ILLYRICUM *in* ROMAN POLITICS 229BC – AD68

Danijel Dzino

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ILLYRICUM IN ROMAN POLITICS
229 BC–AD 68

Illyricum, in the western Balkan peninsula, was a strategically important area of the Roman Empire where the process of Roman imperialism began early and lasted for several centuries. Dzino here examines Roman political conduct in Illyricum; the development of Illyricum in Roman political discourse; and the beginning of the process that would integrate Illyricum into the Roman Empire and wider networks of the Mediterranean world.

In addition, he also explores the different narrative histories, from the Romanocentric narrative of power and Roman military conquest, which dominate the available sources, to other, earlier scholarly interpretations of events.

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Mojoj balerini, princezi i sireni Ariel,
od njezina princa
To my ballerina, princess and mermaid Ariel,
from her prince

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Acknowledgments

This book had a long maturing period, and it is finally here with all its good and bad aspects. It started as my PhD thesis 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate' at the University of Adelaide. After the thesis was passed, I understood (and it took me some time) that the thesis has a fundamental flaw: Illyricum did not exist as a geo-political system, as the thesis pompously assumed – it was constructed as such by the Romans!

Scholarly work does not exist per se and I am in significant debt to numerous colleagues and friends. First, to my supervisors, Ron Newbold and Ann Geddes: Ann for looking after me in my undergraduate years and during my Masters thesis, Ron for making me look at ancient history from unusual and unexpected angles. I am grateful to all the staff and students from the Classics department at the University of Adelaide for creating a good working environment and especially to Han Baltussen for heaps of useful advice and intellectual challenges, and to Barbara Sidwell for all her help in editing the book, support, coffees and all the perfect days, past and still to come.

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Table of events mentioned in the book. All dates BC, except where noted

393	Illyrian dynast Bardylis I defeats Amyntas III, the king of Macedonia.
387	Sack of Rome by the 'Gauls'.
384	Syracusan navy defeats the league of the Iadastinoi in the battle at Pharus.
360/59	Philip II of Macedon defeats Bardylis I.
334	Alexander I of Epirus crosses into Italy to fight the Lucanians and Brutii.
285	La Tène movements in south-eastern Europe: Macedonian king Ptolemy Ceraunos killed in battle by the 'Gauls'.
280	Pyrrhus of Epirus invades south Italy.
279	Raid on Delphi by the 'Gauls'.
232 (or 230)	Epirote monarchy dissolved and the federation formed.
231	Illyrian-Aetolian war and Illyrian victory, death of king Agron.
230	Illyrian attacks on Elis and Messenia, the capture of Phoenice and Corcyra, siege of Issa, the murder of the Roman envoys.
229–228	The first Illyrian war.
221	The first Histrian war.
220	Scerdilaidas allies with the Aetolian league against the Achaean league.
220 or 219	Scerdilaidas becomes ally of Philip V against the Aetolian league.
220–217	The Social war of Philip V against the Aetolian league.

219	The second Illyrian war, Demetrius of Pharus escapes to Macedonian court.
218	The second Punic war begins, Hannibal in Italy.
217	The war of Scerdilaidas and Philip V. Hannibal wins at Lake Trasimene.
Winter 217/16	Scerdilaidas becomes ally of Rome.
216	Hannibal wins at Cannae.
215	The alliance of Macedonia and Carthage. The first Macedonian war begins, Demetrius of Pharus killed, Philip V briefly captures Oricos.
214–213	Philip captures Lissus, and subjugates the Parthini and Atintanes.
212	Philip campaigns in Illyria.
209–208	Illyrian counter-offensive against Philip V.
205	The peace of Phoenice, the end of the first Macedonian war.
202	The end of the second Punic war.
200–197	The second Macedonian war.
181	The second Histrian war.
178	The third Histrian war, dissolution of Histrian kingdom.
170–169	The third Macedonian war.
168	The third Illyrian war.
167	The peace of Scodra.
159 (or 156)	Cornelius' (?) defeat by the Segesticani.
156–155	The campaigns of Figulus and Scipio Nasica (the first Dalmatian war).
148 or 147	Macedonia *provincia*.
135	The war with the Ardiaei and Pleraei.
129	The campaign of Tuditanus and Pandusa against the Taurisci, Carni, Histri and Iapodes.
119	The campaign of Cotta and Metellus Diadematus (?) against the Segesticani.
118–117	The campaign of Metellus Delmaticus (the second Dalmatian war).
115	The campaign of Scaurus against the Taurisci.
113	The Cimbri defeat the Romans at Noreia.
102	The Cimbri in northern Italy (defeated by Marius 101).

87–82	The first Roman civil war of Sulla against the Marians.
84	Cinna and Carbo in Liburnia.
78–76	The campaign of Cosconius (the third Dalmatian war).
67	Pompey's 'war on piracy'.
60	*Lex Vatinia de imperio Caesaris*, Illyricum attached to Cisalpine Gaul.
59–50	Caesar pro-consul of two Gauls.
54	The raid of the Pirustae on southern Illyricum.
51	The raid of the Iapodes on Aquileia.
50	The Delmatian alliance captures Promona (the fourth Dalmatian war, the conflicts lasting almost without interruption 50–33).
49–44	The Civil Wars of Caesar and Pompey.
49	Pompeian defeat at Pharsalus, the siege of Salona by Pompeians, the defeat of C. Antonius at Curicta.
48	Cornificius appointed as Caesarian commander in Illyricum.
Winter 48/47	Gabinius defeated by the Delmatae.
47	The naval battle at Tauris, Pompeian defeat and Issaean capitulation.
46	Sulpicius Rufus commander in Illyricum.
45	Vatinius pro-consul of Illyricum.
44	Ceasefire with the Delmatae, Caesar killed, Illyricum added to Brutus' *provincia*, Vatinius deserted by his legions, senator Baebius killed by the Delmatae in renewed conflict.
43–39(?)	Salona taken by the Delmatae.
39–38	Pollio recaptures Salona.
35	Octavian's campaigns against the Iapodes and Segesticani.
34–33	Octavian's campaign against the Delmatian alliance.
31	The battle of Actium.
c. 30	Illyricum established as public (senatorial) pro-consular province. Tamphilus Vaala Numonianus first pro-consul known by name (some time after 30).
27	New constitution promulgated in Rome, principate established *de facto*.

16	Pro-consul of Illyricum Silius campaigns in Val Camonice, the Pannonii and Norici in Histria.
15(?)	The submission of the Scordisci, the annexation of Noricum (assumed date).
14	The unrest of the 'Pannonians'.
13	Agrippa sent against the 'Pannonians'.
12	*Bellum Pannonicum*, phase 1: the campaign of Tiberius and Vinicius against the Breucian alliance.
11	*Bellum Pannonicum,* phase 2: the campaigns in the Dinaric Alps (the alliances of Daesitiates, Mezaei), Illyricum becomes imperial province.
10–9	*Bellum Pannonicum,* phase 3: the final conquest.
10 BC–AD 6	Lentulus, Sex. Apuleius, … vinicius (?), Domitius Achenobarbus imperial legate in Illyricum.
AD 6	*Bellum Batonianum* starts.
AD 7	Germanicus sent with reserves, Mons Claudius, battle at Volcaean marshes.
Winter AD 7/8	Tiberius in Siscia.
AD 8	The submission of Bato the Breucian at Bathinus river, the murder of Bato the Breucian.
AD 9	The surrender of Bato the Daesitiate.
AD 14	The death of Augustus, the mutiny of Danubian legions.
AD 14–20	Dolabella governor of Illyricum (or only Dalmatia).
AD 16–17	Dolabella's roads (*via Gabiniana* and Salona – *ad fines provinciae Illyrici*) completed.
AD 17–20	Second mission of Drusus in Illyricum, probable date of division of Illyricum.
AD 19–20	Dolabella's roads (Salona – *castellum (He)dum*, Salona – *civitas Breucorum*, Salona – Siscia) completed.
AD 42	Saturninus' mutiny.
AD 43–45	Legion rotation in Pannonia, IX Hispana leaves, VIII Augusta and XV Apollinaris replaced with XIII Gemina and X Gemina.
AD 56–57	Legion rotation in Dalmatia, VII moved to Moesia.

MACEDONIAN KINGS

Demetrius II Aetolicus (239–229)
Antigonus III Doson (229–221)
Philip V (221–179)
Perseus (179–168)

ILLYRIAN KINGS

Ardiaean dynasty

Agron (–231)
Teuta regent for Pinnes (231–228)
Demetrius regent for Pinnes (228–220)
Pinnes (220–after 217)

Labeatan dynasty

Scerdilaidas (after 217–before 205)
Pleuratus (before 205–c. 181)
Genthius (c. 181–168)

CHAPTER I

Introduction, approaches, review of sources and secondary literature

ROME AND THE WESTERN PART OF THE BALKAN PENINSULA

The conquest of Illyricum has been examined previously in the context of a general narrative of Roman expansion, as has initial Roman interaction with Illyricum from the perspective of Dalmatian or Pannonian provincial history, and through the analysis of primary sources.[1] This book will examine Roman political conduct in Illyricum, the development of Illyricum in Roman political discourse and the beginning of the process that would integrate Illyricum into the empire and wider networks of the Mediterranean world. It will reveal Roman political and military engagement through the ways in which Roman power was present in Illyricum across the Adriatic and from Aquileia via the Ocra pass between 229 BC, when Roman involvement across the Adriatic starts, and the later Iulio-Claudian era, when permanent control over the Danube is established. In addition, this book will try to explore, as much as it is possible, the different narratives of this process, apart from the Romanocentric narrative of power and Roman military conquest, which dominate the available sources, and earlier scholarly interpretation of the events.

It is highly doubtful that the Romans could organise a grand strategy, apart from the loosely defined idea of the 'conquest of the world'. We cannot really talk about 'foreign policy' in the modern sense, which implies a level of intentionality and consistency of planning during long periods of time. However, the Roman strategy on a regional level appears much clearer and better defined. Written and material sources show that the Romans

[1] Republican political conduct: Zippel 1877; Badian 1952; Wilkes 1969: 29–36; Bandelli 1983; 2004; Šašel Kos 2004; Dzino 2005. General context up to AD 14: Syme 1934b; Wilkes 1965a; Gruen 1996. Provincial history: Mócsy 1962: 527–50; 1974: 31–111; Alföldy 1965a: 166–70; Wilkes 1969: 37–152; Zaninović 1976b; Šašel 1976; Šašel Kos 1997b. Primary sources: Šašel Kos 1986; 2005a; Domić-Kunić 2003; 2004.

possessed the capabilities to think strategically, that they were able to develop and execute more complex military operations in certain regions, especially in the late Republic and later in the empire.[2] This regional 'policy', as will be shown, changed significantly; it focused on different sub-regions and went through different phases that were impacted by changing global and regional factors.

The consequences of the conquest of these lands were significant for the empire and they are visible to any modern historian who enjoys the benefit of historical hindsight. The efforts of Roman generals in the first centuries BC/AD enabled Rome to extend her influence across the Danube and to control huge areas of the Pannonian basin. This achievement created a significant buffer zone between the imperial frontier and the Italian homeland, and gave Rome the military and economic advantages of controlling the Danube. Illyricum, although from a Roman perspective an underdeveloped and relatively poor area compared with, for example, Gaul or the Eastern provinces, gave soldiers for the legions, metals for Roman workshops such as gold, silver and iron, and provided the empire with a land link, from Italy to Macedonia. Some scholars have placed perhaps too strong an emphasis on the significance of the conquest of the Adriatic hinterland for geo-strategic purposes, such as the link between the Eastern and Western provinces.[3] However, even though it is tempting to assume as much, all these issues have not significantly affected the changes and modifications of Roman political practice in Illyricum. These considerations project the contemporary judgements of scholars, their assessment of the situation and interpretation of events, rather than what was influencing actual Roman Illyrian affairs. As will be discussed later, Roman 'imperialism' was not necessarily driven by economic or strategic motives, but rather impacted by the ethos of the elite and their perceptions of fear, insult, etc. Also, Roman political and military actions were significantly affected by their perception of geographic space, which was further influenced by inaccurate measurements, ethnological generalisations and complex imperial ideology developed in the Augustan era.

It is a curiosity that such a vast territory just across the sea from Italy remained almost untouched by Roman expansionism until the end of the first century BC. Physical geography might be one reason for the delayed conquest, as rough terrain discouraged the plans of any would-be conqueror to expand from the eastern Adriatic coast further into the continent.

[2] Alston 1998: 276–85, and also Ferrill 1991; Isaac 1992; Whittaker 1994; 2004: 28–49 etc.
[3] Syme 1934b; Wilkes 1965a: 13–14; 1969: 46–7; 1996: 547–8.

However, other reasons might also be assumed. A full conquest of the area required primarily a change in the Roman attitude to the understanding of space and ways of domination over space, which developed in the late Republic, reshaping the very essence of the Roman provincial system. The term 'Illyricum' comes from the Greek term *Illyris* (Ἰλλυρίς), used for their north-western non-Greek neighbours *Illyrioi* (Ἰλλυριοί), whom they perceived as sharing a common culture and 'ethnicity'.[4] However, in imperial times Illyricum was considered to be roughly all the space between the south-eastern Alps, the Danube, Thrace and the Adriatic and the Roman provinces of Dalmatia, Pannonia and Moesia. Earlier scholarship rightly recognised that this extension of understanding what Illyricum was in written sources has been related to the process of Roman conquest of the area.[5] The Romans borrowed the term earlier invented by the Greeks and incorporated it into their political geography, applying it to the inhabitants of what they defined as Illyricum with their cognitive political understanding of space. True, the indigenous population might share some common cultural features but in no way had any sense of common identity. Thus, we can say that the Romans in a way invented Illyricum, as they did with some other regions such as Gaul, Britain, or Germany, constructing them as spatial and geographical units in order to suit their political purposes. As Chapter 5 will argue, this occurred *de iure* with the *lex Vatinia* in 60 BC that entrusted Illyricum to Caesar as an attachment to his *provincia* over Cisalpine Gaul.

For easier analysis, Roman relations with Illyricum should be divided into chronological phases. Certainly, this division, and use of abstract terms such as 'Coastal' or 'Lesser' Illyricum, should be handled with care, as every division of history into historical periods is an essentially artificial construction of the modern historian. These phases are the reflection of the ways Rome interacted with this space, under the influence of regional and global events:

- trans-Adriatic phase (229–60 BC)
- Illyricum (59 BC–68 BC)

[4] Pliny, *HN* 3.144; Pomponius Mella, 2.3.55 *Illyrii proprie dicti* ('properly called Illyrii'); their possible location: Alföldy 1965a: 49–50; Hammond 1966: 241. Suić and Katičić question the existence of a separate people of *Illyrii*. For them *Illyrii proprie dicti* are peoples inhabiting the southern Adriatic coast between Dyrrachium and Lissus; Katičić 1964a; 1965a; Suić 1976c; Pająkowski 1980 (between Lissus and Neretva). Papazoglu 1989: 46–7 (located close to the Macedonian border in later-day Epirus). The form 'Illyricum' derived from *regnum Illyricum* analogous to Noricum – *regnum Noricum*; Šašel Kos 2000: 284. See D. Rendić-Miočević 1980: 15 n. 3 for different spellings of the words Illyricum and *Illyrii* in the Latin sources.

[5] Strabo, 7.5.1 τὰ Ἰλλυρικά; App. *Ill.* 1, 6; Pliny, *NH* 3.139 *nunc totum uno nomine Illyricum vocatur generatim* ('now, the whole is called with one name – Illyricum'); Šašel Kos 2005a: 219–44.

and in more specific ways:

- Illyricum as part of Roman Greek and Macedonian engagement (229– 168 BC)
- The late Republican period (167–60 BC)
- The construction of Illyricum (59–33 BC)
- The establishment and strengthening of 'coastal' Illyricum (59–44 BC)
- The pacification of the interior of part of Dalmatia (44–33 BC)
- Illyricum as a senatorial province, 'Lesser' Illyricum (33–11 BC)
- The imperial province 'Greater Illyricum' (11 BC–c. AD 10)
- The two Illyricums (c. AD 10–68).

The first period is easy to recognise, and it provides the background to Roman relations with Macedonia and North Italy; it is concerned partly with the Illyrian and the Histrian kingdoms and the issue of piracy in the Adriatic, but without a permanent military commitment across the Adriatic. 167 BC witnessed the end of the Illyrian kingdom, which used to be a focal point throughout the initial stage of Roman political involvement in the region. After that event, Rome focused its attention on the south and north Adriatic as separate zones of operations, linked with Macedonia and North Italy, but still avoiding permanent military commitment and the administrative organisation of the space. The proconsulship of Caesar is taken as the start of the transition, and it is marked by the formation and defence of a unified zone of operations on the Adriatic coast – Illyricum – the magistrate's *provincia*, and the control of its immediate hinterland. In this period, the encouragement of Italian immigration and the formation of colonies and *municipia* on the eastern Adriatic coast show a change of attitude and the increased strategic need to include Illyricum in the Roman world. The success of Octavian's expedition in 35–33 BC finally enabled the establishment of an administrative, senatorial province of Illyricum, limited to the coastal belt and the immediate hinterland.

A general change of political conduct and an aggressive expansion into continental Europe in the last fifteen years of the first century BC increased the military and political domination of Rome all the way to the Drava and the Danube rivers. The *Bellum Pannonicum* brought about the formation of the imperial province Illyricum in 11 BC, in order to more easily coordinate military operations in the middle Danube region. 'Greater' Illyricum, encompassing the lands from the Adriatic to the Danube, proved difficult to administer as a single province, and after a series of strategic errors that became evident during an indigenous uprising in AD 6–9 (the *Bellum Batonianum*) marked the final failure of later Augustan political engagement

in Illyricum. This resulted in the division of 'Greater' Illyricum into two parts, the future provinces Dalmatia and Pannonia. This phase finishes roughly with the reigns of Claudius and Nero, when the transformation of Pannonia into a permanent imperial frontier province was completed, and Dalmatia was incorporated into the administrative system of the empire to a reasonable degree.

Is it worth examining the political conduct of Rome in Illyricum, or should we consider Illyricum as something separate from, say, the larger 'Balkan' or 'Central European' policy of Rome (as unfortunate as these modern geopolitical constructs might sound)? Modern scholarship is sceptical about any notion of an Illyrian 'policy', and regards it as at best chaotic and inconsistent.[6] In general, there is still an uncomfortable divide in modern scholarship between the centralist, Tacitean narrative of imperial history of the core and the highly localised historical narrative of the provinces at the periphery. Not much changed after Mócsy recognised this problem: 'A daunting gap separates the study of central Roman imperial history from local, often highly developed, archaeological research. This gap may be bridged only by the use of a method which explores every aspect, period by period and in accordance with historical principles.'[7]

Certainly, it is not possible to explore Illyricum in isolation from other regions, especially when taking into account the inadequate sources we have for Illyricum. For this reason Chapter 2 will briefly deal with Roman foreign relations in general, especially the changes that occurred from the late Republic to the early Principate. True, the Romans often based their foreign relations on day-to-day changes in the situation, rather than following some previously determined policy, due to the lack of communication between commanders in the field and the central government. Still, one would be mistaken to argue that Roman foreign relations were a chaotic chain of unconnected events. These changes of political conduct did not exist isolated from the contemporary socio-political disturbances or from the fundamental change in the Roman political system and society that inaugurated the Principate. They were part of the general process of social transformation: the disappearance of the oligarchic Republic and the gradual establishment of an autocratic regime and imperial ideology.

[6] E.g. Wilkes 1969: 27–8, 36.

[7] Mócsy 1974: xix. The situation has improved in more recent times, depending on the region, but there are still areas, such as central Spain, which are largely neglected by all but local scholars, who rarely treat the region as a whole, Curchin 2004: 2–3.

SOURCES AND MODERN SCHOLARSHIP

It is not possible to make a complete presentation of the material or scholarship that deals with late pre-Roman and early Roman Illyricum here, as the quantity and quality of published works increase each decade. Still, the history of Illyricum remains a comparatively neglected area in Anglophone historiography, but things are improving in more recent times, especially after the detailed monograph of M. Šašel Kos on Appian's *Illyrike* and the history of pre-Roman Illyricum published in 2005.

A large corpus of Albanian and former Yugoslav scholarship remains mainly unavailable and is generally unknown to the wider community of scholars, except through the works of Alföldy, Wilkes, Hammond, and more recently Cabanes and Šašel Kos. In vain Syme complained three decades ago that his work in this field failed to attract either praise or censure, or even a bare mention. Illyricum and its ancient inhabitants are today still represented by little more than brief footnotes in general works of ancient history, although a general shift in scholarly interest in the last decades towards provincial narratives forecasts a brighter outlook for Illyricum.[8]

Ancient historians, geographers, philosophers and poets were never really interested in what they saw as a wild, rough and isolated region on the fringes of the Hellenic and Roman world. In fact, from the start, it provided an example of barbarian 'otherness' in Hellenic intellectual thought. Illyricum was contrasted with Hellenic civilisation, as one of the many barbarian negatives of Greece.[9] Romans maintained the same attitude, the sources giving only secondary attention to the conquest of Illyricum when compared with their conquest of Gaul or Germany. Nothing substantially changed throughout imperial times. The words of Cassius Dio still convey to the modern reader the literary topoi of his times mixed with the genuine contempt, horror and desperation felt by the Mediterranean upper class intellectual from his era who was placed in, what he perceived as, the most remote and barbarian parts of the world, by the hands of cruel Fortune:

> The Pannonians dwell in Dalmatia along the very bank of the Ister from Noricum to Moesia and lead the most miserable existence of all mankind. For they are not well off as regards either soil or climate; they cultivate no olives and produce no wine except to a very slight extent and a wretched quality at that, since the winter is very rigorous and occupies the greater part of their year, but drink as well as eat both

[8] Syme 1971b: 24; Wilkes 1992: 4.

[9] Wallace 1998, esp. 213–16. The indigenous population still represented a relevant part of an international community in Hellenistic times; D. Rendić-Miočević 1981.

barley and millet. For all that they are considered the bravest of all men of whom we have knowledge; for they are very high spirited and bloodthirsty, as men who possess nothing that makes an honourable life worth while. This I know not from hearsay or reading only, but I have learned it from actual experience as once their governor, for after my command in Africa and in Dalmatia (the latter position my father also held for a time) I was appointed to what is known as Upper Pannonia, and hence it is with exact knowledge of all conditions among them that I write.[10]

The most significant problem (post)modern scholars face is the necessity for a re-evaluation of the existing evidence, driven by an increased awareness that preserved primary sources must be read in particular ways. The sources were all written by members of the Mediterranean elite, for a specific audience in order to fulfil their expectations and to fit certain literary genres of their period. Thus, we can say that primary sources reflect the views, stereotypes, discourses and morality of their authors and their audience. Historical 'truth' and 'lie' are the categories that imply our contemporary understanding, rather than the original message of these authors, or the understanding of their audience.[11]

The narratives of the indigenous population of Illyricum remain hidden and are only told in the language and system of the cultural values of their conquerors. It seems appropriate to quote Momigliano on this: 'To give a good account of the origins of a war one must know something about geography and about ethnography, one must have lived with the people of the other side.'[12] Primary sources never bothered with these issues too much and modern scholarship used to recognise Roman interactions with Illyricum only through the acts and aims of Rome, told through the Roman value-system and by the Romans, or 'Romans' such as Greek-writing Appian of Alexandria or Cassius Dio. They show the Romans as culturally and morally superior towards the 'barbarians', and thus create discursive intellectual justification for the Roman conquests.[13] Our written sources present Roman foreign relations as a Roman narrative of power. They assume war to be a natural and inevitable social phenomenon, so that any analysis of Roman conduct in Illyricum depends heavily only on knowledge of Roman military operations in the area as presented by the written sources. The sources often deal with appearance but not substance. They commemorate individual wars or campaigns, but do not always

[10] Dio, 49.36.2–4, transl. E. Cary. See P. Salmon 1986 for Roman stereotyping of the peoples of Illyricum.
[11] Cameron 1989; Marincola 1997; Clarke 1999; Shuttleworth Kraus 1999; Potter 1999 etc.
[12] Momigliano 1960: 23. [13] See for example, Webster 1994; Alston 1996; Rutledge 2000.

mention the reasons behind them, their context inside wider Roman politics, their place within the Roman system of social values nor what they understood by the terms 'war', 'peace', or 'justice'.[14]

The lack of indigenous narratives can be in some degree compensated with archaeological evidence. Archaeology can tell us something about the ways in which the inhabitants of Illyricum constructed their social identities within their communities and regions, ways in which they were affected and in which they selectively accepted cultural templates from the Mediterranean and Iron Age Europe. However, archaeology is not the best methodological tool for determining their ethnicity, if we accept that they had ethnicity at all. It is apparent that individuals and communities who lived in antiquity constructed their identities in their interaction with other communities, and across a number of different social contexts that they inhabited and participated in. The search for cognitive singularities of their 'ethnicities' often reflects rather our own scholarly need to impose order on the confusing world of ancient identities. It does not help us to explain how they formed their identities, why they did it and how they expressed and constructed these identities.[15] Also, archaeology does not provide a complete picture as it focuses only on the artefacts which are preserved, while a range of perishable artefacts, such as, for example, textile, leather, or wood, rarely survive.

As said before, primary sources are scarce. The *Illyrike* of Appian is the only surviving specialised work that deals with the history of Illyricum, focusing on Rome's wars with the peoples of Illyricum. It begins with the first Illyrian war in 229 BC and concludes with Octavian's expedition in 35–33 BC.[16] The Illyricum topic was not attractive to classical historians such as Appian as he himself testifies. Appian admitted to having a problem in locating material for his *Illyrike*.[17] He supplied many essential details about early Roman encounters with Illyricum in the third and second century BC, so that he is together with Polybius and Livy a major source for the history of Illyricum. Appian preferred a geographical and 'ethnological' rather than a chronological approach. He has been praised, but also criticised by modern scholars for his limitations, unevenness and omissions, especially for the period between the mid-second century BC and the campaigns of Augustus.[18] Appian was

[14] Momigliano 1960: 13–27. Cf. Harris 1979 esp. 54–104; Finley 1985: 70–87; Campbell 2002: 1–20, Barton 2007; Rosenstein 2007 etc.
[15] Jones 1996; P. S. Wells 1999; Brather 2004.
[16] It has not attracted significant attention from modern scholars. Key works are Dobiáš 1930; Marasco 1993, and the recent monumental work and a new English translation of Šašel Kos 2005a.
[17] App. *Ill.* 6, 14, 29.
[18] Šašel Kos 2005a: 43–51. See also Wilkes 1969: 34 n. 2; Marasco 1993: 485.

not particularly critical in his assessment of Roman Republican foreign affairs, and, as Marasco argued, he describes every Roman interaction with Illyricum as a *bellum iustum*, regardless of the real causes and motives for these wars. Appian was probably influenced by the foreign relations of his age, which dealt with the defence of the empire; it does not appear that he understood the process of Republican expansion.[19] In the section of his book dealing with the campaign of Octavian, he relied exclusively on the now lost memoirs of Augustus who was an eyewitness, but an eyewitness who had personal and political interest in putting a certain 'spin' on his narrative. The first *princeps* was apparently interested in clearing his name from accusations of cruelty and treachery during the Civil Wars. In the passages of the memoirs concerned with his expedition to Illyricum, Augustus describes only his own deeds, and leaves unmentioned the efforts of others.[20]

The other important source is the Roman history of Cassius Dio.[21] His work covers not only the campaigns of Octavian, but the Danubian campaigns of Crassus in 29–28 BC and the *Bellum Batonianum* in AD 6–9, all of which are treated in some detail, while the *Bellum Pannonicum* 12–9 BC is mentioned sporadically only in the context of the general history of the empire. The fragments of Dio that cover the Illyrian wars are preserved in Zonaras. Dio had the advantage of knowing the area, being governor there in the early third century AD.[22] However, he is not always aware that he often applies the terminology of his own age to the first century BC/AD.[23] It is unclear which sources Dio actually used for his account of the reign of Augustus, including the conquest of Illyricum.[24] For Octavian's campaigns (Books 49–50), his account is generally not so far from that of Appian who follows Augustus. However, some details are obviously different from that of Appian, which suggests the possibility that Dio was using some other source(s).[25] His sources for the *Bellum Pannonicum* and Bato's rebellion are impossible to determine as yet, but it appears that he had good sources on the Pannonian revolt, which resulted in a rather full treatment of the

[19] Marasco 1993: 487–9.

[20] App. *Ill.* 15; on Augustus' 'Autobiography': Charlesworth 1934: 868; Yavetz 1984: 1–8; Mellar 1999: 177–9; Šašel Kos 2005a: 393–7.

[21] Millar 1964; Harrington 1970; Ameling 1997; Swan 1997; 2004: 3–38, and Šašel Kos 1986 – Dio's treatment of Illyricum.

[22] *Legatus Augusti* in Dalmatia, 49.36.4; and Pannonia Superior 80.1.3.

[23] Dio, 49.37.6; Šašel Kos 1997a: 191–2: Dio calls Segestica Siscia, while Appian, who is not so well acquainted with the area, keeps the old name, probably following the autobiography of Augustus.

[24] See Millar 1964: 83 f.; Harrington 1970: 16 f.

[25] Reinhold 1988: 17–19, 68; Šašel Kos 1986: 142–4; Gruen 1996: 172. Šašel Kos 1986: 120 suggests Aulus Cremutius Cordus and the remains of Asinius Pollio's history as the sources in question. See Šašel Kos 1997a for a full treatment of the differences between Dio and Appian.

events.[26] Dio rarely goes into details, but he can give a general idea of the order of events, especially in regard to the *Bellum Batonianum*, and of course he is a useful check on other sources. Modern scholars have criticised Dio as too general, annalistic and dry, and often making obvious geographical errors.[27] Dio's view of history influences his historical narrative, as he saw Roman history subordinating and dominating all other histories, and he saw its course as being an integral product of providence and secular forces, both participating in the natural order of things.[28]

Another important source is the eyewitness account of Velleius Paterculus, who was Tiberius' *legatus Augusti* in Illyricum during the *Bellum Batonianum*. In his history he deals with the rebellion only, and he promises to deliver a more detailed account of indigenous peoples in Illyricum later,[29] but that work is unfortunately either lost or, more probably, was never written. Velleius is often the only source for certain events, so that it is necessary to take his account into consideration. Modern historians have questioned the credibility of his work, which is often seriously undermined by his amateurish approach, his lack of critical judgement and a lack of recognition of matters of historical importance.[30] However, Velleius should not be judged by contemporary standards of what is historically important or irrelevant; it is possible to see the positive qualities in Velleius' work, especially his non-Tacitean lack of cynicism and positive enthusiasm for Tiberius' personality and rule.[31] His work shows both adulation and affection for the new political system in the principate, and should be seen as part of the new discourse on political consensus, which characterised the imperial ideology of the early principate.[32]

Important additional sources are Pliny the Elder and the geographer Strabo of Amasia. Pliny preserved a description of the Roman administrative organisation of the Dalmatian province from the late first century BC, or first century AD.[33] He uses at least three different sources for his description of the administrative provincial organisation of Dalmatia. The oldest is the late Republican administrative structure described by Marcus Terentius Varro (the antiquarian), the *formula provinciae* and the inventory of three judiciary *conventus*, possibly compiled after the division of

[26] Millar 1964: 91; Swan 2004: 21–6. [27] Reinhold and Swan 1990: 171–3.
[28] Swan 2004: 8–13.
[29] Vell. Pat. 2.111.4 (legate); 2.106.2–3 (promised work on Pannonians and Dalmatians).
[30] Harrington 1970: 18–21.
[31] Woodman 1977; Craus and Woodman 1997: 82–4; Schmitzer 2000; Gowing 2007.
[32] Lobur 2008: 94–127. [33] Pliny and Illyricum: Domić-Kunić 2003; 2004; Marion 1998.

Illyricum, and finally the list of conquered Illyrian peoples as given in Augustus' memoirs.[34] Besides these, Pliny used the description of the coast from the unidentified *periplus* from the second century BC, speculated to be the very same one used by Strabo.[35]

Strabo of Amasia provides useful geographical information about Illyricum from his own era, the first century BC and AD.[36] Strabo's sources for Dalmatia are much more complex and chronologically more multi-layered than Pliny's. He relies on Greek-language sources from the second century BC, such as Polybius, Posidonius and an unidentified *periplus* dated from at least c. 100 BC, very possibly written by Arthemidorus. It is also possible that he combined a couple of different *periploi* to compose his description of the eastern Adriatic coast. Strabo also relied on much earlier material such as that of Theopompus. In his account it is possible to recognise works of his contemporaries, such as Augustus' memoirs, or sources that might be as recent as the *Bellum Batonianum*.[37] Strabo incorporates the Hellenistic ethnographic tradition and Roman political ideology and perception of space in his account of Illyricum.[38] There is a significant degree of authorial intervention and a selective approach towards the sources Strabo had at his disposal, so that his account on Illyricum frequently reflects more Strabo's interests in the juxtaposition of, what he regards and construes as, civilisation and barbarity rather than accurate scholarly description.[39]

Polybius is the chief source for the first phase of Roman engagement in this region, and what is preserved of his reports on the Illyrian wars and the first Roman war with the Delmatae remains very important evidence. His position as a Greek historian writing about the Romans distinguishes him from the later writers who wrote inside Roman imperial structures. The scholarship on Polybius is voluminous, and focuses on his construction of historical events, shaped by his political ideology, Greek cultural templates used for description of the others (Romans and barbarians), and the role of fortune (tychē) in his narrative.[40]

[34] Pliny, *HN* 3.122–152; Čače 2001; Alföldy 1961: 60–1; 1965a: 36–7, 70–1; Domić-Kunić 2004 for the sources of Pliny. See the critical view of Pliny's terminology in Vittinghoff 1977: 24–30.

[35] Čače 1992/93; 2001 argues that Pliny also used a pre-Augustan and still unidentified *periplus* dated after the end of the Civil War.

[36] Strabo, 7.5. See Marković 1985; Baladié 1989: 113–27; Kozličić 1990: 221–53; Marion 2006; Dzino 2008a for general comments on Strabo, 7.5 and Čače 1994/95; Šašel Kos 2002a for the regional aspects of Strabo's account of Illyricum.

[37] See Baladié 1989: 13–41 for Strabo's sources for his Book 7.

[38] Dzino 2008a.

[39] Dzino 2006b. See the different approach in Marion 2006.

[40] Wallbank 2002; 2007; Champion 2004.

There are also some useful, although sometimes confusing, bits and pieces of evidence in the epitomes of Livy covering the period to 9 BC, as well as Suetonius' *Lives* of Caesar, Augustus and Tiberius. Caesar mentions Illyricum a few times in the *Gallic* and *Civil Wars*, giving a good report on the fighting in the Civil War in Illyricum. There are also works of compilers from the later period, such as Florus, Rufius (?) Fest, Eutropius and Orosius, who mainly draw on the other sources, without adding much new knowledge. Unfortunately, many of the mid- and later Republican period sources for the history of Illyricum are based on epitomes and fragments, and it is necessary to exercise the utmost caution when dealing with them.[41] Some important works are lost. Asinius Pollio's history would be very valuable in providing another view of the civil wars, as he wrote a history focusing on the period between 60 BC and (opinions differ) either the battle of Philippi 43 BC or possibly Actium 31 BC.[42] The history of Posidonius continued where Polybius stopped and it would have provided useful insights into the obscure second century BC. It is possible that Posidonius wrote about the expedition of Metellus Delmaticus in 118 BC.[43] Amongst the lost works that discussed Illyricum should be mentioned Strabo's 'History' as well as Augustus' 'memoirs'.

In addition to written sources, numismatics, epigraphy and the results of archaeological excavations can supply significant further information. To remedy the lack of material throughout most of the period (especially in the Adriatic hinterland), numismatics is not always so informative here as it can be in some other parts of the classical world. The shortage of coins and coin hoards in itself can suggest some conclusions. Numismatics provides some aid to the historian as individual coin finds and the distribution of coin hoards give some helpful hints about Italian and Greek trade and trade routes with Pannonia, and the economic relations between Greek colonies in the Adriatic and Italy and the Adriatic hinterland. Some of the indigenous peoples in the area minted their own coinage, especially the southern Illyrians, the La Tène peoples in the south-eastern Alps, and also the Scordisci at the confluence of the rivers Sava and Danube.[44]

The epigraphic evidence from the Republican period is very slight and gives no real insight into Roman relations with Illyricum, with the rare

[41] Brunt 1980 is a marvellous piece of work, which emphasises all the dangers of using epitomes and historical fragments as sources.

[42] André 1949: 47–51; Badian 1958b: 161–2; L. Morgan 2000: 54 n. 18 – Philippi; Gabba 1956: 242–3, 248–9 and Pelling 1979: 84 n. 73 – Actium. See André 1949: 41–66 on the *History* of Asinius Pollio.

[43] Kidd 1988: 318–20 (F 70).

[44] Kos 1977; 1986; 1997; Popović 1987.

exception of the inscription recording the Tragurian and Issaean embassy to Caesar in 54 BC. The frequency and importance of inscriptions increase only in Augustan times and later. In the Augustan principate some parts of the *Res Gestae* of Augustus, some military inscriptions, and especially the inscriptions from new colonies in the Adriatic, in particular Iader and Salona, are very important pieces of evidence. For the reigns of Augustus' successors, the inscriptions and other finds of archaeology are often the only way for the historian to understand the establishment of military strongholds, a network of military roads and early Roman colonisation of the interior. Prosopography, relating to both indigenous people and Italians and other foreigners who settled in Illyricum, is one of the most significant tools for any study of social history in Illyricum.[45] Important sources of information for provincial administration in Dalmatia are the inscriptions dealing with boundary settlements between different indigenous communities.[46] Part of volume III of the CIL covers the inscriptions from Illyricum, and there are important local collections of inscriptions from the territories of the former Yugoslavia, such as *Inscriptiones Latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMII et MCMLX repertae et editae sunt* (ILJ). Moreover, a large amount of recent work has been done in this field, which improves our basic knowledge of the population and economy of Roman Illyricum.[47]

Archaeology is almost the only tool for research into the different indigenous Iron Age cultural groups. It helps us to understand their geography, human ecology and cultural characteristics before they became part of the Mediterranean world.[48] Important for the present topic will be the archaeological excavations of urban centres on the Dalmatian coast and Roman military camps in Illyricum and their early development, as well as some economic matters such as patterns of trade in the region. Changes in archaeological theory and interpretation, such as the development of post-structuralist archaeology, have not often been applied to the study of ancient Illyricum, but the situation has improved in the last decade or two.[49]

This book will deal with two not so different areas of historiography: Illyrian studies, and the study of Roman foreign and provincial relations in the late Republic and early Principate. Because of the scarcity of written classical sources, Illyrian studies from their humble beginnings have heavily

[45] Alföldy 1965a; 1969. [46] Wilkes 1969: 456–9; 1974.
[47] Wilkes 1977a: 744–60; 1996: n. 1; 2005 (overview of the recent epigraphic evidence); see also Škegro 1997; Kurilić 2006 for recent epigraphic finds.
[48] Benac 1987a and Wilkes 1992 have a good synthesis on this topic. See also Chapter 2.
[49] E.g. Chapman *et al.* 1996; Gaffney *et al.* 1997; Stančić *et al.* 1999; Gaffney and Kirigin 2006 etc.

depended on archaeology. Local antiquarians, Austrian enthusiasts and other western travellers who wandered in these areas, which were constructed and perceived in western imagination as 'the Balkans', in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the first to carry out Illyrian studies. Serious archaeological, historical and philological work only really began after 1945. These studies led to important results, especially regarding the material and spiritual culture of the indigenous population, as well as their language(s), onomastics and identities. Greek and Roman sites were excavated, especially cities and military sites, and important work was done on research of the Roman economy, road building, epigraphy, cults and provincial art as well.[50] The wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s slowed the process, but in spite of that unfortunate period important new work in Dalmatia has been done, enabling more reliable evidence for a more thorough reconstruction of the economy and society of Roman Dalmatia and its regions.[51]

Because modern Roman historiography outside of the former Yugoslavia and Albania has never really considered Illyricum as an important area, there are not many works that go beyond the basic reconstruction of events from the ancient sources. It is difficult, however, to find any area of Roman history which was not treated in the works of Theodore Mommsen, who dedicated some space to Illyricum in his Roman history. Mommsen was in fact the first scholar to understand that the policy of Augustus in the Balkan peninsula, the Danube and Germany had some degree of basic geo-strategic unity.[52] Scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century followed in Mommsen's footsteps trying to reconstruct the order of events and geography of the Roman conquest of Illyricum.[53] R. Syme did important work in determining and assessing the scope and purpose of Octavian/Augustus' conquest of Illyricum. He apparently won a tough debate with scholars who overestimated the scope of Octavian's campaigns during 35–33 BC, and the territorial extent of his conquest.[54] His work was expanded and

[50] Wilkes 1992: 3–13 and Stipčević 1989: 7–14 give excellent overviews of the historical development of Illyrian studies up to the early 1990s. There have been some comprehensive published archaeological projects in the former Yugoslavia, such as Benac 1987a or Čović 1988. For the most recent developments see Wilkes 2005 and Davison *et al.* 2006.

[51] It is worthwhile mentioning the comprehensive *Adriatic islands project* encompassing the period 6,000 BC–AD 600, with three volumes already published: Gaffney *et al.* 1997; Stančić *et al.* 1999; Gaffney and Kirigin 2006, and www.iaa.bham.ac.uk/bufau/research/aip/aip.htm (the outline of the project).

[52] Mommsen 1882: 7–8.

[53] Zippel 1877 is the first significant and still influential narrative on the history of Illyricum and the Roman conquest. Cf. the bibliography of Charlesworth 1934: 903–4, and Syme 1934b: 938–40 for an overview of older literature on Illyricum.

[54] Syme 1933a; Schmitthenner 1958, contra: Swoboda 1932; Vulić 1934; Miltner 1937; Josifović 1956. Cf. Schmitthenner 1958: n. 1 for a full overview of the polemic.

developed by John Wilkes, whose works could be regarded without exaggeration as the essential comprehensive modern study of Dalmatian and Illyrian history and culture, with contributions to the field of Roman army studies and epigraphy in Dalmatia.[55] Geza Alföldy did comprehensive work on the population of Pannonia and Dalmatia, and he had a significant influence upon Wilkes.[56] The comprehensive and robust scholarly contributions of Jaroslav Šašel and most recently Marjeta Šašel Kos should also not be forgotten.[57] The historiography of Pannonia was improved in the mid-twentieth century due primarily to the fundamental works of the Hungarian scholars Alföldi and Mócsy, and more recently Tóth, Fitz and Nagy.[58]

There is also a large corpus of work by former Yugoslav scholars who have painstakingly assembled many pieces of the Pannonian and Dalmatian archaeological and historical puzzle. The most significant, for the issues this book is dealing with, are the works of Papazoglu, D. Rendić-Miočević, Suić, Zaninović, Bojanovski and, in the most recent generations, amongst others, Čače, Bilić-Dujmušić and Olujić, all of whom integrated archaeological developments into the historical interpretation.[59]

There are many specialised studies in this field. Initial Roman interactions with the Illyrian kingdom in the later third and early second centuries BC attracted a number of scholarly works.[60] Roman relations with Illyricum after the third Illyrian war up to Caesar's pro-consulship did not attract much attention until recent times, because of the inadequate sources.[61] Caesar's command in Illyricum and the Civil War fighting in Illyricum have attracted more significant attention from modern scholars (mostly because of Caesar).[62] A significant body of work exists especially on Octavian's expedition in 35–33 BC, mostly written before 1960.[63] The *Bellum Pannonicum* of 13–9 BC was mostly neglected by modern

[55] Wilkes 1969; 1992; see also his other works in the bibliography.
[56] Alföldy 1965a as the most significant work. See also his other works in the bibliography.
[57] Šašel 1992; Šašel Kos 2005a.
[58] Alföldi 1936; Mócsy 1962; 1974; Lengyel and Radan 1980; Hajnoczi 1995.
[59] See collected works in: D. Rendić-Miočević 1989; Suić 1996; Zaninović 1996; Papazoglu 2007. See the comprehensive archaeological bibliography in Čović 1988, and Šašel Kos 2005a.
[60] Holleaux 1928; Badian 1952; Hammond 1968; Petzold 1971; Gabričević 1974; Domić-Kunić 1993, Šašel Kos 2002c, see Chapter 3.
[61] Skefich 1967: 1–41; M. G. Morgan 1971; 1973; 1974; Čače 1991; Bandelli 2004; Šašel Kos 2004; Dzino 2005, see Chapter 4.
[62] Skefich 1967: 42 f.; Culham 1993; Čače 1993; Freber 1993: 121 ff.; Marasco 1997; Šašel Kos 2000; Bilić-Dujmušić 2000; 2006a, see Chapter 5.
[63] Kromayer 1898; Dobiáš 1921; Swoboda 1932; Vulić 1907; 1926: 39–54; 1934; Josifović 1956; Schmitthenner 1958; Mirković 1968; Malevany 1977; Šašel Kos 1997b; Bilić-Dujmušić 2006b, see Chapter 5.

historiography because of incomplete and very inadequate primary sources,[64] but the Pannonian rebellion, *Bellum Batonianum*, in AD 6–9 at least attracted some attention because of its significance in slowing down aggressive Roman expansion in Central Europe. But no significant discussion has been written in recent decades.[65] The Iulio-Claudian period after Augustus is one of the least understood in the history of Illyricum. Archaeology has helped to reconstruct the position of military camps, the settlement of the veterans and the placement of legions in this period, as well as the building of military roads linking the Adriatic coast with the legions on the Danube.[66] Nevertheless, the lack of literary sources really limits the scope of any intensive research into the general and particular elements of Roman engagement in Illyricum in this period. A more comprehensive exploration of the economy, urbanisation and population of Roman Illyricum was not attempted by modern scholars until the 1950s and 1960s.[67] Modern literature dealing with the indigenous peoples of Illyricum is given in the next chapter.

The studies on the Roman conquest of this area and general regional studies of Illyricum in prehistory and antiquity are still in the process of entering into their post-processual phase. The narrative of the Roman conquest of Illyricum is still dominated by a linear picture of the inevitability of the Roman conquest, which was delayed only by the strategic backwardness of the area for the Romans.[68] Roman interactions with the peoples of what would become Illyricum embraced a number of different narratives, not only related to the process of Roman political expansion, but also to the simultaneous and profound social, economic and political transformation in the region that was becoming part of the 'global' Mediterranean world. The interaction can also be seen in the different narratives of the colonisers and the colonised, those who were coming into, and those who already lived in the region. Especially significant is the

[64] Wilkes 1965b; Nagy 1991; Gruen 1996: 174–5; Domić-Kunić 2006, see Chapter 6.

[65] Vulić 1911: 200–47; 1926: 55–72; Rau 1925; Pašalić 1956; Köstermann 1953; Nagy 1970; Dyson 1971: 250–3; Sordi 2004; Dzino 2006c, see Chapter 7.

[66] Mócsy 1974: 40–79 (Pannonia and Upper Moesia); Wilkes 1969: 78–152, 442–80; 1996 (Dalmatia and Danubian provinces); Bojanovski 1974 (the roads in Dalmatia); Jagenteufel 1958; Syme 1959 (the governors of Dalmatia); Dobó 1968 (the governors of Pannonia); Ferjančić 2002 (settlement of the veterans).

[67] Wilkes 1977a; Kurilić 1994/95 (population of Roman Dalmatia and Liburnia); Pašalić 1967; Šašel 1974c; Zaninović 1977; Škegro 1991; 1999; Glicksman 2005 (economy and trade of Roman Dalmatia); Suić 1976b (cities and urbanisation on the eastern Adriatic coast); Pašalić 1954; Dušanić 1977; 2004; Bojanovski 1982; Škegro 1991 (mining in Illyricum and the Danubian provinces); Fitz 1980 (economy of Pannonia); Bojanovski 1988a (archaeology of what is now Bosnia-Herzegovina in Roman times).

[68] Best represented in Wilkes 1969.

traumatic experience felt by the indigenous population caused by this profound change. This affected the way they defined themselves and the way they constructed their group identities. This book deals with only a part of this complex process. It focuses on examination of a more conventional narrative of the events that we today recognise as Roman political engagement in Illyricum, seeing it as a multifaceted narrative of changing priorities, perceptions, political circumstances and interests on all sides of the interaction.

CHAPTER 2

Illyricum in Roman foreign affairs: historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography

ROMAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN OVERVIEW OF MECHANISMS AND TOOLS

The scholarship on Roman foreign relations, especially the process of Roman expansion and its impact on their understanding of the space they were conquering, is voluminous. Recently, emphasis was laid on Roman perceptions and misconceptions of space, their cognitive mapping of the 'grossly distorted universe' in which they lived.[1] It was shown that Roman perception of space was directly related to the way they applied and organised their political and military power. The Romans perceived space in their political geography in two ways: as the space which was defined, measured, organised and administered and on the other hand, space that was dominated only through political power, but not formally administered. However, their political theory was used to unite both perceptions of space so that the *imperium* of the magistrate was applied and understood as either 'power' or 'administration', i.e. as 'empire'.[2] This is further reflected in the ambiguity of the word *provincia*, relating at the same time to the power of the magistrate over non-organised space, and the province as an organised space with definite frontiers, which we are more familiar with.[3]

In fact, it seems that the way Roman power was projected over a certain space influenced their perception of that space. Claval argues that power has a geographical dimension but not a geographic continuum for the Romans – non-administered lands are not imagined as geographical areas

[1] Moynihan 1985; Nicolet 1991: 57–74; Purcell 1990b; Whittaker 2004. See Šašel Kos 2005a: 99–114 for the Roman distorted view of Illyricum.

[2] Richardson 1991; Hermon 1983: 175–81.

[3] Whittaker 1994: 10–30 showing that the Roman mentality distinguished between administered space and unadministered space dominated by power, and included them both in their political practice. Cf. Hermon 1983, pointing to the changing relationship of power and territory in Republican political practice. For the distinction of *provincia* as a zone of command and the province as an organised and administered space, see Ebel 1976: 42–3; Richardson 1986: 1–10, 174–80; Lintott 1993: 22–7.

with natural limits, but as spaces defined by the existence of those who inhabit them and which are not controlled by Roman power. For example, Dacia was not defined as a territorial unit, but as a space inhabited by those the Romans perceived as Dacians.[4] However, the late Republic and especially the Augustan era brought a more spatial understanding of the world in terms of delimited portions of space, and a territorially defined *provincia*. This is directly related to the developing Roman passion for measuring land and its inhabitants, which became a major tool for controlling the space and assessing taxes on provincials more efficiently.[5]

This framework, having been based on a better understanding of the impact of power on Roman perception of space, successfully accommodates the more complex recent notions of Roman foreign relations. They go beyond the limitation imposed by earlier scholarly perceptions of Roman imperialism through the old dichotomy between scholarly discourses on aggressive and defensive imperialism, which understood the expansion in modern economical and/or strategic terms.[6] The reasons for expanding the empire must also be seen through the language of emotions such as feelings of insult or fear, urge for revenge and anger, and the moral-related ethos of the ruling class based on the maintenance of their dignity, honour, fame, and duty of advancing the empire.[7] As MacMullen recently and brilliantly observed, classical scholarship is still strongly influenced by Syme's cool, rational and disengaged approach, which almost scientifically attempts to assess the intentions and actions of his historical subjects, completely disregarding the irrationality of the emotions that were driving their decisions.[8] The expansion of Rome was a heterogeneous process, very much dependent on specific circumstances of particular areas, such as regional politics, geography, history or 'ethnic' considerations, and it occurred through changing historical circumstances, so that the search for a unified

[4] Claval 1978: 109; Mattern 1999: 207–10. See also Riggsby 2006: 24–45 on Caesar's perception of space.

[5] Nicolet 1991: 189 ff.; 1996.

[6] The most significant modern account of 'aggressive expansionism' is given in Harris 1979, while 'defensive expansionism' is represented in the older scholarship of Mommsen, Holleaux and Badian; see the overviews in Linderski 1984; Frézouls 1983; Hermon 1989, and the very interesting recent work of Eckstein, who introduces into the debate the theories of international systems ('the Realism') and recognises the Mediterranean system in the mid-Republic as a 'multipolar anarchy', Eckstein 2008.

[7] Cf. Bellen 1985; Rich 1993 for Roman fear; Mattern 1999: 159–222 for emotions; Barton 2001 for honour and shame; Robinson 2006: 39–43; for honour and insult, public and personal in Roman foreign affairs, Brunt 1978; Harris 1979 for the ethos of the ruling class in the Republican period, and MacMullen 2003: 1–78 for the general importance of human emotions in historical events.

[8] 'Only in rational terms, then, the past must be explained. Any alternative is naive, a surrender to ornament, to aedificatio, "thrills and chills".' MacMullen 2003: 47–50, the quote from 50.

strategy, or even the ideology of Roman imperialism, is nothing but a futile attempt to project modern values onto the past.

Now we have a clearer insight into the way in which the Romans constructed in their literary narratives some areas of the western Mediterranean and what is now western and northern Europe such as Gaul, Cisalpine Gaul, Spain, Britain or Germany according to their political geography, projection of power and pre-conceived ethnographic stereotypes.[9] These constructions began to appear in the period when Roman political practice started to incorporate *imperium* more as a personal power over the space that was administered, and *provincia* as a territorially defined unit.[10] It is just over fifty years since scholars gradually began to notice that the understanding of what Illyricum was for the ancients changed from *Illyris*, which expressed the Greek perception of a non-Greek western neighbourhood, to the entire space stretching between the Danube and the Adriatic sea, the south-eastern Alps and Thrace.[11] However, the construction of that 'expanding Illyricum' phenomenon was never elaborated in more detail by the existing scholarship, except that it was placed into the context of development in the Roman administrative organisation of the area, and seen as a purely geo-administrative term. The point I want to make in this book is that the expansion in the understanding of the space considered as 'Illyricum' in Roman minds corresponds with the expansion and projection of Roman power over this space. The construction of Illyricum was convenient for Roman understanding of the region and maintenance of their interests there. Illyricum never existed as an ecological or geographical region, a unified polity, and indeed there never were any 'Illyrians' inhabiting it. It was the creation of Rome and the consequence of the projection of Roman power over a heterogeneous space.

The mechanisms by which the Romans conducted their foreign affairs during the Republic are well known, yet some important questions still remain unanswered by modern scholarship. Especially unclear remains the attempt to define and explain fully the driving forces that were behind foreign policy, and to assess the ability of the Romans to plan and implement a cohesive approach towards foreign affairs. It would be difficult to

[9] Gaul: Woolf 1998: 242; Riggsby 2006: 28–32, 47–71; Krebs 2006; Spain: Cruz Andreotti *et al.* 2006; Germany: O'Gorman 1993; Lund 1998; Cisalpina: Purcell 1990a; Britain: Stewart 1995: 1–10; Northern Europe: Schadee 2008.

[10] Hermon 1983: 179.

[11] App. *Ill.* 3; Suić 1955: 136–49; 1976c; Alföldy 1965a: 33 ff; Hammond 1966: 241; Wilkes 1969: 5 n. 1, 161; Šašel Kos 2005a: 219–44, etc. Cabanes 1988: 17–20, who considers Illyricum to be a geo-political concept that shrinks through time, is rightly criticised by Papazoglu 1989: 32–4.

maintain the view that the Romans were fully conscious of the consequences of their policy-planning, at least to the extent suggested by Harris,[12] but it was never the case that the Roman Senate put up with chaotic day-to-day mood-swings in their foreign dealings, or that commanders in the field had complete freedom of action. It is also difficult to accept that either the individual pursuit of glory or commercial interests alone could be decisive factors in driving the political considerations of the Senate. There were influential groups in the Senate who for their own interests pursued continuity in Roman political conduct towards particular areas in certain periods, but only as one of the factors determining the conduct. *Populus Romanus* influenced foreign relations to a certain degree and supported expansionism, without seriously challenging the leading role of the Senate in foreign affairs in the middle Republic. Some scholars make a strong point in favour of the important role of local commanders, but that does not diminish the general importance of the Senate.[13] Internal division and civil struggle in Rome intensified after the Gracchi but rarely affected the consensus of the elite in Roman foreign affairs. There was a struggle of factions, but not a struggle of views on foreign affairs.[14] This is how Sherwin-White summarises the essence of Roman foreign decision-making in the second century BC: 'Hence it is legitimate to speak of senatorial policy, not in the sense that there was a uniform body of opinion within the Senate, but that senatorial decrees about foreign policy represent the view of the majority, and transcend the political ambitions of individuals or factions.'[15]

The Republican political system was beginning to collapse in the late second century BC and, regardless of the Sullan reforms, it was doomed to evolve into something different. Great military commands for Pompey and Caesar in the 60s and 50s BC and subsequent decades of civil unrest affected the very nature of the Roman political system. Possibly not the best but certainly the most efficient solution to the crisis was, apparently, the Principate. Politics moved from the Forum to behind the closed doors of the imperial palace. Now, emphasis was placed on individual power-holding, the person of the emperor over collective decision-making, but only to a certain degree in the period that this book deals with.[16]

[12] Harris 1979, criticised for that view in particular by North 1981: 6–8.

[13] Bandelli 1981: 17 ff. (groups in the Senate). Millar 1984c: 3–6; Gabba 1984a (popular assemblies); Richardson 1986: 119–80; Eckstein 1987; Lintott 1993: 44–5, 53–4 (local commanders). Bloemers 1988 and Willems 1989: 37 go further, seeing Roman expansion as peripheral imperialism not controlled by the core and caused entirely by factors in the periphery that gave a dominant role to generals in the field.

[14] Finley 1978: 5; Sherwin-White 1984: 14–15.

[15] Sherwin-White 1984: 2–15, quotation from 14. See also Dyson 1985: 277–8.

[16] Dio, 53.19; Millar 1982. Cf. also Millar 1977 giving important insight into the role of the emperor.

Roman foreign relations were closely connected with the Roman understanding of boundaries and territorial regions. In general in the Republican era the borders were undefined. While borders in the eastern Mediterranean followed the old borders of conquered kingdoms and states, in the West they tended to be in a fluid state, especially the regions bordering 'barbarian' peoples. Different treaties with Rome bound different peoples and it was impossible to draw a line between the domain of the *Res publica* and the 'barbarians' who did not originate in the classical world. The expansion of Roman direct control very often depended on gradual extension of military and political power, but not necessarily direct occupation of troublesome neighbouring peoples who were, to varying degrees, culturally and economically incorporated into the Mediterranean world, even before the actual Roman conquest.[17]

After the end of the Republic the treatment of the imperial frontiers changed radically, although the change of attitude began earlier, and possibly it was an inevitable and unavoidable process. In Republican times the Roman border was defined vaguely through the power of the Roman sword, while the empire saw the development of more precisely defined *limes* separating the empire from the outside world, but also linking it with the outer world.[18] It was foreign to Roman political thinking of the third and second century BC to distinguish a *provincia* as a strictly defined administrative area separate from a *provincia* as a military zone of operations. In that context the nature of the Republican *provincia* changed from being a military command limited to some territory or some enemy, to an organised provincial administration of the Principate, especially after Augustus.[19] The Augustan principate also carried out a massive programme of expanding Roman political influence especially in Central Europe, affecting in every way the ambiguous constitutional position in which Illyricum stood in the late Republic.

The instruments Rome used in its foreign relations are always simple to see and recognise. If we oversimplify them, we can talk in terms of sticks and carrots. The brute force of the Roman legions, the opening of doors for political integration into the *Res publica* and the desire of certain social groups for wider social integration into an increasingly globalised society of

[17] Haselgrove 1984: 17–48; Millett 1990 (Britain); Nash 1978 (Central Gaul); Haselgrove 1987 (Central and Belgic Gaul).

[18] Cic. *Pis*. 16, 38 as contrasted with *RG* 30.1, or Tac. *Agric*. 41.2. However, modern scholarship must be aware of the significant degree of fluidity which frontiers had. See Whittaker 2004.

[19] Ebel 1976: 42–3; Richardson 1986: 1–10, 174–80; 1994; Lintott 1993: 22–7; Kallet-Marx 1995. Augustan principate: Syme 1934a: 123.

the ancient Mediterranean world were powerful instruments. We can divide the instruments of Roman political conduct into two equally important groups: the instruments of integration and the instruments of power.[20] The instruments of power, and most importantly the Roman army, neutralised opponents and ultimately acquired new territories for the state and secured them. Peace could be achieved only through victorious war, after which the Romans demanded a complete and absolute surrender – *deditio in fidem*, which gave no rights to the defeated – *dedicitii*.[21] Luttwak famously distinguished between 'force' and 'power', defining them as a force and the threat of force, the dynamic and the passive aspect, and mutually opposite. Roman prestige in foreign relations depended on their military superiority, whether it was only perceived through awe and terror of what the Roman legions could do, or acknowledged after the damage Roman legions did.[22]

A strong and efficient army was an important pillar of the Republic and an even more important political instrument. It started as a citizen militia but in time was transformed into the most formidable military machine of antiquity in the Mediterranean.[23] However in Illyricum, as we will see, it appears that there was some limited strategic planning on a regional level in certain periods. The conquest of Illyricum was not possible before the Augustan period, which witnessed the rise of the 'new purpose army', as Syme called it, and its capability for complex military operations in continental Europe.[24] Unfortunately, not much is known about indigenous armies; guerrilla warfare and primitive military strategy are too often and too easily assumed, especially in the context of the *Bellum Batonianum*, thus projecting the discourse on former Yugoslav partisan guerrilla warfare from the Second World War into antiquity.[25] The description of, say, Delmatian, Pannonian or Iapodean tactics suggests that they were capable of fighting Romans in open battle, conducting offensive actions, capturing Roman siege engines and also offering a very stubborn defence and employing strong detachments of cavalry – hopefully archaeological evidence in the future might be able to shed more light on this problem.[26]

[20] *Debellare superbos*, *parcere subiectis* and win over the ambitious with Roman citizenship; Wallbank 1972: 163.
[21] Barton 2007: 249–50; Rosenstein 2007: 227–8.
[22] Luttwak 1976: 195–200; cf. Mattern 1999: 210.
[23] Amongst many others: Brunt 1987; Keppie 1984b; Goldsworthy 1996; Erdcamp 2007: 63–180.
[24] Cf. Syme 1933c; Wilkes 1965a; Gilliver 2007.
[25] Köstermann 1953: 353 ff.; Pašalić 1956; Bojanovski 1988a: 50–2, etc.
[26] Frontin. *Str*. 2.1.15 (the Pannonii fighting in open battle); App. *Ill*. 26–7 (the Delmatae); App. *Ill*. 19 (the Iapodes capturing siege machines); Vell. Pat. 2.110.3 (Pannonian cavalry).

Diplomacy was an important and complex instrument of Roman foreign affairs, especially in Republican times, and it was a necessary supplement to both the elements of force and of integration.[27] The diplomatic manoeuvres of the Romans are difficult to discern in Illyricum. Except for the Greek-speaking communities in the Adriatic islands whose diplomatic activities are reasonably well attested,[28] we do not have evidence for diplomatic conduct with the indigenous polities, except for the Illyrian kingdom. As we will see, some of them certainly were sent on embassies to Rome, or to the magistrate in charge, such as the Daorsi in 156 BC or the Liburnian communities in 50 BC. The Ardiaei were more sophisticated in diplomatic matters, trying to postpone or even prevent Roman intervention in 135 BC. The Delmatae developed their skills after the diplomatic 'blunder' of 156 BC when they refused to accept the Roman envoys and even took their horses, so that when they sued for peace from Caesar in 44 BC, they employed a much more diplomatic tone.

Roman political conduct was also to a large extent executed through political friends and allies of the Romans: independent communities (free cities or peoples) and so-called 'client-kings' took care of local security and upheld Roman regional interests and were incorporated into the Roman state. Parts of the Illyrian kingdom and Greek-speaking polities in the south-east Adriatic were included in this complex net of relationships with Rome, concluding different kinds of treaties with Rome in the period of initial Roman trans-Adriatic expansion 229–168 BC.[29] The nature of their relationship with each other is still not completely clear. One school of thought accepts that the client-patron relationship, developed in early Roman history as a relation between individuals, was in some aspects carried over into the conduct of Roman foreign affairs in Republican times. According to this view, Rome regarded her friends – *amici*, and allies – *socii*, essentially as clients of the state. The client-patron relationship between senatorial families and the provincial elites was considered to be an essential part of this system.[30] However, this view has been recently challenged as being essentially a metaphor, on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Instead it is suggested that the Roman state did not regard foreign states, and especially kings, as *clientela* in any formal or systematic

[27] Gruen 1984: 13–95 gives a comprehensive overview of Republican instruments of diplomacy.
[28] Polyb. 2.11.5–12; 2.12.2–3; CIG 2.1837b; Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 602, 607–8; Sherk 1969: 139–42 (no. 24).
[29] Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 602–10 (App. 5) no. 1, 16.
[30] Badian 1958a; Rich 1989; Lica 2000: 25–37. See Luttwak 1976: 20–40 for the role of client-states in the late Republican and Iulio-Claudian imperial security system.

way.[31] After c. 150 BC there is no sign of an equal relationship with the majority of foreign states in the Mediterranean world and Rome was established as the only relevant political power. As a result of this transformation, Roman law dealing with foreigners and its relationships with *externae gentes*, such as the indigenous inhabitants of Illyricum, changed and became simplified. In essence almost all previous allies and friends of Rome became subordinate to the will of the Republic, retaining only nominal independence. Whether allies and friends became clients or not is questionable, but no doubt a large number of them were placed in a *de facto* subordinate position.[32]

The instruments of integration are much more heterogeneous. They enabled Rome to keep areas under control without committing occupation garrisons to the area, and helped newly conquered territories to become integral parts of the empire; they then became catalysts for the integration of the neighbouring peoples going further from the Mediterranean core.[33] It is true that the instruments of integration worked slowly and sometimes were deliberately slowed down if, as occasionally happened, they diminished the economic gains of Rome and Italy.[34] In the long run, however, they inevitably produced results, enabling indigenous inhabitants to 'become Roman'. Instead of earlier identities from pre-Roman times, the provincial population formed different identities that existed on an ecological and especially regional basis. They negotiated their social and even individual identities inside a basic provincial identity, thus constructing numerous regional senses of 'Romanness', the 'discrepant identities' which strengthened the cohesion of the empire.[35]

The granting of Roman citizenship and the municipalisation of the provincial communities were essential for the successful integration of other communities into the imperial system. It might have been a deliberate policy in some periods or even the result of a whole cultural revolution happening throughout the empire in Augustan times; either way it certainly

[31] Sherwin-White 1973: 187–8; Lintott 1981: 61–3; 1993: 32–40; Braund 1984: 23–4, 29–30 n. 1; Burton 2003.

[32] Badian 1958a: 113–14; Sherwin-White 1973: 182–9; Lica 2000: 25–34. Also Timpe 1972 for legal forms of Roman foreign policy in Caesar's time.

[33] Haselgrove 1984: 16–17; 1987 presenting Gaul as an example of how peripheries were transformed into secondary centres, creating in turn new peripheries.

[34] E.g. Alföldy 1965b describing the provincial policy of Tiberius as deliberately obstructive towards the expansion of Roman citizenship in the provinces for the purpose of economically benefiting Italy. Or Carandini 1989, who argues that expansion of the empire in the long run destroyed the wine industry in Italy.

[35] Miles 1990: 638–45, cf. Brunt 1974a; Mattingly 1997; 2004; Woolf 1998; Keay and Terrenati 2001; Hingley 2005 etc.

needed to be accepted by the indigenous population, and especially their elites, in order to function properly.[36] In the period under discussion, enfranchisement and colonisation concentrated mainly on the coastal areas of Illyricum, which were for much longer exposed to the cultural influences of the Graeco-Roman world and thus more ready to be integrated into the global Mediterranean political and cultural system. The colonisation of the interior, especially the plains of Pannonia, started in the last phase of the Roman conquest of Illyricum, during the reign of Augustus' successors, but we do not know from the evidence of any more significant enfranchisement of the indigenous population in the interior before Flavian times, apart from the members of the elite.

ILLYRICUM IN THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN GEO-POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

The geographical position of Illyricum lay conspicuously between two major parts of the Mediterranean: the 'Hellenistic' East and the 'barbaric' West. Long ago Badian recognised and defined the two different faces of the Republican approach to foreign affairs, which arose from this, somewhat simplistic, geographical division.[37] The 'eastern' approach towards the Hellenistic world and North Africa appears to be based on some general principles. It was hegemonic, indirect rule, based on informal treaties with allies, vulnerable to the constant threat of Roman military action, yet without a permanent garrison of Roman occupation troops. Direct annexation was deliberately avoided as much as possible.[38]

On the other hand, it is not really possible to speak of unified common principles in the 'western policy' of the later Republic. The approach towards regions such as Spain, Gaul, North Italy and bordering areas was much more heterogeneous than the high-level diplomacy used in the East. Sometimes the Republic was willing to impose direct rule in the West through brutal and thorough elimination of resistance. On other occasions it left large pacified areas untouched and ruled through allies and friends (*socii et amici*), even when these areas were strategically crucial, like Transalpine Gaul, so it is not possible any more to see annexation as the

[36] Millett 1990 sees 'Romanisation' happening without deliberate Roman action, opposed by Hanson 1997 who sees 'Romanisation' as a deliberate policy in Roman Britain. See also Zanker 1988; Wallace-Hadrill 1989; Nicolet 1991; Woolf 1995; 1998: 60–76, 240–9 (cultural revolution).

[37] Badian 1952 esp. 139–40; 1968: 4–5; Richardson 1986: 179–80.

[38] Cf. Lintott 1981: 61–3; Sherwin-White 1984: 58–70 for Roman eastern allies and friends. Badian 1958a: 15–140, esp. 45–7 on south-eastern Illyricum.

dominant method of Republican imperialism, in either the West or the East.[39] At first sight it is too easy to recognise that the policy was primarily shaped by imperialism and individual triumph-hunting by the elite members.[40] Yet, closer and more thorough investigation reveals a general stability in the Republican West, no migratory pressure from outside after the settlement of those La Tène peoples, called 'Gauls' by the Romans, on the fringes of North Italy, certainly excluding the Cimbri and Teutones episode, and no pressure for colonisation from within Italy. Therefore there were no pressing reasons for Romans to extend their influence much outside the familiar Mediterranean zone.[41] Basically, Romans did not care too much about the *externae gentes* if they were not a threat to their interests. As Dyson noted: 'Most changes in the western frontiers were either a Roman response to alterations in inherited arrangements or the logical extension of an initially modest commitment.'[42]

Roman political considerations treated the Illyrian kingdom and Macedonia as essentially one large geo-political unit. The first time a Roman magistrate was entrusted with a separate *provincia* Illyricum was when the Illyrian kingdom was destroyed in the third Illyrian war. Roman magistrates who operated against Illyrian kings had Macedonia as their *provincia*. The settlement in 167 BC was applied to Macedonia and a year later Illyricum in a more or less similar way, taking into account differences between the two kingdoms.[43] They were both declared free and forced to divide into several semi-independent polities. However, because of its political instability, Macedonia became a permanent base for Roman legions in 151 BC and a province in 148 BC, and thus differed from Illyricum where no permanent garrisons have been detected. The Roman declaration of freedom in the Greek world can be seen as a political device, which in fact just regulated the status of the *populi deditii*.[44] Conflicts on the northern borders of Macedonia with the Scordisci, Thracians and Dardani required a permanent Roman military presence. Some modern scholars regard the Roman presence in Macedonia in this period as being limited to defence and not extending to the full administration of the province.[45] They argue that pressure from the northern borders made Roman political conduct in Macedonia

[39] Ebel 1976: 41–95; Dyson 1985 summarised 270–81; Richardson 1986: 178–80.
[40] Badian 1968; Harris 1979: 131–62.
[41] Šašel 1976: 74–6; Dyson 1985: 270 ff.; Twyman 1992. [42] Dyson 1985: 270.
[43] Livy, 44.21.4 (the *imperium* of praetor L. Anicius for Illyricum); Kuntić-Makvić 1992: 6–9.
[44] Sherwin-White 1973: 175–81.
[45] Papazoglu 1979: 308–25; Gruen 1984: 433–6; Kallet-Marx 1995: 11–41; Syme 1999: 151–63.

different from their eastern political conduct elsewhere. The reason for this was that the strategic link between Italy and Asia Minor through Greece was too important for the Romans to leave under possible threat without a good defence. The breakthrough which was achieved by several able governors in the 70s BC opened the doors to Roman later aggressive advance towards the Danube.[46]

An unexpected prize from the Punic wars, Spain was gradually and slowly incorporated into the empire through a series of wars in the mid-second century BC by the Republican armies in two distinct phases. The first phase finished with the Gracchan settlement in 178 BC and was aggressive in its nature and appearance. The second phase, beginning in the 150s, fits more into the defensive pattern of Roman imperialism. The sources represent the Roman presence in Spain as challenged by the indigenous population. Still, Spain was not fully conquered before Augustus, partly because of the unrest caused by Roman internal civil strife in the 80s–70s and 40s. Sometimes painfully, but overall very patiently, the Romans built up their position there, slowly pushing the boundary of their control towards the Atlantic coast. Spain was, as Richardson pointed out, an example of 'peripheral imperialism' where the personal initiative and freedom in decision-making of individual Roman commanders in the field played a very important role.[47]

The area that would become Gaul was treated differently from Spain in many ways. Strategically important as a land link with Spain, it was controlled through the Greek colony of Massilia. The Senate did not try to impose direct rule there, and even when it was necessary to create the province of Transalpine Gaul in the 120s, there was no attempt to impose rule away from the coast or to extend direct control deeper into continental Gaul until Caesar's pro-consulship in 59–50 BC. Romans intervened mainly in response to requests from Massilia and they used Massilian supremacy to maintain their influence until the Civil Wars, when Massilians in 49 BC opted for the losing side – Pompey. However, Massilia was not able to satisfy Roman expectations alone, so in order to maintain the security of this strategic coastal strip, the Senate arranged more elaborate diplomatic links with indigenous leaders in the hinterland and accepted some *civitates* such as the Aedui or Arverni into an alliance.[48]

[46] Patsch 1932: 34–42; Syme 1999: 151 ff.; Lica 2000: 40–2.
[47] Dyson 1985: 174 ff.; Richardson 1986: 177–8.
[48] Calderini 1972: 1–28; Ebel 1976 esp. 26–40; Stevens 1980; Dyson 1985: 126–73; Hodge 1998: 128–9, 94–127.

North Italy was, by its geographic position, strategically the weakest and most exposed portion of the Italian homeland. The early second century brought an expansion of Roman and Italian colonies into North Italy, and culminated in the foundation of Aquileia and the political neutralisation of its neighbours, particularly the Histrian kingdom, and later the Carni and Taurisci. Aquileia served as a regional centre of Roman influence, military, economic and political. Initially, it had a defensive role, which acted to prevent potential threats from the North, as well as to take control over a potentially dangerous strengthening of 'foreign' influences amongst the Gallic peoples settled in the neighbourhood.[49] On the other hand, the position of Aquileia at first was too weak and needed to deal with neighbouring peoples to create security arrangements on a wider scale, and to intervene when it was necessary, as happened in Histria in the 181–177 BC campaigns. Throughout the whole second century, the Romans exercised their rule there with the help of client peoples and allied kingdoms such as Noricum. Short military involvements, almost police actions, strengthened their influence in the Alpine regions.[50] An important trade route with Pannonia stretched from Aquileia, Tergeste (Trieste) and the Ocra pass (Razdrto below Mt. Nanos) where significant Roman trade posts, such as Nauportus, (Dolge Njive in Vrhnika) in Slovenia, were positioned in the late Republic and the early empire.[51] The conflicts with the Cimbri and Teutones in the late second century BC showed the vulnerability of Italy from the north. Regardless of internal purposes, the formation of the province of Cisalpine Gaul in the late second–early first century BC, after the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones, signified a permanent Roman commitment to keep this area under tight control, thus preventing all possible threats from the north, or at least minimising them.[52]

The end of the Republic brought changes to Roman conduct of foreign and provincial affairs. A monetary crisis and increased pressure on the treasury resulting from the civil struggle in the 80s, as well as the loss of

[49] Calderini 1972: 11–12; Šašel 1976: 73–6; and Twyman 1992, seeing the fear of Gallic invasion as an important influence on Roman policy-making. See Williams 2001: 100–84 for fear of the Gauls in Roman thought.

[50] Toynbee 1965: 252–85; E. T. Salmon 1969: 106–8; Dyson 1985: 73–4; Eckstein 1987: 24–70; Šašel 1987; Harris 1989: 107–18; Šašel Kos 1997b. See also Chapter 4. *Regnum Noricum* was an important partner in trade with North Italy and many senatorial and equestrian families had investments there; Kolosovskaya 1974; Piccottini 1977: 289–95; Winkler 1977: 193–5.

[51] Nauportus: Strabo, 4.6.10; 7.5.2; Pliny, *HN* 3.128; Šašel 1966; Šašel Kos 1990; Horvat 1990; Mušič and Horvat 2007. There were other trade settlements in the region dating from the late Republic to the early empire. See Mušič and Horvat 2007: 266–7 with literature.

[52] See Šašel Kos 2000: 281 nn. 16–20 for modern opinions expressed on the date of the formation of Cisalpine Gaul.

Map 1. The map of ancient Illyricum.

tribute from the East during the Mithridatic war, forced the Roman government to adopt another approach to the provinces. The *Regnum Sullanum*, or shortly afterwards, is widely recognised as a key moment, triggering a change towards the establishment of direct rule in both parts of the Roman world and a more efficient exploitation of provincial resources.[53]

THE GEOGRAPHY AND ETHNOGRAPHY OF PRE-ROMAN ILLYRICUM

Physical geography shaped Illyricum into three distinguishable eco-geographical zones: the Dalmatian coast with its islands and immediate hinterland, the mountain belt of the Dinaric Alps and the Pannonian plains.[54]

A narrow Adriatic coastal belt together with the Italian coast represents a distinctive geographical unit; in fact it is difficult to argue with Braudel's understanding that the Adriatic was one of the most coherent maritime regions in the Mediterranean.[55] Because of its privileged position, this zone remained strongly linked with the rest of the Mediterranean world, and archaeology reveals the strong impact of Mediterranean 'globalisation' even before Greek colonisation in the central Adriatic in the fourth century BC. The Adriatic islands have a significant quantity of arable land, and some were chosen for Greek colonisation, such as Issa (Vis), Pharus (Hvar) and Corcyra Nigra (Korčula). The North Adriatic islands in Quarnerno (Kvarner) gulf also provided an opportunity for agriculture and were inhabited in ancient times; these include Crexa (Cres), Curicum (Krk), Arba (Rab), etc. The coast is mostly separated from the hinterland by mountains, and there are only a few plains in the immediate hinterland; for example the plains between Zadar and Split, or the alluvial plains in the lower stream of the Neretva. There are only a few passes which enable communication with the hinterland, such as the pass through the Velebit Mountain near Senia (Senj), Ravni Kotari behind Iader (Zadar), the pass of Klis behind Salona (Solin near Split) and the valleys of the rivers Naron (Neretva) and Drilo (Drin). The mild Mediterranean climate offered the possibility for growing grapes and olives, and the coast and islands had

[53] Kallet-Marx 1995: 335–42. Badian 1968: 33 ff. puts this change after Sulla; see also Cobban 1935: 56–7. Cf. Hopkins 1980: 111–12, fig. 2, on the fiscal crisis and Richardson 1994: 593–8 for a change in the Roman perception of *provincia* in this period.

[54] Detailed topographical depictions in: Wilkes 1969: xxi–xxvii; 1992: 38–40; Šašel 1974c. Also the reader is referred to the Barrington atlas, Talbert 2000: maps 20, 21, 49.

[55] Braudel 1966: 113–22, also Brusić 1970; Škegro 1999: 211–23.

numerous positions for harbours, therefore it is not surprising that the coast was the most appreciated area of Illyricum in ancient literature.[56]

In the hinterland began the intermediary zone of the Dinaric Alps, which stretched in a north-west–south-east direction, parallel with the coast. They were a powerful physical obstacle, especially in antiquity, standing between the Mediterranean and the continent, but remaining very open and receptive to the influences radiating from the coastal belt.[57] There are only a few passes, usually the valleys of the rivers such as the Neretva, Bosna, Drina, Una or Vrbas, which offered the possibility for communication between the coast and the Pannonian plains, and were used for Roman roads. The southern part (Lika – Gorski Kotar – Herzegovina – Montenegro regions) is dominated by the *karst* – the mountainous landscape made of porous limestone, characterised by the lack of surface water and vegetation, interrupted only by *poljes* (sing. *polje*), occasional depressions between the mountains with fertile soil. The mountainous northern part, however (Krajina, Bosnia), is covered with thick forests and abundant vegetation. There was no significant indigenous urbanisation, the region did not offer much opportunity for agriculture, but there were significant deposits of metal ores in this area, which the Romans would be able to exploit once their control of the region was more stable, as discussed in Chapter 8.

Finally, there are the Pannonian plains. They open towards continental Europe but are also linked with Italy via the Ocra pass, and with the Black Sea through the valleys of the Drava, Sava and Danube, as well as the south-eastern Balkan Peninsula and Greece through the valley of Morava. Despite occasional swamplands and forested regions, the region offered significant potential for agriculture, but little natural defence from any potential invader from the north. There was no significant indigenous urbanisation, although Pannonia was affected by the phenomenon of *oppida*, and proto-urban settlements in Pannonia, such as Segestica, pre-dated Roman conquest.[58] Cold, snowy winters in the Dinaric Alps and Pannonia made them both very unpopular for the ancient reader, as we can see in the descriptions of the authors such as Dio or Strabo.[59]

It is therefore not a new conclusion that geography in many ways dictated economic development, – and a degree of cultural development in the

[56] Cf. Strabo, 7.5.10.

[57] Braudel 1966: 22–47. Horden and Purcell 2000: 80–2, cf. Macneil 1992 who opposed Braudel and saw these mountains as more connected and closely related to their surrounding regions. These two opposing views do not necessarily exclude each other.

[58] For *oppida* see Collis 1984; Maier 1999; Woolf 1993b.

[59] Dio, 49.26.2–3; Strabo 7.5.10; Prop. 1.8.2.

indigenous population before their political and economic inclusion in the Mediterranean world, – and even influenced the development of their regional identities.[60]

Whom did the Romans encounter in this region? Economic and political power in the eastern Adriatic before the Roman arrival lay with the Hellenistic foundations on the Adriatic islands, such as Issa or Pharus. In fact, the cultural influence and economic power of Apollonia and Dyrrachium (Durrës)[61] lasted much longer and had much more impact on Illyricum than Issa, but in the period under discussion, the political power of these cities was insignificant for Roman Illyrian affairs. Depicting all these cities as 'Greek' does not describe accurately their population, as onomastic evidence shows a strong indigenous presence in the population, and we can assume that a strong acculturation process occurred there as elsewhere within Greek colonies in the western Mediterranean.[62]

The Issaean commonwealth was the most significant of them all, and it became a reliable Roman ally in the third century BC, asking for protection against Ardiaean political pretensions in the central Adriatic and in turn supporting Roman interests and supplying ships for Roman wars in the East.[63] It was regarded as a political friend (*amicus*), but it still remains unclear if it ever concluded any formal treaty (*foedus*) with Rome.[64] These Greek-speaking settlements generally supported Roman expansion over the Adriatic because their trade had an interest in the destruction of Ardiaean sea-power and the Illyrian kingdom, which also threatened Issaean hegemony in the central Adriatic and even its political independence.[65] There are many similarities between the commonwealth (συμπολιτεία) of Issa and that of Massilia in Gaul, including their ultimate destiny.[66] Both cities were faithful Roman allies for whose protection Rome occasionally intervened. Both were left with some independence in charge of a narrow coastal strip with a hostile hinterland, and both opted for the losing side in the Civil War

[60] See Claval 1998: 138–60 for regional consciousness and identity.

[61] The Romans changed the name of Epidamnos to Dyrrachium, as the original name was considered to bear ill-omen, Dio, 41.49.2–3; Pomponius Mella, 2.56; Appian, *B Civ.* 2.39; Šašel Kos 2005a: 540–6.

[62] Cf. D. Rendić-Miočević 1950/51b: 28–57; Woodhead 1970: 509–11; Kirigin 1990: 299, 305–10; 1996: 67–70; Cabanes 2002: 59–62. For a recent re-assessment of the Greek identities in the western Mediterranean, see Lomas 2004, and for the Greeks in the Adriatic, Bracessi 1979 and the more recent collection of papers in Cambi *et al.* 2002.

[63] For modern scholarship on Issa, see the comprehensive bibliography in Kirigin 1996. Cf. Suić 1966: 182–4; 1995: 274–7 and Kirigin 1996: 85–92 on the political system of the Issaean commonwealth.

[64] Gruen 1984: 17; Wallbank 1979: 528.

[65] Wilkes 1969: 13–26; Kirigin 1990.

[66] Cf. the comparisons made by Suić 1995: 292–3.

and so lost their hegemony and independence.[67] Massilia, however, was a much stronger and more influential political power than Issa ever was. It has been suggested that written sources, Polybius in particular, in a real historical 'conspiracy' hide all traces of a negative side in Roman-Greek Adriatic relations, overemphasising the Roman role as a Greek protector. While a degree of Roman-friendly discourse might be present in the sources, it should be remembered that Issa in 49 BC did not rebel against Rome but actually opted for one side in the Civil War, and there is no evidence for other political disagreement between Greek-speaking communities on the Adriatic coast and Rome.[68]

The Issaeans never seriously infiltrated the hinterland, which was inhabited by various indigenous communities. Issa was founded primarily as a trade settlement and a political outpost of Syracuse, but when the need for stronger agricultural production arose, it expanded on the mainland and founded its colonies of Epetium (Gr. Epetion, Stobreč)[69] and Tragurium (Gr. Tragurion, Trogir) in the mid-third century BC, or even earlier. Thus they were coming into conflict with the Delmatian alliance, which was expanding towards the coast. The strategic and political insecurity of these colonies is confirmed by traces of the strong walls built around Epetium.[70] However, the largest and the most significant city in Illyricum became a small port-of-trade, the emporium of Salona, founded between Epetium and Tragurium as a trading post for Issaean exchange with the indigenous population.[71] Some indigenous coastal communities, known from Hellenistic times under the names of the Hyllaei, Nesti and Manii, were either part of it or joined with Issa in an alliance against the common enemy from the hinterland – the Delmatian alliance. They became part of the Delmatian alliance at times of civil war after the Issaean commonwealth was dissolved.[72] Pharus was the other significant

[67] See Suić 1959: 149–50; 1996: 275–6 n. 22, focusing only on local factors, such as Italian settlement.

[68] Kuntić-Makvić 2002: 147–50.

[69] Maršić 1996/97 questioned whether Epetium was a Greek colony, or in fact an indigenous settlement. It is interesting to note that Polybius, the earliest source that mentions Epetium and Tragurium, calls them 'cities in league with Issa' (32.9.1–2), and Strabo (7.5.5) notes only Tragurium as a settlement of Issa.

[70] Gabričević 1973: 166–7. Zaninović 1976a: 304 puts their foundations much later, in the first half of the second century BC. For dating the foundation of Epetium and Tragurium, cf. the overview of influential opinions in Faber 1983, and more recently Kovačić 2002 on Tragurium.

[71] Whether Salona was an Issaean sub-settlement or, more certainly, an attachment to the existing indigenous settlement, as argued by influential authorities (Novak 1949; D. Rendić-Miočević 1988: 9; Zaninović 2003a: 145; Šašel Kos 2005a: 307–9), remains open to debate.

[72] They are often assumed to be part of the Delmatae after Strabo, 7.5.5: 'Delmatian coast' (Δαλματέων παραλία). Culturally close to the Delmatae, they were not a part of the Delmatian alliance; Čače 1992: 36–9; 1997/98: 80–1; 2001: 99–100. Suić 1955: 136–49 argued that these communities were not considered Delmatian as late as the beginning of the first century BC.

Hellenistic settlement. It has been speculated that Pharus was economically based much more on agriculture than on trade, but evidence for agricultural production is sparse.[73] It regained autonomy from Rome after the Illyrian wars, and remained an important ally and logistics base for Roman military interventions in this area until the end of the Republic.[74]

What was to become Illyricum was under the strong influence of the expansion of La Tène cultural templates from Central Europe, and the most significant exponents were political alliances known as the Taurisci and Scordisci. The Taurisci inhabited a strategically important area in the eastern Alps, and controlled the trade route from north-east Italy to Pannonia via their settlement and the *portorium* Nauportus. At the same time they threatened the security of North Italy, and made frequent raids in that direction. The Taurisci did not establish a monarchy like their neighbours in Noricum. Scholars agree that it was an alliance of several communities, referred to by our sources under the common name of 'Taurisci'.[75] They were economically advanced, controlled important mining resources such as iron and gold[76] and minted their own currency in the first century BC, the so-called East Norican coinage, which was locally used.[77] They represented the most significant political force in the eastern Alpine area. North of the Taurisci, the inhabitants of the Transdanubian plains were also strongly influenced by La Tène. The most important were the Boii, whose power was crushed by the Dacian king Burebista in the 60s BC, or some time later.[78]

The Scordisci[79] inhabited an area around the mouth of the rivers Sava and Danube, but their power stretched much further south, as they were able to threaten seriously the security of Macedonia and Greece many times. They appear in the sources only after the La Tène movements in the third century had finished, taking regional hegemony from the earlier political alliance known as the Autariatae in the sources; the sources divide them into

[73] Gabričević 1973: 166–7. See also Kirigin 2003: 127–39. See also a comprehensive study of Pharus in Kirigin 2003.

[74] Zaninović 1988a: 38–40.

[75] Named after the leading people of the alliance; Fluss 1934; Petru 1968; Božič 1987; 1999; Guštin 1996; Šašel Kos 1998; Graßl 2000. Nauportus as initially the Tauriscan *portorium* (Ταυρίσκων κατοικίαν) Strabo, 7.5.2; Šašel 1966.

[76] The gold mines of the Taurisci are mentioned by Polybius in Strabo, 4.6.12 (Polyb. 34.3.10–14), but archaeology does not confirm his statement; Božič 1987: 889. Šašel Kos 1998: 216–9 assumes that gold deposits were discovered in the river Drava.

[77] Kos 1986: 23–4; see also Kos and Šemrov 2003.

[78] For the population of pre-Roman northern Pannonia, see Mócsy 1962: 527 ff.; 1974: 53–73; Petres, 1976. For the Boii: Göbl 1994.

[79] Todorović 1974; Papazoglu 1978: 271–389; Božič 1981; Popović 1987; Jovanović and Popović 1999.

the Great and Small Scordisci.[80] It is not known how far their dominion stretched and what was the nature of their relationship with the Pannonii in the valley of the Sava. However, it is certain that the Scordisci played an important political role in the affairs of Pannonia before the rise of the Dacian kingdom, and the Roman political extension into Pannonia. Some communities in the north-east of the province of Dalmatia (the middle course of the Drina and Western Morava valley) were grouped into a *civitas*, the Dindari, by the imperial administration and possibly represented part of the dissolved Scordiscan alliance.[81]

The Adriatic hinterland and the wider area of the Dinaric Mountains and southern Pannonia, including the territory of the later province of Moesia, were inhabited by peoples known by the common stereotypical term as 'Illyrians'. 'Illyrian ethnogenesis' remains one of the most disputed archaeological and historical problems in this area.[82] The methodology related to the research of group identities in Illyricum was developed in the 1960s and it rests on the methodological tripod made of: the archaeology of Iron Age cultures, onomastics and the interpretation of written ancient sources. Scholars usually divide the indigenous population of pre-Roman Illyricum into five distinctive cultural-ethnic groups based on shared cultural characteristics seen through archaeology and onomastics, combined with the terminology used by Graeco-Roman written sources. The groups at the beginning of the period this book deals with are the southern Illyrians, the Delmatae, the Liburni, the Histri, the Iapodes and the Pannonii.[83]

Archaeology divided the indigenous Iron Age archaeological cultures of Illyricum into three areas: the south-east Alpine area with western Pannonia; the Adriatic-Western Balkan area; and the Central Danubian area. The south-east Alpine area consists of: Carniola (Dolenjska), St. Lucia, Notranjska, Ljubljana, Marijanec-Kaptol and the Donja Dolina-Sanski Most group. The evidence shows that La Tène movements heavily affected and disrupted the development of these groups. In the Adriatic-Western Balkan area are located the Histrian, Liburnian, Iapodean, Central-Dalmatian, Central-Bosnian and Glasinac groups.

[80] Strabo, 7.5.12; Dzino 2007.

[81] Archaeology and epigraphic material confirm a strong La Tène presence in this area; Alföldy 1964a: 96–8, 103; 1964b: 109, 123–7; 1965a: 54–6; Wilkes 1969: 171–2. The view is contested by Katičić 1965b: 63–9 and Papazoglu 1978: 171–8.

[82] Benac 1964b; 1987b: 754–62; Garašanin 1988b; cf. the overview by Wilkes 1992: 38–40.

[83] Katičić 1964b: 15–30; 1965b; Alföldy 1965a: 40–67; Wilkes 1969: 157–77; Čović 1976. See the recent detailed overviews of existing methodological approaches in Benac 1987b; Wilkes 1992: 40–87; and the most up to date and most relevant in Šašel Kos 2005a: 223–33.

Finally, in the Central Danubian area are located: the Dalj, Bosut and Srijem group.[84]

Onomastics analysed indigenous personal names recorded on Roman-era inscriptions and defined certain onomastic areas such as Liburno-Histrian, Delmato-Pannonian, 'ethnic' Illyrian, Dardano-Thracian and Iapodean, which show use of specific names related to those areas. Written Graeco-Roman sources that dealt with this area, such as the Hellenistic *periploi*, known under the names Pseudo-Scylax and Pseudo-Scymnus, Strabo, Appian, Ptolemy, Pliny the Elder, etc., provided us with the group names that those communities were known by in the Mediterranean world, and their locations, which make this methodological tripod complete.[85]

Archaeology and onomastics alone might create a solid explanatory framework, but it is in many ways disrupted by the testimony of the written sources, as the framework is not able to answer numerous inconsistencies created by those sources.[86] I shall note just a few problems that are the most obvious, such as the questions why particular identities disappear from the historical landscape such as the coastal Dalmatian Bulini, Nesti, Manii and Hyllaei or Bosnian-Montenegrin Autariatae, why the mention of the Liburni in the sources makes them appear so far from their homeland in the early Iron Age,[87] and why some identities suddenly appear in the sources, such as the Delmatae or Pannonii.

We shall leave aside the identities of the indigenous communities in this region and the ways they were constructing them in the pre-Roman period, as it is not an immediate concern for this study, and rather focus on the development of their political institutions. Politically, the organisation of those indigenous groups in Illyricum was deeply rooted in its kinship structure, rather than in the development of the more sophisticated institutions of the *polis* or kingdom. The only exception is the Illyrian kingdom, which underwent a significant social transformation in the period between the fourth and second centuries BC, influenced by the impact of the Hellenic and Hellenistic world. The southern Illyrians had a complex society, which was transforming rapidly.[88] This transformation also

[84] Benac 1987a; Wilkes 1992: 40–87. To this should be added Mati, Romaja and the South Albanian group, cf. Šašel Kos 2005a: 227, fig. 50.

[85] Wilkes 1969: 1–9, 481–6; Alföldy 1965a: 33–40.

[86] Wilkes 1992: 39–40 questioning the archaeological component of the Benac-Čović theory of 'Illyrian ethnogenesis', best presented in Benac 1964b.

[87] Čače recently scrutinised the sources and hypothesised convincingly that they in fact reflect the Greek common name for the indigenous population in the eastern Adriatic (the Liburni), regardless of their real identities, Čače 2002.

[88] Cabanes 1988: 191; Papazoglu 1989: 35–7, 48–53.

extended to other communities on the coast, so that the Histri and particularly the Liburni developed an urbanised society and political institutions of their own. The intensity of this transition affected the process of social stratification and hierarchical settlement patterns in the hinterland as well, so that the Iapodes and Delmatae, and to a lesser extent the Pannonii, began to form polities in the third and second centuries BC. The contacts with the Mediterranean world played a crucial role in the development of more centralised and hierarchical social structures amongst the populations of Iron Age Continental Europe.[89] The process of Mediterranean 'globalisation' and Roman expansion affected the creation of indigenous political structures, later recognised as 'ethnicities' through generalisation and 'orientalism' of the Graeco-Roman sources and their ethnographical discourse on 'barbarian' peoples. Rather than being long-time socio-political entities, most of the groups in Illyricum might be an indigenous response to Roman expansion.[90]

The southern 'Illyrian' communities such as the Ardiaei, Daorsi, Pleraei, Narensii, Taulantii, etc., the so-called 'political Illyria',[91] were under stronger Hellenistic influences, more engaged in maritime trade, economically more advanced than the peoples in the hinterland, and they enjoyed the highest level of urbanisation in the region, apart from Liburnia.[92] The nature of the internal structure of the Illyrian kingdom is disputed, as some scholars, such as Hammond, see it as the dominion of the most powerful people over others, and Papazoglu sees it as a strongly centralised kingdom with an unbroken tradition from the fourth century BC.[93] As shown in the next chapter, Illyrian kings had major difficulties in controlling the power of the leaders of neighbouring communities (commonly called the dynasts) nominally subjected to their power in the later third and second century BC, while attempting to establish a more centralised kingdom following Hellenistic models, in particular the Macedonian kingdom.

[89] Nash 1978: 459–75 – Central Gaul; Haselgrove 1984: 17–64 – Britain; 1987 – Gaul.

[90] Wells 1999: 33, 57; 2001: 31–2 (general), Whitehouse and Wilkins 1985; 1989 – archaic Italy; Nash 1978 – Gaul; Olujić 2007: 189–94 – Iapodes; Dzino 2006a – Delmatae. See also Dench 2005: 37–92 for Roman ethnographies.

[91] Cabanes 1988: 20. Daorsi rather than Daorsii as suggested by some earlier authorities; cf. Marić 1973: 110–11. For the location of individual peoples, see Wilkes 1969: 18 fig. 3; Pająkowski 1980: 114 ff.; Benac 1987b; Šašel Kos 2005a: 121 fig. 25.

[92] The political organisation of the Illyrian kingdom: Papazoglu 1967: 18–20; 1988: 185–9; Wilkes 1969: 188–90. Urbanisation and its consequences: Papazoglu 1979: 354–5; N. Ceka 1985; Cabanes 1988: 207–33.

[93] Hammond 1966; Papazoglu 1965; 1967: 15–17. Hammond's opinion seems to be more accepted; cf. Carlier 1987; Cabanes 1988: 87–9 and ff.; but Papazoglu responded vigorously defending her argument; Papazoglu 1988: 183–99; 1989: 37–46. The political unity of the Illyrian kingdom cannot be disputed, especially in the period this book discusses. See Šašel Kos 2005a: 238–9.

Figure 1. The acropolis of the city of Daors … (Daorson?), c. fourth first century BC, Ošanići near Stolac, south eastern Herzegovina.

Some of the stronger and economically more advanced south Illyrian peoples, such as the Daorsi[94] or Taulantii, had an interest in forming an alliance with Rome and in escaping the dominion of the Illyrian kings. The power of the Illyrian kingdom was ultimately shaken with its division in 167 BC. The interest of the newly developed *polis* in south Illyricum clashed with the needs of the centralised Hellenistic monarchy,[95] and resulted in the destruction of the latter.

The Delmatae were politically and militarily the most significant indigenous formation in the mountains of the mid-Adriatic hinterland, and the most formidable opponents of the Romans in the region.[96] They show a very distinctive character in their material culture, displaying characteristics

[94] Hecateus wrongly regarded the Daorsi as Thracians, FGrH 1 fr. 130; Marić 1973 esp. 115–35; Bojanovski 1988a: 93–4. Some authorities repeat this error e.g. Alföldy 1965a: 47; Wilkes 1969: 156 n. 3.

[95] Popović 1987: 94; Papazoglu 1989: 48–51.

[96] Zaninović 1966; 1967; cf. also D. Rendić-Miočević 1955; Čović 1976: 239–67; 1987; A. Rendić-Miočević 2006.

of both the southern Illyrians and the Pannonii.[97] Their economy is assumed, on account of insufficient and circumstantial evidence, to be pastoral, depending on the small quantity of usable land in the *karst* fields in the rocky Dinaric Alps. The Delmatae, who first recognised the supreme power of the Illyrian kingdom, gained full independence some time before its destruction and tried to fill the vacuum of power after the Illyrian kingdom was destroyed. It seems from the historical sources and archaeological evidence, which include settlement patterns, that the *civitas* of Delmium (Dalmion), located in the plains surrounding modern-day Tomislavgrad (*Duvanjsko polje*), was initially the political core of the alliance.[98] The Delmatian alliance expanded and absorbed the smaller, culturally akin communities surrounding Delmium and, in time, the name of the alliance was applied to the smaller and weaker neighbouring *civitates*, although they had not been linked with the Delmatae in the earlier sources.[99] The political structure of the Delmatian alliance is disputed, whether they united only in times of war, retaining full independence of individual communities in times of peace, or were a more permanent political formation dominated by the *principes* of individual *civitates*, at first dominated by Delmium, but after its destruction in 155 BC, based on more decentralised foundations.[100] Difficult terrain and a sophisticated system of hill-forts – *gradine* – made the Delmatae a very difficult military target for all Roman offensive operations.[101]

The Iapodes are the next important cultural group.[102] They lived in territory similar to that of the Delmatae, bordering the Julian Alps and the Istrian peninsula in the mountains behind the Liburnian coast (modern Lika). Scholars believe that sometime after the fifth century BC they possibly expanded towards the valley of the river Una, acquiring arable land there and easier access to metals.[103] Strabo wrote that they had a

[97] Older historiography regarded them as 'Illyrians'; Alföldy 1965a: 44–5. However, onomastic research (Katičić 1964b: 18–21, 28–9; Marić 1996: 77–9) finds links between the Delmatae and the Pannonii. Cf. Zaninović 1966: 58–9 n. 86, and a general overview in Benac 1987b: 779–81.

[98] Čače 1994/95: 107, 114–20. The exact position of Delmium as well as later Roman Delminium is unknown. See Benac 1975b; 1985: 190–4 (the settlement pattern); Bojanovski 1988a: 216–31; Šašel Kos 2005a: 303–6.

[99] Zaninović 1966: 80–2; Čović 1987: 443 n. 2, 476–7; Čače 1994/95: 118–20.

[100] Papazoglu 1967: 21–2 (independent communities); Čače 1979: 105–16 (more permanent political institution).

[101] Benac 1975b; 1985.

[102] Drechsler 1975; Čović 1976: 133–67; Drechsler-Bižić 1987; Raunig 2004; Balen-Letunić 2004b; Olujić 2007.

[103] Čović 1976: 133–68. Marić 1975: esp. 42 argues that the Iapodes only very late (early first century BC) expanded across the Una towards Raetinium (modern Bihać) which became an important centre in the Roman period. These opinions are expressed in the framework of the 'archaeology of cultures', assuming that artefacts somehow reflect the ethnicity of those who used them.

significant 'Celtic' heritage, but onomastic and archaeological arguments are inconclusive and instead suggest the unique character of the Iapodean cultural *habitus*. As it is impossible to find more than a few 'Celtic' names amongst them, modern scholarship mainly disregards Strabo's report. Some archaeologists suggest a strong cultural similarity between the Iapodean cultural group and the Pannonii, especially amongst those Iapodes who inhabited the valley of the Una.[104] This corresponds with the division given by the sources, which distinguish between the two political institutions existing amongst the pre-Roman Iapodes: the Cisalpine and Transalpine alliances.[105] The structure of political organisation of these Iapodean alliances is not entirely clear, with conflicting views on whether the Iapodean alliances were of a permanent nature or not. Čače and recently Olujić argued that the existence of the council-chamber *bouleuterion* (βουλευτήριον) in Metulum might show a more complex and permanent nature for the Iapodean alliances, contrasting earlier opinions. The polity known as the Cisalpine Iapodes in the sources was led, or at least dominated, by the *civitas* of Arupium and the Transalpine by Metulum.[106]

The Liburni[107] were probably linguistically closer to the Veneti of North Italy than to the other peoples from Illyricum. Their material culture and economy were loosely linked with northern Italy, and considered stereotypically in the Greek sources to be a term for the whole population of the Adriatic.[108] The Liburni inhabited the north-east Adriatic coast and the islands between the rivers Titius (Krka) and Tedanius (Zrmanja).[109] They were engaged in intensive maritime trade with Magna Graecia, Picenum and Sicily as well as with their neighbours, especially the Iapodes and Delmatae. The Liburni appear to be the most urbanised people in the region before the Roman conquest, apart from the southern Illyrian

[104] Strabo, 4.6.10; 7.5.2; 7.5.4, also Stephanus s.v. Iapodes. Katičić 1965b: 55–63; Marić 1971: 77–8; D. Rendić-Miočević 1975b. The links with the Pannonii: Marić 1971: 75–9; 2002. See Balen-Letunić 2004b; Olujić 2007: 177–86 recognising the unique character of the Iapodes who negotiated different global influences with autochthon forms, into a separate regional cultural identity.

[105] 'The Iapodes in the Alps' ('Ιάποδες οἱ ἐντὸς Ἄλπεων) and the 'Iapodes on the other side of the Alps' ('Ιάποδες οἱ πέραν Ἄλπεων); App. *Ill.* 16, 17, 21 – transl. Šašel Kos. It is not clear when this division amongst the Iapodes took place, but it is certain that it occurred sometime before 200 BC; Čače 1979: 67; cf. Šašel Kos 2005a: 422–37, contra Olujić 2007: 87, 95–6, 219 arguing the political unity of the Iapodes.

[106] Alföldy 1965a: 168; Papazoglu 1967: 21–2, contra Čače 1979: 55–81; Olujić 2005.

[107] General works: Fluss 1931; Čović 1976: 121–32; Čače 1985; Batović 1987.

[108] The Liburni and the Veneti: Alföldy 1964a: 66–75, 102; 1965a: 42–3; Katičić 1964b: 24–5. The Liburni and Picenum: Suić 1953. Stereotyping in the sources: Čače 2002.

[109] River Titius (Krka) was not the exact border of the Liburni, as some Liburnian communities were located across the river; Čače 1989. Cf. Suić 1960/61: 190–8. Contra Zaninović 1966: 41–2; 1968: 124 n. 21.

communities. The differentiation of the local elite in Liburnia is obvious after the fourth century BC, causing rapid social change and urbanisation, while the Italian expansion of Rome, especially in Picenum, put the Liburni early into strong and intensive trade and cultural contact with the Romans.[110] There was no easily detectable common political unit amongst them. Some scholars speculated that the Liburni created some kind of loose alliance or confederation similar to the Etruscan league between individual *civitates*, but we have no valid source that might enable us to discuss the nature of their alliance, nor is there any possibility of dating its foundation.[111] As discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Liburnia, at the time with which this book is concerned, was characterised by a very heterogeneous political landscape.

The Histri inhabited the Istrian peninsula stretching to the neighbouring Triestine Gulf and bordering the Iapodes in the hinterland of Tarsatica. Appian and Strabo described them stereotypically as 'Illyrians'. Their geographical position enabled them to have more intensive trade contacts with central and southern Italy, and cultural exchange with the Mediterranean world through those contacts. Thus, it is no surprise that the Histri were relatively quickly and successfully included in Italy as early as the Augustan era.[112] In the third century BC Histrian communities united under the leadership of their *principes* from the most significant pre-Roman *civitas* of Nesactium, and formed, what the sources called, the Histrian kingdom.[113]

The Pannonii inhabited the wooded northern and central parts of the hinterland between the Adriatic and the rivers Sava and Drava, and they divided the Taurisci from the Scordisci in Pannonia. However, some sources like Cassius Dio introduced confusion, referring to the Pannonians and Dalmatians as provincial identities which developed after the Roman conquest, rather than the Pannonii as existing pre-Roman group identities.[114] The sources stated that the most significant amongst the Pannonian communities in the historical period were the Segesticani-Colapiani, Breuci,

[110] Batović 1974; Čače 1985: 252–4; 614–9.

[111] Čače 1982; 1985; Batović 1987; Suić 1981: 107–9. The Liburnian alliance fought the Issaeans and Pharians in the fourth century (Diod. Sic. 15.14.2; CIG 2.1837c), so some authorities date its foundation to the late fifth–early fourth century BC; Čače 1987/88: 81.

[112] Strabo, 7.5.3; Degrassi 1954: 14–59; Gabrovec and Mihovilić 1987; Starac 1993/94.

[113] Bandelli 1981: 15 argues that the Romans initiated the foundation of the Histrian kingdom after the first Histrian war in 221 BC, contra Čače 1988/89. Cf. Čače 1979: 81–101 on the nature of the Histrian kingdom.

[114] Dio, Books 53–5 *passim*. App. *Ill*. 14 *Paiones* (Παίονές); *RG* 30.1 *gentes Pannoniorum*; Strabo, 7.5.10 *Pannonioi* (Παννόνιοι) use ethnic terms, cf. Šašel Kos 2005a: 375–83. See also Syme 1934b: 356; 1971b: 19–21; Nagy 1991: 77–8; Vulić 1933: 84–6; Alföldy 1965a: 50–1.

Mezaei, Daesitiates, Andizetes, etc.[115] The Pannonii from southern Pannonia, especially communities in the valley between the rivers Sava and Drava, were significantly influenced by La Tène cultural matrices, incorporating them in the construction of their own identities in the last centuries before the Roman conquest.[116] Many of those communities in the Dinaric Alps lived in areas with rich iron ore deposits, so that iron mining and production was an important part of their economy before and after the Roman conquest.[117] The archaeology shows links between the Pannonii and the southern Illyrians but only to a very limited degree, as at the same time archaeology and onomastic researches show many differences between them.[118] Pannonian personal names from the Roman period are very similar to those of the Delmatae, so that, according to Katičić's classification, they made up a joint Pannonian-Dalmatian onomastic group.[119]

In the historical record the Pannonii arrive relatively late, and are perceived in the sources as a politically amorphous mass.[120] As discussed in Chapter 5, it is very likely that during Octavian's expedition of 35–33 BC the Daesitiates were the head of a political alliance in what is today Central Bosnia, either as clients of the Delmatae or as a more independent polity. In southern Pannonia, the Breuci were the leaders of another political alliance, which was defeated by the Romans in the *Bellum Pannonicum* of 12–9 BC (see Chapter 6). Only during the *Bellum Batonianum* of AD 6–9 do the Pannonii briefly show a relatively coherent and organised political infrastructure inside and between individual communities. The unity of the Pannonii, including the Delmatae who joined them in the AD 6–9 uprising, and the lack of support for the uprising within the rest of Illyricum, might suggest their cultural coherence in the first century BC/AD. Archaeology shows that the Central Bosnian archaeological group, assumed to correspond with the historical Daesitiates, had a degree of cultural unity and a couple of well-organised political centres.[121]

[115] Strabo, 7.5.3; App. *Ill.* 14, 22; Čović 1976: 169–86; Zličić 1978: 351–6; Benac 1987b: 795–9; Domić-Kunić 2006: 69–85. The Daesitiates: Čović 1976: 187–238; 1987: 481–528; Bojanovski 1988a: 143–54; Paškvalin 2000; Mesihović 2007. The Mezaei: Bojanovski 1988a: 266–300. The Colapiani: Božič 2001; Čučković 2004. The Breuci: Zaninović 2003b.

[116] See for example Dizdar and Potrebica 2002; 2005.

[117] Pašalić 1967: 124; Wilkes 1992: 223.

[118] Marić 1964b. Contra but without convincing argument in the post-structuralist framework: Milin 2001/02. Onomastics supports these differences and Katičić 1964b: 17, 20; 1965b: 69–73 links the central-Dalmatian onomastic group with the Pannonii. Contra Zličić 1978: 356.

[119] Katičić 1964b: 18–21, 28–9; 1965b: 69–73. Alföldy 1964a: 92–110 separates the Delmatae and Pannonii as different. Mócsy 1967 doubts the existence of a separate Pannonian language.

[120] App. *Ill.* 22; Mócsy 1974: 21.

[121] Čović 1987: 481–528.

CHAPTER 3

Roman trans-Adriatic engagement (229–168 BC)

PRELUDE TO THE ROMAN TRANS-ADRIATIC ENGAGEMENT

Roman active political involvement across the Adriatic started in the later third century. Their domination over Italy, and especially its southern part, brought the Romans close to the important axis of communication between the south-eastern tip of the Apennine peninsula and the Balkan peninsula. The foundation of Brundisium as a Roman colony shows Roman awareness of this geo-strategic axis, which was the shortest route between Greece and Italy. Roman initial trans-Adriatic engagement was focused chiefly on the south-eastern Adriatic coast, but they also developed an interest in the control of maritime routes over the whole eastern Adriatic coast in this phase. Roman dealings with the Illyrian kingdom formed part of many significant discussions in the earlier scholarship, and this chapter attempts simply to recognise the global patterns of the events, rather than to give their detailed narrative, because this has been dealt with elsewhere.[1]

The most obvious reasons for the beginning of Roman interest in the south-eastern Adriatic, according to the sources, were the rising influence of the Illyrian kingdom and its endemic piracy in the southern Adriatic and Ionian Sea. This piracy interfered in the trade of Rome's Italian and Greek allies who demanded protection from Rome. Piracy at moments even disrupted the Roman supply routes for North Italy shortly before the second Illyrian war in 220 BC. However, a seemingly even more important factor than piracy that influenced Roman conduct was the possible impact of the Illyrian kingdom on the general political situation in Macedonia and Greece, so that Rome became concerned with the possibility of the establishment of a hostile anti-Roman, Illyrian-Macedonian alliance. However,

[1] See Zippel 1877: 43–98; Holleaux 1928; Fine 1936; May 1946; Badian 1952; Hammond 1968; Wilkes 1969: 13–28; Cabanes 1988: 255–334; Petzold 1971; Derow 1973; Levi 1973; Gabričević 1974; Gruen 1984: 360–436: Coppola 1993: 29–194; Domić-Kunić 1993; Eckstein 1994; 2008: 29–96; Šašel Kos 2005a; 2005a: 249–90.

as we will see, this factor did not necessarily impact on the first Roman interventions across the Adriatic in 229 and 220–219 BC, but sometimes increased in significance as the political situation became more complex in Roman dealings with the Macedonian kings Philip V and Perseus. The rivalry of Macedonian and Illyrian kings made this alliance more frequently a theory rather than a practice, and never a matter of serious trouble for the Romans.

A few words are necessary to describe the political situation in the south-eastern Adriatic before the start of the Roman engagement in the mid-later third century BC. In the early fourth century the process of limited Mediterranean globalisation reached the south-eastern part of Illyricum. A culturally similar group of communities called the *Illyrioi* – the term 'Illyrians' here is used just for convention and only depicts communities who inhabited south-eastern Illyricum without sharing a common sense of 'Illyrianness' – were well known in the Greek sources from the Classical and Hellenistic period. On occasions they exercised significant political influence over the Macedonian kingdom and Epirus, especially in the period from 393 to 359 BC. Philip II of Macedon even spent some time in his youth as a hostage of the 'Illyrians' in the court of Bardylis, and the Macedonians were forced to pay tribute to Bardylis, until Philip defeated him in 359 BC.[2]

The Greek sources perceived the 'Illyrian' political institution as a 'kingdom', and that led some earlier scholars to believe in the dynastic and political continuity of the 'Illyrian kingdom' from the fourth to the second century BC.[3] However, today the more accepted opinion is that, what the sources described as the 'Illyrian kingdom', was in fact the alliance of culturally similar communities, at times dominated by the strongest, whose leader was at the same time perceived as a 'king' in the Greek sources. Only in the last period 230–168 BC is it possible to recognise that this alliance appeared more as a kingdom established after the model of Hellenistic monarchies, which was adjusted to particular regional circumstances and political developments. It is important to bear in mind that this area was for most of the time a political patchwork, where different Illyrian dynasts were in pursuit of different political aims.[4]

The political situation in the region, after the wars for Alexander the Great's succession, was marked by the rise of the Epirote kingdom of the

[2] Cabanes 1988 Ch. 2; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 172 ff. [3] Papazoglu 1965.

[4] Carlier 1987; Cabanes 1988: 87–9 and ff.; Šašel Kos 2002d: 110–14. There was a significant degree of originality in the development of regional political institutions, which negotiated the global Greek *polis* model with the federalised *ethne*, cf. Cabanes 1999b.

Molossians. Pyrrhus, the most significant of the Epirote kings, had significant links with the southern Illyrian peoples. He was reared at the court of the dynast Glaucias, where he spent ten years and was adopted by his family. Also, Pyrrhus' wife was the daughter of the dynast Bardylis II, and it seems that Pyrrhus established a firm political hegemony over the Illyrian dynasts in the 280s.[5] After his death, his son Alexander II fought the Illyrian dynast Mytilus, who threatened the Molossian hegemony over the southern Illyrian peoples.[6] After Alexander's death, the Molossian dynasty was in disarray, transforming the Epirote kingdom into a federation in 232 BC. There was a vacuum of power in the region, which was successfully used by the Ardiaean dynasts to establish themselves as the hegemons over other southern Illyrian peoples, and to expand their power in the region.

The Ardiaei were just one of the Illyrian peoples. Unfortunately, their political rise was not registered elsewhere in the sources, until the era of their king Agron, the son of Pleuratus, who appears as the hegemon over the Illyrians in the 230s BC, when Polybius started his story of the Illyrian wars. The testimony of the sources (Strabo, Appian, Aristotle, Aristotle's *Mirabilium auscultationes*) creates serious confusion about the location of the Ardiaean homeland, so that some authors assumed their migration from somewhere in the hinterland or the west bank of the river Neretva, possibly under the turbulence caused by the La Tène movements in the fourth century BC. Nevertheless, the evidence for this assumed Ardiaean migration is less than adequate, and the problem still waits for a more plausible explanation.[7] From the sources we know that under Agron's rule the Ardiaei established themselves as a regional power, especially after their victory over the Aetolian league in 231 BC, and their influence started to expand all the way to the central Adriatic and Peloponnesus, using the demise of the Epirote monarchy, and counteracting the Aetolian league in accordance with Demetrius II of Macedon. In 230 and 229 BC Illyrians captured Phoenice in Epirus and forced the Epirotes into an alliance with them, took Corcyra, and besieged Issa, but failed to capture Epidamnus/Dyrrachium.[8]

[5] Šašel Kos 2002d: 101–10. On Pyrrhus see Hammond 1967: 568–88; Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 219–66, and Zodda 1997.

[6] Trogus, Prologue 25.5, cf. Front. *Strat.* 2.5.10; Hammond 1967: 588–93.

[7] See the overview of the problem, literature and sources in Šašel Kos 2005a: 166–82. Papazoglu 1963 proved beyond doubt that the Ardiaean homeland in the historical period was in the Rhizonic gulf (Boka Kotorska).

[8] Polyb. 2.2.1–2.7.12, 2.9. Cf. App. *Ill.* 7, Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 332–5. Dell 1967b: 95; Gruen 1984: 366 n. 38 objects to the term 'alliance' between Agron and Demetrius II and sees this episode as nothing else but the engagement of Illyrian mercenaries, cf. Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 336: 'the (Macedonian) invitation to Agron seems to have been a sudden decision to cope with the crisis'.

The other parts of what was to become Illyricum had negligible importance in the preserved evidence and in Roman political dealings with the area in this period. Apart from Issa and the Issaean commonwealth, which was a significant opponent to the Ardiaean political designs in the central Adriatic, and a faithful Roman ally, there are no other political 'players' in this period. The Issaeans defeated the Liburnian league led by the Iadastinoi early in the fourth century, and they are not mentioned as politically significant in this period; probably they were internally politically divided.[9] Indigenous communities from the hinterland of the Adriatic remain in historical darkness, although it is reasonable to suggest that the building of political institutions took place in the third century, especially amongst the Iapodes and the Delmatae.[10] On the north-western fringes of the future Illyricum, the Histri would make the most significant resistance to the Romans in the late third and early second century BC.

THE ILLYRIAN WARS: AGRON, TEUTA AND DEMETRIUS OF PHARUS

The main sources for the Illyrian wars were Appian, the epitomes of Dio preserved in Zonaras and finally Polybius. Some lost parts of Polybius were preserved in Livy together with the Roman annalistic tradition. The differences between the sources are quite significant, and it appears clear that Appian and Dio followed one historical narrative and Polybius another. Earlier scholars were initially inclined to follow the account of Polybius.[11] However, the scholarship today considers Appian and Dio to be much more reliable as preferred sources, and Polybius is used only as an additional, and not always too trustworthy, source for these events.[12] Polybius' account might better be understood in the context of his narrative structure, where the behaviour of individual characters, such as Agron, Teuta or Demetrius of Pharus, reflect stereotypical characteristics of the ethnic-cultural group they belong to. In the case of the Illyrians, they are impulsive, treacherous, unpredictable and greedy; they are portrayed as the archetypal 'barbarians', thus serving the purpose of underlining the rationality and discipline of the Romans.[13]

[9] Čače 1993/94. [10] Olujić 2007: 189–94 (Iapodes); Dzino 2006a (Delmatae).
[11] Holleaux 1928: 822, influencing Badian 1952; Harris 1979: 195, and Gruen 1984: 359–68, and for the first Illyrian war see Eckstein 2008: 36.
[12] Petzold 1971; Levi 1973; Derow 1973; Errington 1989: 86–8; Eckstein 1994; 1995: 150–7; Šašel Kos 2005a: 252–62.
[13] Champion 2004: 100–43, esp. 111–14.

What did happen? In Appian's and Dio's version, the joint Roman-Issaean delegation to King Agron was attacked and Kleemporos from the Issaean and Coruncanius from the Roman delegation were killed. In Polybius' version the envoys Caius and Lucius Coruncanii were sent to the Ardiaean court to discuss their piracy and were killed when returning from their mission. In his version king Agron was already dead and the envoys were talking with his widow Teuta who acted as regent.[14] Consequently, the Senate did decide to react with force and the consuls Cnaeius Fulvius Centumalus with 200 ships and Aulus Postumius with 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse were sent to punish the Ardiaei 229 BC.[15] Meanwhile, Agron died in Appian/Dio's narrative and his wife Teuta was left in charge as regent for the crown-prince Pinnes, Agron's son from an earlier marriage. The Roman army was very efficient, and the Romans triumphed very fast, without taking any significant casualties. The peace treaty took the cities of Corcyra, Issa, Pharus, and Epidamnus/Dyrrachium from the Ardiaean power, gave some territories to the Illyrian dynasts that deserted to the Romans when the war started, banned the Ardiaei from sailing south of the Lissus (Lezhë) with more than two *lemboi* (a type of light warship) and forced them to pay tribute to the Romans. The Romans left in charge Agron's minor son Pinnes as king, and his stepmother Teuta as regent.[16]

The first Illyrian war attracted considerable attention from the scholarship as the first example of Roman imperialism, regardless of whether it suited the case of the proponents of 'defensive' or 'aggressive' imperialism. As discussed in the previous chapter, Roman 'imperialism' should be assessed in the context of the emotions driving the Romans in their foreign-policy conduct, such as for example, fear or insult, as well as in the context of the martial values of the Roman elite class and Roman society. Roman wars were often initiated by Roman anger arising after their public or personal *honos* and *dignitas* were threatened, and the anger caused by, what they perceived as, injustices.[17] It might be more productive to see the first Illyrian war in this context, rather than as an example of

[14] App. *Ill.* 7; Polyb. 2.8.12; Dio, 12.49.3, but also Florus, 1.21, Pliny, *HN* 34.24; Orosius, 4.13.1–2; Livy, *Per.* 20. Appian is more to be trusted here, although an alternative reading of Polybius may reconcile the chronology of both accounts, placing his death in 230 BC, Derow 1973: 133–4.

[15] Polyb. 2.11–12; Dio, 12.49.6–7; App. *Ill.* 7.

[16] Polyb. 2.12.3–4; App. *Ill.* 7–8. Harris 1979: 64 argues that the Romans imposed tribute on the Ardiaei (cf. Polyb. 2.12.3), contra Gruen 1984: 367 n. 41. There was some tribute demanded from Pinnes after the second Illyrian war, Livy, 22.33.3; 22.33.5.

[17] Cic. *De Off.* 1.38 is a good example of the Roman standpoint; cf. also Polyb. 2.8.10 (invented speech of the envoys to Teuta – avenging injustices). See also Robinson 2006: 39–43.

'imperialism', whether 'defensive' or 'aggressive'. The narrative present in Appian and Dio cites the complaints of the Issaean commonwealth against Agron's kingdom as the reason behind Roman intervention, while Polybius sees the reason for Roman intervention as Illyrian endemic piracy, which was threatening the trade interests of the Roman allies, such as Apollonia or Issa.[18] Piracy alone can be dismissed as the reason for the war.[19] The scholarship also mentions Roman strategic interests in the straits of Otranto, the protection of trade, honouring the alliance with Issa and the other Greek states in the region, or the Roman fear of the Illyrian-Macedonian alliance.[20] However, it is difficult to ascertain how defined was Rome's trans-Adriatic 'policy' and how important were their trans-Adriatic interests at that moment, as we know that diplomatic interests existed at least a generation before the first Illyrian war.[21]

The problem is that many of the factors provided as the reasons for the first Illyrian war, whether strategy, economy or piracy, are only an interpretation of the modern scholarship and it is difficult to ascertain how real they were at that time, and how important they were to Rome. It might be that some of these issues really existed at that moment, but the ultimate significance of the decision to go to war across the Adriatic cannot be ascertained beyond doubt. Leaving aside modern speculations from the available sources, the first Illyrian war appears to be an *ad hoc* action, which was caused by the Roman perception of insult by the Ardiaeans. The Ardiaean ruler (either Agron or Teuta), whether really responsible or not for this murder, in Roman public opinion was blamed for the death of the Roman envoy(s).[22] The Romans were taking the 'Illyrian problem' with

[18] App. *Ill.* 7; Dio, 12.49 (Zonaras 8.19); Polyb. 2.8.

[19] Gruen 1984: 363–4, 366; De Souza 1999: 76–80, surprisingly brought this forward again as the main reason by Eckstein 2008: 32–41, esp. 35–6, but without introducing new evidence apart from a literal reading of the sources. The notion of endemic piracy in the Adriatic is mainly a construction of the sources; piracy escalated only with the rise of trade and especially with the rise of the Ardiaei, Dell 1967a; Fuscagni and Marcaccini 2002; N. Ceka 2004.

[20] Lamboley 1993 (Otranto); Holleaux 1928; Marasco 1986; Šašel Kos 2005a: 252–3, 259–60; Gabričević 1974 (Macedonian policy). However, Badian 1952: 76–7, 93; Dell 1967b; Gruen 1984: 366–7; cf. Errington 1989: 93–4, who shows convincingly that there was no reason for the Romans to fear Macedonia at this moment.

[21] The complaints of Apollonia 266 BC (Dion. Hal. 20.14; Livy, *Per.* 14; Dio, 10 fr. 43; Val. Max. 6.6.5) and the Acarnanian league c. 240 BC to the Romans, Justin, 28.1–2, cf. Errington 1989: 85; Corsten 1992; Dany 1999: 98–119. There was also a pre-existing Roman alliance with the Issaean commonwealth in 229 BC.

[22] Polyb. 2.8.13. The Ardiaei flatly denied responsibility for the murder, Dio, 12.49.5 (although he claims that Teuta refused to give up the murderers when asked by the Romans). It might be just an unfortunate accident at sea as Derow 1973: 121–2 explains. From Polybius, 2.8.13 it appears clear that the Romans blamed the Illyrians for this act immediately – it was not only the construction of the later apologists, as Gruen 1984: 361 implied.

'circumspection and caution', up to the murder of the envoys, and the Ardiaei certainly were not interested in going to war with Rome.[23] The Senate was worried about the rising of Illyrian power in the southern Adriatic, but nothing suggests that they would react with force if there was no incident with the envoys. In fact, the political and military problems Rome was facing from the La Tène peoples in North Italy made Roman action across the Adriatic even less likely in 229 BC.[24]

Thus, from the sources, we can see that the first Illyrian war was caused primarily by Roman reaction to the murder of their envoys and was focused on humbling and dividing the Illyrian kingdom, but not its destruction, or conquest. Concern about growing Ardiaean power, the insult after the attack and murder of the envoys, fear of the enemy crossing the Otranto and invading Italy – a rather painful memory of the Epirote kings, Alexander I and Pyrrhus crossing the Adriatic in earlier generations – rather than a realistic fear of Agron's kingdom[25] – and the opportunity to wage what they might consider a just war[26] all appear to be the primary reasons for Roman intervention in 229 BC. Strategic and economic considerations, such as the tribute imposed on the defeated, appear only as secondary and less important reasons why Rome for the first time engaged the opponent across the Otranto. The Romans were not interested in establishing any military bases or occupation of trans-Adriatic territories. If Roman envoys had not been killed, it is difficult to argue that there would have been any war in 229 BC: 'An embassy from the Greeks (sic!) from Issa provided the immediate occasion for the Roman embassy of 230, and the murder at sea of one of these ambassadors led directly to the Roman declaration of war.'[27]

After the first Illyrian war, the Romans established some kind of not particularly well-defined political order across the Adriatic. The most important element of future Roman affairs in the region became what Holleaux labelled a 'Roman protectorate'.[28] It does seem rather that the Senate made nothing more than new and/or renewed existing alliances (*amicitia*) with separate political entities affected by this war: Corcyra,

[23] Gruen 1984: 365–6. [24] Eckstein 2008: 38–9. [25] Errington 1989: 83–5.

[26] Fuscagni and Marcaccini 2002: 108–9. Dio 49.5 (Zonaras, 8.19.4) reports a proper war vote in the assembly before the first Illyrian war. Rich 1976: 16 n. 12, following Holleaux, considers Dio to be an unreliable source – but as stated earlier the scholarship changed its view on Dio's account in the meantime. For the Republican Roman perception of the *bellum iustum* see Albert 1980; Riggsby 2006: 157–89.

[27] Derow 1973: 128.

[28] Holleaux 1928: 828–33, 837–47. See the subsequent discussions in: Fine 1936: 24–8; Badian 1952: 73–81; Hammond 1968: 7–9; Petzold 1971: 206–14; Cabanes 1988: 276–8.

Epidamnus/Dyrrachium, Apollonia, the Issaean commonwealth, the Parthini, Atintanes, and also the parts of Agron's kingdom ruled by Teuta for Pinnes, and the dynasts Demetrius of Pharus and Scerdilaidas.[29] It is arguable how formal the nature of these alliances was, and that between Pharus and Rome.[30] Also, this was the time when the Romans started to develop a diplomatic-propagandistic discourse, 'winning hearts and minds of the Greeks', presenting themselves as protectors of the Greeks against Illyrian 'barbarians' and later Macedonians.[31]

The Romans used regional dynasts who collaborated in the war to maintain Roman interests in the region, or at least to prevent the development of anti-Roman alliances. It appears that the maintenance of the political fragmentation of the area was one of the aims of the Roman trans-Adriatic policy in this period. The most important of those dynasts was Demetrius of Pharus. His political role suffered from the 'bad press' he received from Polybius, who portrayed him as treacherous, evil and an enemy of Rome. Demetrius was a typical product of his era, affected by both Greek-Hellenistic and indigenous cultural influences, balancing his identity in between them, like the other Greeks and 'Greeks' living in the western Mediterranean.[32] He was entrusted by Agron with the governorship of Pharus, but when the war started he wisely submitted to the Romans. Demetrius was rewarded with some possessions for his services by the Romans in the peace treaty. After the war, he married Triteuta, the mother of young crown-prince Pinnes and became clearly the most influential and the most powerful of all Illyrian dynasts in the 220s BC. His growing power enabled Demetrius to become more actively involved in Macedonian affairs. He also broke the peace treaty with Rome, sailed with 50 *lemboi* south of Lissus and allegedly detached the Atintani from their alliance with Rome.[33] It is very possible that he shared power *de iure* with Scerdilaidas, the leader of the Labeatae who lived around Scodra, who also appears on the political scene, acting as an independent political agent at this time.[34]

[29] Gruen 1984: 368; cf. Cabanes 1988: 278; Coppola 1991.

[30] Derow 1991 formal; and perhaps more convincing is Eckstein 1999; 2008: 42–58 informal.

[31] Polyb. 2.12.4–6 – Postumius sending envoys to inform the Greeks that Rome eradicated 'common enemies', cf. Errington 1989: 262.

[32] The most recent biography of Demetrius – Coppola 1993, see also Zaninović 1998: 91, and Eckstein 1994 on the personal bias of Polybius' sources. The identity of the Western Greeks – Lomas 2004.

[33] Sources: App. *Ill.* 7–8; Polyb. 3.16; Dio, 12.53 (Zonaras, 8.20). On the Atintani see Šašel Kos 2005a: 275–8.

[34] Šašel Kos 2002c: 146–8; Gruen 1984: 371, 373. Šašel Kos 2002c: 146; 2005a: 270–1 disputes that Scerdilaidas was related to Agron. As she points out, Scerdilaidas was grandfather to Genthius, whose centre of power was amongst the Labeatae, Livy, 43.19.3.

Rome did not react immediately to Demetrius' provocations, as it was engaged in war with the La Tène peoples in Cisalpine Gaul, whom the Romans knew as the Gauls. It appears that Demetrius' joint action with the Histri finally made the Romans act, as they jointly attacked Roman supply ships sailing through the Adriatic with corn from Sicily towards the Cisalpine battlefields.[35] The Romans eliminated the threat from piracy very fast, defeating both the Histrian kingdom and Demetrius. The first Histrian war in 221 and the second Illyrian war in 219 BC followed each other fast.[36] Demetrius was the only target in the southern Adriatic. Rome was not interested in punishing the rest of the Illyrians. Scholars suggest that Rome feared an anti-Roman Illyrian-Macedonian alliance, especially in the context of strengthening Punic power in the western Mediterranean, as Demetrius was on good terms with the Macedonian king Antigonus III Doson who ruled 229–221 BC.[37] Rome might have perhaps perceived some danger from the hypothetical Illyrian-Macedonian alliance. However, it is very doubtful how real that alleged danger was at that moment.[38] The conduct of Demetrius and his policy of domination in the Adriatic might reflect other more important aspects as well. It is possible that Roman *laissez faire* trans-Adriatic policy in this period was understood as a signal to Demetrius that he could extend his influence, and later when his power grew it might have appeared to him that Rome was incapable of reacting to his provocations. However, it is clear that he appeared as someone who might become dangerous to Roman interests, so Rome reacted 'not because of what he (Demetrius) had done, but because of what he might do'.[39]

THE MACEDONIAN WARS: SCERDILAIDAS, PLEURATUS AND GENTHIUS

Not many changes occurred after the elimination of Demetrius; the Romans restored the status quo established after the first Illyrian war.

[35] Dell 1970.

[36] Sources: App. *Ill.* 8; Polyb. 3.16, 18–19; Dio, 12.53 (Zon. 8.20); Livy, *Per.* 20; Cabanes 1988: 282–9; Coppola 1993: 85–100; Eckstein 1994; Šašel Kos 2005a: 267–71. For the Histrian war see Bandelli 1981; Čače 1988/89; Coppola 1993: 63–70; Vedaldi Iasbez 1994: 27–8; Rossi 1995: 364–5.

[37] In particular Šašel Kos 2002c: 144. Dell 1967b: 101 argues that Demetrius was leading only mercenaries, which is not too convincing; rightly noticed in Hammond 1968: 10 n. 37; Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 354; Šašel Kos 2005a: 273 n. 100.

[38] Badian 1952: 82–3, 87–8; Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 354. Strong arguments against Macedonian danger were laid by Errington 1989: 93–4, and especially Eckstein 2008: 63–6.

[39] Gruen 1984: 372, also Eckstein 1994; 2008: 58–60 and Zaninović 1998 arguing that Demetrius controlled almost the whole of the eastern Adriatic. Errington 1989: 93 on the other hand argues that the danger from Demetrius was intentionally exaggerated by the Romans.

Possibly soon after 219 the Romans restored all the privileges Pharus had previously enjoyed, and separated it from the Illyrian kingdom.[40] After Demetrius' defeat, Scerdilaidas became the leading figure amongst the Illyrians, and the sources focus on his activities. At approximately the same time as Scerdilaidas became an Illyrian king, there was a change on the Macedonian throne, where the ambitious Philip V became king in 221 BC. His reign marks a shift in Roman relationships with the eastern Adriatic, as Rome now faced a significant opponent across the Adriatic and, at the same time, the Illyrian kingdom was in need of protection from its aggressive neighbour and turned to Rome for help. On the other hand, the circumstances in which Rome found itself, faced at the same time with Hannibal and Philip V, meant that they required reliable partners across the Adriatic, and the Illyrians certainly had an interest in being amongst these, at that moment.

The second Illyrian war left Scerdilaidas in charge as the most powerful dynast in Illyria, although Agron's son Pinnes was still regarded as king for some time, at least by the Romans.[41] As said before, the rise of Scerdilaidas was at the same time a period of transition of power from the Ardiaei to the Labeatae. Scerdilaidas' first move into foreign affairs was in 219 BC to support Philip V in the Social war against the Aetolian league. He did it for the annual payment of 20 talents (and bad blood with the Aetolians who deprived Scerdilaidas of his booty), but with difficulties as he had problems with dynasts at home.[42] Scerdilaidas was a free agent attacking merchants at sea on his own, and when Philip refused to pay his 20 talents Scerdilaidas turned against Macedonia, attacking Macedonian targets in 217 BC, but also suffering losses in Dassaretia and in the vicinity of Lake Lychnidus from Philip.[43] It should be cautiously taken into account that Demetrius of Pharus was at the time a fugitive in Philip's court, and was sought by the Romans. What his influence was on Philip is difficult to say, despite Polybius' portrait of Demetrius as influential, perfidious and violently anti-Roman.[44] Whatever his position was, Scerdilaidas might still perceive

[40] Robert 1935: 505–6 dates the inscription CIG 2.1837b restoring Roman privileges to Pharus in the second third of the second century BC. Justified doubts on this dating were cast by Derow 1991: 266–7, who puts it back to 219 BC. Kirigin 1993: 202 n. 927 puts a strong argument that the Romans restored independence to Pharus. Contra Wilkes 1992: 171 arguing that Pharus was the possession of Genthius in a later period.

[41] Livy, 22.33.3. He probably died in 217 BC; Šašel Kos 2002c: 149–50.

[42] Polyb. 4.29.5–6 – Scerdilaidas allied with the Aetolians against the Achaians; 4.29.1–7 – the alliance with Philip V; 5.4.3 – the troubles at home.

[43] Polyb. 5.95.1–4 – attacking merchants, 5.101; 5.108 the conflict with Philip V.

[44] Polyb. 5.12.5–7; 5.101.7–10, cf. 3.16 and 3.19 on the 'character' of Demetrius.

Demetrius as a threat to his own position, and withdrew his support from the Macedonians.

In the winter of 217/216 BC Scerdilaidas turned to the Romans. Their naval show of strength across the Ionian Sea made Philip V withdraw from the invasion of Illyria he planned, allegedly on the advice of Demetrius of Pharus, and enabled Scerdilaidas to strengthen his position. The Romans did not want a full-scale war with Philip at first, due to the Romans' problems with Hannibal's invasion of Italy. Philip, apparently scared by the sight of Roman warships at the mouth of the river Aous near Oricum, lost the opportunity to make more advances into Illyria in 216, especially after the Romans subsequently stationed a strong naval squadron at Brundisium and Tarentum.[45] However, the first Macedonian war, which followed the Roman discovery of the secret treaty between Philip and Hannibal, placed the Illyrians between two strong states fighting for influence. Rome's absence from this theatre of war and their defensive strategy initially placed Scerdilaidas in a very weak position towards Macedonia, especially taking into account his problems in controlling his domestic opponents. However, he made an amazing recovery and strengthened his position in the hinterland, thus contributing to the weakening ambitions of the Macedonian king.[46]

The peace of Phoenice, ending the first Macedonian war in 205 BC, made Philip V release his claims on the Parthini, Dimallum, Apollonia and Oricum, but still left the Macedonians in a very strong strategic position. Scerdilaidas probably died some time before 205 BC, because his son Pleuratus is mentioned in the context of the peace of Phoenice as the only Illyrian dynast.[47] Pleuratus supported the Romans in the second Macedonian war that soon followed (200–198 BC), and following the Roman victory was awarded with Lychnidus, the Parthini and the parts earlier conquered by Philip, becoming himself a significant political power in the region, strengthened by open Roman support.[48] It is possible that the efforts of Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus strengthened the central power in Illyria to some degree. However, the dynasts in the region still maintained a significant level of independence. The coinage of their successor, King Genthius, may also show some attempts of the kings to curb the power of the dynasts and introduce more centralisation to the kingdom, following

[45] Polyb. 5.110.3–11 – Philip's withdrawal from the planned invasion of Illyria; Livy, 23.33.5 – the stationing of the Roman navy at Brundisium and Tarentum.
[46] Cabanes 1988: 289–302.
[47] Livy, 29.12.13–14. See Wallbank and Hammond 1988: 409–10 for the settlement.
[48] Polyb. 18.47.12; 21.11.7; Livy, 31.28.1–2; 33.34.10–11. Regional significance, Polyb. 21.21.3–4, 21.11.7–8.

after the model of a Macedonian kingdom.[49] The stronger Roman involvement in the eastern Mediterranean highlighted the significance of maintaining control over the sea link between Italy and Epirus, and their interest in maintaining a friendly Illyrian kingdom was a pillar of Roman interest in Illyria at this moment.

The wild rumour of Philip's alleged intentions to attack Italy through the Adriatic hinterland 'per Bastarnae', and urging 'barbarians dwelling around Hister' to invade Italy, as much as it was impossible to achieve in reality and in all certainty being invented,[50] and later used by his Macedonian enemies to compromise Philip's son Perseus in Rome,[51] could still stir real fear amongst the Romans. The conduct of C. Cassius Longinus in 171 BC, who wanted to reach Macedonia from Aquileia, might be one of the Roman reactions to that fear, as well as showing their lack of geographic knowledge. Longinus was recalled by the Senate, but on his way back devastated the lands of the Iapodes, Carni, *Alpini populi* (the Taurisci?) and the Histri, so that their envoys complained to the Senate.[52] That fear could have driven the Romans to behave more aggressively and to search for more reliable allies in the area. However, the significance of the Roman-Illyrian relationship in this period should not be overstated, and it is reasonable to assume that the Illyrian kingdom was rated low on the list of Roman diplomatic priorities.[53]

Pleuratus was succeeded by his son Genthius some time before 180 BC. His kingdom stretched from Epirus to the central Dalmatian islands and the coast, including some portion of the hinterland.[54] He was accused of supporting piracy and the mistreatment of Roman citizens and the citizens of the Latin allies of Rome by the praetor Lucius Duronius in 180–179 BC. The accusations were denied straight away by Genthius.[55] These accusations had no immediate consequences for Genthius, so we can assume that the Senate did not blame him directly. This piracy should be seen in the

[49] Gruen 1984: 420–1; Šašel Kos 2002c: 152–3. Coinage: Cabanes 1988: 314–15; Domić-Kunić 1993: 208–9.

[50] Livy, 39.35.4; 40.57.7; 42.11.4 – the rumours of Philip's designs on Italy existed even earlier, Polyb. 5.101.8. This wild rumour had its origins in the fact that Philip married his son, probably Perseus, to a Bastarnian princess to gain their help against the Dardani (Livy, 40.5.10); Williams 2001: 163 n. 81. Philip allied with the Scordisci too (Justin, 32.3.5), but the Dardani defeated the coalition, Polyb. 35.5.6.

[51] Livy, 42.11.4, Eumenes of Pergamon accusing Perseus of following the plans of his father.

[52] Livy, 43.1–5; Bandelli 1981: 23–4; Vedaldi Iasbez 1994: 29; Šašel Kos 1997b: 26 ff.; Olujić 2007: 73–5, also Wilkes 1969: 32.

[53] Gruen 1984: 419–23 goes a bit too far by arguing that the Romans did not care at all about their relations with the Illyrian kingdom in the early second century BC.

[54] Domić-Kunić 1993: 210–11; cf. Šašel Kos 2002c: 153. [55] Livy, 40.42.1–5.

context of the third Histrian war that the Romans were conducting at the time, crushing the Histrian kingdom, and possibly some independent piracy of Genthius' subjects, but it does not appear that he was personally involved in it. Duronius received *imperium* against the Histri, and the *duumviri navales* were appointed in 178 BC against, what Livy calls, the 'Illyrian fleet' *Illyriorum classes*, generalising them as 'Illyrians', the indigenous population of the south-eastern Adriatic coast.[56] It might also be that some enemies of Genthius, such as the Issaean commonwealth, were actively lobbying against Genthius in Rome for their own political interests.[57] Possibly there was some regional conflict going on at this point; the Delmatian alliance in the hinterland of central Dalmatia around this time also broke away from Genthius, as Polybius reports in 32.9.1–5.

There is no evidence that Genthius conducted any significant anti-Roman policy prior to the beginning of the Roman war with the last Macedonian king, Perseus. The conflict with the Issaean commonwealth was not necessarily anti-Roman, but a regional affair. The Roman mission to Genthius in 172 BC should be seen as the expression of Roman concern for piracy, rather than proof of his anti-Roman stand. Genthius might not have been able to control all of his subjects and their piracy, but that was an endemic problem for all of his predecessors.[58] Genthius' neutrality in the conflict between Perseus and Rome was a much more serious problem in the eyes of the Romans, and that is the reason why the Roman tradition preserved in Livy saw him as 'suspicious' a few years before Perseus actually approached him. He may have used the Macedonian model for the centralisation of his kingdom, and that may have also made him suspicious in the Roman tradition. However, apart from his coinage with Macedonian motifs, there is no other evidence for his pro-Macedonian sympathies.[59]

The third Illyrian war was in fact a part of the third Macedonian war (170–169 BC), a sideshow rather than a separate conflict. It finished with the complete and utter defeat of Genthius. It is difficult to say why Genthius joined Perseus in 169 BC. Gruen sees the reasons for the beginning of the

[56] Livy, 40.18.3–4; 41.1.3. 'Illyrians' and the Histri are interchangeable in Livy, Gruen 1984: 422 n. 134. The third Histrian war: Zaninović 1990: 53–8; Vedaldi Iasbez 1994: 28–9; 2003: 115–20; Šašel 1996; Kuntić-Makvić 1997; Matijašić 1999/2000.

[57] Domić-Kunić 1993: 213, cf. Livy, 42.26.2–4 for 172 BC. Gruen 1984: 421–2 takes Livy, 40.42.1–5 literally, concluding that Genthius was organising marauders. I would rather agree with Šašel Kos 2002c: 152–3, arguing that Genthius was not able to control his subjects.

[58] Similarly Cabanes 1988: 313–14; Domić-Kunić 1993: 213–15, contra Šašel Kos 2002c: 153–4; 2005a: 284. Livy, 42.26.2–7 – Roman embassy to Genthius 172 BC.

[59] Livy, 42.29.11. Cabanes 1988: 314–15; Domić-Kunić 1993: 208–9.

crisis, finishing with the third Macedonian war, in Rome's concerns over Perseus' popularity amongst the Greeks, caused by Rome's *laissez-faire* approach. The conflict was, according to him, not in sight until Perseus refused to comply with Roman requests, and a Roman show of strength went too far for the Romans to retreat.[60] Genthius made a wrong choice at the moment when the Romans were doing poorly in the war, attracted by Perseus' offer of 300 talents.[61] The decision of Genthius was disastrous in hindsight – the Roman army commanded by Lucius Anicius Gallus defeated him even before news of the beginning of the war reached Rome.[62]

THE ORDER OF SCODRA AND THE ASSESSMENT OF THE INITIAL PHASE

According to Livy in 167 BC the Illyrian kingdom was divided into three parts.[63] The first part covered the coast between the cities of Lissus and Scodra. The second comprised the Labeatae around the lake of Scodra, and the third the communities of Olciniatae, Acruviatae and Rhizonitae in the Gulf of Boka Kotorska and on the modern day Montenegrin coast. As a reward for supporting Rome, the communities of Daorsi, Taulantii and Pirustae were exempted from tribute and remained independent polities.[64] Weber plausibly argues that the *Dassaretarum Pirustae* is an error of Livy who applied the terminology of his age, and not accurate information for the second century BC. Even if there were such people as the Pirustae of Dassaretia, they should not be confused with the Pirustae of Velleius Paterculus.[65]

It is less likely that the historically unknown king Ballaeus was a ruler of the third part mentioned by Livy, which also included Pharus, where one of his mints was located. He probably should be dated to the earlier period, before 168 BC, making him one of the dynasts of the Illyrian kingdom.[66]

[60] Gruen 1984: 408–19, cf. Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 497–504.

[61] Livy, 44.20.5; Polyb. 28.13.7 (Roman problems); Livy, 44.23.7; Polyb. 29.3.1–9; App. *Ill.* 9; *Mac.* 18; Plut. *Aem. Paulus* 13; Diod. Sic. 30.9.1–2 (the alliance of Perseus and Genthius), cf. Gruen 1984: 423, Cabanes 1988: 318–21; Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 523–31 esp. 530–1.

[62] Livy, 44.30–2; App. *Ill.* 9; Flor. 1.29.1–2; Eutrop. 4.6.2.

[63] See the analysis of Livy's sources for this event in Weber 1998: 296, and analysis of the manuscript in Weber 1983: 113–44.

[64] Livy, 45.26.13–15; Zippel 1877: 96–8; Papazoglu 1965: 172–6; Wilkes 1969: 26–8; Suić 1976c: 186–8; Cabanes 1988: 323–5. The text in Livy is corrupt, so the problem of determining the area of the first part is unsolvable; Papazoglu 1976: 202 n. 28. Numismatic evidence: H. Ceka 1973.

[65] Weber 1989: 81–93; cf. Wilkes 1969: 173.

[66] Šašel Kos 2007 plausibly argues that Ballaeus was a contemporary of Pleuratus or Genthius or both of them.

Ballaeus is not mentioned by the sources, but coinage with his name was minted in Rhizon and Pharus, and found in different places including several locations in Italy.[67] Parts of the dissolved Illyrian kingdom south of Lissus were possibly annexed to the province of Macedonia in 148–147 BC.[68] The Romans did not establish a province in Illyricum in 167 BC, as they did not in Macedonia in 168 BC. There was no governor appointed for Illyricum, nor any Roman army positioned there. The *provincia Illyricum* entrusted to Anicius was nothing but a command, and *formula dicta* by Anicius in Scodra was a peace settlement, not a *formula provinciae*.[69]

The main upholders of Roman interests in the area in the new order were the faithful allies, the Issaean commonwealth and the communities who deserted King Genthius in 168 BC, such as the Daorsi or Taulantii. Anicius' 'dictate of Scodra' declared freedom to the Illyrians but ceded to the Republic full control of the south Adriatic, with minimal commitment of material and military resources. 'The Roman declaration of freedom thus preserved the rights of conquest, without involving Rome in the encumbrance of provincial government.'[70] The economic situation in the region was affected by the outcome of the third Macedonian war, especially the brutality of Roman plunder in Epirus. The extent and consequences of Roman plunder and looting in Illyria is impossible to determine.[71] The large number of coins minted there after 168 BC casts some doubts on the opinion that it was significant.[72] Roman success against Perseus was strategically very important, because once they established permanent rule in Macedonia in 148 BC, the Romans built the Via Egnatia in the 130s, thus connecting Italy through Epirus and Macedonia with Asia Minor for military purposes, as the continuance of the Via Appia that terminated at Brundisium.[73]

In the north, Roman interests were approaching what would become Illyricum. The security of an important Italian colony and port, Aquileia, established in 181 BC, as well as the general security of northern Italy before

[67] The coinage of Ballaeus: D. Rendić-Miočević 1964; 1976: 191–4; Marović 1976: 231–44; 1988; Marić 1979: 185–95; Visona 1985.

[68] The area south of Lissus; H. Ceka 1972: 134, 149–50.

[69] Cf. Papazoglu 1976: 202 n. 27. The opinion that the Romans established a province is still sometimes accepted; Alföldy 1965a: 25–6 (leaving the question open until Caesar as the latest date); Suić 1976c: 185–92; Weber 1989: 70; Domić-Kunić 1993: 221–2.

[70] Sherwin-White 1973: 177. See Sherwin-White 1973: 175–81 and Gruen 1984: 145–57 on the political effects and aims behind the Roman declaration of freedom.

[71] Livy, 45.33.8; cf. Hammond and Wallbank 1988: 562–3; Gruen 1984: 423–9; Papazoglu 1979: 355–6, and also Ziolkowski 1986 for the Roman plunder of Epirus.

[72] Marović 1976: 234; Visona 1985: 121.

[73] Rougé 1987: 256. For the dating of the Via Egnatia, see Kallet-Marx 1995: 347–9.

the Aquileian foundation, seems to be of key strategic importance for the Romans.[74] In dealing with hostile peoples such as the Carni, and the Taurisci, Roman diplomacy needed to make arrangements in order to secure the position of Aquileia. The Histrian kingdom created the greatest problems for the expansion of Roman influence and only after its conquest, that finished in 177 BC, was Aquileia secured. It is highly possible that after this victory the Romans took from the Histri the area between the Timavus and Formio, and gave this region to the Carni, thus establishing a protective buffer zone between the Histri and Aquileia.[75] It is not clear what the final political arrangement with the Histri was after their defeat, but it may well be that the Roman administration divided them into separate tribute-paying communities, thus weakening their political power.[76] Perhaps these Histrian communities were for a brief period regarded as an independent autonomous area[77] and later, most certainly after Tuditanus' expedition in 129 BC discussed in the next chapter, they were incorporated into Cisalpine Gaul.

Roman conduct in this phase was continuously evolving through time, adjusting to the changing political circumstances and for that reason it appears relatively inconsistent. It does not seem that the Roman approach in this period was either aggressive or defensive – one can say it was opportunistic and mostly focused on maintaining a certain balance of power between the Illyrians, the Macedonians and Greek communities. Rome was involved in the region against its will in the first and second Illyrian wars, acting to avenge perceived offences and to present itself as the protector of the allied Greek communities from the 'barbarians' and pirates. We cannot see Macedonia as an important factor affecting Roman treatment of Illyria before Philip V. This assumption is nothing more than the hypothesising of modern scholars based on the evidence of an occasional collaboration between the Ardiaean kings and the Macedonians. However, the reign of Philip V changed the Roman approach towards the area, making his challenge to Rome more serious, taking into account the contemporary Hannibalic invasion of Italy, thus increasing the stakes in the control of the south-eastern Adriatic coast. Rome needed Illyrian kings

[74] Livy, 43.1.5–7, 9; Toynbee 1965: 284.

[75] Starac 1993/94: 10–11; 1999: 9, map 2. The Carni can be the Roman 'ethnographic' term for the population of western Slovenia, Božič 1999: 203.

[76] Cf. Petru 1977: 476–7, maps 1–2.

[77] Starac 1999: 18, but there is no firm proof for that. Šašel 1996: 26 is precise in his statement that there was no Roman occupation of Histria in 177 BC and that the Romans avoided all unnecessary struggle with the Histri in trying to incorporate them peacefully.

and dynasts as allies against Philip, fearing his real and alleged designs, but regardless of that the southern Illyrians were placed at the fringes of Roman eastern interests, which were declaratively supporting the welfare of the Greeks, and curbing the designs of the Macedonian kingdom until 168 BC. The Romans never saw their Illyrian affairs as separate from its Macedonian and Greek affairs, nor did they perceive the Adriatic Sea as a unified field of operation, except for brief moments in the 220s and 170s BC, when Adriatic piracy was escalating, usually related to Roman conflicts with the Histri in the north-western Adriatic.

The conduct of the Illyrian kingdom was opportunistic and without lasting unity, reflecting weak central power and the significant independence and power of the regional dynasts. The alliances with the Macedonians by Agron, Demetrius, Scerdilaidas, and Genthius were always brief and strongly influenced by the money that the Macedonians were paying, or promising to pay, for Illyrian military help. Good relations with the Romans maintained by Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus, when the centre of power shifted from the Ardiaei to the Labeatae, were in many ways influenced by the real threat that Macedonian designs were posing for the position of leading dynasts in Illyria. The position of the Illyrian kingdom was becoming less and less tenable between the interests of Rome and the Macedonian kingdom, especially after Macedonia started to develop its aggressive western designs under Philip V.

In the context of Roman Illyrian affairs this is an important phase, as Rome for the first time was politically and militarily engaged across the Adriatic. However, Roman interests were precisely defined, focusing only on the eastern parts of the Illyrian kingdom which impacted the strategic control of the Otranto. The Romans were not interested in the hinterland of the Adriatic. The sources show that the understanding of what Illyricum was for the Romans in this era has been directly influenced by Greek understanding of the *Illyrioi* and related only to the Illyrian kingdom. Only the expansion of their power over the eastern Adriatic coast in the next chronological phase would enable the Romans to start to develop a territorial concept of Illyricum.

CHAPTER 4

Rome across the Adriatic in the late Republic (167–59 BC)[1]

> 'Are you therefore mad, does my love not delay you?
> Am I worth less to you, than chilly Illyria?'
>
> Propertius, *Elegies* 1.8.1 2

The relationship between the region which would become Illyricum and Rome, especially the legal position and status of the region in the later Roman Republic, is not entirely clear due to inadequate sources. It is often assumed by modern scholarship that Illyricum was either a province with 'vague boundaries', being outside a provincial zone as an independent protectorate, or administered from other provinces.[2] Wilkes denied the existence of any meaningful regional policy in this period after the potentially dangerous Macedonian kingdom had been destroyed. Future Illyricum is represented as a strategic backwater where Romans fought only to train armies and provide triumphs for the *imperatores*, a place from which Romans were actually in retreat in the second and early first century BC.[3] Most recently, in an extensive discussion of the sources, Šašel Kos summarised Roman Republican political conduct in the region until Octavian as an *ad hoc* reaction to the regional crisis. There was no meaningful, systematic conquest; the Romans were gradually establishing their direct and indirect control over parts of the region, as a consequence of their military interventions.[4]

The trans-Adriatic conduct of Rome from the Illyrian wars to Caesar's pro-consulship recognised two different, but interrelated, zones in the

[1] This chapter is a revised and updated version of Dzino 2005. See Šašel Kos 2005a: 291–334 for a detailed narrative of the events in this period, and Bandelli 2004: 103–8, 113–16 for a comprehensive bibliography.

[2] Skefich 1967: 30–41; Wilkes 1969: 29–36; Sherwin-White 1980: 17; Lintott 1981: 60.

[3] Wilkes 1969: 36; cf. Wilkes 1965a: 4–5; Badian 1968: 23; Bandelli 1983: 174–5, and see Lintott 1982: 24, for a similar view of Roman conduct in Transalpine Gaul.

[4] Šašel Kos 2005a: esp. 398–9. See also multiple narratives of Roman political engagement in Bandelli 2004: 106–10.

eastern Adriatic.[5] Thus, two contrasting Roman approaches to foreign affairs emerged: expansionism and hegemonism overlapped and complemented each other. What would become Illyricum stood outside the Roman state; it was not a province and it was not administered from other provinces, but the Romans intervened there when either their or their allied interests were threatened or in response to real or perceived regional crises. It was the area they perceived as peripheral to their interests in the Macedonia–southern Balkan peninsula, and the middle Danube basin from the direction of north-east Italy; but still, it was the area Rome saw as its zone of interest.

As was said before, the attention of Rome shifted across the Adriatic relatively late in the late third century BC, as a consequence of Rome's two different interests: Greece and Macedonia in the south and expansion into North Italy. As a consequence and continuation of this initial approach in new circumstances after the fall of the Illyrian and the Histrian kingdom, military operations in the late Republic were performed in two different but interrelated zones in the eastern Adriatic. The south Adriatic zone comprised the southern Adriatic coast from the border of Epirus up to the border between the Delmatae and Liburni on the river Titius (Krka) with the immediate hinterland, corresponding to Pliny's 'the end of Liburnia and beginning of Dalmatia',[6] including the independent Issaean commonwealth in the central Adriatic. The north Adriatic sector was initially limited to the Histrian territory, but later included the Liburni, Cisalpine Iapodes, Carni and Taurisci. These two interrelated operational zones slowly merged into a single one in the mid-first century BC, and only then did the Romans change the way their political power was projected across the Adriatic and 'invented' Illyricum, in order to redefine the projection of their political power in the area.

THE SOUTH AND CENTRAL ADRIATIC

The 'order of Scodra' from 167 BC was very soon challenged. In the early 150s the Delmatian alliance, recently established in the hinterland of the Dalmatian coast under the leadership of Delmium,[7] attacked the possessions of the Roman allies and personally insulted the Roman emissaries led by

[5] See Bandelli 2004: 107.

[6] Pliny, *HN* 3.141; Ptol. *Geog.* 2.16. This understanding of the term Dalmatia reflects an earlier source in Pliny, the *periplus* from the mid-first century BC; Čače 2001: 93–4; 2003.

[7] Šašel Kos 2005a: 294–5. The Delmatian alliance was a recent political formation and a new regional-political identity, Dzino 2006a: 75–6; cf. Čače 1994/95: 118–20.

C. Fannius Strabo sent to investigate the allies' complaints. According to Polybius, the Delmatae refused to give food and accommodation to the emissaries and even took their horses away. According to Dio preserved in Zonaras, the Delmatae also killed the envoys of the Issaeans and Daorsi.[8] After the initial failures of the consul Caius Marcius Figulus in 156 BC, in the following year the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica destroyed the resistance of the Delmatae and burned Delmium, directing his attack from the valley of Naron (Neretva). This action earned him triumph *de Delmateis*.[9]

This Roman reaction was clearly initiated by an attack by the Delmatae on the Roman allies: the mainland settlements Epetium and Tragurium, and the Daorsi east of the river Neretva, as well as the mistreatment of the envoys. It was their 'push to the Adriatic' that filled the political vacuum after the disappearance of the Illyrian kingdom.[10] Polybius was utterly contemptuous in assessing the reasons for this war. He described it as a useful opportunity to keep Roman armies fit in times of general peace. Polybius was involved in these events, lobbying for south-Italian Locris to be freed from the obligation to send ships for the Dalmatian war, so it is possible that he was personally not supportive of this intervention. Also, the theory that peace was in fact negative if it went on for a long time was nothing unusual in the genre of ancient and especially Roman historiography.[11]

As an additional reason for this war, Polybius also mentioned the need for a re-affirmation of the Roman position in the mid-Adriatic basin after a decade of neglect from 167 BC. Some scholars like Wallbank and Harris are perhaps too quick to dismiss the complaints of Roman allies as a direct cause for this war. The Delmatae were formidable opponents and their alliance gained much influence after the fall of the Illyrian kingdom, so that they threatened the new order of 167 BC with collapse.[12] The mistreatment of Roman envoys and the murder of allied envoys was perceived as an insult to the Roman state and sufficient justification for military action. The reaction was relatively swift and efficient, and the army fully confirmed Roman hegemony over the central Adriatic for some time. The complete destruction of Delmium

[8] Polyb. 32.9; Dio, 20 (Zonaras, 9.25.9).

[9] Polyb. 32.13; App. *Ill.* 11; Livy, *Per.* 47–8; Flor. 2.25; Strabo, 7.5.5; Frontin. *Str.* 3.6.2; Insc. It. 13.1: 82–3, 557. Δάλμιον destroyed by Nasica was not the same city as Delminium in the Roman era; Čače 1994/95: 107, 114–20. See Šašel Kos 2005a: 303–6 for an overview of different opinions on locating Delmium and Delminium.

[10] Livy, *Per.* 47; Polyb. 32.9; Zaninović 1966: 38; 1967: 19–20; Gruen 1984: 431; Čače 2003.

[11] Polyb. 12.5.1–3; Woodman 1977: 157, cf. esp. 245–7.

[12] Polyb. 32.13.4–9. Wallbank 1979: 535; Harris 1979: 233–4. These complaints the *legati* discussed with the Delmatae (Polyb. 32.13.1), and only after their mission failed, did the Senate decide to use force; Polyb. 32.13.4 ff. Cf. scepticism in Wilkes 1969: 30–1; Gruen 1984: 430–1; Šašel Kos 2005a: 293.

caused large internal perturbations inside the Delmatian alliance; Delmium lost its leadership of the alliance, and in the subsequent period the alliance was reorganised on a more decentralised basis.[13] In this war the valley of Neretva for the first time appears as an important base for the Roman army. It is possible to see this period as a *terminus post quem* as the increased settlement and infiltration of Italians made the small Hellenistic emporium of Narona (Vid near Metković) an important foothold for Roman infiltration into the region.[14]

The next political crisis in the south Adriatic happened in 135 BC when consul Servius Fulvius Flaccus was dispatched with 10,000 soldiers and 600 cavalry against the Ardiaei and the Pleraei who had attacked Roman Illyria, despite the diplomatic attempts of the Romans to avoid the conflict, and later the Ardiaei to postpone or even prevent the intervention, after the Senate decided to act.[15] What the 'Roman Illyria' (τήν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίους Ἰλλυρίδα) of Appian was has not been answered properly by modern scholarship.[16] This crisis seems to have been triggered by the continuation of the piratical raids of the Ardiaei, who were attracted by the increased trade of Italian and Roman tradesmen, recently settled more numerously in Narona, as well as by the trade interests of Issa and the Daorsi in this area.[17] As said in the previous chapter, regardless of Strabo, who located them on the right bank of the river Neretva,[18] it seems much more plausible to put them in the vicinity of the Rhizonic Gulf. In that position they could easily control the navigation south-east of Neretva together with the Pleraei who inhabited the peninsula of Pelješac.[19]

It was a successful reaction of the Roman army to the threat that resulted in the complete elimination of the Ardiaei from history as a political force. The

[13] Čače 1979: 114–16.

[14] App. *Ill.* 11; Zaninović 1980. Recent archaeological finds confirm the Hellenistic origins of Narona; Marin 2002: 418–21; 2006: 74, cf. Suić 1976b: 132.

[15] App. *Ill.* 10; Livy, *Per.* 56; Strabo, 7.5.6; Insc. It. 13.1: 559.

[16] Papazoglu 1976: 203 argues that it was the coastal belt between Neretva and Lissus that recognised Roman suzerainty; a good term is 'Roman dominion' Šašel Kos 2005a: 316, cf. 314.

[17] Novak 1952: 39; Wilkes 1969: 245–7 (Issaean interests behind the intervention). Cf. CIL I² 2288–93; Livy, 40.42.4. Cf. Škegro 1991: 61–3; 1999: 144–50, 174–5, 229–31 (Republican olive oil and the wine trade in Narona); Gabričević 1980; Katić 2002: 430–2 (the Greek and Daorsian trade). A discovery of the harbour and more than 30 'Illyrian' trade boats fully laden with Roman amphorae from c. 1st century BC, made in the Desilo-Hutovo Blato locality on the alluvial plains which used to be on the left bank of the Neretva river in antiquity, confirm the extent of this trade, Vasilj and Forić 2008, cf. Atanacković-Salčić 1981; Šašel Kos 2005a: 177.

[18] Strabo, 7.5.5. Older scholarship supported this view; cf. Alföldy 1965a: 46–7; Zaninović 1966: 43, 70–6; Bojanovski 1988a: 133.

[19] Papazoglu 1963; cf. Garašanin and Garašanin 1967: 90–3; Garašanin 1974: 11–16; Marić 1989. For the location of the Pleraei: Alföldy 1965a: 47; Garašanin and Garašanin 1967: 93 and older bibliography in Zaninović 1970: 494 n. 12.

Senate acted only after negotiations broke down, as the Ardiaei and Pleraei rejected Roman demands, underestimating Roman resolve to act aggressively.[20] The Romans resettled the Ardiaei away from the coast into the continent, probably modern-day eastern Herzegovina, where they were forced to cultivate soil instead of making their living from the sea, as they had done in the past.[21] It was a unique example of resettlement in Roman Republican times in the region, and there are no other occasions when it was used there before the end of the Republic. There are some echoes of Roman conduct in Transalpine Gaul a decade later for different strategic reasons, and in Pompey's settlement of Cilician pirates in 67 BC.[22] The event shows Rome's continuing commitment to guarding trading and other interests of their allies and the control of navigation in the eastern Adriatic, to which Ardiaean piracy had been seen as a threat in the past. Thus Rome secured the southern and central Adriatic coast for some time, especially the coastal area south of Narona and Narona itself, and its faithful allies were certainly rewarded with pieces of Ardiaean land, probably the coast around modern-day Slano.[23]

In 118 BC consul Lucius Caecilius Metellus attacked the Delmatae, celebrated a triumph and afterwards assumed the honorific name Delmaticus. According to Appian there was no apparent reason for this campaign except Metellus' desire for a triumph at any cost.[24] The negative bias of Appian's source, which cannot be determined with any certainty,[25] is even more visible in his statement that there was actually no real campaign and that Delmaticus was accepted as a friend in Salona, where he spent the winter amongst the Delmatae and afterwards returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph. It is difficult to believe that even a Metellus in the 110s could achieve a triumph without a campaign, or that the Delmatae would accept him so warmly. Later Roman Salona (or Salonae) was a product of the amalgamation of several settlements, 'Greek', 'Roman' and indigenous settlements, which were located on Mt. Kozjak, 1.5 km from coastal Salona.[26] In this period our sources refer to the coastal emporium Σάλων, very probably a member of the Issaean commonwealth or its ally. It is also highly likely that the same name was applied to the indigenous settlement

[20] Šašel Kos 2005a: 316–17. [21] Strabo, 7.5.6, cf. Pliny, *HN* 3.143; Novak 1952: 39; Garašanin 1974: 16.
[22] Strabo, 4.1.5: Caius Sextius Calvinus drove the Gauls off the shore in 124 BC, but not for piracy. Pompey resettled Cilician pirates on the mainland, cf. Plut. *Pomp*. 28; Vell. Pat. 2.32.4; Flor. 1.41.14; Dio, 36.37.5; Livy, *Per*. 99; App. *Mith*. 14.
[23] Zaninović 1966: 43; cf. Bojanovski 1988a: 93, 100–1; Marić 1989: 59.
[24] App. *Ill*. 11; Livy, *Per*. 62; Eutr. 4.23.2; Insc. It. 13.1: 82–3, 560. The source Appian used was undoubtedly hostile to Metellus; cf. Dobiáš 1930: 161–2, 281; Marasco 1993: 478; Wilkes 1969: 33–4, 34 n. 1; Šašel Kos 2005a: 306–8.
[25] Šašel Kos 2005a: 307. [26] Cambi 1989: 37–41; cf. D. Rendić-Miočević 1975: 29–30.



Map 2. The map of the bay of Kašteli with the major settlements from antiquity.

on Mt. Kozjak, or somewhere in the Klis pass, overlooking coastal Salona.[27] Perhaps 'wintering amongst the Delmatae' should be taken literally: if Metellus wintered in Salona, he was in fact wintering amongst the Delmatae because Salona was facing hinterland controlled by the Delmatian alliance.[28] The expansionism of the Delmatae aimed at establishing their control over the Issaean-dominated part of the coast seems the most probable cause of tensions, following the pattern of events in 156 BC.

The campaign was certainly not particularly difficult and apparently there was no need for long sieges of the numerous Delmatian inland hill-forts, as there had been in 156–155 BC. Appian's source, which mentions a friendly reception in Salona for the future Delmaticus, is correct as the Romans were allies coming to relieve the citizens of Salona, Greek-speaking and indigenous, from the Delmatian threat.[29] His route to Salona was assumed by the earlier scholarship to be overland, as Delmaticus was identified with Metellus who was conducting the campaign against Segestica with Cotta (see below). Morgan was the first to dismiss the earlier views that Delmaticus travelled by the Dalmatian coast from Aquileia or that he reached Salona through the overland route from Segestica. The most plausible suggestion seems to be that he sailed directly from Ancona, possibly via Issa or taking the route via the islands of Palagruža, Sušac and Korčula, as the sea voyage was the only possible route until Caesar's times.[30] The trans-Adriatic transport route seems the most logical one in all Roman interventions in the southern sector, as opposed to north Adriatic operations, which used Aquileia and Cisalpine Gaul as bases. The consequences of Delmaticus' campaign include the absence of troubles in Dalmatia in the sources for the following decades, and the increase of Greek and Italian trade-connected settlement at some points on the coast, such as Salona or Narona.

In 78 BC, Caius Cosconius was sent with pro-consular *imperium* to intervene against the Delmatae.[31] There is not much in the sources about this expedition, except that he recaptured Salona and defeated the enemy in

[27] Bilić-Dujmušić, accepted as a possibility in Šašel Kos 2005a: 308–9. See also Clairmont 1975: 2, and recent archaeological evidence from the Manastirine locality dated to the Hellenistic period in Marin 2002: 415–16.

[28] Clairmont 1975: 6. His opinion that there were no indigenous inhabitants in Salona is not tenable. I do not think that the indigenous inhabitants of Salona should be regarded as the Delmatae in this period (also Šašel Kos 2005a: 307–8), in the same way as the inhabitants of the other coastal communities in the area, see p. 34 above.

[29] M. G. Morgan 1971: 292 n. 26 rightly points out that Salona (in fact the Issaean commonwealth) asked the Romans for help.

[30] M. G. Morgan 1971: 275 ff. See Brusić 1970: 555 figs. 1–2; Kozličić 1990: 155–8 fig.4; Radić 2003 and Kozličić and Bratanić 2006: 108–13 on sea routes across the Adriatic.

[31] It was a rather unusual grant of *imperium* for the period (Brennan 2000: 424–5), giving the impression of pressing necessity. Cosconius proved himself a very capable commander in the Social war, Broughton 1952: 36, 39 n. 21; 1986: 77.

two years of campaigning.[32] There seems to be an attempt by the Delmatian alliance to exploit Rome's internal instability, which was sparked by the civil war between Sulla and the Marians. This follows the pattern of the other contemporary conflicts, facing Sulla's successors in 78 BC, such as Lepidus' rebellion, the Sertorian insurrection in Spain, the war in Thrace, or the rise of endemic piracy in the Mediterranean. Another reason for the rebellion could be the imposition of new taxation on allies in this period, as mentioned by Appian, which was extended to tribute-paying peoples such as the Delmatae.[33] This caused serious trouble for the entire Roman eastern Adriatic interests. For the first time the Delmatae extended their political influence in the coastal heartland of the Issaean commonwealth, and showed up the Issaean inability to resist pressure from the Delmatae.

Some scholars support the opinion that Salona was for the first time permanently captured by Cosconius from the Delmatae, who at some point in the late second century overran the Issaean colonies Tragurium and Epetium, mentioned in connection with the 156–155 war against the Delmatae, and located close to Salona.[34] There is nothing in the sources to suggest the need for Roman action in this area between the expedition of Metellus Delmaticus in 118–117 BC, and the campaign of Cosconius. We should allow the possibility that the Delmatae took control of Salona in the period between 85 and 78 BC. There is an unclear connection between Sulla and the Delmatae in 85 BC in Eutropius, who abbreviated Livy, and the unsuccessful transport of Roman troops into Liburnia in 84, discussed below p. 73. The evidence from another breviarium, Orosius, however, suggests that the conflict in Dalmatia was not prolonged.[35] It is difficult to believe that the Romans would allow an offensive act by the Delmatae, such as an attack (not to mention full conquest) on the coastal heartland of the Issaean commonwealth – a key Roman ally in the whole region, to pass unpunished for long.

Nevertheless, the success of Cosconius was in many ways far-reaching for the destiny of the region.[36] There is an argument that Cosconius established the province because his alleged legate Terentius Varro (the antiquarian) refers to the administrative detail that eighty-nine *civitates* sought justice in Narona.[37] This argument stands on shaky ground. Varro is attested in Spain

[32] Eutr. 6.4; Orosius, 5.23.23; cf. Cic. *Clu*. 97.

[33] App. *B Civ*. 1.102; Sall. *Hist*., 2.44.6–7 (references from Sallust, *Hist*. are from the McGushin 1992, not the Maurenbrecher edition); Orosius, 5.23.1.

[34] Wilkes 1969: 33–5, 220; Zaninović 1977: 777–8; Alföldy 1965a: 99–100 arguing that the Delmatae conquered Salona before 100 BC, or in 78 BC, Zaninović 1966: 30.

[35] Eutr. 5.7.1; Orosius, 5.23.1.

[36] Čače 1989: 87 n. 75; cf. Šašel Kos 2005a: 313.

[37] Pliny, *HN* 3.142; Cichorius 1922: 191–2; Šašel 1970/71: 301 (Varro as a legate of Cosconius); Wilkes 1969: 485 (the establishment of the province).

with Pompey in 76–75 BC, and his knowledge of the region might be linked to his stay in Liburnia where he had been the quaestor of Cinna in 85–84 BC.[38] Varro's remark is a description of the later administrative structure of Illyricum under Caesar in the 50s, or even as late as 35–27 BC,[39] according to Bojanovski. Thus, he did not establish the province but his success finalised the opening of the whole coast to Roman influence. It encouraged the settlement of Italian traders in the areas of Salona, and enabled the Romans to pursue a new stage in trans-Adriatic relations – a 'coastal' Illyricum unified as Caesar's *provincia* attached to Cisalpine Gaul.

THE NORTH ADRIATIC

In the 120–110s a stronger Roman political and military interest can be detected on the northern Adriatic coast and its hinterland. In 129 BC the consul Caius Sempronius Tuditanus campaigned in the wider north Adriatic area. Tuditanus' operations focused on the Iapodes, and he celebrated his triumph over them on 1 October 129 BC.[40] However, the campaign extended towards the other peoples in the region as well. Pliny mentions the Histri, and the river Titius (Krka) in Liburnian lands, thus indirectly referring to the Liburni.[41] A fragmentary celebratory inscription of Tuditanus from Aquileia,[42] dedicated to the river deity Timavus (and probably to some others), mentions the Taurisci, Timavus and a triumph.[43]

Tuditanus and his legate Tiberius (Latinius?) Pandusa engaged the enemy and, after encountering initial difficulties, with the help of Decimus Iunius Brutus overcame them. The campaign was conducted on at least two fronts so that Tuditanus was able to return victorious to Italy, after only a couple of months, despite his initial setback.[44] We can assume that Pandusa fought the Taurisci, and Tuditanus and Brutus engaged the Iapodes, because the epitomator of Livy connects Tuditanus and Brutus with the Iapodes. It is doubtful

[38] Varro, *Rust*. 3.12.7; Cichorius 1922: 193–4 (Varro in Spain) *Rust*. 3.10.8–10; Badian 1962: 60 (Varro in Liburnia).

[39] Bojanovski 1988a: 47.

[40] Insc. It. 13/1: 82 f.; 559; cf. Livy, *Per*. 59; App. *Ill.* 10; *B Civ*. 1.19 (march against 'Illyrians').

[41] Pliny, *HN* 3.129 *Tuditanus qui domuit Histros in statua sua sibi inscripsit: Ab Aquileia ad Tityum flumen stadia M (or MM)* – 'Tuditanus, who subdued the Histri, wrote on his statue: From Aquileia to Titius river are 1000 stades.'

[42] CIL I^2 652; ILLRP 335. Seen at first as a *eulogium*, now as a *tabula triumphalis*, Strazzula Rusconi 1990: 296–9.

[43] M. G. Morgan 1973; Bandelli 1989; Šašel Kos 2005a: 324–6.

[44] M. G. Morgan 1973: 31–2. Appian records Pandusa, Livy mentions Brutus. Brutus was the legate and Pandusa was either pro-praetor in Cisalpine Gaul (Zippel 1877: 136–7; M. G. Morgan 1971: 298–9; 1973: 32; Broughton 1986: 117), or the other legate of Tuditanus; Brennan 2000: 217–18.

whether Tuditanus actually fought the Liburni on his way.[45] The campaign focused on the Cisalpine Iapodes as the chief threat, although the Taurisci also might have appeared as worthwhile opponents. It is possible that a minor conflict occurred in Histria as well.[46]

The sources give us no direct reason for this campaign. The Iapodean or Tauriscan threat to the security of North Italian trade with the eastern Alps and the Sava valley and Pannonia could be seen as an important reason for the expedition of Tuditanus to secure Roman interests there. The expansion of the Cisalpine Iapodes towards the sea threatened the Liburni, or at least some Liburnian communities who sided with Tuditanus for that reason.[47] The expulsion of Italian traders from the Tauriscan gold mines is less likely to be a direct reason for this war.[48] Following Appian, some scholars have suggested that Tuditanus departed on the campaign in an effort to avoid domestic political troubles in Rome.[49] Nothing in Appian suggests that the campaign was conducted solely for Tuditanus' political reasons. There is no reason to believe that some other general would not have been appointed if Tuditanus wanted to stay at Rome. Moreover, the fact that he left Rome in the midst of a domestic crisis and returned so fast, suggests the seriousness of the situation in the north-west Adriatic.[50]

The results of the campaign are not immediately apparent, but the fact that the Romans were able to launch successful campaigns into the Adriatic hinterland only a decade later, suggests lasting results from Tuditanus' campaign. His campaign resulted in the conquest of the Histri and probably the establishment of control over the Carni and the Iapodes,[51] the removal of the Cisalpine Iapodes from the coast, and it also brought the Liburni into

[45] M. G. Morgan 1973: 39–40 argues that he did, in order to fight Liburnian piracy, connecting it with the tough Roman stand on Ardiaean piracy in 135 BC, and that the Liburnian campaign was an entirely distinct operation from the Iapodean. This was effectively refuted by Čače 1985: 270–1; 1991: 59 and Cerva 1996.

[46] Čače 1985: 270–1; 1991: 63–5; Šašel Kos 2005a: 321–9, see also Vedaldi Iasbez 1994: 29–30; Rossi 1995: 360–1.

[47] Čače 1985: 273–5; 1987/88: 78–90; 1991: 63 ff.; 2001: 93–4 showing that the 'Iapodean coast' in Strabo and Pliny represents an unidentified second-century BC common source.

[48] Polyb. apud Strabo, 4.6.12 (Polyb. 34.10.10–14); Šašel 1974/75: 147–8. Alföldy 1974: 34, n. 43; Šašel Kos 1998; 2005a: 328–9 refutes Šašel. Cf. Strabo, 4.6.10 for a trade route with Pannonia, and Šašel 1966: 203; Horvat 1990 for the importance of Nauportus for Roman interests.

[49] App. *B Civ*. 1.19; Last 1951: 42. The sources of Appian knew more about the reasons for this campaign and the campaign against the Segesticani in 119 BC; Marasco 1993: 487–8.

[50] As Beness 2005 plausibly suggests, there was the possibility of a special appointment for Scipio Aemilianus, as both consuls were absent at that moment. The crisis mentioned appears to be a continuance of the social disturbances in Rome caused by the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC.

[51] Čače 1979: 69–70; Starac 1999: 10 suggested on the basis of Cic. *Balb*. 14, 32 (naming the Iapodes – probably the Cisalpine – but not the Histri and Carni amongst Roman *foederati*) that these peoples were fully conquered after this campaign and become *peregrini*.

the Roman sphere of interest on a more permanent basis. After this campaign the Liburni probably gained privileges from Rome and possibly were even allowed to annex the Iapodean coast or its larger part.[52] The success of his campaign against the Taurisci is more doubtful, as they are not mentioned in the triumph.[53] The success of Tuditanus opened the whole east Adriatic coast to Rome and secured the already existing important trade links of Aquileia and North Italy with Noricum, Pannonia and Salona. The artefacts and late Republican coinage found in Pannonia suggest the existence of a western trade route Aquileia-Nauportus-Segestica-valley of the Sava and further towards the lower Danube.[54]

The later war waged by Marcus Aemilius Scaurus in 115 BC resulted in significant political changes in the eastern Alps. The triumph of Scaurus *de Galleis Carneis* suggests that the Carni openly resented the 'new order' of 129 BC.[55] The hinterland of the Tergeste was taken from them as well as the Tauriscan territory all the way to the Emona basin, including the important Ocra pass, which was under strong Roman political influences.[56] It was probably even annexed and afterwards included in Cisalpine Gaul or, less certainly, given to the Norican kingdom as a reward for their support.[57] The recent discovery of a late Republican/early Principate boundary stone between Aquileia and Emona near Bevke, 13 km south-west of modern Ljubljana, confirms that the territory Aquileia administered stretched deep into the hinterland. Finds of Republican coins in this area also support this possibility, as well as finds of Roman Republican weapons in the area dated to the late second and early first century BC.[58] An indirect result of this Roman influence and probable annexation was the foundation of a late Republican Roman trade settlement (*vicus*) in Nauportus, dated approximately to Caesar's administration of Cisalpine Gaul.[59]

[52] Those immunities are speculated to be an exemption from liturgies, Čače 1985: 329–30 n. 50; and the status of *peregrini*, Medini 1974: 28.

[53] Cf. Šašel Kos 2005a: 326–9.

[54] Čače 1991: 67. Trade links: Strabo, 7.5.2; Marić 1964a: 47, 49; Šašel 1977a; Parović-Pešikan 1982/83; Popović 1987: 105–13 fig. 30; Katić 2002: 428–9.

[55] CIL I: 49; Insc. It. 13/1. Aurelius Victor, *De vir. Ill.* 72.7, mentions triumph over the *Liguri Taurisci*, so it is possible, but not certain that he campaigned against the Taurisci as well. See Šašel 1976: 79–81.

[56] The Roman trade settlement dated to the end of the second century BC is located in Razdrto in the Ocra pass; Bavdek 1995; Horvat 2002: 142–3, 159.

[57] Šašel 1976: 416, 422, 426–7; 1985: 547–55 describes this as Roman annexation after Tuditanus' campaign. See also Šašel Kos 1995: 230–1; 1997a: 30–1, esp. n. 56, with an overview of archaeological evidence supporting the idea of Roman extension in this direction.

[58] Šašel Kos 2002b (boundary stone); Kos 1986: 25–31; Miškec 2004 (coins); Horvat 2002 (weapons).

[59] Šašel Kos 1990: 147–59; 2000: 294–7; 2002b: 377.

In 119 BC, the consul Lucius Aurelius Cotta and his legate, a member of the Metellus family (Lucius Caecilius Metellus Diadematus?),[60] attacked the Segesticani who lived on the continent with its principal city Segestica (an indigenous settlement next to the later Roman colony of Siscia – Sisak near Zagreb).[61] It is odd that this important breakthrough into the Adriatic hinterland was not given more recognition by the sources. It is possible, however, that Appian used a source heavily biased against the Metelli,[62] and this is even more apparent in his account of Metellus' campaign in 118 BC. Appian hints at the initial success of Cotta and Metellus, but in another place in his *Illyrike* it appears obvious that they could not force the Segesticani to pay tribute even after a couple of years. Appian is notorious for using inadequate sources. A good example is his account of the 135 BC war where he does not bother to consult Livy or Strabo (or Strabo's source), who all knew the final result and the consequences of Flaccus' campaign against the Ardiaei and Pleraei (see above).[63]

This campaign of Cotta and Metellus seems to have been a strategic continuation of Tuditanus' campaign in 129 BC, which aimed to use a local crisis, unknown to us, to complete the establishment of a new political order in the Southern Alps. The probable expansion of Cisalpina after the emergency campaign of 129 BC required a re-arrangement of political relationships, and it appears that the Romans chose to make a protective layer of satellite states, which is exactly what this campaign aimed at. If the Romans had wanted a significant and permanent advance towards the Sava, they could have attacked the Transalpine Iapodes as well, just as Octavian did in 35 BC. The expedition of Aemilius Scaurus against the Carni and possibly Taurisci in 115 BC finalised Roman operations in the eastern Alpine area for a while. It strengthened their position and enabled a much more efficient defence of northern Italy against possible attack from that side. The control of the Segesticani and the Transalpine Iapodes did not last long, and it appears that it was not regarded as particularly important by the Romans.

Appian introduces another puzzle into the history of Roman encounters with the region. He states clearly that the Romans twice attacked the land of

[60] M. G. Morgan 1971 convincingly showed that Appian mixed up two different sources and that Metellus Delmaticus was not involved in both campaigns, 119 and 117 BC, cf. Šašel Kos 2005a: 329–34; 2005b: 435–6; Olujić 2007: 79–80, contra: Last 1951: 108; Wilkes 1969: 33–4; Broughton 1951: 525. The idea of Diadematus as Cotta's subordinate is Morgan's conjecture; other members of the Metelli clan can also be considered, such as Diadematus' younger brother. Caius Metellus Caprarius, Šašel Kos 2005a: 333–4; 2005b: 436.

[61] The Segesticani belonged to a specific archaeological group, corresponding with the later Roman peregrine *civitas* the Colapiani, Božič 2001; Čučković 2004.

[62] App. *Ill.* 10; Wilkes 1969: 33–4 n. 2. [63] App. *Ill.* 10, 22.

the Segesticani before Octavian did in 35 BC,[64] and that the expedition of a certain Cornelius against the Pannonians, amongst whom the Segesticani were classed by ancient sources, finished so disastrously that no Roman commander attempted to attack them for a long time.[65] When did the Romans attack Segestica on the other occasion, and who was the hapless Cornelius? Mócsy made an interesting assumption that the Segesticani were actually a part of a larger alliance dominated in that period by the Scordisci.[66] The prevailing opinion amongst scholars is that the Cornelius in question was either Cnaeius Cornelius Dolabella (consul 159), or Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Lupus (consul 156 BC) who unsuccessfully attempted to take Segestica.[67] There is indeed an interesting connection between the raids of the Scordisci in Macedonia and the Roman engagement on the eastern Adriatic coast in 155 BC. It is still difficult to believe, however, that the power of the Scordisci reached as far towards the north-west as Segestica, nor is there credible evidence of a supposed alliance of the Delmatae and Scordisci in 156 and 119, as suggested by Zippel; bearing in mind especially that all their raids were concentrated further south against Macedonia.[68]

In 84 BC the consuls, Lucius Cornelius Cinna and Cnaeus Papirius Carbo, planned to transfer soldiers from Ancona into Liburnia in order to have a base against the approaching army of Sulla. It has been widely suggested that the *populares* planned to make a short-term campaign in Illyricum in order to train newly conscripted soldiers there for the war with Sulla, rather than to take the field in what was a strategically meaningless area.[69] No other troubles are reported in the region and if this reconstruction is true (which I doubt) it could be a Roman response to the fall of Salona to the Delmatae. It is plain, regardless of the view taken, that the *populares* could not plan to transport an army into hostile territory, so that it is almost certain on this occasion that the Liburni were at least on friendly terms with Rome, continuing their

[64] App. *Ill.* 12.

[65] App. *Ill.* 14; Šašel Kos 2005a: 384–7; 2005b: 436–44, cf. Polyb. fr. 64 and Wallbank 1979: 748 for the Pannonian war. M. G. Morgan 1974: 208 puts it in the wider context of the Dalmatian war 156–155 BC.

[66] Mócsy 1962: 535–6; 1974: 12.

[67] Zippel 1877: 133–5; Scullard 1951: 228–9; Mócsy 1962: 537–8; Šašel Kos 1990: 157 n. 102; 1997a: 29. There is nothing in the sources to support this conjecture; Broughton 1951: 447; Münzer 1901: 1,386–7. M. G. Morgan 1974 suggested that the Cornelius was. Publius Scipio Nasica Serapio (consul 138) and that he was defeated on the Macedonian borders by the Scordisci, in their more natural setting, but that idea is contested by Šašel Kos 1997a: 29; 2005a: 387–92; 2005b: 436–8 as being based on hypothetical premises.

[68] Obseq. 16 *Dalmatae Scordisci superati* (155 BC). M. G. Morgan 1971: 276 n. 17. Šašel Kos 2005a: 302–3 suggests Scordis as a place where the Delmatae were defeated or surrendered, cf. Pająkowski, quoted in Šašel Kos 2005a: 302 n. 47.

[69] App. *B Civ.* 1.77–78. Badian 1962: 58–9; Wilkes 1969: 35; contra Balsdon 1965: 232 and Seager 1982: 184 assuming that Cinna and Carbo wanted to spare Italy from fighting.

amicitia, which was probably established in 129 BC. One more campaign against the Iapodes can be detected but on very vague evidence, based on a fragment from Sallust's *Histories*.[70] It has been suggested that this was part of, or the continuation of, Cosconius' campaign against the Delmatae in 78–76 BC, which spread to the Iapodes,[71] but lack of other evidence leaves this argument without decisive support.

One more Roman interaction with the region is suggested in the sources, and, surprisingly, not many modern authors take it into account. Cicero briefly mentioned the 'sea of Illyrici', in the context of Pompey's sweeping the sea of pirates in 67 BC. Pompey's *provincia* covered the whole Mediterranean, including 30 km inland under the *lex Manilia*.[72] Unfortunately, we can only guess what happened from the context and presume from Cicero that some squadrons under the command of Pompey patrolled and fortified coastal cities, as he does not mention any significant combat. However, this statement of Cicero is very interesting as it shows that everyday Roman cognitive geography was already constructing Illyricum as a political space, even before the *lex Vatinia*.

REPUBLICAN TRANS-ADRIATIC ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN SCODRA AND CAESAR: AN ASSESSMENT

As argued in the previous chapter, the two most significant general aspects of later Roman Republican foreign affairs were a generally more aggressive approach in the West, and hegemonic supremacy over the more politically sophisticated states in the Hellenistic East. The treatment of the south-east area shows characteristics of the eastern approach. The imposition of a new kind of political settlement on Macedonia and the former Illyrian kingdom in 167 BC enabled the Romans to exercise control without involving large military resources in the establishment of direct trans-Adriatic rule.[73] The southern coast was divided in a manner similar to Macedonia and left under the control of Rome's allies, the Issaean commonwealth and friendly indigenous communities like the Daorsi. From the available evidence it is obvious that Roman Republican armies were sent across the Adriatic to defend the interests of Roman allies in 155, 135 and 78 BC in the south-central Adriatic. The consequences of Roman actions in the south-central sector included permanent

[70] Sall. *Hist.* 2.38.

[71] Broughton 1952: 86–7; McGushin 1992: I.203; Contra: Zippel 1877: 179; Skefich 1967: 26–7; Wilkes 1969: 35 n. 6 naming an otherwise unknown Publius Licinius mentioned by Frontinus, *Str.* 2.5.28.

[72] Cic. *Leg. Man.* 12 (35) … *missis (naves) item in oram Illyrici maris*, noted only by Skefich 1967: 27, also Starac 2000: 18.

[73] Sherwin-White 1973: 174–81, esp. 179–81; contra Harris 1979.

removal of the Ardiaei and a check on the aggressive designs of the Delmatae, which resulted in their temporary removal from the coast as a political and military force in the war of 78–76 BC. There were no further preventive actions in the Adriatic hinterland in this sector in the extant sources. Roman armies limited themselves to dealing with the immediate danger to their (and allied) interests, and showed no interest in establishing direct control.

In the north-west, the status quo established with the defeat of the Histri in 178 BC worked for almost half a century. The strategic importance of Aquileia for the wider issue of North Italian security made the Romans go beyond the boundaries of their influence, taking a more aggressive approach, after the crisis of 129 BC, when Tuditanus was appointed to deal with the problem. His, and subsequent actions, resulted in both short- and long-term control of the neighbouring peoples and direct annexations of critical zones,[74] in particular the extension of Cisalpina in the territory of modern-day Slovenia. Profits from the important trade route with Pannonia perhaps played some part in a more aggressive Roman stand in the northern sector. This was an easier and shorter link, which opened new markets to Italian merchants and enabled them to be more competitive in their struggle with the Greek and South Illyrian trade with the valleys of the Sava and the Danube.[75] However, an even more important, if not the decisive, element appears to be the Romans' fear of the enemy appearing suddenly in Italy, as Hannibal, or the Gauls before him did. As Williams points out: 'The idea of the invasion of Italy was one of the most profound and enduring of Roman fears. But what gave this fear its special piquancy was the prospect that any such invasion would, like the original Gallic invasion, be followed by the even more dreadful sequel – the capture and destruction of the city of Rome itself.'[76]

That would explain the irrational fear of Philip V appearing in Italy, as mentioned in the earlier chapter, and the credibility of the wild stories of Mithridates VI's 'plans' to invade Italy through the Balkan peninsula, related in the sources. Those fears were exaggerated through the appearance of the Cimbri in Noricum, and the Roman defeat at Noreia in 113 BC.[77] The Romans were visibly more decisive in this sector, making expeditions in the hinterland against the Iapodes, the Carni, Taurisci and Segesticani, and trying to build a ring of allied satellite states that could protect northern Italy from this side. The north-west area was part of these wider North Italian strategic schemes. All that the Romans needed at this time in the north-west sector was

[74] Cf. Šašel 1976: 77. [75] Cf. Popović 1987: 96–115. [76] Williams 2001: 100–84, quote from 139.
[77] App. *Mithr.* 102, cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 41; Dio, 37.11; see Šašel Kos 2005a: 530–2. For the Roman fears regarding Illyricum, *metus Illyrici*, cf. Bandelli 2004: 109; Šašel Kos 2005a: 397–8.

peace and security on the frontiers of North Italy, and increased economic prosperity there, which the Republic achieved with these military operations.[78]

The Romans did not keep garrisons across the Adriatic at this time and, if examples of these in the 50s were not a recent innovation, it would be reasonable to conclude that local Roman allies such as Issa, or the Liburni, were in charge of everyday security. The Romans were flexible and did not pursue exclusively pro-Greek or pro-indigenous policies in this period. They chose the most suitable allies who were interested in the expansion of trade, well-urbanised and more or less integrated into the Mediterranean cultural system. The first obvious choice was their long-standing ally, the Issaean commonwealth. The economic and political power of Issa and its significance for Italian trade interests was indeed an important factor in Roman regional affairs,[79] but the Romans did not hesitate to include indigenous communities with common interests such as the Liburni or Daorsi in the circle of their allies and friends as well, if it suited them.[80] The probable role of the Liburnian communities as regional upholders of Roman interests was very significant, not only for the north Adriatic region, but also for the wider Adriatic, as it enabled an establishment of the land link with the Issaean commonwealth and the southern Adriatic.[81] The main 'troublemakers' in the Roman sources are the Delmatian alliance, which was a recently developed political identity in the Dalmatian hinterland. They soon developed into a strong and well-organised military and political force, which attempted to assert itself as a regional power in the vacuum that appeared after the dissolution of the Illyrian kingdom.[82] There they clashed with the interests of the Issaean commonwealth, so that Rome was forced to intervene three times in this period in order to preserve the position of its ally and the whole 'order of Scodra'.

Nothing in the sources suggests the existence of a separate province of Illyricum until at least 59 BC, and as shown in the next chapter even later. Roman magistrates operating in this sector received special *provinciae* while in office, and were not based in Cisalpine Gaul or Macedonia. In emergency

[78] Šašel 1996: 28.

[79] Issa was the regional economic leader in Dalmatia, Pharus and Corcyra Melaina (Korčula) followed; see Zaninović 1977: 770–1, 774–6; Dukat and Mirnik 1976: 182–4; Crawford 1985: 220–1, App. 50; Kirigin *et al.* 2005. The coins of central Adriatic Greeks had limited internal use, because their trade with the Illyrian hinterland was based mainly, but not exclusively, on exchange, Popović 1987: 87–91; Zaninović 1976a: 307. After 200 BC Italian exports to Issa significantly increased, Bonačić-Mandinić and Visona 2002: 327–30.

[80] The Daorsi maintained intensive trade with the Hellenistic world and minted their own coins, Dukat and Mirnik 1976: 184; Marić 1976. Hellenistic influences and developed trade in Liburnia are well attested, Batović 1974.

[81] Suić 1981: 137–8; Čače 1991: 55–71.

[82] Zaninović 1966: 38; Čače 1979: 101–16 esp. 113–16.

situations, the magistrates were sent to act only against the precisely defined *ethne*. Wilkes rightly noted that all the magistrates acting across the Adriatic in this period, except Cosconius, were consuls in office. In Republican times, it was the usual practice to send consuls in office to deal with emergency situations, rather than to administer provinces. This is a significant fact, as it proves that Illyricum was not a province, and it also makes clear that Roman involvement happened only in an emergency.[83] There is no evidence that any magistrate was entrusted with specific *provincia* Illyricum, or that they conducted any administrative tasks there at this time.[84] The argument of Brunt that all consuls who operated in Illyricum used Cisalpine Gaul as a base is applicable only to the campaigns of 129 and 119 BC, conducted in the North Adriatic sector, while for other campaigns direct sea transport from Italy, either via the friendly island of Issa or by the route via the islands of Palagruža, Sušac and Korčula, are much more likely, as those were the main trans-Adriatic routes from Neolithic times.[85] There are a couple of valid reasons why the Romans did not wish to occupy completely and administer this area, and the most important of these seems to be the fact that occupation would be fruitless and too expensive.[86]

There is no strong evidence to suggest that the principal motivation behind Roman political conduct was the pursuit of military glory. If Illyricum was a hunting ground for triumphs, as has been suggested, it seems reasonable to ask why the Romans were so passive in Illyricum in the Late Republic. Morgan properly characterised these actions as 'police' actions, taking into account their briefness and efficiency.[87] The Romans had only seven, possibly eight, documented encounters with the two parts of future Illyricum for 109 years, between 168 and 60 BC, and only once in the sources is it suggested, but not proven, in the case of Metellus Delmaticus that a Roman *imperator* earned an easy triumph. Illyricum does not follow the pattern of the other areas where Romans were militarily involved in this period, such as Spain or periodically Gaul. Political contacts are rare, military involvement was caused mainly by requests of the allies, and their extent is limited to either the north or south-central sector, never along the whole coast.

Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that there was no distinct unified Roman Republican policy across the Adriatic before 59 BC. Initially, the Romans saw this region as an interest-zone, grouped with North Italy and Macedonia, and adopted the same approach used for those areas in the future

[83] Wilkes 1969: 36. Consuls used for emergencies: Rich 1993: 50–3; Brennan 2000: 215–21, 371.
[84] Syme 1999: 164–73; Wilkes 1969: 37–8 also does not rule out that possibility.
[85] Brunt 1987: 566–8. See Brusić 1970: 555 figs. 1–2; Kozličić and Bratović 2006: 110–12 and Radić 2003 for the trans-Adriatic routes.
[86] Čače 1985: 294–5; Šašel 1996: 28. [87] M. G. Morgan 1971: 293; Šašel 1976: 77–82.

Illyricum. Illyricum did not exist in the Roman perception, neither legally nor strategically/politically. Roman allies who were not strong enough to be rivals to Roman domination themselves, and who were interested in general peace and security in the Adriatic area for the expansion of trade, were left in charge as Roman regional sheriffs. The Romans used force to intervene on more difficult occasions, but the political situation did not present Rome with too many significant problems, judging by the few interventions attested in the sources. The focal point of political disturbances was control over the gateway communities of Salona and Narona. The political frameworks Rome constructed on the south and north-western zone enabled the system to function without more significant political turbulence.

The central geographical position of the Issaean commonwealth in the eastern Adriatic certainly influenced the development of late Republican political conduct, and its friendly and allied status made the development of a provincial infrastructure in the late Republic unnecessary there. The north generally witnessed a more aggressive Roman approach because it appears that it was perceived after 129 BC as potentially the weakest spot in the defence of North Italy and the Italian homeland. In addition, Aquileian trade interests demanded peace and Roman domination in this area, as well as the control of navigation over the eastern Adriatic coast. Favourable natural characteristics enabled the eastern coast to continue its role as the main naval traffic corridor through the Adriatic, while the western Italian coast was used only for local navigation until the last few centuries.[88]

It does not seem from the evidence that Roman influence in the region diminished; in fact, it seems that Roman influence increased in the second and first half of the first century BC. There was no danger to Roman interests from peoples in the hinterland, and the rather rare engagements indicate stability in the area as well as increased settlement of Italians and Roman citizens. On the other hand, it is obvious that at this time the Romans were not interested in entering the western part of the Balkan peninsula, and did not want to risk fighting in difficult terrain. The political concerns of Rome were based on very broad principles here and, except for the security of Aquileia or the interests of Roman allies, the future Illyricum was really outside of the immediate political concerns of Rome, falling between their fears of an enemy invading North Italy and their engagement in Macedonia and the southern Balkan peninsula. It was a one-dimensional zone of political interest defined by the sea and the mountains of its

[88] Jurišić 2000: 47–51; Kozličić 2000; Kozličić and Bratanić 2006. See Škegro 1999: 211–23 for the synthesis of previous works on maritime links in the eastern Adriatic.

hinterland. Its geographical proximity to Italy required that the area should be kept under loose, indirect control, and that is what we see from the Roman record in the region. The Romans did not send generals to hunt for triumphs, nor did they develop any detectable policy, but sent armies only when they estimated that the political situation demanded military action.

CHAPTER 5

The construction of Illyricum: Caesar in Illyricum and the Civil Wars (59–44 BC)

In 59 BC Caius Iulius Caesar was appointed pro-consul of Cisalpine Gaul, and in addition he received command over Illyricum by means of the *lex Vatinia de imperio Caesaris*.[1] The ultimate significance of this fact for the destiny of the Republic overshadows another important thing – the *de iure* construction of Illyricum in Roman political and administrative discourse.[2] This was the first time we know of that a Roman magistrate was entrusted with *provincia* stretching over the whole eastern Adriatic coast. Earlier instances of *provinciae* that Roman magistrates held in this area in the earlier period were limited to individual indigenous peoples, and the *provincia* of Anicius in 168 BC was related only to the *regnum Illyricum*. The *lex Vatinia* was a crucial change in Roman trans-Adriatic relations. With this law, Roman power over the whole eastern coast of the Adriatic was legally defined, and Illyricum was *de iure* constructed as a political concept. True, it was not yet a province with strictly defined borders, but the very fact that Illyricum was now the space where Roman political, legal and military power was directly and permanently projected signalled the last stage in Roman trans-Adriatic engagement, and at the same time can be recognised as a foundation of Illyricum in Roman political discourse.

This chapter deals with the period of Caesar's pro-consulate in Illyricum 59–50 BC, and the Civil Wars. For this period our sources are much more abundant than for the mid- to late Republican period. Caesar and Hirtius are contemporaries and agents of the events, and without doubt the best sources for the period. A couple of brief notes from Caesar's *Gallic* and *Civil Wars* provide some insight into the political situation in Illyricum, as well as the conduct of Roman magistrates there. Some useful contemporary

[1] Sources: Broughton 1952: 190; Skefich 1967: 139–42. See Gelzer 1928; Balsdon 1939 and Skefich 1967: 64–101, 143–90 for the chronology, the political background, the purpose and older literature on the subject of this law.

[2] The area was officially called Illyricum in Octavian's times and later, Šašel Kos 2005a: 401–3.

information may also be deduced from Cicero's correspondence with Vatinius, who fought the Delmatae near Narona in the mid-40s. Later sources, like Dio, Appian and Plutarch, sometimes make many errors and provide an often confused chronology of the events, so they are not especially reliable for the period of the Civil Wars.[3] Lucan's epic *Pharsalia* does mention the events which occurred in Illyricum, but it should not be taken too seriously as evidence, as factual accuracy was not high on the list of priorities for Lucan. There is even some epigraphic evidence from this period, such as the inscription from Salona that will be discussed later.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF ILLYRICUM

The law of Vatinius raises two major problems. The first concerns the political motives behind extending Caesar's command over Illyricum, and the second concerns the constitutional position of Illyricum in 59 BC. Some authors think that Illyricum became a province just before Caesar's pro-consulship, some time in the late 60s, as Cicero asked the pro-consul Lucius Culleolus to press the Illyrian Bylliones to pay back a loan to Lucius Lucceius. This letter is dated before 58 BC and Culleolus is assumed to be governor of Illyricum, as he cannot be placed in either Macedonia or Cisalpine Gaul at that time.[4] There is a slight problem in this argument. The Bylliones lived south-east of Apollonia, and Apollonia is attested as part of the Macedonian province in 50 BC.[5] Thus, the whole argument about Illyricum being a province before Caesar is invalid, as Culleolus was governor of Macedonia, regardless of when this letter is dated.[6] Other scholars think that Illyricum became a separate province with the passage of the *lex Vatinia* in 59 BC.[7] The sources reporting Caesar's appointment differ in their details, but no source suggests that Illyricum was in any way separate from the administration of Cisalpine Gaul as a different province; it was only an attachment to his *provincia* of Cisalpine Gaul.[8] In fact, the only

[3] Marasco 1997: 313 ff.

[4] Cic. *Fam*. 13.41–2; Broughton 1952: 183, 191; 1986: 78; Shackleton-Bailey 1977: I.353; Brennan 2000: 424–5, 493–4. McDermott 1969: 239–40 dates the letter to 48 BC.

[5] Cic. *Pis*. 86, 96; Papazoglu 1976: 204.

[6] Skefich 1967: 28–9.

[7] D. Rendić-Miočević 1980: 17; Bilić-Dujmušić 2000: 21 (59 BC). Contra Freber 1993: 125–7; Syme 1999: 169–73.

[8] Plut. *Caes*. 14.10: Illyricum added; *Pomp*. 48.3: two Gauls and Illyricum; *Cato Min* 33.3: rule over Illyricum and two Gauls; App. *B Civ*. 2.13: two Gauls, no mention of Illyricum; Dio, 38.8.5: Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul; Suet. *Iul*. 22.1: Illyricum added to the Gauls; Vell. Pat. 2.44.5: two Gauls. Only Orosius, 6.7.1 explicitly states that Illyricum was an independent province in 59 BC. Papazoglu 1976: 205 n. 38; Šašel Kos 2005a: 337–8, 462.

contemporary source we have on this matter, Cicero, in his speech *De provinciis consularibus* in 56 BC, refers only to the 'two Gauls' (*Galliae duae*) under Caesar's command, and clearly understands Illyricum to be part of the Cisalpine *provincia*.[9]

What was the geographical extent of Caesar's Illyricum, and where did his *provincia* extend in reality? It seems obvious that his *provincia* was related to the coastal belt from Histria to Lissus with the immediate hinterland.[10] It is difficult, if not impossible, to search for the defined frontiers, because such a concept was still foreign to the Romans in many ways. Caesar's *imperium* was rather a power and freedom to act over his *provincia*; power to protect certain indigenous political institutions and regulate their relationships; and finally power over the *conventus* of Roman citizens that sprung up over the Adriatic coast in the earlier decades.

The reason for the attachment of the command of Illyricum to Cisalpine Gaul is not stated by the sources. Some scholars, such as Wilkes and Freber, point out that the north-west zone of future Illyricum was routinely attached to Cisalpina during this period, so there was nothing extraordinary about Caesar's appointment. Wilkes also rightly denied the possibility that Caesar planned to make a conquest of Illyricum before he gained the *provincia* of Transalpine Gaul, thanks to the timely death of Metellus Celer.[11] The idea of pre-meditated conquest is not convincing enough, as it speculates too much without evidence and ultimately fails to explain Caesar's obvious lack of interest in Illyricum.

The rise of the Dacian kingdom and the military successes of Burebista in northern Pannonia was not the cause of political turbulence north of Illyricum in the first years of Caesar's rule, as previously thought. Burebista's army, helped by the Scordisci, defeated the alliance of the Boii and Taurisci led by Cristasirus only in c. 40s BC, not a decade earlier.[12] The Dacians presented only a potential and very remote danger to Roman interests in Illyricum in 59 BC, as Burebista's power did not extend to Pannonia or Central Europe.[13] His attention was visibly focused on Thrace and the Black Sea region, so that any suggestion that he was stirring up the conflict in Dalmatia lacks credibility, as there is no evidence for it. It would

[9] Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 2, 3; 15, 36. [10] Šašel Kos 2005a: 338, fig. 79.
[11] Wilkes 1969: 37–8; Freber 1993: 168–9. Conquest plans were argued by Skefich 1967 esp. 70–2; Sherwin-White 1957: 36–9.
[12] Strabo, 5.1.6, 7.3.11, 7.5.2; Crişan 1978: 113–22. This event is redated from c. 60 BC; see Dobesch 1994; Lica 2000: 65–78, esp. 68–70.
[13] Timpe 1965: 193–4; Crişan 1978: 143–6.

be very rash to see Roman troubles with the Delmatae in 50–48 BC, discussed below as starting with the Dacians, as some scholars previously thought.[14]

The fear of the Helvetii could be considered serious enough to attach Illyricum to the Cisalpina, but it is doubtful how justified was that fear. The Helvetii did not threaten Illyricum directly, but the memory of the Cimbri and Teutones might have stirred unpleasant memories amongst the Romans, enough to enable Caesar freedom of action across the Adriatic. The fear of the Helvetii might well be perceived as real by the Romans at that moment, as we can see from Cicero's letter to Atticus where he mentions a fear of the Gallic war in public.[15] The migration of the Helvetii caused at least some political instability in western Pannonia and the eastern Alps. The consequence of this instability was that the Boii besieged Noreia, the capital of Noricum, in 58 BC as allies of the Helvetii, according to Caesar. However, Timpe makes a strong argument against the view that the fear was justified. He argues that Caesar himself used and manipulated the perception of the threat from the Helvetii for his advantage, and carried on the Gallic war entirely on his own initiative, and that the situation on the frontiers of Roman zones of interest in Europe was nothing out of the ordinary in 59 BC.[16] Much more real than the threat from the Helvetii, was the fear of the Iapodes, who were capable of threatening Cisalpine Gaul, and their relationship with the Romans in this period was described as 'dynamic and turbulent'.[17]

Thus, due to lack of other evidence, it appears that Caesar's appointment to Cisalpine Gaul was more a matter of domestic politics than of an immediate outside threat to Roman interests in this region,[18] although the perception and manipulation of the threat certainly played an important part. Caesar was seeking to be located close to Rome, and an opportunity to keep in touch and exercise significant political influence on events in Rome. In the same way the addition of Illyricum to Cisalpina seems to be of a preventive nature, to enable the provincial governor freedom of action if there was need for operations in north-western Illyricum.

[14] Condurachi, quoted and accepted by Dacoviciu 1977: 905 n. 54; Freber 1993: 169–70 n. 845. Burebista's policy had more things in common with the policy of Mithridates VI; Condurachi 1978; Crişan 1978: 122–31 and essentially in agreement with the geographical dimension of Burebista's interests, Lica 2000: 82.

[15] Cic. *Ad Att*. 1.9.2.

[16] Caesar, *B Gall*. 1.5.4. Timpe 1965; Gardner 1983; Freber 1993: 168. Cf. Bellen 1985: 9–19, 36–46 and Williams 2001: 100–84, esp. 171–82 on the Roman fear of Gauls in general.

[17] Olujić 2007: 80–4, the quote from 82.

[18] Cf. Cary 1951: 519; Timpe 1965: 192–214; Gelzer 1968: 87.

However, all of these issues and undertakings do not fully explain the construction of Illyricum, and why there was a need for introducing this new geo-political concept into the political terminology with the *lex Vatinia*. There are two reasons that should be taken into account. The first reason is obvious. The *conventus* of Roman citizens on the eastern Adriatic coast were increasing in importance, and they required the attention of a Roman magistrate to administer them and to regulate their relations with the other Roman allies in the area. The second reason is of a more speculative nature, but should not be underestimated. As argued in Chapter 2, the attitude towards *provincia* changed irreversibly in the mid-first century BC, so it became more territorially defined than before. Caesar's Illyricum was still perceived by the Romans as a one-dimensional tactical space, as Rambaud defined it,[19] from the earlier period, but this time the new, artificially formed superstructure of Illyricum joined the earlier south-eastern and north-western zone of operation under a single *provincia*. The Romans showed their conservatism with the choice of name for the new region, and instead of the new, contemporary and relevant term Dalmatia, they used the old one deriving from the phantom *regnum Illyricum* from the earlier century.[20] The construction of Illyricum was at the same time an ingenious and practical product of Roman expansion that finally made the Adriatic the 'Roman Lake', and secured the extension of direct application of Roman power all around it. Caesar's Illyricum was a political core, which enabled future gradual extension of Roman power in the hinterland. Illyricum was *de facto* gradually created in the previous period, but it was *de iure* constructed with the Vatinian law.

CAESAR – PRO-CONSUL OF ILLYRICUM

Caesar mentions Illyricum only twice in the *Gallic Wars*. In the winter of 57–56 BC he intended to go there personally, to acquaint himself with the region, but the suddenly worsening situation in Gaul prevented him from reaching his destination. He does not say specifically whether he reached Illyricum or not in 57–56 BC. The only fact known beyond doubt is that he was at Aquileia at that time, where he met the delegation of the Issaean commonwealth, as is discussed below.[21] In 54 BC Caesar was taking

[19] Rambaud 1974. [20] Čače 2003 (Dalmatia); Šašel Kos 2000: 284.

[21] Caesar, *B Gall.* 3.7, cf. 2.35. Skefich 1967: 107–13; Gelzer 1968: 116; Papazoglu 1976: 205; Šašel Kos 1986: 104; 2005a: 341–2 suggest that Caesar visited Illyricum, while Wilkes 1969: 38–9 leaves this question open.

counter-measures against the Pirustae who were attacking the 'remotest parts of the province'; he ordered a mobilisation of Roman allies before reaching Illyricum, but seemingly that was enough to calm the problems and permit the solution of the crisis through diplomatic means.[22] It is not entirely clear what targets the Pirustae attacked or threatened. Scholars agree that they inhabited the mountainous and mineral-rich area around modern Pljevlja in the Adriatic hinterland (northern Montenegro/south-eastern Bosnia), and Strabo perceived them as one of the Pannonii.[23] If this location is right, it is highly possible that the security of Narona, or that of the Roman allies in the area such as the Daorsi or even more south towards the Epirus, was under threat.[24]

In 51 BC the Iapodes, it is not clear which ones – Transalpine or Cisalpine, threatened the security of Aquileia and Tergeste.[25] It appears to have been a serious incursion. Its consequences show the potential weakness of the Roman defence system, or possibly it appears to have been a result of Caesar's complete lack of interest in Illyrian matters. No reasons for this incursion are given in the sources, but it has been suggested that the recent foundation of the *municipium* of Tergeste made the Cisalpine Iapodes feel threatened, and for that reason they broke their agreement with the Romans. It is also not impossible that the Transalpine Iapodes, who did not have a *foedus* with the Romans, made this incursion.[26] Strabo's more recent source for the description of this area clearly implies that the Iapodes extended their power almost to the pass of Ocra. Strabo's accounts derive from two different sources: 7.5.2 is older because it regards Nauportus as a Tauriscan settlement and the Iapodean-controlled territory as larger in 4.6.10, as compared with 7.5.2.[27] The citizens of Aquileia built a protective wall after this raid and Caesar sent the legate Titus Labienus and the newly recruited legion XV into the threatened area for its protection, and to prevent further attacks.[28]

The Promona affair happened in 50 BC, when the Delmatae attacked and took possession of the Liburnian-held border stronghold

[22] Caesar, *B Gall.* 5.1; Šašel Kos 2005a: 343–5.
[23] Strabo, 7.5.3; Alföldy 1965a: 56–9; Garašanin and Garašanin 1967: 96–7; Wilkes 1969: 173–4; Bojanovski 1988a: 90–1.
[24] Skefich 1967: 110–20.
[25] Caesar (Hirtius), *B Gall.* 8.24. Suić 1967: 47–8; Calderini 1972: 29; Šašel Kos 2005a: 422–3 connects this raid of unnamed attackers with two undated attacks of the Iapodes in App. *Ill.* 18.
[26] Šašel Kos 2000: 292. The foundation date of the colony in Tergeste is disputed, as it is possible to date it later to the 30s BC and the establishment of the *municipium* in 49 BC; Keppie 1983: 201–2.
[27] Šašel 1966: 199 n. 5; 1977a: 158; Šašel Kos 1990: 144–5; 2002a: 146–8.
[28] CIL I² 2648; Caesar, *B Gall.* 6.1; Šašel 1985: 547–8.

of Promona.[29] It is not clear whose possession Promona was before 50 BC. Cultural similarities of the population of Promona with those who belonged to the Delmatian alliance cannot automatically determine construction of their identity, even less show their political allegiances in 50 BC. So it seems more probable that Promona belonged to the independent or Liburnian-allied Varvarini than to the Delmatian alliance, which had only recently expanded towards the north-west. It is indeed doubtful whether the Delmatae permanently controlled any part of the coast, especially north of Tragurium in that time, taking into account their recent defeat by Cosconius in 76 BC.

After the Liburnian appeal, Caesar sent a strong detachment, but the Delmatae and their allies defeated them. The names of these allies remain unknown. Čače, referring to Appian's 'some other Illyrians' (καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι Ἰλλυρων), suggests action by the larger alliance composed of the Delmatae, their *clientes* and allies. He also points out that it is very possible that the communities which made up the later Roman *civitas* of the Ditiones, who bordered the Liburni in the upper flow of the Titius, joined the Delmatian alliance.[30] It does seem that there were no Roman troops committed to this engagement, but that Roman allies supplied troops possibly under the command of a Roman officer, as they had done when the Pirustae earlier threatened the security of the area.[31] This event also shows the importance of a local self-defence system. It is unclear how that might pacify troubles arising in the hinterland, because Roman allies such as the Issaeans or Liburnian communities had stronger naval than infantry capabilities. The Promona affair reveals the growing strength and vitality of the Delmatian alliance in the late 50s. There was a visible change in their strategic aims, from earlier unsuccessful pressure on Salona and the Manian Bay. They attacked for the first time that we know of in the west and threatened the Liburnian communities. It is not known for certain what happened to Promona later. It was certainly returned to the Liburni in the next decade, because in 34 BC the Delmatae captured it again, but the circumstances remain unclear.[32]

[29] Suić thought that Promona was part of the Liburnian Varvarian municipality. A different opinion is expressed by Čače, who argues that Cosconius took Promona from the Delmatae in 78–76 BC and gave it to the Liburni as a reward for their support. Suić 1960/61: 195–6; Čače 1989: 87 n. 75, cf. Šašel Kos 2005a: 346 and Bilić-Dujmušić 2006b: 43–9.

[30] App. *Ill.* 12. Čače 1993: 7–8. Pliny, *HN* 3.142 and Bojanovski 1988a: 262–5 for the size and location of the Ditiones.

[31] Skefich 1967: 123–5; Wilkes 1969: 39–40; Čače 1993: 6–8 assumed that some Roman citizens from Cisalpina, and the Romans and Italians already settled in Liburnia, were taking action besides the allies.

[32] App. *Ill.* 25. See the different speculations of Čače 1993: 9; Bilić-Dujmušić 2000: 173–6; Nagy 1991: 58.

Lack of sources prevents us from determining what Roman administrative structures, if any, existed at this time on the eastern Adriatic coast. Varro's report of eighty-nine *civitates* 'coming into', i.e. being administered from Narona, should be dated later, as discussed in the previous chapter pp. 68-9. In fact, it is very possible that Caesar did not bother to make any more significant intervention into the administrative division of Illyricum, and was content with the geographical-ethnic divisions in the area, maintaining existing political entities, as in Gaul.[33]

There is a damaged inscription from Salona that mentions an embassy from Tragurium to Caesar, while he was in Aquileia.[34] Unfortunately, the preserved text is confusing and difficult to interpret; yet it is the only surviving document of this kind and therefore immensely important for any study of Roman Illyrian affairs, and Caesar's political actions in this region. The first part of the inscription is dated to early 56 BC and mentions the embassy from Tragurium, an Issaean colony on the mainland led by a Roman citizen, Caius Gavenius, who spoke about friendship between Issa and Rome. The second part reaffirms Roman friendship and alliance with Issa. The last part, poorly preserved, gives unclear references to the citizens of Tragurium and the Iadastini (Ἰα]δαστιν[οί) who were for some time regarded as the indigenous inhabitants of the immediate neighbourhood of Tragurium, until more recent scholarship conclusively argued that they are in fact the citizens of Liburnian Iader.[35]

The tantalising reconstruction of this important document leaves plenty of scope for speculation about its contents. The first part mentions diplomats from Tragurium, the second part is concerned with Issa and the document was found in Salona, so that confusion is complete. Whose interests were in question and what happened in Aquileia? Modern scholars offer several opinions. Without any essential knowledge of the area, Culham recently stated that the indigenous people first threatened Tragurium so that the Tragurians asked Rome for help through the mother-colony. Salona was also an interested party in the problems with the indigenous population, so that a copy was also kept there. It does not appear convincing that the insignificant Iadastini from the neighbourhood of Salona, where

[33] See similar point made by Čače 2001: 93, 100. Caesar's *laissez faire* approach in Gaul is well known; Drinkwater 1983: 18–19.

[34] Three inscriptions have been found in separate locations, originating from the same monument; Sherk 1969: 139–42 no. 24. Sherk regards this document as a *senatus consultum*, but there is no evidence to confirm it, Šašel Kos 2005a: 342.

[35] D. Rendić-Miočević 1935/49 disputed by Sherk 1969; Suić 1975a. Suić 1981: 142–3; Nikolanci 1989 understood that the Iadastinoi were only the Roman citizens settled in Iader, and Čače 1993: 24–7; 1997/98: 76–81, points out that the Iadastinoi are the citizens of Iader, indigenous Liburni.

Wilkes located them, could make so much trouble for the regional heavyweights.[36] In the same manner the suggestion that it was Graeco-Roman tensions in the area which triggered the embassy, rather than problems with the indigenous population, lacks any sound basis.[37] There is also an alternative, more liberal reading of the inscription, suggesting that it conferred freedom from taxes, and guaranteed freedom of navigation in the Manian Bay for Salona, Issa and Iader, instead of settling a border dispute.[38]

This problem is at present unsolvable and only speculation is possible. The mention of Iader, Issa, Tragurium, the Manian Bay,[39] and possibly Salona and Epetium together in the same document, suggests its general importance and the complexity of the political situation inside Illyricum. The inscription from Salona does not mention a *conventus civium Romanorum* or in fact anyone from Salona. The involvement of Salona is assumed only because the inscription was found there. The interested parties are *socii*, Tragurium, Issa and Iadertinoi, appealing for arbitration to the Roman magistrate whose *provincia* encompassed that area for their internal dispute. After Caesar had settled problems with the Issaeans, he sent Quintus Numerius Rufus as his legate to Issa, where Numerius Rufus sponsored the repair of the public portico and became patron of the city.[40]

Early Italian settlement on the Illyrian coast is a very important aspect of Roman affairs in Illyricum, which became more apparent in this period. It directly influenced the important strategic shift in Roman conduct towards a more resolute approach to Illyricum. The personal influence of Caesar is thought to be very significant in this shift.[41] The *conventus civium Romanorum* on the Dalmatian coast pre-dated Caesar, but only as self-organised communities of Roman citizens and without defined public or administrative status. The Dalmatian *conventus* appear to be recent, but in other places they had sprung up already in the second century BC, so it is possible that lack of evidence alone prevents us also from dating the establishment of the Dalmatian *conventus* to the second century BC.[42] Cicero's letters suggest a

[36] Wilkes 1969: 10, 154, 220–1, 360; Culham 1993; following the outdated reading of D. Rendić-Miočević 1935/49.

[37] Wilkes 1969: 38–9, cf. Novak 1949: 73–4; Suić 1966: 184–90; 1981: 144–6; 1996: 273–4; Kuntić-Makvić 2002: 149–50. It is not fully convincing in the light of the continuing good relationship between Romans and Issa, as convincingly argued by Čače 1997/98: 80.

[38] Suić 1966: 190–1.

[39] Especially if Čače 1997/98: 76–81 is right that the Manian Bay includes not only Salona but extends all the way to the peninsula of Pelješac and the mouth of the Neretva.

[40] CIL 3.3078 – Numerius Rufus at Issa; cf. Gabričević 1970.

[41] Alföldy 1965a: 200; Skefich 1967: 132–4; Freber 1993: 149–56.

[42] Wilson 1966: 13–17, 76.

strong Roman economic interest in the south-eastern Adriatic coast in the 50s and 40s BC,[43] and it is possible that those communities also have significant numerical strength. Settlers are generally more numerous in the western provinces, and perhaps settled in much larger numbers than we have evidence for. The Roman *conventus* in Salona is estimated at c. 10,000 inhabitants in the early 40s BC.[44] These communities increase in importance for their wealth and influence on local governors,[45] and they were to be an important element of support for Caesar in the Civil Wars.

Caesar made some *conventus* responsible for administration of the cities in which they existed; we have confirmation of this for Lissus at least, but without more evidence the *conventus* mentioned in the sources as communities should not be confused with *conventus* as administrative units.[46] In the mid-first century BC, *conventus* of Italian traders are attested in Lissus, Narona and Salona, and possibly in Epidaurum and Iader as well.[47] In Lissus are found two inscriptions from the city gate, mentioning Caius Iulius Caesaris Meges, the freedman of Caesar, who was a city magistrate (*IIvir*).[48] Thus, it is highly likely that Caesar gave municipal rights to some of these cities, or entrusted their administration to the communities of Roman citizens during his rule over Illyricum, rather than established colonies.[49]

The Romans needed the support of the local population, which might have been secured by some limited enfranchisement of the indigenous population, and the allocation of municipal rights to some settlements. For that purpose they needed already urbanised centres and a population significantly affected by Mediterranean 'globalisation'. Of all Illyricum, only the coastal communities fully satisfied those requirements. They were focal points of communication and connectivity where old identities were recast, and the coastal Mediterranean core of future Illyricum formed.[50] Suić thought after

[43] *Fam*. 13.41–2; 13.77.3; see Deniaux 1993.

[44] Wilson 1966: 9–12; Bilić-Dujmušić 2000: 130 n. 46 (Roman *conventus* in Salona).

[45] Brunt 1987: 220–1.

[46] Caesar, *B Civ*. 3.29; Skefich 1967: 118–19 argued that Lissus became an administrative *conventus* after the problems with the Pirustae about 54 BC. Papazoglu 1986: 221 thought that Caesar established an administrative *oppidum c. R.*, but the passage from Caesar may also imply that he entrusted rule of the *oppidum* Lissus to *conventus c. R.*, rather than established the *oppidum c. R.* as an administrative unit. Vittinghoff 1951: 462 and Čače 1993: 25 contest that *oppidum c. R.* in Pliny was an administrative category.

[47] Lissus: Wilson 1966: 16–17; Narona: CIL 3.1820; Alföldy 1965a: 134; Paci 2007; Salona: Caesar, *B Civ*. 3.9.2, Alföldy 1965a: 100. Epidaurum: Hirtius, *B Alex*. 44.5 is not reliable evidence for a *conventus* in Caesar's time, but is accepted by Alföldy 1965a: 139; Iader: Suić 1981: 142–3.

[48] AE 1982: 765–6; Prendi 1981.

[49] Brunt 1987: 236–9. Wilkes 1996: 574; cf. Watkins 1979: 83.

[50] Medini 1974: 29 ff.; see Hingley 2005: 105–9 for the role of ancient cities in globalisation.

Pliny that some cities in Liburnia, such as Curicum (the island of Krk), Varvaria or even Asseria possibly acquired *ius italicum* in the 50s, but that matter is disputed and cannot be precisely determined without more evidence. Most certainly municipalisation occurred some time in the early principate, but in Caesar's time it might also have achieved some immunities and other privileges.[51] In this transitional municipal phase,[52] the *praefecti civitatium* were the only magistrates appointed to administer local rule in Liburnian cities and, according to the inscription from Curicum, they were, at least in one case, members of the most distinguished portions of the indigenous elite.[53]

During his visit to Illyricum in 54 BC, Caesar held assizes in the cities with significant communities of Roman citizens who belonged under the Roman judicial system. Unfortunately, his account is very brief, and it is not possible to deduce anything more from it; either his route or the cities he visited.[54] The existence of Roman *portoria* in Illyricum at this time is doubtful, as they are attested only in the early empire.[55] The administrative centre of Illyricum in this period is not known, and the apparent lack of an administrative infrastructure does not suggest that there was one. Narona appears to be the most obvious candidate, although there are some less convincing indications that Issa played that role before it opted for Pompey during the Civil Wars.[56]

THE ROMAN INTERNAL TURBULENCE AFTER 49 BC

The civil war between Caesar and Pompey plunged the whole Mediterranean into conflict. Illyricum suddenly and unexpectedly became a significant theatre of the war. Inside Illyricum the Civil Wars created chaotic divisions. A few interesting situations arose from this turbulent period.[57] Salona, a member of the Issaean commonwealth before the conflict, took an independent course from the rest of the commonwealth and

[51] Curicum: CIL 3.13295; Varvaria: Suić 1960/61: 186–7, 189; Asseria: Suić 1960/61: 187 n. 33, 190 n. 42. Contrary: Alföldy 1965a: 86; Wilkes 1969: 492. These communities certainly gained some privileges from either Caesar or Octavian, Šašel Kos 2000: 297–300; 2005a: 471.

[52] Alföldy 1961: 60 ff.; 1965a: 68 ff.; Medini 1974: 28 using Pliny's account defines three stages of municipalisation: peregrinal, the *ius italicum* and/or exemption from taxes, and municipalisation.

[53] CIL 3.13295; Medini 1974: 30–4. Wilkes 1969: 197 calls them 'quasi-municipal magistrates'.

[54] Caesar, *B Gall*. 5.1.

[55] CIL 5.706 (Tergeste) 3.12914–15 (Salona); 3.13225 (Senia). There was an *Aquileiensis portorium* at this time; Cic. *Font*. 2.

[56] Caesar, *B Gall* 5.1. Narona: Patsch 1907: 24; Skefich 1967: 121–2; Bojanovski 1985: 66 after Pliny, *HN* 3.142. Issa: Wilkes 1969: 39; Šašel Kos 1986: 104; 2005a: 342.

[57] See Veith 1924: 267–74; Marasco 1995; 1997; Bilić-Dujmušić 2000; Wilkes 1969: 40–3.

supported Caesar. The Delmatae, part of the Liburnian communities and the Issaean commonwealth supported Pompey, while Salona and the rest of the Liburni, notably Iader, stood firmly by Caesar. The citizens of Salona stubbornly resisted although they were besieged by Pompeians for a few months until the winter forced Octavius to lift the siege.[58] Even after the Pompeians were finally defeated, there was no peace in Illyricum. The Delmatian alliance continued to resist the Romans, and even to enlarge their territory, using the opportunity after the Issaean commonwealth was dissolved and when the Romans were engaged elsewhere. The success of Pompeian admirals in the Adriatic was a decisive factor in the opportunistic decision of the Delmatae and Issa to support Pompey rather than Caesar.[59]

The Adriatic was a significant naval battlefield in the Civil Wars. Caesar built one of his two fleets in the Adriatic and that fleet employed the Liburni or Liburnian-constructed ships.[60] On the other side, in Pompey's camp, the Liburni were combined with the Achaeans as one of his five naval squadrons, commanded by Marcus Octavius and Scribonius Libo, and they used Issa as a base for Adriatic operations after taking control of the city.[61] Caesar's Adriatic fleet was later defeated and one of its commanders, Caius Antonius, was captured on the island of Curicum (Krk) by the squadron of Octavius and Scribonius, i.e. the same squadron mentioned above, made up of the Achaean and the Liburnian fleet.[62] The citizens of the Liburnian city, Iader, helped Caesar's legate Quintus Cornificius to win a naval engagement against the Pompeians.[63]

The appearance of Liburnian naval auxiliaries on both sides in 49 BC confirms their existing political heterogeneity. Caesar was supported by the majority of Liburnian communities, such as Iader, Aenona, Curicum and those communities in southern Liburnia such as Varvaria and Burnistae, who were already in conflict with pro-Pompeian Delmatae.[64] This does not explain the presence of the Liburnian fleet on Pompey's side but, assuming that the Liburni were a heterogeneous league(s) of independent *civitates* rather than a unified polity, it is not difficult to understand how it happened that some Liburnian communities supported Caesar and some Pompey, as

[58] Caesar, *B Civ*. 3.9; Dio, 42.11. [59] Marasco 1997: 315; Čače 1997/98: 80.
[60] App. *B Civ*. 2.41; Caesar, *B Civ*. 3.9.1.
[61] Caesar, *B Civ*. 3.5.3; Plut. *Pomp*. 64; Luc. *Phars*. 4.529 ff. The sources probably refer to the Liburnian fleet, not the fleet of *liburnicae*, the type of light warship originated by the Liburni, Dzino 2003: 28.
[62] Dio, 41.40; Luc. *Phars*. 4.402 ff.; Livy, *Per*. 110, see also Faber 2003.
[63] Hirtius, *B Alex*. 42–3. Čače 1993: 26–31; 1997/98: 76, 78–9.
[64] Bilić-Dujmušić 2000: 88–92; Čače 1993: 28–9; Zaninović 1988b: 56–7; Suić 1960/61: 188–9; Starac 2000: 17–18.

they looked after their individual interests, or followed earlier formed allegiances.[65] Another reason for some Liburnian support for Pompey could be their long-lasting connection with Picenum in Italy, the ancestral stronghold of Pompey.[66]

It was pure opportunism that caused the Issaeans to support the Pompeians, not some Greek-Roman quarrel, or any special animosity towards Caesar. Issa and Caesar were on friendly terms, his legate Quintus Numerius Rufus had recently become patron of the city. It was speculated that the pro-Caesarian government of the Issaean commonwealth was overthrown and replaced by Pompeian supporters when the war started.[67] However, as Salona had more pro-Caesarian elements, it is possible that the city government simply refused to accept the change of government in Issa and continued to support Caesar. Salona grew significantly in the last decades before the war, and it would be natural to suppose that there was rivalry between Issa and Salona for influence and leadership within the commonwealth.

After Caesar's victory at Pharsalus, Illyricum increased in strategic importance even more, as it had been one of the battlefields of the Civil Wars where the Pompeians were successful. Cornificius was sent as *quaestor pro praetore* in 48–46 BC to fight the Pompeians who, helped by the Delmatae, threatened Caesarian interests in Illyricum. It seems that Cornificius was a very capable and careful organiser and commander, patiently taking the mountain strongholds of the Delmatae one by one. Hirtius does not mention specifically that Cornificius stormed strongholds of the Delmatae, but from the general context it appears obvious that he mainly fought them in a low-intensity campaign.[68] In the winter of 48–47 BC the legate Aulus Gabinius (consul 58 BC) was sent by Caesar to bring help to Cornificius, but he was repeatedly ambushed and harassed by the Delmatae, and lost five cohorts together with their standards, until he finally died in Salona from wounds sustained in this campaign.[69] Modern scholarship

[65] Šašel Kos 1986: 122.

[66] Earlier links between Picenum and Liburnia: Suić 1953. Lucius Tarius Rufus (consul *suffectus* 16 BC), who might have been of Liburnian origins, had extensive family estates in Picenum; PIR^3 14; Wilkes 1969: 330–1. The opinion is disputed; see Syme 1971d: 112–13, 119.

[67] Bilić-Dujmušić 2000: 115–18.

[68] Hirtius, *B Alex.* 42–7; Bilić-Dujmušić 2000: 159–65. Wilkes 1969: 41–2 is very sceptical about Cornificius' achievement, but his achievements, assessed in Hirtius, 42, actually appear quite praiseworthy.

[69] Hirtius, *B Alex.* 42–3; App. *Ill.* 12, 25; *B Civ.* 2.58–9; Dio, 42.11; Plut. *Ant.* 7.1; Cic. *Att.* 11.16.1; Šašel Kos 2005a: 347–53. Dio, Appian and Plutarch wrongly dated Gabinius' expedition to before the battle at Pharsalus; Marasco 1997: 311 ff.; Šašel Kos 2005a: 353–7 for Appian.

assumes that Gabinius travelled by land from Italy to Salona, but the objection that there was no time for a long march through Italy and the north Adriatic and that Gabinius actually sailed straight to Salona has recently challenged the prevailing opinion.[70] In the following year the legate Publius Vatinius helped Cornificius to extinguish the danger from the Pompeian fleet in the Adriatic. They defeated the Pompeian fleet under Marcus Octavius near the island of Tauris with the help of the citizens of Iader, and thus finally expelled Octavius from the Adriatic. The direct result of the Tauris battle was the unconditional and immediate surrender of Issa to Vatinius.[71]

The elimination of the Pompeians did not discourage the Delmatae. It seems that they made good use of Roman internal fighting. They extended the area under their direct control, according to Vatinius' letter dated 45 BC, from the initial twenty to over sixty *civitates*, i.e. fortified places.[72] It is very possible that with an internal crisis in the Issaean commonwealth, some indigenous coastal communities turned away from the Salonitan-led Issaean commonwealth and recognised the power of the Delmatian alliance. This was not a war waged to recover lost possessions by the Delmatae. Vatinius clearly says that the Delmatae expanded their power to the *civitates*, which previously were not members of the alliance. Marasco's suggestion that the Delmatae took over Salona is also wrong, as our sources would have reported the fall of such an important city. The destruction of a large *gradina* (hill-fort) on Veliki Biać – St. Nofar near Tragurium – is dated to this period. It is possible that it had been a key stronghold of the Bulini who belonged, or were closely allied with, the Issaean commonwealth, in the opinion of Čače.[73] In this period we can also place the destruction of the Daorsian stronghold, (Ošanići near Stolac), which was burned and destroyed in the mid-first century BC, certainly by the Delmatae in the temporary absence of the Roman army between 49 and 44 BC, or even later.[74]

Publius Sulpicius Rufus replaced Cornificius in 46 BC, but still had many problems in his operations against the Delmatae. Our sources for his

[70] Travel by land: Wilkes 1969: 41; M. G. Morgan 1971: 277–8. Travel by sea: Marasco 1997: 321–7; Šašel Kos 2005a: 351–3.

[71] Hirtius, *B Alex*. 44–7. The island of Tauris was earlier located at Šćedro and Šipan, but the most convincing location is the Pakleni otoci archipelago, in front of the south-western coast of the island of Hvar; Bilić-Dujmušić 2000: 230–4; 2006a: 27–33.

[72] Cic. *Fam*. 5.10a.3; Strabo, 7.5.5, 50 κατοικία of the Delmatae; Čače 1994/95.

[73] Thus Marasco 1995: 288–9 is wrong. For the evidence from Veliki Biać see Čače 1993: 10–12. Bulini are mentioned in Pliny, *HN* 3.139 as *civitas* of the Liburni.

[74] Zaninović 1966: 28; Marić 1973: 123–4. The name 'Daorson' for the Daorsian stronghold is Marić's conjecture – we do not know its real name, Cambi 1992/93: 41–2.

campaign are very limited.[75] In the next year Vatinius replaced him in command as a pro-consul. From his letters to Cicero, it seems that his camp was stationed close to Narona,[76] and that operations extended deeply into the Adriatic hinterland because his complaints about the harsh Dalmatian winter are more applicable to the hinterland of modern Herzegovina, than to the coastal strip.[77] Narona was a much better base for the campaign against the Delmatae than Salona because the Roman army had friendly territory on the left bank of the Neretva in their rear, and freedom to choose the course of attack. An attack from Salona would be forced to face an easily defensible pass near modern-day Klis and the army would need to rely on sea transport for supplies, as the Delmatae were able to cut off supply routes along the coast. After the initial successes of Vatinius against the Delmatae and the temporary cessation of hostilities, Caesar's murder sent the area again into turmoil. The senator Baebius was killed and his five cohorts defeated by the Delmatae.[78] Vatinius tried to act preventively against the tyrannicide Marcus Iunius Brutus, governor of Macedonia, marching towards Dyrrachium, but the majority of soldiers from his three legions deserted him, and the Senate transferred command of the army in Illyricum to Brutus. This was just an extraordinary, but legal, command, an *imperium maius* over local magistrates without administrative functions.[79]

Caesar's plans for future military expeditions, interrupted by the Ides of March, may suggest a planned change in his policy towards Illyricum. Ancient sources mention his plans for the Dacian and Parthian military campaigns as major future aims of foreign policy, and the sudden conciliatory mood of the Delmatae who asked Caesar for peace, suggests that he intended to conquer Illyricum as a prelude to his expedition to Dacia.[80] Syme first concluded that Caesar was actually more modest in his designs, and intended to subdue Illyricum and destroy Dacian power in the

[75] Cic. *Fam*, 13.77; Wilkes 1969: 42–3. Vatinius celebrated his triumph *de Illurico* in 42 BC, *Insc. It*. 13/1: 86–7, 342–3, 567–8.

[76] His camp can be located in Humac near Ljubuški; Bojanovski 1980; 1988a: 41–2, 366–7. Bojanovski 1980: 5–6 proposed an alternative reading of Cic. *Fam*. 5.9 *ex castris (apud) Narona(m)*.

[77] Cic. *Fam*. 5.9–11; Wilkes 1969: 43–4. Shackleton-Bailey 1977: II.425–6 suggests that there were two campaigns of Vatinius, one in late autumn and another at the beginning of the winter of 45 BC.

[78] App. *Ill*. 13. Marasco 1995: 285–8 casts some doubts on the evidence from Appian, without valid reasons, see Šašel Kos 2005a: 363–9. Whether this defeat occurs before or after Vatinius' legions surrender to Brutus cannot be determined beyond doubt.

[79] Cic. *Phil*. 10.11; 10.13; App. *Ill*. 13; Dio, 47.21.6; cf. Livy, *Per*. 118; Vell. Pat. 2.69.3–4; Girardet 1993: 216.

[80] The sources are given in Syme 1999: 175 n. 4. Peace offer from the Delmatae: App. *Ill*. 13 dismissed by Marasco 1995: 289–91 as pro-Caesarian propaganda, but Šašel Kos 2005a: 363 shows that there is no reason to doubt Appian.

hinterland, rather than to take the risk of attacking a strong and dangerous enemy such as the Parthian empire.[81] The fear of the Dacians suddenly invading Italy, which was supported by the knowledge of Pompey's negotiations with the Dacians in 49 BC, might also have influenced Caesar's plans for the campaign.[82] A decisive expedition against peoples in the hinterland would certainly be necessary to give more lasting security to the settlements on the eastern Adriatic coast, so it is not impossible that Caesar had such a notion in mind. Freber compares Illyricum with Gaul where Caesar essentially secured a coastal corridor to Spain with his conquest of the hinterland, and was expected to do the same thing in a geographically similar situation, securing the coastal link between Italy and Greece.[83] Yet, regardless of what Caesar's true designs were in 44 BC, his assassination prevented their realisation.

THE BIRTH OF ILLYRICUM

By entrusting to a Roman magistrate, whether Caesar or someone else, Illyricum as a *provincia*, with no visible imminent military threat, signifies, besides matters of domestic affairs, a genuine Roman decision to introduce changes in the way their power was applied across the Adriatic in 59 BC. It was the birth of Illyricum, as from this occasion it became officially recognised as a spatial-political-administrative (but artificial from a geographical and ethnic point of view) entity; a direct product of contemporary trends in the Roman approach towards foreign affairs, in the same way Gaul was, for example.[84] The construction of Illyricum enabled Rome to link Cisalpina and Greece, protect interests of the *conventus* and tighten their hold on the Adriatic. As a spatial-political concept, Illyricum in this period was nothing more than the area that the Romans traditionally regarded as their sphere of interest in the previous century – the coast and its immediate hinterland.

Caesar and his legates developed the Roman interaction with Illyricum into a loosely defined administrative framework, binding more tightly the weaker independent allies to Rome, and relying more on support from the *conventus* of Roman citizens in the eastern Adriatic. The nature and reasons

[81] Freber 1993: 157 ff.; Syme 1999: 175; Lica 2000: 87–92.
[82] Syll.^{3} 2.762 (IGB 1^2 13) (ambassador Acornion); and the indirect evidence from Cic. *ad Att*. 9.110.3; Luc. *Phars*. 3.200–2. The perception of fear is attested in Strabo 7.3.11. See discussions in Lica 1998; 2000: 78–85; Šašel Kos 2005a: 500–2.
[83] Freber 1993: 182–3. [84] See Timpe 1965: 209–11.

for the extension of Caesar's *provincia* over Illyricum appears as a mixture of everyday politics, a general shift of Roman strategic thinking, and the acknowledgment that the situation on the eastern Adriatic coast changed after 76 BC. In the long run, changes in the framework show that the Romans finally acknowledged that the eastern Adriatic coast was ready to be politically included in the empire. However, 'coastal' Illyricum as a political framework was developed without the foreknowledge of the Civil Wars, and the political disintegration of the Issaean commonwealth. Caesar did not do enough to strengthen his position in Illyricum, but why would he bother to strengthen his position, as nobody could anticipate civil war in the 50s BC?

A succession of Roman commanders between 48 and 44 BC is not necessarily a sign of the creation of a separate province of Illyricum, but rather indicates the need for separate commands in extraordinary circumstances, like that of Cosconius in 78 BC. Dio and Hirtius mention Vatinius and Cornificius as governors in Illyricum. That was an extraordinary situation where they were sent to Illyricum to fight the Pompeians and their allies, such as the Delmatae, and not to rule or administer the province.[85] In the tumultuous year of 44 BC, Illyricum was added to the command of Brutus, who happened to be the governor of Macedonia, but only as a temporary and emergency measure. It is obvious that at this time some elements of provincial infrastructure were introduced, but without particular order, as was usual in the period. Caesar in particular never cared too much for legal definitions, and it is possible to link the origins of provincial structure in Illyricum with his informal political approach. His 'pacification' of Gaul was in practice not so different from *de iure* provincialisation, regardless of whether there was a formal act of provincialisation or not, and, on the other hand, the subjugation of individual peoples was not always regarded as conquest by him.[86]

The dissolution of the Issaean commonwealth as an independent political entity after the defeat in the Civil Wars, which repeats on a smaller scale the fate of Massilia in Gaul, was perhaps the most important single political event in Illyricum at this time. The southern city wall of Issa was removed, but it does not seem that there were any other serious consequences for the Issaeans after they surrendered to Vatinius, except, of course, their loss of political independence. However, provincial arrangements after the establishment of the imperial *provincia Dalmatia* suggest that the Issaean commonwealth survived, but in the form of a Salonitan *res publica*, as is

[85] Dio, 48.28; Hirtius, *B Alex*. 42; Rice-Holmes 1928: 247–8 n. 5, cf. Papazoglu 1976: 205 n. 28.
[86] Timpe 1972: 294–5.

discussed below, p. 121.[87] In the long run we may say that the end of the Issaean commonwealth was really the beginning of Roman Illyricum, but its immediate result was an escalation of the war with the Delmatian alliance. The support for Italian colonists signalled a shift in the Romans' long-term interest, because the enlarged Italian settlement, clearly visible in the mid-first century BC, turned into a strategic stronghold for the future expansion of direct rule in the eastern Adriatic coast, and the extension of Roman influence behind the Dinaric Alps.

In the 40s Roman control of the eastern Adriatic loosened briefly to a certain degree. It was possible for an escaped slave to hide amongst the Delmatae even when his angry master was none other than Marcus Tullius Cicero himself. However, we should not overestimate the extent of this crisis in Illyricum. For the Roman trading community in Narona, it was business as usual, even in the mid-40s.[88] Rome's strategic aims in the 40s were very limited; it wanted to pacify troublesome opponents like the Delmatae, rather than to extend political influence deeper inland and to conquer them fully. The Pirustae and Iapodes were not able to expel the Romans from the coast by themselves, nor did they try to do that. Their raids were more concerned with plunder and local political gains. The Delmatian alliance appears to be the most serious opponent to the Romans in this period. They attempted to use weakening and the abolition of the Issaean commonwealth in order to accomplish their long-time strategic push to the Adriatic. It seems that they waged their local war on the southern Liburnian communities in 50 BC, rather than purposely attack Roman interests there. Later, in the Civil Wars, they opportunistically recognised their interest to be on Pompey's side, as the Issaeans did. The Delmatae expanded immediately after the Issaeans were eliminated from the political stage in 46 BC, but after the Pompeian fleet was defeated by Caesar's admirals, the Delmatae essentially were in a defensive mode.

Caesar's mind and heart were not in Illyricum; Gaul was a much more urgent and rewarding task. Suetonius suggests that he perhaps planned to change his passive attitude to Illyricum if an agreement was reached with Pompey prior to the beginning of the Civil Wars. It is not necessary to see this as a genuine change of Caesar's policy; it may be nothing more than a momentary repositioning and bargaining for a better position.[89] There is no reason to accuse Caesar of underestimating the situation in Illyricum. The

[87] Hirtius, *B Alex*. 47. 4; Suić 1959: 151–2; cf. Gabričević 1973: 150 n. 10 for the city wall.
[88] Cic. *Fam*, 5.9.2. Deniaux 1993: 264–5 (Narona). [89] Suet. *Iul*. 29.4.

strategic situation never appeared serious enough to require a Roman presence, especially when compared with Gaul, and real troubles arose only when civil war appeared imminent. Caesar paid as much attention to Illyricum as was necessary for the moment; he conducted a policy of consolidation, not of conquest or planned conquest.[90] Caesar's influence on the internal arrangements and municipalisation in Illyricum is a matter where scholarship often places too much reliance on guesswork. It is not our intention to deny Caesar's personal influence on these developments in Illyricum, but only to assess its real extent on the basis of very limited sources. Except for Lissus, and probably Narona and Salona, there is no evidence of any example where he entrusted the rule of the city to the community of Roman citizens. The support of some cities and communities, like Salona, for Caesar in the Civil Wars, does not imply that he made the administrative *conventus* and *municipia* before the war. They are just political players who chose one of the two sides; Caesar's legate was the patron of Issa, but even so that city still supported Pompey.

The control of the eastern Adriatic coast and islands remains a dominant element of the short-term policy in this period, but the sources show that the change in the political framework intended for the coastal strip to become an administratively unified and territorially compact Roman interest-zone. Illyricum combined elements of a direct administration with the self-rule of the allies, such as the Liburnian communities or the Issaean commonwealth. The campaigns of the 40s against the Delmatian alliance appear to show continuing Roman attempts to strengthen control over the area, and to preserve 'coastal' Illyricum from the hostile hinterland, rather than to risk a decisive military commitment to eliminate these threats. Peace and security in the area was also disturbed because of the temporary self-destructive engagement of the Romans in civil war, and the political vacuum created by the Issaean commonwealth's disappearance, as these events were not possible to anticipate when the new political framework was imposed and Illyricum was *de iure* created through the *lex Vatinia*.

[90] Šašel Kos 2000: 301–2. Skefich 1967: 102–37, esp. 136–7, sees the Illyrian policy of Caesar as reasonably well defined, initiated by an opportunistic reaction to the enemy's (the Pirustae in 54 BC) provocation.

CHAPTER 6

Octavian in Illyricum

For Octavian's campaigns of 35–33 BC there are no surviving contemporary sources.[1] Appian's *Illyrike* and Cassius Dio are the only reliable sources we have today. Appian drew his information directly from Augustus' memoirs,[2] and Dio's account is generally in agreement with Appian; in some places he obviously used other, still unidentifiable, primary sources, probably Asinius Pollio or Cremutius Cordus.[3] Marcus Agrippa, Augustus' general and collaborator, also wrote memoirs and he certainly discussed some of these campaigns, but it is difficult to believe that his account differed much from that of Augustus.[4] For that reason it seems reasonable to rely on these sources for the reconstruction of the events, as it is unlikely that Appian and Dio taken together omit any really significant event from this campaign. Appian should certainly be treated with caution as he draws on the autobiographical work of a man who fully understood the importance and benefits of multi-media propaganda in politics, and who was a naturally gifted self-propagandist.[5] With the help of additional sources like Florus, Strabo and Velleius Paterculus, Octavian's campaigns can be reconstructed in reasonable detail.

POLLIO AND THE DELMATAE

Roman relationships with Illyricum between 44 and 35 BC remain obscure. Publius Servilius Isauricus was possibly pro-consul in Illyricum after 41 BC, but nothing is known about his mandate, except the damaged inscription

[1] The silence of contemporary extant sources (except the *Panegyricus Messalae* of Tibullus 3.7.106–17 and epitomes of Livy's book 131) for the Illyrian campaign of Octavian is odd; Schmitthenner 1958: 227–8.
[2] Šašel Kos 2005a: 393–7. Zippel 1877: 226–7 makes the point that Appian followed Octavian's formal report to the Senate where defeated peoples were classed into three groups; App. *Ill.* 16–17.
[3] Šašel Kos 1986: 142–4; Reinhold 1988: 68, but only if we believe that Pollio's histories continued after the battle at Philippi. See Šašel Kos 1997a for a detailed analysis of the differences between Dio and Appian regarding Octavian's campaign.
[4] Roddaz 1984: 568–71. [5] Šašel Kos 1997a: esp. 197–8.

from Narona.[6] Caius Asinius Pollio was operating in the area, at war with the Illyrian Parthini and the Delmatae in 39–38 BC. Subsequently, he achieved a triumph for his victory over the Parthini.[7] The Parthini were the allies of Brutus the tyrannicide, who rebelled after his death, and the Delmatae were restless after the assassination of Caesar.[8] We cannot assess the extent of his military success in 39–38 BC. The Parthini are not mentioned any more as 'troublemakers', although the *Pertheenatae* (Περθενάτας) of Appian, who were a people defeated easily by Octavian in 35 BC, may have been Parthini.[9] On the other hand, Florus says that Pollio deprived the Delmatae of sheep, arms and land.[10] Perhaps it was a hastily made settlement, driven by Octavian's need for troops from Illyricum for the Sicilian war against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BC.[11] However, the standards of Gabinius captured in 46 BC (see pp. 92–3) remained in Delmatian hands, which meant that the Delmatae did not fully submit to Pollio and that his campaign in Dalmatia did not produce lasting results, but only an uneasy peace.

There is some heated scholarly controversy about whether Pollio acted as a pro-consul for Macedonia, Illyricum, or for both these *provinciae*. Contradicting his predecessors, Syme emphasised the fact that the Parthini were located inside Macedonia, in Antony's part of the empire, and that Pollio as Antony's supporter could not be appointed to the command of Octavian's Illyricum. According to this view the way to resolve this problem is to assume that he was a governor of Macedonia.[12] There are a couple of flaws in Syme's argument. The first one is the dogmatic view that Pollio was sent to the province as a supporter of Antony. Bosworth made a strong case against this view, pointing out that it is equally possible that Pollio changed his allegiances before being sent abroad, or that he was simply neutral.[13] The second flaw is the notion that the *Bellum Dalmaticum* of Florus could refer to any place in the Illyrian world and therefore applicable to the Parthini who lived some 300 kilometres south of the Delmatian-controlled area. According to the same logic, Horace gave the honorific name *Delmaticus* to Pollio for a victory over

[6] CIL 3.1858. Isauricus was consul in 48 and 41 BC; Broughton 1952: 272, 370–1.

[7] Dio, 48.41.7; Flor. 2.25; Horace, *Carm.* 2.1.15–16 (the Dalmatian triumph of Pollio); Vell. Pat. 2.78. The triumph can be dated to anywhere between January 40 and November 38 BC; *Insc. It.* 13.1: 86. Porphyrio on Horace, *Carm.* 2.1.15, and Servius on Verg. *Ecl.* 4.1 claim that Pollio captured Salona. Pollio later built the Atrium Libertatis from the booty, Suet. *Aug.* 29.5; Pliny, *HN* 7.115; Isid. *Etym* 6.5.2.

[8] App. *B Civ.* 5.75 (Parthini); App. *Ill.* 13 (Delmatae).

[9] App. *Ill.*, 16; Bosworth 1972: 464–5; but this is only speculation. The *Pertheenetae* (Parthini) are located amongst the southern Illyrians; cf. Pliny, *HN* 3. 143; Wilkes 1969: 44, 155, 165.

[10] Flor. 2.25, a bit of exaggeration in light of their substantial fighting capabilities in 34 BC.

[11] App. *B Civ.* 5.80. [12] Syme 1937; Broughton 1952: 387–8; Wilkes 1969: 44–5.

[13] Bosworth 1972. Woodman 1983: 196, 231–4 argued that Pollio remained neutral between the triumvirs.

the Parthini, instead of the more appropriate *Parthinius*.[14] It would be very surprising if Florus, referring to the Delmatae elsewhere in the same passage, had made such a mistake, especially bearing in mind that he made a precise distinction in passages dedicated to the Roman conflicts against the Iapodes and Pannonii, and the wars against the Delmatae.[15] Also, regardless of all his high-profile connections, it would be quite unusual if Pollio earned a triumph fighting only against the otherwise irrelevant people, the Parthini, last time mentioned in relation to the third Illyrian war.[16]

We have also the testimony of Vergil's eighth eclogue, which mentions Pollio's return to Italy along the Dalmatian coast.[17] Bowersock argued that Vergil addressed Octavian, not Pollio, and Nagy considered the possibility that Octavian or his legate campaigned in north-west Illyricum at the same time as Pollio, but the evidence is still inadequate.[18] The return of a Macedonian governor to Italy via the insecure and tumultuous Dalmatian coast, instead of the short sea crossing from Dyrrachium to Brundisium, seems a very impractical route, if there was no job to be done in central Dalmatia. The problem of crossing inter-provincial borders, as the Parthini were located in the Macedonian province, is hinted at by Bosworth as a piece of practical political thinking in times of trouble, and by the relaxed political atmosphere between Octavian and Antony after they reached a temporary agreement in the treaty of Brundisium in 40 BC. It appears most plausible that Octavian and Antony jointly gave Pollio a roving commission to pacify the eastern Adriatic in Brundisium in 40 BC.[19]

OCTAVIAN'S CAMPAIGNS

The war of Octavian against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BC and the withdrawal of Roman troops could be an important cause for further neglect of the area, and the subsequent reaction of the indigenous communities. Problems arose especially in the former north Adriatic sector, where the Romans were feeling much more vulnerable because of intense Italian settlement

[14] Flor. 2.25; Syme 1937: 42; Bosworth 1972: 466.
[15] Flor. 2.23 (calling the Iapodes – 'Illyrians'); 2.24 (Pannonian war).
[16] Livy, 43.23.6, 44.30.13.
[17] Verg. *Ecl.* 8.6–13 esp. 7–8. Syme 1937: 47–8 suggested Pollio's return through Dalmatia. Thibodeau 2006: 619–20 recently argued that Vergil refers to the crossing of Timavus as a starting point of his campaign, not his return.
[18] Bowersock 1971; Nagy 1991: 57–9; cf. Šašel Kos 2005a: 401. Bowersock is criticised by Tarrant 1978; Woodman 1983: 193 n. 1 and Thibodeau 2006.
[19] André 1949: 22 n. 11; Zaninović 1966: 31–2; Bosworth 1972: 464; Woodman 1983: 193–4; Šašel-Kos 2005: 369–74.

and because of its geographic proximity to North Italy.[20] Dio's source blamed the Iapodes not only for ceasing to pay tribute as the others named there, but also singled them out for repeating their devastating raids of 51 BC on the cities of Tergeste and Aquileia.[21] Taking into account the increased Roman and Italian settlement of the eastern Adriatic coast, it is understandable that when the situation in Illyricum took a turn for the worse in 35 BC, military action, at least in the north-west, became a pressing political task for Octavian. It was not merely a training field for his soldiers.[22]

Octavian's campaigns can be divided into two separate expeditions. The first expedition in 35–34 BC was primarily focused on the north Adriatic and south-eastern Alpine area, although it is possible that some action was taken in the south Adriatic with the support of the fleet. In the first phase it was conducted against the Transalpine Iapodes, Carni and Taurisci, with additional supportive action by the fleet against small-scale Adriatic piracy. At the same time an expedition was conducted against the Salassi as well, outside of the main theatre of war. The first expedition, in the second phase, expanded deeper into the continent against the Pannonian people, known from the sources as the Segesticani. The second campaign was waged in central Dalmatia against the Delmatae and their allies in 34–33 BC. His primary objective was already achieved in the first phase with the submission of the Iapodes and Alpine peoples. The incursion inland towards Segestica does not seem to be provoked by the Segesticani at all, but it appears to be a strategic attempt to create a new buffer zone against the successors of Burebista, as his realm broke down into five pieces after his death, to protect Roman trade with Pannonia and to expand Roman influence further into the Pannonian plains. The security and unity of the Norican kingdom, an important Roman ally, might also be endangered by the disturbances in the Alpine region, which were caused by the Carni and Taurisci, and which might be used by the Dacians if they entertained any future offensive designs in the southern Alpine area.[23]

The second campaign, conducted against the Delmatae, was primarily aimed at the final submission of this alliance, which was potentially dangerous to the growing Italian communities in Salona and Narona. It also offered an opportunity for the recovery of Roman honour – lost with the

[20] App. *B Civ.* 5.80; Wilkes 1969: 48. [21] Dio, 49.34.2; App. *Ill.* 18.
[22] Rice Holmes 1928: 130–1; Syme 1933a: 67.
[23] Strabo, 7.3.11 (the Dacians); Šašel Kos 2005a: 397–8, although (real) Roman fears of invasion of Italy from the north were frequently manipulated for political purposes.

standards of Gabinius and the defeat of Baebius in the 40s. There were other smaller campaigns, made by Octavian's *legati*, but they remain obscure, since they were not included in the accounts of Dio and Appian. There is not much controversy about the chronology or the course of the campaigns. Appian and Dio were quite precise in describing the campaigns so that it is possible to reconstruct accurately the movements of Octavian on the map.[24] The main controversy is in fact the territorial extent of Octavian's achievement. The view of Vulić is that he established Roman control up to the river Sava and conquered the territory of the whole future province of Dalmatia in 33 BC. Syme strongly opposed this idea and defended the earlier opinion of Kromayer, vigorously arguing that the extent of the conquest was more modest, and limited to just the immediate hinterland of the Adriatic coast.[25]

There are several direct and indirect reasons why Octavian decided to begin an extensive military expedition in Illyricum in 35 BC. The sources mention three basic reasons behind this expedition. Dio is the most precise: after finishing with Sextus Pompeius and settling affairs in Italy, Octavian was intending to cross from Sicily to North Africa, when the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni and Iapodes not only failed to pay tribute, but also the Iapodes threatened the security of the wider area. Appian repeated the reasons that Octavian himself gave to the Senate after the campaign: the security of Italy from the raids from north-west Illyricum; revenge for Roman defeats in the 40s; and, in the background, a piece of masterfully placed propaganda – the contrast with the slothfulness of Antony. These are the only reasons given by ancient sources, and all others are the speculations of modern scholarship.[26] The reasons for the campaign provided by Dio do correspond with the Roman theory of just war of this period, recently reinterpreted by Riggsby.[27] In Roman eyes, there was no doubt that they were the injured side, as these peoples broke their *fides* with the Roman people, by failing to pay tribute. Also, individual raids, in particular of the Iapodes, were clear *iniuriae* that were never fully avenged; so the perception of danger related to the geographical closeness of the region to Italy, and the application of the Roman 'collective guilt' approach fully justified a preventive attack by Octavian in Roman eyes.

[24] Veith 1914; Šašel Kos 2005a: 420–55.

[25] See Schmitthenner 1958: n. 1 for a detailed bibliography of this debate up to 1958. The argument of Syme was accepted by Wilkes 1969: 55–7; Nagy 1991: 65–6; Šašel Kos 1997b 31; 2005a: 464–71. Vulić was defended by Josifović 1956 and Bojanovski 1988a: 42–8 without important new arguments.

[26] Dio, 49.34.1–2; App. *Ill.* 16; Schmitthenner 1958: 198–200.

[27] Riggsby 2006: 157–89.

Military training and his desire to keep his legions together under arms are other possible reasons, but they are overemphasised in the modern works and sometimes treated as the main reason for Octavian's expeditions into Illyricum.[28] Velleius Paterculus indeed mentions the training of the army but in a very general context: *Caesar per haec tempora, ne res disciplinae inimicissima, otium, corrumperet militem, crebris in Illyrico Delmatiaque expeditionibus patientia periculorum bellique experientia durabat exercitum*. ('In this period Caesar, wishing to keep his soldiers from being spoiled by idleness, the great enemy of discipline, was making frequent expeditions in Illyricum and Dalmatia and thus hardening his army by endurance of danger and experience in warfare.')

Furthermore, in Velleius' account, the expeditions to Illyricum preceded the conflict between Octavian and Sextus Pompeius and probably referred to the pro-consulship and campaign of Asinius Pollio in 39–38 BC.[29] Dio on the other hand clearly connects the training of the army only with the expedition against the Pannonii, which followed the campaigns against the Iapodes, Salassi and Taurisci. He makes it the main reason for this part of the expedition.[30]

What about the other motives? Modern scholarship has speculated about some motives, but only a few speculations can withstand serious criticism. The proponents of the alleged 'grand strategy' of Octavian depict the Illyrian expeditions as a preventive move against the potential movements of Antony through Illyricum, but that does not seem a really valid reason.[31] However, the opinion that Octavian strengthened his position in southern Illyricum, in the fear that Antony would use the Apollonia/Dyrrachium/Oricus – Brundisium sea link for the invasion of Italy, might appear to be a much more likely reason, if we are able to determine how certain was the conflict between the triumvirs in 35 BC.[32] The view that there was no provocation from the 'Illyrian' side and therefore no *casus belli* for the Romans in 35 BC is unconvincing.[33] The impression of Wilkes that the expedition was a continuation of Republican interventions in Illyricum, which had no actual connection with the situation in Illyricum, is perhaps

[28] E.g. Schmitthenner 1958: 197; Wilkes 1969: 48, 49 n. 1; Gruen 1996: 172; Southern 1998: 88, 226 n. 15.
[29] Vell. Pat. 2.78.2. Bosworth 1972: 467. [30] Dio, 49.36.1.
[31] Swoboda 1932: 1–17; Syme 1971b: 17 suggested the potential danger from Antony from this direction. Contra Vulić 1907: 24–6; Miltner 1937: 201; Schmitthenner 1958: 198–9; Wilkes 1969: 49 n. 1 questioning this as a modern construction.
[32] Mirković 1968: 116, 126–7.
[33] Gruen 1996: 172–3; Southern 1998: 226 n. 15 assume wrongly from Dio, 49.36.1 that there was no significant indigenous provocation. This related to the campaign against the Segesticani; Šašel Kos 1997a: 190–1.

not the best strategic assessment of the contemporary situation.[34] Interventionist it certainly was, but influenced directly by suddenly worsened affairs, and reinforced by Roman perception of the events, and their fear. The crisis of 35 BC shows the opportunism of these communities in exploiting the renewed Roman internal struggle to renegotiate their relationship with Rome. The breaking of the *fides* was a direct offence to Roman *honos* and *virtus*, and a valid reason for the war which provided an opportunity for Octavian. It is important to underline once more the point of Dio, often overlooked in the modern works, that Octavian was intending to sail from Sicily to Africa, because affairs there required settlement. Only bad weather and a rapid deterioration of the security situation in the northern Adriatic sector made him change his plans.[35]

The only source which suggests that Octavian earlier had in mind an Illyrian expedition is Appian, who mentions a mutiny of Octavian's soldiers in Sicily in 36 BC after the defeat of Sextus Pompeius, and his promise of 'Illyrian spoils' to an angry crowd in order to calm them. Dio writes of the same mutiny and does not mention any such thing. It might be that Appian here followed Augustus' biography 'filtrated' for political and personal reasons, whereas Dio followed some other source. Augustus would naturally be interested in representing himself as someone who wanted to stop civil strife and begin a war against the 'barbarians', as we see in Appian.[36] If indeed Octavian mentioned 'Illyrian spoils', he might be exploiting the success of Pollio from his recent Dalmatian expedition, in order to calm the dissatisfaction of the soldiers.[37] Furthermore, there is a hint by Appian that Antony also thought of joining Octavian in the Illyrian expedition, which suggests the seriousness of the situation there; of course, only if we accept that Antony is the subject of the sentence and not Octavian.[38] Therefore, it is evident that the Illyrian expedition was not planned much in advance, but that it was primarily caused by the Roman view of indigenous attacks upon Roman interests in Illyricum as political injury, which was required to be avenged by force.

[34] Wilkes 1969: 49, 56–8; 1996: 549.

[35] Dio, 49.34.1–2; recognised by Hanslik 1961a: 1239; Nagy 1991: 60; Coppola 1999: 196.

[36] App. *B Civ*. 5.128; Dio 49.13–14. Cf. Šašel Kos 1986: 142–4; Reinhold 1988: 17–19; Mondobeltz 2000: 175. Comparison of Appian, *B Civ*. 5.127; cf. Sen. *Clem*. 1.11.1 (Octavian granting pardon to Sex. Pompeian leaders after their defeat) and Dio, 49.12.4 (Sex. Pompeian leaders all executed, except a few) may be a good argument for such a theory.

[37] Booty, from which he constructed the Atrium Libertatis; Suet. *Aug*. 29.5; Pliny, *HN* 7.115, 35.10; Isid. *Etym*. 6.5.2.

[38] App. *B Civ*. 5.132; Schmitthenner 1958: 191 n. 5.

There were other reasons in the background as well. The troubles in Illyricum suited the interests of Octavian perfectly at that particular moment. The personal reputation of Octavian and the opportunity to prove himself on the battlefield after his bleak performances at Philippi and Sicily cannot be disregarded as significant secondary motives. Antony's military prestige was still much greater than that of Octavian.[39] However, this argument should not be overemphasised. The success against Sextus Pompeius and the elimination of Lepidus from further power-sharing placed Octavian in a very strong position in Rome, and there was no immediate necessity to show himself as a great general.[40] Of course, Octavian understood well the importance of propaganda and used public fear for his purposes. He played well the card of the fear of 'Dacian danger', which existed for some time in Rome during Caesar's time, as discussed earlier (pp. 94–5). Octavian hinted that, as a good son and real successor, he was following the designs of his adoptive father in regard to the Dacians in this expedition.[41] Keeping the army together for a final war with Antony is also an important additional reason,[42] which appears in the sources. However, a direct clash between them was not yet in sight. Maintaining so many legions under arms was difficult, expensive and potentially troublesome. This note of Appian and Dio is obviously taken from the same source with foreknowledge of a war with Antony, i.e. Augustus' autobiography.[43] This seems an appropriate place in the autobiography where he could emphasise his foresight and his expectation of Antony's treachery followed by his own wise conduct, but it is highly questionable whether at that moment he really needed so many legions in the one place merely as a preventive measure. Thus, it was a unique opportunity for Octavian to improve his image and keep his legions under arms while reacting to the regional crisis.

The first campaign was waged in 35–34 BC. The plan of Octavian and his advisers was simple and aimed at the final military neutralisation of the Iapodes, the strengthening of Roman influence in the southern Alps and the expansion of power towards the Sava, thus forming a buffer zone for the easier defence of North Italy and Noricum, in case of a potential hostile (Dacian) threat. At the same time the campaign provided an opportunity to

[39] Like Schmitthenner 1958: 194–5; Wilkes 1969: 48–9; Gruen 1996: 172–3.

[40] Cf. App. *B Civ.* 5.130 ff.; Dio, 49.15–16.

[41] Vell. Pat. 2.59.4; App. *Ill.* 22–3; Strabo 7.5.2. It is difficult to believe that the Dacians were a real danger at that moment; cf. Miltner 1937: 204–5; Schmitthenner 1958: 194–5; Mócsy 1974: 21–2; Coppola 1999: 203–4; Lica 2000: 91–2.

[42] Schmitthenner 1958: 196–7.

[43] Dio, 49.13.4; App. *B Civ.* 5.128; cf. App. *Ill.* 17 for the repeated motif of Octavian's anticipation of a future war with Antony, drawn from the autobiography of Augustus.

confirm and redefine relations with different indigenous communities and polities in southern Illyricum. According to Appian, the peoples overcome by Octavian in both campaigns fell into three categories: 'those overcome at one blow'; 'those overcome by more prolonged effort'; and finally 'those who gave him most trouble'. Most of those belonging to the first and second categories were settled on the south Adriatic coast and Adriatic islands, far away from the area of unrest in the north-west, with only a couple of exceptions, such as the Carni and Taurisci. Amongst the latter no doubt were included not only those whom he fought, but also peoples who renewed or made formal submissions when threatened by movements of the Roman navy and army. It is also not impossible that Octavian wanted to impress the Senate with numerous names of 'barbarian' *gentes*, whether existing in 35 BC, or known from earlier wars.[44]

This was by far the largest and the most comprehensive Roman campaign in Illyricum during the Republican period. Octavian attacked on three fronts in 35 BC: Iapodean, Alpine and with the fleet in the southern and central Adriatic, with some eight to twelve legions, which translates into 40–60,000 soldiers;[45] he led the campaign against the Iapodes himself and left the other opponents to his *legati*. Octavian took this campaign very seriously, having with him in the field his best military commanders, such as Marcus Agrippa, Statilius Taurus and Marcus Valerius Messalla Corvinus. Perhaps Agrippa commanded the fleet in the Adriatic, but he is attested by sources as present in the campaign against the Iapodes and Segesticani.[46] Octavian's route was probably similar to that taken in previous Roman campaigns against the Iapodes, i.e. approaching Illyricum via Tergeste, and starting in the Liburnian safe bases, probably Senia,[47] and going through the narrowest part of the Dinaric Alps (the Velebit Mountain) up to the River Sava. The legate Caius Antistius Vetus was sent against the Salassi and, although his achievement did not last long, for the moment he completed his task with success. Messalla Corvinus completed the conquest in the following year, or even shortly after Actium.[48] Soon, the other Alpine communities, like the Carni and Taurisci,

[44] App. *Ill.* 16–17; Kromayer 1898: 4; Schmitthenner 1958: 201–7; Mirković 1968: 120; Wilkes 1969: 49–50; Šašel Kos 2005a: 403–20. Caesar did the same thing in Gaul as a gesture of possession; Riggsby 2006: 71.

[45] Veith 1914: 108–9; Swoboda 1932: 46; contra Syme 1933a: 68. See Brunt 1987: 500–1 for the number of Octavian's legions before Actium.

[46] Dio, 49.35.1; App. *Ill.* 15; Schmitthenner 1958: 234–6; Fitz 1993/94: 27–8. Agrippa: App. *Ill.* 20; Dio, 49.38.3; Kromayer 1898: 4; Hanslik 1961a: 1,240; Roddaz 1984: 142–5.

[47] Kromayer 1898: 4–5; Olujić 2007: 87–8., Probably the detachment was also going from Aquileia, Šašel Kos 2005a: 394, 423.

[48] App. *Ill.* 17; Strabo, 4.6.7; Dio, 49.38.3; Schmitthenner 1958: 210–11, 234; cf. Momigliano 1950: 40–1.

who were named by Dio among the main 'troublemakers', conceded defeat and started to pay tribute again, thus securing Octavian's north-west flank, and enabling him to focus more closely on the Iapodes and Segesticani.

The Roman fleet operated in the eastern Adriatic as some minor piracy was successfully tackled on the islands of Melite (Mljet), Corcyra Nigra (Korčula) and the Liburnian islands.[49] The extent of piracy is doubtful because there are no other mentions of piracy in this period, apart from Appian's note taken from Augustus' memoirs. Especially enigmatic is the sentence where it is stated that Augustus deprived the Liburni of their ships. The campaign against the Iapodes would be impossible without logistical support from the Liburnian communities; thus Dio's remark that the Liburni were part of the unrest cannot be applied to the majority of their mainland communities. It seems that individual communities who supported Pompey in the 40s were forced to pay tribute after their defeat. That is the only way to explain why the Liburni would suddenly start to pay tribute to Rome, because Liburnian communities had enjoyed *immunitas* for quite a long time, perhaps even from the second century BC, as has been speculated.[50] The widespread political crisis in the Roman world had caused some piracy in some east Adriatic communities, as for example in the Liburnian islands, which required the attention of the Roman fleet.

It does not seem that the fleet was starting from Tergeste as suggested by Hanslik, except perhaps for supply ships. It rather seems that some ships returned from Sicily via Brundisium, but Ravenna also might have been a starting point for the ships operating in Liburnia.[51] The young Caesar used his large fleet to make a show of full force and a lasting impression of military strength in this area, not only for its inhabitants, but also for the neighbouring areas belonging to Antony's part of the empire. The punishment of the Meliteni, who were either slaughtered or sold into slavery, seems unusually cruel, taking into account the cautious and diplomatic approach towards other enemies in this campaign, but it is possible that the Romans encountered strong resistance, or maybe they just wanted to make an example of them. Pirates from Melite and Corcyra Nigra disrupted trade and important communications with Narona,[52] so it was perhaps necessary to deal decisively with the problem. The main role of the fleet in subsequent operations was to provide logistical support for the main army, especially in the campaign against the Delmatae, as no significant naval opposition could be anticipated.

[49] App. *Ill.* 16.
[50] Suić 1981: 137–8. Starac 2000: 17, they were probably awarded at a later date; Šašel Kos 2005a: 323–4.
[51] Hanslik 1961a: 1240; Kromayer 1898: 3–4; Šašel Kos 2005a: 419. [52] Zaninović 1980: 177.

Octavian himself tackled the greatest problem – the Iapodes. They not only refused to pay the tribute that the others did, but were the only people Dio singled out as the real threat to northern Italy in 36 BC. Firstly, Octavian swiftly dealt with the Cisalpine Iapodes, whose individual *civitates* surrendered even before the Romans took their leading *civitas*, Arupini, whether by Octavian himself, or it is also possible that he left Messalla Corvinus to finish the job while the main force was hastening away elsewhere.[53] Later, Octavian encountered much stronger resistance when attacking the Transalpine Iapodes, but defeated them relatively speedily, after taking and destroying their key settlement Metulum, located southeast of modern Ogulin.[54] It is, nevertheless, possible that the siege of Metulum lasted longer than Appian suggested, and that he abridged his source at this spot. The splendid story of Octavian leaping on to the walls of Metulum alone (App. *Ill.* 20) carries an obvious propaganda-driven resemblance to Alexander the Great's deeds while taking the city of the Mallians in India.[55] The Transalpine Iapodes represented a very real military danger for North Italy and Histria, because they were so numerous, well ordered and trained, especially if acting in co-operation with the other Alpine peoples. The Metulan *civitas* alone was able to raise 3,000 well-trained warriors to defend Metulum, and they were able to use Roman fighting machines, taken from Decimus (Albinus) Brutus retreating after Mutina in 40 BC, against them successfully. However, they were not able to defend themselves alone against the disciplined, decisive and numerous Roman armies.[56]

The second part of the first campaign, which reached into the land of the Pannonii, is more controversial. Dio states that it was an unprovoked action, so Octavian must have been driven by some other strategic reasons. Appian draws his information from Augustus' memoirs, where the action is justified by Octavian's intention to attack the Dacians and Bastarnae.[57] We can discard this as propaganda discourse, or simply accept that he changed his plans for some reason which remains obscure. On the one hand, if Octavian did indeed intend to attack, it would have been military suicide, because Roman lines of communication would stretch from the not yet controlled Segestica, through to the uncontrolled territory which was open to attack from hostile communities on both banks of the Sava, such as the

[53] App. *Ill.* 16; Schmitthenner 1958: 234–6; Šašel Kos 2005a: 427–8; Olujić 1999/2000: 62–3; 2007: 89–90.
[54] Veith 1914: 29–50; Olujić 2005; 2007: 92–6; Šašel Kos 2005a: 432–5.
[55] Curt. Ruf. 9.4.26 ff.; Arr. *Anab.* 6.9.3; Plut. *Alex.* 63; Wilkes 1969: 51 n. 3; Coppola 1999.
[56] Dio, 46.52.2; App. *Ill.* 19; Šašel Kos 2005a: 430–2. See Čače 1979: 61, 71–81 on Iapodean military organisation.
[57] Dio, 49.36.1; App. *Ill.* 22; cf. Strabo, 7.5.2 – Segestica as a good place to wage war against the Dacians.

Breuci or Mezaei. It is not impossible that Octavian wanted to finish his, so far, brief and successful campaign at some easily defensible point where garrisons could be placed, such as on the banks of the Sava and Segestica.[58] As discussed earlier, fear of the Dacians might be the real reason for this second part of the campaign. This campaign appears to be nothing but what the Romans would regard as a pre-emptive strike against the Dacians, and revenge for Roman failures from earlier times against the Segesticani.

Adding to this confusion about the intentions of Octavian in 34 BC, Appian and Dio give different and somewhat confusing accounts about the ships employed in the siege of Segestica. Octavian needed ships in order to take Segestica because the pre-Roman city, the locality of Pogorelec near Sisak, was surrounded by the river Colapis (Kupa) on three sides.[59] The other reason is clearly stated by Appian – the army needed supplies and it was too difficult to get them through the land of the Iapodes, which was not yet fully pacified. Appian mentions ships being built on the Sava in order to bring provisions to the Danube during his planned campaign against the Dacians. Dio, on the other hand, mentions ships constructed by some allies in that vicinity, which, after they had been towed through the Ister into the Sava and further in the Colapis, helped Octavian to attack Segestica from the river as well.[60] It is relatively easy to accept that Dio or his source was wrong, and had mixed up information taken from Augustus' autobiography and geography. Precedence should be given to Appian as a source here. This idea is impossible for one basic reason: how could Octavian organise in such a short time for ships to arrive all the way from the lower stream of the Danube (in Antony's part of the empire) through hostile territory?[61] The identity of those allies mentioned by Dio remains disputed; the Noricans and Taurisci seem the most likely candidates because they were located close to Segestica, just as Dio suggested. Šašel Kos makes a plausible synthesis of Dio and Appian and argues that the allies in the vicinity of Siscia (in Dio) were the Taurisci, and that they constructed ships on the Sava, (in Appian) and sent them downstream to Segestica.[62]

Octavian's approach was apparently more cautious at the beginning of this campaign, but as he encountered more resistance and ran out of

[58] Kromayer 1898: 6; Syme 1933a: 67. See Durman 1992 on the geo-strategic importance of Siscia/Segestica.
[59] Faber 1972/73: 151–3; Šašel 1974b: 719–26; Nenadić 1986/87: 72–3, fig. 1.
[60] App. *Ill.* 22; Dio, 49.37.4–6. [61] Šašel Kos 1997a: 193–4; Nagy 1991: 61–2.
[62] These allies could be from the Norican kingdom; Zippel 1877: 230; Šašel Kos 1986: 140, or the Taurisci; Wilkes 1969: 53; Nagy 1991: 62; Šašel Kos 1997a: 193–4; 2005a: 441.

supplies, he became more aggressive.[63] However, Octavian did not encounter as much resistance as in his campaign against the Iapodes, except for the siege of Segestica, which lasted for thirty days, and finished with the full surrender of the Segesticani. The siege of Segestica cost Octavian the life of his famous admiral Menodorus, perhaps in the naval encounter Augustus omitted to mention in his memoirs.[64] The settlement was fairly moderate, without unnecessary reprisals for the Segesticani. Dio states that the remainder of Pannonia capitulated as well, but there does not seem to have been a capitulation of all the Pannonii; Dio must have been wrong here. Perhaps some of the Pannonii who sent help to the Segesticani made a *deditio* without fighting, being discouraged by the fall of Segestica, and gave hostages to Rome, or simply retreated.[65] Octavian left 25 cohorts to garrison the place, and that proved a wise decision, as they put down a brief but serious revolt that winter. The revolt of the Segesticani appears to be much more serious in Dio than in Appian. No existing source mentions what happened to the garrison in Segestica after 33 BC. Perhaps it was abandoned, or garrisoned with a minimal number of soldiers; see next chapter.[66]

The fall of Segestica signalled the end of campaigning for the year.[67] What Octavian's intentions were, it is again difficult to understand. A Dacian invasion seems to have been abandoned, if there was ever any serious Dacian plan. Dio mentions Octavian departing for Gaul in order to reach Britain before returning to Illyricum to deal with the rebellion of the Segesticani and the Delmatae, while Appian states that he intended to return to Illyricum in the spring, and that he actually returned earlier on news of the uprising. The unrest started again amongst the Alpine peoples, but it ended quickly and there were no serious consequences for the Romans.[68] There is a slight temptation to prefer Dio as a source for Octavian's campaigns. Octavian, as appearing in Appian, always presents himself in a better light whenever contradicting Dio's source. He was not going to Britain, leaving the Illyrian job unfinished as Dio suggests, but intending to return to Illyricum in the spring as a responsible Roman general fighting barbarians. Despite Appian's statement, it does not seem that Octavian planned the Dalmatian campaign much in advance, but rather that he was forced to return to Dalmatia.

[63] Nagy 1991: 62. [64] Šašel Kos 1997a: 194–5; 2005a: 440–1. For Menodorus see Münzer 1932.
[65] App. *Ill.* 23; Dio, 49.37.6; Syme 1933b: 68–71; Schmitthenner 1958: 215–16.
[66] Dio, 49.37.1–2; App. *Ill.* 22–4. [67] Nagy 1991: 64.
[68] App. *Ill.* 24; Dio, 49.38. Coppola 1999: 200.

The targets of Octavian in 34 BC were the Delmatae, who meanwhile raised an army and fought the Romans with more than 12,000 soldiers under the leadership of their *princeps* Versus (Οὐέρσος), and, after he perished, one Testimus (Τέστιμος) was elected as leader of the new army. From the sources it appears that they made the first offensive moves in occupying the stronghold of Promona again, but after the Romans took Promona and Synodium, and secured the Roman community in Salona, the Delmatae capitulated and started to pay tribute again. There was fighting around Salona, unreported by Appian and Dio, but mentioned in Strabo where Salona (Σάλων) is included amongst the cities burned by Octavian. This may refer to the Delmatian Salona located near Klis in the hinterland, and not the Italo-Greek Salona on the coast.[69]

There is no valid or reasonable explanation why the Delmatae would provoke the Romans after Octavian had so decisively and successfully dealt with the Iapodes and Segesticani in the previous year. Perhaps they tried to settle accounts with the Liburni and expected the Romans to be engaged elsewhere, as in 50 BC, and to recognise the *de facto* situation afterwards. Their overall successful war record against the Romans in the 40s might be a good reason for overconfidence, and if it is true that Octavian left for Gaul, there were circumstances so suitable for them to attack that they could recognise their window of opportunity, or maybe it was simply a pre-emptive action prompted by their expectation of an imminent Roman attack.[70] The power of their alliance stretched far and wide; Appian mentions that at one stage they controlled areas all the way to the Taulantii on the Macedonian frontier.[71] The fast return of Octavian to Illyricum, whether planned or not, was a reasonable strategic move as he could not leave the Delmatae uncontrolled, bearing in mind Caesar's unexpected troubles with them in the 40s.

There is the debate about whether Octavian created a *limes* of connected defensive military points in the Dalmatian hinterland (Tilurium-Andetrium-Promona-Burnum-Siscia) in order to protect communication between Siscia and Salona and Narona in 34–33 BC, or shortly afterwards, for defence from the Delmatae.[72] Military installations in the area cannot be dated precisely, and might well be constructed for temporary use during Octavian's wars, or the *Bellum Batonianum*, and the same applies with the

[69] App. *Ill.* 25–8; Strabo, 7.5.5; Dzino 2008a: 186. [70] Vulić 1926: 49.
[71] App. *Ill.* 24. See the different view by Šašel Kos 2005a: 442.
[72] Wilkes 1969: 91–2; 1977b refuting Patsch 1899: 172 ff.; Veith 1914: 111; Alföldy 1962b: 284–5; 1965a: 25, 171–2; Šašel 1974a; Sanader 2002.

network of small defensive points and *speculae* connecting Siscia with the coast through the territory of the Iapodes, loosely dated to 35–10 BC,[73] but might also have been constructed during the *Bellum Batonianum*. The construction of *limes* was neither a necessity immediately after the submission of the Delmatae and the Iapodes, nor was it Roman practice at that time, when their military power was at its peak.[74] We should agree with Wilkes that this communication line be dated to the later Augustan era (*Bellum Pannonicum* or *Bellum Batonianum*), rather than to the time of Octavian's operations in Illyricum.[75]

We should accept that the subjugation of the Segesticani and Delmatae were the limits of Octavian's expedition, and that he never crossed into the mountainous hinterland with his legions.[76] There was no apparent danger to Roman interests in that area, and certainly no need for Octavian to extend his lines of communication into hostile terrain, test his luck and risk resources once his operation had finished successfully. Thus large areas of today's central and northern Bosnia and the valley of the Sava remained free of direct or indirect Roman control. There is a note in Appian mentioning the sickness of Octavian, which prevented him from subduing other peoples, possibly referring to the Pannonii in the hinterland. Of course, it is impossible to determine the real reason behind his decision to finish the campaign. Octavian was wounded in the knee during the siege of Synodium. We can assume that this injury really was severe enough to prevent his continuing the campaign. On the other hand, it would be an excellent excuse to finish the campaign before reaching the potentially dangerous terrain in the hinterland and to start preparing for a much more important showdown with Antony. Statilius Taurus, Octavian's legate, was left to complete the campaign, and to mop up the remnants of the Delmatian resistance.[77]

An important but unclear question still remains: who are the Daisioi (Δαίσιοι), people singled out, together with the Salassi, the Iapodes, the Segesticani and the Delmatae, amongst those who gave Octavian the greatest problems? They are otherwise unknown in the existing sources, and Appian does not mention anything about Octavian's campaign against them. The overwhelming majority of scholars have suggested that Appian referred to the Daesitiates, a significant polity, whose heartland was in

[73] Patsch 1899: 172–3; cf. Šašel 1974a: 195–6, 199.
[74] Cf. Luttwak 1976: 19, 46–50.
[75] Wilkes 1969: 92; 1977b. See also Šašel Kos 2005a: 469.
[76] Kromayer 1898: 11–12; Syme 1933a; Schmitthenner 1958; Wilkes 1969: 55–7; Nagy 1991: 65–6.
[77] App. *Ill.* 28; injury at Synodium: App. *Ill.* 27; Suet. *Aug.* 20 (the accident with the collapsing bridge not mentioned by Appian); Dio, 49.38.4; Pliny, *HN* 7.148.

central Bosnia according to epigraphic evidence from the Roman period.[78] Certainly, it is not necessary to assume that the power of the Daesitiates was limited only to central Bosnia in 34–33 BC, but rather stretched further south, closer to the Delmatae in Herzegovina. The alliance between the Delmatae and Daesitiates in the *Bellum Batonianum* of AD 6–9 (see Chapter 7) might suggest the existence of some kind of alliance between them, whether as equals, or that the Daesitiates were the clients of the Delmatian alliance, and for that reason were involved in the conflict with Rome. The reasons why Appian (and Octavian's memoirs) does not mention this campaign might be the unsuccessful outcome of the operation, or the *deditio* of the Daesitiates without actual excessive fighting.[79]

The Roman audience did not care too much what happened to the Daisioi or the other 'barbarian' peoples from Illyricum, and how accurate Octavian's report was in its details. Regardless of the silence in the sources, it seems that Octavian and his *legati* also received *deditio* with some of the Pannonii, perhaps the Varciani, Osseriates, and Daesitiates, and less likely the Breuci, recognising nominal Roman suzerainty, without actually fighting them. That would easily explain why the Romans regarded the conflicts during the *Bellum Pannonicum* in 12–9 BC as 'rebellions'.

THE ASSESSMENT OF OCTAVIAN'S CAMPAIGNS

The changed strategic priorities of Rome in the region were not followed by a changed strategic position, and that seems to be the largest Roman problem at the time. Illyricum as a unified zone of operation was more difficult to protect, being a narrow strip without strategic depth and foothold in the hinterland, and preventative intervention was necessary to ensure the security of the Roman position on the sea coast and in the south-eastern Alpine area. Limited interventions, such as Pollio's, produced no results until the wave of disturbances in 36 BC, which was the necessary trigger for a lasting military solution. It, rather than some preconceived plan, initiated the action. Octavian had an opportunity to gather his legions and coordinate their efforts like no other Roman general before him, except Caesar or Pompey, and he had used it successfully, in Illyricum and in Gaul a few years earlier by means of the masterful generalship of Agrippa. Gaul

[78] CIL 3.3201 and the inscription *T. F(lavius) Valens f. princeps D(a)esitiati(um)*; Škegro 1997: 103 no. 126. Cf. Vulić 1934: 164–6; Josifović 1956: 144; Schmitthenner 1958: 213; Malevany 1977: 134; Mesihović 2007: 254–68.

[79] Kromayer 1898: 12 n. 4; Pašalić 1956: 273–6; Šašel Kos 2005a: 458–9; Daisioi might also be one of the Daesitiate communities; Šašel Kos 2005a: 459.

also suffered from the neglect of Caesar's loosely structured *laissez-faire* approach, until Agrippa implemented a decisive and successful change of the political framework in 39 BC.[80]

Internal and external Roman political problems played a significant, but secondary, role in the Illyrian affairs of the period. It cannot be determined precisely how dangerous to Roman interests was the rise of the Dacian kingdom under Burebista and his successors, especially after Burebista's death. The perception of danger and genuine Roman fear certainly existed, and might have influenced Caesar's planned campaign against the Dacians, or Octavian's expedition against the Segesticani. However, no source suggests the existence of direct danger to Italy from this area, and it is obvious that the Dacians were not threatening to cause a large wave of migrations, which would be harmful to Italy, such as those of the Cimbri and the Teutones had been. Nevertheless, the Roman internal crisis and Civil Wars were enough to weaken their position in Illyricum to some degree. We cannot overstate this assessment, as Italian settlement of the eastern Adriatic continued despite all the troubles, and was encouraged, as it helped in defence and at the same time strengthened the base for inland military operations.

Octavian's campaigns should be seen as the beginning of a new phase in Roman relations with the region, completing all the necessary prerequisites for a new way of projecting Roman power that would be imposed by the establishment of Illyricum as a separate province. Octavian used more soldiers than previous commanders, but his campaigns were perceived in the Roman narrative as defensive in nature, and aimed at the pacification of the region, the eradication of piracy and the security of North Italy and Noricum, as well as the communities of Romans and Italians on the Adriatic coast. It was the thoroughness of the action and the final pacification of the Delmatae and Iapodes that eliminated the last obstacles to the establishment of Roman provincial arrangements in Illyricum. He changed the approach from repulsing to injuring and absorbing the enemy in this region.[81]

The settlement with the indigenous polities was far from a permanent annexation. Although there is nothing preserved of Octavian's peace agreements with the defeated peoples of Illyricum, it was certainly their surrender – a *deditio*. Already existing agreements were re-asserted, hostages were given and payment of retrospective tribute imposed.[82] Only the Transalpine

[80] Drinkwater 1983: 19–20, 120–1; Roddaz 1984: 66–75.
[81] Cf. Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 31–2; Riggsby 2006: 21–3, 173–89.
[82] Cf. App. *Ill.* 16, 28 (the Delmatae and the Derbani). See also Šašel Kos 2005a: 455–8.

Iapodes and Segesticani are explicitly mentioned as being brought for the first time under Roman domination.[83] The campaigns of 35–33 BC were not a conquest in the modern sense of that word, which implies the acquirement of territory. Octavian was not concerned with extending Roman territory, but with extending Roman power and imposing it over different *gentes* in Illyricum. The extension of Roman power extended the concept of Illyricum deeper inland than ever, and for the first time Illyricum became, in Rambaud's definition, a geographical space rather than simply a one-dimensional strategic space from previous times.

Previous security arrangements without any lasting commitment of Roman troops became outdated, because Rome's attitude towards Illyricum had changed and a stronger military presence was now a necessity for the security of new Roman and Italian settlers on the coast, and the new position of Illyricum in the empire. The 'coastal' Illyricum invented and established in 59 BC was a Roman acknowledgment that the situation had changed, but in just two decades of Roman internal turbulence it became outdated and dysfunctional. Octavian's campaigns restored political stability in the area. It was a modest but thorough achievement, primarily aimed at and achieving submission of some peoples from Illyricum the Romans saw as troublesome, and additionally acquiring some welcome military *gloria* for the young Caesar. He created, whether by intention or not, conditions for the subsequent Roman political and military advance towards the Danube. However, the changes in the Roman constitution, army and military strategy, and the completion of the municipalisation on the coast, which will be discussed in the next chapter, were necessary prerequisites for Roman conquest of the hinterland.

[83] App. *Ill.* 21 (Transalpine Iapodes), 22 (the Segesticani).

CHAPTER 7

From senatorial to imperial Illyricum: Bellum Pannonicum

ILLYRICUM IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE PRINCIPATE: THE *PAX AUGUSTA*

In 33 BC Octavian's campaigns were finished, and Illyricum was in a few years a *de iure* Roman province. In 30 BC the Roman Civil Wars ended and Octavian was finally supreme master of the Mediterranean. There is some symbolic connection between the fortunes of the first *princeps* and Illyricum, as military victories in Illyricum in 33 and 9 BC mark the high points of his political career, and the *Bellum Batonianum* of AD 6–9 coincides with the darkest hours of his foreign policy.

There is no space here to discuss in depth the great social and political changes in the Roman world that followed the victory of Octavian in the Civil Wars. The battle of Actium and the new constitution from 27 BC finished the long socio-political process of Rome's transformation. Political power had already shifted from the Senate more than two decades before, but this time, instead of two or three, there was only one unchallenged master of the empire – Augustus. However, the transformation was not yet completely finished in the first years of the Principate. The new system needed some time to consolidate, working by trial and error rather than following some pre-determined plan. Augustus implemented a series of reforms patiently and gradually during the whole of his long reign, carefully avoiding a definition of the exact extent of his non-constitutional powers, keeping the façade of constitutional and traditional government, but concentrating all power in his hands and preserving it for members of his family. This is also the time when the Romans started to 'invent' the empire, through the construction of imperial discourse, distinctive imperial culture and reorganisation of conquered territory.[1]

[1] Particularly useful and influential are: Syme 1939: 313 ff.; Millar 1984b; Raaflaub and Toher 1990; Crook 1996: 113–46; Southern 1998: 100–37; Hingley 2005: 57–71 etc.

The conduct of foreign affairs changed as a consequence of the new system. The *princeps* directly controlled most of the army and foreign affairs. In 27 BC the provinces were officially divided into imperial, ruled by legates appointed directly by Augustus, and public, where governors were appointed in the Republican way, by the casting of lots among ex-magistrates. In addition, there was also an equestrian prefect of Egypt, appointed by the emperor. Imperial provinces were generally the troublesome parts of the empire, requiring a strong military presence, while the senatorial were more peaceful areas without imminent threat; they required able administrators, not soldiers.[2] An important change in foreign affairs was that now military co-operation between the governors of different provinces was more likely than in the Republic. Under the new constitution the *princeps* had power to override individual governors and co-ordinate their efforts, so that larger military operations became possible.[3] Even so, a need for internal consolidation, a reorganisation of the army, and rest after the decades of civil unrest perhaps delayed the offensive in the West, before territory over the Rhine and up to the Danube was brought under Roman rule – the most impressive military achievement of the Augustan principate. Augustan expansion remains a very controversial topic. It is difficult to recognise the main reason for sudden Roman interest and a full-scale military engagement beyond the Rhine into Germany, Pannonia and the mid-Danube. It is unclear whether it was primarily an internally driven issue, such as to prove Augustus' successors to be capable leaders and to give an impression of the new system's vitality, or an externally influenced search for easily defensible borders in Europe, or a combination of both.

The sources for the first years of the Principate are often inadequate, especially for the history of Illyricum. Appian's monograph stops with the end of Octavian's wars, so in this period we rely mainly on Dio's dry annalistic account and excerpts from Suetonius' *Vitae*, as well as contemporary sources such as Velleius Paterculus or Augustus' own *Res Gestae*. The sources in this period are concerned with the centre of power, emperor and imperial court, and take little notice of the events they perceive to be too far from the centre of power.[4] Secondary sources, such as the epitomes of Livy (up to 9 BC), Florus or epitomisers drawing on Livy such as Eusebius and Rufius(?) Fest, often make the reconstruction of events even more

[2] Dio, 53.12.4; Strabo, 17.3.25; Suet. *Aug*. 46–7. See Bowman 1996; Ando 2006. The 'independence' of senatorial governors under Augustus was just propaganda; Millar 1984a: 46 ff.
[3] Cf. Wilkes 1965a: 9–27.
[4] Gabba 1984b; Toher 1990; Reinhold and Swan 1990; Pelling 1997; Damon 2006: 23–4.

confusing. The inscriptions from Illyricum are not numerous in this period, yet epigraphy is a necessary tool of the Roman imperial historian, and is the only way of discovering anything about the scale of Italian colonisation and the origins of the new colonies in the Dalmatian coast during this period.[5]

There is not much information from Illyricum itself following Octavian's campaigns. As we saw in the previous chapter, the extent of the conquest in 35–33 BC was actually quite modest, but the fact that no new troubles were reported points to the area being secured to a reasonable degree. Illyricum was finally organised as an independent province in this period. It is said in the sources that Illyricum was put under senatorial administration after 27 BC,[6] so many scholars believe that it was established as a regular province as a direct consequence of Octavian's campaigns in 35–33 BC.[7]

However, it is difficult to point out precisely when, in the period after the summer of 32 and 27 BC, Illyricum became an independent province. Nagy pointed out that Illyricum is missing from the list of provinces which swore an oath to Octavian in the summer of 32 BC, as noted in the *Res Gestae*, so the establishment of the province of Illyricum must be dated after that event. The first book of Propertius' *Elegies* which mentions the departure of the Illyrian governor was published after 31/30, but before 28 BC.[8] It is unknown where the administrative centre of this province was, and there is no mention of its governors in the first years of the Principate, apart from Cnaeus Baebius Tamphilus Vaala Numonianus, who was mentioned in the inscription found in Iader (Zadar), and Publius Silius Nerva, pro-consul in c. 16 BC.[9] There is also an unnamed love rival of the poet Propertius, who was one of the first governors of Illyricum.[10] Knowing that Illyricum had been given to senatorial administration is an important hint that the situation was under control, and that no new military undertakings were necessary there for almost two full decades.

The most important piece of information we have from this period derives from epigraphic sources. Augustus' reign included a large programme of

[5] Alföldy 1962a; 1965a; Wilkes 1969. Their methodology has been subjected to damaging criticism by Vittinghoff 1977, especially Caesarian and Augustan dating. See an overview in Wilkes 1977a: 746–51.

[6] Dio, 53.12.4 *to Delmatikon* (τὸ Δελματικὸν); Strabo, 17.3.25 *Illurida* (Ἰλλυρίδα).

[7] Wilkes 1969: 36; Nagy 1991: 67.

[8] Nagy 1991: 67; *RG* 25.2; Prop. 1.8; cf. Butler and Barber 1933: xxv–xxvi; Camps 1961: 6–7; Hodge and Buttimore 2002: 9; Luther 2003 on the dating of Book 1 of Propertius.

[9] Numonianus Vála: AE 1986: 547; 2000: 1181; Fadić 1986: 416–24; 1999. Silius Nerva: Dio, 54.20.1–2; CIL 3.2973 from Aenona. See the discussion on Silius below.

[10] Prop. 1.8, 2.16, see Dzino 2008b. *Fasces* mentioned in 2.16.11 confirm that he was a magistrate; Butler and Barber 1933: 164; Camps 1967: 130.

Figure 2. The well of Cn. Tamphilus Vaala Numonianus from the forum of Iader (Zadar), c. 20s BC. Archaeological museum in Zadar, Croatia.

Italian settlement in the coastal Illyrian cities, which consolidated and strengthened Roman rule. Those coastal cities, which already had *conventus* of Roman citizens, and had earlier gained some municipal privileges from Caesar, had their status advanced to the level of *colonia Romana*. The colonies were established in Iader,[11] Salona,[12] Narona,[13] and less likely in Senia, and Epidaurum.[14] Other cities, such as Scodra, Lissus, Tragurium, Issa or Aenona, perhaps acquired municipal status in this period, but this view, which assumes that Pliny's *oppida civium Romanorum* were cities with municipal status, has been questioned recently, as there is no evidence that Pliny used consistent terminology.[15]

[11] CIL 3.2907: *Augustus parens coloniae murrum (et) turrus dedit* cf. 3.13264; Pliny, *HN* 3.140; Wilkes 1969: 207–8; Alföldy 1962a: 361–2; 1965a: 78–9; Salmon 1969: 160; Brunt 1987: 597 (C 73). The inscription mentioning the pro-consul Tamphilus Vála suggests Augustus as a founder; Fadić 1986: 425–7; 1999: 51–2.

[12] Pliny, *HN* 3.141; There were two settlements. Alföldy 1962a: 359–61; 1965a: 101–5, 110 suggested that Salona was a double colony: Caesarian and Octavian. The evidence for the establishment of a Caesarian colony is slim, Wilkes 1969: 221–4; Salmon 1969: 160; Clairmont 1975: 6, 18 ff.; Brunt 1987: 251–2, 597 (C 74).

[13] Pliny, *HN* 3.142; Alföldy 1962a: 357–8; 1965a: 135; Šašel Kos 2000: 297 (Caesarian), Salmon 1969: 160; Wilkes 1969: 248 (early Principate).

[14] Pliny, *HN* 3.143; Alföldy 1962a: 357–8, 362–3; 1965a: 76, 139; Wilkes 1969: 200, 252; Šašel Kos 2000: 297. There is less evidence for the date when Senia and Epidaurum became colonies, Vittinghoff 1977: 16, 18.

[15] Brunt 1987: 606–7 (M 35–48). Alföldy 1962a: 363–5; 1965a: 141 regards them as Augustan colonies, but that is disputed by Čače 2001: 98–9; cf. Papazoglu 1986: 215–19.

This was a significant period for building activity in the eastern Adriatic, when new urbanistic forms were implemented over the existing templates of indigenous cities in the eastern Adriatic.[16] It is interesting that early Augustan colonists were not military veterans, as in Gaul or Spain, but civilians. That could be the reason why Augustus omitted Illyricum in the *Res Gestae* from the list of provinces to which he sent his discharged veterans.[17] Some colonies such as Iader were probably of an agrarian nature. Perhaps some of the 80,000 Roman poor resettled by Caesar were transferred to Illyricum.[18] If this is true, it can be regarded as an important sign that Illyricum was considered to be a safe area in this time, as there was no need for the settlement of army veterans. This wave of colonisation hastened the process of Italian settlement, which had already begun in the second–first century BC, when Italian traders started to settle there. Epigraphy also reveals that the settlement of the colonists on the eastern Adriatic coast corresponded with their places of origin across the Adriatic. Thus the majority of the settlers in Liburnia were of North Italian origin; central Italians settled in central Dalmatia, especially in Salona; and settlers from southern Italy settled in the south.[19] Narona is the only exception, as it had an unusually high percentage of freedmen in the population. There are many freedmen attested by the epigraphy who worked for patrons in other cities in Dalmatia or Italy. Epidaurum is the only colony where a substantial indigenous element has been attested.[20]

It is not known what happened with Issa after its defeat in the Civil Wars. The Issaean commonwealth was dissolved in 46 BC, but very soon the inhabitants of Issa and its colonies gained Roman citizenship, and were joined to the Salonitan administration. They were not a part of the Salonitan *conventus* reserved for indigenous *peregrini*, but were full members of a wider Salonitan *Res publica*. Salonitan territory enjoyed substantial autonomy, extending into the coast and islands previously belonging to the Issaean commonwealth. Perhaps it is reasonable to suggest that the Salonitan *Res publica* succeeded the Issaean commonwealth when Salona assumed leadership over Issa after the defeat of the Pompeians in 46 BC.[21]

The exact borders of the province of Illyricum in these early years of the Principate are not known. Essentially, Illyricum was the Dalmatian coastal strip with its immediate hinterland and islands, bordering in the south on

[16] Suić 1976b: 94–104; Faber 2000. [17] Wilkes 1969: 108–9, 231.
[18] Suet. *Iul.* 42; Suić 1981: 152–5 (Iader as agrarian colony); Watkins 1979: 83.
[19] Alföldy 1965a: 185; Wilkes 1969: 300–6. [20] Wilkes 1969: 306–7; Alföldy 1965a: 140.
[21] Suić 1959 refuting Novak 1949: 90–2, Salona as a *Res publica*: CIL 3.12922.

Epirus.[22] In the north the boundary followed the limits of Octavian's conquest in 33 BC, but as it was the frontier of the empire at that time, it does not seem that the border was fixed firmly. It was rather loosely determined, depending on Roman relations with individual peoples from the interior. Perhaps the Romans regarded the territory up to the Sava river as being nominally part of the *imperium Romanum* without requiring any administrative tasks, but there is no evidence to either confirm or dispute that, and it was seemingly unimportant for the Romans. In fact we can compare the situation on the northern frontier of Illyricum with Germany and other border areas in this period, where the Romans used to exercise control over the territory far beyond their military strongholds.[23]

The western boundary of Illyricum with Italy moved in this period so that Histria was included in Italy on a permanent basis in c. 18–12 BC.[24] It remains a controversial issue as to whether it was fixed on the river Arsia, or whether it included Liburnia as well. Pliny the Elder is guilty of causing this confusion as he places the same Liburnian cities into *regio* X of Italy, as well as in the province of Illyricum. Modern scholarship was divided as to whether Liburnia was part of Italy in the very late Republic, or whether those Liburnian cities with *ius Italicum* were administered by Italian cities for census purposes because of their geographical proximity to Italy.[25] It seems that Liburnia was after all part of Illyricum, as Margetić and Čače point out, because Pliny erroneously mixed up his sources.[26] Also, both known governors of senatorial Illyricum were patrons of Liburnian cities, as we saw from the two inscriptions found there. We do not know where the provincial capital was. It might have been Iader or, more probably, the later capital Salona. The administrative division of the province at this time is not known, as Pliny's list of peregrine *civitates* is dated to the later period, as discussed in Chapter 8.

Some scholars followed Ritterling, and believed that the northern part of Illyricum, where some army units were stationed, was organised as a

[22] Strabo, 17.3.25; Pliny, *HN* 3.145.

[23] C. M. Wells 1972: 248; Christ 1957: 425–8. See Luttwak 1976: 13–20, 46–50 on that strategy in general.

[24] Strabo, 7.5.3; Pliny, *HN* 3.129; Degrassi 1954: 54–60. Thomsen 1947: 28 puts the border adjustment in AD 9, but Degrassi supplies weightier arguments. See also recently Starac 1993/94. This decision might be influenced by the increasing number of land estates in Histria owned by the imperial family and Augustan inner circle, Starac 1994: 140–1, cf. Tassaux 1983.

[25] Pliny, *HN* 3.130, 139–40; Thomsen 1947: 26–30 esp. 28–9 (part of Transpadana, enfranchised in 49 BC but included in Illyricum in 42 BC when Transpadana joined Italy); Kubitschek 1889: 105 (part of Italy until 12 BC); Premerstein 1924; Suić 1967: 36; Wilkes 1969: 489–90 (Liburnian cities with *ius italicum*, although provincial, were administered from Italy because of their proximity); Watkins 1988/89: 129–35 (moved to Dalmatia by Vespasian).

[26] Margetić 1977; 1996 and Čače 1992/93 with some differences in interpretation.

separate province, or that the military district was under an imperial legate. However, we do not have any evidence to confirm the existence of these legates. That hypothetical 'Imperial Illyricum' would be limited only by the Adriatic hinterland and southern Alps, as both inscriptions mentioning governors of senatorial Illyricum were found in Liburnia, confirming that it was part of senatorial Illyricum as well. It is after all very unlikely that Augustus would establish such a small province in light of his fondness for large provinces, and his reluctance to create new provinces. Perhaps some units were stationed in Segestica, but otherwise the argument is difficult to maintain due to the geographical position of Illyricum before the *Bellum Pannonicum*, as those units on the border would be easily cut off in the event of indigenous uprising.[27]

The role of the army in Illyricum appears in this phase to be entirely pre-emptive. It would be reasonable to assume that the army was maintained close to the coast where it had secure lines of supply by sea, and from where it could efficiently intervene in the case of any problem. Bases of legions XI, XIII Gemina, XIIII Gemina, XV Apollinaris and XX were probably in Illyricum or North Italy before AD 6, but not much can be proven with the current state of evidence.[28] Contrary to earlier opinions, it is now widely accepted that legion VII was based in Galatia-Pamphylia, not in Illyricum or Moesia before AD 7.[29] It is very difficult to determine the position of legions placed in Illyricum at this time. It is possible that during this period the military bases in Tilurium and Burnum were established, as well as bases in Poetovio and Siscia for other legions, during, or just after, the *Bellum Pannonicum*. Burnum was strategically placed in friendly Liburnian territory just next to the Delmatae as a reminder of Roman power.[30] Sirmium (Sremska Mitrovica) also appears to be an important Roman base in AD 6.[31]

The existence of these bases before AD 6 is highly speculative. Majority opinion used to follow the view of Saria that legion XV Apollinaris was stationed in Emona, and the foundation of Emona was dated in early Tiberian times.[32] The view came under the valid criticism of Kos, as the numismatic evidence denies the existence of a military camp in Emona, and

[27] Ritterling 1925: 1,218–19; Betz 1938: 3; Nagy 1991: 67–8. The argument is refuted by Syme 1933c: 22 n. 55 and Papazoglu 1976: 207–8. Augustus and provinces, Dio, 53.12.8; Braunert 1977.

[28] XI (later Claudia) XIII and XIIII Gemina – North Italy or Illyricum, Ritterling 1925: 1,691, 1,711–12, 1,728; Syme 1933c: 29–31; Keppie 1984b: 208–11; Wilkes 2002: 532–3; XV Apollinaris, Wheeler 2000; XX – Vell. Pat. 2.112.

[29] Mitchell 1976: 301–3; Strobel 2000: 526–8.

[30] Čače 1989: 78–9; cf. Zaninović 1966: 41 n. 58; 1968: 120–1; Suić 1981: 227–8.

[31] Dio, 55.29.3.

[32] Earlier dating: C. M. Wells 1974: 185–7; Keppie 1984a: 77–8 (Augustan); Saria 1938; Degrassi 1954: 109–11; Wilkes 1963; Šašel 1968: 564–5 (Tiberian); Sherwin-White 1973: 242 n. 3 (late Tiberian).

questions its existence in Poetovio before the late Augustan period. Šašel Kos showed that Tiberian datation for Emona is unattainable, while the finding of a boundary stone between Aquileia and Emona confirms that Emona had not been in Illyricum but in Italy.[33] Auxiliary troops were also placed in Illyricum, but it is even more difficult to locate them precisely in the period before AD 6.[34] The Romans rebuilt and strengthened fortifications around the coastal cities and ports, and started to move some indigenous settlements from mountain sides overlooking the sea towards the coast.[35]

Other aspects of Roman actions in Illyricum are obscure. Evidently, there was an economic boom in the north-west Adriatic. Some distinguished Roman and Italian families like the Calpurnii Pisones were buying land and establishing a strong position at the head of the Adriatic.[36] The spread of vineyards in Istria probably affected Liburnia as well, and the economic enterprise of Lucius Tarius Rufus should be seen in that context.[37] Links between the Baebii family and Illyricum in the last years of the Republic and the first years of the Principate were also established.[38] So far, there is no trace of any Roman road being built in this period, which shows a lack of interest and perhaps a lack of need, as the Adriatic was still a major communication link with Italy; large-scale Roman road building in Illyricum starts only after the end of the *Bellum Batonianum*, and the Romans probably used existing communication networks. A high degree of inclusiveness into the empire in this period is only apparent in Liburnia, the area closest to Italy. Some indigenous Liburnian families progressed in importance and the first consul of Liburnian origin appears to have been the above mentioned Tarius Rufus, consul already in 16 BC.[39]

From the scarce information available we may conclude that Roman regional conduct in Illyricum in the 20s BC was intent upon consolidating Roman influence, through the administration and organisation of the province. Italian domination of the Dalmatian coast was now unchallenged. The settlement and establishment of colonies in the Augustan era was part of a much wider process of reinventing Roman identity in the new imperial framework, which strengthened the compactness of the Roman Empire.

[33] Kos 1986: 54–6; Šašel Kos 1995; 2002b, cf. summary of the argument in Šašel Kos 2003.
[34] Alföldy 1962b; Wilkes 1969: 139–44, 470–4.
[35] Faber 2000. This was not necessarily a violent process; Hanson 1988: 56–8; cf. evidence from Spain ILS 6092; Florus, 2.33.59–60; Dio, 54.11.5 (voluntary relocation of citizens of Sabora).
[36] Wilkes 1969: 199–200, 331–2 n. 6, see also Starac 1994, and Matijašić 1998 for Histrian economy.
[37] Pliny, *HN* 14.60–61; Purcell 1985: 16, n. 80. [38] Fadić 1986: 416–18; 1999: 51.
[39] Wilkes 1969: 330–1; Wiseman 1971: 264 no. 419. Syme 1939: 362 n. 2; 1971d: 112–13 thought that he was Picene, because of his estates there. These estates were purchased, not ancestral, Pliny, *HN* 18.37.

The 'ideal' Roman city, that colonies frequently represented, was an ideal template for establishing new, universal Roman, i.e. imperial identity, through a newly conceived imperial imagery of public spaces. The lack of evidence for the transformation of the landscape in the hinterland (roads, cities, land survey) in this period supports the notion that the Romans had no intention or need to fully integrate the hinterland into the empire.[40]

The Adriatic coast and its hinterland was organised as a province, but direct Roman control did not penetrate any more deeply into the continent than in Republican times. It was the threat of Roman power that controlled the hinterland. The Iapodes and the Delmatae were now under firmer Roman control, and this period of peace can also be ascribed to the pacification of these indigenous peoples. Behind the coastal strip was a buffer zone made of the Pannonii, who were not perceived as a threat by the Romans, and there were no outside factors which would cause aggressive Roman treatment of the area. Thus, we can understand why Illyricum became a senatorial province in 27 BC, and why there was no reason for settling veterans there. Regional strategic thinking was still deeply Republican in essence; never ready to risk military engagements in the hinterland, unless the defensive needs of coastal settlements required the pacification of inland peoples. This, however, was in accordance with the generally defensive and inactive Roman army in the West during that period. It would soon change.

THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF ILLYRICUM AND THE *BELLA AUGUSTA*

Regardless of the closing of the doors of Ianus' temple, and the peaceful mood prevailing throughout the empire, some military activities were evident in the 20s. The new regime needed military success to establish itself more firmly; peace was just a political catchword.[41] There are two areas of military operations that are strategically important, if not crucial, for the existence of Illyricum: the Alpine passes and the wider region of Macedonia – Moesia. The Alpine area had been for centuries perceived by the Romans as a potential threat to the security of northern Italy, and it is quite obvious why Augustus wanted to put this region under firm control as early as possible. The campaigns of Antistius Vetus and Valerius Messala

[40] Cities: Whittaker 1997: 144–8; Zanker 2000; Hingley 2005: 77–87; landscape: Ando 2006: 183.
[41] C. M. Wells 1972: 5, 8; Schmitthenner 1962; Gruen 1985; Woolf 1993a.

Corvinus against the Salassi in the Alps did not fully pacify this people. The task was completed only by Aulius Terentius Varro Murena in 25 BC.[42]

On the eastern frontiers of Illyricum, Marcus Licinius Crassus, grandson of the triumvir, fought successfully against the Thracians and the Getae in 29 BC, extended Roman influence towards Lower Moesia and earned a triumph.[43] He actually fought the Dacians and their allies and destroyed Dacian influence in Thrace and Moesia, but for propaganda purposes the facts were distorted and he celebrated a triumph over the Thracians and Getae.[44] These campaigns on the western and eastern borders of Illyricum brought peace in the next decade, and extended Roman influence towards the lower Danube and Alps. They brought no spectacular results or advance in Roman power, but changed the geo-strategic situation in the area. Crassus' campaign removed real or perceived Dacian aggressive designs against Thrace, and enabled Roman influence rather than Roman direct rule to extend further, while Murena established a significant foothold for future Roman expansion in this area.

The political situation in Rome and the empire changed in this decade. Relative peace on the western and northern frontiers gave way to a sudden expansion of Roman power up to the Elbe and Danube. The theories emphasising Augustus' grand designs either for 'European' or even 'world conquest', or for the establishment of stable imperial borders, are disregarded by some modern scholars who prefer to explain this expansion as a short-term reaction to a change in circumstances.[45] There were many factors influencing this renewed imperialism and which prevented its appearance earlier, such as the need to prove Augustus' successors capable leaders, false notions of European and Central Asian geography, the need to present the vitality of an 'ever expanding empire' for propaganda purposes, and perhaps for the economic benefits of the conquest.[46] It is possible to go even further and see the ideology underpinning these wars as 'revolutionary wars' of the new regime. They were the direct consequence of Augustan invention of the empire after Actium, understood as a civilising mission and conducted in order to spread *humanitas* to 'barbarians'.[47] This new approach also included Republican understanding of border defence, essentially based on the idea that peace can be achieved only by 'pacifying' and subduing potentially dangerous neighbours. However, it also departed from this approach in that annexation was used only as a last resort. These subjugated peoples were incorporated into the

[42] Dio, 53.25.3–5; Strabo, 4.6.7 and PIR^3 74 for Murena. [43] Dio, 51.23–7.
[44] Mócsy 1966; 1974: 23–4; Lica 2000: 124–9. [45] Gruen 1996: 195–6; Southern 1998: 155.
[46] False geographical notions: Moynihan 1985; Nicolet 1991: 57–84; propaganda: Gruen 1985; 1996: 188–94; internal reasons for postponement: Syme 1939: 328–9; Roddaz 1984: 480–1.
[47] Hingley 2005: 62–7.

empire and Roman influence was further expanded. This was nevertheless still the expansion of Roman power rather than full-scale occupation, as the Roman army did not impose reliable administrative control over conquered territories in the first years of the expansion.

The Roman army was reorganised at this time. Veterans who had fought at Actium were demobilised and new recruits filled their ranks, so that this new generation of soldiers, recruited 27–20 BC, reached its peak in 15–7 BC when Rome fought decisive wars in the Alps, Germany and Illyricum.[48] Augustan military strategy was simply and efficiently based on the 'economy of force'; large concentrations of forces were used in order to knock down opponents, which made possible the maintenance of only a relatively small army.[49] The push through the Alps during 16–13 BC was the first visible example of this renewed imperialism in practice. It was a relatively fast, but also thorough, process and it prepared the ground for long-term Roman imperial engagement in the affairs of what we now know as central Europe.[50]

At the same time troubles for the Romans arose in the West. The governor of Gaul, Marcus Lollius, had unexpected problems with the 'Germans', and the situation for the moment became serious enough to cause Augustus to travel to Gaul.[51] The *clades Lolliana* made Augustus rethink his Alpine policy, as any potential invader from the north would threaten Italy by passing quickly through the Alpine passes that were not under Roman control. The governor of Illyricum, Publius Silius Nerva, was conducting a campaign in Cisalpine Gaul against the Alpine peoples of the Cammuni and the Vennii, located somewhere around Val Trompia and Val Camonica in North Italy.[52] Whether Silius extended his operations into the Alpine passes as far as the valley of the Upper Rhine, as a beginning of the Alpine operations that were to be conducted by Drusus and Tiberius the following year, or whether it was just a preventative or a defensive action, is difficult to say from the available evidence; but it is very likely that it was a part of larger operations against the Alpine peoples.[53] In light of Silius' engagement in Cisalpina and the overstretched Illyrian legions, some Pannonians and Noricans, unidentified by Dio, plundered Histria in 16

[48] Syme 1933c: 14–21; Raaflaub 1980; Gilliver 2007. [49] Luttwak 1976: 15 ff.
[50] Christ 1957; Wilkes 1965a: 10–13; C. Wells 1972: 59 ff.; Gruen 1996: 169–71; Zanier 1999; Kehne 2002.
[51] Dio, 54.20.4–6; Vell. Pat. 2.97.1; Suet. *Aug.* 23.1; Tac. *Ann.* 1.10.
[52] Silius Nerva – PIR^3 512. Fischer 2005. See the bibliography in Gruen 1996: 169 n. 106.
[53] C. M. Wells 1972: 63–6 allows the possibility that the campaign of Silius, which was much more extensive than what was described by Dio, took more than a year, and started even before 16 BC; cf. Berchem 1968.

BC. However, it was nothing but a raid. Silius and his legates quickly repulsed them.[54] The Roman army in Illyricum first defeated the Pannonians and afterwards they probably collaborated in the subjugation of the Noricans, finishing operations before the end of the year. Silius began his campaign in Cisalpina in the summer, so there was enough time for him to return to Illyricum and deal with this incursion.[55]

The subsequent annexation of Noricum remains very unclear, because some of the sources contradict each other. The fact is that the old ally and client kingdom of Rome was suddenly annexed and made into a province, possibly under the pretext of the incursion of 16 BC. However, the sources do not mention the annexation specifically as an individual campaign, or in the context of the Alpine campaigns, when Tiberius and Drusus operated in the vicinity of Noricum. Most scholars accept 15 BC as the date of annexation, but it could be any time from 16 BC to AD 6. However, the establishment of a more organised provincial structure occurred even later.[56] The annexation of Noricum is one more example of the way the Romans changed and developed new approaches in changed circumstances. This antiquated ally, who had an important role in late Republican times, had no place in the renewed imperialism of the early Principate. On the other hand, this event was significant for Illyricum as the *deserta Boiorum* between the Drava and the upper Danube, including the important settlement and stronghold of Carnuntum, was to be joined to Illyricum, and later to Pannonia.[57]

The boundary with Macedonia was again insecure. The victories of Crassus did not make much impact on the Scordisci and the Dentelethae who remained untouched by his campaign in 29–28 BC.[58] The troubles with the Scordisci and Dentelethae arose in 16 BC, and the Sarmatians crossed the Danube at the same time. However, the next time we hear of the Scordisci was in 12 BC, when they appear on the stage as close allies of Rome in the war against the Pannonii.[59] There is an obvious problem for historiography in explaining why they suddenly changed sides and became Roman allies. Some unreliable sources placed Tiberius in the vicinity of Thrace at this time, so some scholars, following Zippel, have assumed that

[54] Dio, 54.20.1. The invading Norici were the people of Ambisontes who settled close to Histria, Šašel 1972: 136–44, esp. 143; Šašel Kos 1997b: 32, and the most western of the Pannonii – the Colapiani/Segesticani and Latobici rather than the Breuci; Nagy 1991: 69–70; Šašel Kos 2005a: 484, refuting Alföldy 1974: 58.

[55] Nagy 1991: 70.

[56] For an overview of different opinions, see Alföldy 1974: 52 n. 2; Gruen 1996: 171 n. 114; Šašel Kos 1997b: 32; 2005a: 485–8. Independent minting of Norican tetradrachms ended c. 16–15 BC, Kos 1977: 20.

[57] Tóth 1977: 283–4, fig. 2.

[58] Papazoglu 1978: 339.

[59] Dio, 54.20.2–3 (the Sarmatians), Dio, 54.31.3; Suet. *Tib*. 9 (the Scordisci as allies).

Tiberius accepted the Balkan command in 15 BC and conquered the Scordisci, operating from Macedonia or Pannonia.[60] Syme cautiously pointed out the unreliability of the sources, and showed that the subjugation of the Scordisci before the Pannonii was geographically impossible. He concluded that northern Moesia was probably conquered by an unknown general operating from Macedonia, who brought the Scordisci into the alliance with Rome, either by diplomacy or by force.[61]

THE *BELLUM PANNONICUM* 12–9 BC: THE REASONS AND CONDUCT

With the advantage of historical hindsight we can recognise that the *Bellum Pannonicum* was a decisive stage in the development and final shaping of Roman Illyricum. It was part of the new strategic approach that finally broke with the traditional approach based on indirect control of the hinterland through the threat of Roman power. This change finally gave the Romans the benefit of strategic depth in Illyricum, instead of the previous conduct which mostly maintained a strategic buffer zone. The full conquest of Illyricum certainly was part of Augustus' new 'western policy', or what was previously termed 'the new imperialism'. Nevertheless, there were local reasons behind this war. According to the sources, the area became perceived as a security threat again in the mid-10s and Rome, as usual in this kind of situation when it perceived danger, decided to take full control of the area, this time once and for all, to prevent any further complications. The need for conquest was partly fuelled by fears for the security of Italy, initiated by the incursion of 16 BC, which also threatened investments of the Augustan elite, including members of the imperial circle, in Histria.[62]

There is hardly any primary source material for these events, but the chronology can be reconstructed from Dio. The main problems arise from the terminology used in Dio and Velleius Paterculus, our chief sources, as they persistently use the generic term 'Pannonians' (Παννόνιοι – *Pannonii*), which in fact encompasses many different peoples belonging to the cultural group known as the Pannonii, who lived north of the future

[60] Vell. Pat. 2.39.3; Euseb. *Chron*. 167f, 168b. Zippel 1877: 246–7; Mócsy 1962: 540; Alföldy 1974: 52–3; Nagy 1991: 71–3; Šašel Kos 2005a: 508.

[61] Vulić 1907: 31 f.; Syme 1934a: 127–9; Wilkes 1965a: 15–16; Papazoglu 1978: 341–3. It is doubtful that Tiberius could be both with Drusus conquering the Alpine peoples and fighting in Thrace in 15 BC; cf. Levick 1976: 27–8 n. 51.

[62] Roddaz 1984: 479. Cf. Šašel 1976: 84. Augustan-era properties in Histria: Starac 1994: 133–7, 139–40, 142–3, cf. Tassaux 1983; Begović and Schrunk 2007: 327–9.

Dalmato-Pannonian provincial frontier, such as the Breuci, Latobici, Andizetes, Colapiani, Amatini, etc., while the term 'Dalmatians' does not necessarily mean the Delmatae at this time, but the indigenous population living south of the Sava river, the future province of Dalmatia. Dalmatian and Pannonian identities were indeed developed by the population of Illyricum in the later period, as one of the overlapping identities existing inside the Roman empire, but in the early Principate it was only a Roman colonial construct, reflected in the narrative of Velleius.[63]

Syme, repeated and reinforced by Wilkes, saw behind this new approach a wider and more elaborate plan to open the overland route from Italy to Macedonia and Asia. It does not seem a contemporary concern in the 10s. Roman links with Asia functioned perfectly well through the Brundisium–Apollonia sea link, and further on by way of the Via Egnatia. If the land link was desired, it would be natural to expect that the Romans would use the safety of the tightly controlled Dalmatian coast for land communications, rather than open a new communication line through the hostile and unknown interior.[64] 'Not until the middle course of the Danube had been secured could Rome hold and exploit the overland route between Italy and her Eastern territories', wrote Wilkes.[65] This happened at least three or four decades after the *Bellum Pannonicum*, and Roman concerns lay with Germany, not trans-Danubia as argued in the next chapter. This was not a war for communications with the East, nor was it a war to establish links between the Danube and Rhine. These were the consequences rather than the reasons for the extension of Roman power. We should not underestimate the Roman perception of fear from outside incursions, which made them desire to secure Italy and the Dalmatian coast, after the crisis of 16 BC. The extension of Roman power and direct control of territory towards the Danube would ultimately solve these concerns, and make the inhabitants of the Dalmatian coast and Histria feel more secure.[66]

As stated above, the year 16 BC marks a significant change in Illyrian affairs. Illyricum was set on fire after enjoying a decade of relative peace. The incursion of some of the Pannonii and Noricans rekindled Roman fear, and their perception of geographical vulnerability in North Italy. After repelling

[63] Cf. Syme 1934b: 356; 1971b: 19–21; Nagy 1991: 77–8.

[64] Syme 1934b: 352–3; Wilkes 1965a: 13–14, recently strongly emphasised by Burns 2003: 196. See Rougé 1987: esp. 255–7 who underlines the continuing significance of this sea passage for Rome.

[65] Wilkes 1996: 545.

[66] Roddaz 1984: 483, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.96.3 *(bellum) … vicinium imminebat Italiae*. The reason for security is given in the part of the *Res Gestae* that justifies the conquest of Illyricum (*RG* 30.1–2) in contrast with the 'civilising factors' which justify the conquest of the other northern areas; Davis 2002: 261–2.

this incursion Silius Nerva and his legates also renewed the subjugation of the western Pannonii around Siscia, who had made *deditio* to Octavian in 35 BC, whether they were directly involved in the attack or not. In the same context is mentioned the uprising of the 'Dalmatians', which was perhaps caused by these disturbances and an overstretched army, and easily put down by the same pro-consul or, more likely, his legate whom he had left in Illyricum.[67] There is mention of another unrest of the 'Pannonians' in 14 BC, but nothing significant is attached to it by our sources. The current governor of Illyricum and his legates, probably without extensive fighting or resistance, extinguished it.[68]

The decisiveness of Augustus can be seen in the initial choice of commander for this operation in 13 BC. No one but Agrippa himself was entrusted with the command in Pannonia. It is difficult to believe that Augustus used him to deal with merely a local crisis. More elaborate designs were hidden behind his mission, the extension of power, rather than simply its enforcement on previously defeated subjects.[69] Dio gives a rough sketch of the chronology of the campaigns. Evidently, there were five separate campaigns in the *Bellum Pannonicum*; high-intensity campaigns in 13–11 BC and the more localised conflicts in 10 and 9 BC. Agrippa set out on the first campaign in 13 BC, and his approach was initially successful, but his sudden death resulted in further unrest. Dio does not imply that Agrippa was involved in any important military engagement; he might have preferred to use rather his military reputation and diplomacy.[70] Velleius and Florus add valuable additional information, confirming that there was more fighting in Pannonia, as Marcus Vinicius was described as the other commander.[71] He was fighting the Pannonii who lived between the Sava and the Drava, most likely the powerful Breuci and their allies, who inhabited that area.[72]

After the unexpected death of Agrippa, Tiberius carried on further operations in 12, 11, 10 and 9 BC, as commander-in-chief. The first campaign

[67] Dio, 54.20.3.

[68] Dio, 54.24.3, but only those Pannanians who had invaded Histria two years earlier, unhappy with the new arrangements imposed by Silius; Nagy 1991: 73–4. Perhaps the governor in question was Vinicius; Roddaz 1984: 479 n. 12.

[69] Roddaz 1984: 478 ff.; Nagy 1991: 75.

[70] Cf. Dio, 54.24.6 for the similarly fast submission of Bosporans to Agrippa in 14 BC.

[71] Vell. Pat. 2.96.2–3 states that Agrippa started the war and Tiberius finished it. Gruen 1996: 174–5 and Roddaz 1984: 483 regard Vinicius as pro-consul of Illyricum who started the operations in 14 BC, prior to Agrippa's departure. Nagy 1991: 74–5 puts the beginning of the campaign in 13 BC and suggests that Agrippa was called in only after Vinicius reached a stalemate with the Breuci.

[72] Flor. 2.24, calling him wrongly Vinnius; Vell. Pat. 2.96.2–3. Career of Vinicius; Hanslik 1961b; PIR^3 444.

seems to be the most important, as he used the alliance with the Scordisci in order to defeat the 'Pannonians'. The campaign was conducted against the Breuci – specifically named by Suetonius. They were the western neighbours of the Scordisci dwelling in the valley of the Sava. Tiberius disarmed the defeated Pannonii and sold the prisoners into slavery, earning an *ovatio* for these exploits.[73] The disarmament of the Breuci and the enslavement of the prisoners of war appears an extraordinary measure compared with the usual Roman conduct against defeated subjects.[74] We can only guess why Tiberius used extreme measures. Perhaps the punishment was intended to be an example to the other Pannonii as to what could happen if they rebelled against Rome. Syme, and after him Wilkes, regarded the conquest of the Sava valley as a crucial step in the ultimate success of the operations in the Bosnian mountains and Dalmatian hinterland.[75] Tiberius campaigned in 11 BC from two directions, the Dalmatian coast and the valley of the Sava, and fought simultaneously on two fronts.[76] Unfortunately, we do not know if he fought the same opponents as in 12 BC, or, more probably, the term 'Pannonians' was only a generic term and Tiberius in fact fought different peoples. The most probable reconstruction is that he first fought the Breuci and their allies in Slavonia in 12 BC, but after they were defeated and seriously weakened, it seems that subsequent operations in 11 BC were carried out in the Dinaric Alps against the Daesitiates and Mezaei.[77] Dio suggests that his subsequent campaigns in 10 and 9 BC followed the pattern of subjugating the 'Pannonians' and 'Dalmatians', who would continue to renounce Roman overlordship after Tiberius departed from Illyricum. Mócsy was perhaps right in concluding that the *Bellum Pannonicum* lasted for only one year, in 12 BC, and that all subsequent campaigns were actually to extinguish local rebellions, and mop up the resistance.[78]

In 11 BC the legal status of Illyricum changed from a senatorial province to an imperial one. Dio stated that Dalmatia was given to Augustus because of the neighbouring 'Pannonians', and due to potential problems in Dalmatia itself.[79] It marked a legal recognition of the important shift in

[73] Dio, 54.31.2–4; Suet. *Tib.* 9. Syme 1971b: 22 does not exclude the possibility of a Roman general operating from Macedonia/Moesia together with the Scordisci.
[74] Brunt 1975: 260, 269–70. There were some similar situations such as Agrippa and the Cantabri in Spain 19 BC; Dio, 54.11.5–6.
[75] Syme 1934b: 355; 1971b: 19, 21; Wilkes 1965b: 118–19; 1969: 62.
[76] Dio, 54.34.3–4; Wilkes 1965b: 118–19; 1969: 64.
[77] Syme 1971b: 22; Nagy 1991: 78–9; Domić-Kunić 2006: 110–15.
[78] Mócsy 1962: 540–1, cf. Domić-Kunić 2006: 114.
[79] Dio, 54.34.4; 53.12.7. Hanslik 1961b: 115 sees Vinicius as the first *legatus Augusti pro praetore* of Illyricum.

Rome's Illyrian affairs. Wilkes argued that the imperial *provincia* Illyricum had come into existence already in 13 BC when Agrippa and Vinicius attacked the 'Pannonians', and that it encompassed the Sava and Drava region outside Dalmatia. He tried to explain the change in 11 BC as the union of the military district of Illyricum with the province of Dalmatia, because the military situation required co-ordinated military action from Pannonia and Dalmatia.[80]

While the necessity for co-ordinated action, especially in light of the 'Dalmatian' unrest, seems quite reasonable as Tiberius' tactic, the administrative part of the explanation is not, as the existence of a military zone in Illyricum is doubtful in this period. The chief source Dio was looking from his third-century perspective, distinguishing Dalmatia and Pannonia as separate provinces; he himself stated that at that time provinces were larger than in his time. Augustus used to hand out extraordinary commands in this period to members of his household, e.g. Tiberius and Drusus in the Alps. Agrippa, and Tiberius after him, were both sent to Pannonia to co-ordinate military efforts so that there would be no clash of authority with the local governor. Agrippa, when departing for Illyricum, already had extraordinary *imperium*, overriding the *imperium* of the local governor.[81] There was already a governor of Illyricum – Vinicius, on the spot, fighting the 'Pannonians'. Therefore, there is no reason to see a Pannonian command independent of Dalmatia before or after 11 BC. Augustus is clear in that respect; he extended the already existing borders to the banks of the Danube.[82] They were both part of the Illyrian command and Agrippa was commander-in-chief. In 11 BC Augustus regarded the situation as unsettled. He feared new rebellions and Dacian raids, so it is no wonder that he formally transferred the command to himself. Dio states that the status of Dalmatia (i.e. Illyricum) changed after Tiberius' campaign in that year. In fact, it is possible that the transfer of the province corresponds with the Dacian raid in 10 BC. The raid must have happened between two Roman campaigns, because the Romans did not meet the Dacians on the battlefield.[83] Augustus transferred full command of the increased number of legions, who were concentrated in Illyricum, into the safe hands of an imperial legate. Finally, it was necessary to organise the newly annexed territory, a significant task that had to be controlled by Augustus.

[80] Wilkes 1965a: 17–18; 1965b: 119. Nagy 1991: 79 following Ritterling 1925: 1218 explains this event as a merging of senatorial Dalmatia with the *Militärdistrict*.
[81] Dio, 53.12.8, 54.28.1 – Agrippa's extraordinary *imperium*.
[82] *RG* 30.1, cf. 26.1; Tóth 1977. [83] Dio, 54.34.3–4.

The perception of danger from the 'Pannonians' and 'Dalmatians' in 11 BC was surely overestimated by Augustus and his advisers, but the Dacian incursion in 10 BC certainly made the Romans worry. However, it appears to have been just a raid. The Dacians were probably concerned about the extension of Roman influence and used the opportunity to plunder disarmed and helpless Pannonians.[84] This provided a good opportunity for the Romans to bind some of the 'Pannonians' more tightly to themselves in view of the Dacian raid.[85] Tiberius had fewer and fewer problems in extinguishing the subsequent rebellions of 10 and 9. The rebels were newly subjected Pannonii in modern-day Bosnia. In the last campaign of 9 BC he had time in the summer of the same year to join his dying brother Drusus in Germany. The reason for these rebellions lay in the very nature of Roman conquest; armies subdued new subjects and withdrew without imposing military or civilian control, so the conquered people rebelled as soon as the Roman army went to winter quarters.[86]

THE AFTERMATH OF THE *BELLUM PANNONICUM*

The *Bellum Pannonicum* was one of the key events in the history of Roman relations with Illyricum. The Republican buffer zone in the Dinaric Alps was finally and decisively replaced with imperial expansion towards the Danube, which gave strategic depth and geo-strategic advantage to the Roman position. It was much easier to control the plains of Pannonia as a buffer zone rather than the Dinaric Alps, once the latter were under full Roman control. An enlarged Illyricum strengthened the imperial frontier and linked Illyrian-Pannonian advances with the advances in Moesia and the Alps. It is still doubtful whether this was a deliberate plan from the beginning, or just the most positive outcome of Roman intervention, but Agrippa's presence in the first campaign at least showed the decisiveness of Augustus in changing the way Roman power was projected on Illyricum. It was a relatively brief and easy war, despite Velleius calling it formidable. Except for the tough campaigns of 13 and 12 BC when the Romans were subduing the valley of the Sava, and possibly the next one in 11 BC when

[84] Dio, 54.36.2; Nagy 1991: 81–2.

[85] Miltner 1937: 213 ff. connects the Roman incursion of Cnaeus Cornelius Lentulus against the Dacians (Flor. 2.28 ff.; Tac. *Ann.* 4.44) suggested in *RG* 30 and dated to 10 BC. The majority of modern scholars oppose this opinion, but no precise date has yet been determined; Syme 1934a; Mócsy 1962: 543; Lica 2000: 129–31. Syme 1971c: 64–70 re-evaluated the problem and did not exclude the possibility that Lentulus was in command of the Illyrian army 9–6 BC, 1971c: 69–70.

[86] Dio, 54.36.3 (rebellion of the 'Dalmatians' in 10 BC), 55.2.4 (Tiberius' last campaign 9 BC), Seager 1972: 26.

they were subduing the interior, our sources do not speak of particularly large problems for the Roman army, although that would be expected considering the nature of the country. The sources do not mention conquered peoples or conquered cities, which is strange in light of the Roman passion for cataloguing conquered nations.[87] It appears more and more certain that Pannonia, in the same way as Raetia, Noricum or Moesia, was not yet organised as a province.[88] The *Bellum Pannonicum* created a large zone of client-states stretching from the Drava to the hinterland of the Adriatic, so we can see this extension as an extension of power, rather than the extension of territory that was ruled directly.

Nevertheless, the final result is obvious: together with the expansion of Roman power, the expansion of Illyricum from the Dalmatian coast deeply into the continent, reaching over the banks of the Drava into Pannonia. Illyricum now encompassed the Dinaric Alps and the valley of the Sava, and Roman influence stretched all the way to the Danube. Again, it is difficult to determine precisely the northern boundaries of Illyricum in 9 BC, but they are not important as the Romans were not concerned with them but with the extent to which their power was projected. *Res Gestae* 30.1 mentions the extension of the borders of Illyricum (*fines Illyrici protuli*), not the extension of the borders of the Roman empire. Roman power expanded the frontiers of what was perceived and called Illyricum *de facto*, but also the Roman perception of this space. However, it was not only the brute force of the Roman legions that expanded Illyricum; its parts were finally measured, at least in the Dalmatian coastal core, and thus conquered for a second time by Roman and Italian settlers who now dominated it, together with globalised elites from the coast, such as the Liburni. The tactical one-dimensional space of Caesar's Illyricum after the *Bellum Pannonicum* became a two-dimensional geographical space of Strabo's Illyricum from Book 7, and the Illyricum from the *Res Gestae* that was extended towards the Danube.

Modern scholarship agrees that the advance to the middle Danube happened slowly and without much resistance after 8 BC, when the elderly Sextus Appuleius was put in command of the Illyrian legions. That 'slow advance' towards the Danube was perhaps much slower than previously thought, extending well into the first century AD. The Romans now turned to organising new areas and advancing the northern borders;

[87] Cf. Nicolet 1991; Mattern 1999: 162–8. [88] Šašel Kos 2005a: 478–80 after Braunert 1977.

Figure 3. The forum of Iader, c. first century BC modern look. Zadar, Croatia.

these huge spaces were opened up to traders and colonists, land surveyors and taxmen. While the colonies and cities on the Dalmatian coast actually benefited from this war, gaining security and increasing prosperity, the Pannonian interior was devastated by the war and its consequences. The future looked bright in 8 BC for the Romans, and it must have seemed improbable that Illyricum would ever require the special attention of Rome again.

CHAPTER 8

The failure of Greater Illyricum: the Bellum Batonianum

The great *Bellum Batonianum* of AD 6–9 was one of the most significant events, if not the most significant one, in the history of the relations between Rome and Illyricum. Its significance went far beyond local, provincial history; it shaped the future conduct of the early Principate, and perhaps, combined with the aftermath of the *clades Variana* in the Teutoburg forest, caused a sudden end to Roman expansion in north and central Europe. This conflict brought destruction and devastation to almost every corner of Illyricum, and Italy feared the external enemy. This was the first political crisis of this kind after the end of the Republic that seriously undermined Roman confidence and Rome's position in its newly acquired territories.

These events were not a separate phase of Roman interaction with Illyricum, but we need to examine them in more detail as a direct consequence of the political framework earlier defined as Greater Illyricum, after the extension of Illyricum in the aftermath of the *Bellum Pannonicum*. Although the final result was Roman victory and the ultimate establishment of Roman rule, the war and its scale and ferocity were the result of the monumental failure of the previous approach. It made the Romans seriously rethink their previous arrangements and devise new ones. The most important consequence was the post-rebellion division of Illyricum into the provinces of *Illyricum inferius*, future Pannonia, and *Illyricum superius*, future Dalmatia. The date of the division of Illyricum and the formal names of the provinces are a matter of scholarly dispute, deriving from part of the inscription which is now lost – see next chapter p. 160 n. 12. This was an administrative-geographical division, which was to have long-lasting consequences for the destiny of Illyricum, and which would stretch into the period of the later empire with minor changes. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

The identity of those fighting Rome is mostly associated with the Pannonian group – the Pannonii. Pašalić and later Benac sensed a decisive

common cultural component in the uprising.[1] The bulk of the rebels belonged to the peoples whom ancient writers perceived as the Pannonii. No other group in Illyricum is said by our sources to join the Pannonii in the rebellion. The location of the main battles and movements of the Roman army and the rebels are limited to the areas inhabited by those called the Pannonii and the Delmatae by the sources, as will be shown. It does not appear that the Pannonii shared a sense of common 'Pannonianness', especially not before these events took place; but their common 'Pannonian' perception by our sources might suggest that they shared a similar cultural *habitus*, which also included areas earlier dominated by the Delmatian alliance, which were also affected by the conflict.[2]

PRELUDE TO THE CRISIS: GREATER ILLYRICUM 8 BC – AD 6

The sources for the period between the *Bellum Pannonicum* and the *Bellum Batonianum* are extremely scarce. Dio's account is preserved partially in dry but useful reports, and Velleius Paterculus does not appear to be too interested in the period because his hero, Tiberius, was not on the stage. For the events, these two writers still remain the key sources of information, with important additional bits and pieces found in Suetonius, Strabo and the elder Pliny. Both key sources have been criticised for inadequacy and partiality by modern scholars, especially Velleius Paterculus for his ignorance of the events of which he did not have personal experience. Velleius relied too much on rumours and facts he heard from other people. He was uninterested in and took no particular care of things that did not exalt Tiberius' deeds. Velleius failed to see the bigger picture behind his own experiences. He was especially unreliable in reporting events on the Moesian frontier, but still well informed as to the events that took place closer to him on the western front.[3] Dio's otherwise continuous narrative breaks down into two parts, and a lacuna in the text omits events from the middle of AD 8. It has been suggested that he used an unidentified source heavily biased towards Germanicus, which often distorted facts in favour of

[1] Pašalić 1956; Benac 1991; Dzino 2006c: 147–9, all of them implying the existence of a Pannonian 'ethnicity', which is not necessarily the most accurate term, as 'Pannonianness' might well be an outside imposed term, a Roman colonial construct.

[2] Dzino 2006a: 75.

[3] See Vulić 1911: 201–2; Rau 1925: 316; Syme 1934b: 340; Wilkes 1965b: 112–14; Mócsy 1983: 173–4; Köstermann 1953: 346; Pašalić 1956: 253–6. Woodman 1977: 153–83 is more positive about Velleius. Velleius' work is only recently being more thoroughly analysed and appreciated inside his historical and genre framework, cf. Marincola 1997; Schmitzer 2000; Gowing 2007.

the young prince and minimised Tiberius' achievements. Rau recognised two sources for Dio: one, an eyewitness from Germanicus' circle and a second secondary source hostile to Tiberius, who might well be Servilius Nonianus, as Sordi argued.[4] Dio's account also has its good and bad sides. Modern scholars have criticised him for confused chronology and lack of military knowledge, but have praised him for objectivity and the broader picture.[5]

The renewed imperialism of the early Principate, its 'revolutionary wars' at first resulted in success on all fronts, one following the other. The Romans imposed their overlordship over the Alpine area; over Germany up to the Elbe, Pannonia up to the Danube and Moesia. Despite some personal problems with military leadership – the death of Drusus and the departure of Tiberius for Rhodes – Augustus still had a strong army and capable generals to command it. Two major focal points of Roman foreign interests after the *Bellum Pannonicum* and the expansion into Germany were the Dacian kingdoms, and an even more formidable opponent – the kingdom of Marobroduus in Bohemia. In time Roman armies strategically encircled the Marcomannic kingdom in Bohemia, and the sources give the impression that in AD 6 everything was ready for its final elimination.[6] As noted in the previous chapter, Roman expansion into central and northern Europe was more an expansion of power and political influence than a full annexation of these territories, motivated by various, mainly ideological reasons. Rome was engaging the provinces; citizenship was selectively distributed to members of the provincial elites, so for example the 'German' prince Arminius, who held Roman citizenship and equestrian rank, was not an exception but rather the rule.[7] Some scholars have assumed that the Romans already overextended their military with these conquests, but it seems more likely that the operational strategy of the early Principate, defined by Luttwak as 'the concentration of force', was actually well suited to further expansion, and that reasons for slowing down the expansion lay elsewhere.[8]

[4] Rau 1925: 314–15; Sordi 2004: 226–7. For Dio and the *Bellum Batonianum* see Šašel Kos 1986: 178–90; Swan 2004: 195–225.

[5] Vulić 1911: 200–4; 1926: 62; Saria 1930: 92–3 (positive); Rau 1925: 314–15; Swoboda 1932: 34–6 (negative). Pašalić 1956: 256–67 (positive and negative).

[6] Syme 1934b: 364–9; Wilkes 1965a: 20–2; 1969: 67–9. For the career of Marobroduus; Dobiáš 1960: 155–9.

[7] Vell. Pat.2.118.2.

[8] Luttwak 1976: 7–50, cf. Ferrill 1991; Whittaker 1994: 60–97. Overextension is implied by Syme 1934b: 340. There are many works dealing with the sudden end of Roman expansion emphasising a variety of different reasons, such as logistics; Fulford 1992, or socio-cultural differences; Cunliffe 1988: 174–7.

Not much is known about the situation in Illyricum after 8 BC and frequently relies on guesswork. The evidence is scattered and rather uncertain. It is, after all, unclear where the northern frontier of Illyricum was at this time. Augustus claims in a famous line from the *Res Gestae* that he extended Illyricum to the Danube, and the majority of scholars support the idea that Transdanubia, the plains between the rivers Drava and Danube, was joined to Illyricum in the *Bellum Pannonicum* or shortly after.[9] Still, some authors like Fitz and Tóth plausibly argue that the Romans had not yet established their frontier on the Danube at this time, and there are a couple of strong arguments to support this view. No sources mention campaigns in Transdanubia north of the Drava; north Pannonia had no significant economic or strategic value for the Romans, nor did its inhabitants pose any threat to Roman interests.[10] From this lack of evidence it seems reasonable to delay the dating of the conquest for a while, at least until the campaigns of Ahenobarbus, Vinicius and Lentulus, discussed below, or even later. Even then, it is not absolutely clear whether the Romans formally annexed Transdanubia before Augustus died, or just exercised strategic control over the area, without providing any administration until the reign of Claudius.[11]

Despite uncertainty over just where its northern frontier lay – most certainly there was no 'northern frontier' at all in a conventional sense – imperial Illyricum was a huge province, encompassing more than 140,000 km^2.[12] Noricum was probably under the Illyrian administration for some time, especially in military matters.[13] Such a large area was very difficult to administer efficiently, and it does not seem that much administrative reorganisation was done very far inland from the coast. Illyrian governors had more military tasks than administrative ones. Some military bases were established and some settlements of military veterans might be planted in the area after 9 BC, but not much archaeological evidence exists. It is possible that some military *praefecti civitatum* were already in position to control some of the conquered peoples. Unfortunately, no epigraphic or

[9] *RG* 30; Fitz 1977 n. 2, for earlier works written on the subject.

[10] This is an old opinion of Mommsen CIL 3: 415 after *RG* 5.21 defended convincingly by Fitz 1977: 543–5 and Tóth 1977. Low economic value of Pannonia; Mócsy 1962: 541–2.

[11] Fitz 1977: 551–5 puts the final Roman conquest of Transdanubia in the mid-first century AD; cf. Tóth 1977.

[12] The area of the present countries of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The total should be close to 150,000 km^2; it would need to include western Serbia and the western part of the Serbian province of Vojvodina, Albania up to Lezhë and the river Mati, and the southern parts of Austria which belong to Noricum.

[13] Tóth 1980: 83–6.

written source exists to confirm this before the rebellion, so it is likely that most of them were introduced after the rebellion, and they will be discussed in the next chapter. It is also certain that the Romans tried to administer the province through the local elites, retaining the pre-Roman political structure. While the Dalmatian coast and hinterland enjoyed the benefits of peace, the north remained a zone of military operations, which supported preliminary actions against the kingdom of Marobroduus. We can only assume the stronger economic presence of Roman and Italian traders and businessmen, from the fact that they were the first victims of the rebels in AD 6.[14] It is also significant that archaeology has not found any trace of the construction of major Roman roads built in Illyricum during this time.

It is commonly assumed that the known legates (i.e. governors) for Illyricum in the period 8 BC–AD 5 were: Cneius Cornelius Lentulus, Sextus Appuleius, Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus (consul 16 BC), Marcus Vinicius (consul 16 BC).[15] We can accept Appuleius and possibly Vinicius with caution. Of Appuleius we can be certain through the testimony of Cassiodorus, and for Vinicius the evidence is a fragmentary inscription from Tusculum that mentions a certain …*cius* as the legate of Illyricum operating against the Bastarnae across the Danube. Syme makes strong arguments in favour of Vinicius as the unknown legate over the other candidates, although without providing a reliable answer as to why Velleius Paterculus omitted to mention this achievement of Vinicius who was his patron's grandfather.[16] It is possible to assume that Vinicius made a deep incursion, crossing the Danube with the army of Illyricum as part of campaigns intended to encircle Marobroduus and separate him from the Dacians.[17] The role of Ahenobarbus and Lentulus as hypothetical legates for Illyricum is based on very questionable evidence. Dio states that Ahenobarbus, while 'governing the districts along the Ister' not specifying the upper or middle Danube, intercepted wandering Hermunduri, settled them in Marcomannian territory, crossed the river Albis, set up an altar to Augustus and transferred his headquarters to the Rhine.[18] For Lentulus, the situation is even more scattered

[14] Vell. Pat. 2.110.5, not unlike Italian traders in Asia Minor 88 BC.

[15] Syme 1934a: 128–34; 1934b: 364–6 (but changed dating of Lentulus' governorship later to 10/9–6 BC 1971c: 69–70; 1991); Wilkes 1969: 67–9; 1996: 552; Mócsy 1974: 35–6. Dobó 1968: 16–20 (nos. 3–5) places Vinicius in 10–9 BC, Appuleius (PIR^{1} 961) in 8–7 BC and Ahenobarbus (PIR^{3} 128) in 6 BC–AD 1, cf. Fitz 1993/94: I.57 who dates him to 5–2 BC. Lentulus (PIR^{2} 1379) can probably be dated as the earliest of these four, if the altered opinion of Syme is taken into account.

[16] Cassiodorus; *MGH*: *Chron. Min.* 1: 135; *ILS* 8965. Syme 1933b: 144–8; 1971f: 36–8, dating him between 6 BC and AD 4.

[17] Klemenc 1961: 5–6. [18] Dio, 55.10a.2–3.

and obscure. He intervened in Dacia, was engaged in fighting on the lower Danube, and received triumphal *insignia* for his victories against the Getae.[19]

The situation throughout the empire immediately preceding the war appears to be generally tense: fiscal deficit, indigenous unrest in Isauria and Africa, piracy in Sardinia, famine and fire in Rome and the conspiracy of Publius Plautius Rufus, which worried rather than seriously threatened the regime.[20] At the start of the Batonian war the army of Illyricum with its governor, *praepositus Illyrico* Marcus Valerius Messalla Messallinus (consul 3 BC), was stationed with Tiberius in Carnuntum, which was intended to be the southern operational wing for an approaching Roman invasion of the Marcomannic kingdom. Only minor reserves were stationed in the rear, close to the Dalmatian coast. It is commonly assumed that the army of Illyricum consisted of five legions at that time: IX Hispana, XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina, XV Apollinaris and XX.[21] At the outbreak of the war the first four were with Tiberius and legion XX, insufficiently filled, was in its base at Burnum, as discussed below.

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR: REASONS, NUMBERS, ACTORS, AIMS

We do not know much about the reasons for this uprising, apart from those given by our sources. The explanation of Velleius Paterculus that long years of peace made the Pannonians suddenly restless and eager to rebel cannot be taken seriously … *universa Pannonia, insolens longae pacis bonis* … . Velleius was following traditional political theories rather than just being contemptuous towards Tiberius' enemies.[22] Dio, on the other hand, suggested the large amount of tribute given to be the key factor in Dalmatian anger, understanding Dalmatians and Pannonians as the inhabitants of those provinces.[23] Since the exaction of tribute influenced the short-lived conflict with the Pannonii in Dalmatia in 10 BC, and since the economic situation throughout the empire was generally serious in AD 5–6, Dio's explanation sounds reasonable enough.[24] AD 6 was undoubtedly a year of great crisis in

[19] Flor. 2.28–9 confirmed by *RG* 30–1; Strabo, 7.3.11; Tac. *Ann*. 4.44. Syme 1934a: dates Lentulus as a legate in Illyricum in AD 1–4, but changes his mind, later dating him to 10/9–6 BC, Syme 1971c: 69–70; 1991; Wilkes 1996: 552.

[20] Dio, 55.24.9–28.4. Publius Rufus; Dio, 55.27.2, Plautius Rufus; Suet. *Aug*. 19.

[21] Vell. Pat. 2.109.5; Dio, 55.30.1; Syme 1933a: 33; Wilkes 1969: 92. Keppie 1984b: 163 lists the legions VIII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XX, XXI under Tiberius' command in AD 6.

[22] Vell. Pat. 2.110.2; Woodman 1977: 157.

[23] Dio, 55.29.1; Köstermann 1953: 346 n. 3. Cf. Mócsy 1962: 547; 1983: 174–5.

[24] Dio, 54.36.2 (rebellion in 10 BC); Dio, 55.24.9–25 (situation in AD 5–6).

Augustus' regime; the memory of the misfortunes of these years was still strong in Pliny's own times, half a century after the events.[25] The other external reasons are linked with the previous one: administrative cruelty and the incompetence of Roman administrators, as well as the greed of *negotiatores* and *publicani* in the exploitation of the province, and the desire of the indigenous population to regain their freedom.[26]

There was something else beyond this, certainly valid, explanation; something much more difficult to see and define from the available evidence, and that is the growing resentment of those the Romans called the Pannonii. Dyson compared the situation in Illyricum before the *Bellum Batonianum* with Vercingetorix's Gaul in the late 50s BC, and finds common reasons for both uprisings. His sharp observation deserves to be quoted in full:

> The province was undergoing Romanisation and the interior regions were getting the first real sense of what Roman conquest meant for native customs and power structure. There was a native leadership class intact and this apparently had had some contact with Roman military skills. Like the Gallic assemblies, joint levies for armed service must have given the natives some sense of strength and unity. This plus the increasingly uprooted and desperate psychological state of a people under going cultural change, created the "nativistic atmosphere" that helped to overcome local differences and produce a unity that completely surprised the Romans.[27]

It is what Dyson calls 'nativistic atmosphere' that played the role of catalyst in Illyricum. The inhabitants of the Dinaric Alps and the area between the Sava and Drava shared a common destiny after being placed in the zone of Roman political domination, in that they shared a common frustration with sudden social change. They were entering the Mediterranean world too fast.[28] This frustration was combined with a sense of shared cultural unity, which in turn created homogenisation and xenophobia resulting in a degree of polarisation between 'Us' (the 'Pannonii', the 'locals', the 'indigenous') and 'Them' (the Romans, the 'foreigners', the 'arrivals'). Pannonian sense of identity was probably constructed around anti-Mediterranean sentiments in the same way as amongst the Delmatae.[29] All those elements taken together united the most conservative elements amongst the Pannonii

[25] Pliny, *HN* 7.149.
[26] Dio, 56.16.3; Šašel 1974c: 8; Bojanovski 1988a: 49. Maladministration in the provinces continued in the early Principate, e.g. Quintilius Varus in Syria *quam pauper divitem ingressus dives pauperem reliquit*, Vell. Pat. 2.107.2–3. See Brunt 1961: 216 ff.
[27] Dyson 1971: 253.
[28] Cf. Mesihović 2007: 321–8, with perhaps too much emphasis on economic matters.
[29] Dzino 2006a: 75–6.

with the power-hungry young members of the elite that had more links with the Roman world, and were tempted to use Roman approaches to power to justify their rule over their own communities.[30] However, we must bear in mind that this was not a simple situation and simple division along 'indigenous' and 'Roman' lines – the different attitudes towards the social change, which certainly existed in different communities of the Pannonii, must be taken into account.

It has been pointed out that the indigenous population in the provinces often showed resistance to Roman rule in the early Principate, which sometimes turned into unrest when the Romans attempted to draft them into service in distant provinces. This was indeed such a situation and it would be no surprise if the draft of Dalmatians for the war against Marobroduus[31] was the final spark needed to ignite an already explosive situation in Illyricum.

The most prominent groups in this war are, according to our sources: the Daesitiates, Breuci, Amantini, Pirustae, Mezaei and Delmatae, no doubt with other unmentioned smaller communities supporting or being compelled to support them. Whether any other group supported the rebellion remains an unknown and highly questionable matter. The Delmatae are not mentioned explicitly in the sources, but the swift movement of Bato the Daesitiate to the Adriatic coast and Salona at the beginning of the uprising would be impossible without support from the Delmatae.[32] Also, he was captured in the territory of the Delmatae in AD 9, where he was hiding. Strabo adds Andizetes and Ditiones to the list of the Pannonii.[33]

The other cultural and political groups in Illyricum such as the Scordisci, Taurisci, Liburni, Iapodes and southern Illyrians are never said to have joined the rebellion. The Liburni and Iapodes can easily be excluded from the rebellion after the inscription CIL 5.3346, mentioning an unknown extraordinary magistrate ruling over the Iapodes and Liburni during the clashes AD 6–9.[34] The Scordisci in Moesia and Pannonia are never mentioned in the context of the war. If they had joined the Pannonii, the Moesian army under Aulius Caecina Severus would not have been able to

[30] Velleius' statement 2.110.5 shows clearly those links. There is nothing in the sources on the education of the leaders of the uprising, but it is very likely that at least some of them were strongly connected with both worlds – Roman and indigenous, like for example Arminius, the leader of the 'German' uprising in AD 9, cf. P. S. Wells 1999: 230–2 and 285 for more recent bibliography on Arminius.

[31] Dio, 55.29.2–3; Brunt 1974b: 104 ff. [32] Dio, 55.29.4. [33] Strabo, 7.5.3 (Andizetes and Ditiones).

[34] Rau 1925: 344–5; Alföldy 1965a: 29 n. 17; Suić 1991/92: 57. 62 n. 14. Cf. also CIL 3.3158, and PIR^2 106 for Severus. Mesihović 2007: 430–31 contemplates partial support of the Iapodes for the uprising in the valley of Una.

help Tiberius. The southern Illyrians are also never mentioned as taking part in the conflict. Despite the argument of Anamali insisting on the involvement of the southern Illyrians in the uprising,[35] there is no report of any operations conducted south of the river Neretva, which was inhabited by southern Illyrians. The only event involving this area in the fighting happened in AD 6 when Bato the Daesitiate ordered the pillage of coastal communities that extended as far south as Apollonia.[36] The revolt was caused by the frustration of those indigenous peoples, which the sources saw as the Pannonii, with the social transition brought about by the recent Roman conquest, and their inclusion in the global Mediterranean world, the issues southern Illyrians were dealing with for a long time.

The names of three leaders of insurgency are known. They were the Daesitiate Bato, his Breucian namesake, and one Pinnes. Unfortunately, nothing more is known about them.[37] Evidently, the uprising was swift and a surprise for the Roman military, who did not expect it, just like Gaul in 52 BC or Britain in AD 60; for example the walls and fortifications of Siscia were simply a wooden construction before the war.[38] The Romans sustained losses in the beginning; some citizens and traders as well as a detachment of veterans paid the ultimate price at the hands of the rebels.[39] The Pannonii were an incoherent mass collected from members of many different indigenous communities, although some of them had already been trained in Roman methods of combat;[40] it is amazing how they achieved such a level of organisation and relative unity in such a short time.[41] Dio is specific in describing the situation at the beginning. This war does not seem to have been planned in advance; it was just an emotional outburst, which might have become a rebellion, or not. The initial defeat of a small Roman detachment by the Daesitiates, however, encouraged other communities to join the uprising. Velleius Paterculus blames Pannonians in general for starting the war, but that can be explained by his general approach (as Pannonia was the main battlefield in his account) rather than care for

[35] Anamali 1987, rightly criticised by Benac 1991.
[36] Dio, 55.29.4. Most certainly executed by the Pirustae; cf. Caes. *B Gall* 5.1.
[37] Vell. Pat. 2.110.4–5. Dio, 55.29.2–3 initially omits Pinnes, and mentions him only after Bato's betrayal described in 55.34.4.
[38] Nenadić 1986/87: 74–6.
[39] Vell. Pat. 2.110.6. It has been suggested that these veterans were settled inside the Dinaric area; cf. Rau 1925: 323; Köstermann 1953: 348 n. 1; Mesihović 2007: 362–4, or they were from the Dalmatian coastal hinterland; Wilkes 1969: 70 n. 2.
[40] Vell. Pat. 2.110.5. They were lightly armed and extremely mobile; Dio, 55.30.5. Cf. Mócsy 1983: 171–3.
[41] Vell. Pat. 2.110.5–6: *nulla umquam natio tam mature consilio belli bellum iunxit ac decreta paravit* 'no nation ever showed such swiftness in following up with war its own plans for war, and executing them'.

Table 1. *Numbers of Pannonians in the* Bellum Batonianum *(from Dzino 2006c, numbers rounded)*

1.1 Adult male population-estimate

	10 inhabitants/km²	12 inhabitants/km²
Population in Pannonian *civitates*	710,000	750,000
Adult population of military age (22%)	156,000	165,000

1.2. Mobilisation rate

Rate of mobilisation (66%)	103,000	109,000
Rate of mobilisation (50%)	78,000	82,500

1.3. Final estimate

Foot soldiers	69,000	94,000	73,500	100,000
Cavalry	9,000		9,000	
Soldiers (total)	78,000	103,000	82,500	109,000

particular details as to whether the uprising started in Pannonia or Dalmatia.[42]

The numerical strength of Bato's army is estimated by Velleius at 200,000 foot soldiers and 9,000 cavalry recruited out of a total population of 800,000.[43] Modern authorities have failed to criticise Velleius for this huge exaggeration, which is typical for ancient writers.[44] Modern scholarship estimates the population of the Roman province of Dalmatia to have been 700,000 and, excluding Roman colonies and indigenous peoples like the Liburni, Iapodes or southern Illyrians, who did not take part in the uprising, there were only 400,000 or even fewer inhabitants.[45] While these numbers are nothing more than approximations, even if we take into account the population of the communities from Pannonia who took part in the conflict, there is no way by any criterion that their total number could be much over 100,000 men. In fact, according to the estimate given in Table 1, it is reasonable to estimate the numbers of the Pannonii at a

[42] Dio, 55.29.2–3. Vell. Pat. 2.110.2, cf. Köstermann 1953: 347; Swan 2004: 198–9.
[43] Vell. Pat. 2.110.3. [44] Pašalić 1956: 246; Mócsy 1983: 177 n. 46 have some doubts.
[45] Alföldy 1965a: 24, 29 n. 17, 600–700,000 with 200–300,000 who did not rebel. Wilkes 1977a: 752–3 puts the total at 700,000.

maximum of 90,000–100,000 foot soldiers, even if mobilisation was as high as two thirds of all militarily capable males (which is doubtful) and 9,000 cavalry. As previously noted, the account of Velleius is influenced by his own point of view as a contemporary witness of the events. Thus we should not be surprised if there really was at that time a rumour circulating in Rome that 200,000 savage and fierce Pannonians were ready to invade Italy at any moment.[46]

It is uncertain what the initial aims of the rebels were, besides attacks on the nearest Roman settlements and garrisons in the area. The Daesitiates with the allies (Delmatae?) attacked Salona, and the Breuci, Sirmium. Almost certainly they counted on the absence of the Illyrian army and did not anticipate the speedy return of Tiberius from Carnuntum with all the legions.[47] According to Velleius the rebels were divided into three main armies: one to attack Macedonia; one to attack Italy; and the home army.[48] This is a wrong and careless assessment and excellent proof that sometimes it is not good to be too close to the events, as the bigger picture can be missed.[49] Velleius assumed this threefold division from reports arriving, initially, in Rome. In fact the rebel army had four operative groups at the start of the uprising, which he does not mention, or he was not aware of the group which attacked Sirmium, the one mentioned by Dio.[50] With the information from Dio it is easier to reconstruct the events. There were four groups, operating more or less independently. The first group was led by Bato the Daesitiate who attacked Salona with elite units of the Dalmatians: Daesitiates and Delmatae, possibly the detachment of the Ditiones and Mezaei. He sent some units, the second group, to pillage the south-eastern coast towards Macedonia, going as far as Apollonia (possibly the Pirustae). The third operative group, commanded by Bato the Breucian, attacked Sirmium.[51] Finally, there was a home army mentioned by Velleius, guarding the heartland of Pannonian country and providing reserves to the other three operative groups.

The aims and strategy of the Pannonii, beyond the obvious intention to drive the Romans out, are obscure and in all certainty dictated by the course of the events. Velleius Paterculus implies that the rebels planned to invade Italy, but according to Dio we see that Tiberius thought of that only as a

[46] See Dzino 2006c for details. Cf. Mesihović 2007: 741–60 with similar conclusions.
[47] Köstermann 1953: 349. [48] Vell. Pat. 2.110.4.
[49] Surprisingly many of the authorities believe Velleius Paterculus; cf. Köstermann 1953: 349–50; Wilkes 1969: 70 n. 3.
[50] Dio, 55.29.3–4, cf. Wilkes 1965a: 113. [51] Dio, 55.29.2–4.

possibility.[52] The movements of Bato the Daesitiate do not reveal too much strategic thinking (at least from what the available sources report); he spent precious time sending troops to plunder the Dalmatian coast as far as Apollonia, and personally led an unsuccessful attack on Salona. Velleius' assessment that the rebels had already poured into Macedonia actually refers to some units of Bato's army who were making a raid on Apollonia in Macedonia, mentioned in Dio. Dio in fact never mentions this threefold division of rebels, but rather only the Breucian and Dalmatian (Daesitiate) Bato. Alternatively, it is possible to side with Rau and Mócsy who argued that there was no Moesia as a separate province at that time, and that the Macedonian command extended to the Danube, so that the attack on Sirmium was in fact an attack on the Macedonian *provincia*.[53] There was no apparent danger threatening Bato from the south.[54] Modern scholars have suggested that a much better strategy would have been the immediate seizure of key Roman positions in Siscia. An even better strategy had been chosen by Bato – to cut off Roman troops from Italy, by taking the passes in the Julian Alps after advancing north-west through the Dalmatian coast and hinterland. Of course these are only speculations, but if we follow the reconstruction of Köstermann that Caecina Severus fought the Daesitiates in northern Dalmatia, it is very likely that Bato tried to eliminate the garrison of legion XX in Burnum and after that to cut the supply route for the Roman army from Italy via Nauportus. If true, that would give him much more credit than otherwise appears from his Adriatic adventure. Tiberius had problems with supplies for the army in Siscia.[55] Apparently the rebels were not under the unified command in the first days of the war. The Dalmatians made common cause with the Breuci only after being beaten by Messallinus, establishing military collaboration between the alliances led by the Daesitiates and the Breuci.[56]

Panic in Italy is well attested by the sources; Augustus' speech in the Senate and conscription in Italy suggest this, but it is questionable how

[52] Vell. Pat. 2.110.4, 111.1; Dio, 55.30.1.

[53] Vell. Pat. 2.110.4; Dio, 55.29.4; Rau 1925: 319–20; Mócsy 1974: 36. For the location of the Pirustae; cf. Wilkes 1969: 173–6.

[54] Köstermann 1953: 351. Yet the Pannonii defeated some Roman units there, probably veterans or auxiliaries; Dio, 55.29.4; Swan 2004: 200.

[55] The importance of Sirmium and Siscia: Syme 1934b: 370; Köstermann 1953: 353–4; Wilkes 1969: 70; Hoti 1992: 140; Suet. *Tib*. 16; Köstermann 1953: 353–4.

[56] Dio, 55.30.2. See also Mesihović 2007: 387–414, although his discussion depends too much on the evidence of the written source, which perceived the indigenous political institutions in their system of values.

justified it really was.[57] Syme points out the wider context of a potential Thracian rebellion, Marobroduus' next move, and the already attested domestic problems. These made the rebellion more threatening and Augustus more despairing. Still, it is doubtful whether Marobroduus would have had any hostile intentions after negotiating a treaty with Tiberius in AD 6.[58] Dio does not mention panic in Italy, although he says that Tiberius thought that the security of Italy, probably North Italy, could be endangered, so he decided to return from Germany with all the Illyrian legions. Suetonius mentions the recruiting of slaves and freedmen in Italy only in the context of defending the Roman colonies in Dalmatia, i.e. on the coast, without suggesting the contemporary panic that is described in Velleius Paterculus' account.[59] Some emergency administrative measures are apparent, such as the grouping of the Liburni and Iapodi through a joint *praepositus*, thus establishing a kind of *cordon sanitaire* for the protection of northern Italy. Suić suggests that the Romans established in Liburnia and amongst the Iapodes an independent administrative province during the war, but it appears that we are dealing here primarily with an emergency military command (*provincia*) over one part of the province. There is no doubt that the *praepositus Iapudiai et Liburniai* was under the supreme command of a *legatus Augusti*. Suić also confuses this incident with the transfer of Illyricum from the Senate to a *legatus Augusti*, which happened in 11 BC.[60]

A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE WAR

The course of the campaigns is difficult to ascertain due to the conflicting accounts of Dio and Velleius Paterculus, and is not too important for this book, so it will be given in general outlines.[61] After the first skirmishes and initial shock, the Romans tried to keep the rebellion in check and stop it spreading. The first significant engagement with regular Roman troops happened between the Dalmatians and the governor of Illyricum, Messallinus, who commanded the insufficiently manned legion XX. Roman military success cut off the Pannonii from North Italy, which prevented any possible threat there and stopped their devastation of the coast. Köstermann argues that the

[57] Vell. Pat. 2.110.6–111.2; Sumner 1970: 272. It seems that Augustus' panic was genuine, not a deliberate manoeuvre to introduce unpopular measures more easily, as Köstermann 1953: 349 suggests.
[58] Syme 1934b: 371; cf. Dobiáš 1960: 159–61.
[59] Dio, 55.30.1; Suet. *Aug.* 25; cf. Pliny, *HN* 7.149; Macrobius 1.11.32, Swan 2004: 204–5.
[60] CIL 5.3346. This was only a temporary measure; Patsch 1899: 177–8; Suić 1991/92.
[61] Rau 1925; Köstermann 1953; Wilkes 1965a; 1969: 69–77; Mesihović 2007: 414–616.

battle was fought close to Burnum – the base of *legio* XX at that time. This opinion sounds more plausible, as Bato was already attacking Salona, so it would be strange if he suddenly turned towards Siscia (where Syme and Wilkes suggest the battlefield was) rather than continued to ravage the Dalmatian coast, and Pliny suggests that Burnum had been a famous battlefield.[62] The different accounts of Dio and Velleius can be reconciled if we accept that Messallinus returned to legion XX, which was already in Illyricum, at the first news, where he was caught in the rebellion and surrounded by the enemy, as suggested by Velleius. This did happen on the western front, where the reports of Velleius are generally considered reliable.[63] The Moesian governor, Aulus Caecina Severus, strengthened by Thracian cavalry led by King Rhoemetalces, defeated the Breuci near the Drava, and prevented them from taking the stronghold of Sirmium. However, when he himself suffered heavy losses, he withdrew.[64] Meanwhile the Dalmatians, beaten by Messallinus, joined the Breuci on the Mons Almus (Fruška Gora), which continued the pressure on Sirmium, so that Caecina was compelled to return and fight them once more – this time without a clear result. The danger of the Sarmatian and Dacian raids from the north forced him to return to Moesia again.[65] When Tiberius reached Siscia with the Illyrian army in the autumn of AD 6 and met Messalinus, and when reinforcements of veterans from Italy led by Germanicus, including our source Paterculus, arrived, it seemed that the Romans were already controlling the damage. It is uncertain when they arrived, especially Germanicus. From Dio's context it appears that he arrived in the year 7, but if he held the quaestorship in AD 6, perhaps his arrival should be dated to the winter of AD 6–7, as Sumner argued.[66]

However, Tiberius was cautious when he advanced against the rebels in the next year, and he managed to cut off and surround part of the rebels on the Mons Claudius (Moslavačka Gora near Varaždin). It seems from Velleius' sentence *Pars exercitus eorum proposita ipsi duci* … that the detachment of rebels sent to take Siscia retreated without battle to Mons Claudius after seeing Tiberius already there in full force.[67] Dio's source is very critical

[62] Dio, 55.30.1–5; Vell. Pat. 2.112.1–2; Pliny, *HN* 3.142. Perhaps this time Velleius was right; Köstermann 1953: 350 and n. 3; Mócsy 1962: 545, while Rau 1925: 317; Wilkes 1965a: 113; 1969: 70; Hoti 1992: 140; Swan 2004: 200–1 and Syme 1934b: 370 believe Dio who said that Tiberius sent Messalinus from Germany to stop the rebels before Tiberius' arrival, and fought them close to Siscia.

[63] Vell. Pat. 2.112.2. Cf. Köstermann 1953: 350; Wilkes 1965b: 112–14.

[64] Dio, 55.29.3. [65] Dio, 55.30.2–4.

[66] Vell. Pat. 2.112.1–6. Germanicus dispatched; Dio, 55.31.1, mentioning also the ridiculous rumour that Tiberius was intentionally delayed in Illyricum, and deriving it from a source hostile to Tiberius; Rau 1925: 315; Köstermann 1953: 358; Pašalić 1956: 17–18. Sumner 1970: 272 n. 95.

[67] Vell. Pat. 2.112.3–4. Cf. summarised evidence in Petru 1968: 364–5; 1977: 484–5; contra Köstermann 1953: 360–1.

of Tiberius' strategy in AD 7, when the Romans tried to divide the army into small units in order to cover more ground, apparently without much success. Roman legions were tactically inferior in counter-guerrilla warfare, so Tiberius needed to rely much more on his auxiliaries.[68] In the late autumn/early winter five legions, three Moesian led by governor Caecina (IV Scythica, VIII Augusta and probably XI), and two arriving as reinforcements from the East led by Marcus Plautius Silvanus (V Macedonica and VII),[69] with the addition of Thracian cavalry and auxiliary troops, managed to reach Siscia, despite being ambushed and almost decimated by the united rebels at the Volcaean Marshes, close to later Cibalae (Vinkovci).[70] Thus Tiberius had in Siscia significant numbers, and he decided that there was no need to keep them all together. There were ten legions, seventy auxiliary cohorts, fourteen cavalry units, and 10,000 veterans. It would be more than difficult and unnecessary to sustain such an army. The large numbers were probably due to the initial panic of Augustus.[71] Tiberius personally escorted the eastern reinforcements back to Sirmium in the winter of AD 7–8. Silvanus remained in charge of Sirmium and Caecina returned to Moesia. Dio also reports that at that time Germanicus defeated the Maezaei who lived between the valleys of the rivers Vrbas and Una.[72]

The next year was decisive for the outcome of the war, as the Pannonians who were suffering from famine and disease surrendered to Tiberius in the summer at the river Bathinus.[73] Breucian Bato supposedly laid down his arms, surrendered his fellow-leader Pinnes and, as a reward, got an amnesty from the Romans who left him in charge of his people and some other Pannonians.[74] That was the most decisive event in the course of the war, taking into the account the large resources and population of the Breuci, who were able to supply the Roman army with eight auxiliary *cohortes* alone in the later period.[75] However, the Pannonians required the additional

[68] Dio, 55.32.4. On the other hand the eyewitness Velleius Paterculus (2.111.4) considers these tactics working; cf. Luttwak 1976: 41 ff.

[69] Wilkes 1969: 92–3, seen slightly differently by Syme 1933c: 29–31. See also Strobel 2000: 526–8. For Plautius see PIR^6 478.

[70] Vell. Pat. 2.112.3–4; Dio, 55.32.3; Köstermann 1953: 362; Wilkes 1969: 72.

[71] Vell. Pat. 2.113.1–3: Köstermann 1953: 362–3; Sumner 1970: 272; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.110.6 as an eyewitness … *tantus huius belli metus fuit … Caesaris Augusti animum quateret atque terreret*. See also above p. 149 n. 58.

[72] Silvanus is attested later as operating from Sirmium; Dio, 55.34.6–7; 56.12.2. Caecina is not mentioned afterwards. Dio, 55.32.4 (defeat of the Mezaei).

[73] Dio, 55.33.1. It is assumed that the surrender was on the 3 August after CIL I^2 248. The date is questioned by Woodman 1977: 178, who suggests the earlier date.

[74] Vell. Pat. 2.114.4. Bathinus was either the river Bosut (Köstermann 1953: 366–7 n. 4), or more likely Bosna; Saria 1930; 1933; Vulić 1933: 3–12; Wilkes 1969: 73; Bojanovski 1974: 192–9.

[75] Bojanovski 1988a: 364–6.

attention of Silvanus, despite the formal surrender at Bathinus, when unrest followed the murder of Breucian Bato by his Daesitiate namesake.[76] Bato withdrew into the Bosnian mountains from where he conducted counter-attacks, probably against the indigenous population taking the Roman side.[77] Later in the year, Tiberius left Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (consul AD 6) in command of Siscia and Plautius Silvanus in Sirmium and he (possibly) went to Dalmatia before returning to Rome to give a report to Augustus.[78]

The last year of the war witnessed operations in the mountainous Dinaric area. The Romans advanced in three columns led by Silvanus (south-east from Sirmium), Lepidus (north-west from Siscia along the Una valley towards Burnum), while Tiberius and Germanicus operated from the south in the Dalmatian hinterland.[79] Lepidus and Silvanus had no extensive problems in ending the resistance of the Pirustae and Daesitiates. Germanicus encountered more problems. His campaign was covered in some detail in Dio; he took the forts of Splonum, Raitinon (Ραίτινον) and Seretium.[80] There is a problem in the identification of Dio's Raitinon with Roman-era Raetinium placed near the city of Bihać, as Bojanovski notes, because it was in the territory of the Iapodes who did not take part in the uprising. It might be taken by the rebels earlier. They might be siding with the Pannonii for cultural similarities. Marić suggests that the Iapodes only in the first century BC acquired control over the left bank of the river Sana, which was inhabited by the Pannonii.[81] Tiberius pursued Bato until he finally captured him at Andretium, close to Salona, after a brief siege, thus completing military operations.[82] There were significant numbers of Roman military deserters on the Pannonian side who, in fear of punishment, obstructed all peace negotiations and dragged out the war for a while. These deserters were most likely from auxiliary units recruited locally amongst the non-Pannonii

[76] Dio, 55.34.4–7. Apparently not all Breucian subjects were happy with Bato's betrayal of Pinnes; Dio, 55.34.4–5.
[77] Wilkes 1965b: 115; Swan 2004: 222 suggests that Bato attacked the inhabitants of 'alluvial plains' (probably *poljes* in Dinaric *karst*) north of Salona.
[78] Vell. Pat. 2.114.5; cf. Suet. *Tib*. 16; Dio, 56.11–12; PIR[1] 369.
[79] Dio, 56.12.2–3. Cf. the details in Pašalić 1956: 288–95; Köstermann 1953: 370 and Wilkes 1965b.
[80] Dio, 56.11.1–12.1. Splonum is identified with Pljevlja in modern day Montenegro; Wilkes 1965b: 121–5, valley of river Sana; Pašalić 1956: 288–91, Šipovo; Alföldy 1962c: 3–12, or west-north of Bihać, Mesihović 2007: 561–2. See Šašel 1953 for the location of Seretion.
[81] Bojanovski 1988a: 314–5; cf. Mesihović 2007: 562–3; Marić 1975.
[82] See Zaninović 1967: 7 for the location of Andretium.

population of Illyricum, and 'Germans' who came with Tiberius,[83] rather than Roman legionaries.

ERRORS IN STRATEGY: THE ASSESSMENT OF THE UPRISING

This was the last historically recorded attempt at organised indigenous resistance to Roman power in Illyricum. The Romans, generally speaking, did not exercise unnecessary violence after extinguishing the rebellion. Wilkes suggests an almost total extermination of the Pannonii; it was a bloody and cruel struggle, with grave consequences to all those who resisted.[84] However this statement should be understood generally, and assume that the level of Roman revenge was different towards different communities. There are no mentions of large enslavement of the population or excessive Roman retaliation after the fighting was over. The main strongholds were besieged and destroyed with their population, but other settlements, where the majority of the population lived, mainly surrendered peacefully, and the lives of Bato and his followers were, after all, spared. Archaeology finds traces of destruction in the valley of the Sava in this period, but it is impossible to decide whether it was the product of the *Bellum Pannonicum* or the *Bellum Batonianum*.[85] This uprising was an extraordinary event, not comparable with the problems the Romans experienced in the region during the Republic. Instead of being a political periphery of the Roman world as before, where police actions and trustworthy allies could keep things in order, Illyricum now represented an important organic part of the *imperium Romanum*, its geo-political core necessary for supporting important military operations in central Europe – either defensive or offensive. Thus, any trouble arising in Illyricum now significantly affected other parts of the empire, and it was a matter of the utmost importance to keep the area peaceful in the future.

Rome's political conduct in Illyricum in hindsight seems reckless, inadequate and dangerous in the period preceding this crisis. The constitutional framework imposed on Illyricum after the *Bellum Pannonicum* created a system that was too large, spatially and culturally diverse and thus too

[83] Dio, 56.15; German cavalry: Dio, 56.11.2. The Liburni were involved in fighting on the Roman side as well; CIL 3.3158; Wilkes 1969: 289.

[84] Wilkes 1969: 139–40; Vell. Pat. 2.115.2–4; Dio, 56.14.6–7.

[85] Cf. Sordi 2004: 224–6. Dio, 56.16.4 (lack of retaliation); Dio, 55.34.6 (surrender of the Pannonians), 56.15.1, 3 (surrender of the Dalmatians); Dio, 56.13–16; Suet. *Tib.* 20 (the destiny of Bato). Marić 1964a: 50–1, 73 (archaeological evidence).

complex to control. The imposition of high taxes, creation of local resentment in an insufficiently controlled region, and transfer of almost all available troops far north against the Marcomanni, endangered their own strategic rear in Illyricum, and made Italy vulnerable. Any of those elements would not have been fatal individually, but combined they created dangerous circumstances. Some Roman strategies worked perfectly, though. The construction of Illyricum as an artificial space inhabited by heterogeneous communities enabled the Romans to exploit differences amongst indigenous groups, as no other group in Illyricum joined the Pannonii in the uprising, except for culturally akin Delmatae. If that had happened, the Romans would have been in serious trouble. The Romans also managed to use the differences between the Pannonian and Dalmatian Pannonii and divide them internally, getting Bato the Breucian on their side.[86]

Desperate resistance from the Pannonii is understandable, in one respect, for they had nowhere else to go; they could not just leave and resettle outside of the Roman influence, as the communities east of the Rhine could do for example.[87] Their resentment of Roman rule was also predictable; they did not have a city-based culture as did the coastal communities on the Adriatic coast, so they were not used to an organised system of paying taxes and tribute. Therefore, it was very easy to create resentment towards Roman rule. Furthermore, the Romans lacked fortresses and strong garrisons in the Sava valley. There is nothing to suggest that the only known military strongpoints, Sirmium and Siscia, were militarily sufficient for that task in AD 6. The defence of Sirmium required troops from Moesia. Siscia was perhaps better secured, but there is nothing that might confirm that. In fact, archaeology proves that Siscia was fortified by timber-constructed fortifications (destroyed by fire) before the rebellion, and only after that was split stone coursed with mortar used as a foundation for brick walls.[88] Before the rebellion no military roads[89] connecting the coast with the hinterland had been constructed. It was a disaster waiting to happen.

The seriousness of this conflict for Augustan military deployment in Europe made the Romans rethink their military and political arrangements in Illyricum. It exposed their weaknesses and resulted in many military improvements in the next decade, which will be discussed in depth in the

[86] Vell. Pat. 2.114.4. [87] Vell. Pat. 2.108.2; cf. Strabo, 7.1.3.
[88] Nenadić 1986/87: 74–6; Buzov 2001: 141–2.
[89] Possibly the Aquileia–Carnuntum road had been repaired at this time (the ancient amber road); Klemenc 1961: 9 n. 74.

next chapter. It became obvious that one large command was not enough to provide efficient security in the region, so it was divided into two separate commands. Three legions were placed in Pannonia and two in Dalmatia, as strategic reserves and at the same time to watch over the indigenous population. Furthermore, they established a strong defensive line of legionary and auxiliary fortresses in the Dalmatian hinterland. The Romans also established efficient communications, which meant massive road building throughout these provinces. The Romans learned fast from their errors, and their conduct in Illyricum in the next decades reflects experience gained from this rebellion.

The Batonian war was extinguished just a couple of days before Varus lost his legions in Germany. How the rebellion in Illyricum and the Varian disaster affected Roman plans to continue expansion in Europe is a matter for discussion. Their losses had been great but Roman military capabilities were not so difficult to restore. It was celebrated as a great victory and the exotic names of defeated Pannonii, such as the Pirustae or Andizetes, became more familiar throughout the empire and the victory celebrated as a triumph in a foreign war.[90] However, psychologically and personally, it must have been a real disaster for Augustus in the last years of his life.[91] His successor was certainly not too keen to continue wars of conquest after all the campaigns he had endured, especially hard fighting in the snow and mud of Illyricum.

[90] Suet. *Tib*. 16. The personifications of the Pirustae and Andizetes (and Iapodes) were amongst those represented in the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias; R. Smith 1988.
[91] Tac. *Ann*. 1.11; Dio, 56.33.

CHAPTER 9

Iulio-Claudians in Illyricum: the tale of two provinces

In this period Illyricum became an essential part of the empire, its inhabitants were slowly but certainly on the way to 'becoming Romans', and there was no more need to treat this region as part of foreign affairs, except of course for the Danubian frontier. The administrative and political unity of 'Greater' Illyricum was broken into two parts, creating an entirely new geo-political situation, although a certain level of unity was maintained through the administration of the mining district *metalla Illyrici* (see below). The northern part, soon to become Pannonia, was formed as a frontier province for defence against a potentially hostile army threatening from beyond Pannonia. The Dalmatian coast was geographically and culturally already in many ways a part of the inner Mediterranean cultural core, strongly affected by the global processes and acculturation inside Roman imperial templates. The Dinaric Alps region, rich in mining resources, but much less exposed to global Mediterranean influences, stood between these two, but for administrative purposes was joined to the coastal region. The *Bellum Batonianum* exposed all the weaknesses of the Roman political conduct in 'Greater' Illyricum, and the Romans were compelled to make decisive changes if they wanted to maintain their position and avoid further troubles. The most important elements of the new Roman solutions for Illyricum were extensive road-building, resettlement of certain indigenous groups, removal of some indigenous youth through conscription into auxiliary units, military administration of the most dangerous *civitates*, immigration of foreigners into Illyricum, opening of economic links and additional military measures.[1] At the same time, the selective distribution of Roman citizenship to members of the elite and the much wider process of cultural transition affected the indigenous population and the way they positioned and defined themselves between what they saw as their tradition and Roman imperial ideology.

[1] See Alföldy 1965a: 171–3; 1990, who defined these measures for Dalmatia. He also considers amongst these measures the completion of three lines of defence protecting the Dalmatian coast, the so-called Dalmatian *limes*, the existence of which is disputed, see below.

Certainly, these changes cannot be observed in isolation as Illyricum was part of a wider imperial system, so we should also try to place them in the more general context of provincial transformation that took place in this period throughout the empire, and especially in the wider region. This chapter will look at the first decades of this new and – as time showed – more permanent political framework that Rome constructed over Illyricum. It is a modest attempt to see this period in very rough outlines, avoiding detailed discussion on particulars in this final period. Roman internal matters connected with the area, such as the mutiny of the Pannonian legions in AD 14, or the rebellion led by the Dalmatian governor Lucius Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus against the emperor Claudius in AD 42, are beyond the scope of this study and will be disregarded.[2]

Unfortunately, the sources are extremely scarce for this period, even by the perpetually modest standards of Illyricum, so we need to rely more on information provided by archaeology and epigraphy. Inscriptions are helpful in matters such as: boundary settlements between peregrine communities; origins and extent of Italian emigration to Dalmatia; composition of legions and auxiliary units; settlement of veterans; building of roads; and involvement of indigenous aristocracy in administration, etc. Written sources have no particular interest in Illyricum in this period. Velleius Paterculus and Dio supply limited information for the years immediately after the *Bellum Batonianum*, but Tacitus remains our chief historical authority for the period. Lack of political and military events in Illyricum usually kept the region out of Tacitus' Rome-focused sight. Nevertheless, on occasion he supplies useful information on the movements and positions of individual legionary camps and road building. Such an approach is not a surprise. Tacitus and the people of his class, who produced and consumed the writings of this genre, knew and cared almost nothing for details of provincial affairs.[3]

FOREIGN AND PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS OF THE EARLY PRINCIPATE

In this period Rome's Illyrian affairs should be seen in the context of its empire-wide foreign, but also provincial, affairs, as it was a province with a potentially troublesome frontier. Foreign affairs during the Iulio-Claudian era are sometimes obscure in respect of individual regions or periods, but

[2] Tac. *Ann.* 1.16–32; Schmitt 1958; Wilkes 1963 – mutiny of AD 14. Dio, 60.15; Suet. *Claud.* 37.2 (AD 42); Jagenteufel 1958: 19–21 (no. 5).
[3] Cornell 1993: 164–8.

some general models of Roman action can be recognised. A decisive shift from the Augustan aggressive and imperialistic attitude is obvious, whether it was intended by Augustus himself after the setbacks of the *Bellum Batonianum* and the Varian disaster, or was a new political programme developed entirely by Tiberius.[4] The new approach was almost Republican in its essence – yet implemented in very different historical circumstances. It was focused on the control of frontiers and the space behind them without establishing formal boundaries, as well as an apparent reluctance to annex new territories, except when necessary. The Romans frequently relied on client-kings to maintain control over certain areas, although client kingdoms proved often unreliable in the long run, and were annexed when perceived as unstable. Regardless of this general shift, a strong ideological emphasis continued to be laid in the literary sources on the continuing expansion of the empire, and the aspiration of doing so persisted as reality in the minds of the Roman elite of the period.[5]

Roman provincial affairs in this period are also very heterogeneous and depend on the cultural, historical and geographical context in the individual province, and the degree of its inclusion in the Mediterranean world.[6] Recently acquired larger provinces like Gaul or Illyricum were divided into smaller parts, and thoroughly reorganised so the efficiency of their administration increased and the military and political power of their governors that might threaten the position of the *princeps* decreased.[7] Modern scholars are divided in their assessment of Roman attitudes to the provinces held during the long reign of Tiberius. Some follow the positive and (over)enthusiastic assessment of Velleius Paterculus, and see Tiberius' involvement in the provinces as generally more constructive and beneficial for the provincials.[8] However, there is also the more recent, and more accepted, view that Tiberius used the provinces as a source of income only, that he stopped all juridical and social progress in the provinces and

[4] Cf. Ober 1982.

[5] See the general coverage by Bowman 1996: 344–50; client kings in Braund 1984; military strategy in Luttwak 1976: 13–50. Mócsy 1974: 39–52 has a useful overview of Iulio-Claudian frontier policy in the middle Danube, also Conole and Milns 1983 for policy in the middle and lower Danube. Roman propaganda: C. M. Wells 1972: 1–13; Lintott 1981; Moynihan 1985; Brunt 1990: 433–80; Nicolet 1991: 15–56; Whittaker 1994: 33–59; Mattern 1999: 89.

[6] Bowman 1996: 351–70 (administration of provinces); Burns 2003: 141–93 (general relation with 'inner' and 'outer' barbarians), and 194–247 (study of Pannonia).

[7] See the observation of Goudineau 1996: 487, and 467–9 that the division of Gaul was arbitrary and based on rudimentary geographic knowledge.

[8] Vell. Pat. 2.126.3–4.; C. E. Smith 1942: 233–56; Kornemann 1960: 236–40.

improved their administration for the sole purpose of improving the efficiency with which they were exploited.[9]

The enfranchisement of the indigenous population, municipalisation and the settlement of foreigners such as veteran soldiers, Italians, or colonists from other provinces were also an important part of provincial affairs in this period. There were two opposite approaches to enfranchisement in the provinces in the early Principate. Tiberius, who was more conservative and Italy-centred, maintained the attitude of Augustus and hesitated to spread Roman citizenship, but attempted to assimilate the provinces, while Claudius on the other hand implemented a more inclusive approach towards the provincials, although it was still modest when compared with the later emperors. Essentially, he used a more liberal approach as did Iulius Caesar, and brought about a significant social change in the provinces, which would be continued into Flavian times on a much more significant level, and with substantial results.[10]

THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION AND ADMINISTRATION OF ILLYRICUM

The logical outcome of the *Bellum Batonianum*, which had exposed the failures of the political framework of 'Greater Illyricum', was that the province was broken into two parts which could be more easily controlled and fitted into the imperial system of provinces. This division was a decisive political move and carried the most significant long-term consequences for Illyricum. In the long run it broke up the whole geo-political system of 'Greater Illyricum', creating two different regional political systems, and even three economic sub-systems. According to Hopkins' classification of provinces by their role in the political macro-economy of the empire, Pannonia is a military, frontier province, while Dalmatia can be placed among tax-exporting provinces, as it is neither grain-producing nor a frontier province. However, Dušanić recognises *metalla Illyrici*, the mining district organised in the second century in the Dalmatian hinterland, parts of Noricum and Upper Moesia, as a separate, third economic sub-system in imperial Illyricum, between the Dalmatian coast and the military-frontier economy of Pannonia.[11] The southern part of Illyricum, which will be called

[9] Alföldy 1965b; Seager 1972: 170–3; Levick 1976: 129–41.
[10] Sherwin-White 1973: 237–50; Levick 1990: 163–86.
[11] Hopkins 1980, modified by Garnsey and Saller 1987: 95–7. Dušanić 1991, see also Škegro 1991: 81–114.

Dalmatia, and the northern part, which became Pannonia,[12] and their destinies started to separate and to follow different paths for the moment, but in the later empire Illyricum was re-invented as an artificial cultural and political concept through the rise of Illyrian soldier-emperors.

Modern scholarship has accepted the fact that Illyricum was divided after the rebellion, but the point of disagreement is the exact date when it actually happened, as the sources are in conflict. The majority of scholars place the date of the division in the period from the start of the rebellion to shortly after its ending, mainly arguing in favour of AD 8 and the Breucian capitulation at the river Bathinus.[13] Very intriguing is the minority view that dates the division of Illyricum much later, after the second mission of Drusus the Younger to Illyricum; therefore after c. AD 19–20, but still before Claudius' reign.[14] This argument is very convincing as it can explain the inconsistency in the sources, and means that the division should be dated to early Tiberian times. If this is true, then it seems obvious that Augustus himself contemplated the division of Illyricum before his death, and that only his death and a change of *princeps* delayed it. Tiberius was going to Illyricum when he heard that Augustus was on his deathbed. There were no obvious reasons why the successor of Augustus would go to Illyricum at that time. The most likely answer seems to be the reorganisation and the census in Illyricum, the very same task that Germanicus was conducting in Gaul at the same time.[15]

The division of Illyricum was following geo-strategic considerations rather than existing indigenous political/cultural divisions, and it was part of a larger reorganisation of the northern provinces. Initially, all the troops in the area of Illyricum and Noricum were under a single command, and it is possible that even the whole area was under a common military administration, constituting

[12] The inscription CIL 3.1741 ILS 938 mentioning *civitates superioris provinciae Illyrici* is dated in Tiberian times, but unfortunately was destroyed and preserved only in manuscript transcription from the mid-sixteenth century. Thus the idea that Illyricum was firstly divided into *Illyricum superius* (Dalmatia) and *Illyricum inferius* (Pannonia) should be accepted with reservation, see Bojanovski 1988b (who attempts to restore the authenticity of the manuscript copy) and Novak 1966; Wilkes 1996: 565 n. 47 who dispute the authenticity with some strong arguments. Pannonia was called Illyricum as late as AD 60 (CIL 16.4), while Dalmatia is known under that name much earlier.

[13] Alföldy 1965a: 26–7 (AD 6); Ritterling 1925: 1236; Jagenteufel 1958: 9–10; Dobó 1968: 11; Bojanovski 1988a: 56 (AD 8), Nagy 1970; Fitz 1977: 545 (AD 9, but Fitz later altered his opinion, arguing in favour of a much later date. See next note).

[14] Fitz 1988, cf. Novak 1966; Braunert 1977: 215–16 (Illyricum was divided into two separate commands, but still remained a single province after AD 14).

[15] Vell. Pat. 2.123.1; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.5 (the departure of Tiberius). *Ann.* 1.31 (Germanicus in Gaul). Cf. Nagy 1989: 64 n. 18.

the provincial block together with Noricum.[16] Some parts of eastern Noricum such as Carnuntum and *deserta Boiorum* were later joined to Pannonia, so that all legions in this central-Danubian frontier section were *de facto* under the single command of the Pannonian governor.[17] Pannonia was formed as a frontier province and included in a trans-provincial imperial system that comprised the Danubian provinces, regardless of whether it included the trans-danubia region in this period or not. Most changes happened in the western parts of the new province where the old political contexts of *regnum Noricum* were replaced for new imperial strategic benefits, such as unified control of the Amber road.[18] The legions positioned in Pannonia were defensive, but they could be used at any time for offensive tasks across the Danube if the need arose. There were possibly other reasons for the reorganisation. The mutiny of the legions in Pannonia after Augustus' death exposed the potential danger for present and future *principes* of keeping all five Illyrian legions together, under a single command.[19]

Although there are still some uncertainties in detail in the determination of the administrative boundary between Dalmatia and Pannonia, it is possible to position it roughly in the space south of the Sava and north of the Dinaric Alps.[20] The division of Illyricum divided the Pannonii into two parts and constituted the following *civitates peregrinae*: the Breuci, Colapiani (whose *civitas* succeeded the Segesticani), Andizetes, Osi and Amantini were in Pannonia; and the Mezaei, Ditiones, Pirustae and Daesitiates in Dalmatia. The reasons are obviously strategic: to destroy the potentially dangerous political unity of the Pannonii in the same province, counterbalancing them with the La Tène communities in Pannonia and Italian settlers, southern Illyrians, the Iapodes and Liburni in Dalmatia. Some Pannonii were in turn resettled to counterbalance La Tène cultural unity in north Pannonia (see below p. 167). Also, a frontier between the provinces fixed on the Dinaric Alps probably looked more natural in the eyes of the Romans. The mountainous chain presented a significant and easily defensible buffer with only a few easily defensible passages. The military bases in Pannonia were positioned close to the Dalmatian and

[16] Nagy 1989: 68. Tóth 1980: 84–6 says that the unity of the entire Illyro-Norican administration, not only in the area of army command, lasted until the era of Claudius.

[17] Alföldy 1974: 57 placed this event in AD 14, but it is possible that it happened later; see this section n. 16. Alföldy 1974: 60–1 – the eastern frontier of Noricum.

[18] Fitz 1977: 549 ascribes the reorganisation to fear of the Marcomanni, but that appears exaggerated, especially if we date the reorganisation to the mid- to late reign of Tiberius.

[19] Fitz 1988: 23–4.

[20] Bojanovski 1988a: 325–30; Šašel 1953 and especially Dušanić 1977: 64–5 are in agreement in drawing the frontier between Dalmatia and Pannonia further south than Wilkes 1969: 78–80.

Norican frontier at this time, as will be discussed later. This natural position would give time for the Dalmatian command to act against any attack from the north, because such an attack might circumvent or neutralise the Pannonian army, which was probably intended as the first line of defence. Dalmatian legions were also handy as strategic reserves, which could be employed elsewhere if the need arose.[21]

The administrative organisation of Illyricum must be dated to the late Augustan/early Tiberian era, regardless of when the province was *de facto* divided. Tiberius carried out initial arrangements in the last weeks of the *Bellum Batonianum*, just before the capitulation of Daesitiate Bato. He was supposed to complete them in AD 14, but the task was interrupted by the death of Augustus, as pointed out earlier.[22] Tiberius continued with the new Augustan approach that was dividing large provinces into smaller administrative units. The primary purpose of the second mission of Drusus to Illyricum (AD 17–20) was meant to organise defences against the Marcomanni,[23] but we cannot exclude the possibility that he carried out some other arrangements, not only in the context of his mission but in an attempt to organise the administration of the provinces, and confirm the peace.[24]

The most prominent role in the internal organisation of Illyricum was given to its governors. The governors in both parts of Illyricum continued to be appointed as *legati Augusti pro praetore*, but the term *praepositus* was sometimes used in the years immediately after the *Bellum Batonianum*.[25] Their terms of office lasted substantially longer than before, in accordance with the system introduced by Tiberius and followed by his successors. Twelve governors of Dalmatia are attested by name in the period between AD 9–68, and in addition there is the possibility that one or both of two anonymous *legati* can be dated before Flavian times.[26] For Pannonia, eleven different *legati* can be attested in the same period from preserved written sources and inscriptions.[27] One of the most significant governors of Dalmatia that we know of was Publius Cornelius Dolabella.[28] During his term important building activity was carried out, as well as administrative

[21] Cf. Luttwak 1976: 27. [22] Dio, 56.14.7–15.1, see n. 14 above.

[23] Tac. *Ann.* 2.44, 46; Syme 1979: 324; Nagy 1989: 64; contra Mócsy 1974: 40. The first mission of Drusus was to calm the angry legions in AD 14, Tac. *Ann.* 1.24–30.

[24] Cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.46. [25] E.g. Vell. Pat. 2.116.1.

[26] Jagenteufel 1958: 12–30, 63–6 (nos. 1–12, possibly 39 and 41), see also Syme 1959. To these should be added *legatus* Marcus Servilius, son of the Gaius mentioned in an unpublished inscription from Posuški Gradac near Posušje, who might be dated as governor a few years after Bato's capitulation, Dodig 2003: 233–4.

[27] Dobó 1968: 23–31 (no. 9–19), see also Syme 1971e.

[28] Governor in AD 14–20. See the sources in Jagenteufel 1958: 14–17 (no. 3); PIR² 1348.

tasks, such as fixing the boundaries between individual *civitates*. The *forma Dolabelliana*, which represented either a province, or perhaps only Liburnia – opinions differ, was also made during his term.[29] The delimitation was performed under the supervision of military personnel and under direct orders from the governor himself.[30]

The old, late Republican administrative scheme centred in Narona and mentioned by Varro became obsolete for the administration of a new province. Urban coastal communities with substantial Italian immigration or Greek-speaking populations were already organised, or in the process of being organised as *municipia* and *coloniae* and enjoyed significant autonomy inside the province, like the Salonitan *res publica* or the Liburnian communities, some of which had *ius italicum* and some immunities and other privileges.[31] For the interior of the future province of Dalmatia and for Pannonia as a whole, the Romans used a system based on peregrine *civitates*, the system generally used in less urbanised western provinces.[32] Pliny mentions the division of Dalmatia into three *conventus iuridici* for the administration of peregrine communities based on the coast, Scardona, Salona and Narona. He also provides the names of individual *civitates peregrinae* and even the number of their subdivisions, *decuriae*, but only for the Salonitan and Naronitan *conventus*.[33] Although we are informed about the administrative scheme of Dalmatia, the early administrative picture of Pannonia remains largely obscure. Pliny mentions only administrative *civitates*, without providing information on the number of their *decuriae* or any other details (Table 2).[34]

Roman military personnel, *praefecti civitatum*, mainly ruled *civitates*, and in some instances might rule several *civitates* jointly in this period.[35] The *praefecti civitatum* were initially appointed in order to keep close control over the conquered peoples.[36] However, *praefecti* were merely superimposed upon previously existing social structures and organisations. In some communities the Romans exercised power through the local elite, *principes* and *praepositi*,[37] often holders of Roman citizenship, who essentially maintained some

[29] D. Rendić-Miočević 1968: 64.
[30] Condurachi 1969: 150–2; Wilkes 1974. See also Čače 2006: 74–8 for southern Liburnia.
[31] Liburni: Pliny, *HN* 3.139, Čače 1992/93; 2006.
[32] See recently Curchin 2004: 53–7 for central Spain.
[33] Pliny, *HN* 3.141–4. Recently, Marion 1998: 130–2 argued that there was a fourth *conventus* in Dalmatia, located in Epidaurum, corresponding with the former Illyrian kingdom, which was omitted by Pliny.
[34] Pliny, *HN* 3.147. [35] CIL 5.3346; 9.2564; 9.5363. [36] Wilkes 1977a: 742.
[37] Patsch 1899: 176–9 (the Iapodes) followed by D. Rendić-Miočević 1962: 329–30 (the Delmatae) believes that the municipal *principes* formed an advisory council helping the *praepositus* chosen amongst the *principes* to administer the area; cf. CIL 3.14324, 3.14326 *praepositus et princeps Iapodum*.

Table 2. *List of the administrative* conventus *and* civitates peregrinae *for the indigenous populations in Dalmatia and Pannonia, according to Pliny,* HN *3.139–144 (Dalmatia) and 147–8 (Pannonia).*

Provincia Dalmatia

Conventus Scardonitanus

Civitates	Decuriae
Iapodes	n/a
XIIII civitates Liburnorum: Laciniensi, Stulpini, Burnistae, Olbonensi and 10 unmentioned by Pliny	n/a

Conventus Salonitanus

Civitates	Decuriae
Delmatae	342
Deures	25
Ditiones	239
Mezaei	269
Sardeatae	52

Conventus Naronitanus

Civitates	Decuriae
Cerauni	24
Daorsi	17
Daesitiates	103
Docleatae	33
Deretini	14
Deramistae	30
Dindari	33
Glintidiones	44
Melcumani	24
Narensii	102
Scirtari	72
Ardiaei	20
Siculotae	24

elements of pre-Roman social structure and local political systems, while introducing elements of Roman administration.[38] In practice, a peregrine

[38] Many of these inscriptions are dated to the later first century AD, but they reflect the earlier period; cf. D. Rendić-Miočević 1962 esp. 330–1; 1975c: 53–5; 1989: 419–20; Zotović 2002: 15 ff.

Table 2. *(cont.)*

Provincia Pannonia

Conventus Epidauritanus (?)[39]	
Civitates (no decuriae numbers provided)	
Arviates	n/a
Azali	
Amantini	
Andizetes	
Belgites	
Breuci	
Catari	
Colapiani	
Cornacates	
Eravisci	
Hercuniati	
Iassi	
Latobici	
Oseriates	
Scordisci	
Serapilli	
Serrettes	
Varciani	

civitas did not have much direct Roman influence over everyday matters. Everything except foreign affairs, tax payment and military matters remained in the hands of the local elite, as they were before the Roman arrival. In a way, imperial administration treated *civitates* like client-states, only with tighter control, payment of tax instead of tribute, and the compulsory conscription of youth into the auxiliary units. *Civitates* also played a significant buffer role, surrounding and protecting Roman provincial strong points such as colonies and legionary camps.[40]

In general, a *conventus* was divided into *civitates*, which were apparently organised on a regional and 'ethnic' basis. However, we need to be careful about assuming automatically that every *conventus* or *civitas* in Roman Dalmatia and Pannonia accurately represented pre-Roman cultural, 'ethnic' and/or political structures, or reflected the common identity of the indigenous population. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that the

[39] Not mentioned by Pliny. Its existence is postulated by Marion 1998: 130–2.
[40] Burns 2003: 210–2 (for Pannonia, but can be applied to the interior of Dalmatia as well).

Figure 4. The inscription mentioning *T. F(lavius) Valens f. princeps D(a)esitiati(um)* from Breza (Škegro 1997: no. 126). Zemaljski Museum in Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina.

group identities mentioned in the sources in the process of Roman political integration of the region, such as the 'Delmatae', 'Daesitiates', or 'Breuci', represented unified political or 'ethnic' units. They rather reflect both the Roman perception of indigenous 'ethnography', and their own political and strategic considerations, not the factual situation, or shared identity of the indigenous population. Pliny also provides the numbers of the smaller administrative units – *decuriae* – for the *civitates* in the Salonitan and Naronitan *conventus*. As much as it might be tempting to try to assume population numbers from those numbers, they are helpful only for comparison and their relative size, rather than for counting absolute numbers.[41] The Romans made some surgical administrative interventions in Illyricum after the *Bellum Batonianum*, as we can see from the list of the *civitates* provided by Pliny. It seems that they dismantled the larger indigenous political institutions into their smaller parts, which were probably clients

[41] Wilkes 1977a: 752–3 after Beloch assumes that one decuria of Pliny represents 100 adult males, but no evidence supports that notion.

or subjugated smaller communities dominated by politically and militarily stronger communities.

The Breucian alliance in the valley of the Sava and the Drava was broken into smaller administrative units after the rebellion.[42] It is not certain when this happened, probably after the rebellion was extinguished. The same destiny awaited the Pirustae in south-eastern Dalmatia, which were broken into three smaller administrative units, thus providing an easier task for military administrators.[43] We need to take into account the fact that the Scordisci might also have been broken into different *civitates* and dispersed between the provinces of Moesia, Pannonia and Dalmatia.[44] The resettlement of some Delmatian communities in the eastern parts of the Dalmatian province is also possible, and, if it happened as Alföldy claims, no doubt it took place at this time.[45] The resettlement of the Pannonian Azali on the banks of the Danube separating the Boii and Eravisci also took place in the Iulio-Claudian era, but it is difficult to determine exactly when.[46] The other solution, the grouping of smaller, culturally similar communities into larger administrative units, took place in some instances, such as the *civitas* of Docleatae, which was composed of less numerous peoples living on the south-eastern Adriatic coast.[47]

MILITARY COMMITMENTS, ROAD-BUILDING AND SETTLEMENT OF VETERANS

The Roman military had several roles in Illyricum. Keeping an eye on the indigenous population was the most obvious one, and the defence of frontiers and the building of roads were equally significant additional tasks. After the *Bellum Batonianum* legions VII and XI (both future *Claudia pia fidelis*) were initially stationed in Dalmatia, and legions VIII Augusta, IX Hispana, XV Apollinaris in Pannonia.[48] It is much easier to trace the Dalmatian legions. Legion XI replaced XX at Burnum on the river

[42] The Breuci were broken into at least three *civitates*, Oseriates, Breuci and Cornacates, mentioned by Pliny, Mócsy 1962: 606; 1974: 53–5; Zaninović 2003b: 445–6. Mócsy dates this reorganisation after the *Bellum Pannonicum*, but this dating remains uncertain.

[43] Wilkes 1969: 173–6; Alföldy 1965a: 56–9.

[44] Alföldy 1964b: 109, 123–7; contra Katičić 1965b: 63–9; Papazoglu 1978: 171–8.

[45] Alföldy 1965a: 56, 173.

[46] Mócsy 1974: 55, 59, dating it after the *Bellum Pannonicum*. It seems that it took place later, as the Romans annexed trans-Danubia much later than previously thought. See above.

[47] Wilkes 1969: 166–7; 1996: 578. In Gaul, for example, the Romans grouped the indigenous population into larger administrative units based on political or 'ethnic' principles such as the Arecomici; Goudineau 1996: 474–6.

[48] Cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.16, 23, 30, also Wilkes 1996: 569–71 for deployment of the legions.

Krka (locality Šuplja Crkva, Ivoševci near Knin) and VII was positioned in Tilurium (Gardun, near Trilj), strategically placed close to the coast but also able to keep a watchful eye on the interior.[49] Legion VII was moved from Dalmatia to Moesia under Claudius or Nero, between AD 42 and 67; the exact date remains uncertain, probably AD 56–57.[50] It is uncertain where the Pannonian legions were positioned. It is usually assumed that Pannonian legionary camps were based in Poetovio (VIII), Emona (XV) and Siscia (IX), but Emona as the location of a legionary camp is today unascertainable.[51] Possibly XV Apollinaris was stationed in or near Siscia before Tiberius, and in Vindobona under Tiberius, before it moved to Carnuntum sometimes under Gaius or Claudius.[52] Between 43 and 45 there are also changes of legion arrangement in Pannonia as well: legion IX Hispana leaves the province, while VIII Augusta is replaced with XIII Gemina and XV Apollinaris is replaced with X Gemina.[53] In addition to the legions, significant auxiliary detachments were stationed in Illyricum. However, modern scholars dispute their exact number and position, especially those stationed in Dalmatia.[54]

The situation on the northern Pannonian frontiers showed unexpected stability throughout this period. The most significant event appears to be the settlement of the Iazyges, one branch of the Sarmatians, allegedly expelled from the lower Danube by the Dacians.[55] These events still remain unknown except in outline, but from what is known it seems that they settled on the north Pannonian plains with the approval of the Roman government before AD 50, probably between AD 17 and 20. It seems to be a significant strategic measure of Rome, in that it was trying to establish a protective barrier against the Dacians and the Marcomanni.[56] A similar measure was the establishment of Vannius, a vassal king of the Quadi on the northern banks of the Danube on the Hungarian plains in the Tiberian era, as a buffer against the 'Germans'.[57]

As noted earlier, Tiberius was generally very conservative in the enfranchisement and expansion of colonies. He returned to the Republican attitude of granting citizenship to provincials and peregrine communities

[49] Wilkes 1969: 97–8; Zaninović 1968 (Burnum); 1984 (Tilurium); 1985 (both camps). See also Sanader 2003 for the recent excavations of Tilurium.
[50] Ritterling 1925: 1619; Wilkes 1969: 96–7.
[51] Šašel Kos 1995: 236–7 suggests a site for a camp closer to the frontier, also Mócsy 1974: 42–3.
[52] Mosser 2002; 2003; Kandler *et al.* 2004. I am very grateful to Prof. Šašel Kos for this reference.
[53] Mócsy 1974: 48. Ferjančić 2002: 29–30 dates the replacement of VIII Augusta with XIIII Gemina in 57.
[54] Dalmatia: Alföldy 1962b; Wilkes 1969: 139–44, 471–4; Bojanovski 1988a: 355–7. Pannonia: Mócsy 1974: 48–51.
[55] Pliny, *HN* 4.80–81. [56] Alföldi 1936: 85. [57] Mócsy 1974: 57; Nagy 1989.

very selectively, and not encouraging the establishment of colonies in the provinces.[58] Still, despite the general attitude of Tiberius, some regions in Illyricum profited in some ways in his reign. Some Liburnian communities gained the *ius italicum* and completed the process of their incorporation into Italy.[59] The reign of Tiberius saw the planting of the first veteran settlements (*viritim* settlements rather than colonies) in Illyricum such as Siculi between Tragurium and Salonae,[60] *pagus Scunasticus* (Bigeste) between Tilurium and Burnum near Narona,[61] Roški Slap near Scardona,[62] Scarbantia[63] and less possibly the establishment of the colony in Emona.[64] The Claudian era saw the establishment of military colonies of Savaria (Szombathely) in northern Pannonia, on the Amber road,[65] and Aequum near modern Sinj in the neighbourhood of Salonae.[66] Individual settlements were also made throughout the provinces. It does seem from epigraphic evidence that the majority of veterans chose to settle close to the bases of their legions, or in the urban centres of the Dalmatian coastal area such as Salona, Narona, Iader – although not in significant numbers in this period – etc., and in Pannonia, mostly in the western part of the province.[67]

A couple of inscriptions illustrate important building activity in Dalmatia after the rebellion of AD 6–9 was under way. There is an interesting inscription from Issa mentioning Drusus the Younger and the governor Dolabella dedicating a *campus* for military exercise in AD 20. The inscription from an architrave of the temple in Salona, dated AD 12–14, may commemorate the Roman victory over the Pannonian rebellion.[68] The Gardun tropaeum from the camp Tilurium, which symbolically represents Dalmatia and Pannonia as two bearded 'barbarians' chained to the bier, or *ferculum*, can also be dated in the same period, or perhaps some time before.

[58] Alföldy 1965b: 836–40.
[59] Alföldy 1965a: 68 ff., 200–1; Wilkes 1969: 107–15 places municipalisation in this period. Vittinghoff 1977, esp. 21–4, seriously questions the methodology of Wilkes and Alföldy and dates it to the reigns of Tiberius and Claudius.
[60] Pliny, *HN* 3.141; Alföldy 1965a: 108 ff.; Wilkes 1969: 112–14; Ferjančić 2002: 103–7.
[61] *Pagus Scunasticus*: ILJ 113–14; Bojanovski 1988a: 124; Ferjančić 2002: 107–14.
[62] Ferjančić 2002: 114–18.
[63] Ferjančić 2002: 119–25 thinks that *oppidum Iulia Scarbantia* from *HN* 3.146 was initially a donation to the military veterans in Tiberius' era.
[64] Emona, see Chapter 6 and also the discussion in Ferjančić 2002: 36–46, and Watkins 1983: 326.
[65] Pliny, *HN* 3.146; Scherrer 2003. See also Mócsy 1974: 76–7; Watkins 1983: 328–9; Ferjančić 2002: 21–8.
[66] Alföldy 1965a: 119–20; Wilkes 1969: 109–10; Ferjančić 2002: 56–62. For its legal status cf. Watkins 1983: 328. Some scholars argue that this settlement was founded in the Neronian period, cf. Ferjančić 2002: 57–9.
[67] Ferjančić 2002: 129–53, 175–81, 183–207. Also in English summary 209–32, and Wilkes 2000: 328–32 for Dalmatia.
[68] Issa: ILJ 257; D. Rendić-Miočević 1952; Salona: ILJ 123; D. Rendić-Miočević 1950/51a: 170–5.



Map 3. The map of Dolabella's roads. Reprinted from Bojanovski 1974 (Map V) with the kind permission of the publisher Centar za Balkanološka ispitivanja.

It is very similar to the motifs from the unknown emperor's armour on the statue from Salona (kept in the Archaeological museum in Zagreb), and the Augustan relief from the Temple of Apollo Sosianus at Rome, which represents Octavian's victorious campaigns in Illyricum.[69]

[69] Abramić 1937: 13–16, fig. 2–3; Cambi 1984; Schönauer 2000: 234–9. The tropaeum honours the *Bellum Pannonicum* (Cambi 1984: 81 n. 34), or the *Bellum Batonianum* (Abramić, 11). See Abramić 1937: 17, fig. 11, for armour from the Salona statue and Ferris 2000: 36–7, fig. 7 for the relief from the Temple of Apollo Sosianus.

Road-building became an extremely significant part of Roman activity in Illyricum after the uprising.[70] Learning from their painful experiences, the Romans understood the importance of linking the Dalmatian coast and Pannonia with roads of sufficient quality. During the governorship of Dolabella, five major roads were built in Dalmatia, linking the provincial centre Salona with strategically important parts of the province.[71] In AD 16–17 two roads had already been completed, the *via Gabiniana* from Salona to Andetrium (Muć, close to Sinj) extending later to Burnum, and Salona – … *ad fines provinciae Illyrici* – via Andetrium, the plains around Livno, the plains around Glamoč, and the valley of Vrbas all the way to the Sava river. In AD 19–20 another three roads were completed. The first from Salona to the *castellum* (He)dum in the Daesitiate *civitas* in central Bosnia via Tilurium, the plains around Tomislavgrad, the valley of Rama, Bugojno, Vitez and Busovača; the second linking Salona and the Breuci, along the valley of Bosna;[72] and a third in the direction of Siscia, via Burnum, Drvar, Sanski Most, Prijedor and Kozarska Dubica, completed in AD 47.[73]

It is possible that the route linking Salona and the Via Egnatia in the direction of Dyrrachium was built in this period, completing the Adriatic route from Aquileia, via Tarsatica, Senia, Burnum, Promona, Tilurium, Narona, Diluntium (replacing the destroyed Daorsian stronghold) and Doclea to Scodra.[74] Another important route was also established, from Senia to Siscia, via the pass of Vratnik, through the area once controlled by the Iapodes.[75] It is easy to recognise their strategic and primarily military purpose, which was to connect the legionary camps in Burnum and Tilurium, Salona as the administrative centre of the province and the recently conquered peoples such as the Daesitiates, Delmatae and Breuci, as well as to establish a vital communication link with Aquileia, Pannonia and the Via Egnatia. They followed the shortest route between those points, rather than linking commercial and otherwise significant pre-Roman sites.[76]

The Romans also built roads in Pannonia at this time. The road between Aquileia and Emona across Ad Pirum had either been built during the last years of Augustus' reign, or just prior to this.[77] The Romans used an almost entirely new network of roads in this part of Pannonia, disregarding

[70] Šašel 1977b; cf. Wilkes 2005: 146–8, 180 ff. and fig. 1 for the most recent review of evidence on the Roman road network in the region. See also Miletić 2006 for the Roman road network on the coast.
[71] CIL 3.3198–3201, 10156–9; ILJ 263. Bojanovski 1974.
[72] It seems that it is identical with the previous one; cf. Bojanovski 1974: 199–202.
[73] CIL 3.13329 ff.
[74] Garašanin and Garašanin 1967: 169–75; Bojanovski 1973: 171–2; Miletić 2006 for the Roman Adriatic road-network.
[75] Miletić 2006: 128–9; Olujić 2007: 207–12. [76] Bojanovski 1974: 26 ff. [77] Tac. *Ann.* 1.20.

previous indigenous settlements and connecting only those points they considered necessary.[78] The main strategic concerns, both offensive and defensive, were to link Carnuntum with Aquileia via Emona, Poetovio and Savaria, following the ancient Amber road.[79] It was a link crucial for keeping efficient watch over the middle Danube, and for bringing reinforcements from Italy. It was also necessary to protect it with a network of fortifications and military colonies, as this was the shortest and easiest way for any attacker to reach Italy.

An important new feature was the strengthening of defences around military camps. The walls of Siscia were strengthened significantly.[80] Probably it was the governor Dolabella who ordered an additional fortification of the camps of Burnum and Tilurium in Dalmatia.[81] The strategy towards Dalmatia shows much more confidence and careful planning. The Romans built the system of defence designed for multiple purposes, such as keeping the province under control, enabling the exploitation of necessary resources and, the most important factor, keeping communications with Pannonia open.[82] The way followed the fortified points Bigeste (near Narona)-Tilurium-Andetrium-Promona-Burnum-Siscia, and further linked with the Amber road and Carnuntum. It appears to have been a heavily defended line of communication between Dalmatia and Pannonia, rather than the defensive *limes* against the Delmatae, which would have made no sense after the Delmatian alliance was subjugated by the Romans.[83] This route was strategically significant, as a potential attacker could use it in order to circumvent fortification on the Amber road and reach the coast.[84] Legionary camps remained close to the coast, as in the phase of 'Greater' Illyricum, because, if moved further into the hinterland, they would be vulnerable and easily cut off.

THE REWARDS OF ILLYRICUM: CONSCRIPTION, MINING, TRADE

Illyricum became more and more a field for recruiting new soldiers. Although conscription was one of the reasons for the *Bellum Batonianum*, it continued in Illyricum after Augustus. In a way, it was a repressive

[78] Šašel 1977a: 158–9.
[79] Burghardt 1979: 7–8; Burns 2003: 208, 213. See also papers collected in Buora 1996.
[80] Nenadić 1986/87: 74–6; Lolić 2003: 131 ff. [81] Zaninović 1976: 165.
[82] Šašel 1974a: 195; Paškvalin 1986. Zaninović 1986: 167 rightly points to the advantages of this position, such as easy supply of troops through the eastern Adriatic ports.
[83] As suggested recently in Sanader 2002. [84] Šašel 1974a table 1.

measure of the occupying army, aimed at removing some of those of military age.[85] It is very difficult to determine the real demographic impact of the *dilectus* on the indigenous population of Illyricum, and the popular attitude to conscription. Warrior values were perhaps an important part of establishing social identity inside one's own community, amongst some peoples in Illyricum, and after the *Pax Romana* took away the opportunity to wage independent war, service in auxiliary units could be a way for some to prove themselves. Still, it is doubtful how significant the demographic impact was. One *cohors peditata* in the Augustan period numbered only 480 soldiers,[86] so that we are looking at a total of 3,360 auxiliaries from Dalmatia (VII *cohors Delmatarum*) and 3,840 from the Pannonian Pannonii (VIII *cohors Breucorum*). The impact of the *dilectus* on provincial populations is difficult to assess and varies in different parts of the empire.[87] A few indigenous auxiliary units are attested in the later Iulian-Claudian period in inscriptions, such as VIII *cohortes Breucorum*, VII *cohortes Delmatarum*, I *cohors* of the Liburni, and the mixed *cohors Pannoniorum et Delmatarum*.[88]

Increasingly, an important aspect of Roman activities was the mining and exploitation of other natural resources, especially in Dalmatia. The Dinaric Alps in modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina are very rich in metals, but the pre-Roman level of exploitation was not efficient enough to satisfy Roman needs.[89] There were three main mining areas in the Dinaric Alps, corresponding with the areas of modern-day Bosnia (the division made by Pašalić): the central region providing gold and copper; the western region providing iron; and the eastern region, rich in silver, lead and copper.[90] Written sources from the early Principate give us a hint that gold mining in Illyricum was the most famous and most interesting characteristic of Illyricum that was known to the Romans,[91] but inscriptions and archaeology confirm that silver and iron were dug there, too. Their real importance, however, significantly increases in the second century AD.[92] Perhaps the

[85] Šašel 1974c: 6; Bojanovski 1988a: 53. [86] Holder 1980: 5–13. [87] Haynes 2001.

[88] CIL 10.5829. For indigenous auxiliaries see Holder 1980: 112, 114, 224–6; Domić-Kunić 1988, and Bojanovski 1988a: 364–6 for the Breuci. *Cohortes Delmatarum* denotes provincial rather than *civitas* origin, as there are a number of auxiliaries from other *civitates* attested; Domić-Kunić 1988: 104 n. 90.

[89] The tradition of mining in the north-west Balkan peninsula began before the Romans; Pašalić 1954: 64–7; Čović 1980; Škegro 1991: 79–80; 1999: 23–37.

[90] Pašalić 1954.; Bojanovski 1982; Škegro 1991: 79–114; 1999: 39–138.

[91] Flor. 2.25; Stat. *Silv*. 1.2.153; 3.3.90; 4.7.14; Pliny, *HN* 33.21, Martial, *Ep*. 10.78.8. Gold was extracted in central Bosnia: Pašalić 1954: 50–4, but epigraphic and archaeological sources confirming gold mines are scarce, Škegro 1991: 81–7; 1999: 44–52.

[92] Cf. Bojanovski 1982: 92–116; Dušanić 1991; Škegro 1999: 57–131.

Roman state first concentrated on exploiting the more interesting and tempting silver and gold, and iron mines remained in private hands.[93]

Trade and Italian imports into Illyricum increased rapidly in the period following its final pacification, but it was mostly intended for the coastal settlements, while in the hinterland archaeology has not detected any extensive change in the trade patterns for the period. There were significant customers for Italian goods in Dalmatia, especially for building materials like roof tiles, pottery, stone, glass, but also olive oil and wine were needed by Italian settlers and Roman soldiers. The demand, according to archaeological evidence, peaked in the mid–later first century AD, but later gradually declined as the links with Italy lessened. In exchange, Dalmatia produced food and timber for export.[94] Southern Pannonia also shows a lively picture of significant trade in the first century, especially of pottery imports from Aquileia.[95] We cannot say that trade or economic interests ever significantly influenced Rome's dealings in Illyricum; they should rather be regarded as its consequence. Nevertheless, trade was an important tool of integration into the wider Mediterranean network. It ultimately helped to open the Dalmatian hinterland and Pannonia to more extensive trade and hastened their incorporation into the wider imperial macroeconomic system.[96]

THE FINAL INCORPORATION OF ILLYRICUM IN THE EMPIRE

The aims and the consequences of Roman Illyrian affairs in this period are surprisingly clear, though we do not have many sources to rely on. Keeping the *status quo* inside Illyricum and effectively controlling and preventing any challenge to it seems the primary aim of the Illyrian governors. Keeping a check on activities beyond the Danube, and even intervening directly in some cases, remains a dominant element of Roman military conduct on the Pannonian frontier. The reasonable assumption is that military administration seems eventually to be replaced through time with an indigenous civilian administration. The social dimension of Roman conduct in Illyricum is not as significant as it was to be under the Flavian dynasty. Enfranchisement was very rare, the planting of colonies significant only in Pannonia, and in Dalmatia only Liburnia witnessed a significant level of

[93] Bojanovski 1982: 107. [94] Wilkes 1969: 407–15; Škegro 1999: 286–300; Glicksman 2005: 194–201.
[95] Dizdar *et al.* 2003: 63–4 with bibliography.
[96] E.g. Hopkins 1980; Garnsey and Saller 1987: 20–40, 95–7; Duncan-Jones 1990: 30–48, 187–98.

municipalisation and spread of citizenship. Veteran soldiers were settled in strategic points, especially close to more urbanised regions. The silence of the sources tells us at least something, that the security measures show a high level of efficiency because no other troubles with the indigenous population are reported, and the frontiers remain stable. Cultural, or what Romans saw as 'ethnic' considerations, are the more dominant part of Roman policy in this period. Rome tried to break the political unity of the Pannonii in particular, and establish a provincial system that would make future uprisings and internal disruption more difficult.

The hold over Pannonia was the ultimate result of Roman engagement in Illyricum, which was significantly driven by the urge to establish a more efficient geo-strategic position, a buffer-zone for the defence of the Italian homeland. It was also the ultimate stronghold for further conquests towards Dacia and central Europe that were anticipated in the imperial propaganda. The Romans recognised that Pannonia might become a weak spot in the new, realigned imperial geography, because of its natural defencelessness. The occupation of Pannonia was a more efficient solution when we take into account the situation in Dalmatia, where the Romans now fully controlled the Dinaric Mountains and the passes through them. The legions in Pannonia thus provided only a first line of defence, while the Dalmatian legions provided strategic reserves and reinforcements. The establishment of the Flavian *limes* and the demilitarisation of Dalmatia in the same period are beyond the scope of this book, but they suggest that measures taken in the Iulio-Claudian period worked. Dalmatia was ultimately conquered and the attention of the Romans shifted further north, to keep watch over the Danube.

This is the most obscure period of Roman engagement in Illyricum and also the most one-sided, as it provides information only about the elements of the Roman system: the army, administration, trade, etc. All the peoples of Illyricum are left entirely in almost impenetrable darkness for any historical enquiry. For the peoples of Illyricum, this was a period of adjustment, a period of accepting new realities and dealing with them through constructing who they were inside a new framework; they were now a structural part of the imperial system. They were 'becoming Romans' slowly but certainly, selectively incorporating and reinterpreting the elements of Roman material culture and identity into, what they regarded as, their own traditions. The heterogeneity of the population of Illyricum contributed to the plurality of ways in which the indigenous population was negotiating their ways of 'becoming Roman', constructing their identities between 'global' and 'local' cultural matrices. The evidence for this process in the

hinterland is more obscure, but is becoming more evident with recent archaeological findings in southern Pannonia, which show the elements of global 'Romanness' existing and interacting with the local reinterpretation of La Tène cultural forms in this period.[97]

The system of *civitates* established new, precisely determined regional identities, which were almost the same, but not quite the same as they were before. They would in the long run be again restructured with municipalisation, which would break *civitas* identities in the second and third centuries, so that provincial, Dalmatian and Pannonian identities became dominant identities that the indigenous population chose to identify with in later antiquity. After AD 9 the Romans showed that they had learned from their mistakes, and that they were serious in keeping Illyricum and incorporating it as an essential territorial part of the Empire, rather than just maintaining it as a buffer zone. Incorporating its peoples would require time and a change of attitude amongst both Romans and the indigenous population, but that is a different story.

[97] Majnarić-Pandžić 1996; Dizdar *et al.* 2003: 63–70; Dizdar and Radman-Livaja 2004.

Conclusion: the construction of Illyricum in Roman political discourse

> '… the Roman conception of the place to be conquered and the process of conquest are so closely related as to be the aspects of the same mentalité, and there is no need to disjoin them or seek more elaborate explanations'.
>
> Purcell 1990a: 21

Illyricum was born from a need to link Roman political interests in Macedonia and North Italy – later Cisalpine Gaul – and from the late Republican political backwater it became a crown jewel in imperial geo-political structure. The extension of Roman power in the region was a gradual process, which evolved through time from the late Republican interventionism, to the organised large-scale military operations conducted by Octavian and Tiberius. Insufficient evidence remains a great, almost unbeatable curse that *Clio nostra* casts upon Illyricum and its historians. It is the main reason why the indigenous peoples of Illyricum still remain 'people without history', to paraphrase the title of E. Wolf's influential book,[1] and why Illyricum is still one of the least popular regions of ancient Europe for research for ancient historians.

The Roman political conduct in the region cannot be depicted or analysed in a single 'objective' narrative; it was a multifaceted, non-linear process, which existed in a number of different parallel historical narratives. The most influential narratives are certainly those present in the written sources, 'the discourse of the dominant', written by the members of the Roman elite and reflecting their perception of the world.[2] The sources present us with the narrative of Roman armies fighting against 'barbarian' rebels, brigands and pirates. This is the story of the coloniser, which shows the Roman 'need' to 'pacify' the area, to put its chaotic state in order,

[1] Wolf 1982. [2] Potter 1999.

representing the whole process as an inevitability, a necessity, the expansion of civilisation and protection of the weak from the stronger, the punishment of the treacherous, proud and arrogant.[3] The sources are not just a collection of the facts; they are also part of the wider literary constructs of their authors: for example Appian's *Illyrike* is part of a much wider literary project, his *Roman History*, which attempts to explain the Roman rise to power as beneficial to the whole of his known world.[4] Strabo's construction of Illyricum in his *Geography* 7.5 betrays very similar intellectual and literary settings:

> The Roman military and political advance helped the area to finally start its march towards civilisation, and enter inside the zone of cultural semi periphery. This view of Roman conquest as a catalyst of civilisation is a part of the ongoing Augustan imperial discourse in Strabo's lifetime and he is certainly not immune to those influences. Roman conquest is the crucial element that helps to explain his assess ment of civilisation in Illyricum: it is in the zone of civilisation, close to both Italy and Greece, and due to the piratical nature of its inhabitants it does not achieve civilisation on its own, until it is conquered by Rome. The references to Roman conquest and military might are numerous and obvious in 7.5.[5]

Closely related to this narrative of conquest is the process of construction of Illyricum in Roman political discourse from mid-Republican times to the Principate. As shown in Chapter 2, earlier scholarship clearly shows the understanding that Illyricum expanded through time, encompassing in the end a vast but ecologically and ethnically heterogeneous region. This book has argued that understanding what Illyricum was in this period is inextricably connected with gradually increasing Roman political power over this region. The Romans made Illyricum their colonial construct, as the area increased in strategic importance. Naming and defining what constituted Illyricum from a previously undefined amorphous space was a very significant step towards controlling and dominating that space. Illyricum was just one in a series of Roman colonial constructs, corresponding chronologically with other geo-political constructs such as Gaul, Spain or Germany.

Illyricum was not constructed *ex nihilo*; its construction was the result of a long and ongoing interaction between Roman power and the spaces across the Adriatic, as well as a gradual extension of direct and indirect Roman domination over the region. The process began with Roman political engagement with the Illyrian kingdom, which roughly corresponded with the Classical and Hellenistic Greek concept of *Illyris*. The notion of what

[3] For proud and arrogant in Illyricum, see Florus, 1.21; 2.21; Vell. Pat. 2.110.2.
[4] Šašel Kos 2005a: 45. [5] Dzino 2006b: 126.

Illyricum was spread in popular and political discourse over the whole eastern Adriatic coast, as Roman power spread over the region. The eastern Adriatic was known as 'the sea of Illyrici' by Cicero in 67 BC.[6] The most important date in this process was certainly the date when Illyricum was *de iure* constructed with the *lex Vatinia* in 60 BC. By the provisions of that law Illyricum formally entered Roman political and administrative discourse, as an attachment to Cisalpine Gaul. This legal act unified for the first time, as far as we know, the whole eastern Adriatic coast with its immediate hinterland as a *provincia* of a Roman magistrate. The construction of Illyricum as a colonial artefact enabled the Romans to consolidate their political control and expand their power further towards the Pannonian plains. At the end of this process, two and a half centuries later, Illyricum stretched all the way between the foothills of the Alps, the Adriatic and the Danube, reflecting Roman power, control, possession and domination over that space.

It is also important to conclude that Roman engagement in this region was not always conducted as a calculated, cool assessment of the situation; it was also strongly influenced by Roman fear of invasion and outrage at perceived insult. Fear, regardless of whether it was a reality or just a perception, and in the majority of cases it was only a perception, affected Roman short-term strategic designs on Illyricum, as well as their actions. In the earliest stages it was the fear of Macedonian plans such as Philip V's alleged intention to attack Italy through the Adriatic hinterland, or the fear that an alien conqueror would cross the Otranto, as Pyrrhus of Epirus did in 270s BC. In late Republican times, Roman attitudes were driven by fear for northern Italy, whether based on reality, for example in regards to the Cimbri and Teutones in the 110s and 100s BC, or on imaginary threats, such as that from Mithridates VI, which caused their more aggressive approach to the political crisis which arose in the north-western zone of the Adriatic hinterland. In Caesar's time, perpetual Roman fear of the Gauls and perhaps also of the Iapodes attacking northern Italy was the most prominent, probably helping Caesar to secure Cisalpine Gaul with Illyricum attached as his *provincia*. Octavian later used the fear of the Dacians to justify his attack on Segestica in 35 BC. The fear of the Pannonii and Norici in 16 BC when they invaded Histria caused a rethinking of the political arrangements in southern Pannonia, and probably started the *Bellum Pannonicum*. Finally the fear of Bato's Pannonii in the *Bellum Batonianum* was prominent in the contemporary account of Velleius

[6] Cic. *Leg. Man*. 12 (35). See also Verg. *Aen* 1.243 *Illyricos penetrare sinus* ('enters Illyrican gulf', i.e. the Adriatic Sea).

Paterculus, when the whole of Italy allegedly trembled in fear, including even the divine Augustus.[7]

The Roman perception of insult also significantly affected their actions in Illyricum. The murder of the Roman and Issaean envoys was the ultimate insult that caused the first Illyrian war in 229 BC. The disrespect and threat to the life of the Roman envoys resulted in the first war with the Delmatian alliance of 156 BC. The capturing of the Roman military standards by the Delmatae in 44 BC justified all subsequent conflicts with the alliance. The breaking of the *fides* by the Taurisci, Iapodes and Liburni justified Octavian's campaigns in 35–33 BC, and the breaking of the *fides* by the Illyrian dynast Demetrius, King Genthius and the Pannonii resulted in the second and third Illyrian wars and the *Bellum Pannonicum* of 12 BC, making them 'just' wars in the Roman view.

It is obvious that the conquest and construction of Illyricum in Roman political and popular discourse was a Roman, or in the wider sense, a Mediterranean, metanarrative. The narratives of the indigenous population remain hidden from historians, as they were not in a position to leave any written source of their own. We can assume that initially their narrative would be concerned with the perception of their own victimhood, loss of what they would see as ancestral freedoms, and the suffering caused by the Roman armies. This might also include the frustration caused by sudden change, especially in the last phases of conquest when the Romans started to assert their domination through the rapid transformation of the landscape, in particular through city and road-building, introduction of taxes and conscription. Later, when the indigenous conception of the Romans as 'others' had slowly diminished, or at least changed, the narrative of their elite would not be much different from the narrative of the Gallo-Roman elite, such as Pompeius Trogus or the orator Eumenius, who stated that their indigenous ancestry and Roman identity were side by side and were equally proud of both, recasting them into a specific, regional kind of 'Romanness'.[8]

Through the lack of indigenous narratives, we only know about the Roman conduct towards the indigenous groups in the area, and what their 'ethnic policy' was. In dealing with a diverse and heterogeneous area, where the construction of group-identities was intimately connected with the development of early state formations (and probably caused to a large

[7] Vell. Pat. 2.110.5–111.1.

[8] Trogus: Justin, 43.1.1; 43.5.11; Malaspina 1976; Alonso-Núñez 1987: 57, 69; Eumenius: Woolf 1998: 1–4, 12–13.

degree by Roman expansion) such as Illyricum, the Romans were compelled to develop different relationships with different political groups in order to assert their authority with more success. To some extent they developed a rudimentary, 'ethnic policy', as some *ethne* were generally treated in a friendlier manner than others, for different strategic reasons, or because of the specific cultural, historical and geographical circumstances in which the Romans found them. In general, the Romans concentrated on establishing more friendly relationships with the peoples who were more attuned to the Mediterranean cultural/social system, such as those *ethne* who inhabited the eastern Adriatic coast, the Daorsi, or the Greek-speaking Issaean commonwealth. The Romans also sought to ally themselves with the weaker against stronger groups, encouraging the separatist ambitions of individual south Illyrian *civitates* and their dynasts from the centralising ambitions of Illyrian kings, or gaining personal support from the indigenous *principes*, such as Bato the Breucian, who was bribed with the promise of rule over the Pannonii in AD 8, or the Illyrian kings such as Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus, who allied with Rome to defend themselves from the aggressive designs of the Macedonian kings.

The Romans met more resistance in the hinterland of the Adriatic, where the main 'troublemakers' were not entirely included in the Mediterranean system, such as the Iapodes, Pannonii and Delmatae. The Delmatian alliance had political aspirations of their own to dominate the central Adriatic coast and its hinterland, and its interests there clashed with the interests of the Roman allies and later Rome itself. The Iapodes were for a while perceived as a threat to the political stability of Cisalpine Gaul, with their raids reaching as far as Aquileia. Those known to the Romans as the Pannonii were frustrated by their rapid inclusion in the Roman empire and in the Mediterranean 'global' system after the initial Roman conquest. In addition, the Delmatae and Pannonii represented a homogeneous indigenous block that was most hostile to the expansion of Roman influence. The Romans counteracted the Pannonian-Delmatian obstruction by establishing alliances with their neighbours who defined themselves more visibly through La Tène cultural templates, such as the Scordisci and Taurisci. They themselves had also opposed Rome in the earlier phases of Roman engagement, but were successfully won over as valuable allies. Roman 'ethnic policy' succeeded in keeping the Pannonian-Delmatian groups isolated from the other groups during the *Bellum Batonianum*. The Roman administrative division of the area into the *conventus* and *civitates* in Dalmatia, and *civitates* in Pannonia, enabled easier control of the space, strategically dividing its population into smaller groups and breaking up

strong indigenous alliances such as the Delmatae, Daesitiates, Pirustae or Breuci, so that they were easier to control.

The economic aspect of Roman conduct in Illyricum does not fit the model of aggressive, profit-driven imperialism. If Roman engagement in Illyricum was essentially aggressive and profit-driven, the Romans would have been militarily and politically involved in Illyricum much more and much earlier. There were large metal deposits in the Dalmatian hinterland which they were aware of but did nothing to acquire for a long time. However, the protection of maritime commerce and navigation in the Adriatic against piracy had some impact on short-term policies, especially in the initial phases. There is a link between the economic infiltration of Italians and Roman citizens into Illyricum and the establishment of early provincial structures after 59 BC, which certainly influenced Roman Illyrian affairs later, as their protection became one of the factors that drove Roman actions in the region. Despite these issues, it seems clear that economic matters played a secondary role to political considerations in the Roman conquest of Illyricum, and so helps explain long periods of Roman inactivity in Illyricum.

The archaeological narrative helps us to gain an insight into the process of transformation of the landscape and is very significant, as it reflects Roman mastery over space. In the last stages of the Roman conquest, the significant building programme undertaken in the Dalmatian cities transformed them into clusters of 'Romanness', which fully participated in and maintained the newly established imperial discourse in the early Principate. The major military roads were built comparatively late in Illyricum, only after the *Bellum Batonianum*, as the present evidence shows, transforming rapidly the landscape of the interior. The roads linking the capital of Salona with Aquileia, Dyrrachium, Pannonia and the hinterland were crucial for establishing Roman domination over this space, while at the same time they also opened up opportunities for exploitation of mineral resources. It was not only architecture and urbanism, but also the language of publicly displayed images that reflected this discourse, not only in Illyricum, but also throughout the whole Augustan empire. The generic images of nameless, depersonalised 'barbarians', such as those from Tilurium and Salona, crushed by Roman arms, showed the provincials the advantages of Roman protection and the destiny of those who opposed Roman power.[9] Nevertheless, the interior of Dalmatia did not participate in maintaining imperial discourse, as did the coast or Pannonia at first, lacking urban units until the second and

[9] Ferris 2000: 30–62.

third century AD, and relying on the indigenous *principes* as the essence of Roman administration there until municipalisation.

The immigration of Italians and other migrants into the Dalmatian cities is a very significant part of the process of Roman conquest, as it enabled the establishment of an open, cosmopolitan urban core for the province on the coast. As said earlier, the early Republican *conventus c. R.* played a prominent role in the Civil Wars and the wars with the Delmatian alliance, becoming the first strongholds of Roman-controlled space in Illyricum. The beginning of the Principate was also the beginning of a significant population movement from Italy into the newly established province, its cities and colonies on the Adriatic coast. The immigrants were the first important pillar of 'Romanness' in Dalmatia, especially amongst the newly developed city elites, apart from the Liburnian and south Illyrian cities where the indigenous elites were already well established and following their own path to 'becoming Romans', together with the Liburnian and south Illyrian commoners.

Roman-Illyrian interaction continued and as time passed by it became increasingly significant for both: coloniser and colonised. Rome not only had plenty of things to offer Illyricum, Illyricum also had something to offer Rome. Who would imagine three centuries after Bato's capitulation that a Roman writer would write that the emperors born and bred in Illyricum would be the best for the empire (*optimi rei publicae fuere*)?[10] Tiberius and Bato fighting each other through rugged Illyrian landscapes could not have imagined that Rome and Illyricum would develop a symbiosis, in many ways depending on each other in order to preserve their very existence. The Roman empire needed the mines in Illyricum and the soldiers from Illyricum for its existence, and Illyricum needed the shade of the 'Roman' cultural umbrella in order to define itself in terms of both similarity to and difference from Rome. 'Roman' and 'Illyrian' ceased to be separate entities and blended together in provincial society. True, the inhabitants of Illyricum had their own vision of Romanness, and Illyrian soldier-emperors of later antiquity did not construct their Romanness in the same way as did the late antique senatorial aristocracy in Rome.[11]

The *Illyriciani* – Illyrian soldiers – defended the empire as long as they were able to, but once the empire was destroyed, Illyricum and its

[10] Aur. Vic., *Caes*. 39.26. See Mócsy 1974: 183–212; Matthews 1975: 32–55; Wilkes 1992: 254–65; Lenski 2002: 35–61; Brizzi 2004 for soldiers from Illyricum and their impact on the empire.

[11] It was through Roman culture and Latin language that Illyrian soldier-emperors culturally defined themselves; Alföldi 1952: 121–4; Mócsy 1974: 259–63, 358. Their origins were another matter, and cannot be always regarded as purely indigenous; Syme 1973; Mócsy 1977: 570–1.

inhabitants, culturally and ideologically, rather than physically, slowly ceased to exist. The Roman empire contracted and Illyricum was left abandoned in a political vacuum, ultimately overwhelmed by the rise of the Slavic identities. The transformations of the post-Roman world caused the disappearance of Illyricum, as Illyricum was after all an artificial spatial concept constructed as such by the Romans in the second and first centuries BC.

Roman interaction with this region had its beginning, its successive phases and its end. Rome constructed Illyricum as a concept, a chunk of heterogeneous space held together only by Roman power, which eventually became one of the most significant structural parts of the empire and one of its most important assets.

Bibliography

This list is of lesser known journals and abbreviations. The journal abbreviations follow *L'Année Philologique* if listed there.

AAAd *Antichità Altoadriatiche*, Udine.
AAntHung *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae*, Budapest.
AArchHung *Acta Archaeologica Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae*, Budapest.
AArchSlov *Arheološki Vestnik* (*Acta Archaeologica)*, Ljubljana.
Acta *Acta et Dissertationes Archaeologicae (Arheološki Radovi i Rasprave)*, Zagreb.
Adrias The works of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Split, Split.
AMSI *Atti e Memorie della Società Istriana di Archeologia e Storia Patria*, Trieste.
AN *Aquileia Nostra*, Udine.
ANUBiH/CBI *Izdanja Akademije Nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine / Centar za Balkanološka ispitivanja (Academie des Sciences et des Arts de Bosnie-Herzegovine / Centre D'Études Balkaniques* publications), Sarajevo.
ArchIug *Archaeologica Iugoslavica*, Belgrade.
Balcanica Annual of the Institute for Balcanological Studies, Belgrade.
BAR *British Archaeological Reports* (1974 8), Oxford.
BAR-Brit. Ser. *British Archaeological Reports* *British Series* (1978), Oxford.
BAR-Int. Ser. *British Archaeological Reports* *International Series*, Oxford.
BN *Beiträge zur Namenforschung*, Heidelberg.
BVBl *Bayerische Vorgeschichtsblätter*, Munich.
Časopis *Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje (The Journal for History and Ethnography)*, Maribor.
Diadora The Journal of the Archaeological Museum in Zadar, Zadar.
Dometi *Dometi Matice Hrvatske*, Rijeka.
Epigraphica Rivista Italiana di Epigraphia, Milan.
Folia Archaeologica Balcanica, Skopje.
Fundort Wien *Berichte zur Archäologie*, Publikationen der Stadtarchäologie, Vienna.
GCBI *Godišnjak Centra za Balkanološka ispitivanja (Annuarie Centre D'Études Balkaniques)*, Sarajevo.
Geografski Glasnik Geographical Bulletin, Zagreb.
Glas SANU *Bulletin of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts*, Belgrade.

Glas SKA *Bulletin of Serbian Royal Academy*, Belgrade.
Godišnjak *Godišnjak društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine (Annuaire de la société historique de Bosnie et Herzégovine)*, Sarajevo.
GZMS *Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja u Sarajevu (Bulletin du Musée National de Bosnie-Herzegovine)*, Sarajevo.
HAD *Hrvatsko Arheološko Društvo (Archaeological Society of Croatia)* publications, Zagreb.
Helios Journal of the Classical Association of the Southwest, Lubbock TX.
Hercegovina Journal for Cultural and Historical Heritage, Mostar.
HistAntiqua *Histria Antiqua*: Journal of the International Research Centre for Archaeology, Pula.
HistArch *Histria Archaeologica*, Pula.
Iliria Revue Archéologique, Tirana.
JHG *Journal of Historical Geography*, London.
JIČ *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis* (*Yugoslav Historical Revue*), Belgrade.
Latina et Graeca Revue of Croatian Society of Classical Philologists, Zagreb.
LF *Listy Filologické*, Prague.
OA *Opuscula Archaeologica*, Zagreb.
Obavijesti HAD *Obavijesti Hrvatskog Arheološkog društva* (*The Notices of the Croatian Archaeological Society*), Zagreb.
Orbis Terrarum Zeitschrift für Historische Geographie der Alten Welt, Stuttgart.
Pomorski Zbornik The Annals of Maritime Studies, Rijeka.
Prilozi/Prinosi *Prilozi/Prinosi Instituta za Arheologiju u Zagrebu* (*The Contributions to the Institute of Archaeology in Zagreb*), Zagreb (until 1992: *The Contributions to the Department of Archaeology*, Centre for Historical Sciences, University of Zagreb).
Radovi HDZU *Radovi Hrvatskog Društva za Znanost i Umjetnost (The Works of the Croatian Society for Sciences and Arts)*, Sarajevo.
Radovi JAZU *Radovi Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti i Umjetnosti (The Works of Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts)*, Zagreb.
Ramus Critical studies in Greek and Roman Literature, Bendigo Melbourne.
RFFZd *Radovi Filozofskog Fakulteta u Zadru (The Works of the Faculty of Philosophy)*, Zadar.
RomBarb *Romanobarbarica*, Rome.
RZPZ HAZU *Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU (The Works of the Department for Historical Sciences at the Croatian Academy for Sciences and Arts)*, Zadar.
SANU *Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts)*, Belgrade.
SCI *Scripta Classica Israelica*, Jerusalem.
SCO *Studi Classici e Orientali*, Pisa.
Situla Dissertationes Musei Nationalis Labacensis, Ljubljana.
Tyche Beiträge zur alten Geschichte, Papyrologie und Epigraphik, Vienna.
UBHJ *University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, Birmingham.
VAHD/VAPD *Vjesnik za arheologiju i historiju/povijest Dalmatinsku* (*Bulletin d'Archéologie et d'Histoire Dalmate*), Split.

VAMZ *Vjesnik Arheološkog muzeja u Zagrebu (Bulletin of the Archaeological Museum)*: Series 3, Zagreb.
VDI Вестник Древней Истории *(Journal of Ancient History)*, Moscow.
WMBH *Wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen aus Bosnien und der Herzegovina*, Vienna, Sarajevo 1 13 (1893 1916).
WMBHL *Wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen des Bosnischeherzegowinischen Landesmuseum*, Heft A Archäologie, Sarajevo.
ŽAnt. *Živa Antika (Antiquité Vivante)*, Skopje.

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AE *L'Année Épigraphique*: Revue de Publications Épigraphique relatives à L'antiquité romaine. Paris 1888 .
CIG *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*. Berlin 1869 .
CIL *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*. Berlin 1828 .
FGrH *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, ed. F. Jacoby. Leiden.
IGB *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae*, vols. I V, ed. G. Mihajlov. Sofia 1956 97.
ILJ *Inscriptiones Latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMII et MCMLX repertae et editae sunt*, eds. A. Šašel and J. Šašel. Situla 5, Situla 19, Situla 25. Ljubljana 1963, 1978, 1986.
ILLRP *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae*, vols. I II, ed. A. Degrassi. Florence 1963 5.
ILS *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, ed. H. Dessau. Berlin 1892 1916.
Insc. It. *Inscriptiones Italiae Academiae italicae consociatae ediderunt*, Rome 1931 .
Syll.[3] *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (3rd edition), ed. W. Dittenberger. Leipzig, 1915 24.

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