Soviet" country, they have no choice but to try to counter these stereotypes directly. It is also possible—indeed likely—that political memoirs written nearly a decade after the events they describe embellish the story. My point is very specific: to place in the foreground the fact that Estonian intellectuals of statecraft *take an active part in* the production of Western accounts about Estonia. Estonia's success cannot be viewed apart from that context. This point does not mean that Estonian intellectuals of statecraft impose their views on their Western counterparts. There may have been some deliberate misleading on the part of Estonians, but that is not the issue here. The issue is that Western accounts of Estonia have been made possible, in part, by the information, interpretation, and other assistance provided by Estonian intellectuals of statecraft. Talbott's interpretations of Estonia are not Meri's, but Meri has contributed to them even when the two men disagree. What I wish to dispute is not the contacts, but the assumption that what happens during those contacts is Central Europeans

learning Western norms, without influencing their production. The interaction between Western and Central European intellectuals of statecraft is an integral part of the construction of security in Central Europe.

Writing Geopolitics from the Margins

This chapter has foregrounded the agency of Central European intellectuals of statecraft, that is, their capacity not simply to adopt or learn but also to strategically appropriate Western narratives of geopolitucs. The watertight narrative of security, that emerges as Western and local experts repeat the same claims, has been made possible through circulation and reverberation of particular claims and modes of analysis between Western and Central European intellectuals of statecraft, and the mutual conferral of legitimacy between them. Although the charming hosts who gladly and expertly explain the local situation to visitors do not cause specific accounts, they are an integral part of the settings in which some accounts are made plausible and others implausible.

It is, therefore, not enough assume a generalized learning process through which Western norms come to be adopted in Central Europe. We must examine closely how this happens—how Western concepts are interpreted and implemented in Central Europe, and how Central Europe is marketed to the West. This examination involves investigating the manner in which security discourses in the center and at the margins of the Western security establishment are mutually constituted. The question is not who causes certain constructions of security, but rather what conditions make certain accounts possible and others impossible. The capacity of the margins is perhaps not one of direct influence, but rather one of indirect tinkering with Western discourses through the strategic use of Western research, Western rhetoric, and Western name recognition. Although Western intellectuals of statecraft have an enormous power to define which Central European voices are deemed authentic and relevant, and which ones are ignored as irrelevant, their Central European counterparts likewise have considerable power to define the information about the region that is presented to Western experts as authentic and correct. The task is not to weigh the relative importance of each side, but to underscore that *both* are vital for discourses of European security.

Notes

1. "The Ritual of Listening to Foreigners: Appropriating Geopolitics in Central Europe" is based on chapter 6 of Kuus, Merje 2007 *Geopolitics reframed:*

Security and identity in Europe's eastern enlargement, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Parts of that chapter are reproduced by permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

2. All translations from Estonian are made by the author.
3. I distinguish between Estonian and Western intellectuals of statecraft on the basis of their language skills. Members of the Estonian diaspora are thus defined as "Estonian" if they are fluent in the Estonian language. "Western" here encompasses Europe and North America. Although there are differences among the various Western countries' policies toward the EU candidate states, the basic assumptions with which they approach the candidate states are similar. This is so because they can be traced back to the broader "othering" conceptions of Eastern Europe.
4. On the Western side, the circle of Estonian specialists is also small, so that fact means that Western ideas presented as cutting-edge come from very few Western sources.
5. It is possible that Estonian politicians exaggerate their closeness to Western dignitaries to boost their own image. My analysis errs on the side of caution, and systematically under- rather than over-estimates the personal contacts between Estonian and Western intellectuals of statecraft.
6. Parliamentary stenograms can be accessed by date at the website of the Estonian parliament, http:/www.riigikogu.ee.

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11

Boundary-making in Europe's Southeastern Margin: Balkan/Europe Discourse in Croatia and Slovenia

Nicole Lindstrom

Introduction

Leading up to and following the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991, leaders of national independence movements rallied around the aim of "returning to Europe." Construing nation-state identities as European was a means by which national elites sought to gain international support for national independence movements with the dissolution of SFRY, and to differentiate their respective national identities from the Yugoslav (or "Balkan") sphere, to which they claimed they were artificially tied for the past several decades. Europe was thus simultaneously an important element of internal national self-understanding, and something external to the nation, an identity to be achieved. As Susan Gal (1991, 442) points out, the rhetorical slogan "return to Europe" suggests such a duality, for one must return to a place where it currently does not belong.

Yet, while the "return to Europe" discourse in most post-socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe was a discourse about an imputed opposition between East and West, in the Balkans, the return to Europe was a discourse about an imputed ambiguity. Todorova (1997, 482) argues that because the Balkans are a part of Europe, although always a marginal part,

imputed differences are made *within* one type: "Europe." That is to say, despite its geographical status as European, the Balkans has become Europe's shadow, the structurally despised *alter ego*, the dark side within. Todorova and others in this tradition generally focus on how these "Balkanist" constructs are derived and reproduced by West European elites, and imposed on Balkan or East European states (see also Patterson 2003; Hammond 2004). However, in this chapter, I argue that the persistence of Balkanist discourse can also be attributed to Balkan elites actively reproducing these negative representations against their own neighbors to the south and east. Leading up to and following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, one can observe in the region an endless chain of internal differentiations, whereby national leaders construed their nation as more civilized (or European) in contrast to their more primitive (and less European) neighbors—what Bakić-Hayden (1995) terms "nesting orientalisms."

This chapter examines the process by which Croatian and Slovenian political and intellectual leaders negotiated their marginal position between Europe and the Balkans in the 1990s. I argue that elites in both states used a similar strategy of defining the nation as European, in contrast to Balkan, in order to legitimate their secession from SFRY and promote their inclusion in European institutions. Yet, after achieving independence in 1991, the strategies of the two states diverged. Croatian elites positioned Croatia as the bulwark against Islamic and Orthodox threats to the south and east, threats against which Europe was perceived as unable or unwilling to defend Croatia—or itself. Slovenian elites, on the other hand, gradually began to position Slovenia as a "bridge" between the stable European order to which it was perceived to belong, and the Balkans, with which it was intimately familiar but firmly detached. I argue that whether and how marginal states challenge the center (Europe) depends on the degree to which their self-proclaimed national identification as "European" is recognized where it matters most—by the center itself.

Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans

When Croatia seceded from the SFRY in 1991, Croatians were optimistic that their newfound independence would accomplish two things: Croatia would be recognized as an independent sovereign nation-state, and "return" to its rightful place in Europe. Croatia's prospects were promising. Of the six republics that made up the Yugoslav federation, Croatia was, like Slovenia, more integrated into European networks than other republics, due to its Hapsburg legacy, geographical location, and trade orientation toward Western markets (Woodward 1993, 20). The outbreak of ethnic

violence, first between the Croatian government and the Yugoslav National Army (or JNA), and then between the newly independent Croatia and the Croatian Serbs within Croatia territory, dashed Croatia's hopes for a quick return to Europe. Yet, Croatians were confident that Western leaders would come to the rescue of Croatia as an emerging European democracy to be defended against Slobodan Milošević's expansionism.

This optimism would prove short-lived. After Croatia declared independence in 1991, Germany—and in particular, the then German foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher—did indeed push the international community to quickly recognize Croatia as an independent state, which they did in May 1992. Scenes of the JNA's siege of Vukovar in Eastern Croatia, and the bombing of the medieval Adriatic town of Dubrovnik in 1991, evoked international sympathy for Croatia's cause. Yet, Croatia's image as a victim of Serb aggression would soon be tarnished by its involvement in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Western television footage of Croatian armed forces shelling the Muslim quarters of the Bosnian town of Mostar now supplanted footage of Serbian forces shelling Croatian targets. By 1993, Croatia had assumed a more ambivalent role in Western media accounts as both a victim and aggressor. At the same time, Croatian president Franjo Tuđman and his ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party, which had come to power in Croatia's first free elections in 1990, came under growing Western criticism for autocratic policies at home, and expansionist policies in the Balkans. Believed to be as complicit as Milošević in fueling violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Tuđman's Croatia was soon considered by Western observers to be another unstable and dangerous Balkan regime.

An irony of Croatia's "fall from grace"—from being a frontrunner in the quest to rejoin Europe in 1989 to being viewed, together with Serbia, as a Balkan pariah several years later—is that Tuđman rose to power on the promise of rescuing it from the Balkans and returning Croatia to Europe. An excerpt from a 1991 televised speech illustrates how Tuđman seamlessly combined pro-independence, pro-European, and anti-Yugoslav sentiments: "We hope that the European countries and the EU will understand that the Croatian struggle for its territorial integrity, its freedom and democracy is not only the fight of the Croatian nation, but also the fight against the restoration of socialist communism . . . and the fight for normal conditions when Croatia can join Europe, where she historically belongs" (quoted in Buden 2000, 28).

Croatian leaders sought to displace or externalize identification with the Balkans by presenting themselves as more progressive, prosperous, hard-working, tolerant, and democratic, or, in a word, "European," in contrast to their primitive, lazy, intolerant, or "Balkan" neighbors to the southeast

(Razsa and Lindstrom 2004). Yet, drawing cultural barriers between Europe and the Balkans was not confined to Croatia's external territorial borders; this process of differentiation also played out internally. With Serbs comprising at least 10 percent of the Croatian population as of 1991, Croatian leaders portrayed ethnic Serbian citizens of Croatia as the violent secessionist "other" within. The process of ethnic differentiation was not limited to the discursive realm; it was fatally real, most tragically in the "ethnic cleansing" of Croatia's southern frontier (or the "Krajina"), a heterogeneous region that had long served as a buffer zone against Ottoman rule, and was populated by a diverse mixture of Croatians, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims (see Roe 2004).

When European leaders excluded Croatia from the European center, to which Croatians aspired, and relegated it to the Balkan margins, the Europe/Balkan dichotomy that underlined Tuđman's ethno-nationalist politics had been turned against him. Croatia now found itself on the wrong side of the Europe/Balkan divide. Croatians responded to this reversal of fortune in two ways. The first was to emphasize Croatia's self-proclaimed role as the defender of a Christian Europe. A 1991 editorial describes Croats as martyrs for protecting Europe and European civilization against the Orthodox threat from the east, and the Ottoman threat from the south:

> For almost three hundred years of an uninterrupted war of defense, Croatia has acquired the honest title *antemurale christianitatis*—the outer battlements of Western European Christian culture. But this title has cost us dearly . . . Entire generations, one after another, have been sacrificed in defense of the whole European civilization. During these three centuries, when at that time the largest non-Christian power in the world has been destroying, devastating and conquering Croatia, the Western part of the Christian world has slept soundly behind its battlements and developed in every respect . . . At the end of the 20th century . . . Croatia is once again in danger from the East. (Buden 2000, 28; also see Kneśević 1998)

Framing Croatia's role as defending Christian civilization against external threats was not only an instrumental means to secure European support. This civilizational construct of "European" reflected the essentializing tendencies of Croatian elites, which imbued identities with primordial qualities and rationalized the fate of nations accordingly.

Indeed, Christianity is one criterion advanced by some European elites for what constitutes European identity. and thus for what should serve as a criterion for enlargement, as evidenced by ongoing debates over Turkey's membership (see Delanty 2003). Samuel Huntington has been one of the most unashamedly outspoken proponents of this civilizational view.

Posing the question of "Where does Europe end?" he argues that: "Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin" (Huntington 1996, 35). With regards to NATO expansion, Huntington remarked: "[S]tates that are Western in their history, religion and culture should, if they desire, be able to join NATO. Practically speaking, NATO membership would be open to the Visegrad states, the Baltic states, Slovenia and Croatia, but not countries that have historically been primarily Muslim or Orthodox" (ibid., 36). That Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" became a "bible" of Croatian nationalist elites is unsurprising (see Lindstrom and Razsa 1998). The civilizational discourse refocused the dividing line of Europe from cold war ideological divisions to civilizational ones—a divide that clearly favored the Roman Catholic states of Central Europe. It also bolstered Croatia's proclaimed goal of "containing" Orthodox and Muslim threats in the Balkans, which, as Huntington remarks, must now be aimed at "Islam's bloody border but also still significantly at the traditional cold war enemies of Byzantium" (Huntington 1996, 34).

The second and related response to Croatia's fall from grace was to portray Croatia not only as equally European, but morally superior to Europe. While Europe was "sleeping soundly behind its battlements," Croatia was perceived to have sacrificed generations of its citizens to guard European civilization. Now that Croatia was under attack, Europe was expected to return the favor. Yet, when it was clear that European leaders had no intention of intervening to halt the advance of Yugoslav military and paramilitary troops to Eastern and Southern Croatia, the euphoric embrace of Europe that defined Croatian politics during the late 1980s and 1990s turned to scorn. A Croatian journalist wrote in response to the shelling of historic Austro-Hungarian town of Vukovar: "Somebody said that Europe was ill. That's right! Europe is ill in its wealth. The Croatian nation must now take it upon itself to preserve Europe's morality and Christianity" (quoted in Buden 2000, 43).

In sum, critical conflicts in Croatia throughout the 1990s were shaped by the "politics of recognition," whereby Croatians sought—and ultimately failed—to be recognized by Western leaders as authentically European. Balkanist discourse—in other words, the negative representation of the Balkans in contrast to a positive representation of Europe—provided one means of dissociating Croatia from its Balkan neighbors, and thus reclaiming its perceived rightful place in Europe (see Rihtman-Auguštin 1997). Croatian leaders, by portraying Croatia as the defender of Europe against the Serbian and Muslim threats to the east and south, also sought to obtain what Noel Parker terms in the introduction to this volume "intermediation

rewards" from European leaders. But these rewards were not just withheld by Europe. Croatia's ethno-nationalist and autocratic politics in the 1990s ultimately led Croatia to be *excluded* from Europe, and relegated to the Balkan margins. Having staked their claim to Europe—as well as their so-called "War of Independence"—on the civilizational politics of division and exclusion, Croatian nationalist elites had little recourse but to defend their position as innocent European victims of Serb and Muslim aggression. These claims would be tested again when the EU made the extradition of indicted Croatian war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, a condition of entering EU membership negotiations. This demand was interpreted by many Croatians as another example of Europe betraying Croatia in its struggle to defend its independence and protect Europe along the outer battlements of Western European Christian culture.

Slovenia: "Final Exit from the Balkans"

The Slovenian quest for independence from the SFRY differs from the Croatian in two main respects. Whereas Croatian Serbs comprised over 10 percent of Croatia's population, Slovenia was far more ethnically homogenous. Second, in Slovenia, according to Mastnak (1994, 97), the alternative to the existing Yugoslav system was explicitly articulated in civil society, rather than radically ethno-nationalist, terms.[1] These two factors can help explain why Slovenia managed to avoid the violent ethnic conflict and autocratic ethno-nationalist policies that marked Croatia's course in the 1990s. However, as in Croatia, by the late 1980s, critiques of the Yugoslav state were largely framed as a condemnation of Serbian nationalism and socialist totalitarianism, against which only sovereign independence would suffice (Rizman 1995). Moreover, Slovenian elites used the same kind of Balkan/Europe dichotomy to justify the country's "exit" from the Balkans, and promote its rapid entry into European institutions. This discursive strategy was ultimately far more effective in Slovenia than in Croatia, however, as evidenced by the relative ease with which Slovenia "returned to Europe." By 2006, Slovenia became the first post-socialist state to have adopted the Euro, while, along with Serbia, Croatia is still negotiating the terms of EU membership as a member of the "Western Balkans."

In the first free Slovenian elections in April 1990, the DEMOS (or Democratic Opposition of Slovenia) coalition won a solid majority of votes. DEMOS ran on a platform that included the twin goals of freeing Slovenia from Yugoslavia and rejoining Europe, captured by their campaign slogan, "*Evropa znaj*!" ("Europe now!"). A DEMOS official at the time stated: "Yugoslavia as a concept is exhausted. Slovenia simply wants to

join Europe and is not willing to wait for the rest of Yugoslavia to catch up with it" (quoted in Cohen 1993, 132). The rhetorical strategy of portraying Slovenia as a historically and cultural "European" nation, tragically held captive in the Balkans, was a useful means of legitimating Slovenia's secession to domestic and foreign audiences alike. As in Croatia, the European Community was portrayed in popular accounts as Slovenia's "savior."

In a December 1990 popular plebiscite, 88.5 percent of Slovenians voted in favor of independence. Six months later, on June 25, 1991, the Slovenian National Assembly passed a Declaration of Independence, effectively ending the validity of the Yugoslav Constitution in Slovenia. Belgrade responded by deploying the JNA to Slovenia, resulting in a "ten-day war." The advance of JNA forces to Slovenia brought to light the confusion within the European community about what to do with the outbreak of violence on its borders. Up to this point, the European Community had pushed to keep Yugoslavia in tact. The war in Slovenia prompted European leaders to gather together Slovenian and Yugoslav delegates to the Croatian island of Brioni to negotiate a cease-fire. The conflict ended with the "Brioni Accord," which imposed a three-month moratorium on independence. The accord was only a formality, as the momentum toward Slovenian and Croatian independence could not be stopped. Meanwhile, the Slovenian government's new public relations office, established even before the outbreak of war, sought to portray Slovenia's cause to the international community as a David and Goliath struggle, a matter of supporting a burgeoning European democracy against a Balkan authoritarian regime. President Kučan reflected on this period at the tenth anniversary of Slovenian independence: "Yugoslavia was a futureless vessel void of values. It was governed by violent nationalism and Serb hegemony. With the wave of civil movements supporting the rule of human rights, which came thrashing over the highly guarded eastern borders and flooded the spiritual environment of Central and Eastern Europe, Slovenia, too, received recognition for its way of life and thus also support for its independence plan" (Slovenian Office of the President 2001). Kučan's remarks express the official narrative of Slovenian independence: that Slovenia's independence struggle was rightly recognized by European leaders as a fight for human rights and democracy, against the tide of nationalism to their east.

Upon gaining independence, Slovenian leaders quickly focused on "returning to Europe," namely the European Union and NATO. Then foreign minister Dmitri Rupel remarked on the eve of Slovenia's independence in 1991: "As a nation which for more than one thousand years has been integrally involved in the development of Europe, we should like now to be reintegrated into the best of the European tradition" (Rupel 2001).

The thousand-year history to which Rupel refers is Slovenia's link to the medieval kingdom of Carantania, which included the present day territories of Austria, Hungary, and Slovenia. Carantania existed as an independent entity until the middle of the eighth century when it became part of the Frankish Empire. According to popular national narratives, Carantania was the birthplace of both the Slovenian nation and modern democracy. One piece of governmental promotional literature from 1992, for instance, reads: "The historical roots of politics and democracy extend back to the 6th century, when the free kingdom of the ancient Slovenians—Carantania—was established. This kingdom was famous for its democratic institutions, strong legal system, popular elections of the ruling dukes, and progressive legal rights for women" (quoted in Hansen 1996, 475). Slovenia, in other words, was not simply a passive importer of democratic traditions from Europe, let alone an authoritarian Balkan state. On the contrary, Europe inherited its egalitarian and democratic traditions from the Slovene kingdom of Carantania—including "progressive legal rights for women" (see Lindstrom 2003).

During this period, the "return to Europe" was portrayed as synonymous with "exiting the Balkans." A 1992 Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' report outlined Slovenia's five strategic orientations. The first: "Orientation towards Europe, and the related intensive integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, security and economic structures (particularly EU and NATO)." The fourth: "Final exit from the Balkans and adaptation to the new political role (and thus to new challenges and tasks) within the framework of the Southeast European countries, particularly those emerging from the ashes of the former Yugoslavia" (Rupel 2001). Reflecting on Slovene foreign policy successes in the decade following independence, Rupel (2001) writes: "One particularly notable achievement of Slovene foreign policy is that, at the time of gaining independence, Slovenia as a state began to separate from the area to which it had belonged since the First World War, from the area which the Croatian writer Krleza lucidly called 'the Balkan hot-house,' in which Slovenia was a foreign body despite its proven adaptability over the years." Just as Tuđman's claim that Croatia's links with the Balkans between 1918 and 1990 were "just a short episode in Croatian history," so prominent Slovenian leaders such as Rupel suggest that Slovenia's membership in Yugoslav federations was a brief historical anomaly.

Whereas Croatian leaders would continue to distance Croatia from the Balkans throughout the 1990s, Slovenian elites gradually began to promote Slovenia as a "bridge" or a "translator" between Europe and the Balkans—yet from a location firmly entrenched in Europe (Rupel 2001). This rapprochement with the Balkans can be attributed to rational self-interest. Given that Slovenia lost a key export market with the dissolution of SFRY, reestablishing

trade and investment ties with former Yugoslav republics—where firms could capitalize on their established networks and where consumers were familiar with Slovenian products—became a way to enhance Slovenia's economic growth and competitiveness (see Jaklič and Svetličič 2003). Moreover, capitalizing on its role as a "bridge" to the Balkans was viewed as a means of establishing Slovenia, a small state expected to have marginal influence among the EU/25, as a vital foreign policy actor in the European community's ongoing relations with the Western Balkans. As the first new EU member state to assume the European Council Presidency in 2008, Slovenia has made EU foreign policy toward the Balkans one of its top priorities.

In sum, as in Croatia, in the period leading up to and immediately following Slovenia's independence from SFRY, the "return to Europe" and "final exit from the Balkans" was a central feature of elite Slovenian discourse. Slovenian leaders sought to concretize Slovenia's place in Europe by stressing Slovenia's centuries-long affiliation with European civilization. As Slovenia moved closer to independence from SFRY, and faced strong resistance from Belgrade, Slovenian leaders also looked to "Europe" as a savior. Once Slovenia managed to secure its independence from Belgrade after a brief ten-day war, its path to joining European institutions proceeded relatively unhindered. By 1997, when Slovenia was invited to enter EU membership negotiations, Slovenia was recognized as "European," where it mattered most—in the eyes of West European leaders. Upon securing this recognition from the center, Slovenian elites gradually began to seize the advantages of being located on the margins of Europe and the Balkans. This rapprochement with the Balkans was largely driven, however, by material or strategic interests fueled by a need to reestablish lucrative trade and investment links with former Yugoslav states, or a desire to serve as a key diplomatic intermediary between Brussels and the Western Balkans. A popular Bosnian riposte—"Slovenia: first out of the Balkans, and now the first back in"—captures a certain degree of resentment on the part of other former Yugoslav republics over the ease with which Slovenia navigated its exit from Yugoslavia, and its naked self-interest in returning to the Balkan margins from its privileged position within the center. Yet at the same time, leaders of other former Yugoslav republics look to Slovenia as a model of how to secure their own path from the Balkans to Europe.

Conclusions

I draw two main sets of conclusions. First, a certain tension exists between the insistence on concretizing a marginal state's place in "Europe," and the awareness that one's European status is never ontologically secure. The

degree to which marginal states aggressively lobby at home and abroad to promote a country's European credentials in geographical, cultural, and chronological terms—and to resist being identified as belonging to the Balkan margins—is indicative of this ontological insecurity. Leaders of liminal states, like Croatia and Slovenia, seek to imbue Europe with historical and geographical concreteness, yet recognize that some countries will always be considered more "European" than others in the mental maps of West European leaders. In other words, an implicit understanding appears to exist that states on the periphery of Europe are particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the changing social and political landscape of Europe. Todorova (1997, 139) puts this succinctly: "'Europe' ends where politicians want it to end." The relationship between the center and margins, Europe and the Balkans, is thus less about a concrete geography than about an enduring and contested political discourse about that relation (see Gal 1991).

Second, elite discursive strategies to secure recognition as belonging with the European center often entail a process of differentiation, establishing a nation-state as more European than other nations outside (or minorities within) the borders of the state. Yet, as Bakić-Hayden (1995, 918) argues, this dichotomous model of "nesting orientalisms" eventually establishes conditions for its own contradiction. That is, the kind of dichotomous representations deployed by Europeans to differentiate themselves from an Eastern or Balkan "other" can be subsequently appropriated and manipulated by those so designated. The way in which Croatian and Slovenian elites sought to define themselves as European in contrast to Balkan others, outside and inside their borders, is evidence of such a contradiction.

In the case of Croatia, we can observe a further contradiction: the political agenda of division and exclusion pursued by Tuđman in the 1990s ultimately contributed to Croatia being (re)assigned to precisely the same Balkan category it had defined itself against. Croatia's relationship to Europe and the Balkans stands in marked contrast to the case of Slovenia, whose leaders, having managed to secure recognition as belonging to Europe, could subsequently work to capitalize on a liminal position between Europe and the Balkans. Whereas Croatia's attempt to become a civilizational intermediary for Europe in "containing" the Orthodox and Muslim "threat" undoubtedly backfired, Slovenia has managed to successfully reposition itself as an economic and political intermediary between the EU and the Western Balkans, helping to facilitate political stability and economic growth in the region. Therefore, the degree to which liminal states can position themselves as intermediaries depends on the degree to which the European interests they purport to represent conform to the center's dominant conceptions of its own interests and identities.

Note

1. A number of Slovenian scholars have brought out important qualifications to this claim. Jalušić (1994, 148) argues, for example, that pacifist campaigns in the 1980s initially included a wide range of social actors from numerous Yugoslav republics organized around progressive political goals. Conversely, with the trial of the four Slovenian defendants for defecting from the JNA in the late 1980s, the independence campaign quickly became subsumed under the "national question," where "everything and everybody was mobilized for 'our boys' and against the Yugoslav military." Kuzmani (1995, 38) argues that the ease with which civil society actions were appropriated for nationalist ends suggests that Slovenian social movements could always be seen, in part, as an expression of "soft Slovene nationalism" (see also Stubbs 1996).

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12

Variable Geometries: Institutions, Power, and Ideas in Turkey's European Integration Process[1]

Fabrizio Tassinari

The case of Turkey's relations with Europe, and particularly the country's bid for membership in the European Union (EU), ranks among the most complex and disputed topics in the current European public debate. Turkey's vast size and growing population, its uneven wealth distribution, and its cultural and religious heritage constitute the central arguments shaping this debate. At a time when the European integration process appears challenged by institutional uncertainties, sluggish economic growth, and even by the successful EU enlargement toward Central and Eastern Europe, the topicality of this debate seems straightforward. More essentially, however, the sensitivities surrounding the Turkish issue revolve around the question of spatial, strategic, and conceptual limits of Europe—approaching what in EU circles is called the "finality" question. The EU's possible enlargement to Turkey inevitably raises questions about the EU as a polity and as a power constellation, about its ability to act in the international arena, and about its growing unease with multiculturalism.

In view of these fundamental questions, the Turkish case represents something of a litmus test for the marginality approach pursued by this book. An underlying assumption in the growing body of scholarly literature on Turkey's relations with Europe is indeed that Turkey is a peculiar and unique case because it represents a "center" of its own. Barry Buzan

and Ole Wæver (2003) have categorized Turkey as one of Europe's three "centered" security complexes—besides the EU and Russia. This is arguably a sensible departure point to analyze, for example, Russia's marginal position (see Maxine David's chapter in this volume). What makes the analysis of Russia's marginal maneuvering peculiar is indeed its explicit geopolitical and civilizational posture, distinct from, and even opposed to, the European center. Turkey's marginal position is somewhat more controversial because this country's geopolitical and civilizational "centrality" is counterbalanced by its explicit choice of a Western and European orientation. As will be discussed below, certain instances, such the periodic nationalist backlashes in the Turkish domestic discourse, indicate that the European choice is anything but seamless or irreversible. Yet, the main challenge remains that of discussing Turkey's marginal positioning in its EU membership application, together with its enduring and self-conscious centrality at the strategic and identity levels.

This chapter contends that the debate on "variable geometries," which has made its way in European parlance during the past decade, provides a notable contribution to frame these peculiarities of the Turkish marginal position. The first section is dedicated to explaining why and how this is so, and to elucidating the relevance of the marginality approach to the realm of policymaking, to which the variable geometries debate belongs. The following sections will unravel the variable geometries of Turkey's European integration by unfolding its most significant dimensions: institutions, power, and "ideas."

Variable Geometries, Marginality, and Turkey

The debate on "variable geometries" has long entertained political and intellectual elites in Europe. It emerged and thrived in response to the tension between continuing widening of the European Union (EU), on the one hand, and its internal functioning, on the other. Some observers refer to it with pejorative connotations, i.e., the preference for a primarily intergovernmental, *à la carte* EU, in which member states cherry-pick aspects of European integration that best suit their national interests.[2] For others, no less controversially, variable geometries signal the drive for a more determined, cohesive, and pragmatic "core Europe" (Habermas and Derrida 2005; Verhofstadt 2006). This would take the form of an *avant-garde* group of actors committed to deepening political integration before the rest of the EU. At other times, variable geometry has been used simply to describe a *de facto* state of affairs within the EU, in which some countries have voluntarily chosen to opt out of a number of landmark elements of European

integration, e.g., the Economic and Monetary Union, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), or the Schengen system on free movement of people. More recently (see, e.g., Grant 2006 and *Economist* 2007), this debate on variable geometries has been extended to countries lying at Europe's doorstep. In this context, it constitutes a prism through which to observe options and alternatives for deeper political, economic, and societal integration in Europe for certain countries lying in the wider European neighborhood.

Following this latest understanding of the term, the way in which variable geometries is used in the EU's jargon has a self-evident affinity with the marginality approach. Variable geometries of European integration indeed presuppose the existence of a center, symbolically located in Brussels, from which rules, power, and norms emanate. It assumes the existence of peripheral entities, which are attached to the center, but stipulate specific forms of interdependence with it.[3] Lastly, and depending on whether one is a supporter or a detractor of the idea, variable geometries can produce the whole array of tactics and varying (self-)identities of the margins, along the lines postulated in the introduction of this volume.

In the case of Turkey, the notion of variable geometries has one particular operational asset. By stressing heterogeneous, diversified patterns of European integration, it places an emphasis on both this country's marginal position in relation to the European integration process, and its claim of strategic and cultural centrality. Just as importantly, variable geometries elucidate the responses of the center (Europe) to this claim. The three dimensions that will be reviewed in this chapter appear sufficiently encompassing to address this conundrum. The institutional debate is topical, and important in the current juncture. It illustrates what EU accession negotiations, and some of the proposed alternatives to EU membership, can suggest vis-à-vis Turkey's maneuvering at the margins of Europe in political and economic terms. Second, the focus will be on power, and will look at the marginal possibilities of Turkey in the geopolitical context of the wider European neighborhood. Lastly, the chapter will tackle what is here termed as variable geometries of "ideas," which refers to what Turkey's marginal position has to suggest in relation to the transformation of Europe as a polity, and to Turkey's own self-identity.

Variable Geometries of Institutions[4]

Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership. Negotiations between Ankara and Brussels were opened in October 2005, one year after the European Commission gave its go-ahead. The membership bid has dramatically

influenced Turkey's political, legal, and economic landscape. Judicial reforms exhibit notable achievements, e.g., in relation to the abolition of the death penalty and the long-awaited reform of the penal code. By extending its Customs Union with the EU[5] to the ten new EU member states, Turkey has also made a substantial, if implicit, step forward, as regards its relations with Cyprus. Despite its great regional disparities, the recent record of the Turkish economy is impressive: the inflation rate is falling, currency is being stabilized, and the GDP is steadily growing.

Notwithstanding all this, as the EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn recently warned that Turkey's accession negotiations might be heading for a "train wreck." The stated reasons, in this specific instance, concern Turkey's reluctance to recognize Cyprus, and to open its ports to it. Both the EU and Turkey, however, well know that the malfunctions that could cause a wreck of the enlargement train are more profound. In institutional terms, the predominant concerns can be probably synthesized in two factors: money and size. Certain countries in Europe have long been wary about the possible implications of a Turkish accession to the EU. They are concerned about their labor market stability, and about the generous economic aid that will have to feed Turkey's journey towards EU membership. Moreover, and especially in view of the current deadlock of the EU's constitutional treaty, the fear is that Turkey's accession will change the shape of EU institutional functioning, and thus the EU itself, beyond recognition.

The stipulations of the EU-Turkey negotiating framework reflect these concerns, and contain unprecedented potential restrictions to full membership in Turkey's case. They indicate that, in the case of the Turkish accession, "long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements, or permanent safeguard clauses" may have to be considered (*EU-Turkey Negotiating Framework* 2005, 6). These provisions mean, in effect, that Turkey might—temporarily or permanently—never be fully integrated into the EU in fields such as free movement of persons, structural policies, or agriculture. The EU decisions on Turkey's negotiating framework, however, go further than that. They argue that "negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand" (*ibid.*, 1), and that, should membership not be achieved, "it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond" (*ibid.*).

These open formulations leave room for various interpretations, and have generated, in recent years, several alternatives to full EU membership, especially within conservative circles in Germany (but also France and Austria) that most vehemently oppose Turkey's full integration into the EU. These include the so-called Privileged Partnership option, as well as

the less known Extended Associate Membership option (Quaisser and Wood 2004). Both deserve a closer look because they entail an offer of deeper integration of Turkey into the EU, and arguably the "strongest possible bond," short of full membership. By looking at what these offers are actually about, and at Turkey's position on them, it will be possible to appreciate how Turkey is playing its role from the margins in the all-important aspects of political and economic integration.

In the field of economic governance, these proposals entail a substantial deepening of the Customs Union, which would be extended to form a comprehensive Free Trade Area (Wissmann 2004), including, for example, agricultural and textile products, and property acquisitions by EU citizens or legal entities in Turkey. It would entail an enhancement of aid programs, and the abolition of current restrictions on foreign actors operating in the Turkish non-financial service sector. Moreover, it is argued that such an enhanced Customs Union would necessitate a strengthening of the existing EU-Turkey bilateral institutions, by means of *ad-hoc* institutional arrangements similar to the ones characteristic of the European Economic Area (EEA) (Zu Guttenberg 2004).[6] Alternatively, Turkey would participate in the meetings of the EU Council without voting rights.

In the field of foreign and security policy, the Privileged Partnership and Extended Associate Membership options entail the highest possible degree of alignment of Turkey to EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP. This would involve, *inter alia*, the adoption, by Turkey, of all CFSP positions (to which Turkey is to a significant extent already aligned), and regular participation by the Turkish foreign minister in council meetings. In the ESDP, given Turkey's prominent role in NATO, it could imply, for example, a direct involvement in the building of the EU's fledgling Rapid Reaction Force and in the decision-making procedures for crisis management (Wissmann 2004), possibly leading to institutionalized co-decision rights in ESDP matters (Zu Guttenberg 2004).[7]

In the field of internal security (what the EU now calls "Freedom, Security, and Justice"), the Privileged Partnership or Extended Associate Membership would imply approximation to the EU regulatory norms. This would entail cooperation in the judicial field, possibly leading, *inter alia*, to agreements on data protection, the exchange of personal data, and the convergence of visa policies and practices.

The Turkish government has played its marginal position in the institutional field by flatly rejecting any of these alternatives to full membership (see, for instance, Lobjakas 2005). The EU and Turkey, the argument goes, have initiated membership negotiations and should continue them, unless objective reasons for suspension should arise. More than that,

Turkish officials also point at the grave implications of a derailment of the negotiations for full EU membership. As Turkey's foreign minister Abdullah Gul recently noted: "I cannot help wondering whether Europe is really aware of the consequences of not sustaining the [EU] accession process" (Gul 2006), which can be seen as akin to what, in the context of this volume, is called "seeking loyalty rewards"—i.e., obtaining benefits for not moving away.

In relation to the alternative options proposed here, the prospect of an EEA-like arrangement may considerably alter the conditionality mechanism that sustains enlargement negotiations and the pace of Turkey's economic reforms. Secondly, the emasculated participation of Turkey in EU institutions that is suggested in the Privileged Partnership/Extended Associate Membership would not be acceptable to Turkey, in view of its experience in the Customs Union. Most important of all, both the Privileged Partnership and Extended Associate Membership options are presented as permanent alternatives to EU membership. Their far-reaching scope would arguably signal the importance that the EU attaches to Turkey as a strategic partner for the union. Yet, Turkey rejects these alternatives because both of them explicitly aim at taking off the table the ultimate incentive or "reward": full EU membership.

Variable Geometries of Power

To unravel how Turkey's marginal position affects the wider European power constellation involves assessing how the country's geopolitical role in its surrounding neighborhood impacts on the European "center." A brief critical overview of the various facets of Turkey's foreign policy that are deemed relevant to Europe is in order.

One of the most significant contexts in both the European and Turkish discourses is the broader Middle East region, the diverse area stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to Iraq and Iran. Turkey's position in the eastern Mediterranean is closely linked to the EU accession process because of the Cyprus conflict. The plan of the former UN secretary general Kofi Annan presumably remains the basis for the currently stalled peace process, but was famously rejected by the Greek Cypriot population in the 2004 referendum. As an EU member state, Greek Cyprus seems to be enjoying marginal gains of its own, insofar as it has disproportionate leverage over the EU, which hinders Turkey's potentially constructive role in the region.

In this area, however, Turkey has also been part of the ailing Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process.[8] Over the past decade, Turkey has been fairly inactive with respect to EU-sponsored

Mediterranean cooperation, primarily because, in the mid-1990s, this was presented as a possible alternative to EU membership. Now that this scenario has not materialized, Turkey regards itself as an important asset for the revival of this regional constellation. This would be particularly important, first, when it comes to empowering the southern part of the Euro-Mediterranean partners with a higher degree of "ownership" of the regional process. Secondly, Turkey's cultural, societal, and political background could potentially give inspiration and support to the process of political transformation and economic reforms that the EU aims to promote in the southern Mediterranean.

Turkey's closer relations with the EU may, in the long run, also affect the Union's role in developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq and, further east, Iran. As far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned, Turkey's position appears to converge with the mainstream EU view. Turkey has not refrained from criticizing Israel's policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians. At the same time, Turkey's ties with Israel have proven to be very solid in recent years, especially in the military and economic fields (see Emerson and Tocci 2004, 21). Turkey also has a self-evident interest and an important logistical role in the stability of Iraq, with which it shares a border and a sizeable Kurdish minority. The smoothing of bilateral relations with Iran is witnessed by their increasing economic cooperation, which turns Turkey into a major complementary asset, especially in relation to the efforts of the international community to negotiate with Teheran on its nuclear program (see, for example, Zaman 2006).[9]

Besides the greater Middle East, two further dimensions are provided by Ankara's relations with the Central Asian republics, and by its role in the Black Sea area. In Central Asia, there are cultural, historical, and religious ties that, in the past, fed a movement that is known as "Pan-Turkism."[10] Over time, Pan-Turkism has lost relevance, partly because of its inherent implausibility in the post-Soviet authoritarian contexts of the countries concerned. In its stead, a softer, more cooperative attitude has taken over, focusing on Turkish investment in the region and on support for democratic reforms.

In light of Romania's and Bulgaria's accession to the EU, the Black Sea is becoming a major crossroads of threats and challenges for the enlarged union (Tassinari 2006). Turkey's role in the region is of central importance, not only because of geo-economic interests deriving from transit of oil and gas through the region, but also because of more traditional geopolitical reasons. Most notably, Turkey's role in the south Caucasus remains highly relevant and, at the same time, problematic. It is relevant because of the diaspora from Georgia and Abkhazia hosted by Turkey, and because of the several sectoral agreements that Turkey has signed with Georgia and

Azerbaijan. Turkey's role is, however, problematic because of the historically tense relations with Armenia, and consequent suspicion of bias in relation to some of the frozen conflicts in the area, most notably that in Nagorno-Karabakh.

A critical overview of Turkey's marginal position in Europe's power constellation requires a brief assessment of Ankara's relations with the two other centers relevant to Europe: the United States and Russia.[11] As far as the United States is concerned, Turkey traditionally enjoys a high degree of trust and leverage because of its steady and firm place in "the West," epitomized by its NATO membership. Over the decades, Washington has persistently pushed for a closer engagement of the EU with Turkey. This might have been an important contributing factor in EU decisions in the 1990s, such as that at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, to acknowledge Turkey as a candidate. However, later on, and particularly during the current Bush administration, Washington's pro-enlargement pressure has been less effective, and perhaps even counterproductive. In addition to the objective difficulties that the EU is faced with in relation to Turkey's prospective accession, indeed, American "interference" in European affairs now provokes a more widespread uneasiness, especially within certain EU member states (*Economist* 2005, 5).

Ankara's own attitude *vis-à-vis* the United States is less uncritical than it used to be. In 2003, the Turkish Parliament rejected a resolution that would have allowed the transit of U.S. troops on their way to open a second, northern front in Iraq. This was due not only to the perceived risks in an area—predominantly Kurdish—that remains highly volatile for Turkey's own security. Ankara's refusal was also, arguably, a gesture of opposition to Washington's unilateral focus on Iraq. Moreover, Turkey disapproves of Washington's increasingly assertive posture *vis-à-vis* the problematic issue of the "genocide" of two million Armenians in 1915–1923, perpetrated by the then Ottoman Empire, which Turkey refuses to acknowledge.

Turkey's strategic relevance is just as significant for Russia. Bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey (and the entities that preceded them–the Czarist Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Ottoman Empire) are characterized by a centuries-long history of power-political confrontation. This zero-sum approach in their bilateral relations in some respects still applies—for example, in Russian wariness over Turkey's role as a NATO member, or ever-closer relations with the EU.

On the other hand, a more recent, and perhaps innovative, factor has been the role that oil and gas play in bilateral relations. Turkey's goal of becoming Europe's "fourth artery" for hydrocarbons transit (Roberts 2004) turns Russia into a natural partner. Ankara's asset, in this context, is its strategic geographical centrality in relation to both the north-south routes (as

favored by Russia—e.g., the so-called "Blue Stream" pipeline) and the east-west ones (sponsored by the United States and the EU, e.g., the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan, Nabucco pipelines). Turkey, standing between the ever-increasing assertiveness of Russia's companies (particularly the state-monopoly Gazprom, to control transit routes) and Europe's muffled attempts to diversify its energy sources, pragmatically seeks to accommodate both.

These various dimensions of Turkey's foreign policy provide some concrete elements to discuss how the country's marginal position plays out in the wider European power constellation. Turkey's role in the greater Middle East, Central Asia, and the Black Sea is a textbook case of what Noel Parker defines as offering "intermediation rewards." As will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section, Turkey's role, especially in the greater Middle East, also contains strong normative elements. But as far as power relations are concerned, Turkey's position as intermediary is undoubtedly facilitated by its constructive relations with the majority of the actors in the region. Depending on the country's foreign policy choices, it can also be noted that Ankara's marginal role is that of a stabilizer of security interdependences in these regions—i.e., the "rent-seeking" in the thinking of this volume. Alternatively, Turkey can act as a potential spoiler—hence, going back to demanding more under the "obtaining loyalty" category—should it decide to meddle in the "frozen conflicts" of the south Caucasus, assume a more assertive posture towards Armenia, or tighten its relations with Iran.

The case of Turkey's relations with the United States can also be largely inscribed in the "intermediation rewards" category of marginality. This arguably provides the most straightforward explanation for Ankara's NATO membership, and for Washington's open support of Turkey's EU membership. However, recent occurrences in U.S.-Turkey relations over the past few years and, perhaps even more notably, Turkey's evolving relations with Russia, reveal that Ankara is also playing its marginal role by subtly exploiting existing and potential divergences in the EU-U.S. and EU-Russia bilaterals: as under the category of "playing one center against another." This can be observed especially in the above-mentioned closer relations between Ankara and Moscow in the field of energy transit.

Variable Geometries of "Ideas"

In order to explain how Turkey's marginal maneuvering impacts on the evolution of Europe as a polity, and on its own self-identity, this section must begin with a critical overview of the unique markers characterizing Turkey's national identity.

Turkey's tradition of "civic nationalism" is perhaps the most venerated legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's revolution and of his monumental enterprise of state building. Mustafa Kemal set about reshaping a heterogeneous community by means of staunch secularism, enlightened modernization of the state institutions, and the (re)invention of Turkishness (Tocci 2001). "Kemalism" succeeded in forging a modern state by means of populism—which here specifically concerns the side-lining of class and ethnic divisions within society—and by attributing a fundamental role to state institutions in governing Turkey's economic structures.

Over the decades, however, it became apparent that this strive for modernity "from above" entailed a verticalization of power as well, with an all-encompassing, essentialist state ruling over a rigid and somewhat constrained society. Put in other terms, the monolithic Kemalist elite succeeded in forging a modern state, but did not allow a modern nation to emerge out of it (see Jung 2001).

The roles played in the history of modern Turkey by political Islam, and by the military, provide the most egregious examples of this dynamic. In the Ottoman Empire, Islam was an organizing, community-building principle, in which the brotherhood among believers generated a sense of social affiliation for the individual subject. As the modernization of Turkey proceeded in opposition to class divisions, religious affiliations, and ethnic origins, the Kemalist elite turned Islamism from a marker of national identity into a somewhat individualistic credo (see Aydin and Keyman 2004). With the rise of the multi-party system in the 1960s, the Kemalist elite—and particularly the most Kemalist of Turkish institutions, the military—revived political Islamism in order to oppose liberal and leftist parties. The association between Kemalism and political Islam functioned quite effectively in the 1980s to marginalize these emerging "Western" ideologies. However, the Kemalist elite's enfranchisement of political Islam also meant a sea-change for the essentialist discourse characterizing Turkish identity-building. While in the short run, the alliance with the Islamists allowed the Kemalists to preserve their hold on power, in the long run it backfired: it broke the taboo on exclusion and fostered the emergence of competing identity discourses (Aydin and Keyman 2004, 8-9).

The 2002 electoral success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) can be interpreted in this context. The victory of the moderate Islamist AKP marks a stinging popular rejection of the binary, exclusionary discourse upon which Turkish identity was defined by the Kemalist elite. It was a landmark signal of how inclusive, overlapping discourses eventually came to articulate the ongoing debate on Turkish democracy (ibid.). The reforms of Turkey's democratic institutions and practices undertaken by

the AKP-led government—e.g., a diminution of the power of the military over civilian institutions, a significant overhaul of the legal system, and a more forthcoming approach to the issue of the Kurdish minority—are intrinsic parts of this evolution in Turkish democracy. This domestic evolution is important to understand the challenges posed by Turkey's accession process to the EU/Europe as an emerging polity. The first major challenge concerns the way in which the identities of both Turkey and the EU are being transformed as a result of their closer relations.

Within Turkey, the EU has become an anchor and a boost for AKP-sponsored reforms, and the enlargement process has advanced the country's own domestic transformation. As we will see, the EU's strict and often standardized interpretations of the notions of tolerance, secularism, and democracy have had a negative impact on the Turkish population. But the EU membership perspective has represented a crucial test of the most basic values of Turkey's Kemalist foundations: populism, étatism, and an intrinsically Weberian notion of state sovereignty.

Within the EU, the prospect of enlargement towards Turkey has coincided with a period of uncertainty and deep introspection. This was sparked by contingent occurrences such as the internal split over the Iraq war, but also by more fundamental developments, such as the 2004 enlargement; the rise and fall of the constitution debate; and the increasingly problematic relations of some EU countries with their migrant communities. Because of all this, the issue of Turkey's membership in the EU has become a central battlefield of opposing discourses on Europe's identity. Skeptics, such as former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, have been very explicit in arguing that enlargement towards a Muslim country such as a Turkey would signify "the end of the EU." Those in favor argue that Turkey's EU membership is a historic opportunity for Europe to reflect upon the scope of its constitutive values and norms.

This leads to a second challenge, which concerns the way in which Turkey's EU accession process impacts on the geographical scope and ultimate purpose—what EU jargon refers to as "finality"—of the EU as a polity. A central aspect of this debate, addressed by both supporters and opponents of Turkey's membership, concerns the extent to which Turkey's internal transformation can represent a precursor for democratization in the broader Middle East. On the one hand, skeptics will argue that Turkey's path to modernization has differed greatly from that of the other states in the Arab-Muslim world, so that Turkey can hardly provide a viable model for them. On the other hand, there is the argument that the achievements of Turkey's moderately Islamist government could be of inspiration to other Arab states—especially those such as Morocco or Jordan, which

remain autocratic but have opened up extensively to economic liberalization. Given the present uncertainty surrounding EU-Turkey negotiations, at this stage these arguments are speculative at best. What can be asserted, however, is that while Turkey's democratization has been boosted by the prospect of EU membership, enlargement is a possibility that will not surface in the case of the other Arab-Muslim countries. Hence, the main lesson coming from Turkey with regards to the EU's position in the Arab-Muslim neighborhood is paradoxically quite independent of Turkey's own fate. It is that EU influence in supporting political and economic transformations depends on the clarity of its strategy: incentives, conditions, and objectives. This applies to all EU strategies and, in relation to the Arab-Muslim neighborhood, goes back to the debate on the ultimate goals and form of the European Neighborhood Policy.

The point of clarity leads to the third challenge posed by the Turkey's closer relation with the EU: the question of legitimacy, i.e., the perceptions (both in Turkey and the EU) of the EU's credibility as a governance system, and as an actor. As was noted above, the prospective membership of a large, impoverished and populous country like Turkey has sparked concerns within the EU as to the efficiency, accountability, and democratic representation of EU decision-making mechanisms. Viewed from Ankara, EU promises cannot but waver before these concerns and the increasing polarization of the political spectrum and growing popular opposition in Europe. Turkey's own attitude has changed as a result. In recent months, and in conjunction with the upcoming national elections, this was highlighted by a nationalist backlash in the government rhetoric on the Kurdish question, and by plummeting rates of EU approval—from 61 percent in 2005 to 40 percent in 2006—within the Turkish population.

These observations on the diverse, evolving understandings of identity, finality, and legitimacy have something quite substantial to suggest with respect to Turkey's "identity at the margin" of Europe, as the introduction to this volume defines it. First, an evident peculiarity of the Turkish enlargement process is that Ankara seeks to underline its evolving internal "difference" and to legitimize itself *vis-à-vis* the EU by being different—what Noel Parker refers to as "legitimizing oneself by difference." This is instanced by the argument, both in Turkey and among the advocates of Turkish membership in Europe, that "'Islamization' and democratization of Turkish society are not necessarily mutually exclusive processes" (Jung 2007). This notion challenges the enlightened European assumption that religion and modernity are conflicting (Taylor 1998). More than that, it goes to the core of the debate on Europe's own (in)ability to be different in and "with itself" (Derrida 1992, 9).

A second argument concerns the extent to which Turkish self-identity is asserting a "relative autonomy" from the European center (Noel Parker's

eighth category). This can be raised, for example, following the controversial debate surrounding the infamous article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which allows individuals insulting "Turkishness" to be prosecuted. The EU has repeatedly pointed out that this article infringes the fundamental principles of freedom of expression, and has asked Turkey to repeal it. In some instances, European pressure may have even succeeded in pushing Turkish authorities to soften their stance on the application of the article. Yet, notwithstanding this external pressure, the Turkish traditionalist elite sees it as an eminently domestic question, which can and should be debated (and possibly resolved, see, for example, *Hürriyet* 2007) inside Turkey.

Lastly, as Dietrich Jung argues: "many Turkish intellectuals are toying with the idea that in the end a thoroughly reformed, pluralistic Turkey could pay Europe back for previous humiliations by turning its back on Brussels" (Jung 2007, 4). Following this line of argument, in due course Turkey might indeed represent a model for democratization in the Muslim world. Given the enduring predicament of the enlargement process, Ankara could quite simply exploit its marginal self-identity by rejecting the standardizing decisions of the European center, and develop itself as an "alternative center" (Noel Parker's tenth category).

Conclusions

This chapter has sought to unravel the conundrum posed by Turkey's marginal position *vis-à-vis* its choice of European orientation, and by the country's geopolitical and civilizational "centrality." These two seemingly contrasting features make an analysis of Turkey's marginality peculiar and, it has been argued, intrinsically different from that of, for example, Russia or the United States.

This dilemma was addressed by explaining and applying the under-conceptualized notion of "variable geometries," which has become increasingly familiar in EU policy-making parlance. The focus on variable geometries has two important advantages. First, by stressing heterogeneous, diversified patterns of Turkey's integration into Europe, variable geometries can show how this country has sought in practice to tie its "marginal" position in Europe to its "central" heritage—as well as the reactions of European "center" to this posture. Just as importantly, the focus on variable geometries elucidates the relevance of the marginality approach to the realm of policy-making. The dimensions of institutions, power, and ideas in the variable geometries debate have proved to be congruent with the main facets of Turkey's marginal position and identity.

In institutional terms, Turkey's negotiators place a strong emphasis on the patience and loyalty that Ankara has displayed since 1963, when the

country was first associated to the then European Economic Community. At the same time, they make none-too-veiled allusions as to what might happen were Turkey to be prevented from completing its EU accession process. The perils currently characterizing the EU enlargement negotiations, as well as Turkey's flat rejection of alternative options such as "Privileged Partnership" and "Extended Associated Membership," suggest that Turkey is using its marginal position in order to obtain the highest, and only genuine reward: full EU membership.

The power-related dimension is where the Turkish room for marginal maneuvering is more ample, as this is where it can more productively exploit its inherited strategic centrality. Turkey's foreign policy in the broader Middle East, Central Asia, and the Black Sea are emblematic examples of its key role as intermediary between the European center and its most turbulent and volatile periphery. Perhaps, more interestingly, the analysis also revealed that Turkey's relations with both the United States and Russia may be interpreted as a subtle, if pragmatic way, to pit Europe against the other two centers.

What was termed here as variable geometries of "ideas" is naturally the most controversial of these dimensions. The challenges posed by Turkey's Muslim heritage are epitomized by the desire of Turkey to see its inherent difference legitimized by the center. In fact, by firmly upholding this difference, Turkey has forced Europe to reflect upon its own self-declared difference, reinforcing a phase of profound introspection within the EU. Notwithstanding the pressures coming from Brussels, Turkey has also sought to define the pace and scale of its own internal transformation. Turkey's desire for "relative autonomy" is here aimed at demonstrating that, with or without membership in the EU, the country can turn into a fully-fledged liberal and pluralistic democracy. It cannot be excluded that the growing frustration over uncertain and long-drawn-out negotiations between Brussels and Ankara will, in the long run, push this "autonomy" further, and that Turkey will restyle itself, yet again, as an alternative center.

Notes

1. This chapter is a revised and expanded version of the author's "The Variable Geometries of Turkey's European Integration," a forthcoming publication of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC.
2. Recent instances illustrating this trend are the seven signatories of the May 2005 Treaty of Prüm on internal security; the French-German-British initiative on Iran's nuclear enrichment program; or the enhanced cooperation among Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy on counter-terrorism.
3. In this wider European debate, variable geometries normally tend to be applied to territorial entities, but they nevertheless encompass a broad array of

actors: from transnational regions (e.g., the Baltic Sea or the Mediterranean), to states (e.g., states belonging to the European Economic Area), to sub-state or non-state actors (e.g., Kosovo, Transniestria, the "Euroregions," etc.).

4. The research assistance of Martina Warning of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) on the German debate. reviewed in this section. is gratefully acknowledged.
5. The existing Customs Union covers an estimated 30 percent of the goods produced in Turkey (Karakas 2006), and applies to industrial goods, with the exception of agriculture, services, and public procurement. Under the Customs Union, Turkey is already required to abide by the relevant parts of the EU *acquis*, e.g., in relation to industrial standards, without having any of the associated decision-making rights.
6. The European Economic Area covers relations between the EU, on the one hand, and Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, on the other. The three countries are included in the EU Single Market (with exceptions for specific sectoral policies, such as trade, agriculture, and fisheries), but do not have the possibility to influence EU decision-making bodies on the issues concerned.
7. Interestingly, one of the outstanding issues hindering closer cooperation between the EU and NATO is closely related to Turkey's marginal position. What formally obstructs closer relations is, indeed, the Cyprus-Turkey dispute, an offspring of the 2004 enlargement. Cyprus is neither a NATO member, nor a participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace framework, and Turkey has blocked its participation to joint EU-NATO meetings. Some EU member states uphold the principle that decisions within the union should be taken unanimously, which has further narrowed the scope of EU-NATO dialogue.
8. On this aspect, see Chapter 8 of this volume and, *inter alia*, Emerson and Tocci (2004).
9. Some analysts, however, have speculated that the Turkish-Iranian rapprochement can potentially be deleterious to Europe and the West, as it could be aimed at forging a united front against the problem of Kurdish guerrillas, which both states share.
10. Pan-Turkism is an ideology based on ethnic and linguistic affinities between Turkey and the communities of most Central Asian republics. In the past, it was referred, and at times abused, to enhance Turkey's strategic clout in the region. See, for instance, Landau (1995).
11. Notwithstanding the elaborations in the three chapters in this volume that deal with America's and Russia's marginality in relation to Europe, the United States and Russia are taken here in the straightforward and established sense of power "centers" in the European security context.

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Conclusion

Noel Parker

"Europe's" Interactions with Its Margins

We began this volume in the expectation that we could achieve a subtler and more meaningful understanding of what Europe is, and is becoming in the world, by examining the interactions between the identity of Europe and what lies on Europe's various "margins." In the course of the first, theoretical part, we presented philosophical grounds and a historical scheme, preceded by a theoretical construction—notably, a "theory of positive marginality"—expounding the grounds for this supposition. I postulated various effects of marginality that might be discovered in the course of further investigations, and proposed the following hypotheses:

1. That a number of actors on the margins of Europe pursue tactics we have postulated on the basis of marginality;
2. That actors in marginal positions possess more power than is assumed;
3. That, in their interactions with center(s) in Europe, the identities of some marginal entities change along the lines postulated;
4. That its interrelationships with its margins are significant in the geopolitical identity of Europe as a whole.

Looking back now over our studies, we should first ask whether these suppositions have been borne out.

The case studies have certainly lived up to expectations regarding what can be identified when the marginality of various entities is foregrounded. Across a broad swathe of political entities, we have shown many that behave according to patterns anticipated for those on the margin. This

observation holds, moreover, for a considerable range of types of entity. Not just entities that would seem palpably subordinate—such as the Baltic states or micro-territories like Gibraltar—were found to behave as margins; groups and major states, such as countries of the southern Mediterranean or Russia, were also found to pursue the logic of a marginal position. Indeed, in certain specified terms, one could—over the longer term—revealingly interpret the United States and Europe itself in terms of *their* marginality to others.

In many of our cases, we have found marginal players pursuing power that lies potential *within their marginal position*. Not all were equally successful, of course, or equally successful at all times. Some, such as Kaliningrad or Denmark in earlier centuries, seem to have enjoyed only short-lived advantage from exploiting marginality. In other cases—such as Russia's jockeying for a role in the world, or Turkey for standing in relation to Europe/the EU—the marginal actor scores successes, though the final outcome is unclear. Yet others—Jerusalem, for example—appear to possess potential as hybrid margins that they have been unable to benefit from, or simply have been unaware of. So, it would be emphatically wrong to claim that our studies show marginal actors' *achieving* power in a manner predicated on the basis of their marginality. We have cast light on various power games where marginal entities pursue power via the potentials that their marginality entails. But all games have two or more players, and moves by one player must expect to meet reactions from others. We have, that is to say, shown marginal actors making various moves; the center(s) will of course reply. In itself, then, it is no surprise to have discovered, in many instances, that power on the margin is limited, as any relational power must be to some degree. Yet, two further observations arise regarding power in marginality.

First, there are some conditions that assist marginal players, and some that do not. Rivals occupying the same marginal zone are bad news for a marginal actor: Denmark was overtaken by Sweden, Croatia lost out to the "European" identity projected by its neighbor, Slovenia. Some entities—Putin's Russia reinstituting the "vertical of power," is a case—are *resistant* to negotiating on an equal footing with entities on their margins. The Russian case suggests that those less than sure of their centrality would be especially inclined to this. In this light, Andrey Makarychev pursued the question of how centers' reactions to margins constrain marginal actors' success in seeking to represent some power at the margin. Similarly, by actively intervening to shape Europe, the United States, overly aware of its own power as a center, may frustrate Europeans' efforts to find a comfortable identity for Europe on the margins between the United States and the globalized

world. Alternatively, efforts at shaping Europe may backfire if the United States increases, beyond their capacities, what it demands from marginal military allies, such as Denmark, Britain, or Turkey, who are otherwise eager to sustain alternative relationships to those with Europe.

The second observation is that marginal actors' power often depended upon how they could *present* themselves, including to the center(s): upon how the discourse they conducted about themselves and others (especially the center) could represent them as more or less cohesive and/or weighty actors. Paradoxically, the very obscurity of being a little-known newcomer with a language that few outsiders understood could make it *easier* for Baltic and some Central European states to convey, in their relations with Western Europe, the picture that best suited their interests. But the primacy of discourse in realizing the potential of marginality gave rise to a recurring issue in our internal discussions (to which I return later in this conclusion): Are such discursive devices tools of marginal actors, or constitutive of them? This takes us to hypotheses 3 and 4, about identity change.

To what extent can we see marginal actors modifying, consciously amending, or freely choosing their identity? The identity-altering potentials listed in the theory of positive marginality did not postulate a radical freedom to choose. Indeed, the theory could hardly have done so without contradicting its own approach by supposing that the margin was free of relations to one or more centers—that is to say, not a margin at all. To suppose radical freedom for the margin to choose its own identity would be to abandon as well the anti-immanentism that Sergei Prosorov asserted on grounds of the ontological necessity of a world with boundaries between selves and some that are truly other. If we found shifts of identity arising in marginal entities, then, that was always going to be identity *in relation to* others.

However, with that proviso, it is clear that we have observed a number of identity changes in the interactions between Europe and its margins. Central European and Baltic elites sought, more or less knowingly, to convey identities that would optimize their positions with the centers of gravity of their post-cold war environment. As the cases of Slovenia and Croatia demonstrated, this entailed not simply defining themselves anew, but also defining Europe as a center, and finding a space for a new identity in relation to, or even in-between, other margins. Gibraltar and Kaliningrad dug deep for identity-resources to provide some autonomy in relation to dominant centers. Over the years of wrestling for EU membership, Turkey can be seen developing a new, intermediary identity between Europe's established self-identity, and its own historical career in the Middle East. The British and Danish nation-states were shaped by the pursuit of the

gains available on the margin. Our interpretations provide cases ranging, in the terms of the theory, from asserting autonomy to redefining others via competitive emulation and alternative centrality. The cases also indicate varied degrees of consciousness and deliberateness in these identity-shifts: at one end of the scale, new awareness of oneself as a marginal actor with the potentials that offers, or alternatively more or less cynical image-making; at the other end of the scale, deep structuring of society as a consequence of pursuing marginal tactics—often unwittingly.

To what extent can we observe the significance of its relations with its margins for the geopolitical identity of Europe itself? The presupposition of relational identity entails that this must occur at *some* level. But we can also gather specific instances from our studies. Russia exposes the EU's indeterminateness and vulnerability, and confounds the identity that the EU seeks to give Central and East European Countries (CEEC) states as integral parts of Europe. Turkey and the southern Mediterranean countries disturb the self-identity of a European Union, which is eager to close off enlargement and suture its identity as "Europe": coherent geopolitical entity, bearer of benign, universal values, and good neighbor to the wider world. In various ways, the relation with the United States nibbles away at a coherent identity of Europe, such as the EU would like to promote. This can be seen not just in the effect of deliberate policies, like the effort to build a "coalition of the willing," but also in the long-term centripetal drives in countries like Denmark, Britain, and Turkey, to maintain a geopolitical identity semi-independent of "Europe."

Furthermore, it can be seen at the level of values: the values that may seem to belong to "Europe" as a whole are convincingly claimed as well by a United States that, as argued in Chapter 7, both is and is not "European." Yet, this line of thought applies also in Europe's relationship with many less prominent entities. Turkey takes "Europe's" standards of constitutional form and democratic institutions, and reopens issues within them that appeared closed—such as the role of secularism, the "modern" constitutional state's power over society, or the meaning of the value of "pluralism." And the same sort of challenge can be found on the "inside" of Europe, from identities within that do not fit easy presumptions about our "European" modernity: Gibraltar, Slovenia, or the "awkward partners" in integration. These identity challenges would not be so effective, indeed, if they did not coincide with something that is already present, "inside" Europe's identity. The outsiders impinge upon Europe's identity because the difference *from* Europe, which they appear to exhibit, replicates difference that is already present *within* Europe. As both Michelle Pace and Fabrizio Tassinari argued in regard to Mediterranean countries (following

a mode of thought associated with Jacques Derrida), these "external" challenges bring to Europe's attention differences within itself. Our hypotheses on identity, then, have also been borne out, and developed by the case studies of this book.

Theorizing Marginality

While it is reasonable, then, to claim that this study has produced serious new understandings of the geopolitics of Europe, it is another thing to claim that its theorizing and testing of marginality are cut and dried successes. At least two issues remain open, yet neither appears fatal—not least because so few theoretical positions succeed in disposing of all their loose ends. Our loose ends have appeared in two respects.

Defining the Scope of Analysis

An important issue is how to identify the "centers" and the "margins" that are subject to analysis. This stricture applies to the determination of "the margins," "the center(s)," and the wider environment in which both are determined.

A perpetual loose end in the type of analysis undertaken here is the prior determination for the purposes of analysis of one or more "margins" and one or more "centers." Part of the answer to this can be found in the interdependence of margin and center, and in the multiplicity of terms in which centrality and marginality are manifest. No margin can be determined without one or more centers, and *vice versa*. Moreover, thanks to the diversity of resources that may be adduced in constituting and enhancing an entity, margin-center relationships can overlap and criss-cross. That is to say, one margin's center (Russia, for its "near abroad," for example) may be another center's margin (Russia for the European Union). Again, a margin in one respect (Japan as a military power, for example) can be a center in others (Japan as an owner of sections of American industry). So, it may well be that there is no *definitive* answer to a question in the form: What really is the center here, and what is the margin? This entails that the claims being made for analysis, in terms of marginality, can simply never be tested "objectively," in the sense that the entities would be determined independently, prior to testing hypotheses adduced therefrom.

A further issue is the question of how the net is to be cast to identify the environment in which margin and center exist. It would be correct to say that the importance of the North Sea—which has been crucial for Denmark's

and Britain's "marginal" positions—was itself a consequence of Ottoman power spreading into Venetian trading space in the Mediterranean. In that sense, then, the Eastern Mediterranean was part of the environment originally providing conditions for Denmark's and Britain's being marginal entities. At a later point in history, the power of the United States shifted the centers of gravity within Europe to the Atlantic for defense purposes, and the northwest mainland for economic purposes. Indeed, shifts in centers can occur at any juncture (such as the end of the cold war), and players must try to adjust. On the other hand, it would be a distraction to labor these valid points when conducting an analysis of *how* marginal entities act in their marginality.

Again, it is correct to say that natural developments, such as the erosion or silting of rivers, or new technologies of transport, can be significant in creating or modifying environments where players become centers or margins. This also holds for developments *other* than natural or technological ones. The twentieth-century shift toward a politics of integration in Europe is a feature of the environment of international politics in which Europe's marginal entities operate, though it is neither a natural nor a technological development. It could, however, be thought of as a development in the "discursive" environment, understood as the system(s) of signs within which actors interact with each other. Like the technological environment, it is only partially subject to actors' control, and where it is different, actors compete in their attempts to amend the environment.

The Status of Discourses on the Margin

This returns us to the issue of the discursive context. In numerous cases, as pointed out earlier in this conclusion, the discursive context of marginality and how a margin identifies and situates itself within the available discourses, can display, or be a variable in, the margin's behavior, its impacts, and/or its identity. Where the marginal actor's self-awareness develops to manage its own identity within these constraints, including its relatedness to one or more centers, it may grasp its scope for maneuver and exploit to the maximum the tools that marginality can provide. In short, the way those at the margin *articulate* their identity, and how others *perceive* them are factors in what the margin seeks from its marginal position, in what it can obtain, and ultimately in what it becomes. Hence, that recurring question in our internal discussions: Are discursive devices *tools* of marginal actors, or *constitutive* of them?

My introduction set up a theory of positive marginality with a determinedly ontological emphasis, implying that, at the ontological level, *some or other* margin-center positioning is always given to actors, who then may

exploit or amend it with more or less effect, and greater or lesser conscious awareness of what is going on. The same can be said of Sergei Prosorov's case for anti-immanentism, which is an ontological claim for the necessity of *some or other* boundary. It follows that, though some boundaries or others are given, given boundaries must in their nature be infringeable. Our cases present, by contrast, so many marginal actors' capacities and/or identities being redefined *discursively*: as if it is discourse, rather than ontology, that makes the running. There thus appears to be a besetting tension between the theoretical basis for marginality and so on, and the evidence we adduce to substantiate it.

It may be that the tension is irresolvable between those who believe that the politico-social world is discursively formed, and those who hold that there is an ontological underpinning all the same. Yet, this may not at all render the theory of positive marginality unworkable. Alternatively, some compromise positions may be available, for example that inspired by the Laclau approach as pursued in Andrey Makarychev's chapter. Laclau presents actors forming themselves in a discursive struggle to possess unattainable universal identity. Hence, the *content* of analysis is almost always discursive, but analysis is conducted on the basis of an anti-immanentist *ontological* certainty, namely, that universality will be sought but cannot be attained. Starting from an analogous minimal assumption—that entities cannot attain equality in their efforts to organize each other in the world around them—we can anticipate that this *ontological* impossibility will simply be a perpetual background condition for efforts observable *in discourse* to compete for, and challenge, centrality.

Implications for the Analysis of Political Identities

It is dangerous to claim too grand prospects for a new conceptualization of objects of study in international politics. Yet, in view of our studies of Europe, some possibilities do suggest themselves. These possibilities can be grouped under two headings: what the approach we have pursued may tell us not only about Europe, but also about other zones in the world and their component entities; and what promising conceptual apparatus the approach has revealed over the length of this book.

"Europe" and Other Parts of the World

We began this study with theoretical expositions to show how margins, boundaries, and so on and the dynamics they entail are present in political order *as such*. Frequent references to Europe in those expositions do not, however, entail that they can apply only to Europe. Thanks to the special

character of European integration, it is, to be sure, more obvious to explore the identity of "Europe" through an analysis of its relationships to its margins, than it is to do that with other zones of the world. FEuropean integration exhibits the only zone with an overarching, deeply embedded, enforceable legal regime which rivals, or even fuses with, national regimes. That uniqueness may continue.

Yet, the fact that no other zone has created the same *formal* regime does not foreclose the question: Can an approach in terms of margins be pursued in respect of other zones? On the one hand, the EU itself may well figure as a model for other zones—even if this possibility is overstated in the sunny views of writers such as Cooper (2003) and Haseler (2004), or in official EU expectations of normative power in the wider world. Where the influence by example arises, a greater conscious awareness of the interplay of margins and centers follows.

But the question of applying the approach elsewhere still arises, even without that influence. The dynamics that we have cast light on frequently appear, in any case, outside the formal regime, and/or are not manifest in institutions, or even straightforwardly evident to those who pursue them. It could well be fruitful, then, to consider other zones of the world in terms of perpetual dynamics between centers and margins. The Middle East, which has indeed been touched upon by some of the analyses of this book, suggests itself as a suitable instance, by virtue of its evident fluidity and ostensibly shifting centers and extent. To a lesser degree, the same could be said of South America, East Asia, and Central Asia.

A further significant point seems to follow from the way that the approach we have used is indifferent to size. The United States at one extreme, and Gibraltar at the other, were susceptible to analysis in terms of the interplay of margin and center. And it was not merely that the larger entities were the centers and the smaller, the margins. The United States used to be a margin and then became a center; Russia has taken the opposite path—though in some contexts it is has remained, or is returning to, being a center. If we examine the entities in simple terms of success or failure, size is again irrelevant. Success derives neither from initial absolute size, nor *merely* from location, but from how these states *position* themselves on the margins. Smallness can be compensated for, provided a good deal can be struck with the center. Thus, Britain struck good deals in the seventeenth century; Denmark did so in the twentieth.

This has implications, in turn, for international relations thinking about "small" states. Marginality can override smallness, as such, and may even account for how states become "big" or "small." Though up to a point it is consistent with a neo-realist view that location (as opposed to size) is a constant—that is, a "unit attribute" (Mouritzen 1998, in particular 63)—these

accounts make the consequences of size a function of location *plus* the form and the identity that an entity acquires in its relations to other centers.

Conceptual Innovations

One further feature stands out after these studies: the variety of concepts that the approach has hosted in the course of the expositions. This is, granted, an ambivalent claim, for hostile readers may take it as a sign of conceptual *in*coherence. Yet, from its simple starting point—what is the center here, what is the margin, and how are they interacting?—the approach seems to draw in a battery of concepts useful for a proper understanding of the identities in play in geopolitics, European integration, and international politics.

From one of our starting assumptions—that identity is always to be understood as relational—we are led to find concepts for analysis of what may go on *within* interrelating identities, and of what may go on *between* them. To examine what goes on *within* identities, we have adduced notions of their "hybridity" (the "difference" contained within their identities), their pursuit of centrality, their "universal" qualities, their "immanentist" aspirations to plenitude, and—last but not least—their "marginality" *vis-à-vis* one or other "center." To examine what transpires *between* identities, we have spoken of "projection" (sometimes mutual) between them, of "emulation" of one by another, that is, pretending to possess characteristics perceived in others or thought to be pleasing to them, and of "appropriation." Finally, the approach framing identities in terms of their relatedness, has led to various *ethical* prescriptions, such as that "others" must be recognized in order for identities to be sustained and relations with them maintained, or that dialogue should be "heteroglossic." The normative impulse behind the case for hybridity—that to have mixed identities can be as much a virtue as a weakness (Pieterse 2004)—is implicit in our starting vision of margins and centers. When we analyze their interacting, playing for relative position, swapping places, or changing in the process, we set aside the claim that the center(s) necessarily have the edge over the margins. All the concepts that have developed in our study can then have a role in understanding the fluid interrelational geopolitical identity of Europe—and others—in the future.

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