


CLASSICAL HORIZONS

The Origins of Sociology in Ancient Greece



GEORGE E. MCCARTHY

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The Origins of Sociology in Ancient Greece

George E. McCarthy

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For my daughter and son
Alexa and Devin

To expand their horizons
and to awaken their dreams of justice

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O land of Ionia, they're still in love with you, their souls still keep your memory.

—Constantine Cavafy, "Ionic"



Beyond that, my vision weakens, but I see, at a great distance, a new world stirring in the ruins, stirring clumsily but in hopefulness, seeking its lost and legendary treasures.

—James Hilton, *Lost Horizon*



A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest to him. . . . In the sphere of historical understanding, too, we speak of horizons . . . to see the past in its own terms, not in terms of our contemporary criteria and prejudices but within its own historical horizon. . . . In the process of understanding a real fusion of horizons occurs. . . .

—Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*



I have found confirmation that forgotten memories were not lost. They were in the patient's possession and were ready to emerge in association to what was still known by him; but there was some force that prevented them from becoming conscious and compelled them to remain unconscious.

—Sigmund Freud, *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*



Only with the look toward the uncertain, the anxious care, the prospective view, the hope at worry's threshold, the fear of the future—only then does that which distinguishes man begin.

—Erhart Kästner, "Dog in the Sun"

INTRODUCTION

CRITIQUE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND RETURN TO CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY



Much has been written about the classical social theory of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim. This short work will be another addition to the already extensive literature on the subject. Its goal is different, however, in that it attempts to trace some of the basic ideas of these three authors to their origins in classical Greek philosophy, politics, art, and literature, revealing a continuity of over two thousand years between the classics and the classical, between the ancient Greeks and the theorists of modernity. Their views on alienation, rationalization, and anomie, which have attracted so much attention in the past, have their foundations in classical antiquity and in its view of social justice. Marx's doctoral dissertation was written on the subject of the post-Aristotelian philosophy of nature and science of Epicurus and Democritus; Weber's first dissertation was on commercial law and trading organizations in ancient Rome and medieval German and Italian cities, while his second examined the economy in Roman agrarian society and its meaning for constitutional and civil law; and Durkheim's two theses dealt with ancient and modern social organizations and the division of labor and the foundations of sociology in the neo-Aristotelian political theory of Montesquieu. This book traces the impact of these ancient origins and their effects on the development of the discipline of sociology and its various methods and theories. Unlike the other social sciences grounded in the Enlightenment view of rationality, science, and political economy, classical sociology was reared in a radically different and critical environment. This accounts for its distinctiveness, as well as for its continued theoretical potential today.

The dissertations of the three social theorists were not the exuberant and adventurous works of youth that were later abandoned with age and maturity. Rather, they were the wellspring from which Marx, Weber, and Durkheim drew their insights about a critique of political economy and Enlightenment science, the origins of capitalism and historical sociology, and the formation of the col-

lective consciousness and social solidarity, respectively. Even their different views of science and method, from Marx's critical science and dialectical method to Weber's historical science and interpretive method and Durkheim's moral science and comparative method, were influenced by the tradition of classical humanism. All three believed in different ways that the role of social science was moral—to aid in the development of human dignity, self-enlightenment, rational discourse, and citizenship within a free and democratic community. The ideals of classical Greek ethics and politics were civic virtue and practical wisdom (*phronesis*) within a democratic polity. When incorporated into the logic and method of sociology they represented a rejection of a discipline based on a technical and utilitarian science (*techne*) of explanation and formal causality. In its most succinct form it may be said that the origins of classical sociology lie within the overall framework of the ancient ideal of social justice as expressed in Aristotle's theory of universal, distributive, corrective, and reciprocal justice found in his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*.¹

From this perspective, sociology is distinctive among the social sciences since its intellectual foundations rest in the remembered landscape of Attica. Modern social theory, science, and critique were formed by a synthesis of empirical and historical research methods with classical Greek assumptions about the nature of knowledge, community, virtue, political freedom, and social justice. By blending together the ancients and moderns, nineteenth-century sociology became the most unusual of the social sciences because it self-consciously attempted to integrate empirical research and philosophy, science and the humanities, as no other discipline before or since. However, this distinctive element has been all but lost and forgotten today.

Their training in the classics affected the way in which Marx, Weber, and Durkheim viewed the major issues of industrialization and modernization. It was the American tradition, and especially the writings of Talcott Parsons, which later repressed these origins in order to transform sociology into a utilitarian and positivist science of explanation, prediction, and social control.² Epistemology was replaced by a one-dimensional philosophy of science, methodological self-reflection by a narrow self-assuredness about the nature of knowledge and truth. In the end, both philosophy and history were lost in a sociology geared to measure what is, but unable to understand what was or what could be—that is, unable to understand the historical past or society's future possibilities. It became mired in a measurement of the status quo without the ability to conceptualize alternatives. American sociologists embraced the Enlightenment with its Cartesian dualisms and scientific rationality; its method of causal determinism and explanatory laws; its political philosophy of possessive individualism and liberal rights; and its economic theory of utilitarian values, market freedoms, and consumer choices. Scholars within the European tradition took a much more critical and romantic view of the unfolding of the logic and structures of modernity. For them, Enlight-

enment reason in the form of scientific and technological rationality was implicated in the maintenance and legitimation of oppressive economic power and authoritarian political domination. Reason obfuscated and ideologically distorted social issues, as well as technically manipulated the decision-making process in corporate and state bureaucracies. Critical self-consciousness was never able to penetrate below the surface of sociological phenomena to the structures of class power and privilege in society.

The purpose of this book is to recover the lost traditions of classical antiquity with the hope that it will lead to a renewed inquiry into the nature and function of sociology and expand the range of questions and methods of social analysis. By returning to antiquity the present homogeneity of approaches is transformed into a surprising display of diversity so as to excite even the most passing student of the discipline. The book that follows represents an archaeological investigation into the lost world of the cathartic tragedies of Argos and Thebes, the exhilarating travels and daring adventures of the Achaeans on the fields of Ilium and before the battlements of Priam's palace, and the collective hopes and political aspirations of the public Assembly in Athens. Accompanying the fleet of Odysseus, Menelaus, and Agamemnon to Troy, reflecting on the democratic reforms of Solon and Cleisthenes, watching the performances of the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, attending the public debates under the shadow of the Acropolis with Themistocles and Pericles, or listening in the agora to the philosophical discourses of Protagoras and Plato—all this became part of the classical sociologist's desire to walk in the footsteps of the ancients.

Recovering the Hellenic ideals of the classical tradition, we see a new richness and subtlety hidden by years of conformity to a narrow form of science and rationality. By going back to the Greeks, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim come alive in new and unexpected ways. Their theories of science and truth, capitalism and industrialization, as well as their criticisms of modern society, take on a more refined and penetrating look. New approaches emerge that inquire into the meaning, method, and logic of science; into new ways in which concepts are formed and theories developed; and into new techniques that are presented for verification and validation of truth claims. Their views of humanity and philosophies of human nature and their underlying humanistic values and social criticisms form the foundation for their sociological categories of alienation, rationalization, and anomie. If we appreciate that the origins of Marx's criticism of the market and class society rest in Aristotle's political treatises; Weber's theories of the iron cage and rationalization lie in Friedrich Nietzsche's view of Greek culture and Dionysian tragedy; and Durkheim's examination of the representations and political forms of the *conscience collective* evolves out of his understanding of the Greek polis and democratic polity, we need to rethink not only the groundings of modern sociology but also their implications and relevance as well. Marx was enraptured by the beauty and simplicity of Greek art and was inspired by the ideals of

Athenian democracy and freedom, Weber was awed by the power of Greek tragedy and numbed by Nietzsche's existential nihilism and critique of scientific rationality, and Durkheim wondered aloud at the balanced integration and organic harmony of the Greek communal experience.

These social theorists longed for the dreams of the ancients (*Griechensehnsucht*) in art, philosophy, literature, and politics. Whether it involved a recalling of the ancient communitarian ideals of the polity; the classical views of knowledge and science (*episteme*, *phronesis*, and *techné*); the power of the collective spirit over individual consciousness and perception; or the cultural ideals and aesthetic solace before the terrors of human existence, the Greeks added a key dimension to the study of industrial society. Without the ancients, modern social theory makes little sense; without the inspiration of the Hellenes, the halls of modern government and the acquisitive market produce a reified and oppressive society unrestrained by transcendent ethical principles. It was the Greek perspective that provided the classical German and French sociologists with the critical framework by which to explore the deeper structures and power relationships of modern industrial society, as well as to imagine the future possibilities of humanity.

Sociology today is undergoing profound scrutiny and criticisms, and just when its decline and death are being announced as the "decomposition of sociology," a rethinking of its origins has the power to ignite a new understanding and a renewed hope in the sociological perspective. Chapter 1 of this work, "Karl Marx: Athenian Democracy and the Critique of Political Economy," begins with Marx and his turn toward the Greeks. Marx was trained in the classical tradition at the *Gymnasium* of Trier and at the Universities of Bonn and Berlin. At these universities he studied Roman law, Homer, and Greek and Roman mythology; while writing his dissertation he took courses on Isaiah and the Hebrew prophets and Euripides and Greek tragedy. Enamored by the poetry and tragedy of Homer, Aeschylus, and Sophocles; the classical history of Herodotus and Thucydides; and the philosophical debates of Plato and Aristotle; steeped in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century neoclassical humanism of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Friedrich Schiller, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Hölderlin, Heinrich Heine, and G. W. F. Hegel; and widely read in the classical anthropology and historiography of Henry Lewis Morgan, George Grote, Georg Schömann, August Böckh, and Theodor Mommsen, Marx, too, had a strong romantic and aesthetic yearning for simplicity, wholeness, beauty, justice, and happiness.

Marx sought a world more conducive to self-expression and self-determination, a world based on different political and moral ideals than those found in utilitarian capitalism. He sought a moral community justified by worker self-government "of the people and by the people." He used the accumulated experience of the Greeks to question the institutions and values of the Enlightenment and liberalism. He found in them the basis for his rejection of scientific positivism, classical

political economy, and liberal individualism. Standing on the Acropolis, looking out upon the enticing blue sky and blinding white marble of the Parthenon, and surveying the serene and sublime world of the Greeks, he rejected the barbarism of the London market and the alienation of the Manchester factories. Immersed in the spirit and dreams of the Greeks, he renounced the reality of modernity. He sought the satisfaction of human and social needs, not base material wants; the realization of human rationality and self-enlightenment, not technical science and administrative control; public happiness in political and economic participation, not the maximization of self-interest and utilitarian pleasures; and, finally, he sought a reintegration of human life and activity (*praxis*) beyond the monotonous and grinding repetition of the logic and machinery of capital. Aesthetic and spiritual freedom and participatory democracy replaced the authoritarian and repressive liberty of the market; economic freedom from class oppression replaced individualistic free choice and the search for personal gain.

Marx also sought a renewal and broadening of the public arena that transcended the narrow self-interest of the private sphere. Citizenship, participation, moral dignity, and public virtue became the defining cultural values of society in place of greed, aggression, and competition. The Greeks aroused in Marx new hopes and dreams for a free and rational society based on the values of human emancipation, the general welfare, and public good. His basic epistemological, political, and economic categories radically transformed traditional economic theory and methodology: Positivism was rejected by his application of a critical and dialectical science, utilitarianism by his emphasis on public responsibility and economic democracy, liberal morality by social ethics, and materialism by his belief in spiritual growth and aesthetic praxis. The vision of the ancients inspired him to move beyond the limits of liberal capitalism to a new society based upon their classical ideals and romantic principles.

After working on his initial research for his dissertation, he finished in 1839 his preliminary outline and dissertation notes on Greek philosophy, entitled *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy*, and in 1841 he completed his doctoral dissertation, *Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, which examined the post-Aristotelian discussions about physics, science, and materialist philosophies of nature. The dissertation outlined Epicurus' theory of atomic motion, astronomical physics, and theory of meteors, while comparing the mechanistic and deterministic worldview of Democritus to the indeterminism and natural freedom of Epicurus. Marx's sympathies lay with Epicurus, whom he characterized as "the greatest figure of the Greek Enlightenment." Although he focused on the works of Epicurus and Democritus, he also examined an extensive list of other Greek and Roman authors including Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Lucretius, Seneca, Eusebius, Cicero, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus. Traditionally these authors have gone unnoticed because they have been relegated to Marx's earliest and less mature writings. But they represent an

important key to unlocking the mysteries and complexities of his later works, especially the *Grundrisse* (1857–58), *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), and *Capital* (1867).

The dissertation contains a discussion about the purpose of human knowledge and the nature of science that will be carried through in his later methodology and philosophy of social science. Marx approached modernity from a set of values inimical to modern liberal society. He borrowed from Epicurus' critique of natural science and Greek materialism and his integration of science and ethics. He drew upon Aristotle's view of happiness (*eudaimonia*) as political discourse, his defense of the household economy (*oikonomike*) and moral community (*zōon politikon*) against the ravages of commodity exchange and a market economy (*chrematistike*); his articulation of the democratic polity against oligarchy and mass democracy; his analysis of use value and exchange value; his views on the forms of universal and particular justice; and his distinction between political wisdom (*phronesis*) and technical knowledge (*techne*). Ancient Greek and later neoclassical German authors provided Marx with many of the political and social values that appeared in his early and later writings.³

The influence of the ancient Greeks on every aspect of the development of his thinking is evident throughout his life and is contained in his major writings on political theory and economics. It is present in his ideas about the state, economic justice, and democracy, as well as in his epistemological and methodological discussions about the dialectical method, social critique, and critical science. Some have even argued that Marx's later political writings were attempts by him to rewrite Aristotle's *Politics* for the modern age. In *Capital* he developed a variety of methodological forms for the critique of political economy. Two of these approaches relied on Aristotle's treatises on politics, ethics, physics, and metaphysics. The first is an internal and dialectical critique of the commercial and industrial contradictions (logic) and crises of capitalism based on Aristotle's and Hegel's theories of substance (sensible matter and universal form), change (actuality and potentiality), and causality. The second is an ethical critique of the moral and political limits of an exchange economy based on Aristotle's theory of political economy, friendship, and social justice. In its unquenchable search for profits and property, capitalism undermines the possibility of building a society based on the values of community, civic virtue, social responsibility, and the public good. The capitalist social setting makes it impossible for workers to realize their potential, express their individuality, or fulfill their social needs. Marx referred directly to Aristotle's critique of commodity exchange, an extended market, and the unnatural accumulation of property and wealth in order to make his case.

Social justice requires moving beyond natural rights, parliamentary democracy, and political liberalism to new forms of economic democracy, human emancipation, and an expanded view of freedom and self-determination that

have their origins in Aristotle's philosophy. Marx's earliest writings on political democracy in law and the state in *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* (1843) and his rethinking of the relationship between the state and civil society in "On the Jewish Question" (1843) are compared in chapter 1 to his later writings on workers' control and socialist democracy in the Paris Commune in *The Civil War in France* (1871) and in "Critique of the Gotha Program" (1875). Marx moved beyond the classical political economy of Adam Smith and David Ricardo and the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill by returning to the political ideals of ancient Greece for inspiration and insight.

Chapter 2, "Max Weber: Greek Tragedy and the Rationalization of Society," examines the writings of Weber and his relation to the ancient Greeks and Romans. Like Marx, he, too, was trained in the classical tradition in the *Gymnasium* and in the university. As a teenager he was reading Greek and Hebrew and the historical works of Mommsen, Heinrich von Treitschke, and Leopold von Ranke. By the age of sixteen he had read many of the Greek and Latin classics, including Homer, Herodotus, Virgil, Cicero, Livy, and Sallust.⁴ He entered the University of Heidelberg in 1882 to continue his interests in the classics and took courses with some of the most prominent legal theorists, historians, and economists of the time. Two years later he enrolled in the University of Berlin where he focused on jurisprudence and German law. It is here that he attended the lectures of Mommsen, von Treitschke, Levin Goldschmidt, August Meitzen, and Gustav Schmoller. These lectures ranged from issues in ancient history, economic theory, and Christianity to questions about the relationship between the church and state.

Weber wrote his doctoral dissertation, *On the History of Medieval Trading Companies* (1889), and completed his habilitation, *Roman Agrarian History* (1891), under the strong influence of the writings of the classical economic historian Karl Rodbertus. These two early writings together with his essay "The Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilization" (1896), *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* (1897), and his later analyses of ancient cities and civilizations in *General Economic History* (1923) and *Economy and Society* (1922) constitute an impressive historical and economic analysis of ancient cultures and societies. His knowledge of ancient history was encyclopedic, and he was able to place his economic history in the context of the major debates within the economic theory of his time. Even in his early writings, Weber was concerned with the relationship between the ancients and moderns and the extent of capitalism and rationalization found in early agrarian civilizations. He was interested in uncovering the earliest forms of ancient capitalism through an analysis of slavery, private property, capitalist ventures, and the commercialization of agriculture. Weber traced the evolution of the Greek city-state from the hoplite cities of the seventh century B.C. to the creation of Athenian democracy with the political and legal reforms of Solon, Cleisthenes, Ephialtes, and Pericles.

Detailing the Athenian response to the rise of a market economy and increased class antagonisms and debt slavery, he outlined the formation of a new political constitution, which rested on the institutions of popular sovereignty—the general Assembly (*Ekklesia*), executive Council (*Boule*), and the jury courts (*Dikasteria*). He also historically chronicled the decline of classical democracy, the rise of medieval cities, and the structural origins of modern commercial and industrial capitalism. Finally, he was attentive to the issue that ultimately held all his writings together, that is, an examination of the economic and social factors that inhibited or encouraged capitalist enterprises—the rationalization of antiquity and modernity.

In Weber's lifetime three prominent sociologists-philosophers, Alois Riehl, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Georg Simmel, wrote important works on the existentialism and *Lebensphilosophie* of Nietzsche and on the pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer that deeply influenced the development of his thought. It is through Nietzsche that Weber's classical background was broadened to include issues of the celebration and joy of human life in Greek tragedy and the destructive potential of scientific rationalism. And it was through Nietzsche that Greek drama, art, and philosophy had such a profound effect upon his social theory. The long shadow of influence of Nietzsche and the Greeks extends to a wide range of issues: (1) Weber's sociology of religion, theory of *ressentiment*, and ethics of economics (*Wirtschaftsethik*); (2) his theories of knowledge, objectivity, causality, ideal types, and critique of positivism (*Wissenschaftslehre*); (3) his view of scientific rationalism, disenchantment, the death of God, nihilism, and the rationalization of the iron cage (*Wissenschaftskritik*); (4) his theory of moral relativism and historicism; (5) his moral philosophy with its theory of practical reason, moral autonomy, individual self-realization, and critique of Enlightenment utilitarianism and the "last man"; and (6) his cultural pessimism, sociology of political legitimation, critique of liberalism and natural rights tradition, theory of technocratic decisionism, political bureaucracy, and plebiscitary democracy.

Much of Weber's interpretation and critique of modernity came from Nietzsche's insights into Greek tragedy, physics, and mythology. The Apollonian and Dionysian drives found in Greek tragedy—the dialectic between reason and instincts—pervade the whole of Weber's work. His attack on the limits of Western rationality and his critique of the search for transcendent universals and objective knowledge, loss of substantive reason and the disenchantment of science, reification and truncation of functional rationality, and existential crisis of the meaninglessness of life in Western society are all traceable to Nietzsche and the Greeks. It was the ancient and modern historians, neo-Kantian philosophers, and early German sociologists who provided Weber with the sociological methods that emphasized an interpretive sociology of culture and a historical sociology of institutions in opposition to the approach of the neoclassical economists and positivists.

Chapter 3, “Emile Durkheim: Greek Polis and the Solidarity of the *Conscience Collective*,” outlines the importance of classical Greece in the works of Durkheim, especially regarding his social epistemology, theory of civic morality and education, and forms of collective consciousness in law, religion, and public virtue. The notion of *conscience collective* represents the collective consciousness and shared common values, ideas, and beliefs within society. Entering the Parisian university, the École Normale Supérieure, in 1879, Durkheim continued his work in classical philology and literature. While there he was influenced by two neo-Kantian scholars, Charles Renouvier and Émile Boutroux, from whom he developed a concern for issues of Kantian epistemology, moral philosophy, and social solidarity. Two historians at the university, Gabriel Monod and Fustel de Coulanges, author of *The Ancient City* and *History of Political Institutions in Ancient France*, helped Durkheim with his methodology and broad historical interests. Monod had studied ancient France, while de Coulanges had examined the ancient Greek and Roman city, patriarchal family, and cultic religion.

Durkheim studied philosophy and social science in Germany during the academic year 1885–86. Visiting the universities in Marburg, Leipzig, and Berlin, he, like Weber, came under the influence of the social economists Schmoller, Adolph Wagner, and Albert Schäffle. He was particularly attracted to their criticisms of classical economics, deductive scientific methodology and its abstract reasoning, and theory of liberal individualism. Their attempted integration of science and ethics in their neo-Aristotelian thought, as well as their views on the nature of society and moral relativism, also made an impact on the development of his ideas, especially on the development of his sociology of morals and ethical theory. During this time, he was also influenced by the ethical philosophy of the neo-Kantians and the theory of social customs, group pluralism, and experimental science of Wilhelm Wundt. These would all play a part in the evolution of Durkheim’s own view of scientific rationalism, which tied theoretical to practical reason. Science was to be a moral or practical discipline, which would govern both social practice and ethical ends and would examine the nature of the community, ethical solidarity, and the collective representations of society in its various forms: morality, politics, religion, law, and deviant and abnormal behavior. These objective and external social forms were constructed by means of a dialectic between consciousness and the community.

Durkheim transformed Immanuel Kant’s epistemology and moral philosophy into sociological questions that occupied much of his academic career. That is, he translated and integrated Kant’s critiques of pure and practical reason into an empirical study of social institutions and cultural values—collective ideas and moral imperatives—with the practical goal of building a moral community based upon republican civic virtues. He also borrowed his theories of collective representations, the unrestrained and aimless will, and the cultural pessimism of infinite suffering and perpetual unhappiness, as well as important aspects of his

methodology of critical rationalism, from the Kantian existentialism of Schopenhauer. By methodologically viewing social facts as both objective things and collective representations and by refusing to accept the Cartesian dualism of subject and object and the metaphysics of social realism, he set the stage for a rejection of the Enlightenment view of naturalism and science in his famous works, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), and *Suicide* (1897).⁵

In 1887 Durkheim accepted a position at the Faculty of Letters at the University of Bordeaux, where he taught for fifteen years. He offered courses in social science and pedagogy, on Aristotle's *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, as well as on Auguste Comte, Thomas Hobbes, and Kant. He thought that Plato and Aristotle made the first attempts at sociology.⁶ Influenced by the writings of the classical Greeks, he would develop his political philosophy from a conservative emphasis on liberal republicanism and the social order to a critical socialism with its dreams of social justice and economic democracy. Durkheim offered lecture courses on the history of educational theories, sociology, and socialism from antiquity to the nineteenth century. His primary doctoral dissertation, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), was preceded by a subsidiary doctoral thesis, entitled *Montesquieu's Contribution to the Rise of Social Science* (1892). Written in Latin, it examined the importance of Baron de Montesquieu's writings, especially *The Spirit of Laws*, to the foundations of social science and sociology. The work was dedicated to his teacher and mentor, Fustel de Coulanges. Comparing the two early writings, we see a close connection between his sociological analysis of the pathological division of labor and anomie in industrial society, with the breakdown of communal integration and organic solidarity, and his reading of Montesquieu and classical Greece. In the academic year 1901–2, Durkheim offered a course on the history of sociological thought, which featured Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract*. He viewed Montesquieu and Rousseau as forerunners of sociology and as having laid the principles and foundations for social science. Both were heavily indebted to Aristotle and Greek political philosophy for their key ideas about the primacy of a dynamic and organic community, which Durkheim integrated into his epistemological and social theory.

Durkheim borrowed from Montesquieu's view of society and social change, division of labor, and theory of social solidarity and law, along with the methodologically important social typology of the classical republic, monarchy, despotism, and democracy and his use of the comparative method. He relied on Rousseau's ideas of human nature, the general will, freedom, and the collective well-being of the political community, concepts that were attractive to Durkheim in the formation of his theory of collective consciousness. He also took notice of Rousseau's views on democracy as a moral institution based on citizenship, equality, political obligation, and public reflection and deliberation. Through Montesquieu and Rousseau, Durkheim transformed classical ethics

and the ancient political philosophies of Plato and Aristotle into the central principles of his sociological study of social solidarity, system differentiation and integration, and dysfunctional social pathologies. Their search for social justice, human happiness, and social order became the basis for his own historical and empirical research into the origins, organization, and functions of social institutions and norms.

Durkheim's concern with the moral and psychological anomie and *dérèglement* (madness and suffering) of industrial society and its resulting social disequilibrium was expressed in his analysis of the division of labor, suicide, family, law, public morality, and the ethical foundation of work in occupational groups, guilds, and the modern state. It has been remarked that Durkheim's social theory is but a modern reformulation of ancient natural law.⁷ Steven Lukes writes, "The novelty of Durkheim's approach lay in his recasting of the old, seemingly timeless and a priori problems of ethics, political theory, and jurisprudence. . . . His arguments incorporate the central features characterizing much of traditional social and political theory, from Aristotle and Plato to his fellow nineteenth-century liberals, J. S. Mill and T. H. Green."⁸ Durkheim's later writings and lectures focused more and more on Aristotelian themes of pedagogy, moral education, civic virtue, and social justice, especially in *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (1950). Reacting to the destructive effects of modernization and to the disintegration of public values and social solidarity, Durkheim turned to a moral sociology whose goals were the healing and education of a new humanity concerned with political participation, craft organizations, and the common good. In 1902 he left Bordeaux to accept a position at the Sorbonne, where he eventually received a chair in the Science of Education and Sociology and continued to develop his social theories until his death in 1917.

In chapter 4, "Awakening Classical Dreams: Synthesis of Ancient Justice and Modern Social Science," we examine the implications of the research findings of chapters 1–3. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the romantic longing for the ancient Greeks was manifested in the poetry and aesthetics of Winckelmann, Schiller, and Goethe; later it was incorporated into the social philosophy and critical theory of Hegel and Nietzsche; and, finally, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the sociology of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Though very different from each other, these sociologists shared a common ground, a critical reaction to modernity, in their political, economic, anthropological, epistemological, and methodological works. All were trained in classical Greek political science. Although expressed in various ways and to differing degrees, by returning to the dreams of the ancients, they developed a critique of the Enlightenment and classical liberalism; held nostalgic views of the moral community and its cultural values and social goals; were critical of the reification and social pathologies of industrial society in their theories of alienation and exploitation, rationalization and the iron cage, and organic solidarity and anomie; rejected the precepts of *lais-*

sez-faire economics and utilitarianism; based their ideas on a structural and functional analysis of political economy; sought new theories of knowledge to take the place of naive empiricism and rationalism; and, finally, articulated complex sociological and historical methods as alternatives to positivism that had their foundation in the German idealism of Kant and Hegel or in the existentialism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.⁹ For them, sharing many of the common ideas of the Kantian revolution, reality (thing-in-itself) is never immediately observed; it is not accessible to empirical facts but is instead filtered by political (Marx), historical (Weber), and collective (Durkheim) consciousness.

Observation and experience are always theory-laden and mediated by praxis and ideology, intentional values and cultural meanings, or collective representations and social classifications. Reality is socially constructed within history. Thus the epistemological and methodological foundations of nineteenth-century sociology are at odds with the Enlightenment view of rationality and science. Classical sociology builds upon its Kantian and Hegelian foundations in modern phenomenology and hermeneutics with the development of critical theory, historical science, and moral social science. These forms of science examine an objectivity and cultural rationality that is interpretative and meaningful. There is no objective reality reflected in consciousness as empirical evidence or social facts that can serve the purpose of sociological predictions and instrumental explanations. Rather, it is itself a product of social interaction and the determinations of human consciousness and activity. That is, objectivity has meaning in terms of history, intentions, hidden structures, and repressed values and concepts, and it is only in this context that the objective world can have any sense whatsoever. Interpretation is an understanding of already existing prior cultural interpretations by means of sociological theories, ideal types, value relevance, and normative assumptions. There is never a pure, isolated, and value-free realm within which scientists examine an independent and autonomous reality in itself. Just the opposite: Access to reality requires the use of values, perspectives, and political orientations.

The orthodox interpretation in America of classical social theory has generally emphasized sociology as a positivistic science. Marx is viewed as developing a research method of historical predictions of universal natural laws, economic crises, and inevitable capitalist breakdown; Weber as presenting a value-free sociology of cultural explanations, natural causality, and nomological laws; and Durkheim as providing a theory of statistical methods, functionalist analysis, and systems predictions. What is forgotten are their criticisms of positivism, their alternative epistemologies and methods, their different definitions of science and rationality, and their return to classical Greece. Marx's dialectical method and immanent critique, Weber's sociology of understanding and historical structuralism, and Durkheim's Kantian epistemology and moral science of collective representations and social solidarity offer exciting alternative methods to the American view

of social science. Grounded in neo-Hegelian or neo-Kantian thought, nineteenth-century sociology defined science as critical, interpretive, and moral.

With the loss of the ancients in orthodox American sociology, with the increased separation between philosophy and social science, and the replacement of history by quantitative and statistical methods, the intellectual and spiritual core of the discipline—its humanistic soul—was also lost. In an ironic twist of intellectual fate, when the political and economic sciences were becoming more naturalistic and positivistic, sociology was viewed by Marx, Weber, and Durkheim as a form of ancient political science whose purpose was to examine modern social institutions and values in order to cultivate social justice, happiness, and a virtuous life. These are the Greek ideals of *phronesis* and *praxis*. Values are to develop out of the community and are not to be engineered by a philosophical or technocratic elite. Just at a time when modern social science was displacing its own classical heritage of political philosophy, sociology was incorporating it into the very sinews of its theoretical perspective. The result was the formation of a new *phronetic* science, which was holistic, integrative, and classical, and based on the Aristotelian synthesis of economics, politics (law), and ethics. No longer can the term *classical* in the idea of classical social theory refer only to the founding fathers in the nineteenth century; it must also refer to its more remote origins in classical Greece.

The goal of this work is to search for the classics in the classical, the traditions that are enduring and can be reclaimed to liberate our thoughts from the narrowly immediate and the status quo at hand. In that search it is possible to rediscover and reanimate the missing Hellenic traditions in nineteenth-century social theory and to radically rethink the origins of modern thought as part of a more general rethinking of sociology and its continuing importance for the twenty-first century. Toward this end sociology will be reintegrated with the areas of history, philosophy, and political economy, and its epistemologies and methods will be broadened to include historical, interpretive, and critical research. The ultimate purpose is to join empirical and historical research with critical social theory. Unlike the other social sciences of the nineteenth century, sociology evolved in a philosophical and intellectual environment that questioned the culture and institutions of the Enlightenment. By grounding itself in classical antiquity and in its premodern and pre-Enlightenment views about human nature and society, that is, the ethics and politics of social justice, sociology was involved from its inception in a critical dialogue with liberal capitalism. Consequently, it is in a privileged position today to move beyond the limits of modernity—advanced capitalism, political liberalism, and methodological positivism—to an in-depth analysis of the social possibilities that are our present heritage and future legacy. By unearthing the forgotten dreams and lost horizons of the ancients, we examine some of the unexplored possibilities of the moderns. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has written in *Truth and Method* (1960),

The task of historical understanding also involves acquiring an appropriate historical horizon, so that what we are trying to understand can be seen in its true dimensions. . . . To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand—not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion. . . . Only then can we listen to tradition in a way that permits it to make its own meaning heard.¹⁰

Chapter 1

KARL MARX

ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY



Trained in classical Greek history and philosophy from his earliest days at the Trier *Gymnasium* and at the Universities of Bonn and Berlin, Karl Marx incorporated his love for ancient history, archaeology, and philosophy throughout his writings on political and economic issues. The ancient Greeks offered him an opportunity to romanticize alternative possibilities of an emancipated society freed from the alienation, exploitation, and materialism of modern life. In their collective philosophy, art, and politics the Greeks presented him with an idealized world of spiritual harmony, sensuous beauty, political wisdom, and social justice. The Greek world reflected his hopes and aspirations for a life of noble simplicity and individual freedom within a moral economy. Instead of mind-numbing specialized labor; a fragmented community; class-divided society; and the shallow, self-interested pursuit of material wealth, Marx sought a new humanity guided by a different set of social values and moral principles.

Steeped in the works of Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Plato, and Aristotle; well-versed in the ancient history and archaeology of George Grote, Carl Hermann, Johann Jakob Bachofen, August Böckh, Georg Maurer, Theodor Mommsen, and Georg Schömann; and inspired by the writings of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich Schiller, and Friedrich Hölderlin, Marx confronted an alien world of Manchester factories, rationalized labor, class power, and the stultifying values of utilitarianism and atomistic individualism. The way out of this world was through the dreams of the ancients. As did Aristotle many years before him, he rejected the view of freedom as a series of market choices and consumer tastes. For Marx, freedom was to be defined in terms of self-realization and rational deliberation within a moral community of mutually caring friends and active citizens. The individual was to be portrayed not in terms of how much he or she owned or consumed but in terms of human creativity, moral choices, and political participation. The ancients offered Marx an infinitely superior world of

aesthetic splendor and human dignity. From the dazzling heights of the Acropolis, he could see farther than most nineteenth-century social theorists.

The influence of classical antiquity on Marx's critique of modernity appears in five different periods of his writings. This chapter will follow these periods from his doctoral dissertation and notebooks on Greek physics and science; the classical humanism in his early ideas on alienation, species being, and human rights and emancipation; to his later ethical critique of capitalism, labor theory of value, and dialectical and teleological analysis of economic crises. As he moves from his early philosophical to his later scientific and historical writings, his ideas reveal his continuing reliance on the imagination and wisdom of Aristotle and Greek philosophy.

First, in his thesis notebooks on Greek philosophy and in his dissertation on post-Aristotelian philosophy of nature, he examines the works of Democritus and Epicurus, with special emphasis on the latter's theory of atomic and meteor movement, freedom, and happiness as *ataraxy*. Second, in his early writings of 1843–44, especially *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, "On the Jewish Question," and *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx focuses on Aristotle's theory of social justice, the good life, self-realization, democracy, rational dialogue, and happiness as *eudaimonia* and on the notions of beauty, art, and creativity found in the neoclassical aesthetics of Winckelmann, Goethe, and Schiller. In these early essays, he outlines his theory of species being, self-realization, and political and human emancipation. These political writings were accompanied by his critique of alienated labor, narrow utilitarian rights, and possessive individualism.

Third, in his major economic work, *Capital* (1867), Marx introduces two new methodological forms of social critique. The first method traces the development of the underlying logic and rationality (universality) of capitalism that he borrows from Aristotle's theory of formal and final causality and theory of movement in nature found in his *Metaphysics* and *Physics*. Marx then integrates this with the economic crisis theory and labor theory of value of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. The second form of critique comes directly from Aristotle's analysis of political economy and his theory of social justice, virtue, and moral knowledge in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. Also in *Capital*, Marx reveals the destructive effects of the market, class inequality, and unnatural commercial acquisition of wealth and profits (*chrematistike*) through his analysis of exchange value, abstract labor, surplus value, and primitive accumulation. Both the modern commodity exchange within the commercial market and the social relations within industrial production preclude the possibility of realizing the political and economic potential of a society built upon the ideals of a moral economy (*oikonomia*), political community, and democratic virtue and citizenship. In the fourth period, practical reason is made concrete and transformed into social institutions. Marx uses Aristotle's theory of the democratic polity and the Athenian constitution as a guide to outline the basic structural features of human emancipation, economic democracy, and the workers' collectives in the Paris Commune of 1871.

Finally, Marx turns to ancient history and cultural anthropology to study the historical and structural developments of the political economy of the ancient city-state. In the *Grundrisse* (1857–58) and in *The Ethnological Notebooks* (1880–82), he looks to authors on ancient history (Barthold Niebuhr and Mommsen) and cultural anthropology (Henry Lewis Morgan, Henry Sumner Main, John Budd Phear, and John Lubbock) to help examine precapitalist social formations.¹ In the *Grundrisse*, Marx analyzes the evolution of the ancient commune from a tribal and pastoral society to the classical urban polis, from a society based on communal and tribal property to one founded upon private property. By this means he is able to outline the creation of civil society and economic inequality in the ancient world. In the *Ethnological Notebooks*, he traces the evolution of the Greek political constitution from the Homeric military aristocracy through the legal and democratic reforms of Solon, Cleisthenes, Ephialtes, and Pericles, as well as through the transformation of the ancient commune by means of the growth of private property, class conflict, and specialized labor. Here he explores a question initially raised in chapter 1 of Aristotle's *Politics*: How did the ancient state and class society evolve from the archaic associations and primordial communities of the family, tribe, and village?² By discovering the commonality of interests in these five distinct periods in his writings, we can appreciate the extent to which Marx's social theory is inspired by dreams of classical social justice.

SCIENCE AND NATURE IN DEMOCRITUS AND EPICURUS

Marx's dissertation, *Difference between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* (1841), compares the different views of science, truth, and nature in the Greek physics of Epicurus and Democritus. His earlier preparatory notes, published as *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy* (1839), outline the history of philosophy dealing with post-Aristotelian physics and philosophy of nature. Taking excerpts and interpretations from the works of Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, Lucretius, Seneca, and Cicero, Marx summarizes the ancient treatment of Epicurus and Democritus. In a letter to his father written in November 1837 from the University of Berlin, Marx mentions his readings in legal studies and his excitement about the works of Immanuel Kant, Johann Fichte, G. W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Schelling. He also comments that he has translated part of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. A casual look at the endnotes to his dissertation reveals extensive references to Aristotle. At this time Marx has even made a translation of Aristotle's *De Anima* in German, which he hopes to publish.³

There is little in the secondary literature that examines in any detail Marx's doctoral thesis. Though it is like many other dissertations, esoteric and difficult to read, the patient reader will find some interesting ideas expressed in it. Marx viewed his dissertation as an introduction to a more comprehensive monograph on Epicurean, Stoic, and Skeptic philosophy that he never wrote. The philosophical tradition from Cicero and Plutarch to Leibniz dismisses Epicurus as an

inconsistent, second-rate borrower of Democritus' philosophy of nature. But Marx sees something more creative and original in Epicurus, and this is the main thesis of his work. Marx acknowledges that the science of nature and theory of atoms and meteors that lie at the foundation of their thought are the same. Where Democritus and Epicurus differ is in their view of "truth, certainty, and application of this science, and all that refers to the relationship between thought and reality in general."⁴ Though their atomic theory is the same, their epistemologies and metaphysics are quite different.

According to Marx, their approaches to sensation (sensuous perception) and reason (self-consciousness), the ontology of phenomenal appearances and being, the validity of empiricism and universal concepts, scientific explanation and natural causes, and the nature of science in general reflect different philosophies. In his articulation of these differences lies Marx's originality, and, more importantly, lie many of the seminal ideas that will later become the foundation for his views on the science and method of his critique of political economy. As he presents the ancient philosophy of nature and science, the discussion between Democritus and Epicurus becomes a debate between empiricism and idealism, respectively. They both ask: What is the nature of science, the process of scientific inquiry, and the objective reality that science investigates? These are questions of epistemology, method, and ontology. Though his earliest writing is on Greek physics and nature and his later on political economy and the natural laws of society, they share a common conceptual framework in their critique of natural science (*Naturwissenschaft*). Finally, Marx contends that whereas Democritus merely stated his theory of nature and celestial bodies, Epicurus pushed science beyond nature into the realm of social ethics with its focus on issues of human happiness, potentiality, freedom, and self-consciousness. Thus, this early treatise represents a discourse on Greek epistemology and science that provides us with interesting insights into his later thinking. The doctoral thesis offers Marx an opportunity not only to delve into Greek physics and classical materialism but also to unpack many of the ideas of Kantian epistemology and Hegelian phenomenology with their concepts of matter and form, appearance and essence, existence and essence, and so forth. Under the guise of his exegesis of the Greeks, Marx is coming to terms with the debates within and between German Idealism and Left-Hegelianism (Ludwig Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer).

The basis for Epicurus' philosophy of nature lies in his theory of atoms and meteors. All nature is composed of self-sufficient, indivisible atoms in constant motion and the spatial void between them. Though invisible, these material atoms are characterized by size, shape, and weight; they form the substrate for all material things. In a world of constantly moving atoms, there are three forms of atomic motion: a fall in a straight line due to gravity, deviation or declination from a straight line, and the mutual repulsion of many atoms. For Epicurus, it is the deviation from the natural fall of atoms, their accidental swerving, and their combination that produce the objects of nature. According to Cicero, Democri-

tus accepted the older Aristotelian view of natural and constant motion in a straight line caused by weight and gravitation, while Epicurus introduced the idea of the swerving of atoms. As atoms repel each other, there is a new oblique motion created that is beyond the natural necessity of falling in a straight line. Each body in a straight-line motion surrenders its freedom and independence to the laws of gravity and nature, thereby surrendering its individuality and distinctiveness. Marx sees that without the declination from a straight line, new movement and alternative combinations of atoms would be impossible. He is also opposed to seeking an external and blind cause of declination outside the principle of the atom itself since he is opposed to the necessary and deterministic world of Aristotelian physics. "Thus, while the atom frees itself from its relative existence, the straight line, by abstracting from it, by swerving away from it, so the entire Epicurean philosophy swerves away from the restrictive mode of being wherever the concept of abstract individuality, self-sufficiency and negation of all relation to other things must be represented in its existence."⁵

In this way the atom is freed from any dependence on other atoms or from any determination outside itself. It abstracts itself from other atoms as it collides and is repulsed by them and as it is attracted to and combines with many other atoms. In the process, the atom defines itself from within its own principle or concept as a distinct material entity—a particular object in nature. Repulsion from each other and natural motion give atoms their concrete form, thereby creating the determinations and particularity of objects. Epicurus rejects the deterministic universe of Democritus with its blind and necessary motion studied by natural science. The real difference between the two philosophers at this level is that Democritus' theory of the atom begins and ends with its materiality. Epicurus, on the other hand, in more Hegelian fashion, develops a theory of substance that introduces the idea of the atom as an expression of the subject or spirit—the concept of the atom—rather than as a manifestation of a material element only. The pure concept represents the principle, the determining form, defining both individuality and potentiality, and the essence of the phenomenal world of appearances, which is expressed and realized in the actual declination, repulsion, and combination of atoms. In the very act of repulsion, the particularity and concrete determination of the material object are formed. And it is this notion of a pure concept of the atom that produces for Marx the interesting questions within Greek physics about the nature of science, its external reference in the world of material objects, and the validity of its theories.

The subjective dimension of the atom and the explanation of causes are distinguishing features of the Epicurean theory of physics. In contrast to the mechanical and necessary world viewed by Democritus, Epicurus maintains that the principle underlying the atom and nature is one of "abstract possibilities" and real freedom limited only by the power and insight of the subjective imagination. The explanation for objects in nature comes not from the material objects themselves but from the subjective principle lying within them. In fact, Epicurus has

no interest in seeking the real causes of objects. In this sense, the world of phenomenal objects is a product of the imagination and thus is a fiction; being is a manifestation of, and creation of, the spirit.⁶ The world of being is a subjective world of possible thought. Being is determined by consciousness and not by the objective reality or essence of the thing itself; the theories of the conditions, laws, and explanations of nature come from the subject and not from the object. It is the subject that permits being to appear over time. "Thus in hearing nature hears itself, in smelling it smells itself, in seeing it sees itself."⁷ The subject as thought or reason posits itself as the abstract possibility of nature. It is the human mind that makes objective reality possible by externalizing itself onto the natural world. Marx views this creative and theoretical activity as a form of self-conscious praxis. So long as any causal explanation can ultimately be tied to experience and not contradict the sensations, then any explanation is possible. Nature is represented by a plurality of causes and diversity of theoretical explanations. All that is solid melts into possibilities. Aristotle's theory of substance is transformed into Epicurus' theory of subjectivity and self-consciousness.⁸

There is no one universal explanation of causes in nature, no one particular cause that is natural and necessary. The objective and impenetrable reality of the empirical is dissolved and replaced by chance, arbitrariness, and freedom of the subject. The atom is based on a contradiction between its manifestation in nature and its conceptual possibilities reflected in the imagination, that is, between its existence and its essence, its matter and its form. It is from this contradiction and alienation of the concept as essence into material substance, which is expressed in various forms of motion, attraction, and repulsion, that nature is created. The atom is always in contradiction to itself; its particular determination contradicts its abstract possibilities. The subject is indifferent to the various explanations of the object since the explanations come from the subject and are external to the object itself. Forms are not expressions of metaphysical realities or natural laws as they are for Aristotle; they are the possibilities inherent in subjective consciousness and pure reason. Democritus argues that the proper explanation of particular events rests upon attending to the conditions and reason for them. The cause for drinking lies in thirst; the cause for digging lies in the search for buried treasure. Taking the opposite position, Epicurus maintains that there is no iron law of logic or necessity that underlies nature. "The spirit creates the world . . . which is defined as having been cut out from the infinite."⁹ Nature, as it exists in consciousness, is free and ideal.

The startling implication of this theory is that the ultimate goal of science is ethical, that is, the happiness (*ataraxy*) of self-consciousness as a tranquillity of the mind and negation of fear. Epicurus' method "seeks to destroy the reality of nature which has become independent by an explanation according to abstract possibility."¹⁰ This idea is also developed in his theory of meteors and celestial bodies. These objects have the same characteristics as atoms but on a larger scale: They are eternal, indestructible, and unchangeable; they swerve from a straight

line, and are repulsed by, and attracted to, each other. In this motion, they are also like atoms since their form (concept) is realized and made concrete in matter as independent and substantial individuality (particular objects). Breaking with the whole of Greek physics, Epicurus argues that the solar system is a construct of the human mind and that in knowing the former one also knows the latter. As a project of reason (*Vernunft*), the solar system is a reflection of the categories of the mind. In creating a world of transcendent gods and immortal divinity, the mind alienates itself onto an external other. According to Greek mythology, it is this eternal and unchangeable natural order that determines the motion and position of the meteors. For Epicurus, mythology and physics are empty superstitions and forms of alienated consciousness. Yet, however much he is critical of mythology, Epicurus believes it better to follow the myths of the gods than to accept the necessity and logic of nature and science.

In his letters to Pythocles and Herodotus, Epicurus connects physics with ethics. The purpose of explaining the rising and setting of the sun and moon, the changing of the length of night and day, is to question the immutability and divinity of the celestial sphere and to dispel any fears and terrors human beings may have in the face of the transcendent and mythical causes and universal laws of nature. Just as the atom is indifferent to the subjective explanations of repulsion and attraction, the heavens are indifferent to the various explanations of the movement of heavenly bodies. Epicurus wishes to reject traditional mythology in order to negate the gods and natural law. This is what Marx refers to as the “unity of the object” that is created by “the slavish artifices of the astrologers.” Epicurus’ ethics frees self-consciousness from obedience to alien laws and mythical gods as it reaffirms the values of the abstract possibilities of the imagination and absolute arbitrariness of nature, on the one hand, and classical humanism and individual freedom on the other hand. The heavens are multiple and diverse, and there is no immanent teleology or rational purpose in nature. There are only the meanings and concrete determinations projected onto nature by the subjective spirit. “In the theory of meteors therefore appears the soul of the Epicurean philosophy of nature. Nothing is eternal which destroys the ataraxy and freedom of individual self-consciousness.”¹¹

Science is structured not to peer into the reality of things themselves but to offer explanations for natural occurrences that protect the individual from anxiety and fear and provide theoretical resistance to mythical constructs. The transcendent is made human; the divine is made anthropomorphic. In rejecting the eternal order of nature, the divinity of the heavens, and the existence of mythical and transcendent gods, in emphasizing the primacy of the subject and individual self-consciousness, Epicurus is viewed by Marx as the “greatest representative of Greek Enlightenment.” Reason becomes the criterion by which reality is explained. Since there is no rationality or necessity in nature, there is nothing given as universally true. From Epicurus comes Marx’s rejection of natural science (*Naturwissenschaft*) and empiricism. “Epicurus has nothing but contempt

for the positive sciences. . . . He is called an enemy of science, a scorner of grammar.”¹² Observation, experimentation, and the laws of experience do not provide knowledge of nature, which can be achieved only through reason. The science of nature is used not to search for absolute truth but instead to promote individual happiness, peace of mind, personal security, and the infinite possibilities of nature. It is a theoretical construct with a priori ethical and political motives.

Marx's dissertation sets the stage for much of his later critique of political economy and the Enlightenment that has its methodological roots in German Idealism and in Aristotle's theory of movement and causes. Throughout his writings, Marx strives for a critical wisdom “against all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest divinity.”¹³ From Epicurus he will borrow his romantic critique of religion, science, and positivism; rejection of gods (and markets) as independent entities and of a deterministic universe and belief in external transcendent laws and the natural order of things; emphasis on the priority of freedom, self-consciousness, and action; and integration of science and ethics. Marx will explain political economy in terms of reason and its search for the underlying structural concept (formal principle) and the inner logic of capital. Viewing society in terms of its internal and structural contradictions between abstract labor as the exploitation of surplus value in production and individual contract rights, he challenges the utilitarian concepts of freedom and equality in market exchange. Many of the important themes found in the *Grundrisse*, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, and *Capital* are anticipated in preliminary form in his doctoral thesis, including his critique of transcendent religious principles and laws, the internal contradictions of capitalism, and the critique of Enlightenment science and utilitarian values.

NATURE, PRAXIS, AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVITY

Marx was aware in his dissertation that Greek philosophy was missing an important dimension in its analysis of physics. It failed to consider the relevance of the social and economic determinants on the formation of nature and science within history. “Here Epicurus admits the weakness of his own and of all ancient philosophy, namely, that it knows that notions are in consciousness, but that it does not know their boundary, their principle, their necessity.”¹⁴ With Epicurus and the rise of post-Aristotelian thought, there was a movement away from materiality and substantiality toward the spirit. The subjective principle of self-consciousness that underlies nature in late Greek philosophy will reappear as the foundation of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy and the modern Enlightenment. Because the Enlightenment view of the individual and politics was mired in the necessity and universality of the state of nature and its laws, Marx's attack on the assumptions of Democritean physics and the primacy of the objects in nature would lay the foundation for his later critique of modernity in the form of pos-

sessive individualism, natural rights theory, utilitarianism, and the natural laws of classical economics. This is what Marx refers to as alien forces of “the plastic gods in the market places.”¹⁵ Although the post-Aristotelians saw the subject as primary, it was a very abstract understanding of freedom and individuality. Marx will move beyond the principle of self-consciousness and the idealism of both Epicurus and Hegel to an examination of the subject as a social being that manifests itself both in its individuality and in its social relations within capitalist production—that is, within the history and structures of political economy. The social subject as praxis becomes the defining characteristic of his sociology of nature since humanity expresses and defines itself through work upon nature. The “boundary, principle, and necessity” that underlie nature become a socially constructed reality based on the imperatives and institutions of modern capitalism. It is not the spirit that creates nature out of itself but the social reality that transforms nature. From Epicurus we receive the idea that nature is a construct of the subject, and from Marx we arrive at the materialist conclusion that nature is a construct of social praxis, that is, work, within capitalism. From both the ancient and modern perspectives the underlying foundation of nature rests in subjectivity interpreted as either consciousness or society. Epicurus moves Greek science away from the object toward the subject; Marx turns the discussion about science and nature into a social critique of modernity.

A few years after the completion of his dissertation, Marx writes his famous *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* in which he discusses his early ideas about political economy, the modern state, private property, alienation, wage labor, and human needs and emancipation. Packed inside the essays “Alienated Labor” and “Private Property and Communism” is an unexpected and fascinating, but disappointingly brief analysis of natural science and nature. These sections continue Marx’s thought as he turns away from the abstract philosophy of nature among the Greeks to a sociological critique of the Enlightenment and natural science. This change of emphasis also represents a transition from his criticism of alienated consciousness in religion to a “criticism of the earth,” from a criticism of theology to a criticism of nature and political economy.

Nature and industry provide the material basis for the community; they are the physical bond that holds society together. Nature is the inorganic body of human beings through which the social objectivity is created—perceived objects of everyday life, physical means of subsistence (food, clothing, and housing/shelter), cultural artifacts, social institutions, and so forth. Nature provides the material foundation for market exchange and industrial production. According to Marx, the distinctive characteristic of humans is their productive and creative work as species beings (*Gattungswesen*)—praxis. In the act of making the material and spiritual elements of society, humans create not only their immediate world but realize the potential of their own essence. Praxis is the very process of the objectification of the essence of humanity as communal beings into the

world. This world is eaten as food, appreciated as art, conceptualized as science, experienced as objects of perception, and lived in as cultural and social institutions. The universal creative powers of humanity produce a world having aesthetic, political, economic, and religious meanings that are manifested in its institutions and cultural values. Nature is the basis of humanity's sense of identity and self-fulfillment in work. Through nature humans realize themselves in the process of production as they develop their potential talents and capabilities. By this means, workers live in a world that is a manifestation of their own free and self-conscious activity and an expression of their own human needs. Social objectivity is the expression of this subjective side of species being. Marx writes, "Productive life is, however, species life. It is life creating life. In the type of life activity resides the whole character of a species, its species character."¹⁶ In language reflecting the influence of Kant and Hegel, Marx characterizes praxis as a self-conscious, creative activity in which individuals are treated as ends in themselves, that is, as self-determining and autonomous moral beings.

The concept of *praxis* has a long and fascinating history from Greek philosophy to German idealism and materialism. Although Kant never used the term, he did set the stage for its application in later German philosophy through his epistemology and moral philosophy. In Kant's critique of reason, subjective consciousness constitutes the objects of experience and moral knowledge; in Hegel's phenomenology of spirit, humanity makes its own history and self-consciousness; and in Marx's theory of species being, humans create their own material and spiritual world through the social organization of work. But praxis also shares a deeper connection with a tradition farther in the past. The concept can be traced to Aristotle's belief that the ultimate end of human existence lies in political activity (*praxis*) in the polis through which we become virtuous, rational (*phronesis*), and happy (*eudaimonia*). Marx blends together its ancient and modern meanings of acting and making, and citizen and laborer, to form a picture of humanity seeking self-realization and freedom through creative work and participatory democracy.

In capitalist society, the work relations in the factory or social relations of production are forms of alienated labor because workers lose control over the products produced, the organization and process of production, their own individual selves as species beings, and their relationships with others. Because capitalism is a class society based on private property and inequality of economic power, workers do not control production and its activities; they do not set the rhythm, pattern, and priorities within the workplace because of the division of labor and specialized work; nor do they realize their individual potential as social beings. Finally, unable to form moral and productive communities based on the principles of mutual sharing and democratic citizenship, they are compelled to work in hierarchies of economic domination. The activity that is supposed to anticipate and to promote human self-realization and individual fulfillment leads

instead to lives of exploitation and suffering. Human labor binds the worker only more closely to institutions of alienation and wage slavery. Marx eloquently articulates these ideas in his lines, "The more the worker produces the less he has to consume; the more value he creates the more worthless he becomes; the more refined his product the more crude and misshapen the worker; the more civilized the product the more barbarous the worker; the more powerful the work the more feeble the worker; the more the work manifests intelligence the more the worker declines in intelligence and becomes a slave of nature."¹⁷ Marx outlines the systematic devaluation of self-consciousness and freedom within the modern world.

Within the general framework of alienated labor, Marx views nature and science as "only particular forms of production [which] come under its general law."¹⁸ As with religion, morality, and culture, they are not independent entities existing in some abstract and ahistorical realm of ideas, but rather, are profound expressions of alienation and loss of control over one's life. In capitalist society, private property is the concrete and material form of alienated labor, and natural science is its theoretical expression. Science is the theoretical form of alienated consciousness that ideologically hides and conceptually distorts our relation to nature and to our physical environment. This occurs in both political economy and natural science. Science and nature are historical forms of industrial production and market relations. They are manifestations of the deeper class divisions and power relations in society. Marx concludes with the statement, "Nature, as it develops in human history, in the act of genesis of human society, is the *actual* nature of man; thus nature, as it develops through industry, though in an *alienated* form, is truly *anthropological* nature."¹⁹

Following Epicurus' critique of Democritus and Aristotle, Marx locates the truth of objectivity and nature in the subject and self-consciousness. No longer an abstract concept or guiding formal principle, truth is now an alienated consciousness produced within a social framework of political economy and class domination. Thus the individual is separated not only from the means of production but also from nature and truth. Many theorists have argued that these manuscripts make a strong connection between the values of humanism and positivism. But this is a mistaken position because what Marx refers to as "human science" is possible only after alienation has been overcome and a new relationship between consciousness and nature formed within a truly emancipated community.²⁰

CLASSICAL NEEDS AND NEOCLASSICAL AESTHETICS

There are two areas that give substantive, ethical content and direction to Marx's economic and political theory. First, in his initial economic positions generated after his graduate studies, he emphasizes the notion of self-conscious activity, or praxis, in the workplace. Potentially, social individuals are capable of creating their own natural, institutional, and cultural environments toward the

satisfaction of human needs and according to the laws of beauty and human dignity. The idea of self-realization of the communal life of the species is borrowed from Aristotle's theory of needs, whereas the idea of creative praxis is taken from the neoclassical aesthetics of Winckelmann, Goethe, and Schiller. On the other hand, Marx's early political theory focuses on a search for true democracy, a critique of Hegel's theory of the liberal state, and a rejection of political abstractionism in the form of the separation of politics from civil society. Marx's theories of needs and democracy supply the economic and political cornerstone of his early critique of capitalism. Just as importantly, they also permeate his labor theory of value and economic crisis theory in *Capital*; his approach to bourgeois and socialist theories of abstract rights in the *Grundrisse* and "Critique of the Gotha Program"; and his views on citizenship, a moral community, and economic democracy in the Paris Commune. Throughout his writings the ethical or universal values that underlie his theory of political economy are derived from the texts of classical antiquity though the particular topic of discussion is precipitated by issues generated within nineteenth-century economics, German Idealism, and French socialism. There is no grand split between Marx's early philosophy and later dialectical science since both periods of his life are infused with the ancient ideals of self-realization of human potentiality and the drive to satisfy human needs in a moral economy and democratic polity.²¹

In Marx's social theory, the distinguishing characteristic of human creativity in work is that individuals shape the world according to the "laws of beauty." Schiller earlier used the same phrase to describe his aesthetic ideal for humanity as lying in the Greek view of art and beauty. Thus, the idea of work as a self-conscious activity that leads to self-realization and a democratic society also entails an aesthetic dimension of beauty, balance, order, and symmetry. By returning to the ancients, Schiller hoped to transcend the social and cultural fragmentation of eighteenth-century life, which he characterized in his work *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters* (1795) as being "eternally chained to only one single little fragment of the whole. Man himself grew to be only a fragment of the whole."²² The world had become a machine in which humans were merely lifeless parts in its mechanical process. This "dismemberment of their being" in science and work was the tragedy of modernity and demanded a return to human dignity and moral autonomy; a reinvigoration of society with freedom and the good life; rejection of utilitarianism and Enlightenment ideals; and the development of a personality that cultivated higher needs, human creativity, and the potentiality of human reason. "Instead of abandoning himself to the world he will rather draw it into himself with the whole infinity of its phenomena, and subject it to the unity of his reason."²³

By reintegrating the individual back into society, sensibilities into reason, beauty into freedom, labor into pleasure, and duty into inclination, Schiller hoped to transcend the Kantian antinomies and economic dualisms of modern

society. An appreciation of the moral nobility of humanity and the beauty of created form in nature would produce an immediate harmony of matter and form, senses and intellect. A new world would emerge in which only beauty and moral freedom were perceived. His goal was to create a reconciliation and harmony between being and nature. The Greeks offered Schiller an alternative vision of “the youthfulness of fantasy with the manliness of reason in a splendid humanity.”²⁴ Winckelmann earlier expressed similar ideas in his *Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture* (1755) as he examined the Greek statue of Laocoon helplessly watching the death of his two sons: “The general and most distinctive characteristics of the Greek masterpieces are, finally, a noble simplicity and quiet grandeur, both in posture and expression. Just as the depths of the sea always remain calm however much the surface may rage, so does the expression of the Greek figures reveal a great and composed soul even in the midst of passion.”²⁵

This view of the nobility, simplicity, and beauty of the Greek spirit pervades the writings of German neoclassical authors and later influences Marx’s view of praxis and self-realization. For Marx, society and labor are transformed as consciousness and sensuous activity, the mind and senses, are integrated in an aesthetic ideal of creative work and beauty. With the aesthetic humanization of nature there is an overcoming of estrangement and a general reconciliation of humanity with itself and with nature in a new moral and communal unity. Economic production no longer serves the maintenance of class inequality and power but becomes part of a creative and playful exercise that expresses true human needs and our species being as economic and political animals. Work becomes a conscious and self-determined manifestation of our physical and mental capabilities, no longer limited by the social relations of production. About this Philip Kain has written, “Marx’s ideal resembles Hegel’s view of ancient Greece, where man was neither subordinate to nature as in the Orient nor removed from it as in Christianity. It is also like Schiller’s view, in which man makes nature his object, forms it, so that it no longer rules him as a force. . . . Man produces, ideally for Marx as for Schiller, when free from compulsion.”²⁶ In production we create a material world out of nature but also a world that actualizes our true selves according to our individual purposes, cultural values, and political ideals. The world is made no longer according to the impersonal laws of the market but according to our collective dreams. For Marx, species being “sees [its] own reflection in a world which [it] has constructed.”²⁷ Art and self-consciousness, not economics, determine the landscape of our lives. The mind and body, and the individual and society, are reintegrated into a free and democratic community.

Alienation inhibits the potential in human beings for self-conscious praxis and aesthetic creativity, for the satisfaction of human needs, for the institutionalization of universal rights and human emancipation, and for the development of true participatory democracy. In these early manuscripts, the inspiration and

insight for Marx's critique of political economy, his recognition of the limits of liberalism and political freedom, and his rejection of liberal individualism and egoistic rights are based on his appropriation of Aristotle. The connection between Marx and the Hellenes has also been noticed by Richard Miller: "Marx's theory of alienated labor is, in its more abstract features, largely a description of deprivations that, in Aristotle's view, would deny people a good life. . . . Marx, like Aristotle, judges societies by the kinds of human lives they create."²⁸ Miller contends that the key to understanding Marx's theory of alienation and critique of capitalism lies in Aristotle's ideal of happiness, the good life, deliberative rationality, virtuous action, friendship, self-realization of human potential, and the critique of unnatural wealth acquisition (*chrematistics*). Classical antiquity provides Marx with the lofty and secure heights from which to develop his interpretations and criticisms of modern industrial society. What is also common to both Marx and Aristotle is their sociological stress on the relationships between values (virtue) and institutions (political constitutions), between the ideals of the community and the social institutions that inhibit and obstruct their realization. A virtuous life cannot be realized in a class-strained, commercial society in the ancient world, nor can it be realized in the alienated structures of modern capitalism.

In his major critique of political economy in the *Politics*, Aristotle presents the basic features of a moral economy based on the values of familial love and devotion in the household (*oikos*) and citizenship in the state (*polis*). He describes a self-sufficient community held together by a common bond of language, tradition, and political institutions and ideals. This community has as its goals the basic satisfaction of human needs and the development of the full potential of its members through political participation and rational discourse. It is a society in which the market is relatively marginal and is the basis for the simple exchange of goods produced in individual households. The economy is characterized by household management with distribution based on the tradition of reciprocity, mutual sharing (*metadosis*), and grace. "The technique of trade was obviously not a practice of the earliest form of association, the household; it only came in with the large forms. Members of a single household shared all the belongings of the house, but members of different households shared many of the belongings of other houses also. Mutual need of the different goods made it essential to contribute one's share."²⁹ The distribution of goods within the community is based on human needs and proportionality. Economic activity, which is grounded in the limits established by law and tradition, provides the necessary material goods that the community requires for its subsistence and continuation. But its real purpose is to ensure the realization of the function and final good of human beings within the community—happiness (*eudaimonia*) and the good life.

Aristotle holds that happiness is an "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue."³⁰ Its goal is the nurturing of human excellence by developing a virtuous character in the good and noble citizen. The polis encourages the moral virtues of moderation, courage, honor, and social justice, along with the intellectual

virtues of philosophical contemplation and rational deliberation in the public sphere. Aristotle clearly feared that moneymaking and profit acquisition (*chrematistike*) are unnatural activities that would destroy the natural values and social fabric of the community. They would break the bonds of communal solidarity and its rich traditions of mutual support and collective assistance. With a turn to the market and capitalist trade, life would become commodified and private and public relationships reified. The bonds that held society together would no longer be virtue and citizenship but greed and self-interest. Unfortunately, Marx would prove Aristotle's worst fears correct.

Other secondary authors comparing Marx and Aristotle have also stressed the latter's theory of the good life as characterized by the realization of human capacities, development of human intelligence and reason, exercise of rational deliberation and political participation within the assembly, recognition of the unnaturalness of profit seeking and wealth accumulation, and creation of a society based on virtuous activity, friendship, and mutual caring.³¹ Alienated labor and commodity exchange fail to create the social and economic conditions that make these classical ideals possible. Marx reinterprets the classical ideals of aesthetics and politics to include praxis as both physical and intellectual activity. However, in capitalist society work is not a creative, "free, conscious activity"; it does not lead to social solidarity and reinforcement of communal values; it does not encourage democracy and equality; and it does not develop human potentiality and the good life. Alienation produces the stultification of human needs, the truncation of reason, and the distortion of human capabilities. Everything that is distinctively human is reduced to a means for encouraging market activity and ensuring profit making. Needs are changed into consumer wants; capabilities and talents become mechanisms for profit maximization; friendship and citizenship are transformed into market relations and commodity exchanges; and reason is reduced to utility and pleasure calculations. By blending the ancients and moderns, Marx materializes the notions of abstract freedom found in both Greek and German political philosophy. Though his longing for a better world is inspired by the Greeks, the vantage point from which he draws upon them is modern society and economic theory.

The objectification of the human essence through social praxis in history produces a world both theoretically and practically our own with new values, institutions, and relationships. Praxis is thus an epistemological and ethical category since our experience is mediated and filtered through social institutions and cultural values, and, in a capitalist society, the world we see is alienated from us. The world we live in and understand is a world created by the logic and categories of political economy—a fetishized world of objects, laws, and mechanisms that reflect only the social relations of production in which individuals are reduced to commodities in the market and cogs in a machine. Human beings create the objects of experience through labor in history and society in the very act of production. However, in this process we perceive the world through ideological bar-

riers and distorted constructions of reality. A critical and dialectical science demands that we penetrate the phenomenal appearances of the empirical in order to delve into the hidden structures of power and the inner contradictions of modernity. We must reach beyond the immediately given world of empirical and economic facts to its essential social relationships based on class ownership and private property.

Marx argues for a new world founded not on utility, natural rights, or wealth accumulation but on the actualization of human needs. True wealth is measured by a new criterion that has its origins in Aristotle's political theory. Marx expands upon the notion of wealth by moving beyond its economic connotations and connecting it to species life and to the human potential within the individual. "The wealthy man is at the same time one who *needs* a complex of human manifestations of life, and whose own self-realization exists as an inner necessity, a *need*."³² Instead of building a society based on egoism, hedonism, money, and property accumulation, Marx turns to the development of a political community that defines and realizes human possibilities as social and spiritual needs in history. This involves our needs for creative productivity and aesthetic praxis, for human emancipation and individual freedom, for communal responsibility and economic democracy, and for self-mastery and self-determination. The world of new economic and social relationships that transcend the poverty and oppression of capitalism will liberate not only our self-consciousness but our senses and perception. As Marx expresses it, we will now see with a human eye and hear with a human ear a world that is created by self-conscious activity in nature.

The essence of natural science in an emancipated society would no longer lie in an industrial or productive knowledge with its theoretical imperative of control over nature and human activity. Rather, it would become an expression of human need. Needs mediate the relation between human beings and nature. By rejecting the values of modern political theories of utilitarianism and natural rights as providing the basis for the relationship between nature and humanity, Marx returns to the classical view of *eudaimonia*, virtue, and social justice as the fundamental expressions of human need. Patricia Springborg summarizes this relationship:

Thus Marx's theory of alienation may be seen as a full elaboration of Aristotle's distinction between *oikonomia*, economic activity geared to communal needs and the production of use values, and *chrematistike*, money-making in a society governed by *pleonexia* and oriented to the production of exchange-values. The more Marx in his later writings became preoccupied with the processes of production, exchange and circulation, the closer his concept of needs approximates that of Aristotle.³³

In the final section of his essay, "Private Property and Communism," Marx refers directly to Aristotle, for whom species being begins with the act of sexual intercourse in which physical nature and spiritual humanity, sensuousness and subject are integrated in a creative and productive synthesis. They cannot be viewed as

abstractions isolated from one another. Though nature appears in perception and thought, it is already socially mediated through commerce and production. Expanding the Kantian categories of the mind to include the language, culture, and ideology of industrial capitalism, Marx conceives of nature as preformed through theoretical science and the economy.

The emergence of nature and self-consciousness is perverted in a society based on alienated labor, class divisions, and ideology. Needs instilled are artificially stimulated by a system of private property to promote the legitimation and continuation of capitalism. The need for self-realization and human emancipation turns into a need for money, human needs become consumer wants, beauty and art become fetishes and reified commodities, and human potential is defined in terms of utility and wealth. By turning ends into means, consciousness is stupefied, leading to unhealthy and artificial appetites, a bestial savagery and shallowness of consumer choices, and a mechanical reproduction of physical existence. The human or species dimension is lost; liberty and freedom are restricted to the most primitive and underdeveloped aspects of human existence—market exchange and consumption. The notion that we are communal and moral beings—“the need for society”—is lost in an abstraction of needs from society. Lost, too, are the political ideals and ancient dreams of human potentiality, self-realization, and social rationality within the polis. Individuality is reduced to the most common denominator where material wealth and poverty of spirit are synonymous. Such a society is characterized by an “artificially produced crudeness whose spirit, therefore, is *self-stupefaction*, the *illusory* satisfaction of needs, a civilization *within* the crude barbarism of need.”³⁴ Throughout his early writings Marx longs for an emancipated society based on the classical ideals of friendship and citizenship and on the economic principles of reciprocity and mutual sharing. He refers to these ideals as the brotherhood and nobility of man.³⁵

The theory of human needs remains important throughout Marx's works as he incorporates it into his later essay “Critique of the Gotha Program.” In 1875 he responds to the Gotha Program, a unifying statement about basic socialist principles in Germany. What he objects to in this political statement is its abstract and metaphysical language about equal rights, labor, society, fair distribution, and property. He spends much of his discussion on the issues of distributive justice and equality, rejecting what he sees as a defense of abstract bourgeois rights that simply reinforce the separation of civil society and the state. According to Marx, natural rights must be understood within the context of an overall analysis of private property, class privilege, and power relations within society. Natural rights theory is a form of ideology. To abstract political rights and freedom from their origins in economic alienation and domination is to mystify power and politics.³⁶ It depoliticizes the economy, which becomes an autonomous, almost divine, realm of natural laws. Abstract freedom must be viewed in the context of abstract labor and wage exploitation. A defense of rights becomes another ideological mechanism to hide class power from self-conscious reflection. This critique of abstrac-

tionism is a consistent theme in Marx's writings, from his early critique of egoistic rights and political emancipation in "On the Jewish Question" and *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* to his criticism of the bourgeois ideals of equality and freedom in the *Grundrisse*. His initial critique of the religiosity of the political sphere with its pristine values and distorting dreams reinforces his rejection of the theoretical and practical separation of civil society and the state. His approach is to transcend abstractionism by articulating a theory of democracy resting upon a synthesis of economics and politics within a reintegrated moral community. Where the issue of bourgeois rights separates social institutions; treats individuals as divorced from social responsibility, justice, and the common good; and maintains ideals in contradiction to historical reality, Marx's goal is to develop a theory of democracy grounded in a concrete analysis of market exchange, industrial production, and human needs.

According to the socialist ideals articulated in the Gotha Program, the emancipation of labor requires the transformation of private property into the common property of society and the fair distribution of its social product. Marx objects to the rhetoric in this statement of socialist principles since its abstract categories are without substantive content. That is, they do not refer to the underlying structure of society. He asks: What is meant by the terms *society* and *fair distribution*? According to Marx, with the transition from capitalism to communism, there is an intervening stage of socialism in which the traditional bourgeois ideals become reality. The distribution of consumer goods is to be determined by equal rights to the products of society based on the merits and accomplishments of individual labor. This was the normative basis for commodity exchange in the capitalist market and becomes the new ethical foundation for the temporary stage of socialism. No longer ideological abstractions, the old bourgeois ideals now become the actual institutional basis for fair distribution. Labor is exchanged for its equivalent in the form of consumer goods; an equal amount of labor is exchanged for an equal amount of crystallized labor in commodities. Rights to the social product are based upon labor and contribution. The bourgeois view of meritocracy is implemented at this stage of economic development. But since individuals have different abilities and talents, equal rights turn into a defense of unequal distribution. Some individuals work harder, longer, and more efficiently than others and receive more in return. Marx calls this a continuation of the "right of inequality."

As society evolves into true communism, a fair distribution based on equal rights and unequal physical talents is replaced by a new set of priorities of social distribution based on the ethical principle of human need. As need replaces labor, formal rights are replaced by social justice. The last vestiges of capitalism with its possessive individualism and egoistic rights are gone. There exists a new basis for justice, hearkening back to both Aristotle's political theory and New Testament theology: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"³⁷ This was the underlying principle of Aristotle's theory of the *oikos* or "self-sufficient household." Marx rejects talk about individual rights as "obsolete verbal rub-

bish” and “ideological nonsense.” Some authors have seen this as a rejection by Marx of moral philosophy and social justice in general. But this judgment would seem to be unfounded since he appears to reject only bourgeois legal principles while reaffirming the fundamental ideals of classical Athenian justice. Legal formalism and political abstractionism, along with utopian moralizing, are abandoned as Marx argues that “any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves.”³⁸ Ethics must be tied to an analysis of the structures of political economy to be made politically real and morally relevant. This is the imperative behind historical materialism. The key ethical issue of just distribution moves from a question about individual talents and abilities to a consideration of the structures of power and control over production; it moves from questions of merit to issues of wealth, from distribution and consumption to the social organization of production.

Aristotle distinguished between three different types of particular justice: distributive (*dianemetikos*), rectificatory or corrective (*diorthotikos*), and reciprocal (*antipeponthos*).³⁹ Distributive justice reflects the fair distribution of the social rewards within the political community of honor, status, and money based on the standard of merit defined by the criterion of wealth, freedom, or virtue. This form of justice reflects an equality among citizens of the polis. However, who are to be counted as equal citizens and what standard of merit is to be applied depend on whether the polis is an oligarchy, democracy, or aristocracy. Rectificatory or corrective justice is found in the legal proceedings of the civil court, which attempts to reestablish the harmony that existed before a transgression of fraud, theft, or unjust exchange. The third form of justice—reciprocal—involves economic justice and fair price in the market exchange of material goods. The measurement of commensurability and exchange of goods in the market is determined not by supply and demand, by the inner dynamics of the market, or simply by money, but by the general needs of the household and polis. Need is presupposed and satisfied by the goodwill and friendship (*philia*) within the community of family members and citizens. Thus economic exchange is subservient to the physical needs and self-sufficiency of the household and polity; it overcomes the deficiencies of production within the household economy; and fulfills the broader purposes of the ancient state.⁴⁰ For Aristotle, economics is always subordinate to the demands of ethics and politics, virtue and practical wisdom; that is, economics is always subordinate to the imperatives of social justice—political and economic.

The secondary literature reveals a great deal of controversy about the meaning of these three forms of particular justice. Although Aristotle is not always clear about their definitions or applications, the placement and context of the argument do help us here. Particular justice focuses on the economic concerns for justice in wealth and power distribution, legal action, and market exchange. However, he discusses it within the framework of universal or political justice with its

emphasis on economic reciprocity, friendship, and mutual sharing within and between households; political participation and civic responsibility; and the development of practical wisdom and the virtuous life. Particular justice deals with aspects of the economy and how they relate to the more fundamental ethical and political needs of the polity for social equilibrium, fairness in exchange, just laws, and the proper distribution and reciprocity of property and material goods. The function of economic activity is to serve the fullest development of the common good, happiness, and freedom.

Political justice involves questions not only of distribution but also about the ends of human existence (needs and self-realization); the purpose of economics (building a moral community and friendship); the moral goal of society (rational deliberation and democratic discourse); and the full development of human capabilities and happiness (moral virtue, citizenship, and political wisdom). Fairness in market exchange lies in maintaining the community and family through reciprocal exchange and mutual concern for the common good of its members. Without justice in the marketplace, the community would be overwhelmed by a plague of self-interest and competition. The purpose of money is not to measure the wealth of property but the wealth of moral character and social solidarity. Money is meant to facilitate the movement of goods on the basis of social justice, reciprocity, and mutual aid within a self-sufficient political community.

Marx is able to reintegrate the economic and political elements of human need within a democratic theory of distribution. He interprets equality and freedom as political expressions of practical self-realization and the satisfaction of needs rather than as formal categories of abstract rights. Continuing a line of argument developed in the *Grundrisse* and in *Capital*, he maintains that the vulgar socialism of the Gotha Program fails to look beyond the bourgeois ideals of distribution to consider the question of the distribution of the means of private production and property.⁴¹ The whole theory of alienation and exploitation is eliminated. Dreams will always remain unfulfilled if there are no concrete institutions to give them life.⁴² A classical theory of justice must be integrated with historical materialism and a critique of political economy. To isolate consumption from production, distribution from the means of production, ultimately reduces socialism to the liberal values of market equality and consumer freedom. Inquiry into the nature of social justice is not reducible to issues of simple distribution; it must consider questions of self-actualization in production, need fulfillment, and participatory democracy. These are the very questions raised by Aristotle in his ethical and political writings and the very questions at the heart of Marx's social theory.

ANCIENT AND MODERN DEMOCRACY

Rejecting the separation of civil society and the state, rights and needs, and production and consumption, and offering a materialist interpretation of law and

the state, Marx provides a broader institutional context for his analysis of social justice in his theory of socialism and democracy. In a letter written to Arnold Ruge in September 1843, he states, "The self-confidence of the human being, freedom, has first of all to be aroused again in the hearts of these people [Germans]. Only this feeling, which vanished from the world with the Greeks, and under Christianity disappeared into the blue mist of the heavens, can again transform society into a community of human beings united for their highest aims, into a democratic state."⁴³ From early in his intellectual career, Marx associates democracy with the Athenian political constitution. In the *Grundrisse*, referring specifically to Aristotle's view of the political and rational essence of humanity, he says, "The human being is in the most literal sense a *zōon politikon*, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society."⁴⁴

In one of his earliest works, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, Marx introduces in Aristotelian fashion his notion of democracy as the self-conscious determination of the people in the process of deliberating and deciding on the general affairs of the state. It is in this very act of participating in the deliberative and legislative dimension of the public sphere that the species being, as a political animal, is made real and concrete. This principle had been lost in natural rights theory and utilitarian economics with their definitions of society as an artificial construct for the protection of property and liberty as the self-interested pursuit of unlimited material gain in a market economy. The democratic ideal, on the other hand, revives the notion of the social and public basis for all individuality. "Just as it is not religion that creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the constitution which creates the people but the people which creates the constitution."⁴⁵ The subject of politics is the actual collectivity that creates its own political universe in the form of a democratic constitution. When the subject and object are reversed and the people are determined by external forces over which they have little or no control, as is the case in a monarchy, then we have political alienation. It was Hegel who recognized the importance of viewing the state as institutionally separate from civil society, which embodies the material and private conditions of life in the market, contracts, private property, family, and so forth.

According to Marx, democracy is true when the political state (formal legal institution) is "annihilated" as an independent and alienated ideal standing over and against the particularity of the market. Democracy is the truth of all other forms of political organization in the sense that it is the self-conscious recognition of the material and historical foundations of the state in human action and political creativity. This insight is forgotten in the other forms, as political constitutions appear as external and alien. Even the republican form of government in the United States is seen as an "abstract state" because its real content and essence, that is, civil society, lie outside it. Politics is abstracted from economics. The bourgeois state is not, as Hegel had argued, a manifestation of universal reason or a political ideal unifying all divisions and estates within society under the banner of the

common good and general welfare. Rather, the state is a political and military mechanism for ensuring the social stability and economic order of the market and industry. Civil society is the truth of the state since the former determines the latter. From this insight that the foundations and imperatives of the modern state lie in the economy, Marx concludes, "It is obvious that the political constitution as such is brought into being only where the private spheres have won an independent existence. . . . The abstraction of the state *as such* belongs only to modern times, because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times."⁴⁶ In this sense, a democratic republic has more in common with the authoritarian monarchy of Prussia than with a true democracy as envisioned by Marx.

Marx acknowledges that Hegel was the first political theorist to characterize modernity in terms of the separation and contradiction of the state and civil society. However, he criticizes Hegel for describing the state as the concrete manifestation or substance of the ethical life of the community whose purpose is to realize its general interests and universal will, that is, "matters of general concern." Marx is rejecting not this Aristotelian ideal but only its descriptive adequacy for understanding modern political institutions. He rejects Hegel's methodological approach as an example of political mystification because he treated the state as a development from the logic and concept (*Begriff*) of its various functions and independent activities. For Hegel, the state (monarchy, executive bureaucracy, and legislature) was an expression of the self-conscious reason of a people knowing and willing itself in history. It becomes a logical and metaphysical reality as it evolves out of abstract thinking. "The state has to differentiate and define its activity not in accordance with its specific nature, but in accordance with the nature of the concept, which is the mystified movement of abstract thought."⁴⁷ In the form of a constitutional monarchy with its administrative bureaucracy of executive civil servants and public legislature of estates, the state is viewed as a philosophical idea rather than as an existing sociological phenomenon. Knowledge of the constitution as a political organism with its various functions arises from a reflection on its own general idea and logic, not from its historical and material foundations in civil society. Hegel, the philosophical idealist, had forgotten that the essence of the state lies in its "social quality" and in its actual functions and interrelationships in the real world.

According to Hegel, the main role of the deputies of the state (police, judiciary, and administration) and the legislature (landowning, business, and general estate) is to represent the universal interests of society against the conflicting claims within civil society. They do not express the interests of members of civil society since the state is outside, and independent of, particular economic interests. In fact, the underlying purpose of the state is to rise above these conflicts by implementing policy that will benefit the organic unity of society by integrating its competing claims and functioning parts for the benefit of the whole. Though the legislature is composed of delegates from civil society with their wide diversity of particular interests, they are able to transcend their petty and narrow perspectives

to achieve a resolution of these contradictions. Hegel views this as the realization of subjective freedom and our nature as social beings. For Marx, however, the estates in the legislature represent neither the people nor their public interests or general concerns. That is only a fantastic illusion and symbolic resolution that conceals the true empirical reality of the state, which he expresses succinctly: "The political constitution at its highest point is therefore the *constitution of private property*. The supreme *political conviction* is the *conviction of private property*."⁴⁸

The essence of the state is best seen as the "barbarism of private property," which destroys the family, community, and the very possibilities for democracy. "The *illusion* [is] that the state determines, when it is being determined. It does, indeed, break the *will of the family and society*, but only so as to give existence to the *will of private property without family and society* and to acknowledge this existence as the supreme existence of the political state, as the supreme existence of *ethical life*."⁴⁹ The modern state does not reflect the general interests and well-being of the community, nor is it the highest actuality of social beings. Rather, property is the essence of the state, its constitution articulated in civil law and defended in abstract and natural rights. But these abstractions are illusions of power since rights are, in reality, defenses for exceptions, privilege, and inequality. Abstract rights inhibit recognition of the true relationship between the state and civil society for they accept the divide between individual and substantive (institutional) freedom. The reality of the state is that it represents and protects the particular interests of property, class, and power within capitalist society. It is a form of ideological mystification that conceals and represses its real function behind a facade of concern for the general welfare and the common good.

Marx calls for the dissolution of the state as an abstract and illusory institution in which particular interests of civil society are represented. This is to be accomplished through electoral reform and universal suffrage; by this means there is a transformation of the legislature into a expression of active citizenship and the general will. There is also a dissolution of civil society and a return to the classical tradition where the essence of the private sphere again becomes the foundation for the political—that is, self-determination on the basis of popular sovereignty. Nature, economics, species needs, and all social institutions are humanized and democratized and now express the underlying political values of the moral community—citizenship, participation, self-realization, public virtue, and human dignity. "In actually positing its *political existence* as its *true* existence, civil society has simultaneously posited its civil existence, in distinction from its political existence, as *inessential*."⁵⁰ The formal and metaphysical nature of the state is now the material basis of society as a whole. Marx has incorporated the ethics and politics of Aristotle's philosophy into modern social theory. For him, this represents the modern form of classical Athens since here too "the political state, *qua* political state, [is] the true and only content of the life and will of the citizens."⁵¹ It is not a return to the golden age of antiquity that he seeks but rather the implementation of many of its ideals into the institutions of modernity.

In another essay written during the same year, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx continues his analysis of the antinomy between the state and civil society. The state projects the universal values and spiritual perfections of the species being while civil society represents the terrestrial egoism, self-interest, conflict, and competition of the market. This is Hobbes’s state of nature and the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Ludwig Feuerbach in *The Essence of Christianity* (1841) argued that religion was not a manifestation of a metaphysical reality but only the alienated expression of the hopes and ideals of humanity projected onto the heavens. According to Marx, politics provides the same opium for the people; it simply appears in a different institutional form. “The political state, in relation to civil society, is just as spiritual as is heaven in relation to earth. It stands in the same opposition to civil society, and overcomes it in the same manner as religion overcomes the narrowness of the profane world.”⁵² The state is as unreal, imaginary, and spiritually distant as religion; it is a false universal and illusory projection of the common species bond of humanity that exists only in the ethereal realm of religious fantasy and distorted reality. The state has historically taken the place of religion in the Enlightenment era. In modern society there is a contradiction between the public and the private, the citizen and the bourgeois, and the religious and the profane. This contradiction dissolves the traditional bonds of friendship and citizenship, undermines the moral integrity of the classical political community, and destroys the possibility of true democracy. It cannot be overcome by changing political constitutions. Only a revolutionary transformation of civil society and the abstract state can resolve the contradiction and lead to human emancipation.

“On the Jewish Question,” reflects many of Aristotle’s interests in book 3 of the *Politics* where he discusses various forms of political constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy, and polity) and their influence on the types of citizens found within the Greek city-states. Marx distinguishes between the “rights of man” and the “rights of the citizen,” between political and human emancipation, as he investigates the various political constitutions that developed out of the French and American revolutions. He spends a good portion of this essay discussing the nature of human rights. Analyzing the issue of Jewish civil liberties and citizenship and the universal rights of the individual in the Christian state of Germany, Marx begins to question the very nature of rights themselves. He follows the lead of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Hegel by accepting the division in modern society between the individual as a citizen (state) and as a bourgeois (civil society). He supports the political rights and civil liberties of peaceful assembly; free press; and the freedom of conscience, opinion, ideas, and religion. He calls these the “universal rights of the citizen” or the “rights of the true and authentic man.” Reminiscent of Aristotle, they are social rights that ensure political participation and rational deliberation and decision making. They are the essence of humanity as they nurture human dignity, moral self-development, responsibility to the community, and species being. Marx quotes from the French *Declaration of the*

Rights of Man and the Citizen (1793), the *Constitution of Pennsylvania*, and the *Constitution of New Hampshire* to make his point. But he rejects the abstract bourgeois rights of man—liberty, equality, security, and property—as expressions of the economic rights of civil society. They reinforce the priorities of market liberties, private needs, exclusive ownership of property, and class divisions. Placing the political philosophy and social ideals of natural rights theory squarely in the context of the capitalist economy, Marx concludes, “None of the supposed rights of man, therefore, go beyond the egoistic man, man as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. Man is far from being considered, in the rights of man, as a species being.”⁵³ They are the rights of alienated humans who live in a Hobbesian world where the true essence of self-realization and political participation is rendered impossible. The priorities of this type of society are reversed as the political community and citizenship become the means for the legal maintenance of civil society, the acquisition of private property, and the continuance of market exchange.

When the rights of citizens conflict with the rights of man, the former are suspended in order to guarantee market freedoms and equality. Other individuals are viewed as a threat to egoistic liberty and private property; community is a danger to our rights, person, and freedom. Society is an artificial and arbitrary collection of isolated monads for the protection of property, rights, and liberties legitimated through a social contract. True political rights bring individuals together as human beings within a moral community and express the essence of humanity as a species being, whereas the private economic rights separate humans from each other, encouraging competition, self-interest, and a narrow and isolated individualism. The political emancipation of the French Revolution shattered the residue of the ancient regime with its estates, corporations, guilds, and privileges as it separated the state from civil society. Property, displaced to civil society, was no longer a qualification for membership in the state.

Though political emancipation meant progress over the earlier feudal and aristocratic society, it did not represent full emancipation since the essence of modernity was now located in civil society and not in the state. Liberalism does not dissolve the institutions, rights, and activities that give rise to divisions, inequality, and power; it merely transfers its real content to the market, hidden by claims of false universality, abstract rights, and a theology of the common good. Ideology is required to legitimate civil society and the new role of the state. In its American and French forms, however, this contradiction between the values and ideals of the state and civil society is unresolvable through political emancipation. This kind of emancipation cannot alter the contradiction between the economy and the state, between capitalism and democracy. The divide separating the political ideals of the citizen and the reality of commerce and industry renders their integration impossible. Liberalism would always be troubled by this unbridgeable

gulf since the realization of its political rights would call into question its economic existence and legitimacy. As a political and economic philosophy, liberalism is inconsistent and self-contradictory. Capitalism ultimately distorts the possibilities for a true democracy. Marx calls for a more complete human emancipation that would dissolve civil society and restore politics and democracy as the foundation of a renewed moral economy.

After careful analysis of the political dimensions of modern industrial society, Marx begins an examination of its economic and material foundations. He moves away from a focus on political theory and universal human rights to a consideration of the structures and relations of political economy. However, in his later work, *The Civil War in France*, he returns to these issues in more concrete form as he outlines the French rebellion and the Paris Commune of 1871. About this work Alan Gilbert has written, "Marx found the Aristotelian conception of human nature an apt benchmark. . . . The social republican movement of the nineteenth century, especially the Commune, gave a more precise, institutional, and political picture of what species being might look like."⁵⁴ Perhaps for the first time in his writings we get a more penetrating insight into his analysis of the institutional nature of modern democracy and socialism.

In 1870 the situation in France suddenly changed as Germany under the leadership of Prince Otto von Bismarck defeated the French army and precipitated a breakdown of the Second Empire. A new government was formed headed by Louis-Adolphe Thiers, who immediately called for the disarmament of Paris. Reacting quickly to these events, the workers of Paris cheered the defeat of the old government and formed a social republic, precipitating a civil war. Although it lasted little more than two months and ended brutally with the last of its defenders infamously executed on the heights of Belleville, Marx viewed this event as the first historical example of a working-class republic. To implement a new socialist democracy, the old institutional support of class domination—the centralized state—first had to be dismantled, including the standing army, local police, government functionaries, and the judiciary. With the advance of capitalism, the state had become increasingly a social mechanism for the protection of property, oppression of classes, and maintenance of the political despotism of capital over labor. The army was disbanded and a new citizen National Guard was created. A ward government was formed consisting of municipal councillors elected through universal suffrage and open to immediate recall. All administrative, judicial, and educational positions were to be filled by means of free and universal elections. The traditional careerism and professionalism within the state, as well as the hierarchy of the government bureaucracy, were eliminated as representatives were responsible to their local wards and were paid workers' wages. The Commune's response to religion as a defender of the old government was to dismantle the "parson power" of the church. Priests were sent out to attend to the welfare of the poor in the private sphere, and the educational system was opened to all without the involvement of the church or state. Magistrates of the judiciary

were to be democratically elected and responsible to the people. This was to be a new form of politics based on the “self-government of the producers.”

Marx borrows from Rousseau’s theory of the general will and critique of representative government as a form of political slavery. He also takes lessons from Aristotle’s view of democracy (*demokratia*) based on *isonomia* (political equality), *isegoria* (freedom and equal right of speech), *eisangelia* (public accountability), and *phronesis* (political wisdom). From classical Athens came many of the ideals that would be transformed into the new democratic republic of the Paris Commune. In the *Politics*, Aristotle outlined the basic structural features of Athenian democracy as the best form of government: eligibility and election of all citizens to office by lot; general participation in ruling and being ruled; absence of property qualifications for office; short term limits and rotation of government offices; positions open to as many citizens as possible; judicial branch of government filled by lot; legal cases handled by citizens and not professionals; public scrutiny of officials by citizen law courts; popular sovereignty of the Assembly; and payment for participation in the Assembly, Council of 500, and law courts.⁵⁵ Marx writes, “The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economic foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule. . . . The Commune intended to abolish that class property which makes the labor of the many the wealth of the few. It aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators.”⁵⁶

To begin the emancipation process, production cooperatives and associations of producers were to be formed, property abolished, the old class divisions eliminated, and new democratic methods installed in factories. Politics now becomes the essence of the economy as industry becomes a function of democratic self-realization. Reminiscent of Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s philosopher-king and theory of Forms, Marx maintains that there are no ready-made ideals waiting to be realized. Playing off the distinction in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* between scientific truth (*episteme*) and practical wisdom (*phronesis*), Marx contends that modern science and technology cannot know the ultimate truth, engineer the future (*techne*), or create a new political community. There are no universals or true forms to which philosopher-kings can appeal, nor are there scientific principles or technical rules that social scientists can apply in order to form a free society. This is something that becomes real only through self-conscious praxis, that is, through the deliberation, dialogue, and wisdom (*phronesis*) characteristic of communal democracy. Borrowing from Abraham Lincoln’s *Gettysburg Address*, Marx refers to the commune as the “government of the people by the people.” Marx earlier introduced the notion of *phronesis* in his discussion of methodological issues within social science in his famous “Theses on Feuerbach,” when he so succinctly declared, “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but a *practical* question.”⁵⁷ It is in his analysis of the Paris Commune that he rejects a scholastic and technical approach to social knowledge and applies the criterion of

practical wisdom as its ultimate justification and verification: Knowledge leads to self-conscious awareness and emancipatory social action. The truth of theory lies in attaining practical wisdom, political maturity, and self-determination—self-enlightenment from the accumulated experience and rational discourse within a democratic society.

GREEK SOCIAL JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN *CAPITAL*

The generally accepted view of the division between Marx's early philosophical and later scientific writings exaggerates the differences and overlooks the similarities between the two periods. Evidence of a continuity of thought can be found in his use of Aristotle's *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* throughout his magnum opus, *Capital*.⁵⁸ Marx begins his major work with an analysis of the commodity abstracted from market circulation and production of capital. As he develops his critique of capitalism in the first volume, the focus of his analysis moves from simple commodity exchange and circulation of money to the study of abstract labor and industrial production. He begins with the simplest form of exchange value in a single commodity and traces its evolution to capital as it appears in private production, workplace exploitation, and economic crises. In the course of this analysis of exchange value from simple exchange to production, he makes continuous reference to Aristotle's theory of virtue and needs, democracy and self-realization, and the moral community and mutual sharing. As he progresses from immediate exchange and barter to the simple exchange of goods in trade and commerce (profit) to industrial production; as he progresses from the self-sufficient household and local community in the ancient economy to the commercialization of trade and finance to modern industry and the proletariat, Marx returns to Aristotle's writings for ethical and political guidance. Aristotle's ethical critique of Athenian political economy provides one of the chief moral bases for Marx's rejection of capitalism. The latter's criticism rests not only on the argument that capitalism is inefficient and contradictory, that it undermines its own utilitarian principles and leads to continuous problems of overproduction and structural crises. It rests also on the argument that capitalism destroys the moral basis for community; undermines the family, friendship, and citizenship; and causes alienation in the workplace, thus denying the possibilities for self-realization, freedom, and democracy.

In his analysis of the polis and market in book 1 of the *Politics*, Aristotle argued that the foundations of the political community are distorted by the search for profits and property. The social harmony and equality necessary for civic friendship and citizenship are upset by rising class divisions and growing inequality; the self-conscious recognition of human needs and happiness is replaced by utilitarian goals of material pleasure and political domination; and a society based on moral virtues and communal responsibility is overwhelmed by

the unnatural and destructive competition for wealth and commodities. The fairness, mutuality, and common purpose that should be the basis for market exchange are lost. Trade is no longer a mechanism for the replacement of shortages and satisfaction of human needs within a self-sufficient household and community. Economics no longer facilitates filial devotion or love of city as mutual antagonism negates mutual sharing. The social glue that binds individuals and families together to deliberate about issues of interest to the political community in the Assembly loses its cohesiveness. The desire for self-realization and the full development of human capabilities toward virtuous action and rational discourse is stunted by a society that rewards only the acquisitive ability to compete and accumulate. Market aggressiveness displaces moral courage; moderation becomes caution during times of economic volatility and gives way to unlimited accumulation and excess during prosperity; hard work replaces steadfastness; technical and utilitarian reason eliminate the need for practical wisdom; and brute narcissism distorts a concern for the common good of the polis. The market undermines the very possibility of human happiness and political freedom.⁵⁹ The realization of the potential of the species being becomes impossible.

The logic of capital and the market, production and consumption, represses any remaining ethical and spiritual principles or transcendent political ideals. Modernity is a world turned upside down as society is now motivated by possessive individualism and destructive materialism. The sovereign that rules is the market and class control. The important virtues that defined human activity and propelled political responsibility and economic reciprocity are transformed into market virtues. The military defense of the city in the face of danger, the individual's moderation of passions and desires, and the political wisdom among fellow citizens are translated into economic categories of aggressive self-interest, reduced risk taking, and rational decision making in the market. Although much of this is only implied in *Capital*, the statements about Aristotle throughout the first volume make it difficult not to pause and reflect on these connections.

The specific references to Aristotle made by Marx include the following: (1) To introduce his theory of commodities, the basis for their exchangeability and commensurability, and his labor theory of value, Marx returns to Aristotle's economics (*oikonomike*) and to the ancient theory of value. (2) To facilitate his analysis of the fetishism and false objectivity of commodities, he offers Aristotle's discussion on Greek slavery and asks the reader to look beyond the surface of economic phenomena and commodities as things to the social and class relations of production that underlie them. (3) To help explain his ideas about money (M) and commodities (C) in barter (C-C) and trade (C-M-C), he refers to Aristotle's distinction between the use value within the family and community based on need and reciprocity and the exchange value between artisans based on custom and law. (4) To clarify his analysis of the transition from a theory of commodity exchange to the circulation of money as profit and capital in commerce (M-C-M'), as well

as his analysis of merchants' capital (M-C-M') and usury (M-M'), he makes use of Aristotle's distinction between the economics of a household economy and the chrematistics of money and profit making. (5) To highlight the social and collective nature of production, which he develops in his analysis of capitalist production and surplus value, he reminds the reader of Aristotle's view of humans as political and communal animals. And, finally, (6) to focus attention on the distance between the ideal and the real, he recalls for the reader the emancipatory potential of technology and machinery in the ancient and modern worlds.

In order to understand the full implications of the nature of economic wealth and capital in its various social forms of simple exchange, money, commerce, finance and banking, and industrial production, Marx transcends economic theory and judges modernity by the lost possibilities of the ancients—loss of the community, public sphere, political participation, mutual sharing among friends and citizens, democracy, and self-realization. Marx's rejection of liberalism and utilitarianism and his critique of abstract universal rights and market freedoms are marked by his acceptance of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* or "happiness" as the self-realization of virtue and human needs. These themes, already discussed in his early works, reappear in abbreviated form in his later economic theory. This integration of the ancients and moderns is lacking in the social sciences today due to the overemphasis on a particular view of science and sociology. With the coming of the Enlightenment and positivism, values were excluded from the domain of social science as prejudicial to true knowledge. Rejecting this narrow view of science, Marx integrates the two worlds of political economy and practical wisdom in *Capital*. Since production is fundamentally a question about the political and moral nature of humanity, economics is ultimately a science about social justice.

Marx begins his analysis of capital with the recognition of the Hegelian insight that the truth of objectivity is subjectivity. This means that the essence of products lies not in their material appearance but in their subjective component as social substance and homogeneous human labor. It is the common element that underlies all commodities and gives them their value in the exchange process. Transfiguring nature and matter into a particular social form, commodities satisfy particular needs. Thus they have use value. The substance and properties of the thing—the utility of the product—do not interest Marx; his concern is only for its historically specific social form as abstract labor and exchange value.⁶⁰ By stressing the appearances and properties of the thing or the personal satisfaction of subjective needs, economics is guilty of a fetishism of the commodity, that is, turning the subject into an object. What interests Marx is that commodities have value that can be compared and exchanged based on the amount and historical form of labor contained in them. It is the value expressed in the quantity of labor-time spent making something that is exchanged for useful objects of consumption. Value thus appears in modern history in many concrete economic forms, which Marx calls "value forms" or the social relations of exchange, circu-

lation, commerce, and production. This is the principle upon which Marx's economic theory rests. Probing more deeply into his analysis reveals his comparison of these economic processes in both the ancient and modern economies. The depreciation of the family, moral community, realization of individual potentiality (praxis), and democratic equality troubles Marx. Throughout his examination of the factors of production, he presents an alternative ethical perspective with its moral and political views, recapitulating the values articulated in his early writings. But now the ideal is compared to the real; dreams are measured against the historical and structural reality of liberalism and capitalism.

After introducing the notion of the social content of the commodity, Marx turns to Aristotle in the beginning of chapter 1 for his theory of value:

Hence, the second peculiarity of the equivalent form is that concrete labor becomes the form under which its opposite, abstract human labor, manifests itself. . . . We have then a third peculiarity of the equivalent form, namely, that the labor of private individuals takes the form of its opposite, labor directly social in its form. The two latter peculiarities of the equivalent form will become more intelligible if we go back to the great thinker who was the first to analyse so many forms, whether of thought, society, or Nature, and amongst them also the form of value. I mean Aristotle.⁶¹

What makes two different commodities equivalent in the market and, therefore, exchangeable? Marx recognizes that Aristotle makes the connection between a simple commodity and money as a universal commodity that facilitates exchange. He also sees the importance of the issue of commensurability of commodities but is unable to discover the actual content of value itself, that is, the common substance that underlies the equality between commodities. It is this common substance that makes exchange in the market possible. Marx attributes Aristotle's failure to develop a theory of value and commensurability to the economic underdevelopment of ancient Greece and its reliance on slave labor and the "natural inequality" between individuals. The secret to value that all labor is equal in the market and provides the quantitative basis for measurement and exchange is revealed only with the further evolution and commodification of society. This occurs when labor, land, and raw materials become commodities having prices for which they can be bought and sold on the market without limits. Work under capitalism has become homogeneous, specialized, and mechanized. Commodification occurs as a result of a particular historical form of alienated production and is not the result of exchange or nature. Though he is forgiving of Aristotle, Marx is less gentle with Ricardo and Smith for their failure to examine the nature of the commodity or to formulate a social theory of value.

Each commodity shares a dualistic character as a product having both use value and exchange value. In a capitalist society, utility can come about only after an exchange value has been realized. Utility occurs only after the act of exchange in the market. Like Aristotle, Marx is aware of the fact that in ancient Greece the

circulation of commodities occurred only at the boundaries of the community where surpluses were exchanged for the surplus goods of another family or society for the purpose of the satisfaction of needs. Consumption was an end in itself. Over the course of time, the direct exchange of goods was replaced by the circulation of commodities through the universal medium of money. Later, money and exchange value became the underlying aim of circulation as money was transformed from a medium of exchange into capital, or exchange value as profit. At this point in his analysis Marx reintroduces Aristotle in chapter 4 of *Capital* and his distinction between economics (*oikonomike*) and chrematistics (*chrematistike*), a distinction that presupposes the ethical critique of the market and political economy in ancient Athens.

Whereas economics is a form of knowledge whose goal is the maintenance of a self-sufficient household (*oikos*) and state (*polis*) for the purpose of nurturing human happiness, civic virtue, and political wisdom (*phronesis*), chrematistics has a different end. Through the commercial trading of commodities, its goal is to make money and accumulate unlimited wealth. In the process it will destroy the very purposes of human life articulated by economics. It creates individuals who are motivated by a passionate self-interest and boundless greed that destroy the family, community, and state. Economics and chrematistics are two contradictory forms of gaining a livelihood; they establish the premises of two entirely different social systems, cultural dreams, and ways of life—one built on happiness as political participation and the other on wealth. Chrematistics becomes a science that treats economic activity as independent of all ethical and political concerns (value freedom) and as having its own autonomous laws and motion (naturalism). With the development of his theory of capital and his historical analysis of its effects on workers, class society, division of labor, production, and so forth, Marx is applying Aristotle's ethical critique of political economy and market exchange in a way that will justify moving beyond capitalism to socialism. In *Capital*, Marx rewrites Aristotle's critique of political economy and chrematistics for the modern audience.

It is interesting that some interpreters of Marx have argued that he does not possess a theory of social justice in his later writings because only equal quantities of labor and wages are exchanged according to a worker's contract. They maintain that questions of ethics and justice are bourgeois cultural values that have no place in his scientific critique. Laborers get what they deserve by Marx's own standards, and thus capitalism can never be unjust. This is the famous Tucker-Wood thesis.⁶² A problem with this approach is that it does not recognize the connection between Marx and Aristotle, while it examines capitalism only from the perspective of circulation and simple commodity exchange (C-M-C) and never analyzes Marx's theory of capitalist production. Like liberal theorists, Robert Tucker and Allen Wood separate exchange and capital, circulation and production, markets and factories. Rejecting this thesis, Norman Geras has written, "The decisive factor, which makes possible the discovery in the production

process of the essence of the false appearances of circulation, consists in this: that, in moving from circulation to production, the analysis moves from the consideration of relationships between individuals to that of the relations between classes, of which the former are a function.”⁶³ At this point in his analysis Marx goes beyond Aristotle and classical economics with their emphasis on exchange and circulation to investigate chrematistic production and exploitation in the social form of work in the factories: abstract labor, surplus value, mechanization, and production capital.

RATIONALIZATION OF PRODUCTION AND THE LOGIC OF CAPITAL

One of the more difficult aspects of Marxian exegesis is an analysis of Marx’s epistemology and methodology, that is, his theory of social science. His ideas about method appear in a confusing array of unorganized writings scattered throughout his works, including *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law* (1843); “Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and General Philosophy” (1844); “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Law*: Introduction” (1844); *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847); “Introduction” to the *Grundrisse* (1857); chapter 1, section 4 of *Capital* (1867); and “Notes on Adolph Wagner” (1879–80). Many interpreters have argued that Marx was a positivist who sought to establish laws of social development with the same necessity and universality as the laws of nature in Newtonian physics. In a deterministic and technocratic model, science and the forces of production express the laws of history and economic collapse, provide for the rational management of economic affairs, precipitate social revolution, and cause the withering away of the state. Class consciousness, political participation, and democratic deliberation disappear before the formal rationality and organization of technological knowledge that calls for the withering away of the state. Reason is reduced to a technical science (*techne*) as politics becomes irrelevant in the face of technological administration and rational planning.⁶⁴ This mechanical and one-dimensional view of Marx has been changing in recent years.

Marx views science not as a form of prediction or causal explanation nor as a universal law that covers all interpretations of history. His view of science blends the methods of idealism and materialism. He critically examines the concrete structures and ideologies of modern capitalism (materialism), its essence and phenomenological evolution (Hegelian idealism), and its internal historical dynamic and institutional development (Aristotelian teleology). This combination of themes from a variety of traditions has resulted in scholars referring to his method with such terms as *historical laws*, *teleological forms*, *essence of appearances*, and *underlying structures*. Borrowing from Aristotle’s theory of physics and Hegel’s logic, Marx’s dialectical method is unique and very complex as it outlines the structure of the organic and necessary emergence of institutions in society. Just as Aristotle saw *physis* as the teleological unfolding of the innate potentiality of nature and Hegel viewed science as the self-movement of the concept (*Begriff*)

in history and nature toward the Absolute Spirit, Marx holds that the study of modernity involves an examination of the self-development and teleological unfolding of the concept, that is, the logic and structure of capital as it moves from the worth and market value of a particular commodity to the self-reproducing value of private property in the forms of commercial profits, banking interest, and industrial production. He traces the inner logic of modernity as it evolves from simple barter and local exchange in ancient Hellenic society to capitalist production in modern factories. And he does this within the general framework of Aristotle's ethical and political critique of chrematistics as unnatural wealth accumulation.

In *Capital*, Marx returns to these traditions by first rejecting the method of natural science and vulgar economics as simply reflecting the alienation and commodification of economic and social life. Criticizing the fetishism of methods in modern economics, Marx forcefully argues, "There is a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things."⁶⁵ As we have already seen, Aristotle had discussed the impact of the expansion of the chrematistic market and the commodification of the values of the community by showing the transformation of moral and intellectual virtues into economic skills and salable talents. Traditional values became distorted and reified; the happy and virtuous life changed into competition and acquisition in the market; the search for rationality and freedom through public participation disappeared into the abyss of private consumption; and the dreams of the ancients became economic nightmares as human reason and personal dignity were exchanged for private property and class power. Marx builds on Aristotle's critique of the market and commodification of human experience by grounding his methodology and philosophy of social science in a theory of commodity fetishism. He examines how labor becomes another factor of production in this process along with land, natural resources, and technology and how it can be scientifically studied as just another commodity. The historical and sociological elements of a critical analysis are displaced and repressed. Commodity exchange, money, and capital (property), that is, the areas of commerce, finance, and production, are viewed in economic theory as abstractions and things and not as organic social relationships that define economic activity, profit acquisition, and the meaning of human life. Issues of social inequality, class, and power; questions of rationality, human dignity, and the good life; and consideration of the ideals of economic justice and social freedom are eliminated from critical consideration. They represent ethical and political values and, therefore, are inappropriate areas of scientific inquiry. They are, by definition, unscientific and metaphysical.



Traditional political economy is restricted to a limited range of theoretical questions dictated by the values of productivity and positivism. Science itself

becomes a fetish as labor is subsumed under universal laws of production and consumption. With this transformation of knowledge into a factor of production, praxis has been alienated, workers exploited, and knowledge reduced to a technology that explains human behavior within a mechanized universe. A new theology of capitalist production is constructed. Marx concludes his epistemological analysis of fetishism by saying that the categories of bourgeois economics “are forms of thought expressing with social validity the conditions and relations of a definite, historically determined mode of production, viz., the production of commodities.”⁶⁶ In this short but profound section of *Capital*, he combines his historical materialism with a methodological critique of the conceptual limits of modern political economy, which seeks universal laws having technical application to specific social and economic problems. The goal of orthodox science is the maximization of private utility and the accumulation of wealth. The Aristotelian forms of Greek science are themselves commodified as *episteme* and *techne* are combined, resulting in the loss of “practical reason” or *phronesis*. The political sphere of the virtuous life and rational discourse is methodologically displaced by the mechanics of the economic realm. The public arena disappears as it is subsumed into the all-consuming private sphere of a market economy. In the end, economics loses its classical connection to ethics, politics, and law.

In order to outline the logic and structure of capital—wealth production and property accumulation—Marxian dialectical and historical science restates for the modern reader the approach of ancient political science. Marx begins his major work by examining the underlying formal principles of a society built on the contradictory demands of use value and exchange value—production for human needs and production for profit and property. “All these antitheses and contradictions, which are immanent in commodities, assert themselves, and develop their modes of motion, in the antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of a commodity. These modes therefore imply the possibility, and no more than the possibility, of crises.”⁶⁷ A capitalist economy that is geared to the production of profits within a class society contains within itself its own teleology and principle of growth and decay as it logically moves to a crisis of overproduction and underconsumption. The rationality of economics drives the economy to increasing concentrations of capital, market competition, and scientific and technological revolutions. This, in turn, leads to a dysfunctional and disproportionate relationship between rationalized production and class consumption, between human demand and effective demand. Marx refers to this structural condition as the contradiction between the productive forces (science and technology) and the social relations of production. “The contradiction, to put it in a very general way, consists in that the capitalist mode of production involves a tendency towards absolute development of the productive forces . . . while, on the other hand, its aim is to preserve the value of the existing capital and promote its self-expansion to the highest limit.”⁶⁸ The contradiction appears between the economic requirement to produce value in the workplace and to realize profits in the market. Over

time the conflicting structural imperatives of production and consumption tear apart the economic and social fabric of society. Under these theoretical conditions, crisis is necessary and inevitable.

The dilemma is to sustain economic expansion while maintaining economic exploitation in the form of private property and class domination. The social relations of production undermine the continued ability of the economic system to expand indefinitely its industrial capacity and to rationalize its productive forces. The economic imperative to produce more and more material goods is contradicted by the requirements of the market and profit accumulation. There is a continuous tension between the different structural requirements of production and consumption, accumulation and realization. Demand is kept low to motivate profit accumulation, but this only undermines the ability of the system to reproduce itself through further consumption. Profit lies in the exploitation of surplus value and low wages in the production process. But the continued life of a healthy economy requires that profits be realized when the workers purchase the very commodities they produce in a unified system of production, exchange, and consumption.

Although market demand and human needs are always high, effective demands are kept artificially low by the imperatives of the property system and class domination. Economic distribution and low wages set the stage for a stagnating economy that is unable to absorb everything that is produced. In this contradiction between the material forces of production and the class structure lies the explanation of how there can be poverty in a world of material plenty. In this type of economic system, production will slow or cease when profits and the rate of return fall below a certain minimum level. If consumption does not absorb production, the system stagnates into severe crisis. On the other hand, if consumption and wages are too high, profits will be negatively affected, producing a crisis of the overproduction and underutilization of capital—economic recession and depression. This is the unfortunate inner-driving mechanism of modernity and underlying alien structure of capital.⁶⁹

Capital as a specific form of the social relations of production places limits on the amount of profit that can be accumulated in the long run. Because of the necessity to produce exchange value for the market, wages cannot be reduced beyond a certain minimum and the working day cannot be extended beyond a certain maximum. There are physical, technological, and social limits to the realization of surplus value. At the same time, the production of use value is limited by the social relations of production based on profits, property, and class. Marx writes in the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), “At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production. . . . From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters.”⁷⁰ While the material and technological foundations of political economy serve to fulfill human needs, alleviate poverty, and create the conditions for democratic equality and

socialist freedom, the class organization of production and social relations of private property undermine these possibilities. The majority of workers are poorly paid and cannot adequately consume the products of a rationalized economy.

There is a formal structure and rationality to this economic system based on market decisions and profit maximization. The problem is that these formal principles of production contradict the market requirement for exchange and mass consumption. By narrowing the conditions for consumption, the capitalist economy endangers its own social basis for continued production. Without consumption there is no production. On the other hand, without exploitation and immiseration there is no profit. The two elements of the social system—maximization of profits and continuation of production—are continuously in conflict. There is always a contradiction between the structural imperative for accumulation (lowering production costs and labor involvement) and the realization problem (sale of commodities and shortage of demand). There is an excess of capital at a time of declining consumption. The extraction of surplus value based on labor declines as the amount of labor in each commodity lessens due to increased technological expansion and automation. This ultimately results in a tendency for the rate of profit to fall at the same time that the total amount of profit actually increases. The rationalization of production leads to increased technological development and efficiency. Concentration of production in the hands of fewer individuals is one result of the increasing disproportionality within the economy between production and consumption.

Marx makes it clear that although there is a necessity and universality built into the final cause or formal principle within capitalism, it, nevertheless, remains a logical principle. These are logical laws, not natural laws of history, since they are the result of the law of value. It is Engels who mistook the latter for the former and turned the dialectic and logic of capital into the logic of history.⁷¹ A system geared to the creation of use value and exchange value results in the rationalization of production and the social irrationality of inequality and class conflict. The drive to produce more is limited by the structural restrictions on consumption. Workers are simply unable to absorb the products of industry because of their low wages and high levels of exploitation. Thus Marx recognizes that “the *real barrier* of capitalist production is *capital* itself.”⁷²

GREEK PHYSICS AND MARX’S DIALECTICAL SCIENCE

In *Capital*, Marx uses multiple forms of the method of critique: ethical, dialectical, immanent, and structuralist. We have already considered his use of the *ethical critique* of capital based on Aristotle’s ethical and political writings. And noted previously, *dialectical critique* examines the internal principle, dynamic, and logic (*Begriff*) of capitalism as it develops over time, manifesting itself in problems of the overproduction of capital, underconsumption of commodities, the tendential fall in the rate of profit, and economic disproportionality. The

third form of critique is *immanent critique*. Marx outlines the basic principles of the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill in order to inquire whether the market and industry constitute a fair and just economic set of relationships. The liberal ideals of the innate rights of individuals to freedom, equality, and property are viewed as establishing a level playing field and just society where workers and owners buy and sell their commodities in an open and fair trade. There is a free exchange of labor and wages in what Marx refers to as a simple commodity exchange. Wage contracts are formed that express the knowledge, free will, and common interests of the parties involved. But a further and more detailed analysis beyond simple exchange to a more developed capitalist mode of production characterized by the social relations of abstract labor, surplus value, and exploitation reveals an oppressive economic system that contradicts and undermines the very values of liberal society. Poverty and human misery, and exploitation and alienated consciousness, discount liberal values. The economic arrangement of society makes it impossible for society to realize its own ideals, thereby calling the whole system into question. Finally, a *structuralist critique* highlights the structural and historical conditions necessary for the development of capitalism as lying in a complex set of new social institutions: the factory system (Industrial Revolution), abstract labor, specialization and division of labor, mechanization of production, private property, modern science and technology, the nation-state, commercialization of agriculture (Enclosure movement), and primitive accumulation and colonization.

The philosophical foundations of Marx's view of dialectical science lie in Aristotle's essentialism and teleology, theory of organicism and potentiality, and critique of political economy, and in Hegel's theory of the dialectic and contradictions.⁷³ Marx's theory of social science is thus grounded in Greek and German philosophies of nature and science (*Wissenschaft*).⁷⁴ Having rejected the values and institutions of modernity, he continues his critique of the Enlightenment view of science as a form of fetishism and mystification in his later economic writings. His critical method develops from an expansion of Aristotle's theory of causality and movement, Kant's critique of reason, and Hegel's phenomenology and logic. There is a continuity in Marx's dialectical critique of political economy from his early to his later writings on the nature of science. His questioning of the epistemology and method of orthodox science is already evident in his dissertation. In his later writings, he remains a student of Epicurus and follower of Prometheus as he continues to reject the Enlightenment view of science and positivism with its search for universal and predictive laws. But he also turns to Aristotle's theory of science, universal forms, teleological movement, and rational necessity and causality in his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*.⁷⁵ These ideas are then incorporated and transformed by Hegel's dialectical and scientific method for the study of history and society. Hegel attempts to give Aristotle's ideas a relevance for the modern age by making his categories more concrete and historical. But in neither case is science as *Wissenschaft* confused with natural science (*Natur-*

wissenschaft). Both Aristotle and Hegel develop an immanent teleological philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*) which treats the world as a living and rational organism as it comes to be and passes away.⁷⁶ Natural objects, including societies, are living beings that have a potentiality toward self-realization and that contain the principle of change and end within themselves.

Marx translates both Aristotle and Hegel into materialist categories by redirecting critical thought from the heavens to the earth. He accomplishes this by making formal rationality the very principle and logic of capitalist reality. From an analysis of the concrete forms and universals in physics to the phenomenological unfolding of rational enlightenment in history, the ancients and moderns had integrated and, according to Marx, confused logic and ontology. Marx was not going to make this same mistake by viewing logic as predictive of the actual occurrences of historical development. The logic of capital could only reflect the underlying formal essence or deep structure of the social system and its component parts. Marx views critical science as tracing the underlying tendencies of society produced by the inner contradictions and opposing social forces within capitalism.

In his later writings, it is to Aristotle rather than to Epicurus that Marx turns in order to develop his method of the class contradictions and economic crises of capitalism. The focus of his interest shifts from the subjective categories of nature to the logic and potentiality of the object (capital) itself. For Aristotle, physics is a science whose goal is knowledge of the universal form in concrete sensible things or individual substances—objects that are perceived. As a search for the rational structure of the world, physics examines nature as sensible matter in motion, the self-movement of nature, being in the process of becoming, and actuality in a state of potentiality. (This division between being and becoming will occupy much of Friedrich Nietzsche's analysis of pre-Socratic philosophy and will become important for Max Weber's epistemology and method.) Aristotle concentrates in the *Physics* on the nature of substance, change, and causality. While Plato taught that the universal is a separate concept and transcendent form existing on its own, Aristotle argues that for the universal to be real it must be manifested in a concrete material object. Concepts must be embodied in social institutions. Universals are immanent, concrete forms, and principles; they are real but have no independent existence. They can exist only in particular things. Each substance is composed of matter (potency) and form (act) and is subject to movement and change that inevitably lead in a finite universe to decay and death. As an acorn changes into an oak tree through its own development or marble is transformed into a statue by the act of a sculptor, matter is given a new form of determination. The marble receives the form of a statue by the subject. In the *Grundrisse* Marx, too, describes the labor process in terms of Aristotle's theory of potentiality and four causes.⁷⁷

It is interesting to note that the issue of the ontological and logical status of universals, prominent in Greek philosophy and in the later nominalist debates of the thirteenth century, becomes important in the nineteenth century when the

reality of “society” comes under consideration in early sociology. Is society a real entity, existing in and of itself, or is it real only in the consciousness of its members? The answers to these questions about the existence and reality of universals will help distinguish sociology from psychology and will help provide the method appropriate to the study of society.

In both *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, Aristotle is interested in the investigation of the source (efficient cause), goal (final cause), form (essence and actuality), and matter (potentiality) of concrete substances.⁷⁸ The efficient cause is the source of movement, the final cause is the perfect form or end toward which movement is directed, the material cause is the particular sensible substance of the object, and the formal cause is the particular form of the object. In many instances the formal, efficient, and final causes of natural objects are the same. When a sculptor creates a statue honoring a god or individual, he uses particular materials and applies his energy and effort (efficient cause) as the statue takes on a new form toward the preconceived idea in his mind. Nature is divided into potentiality and actuality. The latter is manifested as the realization of the immanent form. “Actuality is prior to such potentiality both logically and in being . . . The reason or knowledge of the actual must be present before there is knowledge of the potential.”⁷⁹ Actual being is both logically and temporally prior to potential objects. An acorn is in potency in terms of the self-movement or self-realization of its form toward its final goal of being an oak tree. Parmenides had rejected the possibility of change because being could not develop from nonbeing. Aristotle’s theory of potentiality was an attempt to answer him and show how new being is created out of becoming because the former lies immanent and hidden in the object itself. Physics is a reconstructive science that begins with actuality and re-creates the sequence back to its earliest stage of potentiality and being.

This would help explain why Marx begins *Capital* with an analysis of the form of a commodity as the simplest expression of the capitalist mode of production. Although bourgeois society as the highest development of commodity exchange and industrial production is assumed, he begins his analysis with its simplest form and its dualism between use value (product utility) and exchange value (market worth). Thus he distinguishes in the afterword to the second German edition between his empirical research and method of inquiry (*Forschungsmethode*) and his scientific and dialectical method of presentation (*Darstellungsmethode*). The scientific analysis of the essence of capitalism helps provide initial clues to Marx’s examination of the matter, form, and movement of the different forms of value expressed as commodities, money, and capital (*Formbestimmtheit des Kapitals*).⁸⁰ Hegel provides Marx with the creative insight into the underlying cause of movement in the dialectical instability and contradictory nature of capital itself. Marx argues that the economic forms of value and their contradictions and crises lie immanent in the commodity as a use and exchange value. The universal principle or concrete form exists throughout the history of capitalism and offers us an understanding of its actual and potential

development. History and potentiality, the past and future, are built into the logical and structural tendencies of capitalism.

Revising the physics of Aristotle and adapting the phenomenology and dialectical logic of Hegel, Marx reasons that potentiality is prior to actuality. The end has logical priority and already exists as the seminal principle of simple commodities. It is toward this end that commodities move as their final form and necessary cause. The economic crisis and irrationality of capitalism already exist in underdeveloped and unrealized form in the antinomy of the simple commodity as use value and exchange value. Tony Smith has written, "In so far as the commodity form, the money form, and the capital/wage labor relation are abstract categories in a reconstruction of the capitalist mode of production, they articulate structures and structural tendencies that define the system."⁸¹ To this insight Patrick Murray adds that "Marx is, however, attempting to demonstrate the logical necessity for the category of the commodity to unfold into the increasingly complex forms of capitalist political economy. He carefully observes that this is not a *historical* necessity, but is achieved through a conceptual analysis of the forms of already developed capitalism."⁸² Because *Capital* traces the internal teleology of the capitalist system based on the dialectical logic and contradictory structures of modernity, Marx's view of science integrates science and ethics, the logic and structure of capital, with the moral demand for free, self-conscious revolutionary change toward economic democracy.

Commodities are exchangeable and commensurable because they have value determined by human labor within a historically specific form of capitalist workplace (social relations of production). They are exchanged on the basis of the amount of abstract labor contained in them, which is socially measured by time and money. Abstract labor is a particular form of alienated labor produced by a specialized division of labor, factory system, private property, and capital. All sophisticated and skilled labor of the medieval guild system is reduced to a homogeneous minimum by the mechanization and specialization of industrial production. The initial antagonism within commodities between their natural qualities and social characteristics defines the starting point of the contradiction between modern exchange and industrial society.⁸³

Capitalism presupposes a social system in which production is neither for immediate consumption nor for the personal satisfaction of human needs; it is a system in which value is created for commerce, profit maximization, and wealth acquisition. The antinomic relationship divides society, creating a structural and logical contradiction between a society geared to self-realization of human needs and social praxis and one grounded in exploitation and the realization of value (*Verwertungsprozess*). The inner dynamic of a market economy pushes society into further contradictions from which it cannot escape, such as an anomic division of labor and fragmented specialization, exploitative appropriation of surplus value, maximization of profits, intensification of alienated work, and the immiseration and poverty of workers. Once exchange value and chrematistics provide the struc-

tural foundations of modern society, the inner logic or dialectic pushes society to further social problems and crises. Competition within the market and the requirement to expand capital force a rationalization of production: a continuous, revolutionary improvement in new machinery and technology, intensification and speedup of work, increase in the level of exploitation and productivity, and decrease in necessary labor time (wages and consumption). All this is done to increase the production of surplus value and profits. However, these functional requirements within the economy for production companies to maintain a competitive advantage only lead to continued serious dislocations. Productivity and efficiency must be increased at the same time labor costs are lowered. Under these social conditions, the exchange value of production cannot be realized. This is what Marx refers to as the “fundamental contradiction of developed capital.”⁸⁴

Alongside the scientific marvels and technological advancements of modern industrial society is a material and spiritual poverty described in the *Grundrisse*. It is a society in which all values, including freedom and equality, are devalued by becoming subservient to the logic of capital. Marx captures these ideas when he writes, “This kind of individual freedom is therefore at the same time the most complete suspension of all individual freedom, and the most complete subjugation of individuality under social conditions, which assume the form of objective powers, even of overpowering objects—of things independent of the relations among individuals themselves.”⁸⁵ This is simply a restatement of Aristotle’s original critique of commercial exchange and the economic distortion of moral virtues from book 1 of the *Politics*. Throughout Marx’s later writings there is a subtle blending of modern science and ancient ethics.

As Aristotle sees science as the self-development of the form of nature, Marx views it as the self-development of the concept or underlying structural principle of capital. That is, he traces the self-development of the concept from product, commodity, exchange, and money to capital.⁸⁶ Like Aristotle, Marx attempts to formulate a science that investigates the relationship between the universal and particular, potential and actual, and form and matter. He summarizes his perspective in the following manner: “The exact development of the concept of capital [is] necessary, since it [is] the fundamental concept of modern economics, just as capital itself, whose abstract, reflected image [is] its concept, [is] the foundation of bourgeois society. The sharp formulation of the basic presuppositions of the relation must bring out all the contradictions of bourgeois production, as well as the boundary where it drives beyond itself.”⁸⁷

Mediated by Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and the *Science of Logic* (1812–16), as well as by Feuerbach’s critique of Hegelian idealism in his essay “Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy,” Marx’s analysis transforms Aristotle’s philosophy of nature into a study of the immanent logic and potentiality of modern capitalist society. He clarifies his methodology and its connection to the ancients when he writes, “But we are still concerned neither with a *particular* form of capital, nor with an *individual* capital as distinct from other

individual capitals etc. We are present at the process of its becoming. This dialectical process of its becoming is only the ideal expression of the real movement through which capital comes into being. The later relations are to be regarded as developments coming out of this germ. . . . But, from the side of its formal specificity, this process is a *process of self-realization*.”⁸⁸ Commodities, market exchange, and value require an already preexisting capitalist mode of production. By beginning with the commodity as the simplest and most abstract form of capital, Marx is attempting to uncover the inner structure of rationality that underlies capitalism, to examine its internal contradictions, and to trace its dialectical movement to its final end in economic crises. The deeper purpose of the critique of political economy is to reveal the economic and ethical bankruptcy of capitalism: The system is irrational and inefficient, and immoral and detrimental to human freedom and to the possibilities of self-realization.

Critical science focuses upon historical and structural potentialities and present actualities. Since a critical science reveals the necessary connections and internal logic of capitalism in its historical forms; since it portrays capital as ultimately a series of exploitative social relationships in commodities, exchange, money, and capital; and since behind these economic appearances lie the institutions of abstract labor and surplus value, there is a moral imperative for social change in Marx’s analysis. The goal of science is to uncover these deep structures of power and oppression in order to facilitate their transformation. An examination of the logic of capital makes clear that justice cannot be reduced to a simple fairness of exchange, just price in the market, or living wage in the paycheck. Not even a full remuneration for labor or a universal re-distribution of private property to workers can satisfy the demand for social justice. Adjustments to the social system based on principles of fairness, equality, compassion, or justice miss, according to Marx, the importance of the underlying logic and structure of capital as its various forms of economic activity are manifested in commerce and production. Simple or even radical changes within the system are not enough. Calls for change by liberal economists, Catholic communitarians, and French socialists are not enough. Only a new social system that transcends the logic of capital can anticipate a truly democratic and participatory economy.

Marx materializes Aristotle’s and Hegel’s theories of movement and causality. In spite of this, there is no historical necessity in his dialectical model. There are many historical influences and counteracting economic and political forces that are able to lower the costs of reproducing labor (variable capital) and to gain access to cheaper raw materials and more advanced technology (constant capital). Lowering the costs of production can be accomplished by a variety of means—including increasing economic exploitation through lengthening the workday and intensifying labor; lowering wages; creating a surplus population through relative overpopulation; depreciating the cost of capital by means of waste, production crises, and functional stagnation; and, finally, by expanding foreign trade and colonialism.⁸⁹ There is no inevitability to a final breakdown of capitalism because

the system can increasingly and successfully adjust to its own inner logic by intensifying domestic exploitation, socializing the costs of production, expanding into underdeveloped areas, and creating foreign markets. On the other hand, economic crises cannot be entirely escaped either. By revealing the logical and ethical contradictions of historical capitalism, Marx is calling for a self-reflective praxis toward democratic change. He does not accept the normative assumptions of a mechanistic and deterministic science that only reproduces alienated consciousness, idolatrous worship of transcendent natural laws, and the submissiveness of the working class. Enlightenment consciousness simply substitutes the worship of positivist science and technology for the worship of capital and wealth.

Marx is aware that his method could be perceived as an expression of German idealism. He acknowledges, "It will be necessary later . . . to correct the idealist manner of the presentation, which makes it seem as if it were merely a matter of conceptual determinations and of the dialectic of these concepts. Above all in the case of the phrase: product (activity) becomes commodity; commodity, exchange value; exchange value, money."⁹⁰ Marx is not applying an idealist method of science; he clearly recognizes that the analysis of economic categories cannot be divorced from his theory of historical materialism. The concepts are not eternal or transcendental abstractions but are themselves reflections of a particular historical mode of production, which is the real basis from which arise cultural values and economic categories.⁹¹ Neither the product of the innate psychology of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the pure reason of Kant, nor the Absolute Spirit of Hegel, economic "categories are but the theoretical expression . . . [of] the historical movement of production relations."⁹² The categories express forms of being or the social relations between labor and capital as the dialectic takes place within and against history. The crises and problems of capital are real; the contradictions of capital are logical and ethical. They all demand structural change.

Necessity and causality lie in the formal principle and potentiality that are expressed and realized in history. Marx rejects philosophical abstractionism and misplaced concreteness of all kinds, including the notion of abstract natural rights of freedom, equality, and property of Bentham and Mill; the abstract and ahistorical categories of value, capital, and surplus value in the economic theories of Ricardo and Smith; the conceptual fetishism of science resting on a mythology of the empirically given facts—an idolatry of actuality; and the abstract moral criticisms of French and utopian socialists.⁹³ All these theories are removed from their historical and materialist base in the economic and social structures of industrial society. Science only reinforces a terror of the transcendent as technicians and moralists impose their Enlightenment values and ideals upon a passive society. Marx looks instead to an alternative view of science that investigates the dialectical problems lying beneath the surface of "facts." It, too, contains its own form of concrete universality and necessity that arises as a result of a moral demand for change based on a self-conscious understanding of the underlying ethical, structural, and logical contradictions of the capitalist system.

Capitalism is a social system that results in the alienation and depravity of individuals through wage slavery, stultification of human needs, distortion of personality development and human consciousness, increased exploitation, and the destruction of the community. It is a system that is wasteful of its natural and human resources, resulting in the overproduction of capital and the means of production, economic stagnation, capital depreciation and destruction, unemployment and surplus population, constant tendency toward economic crises, misuse of natural resources for chrematistic production, massive accumulation of wealth and increase in poverty, and growing inequality and class divisions. It is a society that destroys the possibilities for self-realization, true democracy, and social justice. These issues have been forgotten and displaced by an interpretation of Marx that draws exclusively from the Enlightenment, which reduces science to positivism as a specialized and technical knowledge of transcendent laws for the purpose of the explanation and prediction of economic crises. By this means, ethical and political issues are excluded. Human knowledge is truncated to a narrow range of utilitarian considerations of happiness and pleasure—to the point where humanity loses its ability to reason and dream about alternative possibilities of organizing social and political life. Richard Bernstein summarizes this when he writes, “The metaphysical and epistemological implications of his [Marx’s] position echo a more classical Greek, especially Aristotelian, view of man that maintains that it is only by understanding what man is—his actuality—that one can appreciate what he can become—his potentiality.”⁹⁴ The potentiality and future of humanity lie in its self-conscious appropriation of the material foundations of society and in its reapplication of the values of democracy and self-determination.

By integrating Aristotle’s theory of science and physics into his critique of political economy, by returning to the political, ethical, and communitarian ideals of classical antiquity, Marx was attempting to overcome the limits of modern economic and utilitarian thought. In his early writings, potentiality and teleology are measured by his philosophical theory of praxis and self-realization, whereas in his later writings they appear as the logical and historical development of the structures of capital and the contradictions between the productive forces and social relations of production. Marx has regenerated the lost elements of a critical historical science based on the Greek principles of practical knowledge—ethics, economics, and politics—into a comprehensive theory of social justice.

CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY AND THE ANCIENT MODE OF PRODUCTION

Marx’s works contain neither a systematic theoretical analysis of ancient Greece and Rome nor a philosophical analysis of his historical methodology. Scattered throughout his writings are references to classical antiquity and to other “precapitalist economic formations,” which he uses as a means to highlight and clarify his positions on distinctive aspects of modern capitalist society.⁹⁵ In the *Grundrisse* (1857–58) he analyzes in more detail the nature of the ancient com-

mune, classical Greece and Rome, the classical economy, and the decline of antiquity and its transition to feudal society as he examines the works of Grote, Mommsen, Niebuhr, and Fustel de Coulanges. In a later work, entitled *The Ethnological Notebooks* (1880–82), he outlines and critically evaluates the anthropological and ethnological literature on primitive societies and communal economies found in the writings of Morgan, Phhear, Maine, Lubbock, and Maurer.⁹⁶

In ancient Greece and Rome, access to land and livelihood was determined by citizenship and participation in the political community. In their early histories, these societies consisted of independent peasants working on their small plots of land. “The commune—as state—is, on one side, the relation of these free and equal private proprietors to one another, their bond against the outside, and is at the same time their safeguard.”⁹⁷ The aim of production within the commune was not the creation of wealth but the maintenance of the institutions and way of life of the political community. The ideal was a form of production that created the best and most virtuous citizen. The right to private ownership of agricultural land and the further appropriation and extension of the public lands (*ager publicus*) through conquest and colonization required the continued military power and success of the state. Marx was aware of the internal contradiction within the ancient mode of production between communal lands and private property. He was also aware of the internal tensions and disruptions this produced.⁹⁸ Over time the communal lands, which were used for common grazing, hunting, and timber collection, were redistributed as private property on the basis of economic power and differential political rights, furthering class antagonisms, especially between creditors and debtors.

Marx’s analysis of the decline of ancient civilizations centers upon the class conflict between the patricians and plebeians in ancient Rome. He sees class contradictions and imperialism as the major factors in the decline of ancient societies, along with the expansion of market exchange, a state of permanent warfare, slavery, the dispossession and impoverishment of an independent peasantry, and land concentration.⁹⁹ Though at first compatible with the foundations of the ancient city-state, these activities eventually became the basis for its decay and dissolution. As with Weber’s later analysis of the decline of the Roman Empire, Marx, too, sees a real problem with the growth of the large estates (*latifundia*) based on slavery leading to the expropriation and pauperization of the independent peasants. The small peasant economy founded on subsistence and egalitarian farming (use value of the *oikos*) and communal productivity and patriarchal responsibility was replaced by a slave economy based on alienated labor and market exchange (exchange value of *chrematistike*), which had serious political implications for the ancient commune and its citizens. The ideals of citizenship, equality, and community were lost as the poor Romans were reduced to the economic position of slaves, becoming no more than a proletarian rabble. Marx writes that over time slave labor became the dominant form of productive labor in antiquity.¹⁰⁰

These transformations in the objective conditions of labor and production dissolved the original unity and ancient mode of production based on subsistence agriculture, equality among the citizen-farmers, and the ideals and responsibilities of the community. With the growth of slavery, state administration and tax farming, territorial expansion following wars of imperialism, and a professional standing army to defend its acquisitions, the situation among the Roman citizens worsened. "The same wars through which the Roman patricians ruined the plebeians by compelling them to serve as soldiers and which prevented them from reproducing their conditions of labor, and therefore made paupers of them . . . these wars filled the store-rooms and coffers of the patricians with looted copper, the money of that time."¹⁰¹ Unfortunately, Marx fails to develop a comprehensive theory of the decline of ancient civilizations; nor does he examine the relationships among the various political, economic, social, and military elements dealt with in his analysis. These are the very questions that will preoccupy Weber in his early writings.

Marx sees class struggle and imperialism as the key elements in the decline of Rome. In the ancient world, economic production was limited by slavery, the underdevelopment of the productive forces of science and technology, and the social ethic of the reproduction of the political community in the form of civic and religious festivals, public building, art and literary events, and the military. In ancient Greece production never went beyond the handicrafts and the needs of private consumption; it never became capital. Marx's ideas on the ancient economies and the decline of ancient Rome, which were left tantalizingly undeveloped, were taken up by Friedrich Engels in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884), where he argues that it was the declining profitability of slavery in large-scale agriculture that led to its demise. As the *latifundia*, cities, and local markets declined in importance, slavery became obsolete.

In the period immediately before his death, Marx begins a series of notebooks containing extensive and critical excerpts from the writings of many important anthropological authors of the time. His goal was to deepen his understanding of primitive communities and preclassical communal economies. The centerpiece of the study is the work by Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient Society* (1867). Morgan was influential on Marx because of his biological and organic view of society and his utopian notion of unilinear social evolution from primitive and matriarchal communities based on hunting, gathering, and horticulture to civilized societies founded upon the political state with its aristocratic hierarchy, expanded territory, and private property. This was the historical transition from gentile society to the political state; from the communalism of *societas* to the class divisions of *civitas*. The earliest archaic communities were undifferentiated moral communities founded on the ancient gentes, personal relationships, and the principles of kinship and fraternity, social equality, collective rights, and communal democracy among men and women. This primitive social form was organized around communal property and the collective will expressed in assem-

blies that dealt with legislative, judicial, and administrative decisions. Private property and social hierarchy were unknown.

This view of the archaic community was derived in part from Morgan's extensive studies of the ancient gens and early social organization of the Iroquois villages and tribes. The Iroquois were a North American confederacy of five independent tribes united for mutual protection with villages scattered over their territory. These villages were surrounded by stockades for protection and were self-governing, self-subsisting communities with an elected sachem or chief as their head. The simplest political organization was the council of the gens, which was a democratic assembly in which all men and women could deliberate upon the main issues of the day; unanimity and consensus were necessary to achieve agreement. Leaders were checked by tradition and the collectivity. Since the government and nation were one and the same, there was no separate organ of political power that could divide the community. The assembly elected its chiefs based on individual ability, wisdom, and bravery. There were also councils for the tribes and a general council for the confederacy as a whole. All members of the village and tribe were equal and free, with the same rights and obligations to defend the community. Tribes were generally at war with all who were not members of the confederacy and who had not agreed to a treaty of peace. Military action was voluntary and determined on the basis of individuals who attempted to organize particular war-parties. There was no need to get approval from the council. Marx observes, "All members of an Iroquois gens [were] *personally free, bound to defend each other's freedom; equal in privileges and personal rights*. . . . It was a brotherhood bound together by the ties of kin. *Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity*, though never formulated, were *cardinal principles of the gens* and the unit of a social and governmental system, the foundation upon which Indian society organized."¹⁰² Marx describes independence and human dignity as the main attributes of the Indian character.

The ethnological material permitted Marx to justify his earliest arguments in philosophical anthropology with a scientific and historical grounding. He replaced his philosophy of humanity with an ethnology of the ideal of primitive communism. His critique of capitalism was no longer based on a comparison of modernity with the theoretical potentialities of social praxis and human emancipation but with an ethnology of primitive communities and species being. The critical impact of these writings is articulated by Lawrence Krader: "Marx applied Morgan's view that in the ancient collectivities there existed the characteristics of society which man must reconstitute if he is to overcome the distortions of his character in the civilized condition."¹⁰³ Marx continues these questions in his treatment of Phear's examination of peasant communities in East Bengal and Ceylon in *The Aryan Village in India and Ceylon* (1880); Maine's studies on jurisprudence in Ireland and India in his *Lectures on the Early History of Institutions* (1875) and *Ancient Law* (1861); and Lubbock's analysis of the origins of

communal marriage, religion, and the state in *The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man* (1870). This final work of Marx also contains a brief section on the development of Athenian democracy from Solon and Cleisthenes to Ephialtes and Pericles, as well as on the social and political organization of ancient Rome. In it are contained a collection of excerpts from the writings of Grote, Mommsen, Niebuhr, Bachofen, Böckh, Schömann, Hermann, de Coulanges, and Connop Thirlwall, along with many references to Homer, Thucydides, Aristotle, Plutarch, Caesar, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Tacitus.¹⁰⁴ Finally, it was Engels again who would take these shorthand notes and brief summaries of anthropological and historical sources and incorporate them into a more fully developed theory of the origins of the family and private property.

Chapter 2

MAX WEBER

GREEK TRAGEDY AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY



Max Weber was born about the time Karl Marx was writing *Capital* and like Marx was educated in the classical Greek tradition. This was to leave a lasting impression on his ideas throughout his life. By the time he was fourteen years old he was steeped in classical Greek and Roman literature and history. According to a biographer, he had read Homer, Herodotus, Virgil, Livy, Cicero, and Sallust in the original languages. He continued reading the classics in the *Gymnasium* and became familiar with the works of the famous classical historians: Ernst Curtius, Theodor Mommsen, and Heinrich von Treitschke. He entered the University of Heidelberg in 1882 and attended the lectures of Immanuel Bekker on Roman law, Bernhard Erdmannsdörfer on medieval history, Friedrich Lange on the history of materialism, Karl Knies on historical economics, and Kuno Fischer on Hegel. In 1884 he left Heidelberg for the University of Berlin and began to concentrate on his legal profession with courses in German civil and constitutional law, Prussian administrative law, and German legal history with Georg Beseler, Ludwig Aegidi, Rudolf von Gneist, Heinrich Brunner, and Otto von Gierke. He also came under the influence of some of the most distinguished classical historians teaching at the university such as Mommsen, von Treitschke, Levin Goldschmidt, and August Meitzen. And it was also at this time that he met several of the leading German social economists and representatives of the German Historical School: Adolf Wagner and Gustav Schmoller.¹ These lists of names show Weber's close association with the pantheon of German intellectual history in the nineteenth century.

He completed his doctoral dissertation in 1889, *On the History of Medieval Trading Companies*, and two years later under the supervision of Meitzen he finished his habilitation on agriculture in the early Roman Republic, *Roman Agrarian History and its Meaning for State and Private Rights*.² In the first work, Weber attempted to trace the historical foundations of property rights in modern commercial institutions, such as trading companies and limited liability companies.

These institutions became the key financial and legal instruments of commercial trade and the modern firm. In the second dissertation, he examined the early practices of communal farming and land leasing on conquered Roman territories. With expansion there was a rise in political strife and class conflict between the landed patricians and the independent peasants over the distribution of these public lands (*ager publicus*) and their development into private property and large agricultural estates (*latifundia*). The issue became more contested after the Second Punic War against Hannibal and the incorporation of large expanses of the defeated Carthaginian empire under Roman control. According to Weber, this massive transfer of new land had important implications for ancient capitalism since “it represents the most unrestrained expansion of capitalism in the agrarian field known in history.”³

Within a few years of his early dissertations he would produce a number of other important but neglected works on economics in ancient civilizations: “The Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilization” (1896) and *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* (1897) which was an extremely broad analysis of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, Greece, and the Roman Republic and Empire. His examination of the development of the Greek polis from the aristocratic and hoplite periods to the radical democratic constitution of Athens and his analysis of the political reforms of Solon, Cleisthenes, Ephialtes, and Pericles are of particular importance today. He was interested in certain issues that would be crucial to his later historical and structural thesis about the rise of capitalism and the rationalization of modernity. Did capitalism exist in ancient Greece and Rome, and in what form? What were the crucial economic institutions of medieval Europe, and how did they help facilitate the development of modern capitalism? And what were the social, political, and economic institutions that enhanced or hindered the chances for capitalist development in ancient societies?

Weber borrowed extensively from many of the same authors in classical history and anthropology that Marx had relied upon, including Barthold Niebuhr, Georg Maurer, Henry Sumner Maine, August Haxthausen, Fustel de Coulanges, J. J. Bachofen, and E. B. Tylor.⁴ Weber wrote at a very exciting time in German intellectual history. He was involved in the middle of the methodological debates between the positivists and the neo-Kantians, the dispute (*Methodenstreit*) between the Austrian utility theorists and the German Historical School, and the Karl Bücher-Eduard Meyer controversy over the nature and role of the household (*oikos*) economy in ancient Greek society. There was a break in 1904 with this structuralist approach as Weber turned to a sociology of religion to supplement his earlier works with an investigation into the cultural and ethical influences on the development of capitalist consciousness. Finally, with his later writings and lectures that appeared in his *General Economic History* (1923) and *Economy and Society* (1922), Weber was able to develop more fully his structural analysis of the modern economy and process of production; investigate the nature of political

capitalism and slavery in classical antiquity; and clarify the differences between the ancient, medieval, and modern city.⁵

The impact of classical Greece on the writings of Weber was important in many different and provocative ways. This chapter traces the development of his economic and sociological writings from his earliest analysis of ancient capitalism in Athens and Rome; his philosophy of social science and theory of social action, understanding, and historical explanation; and his theory of modern rationalization and disenchantment to his later historical and structural analysis of the foundations of commercial and industrial capitalism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England. First, his early writings on Greece provided him with the foundations for his historical and structuralist method and comparative analysis of modern and premodern, and Western and non-Western societies. His understanding of the distinctive features of modernity and capitalism developed over time with his appreciation of the particular nature of ancient civilizations. His views on capitalism evolved from his ideas about ancient commercial and state capitalism, his comparison of ancient political capitalism and the modern market economy, and his analysis of modern production and industrial society. The classical world motivated his thought, opened a debate with the ghost of Marx, and helped him clarify his major thesis about the rationalization of Western society and the development of modernity. It is interesting to note that as he developed his theory of rationalization and modernization, he moved closer and closer to the perspective of Marx in *Capital*.⁶ Second, through the secondary interpretations of sociologists such as Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Alois Riehl, the cultural world of classical antiquity had an impact upon Weber through the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Crucial to the development of Weber's cultural analysis of modern society with its critique of science, technological rationality, rationalization, and bureaucracy (*Wissenschaftskritik*), as well as many of his key ideas on epistemology and methodology, objectivity and truth in the social sciences, and his rejection of scientific positivism (*Wissenschaftslehre*), was the work of Nietzsche. It was Nietzsche's theory of the origins of Greek tragedy in the Apollonian and Dionysian aesthetic drives; the development of scientific rationalism and moral nihilism; his radicalization of Immanuel Kant's and Arthur Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge with its subjectivism, perspectivism, and relativism; and his critique of religion, the herd morality, and the cultural decadence of Western society that provided Weber with many important insights into the existential crisis, political malaise, and tragedy of modernity.

Third, Weber returned to the Greek view of knowledge and science in Plato's *Republic* and in the Renaissance as a way of recapturing a broader understanding of the German notion of science as *Wissenschaft* and as a way of responding to the limits of Enlightenment rationality and modern science. In his work, "Science as a Vocation" (1919), he placed natural science within the historical and philosophical context of the process of rationalization and demystified its epistemological claims to universality. A fourth theme, which has been developed in the writings

of Wilhelm Hennis, is that of the classical Greek idea of *Menschentum* (humanity) that permeates Weber's works as their substantive driving force. Sociology is not a positivistic science but a practical or moral science whose goal is to enlighten and to educate humanity to the ethical possibilities of its own self-realization. This means that the scholar must examine the relationship between specific forms and historical ideals of humanity and their corresponding social institutions and cultural values. With this view of sociology, Weber integrates the thought of Kant, Nietzsche, and Aristotle. Finally, the classical experience helped Weber formulate his approach to sociology as a historical science using the methods of structural analysis of social institutions and hermeneutical exegesis of cultural meaning.

CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY AND ANCIENT CAPITALISM

In his earliest writings, Weber examines the structures of ancient and medieval societies and their transition to modernity. As we have already seen, classical Greece provided Marx with the model of a society based upon the satisfaction of human needs, a democratic polity, and social justice. From this framework he was then able to construct a critical theory of capitalism. The classical world played a different role for Weber. He uses his classical education as a means to delineate and define the nature of modern capitalism and its distinctive historical and structural features. He also asks whether ancient Greek society could be characterized as a form of capitalism. His vacillation about his answer over time helps with a further clarification of the nature of modernity. In *Roman Agrarian History*, Weber is in agreement with his university mentor and teacher, Mommsen, whose perspective is developed in his work, *The History of Rome*. Weber traces the development of private property and ancient capitalism from the communal land practices in early Roman history. John Love criticizes Weber's uncritical acceptance of Mommsen's characterization of early Rome by quoting from Marx's critique of Mommsen in *Capital*. Marx rejected the idea that ancient Rome was a capitalist economy lacking merely the free worker and credit system. It is not profit acquisition or private property that are the distinguishing features of capitalism. For Marx, capitalism entails a developed form of industrial production based on a social division of labor between the bourgeoisie and proletariat and the continuous development of science and technology in the factory.⁷ The distinguishing nature of capitalism lies in its social and technical organization of production and not in the nature of the market or distribution. By characterizing Roman society in such broad social and economic categories, the implication is that Weber does not have such a clear understanding as Marx of the specific nature of modern capitalism nor an adequate distinction of the relationships between the ancients and moderns. But this will change with his later works.

In his short essay, "The Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilization," Weber accepts the "primitivist" view of Aristotle, Mommsen, Bücher, and Johann Karl Rodbertus that Greek society was an urban self-sufficient economy (*autar-*

kia) based on a local exchange of agricultural products of the rural interior with the industrial products of the coastal city. International trade was marginal to the economic life of the community and limited to the purchase of expensive consumer goods for the wealthy. It was a peasant economy built around the household (*oikos*) and based on a local market for the satisfaction of immediate needs, with the city acting as the center of politics, art, and literature. That is, the city was a center of consumption and not of production. An exchange economy forms as a superstructure upon an already existing natural economy. It evolves out of the large slave estates in order to satisfy the growing economic needs of the upper class. "Thus trade in Antiquity more and more became a thin net spread over a large natural economy and as time passed the meshes of this net became finer and its threads became more tenuous."⁸ Weber refers to it in an almost idealist manner as a "natural economy." He expands upon this a year later in his longer and more developed work, *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, where he focuses upon other characteristics of the urban economy, such as economic trade, grain importation, slavery, and the dependence of politics on commercial interests. There seems to be more emphasis on the role of commerce in this work.

Meyer, as a member of the "modernist school," took a different position regarding the *oikos* economy. Instead of viewing antiquity in terms of these idealized categories, Meyer argued that classical Greece should be understood using the concepts of modern economics. He saw the ancient city as having a capitalist economy. Weber rejects the extreme elements of this perspective that maintained that the Athens of Pericles had factories, a working class, and capitalist mode of production. But the perspective does force him to raise the all-important question of whether ancient society was capitalistic or not: "Our answer will depend on our definition of 'capitalist'—and that of course can take many forms. However, one element must be emphasized: capital always means wealth used to gain profit in commerce. . . . This means that goods are produced (in part at least) to become objects of trade and also that the means of production are themselves objects of exchange."⁹ In clear opposition to Marx, Weber takes the position that it is the market, commerce, profits, and property that are the key institutional ingredients in a capitalist economy. Weber's understanding of the relationship between capitalism and antiquity will change over time. These early writings are not always clear or well-edited. What develops in these arguments is a complex picture of ancient society with elements of capitalism embedded in a natural economy. Weber concludes that the modern capitalist enterprise based on free labor did not exist in classical antiquity. If we limit our definition of capitalism to the organization of production, then a capitalist economy was not important among the ancient Greeks. But Weber continues: "However, to accept this premise is to limit needlessly the concept of capitalist economy to a single form of valorization of capital—the exploitation of other people's labour on a contractual basis—and thus to introduce social factors. Instead we should take into account

only economic factors. Where we find that property is an object of trade and is utilized by individuals for profit-making enterprise in a market economy, there we have capitalism.”¹⁰ Weber concludes that “capitalism shaped whole periods of Antiquity.” The defining characteristics of the capitalist enterprise are thus the market economy, profit acquisition, and private property. Weber is aware that there are missing elements that would distinguish ancient from modern capitalism, including fixed capital, technology, and the specialized organization of production, as well as some of the medieval economic forms of trade and finance.

In these early writings, Weber does find elements of capitalism in ancient Greece, including urban cities, market economies, developed banking and financial institutions, wage labor, commerce and profits, and private property. On the other hand, there are no factories, proletariat class, fixed capital, division of labor or capitalist organization of production, guild system, and no widespread consumer market. Even as early as 1897, by engaging in the debates among the ancient historians, Weber was evolving a thesis concerning those structural elements in society that facilitated or placed limits upon the development of capitalism. The problem at this stage in the evolution of his ideas was that he had not settled on a clear and precise definition of capitalism. Ancient Greece and Rome were complex societies that manifested capitalist elements mixed with very strong anticapitalist features. Weber eventually combines the arguments of Bücher and Meyer when he maintains that the *oikos* was the center of a self-sufficient ancient economy. However, among the wealthy owners of large estates, there was an international trade and a market economy in luxury goods, slaves, banking, and government contracts. The small number of wealthy people would ultimately place limits on the possible expansion of external trade. This was a society composed of free peasants who were small owners, tenant farmers, or sharecroppers; free artisans who worked in the city in small workshops; wage workers who were engaged during harvest time or worked on public projects; and slaves. Though Weber refers to this society as a form of ancient capitalism, he is also aware that the capitalist element was subsidiary and underdeveloped. Frustratingly, he does not examine in any detail the relationship between the natural and exchange economy, plantations and the city, nor does he examine the nature and role of the market, or the extent and importance of slavery. What develops from his writings is an interesting and, at times, confusing mosaic of capitalist, feudal, and autarkic economies as the manorial system mixes with the city economy and municipal citizenship. Weber writes that “monetary wealth and capitalist exchange in the classical period were islands in a sea of traditionalism.”¹¹

According to Weber, the relationship between peasants and the manorial lord was based on traditional ties and not market forces. Commerce was founded on noncapitalistic reciprocal obligations, land leasing, mortgage rents, feudal dues, and *corvées*. However, although there was no autonomous market, there did exist exchanges of land and labor for profit. Thus, elements of both the natural econ-

omy and market economy were in precarious balance in ancient Greece. The major forms of capital investment lay in tax collection and public works, mines, sea trade, plantations, banking, mortgages, overland trade, leasing slaves, and the use of slaves in craft production. On the other hand, the two main factors inhibiting the evolution of a fully developed capitalist economy were the natural economy based on slavery and the “state socialism” of the public building projects. Slavery, the rationalization of the state, and the rise of political democracy formed unbridgeable barriers to the further development of ancient capitalism. Weber writes that slavery was concentrated on the rural estates in the countryside, while free labor existed in the city. The economic, political, and class tensions between the two produced the particular structural and historical dynamic of ancient cities. For Weber in the 1896 essay, there was little difference between the ancient and medieval cities; what differences existed were determined by which group was most successful in defining the economy—the urban citizens with their local market or the rural slaves on the self-sufficient manor. The expansion of international trade of the high-priced luxury goods only further strengthened the slave enterprises on the large estates and undermined the power of the free artisans and wage workers in the small urban workshops and local exchange. By late antiquity and the early feudal period the split between the city and countryside would become more pronounced, announcing the decline of urban centers and coastal trade.

The land use in ancient Greece was based mainly on small farming with tenant farming being the most lucrative use of landed property. It was a form of farming in which land was rented as a tradition-bound manorial enterprise. Large numbers of slaves were used in mines, public works, and quarries, but they were also used by their masters on large plantations in oil and wine production and as independent tenant farmers; they were to a lesser extent employed in trade and handicrafts in small workshops (*ergastēria*). Slaves were a capitalist commodity bought and sold in the market and were rented out to industrial workshops and work crews on government projects. Weber notes that the building inscription of the Erechtheion temple on the Acropolis states that slaves and free workers were paid the same wage of one drachma a day. Slavery was not used in expensive agricultural areas requiring labor intensive skills, such as grain cultivation. Skilled slaves could serve as managers on large estates or as independent artisans or tradesmen. There even existed a domestic system in which the master provided the slave with the raw materials and instruments of production in a craft workshop (*ergastērion*) in return for part of the finished product or profits in the form of rent. They were usually attached to the master’s *oikos* or to a merchant’s warehouse. These business and commercial ventures of the master were investment opportunities for the surplus resources of the large estates. Slaves worked together with free men and could over time purchase their own freedom. They could even be leased out as wage workers. Prominent politicians and mili-

tary leaders such as Nicias and Cleon during the Peloponnesian War and later Demosthenes were not landowners but slaveowners. Weber recognizes that slavery was an important factor in inhibiting the transition to a fully developed capitalist society since slaves absorbed a large amount of scarce capital, hindered competition and technological development, restricted the specialization and division of labor, strengthened the household economy, discredited physical labor, and drove out free labor from industry.

The second area of capitalist endeavor after slavery involved the rationalization of the state through public financing, tax farming, debt mortgages, liturgies, and public construction. The state was utilized as a key financial mechanism for capital formation in lieu of an inadequate private sphere. The financing of large public projects was undertaken with moneys acquired through tax farming in which capitalists paid for the privilege of collecting state taxes and thereby profiting greatly, if there was a surplus. These same individuals acted as a state bureaucracy organizing the collection of taxes on behalf of the state. They were administrators who supervised the state mines and crucial grain supply. Some performed the function of state contractors, financial advisors, and bank loaners. They also helped administer and exploit conquered populations for their private interests. The wealthy were charged for liturgies or taxes to help pay for public events, religious festivals, theater presentations, and building projects. Weber refers to this political system as the tax-and-liturgy state.¹² Though the city-states of ancient Greece acted as capitalist slave-labor economies, this ultimately hindered the development of market capitalism. Weber mentions other hindrances to capitalist rationalization in antiquity, including poor land transportation, unstable economic and political systems of capital formation, technical limits to the exploitation of slaves, limited economic rationality and cost accounting in a slave economy, the lack of a religious or social ethic favoring the status and social position of capitalists and entrepreneurs, and a hereditary class structure.

Weber next turns to an analysis of the various historical stages of political organization and rationalization of the polis from its origin in the peasant community to the monarchical fortress, aristocratic city-state, bureaucratic city kingdom, authoritarian liturgical state, hoplite polis, democratic citizen polis, and universal military monarchy. Weber is interested in the evolution of the political constitution in terms of its role in rationalizing the economy and freeing the institutional elements of the civil economy for the pursuit of capital and profits. During the classical period the state eliminated communal ownership of property, feudal land tenure, and debt slavery; permitted slaves, land, and crops to be sold without hindrances; and encouraged capitalist farming practices. With the decline of the Greek city-states at the end of the classical period, there was a return to more traditional and feudal restrictions on the market as power shifted away from the city back to the large manorial estates.

CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE GREEK POLIS

One of the more interesting aspects in *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* was Weber's recognition of the tension existing in the classical polis of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. between capitalism and democracy. This tension will be developed later in his analysis of modern political rationalization and in the rise of administrative bureaucracy and plebiscitary democracy. Weber traces the development of the polis from the earliest days of the village communities and formation of the phratries (brotherhoods) for the protection of the common lands and the fortress kingdoms such as Mycenae and Tiryns during the Homeric period to the classical city of Periclean Athens. The fortress acted as the capital of the warrior kings, such as Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Odysseus who dominated the surrounding geographic area due to the monopolization of trade and military technology. The coastal city was a military and commercial center. It was a military fiefdom whose center was a fortress surrounded by settlements of artisans, shopkeepers, and merchants; the peasants in the rural areas lived in forced clientage. Heavily armed warriors fought on chariots in personal combat using bronze spears and arrows. Sharing the royal table and his wealth with his retinue of aristocrats and fighting companions, the king created a royal council. Over time there was a decline in the monarchy as the aristocracy was able to obtain land and establish its own autonomous centers of power. In the Near East kingdoms of Mesopotamia and Egypt, they were subsumed into the bureaucracy and priesthood of the royal household for the purpose of building and regulating canals.

With the invention of coinage in the seventh century B.C., expanding markets, changing military technology and battle tactics, and the rise of a new hoplite warrior using iron weapons and disciplined phalanx formations, the democratization of the army began and with it a transformation of power away from the aristocracy to a new military class of landowners.¹³ At this time slavery was not prominent on large estates, and tenant farming by free or semifree peasants was the norm. Since military defense was tied to landowners, and since only the latter could afford the expensive weapons, there was a shift of power from the city to the countryside. Ownership determined citizenship, not family background. Now landed peasants could afford to supply their own weapons. With the passage of time and with an expanding economy, mortgages, foreclosures, and debt bondage of the peasants, as well as restrictions on inheritance rights, growing class divisions were becoming more and more common. Land and rents were concentrated in the hands of a relatively small aristocracy. But at the same time, as a result of changing military needs, the small landed peasantry and petty bourgeoisie demanded changes in the old feudal system and the establishment of new legal reforms, especially the placement of limits on interest rates and foreclosures and an end to debt bondage. The rise of the classical polis, reform of the political constitution, and the expansion of democracy and citizenship were all features of a political compromise between the landowners and peasants to stabilize the mili-

tary, check economic abuses, ensure property rights, and maintain a strong peasantry. The result was a long series of political reforms dating back to Solon and Cleisthenes, and to the creation of the classical polis.

Solon, who was appointed archon in Athens in 594–93 B.C., began the social reform by reorganizing the constitution, replacing the laws of Draco, establishing the legal rights of the peasants, and dividing the citizens into four classes measured by specific amounts of wealth: upper class (*pentakosiomedimnoi*), cavalry (*hippeis*), the yeoman or moderate property owners (*zeugitai*), and the proletarian laborers (*thētes*). Among the top three classes he divided the political offices of the polis, and admitted the laboring class into the Assembly and the jury courts. The last group of laborers could not, however, hold office. He halted the slide into further class inequality by reforming the debt laws by canceling all debts and mortgages and banning loans based on the security of land or person (*seisachtheia*). His aim was to respond to agrarian discontent and to protect the peasants from falling into debt slavery, which would lead to further social differentiation, thereby endangering the population base of the hoplite army. Solon began a process of slowly eroding the political power of the old aristocracy, thereby liberating the people. Weber maintains that there was a self-conscious effort toward the “equality of citizens” by limiting the economic power of the landed aristocracy by restricting the accumulation of land and slaves. The metics and foreigners, who gained their livelihood through commerce and trade, were integrated into society by making it easier for them to become citizens.

Solon created a new Council of 400, the right to seek retribution from wrong doing, and the right of appeal to the jury courts (*heliaea*). In his work, *The Athenian Constitution*, Aristotle argued that these measures instituted democratic features and “contributed to the power of the masses.”¹⁴ He wrote that Solon sought the middle ground between those calling for the redistribution of property and those who wanted to maintain the aristocratic system unchanged. The lifting of trade restrictions and the implementation of monetary reform were intended to help peasant farmers but they were prohibited from emigrating to the city. Solon also placed restrictions on the purchase of land. He began taxing the land owned by individuals outside of the local deme that was the basic political, economic, and military unit in the polis. Grain export was prohibited and colonies were established to relieve the burden on the city of caring for the unemployed and poor. Colonization was thus an important mechanism for getting rid of a surplus population and permanent underclass that could destabilize the social economy. The political reformers attempted to transform society by instituting laws that encouraged social stability, political equilibrium, and economic profitability. Solon extended citizenship to all armed warriors, and eligibility to hold office was offered to the yeoman (*zeugitai*) class or moderate property owners who lived in the countryside.

Wealth and power in the ancient polis rested with the great clans with their large plantations and household economies. Cleisthenes attempted reforms in

508 B.C. designed to unravel this system by creating a new territorial division of the state out of the original four tribes. This entailed the formation of a new set of artificially constructed political and economic relationships. Breaking up the power of the old aristocratic families and the clan state, citizens were now divided up into ten new tribes composed of village units or demes scattered over Attica and representing the three areas of the state: city, countryside, and the coast. People would now be named after their deme and would no longer use their father's name. Feudal obligations to the local lord were broken as citizen loyalty was now directed to the newly created demes. The local demes consisted of a wide range of people from those living in the city, freedmen and metics, to rural peasants and aristocrats. There was a blending of classes into the newly formed political structure with the effect of widening the power base of the polis. Cleisthenes expanded the executive Council (*Boule*) to five hundred members, fifty from each tribe. He also instituted a law of ostracism to control powerful individuals. It was first used in 488–87 B.C.

In the city the power of the aristocratic Areopagus was waning slowly as that of the jury courts and Assembly increased. Ephialtes stripped the Areopagus of much of its power as guardian of the constitution, splitting its power between the Council and jury courts. Weber views this as part of a historical development of Athenian democracy that reached its most radical form with the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles. With the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431–404 B.C.), there was further development toward democracy as military tactics and naval technology required more participation on the part of the general population. Payment for jury courts was instituted. The restrictions placed on the sale of land, properties, mortgages, and slaves were abolished. Weber is well aware of the historical irony that, with the implementation of democratic rule, there was a corresponding social transformation producing greater social and wealth differentiation and unlimited land accumulation. Democracy pursued its own demise by unleashing the power of capitalism through free trade. But it was also undermined by the growth of slavery during the classical period.

Weber maintains that slavery and property concentration were the major factors in the fall in the urban deme population, drop in the hoplite army population, limited opportunities for free labor employment, decline in living standards and consumer demand, and restrictions on the development of a market economy. There was also no improvement in the technology and social organization of production in the “industrial capitalism” of antiquity.

The easiest way to achieve profits in antiquity was *not* the creation of new methods to divide the production process in order to have larger, more disciplined, and better organized units of production. Slave labor was not suited for such a development either technically or “ethically.” Nor did there exist a growing market for industrially produced consumption goods, because of the manner in which wealth was divided in antiquity and the low level of consumer demand . . . and it is cer-

tain that the development of capitalism did not raise the economic and social position of industry as a whole, but instead destroyed its ancient foundations.¹⁵

The economy of land rents, mortgages, and slavery undermined the viability of ancient capitalism to develop its own industrial base and consumer market and to move beyond a rentier and state capitalism.

These early writings on agrarian sociology and the institutional foundations of ancient capitalism framed Weber's later historical work on the structures of rationalization. They provide us with invaluable information and insight into his later sociological method and more advanced theory of modernity. They help us to clarify his understanding of the nature of industrial capitalism and a market economy, as well as to establish a more complete picture of historical and cultural science as a balance between a hermeneutical method of understanding and a structural analysis of modern social institutions—a blending of the methods of idealism and materialism.

DECLINE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE RISE OF MODERN CAPITALISM

If Marx's theory of alienation and species being was derived from classical and neoclassical sources, Weber's theory of rationalization was derived in large measure from Nietzsche's critique of Apollonian and scientific rationalism and his historical analysis of ancient civilizations and medieval feudalism. In some of his earliest writings, Weber outlines the structural transformations of society that led to the decline of the Roman Empire, emergence of feudalism, and rise of modernity. In fact, according to Weber the crucial role of the Roman Empire was in dismantling the social institutions of ancient capitalism of city-states and preparing the way for medieval feudalism and later industrial capitalism.¹⁶ The empire undermined and transformed the early foundations of slavery, commerce in slaves, and the political capitalism of tax collection, monopolies, and liturgies (funding for public events) of the republic, and replaced it with a new imperial tax system and state control over crafts, commerce, liturgies, and market prices. The most capitalist enterprise in antiquity—tax farming—was abolished and substituted by an administrative bureaucracy and salaried officials. It replaced the old private tax system with a complex organization of state bureaucracy, tax codes, and forced labor. This, in turn, had profound implications for the changing relationships between the city and the countryside and the creation of a natural economy. The new state policies and administration of taxation for the maintenance of a largely defensive and mercenary army caused the unraveling of the social structure within the empire. The nobility and peasants fled the newly created system with its burdens of taxation by creating a more natural and primitive self-sufficient economy.

Weber sees a conflict arising between the needs of a centralized army and state and an economy undergoing the early stages of feudalization. The economic

and political landscape of ancient Rome was altered by a number of dramatic changes in the empire, including the transformation of the state bureaucracy, state financial and taxation policy, the nature of slavery, return to a barter economy, decline of cities and rise of the countryside, and the formation of a large standing army. In his early writings, Weber attributes the decline of the empire to the defensive consolidation and pacification of the conquered lands, the reorganization (and weakening) of the army in response to external threats and internal civil disturbances, and the market in slaves. In his later writings, he shifts emphasis to questions about the political transformation of the republic into an empire, the pervasive existence of slavery, state intervention into the economy, and the bureaucratization of the army and tax system as the chief structural elements affecting the decline of ancient Rome and the destruction of the potential for ancient or political capitalism. The Roman Empire undermined the two most important structural features of capital investment and ancient capitalism: slavery and tax farming.

Weber recognizes that ancient cities were urban civilizations founded on the principle of self-sufficiency (*autarkia*) with trade with the rural hinterland and with a direct sale in the local market of the polis. Although they were coastal Mediterranean civilizations engaged in international trade in expensive luxury items, there was no real trade with the deeper interior of the country. The economic base of the city was formed upon a natural economy of slavery and self-sufficient country estates (*oikoi*). The surplus of the household economy on the larger slave-based plantations (*latifundia*) was exchanged in the local market for the goods of urban artisans and other farmers.¹⁷

With the decline of the Roman Republic and expansion of the Empire, this system changed. As Rome extended into Spain, Gaul, Illyria, and along the Rhine and Danube, the large and unruly expanse of its empire forced upon it new forms of governance, finance, military organization, and imperial rule. More efficient ways of maintaining a large standing army required that the old forms of tax farming, leasing, and public works needed to be made more rational and efficient. For these purposes a state bureaucracy was formed to oversee the expanded territories. The state began to collect its own taxes, maintained a salaried bureaucracy and large imperial storehouse, paid its functionaries with money and in-kind provisions, and equipped a professional army from the proletariat and barbarians of the conquered territories. The army was no longer recruited from the younger sons of Roman yeomen; it was no longer a citizen army fighting for its homeland. From the ancient polis, a new continental state was formed. With military and territorial expansion, the coastal cities and international commerce declined and were replaced by rural self-sufficiency.

Weber maintains that, beginning with the emperor Tiberius and later Hadrian in the second century, there was an attempt at an internal pacification of the empire. Roman troops were withdrawn from beyond the Rhine and Danube rivers as they attempted to consolidate their conquests. But this had important

effects on the slave trade and economy as a whole. It resulted in severe shortages of slave labor since wars of expansion were, in reality for Weber, slave raids. And since the great Roman plantations were built on the model of army barracks—no family, no property, and no legal rights—there was no internal reproduction of slavery in the Roman Empire. The inevitable result was a general decline in the availability of slaves for these large estates. As the basic form of wealth and large-scale grain production, these estates faced a shortage of slave labor which, in turn, produced a serious economic crisis in the empire. Weber writes, “But after the final offensive wars of the second century, which were in fact little more than slave raids, it became impossible to maintain the great plantations worked by slaves without family and without property.”¹⁸ During the later empire things began to change so that by the Carolingian period, slaves in their collectivist barracks had been transformed into small peasant farmers, who though still slaves, had their own families and owned their own farms. This marked the breakup of the relationship between the slave and the *oikos* and the creation of a new form of hereditary dependency based on a new class of feudal peasants. Production for the market ceased, and commerce surrounding the natural economy stopped. The large estates produced only for themselves in this isolated self-sufficient economy.

The cities and towns that had relied upon the large estates for agricultural produce and exchange also declined, creating a fiscal crisis of the state. Cities were no longer centers of trade, but became part of the state’s administrative system. Recognizing the implications of these changes, Weber states, “Thus as soon as slave barracks gave way to peasant cottages, especially in the interior, production for the market disappeared and the thin net of commerce, which had covered the natural economy of Antiquity, frayed and then snapped. . . . The great estates broke away from the city markets. Most of the medium and small towns lost their economic foundation—the exchange of labor and goods with their hinterlands.”¹⁹ Weber remarks that the new large landowners became the “Junkers or landed aristocracy of Antiquity.” This marked, according to Weber, the beginning of the decline of slavery and the rise of serfdom where the serfs were bound to the soil and owed labor services to the lord of the manor. With the expansion of the great landed estates, the widening powers of rural landowners, and the growing importance of the agrarian population in supplying the military with recruits, the wealthy began to resist incorporation into the administrative urban centers. Power, tax collection, and civil administration of the Roman territories shifted from the urban and coastal to rural areas of the empire, as the landowners obeyed only their own law and the direct orders of the emperor. The large estates began to form their own self-sufficient economic units as a new form of rural natural economy emerged.

Along with the shift of economic and administrative power away from the urban to rural areas of the empire, the nature of the Roman state began to transform into a complex bureaucracy capable of governing the large expanse of a conquered empire. The financial structure changed as the ancient forms of capitalism—tax farming and public contracts—were replaced by the state collection of

taxes. State monopolies were formed in commerce, further inhibiting the development of a class of private capitalists. Weber recognizes that the purpose of the state changed from promoting urban exploitation of rural areas characterized by the *oikos* and city markets to the integration and administration of a large continental empire based on a subsistence economy, rural administration, large state expenditures, and tax payments in-kind. Commerce was too underdeveloped to provide the state bureaucracy and army with the money needed to maintain itself, although money payments were made necessary by the sheer size of the bureaucracy.

Tension was building as commerce and the cities declined; the Roman economy became an interior agrarian system; money was scarce; and there was a shortage of slave labor resulting from the pacification of the empire. The Roman world began to turn inward in order to satisfy the economic need of the large estates for more workers. The army turned to the barracks and the barbarians in search of future recruits, thereby changing the whole nature of the military and making more demands on a limited monetary economy. The local needs of the wealthy landowners conflicted with both the monetary needs of the bureaucracy and the recruitment needs of the army. The natural economy of the manorial estates with their decentralized political and military administration struggled against the requirements of running an imperial social system. It was as if the whole social system was being torn apart at its very foundations. Under these conditions, it became impossible to sustain the military, bureaucratic, and tax structure of the imperial system. Weber is aware of the importance of these changes to the development of feudalism. "In reality, a feudal social structure and a feudal military system were the natural conclusion towards which developments under the Later Roman Empire tended. . . . It is clear, therefore, that the disintegration of the Roman Empire was the inevitable political consequence of a basic economic development: the gradual disappearance of commerce and the expansion of a barter economy."²⁰

A new social system of feudalism took the place of the Roman Empire characterized by the rural and manorial features of Charlemagne's royal household economy, landowning knights, serfs, and the Christian religion. Within the geographic and political landscape of Western feudalism, space was created for the medieval commune to develop and to provide the financial, commercial, and legal foundations for the rise of commercial and industrial capitalism based on a market economy, free labor, medieval trade organizations, rational technology, and the industrial production of the guild system.²¹ This was quite different from antiquity where "ancient capitalism was used to produce rents, and when this capitalism affected industry it did not act to create large enterprises specializing in the manufacture of a particular product."²² The ancient economy was characterized by political conquest and colonization; state trade monopolies and workshops; limited consumer demand; slavery; a rentier economy; and small-scale, impermanent, and opportunistic production for profit. This inhibited the development of a true capitalist economy. During the Middle Ages, a new industrial

city was formed within the manorial system that represented a fundamental break with the polis of classical antiquity. As Weber sees it, “the medieval city was much closer to the development of modern capitalism than was the ancient polis.”²³ The craftsmen and artisans were not marginal in this society but occupied central economic status as they battled the urban patricians over feudal rents and fees, political and commercial rights, taxation, and economic power. And with these conflicts came greater political freedoms and economic autonomy from the surrounding wealthy estates well into the fifteenth century. These cities were centers of economic activity and were not primarily military or political entities. Around this time, the monarchical state bureaucracy began to incorporate these industrial centers into the wider political system of the national economy. The main conflicts were now between urban artisans and the aristocracy, artisans and merchants, and masters and journeymen. In antiquity class conflict focused on the land, fear of debt bondage, the demands of the hoplite yeomanry or peasants, and the growing power of wealthy city rentiers, while in the medieval city, the struggle was between bourgeoisie and aristocrats. The medieval city was a new civic and legal corporation founded as a center of trade and industry; it was an oath-bound fraternity (*conjuratio*) with its own laws, courts, army, and political institutions.²⁴ Upon this new social organization was founded the principles and structures of early modern society.

NIETZSCHE AND THE ORIGINS OF GREEK TRAGEDY

Much of Weber’s substantive analysis and critique of modernity was derived from his interpretation of Nietzsche who was himself steeped in the culture and values of classical Greek literature, drama, and physics. Weber was influenced by some of the most important early classical social theorists who wrote books on Nietzsche: Riehl, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Artist and Thinker* (1897); Tönnies, *The Nietzsche Cult: A Critique* (1897); and Simmel, *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche* (1907). Through primary and secondary literature, Weber was well-versed in Nietzsche’s critique of modernity and Enlightenment rationalism, as well as in his analysis of Greek tragedy. The classical experience was central to Nietzsche’s development of a dialectical theory of Apollonian and Dionysian aesthetics and critique of science. A radical revision of Kant’s critique of pure and practical reason was carried out through a reinterpretation of classical tragedy. This, in turn, led to a new approach in epistemology and moral philosophy—Nietzsche’s relativistic perspectivism and moral nihilism that were so influential on Weber. From Nietzsche’s radicalization of Kant and Schopenhauer and from his reading of Greek physics and philosophy of nature comes Weber’s theory of knowledge and scientific methodology; from his critique of Platonic rationalism and Greek philosophy develops Weber’s critique of the Enlightenment and formal rationality; from his genealogy of morals and religion, ascetic ideals, herd morality, and *ressentiment* evolves Weber’s sociology of religion; and from his theory of the will

to power and moral self-determination springs the classical ideal of humanity and human self-realization (*Humanitätsideal*). While his theory of ancient capitalism and historical method develops directly out of his study of Greek economic and political institutions, the importance of Greek culture and philosophy is derived indirectly through the influence of Nietzsche.

Nietzsche received a chair in classical studies at the University of Basel, Switzerland, in 1869 and began a ten-year teaching career in Greek literature and philosophy. Some of his earliest, unpublished writings examined Greek philosophy in terms of the epistemological debates of the nineteenth century. Nietzsche's major insights were borrowed from Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. As he confronts the epistemology of German Idealism he undertakes a radical critique of the Enlightenment and the foundations of Western rationality and science. Behind the Platonic images on the cave wall, behind empirical facts or the veil of Maya, there is no truth. The world of immediate experience is only a reflection of the illusions and deceptions of consciousness. Very early on in his writing he articulates this anthropomorphic view of nature and reality and connects it with the deeper pessimism and moral resignation of Schopenhauer. He conjoins the epistemological insights of Kant and Hegel that all objectivity is ultimately subjectivity with the existential anxiety and metaphysical fears of Schopenhauer. Behind the objective appearances of phenomena, there is only nothingness. Appearances become illusions and constructs of human consciousness as they change over time in history. In his earliest examination of the pre-Socratic philosophy of nature, Nietzsche treats Greek physics and metaphysics as opportunities to ruminate about Kantian epistemology. Classical humanism offers Nietzsche the philosophical opportunity to work through and expand his ideas about German Idealism. The works of Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras are interpreted as the projection of human qualities or ideas upon nature. From Nietzsche's perspective they are the earliest philosophical expressions of Kant's transcendental subjectivity and categories of the understanding. Nature is a human construct. "The Greeks, among whom Thales stood out so suddenly, were the opposite of realists, in that they believed only in the reality of men and gods, looking upon all of nature as but a disguise, a masquerade, or a metamorphosis of these god-men. Man for them was the truth and the core of all things; everything else was but semblance and the play of illusion."²⁵ Human beings were not passive reflectors of reality, but true creators as they became the measure of all things. Being and becoming are explained in terms of anthropomorphic metaphors that reflect the values and ideals of the polis.

The Copernican Revolution in philosophy occurred when Kant made the argument that the sensations of perception are meaningless without the systematic organization of consciousness in time and space and the categories of the understanding. Subjectivity is involved in the very creation of objectivity. The conscious mind helps form the objects of experience. Kant had made the distinction between the appearances of the phenomenal world and the thing-in-itself,

which is nature prior to perception. The appearances are what we know and the thing-in-itself is beyond knowing and consciousness. Nietzsche rejects the empiricist implications of the thing-in-itself that there is an underlying metaphysical basis for knowledge and maintains with Schopenhauer that what the human mind knows is only itself—the self-images of its own impressions and reflections. What lies before the individual is not the world of immediate sensations. There is no correct perception or reflection of external reality in the mind. What stands before the individual are not objects or immediate impressions but forms of consciousness. It is a world of linguistic metaphors, poetic images, and products of the imagination creating an unbridgeable chasm between reality (thing-in-itself) and knowledge. Nietzsche offers the insight: “But in any case it seems to me that the ‘correct perception’—which would mean ‘the adequate expression of an object in the subject’—is a contradictory impossibility. For between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression: there is, at most an *aesthetic* relation.”²⁶ He is aware that over time philosophers have taken these metaphors and fetishized them into external objects existing in a real empirical world. They become a disenchanted prison of the “residue of metaphors” and “graveyards of perception.” Nietzsche takes Kant’s critique of reason and theory of objectivity and, in the process of transforming them, challenges the very foundations and assumptions of Western science and truth. Skepticism and relativism are the birth parents of science as knowledge dissolves into appearances, science into illusions, and objectivity into art.

These ideas began to germinate in two of his earliest unpublished essays, “The Philosopher” and “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” They come together in his first published work, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). It is here that Nietzsche leaves his remarkable imprint on modern thought. Rejecting traditional neoclassicism and the aesthetic theories of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock, August Wilhelm Schlegel, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Friedrich Schiller, he offers an entirely new perspective on the origins of Greek tragedy. Nietzsche rejects the neoclassical view of the underlying beauty, nobility, catharsis, reconciliation, and final justice of the world. There is no inherent teleology, no final goal, no ultimate meaning, and no absolute truth to be found in the world. The ontological foundations of the Greek worldview are shattered as mere subjective illusions. It was in this context that Nietzsche introduces his ideas on the Apollonian and Dionysian drives in Greek tragedy. With this approach he was able to integrate his theory of Greek aesthetics and drama with Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and epistemology.

But just as one thinks Nietzsche is about to fall victim to a fit of resigned disgust or existential pessimism before the relativity and meaninglessness of science, it is art that lifts humanity up to the highest levels of human dignity, joy, and nobility. Once the universalist claims to science and truth, and metaphysics and epistemology, are rejected, a panorama of the world opens before us as a play-

ground of human creativity and self-actualization. Meaning is not to be found in the world but is to be aesthetically created in art, literature, philosophy, and politics. Thus Nietzsche's early assault on Enlightenment science and the Kantian theory of knowledge is only an introduction to his theory of Greek art and tragedy. This relationship between science and art will be the cornerstone of his critique of rationalism and the Enlightenment.

The publication of *The Birth of Tragedy* is the high point of Nietzsche's relationship with Schopenhauer. The key to understanding the origins of Greek tragedy lay in Schopenhauer's philosophy that the world is both representation and will. The world we know and act upon, according to Schopenhauer, is a product of our own perceived appearances and phenomenal illusions, as well as our own wants and needs. We are always caught in the understanding and will of our own egoism. The world is a product of the subject from which we can escape only by resignation, asceticism, and philosophical contemplation. The human mind transforms the meaningless sensations and organizes them within a coherent framework of time, space, and causality to produce perceptions. "This world as representation exists only through the understanding, and also only for the understanding."²⁷ The world we see in our perception is a world similar to Plato's cave, our dreams, and the Hindu veil of Maya. It is a false impression and illusion that reflects forms of consciousness and not external reality. The objectivity and reality of the material world are called into question by a reconstruction of the process of knowing. There is an external world but it is unknowable as it is in itself. Physics and science never know the reality of nature, only the impressions of it. Schopenhauer has taken Kant's epistemology and radicalized it. He pushes it to its logical extreme by emphasizing the centrality of the subjective. We experience the world as a constructed entity or representation of consciousness not only through our concepts and understanding but also through our actions and will.

The objectivity we experience as both external reality and the movement of our own bodies is the product of our will. It is not the Cartesian ego that is the most knowable thing but one's own body with its drives, instincts, needs, and strivings. The will produces a world of constant striving after pleasure and satisfaction without limits. There is a never-ending quest for satisfaction and a never-ending fight with our passions and fears. The result is a world "without peace and calm" in which "true well-being is absolutely impossible." It is a world of suffering and pain that has no meaning or purpose. Schopenhauer interprets this experience of the world through Greek mythology. "Thus the subject of willing is constantly lying on the revolving wheel of Ixion, is always drawing water in the sieve of the Danaids, and is the eternally thirsting Tantalus."²⁸ The world is a place of "excessive inner torment, eternal unrest, and incurable pain";²⁹ a world of immeasurable suffering, injustice, and cruelty. To escape from the pain is possible only by leaving behind our individuality, our will, and our physical needs in order to reach a state beyond all happiness and pain—a state of will-less contemplation of the Idea or pure form of beauty. Here we become one with being and

with our own nothingness. Schopenhauer attempts to solve the problem of reality by an unusual integration of Hindu mysticism and Platonic rationalism.

Nietzsche relies heavily on Schopenhauer by accepting his general interpretation of Kant and the existential misery and suffering of the world. However, the means he uses to deal with this everyday pain is not to retreat into a transcendent experience beyond the world, but rather to engage the world directly through art. This is what the Greeks were able to do in their tragedies and mythology and in the process created a world of nobility and beauty beyond anything ever attempted in Western culture. Nietzsche substituted the Greek tragic experience for Schopenhauer's existentialism of fear and anxiety; and for Schopenhauer's theory of representations and will, he substituted the ideas of Apollo and Dionysus. Schopenhauer is transformed into Silenus, a follower of Dionysus, as there is a metamorphosis of German existentialism into Greek tragedy. Nietzsche poetically and masterfully portrays the mythical unfolding of the Greek stories of the conquest and odyssey of the Trojan War; the loss of friends and families to years of unrelenting warfare and palace intrigue; the patricide, incest, and exile of Oedipus; the curse on the house of Atreus; the death of Agamemnon; the matricide of Orestes; the unrelenting vengeance of the Furies; and the eternal punishment of Prometheus. But underlying all this dramatic suffering exhibited in these plays is a quest for truth, reconciliation, forgiveness, community, and moral harmony. It is a search for universal standards of justice and beauty. In a world of becoming, without meaning or values, the Greeks forged a moral community, cosmic order, and physical beauty out of nothingness. Greek tragedy is a story of pride, arrogance, and hubris; murder, incest, retribution, and indescribable pain and suffering. The existential condition, outlined initially by Schopenhauer, was presented openly in the mythology and artistic creations of classical Greece. This is a world described by Silenus as so hateful that it is better not to have been born, but if born, to die early.



With all the suffering portrayed in Greek drama, there was also individual moral struggle, courage, nobility, and honor in the efforts and personality of the tragic characters themselves. And Nietzsche sees in these individual strivings the underlying secret to humanity. "The Greeks were keenly aware of the terrors and horrors of existence; in order to be able to live at all they had to place before them the shining fantasy of the Olympians."³⁰ Art was able to provide mythology and drama, that is, an aesthetic form and cultural experience within which existence became meaningful and the individual protected. Art acted as a "metaphysical solace" and as a "pretentious lie." It was used to explain being, to offer a theodicy to give meaning to human suffering and death, and to provide a purpose to human life under the most horrible of circumstances. Finally, through art both pain and suffering were sublimated into happiness and beauty.

Nietzsche develops his own aesthetic theory of Apollonian and Dionysian drives. Apollo, who takes his place in the Greek pantheon as the god of enlightenment, moderation, and dreams, is the form giver in art, politics, law, and science. He symbolizes the inner drive or human need to create artistic form, political order, and metaphysical meaning in the world. Natural law, Olympian mythologies, social ethics, and political constitutions are created through the Apollonian desire to give meaning and purpose to human existence. The Dionysian element, on the other hand, represents the irrational, communal, and destructive dynamic, which undermines old traditions and creates new values. Art is the “completion and consummation of existence and [its] guarantee of further existence.”³¹ Underlying this dialectic between form and will, and teleology and chaos, is the ultimate truth and tragic vision of the ancients. Dionysian wisdom provides the creative impulse to aesthetic change as it recognizes that reality is a world of becoming and chaos producing only suffering and pain. Much later in 1887 Nietzsche would express the same idea in *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887), “Whoever, at any time, has undertaken to build a new heaven has found the strength for it in his own hell.”³² But it is from the cry of unbearable agony that artistic constructions of unparalleled beauty and nobility of soul arise. Terror results in joy and sublime serenity. Underneath the Apollonian forms of civilization lie the unrealized dreams and falsifying ideals that deny and repress the misery of human existence. Life demands both meaning and illusions in order to continue.

Dionysus strips the Apollonian veil of its facade and appearances and reveals a hypostatized reality. But remarkably the Greeks were able to balance this knowledge of the absurdity and nothingness of the world with the corresponding drive to create an illusory cosmos of order, purpose, beauty, and justice. They created a world in which “Apollo found it impossible to live without Dionysus.”³³ Nietzsche was able to integrate the beliefs of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Schiller, and Goethe in the nobility, beauty, and simplicity of ancient Greece with Schopenhauer’s dire pessimism of the plight of humanity in the modern abyss. “Apollo overcomes individual suffering by the glorious apotheosis of what is eternal in appearance: here beauty vanquishes the suffering that inheres in all existence, and pain is, in a certain sense, glossed away from nature’s countenance.”³⁴ Apollonian culture represents a victory of the human spirit and will over existence and becoming; the joy and beauty of culture have subdued the reality of suffering and misery. Nietzsche believes that “life is at bottom indestructibly joyful and powerful” even in the face of human misery and tragic suffering—and, quite possibly, because of it. This perspective represents a radicalization of the Kantian and Hegelian insight that the truth of objectivity is subjectivity. The Apollonian forms and Dionysian creativity set the framework for Nietzsche’s later theory of the will to power of the *Übermensch* (overman) as a will to constructive form and self-realization. It is this tragic wisdom of the Greeks that will provide Weber with the critical foundations for his theory of science, culture, and rationalization.³⁵

EXISTENTIAL NIHILISM AND THE PERSPECTIVISM OF SCIENCE

In Nietzsche's interpretation of world history, the death of Greek art and culture was caused by the rise of dialectical logic and Socratic reasoning. Socrates discovered the heart of formal reason in syllogisms, concepts, and judgments. Everything is encompassed by his quest for knowledge and truth. And in its path lies the forgotten wisdom of antiquity with its existential serenity, tragic wisdom, cultural enchantment, and affirmation of life. Foreshadowing Weber's view of the iron cage, Nietzsche writes, "If we look about us today, with eyes refreshed and fortified by the spectacle of the Greeks, we shall see how the insatiable zest for knowledge, prefigured in Socrates, has been transformed into tragic resignation and the need for art."³⁶ Tragedy for the Greeks led them to a recognition of suffering and pain at the heart of the human condition; the modern tragedy is that in the optimism to control life with science, the Dionysian drive to creativity and freedom through art has been lost. Science is a form of decadence and the "enemy of the tragic view," since its goal is neither wisdom nor sublime peace but control. It is a form of *Herrschaftswissen* (knowledge for domination). For Nietzsche, Socratic reason was the turning point of Western civilization and the birth of the theoretical man with his insatiable thirst for knowledge, technical control, and material happiness. In the prologue to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–85), he calls this person, "the last man." The human will no longer sought the creation of culture, myths, and art to give expression to life and transform nature according to human values but to control nature according to the idol of science. Suffering was to be conquered by materialism and efficiency, by a ruthless forgetting embedded in physical pleasure, and by a dreamless sobriety and painless amnesia.

The world of classical art has been turned upside down as *episteme* (universal knowledge) has been integrated with *techne* (technical knowledge). With rationalism came decline and barbarism and the disappearance of Dionysian wisdom and the tragic vision of the ancients. For Nietzsche, philosophy and art had the role in Greek society of taming science with its technical interests of control and unrestrained desire for knowledge. Its underlying realism and utilitarianism called into question the Greek ideas about anthropomorphism, illusions, and the tragic nature of human existence. These insights disappeared behind a facade that claimed that science examines reality in itself. Representations and illusions are replaced by impressions and objective reality; language and metaphors by observation, experiments, and empirical facts. Logic and science sought universal truth and true being in order to transform it according to the dictates of human reason. There was an optimism that life could be technically engineered on the basis of absolute truths and that, in the end, pain and suffering overcome. The depths of nature may be plumbed for its truth and natural laws, error eliminated, and knowledge applied in utilitarian form for the survival of the species and pleasure of the individual.

With the coming of modern philosophy, things began to change. Nietzsche sees in Kant and Schopenhauer a new form of knowledge that revives the Dionysian spirit and the values of classical humanism. According to Nietzsche, the theory of knowledge developed in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and accepted by Schopenhauer in *The World as Will and Representation* (1819 and 1844) contained a direct assault on the universalistic claims to knowledge of modern science. Emile Durkheim will also develop similar ideas in his analysis of pragmatism, Kantian philosophy, and a social theory of knowledge. By introducing the centrality of consciousness and subjectivity into the process of knowing in the form of the intuitions of time and space and the concepts of the understanding, Kant had called into question the whole of Western thought since Socrates and Plato. "Whereas the current optimism had treated the universe as knowable, in the presumption of eternal truths, and space, time, and causality as absolute and universally valid laws, Kant showed how these supposed laws serve only to raise appearance—the work of Maya—to the status of reality, thereby rendering impossible a genuine understanding of that reality."³⁷ By replacing universality by particularity, science by wisdom, Kant, and later Schopenhauer, had returned to an older philosophical tradition that recognized the human and interpretive nature of all scientific knowledge. In the essay, "The Philosopher," Nietzsche exhorts himself to show the true meaning of Kant's Copernican Revolution when he writes, "It has to be *proven* that all constructions of the world are anthropomorphic, indeed, if Kant is right, all sciences . . . if Kant is right, then the sciences are wrong."³⁸ That is, what we know is a projection of human categories, language, and values onto an external world. Access to an underlying essence, teleology, or hidden reality—the thing-in-itself—is denied, since all knowledge involves the transformation of impressions by the categories of the mind. There is no direct access to the world through impressions or sensations. They are always filtered and mediated by consciousness.

Schopenhauer took Kant one step further by recognizing the temporal and historical nature of the structure of the mind and the illusory nature of all phenomena and appearances. Since the world is in constant flux, science is constantly changing; there is no one universal reality upon which science can concentrate its gaze. And this world of illusions is also a world of pain and misfortune. Nietzsche sees in Kant's epistemology and critique of pure reason and Schopenhauer's radicalization of Kant and existential philosophy the beginnings of a return to the wisdom of the ancients. Their insights have initiated a return to the tragic vision of classical drama—knowledge of becoming and human suffering. Building upon the insights of both philosophers, Nietzsche expands Kantian epistemology with his theory of perspectivism. All knowledge is a perspective and thus relative. In his unpublished manuscript, *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche remarks, "Against positivism, which halts at phenomena—'There are only facts'—I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact 'in itself': perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing. . . . In so far as the word 'knowl-

edge' has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is *interpretable* otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings—'Perspectivism.'"³⁹ The categories of time, space, and causality have simply become metaphors within a changing philosophy and science of nature. The mind offers no universalistic categories to ground the laws of nature; physics cannot access the inner logic and structure of reality. The thing-in-itself is gone. Everything is in a process of becoming in a Heraclitean world of change. The world is always an act of interpretation from a particular point of view. The heart of Western thought with its concepts of being, substance, accidents, matter, and reality are simply projections of subjective consciousness upon an ever-changing objectivity. In fact, the objective world has as much reality as the myths of Homer, Aeschylus, and Sophocles.⁴⁰

All knowledge that makes claims to universality and truth of being: Socratic rationalism, Western Christianity, modern science, political liberalism, and Kantian morality are simply forms of decadence and idolatry because they make us passive recipients of received truths. The aesthetic dynamic of Dionysian creativity and destructiveness is lost and only the traditional and orthodox forms of knowledge are passed on to a passive and conformist herd of people. Illusions are treated as real; becoming reifies into being, particularity into universality; and modish fashion becomes mistaken for originality. Nietzsche is aware that, with an acceptance of a radical Kantian theory of knowledge, there is a real danger of skepticism. This is the very thing he wishes to avoid. For Nietzsche, reality is constituted through art as the human spirit "would sooner have the void for [its] purpose than be void of purpose."⁴¹ The collapse of the illusions of objectivity, epistemology, and foundationalism—rejection of the first principles of being, truth, and God—does not lead to skepticism, despair, pessimism, or negative nihilism. It only spurs Nietzsche on to a view of humanity as continually striving and creating ever new Apollonian forms of culture and social institutions.

Through a self-conscious revaluation of traditional values found in religion, politics, and morality; through an acceptance of the decisions and actions of the moment (theory of eternal return of the present); and through a reliance on the practical will to power, the self-overcoming individual as *Übermensch* constructs a moral and political universe that has meaning and purpose. Aesthetics has replaced metaphysics, and active nihilism and moral autonomy have replaced a subservient adaptation to a culture of death and revenge, as art transcends science and truth. Kantian epistemology and moral philosophy are transformed into Nietzschean aesthetics. We can only be creative, free, and wise in a world we ourselves have made; nobility and human dignity are grounded in self-determination. To live in a culture that denies existence in favor of an afterlife, heaven, political revolution, and so forth only results in humiliation, slavery, and moral tyranny. Individuals have throughout history sought peace and knowledge in a variety of different forms of decadence, including happiness (Aristotelianism), God and salvation (Christianity), duty and moral universals (Kantianism), pleasure and hedonism (utilitarianism), truth (scientism), and equality and liberty

(liberalism). Nietzsche characterizes these cultures as the “metaphysics of the hangman” that ultimately destroy any vestiges of Dionysian creativity. In *The Will to Power* he writes, “Man, imprisoned in an iron cage of errors, became a caricature of man, sick, wretched, ill-disposed, toward himself, full of hatred for the impulses of life, full of mistrust of all that is beautiful and happy in life, a walking picture of misery.”⁴²

Morality and truth are not discovered through contemplation, but lie in the character and courage of those willing to create their own moral values and truths beyond good and evil, beyond universal categories and the moral imperatives of religion, theology, and philosophy. The ultimate justification for morality lies in life-affirming praxis or action. “Everyone [must] invent *his own* virtue, *his own* categorical imperative.”⁴³ Nietzsche, relying on Aristotle and Kant, argues that self-determination and self-realization are the only principles of pure and practical reason that can resist the modern forms of tyranny. However, this is not easy as only the rarest of individuals are willing to challenge traditional authority and Enlightenment rationality as forms of idolatry. Those capable of accomplishing it will be able to re-create the lost heritage of Dionysus.

HISTORY OF WESTERN SCIENCE FROM PLATO TO THE PRESENT

Echoes of Nietzsche’s critique of Western science and Greek rationalism, as well as his critique of epistemology and foundationalism, are incorporated by Weber into his analysis of the disenchantment of traditional myths and ideologies in the process of rationalization.⁴⁴ In his important work on Weber, Wilhelm Hennis summarizes the connection between Weber and Nietzsche: “Weber accepted without any reservation Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the time: God is dead. He treated it as the ‘basic fact’ that we are fated to live in a ‘godless time, without prophets.’ All objective order of values deriving from the Christian conception of God breaks down. Weber is the first to have drawn the most radical scientific conclusions from Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism.”⁴⁵ In his famous but relatively unexplored essay, “Science as a Vocation” (1919), Weber accepts the idea that science has certain presuppositions or a priori technical values that account for its limits and problems. After first examining science as a social institution undergoing a process of bureaucratization and specialization in the United States and Germany, Weber turns to an analysis of the ethos and meaning of modern science.

By means of his tantalizingly brief and suggestive outline of the history of Western thought, Weber offers the reader an alternative to the normative imperatives of natural science. In his search for the meaning of “science,” he outlines a genealogy of the major periods of Western reason and science (*Wissenschaft*) from the ancient Greeks to the present. He describes the historical process of rationalization as the development of the formal logic and methods of science over time from Greek philosophy to early twentieth-century natural science. His

purpose is to outline this transformation of scientific knowledge from philosophy, politics, art, theology, and morality to its more truncated and contemporary form in natural science and neoclassical economics. Concomitant with this, there is a slow erosion in the search for values or substantive rationality in Western thought. Weber starts with the classical Greek view of knowledge as *episteme* (universal knowledge). Plato perfected the Greek inventions of the technical tools of concepts, logical method, and clear analytic thinking. He was able in the *Republic* to transform the search for universals and absolutes into questions about virtue and right action (ethics) and citizenship and the good life (political philosophy). Science focused on the movement out of the cave toward sunlight and self-enlightenment through the philosophical contemplation of the eternal questions of beauty, truth, and justice. It was a search for universal knowledge about physics, mathematics, and nature along with the quest for the good life and virtuous activity in the polis.

Science for the ancients meant philosophical contemplation of universal forms and eternal truths in the face of changing illusions and shadows. Weber refers specifically to the beginning of book 7 of Plato's *Republic* in which individuals are chained before a wall on which images are projected by a fire behind them. Blinded by the darkness and limited in movement by the chains, they mistook the images and illusions on the wall for reality. In time they began slowly to free themselves from their chains, turn around, and leave the cave for the sunlight where they saw objects more clearly and no longer as distorted images. Enlightenment was the search for light and life as manifested in the knowledge of true being. Science was a political philosophy that sought answers to questions about social justice, the good life, and the ideal state. It was Socrates and his followers who discovered the revolutionary dialectical method and formal concepts capable of attaining universal knowledge. "And from this it seemed to follow that if one only found the right concept of the beautiful, the good, or, for instance, of bravery, of the soul—or whatever—that then one could also grasp its true being."⁴⁶ With them began the search for the eternal knowledge of objective reality contained in the ideal concepts of politics, aesthetics, and morality. According to Weber, Platonic science sought practical knowledge about how to act rightly in Athenian life as a good citizen and friend. It helped instruct the Athenians about the nature of courage, moderation, wisdom, and justice. The distinguishing thing about Greek science is that it offered knowledge about the meaning of life and ultimate reality.

The next great period of scientific inquiry occurred during the fifteenth century with the Renaissance and its return to the Greek spirit after being mired in the scholasticism and mysticism of medieval Catholicism. With individuals such as Leonardo da Vinci, science now expressed itself in an art form of rational experimentation and in the controlling of experience. It was the precursor to modern natural science as experiments were undertaken to enhance theoretical

knowledge about nature in order to express it in exquisite works of art by the Italian masters. Experiments in physiology and biology were designed to help in drawing the human body. This was also a period of technical experimentation in art and music that was thought to lead to the clarification of the meaning of life through the study of biological science and true nature. In the seventeenth century, Galileo Galilei and Francis Bacon continued this form of empirical research based on careful observation and analytic thinking into astronomy and physics as they developed a mathematical and deterministic view of the natural world.

With the Protestant Reformation, science was closely attached to pietist theology since it was viewed as an expression of both the laws of nature and the laws of God. Weber tells us that the biologist Jan Swammerdam declared that the proof for God's existence was contained in the anatomy of a louse. Science from classical Greece to pietist theology was used as a tool for the search for meaning and truth whether in eternal forms, art, nature, or God. It represented a search for the significance and purpose of human action within the world—some standard by which to measure the end and goal of human life. But with the development of positivism in the nineteenth century everything changed. Science was transformed into a quantitative and mathematical calculation for achieving personal happiness and economic utility. Weber does not privilege any particular historical form of science over the others in his historical overview of the development of Western rationality. There is no teleological philosophy of history leading to the final form of natural science.

The older forms of science as ways to true being, art, God, and nature are viewed by positivists as illusory folly and replaced by natural science. But modern science cannot teach us anything about what is meaningful in the world. To make his point more emphatically Weber reiterates Tolstoy's statement: "Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: What shall we do and how shall we live?"⁴⁷ The world is constituted by mathematical and quantitative relationships expressing a blind and purposeless nature where everything is dead and void. Formal rationality is meaningless since it cannot speak to the fundamental cosmological and ethical questions about human life. It cannot tell us anything about reality, teleology, or metaphysics since its only purpose is to master life and dominate nature. It is only a useful technology for controlling our natural and social environment in more efficient and productive ways. It appears that Weber has taken Nietzsche's *Twilight of the Idols* (1888) as the foundation for his reading of the genealogy of Western rationalism from Platonic philosophy to modern physics and economics. But this development of rationality also represents the narrowing of human reason to the most technical and formal questions about the external and disenchanting world.

Weber makes reference to Nietzsche's "last man" who applies science as a technique and calculus for mastering utilitarian happiness. He is the most contemptible of modern individuals who is seen as a replacement for the overman

(*Übermensch*). In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche recounts the tale of Zarathustra the hermit and prophet who comes down the mountain after ten years of solitude to teach the people in the marketplace about the new human being—the overman. The overman is the individual who strives to improve himself through knowledge, hard work, spiritual development, and virtuous activity and who still has “chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star.” But Zarathustra is laughed at and jeered by those who do not understand his words. He then warns them of the coming of the last man who seeks only personal happiness and is “unable to despise himself.” There is no reflection, no dreaming, no seeking something beyond humanity itself; there is no longing for something other. There is only a bombastic arrogance and stultifying satisfaction with the present moment. The Faustian agreement with Mephistopheles has been lost. Community and friendship have been replaced by the need for security and protection; creativity and work by entertainment; exertion and effort by pleasure and satisfaction; and difference by equality and sameness. Exasperated by modernity, Nietzsche explodes: “Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.”⁴⁸ This is the world of the utilitarian who not only seeks immediate enjoyment and happiness, but who is incapable of reaching beyond herself to something greater and more noble and divine. These are the true believers of a herd religion who accept the common belief in good and evil. Zarathustra challenges them to reach beyond themselves to something greater and to question their accepted views of life. Weber continues the story but is no more optimistic of its ending. He recognizes that the scientific search for the mastery of life and pursuit of happiness is illusory since science is ethically meaningless. In the end, there is only the conformity and emptiness of the marketplace.

With the Protestant Reformation, scientific revolution, and the Enlightenment, there was a growing demystification and rationalization of society. Science was slowly replacing all forms of traditional knowledge about a world of meaning, enchantment, and mystery. Nature was being reduced to scientific principles and natural laws. The Protestants rejected what they viewed as Catholic idolatry and mysticism, and magical rites and enchanted sacraments, in favor of asceticism, professional vocation, specialized labor, and methodical, systematic work. But with the rise of modern science and the Enlightenment, religion came under closer scrutiny and disappeared as a significant public institution. This led to a situation where the institutions and values of capitalism generated by Protestantism continued after the decline of religion. With the advent of secular society, capitalism continued without its cultural supports and ethical foundations. In the famous lines at the end of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904–5), Weber surveys the human condition with a remarkable pessimism and resigned fatalism:

The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate

worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt.⁴⁹

The result is a society that became an iron cage locking those inside into a social machine that they neither understood nor controlled. Individuals became cogs in a specialized economy and bureaucratic state. Technical civilization overwhelmed traditional culture and its capacity for self-reflection in philosophy, art, and theology. As they became more efficient expressions of formal rationality, societies were created that were shallow and empty of broader economic and political purpose. Individuals were lost in the quest to satisfy the functional and administrative needs of the social system. Only the emptiness and the silence of nothingness could be heard.

Capitalism no longer needed religion to legitimate its activities resulting in a society that has fallen deeper and deeper into an abyss of mundane passions and repetitive activities. Rationalization produces the last man who is a specialist without spirit, sensualist without heart, a person who no longer seeks the truth or searches for meaning in life. Highly educated and specialized without direction or purpose, bound to the material world of pleasure but without feelings, passions, or desires. Even today with the development of cyber-capitalism in Silicon Valley, the machine only goes faster; it doesn't change its fundamental nature or its formal rationality.

PROPHETS OF POSITIVISM AND THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE

In his early essay, "Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" (1904), Weber distinguishes between empirical science and value judgments. He writes that "it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived."⁵⁰ This relationship between science and values is quite possibly the most difficult and interesting of Weber's ideas to unravel. It is the Gordian knot of his theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*). In "Science as a Vocation" (1919), he continues this same line of argument by insisting that a university professor should never impose his moral values or judgments upon an uncritical and powerless audience. The classroom should never be used as a pulpit for the profession of personal positions or political projects; lecturing should never be confused with demagoguery or prophecy. Weber's own critique of pure reason seems to be leveled against science as providing the foundation and justification for universal values to be used for social policy making, that is, political reforms and practical actions in the future. Rejecting demagogic commands and prophetic predictions, Weber directs his crit-

icisms at those who make moral claims about what ought to be done and what ought to occur. But at the very moment of his critique of science, at the very moment that a defense of positivist science would seem to be warranted, Weber quickly shifts gears and rejects the cornerstones of positivist science: realism and naturalism in the form of neoclassical economics. The relationship between facts and values, science and ethics is not as simple as it first appears in either work. Nowhere does Weber say that social science does not contain values nor that values may not be used as a basis for social criticism. When it comes to a consideration of history and culture, the past requires values to come alive in scientific inquiry. It is the future that is more normatively problematic for Weber, and this temporal dimension is tied to questions of authoritarian power and moral pluralism.

However much Weber insists on a strict separation of facts and values, however strongly he distinguishes between science and ethics, he immediately calls his own position into question in both of these essays, precipitating confusion surrounding his intentions and ideas about epistemology and method. After articulating this strict separation, after forcefully and convincingly arguing for a value-free science, he launches into an analysis of the underlying normative values of neo-Kantian social science in the essay on objectivity and the normative imperatives and technical interests found in natural science in the later essay on science as a vocation. As we have already examined in the previous subsection, Weber presents in "Science as a Vocation" a fascinating historical overview of the Western search for science and knowledge that leads to the decadent achievement of contemporary reason. However, rather unexpectedly, Weber takes a surprising turn. Underlying the logic, method, and concepts of modern science is a *Weltanschauung* geared to an optimistic faith in calculation, rational control, and technological progress. "Natural science gives us an answer to the question of what we must do if we wish to master life technically."⁵¹ Modern science is a theoretical reflection of the historical process of rationalization and industrialization. In a mechanical and deterministic age characterized by the fate of the iron cage, formal rationality, and administrative bureaucracy, individual behavior can be defined by predictive laws, causal explanations, and technical control. Rationalization has created a society that conforms to the methodological rules of positivism.

But this interpretation of science runs completely counter to Weber's own neo-Kantian view in the earlier essay that science is a cultural science (*Kulturwissenschaft*) interested in understanding particular historical events and the intentions and meanings of human action.⁵² These two views of science clash, but for what purpose? Has Weber outgrown his earlier ruminations on objectivity and methodology in science? Is he, as some have claimed, merely inconsistent and sloppy in his philosophy of social science? On the other hand, it has been argued by others that Weber's methodological purpose here is very subtle, if not ironic. Under the guise of presenting science as value-free knowledge, he is, in fact, arguing the opposite. Science is never neutral and "objective" but contains its own

imperatives to disenchantment and dehumanization, a metaphysics of hidden values about life, and presupposes a social system based upon the domination of social relations and nature. By joining together Weber's 1904 and 1919 essays, he appears to be creating an immanent critique of science's own normative and philosophical foundations.

An analysis of the relationship between science and ethics is further complicated by the fact that Weber examines the question of science from a number of different perspectives, including its relationship to epistemology, methodology, the process of rationalization, pedagogy, and public policy. Within each area there is a nuanced interpretation that highlights different aspects of the question of the normative foundations of modern science. Weber is critical of any kind of authoritarian proselytizing in the classroom since he is concerned with the intellectual well-being of the politically weak and marginal university students. He is, however, not referring to either epistemology or methodology, concept formation or theory construction within social science itself. This is generally where the confusion in an exegesis of Weber's writings lies. He is also concerned about the direct use of science to influence public policy and direct partisan politics. In the early turn-of-the-century essay on objectivity and method, he does not reject the use of values in the formation of concepts or in the application of methods in science. There appears to be a serious conflict between his epistemology and pedagogy. At one point he allows values and norms to play a role and at other times he does not. Is this the result of methodological confusion or insightful subtlety? And if values are crucial to the development of scientific concepts and theories, how could they not, therefore, play an equally important role in teaching social science in the classroom?

Running throughout Weber's philosophy of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*), there are a series of seemingly endless contradictions and unanswered questions that tend to undermine the validity and seriousness of his methodological writings: (1) Is there an irreconcilable conflict between principles of value freedom and value relevance, between science and ethics? (2) Are the social sciences caught between the merchant and prophet, that is, between knowledge as a technical science for commercial and business success and knowledge as a political activity? (3) What is the role of values in a method that encourages values in the formation of sociological questions and concepts (value relevance) and discourages it in teaching and public policy formation (value freedom)? (4) Is there a fundamental tension between a sociology that seeks causal explanations through nomological laws and one that historically reconstructs the meaning of social action and individual intentions—a conflict between methodology and epistemology? (5) Is there a conflict between two forms of objectivity: an objectivity of scientific method and an objectivity based on the scholarly integrity and subjective responsibility of the sociologist? To complicate matters even more, there are times in discussing the nature of science when Weber is not clear about whether he is referring to natural science or cultural science. Sometimes he simply lumps

the two together. This only further weakens the impact of his metatheoretical reflections on the nature of science. He never seems to reconcile these differences and inconsistencies in his writings, and the debate over the nature of sociology continues to this very day.

In "Science as a Vocation," Weber contends that "politics is out of place in the lecture-room" and "the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the academic platform."⁵³ He clearly rejects the personal opinions and sympathies of the professor and the use of value judgments in the halls of the academy. One interpretation of this essay is that Weber is closely following the Kantian tradition with its separation of pure and practical reason, science and morality. Thus Weber distinguishes between values applied to pure reason and the categories of the understanding, on the one hand, and to practical action and moral judgments on the other hand. The former is legitimate; the latter is not. Values are the necessary and universal condition for creating the historical categories of the cultural sciences. They are the only access we have to the external world and the only means by which we can experience our cultural and social reality. They are rejected, however, as the basis for teaching about political reform and public policy making. Joseph Schumpeter has written that Weber was ultimately concerned with the professionalism of economics and the integrity of scholarship, and worried that members of the Historical School, especially Wagner and Schmoller, had turned their classrooms into opportunities for ethical entertainment and political denunciations.⁵⁴ But this position denies the close personal and philosophical bond between Weber and the Historical School.

Hennis has thoughtfully noted that the call for value freedom is a call for neutrality in pedagogy, but not in his neo-Kantian epistemology or method of science.⁵⁵ This distinction must be kept in mind. In the neo-Kantian view of interpretive sociology, science cannot be constructed without values, while in a classroom lecture, they must be kept out. He provides the example of a Catholic and Protestant studying church history. What would be the basis for their critical evaluations? Their underlying value systems are so different that they could never achieve a common consensus and their values would eventually distort the integrity of their scholarship. However, from the point of view of Weber's philosophy of science, their different religious ethics provide them with the basis for forming their sociological categories, their historical questions, and their scientific methods.

An interpretation that has received little attention emphasizes a different target for Weber's theory of value freedom. The American academy since Talcott Parsons has generally interpreted Weber's sociology as preserving the integrity and objectivity of science over the intrusion of subjective opinions and moral values. But closer scrutiny reveals that under the guise of a justification of science, Weber, in fact, is examining its own hidden values and moral assumptions. He claims that science is a vocation, an inner calling and passionate devotion to a historically and socially defined "way of life" and distinctive inner personality.

Science is defined as the modern, secular form of religious experience. By condemning demagoguery and prophecy in the classroom, what is he, in fact, criticizing? At the most obvious level, a critique of politics and prophecy is a rejection of poor scholarship. However, it is also a critique of a particular form of science that validates its theories by explaining human action through universal laws, mechanical causality, and the anticipation of future events. Positivist social science is the rationalized and modern form of prophecy. According to Weber, this is the method of neoclassical and Marxist economics. Professional academic prophecy replaces empirical, cultural, and historical analysis with an abstract science geared to theoretical predictions, technical control, and administrative organization. Thus Weber's critique of the demagogue and prophet is, in reality, a disguised critique of positivism. The latter produces a form of science that contains the *a priori* values of natural science, social technology, and utilitarianism; it is the science of the last man in a disenfranchised and disenchanted universe who lectures on the scientific imperative of what ought to occur or ought to be done by reducing causal explanations to empirical predictions.⁵⁶

From Weber's perspective, sociology is a cultural and historical science that attempts to understand the past, not determine the future scientifically. Weber is criticizing the notion that science itself is beyond all values and does not foster its own normative agenda on the world. By calling "natural science" a vocation, he is declaring that it is the religious ethic of the "last man who invented happiness in the marketplace." It is the rationalist ethic of a disenchanted world living in a mechanical and deterministic environment of the iron cage. By claiming that politics and ethics have no place in the classroom, Weber is subtly asking us to develop a more sophisticated critique of pure reason and historical science. He is condemning the ethics of positivism with its claims to universality and exclusivity. "Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take on the form of impersonal forces."⁵⁷ The search for universal laws of natural and social development creates a culture in which lies buried the fate of modernity. He fears turning the university into an ethic of the greengrocer selling the local produce of positivism and disenchantment. For Weber, both science and the grocery store are forms of utility that produce technical knowledge of theoretical abstractions and the market. They are both forms of a theology of disenchantment. In this revaluation of scientific objectivity as a form of human existence, science becomes an expression of the contemporary relationship between profession and confession as Weber digs deeper to uncover the connection between Enlightenment science and the ethic of social technology and administrative control.

In the middle of "Science as a Vocation," there is a discussion of Leo Tolstoy's view of natural science and the existential meaning of life followed by a quick and uneasy break as Weber moves into his inquiry about objectivity and neutrality in the classroom. The transition is too abrupt, too contrived to be accidental. Weber seems to be making a substantive claim through his stylistic contrivance and dra-

matic shift in content. Throughout his essay he appears to separate facts and values, science and politics, and professors and prophets. However, a closer look reveals that these distinctions are not maintained consistently throughout his argument. Science cannot speak to questions about the meaning of human life, not because it does not possess values or normative presuppositions, but because its values are antithetical to life. According to Weber, natural science has the wrong set of values—technical control and the domination of nature. Using the same logic, he argues that university professors should not profess or proselytize in the classroom. But again the justification for his argument lies not in the presumed objectivity and neutrality of the scientist or the elimination of sectarian ethics and politics from the classroom. Rather, the ultimate reason can be found in Weber's rejection of the false values and presuppositions of the professors of natural sciences as inappropriate to the cultural and historical sciences. Technical or instrumental reason is incapable of understanding questions about culture, history, and values. Objectivity and neutrality must be maintained in the university so that it will not be overrun by the normative assumptions and hidden values of universal laws, technical control, and positivist prediction. The essay ends in a most ironic fashion with Weber's critique of objectivity and formal rationality in both the natural sciences and the academy.

Two German interpreters of this period, Siegfried Landshut and Karl Löwith, have argued that Weber's purpose in formulating his theory of science was not to eliminate values but rather to articulate publicly the normative assumptions that underlay modern science—naturalism and technical control.⁵⁸ Löwith summarizes his argument in the following statement: "What Max Weber's call for a value-free science sought none the less to demonstrate was that, in spite of science's emancipation, its 'facts' were underpinned by specific preconceived value-judgments of a moral and semi-religious type, some of which even approximated to fundamental principles. . . . Weber's call for the value freedom of scientific judgment does not represent a regression to pure scientificity."⁵⁹ Following the continuity of his early neo-Kantian reflections on science and objectivity, Weber recognizes that scientific objectivity is always achieved within the framework of subjective categories. These are also the social conditions that frame the ultimate meaning of modern vocational life and human existence. Just as the inner-worldly asceticism of the Puritan ethic resulted in the need for an objective criterion of salvation in a professional calling, so, too, has modern natural science sought a [false] objectivity in a meaningless world with its drive for specialized knowledge. In the end, the objectivity of the natural sciences becomes a form of inner-worldly asceticism based on personal drives and a professional ethos of life within a disenchanted world. The profane world and modern science are both meaningless, and objectivity is ultimately carved out by a particular way of life of the subject. But in the classroom even this ethic cannot be confessed or promulgated. Positivism is rejected as professing an inappropriate universal standard for scientific knowledge.

A central focus of Weber's sociology is on value judgments as expressed in culture, action, and institutions. Sociologists investigate the meaning and consequences of social norms as they affect the purpose and application of values, as well as how they influence cultural and political legitimation, authority, and ideology in society. The objectivity of science has been displaced from an objectivity of experience (empiricism) and thought (rationalism) to an objectivity of the scholar's own dedication, responsibility, and intellectual integrity. The truth of scientific knowledge lies not in objectivity itself but in the professional character and scholarly attitude of the investigator. Moving beyond the Enlightenment, Weber holds that truth resides in consciousness and a particular mode of being and way of life (*Lebensführung*) that strives for self-consciousness and rational clarity. Weber's neo-Kantian epistemology has removed the foundations of science from social facts to the evaluative ideas and private decisions of the investigator. Following Heinrich Rickert, he maintains that all knowledge is based on subjective categories; all knowledge is preconditioned by values. This is why sociology requires the creation of ideal types and social categories based on the value relevance of an investigator's particular point of view.

In his essay on method, "Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," Weber clearly stakes out his method in the Kantian traditions of Rickert and Nietzsche. The world is "an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events."⁶⁰ As such, this infinite reality is meaningless and unknowable, what Kant had called in the eighteenth century "the thing-in-itself." Only a finite portion of this reality is knowable. Sociological categories are, therefore, necessary to delineate particular historical events as relevant and meaningful. Reality is socially constructed by historians and sociologists who create what is worth knowing. Weber appreciates that "'culture' is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which *human beings* confer meaning and significance."⁶¹ Historical and cultural scientists are not searching for universal causal laws or for a mirror reflection of reality. Weber rejects both the rationalist search for historical laws (naturalism) and the empiricist copy theory of truth (realism). He rejects positivism and natural science as possible foundations for sociological inquiry and makes a sharp contrast between the methods and values appropriate for the cultural (*Kulturwissenschaften*) and the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*).

The sociologist creates history out of the particular interests and cultural values existing at the time, that is, value relevance (*Wertbeziehung*). "Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to us due to their connection with our values."⁶² And since, as we have already seen, there can be no scientific justification of any particular set of values, science cannot impose itself on the types of questions and issues under investigation or the methodologies applied. Weber's theory of objectivity and

value freedom frees sociology to ask any question that it deems relevant. Positivism, by limiting itself to the method of the natural sciences, arbitrarily restricts the scientific approaches and scholarly concerns it can publicly raise. Weber is critical of the lack of diversity and pluralism in the classroom and the hidden values contained in modern science (rationalization) and economics (productivity). He proposes a question that is rarely asked: Why start economics with the value of productivity rather than with the ideal of social justice? Values cannot be kept out of scientific methodologies, research, or concept and theory formation. Therefore, value freedom cannot mean a freedom from values (objective neutrality), but rather a freedom from absolute and universal values that exclude others. Value freedom and value relevance are intimately related methodological concepts. They are not opposed to each other. And both are historically related to the process of disenchantment. Value freedom does not deny the importance of values in forming the fundamental categories of science, that is, value relevance. It only demands that no particular value has a priority over others. It also implies that values once chosen should not distort empirical research and the scientific accumulation of information. Weber calls for a freedom from universal values, since there are no longer any binding public ideals or universally accepted social norms; his criticism represents a rejection of Platonic elements in social science. Values are ultimately subjective categories and personal decisions without which science would be impossible. In spite of this, science must free itself from any residual claims to universal truths. Weber wishes to create a science free from unconscious judgments that exclude other values by definition. Nietzsche's polytheism and nihilism are joined with Rickert's neo-Kantian philosophy of science to form a fascinating critique of positivism.

RATIONALIZATION AND THE ECLIPSE OF REASON

In the methodological context, the call for value freedom is not to get beyond values, but to make them public and open to discussion. This involves investigating the normative assumptions and value judgments inherent in modern science. Löwith states that the epistemological goal of the scientist is "the radical dismantling of 'illusions.'" The problems and issues investigated by science are first highlighted as normative and value-laden. According to Weber, science can neither deduce particular historical events from universal laws nor can it deduce binding norms and ideals from empirical reality. Though he appears to argue that science must be kept distinct from value judgments, this is because he is attempting to argue that the hidden values of science must not themselves be privileged. In rejecting naturalism and realism, in articulating his neo-Kantian theory of knowledge with its values and concepts, and in showing the underlying connection between science and vocation, and science and a particular way of life, Weber is arguing for a moral nihilism and polytheism that lie deeper than scientific rea-

son and that result from the modern “collision of values.” By raising the question of the meaning of science, he is attempting to reintegrate science and ethics by moving beyond functional rationality and the process of rationalization.

The Greek view of science as *episteme* or knowledge of universal truth, essence, and form has disappeared as modern knowledge has simply become a particular form of reasoning to accomplish particular ends. Science has become a formal rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) of technical means. The substantive rationality (*Wertrationalität*), or practical ends, of premodern science toward equality, fraternity, and justice has been lost in a society in which means have become ends in themselves. The formal rationality of Enlightenment science that has been embedded in social institutions is now an independent force of nature. This is what Weber refers to as the tragic process of rationalization and the fate of public disenchantment—it is a world without myth, meaning, and hope. Practical reason has been exiled from the iron cage. Weber continues his earlier argument that modern science contains its own hidden assumptions about reality when he states, “Science contributes to the technology of controlling life by calculating external objects as well as man’s activities.”⁶³ It already contains a priori values that influence the type of knowledge and objects of experience that it seeks to explain. By excluding ethical and political values, science represses self-reflection on its own moral imperatives and hidden assumptions at the same time that it becomes useless in the face of questions about the purpose of life and the meaning of human existence. It replaces one set of ethical values with another set of technical values. Science cannot respond to Schopenhauer’s existentialism or Nietzsche’s nihilism.

The historical account of the rationalization of society by Weber begins with modern industry with its calls for greater formal efficiency, capital accounting, division of labor, factory discipline, and productivity and develops into the rationalization of the state through the formal impersonality of its routinized bureaucracy, organizational hierarchy, technical expertise, and efficiency of decision making. This mentality pervades all aspects of social life and institutions. Rogers Brubaker summarizes the extent of rationalization as it permeates the economy, law, state administration, and religious ethics: “In each of these institutional spheres, rationalization has involved the depersonalization of social relations, the refinement of techniques of calculation, the enhancement of the social importance of specialized knowledge, and the extension of technically rational control over both natural and social processes.”⁶⁴ Material well-being coincides with administrative domination and the loss of individual freedom, technical control over nature with the growth of the iron cage, scientific and technological progress with disenchantment and nihilism, and formal rationality with depersonalization and alienation. As society becomes more formally rational, there is a decline in traditional liberalism, democracy, and the public sphere. There are two elements to the tragic fate of humanity running concurrently through modernity—one is the loss of freedom in bureaucratic and formal organizations and the

other is the loss of meaning in disenchantment and science. Disenchantment occurs with the reduction of knowledge to calculation and control where “the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations.”⁶⁵ Rationalization, on the other hand, appears with the rise of impersonal and technical forces that determine human action from above in the form of economic markets, industrial factories, political bureaucracies, and governmental administration. In a rationalized society, the intentions and meaning of human action are more and more reduced to the language and values of neo-classical economics and marginal utility theory, that is, to the imperatives of work and power. This tension between substantive and formal rationality, which characterizes the whole of Weber’s theory of modernity, Max Horkheimer has referred to as the eclipse of reason.

What Weber is doing with his theory of objectivity and science is preserving the autonomy of ethics in the face of the hidden values and assumptions of modern science and neoclassical economics. If he did not appear to separate science and ethics initially, then the values of science—technical control, efficiency, and domination over nature—would overwhelm the pluralism of ethics. And this is the ultimate goal of knowledge, to preserve the integrity and diversity of ethics and the future possibilities of human self-realization. The purpose of his phenomenology and history of science is to protect ethics and moral pluralism from modern science, rather than to protect science from ethical prejudices and normative distortions. That is, ethics must be protected from the universalizing tendency of the natural sciences. The strict separation of subject and object, fact and values, and science and ethics is a product of positivism. Weber’s real unstated goal is the reintegration of historical science and ethics, Rickert’s neo-Kantian method and Aristotle’s ethics of self-realization. The debate about the relationship between science and freedom from value judgments (*Werturteilsfreiheit*) had been in the air since the 1850s with the older German Historical School (Wilhelm Roscher, Bruno Hildebrand, and Karl Knies); it picks up steam with the famous methodological dispute in the 1880s between Gustav Schmoller and Carl Menger; and, finally, explodes on the German scene again in 1910 with Weber’s publication of a response to Eugen von Philippovich’s paper the previous year at the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (Association for Social Policy). Von Philippovich, a neo-classical economist, had written a piece on the national economy and productivity. Weber argues that this introduced a hidden value judgment about productivity that was inappropriate, precipitating an intense philosophical discussion within the association about the relationship between knowledge and interests (*Erkenntnisinteresse*). Weber’s essays, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics” (1917) and “Science as a Vocation” (1919), were his responses to these debates within the social sciences.⁶⁶

A final distinction should be made between Weber’s pedagogical statements about valuation and his epistemology of value relevance that recognizes the under-

lying values of the natural and social sciences toward explanation and control, on the one hand, and understanding and interpretation on the other hand. Valuations in the sense of political choice of worth, options, and course of activity are denied by Weber. But an ethical critique of modernity; its formal rationality; its destruction of traditional values, culture, and individuality; and its creation of an iron cage in a world that has lost its meaning for human life is not clearly developed. Weber's theory of social critique demands a separation of pedagogy and epistemology, politics and ethics, social planning of the future (natural science) and social critique of the past (historical science), and *techne* (technical knowledge) and *phronesis* (political wisdom). Peter Lassman and Irving Velody recognize that the "tortured quality of Weber's thought resides in the pathos of an intensely political thinker who refuses to produce an explicit political philosophy," or to clarify the relationship between science and politics.⁶⁷ But they both argue that Weber makes critical judgments about modernity in terms of whether or not it encourages and nurtures individual character development and self-actualization. The whole of Weber's theory of rationalization and disenchantment represents a fundamental normative critique of the institutions and values of modern society.

A central question implied throughout Weber's methodological writings focuses on Nietzsche's perspectivism and nihilism. It comes to the surface when Weber asks: "Which of the warring gods should we serve?" Referring to Nietzsche, Weber remarks that just as the Greeks lived in a polytheistic world enchanted by competing demons and gods, Titans and Olympians, so, too, in modern society, there are many irreconcilable metaphysical and ethical perspectives. Science is incapable of choosing between them and the professor must not be a self-styled adjudicator. Weber argues that university professors must present only the scientific explanations and causes of social action in as objective a manner as possible and must exclude, as far as possible, any value judgments about public policy and social action. Values are incommensurable and cannot be universalized in the modern world. Thus professors cannot champion a particular political or social cause in an arena where there is no public debate or alternative views presented. But Weber is talking about the process of valuation here, that is, the professor acting as leader, prophet, politician, or demagogue. Throughout his works Weber warns about giving "directions in practical life." However, in spite of this, the values embedded in the methods, theories, analyses, and public presentations of the cultural and historical sciences are an essential part of the intellectual life of the university and cannot be restricted or prohibited by false claims to epistemological neutrality. In the classroom normative perspectives must be joined with a firm desire to maintain the highest standards of scholarly objectivity, professional integrity, and vocational commitment. Weber is quite aware that positivist neutrality and objectivity favor the power and privilege of the ruling class and state bureaucracy. Values and scholarship form an integral theoretical bond that finds expression in Weber's critical discourse on modernity and theories of rationalization and disenchantment.

Weber's apparent methodological inconsistencies become less striking when we no longer translate his call for nomological laws, causal analysis, sociological explanations, and ethical neutrality within the orthodox tradition of Enlightenment positivism. When they are examined within the framework of his own theories of ideal types, objective possibility, adequate causation, and evaluative ideas, they take on different meanings. That is, when he is understood as part of the debate within neo-Kantian epistemology and philosophy of social science, the Historical School of economics and law, and the radical perspectivism and nihilism of Nietzsche, the ideals of objectivity and neutrality place Weber in a different philosophical universe that is alien to much of Anglo-American sociology.⁶⁸ In the end, Weber undertakes his historical and cultural analysis of the meaning of human action from a perspective that is value-laden but free from universal value judgments. Without values, social science, as interpretive sociology, is impossible; without values, we cannot begin to examine the nature of society or history. However, science cannot be the arbiter of universal ethical and political truths because, as Nietzsche never tires of telling us, there are no longer any universal idols—all the gods are dead. Science is thus just another cognitive point of view. The call for neutrality is not a call for realism, naturalism, or value exclusionism, but a recognition of the fundamental relativity that lies at the heart of social science. It is a call that drives us back to Nietzsche, the founder of nihilism, not to David Hume, the founder of positivism. When values are necessarily used, we must be methodologically cautious. We must be aware that they help us provide just another interpretation of social reality, since, in the end, all science is interpretation.⁶⁹

CLASSICAL HUMANISM AND HISTORICAL ECONOMICS

There may be no immediate way out of these methodological difficulties but an interestingly new and insightful perspective has come to light with the writings of the German scholar, Wilhelm Hennis. Hennis argues that the secret to unearthing Weber's intentions lies in his classical background. Weber held a number of distinguished positions in political economy throughout his lifetime. Sociology grew out of his various interests in public law, history, and political economy. By returning to the intellectual and philosophical roots of nineteenth-century German political economy, Hennis rediscovers Weber's meaning of "science" as resting in the classical political science of ancient Greece: Economics is thus a science of the quality of humanity, a political science of communal life concerned with issues of morality, virtue, and social justice.⁷⁰ Rejecting the science of David Hume, Auguste Comte, and Emile Durkheim, Hennis places Weber's political economy in the tradition of Aristotle, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Alexis de Tocqueville. The later development of social science is nurtured within the broader context of moral and political philosophy. Its goal is to help in the transformation and perfection of the human being and in the revealing of the

connections between social institutions and types of human behavior. Weber raises ancient philosophical and ethical questions within the context of the empirical and historical studies of sociology.

Weber's sociology mirrors classical political science since Aristotle, too, focused on the various types of persons and virtues produced by changes in the forms of political constitutions in an oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The nature of the citizen and virtuous activity changed with the form of the state and the organization and values of its social, political, and economic institutions.⁷¹ Aristotle in the *Politics* inquired into how different societies based on the principles of wealth, virtue, or freedom created correspondingly different types of human beings. Human potential can only be realized through concrete historical social institutions. He also empirically examined the different constitutions of Athens, Carthage, Crete, and Sparta as he searched for the best and most virtuous political community. Weber raises the same general question with regards to modernity by asking how capitalist institutions and the ascetic culture and ethics of Puritanism changed the personality of the modern man and woman. His central concern was with the fate of humanity in face of the frightening onslaught of the process of cultural and institutional rationalization and disenchantment in the iron cage.

Hennis digs deeper into Weber's earliest writings as he makes the distinction between the tradition of German national economy (*Nationalökonomie*) and English economics. As Weber states in his 1895 *Freiburg Inaugural Address*, "The science of political economy is a *political* science."⁷² As in Aristotelian political science, economics is subordinate to the broader communal and political needs of the polis. By making this revelation Weber is linking science to ethics, and economics to political science. Science and scholarship are a form of practical reason and political activity. This is very similar to the statement by Wilhelm Roscher in his *Outline of Lectures on Political Economy* (1843): "Political economics (*Staatswirtschaft*) is not merely a 'Chrematistik,' an art of acquiring wealth; it is a political science based on evaluating and governing people."⁷³ The goal of political economy is practical knowledge (*phronesis*) for the establishment of the common good and social justice based on the Aristotelian ideal of political science. It is knowledge about the changing world that replaces the art (*techne*) of unnatural acquisition with the wisdom of politics by means of an integration of ethics, politics, and economics.

Using the opportunity of a survey sponsored by the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* about the agrarian situation in eastern Germany, Weber investigates at the beginning of 1892 the changing social conditions, population problem, and agrarian transformations in the East Elbian estates in Prussia. There is certainly a connection here between his early interests in agrarian policy and the decline of imperial Rome and the German government's agricultural policy in East Elbe. In both cases there is an emphasis on large agricultural estates and the shortage of farm labor. This work is also important for another reason since it represents a synthesis of

economic policy and theory. At the time of his report to the *Verein* in 1893, government policy was favoring the right-wing Junkers to the detriment of German peasants and small farmers living along the eastern border of the country. With the growing commercialization of agriculture, the dismantling of the patriarchal form of communal cultivation, depression of wages and declining living standards of agricultural workers and small farmers, and the unintended consequences of public policy, German workers were being slowly replaced by Polish immigrants. At the same time the old landed aristocracy was displaced by a new class of agricultural capitalists and autocratic employers. The social organization of production and the life order were radically altering as the old feudal obligations in the manorial system broke asunder with the advent of the proletarianization of rural workers through the introduction of wage labor and subsistence market wages.

According to Weber, there was a danger that the eastern portion of the German nation was being economically, socially, and militarily destabilized, thereby seriously undermining the political power of the state. The old patriarchal and aristocratic system was being displaced, which had tragic consequences for the German nation.⁷⁴ There was a growing conflict brewing between the interests of capitalism and German nationalism. The Poles were replacing German farmworkers because of their willingness to accept the appalling work conditions found there. Weber feared the loss of the old independent spirit and moral self-reliance of the peasantry for the nation as a whole. By arguing for the state support of peasants and small farmers through land redistribution and internal colonization and by rejecting the claims of the Junkers, Weber applies scholarship to public policy, thereby linking science and politics. Taking a position firmly within the Historical School of Knies, Roscher, and Schmoller, he defines the science of economics as a human science whose goal is the examination of the nature and quality of human beings and their relation to the economic and social conditions of life.⁷⁵ In 1897 Schmoller wrote, "From a mere theory of market and exchange, a kind of business economics which at one time threatened to become a class-weapon of the propertied, it [economics] has once again become a great moral and political science."⁷⁶ Modern empirical science has been joined with Aristotle's moral science and theory of virtuous activity and social justice.

Weber rejects the position of theoretical science as having a Platonic interest in social technology and engineering and the Marxian notion that science is used by the dominant class for apologetics and ideological justification. Weber regards British economics from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall as normatively biased by its interests in wealth creation and productivity. The neoclassical claims to neutrality were, in fact, laden with hidden and unarticulated values of chrematistics or wealth acquisition (*Erwerbswirtschaft*). The German Historical School, on the other hand, consciously attempted to reconnect and reconcile economics with issues of social justice and a critique of capitalism. Members of this school were academic socialists who held that science was a historical and empirical inquiry,

not a search for pure theory or universal laws. Weber views the modeling of British neoclassical economics on the paradigm of natural science the result of the process of rationalization. Its call for value freedom only strengthened the tie between science and chrematistics. Thus, the notions of objectivity and neutrality reinforced the methodological and theoretical bias of the search for wealth over justice. That is, the call for a positivistic science reinforced a particular normative position. It was not neutral but had a distinct political and ethical agenda that he rejected. Taking a quite different view, Weber argues that an understanding of the scientific nature of German economics rests in the classical tradition of political science. Science plays a role in the cultivation of a type of humanity, of the inner core of the human personality, and of the values and ideals of the political community. At its heart is a diagnosis of the social pathology of modernity and the dream for a better humanity.

Hennis stresses that this view of economics as a political and human science opens a new avenue of Weberian analysis. Remnants of the traditional approach to economics may be found in the Historical School to which Hennis turns. They, too, reject the naturalism and positivism of theoretical science. Quoting from Knies's book, *Political Economy from the Historical Point of View* (1853), Hennis argues that it represents an important clarification of Weber's ideas on these issues. As a former professor of Weber, Knies was very influential in the development of his economic thought. According to Knies, political economy "seeks to solve the problems arising in the life of people and state. . . . [Since it] contributes to the solution of the moral-political problems of the whole, it is therefore enjoined to take its place with the *moral and political sciences*."⁷⁷ The Historical School sought to incorporate political economy with issues of social justice, political judgment, and social responsibility. The ends and goals of economics lie outside of the discipline itself, which is the reason why Weber separates science and ethics. The science of neoclassical economics, on the other hand, is a "value free," ideal type because it is a pure theoretical construct abstracted from the real economic and historical world. This is the tradition of John Stuart Mill and the British economists. But Hennis continues that this school of thought is of no interest to Weber. It is the analysis of the political and cultural values that underlie the economic policy of the German state that fascinates him.

Rejecting the view that the purpose of science is to serve class interests, protect natural rights, maximize utility, acquire property, or discover theoretical and historical laws, Weber writes, "The ultimate goal of our science must remain that of cooperating in the *political* education of our nation."⁷⁸ For Hennis, Weber's position is that the ultimate purpose of political economy is to educate the individual, cultivate the personality, serve human needs, and stir the soul. He concludes his major work on Weber with the sentence: "Here it is not a question of securing interests or comfort, but rather the unfolding of the power of the soul, an unfolding that appeared to be possible not on an individual basis, but rather

communally, associatively, ultimately in the ancient sense of *politics*.”⁷⁹ Weber develops his political instincts not in the form of a political philosophy but as a political economist who measures the individual against the empirical social condition, or “conduct of life” (*Lebensführung*). His focus is upon the relationship between the conduct of life and personality (*Persönlichkeit*) development. He reproduces the classical philosophical question within modern sociology by raising the question anew. The overarching theme running through his works is the connection between a form of social action within a historically specific set of social relationships, structures, and cultural values and a certain type of person and ideal of humanity. The calling of the Protestant ethic, the spirit of capitalism, the rationality and conformity of bureaucratic organizations, vocational science, and the gentlemanly education of the Confucian literati produce a certain type of human person (*Menschen-tum*). He traces the character development and social life of the inner-directed, ascetic Puritan who follows the rational conduct, professional calling, and capitalist spirit of a competitive market economy and the metaphysics of neo-Calvinist theology. Further societal rationalization and disenchantment in the Enlightenment limit the range of human ideals and the potentialities of self-realization; they produce a modern tragedy of unrealized hopes and reified social relationships. Questions about the institutions of social life and historical forms of self-development represent inquiries into the meaning of social existence and the existential possibilities of human life in general. Lassman and Velody have written regarding the theme of personality and life orders: “In so far as this theme implies a moral and political dimension in which the question of the possible forms of existence for mankind under modern conditions is raised, then it is clearly an extension, in a different vocabulary, of the classical question of the ‘good society.’”⁸⁰

In the *Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (1916), the Confucian literati are viewed as individuals without an inner personality core, unified way of life, or driving ethical tension that directs human activity toward the ascetic control and domination of an external and profane world. Rather, adjustment and conformity replace confrontation and domination in their ethic of propriety and tradition. Though having instincts for utilitarian self-interest, the Confucian administrator is more concerned with dignified behavior, genteel appearances, and an outer self-control of emotions. There is no restless spirit or troubling demon driving the individual to transform the world according to the ethical imperatives of religion. Finally, with the Enlightenment rejection of religion and metaphysics, the core and formative element of a strong, inner-directed personality is lost, as the modern individual is overwhelmed by the great calamity (*Verhängnis*) of modernity—the mechanistic and deterministic fate of industrial capitalism, technological rationalization, scientific formalism, and a disciplined workplace. Weber traces the character development of human beings (*Menschen-tum*) from the “full and beautiful human being” of the Athenian polis to the frag-

mented isolation of the middle-class prisoner of the iron cage.⁸¹ Critical social theory entails continuous value judgments throughout. Each form of society and its distinctive conduct of life (*Lebensführung*) produces a certain type of individual (*Persönlichkeit*). Whether examining medieval trading societies, the German peasants of East Elbe, the Protestant ethic, or the relation between the economy and society, Weber empirically and “scientifically” examines the historical and social conditions of Nietzsche’s “last man.” This analysis of the rationalization and disciplining of the soul is what Hennis sees as Weber’s contribution to the classical tradition. He attempted to integrate modern empirical analysis with the moral concerns of classical political thought. According to Hennis, it is this relationship between personality development (the soul of humanity) and the cultural values and social institutions that constituted the central theme in Weber’s works from his early historical sociology to his sociology of religion. This runs against the mainstream academic tradition in Germany that has held that it was his theory of rationalization or his historical research into the origins of capitalism that provided the integrative force to his works.

Weber also maintains in his *Freiburg Inaugural Address* that economics is a science of humanity that “investigates above all else the *quality of the human beings* who are brought up in those economic and social conditions of existence,” as well as in the dignity and virtue of humanity.⁸² And Hennis in an interesting twist of interpretation maintains that the driving force behind Weber’s writings is the freedom of evaluative judgment (*Werturteilsfreiheit*). That is, Weber struggles for an intellectual freedom from the underlying presumptions of modernity—the Enlightenment, modern science, and political liberalism—and the prejudice that forms “like mildew upon [the] imagination,” as it searches for technical knowledge and social domination.⁸³ He likens this to Marx’s critique of bourgeois science. Weber seeks a science whose ultimate purpose is to help make rational evaluations, sober judgments, and prudent policy decisions. The goal of knowledge is not *techne* but the ancient form of *phronesis* (moral knowledge) and *prudentia* (prudence).⁸⁴ It represents an ethic of moral responsibility and an integration of reason and virtue, passion and responsibility, and ethics and moderation toward the creation of a kind of individual who possesses a rational inner-core of spiritual values and virtue. Economics (and thus also sociology) is a way of life and moral science that enhances our ability of developing an inner personality and moral imperative with a strong sense of identity, freedom, and integrated purpose of life; it produces an academic calling of the will to power in the face of the meaningless abyss and fate of modernity. The search for knowledge is a virtuous activity based upon reasoned judgment, moral responsibility, and general passionate commitment to the political community and nation. For Hennis, this is Weber’s view of the complete human being and the “highest form of humanity.”⁸⁵ As in the classical Greek tradition, there is an integration of practical science and ethics. Keith Tribe also agrees with this general interpretation of Weber, for he has written that “Weber has been shown to be a figure whose work

belongs as much to classical political theory as to a more modern consideration of social and economic structures and processes.”⁸⁶ Weber’s early sociology and economics have their roots in an Aristotelian theory of ethics and politics.

Hennis offers the following observation in an essay on political judgment and science concerning Weber’s overall position on value freedom: “The presentation of scientific matters could only be educative, only then lead to clarity and thence be of service to moral values, as long as the teacher refrained from the expression of his own evaluations—*so that the discussion of values, i.e. the problematization of every standpoint, could be furthered.*”⁸⁷ The goal of classroom discussion is the unfettered analysis of future possibilities. Science is to be used for opening communication and public deliberation about issues of ethics and politics. It empirically reveals the relationships between modern social institutions and ways of life—modern liberalism, the iron cage, and the impersonality of rationalized society—and the type of individual it produces—the specialist lost in a meaningless world and the sensualist encased in all-consuming pleasures. Modern social relations and culture create individuals who are narcissistic and empty of meaning and purpose in life. As opposed to the ascetic Protestant, the modern capitalist lives in a disenchanted world of domination without ethical bearing or aesthetic direction. Thus, according to Hennis, Weber’s central theoretical interest lay in the question of the nature of humanity (*Typus Mensch*) produced by modern society. These are exactly the same themes introduced at the philosophical level by Nietzsche. The latter offered us profound insights into the moral condition of nihilism with its utilitarian decadence and mass conformity before the depersonalized altar of modernity. Values have become rationalized in the service of technical discipline and formal organization. They have fled the public sphere as ethical life becomes more improbable every day. In the end, science cannot determine the outcome of the debate; it can only offer clarity of options and implications. From Hennis’s perspective, Weber is the social philosopher of the historical fate and existential condition of humanity. He has written a scientific study of the birth of the modern tragedy for the purposes of the preservation of the common good of the nation and communal and self-enlightenment.

Hennis does not spend much time discussing the specific nature of Weber’s ethical philosophy because as a follower of Nietzsche’s nihilism and nominalism there are infinite possibilities of values, none of which can claim universal validity. However, a number of other authors have argued that Weber does possess a particular value system that includes the ideals of neo-Kantian rationality, moral autonomy and self-determination, personal integrity and noble dignity, and dedication to an academic calling.⁸⁸ Weber proclaims in his public speech, “We do not want to train up feelings of well-being in people, but rather those characteristics we think constitute the greatness and nobility of our human nature.”⁸⁹ In a later essay on the meaning of ethical neutrality penned toward the end of his life, Weber comments that “every single important activity and ultimately life as a whole, if it is not to be permitted to run on as an event in nature but is instead to

be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul—as in Plato—chooses its own fate, i.e., the meaning of its activity and existence.”⁹⁰ And it is ultimately the role of the scientist to engage in moral and political evaluation of economic phenomena as a whole, since there is a strong suspicion and skepticism about the institutions and values of rationalization and capitalist society. This attitude leads to a continuous and unrelenting tension in his works between his Aristotelian, Kantian, and Nietzschean striving for a strong and virtuous personality, on the one hand, and the opposing forces of a disenchanted and rationalized universe on the other hand.

Chapter 3

EMILE DURKHEIM

GREEK POLIS AND THE SOLIDARITY OF THE *CONSCIENCE COLLECTIVE*



As in the case with Karl Marx and Max Weber, Emile Durkheim was also trained in the classical tradition of ancient Greece.¹ It was this background that influenced his view of sociology and his theories of human nature, community solidarity, social problems, and political ideals. From his doctoral thesis on Baron de Montesquieu to his empirical writings on the division of labor, anomie, and suicide, from his theories of organic solidarity and social justice to his later pedagogical writings on moral education and the community, it was his appropriation of classical antiquity that shaped his sociological perspective. The whole of his social theory is bound by the political philosophy of Aristotle, on one side, and Kantian ethics and the existentialism of Arthur Schopenhauer on the other. In his later epistemological writings, the Athenian polis gives substance to his formal ideas about consciousness and collective representations. As Dominick LaCapra writes, “In a crucial sense, Durkheim’s thought was as much the culmination of classical philosophy as the initiation of modern social science.”²

In 1879 at the age of twenty, Durkheim entered the prestigious École Normale Supérieure at a time when a great renaissance was occurring. Here he studied Latin and Greek his first year. His second year was spent doing personal research with Gaston Boissier, a noted Latin scholar for whom he wrote a study on morality and Roman Stoicism. At the time he was moving away from what he viewed as “antiquated humanism” and detailed textual analysis of the classics and moving toward psychology and history. He felt philosophy had become too dialectical and too dilettante, too removed from the real empirical issues and questions of the time. He was taught by the historians Gabriel Monod and Fustel de Coulanges who stressed the importance of critical and comparative historical research and the role of religion in social life. It was de Coulanges who maintained that sociology was history, and it was *The Ancient City* (1864) that was so influential on Durkheim’s view of classical antiquity and his sociology of religion. From another

one of his teachers, the liberal republican and neo-Kantian, Charles Renouvier, he developed a keen sense of Kantian philosophy with its stress on the universal values of human dignity, moral autonomy, and social justice. After completing his final exams (*agrégation*) in 1882, Durkheim taught philosophy at the Lycées de Puy, Sens, Saint-Quentin, and Troyes until 1887. During this time he was working on his doctoral dissertations and defended both his primary thesis, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), and his subsidiary Latin thesis, *Montesquieu's Contribution to the Rise of Social Science* (1892). During the academic year 1886–87, he spent one term studying social science at the German universities in Berlin, Leipzig, and Marburg. During his stay he was influenced by the works of Gustav Schmoller, Adolf Wagner, and Albert Schäffle who were academic socialists attempting to integrate political economy and Aristotelian social ethics. Schäffle, in particular, was very important in Durkheim's intellectual development since he rejected Jean-Jacques Rousseau's view of the individual and, instead, stressed the biological metaphor of an organic view of society, the importance of the *conscience collective*, and the notion that society is a collective ideal.³ Also at this time he came under the influence of the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, whose scientific study of morals and social customs and use of the experimental method greatly impressed him.⁴

In 1887 he began his university teaching in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bordeaux holding an appointment in social science and pedagogy. It was here that he introduced the first lecture course in France on the topic of social science and social solidarity. It was here, too, that he became friendly with two of his philosophy colleagues who were also making the transition from philosophy to sociology: Alfred Espinas and Octave Hamelin. A third colleague influential on his intellectual development, Georges Rodier, was a noted Aristotelian and Greek scholar. Later Durkheim would offer two courses on Aristotle's *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. In a 1900 article on the nature of sociology in the nineteenth century, Durkheim writes, "The theories of Plato and Aristotle on the diverse forms of political organization could be regarded as a first attempt at sociology."⁵ The following year he also offered a series of lectures on Rousseau's *Social Contract*. Together, his writings on Montesquieu and Rousseau provide us with an insight into the earliest foundation of sociology with its origins in classical Greece and eighteenth-century French social philosophy. The other strong presociological component in Durkheim's view of social science comes from Immanuel Kant. Kant's epistemological work, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), and his moral philosophy contained in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) formed the basis upon which Durkheim developed his theories of knowledge, collective representations, and primitive classification, as well as his theories about moral science and social solidarity. Joining together his interests in classical antiquity, political economy, French social philosophy, neo-Kantian philosophy, and German existentialism, Durkheim proceeded to develop his own views of society and social science.

This chapter is organized around the Greek influence on the major theoretical periods in Durkheim's intellectual life: (1) his writings and lectures on the organic nature and origins of society in the neoclassical political philosophy of Montesquieu and Rousseau; (2) his early functionalism with its concern for issues of social solidarity and the collective conscience, the disruptive changes brought about by technological specialization and the division of labor within social institutions, and the alarming rise in anomie and suicide in modern society; (3) the importance of German idealism, existentialism, and Anglo-American pragmatism in the formation of his theory of collective representations and sociological theory of knowledge; (4) the role of Kant's and Schopenhauer's epistemology in the development of his philosophy and methodology of social science; and (5) his political and ethical ideals of democracy, guild socialism, and civic virtue found in his later writings on morality, pedagogy, and public education. We will see how these unusually diverse areas of sociological research were held together by the common thread of Aristotle's communitarianism and theory of social justice.

ARISTOTLE, MONTESQUIEU, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY

From his earliest writings and lectures Durkheim provides us with insights into the formation of sociology as a distinct social science whose intellectual and philosophical roots are to be found in classical Greece. Crucial to the uncovering of these classical roots are Durkheim's Latin dissertation on Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws*, his 1901–2 lectures and manuscripts at the University of Bordeaux on Rousseau's political philosophy in *The Social Contract* and *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, and another series of lectures on Rousseau's theory of pedagogy and moral education in *Émile*.⁶ It is with a little surprise that we read Durkheim saying that Montesquieu provides the principles for a new science. It is this eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosopher who, for Durkheim, offers many key insights into the foundation, subject matter, nature, and method of the new science of sociology.⁷ And along with Rousseau he leads us back to the political philosophy of Aristotle and to the classical tradition of natural law, reaffirming the idea that the true origins of sociology lie in the ancient Greek world.⁸ Montesquieu will ultimately set off on his own, disagreeing with Aristotle over the subject matter, method, and status of science. And as a result of his debate with the ancients, Montesquieu forms the foundation for a new, integrated science of social phenomena—sociology—with his analysis of social types and natural laws.

Durkheim recognizes that Montesquieu's study of the various forms of governments in *The Spirit of Laws* (1748) begins with an acceptance of Aristotle's classification of the variety of political constitutions in ancient Greece found in book 3 of the *Politics*. Aristotle refers to the best constitutions as kingship, aristocracy, and polity and to their three deviant forms as tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Montesquieu, in turn, begins by modifying these ideal types as the basis for his classification of the various forms of government: republic (aristoc-

racy and democracy), monarchy, and despotism. But it is in his general approach and method that he differentiates himself from Aristotle and provides the basis for his transition from a study of the state to an examination of society, from classical political philosophy to modern social science.

Aristotle organizes the political types according to the number of rulers—one, few, and many—for kingship, aristocracy, and polity and according to the nature of public administration. Montesquieu arranges the types in the following manner. A *republic*, which can be either an aristocracy or a democracy, was the term reserved for the ancient Greek and Roman city-states and medieval Italian cities. *Monarchy* referred to the political organization of larger geographic areas throughout Europe after the German invasions and breakup of the Roman Empire. And *despotism* was used to characterize the large Turkish and Persian empires in the Near East. Montesquieu bases his typology not only on the number of rulers but also on the social arrangement, structure, and cohesion of the various elements in society. According to him, the republics were established in small cities and characterized by homogeneity, internal cohesion, a sense of communal responsibility for the common good, relative equality, citizenship, and public office rotation. In the private sphere, class divisions, property ownership, and profit maximization were minimal as economic equality, frugality, and moderation were the norm. In these societies, there were even restrictions on the formation of wealth. Political virtue maintained an inner cohesion within society by placing limits on self-interest and economic activity. Montesquieu mentions that commerce was not developed in this type of society. “In short, there is no division of labor among the members of the body politic. . . .”⁹

Monarchy is characterized by greater economic development, structural differentiation, division of labor, and separation of powers. The public and private spheres become more complex and fragmented as there is a noticeable rise in farming, trade, crafts, and so forth. The legal system becomes more advanced and there are constitutional limits on the power of the monarchy. In it the division of labor reaches its maximum development. Montesquieu likens this society to a living organism with complex parts performing specific functions for the maintenance of the whole. Because this is a class society with competing interests and a separation of power between its various functions, the authority of the monarchy is limited. The social goal is not to produce a public consensus built upon political virtue but to maintain social cohesion by formalizing and balancing the competing political and economic elements within society. The driving force of this type of society is not virtue but the seeking of honor, status, and wealth. Public harmony, political freedom, and the common good arise out of this social differentiation and private self-interest. Despotism, on the other hand, is characterized by a complete breakdown of the internal division of labor, status, and power. It is a society in which neither virtue nor honor is the principle of social life and all power rests with the despot. Montesquieu also maintains that within these social types the customs, religion, family, marriage, and crime and punishment are different.

In transforming the nature and types of political typology, Montesquieu also changes Aristotle's method found in *Politics*. For Aristotle, his *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* represent parts of one comprehensive treatise on the nature of man and the state. Political science is a moral or practical science concerned with the ultimate human good and final end that investigates the nature and function of man. Practical science (*phronesis*) is neither a theoretical science (*episteme*) concerned with the eternal truths of mathematics, physics, or metaphysics, nor is it a technical science (*techne*) whose focus is on creating or making physical objects of art or work. Rather, it is occupied by questions of political wisdom and moral knowledge about the good life that cannot be taught but must be experienced over time by participating in the political process and the creation of law. Unlike other living beings in nature, the ultimate function, the goal of humans, is to live a life of reason and happiness. This is expressed by Aristotle as a life of virtuous activity and rational discourse within the polis.¹⁰

From Aristotle's perspective, it is by developing man's potential by nurturing his inner character and the moral virtues of courage, moderation, and social justice, as well as by expanding the intellectual virtues of the theoretical and political sciences, that human beings become rational and free.¹¹ Since individuals are social animals, this can only be accomplished within a moral community of the self-sufficient Greek polis. The political community is the ultimate end of human development; it is the final form of the perfection of human association. Just as nature moves from potentiality to actuality as it develops over time, so too, for Aristotle, politics is understood within a teleological perspective. The ultimate end or form for humanity is the education and cultivation of the virtuous, noble life and the exercising of practical and theoretical wisdom of the citizen within the political community. It is by theoretical contemplation (*theoria*) of the philosopher and political participation and activity (*praxis*) of the citizen that human beings achieve happiness (*eudaimonia*)—the final form toward which human life moves is reason in its concrete manifestations of self-determination and popular sovereignty.

The role or function of the state is to encourage the full development of political happiness, moral virtue, and practical wisdom. This is the good and just life; the natural purpose of human existence is the direct participation in the judicial and deliberative activities of the community. As Aristotle writes, "What effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participation in giving judgment and in holding office."¹² By sitting on the jury courts, speaking and voting at the Assembly, or participating in the Boule, Athenians fulfilled their responsibilities and duties as citizens of their city-state. The formal structure of this political and moral community is articulated in the constitution of the state. According to Aristotle, there are three best forms of political constitutions that pursue the goal of general happiness and the common good of society. As we have already seen, they are based on whether the government is ruled by the one (monarchy), the few (aristocracy), or the many (polity). Aristotle also examines

the perverted or abnormal political constitutions of tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy in which governance is determined by the class interests of the one, the wealthy, or the poor. Durkheim argues that social relationships were viewed by later theorists as contingent and fortuitous and, therefore, not amenable to systematic and scientific study. For him, these social relations became the heart of the new science of society.

Montesquieu rejects Aristotle's teleological method of defining the nature and essence of man and political constitutions by deducing them from their functions and formal ends. Classical political science rested on a theory of nature (*physis*) and metaphysics. Durkheim interprets Montesquieu as moving away from a deductive to an inductive and descriptive method of historical explanation in his search for social phenomena. Natural laws are not determined by the formal principles or universal causes within society but partake of historical contingency; they are discovered by observation. According to Montesquieu and Aristotle, human action does not always correspond to natural laws. There are contingencies, accidental causes, and deviations from the law and normal forms resulting from the imperfections of human life, as well as from the mistakes of lawmakers. The role of the lawmaker is to reestablish the natural order and harmony of society through appropriate changes in the law that will discourage deviant behavior, such as laziness and sloth or pride and recklessness. Montesquieu holds the position that social science should focus on the "normal forms of life" and not on their contingent deviations or anomalies.

Durkheim takes a different view of these deviations. He argues that the method Montesquieu applies begins with logical and a priori categories of the nature of society from which laws are deduced. The causal and universal connections are between concepts and do not reflect empirical reality. "In this event they will express what is implied in the definition of a society, but perhaps the definition will not follow rationally from the nature of the society in question. They will tell us what is rational rather than what actually exists."¹³ Durkheim, on the other hand, wants to integrate normal and diseased social organisms by viewing both of them as part of natural law. For him, there are "diseases of the social organism," which are also natural and "inherent in the nature of living things."¹⁴ They are contingent, but they, too, have their own laws that then may be compared to their healthy states. Montesquieu was a transitional figure in the social sciences because he bridged the ancients and moderns. He held to the classical principle of universal necessity and formal natural law and to the modern goal of scientific observation and description of social types.

Durkheim accepts these insights of Montesquieu for his own theory of methods. He argues that it is Montesquieu who first develops the primacy of induction for the social sciences. "From the general notion of man they [social philosophers] derived the form of society consonant with human nature and the precepts to be observed in social life . . . but unless these ideas are confirmed by observation, we cannot tell whether they actually express the reality. The only way

to discover the laws of nature is to study nature itself.”¹⁵ Observation and experimentation (comparative analysis) are the only means of acquiring knowledge of empirical reality. Only by comparing the various forms of particular social phenomena in different types of societies are we able to distinguish what is essential from what is contingent. Deduction may be useful for the interpretation and for the development of new ideas about social phenomena but these, in turn, must be investigated using observation and experience.

Montesquieu also broadens the notion of types to include not only the forms of government but the forms of social life: religion, ethics, law, customs, trade, and the family. He is interested in how they differ in different types of societies. He also stresses the role of population size, geography of the territory, typography of the soil, and climatic conditions as having lawlike effects on the formation of different social types. Causality is connected with the description and explanation of social phenomena. Effects are related to concrete historical causes. Specific customs, laws, and institutions must be examined historically as social types. They cannot be deduced from the nature of human beings, but must be examined scientifically. On the phenomenal surface of things, causes appear to be the result of contingent and fortuitous decisions and actions. However, Durkheim maintains that there are deeper and more constant structural realities—a determinate order—within societies that produce the same effects and result in the classification of social types. The same set of arrangements and order produce the same type of social effects. These are Durkheim’s natural laws of social arrangements. They are not a product of metaphysics or teleology. Movement and change occur because one element in society influences another, not because individuals are realizing their essence as rational human beings or moving from potentiality to actuality. Causality is a product of the natural order and underlying social structures that are governed by explanatory laws. Taking an apparent critical swipe at Weber and the sociology of understanding, Durkheim stresses that social phenomena cannot be explained by motives and intentions of lawgivers and social actors but are the product of functional relationships among political, religious, legal, and economic institutions. “But to accept it [intentionality] is to deny the existence of any determinate order in human societies, for if it were true, laws, customs, and institutions would depend not on the constant nature of the state, but on the accident that brought forth one lawgiver rather than another.”¹⁶ Most laws and social phenomena are not the product of the conscious intention of lawgivers. They are closer to traditional customs and to a “way of life” as they serve particular unconscious social functions and utility. Natural laws develop out of the common nature and harmonious interaction of the various and necessary elements of the social organism and not from anthropology or psychology. Durkheim adds, “In pointing to the interrelatedness of social phenomena, Montesquieu foreshadowed the unity of our science.”¹⁷ The search for a scientific method of social phenomena and their underlying structural laws is extremely difficult and complex. Montesquieu’s work has been invaluable toward this end.

Finally, according to Durkheim, Montesquieu attempts to integrate art and science, and norms and explanation. It is not just the case that scientists study the laws and nature of society. They do so with a specific goal in mind: the preservation of the natural order and health of society. This dialectical relationship between science and ethics will become more fully developed in Durkheim's lectures and writings on moral education, pedagogy, and citizenship. It challenges the traditional positivist assumptions about objectivity and neutrality in social science. Montesquieu examines different historical types of societies and the different forms and conditions of their social institutions in order to understand their normal and deviant forms. The normal social form reinforces the acceptable social type or essence of society as the social scientist distinguishes between sickness and health.

ORIGINS OF SOCIETY IN ROUSSEAU AND ARISTOTLE

In Durkheim's lectures and writings on Rousseau at the University of Bordeaux, he continues to develop the continuity between the rise of social science, French political philosophy, and classical antiquity. The ancient Greek world provided Rousseau with the basis for comparing the social institutions and cultural values of the ancients with those of modern civilization. And from these sociological studies, ethical implications were deduced. Durkheim sees in Rousseau another forerunner of social science. One of the most enduring epistemological problems was the recognition that society could be studied in itself. Montesquieu, as we have seen, had stressed the fact that the social dimension was not simply fortuitous and contingent but could form its own constant and enduring social types and laws. Rousseau, on the other hand, offers a view of the individual whose ultimate perfection, freedom, and happiness lay in civil society, law, and government, not in the state of nature. This is a political philosophy in direct contrast to the traditional individualism of natural rights theory and utilitarian economics. Rousseau was one of the first modern thinkers to propose an alternative interpretation of the nature of society and the state. According to Durkheim, society is a reality, it represents the perfection of humanity and the polity, and it can be studied as its own phenomenon. Douglas Challenger has written, "Durkheim believed that Rousseau liberated himself from the individualism of his age by drawing on the social philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and that the social and political ideal that inspired his social theory was the model of the city-state of ancient Greece."¹⁸

Rousseau picks up where Montesquieu left off. Whereas the latter examined the essential nature and forms of society, the former studies the origins of social institutions. Durkheim outlines closely the basic arguments of Rousseau's political philosophy found in *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right* (1762) and in *A Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men* (1755). With his theory of the state of nature, origins of civil society, property, and class

divisions, and the formation of popular sovereignty, the general will, and democracy, Rousseau's central focus is upon ideas about the nature and formation of society that provide crucial elements for the later foundation of sociology.¹⁹

Rousseau, as most other Enlightenment political theorists, examines the complex relation between the individual and the social by resorting to a hypothetical state of nature thought experiment. By comparing the nature of human beings in the state of nature to the nature of human beings in civil society, their essential traits are brought to the surface by an abstraction from all artificial and social elements. Beginning with a method similar to René Descartes's use of methodical doubt and skepticism in *Discourse on Method* (1637), Rousseau attempts to establish a pure slate free of all prejudices in order to get back to an analysis of the individual before the social contract. What were the characteristics of individual human nature before the addition of social relations and institutions? And what are the origins of society? These questions require that he construct a view of the state of nature: People in this original state were isolated and free but without language, reason, and culture. This natural person lived an instinctual life based on the satisfaction of immediate needs. There was a harmony and balance between individual needs and the physical environment.

Rousseau rejects the state of war thesis of Thomas Hobbes as he argues that this primitive world was one of peace and satisfaction. Humanity's relation to its environment was that of immediate sensations. This was a state of innocence and indolence. Primitive man was a forest wanderer "without occupation, without speech, without a home, without war, without ties, with no need of his fellow men and no wish to harm them. . . ." ²⁰ There was no reflection or abstract thought, no morality—no past and no future—and human bonds were limited by their instincts and sensations to immediate, small groups living in huts. Hobbes had argued in the *Leviathan* that the movement out of the state of nature was caused by the individual's fear of violent death and desire for a commodious and happy life. Rousseau argues instead that this primitive state was, in fact, a happy and self-sufficient condition. There was no inner need to pursue a broader society of laws and social regulations. Thus the question arises for both Rousseau and Durkheim: From where did the impulse for society come?

Rousseau conjectures that the movement out of the state of nature was produced by outside shocks to its stability and harmony. Dramatic changes in the balance of nature and climatic conditions produced new situations in which primitive man had to adjust to the cold, heat, natural catastrophes, and changing food supply. If nature was no longer a hospitable place, humans had to adapt. Instinct had to be supplemented with thought and reason, indolence with coordinated planning, and isolation with language and society. These, in turn, changed the needs of primitive people and their physical environment. Over time there developed contractual relations, a "need for civility," division of labor, economic coordination, property, and, finally, the establishment of laws, principles of justice, and government, that is, a civil society.

As with many other political philosophers of the Enlightenment, Rousseau maintains that society is an artificial creation. But he also argues in classical fashion that it is a moral entity, a living organism whose sum is greater than its component parts. Durkheim views Rousseau as caught between a communalist and an individualist perspective—between the ancients and moderns. Only the individual is a natural product of the state of nature, but society is a living organism. Only the individual exists, while society is a mental and rational construct that has led to artificial inequalities, conflict, and dependency. After summarizing much of Rousseau's position, Durkheim asks the question: "Are the state of nature and life in society irreducibly antithetical, or is there some way of reconciling them?"²¹ Much of the secondary literature on Rousseau contends that there is a real conflict within his works between the natural man and the citizen. Durkheim holds that in the state of nature individuals contain the potentiality to move beyond the natural state to a more perfectible state of civil society where morality, justice, and happiness are developed. Durkheim concludes this issue with the statement that "perhaps this new perfection will be superior to that of the original state."²² But to attain this level of perfection requires a great deal of education and cultivation of another self-identity or personality.

The advancement of the natural man in civil society requires a democratic republic bound together by a common force or collective will that is a reality *sui generis* and that fosters virtue, equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty. This explains Durkheim's academic obsession with issues of pedagogy and education throughout his life. Civil society will be a natural state because it is a product of human reason and social justice. The general will results from public debate and universal deliberation of the assembled citizens. By means of public participation in the judicial and legislative functions of society, sovereignty passes to the general will that is inalienable and indivisible. For this to occur citizens must adhere to a general concern for the common well-being of the community. The individual is free in this form of government because citizens are obeying only themselves by conforming to the rational and universal concerns of their collective selves. Self-determination within an enlightened moral community becomes the basis for political and legal institutions. Rights and obligation cannot be grounded philosophically in natural law or human nature. The self-interest exhibited by *laissez-faire* liberalism would undermine this type of popular sovereignty based on the social solidarity and general welfare of the community.

For Rousseau and Durkheim there are limits to popular sovereignty that subsist in the rights, dignity, and moral autonomy of the modern individual. Rousseau's political philosophy integrates the political and ethical world of Aristotle and the Enlightenment. The general will is compatible with a particular form of liberalism that emphasizes a very different form of individuality than that found in the Anglo-American tradition of natural rights, possessive individualism, and utilitarianism. Montesquieu and Rousseau and the German Historical School of Schmoller and Wagner provide Durkheim with the philosophical framework for

a discussion of the idea of society as something more than a sum of its individual parts; society is no mere aggregation of its members as in utilitarian liberalism and classical economics. These French and German thinkers help precipitate questions about the nature of social solidarity, the moral community, and social integration as the basis for moral judgment and individual freedom. By rejecting crucial aspects of the Enlightenment, Durkheim seeks an answer to the problem of social unity in an examination of normal and abnormal social relations. Montesquieu and Rousseau along with their classical backgrounds provide Durkheim with the basis for his general theory of society, as well as for his theory of collective conscience, social solidarity, moral education, and social epistemology.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM IN KANT AND SCHOPENHAUER

The distinguishing characteristic of modern epistemology and moral philosophy lies in their emphasis on the ideas and categories of consciousness and subjectivity, as well as on issues of truth, science, and morality. Durkheim transforms the response of philosophy in order to create his notion of the *conscience collective*, a concept borrowed, in part, from Rousseau's idea of the general will and his organic view of society. It has a cognitive and moral dimension as it refers to both a common consciousness and a communal conscience. It reflects the foundations of society in its collective values and social solidarity, its culture and social institutions. Society projects its own collective mind in the form of its intersubjectively shared moral rules and social consensus that act as external forces and social constraints upon the individual. Society is viewed as an integrated system of ideas and symbols. Common beliefs and moral consensus have the effect of creating a social unity based on universally shared ideas and individual obligations. It has been argued that the key to unlocking Durkheim's arguments in these areas is the recognition that he is following closely the work of Schopenhauer.²³

According to Durkheim, the collective consciousness is an ideal and social phenomenon expressed in religion, morality, law, education, forms of classification and categories of the mind, customs, beliefs, tradition, and so forth. Moral ideals are manifestations of underlying social structures:

What it [individual morality] makes us try to realize is the ideal man as the society conceives him, and each society conceives its ideal in its own image. The Roman or the Athenian ideals were closely related to the particular organizations of these two cities. The ideal type which each city demands that its members realize is the keystone of the whole social system and gives it its unity.²⁴

On the other hand, the breakdown or unraveling of this consciousness and social cohesion leads to unbridled differentiation, excessive willing, egoism, unconscious desires, anomie, and, possibly, even suicide. Both perception and morality are constituted by social forms and collective sentiments. Early in his writings Durkheim stresses the collective ideas that hold the members of society together

into a community with shared ideas, moral values, and political goals. But he is also interested in examining the dissolution of the common basis of society through social pathologies and abnormal behavior that could destroy the community and the self. The notions of representation and will both summarize and organize Durkheim's many writings around those aspects of reason that integrate society and those aspects of the will that undermine the cohesive unity of the collectivity. As in the case of Weber who was heavily influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche, Durkheim, too, was affected by Georg Simmel's book, *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche* (1907), and the brooding pessimism of the Kantian existentialism in Schopenhauer's writings.²⁵ Finally, Schopenhauer's influence pulls Durkheim away from the metaphysical and epistemological realism prevalent in positivism toward a radicalized form of Kantian epistemology. The objective reality beneath the phenomena is inaccessible due to the fact that it is always conceptually mediated and socially constructed. This represents a further elaboration and development of a Kantian theory of knowledge transformed into sociology.

Schopenhauer's major ideas are contained in his doctoral dissertation, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813), and his philosophical masterpiece, *The World as Will and Representation* (1819 and 1844). According to Schopenhauer, the world is made up of ideas and will, reason and instincts. As we have already seen in chapter 2, he begins *The World as Will and Representation* with the view that "everything that in any way belongs and can belong to the world is inevitably associated with this being-conditioned by the subject, and it exists only for the subject. The world is representation."²⁶ Continuing the arguments of the Copernican revolution in philosophy and pushing them to the extreme, he isolates and expands Immanuel Kant's theory of consciousness. Kant had combined elements of both empiricism and rationalism, whereas Schopenhauer radicalizes his epistemology by emphasizing the subjectivity and idealism of his theory of knowledge. What we know is only our representation of the world, not the world itself. Objectivity, as structured and meaningful phenomena, has been incorporated into subjective consciousness that includes both the act of perception and the organization of the understanding. There is no pure access to an independent and objective world that is then capable of being compared to our intuitive perception and understanding of it. The objectivity of empiricism is an illusion that fails to consider that the phenomenal world of perception is a mental construct (*Vorstellung*). All we have are our representations. "Realism overlooks the fact that, outside its reference to the subject, the object no longer remains object . . . all objective existence is at once abolished."²⁷ The objectivity ensured by a veracious God or transcendental subject has disappeared, leaving behind an unprotected and frightened ego ravaged by time and passions. The epistemological theories of representation have reached their logical conclusion.

With John Locke and David Hume experience had been transformed into an isolated act of knowing that later precipitated a crisis of the individual and knowledge in critical theory. In Schopenhauer's reading of Kant our sensation and

understanding of the world are mediated by the intellectual categories of time, space, and causality. The raw materials of sensation must be organized in the mind in order for experience and knowledge of an objective world to occur. The sensations of sight, touch, sound, and so forth are formless and meaningless affections of the body. Only after the information they provide has been interpreted by consciousness and placed within a temporal, spatial, and causal framework is objectivity created. Kant argued that the world we see is constructed by our concepts that are universal forms and a priori categories of the mind residing in consciousness. An epistemological and existential crisis awaits behind the next turn in the argument.

If all we know are only our representations of the objective world, how are knowledge and truth objectively possible? What standards or criteria can we use for universal knowledge or for the validation of science? This represents the potential for a crisis of science. The relationship among perceived objects is entirely relative, due to the intervention of human consciousness in the process of knowing. Schopenhauer makes the analogy to Plato's *Republic* and to the theory of the cave. Objects we see are mere images projected on the wall of the cave by the fire behind us. We do not see the images themselves, only their projections. Everything is in flux and constant change as Heraclitus had argued; everything is a dream without any substantive reality. Temporal, spatial, and causal relationships are formed by the mind and do not express the essence of an external world. Kant had said that reality is a thing-in-itself consisting of an infinite, meaningless, and constantly changing world. Borrowing from the great Hindu texts, Schopenhauer argues that the world we experience consists of phenomena that are simply the veil of Maya—a phenomenal world of dreams, illusions, and deceptions. This is what he means by representations (*Vorstellungen*) and appearances. Consciousness provides the immediate sense and temporary conditions of stability, substance, and order. "What the eye, ear, or the hand experiences is not perception; it is mere data. Only by the passing of the understanding from the effect to the cause does the world stand out as perception. . . . This world as representation exists only through the understanding, and also only for the understanding."²⁸ Sensation provides the raw, meaningless data or impressions upon which the understanding creates perception and thought. Kant has changed Hume's theory of objectivity into the unformed sense impressions that must be molded and organized by the understanding in order to be perceived. All perception and knowledge of the world are mediated as representation; there is no direct access or privileged impression. This epistemological position makes a theory of objectivity and social science very difficult because there is no unmediated experience that could act as the basis for empirical verification and scientific validation. The foundations of knowledge and science have disappeared. Reviving the fears of Descartes, Schopenhauer concludes his initial inquiry with the words: "[We] are forced to concede to the poets that life is a long dream."²⁹ Does madness not lie just around the corner?

Besides perception and understanding, there is another element in the world that can be known and that also creates the world of objects. This is the will consisting of unconscious and conscious forces of nature, including our motives, drives, emotions, and desires that manifest themselves in acts of the body. The will is the blind driving force of life, its essential reality, and the cause of objectivity. Will appears as external phenomena. Schopenhauer refers to the will as the thing-in-itself, the underlying force of nature. "All *willing* springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering. Fulfillment brings this to an end; yet for one wish that is fulfilled there remain at least ten that are denied. Further, desiring lasts a long time, demands and requests go on to infinity; fulfillment is short and meted out sparingly. But even the final satisfaction itself is only apparent."³⁰ The world is a place of unrelenting human suffering and pain characterized by delusions and by the unrewarding search for happiness and peace. Fulfillment is impossible with a will that is never satiated. Human misery and personal tragedy unmask the emptiness and superficiality of a world in a constant state of becoming. Schopenhauer writes that all life is suffering. Unmet material needs and the infinity of desires bring only insecurity and dissatisfaction in their wake. This is the utilitarian hell that is inhabited by Nietzsche's "last man." For Schopenhauer there is only one way out—escape by an abandonment of the body and will and their attachment to life through asceticism, worldly indifference, self-mortification and resignation, and philosophical contemplation. Egoism is a problem in the modern world since it becomes lost in the chaos of becoming, the utilitarian search for pleasure and happiness, and the futility and absurdity of an existence masked by the veil of Maya.

Schopenhauer retreats to a world of Hindu and Platonic philosophy in search of the universal and sublime in the form of Plato's Idea of beauty. In the Idea is the oneness of all will and life as the essence of true being and knowledge. By means of a contemplative life a pure will-less knowing is created that leaves the body, will, and suffering behind. It also leaves behind the "charm of delusion" and the seduction of individual happiness. We search for the "ghost of our own nothingness" as we recognize that all the phenomenal reality of the idea and will are nothing but ephemeral and meaningless whispers of a constantly changing world. We should seek the contemplative world of the beautiful soul and its protection of the pleasures of beauty and the unchanging Platonic Forms.

PLATONIC RATIONALISM AND THE SOPHISTRY OF PRAGMATISM

Durkheim rejects Kant's description of the organizing principles of experience—the categories of the mind—as universal, immutable, and transcendental. For him, they are artificial, historical, and social symbols, that is, they are collective representations. Durkheim's epistemology is developed in three of his major works: *Primitive Classification: Contribution to the Study of Collective Representa-*

tions (1903) with Marcel Mauss, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912), and *Pragmatism and Sociology* (1913–14). He offered a series of lectures at the Sorbonne on the topic of pragmatism and sociology in 1913–14, continuing an earlier interest that began with his essay, “Individual and Collective Representations” (1898) and developed further under the influence of William James in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Durkheim had been introduced to American pragmatism and, in particular, to the writings of James through his teachers, Charles Renouvier and Etienne Boutroux. These little-known lectures give us an important look at Durkheim’s theory of knowledge and its relation to sociology. At the turn of the century, American pragmatism was the main theory of knowledge in France according to Durkheim who views it with both praise and suspicion. By means of his analysis of pragmatism he hopes to revive the declining fortunes of his view of “rationalism.”

He begins his lecture series with a brief summary of the Enlightenment theory of knowledge (and by implication the philosophy of morality) found in empiricism and rationalism. Both argue for universal knowledge and absolute truth whether grounded in experience or self-reflection. The pragmatist movement of James, John Dewey, Ferdinand Schiller, and William Peirce denied the possibility of unchanging and universal foundations to knowledge as they followed in the tradition of the Greek Sophists and Protagoras by arguing that “man is the measure of all things.” There are no other transcendent or external bases for making truth claims. And, just as Socratic rationalism was the response to the Sophists, so too will Durkheim be aroused from his “philosophical slumber” to respond to the solipsism and antifoundationalism of this school of American and English thought. Pragmatism represented a rejection of the epistemological weaknesses it saw in rationalism or dogmatism and was thus a direct assault on Western rationality. “James sees this conception [of rationalism] as based on a very simple principle, namely, that the true idea is the idea which conforms to things. It is an image, a copy of objects, the mental representation of the thing. An idea is true when this mental representation corresponds accurately to the object represented.”³¹ The mind mirrors the external world that is either a world of impressions and sensations or a world of reason and ideas. In any case, these sensations and ideas must express accurately the reality that stands opposed and outside the knower; sensations and ideas are forms of translation of objective reality whether that objectivity is one of experienced objects and facts (empiricism) or mental thoughts and reason (rationalism). It is Plato who offers the classical definition of rationalism as an “organized system of ideas with their own existence . . . which the mind must reproduce.”³² Though the empiricists and rationalists disagree as to the means of access to reality, they both contend that there is, in fact, an objective reality and our concepts have validity when they reflect that reality in perception or thought. Truth lies in the sensible or in the intellectual worlds, in induction or deduction. There is no doubt about the existence of an

objective reality or about the necessary and obligatory nature of truth. The debate is over the means to access this reality and to acquire truth.

Pragmatism attacks Enlightenment rationality and science head-on as it rejects the epistemological assumptions of positivism. It critically characterizes the view of knowledge of these two forms of dogmatism as impersonal, absolute, objective, transcendent, and universal. This view of knowledge has its beginnings in Platonic philosophy. "We have seen that the great thinkers of Greece tried to ensure intellectual unity and understanding among men. The means they used was to take objective reality as their object, since it must necessarily be the same for all men, given its independence from the observing subject."³³ With some key reservations, Durkheim accepts the pragmatist view of classical rationalism. Probably the most important element in pragmatism is its rejection of the copy theory of truth and epistemological realism. Moving beyond Galileo's and Descartes's view of primary and secondary qualities, the pragmatists argue for the primacy of the secondary characteristics perceived by the senses. That is, they view the changing world of sight, sound, smell, and so forth as more important than the mathematical universals of extension, shape, and motion. If it is held that the purpose of knowledge is only to reproduce the eternal Ideas of Plato, however imperfectly, then the pragmatists argue that this represents the theological fall of humanity.



In classical and modern rationalism, human beings have no other function than to reflect reality passively, not to create it. Durkheim asks about the purpose of such truth if its goal is merely to duplicate reality. He claims that this form of knowledge is useless. We become mere slaves to reality as we limit human possibilities to the myth of the statically given. He also contends that there is an "epistemological chasm" between concepts and reality that is unbridgeable as the concepts represent an ideal world beyond the world of experience. Following the lead criticism of Schiller, Durkheim remarks that Plato's distinction between transcendent Ideas and the concrete world requires that the mind possess special, but unexplained, characteristics in order to reach the former. If thought is a copy of reality, then how can the profane know the divine? Durkheim is aware that he is questioning the underlying principles of both realism and objectivism. Since thought is the only means of accessing the external world, what is the relationship between thought and reality, mind and existence? This is the question that lies at the heart of modern epistemology since the seventeenth century and has never been adequately answered according to Durkheim. Agreeing with Dewey, he contends that a critique of the copy theory of truth followed to its logical conclusions will ultimately lead to skepticism and sophism—knowledge would be impossible. The way out of this dilemma is to reject Enlightenment positivism by overcoming the divide between thought and existence. Durkheim believes that this has been accomplished by pragmatism.

As with the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge and sociology of *Verstehen* (understanding) of Weber, Durkheim maintains that the search for truth begins with some type of value relevance in the form of an initial selection and choice of epistemological goals based on human interests.³⁴ Truth does not lie above human interests in a transcendent plane in a Platonic system of ideas but is part of the very life and fragility of humanity. The pragmatic world is diverse, pluralistic, and tolerant since concrete truth is existential, temporary, malleable, relative, and historical. Pragmatism rejects the standard interpretation of the Enlightenment view of reason and truth as a verifiable copy of reality. Durkheim expands upon the implications of pragmatism's critique by saying, "If, as pragmatism maintains, there is no true idea but that constructed, there can be no given or established idea of truth that can be verified."³⁵ This constructivist and conventionalist perspective is also developed by Schopenhauer. Since there is no objective reality against which any idea of consciousness can be compared and measured, there can be no objective validity to the ideas themselves. Instead of viewing the relationship between consciousness and reality as crucial, it is the relationship between thought and existence that takes center stage. Appropriating Rousseau's analysis of the origins of society on the basis of disequilibrium and new needs, Durkheim applies it to the pragmatist view of knowledge. Rousseau supplements Dewey. In the state of nature sensations were all that were necessary for knowledge because they met our needs. With changes in the environment and an increase in physical and social tensions, reflection and thought evolved to solve particular problems. Thought is a function of our practical needs and future desires, not our present situation or contemplative ideals. "Thought thus comes into existence not in order to copy reality, but to change it."³⁶

Rather than experiencing a divide between thought and reality, the pragmatists view the mind and reality as part of a continuous and integrated process of life. Thought has a strong instrumentalist and utilitarian character as science and morality, truth and the good serve specific human interests and values. Knowledge is "primarily an instrument of action."³⁷ In opposition to Schopenhauer, technical knowledge is supposed to reestablish a lost equilibrium and feeling of satisfaction. It is a way of adapting to life and the flow of existence. Its purpose is to bring peace and to enrich our lives that is accomplished when suffering and pain are eliminated. Verification does not occur when there is a correspondence to reality, since the latter is always a construct. Verification is a practical principle, not a logical one, and is based on subjective satisfaction (James) or the success of an anticipated action (Dewey). In Durkheim's eyes pragmatism is related to Schopenhauer's metaphysics. The truth of pragmatism is related to quelling the sources of unrest and suffering in the individual; it is the basis for inner satisfaction and peace, as well as adaptation to a world that is malleable and plastic. Knowledge is true when it positively affects the quality of our living. Since knowledge is not separated from life, it is not simply a technical tool but a mode of existence. Combining existentialism and pragmatism, Durkheim explains further,

"Reality, like truth is largely a human product. The world is a 'chaos' from which the human mind 'cuts out' objects which it has arranged, put in place and organized in categories. Space, time, causality: all these categories come from us. We have created them to meet the needs of practical life. Thus the world, as it is, is as we have constructed it. Pure sensation does not exist: it only takes shape by virtue of the form that we give it."³⁸ Durkheim begins to sound more and more like Weber at this point, as he, too, historicizes Kantian epistemology. Objectivity, as the existence of the world of nature and reality and the world of truth, is a theoretical human construct made by human beings for technical and utilitarian purposes. According to pragmatism, what underlies this reality, what metaphysical meaning this reality possesses beyond human thought, is meaningless. The world we see is a construction of consciousness only. Truth is all too human. And it is on this very point that Durkheim begins to question the validity of pragmatism.

The ideas of an objective method, objective reality, and objective validity of concepts had all been interrelated features of modern positivism. Pragmatism rejects epistemological realism, the verification of knowledge, and the possibility of objective validity based on a correspondence between concepts and reality. Knowledge and human interests create reality. There is no objective world independent of our cognitive and moral categories. Because reality is always constructed through human activity according to technical ends, the epistemological framework of the Enlightenment collapses. Through our values and actions, and our interests and choices, we constitute the reality we see both consciously and unconsciously. However, Durkheim is critical of pragmatism's inability to view the nature of truth and reality as separate questions. What is missing in its analysis so far is a comprehensive theory of human interests and the social foundations of cognition and consciousness.

The goal of pragmatism is to "soften the truth" by reconnecting truth claims to human interests away from its absolute and sacred nature found in Platonic philosophy. It is at this point in his lectures that Durkheim now begins to outline the connection between pragmatism and sociology. He accepts a constitution theory of truth, a view of pragmatic reason, the relationship between truth and normative interests, the technical and historical bases of knowledge, the connection between truth and action, and the rejection of positivism. For both pragmatism and sociology there are no pre-given facts, no universal categories of knowledge, and no absolute and objective reality; our perception and understanding of reality change over time. Where they differ is in sociology's rejection of pragmatism's theory of knowledge based upon individual consciousness. According to Durkheim, pragmatism falls into an empty psychology that limits knowledge to subjective rather than to intersubjective consciousness. Pragmatism has an inadequate theory of knowledge since truth is ultimately reduced to forms of individualistic action and *techne*. Durkheim takes the position that the role of thought and consciousness is to create reality, the collectively shared symbols, and

society itself. It is sociology that introduces, through the writings of Montesquieu and Rousseau, the notion of society into the subjective and philosophical Kantian theory of knowledge. Durkheim is attracted to pragmatism's critique of empiricism and epistemology. However, he rejects its radical subjectivity and utilitarian claims since he wishes to rescue truth in the form of a social theory of knowledge—a theory of universally shared values and beliefs in the collective representations and consciousness of society.

Durkheim creates a new social epistemology with his sociological theory of collective representations. Objectivity is related to the structures of society as it is social thought that constructs reality in the collective experience and memory of the community. The reality to which ideas correspond is not metaphysical or transcendental but social. It is in the context of the historical development of social institutions and cultural values that a consciousness of reality is formed. Agreeing with the pragmatists that reality is constructed, Durkheim introduces a sociological theory of knowledge that maintains that there is a social construction of reality through the collective categories of the understanding. Thus for him sociology is built on the pragmatic critique of the Enlightenment view of reason and truth combined with the ancient treatment of the social and organic dimension of human reality. This leads to another synthesis of the moderns and ancients in his thought. In opposition to pragmatism, Durkheim argues that the real value of knowledge lies not in its utilitarian function but in its creation of the historical and collective experience of communal life manifested in social institutions. It constructs our experience of the social and forms the individual human being; it also builds society's own self-understanding from mythological thought and religious representations to modern science and democratic and moral ideals. However, over time the social foundations of representations are forgotten, and ideas become reified into transcendent objects.

As we have just seen, our perceptions, our experience, and our ideas about the world are all filtered through our mental representations. There is no direct access to an external reality. In Durkheim's rejection of naive empiricism and realism, he adds that all apprehension of the world is mediated by social constructs and collective categories. The conclusion he reaches is that "the thesis [theory of knowledge] enunciated by pragmatism is justified from the sociological point of view. . . . We can no longer accept a single, invariable system of categories or intellectual frameworks."³⁹ The implications of Durkheim's epistemology and sociology of knowledge for his method is that social facts are social representations and thus open to reinterpretation with changes in society and history.⁴⁰ This Kantian social theory of knowledge comes very close at times to Weber's neo-Kantian theory of objectivity and value relevance. Durkheim's method is thus a sociological and historical reformulation of Kant's critique of pure and practical reason, that is, a rethinking of Kantian ethics and theory of subjectivity and representations within a critical sociological perspective.⁴¹

Durkheim rejects what he views as inconsistencies and contradictions running throughout the method and theory of pragmatic philosophy, especially with regards to its theories of consciousness, truth, and the origins and functions of knowledge. "The initial error of pragmatism is thus to deny the proper nature of consciousness and subsequently of knowledge. It does, however, have the merit of causing us to reflect on the question of how the notion of truth should be constructed."⁴² Although he accepts the idea of a close connection between theory and action and the principle that knowledge should have a useful purpose, he does not accept the narrow and exclusive understanding of pragmatic utilitarianism. Knowledge can direct individual behavior and it can aid in the creation of a new human being. This is what the Germans refer to as practical (ethical) wisdom. Thus his notion of utility includes technical knowledge but also encompasses the practical dimension of moral education, virtue, and character development, as well as the theoretical dimension of speculative reason. In response to what he views as a weakness in pragmatism, Durkheim develops a theory of human needs that includes technical and practical needs, as well as individual and social needs.

Durkheim briefly outlines the intellectual history of the forms of Western thought in mythology, philosophy, religion, morality, and science from archaic mythology and Greek philosophy to the Reformation and the Enlightenment. This is reminiscent of Weber's outline of Western rationality in his essay, "Science as a Vocation." Whereas Weber was concerned with the question of the limits of human reason and our definition of science, Durkheim's focus is centered upon the issue of utility and the range of application of knowledge to action. These historical periods reflect different systems of ideas that have no technical utility or instrumental interests. They are expressions of deeper human needs for explanation, understanding, values, and cultural meaning. They are attempts to broaden our awareness of the world, give meaning to human life, and present ideals for human action. They seek the universal in the particular, the true nature of things through a contemplative reflection on the essence of the world. Durkheim concludes that even science is opposed to pragmatism. This is certainly an interpretation of science that is at odds with Weber's theory of rationalization.

These ideas were developed more fully the previous year in his work, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. "The individual gets from society the best part of himself, all that gives him a distinct character and a special place among other beings, his intellectual and moral culture."⁴³ The gods, cosmology, and religious principles are all symbolic expressions of the social ideals and collective consciousness internalized in the minds of the individual as a "kingdom of ends" and moral truth. By integrating the natural, social, and individual worlds, they provide the moral and theoretical categories of thought, as well as the very foundations of society. They are the categorical forms and objective sentiments by which society reflects upon itself, affirms its own life, and unifies its collective existence. The collective representations

correspond to the way in which this very special being, society, considers the things of its own proper experience . . . they add to that which we can learn by our own personal experience all that wisdom and science which the group has accumulated in the course of centuries. Thinking by concepts is not merely seeing reality on its most general side, but it is projecting a light upon the sensation which illuminates it, penetrates it and transforms it.⁴⁴

They help form the moral character and natural kinship of each member of society, thereby creating and maintaining a moral community. Durkheim ends this work in words strikingly similar to Weber's conclusion in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904–5). The old gods are dead and new ones are replacing them but no one knows who will live in this world in the future.⁴⁵

As in the case of Weber's perspectivism and polytheism, Durkheim calls for a tolerance of viewpoints based on the complexity and diversity of the realities of social life. Being is heterogeneous, and there is no "luxury of reality." Each viewpoint adds another dimension to our knowledge of the world and hence must be respected. However, in spite of this, Durkheim articulates that there is a universal objectivity and shared reality to the collective representations since the ideas and forms of truth accepted within society are not illusory. They are not merely the product of subjective consciousness, but are the concrete and external expressions of the general values and culture of society that directly affect the thoughts and actions of its members. Truth is not abandoned as simply a technical interest of human survival, but is understood as an interpretation of reality that manifests the diversity of social life. It is objective and real because it is an expression of a living consensus within society about its underlying ideals. Reality and truth are historical and social constructions that transform human life. The truth of science and morality is real because the objectivity and universal authority of society are real.

COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS AS SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY

The stage has now been set for the introduction of Durkheim's appropriation of Schopenhauer's ideas in his theory of collective representations with its epistemological and methodological importance for the foundation of classical sociology. Durkheim was so enamored by Schopenhauer and referred to him so frequently in his lectures that his students called him "Schopen." In *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), Durkheim attempts to provide the epistemological and methodological foundations for his scientific study of society. It is a work of great controversy and ambiguity.⁴⁶ What is clear is that there is a theory of representation that provides its underlying unity. In his description of the basic building blocks of social science, he writes that social facts are "ways of acting, thinking, and feeling," which are outside the individual, are coercive constraints because of their moral or cognitive force, and have a strong impact because of their transcendent authority. They are the moral force and authority to which

individuals owe duty and obedience. They are social forms of thinking and ways of acting that are neither biological nor psychological entities. Thus, through the use of the concept of social facts, Durkheim was able to expand Plato's theory of Forms and Kant's categorical imperative into a sociological phenomenon.

By describing social facts in this way, Durkheim is rejecting both subjectivism and psychologism. In the process he makes clear that he is not making ontological claims about reality.⁴⁷ Rather, social facts are social phenomena or social representations that exist *sui generis* but only in and through individual consciousness. As in the case of Aristotle's critique of Plato, society and universals have no transcendent or metaphysical reality independent of individuals. This is Durkheim's "renovated rationalism" that moves beyond both the nominalism of classical economics and the metaphysical realism of positivism. Rejecting the subjectivism prevalent during his time, Durkheim argues that society is its own object of scientific inquiry and consists of ideas and representations of laws, mores, habits, religion, education, and the categories of the mind. These collective representations are the product of the socialization and internalization of the collective habits and shared ideas of society and are the manifestation of the social values and ideals of the community. "The organization of the family, of contracts, of punishment, of the state, and of society appears thus to be simply the embodiment of the ideas we hold concerning society, the state, justice, etc."⁴⁸

Durkheim is expanding upon Kant's theory of knowledge and Schopenhauer's existential philosophy by arguing that the categories of the mind are social and historical. They are the social filter or conceptual paradigm through which we view nature and society, and that act as social imperatives and the boundaries of our cognition. Reinterpreting Kant through the theoretical framework of sociology, Durkheim continues: "Consequently, if truth is human, it too is a human product. Sociology applies the same conception to reason. All that constitutes reason, its principles and categories, has been made in the course of history."⁴⁹ This has important implications not only for the development of his sociology of knowledge but also for his social theory of knowledge (epistemology). And it is the latter that has important implications for his method and theory of sociology. What is the actual reality of the state, society, and justice behind the appearances of these representations? Within the Kantian tradition, even in its radicalized and existential form, this question cannot be raised since our only access to reality is socially mediated through the representations themselves. Durkheim again rejects epistemological realism that could provide the foundations for social science. If this is true, then his notion of social facts must be reexamined and reinterpreted. There is a tension between his epistemology and ontology.

Problems have developed in the interpretations of this work because of Durkheim's use of the term *social facts*. Giving the appearance of accepting the empiricist notion of impressions, he has been labeled a positivist by a wide variety of authors.⁵⁰ It is almost a truism in American sociology that Durkheim is a

positivist building a scientific theory based on empirical facts and constructing explanatory and predictive laws of social action. Characterizing social representations as social facts presents us with a dilemma. What is to occupy center stage in Durkheim's epistemology; are they the social facts or social representations? A closer look at his works reveals that Durkheim lies in the tradition of Kant and Schopenhauer and not that of either Humean empiricism or Comtean positivism. This awareness forces us to rethink his method and theory of knowledge in exciting ways. If anything, the real difficulty lies not in his epistemology but in the apparent conflict between his epistemology and methodology, that is, in the application of his social theory of knowledge to the empirical study of society.

In his discussion of social representations, Durkheim rejects the Marxist premise that thoughts and representations are epiphenomena and, therefore, ideological products of the economic foundations and structures of power within society and the Weberian emphasis on individual intentionality and meaning behind social action. Durkheim views society as a form of collective consciousness that influences individual thoughts and behavior according to predictable social laws. "If, however, one admits that representation is a collective achievement, it recovers a unity which pragmatism denies to it. This is what explains the impression of resistance, the sense of something greater than the individual, which we experience in the presence of truth, and which provides the indispensable basis of objectivity."⁵¹ Replacing the transcendental subjectivity or pure ego at the heart of Kant's theory of knowledge, Durkheim develops a constitution theory of truth based on the social construction of reality. That is, the categories of the understanding are radically sociological.

Durkheim begins his methodological work by stating that social facts are social things. Though collective ideas and values are to be examined as having the properties of objects and things, Durkheim is insistent that this is a methodological and not an epistemological (read: ontological) position. This means that he is not making an argument about their reality. It is only meant as the basis for sociological investigation. In the author's preface to the second edition, Durkheim writes, "The proposition which states that social facts are to be treated as things—the proposition at the very basis of our method—is one of those which have provoked most contradiction."⁵² He attempts to clarify that he is not using the method of the natural sciences, although he wants to stress the term *facts* in order to heighten our awareness that we are not dealing with mental or subjective categories. Access to scientific data requires observation and experimentation. By referring to social phenomena as facts, they acquire the status of objectivity and externality. His comments were not, however, intended to make judgments about the reality of these facts, which is an epistemological question. He is making a distinction within science between art and technique, on the one hand, and science as truth and social reality on the other hand. "To treat the facts of a certain order as things is not, then, to place them in a certain category of reality but to assume

a certain mental attitude toward them. . . ." Later he will state emphatically that "our principle, then, implies no metaphysical conception, no speculation about the fundamental nature of beings."⁵³ Neither empiricism nor subjectivism (introspection) are adequate sociological methods. It is not the conscious idea of morality or law, as a hypostatized abstraction, that is, a pure idea or form, which is important. What is important is only its concrete manifestation in moral or legal institutions. In his essay, "Individual and Collective Representations," Durkheim uses the example of ancient Greek and Roman religion to clarify this point. The examination of representations in the ancient myths and cosmologies must be viewed in the broader context of the structure of society and in the study of the political constitution of the city, formation of the primitive clans, and the nature of the family.⁵⁴

Social phenomena from the perspective of his theory of knowledge are representations or appearances, whereas from the perspective of his method they are things or objects. Durkheim is attempting to make clear his opposition to the principles of a positivist epistemology. Positivism is a philosophical theory of knowledge that assumes certain criteria of truth defined as a specific relationship between consciousness and reality: (1) the world exists as an external thing in itself (objectivism), (2) science is ethically neutral and objective (value freedom), (3) the senses or ideas of consciousness accurately reflect or copy the external world (realism), and (4) science uses only the valid method of the natural sciences to establish universal laws of nature (naturalism). Although Talcott Parsons contends that the early Durkheim was a positivist because of his empiricism and objectivism, this is more of an assertion than a fact. Durkheim does not appear to share any of these principles of positivism, although there are positivist tendencies in his early functionalist and utilitarian analysis of social organizations, division of labor, suicide, and anomie.

In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim refers to his method as "scientific rationalism," as he refuses to accept the designation of positivism as adequate to his methodology. He even makes reference to Schopenhauer's veil of Maya when he says that we cannot know the laws of reality because there is a "veil drawn between the thing and ourselves."⁵⁵ Although sociology approaches society as a collection of ideas, it cannot be reduced to psychology or introspection. Ideas or social things are the concrete and empirical manifestations of human activity. It is interesting to note here that Weber, too, had real difficulties clarifying the differences between his epistemology and methodology, that is, distinguishing between his neo-Kantian theory of science based on Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert and some of his methodological statements about explanatory and universal laws and empirical verification. The interrelationships between philosophy and sociology were never clearly laid out in the classical period, which has only led to further confusions today.

The traditional theory of objectivity and value freedom in positivism

assumes a separation of science and ethics. This is not accepted by Durkheim as he explicitly states throughout this work that science has a normative interest in defining the normal or average society, maintaining a healthy social organism, and avoiding all social pathologies that might disrupt social harmony and the natural law. The goal of sociology is to study the physiology and functions of the social organism for the purpose of maintaining system stability and integration. Science is to be used as an art of adaptation and survival in order to maintain the normal conditions of collective existence. The objective study of morality, religion, crime, and so forth is to serve specific ethical values. "Now, it is important, from the very beginning of research, to be able to classify facts as normal and abnormal, save for a few exceptional cases, so that the proper domains can be assigned to physiology and pathology, respectively."⁵⁶ Science must be used by lawmakers acting as political physicians who provide preventive and curative medicines for social ills. This is similar to Weber's view of sociology as a political science with practical goals. Durkheim differs here from Weber in that science is not viewed as a search for wisdom but as a tool for social control through its technical knowledge of efficient causes, explanations, and functions. Durkheim's perspective here represents a return to Plato's view of the republic and political science as *techne*—social engineering based on the model of a political ideal. Weber's position is more closely aligned to Aristotle's view of *phronesis* or "political wisdom." It is at this point that Durkheim's method distorts his epistemology. While rejecting a positivist theory of knowledge with his theory of social representation, he ultimately accepts elements of a positivist view of method since knowledge is normatively tied to technical control and utilitarian domination. This split between epistemology and method seems to be a common occurrence in classical sociology. Because there is no access to social reality, the objectivity of science is determined by the successful adaptation of the social system. However, even this view is inadequate since Durkheim argues that issues of social order are ultimately related to those of social justice. In his later writings this shift from a concern with issues of functional integration, specialized division of labor, and the maintenance of a healthy social order to the principles and ideals of moral autonomy, self-development, and social justice is more pronounced and more explicitly examined.

These arguments were also developed in his earlier work, *Primitive Classification*, and in his major work, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, where he challenges Kantian epistemology and develops a sociological theory of knowledge. Durkheim revisits the philosophical debate in Western thought about the nature of knowledge and truth. How is objective reality reflected in our consciousness? Is it simply a collection of our experiences or does the mind itself reflect the rational and logical organization of the world? Does it condition and transform what we perceive and think? Does reality reside in the senses or mind? Are the universal properties of the world empirically derived from nature or from the innate principles of the mind? Rejecting both the empiricist and rationalist traditions, he

turns to Aristotle's and Kant's doctrine of categories. Aristotle's philosophy of the categories of the understanding—time, space, class, number, cause, substance, personality, and so forth—was based on the assumption that the universal categories of human thought and judgment were expressions of the real world. There was a clear relationship between logic and being, knowledge and objective reality.⁵⁷

With the beginning of modern philosophy, the empiricists maintained that logic was only a form of classification and systematization that organized our experience but did not create a real world beyond what we perceived through our senses. Concepts and universals were only nominalistic means of classifying our impressions; only the sensations and impressions were real. David Hume in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) developed his theory of association in which the connection between ideas was based on resemblance, contiguity, and causation. He reduced his theory of knowledge to a theory of psychological habit.⁵⁸ Any knowledge that did not faithfully copy external reality was metaphysical and, therefore, illegitimate. He rejected the rationalists who contended that truth arose out of inner self-reflection upon the innate concepts of the mind and beginning with the simplest principles proceeded by way of deduction to the ultimate truths.

Kant altered this perspective with his argument in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the categories were part of the very structure of the mind itself and helped form the objects of experience and thought. He attempted to integrate key elements of both empiricism and rationalism with his subjective idealism and critique of pure reason. Knowledge of objective reality is a process of joining together the unformed and meaningless sensations and impressions of sensible perception (Hume) with the active structuring of the mind (Descartes). Both are needed for experience and thought to occur. After summarizing the differences between the a posteriori position of the empiricists and the a priori perspective of the rationalists, Durkheim rejects both positions as inadequate. He basically accepts Kant's synthesis of the two theories of knowledge that have split philosophy since the seventeenth century. Neither experience nor the pure mind alone can be the basis for these categories and, therefore, be the basis for knowledge. He accepts the fundamental premise of Kantian epistemology—knowledge begins with the senses but includes something else. Perception itself cannot provide the foundation for the categories of the mind since the latter form the sensations into objective experience. Reason and logic are not found in sensations or impressions that are fleeting and without systematic order. There is no universality or necessity in the process of becoming. With his critique of pure reason and investigation into the limits of the structure of the mind, Kant attempted to justify Newtonian physics. The ordering principle of the world was to be found in reason and in the categories of the understanding.

Durkheim disagrees with Kant, however, that the categories of the understanding arise out of the structure of the mind and can be validated by his

method of transcendental deduction. Instead, Durkheim turns from a philosophical to a social theory of knowledge. Tracing these epistemological developments, Peter Hamilton writes, "Consequently, concepts and the categories of the understanding are not given, but are created by the facts of social life. . . . Durkheim believed that in showing classification to be a collective representation he had produced a method by which the debate between empiricism and rationalism could be resolved."⁵⁹ In this radicalized reading of Kantian epistemology within the framework of sociology, Durkheim transforms the whole of the history of Western thought from Aristotle to Kant. The secret to the origins of the categories of the mind lies in the nature of society. The categories of time, space, causality, substance (accidents), and class (species), that is, the organizing principles of all physical and human reality, are the products of the structure and organization of society. The process of differentiation and association, the grouping of different objects together into a coherent unity, the formation of universal categories, and the division of nature into temporal and spatial relationships are the result of prior social divisions within the community.

In his analysis of primitive classification and totemism (primitive religion) among the Australian aboriginal tribes and American Sioux Indians, Durkheim recognizes that the physical grouping of animals in relation to each other results from a prior connection and organization of groups within society. Everything then becomes an expression of the "collective mind." For example, among the Sioux Indians the clans representing the mountain lion, buffalo, and elk are gathered together because of their violent nature. Members of these clans form the warrior class. The classification of genus and species, he argues, is a result of kinship and family relations, the division of primitive tribes around moieties, clans, and families and their corresponding social functions. They are not the result of some psychological predisposition or a priori structure of the mind to think in terms of abstractions and universal categories. The social is projected onto the physical and cosmological and provides them with order and meaning. Nature is pictured as unconsciously reflecting the physical and social organization of society. "Society was not simply a model which classificatory thought followed; it was its own division which served as divisions for the system of classification. The first logical categories were social categories."⁶⁰ The concepts and categories of the understanding are reflections of the priorities and hierarchies within group relationships.

The collective representations reflect the "mental states of the group; they should depend upon the way in which this is founded and organized upon its morphology, upon its religious, moral and economic institutions."⁶¹ Logic and consciousness merely reproduce the ontology of society; the categories of the understanding are the social forms of the rhythm of life, physical organization of the community, and classifications and priorities within human groups. These objective institutions and social forms are internalized in subjective conscious-

ness as they become the logical and theoretical principles by which the mind organizes the reality it perceives. The categories or conceptual paradigms, by which we organize our experience of the world through abstract universals, concrete particulars, and causal relationships, have been taken from society and projected back onto the world. The concrete empirical world of being comes into existence only through these collective representations and communal memories. Without them experience and rational thought would be impossible. The history of Western philosophy and its discussion about the nature of knowledge is really a discourse about the social unconscious that constitutes our habits of thinking and theories of science.⁶² Epistemology, in actuality, has become a form of sociological self-reflection.

HELLENIC SOLIDARITY AND MODERN ANOMIE

Durkheim was initially concerned in his early writings with questions about the nature of the collective conscience and the social order, whereas in his later works he moderates his functionalism by turning to questions about virtue, education, democracy, and social justice.⁶³ In *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893) and *Suicide* (1897), he stresses questions of functional equilibrium, social harmony, and the social order. Society is understood as a living organism with complex, interconnected parts that function to serve its structural and technical needs for stability and order. According to Parsons, "the problem of order in Hobbes's sense was the logical starting point of Durkheim's study."⁶⁴ Disruptions or changes in the inner social environment, specialization of labor in the workplace, family, religion, or the economy could affect the composition of the whole and its ability to maintain its social integration and communal cohesion. In some cases the sociological results could be a breakdown in the natural law and moral order of the social system by exhibiting unhealthy symptoms of abnormal behavior, anomie, or increased instances of divorce, crime, individualism, and suicide.

In his doctoral dissertation, Durkheim outlines the development of the organization of society by examining its transformation from ancient Greece and Rome to modern industrial society. The chapter on the mechanical solidarity of the ancients is replete with references to his readings of Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Euripides, Heraclitus, Hesiod, Plutarch, Pliny, Tacitus, Cicero, Servius Tullius, Diodorus, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.⁶⁵ Durkheim begins *The Division of Labor in Society* by recognizing that occupational specialization has not only played an important role in economic advancement, productivity, and efficiency, but has had an important moral function in the creation and maintenance of social solidarity and moral unity. He inquires into Aristotle's *Politics* and observes that the Greek notion of natural friendship was viewed as a means for creating unity and higher purpose in society. Friendship creates the positive social conditions for small group interaction and for the playing of social roles. This is the beginning of a division of labor. Rejecting the contract theorist and utilitarian

view of social cohesion resulting from self-interest, market rationality, and unregulated competition, Durkheim views the cohesion and integration of society as coming from these early forms of friendship, as well as from the division of labor within the family. He asks if the more extensive division of labor of industrial and commercial society could perform this same function. That is, out of the division of labor arises the solidarity of a common moral and legal system. He divides history into its ancient and modern periods that he describes as mechanical and organic solidarity. "Mechanical solidarity" is represented by a homogeneous society characterized by a coherent moral order and repressive law that directs human behavior by objective institutions and punitive legal codes as in ancient Israel, Greece, and Rome. Durkheim's thesis is that the unity and coherence of ancient societies is maintained by a collectively shared belief system that produces a similarity and likeness of individuals that emphasizes the role of the group. "The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience."⁶⁶ Though the collective conscience can only exist through individuals, it does have a life of its own as an external and objective moral force; it is a reality *sui generis*.

It is the uniformity and precision of the penal code that provides society with a set of clear restrictions and definite boundaries that Durkheim sees articulated in the Mosaic laws of the Pentateuch, especially in *Exodus*, *Deuteronomy*, and *Leviticus*, in the legal reforms of Solon and Ephialtes (562–61 B.C.) whereby the Assembly acted as the final court of appeals in Athens, and in the Twelve Tables and *centurial comites* of ancient Rome. Moral sanctions in society are relatively unfocused and less institutionalized. Law and punishment that protect the common sentiment also give it more institutional force and direction. In classical antiquity, it is the people in general who assemble to pronounce guilt or innocence. Thus, crime is not a transgression of particular laws or even an infringement detrimental to the physical life of the community. Rather, it is an abrogation of the collective will and its values. Society itself has been wronged. Crime is dangerous not because it directly threatens society but because it questions the collective spirit that holds society together. Since crime is universally disapproved, it shocks the collective sentiment and is, therefore, more aggressively pursued and more harshly punished. In a society formed around a community of beliefs, crime is an "outrage to morality."

Durkheim argues that the intensity of the punishment is not directly related to the severity of the transgression or to the ideals of justice but to the intensity of the emotions of the collective sentiment it offends. He describes the penal law of ancient societies as mechanical, aimless, irrational, and emotional whose goal is to eliminate everything that resists it in a nonreflective and instinctive act of blind revenge and destruction. This is why it is so savage, repressive, and conservative (slow to change). The law is there in order to make the criminal suffer in disgrace. There is no apparent balance between the criminal act and the severity

of the punishment. In actual fact, an economic crisis or bank failure is more dangerous to society than an isolated homicide, but the latter is more severely punished. The ancient legal codes of the Pentateuch are replete with examples of serious penalties for crimes that today we would not find serious infractions, such as eating forbidden food, misstating or inaccurate performance of sacred formulas or rituals, touching a forbidden object, and adultery. There are also examples when not only the criminal is punished but the severity of law is extended to the innocent members of the family (diffuse repression).

Serious transgressions and criminal acts undermine the collective conscience that unite a society in a common tradition, culture, and history. They challenge the collective memory and ideals of society that threaten its very continuity and future. Since society is constituted as a system of representations and symbols, any action that weakens this common bond is severely punished. Crime is an offense not against an individual but against society. "An act is criminal when it offends strong and defined states of the collective conscience . . . [when it] violates very pervasive and intense sentiments."⁶⁷ Since the criminal act questions the collective sentiments and public authority, it demands a reassertion of the collective will and its communion of spirits. Society can only reassert itself through its punitive laws and violent collective passions. Crime violates social cohesion and calls its foundations into question. Punishment reestablishes the collective bond and common conscience by reasserting the sacredness and morality of the legal system. To help explain these ideas, Durkheim examines a variety of different kinds of ancient laws in classical antiquity relating to religion, ceremonies, sacrifice, and profanation; dress and customs; crimes against individuals, marriage, and adoption; domestic law and familial obligations, kinship, and children leaving the family; robbery and murder; contractual obligations, rights, and debt; and administrative law.

Durkheim finds that in ancient Hebrew, Greek, and Roman societies there were distinctions made between private offenses and public crimes. The former included unseen robbery, rape, and slander, which might result in a compromise or fine, and the latter, which could result in the application of the repressive power of the whole city. The severity of the repressive laws also lies in their religious foundations and appears to the citizens as transcendent and thus sanctioned by the sacred. In language reminiscent of Plato's cave and Schopenhauer's veil of Maya, Durkheim characterizes the ideas or representations as mere images, illusions, and inert shadows. There is no God behind the laws, only society. "Since these sentiments have exceptional force because of their intrinsic intensity, they separate themselves radically from the rest of our conscience whose states are much more feeble. They dominate us; they are, so to speak, superhuman . . . [and] appear to us as an echo in us of a force which is foreign to us, and which is superior to that which we are."⁶⁸

Modern industrial society, on the other hand, has a different form of collective conscience and a different mechanism of social integration and cohesion.

Since it has become so complex and the means for maintaining authority and legitimation are so diffuse and subtle, there is no longer any need for punitive and vengeful law. Law has become rational, protective, and restitutive. Its goal is not repression but deterrence and, if this is not possible, at least a return to the original circumstances and equilibrium of those involved before the crime took place. In ancient civilizations, law, as the objective and institutional manifestation of social morality and the collective will, acted as the functional mechanism for social unity. In modernity the power of the collective conscience has weakened as its equilibrium function has been replaced by the expanded specialization of political, economic, and legal institutions and social organizations within a complex division of labor. The ideas of functional specialization and social differentiation are derived in part from Aristotle's *Politics*, which is quoted on the title page of the original French edition of *The Division of Labor in Society*: "The state consists not merely of a plurality of men, but of different kinds of men; you cannot make a state out of men who are all alike."⁶⁹ Durkheim, however, applies this insight to his analysis of modernity. The specialization of functions and social integration, which Aristotle viewed as crucial for the organizational structure of the polis, is what Durkheim calls "organic solidarity." It is an adaptive mechanism in response to the rise of "moral density": the nation-state, urban production, and a market economy. Durkheim has reversed Ferdinand Tönnies's development of history from the natural community of the *Gemeinschaft* to the artificial contractual relations of the *Gesellschaft* with his view of social evolution from mechanical to organic solidarity.

In modernity, he asserts, there is no disgrace or loss of honor in losing a lawsuit. Legal prescriptions remain indifferent and marginal to the collective conscience as there has been a rationalization and specialization of law into a variety of legal functions and organs. Cases are not determined by how intensely they offend the collective sentiment, but rather, how the general principles of law are formally applied in particular cases. The public is no longer threatened and is no longer affected by a particular case. According to Durkheim, there are two forms of negative solidarity produced by restitutive law: real and personal solidarity. Real solidarity represents the protections of individuals through negative rights, especially the rights to property, inheritance, and things protected from outside interference, whereas personal solidarity helps to reestablish rights that have been violated by conflicting rights between persons. Neither of these forms are positive in that they are geared to restore and reaffirm negative solidarity and rights but they do not create the basis of a new collective conscience or social consensus around common ends upon which social harmony ultimately rests. "It is not a true solidarity. . . . The first condition of total coherence is that the parties who compose it should not interfere with one another through discordant movements."⁷⁰

Laws produced by negative solidarity ensure the protection of the rights of isolated individuals interacting, but not necessarily cooperating, with each other. Barriers and limits are set for individual actions that only further demarcate and

separate individuals. Durkheim argues in Lockean fashion that property rights are real because they result from the rights entailed in the ownership of one's own body. This is a Newtonian universe of isolated atoms and stars that represents a reaffirmation of the seventeenth-century ideals of possessive individualism and the commercial market. Durkheim asks from where the positive reinforcement for social consensus and cooperation comes, since it is upon this organic solidarity that the moral order is founded. His answer is that it comes from the process of rationalization itself. The division of labor, the specialization of functions, and the diversity of social roles and rights, do not fragment and divide society, just the opposite. They provide the opportunity for increased cooperation, agreement, and integration. Functional differentiation and integration are a product of greater interdependence among society's parts. Because the functions of society have become more specialized, it requires greater coordination and effort among the parts to maintain societal equilibrium. Borrowing from biology and physiology, Durkheim makes an analogy to the nervous system of living organisms and to its harmony of integrated functions. The more complex the organism, the more specialized its functions, the more adaptive its possibilities, and the more coordinated it becomes.

Since cooperation occurs at many different levels and since there is a diversity of social spheres and specialized functions, solidarity rests neither on punitive laws nor on the public assembly of citizens in judgment. There are now numerous forms of law: domestic, contract, commercial, procedural, administrative, and constitutional law. Law is constituted through representative governments, formal bureaucracies, and the rational principles of the rule of law further removing the collective from public decisions about particular crimes. With this functional diversification, with organizational and legal specialization, the collective conscience is no longer threatened by any particular criminal wrongdoing. It is simply unaware of what is going on. Durkheim contends that law becomes marginal to the collective conscience. Legal rules and procedures no longer express the full consciousness or force of society; they are no longer viewed as transcendent and sacred—as expressions of a common soul. Thus, a violation of law produces more moderate responses and calculated punishments. As the power of the collective conscience declines, the distinctiveness and autonomy of the individual grows along with the search for personal happiness and the rise of dissatisfaction and suffering.

Although Durkheim argues that the division of labor is potentially an integrating feature of social solidarity, he is also aware of the fact that it has not actually performed this function in modern society. Economic and commercial crises, class conflict and worker oppression, and scientific rationalization represent three different phenomena of social pathology, that is, three forms of the anomic division of labor. At the level of macro- and microeconomics, large-scale industrialization has resulted in increased functional disturbances and internal tensions resulting in a breakdown in integration and equilibrium within the social organ-

ism. These social forces lead to unhappiness and injustice by weakening the collective conscience and social cohesion. Specialization within the market, production, work, and science has not resulted in greater solidarity but worker isolation manifested as a weakening of the social and personal ties within industry. The idea of a collective effort toward a common goal has been lost. Durkheim also argues that with the development of modernity changes in other social institutions, such as religion and the family, affect individual consciousness and the general bonds of social commitment and responsibility. The rise of Protestantism and divorce strain the communal experience and place more pressures on the isolated and anomic individual that lead to greater personal stress and higher rates of suicide.

In language reminiscent of Marx's theory of alienation, Durkheim contends that workers in modern industry are alienated from the process of production and the community of their fellow workers. The division of labor has become a source of structural disintegration, functional crisis, and social disequilibrium. Specialization has not provided the structural basis for either an expansion of industry and productivity or a greater coordination and cooperation within the workplace. Comte had seen the very same process and believed that it would be the role of the modern state to reestablish the lost equilibrium and general interests disrupted by the specialization and fragmentation within society, while science would provide the same role of integration at the level of cultural ideology. "Collective sentiments become more and more important in holding together the centrifugal tendencies that the division of labor is said to engender, for these tendencies increase as labor is more divided, and, at the same time, collective sentiments are weakened."⁷¹

As with Marx, Durkheim maintains that a society's ideals must be an expression of the structural possibilities of the social organism. With the growth of the market and industrial production, new forms of integration are necessary to maintain functional stability and moderate market competition. As society becomes more complex, the relations among its members become more dependent on, and interconnected with, each other. Because of its complexity, modern society creates a structural requirement for greater dependency between capital and labor, humanity and machines, and industry and social institutions. The organization of work tasks must match particular capacities, goals must reflect aptitudes, and individual natures must parallel social functions. Durkheim says that the division of labor must be based on spontaneity, equality, and noncoercion. Over time castes and class have been replaced by a moral view of the dignity of each individual. Inequalities and class did not negatively affect the collective conscience in antiquity but can lead to real disruptions in the modern form of social solidarity. There should be harmony between individual needs and social functions. Under these conditions any resulting inequality would be the net effect of natural attributes and inequalities, not inequalities of class and wealth. Without these preconditions the division of labor can no longer act as an agency of functional specialization, coordination, and social cooperation. Nor is it able

to create moral beings with duties, dignity, and autonomy. Function is defined in terms of social justice.

The individual achieves a place in society that is an expression of his or her moral obligation at the same time that it constrains egoism and will. Durkheim concludes his dissertation by returning to Aristotle's notion of potentiality and self-realization and by integrating it with Kant's theory of the moral self. Most secondary interpreters of classical Greece have placed Aristotle's idea of self-realization in political activity (*praxis*) or philosophical contemplation (*theoria*). However, for Durkheim, Aristotle viewed the realization of human nature in household work (*oikeion ergon*). He argues that in modernity the nature of work is quite different, as it is no longer based on a homogenous consciousness, integrated polity, or self-sufficient household economy. Rather, it requires a great deal of specialized coordination, as has already been noticed. Durkheim believes that humans must realize their potential in society and history. To be a person means to develop within society and within a historically specific form of the division of labor. In the end, the final goal is to produce a "concrete personality," a free, emancipated individual with a clear sense of the possibilities and elevated needs that exist in society—"the social horizon."

The practical knowledge of sociology with its law of social equilibrium and evolution is not to be used for maintaining stability and unity for its own sake and, thus, for maintaining class power and inequalities. Durkheim's goal is ultimately human emancipation and moral autonomy in a healthy society—social justice—and this requires the elimination of anomie and the abnormal division of labor.⁷² Independence arises from economic interdependence. Science and ethics are integrated into his sociology of morals. For Durkheim, moral philosophy is closely connected to the science of morals, as he brings together German Idealism, historical political economy, and socialist thought. Rejecting the Kantian split between pure and practical reason, and fact and value, Durkheim begins to develop his own science of morality. In the *Division of Labor in Society*, he explains, "Although we set out primarily to study reality, it does not follow that we do not wish to improve it; we should judge our researches to have no worth at all if they were to have only a speculative interest. If we separate carefully the theoretical from the practical problems, it is not to the neglect of the latter; but, on the contrary, to be in a better position to solve them."⁷³ The strength of the moral being is based not on the rationality of a transcendent ego but on the collective consciousness of social values. This is Durkheim's way of sociologically expressing Kant's notion of the kingdom of ends. "Moreover, far from being trammelled by the progress of specialization, individual personality develops with the division of labor. To be a person is to be an autonomous source of action."⁷⁴ This is similar to the neo-Kantian goal of the development of a strong personality we found in Weber's writings.

Law, morality, and duty are the product of a complex division of labor that creates individual obligations, rights, and functions. They produce a new type of

individual who is a moral being formed in a dialectic between the collective conscience and personal autonomy. This is, for Durkheim, the nature of social justice. Earlier upon his return from travel to Germany and under the influence of the German Historical School, he wrote in his 1887 essay, "Ethics and the Sociology of Morals," "Social economy (*die Volkswirtschaft*) does not consist simply in corporate production. What is important above all is not knowing how to produce as much as possible, but to know how people live, to know the extent to which economic activity attains the ethical goals of life, the demands of justice, humanity, and morality which impose themselves upon every human society."⁷⁵ In the tradition of Aristotle's discussion of concrete universals, Durkheim too, in his ethical theory, unites matter and form. The principles of morality are not transcendent concepts or abstract forms as they are for the rationalists. Rather, they make sense only when seen as part of an empirical and historical analysis of the laws of property, contracts, labor, inheritance, and so forth. Social justice and moral autonomy can only be realized within the life of real social institutions.

Moral values have validity only when understood within the context of history and political economy. They are the collective habits and social obligations that attach to a particular set of institutions and culture. This is the meaning of the concept of "social economy." Durkheim develops an ethical theory that leaves behind the abstract principles of the good, duty, and utility for the foundation of a social ethic in the concrete community. "One cannot construct an ethic in its entirety and impose it on reality later; one must rather observe reality to infer morality from it."⁷⁶ Finally, Durkheim hopes that with the development of sociology, it will be able to develop its practical and ethical dimension so that "the day will come when the science of ethics will have advanced enough for theory to be able to regulate practice."⁷⁷

Issues of social pathology and anomie are continued in his work, *Suicide*. Here he investigates the connection between anomie, as a state of social derangement of individual needs, and the rate of suicide as tied to particular features of modern economic life: economic crises, market competition, and insatiable human needs.⁷⁸ Anomie reflects broad structural changes in modern society, including the rise of a market society and economic competition; a decline in the collective consciousness, social solidarity, and the public sphere; a rise in the minimalist state of classical economics; and an ethic of economic materialism and private interest, utilitarian and chrematistic values. Anomie is a condition of liberalism in which the state is unable to regulate or moderate the infinite desires of the narcissistic will and its unfettered demands for property and success in a competitive market.⁷⁹ Egoism overwhelms the collective consciousness. The moral and religious values of society are incapable of dampening the ever-increasing and insatiable desires of the utilitarian ego. During periods of rapid change, especially during industrial and financial crises, there is a noticeable increase in suicides because of a disturbance in the equilibrium of society. Periods of rapid change create conditions that undermine social restraint and promote unlimited individual desires affecting the

will to live.⁸⁰ Suicide is a social disease of modernity, as anomie weakens the will to live and leaves the individual in a state of alienated suffering and existential despair.

There is also a powerful subjective element to these structural changes. With a decline of the public conscience and its moral regulation of human behavior, there is a dramatic increase in human appetites and passions with a growing loss of meaning and purpose in life. The infinity of endless desires results in social chaos and a futility of personal happiness, thus giving rise to dissatisfaction and suicide. Durkheim refers to this social disorganization as the disease of the infinite. It is most clearly expressed in the doctrine of economic materialism found in both capitalism and socialism. With shifts of supply and demand within the market, the permanent business cycle creates conditions of economic crisis, further weakening the collective sentiments and moral values within society. This has deleterious effects on the individual. Creating his own theory of Aristotelian chrematistics, Durkheim rejects the primacy of economic materialism with its unlimited wants and physical desires. In modernity, economics, instead of being a means to an end, becomes the end of human life itself. He describes this state of the unrestrained will and "collective sadness" in language similar to that of Schopenhauer. "Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity. . . . Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture. . . . To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness."⁸¹

The modern economy creates a market based on the exploitation of human needs and the creation of never-ending restlessness and disappointments. Needs are aroused but left unfulfilled; appetites are excited merely to create psychological dependency; ambition is unleashed; and competition and market irrationality are intensified. Life becomes "more violent and painful." At the same time life becomes empty, valueless, and sterile with no past and no future. The end result is disillusionment and futility.⁸² This is certainly the sociological side of Schopenhauer's world of pain and suffering. Durkheim transforms Schopenhauer's existential crisis into the social crisis of modernity. In a market economy there is no goal or purpose other than eternal dissatisfaction and striving. This is a society characterized by lawlessness, a deregulation and disintegration of social norms, and an abyss of disillusionment. "It is true, indeed, that economic life has this character at the present day. . . ." However, he argues that it cannot continue indefinitely. "It is not possible for a social function to exist without moral discipline. Otherwise, nothing remains but individual appetites, and since they are by nature boundless and insatiable, if there is nothing to control them they will not be able to control themselves."⁸³ Modern capitalism produces a competitive market economy unexcelled in fomenting excessive wants, unlimited desires, and unrelenting economic crises and disequilibrium; it creates a world of hostility, mistrust, and human suffering. Sociology is a practical science that in the Aristotelian

tradition of *phronesis* provides for an understanding and implementation of the principles of higher moral purpose, collective responsibility, and communal happiness within the public sphere: law, government, education, and professional organizations in the workplace. For a social remedy Durkheim turns to Aristotle's belief that needs have to be moderated and placed under the control of the conscience and moral order; limits are to be created by a new economic ideal. New limits and ideals evolve slowly through enhanced moral education and new forms of social organization that cultivate and nurture a renewed sense of social responsibility, civic virtue, and democratic participation. This interest in pedagogy and politics accounts for much of Durkheim's later writings.

CLASSICAL PEDAGOGY AND MODERN POLITICS

As has been noticed by a number of authors, Durkheim's educational and pedagogical lectures and writings have occupied a large part of his time but have received little attention from sociologists. These lectures offer us insight into his thoughts on moral education, civic virtue, citizenship, and the good life. Pedagogy is the modern expression for classical Greek ethics and political science. Durkheim's theory of public education provides us with the social and political ideals that are to be nurtured among the young. Education and socialization thus express a society's hopes for the future and for its functional needs for the present. Since society is a system of ideas and beliefs, education of commonly shared values manifests its collective expectations and ethical dreams. The goal of social education is not to follow nature but to create nature, since it "creates in man a new man, and this man is made up of all the best in us, of all that gives value and dignity to life."⁸⁴ These lectures represent his attempt to rewrite Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and Aristotle's *Politics* for a modern French audience by integrating the classical view of ethics, politics, and participatory democracy (Aristotle and Rousseau) with the Kantian values of human dignity and individual freedom. His reflections on the Roman guild, medieval craft associations, and the modern state echo Aristotle's views on the family, friendship, citizenship, and social justice. It is the state that ultimately calls "the individual to a moral way of life, new social ideals, and new communal possibilities of human potentiality."⁸⁵ These universal values of classical humanism express the collective conscience of modern society.

In order to overcome the social problems of anomie, abnormal division of labor, suicide, and economic and industrial crises, sociology must become a practical science (*phronesis*) for the ethical and political education of the nation's citizens. Its goal is social enlightenment and the re-creation of human needs expressed as the ultimate values of society. Since the Kantian categories of the understanding, forms of logical and conceptual classification, and representations are socially constructed; since the faculty of association, the grammar of logic, and

the forms constitutive of the understanding and social consciousness, that is, the formal structure of the mind, are neither innate nor a priori, the educational process becomes essential in the formation of a new autonomous personality and the collective conscience within history.⁸⁶ The interpretation of physical and social reality mediated through collective representations integrates Durkheim's epistemology with his theory of education. Education through the sciences cultivates the forms and ideas through which reality is constructed and moral principles confirmed. In this manner the social being of each individual, as well as the perfection of the species, is created. Science and citizenship are intimately bound together in this social reconstruction. In his work, *Education and Sociology* (1922), Durkheim maintains that "education is, then, only the means by which society prepares, within the children, the essential conditions of its very existence. . . . Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined."⁸⁷

We have seen how the moral and political thoughts of Kant and Rousseau were used to counter the positions of classical and utilitarian economists. This leads to another challenging question of the influence of socialism on Durkheim's thought.⁸⁸ Durkheim calls for an equality of opportunity and condition, a socialist redistribution of wealth, and the principles of charity and altruism to be joined with his Kantian liberalism of social rights, human dignity, and self-determination. This is a position similar to the nineteenth-century neo-Kantian school of socialist thought at the University of Marburg that attempted to integrate Marx and Kant.⁸⁹ Durkheim rejects the technological socialism and deterministic Marxism prevalent in his day.⁹⁰ But he was also heavily influenced from very early on in his academic career by his trip to Germany, when he came under the influence of the German Historical School and academic socialists: Schmoller, Wagner, and Schäffle. Like Weber, Durkheim views orthodox economics as value laden and responds favorably to the Historical School with its rejection of classical economics and laissez-faire capitalism. Following the path of Aristotle it also argued for an organic view of society, union of political economy and ethics, social solidarity and social conscience, and the promotion of social ideals over private interests.

Throughout his teaching career at Bordeaux and the Sorbonne, his lectures focused on issues of pedagogy and education, as they provided the vehicle for the discussion and transmission of his ideas about ethics and social justice. Sociology is not a technical science but defines social ends and practical (moral) values. Like Marx, there is a close connection between theory and social action. Since humans are radically social and historical beings, the foundation of individual and collective consciousness lies in education. In 1904–5, Durkheim first presents a series of lectures on education, entitled *The History of Education in France*. Tracing educational values and methods from ancient Greece and Rome to modern society, he provides a historical overview to different periods and goals of pedagogy in

Western Europe. Using the comparative historical method, he traces the evolution of education from the fall of the Roman Empire and the Carolingian period through the foundation of the universities and formal education in logic and dialectical instruction in the Middle Ages to the humanism of the Renaissance, the revival of classical studies in Jesuit universities, and the later pedagogical conflicts within modernity. He also offers us an overview of the social ideals proposed within secondary education in France.⁹¹ By treating past pedagogical ideals as social facts, Durkheim is able to compare previous educational values and their functional and institutional role in maintaining past societies.

The Greek ideal was expressed in its love for wisdom and physical beauty; the Romans stressed military virtue and courage; the medieval world emphasized chivalry and a warrior code; and the modern world has as its highest values knowledge and science. Today we live in a world of pedagogical anomie and “disenchantment” caused by a loss of educational values and clear direction. This historical method is important to Durkheim. Because social ideals are manifestations of concrete institutions and relationships, the future can only be built upon the present circumstances and cannot result from utopian fantasies. A study of education offers modernity an opportunity to reflect on previous societies and their cultural ideals (social unconscious) that might offer us insight into our present dilemma. The past offers clues in understanding our present circumstances, functional problems, and future possibilities.

Education provides a form of knowledge that is not only geared to tell us about the past but, like medicine and politics, is able to guide us into the future. Durkheim is clearly joining science with practical reason, the real with the ideal, and theory with practice. By integrating sociology and pedagogy, he joins together the scientific study of education with the practical theories of the educator. Education transforms the egoism and asocial nature of human beings as it creates a new social being by developing its hidden potential and cultivating a collective memory of cultural ideals. The individual is taught the moral values of individual duty, autonomy, dignity, and democracy, as well as a respect for reason and the highest ideals of modern science and traditional civic humanism. Education expresses the spirit of each society. Following Kant and John Stuart Mill, Durkheim hopes that education will point to the highest perfection of humanity. Not limited by a transcendental view of human nature and universal moral values, Durkheim contends that education cultivates human potentiality and social possibilities. In Aristotelian language, he writes,

Since man carries in himself all the potentialities of his development, it is he and he alone who must be observed when one undertakes to determine in what direction and in what manner this development should be guided. What is important is to know what his native faculties are and what their nature is. . . . The man whom education should realize in us is not the man such as nature has made him but as the society wishes him to be.⁹²

For Durkheim, this would be the role of sociology and psychology. Morals and societies change, and education must be responsive to these changes. Reacting to criticism that this sounds like tyranny, he responds by saying that education brings out the best in us. Durkheim describes freedom in the neo-Kantian terms of self-conscious rationality and self-mastery: "For to be free is not to do what one pleases; it is to be master of oneself, it is to know how to act with reason and to do one's duty."⁹³

The main purpose of education is to cultivate in individual consciousness the importance of social ideals and democracy. In lectures given in the decade between 1890 and 1900 and continued at the Sorbonne in 1904, 1912, and again just before his death, entitled "The Nature of Morals and Rights," and later published as *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (1950), Durkheim supplements his work on pedagogy and morality by outlining his theory of social ethics and politics. These lectures on the nature of professional morals and public rights represent a further clarification of the collective consciousness in the form of craft organizations and the modern state. It is here that he develops his democratic ideal of a broad political community in education, law, and the state that integrates moral individualism with political responsibility.⁹⁴ It represents a change of position from his dissertation and an incorporation of Aristotelian philosophy of the common good and the collective consciousness back into the modern experience. The simplistic dualism between mechanical and organic solidarity of the dissertation is transcended as the collective values and consciousness of mechanical solidarity are again necessary to restrain the diversity of secondary social organizations. Political community and public morality are needed to unite the diverse groups within modern society.⁹⁵ Durkheim is attempting to bring together the individual and society, moral individualism and social pluralism, and mechanical and organic solidarity. The ancient world is not lost in the modern experience but becomes a crucial element in the legitimation of modernity itself through the secondary associations.

CLASSICAL JUSTICE INFORMING SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The importance of the state to social solidarity was first articulated in *Suicide* but is more fully developed in his *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. It is to be the state, as the most important collective body within the political community, which promotes equality, human dignity, and self-determination. Durkheim refers to this form of collective consciousness as the cult of the individual. It cannot be used to protect particular economic or class interests, for its role is the nurturing of the collective morals of society and its highest political ideals of individual autonomy, democracy, and social justice. This can no longer be the exclusive function of the division of labor. If the disease of modernity lies in the market economy and industrial production, Durkheim studies the past for ways in which it, too, has dealt with economic pathologies and commercial and indus-

trial crises. In his lectures on sociology as a science of morals and rights, he begins by examining how civic duty and professional responsibility were developed in ancient Rome. Toward this end he studies the ancient forms and functions of public law and order, contract and property rights, and the formation of Roman trade and production guilds. Following Aristotle and Montesquieu, Durkheim argues that these laws are different in ancient societies according to whether the state is a monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy.

After rejecting classical economics and the utilitarian view of a self-regulating and self-stabilizing market, he questions whether the market could act as a moral guide and discipline our natural egoistic inclinations and the anarchy of production. He notes that socialism has the same sociological problem since it cannot institutionally account for moral authority and social harmony within its materialistic and anomic culture. The market functions as a disruptive element in society fostering private interests, competition, and moral disintegration. Durkheim asks about the source for moral self-restraint and the functional moral integration of society. He concludes that the unifying function can only be provided by the moral force of a professional ethics within a wide variety of well-defined and organized occupational associations that inculcate into the public consciousness a system of corporate ethics and social responsibility for the common good. Durkheim calls this social arrangement of decentralized moral centers of authority that communicate and share their values with the rest of society, "moral polymorphism." Though his response to the social pathology of the market economy is distinctively modern, his view that happiness and freedom depend upon social moderation, individual restraint, and moral regulation draws upon ideas from Aristotle to Rousseau.

Turning to Plutarch and Pliny for help, Durkheim begins to investigate the early forms of craft associations and worker guilds (*collegia*) that extend well into the Roman Republic and Empire. Rome was particularly interested in the regulation of foodstuffs that came under the close scrutiny and protection of the state. With the end of the Roman era, these institutions of trade and industry faded from use but were revived and prospered during the Middle Ages from the eleventh until the fourteenth centuries. Durkheim believes that these craft guilds must be reconstructed in modernity in order to offset the terrible effects of the market economy. He maintains that the role of the guild system in the medieval period was as a vocational and professional association of craftsmen and merchants whose main purpose was the utilitarian regulation of methods and prices, maintenance of the organization and rights of apprenticeship, and the development of industry. They formed the heart of the medieval commune. The function of the "worker guilds" or *collegia* in ancient Rome was fundamentally different, since it stressed a profound religious and moral role.⁹⁶ It acted as a means for creating moral solidarity, spiritual kinship, and a brotherhood of craft workers with their common deities, rituals, festivals, welfare funds, and cemetery. The Roman guild system formed the moral life of the worker community similar to that of the fam-

ily that gave meaning to human existence based on friendship and a commonality of interests. They lasted until the dissolution of the cities, trade, and industry resulting from the civil wars and Germanic invasions of the Roman Empire.

By the eighteenth century and the French Revolution, the importance of the guilds had been eclipsed by the nation-state. The state, as the fullest expression of the collective consciousness, had institutionalized the process of deliberation, reflection, and critique in public affairs.⁹⁷ Durkheim believes that it is time to revive an old idea, but within the renewed spirit of modern democracy in public assemblies and occupational guilds. The professional and craft associations would be run by administrative councils, viewed by Durkheim as miniature parliaments: "We go on to imagine this council or parliament as having the power, on a scale to be fixed, to regulate whatever concerns the business: relations of employers and employed—conditions of labor—wages and salaries—relations of competitors one with another, and so on . . . and there we have the guild restored, but in an entirely novel form."⁹⁸ The guild would help regulate and plan the economic life of the community so as to avoid the anarchy of production. It would determine wages, work conditions and industrial health, labor contracts, relations between owners and workers, rights and obligations toward one another, quality of product, and so forth. Tribunals would be established to adjudicate labor disputes. Finally, the corporate organ of guild democracy would be attached to the central organization of the state.

Durkheim's view of democracy is informed by his interpretation of Rousseau.⁹⁹ According to Durkheim, democracy is "the political system by which society can achieve a consciousness of itself in its purest form."¹⁰⁰ Sovereignty rests with a self-conscious people who are open to new possibilities of individual freedom and moral development and to new forms of social adaptation. Morality and function are its two key elements. However, societies founded on unconscious sentiments and ideas, unarticulated values and prejudices, and blind bureaucracy cannot be the basis for a true democracy. Because of this, Durkheim separates the state from the mass of citizens. He is critical of the form of direct democracy found in both Aristotle and Rousseau since he believes that it leads to political anomie and social instability. When the crowd participates fully then there is no real government and no real democracy. Returning to Lewis Henry Morgan's ethnology of the Iroquois Indians, Durkheim rejects the view of primitive tribal society, the council of sachems, and communal democracy that is developed by both Morgan and Marx. "If every one is to govern, it means in fact that there is no government. It is collective sentiments, diffused, vague and obscure as they may be, that sway the people. No clear thought of any kind governs the life of peoples."¹⁰¹ Only the most general unarticulated and unconscious sentiments of the majority would prevail. He contends that the distinction Rousseau makes between the bourgeois and citizen, and between the economy and polity, cannot be transcended directly. Collective sentiments cannot be rationally

articulated or publicly deliberated by irrational self-seeking individuals competing in a market economy for their own personal advantage. The unnatural striving and unbounded appetites of the egoistic individual contradict the search for clear ideas and communal ideals within the political community; they also contradict the belief that we are moral beings requiring equality and dignity in our social relationships. The tension between democracy and capitalism continues in classical social theory.

Durkheim, like Aristotle and Marx before him, recognizes that democracy and capitalism are antithetical. It is for this reason that he separates state government from the will of the nation and places communal limits on the market and property ownership. For in the end, it is the state that makes us moral and free. Rejecting utilitarian and neoclassical economics, Durkheim argues that it is the state that emancipates the individual, defends human rights, and provides social justice to our moral existence. "Man is man only because he lives in society. Take away from man all that has a social origin and nothing is left but an animal on a par with other animals."¹⁰² As with Aristotle, the role of the state is to create citizens and moral individuals. Durkheim is concerned that the Enlightenment reduces humans to their vegetative and digestive systems—commercialism and consumerism—thereby sacrificing the individual to market initiatives.

According to Aristotle, in a democracy there is a sharing and dialectic between ruler and ruled, and, according to Rousseau, democracy is a political institution of self-legislation where the common good is a faithful expression of the collective will in public assembly. Sovereignty rests with the assembled public as it reflects upon, articulates, and debates its general responsibilities. However, Durkheim rejects the idea that "under a democratic system the will and thought of those governing are identical and merge with the will and thought of those governed."¹⁰³ For him, democracy is not the direct expression of the will of the people. This blending of the state and nation leads to a political malaise. Because of the weakening of the collective consciousness and the dangers of political anomie in modern society, he is fearful that direct democracy would not have the firm foundations to maintain moral authority and social order. He wishes to provide the state with more structural independence and freedom of action from its constituents and citizens, while maintaining an important link of communication and dialogue of ideas between the state and nation so that the general will is expressed. "The more that deliberation and reflection and a critical spirit plays a considerable part in the course of public affairs, the more democratic the nation."¹⁰⁴ True democracy takes place in the deliberation of the state government and executive councils and in the dissemination of reports and findings to the citizens at large.

Ultimately for Durkheim, democracy is defined by society's ability to communicate openly and freely between the mass of citizens and the deliberative bodies and government councils of the state. In its legal and moral deliberations, the state is the representative and voice of the collective conscience. By this means

important political and social issues are brought from the shadows into public view. Durkheim's rejection of the narrow individualism of modern political theory, along with his social epistemology and theory of collective representations, forces him in the direction of a technocratic communalism. Unfortunately for Durkheim, his view of democracy has strong elements of a political technocracy and authoritarian structure that run counter to his Kantian view of the moral individual and the Aristotelian view of citizenship. He salvages some of this with his ideal of guild socialism but he never quite settles the antagonisms between the mass market and political democracy, between the crowd and individual citizens. The tension between the anomic will and practical reason is never resolved.

Durkheim seems aware of these problems since he replaces direct democracy with a political representation through professional organizations and other intermediary public bodies. Only the guild can solve Rousseau's paradox: the state is based on the actions and deliberation of individuals but only the collective mind can be democratic. Market individualism debases public morality and civic virtue. It undermines moral discipline and communal citizenship. Like Aristotle, Durkheim contends that the market represents a public danger. He asks the question: Where can morality, public discipline, and a sense of social needs originate if there is only self-interest, competition, and economic warfare? For him, elections cannot be the place for the formation of a rational collective consciousness since the former are so infrequent and temporary. This is a criticism of liberal democracy he borrows from Rousseau, but he rejects his solution of the formation of a general will within the public legislature.¹⁰⁵ For Durkheim, moral education and public morality can occur only in worker associations that are permanent and cohesive. The guilds will transform the mass of workers into reflective and responsible citizens and statesmen who are aware of their social responsibility. It is here at the local level that direct democracy and citizenship play a key role.

Durkheim also wishes to protect citizens from the direct power of the state by creating a diverse group of secondary political and economic organizations in society—new forms of political and economic decentralization. This emphasis on group pluralism and political diversity is similar to the recommendation of Alexis de Tocqueville who maintained that they were necessary as protections against the dangers of state tyranny. The early emphasis on functional differentiation in *The Division of Labor in Society* is replaced by political and social differentiation. As intermediaries between the mass of people and the state Durkheim interjects representatives of provincial assemblies and occupational and professional associations. Again criticizing Rousseau, he contends that respect for the law comes not from constituting the law but from the organization and procedures of the law itself, that is, from the quality of the political system. By the very nature of these institutional standards, citizens may judge the legitimacy of the laws. Since rights are realized in institutions, it is the diversity and pluralism of political associations that define the nature of modern democracy, not immediate participation in the organs of state.

Durkheim rejects the theory of natural rights as he argues that individual rights are not inherent in society or in the individual but are formed and protected by the state. They are not given but evolve over time. "It is the state that creates and organizes and makes a reality of these rights."¹⁰⁶ He believes that it is the main function of the state to realize human freedom and to emancipate individual personalities. "What makes it possible for him to transcend himself and to rise above the level of animal nature is, that collective life echoes in him and permeates him."¹⁰⁷ In opposition to classical economics, he states that the two are not in conflict with each other. In the course of his lectures, Durkheim outlines the history of the evolution of civic morals, property rights, and contract obligations. Following in the tradition of Rousseau, Kant, and Mill, he maintains that it is the act of the will of appropriation of unoccupied land, the satisfaction of human needs, and human labor that justify the right to private property. Durkheim agrees with much of this liberal tradition but ultimately sides with the right to property flowing from the collective sentiment and tradition. How these rights developed historically takes Durkheim back to the view of property in the Roman family and in the Justinian Codes.

Durkheim concludes his analysis of the state with a recapitulation of the Aristotelian view of social justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: commutative and distributive justice. The first of these forms of collective consciousness regulates market exchange according to a just price and the second form governs the distribution of rank and office as it calls for a more egalitarian society. Included in commutative justice is Durkheim's theory of laws for a just contract: fair compensation, just minimum wage, and provisions for worker's compensation and social welfare that insure against sickness, old age, and industrial accidents. As with Mill, it is inheritance that is the main stumbling block to social equality and to a dismantling of the class system. The implementation of industrial law is "designed to prevent the employer from abusing his position to get labor out of the workman on terms too much against his interests, that is to say, on terms that do not equate his true value."¹⁰⁸ Durkheim's theory of commutative justice calls for a transformation of the power relations within the workplace based on a change in contracts, industrial law, and the guild system to establish a balance between the opposing classes respecting the principles of the value and dignity of the workers. He summarizes this aspect of his theory by saying, "Therefore as long as such sharp class differences exist in society, fairly effective palliatives may lessen the injustice of contracts; but in principle, the system operates in conditions which do not allow of justice."¹⁰⁹

The ideals of social justice are broadened with the inclusion of a theory of distributive justice based on the institutions of property, inheritance, and class and the principles of social merit and services rendered to the community. Durkheim states that justice and equality of opportunity within society require that wealth should not be inherited but should be redistributed by the professional associations. Justice requires a fair exchange within the market and a dis-

solving of all social inequalities not legitimated by individual merit. Just as individually won titles and ranks are no longer transferable from parent to child, so, too, property should no longer be part of the right of inheritance. Durkheim recognizes that this is an uncomfortable prospect for many people to accept. But in a society no longer based on inequality of class power and brutalizing competition, social equality takes away much of the parental fear of leaving children unarmed before a savage social world. Durkheim does allow for some inheritance but not enough that would negatively affect social equality. Completing his analysis of professional ethics and civic morals with a theory of social justice that alters private property, labor contracts, and the social organization of production, he attempts to redefine radically the distribution of economic and political power in modern industrial society.

In the end, even merit, as the ethical basis for a just distribution, is questioned by the sentiments of charity. Durkheim concludes his lectures by saying that even natural inequalities of hereditary and personal merit should be eliminated in favor of the principles of moral equality, human fraternity, and citizenship.¹¹⁰ As with Aristotle and Rousseau, friendship and citizenship are the final standards of social justice and charity as Durkheim integrates the modern and ancient view of democracy. He integrates the ancients and moderns into a guild socialism that at the economic level is based on the principles of Aristotelian ethics but at the state level runs counter to the ancient and modern ideals of communal democracy found in the writings of Aristotle, Rousseau, and Marx.

Chapter 4

AWAKENING CLASSICAL DREAMS SYNTHESIS OF ANCIENT JUSTICE AND MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCE



Most interpretations of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim treat them as very distinct writers who provide a wide variety of theories in sociology as they articulate the foundations of modernity in their ideas of alienation, rationalization, and anomie. This concluding chapter stresses the commonality of their backgrounds in classical Greek and Roman history, philosophy, and literature and their borrowings from German philosophy, law, and history. Their epistemologies and methods are, moreover, framed by their interests in German idealism and existentialism and by nineteenth-century political economy and history. And their theories of social science are permeated by Aristotle's theory of ethics and social justice and his views on rationality and happiness (*eudaimonia*). A moral and historical science, nineteenth-century sociology develops as a critical and skeptical response to the rise of modern industrial society with its political and cultural values of liberalism and individualism and its reliance on the disruptive forces of a competitive market economy and administrative state. From the heights of the Athenian Acropolis, the early sociologists view the new social system with both admiration for its economic capacity and disdain for its overall quality of ethical life and destruction of the community. The ancients furnish them with support for their social criticisms and justification for their political ideals and social dreams.

As we have seen in the previous chapters, these authors are critical of the Enlightenment view of science and rationality and its underlying epistemology of empiricism and positivism. They reject the notion that empirical facts lie at the heart of social science. Instead, they view science as resting in different forms of subjectivity: the categories of political economy, the ideal types of culture, and the history of collective representations. These, in turn, are manifestations of deeper underlying structures and relationships in society. Objective reality is

mediated by class ideology and false consciousness, religious ethics and secular reason, or collective categories and cultural classifications. There is no objective reality (objectivism), no privileged access to truth through science (scientism), no correspondence between ideas and reality (realism), and no universal laws of causal explanation based on the method of natural science (naturalism). With the notion that knowledge and truth are socially mediated, the facade of the Enlightenment is stripped away. Rejecting the epistemology and methodology of Enlightenment rationality, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim seek alternative forms of scientific and historical knowledge.

The classical tradition in sociology also reacted strongly to political liberalism, social contract theory, and utilitarianism as it turned instead to the history and ideals of classical antiquity. In his early writings Marx uses the post-Aristotelian theory of Epicurus to criticize the systems of both Aristotle and Hegel, to develop an initial view of science and ethics, and to outline the basic features of his anthropological theory of self-realization and species being. In his later writings, especially *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, *Capital*, and *The Ethnological Notebooks*, he uses Greek culture and society as the basis for his ethical critique of capitalism and for the foundation for his ideas about social justice and economic democracy. Weber turns to classical Athens and Rome in his writings on the ancient economy and city-state in order to pinpoint the historical origins of Western society and the structural foundations of rationalization. The Greeks and Romans help him answer key questions about the distinctions between ancient and modern capitalism and the structural formation of the modern economy and state. By way of Nietzsche's appropriation of the Greeks, Weber derives his critique of Western reason and science, his analysis of the process of disenchantment and rationalization, and his articulation of a theory of Dionysian dreams and Apollonian order. Durkheim returns to the Greeks for a better picture of the nature of society as a whole—its order, unity, and solidarity—which he counterbalances to the anomie, social disruption, and physical suffering in a modern economy. His ideas on pedagogy, moral enlightenment, citizenship, and democracy are derived in part from his experience of the Athenian ideal of social justice. The Romans provide him with a more detailed knowledge of the history of contracts, property, and the social organization of production. It is Durkheim who argues that Plato and Aristotle were the first sociologists with their typologies of political constitutions. These modern theorists also use the tensions between Athenian democracy and ancient capitalism to examine the early relationships between political freedom and economic liberty, participatory deliberation within the Assembly and the disruptions of market competition. Their interest in the resulting social tensions and class conflicts have enormous implications for their interpretations of modern society.

These early sociologists are influenced by the writings of Immanuel Kant as they stress the importance of human dignity and moral autonomy, as well as the rejection of both empiricism and rationalism as the foundation of truth.

Following Kant, but rejecting his transcendental subjectivity as ahistorical and asocial, they view social reality as mediated by subjectivity and consciousness in the form of praxis and ideology, the value-relevance and theoretical categories of the dedicated scholar, or the collective consciousness. That is, truth lies in class consciousness, in the dignity and responsibility of the intellectual, or in the ideals of the collective memory of society. There are no independent facts existing objectively in the external world. Scientific objectivity is always an interpretation mediated by the normative interests and values of the sociologist. Sociology as a science involves a hermeneutical uncovering of the meaning of human action. Meaning may be overt in history, reflecting the actual intentions of historical actors, or it may be repressed by social structures and ideologies, the unconscious values of positivism and natural science, or the forgotten memories of the collective past of society itself. Social amnesia plays an important conceptual role in the classical sociological tradition, which requires detailed investigations into the structures of modernity to highlight the relationships between consciousness and capitalism. Whether the focus is on cultural ideologies and the superstructure, on religion and the Protestant ethic, or on the history of theories about morality and education, the purpose of science is to clarify the forms of consciousness and their relationships to broader social institutions of power and domination.

All three accept the ideal that sociology, as *Wissenschaft*, should lead to self-consciousness, social enlightenment, moral well-being, and human dignity. Science is intimately bound to moral growth and self-development. Marx is influenced by the historical and phenomenological method of Hegel, whereas Weber and Durkheim are neo-Kantians influenced by the German Historical School. For all three, truth is socially specific and historically relative; knowledge is mediated by the categories of the understanding. Science is to guide human action in order to transform the nature of communal life and make it freer and more human. Influenced by Aristotle's political and ethical theory, Durkheim and Marx move in the direction of a social democracy, whereas Weber takes a more individualistic approach in which knowledge is helpful in creating the social conditions and national structures for a meaningful life characterized by personal dignity, moral striving, and hard work.

Marx rejects empiricism and the existence of false consciousness—a false sense of objectivity and empirical facts, which he calls “fetishism,” since behind them is hidden the historical and social nature of consciousness and events. Political economists turn history and social structures into independent forces and intellectual commodities. In *Capital*, he warns against the methodological fallacy of relations between human beings interpreted as relations between things, thereby creating an external world of “theological laws” of economic development and human behavior, which abstract from the social relations of production, class institutions, and structures of power in modern society.¹ He abandons the epistemological principles of naturalism and realism because they establish new forms of idolatry as transcendent economic laws. The traditional categories

of political economy—private property, capital, wages, profit, rent, exchange value, and so forth—must not be interpreted, according to Marx, as physically given entities divorced from their historical and social contexts. Frozen in time and dissociated in space, classical political economy produced hypostatized events and reified laws unrelated to the historical and social conditions that gave rise to them. The categories of economics became static and transcendent. Empirical facts dissolve as the foundation of positivist science when they are examined as part of the history, internal logic, and the potentiality of modern society. For Marx, sociological events must be viewed as part of a comprehensive analysis of both history and structure that includes the evolutionary dynamics of industrial technology and production, power and class relationships, the logic of the market and capital, and ideological consciousness. The present must be seen as an integral component of the living flow of time from the past into the future and must not be fetishized as an abstract and externally unrelated moment. Also, the individual as a species being is embedded in this network of social relationships, and this provides an opportunity to consider the concrete historical possibilities for individual self-realization.

Weber, too, is aware of the epistemological dangers of treating society as a thing to be objectively studied in the abstract. He approaches historical reality from the perspective of particular values, which orient the sociologist and enable him or her to ask probing and informative questions. But knowledge of an objective reality as a “thing-in-itself” is epistemologically rejected, as is the examination of society through social laws based on the model of the natural sciences. Reality cannot be studied as if it had the properties of things—mechanical causes, universal laws, and technical interests—because it is an infinite and unknowable process. Its objectivity is created by the investigator, who constitutes the objects of scientific inquiry by focusing upon those events that possess meaning and cultural significance. This position, too, necessitates a rejection of epistemological realism and positivism. Sociology involves a normative choice based on the interests and values of the investigator who, through the value relevance (*Wertbeziehung*) of that investigator, constitutes, rather than mirrors, the objects of inquiry as ideal types. Nor can individual action in history be subsumed under nomological laws of science.

Durkheim views sociology as the study of collective representations expressed as logical, religious, economic, legal, and political ideas, which intervene between consciousness and reality to form experience. In his lectures on pragmatism and epistemology, he, too, rejects positivism, social realism, and the copy theory of truth. He maintains in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* that neither empiricism nor rationalism can adequately understand the structure of consciousness or the process of knowing. For there to be knowledge, our experience and thoughts must be organized in a necessary and universal manner by mental categories, which form our perceptions and give them coherence and meaning. These categories transform what might be subjective and individual

experiences into universally shared ones. Knowledge of an objective reality would be impossible without this universally shared foundation in concepts. Durkheim's important advance is in the recognition that the concepts that organize our world into a logical form are a product of society and not the result of nominalist classification (Hume), innate ideas of the mind (Descartes), or the a priori structure of transcendental subjectivity (Kant).² Our experience of the world contains representations filtered through social categories and forms of social thought. Kant's critique of pure reason is transformed into a sociological and historical theory of knowledge. In the classical tradition the categories of the understanding become social and ideological categories, ideal types and moral perspectives, or "primitive" and scientific classifications.

The three social theorists integrate both idealism and materialism in their works. Marx brings together his anthropology and critique of political economy; his ethical and immanent critique with a historical analysis of capitalism and the economic foundations of society; and his theories of value, primitive accumulation, and historical materialism with a logical and dialectical analysis of the inner dynamic and economic contradictions of capital in his later writings. Weber blends together his studies of religion, science, and consciousness with a structural analysis of the origins of modernity and rationalization. And Durkheim joins his idealism of the collective representations and social forms of classification with an investigation into the social facts and material reality of anomie, suicide, labor contracts, and historical types of property. The three use a comparative historical method to highlight aspects of their analyses as they integrate consciousness and structure into their theories of modernity.

Marx, Weber, and Durkheim treat individuals not as consumers of production goods or market entities; nor do they accept an ethic of economic materialism: self-interest, competition, and the accumulation of material wealth. Rather, they rely upon Kant's moral vision articulated in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. Humans are moral beings whose goal is equality, freedom, and social justice. These ideas are supplemented by Hegel's critique of Kant and by the introduction of the notions of history and society into the discussion of moral autonomy and self-determination. The manner in which these values are understood and appropriated is quite different in these three authors. The classical sociologists use Kant, filtered through Hegel, Schopenhauer, or Nietzsche, as the normative basis upon which to generate their criticisms of liberal individualism, the competitive market, capitalist organization of industrial production, and Enlightenment rationality and science. A society defined by the loss of personhood, the creative spirit, and self-consciousness is a society characterized by alienated consciousness, the iron cage, or an abnormal social organization and anomic division of labor. Modernity transforms human reason into a mechanical and deterministic science. Science, in turn, creates its own forms of objectivity as it measures the immediate present and reduces individual potential and human possibilities to that which is articulable from within the limits of the present social system. It cre-

ates a dreamless present within which the possibilities of social justice are foreclosed. Alternative social forms are excluded as unwanted personal biases, cultural prejudices, or intrusive and nonscientific ethical values.

Positivism is a form of false consciousness and distorted philosophy of social science since it is the epistemological manifestation of the alienation, rationalization, and anomie of modern industrial society. The objectivity of science presupposes a world in which individuals are already objectified and reified. Only then can causal explanations and functionalist analysis be applied to the study of human behavior in a mechanistic and deterministic social system. From this perspective, disagreements over methodology reflect fundamental differences of opinion regarding political, economic, and social values. Reflections on method are ultimately expressions of displaced politics. Positivism represents the end of epistemology since debate about the nature of knowledge is replaced by a universal acceptance of a particular kind of scientific inquiry. By defining objectivity and truth in terms of either empirical facts or verifiable methods, by separating subjectivity and objectivity, and by eliminating values from science, positivism limits the pursuit of knowledge to the range of questions raised by either empiricism or rationalism. It creates not only the definition of science and objectivity, but the very objects of experience and criteria of truth itself. The scientific method constitutes its prestructured facts out of its own paradigm. Facts unmeasurable by its method are rejected and stigmatized as unscientific and irrelevant. The sphere of reason is reduced to the observable appearances of the immediately given world.

Although the research and methods of classical sociology range far beyond these limits to questions about the political ideals of classical humanism, the underlying structures and functions of modern society, and the human and moral possibilities inherent therein, the discipline of sociology over time marginalized these areas because they did not conform to the criteria of science established by positivism. Questions about worker alienation and exploitation in society, about the history and structures of a rationalized and disenchanting world and the meaning of social action, and about the rise of narcissism and anomie in communities with declining cultural values were no longer asked. Questions about the needs and motives that gave rise to sociology in the nineteenth century were repressed; the theories that articulated those needs in classical form were displaced, their language silenced; and the economic and political ideals that animated them were excluded from their original sources. Science as critique was exiled from the academy; its concepts banished from thought, and with them the dialectical, interpretive, and historical methods.

As sociological concepts became dissociated from reality, the classical horizons of Greek humanism receded; their ideals lost their collective potential to influence modernity. Language itself became an impediment to further inquiry through a complex process of censorship in which the philosophical and cultural past was forgotten and the original texts distorted. About the general process of

distorted communication and lost dreams, Jürgen Habermas writes, “The psychically most effective way to render undesired need dispositions harmless is to exclude from public communication the interpretations to which they are attached—in other words, repression. Freud calls the excluded symbols and the motives that are excluded through them unconscious wishes.”³ Positivism domesticated and pacified the intentions of the great thinkers of the discipline and excluded their critical ideas from public reflection. It replaced questions about ethics, history, and culture with quantitative explanations and predictive theories. It produced a science that could neither explain society’s origins, understand subjective intentions and historical meaning, nor criticize social injustice. With the rationalization of society and sociology, positivism became an ideology that repressed and silenced the rich diversity of nineteenth-century forms of social science and research methods. It expressed the values of an alienated and rationalized world in which individuals were lost in statistical probabilities and mechanical relationships; history, culture, and social institutions were subsumed under reified laws and deterministic causality. The ancients were replaced by the moderns, classical antiquity by the Enlightenment, and *phronesis* and ethics by the exclusionary method of natural science and epistemological realism. Science shrank to a utilitarian concern for technical knowledge and pragmatic results. The Aristotelian dimension of science with its emphasis on practical wisdom, interpretive understanding, and communal justice disappeared into the academic unconscious.

Viewing the panorama of nineteenth-century sociology, we see a wide variety of research methods and techniques based on the use of immanent critique and neo-Hegelian logic, historical analysis, neo-Kantian epistemology, and renovated rationalism. For the early sociologists, science transforms reality by integrating it with *praxis*—theoretical reason and practical action. Scientific concepts are rational reconstructions that do not mirror unmodified and unmediated empirical facts, but filter reality as they attempt to delve into the structural and cultural heart of society. They do not merely reflect the status quo; nor do they merely reproduce the given social formations. They produce new forms of classical science imbued with the moral fervor of Aristotle’s theory of social justice—dialectical science, interpretive science, and functional, moral science. The orthodox perspective, in contrast, deems questions about ethics, the good society, participatory democracy, history, meaningful social action, the formation of the collective consciousness, the deeper structures of power and domination in the modern economy and state, and the technological potential of society as inappropriate and unverifiable. They are fraught with normative assumptions and hidden value judgments, ready to pounce “upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with . . . fears and prejudices.”⁴

In the Enlightenment view of science, the past and future are caught in a web of the immediate appearances; the past and future are sacrificed to the present on an altar of utilitarian metaphysics and a priori technological imperatives. And, in the end, these crucial elements of science are also repressed. Regarding Marx’s cri-

tique of empiricism, Patrick Murray has written, "The logic of the concepts of 'facts' is one of sensual immediacy. . . . 'Facts' relate to one another only externally: each is what it is quite apart from the other 'facts' it happens to relate to. 'Facts' have the flatness of being without history and without potentiality."⁵ This criticism of empiricism and naive realism is also part of the epistemology of both Weber and Durkheim as they reject the idea that the goal of sociology is merely to study surface phenomena. They suggest that orthodox social science does not question the structure, purpose, or ideals of society; nor does it raise issues about the type of personality the institutions of modernity produce. With the fragmentation and specialization of modern science, much of the intellectual excitement and passion of classical sociology is lost.

For the classical social thinkers, on the other hand, science is intimately connected with ethics and politics. The positivist notions of consciousness, objectivity, value freedom, and technical knowledge are rejected in favor of Kantian and Hegelian (historical and sociological) notions of science and reason. Critical of Enlightenment science, the classical sociologist returns to the heights of the Acropolis in order to create a new science that integrates political economy and ethics. This integration is to be found in the political and ethical writings of Aristotle; in the German Historical School of economics in the nineteenth century; and in the university courses in law and classical political science. For Marx, positivism provides the philosophical justification for the vulgar economics and fetishism of the nineteenth century; universal and mechanical laws of production and consumption reflect a mystified and deterministic universe that has lost self-consciousness and individual freedom. For Weber, positivism is expressed in both neoclassical and Marxist economics and is the theoretical side of the process of rationalization in which reason is transformed into the formal and technical rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) of the last man. Durkheim's initial functionalism and emphasis on social facts develop into an idealistic interpretation of social representations and will that borrows extensively from both Kant and Schopenhauer. His functionalism is ultimately related to questions of social justice and virtuous activity.

Marx compares capitalist forms of production to the Kantian ideal of humans as creative moral beings and sees only alienation, injustice, and false consciousness. Weber comes from the same Kantian perspective and contemplates a world locked into the logic and grammar of an Apollonian nightmare and the meaninglessness of functional rationality. Durkheim looks at the world and sees unhappiness; personal suffering; a loss of social restraint and laws; the rise of pathological suicide; and a deterioration of social solidarity, public spiritedness, and the collective consciousness. Modernity does not give rise to human happiness, rationality, public freedom, or private rights and liberties. The progress anticipated by the Enlightenment is an illusion and veil of Maya, since the market produces only economic exploitation, a narrowing and eclipsing of reason, and a pathological social organization of production. For Marx, Weber, and

Durkheim, the understanding of modernity is suffused with a powerful existential critique of its institutions and values, which undermine the possibilities for human rationality and moral autonomy. The existential element in Weber and Durkheim is derived from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, whereas, for Marx, it comes from the implicit existentialism of the radical subjectivity and phenomenology of Kant and Hegel.

The classical theorists have similar methodological interests because consciousness plays such a central role in each. In his early writings Marx is concerned with the false consciousness and ideology resulting from the categories of classical economics of Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus and the structures of the workplace. In his later writings, the logic, structure, and history of capital become the object of analysis. Borrowing from the method and logic of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* and Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic*, Marx examines capitalism through a critical theory that outlines the internal contradictions and dialectic at the heart of the concept (*Begriff*) of capital, which reveals the distorted inner logic, teleological rationality, and essence of the modern social system. It is a deeply flawed and irreparable economic system driven by a mechanical and unconscious competition, constant technological innovation, and structural tendencies to overproduction, social and economic waste, and declining rates of profit.

Weber takes a different approach with his interpretive and historical methodology. He sees sociology as studying the intentions, beliefs, and actions of historical figures and events. The goal of sociology is to understand human action as a product of conscious decision making on the part of individuals in history. But there is also another element of Weber in *Economy and Society* and *General Economic History* that stresses the importance of underlying historical structures and institutions in the origins of Western society. This is his theory of rationalization with its transformed Kantian question: What are the universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of capitalism? It represents a different approach to sociology and a different appropriation of Kant from that of the method of understanding. By blending together the methods of historical interpretation and structuralism, Weber admits that most social action occurs behind the backs of individuals in unconscious and unintended behavior. Durkheim's early writings stress the method of functionalism and systems equilibrium based on an examination of social facts. His later works, however, are more Kantian as they emphasize collective consciousness and commonly shared social representations and beliefs. For him, science is a moral discipline. In his study of law, education, religion, politics, and ethics, he uses a comparative historical method and interpretive sociology. He considers sociology neither value free nor neutral since social science is founded upon a practical interest in emancipation and human freedom.

Though Marx, Weber, and Durkheim offer different interpretations about the nature of modern social science, they are all in agreement that it is closely connected to the ethics and values of Aristotelian social justice. Marx hopes for

an emancipation from class society in economic democracy; Weber, as a member of the Historical School, seeks the classical ideal of political knowledge for the common good of the nation and humanity (*Menschentum*); and Durkheim investigates the role of education, pedagogy, and moral pluralism in transforming the state and industrial and craft organizations for the purpose of creating a diverse and democratic society based on the Kantian values of equality, dignity, and social justice.⁶ Although one may find examples of all three engaging brief moments of positivism, these are always marginal to their central focus on critical, interpretive, and historical methods.

Trained in the political science of classical antiquity, the three sociologists write their dissertations on aspects of ancient Greece and Rome and base their views of science on practical reason and not on the method of natural science. They do not separate knowledge from ethics but understand sociology as an emancipatory science that would lead away from the alienation, rationalization, and anomie of modernity. Exploitation, the iron cage, and the social pathologies of suicide and the abnormal division of labor can be overcome only by means of a science that is willing to confront social reality with its own historical past and future ethical and political possibilities. The later Americanization of sociology had pronounced political and utilitarian interests in removing critical science from a confrontation with modern society. To this end, theorists had to rewrite the origins of sociology so as to exclude its foundations in classical antiquity, German philosophy, European history, and historical economics. It is by no means accidental that sociology continues to separate itself even today from philosophy, history, and political economy. By becoming its own autonomous and isolated discipline, by redefining its method and epistemology in ways that immunize social reality from critical self-reflection and disturbing ethical questions, and by reinforcing its social amnesia and separation from its philosophical heritage, sociology no longer resembles, or even understands, its own classical tradition.

Today methodological questions deal with techniques and research methods that presuppose the validity of positivism and its particular philosophy of science. In the nineteenth century, it was just this narrow and limited definition of science and truth that was problematic and open to question.

The ancient Greek world distinguished between three forms of knowing that corresponded to three types of social existence within the Athenian city-state. *Theoria* expressed the theoretical contemplation of the philosopher, who sought universal and transcendent truths. *Phronesis* was the practical knowledge of the citizen, who participated in the public life and political activities (*praxis*) of the ancient polis. Classical political science, found in Aristotle's *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, was thus a practical form of political and ethical knowledge whose goal was the education and maturation of the individual within the community. It was a form of moral wisdom that sought an understanding of the institutional possibilities of the good life and political happiness. Through public edu-

cation and political participation citizens could realize their potential as social beings by nurturing their moral virtues and rational character. By developing the virtues of courage, moderation, honor, and wisdom and by expanding their reason and sensitivity to issues of social justice, they could live the good life based on friendship and citizenship. Human potentiality, reason, and freedom were all communal categories. By borrowing so profoundly from the ancients, classical sociology attempts to join together the ancient and modern worlds with the expectations of a better life for humanity. In this way the political ideals of Aristotle are imperceptibly connected to the rationality and methodology of nineteenth-century historical science.⁷ Social justice becomes an inseparable part of social science; the ancient classics are integrated with the classical in sociology. Aristotle's broad definition of economic and political justice; his challenging critique of chrematistics and the market economy; his views of a social economy founded on grace, reciprocity, and mutual sharing among friends; and his hopes for a democratic polity and political freedom based on virtue, equality, and participation in the legislative and judicial decision-making processes provide sociologists with a more comprehensive appreciation of human rights, democracy, and political participation, as well as the foundation for their criticisms of both capitalism and liberalism.

The possessive individualism of the modern market and the ideals of utilitarian economics produce only alienation in the workplace, rationalization of social institutions, and the anomic pathologies of the individual will. By divorcing human self-realization from the public sphere, by silencing the voice of human potentiality, and by robbing reason of its communal dreams, modern society creates a political vacuum that defines itself in terms of the ideals and expectations of egoism and narcissism. With the disappearance of the public sphere and the trivialization of the private, we become locked in an iron cage, experiencing fear, anxiety, and loneliness. The early social theorists are well aware of the close connection between existentialism and sociology.

The third form of Greek knowledge was *techne*, the technical knowledge of the artisan and laborer whose activity (*poiesis*) involved the physical planning and construction of their worlds. Habermas in his work *Theory and Practice* recognizes that the modern political science of Machiavelli and Hobbes had replaced the older Greek ideal of practical knowledge of the virtuous citizen and the good society with concerns about the engineering of the correct social order. Political science had lost its classical foundations and was transformed into a science of social engineering, technical knowledge, and administrative control. Political wisdom, ethical knowledge, and the ideals of virtue and social justice were replaced by a technical science whose goal was calculation, order, and instrumental knowledge.

Modern political science attempts to integrate the Greek notions of *episteme* and *techne* as it separates politics from morality, and science from ethics. Habermas argues, "This separation of politics from morality replaces instruction in

leading a good and just life with making possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order.”⁸ This approach to science becomes the model for the social sciences in general and sociology in particular. Social science searches for universal truth with a technical application that is believed to be objective and value free. Taking a different perspective, classical sociology in Germany and France rejects this rationalization of science and attempts to rediscover the classical Greek view of knowledge with its practical and moral goals of human dignity and political freedom. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim view science as an ethical form of knowledge whose purpose is to lead to self-realization and moral development—in the form of class enlightenment and an emancipated society for Marx, cultivation of the individual personality and humanity within the nation for Weber, and education for civic responsibility and democratic citizenship for Durkheim.

Classical sociology is unique among the social sciences of the nineteenth century. It is a critical and phronetic science combining key elements of both Kant and Aristotle. In its methods and theories, in its study of the formation of the social institutions of modernity, it rejects the model of the natural sciences as the foundation for sociological inquiry and knowledge. It alone among the social sciences derives its social and epistemological ideals from the ancients. And it alone among the social sciences is developed in opposition to the Enlightenment, utilitarianism, and classical and neoclassical economics. In its challenge to the values of modernity and its political and economic ideals, it brings to the academy a critical perspective that offers alternative insights into the possibilities of human self-realization and self-determination. In its quest for social justice, sociology reestablishes the connection between science and ethics and between knowledge and politics. Its opposition to modern society provides us with the possibilities for understanding our history and building our future. No longer bound to the principles, logic, and rationality of the Enlightenment, we are free to develop reason and science based upon the hopes of classical justice and social democracy. With the uncovering of the hidden treasures and forgotten dreams of our classical horizons, we rediscover the possibilities of humanity that lie buried deep within each of us as social beings.

NOTES



INTRODUCTION: CRITIQUE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND RETURN TO CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

1. The Greek discussion about the ideal of social justice, especially as found in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, includes a broad range of issues: the common good, happiness, human reason, morality, character development, moral and intellectual virtues, political economy, wealth creation and distribution, and political sovereignty and democracy. In Aristotle's philosophy of science, there are three distinct forms of knowledge: *phronesis*, *techne*, and *episteme*, with their three corresponding forms of social activity. *Phronesis* is the ethical knowledge or practical science of the prudential citizen and experienced politician who cultivate wisdom through political activity (*praxis*), that is, through political deliberation and public discourse in the Athenian Assembly, *Boule* (Council of 500), and jury courts. *Techne* is the technical knowledge or utilitarian science of the artist, craft artisan, and worker who through fabrication and making (*poiesis*) transform nature into things based on pre-conceived models and ideas. And *episteme* is the universal knowledge or theoretical science of the philosopher who through contemplation (*theoria*) seeks universal and eternal truths in metaphysics, physics, and mathematics. Nineteenth-century Enlightenment authors viewed natural science as a form of domination and mastery over nature integrating both theoretical and technical knowledge. This became the epistemological heart of positivism. The Greek ideal of *phronesis* was lost. However, classical sociologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, rejecting much of the Enlightenment view of science and rationality, turned instead to *phronesis* as the foundation for sociology as an interpretive and moral science for the study of cultural values, social institutions, and the deep structures of modernity. In the process they created a new *phronetic social science*—a sociology of phronesis—based on the general principles of classical Greek political science. For more details, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 1947), book 6, chapters 3–13, 1139b15–1145a10, pp. 426–442. The most important and insightful secondary literature on the subject of *phronesis* includes the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 307–24; Ronald Beiner, *Political Judgment*

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 72–97 and 138–43; and Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 290–372.

2. Alvin Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: Equinox Books, 1971), pp. 61–87. Gouldner's exciting earlier work, *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory* (New York: Basic, 1965), examines social theory in the Platonic dialogues and in the Greek world. Years later Irving Zeitlin followed with another interesting work on the Greek origins of social and political theory, entitled *Plato's Vision: The Classical Origins of Social and Political Thought* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993). The project of the following work on classical horizons and forgotten dreams attempts something altogether different than these two previous monographs. Its goal is to ground the discipline of modern sociology—its methods, theories, and critiques—in classical Greece, especially in the ethical and political writings of Aristotle. Gouldner and Zeitlin returned to Plato and to the ancients in order to study their social ideas. This new work reintegrates the moderns and the ancients in the classical sociology of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim. By this means the radical distinctiveness of modern historical and cultural science, as well as its romantic break with the Enlightenment and positivism, will become clearer.

3. George E. McCarthy, "Karl Marx and Classical Antiquity: A Bibliographic Introduction," *Helios* 26, 2 (Fall 1999): 165–73.

4. Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography*, trans. and ed. Harry Zohn (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 50.

5. Harry Albert, *Emile Durkheim and His Sociology* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966). Albert writes, "Nor should it be forgotten that Durkheim objected to being called a positivist and explicitly rejected Comtist metaphysics and the Comtist conception of sociology" (p. 25).

6. Durkheim, "Sociology in France in the Nineteenth Century," in *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, ed. Robert Bellah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 3.

7. Dominick LaCapra, *Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 4 and 6; and Douglas Challenger, *Durkheim through the Lens of Aristotle: Durkheimian, Postmodernist, and Communitarian Responses to the Enlightenment* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994), p. 13.

8. Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work, A Historical and Critical Study* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), pp. 264–65.

9. For another examination of the relationship between positivism and sociology, see Anthony Giddens, *Positivism and Sociology* (London: Heinemann, 1974); and Jonathan Turner, *Classical Sociological Theory: A Positivist's Perspective* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1993).

10. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 303 and 305.

CHAPTER 1: KARL MARX: ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

1. Karl Marx, *The Ethnological Notebooks*, in *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*, trans. Lawrence Krader (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Company, 1974), pp. 196–241. For his analysis of ancient societies Marx draws upon a wide range of historical and anthropological literature on primitive communities and the ancient mode of pro-

duction with a main focus on the following ethnological writings: Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (1861), *Village Communities in the East and West* (1871), and *Lectures on the Early History of Institutions* (1875); Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient Society* (1877); John Budd Phear, *The Aryan Village in India and Ceylon* (1880); and John Lubbock, *The Origins of Civilization* (1870). Also included are works on ancient Greece and Rome, including Rudolph Sohm, *Fränkisches Recht und Römisches Recht: Prolegomena zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte* (1880); J. J. Bachofen, *Das Mutterrecht* (1861); August Böckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* (1817); Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique* (1864); Otto Gierke, *Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (1868–1913); George Grote, *A History of Greece* (1846–56); Carl Hermann, *A Manual of the Political Antiquities of Greece Historically Considered* (1836); Georg Maurer, *Einleitung zur Geschichte der Mark-, Hof-, Dorf-, und Stadtverfassung* (1854), *Geschichte der Markenverfassung in Deutschland* (1856), *Geschichte der Fronhöfe* (1862–63), and *Geschichte der Dorfverfassung in Deutschland* (1865–66); Theodor Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte* (1854–56); Barthold Georg Niebuhr, *Römische Geschichte* (1811–12); Georg Schömann and J. H. Lipsius, *Griechische Alterthümer* (1855); and E. B. Tylor, *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* (1865), *Primitive Culture* (1871), and *Anthropology* (1881). For an analysis of Marx's later writings, see Padelis Lekas, *Marx on Classical Antiquity: Problems of Historical Methodology* (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), pp. 55–104; E. J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction," in *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, by Karl Marx, ed. E. J. Hobsbawm, trans. Jack Cohen (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964), pp. 9–65; and Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

2. Patricia Springborg, "Marx, Democracy and the Ancient Polis," *Critical Philosophy* 1, 1 (1984): 48–50.

3. Heinz Lubasz, "The Aristotelian Dimension in Marx," in *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (April 1, 1977): 17; Scott Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx* (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1985), p. 58; and Tony Burns, "Materialism in Ancient Greek Philosophy and in the Writings of the Young Marx," *Historical Materialism* (Summer 2001): 4. Throughout Marx's dissertation there are numerous references to Aristotle, including *On the Soul*, *Metaphysics*, *On the Generation of Animals*, *Physics*, *On Becoming and Decaying*, and *On the Heavens*.

4. Marx, *Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, in *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 38.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

6. It is very interesting that both Epicurus and Nietzsche viewed Greek science as a rational, but fictitious, construction. Its purpose was tranquillity or happiness of the individual for Epicurus and metaphysical solace and utilitarian survival for Nietzsche.

7. Marx, *Difference between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, p. 65.

8. Laurence Baronovitch, "Marx, Hegel and Greek Philosophy: A New Approach to the Subject of Karl Marx's Early Intellectual Development," *Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy*, Oberlin College 7, 2 (May 1976): 66 and "German Idealism, Greek Materialism and the Young Karl Marx," *International Philosophical Quarterly* (September 1984): 253–54; Peter Fennes, "Marx's Doctoral Thesis on Two Greek Atomists and the Post-Kantian Interpretations," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 47, 3 (July/September 1986): 445; Oded Balaban, "The Hermeneutics of the Young Marx: According to Marx's Approach to the Philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus," *Diogenes* 48 (Winter 1989): 28–41; G. Teeple,

“The Doctoral Dissertation of Karl Marx,” *History of Political Thought* 11, 1 (Spring 1990): 81–118; and John Stanley, “The Marxism of Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 33, 1 (January 1995): 133–58.

9. Marx, *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy*, in *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 424.

10. Marx, *Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, p. 72.

11. Ibid. Some of these ideas anticipate the radical Kantianism and critical theory of Nietzsche.

12. Ibid., p. 41.

13. Ibid., p. 30.

14. Marx, *Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy*, p. 425.

15. Ibid., p. 437.

16. Marx, “Alienated Labor,” in *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 127.

17. Ibid., p. 123.

18. Marx, “Private Property and Communism,” in *Karl Marx*, p. 156.

19. Ibid., p. 164.

20. Marx never really delves into this question of the alienation of nature and science. The main question that he fails to examine is whether in socialism a new science would be created or whether natural science would be under the control of democratic institutions. These issues have been considered by twentieth-century authors, including Herbert Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” in *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1969), pp. 201–26; and Jürgen Habermas, “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology,’” in *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics*, trans. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1971), pp. 81–122.

21. Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair (London: Penguin Books, 1981), book 1, chapter 9, 1257a10–1257a40, pp. 82–83 and *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 1947), book 5, chapter 5, 1133a5–1134a10, pp. 408–11.

22. Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*, trans. Reginald Snell (New York: Ungar Publishers, 1965), p. 40. There are a number of interesting works that trace the Greek influence on Schiller: Philip Kain, *Schiller, Hegel, and Marx: State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982), pp. 13–33; Josef Chytry, *The Aesthetic State: A Quest in Modern German Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 70–105; and Bernard Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 133–84.

23. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, p. 69.

24. Ibid., p. 38.

25. Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture*, trans. Elfriede Heyer and Roger Norton (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987), p. 33.

26. Kain, *Schiller, Hegel, and Marx*, p. 89.

27. Marx, “Alienated Labor,” p. 128.

28. Richard Miller, “Marx and Aristotle: A Kind of Consequentialism,” in *Marx and Aristotle: Nineteenth-Century German Social Theory and Classical Antiquity*, ed. George E. McCarthy (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), p. 277.

29. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 1, chapter 9, 1257a20, p. 82.

30. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 1, chapter 7, 1098a15, p. 319.

31. Two authors in particular have stressed the importance of Aristotelian eudaimonism: Miller, "Marx and Aristotle," pp. 275–302; and Alan Gilbert, "Marx's Moral Realism: Eudaimonism and Moral Progress," pp. 303–28, in *Marx and Aristotle*. For Aristotle's discussion of rational deliberation and citizenship, see Aristotle, *Politics*, book 3, chapter 11, 1281a39–1282a41, pp. 202–06 and *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, chapters 3–13, 1139b15–1145a10, pp. 426–42.

32. Marx, "Private Property and Communism," pp. 164–65. The relationship between Aristotle's and Marx's theory of need has been noticed by a number of secondary interpreters. In his work, *Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Engels* (Oxford: Clio Books, 1975), Norman Levine argues that the social eudaemonism, or freedom and happiness to develop one's productive capabilities, found in the 1844 manuscripts comes from Marx's reading of Moses Hess and Wilhelm Weitling (pp. 21–27). For a provocative analysis of the social activities of the free individual compare Marx in Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, ed. R. Pasca (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 22 and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 9, chapter 11, 1172a1–1172a9, p. 518. It is also in this work that Marx and Engels reject Aristotle's ahistorical theory of the substance and essence of humanity (p. 29).

33. Patricia Springborg, "Aristotle and the Problem of Needs," *History of Political Thought* 5 (Winter 1984): 419. Also see Agnes Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx* (New York: St. Martin's, 1976).

34. Marx, "Needs, Production, and Division of Labor," in *Karl Marx*, p. 174.

35. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 1, chapter 9, 1257a5–1258a14, pp. 81–85.

36. Albrecht Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), p. 82; and Drucilla Cornell, "Should a Marxist Believe in Rights?" *Praxis International* 4 (April 1984): 52.

37. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," in *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, by Marx and Engels, ed. Lewis Feuer (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 119.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

39. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5, chapters 1–11, 1129a1–1138b14, pp. 397–423.

40. George E. McCarthy, *Marx and the Ancients: Classical Ethics, Social Justice, and Nineteenth-Century Political Economy* (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1990), pp. 60–83 and *Dialectics and Decadence: Echoes of Antiquity in Marx and Nietzsche* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994), pp. 14–20.

41. Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 240–49 and *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol 1: *The Process of Capitalist Production*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 176.

42. Norman Geras, "The Controversy about Marx and Justice," *Philosophica* 33 (1984): 49 and 78.

43. Marx, "Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher," in *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Collected Works*, vol 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 137.

44. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 84. For an interesting analysis of the relationship between Marx's notion of species being and Aristotle's idea of the *zōon politikon*, see Nancy Schwartz, "Distinction between Public and Private Life: Marx on the *zōon politikon*," *Political Theory* 7, 2 (May 1979): 254–56; and Horst Mewes, "On the Concept of Politics in the Early Work of Karl Marx," *Social Research* 43, 2 (Summer 1976): 278–83.

45. Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, in *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 29. For an analysis of participation and deliberation in a democratic polity, see Aristotle, *Politics*, book 3, chapter 1, 1275a22–1275b21, pp. 169–70.

46. Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, pp. 31–32.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

52. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *Karl Marx*, p. 13.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

54. Alan Gilbert, *Democratic Individuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 267–68.

55. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 6, chapter 2, 1317a40–1318a3, pp. 362–64. See also Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, trans. P. J. Rhodes (London: Penguin Books, 1984). For a summary of the recent literature that a democratic polity represented Aristotle's best political constitution, see McCarthy, *Dialectics and Decadence*, pp. 329–30, n. 8.

56. Marx, *The Civil War in France: The Paris Commune* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 60–61. For a detailed introduction to Athenian democracy, see Mogens Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly: In the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) and *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology*, trans. J. A. Crook (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); M. I. Finley, *Democracy Ancient and Modern* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988); Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and David Stockton, *The Classical Athenian Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

57. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, p. 243.

58. Marx, *Capital*, vol 1, chapter 1, pp. 59–60; chapter 1, p. 82; chapter 2, p. 85; chapter 4, p. 152; chapter 5, p. 164; chapter 13, p. 326; and chapter 15, p. 408.

59. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 1, chapter 9, 1257b40–1258a18, p. 85.

60. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, pp. 714–15. Abstract labor is a historically specific form of human labor characterized by the capitalist social organization of production: specialization and fragmentation of labor, dispossession of workers from the means of production, deskilling of labor, and production based on private property and class domination.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 58–59.

62. Robert Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 37; and Allen Wood, *Karl Marx* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 125–56.

63. Norman Geras, "Marx and the Critique of Political Economy," in *Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory*, ed. Robin Blackburn (Glasgow, Scotland: William Collins Sons, 1978), p. 300.

64. G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 134–74.

65. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 72.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

68. Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 3: *The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole*, ed. Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 244.

69. Marx turns to Greece in order to offer insight into a community grounded in the production of use value for the satisfaction of human needs. In the *Grundrisse* he writes, "This is why the childish world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier" (p. 488). For an interesting analysis of Marx and ancient Greek society, see William James Booth, *Households: On the Moral Architecture of the Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

70. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 21.

71. Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," in *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, p. 230.

72. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, p. 245.

73. For an interesting critique of absolutist claims to knowledge and certainty, as well as a radical analysis of Hegel's view of the dialectical movement of the concept, see Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon, 1960), pp. 91–168; and Kenley Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method," *Review of Metaphysics* 23, 4 (June 1970): 615–41.

74. J. Glenn Gray, *Hegel and Greek Thought* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 53–91; Rebecca Cooper, *The Logical Influence of Hegel on Marx* (New York: Gordon Press, 1976); and Robert Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit'* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 480–505. See also K. H. Ilting, "Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Politik," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 71 (1963–64): 38–58; and Joachim Ritter, *Metaphysik und Politik: Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel* (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977), pp. 9–179.

75. For an examination of Aristotle's writings on physics and metaphysics and their relation to Marx's social theory in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, see Carol Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory of Social Reality* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1980), pp. 44–46 and 78–80; and Jonathan Pike, *From Aristotle to Marx: Aristotelianism in Marxist Social Ontology* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), pp. 112–35.

76. Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx*, pp. 70–93.

77. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 300.

78. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), book Delta, chapter 2, p. 89 and *Physics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), book 2, chapters 1–9, pp. 329–42. The material on causality and change may be found in book 2, chapters 5 and 9 of the *Physics*. See also G. W. F. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances Simson (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), pp. 137–79; R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (New York: Galaxy Books, 1960), pp. 3–4 and 80–92; and Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 1: *Greece and Rome*, part 2 (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1962), pp. 30–61.

79. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book Theta, chapter 8, p. 192

80. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 19 and *Grundrisse*, pp. 100–08. Helmut Seidel, "Das Verhältnis von Karl Marx zu Aristoteles," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 27 (1979): 666. It should be stressed here that the various value-forms of commodity, money, and capital (private property) are concrete manifestations or essences of value. This is important

because of the attempts by Proudhon and later left-wing followers of Ricardo to formulate a vision of socialism based simply on the elimination of money (time-chitters) and the socialization of capital. These positions fail to realize that money and capital are only the outward appearances of the underlying social relations of production based on alienation, wage labor, and property. That is, by tinkering with the appearances, the utopian socialists never discovered the inner workings and laws of the capitalist mode of production and were thus never able to provide insight into the possibilities of real social revolution. See Patrick Murray, "The Necessity of Money: How Hegel Helped Marx Surpass Ricardo's Theory of Value," in *Marx's Method in Capital: A Reexamination*, ed. Fred Moseley (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1993), p. 56 and "Redoubled Empiricism: The Place of Social Form and Formal Causality in Marxian Theory," in *New Investigations of Marx's Method*, eds. Fred Moseley and Martha Campbell (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1997), p. 54.

81. Tony Smith, *The Logic of Marx's Capital: Replies to Hegelian Criticisms* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 39. Smith outlines the various models used to interpret *Capital* in an attempt to explain the transformation from simple commodity exchange to money in commerce and banking to capitalist production. These models are viewed as historical, teleological, dialectical, or empirical. Their function is to trace the following: (1) the actual historical movement of these stages of value-form from commodity to capital based on the philosophy of history of Engels; (2) the teleological change of the social organism based on the biological and organic paradigm of Aristotle; (3) the dialectical unfolding of the logic of capital grounded in the logic and phenomenology of Hegel; or (4) the empirical inquiry into the nature of capitalism following the empiricism of Hume.

82. Murray, *Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988), p. 226.

83. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 147.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 415.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 652.

86. Murray, *Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge*, pp. 182 and 226.

87. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 331.

88. *Ibid.*, pp. 310–11.

89. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, pp. 232–40.

90. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 151.

91. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 82.

92. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1969), p. 105.

93. Richard Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 72–73.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

95. Robert Padgug, "Classes and Society in Classical Greece," *Arethusa* 8, 1 (Spring 1975): 85; Hindess and Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*, pp. 79–108; and Lekas, *Marx on Classical Antiquity*, pp. 77–79.

96. Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 471–514 and *Ethnological Notebooks*, pp. 97–421.

97. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 475.

98. Lekas, *Marx on Classical Antiquity*, p. 83; and Hindess and Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*, pp. 86–88.

99. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 487.

100. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 555.
101. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, pp. 598–99.
102. Marx, *Ethnological Notebooks*, p. 150.
103. Lawrence Krader, “Introduction,” in *Ethnological Notebooks*, p. 14.
104. Marx, *Ethnological Notebooks*, pp. 196–241.

CHAPTER 2: MAX WEBER: GREEK TRAGEDY AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY

1. Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography*, trans. and ed. Harry Zohn (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 64–104.
2. Max Weber’s second dissertation was written under the influence of three of the most influential and prominent German historians of ancient Rome: Theodor Mommsen, August Meitzen, and Karl Rodbertus. See Karl Rodbertus, *Investigation into the National Economy of Classical Antiquity*; and Mommsen, *History of Rome and Provinces of the Roman Empire*. Also see Antoine Guillard, *Modern Germany and Her Historians* (New York: McBride, Nast and Company, 1915).
3. Weber, *Die römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats- und Privatrecht* (Stuttgart, Germany: Enke Verlag, 1891), p. 129.
4. Paul Honigsheim, “Max Weber as Historian of Agriculture and Rural Life,” *Agricultural History* 23 (1949): 179–213; Harry Pearson, “The Secular Debate on Economic Primitivism,” in *Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economics in History and Theory*, eds. Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg, and Pearson (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957), pp. 3–11; Martin Riesebrodt, “From Patriarchalism to Capitalism: The Theoretical Context of Max Weber’s Agrarian Studies,” in *Reading Weber*, trans. Leena Tanner, ed. Keith Tribe (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 131–57; Lawrence Scaff, “Weber before Weberian Sociology,” in *Reading Weber*, pp. 15–41; Dirk Käsler, *Max Weber: An Introduction to His Life and Work*, trans. Philippa Hurd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 24–50; Moses I. Finley, *The Bücher-Meyer Controversy* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) and *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 3–23; Arnaldo Momigliano, “New Paths of Classicism in the Nineteenth Century,” *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History* 21, 4 (1982): 1–64; Christian Meier, “Max Weber und die Antike,” in *Max Weber: Ein Symposium*, eds. Christian Gneuss and Jürgen Kocka (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), pp. 11–24; and Alfred Heuss, “Max Webers Bedeutung für die Geschichte des griechisch-römischen Altertums,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 201, 3 (December 1965): 529–56. Also see the extensive secondary literature contained in the bibliography at the end of John Love, *Antiquity and Capitalism: Max Weber and the Sociological Foundations of Roman Civilization* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 316–31.

A list of Weber’s expanded readings on the topic of political and economic history of ancient Greece and Rome may be found in his 1898 *Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine [“theoretische”] Nationalökonomie* (Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1990), p. 13. The course outline of readings includes the following works listed under the general heading of “The Economic Development of Ancient Coastal Culture”: Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums und Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im Altertum*; Carl Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*; August Boeckh, *Der Staatshaushalt der Athener*; Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*; Robert Pöhlmann, *Geschichte des antiken*

Kommunismus und Sozialismus; F. Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms*; Karl Bücher, *Die Aufstände der unfreien Arbeiter*; Johann Rodbertus, *Zur Geschichte der agrarischen Entwicklung Roms*; A. B. Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Altertum*; Paul Guiraud, *Histoire de la propriété foncière en Grèce*; Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique*; Joachim Marquardt, *Das Privatleben der Römer*; Blümmer, *Gewerbe und Künste bei Griechen und Römern*; W. Lecky, *Sittengeschichte Europas von Augustus bis auf Karl den Grossen*; Ludo Hartmann, *Die Gründe des Untergangs des römischen Reichs*; and Adolf Schulten, *Die römischen Grundherrschaften*. Finally, for a fascinating and informative comparison of Weber and Marx, examine the original source materials on classical antiquity referred to by both sociologists in *Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine* ["theoretische"] *Nationalökonomie*, pp. 7–9 and *The Ethnological Notebooks*, in *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*, trans. Lawrence Krader (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Company, 1974), pp. 196–241. They were certainly relying on much of the same historical and anthropological sources with different results. See note 1 in chapter 1 of this book.

5. It should be noted that Weber's interest in the classical antiquity of Greece and Rome occupied his attention throughout his life from his dissertations to *Economy and Society*, which contains his essay, "The City," written between 1911 and 1913 and first published in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* in 1921. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), compiled from a series of lectures 1913–20, contains an analysis of ancient Roman sea trade and the importance of the *commenda* (medieval commercial organization), as well as a study of state contracting and Roman administrative bureaucracy. For an excellent secondary source on this material, see Love, *Antiquity and Capitalism*, chapters 4 and 5, pp. 154–208. It is interesting to note that the second editions of *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* and *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* were both published in 1909.

6. This is a view expressed by Wolfgang Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920*, trans. Michael Steinberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 103–4. Mommsen even argues that Weber's distinction between substantive and formal rationality anticipated Herbert Marcuse's later critique of capitalist society. See also Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), pp. 67–68.

7. Love, "Max Weber and the Theory of Ancient Capitalism," *History and Theory* 25 (1986): 156.

8. Weber, "The Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilization," in *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, trans. R. I. Frank (London: New Left Books, 1976), p. 394.

9. Weber, *Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, p. 48.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

12. Love, *Antiquity and Capitalism*, pp. 224–76. Weber's thesis is that these forms of political capitalism inhibited the development of market capitalism.

13. Weber, *The City*, trans. and eds. Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 169.

14. Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, trans. P. J. Rhodes (London: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 50.

15. Weber, *Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, pp. 208–9.

16. Weber, *City*, p. 181.

17. For an analysis of the rural conditions of ancient Rome, see Weber, *Die römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats- und Privatrecht*, pp. 1–281 and “Roman Republic,” in *Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, pp. 260–335.

18. Weber, “Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilization,” p. 399.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 407–8.

21. Weber, *The Religion of China*, trans. and ed. Hans Gerth (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 13–21. Weber’s historical sociology shows how the great patrimonial and bureaucratic state systems of China and the Middle East inhibited the development of autonomous political, military, and economic cities characteristic of medieval European society.

22. Weber, *Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, p. 356.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

24. Weber, *City*, pp. 91–120 and 180–95. For an analysis of the specific legal and commercial institutions and trading organizations of ancient Rome and medieval Italy and Germany that provided the foundations for the development of modern industrial capitalism, see Weber, *Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter*, in *Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1924), pp. 312–443 and *General Economic History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1981), pp. 195–271.

25. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 41.

26. Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s*, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 86.

27. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), p. 12.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 364.

30. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, in *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1956), pp. 29–30.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

32. Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, in *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 251.

33. Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, p. 34.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

35. Karl-Otto Apel, “The Common Presuppositions of Hermeneutics and Ethics: Types of Rationality beyond Science and Technology,” *Research in Phenomenology* 9 (1979): 42.

36. Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, p. 95.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

38. Nietzsche, “The Philosopher,” in *Philosophy and Truth*, p. 32.

39. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 267.

40. This is an interesting point not lost on Willard Van Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 44.

41. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, p. 299.

42. Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, p. 214.

43. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1969), p. 577.

44. Ralph Schroeder, "Nietzsche and Weber: Two 'Prophets' of the Modern World," in *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*, eds. Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 219.

45. Wilhelm Hennis, "The Traces of Nietzsche in the Work of Max Weber," in *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, trans. Keith Tribe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 158. Hennis argues that the key principles of Weber's *Wissenschaftslehre* (theory of science), including his concepts of objectivity and value relations, must be viewed in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy.

46. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and eds. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 141.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

48. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *Portable Nietzsche*, p. 130.

49. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner, 1958), p. 181.

50. Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. Edward Shils and Henry Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949), p. 52.

51. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," p. 144.

52. For an analysis of Weber's neo-Kantian epistemology, see Thomas Burger, *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1976), pp. 57–93; Guy Oakes, *Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988), pp. 18–40; Ken Morrison, *Marx, Weber, Durkheim: Formations of Modern Social Thought* (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 257–70; and George E. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason: Weber, Habermas, and the Methodological Disputes in German Sociology* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 127–212. Weber's famous *Wissenschaftslehre* includes the following essays: "Roscher's Historical Method" (1903), "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" (1904), "Knies and the Problem of Irrationality" (1905), "Knies and the Problem of Irrationality" (1906), "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences" (1906), "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology" (1913), "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics" (1917), "Science as a Vocation" (1919), and "Basic Sociological Terms" in *Economy and Society* (1922).

53. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," pp. 145 and 146.

54. Joseph Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, ed. Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 802.

55. Hennis, "Max Weber's 'Central Question,'" in *Max Weber*, pp. 37–38.

56. Mark Blaug, *Economic Theory in Retrospect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 697.

57. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," p. 149.

58. The connection between the apparent value neutrality of modern science and its actual normative foundations is developed by Siegfried Landshut, "Max Weber's Significance for Intellectual History," pp. 99–111; Karl Löwith, "Max Weber's Position on Science," pp. 138–56; and Peter Lassman and Irving Velody, "Max Weber on Science, Disenchantment and the Search for Meaning," pp. 159–204, in *Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation'*, eds. Peter Lassman and Irving Velody with Herminio Martins (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). They argue that Weber's theory of rationalization, disenchantment, and value-free science was

ironically and intentionally directed against modern science and positivism. Lassman and Velody reaffirm the position of Hennis (to be developed later in this chapter) that Weber's sociology represents an ethical critique of the tragic fate of modernity and, thus, reflects a return to the classical Greek view of political science (pp. 173–74, 178, and 188–89). See also H. H. Bruun, *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1972), pp. 102 and 135–38; and Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber's Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 141. Both Bruun and Ringer argue that the object of Weber's criticism was the authoritarian nature of positivist values of scientism, naturalism, and realism as they were taught in the German classroom. Finally, for a summary of the recent criticisms by Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel of Weber's supposed positivism, see Jay Ciaffa, *Max Weber and the Problem of Value-Free Social Science: A Critical Examination of the Werturteilsstreit* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1998), pp. 105–14.

59. Löwith, "Max Weber's Position on Science," p. 146.

60. Weber, "Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," p. 72.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

63. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," p. 150.

64. Rogers Brubaker, *The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 2.

65. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," p. 155.

66. Käsler, *Max Weber*, pp. 184–96.

67. Lassman and Velody, "Max Weber on Science, Disenchantment and the Search for Meaning," p. 176.

68. McCarthy, *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason*, pp. 127–55. The issue of objectivity as the standard of evaluation for the truth claims of Weber's sociology is one of the most difficult of his epistemological and methodological problems and has not been fully addressed. In the history of modern philosophy of social science, arguments have been made for locating the basis for sociological objectivity and scientific validation in empirical facts (Hume), the collective values of the community (Rickert), psychological empathy or subjective understanding of others (Dilthey), value relativism or nihilistic perspectivism (Nietzsche), nomological and universal laws of causality (Marx and Menger), and, on the contemporary scene, in the consensus formed around mythopoetic versions of the truth (Rorty). Weber rejects these positions: He rejects the naive empiricism and epistemological realism of Hume, the collective universality and philosophy of history of Rickert, the subjectivity and psychologism of Dilthey, and the naturalism and scientism of neoclassical and Marxist economics. He tries to develop an alternative view of science and objectivity based on the theory of "objective possibility" and "adequate causality" found in the writings of Johannes Kries, Gustav Radbruch, and Eduard Meyer, which he integrates into his neo-Kantian philosophy of cultural science, Windelband's and Dilthey's distinction between history and the natural sciences, Rickert's theory of value relevance, and Nietzsche's philosophy of relativism. See Gerhard Wagner and Heinz Zipprian, "The Problem of Reference in Max Weber's Theory of Causal Explanation," *Human Studies* 9 (1986): 21–42; Oakes, *Weber and Rickert*, pp. 155–56 n. 19; and Ringer, *Max Weber's Methodology*, pp. 63–75.

69. Hans-Georg Gadamer, in *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1994), continues to develop Weber's view of interpretive science as he provides the foundation for his own theory of

hermeneutics, critical understanding, and historical consciousness by showing its connection to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and theory of practical knowledge and political wisdom (*phronesis*). See also Gadamer, "Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences," *Research in Phenomenology* 9 (1979): 74–85; and George E. McCarthy, *Romancing Antiquity: German Critique of the Enlightenment from Weber to Habermas* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), pp. 227–40.

70. Hennis, "A Science of Man": Max Weber and the Political Economy of the German Historical School," in *Max Weber*, pp. 116–17. See also Hennis's differentiation of the three forms of political science: positivist science, critical science, and practical science (classical Greek political science) found in his postdoctoral dissertation, *Politik und praktische Philosophie: Schriften zur politischen Theorie* (Stuttgart, Germany: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1977), pp. 184–91 and in his work, *Max Webers Wissenschaft vom Menschen: Neue Studien zur Biographie des Werks* (Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1996), pp. 99–110. See also Jem Thomas, "Max Weber's Estate: Reflections on Wilhelm Hennis's *Max Webers Wissenschaft vom Menschen*," *History of the Human Sciences* 11, 2 (1998): 121–28; and Gerhard Krüger, *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Geschichte, Wahrheit, Wissenschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1965), pp. 177–86.

71. Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair (London: Penguin Books, 1981), book 3, chapter 4, 1276b16–1277b32, pp. 179–83.

72. Weber, "The National State and Economic Policy," *Economy and Society* 9 (1980): 438. For interesting analyses of the Aristotelian and ethical foundations of German political economy in the early and late nineteenth century, see M. Riedel, "Der Staatsbegriff der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts in seinem Verhältnis zur klassisch-politischen Philosophie," in *Der Staat* 2 (1963): 41–63; Peter Koslowski, "Haus und Geld: Zur aristotelischen Unterscheidung von Politik, Ökonomik und Chrematistik," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 86 (1979): 60–83 and *Politik und Ökonomie bei Aristoteles* (Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1993); Birger Priddat and Eberhard Seifert, "Gerechtigkeit und Klugheit: Spuren Aristotelischen Denkens in der modernen Ökonomie," in *Ökonomische Theorie und Ethik*, eds. Bernd Biervert and Martin Held (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Campus Verlag, 1987), pp. 51–77; and Birger Priddat, "Die Politische Wissenschaft von Reichtum und Menschen," *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* 75 (1989): 171–95, *Der ethische Ton der Allokation: Elemente der Aristotelischen Ethik und Politik in der deutschen Nationalökonomie des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), and "Intention and Failure of W. Roscher's Historical Method of National Economics," in *The Theory of Ethical Economy in the Historical School*, ed. Peter Koslowski (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1995), pp. 15–34. Priddat, in "Die Politische Wissenschaft von Reichtum und Menschen," provides a valuable summary throughout his essay of the key works on social ethics and Aristotle in the nineteenth century that would have been so influential on both the German Historical School and Weber.

73. Wilhelm Roscher, *Grundriss zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirtschaft* (1843), quoted in Priddat, "Intention and Failure of W. Roscher's Historical Method of National Economics," p. 17. Roscher also wrote works on ancient Greece and Thucydides. See also Edward Portis, *Max Weber and Political Commitment: Science, Politics, and Personality* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), p. 27.

74. Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920*, pp. 21–34.

75. Manfred Schön, "Gustav Schmoller and Max Weber," pp. 59–70; and Dieter Krüger,

"Max Weber and the 'Younger' Generation in the Verein für Sozialpolitik," pp. 71–87, in *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*, eds. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987); and Horst Betz, "The Role of Ethics as Part of the Historical Methods of Schmoller and the Older Historical School," in *The Theory of Ethical Economy in the Historical School*, pp. 81–103.

76. Schmoller, *Über einige Grundfragen der Sozialpolitik und der Volkswirtschaftslehre* (1898), quoted in Hennis, "A Science of Man," in *Max Weber*, p. 127.

77. Karl Knies, *Die politische Oekonomie vom geschichtlichen Standpunkte* (1883), quoted in Hennis, "A Science of Man," in *Max Weber*, p. 120.

78. Weber, "National State and Economic Policy," p. 447.

79. Hennis, "Voluntarism and Judgment: Max Weber's Political Views in the Context of his Work," in *Max Weber*, p. 196. There may be some discussion here about who should be included in the classical tradition of political science. See Habermas, "The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy," in *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon, 1973), pp. 41–81.

80. Lassman and Velody, "Max Weber on Science, Disenchantment and the Search for Meaning," p. 188.

81. Weber, *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 181.

82. Weber, "National State and Economic Policy," p. 437. About the notion of political economy as a human science, Hennis writes, "When Weber characterizes economics as a science of man, we are placed not on the terrain of a (pseudo) natural science but on the most ancient ground of political science; the mutual relation of 'conditions of existence' (political in the older context, social in the modern) and the quality ('virtue') of man" (Hennis, "Science of Man," in *Max Weber*, p. 125).

83. Weber quoted in Hennis, "Max Weber's 'Central Question,'" in *Max Weber*, p. 52. On these issues, see also Scaff, "Weber before Weberian Sociology," in *Reading Weber*, pp. 15–41; Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920*, p. 71; and Bryan Turner, *Max Weber: From History to Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 228–41.

84. Hennis, "Voluntarism and Judgment," in *Max Weber*, p. 192.

85. Hennis even argues that Weber's early methodological essay on objectivity is suffused with this anthropological view of humanity with its emphasis on subjective meaning and intentional social action. See Hennis, *Max Weber*, pp. 58, 74, 91–92, 157, and 210 n. 110.

86. Keith Tribe, "Introduction," in *Reading Weber*, p. 1.

87. Weber, "The Pitiless 'Sobriety of Judgment': Max Weber between Carl Menger and Gustav von Schmoller—The Academic Politics of Value Freedom," *History of the Human Sciences* 4, 1 (1991): 52.

88. Peter Roche de Coppens, *Ideal Man in Classical Sociology: The Views of Comte, Durkheim, Pareto, and Weber* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), pp. 127–41; Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, pp. 88–90; Hennis, "Max Weber's Theme," in *Max Weber*, p. 82; and David Rasmussen, "Between Autonomy and Sociality," *Cultural Hermeneutics* 1, 1 (April 1973): 7–10 and 29–38.

89. Weber, "National State and Economic Policy," p. 437.

90. Weber, "Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," p. 18.

CHAPTER 3: EMILE DURKHEIM: GREEK POLIS AND THE SOLIDARITY OF THE CONSCIENCE COLLECTIVE

1. The Greek influence on Durkheim has been explored in a number of works, including the following: Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), pp. 368–76; Ernest Wallwork, *Durkheim: Morality and Milieu* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 32, 135, 154, and 163; Dominick LaCapra, *Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 158 and 162; Robert Bellah, “Introduction,” in *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, ed. Bellah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. xviii; Douglas Challenger, *Durkheim through the Lens of Aristotle: Durkheimian, Post-modernist and Communitarian Responses to the Enlightenment* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994); Stjepan Mestrovic, *In the Shadow of Plato: Durkheim and Freud on Suicide and Society*, doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Microfilms, 1982), “Durkheim’s Criticism of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Saint-Simon in the Context of the Dualism of Human Nature,” paper presented at the American Sociological Association (San Francisco: 1982), and *Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988); W. S. F. Pickering, *Durkheim’s Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 23; H. Karabatzaki-Perdiki, *Individual and Society in Plato and Durkheim: A Comparative and Critical Analysis*, doctoral dissertation, University of East Anglia (1988) and “E. Durkheim’s Classical Background: Some Views on Ancient Philosophy and Society,” *Philosophical Inquiry* 14, 1–2 (1992): 39–54; and Donald Nielsen, *Three Faces of God: Society, Religion, and the Categories of Totality in the Philosophy of Emile Durkheim* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 20–32, 38–40, and 126–27. Durkheim’s communitarian social theory has its origins in medieval corporatism and in the political and social philosophies of Aristotle and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For an analysis of the philosophical foundations of communitarianism in Greek philosophy, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

2. LaCapra, *Emile Durkheim*, p. 6.

3. Anthony Giddens, “Durkheim as a Review Critic,” *Sociological Review* 18 (1970): 172–74 and *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 66–69; and Jeffrey Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*, vol. 2: *The Antinomies of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 84–91. See also Durkheim’s review of both Albert Schäffle, *Bau und Leben des Sozialen Körpers* (1885) and Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1889), in Durkheim, *On Institutional Analysis*, ed. and trans. Mark Traugott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 93–122.

4. Durkheim, *Ethics and the Sociology of Morals*, trans. Robert Hall (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1993), pp. 58–77. It is interesting that both Durkheim and Max Weber were influenced by the German Historical School, Kantian epistemology and moral philosophy, and German existentialism. See also Gustav Schmoller, “The Idea of Justice in Political Economy (1881),” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 4 (July 1893/June 1894): 697–737.

5. Durkheim, “Sociology in France in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, ed. Robert Bellah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 3.

6. A translation of Durkheim's Latin thesis, *Montesquieu's Contribution to the Rise of Social Science* (1892) and his lectures and manuscript on Rousseau's *Social Contract or Principles of Political Right*, may be found in *Montesquieu and Rousseau: Forerunners of Sociology*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Ann Arbor, MI: Ann Arbor Paperback, 1975). See also Durkheim's essay, "La Pédagogie de Rousseau," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 26 (1919): 153–80, that contains his mature thoughts on Rousseau and pedagogy and "Rousseau on Educational Theory," in *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*, ed. W. S. F. Pickering, trans. H. L. Sutcliffe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 162–94. A general introduction to the Greek influence on Montesquieu and Rousseau may be found in Bernard Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 35–85. For an analysis of the relationship between Durkheim and Montesquieu, see W. Watts Miller, "Durkheim's Montesquieu," *British Journal of Sociology* 44, 4 (December 1993): 693–712 and *Durkheim, Morals, and Modernity* (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 47–71; and Robert Alun Jones, "Ambivalent Cartesians: Durkheim, Montesquieu, and Method," *American Journal of Sociology* 100, 1 (July 1994): 1–39.

7. Durkheim, *Montesquieu's Contribution to the Rise of Social Science*, in *Montesquieu and Rousseau*, p. 1.

8. La Capra, *Emile Durkheim*, p. 4; Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work, A Historical and Critical Study* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), pp. 264–65; Michel Verdon, "Durkheim and Aristotle: Of Some Incongruous Congruences," *Study in History and Philosophy of Science* 13 (1982): 333–52; and Challenger, *Durkheim through the Lens of Aristotle*, p. 12. Karabatzaki-Perdiki writes in his essay, "E. Durkheim's Classical Background," that Durkheim was attracted to Aristotle because of his dialectical logic, empirical thought, and view of human nature as self-realization and to Plato because of his concern for issues of moral unity and order (pp. 40–42).

9. Durkheim, *Montesquieu's Contribution to the Rise of Social Science*, in *Montesquieu and Rousseau*, pp. 27–28.

10. Ernest Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (New York: Putnam, 1906), p. 243.

11. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 1947), books 5 and 6, 1129a1–1145a12, pp. 397–442.

12. Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair (London: Penguin Books, 1981), book 3, chapter 1, 1275a22, p. 169.

13. Durkheim, *Montesquieu's Contribution to the Rise of Social Science*, in *Montesquieu and Rousseau*, p. 47.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

18. Challenger, *Durkheim through the Lens of Aristotle*, p. 108.

19. Mark Cladis, "Rousseau and Durkheim: The Relationship between the Public and the Private," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 21, 1 (Spring 1993): 1–25 and "What Can We Hope For? Rousseau and Durkheim on Human Nature," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 32, 4 (October 1996): 456–72; and Robert Alun Jones, "Durkheim, Realism, and Rousseau," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 32, 4 (October 1996): 330–53.

20. Durkheim, *Rousseau's Social Contract*, in *Montesquieu and Rousseau: Forerunners of Sociology* (Ann Arbor, MI: Ann Arbor Paperback, 1975), p. 74.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

23. This relationship between Durkheim and Arthur Schopenhauer has been stressed by Stjepan Mestrovic in his many writings, including "Durkheim, Schopenhauer and the Relationship between Goals and Means: Reversing the Assumptions in the Parsonian Theory of Rational Action," *Sociological Inquiry* 58, 2 (Spring 1988): 163–81; "The Social World as Will and Idea: Schopenhauer's Influence upon Durkheim's Thought," *Sociological Review* 36 (1988): 674–75; *Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology*, pp. 8–15, 44–48, 57–61, and 86–93; "Search for the Starting Points of Scientific Inquiry: Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method and Schopenhauer's Philosophy," *Sociological Inquiry* 59, 3 (Summer 1989): 267–86; and "Rethinking the Will and Idea of Sociology in the Light of Schopenhauer's Philosophy," *British Journal of Sociology* 40, 2 (June 1989): 271–93. For a critical reaction to Mestrovic's innovative thesis, see Ken Morrison, "Durkheim and Schopenhauer: New Textual Evidence on the Conceptual History of Durkheim's Formulation of the Egoistic-Altruistic Types of Suicide," *Durkheimian Studies* 4 (1998): 115–123.

24. Durkheim, "The Determination of Moral Facts (1906)," in *Sociology and Philosophy*, trans. D. F. Pocock (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 56–57.

25. Mestrovic, "Social World as Will and Idea," pp. 680–83.

26. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), p. 3.

27. Schopenhauer, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1994), p. 51.

28. Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Representation*, p. 12.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

31. Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology*, ed. John Allcock, trans. J. C. Whitehouse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 11.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

34. Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, vol. 1: *Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim* (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 442.

35. Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology*, p. 72.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 71. It should be noted that there are later interpretations of pragmatism that maintain that it has a broader theory of knowledge that includes sociological, moral, and democratic elements that were missed by Durkheim. Because of his death in 1917, he was unable to include the 1920s writings of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. Durkheim's view is adequate when dealing with the theory of consciousness of William Peirce and William James and the early years of pragmatism, but must also be reevaluated and amended on the basis of the development of social pragmatism in its later phase. For an analysis of these treatments of pragmatism, see Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," in *The Early Works 1882–1898*, vol. 5 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1968), pp. 219–34.

sity Press, 1972), pp. 96–109; Tom Goff, *Marx and Mead: Contributions to a Sociology of Knowledge* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Mary Ellen Batiuk and Howard Sacks, “George Herbert Mead and Karl Marx: Exploring Consciousness and Community,” *Symbolic Interaction* 4, 2 (1981): 207–23; Hans Joas, *G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of his Thought*, trans. Raymond Meyer (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1985) and *Pragmatism and Social Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Mitchell Aboulafia, *The Mediating Self: Mead, Sartre, and Self-Determination* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986) and Aboulafia, ed., *Philosophy, Social Theory, and the Thought of George Herbert Mead* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); and Cornell West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).

40. Mestrovic, *Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology*, p. 92. Weber and Durkheim come closer together methodologically when we see the Kantian epistemology that lies at the heart of both authors. With their rejection of positivism and realism, they anticipate the later position of Thomas Kuhn in his work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

41. In *Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology*, Mestrovic draws a close connection between Durkheim’s critique of pragmatism and his notion of the objectivity of social facts. Mestrovic, arguing on behalf of Durkheim’s “renovated rationalism,” is very critical of pragmatism. For him, it represents epistemological anomie and despair. He writes, “Pragmatism is more than a philosophical error. For Durkheim, it is a form of sacrilege, an attack on the ‘cult of truth.’ It is a reversal of the philosophical respect for reason and truth, a genuine *dérèglement*” (p. 83).

42. Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology*, p. 83.

43. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 388.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 483 and 484.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 475.

46. For an overview of the literature on Durkheim’s epistemology and method, see Paul Hirst, *Durkheim, Bernard, and Epistemology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); Jonathan Turner, *The Search for a Methodology of Social Science: Durkheim, Weber, and the Nineteenth-Century Problem of Cause, Probability, and Action* (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing Company, 1986); Robert Alun Jones, *Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major Works* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986); Mike Gane, *On Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method* (London: Routledge, 1988); and Warren Schmaus, *Durkheim’s Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

47. Some secondary authors have argued that there are two distinct periods and theses in Durkheim’s works: the functionalism and positivism of his early writings and the idealism and social constructionism of his later ones. The two-Durkheim thesis is explored in Anne Warfield Rawls, “Durkheim’s Epistemology: The Neglected Argument,” *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (1996): 468–79. Both Rawls and Mestrovic take the position that there is no break within Durkheim’s writings, since the early Durkheim is not a positivist. Social facts in the early works are representations and social constructs. They have the appearance of facts only because they act as external moral constraints on individual action. In his work, *A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism: Emile Durkheim and Contemporary Social Theory* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), Mark Cladis

observes that the term *social facts* is used in his early writings in *The Division of Labor in Society* and *The Rules of Sociological Method*, but is dropped a couple of years later in *Suicide* to be replaced by that of *collective representations*. The early positivist and morphological (population density) terminology is replaced by a more nuanced Kantian perspective as the external restraints become internalized collective beliefs and sentiments. Cladis believes that the early characterization of social facts as objective and external was more of a political and methodological response to the subjectivism and voluntarism of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer than a move toward positivism and social determinism (p. 43). Just as Durkheim weaves his way between rationalism and empiricism in his sociology of knowledge, he takes a similar position midway between realism and nominalism.

48. Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, ed. George Catlin, trans. Sarah Solovay and John Mueller (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 17 and “Individual and Collective Representations” (1898), in *Sociology and Philosophy*, pp. 24–25.

49. Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology*, p. 67.

50. For an analysis of the apparent scientific positivism in Durkheim’s functionalism, see Parsons, *Structure of Social Action*, vol. 1, pp. 305–6, 343–75, 441–50, and 463–64; Russell Keat and John Urry, *Social Theory as Science* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 80–95; Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*, vol. 2, pp. 76, 81–82, 104–6, 302–3, 400–401, and 403 n. 24; Steve Taylor, *Durkheim and the Study of Suicide* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982), pp. 203–4; Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, pp. 67, 79–85, and 316–18; Jonathan Turner, *Classical Sociological Theory: A Positivist’s Perspective* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1993), pp. 47–85; and Ken Morrison, *Marx, Weber, Durkheim: Formations of Modern Social Thought* (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 121–23.

51. Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology*, p. 68.

52. Durkheim, *Rules of Sociological Method*, p. xliii.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. xliii and xiv.

54. Durkheim, “Individual and Collective Representations,” in *Sociology and Philosophy*, p. 31.

55. Durkheim, *Rules of Sociological Method*, p. 15.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

57. Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, *Primitive Classification*, ed. and trans. Rodney Needham (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1967), p. 5.

58. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, in *The Empiricists* (Garden City, NY: Dolphin Books, 1961), p. 336.

59. Peter Hamilton, *Knowledge and Social Structure: An Introduction to the Classical Argument in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 105 and 113.

60. Durkheim and Mauss, *Primitive Classification*, p. 82.

61. Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 28.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 169–73.

63. Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, p. 78; and Wallwork, *Durkheim*, chapter 6, pp. 151–81. Anthony Giddens, in his essay, “Weber and Durkheim: Coincidence and Divergence,” in *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*, eds. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), argues that in *The Division of Labor* Durkheim’s central focus was on the social institutions that nurtured or hindered the development of the morally autonomous individual (p. 183), thereby calling into question the traditionally accepted view of a split between Durkheim’s early functionalism and later idealism. Both

Mestrovic, *Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology*, p. 7 and Carmen Sirianni, "Justice and the Division of Labour," *Sociological Review* 32 (1984): 449–70 argue that social justice is the main theme running throughout Durkheim's early and later works. Durkheim's early functionalism is not concerned with establishing social order and system stability but organic solidarity and social justice. See Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 387–88 and 407. There are those who argue that there is also another break in Durkheim's writings between materialism and idealism. See LaCapra, *Emile Durkheim*, p. 75; Wallwork, *Durkheim*, pp. 82–83; and Challenger, *Durkheim through the Lens of Aristotle*, pp. 173–74. On the other hand, Giddens, in *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*, argues that the break between materialism and idealism has been exaggerated (pp. 105–6).

64. Parsons, *Structure of Social Action*, vol. 1, p. 315. See also Robert Nisbet, *The Sociology of Emile Durkheim* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 67.

65. Durkheim's examination of the historical and anthropological literature of ancient Greek, Roman, and German communities in *The Division of Labor in Society* is extensive and includes references to the following works: Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten*; Francotte, *L'Industrie dans la Grèce antique*; Gilbert, *Handbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer*; A. B. Büchsenschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Altertum*; Thonissen, *Droit pénal de la République athénienne* and *Procédure de la loi salique*; Meier and Schömann, *Der attische Process*; Morgan, *Ancient Society*; Waltzing, *Étude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains*; Walter, *Histoire de la procédure civile et du droit criminel chez les Romains*; Rein, *Criminalrecht der Römer*; Mainz, "Esquisse historique du droit criminel de l'ancienne Rome"; Bouvy, *De l'infamie en droit romain*; Fustel de Coulanges, *Histoire des Institutions politiques de l'ancienne France* and *La cité antique*; Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverfassung*, *Privat Leben der Römer*, *Römische Alterthümer*, and *Römische Staatsverwaltung*; Voigt, *Die XII Tafeln*; Boissier, *La Religion romaine*; Accarias, *Précis de droit romain*; Wyss, *Die Sprichwörter bei den Römischen Komikern*; Schmoller, *La division du travail étudiée au point de vue historique*; Bücher, *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft*; Sohm, *Über die Entstehung der Städte*; Dargun, *Mutterrecht und Raubehe in Germanischen Rechte*; Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, and *Das Alte Recht der Salischen Franken*; Schäffle, *Bau und Leben des Sozialen Körpers*; Kulischer, *Der Handel auf den primitiven Kulturstufen*; Post, *Bausteine für eine allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft* and *Die Grundlage des Rechts*; Zoepfl, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*; Gierke, *Das Deutsche Genossenschaftswesen*; Rietschel, *Markt und Stadt in ihrem rechtlichen Verhältniss*; Bouglé, "Remarques sur le régime des castes"; Schrader, *Linguistisch-historische Forschungen zur Handelsgeschichte*; Wagner, "Die Kulturzüchtung des Menschen"; Ihering, *Der Zweck im Recht*; Munck, *Palestine*; and Selden, *De Syndriis*. Durkheim made specific references to Homer, *Iliad*; Plato, *Euthyphro*, *Alcibiades*, *Republic*, and *Protagoras*; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*; Hesiod, *Works and Days*; Plutarch, *Life of Numa*; Pliny, *Natural History*; Tacitus, *Germania*; and Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*. Along with the Greek and Roman sources, Durkheim also referred to various books of the Bible, including *Exodus*, *Deuteronomy*, *Leviticus*, *Numbers*, and *Joshua*.

Finally, it has been noticed by a couple of authors that a great deal of Durkheim's contribution to the study of classical antiquity lies hidden in his book reviews of French and German authors writing on ancient Greece and Rome. See Giddens, "Durkheim as a Review Critic," pp. 171–96; and Karabatzaki-Perdiki, "E. Durkheim's Classical Background," pp. 47–51 and 52–53 n. 31. Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that the book reviews

complete the arguments found in *Evolution of Educational Thought in France*, as they emphasize issues of Greek and Roman culture, morality, law, family, state, and class. In his analysis of the formation of the Greek city-state, Durkheim returns to both Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics* for historical and theoretical guidance.

66. Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*, p. 79. Although in this work he rejects mechanical solidarity in favor of the modern specialization of labor and organic solidarity, he reappropriates this concept in his later writings in the form of collective representations and common sentiments, especially in his lectures, "Professional Ethics and Civic Morals," offered about a year after *Suicide*. Cladis, *A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism*, argues that the ideal of organic solidarity constitutes the first key ingredient in Durkheim's developed theory of moral individualism, which includes his ideas about moral solidarity, human dignity and autonomy, and pluralism, thereby, in effect, combining Aristotle's theory of solidarity and Kant's theory of human dignity and moral autonomy (pp. 44–45). It is in these lectures that the importance of a democratic political community is recognized by Durkheim (p. 62).

67. Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*, pp. 80–81.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

69. Aristotle, *Politics*, book 2, chapter 2, 1261a24, p. 104 quoted on the title page of Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1932), sixth edition.

70. Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*, pp. 119 and 120.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

72. For a conservative treatment of Durkheim's theory of social solidarity, see Robert Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition* (New York: Basic, 1966), pp. 82–88; and a critical response by Steve Fenton, *Durkheim and Modern Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 32–36 and 43–47.

73. Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*, p. 33. Similar sentiments are expressed in "The Determination of Moral Facts," in *Sociology and Philosophy*, p. 61. Durkheim believes that sociology, as a science of morality, can show us which social ideals are in decline and which ideals should be fostered. See also Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*, p. 93.

74. Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*, p. 403.

75. Durkheim, *Ethics and the Sociology of Morals*, p. 61.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

78. Mestrovic has a very interesting analysis of Durkheim's notion of anomie in *Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology*. He calls into question the accepted tradition in English that anomie refers to a state of "normlessness" or "deregulation." For him, it is a mistranslation of the French word, *dérèglement*, which means "derangement." Mestrovic suggests that derangement has a strong theological connotation of madness, suffering, sin, and immorality, as well as a pronounced Freudian element of the primordial and unconscious id implying that anomie refers to the transgression of social and moral values by the lower side of human nature (pp. 34–34 and 64–65). In an essay written with Helene Brown, entitled "Durkheim's Concept of Anomie as Dérèglement," *Social Problems* 33, 2 (December 1985): 81–99, Mestrovic refers to anomie as the "derangement or disarrangement of collective representations" (p. 85). According to Mestrovic, the source of Durkheim's theory of anomie lies in Schopenhauer, whereas for Cladis it lies in Rousseau.

79. Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, p. 404; and Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, p. 174.

80. LaCapra makes the argument in *Emile Durkheim* that the idea of social restraint in an anomic society corresponds to the Greek notion of moderation and the need to control hubris (p. 158).

81. Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trans. John Spaulding and George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 247.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 253–56.

83. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, trans. Cornelia Brookfield (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 10–11.

84. Durkheim, *Education and Sociology*, trans. Sherwood Fox (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), p. 125.

85. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 69.

86. Durkheim, *Education and Sociology*, p. 48.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 71. These collected essays were written and published between 1903 and 1911.

88. Alvin Gouldner, “Introduction,” in *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, by Emile Durkheim, trans. Charlotte Sattler, ed. Gouldner (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. xxiii–xxvii; Raymond Aron, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought*, vol. 2: *Durkheim, Pareto, Weber* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 81–94; Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, pp. 245–54 and 320–30; and Frank Pearce, *The Radical Durkheim* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 159–206.

89. Thomas Willey, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought 1860–1914* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1978), pp. 102–30.

90. Durkheim, *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, pp. 5–17, 90–108, and 193–240.

91. Durkheim, *The Evolution of Educational Thought in France*, trans. Peter Collins (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 320–48 and *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education*, trans. Everett Wilson and Herman Schnurer (New York: Free Press, 1973), pp. 95–126.

92. Durkheim, *Education and Sociology*, pp. 116 and 122.

93. *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90.

94. The concept of moral individualism is developed in the following works of Durkheim: “Individualism and the Intellectuals” (1898), in *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, pp. 43–57 and “The Determination of Moral Facts” (1906), in *Sociology and Philosophy*, pp. 35–62.

95. Cladis refers to this as a “common faith” that Durkheim stresses in his continuous disagreement with classical liberalism in *Communitarian Defense of Liberalism*, p. 63. See also Challenger, *Durkheim through the Lens of Aristotle*, p. 165; and Wallwork, *Durkheim*, pp. 82–83.

96. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, pp. 20–27.

97. The connection between democracy and dialogue is central to Rousseau’s political philosophy. See James Miller, *Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 108; and Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 19–20 and 182–84.

98. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 37.

99. For an analysis of Rousseau’s view of democracy, see Stephen Ellenburg, *Rousseau’s Political Philosophy: An Interpretation from Within* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 159–64; Ramon Lemos, *Rousseau’s Political Philosophy: An Exposition and*

Interpretation (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 1977), pp. 164–91, 212–26, and 240–42; and Andrew Levine, *The General Will: Rousseau, Marx, and Communism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 75–100.

100. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 89.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

105. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right*, in *The Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. C. D. H. Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950), p. 94.

106. Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, p. 60.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

110. This is similar to the conclusion about rights and justice reached by Karl Marx in “Critique of the Gotha Program,” in *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, by Marx and Friedrich Engels, ed. Lewis Feuer (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), pp. 118–19.

CHAPTER 4: AWAKENING CLASSICAL DREAMS: SYNTHESIS OF ANCIENT JUSTICE AND MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCE

1. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1: *The Process of Capitalist Production*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Friedrich Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 72.

2. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Swain (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 26–28.

3. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1971), pp. 223–23.

4. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, in *The Empiricists* (Garden City, NY: Dolphin Books, 1961), p. 312.

5. Patrick Murray, *Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988), p. 41.

6. For a different perspective on the values motivating Max Weber's research, see the work of Wolfgang Mommsen, who stresses the importance of the German nation in *Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920*, trans. Michael Steinberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 38.

7. For a comprehensive examination of Aristotle's importance for twentieth-century social theory and philosophy of social science, see Joseph Dunne, *Back to the Rough Ground: 'Phronesis' and 'Techne' in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993); George E. McCarthy, *Romancing Antiquity: German Critique of the Enlightenment from Weber to Habermas* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997); and Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

8. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon, 1973), p. 43. For a further analysis of the departure of modern social and political thought from Aristotle, see Donald Levine, *Visions of the Sociological Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 272–73.

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