Stereotypes during the Decline and Fall of Communism

György Hunyady

International Series in Social Psychology

Also available as a printed book
see title verso for ISBN details

Stereotypes during the Decline and Fall of Communism

Unique among the satellites of the Soviet Union, Hungary has data from a series of 14 substantial surveys from the mid-1960s through to 1994. How do Hungarians think about themselves, their history, their society, and other countries and their peoples? How do they describe and think about concepts such as nation, patriotism, social class and historical development? How have these changed over a thirty year period, especially in the wake of the new freedom of expression possible since 1989? Hunyady provides an excellent summary of investigations examining these questions, analysing them against the background of the social psychology literature of stereotypes. Much recent work has focused on laboratory studies of stereotype formation in what are probably only weakly held schemas. In contrast, the views reported in Hunyady's analyses were directed at matters on which both the totalitarian local government and the Soviet government had strong party lines. The removal of the possible sanctions against non-conformity are dramatically evident in the data.

Hunyady provides a masterly integration and synthesis of how members of a changing society view themselves and others. The data and ideas presented will be relevant not only to social psychologists, but also to students of history, sociology or political science.

György Hunyady is Professor of Social Psychology at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary, and has published widely in Hungarian and English, mainly in the fields of social perception, belief systems and cognitive psychology.

International Series in Social Psychology
Edited by W.Peter Robinson
University of Bristol, UK

This series provides a showcase of original contributions of the highest quality as well as thorough reviews of existing theories suitable for advanced students and researchers. Many will be useful as course texts for higher level study; applied topics are well represented and social psychology is defined broadly to include other psychological areas like social development, or the social psychology of abnormal behaviour. A reflection of contemporary social psychology, the series is a rich source of information for dissertations, new research projects and seminars.

Recent books in this series:

Adjustment of Adolescents
Cross-cultural similarities and differences
Ruth Scott and W.A.Scott

Adolescence from Crisis to Coping
A thirteen nation study
Janice Gibson-Cline

Changing European Identities
Social psychological analyses of social change
Glynis M.Breakwell and Evanthia Lyons

Children as Consumers
A psychological analysis of the young people's market
Barrie Gunter and Adrian Furnham

Making Sense of Television
The psychology of audience interpretation 2nd edition
Sonia Livingstone

Social Groups and Identities
Exploring the legacy of Henri Tajfel
Edited by W.Peter Robinson

Stereotypes during the Decline and Fall of Communism

György Hunyady

London and New York

First published 1998
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

© 1998 György Hunyady

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
Hunyady, György.
Stereotypes during the decline and fall of communism/
György Hunyady.
(International series in social psychology)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Social psychology—Research—Hungary. 2. Stereotype (Psychology)—Hungary. 3. National characteristics, Hungarian.
I. Title. II. Series.
HM251.H85 1998
302′.07′20439–dc21 97–51633

ISBN 0-203-45184-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-76008-5 (Adobe eReader Format)
ISBN 0-415-18856-3 (Print Edition)

Contents

List of figures vii
List of tables ix
Preface x

1 Stereotype systems research 1

Stereotype research on this and that side of the information processing paradigm 1
The historical context: Hungary as an experimental field 21
Subject, strategy, and method of research 33

2 The cognitive domain of nations: I National categories and attitudes 41

Premises and rationale 41
National attitudes and stereotypes 41
Concepts of 'nation' and 'our nation': historical motifs for the evaluation of ingroups 52
The interpretation of patriotism and international expectations: social attitudes in the 1970s 69
Comparison of countries, 1973–94 78
Countries forming and representing Europe 89

3 The cognitive domain of nations: II National stereotypes 94

Hungarian autostereotype 94
National characterizations, 1981 and 1991 101
Continental and regional perspectives in the 1990s 124
Romanian-Hungarian interrelationships 134
Marginal groups in double bind and the national-ethnic categorization 144
Summary 157

4 The domain of societal categories: perception of occupational groups and class relations 169

Premises and rationale 169
The concept of social class and views of the division of society 177
Characterization of occupational groups, 1981 and 1991 184
Copying social hierarchy in the evaluative judgements, 1981 and 1991 198
Evaluative characterization of traditional and modern occupational categories, 1994 206
Summary 216

5 The domain of historical periods: beliefs about 20th-century history 219

Premises and rationale 219
The concept of social development and the segmentation of the past 227
Developmental trends implied by historical judgements, 1971: social and family points of view 236
Characterization of periods and implied trends of development, 1981 and 1991 252
Changes in the political system: reflection and effect on historical judgements, 1994 262
Summary 271

6 Stability of and changes in stereotypes: results 276

The novelty of the results 276
The organization of stereotype characterizations 279
Changes in the content of stereotypes and their social varieties 283
The changes continue: in society and in stereotype research 292

Appendix 298
Bibliography 305
Name index 321
Subject index 324

Figures

2.1 Mean frequency of each country's selection, 1981 and 1991 87

3.1 Trait profiles of Hungarian national autostereotype in the responses of groups differing in evaluation, 1973 96
3.2 Trait profiles of Hungarian national autostereotype in the responses of different socio-occupational and age groups, 1975 99
3.3 Trait profiles of 'Hungarians' before (1981) and after (1991) the radical changes 104
3.4 Trait profiles of 'Russians' and 'Romanians', 1981 and 1991 112
3.5 Evaluative charge of the characterization of national categories: unweighted means of trait judgements, 1981 and 1991 114
3.6 MDS map of national characterizations, 1981 116
3.7 MDS map of national characterizations, 1991 121
3.8 Evaluative charge of the characterizations of the nations of the region, and their trait ranks, 1994 128
3.9a MDS map of the nations of the region, 1994 131
3.9b Common MDS map of the nations of the region and continental types, 1994 131
3.10 Trait profiles of national autostereotypes in the responses of the Hungarian and Romanian samples 141
3.11 Trait profiles of the characterizations given about the 'other's nation' in the responses of the Hungarian and Romanian samples 141
3.12 MDS map of the national characterizations given by the Romanian sample, 1994 142
3.13 Judgement of similarity between the 'Hungarian' and 'Romanian' ethnic groups: MDS map 150
3.14 Judgement of the cultural similarity of ethnic groups, 1994: relations between Americans, Israelis, and Hungarians 152
3.15 Judgement of the similarity of ethnic groups, 1994: relations between Americans, Israelis, and Hungarians 154

4.1 Trait profiles of the characterizations of 'skilled workers' and 'intellectuals', 1981 and 1991 195
4.2 Trait profiles of the characterizations of 'peasants' and 'supervisors', 1991 196
4.3 Evaluative charge of the characterization of social categories, 1981 and 1991 199
4.4 MDS map of the characterization of social categories, 1981 201
4.5 MDS map of the characterization of social categories, 1991 203
4.6 MDS map of the social categories of market economy, 1994 210
4.7 Trait profiles of the characterizations of 'managers', 'businessmen', and 'bankers', 1994 213
5.1 Trend of development in the history of society and the family, 1971: evaluative charge of the characterizations of the periods 240
5.2 Trend of development in social history, 1971: from the aspects of different social groups 241
5.3 Trend of development in social history, 1971: from the aspects of different traits 241
5.4 Trend of development in the history of the family, 1971: from the aspects of different social groups 243
5.5 Trend of development in the history of the family, 1971: from the aspects of different traits 244
5.6 Trend of development in social history, 1971: from the aspects of different levels of political interest 249
5.7 Trend of development in the history of the family, 1971: from the aspects of different levels of political interest 249
5.8 Trend of development in the history of the family, 1971: from the aspects of preference of different historical sources 250
5.9 Trend of development in the history of society, 1981 and 1991: evaluative charge of the characterization of historical periods 253
5.10 Trait profile of the characterization of 1950, given in 1981 and 1991 257
5.11 Trait profile of the characterization of 1975, given in 1981 and 1991 259
5.12 Characterization of the stages of the transformation: socio-political judgements of the traits of 1989 and 1993, given in 1994 264
5.13 MDS map of periods in social history and in family history, 1994 266

Tables

2.1 The criteria of patriotism (1973–91): percentage of affirmative responses 72
2.2 The selection of countries from different aspects (1973–91) 80
3.1 National characterizations, 1981 and 1991: means and factor structure 102
3.2 Similarity of national characterizations, 1981 and 1991: trait ranks and correlations 111
3.3 Characterization of the continental types, 1991: means and factor structure 127
3.4 National characterizations given by the Hungarian (1991) and the Romanian (1994) samples: significant rank correlations 139
4.1 Characterization of social categories, 1981 and 1991: means and factor structure 186
4.2 Similarity of characterizations of social categories, 1981 and 1991: trait ranks and correlations 194
4.3 Characterization of the social categories of market economy, 1994: means and factor structure 209
4.4 Similarity of the social categories of market economy, 1994: trait ranks and correlations 212
5.1 Characterization of historical periods, 1981 and 1991: means and factor structure 255
5.2 Similarity of development in the history of society, 1981 and 1991: trait ranks and correlations 261

Preface

Hungarian history provides an exceptional opportunity for researchers of stereotypes: it is possible to follow how the first slow, then radical changes in the social situation shaped the contents and interconnections of stereotypes. In order to reveal this, one only needs to return to the characterization of certain categories within the same research paradigm for decades with stubborn commitment.

The investigations we carried out focused on how national, social, and historical categories exist in public thinking. The development of public thinking within the timescale of our study was unavoidably more eventful in the East Central European region than either in Western Europe or in the United States, for this was the place and time the communist system gradually became agitated, then collapsed, and a search for new social and economic directions began. Perhaps this is not without a lesson for those historians and political scientists who analyse social transformations, and it may also be of interest to psychologists who wish to study the fixed or flexible nature of stereotypes, and their individual or systematic changes.

The size constraints of this volume do not allow us to discuss the rest of the results of the investigations we have carried out, namely, those that relate to the structure and context of stereotypes as indicated by the title of our other book (published by Eötvös University Press simultaneously with this volume), *Characterization of Social Categories in Psychological and Societal Context*. Based on essentially the same empirical data, it analyses what network stereotypes are formed between categories and traits, categories and categories, and traits and traits. It also studies how the individual ways of thinking in terms of cognitive complexity, the social positions individuals take, and the prospects they have affect stereotyped characterizations. Naturally, these are inexhaustible topics in themselves, and even more so together.

A repeated analysis has been carried out on the research material listed and outlined in the Appendix, but this is the first time that most of the results have become available to the English-reading public. Due to the dual nature,

some difficulties arose: it was not easy to find the correct ratio of data, and sometimes the masses of data had to be shown in unusual forms.

These investigations were not and could not have been a one-man enterprise; in this respect, this summary is a collective work. The list would be too long if I mentioned by name only the most worthy collaborators of the 14 investigations. Let me thank them collectively for working with me and taking part in the investigations under my direction at various institutions: first at the Institute of Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, then at the Research Centre for Mass Communication of the Hungarian Radio and Television in the mid-1970s, then in the Departments of Psychology of the Eötvös Loránd University and the Kossuth Lajos University since the end of the 1970s. I was very fortunate that regardless of the presence or absence of the financial conditions for the work, dynamic, clever, and committed colleagues always stood beside me. Although it is impossible to name them all, it would be totally unethical not to mention at least those who for many years devotedly undertook their share of these investigations with all their talent and energy. I am particularly indebted to Katalin Pörzse, Katalin Gallay, and Irén Murányi. Many colleagues took part in the different stages of data analysis for longer periods as well, but the intellectual contribution of Akos Münnich, mathematician, from the beginning of his career at Kossuth Lajos University has been outstanding.

The psychodynamics of such an enterprise naturally includes struggles with reservations and attempts at expropriation, response to challenges, and overcoming the resistance of the professional medium. Some people represented this resistance only for a few years, others for decades. Wilfully or not, they also helped a lot.

This book would not have been written if Professor Peter Robinson, the editor of the International Series in Social Psychology, had not convinced me of the unique nature of this research, which he got to know in detail, and about the necessity of its publication. My professional and personal relationship with Professor David Hamilton and his internationally authoritative workshop of stereotype research at the Santa Barbara campus of the University of California played an important role in the fact that I could undertake this task. The concrete purpose of one of Professor David Messick's visits to Hungary was to study the rise of nationalism in the region with me. I hope it will be clear in the appropriate parts of the book how greatly my social psychological views were influenced by Bill McGuire, professor at Yale University, whose professional opinion and encouragement greatly contributed to the preparation and development of this text.

It is even more difficult to encourage and orient somebody when living with him, but I received unconditional support: I am particularly grateful to my mother and to my wife, professors in history and in pedagogy, who supported my work with their comments. I could not have conducted the investigations in the past decades, and the summary in the past two years, if

my whole family had not supported me with unselfish patience and loving trust. As grateful compensation, I dedicate this book to the memory of my father-in-law, Lajos Gárdonyi, who followed my work with great interest and heartfelt goodwill.

Many people assisted in the production of the present book. Probably, the most thorough reader is the translator—in this respect, the text was greatly influenced by the remarks made by Anna C.Gösi-Greguss, the translator, and by Christopher Ryan, the editor of the English version. The critic within my Department was my excellent student Nguyen Luu Lan Anh; the role of the Hungarian publisher's reader was played by Professor László Halász with a great sense of responsibility; Agota Biletzky spent a lot of time on the preparation of the tables and figures, and also oversaw the text and its technical edition with the assistance of Judit Nagy. If despite all these efforts the text seems dense due to the space restrictions, and is often filled with laconic references instead of elaboration, the fault lies solely with the author. For this reason I owe the reader thanks in advance, for taking the trouble to study this long, condensed work.

Budapest, April 1998

1 Stereotype systems research

Stereotype research on this and that side of the information processing paradigm

We made the first attempt to reveal the content of a Hungarian national autostereotype in the early 1970s. At that time, the international literature on stereotypes was virtually at a standstill, but in fact the conditions for its radical renewal and rapid growth were maturing. The data on Psychological Abstracts reported by Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) are interesting in this respect: according to this report, after a few years of stagnation, the number of publications on stereotypes rose above 50, 100 and 200 in 1971, 1975, and 1977, respectively, and this number has probably been increasing ever since.

The traditions of the research field

The concept of stereotype was still linked to one specific procedure in the 1970s: the method of measurement introduced by Katz and Braly in the early 1930s. In order to characterize a category respondents are asked to choose traits from a given list; traits that are considered as stereotypes about which there is a general agreement (Katz and Braly, 1933, 1935). For many generations of social psychologists this procedure determined how the concept 'stereotype' should be understood and used. This is true, even if at the end of the 1960s the fixed measurement method of bipolar trait scales was introduced—primarily to study dichotomous gender stereotypes (Rosenkrantz *et al,* 1968)—and Brigham (1971) was asking for the judgements of the relative frequency of traits in groups, although this method did not produce essentially different results from those of Katz and Braly (Stapf *et al.,* 1986).

Katz and Braly referred to Walter Lippmann (1922), who introduced the term 'stereotype' into the investigation of individual and public thinking in his excellent book on public opinion. They found it important that, according to Lippmann, there are emotionally tinted general presuppositions that precede, direct, and filter information, and they applied this definition

to widespread assumptions about the traits of national-ethnic groups, some of which could probably not be based on experience—the American students questioned were unlikely to have met Turks, for example. Thus, the stereotyped description of groups was closer to prejudice, a mostly negative attitude. The pioneering technique of Katz and Braly was able to demonstrate that there is a certain degree of consensus about the traits that belong to a given group, which is also manifested in the characterizations as an evaluative orientation towards that group. The method of investigation was unsuited for revealing how people apply these characterizations of categories when they form impressions about individual members of the group in question. They assumed that the mere existence of such group characterizations would exclude or at least distort the objective cognition of the members of the group. There are two marked characteristics of Katz and Braly's stereotype concept, namely, consensus as a criterion, and negative evaluation of the mere existence of group characterization (Miller, 1982).

The concept of stereotype itself can be an object of attitude, and Katz and Braly seem to be prejudiced about it. Many arguments have emerged over the decades about their interpretation. On the one hand, it cannot be excluded that groups of people do have differentiating features (Vinacke, 1957; Brown, 1965; Campbell, 1967; Brigham, 1971; Peabody, 1985). It is improbable that any group will form such a united cultural community that every member of the group shares generalizable traits or attitudes, but some preference of values, psychological traits or even physical characteristics can be more frequent among members of one group than in other groups. In this, there can be some truth in the global trait judgements.

On the other hand, highlighting essential information about a group as a whole is not worthless even if it is done by projecting it onto a typical representative of its members. Past experiences may be accumulated and fixed in this way, too, providing elaborate knowledge for use in new situations, when perhaps there is no possibility and/or need to ascertain every detail personally. Of course, group membership entails only the probability that an individual will possess any typical trait, not a certainty. This probability, however, is a valuable piece of information as long as it is not distorted into the absolute and unchangeable judgement that any member of a group must necessarily be like that.

It is obviously wrong to indulge in emotionally overheated and unfounded generalizations about certain groups, and there is always a risk that despite contrary evidence some people will judge individual members of a group on the basis of such generalizations. This does not mean that group stereotypes have no basis and function whatsoever, and that they necessarily damage objective information processing in a prejudiced way, but there can be no doubt that in the long history of the investigation of inter-group relationships, a number of individual and group factors that distort the recognition and interpretation of real group differences have been identified by social psychologists.

Thus, historically, three typical views have developed about the origin and nature of the characterization and evaluation of groups. The first registers stereotypes as a cultural heritage passed on by society. The second traces back prejudiced thinking that leads to the rigid application of stereotypes to internal tensions and a distorted development of the personality. The third sees the categorization of people and the general characterization of categories as an inevitable part of the process of cognition. Retrospective analyses in the history of science demonstrate that these three contexts (culture, personality, and cognition) have been continuously present in stereotype research (Ashmore and Del Boca, 1981; Pettigrew, 1981; Miller, 1982; Rothbart and Lewis, 1994).

All three approaches are justified and fertile. Our own investigations, reported in this volume, are not far from the first one, which conceives of stereotypes as a peculiar type of knowledge produced and maintained by society. In this respect, we counted on two differentiating factors. First, we counted on the fact that the effect of different historical constellations on the content of stereotypes may cross each other and may be superimposed on each other. Second, we relied on the fact that as with other elements of culture, the provision, acquisition and further development of stereotypes are not distributed uniformly in society, but vary across situations and groups.

The investigation of the Authoritarian Personality' belongs to the second trend in stereotype literature (Adorno *et al.*, 1950), which combined prejudice and stereotype in one unit, and revealed a personality type that is prone to both. This line leads further to the investigation of individual cognitive style, among others, through Rokeach's (I960) and Harvey's (1967) works to Tetlock's analysis today (1993). Even if their roots are not common, the investigation of cognitive complexity-simplicity runs parallel with this, although we ourselves also used its aspects and means in our investigation.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to understand and follow the flourishing of stereotype literature if insufficient attention is paid to the third, cognitive approach and to the related changes in the history of science. This approach cast light on the psychological nature of stereotypes, and the mechanism of their creation and operation when it linked stereotype to categorization. The radical cognitive turn that took place in psychology and social psychology only later enhanced and widened the tendency to determine and to look for the position and role of stereotypes in the process of information processing.

Categorization

Allport characterized stereotypes in the mid-1950s as an exaggerated view associated with a category. He offered no definition of a category, but it was evident from his examples that he meant a linguistically marked class into which everyday thinking classifies events, things, and people, and, relying on

this, forms (or explains) its relationship or behaviour towards these categories (Allport, 1954).

It was soon recognized that classification into a category has consequences in the field of cognition as well: first, we draw boundaries on the variables that form the basis of classification regardless of continuous transitions (Secord *et al*., 1956; Secord, 1959); second, the division radiates to the judgement of other variables, and we tend to perceive parallel similarities and differences in these respects (Bruner and Goodman's classical coin size estimation experiment, 1947; see Tajfel's summarizing paper about the abundant related literature, 1957). Contextual effect was demonstrated in the perception of physical stimuli (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963) and humans (Tajfel, Sheikh and Gardner, 1964; Taylor *et al*., 1978; Taylor, 1981): the differentiation by individuals is decreased within categories, but differences between categories are enhanced. The latter effect has been demonstrated repeatedly and more powerfully. In accordance with this, if somebody represents a category alone within a large group, s/he will play a marked role and will be better remembered (Taylor *et al,* 1978; Taylor, 1981).

The boundaries of 'natural categories' used in everyday life are far from being logically pure, and overlap is especially great at the lower levels of logical hierarchy. Rosch's analysis (1978) of the mental arrangement of the world of objects also inspired researchers of social categorization to investigate the hierarchy of categories for the most effective 'base level' of information processing, preservation, and application for each object circle (see Brewer *et al,* 1981). It is worth noting in this respect that features differentiating and characterizing sub-types are more informative in the formation of judgements and impressions than classifications into broader categories.

In social perception, many things can serve as a basis for categorization: striking external physical features and the strong evaluative categorizational aspects of the evaluating person may compete with each other in this. On the one hand, there seem to be 'primitive categories' into which we place other people automatically, without consideration: gender, race and age appear as the most frequent aspects of categorization (Bruner, 1957; Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). On the other hand, personal systems of values and attitudes certainly influence which categorizations of people are more emphatic and more memorable for us when persons can be or are categorized from other points of view. Also, the frequent use of a particular category increases its availability, and may give a quasi-automatic nature to its use. The so called 'white male norm' found in the United States may be a common effect of primitivity, evaluative presumptions, and frequency: it serves as a reference background against which the differentiating category of 'deviant' target persons is emphasized in one or two respects (Zarate and Smith, 1990). When the target persons are black males, the conception and identification of race evokes the fastest

cognitive reply, in the case of white females it is gender, and in the case of black females it is the compound category of race and gender to which we give the fastest replies. We meet again the question of general interest here (upon which we can find implications of world view): what is the relationship and, if combined, what will be the relationship between the categories formed on different bases (race and gender, or gender and occupation in Eagly's series of studies (Eagly and Wood, 1982; Eagly and Steffen, 1984), or gender and nation (Eagly and Kite, 1987)). We have to be prepared for the relations of categorizational aspects to be clarified by results reflecting the features of certain compound categories, rather than by undifferentiated general results.

We generally differentiate between the basis of the categorization of people (these are often demographic and social variables) and the connected attributes. Nevertheless, one can find examples of the fact that we categorize people on the basis of some psychological feature of the personality (e.g., extroversion in the important paper of Cantor and Mischel, 1979).

It is a handy starting point of categorization when the people forming the object of cognition are members of a group linked by personal interactions or by a system of social institutions (such as family or nation). Nevertheless, it is not certain that a specific 'group' forming a unit in some sense, and an abstract 'category' generalizing the features of its own members are identical and interchangeable concepts (cf. Rabbie and Horwitz, 1988).

The relationship between the individual and a group is dependent on whether the person is a member of that group (ingroup) or is a separated external observer (outgroup). Tajfel's 'minimal intergroup paradigm' studies emphasized that even a single boundary of category drawn at random may lead to a difference in evaluation between the ingroup and the outgroup, to the advantage of the former and disadvantage of the latter (Tajfel *et al.,* 1971; Billig and Tajfel, 1973). In her 1979 review Brewer concluded from the large collection of research that the basic motif of differentiation is not the rejection of the foreign group, but the positive emphasis on the ingroup (ingroup bias). Lemyre and Smith (1985) revealed a lot about the dynamics of categorization affecting self-evaluation, when they demonstrated that it leads primarily to a decrease in self-esteem, while the preference of the ingroup contributes to the restoration of self-esteem. After Tajfel, Turner worked out a theory of social identity, according to which 'social comparison' in the service of self-esteem is complemented or replaced by inter-group social comparison under certain conditions (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; cf. self-categorizational theory, Turner *et al.,* 1987; Oakes *et al.,* 1994).

Self-esteem and self-definition may affect another difference between the conception of the ingroup and that of the outgroup. As has been demonstrated by McGuire and McGuire (1988), there is a strong tendency

for those features to come to the fore in our spontaneously organizing self-images which differentiate us from other people in the given social situation. An opposite, mirror image process is assumed by Park and Rothbart (1982) with the background that the ingroup is seen to be more heterogeneous than the outgroup. According to this logic, the characterization of the members of the outgroup is confined to the features that differentiate them from the ingroup, while in the case of the ingroup, it is not sufficient to emphasize the similarities, we also have to make more and more internal differentiations, until the 'self seems to be unique. The same phenomenon, the heterogeneity of the ingroup and the homogeneity of the outgroup, was deduced from the quantitative difference of knowledge based on personal experience and the expressed richness of aspects by Linville (1982, 1995; Linville *et al.,* 1986). She also assumed that outgroups are not only devalued, but are also more simply judged. Thus, they are more extremely judged than the ingroup.

The paradigm of information processing

The most significant development of stereotype research in the history of science in the period between the early 1970s and mid-1990s was the appearance of the 'information processing paradigm'. Actually, the revived interest in the topic arose from this method or approach, since stereotypes as a product and means of getting to know groups were particularly suited to enforce, to demonstrate, and to make use of this approach. 'Stereotype' received a new meaning in this paradigm, and was put in a new context: the conceptual link to prejudice and the presumption of its rigidity became weaker, and before long it became a synonym for group perception. Research in this field and the investigation of person perception developed together: the difference, and the functional relationship between them remained the focus of attention. The more flexible and functional concept of stereotype was no longer pejoratively evaluative, but interpretative and explanatory in character. At the same time, the social aspect was left out not only from the psychological interpretation and explanation, but also from the definition and investigation of the phenomenon itself: social consensus as to the content was no longer a criterion, and the social conditions of differences in content were no longer subjects of analysis either.

This paradigm is excellently represented by David Hamilton, who prepared his first summarizing review in this spirit (1979), published the first collection of works in this field (1981), and repeatedly reviewed and commented on the state of the field together with his colleagues (Hamilton and Troiler, 1986; Hamilton and Sherman, 1989; Hamilton, 1990; Hamilton, Stroessner and Driscoll, 1994). His summarizing work with Sherman in 1994, provides an almost complete description of the results and conclusions of studies on the paradigm. His central position in the field is also due to the fact that illusory correlation, the consistently studied and

thoroughly investigated object of his empirical research, can be considered as a basic mechanism in the development and function of stereotypes. Other members of the generation that introduced and extended the paradigm (S.Taylor, S.Fiske, M.Rothbart, A.Eagly, or P.Linville), on the other hand, do not concentrate primarily on this circumscribed area, although they contributed very inventively to stereotype research. Naturally, there were others who also prepared summarizing and systematizing works which put the last few decades of stereotype research into the broader perspective of inter-group relationships (Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Stephan, 1985; Messick and Mackie, 1989), and that of social cognition (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, 1991; Stephan, 1989; Fiske, 1993; Leyens *et al,* 1994). This rich background literature makes it easier to outline the most typical features of the application of the information processing paradigm without going into the details of the large number of results.

This paradigm, as indicated by its name, grasps the development and role of stereotypes within a process of information processing, as information is a) filtered, interpreted and coded; b) processed internally, that is, integrated, organized, and conclusions drawn from it; c) preserved and recalled; and d) taken into consideration when behaviour is developed. All this takes time, and researchers hoping to achieve experimental objectivity when studying categorization and recall from memory are bound to control elapsed time and consider it as an important variable.

It is a characteristic of the process that there is a mismatch between the amount of information impinging on a person and their limited capacity to process it. Generally this leads to the economical organization of cognition, to the economical use of the capacity of attention and memory, and to the application of simplifying methods and heuristics which often neglect relevant pieces of information.

Existing and structured knowledge takes part in this process when new information is being processed. A person is able to complement and shape new pieces of information to personal needs; accordingly, information processing has a kind of circular, self-reinforcing, impression-conserving nature. The processes of interpersonal and inter-group interactions repeating themselves, creating and meeting expectations, and resulting in stability contribute to this internal search for and maintenance of order. Social stereotypes appear and operate within this dual, mutually reinforcing mechanism.

The fruitful application of the information processing perspective can well be illustrated by the phenomenon known as illusory correlation. Two well-known experiments reflect the nature of the rich work done in this direction. It is demonstrated, on the one hand, that the association of two striking features seems to be more frequent than in reality. This distinctiveness-based illusory correlation is manifested when the joint appearance of rare group-membership and rare trait is overestimated, and this influences group evaluation (Hamilton and Gifford, 1976). This

phenomenon has been studied and interpreted in many ways, and is related to the origin of certain stereotypes. On the other hand, it has also been investigated how already existing stereotypes influence the recall of trait marks related to representatives of socio-occupational categories (Hamilton and Rose, 1980). Expectancy-based illusory correlations demonstrate that relationships that correspond to stereotypes are thought to be more frequent than they are in reality. Thus, the stereotype is supported by the distortion of the information.

The concept of schema is a vital instrument in the interpretation of the results for the representatives of the information processing approach (Fiske and Linville, 1980), though it has perhaps been slightly trivialized. It is well suited to the description of the actual organization of knowledge, and to the expression of the active constructing role of the person in creating the image of reality. But its content becomes unavoidably blurred if we can similarly talk about schemata regarding persons, a feature of a person, a role, an event, or even independently of content, in social cognition, even if Fiske and Taylor (1984, 1991) do see differences between prototypes linked to category and schema.

The relationship between person and group perceptions is a lively and fertile field in the investigation of social cognition. This relationship has been approached from several sides. First, differences in content have been demonstrated between persons and the groups to which they belong in some respect or another: persons tend to be seen more positively than the more abstract category of groups (person positivity bias, Sears, 1983). Second, it has been shown that the result of the organization of the same pieces of information regarding a person is different from that regarding members of a group (Sanbonmatsu *et al.*, 1987). Third, a parallel has also been demonstrated between the conclusions drawn from the behaviour and performance of persons and those of groups. The results are projected onto the image of a typical member of the group, even if due to the known internal mechanisms, it played practically no role in the result (basic group attribution error, Allison and Messick, 1985). Fourth, alternative theories have been developed about the function of classification into groups on the basis of membership in a group in the development of impression formation and evaluative judgements about persons (Fiske, 1982; Fiske and Pavelchak, 1986; Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). Fifth, research has attempted to reveal the role of information about individual members of a group in changes of category characterizations of groups.

The literature expects changes in stereotypes if the judging person is in contact with the members of the group in question. As has been described (Rothbart, 1981), the effects of personal experience that do not reinforce the stereotype may slowly accumulate ('bookkeeping model'), or may lead to fast and complete reversal ('conversion model'). The nature of the effect is determined by the distribution of the traits

deviating from the stereotype among the members of the groups to be judged, and by how credibly the members who carry these traits represent the group. It is highly probable that the unexpected features of the persons are not projected onto the whole group, but lead to the mental isolation of a circumscribed 'subtype'. Rebuilding the stereotype on an experiential basis is a controversial process in any case: the subtypes do not influence the main tendencies of the group characterization in the first step, but do contribute to the impression of variability of the group; loosening in this way the image of the group as a unit, they make it possible to maintain the group stereotype while defying the facts (cf. Hewstone, 1994). It is, of course, relevant which are the traits where the stereotypes and experience clash: the effect of the different types of behaviour on the inference of traits is differentiated (Reeder and Brewer, 1979); so is the radiating role of the individual traits on the overall image of the characterization (Hamilton *et al.,* 1992; Hamilton and Sherman, 1994).

The hypothesis regarding the role of contact in dismantling stereotypes and prejudice is not proven easily and unequivocally, no matter how widespread it may be in the literature. There is no certainty that it will result in positive change, because the contact itself may be laden with conflicts, and can lead even to mutual emotional withdrawal. Nevertheless, there is barely any other description and interpretation of changes of stereotypes. Only one other approach and experimental direction arises from the analysis of the above mentioned group attribution error (Mackie *et al.,* 1990; Mackie *et a.l,* 1992a, 1992b): in certain cases conclusions that originate in the outcome of group decision and behaviour, and neglect items of information, may leave the impression of change, and act as the basis of generalizations different from stereotypes. In these cases the change and the generalization are of illusory nature, but this only underlines the fact that a collective outcome is projected onto the whole group, thus success or failure in the broadest sense of the word have an effect on the (re)evaluation of the group and on the (re)interpretation of its traits. Hence we arrive logically at the question of when and how we measure the relationships between the achievements of the groups, and how groups appear in the changing overall image of society. This is a hitherto unanswered question: there has been little investigation of whether or not the global modification of the systems of relationships among groups and that of the evaluative hierarchies do have any effect on the perceived characteristics of the individual groups.

The nature of the internal representation of categories has not yet been cleared up: in fact, it polarizes standpoints as shown below. The psychological significance of this cannot be overestimated: its understanding is indispensable in explaining both the role categories play in cognition, and the changes of the content of related stereotypes.

Two extreme ideas have appeared in this respect. One of them emphasized that an abstract characterization of social categories lives inside us: a structure of knowledge comprising traits, which can be called prototypes. Since social categories have loose boundaries, categorization is also based on the degree—at least from certain aspects—to which the individual is similar to the typical prototype (Brewer *et al.*, 1981). It has been demonstrated that in addition to the central tendency of knowledge regarding traits, people also know how varied and variable a given category is (Park and Hastie, 1987; cf. Linville *et al.,* 1989). This may reinforce the polemical idea that categories are represented by the multitude of their exemplars in us, and the arising summary is the basis of the general description (Hintzman, 1986; Smith, 1990; Smith and Zarate, 1990, 1992). Thus, recall from memory plays a fundamental role in the image and judgement formed about a group. However, this is partly contradicted by what is known as primitive categorization and by the easiness of on-line judgement based on impression. In any case, neither of the extreme views seems to offer an exhaustive explanation, so there is some justification for considering the possibilities of mixed, either-or, and cumulative representations (Hamilton and Sherman, 1994).

Since the effects of factors hidden in cognition have been studied from many sides, the place and role of emotional factors have been looked for and marked on the basis of analytic knowledge about information-treating processes. Bodenhausen (1993) differentiated occasional and integrated emotions from the point of view of stereotypes. Mood caused by external factors can be an example of the former, while fear of or aversion towards the group to be evaluated can be cited as an example of the latter. The manipulation of mood in an experimental situation has also had a remarkable effect, thus, for instance, elevated mood affected the two types of illusory correlation differently. Illusory correlation based on distinctiveness disappeared, while that based on expectation was enhanced (Hamilton *et al.,* 1993). Looking beyond the topic of stereotyping, the divergent findings are organized into a comprehensive mental frame by Forgas (1995). He emphasized two processes of information processing in which the emotions play an important influencing role. One of them is evident, namely, the simplified process in which emotion as a piece of information receives a heuristic role. The other one, however, is surprising, because it is the thorough processing of information, when for instance emotional priming shapes the circle of associations and the direction of thoughts.

Researchers within the framework of the information processing paradigm probably reached a conceptual boundary when they began to investigate the interrelationship between emotion and cognition, and the influence of the former on the latter. Nevertheless, this does not mean a return to the large-scale descriptions of the theories of cognitive (evaluative) consistency and attitudes.

Directions of progress

Several series of investigations in the literature have tried to go beyond the application of the information processing paradigm, and, in a certain sense, they do combine it with other approaches. Three examples can be given.

J.C.Turner and a group of researchers in Australia developed Tajfel's approach further (Turner *et al.*, 1987; Oakes *et al.*, 1994; Haslam *et al.,* 1992a, 1992b; McGarty *et al.,* 1993). For them, a group is not only a special association of individuals, but constitutes a 'psychological reality', which lives in the consciousness of its members through self-categorization, and also appears in the actions taken with full knowledge of belonging together (and even of inter-changeability). People have social reasons and psychological needs for self-categorization, and thus to apply stereotypes to themselves, too. In this line of thinking, classification into categories and stereotype characterization cannot be considered as an impoverishing loss of information regarding ourselves or others, but as the enrichment and fulfilment of information with experience. Yet at the same time, classification and belonging to a group are not exclusive, one-time or permanent, but always depend on the actual context: the same individual may belong to different categories with respect to different aspects. According to these authors, the relationship between persons and the categories used for their classification is determined by the so-called meta-contrast: those belong to the same category who are less different from each other than from others.

S.Fiske builds her interpersonal functional theory of stereotypes step by step. The mental framework of her work in this direction is the 'continuum model' of impressions formed about persons (Fiske and Pavelchak, 1986; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). She described two routes (and transitions between them) for the development of impressions coloured by emotions: there is impression organization based on categories, progressing downwards from the higher level of abstraction, and 'piecemeal-based' organization, built up from traits, starting from details. The former route corresponds to the application of stereotypes to the individual, the latter is the development of an individual overall image of the personality. According to Fiske, people's position in the relevant social-power hierarchy influences how motivated they are, in interpersonal relationships, to get to know the individual features of the other, how much attention they pay to information regarding the other, and how they process this information. This is the reason why the image formed by subordinates about those in power is individualized, while those in power form stereotyped impressions based on categorization. According to Fiske's interpretation, stereotypes are parts of, means of, and conservers of power relations in both their descriptive and prescriptive forms.

Jost and Banaji (1994) outlined another line of thinking, attributing several types of justifying function to stereotypes, including the

justification of the social system, in addition to self-justification and justification of one's own group. The acceptance of the social status quo is very likely to clash—in the case of people in subordinate position—with the interests of the individuals and their own groups, and as 'false consciousness' it prevents the conception and realization of these interests. When the subordinated groups of society accept and apply stereotypes about their category, they give up the possibility of enforcing their interests in the sign of false consciousness, and co-operate in maintaining the system of social inequality.

These approaches are not necessarily in conflict with the results obtained in the framework of the information processing paradigm. Although the Turner group disputes some of the fundamental theoretical constructs (the principle of cognitive economy, illusory correlation as a framework of interpretation, and the static conception of the relationship between individual and category that may appear in the thought of prototypes), it indisputably represents a cognitive view. Fiske is a definite supporter of the information processing paradigm. Nevertheless, all three approaches look beyond information processing, and investigate the advantageous and disadvantageous functions of stereotypes for individuals, for groups, and for interpersonal and social relationships. It remains to be seen how far these attempts at integration move away from Lippmann's original stereotype conception.

From Lippmann to Lippmann

Katz and Braly referred to Lippmann's concept of stereotypes at the time of their pioneering works, but, undoubtedly, they did so in a narrowing and restrictive way. Lippmann did indeed discuss the general presuppositions and their emotional tone, which precedes and moulds experience. However, we cannot claim that this is the whole of his stereotype concept. It is more justified to say that every essential element of the cognitive approach can be found in his abundant and freely flowing thoughts. This has already been demonstrated by A.G.Miller (1982) and also by Ashmore and Del Boca (1981). According to Miller, Lippmann became aware of the simplifying role of stereotypes, the dangers inherent in their obviousness, their actively constructing nature, their function as a psychological defence, and the difficulties of attribution distortions and extreme judgements related to them. Later authors state that Lippmann used the concept of stereotype in the sense of today's (Neisser's) schema, and social schema (introduced by Taylor and Crocker).

Following this track, it can be said that not only the initial theorems, but even the anticipated image of several recent empirical observations and parts of theories can be found in Lippmann's classical work (1922). The errors of statistical estimation that lie in the background of distorted judgements, the aversion for categorization, the situative nature of the self, or emotions

linked with symbols as political motives are all theses that can be cited as examples from his works.

Empirical investigations that aim at exactness through their clear questions and specific variables cannot be considered as infertile even if their conclusions could already be phrased. It says much for Lippmann's rich and original line of thought that, without systematic empirical work, he could reach the essence of their message by taking the short cut of intuition.

Taking courage from this, we can search his epoch-making work for inspiration as we try to decide what deserves consideration and investigation when we place stereotypes in the context of the individual and society. Four main areas of thought may draw our attention and evoke reflections:

Social origin and exploitability

Lippmann thought that most people form their image of the world, including their conceptions about themselves, about their situation, merits and interests from the elements of thought received in a ready-made form. He considered the masses as almost mentally helpless in comparison with the intellectual elite. However, the intellectual achievements of the latter do not take root in public thinking in their subtly elaborated form, but become vulgarized as they spread, and thus contribute to the development of culture and history.

> Most of us would deal with affairs through a rather haphazard and shifting assortment of stereotypes, if a comparatively few men in each generation were not constantly engaged in arranging, standardizing, and improving them into logical systems, known as the Laws of Political Economy, the Principles of Politics, and the like. Generally when we write about culture, tradition, and the group mind, we are thinking of these systems perfected by men of genius. Now there is no disputing the necessity of constant study and criticism of these idealized versions, but the historian of people, the politician, and the publicity man cannot stop there. For what operates in history is not the systematic idea as a genius formulated it, but shifting imitations, replicas, counterfeits, analogies, and distortions in individual minds.
>
> Thus Marxism is not necessarily what Karl Marx wrote in Das Kapital, but whatever it is that all the warring sects believe, who claim to be the faithful.
>
> (Lippmann, 1992, p. 69)

Yet at the same time, politicians striving for power can approach and direct the masses through and in the language of stereotypes.

Accepting the possibility outlined in the theorem, and the ideological and cultural-historical material, a hypothesis regarding an opposing process can also be set up. Thinking about social relationships and

processes, the philosopher, the historian, the sociologist, the effective publicist and author probably receive their inspiration, interest and starting points from their social milieu. Stereotypes that exist in public thinking may form the background and basis of subtle and individual thoughts at different levels of awareness. This is particularly so, if they have a radiating social effect.

Changing society and the stability of its image

Lippmann says that the image of society in our heads is selected, despite the free flow of information; is full of blind spots, despite totality; is stable, despite changes. In his view this image of society is more than the economical treatment of information arising from limited capacity. This is motivated by the convenience of habit, by the need for security, and is the deposit of some internal peaceful state we try to protect. Perhaps lost and Banaji are not right here when they see only the recognition of the defence of personal (or perhaps group) position in Lippmann's words. Most probably, there is more to it than that.

> There is another reason, besides economy of effort, why we so often hold to our stereotypes when we might pursue a more disinterested vision. The systems of stereotypes may be the core of our personal tradition, the defenses of our position in society.
>
> They are an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the world, to which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and our hopes have adjusted themselves. They may not be a complete picture of the world, but they are a picture of a possible world to which we are adapted. In that world people and things have their well-known places, and do certain expected things. We feel at home there. We fit in. We are members. We know the way around. There we find the charm of the familiar, the normal, the dependable; its grooves and shapes are where we are accustomed to find them.
>
> No wonder, then, that any disturbance of the stereotypes seems like an attack upon the foundations of the universe. It is an attack upon the foundations of our universe, and where big things are at stake, we do not readily admit that there is any distinction between our universe and the universe. A world which turns out to be one in which those we honor are unworthy, and those we despise are noble, is nerve-racking. There is anarchy if our order of precedence is not the only possible one.
>
> A pattern of stereotypes is not neutral. It is not merely a way of substituting order for the great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality. It is not merely a short cut. It is all these things and something more. It is the guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world of our own sense of our own value, our own position and our own rights.

> The stereotypes are, therefore, highly charged with the feelings that are attached to them. They are the fortress of our tradition, and behind its defenses we can continue to feel ourselves safe in the position we occupy.
>
> (Lippmann, 1922, pp. 63–64)

The theorem deserves attention, and agrees with the Marxist formula that 'consciousness lags behind existence'. However, a counter-hypothesis can also be formulated, namely, that the development of public thinking is woven into social changes; in fact, it may in certain cases even mark their future direction. This may occur in the critical periods of social disintegration, and in the ideological world of social movements enhanced by crises. The social processes and constellation of the clash of old and new stereotypes, and the spread of the latter, seem to be worth investigating.

Unreflected knowledge with unfounded conviction

Lippmann repeatedly gave the impression that he thought there was some empirical basis for stereotyped generalizations, that we could be poorer without them, and that they form a part of our culture, but he thought it dangerous that this excessively convenient knowledge, full of simplifications and interwoven with emotions, replaces the ever-changing social reality. He considered undifferentiated, extreme judgements, and generalizations taken out of time limits to be dangerous. Similarly, he blamed political ideologies for their strong inclination to predict the uncontrollable future on the basis of unrestrained imagination.

He repeatedly indicated that it would be advisable to control everyday knowledge, or at least to know that it is uncontrolled.

> If in that philosophy we assume that the world is codified according to a code which we possess, we are likely to make our reports of what is going on describe a world run by our code. But if our philosophy tells us that each man is only a small part of the world, that his intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects in a coarse net of ideas, then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are only stereotypes, to hold them lightly, to modify them gladly.
>
> (Lippmann, 1922, p. 60)

His whole work can be conceived as a warning against this. Yet he also counts on and points at the notion that neither the mass of information in the social environment, nor the body of knowledge accumulating in civilization can be treated and utilized in everyday life otherwise than in the form of simplified and elaborated schemata.

Constituent elements of a general and overall image of the world

The now classical author did not deal only with the way groups are perceived, although one of the most marked descriptions of stereotypes (as a category attributed with traits, and judged) implies mostly social roles and groups.

> This philosophy is a more or less organized series of images for describing the unseen world. But not only for describing it. For judging it as well. And therefore, the stereotypes are loaded with preference, suffused with affection or dislike, attached to fears, lusts, strong wishes, pride and hope. Whatever invokes the stereotype is judged with the appropriate sentiment. Except where we deliberately keep prejudice in suspense, we do not study a man and judge him to be bad. We see a dewy morn, a blushing maiden, a sainted priest, a humorless Englishman, a dangerous Red, a carefree Bohemian, a lazy Hindu, a wily Oriental, a dreaming Slav, a volatile Irishman, a greedy Jew, a 100% American. In the workaday world that is often the real judgment, long in advance of the evidence, and it contains within itself the conclusion which the evidence is pretty certain to confirm.
>
> (Lippmann, 1922, pp. 78–79)

Elsewhere, however, he made it clear that personalization making the meaning of things vivid, and attribution with personal traits, and even representation by human figures are not only characteristic of the stereotypes of groups. Furthermore, he preferred to show the emergence and role of social stereotypes in the conception of progress and the neglect of the facts of changes.

> With the stereotype of 'progress' before their eyes, Americans have in the mass seen little that did not accord with that progress. They saw the expansion of cities, but not the accretion of slums; they cheered the census statistics, but refused to consider overcrowding; they pointed with pride to their growth, but would not see the drift from the land, or the unassimilated immigration. They expanded industry furiously at reckless cost to their natural resources; they built up gigantic corporations without arranging for industrial relations. They grew to be one of the most powerful nations on earth without preparing their institutions or their minds for the ending of their isolation. They stumbled into the World War morally and physically unready, and they stumbled out again, much disillusioned, but hardly more experienced. In the World War the good and the evil influence of the American stereotype was plainly visible.
>
> (Lipmann, 1922, pp. 72–73)

Regarding the mechanisms of the economy, he also counted on the possibility of the separation of public opinion and reality, and he blamed concepts that descended into public thinking.

> With modification and embroidery, this pure fiction, used by economists to simplify their thinking, was retailed and popularized until for large sections of the population it prevailed as the economic mythology of the day. It supplied a standard version of capitalist, promoter, worker and consumer in a society that was naturally more bent on achieving success than on explaining it. The buildings which rose, and the bank accounts which accumulated, were evidence that the stereotype of how the thing had been done was accurate. And those who benefited most by success came to believe they were the kind of men they were supposed to be.
>
> (Lippmann, 1922, p. 77)

According to Lippmann, the role of categorization may be contradictory in the conception and even the formation of society. He argued that classification into the 'working class' is not unequivocal, the categorization of those within and outside this category is not clear, which may bring about unfounded expectations and actions pointing in many directions. He thought that the feeling of national connection is not only an object of, but actually a creation of categorization. This, however, is associated with the distorted conception of the past and the relationships of descent among nations.

The variability of his topics also indicates that he did not think that stereotypes are confined to the peculiarities of the perception of different groups. Their existence and operation play a filtering, stabilizing and organizing role in people's relationships with the world and society. With this view, he anticipated and served the constantly renewed ambitions of cognitive social psychologists (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Sampson, 1971) to find a comprehensive and structured system of beliefs in the background of social behaviour—albeit without full professional awareness.

The prospects and basis of the investigation of belief systems

If Lippmann's thoughts regarding the essence and nature of stereotypes are accepted as authentic, further research tasks can be found in them. However, the literature of stereotypes is not the only source of incentive, encouragement and appropriate methodology for this research. Programmes for the investigation of social belief systems have appeared in different guises in many places.

We may turn first to McGuire's reviews of the history of science and to his exemplary research. McGuire's summarizing works represent a quite exceptional point in the mosaic-like literature of experimental

social psychology; seeing the essence, he structures the scattered past of a whole field of social psychology. His classical works devoted to attitude research (McGuire, 1969, 1972, 1985, 1986b, 1989) and to political psychology (McGuire, 1993) outline a direction of development which can be extrapolated into the future. Talking about attitude research, he differentiated three phases in the investigations of descriptive studies, of attitude dynamics, and of attitude systems. He thought that in the history of political psychology the period of the investigation of personality and culture had been followed by the attitude period, which was in turn replaced by the psychology of political ideology in the 1980s and 1990s. His conclusions converge in the idea that no matter which field we examine, it is the belief systems that will become the focus of attention, because views are formed within the individual and they are embedded in the relationships between persons and groups. McGuire himself dealt with the content, structure and operation of mini-systems of thought systematically (McGuire and McGuire, 1991). He demonstrated the role of certain organizing principles in the way we perceive the antecedents and consequences of any core event, and judge this event in the dimensions of probability and evaluation. This is not the first time he has looked for the manifestation of the logic of probability in everyday thinking. Nevertheless, he demonstrates the tendency of harmony of evaluation in the organization of the views formed about the core event and its circumstances. This is rather instructive, since the previously heavily discussed topics of evaluation and consistency seem to be rather outdated in the eyes of many investigators (Eagly, 1991; in fact, the authors themselves consider the investigation of evaluation excessive in other fields, for example in the traditional study of self-image, McGuire and McGuire, 1988). The epoch-making appearance and dominance of consistency theories is not accidental (cf. Abelson *et al.*, 1968): the harmony of evaluation is such a strong organizing factor in the organization of views that, although one may weary of it, one certainly cannot avoid it even in present-day social psychological investigations.

McGuire himself was faithful to his methodological programme, which was put forward in the 'crisis period' of social psychology, and which is a standard for many researchers: instead of pre-structured measurements, he consistently goes after free associations by counting the content elements and frequency relationships (McGuire, 1973, 1983, 1989). This is particularly remarkable in his case, since his impressive intellectual power is manifested in searching for and revealing systems (Fiedler, 1991). This is well demonstrated by his paper on individual attitudes, attitude systems, and the relationship of the latter with other personality systems (McGuire, 1989). In this framework he distinguishes systems of attitudes in which a) several objects can be found in a single dimension, b) one object appears in several dimensions, and c) several

objects appear in several dimensions. The last point would be the case of partial or overall ideologies: he offers a logical frame for their psychological approach, and encourages its use. Although he does not much appreciate Kelly's personal construct theory, it is perhaps the closest relative of this grandiose idea.

Linville and Carlson (1994) wrote that George Kelly's theory of personal constructs preceded (immaturely) the information processing paradigm. It can be added that he surpassed this paradigm in a certain sense, when he studied the characteristics of the content and structure of the individual cognition of the personal sphere as a system. Kelly grasped the perceived relationship between persons and traits through his repertory grid (REP) test, he revealed the part played by traits in the characterization of persons, and thus determined the content of the aspects of the studied individual, and the complexity of his/her thinking. Kelly's approach offers the opportunity to grasp the perceived relationships between categories and traits, and to reveal the role played by traits in the characterization of categories, and, thus, to determine the content of the aspects of individuals and groups, and the complexity of their thinking in one 'cognitive domain' of categorization or another. It is noteworthy in this approach that a) it does not compare the cognition of objects at different levels of abstraction, b) it does not follow the logic of a process of antecedents and consequences, but c) it analyses the similarities and differences, and consequential implications of trait judgements regarding similarly created categories (such as nations) at the same level of abstraction, and d) it does this in many fields. Thus, it makes it possible to compare category characterizations within and across fields, and to reveal the inherent interrelationships. W. Scott and his co-workers have already done such research (see Scott, Osgood and Peterson, 1979), primarily led by the aim of ascertaining the thematic generalization of individual cognitive style. Looking beyond the cognitive domain of person characterization, they described the characteristics of individual cognitive structures from many sides. For them, it was not so important to look at the political-ideological content of the characteristics of cognitive style.

Emphasis can be shifted, however, and the conceptual and methodological instrument offered by 'cognitive domain' and 'object by trait matrix' can be put to the service of the content analysis of category characterizations as a primary aim. We may be prompted to do this if we think that ideologies live in the form of stereotypes in public thinking. It is already a classically controversial question whether or not common people think ideologically about society and its history. It can be assumed that public thinking is not the result of systems of ideas using clear logic to analyse assumed values. It is not excluded, however, in fact, it is probable that people's concepts of social categories and their relationships include the essence of ideology. Naturally, this does not appear in the short-term individual processes of the development or operation of a given stereotype,

but in the social appearance of many kinds of politically relevant stereotypes and in their historical development.

McGuire lists among the examples of developments and prospects in the history of science those theoretical and empirical findings that are related to 'implicit theories' inherent in public thinking and to 'lay theories' which appear in public opinions. The two are probably not completely identical. The former concept appeared in the literature of person perception when 'implicit personality theory' was introduced. Its indication and classical procedures for measuring it also imply that presumptions about the relationships between traits are present and applied in trait judgements regarding persons (Bruner and Tagiuri, 1954). Attempts have been made to account for stereotypes as implicit personality theories (Ashmore, 1981); in other words, we include the relationship between category and trait in the system of relationships between trait and trait. Stereotypes can also be hidden presumptions, but mostly they are grasped as conscious opinions put into words. Generally, these latter opinions characterize 'lay theories', which—fitting into Lippmann's conception of stereotypes—means the mental elaboration of a problem or field as it lives in public thinking (Furnham, 1988). The increasing literature of this field is complemented by theoretical work that analyses the peculiar nature and content of knowledge about man and society, studies the process of its acquisition, and contrasts the development of public beliefs with scientific cognition (Bar-Tal and Kruglanski, 1988; Kruglanski, 1989).

One cannot forget, however, that there is and there must be a difference between the two strategies: one of them studies the progress, results and rules of the organization of beliefs within the individual (as does McGuire in his systematic work cited above), and the other describes and explains the diffusion of beliefs though society, the similarities and systematic (parallel, simultaneous) differences in the content of these beliefs. The latter appears as a research programme when one attempts to grasp the telling concept of 'social representation' empirically (see Doise, Clemence and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993).

The aims of the two strategies are different, but their realizations depend on each other, as can well be seen in the most traditional attitude research. There, the task is to define attitudes, but usually this cannot be done without revealing the social differences in views regarding the object of attitude, and without finding out the correlation between the views. The latter may be of scientific interest in itself, especially if we study not the evaluation of a single object of attitude, but the joint mental treatment of several topics—which is an old effort of social psychology. This, however, cannot be done without comparing a large number of individual opinions. What we know about the relative nature of judgement formation and its expression helps us to measure the serious theoretical and methodological difficulties of these comparisons (Eiser, 1984; Krebs and Schmidt, 1993). Nevertheless, we have to look for and identify the effects of social relationships and historical

constellations behind the relations of individual beliefs, and in the beliefs themselves.

Our questions arose from the above recognition: how are elementary trait judgements organized into widespread general images of social categories? What is the relationship between the characterizations of categories separated on the same basis of division and existing at the same level of abstraction: is a widespread general image of the 'cognitive domain' determined by them in public thinking? Has social and political transformation brought about changes in all this? What changes have taken place in the system of category characterizations in public thinking?

The historical context: Hungary as an experimental field

Hungary's blurred image

Seen from the outside, and from a distance, Hungary is a small spot on the map of Europe: she is in the centre of the continent in a geographical sense, and on the eastern border of the cultural and political unit of Western Europe. After the Second World War, Hungary was melted into the amorphous mass of the Soviet bloc; it took some political skill, as well as cultural and historical knowledge, to distinguish between Bucharest, the capital of Romania, Budapest, the capital of Hungary, and Bratislava, the co-capital of Czechoslovakia. If the country is remembered at all, it is for the events of 1956, when the heroism of Hungary and Budapest and the desperate appeals for help won international attention and sympathy, even in those nations whose governments refused to take up arms in defence of this small country. After 1989, Hungary began to blend into the colourful national-political whirlpool of events that echoes around the splitting up of states, the cracking of borders, the noisy competition of politicians, and the crackling of shaky economies. Few remember that this was the first country that was applauded for having the opportunity and the courage to move towards a market economy. It is already almost forgotten that Hungary, precisely because of her insignificant size, could serve as a vital pillar in the bridge between East and West, and that she greatly contributed to the collapse of East Germany and to the symbolic destruction of the Berlin wall in 1989, by letting thousands of East German citizens escape across her western border.

Between East and West: a very short history of Hungary

At the time of writing, Hungary stands at a crossroads: it is all too likely that her recent past and immediate environment will bind her fate irrevocably to that of her eastern neighbours. If this happens, she will be excluded from the integrating Europe in spite of her historical ambitions, and in spite of her cultural achievements and the human and material

sacrifices that she has made in the hope of becoming a part, a mediator and a representative of Western Europe. Just over a thousand years ago, defying Byzantine influence, Hungary's first royal house made the vital decision to adopt western Christianity, and won the symbol of Hungarian statehood, the 'Holy Crown' from the Pope of Rome. The historical importance of this choice is not diminished by the fact that Hungary was only one link in the chain of states, running from Scandinavia through Poland, that were converted to Catholicism at about the same time, and were thus admitted to Europe.

The western Roman empire had once stretched as far as the geographical unit known as the Carpathian Basin. When the empire collapsed, great waves of migrating peoples swept across this area, among them the Hungarian tribes who reached the border of the German-speaking western culture in the 9th century. It took them almost a century to abandon their marauding traditions, give up their nomadic way of life and settle down. This was a culturally solitary people, which was related to the Finns but had been strongly influenced by the Turks in the course of its migrations. It took possession of areas inhabited by Slavic peoples, and followed the Italian and German example in forming a feudal statehood. The church and the reigning family, which intermarried with the royal houses of Europe, mediated the determining religious, cultural and legal norms, but had to struggle against the resistance of the rest of society. The defence of traditions, the struggle against foreign influence and the ideal of centralization were interwoven from the first. One epoch-making event in the course of this prolonged struggle, the issue of the 'Golden Bull' in 1222, secured the independent legal state of the nobility against the King (offering to the legal historians of posterity the possibility of a distant analogy with the development of English law).

The Mongol horde swept through Hungary in the 13th century, but the Hungarian feudal state survived this eastern invasion, became stronger, and grew to be a great regional power under the economically prosperous and Renaissance-spirited rule, first of the House of Anjou, and then of Mátyás Hunyadi. However, Europe as a whole was threatened from the south-east by the Muslim Turkish empire. It is an essential element of every Hungarian's historical knowledge that the country served as 'the bastion of Christendom'; this is commemorated by the cultural historical fact (less well known abroad) that the Pope introduced the Noonday Bell in honour of the resistance offered by Hungarians to the Turks. By the beginning of the 16th century, however, Hungary could no longer resist the expansion of the Turkish empire: she suffered a crushing defeat in 1526, and a considerable part of the country lay under Turkish rule for the next 150 years. The Hungarian bastion had fulfilled its duty to Christendom by absorbing the main force of the onslaught—indeed, the Turkish advance stopped in Hungary—but the country paid a heavy price: she was badly damaged economically, and her

political independence was lost. First, her northeastern part, then the whole country, came under the rule of the Austrian Habsburgs, and after the Turks had been driven out, the Hungarian kingdom became a province of the Austrian empire.

This relationship, which lasted from the 16th to the early 20th century had a double effect. On the one hand, it drew Hungary into an empire that extended for a considerable period even over Spain and the Netherlands and was restricted only gradually to the Austrian, Czech, Moravian and Hungarian regions of Central Europe. This meant spiritual circulation and the transmission of cultural, political, military, and economic experience, examples and impulses. On the other hand, it also implied dependence, real defencelessness, and the predominance of foreign interests, which repeatedly evoked the demand for independence and autonomy. The war of independence led by Prince Rákóczi at the beginning of the 18th century was only one notable episode in a whole series of struggles for freedom. The French Enlightenment and revolution, and the rule of the Viennese court, at first enlightened but later oppressively absolute, exerted their influence on Hungarian society too. In the first half of the 19th century, cultural, economic and legal changes inspired by a truly modern national consciousness were introduced by the economically active Hungarian nobility who took the part played by the bourgeoisie in the rest of Europe, and by intellectuals and men of letters, who visited and admired England. The nobility of this multinational country had always communicated with each other in Latin: it was at this point that Latin was replaced by Hungarian: Hungarian literature, especially poetry, began to flourish. A whole series of reforming plans, debates and innovations led up to the 1848 revolution, the attempt to abolish the long-outdated institution of serfdom, and to introduce general and proportionate sharing of taxation, the parliamentary system, and the institution of responsible governments. This revolution turned into a war of independence led by Lajos Kossuth; it was put down by the troops of the Russian tsar who hastened to the aid of the Austrian emperor. The compromise of 1867, reached after years of national suppression, established a dual state similar to the double-eagle of the Habsburg coat-of-arms, strengthening the laws of bourgeois equality before the law in Hungary, and thus creating the conditions for economic development and the spread of bourgeois customs.

Militant attempts at independence generally evoked mild indifference in Western Europe, where nobody was really interested in the re-arrangement of the area, while destabilization at the border of the German and Slavic cultural regions and spheres of influence was considered risky. Hungary had joined feudal Europe several hundred years late. Isolated in the middle of the continent, she had no colonial possessions, and did not play a significant role in commercial relations even in her brightest period. Thus, there was little

stimulus for industrialization, urbanization or the development of bourgeois mentality in the area, even though Hungary was rich in natural resources. A considerable portion of the city dwellers were of immigrant origin, at first German, and later Jewish. Economic development began to accelerate in the second half of the 19th century, and at the same time Hungarian culture became stronger. This culture not only accepted the national minorities who constituted almost half of the inhabitants, but even tried to assimilate them. Nevertheless, Hungary was still perceived by Western Europe as the agricultural hinterland of Austria, beset by great social differences and increasing problems with minorities, and whose small aristocracy was determined to preserve the monarchy and its feudal features.

The Austro-Hungarian empire joined the losing side in the First World War, and the consequences of defeat for the newly independent state of Hungary were more severe even than those suffered by Germany. She lost two-thirds of her historical territory, and one-third of the Hungarian-speaking population, which had once been the majority, found itself living outside the borders of Hungary, forming minorities in the newly created Yugoslavia, in Czechoslovakia, in Romania (which doubled her territory), and even in Austria. The Trianon Peace Treaty failed to create national states, while anti-Hungarian co-operation became established within the Little Entente system of alliance. The spectre of national dismemberment also contributed to the fact that the republic announced in 1918 under the presidency of Mihály Károlyi gave way to the second Bolshevik dictatorship in the world, but even that could not survive the political and military pressure of the Entente.

The military leader of the successful counter-revolution was Miklós Horthy, who had served as an adjutant of Emperor Franz Joseph, then as a rear-admiral in the navy of the empire. The kingdom was formally reestablished, but without a king: Horthy was appointed regent. Political pressure was exerted on labour movements, liberal forces and the Jews (it was now that the 'numerus clausus' was passed, the first law that discriminated against Jews by limiting their educational opportunities). The national system that emerged was a complex one: it maintained the feudal symbols of the past, and large estates survived within the restricted borders of the country, but a multi-party parliament operated, and the Jewish plutocracy also preserved the positions that it had achieved under the dual monarchy. Pre-fascist methods were used in the attempt to contain the social conflicts that, inevitably, began to emerge.

The generation that lived through the Trianon Peace Treaty as adults could not accept this destruction of their historical traditions; they yearned for the continuation of statehood and economic integration, and the irredentist demand for territorial revision enjoyed unanimous support. The counter-revolutionary system mixed this policy with conservatism, which was renewed in the name of anti-Bolshevism. First, the neo-nationalist idea of regional 'cultural supremacy' was announced, based on the fact that both

the Hungarians who lived in, or fled to, the mother country and those who were left behind as minorities in neighbouring states were relatively well educated, played a culturally creative role, and were experienced in establishing institutions and in practical politics. Later, the foreign policy of Horthy's Hungary drifted towards Italian and German fascism, which were seen as the only hope of breaking the restrictions imposed by the Little Entente. The radicalism of fascism was foreign to the ruling circles of the Hungarian system, whose political ideals were closer to those of English conservatism, at least as they perceived it. Nevertheless, these ideals were not enough to save the country from tragic involvement in the Second World War, which led eventually to the confirmation of the Trianon Peace Treaty and to the inclusion of Hungary, along with the rest of the region, in the power zone of the Soviet Union.

Periods of communist rule

After the war, a multi-party coalition government existed between 1945 and 1948. The occupying Soviet forces, who officially represented the Allies, limited the political movements that they accepted as democratic political elements. Even with Soviet support, the Hungarian Communist Party was unable to win a swift electoral victory, but the communists took possession of the key positions within the government, crushed the civil parties and forced the traditional Social Democratic Party to unite with them. In 1948, one-party 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was instituted in Hungary as in other countries. The split between the Communist International and Tito's Yugoslavia forced the communist leaders to show which side they supported: in Hungary László Rajk, the ex-minister of internal affairs who symbolized the national wing of the communist movement, was prosecuted and executed as a Titoist spy. After this, power was concentrated in the hands of the Bolsheviks who had returned from exile in the Soviet Union, led by Mátyás Rákosi, 'the best Hungarian disciple of Stalin'. After the death of Stalin in 1953, a struggle for power began between Rákosi and Imre Nagy. The latter, who also belonged to the group of Soviet exiles, was an agricultural specialist who promised a less doctrinaire economic policy to the distressed country. Since he was not of Jewish origin, he was also associated by many with hopes for more national policies.

Radical social transformations took place between 1945 and 1956. First, the large estates were distributed among the peasants, with the co-operation of Imre Nagy, then heavy industry and banking were nationalized. After 1948 the private sector was heavily restricted, and small farmers were increasingly forced to join co-operatives. All this was accompanied by the aggressive and discriminatory measures of the so-called class struggle: the ruling circles of the Horthy era were eliminated, and with them the Christian middle class and the financially independent bourgeoisie which had formed 'the establishment'. Society was thus beheaded, and only a few occupational

groups and families that stole through into the new intelligentsia provided some historical continuity.

This revolutionary change did have some social support: the society of the beginning of the century and the Horthy era had been highly polarized, and had provided no opportunities for social advancement to the farm labourers, workers and clerks who craved it. It was above all the Hungarian villages that exerted social pressure and put new blood into both heavy state-owned industry and the new intelligentsia of the revolutionized society. This accelerated social movement was refreshing, but because it involved the most nationalistic sector of society it tended to work against the officially international ideals of the prevalent philosophy.

The dramatic events of 1956 were the outcome of several years of fermentation. They left two unforgettable memories with all those who lived through and participated in them. The first was the feeling of unprecedented national unity on 23 October, when hundreds of thousands of people expressed their unanimous wish to break with Stalinism. Everybody felt the same way: ex-Stalinists who wanted to erase the memory of their own role in the past ten years through their own courage, workers and young people who missed and desired the realization of the ideals of socialism, everybody who had suffered from the persecution, disadvantages and poverty of the Rákosi era, including the promoters of civil society and democracy, the small groups of conservatives and the extreme right wing. The troubled and repeatedly reformed government of Imre Nagy followed events rather than directing them, and after initial hesitation it committed itself to political pluralism and national independence. Meanwhile, the evanescent experience of unity faded, communist and anti-communist terror-actions harassed the public, and the full range of political opinions re-emerged, re-uniting only after the Soviet military intervention in a brief outburst of national and democratic resistance. At this point the second fundamental truth of 1956 emerged, one which was to become the determining political experience of a whole generation: the loneliness and defencelessness of a country entirely on its own, the knowledge that despite their reassurances, declarations of solidarity and real humanitarian intentions, not one other country was prepared to help Hungary. True to the spirit of the Yalta Agreement, the 'free world' treated Hungary as a province of the Soviet empire, abandoned her as a pawn in the internal power struggles of that empire, and did not even consider supporting her against armed invasion by the Soviet Union.

János Kádár became the head of a new puppet government. So far he had played only a small part in history, as a representative of the national wing of the communist movement and a supporter of Rajk. He had appeared in the Rajk trial, he too had been imprisoned by Rákosi, and then he had become a party leader and minister in the Nagy government. He gave his name to communist restoration between 1956 and 1962. In the name of the so-called 'two-front struggle', he prevented a second return of the Stalinist Rákosi from Soviet exile, but he also co-operated in the arrest,

trial and execution of Imre Nagy. The reasons for this cruel decision have been interpreted in many ways: envy for a transfigured rival, revenge on a traitor who had deserted his comrades in the face of counter-revolutionary terrorism, punishment for jeopardizing the country and the international communist movement. But whatever Kádár's motives, and whatever the external pressures may have been, he could never forget his personal responsibility for the bloody retaliation; neither could the latent public opinion of the country.

The unique and peculiar profile of the Kádár system developed after 1962. The forcible creation of co-operatives continued, but a fortunate combination of collective economy with small-scale farming in the hands of peasants emerged. Nationalized heavy industry was preserved and expanded, but the rigidity of the centrally planned economy was relaxed, the independence of companies increased, and foreign trade relationships were opened up. All of this could be felt in both the variety and the level of services. A pragmatic attitude gained ground, and with it the recognition that both expertise and financial interest are necessary for economic progress. Consequently, ideological affiliation was no longer the only and most important aspect of employment policy, and the financial situation of intellectuals improved relatively. Ideological restrictions in the arts and sciences were relaxed, and Hungary became the most open country in the Soviet bloc to the international flow of information. The cultural and social costs were almost greater than the economic load-bearing capacity of the country and, in retrospect, Hungary appeared as an economically immature welfare state. None of this changed the basic facts of the social system: the international and internal restrictions, the deficiencies of constitutional statehood and human rights, the paralysing rigidity of the centralized economy, which was not eased by readily offered western loans. Social equalization and relative welfare reassured public opinion less and less, the demand for greater and more favourable changes only increased, and fewer and fewer people placed any trust in the ability of the ageing representatives of centralized power to reform or radically transform the system.

János Kádár did not have a complicated brain, but he was a good chess player and a master of the art of political balance. Unlike the Czech reform communists, he did not talk about 'socialism with a human face', but he actually realized it better than they did. Unlike the hard dictator of Romania, he did not openly defy the Soviet political line, but he did provide a relatively wide scope of movement for Hungary in the areas of economy and foreign cultural relationships, and in choosing his own, experimental methods. For many people, he changed from being the detested and vengeful traitor into the saviour of his country and even the sober heir of what had begun in 1956. However, his pragmatic policy of preserving and improving living standards led him into a field of economic relationships that he did not fully comprehend, and he fell into the trap of

international loans and interest charges. Due to disadvantageous economic changes abroad, and the state's inability to restructure production, the country was severely in debt by the end of his regime. Meanwhile, the balance of world power in which Kádár's policies could play an appreciated role was shaken. Gorbachev, too, started on the path towards political democratization and the market economy, with the result that the Soviet system, which was economically non-competitive and which had lost its political authority, collapsed with dizzying speed.

The struggle between ideology and reality: three taboos

Investigations of social categorization and stereotypes have been carried out in Hungary since the mid-1960s. Naturally, they bore the marks of the system that had impressed its political, economic and social characteristics on this part of the world until the end of the 1980s. These marks can be seen as clearly in the questions asked and in the methods chosen as in the opinions and answers of the respondents, and in their implications.

In the history of socialism, the relationship between ideological starting points and socio-political realizations is one of the greatest issues and one of the most important lessons. The great ideological rallying points of 17th- and 18th-century European and American history were political freedom and equality before the law. In the 19th and 20th centuries they were joined by the ideals of economic equality and social security. In their attempts to realize socialism, the communists sacrificed both political and economic freedom—in principle, at the altar of equality; their system was imposed on technically underdeveloped countries by main force.

The system was born in Russia, when the military defeat of the feudal police state drove the pauperized masses of the multi-national tsarist empire into a revolution. It was conceived in revolutionary terror, and maintained by the terrorist dictatorship of Stalinism through periods of intervention, isolation, world war and world-wide arms race with the highly developed market economies of the West. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union extended its military, political and economic influence over the whole eastern region of Europe, where it came up against the resistance of cultural and social relations that were foreign to it.

It was the strength and weakness of the socialism of the communists that it was simultaneously a system of ideas and a political movement, then a political system and even a world power. The two roles both strengthen and fetter each other. It must be a remarkable system of ideas if it can grip the masses and transform the world, but it is bound to lose its idealistic purity as it collects the historical deposits of wrong-doing, troubles, and failure. It is high-quality politics if it expresses its aims and principles through the promise of philosophical depth ripened by historical experience, but it will lose its reason and efficiency if it tries to do violence to real social relationships by clinging to outdated abstractions.

Mental restrictions that obstruct and deform the knowledge of reality arose from the combination of power and ideology in three cognitive areas that inform particularly important opinions. The theorem regarding the historical destiny of the *working class*—the idea that it is the workers engaged in modern industry who will shake off the shackles of exploitation and will create a new world of paradise—can be traced back to Marx. This imposed role affected the conception of social classification and prestige relationships. According to Lenin, the basis of the existence, strength, and responsibility of the Bolshevik Party and its right to mould society even by force is the *scientific knowledge of development* determined by law. If development is not determined by law, if knowledge about it is not of scientific quality, if party politics does not or cannot build on it, then the party and its state will lose their ideological legal ground. The *Soviet world empire*, the political achievement of Stalin, demanded a distinguished place at every level and in the overall image of international relations on the basis of the historical merits of its pioneering work, the generalization of leading experiences, and last, but not least, on the basis of raw military and political force.

Communist systems could change and did in fact undergo transformations, but the above theorems belonged to their essence: they could not be abandoned. As a result, they became taboo. Reality, however, was struggling and contradicted them: the working class did indeed awake to awareness, but it did not lead society; in fact, it tried to merge into its hierarchy as a lower middle class. The courses of development branched off, economic indices became increasingly important in time of peace, even partial success could only be won by sacrificing doctrines based on social visions. In a bipolar world, as the international flow of information speeded up, the military capacity and high technological achievements of the Soviet empire could no longer conceal its failings in the fields of economy, standard of living, and culture. This was perceived by common sense and reflected in everyday experience.

Naturally, it is impossible to grasp and reconstruct the Stalinist terror from the public opinion polls of the times. But it was a sign of a new age when, from the 1960s onwards, systematic research into social views in Hungary was no longer excluded on an ideological basis, when the authorities thought it could be utilized politically, when it was encouraged under controlled circumstances, and, before long, it was no longer sealed off from international professional publicity. The restraints of caution gradually relaxed, both in the researchers and among the respondents. For some, this happened quite fast, for others, it was a slow process, but more and more could be revealed about the contents and changes of social views. This was both a reflection and a modest part of a process that was considered as progressive decay by orthodox believers of the system. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that they were right.

Transformation of the political system

We do not have enough space here, nor perspective or source material, to give a deeper analysis than a rough overview of the critical historical period of our investigations. Among others, even social psychologists have already treated the components and consequences of this varied and prolonged process (see Halász, 1987, 1992; Erös, 1993; Garai, 1993, 1995; Pataki, 1993; Forgas *et al.,* 1995), but several credible recollections, interview materials, essayist studies, and the psychologically sensitive flow of papers by politologist László Lengyel in particular, rival them. (For the variegated nature of views also see Fehér and Heller, 1992; Schöpflin, 1993; Krausz, 1994; Vásárhelyi, 1995.)

By the time Kádár died, his system had become obsolete: despite its previous success, it had lost almost all internal support by the end of the 1980s. Not only the young people, but the whole population, especially the most influential groups, the leaders of the economy and the intelligentsia, turned towards market economy and the world of democracy. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was also disintegrating; its dominant majority declared themselves Social Democrats. The government of Miklós Németh declared its independence from the Party. In a race with the increasing and diversifying opposition it dismantled the one-party system and created the legal conditions for a constitutional state, ensuring the smooth flow of the political, mental, and social change of the country. The years 1989–90 were a busy, lively, and exceptionally fertile period in Hungarian political life. From a socio-psychological perspective, the collective and individual changes in the political identity of the multitudinous party membership are fascinating, and the various ways in which individuals tried to escape from the restrictions of their previous group membership are most illuminating. Some members wanted to reform and re-name the party, others re-interpreted their own party activity, some denied their membership altogether and tried to redeem it by taking radically new directions.

Hungary was the first country in the region to start changing, but as her neighbours followed suit the significance of Hungary's pioneering role soon decreased. In several of the surrounding countries the transformation was a matter of the socialist leaders embarking upon openly nationalist programs. This political half-turn towards nationalism could be rationalized and justified in various ways:

a It ensured the political survival of those in power, and the continuation of government with new partners in a situation where no new political élite was ready to fill a possible power vacuum.
b It did not usually upset the advantages and achievements of 'existing socialism' by attempting to restore or radically renew social aims.
c It recognized that society was not yet ready for the development of a

private economy and individualistic ideas, but still understood and spoke the political language of collectivism.

d It meant that, with the disappearance of Soviet influence, the struggle for national independence and autonomy, traditionally linked with other, similarly oppressed views such as religious convictions, could come to the surface without resistance.

e It offered emotional and mental security, while other social and political attachments that might have provided a sense of identity either lost their object or became less credible. (Thus, for example, the chance of European integration and the sense of 'being European' might curb the one-sidedness of nationalist ambitions, but as the possibility of integration fades, these ambitions are likely to increase.)

f Finally, the struggle to preserve national and ethnic values would encourage the appraisal and conscious defence of wider moral and social standards in an otherwise dangerously de-stabilized situation.

This sort of policy might also have developed in Hungary under the leadership of Imre Pozsgay, but he disappeared from the scene in 1990 because the Hungarian situation differed from that of her neighbours in many respects. First of all, the possibility of a political change had been maturing both in the economy and in political thinking for years. On the one hand, a group of economic leaders with some skill, or at least some experience, in market economics had developed, with a relatively wide background of small contractors. On the other hand, small groups of intellectuals who 'thought differently' formed rapidly: they had been isolated and unheard for a long period, but the social criticisms that they expressed at a high intellectual level were shared by broad social strata and by many age groups. Furthermore, Hungary could look back to the civil middle class and the system of parliamentary democracy that she had once enjoyed. These memories, briefly revived in 1956, had survived for more than half a century; dim and fragmentary as they were, they still served as a kind of cultural breeding ground for the change of the political system. (This factor also distinguishes the Czech Republic from other countries in the region; there too, it may have a significant effect on the direction and speed of social transformation.)

In 1990, it was not a socialist-nationalist half-turn that took place in Hungary. The elections were won by an alliance known as the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), which took office together with its Christian Democrat and Smallholder coalition partners. The old Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP) had split up: the majority of its ex-members regrouped into the MSzMP's legal successor, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), painted the symbols of social modernization on their tattered banner and claimed to be the defenders of social democratic values. The left-wing rump of the MSzMP failed to win a single seat in parliament. Naturally, some ex-MSzMP members identified themselves with national and popular

efforts in the new situation and joined the victors, but they did not represent a dominant force within the MDF.

The Hungarian Democratic Forum, its leader József Antall, and the government that he co-ordinated, were attracted to the Hungarian political tradition of conservatism. They reached back to the system of values of the Christian middle class, which had never been very liberal, and attempted to regenerate historical continuity with the Horthy era pre-1945. This middleclass, right-wing government turned sharply against the 'bad old days' of communism, searched for people who could be held responsible for the sins of the past and tried to organize compensation for those who had been persecuted or impoverished. It aimed at European integration and, while avoiding a policy of territorial revision, cultivated contacts with Hungarian minorities abroad and supported their interests. It conducted a legal struggle for control over the mass media against strong liberal opposition from the group who were formerly labelled as 'thinking differently'; meanwhile, it did not condemn anti-Semitic accusations directed against the liberals.

The four-year term of the government was tragically disturbed by the death of József Antall and the loss of his statesmanlike qualities. During this period, the economy made little progress: the compensation paid to victims of the former regime and to the churches strained the resources of the state, living standards sank to a hopeless level for large sections of the population, and the anti-communist government scared away a considerable part of the old administration and the new middle class. The middle-class right wing lost the 1994 elections and was forced into opposition.

Four years earlier, the voters had wanted to break with the recent past and had demanded a new mentality and new leaders. They were motivated primarily by the rejection of the past, and it seemed to be only of secondary importance which party they chose from the selection of new and practically unknown politicians. They chose the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which promised changes, but not radical ones, whose representatives had lived together with the Kádár system just like the majority of the population, and who had not constituted the 'hard core' underground opposition of the liberals. In 1994, again, the voters wanted to break with the recent past, and rejected the Christian, national and conservative government. They chose the Hungarian Socialist Party, which combined idealized memories of the Kádár era and its faceless ways with promises of expert modernization. It was a political paradox that the successor party to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the successors of their former enemies the Association of Free Democrats (SzDSz) formed a coalition government together. Thus, the odyssey of Hungary continues towards distant aims through the transformation of production, massive unemployment, dramatic falls in the standard of living, and further loss of trust, beyond the constructive advice, strict demands and sour evaluations of international monetary institutions and

integrational organizations, towards a social market economy, full democratic parliamentary statehood and an integrated Europe.

The last empirical data were collected in the spring of 1994, a few weeks before the elections.

Subject, strategy, and method of research

The present volume reviews 25 years of investigations into stereotypes, and their principal results. The direction of these investigations can be characterized—in the style of modern bibliography—by a few key words: content of stereotypes, their historical changes, their organization within, and (for example in the cases of cross-categorization) between cognitive domains, the use, role and interrelationships of trait constructs in the characterizations of social categories and persons, and features of cognitive styles and social differences in the formation of these beliefs. Only the topics denoted by the first three key words will be covered in this volume. The subsequent ones can be found elsewhere (Hunyady, in press).

Content and changes of stereotypes

We repeatedly attempted to describe the content of characterizations of categories. In this respect our studies did not follow the increasingly widespread information processing paradigm, and deviated from research carried out in terms of that paradigm. Naturally, its concepts, operations and results provided a background for our investigations, but in the end our main focus was the problem of what traits are attributed to different categories in Hungary: what is the basis of their differentiation, what evaluation can be inferred from the related judgements, what is related to what, either explicitly or implicitly in their characterizations (the judgement of what trait is related to that of what other trait, the judgement of what category is related to that of what other category).

This orientation in content was not absent from American and English social psychology either, as will be seen below as we proceed from topic to topic; it repeatedly regains strength whenever social conflicts become strained, and important social changes ripen and take place (as a current example we might cite the investigation of national awareness in the period of European integration, but it is also worth mentioning the long-term problems of ethnic and gender stereotypes and prejudices in the United States). The antecedents were not studied, and it seemed worthwhile to reconstruct several social standpoints in a culture and political field of force which differed in many respects from that of the West.

The content of stereotypes feeds both on cultural traditions and on more recent collective experience and rumours. Beyond and in opposition to these sources, political ideological constraints also operated in Hungary for long

historical periods. The historical political transformation that gradually destroyed and eliminated ideological constraints, at the same time as it produced a variety of disturbing experiences for Hungarian society, created an exceptional 'experimental situation'. One self-evident question was how these changes affected the content of stereotypes (including stereotypes about historical periods and the changes themselves).

The historical accumulation and collection of the data

A series of investigations will be reviewed in this volume, starting with the analysis of basic historical concepts given by pupils in the mid-1960s. Hungarian society experienced considerable alterations in three decades, and public thinking changed at the same time. It is difficult to forecast what will elicit greater interest: the flowering and decline of the Kádár era, or the changes after 1989.

Naturally, these investigations were not initiated with the aim of following such or similar historical changes. The historical movements and developments that have just been described were not foreseen either by learned Kremlinologists, or by the most optimistic factions of the internal political opposition, or even by the author of this book. Nevertheless, a persistent interest in the interdisciplinary relationships of psychology, and in the chance of elaborating a historical and political psychology, encouraged us to consider the possibility of accumulating and comparing the data that we collected. The knowledge of this long-term aim also contributed to the fact that the topics under investigation were studied again and again at different times, and that our methods, once chosen, were also retained.

One of our chief aims was to compare the results received at different times, to identify long-term tendencies from the changes of the overall image. Temporal comparisons were made in almost every aspect of the reviews. Statistical comparisons of the structures (trait ranks and factor structures) were performed in several cases, but even then (see MDS maps and trait rank hierarchies), qualitative comparisons of the data received at different times were very often made and conclusions were drawn, based on these comparisons.

The statistical comparison of individual variables measured at different times was not our aim, the level of statistical significance was not measured, the extent of 'change' was not measured by such comparisons. There were three main reasons for this. The first was the conceptual conviction that every opinion gains meaning and significance in the given person, situation, and overall image. The comparison of overall images is primary, and individual empirical data can provide only additional material. The second reason was that despite the researchers' attempts at consistency, not only the methods, but especially the composition of the samples and their social integration have changed more or less in the course of time. Uniformity was attempted (for example, by using national representative samples, or student

samples built up from homogeneous groups), and the samples did have comparable common elements, but their uniformity could hardly be described as complete. The third reason was that the traditional methods for the quasi-longitudinal analysis of data that were used in the different investigations did not seem to be optimal. Consequently, the comparison of data received at different times demanded great care, and the recognition that our observations could sometimes be taken only as interesting, but unreliable, indications.

After 1989–90, there could be no doubt that a radical social change had taken place, which cast new light even on the previous results, and promised novel data about all of the essential questions that had previously been asked. From this point onwards, our replication and supplementary investigations were planned purposefully, with a view to the present historical summary and discussion of the empirical data.

The peculiar case of stereotype trapped by ideology

There has been extensive and deep debate on the question of whether or not public thinking is ideological, whether or not the views of common people are organized into a system where directions of interests and values appear, and whether they can be matched with the systems of views elaborated in political thinking and propagated by the authorities.

In Eastern Central Europe the question has been settled by history, and the conclusion can hardly be doubted. This is not because we could be or were convinced of the overall effectiveness of Marxist ideology, or of the success of institutionalized ideological education and co-ordinated official political propaganda. Such direct effects were, to say the least, of dubious value. Seen 'from the inside', they were even more dubious than they were for the outside observer who could see below the varnish of opinions expressed under official control. It is hard to tell whether the propagandists themselves took their own propaganda seriously, whether they expected the younger generation to pay more than lip-service to their ideological theses, or hoped that they would set social and personal goals in the real spirit of Marxist ideology. There can be no doubt, however, that Marxist-Leninist ideology did play its part in the birth, existence, and legitimization of the socio-political system. It provided a language through which power could express itself, and in which people could communicate with power. People expressed their relationship to this system in this language both for themselves and for the system. Even if the content of this view of the world was disputed at one or many points, the structures, categories and their relationships were accepted as natural starting points by many people, who continue to conceptualize social matters in these terms even today.

Ideology, as we have seen, most probably fits in with common views and enhances them as it descends from philosophical and scientific spiritual heights, spreads and dissolves into public thinking. This process depends on

power positions, and the disintegration and collapse of the whole system opens new vistas for both the sober (and naturally 'naive') generalization of social experiences, and the attraction of hitherto forbidden counter-ideologies. Consequently, changes in the content of stereotypes that people hold and express can be expected; in fact, it would be most odd if no changes were found.

The method of questioning: free andIor pre-structured

Almost all of the 14 investigations listed in the Appendix contained both open-ended and multiple-choice scalar items. Undoubtedly, the latter types were more frequent in our investigations, and often they prevailed.

Each open-ended item served one of three aims. First of all, they asked for knowledge about historical times, places, figures, concepts. The answers could be evaluated normatively: in 1981 and in 1991 they provided data about the respondents' level of knowledge. Descriptions of 'fundamental historical concepts' were analysed not only in terms of the nature and richness of the content elements, but also in terms of approach and phrasing. Another function of the open-ended items was to elicit opinions, characterizations and judgements in all three fields related to the nation, class relations, and the historical past. Finally, open-ended questions sometimes probed associations between different categories and different cognitive domains.

However, the characterization of categories and persons, and even the exploration of the perceived relationships between them, generally involved the use of scalar systems. Following the formal solution of Osgood's semantic differential (Osgood *et al.,* 1957), the respondents were invited to express their judgements about the target persons or the representatives of the categories to be characterized by means of bipolar trait scales. Generally, a seven-point scale was used between the trait pairs so that the negative traits were put at the bottom end of the scale, at value 1, while the positive traits were next to the scale value of 7. In this case, neutral or ambivalent judgements were expressed by a value of 4 on the scale. When selecting the traits (see Tables 3.1 and 4.1 for more details), the choice of traits given as a response to open-ended questions was taken into consideration, but it was also important that the characterization of the scale system touched upon intellectual features ('intelligent', 'educated', 'good-humoured'), moral features ('honest', 'diligent'), the sociability of the type or person to be characterized ('friendly', 'popular'), and their attitudes regarding the situation and their identity ('satisfied', 'self-assertive', 'patriotic', 'interested in politics'). The association of the listed traits peculiarly coloured the meaning of the resulting clusters: 'good-humoured' can be an element of, for example, sociability in varied combinations, while 'interested in politics' was definitely an intellectual feature. The judgements were usually made from about ten aspects, on the basis of mostly identical trait pairs, although these

were slightly modified as a function of object circles. Besides this typical procedure, some other scales were also used, for instance, for the judgement of periods from fixed aspects, or for global judgements of similarity between groups.

Characterization of social objects: the introduction of key concepts

The characterizations of categories and persons were carried out with trait scales. These characterizations were described and analysed from three points of view:

'Trait rank order', or 'profile of characterization'

As has been explained, we take the content of a stereotype to mean that in comparison with each other some of the given traits are judged to be more, some less, characteristic of a given category than others.

Two further points had to be considered in this case. One was the interdependence of the positive and negative traits, the dimension of judgement being determined by its bipolar nature. Actually, the opposite traits referred to the same feature; this can be checked (as was done by Peabody, 1985), or guaranteed by contrasting them and asking for their simultaneous judgement (on an Osgood-type scale). The other point was that the assumption of positive traits is a less informative judgement than doubts or markedly negative statements.

On the basis of the above two considerations, we should perhaps not be satisfied with finding out whether or not certain traits are linked with the given category when stereotypes are explored. Nor is it enough to know the intensity of judgements that are positive and negative in themselves. The position of the judgements regarding pairs of traits in the positive-negative continuum can be the basis of outlining the profile of the object.

One objection to this solution may be that the meaning and value of individual traits depend on the context. Without knowing the values of the respondent, it is difficult to tell whether labelling somebody as 'interested in polities' implies a positive judgement or not. Similarly, it is difficult to judge whether 'self-assertiveness' or 'satisfaction' are positive when these traits are taken out of the context of the other evaluated traits. Giving full credit to the justness of these objections, we hold that if we do not start from a general meaning of the constructs as a first approach, even the possibility of the measurement of the general nature of the impression will be lost in the name of total relativism.

Thus, the contents of the stereotype are identified by the trait profiles received from the bipolar scales or from the trait ranks, the latter providing a simplified and more clearly marked image. We studied how widespread these contents were, how often they appeared repeatedly in the different groups, and how permanently they appeared in time.

'Factor structure', or 'the components of characterization'

There could be full agreement between individuals when a certain category (or a person in a given relationship) is characterized, but opinions usually vary: the presence or absence of certain traits are seen and judged differently by different people. It is uncertain, however, whether or not judgements regarding the traits are correlated with each other, which are the traits whose judgements are related in this sense, and which are independent from each other. Correlation analysis and principal component analysis are suitable methods to answer these questions, and they help to reveal the traits behind which common factors can be found.

The factors underlying the series of judgements, and the group of traits belonging together by and in these traits are considered as the components of the characterizations. Such a group of traits cannot be considered as the content of stereotypes in the sense that everybody would consider these traits as characteristic (or very uncharacteristic) of the object. On the contrary, there is a parallel difference in opinion in this respect: some respondents consider these traits as characteristic, others think they are missing. Thus, in public thinking they belong together, at least when talking about the given object. The value of their judgement is not necessarily identical, but their relation (small or large difference) is relatively stable, thus the related judgements are co-ordinated with each other.

Some of the characterizations have one single underlying factor: all of their traits are co-ordinated. It is not uncommon that the characterization is broken into two, having two factors, one of which includes the (relatively or absolutely) negative traits of the characterization. It may be a consequence that at least one group among the respondents deemed that the given features were more or less missing from the object being characterized, while others assumed the existence of these traits with greater or lesser certainty.

'Object evaluation', or 'the evaluative charge of characterization'

The object or person to be characterized is either approved or disapproved, appreciated or criticized. The attitude was established using the judgements of the traits of the objects within the present study, from the general level of positivity and negativity. Unweighted means were calculated for all of the judgements regarding the object, and the result was considered as the index of object evaluation, or the 'evaluative charge' of the characterization.

The method of measurement employed was obviously an imprecise one. It is insensitive to the content relevance of the individual characterizations, to their role in the evaluative differentiation between objects, to their personal relevance, and to their social distribution and correlations, and it seems to be a grotesque simplification in comparison with the refined mental edifice of 'cognitive algebra'. Nevertheless, it is only one of the studied projections of the characterizations; its function is shared by the analysis of trait profiles

and the factors behind traits. Other methods were also used to elucidate object evaluations, which controlled the conclusions about preferences that were drawn mainly from the judgements of the traits, primarily by determining positions in the hierarchy of objects (thus, for example, the ranks based on individual traits were also averaged).

With this, however, we have already passed the analysis of judgements regarding a given object. The aim of our investigations was far from being confined to revealing the content and structure of the individual characterizations. In fact, the relationships of the different characterizations were studied by cognitive domains, and even beyond.

The relationships of characterizations belonging to one cognitive domain

In general eight objects were characterized within each cognitive domain; five in the case of historical periods. The relationships between the perceptions of these objects show how the given cognitive domain is organized in the minds of the respondents: how it is structured, what preferences they reflect, what principles and value judgements may lie behind them.

These relationships are analysed from three points of view. First, the similarities of the profiles of the characterizations of the objects were revealed, and the degree of similarity between the trait ranks of the different objects using rank order correlations. Second, the evaluation hierarchies of the objects were examined: the evaluations of objects were compared within the individual cognitive domains. The starting point could be the average judgements of the traits, the average positions in the ranks created by traits, or the direct rankings of the objects. Third, the distances between the characterized objects were also mapped using the multidimensional scaling (MDS) procedure. These 'distances' condensed the supposed differences, without restricting the differences into a single evaluative dimension. The starting data were usually the judgements given on bipolar trait scales, although sometimes, as in the case of ethnic groups in double bind, their similarities were judged by the respondents directly.

Different expectations can be involved in the exploration of the relationships of evaluations and similarities in the three cognitive domains that were studied.

The historical periods form a chain in the dimension of time; together they form an overall image of process. The similarities between them and the level of evaluation within them show how the respondents divided up the past. The present had a special place in the 'line of development' that they demonstrated, which could be an organic continuation of the past, an alarming detour, or an optimistic hope for a better future.

The socio-occupational categories are definitely organized into a hierarchy. The status and prestige of these groups are known and expected to be different. It may be wondered on what basis the position in the hierarchy

is determined, and whether it is only one aspect or several aspects that are involved. The differences between the categories arise from the role and the position taken, the activity performed and the achievement reached. Despite all differences, and even contradictions, there is some functional interdependence between the categories, for they are part of a society. The respondent's own category fits into this overall image: its acceptance gives a peculiar social perspective, while its prestige influences the respondent's acceptance of and identification with it.

National categories are regarded as forming groups. Some nations are seen to co-operate with each other, some are allies, some compete with each other, and some are active enemies. In principle, there are no longer any hierarchical relationships between them, but differences and similarities, which may be attributed to genetic origins, environmental conditions, or historical effects, depending on the attitude of the respondent, and which are manifested in economic performances. In addition to the characterization of nations as large social groups, respondents were also asked to compare the internal state and external situation of the countries.

A shift in the style of research

The content and organization of beliefs regarding history, society, and nations were studied using the conceptual apparatus, operations, and terminology outlined above. In retrospect it is clear that, beyond the particularities of the approach, there was a general shift in our methodology. At the beginning of our studies, in the 1960s, we had been carrying out the investigations at a higher level of abstraction, looking for specific content elements and structures of thinking in the replies of the respondents. In the mid-1990s, however, we were conducting exploratory research in several directions, prompting the respondents to make free comparisons and associations. This was not decisive in the mostly descriptive, partly free process of data collection, which was basically linked to trait scales. Nevertheless, it represented a slight modification which is in accordance with the methodological tendency indicated by McGuire (1973). It is also concordant with the nature of the social changes that are taking place in the region, and which promise a variegated, spontaneous spiritual atmosphere instead of homogeneous closed orders.

2 The cognitive domain of nations

I National categories and attitudes

Premises and rationale

For decades, the first thing that occurred to specialists and laypeople alike on hearing the word 'stereotype' was nearly always the judgement and characterization of national and ethnic categories. 'How do people perceive the Germans?' 'What do people think of the Turks?' 'What traits do people consider to be characteristic of Negroes?' Since the 1930s, these have been the classic examples. In other words, and in harmony with our topic and the literature, the historical prototype of the stereotype is a national-ethnic stereotype. This must be taken into account if we are really to understand a number of debates and occasionally the occurrence and phrasing of basic questions about this phenomenon of public thinking. When, for instance, supporters of the view that 'There is some truth in stereotypes' clash with those who believe that 'There is no foundation whatsoever for stereotypes', the basic argument, whether or not it is actually stated, concerns the question of whether public thinking can justly look for and hope to find differences between national-ethnic groups. The provocative actions of the extreme right wing in this area, their personal and social consequences, and their occasionally painful timeliness have drawn motifs and aspects from outside the sphere of science into stereotype research, too. It is not only perfectly understandable but actually professionally proper when social psychologists, studying stereotypes and prejudices, collect and emphasize data that argue against the frightening appearance of aggressive nationalism and racism in the 20th century.

National attitudes and stereotypes

How do people see their own group, other groups, and the relationship between them? This question was raised and subjected to empirical investigation quite early on. Sumner (1906) introduced the term 'ethnocentrism', indicating the acceptance of the views of one's own group, its positive discrimination, and even its prejudiced appreciation at the

expense of others, which may afflict the minorities, the nationalities and foreign nations alike. On an intuitive basis, Bogardus (1925) elaborated his very reliable and valid scale for measuring and comparing 'social distance' from other groups. The evaluation of one's own group is not revealed by this method.

The category of ethnocentrism includes all kinds of partiality and prejudice (in accordance with American conditions, it is a looser and more comprehensive term than nationalism in the strict sense of the word); in fact, it includes the assumption that these partialities and prejudices are interrelated and form attitude clusters. Adorno and his colleagues attempted to prove this by their classic series of investigations which resulted in the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* in 1950. According to this research, anti-Semitism-ethnocentrism-authoritarianism form a chain: the essence of their conception is that specific prejudices are manifestations of the general orientation, characteristics, and type of the responding personality. Actual proofs of the theorem are prone to contradictions, too, based on methodological and theoretical considerations and on contrary observations (see, e.g., Doob, 1964; Ray, 1974; Heaven *et al.,* 1984), but the direction of research proved to be fertile, and the right-wing, prejudiced, socalled 'authoritarian personality' is being successfully identified, analysed and characterized all over the world (see recently Altemeyer, 1988; Stone, Lederer and Christie, 1993).

Likert's classic scale system (1932) already aimed specifically to investigate attitudes towards international relationships and politics. It was part of a pioneering enterprise which—beyond individual attitudes—investigated the system of views, and, in the end, the degree of radicalism of American university students from many points of view and in their interrelationships (Murphy and Likert, 1938). The same questions had been present since the beginning of American investigations in this area: should the USA retreat or take an active international role (see especially Free and Cantril, 1967; McClosky, 1967; Watts and Free, 1974), should she demand dominance or not, how much sacrifice should she make (either in the form of economic aid or military intervention)? Evidently, the relationships towards the cold war, international communism, and the Soviet Union were investigated in the appropriate periods (see, e.g., Scott, 1965), which were prone to the accidental influence of contemporary political developments. It should be mentioned here that the suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary significantly decreased the evaluation of the Soviet Union all over the world, but one year later, when the first sputnik was launched in 1957, her evaluation returned practically to its former level (Deutsch and Merritt, 1965).

Several factors may influence the evaluation of different countries. One of them is more knowledge and personal experience—it is hoped that this can reduce prejudice. The observable effect of a visit to a foreign country resembles a U-shaped curve, and several observers reported that another

U-shaped curve can describe the attitude towards the homeland and the home relationships after returning home.

So-called patriotism scales measure the evaluation of the respondent's own country and determine personal readiness to sacrifice (the earliest was Thurstone, 1932). Naturally, they include some kind of interpretation of patriotism itself. Thus, Christiansen (1959) attempted to cast light upon the patriotism (or nationalism) of the respondents by contrasting their commitment to humanity and to Norway.

The evaluation of countries and that of people are two distinct, though probably related, attitudes. The description of individual people may move in a broader frame, and more individual aspects can be taken into consideration than for countries; the former may outline a more or less typical human profile—as a prototype of the category.

The classical study by Katz and Braly (1933, 1935) covered this topic, and defined the operationalization of the concept of stereotype for decades. It combined the investigation of stereotype and prejudice, demonstrating that the well-known 'Negroes' and the practically unknown Turks' were the least likeable, and had the least favourable characteristics in the eyes of white, middle-class American university students. The first group were said to be 'superstitious' (84%) and lazy (75%), as to the second group there was less agreement, the most frequent assumption (54%) being that the Turks were 'ruthless'. While they demonstrated a clear-cut relationship between attitude towards a group and the evaluative tint of the traits describing their profile, it could not be shown that the social uniformity of the characterization depended on the evaluative attitude, nor on the degree of acquaintance with the group (although the two together seem to explain why certain features of the known, but rejected groups ('Negroes' and 'Jews') were considered as characteristic by most respondents).

The American setting of the investigation makes it hard to decide what constitutes 'knowledge of a group'. Almost all of the Princeton university students who were questioned could have met the members of the groups that were included in the study (with the important exception of the Turks') as immigrants to America. Yet the chances of such meetings must vary greatly, in terms both of frequency and of social quality. At the same time, all of the immigrants belonged to the most preferred 'American' category, too, while an independent national state could also appear beyond them, mostly the image of a superpower with great international influence (in this respect, the categories of 'Negroes' and 'Jews' constituted the exception). Looking at it from another side, the groups to be characterized differed in external, racial features, too (especially 'Negroes' and the 'Japanese'). This variegation is masked by the term 'ethnic group', which continued to be used loosely to include different nations and minorities.

The investigations repeated in Princeton can be considered as the direct continuation of the Katz and Braly study (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins *et al.,* 1969).

The frequency of negative evaluation decreased in the characterizations, and more favourable aspects also emerged, which led to the conclusion that the stereotyping of and prejudice against Negroes had also decreased over the three decades. One of the methodological deficiencies (cf. Brigham, 1971) here was that temporal cross-sections can be compared only externally. This emphasizes the value of investigations like the longitudinal study by Rothbart and John (1993), who revealed the impressions of students about Blacks and Asians before and after their four years of university studies, together with opportunities and willingness to make contact with these groups. The overall picture of changes gives rise to less optimism. The negative features put forward in the Katz and Braly study were present in the following form: the appropriate positive feature was not considered as characteristic of the target group. The whole sample was very consistent in judging the characteristics; thus, the 'cultural stereotype' was stable. At the individual level, the characterizations were more unstable, the demonstrable temporal changes did not point in the same direction, if the different target objects and the different trait clusters were viewed together. As compared to the more comprehensive ethnic categories, their specific sub-categories (Black student, Asian students) were less different from each other, in this sense they were less stereotyped, but this was generally true both of the original positions and of those four years later.

The international contrast and comparison of characterizations are a natural extension of the investigation of national stereotypes. This has been done in both adults (Buchanan and Cantril, 1953) and children (Lambert and Klineberg, 1967). Buchanan and Cantril carried out their investigations in 1948–49 with the support of UNESCO. In eight countries at the western end of the polarized world they found that Americans' were the most preferred people with the most favourable traits, while 'Russians' were the least liked nation and their perceived traits were the most negative. They administered a variation of Katz and Braly's procedure, decreasing the number of traits to 12. The greatest agreement among the respondents in different countries proved to be in indicating the assumed traits of the 'Russians'. Thus, this appeared as a common mental possession of 'western culture' to the researchers. Language community evoked sympathy, but a common border evoked more antipathy from the inhabitants of the adjoining countries. At this time, memories of war allies and enemies were still effective (which explains why 'Germans' were the most repellent for the French sample). With this background, the change in evaluation and content regarding the characterization of 'Russians' between 1942 and 1948 is very striking. According to Cantril and Strunk (1951), 'Russians' were considered first of all as 'industrious' and 'brave' at the time of the war, which changed in both meaning and order to 'ruthless' and 'industrious' three years after the war ended. Relying on these and similar findings (Gilbert, 1951), Buchanan and Cantril put forward their thesis that stereotypes do not direct the relationships of sympathy between

nations, but rather conform to co-operation and conflicts between them. The observation of the authors is very important for our purposes, namely, that in the meantime, a certain stability could also be seen, for example, there was a positive and a negative pattern of traits of the national characterization of the Russians in both periods, and despite the shift between them, there was no change in what was considered as more, and what was considered as less typical of that nation within a set of traits.

Later it was found again in the politically polarized world that the degree of negativity of attitudes towards the Soviet Union decreased in Western Europe between 1954 and 1964, while the perceived significance of this superpower also decreased slightly (Merritt and Puchala, 1968). Public opinion reacted sensitively to the different stages of space research competition. The basic tendency of these changes was the positive equalization of the West European nations, and the emphasis on the values and significance of the USA. Circumstances did not allow the empirical investigations to be extended over the Eastern bloc, or over the often mentioned Russian population. Nevertheless, the expression 'mirror image', introduced by Bronfenbrenner (1961), seemed to be appropriate for the characterization of the tensions of the cold war. Relying on his own observations, Bronfenbrenner concluded that the citizens of the two superpowers related to themselves and to the other party similarly: they saw themselves as peace-loving, and saw the others as threatening; they saw a split between the leaders and the people on the other side, and were afraid of this unfounded and dangerous policy. Naturally, it was impossible to talk about the complete mutuality of attitude and judgement of the situation besides this narrow aspect of power. Oskamp (1965) contributed to the understanding of the parallelism and opposites of political thinking with his analysis, demonstrating that Americans (and probably Russians loyal to the system) applied a 'double measure' when they judged the activity of their own government and that of the other side. This tendency regarding American-Russian relations was less characteristic of, for example, British respondents (Oskamp, 1972, 1977).

Buchanan and Cantril found that respondents attributed quite favourable traits to their compatriots (and themselves). They explained this subjectivity by saying that national autostereotypes are the 'extension of the ego'. With this, they touched one of the most relevant issues from the psychological point of view, which became differentiated later, but is still unsolved (see egocentric projection to one's own group, Mullen *et al.*, 1992, and ethnocentric projection to people in general, Krueger and Zeiger, 1993). The tendency to select one's own group was also markedly present among the 6-, 10- and 14-year-old children in the UNESCO research project, which was conducted in 11 regions of the world (Lambert and Klineberg, 1967). In 1959, when the children answered open-ended questions in an interview situation, the positive selection of their own nation was absent only in the responses of the Japanese and the South

African Bantu samples. The 6-year-old children gave only 'good' and 'bad' descriptions of foreigners, the responses of the 10 to 14-year-old children were more differentiated both in evaluation and description: sympathetic nations were described more objectively, while the characterizations of disliked nations were more evaluative. This was the area and trend of research that led to the theory of social identity marked by the names of Tajfel (1974, 1982) and Turner (1975, 1982), and to further mental constructions. Like Jahoda (1962), Tajfel (1966) found that children cherish and demonstrate national feelings before they acquire genuine knowledge.

The interrelationship between the evaluation of countries and knowledge about them was studied in three age groups of children by Johnson, Middleton and Tajfel (1970). The uniformity of preferences increased with age: England came first, followed by Australia, France, and the USA. China, India, Japan, and Germany fell slightly back, but Russia was evaluated negatively. The children knew slightly more about the countries they liked and about those they treated with more or less reservations. The authors concluded that this reflected the effect of 'propaganda environment'. Another group of findings (Middleton, Tajfel and Johnson, 1970) concerned the degree to which the egocentrism of the children's standpoint prevents understanding of the relationship between foreigners and their own homeland. The older children assumed greater differences between their own views and the views of the inhabitants of a disliked country, and, generally, the children assumed that in a fictitious dangerous situation the representatives of a disliked country would not behave fairly. The correlation between cognition and motivation is assumed by the 'social identity' theory of Tajfel and Turner. According to this, individuals compare social categories the way they do because they want to contrast the value of their own category with that of other(s), and in this way they can raise their own positive self-esteem. This appreciation of one's own category does not appear similarly in every dimension, but is attached to certain aspects of evaluation (in others it may be different and even opposite, see Dion, 1979; Mummendey and Schreiber, 1983). According to Turner, the first stage of social identification is categorization, the second is the identification of typical and characteristic behavioural elements, and, finally, in the course of self-stereotyping, the person accepts the internal and external features of his/her category. Being listed in a category and accepting it is not necessarily a straightforward process: there may be resistance and reaction (Lemyre and Smith, 1985). Thus, 'extension of the ego' to the category of the self in general, and to one's own ethnic and national group in particular, is not at all an easy operation.

Tanaka (1972) asked for national characterizations in fixed trait dimensions, proving in international comparisons that beyond cultural peculiarities the typical factor structures of Osgood's 'semantic space' of nations were common in many places, and she identified general rules in the judgements of compound concepts containing national components. One

finding of her systematic and methodologically invaluable investigation was that—according to multiple regression analysis—the features of compounds like 'Japanese government', 'Japanese people', 'Japanese nuclear experiments', 'Japanese foreign policy', 'Japanese military power' determine the image of 'Japanese' in general. Warr, Schroder and Blackman (1969a, 1969b) took another step forward in the application of multi-variable procedures when they were able to contrast and correlate the results of semantic differential (SD) measurement and multidimensional scaling (MDS) in judgements of the governments of countries. It was found that the evaluation dimension was more important in both cases, which, incidentally, became even more significant in the cases of objects of political relevance (in England) in judgements made by right-wing people than in those of left-wing people.

Peabody's book (1985) about national characteristics represents—in a certain sense—the high point of research into this topic. It is outstanding in that he conducted a methodically renewed and uniform stereotype study in nine countries in 1969–70. He did this on the basis of a systematic review of the related literature, with the assumption and conclusion that nations really have observable typical traits. Accepting Inkeles and Levinson's (1969) consideration, he fixed the aspects of comparison as the nature of social relationships and rules, control of aversion and internal impulses, relationship towards authority and hierarchical order. Apart from the last aspect, the similarity between 'Americans' and 'Englishmen' would be complete, according to Peabody. He saw a relationship between the mentalities of 'Frenchmen' and 'Italians'. 'Germans' and 'Russians' were not related even to each other in his analysis. Peabody did not dwell long on the judgement of the smaller, especially Central European nations. Thus, only the following can be read: 'According to the judgement of Austrians, Hungarians represent a degenerate variation of traditionally impulsive behaviour, as present in Viennese operettas. They are judged to be particularly "loose" and "assertive"' (Peabody, 1985, p. 196).

His main finding regarding stereotypes was that there was a concordance between totally different sub-samples in their characterizations of the individual target nations. The validity of this finding is only underlined by the fact that the same sub-samples judged different target nations differently (cf. Jaspars and Warnaen, 1982 and Marin and Salazar, 1985). Peabody did not go deeply into the question of what connected the two groups of nations—'Englishmen', 'Russians', and 'Germans', on the one hand, and Americans', 'Frenchmen', and 'Italians', on the other—in the eyes of the respondents, and why. According to the author, the descriptions give a more accurate than false portrayal of real national character, although the stereotypes are not sensitive to subtle details, and there was no way to express them in the study.

Separating the descriptive and evaluative nature of the characterizations, he found the former aspect more important. The two most important

descriptive dimensions were tight-loose and assertive-unassertive. In the first dimension, the respondents perceived rather great differences between nations (and they agreed to a large extent, with the exception that Austrians and Greeks consider themselves as loose, while outsiders see them as tight, disciplined, with strong self-control). No polarization could be seen in the other dimension, the difference was only in the judgement of the greater or lesser degree of assertiveness (usually, the less assertive nations belonged to the tighter nations with greater self-control; thus, the two dimensions were not wholly independent of each other).

He saw the role of evaluation totally differently from the stereotype conception of Katz-Braly. According to Peabody (1985, pp. 224–27), the test of the Katz-Braly conception is for the evaluative component to be more important than the descriptive component within the characterization, and for the evaluation to be negative both in the direct and the indirect forms. None of these criteria are met in two-thirds of the 76 studied characterizations, and there was only one that met these demands fully (what the Greek sample said about the 'Turks').

The rarity of negative responses also means that

a The previously found evaluative difference between the two world systems did not appear in these data (the evaluative components of the 'Americans' and the 'Russians' were equal).
b Generally, there was no evaluative discrimination between the respondents' own nation and other national groups (in fact, the national self-evaluations of the French and the Germans were worse than their appreciation of the traits of other groups).
c He found rejection in a peculiar case, namely, the samples of societies known for their greater tightness, discipline and self-control gave negative characterizations of nations who were looser, less disciplined and controlled their impulses less (this appeared in his study in parallel with the difference between north and south. As he assumed, this mainly concerned the characterization of 'Italians' among the target nations here).

With this Peabody claims to have explained why others had repeatedly found differences in the evaluations of the ingroup and outgroups (Brewer and Campbell, 1976; see also Brewer, 1986), because the judged national groups were less civilized. He himself said in his final remark that traditional stereotypes (prejudices) will disappear in Europe.

If we hesitate to describe Peabody's work as the peak product of national stereotype research, it is partly because of the isolation of his observations. The author has a tendency, not only in this basic matter, to assume that his own, somewhat subjective, opinion represents the final word on problems that are still open to debate (for example, he does not consider the interchange of socio-occupational and national categories as worth

studying, saying that European nations include and represent all kinds of socio-occupational groups; see Peabody, 1985, p. 92). Koomen (1993) performed a secondary analysis of data collected 30 years before in six West European countries, from adult samples of more than one thousand. His findings supported the concordance of samples in the characterization of the target nations, but contradicted Peabody's opinions regarding the evaluation of ingroups-outgroups: the respondents systematically evaluated their own national group more positively. The differences of the results may be due to the mutually allowable reason that the two samples were taken from different social and age groups. Student samples are usually more likely to refrain from the evaluative differentiation of national-ethnic groups. In this respect, Krueger's (1994) finding is noteworthy, namely, that American students project their personal racial stereotypes, they describe the socalled cultural stereotypes as the same. In these two manifestations of the students no positive differentiation of their own group (black vs. white) could be seen, but they assumed that the other group did make such differentiation. Thus, by making this assumption they blamed the other group for violating the social norm of equality.

Thus, the characterization of their own national group may be different from the description of other nations not only in the degree of inherent evaluation but also in the method of internal representation. Analysing the free description of European nations, Askevis-Leherpeux and Bastounis (1994) found that French and Dutch students differ in the way they know other European countries, and there is a difference in the compactness of their national characterizations. But they were similar in the general tendency to use more abstract traits in the characterization of their own group than they did for any other group. The difference in the knowledge of foreign nations was manifested in their mention of specific forms of activity.

The process of the development of European identity has several levels, and positive attitude is not the same as identification. Thus, we are justified in setting the aim of revealing the degree and content of 'supranational' identification in relationship with identity constituent elements at different levels of abstraction (De Rosa, 1994). It must not be ignored that integration is associated first of all with economic processes and problems to be solved, while cultural connection is related and attached primarily to the nation. One of the most urgent inter-group problems of modern Europe is immigration. In this connection, the set of the minority group in a disadvantageous situation is more often studied than the strategic orientation of the dominant group. In the latter respect (Piontkowski and Florack, 1995), the declared opinions show intentions of adaptation and assimilation in Germany and Switzerland. If this is viewed together with the orientation of the Slovaks towards the Hungarian minority who migrated there at least 1,100 years ago, then among the strategies of dominant groups, the intention of exclusion appears just as frequently as the previous two strategies—unfortunately. Current developments in the East Central

European region led to the changed evaluation of people's own national groups in the countries of the Eastern bloc. Social comparison may lead to 'negative social identity', as shown by the case of the East Germans, who cannot avoid being compared with the West Germans after unification. Mummendey *et al.* (1994) attempted to model the choice of the different (group vs. individual, behavioural vs. cognitive) strategies (outlined in social identity theory) for coping with this negativity.

The investigation of national stereotypes started in Hungary in the 1970s. Although the empirical study of public thinking began between 1945 and 1948, in the delicate and defenceless situation of the country in international affairs the excellent psychologist Pál Harkai-Schiller and his colleagues asked no questions about other nations or about national awareness. The only conspicuous example was when the Hungarian Public Opinion Service asked a national representative sample whether they saw any chance of democracy taking root in Germany, and the majority answered in the negative. This was a living example of the fact that the direction of discrimination between nations and ethnic groups could change and even turn through 180 degrees within a few months or years, but the existence of prejudice did not change. After 1948, nation as an object and the empirical investigation of society were deemed undesirable in Hungary.

The first attempts at empirical investigation of the Hungarian autostereotype, the public conception of nation and patriotism, were made in 1973 in the context of studies discussed below. These were followed by a series of investigations, first on national representative samples, then on student samples, covering a longer period of time. This not inconsiderable methodological change was related to the fact that the institutional and financial conditions for such research had changed for the worse, while the direction of research involving national awareness at the Central Research Institute for Mass Communication, which had a monopoly of public opinion research, was taken over by György Csepeli in 1977. Since then Csepeli and his colleagues (1979, 1985, 1987, 1992) have played an active role in the investigation of opinions and attitudes related to the Hungarian nation, and in the mediation of the related social-psychological literature.

There seemed to be a mental tension within the work they carried out and published with such efficiency. On the one hand, György Csepeli sees and considers integration of the nation and national attitude as being unavoidable in the stage of bourgeois development. With this background, he expects the general human tendencies of ethnocentrism and inter-group discrimination. However, he thinks that 'nation' itself is a mere figment of the imagination: its idea dims the clear vision of man, especially in the case of societies that have chosen the wrong historical path, like Hungary. On the one hand, a bitingly critical attitude arises as a consequence of these two preliminary assumptions, in which the fact and the sensation of national

identity are defined and caricatured as nationalism. He constantly attempts to account for national attachment as a reduction of cognitive dissonance, but the relevance of his loose theory is not supported convincingly. On the other hand, he believes in the fading and disappearance of national commitment and prejudice with short-sighted optimism. Up to 1989 he hoped that it would result from the strengthening of international structures. Since 1990, he has placed his confidence in the American example, which he thinks is good, and in the intellectual groups who are moving away from the traditional conception of nation. Among other things, he wrote in 1980 that national stereotypes had already died out from public thinking. This surprising thesis was contradicted in his own and in his colleagues' investigations, even if they use the concept of stereotype in a narrow and pejorative meaning of the word. The accumulated empirical material is rich, and its consequences are far from being confined to the closed sphere of national nihilism.

The research done by György Csepeli or in co-operation with him has proven that the positive emotions regarding one's own nation are manifested in biased favourable judgements and attributions, and the attitude labelled as ethnocentric by the authors is already manifested in the responses and choices of 10 to 14-year-old children. It is a noteworthy socializational contribution that the educational level of the head of the family determines the country preference of the child more than the response of the parent him/herself (Szabó and Csepeli, 1984). In the 1980s, children of intellectual parents preferred West European (non-socialist) countries at an early age, and as the age of the children increased this tendency became general. After the change of the socio-political system, national self-evaluation definitely decreased in the studies aimed directly at this (Lendvay, 1993). It can be concluded at this time that the expansive, nationalist pressure of national commitment was far from the representative sample of the country, and a new observation was also made, according to which for certain groups Hungarian Jews bear the values of civilization and modernization; thus, they are attractive and promising prototypes (Lázár, 1994).

We have treated the cognitive area of national categories repeatedly and from many sides. Following the same lines, two sets of questions can be distinguished: the first is related to concept interpretation and attitudes (this chapter), the second is related definitely and directly to questions about the stereotyped characterization of nations and ethnic groups (Chapter 3).

Thus we are going to investigate the following:

- How did the conception of nation and the relationship towards it change? What definitions of nation do pupils give in the 1960s under the influence of Marxian education, and subsequently, what national criteria do samples of different social groups indicate? What significance do they attribute to personal choice and emotions, and what emotions do they mention themselves?

- How do the respondents conceive the concept of patriotism? How do their social place and the historical time of their responses influence their opinion? Is there a (retrospective) tendency to move in the direction of greater tolerance and openness?
- How are different countries evaluated, what is appreciated in them? What was the degree of agreement between real political groups and the evaluation of countries? What changes did the disintegration of the Eastern bloc bring about? What was and is the place taken by Hungary, the homeland of the respondents, in the perceived hierarchy of countries?
- What was and what is now the content of the national autostereotype? What was the extent of social agreement over this? Were there features specific to certain groups? What position did the characterization of 'Hungarians' take among those of other national stereotypes with respect to similarities and differences? What role did a narrow or broad frame of reference play in national self-characterization?
- What relationship of similarities and differences did the respondents identify among different nations before and after the socio-political transformation, and were they the same as the evaluation of countries? Did national characterizations prove to be stable? In what respects were they unstable? What changes took place in the image of 'Englishmen', who enjoyed appreciation for centuries, and in that of 'Russians', confined to a leading role?
- What profile does the critical Romanian-Hungarian relationship show, and what is its overall image on 'the other side'?
- What impressions and what judgements of similarity related to categorization are given with respect to groups in double bind (like Hungarians abroad, and ethnic minorities in Hungary) in Hungary in 1994?
- How are Europe and 'Europeans' perceived after the change of the socio-political system? What are their differential features? What role have the individual countries played in the overall image of the continent, and how far away are Hungary and 'Hungarians' from it?

Concepts of 'nation' and 'our nation': historical motifs for the evaluation of ingroups

In the mid-1960s, we attempted to record the development of the concept of 'nation' in all age groups receiving public education, in other words, in both primary (up to age 14) and secondary schools (02.R65). What we observed was the gradual unfolding of a layperson's theory of nation rather than anything that could be described as purposeful pedagogical development or ideological indoctrination. One of the most important conclusions was that the much-debated Marxist concept of nation had not really modified the subject matter of instruction, and even history teaching had no deep

influence on the apparently spontaneous development of the definition of nation.

Pupils were asked what a nation was. Ten-year-olds who were just beginning to study history defined nation by means of a synonym (most frequently by 'people'), or gave an (exclusively Hungarian) example:

> 5th grade, S 26: 'People is called nation.'
> 6th grade, S 64: 'Peoples are nations.'
> 5th grade, S 27: 'Nation is when people speak the same language, for example, the people of Hungarian nationality.'

In the responses of somewhat older pupils, the term 'country' with its geographical-spatial character, appeared as a one to one, but more definite synonym of 'nation'. As the prototype of nations for pupils was the Hungarian nation, the recognition that members of a nation may live outside the borders of a country, and that the match between nation and country was therefore not complete and perfect, started at 11–12 years of age.

> 7th grade, S 2: 'Nation is the people of a country.'
> 6th grade, S 10: 'Several people, who are of the same nationality, but do not live in the same country. For example, there are Hungarians living in Romania, and they are of Hungarian nationality.'

It was not easy to determine the genus of the concept of nation. Occasionally, some pupils replied that nation was a name applied to something. There were naive etymological attempts and associations with expressions that sounded similar in Hungarian (clan, generation). Country, a people, and people with various characteristics were mentioned the most frequently.

As shown by content analysis, the mean number of conceptual associations in the definitions, mean number of conceptual features and the index of content variability increased (1.6 to 2.3, 8 to 1.5, and 8 to 14, respectively), and the overall picture became more and more complex in the course of education in primary school. In addition to 'country', 'language' appeared as an important element of content (relative frequency of 26% among the 14-year-old pupils), then came co-operation, aim, will, fight, and activity. When the function and activity of nation were indicated, the pattern of 'co-operation-aim-fight' appeared several times—probably as a result of national rhetoric. Subjective, emotional relationships as motifs appeared both as attachment to one's own native land and as a psychological factor connecting members of a nation in general.

> 8th grade, S 26: 'By nation I mean my native land; I love her very much.'

> 8th grade, S 46: 'Nations usually speak the same language (except for the unions, like the Soviet Union). It is a sum of people with the same feeling in general or in one feeling only. Every honest citizen of a nation sympathizes with his/her home and people founded by his/her ancestors, with his/her nation.'

The replies of primary pupils can be compared with those of students in secondary schools.

The definition of nation by means of a (Hungarian) example does occur in secondary schools also, although far less often.

> 3rd year grammar school, S 16: 'Nation is the comprehensive name of citizens of a people, of a country, e.g. the Hungarian nation. I mean all the Hungarians who live in Hungary.'

The above illustration also demonstrates that the geographical localization of nations repeatedly played an important role in the definitions.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 104: The concept of nation means people living in the territory of a country.'
> 3rd year grammar school, S 84: 'A social group, which is within a country. Social groups belong to it.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 75: The Earth is populated by people. People living within one geographical unit or country constitute the people. They speak the same language.'

When defining 'nation', 60% of the 18-year-old students used the synonym of people, 43–45% found the logical genus of nation in the term 'group', 10–33% mentioned the abstract 'unit' for nation.

In the socially more mature and select circle of grammar school students the definitions were richer in content (conceptual association mean: 4–4.7, mean number of features: 2.4–3.7, number of feature types: 10–20). The difference lay not in the emergence of totally new content, but in the more complex and more complete definitions that emerged. The logical genus of common language was very widespread (92%), and country was also mentioned in most (84%) of the definitions. Struggle and fight were often mentioned as possible functions of nation—sometimes in circular arguments which achieved grotesque results.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 131: 'A uniform people struggling for independent nationalistic endeavours, struggling for common aims.'

Nevertheless, in addition to the previous ones, totally new contents also appear: history, stability, origin, culture, economy, state, law, freedom, and type.

Most of the replies were conceptual definitions based on comparison. Comparison played an important role in explaining the content of the concept: comparison between members of a nation, or between different nations and definitions of difference. Thus, nation appeared as a category of people with descriptive character, but without deep logical or historical embeddedness.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 11: 'Nation is the collectivity of people speaking the same language and belonging to the same race, who occupy a territory on Earth.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 80: 'A group of people who speak the same language, have the same culture, and were born in the same territory.' 4th year grammar school, S 24: 'Nation is the permanent unit of people living in the same territory, speaking the same language, and cemented together in the community of culture. They have the same political and legal freedom.'

Not even by the end of their grammar school studies did the students reach the logical heights of attempting to define the criteria of nation as a group in comparison with other large social groups. Instead, they compared nations to other nations, and, in particular, they compared members within a nation to one another. They did not mention the place of a nation, the conditions of its development, the consequences of its existence, or the limits of its perspectives even within the course of its historical development. At best, history appeared only in the past and culture of a given nation, or as the historical heritage, antecedents, and origin of the people constituting the nation.

The ideas regarding the genesis of nations were poor and sketchy.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 20: 'Nation is a race developed through geographical settlement.'
> 2nd year grammar school, S 13: The roots of nation as a concept date back to primitive society, when people still lived in hordes. These loose organizations later became clans and tribes. One tribe spoke the same language, they had their own customs. When in the course of the division of labour the development of states was inevitable, the nation was kept in evidence as a state. But this is not true, because the People's Republic of Hungary as a state is not equal to the Hungarian nation, because Hungarians do not live in the territory of Hungary only. With the development of communism, with the withering of states the concept of nation will also disappear.'

Some students tried to explain the continuing basis and vital force of nations and identified psychological and ideological factors.

> 3rd year grammar school, S 81: 'A group of people who speak the same language and live in a certain territory, and whose members are united by attachment to the place of residence, to the native land.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 19: 'A collectivity of people who have common language and interests, who live in one territory predominantly, who are united by the aim of developing and making their native land flourish. In order to achieve this aim, they are capable of making great efforts together.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 14: A community united through memory (this is how the dead live forever) by common historical and mainly cultural traditions, that form and have to form the basis of arts (especially literature, but even music).'

The social constitutive elements of nations were discussed by grammar school students, and it was a sign of a historical approach that their answers occasionally mentioned when and how the social constituting elements differed. This was expressed in a special mixture of admitted subjectivism and historical relativism. The idea that the nation was itself a name, a concept, a mental construct that can be used to refer to a certain circle of people returned at a higher level, too.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 25: 'People of different class meant different things by nation. I cannot tell exactly, but I know that it was not the same as people, nor as the nobility.'
> 2nd year grammar school, S 17: 'I think a nation consists of several strata, right now it consists of the workers, the peasants and the intellectuals. Nation equals the people. There are and there were people whose conception of this is different. There were people, e.g. Kölcsey, who meant by nation only the nobility.'

On the basis of this data it seems clear that Hungarian students of the 1960s based their concept of nation on the everyday use of the language. They became aware of the fact that national categories reflected differences and similarities among people. The secondary school students were beginning to consider the nature and role of nations as social units, with ideas about a common culture, a common defence and a common struggle. The messages about nation that were handed down in history textbooks had little effect on them: there was no example of a student giving the concept of nation a historical dimension or mentioning the social characteristics of its development. It seemed to be a common concept without scientific pretensions or ideological embeddedness, even if some students attached the label 'socialist' to the term nation when talking about the nations of the Eastern bloc.

The example of a nation for them was always the Hungarian one—and the teaching of history was partly responsible for this one-sidedness.

In the early and mid-1970s the analysis of the concept of nation could be extended to a national representative sample (05.R73p). As a first step, the abstract problem was made more specific in two ways: a) the questions did not regard nations in general, only the *nation of the respondents,* and b) the questions did not refer to the characteristics of nations as units, but only to the criteria of who can belong to this nation. The question asked was: 'Who do you regard as Hungarian?'

In 1973, 12% of the representative sample thought that the criterion was having been born in the country, 12% demanded living in the country, 12% saw citizenship as a determining criterion, 8.5% thought Hungarian as the native language was important, 7.4% thought Hungarian ancestry was a criterion of national status. All of these criteria treat national status as a given thing, received and kept by people—in borderline cases a frequent (14.6%) response was that those who worked in the country were Hungarians.

It was a difference in emphasis, but a still larger group (22.4%) thought that those who work for a country and its better future belonged to a nation. For this criterion national status depends on personal commitment, manifested in actions and/or feelings. In respect of actions, in addition to work for the country, readiness to defend the country (5.5%) and socio-political activity (2%) were also mentioned. As for feelings, patriotism, sympathy for the destiny, worries and achievements of the native land (13.5%), loyalty towards the country and its laws (11.8%), and even agreement with and attachment to the political system (4.8%) could be criteria for belonging to a nation.

A relatively modest proportion of respondents thought that conscious self-identification as Hungarians was criterial: those who felt themselves to be Hungarian (5.5%), those who declared themselves to be Hungarian (4.6%), and those who both felt and declared themselves Hungarian (3%). A fraction of the respondents stressed a commitment to the constitution and the laws. 'Good patriots' were seen as Hungarians by 1.8%. A normative idea was explicit here. Its covert form could be perceived in the indications of activity and commitment if two questions were mixed: 'Who can be considered as a Hungarian?' and 'Who can be considered as a good Hungarian?'

It emerged that about one-third of the questioned national representative sample conceived of national status as a given thing, one-third conceived of it as a commitment, and a quarter combined the two. These types of attitude were partly dependent on the social background of the respondents. The oldest age group tended to stress only the given nature of national status, the group of 40-year-olds emphasized the other extreme. It was generally observed that the more educated and the more urbanized the respondents were, and the more open they were to the world, the more they stressed personal attitude as a criterion for belonging to a nation.

In 1975, when the question was repeated to younger and older, worker

and intellectual sub-samples (06.R75), the responses contained the same content elements. Country as a dwelling place and ancestry were mentioned more by the workers (though by less than 10%), while language and culture were mentioned more by the intellectuals (only 12%). For the young workers, working for the country was the most frequent criterion, while the younger and older intellectuals thought personal commitment and feelings toward the native land were the most important factors. The importance of passive acceptance and emotional attachment was particularly stressed by the older intellectuals.

There was a chance here to compare the criteria for national status and the general definitions of nation as expressed by the respondents. In the interviews the following question was asked: The expression "nation" can often be heard and read. What do you think this expression means?' It should be noted that Hungarians were cited as examples of a nation by more workers (23% of the younger, 17% of the older) than intellectuals (11% of the older, 6% of the young university students).

The possession of a whole piece of land, the country, took first place among the characteristics of a nation (59% of the adult working intellectuals, 36% of the workers). The community created by a shared language, the mother tongue, took second place in terms of frequency. National past and traditions came up frequently in the responses of the working intellectuals. About a quarter of the younger and older intellectuals mentioned common culture, ways of thinking, and spirit. The somewhat empty 'common aim' occurred in three of the sub-samples, but the older workers ignored it. The element of economic relations unifying the nation appeared in less than 20% of the sub-sample of intellectuals. The emphasis on emotional bonds was lower than 10%, while national defence, ancestry, and common origin were mentioned rarely, by only a small percentage of the respondents. As might be expected, workers gave formally 'lower level' definitions (synonym-like definitions were more frequent, logically complete definitions rarer), there were fewer conceptual features (this was because there were fewer references to some of the content elements, especially historical and cultural features), and, in contrast to the intellectuals, 'don't know' answers were not uncommon (19% of younger workers, 17% of older workers).

There were some differences between the abstract definition and the criteria of being Hungarian. In all of the sub-samples, the features of country, language, and culture appeared more frequently in the abstract definitions. Among the criteria mentioned for Hungarians, however, common work, production, economy, personal commitment, and feelings and ancestry occurred more often. It should be noted that these discrepancies arose not only from the differences in the attitude of the respondents, but also from dissimilarity of the tasks: the definition regarded the nation as a whole, while the criteria were related to the classification of individuals.

Multiple-choice questions about who belonged to a nation were also used. The question was asked at two levels of abstraction: at a general level and with specific reference to Hungarians. When the ideas of activity ('participation in work and the community') and reflection ('feeling and declaration of membership') were offered, they were accepted even by those respondents who conceived national status only as a special given feature. Unfortunately, the statements to be evaluated were not subtle enough to reveal whether the respondents saw the given features as essential, or whether personal attraction and inclination of commitment without the given features were sufficient for assigning an individual to a particular nation.

One critical general question revealed age group differences. The majority of older, working intellectuals and workers agreed with the statement 'People living in the same country all belong to the same nation', while most of the young generation disagreed. This question, which was evidently capable of provoking conflicting responses, was systematically investigated with specific reference to Hungarian nationality. The standard question was:

> 'When you think of the Hungarian nation, do you also include Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries, Hungarians living in the western countries, and the nationalities living in Hungary?'

Members of the national representative sample were asked this question for the first time as early as 1973 (05.R73p). In that year, 72.5% of the respondents considered the national minorities living in Hungary as part of the Hungarian nation, 21.5% rejected this statement, while the rest avoided the answer. It should be noted that when asked to list the minorities, the sample mentioned the Germans living in Hungary the most frequently (63%), 53% mentioned the Slovaks, 47% listed the Serbs and other Southern Slavs, 41% mentioned the Romanians, while 4% indicated the Gypsies as a nationality.

Opinions as to whether Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries were included in the Hungarian nation were more divided: 45% agreed that they were, 50% disagreed. The respondents' knowledge in this area was tested by asking them to list the neighbouring countries where Hungarian minorities could be found. Czechoslovakia was mentioned by 72%, followed by Romania (68%), Yugoslavia (56%), the Soviet Union (36%), and Austria (26%). Members of the sample were asked whether Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries had preserved their mother language: 25% thought that all of them had, 38% said that most of them had, 18.5% believed that only a fraction of them preserved their mother tongue. Of those who believed that Hungarian had been abandoned, 23% blamed it on external pressure of circumstances, on politics, while approximately the same number attributed it to a natural

process, and the same proportion blamed the Hungarians themselves who lived in minority.

The sub-question of whether Hungarians living in the West were part of the Hungarian nation received negative answers from most of the respondents. Thus, when the question referred not to the inhabitants of areas annexed by neighbouring states but to people who had decided to leave the country, who were 'defectors', only 24% of the respondents included them in the Hungarian nation, while 72% definitely excluded them.

These results imply that country and nation belong together in the eyes of the respondents, most of whom were inclined to consider people living within the boundaries of the country as members of the Hungarian nation regardless of the details of culture and language of the national minorities. This view, however, was not strictly consistent in the opinion of a substantial group, who accepted both the national minorities living in Hungary and the Hungarian minority living in the neighbouring countries. Individuals and groups who had made a personal decision to leave the country were judged from another angle: in those days the predominant opinion was that such people had chosen not only another country but another nation as well.

Naturally, contrary opinions were also voiced, and social differences could be identified behind the different opinions. The most decisive social influencing factor was level of education: those with a higher level of education were more inclined to include nationalities within the Hungarian nation, and to exclude the Hungarians of the neighbouring countries from the Hungarian nation consistently. The dominant and less consistent views were held by less educated and older people who—by the way—were less familiar with the place and position of the Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries. More highly educated people were better informed, but they also separated themselves from Hungarians living outside the country.

In 1975, worker and intellectual samples of different age groups provided very similar response ratios. The only notable variation was that there was a difference in opinion between the groups of university students and workers over 25, which was unexpected on the basis of the national sample (06.R75). It was most often students (42%) who thought that Hungarians living in neighbouring countries belonged to the nation, while this opinion was the least frequent (only 24%) among the adult workers. These groups disagreed with other groups of the same age and educational level, which suggests a renewed awareness of the national problem among young intellectuals, contrasting with an 'internationalist' ideological set among workers.

In 1981, more than three-quarters of the sample of students replied again that the national minorities living in Hungary belonged to their nation, while less than half of the respondents stated that Hungarians living in neighbouring countries belonged (08.R81). It was striking, however, that at the beginning of their studies (and only then, in primary school, irrespective of their school achievements) children from intellectual families were more

likely to hold this opinion than their fellow-pupils (x^2=3.92, p<.05). Furthermore, both bright primary school pupils (x^2 =9.92, p<.01) and outstanding grammar school students in Budapest (x^2 =4.75, p<.05)—irrespective of their social background—tended to include the Hungarian minorities of the neighbouring countries in the Hungarian nation. Thus, intellectual background and the prospect of an intellectual profession seem to have been related to opinion formation in this critical area. Once again, Hungarians who moved to the West were considered as part of the Hungarian nation by less than 20% of this sample.

Significant changes had taken place by 1991, after the socio-political changes, when students of similar social strata were asked the same questions as had been used in the earlier survey (11.R91). The ratios had been reversed: the great majority (70.7%) stated that Hungarians living outside the boundaries of the country were members of the Hungarian nation, while only one-quarter (25.4%) rejected this. However, opinions about the status of minorities within Hungary varied widely. Previously well-defined positions became ambiguous: 51.25% stated that such minorities belonged to the Hungarian nation, 39.4% said that they did not, and the rest of the sample either did not answer or could not decide. It was noteworthy that students who were doing well at school tended to give a positive response; in other words, they stood out from the prevailing patterns as they had before, but over a different question.

Although the standpoints had shifted, the contradiction that had been noted in the earlier survey remained: the prevalent view saw nation as a community with a common language and culture, irrespective of political frontiers, but there was still a sizable group of respondents who shared this view of Hungarian minorities abroad, but also included the nationalities within the country in the Hungarian nation. This would be a problem of formal logic only if a) one could belong to one nation only, b) people in the same situation were uniformly assigned to one or the other nation on the basis of this situation, and c) the cultural and political situations of the national minorities were the same within a specific country, and in the countries of the region in general. Although these premises were not sufficiently proven, and were not even completely true, the 'logical inconsistency' deserves attention: it indicates, albeit with a changing content, a stable tendency towards inclusion and expansion of the respondents' own nation.

Opinions about people who had left for the West also changed: the percentage of respondents who considered them as members of the Hungarian nation increased considerably to 45.9%, though it still did not reach the number of those who included Hungarians living in territories annexed by neighbouring countries. A social group of unchanged size still made a distinction on the basis of the reason why a Hungarian person did not live in the country, or on the basis of the extent to which people were able to maintain communal relationships. Overall, 48.6% of the respondents

denied that the Hungarians scattered in the West were part of the Hungarian nation.

It has been demonstrated that the responses given by very different samples about the conflicting criteria for national status were very similar in content for more than a decade and a half before 1989. The fact that in a heavily selected, almost professional sample of students in 1994 the ratio of responses was almost identical in many respects, demonstrates the stability of the new state of affairs that had emerged by 1991 (13.R94s). Of the 26 respondents, 18 included the Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries in the Hungarian nation, 13 considered national minorities living in Hungary as part of this nation, and 9 doubted this view. The only modest difference was that Hungarians living in the West were considered as part of the Hungarian nation by 15 of the 26, that is, by over half of the respondents, as opposed to the previous 46%. This insignificant discrepancy also highlighted the direction of changes.

Since the beginning of these investigations the intention has been to throw light on the emotional side of national status, and to find the reasons and sphere of historical associations that support the emotions that are linked with the category of one's own nation. In accordance with the nature of things, the respondents were addressed as members of a social community that was extensive in the historical dimension, too: 'In your opinion, should we or should we not be proud of being Hungarian?' 'In your opinion, are there things we, Hungarians, should be ashamed of?'

In 1973 (05.R73p), 91% of the representative sample found national pride justified (doubts rose to 15% only in the youngest group: the under-20s). In contrast, only just over a third (35.5%) of the respondents believed that the members of the nation had anything to be ashamed of; some people were uncertain and gave an elusive reply, while 50.5% denied it. It should be noted that a larger proportion of the representatives of the youngest group (47%) found something to be ashamed of. The level of education had a definite influence on the respondents' opinions: the least educated people rejected the possibility of national shame in the greatest number, while only 23.5% of the university graduates shared this opinion—the great majority (73.5%) of university graduates thought our nation did have something to be ashamed of.

These feelings may be connected to the history and present situation of the nation. The reasons for shame that were mentioned belonged more to the past, or were timeless, while the reasons for pride were connected more closely to the present situation (in which, of course, material and spiritual values accumulated in the past also play their parts). Even those respondents who wanted or managed to specify reasons for shame were only a fraction (27.5%) of those who believed that Hungarians had any cause for such feelings. Of the scanty reasons, the most frequent ones were as follows: participation in the Second World War (32%), the reactionary political systems of the past, defeats and losses of territory, 'mistakes' of

the Rákosi era, 1956, the defections. The less educated respondents considered the general weakness of Hungarians as a source of shame—if at all—but also tended to see the reasons for pride in their positive traits. Others, at a more specific level, mentioned the country's advanced state of economy and political maturity, her favourable natural endowment, her cultural values and historical services, and the good reputation that reflected all these. The most frequent answers given by the whole sample to the open-ended question included the highly developed state of the economy and political maturity. When multiple-choice items offered various possibilities, the different areas of production came very much to the fore as objects of national pride. Choosing three of the 12 alternatives, 40% of the sample chose Hungarian industry; more of the respondents chose agriculture (38.3%) than outstanding athletes (29.4%), music (15.4%), science (14.9%), literature (14.9%), or fine arts (3.6%). The educational level of the respondents had a great influence on these answers as well: the cult of production peaked among the least educated respondents (less than eight grades of primary school), while intellectual culture was indicated with striking frequency by the highly educated respondents. 'Historical antecedents' generally took third position among the objects of pride, but they seemed to be the most important for grammar school graduates.

Nevertheless, it was assumed that the experience of belonging to a nation was reflected in and was tinged by the general impression formed about the past. Thus, the following question was asked from the whole sample—regardless of whether or not the respondent indicated history among the objects of national pride: 'In your opinion, is Hungarian history more tragic, or glorious?' Probably, the contrast implied by the form of the question was not very correct semantically—since something tragic can also be glorious, and an inglorious thing is not necessarily tragic—but the question in all its roughness provided an opportunity for the respondents to express their views simply: the past of the Hungarian nations gives cause for gloom or self-assured enthusiasm. Those who said that 'the Hungarian past was more glorious' (47%) and those who said 'it used to be tragic, but now it is glorious' (6%) constitute a weak majority. The percentage supporting this view was the smallest among college or university graduates (24%). Those who thought that 'Hungarian history was more tragic' formed 36%; this percentage reached 49% in the most educated group.

In addition to this somewhat overgeneralized judgement, we attempted to elicit 'lessons' drawn from Hungarian history. It was useful to discuss only one of its dimensions here, that is, the development of the variable 'small country'. A list of truisms regarding the disadvantageous position and perspectives of 'small countries' was offered to the respondents: 59.1% agreed that 'It is always the small countries that come off worst'; 40.9% thought that 'Small countries can play only an insignificant role in forming world polities'; 27.6% doubted whether

'Collaboration of small countries may check greater powers'; 19.1% rejected the idea that 'Small countries may be just as successful as the big ones'. This degree of scepticism should not be underrated. It is noteworthy that age and scepticism regarding the fate of small countries were in a linear and direct relationship with each other. The older generation and less educated people tended to hold this opinion. The suspicion may arise that there was a contradiction here: Hungary was surely listed among the small countries, yet the very same social strata emphasized glory and legitimate pride, without shame, in Hungarian history. However, this was not in fact a contradiction. In the background of the positive evaluation of the nation—in response to the open-ended questions—the motif of 'small country' can be found regularly in the context of statements that this nation reached its achievements despite its limited capacity and disadvantageous position. This seemingly unrealistic evaluation of national achievements should be interpreted with this background in mind (and—as will be seen later—it can be understood within the limits of the 'socialist block'). This basis of comparison, however, lacked historicity, for the category of 'small country' could not really be applied to Hungary until after the First World War.

In 1975, the themes of national pride and shame were studied again using intellectual and worker, young and adult samples (06.R75). The basic percentages and the reasons given in the answers to questions about feelings were very close to those described above, even in this radically altered social medium. None the less, characteristic social differences prevailed. In the worker sub-sample, over 90% saw reasons for national pride, while the relative frequency of this response was only 76% in the university student sample. Those university students, however, who thought that there was cause for national pride, quite frequently mentioned the idea (already encountered in the previous studies) that this feeling was a natural concomitant and part of national identity, and so it did not have to be, and could not necessarily be justified objectively. These sub-samples of workers and intellectuals indicated history and national past more often among the reasons and objective grounds of pride than the more heterogeneous national representative sample. The percentage reached 54% in the answers to the open-ended questions and 48% in answers to the multiple-choice questions given by the older intellectual sub-sample, but in the industrial worker sub-sample of the same age it was still no less than 28%. Intellectuals laid greater emphasis on the mental and cultural achievements of the nation, but the whole sample also tended to highlight these values more than economic achievements in different spheres of production. (The fact that industry and agriculture were added to more of the multiple-choice questions, with greater specificity, may have been a slight influencing factor here.) When considering the values of past and present, the motif of 'small country' as a value-raising frame of reference appeared in the responses

of all of the sub-samples; the appearance of this motif was rarest (13%) in the university student group.

The idea of national shame was accepted by less than 40% of the worker sub-samples, but by 62% in the university student sample, and by as many as 85% of the working intellectuals. Over half of the respondents mentioned the Horthy era, participation in the Second World War, and fascism as reasons for shame, while more recent causes were mentioned only rarely (e.g. 'distortions' of the 1950s were identified by a few university students only).

The study of this topic was repeated in a student sample based on homogeneous groups in 1981 (08.R81). Of the sample, 84% could see reasons for pride, but the majority of the secondary school students found things to be ashamed of, too. It should be noted that the most successful students in both primary and high-quality secondary schools gave more positive responses regarding both pride and shame than the students who were less successful in their studies. Pride was described again as a manifestation of emotional bond (15%), or as the natural attitude of a member of a group (35%). Historical past as a reason for pride was mentioned by the students quite frequently, too (38%), and the motif of 'small country' (13%) emerged in connection with historical achievements and current results, especially in the responses of the children of skilled workers who studied in the best grammar schools of the country, and who were also far more likely to mention the economic and social advancement of the country. The achievements of Hungarian culture appeared in 15% of the sample. They were mentioned more often by the most successful grammar school students than by their less successful classmates or by students attending other types of secondary schools.

The year 1989 brought no essential changes regarding the judgement of pride and shame, while the material supporting the personal opinions became reduced (11.R91). In 1991 only 74% (10% less than before) of the student sample, whose composition was very similar to that of 1981, saw some cause for pride in the nation, 23% found it natural: proud self-assertion accompanied the awareness of identity of every people. An unusually small number of students emphasized the positive past and present values of the nation with the explanation that our national achievements were especially outstanding 'for a small country like this'. Justification for pride in the historical past was not found in glorious struggle and the achievement of freedom by the majority (12%) but in the ability to face a series of calamities and survive. Culture was mentioned by 15%. This ratio was higher among the most successful students, and, interestingly enough, it was in the grammar schools that emphasis shifted from individual achievements to the talent of the people and to the general level of culture. Students in vocational training schools mentioned the moral characteristics of the people in a small number of cases. Socio-economic advancement was seldom mentioned; the current experience of the socio-political changes and

the new democratic government was mentioned in 2.1% of the responses of the sample.

Reasons for national shame could be seen by 56% of the sample, while 38% rejected this idea. Historical reasons for shame were still seen by most of the students (13.4%)—especially grammar school students—in Hungary's participation in the Second World War and in the past success of fascism. The period after the Second World War was mentioned by fewer students, the 'socialist detour' by less than 3%, and less than the 20 respondents considered the activities of the new government shameful.

Three years later, in 1994, further data were obtained about the emotive force and the concept of national identity in a much smaller sample of respondents (13.R94s). The narrow group of future historians and history teachers who made up the sample mentioned about the same number of motives in their explanations of the reasons for pride and shame. Paradoxically, excessive national identity and self-assurance themselves were given as reasons for shame. Excessive nationalism and 'posing as true Hungarians' were criticized, both in the conduct of politicians and in the activity of skinheads. Failure to understand neighbouring peoples was another negative characteristic mentioned by some respondents. The historical examples of racial discrimination, the deportation of the Jews, co-operation with Hitler's Reich in relation to the Holocaust, and other war crimes were also cited. References to these sources of shame were sometimes accompanied by rejection and indications of responsibility. The embarrassing behaviour of Hungarians abroad (Mariahilfer Strasse, the shopping centre in Vienna, became a symbol in this respect), Hungarian lifestyle in comparison with international standards, lack of culture, laziness, litter, and even unhealthy diet were further elements in the list. Criticism of phenomena related to market economics was a new element: it included condemnation of excessive greed, fraudulence, impudence, and the 'excessive desire to meet the demands of other nations'.

The constellation of reasons for shame was enriched in the few years after the change of the system. The reasons for pride, however, were already familiar from previous years. They included the fulfilment of historical commitments, sacrifices made in defending Europe, success in arts, sciences, and sports. One respondent mentioned that Hungary was the first country where the communist system had been overthrown. The observation that this pride is a natural concomitant and consequence of belonging to a nation and of good national public feelings was made more frequently. This natural characteristic may turn into a counter-argument, too, in the sense that everybody belongs to a nation, so nobody deserves any particular credit for it. Thus, belonging to a nation cannot be a source of one's evaluation or judgement either.

National character was seldom mentioned in this narrow circle, and even then it was related only to emotional life: Hungarians were seen as hotheaded and impulsive. To sum up, one prerequisite for the investigation

of national attitudes was to find out what people considered as a nation, and to establish how this concept was defined in general and in relation to the respondents' own nation. The relationship between the two levels of abstraction lies in the fact that, whether they admitted it or not, respondents considered their own nation as the typical example of the concept. Although definition through examples decreased with the increase of age and level of education, the only example ever referred to in the whole series of investigations was that of Hungarians. The feeling that this was self-evident and natural was not really affected by the wide historical perspectives or typifying comparisons found in history teaching in the schools. History teaching did not prove to be an effective tool for transmitting the ambiguous message of the predominant Marxist ideology about nations, or for preparing people to use it.

In the mid-1960s, the definitions given by pupils reflected two approaches to the definition of nation. On the one hand, it was the country as a geographical-territorial unit and as a state organization into which this large group was placed. But this was complicated by the existence of Hungarian national minorities abroad. The other approach involved the comparison of the people constituting a nation, and then the abstraction of their common features and of the traits that were different from others. Both starting points suggested a static concept of nation; the students were not really aware of the historical nature of the formation of nations.

The adult samples of the inhabitants of the country and those of the different social classes indicated common language and/or common culture in a wider perspective as the relevant features of nations. The older generations and less educated people tended to hold the initial view that belonging to one particular nation was a matter of natural endowment. The bonding force of traditions and ideas was mentioned more frequently by the more educated groups, but even among intellectuals only 20% mentioned economic foundations in the development and cohesion of a nation. In contrast to the abstract definition of a nation, participation in common work, personal commitment and origin were mentioned quite often among the criteria of belonging specifically to the Hungarian nation.

In the long period of the 1970s and 1980s, the overwhelming majority of adult and student samples thought that the national minorities in Hungary belonged to the Hungarian nation, and the same ratio rejected the idea that those who had emigrated or fled from the country belonged to the Hungarian nation. However, opinions were deeply divided over the issue of the Hungarian minorities who had found themselves outside the borders of Hungary after the First World War, whether they belonged to a nation according to their country or according to their culture. In this respect a change took place in the early 1990s. The majority of respondents thought that Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary belonged to this nation. However, opinions regarding those leaving the country voluntarily

and regarding the national minorities living in Hungary were deeply divided. The importance of the role of culture increased, the significance of the place of living and citizenship decreased.

There was a large group in both phases who thought that both the national minorities living in Hungary and the Hungarian minorities living in the neighbouring countries belonged to the Hungarian nation, either without recognizing this logical contradiction or simply accepting it. The proportion of such people was practically constant at about 20%. There was a further re-arrangement affecting another 20%: those who no longer considered national minorities living in Hungary as part of the Hungarian nation, but who did think that Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries belonged to it. The ratio of changes regarding the evaluation of people who moved to the West was even greater, even if it was still the minority who thought that western emigrants were part of the Hungarian nation.

Nation is charged with emotions, and this was manifested in the cognitive side of the definitions. The respondents occasionally referred to their positive feelings toward their own nation, and several definitions of the conceptual features of nation included the idea that their members had common feelings, and that they formed an emotional community. The quality, conceptual cues and consciousness of the emotions colouring the image of the Hungarian nation were investigated by means of a few questions. It was a unanimous finding of the investigations of the past 20 years that the great majority of the adult and student samples did see reasons for national pride, and a much smaller ratio thought that there were reasons for shame in present and past Hungarian history. In 1973, 91% saw reasons for pride, 35.5% saw reasons for shame.

Pride was considered by a substantial and increasing proportion of the respondents as a natural concomitant of national belonging that needed no further explanation. The general and economic development of the country was quite often the object of pride. Judgements about the significance of cultural achievements varied. In 1973, the national representative sample did not appreciate cultural achievements very much; in 1975, the intellectual sub-samples stressed it heavily, even in comparison with industrial and agricultural achievements; in 1981, it was pushed to the back again in the responses of students. National past and history fraught with struggles were highlighted in the 1981 investigation. The 'small country' motif came to the fore again and again. The position of 'small countries' was seen as defenceless, having no chance, and thus every achievement they made bore increased significance.

The object of national shame was often indicated in recent history, or in the eternal flaws of the Hungarian national character. The historical cases of military or political defeat, collapsed systems, and widespread alienation of the masses from the political system were cited from 20th-century history.

The responses of the less educated social groups reflected greater national pride, and admitted fewer reasons for shame. The 'small country' motif was more prevalent in this class, too. The worker respondents and their children within the student sub-sample were especially characterized by the cult of productivity. Students with good academic records indicated more reasons for both pride and shame than poor achievers. The respondents with higher education, especially university students, found fewer sources of pride, and admitted considerably more often that there were reasons for shame in national history. Their admitted emotional bond was more complex, they tolerated and accepted inconsistencies in this respect better. It was the intellectuals who repeatedly identified national values in the area of culture.

In 1991, immediately after the change of the political system, there was no essential change in the argumentation about national pride and shame. The responses were less rich in content, with pride in economic achievements becoming fainter. The 'small country' motif did not appear often, but overcoming difficulties and pure survival in the past seemed to be national virtues for many respondents. The ambivalence of national emotions increased: in the student sample the acceptance of pride and shame shifted to 74% and 56%, respectively. The nation was not often reproached for the propagation and perseverance of communism, nor for co-operation with it. On the contrary, critical reference to the past influence of fascism was several times as frequent.

The interpretation of patriotism and international expectations: social attitudes in the 1970s

Personal relationship with the national category and the native land—patriotism—was an important attitude for our topic. Repeated attempts have been made to learn more about the perception of this personal attitude and the related normative expectations in the widest possible circle. The researchers had no illusion that they were measuring the attitude that lay beneath the behaviour of the respondents. It was possible to grasp only its mental image and verbal manifestations—although the normative demands that appeared may have had certain effects of behaviour control, similar to those of moral consciousness. For the purpose of this research, however, it was especially important to see how perception of patriotism was related to other views, and into what ideological context the conception of patriotism would fit in the given historical period. Furthermore, this research had a secondary gain: in harmony with the endeavours of modern cognitive social psychology, the everyday meaning of this 'construct' could be discovered. For this purpose, respondents were given the task of making spontaneous judgements about the patriotism of specific persons and abstract categories.

As a first step, the subjects were asked to define concepts. In 1973 (05.R73p), the members of the national representative sample were

asked: 'What do you think the word patriotism means?'—15% of the respondents could not or would not answer. One-third identified patriotism with love of one's country, a small fraction (5%) thought patriotism was loyalty to the country, political system, and government, and a large proportion (19%) gave negative definitions (those who do not defect the country, do not act as spies, do not break the laws). Those elements of content in which there were no indications of activity at all could be found in the majority of the responses (59%). Quite a few respondents (23%) mentioned labour for the country and the advancement of society, almost the same number (22%) mentioned national defence, while only a small proportion (3%) found public and political activity as the characteristic sign of patriotism. All those elements of content indicating activity appeared in 48% of the responses. Naturally, a considerable group (22%) of the respondents combined the active and passive elements in their replies, which resulted in a balanced answer in this sense. Nevertheless, in 1975, when the question was repeated to four sub-samples chosen on the basis of occupation and age (06.R75), characteristic differences were found: definitions implying only activity were especially frequent (more frequent than balanced answers) in intellectuals and workers younger than 25, while the older generation, regardless of social differences, responded with more frequent passive elements of content.

The 1973 representative sample (05.R73p) was also asked the following question: 'In your opinion, does patriotism mean something other than it used to, or does it mean the same thing?' The first and the second alternatives were chosen by 32% and 51%, respectively. This seemingly evident continuity must have disappointed those who proclaimed and propagated 'socialist patriotism'. However, it was probably the opinion of the majority of respondents that patriotism was the same thing, but was manifested in different ways at different times. This was suggested by the replies to the question 'In your opinion, how can one's love for one's country be expressed these days?' Most of the responses implied actions, in which the percentage of home defence was insignificant, while labour became predominant (59%).

The question regarding past and present patriotism was repeated in 1975 (06.R75). In the selected groups of workers and intellectuals the opinion that the meaning of patriotism had changed prevailed. This time age differences did not count: only occupation and the related level of education affected the content of replies. The majority of replies reached or just exceeded 50% in the worker sub-sample, while it was between 70% and 80% in the intellectual groups. The essence of the contrast was that patriotism used to be more martial in spirit and was manifested more in struggles, while at present it was more simple, common, and peaceful. Both nostalgia for heroism and the rejection of militant nationalism lay behind this reasoning. (The expression 'nationalist' could not be interpreted

sufficiently clearly, or the task was avoided, by 63% of the national representative sample in 1973.)

A new measuring technique was introduced into the series of investigations in order to discover the necessary criteria for patriotism in public thinking, and to find out, from the pure number of exclusive criteria, the levels of strictness of setting requirements in different groups (Table 2.1). In 1973, 15 types of behaviour were offered to the national representative sample, for the respondents to judge which ones were incompatible with patriotism ('One cannot be a good patriot, if one…'). Over 75% of the sample found five types of behaviour incompatible with patriotism, two of which implied spiritual and/or physical separation from the country ('defects from the country in order to live better'; 'does not feel homesick'), two types of behaviour implied another aspect, the lack of emotional bond ('does not feel homesick', 'cannot sing/recite the national anthem'), two types implied breaking the laws ('defects from the country in order to live better'; 'attempts to avoid military service'), and the only representative of the demand for activity was 'does not work in accordance with one's abilities'. It should be noted that as opposed to labour, public activity was rarely a requirement, and only one-third (32%) of the sample stated that if one was 'not interested in polities' one was not a good patriot. This was the last but one in the series of criteria; those who required interest in politics demanded especially strict requirements.

The choice of items covered three themes: activities (or rather their absence), following the rules (or rather deviation from them), and relationship to foreigners, their culture, and products (acceptance of them). With regard to the items related to the last theme there was less agreement, fewer respondents regarded acceptance of foreign people, values, and goods as an offence against patriotism, and their rejection as a criterion of patriotism. An index was compiled for each theme from the number of items indicated by the respondent as criteria for patriotism. The three indexes varied in degree of agreement.

Agreement regarding compliance with the laws was the greatest within the national representative sample. The only exception here was that the respondents were very uncertain as to what was objectionable in defection and in avoiding military service, and why. Nevertheless, because of the uncertain consent of the respondents, this index did not prove to be variable or sensitive.

The criteria behind the index of activity reflecting the condition of actions were quite varied. As indicated above, working was also considered as part of patriotism by the majority of the respondents, but public and political activity were not necessarily seen as criteria. It was level of education that had the most powerful effect on this index (the mean of those finishing only eight grades or less in primary school was 2.33, while that of university graduates was 3.17). Connected to this was the fact that urban respondents, especially those living in the capital,

Table 2.1 The criteria of patriotism (1973–91): percentage of affirmative responses

One cannot be a good patriot if one . . .	*1973*	*1975*				*1981*	*1991*
		Workers		*Univ. stud.*	*Adult int.*		
		18–25	*26–60*	*18–25*	*26–60*		
		years old					
travels abroad each year, although s/he does not know even Hungary	55	53	48	28	39	39	27
is not interested in politics	32	34	48	59	77	27	12
prefers foreign pop music to Hungarian music	28	8	22	3	5	2	2
attempts to avoid military service	80	73	89	49	81	75	33
buys foreign goods when they cost the same as Hungarian products	49	30	46	26	33	14	9
marries a foreigner	33	19	33	11	9	7	6
is not interested in the problems of his/her settlement	68	54	69	55	60	63	55
does not work in accordance with one's abilities	78	77	83	74	87	82	51
is not interested in the problems of his/her country	63						
is not interested in how many gold medals the Hungarian athletes win at the Olympic Games	45	32	58	22	34	24	27
does not feel homesick even after spending a prolonged period abroad	87	84	88	62	70	70	69
always attempts to follow the latest foreign fashion	37	11	26	10	14	5	7
defects from one's country in order to live better	93	97	98	99	98	97	70
does not want to have children	74	44	61	32	56	12	13
cannot sing/recite the Hungarian national anthem	77	82	84	72	75	72	74
does not believe in socialism unconditionally		71	82	60	78	52	
never does voluntary work for the community		65	77	67	75	74	33
wants authoritarianism again instead of democracy							67
is a believer in socialism							17

Notes
univ. stud.=university students
adult int.=adult intellectuals

expected more activity (including public activity) of a patriot than village dwellers did.

Acceptance of foreign countries and signs of favouring other cultures (travel, permanent absence, purchasing foreign goods, fashion, pop music, and notably marriage) conflicted with ideal patriotism according to a non-dominant group of variable size. The index reflecting this set can rightfully be called an anti-cosmopolitan index or directly an anti-foreign country index. Due to disagreements within the studied sample this was a sensitive and variable index embedded in different relations. This index was also dependent on the level of education but in the opposite sense to the activity index: the mean of those finishing only eight grades or less in primary school was 3.29, while that of university graduates was only 2.91. At the same time, much depended on the age of the respondents: there was a clear, unbroken linear statistical relationship: its average in the oldest sub-sample of people over 60 was 3.45, while in the youngest sub-sample under 20 it was 1.57. The urban population was less resistant in this respect. Regarding the different social and occupational sub-samples, the values of this index in the sub-samples of students and intellectuals in subordinate posts were especially low.

The sum of the three indexes reflected the strictness of criteria of patriotism quite well, although without thematic particulars. A low score and numerically fewer conditions indicated a less distinct concept of patriotism, and suggested a less selective and more tolerant attitude. A high score and a large number of demands promised showed greater selection and less tolerance, and indicated that the respondent accepted reserved and excluding criteria that were considered unjustified by many others.

The thematic indexes of patriotism and the general index of the strictness of the conditions were statistically related to several other attitudes measured in Hungary in the mid-1970s. The attitude studies of similar topics tapped the views of the respondents in the following questions:

a How significant was the love of one's country?
b What was the special relationship between the love of one's country and socialist commitment?
c To what degree was the situation of the 'small countries' seen as particularly problematic, and what solutions could they see?
d How was co-operation among, and the organizations of, the officially socialist countries seen?
e How were the perspectives of the separation of nations seen?
f How satisfied were they with the celebration of national and international public holidays of symbolic significance?

As will be discussed in detail later, statistical correlations were looked for and found between the criteria for patriotism and the evaluation of the

country. The relationships that emerged helped to interpret what the strictness of the criteria of patriotism meant in Hungary in the 1970s.

In 1975, the instrument for measuring the requirements of patriotism was slightly altered, but its principle and the majority of its items were unchanged (06.R75). Attitudes—especially those related to international relations (foreign trade and disarmament)—were also measured in this year. One of the main findings was again that the correlation between the extent and content of the requirements of patriotism and either the evaluation of the country or other political opinions was not independent of the social circumstances under which the investigation was conducted. Both the content of the opinions and the correlations of thought depended on the social background of the respondents.

Normative beliefs regarding the criteria of patriotism were measured by 15 items in 1973; the mean of the national representative sample was 8.99. In 1975, 16 items were used in the stratified samples: on the one hand, two previous items were combined (the item regarding interest in the public affairs of the county and those of the city were changed into a general question of 'one who is not interested in the problems of where one lives'), and, on the other hand, two new items were introduced regarding 'one who never does voluntary work for the community' and 'one who does not believe in socialism unconditionally'. Undoubtedly, the changes in the content of the survey had an effect on the meaning of the index. Changing the number of items affected the value of the index: the mean of the national representative sample would have been 9.52 if there had been 16 items. The conceptions of patriotism in the four sub-samples in 1975, however, can really be compared, since they were measured by the same device: among the respondents over 25, the workers set more 'strict' criteria (10.1) than the intellectuals (8.9), and, similarly, among those under 25, the university students were more tolerant (7.3) than the workers (8.4). In addition to the definite differences due to the level of education/occupation, age differences were also visible. These were smaller among the workers, and were greater between the present and future intellectuals. The same relationships appeared in the criteria of socialist commitment (accepted by the majority), and in the anti-cosmopolitan (or anti-foreign country) index. The respondents under 25 were more open toward the foreign countries, and were less enthusiastic about completion of military service as a criterion of patriotism than the older representatives of their social and occupational group.

Knowledge of the national anthem and the feeling of homesickness, however, were required by the worker sub-samples more than by the intellectuals. The requirement of public activity was specific in that in both age groups it was the intellectuals who set stricter criteria than the workers. Focusing on one item, we note that 'one who is not interested in polities' cannot be a good patriot in the opinion of 34% of workers under

25, 59% of university students, 48% of workers over 25, and 77% of intellectuals.

All things considered, over 90% of the respondents rejected defectors from the circle of good patriots, 75% required working in accordance with one's abilities, knowledge of the national anthem, homesickness when abroad, and completing compulsory military service, and 73% demanded loyalty towards socialism. 'Does not want to have children' was considered as a reason for disqualification far more often than before. Openness towards foreign countries also increased as compared to 1973—partly due to the greater proportion of young respondents.

In 1981, the rank order and the ratio of the criteria in the student sample of different sub-samples were similar to those described above (08.R81). Significant differences could be noticed in the criteria of loyalty towards socialism (52%), demand for interest in politics (27%), disqualification of people who did not want to have children (12%), and in the anti-cosmopolitan index, when over 90% would tolerate marriage with foreigners, following the fashion, and preference of foreign pop music. All of these changes showed less strictness; the index of the whole sample was 7.1.

Students in the country set stricter criteria than students in the capital. The most successful students were more demanding in matters of detail, and students in vocational secondary schools, especially those in vocational training schools, also set strict criteria at the general level of the index. Irrespective of school achievement, students from intellectual families were more tolerant than those whose parents were skilled labourers: this tendency was not yet statistically significant in primary schools but if data from the best primary schools and the grammar schools were collapsed, and especially in the grammar schools, the tendency became conspicuous. As for details: socialist commitment, devoted labour, and homesickness were less required by them.

In 1991, in the transformed social and political situation, the instrument used for measuring the strictness of the criteria of patriotism was slightly altered again (11.R91). The descriptor which, in previous surveys, had so often led to disqualification—'one who does not believe in socialism unconditionally'—was reversed and became 'Can one be a good patriot if one believes in socialism unconditionally?' A new, 17th item was also included: 'wants authoritarianism again, instead of democracy'. The total mean in the student sample of the investigation composed of homogeneous sub-samples again was 5.7, which would not have been more than 5.4 in the previous frame of reference—if we have any right to compare it with the previous 16-item instrument in spite of the differences in content.

Generally, the criteria became less strict. Even the most widely accepted criteria fell below 75%: lack of knowledge of the national anthem (73.8%), leaving the country in order to live better (70.3%), lack of homesickness when abroad (69%), and the new element, attempt to restore

authoritarianism (67.2%). It should be noted that in the given historical situation 'non-democratic authoritarian system' could be interpreted in more than one way, including both fascism and communist dictatorship, but socialism in general did not belong to this category, for believers in socialism were excluded from the company of good patriots by only 17.5% of the sample.

Most of the respondents found criteria of patriotism in only two further items, that is, in involvement in local public life (55%) and in working in accordance with one's abilities (51.4%). The support for items reflecting an anti-cosmopolitan position did not reach even 10%. To tell the truth, the proportion of those who set political activity within the new, democratic framework as a criterion of patriotism was not much higher (12.1%).

Grammar school students in the country and students in vocational training schools in the capital set stricter criteria (6.1 and 6.0, respectively) than grammar school students in Budapest (5.2). The girls were less tolerant and stricter if their parents were skilled (6.1) or unskilled workers (6.8). The most successful students were polarized according to social background: those with a skilled and unskilled worker family background were the strictest (6.0 and 6.4), while children of intellectuals and other non-manual workers were the least strict (5.0 and 5.3).

In 1994, the tendencies that had been observed after the changes in the social and political system reappeared in the selected student sample. The mean of the criteria on the same instrument declined to below even 3.5. The majority or at least more than one-third of the respondents agreed with only four of the previously accepted criteria: oddly enough, leaving the country was again a disqualifying item in addition to attempts to restore authoritarianism, lack of knowledge of the national anthem, and lack of homesickness. For a few respondents socialist commitment or political passivity were causes for exclusion, but nobody considered marriage with foreigners, fashion or music preferences in this respect.

To sum up, the investigation of the concept of patriotism served two purposes. On the one hand, the components of personal attitude towards norms were revealed. On the other, we approached the mental contents of the construct of 'patriotism', a marked area of evaluation in the characterization of specific individuals and large social groups.

More than half of the national representative sample in 1973 interpreted patriotism in terms of attachment and devotion to the homeland and the socio-political system, and almost half of the sample thought that patriotism also meant activity for the country. The younger generations emphasized the active nature of patriotism, while older ones stressed passive acceptance and emotional bond. Most of the respondents seemed to think that historical changes were present in the manifestations of patriotism rather than in its nature. In 1975, the responses of four sub-samples indicated even more clearly that the patriotism of the past was

perceived as combative, while that of the present was more conventional and peaceful, expressed in work well done.

From 1973 onwards the same method of measurement was used to investigate the requirements of patriotism and how strict the different sub-samples were in determining these requirements. Respondents were offered 15 to 17 items from which to choose the forms of behaviour that did not conform to patriotism. The selection of an item meant that the person who behaved or felt or made judgements in a certain way did not meet a requirement and broke a 'rule' of patriotism. There was a clear-cut tendency that no matter how varied the composition of the samples, the number of requirements fell and the concept of patriotism became more and more indistinct and tolerant. The average number of requirements, transformed to a 16-item scale, would have been 9.5 on the national representative sample in 1973, would have varied between 7.3 and 10.1 according to social class in 1975, would have been 7.1 in a stratified student sample in 1981, would have been 5.4 in a similarly composed student sample in 1991, after the change of the political system, and would have been 3.3 in a small student sample in 1994. This change is unidirectional and large, even bearing in mind the fact that young people are usually more tolerant in this respect, and that the data collected since 1981 have come from student samples, rather than from adults.

In 1973, more than 75% of the national representative sample indicated that if people defected from their country, evaded military service, did not work according to their abilities, did not feel homesick when abroad, or could not sing the national anthem, they could not be considered good patriots. There was general agreement over the necessity of obeying the laws. The importance of activity related to work was emphasized, while public activity was considered necessary by only 32%. The preference for the homeland and its inhabitants, and for Hungarian intellectual and physical goods as opposed to foreign ones divided the respondents: the older generation was stricter, the younger generation was more tolerant in this respect.

In 1975, the above-mentioned criteria of good patriotism still prevailed. Those defecting from the country were excluded from the circle of good patriots by more than 90%. The symbol of the national anthem and longing for home were especially important for the worker sub-samples. Intellectuals emphasized the importance of public activity and political interest. The older generations of the stratified sample mentioned the necessity of military service and an attitude of reservation about foreign countries more often than the younger respondents. The younger generation seemed to believe more in informality and openness. This was the first time respondents were asked whether or not commitment to socialism was a criterion of patriotism: 73% replied in the affirmative.

In 1981, loyalty to socialism took a considerably more modest position in the responses of the students: only 52% of them indicated it as a criterion,

which was a sign of political erosion. Public activity was not considered by many respondents as very necessary either. Private life had also become more independent of patriotism than for any previous sample. The acceptance of foreigners and foreign goods no longer posed a problem for 90% of these student respondents.

In 1991 and 1994, after the socio-political changes had taken place, the above-mentioned tendencies became more pronounced: resistance to foreign countries disappeared completely in the younger generation. Both public activity and private life vanished from the criteria; attachment to the country and respect for national symbols remained the narrow core of the norms of patriotism. Neither the socialism of the past, nor the social program of the future seemed to conflict with patriotism in the opinion of the great majority, but the demand for and acceptance of democracy was required, and authoritarianism was no longer regarded as compatible with patriotism.

The strictness of the criteria of patriotism and the degree of tolerance were influenced by the socio-educational situation of the respondents. It was true throughout the period of the studies that workers, their children, and future workers still studying in vocational training schools were more demanding and more reserved about foreign countries than intellectuals and their offspring. In 1981, students with good academic records made more demands than their school-mates, while in 1991 polarization depended on origin: students whose parents were workers were more demanding, while students with intellectual parents were the most tolerant. This is a good example of the long-range effect of familial socialization and of the fact that workers had and still have special attitudes.

Comparison of countries, 1973–94

When studying the contents of public thinking related to our topic, the conceptual link between nation and country also justifies systematic and repeated investigation of the way in which people evaluate the current situation of different countries. The starting point in the interpretation of the results was that the perceived situation of the country forms (from the point of view of group attribution) an external frame for the activity of the mentally corresponding ('state forming') nation. On the one hand, it constituted a totality of conditions under which and relying on which members of the nation were active. On the other hand, it was a result of the efforts, work and internal and external struggles of a nation; it was the achievement that the large social group could show up to itself and to the outside world in any given historical moment.

The-basic method applied in the research that will be presented here was a series of comparisons among countries. The subjects were asked to compare the situation of certain countries under predetermined aspects, and to choose three countries that stood out from the others under each aspect.

The content and the number of criteria varied, but the method was the same: we counted how many times a country was chosen as outstanding in 8–10 comparisons. Relying on the individual response series, the mean frequency of choosing each country was calculated for the sub-samples and the whole sample; this latter frequency was considered as the index of evaluation for the given country (Table 2.2).

The same eight countries were repeatedly compared by the subjects over a long period. As will be seen later, this list of countries was modified in the 1990s. Before that, the countries considered for about two decades were as follows (in a different order): United States of America, England, France, Hungary, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Romania and the Soviet Union. The development of this 'selection' of countries was naturally led by certain hypotheses of our own.

In the 1970s it was assumed that the evaluation of the countries could be influenced by at least two factors. One was socio-political system and the economic-military commitment. Thus, the countries were selected from two world systems. The other factor was power. By this time, the two superpowers had risen above the other great powers, and clearly the existence of the small countries—to which the country of the respondents, Hungary, also belonged—had to be considered also. Certain questions regarding the situation of the countries drew the respondents' attention to the world system to which the individual countries belonged, to what kinds of achievement one or the other world system could show in the relevant field. Other questions highlighted the power of the countries; in this case the USA and the Soviet Union did not stand opposite each other, but were similar.

In addition to these basic background factors, two more possible influences on judgements were taken into consideration when the set of countries was made. The first was national connection, which—extending beyond the strong separating walls between the world systems—could have influenced the evaluation of the two German states, which had long been separated, either in the direction of similar positioning or in the direction of emphasizing the differences between them. The other factor was the historical regional tension between Hungary and Romania, two countries who were forced into the boundaries of the same world system; this tension could have undermined the impression of homogeneity of the world system or, on the contrary, it could have been subordinated in a demonstrative way to the unity of the world system.

In addition to the two basic and two supplementary influencing factors, it was naturally assumed that one of the countries was and would be the respondents' own native land. Consequently, one of the world systems, the so-called socialist bloc—voluntarily or not—had to be treated as their own potentiality by the subjects. Judgement of one's own country meant the evaluation of the conditions and achievement of one's own group—which

Table 2.2 The selection of countries from different aspects (1973–91)

Which are the three countries . . .	*H*	*USSR*	*GDR*	*FRG*	*ROM*	*ENG*	*F*	*USA*	*POL*
1 that support best the economic development of underdeveloped nations?									
1973	II	I	III						
2 where medical care is 'cheapest'?									
1973	I	II	III						
3 that serve best the cause of peace?									
1973	II	I	III						
4 whose foreign policy serves their own interests?									
1973				III		II		I	
5 whose athletes have outstanding achievements?									
1973	III	I						II	
1975		I	III					II	
1981		I	III					II	
1991		II	III					I	
6 that are the richest in national beauties?									
1973		I			II			III	
1975	II	I			III		III	III	
1981		III					II	I	
1991					III		II	I	
7 where living standards are the highest?									
1973		II		III				I	
1975		III		II		III		I	
1981				II		III		I	
1991			III			II			
8 whose economic development is the fastest?									
1973	II	I	III						
1981		I	III					II	
1991			II			III		I	
9 where prices have increased least?									
1975	III	I	II						

10 where the greatest scientists live?									
1975		II				III		I	
11 where people have the possibility to influence the country's politics?									
1975	II	I	III						
1981	II	I	III						
1991						II	III	I	
12 whose leaders have the greatest prestige?									
1975		I		III			III	II	
1981		II				III		I	
1991			III			II		I	
13 where people are the most satisfied?									
1981	II	I	III						
1991						I	III	II	
14 where people are the most cultured?									
1981		III				I	II		
1991			III			I	II		
15 whose economic development is the greatest?									
1991			II			III		I	
Mean frequency of each country's selection									
1973	4.37	5.37	2.71	1.36	0.84	0.86	1.00	2.33	
young worker	4.91	7.71	3.57	2.17	1.36	1.51	1.43	4.71	
1975 elderly worker	4.86	8.05	3.76	2.21	0.84	1.27	1.11	4.69	
young intellectual	3.92	7.72	4.30	2.66	1.13	1.82	1.76	5.53	
elderly intellectual	4.33	8.46	4.42	2.73	0.64	1.51	1.43	5.39	
1981	2.67	5.31	2.85	2.53	0.56	2.65	2.42	4.35	
1991	1.31	1.68	4.95		0.53	5.09	4.03	6.06	0.3

Notes
F=France, FRG=Federal Republic of Germany, ENG=England, GDR=German Democratic Republic, H=Hungary, POL=Poland, ROM=Romania, USA=United States of America, USSR=Soviet Union

could not be without contradictions due to the duality of condition and achievement. In this respect, the subjects were provoked by the task, when, in the composition of the set of countries, they had to measure their own country against countries that were usually of different weight. The task was influenced by the fact that when the countries were of the same weight regarding the objective indexes, they came only from the same world system, that is, from the socialist bloc.

In the first study, conducted in 1973 (05.R73p), the Soviet Union was the most frequently (5.37) chosen country in the sample. Hungary was the second (4.37), the GDR the third (2.71). The USA came only fourth (2.33), followed by the rarely chosen FRG (1.36), France (1.00), and England (.86). Romania brought up the rear with a mean of .84, which was close to that of England.

The results received on the national representative sample followed the logic of differentiation between world systems, and reflected the dominance of the respondents' own system, that of its superpower, and the predominant preference of the respondents' own country. This overall image was rectified by the historical tension between the respondents' own country and neighbouring Romania: isolated from all of the other countries of the so-called socialist bloc. Romania received the least positive evaluation. In the overall image strong differentiation between ingroup and outgroup was found (both in the strict and wider sense of the word), which may have included motives of political conformity.

The Soviet Union, the GDR, and Hungary were especially frequently chosen when the subjects were asked which countries served the cause of peace, which ones supported the economic development of underdeveloped countries, whose economic development was the fastest, and where medical care was the cheapest. With an especially narrow range of vision it was quite frequently stated that the socialist countries (this time including Romania, which incorporates a large part of historical Hungary) had especially beautiful landscapes.

Opinions were more divided over which countries had the highest living standards and whose athletes had outstanding achievements. In relation to the first question, the USA was mentioned the most frequently (54.2%), closely followed by the Soviet Union (51.8%), then came the FRG with 37.7%. Regarding the latter question, the Soviet Union came first (71.2%), but the USA was also often chosen (49.6%). Answers to the question 'Which country's foreign policy serves best her own interests?', which was probably interpreted in a more or less pejorative sense, frequently included the western powers, with the USA in the lead.

With almost grotesque frequency, Hungary was mentioned among the friends of peace (2nd:71.6%), regarding natural beauty (lst-2nd:63.3%), cheap medical care (1st:60.6%), supporting the underdeveloped (2nd: 59.7%), economic dynamism (2nd:45.4%), and great sports achievements (3rd:40.6%). Although her living standards were less emphasized in this

international comparison (4th:27.2%), she came before England or France. Not many subjects stated that Hungary's foreign policy stood for Hungary's own interests (6th:20.4%)

The opinions expressed can be interpreted as a vision of dynamically developing, sociable and beautiful countries guided by gentle intentions, faced by a selfish western world living mostly at a high standard. The way in which the dynamism of economic development and the living standards were localized, divided, and contrasted is somewhat perplexing.

Against all contrast, there were parallels in the respondents who chose the two superpowers most frequently. The frequency of choice varied, but those who were young, those who were educated at secondary level, those who were skilled workers (but not in agriculture), those who lived under urban conditions, and those who were interested in politics chose the Soviet Union and the USA more frequently. In choosing Hungary, however, the contrasting groups of the youngest generation and those over 60, those who had completed only primary school and had university diplomas, and industrial workers and intellectuals who held leading posts stood out from the national representative sample.

In 1975, the evaluation of the countries was repeated in four markedly different sub-samples (06.R75): workers and intellectuals, young adults and adults over 25.

The four sub-samples had to choose three countries from the above set of countries for each question. The triad of 'socialist' countries (the Soviet Union, Hungary, the GDR) often appeared in responses when the questions asked where people had a voice in politics, where the workers could enforce their will in factories, where prices went up the least, and where medical care was cheap.

The superpowers were most often mentioned when the questions asked which country's leaders commanded international respect, which countries were technically well developed, where great scientists lived, and which country's athletes achieved outstanding results. The leaders for the first two questions were the Soviet Union, the USA, and the FRG. England and the GDR were mentioned very frequently for the third and fourth questions, respectively.

It was striking that these strata, which can be considered as politically sensitive and from which the sub-samples were selected at random, chose western countries in answer to these questions of effectiveness quite frequently in 1975—while placing the Soviet Union in the second or third position. Living standards were thought to be highest in the USA and the FRG, and only the third position was divided: the intellectual sub-sample mentioned England, the workers chose the Soviet Union frequently.

Beside the exchange of some questions and the introduction of a few new ones, a kind of schism was again observed in the responses of the strata with marked political roles: answers of political loyalty were separated from the appreciation of individual and social effectiveness.

In addition to the tangentially indicated nine questions, as a tenth question we asked again which of the countries in question was the richest in natural beauties. Besides the two vast superpowers, Hungary was mentioned, especially by the workers (70–76%).

This is worthy of note because Hungary was the only country whose position altered between the ranking of countries given in 1973 by the national representative sample and that given in 1975 by the studied social groups. While in the younger and the older worker sub-samples Hungary still followed the Soviet Union in the ranks of evaluations, in the two intellectual sub-samples the United States definitely preceded Hungary. It should be noted that as the level of education increased, Hungary received less emphasis even earlier; the 1975 findings simply underlined this observation.

In 1975, another data-collection method was used to investigate views of the economic development of Hungary. The respondents evaluated 14 factors from two aspects on three-point scales, that is, how important they were as conditions in the economic development of any country and how far they characterized the economic conditions of Hungary at the time of the investigation. There was considerable similarity between what the different sub-samples considered as necessary for development and what they considered characteristic of the given situation. Important conditions were absent even according to public thinking. For instance, the 'technical level of production' was not considered as satisfactory, especially by intellectuals. If, in the spirit of the expectancy-value model, the evaluations of the different factors are weighted according to their importance, an index of the economic development of the country is obtained which is characteristic of the individual or group. The conclusion could be drawn from this index that the workers' evaluation was usually more favourable than that of intellectuals, and that the views of the two socio-occupational groups were especially polarized in the younger age groups.

Returning to the 1975 ranks of the countries, the significant similarity was striking partly because most of the questions were different in the two years. Only four were exactly the same, and six were completely new. Despite this, the evaluation hierarchy of the countries seemed to be stable in the middle of the 1970s and in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, there was a double tension deep down in this stability. On the one hand, there was a contradiction of content between the responses based on political loyalty to the existing system and the objective acknowledgement of the social and economic efficiency. On the other hand, there was a social and generation gap manifested in the way the different groups interpreted the requirements of political loyalty, and the amount of factual knowledge was also different in the various groups.

Socializational effects and differences were also studied when the comparisons of the countries and the index of their cumulative choices were analysed (08.R81) in 1981. There were eight aspects of comparison this

time, three countries had to be chosen by the respondent for each question. It was found again that the triad (the Soviet Union, Hungary, the GDR) of 'socialist' countries appeared when respondents were asked in which countries people had a voice in national politics and where people were the most satisfied. Strangely enough, these were the very countries that were forced behind the USA, the FRG, Great Britain, and France when the questions asked where the standard of living was the highest. Thus, there seemed to be an inverse relationship between satisfaction and standard of living—which is an interesting psychological assumption. It is not certain that the respondents were aware of this bold theorem inherent in their replies: they were merely thinking in social and political blocs, declaring the values of 'their own' and only hesitantly acknowledging the superiority of 'the others'.

Thinking in bloc terms was limited from the beginning, since Romania had always been an exception; she was not chosen together with the other 'socialist' countries. Just as before, the only item for which she was considered at all was 'which countries are the richest in natural beauties'. She was not among the most frequently chosen countries even in this respect. Hungary came before Romania, although Transylvania, which is especially rich in natural features, is no longer part of Hungary, but belongs to Romania.

The social and political blocs became polarized in the eyes of the respondents with respect to some of the questions. The responses to the question 'In which countries are the people the most cultured?' regularly included West European countries, while the USA was seldom mentioned. As to the greatest international respect, the Soviet Union was chosen the most frequently, but the other 'socialist' countries were rarely mentioned.

The superpowers took the best positions when the basis of selection was rate of economic development and performance of athletes. The respondents saw the two leading countries of the two social and political blocs as excelling in these indicators of effectiveness, as if the two countries competed with each other in these respects.

In the rank order of evaluation based on the whole series of choices, in most of the sub-samples the Soviet Union and the USA took the first and second positions respectively. The GDR was third, followed by Hungary, slightly preceding Great Britain. After the FRG and France, Romania came last. The responses of the 1981 student sample differed from those of the 1973 national representative sample as a whole in two relevant points. On the one hand, they emphasized the values of the USA, and placed the USA in second position after the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they evaluated Hungary in a slightly more reserved manner. Thus, their own country came only fourth in rank, and did not reach the second place. This made the views of the (youthful) group of students similar to those of the intellectual sub-sample of the 1975 study.

The differences between the sub-samples based on the school they

attended and on their family background and origin were especially striking. Grammar school students in the capital placed the USA in first position, and were somewhat more reserved in their evaluation of the Soviet Union. The FRG and England were evaluated quite favourably, too. Hungary was forced to the seventh, next-to-last position. The last two tendencies were less conspicuous in the students whose parents were manual workers. In contrast to the aforesaid results, secondary school students in the country (both in grammar schools and in vocational secondary schools) had a different opinion. In their circles the preference for the Soviet Union over the USA was clear-cut. The GDR and Hungary were also very positively evaluated, especially by the students who did not do very well in school and whose parents were workers or peasants.

Thus, there were marked differences in the evaluation of the social and political blocs between students in the capital and in the country. This can be conceived as a sign of progressing ideological ferment: it had already affected the more open schools in the capital, but had not yet reached the more slowly reacting schools in the country. Primary school pupils and vocational training school students were the closest to each other. For them, the order of Soviet Union, USA was stable, but otherwise the logic of social and political blocs was not evident in their opinions. They evaluated Hungary very positively; this attitude regarding their homeland was especially marked in the opinions of the most successful students. It can be mentioned as a matter of interest that the students in the vocational secondary schools in the capital showed a dichotomy: the responses of the sub-samples of most successful students were similar to those of grammar school students, while students whose scholastic achievement was poor or moderate responded similarly to primary school pupils and the students in the vocational training schools. This dichotomy is noteworthy because it matches the hybrid nature of this type of school.

Ten years later, this investigation was repeated on a similar student sample (11.R91). The questions asked in 1991 were the same as before, but the GDR was naturally removed from the list of countries to be compared, and was replaced by Poland. The responses showed that the most dramatic change in the frequency of choice and the rank order of countries based on this frequency was the collapse of Russia, as compared with the rankings often years earlier (Figure 2.1). The United States had taken first place (mean number of selections: 6.06), closely followed by Great Britain (5.09) and Germany (4.95). The fourth position was taken by France (4.03). As for the number of choices, Russia (1.68) and Hungary (1.31) fell back, while Romania (.53) and Poland (.3) were chosen least often.

In addition to the indirect method of cumulative selection respondents were also asked directly how favourably or unfavourably they evaluated the countries. In the rank order given by the respondents, Great Britain (mean rank position: 2.36) and the USA (2.83) occupied the best positions. The



Figure 2.1 Mean frequency of each country's selection, 1981 and 1991.

positions of France (3.26) and Germany (3.27) were almost indistinguishable, the rank of Hungary (3.75), the respondents' own country, was better than that of Poland (5.93), or Russia (6.41) and Romania (7.55) at the end of the list. It was notable that the United States, Germany, and Russia (which was forced into the background anyway), received less preference in the course of direct evaluation than when the respondents had to start out from details and had to consider many aspects. Within the frame of direct evaluation, respondents put Great Britain and France to the fore, and gave a better ranking to Hungary, their homeland, and to Poland. In spite of deviations, the evaluative rankings that were connected more to details and were phrased more like personal opinions were fundamentally similar. The earlier illusions and self-deceit were gone, the West appeared as an attractive model, and the only questions that remained were how closely the position of the West could be approached, and whether it could ever be reached at all.

To sum up, the comparison of the countries from given aspects produced roughly the same findings in 1981 as in 1973. This is all the more noteworthy since the comparisons were made not only in different periods, but also by samples of rather different composition and from quite different aspects.

For a long period the respondents seemed to have classed and evaluated the countries according to two basic criteria. The first was based on the socio-political system. The differences between the Eastern and the Western

blocs were clear to the respondents, who discriminated in favour of the so-called socialist countries in many respects. There were several motives for this. On the one hand, the choice was suggested by the whole institutionalized system of upbringing and propaganda, by conformity, and by existential interest under the given circumstances. On the other hand, the respondents' homeland, Hungary, also belonged to this category of countries, and by evaluating the country positively they also valued the category, and vice versa. It was in terms of this grouping that the superiority of the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Hungary over the USA, England, France, and the FRG was declared. Romania, however, was detached from the other 'socialist' countries, and was repeatedly given last place. Romania was a negative exception: the assumed positive sides of the category of countries to which Romania and the respondents' homeland both belonged did not extend to Romania.

The second basis of classification was power and success, differentiating between superpowers, medium powers, and small countries. The Soviet Union and the United States were perceived to be in close competition. The Soviet Union, the United States and the closely following FRG were contrasted to the other countries.

In 1973, in addition to the aims of world politics, social policy and economic development seemed to be the greatest virtues of the 'socialist' countries. In 1975, their superiority was seen in the fields of democracy in politics and in workplaces, social policy, and economic stability (stable prices). In 1981, the student sample emphasized the positive sides of internal politics and climate of opinion in contrast to the western countries. The pattern of responses was the same, despite different questions and different countries to be judged.

In 1973, the superiority of the superpowers was seen in the fields of sports and standard of living. In addition to athletic achievements, in 1975, international prestige and technical and scientific development played a similar role. In 1981, the superpowers were seen as outstanding in the area of athletic achievements, international prestige, and economic progress.

As can be seen in this review, the 'rate of economic development' was seen in a new light in 1981 in comparison with 1973. Previously, it seemed to be a common virtue of the 'socialist' countries, although in terms of the standard of living, the group consisting of the USA, the Soviet Union and the FRG was already evaluated the most favourably. In 1975, the intellectual respondents were inclined to say that the non-socialist countries had the highest standard of living. In 1981, this was the general opinion among students, and the high rate of economic development was no longer perceived as an advantage of the so-called socialist countries, although it was not doubted in the case of the Soviet Union.

Good climate of opinion, moving away from the standard of living, remained the only privilege of the Eastern bloc. In fact, the two aspects were contrasted: 'We feel good, and you live well'. In 1981 it was found that

dividing countries by political blocs became ambivalent, because both sides were superior in some important field. Furthermore, a peculiar new pattern of response also emerged, when the cultural level of the non-socialist countries and non-superpowers was highly esteemed: Western Europe appeared in a positive light.

The struggle between false ideological dogmas supported by political pressure and the recognition of reality could be seen in this prolonged process. The change of the socio-political system made it possible to tell the truth: when the series of questions asked in 1981 was asked again in 1991, the complete superiority of the USA and Western Europe was unambiguous, Russia and the whole East Central European region fell far behind. Self-deception and hypocrisy related to the evaluation of Hungary were also abandoned: absurdly, the overall evaluation of Hungary among the countries in question had been second in the responses of the national representative sample in 1973, and in those of the worker sub-samples in 1975. In the student sample in 1981 Hungary was already surpassed not only by the Soviet Union, but by the USA and the GDR as well, while in 1991 she came sixth, preceding only Romania and Poland, the new member on the list. Thus, according to this self-evaluation, the position of the country was not bad within her own region, but she could not compete with the world-leaders—except perhaps in the somewhat subjective evaluation of natural beauties.

As to the direct, global evaluation of countries without specific criteria, Hungary and Poland preceded not only Romania but Russia, too. There was a shift in this respect among the western countries, too: the traditional prestige of Great Britain and even France showed up better in direct global evaluation than when decisions about more fact-related items were aggregated.

Countries forming and representing Europe

The collapse of the walls between social and political systems raised the possibility of a united Europe, and joining the West became an aim for the whole East Central European region. Under these circumstances the name of the continent and the right to belong to her received a strong evaluative charge, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In this chapter, our attention will be focused only on how the respondents in these radically changing times perceived the relationship between different countries and Europe.

In the year when the social and political systems changed we decided to approach this area by investigating (10.R90), on a narrow sample, the question of which countries are associated mentally with Europe by the respondents. The rank was Germany, France, and, surprisingly enough, Great Britain's third place was shared with Hungary. These initial results were reinforced in 1991, when a complex sample of students was asked to state which countries they thought of when they considered the concept of

Europe. The sample consisted of over 500 persons, each of whom could choose three countries. Most of the respondents mentioned Germany (74.4%) and France (59.3%). It is worth noting that half of the respondents (51.2%) mentioned their own East Central European native land as a characteristic country of Europe. The fourth in line was Great Britain (47%), then came Switzerland (9.6%), Italy (9.0%), Austria (7.1%), Russia (sometimes still named as the Soviet Union) (5%), and Sweden (4%). Other countries from the eastern region were mentioned, though by few respondents: Romania (16), Czechoslovakia (14), Poland (11), Yugoslavia (7), and Bulgaria (3) (11.R91).

It could be ascertained that the associations of countries with Europe were basically limited to a few prominent West European countries. The smaller member-states of the European Community were not very frequently mentioned even if we calculated them as one group. This only underlines the surprising fact that the majority of the respondents mentioned Hungary as a typical country of Europe, while practically ignoring the other countries in the region. It was striking that the Soviet Union was relatively rarely associated with Europe in the minds of the respondents.

We also attempted to uncover the role attributed by the respondents to certain countries in the past and the future of Europe. In order to do this, judgements were elicited about the European influence of certain countries in three different periods. The first questions was: 'In your opinion, which country left its mark, how strongly, on the overall image of Europe at the turn of the century?' The second question asked the same in relation to 'the 1950s', while the third similar question referred to the year 2000, the future. The response had to be given on a five-point scale, from (1) 'no role' to (5) 'a completely determining role'.

From the listed countries to be evaluated, the respondents saw Germany as the first in 1900 (mean: 4.21), followed by Great Britain (3.88) and France (3.68). They thought Russia played quite a significant role (3.64), but the distant USA (2.82), Italy (2.73), and Hungary (2.62) did not. At the time, Romania was perceived as being of minor importance (1.92).

According to the respondents, the image of Europe had drastically changed by the 1950s. The most powerful determining country was Russia (i.e., the Soviet Union) (4.16). The USA came only second (3.68). Interestingly enough, the loser of the Second World War, the divided Germany, again reached third position in this period, while Great Britain (3.43) and France (3.22) were forced behind. More modest roles were attributed to Hungary (2.63), Italy (2.57), and Romania (2.06). The factorial structure of the responses suggested that the two leading superpowers belonged together in the minds of the respondents, the evaluation of the four West European states expressed another underlying factor, and the judgements of the roles of Hungary and Romania were separated again.

Looking forward to the year 2000, the respondents foresaw a leading role

for Germany in Europe (4.11), and expected strong US influence (3.99). Great Britain (3.55), then France (3.33), came next, but Russia still had some weight (3.26). According to the forecast of the students, Romania (2.22) is still going to follow some way behind Hungary (2.85) and Italy (2.79). It should be noted that the forecasts made in the data of the 1990 preliminary study and those from the extensive 1991 investigation matched each other almost perfectly.

In Chapter 5 the data collection method and the results will be discussed in greater detail, when judgements regarding an object in several historical periods were asked for. Thus, the object to be evaluated, which in this case was the perceived development of certain countries, could be unravelled. The development of Russia was the most individual: it took the shape of an inverted U form, reaching the peak of European influence in the 1950s, with her future prospects worse than her starting position at the turn of the century. There seemed to be a parallel in the 'path' of the four West European countries: as opposed to Russia's trend of development, they reached their nadir in the 1950s, but by 2000 they were expected to regain their starting position of influencing power. This return is probably the most important for Germany, since according to these results she is going to return to her leading position in Europe by the end of the millennium. The influence of the other three countries was expected to take different courses. In the respondents' opinion, the roles of Romania and Hungary would increase gradually. Hungary would even come slightly before Italy by the end of the century. The influence of the USA started in an elevated position, and would rise even higher. She was second in the middle of the century, and, despite every historical change, she was expected to keep this position for the foreseeable future.

Questions justly arose about how the evaluation of individual countries and judgements about their past and future roles were interrelated, and about whether there was any relationship between the role played by the different European countries and the evaluation of the changes of these roles. Correlation and factor analyses were performed in order to answer these two questions.

The evaluation of the roles the different countries played in three different periods, the evaluation indexes, and further indexes related to the people of the given countries were subjected to analysis (see pp. 102–8). It was found that the judgements of the very same countries in the three different periods were significantly correlated, the power of their relatedness was great within the indexes related to the country and its people, and one, and only one, factor appeared within them.

Only limited data are available for Italy, but for all the other seven countries, the analysis revealed the above results one by one. Thus, the correlation between the countries' perceived roles in 1900 and 1950 was .305 on the sample of 500. The correlation coefficient was the highest in the case of the evaluation of Romania (.410), it was less, but still

significant, in the cases of the USA (.222), Russia (.220), and Germany with her dramatic changes (.176). The correlations between the roles played in 1950 and in 2000 was even stronger, on average it was .361. In the case of Great Britain it reached .485, while in the cases of Germany, whose course was expected to rise, and Russia, whose course was expected to fall, the coefficients were significantly less (.167 and .137, respectively). The average correlation between 1900 and 2000 was slightly less (.284). The two extremes were Romania (.405) and Russia, again (.129). As a basis of comparison, it is worth considering that the average correlation between 'selection of a country' and the European role a country was judged to take in 1900 was less than .054, that in 1950 was .070. Only the average correlation between 'selection of a country' and the European role a country was expected to take in 2000 reached a statistically significant level (.146). Taking everything into consideration, the judgements of the European role of the individual countries in different periods were different, but they were closely correlated: the judgements regarding the previous periods were the best predictors of the next period's evaluations. The evaluation of historical influence did not necessarily change with the evaluation of the given country in an international comparison, but the forecast of the future European role of a country did tend to be correlated with it.

The whole sphere of variables in question were also analysed as a whole, purposefully paying attention to the relationship between the judgements regarding the historical roles of the different countries. The first of the rotated factors united the three judgements given both to Romania and to Hungary. The second factor linked the evaluations of the continental influence of France, Great Britain, and Germany (excluding her role at the turn of the century). The evaluations of the European influence of the USA in the three periods were separated. As a rare exception, the past and future of Russia were not in the same factor; this could be related primarily to the 'selection index' of this superpower in crisis. Otherwise, it was repeatedly found that the judgements regarding the historical roles were organized within themselves. The historical roles of the West European countries appeared together, while the judgements of two East European countries in the three periods formed another distinct unit: a group of very reserved and sensitive variables. Thus, when the respondents associated the West European countries with Europe while mentioning their own homeland quite frequently also, there was no indication whatsoever, even in 1991, that they would not grasp the substantial past and future differences between these countries.

In 1994, the respondents were asked again to associate mentally a country with the word 'Europe'. The relative frequency with which countries were mentioned was essentially unchanged: Germany was the first, followed by France and England. The only significant difference between 1991 and 1994 was that previously more than half of the respondents indicated their own

country; a few years later, only every fifth respondent mentally associated Hungary with Europe.

To sum up, the concept of Europe gained new political significance in the 1990s in the opinions of Hungarian respondents, too. It was mentally associated above all with the continental power of Germany and France. When thinking of Europe, the respondents thought of all the other member-states of the European Community and all the other countries of the continent significantly less often than of these two countries and the insular kingdom of Great Britain. The only exception was Hungary, the respondents' own country; Hungary was mentioned by 51% as a typical European country in 1991, but this ratio had decreased considerably by 1994. The mental association of Hungary with Europe was a matter of wishful thinking, and certainly did not mean that the same role was ascribed to Hungary as to the leading western powers, or that the evaluation of her role would run parallel with theirs.

The 20th-century role of the leading countries of Western Europe was described as a U-shaped curve. In the 1950s they were pushed to the background in their own continent, while Russia and the USA gained control, but the respondents expected the relationships of the turn of the century to return by the turn of the millennium. This was true of Russia, too. Her career, shaped like an inverted U, was expected to bring her status back to almost the same as it had been before the First World War. The USA would not lose the strong influence she had gained in the 1950s, but Germany would regain the first place.

This anticipation of the future appeared almost immediately, simultaneously with the socio-political change. The roles expected in the Europe of 2000 were not independent of the specific evaluations of different countries as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. However, it was also evident in the answers of the respondents that the roles of various countries in Europe were seen as different in the years 1900, 1950, and 2000, but the judgements related to these years correlated.

3 The cognitive domain of nations

II National stereotypes

Hungarian autostereotype

The category of one's own nation and the related stereotypes have outstanding psychological character and significance. Group self-characterization, which is a collective work in itself, emerges as a collective product, while it is also an extremely simplified and biased mirror of collective functioning and culture. Its bias is inevitable, since it plays a role in group cohesion, in the acceptance and facilitation of group existence, while each member of the group develops, expresses, supports, and emphasizes his or her own self-image. In the present stage of national states and increasingly broad international relations, it is of both ideological and practical significance what image a national community develops and communicates about itself, and how and what it contributes to the self-consciousness of its members.

It was virtually without precedent that we asked people the question in 1973 (05.R73p): 'In your opinion what are the good/bad qualities that characterize Hungarians?' Members of the national representative sample mentioned far more positive qualities than negative ones in their answers to this open-ended question. Only a quarter of the sample were unwilling or unable to give positive qualities as an answer, while half could or would not give negative qualities. Most of the respondents mentioned two or three positive features, while 10% of them listed as many as four or five. Most of the respondents indicated only one negative characteristic, 11% mentioned only two, while the percentage of those who mentioned three or four did not reach 10% of the total sample.

As for the content of the responses, it was quite frequently mentioned that Hungarians had a cheerful disposition towards life (liked to eat, drink, and enjoy themselves, were happy), their cordiality was emphasized (they were hospitable and friendly), and their love of work and their diligence were also referred to. Among the negative qualities, lack of loyalty and the related moral shortcomings (individualism, envy, selfishness) were most often indicated. The spontaneous replies elicited by the simple open-ended question avoided a number of other possibilities: no mention was made of outstanding knowledge or highly developed art, of great performances in general, of strength in the figurative or literal sense of the word, or of

morality. Regarding the last quality, the contrary seemed true: the almost dangerous absence of stability within the community was implicit in comments to the effect that 'divergence was a Hungarian curse'.

This finding was supported when respondents had to rate the qualities of 'Hungarian people' according to 20 given pairs of characteristics, using five-point scales. In this case the members of the sample did not have to search for the appropriate word; they could easily use the possibilities on offer. When the characteristics were ranked according to the degree of typicality of positive features as rated by the total sample, significant differences could be seen between the means despite the fact that none of them express a negative judgement. Hungarians were credited primarily with emotional qualities that express impetus, attachment, and positive feeling towards life, and, correspondingly, features that reflect prudence and self-possession were considered as the least characteristic. Features indicating intellectual abilities drifted towards each other, and were represented in this Hungarian image without extremes. Features that would have reflected the corporate spirit of Hungarians, like unselfishness, loyalty, public activity, or interest in politics were even less emphasized. The absence of these features is particularly striking, since patriotism, in terms of commitment to public and common causes, was given as one of the most characteristic features of Hungarians.

The characteristics offered in the multiple-choice questions were chosen from the interview material in the pilot studies, in the hope that they would appropriately express the opinions present in public thinking. The replies on the scales can be summarized and compared with each other. The judgements on the 20 pairs of characteristics were averaged without weighting, so as to provide a simple index of evaluation of the respondents' own national group. This average turned out to be 4.12 for the whole sample. The numerical evaluation of the individual characteristics and that of their sum can be compared according to the different groups within this 1973 sample and those in later studies.

As with Katz and Braly's classic question, one of our early research problems was how consistent the evaluation—indirect qualification and description of the characteristic profile—of the national group was. Focusing on the respondents' own nation, we considered the number of times the respondents chose Hungary when comparing the different countries as an indicator of indirect qualification (see Table 2.2).

It was clear that the global evaluation of Hungarian people correlated with this indicator of indirect qualification. There was only one obscure point in this respect, related to respondents who never mentioned the country; in other words, those who thought Hungary did not reach the level of other countries, or perhaps did not even belong in the same category, with the result that they could not be considered together; those, in fact, who believed that the comparison of countries was an impossible task. These respondents proved to be a heterogeneous group with regard to the characterization of nations, too; as a final result, their total evaluation was

average. Apart from this, the relationship was definite and was true from the other side, too: the more favourable the mean of the evaluation arising from the characterization of Hungarian people, the more frequently Hungary was accentuated within the series of international comparisons. The documented relationship was not the only logical possibility, since an outstanding nation may live under unjust circumstances, and severe conditions may prevent its success. Psycho-logic was effective, however, in pairing the negative with the negative, and the positive with the positive.

It deserves special attention that despite all consistent and well traceable differences in evaluation, the 'evaluation layers' based on the number of instances in which Hungary was accentuated resulted in similar characterization of the 'Hungarians' (see Figure 3.1). This was shown by the high correlations (from .541 to .956) of the characteristic profiles and those among the characteristics ranks (from .640 to .940), which regularly proved to be statistically significant. Thus, it can be said that there was an image of Hungarians in public thinking that was generally accepted, at worst the evaluative charge of the whole and the details differed in degree of positiveness. Typical Hungarians were considered more or less patriotic and consistent, but there was no doubt that they were more patriotic and friendly than consistent and sober. It would be bold to say that this schema-like



Figure 3.1 Trait profiles of Hungarian national autostereotype in the resources of groups differing in evaluation, 1973.

cognitive formation was independent of the externally linked affective-evaluation relationships, but a certain structural stability of judgements regarding the nation could be grasped in this way. This was true even if at the peak of the evaluation of the country's situation (eight instances of emphasis) 'patriotic' and 'brave' were in the fore, and Hungarians were considered especially 'loyal' and 'strong' in comparison with those who represented the nadir of the country's evaluation (one choice). The former respondents pointed at responsibility and virtues guaranteeing individual and public efforts more vividly, while the latter ones emphasized only signs of attachment from among the emotional features of the Hungarian image, and considered good humour and impulse less characteristic. They rather questioned Hungarians being 'happy', 'optimistic' or 'diligent', although they were also less inclined to consider Hungarians as 'impetuous'.

Strangely enough, the two extremes fell behind those who came in the middle when evaluating the country (four choices) in one question: they thought Hungarians were not very interested in politics. This was a critical point, because at the time of the survey talking about and being interested in politics was widely seen as a way of supporting or co-operating with the monolithic political system, or at least complying with it.

The evaluation of the characterization of the typical Hungarian developed as a function of several social factors. In general, evaluations expressed by respondents living in the capital and under urban conditions, of young people, and of highly educated persons were more restrained than those of rural, older, and less educated persons, respectively. The relationship, however, was never linear. From among those living in the provinces, it was the town-dwellers who stood out with their positive evaluation (4.17), and not the village-dwellers. In the 1970s 40 to 50-year-olds were more restrained in the evaluation than both older and younger people. Evaluations made by people whose educational level was only eight grades at the most, were quite high (4.17), those from people with secondary school diplomas were low (4.07), while those of college and university graduates were definitely moderate (3.93). However, occupation and rank was an important modifying factor: the 'leading' intellectuals gave significantly more positive characterizations (4.11) than others in their category. It was also important that although the evaluations of industrial workers fell behind those of agricultural manual workers, they were much higher (4.20) than the mean of the whole sample.

The roles of age and educational level in the characterization and evaluation of the nation were investigated together almost two years later, in 1975, when the responses of university students, young workers, and intellectuals and workers over 25 were studied and compared (06.R75). The four sub-samples characterized Hungarians on a five-point scale according to the above-mentioned 20 pairs of characteristics (plus a new 'thrifty-wasteful' pair). The average evaluation of the nation was less in all four sub-samples than the index of the national representative sample, and none of

them reached the value of 4. Workers and people over 25 regularly gave more positive responses: 'Adult' workers ranked the highest, followed by young workers and working intellectuals, while university students came last. In judging certain features the last two groups definitely tended to attribute the negative characteristic to Hungarians (see 'dissent', 'superficiality', and especially 'impetuosity').

The differences between the four sub-samples, between the occupational and age groups were studied separately for the judgement of each of the 21 pairs of characteristics. The social and occupational differences were often conspicuous when respondents were judging features they did not consider very characteristic of Hungarians. In these cases younger and 'older' workers were less critical. Two-way ANOVA analysis showed the main effects of occupation and age in 13 and 10 cases, respectively. There was significant interaction twice, when intellectuals behaved differently depending on their age: university students tended to doubt the diligence and patriotism of Hungarians, while older intellectuals definitely assumed these traits in Hungarians. Only once did young people judge Hungarians more positively than did the older ones: when judging the 'loyal-discordant' pair, young people, especially workers, were less bitter than their elders, especially than working intellectuals. Apart from all slight differences, the characteristics profiles measured in the national representative sample in 1973 and in the four sub-samples in 1975 were similar—statistically as well (see Figure 3.2). Hungarians were judged to be particularly patriotic, friendly, happy, proud, faithful, optimistic, and brave, while it was strongly doubted whether they were thrifty, generous, consistent, peaceful, loyal, thorough, or sober.

The internal relationships of the characterization of the nation and its embeddedness in other opinions was analysed by sub-samples: to establish whether they correlated statistically. Every detail of content lost importance in the light of the finding that in the four sub-samples the relations between the judgements were all structured differently. The relationship between the general level of the evaluation of nations and certain relevant elements of the characterization of the Hungarian nation differed in these sub-samples, as did the relationship between all this and self-characterization, and the relationship between national and self-characterization and the acceptance and rejection of certain themes of foreign affairs, of foreign economy, and of military politics.

In the worker sub-samples there was a close and organic relationship within national characterization and between national and self-characterization. In workers over 25 the general level of evaluation of national characterization went loosely together with appreciation of the socialist and leading capitalist countries, with the acceptance of standing apart economically, and of the socialist military force ('The economic crisis and inflation of the capitalist countries do not affect our country', and 'The military force of the socialist countries has to be decreased also, in order to



Figure 3.2 Trait profiles of Hungarian national autostereotype in the responses of different socio-occupational and age groups, 1975.

avoid war'). In young workers the answer to the question 'Are Hungarians thrifty?' proved to be an especially good indicator; its positive judgement varied together with restrained evaluation of the USA and the FRG, in addition to standing apart economically ('Economic uncertainty is so great in the capitalist countries that it is worthless to contract business with them', and The economic crisis and inflation of the capitalist countries do not affect our country'). In the intellectual sub-samples there was a loose relationship between the general level of national characterization and the individual characteristics; in fact in the university student group a definite negative correlation could be found (between evaluation index and the feature of patriotism). There was no correlation between the evaluative charges of self-characterization and national characterization. Among older intellectuals the self-evaluation of their own patriotism and the patriotism that they attributed to Hungarians were inversely related to emphasis on the USA in international comparisons. In the responses made by university students there was a specific correlation between the assumed patriotism of Hungarians and the judged competitiveness of the economy ('Our chief aim

should be to have as large a selection of goods in Hungarian stores as in the highly industrialised countries'), and between the assumed patriotism of Hungarians and the demand for maintaining socialist military strength ('The only guarantee of world peace is the military force of the socialist countries', and The military force of the socialist countries has to be decreased also, in order to avoid war'). In accordance with the nature of correlations the relationships can be described the other way around, too: the less patriotism was attributed to themselves by young intellectuals, the less often they emphasized the values of the socialist bloc, that is, of Hungary, the Soviet Union, and the GDR. The results unavoidably drew attention to the social differences that appeared in both the content and the organization of opinions. They helped us to realize not only that the content of the opinions was linked to the pattern but also that the revealed correlations should be interpreted within the frame of this pattern.

To sum up, the content of the characterization of 'Hungarians' was not essentially different whether respondents were answering open-ended or multiple-choice questions in 1973. Their common attribute was that the emotional traits of the national character were emphasized, that is, positive attitude toward life, social openness and attachment to the homeland. Nevertheless, reservations were expressed about the sobriety, prudence, public morality, and public-political activity of Hungarians.

The trait profiles of the Hungarian autostereotype in the different groups of the national representative sample were concordant with each other. This was tested when the groups were divided according to the relevant criterion of how Hungary was evaluated, how many times she reached the top positions in the international comparisons (cf. Chapter 2). The evaluative charge of the stereotyped national characterizations develops in parallel with the evaluation of the countries. The unweighted mean of the number of allotted positive traits was chosen as an indicator of the evaluative charge. Furthermore, the ranks of positivity of the traits were also concordant in the responses of these groups of the sample. Thus, there was a difference between the groups as to how characteristic they thought the positive traits to be, but there was practically no disagreement as to which trait was more and which one was less characteristic of their own national group.

In 1975, according to another investigation on a stratified sample, occupation and age both had an effect on stereotyped national characterization. The judgements of workers were more favourable in 13 traits than those of intellectuals, and there were significant differences between age groups in the judgements of 10 traits. Respondents under 25 were generally less critical, but they assumed greater social solidarity in Hungarians than did older respondents. It was not only the extent of national evaluations as seen in the national characterizations that varied in different social groups, national evaluations were organized with, embedded in, and correlated with other views in different ways as well. Nevertheless,

despite these peculiarities, the trait profiles of 'Hungarians' in the different sub-samples and in the responses of the 1973 national representative sample proved to be significantly similar.

National characterizations, 1981 and 1991

Content and structure of characterizations

Categories and the related stereotypes do not stand by themselves: they exist, their meaning appears, and their significance can be determined only in relation to other categories and stereotypes. Attempts were made to elucidate these relationships in 1981 and in 1991, when eight nations were characterized on seven-point scales between standard pairs of characteristics (08.R81 and 11.R91). In choosing the ten pairs of characteristics the results of the characterization of Hungarians by open-ended and multiple-choice questions were utilized; it was also an aim to tap as many aspects of the human personality as possible (intellect, sociability, morality, involvement in the community and in public affairs) by choosing and combining characteristics. In both cases the study was conducted on complex samples of students: dozens of sub-samples could be formed according to social background and origin, type of school attended, and scholastic achievement.

Different emphasis and accent were given to the ten features in the characterization of the eight nations (see Table 3.1). These features expressed and evoked different general impressions and were chosen mainly for their ability to represent the positive and negative extreme of each category. If the level of evaluation—to be discussed in detail later—was disregarded, similarities and differences between the different characterizations of nations could also be determined by the rating of the characteristics.

Hungarians

Let us see how the respondents characterized a typical representative of their own group in 1981. In the student samples, when characterizing Hungarians, the most favourable characteristics involved social openness and commitment, 'friendly' and 'good humoured' paired with patriotism—which was in accordance with the previous data. It was an interesting contradiction that social and public characteristics could be found on the opposite side, too. It was usually doubted whether Hungarians were 'popular' and involved in politics, and their diligence was definitely rejected. This evoked the impression of loyalty, spontaneity, and serenity on the one hand, and moderate effort, endurance, and efficiency on the other. They could be both intense and lukewarm. It cannot escape our attention that—as could be seen in the characterizations—the younger generation of the early

Table 3.1 National characterizations, 1981 and 1991: means and factor structure

1981

Hungarians

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.77	h	5.42
	.77	d	4.49
	.68	t	5.92
	.67	i	5.73
	.62	p	5.27
	.55	e	5.42
factor 2	.71	g	5.82
	.69	f	5.99
	.59	o	5.26
	.49	a	5.57

PV = 49.4

English

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.75	h	5.74
	.74	t	5.86
	.71	i	6.13
	.66	a	5.68
	.41	d	5.12
	.38	e	5.84
factor 2	.73	g	5.04
	.73	f	4.79
	.54	o	6.16
	.40	p	5.75

PV = 43.1

French

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.72	t	5.82
	.70	a	5.44
	.66	h	5.34
	.58	i	5.89
	.49	p	5.19
factor 2	.76	f	5.41
	.70	e	5.53
	.53	d	4.79
f3	.74	o	6.02
	.71	g	5.50

PV = 52.6

Americans

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.72	t	5.14
	.67	h	4.36
	.63	a	5.14
	.56	i	5.68
	.55	d	4.86
	.49	f	4.69
factor 2	.72	g	5.34
	.72	o	6.08
	.48	e	5.27
f3	.70	p	5.88

PV = 51.0

Chinese

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.74	f	3.15
	.57	h	3.70
	.54	o	3.12
	.51	i	3.75
	.49	g	3.30
	.47	e	3.21
factor 2	.79	t	5.17
	.71	a	4.70
	.62	d	4.64
f3	.85	p	5.12

PV = 52.7

Romanians

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.70	f	3.31
	.68	h	3.63
	.68	i	4.22
	.66	e	4.02
	.64	o	2.82
	.62	d	4.13
	.58	g	3.53
factor 2	.71	a	4.64
	.68	t	5.02
	.66	p	4.54

PV = 50.8

Russians

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.71	a	6.03
	.69	d	5.62
	.64	f	5.74
	.55	h	6.02
	.55	t	6.57
	.47	p	5.98
factor 2	.76	o	4.97
	.75	g	4.25
	.63	i	5.63
	.48	e	5.17

PV = 47.6

Germans

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.71	t	5.91
	.65	h	4.98
	.64	a	5.56
	.63	i	5.81
factor 2	.75	o	4.78
	.66	g	4.24
	.56	f	4.52
f3	.83	e	5.33
	.61	d	5.28
f4	.89	p	5.43

PV = 59.8

1980s was no longer pervaded by the perennial experience of social discord, but the fall of the position of 'diligence' in the national self-characterization was also prominent—which could mean the decline of social experience of morality and endeavour, beyond any 'typical student attitude'.

In 1981, factor analysis revealed that the relatively low judgement of diligence correlated with accentuated patriotism and the otherwise moderately evaluated moral-intellectual qualities. There was another factor, too: the group of social features, with the stronger positive features and the more ambiguous 'popularity'. By 1991, the structure of the factors had changed in that the factor of national consciousness and endeavour—as the second in explanatory power—became separated from the moral-intellectual cluster of characteristics: 'patriotic'—'self-assertive'—'interested in polities'.

Table 3.1 (cont.)

1991

Hungarians

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.77	h	4.36
	.71	d	4.08
	.66	i	4.91
	.66	e	4.72
factor 2	.76	a	5.04
	.72	t	5.12
	.65	p	4.80
factor 3	.80	g	5.47
	.68	f	5.28
	.50	o	4.50

PV = 56.3

English

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.78	t	5.60
	.64	h	5.63
	.64	i	5.72
	.54	p	5.27
	.53	a	5.65
factor 2	.80	e	5.52
	.78	d	5.15
	.78	g	4.79
f3	.67	f	4.45
	.62	o	5.27

PV = 55.2

French

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.69	h	4.89
	.69	e	5.14
	.64	i	5.23
factor 2	.80	g	5.09
	.69	f	4.84
	.66	o	5.09
factor 3	.81	t	5.72
	.78	a	5.50
	.61	p	4.80
	.61	d	4.53

PV = 58.7

Americans

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.78	e	4.55
	.74	i	4.78
	.70	h	4.34
	.60	d	4.60
factor 2	.78	o	6.10
	.75	g	5.44
	.54	f	5.26
factor 3	.81	t	5.25
	.81	a	5.46
	.46	p	4.85

PV = 55.4

Chinese

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.80	t	5.12
	.65	a	4.74
	.64	i	4.75
	.56	p	4.09
	.55	e	4.36
f2	.82	g	3.91
	.71	o	3.88
factor 3	.79	d	5.40
	.64	h	5.29
	.60	f	4.80

PV = 59.3

Romanians

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.77	i	3.50
	.74	e	3.27
	.72	h	3.38
	.71	f	3.15
	.71	d	3.36
	.67	g	3.35
	.62	o	2.45
factor 2	.79	a	4.48
	.79	t	5.08
	.64	p	4.53

PV = 53.3

Russians

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.75	i	4.14
	.75	d	3.90
	.73	h	4.17
	.72	e	3.95
	.53	o	3.50
factor 2	.78	t	5.18
	.76	a	4.64
	.70	p	4.87
f3	.67	f	4.36
	.75	g	3.87

PV = 58.6

Germans

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.80	t	5.41
	.68	a	5.51
	.65	p	5.04
	.47	i	5.16
	.45	h	5.11
factor 2	.81	g	4.39
	.75	o	4.82
	.66	f	4.39
f3	.83	d	5.20
	.72	e	4.98

PV = 58.3

Notes
FL = factor loading, A = attribute, M = mean, PV = percent of variance

a = self assertive, d = diligent, e = educated, f = friendly, g = good-humoured, h = honest, i = intelligent, o = popular, p = interested in politics, t = patriotic

Thus, characterization, which can be traced back to three underlying factors, became more complex.

The general position of these characteristics did not alter radically in the responses of the sample, but interest in politics was now less doubted. Naturally, its meaning had also changed in the given context: it could mean not only compliance with the monolithic system but also utilization of the possibilities of democratic pluralism. It deserves just as much attention that the evaluation of 'honest' as a feature of Hungarians had fallen: in 1991, it came only just before 'diligence' at the bottom of the scale (see Figure 3.3).

The altered political system and the conditions of economic privatization lay behind this change for the worse, and behind the fact that the general level of evaluation of the national ingroup had fallen over the decade from 5.5 to 4.7 on the seven-point scale.



Figure 3.3 Trait profiles of 'Hungarians' before (1981) and after (1991) the radical changes.

The English

Among the national outgroups the characterization of the 'English' seemed to take the role of a permanent ideal image. In 1981, intellectual features were outstanding in the characterization of English people. Beside the esteem of intellect, erudition, and moral poise, the respondents ranked social characteristics like humour and friendliness towards the end. The likelihood of hidden comparison between the categories of 'Hungarians' and the 'English' was strengthened by the fact that the relative weaknesses of the members of the highly judged outgroup corresponded precisely to the main strengths of the ingroup, whose characterization was generally restrained. Furthermore, while the sociable Hungarian was seen above as unpopular, here the highest positive trait of the English, who were seen as relatively reserved and whose humour was 'strange', became popularity.

In 1981, the factor structures of the characterization of Hungarians and the English were essentially alike. The most numerous group of traits with intellectual-moral character was the dominant factor, while there was another factor behind the well-described group of social features. The

similar structure highlighted difference in content and contradiction of evaluative nature. In 1991, the factor structure of the characterization of the 'English' had changed—it became more complex—in that 'diligence' and 'educated' became separated from among the intellectual-moral characteristics, and were linked only to each other in the judgement. Even without these features of civilization the intellectual-moral group of characteristics constituted the dominant factor of the characterization, including political involvement, which was judged by the respondents together with national virtues and other strengths.

The rearrangement of content by 1991 could be seen just within this factor. The relative strength of both political interest and patriotism lessened, they moved toward the end of the list of traits; the relative importance of 'self-assertive' and 'honest' increased, and, together with 'intelligent', they constituted the pronounced traits of the positive features. The description of the typical English person remained quite appreciative, but became slightly fainter: the 5.6 mean in 1981 became 5.2 in 1991.

The French

The characterization of the French was very similar at many points to that of the English. 'Popular' was emphasized, and their intellectual features and patriotism were present as positive features. The sociability of the French was not as debatable for these students as that of the English, but their moral features (honesty and diligence) were less well judged.

In 1981, three factors could be found behind this description. The structure of this description was very similar to that of the English, with the exception that in addition to the factors of intellectual-moral and social features the feature group of 'diligent' and 'educated' appeared here together with 'friendly'. In 1991, however, this last factor disappeared completely, and its elements joined the other two factors in an evident distribution. However, this description differed from that of the 1991 characterization of the English. The features of 'patriotic'—'self-assertive'—'interested in polities' (which implied national self-reflection) became separated, and their judgement formed a separate factor in the evaluation of the French.

In 1991, patriotism and self-assertiveness took a more intensive and more positive role in the general view of the French than a decade before. Yet the popularity of this nation—similarly to that of the English—seemed to become less characteristic, and the general level of nation evaluation decreased somewhat: in 1981 it was 5.5 on the seven-point scale, in 1991 it was 5.09.

Americans

The third, emphatically 'popular', nation of the western world in 1981 was the American. In characterizing this nation involvement in politics

received an unusual accent, but intellectual features also got a relatively favourable position. Oddly enough, strong doubts arose regarding the diligence and especially the honesty of Americans. There was a notable internal inconsistency in the characterization: it was difficult to decide whether the definitely popular and good-humoured Americans were 'friendly' or not.

This contradiction was reflected in the factor structure of the characterization. The positive trait of popularity and humour was the second factor in terms of explanatory power. Political involvement took a high place in the third factor, while friendliness had a negative factor load. Otherwise, the rather different judgements of intelligence, patriotism, and honesty could be found together in the comprehensive, dominant factor. The factor structure of the responses in 1991 was more usual. Features reflecting sociability, including friendliness, belonged to one factor, while patriotism, independence, and the related political mentality were separated from them again.

Multiple changes in content had occurred by 1991. Political interest moved down the list, while the ambiguity about the friendly intentions and behaviour of Americans had disappeared. This is probably related to the fall of the separating walls between the countries. Judgements about patriotism and self-assertiveness received greater emphasis in the overall picture. At the same time, the intellectual traits intellect and culture were less favourably judged than before. Only the two extremes of the list of characteristics proved to be stable: popularity at one end, and the more or less doubted moral features at the other. The level of evaluation decreased: in 1981 it was 5.3, while in 1991 it became 4.9.

'Chinese' and 'Romanians' turned out to be in contrast to the nations of the West in the eyes of the students.

The Chinese

In 1981, the nation of the renegade great power of the Eastern bloc was credited with patriotism, political involvement, and self-assertiveness. Moral and intellectual traits took a middle position, and the Chinese were seen as being more intelligent than educated. Features of sociability could be found towards the end of the list; in fact the list was closed by 'popular'.

The questionable social features and the intellectual-cultural characteristics belonged to one, dominant factor. There was another factor behind the group of features characterized by 'patriotic'—'diligent'—'self-assertive'. Political involvement did not belong to any other group in the judgements, but was independent and separate. In 1991, there was a radical change in the level of evaluation and in the contents of judgement with a change in factor structure. The groups of 'patriotic'—'diligent'—'self-assertive' and 'interested in polities' were united, and belonged to the same

factor as intellectual-cultural features. Social features became separated: humour and popularity belonged together, while friendliness became linked to honesty and diligence.

The judgements of the separated traits were different. The negative judgement of humour was only slightly better than that of popularity. At the other end, however, a new focus of moral traits was developing—'diligent' became a leader, then came the judgement of 'honest', and the emphasis on 'friendly' was only slightly less. Together with the rearrangement of the list of features, a remarkable positive change had taken place in the evaluation of the Chinese people over the decade: the general level of evaluation rose from 4.0 to 4.4.

Romanians

There was only a slight difference between the structures of the Chinese and Romanian descriptions in 1981. The most positive traits of the characteristic profile were 'patriotic'—'self-assertive'—'interested in polities', though even these were poorly evaluated. Intellectual and moral traits received still less emphasis. Features of sociability stood in one block at the end of the list, with 'popular' following at the end.

Features expressing national loyalty and effort were separated in a factor with weak power of explanation. The rest of the judgements, however, were all linked and formed a dominant factor. Ten years later, by 1991, there was practically no change in this respect.

There were minimal variations within the rank of features of Romanians (honesty and humour changed places with diligence and educated, respectively). The profile of the characterization, however, was essentially unchanged. The general level of evaluation fell from 4.0 to 3.6, that is, by this time its mean also became definitely negative.

Russians

The characterization of Russians reflected high esteem. In 1981, while its structure revealed similarities to the very disadvantageous Romanian description, the most positive features of the profile were again 'patriotic' and 'self-assertive'. Political interest was close to them, but the appreciation of Russians as 'honest' was a novelty that could be considered as a peculiarity of this characterization. The features of 'intelligent' and 'educated' did not take a very high position here either. The friendly mentality of the Russian people was not doubted, but their popularity and humour were in question.

The last two negative traits and the intellectual features of 'intelligent' and 'educated' belonged to one critical factor in the 1981 characterization of Russians. Otherwise, most of the characteristics changed together in their hierarchical order, with a sole underlying factor in the background. In

1991, the factor structure was different and the number of factors increased. The negative features did not appear uniformly: 'popular' belonged to the factor of moral and the relatively disadvantageous intellectual features. Sense of humour was judged together with 'friendly' mentality. However, the chief positive traits—those indicating national consciousness and activity—belonged together, and could be considered as manifestations of one factor.

Although the covariance of judgements altered, the profile of characteristics did not change in effect. At best, political interest came to the fore slightly, and judgement of 'honesty' fell slightly within the overall picture. By this time, it was not the critical points that attracted attention but the accent on the perceived positive traits, since the general level of judgements fell from 5.6 to 4.2 in the ten-year period.

Germans

In 1981, the general characterization of Germans was complicated by the existence of the FRG and the GDR, that is, the division of the German people between the world systems. Patriotism, self-assertiveness and political mentality, mixed with intellectual virtues, took the leading positions in the responses—falling behind morality, popularity, friendly nature and good humour; that is, the sociable traits of Germans were the most doubted.

The factor structure of the characterization was particularly complex. It was striking that there were four factors in 1981. The dominant underlying variable was seen in the most positive traits: 'patriotic', 'intelligent', 'self-assertive', paired with honesty. Political involvement, however, was not part of this factor, but stood alone as a separate factor. Two further factors were revealed by factor analysis: the first lay behind diligence and erudition, the other one linked the different manifestations of sociability, the most questioned trait. By 1991, the factor structure had changed only in that the factor with the least power merged with the factor with the greatest power, that is, political mentality accompanied the most prominent characteristics. The internal structure of the characterization had become simpler, the content and role of the other two factors remained unchanged.

In 1991, in a transformed and more transparent political situation, self-assertiveness reached first place on the list of traits of Germans. Then, the traits belonging in one factor bunched together, 'intelligent' fell back a little, 'honest' came forward somewhat. Political involvement, the new member of this group of traits fell behind, playing a slightly fainter role in the overall picture of Germans. The previously more accentuated diligence and culture came to the middle region. Even the internal order of the three traits of sociability remained the same, and took their place on the negative side of the characteristics profile. The general level of judgement moved only slightly, the mean decreased from 5.2. to 4.9 by 1991.

Similarity of evaluation in structure and content within and among nations

The arrangement of the characterizations into separate and internally organized clusters of judgements did not mean that the characterizations had no repeated or stable structure, or that the characteristics were not organized into one hierarchy in a stereotyped way. The organization within a factor was already a partial guarantee of this, but the relationships between the factors were probably determined by the fact that the relatively positive and the relatively negative sides of the characterization had become separated and belonged to different factors.

There was agreement regarding the content and structural construction of the characteristics belonging to the national categories. In this respect, 'Russians' stood in the first place in 1981 (Kendall's W=.72), followed by 'Chinese' and 'Romanians', then 'Hungarians', the 'English', and 'Americans', while 'Germans' and the 'French' came last (Kendall's W=.45). The agreements of opinion within the 40 sub-samples were significant in every case. In cases of complex characterizations that fell into several factors the characteristic ranks were less stable, but were still basically in harmony with each other. The characteristic ranks were evidently more prevalent and stable when there were generally greater differences of judgement between the different features, and if the positive and negative sides of the characterization differed more markedly from each other in public thinking. We expected this potential of characterization to be the greatest in the cases of nations that were rejected and therefore viewed with greater ambivalence. However, it was especially noteworthy that the stability of the highly esteemed 'Russian' characteristic rank was very close to and even higher than that of the 'Chinese' and 'Romanian' characterizations.

The analysis of the national characterizations of 1991 revealed that the essence and even the most important details of the results were repeated. All indexes of concordance calculated for the whole sample—for all of the respondents—were statistically significant at the highest level. Concordance was the greatest in the characteristic ranks of the 'Chinese' and 'Romanians' (Kendall's W=.33 and .22, respectively). 'Russians' came a little lower, but were still among the first three; they were closely followed by the Americans', 'Hungarians', and the 'English'. The 'Germans' and the 'French' came last again (Kendall's W=.10 and .09, respectively).

On the one hand, the degree of concordance regarding the rank of characterizations seems to be a relatively stable and recurring feature of the characterization of objects. On the other hand, it seems to be clear that the more negatively evaluated objects elicit more homogeneous response structures, but there has been no linear relationship between the evaluative charge of the national characterization and agreement over the positive-negative rank of the characteristics.

For reasons of both methodology and content the nature of similarity of these series of characteristics, which elicit such general and great agreement, deserves to be studied further. The passing impressions based on the results so far imply that there was a great variety of construction of the characteristics, but this has not yet been studied systematically. Is it not possible that the concordance regarding every national characterization stems from the fact that the positive-negative rank order of the characteristics was very similar, whatever the object? Or looking at it the other way around: are the recurring differences in concordance not related to the fact that the markedly individual series of characteristics, which was not related to anything else, could be more easily learned and was more widespread than a series of dull characteristics that was similar to several others? Or was it the structure of the individual characterization that was going to be somewhat less stable and less general, while the 'typical' structure was more frequent and more stable in the characterization of several nations?

The answer to the first question was a definite no (see Table 3.2). Twentyeight relationships could be analysed among the eight national characterizations. Eight of these were statistically significant rank order correlations in 1981, while the order of the remaining 20 showed no significant relationship. In 1991 the situation differed in that the number of significant rank order correlations was only two, while in 26 of the cases no significant similarity could be found.

The answers to the second and third questions were also negative. There seemed to be no relationship between the special construction, individuality, and prevalence of the structure. In 1981, regarding their structure, there were two groups of national characterizations. One was the group of 'Romanians', 'Chinese', 'Russians', and 'Germans' (the relationship between the latter two was the weakest, but even that was significant at the $p<.05$ level). The other group was the 'French'—'English'—'American' chain, in which the first and the third were not even directly similar to each other significantly. As opposed to this, only two pairs were found in 1991. One was the structural similarity between the characterizations of the 'Russians' and the 'Romanians', which survived the decade, the other was a novel similarity in the structure of the characterizations of the 'English' and 'Germans', in place of others. The only nation whose characterization structure could not be connected to any other nation either earlier or later was the 'Hungarian' (see Figure 3.4).

Our line of thought would not be complete without studying two further problems. The first one is the durability of the individual national characterizations regarding content and structure. The other is the place and degree of similarity between the earlier and later characterizations of the different nations.

The 1991 characterization of the 'Germans' was similar to its 1981 self, but also to the 1981 characterization structure of the 'Romanians', 'Chinese', and 'Russians'. The 1991 'Romanian' rank order of traits was

Table 3.2 Similarity of national characterizations, 1981 and 1991: trait ranks and correlations

		HUN	ENG	FRE	USA	CHI	ROM	RUS	GER
	HUN								
	ENG								
1	FRE		.75*						
9	USA		.65*						
8	CHI								
1	ROM					.94***			
	RUS					.70*	.70*		
	GER					.76*	.90***	.64*	
	HUN	.87***							
	ENG								
1	FRE			.81**					
9	USA					−.88***			
9	CHI						.93***	.71*	.70*
1	ROM						.89**	.72**	.79**
	RUS						.72*	.92***	.66*
	GER		.67*				.75*		.81**

	HUN	ENG	FRE	USA	CHI	ROM	RUS	GER	HUN	ENG	FRE	USA	CHI	ROM	RUS	GER
Rank	1981								1991							
1	fri	pop	pop	pop	pat	pat	pat	pat	hum	int	pat	pop	dil	pat	pat	slf
2	pat	int	int	pol	pol	slf	slf	int	fri	slf	slf	slf	hon	pol	pol	pat
3	hum	pat	pat	int	slf	pol	hon	slf	pat	hon	int	hum	pat	slf	slf	dil
4	int	edu	edu	hum	dil	int	pol	pol	slf	pat	edu	fri	fri	int	fri	int
5	slf	pol	hum	edu	int	dil	fri	edu	int	edu	pop	pat	int	hon	hon	hon
6	hon	hon	slf	slf	hon	edu	int	dil	pol	pop	hum	pol	slf	dil	int	pol
7	edu	slf	fri	pat	hum	hon	dil	hon	edu	pol	hon	int	edu	hum	edu	edu
8	pol	dil	hon	dil	edu	hum	edu	pop	pop	dil	fri	dil	pol	edu	dil	pop
9	pop	hum	pol	fri	fri	fri	pop	fri	hon	hum	pol	edu	hum	fri	hum	fri
10	dil	fri	dil	hon	pop	pop	hum	hum	dil	fri	dil	hon	pop	pop	pop	hum
Kendall W	74***	.54***	.45***	.58***	.71***	.69***	.72***	.48***	68***	.45***	.37***	.57***	.66***	.71***	.63***	.78***

Notes

CHI = Chinese, ENG = English, FRE = French, GER = Germans, HUN = Hungarians, ROM = Romanians, RUS = Russians, USA = Americans

dil = diligent, edu = educated, fri = friendly, hon = honest, hum = good-humoured, int = intelligent, pat = patriotic, pol = interested in politics, pop = popular, slf = self-assertive

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$



Figure 3.4 Trait profiles of 'Russians' and 'Romanians', 1981 and 1991.

connected to its own 1981 characterization, and, in accordance with the above, to the content and structure of the 1981 characterization of the 'Germans', 'Chinese', and 'Russians'. The 'Russian' characterization was very close to that of its 1981 rank order of traits, and could be connected to the structure of the 1981 'Romanian' and 'Chinese' characterization.

There were two 1991 characterizations that had no other antecedents in 1981 than the description of their own category: the earlier and later ranks of characteristics of 'Frenchmen' corresponded only with each other. The same was true of 'Hungarians'.

The structure of the characterization of three nations transformed radically in a decade. The order of characteristics of the 'English', 'Chinese' and 'Americans' in 1991 was not similar to their own 1981 self. The structure of the 'English' in 1991 was similar to that of the 'Germans' in 1981. The structure of 'Chinese' in 1991 was the opposite of that of the 'Americans' in 1981. The structure of the characterization of Americans' was not close to that of any other nation.

All of these consistent results indicate that according to the arrangement of characteristics in the positive-negative dimension the following is true:

- In 1981, there was an extensive group of national characterizations whose characteristics had not disappeared by 1991, although the group loosened up. Only the similar structure of the characterizations of the 'Romanians' and the 'Russians' to themselves and to each other was maintained. The 'German' characterization was also consistent, but in 1991 the 'English' description got closer to the 1981 and 1991 'German' portrayal.
- The 1991 'English' characterization moved away from what it used to be, and the similarities that used to connect it to the 'Americans' and to the 'French' also disappeared.
- The content structures of the characterizations were more varied and less similar to each other in 1991 than previously. The characterization of the 'Chinese' was also transformed: it had no pair; the only striking feature was that its content structure became the opposite of that of the 1981 'American' characterization. The series of characteristics also changed radically, and became unique by 1991. The structure of the 'French' characterization could not be connected to anything else in 1991, but it was totally consistent with its 1981 self. By 1991, all three of the national characterizations lost those structural similarities that connected them to the descriptions of other nations in 1981.
- Finally, regarding the rank order of the traits, the characterization of the respondents' own national group ('Hungarians') already differed from that of all of the other national outgroups in 1981. This situation was the same in 1991. Not only was the separation repeated, but the structure of the description was also the same in 1991 as in 1981.

It must be pointed out that all the structural characteristics, similarities, and differences discussed here were in one sense flat, lifeless abstractions, for in the course of description and analysis the general levels of and the changes in the evaluation of the national characterizations were deliberately disregarded. We studied only what we thought to be the relatively positive, favourable side and the relatively negative, unfavourable side of each nation at a given level of evaluation. The usual logic of attitude studies is just the opposite: the features of the series of characteristics are forgotten while research concentrates on the level of general evaluation. There will be an opportunity here to compare the two, both in their momentary cross-section and in their transformations.

Evaluation hierarchy and mental map of the national categories, 1981–91

The characterization and evaluation of 'Hungarians' in 1981 (08.R81) were not thrust spectacularly to the first positions, but they did take a relatively favourable position in the eyes of the Hungarian students in the sample. If the index of evaluation evolving from the characterizations and the unweighted mean of the individual judgements are taken as a starting point,

then the eight nations can be ranked on four levels of judgement in the responses of the whole sample (see Figure 3.5). Both the 'English' and 'Russians' averaged 5.61 on the seven-point scale, the 'French' and 'Hungarians' averaged 5.49, 'Americans and 'Germans' averaged 5.26 and 5.19, respectively, while 'Chinese' and 'Romanians' fell below the neutral value of 4 to 3.99 and 3.97, respectively.

The student sample was constructed from homogeneous sub-samples. The responses of 40 sub-samples could also be analysed in order to reveal the extent and content of agreement regarding the evaluation hierarchy of the national categories. There seemed to be significant differences in emphasis between students who attended different schools, that is, according to phase and direction of socialization, in the internal relations of the national characterization of the different groups. Respondents aged 14 who were just finishing primary school and students in vocational training schools who had not drifted from them in mental attitude were at one extreme. They preferred Russians to the English, Hungarians to the French, and, at the bottom of the hierarchy, the Chinese were somewhat less appreciated than Romanians. This had a slight ethnocentric character in the broad sense that the members of this group were more likely to prefer those who belonged to the same political group or had the same colour of skin than the whole sample. However, the limits of the four levels of evaluation were not broken. The other extreme was constituted by grammar school students, especially those in the capital. Unlike the whole sample, these respondents put the French in second place, after the English who definitely held the leading position. The Russians were forced to third place, and Hungarians, the



Figure 3.5. Evaluative charge of the characterization of national categories: unweighted means of trait judgements, 1981 and 1991.

category of the respondents' own nation, could not achieve a better position than fourth. The evaluation of the Americans was a little better than that of the Germans, the Chinese were esteemed higher than the Romanians, who came last. It was striking that in this social medium orientation towards the West was already relatively strong, and there was no over-evaluation of the respondents' own nation, of the political bloc or of skin colour. A certain dichotomy in the public mind was manifested in these response series, but without offending such foundations of the political system as respect for the Soviet Union and her nations, and without consistently under-evaluating other nations like China or Romania that were generating decay in the Eastern bloc. Beside and in spite of every typical variety, there was a common basis, a general agreement in the internal structure of the response series. The value of Kendall's W in the 40 groups was .78, which was significant at the $p<.001$ level.

The evaluation of the nations in the responses of the whole sample could be examined not only in general, but by traits as well. If the individual nations in question are ranked according to the degree to which a certain trait (e.g. 'educated', 'honest', etc.) was considered to be characteristic of them, these nations may take different positions in different traits. The case of Hungarians was outstanding in this respect: the respondents put their own nation in first place twice. Hungarians were considered to be the most 'friendly' and to have the best sense of humour. At the same time, with respect to one trait—'diligence'—Hungarians took the second last position in the rank order of nations. It was remarkable in this respect that the category of their own nation, whose overall evaluation was restrained, still took precedence in certain areas in the eyes of the respondents. However, it is interesting to note the areas in which the respondents identified the particular strengths and weaknesses of their own nation. When considering this, it was difficult to forget that the sample consisted of students, yet at the same time, the long tradition of referring to Hungarians' sociability is well known, as is the economic state of affairs in Hungary at the turn of the 1980s when the criticism of the general attitude to work was a common topic for discussion. This inconsistency in the evaluation of Hungarians was comparable with the ambivalence of the judgement of Russians, and the disintegrated evaluation of the Americans. The judgements of the other five nations, on the other hand, were considerably more homogeneous when the ranks of the different traits were considered. Averaging the ranks by characteristics, the hierarchy of the evaluation of the national categories remains the same as that based on the overall evaluation.

The connections of the eight national categories have been treated and characterized so far as if they differed from each other only in respect of evaluation and in only one dimension, and as if the judgments regarding the different traits merely reflected or contributed to this evaluation. This approach was not improper, but it could not be denied that the peculiarity and autonomy of the national characterizations was not confined to a single

dimension, and that their relationships could better be described as distances in a multidimensional mental space, where the distinctive role of the particular traits and cluster of traits could also be seen and determined.

As a first step, we tried to picture the eight national characterizations using the method of multidimensional scaling (MDS) in a two-dimensional basic space (see Figure 3.6). It was a striking feature of their arrangement that two categories, the 'Chinese' and the 'Romanians', drifted away from most of the characterized nations and were quite far from each other as well. They were the farthest away from the French and the English, two typically European nations. These latter two nations, however, were embedded in the circle of other national characterizations. The term 'circle' can be understood even in the literal sense, and it was only a matter of standpoint whether a narrow or broad circle was determined. In addition to the French and the English, the narrow circle includes the Americans and the Hungarians, the latter two being the close companions of the former pair. The broader circle includes—in addition to the English, the French and the



d = diligent, e = educated, f = friendly, g = good-humoured, h = honest, i = intelligent, o = popular, p = interested in politics, s = self-assertive, t = patriotic

Figure 3.6 MDS map of national characterizations, 1981.

Americans—the slightly distant Germans and the Russians, too, when it could be said that the Hungarians become the centre of the whole formation, almost at the same distance from the other five nations.

In order to elucidate the national characterizations of 1981 better, the straight lines corresponding to the individual traits were inserted into the MDS maps. The horizontal axis of the graph fell between the traits 'self-assertive', 'intelligent', and 'educated', which helps to interpret its content, while the traits 'good-humoured' and 'popular' can be found next to the vertical axis. The two traits 'intelligent' and 'educated' can be found between them, constituting the main axis of the ellipse determined by the arrangement of the national categories. Thus, it can be said that the greatest differences appeared along these very lines, while the differences between the categories that stand closer to one another can be interpreted on the basis of the above contents of the co-ordinates. Thus the 'English' and 'Russians' were slightly, but perceptibly, different from 'Americans' and 'Germans' with respect to the self-reflective and moral traits. The western nations were perceived as different from 'Germans' and 'Russians' in the subjectively appreciated 'humour' and perceived 'popularity'.

This two-dimensional space did not provide a good fit for all traits, and thus, 'diligent' and 'interested in polities' had no place in it. Actually, even in the three-dimensional space only one of the traits, 'diligence', characterized this dimension, where 'Germans', the 'English', and to a lesser extent 'Russians' stood in contrast with the weaknesses of the 'French', 'Hungarians', and 'Romanians'.

Another extensive study was conducted on a large student sample in 1991 (11.R91), which made it possible to contrast the responses of the two periods, and to answer the question of how the evaluation of the nations had changed.

The level of evaluation turned out to be lower than before (see Figure 3.5). It was not surprising in itself that as a result of the historical changes and the new situation in foreign policy, the declared evaluation of the 'Russians' fell considerably in ten years: the difference in the mean was 1.35 on the scales. It was less obvious, however, that the evaluation of 'Hungarians', that is, the typical representatives of the respondents' own nation, would be much less favourable, although the nation had freed itself and was able to act independently; the difference was .66 on the scale. The evaluations of the different outgroups were also less favourable than in 1981. The degree of decline was significant in the cases of the 'French' (.40) and the 'Romanians' (.31), whose evaluations were low anyway, and the 'English' at the top of the list (.28); it was moderate in the cases of 'Americans' and 'Germans' (.19 and .18, respectively). The different degrees of decline indicate that the difference in evaluation was not general and unorganized, nor was there a change in the style of the responses, but there were subtle modifications that also reflect changes in trends. This recognition was supported by the exceptional, positive change in the

evaluation of the 'Chinese' (.65) only. This significant difference appeared when both the Hungarian perspective and the international situation of China had changed profoundly: what had once been a renegade member of the Soviet bloc was now the only great power with a socialist label, and was far—not only in the physical meaning of the word—from the West towards which official Hungarian policy had turned.

As these differences show, the hierarchies of the national evaluations were different in 1991 from what they had been in 1981, but some essential, similar features remained. Again, the general evaluation of the 'English' was the most favourable (5.33), but their now discredited rivals, 'Russians', were no longer near the top. The 'French' and Americans' followed very closely (their means were 5.09 and 5.07, respectively), and the evaluation of the 'Germans' was also very close (5.01). The description of the typical representative of the own-nation category fell behind the general evaluation of characterization of the representatives of western powers, societies and cultures: the mean general index of 'Hungarians' was 4.83. The eastern nations—far or near—were the least favourably evaluated and closed the rank of evaluations: first the 'Chinese' (4.64), then the fallen 'Russians' (4.26), and the 'Romanians' who received an absolute negative evaluation (3.66).

Another possibility was to describe the hierarchy by starting from the rank of the national categories as compared to one another within the individual system of each respondent. On the basis of the index of evaluation a rank of national evaluation could be set up from the response series of each subject, and thus the positions of the individual national categories could be summarized for any group and for the whole sample. Using this system, the first place undoubtedly goes to the 'English', whose mean rank was 2.46 for the whole sample. The 'French' (3.38) and 'Americans' (3.39) follow in close and mixed succession. There were characteristic differences between the internal positions of these two national categories. In the sub-sample of Budapest grammar school students, the second position after the 'English' definitely belongs to the 'French', while Americans' were not even the third, but go to fourth place after 'Germans'. The opinion of the students in a vocational training school in Budapest was just the opposite: they placed Americans' second, 'Germans' came next, and the 'French' were only fourth. In contrast to the two extremes, grammar school students in a large provincial town put Americans' in second place, the 'French' third and 'Germans' fourth.

These differences also clarified the meaning of the fact that 'Germans' took fourth place in the internal ranks in the whole sample (3.78). The position of the typical representative of the respondents' own nation, the 'Hungarians', was fifth (4.33), and the 'Chinese' came sixth (5.01). This general order appeared in grammar schools in the capital and in the large provincial town, while in certain groups of vocational training school students the evaluation of the 'Chinese' was strikingly favourable and took

fifth position on average. The lower end of the internal rank order was uniform again: 'Russians' were second last (6.14), and 'Romanians' were last (mean of 7.5).

Naturally, there were further differences between the different sub-samples (which were grouped according to chosen career as well as type of school). It was especially striking that girls put the 'French' in third place and 'Americans' second more often than boys, while boys, especially those of working-class origin, were inclined to evaluate 'Germans' more favourably. These were overall tendencies only: they were not particularly characteristic of the Budapest grammar school students (in fact, here the girls put the 'French' in second place). It is worth noting that the covert evaluation trend in the answers of the Budapest grammar school students perfectly matches that of the sub-sample of excellent grammar school students from intellectual families; the evaluation trend of the responses of the whole sample also matches the internal rank order of national characterization produced by the excellent grammar school students from intellectual families. This group of boys and girls, with their relatively balanced responses, seem to be able to represent the greater whole the best. In spite of all variability and individual differences, the internal ranks of the national categories were concordant with one another for all members of the sample (Kendall's W=.46, p<.001)

Previously, it was also useful to examine—albeit at the level of rough averages for the whole sample—how well the hierarchies based on the general evaluation index match the national rank orders based on the evaluation of individual traits. For six of the ten traits the 'English' were considered to be the most positive, although in 'friendliness' the 'English' were ranked fifth among the eight nations. Their mean rank was 2.1. The 'French' and 'Americans' rank first in one trait each ('patriotic' and 'popular', respectively), but they also fall behind to the sixth place once each. Their mean ranks for traits were 3.2 and 3.7, respectively. 'Germans', who were second and third in many traits, slip in with their 3.3 mean—thus beating 'Americans', whose evaluations were more polarized. The characterization of 'Hungarians' was the most favourable among all the other nations in two traits: they were—traditionally—'friendly' and 'good humoured'. The evaluations of the other traits fall behind, and were more unfavourable than those of the outgroups. It was striking that in 1991 the Hungarians' weakest trait was, according to the respondents, 'patriotism'. The mean rank of 'Hungarians' was 4.3. The positions of the last three nations were definite, their ranks were 5.1, 6.4, and 7.9, and the range of ranks becomes increasingly narrow. The 'Chinese' actually reach one first ('diligent') and one second ('honest') place. The most favourable position reached by 'Russians' as judged by the members of the sample was third place for 'political interest'. The national characterization of 'Romanians' was seventh for 'interested in

polities'; in all other traits they came eighth when evaluations of national characterizations were compared.

The hierarchy of the evaluations of the national categories as developed by 1991 was studied in different ways. Some definite points emerged, but light was also thrown on the nature of uncertainty about the interrelationships of evaluations. The preference for the 'English', which showed a slight decline as compared to the absolute level of evaluation, was definite, 'Hungarians' were appreciated moderately, and the near and far east were rejected. The evaluation of 'Russians' fell to the same level as that of 'Romanians', while the position of the 'Chinese' indicated increased esteem. 'Hungarians' and the 'Chinese' excelled in some virtues even if their average indices were not excellent. According to the sample, these virtues were not very characteristic of the western nations who were preferred in general. The exact order of the western nations (in other words which came second, third and fourth after the 'English') depended on the way in which their evaluations were summarized. The positions of 'Americans' and 'Germans' were especially difficult to establish because they also involved two patterns and two influences. It was the evaluation of these two nations that declined the least in the critical period.

In addition to the unidimensional evaluation, the separation and independence of the clusters of traits—which were supported in factor analysis as well—could also be considered.

The mental map present in the minds of the respondents about the relationships between nations was investigated by multidimensional scaling in 1991, too (see Figure 3.7). The distance in national characters was the greatest between 'Romanians' and the 'English', then the distances from 'Romanians' and the other nations decrease in the following order: Americans', the 'French', and 'Germans'. The greatest apparent similarity was between the 'English' and 'Germans', and between these two nations and the 'French'. In this highly polarized image of the world, 'Russians' were the closest to 'Romanians', while Americans' and 'Hungarians' were the closest to the 'French', and the 'Chinese' were relatively the closest to 'Germans' and 'Russians'.

The complex arrangement could be described in two dimensions, but the fit was exceptionally good in three dimensions (RSQ=.969). In the first dimension, the differences already mentioned between 'Romanians', the 'English', and Americans' were the most significant. In the second dimension, Americans' and 'Hungarians' differ first of all from the 'Chinese'. In the third dimension, the 'Chinese', Americans', and 'Hungarians' jointly differ from the 'French'.

The traits can be placed in this space of nations by the PROFIT procedure. Humour, political interest, and popularity belonged to the same cluster of traits, friendliness being close to them. These features, which suggest sociability, socio-political openness, and acceptance, played an especially positive role in the characterizations of Americans', the 'French',



d = diligent, e = educated, f = friendly, g = good-humoured, h = honest, i = intelligent, o = popular, p = interested in politics, s = self-assertive, t = patriotic

Figure 3.7. MDS map of national characterizations, 1991.

and 'Hungarians', and these were the traits along which the greatest differences were found between the above nations and 'Romanians'. Self-assertiveness and the construct marked by the line of patriotism and culture are arranged on either side of the horizontal axis. These two traits and intelligence were especially characteristic of the 'English' and 'Germans', at the greatest distance from 'Russians'. The line depicting honesty and diligence can be found between the 'English' and 'Germans' and the 'Chinese', lying perpendicular to the line corresponding to friendliness, and on which not only 'Romanians' and 'Russians' but 'Hungarians' as well, score negatively.

To sum up, the judgement of the characteristics of eight nations was asked for again in 1981 and in 1991. The trait profile of these national characterizations appeared regularly in the responses of the student sample in each period. It was repeated every time to a significant extent, and the unanimity became prominent when the positive and negative sides of the characterization in public thinking differed seriously (as in the cases of 'Romanians', 'Chinese', and 'Russians' who were still highly esteemed in 1981). The trait profiles of five of the eight national stereotypes persisted ten years later, but three did not: the hierarchies of traits of the 'English', 'Americans', and the 'Chinese' underwent considerable changes.

The stereotyped national characterizations contained both common and differentiating features. Thus, it remained a common characteristic of the

'Atlantic triad' that the 'English', 'French', and 'Americans' were perceived as more popular and intelligent than diligent and friendly. Patriotism and culture were closer to the top in the characterization of the 'English' and the 'French' than in that of Americans'. It was a common unfavourable feature of the 'French' and Americans' that honesty came lower in their characterizations than in the description of the 'English', while the latter nation lacked the humour of the former two. The ranks of traits were more similar in 1981 than in 1991, for in 1991 the Americans' were found to be more friendly than before, but their erudition, intellect and even political interest were ranked lower. Conversely, in the rank of traits of the 'English', it was intellect, self-assertion, and honesty that moved up, while the position of popularity fell.

This new perception of the 'English' resembled the 1981 and 1991 characterizations of 'Germans' more than their own of ten years before. The 'Germans' were seen as especially patriotic, intelligent and self-assertive both in 1981 and in 1991, but not very popular, friendly or good-humoured. In the course of a decade, the position of their moral values improved in the overall image.

This list of traits characterizing 'Germans' was close to that of 'Russians', 'Romanians', and 'Chinese'. This similarity decreased over time, but the resemblance between 'Romanians' and the 'Chinese' persisted. Although the latter two nations were separated by an exceptional distance in evaluation in 1981, their ranks of traits were nevertheless similar in that patriotism, self-assertion, and political interest were at the top, while erudition, humour and popularity were towards the bottom of the hierarchy. The recognition of the moral values of 'Russians' showed a relative decrease, but did not become as problematic in 1991 as that of 'Romanians' was, either in 1981 or in 1991. As to the evaluation of friendliness, not only its extent, but its position in the rank of traits was also consistently different. Nevertheless, the extraordinary similarity of the trait profiles was manifested in the perception of the two nations both before and after the great historical changes.

The characterization of the 'Chinese', and consequently their similarity to other nations underwent radical changes. In 1981, it was essentially the same as that of the above nations; ten years later, however, the diligence and the honesty of the 'Chinese' had become more positive than their patriotism, self-assertiveness, and political interest. In fact, the latter two traits were preceded even by the assumption of their friendliness.

The trait profile of the category of the respondents' own nation remained unique, but consistent. The most positive traits of 'Hungarians' were their friendliness, good humour, and patriotism. Their intellectual qualities, self-assertion, and erudition were not esteemed very highly, while their popularity and diligence ranked low. The emphasis on the sociability and national attachment of 'Hungarians' was not a new element; it had been found before in other samples. Querying their work ethic was a new development in 1981, which can justly be related to the

fact that the sample consisted of students. Furthermore, it should be noted that in 1991, the position of the previously moderately evaluated 'honesty' fell back considerably, to the next to last position between popularity and diligence.

The evaluation of the respondents' own national group was never extreme. There were some traits that were ranked first in every comparison: the features related to sociability. The general level of evaluation, looking at it from different angles, was and remained moderate. However, the frame of reference did change between 1981 and 1991.

After the socio-political upheaval, general and typical changes took place in the evaluative charge of the national characterizations, too. On the one hand, a general decrease in the level of evaluation could be observed. On the other hand, due to the uneven decline of evaluation, the hierarchy of nations was rearranged. In 1981, the 'English' and 'Russians' were neck and neck at the top. The content and the degree of evaluation of the 'English' was modified, but kept the best position. Although the trait profile of 'Russians' did not change considerably, the level of average evaluation dropped by 1.35 on the seven-point scale in 1991, to the seventh, or second last position.

In 1981, the 'French', 'Hungarians', 'Americans', and 'Germans' were evaluated quite favourably. In 1991, the decrease in the level of evaluation was the smallest for 'Americans' and 'Germans', taking about the same level as the 'French'. The evaluative charge of the category of the respondents' own nation, that of the 'Hungarians', dropped .66 on the seven-point scale, with the result that both 'Americans' and 'Germans' overtook this group. Thus, 'Hungarians' did not rise in the rank of national evaluations as might have been expected because of the dramatic devaluation of the 'Russians', but slipped one position lower.

In 1981, the 'Chinese' and 'Romanians' took the lowest positions in the hierarchy of evaluations. In 1991, the 'Chinese' were unusually more positively evaluated globally than previously. This favourable change meant .65 points of the scale, and, as a result, their evaluation became positive in absolute value. They came after 'Russians' with an evaluation verging on neutral but still positive. The evaluation in the characterization of 'Romanians', however, decreased and turned definitely negative in 1991. Thus, this neighbouring nation stayed in the lowest place in the hierarchy of nations.

The changes following the historic social transformations can be seen even more completely and subtly in the two MDS maps. There was a closely related group of nations in both years, and only two or three nations were detached from this narrow circle. The Atlantic triad of the 'English', 'Americans', and the 'French' was repeatedly present in this circle, from which 'Hungarians' were not perceived to be very distant. Ten years later, due to the more differentiated characterizations, this group loosened up and the relative internal distances increased. The 'Germans' now definitely

belonged to this circle, but the 'Russians' were much further from them in 1991 than before, and not only the extent but the direction of their separation also changed considerably. As a result of rearrangement, a virtual line could be drawn between East and West on this map, around the place where 'Hungarians' could be found. In the wide sphere of the East, the perceived distance between the 'Chinese' and 'Romanians', the two out-of-the-way points, increased.

Continental and regional perspectives in the 1990s

The collapse of the Soviet Union and her imperial system of influence created a new situation; international relations and their reflections were reorganized. Large geographical units were no longer cut up by sharp social and political boundaries, while the different countries of the Eastern bloc were freed from uniformity, and their nations began to attempt to defend their interests both together and against one another.

Europe, neighbouring countries, and the region as a whole, including nearby countries that are not immediate neighbours, have taken on new positions in Hungary's official politics and in her public thinking. Europe is not only a continent to which Hungary belongs, but also a frame of progressive international integration to which Hungary would like to belong together with the other liberated countries. In the meanwhile, the map of the region has been redrawn, and Hungary has to experience the conflicts of interdependence and competing opposition while surrounded by new national states (Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia).

In the new situation it was right to ask what 'Europe' and 'European' mean here today; what the geographical regions and their inhabitants represent. The replies to these questions were filled with expectations, demands, ideals, and distorted images, but in spite of this, it was possible to collect implications about the direction in which Hungarian public thinking was heading at this time of historic transformation. They were no more than implications because of the characteristics and size limits of the samples used in these studies.

1991 was the first year (11.R91) that we analysed what Europe meant to the respondents. Naturally, we were concerned not with the purely geographical concept of the continent, but with a social and political unit: a category to which typical cultural and human traits could be assigned.

The same bipolar list of traits was used for the characterization of 'Europeans' as for the evaluation of the different nations. In terms of positive and negative judgements, features representing intellect and self-assertiveness were in the forefront, while social and moral traits were less emphasized, but the general level of evaluation was uniformly high.

This order of characteristics was definitely stable according to the highly significant concordance indicator for the whole sample (Kendall's W=.067, p<.001). In the background of this finding there were certain differences

between the students—uniform within their own group—attending different schools: students in vocational training schools laid less emphasis on 'Europeans' being self-assertive, but highlight their friendly nature more than the rather sceptical grammar school students.

Factor analysis of the responses reveals the effect of three factors in the ten judged traits of 'Europeans'. The first factor contains 'friendly', 'diligent', and 'honest'—traits considered to be the weaknesses of 'Europeans'—and 'educated'. The index developed from this was subjected to analysis of variance. Significant differences were found between the grammar school students in the capital and those in the country: the former were more critical (F=12.331, p<.001). Within the grammar school students in the capital significant differences were found, depending on socio-familial background: the children of non-skilled workers show the greatest reservations regarding these traits of the 'Europeans' (F=3.274, p<.02). The second factor includes traits of effectiveness and intelligence, which were usually thought to be characteristic features: 'popular', 'good humoured', 'interested in polities', and 'intelligent'. The index based on these traits indicates that the judgements of provincial grammar school students were more positive than in the capital (F=9.644, p<.01), and a significant interaction shows that the reservations of children of non-skilled workers in the capital were opposed primarily by the positive evaluations of children of skilled workers in the provinces (F=3.251, p<.05).

The combined analysis of students in grammar schools and in vocational training in the capital schools reveals that the vocational training school students were more positive in their judgements (F=11.537, p<.01), children of skilled workers had better opinions of 'Europeans' than children of non-skilled workers (F=11.930, p<.01), and students achieving better results in school gave more positive evaluations than poor achievers (F=4.070, p<.05). The third factor includes personal and social awareness of identity and features of individual and collective ambition: self-assertiveness and patriotism. These traits of 'Europeans' were seen and emphasized more by the better grammar school students both in the capital and in the provinces (F=5.129, p<.05), and the same trend was true in the case of combined analysis of students in grammar schools and in vocational training schools in the capital (F=7.392, p<.01). In the grammar schools, excellent students with skilled and non-skilled parents were polarized: the evaluations of the former group were especially positive, while those of the latter were especially negative in this respect (F=3.578, p<.01). In provincial grammar schools, the unsuccessful students were polarized: evaluations made by children of skilled workers were the most positive, while those of children of intellectual parents were the least positive (F=4.658, p<.01). It was clear from these findings that socialization had a specific and consistent effect on the judgement of clusters of traits. The high esteem of 'Europeans' in 1991 was not a

particular mental characteristic of present and future holders of high social and cultural positions, but definitely disadvantageous social origin (non-skilled worker parents) and frustrating school failure (poor achievers with intellectual parents) cast a shadow on the judgement of the traits of the 'Europeans', too.

In addition to 'Europeans', the respondents were also asked to characterize 'Asians' and 'Balkan people', two more continental categories—if we may call them that slightly loosely. There was great concordance in the responses of the sample regarding the most and the least characteristic features of the representatives of these categories (Kendall's W=.195, p<.001 for the 'Asians'; Kendall's W=.227, p<.001 for the 'Balkan people'). There was almost unanimous agreement that in this frame of reference the level of judgement of 'Europeans' was the most favourable (the best definable exception was the group of girls with non-skilled parents who achieve well in school, regardless of whether they go to grammar schools or vocational training schools). The second place goes to Asians' and the third to 'Balkan people' (Kendall's W=.333, p<.001). If the judgements of the continental categories are ranked among the group of national categories, 'Europeans' (5.0) take the same place as 'Germans', just before 'Hungarians'; Asians' are between the 'Chinese' and 'Russians', while 'Balkan people' (4.0) come after 'Russians', and are followed only by 'Romanians'.

Table 3.3 shows the relationships between the contents and structures of the three characterizations. The advantage of 'Europeans' was broken in three instances: Asians' precede them in patriotism, diligence, and honesty. 'Balkan people' were the lowest in almost every trait, the only exception being interest in politics, since here 'Asians' took last place.

In 1994, eight countries were chosen from the East-Central European region and subjects were asked to compare them on the basis of several dimensions in the same way as before (13.R94s). Most of the subjects repeatedly grouped Germany, Hungary, and Poland together in their answers to questions about such diverse topics as public culture, democratic transformation in politics, or rate of economic development. Poland was not chosen as often as the other two countries of the region with regard to standard of living and sports achievements. Hungary was less often emphasized than Germany when the questions regarded international prestige or public satisfaction. According to the students, Russia was outstanding with regard to sports achievements, international authority, and natural beauty. A definite rank of evaluation of the countries arises from all this: the list is headed by Germany (mean number of choices: 7.0), followed by Hungary (6.15), then, after a gap, Poland (3.92) and Russia (2.69), and the last ones were the rarely chosen Slovakia (1.88), Bulgaria (1.08), Romania (.96), and Serbia (.19).

This time, respondents were also asked for a direct ranking of the countries. In this evaluation Germany and Hungary drift even closer (mean ranks: 1.69 and 1.77, respectively). Poland (2.92) was followed by Slovakia

Table 3.3 Characterization of the continental types, 1991: means and factor structure

European				Asian				Balkan			
	FL	*A*	*M*		*FL*	*A*	*M*		*FL*	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.74	f	4.80	factor 1	.73	d	4.98	factor 1	.77	i	3.72
	.67	d	4.55		.67	h	4.84		.75	e	3.54
	.55	e	5.14		.66	f	4.84		.73	h	3.81
	.49	h	4.47	factor 2	.70	a	4.70		.73	o	3.02
factor 2	.69	g	4.90		.64	t	5.20		.73	f	4.12
	.69	o	4.91		.62	p	3.61		.68	d	3.70
	.60	i	5.30		.41	g	3.90		.41	g	3.90
	.59	p	5.23	factor 3	.71	e	4.10	factor 2	.85	t	4.95
f 3	.75	t	5.05		.69	o	3.59		.77	a	4.54
	.69	a	5.25		.49	i	4.38		.74	p	4.27
PV = 50.4				PV = 52.5				PV = 58.0			

Notes
FL = factor loading, A = attribute, M = mean, PV = percent of variance

a = self-assertive, d = diligent, e = educated, f = friendly, g = good-humoured, h = honest, i = intelligent, t = patriotic, 0 = popular, p = interested in politics

(4.46) and Bulgaria (4.88). It was notable that Russia took only sixth place on the basis of the global and direct evaluation (5,23). Once again, Romania (6.50) and Serbia (7.27) came at the end of the list.

The nations were also ranked with the known subjectivity of personal sympathy. As could be expected, the respondents' own category, Hungarians, were undoubtedly the first in this case. Among the national outgroups, Poles take the best position (3.05). Exceptionally, Germans were not included as a national category, but Austrians were ranked instead, and took third place (3.90). Americans' were also in the list as an external reference point—they came fourth (4.24). After Bulgarians (4.81), Russians (5.57) precede Slovaks (6.19), while Serbs (7.86) and Romanians (8.33) lag behind.

The inhabitants and national types of the above-mentioned countries were also characterized by the subjects. When the unweighted mean of the judgements of the ten pairs of characteristics was considered as a rough index of evaluation, here, too, the rank order changed slightly again (see Figure 3.8). The Poles were in first place (mean of 4.95 on the seven-point scale), Germans were forced to second position, (4.78), practically to the same level as the respondents' own nation, Hungarians (4.77). They were followed by the evaluation drawn from the characterizations of Slovaks (4.42) and Bulgarians (4.40). The judgements were the least favourable for Russians (4.12), Serbs (4.05), and Romanians (3.83). In the latter case the



Rank	GER	ROM	POL	RUS	SER	SLO	BUL	HUN
1	slf	slf	pat	pat	pat	pat	pat	hum
2	pat	pat	slf	slf	slf	slf	slf	pat
3	dil	pol	fri	hon	pol	hon	fri	int
4	hon	hum	hon	fri	int	int	hon	slf
5	int	hon	int	hum	hum	pol	hum	edu
6	edu	int	pop	int	dil	hum	pop	hon
7	pol	edu	hum	pol	edu	dil	int	pop
8	pop	fri	pol	pop	hon	edu	edu	pol
9	fri	dil	edu	edu	fri	fri	pol	fri
10	hum	pop	dil	dil	pop	pop	dil	dil

BUL = Bulgarians, GER = Germans, HUN = Hungarians, POL = Polish, ROM = Romanians, RUS = Russians, SER = Serbians, SLO = Slovakians

dil = diligent, edu = educated, fri = friendly, hon = honest, hum = good-humoured, int = intelligent, pat = patriotic, poi = interested in politics, pop = popular, slf = self-assertive

Figure 3.8 Evaluative charge of the characterizations of the nations of the region, and their trait ranks, 1994.

mean itself was below the neutral 4, and it tended towards a negative evaluation.

On the basis of the above analyses the following could be established:

a The German state and her economic capacity seem to be the most significant for the respondents, but this did not automatically mean the maximal recognition of this national category.

b The traditional sympathy for the Polish people was expressed in the characterization of the national category, and probably this has a positive effect on the evaluation of the country, too.

c The declared emotional bond towards one's own nation was accompanied by favourable descriptions of both the position of the country and the characteristics of the national category.
d The direct evaluation of Russia was more disadvantageous than the consideration of her capacities in international comparison. Although there was more sympathy for Russians than for Slovaks, their characterization was less favourable. These perceptible contradictions may arise from uncertainty and assumed expectations.
e Serbia as a state was uniformly rejected, the obvious reason for this being her war policy. The evaluation of Romania was better than that, but reservations about the category of the Romanian nation were the strongest and appear persistently.

Looking behind global nation evaluations, the rank orders developing on the basis of the individual traits judged in 1994 also deserve attention. In this respect, the position of 'Poles' was the most favourable (mean rank: 1.9). The young Hungarian respondents make the most positive evaluation about them in four instances: 'Poles' were considered to be the most intelligent, honest, friendly, and popular. This description reflects strong sympathy, and is not spoiled by the fact that 'Poles' were put in third and fourth places for erudition and self-assertiveness. On the basis of the mean ranks (3.1), 'Germans' came second, and in the individual characteristics they also generally took the first to fourth positions. There were only two traits—diligence and self-assertiveness—in which they were judged the most favourably. It was striking in this characterization that the humour of 'Germans' was the worst in every comparison.

The category of the respondents' own nation, 'Hungarians', took quite a favourable position, coming third (mean rank: 3.4). It was especially striking that there were two traits for which Hungarians received the most favourable judgements. One of these was humour, but the appearance of the other, which was erudition, was more unusual, and it appears in the region's frame of reference for the first time in 1994. Another unusual development in the content is that friendliness was no longer a special Hungarian virtue in international comparison, for 'Hungarians' came only third after 'Poles' and 'Bulgarians' in this respect. Where moral traits were concerned, the respondents' own nation was pushed even further back, and 'Hungarians' took the most unfavourable position—sixth in international comparison—when patriotism was judged.

The characterization of 'Slovaks' was lower than that of 'Hungarians' when rank orders were calculated for each trait (mean: 4.7). They achieve a relatively good position for 'diligence', otherwise they ranked fourth to sixth. As regards ranks, 'Bulgarians' stand close to 'Slovaks', although their positions were more scattered (5.1). As has already been mentioned, they did appear in second place once, but they seem to be the last of the eight nations where patriotism and political involvement were concerned. The

characterization of 'Serbs', on the other hand, was outstanding in precisely these last two traits, and they were also perceived as quite self-assertive. This description was the most controversial, as could also be seen in the fact that the respondents judged them as the least honest, friendly, and popular of all national categories (mean rank: 5.3). 'Russians' could be found in the fourth to eighth positions when the different traits were evaluated (mean: 5.8): Their patriotism and humour was the least doubted, but the sample of Hungarian students doubted the self-assertiveness of 'Russians' the most, putting them in eighth position—which was novel and unusual. In contrast to this, the definitely least favourably judged 'Romanians' (mean rank: 6.7) were perceived by the respondents as quite self-assertive—achieving third position in this respect—while they came last among the nations for intellect, diligence, and erudition.

The different traits played different roles in the characterizations of nations. Judgements of patriotism and self-assertiveness were usually positive, and one or other of these two was nearly always the most favourable trait in the profile of any nation's characterization. The only exception was that the humour of 'Hungarians' was esteemed even higher. As regards the judgement of diligence—which was usually critical, and was judged on average to be neutral or even negative—the 'Hungarians' were no exception; in fact, this could be the explanation of the anchor point. In half of the cases this was the least favourable trait in the profile, the positive exception in this respect being the category of 'Germans'. The most varied judgements were given about the friendliness of nations. As we have mentioned, it was a peculiarity that the characterization of the respondents' own (Hungarian) nation was no longer favourable in this respect in 1994; in fact, this trait became the ninth of the ten traits within the profile of the characterization. In this instance, a significant change in autostereotype content could be witnessed.

The relationships between nations as manifested in the characterizations were demonstrated both in two dimensions (RSQ=.85) and in a three-dimensional space (RQS=.94) of multidimensional scaling. It was already clear in two dimensions that as the respondents' standpoint shows (see Figure 3.9a), the greatest distance separates 'Romanians' and 'Serbs' from 'Hungarians', 'Poles', and 'Germans'. 'Romanians' differ from 'Serbs', and 'Hungarians' move away from 'Poles' on the horizontal axis, while the categories of 'Russians' (close to 'Romanians'), and the most similar 'Slovaks' and 'Bulgarians' lie in between. 'Germans' move away from several of the nations in the region on the vertical axis, and thus their distance from 'Romanians' did not mean that they were close to 'Poles' or 'Hungarians'. The third dimension serves primarily to show the hitherto hidden distance between the 'Serbian' and the 'Russian' characterizations.

Placing the three continental categories in the demonstrated interrelationships of the characterizations gave a substantially altered overall image (see Figure 3.9b). A two-dimensional approach was enough to



Figure 3.9a MDS map of the nations of the region, 1994.



Figure 3.9b Common MDS map of the nations of the region and continental types, 1994.

provide a valid picture (RSQ=.84). The newly introduced continental categories were quite far from each other. Of all the distances in this space, the distance between 'European' and 'Asian' on the horizontal axis was almost the greatest. 'Serbs', who had the highest value on the vertical axis,

were quite far from Asians', similarly to 'Hungarians', 'Germans', and 'Poles'—who were not very far from 'Europeans'. 'Russians' were not any further from 'Europeans' either, but this national category already belongs to the group forming a semi-circle which lies very close to the continental category of 'Balkan people'. Thus, 'Russians', 'Bulgarians', 'Slovaks', 'Serbs', and—above all—'Romanians' could be listed in this group. Evidently, it was not the raw geographical category of 'Balkan people' that plays a special role here and that connects the similarities of the national categories. In the three-dimensional space (RSQ=.938) a further difference could be demonstrated that separates the characterizations of 'Europeans', 'Germans', and 'Romanians' from the group of 'Poles', 'Hungarians', and 'Bulgarians'.

In the general level of judgement of the three continental categories, the highest was 'Europeans' (4.89), followed by 'Asians' (4.17), and 'Balkan people' came last (3.97). This hierarchy shows itself in the ranks based on the judgement of traits as well. Regarding friendliness, Asians' did best, and they came before 'Balkan people' in many other respects, too. 'Balkan people' came first for 'patriotism' and second for self-assertiveness and political involvement.

Comparing the 1991 characterizations of the continental categories with the trait judgements in 1994, only the most cautious conclusions could be drawn, since the new sample was narrower and more highly selected. The list of characteristics of 'Balkan people' has not changed in essence; in 1994, the traits of 'patriotism' and 'self-assertiveness' at the top of the list were judged to be even more characteristic of 'Balkan people' than before. Most of the characteristics of Asians' were judged more critically. The list of characteristics was essentially the same as before, with the definite tendency that the judgement of 'friendly' and 'good humoured' was more favourable, so that this category achieved a better position in the overall picture. In the evaluation of 'Europeans' there were three points where changes could be noticed that were concordant in content: 'self-assertive' and 'patriotic' moved forward with respect to both the degree of positiveness and the rank taken in the order of traits, while the characterization of 'friendly' fell back to last place. Europe seemed to have become even less receptive yet.

It was asked again in 1994 which countries the respondents associated with the stimulus word 'Europe'. The relative frequency of the mentioned countries was essentially unchanged: the first was Germany, followed by France and England. The only significant change between 1991 and 1994 was that in 1991 over half of the respondents mentioned their own country, while in 1994 only every fifth respondent associated Hungary with Europe.

To sum up, the investigations that were carried out in 1991 and 1994, after the change of the socio-political system, also touched upon what Europe, a geographical label that had become a political framework and program,

meant to the respondents. There was a consistent image of 'Europeans' in the minds of the students: it was a favourable and relatively well-balanced impression, in which intellectual virtues and features of self-assertion stood out in comparison with the traits of sociability and morality.

A particularly favourable image of 'Europeans' was formed by the students with skilled worker background, students in the vocational training schools, and the students in the provinces, that is, by social layers who were not in a very advantageous position and whose thinking style was generally characterized by less distinct and more extreme evaluations. Yet the children of the unskilled worker parents, who were in an even more disadvantageous social position, formed a counterpoint (probably because of their social position rather than their thinking style): they were the ones who appreciated the positive sides of 'Europeans' the least, and were the most critical about the negative sides. The middle achievers recognized the patriotism and self-assertiveness of 'Europeans' less than the excellent students did.

In 1991, although the general level of evaluation of the descriptions of 'Asians' was below that of 'Europeans', 'Asians' were perceived more favourably with respect to patriotism, diligence, and honesty. An unusual finding, from a smaller sample in 1994, was that a friendly attitude was considered as more characteristic of 'Asians' than of'Europeans'. Furthermore, in the rank of traits of 'Europeans', the evaluation of friendliness came last, as the least positive feature of these people.

The Hungarian student respondents thought that among the leading countries of West Europe, it was Germany that was primarily linked with Europe. In 1991, Hungary was also included among the associations with Europe in half of the responses, although evidently the meaning and the weight of this was different. Three years later this was much less frequent.

In the region of Central Europe, Germany, towards which there were ambivalent feelings, was found to be the dominant factor. 'Germans' were judged to be particularly diligent and self-assertive, but also to have the least sense of humour. Humour and erudition characterized 'Hungarians' the most in this regional comparison, taking a lower position than their friendliness and patriotism had held previously. In contrast to every previous national self-characterization, patriotism came second last in the rank of traits. Nevertheless, in 1994, the respondents still demonstrated their attachment to their native land, declared the values and potentials of their country, and the evaluative charge of the national autostereotype put 'Hungarians' among the first three nations within the region.

Three conclusions can be drawn from the above. First, the relationship between Europe and Hungary, which was hopeful in 1991, gave rise to less optimism in 1994. The associations linking Europe and Hungary became less frequent, and 'Europeans' were considered to be less friendly than before—which perhaps reflected the perceived lack of political and cultural

openness within Europe. Second, national self-characterization had also altered significantly. It was an unprecedented novelty that 'Hungarians' were no longer considered as particularly friendly, which could be a sign of the change in the social atmosphere. 'Patriotism' also fell back, which was especially noteworthy in the fourth year of activity of a government that laid great emphasis on national character. Third, the emphasis on the erudition of 'Hungarians' within the region recalled the self-assurance of 'cultural supremacy' of past times, which was temporarily replaced by the positive knowledge of economic efficiency in the Kádár era.

The attitude toward the Polish was the most favourable among the relationships with other nations in the region. This could be seen not only in the characterization of 'Poles' but in the evaluation of Poland as well. Bulgaria, Slovakia, and their peoples took an intermediate position in the international comparisons. There was a slight contradiction in the evaluation of Russia and the 'Russians': the indirect evaluation of the country and the admitted sympathy for her people put her one step ahead of Slovakia and the Slovaks, but the direct evaluation and description of her national character put her near the bottom of the list. In 1994, the last two positions were divided: Serbia was the last as a country, but sympathy for the Romanians was the smallest and the evaluative charge for 'Romanians' was definitely negative.

Romanian-Hungarian interrelationships

It has been repeatedly found over the past 25 years of investigations that for any sample the nation that was least liked and was treated with greatest reservation was Romania. Neither the chosen social medium, nor the year of investigation changed this result, no matter what historic social and political changes were taking place. However, the profound changes in the region made it possible to conduct an investigation in Romania in parallel with the Hungarian study (12.R93r). The respondents in this investigation did not belong to the Hungarian minority but to the Romanian majority.

In 1994, Romanian students in their last year of secondary school studies answered the same questions regarding the evaluation of countries and the characterization of nations as their 'peers' in Hungary. Among other things, they answered a series of questions in which they had to choose three out of eight countries as being 'outstanding' in particular respects. The cumulative index of the so-called 'country evaluation' of these choices was the highest for the USA (mean: 5.36). This was followed by the three great powers of Western Europe: England (4.23), Germany (3.99), and France (3.11). Romania, the respondents' own country, was fifth in the list (1.81), Russia was slightly behind (1.25), while Hungary (.26) and Poland (.12) took the last two positions.

Regarding the values of the countries, the USA was chosen with the relatively greatest frequency for its achievements in terms of international

authority, standard of living, democratic enforcement of will, and sport. It was conspicuous in the answers of the Romanian students that Germany was ranked only second in standard of living, but her rate of economic development was appreciated more than even that of the USA. England was mentioned slightly less frequently than the USA for international authority, but was far above the USA in terms of the erudition of its inhabitants, while the two countries were at the same level with regard to the (possible) satisfaction of the people. Romania, the homeland of the respondents, was chosen in one respect: it was a general opinion that Romania was especially rich in natural beauties.

The members of the Romanian sample had the opportunity to express their evaluation of the countries not only indirectly but also by means of direct ranking. In this case, England came first in a well-articulated list with a mean rank of 2.36. There was only a barely perceivable difference between the ranks of France (3.04) and Germany (3.09). The western superpower, the USA, which had an almost unsurpassable advantage when specific different areas had to be evaluated, came only after the leading West European countries (mean rank: 3.16). Falling behind in this list, Romania came fifth (5.27), followed by Poland (6.02) and Hungary (6.15) close to each other, and Russia was last (6.87).

Undoubtedly, there were some differences between evaluations connected to the different areas of social life discussed above and the global evaluation. Naturally, sympathy and antipathy towards nations also play a role in the evaluation of the countries. Their extent was investigated by asking the respondents to rank ten ethnic groups by 'personal sympathy'. The responses of the Romanian students indicate a distinct group of strongly favoured nations, which includes the 'French' (3.31), Americans' (3.43), the 'English' (3.64), and their own nation, 'Romanians' (3.80). The second, less well-liked circle contains the different German-speaking nations (former West Germans, Austrians, and former East Germans, with mean ranks of 5.66, 5.81, and 6.36, respectively), with the 'Chinese' lying in between (6.30). The small third circle includes the distant groups of 'Hungarians' and 'Russians' (in the group often nations their mean ranks were 8.04 and 8.53, respectively).

The evaluative charges of the national characterizations were measured—as an index—by the unweighted means of the judgements of the individual characteristics in this case, too. Among the various evaluative rankings of countries and nations the evaluation of nations by this method also represents a special tint. The most favourable evaluation was given to the 'English'—just as was found repeatedly in Hungary: the mean rank of their index was 5.22 on the seven-point scale. The 'Chinese' and the 'French' came next, very close to each other (respective means: 5.08 and 5.06). The evaluations of 'Romanians', Americans', and 'Germans' followed in one group (respective means: 4.90, 4.86, and 4.80). The characterizations of

'Hungarians' and 'Russians' fall behind, but without reaching a level of negative evaluation (respective means 4.41 and 4.38).

This index of global evaluation generally reflects the opinion of the whole sample, since in this respect there was no statistically significant difference between the homogeneous sub-samples of Romanian students (homogeneous with respect to social and familial background and to school achievement). However, the MANOVA method did show significant differences in some of the themes. Excellent students usually produced more favourable national evaluations than their fellow students who were moderate or poor in school achievement. This consistent but usually faint tendency reaches the level of statistical significance in the case of the 'Chinese' (F=7.11, p<.02). A peculiar statistical interaction could also be observed in the case of national evaluations. While the students who perform poorly in school and come from an intellectual family background esteem the 'French' exceptionally highly, excellent students from non-intellectual backgrounds surpass even those who came from intellectual families (F=15.74, p<.001). A similar pattern could be observed repeatedly in the responses. The only difference was that, as with the 'French', the evaluation given by weak students from intellectual families was the most positive among all the groups in the characterization of Americans' (F=7.11, p<.02), while in the case of judging the 'English' (F=14.94, p<.001) and 'Romanians' (F=5.06, p<.05), it was the excellent non-intellectual students who express the most positive attitude. These group details, however, did not change the evaluation hierarchy of the nations very much. Furthermore, the order of the less positive evaluation of the non-intellectual students with low achievement also differs slightly from the preferences of the whole groups (in a more favourable position for the 'Chinese', and the much less powerful judgement of the 'French' and Americans').

As was the case in Hungary, it could be seen that the respondents' socializing background (and the values that it transmitted), and the special socializing position of good school achievement, did have an effect—among other things—on national characterizations and the index of evaluation.

Beyond the indexes, it is worth looking at the rank order of nations for each trait. It should be said first that the rank order based on the index and the rank order based on the 'mean ranks' tally with each other: 'mean ranks' means that the positions taken by the nations among the other nations with respect to the different characteristics were averaged.

The details of the results were not without interest either. The 'Chinese' occupy the first position in four of the ten characteristics: they were seen as the most patriotic, the most honest, the most intelligent, and the most diligent. This was not an ordinary group of characteristics but more of an idealized image of a distant personification of morality and capacity. This was not spoiled by the fact that the 'Chinese' were seen as only moderately sociable, that is, moderately 'friendly' and 'good-humoured', and the least

interested and involved in politics. The 'English' reached first place by being the most erudite and 'self-assertive', and by taking second place in most of the other characteristics, although they were not seen as very 'friendly', 'good-humoured' or even 'patriotic'. The 'French' take positions of moderate esteem, except for a definitely positive judgement of their 'friendly' nature. In this respect they share the first position with the 'Romanians', since the Romanian students judge their own nation to be especially 'friendly' and the most 'good-humoured' of all. In this respect, national self-characterization was strikingly similar to the Hungarian autostereotype discussed above: the respondents' own nations were seen as outstanding in the same characteristics, and they were seen as the worst in the same features; they were considered to be the least 'diligent' as compared to people of other nations.

The evaluation of Hungarians was a long way behind the evaluative charge of the Romanian autostereotype. It was preceded by the description of the 'Americans', which shows an especially mixed picture with respect to other national characterizations. 'Americans' take positions from first to eighth in the comparisons of characteristics—they were the most 'popular' according to the Romanian students (though this was not supported by their personal opinion), but they were definitely seen as the least 'educated' and 'honest' of the eight nations. The 'Germans' were not placed in first position in any characteristics, but they came second in patriotism and honesty (behind the 'Chinese'), while due to the definitely negative evaluations, they were the last in friendliness. Even in mean ranks the 'Hungarians' came only after the Germans; they were seen by the Romanian respondents as especially 'interested in polities' and as rather 'patriotic', but otherwise they were ranked in the sixth to eighth positions. The evaluation of the 'Hungarians' was the least positive when intellect and humour were considered. There was only one nation behind the Hungarians regarding individual characteristics, too: the 'Russians'. They were seen as rather 'interested in polities', but their patriotism, self-assertion and popularity were all judged lowest by the Romanian students.

The hierarchy of the evaluation of the countries and nations was approached in various ways, and the responses of the Romanian sample proved to be very variegated although essentially stable. In the slightly different frame of reference of countries and nations, the capacities of Russia were appreciated, but both the country and its dominant nation were strongly criticized by the respondents. The position of Hungary and 'Hungarians' was almost immovable; in almost every respect they, too, were strongly criticized and came second last. Romania and 'Romanians' took moderate positions in the middle range; in both direct and indirect evaluations the country came fifth, while the nation came fourth. Among the most preferred nations the 'Chinese' represent a peculiar dash of colour: they were not distinguished with sympathy, but were described in a very

favourable way (unfortunately, the evaluation of the country was not available in this case). The appreciation of Germany as a country was definitely more positive than the relative position of the 'Germans' among the different nations, both in direct and indirect evaluation. The respondents declared their esteem for France and for the 'French' both by direct evaluation of the countries and by the direct expression of sympathy for nations, while the evaluations of specific performances and characteristics were somewhat less favourable. There was a certain amount of ambivalence in the characterization of both the USA and 'Americans': the USA was seen as an undoubted leading world power, but the West European countries were preferred in direct evaluation; and while outstanding sympathy was shown for the nation, a less flattering characterization was given of 'Americans'. The consistently favourable evaluation of England and the 'English' was not shadowed by the USA being stronger and more effective, and sympathy towards the 'French' and the 'Americans' being greater. In this respect, and especially in direct evaluation of the countries and in indirect characterization of nations, England and the 'English' were definitely highly esteemed by the Romanian students.

When comparing nations, the factors conspicuous in the individual characterizations were different from those seen when the relationships and the positive and negative features of the characteristics were compared within the given characterization. Regarding internal structure, in the majority of the national outgroups 'patriotic' seems to be the most positive trait. There were two exceptions: the slightly idealized 'English', who were said to be primarily 'intelligent', and Americans' who were respected for their efficiency, and who were primarily 'popular'. In the characterization of their own nation, good humour was the most appreciated positive trait, while 'honest' and 'diligent' appear on the opposite pole.

What has been said so far may already raise interest in the similarity between these 'profiles' of national characterizations, and especially in how similar they are to the responses of the Hungarian respondents about the same topics (see Table 3.4). Three content areas of the characterizations could be distinguished in the responses of the Romanian sample, even if their evaluative charge was disregarded, and only the positive-negative dimension of the characteristics were considered. First, there was a great similarity in the characterizations between the 'Chinese' and 'Germans', between the 'Chinese' and the 'English', and between 'Germans' and the 'English', which was complemented by the finding that the series of traits for the 'English' and Americans' tend to be related. Second, there was a great similarity of structure in the descriptions of 'Hungarians' and 'Russians'. Third, the Romanian students describe 'Romanians' and 'French' as similar to each other with respect to positive and negative traits.

Two impressive discoveries emerged when the 1991 Hungarian and the 1994 Romanian investigations were compared.

The first lesson was the great agreement between the two national

Table 3.4 National characterizations given by the Hungarian (1991) and the Romanian (1994) samples: significant rank correlations

		HUN	ENG	FRE	USA	CHI	ROM	RUS	GER	HUN	ENG	FRE	USA	CHI	ROM	RUS	GER
ROMANIAN	HUN						.76*		.76*								
	ENG		.70*														
	FRE																
	USA				.84**						−.63*						
	CHI		.69*			.77**			.78**		.79**						
	ROM	90***										.66*					
	RUS						.81**	.83**		.78**							
	GER		.72*						.80**		.73*			.92***			
Rank		HUNGARIAN								ROMANIAN							
1		hum	int	pat	pop	dil	pat	pat	slf	pat	int	pat	pop	pat	hum	pat	pat
2		fri	slf	slf	slf	hon	pol	pol	pat	pol	hon	int	hum	hon	int	pol	hon
3		pat	hon	int	hum	pat	slf	slf	dil	slf	pat	hum	pat	int	pat	slf	int
4		slf	hum	edu	fri	fri	int	fri	int	int	pop	pop	pol	slf	slf	int	slf
5		int	edu	pop	pat	int	hon	hon	hon	fri	slf	hon	slf	pop	pol	pop	pop
6		pol	pop	hum	pol	slf	dil	int	pol	pop	pol	slf	int	pol	fri	hum	pol
7		edu	pol	hon	int	edu	hum	edu	edu	hon	hum	pol	edu	hum	pop	edu	fri
8		pop	dil	fri	dil	pol	edu	dil	pop	edu	fri	dil	hon	fri	hon	hon	hum
9		hon	hum	pol	edu	hum	fri	hum	fri	hum	dil	edu	dil	edu	dil	dil	edu
10		dil	fri	dil	hon	pop	pop	pop	hum	dil	edu	fri	fri	dil	edu	fri	dil

Notes

CHI = Chinese, ENG = English, FRE = French, GER = Germans, HUN = Hungarians, ROM = Romanians, RUS = Russians, USA = Americans

dil = diligent, edu = educated, fri = friendly, hon = honest, hum = good-humoured, int = intelligent, pat = patriotic, pol = interested in politics, pop = popular, slf = self-assertive

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

samples about the characteristic human traits of distant nations. Strong and highly significant correlations can be seen in the axis of Table 3.4. Regarding the construction of the lists of characteristics, the respondents in Hungary and in Romania agree on about five of the national characterizations: 'Americans', 'Russians', 'Germans', 'Chinese', and the 'English' (who are preferred by both groups). There was disagreement about only one nation: the 'French' were seen as more sociable, more open, and 'closer' by the Romanian than by the Hungarian students.

The second lesson was that the relationship to the object was extremely important. The images of 'Hungarians' given by the Hungarian and Romanian samples did not resemble each other, just as the two descriptions of 'Romanians' also differ from each other. In contrast, there was a great similarity between the ways in which the two samples describe their own nation, between the way Hungarians see 'Hungarians' and Romanians see 'Romanians' (see Figure 3.10). Furthermore, there was an especially strong correlation between the ways they see each other: the description of the 'Romanians' given by the Hungarian sample was the mirror image of that of the 'Hungarians' given by the Romanian sample (see Figure 3.11). This was the strongest rank order correlation of all correlations, and if the profiles of the national characterizations are depicted, the parallel is striking.

Regarding the factor structure of the national characterizations given by the Romanian sample, if it was compared with the observations in Hungary containing no subtle details, many more factors were found which serve to indicate the complexity of these characterizations. This was in harmony with the general image received from the Romanian evaluations of countries and nations, which have already been summarized. The three factors of the characterizations of the 'English', 'French', and 'Americans' were less than the factors of the others, where generally there were four factors behind the ten characteristics.

Considering the characterizations of the eight nations simultaneously, their interrelationships could be determined by multidimensional scaling (see Figure 3.12). The relationships of the nations as seen by the Romanian students can be characterized through the distances between nations even in two dimensions (RSQ=.73). At first, in the two dimensions the nations form an inverted U-shaped curve. An especially great distance separates Americans' and 'Romanians' from 'Hungarians' and 'Russians' along the horizontal axis. The 'Chinese' are at the top of the inverted U shape, the furthest from Americans', but actually quite far from both extremes. The 'French', while being almost inseparably close to the 'English', are also very close to the American'/'Romanian' couple on the rising side of the inverted U. 'Germans' are on the downward slope of the inverted U, beyond the 'Chinese', but they are still not very close to 'Hungarians' and 'Russians'. On the contrary, the inner European circle of the 'English', 'French', and 'Germans' is grouped under the exotic and appealing category of the 'Chinese'.



Figure 3.10 Trait profiles of national autostereotypes in the responses of the Hungarian and Romanian samples.



Figure 3.11 Trait profiles of the characterizations given about the 'other's nation' in the responses of the Hungarian and Romanian samples.



Figure 3.12 MDS map of the national characterizations given by the Romanian sample, 1994.

The three-dimensional spatial arrangement gives a more complete description of the relationships (RSQ=.944), where the relationships between hitherto seemingly close pairs receive special depth. In this third dimension, 'Romanians' come before 'Americans', the 'Chinese' come before 'Germans', and the 'Russians' are in front of 'Hungarians'; in other words, there seems to be some kind of association among 'Romanians', the 'Chinese', and 'Russians' with respect to 'Americans', 'Germans', and 'Hungarians'.

When looking for spatial relationships where comprehensive continental categories were also considered, one notices that the 'European', Asian', and 'Balkan' categories were not very far from one another in the responses of the Romanian students, neither in the two-dimensional (RSQ=.698) nor in the three-dimensional (RSQ=.908) versions. The relative closeness of the 'European' and the 'Balkan' categories also arises from and accompanies the fact that 'Europeans' are relatively close not only to the 'French' and 'English' but—in third place—to 'Romanians' as well. On the other hand, 'Romanians' and 'Balkan people' receive very similar characterizations, and the 'French' also get close to the 'Balkan' category after the second 'Russians'. In comparison with this many-sided and complicated formula, the position of Asians' is relatively simple: it is understandably close to the 'Chinese'.

The global judgement as measured by the unweighted means extracted from the characterizations of the continental categories could not really reflect the complexity of this system of relationships. It suggests a simple hierarchy of judgements, led by 'Europeans' (4.98), followed by 'Asians' (4.77), and 'Balkan people' (4.64). The comparison of this with the series of national characterizations reveals that the 'European' category lies between the 'French' and 'Romanians' on the basis of the judgement level as well, while 'Asians' come after the 'Chinese', approaching the 'Balkan' category, above the level of 'Hungarians' and 'Russians'.

The comparison of the three continental categories trait by trait reveals again that the description of 'Europeans' was the most favourable: its judgement was the most positive in six cases. The 'Asians' were the most favourably esteemed from a moral point of view: they were seen as the most 'honest', 'patriotic', and 'diligent'. 'Balkan people' were the most friendly of all continental categories according to the Romanian students, and also precede Asians' in six respects.

The Romanian sample was also asked which countries they thought of first, second, and third when talking about Europe. It was not contrary to the above findings that they mentioned Germany in the first place and France in the second place; considering the three positions together, the two West European countries are equal in the responses (both occur 47 times). Romania, the respondents' own country, was frequently mentioned in the first position, more often even than France, but in the overall positions she came fourth (with 22 occurrences). Great Britain surpasses her (with 40 occurrences). Italy, Switzerland, and Spain were also mentioned, but they were chosen only sporadically. As a matter of curiosity, it could be mentioned that among neighbouring countries both Greece and Moldavia were mentioned once, but Serbia and Hungary were never reported.

To sum up, in order to compare the results, the investigation was repeated in the majority nation in Romania in 1994. The most striking finding was that the approach of the Romanian students towards Hungary and the Hungarians was just as unfavourable as that of the Hungarian samples towards Romania and the Romanians. It was an interesting example of this reciprocity that the trait profile of the characterization of 'Hungarians' by the Romanian students was practically the same as that of the 'Romanians' by the Hungarian students. The only difference in the evaluative charge of the characterizations was that the Romanian sample only queried the positive side, and the quality of their attitude was not explicitly negative. Furthermore, it was repeatedly seen that the rejection of Russia and the Russians was somewhat stronger than reservations about Hungary and the Hungarians.

The national self-characterizations were very similar to each other: features of sociability were emphasized and moral values were queried when Romanians talked about 'Romanians' and Hungarians talked about

'Hungarians'. The two samples perceived the position of their own respective country and nation very similarly within the given international frame of reference. The Romanian students associated Europe with their own country relatively often even in 1994, considering and describing her as a typical European country.

The Romanian sample appreciated the outstanding position of the USA first of all in the comparisons between countries. Americans' were considered quite likeable and America was evaluated positively, although not without ambivalence. The direct evaluation of England and the characterization of the 'English' was definitely complimentary, reflecting the traditional prestige. The personal sympathy of the respondents lay first of all with the French: the evaluation of the traits of the 'French' was rather positive. 'Germans' and their homeland were not outstanding in any respect, though they received quite a favourable evaluation. The almost idealized evaluation of the 'Chinese', especially from the moral point of view, was characteristic. The different aspects of the evaluations of the countries and the nations did not always coincide in this sample either, and the national characterizations were also very complex with several factors.

The views of the Romanian and Hungarian students exhibited several common features: the nature of their relationships and the trait profiles of their national characterizations were similar in many respects. The only exceptions were the characterizations of their own and each other's nation, and the image of the 'French', who were seen as more sociable and open by the Romanian sample. It was usually the students with intellectual parents who stood out by their high evaluation of the 'French', but excellent students with non-intellectual parents surpassed even them in this respect. Thus, this international preference is continuous and is reproduced both in the leading cultural class and in the potential leading class. The national characterizations of the intermediate-level students were less positive and the difference as a function of school achievement reached the level of statistical significance in the case of the 'Chinese'.

Marginal groups in double bind and the national-ethnic categorization

We returned to people's perceptions of controversial national ethnic groups because of four considerations. First of all, this issue has been emerging persistently since we started investigating definitions of nation and criteria for belonging to a nation: where were nationalities and the minorities listed, how were their relations perceived, and what characteristics were attributed to them by the members of the different samples? Second, the contradictions that had emerged previously as opinions became sources of open conflict only after the great social political change in 1989–91, but there has never been any doubt about

their historical and political relevance in this region. Third, how were the relations of groups that were difficult to categorize perceived by people, and what factors influenced their evaluation of these relations? These hitherto barely exposed problems may be interesting in both theory and in practice. Finally, the multidimensional scaling of judgements of similarities and differences appeared to offer an especially profitable and exploitable way of studying the topic systematically. Various factors encouraged us to supplement previous studies with a new investigation in 1994: the perennial controversy over the matter, its political and historical topicality, the novelty of the theoretical problem, and the new methodological possibilities that had appeared (13.R94s).

Complex national relations characterize the region under discussion: hundreds of thousands of Hungarians live as minorities in each of the neighbouring countries, and although Hungary itself could be considered as a national state, its population does include a modest number of representatives of the dominant language and culture of the neighbouring countries. Thus, as an ethnic group living in double bind, Hungarians may be aware of both the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries and the national minorities living in Hungary. On this occasion, the study was not extended to Hungarian-Ukrainian and Hungarian-Serb interrelations, only to Hungarian-Romanian, Hungarian-Slovakian, and Hungarian-Austrian/German relations.

Attention was also paid to the Gypsies, who have no background country of their own and whose community constitutes a considerable part of the population in Romania, too. The judgement of the Jews in Hungary was also touched upon; Jews could not be separated from the Hungarian population on the basis of language or general culture, yet they constitute a source of immigrants to Israel. There were several waves of emigration from Hungary to America, too, one of which involved a group of Hungarian Jews who emigrated to escape racial discrimination; later groups were ethnically mixed and irrelevant. Whether it is openly stated or not, the question of the integration and international background of Jews in Hungary has been present both in internal affairs and in the trends of international public thinking of the past few years. Attempts were also made to study this problem empirically but without generating tension by directly contrasting Hungarians of Jewish and non-Jewish origin in the questions.

Subjects were asked to judge 45 ethnic relations on a five-point scale (from difference to similarity) in five areas:

a Cultural traditions.
b Professional knowledge and thorough grounding,
c Achieved standard of living and developed lifestyle,
d Awareness of identity and national consciousness,
e Physical appearance and conduct.

Dominant nations in certain countries and ethnic-national groups living mostly in double bind served as anchor points in questions dealing with ethnic relations. The individuals who made the judgements this time were a selected group, who were prepared in a certain sense, had interest in the topic, and were potentially effective in the long run: they were 26 students who did exceptionally well in the written history entrance examination for Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, in 1994.

The distances between 'Hungarians in Hungary' and other anchor points vary. Considering all of the judgements of similarity and difference, 'Hungarians in Hungary' were the closest to 'Slovaks in Slovakia', the second and third positions were taken by 'Austrians' and 'Germans in Germany'. The fourth place went to 'Romanians in Romania'. The respondents thought that 'Israelis' and 'Americans' in general were the furthest; they take the fifth and sixth places.

The smallest and greatest distances from 'Hungarians in Hungary', the relative similarity of the Slovaks and the difference from the Americans, seem to be the most stable. The differences in standard of living and lifestyle were the most salient between 'Hungarians in Hungary' and 'Germans in Germany', their mean was 4.12 on the five-point scale, approaching the difference of 4.15 from the Americans. In this respect, however, there was no significant difference between 'Hungarians in Hungary' and the Israelis. Physical appearance and conduct of the Americans and 'Hungarians in Hungary' were not perceived as strikingly different, but 'Romanians in Romania' and Jews in Israel were seen as rather different.

Knowing these frames of reference, we were able to review people's image of the situation of Hungarians living outside the borders of the country, in the disannexed territories and in the West. According to the respondents' judgements of similarity, the order of distance from 'Hungarians in Hungary' was 'Hungarians in Slovakia'—being the least—then 'Hungarians in Austria', 'Hungarians in Romania', and, finally, 'Hungarians in America' and 'Israelis coming from Hungary'—being most different. This order fits quite well with the perceived relative similarity of the dominant population of the given country, only the order of the last two countries was uncertain.

Regarding the items of 'standard of living' and 'skill', the respondents thought that the situation of 'Hungarians in Romania' was definitely detached from those in the mother country. In these two areas 'Israelis coming from Hungary' took the relatively close third position, followed by 'Hungarians in Romania' who were in a disadvantageous position, and, finally, 'Hungarians in America' who were in a definitely advantageous position. Regarding cultural traditions, national consciousness, and physical appearance the respondents thought 'Hungarians in America' were closer to the 'Hungarians in Hungary' than the immigrants in Israel from Hungary. (This may seem slightly peculiar, since physical appearance

and conduct were thought to reflect the greatest difference of 'Israelis in general'; otherwise, even if there were differences, they were not the greatest.)

As a result, the question justly arose of how far the respondents thought the Hungarian minorities and the immigrant groups were assimilated into the dominant population of their country. The greatest distance turned out to be between 'Romanians in Romania' and 'Hungarians in Romania' (even if not primarily in the degree of national consciousness). There was still a large difference between 'Hungarians in America' and 'Americans' in general (although Hungarians become quite successfully assimilated in standard of living and culture). The similarity was greater between 'Hungarians in Slovakia' and the Slovak majority, and between 'Hungarians in Austria' and the Austrian majority (even in physical appearance). The respondents thought the similarity was the greatest between 'Israelis coming from Hungary' and Israelis in general (perhaps physical appearance and skill were not unsurpassable in this).

Moreover, it was recognized that the attachment of Hungarian minorities and of immigrant groups were not the same: according to the respondents, they were ambivalent, too. A characteristic pattern emerges: standard of living, skill, and competence were closer to the country's dominant population than to those of the mother country, but the reverse was true of cultural traditions, awareness of national identity, and physical appearance: they were closer to 'Hungarians in Hungary' than to the majority of their fellow citizens. This pattern was equally true of 'Hungarians in Slovakia' where a small distance was bridged, of the minority and immigrant 'Hungarians in Austria', and of 'Hungarians in Romania' who were very far from the dominant nation in many respects. The picture was somewhat different for 'Hungarians in America': the majority of the respondents thought these Hungarians were closer to the recipient country culturally as well as in other ways. It was maintained, however, that 'Israelis coming from Hungary' were more similar to the Israelis in general in every respect than to the population of the country they came from.

The question justly arises of whether the same pattern emerged about the situation of at least some of the national minorities living in Hungary. The answer was basically affirmative. The 'Slovaks in Hungary'—two supposedly similar nations—were seen as closer to 'Hungarians in Hungary' in standard of living and skill, while they were closer to 'Slovaks in Slovakia' in culture, national consciousness, and physical appearance. In the case of 'Romanians in Hungary'—two supposedly distant nations—the double bind of the national minorities would be similar. The distances to be bridged and the relationships to be developed were naturally disparate: the respondents conceive closer relations with 'Slovaks in Hungary' and more distant relations with the 'Romanians in Hungary', on both sides.

The judgement of the relationships of 'Germans in Hungary' was interesting. Together with the Slovaks, this was the national minority that

the respondents considered most similar to the Hungarian majority of the country. They were closer to the 'Hungarians in Hungary' in every respect than to the Austrians'. The relationship was seen to be more complex with the 'Germans in Germany': 'Germans in Hungary' resemble them more when national consciousness and physical appearance were considered. In accordance with the usual response patterns, 'Germans in Hungary' were similar to 'Hungarians in Hungary' in their standard of living and skill, but in contrast with the usual pattern, they were closer to them in cultural traditions, too.

This comparison could not be made in two further cases for different reasons. As will be discussed in detail later, the relationships of the 'Gypsies in Hungary' were different, since they do not have their own background country but are present as ethnic minorities in other countries as well. In the case of 'Hungarians of Jewish origin', on the other hand, the incorporating relationship to the 'Hungarians in Hungary' obscures the possibility of comparison. The systems analysis of the perceived similarities and differences among the different groups, which will be discussed below, promises further results beyond the raw comparisons.

Before this is done, however, we must draw attention to the fact that the judgements of similarities and differences—depending on what they refer to—show not only parallels but also divergences; they differentiate between different ethnic groups to various extents, and thus contribute to the overall picture of the relationships between the groups to different degrees.

When weighing the similarities and differences of the 'ethnic objects', the subjects found smaller general differences in physical appearance and conduct, and professional expertise and grounding (the mean similarities calculated for the 45 relationships on the five-point scale were 2.70 and 2.89, respectively) than in the other items. The multiple similarities and differences of identity with the community and national consciousness take an intermediate position (the mean was 3.04: the neutral middle point). Overall, the differences were found to be the greatest when cultural traditions and standard of living and lifestyle were considered (the means of both items were 3.11). The study of the correlation matrix of these variables reveals that the evaluation of the similarity of standard of living and lifestyle correlates with everything else. This was reflected in correlation coefficients that were statistically highly significant. The intercorrelations of the similarities of cultural traditions and national consciousness were the loosest: these variables were independent of each other and of other series of judgements as well.

The Hungarian-Slovak system of relationships seems to be the simplest to survey. An almost perfect square was produced by the respondents, where the 'Hungarians in Hungary' and the 'Slovaks in Slovakia' occupy the two ends of one diagonal. The 'Hungarians in Slovakia' and the 'Slovaks in Hungary' were at an almost equal distance from the two end points, but the former group were slightly closer to the parent nation than

to the dominant majority of their country. Thus, the respondents did face the facts of double bind, accentuating the connection to the Hungarian minority slightly.

This summarizes the five series of responses. Due to the regular arrangement, it was striking how and in what direction some of the questions regarding similarity influenced the overall picture. While the aspects of culture and national awareness increase differences between nations and nationalities on the abscissa, physical appearance and the problem of the standard of living accentuate differences between countries along the ordinate. If the responses given to the individual items were treated and illustrated separately, this was the way and the direction in which they deviate from the overall picture united and balanced by the INDSCAL method.

The description of the Hungarian-German relationship systems was essentially similar, with the difference that—for historical and geographical reasons—evaluations for the Austrians' and the 'Germans in Germany' were also asked for. Incidentally, the respondents deem these two groups as the closest to each other, and they could be treated as the common vertex of the square similar to the one described above. This square was no longer a very regular square, in a trapezoidal arrangement the 'Germans in Hungary' were certainly closer to the majority of their country than to either the 'Austrians' or the inhabitants of Germany. Double bind could clearly be seen in this arrangement, too, but the respondents in this case assume more similarities than separating differences with their fellow countrymen who speak German.

The contribution of individual items to the overall picture was the same as before. According to the judgement of the student sub-sample, culture and national awareness reflect differences in nation and nationality, while physical appearance and standard of living show more of the characteristics of the country.

The Romanian-Hungarian relationship system offers a somewhat different picture and a new insight (see Figure 3.13): the arrangement was an irregular square, where the distance between 'Romanians in Hungary' and 'Romanians in Romania' was less than in any other relation. Thus, this nationality in Hungary was seen by the respondents as closer to the majority nation of the neighbouring country than to their fellow countrymen. The 'Hungarians in Romania', however, take an intermediate position; essentially, they were at an equal distance from the anchor point of 'Hungarians in Hungary' and the 'Romanians in Romania'.

In this case, according to the respondents, the differences in nation and nationality are strongly reflected not only in culture and national awareness but also in professional expertise. The respondents also thought that lifestyle and standard of living depend not only on where a person lives but partly on the nationality s/he belongs to.

The situational nature of the whole arrangement was indicated by the



Figure 3.13 Judgement of similarity between the 'Hungarian' and 'Romanian' ethnic groups: MDS map.

change that appears when the two minority groups of 'Gypsies in Hungary' and 'Gypsies in Romania' are also considered, together with their relations. In the overall picture of the whole system of relationships the two ethnic groups of Gypsies were the closest to each other. There was a relatively great distance separating them from the Romanian minority or majority of their own country, while they were at an equal distance from each other. According to the Hungarian students, however, this difference was surpassed by the difference between the Gypsies and the Hungarian majority or minority of the given country. Accordingly, this perspective on the similarity between Romanians and Hungarians stresses the importance of where one lives, for in this context, there was a greater similarity between Romanians and Hungarians living in Hungary, and between Romanians and Hungarians living in Romania, than on a national basis, disregarding the borders of a country.

The three questions of lifestyle, expertise, and national awareness influence the representation of the relationships in a similar direction: they gave weight to the ethnic differences separating Gypsies, too.

It seems to be clear from what has been said so far that the respondents' concept of complex ethnic relations was not uniform, but differed in nature for every relationship. The few cases studied in the narrow range of students virtually exhaust the possible logical variations: a) the Hungarians in Slovakia were closer to the Hungarians in Hungary—even if only to a slight

extent, b) the Germans in Hungary also resembled the Hungarians in Hungary the most, and c) the Romanians in Hungary, on the other hand, were related to the Romanians in Romania the most. However, a fundamental tendency could be discovered in the background. The ethnic groups in double bind were pushed in one direction in one item and in the other direction in another item, but the two-sided and altogether often balanced relationships were not in doubt. Nevertheless, there was a contrary example in this respect, when the double bind was practically given up, and repulsion was one sided: the case of the Gypsies in both Hungary and Romania.

Studying the perception of the relationships between ethnic groups one particular theme emerged that has certainly occupied public thinking in recent years, but that requires cautious and tactful handling, because it is a sensitive area full of conflicts. One group within the population of Hungary—mostly city-dwellers and intellectuals—have a Jewish familial-cultural background, but a substantial number of them no longer practise the Jewish religion. Whatever their religious status, their mother tongue is Hungarian, and they do not differ from other Hungarian citizens in terms of their social and cultural scope. A certain section of the general public—having bitter historical experiences—reacted vehemently to the exclusive allusions of some right-wing politicians and writers, rejecting every overt or covert manifestation of anti-Semitism. We attempted to establish, using a small sample and not very sensitive empirical methods, whether or not this loose group that could certainly not be considered a nationality was considered as different or separable from other Hungarians, where these differences could be found, and to what extent. This attempt was made without contrasting Hungarians in Hungary in general and Hungarians with Jewish ancestry in particular in any question: this relationship was estimated by INDSCAL computer program on the basis of similarities to and differences from other groups.

Our studies of judgements regarding two groups of émigrés from Hungary were connected to this issue. The first group consisted of immigrants to Israel, who, naturally, have Jewish religious and cultural backgrounds almost without exception, and who are conscious of a committed choice and a definite ethnic identity. Unlike other Hungarian-speaking emigrants, this group of people find, and in a certain sense seek, their real home. The second group, which may serve as a basis of comparison, consisted of Hungarian emigrants to America, a wave of whom fled from anti-Semitism to a distant, foreign continent. Among their representatives—outstanding scientists and businessmen—it was not difficult to find international celebrities of Jewish origin. The Hungarian immigrants in America were naturally diverse, yet they shared the same fate when they made their long journey between Hungarian and American society and culture.

Figure 3.14 demonstrates the similarities and differences seen in cultural



A = Americans in the USA, AH = Hungarian immigrants in the USA,
H = Hungarians in Hungary, HJ = Hungarians with Jewish ancestry,
I = Israelis in general, IH = Israelis from Hungary

Figure 3.14 Judgement of the cultural similarity of ethnic groups, 1994: relations between Americans, Israelis, and Hungarians.

traditions. As can be seen, the group of 'Hungarians in Hungary' were at the top of the triangle, while the other two anchor points were practically equidistant from them: 'Americans in the USA and 'Israelis in general'. The inhabitants of the USA and Israel were seen to be at a considerable distance even from each other in the judgements of similarities made by the respondents, and the sides of the triangle with 'Hungarians in Hungary' were almost perpendicular to each other. The images formed of the Americans and the Israelis did not overlap, but did not oppose each other totally (in one dimension) either. With almost perfect logic, the Hungarian immigrants to the respective countries were on the sides of the triangle. Both 'Hungarians in America' and 'Israelis from Hungary' were slightly closer to the inhabitants of recipient countries than to those of Hungary, but this tendency was stronger in the latter case. The group of 'Hungarians with Jewish ancestry' were the closest to 'Hungarians in Hungary' in general, but undoubtedly, they move away from them on the side of the triangle in the direction of the Israelis. They were closer to 'Hungarians in Hungary' than to 'Israelis in general', but according to the respondents, they were most similar of all to 'Israelis coming from Hungary'.

Thus, the respondents gave clear-cut answers to the first question (similarity of cultural traditions). The image formed of physical appearance was quite close to this. It was a non-decisive difference here

that 'Hungarians in Hungary' and the inhabitants of the USA were further away from 'Israelis in general' than from each other. It was another characteristic that 'Hungarians with Jewish ancestry' and 'Israelis coming from Hungary' were rated very close to each other (this was the smallest distance in the whole arrangement). Their distance from the inhabitants of Hungary and Israel was almost even, but each group was slightly closer to its home country.

Where similarity of lifestyle and standard of living were concerned, country as a unit was a greater influencing factor than in the case of cultural traditions and appearance. It was understandable that Americans in general and Israelis in general were very close to the respective communities of 'Hungarians in America' and 'Israelis coming from Hungary'. The situation of 'Hungarians of Jewish ancestry' was also very similar to that of 'Hungarians in Hungary', but this—estimated—distance was greater than in the cases of the above-mentioned two relations. People living in Hungary were closer to the level of Israelis than to the standards of Americans, although the respondents thought 'Hungarians of Jewish ancestry' were closer to both the Israelis and the Americans with respect to lifestyle and standard of living than to the 'Hungarians in Hungary' in general.

Regarding professional skill and expertise, country as a unifying agent also plays a role, but, strangely enough, this was the area where 'Hungarians of Jewish ancestry' definitely drift away from 'Hungarians in Hungary', and move closer to Israelis in general. The judgements of similarities of the respondents were probably not due primarily to the real or alleged role of this group in modernization, because 'Hungarians of Jewish ancestry' were hardly closer to the American groups in question than the inhabitants of the country in general. Probably, they interpreted 'professional skill and expertise' in terms of direction of interest, or rather mentality.

The image formed of the 'national bond' and 'consciousness of identity' of these groups was even more puzzling, since the large groups, the majority, and their social groups with double bind were polarized here. This difference appears markedly both between Americans in general and 'Hungarians in America', and between 'Hungarians in Hungary' and 'Hungarians of Jewish ancestry'. In this respect, 'Hungarians of Jewish ancestry' were seen again as the closest to 'Israelis coming from Hungary', but this was followed by the rather unusual similarity to 'Hungarians in America'.

Similarly to the other relational systems, the complex analysis of the conception of Hungarian-Jewish-American relations was also performed, and the overall picture emerging from the responses to the five sub-questions was demonstrated using the INDSCAL method (see Figure 3.15). Corresponding to the results detailed above, the arrangement of the six ethnic units was triangle-shaped, with categories in unambiguous positions located at the points: Americans' in the USA, the Jews in Israel who were far from the 'Americans', highest on the vertical axis, and the



A = Americans in the USA, AH = Hungarian immigrants in the USA,
H = Hungarians in Hungary, HJ = Hungarians with Jewish ancestry,
I = Israelis in general, IH = Israelis from Hungary

Figure 3.15 Judgement of the similarity of ethnic groups, 1994: relations between Americans, Israelis, and Hungarians.

'Hungarians in Hungary' who were far from the 'Americans', mostly on the horizontal axis. The groups in double bind were placed on the 'appropriate' sides of the triangle, on the side that connects the two national categories affecting them; in every case, they stand closer to the majority of the country that gives them home and citizenship. The 'Hungarian of Jewish origin' and the 'Israelis coming from Hungary' were evidently on the same side of the triangle, but in the final analysis they were closer to the two points than to each other. INDSCAL analysis also reveals that standard of living and expertise gave greater weight to the horizontal axis, making 'Hungarians in Hungary' more distant, while the two items related to the similarity of culture and physical appearance have more effect on the vertical axis, and stress the differences of 'Israelis in general'. The summary for the whole arrangement may naturally hide important details of content: as we have already mentioned, at the level of specific answers to the individual questions 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' were especially close to 'Israelis coming from Hungary' in some

cases, and where this was not the case—standard of living and lifestyle—they moved from 'Hungarians in Hungary' towards the USA, rather than Israel, even if only moderately.

All things considered, the following could be concluded:

a There was no complicity whatsoever (or collusion, as suggested by the traditional anti-Semite paranoia) between images of the Americans and the Israelis.
b People emigrating from Hungary to America, and to Israel in particular, were seen as closer to the inhabitants of the recipient countries.
c The unique nature of national identity appeared in such groups as 'Hungarians in America' or 'Hungarians of Jewish ancestry', who were thought to be in double bind.
d The characterization of the latter group was diverse. They were not mixed totally in the group of Hungarians in Hungary, but it was also indicated that they belong there.

Another important lesson concerned the value of this method—asking systematic but relatively 'opaque' questions about similarities and differences between groups—in the investigation of complex and sensitive topics.

To sum up, we investigated how the positions of groups living in double bind in one dimension (or in a situation that can be considered as such) perceived their relations. The aim was to elucidate when certain ethnic groups living under conflicting circumstances were related to their mother nations, and when they were related to the majority nation of the country in which they were living, separated from their mother nation.

It was a general finding that such groups were seen as similar to their mother nation in cultural traditions, national identity, and physical appearance. Regarding professional qualifications and standard of living, however, they were considered to be similar to the majority nation of their country. This twofold tendency was manifest in the evaluation of similarities of both Hungarian minorities abroad and national minorities in Hungary. This was true in the cases of the 'Hungarians in Slovakia', 'Slovaks in Hungary', 'Hungarians in Romania', 'Romanians in Hungary', and 'Hungarians in Austria' alike. 'Germans in Hungary' and 'Hungarians in America' were an exception in that they were related to the receptive countries rather than to their mother country in their cultural traditions as well.

The double bind was clear in the summary of the responses given to the five questions and demonstrated in the MDS maps. Some of the ethnic groups living under conflicting circumstances were seen as more similar to their mother nation ('Hungarians in Slovakia', 'Romanians in Hungary'), some others resembled the majority nation of the country they were living in ('Germans in Hungary', 'Hungarians in America'), but both influenced the

judgement, often linking the intermediate groups to themselves equally (see, e.g., 'Slovaks in Hungary', 'Hungarians in Romania', 'Hungarians in Austria').

Placing the judgements of the similarities between 'Gypsies in Hungary' and 'Gypsies in Romania' in a Hungarian and Romanian context, it was found that the two Gypsy minority groups stood very close to each other, both of them at a greater distance from the Hungarians than from the Romanians. (The virtual similarity of Gypsy ethnic groups across national borders strikingly emphasized the similarities of Hungarians and Romanians both in Hungary and in Romania.)

For technical and moral reasons, it was impossible to ask how much 'Hungarians in Hungary' and 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' merged into each other in the eyes of the respondents. But the subjective distance of these categories could be estimated by using them together with the categories of 'Americans in the USA', 'Hungarians in the USA', 'Israelis in general', and 'Israelis from Hungary' within a similarity matrix. 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' and 'Israelis from Hungary' usually fell between 'Israelis in general' and 'Hungarians in Hungary' in the MDS space. 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' seem to have been perceived as being closer to 'Hungarians in Hungary' than to 'Israelis in general', in fact, closer than to the specific group of 'Israelis from Hungary'.

This conclusion was not valid for all of the questions. Thus, regarding professional qualifications, 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' were closer to 'Israelis in general' than to the category of 'Hungarians in Hungary'. Furthermore, 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' were closer to 'Israelis from Hungary' in many respects, above all in physical appearance.

It should be noted that 'Israelis from Hungary' were seen as significantly less similar to 'Hungarians in Hungary' in every evaluated aspect than to the population of their country. On the other hand, no general separating line between 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' and 'Hungarians in Hungary', such as might have indicated exclusion, could be found in the data received from this narrow sample.

The respondents saw a relatively large distance between 'Hungarians in Hungary', 'Israelis in general', and 'Americans in the USA. Hungarian immigrants were seen as amalgamated with these foreign societies almost completely in the former case, and in most essential ways in the latter. 'Romanians in Romania' were also seen as very far from the respondents' own group, and also from 'Hungarians in Romania'. 'Germans in Austria' and 'Germans in Germany' were at a moderate distance, and the groups at a moderate distance were seen as quite adaptable both in Hungary and in Austria. 'Slovaks in Slovakia' were seen to be the closest to 'Hungarians in Hungary' among the foreign nations, and the intermediate groups could even play a linking role, since they both were quite close to both anchor points.

Summary

The general concept of nation and the specific concept of Hungarian nation are related to each other. This is true not only in logic but according to the findings of the empirical study of public thinking. In the investigations carried out at the end of the 1960s on primary school pupils, and at the beginning of the 1970s on national representative and stratified samples, both young people and adults often cited examples when the task was to determine the concept of nation, and the examples given referred exclusively to 'Hungarians'.

Since 'nation' was not the primary unit of society in Marxist thought, its coherences and tensions required complex explanations, and the theoretical complications were increased by the political deposits of the history of the multi-national Soviet Union and the national states within her zone of influence, and that of the anti-imperialist national movements that she supported. After 1956, the delicate questions of the essence of a nation and the enforcement of a nation's interests had to be dealt with, but the official ideology that was transmitted through the institutions of education was too complicated; it rang hollow when compared to the actual visible exercise of power. Not surprisingly the official doctrine failed to take root. The investigation carried out among pupils at the end of the 1960s showed an essentially spontaneously developing naive concept that was not integrated into ideological relations. In the end, the pupils either considered the inhabitants of a country as one nation, or regarded the community united by language and culture and the differences separating them from others as the characteristic feature of a nation. Neither concept was likely to help these children to come to grips with the process of the development of nations and the historical nature of the existence of nations.

The adult samples in the investigation considered the country and the linguo-cultural community as the fundamental features of a nation. The two features do not necessarily coincide, and in the case of Hungarians they are in sharp contrast, since one-third of all Hungarian-speaking people live outside the borders of Hungary in neighbouring countries. In order to focus this dilemma, we repeatedly asked whether the national minorities living in Hungary, the Hungarian minorities living in the neighbouring countries, and the Hungarian emigrants living abroad belonged to the Hungarian nation or not. The decisions regarding this dilemma underwent considerable changes in the course of time. In the 1970s and 1980s the adult and student samples tended to consider the country as primary and citizenship as a governing factor, but in the 1990s the opinion that common culture and language were the fundamental factors became dominant. Opinions used to be deeply divided as to where Hungarian minorities abroad and national minorities in Hungary belonged. About 20% of the sample took a new position at the beginning of the 1990s: they consistently said that cultural community was

the basis of belonging to a nation both in Hungary and abroad. There was, and there remains, another inconsistent 20% who thought that both national minorities in Hungary and Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries were part of the Hungarian nation.

There was a radical change in the judgement of Hungarians who had emigrated to the West, too. Previously, there was an almost unanimous feeling that people who had left the country of their own free will and who did not share the struggles and fate of its people, did not belong to the Hungarian nation. At the beginning of the 1990s, a more 'forgiving' attitude was considerably more frequent, but even then it was not dominant. Open political condemnation of those who had left for the West was already meaningless, but the previous uniformity and the later division of the sample indicated several implicit assumptions. First of all, belonging to a nation depended on personal acceptance of belonging to a community. Second, some respondents thought that one can become 'unworthy' in this respect, that is, 'acceptance' into a nation can be lost. Third, altered circumstances and opportunities can change people, and thus they will really become different from the original community.

For the concept of nation, it was relevant to investigate which of the two binds people consider as stronger when thinking about groups in an ambivalent situation. Which connection seems to be stronger in the cases of national minorities in Hungary, Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries, and Hungarian emigrants: one based on territory and state or one based on language and culture? This investigation began as a pilot study on a small sample in 1994, using the MDS method of the judgements of similarity. The first finding was that there seemed to be no universal rule in this respect: it was subject to different considerations for each group. Second, the ambivalent nature of the situation of these groups was not doubted: neither part of the double bind was ignored and at most they were seen to be manifest in different areas. Professional skill and standard of living was usually seen as similar to the majority nation of the given country, while cultural traditions, national awareness, and physical appearance were regarded as more similar to the mother nation. An exception was that 'Germans in Hungary' and 'Hungarians in the USA' were perceived to be closer to the majority nation of the receptive country even in cultural tradition. The third finding was that the assumed distance between the majority nations forming each state had an effect on how markedly the majority nations separated themselves from groups who were in an ambivalent position between them. 'Hungarians in Hungary', 'Slovaks in Slovakia', and even 'Germans in Hungary' and 'Germans in Austria' were seen as quite close to one another. Thus, the intermediate groups could be linked to both poles in a well-balanced way. The greater distance between the 'Hungarians in Hungary' and 'Romanians in Romania', and between 'Hungarians in Hungary' and 'Americans in the USA' forced a break: 'Hungarians in Romania' were seen to be more similar to their mother

nation, while 'Hungarians in America' were thought to resemble their domicile more.

At the beginning of the 1990s, it became possible to investigate the judgement of Jews in Hungary, too, although with due respect to increased sensitivity. 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' were perceived as a group in double bind, similar to 'Israelis from Hungary'. The respondents seemed to have accepted where the groups in question had chosen to live: the former group seemed to be similar to 'Hungarians in Hungary', while the latter one was perceived to be like 'Israelis in general'. Furthermore, the 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' were seen to resemble 'Hungarians in Hungary' more than even 'Israelis from Hungary'. Beyond these global similarities, the respondents saw strong physical resemblance between 'Hungarians of Jewish origin' and 'Israelis from Hungary', and a similarity in the area of professional skill between the former group and 'Israelis in general'. Nevertheless, no trace of ethnic discrimination was seen, although respondents did show signs of exclusion when the situation and traits of Gypsies had to be evaluated.

As we can see, there was no general concept of nation, that is, how the respondents conceived their own nation, that would have set the standard in any stage of the periods studied. Similarly, the criteria for belonging to the Hungarian nation did not dictate how groups in double bind would be perceived. Certainly, the respondents did not deduce their opinions in answering the questions, and their views were probably inconsistent in generalizing their personal experiences and motives and raising them to an abstract level. Common past, production carried out in interdependence, and economic activity were not dominant in the definitions of 'nation' and 'Hungarians'. If, however, the experiences, values, and emotional charge of belonging to the nation were required, it was history and economics that informed the responses.

The respondents were repeatedly asked from the 1970s onwards whether they felt pride or shame about their own nation. In 1973, pride was present in 91% of the responses of the national representative sample, while shame occurred in 35%. In 1991, the same respective ratios were 74% and 56% in a student sample. Noticing these characteristic changes, it had to be considered that the less educated adult manual workers always emphasize pride and see fewer reasons for shame than more educated individuals, especially university students. Students whose achievement record was quite poor in secondary schools were rather at a loss in this respect, while the better students saw more reasons for both pride and shame.

It was increasingly and in a great number considered natural that one is fond of one's homeland, and this needs no explanation. Economic achievements were considered as significant primarily by the manual workers and by children of manual workers in the student samples. The intellectuals consistently mentioned culture and intellectual achievement in relation with the nation, also as objects of pride. The students found positive

elements in fighting past struggles and in the fact of survival. The motif of 'small country' appeared repeatedly, according to which the modest size, resources, and defencelessness of Hungary emphasize every achievement and even the significance of mere existence. Most of those who (also) saw reasons for shame found the cause in the eternal faults of character and in 20th-century, recent Hungarian history. Most frequently, lost wars and political failures were mentioned. The alliance, co-operation, and tolerance of the influence of fascist Germany were quite often mentioned. This was true after the socio-political transformation, too, and it was hardly mentioned that co-operation with the Soviet Union and tolerating her influence should be reasons for shame.

A peculiarly perceived international constellation provided the background and frame of reference in evaluating the performances of the country. Repeated studies between 1973 and 1991 also investigated how different samples judged the values of eight different countries, including Hungary. Until the change of the political system it could be seen in the evaluative replies that Hungary represented outstanding values even in the most dignified international comparisons. Almost grotesquely, an overall image could develop in which Hungary, together with or closely following the Soviet Union, surpassed the leading western powers in many respects. This was the opinion of the national representative sample in 1973, and that of the worker sub-samples in 1975, while in 1981 the USA and the GDR came before Hungary in the responses of the student sample, but the three leading powers of Western Europe were still behind her. Evidently, these opinions were not objective; their often inconsistent content suggests that they were not honest, either. Nevertheless, several factors influenced them in this direction. First there was solidarity with their own nation and the block of countries confined together on the international 'battlefield', the acknowledgement of the situation, combined with a feeling of self-worth. The second factor was relative satisfaction in comparison with the past and the immediate scope of vision in the 1970s and early 1980s. The third factor was international and national ideological propaganda: conformity to some of its critical points was also enforced by political pressure. The fourth factor was the predetermined criteria of evaluation, which offered the opportunity to emphasize positive aspects of the East Central European political system, such as medical care, stable prices, and official support for sporting activity.

The hierarchy of the countries representing different social systems proved to be quite stable in the responses of different samples to partly different questions in the 1970s and 1980s. The first place was usually taken by the Soviet Union; in many answers she was favoured together with the other so-called 'socialist' countries Hungary and the GDR, while in some other respects she was associated with the USA, the other superpower. Consequently, England, the FRG and France were pushed out, except when the cultural level of the countries were considered: in 1981, the common

values of these countries were associated. However, neither the questions asked nor the historical situation could make the Hungarian respondents find any outstanding values in Romania, even as a fellow-member of the socialist bloc. Only the natural beauty of the territories that had been ceded to Romania from Hungary received some appreciation.

Despite this stability, some erosion of the hierarchy of the countries could be observed in the responses. The rate of economic development of the 'socialist' countries was highly valued in the early 1970s, but the highest standard of living was not found here. In 1973, the Soviet Union was still placed next to the USA and the FRG with respect to standard of living, but in 1975 the intellectual sub-samples already admitted that none of the countries in the Eastern bloc belonged to the group with the highest standard of living. The students in 1981 not only agreed with this, but also doubted the dynamism of economic development in the socialist bloc, while maintaining the paradoxical opinion that independently of and despite the economic situation, public morale was better in the 'socialist' countries.

In 1991, on the other hand, there was no need to search among the vague indicators of morale and democracy for evidence of the partial superiority and full equality of the Eastern bloc. The bloc itself was no more. The superiority of the USA and Western Europe became complete and undoubted. Appreciation of Russia from various points of view declined considerably, but the openly admitted, direct evaluation was even worse than the indirect evaluation.

Descriptions of the roles played by different states in the 20th-century history of Europe are also typical in this respect. Judgements about the past and expected future influence and the importance of the different countries at the turn of the century, in 1950, and in 2000 were asked for. It became evident from the responses that although the roles played by the different countries changed from one period to the next, the three judgements regarding the influence of a country were interrelated, and expressed certain attitudes. The roles of the three leading West European powers diminished in 1950, while the USA and Russia shot ahead. The respondents expected the USA to keep its important role at the turn of the millennium, but the course taken by Russia was expected to resemble an inverted U-shaped curve. Already in 1990, at the time of the change of the political system, then in 1991, in the extensive study on students, the respondents indicated that Germany was going to be the most influential country in Europe at the end of the millennium.

In 1991 and in 1994, we also investigated which countries were associated with the stimulus word 'Europe', a geographical term on its way to becoming a political ideal, and how frequently these associations occurred. It was found that Germany and France were the countries most often associated with Europe, while less attention was focused on the insular kingdom England. It is worth noting that Hungary was indicated by 51% of

the respondents as a typical European country in 1991, but that this percentage had decreased dramatically by 1994.

Beyond the decisive question of belonging to Europe, there were contradictions and some uncertainty in the judgements of the situation and values of Hungary at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1991, the position of Hungary decayed dramatically in the usual comparisons of countries, in parallel with the general devaluation of the countries in the region. Focusing on the East Central European region, a relatively favourable position was attributed to Hungary. She was among the three most highly valued countries with Germany, the admittedly dominant country in the region, and Poland, the country appreciated on the basis of a long tradition of reciprocal friendship. The nadir was Serbia, currently at war, and Romania, which had been continuously judged as worthless for decades.

The opinions expressed in Hungary were by no means unique, as was demonstrated by the comparative investigation carried out on a Romanian student sample in Romania, which revealed that the perception of the hierarchy of countries was similar in many respects. The Romanian sample also saw the USA and Western Europe as dominant, considered their own country as typically European in 1994, and regarded their relative position in the region as favourable. They thought they had more values than the declining Russia; the direct evaluation of Russia was even worse than that of Hungary, although Hungary was assigned the last places in the different rank orders of the countries.

Furthermore, the characterizations given by the Hungarian and Romanian students about each other's nation and about their own were ideally mirror images of each other: the trait profiles of the ingroup and the outgroup outlined by them were identical (even if the evaluative charges were not the same: the evaluations of the 'Romanians' given by the Hungarian students were less favourable). The stereotype descriptions of other nations also revealed extensive similarities, when the 'English', Americans', 'Russians', 'Germans', and the 'Chinese' had to be characterized. The only exception was the image of the 'French': both the trait profile and the evaluative charge of this nation was more favourable in Romania, especially among students from intellectual families and among the excellent school achievers who formed the future intellectual class. Apart from this, characterizations of countries and national characterizations were very similar in the two countries from the early 1990s onwards.

There can be, and indeed there were, considerable differences between the measured evaluation of the countries and the evaluative charge of the national stereotypes/In the investigation carried out at the beginning of the 1980s, the characterization of nations showed slightly different evaluations from the hierarchy of countries. The judgements regarding 'Russians' were very positive, but the global evaluation of the 'English' was at a similar level. Both of them definitely surpassed the evaluative charges of the perceived traits of the respondents' own national group: even those of the 'English',

whose country was not preferred by the Hungarian students. The 'French' were in line with 'Hungarians', and the two of them came before Americans' and 'Germans' with respect to evaluation. The homeland of the latter groups, that is, the USA and at least the GDR, took more favourable positions than either Hungary or France. The characterization of the 'Chinese' was forced down to second last place, while the position of the 'Romanians' was the worst, in accordance with the least favourable evaluation of Romania.

After an overall comparison, two observations can be made. First, the two typical westerners, the 'English' and the 'French', were more positively evaluated than their countries, whose social system and military-political alliance was not the same as that of the world of the respondents. Second, beyond the evaluation of the countries, which could not be considered as realistic, the respondents tended to prefer their own national group to the inhabitants of the USA and the FRG.

There were two groups of nations regarding the similarity of profiles in 1981. One of them was the Atlantic triad'—the group of 'English', 'French', and Americans'. The second was the more heterogeneous bloc of 'Russians', 'Germans', 'Chinese', and 'Romanians'. The group was heterogeneous not only in the geographical sense but also in the evaluations, since the structural similarity of the strongly preferred 'Russians' to the consistently most rejected 'Romanians' was astonishing. All of the members of this heterogeneous group had something to do with the 'socialist' socio-political system. National self-characterization, however, did not resemble this group; it had a distinct profile of characterization.

In 1991, after transformations of historic magnitude, a general decline in the level of evaluation could be observed in the national characterizations. The only exception was that of the 'Chinese', whose evaluations became less negative, and even slightly positive in value. The level of evaluation of all of the other nations decreased. This was true of the 'English', and of the 'French', Americans', and 'Germans' who followed them in line. Thus, the western nations remained at the top, as they did in the evaluation of the values of the countries. The 'English' kept their first place among the nations, while the USA stood out from among the countries in the eyes of the respondents.

The evaluative charge of 'Hungarians' was also less positive, which partly caused them to fall back down the rank of nations: in contrast to the 1981 study, both Americans' and 'Germans' came before 'Hungarians' in 1991. The rank of evaluations also indicated something that the MDS figure, relying on more complete information, showed impressively: 'Hungarians' were between the eastern and the western nations, at the border of these two groups. The characterizations of the 'Chinese' and 'Russians' were behind her: the 'Russians' fell from first position in 1981 to second last place in 1991, next to the 'Romanians'. This fall was 1.35 on the seven-point scale.

Only two pairs of nations had similar trait profiles. The only feature that remained from ten years before was the great similarity between the ranks of traits of precisely these two nations: 'Russians' and the 'Romanians'. Previously, the striking difference in evaluation had made this similarity surprising, but this difference disappeared over time, and 'Russians' and 'Romanians' found themselves neighbours at the bottom of the evaluation rank of nations, too. The close connection between the trait profiles of the 'English' and 'Germans', however, was a new development in 1991. This change was mainly due to the changes in the content of characterization of the 'English'. It should be noted that independently of this change, their levels of evaluation also became similar, since the positive evaluation of the 'English' decreased more than that of 'Germans'.

All things considered, the change of the social system and the transformation of the international political constellation brought about significant changes in the evaluation of nations. One was the collapse of the high esteem expressed for 'Russians', which had been preserved by external factors. Another change was the east-west polarization of evaluations, where 'Hungarians' hold at best an intermediate position. The general devaluation of nations, evidently accompanied by the negative change in the evaluation of 'Hungarians', was a third notable development. This may have been due to widened horizons, loss of illusions, a tendency to dispense with the external constraints of conformity, and changes in the way judgements are made.

The content of nation characterizations changed in other respects, too. Several trait ranks were modified. In 1981, popularity and intellect took the best positions in the rank order of traits of the 'English'. Ten years later, popularity, patriotism, and erudition moved slightly back, while intellect, self-assertiveness, and honesty moved even more to the fore. Good humour and friendliness continued to be seen as their least characteristic feature. In 1991, 'Americans' were seen as less involved politically, less intelligent and educated than before, but social traits like friendliness and good humour came to the fore. The traits of honesty and diligence remained the critical side of their characterization. In the traits of the 'Chinese', however, it was the last two characteristics that took the leading position in 1991, as opposed to the overall image of ten years earlier, when the features of patriotism, self-assertiveness, and political interest dominated.

The last triad of traits were the most favourable features of several other nations in 1981. Individually, and even together, these traits seem to be positive, but if they dominate the overall impression they can express strong self-vindication and expansion of power. This was and remained the most positive feature of the 1981 and 1991 characterizations of 'Russians' and 'Romanians', where low-scoring erudition, humour, and popularity were relatively the most negative traits. This was the profile that rendered the two characterizations similar in 1981, despite the great differences in evaluation,

and that was sustained in 1991, despite the unique decline in the evaluation of the 'Russians'.

The characterization of 'Germans' was also similar to the above nations in 1981, with the exception that intelligence belonged to their outstanding traits, and lack of erudition was not found on the negative side of the characterization, but they were seen as less 'popular', 'friendly' and 'good-humoured'. 'Germans' were similarly characterized ten years later, with the exception that their morality, especially their diligence, took a better position in the rank of traits. The trait profile of the 'English' became more similar to this description, moving away from that of the 'French'. Both of the latter two nations were seen as popular, intelligent, patriotic, and educated, and rather less diligent and friendly. The characterization of the 'French' changed little in ten years.

The trait profiles of the four nations discussed above, those of 'Russians', 'Romanians', 'Germans', and the 'French', were consistent in 1981 and 1991. The investigation of the judgement of 'Hungarians' began sooner, and was continued in 1994, which enables us to view it from a wider perspective.

In 1973, the national representative sample stressed Hungarians' positive attitude towards life, social openness, and attachment to their country, both in open-ended and in multiple-choice questions. They doubted whether Hungarians were cool or level-headed, and definitely denied that they were loyal to each other or had political inclinations and mentality. The image emerging from the perceived virtues and faults was one of an emotional individual, who was cordial and impulsive and devoid of cool self-interest. This rough image present in public thinking corresponded to descriptions of the national characteristics made by literary essayists: both agreed that Hungarians are not a people of reason and determined action. However, the powerful emotions that govern Hungarians did not seem to emerge in the dark shades of loneliness and pessimism.

It was demonstrated that on the level of global national evaluation, different groups gave different evaluations of Hungary in international comparisons. The two indicators were correlated. Nevertheless, the trait ranks of the national characterizations of these groups were significantly similar to each other; in other words, the same basic trait profiles were shifted in the positive-negative dimension. Nevertheless, there were further slight differences in content between them. The respondents who were particularly positive in their attitudes considered 'Hungarians' as especially patriotic, brave, loyal, and strong, while the most negative respondents tended to doubt the happy, optimistic, diligent, and impulsive qualities of 'Hungarians'.

In 1975, the responses of four sub-samples differing in occupation and age revealed essentially similar trait profiles about the typical representatives of the respondents' own nation to those described above. Nevertheless, the social and demographic differences were manifested in the level of

evaluation of the traits: workers and the older adult generation gave significantly more positive responses than the intellectuals and people in their twenties, respectively.

In 1981, the nation characterizations given by pupils and students were quite favourable, though not outstanding. There were differences again, with respect to age and type of school attended: primary school pupils and the mentally similar students in vocational training schools considered their own nation much more positively. In 1991, the general level of evaluation decreased, as has already been mentioned, and the category of the respondents' own nation was forced behind all of the western nations in question. It was noteworthy in this respect that it was 'Hungarians' who received the most positive evaluation in friendliness and good humour, the traits expressing sociability, among the eight evaluated nations in both years. Thus, there was at least one area where Hungary did well in the otherwise rather reserved nation evaluation. Nevertheless, there were traits in both years in which 'Hungarians' took an unfavourable position: in 1981 and in 1991, they were seventh in diligence and in patriotism. Outstanding esteem combined with devastating criticism to lend a split character to national self-characterization in the comparison of nations. The trait profiles in 1981 and in 1991 were nevertheless very similar, and none of them stood close to the trait ranks of the description of any other nation.

The countries of the Central East European region were compared with each other and their nations were characterized in a 1994 investigation. The general level of evaluation of 'Hungarians' in this context was definitely favourable: it was among the first three, in the company of 'Germans' and 'Poles', among eight national categories. In accordance with the previous findings, the good humour of 'Hungarians' ranked first, while it was an apparently new element that the respondents considered Hungarians to be outstandingly well educated. But however new it may seem, this national self-characterization echoes a pre-war idea about the regional cultural superiority of Hungary. It is worth noting that in this frame of reference and in this year 'Hungarians' no longer seemed to be strikingly friendly: they were only third among the national categories. Their position with respect to patriotism was still not very high: it was sixth.

No matter how consistent national self-characterization was in the studied decades, quite important changes in its content could be observed in this already historical period. At the beginning of the 1970s, the greatest distinctions of 'Hungarians' were their friendliness and patriotism, to which their diligence was connected in the honourable middle range. The first trait to fall behind in rank was this last feature, but it happened first in a variable context and in a student sample, so the reason why this component of efficiency related to work did not take a more favourable position in national self-characterization could have been explained by external factors. Since 1981, however, diligence has repeatedly been the last in the rank of traits. Later, it was followed by the evaluation of the fundamental trait of

national self-characterization, that of friendliness. In 1994, the characterization of 'Hungarians' was definitely non-flattering in this respect in comparison with some of the other nations. Since the references between nations also changed in the period in question, this alone would not have brought about a change or had a decisive effect on its direction. But within national self-characterization itself, the friendliness of 'Hungarians' fell back to the next to last position, which was undoubtedly a change as compared to the preferred position in the past.

The patriotism of 'Hungarians' within the internal rank of traits in national self-characterization preserved its second or third position. With this, they came second among the eight nations in 1981, but took only seventh and sixth place in 1991 and 1994, respectively. This striking contrast between external and internal references arose from the fact that the patriotism (and self-assertiveness) of different nations was not doubted: it was judged positively and was evaluated at a high level and within a narrow range. The question arises of whether or not the meaning of this trait is completely the same for the self and for others. At any rate, we attempted to investigate how strict the wide and narrow circles of respondents were in their conception of this trait and their indications of its normative demands. In order to do this, the number and nature of the conditions of 'patriotism' were repeatedly studied in the two decades of investigation presented here.

The respondents in the 1970s differentiated between past and more recent manifestations of patriotism: they thought the old forms of patriotism were more militant, while the present forms were expressed rather in peaceful work. The younger respondents emphasized the active nature of patriotism, while the older ones stressed the emotional bond to the homeland and the acceptance of the socio-political system in their spontaneous responses. When specific items of behaviour were offered in order for the respondents to decide whether or not they agreed with patriotism, a gradual reduction of demands was revealed. Transforming the results to a 16-item scale, the mean score of the sample was 9.5 in 1973; it dropped to 5.4 by 1991, and it was only 3.3 in a very narrow sample in 1994. Attachment to the country and respect for the national symbols belonged to the consistently expected demands of patriotism. In 1973–75, public opinion was divided over the question of whether rejection of and isolation from foreign countries, foreigners, and foreign intellectual and material goods were desirable modes of behaviour or not. This issue was no longer important for the majority of the respondents by the early 1980s. In 1975, socialist commitment was considered as a criterion of patriotism by 73%; this had fallen to 52% by 1981. At the beginning of the 1990s the earlier opinions were not reversed. The majority of the respondents thought that socialist commitment could also harmonize with patriotism, but authoritarianism was excluded and a democratic attitude was required.

The requirements of isolation from foreign countries and political

exclusion fell away from the concept of patriotism in the course of time. The remaining thin content was no more than the acceptance of identification with and attachment to the nation. At the same time, this was the only preferred emotional-moral feature of national self-characterization that was left by the mid-1990s. Humour came before patriotism in the rank of traits, followed by intelligence, self-assertiveness, and erudition. It remains to be seen whether this change was due to the ambition of rationality or to the loss of social illusions, or perhaps to both.

4 The domain of societal categories

Perception of occupational groups and class relations

Premises and rationale

The meaning of social stereotypes is by no means self-evident. Even the basis on which the categories to be characterized are selected and sorted is indefinite. The first point to clarify is which of the many groupings that people make can be considered as social groups. The basis could be title, rank, position, property, current income, nature of employment or profession, qualifications, or the less easily definable habits, manners, and lifestyle. Most probably, we need some kind of a hierarchical division, and not, for example, regional, ideological or religious division.

Two of the many possibilities have considerable antecedents in the literature. Stereotypes regarding social classes, and characterizations regarding occupational groups have been studied. The differentiation of social classes rests on relatively obscure bases, requiring interpretation themselves, while categorization on the basis of occupation is more simple and clear. There are connections and even overlaps between social class and occupation, however, they cannot be considered as the same.

Conception and interpretation of class structure

The two extremes of the financial situation, the groups of the rich and the poor, are two living and opposing categories that have endured persistently, despite all historical changes. The division into higher, middle and lower social classes, in addition to indicating financial situation and income, implies differences in influence, prestige, educational level, and lifestyle. This categorization is more formal, yet more flexible, and is easier to apply in modern industrialized countries than the Marxist contrast between capitalists and the proletariat based on the 'ownership of the instruments of production'. Everyday language often distinguishes the middle class from the working class. These large social groups differ considerably in the nature of the work they do: members of the latter group perform manual work, while those in the former group do not. Thus, occupational groups have a status hierarchy of their own, while individual occupations also have a special

image arising from the activity, the demands, and the concomitant income and social liberty of the occupation.

Social-economic divisions within different countries vary considerably; the terminology and methodological traditions of their sociology are also different/Accordingly, sociological studies regarding social categories in public thinking and the self-categorization of respondents are very heterogeneous. Many of them aim at revealing what people rely on when they assign themselves and others to particular social classes.

Financial situation, that is, differentiation according to property and income, is an obvious consideration when social groups are differentiated. This was supported by an exceptionally early American study (Centers, 1949), where a sample of 1100 respondents defined the upper and middle classes primarily on the basis of financial criteria. Those concerned—especially those in the higher classes—also strongly emphasized family background, origin, and level of education. As to the lower, working classes, the respondents often mentioned the necessity and fact of working for a living, and the physical nature of the work.

The responses implied various assumptions about the relationship between social differences in terms of power, property, prestige, educational level, occupation, quality of life, and work; whether they ran parallel, in co-ordination with each other, or were basically separate and became linked with each other at random. Although very few extensive sociological studies have dealt with this problem, the results so far have supported the 'status congruency' hypothesis, that is, people perceive advantages and disadvantages as accumulating.

Stereotype research reveals what human characteristics are associated with different class and occupational categories, and how these categories are evaluated and characterized by the respondents. In other words, it can also be asked whether or not the respondent samples perceive psychological differences between the different layers of society in parallel and in co-ordination with the differences in social situation. It can also be asked whether 'congruent status' is supplemented by the 'halo effect', as well; in other words, whether or not an advantageous social situation is associated with highly favourable characteristics while disadvantageous social situation goes with negative personality traits, in accordance with cognitive consistency.

This problem has an attribution aspect as well. Social differences can be seen as accidental, or as a necessity arising from the nature of the socioeconomic system, or it may be thought that socio-economic conditions make the success of individual qualities possible: outstanding individuals will progress, while the weak fall behind. If the position in a given society is explained by chance, or, in the case of a given individual, by some external cause that is not in the power of the person, then it is obvious that personality characteristics cannot be inferred from a social position. If, however, a position depends on individual abilities and efforts, favourable

conclusions will be drawn from advantageous positions, unfavourable ones from disadvantageous positions. Starting from this logic of attribution, studies in this field ask open-ended and multiple-choice questions regarding the causes of wealth, poverty, and, more recently, unemployment.

In the above-mentioned pioneer research series, Centers (1948) revealed that after the Second World War an American representative sample indicated negative features characterizing poor people as the causes of poverty: laziness, and lack of ambition, ability, and thrift. Only half of the respondents assumed external, social structural reasons.

A similar basic tendency was found by Feagin (1975), who offered three groups of reasons as explanations of poverty to the respondents: individual, structural, and fatalistic factors. Several investigations have been conducted by the same method in a number of countries, finding a predominance of individual responsibility as opposed to structural reasons (Feather, 1974). The investigations in the last-mentioned citations built on the factor analysis of reason attribution, rather than on their a priori grouping, thus demonstrating the separation of three typical interpretations, that is, the different frequency of the individualistic, structural, and fatalistic explanations. Beyond his own results, Furnham (1988) justly cited several studies that documented that 'lay theories' regarding poverty, unemployment, and wealth do not stand in isolation, but are embedded in a wider range of personal and social opinions.

Thus, it can be concluded from many investigations that the respondents tend to attribute financial situation and related class status to the personal characteristics of the rich and the poor. This finding is especially true of the USA, where the majority of the studies made in this direction in the past 50 years have been conducted (Morris and Williamson, 1982). Naturally, there are differences between continents and countries in this respect, which can be well illustrated by findings in the similarly highly developed Western Europe (Argyle, 1994).

Special attention should be paid to investigations in which the social class of the target person was not defined by descriptions of characteristics of abstract categories, but in which stereotyped characterizations were elicited through the target person's speech and the instruments and goods s/he owns (Giles and Coupland, 1991; Dittmar, 1992). The results were practically the same as cited above.

Occasionally, negative stereotypes regarding the poor arouse anxious comments in the social psychological literature, because negative judgement of the poor may become the basis for behaviour towards them and for the treatment of social welfare issues in general. Furthermore, it may offer the wealthier classes a subjective reason for showing indifference to poverty and unemployment, and for refusing to make financial sacrifices.

The phenomenon can be explained within psychology by the concept of 'belief in a just world', introduced by Lerner (1980). It is better and more reassuring to assume that only those who deserve it will get into trouble than

to believe that it can happen to anyone, including ourselves, however worthy we may be. Thus self-protection and the need for self-reassurance may lead people to condemn individuals who are suffering or in difficulties, even if it is unjust. This psychological explanation is partly related to the widespread sociological approach, the 'blaming the victim'. In order to explain the phenomenon in question, social psychologists also offer social and cultural historical outlooks, and they find clearly identifiable and empirically verifiable cues in the ideas of the Reformation and especially in the 'Protestant Ethic' (Furnham, 1990), in the typical American attitudes towards self-determination, and in the widespread view of social-Darwinism.

We cannot avoid the question of how people at the lower end of the social hierarchy perceive themselves, their own situation, the level and desirable degree of social differences, and the social and economic system that produces and maintains these differences. The widespread social stereotypes that represent the views and interests of the ruling circles and that legitimize the existing state of affairs are neither flattering nor helpful to them. Nevertheless, the majority of adult representatives and their children in the lower end of the social hierarchy seem to accept these stereotypes. At the same time, they show a statistical tendency to perceive social differences less realistically. These differences are less accepted by them in their evaluation: political attitudes towards social equality are manifested quite frequently, and the characterization of their own category can even be modified by values of openness, joviality, and solidarity.

It is part of the overall picture that members of the lower classes do not necessarily appraise their own social status objectively, especially those who are in a borderline situation or who at least see a possibility of individual or family advancement.

As for the characterization of social categories, traditional stereotype literature is in difficulties. In the cognitive field of the national-ethnic characterization it is easier to state that there is no realistic basis for distinguishing between categories and attributing them with different characteristics, or even if there were some basis, it would be manifested and passed on in a heavily distorted form. The differences in social hierarchy, conditions of life, and mentality are striking—the ideologies that defend or attack the system reinforce awareness of them, the observations and measurements of psychology itself support them, even if the differences that are found cannot be explained by a single factor but by a whole fabric of causes and interrelationships. In the long run, important differences will be found between the rich and the poor in several spheres of personality, even if wealth did not necessarily arise from eminence, and poverty did not always stem from weakness. Social position, with its own limits, possibilities and perspectives is an important factor of personality development. No psychologist can state that an individual's occupation, whether chosen freely or not, would have no basis, implications, and consequences in personality

development. On the contrary, going back to Münsterberg, considerations have been found stating that occupation is the most important source and manifestation of the similarities and differences between people. Occupational categorization is a natural basis for everyday attribution that starts from the relationship between situations and actions, both as a basis for typology and as a frame of reference when judging individual characteristics.

Occupational prestige and stereotypes

A characteristic professional attitude arises from this approach in the field of socio-occupational stereotypes. First of all, social psychology neglects this field, in comparison with the national-ethnic characterizations. Second, as a matter of course it chooses occupational stereotypes as tools for experiments and a means of demonstrating general principles (e.g. Jones and Davis, 1965; Hamilton and Rose, 1980). Third, it considers socio-occupational stereotypes as basic and primary as opposed to other category characterizations (Eagly and Kite, 1987; Eagly and Steffen, 1984), and chooses them as a basis of comparison when studying the role of national-ethnic stereotypes.

The two last-mentioned studies demonstrate the strength and importance of socio-occupational categorization. The role of this categorization dimension was also demonstrated by Katz-Braly's technique of adjective check-lists: social status proved to be dominant upon the characterization of compound ethnic and social categories. Bayton *et al.* (1956) found that when indicating the traits of white and black Americans, it was not colour of skin but social status that was determinative. The groups of white and black Americans belonging to the upper class were considered similarly intelligent, ambitious, and orderly in appearance, while regardless of skin colour, it was a widespread opinion of lower class people that they were indifferent, lazy, noisy, and dirty. Both black and white university students shared this opinion. Twenty years later, Smedley and Bayton (1978) partly replicated this finding. This was how white university students talked about middle and lower class Americans. Black students perceived their own racial group more favourably regardless of social class, but were especially critical of lower class whites.

In social psychological investigation, the study of characterizations in connection with socio-occupational categories in and for itself is a neglected area. Even attitude studies, which investigate plenty of targets, fail to pay much attention to attitudes towards different social layers and occupational groups. Even sociologically inspired surveys oriented towards public thinking concentrate on the evaluation of social phenomena, spheres of activities, and institutions. Empirical studies related to social status and the values and attractions of different occupations are connected to the topic of this book/chapter, but they attempt to reveal the relative values of status and

occupations. They do not study the stereotyped characterizations of the persons of the given status and occupation.

There are many kinds of occupation, but, in spite of the great diversity of content, there is quite a widespread hierarchy of occupations in the industrialized world (see Treiman, 1977; and Kelley's 'world-wide status score' in 1990). Investigations carried out in very different countries with very different methods conclude unanimously that intellectual occupations are evaluated more favourably than office employment, and that there is a sharp dividing line between non-manual and manual workers. There is a special hierarchy within the latter group, too: skilled workers stand above unskilled industrial or agricultural workers.

Peculiarities of the social system

The status hierarchy of occupations developed in a curious way in the countries under communist regime. According to the sporadic data in the literature, the most important characteristic was the relatively high status of workers, rising, unusually, above the category of office employees. At the same time, the 'intellectual' occupations stood at the peak of the social hierarchy, even without the financial background of the middle classes.

The communist parties gained power in countries where class-division within society used to be very extensive, and the society was very much divided according to rank in the feudal sense of the word, financial situation, and educational level. Revolution practically beheaded these societies: their upper layers were destroyed. Their relatively weak middle classes fell apart and could hope for social survival only through their intellectual orientation and skill, and through assimilation into the new people's intelligentsia. The Party deliberately attempted to produce a new intelligentsia that would dissolve the remains of the old middle classes.

The results of this policy were controversial. It was a cardinal dogma in Marxist ideology that private ownership of the instuments of production had to be eliminated, thus eliminating class relations themselves with the aid of a working class that had an interest in this, and which was able and ready to do it. Communist policy did in fact eliminate private ownership of the instruments of production, 'expropriated from the expropriators', and communist propaganda could not emphasize enough the role of the working class in transforming and maintaining society, contributing greatly to the internal and external identity of this large social group. All this was successful in that within the sphere of communist rule, material differences became quite narrow, and almost everyone was aware of the fact that in principle, the working class was the leading force of the country. It was therefore in a supported and protected position, and the road to public and social rise lay open to its members.

In terms of ideological aims, success was only partial, since the

destruction and concealment of material differences and the levelling of incomes received from the state-controlled institutions and the co-operatives greatly accentuated the nature, quality, and extent of the work done. With this background, the difference between manual and non-manual work, and the concomitant quality of life and orientation seemed to be even more important. Even if social mobility was now possible for the working classes, advancement meant education and intellectual occupation for the family and the growing youngster (Gazsó *et al.,* 1970); in other words, leaving one's class. In the reorganized society new, strong differences arose between different layers of society, not on a material basis but on an intellectual basis—which was in sharp contrast with the traditional concept of Marxism. On the one hand, the intelligentsia played an honoured and authoritative role, but, on the other hand, it could not be independent of the party state that kept a firm hand on the opportunities for education and work. Thus, it was divided and defenceless itself in a society saturated with politics.

Party officials and clerks lost contact with and rose above the rest of society to various degrees in different countries and at different periods. Those who embodied and represented political power could enjoy financial advantages as well, but these advantages usually depended on their organizational position and took the form of special services. Within a society that was highly organized in every respect, a variable mixture of expertise and readiness for political co-operation was needed by anyone who hoped to achieve a leading role in any field and in any institution.

From the mid-1960s, the beginning of the investigations presented in this volume, a prolonged process of fermentation took place in Hungary. In the course of this process the working class lost more and more of its privileged position both financially and ideologically. A kind of lower middle-class standard of living and a grossly materialistic set of values spread with a speed and to an extent that were unusual in Eastern Europe, and that could be shared by farm labourers in co-operatives and skilled workers as well. In this period, the financial situation of individuals and families became increasingly independent of their political positions, and on the pretext of financial inspiration and recognition of skill the restrictions of economic equality became looser and looser. The intelligentsia gradually became independent of political authority, then as the depository of competence and international outlook it gradually became the instructor of the government of the party state. Soon, the intelligentsia created for itself the illusion of a kind of 'ideocracy' or government by ideas, while as social mobility through education slowed down, this social layer became more and more inbred in character.

After these antecedents the drastic social change in 1989–90 not only deprived the working class of its (already more alleged than real) privileges, but was a thorough and total change of the whole system. In the course of the transition to a market economy, the intelligentsia, which took the place

of and imitated the bourgeoisie, had to face a new social category that was separate from the lower layers and from the intelligentsia itself; in other words, the increasingly numerous group of contractors and modern businessmen. The lower middle class, however, started to sink, and the polarization of society progressed, with the 'haves' getting richer on one side, and the 'have-nots' getting poorer on the other. In this muddled world only a few people are winning, and a lot of people are losing: even the most traditional social layer, the peasants, are seen in a new light.

Thus, in the period covered by the present investigations, which spanned a generation, the authorities propagated the social image of Marxism as the basis of their legitimacy, and this was taken into consideration in the active political formation of social and economic relations. At the same time, due to the real relationships and the resistance of public opinion, the authorities were forced to correct this image from time to time. Ideological theses about the existence and nature of the working class, and about the leading role of the working class in the worker-peasant alliance contributed to the self-definition, self-presentation, and political endeavours of the Party. Yet neither the constitution of the Party nor the centralized direction of society and the economy enabled the intelligentsia to become a tertiary layer beside the two basic classes of manual workers. At the level of both personal relationships and personal ambitions the status of intellectuals was the highest in the social hierarchy. With the slackening of political restraints and ideological dogmatism the social role of the intellectuals became increasingly evident, and the cultural superiority and standard of living of this class could gradually emerge. With the collapse of the party state, however, the differentiation of economic positions accelerated, and the aims of the market economy even directed attention towards the new middle class, which arose out of economic success and encouraged economic ambitions. The genuinely authoritative role of the intelligentsia came to an end at the same time as the dogma of the leading role of the working class was terminated. There were various ways in which public thinking and the evaluation of social categories could react to this:

a By getting hopelessly stuck with the contradictory conception of the relationship between workers and intellectuals,
b By a fast 'conformist' turn toward the new activities of the market economy, occupations and the middle classes,
c By taking fright at the shocks of modernization and retreating in the direction of pre-communist and pre-capitalist patterns of values.

On the basis of all this, the following questions were investigated:

- How was the concept of 'social class' defined and used by the pupils who were taught in the spirit of Marxism in the 1960s? How was the class structure of society evaluated by them; did they consider it

necessary and did they expect it to last? How did adult samples evaluate the existence, degree and perspectives of social differences in the 1970s?

- Did individual socio-occupational categories possess widely accepted characterizations, and, if so, what characteristics were attributed to them in the 1980s? Did widely accepted characterizations in society change immediately after and as a result of 1990? What kind of differences and similarities among the socio-occupational categories were perceived by the respondents? How did social differences emerge in terms of personality traits?
- Could a recurrent evaluation hierarchy of the socio-occupational categories be discovered in the responses? If so, was the hierarchy of occupational categories the same under 'existing socialism' as that observed in western societies? Did the Marxist formula for the historical role of the working class influence the stereotype of the workers before and after the fall of the system in 1990?
- Had a stereotyped characterization of the socio-occupational categories representing the modern market economy developed and spread by 1994? Did the respondents perceive similarities among the categories representing the modern market economy, and were they seen as different from the traditional constituent elements of the social image? If so, what were the similarities and the differences? Can the orientation and change of views of society and the system of values be understood from the grouping and evaluation of the different socio-occupational categories?

The concept of social class and views of the division of society

'Social class' is not a phrase in general everyday use, no matter how frequently it appears in the newspapers and in school material in Hungary. Everyday discussion rarely involves this abstract expression, but in the 1960s history teaching in schools and the propaganda of the party state consciously aimed at the introduction and elaboration of this concept as part of ideological indoctrination. The effectiveness of this deliberate attempt could well be seen when the question 'What is a social class?' was put to primary and secondary school students in the mid-1960s (02.R65). Naturally, the extent to which people's real ideas about society were influenced cannot be judged from these investigations of definitions, since it is in the use of the term 'social class', in its application, and the role it plays in orienting thinking that the directed educational effects can or could have been accomplished.

In the early stages of education, when pupils start to learn history at school, great uncertainty could be found: examples of unsuccessful etymology and primitive guesses can be cited from among the responses of the pupils:

5th grade, S 13: 'Several families unite, and they divide everything.'
5th grade, S 28: 'It means they work together.'

The latter sentence is typical of 10-year-old pupils who quite often applied this indicative form, identifying 'social class' with a certain condition or function. Even the best attempts at solving this problem, which was beyond the knowledge and intellectual capacity of the pupils, were only linguistically incomplete indications.

5th grade, S 12: 'The poor and the rich.'

From the 6th grade intelligent attempts to elucidate this abstract concept begin to appear. One form that these attempts take is the illustration of the concept by means of an example.

6th grade, S 12: 'Social class: working class.'
7th grade, S 3: 'There is: working class, there is: capitalist class.'

The classes were often placed within a unifying whole, and this placement may also be accompanied by comparison between complete social systems.

6th grade, S 2: 'There is a society, there are social classes in it.'
6th grade, S 41: 'Social class: in every country there is a different social class. Among these, where classes are building socialism and communism, people have equal wealth. In the countries building fascism [*sic*], however, there are poor people and rich people.'

Consideration of society as a whole often leads to the comparison and contrast of past and present conditions.

6th grade, S 64: 'It was characteristic of the social classes in the past that the poor were in one group and the rich were in one group. Today, it is no longer like this. Everybody is equal, uniform, there is equality.'
8th grade, S 67: 'Social class is a social layer within a country. There are social classes and social layers, which ceased to exist in the course of history, and new classes came into being instead. Slavery is like this, it became serfdom, the serfs became the working class. Today the working class is an equal layer.'

It should be noted that the list in the last attempted definition was not valid even in terms of an approach to the teaching of history that strove to show historical changes taking place in social classes, since in this view no individual classes are born and classes do not merge into each other, but

there are systems of antagonistic classes, they oppose each other, then collapse and replace one another.

The term 'social class' was related to very heterogeneous social phenomena by the primary school pupils. The expressions 'group' and 'layer', lacking in the majority of primary pupils' definitions, appeared in most of the definitions given by grammar school students. The conceptual associations at the beginning of the historical studies were rare and accidental; their occurrence increased in primary schools from 1.8 to 2.4, but in the grammar schools it was at least doubled. The number of different characteristics of 'social class' did not increase substantially, since in the grammar schools the initial characteristics were replaced, and the number of occurrences of the new ones increased rapidly. In primary schools the terms 'co-operation', 'law', 'economy', and 'struggle' were quite frequent. In the grammar schools, however, 'economy' (especially 'relation to the means of production'), 'work' ('participation in the production system'), 'interest', and 'idea' were especially frequently mentioned. The emphasis laid on these concepts by the educational system is clear, and leads to the heavy use of terminology that was alien to everyday language.

The definitions of 'social class' given by grammar school students differed widely in form. Pure examples did appear here, too, but this type of verbal definition was quite rare.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 62: 'Classes of the serfs, the peasants, and the workers. Certain layers of the people are called social class.'

Comparisons between whole societies with regard to class structure, where the contrast between 'past and present' was widened into historical enumeration, became more frequent.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 5: 'In society, groups who have different interests are called social classes—we can talk about class society since the time this difference in interest came about (primitive society, the age of barbarism. Private property develops—and so do different interests); there are different classes in class society.'
> 2nd year grammar school, S 1: 'Social class is a symptom or a remnant of past ages, when the material differences made people defenceless; today, social classes, and therefore social differences disappear, or rather they should disappear. In our place, for example, peasants are disdained, because they are rude and coarse. We should have got past this already.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 29: 'Social classes can be grouped according to property, erudition, etc. In past societies, and even in socialism, society was divided into oppressors and the oppressed. Thus, in socialism the larger layer, the workers, oppress the exploiters. With the exception of the

> primitive society, in other societies the ruling class oppressed the larger layers. However, progress cannot be stopped, and when classless society develops, conflicts will disappear, there will be happiness on Earth. Just as at the beginning of the development of humans there were no classes, as a result of continuous progress, classes must also cease to exist.'

It can be seen in the last attempts at definition that, on the one hand, the students re-interpreted the task, and discussed the development and termination of class society rather than the nature of social class. On the other hand, it was striking how the ideological clichés crammed into them at school appeared at this level of generalization: they recited that even if class differences persist over a very long period of history, this period is surrounded by classlessness, and that the walls separating the social classes should collapse or should have done so already. Even the phrasing of the responses frequently indicated that they were not talking about real social conditions, but about expectations fostered by ideological norms and Messianic hopes.

The expression, description, and analysis of the similarities and differences among the members of the different social classes appeared in the definitions of 'social classes' as well.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 18: 'A social class is a mass of people having the same political and economic interests.'
> 3rd year grammar school, S 5: The totality of people who have the same class interest, political and social situation, lifestyle, and opinion. (Speaking very generally.)'
> 4th year grammar school, S 69: 'Members of the same social class are in the same existential-material and political situation. Actually, these are the common features that group people into one social class, and this is what generates class struggle, which is an endeavour to improve the situation of a social class.'

The cited definitions analyse the similarities of the individuals constituting a social class in various depths. As the last example shows, for some of the students identity is the basis, and provides the starting point for the activity of the class.

Frequently, recognition of the differences between classes and the resulting conflicts logically accompany the statements regarding the similarities among the people constituting a class.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 68: An identical group safeguarding the same interests is called a social class, each social class safeguards its own interests against the other social class, they even fight if they have to, for example, in 1437, the class of the peasant army fought against the classes of the nobility for better living conditions.'

> 3rd year grammar school; S 23: 'Groups of society of different opinions: moral or political or ideological. The classes fight against one another, and when the conflicts cannot be bridged, a revolution breaks out.'

As can be seen in the last example, the differences and the fight between classes are often traced back to the ideas and to the conflicting ideas of the large groups within society. Other students had successfully learnt the lesson that the basis of class membership and class conflict is economic in nature.

> 4th year grammar school, S 50: 'A social class is a collectivity of people separated on an economic basis, who differ from one another in material respects.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 19: A group of people living in the same production relations and having the same interests, and who can be differentiated on the basis of four main features: whether or not they own capital equipment, whether or not they participate in the production, how and to what extent they receive a share of the produced goods, whether they work according to their own interests or according to the interests of other groups.'

After the review of the attempts of definition of the abstract term 'class' given by the pupils and students in the 1970s, an attempt was made to discover what sort of image the members of society had formed about the current relationships between social groups.

In 1975 a series of questions was asked about the degree of social harmony (06.R75). The respondents answered the question 'Is there rather concord or rather discord between the different large social groups in Hungary?', evaluating the relationship between specified pairs of classes on a five-point scale from 'only discord' to 'only accord'. All four sub-samples of respondents assumed the greatest harmony between the 'party and state organizations' and between 'state organizations and the trade unions'. The intellectuals repeatedly assumed more favourable relations between 'Hungarians and the minorities', 'party members and non-members', 'religious and non-religious people' than did the workers. As to the last aspect, the workers emphasized the prevalence of discord. The relationship between 'workers and peasants' was very similarly evaluated by the different sub-samples: 18% of the whole sample saw both discord and accord, 5% saw only discord in this relationship. An ambivalent relationship between 'workers and intellectuals' was talked about by 33% of the whole sample, while 13% said there was discord between them. The opinions varied quite extensively, and thus there was no statistically significant difference between workers and intellectuals in this respect. According to the respondents, it was not socio-occupational discord that was the strongest but tension between the generations. Ambivalence in the relationship between the 'young and the

old' was reported by 50% of the respondents; 29% said that discord prevailed.

The evaluations of degree of harmony existing between different sections of society were not independent of each other statistically: for example, judgements of the relationship between 'party members and non-members', and of that between 'religious and non-religious' people were correlated, as were the evaluations of the relationships between 'workers and peasants' and between 'workers and intellectuals'. It is also interesting to discover that the general characterization of 'Hungarians' as being discordant or loyal was also related to the judgement of the relationships within society; not with every aspect, but in two sensitive areas, that is, with how the respondent saw the discord between 'party members and non-members' and between 'workers and intellectuals'.

In 1973, during a research project on patriotism (05.R73p), the members of the national representative sample were also asked whether they saw any difference in the attitudes of the different socio-occupational and age groups. Differences between the three basic socio-occupational groups were seen by 16% of the sample, mostly those living in the capital and the better educated respondents. These respondents judged the patriotism of the workers to be more definitely positive, and had more reservations about the attitudes of peasants and intellectuals. A considerably larger proportion of them perceived differences between the patriotism of young and old people. The existence of this difference was stated more often by older respondents than by younger ones. The leading aspect of comparison was the greater attachment and loyalty of older people, with young people being seen as more light-headed, travelling more often, and defecting to the West more frequently. It was the less educated respondents, especially those in their early seventies or aged between 40 and 50, who took this dominant view, although it was not without contrary opinions.

The ideological dogma of the primacy of the working class tinted the responses only slightly, and the idea of a conflict-free unity of society was preferred by them. The responses of the workers were conspicuous not because they emphasized the exceptional role and value of their own class but because they recognized more discord in society than intellectuals did.

When evaluating the general situation and judging ideological relations, questions relating to differences in income were more relevant. In 1975, all four sub-samples thought that the differences in income were too high in Hungary and thought that a reduction of this difference would be justified (06.R75). Only 24% of the intellectuals thought that greater differences would be proper, but the latter view became dominant when it was asked whether the difference of income should be increased between those who work well and those who work badly. Certain groups, like the intellectuals and some of the young respondents, were also inclined to accept an increase in the difference of income as a function of the level of education.

There was a special relationship between the evaluation of the social groups and the demand for differences in income. Differentiation in income was demanded by those who assumed greater accord between 'workers and intellectuals'. And the reverse was also true: it was the respondents who perceived discord in the relations between 'workers and intellectuals' that favoured reducing the differences in income.

To sum up, in the late 1960s and early 1970s investigations were carried out to find out how representatives of different age groups perceived and interpreted the division of society under the influence of Marxist education and political propaganda. These were the years of stability in the middle of the Kádár era, and form a very suitable background for the study because they fell at a typical peaceful period of the communist system, and because we can learn more about the political socialization of the generation of Hungarians that would be in their thirties and forties at the time of the change of the political system.

School education in general, and history teaching in particular, directly attempted to acquaint the students with and secure their acceptance of the Marxist concept of class. This official endeavour was manifested in various ways, and was filtered and shaped by the school material of history itself, by the textbooks, and by the diversity of the teachers' mentalities. By the end of obligatory education at the age of 14, no more than an approximate understanding of the word could be achieved. A complete Marxist interpretation would have included the idea of complex systems and changes in social relations, but of all this only two simplified assumptions actually got through to the pupils. One assumption was that in the course of the history of society the rich and the poor had been separated and had opposed each other; the other was that these material differences should disappear.

In their secondary school studies students got beyond the level of etymology and examples. The earlier expressions were replaced by conceptual definitions, and the beginning and end of class division as a process was also mentioned by the students. Some of them could 'recite' the proper definition of social class, but the idea of the relationship between class division and production was not expounded, coloured in or illustrated. The field of economic differences and the parallel political conditions were even less well internalized. Thus, the issue of the cultural role and way of living of different classes in society never came up. This greatly contributed to the fact that the concept of class remained a mere inanimate abstraction when describing social differences.

Although the students did talk about the wealthy and ruling classes, too, the examples of the poor and working classes were more often cited, and the students sided more with the working classes' viewpoint when predicting demands for the abolition of class differences. No explanation was given for the idea that this would be unavoidably necessary or even possible.

The adult respondents who were asked about the interrelationships of

the constituent elements of society at the beginning of the 1970s did mention unity in the sphere of power, but there were also groups that seemed to perceive social differences and even conflicts. In these opinions tension may arise on an ideological basis, between socio-occupational groups, and especially between different age groups. When evaluating the political attitude (for example, patriotism) of different social and demographic classes, the ideological cultivation of the working class seemed to be manifested. However, the perceived social differences were in accordance with the empirical results of the author's own investigations: there was an undoubted difference in the representation of 'socialist patriotism' between workers and intellectuals, between adults and young respondents.

The workers in the investigation perceived greater differences and tensions within society than did the intellectuals. The latter group mentioned social unity more often, but they were more inclined to favour greater differentiation of income. They would have supported greater differences not only on the basis of the quality of the work done but on the basis of education, knowledge, and thorough grounding, thus, of course, strengthening their own positions.

Characterization of occupational groups, 1981 and 1991

How eight occupational categories are seen, described, and evaluated by students was investigated by a method similar to the study of national categories. This investigation was conducted first in 1981 (08.R81), then repeated ten years later, after the socio-political changes (11.R91). The samples consisted of homogeneous student groups chosen according to the same principles.

The pairs of characteristics and the dimensions of judgements were also the same as those used for national characterizations. The only difference was that the 'popular-non-popular' pair of characteristics was replaced by 'satisfied-dissatisfied'. Both pairs of characteristics concerned one aspect of the situation of the given group: in the case of nations it was 'perceived external judgement and acceptance', while in the case of socio-occupational groups it was 'internal judgement and acceptance of the situation' that was being evaluated by the respondent.

The occupational categories differed from each other in many respects. Some of them involved mental, others physical activity. 'Intellectuals' in general and 'teachers' in particular belonged to the former group, together with 'supervisors' and 'office employees'. The transitional category of 'students', to which the respondents themselves belonged, can also be listed among this group, while the more educated 'skilled workers', the less educated 'unskilled workers', and 'peasants' perform physical activities.

The characterization of these socio-occupational categories was made

within a society where these large groups could not really be differentiated on the basis of either property or income. All of them were employees of organizations in public ownership—this was most loosely true of 'peasants', who could be members of co-operatives under strong state influence, while they could also run small individual farms. The term 'peasant' is a traditional one, often associated with the distant past and with pejorative connotations of low status and poor living standards. The official ideology of the age preferred workers, especially large factory workers and skilled workers, as the principally propelling and dominant force of production and politics. The features of the most cultured lifestyle, selection by individual performance, and—in superposition—the survival of the previously bourgeois layers, were connected to the category of 'intellectuals'.

Intellectuals

As a matter of course, intellectual features were those considered most favourable in the characterization of the category of 'intellectuals' in 1981, too (see Table 4.1). The mean value of the scores on the seven-point scale was over 6 when this category was characterized with respect to 'intelligent' and 'educated'. Public activity, self-assertiveness, and moral behaviour were also favourably judged, while features of sociability like humour and friendliness did not reach the level of 5 on the scale, nor did diligence. Satisfaction was at the end of the list, but still with a positive tint.

There were two factors in the characterizations in 1981. The outstandingly favourable traits belonged to one factor. The judgement of humour also joined this group of intellectual-political characteristics. On the other hand, the two most critical features, 'friendly' and 'satisfied', belonged to the second factor, united with the moral aspects of 'honest' and 'diligent'. The factorial structure of the characterizations in 1991 was strikingly similar to the earlier investigation, with respect both to the number of factors and the constituent characteristics. The domain of meaning of the factors was somewhat more obscure, since this time 'honest' belonged more to the first factor, while 'good-humoured' and 'educated' belong rather to the second. All three links were quite relative, as these features loaded quite heavily on both factors. However, the public and self-assertive activities tended to be stronger in the first factor, while in the second it was the adjusting, social, civilized nature that became prominent.

The trait profile of the 1991 characterization was almost the same as that of ten years earlier. There were only two changes of position in the ranks of the traits: 'patriotic' and 'good humoured' ranked one position back. On the whole, the evaluation of 'intellectuals' (global mean: 5.40) decreased slightly (5.13).

Table 4.1 Characterization of social categories, 1981 and 1991: means and factor structure

1981

Intellectuals

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.69	i	6.17
	.67	e	6.13
	.65	p	5.83
	.63	a	5.61
	.63	t	5.56
	.39	g	4.98
factor 2	.75	f	4.91
	.70	c	4.55
	.68	d	4.96
	.64	h	5.26

PV = 50.7

Teachers

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.75	i	6.17
	.74	t	5.78
	.74	p	5.68
	.67	a	5.81
	.61	h	5.70
factor 2	.74	f	5.32
	.72	e	6.19
	.65	g	4.94
	.61	d	5.57
	.34	c	4.12

PV = 50.7

Supervisors

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.76	t	5.50
	.73	d	5.00
	.70	h	5.03
	.70	i	5.71
	.68	a	5.53
	.65	f	4.72
	.60	e	5.56
	.56	g	4.58
	.53	p	5.68
	.33	c	4.92

PV = 40.5

Office employees

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.76	t	4.96
	.71	i	4.98
	.70	d	4.17
	.69	h	4.61
	.68	a	4.90
	.66	p	4.91
	.63	g	4.53
	.63	f	4.36
	.61	e	4.98
	.51	c	4.09

PV = 43.8

Skilled workers

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.71	i	4.82
	.70	d	4.77
	.69	t	5.19
	.66	h	5.09
	.65	e	4.47
	.62	a	5.23
	.61	f	5.05
	.51	p	4.53
	.42	c	4.11
f2	.68	g	5.20

PV = 47.9

Unskilled workers

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.74	h	4.56
	.74	i	3.82
	.71	d	4.18
	.73	t	4.65
	.73	e	3.56
	.68	p	3.81
	.67	a	4.66
	.62	f	4.63
	.49	g	4.78
	.46	c	3.53

PV = 44.3

Peasants

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.78	e	3.85
	.76	p	3.64
	.72	i	4.22
	.49	t	5.17
	.44	g	4.87
factor 2	.73	d	5.95
	.68	f	5.27
	.64	h	5.68
	.57	a	5.23
	.43	c	4.58

PV = 46.9

Students

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.71	g	5.81
	.64	a	5.04
	.63	f	5.58
	.51	e	4.81
	.51	t	4.89
	.40	p	4.54
factor 2	.77	c	3.43
	.69	d	3.90
	.64	h	4.71
	.52	i	4.84

PV = 46.9

Teachers

The category of 'teachers' indicates a narrower group of intellectuals, and thus it can be expected to show similar features to the description of the more general socio-occupational category. Indeed, it could be seen again that in 1981 'cultured' and 'intelligent' were the most positively judged traits (over 6 on the scale). The subsequent order was 'self-assertive', 'patriotic', and the traits indicating political interest. The last group was interpolated between two moral types of feature. The most dubious traits—how 'friendly', 'good-humoured' and 'satisfied' teachers were—were at the end of the list, quite far apart even from each other. 'Friendly' scored above 5, 'good-humoured' was just below 5, while 'satisfied' tended toward the definitely neutral score of 4 in the responses.

Table 4.1 (cont)

1991

Intellectuals

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.75	t	5.20
	.74	i	5.83
	.69	a	5.44
	.61	p	5.47
	.56	h	5.03
factor 2	.74	f	4.79
	.74	d	4.98
	.59	c	3.87
	.51	g	4.81
	.50	e	5.77

PV = 47.8

Teachers

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.67	h	5.66
	.66	p	5.24
	.65	e	5.82
	.64	t	5.13
	.61	a	5.38
	.55	d	4.95
	.52	i	5.09
factor 2	.69	f	4.53
	.69	c	3.01
	.64	g	4.31

PV = 49.7

Supervisors

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.72	h	3.92
	.70	g	4.05
	.65	f	3.98
	.65	d	4.28
	.61	e	4.84
	.60	i	4.83
factor 2	.79	p	5.08
	.73	a	5.04
	.59	t	4.44
f3	.91	c	4.38

PV = 57.9

Office employees

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.70	a	4.48
	.70	t	4.31
	.69	p	4.59
	.60	i	4.53
	.51	g	3.98
factor 2	.74	d	4.10
	.69	c	3.66
	.61	f	3.98
	.59	e	4.62
	.56	h	4.15

PV = 52.1

Skilled workers

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.78	i	3.90
	.76	e	3.77
	.71	h	4.34
	.68	d	4.22
	.67	t	4.53
	.62	a	4.56
	.61	f	4.62
	.57	p	4.16
	.56	g	4.72
	.42	c	3.25

PV = 41.7

Unskilled workers

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.75	t	4.09
	.69	p	3.53
	.67	a	4.03
	.56	h	3.70
	.48	g	4.26
	.45	f	4.06
factor 2	.80	c	2.85
	.66	e	2.94
	.65	d	3.59
	.61	i	2.93

PV = 52.2

Peasants

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.75	d	5.82
	.71	f	5.14
	.69	h	5.54
	.48	g	4.71
factor 2	.78	e	3.54
	.67	i	3.89
	.57	c	3.22
factor 3	.69	p	3.87
	.65	t	5.20
	.52	a	5.03

PV = 54.9

Students

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.72	g	5.74
	.70	f	5.45
	.55	e	4.65
factor 2	.78	d	3.55
	.61	h	4.17
	.54	c	2.94
	.47	i	4.63
factor 3	.76	p	3.70
	.65	t	4.14
	.59	a	4.81

PV = 51.4

Notes
FL = factor loading, A = attribute, M = mean, PV = percent of variance

a = self-assertive, c = contented, d = diligent, e = educated, f = friendly, g = good-humoured, h = honest, i = intelligent, p = interested in politics, t = patriotic

There were two factors in this case, too. 'Intelligent' belonged more to the first factor, which included the political, self-reflective, and moral group of traits with a positive charge. The second factor was of social-emotional character, related to efficiency, in which 'cultured' loaded quite heavily, right after 'friendly', but before 'good-humoured'. In 1991 there were two factors again, and the traits were grouped in similar bundles. The only difference was that 'cultured' loaded more heavily on the first factor this time. The second factor included only how friendly, satisfied, and good-humoured teachers were seen to be.

The trait profile of the category of 'teachers' was very similar to that of ten years before. The positions of the most positive and the most doubted traits were stable, being the same in both profiles. There was a slight change in the middle of the list due to the fact that the evaluation of the honesty and patriotism of the 'teachers' fell behind that of their political interest. On the whole, the judgement of 'teachers' decreased quite considerably, with the mean scale value dropping from 5.53 to 4.92.

Supervisors

The category of 'supervisors' was a less ambiguous or at least a more understandable term in 1981 than it had become by 1991, after the termination of the overall state ownership and pervasive party-political influence.

Even in 1981, none of the traits of this category was judged to have a scale value over 6. In the already known group of traits including intellectual qualities, self-assertiveness, and public activity, 'intelligent' at the top was followed by 'interested in polities'. Moral traits could be found next to the score of 5, then came 'satisfied', while the social-emotional traits—'friendly' and 'good-humoured'—drifted towards the last positions.

It is hitherto unheard of for there to be one single factor behind this characterization. The traits in the middle of the list—'patriotic', 'diligent', and 'honest'—had the greatest load on the factor. This gave a kind of moral emphasis to the totally comprehensive evaluation. In 1991, however, the characterization was structured by three factors. The first one combined several features, among which 'honest' and the social-emotional traits had the heaviest load. The second factor appeared in the traits of self-assertiveness and public activity: the judgements of political interest, self-assertiveness, and patriotism belonged together. Only one trait, 'satisfied', could be considered as belonging to the third factor, and was quite separate from the rest of the traits.

In 1991, the average judgements of only two traits reached the scale value of 5: political involvement and 'self-assertive'. Traits typical of the intellectuals came only later, below this level. Moral and social characteristics could be found at the end of the list: diligence and humour were judged slightly more favourably than the neutral 4, while 'friendly' and 'honest' were evaluated definitely on the negative side.

All of these features of the content of the trait profile expressed and promised less appreciation of the members of this category than ten years before. The quantitative change in the global index of judgement supported this finding: its mean value decreased from 5.22 to 4.49.

Office employees

'Office employees' are usually not very highly qualified, but they do no manual work either. In this respect, they are related to the social categories of

intellectual activities, but they are not in a very favourable social position because of their subordinate professional position.

In 1981, the judgements regarding 'office employees' were distributed on a fairly narrow range: they did not reach 5, but were above the neutral score of 4. Considering the reserved nature of the evaluation, it can be said that the relatively most advantageous judgement of this category was in the traits of culture and intelligence. These traits were followed by the compact block of self-assertiveness and public activity, then came the trait of honesty. Diligence and satisfaction were at the end of the list, after the social-emotional traits, with a mean definitely in the neutral range.

There was only one factor with quite a strong explanatory power behind this characterization. The generally accepted and rejected traits had the greatest factor load: 'patriotic' and 'intelligent' on the one hand, 'diligent' on the other. As compared to this, the 1991 characterization was broken up in that the effects of two factors can be seen behind the judgement of the traits. The first one was linked primarily to the traits of self-assertiveness and public activity, but the double bound traits of 'intelligent' and 'good-humoured' also belonged to this bundle—more than to the other factor. The second factor touches upon a quite crucial point of the characterization, that is, how diligent and satisfied 'office employees' were regarded to be. Although friendliness, culture, and honesty were also double bound, they rather belonged to this factor.

Even the most positively seen trait, 'educated', scored only 4.62 in 1991. This was followed by political interest, while the perceived degree of intelligence of 'office employees' came only after this. With regard to self-assertiveness and patriotic commitment even more reserved judgements were made, and the evaluation of moral features reflected neutral, evasive replies. The social-emotional features received neutral/negative evaluations, while definitely negative answers were given as regards how 'satisfied' members of this category were. On the whole, the global judgement of this category became less marked as compared to the 4.64 score in 1981: ten years later it was 4.24.

Skilled workers

'Skilled workers', the category of qualified manual workers, did not receive a very variegated characterization in 1981. The difference between its extreme traits is moderate, and on average it was slightly more than 1 degree on the scale (the most positive score of evaluation is 5.24, the most negative is 4.12). First of all they were perceived as 'self-assertive', and the respondents also saw them as 'good-humoured', 'patriotic', and 'honest', and gave more than 5 on the 'friendly' trait. As compared to these traits reflecting conduct, serenity, and morality, the perceived intellectual and working capacity of 'skilled workers' was lower. The political interest of 'skilled workers' was

closer to 5, while their satisfaction definitely tended towards the neutral 4 on the scale.

There were two factors behind the characterization. The first put the moral features of honesty and diligence in the centre of the extended and various circle of traits with the greatest load. The second factor linked the judgement of humour among the positive traits with the relatively negative evaluation of political interest. In 1991, the situation became more simple and clear-cut: there was only one factor in the characterization of 'skilled workers'. Both accepted and doubted intellectual and moral traits—whether or not typical representatives of 'skilled workers' were 'intelligent', 'cultured', 'honest' or 'diligent'—appeared together with great factor load.

In the 1991 characterization, social-emotional features like 'good-humoured' and 'friendly' were at the top of the list of traits, although even they did not reach or approach the score of 5. Self-assertiveness and public activity, together with the moral traits, received a positive evaluation tending toward the neutral. The intellect, culture, and satisfaction of the 'skilled workers', however, turned definitely towards the negative side of the evaluation; they scored less than 4. The content of the characterization has changed in that the judgements of both individual and collective self-assertiveness are more reserved, while the intellectual features are more definitely criticized in the later survey. The general level of judgement moved from 4.85 to 4.21, towards neutrality.

Unskilled workers

One cannot find coincidences or clashes of extreme judgements in the characterization of unqualified 'unskilled workers' either. In 1981, the humour, self-assertiveness, and patriotism of 'unskilled workers' were appreciated, tending towards the neutral, and their 'friendly' and 'honest' personality was not doubted either. The judgement of their diligence corresponded to the level of neutral average. The characterization of their intellectual features, however, scored under 4, indicating critical doubt as to whether the typical representatives of this category are intelligent, interested in politics or educated. 'Unskilled workers' were not considered to be satisfied either.

In 1981, the characterization was organized by a single factor. The factor loads of the two extremes, namely those of the most appreciated humour and the most doubted satisfaction were the greatest. In 1991, the relatively and absolutely negative traits become arranged in a separate factor. The first factor appeared as public activity and self-assertiveness, and in the judgement of sociability. The second factor included negative features. In addition to dissatisfaction, an assumed lack of erudition, diligence, and intellectual capacities appeared, in the judgement of which reservations regarding this category came to light.

There are only four traits that were judged slightly more positively

than the neutral: humour and friendliness were the most positive, while patriotism and self-assertiveness were near the score of 4. The characterization of the moral traits was already negative, and the honesty and diligence of this category were doubted. Judgement of political interest could still be found between 4 and 3, but that of 'intelligent' and 'educated' were lower even than 3, together with satisfaction. The negative judgement of this layer at the bottom of the social hierarchy became more profound: the mean global evaluation was 4.20 in 1981, but had dropped to 3.60 by 1991.

Peasants

In the language of officialdom the denotation of this category as 'peasants' was replaced by 'agricultural manual worker' in 1981, but in our investigations the more traditional and common variant was applied. Its characteristic profile was unique; the judgements of its various traits were quite distant from each other. Its most positive trait, diligence, closely approached the score of 6 with its mean value of 5.95. The honesty, friendliness, self-assertiveness, and patriotic set were also highly valued. Their humour, satisfaction, and intellectual capacities were perceived to be under the score of 5. The erudition and political involvement of 'peasants' were judged to be under the neutral values of 4—which indicated reservation in this respect. The contrast between high work morale and unpolished intellect was a peculiar feature of the characterization of this category.

Two factors were statistically identified behind the description in 1981. The first factor—having greater explanatory power—appeared in the judgement of the crucial points, that is, how 'educated', 'interested in polities', and 'intelligent' representatives of this category were seen to be. The double bound variables of humour and patriotism belonged more to this factor than to the other. The second factor expressed the evaluation of the acknowledged positive traits. It appeared in the judgement of traits like the 'diligence' and 'friendliness' of peasants, but judgements of their honesty, self-assertiveness, and satisfaction also belonged more to this factor than to the first one. In 1991, three factors of this complex characterization could be discovered. The first one, led by diligence, collected the moral and social-emotional traits. The second included the doubted intellectual characteristics and perceived satisfaction. The third factor was manifested in the judgements of self-assertiveness and public activity.

In 1991, the number one positive trait of 'peasants' was 'diligence' again, near the scale value of 6. The honesty, patriotism, friendly mentality, and self-assertiveness of this social category were judged to be more positive than 5, again. Their humour was judged to be positive, but it scored under 5. There was a negative response, however, to the question of whether 'peasants' were 'intelligent', 'interested in polities' or 'educated', and now their satisfaction was at the end of the list. The doubts regarding their

intellectual capacities became greater, the positive impression about the satisfaction of this layer became negative, but the characteristic profile very much resembled that of ten years before. There was a slight negative shift: the mean evaluation moved from 4.84 to 4.60, but this modification was less than the extent of change in the characterization of other categories.

Students

Both appreciation and reservation regarding their own group were manifest in the variegated characterization of 'students' in 1981. Social and emotional traits like humour and friendliness received scores higher than 5 on the scale. The judgement of patriotism was related to personal self-assertiveness, and a feeling of national identity almost reached 5 on the scale, followed by the intellectual traits of 'intelligent' and 'educated'. Among the moral traits, the judgement of 'honest' was still definitely positive, while their diligence was regarded as negative on average, with political involvement in between. The trait of 'satisfied' came last of all. In the general picture, traits linked with social relationships received more emphasis, judgements regarding intellectual capacities were moderately reserved, while prerequisites and consequences of efficiency like diligence and satisfaction fell behind.

In 1981, two factors with roughly the same explanatory power could be spotted in the characterizations. The first was manifest primarily in the positive judgement of the traits 'good-humoured', 'self-assertive', and 'friendly', but many traits connected to both factors, for example, public activity and intellect, belonged rather to this one. The second factor appeared in the particularly critical judgements, arising from the 'satisfied' and 'diligent' aspects. In 1991, the factorial structure was more complex. There were three factors. The first one included the traits of humour, friendliness, and erudition; the last trait was connected primarily, but not exclusively to this factor. The second factor was composed of traits of morality, satisfaction, and intellect. The third factor united the three traits of self-assertiveness and public activity, appearing in their judgement.

Invariably, the two social traits of humour and friendliness were the most positive in 1991, well above the scale value of 5. They were followed again by self-assertiveness, then by the erudition and intelligence that students perceived in their own group. The judgement of honesty came next close to the already neutral score of 4, and the judgement of patriotism also shifted to this value. Political interest received a score that was already slightly negative, while the list was closed by diligence and satisfaction well below the level of 4.

With the knowledge of the characterizations of eight socio-occupational categories received in different periods, the question arose of what relationship there was between the trait profiles, or rather between their

simplified and polarized descriptions, between the trait ranks within the categories (see Table 4.2).

It has to be recognized first that despite all modification, changes in judgement, and differences in the samples, the profiles of characterizations regarding the same categories were essentially alike in 1981 and 1991 (see Figure 4.1). All of the eight rank order correlations were statistically highly significant. The correlation was highest between the two characterizations of 'intellectuals' ($r=.98$, $p<.001$), closely followed by 'teachers' and 'students' ($r>.9$), but 'office employees', 'peasants', 'skilled workers', and 'unskilled workers' were not much behind either ($r>.8$, $p<.01$). The 'supervisors' were the last ones in the list ($r=.77$, $p<.01$).

There was a typical and not surprisingly recurring pattern among the characterizations of the socio-occupational categories. Basically, there were two circles of the characterizations of the occupational categories, and a separate case in 1981. On the one hand, there was a strong rank order correlation between 'intellectuals' and 'office employees', between 'supervisors' and 'teachers', in every relationship. The correlation was the highest between the first two ($r=.96$, $p<.001$), and it was the lowest between the middle two ($r=.81$, $p<.01$). On the other hand, there was a significant rank order correlation between the list of traits of 'skilled workers', 'unskilled workers', and 'students', the first two being more highly correlated ($r=.91$, $p<.001$). The characterization of 'peasants', however, stood alone: their individual rank of traits was in a negative rank order correlation with that of the groups engaged in intellectual activity, but this correlation did not reach statistical significance.

The relationship found between traits as described above reappeared in 1991. So did the similarity between the ranks of traits of categories performing intellectual activity, within which 'intellectuals' and 'office employees' still resembled each other the most ($r=.96$, $p<.001$), but even the lowest correlation was statistically highly significant ($r=.75$ between 'supervisors' and 'teachers', $p<.001$). The relationships remained the same between the characterizations of 'skilled workers', 'unskilled workers', and 'students' ($r=.94$ between the first two groups, $p<.001$). It was a new element, however, that 'peasants' were loosely but positively related to this group of categories (the rank order correlation of the descriptions of 'peasants' with those of 'skilled workers' was .47, $p<.05$), while they appeared in a definitely negative relationship with one category of intellectual workers, that is, with 'supervisors' ($r= -.53$, $p<.02$) (see Figure 4.2). Thus, the system of rank order correlations was both more integrated and more polarized in 1991 than before.

Not only can the correlation matrices of the relationships in 1981 and in 1991 be considered with regard to the stability of the profile of the same category, but the development of the groups of categories and their relationships can also be recorded. It is striking that members of certain category groups resembled each other in 1981 and in 1991.

Table 4.2 Similarity of characterizations of social categories, 1981 and 1991: trait ranks and correlations

		SKW	INT	PEA	OFE	UNW	SUP	TEA	STU	SKW	INT	PEA	OFE	UNW	SUP	TEA	STU
	SKW																
	INT																
1	PEA																
9	OFE		.96***														
8	UNW	.91***															
1	SUP		.89***		.81**												
	TEA		.87***		.89***		.82**										
	STU	.83**				.89***											
	SKW	.81**				.83**			.81**								
	INT		.98***		.92***		.94***	.90***									
1	PEA			.88***						.47*							
9	OFE		.92***		.89***		.92***				.96***						
9	UNW	.77**				.80**			.78**	.94***							
1	SUP		.65*	−.68*			.77**				.79***	−.53**	.77***				
	TEA		.92***		.90***		.90***	.96***			.92***		.93***		.75***		
	STU	.72***				.72*			.92***	.75***				.76***			
Rank		1981								1991							
1		slf	int	dil	edu	hum	int	edu	hum	hum	int	dil	edu	hum	pol	edu	hum
2		hum	edu	hon	int	slf	pol	int	fri	fri	edu	hon	pol	fri	slf	int	fri
3		pat	pol	fri	pat	pat	edu	slf	slf	slf	pol	pat	int	pat	edu	slf	slf
4		hon	slf	slf	pol	fri	slf	pat	pat	pat	slf	fri	slf	slf	int	pol	edu
5		fri	pat	pat	slf	hon	pat	hon	int	hon	pat	slf	pat	hon	pat	pat	int
6		int	hon	hum	hon	dil	hon	pol	edu	dil	hon	hum	hon	dil	con	hon	hon
7		dil	hum	con	hum	int	dil	dil	hon	pol	dil	int	dil	pol	dil	dil	pat
8		pol	dil	int	fri	pol	con	fri	pol	int	hum	pol	fri	edu	hum	fri	pol
9		edu	fri	edu	dil	edu	fri	hum	dil	edu	fri	edu	hum	int	fri	hum	dil
10		con	con	pol	con	con	hum	con	con	con	con	con	con	con	hon	con	con
Kendall W		.53***	.78***	.86***	.48***	.66***	.65***	.73***	.78***	.62***	.69***	.86***	.43***	.67***	.60***	.78***	.80***

Notes

INT = intellectuals, OFE = office employees, PEA = peasants, SKW = skilled workers, STU = students, SUP = supervisors, TEA = teachers, UNW = unskilled workers,

con = contented, dil = diligent, edu = educated, fri = friendly, hon = honest, hum = good-humoured, int = intelligent, pat = patriotic, pol = interested in politics, slf = self-assertive

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$



Figure 4.1 Trait profiles of the characterizations of 'skilled workers' and 'intellectuals', 1981 and 1991.

The Janus-faced, connecting and separating role that 'peasants' played in 1991 was not manifest before, and thus the question justly arises of what has changed and in what respect. The 1981 characterization of 'supervisors' was not in statistically significant relationship with the 1981 or with the 1991 image of 'peasants'. Its 1991 description, however, was in contrast not only with the 1991 but also with the 1981 rank of traits of 'peasants' ($r = -.68$, $p < .05$). Thus, it was probably the image of 'supervisors' that had changed; the 1991 judgement of their traits—with their doubted morality, sociability, and outstanding satisfaction and self-assertiveness—turned against the preserved image of the 'peasants'.

It can be said that the 1981 characterization of the 'skilled workers' had no statistically significant relationship with the 1981 or with the 1991 image of 'peasants', either. But their 1991 rank of traits showed a positive relationship only with the simultaneous description of 'peasants', not with the 1981 judgement of 'peasants'. Thus, the approach between the two categories was probably due to certain modifications in the characterization of both categories: intellect, erudition, and self-assertion played a less important role, while diligence and political involvement became more accentuated in the image of the 'skilled workers' ten years later. This change



Figure 4.2 Trait profiles of the chatacterizations of 'peasants' and 'supervisors', 1991.

ran parallel with the change of image formed about the 'peasants', who were perceived as even more patriotic and less satisfied in 1991.

To sum up, the first aspect of analysis of the characterizations of socio-occupational categories given in 1981 and in 1991 was the way in which each category was built up from individual traits, what their pattern was, and whether the patterns or the similarities and relationships between them changed in the course of ten years. Pattern means the same thing here as it did before: which of the positive traits characterized more and which ones characterized less the category to be judged in the description on the scales.

The pattern of the individual socio-occupational categories seemed to be relatively stable, despite all historical changes: the ranks of traits were consistently and significantly similar in 1981 and 1991. Naturally, the correlations among the characterizations were not modified significantly in this respect either. Two marked groups remained from the repeatedly studied eight categories. One was the group of non-manual occupations, including 'intellectuals', 'teachers', 'supervisors', and 'office employees', while the other was the group of manual workers, which peculiarly enough included the description of 'students' together with that of 'skilled workers' and 'unskilled workers' in both years. In 1981 'peasants' stood alone with an

individual characterization, but in 1991 they got closer to the modified description of manual workers, while definitely contrasting with 'supervisors' described in the same year (i.e., the correlation was negative).

In the first group of categories the most stable point was the self-equivalent characterization of 'intellectuals'. The four categories in question were characterized mainly by intellectual values according to the respondents; political interest was quite characteristic of them, moral features received little emphasis, and diligence, which is also related to work, received even less. They were the least characterized by sociability, humour, and friendliness, and they did not seem to be satisfied either. Naturally, in comparison with these generalities, each category had its own peculiarities. According to the respondents, 'teachers' were not very interested in politics, nor were 'supervisors'. This feature of the latter group became more prominent by 1991, while they became increasingly satisfied, but they found good intellect to be less characteristic and honesty to be the least characteristic feature. It was this last category whose characterization underwent the most radical structural changes, too, when instead of the one factor in 1981, the effect of three factors appeared in the judgements of its traits in 1991.

Regarding manual workers, in 1981, in the descriptions of 'skilled workers' and 'unskilled workers', their good humour was recognized with emphasis on their awareness of their individual and national identity, but the respondents did not stress the moral or intellectual excellence of this group, and doubted their political interest. In 1991, the contrast between their sociability and intellectual capacities was even more marked in the characterizations of 'skilled workers' and 'unskilled workers'. The description of 'students' resembled these two stereotype descriptions in that humour and friendly mentality were the two most positive features of it. Moral values were not in the fore here either. In fact, diligence fell between the two questioned traits of political interest and satisfaction at the end of the list. When talking about their own category, the student respondents did not stress intellectual values, but were not as negative about them as they were when characterizing manual workers, especially in 1991. The most important shift in the characterization of 'students' between 1981 and 1991 was that the position of 'patriotism' fell back in their trait profile.

The perceived traits of 'peasants' differed from all other characterizations, including that of workers, mainly in that the moral values of diligence and honesty represented their most positive traits. Undoubtedly, intellectual characteristics, with political interest as the last feature, were pushed to the back here, too. In 1991 this category became part of the relationship-net of the characterizations through one marked similarity and one marked dissimilarity, but not primarily because the image of 'peasants' had changed. On the one hand, the intellectual features of 'skilled workers' were devalued and thus became similar to those of 'peasants', and, on the

other hand, the moral values of 'supervisors' were doubted to such an extent that their characterization became definitely the opposite of the traditional pattern of characterizations of 'peasants'. The greatest change in the image of the latter category was that they were no longer thought to be as apolitical as before, and they were seen to be just as dissatisfied as most of the other social classes.

Thus, non-manual work was separate in the eyes of the respondents. Non-manual workers and manual workers were seen as depositories of intellectual values and sociability, respectively. The respondents characterized hardly anybody—except the peasants—with a high work-ethic standard. Almost all of the categories were seen as unsatisfied, except for the morally and socially most problematic group of supervisors.

Copying social hierarchy in the evaluative judgements, 1981 and 1991

In 1981, when the evaluations of the eight socio-occupational categories were compared, they were in harmony with each other, and were essentially similar in different aspects. The most characteristic feature of this hierarchy of evaluation was that 'teachers' were at the top, followed by the general category of 'intellectuals', while the 'unskilled workers' were at the bottom. Thus, the compound sample of students attributed fundamental importance to educational level and the related character of labour. Furthermore, the relative evaluation of the categories may also depend partly on which categories normally play initiative-directive or following-directed roles. The rank of evaluation below made it clear that no matter how important mental versus physical nature of work is, it is not the only basis for the arrangement of occupational categories in the dimension of evaluation.

If the unweighted mean of the judgements of the characteristics is regarded as the raw and direct indicator of evaluation (see Figure 4.3), 'teachers' (5.53) and 'intellectuals' (5.40) were followed by 'supervisors', still above 5 on the seven-point scale (5.22). 'Skilled workers' (4.85), 'peasants' (4.84), and 'students' (4.74) were quite close to one another in the continuum of evaluation. 'Office employees' (4.64) are ranked behind, while the evaluation of 'unskilled workers' (4.20) was significantly lower. It must be noted that this evaluation of the socio-occupational categories remained on the positive side of the continuum, and the global index did not become definitely negative even in the least advantageous case.

Subtle analysis of the evaluation indices of the 40 sub-samples and their relationships revealed results that were in accordance with one another and with the previous results (Kendall's W=.8434, p<.001). The evaluation of 'teachers' took the first position in 30 of the samples; their mean rank was 1.3. 'Intellectuals' ranked second in most of the cases—in the internal rank of 27 sub-samples their mean rank was 1.87. The position of 'supervisors'



Figure 4.3 Evaluative charge of the characterization of social categories, 1981 and 1991.

varied between the second and fourth position, but in 29 sub-samples they ranked third, and, therefore, their mean rank was 2.92 for all of the groups.

The ranks after this leading triad varied greatly between the third and seventh ranks in the different samples. 'Peasants' (5.01) and 'skilled workers' (5.09) ranked neck and neck, followed again by 'students' (5.71) and 'office employees' (6.16)—the last category was seen slightly more unanimously: it was seventh in the list of social-occupational categories in 18 of the cases. There was almost no exception in the evaluation of 'unskilled workers'; in 37 of the 40 cases they took the last position (mean rank: 7.93).

In spite of the general agreement, there were some differences between certain groups within the sub-samples as regards the evaluation hierarchy of the socio-occupational categories. It was a common characteristic of pupils in primary schools and students in vocational training schools that they ranked 'office employees' in fourth position, preceding 'peasants', 'skilled workers', and especially 'students'. In secondary schools in the country 'skilled workers' precede 'peasants'—the relatively favourable position of the latter category in the summed responses of the whole sample was due to the appreciative evaluation of grammar school students in Budapest. 'Students' were appreciated more than 'skilled workers' by grammar school students in Budapest.

An interesting phenomenon could be found in the grammar school students in Budapest: representatives of certain origin—children of intellectuals and clerical workers—regard their own group more favourably

than their school mates. The reverse was true of children of agricultural manual workers in the country: the category of 'peasants' was judged especially unfavourably. The evaluation of 'skilled workers' was quite favourable among students from this background and among pupils in primary schools, students in vocational training schools, and in vocational secondary schools, but it was definitely unfavourable in grammar schools, especially in the capital.

The effects of both experience and social bonds on the responses are hard to generalize, because attraction and repulsion depend on the nature of both the situation and the object. Furthermore, the peaks and nadir of the hierarchy of the socio-occupational categories stood as solid borders around the diversified ranks of evaluation of the socio-occupational categories.

So far, the hierarchy of evaluation has been analysed on the basis of the mean judgement of the occupational categories—both at the level of the whole sample and at the level of sub-samples—disregarding the peculiarities of the individual traits. The categories can also be arranged in separate and mean rank orders according to judgements of the different traits.

In this case, the limited category of 'teachers' won the first place in five of the ten rank orders. Their erudition, intellect, self-assertion, patriotism, and honesty were judged the most favourably, while in other categories they were in fourth or fifth place (humour and satisfaction) at the worst. Overall, their mean rank was 2.0. The more comprehensive group of 'intellectuals' came before the 'teachers' and all other categories in only one respect: that of political involvement. They were mostly in second or third place, and even in their least appreciated qualities, diligence and friendliness, they were no lower than fourth or fifth place. Their mean rank was 2.7. 'Supervisors' were regarded as the most satisfied, they were only second with regard to political involvement, they were often third, but their positions varied widely until the sixth place in friendliness and the seventh place in good humour (3.6).

The mean rank of 'peasants' was only slightly better than that of 'skilled workers' (4.5 vs. 4.6). The 'peasants' were put in second place with regard to diligence, and they were third when honesty and satisfaction were considered, but they were only seventh in the field of intellect and erudition and only eighth in political involvement. The positions taken by 'skilled workers' varied very little. The highest positions they reached were second place for humour and sixth place for erudition and political involvement.

The characterization of 'students', however, played a double, almost split role. They came before others in two respects: they were the first in terms of good humour and friendliness. (It is striking that if we examine the characterization of the other category of the self, that is, the large group of the respondents' own nation, the same emphasis is found in the same two respects.) In most of the other traits, however, they fell into the definitely weaker section of the rank orders, and 'students' were the lowest category in two instances: they were the least 'diligent' and the least 'satisfied'. In this

case, then, a great variety of positions can be found behind the average rank order when the different traits are regarded (mean rank: 5.2).

The perceived position of the category of 'unskilled workers' is less complex among the socio-occupational groups. Their diligence and humour lay in sixth place in this frame of reference—and these were the most favourable positions that this category achieved. In five of the ten cases, the judgement of 'unskilled workers' was the least favourable: they were the last when self-assertion, patriotism, honesty, intellect, and erudition were considered (mean rank: 7.3).

The relationships between the socio-occupational categories can be described by the method of multidimensional scaling as well (see Figure 4.4). Each of them have a peculiar profile: they are habitually quite far apart from each other.

In the two-dimensional space the arrangement of the categories was almost circular, except that 'supervisors' and 'intellectuals' were quite close to each other, and that 'skilled workers' were in the middle of the circle, being at an equal distance from all other socio-occupational groups. The greatest distance along the horizontal axis—which can be conceived as the diameter of the circle—separated the 'intellectuals' from the 'unskilled workers', while in the direction of the bisector of the co-ordinates it



a = satisfied, d = diligent, e = educated, f = friendly, g = good-humoured, h = honest, i = intelligent, p = interested in politics, s = self-assertive, t = patriotic

Figure 4.4 MDS map of the characterization of social categories, 1981.

separated the 'teachers' and the 'students', while in the direction of the vertical axis it can be found between the 'office employees' and the 'peasants'. The groups of non-manual occupations can be found quite close to one another, as opposed to the manual workers. The same is true of the categories of people who performed 'directive' work as opposed to the different occupational categories whose members are subject to direction.

The traits were inserted into this two-dimensional space by the procedure of PROFIT as straight lines. The traits formed about three bundles, one of which included 'intelligent', 'educated', 'interested in polities', and almost completely covered the horizontal axis. Traversing slightly from the horizontal, the second bundle was composed of the group of traits of 'self-assertive', 'patriotic', and 'satisfied'. The third bundle—'honest' and 'diligent'—traversed even more from the horizontal, without covering the vertical axis. The first bundle differentiated between the general categories of non-manual and manual workers. The second bundle, the group of self-assertiveness and public activity traits, played an important role in separating the categories of directive and directed occupations. The third bundle of traits, related to work and morale, re-coloured the whole arrangement in a peculiar way: at one extreme stood 'peasants' and 'teachers', while at the other end there were the non-manual and manual workers who can be listed among the directed group.

The traits 'good-humoured' and 'friendly' cannot easily be inserted into the two-dimensional space: they fit better in a three-dimensional arrangement—evidently, mainly in the third dimension. In this respect, the greatest differences can be found between 'students' and 'skilled workers', and between 'supervisors' and 'office employees'.

The characterization of the socio-occupational categories was analysed by the method of multidimensional scaling in 1991, too (see Figure 4.5). The relationships of the variables were already satisfactorily reflected in two dimensions (RSQ=.846). The illustrated interrelationships of the eight categories resembled those of ten years earlier in many respects. The socio-occupational categories were distributed over the field being surveyed. Once again, a considerable difference appeared between 'intellectuals' and 'unskilled workers' on the horizontal axis. This was the greatest distance between any of the categories. There was some distance between 'peasants' and 'supervisors' and between 'peasants' and 'students'; the latter difference lay mostly on the vertical axis. The distance between non-manual and manual workers was greater than the differences within the groups of categories. In this respect, 'office employees' and 'students', the two groups who were subject to direction, took intermediate positions.

As compared to 1981, three major changes could be recorded, primarily with respect to non-manual occupations. The first one was the strikingly decreased distance between 'teachers' and 'intellectuals', with the 'intellectuals' taking the outer position, rather than the 'teachers'. The second change was that the position occupied by 'supervisors' moved further



a = satisfied, d = diligent, e = educated, f = friendly, g = good-humoured, h = honest, i = intelligent, o = popular, p = interested in politics, s = self-assertive, t = patriotic

Figure 4.5 MDS map of the characterization of social categories, 1991.

away from that of 'intellectuals' and closer to the less respected 'office employees' and 'students'. The third change was that the previously marked and extreme judgement of 'office employees' became more reserved, retreating towards the inside of the previously circular but now rhomboid formation, near the characterization of 'skilled workers'.

It helps to understand the arrangement and the role played by the traits in it, if the rank orders of the categories are examined trait by trait. The position of 'intellectuals' was generally favourable, and it usually took one of the first three places (mean rank: 1.8). It preceded all of the other socio-occupational categories in four respects: 'intellectuals' were regarded as the most 'intelligent', the most 'interested in polities', the most 'self-assertive', and the most 'patriotic'. This high position went together with the less favourable than before judgement of the different traits of 'teachers' (mean rank: 3.1). There was now only one trait where they were in first place: education. They were in fifth place regarding both humour and friendliness; the latter quality seems to have suffered a serious decline. As regards satisfaction, they were sixth of the eight categories.

Averaging the ranks by traits, 'peasants' took third position in 1991 (mean rank: 3.8). They were first in diligence, just as before, but in 1991

they were first in honesty, too. They were considered to be second of all of the groups in patriotism and friendliness. Their least advantageous position was seventh in intellect and erudition. However extreme, even polarized, their characterization is, they no longer take the last position in any of the traits (thus, they are not considered to be the last in involvement in politics either).

'Supervisors' were considered to be the most satisfied, but, otherwise, their judgements varied widely between the third and eighth rank position (mean: 4.4). They were second last in humour and honesty, and eighth in friendliness. As compared to this, the characterization of 'skilled workers' was narrowed down to fourth and fifth place among the categories (mean: 4.7). The description of 'students' seemed to be more varied within the framework of the socio-occupational categories. They were still first in humour and friendliness, that is, in socio-emotional aspects, but in other traits they took the fourth to eighth position. The respondents, describing their own category, placed themselves seventh in patriotism, political interest, and satisfaction, and eighth in diligence (mean rank: 4.9).

The judgement of 'office employees' was quite varied: they took positions from the third to the eighth (mean rank: 5.7). They were third among the other categories in the most negative trait of the characterization, namely, in satisfaction. They were the last ones in humour. Finally, the position of the 'unskilled workers' was quite unequivocal and uniform (mean rank order: 7.5). In seven of the ten traits, 'unskilled workers' took the lowest place. At best, they reached sixth place in two social traits, that is, when the humour and the friendliness of their representatives were considered.

In 1991, after radical change in social and political relationships, the evaluation of the eight occupational groups in question changed slightly (see Figure 4.3). If the unweighted mean of the judgement of the traits is considered as the global index of evaluation, only one category remained above the level of 5 on the seven-point scale: the judgement of 'intellectuals' was 5.13. The narrower category of 'teachers' scored less (4.92), 'peasants' came third (4.60), and 'supervisors' were pushed down to fourth position (4.49). The position of 'students' was fifth in the rank order of evaluation (4.38), closely followed by 'office employees' (4.25) and 'skilled workers' (4.21). In 1991, the global evaluation of 'unskilled workers' at the bottom of the hierarchy became negative (3.60).

If nothing else is done but the ranges of evaluations between 1981 and 1991 are compared, the conclusion can already be drawn that the global evaluation of the socio-occupational categories became less favourable. The decline in evaluation is especially sharp in the cases of 'supervisors', 'skilled workers', 'teachers', and 'unskilled workers', that is, with respect to authority figures qualified for leadership on the one hand, and to workers who used to be advantaged on an ideological basis, on the other hand. This decline was less pronounced in the categories of 'office employees', the

'students' themselves, 'intellectuals' in general, and especially 'peasants'. Thus, the evaluation of groups who are governed, and that of layers who have a certain independence and can therefore also represent the values of past history with a certain continuity, declined the least. No positive change could be observed in any of the socio-occupational categories, but a new hierarchy had emerged, since 'teachers' fell behind 'intellectuals', 'supervisors' behind 'peasants', and 'skilled workers' behind 'students' and 'office employees'.

It was also found in 1991 that there was general agreement among the different homogeneous sub-samples of students with respect to the evaluation hierarchy of the socio-occupational categories (Kendall's W=.455, p<.001). This time, the category of 'intellectuals' was at the top (mean rank: 2.0), the limited subgroup of 'teachers' now came next (2.75). The positions of 'peasants' (4.06) and 'supervisors' (4.41) were more varied in the hierarchies created by the different sub-samples. The fifth position was taken by the respondents' own category, 'students' (5.39), followed by 'office employees' (5.24) and 'skilled workers' (5.39). The list was closed by 'unskilled workers' again, whose relative evaluation was quite uniform (mean rank: 7.21). Despite all variation in the response series, and in spite of the alternations and vagueness of the positions of the given socio-occupational categories, the hierarchy that appeared corresponded perfectly with the results received on the basis of the global indices of evaluation directly for the whole sample.

To sum up, the evaluations of the eight socio-occupational categories were compared with each other in many respects both in 1981 and in 1991.

In 1981, the hierarchy of the categories coincided with each other a) when the rank of categories were considered by traits and were averaged, b) when a global evaluation index was calculated by categories, and c) when this was done by sub-groups and the resulting ranks were averaged by categories. In every respect the 'teachers' stood in the first position, 'intellectuals' usually came second, and 'supervisors' were third. 'Peasants' and 'skilled workers' were neck and neck: it is impossible to tell whether the more complex characterization of the former, or the simpler characterization of the latter means a more positive evaluation. The self-category of 'students' was definitely split: it was ranked first in sociability, but in other respects it was so critical that in the overall rank it came only sixth. The last two positions were taken by 'office employees' and 'unskilled workers'.

The 'absolute level' of evaluation shifted in a negative direction from 1981 to 1991. On the seven-point scale, the mean evaluation of the highest status category fell from 5.53 to 5.13, that of the lowest status dropped from 4.20 to 3.60.

In 1991, the 'intellectuals' came first in all three aspects of the hierarchy of the categories, while 'teachers' took only second place. The characterization of 'peasants' was consistently higher than that of 'supervisors', but the

contents of both categories were varied and divided the sub-samples. The global evaluation of 'students' given both by the whole sample and the sub-samples was more favourable than the position of 'skilled workers', but examining their rank by traits, the very complex characterization of 'students' fell behind the relatively simple description of 'skilled workers'. The position of 'skilled workers' was considered to be worse than even that of 'office employees' by the sub-samples, although the latter group was generally the seventh and 'unskilled workers' were the last ones among the eight occupational categories.

Searching for an explanatory principle behind the evaluation of the categories, we found the combination of two factors in 1981: the differentiation between non-manual and manual work on the one hand, and the contrast between leaders and subordinates on the other. The role of the latter factor became fainter at the time of the social and political change: the positions of the categories that have official authority, that is, 'teachers' and 'supervisors', grew worse. The situation of the definitely subordinate groups, however, that of 'office employees' and 'unskilled workers', did not change at all.

The clean-cut separation between non-manual and manual occupations was not improved by the changes in evaluations either. The position of 'skilled workers', who were once cultivated and given preference for political reasons, decreased considerably. 'Students' took precedence over 'skilled workers', whose evaluation became mixed with the low-status group of 'office employees', although without actually falling behind them. The evaluation of 'peasants', however, became strikingly advantageous within the altered frame of the socio-occupational categories. In the eyes of the respondents, their simplicity was paired with the assumption of enough moral purity to raise them above the category of 'supervisors', whose authority decreased considerably.

These complex and probably still unsettled changes can well be seen in the differences between the MDS maps prepared in the two years: in the altered positions of the 'teachers' and 'supervisors' and the different relationship between 'office employees' and 'skilled workers' from 1981 to 1991.

Evaluative characterization of traditional and modern occupational categories, 1994

The social structure of the country and the roles of the different social layers in it had changed by 1991. In addition to the questions regarding given categories, an open-ended question was also asked (11.R91): 'What social classes and layers do you think exist in Hungary today?' More than a third of the respondents, 36%, indicated the traditional 'worker—peasant—intellectual' trio. Another 20% talked about the 'worker-intellectual' dichotomy, less than 6% differentiated 'peasants' and 'intellectuals', 7% mentioned intellectuals only. Considering the social categories individually,

'intellectuals' were mentioned the most frequently (69%), followed by the workers (56%) and the peasants (47%). Artisans and tradesmen (28%), clerks (16%), and 'leaders' as a separate class (16%) were mentioned by fewer respondents. The mental traditions of the past were still present in the spontaneous phrasing of the responses and social concepts applied; even the expression of the highlighted 'intellectuals' originated in the past and can be only a transition on the way to civil society.

The responses to a further question as to the nature of the differences between the different classes and layers included three basic aspects. Most of the responses indicated material differences (73%), but the majority also included differences in erudition (56.5%). The third aspect was the nature of work done (33%), which is noteworthy, since the name of the social categories implied mainly the kind of work people do. But the differences in economic position were already unequivocal and conspicuous. The unanimity of the responses to the questions 'Are there rich people in Hungary today?' and 'Are there poor people in Hungary today?' (99.8% and 99.2%, respectively) were reminiscent of the ballots of the communist era. Explanations of who was going to be rich or poor in the country, and why, were also asked for. The great majority (71%) indicated that artisans and tradesmen, people in the private sphere, were becoming rich. The other category that was often mentioned in this respect was the group of all kinds of leaders (35%). Most of these responses referred to the enrichment mainly or exclusively of political leaders. Intellectuals were also mentioned but only by 14%. The personal characteristics and behaviour of the wealthier people were only rarely mentioned; 5–6% answered that such people were clever or were 'thieves'. The great majority of the respondents indicated low wages as a reason for poverty (57%), supplemented by the generalization that impoverishment affected or may affect everybody (9%). Peculiar circumstances were highlighted by those who reasoned that it was primarily the old people living on a pension who became poor (33%), others referred to large families (6.5%), and to the Gypsies as a minority group (3%). The combination of changing circumstances with often old-fashioned ways of thinking can well be seen in the above responses in 1991.

Radical changes began at the beginning of the 1990s in Hungary, the depth and speed of which naturally stimulated unsatisfied criticism also, namely, that the changes were not deep and fast enough. Anyhow, at the time of the investigation mentioned last, in 1991, a democratically elected, new political administration announced and promised to lead the country in the direction of market economy. Three years later, in 1994, it seemed to be a realistic endeavour to investigate directly the stereotypes formed about the typical socio-occupational categories of a market economy, and the traits attributed to them in public thinking (13.R94s).

As a next step, the characterization of 'businessmen', 'managers', and 'bankers' was asked of a relatively narrow, but carefully selected sample.

Naturally, in addition to this, the traits of the categories traditional in this region, for example, 'teachers', 'workers', 'farm labourers', were also evaluated. The last category was novel only in its wording as compared to the previous investigations, but other traditional categories like 'miners' and 'soldiers', who had not been characterized in any form previously, were also introduced. The respondents made their judgements on predetermined pairs of traits on seven-point scales. The pairs of traits were all present in the previous studies. The aspects of 'satisfied-dissatisfied', and 'popular-unpopular' were not alternating, but were present simultaneously; the number of pairs of traits increased to 11 this way (see Table 4.3).

Studying the interrelationships among the characterizations by the method of multidimensional scaling, it turned out that the arrangement of the socio-occupational categories can be described satisfactorily in two dimensions (RSQ=.92) (see Figure 4.6).

The distance was the greatest between 'bankers' and 'farm labourers', then between 'businessmen' and 'farm labourers', between 'bankers' and 'workers', and between 'managers' and 'workers'. These data already suggested that there were two systematically different groups of socio-occupational categories: 'bankers', 'businessmen', and 'managers' were on one side, 'farm labourers', 'workers', and 'miners' were on the other. The internal coherence of and the similarity within the latter group is greater: the respondents perceived no difference between the 'workers' and the 'miners'.

'Soldiers' and 'teachers' were distant from both of the above groups and also from each other. The former were separated from the categories representing modern market economy more than from traditional manual workers. This cannot be said of the latter; they seemed to be at the top of an isosceles triangle. Here, they represented alone the previously repeatedly studied bundle of mental-intellectual occupations. The differences and contrasts among manual workers and these occupational categories could be studied for decades. The significance of this difference was limited now, and was replaced to a certain extent by the differences perceived between manual workers and representatives of the market economy.

The greatest difference on the horizontal axis was between the 'bankers' and the 'farm labourers', that on the vertical axis was between the 'farm labourers' and the 'teachers'. The three-dimensional projection fit the data even better (RSQ=.96). In the first dimension, the two extremes were the same as above, in the second dimension the difference between 'businessmen' and 'managers' versus 'teachers' appeared, while in the third dimension there was a contrast between 'soldiers' and the peculiar pair of 'farm labourers' and 'managers' (at the level of traits this was manifested in the perception of sociability and diligence, in favour of the latter group).

Studying the relative positions of the occupational categories based on the judgement of individual traits, quite a complex picture emerged, but the position of the 'managers' was the most favourable (general rank: 3.1). The

Table 4.3 Characterization of the social categories of market economy, 1994: means and factor structure

Businessman

	FL	*A*	*M*
f1	.85	t	3.76
	.69	c	4.26
f2	.85	p	4.73
	.62	g	4.42
factor 3	.73	f	4.23
	.63	d	5.69
	.51	e	4.76
f4	.82	o	3.88
	.76	h	3.65
f5	.81	i	5.34
	.45	a	5.26

PV = 69.2

Agricultural worker

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.85	d	5.73
	.81	c	3.15
	.67	h	5.73
factor 2	.73	e	3.42
	.73	f	4.80
	.69	g	4.73
f3	.79	p	3.53
	.74	t	5.19
factor 4	.80	i	4.03
	.64	o	4.07
	.39	a	4.65

PV = 73.1

Manager

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.88	a	5.46
	.77	i	5.26
	.73	p	4.57
factor 2	.86	e	4.80
	.75	f	4.46
	.63	g	4.53
	.43	d	5.76
f3	.75	t	4.15
	.73	h	3.88
f4	.87	c	4.38
	.61	o	4.88

PV = 71.8

Soldier

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.89	t	5.73
	.79	p	4.73
	.60	h	4.61
factor 2	.82	i	3.88
	.81	e	3.53
	.61	d	4.03
factor 3	.77	o	3.61
	.62	f	3.80
	.61	g	4.15
f4	.92	c	3.26
	.51	a	5.38

PV = 73.1

Banker

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.89	t	3.84
	.79	p	5.11
	.60	h	4.23
factor 2	.82	i	5.76
	.81	e	5.11
	.61	d	5.69
factor 3	.77	o	3.57
	.62	f	3.88
	.61	g	3.88
f4	.92	c	4.57
	.51	a	5.07

PV = 68.8

Worker

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.85	f	4.23
	.84	e	3.23
	.63	i	3.84
	.61	d	4.46
factor 2	.87	a	4.65
	.68	t	4.88
	.66	p	4.03
	.53	o	3.42
f3	.80	c	2.50
	.72	h	5.15
f4	.90	g	4.50

PV = 71.5

Miner

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.85	p	4.15
	.84	t	4.50
	.82	g	4.34
	.76	o	3.92
	.56	i	3.92
	.45	a	4.46
f2	.80	c	2.88
	.69	d	5.42
f3	.78	f	4.69
	.73	h	5.50
f4	.93	e	3.38

PV = 75.2

Teacher

	FL	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.84	h	5.30
	.79	e	6.03
	.70	i	5.88
	.59	t	4.88
	.48	a	4.96
factor 2	.88	g	4.42
	.88	o	4.34
	.80	p	5.23
f3	.82	d	4.92
	.80	f	4.92
f4	.91	c	2.80

PV = 72.9

Notes
FL = factor loading, A = attribute, M = mean, PV = percent of variance

a = self-assertive, d = diligent, e = educated, f = friendly, g = good-humoured, h = honest, i = intelligent, o = popular, p = interested in politics, t = patriotic

respondents rated this category to be the most diligent, the most self-assertive, and the most popular. They were second in satisfaction and humour, but were relatively behind in patriotism (sixth) and honesty (seventh).

As regards mean rank, 'teachers' stood the closest to them (3.3), second in the rank of categories. Above all, they were 'educated', 'intelligent', and 'interested in polities'—no occupational category came before them in these

Figure 4.6 MDS map of the social categories of market economy, 1994..

traits. They were the second most popular after the 'managers', but were behind in diligence (sixth place) and in satisfaction (seventh).

The 'farm labourers' took fourth position based on the mean ranks of traits (3.8). This category was the most honest, the most friendly and the best-humoured group according to the respondents. They were rated the second most diligent and patriotic, while they were perceived as next to last in erudition and definitely last in political involvement.

It should be noted that these categories at the top were not in a unidimensional position, their presentation indicated contradictions—as compared to one another, too. They could be constrained into a unified series of evaluation only with force; actually, they were models of value-orientations that can be put side by side. 'Managers' were the personification of unrestrained purposefulness and efficiency, 'teachers' were quite unproductive and unsuccessful figures of high mental standards and openness, while 'farm labourers' were the trustees of social and moral values with their mental and public isolation. Further consideration is needed of what social experiences are condensed in the description of these types, and what social image appears that filters and organizes these experiences.

'Bankers' took fourth position based on the mean ranks of traits (4.58) of the eight categories. They can be found in first place, too, with respect to satisfaction. They are often second, after the 'teachers' repeatedly: 'intelligent', 'educated', and 'interested in polities'. They stand last in the

manifestations of patriotism and sociability and it was doubted whether they were 'friendly' or 'popular'. As regards humour, they are last (i.e., they have the intelligence for humour, but they have no social inclinations for it.)

The mean rank of 'businessmen' was 4.8., and thus they were fifth in the order on this basis. Their best position was usually third place, namely, in diligence, intellect, self-assertion, and satisfaction. Occasionally, however, they came last of the eight categories: their patriotism and honesty were strongly doubted.

The characterization of 'miners' was barely behind 'businessmen' with respect to mean rank (exactly .03, the rounded value is 4.8 again), but the contents of the judgements and the nature of the deviation from other categories were completely different. 'Miners' received the second best position in honesty and friendliness, after 'farm labourers'. They often took fourth, fifth, and sixth positions. However, they came last when self-assertion was considered.

'Soldiers' took seventh position based on the mean ranks of traits (5.3). This occupational group, which was in seventh place overall, received the most favourable judgement when patriotism was considered. They were rated second in self-assertiveness. Most of the time, however, they took less advantageous positions. Thus, they were next to last when humour and intellect were rated, and they came last in diligence and friendliness.

Finally and undoubtedly, 'workers', the idealized category of the society of the recent past, took eighth position based on the mean ranks of traits (6.2). Their position was quite favourable when the two rather different traits of humour and patriotism were judged by the respondents. They were often seventh and eighth, and came last with respect to intellect, popularity, erudition, and satisfaction.

The eight occupational groups can be inspected from a different angle as well. The unweighted means of the judgements of different aspects resulted in the global index of evaluation. In this respect, the non-manual workers of the socio-occupational categories were uniformly and definitely judged more favourably than the others.

The 'teachers' were regarded the highest (mean: 4.84), their mean judgement with regard to 'educated' was higher than even 6, and the nadir of their evaluation was 'satisfied' with its scale value of below 3. This was quite a unique characterization, since the rank order of traits was in no significant correlation with the description of any other categories. None of the members of the triad of 'managers' (4.74), 'bankers' (4.61), and 'businessmen' (4.53) were considered to be very 'educated' or 'dissatisfied'. The rank order of the traits of these categories resembled each other in a chain (see Table 4.4): there were significant rank order correlations between 'bankers' and 'businessmen' ($r=.84$, $p<.01$), between 'businessmen' and 'managers' ($r=.75$, $p<.01$). It was their common feature that they all seemed to be quite 'diligent' and 'intelligent', thus they all have the motivation and

Table 4.4 Similarity of the social categories of market economy, 1994: trait ranks and correlations

BUS								
FAR								
MAN	.75**							
SOL								
BAN	.84***							
WOR		.84***		.85***				
MIN		.95***		.60*		.86***		
TEA								
Rank	BUS	FAR	MAN	SOL	BAN	WOR	MIN	TEA
1	dil	dil	dil	pat	int	hon	hon	edu
2	int	hon	slf	slf	dil	pat	dil	int
3	slf	pat	int	pol	pol	slf	fri	hon
4	edu	fri	pop	hon	edu	hum	pat	pol
5	pol	hum	edu	hum	slf	dil	slf	slf
6	hum	slf	pol	dil	con	fri	hum	dil
7	con	pop	hum	int	hon	pol	pol	pat
8	fri	int	fri	fri	fri	int	pop	fri
9	pop	pol	con	pop	hum	pop	int	hum
10	pat	edu	pat	edu	pat	edu	edu	pop
11	hon	con	hon	con	pop	con	con	con

Notes
BAN = banker, BUS = businessmen, FAR = farm labourer, MAN = manager, MIN = miner, SOL = soldier, TEA = teacher, WOR = worker

con = contented, dil = diligent, edu = educated, fri = friendly, hon = honest, hum = good-humoured, int = intelligent, pat = patriotic, pol = interested in politics, slf = self-assertive

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

capacity to be efficient. At these points their average evaluations all surpassed the scale value of 5 (see Figure 4.7). As opposed to this, their friendliness, patriotism, honesty, and popularity were judged to approach, and sometimes to sink below the neutral 4. As regards the traits linked with social attachment and morality, no large differences were seen by the respondents among the three categories: 'managers' were seen to be definitely more 'friendly' and 'popular' than the other two, but 'bankers' were seen as much more 'honest', not to talk about their outstanding intellectual capacities (intelligence and erudition).

The global evaluations of the categories of manual workers and the 'soldiers' fell behind the above categories, so did the mean evaluation of even the 'farm labourers' (4.46). The evaluation of 'farm labourers' was followed by that of the 'miners' (4.28) and 'soldiers' (4.25), while the totally neutral mean evaluation of the 'workers' (4.08) was the last in the row, in this respect too. The rank orders of the traits were similar to one another in many respects. Thus, there was a very close rank order correlation between the characterizations of 'farm labourers' and 'miners' (r=.95, p<.001). Similarly, the trait profiles of 'miners' and 'workers' (r=.86, p<.01), of 'farm labourers' and 'workers' (r=.84, p<.01), and of 'workers' and 'soldiers' (r=.85, p<.01) resembled each other very much.



Figure 4.7 Trait profiles of the characterizations of 'managers', 'businessmen', and 'bankers', 1994.

As regards the categories of manual workers, honesty was judged to be more positive than 5 on the scale, the satisfaction of the representatives of these categories was doubted, while their erudition and intelligence were definitely questioned. It was a peculiarity of the characterizations that the 'peasants' and the 'miners' were also seen as diligent. This trait was seen to be significantly less characteristic of the 'workers' by the respondents.

The characterization of the 'soldiers' was quite comparable to the main characteristics of the manual workers, although they were seen to be much less honest and diligent. In contrast, their patriotism and self-assertiveness were judged to be higher than 5 on the scale, and their political involvement was also strongly emphasized.

The similarities of the trait profiles of the socio-occupational categories were also studied by analysing together the characterizations given in 1991 and in 1994. The results of cluster analysis demonstrated well that the typical figures of the market economy resembled mainly their own kind. They were more distantly and loosely related to the non-manual worker categories that were present in 1991 in quite large numbers; the 1994 characterization of the 'teachers' found its natural place in these categories. Manual workers formed another large group, divided into two: the first focus was the characterizations of workers in 1991 (to which the 1994

characterization of workers was only very indirectly related), the other focus was the category relating to heavy physical work, such as 'farm labourers' and 'miners' (which was very similar to the characterization of 'peasants' in 1991). Inspecting the relationships between the former and latter characterizations, it seemed to be the opinion of the respondents that society was becoming polarized in a new way.

The data reviewed from different angles tell that the typical categories of market economy achieved distinct roles, and that as a result of their appearance, the system of opinions regarding the socio-occupational groups underwent a transformation in Hungary. The repeatedly recorded traditional dichotomy of non-manual and manual workers disappeared. The typical image of 'intellectuals' and that of its prototype, the 'teachers', was very dissimilar from the figures of 'businessmen', 'bankers', and 'managers'. The last three categories manifested similar features, despite their individual peculiarities. The stereotype descriptions about the social categories of manual workers drew closer to one another and became reorganized. The special values of 'farm labourers' became better accepted, while the category of 'workers' lost the role it possessed before.

In this case, it was quite clear that the evaluation of the categories was neither simple, nor uniform, nor unanimous. Differences and even conflicts among the judgements of the different traits were present behind the global evaluation of the categories. Erudition and efficiency seemed to separate. Socio-economic success and moral humanity definitely opposed each other. Sociability and emphatic social identification were also separate entities in the respondents' eyes. The richness of angles was due to the fact that none of the judged social categories or groups of categories were seen by the respondents as the sole carriers of all of the important values.

In the course of social changes the respondents learned to respect socioeconomic efficiency and the categories of market economy that embody this efficiency. Still, they did not forget the value of knowledge and morals in their own right. Undoubtedly, they considered these values to be linked to other categories. Their view of society reflected the progress and even need of socio-economic modernization, while it expressed the reservations and feelings of dissatisfaction with respect to the transition.

To sum up, the continuing social changes in the early 1990s justified the analysis of the judgement of more recent social categories, but using the previous methods, in 1994. First of all, typical occupations of the market economy like 'businessmen', 'bankers', and 'managers' were evaluated.

As can be seen on the MDS maps, the respondents saw this group of civil middle-class occupations as definitely separate from the closely linked group of manual workers such as 'farm labourers', 'miners', and 'workers'. The image of 'soldiers', which had never been studied before, stood closer to the latter group. This was not true of the previously studied 'intellectual' occupation, 'teachers'. They stood at an equal distance from the representatives of the market economy and the manual workers.

The evaluation hierarchy was studied from two aspects this time:

a The ranks of the categories were determined for each trait, and these ranks were then averaged,
b A global evaluation index was calculated for each category.

In the first aspect three categories ranked at the top: 'managers', 'teachers', and 'farm labourers'. All three received complex, split characterizations; in other words, they ranked highest in one or more traits, while ranking the lowest in some other trait. 'Managers' were perceived as effective, but barely connected to the homeland and morality. Teachers' were seen as cultured but ineffective. 'Farm labourers' were considered honest but not cultured. The inconsistency of the social constellation and the competing plurality of the value systems experienced by the respondents can be inferred from the internal inconsistency and the unusual complexity of the characterizations.

In other respects, the status of the non-manual occupations usually preceded that of the manual workers, and the category of 'workers' in the last position behind the 'soldiers' was particularly low on the basis of the ranks of the judgements of the different traits, too (point a above). This tendency was stronger when the global index of the categories were considered as the basis of evaluation (point b above). In this case the categories of the market economy, together with 'teachers', stood at the top, then came the manual occupations, starting with 'farm labourers' and ending with 'workers'.

Thus, the previous recognition of the intellectuals still left its traces, but the old cult of the working class did not. This impression was further reinforced by the fact that this time no distinction was offered nor could be made between 'skilled workers' and 'unskilled workers'. However, a new eliciting word, 'miners', was introduced, as an occupation of dangerous and heavy physical work. Its characterization turned out to be similar to the description and evaluation of the 'farm labourers'. The 'workers' were behind even them in most of the moral and social values, while with respect to intelligence, internal satisfaction, and external popularity they were the lowest of all the categories.

The 'market economy categories' had their own, distinctive pattern of traits. There was a difference in evaluation between 'managers' and 'businessmen', while their trait profiles were similar, especially in emphasizing their diligence, intelligence, and self-assertiveness, and doubting their patriotism and honesty. The respondents perceived 'businessmen' and especially 'bankers' as less sociable: less popular, less good-humoured and less friendly than 'managers'. At the same time, 'bankers' were seen as more cultured, intelligent, and somewhat more honest than the other two groups. The latter is a critical issue, since the three categories in question, the pioneers of the market economy, took the last positions with respect to honesty. Yet these were the categories that were

considered to be relatively satisfied with themselves and their situation in these years of economic reconstruction.

Summary

The development of the perception of the socio-occupational categories in Hungary was followed for three decades, mainly in student samples. The investigations began in the period of the consolidation of the party state system, and after the long period of social fermentation the consequences of the radical political changes could be studied.

In the mid-1960s the 'social class' concept of pupils was formed under the purposeful and systematic influence of Marxism. However important this system of ideas and its fundamental idea of class were for the legitimacy and policy of the Party, attempts to indoctrinate pupils with this concept met with little success. One result was the recognition of the fact that in the history of humankind there had been wealthy and poor people for long periods. The other result was the optimistic declaration that these social differences should disappear.

The examples given by the pupils and the responses of contemporary adults proved that, in the Hungarian society of the time, under conditions where the material and income status were levelled by force, classes were distinguished on the basis of 'the nature of work done' and the consequent quality of life. The intellectuals tended to deny class differences and demanded greater income differentials, while the workers saw more differences and tension between the classes, which they would have liked to reduce. In both views there is a struggle between the ideological image of society and reality.

Stereotype characterizations, widespread in public thinking and remaining for a prolonged period, were linked to socio-occupational categories. At the beginning of the 1980s, in the eyes of student respondents, two groups of socio-occupational categories were linked together but separated from each other: the categories of non-manual workers and manual workers. In the trait dimensions offered to the respondents, the former categories were characterized by intellectual values and less sociability, while the latter ones were described by features of good humour and awareness of identity and fewer intellectual and cultural values.

From among the eight categories offered to them, 'teachers', 'intellectuals', 'supervisors', and 'office employees' belonged to the first group both in 1981 and in 1991. The categories of 'skilled workers' and 'unskilled workers' formed the core of the second group. According to the characterizations, due to their sociability and immaturity, 'students' were perceived as being similar to the second group.

The category of 'peasants' came closer to the description of 'skilled workers' only in 1991, not least because the pattern of traits of the latter

showed changes. The characterization of 'peasants' was peculiar, with an emphasis on morality and modest intellectual values in both years.

Thus, there were differences in the content of the stereotyped characterizations of these two groups of categories. But there was no definite opposition until 1991, when the above-mentioned ideal image of 'peasants' stood in sharp contrast to the sceptical description of 'supervisors'.

In 1981, the evaluation hierarchy of the categories was usually as follows: 'teachers' and 'intellectuals' in general took the two top positions, followed by 'supervisors', then came 'peasants' and 'skilled workers', closely following one another. The last positions in the evaluations were taken by the subordinate categories: 'students', 'office employees', and 'unskilled workers'. Although non-manual occupations generally took the lead, manual workers preceded 'office employees' in the status hierarchy in Hungary, too, as can be seen from the characterizations.

As a result of socio-political changes, radical changes took place in the evaluation of the socio-occupational categories between 1981 and 1991. On the one hand, it was a sign of the wavering of official authority that 'teachers' and 'supervisors' fell back by one place in the rank of evaluations. The content of characterization of the latter category changed, with a perceived increase in political involvement and increased doubts about their morality. On the other hand, the evaluation of 'skilled workers', who were previously highly esteemed because of power interests and official cultivation, declined rapidly. Within the characterization, their sociability was more definitely emphasized, and their intellectual strength was more openly doubted.

The evaluation of the whole series of socio-occupational categories fell by a score of about .5 on the seven-point scale. The decline was the smallest in the evaluative description of the 'peasants'. This also contributed to the fact that we cannot speak of a dichotomy in the evaluation of the non-manual and manual occupations.

In 1994, at the time of a more advanced stage of political-economic change, the investigation of the characterizations and evaluations was repeated, including new socio-occupational categories. By this time, the usual, clear status hierarchy of non-manual and manual workers familiar in other countries in the world was present. The evaluation of the category of 'workers' reached the nadir of its declining path.

The results of multidimensional scaling also illustrated that in the minds of the respondents, a third group of occupations related to the market economy was seen to be separated at an equal distance from the intellectuals (as represented by the category of 'teachers') and from the manual workers (as represented by 'farm labourers', 'miners', 'workers', and even 'soldiers' relatively similar to them). In addition to the already known similarities and differences, the characterizations of 'managers', 'businessmen', and 'bankers' described new relationships.

The latter categories were judged to be the least honest of all groups, but

were credited with effectiveness. Thus, diligence, which had once been the individual characteristic of 'peasants', was no longer assigned exclusively to their successors, 'farm labourers', but was also assigned to the characteristic figures and classes of the market economy. However, the latter categories did preserve one feature of the earlier group of 'supervisors': unlike all the other categories, they were judged to enjoy at least some satisfaction.

The inconsistency in the characterizations of the key socio-occupational categories in 1994 may not indicate that the respondents felt that society had lost its way, but it does suggest a sense of social uncertainty. It emerged that 'managers' were effective but not honest. Were 'teachers' (cultured but not effective) or 'farm labourers' (honest but far from cultured) any better? The cluster of characteristics reflecting effectiveness offers a new path, but one that still lacks security.

5 The domain of historical periods

Beliefs about 20th-century history

Premises and rationale

What antecedents did our research regarding the conception of historical periods have in social psychology? This question can be answered very briefly. There is practically no literature on this topic even today. This seriously negative statement is both reinforced and denied by the comprehensive work of Schwarz, Wanke, and Bless (1994). Reinforcement lies in the fact that they also missed the systematic research of the central core of this topic, that is, the investigation of the perception and evaluation of social changes. But its negation lies in the pure existence of their work and in its citations expressing the demand for, scattered antecedents of, and professional chance of extending the trend of social cognition over this field, too. The 'end of communism in Eastern Europe', and particularly the unification of Germany gave an opportunity for and prompted this kind of research while they also provided the object and population to be investigated.

Naturally, the timeliness of the topic was absent in the 1960s and 1970s, at the beginning of our investigations. Although the end of the cold war brought about considerable transformations in world politics, it was not evident that a historical change took place and a new epoch began. However, a continued socio-cultural inspiration, and an even more prolonged tension or 'eternal challenge' inherent in the relationship between historical and psychological cognition were still present.

The social role of historical cognition

We began to investigate the image of historical ages in public thinking in the 1960s and 1970s, partly for socio-cultural reasons. The conscious and repressed questions of the historical past did engage the attention of Hungarian intellectual thinking, and in some or another form was present in the minds of the members of the developing middle classes. This could be and had to be investigated in public thinking. It was no coincidence that the level of historical knowledge (Angelusz, 1980; Békés, 1980; Eperjessy and

Szebenyi, 1976) and the effect of programs of historical content in mass media (Dankánics and Erdösi, 1975) were empirically investigated in Hungary in these years by others, too. There was certainly some division of labour among the investigations originated and carried out mostly at the same research institute. Our own field of investigation was studying historical judgements, evaluative attitudes, and stereotypes.

The special role history plays in arts, in literature, in journalism, in political thinking, and in the object selection, methodology, and institutions of scientific research can be explained by many reasons.

One of them is the simple fact that Hungary and her people do have a history, a thousand years of past, which may justly elicit the interest of the present age. Although this fact is insufficient in explaining the above phenomenon, it is noteworthy, since the situation differed here, as well as almost everywhere else in Europe, from that of the American example setting the standards in modernization. The history of Hungarians differs in this respect from that of other nations who reached the stage of national consciousness and state formation only in the past hundreds of years, too, and thus from the antecedents of many countries in the region. Their case also proves, however, that past in the historical sense is not even a necessary condition for historizing, not to talk about a sufficient condition, for—in accordance with the identity needs—the lack of continuity of antecedents can be made up and created as a promising image of the past.

This history can also be characterized by the duality of transformation and stability. In the long run, the trend of changes is not favourable: after the glory of the Hungarian state in the Middle Ages came a series of defeats and the loss of sovereignty, then, in the 20th century, the harmony of social and economic development was disturbed by severe and irremediable territorial losses. Stability arises from the intermediate position between the East and the West, from the internalized tensions, choices, and strainful fate of the buffer zone. Hungarian history is rich in thought-provoking problems.

Naturally, it also plays a role in national orientation that knowledge regarding the common past, cultivation of its values, passing on the real or assumed consequences of the lessons learnt are essential conditions and content of national identity. Nation as a collective actor can be unfolded, created, and shown to society from its historical 'deeds', struggles, and achievements. The shocks of state life and society, the dilemmas of searching the way, and recruiting one's strength to realize common aims motivate one to think over historical antecedents repeatedly, and to search for inspiring examples and critical lessons. There have been many reasons for this mental activity in the lively history of modern times of Hungary, but the possibilities of practical actions were not in proportion with it.

Looking back at national history presumes certain categorization: it not only unifies the generations of past and present, but also separates both past

and present, as to who is selected to be a member of this historical community.

The mental treatment of the various ethnic groups in the region living in entanglement for hundreds of years is ambiguous; as to the achievements of the past, it is more inclusive than in sizing up the present social and mental potentials. This duality is further amplified by the historical fact that the whole Carpathian basin had been under the authority of the Hungarian state until 1918, when she lost two-thirds of her area, and one-third of the Hungarian ethnic group found themselves outside her borders. It is not easy to follow uniform principles of categorization when looking at the distant and more recent past merging with the present.

In order to make a socio-political system accepted, strong, and socially fully legitimate, it is necessary to demonstrate its roots, origin, and continuity. Socio-political systems have changed several times in Hungary in the 20th century, introducing themselves as a negation or at least a strong correction of the previous ones. This self-definition itself already contributed to history writing and public thinking to reorganize and reevaluate the periods of the past. The systems changing from generation to generation did not accept every line of their antecedents, the whole circumstances of their origin, the tactical details of the changes in their internal direction, nor the oppressing mechanism of their continuation. Naturally, this evoked the desire to clarify 'historical truth' at the first opportunity.

The historical interest, involvement, and symbolism of public thinking or the intellectual élite has been repeatedly criticized in social analyses and in the press. One of its realistic elements was that the selection of the historical topic and the approach to the historical object was actually a substitute for open political discussion—it was an opportunity to touch delicate matters; it was a figurative speech to make hidden strivings felt. It was a related consideration that interest and thinking in the past are infertile, and do not serve building the future. They may perhaps only pull back: they certainly engage valuable mental energies. In this sense, they substitute constructive political discussion even when the possibilities are already open.

The questions of the social role and scientific prestige of historical thinking had already been fully analysed in Hungary when the political transformation was developing and taking place (see Berend, the politically influential historian, 1978; Kosáry, the doyen of Hungarian historians, 1987; Glatz, the editor of the journal *História,* which transformed the historical consciousness of society, 1990). In the background of all this, one can find the cultural and ideological context of conservative German historicism, the emphatic historicity of Marxism and its criticism, the radiating suggestive-methodological renewal of French historical scholarship. Historical science and philosophy brought historical cognition to a high level of consciousness, and dealt with its social and human functions subtly, from the classical critical analysis of Nietzsche (1874,

1921) to the systematizing work of John Lukacs (1968) devoted precisely to historical consciousness.

Connections between history and psychology

The relationship between historical and psychological cognition and the corresponding sciences has been a strategic question in human studies beyond the system of sciences, occupying many people since the 19th century. In parallel with the appearance of scientific, experimental psychology, Dilthey (1974) and his followers laid the psychological foundations of the humanities in Germany (the birthplace of experimental psychology, too). This meant the program and application of a special, understanding psychology, first of all in historical cognition. This was both a break with two different conceptions of psychology and a need and attempt to build human products and the process of history on the psychology of mental involvement and intuitive understanding.

From among the two kinds of psychology, the one following the steps of natural sciences, that is, the experimental variant, developed first of all in the social and scientific medium of the United States of America. A few years ago, Hugo Münsterberg's APA presidential address of 1898 devoted to the relationship between psychology and history was called up. In this paper, Münsterberg (1899, 1994) tried to separate and even contrast the two fields, announcing the incompetence of the already forming scientific psychology (which he himself very ambitiously represented) in the history of purposeful acts and valuable strivings. An interpretation of this early paper of Münsterberg today says that he anticipated the approach of cognitive psychology neglecting the standpoints and possibilities of social and applied psychology (Schöpflug, 1994). Münsterberg had a marked,but flexible mind. In spite of his original standpoint and theoretical orientation he became a pioneer of American applied psychology. He wrote a chapter on social psychology in his comprehensive book in 1914, and, in fact, considered historical psychology applied to the past as a separate and independent branch of applied psychology. He thought this to be practical knowledge of human character which could be used by historians in their special position in order to understand figures of the past better. This way Münsterberg took a step in the direction McGuire (1994) missed so much in his first paper, and whose importance and possibilities were indicated by himself, too: he approached the relationship between the two disciplines constructively, marked the path of their co-operation, and began its construction.

McGuire (1994) systematically indicated the convergences of history and psychology in a 2×2 field, that is, in micro and macro level humanistic (ideographic) and scientific (nomothetic) research. Thus, he differentiated studies concentrating on the individual and the society, that is, those searching for laws of the specific and the general, in which historical and

psychological perspectives may meet. We have also outlined four meeting areas previously (Hunyady, 1981b):

a Analysis of historical figures and processes,
b Historical study of psychological phenomena and processes,
c Scientific, cultural, and social history of psychology,
d Psychology of the person studying, knowing, and evaluating history, let it be historian, teacher, student, or layperson.

Our present cited investigations belong to the latter area.

The literature of social psychology began to treat several relevant problems in the past two decades and achieved significant results. By way of illustration, let us mention that the experience of time, its applied conceptual apparatus, the analysis of temporal organization in cross-cultural comparisons, has come to the fore in the past few years (McGrath and Kelly, 1986; McGrath, 1988). The study of the recall, observation, and mental organization of definitely historical events and experiences has begun. Schuman and Scott's (1989) study, which showed how Americans belonging to different age groups saw and grouped historical events, deserves special attention. This research takes an international comparative character when similar questions are asked in Lithuania (Schuman *et al.*, 1994), and the responses given by the Lithuanians and the Russians living there differ. Social-communal influences, forums, and norms may and do play significant roles in elaborating past events and experiences, the nature and mechanism of which are discussed under 'collective memory' in the social psychological literature (Middleton and Edwards, 1990). The socially different conception of historical events, institutions, and products rising to the level of symbols, and the contrast of these views may also be the object of research (see Billig, 1992). A number of questions in cognitive social psychology are relevant in historical cognition, even if the researchers who phrase and study them do not address this aspect specifically. The thousands of experiments on attribution, studying when and what reasons people attribute to human acts, may serve as a good example. The specific example of studying how the non-fulfilment of expectations may evoke analogous memories from the past belongs here (Read and Cesa, 1991). The series of research attempting to reveal the forms, motives, personal background, and consequences of the conceptions moving away from and struggling with the facts is especially relevant from the aspect of mental elaboration of historical processes (Roese, 1994; Roese and Olson, 1995). The influencing and modifying effects of personal motives in cognition are demonstrated in the findings that show the role of search for security in the justification of past events (see The *Belief in a Just World,* Lerner, 1980), or reveal the circumstances and conditions of optimism moving away from reality.

Psychology of historical cognition

The list could be continued, but there are three directions of research that chose historical cognition specifically as their object, and achieved significant results.

The first one deals with the characteristics of the perspectives of looking back. It was Fischhoff's sober recognition (1975, 1982) that if we know the consequences of a decision, we will look at the alternatives differently from those who brought the decision, naturally without knowing the real consequences. This knowledge strengthens the feeling of unavoidable determinism, and decreases the uncertainty and freedom of choice between the alternatives. The role of this distortion is not eliminated if looking back at the past situation of decision, we count on the fact that this knowledge of later events may influence our judgement. People's tendency to overestimate their capacity, and their inability to subtract the effect of additional information available to them from their knowledge and performance (Fischhoff, 1977) are manifested here again. The exaggeration of predictability is a special error in the treatment of information of not only historians but also of common people thinking about the past (Greenwald, 1980). There is some research evidence that under appropriate conditions, people can recall their expectations and views in a group situation better than alone, without social support and control (Stahlberg *et al,* 1994).

The difference between prediction and looking back, the impossibility of their reversal, and the difficulties of their approach explain the reservations put forward by cognitive (decision) psychologists regarding the usefulness and utilizability of 'historical experiences'. Even the concept and content of 'historical experiences' seems to be quite soft for them, for we not only collect and summarize the material of experience, but also evoke them ourselves. The observations and experiences are elaborated with a certain, definite attitude, and the result does not judge a decision, a behaviour, or a character directly and unambiguously, but may depend on a number of further factors. Past situations will not return, circumstances always change. Realizations reflecting on previous circumstances are later useless. The series of objections could be continued in a similar spirit.

The second direction of research relevant in the study of historical beliefs relates to the mental-emotional elaboration of personal past. First of all it was Ross and Conway (1986) who introduced and demonstrated the thesis according to which looking back to personal past is a 'creative process'. They think that in forming the image of personal past the present is the starting point; both content and mood of the present influence what seems to be important and characteristic in the past. Previously, they had already dealt with the problem (Conway and Ross, 1984) that people are influenced by their assumptions regarding the degree and direction of experienced changes when perceiving the differences between their past and present

situations, states, and capacities. The suspicion that the outcome of social group development and personal development, and that of correctional interventions cannot be measured credibly on the basis of subjective evidence arises from this recognition. The second consequence is the theorem that the present situation and the 'implicit theories' regarding the nature of the experienced changes together determine the subjective image and description of the past situation.

The conceptions regarding the construction of personal past are supported by the empirical experiences and secondary analyses that demonstrate the distortions of recall of personal views and standpoints. These are manifested in the recall of the early phase of personal emotional relationships (McFarland and Ross, 1984) just as much as in the recall of social and political attitudes after a prolonged period (Markus, 1986). The edifying data of the latter paper show that only one-third of the members of a sample covering two generations could objectively recall their previous standpoints nine years later. The representatives of both generations significantly modified their standpoints in a number of socio-political issues, nevertheless 36% of the younger generation and 61% of the parents thought that their opinions had been essentially identical nine years before. Striving for consistency usually characterizes the recall of personal past, and consequently the recognized changes of behaviour and opinion are mostly attributed to external reasons and to changes in the situation (Smith, 1984).

Recognizing the tendency towards consistency does not exclude the possibility and existence of life-long consistency in representing values, principles, and attitudes, which can be demonstrated both in right-wing and in left-wing political commitment (Andrews, 1991). Methodological awareness, however, is indispensable in utilizing autobiographical memory and reports in retrospect in social sciences—cognitive social psychology can well contribute to this awareness (Schwarz and Sudman, 1994).

It is a question of present day cognitive social psychology how much the perceptions of stability and changes differ when we judge ourselves and others (Silka, 1989), whether we remember events related to ourselves and others the same way or differently (Skowronski *et al.*, 1991). It is certain that there are preserved and determining experiences in our own lives that determine our world view (see Catlin and Epstein, 1992). It is true, furthermore, that recalling and sharing our own past with others depends on the social role (as demonstrated on the gender differences by Ross and Holmberg, 1990). Personal past is also a narrative, a structured history harmonized and formed in interpersonal relationships (cf. Gergen and Gergen, 1984), which has elaborated variants that can be described and which recur repeatedly. In this respect, the idea of Agnes Hankiss (1980) about the quadruple division of 'self mythologies' coming from a Hungarian sample of investigation is not irrelevant:

a 'Dynastic strategy' emphasizing the continuity of family situation and personality development.
b 'Antithetic strategy' contrasting background with self-development,
c 'Compensating strategy' compensating the failures of the present with the beauties of the familial past,
d 'Self-acquitting strategy' searching for explanations for the difficulties of the present in difficulties at the start.

Similarly structured stories about families, groups, and whole societies may be alive in public thinking (cf. Silka, 1989), and even in the minds of historians (Morawski, 1984). The third line of research is related to the representation and evaluation of the past, present and future.

As to evaluation, the applicable principles of cognitive (decision) psychology can serve as starting points. Thus, on the basis of Tversky's (1977) trait comparison model we can count on the fact that it is significant to the conclusions whether present is compared with the image of the past, or the past is measured to the present. According to Schwarz *et al.* (1994), who are inclined to originate the unfavourable mood of the inhabitants of the former GDR in the subjective errors of cognition, the direction of comparison is also responsible for the fact that the negative sides absent today are missing from the image of the past compared to the present, while the new difficulties remain visible. Although the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) is related to considering the consequences of the decisions, it is also relevant for the historical weighing of favourable and unfavourable developments, gains and losses, too. New developments are accounted as gains and losses in comparison with some neutral reference point: we react more sensitively to both around this point, and losses always influence overall evaluations more than gains of the same proportion. Thaler and Johnson's (1990) 'hedonic editing hypothesis' and Linville and Fischer's (1991) 'renewable resources model' deserve special attention for our topic. They compete with each other in making partly conflicting predictions about the effects of temporal links and separations of good and bad events. Fredrickson and Kahneman's (1993) observation on short-term experiences is related to a series of events (or periods, if you like): the length of time does not count in the retrospective evaluation of a process, but the most marked time of the period and the experience of its termination determine the subjective evaluation of the whole period together as an average.

The empirical starting point of the definitely social historical investigations was related to the continuous research on subjective well-being (see Robinson *et al.,* 1991; Strack *et al.,* 1991). The conception and evaluation of the situation is greatly influenced by temporal categorization and by when and where the judging person finds reference points. Strack *et al.* (1985) related the way present feeling of well-being is influenced by marked evaluative experiences with temporal distance between the events. If

the respondents are instructed to recall positive experiences from the recent past, they will be more likely to report better feelings of well-being than when the task is to recall negative experiences. However, if the task is to recall experiences from the distant past, negative experiences contribute to today's present good feelings more than positive experiences do. This research finding fits well into the inclusion-exclusion model of assimilation and contrast effects on evaluative judgements (Schwarz and Bless, 1992). Thus, if the representation of the object to be evaluated (e.g., the present period) includes available and strong experiences, this will result in assimilation effects. If, however, available and strong experiences appear as measures outside the representation of the object, an effect of contrast will appear. This is true for the future, too. Thus, positive expectations for the future with clear bounds will decrease today's feeling of well-being (Strack and Martin, 1987).

When dealing with the triad of past, present, and future, and reinforcing or weakening the unstable boundaries of these categories, this research on the mutual effect of evaluation also shows the role of temporal categorization. The effect of multi-categorial division determined by social conventions was intensively studied by Krueger and Clement (1994) when they asked for the estimation of the ten-year average of temperature in different (inter-category) and same months (intra-category) of the year. For the authors, the selection of the object was a tool in contrasting research paradigms and theories of category representation theories; for us, it is an individual example of measuring the effect of temporal categorization (assimilation) in the area of recalling and summarizing non-social features. Historical categorization, whose special nature is barely known yet, associates significant social events, structures, and persons with time periods, and has an effect on their joint evaluation.

The concept of social development and the segmentation of the past

In 1967, the concept of 'social development', which was among the most fundamental, framework-providing concepts that the teaching of history was supposed to mould, was also investigated. The sampling and analysis techniques were the same as those used for the concepts of nation and social class.

Defining 'social development', a term which was used frequently in history textbooks, proved to be a difficult, not to say impossible, task for 5th and 6th grade children. A typical approach to the problem was to point at or denote the thing that was developing and say what the result of development was.

> 5th grade, S 8: 'Development means that 1. the animal develops and becomes stronger; 2. the country develops, becomes more modern, becomes more beautiful; 3. the plants grow, develop.'

Attempts at interpretation were similar to this one: they were often paired with open indications of the context in which these expressions are used.

> 5th grade, S 2: 'There are developments of humans, plants, animals, and there are developments of country, factory, which means that people say more good things about industrial plants.'
> 6th grade, S 19: 'Development means that people work and learn better.'
> 6th grade, S 3: 'E.g., people used to cultivate their land by hand, now it is done by sowing machines, this is development.'
> 6th grade, S 54: 'Social development: we live in a totally different age than it used to be. People used to kill each other, today they live in happiness.'

It is evident from the above examples that, initially, the expression of development appeared in the most varied contexts, primarily in relation to biology. At first, it was human ontogenesis that frequently appeared as a mental starting point. Gradually, more and more pupils grasped the idea of social and economic change.

The expression of development often had an evaluative content and indication, it often meant an increase in value for the children. The strategy of comparison took on a significant role in the definition of the concept: the children tended to look back to the past from the present, often making comparisons that were advantageous for the present.

> 5th grade, S 7: 'One is more clever and knows more than before; this is development.'
> 6th grade, S 64: 'Social development is that in the past only the lords were educated, the poor people were not, because in the past, the land was owned by the lords, but now it is owned by the state, which means that it is owned by everyone. Boys today, who [*sic*] father and mother were servants, may today cultivate themselves as rich children could in the past, but even more. Prospects are better. The people used to live in hovels, but now everybody has a nice house.'
> 6th grade, S 67: 'Social development: in the ancient past people were not as educated as today. Ancient man did not even know what a university was. Today's men are more educated and clever.'
> 8th grade, S 37: 'Kings used to rule and fight in the past, today there are no kings and we live in peace. People in the past could not write and read, while today everything can be even filmed. This is development.'

This quite frequent approach appeared throughout primary school, even in the 8th grade. It was typical that the present was contrasted with the past in general, without differentiating the troublesome conditions of the past.

Changes in the mental area were quite often mentioned as indicators of development, and sometimes as a driving force.

In the 6th grade, occasional examples of attempts at segmentation of social development could be seen, and periods were listed. The pupils tried to establish a framework by indicating starting and finishing points.

> 6th grade, S 49: The progress of social development: 1. gathering, fishing, hunting. Only in the prehistoric age. This is when the classes became separated, (poor, rich). 2. Farming. Antiquity. Huge empires existed already. There were four classes already: slaves, the poor, the rich, and the rulers.'
> 6th grade, S 57: 'Social development: the beginning of development was the prehistoric age, antiquity, middle ages, modern age, the most modern age.'
> 8th grade, S 46: 'Development of society was generated by the constant development of the people. It was necessary for feudalism to evolve from primitive society, and for capitalism from feudalism, because one person owned such a big piece of land and other property that he could no longer cultivate it himself. Meanwhile, very unjust acts were done to workers and peasants, which necessarily led to the socialist and communist world system.'

The attempts at definition that used the periods and limits of social development showed poorly learnt and often distorted traces of school material. It is evident from the last example that the pupil had taken in the suggestion, implicit in the history teaching of the time, that development is inevitable throughout history, and in the end, it is the only possible course determined by laws, but that the nature of necessity had remained obscure for him/her and for other pupils of the same age. They had acquired, at best, slogans about the arrival of communism, but not the theses of Marxism regarding the interdependence of social phenomena. The following is a primitive example of this.

> 8th grade, S 2: 'The workers build socialism with their work, and struggle for development.'

The intellectual difficulty of this definition task could also lead to tautological results at the different stages of primary school studies.

> 6th grade, S 43: 'Social development started to develop in the 4th and 5th centuries, and it has been developing ever since.'
> 6th grade, S 15: 'Development means that for example if something could not be used before, by now it has been modernized.'
> 8th grade, S 26: 'Social development is when working people promote development and progress by their diligent work, and they also raise the standard of living.'

> 8th grade, S 44: 'Social development, in which everything is modernized. New machines are invented.'

At the very beginning of history teaching in primary school, 'man' was the carrier and subject of development without differentiation and in a general sense in almost half (43%) of the definitions. Country was also present in this sense (26%), but no socio-economic formation was indicated at all. On average, two conceptual associations per definition were mentioned, and 13 different content elements of concept could be found, the most frequent of them (43%) being features belonging to the category of knowledge. By the 8th grade, the ratio of responses indicating the subject of development as man and country had decreased. The frequency of occurrence of society (32%), and of social classes and social relations (20–30%) increased. About one-sixth of the pupils mentioned social and economic systems in relation to development. The number of conceptual associations in the definitions was between 3 and 4, and the features indicated in the replies were heterogeneous, including 30–35 kinds. About half of the definitions contained economic features, indications or references, one-third contained ideological features, and a quarter included political features. A considerable number of pupils related development to work.

Some of the grammar school students attempted definitions that were intended to interpret 'social development', often fusing it with the concept of progress.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 121: 'We can talk about progress when a new, more highly developed variation of an old order, or a new, more highly developed order arises.'

In some attempts the nature of development was illustrated by an example, and certain processes and events were indicated as development.

> 4th year grammar school, S 10: 'Social development is when a higher social order evolves from a lower social order.'

In this type of school, generalization going beyond the object to be defined was quite frequent, where philosophical theorems were planted in the history material without being properly connected to the historical changes of society.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 17: 'Development is when quantitative changes turn into qualitative changes. Social development is the same, with respect to society.'
> 3rd year grammar school, S 111: 'It is a chain of qualitative and

> quantitative developments, having an effect on the whole society. Mechanization, developing the chemical industry, increasing personal financial interest are examples of qualitative development. More production, using larger areas are examples of qualitative development. This is the development of an existing society.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 3: 'One-way qualitative and quantitative increase.'

In addition to these simple or empty attempts at definition, conceptual definitions could quite frequently be found as early as the 2nd year of grammar school, where the students searched for a general concept of genus and the special features, as if following the rules of classical logic, when defining social development.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 103: The process which always brings about new and better ways of life for humans who live in communities.'
> 2nd year grammar school, S 112: 'Development is a necessary historical process which wants to bring about a better and more humanistic social system through a lot of struggle.'
> 3rd year grammar school, S 5: 'Social development is a transformation or change, in the course of which the economic, social and political situation of a country is transformed in a positive direction, which brings about a rise in the standard of living, and a change in the situation of the classes.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 14: 'Qualitative change, in the course of which everything becomes more perfect. Historical development also means this: a transformation, in the course of which 1. the happiness of mankind (in terms of both the individual and society) will become increasingly greater, 2. will get closer to certain aims.'

It seemed to be a common characteristic of all of these definitions that social development and the process of historical change were optimistically identified with forward progress, with the improvement of people, relations, and situations. From this viewpoint—which was really suggested by the school material—history acquired a teleological character, striving for certain aims.

Others attempted to outline the process of social development itself. In such cases respondents also looked for causal relationships and attempted to identify them by using conceptual elements gleaned from school material.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 104: 'Mankind has been developing mentally over hundreds of years. It is a result of development that certain ideas and theories arise or become outmoded. As a result of ideas, the social system is changed. Progress is when the new system

> wins over the old, outdated one. This causes the transformation of society in a new direction.'
> 2nd year grammar school, S 62: 'Social development depends on economic development. The forces of production develop together with the instruments of production; with the development of society, the standards of living also increase and culture also develops.'
> 3rd year grammar school, S 81: 'the gradual perfection of social relationships: the balance between the two sides of the mode of production gets looser, revolution takes place. Society is transformed: 1. primitive society, 2. slave-owning society, 3. feudalism, 4. capitalism, 5. socialism, the termination of exploitation.'

It is to be feared that these lofty abstractions, which had been introduced and used in the school material, were not only totally empty but completely separated from all concrete knowledge of history. Alarming examples of this could often be seen when the respondents tried to expound their definition of social development in detail.

> 2nd year grammar school, S 53: 'Before the World War neither industry, nor agriculture developed. Exploitation was much practised, and before that, the class of big landowners exploited the serfs. This took away the serfs' love of work. They emigrated in masses. Thus, the country did not develop economically. As a result of different liberalization, e.g., freedom of movement, the development of the country became possible, because the peasants loved to work, thus, economic development got started.'
> 4th year grammar school, S 16: 'If we want to define this, we have to turn the wheel of history back, all the way. And gradually turn it forward. Social development started already in primitive society, when people realized that they can achieve more if there are more of them, therefore, they grouped into hordes. This is only one step in social development. Naturally, when the differences in property developed, we cannot talk about full social development, because in those times the rich were satisfied with the existing order. Thus, only the oppressed people wanted change, which was often successful. This development can be seen up to today, this is why there is a rise in the standard of living.'

As grammar school studies proceeded, society (about 40%) or different social classes (about 40%) were more and more frequently indicated comprehensively as the subject or carrier of social development. Indication of the country and the people fell back, and reference to man in general was limited to one-fifth of the cases. An increasing number of social and economic formations were mentioned, more than three by the 4th year. The mean number of conceptual associations within a definition was around 6 in

the 2nd year—it became 5.3 in the 4th year. The number of different features in the definitions was 51 in the 2nd year, which did not increase but in fact fell slightly to 47 by the end of grammar school studies. This trend in the number of features can be interpreted as a sign that progress in historical studies was associated with the attempt to highlight essential features rather than with a constant increase of the variety of content motifs. In the 2nd year, about one-third of the definitions included some reference to the economic sphere of society, a quarter to social ideas, and somewhat fewer to politics. In the 4th year, all three domains of ideas were mentioned more frequently. Features of the economy were included in about half of the definitions (in some classes this ratio reached two-thirds), while both ideological and political contents were woven into the definition of social development by one-third of the respondents.

About 30 years ago attempts to define 'social development' as one of the fundamental concepts of history were also analysed. One of the main findings of this analysis was that the mental comprehension of the historical course of humankind is a very difficult task even for those students who are purposefully and even ambitiously prepared for it.

What could be gathered from these attempted definitions was either subjective declarations or statements in scientific terminology about the fact that as time goes by, the situation of humankind becomes better, so that humanity proceeds from an alarming past into a future that justifies optimism. The first question about such grandiose assumptions is how they can account for, and even build on, the historical facts. It seems to be an especially critical issue where the boundary between past and present is set, where the present starts, and what transitions, indicative of progress, can be seen between past and present.

The line of research presented here soon turned in the direction of uncovering the concept of the recent past held by ordinary people. We repeatedly studied how 20th-century Hungarian history was characterized, as experienced by the respondents themselves or by their forebears. We felt justified in checking how respondents divided up history, and even in setting the respondents' own segmentation of time as a starting point, to check where they perceived historical turning points or the beginning or end of a historical period. Besides the central theme of investigation, the respondents were also asked what they could link positive or negative experiences and values with, in the 20th-century life of the family or of society as a whole. A systematic investigation was carried out in the early 1990s, when social and political changes of historical magnitude cast new light on the whole century as it approached its end, providing new approaches to judgements about where the boundaries in 20th-century Hungarian history can be found.

The data of three investigations are available—the responses of different populations to the question 'Into what main periods would you divide 20th-century Hungarian history? From what time to what time did the different

periods last?' For the students sampled in 1991 (11.R91), this was not simply a matter of personal opinion but partly the recollection of school material, or at least a reflection on it. For the restricted group of students applying for admission to the university to become history majors in 1994 (13.R94s), this was a professional question that needed consideration. In 1994, for the members of a national representative sample of 1,000 (14.R94n), this was an unusual task, the historical material of knowledge was not systematic or complete, but was tinted with personal experience, which in fact turned the replies into an expression of personal opinion.

It could be seen from all of these sources that most of the respondents considered 1945, the end of the Second World War, as an important turning point in the history of the 20th century. The ratios were characteristic: in 1991, 81% of the students indicated this year as a year of demarcation; the national representative sample also indicated this date the most frequently, but this only meant 47%. Three other years were quite frequently mentioned. The end of the First World War, which led to considerable changes in the size of the country, occurred to 64% of the students but to only 20% of the national representative sample. The latter ratio was still no higher than 31% even if the votes for the year 1917 were added. For 52% of the students and for 49% of the representatives of the adult population, 1956–57 was a boundary limit. The great social changes of 1989–90 appeared in the replies of 61% of the student sample and in 34% of the national representative sample.

The period of the turn of the century ended with the First World War. As a more subtle limit, the beginning of the war itself and the first revolution of the proletariat in 1919 after the collapse due to the war were also mentioned. This is the year when the second period, the Horthy era, began, lasting roughly until the end of the Second World War. Within this period, the great world economic crisis, the beginning of, and Hungary's entry into, the Second World War, and the year of the fascist take-over in 1944 were also mentioned. The third period of the century was perceived by the respondents to be between 1945 and 1956. Within this period, the communist take-over of 1948 and the tottering of the Rákosi regime in 1953 served as further dates of reference. The fourth long period was rooted in 1956, started in 1957, and lasted until 1989–90, the collapse of the socialist political system. The whole period can be named as the Kádár era. Some of the respondents distinguished the early, more dynamic and less outlined initial period of the 1960s and 1970s, which was cut in half by 1968, the year of the Czechoslovakian invasion. The respondents placed themselves in a fifth period, if this spontaneous segmentation is followed. It is worth noting that despite the systematic and recent nature of the students' knowledge, some portion (6–11%) of the national representative sample made more subtle historical distinctions than did the students, for example, with respect to 1933, 1944, 1953, and 1968.

To sum up, an investigation conducted decades ago showed that history teaching involving Marxist ideology achieved only limited success in forming the students' concept of social development. The assumption that the present was better than the undifferentiated general past and the idea that the future would necessarily be better than the present were both linked with this concept.

In primary schools, the pupils were still unable to identify society as a subject and result of change. It was only in grammar schools that students became able to link this very abstract and comprehensive concept to social relationships and systems. At the end of their grammar school studies, the students mentioned an average of three 'socio-economic formations' in their responses (according to this concept of history 'primitive society', 'slave-owning society', 'feudal class society', and 'capitalist class society' had existed, while 'socialism' existed in the present and would continue to exist). The variability of content features did not increase after a certain point, and between the 2nd and 4th year in secondary school it actually decreased, which can be interpreted as a reduction of opportunities and attempts to identify essential concepts. By the end of their school studies, between half and two-thirds of the respondents mentioned economic aspects and reasons in their descriptions of social development. The central theme of the many responses was that people had produced goods by different methods, in changing systems and with changing results, and their improvement made a higher standard of living and better quality of life possible for wider and wider layers of society. This rational core of the message emerged in examples and implications, and in the circular use of meaningless terminology. The historical examples that the students brought and the language that they used indicated that they were still not able to grasp and comprehend the motives, determined nature, historical fluctuations, and areas of manifestation of this development.

The conception of 20th-century Hungarian history as a past including and influencing personal lives directly was repeatedly investigated. This was also a basic test of the applicability of the concept of development, and of how this concept could direct, accompany or follow thinking about historical facts. One of the fundamental questions was how the respondents segmented the historical past, how they differentiated developmental periods.

At the beginning of the 1990s, data collected from the most varied sources revealed that public thinking considered the end of the Second World War as a turning point in 20th-century Hungarian history. The three additional markers of historical periods indicated by the majority of the students and by about one-third of the national representative sample were the end of the First World War, 1956–57, and 1989–90. These were all events in political history, the fall and emergence of political systems in the country. Systems that could also be linked to the symbolic figures of leading politicians followed one another at these turning points. These were the periods of

Franz Joseph, Miklós Horthy, Mátyás Rákosi and János Kádár. Within this short period of barely one century, virtually the only events that led to historical social changes were those that were most often mentioned: the destruction of the semi-feudal and semi-bourgeois society by the communists in 1945 and over the next few years. The second historical social change is due now, after the events of 1989–90, when the disintegration of the communist dictatorship was completed, and the polarization of society, previously balanced at lower middle-class level, began. The continuity of social development, if such a thing exists, is not unbroken.

Developmental trends implied by historical judgements, 1971: social and family points of view

In a 1971 study, the historical views of the adult population of Hungary were studied. This time, it was not the level and development of historical knowledge that were studied, and the method was not deductive reasoning, which emphasizes the content and application of abstract concepts. On the contrary, in a quasi-inductive way we attempted to discover how individual historical experiences and observations became organized, what overall picture of the 20th century they showed, and what evaluative belief systems developed under the given social circumstances.

The research dealt with views of the 20th century and their organization, that is, it studied the comprehension of a period that could be considered as an historical object while affecting the respondents and their social environment personally. The respondents commented on the history of the 20th century in two respects. On the one hand, they expressed their opinions about the society and the life of people in general in the course of this century. The development of their opinions could have been influenced by what they had learnt in school, from books, from magazines, or the mass media. These channels were controlled by the monolithic party state. On the other hand, these generalizations and evaluative judgements regarding society were also affected by experiences, realizations, and information from non-official institutions, often collected and mediated by the family. This double nature of the sources and their potential conflict was enhanced by the task that asked the respondents to characterize and evaluate the history of the 20th century by describing how the fate, living conditions, progress, and situation of the individual members of their own family developed in the course of the century. In the latter respect, the primary source of information could hardly be other than the experience, traditions, and collective memory of the family. With this background, school studies and messages through culture and mass communication could only be orienting points or frames of reference.

By gathering responses simultaneously to questions regarding society and the history of the family, information was gathered indirectly about the sources of information regarding the past, about their roles, and about the

interaction between the various items of knowledge at different levels of abstraction. In addition to indirect analysis, direct questions were also asked as to whom people believed and trusted more: history books or family traditions and stories.

Members of the national representative sample were asked the following question: 'At times, family experiences (handed down by one's parents or grandparents, or encountered by oneself) do not completely match the general statements of history books. How do you think people resolve this contradiction?'

Several alternative responses were offered. Quite a large proportion (31%) chose the alternative that in case of conflict people believe both sources, saying 'the exception proves the rule'. A small minority (4%) believed that in such cases 'people believe neither of the sources, they remain in doubt'.

The two groups that made a definite choice as to which source would be more trustworthy are especially interesting. According to 19% of the sample, in cases of conflicting information people would believe textbooks or institutional and professional sources, invalidating family and personal experiences. Such responses were quite frequently given by office employees and other white-collar workers, by unskilled and skilled workers. Similar responses were very rare at the two extremes of society, that is, among the intellectuals (9%) and among the agricultural labourers or housewives.

Another 27% of the sample thought that in such conflicting situations people would rely on their families' and their own experiences, rather than on the general statements of textbooks. It was mostly agricultural labourers, housewives, and skilled workers who agreed with this choice, while intellectuals very rarely responded like this. It can well be seen that intellectuals did not tend towards extreme standpoints: in case of conflict they did not want, or were unable, to choose one source and disregard the other.

The social layers of intermediate educational level conformed to the authority of school and professional books in quite a large proportion, while the less educated groups understandably preferred personal experiences and family oral traditions. As regards age, the middle age groups quite often preferred the books. It is more surprising that beside the family preference of the 50 to 60-year-old respondents, the ratio of those who preferred the family was the highest in the youngest adult age group (46%). From among the several possible reasons for choosing the family, the desire to turn away from the official professionals and the ideological historical dogmas can be suspected behind the choice of the latter age group in the national representative sample.

The same respondents' replies to the question 'Do the experiences of your own family match the general statements of the history books completely?' provide important additional material for the interpretation of the responses related to historical sources. Of those who preferred the

books 63% reported a perfect match, while only 31% of the those who sided with the family reported full agreement. Thus, the former group thought not only that they would accept the truths in the books in case of conflicting information, but most of them also thought that the general statements of the books and their family's experiences did not differ significantly. Those who preferred the family found that there were quite often contradictions between the information in the books and the empirical facts, and that in these frequent conflicting situations family experiences could be trusted more.

It emerged from these results that opinions as to the value of historical sources are indeed a relevant indicator of the individual's relationship to the social and political system and its announced principles. The way in which the respondents classed themselves as to 'political interest' provides additional material in this respect. In the given period, political interest could be conceived both as political involvement and as acceptance of the official policy, and there was a certain degree of overlap and unresolved mixture between the two ideas. According to the self-characterization of the respondents on the five-point scale, the greatest political interest was exhibited by the respondents who preferred the books (3.49); those who preferred the family scored significantly less (3.17).

These direct statements about the sources and relationships of society and families can be properly interpreted only if it is known how the respondents understood and presented 20th-century Hungarian history.

Characterization of 20th-century public history

Several methods of measurement were used to discover the respondents' views on 20th-century Hungarian history. One of the methods was to cut out five periods from this historical process and ask for characterizations on bipolar scales of traits. The following periods were used:

- 1900–14, the turn of the century. Some historians consider this period as an organic continuation of the 19th century; in this sense, they use the expression 'the long 19th century'.
- 1919–39, the history of 'truncated Hungary' (as it used to be called after Hungary lost a large proportion of her territory as a result of defeat in the First World War) from the suppression of the civil democratic and the proletarian dictatorial revolutions to the Second World War.
- 1945–48, the 'people's democratic' system of the country, which was defeated in the Second World War and came under Soviet influence; political pluralism developed, but the communist left wing became increasingly dominant.
- 1948–53, from the so-called 'decisive year', that is, the open communist take-over to Stalin's death, that is, the first faltering of the Stalinist system marked by the name of Mátyás Rákosi.

- 1957–(1971), from the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution to the time of the present investigation, that is, to the middle of the 'Kádár era'. By this time, the system had stabilized and was beginning to nurture reforms, but had already recoiled from their realization, mostly under the influence of developments in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

As can be seen from the list above, the periods covered practically the whole 20th century and they touched upon all of the stabilized and marked social and political systems. But the characterization was not extended over the difficult periods of wars, nor over the antecedents of the communist (1919) or anti-communist (1956) revolutions, the rapid succession of events that caused breaks in the flow of history. Nevertheless, the evaluation of the subsequent periods may already give an overall picture about the perceived historical development of the century.

The above periods were evaluated by the national representative sample from five points of view on five-point scales. The questions asked how 'calm' (vs. 'full of struggle'), 'happy' (vs. 'unhappy'), 'honest' (vs. 'lying'), 'dynamic' (vs. 'problematic'), or 'free/relaxed' (vs. 'filled with fear') the given periods had been. The order of the positive and negative members of the pairs of traits alternated. The unweighted mean of the five judgements was calculated as a rough approximation of global evaluation.

These means showed that the national representative sample judged the two periods before 1945 negatively both in themselves and in comparison with the subsequent three, positive periods (see Figure 5.1). In spite of the definite and unequivocal divisions, the trend of development was not unbroken or linear. The turn of the century was seen as slightly more advantageous (2.26) than the Horthy era between the two world wars (1.95). The evaluation of the coalition period after 1945 and the subsequent Stalinism in Hungary barely rose above the neutral scale value of three (3.09 and 3.19, respectively). As compared to these, the judgement of the period after 1957, that is, the evaluation of the present from which the respondents looked back, was outstanding in every respect (4.47).

The means of the whole sample conceal considerable variation between individual responses. For 10–20% of the respondents the rank of the periods was reversed. Nevertheless, when the sample was divided into different social and demographic sub-samples, the above ranking of periods recurred continually, with a few exceptions that are detailed below.

As for the positive and negative extremes, the sample was the most uniform when the periods between 1919–39 and between 1957–71 were considered. Quite a large proportion (22%) could not express their opinion about the period between 1900–14. This period came fourth in the indirect comparison of the periods based on the evaluation hidden in the characterization. The oldest respondents, however, ranked it higher, above the coalition period just after the Second World War. The evaluations of the periods between 1945–48 and between 1948–53 were inconsistent



Figure 5.1 Trend of development in the history of society and the family, 1971: evaluative charge of the characterizations of the periods.

internally: the sample was divided over this issue (see Figure 5.2). The views conflicted in their indirect order as well. The whole sample, especially the workers, preferred the period between 1948–53. Retired people, agricultural workers, intellectuals, and educated employees, however, considered the period of Stalinism worse than the coalition period after the Second World War.

The difference, as seen in the global index of evaluation, was especially marked in two instances of the responses of the intellectuals. The intellectual respondents were in sharp contrast to the whole sample when they rated the dimension 'free/relaxed vs. filled with fear' as significantly better in 1945 48 than in 1948–53, while they made no such distinction between the latter period and the Horthy era. Furthermore, the intellectuals made less significant distinctions between the different periods than other respondent groups, especially the skilled workers.

Generally, an evaluation hierarchy of the periods could be seen in the judgements of the different traits in the whole sample (see Figure 5.3). The greatest number of significant differences appeared in the judgements of how happy and how honest people had been in the different periods.

In all five traits, significant differences separated the period after 1957 from all the other periods. Only the Horthy era differed from the two periods after 1945 to such a great extent, with the exception that the period between 1945–48 was not considered as significantly less 'full of struggle'. It has to be noted that in the respondents' view, it was precisely this 'full of struggle' trait



Figure 5.2 Trend of development in social history, 1971: from the aspects of different social groups.



Figure 5.3 Trend of development in social history, 1971: from the aspects of different traits.

that differentiated the two periods subsequent to 1945. The comparison of the two profiles revealed a picture that was far from uniform: the period between 1948–53 was thought to be not only calmer but also more dynamic, and the sample admitted that it had been less 'happy', less 'honest', and less

'relaxed'. These differences in the mean, however, did not reach the level of statistical significance because of the high standard deviation.

Characterization of 20th-century history of the family

The respondents were also asked to recall and evaluate the past of their own families. For the sake of comparison, the same periods were specified as the ones above. Naturally, the aspects of judgement were different. The respondents were asked how their families had spent the given periods: 'in peace' or 'under strain', 'independent' or 'subordinate', 'in wealth' or 'in poverty', 'respected' or 'despised', 'satisfied' or 'unsatisfied'. The responses were always given on a five-point scale.

When the unweighted mean of the five judgements was considered as the rough index of the evaluation of the period, marked differences appeared again in the periods before and after 1945 (see Figure 5.1). The global judgement of the turn of the century (1900–14) was close to neutral (3.03), behind which lay quite diversified features: it was not doubted that the family lived 'in peace' and was 'respected', but more and more negative evaluations were given with respect to the family having been dissatisfied and subordinate, and especially about poverty. A similar profile emerged for the Horthy era between 1919 and 1939: the same features as before were positive and negative. The general level of evaluation, however, decreased considerably, and its absolute level became negative (2.75). The global evaluations of the periods after 1945, however, were definitely positive. According to the respondents, their families lived under slightly better conditions and in a better social climate between 1945 and 1948 (3.63) than between 1948 and 1953 (3.50). The financial situation of the family was considered to be relatively and even absolutely unfavourable. In contrast to this it was clearly indicated by scores over 4 that the family enjoyed respect both in the coalition period and in the Stalinist period in Hungary. The period after 1957, that is, the present for the respondents, was evaluated the most positively (4.50). Again, it was financial wealth that was the least emphasized, but the mean score in this respect was still positive. All of the other scores averaged higher than 4, and, oddly enough, the highest scores in the evaluation indicated that the family lived in peace.

Naturally, the trend of development outlined above was not uniformly present in individual responses or in those of every social and demographic group. It was generally agreed that the most recent period, between 1957 and 1971, was the most favourable: 78% of the respondents put this period in first place, while 12% rated it second. Nevertheless, 48% of the respondents indicated 1948–53 as one of the two most positive periods, 44% indicated the period between 1945 and 1948, 21% indicated 1900–14, and even the most critically evaluated period (1919–39) was chosen by 19% of the respondents. The last two periods took one of the last two positions in almost half of the whole sample (41% and 51% of the responses,

respeclively) in the evaluation hierarchy of the periods. The respondents were divided in the sense that strongly opposing views emerged with respect to every historical period, although in different proportions.

The opinions of the different social and demographic groups diverged in three respects (see Figure 5.4). First, the less educated groups (housewives) evaluated the periods before 1945 quite favourably, especially in comparison with the intellectuals. Second, marked differences appeared between country and city dwellers, and especially between the agricultural workers and the skilled workers with respect to the evaluation of 1948–53, the Rákosi era. Third, the generation that was younger than 40 in 1971 was more critical of the period after 1945 than the older generations. This was not true of the period between 1951 and 1971, which received a generally positive evaluation.

As for the periods of family history, there were differences in the global evaluations, but these differences did not appear the same way in the judgements of all five characteristics (see Figure 5.5). The most sensitive indicator was the 'independent' or 'subordinate' situation of the family: this was the aspect that differentiated the periods significantly. The judgement of satisfaction-dissatisfaction came second, while the differentiation of the other features was slighter. It was a peculiar exception that in the wealth-poverty dimension the difference between the two periods was sometimes just the opposite of that of the global evaluation. Thus, as compared to the privations of the period between 1945 and 1948, the period between 1948 and 1953 was seen as more favourable. This is just an example of the inconsistency of the evaluation of these periods. Agricultural workers and



Figure 5.4 Trend of development in the history of the family, 1971: from the aspects of different social groups.



Figure 5.5 Trend of development in the history of the family, 1971: from the aspects of different traits.

the older generations, however, held more consistent views. They judged the period between 1948 and 1953 to be worse in terms of wealth-poverty as well.

It was striking that there was quite a stable trait hierarchy of the characterizations about the situations of the families. Peace and respect were two features that were repeatedly judged to be positive in any of the periods. Satisfaction and wealth were repeatedly judged to be more negative. The latter features were actually negative in two and in four periods, respectively. This relatively stable structure implied that the differentiation between periods was crossed by another tendency, namely, the ambition of the respondents to express the high value of their families. They did this by emphasizing both the harmony and the respect enjoyed by the family and the difficulties that they had had to overcome. At any rate, financial wealth was not one of the values to be displayed.

The respondents' relationship with their family history and their conception of the different periods of the past was investigated in a different way, using a different approach. The 'periods' discussed so far conform to the developments of social and political history, the judgements can be contrasted with the evaluation of the periods, but it is impossible to identify whom or whose situation the respondents referred to: to their own, to their parents' or perhaps to their grandparents' life. In order to supply these missing data, direct questions regarding these three generations were also asked. These questions covered three areas for each generation: the characterization of the individual representative of each generation, the

recall of opinions regarding certain social and political events, and the definition of the social situation of each of the three generations.

The respondents had to characterize themselves, their fathers, and one of their grandfathers on five-point scales for each of five traits. They had to evaluate how far these three members of the family enjoyed the respect of others, how well they were satisfied with their situation, to what extent they were interested in politics, how hard-working they were, and how much of a family person they were. The respondents did characterize themselves almost without exception, while 95% and 63% characterized their father and the grandfather they knew better, respectively. In the characterization of the two previous generations diligence and respect were recurrently mentioned as positive traits, while being a family person was emphasized in the self-characterization. Satisfaction was considered as less characteristic of any member of the family, while political interest was the least. In the case of parents and grandparents, a definite lack of such interest was expressed, while they felt they themselves had a moderate level of political interest.

Typical patterns of evaluations could be seen in the different age and socio-occupational groups. The self-evaluation of intellectuals, of employees and of other 'white-collar' occupations was quite high (over 4.3), to which the group of skilled workers was also close. In a peculiar reflection of social hierarchy, the self-evaluation of unskilled workers and agricultural labourers was below this value (4.15 and 4.18, respectively). The self-evaluation of housewives was the lowest. It was striking that the most mobile groups of society, intellectuals at one end and unskilled workers at the other, characterized themselves more favourably than their fathers or their grandfathers, and thus they reported a kind of rise in esteem within the family. There were only slight differences in the evaluations of the three generations among skilled workers. Agricultural workers and housewives esteemed their father and their grandfather higher than themselves to a greater or lesser degree. The observations noted above were coloured by the fact that respondents under 40 were more critical of both themselves and their ancestors than were the older members of the national representative sample.

The results that reflect social differences in the experience and principles of child-rearing in the family can only be indicated here. Questions were asked as to 'What were child-rearing practices like before? For instance, how did your parents raise you? Did they interfere with…?' Seven situations were mentioned where decisions had to be made at various levels. The following questions were also asked in connection with the same situations: 'What do you consider appropriate? Should a parent interfere with what his/her child…?' The overall results showed that the above-mentioned relatively immobile groups of society remember being actively directed by their families, but they themselves did not make such demands. The content of the intellectuals' responses was different: they judged their own upbringing as

unrestrictive, while they wanted to reserve the right to 'interfere' and direct actively.

Investigations into different generations provided the opportunity to ask about the reactions of the respondents and their family members to certain historical and political events. The respondents had to reply positively or negatively to these items. For the first time, in 1971, Hungarian public opinion research asked for reactions to statements like The Trianon peace treaty filled him with deep bitterness'. This question was answered by 46% of the respondents about themselves: 70% of those who answered said yes; 19% said no. The proportion of intellectuals and agricultural workers who accepted this statement was higher than the average, while less than the average ratio of employees and skilled workers did so.

Considering that the tendency to acquiesce might distort the ratio of responses concerning the significance of the Trianon Treaty, the next item was phrased in a negative form: 'He did not approve of the reannexation of Transylvania and the Upper Northern territories'. Of the 59% of respondents who gave answers to this item, the majority rejected it: 42% agreed, most of whom were housewives, who can be assumed to be outsiders in historical and political issues, and skilled workers.

Opinions about the situation that developed at the end of the Second World War were expressed by 57% of the respondents. The statement was: 'He expected the British and the Americans to drive the Germans out of Hungary': 11% agreed, while 59.5% definitely rejected it.

A series of further statements explored reactions to the typical changes of the period from the Second World War through 1956 to the end of the 1960s. It seemed to be a general tendency that responses about the opinions of fathers and grandfathers deviated more boldly from official ideological expectations as perceived by the respondents than the opinions of the respondents themselves. Thus, when talking about fathers and grandfathers, the opposition to the Trianon Peace Treaty was more emphatic, the expectation of British and the American troops was not so minor, and more of the respondents stated that their fathers and grandfathers had doubts about nationalization than those who admitted to holding such opinions themselves.

An attempt was made to develop a method for measuring the 'perception of social situation'. The starting points were Bogardus' scale measuring the relationship with groups and Triandis' device for measuring 'behavioural differential'. This time, these items were reversed: rather than asking what kind of relationships and forms of social contact were desirable or acceptable by the respondent (or his/her father or grandfather), we asked what kind of relationships and forms of social contact were possible and attainable for individuals at different levels of the social hierarchy. The instructions were as follows: 'We would like to know more about the social habits of several decades. Please try to recall the social situation that your grandfather/father was in at the age of 30–35. In accordance with the

customs of those times a man in such a position….' Different occupational categories and related relationships expressing equality were offered to the respondents. Thus, the statements 'He could marry into the family of a peasant', 'He could make friends with a teacher', 'He could frequent the same society as a station-master', and 'He could marry into the family of a managing director' are examples of the eight possible relationships.

No matter whether the questions concerned the grandfather, the father or the respondent him/herself, the eight occupational categories under investigation turned out to be in essentially the same hierarchical order. In all three cases, the social situation of the person in question was most frequently characterized as being at the same level as workers, cobblers, and peasants, with whom they could enter into a relationship based on equality. In all three cases, it was very rare for the characterizations to imply that the person in question could get close to a head physician or to a managing director on equal terms. Thus, quite a stable hierarchy of occupational prestige was reported both when looking back to the past and when talking about contemporary relations. The positions of the different occupations did move, depending on the period and on the generation in question. Thus, for example, the 'teacher' in the more distant past seemed to be less accessible in the social hierarchy than in more recent times; the category of 'head physician' seemed to be even less accessible in more recent times than the 'managing director'. Regarding their own position, however, beyond these particular changes, the most significant difference was that far more 'usual relationships' were marked in connection with every category: the respondents, comparing and contrasting their own experience with the past, perceived an increase in equality.

Nevertheless, the most fundamental differences depended on whether the members of the representative sample were talking about their forebears (grandfather or father) or about themselves. There were fewer answers about the grandfathers' social situation (75%) than about the fathers' (90%). Despite these differences, the characterizations of the grandfathers' and the fathers' situation, which most probably referred to the times before 1945, were essentially alike. The most frequent response was that the forebears were or could be on equal terms with two or three categories. In the case of the grandparents, 35% of the sample stated that their situation was linked to social classes which were the lowest in prestige; this ratio was 41% in the cases of the fathers. Relationships with the lower and middle classes were assumed by 12% and 23%. In contrast, the ratio of those who saw their forebears as equal to the middle or upper social classes was less by whole orders of magnitude.

Talking about themselves, the respondents characterized their own scope radically differently: 41% declared that all of the eight relationships were available to them, while 20%, 15%, and 10% considered seven, six, and five relationships, respectively, as 'usual' in their own social situation under the circumstances of the period.

The mere number of possible relationships indicated that a significant ratio of the members of the national representative sample did not feel restricted by social class. Nearly half of the respondents (47%) claimed that they were able to cultivate equal relationships with all three classes, and that they actually did so. This percentage reached 70% among the intellectuals, but it was also considerable among the other intellectual occupations. It was higher in the capital than in the country, and it was significantly more favourable among younger people (64% between 20 and 30 years of age) than among older ones. About a third of the sample (32%) perceived that their scope was restricted to the lower and middle classes of society, and 12% stated that they had equal relationships with only the lower classes of society. The number of these latter two groups was greater in the villages (36% and 17%, respectively). It was mostly the agricultural labourers who gave this response (43% and 16%). A considerable proportion of the housewives (25%) were peculiarly characterized by narrowing their relationships to the lower social classes. However, apart from these perceived and demonstrated limits, the survey indicated enormous changes in the perception of the social situation of the different generations. The responses show that the respondents, that is, the representatives of the Hungarian adult population of the 1970s, experienced a revolutionary transformation in social relationships, evidently after the Second World War.

The domain of social relationships as related to political interest played a peculiar role: those who presented their forebears as being restricted to the lower social classes declared less political interest (3.21) than those who indicated relationships with the middle and even higher social classes (4.33). This concordance was still valid in terms of the social situation of the respondents themselves: an almost linear correlation was found between the 'social scale' of their relationships and the amount of political interest that they showed.

With respect to the more distant past of the forebears, this was partly interesting, since it contradicted the basic tendency observed throughout the investigation: those who were more interested in (and committed to) politics looked at the periods before 1945 more critically than those who were less interested in politics. Nevertheless, it fitted well with the basic tendency for post-1945 developments to be evaluated more favourably by politically interested respondents than by others.

This 'consistent' display of the declared position was evident in the evaluation of the different periods of the history both of the family and of society (see Figures 5.6 and 5.7). It was especially marked in the more negative evaluation of the family's history and in emphasizing the positive sides of present-day public history. It would have been difficult to establish clearly whether an objectively described past frustration had led to a better political acceptance of the present, or whether it was identification with the current political system that predisposed the respondents to distance them selves critically from the past, especially within the familial-personal history.



Figure 5.6 Trend of development in social history, 1971: from the aspects of different levels of political interest.



Figure 5.7 Trend of development in the history of the family, 1971: from the aspects of different levels of political interest.

At any rate, similar characteristics were found in the respondents who 'preferred' the books (i.e., the official sources) as compared to those who preferred family sources (see Figure 5.8). They also contrasted the past and present more, mainly by emphasizing the present positive aspects of the



Figure 5.8 Trend of development in the history of the family, 1971: from the aspects of preference of different historical sources.

history of the family and of society. It was an interesting and eloquent testimony to the fact that the choice of sources regarding the past is most closely linked to the intended and real degree of present social adaptation.

The observations regarding this set and personality characteristics should not divert attention from the fact that negative presentation of the past and positive presentation of the present, and even their opposition was a widespread standpoint throughout the sample, both for public history and family history. This contrast was greater in the responses of those who lived in the cities, whose occupation required higher qualifications, and who were of middle age, and it was fainter in the replies of the village-dwelling, less educated and older respondents, but it was quite general. The standpoints of the different social groups differed mainly in the evaluation of the disputable periods following 1945, and the opinions of the members of the whole sample depended on whether family history or the life of the whole society was in question. All things considered, the great majority of the respondents indicated that the Horthy era was the nadir of this century, while the apogee was reached during the Kádár era; and they did so in 1971, in the middle of the Kádár era.

To sum up, talking about the 20th-century history of society and of their own family, members of the national representative sample contrasted the bad period before 1945 and the more favourable periods after 1945. They stated that the Horthy era had represented a decline as compared to the turn of the century, it was a nadir of the century in the history of both society and their family. The transitional periods immediately before the communist regime (1945–48) and the Stalinist period (1948–53) were seen merely as

steps towards the post-1957 system, which represented the peak of the history of both society and the family.

The general level of evaluation was usually more favourable when the respondents were reconstructing the history of their family, especially when 'points of honour' were concerned, that is, whether or not the respondents and their ancestors met with recognition and lived in inner peace. Nevertheless, the respondents did not accept the statement that their families had lived in definite sufficiency. The judgements of the periods of social history were more critical, the differences in evaluations were greater.

Although there were parallels between the trend of development in the history of the family and that of society, there was also a difference when the pre-communist period of 1945–48 was compared with the height of communist dictatorship in 1948–53: the former period was seen as better for the family, and the latter one was seen as more favourable for society. These differences in evaluation were rather faint, and did not affect every trait characterizing the atmosphere of the period. The respondents thought that their families had suffered greater privations immediately after the Second World War than later, but that society was less free, honest, and happy during the Rákosi era than a few years earlier.

The opinions of different groups within the sample also differed in evaluating these two critical periods. Respondents in the country, especially peasants, thought that both society as a whole and their own families had led better lives immediately after the war, while skilled workers saw it the other way around: they perceived no decline for their families, and thought that the Rákosi era was better for the history of society than the previous period. The socio-historical evaluations of the intellectuals were rather peculiar: in agreement with the political expectations of the age, they were critical both of the Horthy era on the one side and of the Rákosi period on the other. Furthermore, they were the ones who evaluated the democratic transitional period between 1945 and 1948 the most positively.

Historical judgements were certainly influenced by political commitment and conformism, too. The group with high political involvement (according to self-report) was markedly critical of the Horthy era, but more inclined to accept the Rákosi regime and the most favourable of all to the Kádár era. A group that became known as the 'textbook preferrers', who preferred official opinions about history to family experiences on principle, was selected. Their image of the history of the century was more polarized than that of the 'family preferrers' who represented the opposite principle: the 'textbook preferrers' described the periods before 1945 more negatively, those after 1945 more positively. The difference between the two groups was nevertheless the greatest in the case of the socio-historical evaluation of 1948–53.

The evaluation of the Rákosi period, the era of Hungarian Stalinism, seemed to be very controversial. Social experiences were divided, and in 1971 there were no distinct ideological expectations that would have offered

external cues for everybody. Nor was it evident how far the existing party state system associated itself with these antecedents, and how much recognition of continuity it expected.

The great majority of the respondents accepted a historical series of evaluations that divided and emphasized the given socio-political arrangement along the temporal dimension. Only a small minority, less than onefifth of the sample, deviated from this developmental trend in their judgements. A conscious wish to conform, a self-comforting acceptance of the present situation and of future perspectives, and a belief in apparently well-founded historical knowledge were certainly inextricably entangled. Recalling memories of family history by talking about their parents and grandparents also gave the respondents an opportunity and an excuse to voice opinions that differed from the perceived official ideology (see, for example, the responses to the first questions regarding Trianon). However, judgements about the family's possibilities of social relationships and scope for social movement agreed with the basic tendencies of historical evaluations: the respondents were convinced that Hungarian society was more divided and more hierarchical before 1945 than afterwards.

It emerged that the respondents' own social position had an effect on their self-esteem and on the relationship between their evaluation of themselves and of their ancestors. One finding that will be of some interest to future investigations and will affect future socio-political developments is that members of the young adult generation of the national representative sample were more critical not only of themselves and of their ancestors but also of the periods after 1945 in the history both of the family and of society.

Characterization of periods and implied trends of development, 1981 and 1991

In 1981 and in 1991, students were asked the same questions about five historical points of time (08.R81 and 11.R91). The respondents had to judge the situation of Hungary in nine different aspects on seven-point scales. These aspects concerned the economic sphere of society (the rate of economic development and the standard of living of the population), internal affairs (the opportunity of the people to influence national politics and the climate of opinion in the country), foreign policy (the effectiveness of foreign policy and level of international prestige of the country), the country's general level of culture, athletic achievements, and the natural beauties of the country. The questions approached the situation of Hungary from several angles, which were also used when the respondents were asked to compare different countries.

The five points in time were set, using apparently arbitrary intervals of 25 years, at 1900, 1925, 1950, 1975, and 2000. However, in terms of the real rhythm of historical changes these dates do represent the typical eras of recent Hungarian history. In 1900, Hungary was part of the Austrian-

Hungarian empire under Franz Joseph. In 1925, the counter-revolutionary system became stabilized in the country, which had suffered significant territorial losses, under the regency of Miklós Horthy. 1950 was the year of Soviet influence and the communist dictatorship of Mátyás Rákosi, 'Stalin's best disciple'. 1975 was the year of the stabilized and pacified party state, in which János Kádár pursued his policy of balance. 2000 was the future, an attainable prospect for the respondents.

The judgements made from totally different aspects were averaged without weighting to produce a primary, global index for the evaluation of the different periods. In 1981, the evaluative hierarchy was uniform and unambiguous (see Figure 5.9). The periods received increasingly favourable evaluation according to their chronological order, which showed that there was an assumption of an almost unbroken development hidden in the responses of the students. The students probably thought that whatever happened was inevitable, but in the end, the life and efficiency of Hungarian society was improving and this improvement would continue in the future. This self-encouraging optimism resembled the mechanism of the 'belief in a just world': many disasters may have struck the country in the past and might strike her in the future, but development proceeds, the overall picture improves, 'the wheels of history cannot be reversed'.

In 1991, at the time of the second survey, the evaluation of the five historical periods showed a totally different picture, as will be seen in the detailed description of the results. The respondents no longer believed in unbroken development. On the contrary, they saw 20th-century Hungarian history as an overall decline followed by a hopeful escape from difficulties.



Figure 5.9 Trend of development in the history of society, 1981 and 1991: evaluative charge of the characterization of historical periods.

The line of development connecting the five periods formed a steep U-shaped curve. The evaluation of the turn of the century was essentially neutral. The evaluation of 1925, the Horthy era, was more negative, but the nadir came with the Rákosi era in 1950. 1975 came at an intermediate, improving stage, and was neutrally evaluated. The only really positive period could be found in 2000, in the perspective of the future. When the two lines of development were compared, it was striking that the evaluation of the two periods before 1945 was slightly more positive in 1991 than ten years before, while the periods after 1945 were judged less positively than previously. This was also true of future perspectives, of the evaluation of 2000. In general, expectations were more optimistic in 1981 than in 1991.

The turn of the century

In 1981, the mean judgement of the characterization of the first period was very negative, and did not even reach the level of 3 on the scale (2.61). The most favourable judgements about the turn of the century regarded the natural beauties of the country. All the other judgements were negative, ranging from 1 to 3. Athletic achievements and the rate of economic development were not very heavily condemned, but the standard of living and erudition of the population, and 'the opportunity of the people to influence national polities' were very strongly criticized. It can be said that the respondents perceived the material, cultural and political situation of Hungary at the turn of the century as disastrous. Their judgements were absolutely or relatively more favourable in socially and politically less relevant questions.

In 1981, when the judgements regarding the turn of the century were subjected to factor analysis, separate groups of characteristics emerged (see Table 5.1). The factor with the largest explanatory power appeared in the judgement of the most critical features, while the evaluation of the positive side belonged to the second factor led by appreciation of the 'natural beauties'. In 1991, this factor structure reappeared in essence; the heaviest load on the first, negative factor was in the judgement of standard of living (.78), while the strongest manifestation of the second factor, representing the positive side, was the favourable judgement of the natural beauties of greater Hungary.

Nevertheless, the global evaluation of the period was less critical than it had been in 1981, being closer to the neutral (4.1). The appreciation of natural beauties was strikingly high with a scale value of almost 6. The mean judgements of the rate of economic development, of climate of opinion, and of athletic achievement were over 4. Even the negative features were not scored lower than 3. The strongest doubts concerned the opportunity of people to influence political decisions.

Table 5.1 Characterization of historical periods, 1981 and 1991: means and factor structure

1981

	1900			1925			1950			1975			2000		
	FL	*A*	*M*	*FL*	*A*	*M*	*FL*	*A*	*M*	*FL*	*A*	*M*	*FL*	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.81	l	1.97	.82	f	2.36	.79	f	4.64	.77	f	5.54	.81	f	6.14
	.77	p	1.88	.80	l	2.51	.75	p	4.17	.75	l	5.45	.79	l	6.27
	.76	f	2.15	.79	p	2.45	.69	e	4.22	.74	p	5.67	.73	e	6.18
	.75	c	1.93	.74	c	2.58	.65	i	3.80	.67	e	5.49	.73	i	5.69
	.64	e	2.52	.60	e	2.91	.64	l	3.95	.68	c	5.25	.72	p	6.30
	.54	i	2.54	.58	i	2.78	.55	c	3.86	.67	d	5.50	.69	c	6.02
factor 2	.87	n	4.75	.50	d	3.21	.78	a	4.27	.61	i	5.06	.66	d	6.23
	.57	a	2.88	.86	n	4.42	.60	d	4.53	.56	a	4.91	.66	a	5.65
	.51	d	2.65	.59	a	3.34	.58	n	4.55	.53	n	5.24	.48	n	5.19

1991

	1900			1925			1950			1975			2000		
	FL	*A*	*M*	*FL*	*A*	*M*	*FL*	*A*	*M*	*FL*	*A*	*M*	*FL*	*A*	*M*
factor 1	.78	l	3.74	.73	l	3.28	.76	e	3.15	.76	f	3.86	.77	l	5.09
	.71	p	3.12	.70	c	3.67	.75	p	2.65	.74	p	3.22	.76	f	4.83
	.69	c	3.56	.69	i	3.20	.74	i	3.06	.72	e	3.76	.73	i	5.05
	.67	i	3.97	.61	p	3.22	.67	f	2.91	.71	i	3.66	.71	e	5.39
	.64	e	3.86	.56	f	3.16	.63	l	3.14	.70	d	3.93	.70	c	5.26
	.63	f	4.14	.40	a	4.10	.51	c	3.73	.66	l	4.15	.69	d	5.16
	.55	d	4.35	.78	n	4.70	.30	n	4.18	.66	c	4.29	.68	p	5.46
	.52	a	4.14	.58	d	3.87	.88	a	4.97	.48	n	4.21	.49	a	5.54
f2	.87	n	5.85	.48	e	3.41	.55	d	3.78	.34	a	4.92	.41	n	3.97

Notes

FL = factor loading, A = attribute, M = mean

a = achievement of athletes, c = civilization, d = pace of economic development, e = efficiency of foreign affairs, f = public feeling, i = international authority, l = living standards, n = natural beauties, p = intervention in political life

The Horthy era

The characterization of 1925, the year representing the Horthy era, resembled that of the turn of the century in many respects, when a large sample of students was asked to judge its different traits. In 1981, the global index of evaluation on a seven-point scale was 2.96. As regards the trait profile of the characterization, the 'natural beauties' of the country were relatively the most positive and the only qualitatively positive trait.

Between 1900 and 1925, significant changes took place in the geographical area of the country. Hungary lost two-thirds of her territory, including areas of great natural beauty. Thus, there is good reason for the

evaluation of this trait to become less favourable in 1925 than in 1900. The most positive trait was thus less favourable than in the previous period.

However, the general tendency was different. In 1981, the students gave a more positive overall description of the Horthy era than of the turn of the century. The evaluation of athletic achievement and that of the rate of economic development were between 3 and 4 on the scales. The rest of the traits scored less than 3. The respondents evidently felt that in the Horthy era the Hungarians had no opportunity to influence national politics. This time, however, the most negative evaluation regarded the climate of opinion in 1925, which was perceived as bad.

The factor structure of the characterization was set by the evaluative nature of the above-mentioned traits with respect to 1925, too. A negative, critical factor dominated the historical characterization, which had the heaviest load on the judgement of the climate of opinion. There was a second factor, too, with less explanatory power, which appeared primarily as the existence and quality of 'natural beauties'. In 1991, there were two factors again in the characterization of the Horthy era. The content and range of both were much as before. So were the internal structures of the characterizations of the two periods. The first factor containing the negative traits was found mainly in judgements of the standard of living (factor load: .74), while the second factor of positive evaluation was expressed mainly in the judgement of 'natural beauties'.

In 1991, there were only two traits in the characterization of the Horthy era that averaged between 4 and 5 on the scale: natural beauties and athletic achievements. The rest of the traits scored between 3 and 4, with climate of opinion having the most negative evaluation again. On the whole, the global evaluation index, that is, the unweighted mean of the evaluations of the different traits, was negative (mean: 3.6). This mean on the seven-point scale can be analysed within two frames of reference. On the one hand, it was less favourable than judgements made at the same time about the turn of the century: the respondents evaluated the Horthy era as a decline. On the other hand, the overall image of the same period was more favourable than it had been ten years before. In 1991, the judgements about the period before the Second World War were still negative, but they had become less extreme.

The Rákosi era

In 1981 it already seemed possible to ask the students for an evaluation of the 1950s. On the whole, the final outcome of the Stalinist period in Hungary seemed to be positive: the unweighted mean of the traits was 4.17. Most of the traits received scores higher than 4. This time, athletic achievements were at the top, followed by four other traits: 'natural beauties', and important social traits like 'rate of economic development', 'efficiency of foreign policy', 'democracy in political decision making' (see Figure 5.10). The four traits that appeared with negative score values (below



Figure 5.10 Trait profile of the characterization of 1950, given in 1981 and 1991.

4) were 'unfavourable climate of opinion', 'cultural affairs', 'insufficient standards of living', and 'lack of international prestige'.

This characterization of 1981 reflected the effects of two factors. The first one appeared primarily in the negative judgement of the climate of opinion (factor load: .79), but it affected the evaluation of other critical traits, too. In fact, the evaluation of the efficiency of foreign affairs and that of political decision making were logically organized with these traits. The second factor contained the three most positive traits of the characterization. In 1991 the factor structure remained the same. The only difference was that the decisive role of the second factor was restricted to athletic achievements and the rate of economic development, while the judgement of 'natural beauties' was not even remotely linked to it.

In 1991, the level of global evaluation of 1925 fell to 3.4 on the seven-point scale. This was more negative than the global index of the Horthy era, and much less than that of the same period evaluated ten years before. The judgement of the athletic achievements almost reached 5 on the scale, but the only other trait that had a positive score was 'natural beauties'. The rest of the traits scored less than the neutral value of 4. Climate of opinion and especially the evaluation of the democratic enforcement of the will of the people scored between 2 and 3. This characterization of the 1950s was more consistent, both with respect to evaluation and logically, than ten years before. Looking back from a more distant historical perspective, from a new social and political system, the 1991 respondents expressed a generally less

positive evaluation of the Rákosi era. The two traits that the respondents probably associated with democracy were especially negatively evaluated.

The Kádár era

In 1981, the respondents were still quite close to 1975, the next period to be characterized. They could evaluate their own country and their own situation in relation to this not particularly significant year of the Kádár era. It is unlikely that the students in the sample would have attempted, or been able to find the specific characteristics of 1975, and to point out that the period was marked by a small move to the left within Kádár's policy of equilibrium.

The global evaluation of 1975 was well above the scale value of 5. The possibility of enforcing the people's political will and the positive climate of opinion was judged the highest, but the rate of economic development, the efficiency of foreign policy, and the standard of living were also highly evaluated. Almost all of the judgements scored above 5, the only exception being athletic achievement with a mean score value of 5.34. Thus, the most favourable traits of the characterization profile were of a political nature, and economic aspects of judgement were positive and close to one another, while judgements of non-social and non-political aspects came lower down the scale.

Compared with other periods, this period was unusual in having only one factor behind the whole characterization, where the factor loads of 'climate of opinion' (.77) and 'standard of living' (.75) were the greatest. This exceptional order in the characterization was repeated in 1991, when a single factor lay behind the judgement of 1975 from nine aspects, and explained 42.7% of all variance. In 1991, 'public feeling' (.76) and the people's 'opportunity to influence' politics (.74) had the greatest factor loads.

By 1991, the characterization of this part of the Kádár era had undergone radical changes in content. The global mean of evaluation was 3.8, which was slightly better than the same respondents' characterization of the Horthy era, but two whole points lower than the evaluation given in 1981. It is characteristic that only the athletic achievements of 1975 were evaluated in the same way, scoring 4.91 and 4.93 in 1981 and in 1991, respectively. Thus, what had been the most negative trait became the most positive in the trait profile of the era (see Figure 5.11).

Besides athletic achievements, only 'natural beauties', which are socially and politically neutral, and the population's cultural level and standard of living received positive scores. All of the other traits received negative scores between 3 and 4. The judgements of the climate of opinion, international effectiveness and prestige, and the population's 'opportunity to influence' politics were especially low. Apparently, the judgements made in 1981 during the Kádár period were completely reversed ten years later, after the Kádár period had ended. Not only was there a dramatic change in the degree and quality of global evaluation, but the traits that had once been the most favourably evaluated were now seen as the most problematic ones.



Figure 5.11 Trait profile of the characterization of 1975, given in 1981 and 1991.

Future prospects

The year 2000 lay in the future in 1981 as well as in 1991, but in 1981 the millennium was rarely mentioned, while in 1991 its slogan-like repetition appeared in the most varied political programs.

In 1981, the future looked very bright: the future situation of the country scored 5.96 on the seven-point scale. The majority of the judgements of different traits averaged above 6. The most optimistic judgements regarded the people's 'opportunity to influence' politics, the standard of living, and the rate of economic development. Only three, still positive traits scored less than 6: 'international prestige of the country', 'athletic achievements', and 'natural beauties'. Not only the relative score but the absolute score of the judgement of the last trait fell back as compared to the characterization of 1975. This worry about the environment cast the only shadow over the otherwise almost unclouded optimism.

In 1981, the characterization of the year 2000 clustered around a single factor. As with the judgements of 1975, the evaluations of 'climate of opinion' and 'standard of living' had the greatest factor loads (.81 and .79, respectively). The number of factors did not change in 1991, and the same factors had the greatest factor load: 'standard of living' (.78) and 'climate of opinion' (.76).

In 1991, the global mean of evaluation of the future perspective was 4.9. This was much lower than ten years before, but in comparison with

characterizations of other periods it was by far the most positive. The majority of the judgements scored higher than 5, the students' expectations were the most positive with regard to athletic achievements, but the expectations of democratic public life, the people's 'opportunity to influence' politics, followed immediately. Oddly enough, one of the two judgements that scored less than 5 concerned positive climate of opinion. The other definitely negative expectation was related to the fate of 'natural beauties'. The student sample judged the situation of the environment more pessimistically than ever before.

The characterization profiles of different historical periods were similar in 1981 and 1991 (see Table 5.2). In 1981, there was a great similarity between the descriptions of 1900 and of 1925, and between those of 1975 and 2000. The image of the distant past, and that of the present and future, stood in sharp contrast. 1950, however, did not resemble either end of the century.

Talking about the earlier periods, the respondents saw natural beauties in a favourable light, more or less closely followed by athletic achievements, then by the more critically evaluated rate of economic development. Democratic freedom of expression, standard of living, and cultural level represented the nadir. With regard to the present and future, however, it was precisely the latter aspects that were emphasized in 1981, while the greatest doubts were expressed about athletic achievements and the preservation of natural beauties.

In 1991, the picture changed radically: it was the middle periods of the century that were related to each other. The profiles of the Horthy (1925) and the Rákosi (1950) eras were the most similar, but both were related to the description of 1975, the Kádár era. The early and late periods of the century were separated from this block, and were in contrast with each other, too.

The Horthy and Rákosi eras were seen as similar in that both lacked democratic freedom of expression, positive climate of opinion, and international prestige. Although this was not far from the 1991 description of the Kádár era, the cultural level and the standard of living of the latter period were ranked higher in its trait profile.

The similarities and differences between the characterizations of historical periods in 1981 and in 1991 lay mainly in the findings described above. The descriptions of the turn of the century and of the Horthy era were essentially 'sustained' by the respondents. The characterization of the Rákosi era given in 1981 was close to that of the turn of the century and of the Horthy era given in 1991.

It should be noted that there was no similarity between the 1981 and the 1991 descriptions of the Kádár era. Although the negative correlation between the 1981 and 1991 ranks of traits was not significant ($p>.10$), it is true to say that there was a change in the description of this period: the dominant positive features of the trait profile given in 1981 (i.e., democracy

Table 5.2 Similarity of development in the history of society, 1981 and 1991: trait ranks and correlations

1	1900									
9	1925	.83**								
8	1950									
1	1975									
	2000	−.70*	−.60*		.80**					
1	1900	.87**		.73*						
9	1925		.85**	.83**						
9	1950	.73*					.93***			
1	1975						.72*	.82**		
	2000									
		1900	1925	1950	1975	2000	1900	1925	1950	1975	2000
Rank				1981					1991		
1		nat	nat	fel	pol	pol	nat	nat	ath	ath	ath
2		ath	ath	nat	fel	liv	dev	ath	nat	civ	pol
3		dev	dev	dev	dev	dev	fel	dev	dev	nat	eff
4		int	eff	ath	eff	eff	ath	civ	civ	liv	civ
5		eff	int	eff	liv	fel	int	eff	eff	dev	dev
6		fel	civ	pol	civ	civ	eff	liv	liv	fel	liv
7		liv	liv	liv	nat	int	liv	pol	int	eff	int
8		civ	pol	civ	int	ath	civ	int	fel	int	fel
9		pol	fel	int	ath	nat	pol	fel	pol	pol	nat
Kendall *W*		.75***	.80***	.58***	.48***	.61***	.63***	.60***	.76***	.62***	.55***

Notes
eff = efficiency of foreign affairs, liv = living standards, dev = pace of economical development, fel = public feeling, civ = civilization, int = international authority, pol = intervention in political life, ath = achievement of athletes, nat = natural beauties

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

in decision making, positive climate of opinion, promising rate of economic development) definitely fell back, not only in the degree of their evaluation but also in their relative position in the rank of characteristics. Democratic freedom of expression fell to the last place, behind even international prestige and the effectiveness of foreign policy.

To sum up, the characterization and evaluation of five typical historical periods, and thus that of five 20th-century Hungarian political systems, were investigated by the same method in the early 1980s and 1990s. The data were collected in two, already different historical periods.

In 1981, the student respondents outlined a steadily progressive trend of development, extending this optimistic approach towards the future. The global evaluation of the earliest date, 1900, was the most negative (2.61 on the seven-point scale). This was followed by the increasingly favourable evaluation of the Horthy era (2.96) and the Rákosi era (4.17), reaching a peak in the evaluation of the Kádár era (5.34). The evaluations of the periods before 1945 were negative, those after 1945 were definitely positive. Reassuring optimism about the year 2000 rose to an almost unsurpassable height (6.96 on the seven-point scale).

In 1991, 20th-century Hungarian history was seen from a completely different angle. Compared to the turn of the century (4.1), all three of the previously negatively evaluated periods, the Horthy era (3.6), the Rákosi era as a nadir (3.4), and even the Kádár era (3.8) seemed to represent a decline. There were some positive expectations about the turn of the millennium, which was no longer in the very distant future, but even they were far lower than the optimistic forecasts of ten years earlier.

The trait profile of the historical periods was also different in 1981 and in 1991. In 1981, the current Kádár era and the even more promising future were contrasted with the darker periods of the past. The only exception was 1950, whose evaluation did not fit so well into the polarized picture. In 1991, the beginning and the hopeful closing of the century differed from the typical historical periods of the century, which were similar to each other at critical points. These were perceived by the students as being characterized by lack of democracy, bad climate of opinion, and low international prestige.

Changes in the political system: reflection and effect on historical judgements, 1994

1975 and the beginning of the 1990s were separated by a sharp and significant political change experienced by the whole of society. The understanding of this historical dividing line, the perception of the end of the previous period and that of the beginning of the economic and political system were studied by intensive questioning of a narrow sample in 1994 (13.R94s).

Judgements of five different periods were asked for, as in the surveys described above. In addition to the beginning and end of the 20th century, the dates to be judged included the following:

a 1950, the extreme and typical year of communist rule.
b 1989, the end of the party state, when reforms to 'existing socialism' led to the Party giving up political and economic power,
c 1993, the advanced stage of the activity of the nationalist-conservative government subsequent to the change of the political system.

The evaluations of the turn of the century, of 1950, and of the millennium were in agreement with the general findings from the larger samples. The global evaluation of 1900 was slightly positive (4.39 on the seven-point scale), 1950 was the nadir (3.21), while the evaluation of 2000 reflected definitely positive expectations (5.25). The evaluation of the two newly introduced years, 1989 and 1993, can be considered within this framework. 1989 received the more positive evaluation (4.63 as compared to 4.38 for 1993). Thus, while the 1950 communist reign was definitely repulsive, the disintegrating system of the reform communists left more

positive memories than the activities of the new, democratically elected government.

The five indicators of global evaluations were subjected to correlational and factor analysis. It emerged that the evaluations of 1950 and 1989 were quite significantly correlated (.50), the correlation between the evaluations of 1989 and 1993 was slightly less (.46), and even the high correlation between 1989 and 2000 (.58) was surpassed by the correlation between the evaluation of 1993 and optimism regarding the future (.79). As a result, two factors were found by factor analysis: the first one included 1993 and 2000 joined by the evaluation of 1900; the other factor was manifested primarily in the evaluations of 1950 and 1989.

It has to be noted that a very similar structure could be found when the complexity of the five characterizations were subjected to factor analysis. The complexity of the characterizations of 1900 and 1993 changed together, despite their differences, which was related mostly to the characterization of 2000. The second factor linked 1950 with 1989 again but in a special way. The former period had a positive factor load, the latter had a negative load. Thus, if the characterization of 1950 was simple, the characterization of 1989 was more complex, and vice versa. This was probably due to the strange result of the simultaneous connection and qualitatively different evaluations of the two periods.

It can be seen from the above that the respondents did not perceive 1950 and 1989 as independent of each other, the two extreme stages of the great historical experiment with the party state. Still, 1989 appeared in a more favourable light than the more recent 1993, even though the evaluation of the present correlated better with the evaluation of both the distant past and the future.

The characterization of the two critical years differed not only in the general level of evaluation but also in the judgement of individual traits, in their characterization profile, in the structure of the characterization, and in their relative positions among the characterizations of the other periods (see Figure 5.12). The disadvantages of 1989 appeared mainly in the judgement of the rate of economic development: its evaluation was definitely negative, while that of 1993 was definitely positive. Its disadvantage in 'natural beauties' and in the general cultural level seemed to be accidental. Its advantage was seen in the people's ability to enforce their political will, in the climate of opinion, and in the standard of living. The evaluation of these traits was positive in 1989, but it was astonishingly negative in 1993. The assumed advantage of 1989 in international effectiveness and prestige, and athletic achievements did not mean qualitative differences, as their extent was insignificant.

There were no similarities in the characterization profiles, but it was a striking contrast that the weakest trait in 1989, the rate of economic development, received the most positive evaluation in 1993. The factor structures of both series of judgements were quite disintegrated: there were



Figure 5.12 Characterization of the stages of the transformation: socio-political judgements of the traits of 1989 and 1993, given in 1994.

four and three factors with explanatory power above 10% in the characterizations of 1989 and 1993, respectively, but none of them resembled one another.

The comparison of the characterizations of the five periods revealed that 1989 and 1993 never reached extremes, while 2000 received the best judgement in six out of the nine cases, and 1950 received the most negative judgements six times, too. An ambivalence could be seen in the characterization of 1900: the respondents rated it highest in natural beauties and in economic dynamism but lowest in athletic achievements and cultural level. Even this ambivalent characterization outrivalled 1993, when the rank of traits was averaged, while 1989 took the second position after 2000 and before 1900. The investigation carried out on the specially selected sample of students showed that 20th-century Hungarian history was no longer perceived by the respondents as an unbroken line of progress. Having experienced the social and political changes, they could see rises and falls and conflicts both in the past and in the future. There was only one exception: the rise of the cultural level of the population was described in the responses as a steady, continuous process, undisturbed by circumstances.

In addition to the intensive analysis of the understanding of the changes, an extensive investigation was carried out in 1994, studying how members of a national representative sample of 1000 saw the course of development of 20th-century Hungarian history (14.R94n). The questions covered the

five standard periods, but multiple characterization was omitted this time. Respondents were asked to make judgements on a single scale about the history of Hungarian society, that is, how people live or lived in Hungary in the given period. Thus, a global evaluation was given, and it was up to the individual respondents to decide whether to concentrate only on the standard of living, or to include political freedom or cultural level.

In the course of analysis, the effect of age, gender, educational level, occupation, and *Weltanschauung* as related to religion on the opinions was noted.

The national representative sample's evaluation of 1900 was negative, but not excessively so. The mean was 4.64 on the ten-point scale. Respondents under 40 saw the turn of the century slightly more positively than the older and better educated groups. The responses of those who had been through higher education were quite favourable, approaching an average scale value of 5.

1925 was evaluated more critically: its mean value was 4.03, moving away from neutral. The 20 to 30-year-old age group evaluated this period slightly more favourably, but the 60 to 70-year-old respondents gave definitely negative evaluations of the period of their early youth.

1950 was judged as definitely negative, with an average of 3.35. Again, the younger age groups were less critical, but the responses of those over 50 approached the scale value of 3. It is worth noting that there was a statistically significant difference between the judgements of this period given by the groups divided according to religious conviction. The respondents classed themselves into one of the following five categories: religious, a believer in his/her own way, cannot decide, non-believer, has a different conviction (atheist). This was the first time that ANOVA revealed characteristic differences between the historical judgements of groups of different *Weltanschauung* (F ratio=4.08, $p<.01$). The 110 religious members of the sample were significantly more critical (mean: 2.77) than the 193 non-believers, and the 39 atheists (means 3.53 and 3.67, respectively).

1975 received a markedly more favourable evaluation in the responses of the national representative sample, with a mean score of 6.68 on the ten-point scale. The 20 to 40-year-old group expressed the most positive opinions, but in no group did the mean value of evaluation fall below 6. The respondents with higher education were slightly more reserved than the other groups. Again, a significant difference was found between the groups divided according to their religious convictions (F ratio=2.64, $p<.05$). The respondents who classed themselves as religious appreciated the Kádár era the least (mean: 6.25, compared with 6.83 and 6.86 for non-believers and atheists, respectively), but even they did not doubt that this was the period of 20th-century Hungarian history when 'people lived the easiest life'.

The evaluative judgement of 2000 deserves special attention. The year 2000 appeared in an optimistic light in the responses of various student

samples. Indeed, the youngest adult age group of the national representative sample judged 2000 even higher than 1975 (6.98 vs. 6.62). However, this was not characteristic of the whole sample. On the contrary, in 1994 a sample of 1000 respondents judged this already foreseeable future less favourably than 1975 (6.32 vs. 6.68).

As for the differences between age groups, the groups aged between 20 and 30 and over 60 were more reserved in their expectations. As regards occupational categories, manual workers (employees of agricultural plants, unskilled labourers, skilled workers) looked to the future without much optimism. Respondents with higher education, who made up 10% of the representative sample of 1000, seemed to be more optimistic than the other groups. They were the only ones who expected 2000 to be better than the 'lost paradise' of 1975.

The interrelationships of the five periods in the judgements of the large sample can be made clearer by the method of multidimensional scaling. The five objects of judgement can be excellently illustrated in two dimensions (see Figure 5.13). The distances that separated 1950 from 2000 and from 1975 were the greatest. All things considered, the rhomboid arrangement shows that no simple scheme of linear development about the history of the century was present in the minds of the people in 1994.

It was one generation ago, in 1971, that we studied the relationship between the evaluative description of the history of society and the portrayal of the well-known immediate environment, that is, the history of the family. At the time, it was reasonable to assume that the authorities were attempting to prescribe the general evaluation of the periods of public history. In 1994, no such co-ordinated attempts had to be considered. On the contrary, a wide variety of historical evaluations appeared, alternated, and clashed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently, nothing prevented the formulation of family experiences or even their generalized projection. In 1994, the old



Figure 5.13 MDS map of periods in social history and in family history, 1994.

question was asked in a different situation: how did the members of the national representative sample see the situation of their own families in the different periods of the 20th century?

The evaluation of 1900 was negative, at 4.32 on a ten-point scale. The evaluation of family life was worse than that of the general social situation, 'the life of the people'. Nevertheless, the same tendencies emerged as in the responses discussed above: the opinions of the younger and the more educated respondents were somewhat less negative.

The respondents gave an even more negative picture of 1925, even when the situations of their families were considered. Their historical judgements regarding their families (mean: 4.05) were close to their evaluations of the general conditions of the period. Once again, the two extremes were represented by respondents under the age of 30, who gave the least critical judgements, and those between 60 and 70, who were the most damning.

The year 1950, and thus the 1950s in general, was the most negatively evaluated, also when the situations of the respondents' families were considered (3.59). However, judgements about family life were slightly less damning than the characterization of the general situation of society, of 'the life of the people'. This was true for each age group, both in the reserved criticism of the younger, and the more definitely negative judgements of the older groups. The more highly educated the respondents were, the more reserved they were in condemning the 1950s, and, simultaneously, there was a larger discrepancy between the characterizations of the general situation and that of their families' conditions. This favourable shift appeared in the responses of the groups formed on the basis of religious convictions, although there were marked and statistically significant differences between the memories of these groups: the mean judgements of the religious respondents and those of the atheists were separated by one full point on the scale. The former group remembered greater family misery than the latter (F ratio=4.78, $p<.001$).

1975, the year representing the Kádár era, received the most positive evaluation so far (6.19), but the characterization of the family's situation was less positive than that of society and 'people in general'. The difference is the greatest in the age group between 20 and 40. This group gave the most favourable judgements in both respects. When the respondents were divided according to education, the most highly educated groups gave the least favourable judgements (below 5.9) when looking back to the recent past of the family. Those who classed themselves as 'religious' were similarly reserved in praising the Kádár era. However, there were no statistically significant differences between the groups divided according to the above criteria, as opposed to the general characterization of the situation regarding 'people's life'.

The respondents judged their own situation in 1994 rather reservedly, with a mean of 4.86 which approached the neutral value on the ten-point scale. This year was better than the 1950s, but definitely worse than the

memory of 1975. The opinion of those under 50 was better (under 20 the mean score was above 5 at 5.43), and the ANOVA by age was significant (F ratio=2.22, $p<.05$). The evaluations given by the highly educated respondents were strikingly positive (5.39) as compared to those with less education (F ratio=4.70, $p<.01$). As a corollary of this, there were marked differences between representatives of different occupational categories: employed and independent intellectuals were at one end, while farm labourers, skilled workers, and office employees formed the other end (F ratio=2.41, $p<.05$). However, the presence or absence of religious conviction made no difference.

Looking forward to the millennium, the respondents were optimistic (6.30) when comparing both their family's situation and 'the life of the people' to the present. Although this meant a decline as compared to 1975 with respect to 'the people', it was a favourable return to the level of the Kádár era (or even a minimal improvement) regarding the family.

As regards age groups, the same groups were optimistic as those who were generally hopeful when regarding society, However, there was a difference between the groups: when comparing the future of society and that of the family, the 20 to 30-year-old respondents were more pessimistic about society, while those over 60 predicted a bleaker future for themselves and their families. The greatest and the most favourable difference between the expected situation of their families in 1975 and 2000 was seen by the most highly educated respondents, but their optimism regarding the millennium did not reach the level of their general confidence about the future conditions of society.

All things considered, the national representative sample gave a significantly more complex picture of 20th-century Hungarian history than had emerged from a similar study conducted 23 years earlier. It was a common element in 1971 and in 1994 that when the first half of the century was being evaluated, respondents saw a national decline between the two world wars in a Hungary that had lost a great part of her territory. In 1971, unconvinced and mixed judgements were given both about the general situation of the country under Soviet influence and communist rule, and about the history of the respondents' own families. After the social and political change of system, however, the judgements became definitely negative, and this period was judged as the nadir of the whole process of development. Peculiarly enough, however, despite all similarity and continuity, the Rákosi era and the Kádár era that followed the 1956 interlude were seen as totally different by the respondents. This was true in 1973, when it could have been explained in terms of conformism and the effect of a naive concept of history. But it was still the case in 1994, when there were no longer external factors influencing opinions in this direction: even in retrospect, the 1970s seemed to be a barely surpassable peak. It is striking that the generalizations regarding the past of the society were more extreme than the judgements about the situation of the families, whether for

the negative features of the 1950s or the positive factors of the 1970s. Historical evaluations regarding the society and the family fluctuate together, with expectations regarding the millennium almost perfectly matched in 1994. This was not a vision of unbroken development, for the respondents' expectations regarding society did not even approach the perceived level of 1975. Still, some optimism can be discovered, especially in the more strongly motivated personal-family judgements, when one realizes what a trough the respondents saw themselves in after 1975 and before 2000.

It was a recurring observation of the series of investigations presented here that there was general agreement at the time of the investigations with respect to the characteristic traits of a given age and to the evaluation hierarchy of the different periods. This is true even if the content of agreement can and does change. The last observation discussed above supported the investigators' experiences regarding stereotyped historical thinking. The fluctuating trend of development appeared in each of the sub-groups of the representative sample.

Naturally, the general agreement over content did not exclude individual variation. As could be seen above, several characteristics of the historical views of the different groups emerged in various aspects. Statistically significant differences were repeatedly found between groups divided according to religious attitudes: parallel with their difference in *Weltanschauung*, the most marked differences in judgement of the social historical periods (1950 and 1975) of communist ideology and policy are found between the definitely religious and the atheist groups. This judgement extended to the memory of family situations in 1950 but to nothing else. Parallel and concordant differences in judgement were found between groups divided according to occupation and educational level. The identification and separation of the representatives of the developing middle class caused difficulties in the years of transformation. For the time being, the educational level seems to be the most relevant indicator and determinant of social differences. The most highly educated group was not extreme either in condemning the 1950s or in evaluating the 1970s too warmly, their current spirit was the best, and they were especially hopeful about the future. They differed in these aspects from large social groups, that is, from the workers with low levels of education. As for the evaluation of the past, the less critical and more favourable attitude of the younger age groups in comparison with the older generation emerged repeatedly, and this tendency was the most marked when 1994, the present, was being evaluated. As for the future, especially in terms of general social prospects, the 20 to 30-year-old respondents did not seem to be particularly optimistic.

To sum up, the period of the change of political system in Hungary was in itself an historical experience. When studying the evaluations of the younger and the more mature generations who had undergone this

experience, the answer to two questions were sought. The first question was how the period of transition appeared in contemporary public thinking. The second question was how the experience itself affected the respondents' evaluation of past, present, and future, and their unfolding conception of development.

In 1994, it stood out from the responses of a small sample of specially selected students that 1989, the dawn of the change of the political system, was evaluated more positively than 1993, an advanced stage of the actual changes. The differences were related mainly to democratic decision making, public climate of opinion, and standard of living. The latter was peculiarly tinted by the fact that the respondents thought that the economy was more stagnant and developed less dynamically in 1989 than in 1993.

It was worth noting that the evaluation of the two periods belonged to two different groups of variables: the evaluation of 1989 varied together with that of 1950, although the difference between their evaluations was great, and the complexity of their characterizations were negatively correlated; the evaluation of 1993, however, was embedded in the relations of the turn of the century and the turn of the millennium, and its judgement changed together with the positive nature of the distant past and of the future.

This circle did not share the illusion of unbroken linear development that was still rather general among students. A decline was also perceived in comparison with the turn of the century. In fact, the change of the political system itself was conceived as a kind of historical 'swell' that started from a favourable position, and included the perspective of (economic) development that would lead to a better future after a temporary decline.

The findings of the 1994 investigation carried out on a national representative sample were not indifferent with respect to the interpretation of the above results either. Thus, the families of the respondents lived under considerably worse conditions in 1994, after the change of the system, than in 1975, in the middle of the Kádár era. The actual situation of the family was judged to be at a nadir between 1975 and 2000, since the respondents believed that their family's standard of living would be higher than ever before in 2000. As to the previous history and perspectives of society, the situation was not quite the same, since the respondents stated that the situation of the people was so favourable in the middle of the Kádár era that it could not be bettered even at the end of the millennium.

The trends of development in the responses regarding the history of the family and of society ran in parallel. They declined together when 1900, 1925, and 1950 were evaluated, and rose together when 1975 was considered. It was noteworthy that the respondents' opinions were less extreme when their families were considered, whether for the bad situation in 1950 or for the good position in 1975. Regarding the future, however, the

prospects for society were no more extreme than those of the family: the two were practically the same.

Political pressures did not affect the responses in 1994 as they had 23 years before. The admitted political views of the respondents still had some influence on the content of their historical evaluations. The difference between religious and atheistic respondents was that the religious respondents evaluated 1950 more negatively regarding both the society and the family, and they also judged the situation of society in 1975 more negatively than did the atheists. The different social and demographic groups also gave slightly different historical evaluations. The more highly educated respondents were more reserved in condemning 1950 and in praising the 1970s, but they also saw the future more optimistically than did the groups of manual workers.

It was noteworthy that the judgements of the 1950s and 1970s were intricately intercorrelated in the responses of both the students and the members of the national representative sample. The relationship between the characterizations of the two types of communist party system was far from unequivocal or unanimous. One thing, however, is certain: the evaluative differentiation between the two periods was definite and unanimous, and the condemnation of the Rákosi era had become severe and general.

Summary

'Social development' was the conceptual framework within which Marxist ideology attempted to interpret the historical course taken so far and the tasks still to be carried out in the future. This comprehensive and systematic concept remained distant and abstract for the pupils at the end of the 1960s: the influence of the school was not substantial, and the concept remained superficial even in the children's interpretation of historical processes, to say nothing of its ability to influence their understanding of the future.

The first attempts by 10 to 12-year-old pupils to explain the expression indicated that the present was better than the dark past, and the future would surely be even better. At the end of grammar school, the most successful attempts at definition explained that people had produced goods by different methods and in different systems, but with steadily improving results, which in turn provided higher standards of living and better quality of life for increasingly wide social groups. Thus, the majority of the respondents indicated the economic basis of development, roughly linked to the idea of an almost static conflict between exploiters and the exploited classes. Studying history did little to eliminate or refine naive conceptions and expectations of linear development. The students were confused in their use of abstract terminology, their lists of the socio-economic structures that they had studied, and their citations of incomplete historical examples.

'Period' is a separate category of the historical process, and the respondents' concept of historical development can be reproduced by discovering how they separated different periods and what they perceived as the characteristics of each period.

People distinguish the present from the past in various ways. Some use historical events as markers, some use personal continuity and discontinuity of public life, or the declared common principles or conflicts of subsequent systems. In 1981, the great majority of the respondents in the present investigation also emphasized the values of the present and showed their acceptance of them by rejecting the past. The border between the past and the present, however, was not always clear to them: 1945 was a historical turning point on the one hand, but the Kádár era began only much later, in 1957. Thus, Horthy's counter-revolutionary period, which led Hungary to the Second World War, was depicted more disadvantageously than the turn of the century. The two short periods after 1945 were evaluated considerably more favourably, but opinions were divided as to whether the coalition period immediately after the war or the communist rule with Stalinist features was better. But the period between 1957 and the time of the investigation was appreciated much more than either of the other two periods.

Only a modest minority of the respondents, less than a fifth of the sample, outlined a trend of 20th-century development that differed from that described above.

The respondents who expressed their political distance by declaring that they were not interested in politics were more reserved in the evaluative contrast between past and present. Those respondents, however, who indicated their involvement by admitting their great interest in politics increased the contrast, thus representing the dominant opinions in an extreme way. Open conformity was shown by the respondents who stated that they preferred the 'official history version' in books to the experiences and passed-on knowledge of the family, and who claimed that the two were seldom in conflict, anyway. This 'book-preferring group' also sharpened the differences between evaluations of the past and the present. Both the politically interested and the book-preferring groups evaluated the 1950s relatively positively, and in a certain sense they judged the Rákosi era more highly than the coalition period. In some ways their appreciation for the Rákosi era approached that of the Kádár era, although it was in this group that the Kádár era was the most popular.

In 1971, the evaluation of the Rákosi era was a delicate matter: on the one hand, it had been a communist system, but, on the other, it had led to 1956 and to the imprisonment of János Kádár himself. The opinions of the different social layers were also divided. The trend of development outlined by intellectuals showed great fluctuations. This group was particularly critical of the Horthy era, accepted the multi-party coalition period the most readily, and in order to appreciate the values of the Kádár era, they criticized

the Rákosi era heavily. There was a difference of opinion between the peasants, who condemned the Rákosi era the most, and the skilled workers, who showed a relative preference for this period.

The historical experiences of these large social groups, the forced foundation of co-operatives and the compulsory delivery of produce to the state, on the one hand, and the industrialization and the financial and social appreciation of industrial workers, on the other, may have played a role in the difference of opinion mentioned above. The history, past experiences, and changing circumstances of the respondents' families were asked for in the 1971 investigation. The need to maintain the family's self-esteem may have contributed to the fact that the evaluation of these historical periods was usually more favourable in this respect, and thus it was also less severe for the period before 1945. Nevertheless, talking about the scope of social mobility and possibilities of relationships in terms of 'position perception', the respondents attested that the borders separating the different levels of the social hierarchy were really destroyed around 1945.

While the whole sample evaluated the social history of 1948–53 more positively than that of 1945–48, the experiences of the families were just the opposite: 1945–48 was perceived in a slightly more favourable light than 1948–53. The characterization of both periods, however, brought out the contradictory nature of the evaluations. The preferences of peasants and skilled workers were consistent in both respects. These slight variations, however, had no considerable effect on the fundamental finding that the socio-historical and family-historical trends of development present in the responses actually ran in parallel. Both showed that the Horthy era, the past, was the nadir of the century, while the peak of the century was the Kádár era, the present.

As mentioned above, in 1981 a student sample was asked about 20thcentury Hungarian history. The years 1900, 1925, 1950, 1975, and the future 2000, which represented different historical periods, were to be evaluated from different aspects. There were slight differences in opinion between the students: excellent students and the children of skilled workers contrasted the Horthy and the Rákosi eras more sharply than middling students and children from intellectual families, respectively. Grammar school students were more critical of both periods than other student groups, and were slightly less overwhelmed by the present and the perspectives of the future. Nevertheless, it was true that in 1981 the students depicted an unbroken trend of linear development, whose nadir was 1900, and whose peak would be 2000.

The trend of 20th-century development was seen differently by students in 1991, after the socio-political turn. The general level of evaluations decreased dramatically; even 1900 and 2000 received only slightly positive evaluations on the seven-point scale. The intermediate periods, the greater part of the century, however, appeared as a long negative detour, whose nadir was the Rákosi era, the period of Hungarian Stalinism, rather than the

Horthy era. The respondents perceived 1925, 1950, and 1975 as being similarly characterized by lack of democracy, unsatisfactory climate of opinion, and lack of international prestige. No consistent social differences were found behind these findings. Students in vocational training schools still preserved a relatively positive memory of the Kádár era, and evaluated the 1950s (as well as all other periods of 20th-century Hungarian history) more positively than the others.

A few years later, this nostalgic view was no longer isolated. In 1994, it was the opinion of a national representative sample that the history of the 20th century was a continuous decline from 1900 through 1925, until 1950. Then in 1975, after a sudden turn, it reached heights that will not be surpassed even in 2000. Thus, the bold turn happened between the two periods of communist political system: the nadir was the Rákosi era, while the Kádár era was the unsurpassable peak. Besides questions about the history of society, there were also questions about the history of the family and its situation in the past, present, and future. As in the 1971 study, the evaluations of the history of the family and those of society ran parallel, but the latter evaluations were less extreme with respect to the past. Reservations did appear in the criticism of 1950 and in the appreciation of 1975. Nevertheless, the 1000 respondents in the national representative sample stated that although the conditions of their families had definitely grown worse after the change of the system as compared with 1975, they still hoped that things would be even better in 2000 than in 1975. Thus, the prospects for society and the family would meet in 2000: for the family, conditions would improve; for society there would be not so much progress as regeneration after the change of the system.

There was no external reason why the respondents should evaluate the Kádár era positively in any respect. Internal conviction, however, could even have been against it. Thus, the respondents who declared themselves as religious evaluated both 1950 and 1975 more negatively from the socio-historical point of view, but from the standpoint of the family only 1950 was more negatively judged than by the other respondents, and therefore they did not suggest that they had suffered persecution in 1975.

Better understanding of the perception of the change of the political system was promoted by the investigation carried out in 1994 on a special and highly selected student sample. The trend of development outlined in the students' responses reflected a decline from the turn of the century until 1950. 1950 and 1989 (the year of 'reform communist' rule) were evaluated totally differently, but they were closely linked in public thinking: their evaluations were related to each other, but the complexity of their evaluations were negatively correlated. 1993, the already experienced period of the new political system, brought a decline as compared to 1989, especially with respect to democracy, climate of opinion, and standard of living. The evaluation of 1993, however, was related to the distant past and to the image of the expected future. Its positive side was a perceived dynamic

economic development, which may have contributed to the students' hope that the virtues of 2000 will surpass those of 1989.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this. The first is the realization that the adults and intelligent young people who had gained historical experience in the change of the political system did not think in terms of an unbroken line of development leading from a dark past into a bright future: they saw the whole 20th century, with its left- and right-wing extremes, as a great historical detour. The second recognition was that by 1994, the Kádár system and its successors, the reform communists, were seen in a favourable light, without any political pressure, and even despite the prevailing political forces. The respondents made sharp distinctions between the different communist political systems: the Rákosi era was still considered as the nadir of the century, the Kádár era was perceived as a peak that cannot easily be reached again. After the socio-political change, it was not Kádár's complicated political formula that was rejected without hesitation, but the period symbolized by Rákosi. The third recognition was that even the current changes in the socio-political system itself corresponded to a wavy line of development. Circumstances did not become better or worse due to this change, even if the respondents did not exclude the possibility that their families and the whole of society would recover in the not too distant future. The change of the political system was certainly a historical turning point, but neither adults nor younger people identified automatically with the emerging social system. It is also true that the degree and nature of acceptance of the Kádár system would not have been as widespread in 1960 as it was in 1971.

6 Stability of and changes in stereotypes: results

The novelty of the results

The extensive literature more or less related to the questions of our investigations was reviewed both at the beginning of the book and at the beginning of the individual chapters. Had we failed to be completely clear about it until now, it is worth summarizing what the novelty was in our series of investigations as compared to the literature.

It seems to be rather evident that we put forward something new in three respects—and this cannot be independent of the question whether or not we contributed something new to the nature of stereotypes in general. First, the place of the investigations was undoubtedly rather unusual. Second, the historical situation in which the investigations could be carried out was exceptional. Third, the range of themes was quite unique. Let's take a brief look at all three aspects.

The place of the new investigations

Although this does not promise such exotic material as the book *African Social Psychology* (Armer, 1974), nevertheless, we investigated social psychological phenomena in a socio-cultural context that is still rather neglected in the literature. This (re)directs the attention to the content of social beliefs, to their probable differential features, but it also tests the degree to which organizational principles thought to be general are linked to well-known cultures.

Stereotype investigations were conducted first of all in the United States, but their number has been increasing in Europe as well, partly because of the integration process. Peabody's already cited work (1985) on national character and nation characterizations represented a high point in international comparative studies on this theme, but even this did not extend to the countries of the closed Eastern bloc. Because of the quite homogeneous medium of investigation, beside the repeated and extensive investigation of international relations, or that of the social class relations,

the question unavoidably arises how people at the other geographical and social end of the world see the very same questions. Our research has offered new results in this direction since the 1970s, demonstrating both common and different features than those observed in the western world. It became evident that the international and the social spheres are differentiated similarly in the two parts of the world; furthermore, more surprisingly, there is a great similarity between the evaluation hierarchy of nations and occupations as well. Yet the differences in social attitude, in experience, and in the expectations of those in power lead to differences in content, too.

The people's view of the world has been less characterized by the consistency of evaluations here. In view of our results, it seems to be an over-generalization that people under all circumstances prefer their own group, category, and everything they belong to and in which they are involved. The common social image of this small East Central European country with a lot of vicissitudes is visibly characterized by some ambivalence.

The historical setting

It was not without interest to follow the changes of stereotypes in stable or evenly developing societies, as proven by the life of Katz and Braly's now classic investigation (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins *et al.,* 1969).

Local characteristics mainly but not exclusively arose from the fact that for a long period, Hungary belonged to the communist ruling sphere where political power made every effort to enforce ideological unity. At the end of the 1980s a change of historical magnitude took place, which released public thinking from this pressure, but at the same time international and social relationships to be evaluated were also radically transformed. Effective forces and changes in the stereotypes are interwoven. Undoubtedly, the level of evaluation of categories that used to be honoured under duress and which used to be treated as a taboo decreased—thus, the overall social image of international and national relationships changed. But the occurring changes did not turn everything upside-down even with respect to the most affected categories (there is a consistency in their trait profiles); nevertheless, they had a general effect on evaluation and mood.

By the novel investigation of historical categories and their evaluation we analysed directly how people conceive and react to the process of changes in society's situation, and in their own situation. This is in accordance with the most recent social psychological investigation of the relationship between past and present, with the addition that we took into consideration that past is not seen as uniform by the people but as a series of subsequent and interrelated periods. Our observations also revealed that stereotyped characterizations may and do develop and exist in public thinking, not only about members of a group in the narrow sense but about abstract socio-political systems as well.

The range of themes

Stereotype research is usually directed towards the perception of individuals and their category, and towards that of categories belonging to a given cognitive field. In comparision, it is a plus in the present study that categories and stereotypes of three cognitive areas were studied simultaneously.

The results demonstrated in three aspects (nations, social classification, historical development) what image people in general and some specified social groups in particular had about human society before and after 1989. Many categories had to be characterized in all three aspects; this way people expressed how highly they esteemed certain features within the overall image of the categories and when comparing related categories. The system of relationships revealed this way may serve as a basis for reconstructing the content of the image of society.

The size limit of the book prevented us from demonstrating further the advantages of the thematic complexity of our research extending over three cognitive areas (and the perception of familiar persons as a fourth field) when studing the organization of opinions. It was this that made various structural analyses possible (Hunyady, in press). The relationships between categories and categories in public thinking were revealed not only within but also across cognitive areas. This also characterized the relationship of these areas, which is highly relevant for approaching the problem. We could reveal the relationships between traits and traits in public thinking, and how differentiated this 'implicit personality theory' is in the different cognitive fields. We also received a solid reply to the old question whether the richness of aspects in the use of contructs is generally true or is only linked to a given theme. We could also see how this cognitive style is related to the content of opinions in a changing socio-cultural context.

Even if the latter aspects had to be left out here, it may be inferred from the above how our results lead to novel interpretations regarding the nature of stereotypes, for it was a starting point and a conclusion that we perceive categories as fitting into a system of relationships, and that they are functional parts of the overall image of society, as pieces in a mosaic. Political power with ideological commitments may attempt to influence the image formed about society for longer or shorter periods, and this is related to traditions, and is subject to the influence of mass communication, and stereotypes change as experiences affected by interests and values also change. Stereotypes reflect and create social reality, and they are social reality themselves. This conception of stereotypes—which we tried to indicate above—is included in Lippmann's now classic line of thought, and it is not new in this sense. We only attempted to attach empirical operations and observations to it.

A large number of issues have yet to be cleared in this respect. Here we could summarize only two relevant sets of results. One is related to the

organization of stereotypes. This includes several implicit assumptions regarding the fact that judgements about the personal traits characterizing categories are born within a dual frame of reference: they are the results of comparisions within and across traits of categories. It can also be assumed about psychological mechanisms that they are sustained and modified not as simple associations, but that we regenerate them with constant or changing content with different comparisons. Another group of our results revealed the effect of ideological pressure in Hungary on the content of stereotypes before 1989, when it demonstrated uncertainty and lack of ideology in the mental elaboration of the changing social constellation.

In reviewing the results, we have summarized mainly the findings of the 1981 and 1991 studies, occasionally touching upon the already reviewed findings of our other investigations on other samples in different periods.

The organization of stereotype characterizations

Today, 'organization of stereotypes' generally means the development of the structure of individual opinions, in the framework of the information processing paradigm. This approach cannot avoid comparisons between individuals either, or at least the comparison of the manifestations of changes taking place within individuals.

Under this heading in this book, we dealt openly with the structure and development of the concepts of socially circumscribed groups. This approach cannot neglect intra-individual structures, for generalized similarities and systematic concordances that characterize social groups in a given or a historically determined situation can be described only if individuals are compared.

The evaluative charge of characterizations

Stereotypes include evaluations. Stereotype literature has always attempted to measure this, and to determine their relationships and roles.

The unweighted mean of the different trait judgements is the simplest possible approach to this variable. It became clear that this indicator of evaluation can help determine the relationships of different objects as reflected in the minds of the respondents from an important point of view.

In different historical periods, we found essentially similar object evaluation hierarchies in samples representing different social groups. They were reflected in the statistically significant Kendall's *W* values regarding object evaluations. Behind the evaluation hierarchy, one can find covert classification and contrast of the characterized categories and persons.

Despite the similarity between the evaluation hierarchies found in similar samples in 1981 and in 1991, the responses differed in two respects. On the one hand, the general level of evaluation dropped in almost every respect (the only exceptions were the evaluative charge of the characterization of the

'Chinese' and the global evaluation of 1900 and 1925 among the historical periods). This universal difference cannot be explained simply by the change in the sample composition and the related change in cognitive and response style. On the other hand, the evaluations were modified to a different degree for each object, which indicates the special content of people's responses to the reorganization of society.

The trait profile of the characterizations

In addition to the hierarchy of object evaluations, the hierarchy of the judgements of traits belonging to an object can also be revealed. The judgements about the traits of an object were compared, and their positive-negative ranks were described. In this case, it was not important how highly the respondent or the sample of respondents evaluated the objects to be characterized: the aim was to analyse which traits were evaluated more positively, and which ones were evaluated more negatively.

The abstraction and independent investigation of this structure of the characterizations in the early 1970s was based on the observation that groups with different national attitudes actually agreed as to the more and the less favourable features of their own nation: it is only a slight oversimplification to say that the contents of the stereotypes are the same, but are shifted in the dimension of evaluation as compared to each other.

These trait profiles were widespread in the same period. Student samples of over 500, whose composition of homogeneous sub-samples was essentially the same in 1981 and 1991, characterized the same categories homogeneously, and the same ones with rather less agreement ten years apart. Thus, for instance, there was and there remained a greater general social agreement over the trait ranks of 'Russians', 'Romanians', and the 'Chinese', than those of 'Germans' or the 'French'. Regarding the trait ranks of 'peasants' and 'students', harmony was greater in both years than the characterizations of 'skilled workers', 'supervisors', and 'office employees'. Nevertheless, the indices of concordance of opinions (Kendall's *W*) reached the level of statistical significance for all characterized objects.

The trait profiles not only appeared at the same time everywhere in the sample, but they mostly reappeared in the characterizations of the given object later in a transformed social constellation. This continuing consistency could be observed in the characterizations of all the socio-occupational categories and persons between 1981 and 1991. This was also true of the descriptions of most of the nations, the exceptions being the trait profiles of the 'English', 'Americans', and the 'Chinese', which were not statistically significantly correlated.

The characterizations of the two early periods of 20th-century history were not modified in this respect either, but the ranks of traits of 1950, 1975 (representing the periods of communist rule), and of 2000 (representing future prospects) did change. Thus, historical social changes had a selective

effect on the development of trait profiles. The structure of most of the characterizations was unaltered, despite the fact that their evaluative charge did change.

The development of the national stereotype of 'Russians' was an extreme example of the combination of the above presence and absence of changes between 1981 and 1991. At the time of the great historical transformation there was, not surprisingly, a dramatic decline in the level of evaluation of this national category. As will be mentioned in the present summary of the systems of views, this nation competed for the first position in the hierarchy of nations in 1981, while in 1991 it was at the bottom of the hierarchy. Its trait profile, however, did not change: the trait profiles given in the two years were significantly correlated. It was a peculiar contradiction in the 1981 characterization—already perceived at the time—that although 'Russians' and 'Romanians' were at the two opposite ends of national evaluations, their trait profiles were significantly similar. Changes in historical circumstances also contributed to the resolution of this contradiction: the similarity of trait profiles remained the same, and, in accordance with this, the evaluative charge of the characterizations of the two nations became very similar to each other.

This example clearly demonstrates what happened to the majority of the category characterizations: their evaluations did change to a greater or lesser degree, but their trait profiles remained essentially the same as they had been ten years before. No contradictory example was found: it never happened that the level of evaluation remained unchanged while the ranks of traits changed. A change in trait profile was always accompanied by re-evaluation. This relationship suggests that evaluation (the result of inherent emotions and/or external expectations) is more sensitive to changes in the social constellation affecting the relationships of the objects to be characterized than to any 'knowledge' of the relevant positive and negative sides of the object to be characterized. Furthermore, it is probable that the two factors we differentiated (evaluation and trait profile) have separate representations, and change independently of each other somehow in public thinking, too.

The nature of changes

It was rightly assumed that investigations carried out on different samples at different times would reflect a certain stability in the organization of stereotypes. Indeed, the evaluative charge of stereotypes can be ascertained, and their trait profile can be differentiated. Although stereotypes are differentiated by cognitive fields, they are also connected, and typical thinking styles are manifested in the characterization of categories.

The changes in stereotypes were studied against this background, in the course of and after the historical changes. Most certainly, such large and multiple changes were not based on personal experiences of the individual

categories and their representatives. The whole view of the world was shaken to its roots and transformed. This is what we can read from the following findings:

- In all cognitive domains the level of evaluation changed (usually falling); the hierarchy of evaluation and the similarity of trait profiles also changed.
- Trait profiles seem to be more stable; their radical re-arrangement took place with respect to the description of the historical periods that were directly related to the transformation of the social system.
- Self-evaluation and the relationship between elements of social identity changed. The many-sided decline of evaluation was the greatest in the evaluative charge of the respondents' own nation.
- The hierarchy of nations and socio-occupational categories altered with the disappearance of political restrictions. Relationships surpassing the boundaries of cognitive fields also appeared among the evaluations of certain groups of categories, namely, the positive and moderate attitude towards the West and the intellectuals.
- The changes in the values inherent in the judgements were brought to the surface by the fact that the abstract judgement of traits and their empirical application also showed shifts.

Seeing the extent of the ensuing changes, which reach into the depths of personality, we have to search for a mechanism and an explanation. We can consider several factors:

- People's ability to form opinions and think matters over was hindered by institutionalized obstacles, while schools, the mass media, and party propaganda mediated views that deviated from cultural traditions and everyday social experience at several essential points.
- However, the influence of certain characterized groups and their role in internal and foreign affairs, once maintained by force, disappeared, and this, as a failure, had an effect on the attributions made about these groups.
- The experience of order and stability was replaced by the liberating but alarming sensation of being forced into change.
- Simultaneously, the frames of reference in which national and social categories were evaluated and in which the judgements were meaningful also changed. A broader horizon did not favour the positive evaluation of ingroups.
- The whole country became conscious of its marginal position between the East and the West, and also began to experience the difficulties of breaking free from this position.
- Beyond social prospects, the difficulties of earning a living experienced by many people and the unprecedented increment in social differences

increased the feeling of disappointment in broad sections of the population.
- The negative experiences of the past were selected in memory, and began to diminish in comparison with the problems of the present.
- The ideological efforts of the government which followed the change of the system had a boomerang effect: they ran counter both to nostalgic public thinking and to the public demand for modernization.

Thus changes in stereotypes took place together and in interaction with each other, as a psychological projection of a social process that was taking place at several levels.

Changes in the content of stereotypes and their social varieties

The effects of the social system, before 1989

There are good reasons for suspecting that the expressed views of respondents did not correspond perfectly to their 'real' opinions under the circumstances of the monolithic socio-political system, no matter how 'soft' the pressure of the dictatorship may have been. This suspicion is further strengthened if the expressed opinions were self-contradictory and in conflict with the evidence of reality. However, attempts to extract the elements of external conformity from the expressed opinions may end in failure, since it is impossible to establish the degree to which conformist opinions have really been internalized.

The political system exerted pressure on the opinion of people in all three of the studied areas of thinking about society.

Effect on the stereotyped characterization of nations

The socio-political system of the 1970s and 1980s in Hungary also affected people's conception of the international situation and Hungary's position in it. There was a certain contradiction in the fact that socialism was declared to be a social system that was more highly developed than capitalism, while self-deceiving propaganda programs were announced about how the countries of 'existing socialism' would catch up with and overtake even the leading capitalist countries in economic development within the foreseeable future. This was topped by a logic of power which many people found easier to follow, namely, that the Soviet Union was a leading military world power, and Hungary was within her subordinate region, and that under the given circumstances of power, accepting community with the country itself, identification with her also meant acceptance of the leading role of the Soviet Union, and the military and economic relationships within the Eastern bloc.

The responses of both the large representative and the special samples in

the 1970s proved that a great proportion of the respondents recognized this dual reasoning, and expressed it. The answers to the repeatedly asked questions emphasized the political and public welfare of the Soviet Union, and, simultaneously and consequently, that of Hungary in international comparisons. The respondents were thinking in political blocs (just as people did in the West), including the GDR but excluding neighbouring Romania. The nature of the relationship between stereotyped national characterizations and this categorization and evaluation hierarchy of the countries was quite noteworthy. At the beginning of the 1980s the hierarchy of the countries was projected onto the evaluative charge of the national characterization of countries: the characterization of 'Russians' was more favourable than that of 'Hungarians', while 'Romanians' came last in the hierarchy. On the other hand, the traditional respect for the western nations and the current attraction also crossed this tendency: the 'English' and the 'French' were next to 'Russians' and 'Hungarians', respectively; the evaluation of their nations was somewhat more favourable than that of their countries.

The real conditions of the countries become even more remote when we consider the trait profiles of national characterizations as well as their evaluative charge. In this respect, the different nations were seen as being divided into two groups in 1981, while 'Hungarians' formed a third unit, since this nation was seen as unlike any other. The first group was the 'Atlantic triad', consisting of the 'English', 'French', and 'Americans'. All of them were said to be popular (as if their positive evaluation was being projected onto public thinking) and intelligent, the first two were seen as educated and patriotic, and the Americans were considered as politically involved and having a good sense of humour. None of them were perceived as very diligent or friendly, and the respondents did not see any sense of humour in the 'English', political interest among the 'French', or honesty among Americans' and the 'French'.

The second group was even more homogeneous—the diversely evaluated national categories of 'Russians', 'Germans', 'Chinese', and 'Romanians'. All of these nations were somehow related to the so-called socialist social system, even if only partially (as in the case of 'Germans'), or in conflict with the Soviet bloc (the 'Chinese'). In 1981, no matter how differently these nations were seen by the respondents, the most positive features of their descriptions were that they were patriotic, self-assertive, and interested in politics. All of these traits may suggest expansive self-assertion, especially if the accompanying negative traits included lack of co-operation and sociability: unfriendliness, lack of humour and unpopularity were repeatedly present among the comparatively negative traits, although at very different levels of evaluation.

'Hungarians', however, seemed to be above all friendly and good-humoured, even if they were not seen as particularly popular. 'Hungarians' were perceived as patriotic, although not very deeply involved in politics.

Their intellectual and cultural values were not at the centre of attention. All these findings were in harmony with the data received at the beginning of the 1970s when national autostereotypes were investigated by means of direct interviews and trait selection. It was a new element in the responses of students at the beginning of the 1980s that 'Hungarians' were thought to lack diligence. This may have been a content characteristic of the particular sample, but one also suspects that increased opportunities for international comparison led to doubts about national efficiency and work morale in a shaky economic situation.

It should be noted that in the course of the 1970s, by the early 1980s, the contradictory nature of the evaluative differentiation between the eastern and western countries became increasingly conspicuous in the responses of the respondents (especially in those of the younger generation). Successive samples gradually lost faith—or even hope—in the economic superiority of the Eastern bloc, and this began to overshadow the meaning and validity of opinions regarding the more positive climate of opinion and more democratic public life. This was already a sign of the political erosion of the system. Parallel with this, another process was also recorded: the respondents' concept of patriotism was also changing. The number of requirements of 'good patriots' decreased, and their content also altered: the anti-foreign edge was lost, and patriotism was no longer linked to a commitment to socialism to the same extent as before.

Effect on the stereotyped characterization of socio-occupational groups

According to the officially propounded view, it is the mass of manual workers and especially the working class that maintains society and provides its leading force. There was a tendency in the responses given in the 1970s to emphasize the values of the working class, for instance with respect to patriotism. As respondents, the workers themselves repeatedly demonstrated their simple commitment to the social system and to the block of socialist countries in general. Nevertheless, they presented a front against existing social inequalities and in favour of faithful equality, implying that they did not feel like the 'ruling class' of society at all. The intellectuals, however, doubted the existence of inequality, and indicated their need for an apparently just, more marked differentiation.

It became evident from the stereotyped characterization of socio-occupational categories that at the beginning of the 1980s, the distinction was drawn between non-manual and manual workers, and the similarities were seen within these circles. Within the offered-dimensions of traits, the former group was characterized by intellectual values more than by sociability and identity with the community. In the case of the latter group, however, just the opposite was true. The characterization of the peasants was unique even in this circle, where good morality was associated with modest intellectual values. Despite this equalizing tendency of the opinions there was

a definite difference between the evaluative charge of the stereotyped characterizations: non-manual occupations were valued higher. There was one important exception in this respect: the characterization of skilled workers and peasants was more favourable than that of office employees, representing the lower groups of non-manual workers. This was also specific to Hungarian society: western research data has described the definite polarization of non-manual and manual workers, but even within the Eastern bloc there was no evidence of the category of 'peasants' receiving such favourable judgements, even with a peculiar trait profile. This preference probably had many components. The first was the expected appreciation of the peasants as a manual working class. The second was the recognition of the situation and performance of this social class, which lived in the duality of co-operatives and so-called 'household farming' while prospering financially from it. The third was an illusory element from the past: the populist view that village people were the depositories of moral and national values, in contrast to the confusion of the industrialized society of the cities.

All things considered, the more favourable judgement of the intellectuals and the leading groups was quite definite, but the social image was not totally polarized, and some manual worker groups also had strong positive sides. In order to understand and accept the reality of this image, it has to be noted that the party state was able to influence people not only through its ideology but through its policy that changed society: there were no more middle classes taking an economically independent position, which brought the intelligentsia into a special situation where they were both important and insignificant. Beyond the ideological appreciation of the role of the workers and the peasants, the relatively balanced and sometimes even favourable financial situation of these classes raised the level of their social prestige. These classes also served as the source of replacement of the intelligentsia, although with decreasing intensity.

Effect on the stereotyped characterization of historical periods and perspectives

Regarding the process and periods of the history of the 20th century, the ideology of the political system emphasized the fact and importance of the defeat of feudalism by capitalism, and the progressive values, stability, and dynamism of 'existing socialism'. The political system of the 1970s and the 1980s could not deny its relationship to that of the 1950s, but it drew a clear dividing line with itself on one side and the period of the genesis of the system, Stalinism, and the crisis which led up to 1956 on the other. The respondents did tend to contrast past and present, and the family and personal experience of large social groups also seemed to have reflected favourable changes. This was supported most of all by the data of the 1971 'family history' study, which was intended to reveal people's perceptions of

the position of the family in society. The respondents' answers revealed the collapse of social restrictions.

When the respondents evaluated either the history of the family or the historical periods of society, the Horthy era preceding 1945 was the least appreciated, while the Kádár era following 1957 was esteemed the highest. Looking back at the more distant past of the family, the sample was less critical, and considered the Rákosi era as a decline in comparison with 1945–48. The same national representative sample differentiated the present and the past in the history of society more markedly, and, on the whole, 1948–53 was seen as more positive than the coalition period. The evaluations of the two periods after 1945 were conflicting in content, and there were differences between social groups, too: the workers and the peasants differed over the period of Stalinism in Hungary. It was noteworthy that at the beginning of the 1970s, the Rákosi era was evaluated quite positively, and was seen as more similar to the particularly highly esteemed Kádár era by the 'book-preferring' respondents, who declared in an authoritarian way official publications to be more trustworthy sources of information than the historical experiences of their own families and themselves.

The investigations carried out at the beginning of the 1980s studied the evaluations of five characteristic periods. The student sample outlined an essentially unbroken, linear trend of development from 1900 through 1925 and 1950, to 1975 and further into 2000, the future. The turn of the century was seen as worse than the Horthy era. Lacking historical experience and influenced by the inadequate and biased school material, the students described the Rákosi era as just another stage of development. This was especially true of students from skilled worker families and of students with excellent academic records. The present, 1975, was evaluated more homogeneously and more unambiguously; it was so favourable that the respondents found it hard to express their optimism regarding rapid further development.

Changes following the transformation of the system: liberation and hesitation

Frightened national self-assertion and reminiscences of bygone days

New light was thrown on international prospects, and on Hungary in particular, after 1989. The Soviet bloc collapsed and Hungary was among the first of its members to become independent. The evaluation of Russia declined considerably in international comparisons. Considered from various points of view, and subjected to indirect judgements, she was still more positively evaluated than when direct global judgements of her international significance were made: conformity was against her at this point. The generally high esteem of other countries in the East Central European region, including Hungary, also declined.

Considering the values of the countries, the superiority of the USA and Western Europe was obvious in every area by 1991. In the students' judgements, the role distribution of the turn of the century will actually be re-established in Europe by the year 2000, after the long detour of the century: the power of Russia will diminish. It was a stable development that the presence and influence of the USA will persist. Nevertheless, Germany will be the most influential country in the continent again. In 1991 and in 1994, Europe was no longer only a geographical concept for the respondents but also a socio-political ideal, associated primarily with Germany and France. Evidently, Germany was considered as dominant in the smaller East Central European region as well.

National characterizations were integrated into this overall image of international relations. The general level of evaluation was lower than ten years before for all but one nation. Naturally, the degree of decline differed from object to object in this cognitive area, too; there was marked East-West polarization in this respect.

The western nations were systematically evaluated more positively. The evaluative charge of the characterizations of the 'French', Americans', and 'Germans' reached the same level, their distance from the leading 'English' decreased, while the trait profile of this outstanding national category became less similar to that of the 'French' and closer to that of 'Germans'. The described profiles of the western nations were quite varied: in 1991, intellect, self-assertion, and honesty came to the fore in the characterization of the 'English', while their humour and friendliness were still doubted. The same negative features were present in the characterization of 'Germans', while their positive traits were diligence and honesty, in addition to the persisting self-assertiveness, patriotism, and intelligence. The 'French' were also considered to be patriotic, self-assertive, intelligent, and well educated but not very diligent or friendly. In the characterization of Americans', not only diligence but honesty also fell back, while in addition to their popularity and self-assertion, their social features like friendliness and good humour were emphasized.

The eastern nations could be found at the opposite pole of the evaluations. The evaluative charge of 'Romanians' was consistently the most negative, followed by the evaluation of 'Russians', due to the changes in world politics. The enormous difference in evaluation, which had separated the two nations ten years before, disappeared, but their trait profiles changed very little. Patriotism, which was perhaps felt as oppressive, political involvement, and self-assertion had been and remained their common traits. The latter trait fell slightly back among the most characteristic features in 1991. Furthermore, both nations were judged to be unpopular, and in addition to their lack of friendliness and sense of humour, their want of culture also featured among their negative traits. The characterization of the 'Chinese' was more favourable and showed a different trait profile in 1991. This was the only nation whose evaluation was more favourable than ten

years before. Their most positive traits were related to morality: diligence and honesty, later joined by patriotism.

National self-characterization, the description of 'Hungarians', lay between the two poles, the two worlds described above. They took an intermediate position in the evaluation hierarchy of nations, too, as demonstrated by the MDS figure based on all of the characteristics. The evaluation of the respondents' own category declined both on the scales and in comparison with other nations, but their trait profile was still unlike that of any other nation and did not change between 1981 and 1991. Humour and friendliness, the features of sociability, became the most positive. Perceived patriotism fell back by one rank point within the internal rank of traits, but it declined considerably in the evaluations of other nations by 1991. 'Hungarians' were not considered very diligent even in 1981; this reservation became more emphatic, and the judgement became neutral. Doubts were also expressed about honesty, which took the next to last position. It was noticeable that belief in the morality of the respondents' own nation became fainter and weaker.

Erudition has never been among the most positive traits of 'Hungarians'; it was absent in 1991, too. In 1994, however, when a small group of respondents characterized a few nations of the East Central European region, only good humour remained among the usually emphatic virtues of sociability that distinguished 'Hungarians' above all. Yet at the same time, 'Hungarians' were judged to be exceptionally favoured with respect to erudition. The new nationalistic ideology of 'superior culture' was proclaimed in this context after the First World War: at that time, the thousand-year-old Hungarian state, its experience in administration, and the high culture of European quality in the cities supported this feeling and conviction of superiority. Seventy years later, these arguments had faded, the societies of the region had been all mixed up and sent in the same direction by decades of communist rule. The only fact that could support such views was that Hungary was slightly more advanced in terms of modernization and had more intensive foreign relationships than her immediate and secondary neighbours. This advantage, however, did not prove to be decisive or long lasting, especially since the West kept an undifferentiated distance from the whole region. This sobering experience emerged clearly in the responses: Hungary was among the countries most closely associated with Europe in 1991, while in 1994 only a fraction of the respondents reported this association.

Uncertainty of values in the image of society

After the transformation of the political system, several important changes occurred in the characterization of socio-occupational categories. In the 1991 investigation, the level of global evaluation of all of the socio-occupational categories was lower than it had been ten years before in

another student sample. The degree of change, however, was also different for different objects: it was particularly great for representatives of official authority ('teachers', 'supervisors') and about worker categories ('skilled workers', 'unskilled workers'). The devaluation of the former group could be a concomitant and manifestation of the general tendency for social authorities to become unstable. There were probably several reasons why the evaluative charge of the characterization of the latter group became less positive. Both the ideology of the primacy of the working class and the policy that favoured the realization of this primacy were shaken to their foundations. The prospects of state industry grew evidently worse, and thus the existential security of the working class ended, their defencelessness increased, and their perspectives diminished. Due to the extensive devaluation of 'skilled workers', all of the other occupational categories except 'unskilled workers' overtook them. Their sociability was still stressed in 1991, but their intellectual strength was already doubted. The description of their trait profile became similar to that of 'peasants', with the notable exception that the degree of depreciation of 'peasants' was the smallest among the occupational categories, so that their position improved among the rank of categories. The polarization and the definite difference in evaluation of non-manual and manual work was not yet complete: 'peasants', with their relatively favourable evaluation, took position among the intellectual occupations. This was probably also due to nostalgic memories of past village life, idealizing 'peasants'. It was precisely the assumption of their innocent morality that contrasted them to the sceptical description of 'supervisors'.

In 1994, a narrow student sample also characterized the typical occupations of the nascent market economy. In this description, features of social types that were previously considered as completely different were mixed: 'managers', 'businessmen', and 'bankers' seemed to be both effective and morally uninhibited. In this way, the circle of socio-occupational categories that received ambivalent characterizations was enlarged, for 'farm labourers' were honest but not educated, while 'teachers' were educated but not effective. These were all split contradictions, conflicting values in an insecure and immature social situation.

The fact and uncertainty of social reorganization could be seen in the characterizations of social categories and in their revealed relationships. It was the 'skilled workers' who lost through the changes: they had never really enjoyed the primacy indicated by Marxist ideology, but now, losing their social ground and political support, they were pushed permanently into the background. We have moved away from the ambiguous preferences of the past, but no new and unambiguous values have appeared yet; simultaneously with the decline of the evaluation of the workers, respect for their counter-pole, the intelligentsia, has also been also shaken. The typical figures of the distant past and of the market economy are both attractive and repulsive at the same time.

The reorganization of the past and uncertainty about the future

After the change of the socio-political system, the image of the past and the perceived trend of development of the historical course taken so far also changed. In 1991, the members of a student sample evaluated the years marking the same periods as ten years before. The trend of development outlined in the responses was no longer linear and unbroken, but formed an elongated U-shaped curve: Hungarian society declined from the turn of the century through the Horthy era until it reached its nadir in the 1950s. The Kádár era marked a comparative rise, and hopes were attached to the year 2000. In these descriptions, the slight positive features of the turn of the century and 2000 framed the actual history of the century: the negative evaluations of 1925, 1950, and 1975. In the students' opinion, the Horthy era, the Rákosi era and the Kádár era were all characterized by lack of democracy, dissatisfied climate of opinion, and lack of prestige in foreign affairs.

When the historical evaluations given in 1981 and in 1991 were compared, it became conspicuous that only the evaluation of the turn of the century moved in a positive direction: the formerly negative evaluation became more than neutral. The characterizations of all the other periods became more critical. Those of the Horthy era and of future perspectives were modified the least and the most, respectively. (Future perspectives fell to the same level as the evaluation of the Kádár era had been in 1981.)

A national representative sample in 1994 described the trend of development of 20th-century Hungarian history in basically the same way: the situation of society declined from the turn of the century through 1925 until 1950. The 1000 respondents representing the adult population made marked distinctions between the Rákosi and the Kádár eras, the two periods of the communist system. The former was the nadir of the century, while the latter was an unsurpassable peak in the history of the century, which was not expected to be surpassed even by the near future: the year 2000. This direct evaluation of the critical period expressed the nostalgic social atmosphere in which the 1994 elections took place and brought the successor of the former party state into power by democratic means.

The communist socio-political system was again rejected in the form of the Rákosi era, but it was hardly identified at all with 1975, the Kádár era. This was probably partly due to the new experience of the change of the political system itself. The respondents also voiced their opinion about the 20th-century history of their families. As in 1971, evaluations regarding family history were more reserved than those of social historical periods: the image of the more distant past was less critical, and the appreciation of 1975 was less ecstatic. Nevertheless, the respondents stated that the change of the political system brought about disadvantageous changes in the situation of their families. However, they did not give up the hope that after the present decline they would live better in 2000 than they had in 1975.

The conservative-democratic government which followed the change of the political system represented a totally different standpoint from public opinion, manifested in the characterizations of historical periods also. Respondents who regarded themselves as religious, tending towards the opinion of the government, evaluated 1950 and 1975 from the socio-historical aspect more negatively than did the whole sample. Similar difference regarding the history of the family was present only in the evaluation of 1950.

The experience of the change of the political system was investigated by the 1994 survey of a narrow student sample, too. In harmony with the above findings, they, too, regarded 1950 as the nadir in the trend of social development. The year of reform communist rule, 1989, was linked with 1950 in a latent way, but the situation of the two periods was evaluated totally differently. They considered 1993, the present, to represent a decline in democracy, climate of opinion, and standard of living alike. Still, their respective judgements were in a latent relationship with the evaluation of the distant past and the near future. The evaluative charges of 1900, of 1993, and of 2000 were different, but they changed together. The students thought that future perspectives might surpass even the best experiences of the past.

The last few investigations were especially illuminating:

a They reflected the struggle between new and negative expieriences and the natural tendency towards optimistic expectations about the future.
b They indicated the 'psycho-logic' of historical evaluations, in the spirit of which disappointment with the present affected the evaluation of periods that succeeded and rejected each other; they induced the upgrading of the recent past represented by the Kádár regime.
c They demonstrated that proximity and distance in evaluation were not the same as the covariation of evaluation: the evaluations of the Rákosi and the Kádár eras stood in sharp contrast to each other, but they were related to each other in public thinking in a latent way.
d They showed that under democratic conditions political power exerts far less conforming effects than it did even under the Kádár regime; in fact, it may elicit a boomerang effect which is the opposite of its intentions. In the present case, it even contributed to the idealization of the Kádár era by its offensive ideological behaviour.

The changes continue: in society and in stereotype research

The research presented in this book may give the impression that the social changes followed a perceptible direction and a traceable logic. Evidently, we must beware of what Fischhoff defines as 'hindsight bias': it is easier to notice the main tendencies of the changes in public thinking from the mosaic results of stereotype research in retrospect than at the time of their occurrence. Fischhoff claims that this distortion is so

persistent that even if we include it in our calculations we cannot subtract it from the later developed experience of predictability. If we have the consistent impression that the disintegration of the Kádár system and the indefensibility of the ideological theorems opposed to reality were manifested in these results, it may be a living example of this distortion. It was also clear that Hungarian society was not prepared for a conservative change, that national consciousness was not expansive, and that the nation received the social transformations ambivalently when they occurred.

Naturally, the real test of predictability would be if we could predict future changes from the results of the 1994 investigations with reassuring certainty. There are, however, two reasons why this would be a difficult undertaking. First, to use Hegel's formula, the condition of 'negation of the negation' occurred in 1994: communist rule was overthrown, but those who determined their own ideological-political identity by rejecting the system also left power. Something qualitatively different should have taken place in the process of social modernization, in which a new society and renewed public thinking develops. The second reason is that the success or defeat of this modernization depends very largely on external international factors: internal public opinion only reacts to it, at best, but does not form it. It remains to be seen whether or not international financial institutions will release a country that fell into the trap of debts in the communist period from her strained situation, and whether a united Western Europe will admit a society liberated from the Eastern bloc.

In the end, these investigations have perhaps contributed to the multifaceted area of stereotype research with one outcome: although they deviated from experiments in the framework of the information processing paradigm, this deviation made it possible to describe stereotype changes that had taken place very quickly in a great many people as a result of international and internal social developments. There has been virtually no new information about different national and social groups that would cause a gradual or sudden change in the evaluation of these categories, or at least in the differentiation of sub-groups within these categories. Nevertheless, the evaluative charge of stereotypes shifted in general and relative to each other, there have been examples of significant modifications of trait profiles, and their similarities and differences have also changed.

The greatest changes took place with respect to 'Russians' in the area of nation characterizations, to 'skilled workers' in the cognitive area of socio-occupational categories, and to the communist eras among the historical periods. These objects and their cult were central elements in the ideology of the past system—an ideology that both justified and was sustained by political pressure.

It is not clear whether an ideology can or cannot be disproved (if Kuhn doubts the disproof of paradigms, then this doubt is even more justified in the case of the general orientation of ideologies as manifested in emphasis),

nevertheless, the combination of political power with ideology has certainly collapsed in the region. The situation of the national and social categories in question changed in reality, too, and the period of rule ended in ignominious chaos. Everything the respondents unanimously said about the central elements of ideology was transformed together with this change in constellation. The transformation can be explained by the rejection of the ideology, by radical changes in the real social field of force, and by the appearance of freedom of speech, both together and separately. Furthermore, we have discussed in detail a number of other changes in stereotypes that have also occurred. The most prominent one was the general decline in the level of evaluation, including self-evaluation, the conception of the respondents' own category, and the less optimistic judgement of future prospects. These shifts can be explained by changes in the public social situation which can make people feel insecure, by changes in the frames of reference, and by the lack of new, positive ideals and aims: all these factors can contribute to these manifestations of social atmosphere. Naturally, one cannot exclude the role of new experiences and information in some cases (for instance with respect to the stereotype of the 'Chinese', the only positive change, or to the image of 'Americans' and the 'English' representing the western world), but it is generally unlikely for stereotype changes to take place separately by categories and to reflect a bottom-up process. The same may be suspected of the ambivalently characterized categories of the market economy that really appeared in the new social constellation and are subject to discussion in the mass media. The modifications and the new contents seem to express the reorganization of the whole world view and its internal relations; thus they can be explained within this system.

It is most likely that the stereotype changes that occurred in many people and rapidly expressed the radical transformation of the social constellation occurred when the ideological restrictions which deformed the handling of information had collapsed, and when public thinking was still undecided. A social constellation and its transformation are holistic, yet they mean different things in terms of the existence of different social groups and individuals. This duality also emerges in the way it is reflected in the consciousness of people who form society. We may refer here to the irritation and peculiarities that characterized the responses of students from worker families in our 1991 investigation.

Naturally, the changes in the content and relationships of categories and stereotypes were not all upsetting or chaotic, but were relative and circumscribed. They were more manifested in the evaluation of categories than in the stereotyped description of the relationships of traits, although we cited several examples of the latter. Evaluation and trait profiles express a way of thinking related to individuals and social groups: the differences in these cognitive styles persisted more consistently than content of thinking, and were also manifested in the way the content of thinking changed. Thus,

changes are complex and take place at several levels simultaneously, both in the social and the psychological sense.

If we take into consideration the phenomena found under the exceptional 'experimental conditions' of Hungarian social changes, we can recognize two things. First, the 'historical sensitivity' and 'systematic transformation' of categories and stereotypes are most probably not unique developments, but are also present in the public thinking of societies that change less rapidly, although in a softer, less visible form. International attitudes under conditions of war and cold war, the psychological effects of 1956, and the sputnik-shock can all be interpreted within these relations and in this conceptual framework. The second recognition is that neither the investigations into stereotype changes that have been carried out so far, nor even the basic stereotype research literature, which concentrates on information processing, are particularly well suited to the measurement and explanation of the effect of constellation changes that restructure the whole image of society. Subtle mental constructs, resting on solid empirical bases, have already been built around the representation of the individual categories of individuals and the dynamics of the modification of individual stereotypes, but the analysis of social views comprising individual stereotypes and the investigation of how people experience and see the changes that upset their usual world are missing.

Our contribution to the systematic study of this area has been little more than the observation and quantitative description of the phenomena that are reported in this book. Our approach, investigations, and findings are open to justified criticism on three levels. On the first level, it is possible to query and object to the measurement and analysis procedures that we used. The application of bipolar scales is only one of the possibilities, their selection could be slightly accidental, increased by the intuitive decision of which traits were positive. We chose the simplest way to measure the evaluative charge and complexity of characterizations. Looking for relationships by correlation and factor analysis is not always justified, yet at the same time, a very large amount of information was utilized in this huge mass of data. The comparison of different samples is formally not well elaborated, while due to the composition of the samples, the comparison of content is often problematic. The demonstrated effect of social factors often remained modest and self-evident because the investigations were repeatedly, although not exclusively, carried out on student samples.

At the second level, the definition of the discovered phenomena themselves may give rise to doubts and questions. The relationship between an expressed opinion and the judgement that lies behind it has to be clarified if we are to determine what we mean by stereotypes. It is more important, however, to elucidate what we state about the representation of categories within the individual and about the relationship between the representations

of individuals forming society when we find the factors of trait judgements, or when we describe the trait profiles of characterizations and the concordance with respect to trait ranks. This is the key question in the empirical investigation and theory of 'social representation'. No breakthrough could be achieved in this respect either.

At the third level, feelings of uncertainty can be evoked by the explanatory principles applied to the phenomena. Loosely outlined hypotheses were phrased with respect to three psychological mechanisms. From the relationship between trait judgements, we could read out their comparison and relationship. Comparing the responses of persons with different cognitive styles we assumed that the respondents apply different strategies to find a balance of evaluation, that they look for the balance of positive and negative features between objects to be characterized or within the characterization of an object. Seeing the stereotype being modified by large groups in the changing situation, we reached the hypothesis that it is not persistent object-trait associations that lie behind stereotyped characterizations, but generating processes that, depending on current information, lead to a characterization that repeats the previous one or which, on the contrary, deviates from it.

These points of uncertainty justify further investigation, but this is no reason to eliminate our starting hypothesis, which originates in the traditions of cognitive social psychology and in the experiences of the history of ideologies. The individual has to give a full description and explanation to him/herself and to the members of society about history and society, therefore s/he creates a mosaic-like overall image made of categories and stereotypes. Thus, research cannot limit itself to the investigation of solitary stereotypes and their application, but one of its possible directions must extend to the investigation of how categories and stereotypes are linked to each other, how they complement each other, and what function they perform in the system of social views reflecting on socio-historical processes. Relying on our initial efforts, the following can be offered as objects and methods for future investigations.

First, we can offer the relationships among categories within and especially between different cognitive areas, the overlap between categories in terms either of the differences and similarities of traits found to be characteristic of them, or of the partial concordance or complete dissimilarity between the sets represented by them. In this respect, we took a first, uncertain step when we asked respondents to judge the national status of ethnic groups in double bind, beyond the systematic analysis of the four cognitive fields, and, also, when the relations of two spheres of national and social categories were studied, albeit briefly and one-sidedly. Revealing the relationships among categories may help us to rise above this level of abstraction and learn more about the social views manifested in the covert or overt categorization of the categories, and, also, descending from this level of

abstraction, to better understand the simultaneous application of different categories in the perception of persons (and their groups).

Second, we can offer the organizing role of emotional-rational evaluation in the conception of the relationship between categories and that of the characteristics of individual categories. Let traditional attitude research decline, or a balanced investigation of cognitive and affective factors rise—evaluation is present in the judgement of every trait of every category. When studying the internal organization and overall system of stereotypes, the positive-negative dimension cannot be avoided. In this respect, we made an initial, if not particularly original, effort when we described the trait profiles, evaluation hierarchy, and spatial interrelationships of the characterizations of the categories, and the matrix of the relationships (blended with evaluation) among objects to be characterized and characteristic traits. Further systematic investigation of this set of problems may enable us to describe the essence of the content of prevailing public thinking on the one hand, and the formal types of individual thinking on the other hand.

Third, and most particularly, we can offer the categorization of temporal processes, the temporal division of personal and public history, together with the historical inclusion and temporal aspect of social categories. We took the first steps in this almost untouched field when we repeatedly analysed the conception of 20th-century Hungarian history by a seemingly mechanical method. This is a narrow and incidental field compared to the research perspectives of the perception of historical changes. Historical psychology in this cognitive sense may help us to understand our intellectual conception and elaboration of the social processes of the past. Getting to know the past in this way always develops as a function of the experiences and changes of the present, and thus attitudes and stereotypes related to the past are the indexes and components of our relationship with the present. Revealing them can help social psychology to follow, interpret, and predict socio-political changes by studying public consciousness.

Appendix

The main characteristics of the frequently cited investigations are described below. Rather than repeatedly describing these investigations at length in the main text, we have referred to them by the code numbers listed below. Here, in condensed and summary form, we provide the following information:

a The general aim and the most important key words of the investigation,
b The year of the investigation,
c The related publications,
d The composition of the sample.
e The nature of the methods applied in the investigation and the level of data processing.

01.R64 The object of the investigation was to study the role played by common beliefs in interpersonal relations, that is, the effect of similar characterizations of national and social (and in one case combined) categories. Key words: sociometric relationships; latent ideological group structure; characterization of social and national categories by semantic differential; the difference between conformity at the level of society and at the level of groups.
Year: 1964. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1967.
Sample: 36 grammar school boys, aged 17–18 years. (This was a pilot study for an extensive research project in the field of real and perceived similarity of attitudes and group cohesion.)
Methods: Multivariate sociometry, measurement of the meaning of 14 words by semantic differential, analysis of the interpersonal correlations of judgements on bipolar scales of traits, description of the concordance between the two structures.

02.R65 The object of the investigation was the development of basic concepts of history in pupils. Key words: concept and meaning of historical development; concept and meaning of nation; concept and meaning of social class; intellectual development and changes in the forms of definitions; development of *Weltanschauung* and the content elements and structures of definitions.
Year: 1965. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1968.
Sample: 800 persons. Students of 25 school classes in the following distribution: 10 to 14-year-old pupils from three 5th grades, four 6th grades, two 7th grades, and two 8th grades of primary school, and 16 to 18-year-old grammar school students from three 2nd year classes, three 3rd year classes, and five 4th year classes.

Methods: Open-ended and multiple-choice questions, alternatives of definitions. Supplementary procedure: content analysis of school textbooks. Level of data processing: analysis of frequency distribution in 'developmental cross-sections'.

03.R71 The object of the investigation was to study beliefs about Hungarian history in the 20th century. Contrasting judgements and evaluations regarding the history of society in general and the family of the respondent in particular. Key words: judgement of historical periods; characterization of historical figures, family history, publications and family experiences as sources of history, systems of historical views.
Year: 1971. *Publication:* Hunyady & Pörzse, 1976; Hunyady, 1976, 1982.
Sample: 458 persons. Respondents of a national representative sample of adults (with respect to age, sex and place of living).
Methods: Open-ended and multiple-choice questions; series of five-point scales between pairs of characteristics for the characterization of periods and historical figures; special scales for the multiple evaluation of periods and for the perception of the situation of the family. Level of data processing: analysis of frequency distributions; tests of significance of the correlations between social and demographic differences and the measured variables.

04.R73c The object of the investigation was to study the relationship between cognitive complexity in the characterizations of personalities and the complexity manifested in the (more or less stereotyped) characterizations of nations. Key words: cognitive style; measurement and generalization of cognitive complexity; characterization of persons; characterization of national categories; the roles of cognitive domains and structures; positive evaluations and simplicity of characterizations.
Year: 1973. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1979.
Sample: 70 persons, randomly selected heterogeneous group of working adults between 20 and 60 years of age.
Methods: Characterization of five target persons and five target nations (the targets were selected on the basis of given relationships; the characterizations were performed on seven bipolar scales of traits); measurement of complexity, Bieri's technique and measurement of the intercorrelations of the indexes; analysis of the relationships and constructs serving as a basis of selection.

05.R73p The object of the investigation was to discover the beliefs regarding patriotism and the nation, that is, the characteristics and past of Hungarians, and the international relationships of the country in particular. Key words: the concept of nation and the criteria of belonging to a nation; Hungarian national autostereotype; evaluation of countries; the concept of patriotism; layperson's theory of the love of one's country; attitudes towards national and historical symbols; general conclusions 'drawn' from national history; understanding the principles of international co-operation.
Year: 1973. *Publication:* Hunyady, Hann, Lázár & Pörzse, 1974; Hunyady, Hann & Pörzse, 1975a, 1975b; Hunyady, Hann & Pörzse, 1980.
Sample: 564 persons. Respondents of a national representative sample of adults (with respect to age, sex, and place of living).
Methods: Open-ended and multiple-choice questions; special scale for investigating national autostereotype; measurement device for the analysis of the evaluation of

countries; measurement device for the determination of the criteria of patriotism for the subjects and the extent of their strictness. Level of data processing: analysis of frequency distributions; tests of significance of the correlations between social and demographic differences and the measured variables.

06.R75 The object of the investigation was to study the attitudes towards patriotism, the nation, and co-operation with so-called socialist countries. Key words: the concept of nation and the criteria of belonging to a nation; Hungarian national auto stereo type; evaluation of countries; the concept of patriotism; beliefs regarding the internal harmony of society; beliefs regarding the relationships of the so-called socialist countries; attitudes towards economic foreign relations; attitudes towards the so-called peaceful co-existence of social and political systems.
Year: 1975. *Publication:* Hunyady, Hann & Pörzse, 1975a, 1975b.
Sample: 516 persons. Four randomly selected sub-samples: 126 workers between 18 and 25 years of age; 126 workers between 26 and 60 years of age; 126 university students between 18 and 25 years of age; 128 intellectuals between 26 and 60 years of age.
Methods: Open-ended and multiple-choice questions; special scale for investigating national autostereotype; methods of measurement for the analysis of the evaluation of countries, and for the determination of the requirements of patriotism and of the extent of their strictness; attitude scales regarding international economic co-operation and disarmament. Level of data processing: analysis of frequency distributions; tests of significance of correlations between social and demographic differences and the measured variables; factor analysis of correlation matrices calculated for sub-samples.

07.R80 The object of the investigation was to characterize compound categories, with special emphasis on the roles of the historical, national, and socio-occupational constituting elements in the trait judgements of the categories. Key words: cross-categorization between cognitive domains; connected meanings; the approach of holistic reference; the perception of ingroups and outgroups—differences in the perception of homogeneity, that is, eclipse of the difference between the historical and social sub-categories when evaluating national outgroups; differences between age groups in cognitive organization.
Year: 1980. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1986, 1989a.
Sample: 240 students (half of them 12-year-old pupils in primary schools, half of them 16-year-old secondary school students), and their parents, a group of 490 adults, in a large provincial town and its surroundings. (The study was a supplementary part of the multiple-stage process known as the Debrecen Complex Study of Public Thinking.)
Methods: Judgement of six compound categories and three constituting elements of each on 12 bipolar scales of characteristics. Level of data processing: analysis of distribution and correlations of the judgements of the characteristics; multiple regression of each trait, comprehensive interpretation of the results of the 72 calculations for each of the two age groups.

08.R81 The object of the investigation was to study students' beliefs related to history, nation, and society, and the development of these views as a function of social context and cognitive style. Key words: historical periods as categories, and

their characterization; national categories and their characterization; social and occupational categories and their characterization; the roles of constructs within and among cognitive areas; cognitive complexity within and among cognitive areas; the intercorrelations between level of knowledge, evaluative judgements, and ways of thinking, and their determinants; circumstances of socialization (background, direction, performance) and their effects.
Year: 1981. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1981a; Hunyady, 1986.
Sample: 520 students aged 14, 17, and 18 in the last year of their studies in primary schools, vocational training schools, specialized secondary schools, and grammar schools. A total of 40 homogeneous sub-samples were formed on the basis of the place and type of the attended school, the occupation of the students' parents, and the students' school achievements; thus appropriate grouping made a quasi-experimental design possible.
Methods: Open-ended and multiple-choice questions with series of seven-point scales between pairs of characteristics used to characterize nations, social and occupational categories, and persons; items for the judgement of historical periods on seven-point scales and for the comparison of countries; measuring device for the determination of the requirements of patriotism and of the extent of their strictness; investigation of the level of historical knowledge; shortened F and D scales; measurement of cognitive complexity in order to determine cognitive style. Level of data processing: three-way ANOVA of homogeneous sub-samples in quasi-experimental design; cluster analysis for the whole sample depending on the type of data; multiple-step factor analysis starting from correlation matrices; multidimensional scaling.
The variables were subjected to three-way analysis of variance in which the following comparisons were made:

1 Groups of grammar school students in Budapest by a) the method of history teaching (regular or 'experimental'), b) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, other non-manual workers, skilled workers, unskilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).
2 Groups of secondary school students in Budapest by a) type of school attended (grammar school, vocational secondary school), b) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, other non-manual workers, skilled workers, unskilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).
3 Groups of grammar school students by a) type of habitation (capital, country), b) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, other non-manual workers, skilled workers, unskilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).
4 Groups of vocational secondary school students by a) type of habitation (capital, country), b) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, other non-manual workers, skilled workers, unskilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).
5 Groups of students in Budapest by a) type of school attended (vocational secondary school, vocational training school), b) occupation of the parents (skilled workers, unskilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).
6 Groups of primary school pupils by a) type of history teaching (regular, 'experimental'), b) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, skilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).

7 Groups of students in Budapest by a) level and type of school attended (primary school, grammar school, vocational secondary school), b) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, skilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).
8 Groups of students participating in 'experimental' history teaching programme by a) level of school attended (primary school, grammar school), b) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, skilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).
9 Groups of students in Budapest by a) type of school attended (grammar school, vocational training school), b) occupation of the parents (skilled workers, unskilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).

09.R82 The object of the investigation was to study the characteristics of students whose cognition was either complex or simple in the processing of historical information. Key words: cognitive style; cognitive complexity; integrative complexity; perception of historical figures: categorization, attribution, empathy; understanding historical processes and current social problems; type differences in cognitive responses: characteristics of the ways of thinking and sensitivity and susceptibility towards content elements.
Year: 1981–82. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1986.
Sample: Groups of 19 and 22 students selected on the basis of a multiple-stage investigation, and definitely identified as thinking in a complex or in a simple way in the cognitive areas of person perception and the characterization of historical periods.
Methods: Information from standard 'historical essays' and orienting questions to elicit cognitive responses; content analysis; measurement of the difference in the frequency of response elements between the criterion groups; qualitative analysis of the typical ways of thinking of the criterion groups (differentiation, embedding, ambivalence of evaluation).

10.R90 The object of the investigation was to study beliefs about historical, national, and social topics in the eventful months of changes in Eastern Europe. In addition to the exploration of new content elements, the research touched upon the perception of historical changes in international relations, and the beliefs regarding the social and occupational composition and characteristics of different continents and nations. Key words: changes in the characterization of categories and in the content of historical, national, and social beliefs; perception of changes in international relations; continental units: European, Balkan, and Asian categories; social and occupational associations of continental and national categories.
Year. 1990. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1990b, 1991a.
Sample: 55 students aged 15 to 18 from different secondary schools.
Methods: This research was a selective replication of 08.R81 and also served as a methodological preparation for 11.R91. In addition to the application of already-used methods and instruments, judgements were made on scales regarding continental units, regional roles, and social and occupational composition of nations. In the last area, the students reported their associations in response to orienting questions. Level of data processing: the beliefs were content-analysed at the level of statistical description of the frequency distribution of responses and indexes.

11.R91 The object of the investigation was to replicate 08.R81 after the radical change in the social and political situation, adding the supplements in content and methodology tested in 10.R90. Thus, the object of the study included the content and organization of belief systems regarding historical, national, and social topics in order to reveal the changes occurring between 1981 and 1991. Key words: as in the cited investigations, plus historical comparison; stability and change in stereotypes; cross-categorization, that is, characterization of compound categories consisting of national, social, and occupational elements; the contents of complex and simple cognitive style in changing situations.
Year: 1991. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995; Hunyady & Nguyen, 1993; Hunyady & Münnich, 1995.
Sample: 17 to 18-year-old students finishing grammar school or vocational training school. A total of 42 homogeneous sub-samples formed on the basis of the location and type of the school, the sex and school achievements of the students, and the occupation of their parents. In appropriate arrangement a quasi-experimental design was possible within this year of study and in comparison with the sub-samples of 08.R81.
Methods: See 08.R81 and 10.R90. Level of data processing: e.g., canonical correlation to elucidate the relationship between compound categories and the characterization of their elements; multi-variable analyses, determination of the relations of variable structures by LISRELL computer program.
The variables were subjected to three-way analysis of variance in which the following comparisons were made:

1 Groups of grammar school students in Budapest by a) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, other non-manual workers, contractors, skilled workers, unskilled workers), b) school achievement (excellent, moderate), and c) gender.
2 Groups of grammar school students in Debrecen by a) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, other non-manual workers, contractors, skilled workers, unskilled workers), b) school achievement (excellent, moderate), and c) gender.
3 Groups of grammar school students in Budapest and in Debrecen by a) type of habitation (capital, country), b) occupation of the parents (intellectuals, other non-manual workers, contractors, skilled workers, unskilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).
4 Groups of grammar school students and vocational training school students in Budapest by a) type of school attended (grammar school, vocational training school), b) occupation of the parents (skilled workers, unskilled workers), and c) school achievement (excellent, moderate).

12.R93r The object of the investigation was to study the stereotyped characterization of national and social beliefs and categories in Romanian students in Romania, with special emphasis on the possible comparison of the results with the findings of the investigation denoted by 11.R91. Key words: cultural comparison; tension and mutual rejection between nations; international consent regarding national stereotypes.
Year: 1993 and 1994. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1996.
Sample: 70 grammar school students, divided into four homogeneous sub-samples

on the basis of ancestry (worker and intellectual families) and school achievement (good and poor).
Methods and level of data processing: see the description of 11.R91.

13.R94s The object of the investigation was to study the belief systems in the historical, national, and social themes of students who showed deep interest and knowledge in history in particular. A replication of 11.R91, supplemented by the study of the perception of 20th-century historical figures, and by the exploration of judgements regarding where nationalities and minorities are thought to belong. Key words: as in the previous investigations, plus categorization of historical figures; dimensions of the evaluation of historical figures, the complexity of their characterizations; perception of the relations of groups in double bind with regard to the ethnic dimension.
Year: 1994. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1996.
Sample: 26 18-year-old students who achieved excellent results in the written part of the entrance examination to the history major of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest.
Methods: The same as the procedures and antecedents described in 11.R91, plus open-ended and multiple-choice questions; filling in the REP matrix regarding historical figures; direct comparisons regarding ethnic groups in double bind and nations serving as anchor points—in 45 relations; the adequate method of this latter analysis of multidimensional scaling.

14.R94n The object of the investigation was to study the historical beliefs and evaluations present in public thinking, with special emphasis on 20th-century family history, social history, and the figures of political history. Key words: historical attitude; differentiation and evaluation of historical periods as categories; family history; developmental trends implied in historical judgements.
Year: 1994. *Publication:* Hunyady, 1996.
Sample: a national representative sample of 1000 persons, representing the composition of the adults in Hungary as to age, sex, and dwelling place.
Methods: Open-ended and multiple-choice questions, including seven-point scales on which the evaluative judgements of time periods symbolizing eras had to be made. Level of data processing: analysis of frequency distributions; significance tests of social and demographic differences and of the correlations among the measured variables.

Bibliography

Abelson, R.P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W.J., Newcomb, T.M., Rosenberg, M.J. and Tannenbaum, P.H. (Eds.) (1968). *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Adorno, T.W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D.J. and Sanford, R.N. (1950). *The Authoritarian Personality.* New York: Harper and Row.

Allison, S.T. and Messick, D.M. (1985). The group attribution error. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* **21,** 563–79.

Allport, G.W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice.* Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Altemeyer, B. (1988). *Enemies of Freedom.* New York: Jossey-Bass.

Andrews, M. (1991). *Lifetimes of Commitment: Aging, Politics, Psychology.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Angelusz, R. (1980). Ismeretek a történelemrôl. In T., Frank and M.Hoppál, (Eds.), *Hiedelemrendszer és társadalmi tudat, I.kötet* (pp. 211–18). Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont.

Argyle, M. (1994). *The Psychology of Social Class*. London and New York: Routledge.

Armer, M. (1974). *African Social Psychology.* (Africane Bibliography Series No.2) New York: Africane Publishing Company.

Ashmore, R.D. (1981). Sex stereotypes and implicit personality theory. In D.L. Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behaviour* (pp. 37–82). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Ashmore, R.D. and Del Boca, F.K. (1981). Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping. In D.L.Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behaviour* (pp. 1–36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Askevis-Leherpeux, F. and Bastounis, M. (1994). The effect of familiarity on free descriptions of European nationalities: A cognitive approach, (manuscript).

Bar-Tal, D. and Kruglanski, A.W. (1988). *The Social Psychology of Knowledge: Its Scope and Meaning.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bayton, J.A., McAlister, L.B. and Hamer, J.R. (1956). Race-class stereotypes. *Journal of Negro Education,* **4**, 75–78.

Békés, F. (1980). *Ismeretszintmérés, ismeretstruktúra, ismerettipológia.* Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont.

Berend, T.I. (1978). *Ot elöadás gazdaságról és oktatásról.* Budapest: Magvetö.

Bernstein, B. (1971). *Class, Codes and Control. Vol. 1.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Billig, M. (1992). *Talking of the Royal Family.* London: Routledge.
Billig, M. and Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **3**, 27–52.
Bodenhausen, G.V. (1993). Emotions, arousal and stereotypic judgments: A heuristic model of affect and stereotyping. In D.M.Mackie and D.L.Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, Cognition and Stereotyping* (pp. 13–38). San Diego, CA: Academic.
Bogardus, E.S. (1925). Measuring social distances. *Journal of Applied Sociology,* **9**, 299–308.
Brewer, M.B. (1979). Ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis. *Psychological Bulletin,* **86**, 307–24.
Brewer, M.B. (1986). The role of ethnocentrism in intergroup conflict. In S.Worchel and W.G.Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (2nd edn) (pp. 88–102). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
Brewer, M.B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T.K.Srull and R.S.Wyer (Eds.), *Advances in Social Cognition, Vol. 1* (pp. 1–36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brewer, M.B. and Campbell, D.T. (1976). *Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Attitudes: East African Evidence.* New York: Halsted Press.
Brewer, M.B., Dull, V. and Lui, L. (1981). Perceptions of the elderly: Stereotypes as prototypes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **41**, 656–70.
Brewer, M.B. and Kramer, R.M. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology,* **36**, 219–43.
Brigham, J.C. (1971). Ethnic stereotypes. *Psychological Bulletin,* **76**, 15–38.
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1961). The mirror image in Soviet-American relations: A social psychologist's report. *Journal of Social Issues,* **17**, 45–56.
Brown, R. (1965). *Social Psychology.* New York: Free Press.
Bruner, J.S. (1957). On perceptual readiness. *Psychological Review,* **64**, 123–52.
Bruner, J.S. and Goodman, C.D. (1947). Value and need as organizing factors in perception. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* **43**, 33–44.
Bruner, J.S. and Tagiuri, R. (1954). Person perception. In G.Lindzey (Ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2* (pp. 634–54). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Buchanan, W. and Cantril, H. (1953). *How Nations See Each Other.* Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Campbell, D.T. (1967). Stereotypes and the perception of group differences. *American Psychologist,* **22**, 817–29.
Cantor, N. and Mischel, W. (1979). Prototypes in person perception. In L.Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 12* (pp. 4–51). New York: Academic.
Cantril, H. and Strunk, M. (1951). *Public Opinion 1935–1946.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Catlin, G. and Epstein, S. (1992). Unforgettable experiences: The relation of life events to basic beliefs about self and world. *Social Cognition,* **10**, 189–209.
Centers, R. (1948). Attitude and belief in relation to occupational stratification. *Journal of Social Psychology,* **27**, 159–85.
Centers, R. (1949). *The Psychology of Social Classes.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Christiansen, B. (1959). *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality.* Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Conway, M. and Ross, M. (1984). Getting what you want by revising what you had. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **47**, 738–48.

Csepeli, Gy. (1979). A nemzeti tudat- és érzésvilág kutatásáról. *Társadalmi Szemle,* **34**(11), 90–98.

Csepeli, Gy. (1980). Szociológiai, szociálpszichológiai szempontok a nemzeti érzés és tudat kutatásához. (manuscript).

Csepeli, Gy. (1985). *Nemzeti tudat és érzésvilág Magyarországon a 70-és években.* Budapest: Múzsák.

Csepeli, Gy. (1987). *Csoporttudat—nemzettudat.* Esszék, tanulmányok. Budapest: Magveto.

Csepeli, Gy. (1992). *Nemzet által homályosan.* Budapest: Századvég Kiadó.

Dankánics, M. and Erdösi, S. (1975). A 'Nagy csaták' hatása nyomában. In *Két tanulmány a 'Nagy csaták'-ról* (pp. 65–153). Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kozpont.

De Rosa, A.S. (1994). Am I Italian and/or European? (manuscript).

Deutsch, K.W. and Merritt, R.L. (1965). Effects of events on national and international images. In H.C.Kelman (Ed.), *International Behaviour: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (pp. 132–87). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Dilthey, W. (1974). *A történelmi világ felépítése a szellemtudományokban.* Budapest: Gondolat.

Dion, K.L. (1979). Status equity, sex composition of group and intergroup bias. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* **5**, 240–44.

Dittmar, H. (1992). *The Social Psychology of Material Possessions.* New York: Harvester and Wheatsheaf.

Doise, W., Clemence, A. and Lorenzi-Cioldi, F. (1993). *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Representations.* New York: Harvester and Wheatsheaf.

Doob, L.W. (1964). *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Eagly, A.H. (1991). The three ironies of the McGuires' theory of thought systems. In R.S.Wyer Jr and T.K.Srull (Eds.), *Advances in Social Cognition, Vol. 4* (pp. 121–28). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Eagly, A.H. and Kite, M.E. (1987). Are stereotypes of nationalities applied to both women and men? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **53**, 451–62.

Eagly, A.H. and Steffen, V.J. (1984). Gender stereotypes system from the distribution of women and men into social roles. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **46,** 735–54.

Eagly, A.H. and Wood, W. (1982). Inferred sex differences in status as a determinant of gender stereotypes about social influence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **43**, 915–28.

Eiser, J.R. (Ed.) (1984). *Attitudinal Judgement.* New York: Springer Verlag.

Eperjessy, G. and Szebenyi, P. (1976). *A tanulók történelmi fogalmainak fejlödése.* Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó.

Erös, F. (1993). *A válság szociálpszichológiája.* Budapest: T-Twins Kiadó.

Feagin, J.R. (1975). *Subordinating the Poor Welfare and American Beliefs.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Feather, N.T. (1974). Explanations of poverty in Australian and American samples: The person, society or fate? *Australian Journal of Psychology,* **26,** 199–216.

Feher, F. and Heller, A. (1992). *Kelet-Európa 'dicsöséges forradalmai'.* Budapest: T-Twins.

Fiedler, K.F. (1991). The tricky nature of skewed frequency tables: An information loss account of distinctiveness-based illusory correlation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **60**, 24–36.

Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight is not foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,* **1**, 288–99.

Fischhoff, B. (1977). Perceived informativeness of facts. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,* **3**, 349–58.

Fischhoff, B. (1982). For those condemned to study the past: Heuristics and biases in hindsight. In D.Kahneman, P.Slovic and A.Tversky (Eds.), *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (pp. 335–54). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fiske, S.T. (1982). Schema-triggered affect: Applications to social perception. In M.S.Clark, and S.T.Fiske (Eds.), *Affect and Cognition.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Fiske, S.T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. *American Psychologist,* **48**, 621–28.

Fiske, S.T and Linville, P.W. (1980). What does schema concept buy us? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* **6**, 543–57.

Fiske, S.T. and Neuberg, S.L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from category-based to individuating processes: Influences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation. In M.P.Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 23* (pp. 1–74). New York: Random House.

Fiske, S.T. and Pavelchak, M.A. (1986). Category-based versus piecemeal-based affective responses developments in schema-triggered affect. In R.M.Sorrentino and E.T.Higgins (Eds.), *The Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundation of Social Behaviour* (pp. 167–203). New York: Guilford Press.

Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1984). *Social Cognition* (1st edn). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1991) *Social Cognition* (2nd edn). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Forgas, J.P. (1995). Mood and judgement: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM). *Psychological Bulletin,* **117**, 39–66.

Forgas, J.P., Laszlo, J., Siklaki, I. and Moylan, S.J. (1995). Images of politics: A multidimensional analysis of implicit representations of political parties in a newly emerging democracy. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **25**, 481–96.

Fredrickson, B.L. and Kahneman, D. (1993). Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective episodes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **65**, 45–55.

Free, L.A. and Cantril, H. (1967). *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Furnham, A.F. (1988). *Lay Theories: Everyday Understanding of Problems in the Social Sciences.* Oxford: Pergamon.

Furnham, A.F. (1990). *The Protestant Work Ethic: The Psychology of Work-Related Beliefs and Behaviours.* London: Routledge.

Garai, L. (1993). '*...elvegyültem és kiváltam' Társadalomlélektani esszé az identitásról* Budapest: T-Twins.

Garai, L. (1995). *Quo vadis, tovaris? A modernizáció útjáról és a rajta vándorló emberröl.* Budapest: Scientia Humana.

Gazsó, F., Pataki, F., Sántha, P. and Várhelyi, Gy. (1970). *Pályák vonzásában*. Budapest: Ifjúsági Lapkiadó Vállalat.

Gergen, K.J. and Gergen, M.M. (Eds.) (1984). *Historical Social Psychology*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Gilbert, G.M. (1951). Stereotype persistence and change among college students. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* **46,** 244–54.

Giles, H.J. and Coupland, N. (1991). *Language Contexts and Consequences*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Glatz, F. (1990). *Történetírás korszakváltásban*. Budapest: Gondolat.

Glatz, F. (Ed.) (1990). *Tudomány, kultúra, politika: Gróf Klebelsberg Kuno válogatott beszédei és írásai 1917–1932*. Budapest: Európa.

Greenwald, A.G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. *American Psychologist,* **35**, 603–18.

Halász, L. (1987). A téves ítélet, a prekoncepció, a koncepciós per és a 'kegyes csalás' pszichológiája. In L.Halász *Mi fér meg az emberben?* (pp. 259–316). Budapest: Magvetö Kiadó.

Halász, L. (1992). Uldözö és üldözött I-II. In L.Halász *Hasonmás: Az ember kettössége* (pp. 173–216). Budapest: Scientia Humana.

Hamilton, D.L. (1979). A cognitive-attributional analysis of stereotyping. In L.Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 12* (pp. 53–84). New York: Academic.

Hamilton, D.L. (1981). Illusory correlation as a basis for stereotyping. In D.L. Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behaviour, Ch. 4* (pp. 115–44). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Hamilton, D.L. (1990). Social cogniton and the study of stereotyping. Paper presented at the General Meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, Budapest.

Hamilton, D.L., Gibbsons, P., Stroessner, S.J. and Sherman, J.W. (1992). Stereotypes and language use. In K. Fiedler and G.R.Semin (Eds.), *Language and Social Cognition* (pp. 102–28). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976). Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: A cognitive basis of stereotyping judgments. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* **12,** 392–407.

Hamilton, D.L. and Rose, T.L. (1980). Illusory correlation and the maintenance of stereotypic beliefs. J*ournal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **39**, 832–45.

Hamilton, D.L. and Sherman, J.W. (1994). Stereotypes. In R.S.Wyer and T.K.Srull (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Cognition* (2nd edn), *Vol. 2* (pp. 1–68). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Hamilton, D.L. and Sherman, S.J. (1989). Illusory correlations: Implications for stereotype theory and research. In D.Bar-Tal, C.F.Graumann, A.W. Kruglanski and W.Stroebe (Eds.), *Stereotypes and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions* (pp. 59–82). New York: Springer.

Hamilton, D.L., Stroessner, S.J. and Driscoll, D.M. (1994). Social cognition and the study of stereotyping. In P.G.Devine, D.L.Hamilton and T.M.Ostrom (Eds.), *Social Cognition: Impact on Social Psychology* (pp. 291–321). San Diego, CA: Academic.

Hamilton, D.L., Stroessner, S.J. and Mackie, D.M. (1993). The influence of affect on

stereotyping: The case of illusory correlations. In D.M.Mackie and D.L. Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, Cognition and Stereotyping* (pp. 39–61). San Diego, CA: Academic.

Hamilton, D.L. and Trolier, T.K. (1986). Stereotypes and stereotyping: An overview of the cognitive approach. In J.F.Dovidio and S.L.Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism: Theory and Research* (pp. 127–64). San Diego, CA: Academic.

Hankiss, A. (1980). 'Én-ontológiak'. In T.Frank and M.Hoppál (Eds.), *Hiedelemrendszer és társadalmi tudat, Vol. 2* (pp. 30–39). Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont.

Harvey, O.J. (1967). Conceptual Systems and Attitude Change. In C.W.Sherif and M.Sherif (Eds.), *Attitude, Ego-Involvement and Change* (pp. 205–18, 222–61). New York: Wiley.

Haslam, S.A. and Turner, J.C. (1992a). Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 2: The relationship between frame of reference, self-categorization and accentuation. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **22**, 251–77.

Haslam, S.A., Turner, J.C., Oakes, P.J., McGarty, C. and Hayes, B.K. (1992b). Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping L: The effects of intergroup relations as mediated by social change and frame of reference. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **22**, 3–20.

Heaven, P.C.L., Rajab, D. and Ray, J.J. (1984). Patriotism, racism and the disutility of the ethnocentrism concept. *The Journal of Social Psychology,* **125**, 181–85.

Hewstone, M. (1994). Revision and change of stereotypic beliefs: In search of the elusive subtyping model . In W.Stroebe and M.Hewstone (Eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 5* (pp. 69–110). Chichester: Wiley.

Hintzman, D.L. (1986). 'Schema abstraction' in a multiple-trace memory model. *Psychological Review,* **93**, 411–28,

Hunyady, G. (1967). A szociometriai és látens ideológiai szerkezet viszonya a csoportban. *Magyar Pszichológiai Szemle,* **24**, 362–78.

Hunyady, G. (1968). *Tanulók történelmi alapfogalmainak vizsgálata.* Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó.

Hunyady, G. (1976). A XX. század különbözö idöszakainak értékelése a közgondolkodásban. In H.Vass (Ed.), *Történelem és tömegkommunikáció.* Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

Hunyady, G. (1979). Adatok a kognitív komplexitás anatómiájához. In J.Salamon (Ed.), *Az alkotó gondolkodás problémái* (pp. 29–52). Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

Hunyady, G. (198la). Kognitív komplexitás személyek és ideológikus tárgykörök megítélésében. *Pszichológia,* **1**, 105–30.

Hunyady, G. (1981b). Történelem és pszichológia. *Történelmi Szemle,* **1**, 71–78.

Hunyady, G. (1982). Történelmi ismeretek és attitüdök a közgondolkodásban és az oktatasban. In H.Vass (Ed.), *Történelem és közgondolkodás* (pp. 88–106). Budapest: Kossuth.

Hunyady, G. (1986). Történelmi nézetek pszichológiai szerveződése és társadalmi sajátosságai (D.Sc. Dissertation, Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Budapest: MTA.

Hunyady, G. (1988). National stereotypes: Three approaches in social psychology. In A.Fusco, P.M.Battisti and R.Tomassoni (Eds.), *Issues in Cognition and Social Representation: Selected Papers from the Italian-Hungarian Psychology Symposium* (pp. 265–81). Milan: Angeli.

Hunyady, G. (1989a). Komplex történeti-nemzeti-társadalmi kategóriák jellemzéséröl. In I.Vári-Szilágyi and P.Niedermüller (Eds.), *Identitás kettös tükörben* (pp. 177–89). Budapest: TIT.

Hunyady, G. (1989b). Schemas in historical-political thinking. Paper presented at the Second Hungarian-Italian Psychology Symposium, Budapest.

Hunyady, G. (1989c). Social psychological approaches to national stereotypes. Paper presented at the First European Congress of Psychology, Amsterdam.

Hunyady, G. (1990a). From the national character to the mechanism of stereotyping: The withdrawal of social psychology in the history of sciences. In J.C. Nyiri (Ed.), *Perspectives on Ideas and Reality* (pp. 174–200). Budapest: FPIK.

Hunyady, G. (1990b). Social-historical changes and national stereotypes. Paper presented at the Conference of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, Budapest.

Hunyady, G. (199la). Historical attitudes and social changes (Keynote lecture). In G.Hunyady (Ed.), *Proceedings of the Second European Congress of Psychology* (pp. 53–58). Budapest: NSOC.

Hunyady, G. (1991b). The turn of century in the Hungarian public thought. Paper presented at the Conference on 'Culture and Society in 20th Century Hungary' Santa Barbara Hungarian Cultural Festival. In *Hungarian Studies,* **9**, 215–26.

Hunyady, G. (1993a). Historical attitudes in historical times. Paper presented at the 3rd Hungarian-Italian Psychology Symposium, Palermo.

Hunyady, G. (1993b). National and Social Categories: A Cognitive Interaction. Paper presented at the Lisbon Conference of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology.

Hunyady G. (1994). Nemzeti és nemzetfeletti sztereotípiák. Paper presented at the Scientific Conference of the Hungarian Psychological Association, Debrecen.

Hunyady, G. (1995). The Image of Nations Masks a Social Model. Keynote lecture presented at the 4th European Congress of Psychology, Athens.

Hunyady, G. (1996) *Sztereotípiák a változó közgondolkodásban*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

Hunyady, G. (1998). *Characterization of Social Categories in Psychological and Societal Context: Hungarian Public Thinking Before and After 1989*. Budapest: Eötvös University Press.

Hunyady, G., Hann, E., Lázár, G. and Pörzse, K. (1974). *Nézetek a magyarságról, hazafiságról és az internacionalizmusról* Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont.

Hunyady, G., Hann, E. and Pörzse, K. (1975a). *Nézetek a szocialista hazafiság idöszerü kérdéseiröl* Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont.

Hunyady, G., Hann, E. and Pörzse, K. (1975b). Sztereotip nemzetjellemzések kognitív szerveződése. *Magyar Pszichológiai Szemle,* **32**, 147–62.

Hunyady, G., Hann, E. and Pörzse, K. (1980). Investigations into national stereotypes and attitudes. In L.Kardos, Cs.Pléh and G.Hunyady (Eds.), *Attitudes, Interaction and Personality* (pp. 57–80). Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

Hunyady, G. and Münnich, A. (1995). A modified True Score TMM model for analysing stereotype effects on characterizations of nations. In W.E.Saris and A.Münnich (Eds.), *The Multitrait-Multimethod Approach to Evaluate Measurement Instruments* (pp. 173–84). Budapest: Eötvös University Press.

Hunyady, G. and Nguyen, L.A. (1993). Europe's image in Hungarian pupils. Paper presented at the Budapest Conference of the Network Educational Science, Amsterdam (NESA).

Hunyady G. and Pörzse K. (1976). *Vélekedések a XX. század történetéröl és a családok múltjáról* Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont.

Inkeles, A. and Levinson, D.J. (1969). National character: The study of modal personality and sociocultural system. In G.Lindzey and E.Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 4*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Jahoda, G. (1962). Development of Scottish children's ideas and attitudes about country and nationality. *British Journal of Educational Psychology,* **33**, 47–60, 143–53.

Jaspars, J.M.F. and Warnaen, S. (1982). Intergroup relations, ethnic identity and self-evaluation in Indonesia. In H.Tajfel (Ed.), *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (pp. 335–66). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, N.B., Middleton, M.R. and Tajfel, H. (1970). The relationship between children's preferences for and knowledge about other nations. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology,* **9**, 232–40.

Jones, E.E. and Davis, K.E. (1965). From acts to disposition: The attribution process in person perception. In L.Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2* (pp. 219–66). New York: Academic.

Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology,* **33**, 1–27.

Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. *Econometrica,* **47**, 363–91.

Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values and frames. *American Psychologist,* **39**, 341–50.

Karlins, M., Coffman, T.L. and Walters, G. (1969). On the fading of social stereotypes: Studies in three generations of college students. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **13**, 1–16.

Katz, D. and Braly, K.W. (1933). Racial stereotypes in one hundred college students. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* **28**, 280–90.

Katz, D. and Braly, K.W. (1935). Racial prejudice and racial stereotypes. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* **30**, 175–93.

Kelley, J. (1990). The failure of a paradigm: Log-linear models of social mobility. In J.Clark, C.Modgil and S.Modgil (Eds.), *John H.Goldthorpe: Consensus and Controversy.* London: Falmer.

Kelly, G.A. (1955). *The Psychology of Personal Constructs.* New York: Norton.

Koomen, W. (1993). National stereotypes: Common representations and ingroup favoritism. (Manuscript).

Kosáry, D. (1987). *A történelem veszedelmei.* Budapest: Magvetö.

Krausz, T. (1994). *Megélt rendszerváltás.* Budapest: Cégér.

Krebs, D. and Schmidt, P. (Eds.) (1993). *New Directions in Attitude Measurement.* Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Krech, D. and Cruchfield, R.S. (1948). *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Krueger, J. (1994). From personal beliefs to cultural stereotypes: Projection, consensus and subtle race bias among college students, (manuscript).

Krueger, J. and Clement, R.W. (1994). Memory-based judgements about multiple categories: A revision and extension of Tajfel's accentuation theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **67**, 35–47.

Krueger, J. and Zeiger, J.S. (1993). Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **65**, 670–80.

Kruglanski, A.W. (1989). *Lay Epistemics and Human Knowledge*. New York: Plenum.

Lambert, W.E. and Klineberg, O. (1967). *Children's Views of Foreign Peoples. A Cross-National Study.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Lázár, G. (1994). A felnött lakosság nemzeti identitása a kisebbségekhez való viszony tükrében. (Ph.D. dissertation, Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Budapest: TMB.

Lemyre, L. and Smith, Ph.M. (1985). Intergroup discrimination and self-esteem in the Minimal Group Paradigm. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **49,** 660–70.

Lendvay, J. (1993). A nemzetben való gondolkodás két fö típusa: a nemzetkép és a nemzeti sztereotípia. (Ph.D. Dissertation). Budapest: TMB.

Lerner, M.J. (1980). *The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion*. New York and London: Plenum Press.

Leyens, J.P., Yzerbyt, V. and Schadron, G. (1994). *Stereotypes and Social Cognition.* London: Sage Publications.

Likert, R. (1932). A technique for the measurement of attitudes. *Archives of Psychology, No. 140.*

Linville, P.W. (1982). The complexity-extremity effect and age-based stereotyping. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **42**, 193–211.

Linville, P.W. (1995). A new outgroup bias: The outgroup-covariation effect. Paper presented at the Person Memory Interest Group Annual Meeting at Front Royal, Virginia.

Linville, P.W. and Carlston, D.E. (1994). Social cognition of the self. In P.G.Devine, D.L.Hamilton and T.M.Ostrom (Eds.), *Social Cognition: Impact on Social Psychology* (pp. 143–93). San Diego, CA: Academic.

Linville, P.W. and Fischer, G.W (1991). Preferences for separating of combining events. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **60,** 5–23.

Linville, P.W., Fischer, G.W. and Salovey, P. (1989). Perceived distribution of the characteristics of in-group and out-group members: Empirical evidence and a computer simulation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **57**, 165–88.

Linville, P.W, Salovey, P. and Fischer, G.W (1986). Stereotyping and perceived distributions of social characteristics: An application to ingroup-outgroup perception. In J.F.Dovidio and S.L.Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism* (pp. 165–208). San Diego, CA: Academic.

Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch.

Lukacs, J. (1968). *Historical Consciousness: The Remembered Past*. New York: Schocken Books.

McClosky, H. (1967). Personality and attitude correlates of foreign policy orientation. In J.N.Rosenau (Ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (pp. 51–109). New York: Free Press.

McFarland, C. and Ross, M. (1984). The effect of changes in impressions of self and others on recollections of the past, (manuscript).

McGarty, C., Haslam, S.A., Turner, J.C. and Oakes, P.J. (1993). Illusory correlation as accentuation of actual intercategory difference: Evidence for the effect with minimal stimulus information. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **23**, 391–410.

McGrath, J.E. (Ed.). (1988). *The Social Psychology of Time, New Perspectives*. Newbury Park: Sage.

McGrath, J.E. and Kelly J.R. (1986). *Time and Human Interaction Toward a Social Psychology of Time*. New York: Guilford Press.

McGuire, W.J. (1969). The nature of attitude and attitude change. In G.Lindzey and E.Aronson (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (2nd edn), *Vol. 3* (pp. 136–314). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

McGuire, W.J. (1972). Attitude change: The information-processing paradigm. In C.G.McClintock (Ed.), *Experimental Social Psychology* (pp. 108–11) New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

McGuire, W.J. (1973). The yin and yang of progress in social psychology: Seven koan. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **26**, 446–56.

McGuire, W.J. (1983). A contextualist theory of knowledge: Its implications for innovation and reform in psychological research. In L.Berkowits (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 16* (pp. 1–47). New York: Academic.

McGuire, W.J. (1985). Attitudes and attitude change. In G.Lindzey and E.Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (3rd edn), (pp. 233–346). New York: Random House.

McGuire, W.J. (1986a). A perspectivist look at contextualism and the future of behavioral science. In R.L.Rosnow and M.Georgoudi (Eds.), *Contextualism and Understanding in Behavioral Science: Implications for Research and Theory* (pp. 271–301). New York: Praeger.

McGuire, W.J. (1986b). The vicissitudes of attitudes and similar representational constructs in twentieth century psychology. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **16**, 89–130.

McGuire, W.J. (1989). A perspectivist approach to the strategic planning of programmatic scientific research. In B.Gholson, W.R., Shadis Jr.R.A.Neimeyer and A.C.Houts (Eds.), *Psychology of Science: Contributions to Metascience* (pp. 214–45). New York: Cambridge University Press.

McGuire, W.J. (1993). The poli-psy relationship: Three phases of a long affair. In S. lyengar and W.J.McGuire (Eds.), *Explorations in Political Psychology* (pp. 9–35). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

McGuire, W.J. (1994). Uses of historical data in psychology: Comments on Münsterber (1899). *Psychological Report,* **101**, 243–47.

McGuire, W.J. and McGuire, C.V. (1981). The spontaneous self-concept as affected by personal distinctiveness. In M.D.Lynch, A.A.Norem-Hebelsen and K.Gergen (Eds.), *Self-Concept: Advances in Theory and Research* (pp. 147–71). New York: Ballinger.

McGuire, W.J. and McGuire, C.V. (1988). Content and process in the experience of self. In L.Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 21* (pp. 97–144). New York: Academic.

McGuire, W.J. and McGuire, C.V. (1991). The content, structure and operation of thought systems. In R.S.Wyer Jr and T.K.Srull (Eds.), *Advances in Social Cognition, Vol. IV* (pp. 1–78). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Mackie, D.M., Allison, S.T., Worth, L.T. and Asuncion, A.G. (1992b). The impact of outcome biases on counterstereotypic inferences about groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* **18**, 44–51.

Mackie, D.M., Worth, L.T. and Allison, S.T. (1990). Outcome biased inferences and the perception of change in groups. *Social Cognition,* **8**, 325–42.

Marin, G. and Salazar, J.M. (1985). Determinants of hetero- and autostereotypes: Distance, level of contact and socioeconomic development in seven nations. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,* **16,** 403–22.

Markus, G.B. (1986). Stability and change in political attitudes: Observed, recalled and 'explained'. *Political Behavior,* **8**, 21–44.

Merrit, R.L. and Puchala, D.J. (Eds.) (1968). *Western European Perspectives on International Affairs: Public Opinion Studies and Evaluations*. New York: Praeger.

Messick, D.M. and Mackie, D.M. (1989). Intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology,* **40**,45–81.

Middleton, D. and Edwards, D. (Eds.) (1990). *Collective Remembering*. London: Sage Publications.

Middleton, M.R., Tajfel, H. and Johnson, N.B. (1970). Cognitive and affective aspects of children's national attitudes. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology,* **9**, 122–34.

Miller, A.G. (1982). Historical and contemporary perspectives on stereotyping. In A.G.Miller (Ed.), *In the Eye of the Beholder: Contemporary Issues in Stereotyping* (pp. 1–39). New York: Praeger.

Morawski, J.G. (1984). Historiography as a metatheoretical text for social psychology. In K.J.Gergen and M.M.Gergen (Eds.), *Historical Social Psychology* (pp. 37–60). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Morris, M. and Williamson, J.B. (1982). Stereotypes and social class: A focus on poverty. In A.G.Miller (Ed.), *In the Eye of the Beholder: Contemporary Issues in Stereotyping* (pp. 411–65). New York: Praeger.

Mullen, B., Brown, R. and Smith, C. (1992). Ingroup bias as a function of salience, relevance and status: An integration. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **22**, 103–22.

Mummendey, A., Mielke, R., Wenzel, M. and Kanning, U. (1994). Social identity of East-Germans: The process of unification between East and West Germany as challenge to cope with 'negative social identity', (manuscript).

Mummendey, A. and Schreiber, H.J. (1983). Better or different? Positive social identity by discrimination against or by differentiation from outgroups. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **13,** 389–97.

Münsterberg, H. (1899). Psychology and history. *Psychological Review,* 6, 1–31. Reprinted in *Psychological Review,* 1994, **101,** 230–36.

Münsterberg, H. (1914). *Psychology: General and Applied*. New York: Appleton.

Murphy, G. and Likert, R. (1938). *Public Opinion and the Individual: A Psychological Study of Student Attitudes on Public Questions, with a Retest Five Years Later.* New York: Harper.

Nietzsche, F. (1874). Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historic für das Leben. Reprinted in *Korszerûtlen elmélkedések* (pp. 25–142). Budapest, Révai 1921.

Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A. and Turner, J.C. (1994). *Stereotyping and Social Reality.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Osgood, C.E., Suci, G.J. and Tannenbaum, P.H. (1957). *The Measurement of Meaning*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Oskamp, S. (1965). Attitudes toward U.S. and Russian actions: A double standard. *Psychological Reports,* **16,** 43–46.

Oskamp, S. (1972). International attitudes of British and American students: A fading double standard. *Proceedings, 80th Annual convention, APA,* **7**, 295–96.

Oskamp, S. (1977) *Attitudes and Opinions*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Park, B. and Hastie, R. (1987). Perception of variability in category development: Instance versus abstraction-based stereotypes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **53**, 621–35.

Park, B. and Rothbart, M. (1982). Perception of out-group homogeneity and levels of social categorization: Memory for the subordinate attributes of in-group and out-group members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **42**, 1051–68.

Pataki, F. (1993). *Rendszerváltás után: Társadalomlélektani terepszemle*. Budapest: Scientia Humana.

Peabody, D. (1985). *National characteristics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pettigrew, T.F. (1981). Extending the stereotype concept. In D.L.Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior* (pp. 303–32). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Piontkowski, U. and Florack, A. (1995). Attitudes toward acculturation from the dominant group's point of view. Paper presented at the 4th European Congress of Psychology, Athens.

Pyron, B. (1966). A factor-analytic study of simplicity-complexity of social ordering. *Perceptual and Motor Skills,* **22**, 259–72.

Rabbie, J.M. and Horwitz, M. (1988). Categories versus groups as explanatory concepts in intergroup relations. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **18**, 117–23.

Ray, J.J. (1974). Balanced dogmatism scales. *Australian Journal of Psychology,* **26**, 9–14.

Read, S.J. and Cesa, I.L. (1991). This reminds me of the time when…: Expectation failures in reminding and explanation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* **27**, 1–25.

Reeder, G.D. and Brewer, M.B. (1979). A schemantic model of dispositional attribution in interpersonal perception. *Psychological Review,* **86**, 61–79.

Robinson, J.P., Shaver, P.R. and Wrightsman, L.S. (Eds.) (1991). M*easures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes, Vol. 1*. San Diego, CA: Academic.

Robinson, W.P. and Rackstraw, S.J. (1972). *A Question of Answers*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Roese, N.J. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **66**, 805–18.

Roese, N.J. and Olson, J.M. (1995). *What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Rokeach, M. (1960). *The Open and Closed Mind*. New York: Basic Books.

Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E.Rosch and B.B.Lloyd (Eds.), *Cognition and Categorization* (pp. 27–48). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Rosenkrantz, P.S., Vogel, S.L., Bee, H., Broverman, I.K. and Broverman, D.N. (1968). Sex-role stereotypes and self concepts in college students. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology,* **32**, 287–98.

Ross, M. and Conway, M. (1986). Remembering one's own past: The construction of personal histories. In R.M.Sorrentino and E.T.Higgins (Eds.), *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition* (pp. 122–44). New York: Guilford Press.

Ross, M. and Holmberg, D. (1990). Recounting the past: Gender differences in the recall of events in the history of a close relationship. In J.M.Olson and M.P. Zanna (Eds.), *Self-inference Processes: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 6* (pp. 135–52). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Rothbart, M. (1981). Memory processes and social beliefs. In D.L.Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behaviour* (pp. 145–82). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Rothbart, M. and John, O.P. (1993). Intergroup relations and stereotype change: A social-cognitive analysis and some longitudinal findings. In P.M.Sniderman, P.E. Tetlock and E.G.Carmines (Eds.), *Prejudice, Politics and the American Dilemma* (pp. 32–59). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Rothbart, M. and Lewis, S. (1994). Cognitive processes and intergroup relations: A historical perspective. In P.G.Devine, D.L.Hamilton and T.M.Ostrom (Eds.), *Social Cognition: Impact on Social Psychology* (pp. 347–82). San Diego, CA: Academic.

Sampson, E.E. (1971). *Social Psychology and Contemporary Society.* New York: Wiley.

Sanbonmatsu, D.M., Shavitt, S., Sherman, S.J. and Roskos-Ewoldsen, D.R. (1987). Illusory correlation in the perception of performance by self or a salient other. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* **23**, 518–43.

Schöpflin, G. (1993). *Politics in Eastern Europe.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Schöpflug, W. (1994). The road not taken: A false start for cognitive psychology. *Psychological Review,* **101**, 237–42.

Schuman, H., Rieger, C. and Gaidys, V. (1994). Collective memories in the United States and Lithuania. In N.Schwarz and S.Sudman (Eds.), *Autobiographical Memory and the Validity of Retrospective Reports* (pp. 313–33). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Schuman, H. and Scott, J. (1989). Generations and collective memories. *American Sociological Review,* **54**, 359–81.

Schwarz, N. and Bless, H. (1992). Constructing reality and its alternatives: An inclusion/exclusion model of assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment. In L.L.Martin and A.Tesser (Eds.), *The Construction of Social Judgments* (pp. 217–48). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Schwarz, N. and Sudman, S. (1994). *Autobiographical Memory and the Validity of Retrospective Reports.* New York: Springer-Verlag.

Schwarz, N., Wanke, M. and Bless, H. (1994). Subjective assessments and evaluations of change: Some lessons from social cognition research. In W.Stroebe and M.Hewstone (Eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 5* (pp. 181–210). Chichester: Wiley.

Scott, W.A. (1965). Psychological and social correlates of international images. In H.C.Kelman (Ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (pp. 71–103). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Scott, W.A., Osgood, D.W. and Peterson, C. (1979). *Cognitive Structure Theory and Measurement of Individual Differences.* New York: Wiley.

Sears, D.O. (1983). The person-positivity bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **44**, 233–50.

Secord, P.P. (1959). Stereotyping and favorableness in the perception of Negro faces. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* **59**, 309–15.

Secord, P.F., Bevan, W. and Katz, B. (1956). Perceptual accentuation and the Negro stereotype. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* **53**, 78–83.

Sherif, M. and Hovland, C.I. (1961). *Social Judgement Assimilation and Contrast Effect in Communication and Attitude Change.* New Haven, CoT: Yale University Press.

Silka, L. (1989). *Intuitive Judgments of Change.* New York: Springer-Verlag.

Skowronski, J.J., Betz, A.L., Thompson, C.P. and Shannon, L. (1991). Social memory in everyday life: Recall of self-events and other-events. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **60**, 831–43.

Smedley, J.W. and Bayton, J.A. (1978). Evaluative race-class stereotypes by race and perceived class of subjects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **36**, 530–35.

Smith, E.R. (1990). Content and process specificity in the effects of prior experiences. In T.K.Srull and R.S.Wyer, Jr (Eds.), *Advances in Social Cognition, Vol. 3* (pp. 1–59). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Smith, E.R. and Zarate, M.A. (1990). Exemplar and prototype use in social categorization. *Social Cognition,* **8**, 243–62.

Smith, E.R. and Zarate, M.A. (1992). Exemplar-based model of social judgment. *Psychological Review,* **99**, 3–21.

Smith, T.W. (1984). Recalling attitudes: An analysis of retrospective questions on the 1982 GSS . *Public Opinion Quarterly,* **48**, 639–49.

Stahlberg, D., Eller, F., Maass, A. and Frey, D. (1994). We knew it all along: Hindsight bias in groups, (manuscript).

Stapf, K.H., Stroebe, W. and Jonas, K. (1986). *Amerikaner über Deutschland und die Deutschen: Urteile und Vorurteile.* Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Stephan, W.G. (1985). Intergroup relations. In G.Lindzey and E.Aronson (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2* (pp. 599–658). New York: Random House.

Stephan, W.G. (1989). A cognitive approach to stereotyping. In D.Bar-Tal, C.F. Graumann, A.W.Kruglanski and W.Stroebe (Eds.), *Stereotyping and Prejudice* (pp. 37–58). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Stone, W.F., Lederer, G. and Christie, R. (Eds.) (1993). *Strength and Weakness: The Authoritarian Personality Today.* New York: Springer.

Strack, F., Argyle, M. and Schwarz, N. (Eds.) (1991). *Subjective Well-Being: An Interdiciplinary Perspective.* Oxford: Pergamon.

Strack, F. and Martin, L. (1987). Thinking, judging and communication: A process account of context effects in attitude surveys. In H.J.Hippler, N.Schwarz and S.Sudman (Eds.), *Social Information Processing and Survey Methodology* (pp. 123–48). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Strack, F., Schrarz, N. and Gschneidinger, E. (1985). Happiness and reminiscing: The role of time perspective, mood and mode of thinking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **49**, 1460–69.

Sumner, W.G. (1906). *Folkways.* New York: Ginn.

Szabó, I. and Csepeli, Gy. (1984). *Nemzet és politika a 10–14 éves gyerekek gondolkodásában.* Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont.

Tajfel, H. (1957). Value and the perceptual judgement of magnitude. *Psychological Review,* **64**, 192–204.

Tajfel, H. (1966). Children and foreigners. *New Society,* 30 June. Cited in Johnson, Middleton and Tajfel, 1970 (pp. 232–33).

Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Social Science Information,* **13**, 65–93.

Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology,* **33**, 1–39.

Tajfel, H., Billig, R., Bundy, C. and Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behavior. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* **1**, 149–78.

Tajfel, H., Sheikh, A.A. and Gardner, R.C. (1964). Content of stereotypes and the inference of similarity between members of stereotyped groups. *Acta Psychologies* **22**, 191–201.

Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S.Worchel and W.Austin (Eds.), *The Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (2nd edn), (pp. 7–24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

Tajfel, H. and Wilkes, A.L. (1963). Classification and qualitative judgment. *British Journal of Psychology,* **54**, 101–14.

Tanaka, Y. (1972). A study of national stereotypes. In H.C.Triandis (Ed.), *The Analyses of Subjective Culture* (pp. 117–79). New York: Wiley.

Taylor, S.E. (1981). A categorization approach to stereotyping. In D.L.Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior* (pp. 88–114). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Taylor, S.E., Fiske, S.T., Etcoff, N.L. and Ruderman, A. (1978). Categorical and contextual bases of person memory and stereotyping. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* **36**, 778–93.

Tetlock, P.E. (1993). Cognitive structural analysis of political rhetoric: Methodological and theoretical issues. In S.Iyengar and W.J.McGuire (Eds.), *Explorations in Political Psychology* (pp. 380–406). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Thaler, R.H. and Johnson, E.J. (1990). Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: The effects of prior outcomes on risky choice. *Management Science,* **36**, 643–60.

Thurstone, L.L. (Ed.) (1932). *The Measurement of Social Attitudes.* Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Treiman, D.J. (1977). *Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Academic Press.

Turner, J.C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects of intergroup behavior. *European Journal of Psychology,* **5**, 5–34.

Turner, J.C. (1982). Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. In H.Tajfel (Ed.), *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (pp. 15–40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Turner, J.C., Hogg, M.A., Oakes, P.J., Reicher, S.D. and Wetherell, M.S. (1987). *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Tversky, A. (1977). Features of similarity. *Psychological Review,* **84**, 327–52.

Vásárhelyi, M. (1995). *Rendszerváltás alulnézetben.* Budapest, Pesti Szalon.

Vinacke, W.E. (1957). Stereotypes as social concepts. *Journal of Social Psychology,* **46**, 229–43.

Warr, P.B., Schroder, H.M. and Blackman, S. (1969a). The structure of political judgment. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology,* **8**, 32–43.

Warr, P.B., Schroder, H.M. and Blackman, S. (1969b). A comparison of two techniques for the measurement of international judgment. *International Journal of Psychology,* **4**, 135–40.

Watts, W. and Free, L.A. (1974). *State of the Nation.* Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates.

Zarate, M.A. and Smith, E.R. (1990). Person categorization and stereotyping. *Social Cognition,* **8**, 161–85.

Name index

Abelson, R.P. 18
Adorno,T.W. 3, 42
Allison, S.T. 8
Allport, G.W. 3, 4
Altemeyer, B. 42
Andrews, M. 225
Angelusz, R. 219
Antall, J. 32
Argyle, M. 171
Armer, M. 276
Ashmore, R.D. 1, 3, 12, 20
Askevis-Leherpeux, F. 49

Banaji, M.R. 11, 14
Bar-Tal, D. 20
Bastounis, M. 49
Bayton, J.A. 173
Békés, F. 219
Berend T.I. 221
Billig, M. 5, 223
Blackman, S. 47
Bless, H. 219, 227
Bodenhausen, G.V. 10
Bogardus, E.S. 42
Braly, K.W. 1, 2, 12, 43, 44, 95, 173, 277
Brewer, M.B. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 48
Brigham, J.C. 1, 2, 44
Bronfenbrenner, U. 45
Brown, R.J. 2
Bruner, J.S. 4, 20
Buchanan, W. 44, 45

Campbell, D.T. 2, 48
Cantor, N. 5
Cantril, H. 42, 44, 45
Carlson, E.R. 19
Catlin, G. 225
Centers, R. 170, 171
Cesa, I.L. 223
Christiansen, B. 43
Christie, R. 42
Clemence, A. 20
Clement, R.W. 227
Conway, M. 224
Coupland, N. 171
Crocker, J. 12
Cruchfield, R.S. 17
Csepeli, Gy. 50, 51

Dankánics, M. 220
Davis, K.E. 173
De Rosa, A.S. 49
Del Boca, F.K. 1, 3, 12
Deutsch, K.W. 42
Dilthey, W. 222
Dion, K.L. 46
Dittmar, H. 171
Doise, W. 20
Doob, L.W. 42
Driscoll, D.M. 6

Eagly, A.H. 5, 7, 18, 173
Edwards, D. 223
Eiser, J.R. 20
Eperjessy, G. 219
Epstein, S. 225
Erdösi, S. 220
Erös, F. 30

Feagin, J.R. 171
Feather, N.T. 171
Fehér, F. 30
Fiedler, K.F. 18
Fischer, G.W. 226
Fischhoff, B. 224, 292, 293
Fiske, S.T. 5, 7, 11, 12
Florack, A. 49
Forgas, J.P. 10, 30

Franz Joseph I. 24, 236, 253
Fredrickson, B.L. 226
Free, L.A. 42
Furnham, A.F. 20, 171, 172

Garai, L. 30
Gardner, R.C. 4
Gazsó, F. 175
Gergen, K.J. 225
Gergen, M.M. 225
Gifford, R.K. 8
Gilbert, G.M. 43, 44, 277
Giles, H.J. 171
Glatz, F. 221
Goodman, C.D. 4
Gorbachev, M. 28
Greenwald, A.G. 224

Halász, L. 30
Hamilton, D.L. 8, 9, 10, 173
Hankiss, A. 225
Harkai-Schiller, P., 50
Harvey, O.J. 3
Haslam, S.A. 11
Hastie, R. 10
Heaven, P.C.L., 42
Hegel, G.W.F. 293
Heller, A. 30
Hewstone, M. 9
Hintzman, D.L. 10
Holmberg, D. 225
Horthy, M. 24, 25, 26, 32, 65, 234, 236, 239, 240, 242, 250, 251, 253, 254–8, 260–2, 272–4, 287, 291
Horwitz, M. 5
Hunyadi M. 22, 278
Hunyady, G. 33, 223

Inkeles, A. 47

Jahoda, G. 46
Jaspars, J.M. 47
John, O.P. 44
Johnson, E.J. 226
Johnson, N.B. 46
Jones, E.E. 173
Jost, J.T. 11, 14

Kádár, J. 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 134, 183, 234, 236, 239, 250, 251, 253, 258–60, 262, 267–8, 270, 272, 274–5, 287, 291–3
Kahneman, D. 226
Karlins, M. 43, 277
Károlyi, M. 24
Katz, D. 1, 2, 12, 43, 44, 95, 173, 277
Kelley, J. 174
Kelly, G.A. 19
Kelly, J.R. 223
Kite, M.E. 5, 173
Klineberg, O. 44, 45
Koomen, W. 49
Kosáry, D. 221
Kossuth, L. 23
Kölcsey, F. 42
Kramer, R.M. 7
Krausz, T. 30
Krebs, D. 20
Krech, D. 17
Krueger, J. 45, 49, 227
Kruglanski, A.W. 20
Kuhn, T.S. 293

Lambert, W.E. 44, 45
Lázár, G. 51
Lederer, G. 42
Lemyre, L. 5, 46
Lendvay, J. 51
Lengyel, L. 30
Lenin, V.I. 29, 35
Lerner, M.J. 171, 223
Levinson, D.J. 47
Lewis, S. 3
Leyens, J.P. 7
Likert, R. 42
Linville, P.W. 6, 7, 8, 10, 19, 226
Lippmann, W. 1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 278
Lorenzi-Cioldi, F. 20
Lukacs, J. 222

McClosky, H. 42
McFarland, C. 225
McGarty, C. 11
McGrath, J.E. 223
McGuire, C.V. 6, 18
McGuire, W.J. 6, 17, 18, 20, 40, 222
Mackie, D.M. 7, 9
Marin, G. 47
Markus, G.B. 225
Martin, L. 227
Marx, K. 13, 29; *see also* Marxism
Merrit, R.L. 42, 45
Messick, D.M. 7, 8
Middleton, D. 223
Middleton, M.R. 46
Miller, A.G. 2, 3, 12
Mischel, W. 5

Morawski, J.G. 226
Morris, M. 171
Mullen, B. 45
Mummendey, A. 46, 50
Murphy, G. 42
Münsterberg, H. 173, 222

Nagy, I. 25, 26
Neisser, U. 12
Németh, M. 30
Neuberg, S.L. 4, 8, 11
Nietzsche, F. 221

Oakes, P.J. 5, 11
Olson, J.M. 223
Osgood, D.W. 19, 36, 46
Oskamp, S. 45

Park, B. 6, 10
Pataki, F. 30
Pavelchak, M.A. 8, 11
Peabody, D. 2, 37, 47, 48, 49, 276
Peterson, C. 19
Pettigrew, T.F 3
Piontkowski, U. 49
Pozsgay, I. 31
Puchala, D.J. 45

Rabbie, J.M. 5
Rajk, L. 25
Rákóczi, F. 23
Rákosi, M. 25, 26, 63, 234, 236, 238, 243, 251, 253, 254, 256–8, 260, 261–2, 268, 271–5, 287, 291–2
Ray, J.J. 42
Read, S.J. 223
Reeder, G.D. 9
Robinson, J.P. 226
Roese, N.J. 223
Rokeach, M. 3
Rosch, E. 4
Rose, T.L. 8, 173
Rosenkrantz, P.S. 1
Ross, M. 224, 225
Rothbart, M. 3, 6, 7, 8, 44

Salazar, J.M. 47
Sampson, E.E. 17
Sanbonmatsu, D.M. 8
Schmidt, P. 20
Schöpflin, G. 30
Schöpflug, W. 222
Schreiber, H.J. 46
Schroder, H.M. 47
Schuman, H. 223
Schwarz, N. 219, 225, 226, 227
Scott, W.A. 19, 42, 223
Sears, D.O. 8
Secord, P.F. 4
Sheikh, A.A. 4
Sherman, J.W. 6, 9
Sherman, S.J. 10
Silka, L. 225, 226
Skowronski, J.J. 225
Smedley, J.W. 173
Smith, E.R. 4, 5, 10
Smith, Ph.M. 46
Smith, T.W. 225
Stahlberg, D. 224
Stalin, J.V. 25, 26, 28, 29, 9, 242, 250, 251, 253, 256, 272, 273, 286, 287
Stapf, K.H. 1
Steffen, V.J. 5, 173
Stephan, W.G. 7
Stone, W.F. 42
Strack, F. 226, 227
Stroessner, S.J. 6, 7
Strunk, M. 44
Sudman, S. 225
Sumner, W.G. 41
Szabó, I. 51
Szebenyi, P. 220

Tagiuri, R. 20
Tajfel, H. 4, 5, 11, 46
Tanaka, Y. 46
Taylor, S.E. 4, 7, 8, 12
Tetlock, P.E. 3
Thaler, R.H. 226
Thurstone, L.L. 43
Tito, J.B. 25
Treiman, D.J. 174
Trolier, T.K. 6
Turner, J.C. 5, 11, 12, 46
Tversky, A. 226

Vásárhelyi, M. 30
Vinacke, W.E. 2

Wanke, M. 219
Warnaen, S. 47
Warr, P.B. 47
Watts, W. 42
Wilkes, A.L. 4
Williamson, J.B. 171
Wood, W. 5

Zarate, M.A. 4, 10
Zeiger, J.S. 45

Subject index

agricultural workers *see* peasants
America/Americans *see* USA
analysis: ANOVA 98, 265, 268; correlation 38, 39, 91, 193, 263, 270, 274, 295; factor 91, 102, 120, 125, 254, 258, 263, 295; INDSCAL 149, 151, 153, 154; judgement 39; MANOVA 136; principal component 38; statistical 34, 38, 98, 109, 110, 114, 115, 136, 193, 200, 227, 267, 269, 279; of variance 125
anti-cosmopolitan index 73–6
anti-Semitism *see* Jews
appearance, physical *see* ethnic minorities
arms race 28
artisans, characterization 207
Asia/Asians 44; characterizing 126, 127, 131, 132, 133; ranking 143
assertiveness *see* self-assertiveness
Association of Free Democrats (SzDSz) 32
athletic prowess: historical comparisons 252, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 264; national comparisons 80, 82, 83, 85, 88, 126
Atlantic triad *see* France, Great Britain, USA
attachment, national *see* patriotism
attitudes 2, 18; changing 42, 45, 295; clusters 42; to cold war 42, 45; to communism 42, 262, 271; defining 201; to history 220; national 41–69, 93; negative/positive 45, 100; parallelism 45; professional 173; *see also* belief *and* opinion *and* optimism
Australia/Australians 46
Austria/Austrians 23, 24, 47, 48, 59; ranking 90, 127
Austro-Hungarian Empire 24
authoritarianism 3, 42, 76, 287
autostereotypes: Hungarian 94–101, 130, 133, 137, 285; national 45, 50–2, 94, 98–9, 133–4, 137, 143–4, 163, 166–8, 238, 245, 289; *see also* self evaluation

Balkans: characterization 126, 127, 132; ranking 143
bankers: characterization 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 290; ranking 211, 212, 215; trait profiles 213
beauty, scenic: historical comparisons 252, 254–60, 263–4; national comparisons 80, 82, 84, 85, 89, 135, 161
belief: in a just world 171, 172, 223, 253; systems 13–21, 19–75; twentieth-century history 219–75; *see also* ideology
Berlin wall, destruction of 21
bias: hindsight 292–3; national 51; political 287
bipolar trait scales 1, 36, 37, 39, 124, 238, 295
Blacks 41, 43, 44
blaming, victim 171–2
Bogardus' scale 246
Bolshevik 24, 25
bookkeeping model 8
book preferrers 237, 238, 250, 251, 272, 287
bravery, characteristic of 98
Budapest 61
Bulgaria/Bulgarians, ranking 90, 126–7, 129–30, 132, 134
businessmen: characterization 207–12,

214, 217, 290; ranking 211, 212, 215; trait profiles 213

calmness, of historical period *see* peacefulness
categorization 3–6, 12, 19–21, 33, 36, 221, 278, 284; by age 4; changing 8, 9, 84; groups 5, 8; hierarchies 39–40; historical 227; images of 21; interdependence 40; internal 9; national 40, 41–93; natural 4; personality 5; primitive 4, 10; reaction to 46; resistance to 46; role 17; of self 11, 12, 13, 18; and self-evaluation 5, 18, 46; social 28, 46, 169–218; socio-occupational 173, 177; temporal 226, 227, 297; and traits 20
centralization 27
changes: categorization 8, 9, 94; evaluation 44, 50, 104, 117, 118, 121, 122, 164, 217, 281–2, 288, 293; measuring 34; opinion 42, 45, 61, 62, 105, 106, 124, 214, 295; perception of 219, 225; political 30–4, 174–7, 221, 262–75, 282, 283, 287–92; readiness for 293; social 35, 174–7, 214, 219, 228, 280, 291, 292–7; stereotype 15, 124, 164, 276–97; temporal 44; trait profiles 134, 281, 293; values 177, 289–90
characterization 2, 3, 11, 19, 21, 33, 36; circles of 116, 117, 123, 124, 193, 201 (*see also* cognitive domain); and class 171, 172, 173; complexity of 140, 144, 214, 215, 295; consistency of 106, 160, 166, 218; descriptive component 38, 47, 48; dimensions 138; distances 39; durability of 110; evaluative component 38–9, 47, 48, 128; family members *see* family; historical periods *see* history; national 46, 47, 49, 66, 94–101, 113, 276, 277, 288 (*see also* specific nations); polarized 48, 84, 85; positive/negative 109; relationships of 39–40, 116, 120, 130; self *see* autostereotypes; similarities 109–13, 166; socio-occupational 37–8, 39, 184–6, 196, 198–206 (*see also* specific occupations); structure of 109–13, 263, 281; *see also* evaluation *and* stereotypes *and* trait profiles
child-rearing practices 245, 246
children: concept of nation 52–69; evaluation by 46
China/Chinese 46; characterization 102, 103, 106–7, 109–10, 112–13, 116, 118–24, 162, 280, 284, 288–9, 294; ranking 109, 114–15, 126, 135–8, 143–4, 280; trait profiles 280, 288
Christianity, adoption of 22
class, social: concept of 29, 177–84, 216; conflict 25, 181, 216; definition of 176, 178, 179, 180, 181; differences 28, 169–218, 180, 181, 184; division 174, 183, 184, 252; leaving 175; and occupational categories 206–16, 286; perceptions of 172, 177, 286; and personal characteristics 171, 172, 173; and public opinion 84, 241, 272, 274; solidarity 172; status 171, 177; structure 169–73; stereotypes 169, 177; values 172
classification 4, 11, 29, 88, 279; *see also* categorization
clerks, characterization 207
cognition 3, 7, 12, 20: historical 223, 224–7; and motives 46, 223
cognitive: psychology 17, 223, 225, 226, 296; style 3, 19, 33
cognitive domain 21, 33, 39; of nations 41–93, 94–168; organization of 39
cold war, attitudes to 42, 45
collectivism 31
communism 25–8, 268, 269; attitudes to 42, 262, 271; end of 219, 236, 263, 274, 294; slogans 229; and status hierarchy 174–7, 277
comparison: Hungarian-Romanian data 138, 139, 140; international 44, 46, 47, 55, 78–89; qualitative 34, 35; social categories 46; statistical 34; strategy of 228; temporal 34, 37, 39, 44, 228, 229; traits 279, 296; *see also* specific traits
conformity 251, 252, 272, 283; *see also* freedom *and* propaganda
congruent status 170
conservatism 32, 42
consistency: evaluative 95, 113, 115, 215, 243; Hungarians 98; striving for 225; theory 18; trait profiles 280
contentment *see* satisfaction
contextual effect 4, 37
continuum model 11
conversion model 9
conviction, unfounded 15–17

co-operation, and national identity 53, 284
co-operatives, creation of 27
cordiality *see* friendliness
correlation: analysis 34, 38, 91, 193, 263, 270, 274, 295; evaluation 38; illusory 7, 8, 87, 89, 284; and motivation 46; rank order 39, 84, 85, 113, 114, 129, 136, 200, 201, 203, 212; traits 33
crisis *see* change, political
Croatia/Croatians 124
cultural supremacy 24; historical comparisons 252, 258, 260, 263, 264; national comparisons 81, 85, 121–2, 134, 160, 289
cultural traditions, and ethnic relations 145, 147, 148, 149, 158
culture: and national identity 54, 55, 56, 58, 65, 68, 69, 158; and occupational stereotypes 189, 190, 215, 218; and personality 18; and stereotypes 3, 44; values 216
Czechoslovakia/Czechs 21, 23, 24, 31, 59; developments in 239; invasion by 234; ranking 90

data collection *see* methodology
defence, of nation 53, 54, 58; *see also* patriotism
democracy 28, 30; historical comparisons 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 270, 274, 292; national comparisons 81; *see also* freedom
development: concept of 228, 230, 231, 235, 264; economic *see* economic development; ideas 13, 15; trends of 236–52, 252–62, 264–71, 272, 273, 274, 275; social 227–36; stereotype of 16
dictatorship 283; of the proletariat 25; terrorist 28
diligence: Americans 106; Asians 126, 133; English 105; Europeans 125; family members 245; Hungarians 98, 101–3, 115, 166, 285, 289; as national characteristic 94, 117, 121–3, 129, 130, 133, 136–8, 164–5, 284, 288–9; and occupational stereotypes 185, 189–92, 195, 197–8, 200–4, 209–13, 215, 218
discrimination: evaluative 2, 4, 48, 50; racial 66, 145
distortion: perspective 224; reality 2, 3, 8, 12, 17, 89, 124; recall 225; *see also* hindsight bias *and* propaganda
Dutch *see* Netherlands
dynamic period, of history 239, 241, 264

East Germany *see* German Democratic Republic
Eastern Europe 21, 87, 89; ranking 115; *see also* Europe
economic development 40, 214, 220, 283, 293; concept of 228, 271; equality 28; index 84; historical comparisons 252, 254, 256–60, 263–4, 271, 275; Hungary 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 66; national comparisons 80–2, 84–5, 88, 99, 135, 161; Soviet 29; *see also* development *and* market economy *and* political changes
educational level: Europeans 125; evaluation of 254; Hungarians 168, 289; as national characteristic 117, 137, 165, 189–92, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 284; *see also* intelligence *and* knowledge *and* occupational stereotypes
efficiency *see* economics
emigration, Hungarian 145; *see also* immigration
emotions, role of 10, 12, 13, 281, 297; and evaluation 46; and concept of nation 62, 68–9, 129; pride 62–6, 68–9, 98, 159; shame 62–6, 68–9, 159, 160
employee *see* worker
England/English *see* Great Britain
enjoyment, of life *see* satisfaction
environment, quality of *see* beauty, scenic
equality: economic 28; social 247, 248
erudition *see* educational level *and* intelligence
ethnic minorities 43, 221; assimilation 147; categorization 4, 5; discrimination 66, 145; living standards 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 155, 158; perceptions of 144–68; physical appearance 145–9, 158; prejudice 41, 115; relations 145–50, 153, 155–6, 158; skills 147; stereotypes 33
ethnocentrism 41, 42, 51
Europe: concept of 89, 93, 161, 162; national roles 89–93, 133, 143; *see*

also Eastern Europe *and* Western Europe
European: characterizing 125, 127, 131, 132; identity 49, 52, 125, 132–3; ranking 143
evaluation 18, 36–9, 43, 46, 47; average 39; changes 44, 50, 104, 117, 118, 121, 122, 164, 217, 281–2, 288, 293; charge 138, 159, 162, 163, 199, 253, 279–80, 281, 284, 286, 288, 290, 293; children, evaluation by 46; and class 84, 252; consistency 95, 113, 115, 215, 243; content of 109–13; contrast effect 227; decreased 42, 117, 118, 123, 163, 204, 242, 273, 282; differentiation 46, 49, 52, 148; factors influencing 38–9, 42, 44, 79; family 251; formation 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 19, 20, 164; hierarchy 39, 113–24, 136, 137, 143, 160, 198–206, 215, 217, 240, 243, 253, 269, 277, 279, 282, 284; illusions 87, 164, 168; inclusion-exclusion model 227; increased 118, 124; index 91, 113, 114, 118, 119, 128, 135, 242; and knowledge 42, 43, 45, 46; layers 96; national 43, 52, 64, 73, 74, 79, 100 (*see also* specific countries); negative 43–6, 48, 50, 82, 100, 118, 124, 265, 267, 280, 291; numeric 95; of past 220, 226, 236, 262–71; political systems 86, 89, 271; positive 45, 64, 100, 123, 124, 125, 280, 291; self s*ee* self-evaluation; similarities of 109–13, 162, 164; socio-political 87; structure of 109–13; *see also* global evaluation *and j*udgement *and* opinion
exclusion 49
expectancy-value model 84
expectations 7, 39, 129, 180, 254; disappointment 283

factor: analysis 91, 102, 120, 125, 254, 258, 263, 295; structures 34, 38, 109–13, 256
faithfulness, Hungarians 98; *see also* patriotism
family: characterization of twentieth-century history of 242–52, 270, 273, 287; evaluation 251; future of 268; independence in different historical periods 242, 243, 244, 250; preferrers 251, 272, 287; wealth 242–4
farm labourers *see* peasants
fascism 25, 65, 160
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 21, 79, 82, 83, 85; evaluation 99; ranking 85, 86, 88, 160, 161; *see also* Germany *and* German Democratic Republic
feelings *see* emotions
fighting, for nation *see* defence
Finland/Finns 22
foreign policy: evaluation 252, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 274; national comparisons 80, 82, 83
France/French 23, 44, 46–7, 49, 79, 82, 85; characterization 102–3, 105, 109–10, 112–13, 116–23, 165; ranking 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 109, 114, 135–8, 144, 160, 280, 284, 288; trait profile 162, 288
freedom: economic 28; political 28, 85, 239, 240, 241, 251, 261, 274; of speech 283, 294; *see also* conformity *and* democracy *and* propaganda
friendliness 101, 102, 115, 120, 122, 124, 133; Asians 132, 133; Chinese 136; Europeans 125; Hungarians 94, 98, 100, 115, 121, 129, 166–7, 284; as intellectual characteristic 185; as national characteristic 36, 119, 122, 130, 137, 164–5, 284, 288–9; and occupational stereotypes 188, 190–2, 195, 197–8, 200, 202–4, 209–13, 215–17; *see also* good humour
future, evaluation of 259–62, 268, 291, 292; *see also* history *and* optimism

gender: categorization 4, 5; and evaluation 265; stereotypes 1, 33
generosity, Hungarian 98
German Democratic Republic (GDR) 79, 82, 83, 85, 226; evaluation 100; ranking 85, 86, 88, 89, 126, 135, 160; *see also* Federal Republic of Germany *and* Germany
Germany/Germans 22, 24, 25, 41, 44, 46, 47, 49; characterization 102, 103, 108–10, 112–13, 117–23, 126, 162, 165, 284, 288; living in Hungary 59; ranking 86–3, 109, 114, 115, 126, 127–35, 137, 138, 144, 161, 280, 288; trait profile 288; unification 219; *see also* Federal Republic of Germany *and* German Democratic Republic
global evaluation, indices of 136, 143,

165, 188–9, 198, 204–6, 211–12, 215, 239–40, 242–3, 253–9, 261–3, 289
Golden Bull 22
good humour: Asians 132; Europeans 125; Hungarians 168; as national characteristic 117, 120, 122, 129–30, 133, 136–8, 164, 166, 284, 288–9; and occupational stereotypes 185–7, 189, 190–2, 197, 200–4, 209–13, 215–16
Great Britain/English 46, 47, 79, 82, 85–6, 88, 92, 134; characterization 102–5, 109, 110, 113, 116–18, 120–3, 162, 164, 165, 123, 284, 288, 294; ranking 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 109, 114, 135, 135, 136, 137, 138, 144, 160, 288; trait profiles 280, 288
Greece/Greeks 48
groups: belonging 11, 94; categorization 5, 8; evaluation 8, 48; ingroup 5, 6, 48, 49, 162, 282; membership 8; outgroup 5, 6, 48, 49, 162; perception 6, 8, 16, 17; self-characterization 94; stereotypes 2, 16
Gypsies 59, 145, 148; in Hungary 150, 151, 156, 207; in Romania 150, 151, 156

halo effect 170
happiness *see* satisfaction
hardworking nature *see* diligence
harmony, social 181, 182
hedonic editing hypothesis 226
hierarchy: of categories 39–40; evaluation 39, 57–62, 63, 93, 113–24, 136–7, 143, 160, 198–206, 215, 217, 240, 243, 253; 269, 277, 279, 282, 284; national 282; and stereotyping 11, 12; trait 244; *see also* occupational status *and* ranking
hindsight bias 292, 293; *see also* bias
historical: belief systems 19–75, 220, 236–52, 266, 277; comparisons 34, 37, 39, 44, 228, 229; sensitivity 295; sources, preference for 237, 238, 250, 251, 272, 287; stereotypes 220, 269; trait profiles 255–64
history: categorization 226–7, 297; characterization of different periods 219, 236, 238–42, 264, 272–4, 280, 286–7, 291; contradictions 237, 238; in different decades 101–8, 252–62, 265, 279; dynamic period of 239, 241, 264; evaluation of 220, 226, 236, 262–71; experience of 223, 226; family characterization 242–52, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 274; national 21–5, 26, 42, 56, 62, 63, 67, 76; observation of 223; organization of 223, 236, 291–2; personal 224, 225; and political changes 262–71; and psychology 222–7; recall 223; of science 3, 20; of society 238–42, 266, 268–71, 274, 277; teaching 67; twentieth-century 233, 234, 235; *see also* future *and* Hungarian history
Holland *see* Netherlands
Holocaust 66
Holy Crown 22
homesickness 71, 74, 75, 77; *see also* patriotism
honesty *see* morality; *see also* distortion *and* propaganda
Horthy era *see* name index
housewife: perspective of 241, 243, 246, 248; self-evaluation 245
humour *see* good humour Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) 31, 32
Hungarian history 21–5, 26, 42, 218–75; evaluation of 239, 272; twentieth century 233, 234, 235; viewpoints of 236–52, 272;1900–14, the long nineteenth century 238, 239, 240, 250, 254;1919–39, truncated Hungary 238, 239, 240, 250, 255, 268;1945–48, people's democratic system 238, 239, 240, 250, 251; 1948–53, decisive year 238, 239, 240, 250; 1957–71 239, 240, 250
Hungarian: Public Opinion Service 50; Social Democratic Party 25; Socialist Party 31, 32; Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP) 30, 31, 32
Hungary/Hungarians 21–33, 34, 47; —Austrian/German relations 145; autostereotype 94–101, 130, 133, 137, 285; characterization 94, 98, 101–4, 109, 112–13, 116–24, 126, 165–6, 233, 240, 242–62, 271, 284, 291; emigration 145; —European relations 133; evaluation 82, 84, 85, 89, 100; political changes 174–7; ranking 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 109, 113–15, 126–7, 130,

132–8, 143, 160, 162, 284; —Serb relations 145; —Sloyakian relations 145, 148; socio-political system 221; territory losses 220, 221, 238–40, 250, 255, 268;—Ukrainian relations 145; *see also* Romanian-Hungarian relations
hypocracy 89; see also propaganda

identity: consciousness 153, 216; ethnic minorities 145, 147, 155; European 49, 52, 125, 132–3; national 50, 51, 53–9, 65, 66, 68–9, 155, 157–8, 192, 197, 220, 284; social, theory of 5, 46, 50
ideology 35–6; constraints 33–4; overall 19; partial 19; political 13, 18, 28–9, 286, 290, 294; pressure of 278, 279, 283; and public thinking 35–6, 55, 180, 278; as stereotype 19; *see also* belief systems *and* politics
illusory correlation 7, 8, 87, 89, 284; *see also* distortion
images: categorization 21; idealized 136, 144; of society 14–15, 278; *see also* perception
immigration 22, 49, 68; *see also* emigration
inclusion 61
inclusion-exclusion model of assimilation 227
income differentials 182, 183, 184
independence: families 242, 243, 244, 250; Hungary 22, 23
index: of activity 71; anti-cosmopolitan 73–6; of economic development 84; of evaluation 91, 113, 114, 118, 119, 128, 135, 242; *see also* evaluative charge *and* global evaluation
India 46
individualization 11
INDSCAL analysis 149, 151, 153, 154
information: filtering 1, 17; paradigm 6–10, 11, 19; processing 2, 11; *see also* knowledge
ingroup 5, 6, 48, 49, 162, 282
integration: European 32, 33, 89–93; Hungarian 50
intellectuals: characterization 105, 117, 185–6, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 200, 202, 203, 204, 207, 214; perspective of 241, 243, 251, 268; ranking 198, 199, 200, 205, 216, 217; self-evaluation 245; trait profiles 185, 195; values 216
intelligence: European 125, 133; Hungarian 168; judgement of 36; as national characteristic 117, 121, 122, 124, 130, 136–7, 164, 284, 288; and occupational stereotypes 188–9, 190–2, 195, 197, 200–4, 209–13, 215–17
intelligentsia 175, 176
internal affairs, judgement of 252, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 270, 274, 292
intuition 13
Israel/Israelis 145, 146, 147; images of 155; immigrants to 151, 153, 154, 155, 156
Italians/Italy 22, 25, 47, 48; ranking 90, 91

Japan/Japanese 43, 46; image 47
Jews 24, 42–3, 51; deportation 66; in Hungary 145, 148, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159
judgement, traits 19, 20, 21, 279; *see also* evaluation *and* opinion
justice, belief in 171, 172, 223, 253

Kádár era *see* name index
Kendall's *W* 109, 115, 119, 124, 126, 198, 205, 261, 279, 280
knowledge: acquisition 20; control of 15; and evaluation 42, 43, 45, 46; professional 145, 147–9, 153, 155–6, 158; stereotypes as 3, 15; structure 10; unreflected 15–17; value 39; *see also* information

language: and national identity 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 157; and stereotypes 44
lay theories 20, 52
leaders: characterization 207; prestige, national comparisons 81; *see also* supervisors *and* work, directive
Lithuania 223
living standards *see* standards of living
loyalty: Hungarians 94, 98, 101; national comparisons 57, 75; *see also* patriotism

managers: characterization 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 217, 218, 290; ranking 211, 212, 215; trait profiles 213, 215
MANOVA method 136
market economy 28, 30, 208, 214, 215, 218, 290
Marxism 13, 15, 29, 35, 51, 52, 67, 174–7, 183, 216, 221, 229, 235, 271, 290

materialism 175
measurement, methods of *see* methodology
medical care, national comparisons 80
memory: collective 223; recall 10, 223; selective 283
meta-contrast 11
methodology: data collection 34–5, 84; of measurement 1, 71, 77, 109, 115, 119, 124, 126, 198, 205, 246, 261, 279, 280, 295; questioning *see* questioning methodology; statistical *see* analysis
miners: characterization 207–13, 215; ranking 211–12, 215, 217; trait profile 212
mirror images 45, 140, 141, 143–4, 162; *see also* Romanian-Hungarian relations
models: bookkeeping 8; continuum 11; conversion 9; expectancy-value 84; inclusion-exclusion 227; renewable resources 226; trait comparison 226
modernization, economy 214, 220, 283, 293
moods *see* emotion
morale: and occupational stereotypes 191, 202; public 161
morality 36; Americans 106; Asians 126, 133; Chinese 136, 289; English 105; Europeans 125, 133; Hungarians 94, 95, 100, 102–3, 129; as national characteristic 105, 117, 121–3, 130, 136–8, 164, 284, 288–9; and occupational stereotypes 185, 188–92, 195, 197, 200–4, 209–13, 215–18; of society 239–41, 251; traits 101, 117, 122, 124
Moravia 23
motivation, and cognition 46, 223
multidimensional scaling (MDS) 39, 47, 116, 117, 120–1, 123, 130, 131, 142, 145, 150, 152, 154, 158, 163, 201–3, 206, 208, 210, 214, 217, 266, 289
Muslim Turkish empire 22

nation: concept of 50, 51, 52–69, 157, 158, 159; and country 78; definition of 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 67, 68; geographical localization of 54, 58, 67
national: aims 53, 54; attitudes 41–69; awareness 158; bond 153, 159; categorization 40, 41–93; hierarchy 282; selection 79, 80, 81; stereotypes 41–93; values 69, 162, 175
nationalism 30, 41, 43, 46, 50, 66; rejection of 70; *see also* patriotism
nationalization 25, 246
Negroes *see* Blacks
Netherlands/Dutch 23, 49
Norway 43

occupational: categorization 173, 177, 206–17, 286; characterization in different decades 184–98, 199–206, 206–16, 289, 293; characterization of traditional and modern categories 206–216; and public opinion 100, 241, 265, 266, 268, 269; status 169, 173–7, 198–206, 245, 247, 252, 273, 277, 285–6; stereotypes 169, 173–4, 177, 184–6, 191, 196, 198, 202–3, 206–9, 211, 215–16, 285–6; *see also* specific occupations
office employees: characterization 186, 187, 188–9, 193, 194, 196, 201, 202, 203, 204, 286; perspective 268; status 198, 199, 205, 206, 216, 217, 280
opinion, public 2, 13–18, 20, 36, 42, 83, 95, 173; changing 42, 45, 61, 62, 105, 106, 124, 214, 295; climate of 252, 254, 256–60, 262–3, 270, 274, 292; content 100; defining 201; and educational level 64–7, 69–71, 73–5, 78, 84–6, 97–8, 101, 114, 117–19, 125–6, 133, 136, 144, 166, 200, 237, 240, 243, 245–6, 265–9, 271–3, 287 formation 4, 8, 10; gender, effect of 265; generation gap 4, 84, 100, 102, 114, 166, 178, 243, 265–9; and ideology 35–6; and occupation 100, 241, 265, 266, 268, 269; organization 11, 100, 278; and political pressure 271, 274, 275; and religion 265, 267–9, 271, 274; research 50; and social class 84, 241, 272, 274; urban/rural gap 86, 243; see *also* evaluation
optimism, Hungarians 98, 223, 259–63, 266, 268–9, 271, 274–5, 285, 287, 292
oral tradition 237
Osgood's semantic differential 36
outgroups 5, 6, 48, 49, 162
over-evaluation 115
ownership, and stereotypes 171

parallelism *see* mirror images
patriotism: Asians 126, 133; as Balkan

characteristic 132; concept of 52, 76, 77; criteria of 71–6; definition of 70, 71; Europeans 125, 133; Hungarians 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 129, 167, 168, 285; as intellectual characteristic 185, 186; interpretation of 69–78; as national characteristic 52, 53, 57–8, 100, 121–2, 130, 132, 134, 136–8, 164, 284, 288, 289; and occupational stereotypes 188–9, 190–2, 197, 200–4, 209–13, 215; scales 43, 50, 57; and social class182; *see also* nationalism
peace making, national comparisons 80, 82, 98
peacefulness, of historical period 239–42, 244, 250
peasants: characterization 186, 187, 191–8, 200–5, 207–15, 217, 218, 285–7, 290; perspectives of 241, 243, 244, 248, 251, 268, 273; ranking 198, 199, 200, 205, 206, 216, 217, 280; self-evaluation 245; trait profiles 196, 212; *see also* class, social
perception: of change 219, 225; group 6, 8, 16, 17; physical stimuli 4; position 20, 21, 247, 248, 252, 273; of social class 172, 177, 246–7, 286
personal construct theory 19
personality: categorization 5; and culture 18; and stereotypes 3, 11, 282; systems 18; theory, implicit 20, 278; traits 170, 171, 177
personalization 16
Poland/Poles 22; characterization 126, 134; ranking 86–7, 89, 90, 126–30, 132, 134–5
political activity 97, 100, 238, 272; Asians 126; as Balkan characteristic 126, 132; Europeans 125; family members 245, 248, 249; historical perspective 249, 251, 254; as national characteristic 101–2, 117, 120, 122, 129, 137, 164, 284; and occupational stereotypes 188–92, 195, 197–8, 200, 202–4, 210, 212–13, 217
political: bias 287; change 30–4, 174–7, 221, 262–75, 282, 283, 287–92; influence 252, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 270, 274, 292; nostalgia 283, 291; prejudice 115; pressure 271, 274–5, 278, 279, 283
political systems 79; evaluation 86, 89, 271; Hungary 221
popularity: Europeans 125; national comparisons 117, 120, 122, 123, 130, 137, 164, 284; and occupational stereotypes 203, 208, 209, 211, 215
poverty, explanations of 171, 207; fatalistic factors 171; individual factors 171; structural factors 171; *see also* wealth
power, ranking 88
power relations, and stereotypes 11, 12, 13
predictability 224
prejudice 2, 3, 9, 16, 33, 42, 50; political 115; racial 41, 115; reduction 42, 43, 44, 48, 51; research 43; *see also* stereotypes
prices, national contrasts 80
pride, national *see* emotions
probability 18
professional: attitudes 173; knowledge 145, 147–9, 153, 155–6, 158
profiles, similarities 163, 165–6
PROFIT procedure 120, 202
progress *see* development
propaganda 35, 46, 85, 87–9, 183, 282–4; *see also* distortion *and* freedom, political
prospect theory 226
'Protestant Ethic' 172
prudence, Hungarians 100
psychology: and history 222–7; social 223
public: activity, and occupational stereotypes 185, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192; opinion *see* opinion

questioning, methodology 35–7, 53, 59, 63, 68–71, 86, 90, 95, 100, 101, 206–7, 227, 244, 246–7, 252, 262, 271, 267, 270, 285

racial *see* ethnic
radicalism 42
Rákosi era *see* name index
rank order correlations 39, 84, 85, 113, 114, 129, 136, 200, 201, 203, 212
ranking: historical periods 239; by personal sympathy 135; social 20, 21, 247, 248, 252, 273; stability 109, 110; traits 34, 37, 39, 122, 164, 195, 196; *see also* evaluative charge

reality: and ideology 28–9; and optimism 223; recognition of 89
recognition *see* respect
reform, political 219, 236, 239, 262–3, 274–5, 294
relations, international 45, 46, 89–93, 124, 140, 141, 142
relationships: inter-group 7; Romanian—Hungarian 52, 79, 82, 134–7, 149–50, 155–6, 158, 161–2; social 20, 21, 247, 248, 252, 273
religion, influence of 31, 265, 267–9, 271, 274
renewable resources model 226
repertory grid (REP) test 19
research: attitudes 173; belief systems17–21; humanistic 222; scientific 222; stereotype 1, 28, 33, 43, 276, 278, 292–7; *see also* studies
research methodology 33–40, 238; changes in 40, 44; *see also* questioning methodology
respect, for family 242, 244, 245, 250
responsibility, of individual 171
right-wing *see* conservatism
rights, democratic *see* democracy
Romania/Romanians 21, 24, 27, 59, 79, 82, 85; characterization in different decades 102–3, 107, 109–10, 112–13, 116–24, 164–5, 281, 284; —Hungarian relationship 52, 79, 82, 134–47, 149– 50, 155–6, 158, 161–2; ranking 85–92, 109, 114–15, 126–7, 129–30, 132, 134–8, 161, 164, 280, 284, 288
Russia/Russians 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 223; characterization 102–3, 107–10, 112–13, 117–24, 126, 162, 164–5, 284, 293; ranking 86–7, 89–92, 109, 114–15, 126–7, 129, 130, 132, 134–7, 143, 161, 164, 280, 281, 287–8; trait profile 281; *see also* Soviet Union
Russian Revolution 28

samples, uniformity of 34–5
sampling techniques *see* methodology
satisfaction: family 239, 240–4, 245, 251; Hungarians 98; and living standards 85, 88; national comparisons 81, 94; and occupational stereotypes 188–92, 195, 197–8, 200–4, 208, 210–13, 218; *see also* well-being
scales: bipolar trait 1, 36, 37, 39, 124, 238, 295; Bogardus' 246; Likert's 42; patriotism 43; of social distance 42
Scandinavia 22
scientific endeavour, national comparisons 81, 83
self-assertiveness: as Balkan characteristic 132; European 125, 133; Hungarians 168, 287; as intellectual characteristic 185, 186; as national characteristic 48, 117, 120, 122, 124, 129–30, 132–3, 137, 164, 284, 288; and occupational stereotypes 188–92, 195, 200–3, 209, 211–13, 215
self-categorizational theory 5; -consciousness 94; -deception 89; -determination 172
self-esteem 5, 14, 15, 273; raising 46; and social position 252
self: -evaluation, national 5, 18, 42, 45–6, 48–51, 89, 118, 123, 127, 129, 134, 199, 200, 205, 245, 251, 277, 282, 294; -image 18, 94; mythology of 225; -reflectiveness, national characteristic of 117
semantic differential (SD) 36, 46, 47
Serbia/Serbs 59, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134
shame, national *see* emotions
similarity, evaluation of 52, 148
simplification 7, 12, 15, 17; *see also* opinion, public
skilled workers: characterization 186–7, 189–90, 193–8, 200–3, 215, 280, 286, 290; ethnic minorities 147; perspective of 241, 243, 246, 251, 273; status 198, 199, 200, 204–6, 216–17; *see also* work
Slavs 59
Slovakia/Slovaks 59, 124, 126–7, 129, 130, 132, 134, 146, 147, 155
sobriety, Hungarians 98, 100
sociability *see* friendliness
social: adaptation 250; changes 35, 174–7, 214, 219, 228, 280, 291, 292–7; class *see* class, social; Darwinism 172; democracy *see* democracy; development, concept of 227–36; differences 170; distance 42; harmony 181, 182; history, trends of development 249, 251; identity, theory of 5, 46, 50; mobility 175; policy, national

comparison 88; psychology, experimental 18, 20; representation 20; security 28; situation, perception of 246, 247; solidarity 100; stereotypes 7, 16, 169–218
socialism 26, 27, 28, 283; collapse of 234; commitment to 74, 75, 76, 77, 285; reforms 262
socializational effects 84, 114, 125, 136
society: future of *see* future; history of 238–42, 266, 268–71, 274, 277; images of 14–15, 278; polarization of 236; stress 242
soldiers: characterization 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214; ranking 211, 212, 215, 217; trait profiles 212
solidarity, social 100
South Africa 46
Soviet Union 21, 25, 27, 31, 42, 59, 79, 82, 83, 85; evaluation 100; ranking 85, 86, 88–90, 160, 161; *see also* Russia
space research, and changing attitudes 42, 45, 295
Spain 23
speech, and stereotypes 171
sporting prowess *see* athletic prowess
stability: economic, national comparisons 88, 95; maintenance of 7, 14, 15, 17; perception of 225; of stereotypes 44, 45, 52, 124, 276–97; of trait profiles 282
Stalinism 26, 28, 29, 286, 287
standards of living 85, 292; ethnic comparisons 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 155, 158; evaluations of 252, 254, 256–60, 263, 270, 271; lower middle-class 175; national comparisons 80, 82–3, 88, 126, 135, 161; and satisfaction 85, 88
statistical analysis *see* analysis
status congruency hypothesis 170; occupational *see* occupational status; *see also* class *and* hierarchy *and* ranking
stereotypes 171, 177, 217, 277, 284, 285, 294; changes 9, 15, 16, 33–4, 44, 124, 164, 276–97; concept of 1, 2, 12, 20, 43, 51, 278; content 33–4, 38; cultural 3, 44; definition 1, 2; development of 7; distribution of 3; ethnic 173; function of 7, 12; historical 220, 269; interpersonal functional theory of 11; justification of 11, 12; language of 13; maintenance of 7, 14, 15, 17, 18; measurement 1; national 41–52, 94–168, 173; negative 171; and occupational group *see* occupational stereotypes; organization of 33, 279–83, 297; and personality 3, 11, 282; psychological nature of 3; reinforcement 7; research 1, 28, 33, 43, 276, 278, 292–7; rigid 3; self 46, 172; simplification 7, 12, 15, 17; social 7, 16, 169–218; and social class 169, 177; and society 13, 14; and speech 171; stability of 44, 45, 52, 124, 276–97; validity 2, 41; *see also* categorization *and* traits
strategy: antithetic 226; compensating 226; dynastic 226; self-acquitting 226
students: characterization 186–7, 192–4, 196, 197, 200–4; ranking 280; status 198–201, 205–6, 217
studies: R64 298; R65 52, 177, 298–9; R71 299; R73c 299; R73p 57, 59, 62, 69, 70, 82, 94, 182, 299–300; R75 58, 60, 64, 70, 74, 83, 97, 181–2, 300; R80 300; R81 60, 65, 84, 101, 113, 184, 252, 300–2; R82 302; R 90 89, 302; R91 61, 65, 75, 86, 90, 101, 117, 124, 184, 206, 234, 252, 303; R93 134, 303–4; R94s 62, 66, 126, 145, 207, 234, 262, 304; R94n 264, 234, 304
subordination *see* freedom *and* independence
supervisors: characterization 186–8, 193–8, 200–3, 217–18, 280, 290; status 198–9, 204–6, 217; trait profile 196; *see also* leaders
Sweden, ranking 90
Swiss/Switzerland 49; ranking 90

teachers: characterization 186–8, 193–4, 196–7, 200–4, 208–10, 212–14, 218, 290; ranking 211, 212;9, 200, 204–6, 215–17; trait profile 188
territory: loss, Hungary 220, 221, 238–40, 250, 255, 268; and national identity 56, 158
textbook preferrers 237, 238, 250, 251, 272, 287
thinking, public 226
thrift, 98, 99
tradesmen, characterization 207

trait profiles 37, 39, 96, 99, 100, 101, 104, 112, 121, 122, 144, 162, 163, 197, 280–1, 288, 289, 294; bankers 213; businessmen 213; changes in 134, 281, 293; consistency 280; English 280, 288; Germans 288; historical periods 255–64; intellectuals 185, 195; managers 213, 215; miners 212; peasants 196, 212; Russians 281; soldiers 212; stability of 282; supervisors 196; teachers 188; workers 195, 212, 213; *see also* characterization
traits 2, 20, 33, 45, 278; abstract 49; clusters 120; comparisons 226, 279, 296; co-ordination 38; dimensions 216, 285; factors 39; judgement 19, 20, 21, 279; personality 170, 171, 177; perspectives 241, 244; positive/negative 37, 44, 45, 94; ranks 34, 37, 39, 122, 164, 195, 196; scales *see* scales; *see also* specific traits
transformation, political *see* change
transition, continuous 4
Transylvania 85, 246
Triandis' measure 246
Trianon Peace Treaty 24, 25, 246, 251
truth *see* morality *and* propaganda
Turks 2, 22, 23, 41, 43
twentieth century, beliefs 219–75

Ukraine 124
UK *see* Great Britain
UNESCO 44, 45
USA/Americans 2, 46, 79, 82, 83, 85, 222–3; characterization 16, 44, 47, 48, 51, 102, 103, 105–6, 109–13, 116–20, 122, 123, 162, 280, 284, 288; images of 155, 294; immigrants to 151, 153, 155, 156; ranking 85–92, 99, 109, 114, 115, 127, 134–8, 144, 160, 161; trait profiles 280
unskilled workers, characterization 186–7, 190–91, 193–4, 196–7, 201–4, 215, 290; self-evaluation 245; status 198–9, 201, 204–6, 216–17; *see also* work, manual

values: changing 177, 289–90; class 172; cultural 216; intellectual 216; national 69, 162, 175; systems 4, 14, 45, 272; temporal 272
variation, response 239
views *see* opinion

War, World 24, 28, 37; memories of 44; First 234, 235; Second 234, 235
wealth: classification 88; explanations of 207; of families in different historical periods 242–4; *see also* poverty
well-being, subjective 226–7; *see also* satisfaction
Weltanschauung 265, 269
West Germany *see* Federal Republic of Germany
Western Europe 21, 22, 88; ranking 89, 115, 161, 163; *see also* Europe
work: directive 202, 204, 206, 207; ethic *see* diligence; manual 198, 202, 206, 211, 213, 214, 285; non-manual 198, 202, 206, 285; *see also* skilled/unskilled workers
workers: characterization 207, 208, 209, 210, 213, 287, 290; perspective of 241, 243; ranking 211, 215, 217; trait profiles 195, 212, 213; *see also* work

Yugoslavia 24, 59; ranking 90