ULRIKE FREITAG

Indian Ocean Migrants and State Formation in Hadhramaut

Reforming the Homeland

BRILL

INDIAN OCEAN MIGRANTS AND STATE FORMATION
IN HADHRAMAUT

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INDIAN OCEAN MIGRANTS AND STATE FORMATION IN HADHRAMAUT

Reforming the Homeland

BY

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

"You will not find sources here in Hadhramaut, because they have been destroyed in the revolution" (of 1967), I was told time and again in Tarīm, Say'ūn and al-Mukallā during my first visit in 1995. "You must go to Singapore". For a Middle East historian, this seemed more outlandish than to most Hadhramis, whose mental landscape still links South Arabia firmly to the Indian Ocean rim. From Singapore, I was directed to Jakarta, "because people here care about the present, not the past". Almost predictably, people in Jakarta sent me to Surabaya, the older Hadhrami community, and there Hadhramaut and Jeddah were pointed out as the authentic places for sources on the history of the region and its South East Asian diaspora. Fortunately, in most places, friendly people in the end took pity on the foreigner and shared with her some of the historical materials that their personal collections contained. While at times causing immense frustration, it was this international outlook which had initially drawn my curiosity to Hadhramaut and its history.

The work would have been impossible without the support and encouragement of a large number of people and institutions, of which only a few can be mentioned here. Prof. Fred Halliday was the first scholar on Yemen who thought that this project might be viable, and my London colleague Prof. William Clarence-Smith suggested that we organise a conference on the topic through which I met for the first time a number of the scholars working on Hadhramaut and its diaspora and became acquainted with the ongoing research in different regional and disciplinary fields.

In Sana'a, Dr. Burckhardt Vogt of the German Archaeological Institute, Dr. Noha Sadiq of the American Institute of Yemeni Studies and Dr. Franck Mermier of the Centre Français d'Études Yéménites provided first points of call. Thanks to the Markaz al-Buḥūth wa-l-Dirāsāt in Sana'a, I was able to use libraries and archives in Sana'a, Aden, al-Mukallā, Say'ūn and Tarīm, while Dr. Sa'd b. Ṭālib and the Hadhrami Association in Sana'a facilitated contacts. Dr. Sylvaine Camelin was my first guide to Hadhramaut and a wonderful hostess in Sana'a.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BKV   Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
BSOAS   Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CSSH   Comparative Studies in Society and History
CUP   Cambridge University Press
EI   Encyclopaedia of Islam
GuG   Geschichte und Gesellschaft
GWU   Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht
IJMES   International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
JRCAS   Journal of the Royal Society of Central Asian Studies
JRGS   Journal of the Royal Geographical Society
MEJ   Middle East Journal
MERIP   Middle East Report and Information Project
MES   Middle Eastern Studies
OUP   Oxford University Press
UCL   University College London
WI   Die Welt des Islams
ZDMG   Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TERMINOLOGY

The transliteration used for Arabic generally follows the guidelines of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. I have tried to somewhat standardize the vocalization of names, and consistently rendered the Hadhrami "Bin" as Ibn, except where "Bin" has become part of a name normally written in Latin script. For the names of Arabs abroad who spell their names in Latin script, I have normally adopted that spelling (Alatas instead of al-ʿAṭṭās). Where they also write in Arabic, I have vocalized according to their own preference (i.e. Shahāb instead of Syahab or Shihāb). Hadhrami texts are often characterized by a rather individualistic spelling. If there was need for transliteration, I have followed the original spellings, even if they deviate considerably from standard Arabic as well as from spelling elsewhere in the same publication. In order to reduce the number of Arabic terms as far as possible, I have opted for the English plural s instead of Arab plurals (i.e. *sayyid*s instead of *sāda*) except where I transliterate longer Arabic passages. Only where the plural seemed fairly widely known (e.g. *ʿālim*, pl. *ʿulamāʾ*) have I diverted from this rule. Place names in the Hadhramaut have been normally transliterated, those in the wider Arab world only when they refer to less generally known towns and regions (i.e. Aden, Sanaʾa, but: Zabīd). Arabic words that have entered the English language (e.g. Koran) have not been transliterated.

In light of the upheavals of modern history, geographical terminology becomes controversial. Both Hadhramaut, Aden Protectorate, South Yemen, Yemen et al. are used to denote historical political entities as they appear in the literature of the respective periods. Terms such as "Hadhrami" and "Yemeni" primarily serve to denote key features of identity at certain periods. For the period before World War II, I usually refer to the Netherlands East Indies or Indies to denote present-day Indonesia, unless there is a clear connection to later developments. Given the multitude of (local) ethnicities in Indonesia which are mostly not distinguished in the Arabic sources, the local population is called Indonesian.

INTRODUCTION

> History, says Fernand Braudel, is the sum of all possible histories. The question to ask is not whether an argument is right enough to exclude all others, but *how* right it is, how much it tells us that we did not know. (Eugen Weber, p. 493)

The internal dynamics of change in Muslim societies have long intrigued historians of the modern Middle East. While much of the Arab world formed part of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabian Peninsula offers intriguing insights into the processes of state building which tribal societies underwent in the 19th and 20th centuries. The case of Hadhramaut, a region on the southern edge of the Peninsula approximately halfway between Aden and Oman, is of particular interest. Many Hadhramis migrated to the areas bordering on the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. They maintained strong ties with the homeland, while at the same time taking active part in the economic, religious and political life of their host communities. I will argue that the dynamics of change in Hadhramaut reflect wider trends predominant in the Indian Ocean region. A study of the political, economic and social change in this South Arabian area thus offers insights into the international networks which formed an important constituent of the historical region which was the Indian Ocean. Such a study also opens perspectives on the interaction between different cultures. As Hadhramis were also in contact with the religious and political centres of Middle Eastern Islam such as Mecca, Cairo and Istanbul, they further served as transmitters of ideas between Muslims in the Indian Ocean region and those in the Middle East and vice versa. Since most of the discussions about change in the modern Middle East focus on the exchange or confrontation with Europe, and neglect the non-Middle Eastern Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, a study of Hadhramaut thus significantly widens the historical perspective and provides a useful corrective to some of the older historiography on factors and agents of change in the modern Middle East.

In terms of Hadhrami history, this book covers political, economic and social change from about 1800 to 1967. Following a period of

unrest, two distinct sultanates emerged from the mid-19th century and expanded their control from central cities into the surrounding areas. The military leaders were supported by an elite of merchants, scholars and intellectuals. They were partly based in Hadhramaut, partly members of the diaspora. It is mainly this elite on which the book focuses, bringing its ideas and actions, its struggles and ambitions to the fore as far as possible. This elite increasingly began to show features which allow it to be characterised as a bourgeoisie which undertook to modernise its homeland. However, events in Hadhramaut need also to be placed in the wider context of the imperial expansion of Britain in Southern Arabia following the occupation of Aden in 1839 and the establishment of a British protectorate in Hadhramaut in 1888.

An Entrepreneurial Diaspora

The main cities and settlements of Hadhramaut were situated in a wadi system approximately 150 kilometers inland, with the exception of a small strip of fertile agricultural land in oases near the coast. There, the most important settlements were the two ports of al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā through which trade and migrants passed. During much of the period under discussion, Hadhramaut was arguably more closely connected with East Africa, India and present-day Indonesia than with most other parts of present-day Yemen. As the region was subject to regular droughts, as well as the scene of much political unrest, Hadhramis had a long tradition of emigration to most areas bordering on the Indian Ocean, where they settled and integrated into local communities. This process was facilitated by the Islamisation of the coastal areas around the Indian Ocean, in which Hadhramis participated in no small measure.[1] The migrants formed "ethnic minority groups of migrant origin residing and acting in host countries, but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin", to employ Sheffer's definition of a diaspora, which will be used here to refer to the overseas Hadhramis.[2]

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[1] Syed F. Alatas, "Hadhramaut", sums up the Hadhrami literature on the topic. The Hadhrami contribution to the Islamisation of Java is not undisputed, see van Bruinessen, "Najmuddin".

[2] Sheffer, "Modern Diasporas", p. 3. For a discussion of the diaspora character

As "transnational" or, given the absence of nation states, more appropriately "translocal" communities, they often held multiple identities linking them to both place of origin and their present residence.[3] In their own perspective, the Indian Ocean rim formed a kind of natural extension of their secure home base to which they could return in case of danger.[4] The introduction of steamships in the Indian Ocean in the mid-19th century greatly facilitated migration and thus seems to have led not only to an increase in numbers but also to closer contacts between diaspora and homeland.

Although no reliable figures exist, it is estimated that by the mid-1930s, twenty to thirty percent of the total Hadhrami population of approximately 260,000 lived abroad.[5] Given that families often seem to have taken turns in looking after their overseas concerns,[6] one may safely assume that an even larger proportion had at some time in their lives sojourned outside Hadhramaut. If one adds that most Hadhramis depended on the migrants' remittances for their livelihood, it is safe to argue that the population of the homeland became part and parcel of a society of "dispersed, but highly interrelated communities".[7] The ideal-typical distinction of homeland and diaspora, which A. Cohen draws in his study of the Hausa society in Nigeria seems, in view of the sheer volume of emigration and its wide impact upon society, not applicable to Hadhramaut. Instead, a comparison with Lebanon with its even larger population flow appears fruitful.[8] Lebanese migrants and Hadhramis shared the tendency to move between different destinations, in contrast to Turkish migrant labour to Germany, for example. They also had a high percentage of returning migrants,[9] and although there are no comparable statistics for Hadhramaut, the close contact between migrants

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of Hadhramis, see Clarence-Smith, "Hadhramaut and the Hadhrami Diaspora", pp. 1–10.

[3] On the characteristics of the "marginal man" see Park, "Human Migration", on the concrete experiences of mixed-race Hadhramis Ho, "Hadhramis abroad".

[4] See Camelin, "Shihr, une grandissime cité . . .", p. 49.

[5] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 141, 145–166; Fuhrmann, Die Ausbreitung, pp. 134–143, 177, 185; Leidlmair, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 22.

[6] Freitag, "Arab merchants".

[7] A. Cohen, "Cultural Strategies", p. 267.

[8] R. Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, pp. 98–101. For a comprehensive study, see Hourani & Shehadi (eds.), *The Lebanese in the World*.

[9] The percentage of return migrants over total emigrants in the period between 1926 and 1933 was 49.15 per cent, Hashimoto, "Lebanese Population Movement", p. 66, fn. 2.

and homeland emerges as a characteristic feature in the study of
biographies. They maintained close contact with the homeland either
via visits or through personal remittances, although this is almost
impossible to measure in the case of Hadhramaut, where reliable
migratory statistics are inexistent.[10] The impact of emigrants on their
home country, a topic which has been under-researched in both the
Hadhrami and the Lebanese cases, will loom large in this study,
albeit in qualitative rather than in quantitative terms due to the
nature of the source material.

    The analytical value of the term "diaspora" has received some
critical attention. Students of Chinese merchants in South East Asia
have rejected it because Chinese imperial ideology regarded emi-
grants with suspicion.[11] In spite of the completely different setting
and the prevalence of what Bujra has termed a veritable "culture of
emigration",[12] a certain ambivalence towards migration and the
migrant resounds also in Hadhrami literature and folklore.[13] This
can be explained by the changes which travellers abroad underwent:

> By overstepping the horizon of the other members of their group, trav-
> ellers acquire knowledge inaccessible to these. Travellers moreover learn
> to know their own capacities and limits: during their travels they also
> explore themselves. Real or imaginary travelling is therefore frequently
> connected with extraordinary states of consciousness, for example ini-
> tiation, the quest for visions, ecstasy, shamanism and pilgrimages. A
> homecomer from a real or imaginary journey is expected to have
> changed. Like a visitor from abroad he thus becomes a menace to the
> identity of his group.[14]

What is assumed in the above quotation and what appears to be at
the root of much of the Hadhrami uneasiness about travellers is their
role as agents of cultural change.[15] This can be confirmed for the

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[10] Hashimoto, "Lebanese Population Movement", pp. 67–71. Hashimoto suggests
to take personal remittances, as opposed to those sent through benevolent societies,
as a sign for the persistence of ties between senders and receivers.
    [11] Wang Gungwu, "The Southeast Asian Chinese", pp. 13f.; R. Cohen, *Global
Diasporas*, p. 87.
    [12] Abdalla Bujra, oral contribution, SOAS workshop on "South Arabian Migration
Movements, the Case of Hadhramaut", April 1995, cit. in Boxberger, *On the Edge
of Empire*, p. 39.
    [13] Ho, "Hadhramis abroad", J. al-Saqqāf, *Lamaḥāt*, pp. 35–74.
    [14] Stagl, *A History*, pp. 11f.
    [15] The wider theoretical question of possibilities and limitations of intercultural
communication and the transmission of ideas between cultures obviously underlies

Hadhrami case by investigating the biographies of many of the lead-
ing Hadhrami reformers, usually merchants or scholars who had
lived and travelled abroad. However, just as the ambivalence towards
migration did not prevent large numbers of Hadhramis from leav-
ing their homeland, so does the rejection of migration by ideologi-
cal persuasions not seem to me sufficient reason to reject the term
"diaspora" as an analytical category which describes certain group
characteristics from without.

Diaspora studies have concluded that there are different types of
diasporas which may or may not share a range of features.[16] Many
Hadhramis maintained (and maintain) a strong, often religiously based
spiritual bond with their homeland, even after several generations
abroad. They also often fostered family networks which extended to
different parts of the wider Indian Ocean world. These two factors,
which have been considered among the central defining criteria of
diasporas, were crucial to the success of Hadhrami entrepreneurs
and scholars.[17]

On the basis of Simmel's notion of sojourners (to be discussed
later in the chapter), Curtin has asserted that the separation between
cross-cultural traders, whom he assumes to form homogenous dias-
poric groups, and their host societies was both a typical and neces-
sary characteristic of cross cultural trade. Subrahmanyam rejects this
view, arguing that it implies untenable generalisations about the
behaviour of migrants.[18] Using the example of Iranian merchants,
he shows the internal differentiation within the group of traders and
gives examples of their political integration into a variety of host
societies. A similar observation can be made for Hadhramis, who,
in some cases, rose into the highest ranks of their host societies and

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this point. For a theoretical and historical exposition of this problem, see Daniel,
The Cultural Barrier.

[16] R. Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, pp. 177–196. A good number of the diasporas
which he discusses, such as the Lebanese, actually remained in fairly close contact
with their homeland.

[17] In addition to R. Cohen, *Global Diasporas* and A. Cohen, "Cultural Strategies",
see Clifford, "Diasporas".

[18] Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade*, pp. 5f.; Subrahmanyam, "Iranians abroad" and
"Of Imârat". It seems to me that Subrahmanyam exaggerates Curtin's argument,
who, after all, points to "the wide range of possible relationships between the trade
community and the host society" (p. 5). The main thrust of Subrahmanyam's argu-
ment seems to be directed against a eurocentric interpretation which establishes
fundamental differences between European and Asian trade.

occasionally even established themselves as rulers over their "hosts", while at the same time maintaining internal difference.[19]

Political involvement in a host society thus does not necessarily disqualify emigrants from being members of a diaspora. Sheffer actually notes: "Because of their organization and determination, ethnic diasporas can become, in some small states, a significant political factor both domestically and in the foreign affairs of their host country."[20] And while Sheffer, who refers to the Palestinians in Lebanon before 1982, seems to think mostly of diaspora organisations such as the PLO, one also has to consider the political roles played by individuals who might, once in a position of power, try to act in favour of their community as well as play a political role similar to the one of any "indigenous" citizen of the state in question.[21] An appropriate Hadhrami example is Hamid Algadri (1912–1998) in Indonesia. He was one of the leaders of the Indonesian movement for independence and later a prominent member of the Partai Sosialis Indonesia and the parliament. At the same time, he fought for the legal equality of Indonesians of Arab descent.

Nevertheless, Curtin's concern raises another issue which is far more pertinent to a historical study, namely the fluidity of the actual composition of a diaspora and its change over time. Many Hadhrami emigrants intermarried with their host societies and integrated so completely that after the passing of a generation or two their descendants could no longer be regarded as members of a 'diaspora'. Others, however, chose to retain their affiliation to the homeland and might have returned at the end of their lives, resembling more temporary migrants than members of an overseas diaspora. Many married descendants of other immigrants, thus creating a fairly stable community of *muwalladīn* (mixed-race Hadhramis) which was regularly refuelled by new arrivals. In spite of their partial indigenisation, these *muwalladīn* tended to maintain some form of Hadhrami consciousness, although the advent of nation states in the 20th century has often exerted considerable pressure towards either complete integration or departure.[22] Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude

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[19] Khalidi, "The Hadhrami Role", Othman, "Hadhramis", Le Guennec-Coppens, "Changing Patterns", Dale, "The Hadhrami Diaspora", cf. ch. V below.
[20] Sheffer, "A New Field", p. 5.
[21] See the interview with him in *Yemen Update* 34; 1994, pp. 14–19, 44.
[22] Freitag, "Conclusion". Because of the retention of Hadhrami consciousness

that members of the Hadhrami diaspora have therefore either all departed or assimilated to the extent of renouncing their Hadhrami identity. This is illustrated by a recent debate about Arab and Malay identity within the Singaporean Hadhrami community, many members of which no longer speak Arabic and have never seen Hadhramaut, but are still keen on preserving some aspects of their Hadhrami-ness.[23]

Thus I would argue in favour of a fairly differentiated view of the Hadhrami—and indeed any—diaspora. Some members might have indeed played the ideal-typical role of a politically disinterested mid-dlemen minority and might have been treated accordingly by their host societies, while others became involved while maintaining their commercial interest. Not all were interested in maintaining their Arab identity. This latter option may more often than not have been linked to their origins, as families who traced their descent to the Prophet Muḥammad were more likely to retain their Arabness, but even this generalisation is problematic. Therefore, one has to conceive of "dias-pora" as a dynamic concept. There may well have been periods dur-ing which the diaspora character of Hadhrami communities was more pronounced than during others, when they seem to have inte-grated almost completely into the host communities.[24] Given all these factors, as well as the differences between the various host societies, one can only expect a wide range of different patterns of political and economic behaviour to emerge.[25]

Sojourning Merchants: Core of an Economic Bourgeoisie?

While a number of Hadhramis migrated purely as scholars, or enrolled in foreign armies as in the case of India, others combined trade and religious teaching. Many fit the description of sojourners, charac-terised by Simmel as individuals who aimed at an eventual return to their homeland. Unrestrained by the traditions of their host soci-eties and less than at home due to their own social taboos, sojourners

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among the *muwalladīn*, I would argue that diasporas can actually 'creolise' or 'indi-genise' more than seems acceptable to R. Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, p. 24.

[23] *Al-Shorouq* 1;4, 1992, pp. 1–4, *Al-Mahjar* 1;1, 1996, pp. 3f., 6f.

[24] Sheffer, "A New Field", p. 4. He mentions the example of the Polish Catholic community in the US.

[25] See also Clarence-Smith, "Hadhramaut and the Hadhrami Diaspora".

shared a particular propensity for thriftiness.[26] Certainly the first gen-
eration of emigrants fitted such descriptions, while their more set-
tled and integrated descendants relaxed their attitude to hard work.[27]

Dobbin has convincingly argued that the economic behaviour of
various Asian entrepreneurial minorities was of a capitalist nature.
She therefore refutes Max Weber's contention of a specifically 'Protes-
tant ethic' as a precondition for capitalist development.[28] This does
not mean, however, that she refutes a number of the traits which
he describes as typical for a capitalist group of entrepreneurs, only,
that these are not specific to the Protestant faith. It will be argued
throughout this book that such traits can be found in the type of
revivalist Islam and, later, Islamic modernism which influenced cer-
tain sectors of the Hadhrami elite. Nevertheless, the existence of cap-
italist entrepreneurs should not blind one to Braudel's insight that,
while there existed pockets of capitalist accumulation in Asia, par-
ticularly in the coastal towns, vast areas were not included in the
process of capitalist development.[29]

Much of Dobbin's argument is concerned with the question of
multiple identities and spiritual resources as the basis of entrepre-
neurial creativity, which she sees as a phenomenon of relevance to
different civilizations, including the European, and for which the
British merchants in the Atlantic trade provide ample illustration.[30]
It is beyond the scope of this study to test these views with regard
to Hadhramaut. Instead, it focuses on the impact of a particular sec-
tion of the diaspora on its homeland. Major Hadhrami traders had
their business concerns abroad, in East Africa, Ḥijāz, 'Asīr and

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[26] Simmel, *Soziologie*, 1983, pp. 509–512, Bonacich, "A Theory", p. 585.

[27] Romero, *Lamu*, p. 176, cf. the quotation from a member of the al-Kāf fam-
ily in Freitag, "Arab Merchants", section 1.

[28] Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities*, pp. 1–16. Her discussion is thus not only
directed against Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 2nd ed. London
1976, but also against the contention that, while capitalism existed in other world
religions, only Protestantism succeeded in eliminating magic and the supernatural
quest for salvation, made in his *The Sociology of Religion*, London 1965, pp. 262–274.
For a discussion of capitalism and Islam see Rodinson, *Islam*, for a refutation of
Weber's relationship between religion and modernisation H. Alatas, "Religion".
Chaudhuri, *Trade* and *Asia Before Europe* has explored the Indian Ocean economy
and civilisation before European dominance. Cf. Subrahmanyam, "Of Imârat", pp.
751–753.

[29] Braudel, *Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 629–666, on the significance of diasporas for trade
in Asiatic ports see Lombard, "Y-a-t-il une continuité".

[30] Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities*, pp. 210f.; Hancock, *Citizens*.

Yemen, in India or South East Asia. They derived most of their income from trade and business abroad, rather than from agrarian concerns at home, and only occasionally invested in independent military might. Nevertheless, they acted at home not unlike the portfolio capitalists discussed by Subrahmanyam and Bayly for 18th century India.[31] Thus, the description of portfolio capitalists as merchants who took over certain functions such as revenue farming and even military functions, and eventually constituted a threat and competition for the very rulers who had originally seen them as useful tools fits quite neatly with what we know about a number of prominent Hadhrami families, most notably the al-Kāf. That they could successfully operate in Hadhramaut until the mid-1950s can be explained by the relatively late imperial penetration and state-building process in Hadhramaut. This difference notwithstanding, one can observe in Hadhramaut similar consequences of state-building, namely the relative decline in importance of portfolio capitalists, which is a major feature of the 1950s and 1960s.[32]

Apart from the contribution of this merchant elite to the process of state-building and apart from its economic function, it stimulated change in other areas as well. In ways reminiscent of other Middle Eastern merchants such as Iranians during the Qajar period and merchants in Dubai in the early 20th century, but also of 18th century British transatlantic merchants and the Prussian economic bourgeoisie of the 18th and 19th centuries, Hadhrami merchants played a major role in promoting social change.[33] They were instrumental in expanding the physical infrastructure of Hadhramaut, in building schools and sponsoring intellectuals. They provided relief for the poor and built mosques, paid for preachers and books. Reform and refinement, *iṣlāḥ* and *tahdhīb*, were their hallmarks. The following characterisation of the aforementioned British merchants also fits the Hadhrami bill:

> The associates and other merchants like them—marginal, opportunistic, global, improving, and integrative—were in accord with what we can call their century's 'practical Enlightenment.' They were the necessary men of that moment. They were not philosophers; they did not

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[31] Subrahmanyam & Bayly, "Portfolio Capitalists", p. 260.
[32] Cf. Ho, "Yemenis on Mars", p. 30.
[33] Calmard, "Les marchands iraniens"; al-Sayegh, "Merchants' Role"; Hancock, *Citizens*; Straubel, *Kaufleute*.

rule in the grand realm of ideas. All the same, they were as caught up in innovative, investigative efforts, and as confident of the possibilities of human reason and endeavor in controlling the environment as those in the intellectual sphere. They were opportunistic seekers of advantage, careful implementers and coordinators, and quick adherents of ideas and plans devised by others. These were the men who made things work [. . .].[34]

In other words, the Hadhrami entrepreneurs resemble very closely what has been called, in a European context, the economic bourgeoisie or *Wirtschaftsbürgertum*.[35] They were essentially sponsors of scholars and intellectuals, who in turn closely resemble groups considered to be the educated professionals or *Bildungsbürgertum* in European historiography.[36] As will be argued in chapters V and VI, sufficient structural similarities exist between the admittedly vague and locally varying category of 'bourgeoisie', first established by historians and sociologists of Europe, and certain groups in Hadhramaut, to justify the use of this term in an Arabian context. Before the argument can be further developed, however, a central question has to be asked, namely what kind of process are we dealing with?

Iṣlāḥ: *Modernisation or Modernity?*

If one accepts as a working hypothesis that the Hadhrami merchant and intellectual elite can be compared structurally to the European bourgeoisie, a major historiographical problem arises. The European bourgeoisie has been credited with the creation of 'modern' Europe, in which the enlightened spirit of secular 'modernity' provided the philosophical foundations for capitalist industrialisation or 'moderni-

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[34] Hancock, *Citizens*, p. 396. For a detailed argument elucidating this comparison for a group of four Singaporean-Arab families, see my "Arab Merchants".

[35] For convenience sake, I use the term "bourgeoisie" for the German "Bürgertum", although I am aware of the very different historiographic traditions linked to the terms 'Bürgertum' and 'bourgeoisie'. In addition, the lumping together of economic bourgeoisie and the educated classed in one category of "bourgeoisie" or *Bürgertum* has been questioned, see Schulz, *Weltbürger*, pp. 7–10.

[36] See the contributions in Jürgen Kocka (ed.), *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1987, in particular the introduction by Kocka and the contributions by Lepsius, "Zur Soziologie" and Rüschemeyer, "Bourgeoisie". For the translation of Bildungsbürgertum as professionals, see Conze & Kocka, "Einleitung", pp. 16–19. On the importance of education in bringing about social change cf. Williamson, *Education and Social Change*, pp. 37–45.

sation'. Such a development was often understood in terms of a historical evolution from tradition towards 'progress', which itself became one of the foremost concepts of 'modernity'.[37]

For a long time, non-Western societies were seen to have developed along lines different from 'the West', lacking not only the Scientific and Industrial Revolution but, perhaps more crucially, the philosophical underpinnings of scientific and industrial development, most importantly the Renaissance and Enlightenment.[38] In the 1950s, the Western model was seen to have proven its validity not least through imposing its worldwide dominance during and after the age of imperialism. Thus, the logical development for the non-Western world, and the only path towards the achievement of 'progress', seemed to be to copy the development of the West through a process of 'modernisation'.[39] Lerner's explanation that "The 'Western Model' is only historically Western; sociologically it is global" exemplifies this view.[40] If one accepts such an interpretation, the Hadhrami elite could, at best, be seen as agents not of modernity but of modernisation, possibly in conjunction with their interpretation as an elite of compradors who collaborated with the imperial powers.[41] They could, in other words, be regarded as a group who, possibly through the "fringe Westernization" discussed by Curtin for the Indian Ocean, "not only acted as agents of Western-style capitalism; they also became Western-style capitalists in their own right".[42] This could explain why they showed traits similar to the European entrepreneurs discussed in the context of the bourgeoisie. I will return to this question, but

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[37] It is thus instructive that Wehler points to the linkages between evolutionary and modernisation theories, see his *Modernisierungstheorie*, p. 13.

[38] In the first edition of his *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (1962), Habermas declared that the bourgeois forms of public debate, an important constituent of what would nowadays be termed "civil society", could not be divorced from the specific European traditions of the 18th century, Habermas, *Strukturwandel*, p. 51. That Habermas follows an evolutionary model of limited value to historians was noted by Nolte, "Soziologische Theorie", pp. 531–547.

[39] Gumbrecht, "Modern", p. 129. More recent scholarship tends to use modernisation for developments both in Europe and elsewhere, for example Wehler, *Modernisierungstheorie*, pp. 47–50, who nevertheless defends the definitory linkage of modernisation and specifically Western developments, against which non-Western modernisation could be measured. For an example of the analytical distinction between "cultural modernity" and "capitalist modernisation", Habermas, *Die Moderne*, p. 39.

[40] Lerner, *The Passing*, p. ix.

[41] Robinson, "Non-European Foundations"; Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities*, p. 199.

[42] Curtin, *Cross-cultural Trade*, p. 251.

will first discuss the wider problem of modernisation and non-Western modernity and thus explore whether, at least in theoretical terms, the discourse of *iṣlāḥ* (reform) could be seen as something other than a modernist discourse.

Modernisation theory has come under attack since the late 1960s for a number of reasons.[43] Its strong ideological tendencies have been exposed which allows one to see it in continuation of the imperial civilising mission, albeit in a nonracist form which accepts Africans and Asians as agents of change.[44] The notion of the creation of an increasingly economically integrated world since the 16th century, in conjunction with more recent debates on globalisation and with post-colonial scholarship, have inspired scholars to go a step further and to question whether modernity, the point of departure for modernisation, was a uniquely European development or whether it has to be conceptualised as a truly global phenomenon.[45] This would frame many developments outside the West also within the context of a wider modernity which might or might not share a number of features with what has been described by analysts as specifically Western. Thus, one could historicise the process of 'modernisation' beyond Lerner's dichotomy of "past centuries of modernization in the West and recent decades of modernization around the contemporary world".[46]

Washbrook, to give one example, suggests that the question of what exactly constitutes "modernity" has been reopened by the experiences of the 20th century such as fascism, questions about the ability of Western-style modernity to transform the rest of the world, and scepticism about the long-term sustainability of Western style industrialism.[47] Other problems include the question of how the development of modernity can be conceptualised, for example, to what

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[43] It is not the task of this short discussion to recapitulate this debate, for an extended discussion see Wehler and the references in Adas 1989, p. 415, fn. 34.

[44] Adas, *Machines*, pp. 402–418; Wehler, *Modernisierungstheorie*, p. 19 speaks of "a sort of intellectual imperialism" (my translation).

[45] For the Middle East, Gran, *Islamic Roots*, states: "I am convinced that, properly understood, the industrial revolution was a global event, and I question the strong tradition in the West to assume a proprietary relationship to it" (p. lii). More subtle forms of this argument can be found for other regions, e.g. Washbrook, "From Comparative Sociology".

[46] Lerner, *The Passing*, p. 77.

[47] For a summary of this problem, which has become widely discussed in the wake of postcolonial scholarship, see Washbrook, "From Comparative Sociology", pp. 410–417. In the context of Middle Eastern history, much of this debate crystallised around Edward Said's much discussed work *Orientalism*, New York 1978.

extent the expectation of definite, irreversible developmental stages, so typical of modernisation theories, can be maintained.[48] Thus, it has been asked whether the notion of development towards a modern state in the Weberian sense is sustainable.[49] Such questions, which undermine common notions of 'progress', unsettle the evolutionary notions underlying much of the discussion about modernisation and modernity.

On the basis of such considerations, Washbrook actually rejects the concept of "modernity" as flawed by an inherent teleology.[50] This would basically leave us with a temporal framework within which to consider the closely linked histories of different regions either separately or in their interaction. Coming from the background of network analysis, Reichmuth suggests in a not dissimilar argument that a close investigation of the international networks which link different Muslim societies might help us towards a better understanding of the way in which different agents used and changed them over time.[51] This seems a neat solution to the problem. However, if one is interested in comparative questions, some properly defined general concepts seem to be an almost indispensible basis for such comparisons. Are there, then, other ways of dealing with the vexed question of 'modernity'?

Other scholars of Asian history have suggested not to discard the term 'modernity', but to apply it more loosely to a relatively wide range of periods and phenomena.[52] Similar to newer proponents of modernisation theory, they use the term equally for all societies and take a more critical view of some of the underlying ideological assumptions. This reformed or 'neo'-modernisation theory tends to take a broad approach and acknowledges that we are talking more about a loose combination of ideas which have inspired scholarship than about a stringent and historically compelling and Western-led path

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[48] Fornäs, *Cultural Theory*, pp. 33f. A classical example of modernisation through stages is W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, 2nd ed. London: CUP 1971; cf. Lerner, *The Passing*, pp. 43–75.

[49] See the discussions in Wolfgang Reinhard (ed.), *Verstaatlichung der Welt?* München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1999, notably Reinhard, "Geschichte der Staatsgewalt und europäische Expansion", pp. 317–356 and Harald Haury, "Protokoll der Stellungnahmen zu Kolloquium und Abschlußvortrag", pp. 357–366.

[50] Washbrook does so explicitly in his "The Global History of 'Modernity'", p. 296.

[51] Reichmuth, "'Netzwerk' und 'Weltsystem'", pp. 290f.

[52] Particularly B. Andaya, "Historicising 'Modernity' in Southeast Asia".

of international development.[53] Furthermore, this revised view acknowl-
edges that modernisation, which is seen as a primarily endogeneous
process, can take place at different paces in different sectors of social
and individual development.[54] Such a holistic approach to moderni-
sation lists cultural and social change. It emphasises the development
of a public sphere in which individuals participate and which is
formed by an expansion of schooling and marked by increasing ratio-
nalisation. Nevertheless, the more traditional view of modernisation
as the development of a competition-based capitalist economy is not
excluded from this vision.[55] It thus includes 'modernity' as part of
'modernisation'. Furthermore, it allows for different sectors to change
at a different pace and more importantly in different directions.[56]
The major challenge to this approach has been mounted by schol-
ars who would like to maintain the uniqueness of the European expe-
rience.[57]

Reinhard Schulze's question of whether there possibly existed an
"enlightenment in the Islamic cultures of the precolonial modern
period" aims at the core of what constitutes Western modernity.[58]

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[53] Berger, "Was behauptet die Modernisierungstheorie", pp. 46, 51.
[54] Tiryakian, "Modernisation" p. 173.
[55] For a systematically not satisfying, but otherwise enlightening tabulatory sum-
mary of this version of modernisation, see Berger, "Was behauptet die Modernisie-
rungstheorie", p. 53.
[56] See the contributions in *JESHO* 40;4 (1997) with references to earlier contri-
butions to the debate. For a much wider version of modernisation theory which
seems to take such views into account and which could be seen to encompass the
development of 'modernity' in a wider sense, see Tiryakian, "Modernisation".
[57] Van der Veer, "The Global History", see also Washbrook's response, "The
Global History of 'Modernity'—A Response". Some of the underlying philosophi-
cal problems of the debate are discussed by Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought
and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* London 1986, pp. 1–35, with specific
reference to concepts of nationalism. The underlying question of whether different
societies can be compared at all remains, however, to this day disputed. For views
opposed to such an approach, see Samuel Huntington, "The clash of civilisations?",
Foreign Affairs 72;3 (1993), pp. 22–40 and Tilman Nagel, "Die Ebenbürtigkeit des
Fremden", *ZDMG* 148 (1988), pp. 367–378. I prefer to follow Roger Owen's
approach as outlined, for example, in "The Middle East in the eighteenth cen-
tury—an 'Islamic' society in decline?", *Review of Middle East Studies* 1 (1975), pp.
101–112 who is quite clear about the comparability. For an overview of the debate,
see my "The critique of Orientalism", in Michael Bentley (ed.), *Companion to
Historiography*, London, New York 1997, pp. 620–638.
[58] Schulze, "Was ist die islamische Aufklärung", p. 296 (my translation). The
debate was launched by Schulze in 1990 ("Das islamische achtzehnte Jahrhundert"),
who was criticised, for example, by Peters, "Reinhard Schulzes's Quest" and Radtke,
"Erleuchtung und Aufklärung". A balanced view is taken by Haarmann, "'Ein

Perhaps his most interesting suggestion is to scrutinise more closely Islamic mysticism (Sufism) and pietism in the 18th and 19th centuries. In spite of the methodological problems of his approach,[59] this idea links his concerns to an ongoing debate about changes in Sufism which have led to some scholars denoting parts of 18th and 19th century Sufism as "Neo-Sufism".[60] According to Levtzion the Sufi orders (Arabic: *ṭarīqa/ṭuruq*), particularly of the Islamic periphery, centralised their organizational framework, popularised certain practices in order to enhance recruitment and strove for closer cohesion among their members. They also promoted a more positive attitude to this world and chose the vernacular for their poetry.[61] It would seem that there exists more discord about the theological differences between 'old' and 'neo' Sufis, which appears to be partly a problem of lacking scholarship, although even Radtke, one of the strongest critics of 'Neo-Sufism', concedes that new traits are discernible among certain 18th and 19th century Sufi orders. Foremost among them is the conviction of the Neo-Sufis that they had a full understanding of the religion, rather than some traditional *'ulamā'* and that they could be sure of salvation.[62] Voll has shown the importance of scholarly networks, most notably in the context of *ḥadīth* studies and Sufism, in the spreading of Islamic revivalism in the 18th and 19th centuries.[63]

As will be seen in the following chapters, such developments within Sufism played some role in Hadhrami society in which many of the elite were members of the *Ṭarīqa 'Alawiyya*. However, what is important here in conceptual terms is the wider question of modernity. The debate about Sufism seems to confirm that the specific forms of pietism developed in the 18th and 19th centuries by what has

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Mißgriff des Geschicks'". Vikor, "Muḥammadan Piety" summarises the debate. See also Wild, "To our readers", *WI* 36;3, 1996, pp. 271–275, here p. 274. Gumbrecht's discussion of "Modern" is of relevance in this context.

[59] The so far best and most comprehensive criticism stems from Hagen & Seidensticker, "Reinhard Schulzes Hypothese". I would like to thank Prof. Ende for pointing me to this article.

[60] The term is used in Nehemia Levtzion & John Voll, *Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam*, Syracuse 1987. For a discussion, see O'Fahey & Radtke, "Neo-Sufism", O'Fahey, "Pietism", Levtzion, "Eighteenth Century Sufi Brotherhoods", Vikor, "Muḥammadan Piety", pp. 12–22.

[61] Levtzion, "Eighteenth Century", pp. 148–160.

[62] Radtke, 'Kritik am Neo-Sufismus'.

[63] Voll, "Hadith Scholars" and "Linking Groups".

been called "neo-Sufis" might have advanced notions of individuality, albeit in the narrow context of an individual's obligation to be a good Muslim. This implied his and—increasingly—her ability to understand the meaning of the revelation.[64] The Islamic revival for which some of the 18th century scholars strove was based on a "sociomoral reconstruction" within a community of like-minded Sufis.[65] Both of these aspects, the individual understanding of his or her religious and moral duties and the attempt to create communities in which these moral ideals could be realised resound with certain notions and practices of European pietism which evoked harsh criticism by a church fearing for its control over the faithful.[66] Lapidus has argued that, while on the level of socio-moral renewal (*tajdīd*) the reformist Sufis show certain similarities to Protestantism, and while *tajdīd* "favors dynamic worldly activity", this "is not directed to economic accumulation".[67] I will argue in chapter II to the contrary that, while *tajdīd* itself might have been directed towards the correct practice of Islam, the Hadhrami reformers of the early to mid-19th century had quite explicit economic ideas. While these might have been a far shot from complete economic concepts, they reflect a clear concern with the economic welfare of the population, and are linked in no uncertain terms to the socio-moral renewal. This was to be based on proper Islamic rule. Furthermore, Sufis played a major role in the development of new communicative structures through the growth of literacy. They propagated the idea that individuals were obliged to work towards a society pleasing to God. In Hadhramaut, this gave growth to the first associations which aimed at the spreading of Islam.[68]

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[64] Hofheinz, "Der Scheich".

[65] Voll, "Linking Groups", p. 88.

[66] Gierl, *Pietismus*, pp. 36–76. However, the contrast between theology and belief seems to have been less pronounced among the Muslim scholars than among the pietists studied by Gierl, probably due to the absence of an officially sanctioned church establishment in Islam.

[67] Lapidus, "Islamic Revival", p. 454.

[68] The creation of a new public sphere is one of the major crossing points of European Pietiesm and Enlightenment, according to historians. Vierhaus, "Aufklärung als Prozeß", pp. 6f.; Gestrich, *Absolutismus*, pp. 68–101 who emphasises the connection between new forms (and technologies) of communication and Pietism; cf. Gierl, *Pietismus*. Older authors reject this in favour of a stark contrast between the two intellectual trends, cf. Lerner's statement: "Secular enlightenment does not easily replace sacred revelation in the guidance of human affairs." *The Passing*, p. 43.

Nevertheless, one must take seriously Vikor's warning against easy comparisons. One cannot assume that, only because a certain set of ideas constituted enlightenment in Europe, it would be identical in other societies.[69] In other words, he warns of a similar construction of "historicist genealogies" with respect to enlightenment as Washbrook does with regard to modernity.[70] There also arises the slightly larger question as to whether or not one can apply tools to non-Western societies which were originally developed in the context of Western sociology and history.

One clearly has to avoid the pitfalls of thinking and translating "the world through the categories of the European imperial-modern" and must "attempt to write difference into the history of our modernity in a mode that resists the assimiliation of this history to the political imaginary of the European-derived institutions", as Chakrabarty has argued with regard to India.[71] However, if one does not subscribe to cultural essentialism which would preclude any comparative historical approach, historians should, with due care, be able to point to similarities such as the ones outlined above between the Hadhrami elite and the European bourgeoisie, as long as no "common general patterns of development" in an evolutionary sense are expected.[72] This is of particular relevance if we consider that Hadhramaut itself did not undergo any significant capitalist development, even if the merchant elite discussed above was engaged in capitalist ventures in the diaspora. 'Modernisation' in its widest sense, if indeed this is how we can interpret *iṣlāḥ*, did then come about in the absence of such capitalist development and was mostly visible in the realm of social, cultural and political change.

A Civil Society in the Making?

In spite of the considerable differences about what exactly constitutes 'modernity', a central theme emerging in a large number of theoretical and historical studies is *The Structural Transformation of the*

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[69] Vikor, "Muḥammadan Piety", p. 11.
[70] Washbrook, "The Global History of 'Modernity'—A Response to a Reply", p. 297.
[71] Chakrabarty, "The Difference-Deferral", pp. 87f.
[72] Zubaida, *Islam*, p. 123, cf. pp. 121–182.

Public Sphere, no matter whether or not one agrees with Habermas'
specific historical views.[73] New media, most notably print, and a new
infrastructure helped to revolutionise communications and opened
the available knowledge to new groups in society. These started to
claim a share in discussions and in due time to challenge the for-
mer authoritative guardians of knowledge, in parallel with wider
socio-economic, but also political changes in society. This process has
often been conceptualised in terms of a shift from community
(*Gemeinschaft*) to society (*Gesellschaft*), the former characterised by a
greater integration of 'private' and 'public', but also by clear struc-
tures of authority, the latter by greater individuation and a search
for new forms of association for the expression of common concerns.

   A major aspect of change in Hadhramaut from the mid-19th cen-
tury to the mid-20th century is the appearance of numerous groups
and associations which range from religious reform societies and edu-
cational gatherings to development associations and include, in the
later stages, political parties and trade unions. Many of these groups
resemble very closely the fabric of the bourgeois public sphere ('*bür-
gerliche Öffentlichkeit*') as discussed, for example, by Lepsius. His state-
ment that the "transmission of private property and knowledge into
the public sphere" was typical of the convergence of the interests of
the educated classes and the commercial bourgeoisie[74] seems simi-
larly appropriate for the Hadhrami elites. This bourgeois public
sphere shows important similarities with the phenomena discussed in
the 1990s under the label of 'civil society'. Thus Carapico, who has
discussed 'civil society' in the Yemeni context, lists the following
activities as part and parcel of "the modern civic realm": member-
ship in various societies and organisations, the material contributions
to social services and infrastructure, independent intellectual pro-
duction and participation in "public non-governmental non-com-
mercial events."[75] Typical in both cases is that the common interest

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[73] This is the title of the translation of Habermas *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*,
Engl. ed. Boston (Mass.) 1989. For studies which make use of Habermas' basic con-
cept but disagree with some of his basic assumptions see Gierl, *Pietismus* and, for a
Muslim society, Reichmuth, *Islamische Bildung*.
   [74] Lepsius, "Zur Soziologie", p. 89, the German text reads: "die Vergesellschaftung
von 'Besitz und Bildung'". I disagree with Kößler, "Zivilgesellschaft", p. 18, who
argues that civil society in the 'Third World' cannot usefully be linked to the com-
municatory network of a reasoning public of private individuals.
   [75] Carapico, *Civil Society*, pp. 11f.

of autonomous individuals constitutes the basis of such 'modern' behaviour. The new organisations are 'volitional'; their membership is based on common interest by indidviduals who decide freely that they like to become actively involved. Similarly, members can withdraw support relatively easily. These organisations stand in contrast to pre-modern organisational forms such as tribes or certain types of religious and professional associations like guilds, membership in which resulted from birth or the choice of profession.[76]

Somewhat more problematic with regard to the adoption of the term 'civil society' is the question of statehood. Conventionally, 'civil society' is defined in relation to the state as providing "a buffer between state and citizen".[77] As will be seen in the following chapters, the creation of a state was a major goal of the most active parts of the Hadhrami elite over much of the period under discussion. Can we talk of 'civil society' in the absence of a state? Carapico has solved this problem by distinguishing between "the primordial civic realm", which operated in a society dominated by tribalism and "mechanisms rooted in Islam", and "modern activism" once the state had become an established entity.[78] The activities launched by the Hadhrami (and to a lesser degree other Yemeni) merchant elites occupy in her discussion an intermediary position because of the introduction of new forms of social activism and the infusion of vast sums of money.[79]

Although I agree with Carapico in terms of characterising the Hadhrami merchants' activities as 'civic', I will refer more to the terms bourgeoisie and bourgeois society precisely because of the lack of a proper state in much of the period under discussion. The establishment of more stable polities and later a civilian state was the aim of the Hadhrami elite. They formulated "a quest for constitutional order and legal hegemony, an effort to centralise judicial practices, co-opt interpretations, and impose the 'rule of law'."[80] Thus,

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[76] Ibrahim, "Democratization", pp. 28, 30–32. Ibrahim classifies the premodern Arab organisations as "traditional Arab civil formations" (p. 30), while Carapico, *Civil Society*, p. 7, stresses their potential to develop in the direction of civil society.

[77] Norton, "Introduction", p. 7, cf. Kößler, "Zivilgesellschaft", pp. 13f.

[78] Carapico, *Civil Society*, p. 11.

[79] Carapico, *Civil Society*, pp. 80f. Although not stated explicitly, this might be seen as replacing the capitalist development which in European states formed the basis for the formation of bourgeois society.

[80] Carapico, *Civil Society*, p. 19.

I will argue here that in the Hadhrami case, the state was to some extent an "outgrowth of the society as such".[81] However, once that state started to rapidly expand its power in the wake of the advisory treaties, i.e., once it became reliant on outside support rather than having to negotiate its development internally, it started to dominate and limit the public sphere, and the merchant elites lost much of their former power. Ayubi's observation about the state in the Gulf after colonial intervention thus seems to be also pertinent to Hadhramaut:

> [. . .] the 'state' was separated from its socio-economic base and given a specifically political/strategic underpinning within newly defined, 'rigid' and often artificial borders which restricted the tribes' traditional movement [. . .]. The conventional right of 'exit' was thus to all intents and purposes blocked, with serious political implications to follow [. . .]. From now on the tribal leadership would have supremacy over the merchant classes.[82]

In this phase, which lasted from the late 1930s until independence, the term 'civil society' might be best applicable, while the newly independent socialist South Yemen did everything in its might to extinguish any associations and actions independent of state control.

Imperialism and Non-European Modernity

I would conclude from the above discussion that certain notions developed in the Muslim world resemble central ideas of Western modernity. Nevertheless one has to investigate the more traditional view that change was brought about not by internal dynamics but by the collaboration of the indigenous elite with an imperial power. Hadhramis met imperial powers (most notably the British and the Dutch) not only in the diaspora, but also much closer to home. After the occupation of Aden, Britain had slowly extended its influence in the hinterland, partly in response to local politics and resistance, partly in competition with other powers, most notably the Ottoman

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[81] Zubaida, *Islam*, p. 126. It would thus seem that the Hadhrami sultanates occupy an intermediate position in Zubaida's ideal-typical classification of Western states as natural outgrowth of society and Third World states as outside impositions, which might be an indication that the classification is somewhat problematic.

[82] Ayubi, *Over-stating*, p. 133.

Empire which, since the mid-19th century, had begun to reassert its control over Yemen. When the Yemeni highland was brought under partial Ottoman control in 1872 and the Ottomans started to be considered as an attractive ally by certain tribes near Aden, the British became alarmed and began to pursue more interventionist policies themselves. In Hadhramaut, where an intense struggle for political domination was under way, each of the rivalling factions sought outside support. Given the imperial rivalry between the European powers and attempts to contain the Ottomans, the British decided in 1882 to follow the repeated requests by the one of the competing Hadhrami sultans and concluded a treaty of friendship with him. Six years later, this was replaced by a protectorate treaty which subsequently was extended to include the hinterland. Thus Hadhramaut entered the realm of informal Empire.[83] In a second expansionist phase in the 1930s which was dominated by geo-strategic considerations such as the need for landing strips on the air route to India and also by the hope to find oil, advisory treaties marked the beginning of stronger British involvement.[84] Consequently Hadhramaut became subjected to 'indirect rule', defined by Fisher as "the exercise of a determinative and exclusive political control by one corporate body over a nominally sovereign state, a control recognized by both sides."[85] However, rule occasionally took on rather direct forms.[86]

The story of imperial collaboration has certainly been highlighted in Western studies of Hadhramaut. Perhaps the most influential book on the region is Harold Ingrams' *Arabia and the Isles*, first published in 1942. In his foreword, Bernard Reilly, former Resident and then Governor of Aden (1931–40), gave the following explanation for the increasingly direct British involvement in Hadhramaut during the 1930s of which he together with Ingrams was the "main architect":[87]

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[83] I am following here loosely Osterhammel's definition of 'informal Empire', *Kolonialismus*, pp. 25f. Doyle, *Empires*, p. 40 would use the term 'hegemony' to describe such a relationship. Although, in theory, the protectorate treaty limited the ability of the Qu'aytī sultan to conduct his own foreign policy, he de facto continued to do so until the conclusion of the advisory treaty.

[84] See Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 131–226 and Ibn Yacoob, Anglo-Ottoman Rivalries for Anglo-Ottoman rivalry, Freitag, "Hadhramis in International Politics" for the developments in Hadhramaut.

[85] Fisher, *Indirect Rule*, p. 6.

[86] Fisher, *Indirect Rule*, pp. 464–467.

[87] Gavin, *Aden*, p. 277.

Many of the Arabs of the Hadhramaut had for some time emigrated in large numbers to Malaya and Java, and there they had seen the results of internal security and settled government. Never losing their love for their home in Arabia, they came to realize how much better and happier a place it might be if the curse of tribal and private warfare could be lifted from it. At the same time it became all too apparent to them that there was in their country no local force or institution strong enough to deal with the mischief, and their eyes turned hopefully to the envoys of the Power which had brought peace and prosperity to India, to Malaya and—near at hand—to Aden.[88]

This fits almost as a textbook example into Ronald Robinson's explanation[89] of imperialism brought about by a combination of European expansionism and European cooperation with local elites. They were attracted, according to Robinson, by "the allure of what the big society had to offer in trade, capital, technology, military or diplomatic aid".[90] Thus, they drew on the resources of an imperial power until the collaborative arrangements collapsed, often as a result of increased demands by the imperial power. This is how the most significant British 'man on the spot', Harold Ingrams, who was deeply attached to Hadhramaut and genuinely believed in the 'white man's burden' "to teach people to govern themselves",[91] characterised the arrangement:

A lot of nonsense has been talked about 'Imperialism' and the word has been given a meaning of exploitation of backward races. I do not think anyone will be able to find much about exploitation in the story of the Hadhramaut [. . .]. But I am quite certain I am an Imperialist and equally certain that the vast majority of the Arabs in the Aden Protectorate are too, because we all believe in belonging to an Empire

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[88] H. Ingrams, *Arabia*, pp. ix–x. In the foreword to the 1966 edition of *Arabia and the Isles*, H. Ingrams specifies this further by describing the local sultans as weak, most of the religious elite as interested in feuds and by naming Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf as the most prominent person in favour of British government over Hadhramaut, while protesting his own idealist and non-interventionist intentions, pp. 16–20. Gavin, *Aden*, gives a far more balanced picture, but nevertheless sees 'Ingrams Peace' as "the first step to progress", p. 303 and Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, p. 90 argues that the advisory treaties came about at the instigation of emigrants and offered an opportunity for the tribesmen to conclude peace without losing face.

[89] I would agree with Osterhammel, "Jenseits der Orthodoxie", pp. 120f., that these are "partial explanations of expansion", not an abstract 'theory'.

[90] Robinson, "Non-European Foundations", p. 120.

[91] H. Ingrams, *Arabia*, p. 7.

> which runs itself on a basis of the mutual interests of all who belong
> to it. As it has turned out we have gained a great thing out of doing
> our best for the Arabs in the Hadhramaut and that is their friendship
> [. . .].[92]

There are a number of problems with this concept of 'collaborating
elites' quite apart from the most obvious one, namely the negative
connotations of disloyalty which the term evokes.[93] Dobbin has crit-
icized Robinson because "he underplays the role of commercial col-
laborators" in favour of political collaboration, thus underestimating
the crucial role played by commercial diasporas in enabling European
powers to operate in South East Asia. These she sees, quite in con-
trast to Frank and Wallerstein, as dynamic entrepreneurs who cre-
ated peripheral metropolises.[94] She thus raises the crucial question
of the agency of the commercial diasporas. On a more fundamen-
tal level, von Trotha has pointed out that the subjectivity of all par-
ties, i.e., colonisers and colonised alike, is an underlying, albeit hitherto
underdeveloped aspect of periphery-oriented theories of imperialism.[95]
Shula Marks and Dagmar Engels have rejected the notion of col-
laboration as a functionalist approach. They suggest investigating the
Gramscian notion of hegemony, i.e., of certain notions of order and
power, in order to explain why the interests of colonial powers and
certain elites so often converged. While using different concepts from
those employed by von Trotha, their approach serves a similar aim,
namely "to explain the attraction which Western values had for the
colonized middle classes".[96] They argue that only those colonial ide-
ologies and politics could achieve acceptance—and thus hegemony—
which were rooted in the worlds of both rulers and ruled.

To return to the Hadhrami case, are we thus back to a group of
diaspora merchants who had undergone 'fringe Westernisation'? Did
their interests converge with those of a colonial power because they
had adopted hegemonic notions of modernity? Consider the follow-
ing characterisation of the Hadhrami merchant elite, which could
be substantiated in numerous ways:

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[92] H. Ingrams, *Arabia*, p. 2.
[93] Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus*, pp. 72–75.
[94] Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities*, pp. 199; 13–15.
[95] Von Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, p. 11.
[96] Engels & Marks, "Introduction", p. 4.

> In fact the wealthy Hadrami, supervising his model palm groves, por-
> ing over manuscripts in his newly built mansion—paid for by money
> made overseas—was closer to the image of the eighteenth-century
> English nabob returned from the East. And, sequestered within fine
> houses, well-to-do-Hadrami ladies lived a life of social intrigue, petty
> squabbles and boredom that Mrs Gaskell would have recognized.
> Parochialism and far-flung travel bended to produce something curi-
> ously familiar to Freya Stark and the Ingramses.[97]

Or is it possible—and I would suggest this to be the case—to con-
sider that basic notions of 'modernity' were more widely dissemi-
nated than the concept of 'fringe Westernisation' suggests? This leads
back to the earlier discussed, wider models of modernity and assumes
that we can talk about relatively close international integration from
the 16th century. In such a scenario, the shaping of Hadhrami reform
societies along a Chinese model no longer amounts to some kind of
second-degree Westernisation, but would be seen as part of an inter-
national process. This might also help to overcome the dichotomy
between 'colonial state' and 'traditional society', and to refocus atten-
tion on the interests of specific elites.[98] Similarly, one might also be
able to conceptualise later changes in Hadhramaut, i.e., the gradual
increase in voices calling for national unity and independence, in
terms of the rise of new hegemonic ideas among a younger gener-
ation. From such a perspective, the question of whether a certain
idea was first vented in 'the West' or 'the East' becomes secondary.
It does not contribute much to our understanding of the actual his-
torical processes because it tends to blind our view to the multifold
interactions between societies and cultures while encouraging an often
ahistorical and apologetic search for historical roots of various phe-
nomena in a specific culture.

The relatively late appearance of modernity among Hadhramis
need not worry us too much in this context. After all, it is worth-
while to remember that while an intellectual understanding of moder-
nity was developed in certain European centres since the 17th century,
it did not necessarily penetrate these societies very thoroughly until

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[97] Mackintosh-Smith, *Yemen*, 180f., cf. Ho, "Hadhramis abroad", pp. 142f. and my "Arab merchants", part iv.

[98] Engels & Marks, "Introduction", p. 4. The dichotomy is very pronounced in Schulze, *Geschichte*, pp. 67f.; cf. Malik, *Colonisation*, 17–24, for a critique see Loimeier & Reichmuth, "Zur Dynamik", pp. 152–159.

much later. In his study of 19th century France Eugene Weber has shown that it was only in the second half of the 19th century that much of rural France was drawn into the orbit of the modern nation state, thus contradicting the common notion that after the French Revolution, France was a modern state. Weber talks in terms of the very same infrastructural and institutional changes which mark the history of Hadhramaut such as the building of roads and the safe-guarding of their security, schools, health and standard of living, but also religious reform and ideological change. Weber's study helps us in our context to put European modernity's triumphal march into a temporal perspective. This relative contemporaneity of modernisation in rural France and in Hadhramaut, both of which were peripheral when seen from the regional metropolises of their time, would at least encourage a systematic comparative approach, if not at least some comparative considerations.[99] As indicated above, I would not want to presume that there were intellectual reflections of modernity in Hadhrami society before the early 19th century. To reach conclusions on this topic would be the task of another, quite different study. As regards the imperial domination both of discourse and action, it can easily be accommodated within the larger concept of closer international integration. The latter does not preclude the increasing dominance of the imperial power, but dispenses with the ahistorical and culturally essentialist contrast of European progress and the stagnation of the 'rest of the world'. I will therefore be happy to follow Hourani's suggestion to consider indigenous processes of change as well as the undeniable influences which the West has exerted in the past century over the Middle East and—one might say—the non-Western world in general.[100] Since the focus of this study is on the Hadhrami elites, their aspirations and actions form the vantage point of investigation.

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[99] On the problem of 'world time' and intercultural comparability cf. Schulze, "Was ist die islamische Aufklärung", pp. 322–325. Osterhammel, "Sozialgeschichte", discusses the problem of intercultural comparison systematically. His suggestion of a more a systematic comparative approach exceeds the scope of this study.

[100] Hourani, "The Fertile Crescent".

Literature and Sources

The literature about Hadhramaut both in Arabic and in foreign languages reflects the region's modern history.[101] To start with the Arabic literature, Wadi Hadhramaut has a long scholarly tradition which is most notably reflected, as far as history is concerned, in the genres of biographical collections, family histories which often take the form of *manāqib* or studies extolling the virtues of pious ancestors, local history (*tārīkh*) and a genre which might be termed historical geography. These genres still dominate the modern historiography of Hadhramaut, although they have undergone interesting transformations.[102]

  Scholarly biographies, even if they take the form of autobiography, have to be read in the context of the expectations readers had of this genre and of the 'person', i.e., the cultural concept of a scholar. They therefore follow a culturally and regionally determined, albeit historically changing pattern which requires the inclusion of certain types of information at the expense of others.[103] For a scholar interested in the social history of a certain elite, the long lists of teachers, peers and students given in these works give some sense of the scholarly networks. However, "Men of learning may be landlords, politicians, and shrewd entrepreneurs, but these activities are outside the scope of the tarjama, which concentrates on those elements of personhood that link individuals with the sacred center of society, as viewed in religious terms."[104] Although this has changed in some of the more recent works, the historian interested in precisely these matters often has to piece together snippets of information which are given almost accidentally in the biographies.[105]

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[101] The following review is limited itself to the most important works, for a fuller account, see the bibliography. Yousof M. Talib provides a review of literature until the early 1970s in his Les Etudes Europeennes sur la Société Hadramite. Essai de bibliographie critique, Thèse de 3ème cycle, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes 1971–1972 (unpublished typescript).

[102] For a survey until the early 1960s see R. B. Serjeant, "Historians and Historiography of Ḥaḍramaut", *BSOAS* 25, 1962, pp. 238–261 and his "Materials for South Arabian History", *BSOAS* 13 (1950), pp. 281–307, 581–601.

[103] Dale Eickelman, "Traditional Islamic Learning and Ideas of the Person in the Twentieth Century", in Martin Kramer (ed.), *Middle Eastern Lives. The Practice of Biography and Self-Narrative*, Syracuse University Press 1991, pp. 35–59. Interestingly, the Hadrami *manāqib* tend to list peers (in the form of people mentioned as both teachers and students), something which the texts analysed by Eickelman seem to avoid.

[104] Eickelman, "Traditional Islamic Learning", p. 40.

[105] On the problems of writing history on the basis of biographical literature,

Unfortunately, the somewhat stereotypical images of public persons, be they *sayyid*s (people who claim descent from the Prophet Muḥammad who are normally depicted as scholars) or sultans (who are portrayed as either just or unjust rulers), permeate not only the traditionally-oriented biographical but also the annalistic historiography.[106] Given the absence of family archives which might contain documentary evidence of the economic and political roles of these individuals, or rather their inaccessibility to foreign scholars, the argument will have to be based on a less than satisfactory combination of colonial archives and such biographical and miscellaneous information as may be found. An additional problem is that the documents quoted in those works such as letters, agreements, etc., which constitute invaluable source material, are not accessible elsewhere in the public domain. If one does not want to discard them altogether, one has to rely on the scholarly standards of historians working in a rather different historiographical tradition. A sound economic history which has formed the basis for the assumptions about the European bourgeoisie, therefore remains elusive as long as family and firm archives are not made available to historians.

In spite of such problems, a number of the more recent biographical works do contain more pertinent information (and more original sources) than the older collections. Thus, one of the most famous recent biographical collections, *Shams al-ẓahīra*, was "intended to bind young *sayyid*s to their origins, and remind them of the ascetic glories of their forefathers, even as they were tempted by the degenerate ways of the wealthy East Indies."[107] Apart from the intention, the collection clearly departs from traditional scholarly biographies in its inclusion of particularly prominent figures who made their names in politics and business, although their devotion and religious engagements still occupy pride of place. Another major work was compiled by a local historian, Muḥammad Bā Maṭraf, who himself played some part in the colonial administration and later in the

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albeit with specific reference to earlier periods, cf. Stephen Humphreys: *Islamic History: a Framework for Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991, pp. 187–208.

[106] Abū Bakr al-ʿAdanī b. ʿAlī al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ al-Nūr. Nukhba min aʿlām Ḥaḍramawt*, Sanaʾa n.d., Sālim b. Muḥammad b. Sālim b. Ḥamīd al-Kindī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt al-musammā bi-l-ʿidda al-mufīda*, 2 vols., Sanaʾa 1991 (ed. ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī).

[107] Ho, "Hadhramis abroad", p. 140.

movement for independence. He lists Yemeni (no longer only Hadh-rami) emigrants of all strata who died abroad. This almost appears to be an ideological counter-project to *Shams al-ẓahīra* in that Bā Maṭraf rejects explicitly the idea of limiting himself to a specific fac-tion or region.[108] A certain problem of these works to which a num-ber of studies focussing on individual scholars could be added is that they tend to have adapted to the expectations of a 20th-century audience. Although in many ways still following traditional bio-graphical patterns and including more information of relevance to our topic than earlier works, they tend to emphasise the reformist attitude of their subjects which has never been clearly defined.[109] While, somewhat reassuringly, Ibn Ḥamīd's 19th-century chronicle confirms that there existed reformist trends at the time, one still con-fronts a backward projection of current concerns which obscures the threads of continuity and overemphasises the momentum for change.[110]

Among the other biographical works written in the 20th century, we find a five-volume work about Hadhrami poets[111] as well as a collection of selected biographies from a major family written by a body-building champion and self-styled 'professor' in Singapore.[112] The latter book provides an extreme example of how expectations about the contents of biographical collections have changed in the 20th century and to what degree individuality has become possible. A new addition to the biographical literature—as far as Hadhramaut is concerned—are the political biographies of prominent figures before independence. These comprise two recent studies about Hadhrami wazīrs ('prime ministers') by their descendants as well as the biog-raphy of a local ruler of the Quʿayṭī dynasty.[113] While written or

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[108] Bā Maṭraf, *al-Jāmiʿ*, 4 vols., Aden 1977, 2nd ed. 1984. See vol. 1, p. 6. I would suggest that *ṭāʾifa* refers here to specific strata and is a hidden attack on the *manāqib* works by sayyids. I owe this idea to a discussion with Engseng Ho.

[109] Muḥammad Asad Shahāb [Shihāb], *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā b. Shihāb, rāʾid al-nahḍa al-iṣlāḥiyya fī janūb sharq Āsiyā*, Qom 1314 h.s. and, to a lesser degree, ʿAbd al-Qādir Zayn al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd al-ʿasjadiyya fī nashr manāqib baʿḍ afrād al-usra al-junaydiyya*, Singapore 1994.

[110] For a similar historiographical problem with regard to the Ottoman Empire, albeit for different reasons, see Fortna, "Education and Autobiography".

[111] ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Ḥāmid al-Saqqāf, *Tārīkh al-shuʿarāʾ al-Ḥaḍramiyyīn*, 5 vols., al-Ṭāʾif, vols. 1, 4–5 n.d., vols. 2–3 1937–8.

[112] Syed Mohsen Alsagoff, *The Alsagoff Family in Malaysia A.H. 1240 (A.D. 1824) to A.H. 1382 (A.D. 1962)*, Singapore 1963.

[113] Ḥāmid b. Abī Bakr al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjamat al-zaʿīm al-sayyid al-ḥabīb Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār wa-l-salṭana al-quʿayṭiyya*, Jeddah 1983; Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Qaddāl,

commissioned by their descendants, these works tend towards a doc-
umentary, albeit not necessarily critical style.

The histories of Hadhramaut for the 19th and 20th centuries mir-
ror the political developments and debates of the period, most notably
the conflict between reformist *sayyid*s and their non-*sayyid* critics. Sālim
b. Muḥammad b. Ḥamīd al-Kindī (hitherto called Ibn Ḥamīd)[114] is
our main contemporary author for the 19th century. He was an
employee of one of the leading reformist *sayyid*s of his time who sup-
ported the Kathīrī sultanate but was disappointed with the political
course it took.[115] This view was clearly shared by the author who
comments repeatedly on various events and individuals and occa-
sionally mentions his own participation in events.[116] The history of
the Kathīrī sultanate until 1855 is imbued with the early 20th cen-
tury spirit of patriotism by reformist *sayyid*s which centered on the
Kathīrī territory. It was written by Muḥammad b. Hāshim (Ibn
Hāshim), an author whose role as educator, journalist and advisor
to the sultan will be considered in the course of this study.[117] In
many ways, Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, author of the two-vol-
ume work *Adwār al-tārīkh al-ḥaḍramī*, can be considered a student of
Ibn Hāshim whom he resembles in terms of political and reformist
orientation.[118] A last historian who can be considered to be part of
this wider trend of reformist *sayyid* historiography is 'Alawī b. Ṭāhir
al-Ḥaddād, who was involved in the 'Alawī-Irshādī dispute about
the status of *sayyid*s in South East Asia.[119]

'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Ubaydillāh al-Saqqāf, the (informal) *muftī* of
Hadhramaut, holds the middle ground in this conflict as he tried to
mediate in the 'Alawī-Irshādī conflict and fell into disgrace with the

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al-Shaykh al-Qaddāl Pāshā, *mu'allim sūdānī fī Ḥaḍramawt, wamḍāt min sīratih 1903–1975*,
Aden 1997 and Muḥammad Sa'īd al-Qaddāl & 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Alī b. Ṣalāḥ al-
Qu'ayṭī, *al-Sulṭān 'Alī b. Ṣalāḥ al-Qu'ayṭī 1898–1948*, Aden 1999.
    [114] The Arab authors use his *shuhra* (Ibn Ḥamīd), while Hartwig calls him by his
nisba (al-Kindī).
    [115] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*. About this work, see the introduction by
'Abdallāh al-Ḥibshī, vol. I, pp. 13–22, cf. Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 20–22.
    [116] See, for example, Ibn Ḥamīd, vol. I, p. 363 and vol. II, pp. 153f.
    [117] Muḥammad b. Hāshim, *Tārīkh al-dawla al-kathīriyya*, Cairo 1367 h./1948, see
foreword by Muḥammad 'Alī al-Jifrī, p. h.
    [118] Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār al-tārīkh al-ḥaḍramī*, 1st ed. 1972, 3rd
ed. Medina 1994. For his biography, see al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 459f. and the
introduction by Ibn Hāshim to al-Shāṭirī's *Dīwān*, pp. 3–30.
    [119] Serjeant, "Historians", pp. 249–53.

Kathīrī sultans because of his sometimes unorthodox views. An out-
spoken reformer, he has composed a history of Hadhramaut, which
unfortunately is still unpublished. Parts of it were reworked in his
geographical and historical dictionary.[120] Of the Irshādī historians
who were particularly critical of the Hadhrami *sayyid*s, Ṣalāḥ al-Bakrī,
author of *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt al-siyāsī* as well as a number of other
works on Yemen and the *Irshād* movement, deserves special men-
tion for his detailed, albeit partisan accounts.[121] Saʿīd ʿAwaḍ Bā
Wazīr not only contributed an interesting work in which he presents
what he considers to be outstanding Hadhrami personalities, he also
wrote an account of the reformist movement in Hadhramaut and
has left us a rather unusual manuscript of memoirs.[122]

  During socialist times, historians publishing in Yemen paid particu-
lar attention to popular culture and movements which were sometimes
interpreted as a precursor of nationalism and/or protosocialism.[123]
While Bā Maṭraf's study of the genesis of the Hadhrami sultanates
in the 19th century takes a rather neutral stance, the Palestinian
author ʿAkāsha, who for some time taught in Aden, wrote his work
on the same topic as an indictment of imperialism and the "reli-
gious aristocracy".[124] Karāma Sulaymān's study of the educational
system in southern Yemen, which as a consequence of its author's
origin and professional career focusses heavily on Hadhramaut, pro-
vides a narrative of educational modernisation heavily influenced by
the views of the socialist era.[125] One of the very few authors whose

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[120] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf, Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt, 3 vols., MS Seyun
1360 h. and Idām al-qūt aw-muʿjam buldān Ḥaḍramawt, 1375.

[121] Ṣalāḥ al-Bakrī al-Yāfiʿī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt al-siyāsī*, 2 vols., first published Cairo
1935–1936, see also his other works, *Fī janūb al-jazīra l-ʿarabiyya* (1949), *ʿAdan wa-
Ḥaḍramawt* (1960), *Ittiḥād al-janūb al-ʿarabī* (1965) and *Tārīkh al-Irshād fī Indūnīsiyā*
(1992). For a brief discussion of his work, see Serjeant, "Nashāṭ", p. 8.

[122] Saʿīd ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt fī shakhṣiyyāt*, al-Mukallā 1957, *Ṣafaḥāt
min al-tārīkh al-ḥaḍramī*, Cairo 1958–59, 2nd ed. Aden n.d., *al-Fikr wa-l-thaqāfa fī 'l-
tārīkh al-ḥaḍramī*. Cairo 1961, "Mudhakkirāt", n.d.

[123] See the contributions in Ṣāliḥ ʿAlī Bā Ṣurra and Muḥammad Saʿīd Dāʾūd
(eds.), *Wathāʾiq al-nadwa al-ʿilmiyya al-tārīkhiyya ḥawla 'l-muqāwama al-shaʿbiyya fī Ḥaḍramawt
1900–1963 al-munʿaqida fī kulliyyat al-tarbiya al-Mukallā 25–26 fabrāʾir 1989*, Aden
(n.d.), Bā Maṭraf, *al-Iqṭāʿīyūn kānū hunā*, Mukalla 1983 and his *al-Muʿallim ʿAbd al-
Ḥaqq*, 2nd ed. Aden 1983.

[124] Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl al-ḥukm*, 2nd ed. Aden 1983,
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿAkāsha, *Qiyām al-salṭana al-quʿayṭiyya wa-l-taġalġul al-
istiʿmārī fī Ḥaḍramawt 1839–1918*, Amman 1985.

[125] Karāma Mubārak Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya wa-l-taʿlīm fī 'l-shaṭr al-janūbī min al-
Yaman*, 2 vols., Sanaʿa 1994.

works shed light on conditions among peasants and ordinary towns-people is the late ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣabbān, who was himself an activist in Sayʾūn in the decades preceding independence and later became curator of the Sayʾūn museum. He has written important studies on the *Customs and Traditions*, on the peasant leader Ḥamūd Bā Ḍāwī and on a variety of other subjects.[126] Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh, a former politician, revolutionary and historian, has written an interesting mixture between history and memoirs, the first part of which was serialised in the Aden weekly *al-Ayyām*.[127]

As far as Western literature on Hadhramaut is concerned, the old-est sources for our period stem from travel reports. Wrede's book (1843) for long was wrongly bedevilled as a complete forgery. He was followed by Hirsch (1893) and the Bents (1893/94).[128] In con-trast to visitors of the 1930s such as van der Meulen and Wissmann, Freya Stark and of course the Ingramses, these early travellers did not, as a rule, obtain closer insights into Hadhrami society and the changes it was undergoing. They nevertheless contain interesting observations about the physical development of the region, its eco-nomic life and reactions to outsiders. They provide a variety of mate-rial not least on the interior, and therefore offer important additions to the early colonial explorations and reports which were mostly lim-ited to the coast.[129]

This changed in 1934 when, prior to and in preparation for the conclusion of advisory treaties Doreen and Harold Ingrams visited Hadhramaut and prepared the most comprehensive survey of the conditions there to date.[130] Its predecessor, van den Berg's remarkable

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[126] ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣabbān, *ʿĀdāt wa-taqālīd bi-l-Aḥqāf*, vol. 1 Sayʾūn 1980, vol. 2 typescript and *al-Ẓaʿīm al-ʿummālī Ḥamūd Bā Ḍāwī*, Sayʾūn 1982.

[127] Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ min tilka 'l-ayyām", *al-Ayyām*, 9.6.1992–16.6.1993. I do not know if the second part was ever completed or pub-lished, as Bā Faqīh became quite ill in the mid-nineties.

[128] Adolph von Wrede, Reisen in Ḥadhramaut, Beled Beny ʿIssa und Beled el-Hadschar, Braunschweig 1873; Leo Hirsch, *Reisen in Süd-Arabien, Mahra-Land und Hadramūt*, Leiden 1897 and Theodore & Mabel Virginia Anna Bent, *Southern Arabia*, London 1900.

[129] D. van der Meulen & H. von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut. Some of its Mysteries Unveiled*, Leiden 1932; D. van der Meulen, *Hadhramaut das Wunderland. Eine abenteuerliche For-schungsreise durch das unbekannte Süd-Arabien*, Zürich 1948; Freya Stark, *The Southern Gates of Arabia, A Journey in the Hadhramaut*, 9th ed. London 1971; Harold Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, 3rd ed. London 1966; Doreen Ingrams, *A Time in Arabia*, London 1970.

[130] Harold W. Ingrams, *A Report on the Social, Economic and Political Condition of the*

study, had been researched and written in the Netherlands East
Indies on the basis of information gathered by the author from mem-
bers of the diaspora there.[131] Between the 1940s and 60s, Hadhramaut
attracted a fair amount of scholarly attention which was, in part,
facilitated by the more peaceful economic conditions. Anthropologists,
the most influential of whom proved to be Abdalla Bujra, were fas-
cinated by the fairly rigid social stratification of Hadhramaut which
has occasionally been compared to a caste system, and Bujra, a
Kenyan-born Hadhrami, briefly participated in the revolutionary
movement preceding 1967.[132] Economic development in the context
of colonialism and migration, as well as the evolution of a new type
of political discourse, proved of interest.[133] The Arabist R. B. Serjeant
spent some time in the Hadhramaut in the late 1940s as a Colonial
Research Fellow and collected materials on a very wide range of
different topics, historical, literary, legal and religious, about which
he later wrote extensively.[134] Although Serjeant's work often suffers

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Hadhramaut, London 1937. It was updated a few years later by Doreen Ingrams, *A
Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in the Aden Protectorate*, Eritrea (Asmarra?) 1949.
    [131] L. W. C. van den Berg, *Le Ḥaḍramout et les Colonies Arabes dans L'Archipel Indien*,
Batavia 1886.
    [132] Abdalla Bujra, *The Politics of Stratification. A Study of Political Change in a South
Arabian Town*, London etc. 1971. On Bujra's participation in a demonstration in al-
Mukallā and his publication of articles in the al-Mukallā newspaper *al-Ra'y al-ʿāmm*
see Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām* 18.11.1992. For further studies of stratification, see
John G. Hartley, "The Political Organization of an Arab Tribe of the Hadhramaut",
unpubl. PhD thesis, London 1961 and R. B. Serjeant, *The Sayyids of Ḥaḍramaut*,
London 1957. For a critical review of this literature, see Camelin, "Reflections".
For other anthropological studies conducted during this period, see the works by
Walter Dostal.
    [133] On migration and economic development see Gustav Fuhrmann, "Die
Ausbreitung der Hadrami (Hadarim) im Raume des Indischen Ozeans und ihre
Rückwirkung auf Hadramaut", PhD thesis Heidelberg 1943; Adolf Leidlmair,
Ḥaḍramaut. Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft im Wandel der Gegenwart, Bonn 1961; Walter
Dostal, *Handwerker und Handwerkstechniken in Tarim (Südarabien, Hadramaut)*, Göttingen
1971 and his "Landherr und Landarbeiter in Tarim. Eine Studie über den 'Renten-
kapitalismus' in Südarabien", in Fischer & Sauberer (eds.), *Gesellschaft*, *Wirtschaft*,
Raum, Wien 1987, pp. 279–292; on the political developments see his "Vorläufige
Ergebnisse einer Untersuchung zur Feststellung der politischen Meinungsbildung in
Südarabien", *Mittheilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien* 95 (1965), pp. 1–21;
A. Bujra, "Political Conflict and Stratification in Ḥaḍramaut", *MES* 3;4 (1967), pp.
355–375 u. 4;1 (1967), pp. 2–28 and "Urban Elites and Colonialism: The Nationalist
Elites of Aden and South Arabia", *MES* 6 (1970), pp. 189–211.
    [134] R. B. Serjeant, "Materials for South Arabian History", *BSOAS* 13 (1949), pp.
280–307, here p. 281. For more of his works which are relevant to this book, see
bibliography.

from his lack of a systematic approach,[135] it still provides essential information on many different issues based on sources that are sometimes no longer available.

Unsurprisingly, after independence the interest of Western scholars turned to an investigation of the imperial past and the rather chaotic end of British rule.[136] Thus, the political history of the Aden protectorate, including Hadhramaut, became fairly well researched, albeit mainly on the basis of Western archives. One reason for this shift in interest may well have been the socialist revolution in Southern Yemen, which greatly hampered the access to local sources by Western scholars. Instead, closer scholarly cooperation with the Soviet Union led to a series of joint Russian-Yemeni research missions in Hadhramaut.[137]

After Yemeni unification in 1990, there was an upsurge in Western interest in the region. Contrary to suspicions that this was led by some kind of sinister plot to encourage Hadhrami secessionism from Yemen, I would argue that the renewed accessibility of the region for Western scholars sparked their curiosity. The historians among them were additionally intrigued by the opening of the Kathīrī state archive in Sayʾūn which had been discovered and painstakingly indexed by the aforementioned ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣabbān. One result of this is the study by Boxberger which provides a historical anthropology of Hadhramaut and which was written in parallel to this book.[138]

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[135] This is evident, for example, in Serjeant's "The Ḥaḍramī Network" in Denys Lombard & Jean Aubin (eds.), *Marchands et hommes d'affaires asiatiques dans l'Océan Indien et la Mer de Chine 13ᵉ–20ᵉ siècles*, Paris 1988, pp. 147–154.

[136] Brinston Brown Collins, "Hadramawt: Crisis and Intervention 1866–1881", PhD thesis, Princeton 1969; R. J. Gavin, *Aden under British Rule 1839–1967*, London 1975, Joseph Kostiner, *The Struggle for South Yemen*. Croom Helm (London, Canberra), New York 1984.

[137] Some information on these missions is contained in ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣabbān, *Natāʾij aʿmāl al-baʿtha li-ʿāmm 1984. Dalīl al-maʿraḍ*, Sayʾūn, n.d. and "Akādīmya al-ʿulūm li-l-abḥāth al-sūfiyītī: al-baʿtha al-yamaniyya al-sūfyitiyya al-ʿilmiyya al-mujamiʿiyya al-mushtaraka" (typescript, n.d.). Some of the work done by anthropologist Mikhail Rodionov and Arabist Alexander Knysh has started to appear in abridged form in English, M. Rodionov, "Poetry and Power in Ḥaḍramawt", *NAS* 3 (1996), pp. 118–133 and "The Labour Code of the Sultan ʿAlī b. al-Manṣūr al-Kathīrī, 1351/1932", *NAS* 4 (1997), pp. 196–204; A. Knysh, "The Cult of Saints and Religious Reformism in Hadhramaut", in U. Freitag & W. G. Clarence-Smith, *Hadhrami Traders*, Leiden 1997, pp. 199–216.

[138] Linda Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire. Hadhramawt, Emigration, and the Indian Ocean, 1880s–1930s*, New York 2002. I was only able to consult this work after having finished my own research and drafts.

At the same time, and possibly in the quite different context of a
renewed interest in questions of ethnicity and globalisation, scholars
of other regions of the Indian Ocean showed growing interest in the
Hadhrami diaspora in East Africa, India and South East Asia. A
workshop in London in 1995 brought these diverse trends together,
which had hitherto been integrated only into their different regional
fields of study and into different disciplines.[139] This was followed by
a more specialised seminar in 1997 on Arabs in South East Asia
and in December 2000,[140] by the final conference of the Indian
Ocean programme at Bergen University, which once again concen-
trated on the Hadhrami diaspora.

  As the above survey shows, there exists a sizeable and growing
body of literature on Hadhramaut and the diaspora. However, a
narrative covering the 19th and 20th centuries and systematically
analysing and conceptualising the role of the diaspora merchants in
the Hadhrami *nahḍa* (renaissance) is, as yet, lacking.[141] Hartwig has
investigated the relationship between India and Hadhramaut in the
19th century and offers interesting insights into the role of scholars
(*'ulamā'*), but his conclusions remain somewhat tentative and, because
of his regional focus, ignore the important impact of Hadhrami mer-
chants in South East Asia.[142] In addition, his investigation of the net-
works connecting the diaspora to Hadhramaut is less than systematic,
while the reconstruction of such networks plays an important part
in this study. Bang's excellent study of the Ibn Sumayṭ family has
shown in an exemplary way the networks which link members of
the Hadhrami Sufi order, the *Ṭarīqa 'Alawiyya*. It also discusses the
advent of Islamic modernism in East Africa.[143]

  Lekon's investigation of the British-Hadhrami relationship from
1863 to 1967 contains important observations on local history, with-

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[139] The results are published in Freitag & Clarence-Smith, *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen*, Leiden 1997.

[140] Huub de Jonge & Nico Kaptein, *Transcending borders. Arabs, politics, trade and Islam in Southeast Asia*, Leiden 2002.

[141] Fuhrmann's dissertation is a good summary of the literature until the 1940s, but lacks in orginal research and offers no convincing explanatory arguments.

[142] Friedhelm Hartwig, *Hadramaut und das indische Fürstentum von Hyderabad. Hadramitische Sultanatsgründungen und Migration im 19. Jahrhundert*, Würzburg 2000.

[143] Anne K. Bang, Sufis and Scholars of the Sea, PhD thesis, Bergen 2000. Another study into networks is Engseng Ho, "Genealogical Figures in an Arabian Indian Ocean Diaspora", PhD thesis, University of Chicago 2000. The thesis was only available in Chicago and was barred from microfilm distribution until the final version of the manuscript had been prepared.

out, however, systematically investigating the internal dynamics of Hadhrami society.[144] Leif Manger's *People with History*, which is currently being written, will constitute an important supplement to this present study.[145] Of central importance for an understanding of the background of the Hadhrami intellectual movements in the Netherlands East Indies are the two studies by Mandal and Mobini-Kesheh,[146] which by virtue of their focus do not provide an analysis of the implications of these movements for the homeland. In an important article, Kostiner has shown some of the intellectual connections between Arab-Islamic reform in South East Asia and in Hadhramaut, but this needs to be extended beyond the religious sphere.[147]

What sources, besides the Arab and Western works discussed above and the memoirs published by participants in the events, can the present historian use for her work? In terms of archives, I have used the already mentioned Kathīrī state archive in Say'ūn, which holds the official correspondence of the Kathīrī sultans for the period under discussion, as well as numerous documents with information about local traditions, organisations, etc. Much of the correspondence of the local rulers and of important individuals with British officials, as well as the documents outlining the British decision-making process are preserved in the records of the India and Colonial Offices in London. This material offers many insights, but it needs to be treated with special care since much of it stems from a few individuals on the spot who occasionally held strong views. This is true for both the reports from Hadhramaut as well as those from Batavia dealing with the Arab community there. While a more detailed analysis of the socio-economic background of the merchants might have been

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[144] Christian Lekon, "The British and Hadhramaut (Yemen) 1863–1967: A Contribution to Robinson's Multicausal Theory of Imperialism", PhD thesis, London School of Economics 2000.

[145] I had a chance to see some draft chapters and discuss the general ideas with Leif Manger at the workshop organised by him on "The Indian Ocean Programme. Hadrami Diaspora: Migration of People, Commodities and Ideas" in Bergen, Dec. 4–5, 2000.

[146] For the Netherlands East Indies, see the dissertations by Sumit K. Mandal, "Finding their Place: A History of Arabs in Java Under Dutch Rule, 1800–1924", PhD thesis Columbia 1994 and Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900–1942*, Ithaca 1999.

[147] Joseph Kostiner, "The Impact of the ḥaḍramī Emigrants in the East Indies on Islamic Modernism and Social Change in the Ḥaḍramawt during the 20th Century", in Raphael Israeli & Anthony H. Jones, *Islam in Asia*. Vol. III: *Southeast and East Asia*, Boulder, Co. and Jerusalem 1984, pp. 206–237.

possible with the help of documents from the Algemeen Rijksarchief
in The Hague as well as from work in the Arsip Nasional Republik
Indonesia in Jakarta, and while such an analysis remains a desidera-
tum, it was left out of this work as too time-consuming for what it
might have contributed to the questions under investigation. Instead,
the lively Arab press in the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore
has been scrutinised for its reflection of and comments on the reform
debate. Similarly, the far less voluminous and less well preserved
Hadhrami press in Hadhramaut has been used, as far as I have
been able to access it.[148] A range of scattered documents in public
and private collections, as well as the memoirs of some contempo-
raries and interviews with both Arab and Western contemporaries
complement the picture.

  Overall, the available sources, both archival and literary, tend to
deal predominantly with elite history. We know more about *sayyid*
activities in Hadhramaut and abroad, probably because this group
has a long history of scholarship and preserving family histories in
the *manāqib* literature as well as conducting correspondence. While
their actual status in society has been interpreted differently by
different groups in society,[149] there is little doubt that through their
literary production, they have managed to dominate the written his-
torical discourse.[150] Thus, we learn little or nothing about the peas-
ants, fishermen and ordinary Beduins of Hadhramaut, and what we
know stems normally from the 1930s onwards.[151] While one can

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  [148] For a survey of the Hadhrami press in the Indies see Mobini-Kesheh, "The
Arab Periodicals of the Netherlands East Indies, 1914–1942", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-,
Land- en Volkenkunde* 152 (1996), pp. 236–256, for a survey of the press in Hadhramaut,
cf. Freitag, "Periodicals in a Valley behind the Mountains: the Development of the
Press in Hadhramaut 1900–1967". In: Anja Pistor-Hatam: *The Origins of the Press in
the Middle East*, Frankfurt etc. 2001, pp. 139–155.
  [149] Camelin, "Reflections".
  [150] Here, Foucault's warning that not all levels and forms of discourse are equally
accessible is of particular relevance to historians. M. Foucault, "The Discourse on
Language", in his *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, New York etc. 1972, pp. 215–237,
here pp. 224–227.
  [151] An exception are the unclassified documents in Seyun dealing with land-tenure
and contracts, which I have sampled. A study of these might have given detailed
insights into economic conditions. Since many of these documents are in a bad
condition and/or very difficult to read, and because access to them is by no means
secured (selected examples were shown to me only towards the end of my second
stay in Seyun after weeks of pleading, with the comment that they were of no rel-
evance to me and that another scholar had already seen some of them), a study
of these documents would have required a disproportionate amount of time and

speculate about the impact which the socio-economic changes had on their lives, it is only at a few junctures that they appear in the sources at all, for example when Beduins opposed the introduction of road transport because it endangered their livelihood. In addition to these limitations by the sources, the very topic of trade and reform favours the consideration of urban groups over rural ones, which tends to reinforce this social bias.

Any scholar dealing with a comparatively long period in time and with developments spanning different regions cannot take all available materials into account. For example, journals by the Hadhrami community which were published in Malay and Indonesian were not consulted. Similarly, longer research trips might have helped to gain access to more private papers, but then again they might not. To a foreign female scholar travelling without a male escort, certain doors might never have opened,[152] but then again surprising materials were volunteered by complete strangers knocking on the doors of my hotels at odd times. As a rule of thumb, I have tried to find new material until I felt that new documents, journals, interviews, etc. did not add significant new aspects to the work but merely corroborated what I had found elsewhere. Obviously, both the direction of my enquiry and the nature of my source material have guided the following presentation and analysis in a particular direction. Other scholars will find different angles, not least because for Hadhramis, the reading and re-reading of their history is very much part of their present. I only hope to contribute one small history to *the* history of Hadhramaut.

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might, in the end, not have contributed significantly to the central questions of this work.

[152] Regarding the suspicions which confront foreign scholars in Hadhramaut (in spite of research permits etc.), see AK, "He is a spy!", *al-Mahjar* 4;2 (1999), p. 7.

THE SETTING: HADHRAMAUT AND THE DIASPORA IN THE 19TH CENTURY

Hadhramaut and its Population

Historically, "Hadhramaut" has been used in at least three distinct ways: to denote the whole territory between Aden and Muscat, the Arabian Sea and the northern deserts (*Ḥaḍramawt al-kubrā*); to characterise only Wadi Hadhramaut between al-'Aqqād and Qabr Hūd excluding the coast (*Ḥaḍramawt al-ṣughrā*); and finally for the region between the northern deserts and the Arabian Sea, 'Ayn Bā Ma'bad in the West and Sayḥūt in the East (*Ḥaḍramawt al-wusṭā*).[1] Only in the course of the political struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries did the territorial and political boundaries slowly converge, not without ongoing controversy both locally and on an international level. Both Arab and foreign historical sources from this period regularly distinguish Hadhramaut from Muscat and Dhofar, as well as from Aden and 'Yemen', which in these sources denotes Highland Yemen and the Tihāma. Arabic sources sometimes differentiate further, singling out Ma'rib and Bayḥān, for example, as neighbouring political entities with which close relations were entertained. Sometimes Hadhramaut was regarded as part of larger Yemen; sometimes it was not. Since this book deals with people and the two dynasties of the Āl 'Abdallāh al-Kathīrī and the Āl al-Qu'ayṭī rather than with the history of any particular territory, "Hadhramaut" will be used rather loosely to denote the territories which, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, came under the rule of these two dynasties. The major focus will be on the towns of Wadi Hadhramaut and its coast, where many of the merchants resided and where the rivalling sultans had their seats.

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[1] For this and the following al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 14–23, al-Kāf, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 11–22, Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām* 8.7.1992 and 15.7.1992; and for a recent summary of the literature on geography and society see Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 29–49.

Reliable information on the population of the region is scarce. The travellers of the 19th century tried to record data and estimate the population of those towns and villages which they visited. Van den Berg, who collected information on Hadhramaut among emigrants to the Netherlands East Indies in the 1880s; attempted a more systematic estimate. On the basis of what he was told, he calculated that the maximum population of Hadhramaut was 150,000, which, he warns us, was likely to be too high a figure.[2] A political officer of the Aden government who visited the Wadi in 1920, still quoted the same figure as Hadhramaut's maxiuum population.[3] This seems more realistic than earlier estimates published in the Ottoman provincial journal of Yemen, Ṣanʿāʾ, which arrived at over 1.5 million inhabitants.[4] Ingrams, whose 1934 estimate is based on the most extensive travel in Hadhramaut to date as well as an analysis of earlier publications, gives a figure of approximately 260,000 inhabitants. Of these, he informs us, an estimated 20 to 30 percent lived abroad at any one time,[5] which means that the actual population would have amounted to approximately 200,000 people. With the exception of some Banyan merchants, Somali immigrants and slaves, the majority would have been called 'Hadhrami' by outsiders, while this term was less than obvious from the inside.

A Hadhrami in the wider sense was, for the purpose of this study and by way of simplification, everybody originating from the region of *Ḥaḍramawt al-wusṭā* unless indicated otherwise. This is not the way many local people would have regarded this matter in an area where genealogical consciousness ran high and was coupled with a locally varying but at least theoretically rather rigid system of stratification.[6] Even if there were distinct variations from place to place, an ideal-typical model would have included the ruling sultans, *sayyid*s and

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[2] Van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, p. 42.

[3] IO, R/20/A/1415, part I, Report by Captain Nasir-ud-din Ahmad, Political Officer Aden, on his visit to the Hadramaut [12.3.1920], p. 10.

[4] The figure of 1.55 million is given in *Ṣanʿāʾ* 16, 6. Jumādā al-awwal 1298/6.4.1881, a detailed list of the main towns (including some which are unidentifiable) with the number of houses and inhabitants arrives at 1,481,300 inhabitants (excluding the coastal towns and small settlements). *Ṣanʿāʾ* 61, 29. Muḥarram 1299/20.12.1881.

[5] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 10–12, 141.

[6] For this and the following see Hartley, The Political Organization; Serjeant, *The Sayyids*; Bujra, *The Politics*, Camelin, "Reflections" and "Shiḥr, une grandissime cité . . .", pp. 192–239; Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 17–37. Abaza, *Hadramaut*, provides a useful survey of the literature.

Map 1. The Arabian Peninsula

mashāyikh as the political, scholarly and religious elite among which the *sayyid*s claimed priority due to their descent from the Prophet. Then came the *qabāʾil*, tribesmen, most of whom were settled with the exception of the Beduin, followed by the rural and urban unarmed population (*masākīn*), who themselves can be subdivided into town dwellers (*haḍar* or *qarar*). These can be further distinguished by occupation (i.e., *tujjār*—merchants and *ḥirafiyyīn*—artisans) and substrata (i.e., *ṣubyān*—'servants'), by landownership (*ḥirthān*) and the lack thereof (*ḍaʿīf*, pl. *ḍaʿfā* or *ḍuʿafāʾ*) among peasants and agricultural labourers (Hadrami sources use the terms *fallāḥūn, muzāriʿūn* and *ʿummāl*). Finally slaves and their descendants (*ʿabīd*) were grouped separately.[7] Women formed part of the varying strata but in many contexts constituted a separate group because of the relatively strict gender segregation, notably in urban contexts.[8] While they did not, for the most part, openly participate in the documented public life which forms the basis of the historians' work, their presence can be felt in a variety of ways.

Thus, they were crucial to the maintenance of social boundaries which was achieved by way of dress codes, through specific customs and even customary law (*ʿurf*) pertaining to the various groups.[9] Mainly, however, these boundaries were perpetuated through marriage rules, according to which women from one stratum were preferably married to members of the same stratum. While women could marry men of higher strata, men could only marry within or below their own stratum.[10]

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[7] This system has been often described and discussed, see Introduction, fn. 136 and Serjeant, "Social Stratification in Arabia". I therefore limit myself here to the absolute minimum. As far as the sedentary population and their subdivisions are concerned, which somewhat vary in the literature, I am following Bā Maṭraf, *al-Muʿallim ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq*, p. 225, for different terms used for agriculturalists, see al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*. Their terminology might well have been influenced by the politicization of the 1960s and subsequent socialist rule.

[8] For a description of women's spaces in present-day Hadhramaut, see Camelin, "Shiḥr, une grandissime cité . . .", pp. 126–131, for their (present) rejection to be drawn even into local politics, pp. 363f.

[9] Al-Ṣabbān, *al-ʿĀdāt*, vol. I, pp. 32–50, 140.

[10] This separation was based on the principle of *kafāʾa* or commensurability in marriage, which is particularly strictly interpreted by the Shāfiʿī legal school. However, once again, this separation is the ideal. While a conflict about such marriages erupted in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies in the early 20th century, it can probably be assumed that these were not the first cases in which the principle was violated.

Each of the social strata fulfilled certain functions. Thus, it was considered to be the prerogative of the *qabāʾil* to bear arms and serve as protectors (and occasionally aggressors) of the other social groups. Hadhrami tribes place great emphasis on their control over particular tracts of the country.[11] Thus most Hadhrami territory is considered to belong to particular tribes. Both *sayyid*s and *mashāyikh* claimed and were accorded religious authority. This was derived from the political function of their leaders (*manṣab*)[12] as mediators in tribal disputes. They often lived in sacred enclaves (*ḥawṭa*, pl. *ḥawaṭ*) which were considered inviolable by the neighbouring tribespeople and sultans, exempt from taxes and other sultanic intrusions, and therefore provided neutral ground on which feuding tribesmen could meet. A *ḥawṭa* usually centered around the grave of the enclave's founder who was considered to be imbued with special *baraka* (blessing) and whose grave thus became the centre of annual pilgrimages (*ziyāra*). These served simultaneously as trade fairs.[13] However, the widespread assumption that the *sayyid*s collectively renounced the bearing of arms after being introduced to Sufism ought to be considered more a moral standard than the historical reality.[14]

Individuals, notably of the three higher strata of *sayyid*s, *mashāyikh* and *qabāʾil* would have typically identified themselves as such and by their familial and tribal affiliation, i.e. their membership in a group (often also termed *qabīla*) which was based on patrilineal descent.[15] This was often traced back into pre-history so that individuals from the *mashāyikh* and *qabāʾil* might have referred to the legendary South Arabian Qaḥṭān as their forefather, while the *sayyid*s claimed descent from ʿAdnān and thus the Arabised Northern Arabs.[16]

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[11] On this issue, and the question of tribalism in general, see ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAqīl, "al-Lawḥa al-ʿamma".

[12] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 158 vocalizes the term as "*manṣib*".

[13] Serjeant, "Ḥaram and Ḥautah"; ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAqīl, "Ḥawṭa".

[14] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 77, about the original and symbolic "breaking of the sword" by al-Faqīh al-Muqaddam. H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 40, states as a general rule "Seiyids do not carry arms", although he admits some exceptions. Evidence to the contrary can be found in the *sayyid* leadership during the defence of Hadhramaut against the Wahhābī incursions discussed in the next chapter.

[15] *Qabīla* in the sense of a patrilineal descent group (as opposed to *qabīlī*/*qabāʾil*) is used in Hadhrami literature not only for the stratum of the *qabāʾil*, but also for *sayyid*s and *mashāyikh*, see, for example, al-Shāṭirī, *al-Muʿjam al-laṭīf*.

[16] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 28–29; cf. G. Rentz, "Djazīrat al-ʿArab" in *EI*², vol. I, pp. 533–556, here p. 544.

Closer to recorded history, the *sayyid*s trace their origin back to Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā al-Muhājir (873–956)[17] who migrated with some of his relatives and retinue from Baṣra via the Ḥijāz and Yemen to Hadhramaut about 318 H./930–31 A.D. After the outbreak of the ʿAlawī-Irshādī conflict in the Netherlands East Indies early in the 20th century, this distinction between descendants of Qaḥṭān and ʿAdnān gave rise to polemics about who was a proper Hadhrami and thus could lay a legitimate claim to leadership, both religious and political.

Ironically, one of the pioneers of this debate, the historian, teacher and journalist Ṣalāḥ al-Bakrī, who characterised the *sayyid*s as intruders who had corrupted the pure Hadhrami society,[18] was himself of Yāfiʿī origin. The Yāfiʿīs, themselves one of the old tribes in South Arabia and therefore of Qaḥṭānī descent, at least in their self-view, originated from an area situated between Aden and Hadhramaut. They seem to have come to Hadhramaut in larger numbers in the early 16th century when the famous restorer of the Kathīrī sultanate, Badr b. ʿAbdallāh Abū Ṭuwayriq (902/1496–7 – 977/1569–70) recruited them as soldiers.[19] Although later many apparently returned to Yāfiʿ, others spread to various towns in Hadhramaut and eventually brought them under their rule.[20]

A number of different factors including internal migration and economic activities have traditionally helped to vary and mitigate the effects of stratification and lineage. Traditionally regarded as the highest stratum, sayyids were often among the economic elite as well.

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[17] M. Ḍ. Shahāb & ʿAbdallāh b. Nūḥ, *al-Imām al-Muhājir*. The line of the Āl Bā ʿAlawī goes back to ʿAlawī, a grandson of Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā al-Muhājir, who is said to have been the first *sayyid* in Hadhramaut. For a genealogy, see Jamal al-Layl, *al-Shajara al-zakiyya*, plate 30. About the background of the *sayyid*s's claim to a special status, cf. Peskes, "Der Heilige", about *sayyid* historiography Alexander Knysh, "The Sāda in History".

[18] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 150f. While both groups are nowadays undisputedly regarded as 'Hadhrami', the distinction between "the original inhabitants of the Hadhramaut Valley" and "others" who "had immigrated from the north, as far as Baghdad [. . .] during the early Islamic period" is still being made, see A.K., "A Chinese Represents a Yemeni Organisation in Singapore!!", *al-Mahjar* 4; 2 (1999), p. 9.

[19] According to Yāfiʿī historians, their presence in Hadhramaut predates Islam, cf. Dayyān, *Waqāʾī*, p. 239.

[20] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. 1, pp. 125–132, 147–154, al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 404–409, al-Nākhibī, *Riḥla*, pp. 89f. al-Nākhibī is somewhat chaotic as far as dates are concerned, see p. 89.

They owned sizeable estates and controlled the religious endowments (*waqf*, pl. awqāf).[21] In addition, their religious status facilitated successful migration, as descent from the Prophet and learning both increased the likelihood of a positive reception overseas and thus considerably eased the risk of such a step. However, not all *sayyid*s were members of the economic elite in Hadhramaut. For example, one biographical work reports the case of a *sayyid* who had to borrow money and whose daughters earned their living by spinning cotton.[22] The politician and historian Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh tells us that his grandfather, a *sayyid*, was a carpenter, i.e., an artisan.[23] His father migrated in the early 20th century to Djibouti at the age of fifteen, working for the merchant house of Bā Zarʿa, a *ḥaḍar*, which again constituted an economic dependency quite contrary to the commonly imagined hierarchies.[24]

On the other end of the social spectrum, slaves not only played a major part in the military forces of the sultans until the reorganisation of the military from the late 1930s onwards, but they also acted independently on occasion and could exercise great power.[25] In the tradition of the Mamluk system, they could rise to high office. One such example is Faraj Saʿīd who became governor of a number of Quʿayṭī provinces.[26] Settled tribesmen in urban areas, who pursued professions such as trade, might have shown, for all intents and purposes, more similarities with other urban dwellers (*ḥaḍar*) than with their brethren from the same tribe who were Beduins (*badū*). A townsman without lineage could become a scholar and thereby earn significant respect for himself and his family. Nevertheless, a commercial broker (*dallāl*) in Shibām whose profession was not terribly highly regarded by society could occasionally act as tribal mediator.[27] Furthermore, *ḥaḍar* residents of the major Hadhrami towns, with the exception of Shibām, were part of a quarter organisation. It arranged many of the internal affairs of the quarter and represented its residents both at the political and the symbolic levels.

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[21] Bujra, *The Politics*, pp. 54–92. It needs to be pointed out, however, that social and economic structures vary greatly between the different towns and settlements of Hadhramaut, Camelin, "Reflections".

[22] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 35f. Cf. my "Dying of enforced Spinsterhood", p. 14.

[23] Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 3.2.1993.

[24] Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 28.10.1992.

[25] For an example, see al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. 2, p. 54.

[26] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 118, Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 37.

[27] Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 83f.

Members of the non-*ḥaḍar* population seem to have been part of this organisation only in a very limited sense, for example, when they needed certain ritual services. In other cases *sayyid*s acted as mediators in conflicts both within and between quarters.[28]

In addition, Camelin has pointed us to the very real differences between Hadhrami towns. While the *sayyid*s played a particularly significant role in the Kathīrī strongholds of Tarīm and Say'ūn in both religious and economic terms, their role on the coast was far less dominant.[29] Particularly in the ports of al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā, members of other strata formed a "popular financial leadership" (*al-wājiha al-māliyya al-sha'biyya*) which entertained close economic and political relations with the sultans.[30] In Shibām, a centre of trade, townspeople (*qarār*) and brokers (*dallāl*) played a central role, and it might be possible that the *sayyid*-origin of some of them had become obscured.[31] Thus, a complex mixture of lineage, profession, learning and wealth in conjunction with the actual locality and the composition of its inhabitants made up the status of a person, which, depending on context, could be considered in a number of different ways. It will be argued that migration and the wealth acquired abroad helped to reinforce the importance of an individual's economic position, although more research into earlier centuries would be required in order to evaluate whether, as I would surmise, this process really accelerated in the 19th and early 20th centuries with the increase in emigration which will be discussed below.

The question of "Hadhrami-ness" is further complicated by what to the outsider seemed to be an extreme parochialism of the region's inhabitants. Ingrams reports that, when he visited Java in 1939, a member of the Kathīrī family approached him.

> He asked me if he might see me privately after the meeting and then asked me to arrange independence for Jahiz. Jahiz was his village in the Wadi 'Amd and consists of five houses.[32]

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[28] On the historical quarters Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 72–74, 77, 105, on those of al-Shiḥr Camelin, "Shihr, une grandissime cité . . .", pp. 135–188, 386–405, 411–446.

[29] Camelin, "Reflections".

[30] Al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 302; for a discussion of the role of the merchants of al-Mukallā, see al-Nākhibī, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 72f. For a penetrating anthropological account of al-Shiḥr, see Camelin, "Shihr, une grandissime cité".

[31] Al-Damluji, *The Valley*, pp. 70–72; for a historical description of Shibām and discussion of its trade, Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 78–85.

[32] H. Ingrams, "Political Development", p. 243. Serjeant, "Recent marriage

This state of affairs persisted long after the Kathīrī and Quʿayṭī sul-
tanates had begun to extend their control beyond the major towns
and therefore served as foci of loyalty, although ideas of a wider
notion of "Hadhramaut" can also be found in the sources.[33] While
nationalists in the 1950s and 60s fought for a united Hadhramaut
or even Yemen, others strongly resisted such moves. Even in the
united Yemen of the late 1990s, one can still perceive dim reflections
of such struggles for local and regional identity. While the majority
of Hadhramis rejected the 1996 proposition to divide the province
with the current capital al-Mukallā into two, one could hear from
some inhabitants of the Wadi that this might not be such a bad
idea after all. Underlying this view was not just the practical con-
sideration of having certain government services closer to hand, but
also some nostalgia for the Kathīrī sultanate.[34]

Hadhramis in the World: An Indian Ocean Diaspora

Monsoon-based trade in the Indian Ocean can be traced back to
the third millenium B.C. even if there is little precise information
about its scope. Similarly, the connections between the Mediterranean
world, South Arabia and India date back to pre-Islamic times.[35] Ports
on the coast of Hadhramaut and Dhofar formed part of this wider
trade network which expanded with the rise of Islam and the estab-
lishment of Muslim merchant communities around the Indian Ocean.
Much of this trade followed the coasts rather than risk crossing the
open ocean. Hadhrami ports, "perfectly integrated into the general
movement of commercial navigation",[36] offered supplies of fresh water
and provisions as well as items for local and regional trade such as
hides and later tobacco. They also competed with Dhofar for the

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legislation", p. 491 reports that inhabitants of different quarters in Ghayl Bā Wazīr
did not intermarry.

[33] Cf. chapter VI.

[34] Interviews in Hadhramaut, 1997 and London, 1999.

[35] For a discussion of early Asian trade, see van Leur, *Indonesian Trade*, pp. 1–144,
for a discussion of Indian Ocean trade from the rise of Islam to 1750 Chaudhuri,
Trade. Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 36f., lists travel conditions between South Arabia
and India. Ancient as well as early Islamic contacts between South Arabia and the
Malabar coast are discussed by Forbes, "Southern Arabia".

[36] Camelin, "Shihr, une grandissime cité . . .", p. 43, with regard to al-Shiḥr.

export of valuable frankincense. People travelled with these goods or were—in the case of slaves—treated as such. While the focus here is on the (dominant) outward migration, it is worthwhile to note that Hadhramaut also hosted immigrants. Thus, al-Shiḥr, the main port in the 19th century, had at least one Somali and Indian quarter each.[37]

It is highly likely that ever since that trade existed, Hadhramis joined ships heading for East Africa and the Red Sea, as well as for India, but Serjeant has warned us that there is scant documentary evidence as to the actual occurrence and extent of migration.[38] India maintained regular trading links with the Malay archipelago, and although Snouck Hurgronje suggests that it was only the European expansion in South East Asia from the 16th century onwards which opened the doors for Arab entrepreneurs, Arabs seem to have participated in South East Asian trade before.[39] Hadhrami *sayyid*s like to claim that they were instrumental in introducing Islam to South East Asia, a view which is, however, highly contested.[40] However, there exists consensus that from the 17th century onwards, Hadhrami *sayyid*s started to emigrate in rapidly increasing numbers to India and the Netherlands East Indies.[41] The latter destination shows a drastic increase in the number of Arabs between 1860 and 1952 with a peak in immigration in the late 19th and very early 20th centuries.[42] As for East Africa, it would seem that emigration grew considerably from the late 15th century.[43] Again, there are indica-

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[37] Camelin, "Shihr, une grandissime cité . . .", p. 48.

[38] Serjeant, "The Ḥaḍramī Network", p. 147. For a survey of the literature on Hadhrami emigration, see Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 39–63.

[39] Snouck-Hurgronje, "L'Arabie", pp. 109–110.

[40] For an interesting account from the sayyid perspective, see al-Jifrī, "al-ʿArab fī Indūnisyā", I; pp. 549f. Syed F. Alatas, "Hadhramaut and the Hadhrami Diaspora", emphasizes the Hadhrami (*sayyid*s) influence in the Islamisation of South East Asia, while van Bruinessen in "Najmuddin al-Kubra" takes a historiographical approach which investigates the changing nature of myths surrounding one of the nine saints (*wali songo*) who are said to have Islamised Java.

[41] Serjeant, "The Ḥaḍramī Network", p. 149, al-Shāṭirī, *Sīrat al-salaf*, pp. 29–32, who insists that contacts with Ḥijāz, Syria, Yemen and Iraq were maintaind after Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā al-Muhājir arrived in Hadhramaut, pp. 14f., Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 99–107. For an interesting family history illustrating this point, see Cannon, "Sharifian Intermediaries".

[42] Patji, "The Arabs", pp. 41f. I would like to thank Michael Laffan for supplying me with a copy of this thesis.

[43] B. G. Martin, "Migrations", p. 3.

tions that during the course of the late 18th and 19th centuries, emigration greatly increased.[44] Ibn Ḥamīd's chronicle provides ample illustration of 'push factors' for emigration in this period, namely internal strife as well as strains on the sensitive ecological system which was susceptible to drought and locusts.[45] However, the 'pull factor' of increased economic opportunities, which resulted from the increasing integration of the world economies and included the European expansion among others, should probably not be underestimated in the investigation of a commercial diaspora.[46] In contrast to Highland Yemen, it was not the poorest but rather those with skills ranging from religion or commerce to military expertise who left in search of greener pastures abroad.[47]

Migration was greatly facilitated by the introduction of steamships in the Indian Ocean, particularly after the establishment of a regular service to India in 1834 and even more so after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.[48] It seems that the reduced travel time and, perhaps more importantly, the greater regularity of steamships which were independent from the seasonal monsoon winds attracted the migrants.[49] Since steamship competition after 1869 contributed to a significant drop in freight rates, it is conceivable that travel also became cheaper.[50] If the debate about late 19th century transatlantic globalisation emphasises steamshipping (as opposed to lower tariffs) as a central factor for closer integration in terms of commodity

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[44] For India, see Rao & Manger, *Winners*, pp. 15f., for South East Asia van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, pp. 104f.

[45] See Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 270, for a compilation of droughts, locusts and epidemics in the Wadi between 1844 and 1885 on the basis of Ibn Ḥamīd.

[46] I consciously avoid the term "world system", which has been sometimes used in this context. For a thorough discussion of the various ways in which the Islamic expansion has been framed, see Reichmuth, "'Netzwerk' und 'Weltsystem'". Clarence-Smith, "Hadhramaut", p. 2, sees more a direct link with the European colonial expansion after 1750, cf. Ewald & Clarence-Smith, "The Economic Role" and Clarence-Smith, "Hadrami Entrepreneurs".

[47] Camelin, "Shihr, une grandissime cité . . .", p. 51.

[48] While Wrede, *Reisen*, only describes few people with contacts overseas, Hirsch, the Bents and van der Meulen and von Wissmann encountered ever increasing numbers of Hadhramis who had lived abroad. Cf. Stark, *The Southern Gates*, p. 121, where she describes how migration had increased in Wadi Dawʿan. Interestingly, al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 123, gives 1250/1834 as the date when the Hadhrami golden age began, although without any justification.

[49] This at least was the experience in the Mediterranean, while steamer fares seem to have been initially higher. Issawi, *An Economic History*, pp. 46–48. I would like to thank Guido Steinberg for this reference.

[50] Fletcher, "The Suez Canal", p. 568.

exchange and migrants, then it seems reasonable to make a similar assumption for the Indian Ocean.[51] By early 1872, the fares and re-duced journey times proved attractive to Hadhrami pilgrims to Mecca, who previously had taken sailing boats or embarked on the perilous long journey through the desert.[52] In the same period, the develop-ment of steam navigation greatly encouraged increased Arab immi-gration to South East Asia.[53] Migrants who formerly might have headed to Egypt and the Red Sea now seem to have pondered the long journey eastwards[54] which no longer took months on end nor entailed great risks. Finally, migrants supported relatives hoping to emigrate, thereby helping with the high costs of travel and encour-aging the snowballing of emigration in the late 19th century.[55] One Hadhrami author from Indonesia commented sourly as late as 1961 that, while early migrants had been exemplary anti-Imperialist Muslims, the later wave of immigrants was "like a plague which carries with it the germs of disintegration and downfall", comments which caused a heated reaction from Hadhramis both in Indonesia and Hadhra-maut.[56] By 1919, a steamer from Aden called once a month at al-Mukallā, by then the second port on the South Arabian coast, and if sufficient cargo was available, the Bombay-Aden lines stopped there as well.[57] Nevertheless, this change from sail to steam was a slow process. For example, trade with India continued to be dominated by dhows well into the 1940s and 50s.[58]

In the ports, Hadhramis were usually accomodated by fellow coun-trymen, either relatives or business partners.[59] Those who could not rely on relatives for lodging, initial help, and possibly employment were assisted by others who had put up guest houses and acted

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[51] For the transatlantic discussion, see O'Rourke & Williamson, *Globalization*, p. 33.

[52] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 321 for 1288, while he reports for 1282 how Hadhramis tried to establish the inland route to the Ḥijāz, pp. 190f.

[53] Van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, p. 105.

[54] Cf. Leidlmair, *Ḥaḍramaut*, pp. 24f.

[55] See the comment in *Ḥaḍramawt* 226, 2.1.1930, p. 1, that initially only few migrants could afford the fares to Java, but that emigration increased as these migrants helped their relatives.

[56] Al-Jifrī, "al-'Arab", I; 557. For furious reactions, see *al-Ṭalī'a* 124, 9.11.1961; 128, 7.12.1961; 129, 14.12.1961; 131–132, 4.1.1962.

[57] Little, *The Geography*, p. 13.

[58] Personal communication, Sultan Ghālib al-Qu'ayṭī, London, 25.2.2000.

[59] A *waṣiyya* by Shaykh b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kāf to two younger relatives trav-elling to Singapore, written on September 1, 1907, explains in detail to whom they should turn for lodging, credit etc. Document in the possession of 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Say'ūn.

effectively as recruitment agents. Only in the rare cases where no links existed at all, mosques provided the first shelter.[60] It is therefore not at all surprising that one could find concentrations of migrants from particular areas and families in specific overseas locations. Thus, people from the Wadi between Shibām and Tarīm went to South East Asia, while inhabitants of Wadi Dawʿan tended to head towards Aden, the Red Sea ports and Cairo. India was preferred by people inhabiting the Hadhrami coast, as well as by members of the Yāfiʿī tribe, and coastal dwellers could also be found in considerable numbers in East Africa.[61] Mobility seems to have increased rather dramatically in the period from the late 19th century onwards, both inside the Wadi as a result of the developments which are the topic of this book, and outside as a result of growing emigration and improved communications. As a result, regional migratory trends became somewhat blurred.[62]

Unfortunately, even for the 19th and 20th centuries, all information about the size of the diaspora communities remains tentative. Apart from the lack of regional data, the question of who actually formed part of the diaspora makes the task of ascertaining the sizes of various diaspora communities impossible. The figure of some 90,000 to 100,000 Hadhramis living abroad in the early 1930s, given by Ingrams, can therefore at best serve as an extremely rough guide, and probably excludes large numbers of *muwalladīn* who might have retained some links with the homeland.[63] These *muwalladīn* made up a large proportion of the diaspora communities, as Hadhramis tended to travel without their wives. This changed significantly only in the second half of the 20th century when the main destination became Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and both car and air travel started to allow for more private and comfortable journeys.[64] As the migrants' absences usually lasted for significant periods, they mostly married into their host societies, which hastened their integration, but meant

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[60] For East Africa, see Romero, *Lamu*, p. 98, for India, Rao & Manger, *Winners*, pp. 24f., for the Netherlands East Indies, van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, p. 124, for Singapore Freitag, "Arab Merchants".

[61] Van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, p. 124; H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 143f.; Redkin, "Migration".

[62] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 143.

[63] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 141.

[64] Contrary to the widely held opinion that women never travelled, propounded, for example, by Serjeant, "Sex", p. 198 and van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, p. 97, there are scattered reports about very small numbers of women emigrating, see Rao & Manger, *Winners*, p. 18; Villiers, *Sons*, p. 58.

that their offspring often identified themselves as Swahili, Indian or Malay rather than as Hadhrami. Fathers tried to overcome this problem by sending at least their sons to Hadhramaut for socialisation and religious training, and strongly encouraged marriage with the children of other *muwalladīn* or immigrants. For example, a survey conducted in Surabaya in the early 1980s suggested that Arabs still had a strong preference for intermarriage.[65] There might well exist regional differences in marital strategies, as data for East Africa suggest a larger degree of exogamy.[66] As discussed in the introduction, these points raise the obvious question of who considered and identified themselves (primarily) as Hadhrami, when and if statistical surveys were conducted.

In spite of such obstacles, and in order to obtain at least some sense of the influence of the diaspora on the homeland, it might be useful to summarise the available data for the 1930s.[67]

In East Africa, where by the 1930s approximately 13,000 Hadhramis were counted, Hadhrami communities could be found in the major trading ports from the Horn of Africa in the north to as far south as Mozambique.[68] Particularly large and influential communities resided in the area from Lamu to Dar es Salaam. The Comoro Islands, which in the 18th century had been the major centre of slave trade in the Western Indian Ocean, also hosted a large community, many members of which made their way to the more prosperous towns of Zanzibar and Lamu in the course of the 19th century. It was the son of a newly immigrated Comorian Hadhrami tailor, Sayyid Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī Jamal al-Layl, who became a famous religious teacher and built a Mosque College (*al-Riyāḍa*) around 1902 which became a noted centre of learning on the East African coast.[69] Besides religious teaching, Hadhramis could be found in all professions. Probably because the passage was cheaper than that to India or even the Malay archipelago, many Hadhramis of lower status and wealth

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[65] Patji, "The Arabs", p. 140, table 13, cf. pp. 140–143, 145–149.

[66] Le Guennec-Coppens, "Qui épouse-t-on".

[67] For a more comprehensive survey and discussion of individual diasporas, see the contributions in Freitag & Clarence-Smith, *Hadhrami Traders*.

[68] On Hadhramis in East Africa, see B. G. Martin, "Migrations" and "Notes"; Le Guennec-Coppens, "Changing Patterns"; H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 151–161, on Ethiopia, see Ahmed, "Archival Sources".

[69] Romero, *Lamu*, pp. 94–108; el-Zein, *The Sacred Meadows*, pp. 115–152; Bin Sumeit al-Khitamy, "The Role".

Table 1. *Distribution and size of the Hadhrami diaspora in the 1930s*

South East Asia		East Africa[70]	
Netherlands Indies (1930)	71,335[71]	Kenya[72]	920
Singapore (1947)[73]	2,591	Mombasa	5,000
Straits Settlements[74]	2,000	Lamu	1,500
Total	75,926	Tanganyika Territory[75]	2,500
India		Zanzibar + Pemba	2,797
Hyderabad[76]	13,000	Total	12,717
Malabar coast and other regions	no data available	*Saudi Arabia*	12,717
Total	in excess of 20,000?	*Egypt and Sudan*	1,200

arrived who performed menial tasks in the harbours. Others acquired great wealth through trade, particularly in slaves, or as craftsmen. When emigration to India and Indonesia became difficult after World War II, East Africa continued to offer opportunities to enterprising and hard-working Hadhramis. Thus, an illiterate carpenter from al-Qaṭn, Mubārak Maḥfūẓ b. Duhrī, left Hadhramaut in 1945 after a devastating famine. His resolve to migrate might have been further strengthened by the fact that the *ḥaḍar* had married a wife from the

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[70] The figures are for 1921, except for Zanzibar and Pemba, where they are for 1931.

[71] According to calculations, some 60,000 of these were *muwalladīn*, Patji "The Arabs", p. 42.

[72] This figure excludes the 1,347 who gave Arabia as their birthplace.

[73] This figure is given by Sia, "The Arabs", p. 21. H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 150, gives the number of 580, which seems grossly out of line with the demographic development discussed by Sia. Were we to follow Ingrams (pp. 149f.), numbers would have fallen between 1884, for which he gives a total of 836, and 1934, while the interwar period saw the peak of Arab prosperity and therefore would have, if anything, attracted additional immigration.

[74] This number is purely speculative and based on an assumed increase of a population which numbered 801 persons in 1884, on a rate somewhat below that of Singapore.

[75] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, gives a figure of 2–3,000, p. 152.

[76] Fuhrmann, "Die Ausbreitung", p. 185, suggests that Ingrams' figure of 5–6,000 only refers to men.

al-ʿAmūdī family, who are *mashāyikh*, and that this had met with local disapproval. After visiting a number of East African towns, Ibn Duhrī eventually settled in Mombasa and managed to set up his own shop. In time, he became the sole contractor for government school furniture in Kenya, a greatly expanding sector at that time. As one of the wealthiest members of the Mombasa community, he later became president of the Arab welfare organisation and the Hadhrami League.[77]

A similar situation has been described for the Ḥijāz, where some Hadhramis could be found as porters in Jiddah and Mecca, while compatriots ranked amongst the foremost merchants and rose to high religious office.[78] An example of a particularly successful family are the al-Saqqāf who maintained close links with Hadhramaut and Singapore and managed to obtain a major share in the business of transporting pilgrims.[79] Hadhramis in Jeddah, estimated to number around 2,000 in the 1850s, were, as their compatriots in other Red Sea and East African ports, involved in the lucrative slave trade. They strongly resisted European and Ottoman moves to abolish it in the mid-19th century, and a Hadhrami, Shaykh Saʿīd b. Ḥusayn al-ʿAmūdī, was accused of leading a revolt in Jiddah against British influence in 1858 and subsequently executed.[80] In the 1880s, Hadhramis were called to arms by the Sharīf of Mecca against the Beduins, which raises the question as to whether there might have been a contingent of Hadhrami mercenaries in the Ḥijāz, as there were in India and parts of East Africa.[81]

A number of Hadhrami families had moved north to Cairo where they had settled as merchants, primarily selling coffee and South Arabian produce such as tobacco and frankincense.[82] Obviously, Cairo also attracted students, both directly from Hadhramaut as well

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[77] Obituary for Mubārak Maḥfūẓ b. Duhrī in *Nidāʾ al-waṭan* I; 3, 31.3.1977, pp. 6f. I would like to thank his son, Muḥammad b. Duhrī, for providing me with the article and additional information on his family.

[78] Any such comparison of the different communities is, of course, rather impressionistic, given the lack of comparative 'hard' data. However, the typical images of immigrants to various areas do vary considerably.

[79] See my "Arab Merchants"; Ochsenwald, *Religion*, p. 102.

[80] Ewald & Clarence-Smith, "The economic role", pp. 283–291, cf. Daḥlān, *Khulāṣat al-kalām*, pp. 322f.

[81] Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, vol. I, p. 175.

[82] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 161f. While Ingrams suggests that most members of

as from among the diaspora, although to a lesser extent than Mecca and Medina. From the biographies read in the context of this study, it would seem that Cairo's attractiveness grew from the end of the 19th century in conjunction with the reform of Islamic learning as well as the foundation of new educational establishments which offered Western-style education. The publication of internationally distributed Islamic journals probably contributed to the growing attraction of Cairo as an intellectual centre.[83]

Hadhramis also migrated eastwards. Therefore, we find small communities in most of the ports on the Arabian Peninsula such as Muscat, Baḥrayn[84] and Basra, the latter being the major port for dates exported to Hadhramaut. The Kathīrīs entertained tribal links with Dhofar, a major trading centre for frankincense and the export of horses to India. A number of important *sayyid*s also settled there over the centuries. In the 19th century, Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl al-Saqqāf (d. 1217/1802–3) and Sayyid Faḍl b. ʿAlawī b. Sahl ruled for some time over the territory.[85] The real growth of the Hadhrami communities in the Gulf came in the 1950s and 60s, when the development of the oil economy in conjunction with growing difficulties elsewhere increased Hadhrami migration from many areas to the Gulf.[86]

The Malabar coast of India, where many of the valuable Indian spices were produced, had long-standing relations with Hadhramaut, and accommodated generations of immigrants.[87] Many were pros-

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the community "settled there over half a century ago" (p. 160), al-Jabartī mentions quite a number of Hadhrami scholars in Egypt, as well as soldiers. See, for example, Thomas Philipp & Moshe Perlmann, *ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī's History of Egypt*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1994, vol. I, p. 431 for the soldiers, for the scholars see the various entries under al-ʿAlawī, al-ʿAydarūs(ī), al-Ḥaḍramī, al-Saqqāf and al-Tarīmī in Thomas Philipp & Guido Schwald, *ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī's History of Egypt, A Guide*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1994.

[83] In order to substantiate this observation, a quantitative analysis would be needed, including an attempt to obtain data from al-Azhar about its students. The study of the Egyptian community is one of the desiderata of future studies, cf. Freitag, "Conclusion", p. 327.

[84] For the biography of a member of the Jamal al-Layl family in Baḥrayn, who had migrated there via the Yemen, see al-Bassām, *Rijāl*, pp. 19–26.

[85] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 27 for the Kathīrī links, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 73; al-Qāsimī, *al-Shaykh al-abyaḍ* and Saunders, "A short Memoir", pp. 174f. on Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl, for Sayyid Faḍl, see below.

[86] On this trend, see Redkin, "Migration", pp. 3–5, Freitag, "Conclusion", pp. 319–323, Rao & Manger, *Winners*, pp. 68–71.

[87] Dale, "The Hadhrami diaspora" and Lakshmi, From Yemen. For an overview

perous maritime merchants who had intermarried with the local population to form the so-called Mappila (or Moplah) community. Although little detail is known about their economic interests, it seems that at least some ventured from the spice trade into spice production.[88] Political unrest in India and the expansion of the East India Company in the 18th and 19th centuries created a growing market for a specific type of immigrant, the mercenary. He was seen as a potentially loyal soldier by a number of Maratha rulers, but initially also by representatives of the East India Company. This opportunity was eagerly seized by Hadhramis and Yāfiʿīs, but also by Beluchis, Sikhs and other groups who flocked to the regular and irregular armies of India.[89] As British troops advanced in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, they dismantled the various Indian armies. Many of the former soldiers now gathered in Hyderabad, whose ruler had signed a treaty of subsidiary alliance with the British. He thus retained more room to manoeuvre than those of his contempories who were militarily defeated by the British. By the time of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, possibly as much as one third of all lands in Hyderabad was controlled by Arabs.[90] In spite of growing British prejudice against Arab soldiers who were perceived as a danger to British expansion and interest, and in spite of attempts to limit Arab immigration in the second half of the 19th century, Hyderabad remained an attractive destination for immigrants. They spoke of the prosperous city as the "golden bird".[91]

The armed forces of the Nizam, the ruler of Hyderabad, were mostly decentralised troops maintained on the Nizam's behalf by notables and commanders. Military commanders were engaged to collect taxes and private debts, which opened the avenue into moneylending to individuals and, increasingly, to the state. Often, the land

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of Hadhramis in Hyderabad and elsewhere, see also Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 303–309. The following is based on Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 119–162; Khalidi, "The Hadhrami Role", pp. 67–79; Rao & Manger, *Winners* and Ansari, "The Relations".

[88] For example, the Ibn Sahl family is said to have owned pepper plantations on the Malabar coast. Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 41–43.

[89] For Arabs in Gujarat, see *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency* IX; 2, Bombay 1899, pp. 15–17.

[90] Personal communication, Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿaytī, Jeddah, 24.3.2000, for a critical discussion of Arab property Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 204–226. For a lively description of how Arabs came to control lands, see Fraser, *Memoir*, pp. 238f.

[91] Rao & Manger, *Winners*, p. 20. For the British restrictions, see Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 130–161, 227–244, 326–334.

of borrowers was transferred to the moneylenders if debts were not
redeemed. Thus, a number of Arabs rose to join the richest fami-
lies of Hyderabad, among them ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿayṭī, Ghālib
b. Muḥsin al-Kathīrī and ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī al-ʿAwlaqī, all of whom
later became involved in a struggle to control Hadhramaut. Although
these military leaders and their descendants were the most impor-
tant emigrants to India with regard to immediate developments in
Hadhramaut, it is noteworthy that thousands like them migrated to
Hyderabad and found employment, mostly in the armed forces or
as private guards and watchmen, but also in administrative and reli-
gious positions.[92]

It seems that India served as a vantage point for the first Hadhramis
migrating to South East Asia.[93] Ports on both sides of the Straits of
Malacca, notably Aceh on Sumatra and Malacca, became impor-
tant bases from which Hadhramis travelled both inland and to other
important ports. Before the advent of colonialism, they had already
established themselves in leading positions in a number of Malay
states, occasionally even attaining the position of sultan.[94] Economically,
the community in Singapore became the most successful on the
Malay Peninsula in the late 19th century.[95] Established in 1819 as
a free port by Stamford Raffles, the town quickly began to attract
merchants from many different ethnic communities, among them
Hadhrami Arabs from all over the Indo-Malayan world. By 1886,
Singapore hosted more rich Hadhramis than any of the Javanese
towns from where they had originated.[96] Their business acumen,
together with soaring prices for real estate in which Hadhramis had
invested heavily, meant that by the 1920s, a number of Arab families
ranked among the richest in Singapore, while the community as a

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[92] In 1881, some 3797 individuals or 3.1% of Hyderabad's population were native
speakers of Arabic. Schwerin, *Indirekte Herrschaft*, p. 39, table 2.

[93] Where not indicated otherwise, the following is based on van den Berg, *Le
Hadhramout*, pp. 104–122: Othman, "Hadhramis"; Clarence-Smith, "Hadhrami
Entrepreneurs" and Bajunied, "The Arabs".

[94] Bajunied, "The Arabs", mentions that the sultanates of Siak and Pontianak in
Indonesia and of Sulu and Maguindanao in the Philippines were founded by Arabs.
The dynasties of Brunei, Terrengganu and Perlis, among others, claim Arab descent,
cf. Othman, "Hadhramis", p. 88 and *al-Mahjar* 3;2 (Dec. 1998), "New Sultan
Terengganu descendant of Sir Omar Aljunied", p. 5.

[95] For the following, see my "Arab Merchants" and Clarence-Smith, "Hadhrami
Entrepreneurs".

[96] Van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, p. 146.

Map 2. The Indian Ocean

whole was fairly well off.[97] Through its position, the Singapore com-
munity became a central port of call for travellers between Hadhramaut
and India on the one hand and Malaya and the Netherlands East
Indies on the other. In light of its economic importance and cos-
mopolitan population, it is not surprising that Singapore became a
major centre of Islamic learning and publication in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. Arabs were key participants in this devel-
opment.[98] Their wealth, as well as their intimate knowledge of devel-
opments among Hadhramis in the region and beyond may well
explain why Singaporean Hadhramis played a crucial role in many
of the developments which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Finally, the Netherlands East Indies need to be discussed both
because of the large size of the community (government estimates
of 1930 mention 71,335 persons[99]) as well as for the importance
these migrants had for the homeland, both economically through
their remittances and intellectually. The majority of Hadhramis had
settled in Java in the string of ports on the northern coast. Although
hindered in their development by discriminatory colonial laws lim-
iting their areas of settlement and movement until the early 20th
century, by 1850 they owned over half of all boats with European
rigging registered on the island. As these were the major sea-going
boats in the period, the Arab share in shipping was therefore con-
siderable.[100] They were heavily involved in inter-island trading, which
explains while Gresik, and later nearby Surabaya in Eastern Java,
were more important than Batavia, the colonial capital.[101] By con-
trast, commerce with India and Hadhramaut was fairly neglible.[102]
Many immigrants seem to have started their careers as itinerant ped-
dlers, playing the role of intermediaries between European whole-
sale merchants and the local population. Once they had secured
their subsistence, many moved into money-lending, the textile indus-

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[97] Bafana, "The Singapore Arabs", p. 12.
[98] Roff, "The Malayo-Muslim World".
[99] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 146.
[100] Broeze, "The Merchant Fleet", pp. 253f., 257; for the discriminatory nature
of Dutch colonial legislation de Jonge, "Dutch Colonial Policy".
[101] By 1885, Batavia numbered slightly more Arabs than Surabaya (1448 and
1145 respectively), followed closely by Sumenep with 1037, van den Berg, *Le
Hadhramout*, pp. 105f. The Arab role in the islands is—with reference to the Malukus—
discussed by Clarence-Smith, "The Economic Role".
[102] Van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, pp. 134f. For the following, see also ibid., pp.
134–158; Clarence-Smith, "Hadhrami Entrepreneurs" and "Horse trading".

try and other fields. This was often facilitated by local marriages for
which Arab husbands, with their aura of religious pedigree, were
often favoured. With the first saved capital, the immigrant aspired
to invest in real estate which was rented out for profit. In the early
20th century, the Hadhrami community in the Netherlands East
Indies began a remarkable cultural development, in the course of
which a number of organisations, a multitude of schools and a wide
variety of periodicals were founded. While these developments and
the ways in which they contributed to changes in the homeland will
be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters, they are
worth mentioning in the context of a general discussion of the dias-
pora because they show the special intellectual impact of the com-
munity in South East Asia on Hadhramaut.

The geographical distribution of Hadhramis in itself does not auto-
matically make the Hadhrami diaspora an international one. For the
international dimension to be more than a historical contingency, it
needs to be realised in the form of contacts. Hadhrami trading links
existed with the Arabian, Indian, East African and Red Sea coasts,
but in the wider trade of the Indian Ocean, it was of minor signi-
ficance.[103] In addition, it would seem that a major part of that trade
was in Indian, rather than in Hadhrami hands, except for the slave
trade which was conducted with the East African coast.[104] Van den
Berg confirms this picture by telling us that in spite of the intense
involvement of Hadhramis in trade, they hardly ever engaged in
importing products from the Levant or the Gulf to South East Asia,
which was done either by Armenians or Bengalis.[105]

However, contacts of an international nature were maintained
through family and religious links and activated through travel and
letters. By the early 20th century, Hadhrami periodicals contributed
to an awareness of diaspora communites elsewhere.[106] These con-
tacts linked Hadhramis who were otherwise dispersed and were a

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[103] For a survey of the situation in the 1930s, see H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp.
71–78.
[104] Bent, *Southern Arabia*, p. 75 and Hirsch, *Reisen*, pp. 24, 84, 86–88. Both describe
the situation in 1893–94. Archival sources for the 1880s confirm this picture, see
IO, R/20/A/528, Letter by 7 Indian merchants to Assistent Resident, Aden,
2.12.1880.
[105] Van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, p. 145.
[106] *Al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 5–6 (May 1929), pp. 105–7, which was printed in Surabaya, pub-
lished a letter by a Hadhrami merchant in Marka, Somalia.

way through which they maintained contacts with merchants and
scholars of other (mostly Muslim) communities. While all of these
issues will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, a few
remarks are necessary here to illustrate the point. As only a few
merchants and scholars had the means and opportunity to visit more
than one region, the most important journeys were the ones between
Hadhramaut and one particular destination, either for visits or when
a migrant returned for good. Such journeys, particularly if they were
between far-away destinations, could involve a number of stops. Thus,
a typical traveller from Surabaya in eastern Java to Hadhramaut
might have stopped in Batavia and Singapore. Bombay would have
been the next obvious destination before reaching either Hadhramaut
directly or arriving there via Aden. During these stops, which might
have lasted up to a few months, particularly before the onset of
steamshipping, the traveller would have stayed with relatives. He
would have encountered other members of the Hadhrami commu-
nity. These meetings provided the opportunity to exchange news,
collect letters, conduct perhaps some trade or make use of the oppor-
tunity to study with some famous scholars. If the person was impor-
tant enough, elaborate ceremonies to receive him would have helped
to introduce the traveller to his compatriots and important local
figures.[107] Ports such as Singapore, Bombay, Aden and Jiddah, in
addition to the Hadhrami ports, therefore served as hubs of infor-
mation or—if we employ network terminology—as 'nodal-points'.[108]
Obviously, the East African diaspora had closer contacts with com-
munities in the Red Sea, while South East Asians were more in con-
tact with Indian Hadhramis. While we know of some individuals
such as Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ (1861−1925) from East Africa who dur-
ing their lifetime visited most centres of the diaspora and maintained
personal links with family members elsewhere, this remained an
exception. One group which seems to have entertained particularly
intensive international contacts was the scholars, as will be seen later.
What is important to note in summary is that it was partly the very
same media which have been ascribed as furthering territorial nation-

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[107] Al-Ṣabbān, al-ʿĀdāt, vol. 1, 121−126. Although al-Ṣabbān describes the cus-
toms as performed in Hadhramaut, guests arriving in diaspora communities and
carrying news were also received in style, which was even occasionally reported in
journals, cf. Ḥaḍramawt 315, 14.1.1932, pp. 2, 360, 20.10.1932, p. 1.

[108] McPherson, "Port Cities", Reichmuth, "'Netzwerk' und 'Weltsystem'", p. 287.

alism such as the press and improved communications, which also
sustained a transnational community in its self-awareness and cohe-
sion. While it is true that the Arab (and indeed Chinese) commu-
nities did not promote imperial expansion, they nevertheless "successfully
established coherent, wealthy, self-consciously creole communities"
abroad.[109]

An Outline of Political Developments in the 19th Century

Joining a distinguished pedigree of Arab historians who were usu-
ally close to the Kathīrī dynasty, 19th and 20th century Hadhrami
writers have tended to write Hadhrami history according to cycles
of dynastic rule. They therefore focus on *dawla* (dynasty, 'state') at
the expense of other, mostly tribal forms of political control which
were often characterised as "chaotic" (*fawḍawī*).[110] In particular the
18th and early 19th centuries emerge from much of the historiog-
raphy as such periods of chaos. Even the Yāfiʿī author al-Bakrī gives
only a very brief account of this period, much of which focusses on
Yāfiʿī (dynastic) rule in the coastal towns of al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā.[111]
Such dynastically oriented historiography reflects the values and
affiliations of the urban historians, as Hartwig has shown. Ibn Ḥamīd
was a close associate of one of the leading reformist *sayyid*s of the
19th century, while Ibn Hāshim, al-Shāṭirī and al-Bakrī were all part
of the 20th century Hadhrami reform movement. Nevertheless, al-
Bakrī, the only historian who stresses his tribal (Yāfiʿī) allegiance

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[109] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 191. Anderson is among those emphasising
the importance of the print media in the formation of national consciousness.

[110] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 337. Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, p. 112 talks about the politi-
cal chaos (*al-fawḍa al-siyāsiyya*). Ibn Ḥamīd's *Tārīkh* centers on the Kathīrī dynasty
whose representatives are invariably called *dawla*. Similarly, later works show the
dynastic orientation, which is already reflected in Ibn Hāshim's title, *Tārīkh al-dawla
al-kathīrīyya*. Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt* and al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār* structure much of their
presentation according to ruling dynasties. Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl al-ḥukm* is, as the title
suggests, interested in political and military control which is seen as invested in the
competing dynasties, while ʿAkkāsha, *Qiyām al-salṭana al-quʿayṭiyya* is focussing on a
sultanate. This view of the tribes is almost a topos of urban based Arab historiog-
raphy and can be found in much earlier sources, such as Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī
'l-tārīkh* (ed. J. Tornberg 1864, repr. Dār Ṣādir, Beirut 1965–67), vol. 10, pp. 179,
183f., 217. I would like to thank Konrad Hirschler for this reference.

[111] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, deals with the critical period of 1130–1259
(1717–1893) on twelve pages (vol. I, pp. 145–161), of which pp. 147–154 deal with
"the Yāfiʿ *dawla* in its first period", i.e. Yāfiʿī rule over the coast.

both in his name and writings, was quite distant from the Hadhrami
tribal values due to his upbringing in Java, his training at Cairo
University and his subsequent political activities in the milieu of the
Indies (cf. chapter VI). Therefore, all contemporary historians were
in one way or another engaged in state-building activities. Moreover,
their writings reflect urban values, so that the tribal point of view
is clearly underrepresented in our sources. Later historians such as
Bā Maṭraf never even considered any political models other than
that of (relatively recently acquired) statehood.

   Hartwig has further raised the question whether such a *dawla*-
oriented discourse obscures the fact that much of Hadhrami history
was marked by rather localised political entities which had their own
mechanisms of conflict limitation and solution. He suggests that it
was only in the early 19th century that these mechanisms broke
down, and that this development, together with new ideas about
statehood, informed the historians' negative perspective on 'tribal
chaos'.[112] Both their own accounts and Hartwig's analysis of their
works show that, in spite of the focus on the competing *dawla*s in
the second half of the 19th century, this period was marked by high
levels of armed conflict. This contradicts the historians' suggestion
that dynastic rule meant an automatic reduction of chaos.

   It might be useful at this juncture to return briefly to the terms
qabīla (tribe) and *dawla* ('state') which are presented in much of the
historiography as irreconcilable contrasts. Both anthropologists and
historians have recently argued that these terms present two com-
peting ideal types of social organisation, which explains why the
differences between them rather than the many transitional forms
and symbiotic relationships are emphasised in much of the litera-
ture.[113] To some extent, these models are based on the different
ethics associated with 'tribalism' and urban life. "Tribe", as Tapper
has suggested, "is rather a state of mind, a construction of reality,
a model for organisation and action. To describe any named group
as a tribe is to mention only one facet of its nature and to deny
that facet to other groups in the same system, at larger and smaller

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[112] Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 83–88, for a brief summary of the argument see his
"Expansion", pp. 37f.

[113] For the problem of definition and use of the term 'tribe' see Tapper, "Anthro-
pologists", pp. 48–73, here in particular p. 68: "I have argued elsewhere that tribe
and state are best thought of as two opposed modes of thought or models of orga-
nization that form a single system."

levels."[114] Of course, this "state of mind" had very real repercussions: while "tribe" and "state" were not necessarily exclusive categories, rural tribesmen and urban notables repeatedly clashed over conflicting interests, not least pertaining to land rights, and invoked their respective ideologies to justify their respective positions.[115]

In Hadhramaut, *qabāʾil* were described by the urban elite as a group not submitting to the laws of the state nor paying taxes. Armed fighting amongst them was considered to be an expression of *qubūla*, of tribal values marked by bravery and honour.[116] In contrast, the ideology of the learned elite, foremost amongst them the *sayyid*s and *mashāyikh*, emphasised their commitment to the religion and ways of the pious forefathers. Despite a quietist tendency among certain Hadhrami Sufis, the aim to translate their ideals into political reality led many in the 19th century to assume religious and political leadership by mediating between tribes and by emphasising the *sharīʿa* as the ideal way to organise communal life.[117] Obviously, it is significant in this context that this elite was normally unarmed, so that the chivalry of the *qabāʾil* appeared threatening rather than appealing. In contrast, the concept of a *dawla* which took religious law as its basis, and therefore almost by necessity afforded this elite a leading role in upholding the law, appeared quite attractive. Essentially, *ʿurf* competed with the *sharīʿa* as it governed social relations, comprised a system of civil and penal law and contained provisions for political rule.[118]

While the competing ethics and legal systems are therefore couched in terms of the contrast between *sharīʿa* and *ʿurf*, the contrast was not, strictly speaking, one between scholars and tribesmen, as many tribesmen were actually living in towns. Bujra has noted the opposition between *ḥaḍar*, sedentary urban dwellers who considered themselves as sophisticated and civilised, and *badū*, the Beduin depicted as "primitive, half-naked armed tribesmen roaming the plateaux and

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[114] Tapper, "Anthropologists", p. 56.

[115] On the tribal self-view, see ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAqīl, "al-Lawḥa al-ʿāmma", p. 14. In terms of perception (but not necessarily interest), such mutual views could be perpetuated even within an entirely urban environment, see Camelin, "Shihr, une grandissime cité . . .", pp. 292–318.

[116] Al-Ṣabbān, *ʿĀdāt wa-taqālīd*, vol. I, p. 40 and Bā Maṭraf, *al-Muʿallim*, pp. 120f.; 204.

[117] Bā Maṭraf, *al-Muʿallim*, pp. 195f., Serjeant, *The Sayyids*, pp. 19f.

[118] ʿAlī & Millāḥī, "Tārīkh", p. 213.

the valleys."[119] While this might capture the self-view of urban *qabāʾil*, not all rural *qabāʾil* would have been content to be considered as Beduins. Nevertheless, it is certainly useful to consider the different views pertaining to law, order and political rule as closely linked to the rural and urban milieus, as Bujra has suggested. The central government which he considers as an important aspect of towns, (marked additionally by the presence of different, stratified communities, a high degree of division of labour and their role as religious and educational centres) was normally perceived as 'state government', *dawla*.[120] Unsurprisingly, Hadhrami historiography describes the areas surrounding the towns almost invariably as tribal. This is quite independent of the fact that these tribal areas might or might not be in alliance with the *dawla*. It also reflects that the *dawla* could effectively only extract taxes and other levies from the unarmed town-dwellers. I will return to this issue in chapter III.

It is on the basis of these contrasting ethics and expectations that we have to read the Hadhrami historians and to interpret the theme of continuity and its absence. This is particularly true for the history of the Kathīrī *dawla*. With regard to Highland Yemen, Dresch has argued that the idea of a Zaydī state could "outlast its actual manifestations, the program rolling on intact through times when the output is thin or almost nonexistent".[121] It seems possible to argue in rough analogy that the Kathīrī *dawla*, as presented in the Hadhrami historiography of the 19th century, appears far more important in the Hadhrami historians' texts, in particular of Ibn Ḥamīd's chronicle, than an outside reading of them would suggest.[122] In addition, much of this historiography almost obscures the fact that the foundation of the Kathīrī *dawla* was tribal and that it only thrived in alliance with other tribal entities. The sultans came from one particular clan which traced its origins to the famous 16th century ruler Badr b. ʿAbdallāh Abū Ṭuwayriq (r. 1518–1568). Even Abū Ṭuwayriq's exercise of effective control depended on the willingness of other

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[119] Bujra, *The Politics*, p. 5.
[120] Bujra, *The Politics*, p. 6. Cf. Tapper, "Anthropologists", p. 66.
[121] Dresch, "Imams and Tribes", p. 264.
[122] In the context, the criticism of Ibn Hāshim's *Tārīkh al-dawla al-kathīrīyya* by al-Shāṭirī deserves mention. Al-Shāṭirī points out that some of the Kathīrī sultans identified by Ibn Hāshim never actually exercised any power (*Adwār*, p. 236). Such a mistake might well be the result not of a lack of scholarship but of a desire to keep "the program (of orderly Kathīrī rule) rolling".

clans to cooperate. Furthermore, as we will see, *ʿurf* and rule by force seem to have been at least as characteristic of this *dawla* as the application of the *sharīʿa*. Similarly, the Quʿaytī dynasty emerged as the strongest of a number of rival Yāfiʿī *dawla*s and consequently was also based to an important degree on the tribal solidarity (*ʿaṣabiyya*) of former and contemporary Yāfiʿī mercenaries. These also maintained links to their homeland in Upper Yāfiʿ. Therefore, instead of conceiving of *dawla* and *qabāʾil* as oppositional forms of historical organisation, they might more usefully be seen as different ways of presenting political rule, the exercise of which might actually not have differed all that much.

Such a differentiation was most likely employed actively not only by the historians, but also by the aspiring rulers themselves. Al-Shāṭirī points to the fact that the rule of most Hadhrami sultans—and here he refers to both the Kathīrīs and their predecessors and rivals, the Āl Yamānī (r. c. 620/1223–920/1514)—betrayed contradictory characteristics.

> Most of them did not hesitate to shed the blood of innocent people, or abstain from tyranny, feudalism and the imposition of fines and taxes without equality or justice. All the while, they pretended to sanctify the noble Muḥammadan *sharīʿa* and to be committed to respect the men of piety, righteousness and learning. They had a good dogma and held a high opinion particularly of the distinguished Alawis. In spite of this, they did not pay attention to their advice, recommendations and instructions unless these coincided with their own desires, or if they feared the fury of public opinion against them, or if the military or tribal conditions forced them [. . .].[123]

Arguably, what al-Shāṭirī describes here is the attempt by the sultans to gain legitimacy beyond that which a tribal Shaykh could command. This was done by purporting to follow the ideals of Islam while at the same time acting according to the codes of *qubūla*. Because these sultans employed a different legitimising strategy from tribal Shaykhs, and because their rule did at times extend further than tribal rule, their sultanates seem to fit what has been called 'chiefdom' or 'chieftaincy' or, in local terminology, *imāra*. These were political entities which were more heterogeneous and potentially larger than tribes, but less institutionalised and stable than premodern

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[123] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 251.

states.[124] The existence of a relatively high level of violence in this process was nothing exclusive to Hadhrami tribal society: Tilly has stressed the central role of force in the making of European states. According to him, typical elements of these states were not only external war-making, but also the forcible elimination of internal rivals, the protection of the state's clients and extraction of surplus. Tilly compares such states with racketeers, although the exact strategies employed by them differed considerably, depending on a number of factors.[125]

The political developments in Hadhramaut during the 19th century have been discussed in a number of works and therefore need to be summarised here only in so far as is necessary for an understanding of the subsequent discussion of the role of the merchant elites.[126] As mentioned before, the period between the death of the last Kathīrī sultan about 1130/1717–18 and the 1840s[127] has been considered by Hadhrami historians such as Ibn Hāshim as one of "tribal chaos" and "factional rule" respectively in Wadi Hadhramaut. During these years, the towns of Shibām, Say'ūn and Tarīm were controlled by factions of former Yāfi'ī mercenaries and descendants of their former Kathīrī overlords who were involved in prolonged fights for supremacy.[128] The following example from Ibn Ḥamīd's chronicle shows the situation in and around the trading centre Shibām for the year 1247/1831–32. It is representative of many similar events during this period and shows at the same time certain characteristic features of the politics of the day. Among these are short-lived alliances between sultans and tribes, attempts by sultans and tribesmen alike to extract surplus from traders who effectively had to pay

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[124] Khoury & Kostiner, "Introduction", p. 15; Tapper, 'Anthropologists', p. 50.

[125] Tilly, "War Making".

[126] The best survey in English is given by Gavin, *Aden*, 156–173, see also Hartwig, "Expansion", the most detailed account on the basis of the Arabic histories and British material is Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 89–98 and 255–294. In Arabic, the period is covered by Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 112–189; al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 337–417; al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. I, pp. 147–193 and vol. II, pp. 1–36; Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl* and 'Akāsha, *Qiyām*. Bā Faqīh, "Shay'" usually relies on these earlier historians in his discussion and is therefore only quoted when introducing new material.

[127] The above mentioned historians choose different junctures. Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, marks the period 1130/1717–18 to 1270/1853–54 as the "tribal period" (p. 336), al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, sets 1260/1844, when the Āl 'Abdallāh purchased al-Ghuraf, as the beginning of the 4th period of the Kathīrī state and is followed in this by Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 255.

[128] A useful tabulatory survey is provided by Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 65.

Map 3. Hadhramaut

protection money, and the relative safety of the sacred enclaves (the "places of the *sayyids*", as they are called in the text):

> In 1247 [. . .], the governor of Shibām was Sultan ʿUmar b. Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī. In the said year, matters became very difficult for him. He brought in a number of Shanāfir tribal groups, as well as the Āl ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, descendants of the Āl ʿĀmir. His demands caused much harm to the merchants. The merchants appointed *qabāʾil* as guards to protect themselves and their houses. Finally, they became so troubled that they left the town and took refuge to the places of the *sayyid*s, such as al-Ḥazm, the abode of the Āl al-ʿAydarūs, and Khalʿ Rāshid of the Āl Aḥmad b. Zayn [al-Ḥibshī, d. 1731], where they stayed for a while. Then Sultan ʿUmar asked for dirhams [i.e. levies] from the subjects who were staying with the *ḥabāʾib* [another term for *sayyid*s] through ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Marʿī b. Ṭālib, but they did not give him anything at all.[129]

Another extreme case of factionalism and fighting was the Hadhrami centre of religious learning, Tarīm, which was famously subdivided between the 1830s and the conquest by the Āl ʿAbdallāh al-Kathīrī in 1847 by three warring factions of the Yāfiʿī Banū Labʿūs. During this period, even the mandatory communal Friday prayer had to be held in different mosques.[130] Again, reports about despotism abound. The biography of Aḥmad ʿAlī al-Junayd, a respected scholar of the time, informs us that he had invited his brother ʿUmar, an emigrant to Singapore, to return home after the death of his son in 1834. ʿUmar complied with the wish of his older brother and arrived with his sons and a cousin, only to be arrested in 1837. Shocked by the events, the relatives hastened back to Singapore after their release.[131] Emigration, not just abroad but also to the surrounding *ḥawṭa*s, was the means to which a number of other leading members of the community resorted in response to the situation, in a way very similar to what happened in Shibām. Therefore, Tarīm suffered a period of decline which seems to have lasted until the 1880s, when relative stability returned.[132]

The condition in the countryside was not much different: except

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[129] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, pp. 321f. About the episode cf. Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 75.
[130] Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 116–118, unfortunately, he does not give a starting date, nor does al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. I, p. 156. al-Nākhibī, *Riḥla*, p. 123, only glosses over these events.
[131] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 140f.
[132] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥadhramout*, pp. 42f.; Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 75f.

for the sacred enclaves, which were more or less ruled by their respective *manṣab* and protected by the tribes affiliated with him, the land was subdivided into territories which were controlled by different tribal clans. Travel from one area to another thus invariably required a *sayyāra*, official protection and accompaniment by a representative of the territory that was traversed.[133] Ibn Ḥamīd's history gives ample evidence that, in spite of such precautions, caravans repeatedly were raided and plundered.[134]

Meanwhile, the main coastal town of al-Shiḥr had come under the control of the Yāfiʿī clan of the Āl Burayk since the mid-18th century, after the seven sons of ʿUmar b. Burayk migrated there from al-Ḥurayḍa in Wadi ʿAmd.[135] Through a shrewd alliance with the neighbouring powerful Ḥamūmī tribe which controlled the main trade route to the interior, the eldest brother Nājī b. ʿUmar (d. 1193/1779) set the foundations of the nascent *imāra*.[136] His son ʿAlī (d. 1807) consolidated Buraykī rule by defeating remaining opponents in al-Shiḥr and by conquering Ghayl Bā Wazīr, the most important agricultural centre on the coast where tobacco was produced for export. In spite of numerous internal disputes, the Buraykī *imāra* persisted until 1283/1866, when al-Shiḥr was briefly conquered by the forces of the Kathīrī Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin. This was possibly made easier by the decline in the ruler's fortunes and the alienation of the town's merchants following the conclusion of an anti-slavery treaty with the British in 1863. Possibly because al-Shiḥr had depended less than its neighbour on the slave trade, the *amīr* had implemented the anti-slavery treaty quite rigourously.[137] In contrast, the *naqīb* of al-Mukallā had largely ignored a similar commitment.[138]

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[133] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 398f.; al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 12f.; Wrede, *Reisen*, pp. 55–58 and Hirsch, *Reisen*, p. 121.

[134] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 23, 179, 257. Cf. Saunders, "A short Memoir", p. 172.

[135] For the following, see S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, pp. 173–189; al-Nākhibī, *Yāfiʿ*, pp. 86–97, 107–116; Hunter, Sealey & Mosse, *An account*, pp. 125–144 and Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 66–71.

[136] Both S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, p. 181 and Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl*, p. 9 and passim, use this term to characterize the political rule of the Āl Burayk.

[137] IO, L/P&S/9/34, Acting Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 12.9.1855 (pp. 351–354), 8.11.1855 (pp. 408–438) and IO, L/P&S/9/37, Acting Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 17.10.1859 (pp. 267–271); IO, L/P&S/9/40, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 18.5.1863 (pp. 117–123). Apparently, it also served as market for slaves imported by Mahrīs, Saunders, "A short Memoir", p. 185.

[138] Lekon, "The British", p. 249.

Another Yāfiʿī *imāra* was established in the lesser port of al-Mukallā by members of the Āl Kasādī possibly as early as 1703.[139] The rulers, who came to be commonly known as *naqīb*, pursued a policy of encouraging trade, not least by attracting merchants with low taxation.[140] Al-Mukallā thus began to rival al-Shiḥr. When Commander Haines of the Indian Navy, who from 1829 was surveying the South Arabian coast and after 1839 became the first British Political Resident of Aden, visited al-Mukallā around 1836, he described the town as the "principal commercial depot of the s[outh] coast of Arabia" and with its 4,500 inhabitants, as almost as populous as al-Shiḥr with 6,000.[141] Possibly as a consequence of British attempts to limit the slave trade in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, al-Mukallā had developed into the major slave entrepôt on the South Arabian coast by the mid-19th century. From there, slaves were dispatched to the Yemen, the Ḥijāz and the Gulf. Ibn Hāshim describes it as a major centre for sailing ships to Aden, Baṣrā, the Ḥijāz and India, while travellers from al-Shiḥr had to rely on fishermen's boats for transfer to al-Mukallā.[142]

The mid-19th century saw the rise of three new contenders for control over Hadhramaut. All three had made their fortunes in the service of military forces serving the Nizam of Hyderabad.[143] Hartwig has suggested that the renewed interest of those emigrants in their homeland might well have something to do with the increasing pressure under which Arab military leaders were coming to Hyderabad through increased British intervention.[144]

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[139] On the origins of this *imāra*, see the competing versions in ʿAkāsha, *Qiyām*, pp. 36–38, cf. al-Nākhibī, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 75. The date given by ʿAkkāsha coincides with al-Nākhibī's statement that *naqīb* Sālim Aḥmad Mujaḥam al-Kasādi came to al-Mukallā at the instigation of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-Ḥaddād (1634/35–1719/20), al-Nākhibī, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 69.

[140] S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, pp. 173f. claims that this rise of al-Mukallā started in the 12th/18th century, while al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. I, pp. 153f. ascribes its ascent to Ṣalāḥ b. Muḥammad al-Kasādī (d. 1873). Al-Nākhibī, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 70, underlines the role of *naqīb* Muḥammad; cf. Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 69 and p. 70, fn. 93.

[141] Haines, "Memoir", pp. 149–150, 152. The visit seems to have taken place in or after 1836, as Haines lists the customs' revenues of al-Mukallā for that year.

[142] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 22f.

[143] On this topic, see Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 199–231; Ansari, "Relations", in particular pp. 133–224 and Khalidi, "The Hadhrami Role".

[144] Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 211–214.

'Umar b. 'Awaḍ al-Qu'ayṭī (c. 1780[145]–1282/1865–66), born near Shibām, migrated to India in 1207/1792–93.[146] He first joined Yāfi'ī relatives in Nagpur before moving to Hyderabad. There, he was given the rank of *jam'dār* (jemadar) and came to command a large contingent of Arab soldiers and cavalry.[147] Probably in reaction to events in and near Shibām, where a Kathīrī sultan had successfully overcome rivalling Yāfi'īs, 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ sent money to his relatives in order to purchase a suitable basis for the defense of Yāfi'ī interests. Some time between 1255/1839 and 1259/1843, his representatives bought land from the Āl al-'Aydarūs near al-Qaṭn and erected a fortress.[148] At the request of a delegation of Yāfi'īs, 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ accepted their leadership and sent his son Muḥammad together with his trusted *mawlā*,[149] Almās 'Umar al-Ḥabashī, to coordinate the Qu'ayṭī movements in Hadhramaut.

Under the leadership of 'Umar's son, the *jam'dār* 'Awaḍ (d. 1325/1909) who in 1902 was awarded the title 'sultan' by the Indian government, large numbers of warriors were recruited in Yāfi' from 1261/1845 onwards.[150] After a protracted fight for control over Shibām, the local Kathīrī sultan was submitted and the trading centre became controlled by the Qu'ayṭīs in 1274/1858. From their basis in the Western part of the Wadi, and with continuing support from Hyderabad, the Qu'ayṭīs now set out to combat the second military leader from Hyderabad who invested his fortunes in Hadhramaut.

Ghālib b. Muḥsin al-Kathīrī (1223/1808–1287/1870) of the Āl 'Abdallāh like his Qu'ayṭī opponent, was born in Wadi Hadhramaut,

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[145] According to S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, p. 214, 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ was born in the last decade of the 12th ḥijrī century, i.e. some time between 1776 and 1784. For a biographical survey, see ibid., pp. 214–225, cf. 'Akāsha, *Qiyām*, 58–60 and al-Nākhibī, *Riḥla*, pp. 124–127.

[146] Annex A provides a chronological list of the Qu'ayṭī and Kathīrī rulers.

[147] According to Ansari, "Relations", p. 170, he commanded 2400 Arabs, to which S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, p. 215, adds 1000 horsemen.

[148] S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, p. 217 and—probably in his footsteps—'Akāsha, *Qiyām*, p. 59 give the earlier date. According to Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 330 the events which sparked the intervention took place in 1259 and 1261.

[149] The term, which is used by S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, here seems to refer to the fact that, although a slave, Almās was a trusted military leader in his own right. Interestingly, a Ghālib b. Almās is listed by Ansari, "Relations", p. 170, as commander over 900 Arabs.

[150] The following is discussed in some detail by S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, pp. 226–243 and 'Akāsha, *Qiyām*, 60–65.

where he obtained religious and military training.[151] In 1246/1830–31 he joined relatives in Hyderabad, where, once again like ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ, he quickly rose to the military rank of *jamʿdār*. Around 1260/1844, he began to explore the possibilities of renewing the Kathīrī sultanate through his relatives. The first practical step taken was the purchase of the village al-Ghuraf in 1260/1844, which became the basis of his political and military expansion. After negotiations with religious and tribal leaders in Eastern Wadi Hadhramaut, the Kathīrī forces, which consisted of tribesmen as well as significant numbers of slave soldiers, first took Tarīm in 1263/1847 and Sayʿūn in 1264/1848. The following years were marked by the growing confrontation with the Quʿayṭīs, but also by infighting.

A new boost for the Kathīrī expansionist drive came when Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin was forced to relinquish his properties in India and leave Hyderabad after his troops there had clashed with those of ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ.[152] He returned to Hadhramaut in 1272/1856 and took command of the Kathīrī forces which had started to disintegrate in his absence. After consolidating his position in the Wadi, he turned to the coast and in 1283/1866 conquered al-Shiḥr from the Āl Burayk.[153] This victory, which was meant to secure vital access to the coast for the interior towns in the Eastern Wadi which were under Kathīrī control, could not be sustained for long. The Quʿayṭīs, whose ties with India had not been severed and who therefore could rely on continuing material support, took the harbour in the same year.

The third military commander from Hyderabad who invested in Southern Yemen was ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī al-ʿAwlaqī. Like his more successful rivals, he started out by buying a small fortress on the coast around 1858. In the end, his efforts at building a sultanate for himself in Hadhramaut were thwarted by the Quʿayṭīs in 1876. They begrudged his challenge to their position in Hyderabad as much as his support for the Kathīrīs and Kasādī against the Quʿayṭī quest for supremacy.[154]

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[151] S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, pp. 190–200, Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, pp. 330–338.
[152] Ansari, "Relations", pp. 189–190. ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ himself seems to have been banned from Hyderabad at some stage, al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, pp. 33f.
[153] For a detailed account see ʿAkāsha, *Qiyām*, pp. 71–86.
[154] ʿAkāsha, *Qiyām*, pp. 141–142; Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 242–244.

As the fight for supremacy and control of the coast between the Qu'ayṭīs, Kathīrīs and Kasādīs intensified in the 1860s and 70s, all parties started to actively look for outside support.[155] While the Kathīrīs turned towards Yemen and conferred with the Sharīf of Ma'rib, the Imām of Yemen, the Ottomans in Yemen and the Ḥijāz, the 'Awlaqī and Kasādī appealed to the ruler of Oman for help. All sides explored the possibility of cooperation with the British, who eventually decided to intervene in favour of the Qu'ayṭī sultan, as will be seen below.

The details of the struggle for Hadhramaut have been described by the historians mainly in terms of battles to control the major towns and of alliances between various tribal groups. This is of no concern here. Rather, it is worthwhile to outline a number of features which were typical of this period and which arguably remained important characteristic of Hadhrami politics well into the 20th century. Both Qu'ayṭīs and Kathīrīs primarily relied on local warriors for their military forces, which were highly variable in size, depending on actual tribal alliances as well as on agricultural seasons. In order to expand these forces in size, and possibly to have a more loyal basis, the Qu'ayṭīs also resorted to direct recruitment in Yāfi'. Both sides also imported slave soldiers, 'abīd or mamlūk, from East Africa, often via Zanzibar.[156] It seems that those qabā'il who regularly found themselves engaged in armed confrontation also possessed some slaves, whom Ibn Ḥamīd occasionally includes when discussing casualties of armed clashes.[157] Finally, a number of neighbouring tribes and rulers, most notably the Sharīf[158] of Ma'rib, made regular appearances in Hadhramaut, accompanied by more or less significant armies, and offered themselves as allies to the warring sides.[159] Obviously, such 'offers' were made under the impression of considerable force and in expectation of the exploits from the ensuing plunder. Consequently, the rejection of these volunteers carried a considerable

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[155] The details of this struggle are discussed in Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl*, for the international dimension of the struggle, cf. my "Hadhramis in international politics" with further references.

[156] 'Akāsha, *Qiyām*, pp. 71f.

[157] For example Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 273, 373.

[158] While the term points to his descent from the Prophet Muḥammad through al-Ḥasan, in political terms the *Sharīf* of Ma'rib was a local *amīr* or ruler.

[159] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 169–174 for an example from 1274/1858–59, for other examples see vol. I, p. 343 (1263), 369 (1263f.), vol. II, p. 270 (1284).

risk of raids by these 'allies' in conjunction with one's enemies.[160]
Thus, when the Kathīrīs took Say'ūn from the Yāfi'īs in 1264/1848
in cooperation with forces from Ma'rib and Bayḥān, they were con-
cerned that the town might be subjected to plunder, as this would
have undermined their legitimacy. They therefore took care that the
"the strangers" did not enter Say'ūn but remained outside the walls.[161]

   Alliances with tribes in Hadhramaut also seem to have functioned
on the basis of a clear *quid pro quo*, normally in the form of pay-
ments by the sultans, even if most tribes had clear preferences for
alliances with specific contenders for power.[162] Quite often, formal
agreements were concluded by specifying the mutual obligations.[163]
Ibn Ḥamīd describes one such agreement of 1294/1877, giving some
interesting detail. The Tamīmīs came to 'Awaḍ b. 'Umar al-Qu'ayṭī
to collect what he owed them.[164]

> He asked them for hostages, and a number of them went to the port
> [where he resided, i.e. al-Shiḥr]. It was reported that 'Awaḍ b. 'Umar
> only agreed with them on three conditions: that they provide a hostage
> from each tribal subdivision, that they would allow him to station
> specified numbers of troops in their lands, and, thirdly, that he reduced
> the number of recipients of stipends by three fifths.[165]

Although Ibn Ḥamīd's chronicle abounds with reports of war, tribal
skirmishes and the like, he also reports the large number of peace
agreements which lasted from one month to ten years. Such agree-
ments could be concluded between the rivalling *dawla*s, between *dawla*
and tribes and among tribes. It would seem from the chronicle, how-
ever, that overall these were honoured more by breach than by
fulfilment. Often, such agreements were brokered by *sayyid*s in their
function as *manṣab* or as respected religious authorities.[166]

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[160] See Ibn Ḥamīd's account of the appearance of the 500 tribesmen and 30
horses of the Dhū Ḥusayn in 1265/1848–49, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 6.

[161] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, pp. 369f.

[162] For a survey of preferred alliances, see Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 336.

[163] A number of such agreements between tribes and the 'states' are preserved
in the museum in al-Mukallā and in the archives in Say'ūn.

[164] The text is not clear on the nature of this debt, but the hostage issue would
imply that it is some kind of tribute which was paid in exchange for loyalty.

[165] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 374. I would like to acknowledge the help
which Sultan Ghālib al-Qu'ayṭī and Sayyid Muḥammad al-Shāṭirī offered in under-
standing this passage.

[166] For examples of such agreements, see Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 371 and
vol. II, pp. 151, 158, 166, 309, 376.

The ports of al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā provided a lifeline for aspiring Hadhrami rulers through which civilian and military supplies arrived and contact with the outside world was maintained. Although the inland route to the Yemen and occasionally to the Ḥijāz was in use and occasional caravans braved the overland journey to Aden,[167] the sea was safer, quicker and provided the connection to the economically vital communities in India and South East Asia. Thus, it comes as no surprise that all contenders for power aspired to control the ports, particularly al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā. For the most part, the Kathīrīs found themselves dependent on other rulers of the coast, and Ibn Ḥamīd's chronicle abounds with reports of blockades of Kathīrī territories, notably by the Quʿaytīs and their allies.[168]

Without a detailed study of the 18th century, it is difficult to gauge how much actually changed in the structure of Hadhrami politics until the 1870s. The appearance of wealthy mercenaries to India on the Hadhrami scene was surely new, but for the most part, their actions followed older patterns of Hadhrami politics. However, the wealth of these new types of leaders and their supporters probably meant an unprecedented influx of soldiers and military slaves, as well as an increasing professionalisation of their armies. Although this seems to have been a relatively slow process, Ibn Ḥamīd's repeated reports about Kathīrī extortion and about the monetary difficulties of their sultans indicate the increasing costs of the arms race.[169] Unfortunately, we lack information about the arms used in Hadhramaut, but it would seem that the modernisation of the arsenal also played some role in developments. Ibn Ḥamīd offers only a few comments from which it transpires that (a new type of?) cannons came to play an increasing role in tribal warfare and helped to demolish hitherto impregnable defences. While in 1264/1848, the import of a cannon by ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿaytī from Hyderabad still caused a leading *sayyid* to write a note of protest to the Nizam, the technology seems to have been adapted by the Kathīrīs themselves at the first opportunity. Three years later, a former Turkish

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[167] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 190f., 288, 335.
[168] For example Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, pp. 428–32, vol. II, pp. 39–49, 206, 263.
[169] A very good example is Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 115–117, where he recounts how the arrival of money from India ends the extortions of the population and where dissent breaks out among the Kathīrī sultans over the purchase of military slaves and debts.

soldier made a living in al-Ghuraf as military expert who knew how
to repair cannons which were used shortly thereafter. Furthermore,
Sultan Ghālib issued instructions to his relatives in Hadhramaut to
receive and honour a Dawʿanī soldier with special expertise in can-
non repair.[170] Similarly, the fact that the said Turkish soldier also
knew how to train soldiers on the *barūd* (rifle) indicates that new
types of firearms were being introduced, possibly muskets which
increasingly replaced the older matchlocks.[171] This seems to have
increased the number of casualties rather dramatically and therefore
possibly increased the urgent need for change. The arms race extended
to naval warfare. In the 1866 battle for al-Shiḥr, ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ
reportedly used three steamers, while the Kathīrīs, well aware of the
military advantage thus obtained by the Quʿaytī, later made an
urgent appeal to the British to supply them with militarily-equipped
steamers.[172]

Large scale and 'high technology' warfare was, however, only one
facet of strife in Hadhramaut. If we believe our chronicler, the cut-
ting off of the date harvest or in extreme cases the destruction of
the valuable date palms themselves by cutting off their leaves or
trunks was a frequent occurrence. The perpetrators of these offences
were normally tribesmen, although they occasionally acted in the
context of the larger struggle for control of Hadhramaut.[173] In Tarīm,
town-dwellers owning date palms in tribal areas had to hire tribal
guardians whose permission was needed to harvest and who obtained
a share of the dates.[174] In the case of continuing conflict between
townsmen and tribes, or between feuding tribal settlements, they
resorted to digging trenches in order to reach the fields, as normal
paths exposed their users to enemy fire.[175] The blockade of individ-
ual towns included the cutting off of their water supplies, the destruc-
tion of irrigation systems and the plundering of caravans whose goods

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[170] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 368, vol. II, pp. 35, 46–49, 54.

[171] Gavin, *Aden*, p. 162.

[172] Ansari, "Relations", p. 197; IO, L/P&S/9/45, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 31.3.1870, pp. 77f.

[173] For example, Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 29, 51, 61, 302; Wrede, *Reisen*, p. 52, To Ibn Ḥamīd, it merited special mention when, in 1272/1856, the inhab-itants of Tarīm could harvest their dates unimpeded, vol. II, p. 161.

[174] Bā Maṭraf, *al-Muʿallim*, p. 133, fn. 21; H. Ingrams, *Arabia*, pp. 309f.

[175] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 432, this technique was still in use in the 20th c., van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 188.

were owned by particular clans. All of these actions formed part of the almost continuous small scale warfare during the 19th century.[176]

In spite of the Quʿaytī sultan's financial, military and (after the conquest of al-Shiḥr) strategic superiority, he had difficulties achieving an all-out victory over his rivals. It was in this context and as a result of the pleas for outside support by all sides, that he struck a deal with British forces. How they had become involved in the area and how they perceived the developments now needs to be considered briefly.

The British in Aden and Beyond

The occupation of Aden by the already mentioned Commander Haines in 1839 has been discussed in great detail by Gavin.[177] He has pointed out that Haines' chutzpah, together with British rivalries with Muḥammad ʿAlī of Egypt and Russia as well as with France which was rumored to pursue designs on the region, played a major part in this act and the subsequent establishment of a British settlement in Aden. British interest in control of one or more Arabian ports also has to be seen in the context of the introduction of steam navigation in the Indian Ocean, which necessitated the establishment of coaling stations on the commercially and strategically vital route from Suez to Bombay. The decades after 1839 first saw a slow but increasingly steady growth in commerce and therefore in the size of the settlement, although Aden only became a major trading entrepôt when the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. The tribal areas in the hinterland of Aden were slowly integrated economically and as far as possible friendly relations with their rulers were maintained through negotiations, hospitality to visitors in Aden and the dispensing of gifts which, from a local perspective, might well have been interpreted as tribute.

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[176] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 370 (cutting off water), p. 29 (destruction of irrigation system of Shibām), for caravan raids, cf. the references above, fn. 134.

[177] Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 1–61. Where not indicated otherwise, the following discussion is indebted to Gavin's excellent account. As the following political history has already been discussed by a number of historians, reference to documents will only be made where they seem particularly salient for the discussion.

   From 1872 onwards, matters changed when the 'sick man of Europe', namely the Ottomans, began to reconquer Yemen in earnest.[178] Yemen had been an Ottoman province between 1538 and 1635. Since the 1820s, Egyptian forces carrying the Ottoman banner, and after 1840 Ottoman forces commanded from Istanbul (or rather Jeddah) had regained a foothold on the coast. The British had carefully observed Ottoman movements in Southern Arabia. When the Kathīrīs recruited troops in Ottoman Ḥijāz to attack al-Shiḥr under the leadership of Sayyid Isḥāq b. 'Aqīl b. Yaḥyā in 1851, Haines kept the Indian government closely informed of the moves and defeat of what he perceived to be a "Turkish fleet".[179] Similarly, the appearance of Ottoman ships in al-Mukallā in 1867 in the aftermath of the battle for al-Shiḥr prompted the British to follow the developments closely without, however, wishing to become quite as involved as the *naqīb* of al-Mukallā would have desired.[180] Nevertheless, the aforementioned anti-slavery treaties of 1863 (renewed in 1873) can be seen as something of an indicator of increased British interest in developments in the region between Muscat and Aden. Nevertheless, the very slow implementation of the ban on slavery shows the limits of this concern.[181]

   When the Ottomans began advancing not only into highland Yemen, but also pushing southwards towards Aden, the British became seriously alarmed.[182] Consequently, in May 1873 they drew up a list of nine tribes whose independence Britain asked Istanbul to recognise. At the same time, the Resident in Aden took unprecedented steps to subordinate those leaders who felt that the Ottoman presence afforded them with additional room for political manoeuvre *vis à vis* Aden. By the late 1870s, the hinterland of Aden had been brought

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[178] For an overview on Ottoman rule over Yemen, albeit from an Arab nationalist perspective, see Abāẓa, *al-Ḥukm al-ʿuthmānī*.

[179] IO, L/P&S/9/31, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 14.4.1850, pp. 47–50 and 13.6.1850, pp. 107f. The term "Turkish fleet" is used on p. 107. According to the Ottoman provincial newspaper *Ṣanʿāʾ*, this fleet consisted of approximately 500 irregular soldiers and one canon. *Ṣanʿāʾ* 37, 25. Rajab 1298/23.6.1881.

[180] IO, L/P&S/9/44, Officiating Resident, Aden to Bombay, 17.9.1867, pp. 51–54, Assistant Resident in Charge, Aden to Bombay, 15.6.1869, pp. 271–275 and 18.1.1869, pp. 3–5. Cf. my "Hadhramis in international politics", p. 119 with further references.

[181] IO, L/P&S/9/41, Political Resident Aden to Bombay, 17.6.1864 (pp. 107–110). Ibn Ḥamīd reports of earlier British attempts to control slavery, i.e. 1277/1860–61, see *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 183.

[182] For the following, see Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 139–155.

under British control, and a first scheme to establish a protectorate was floated in 1873. As wider diplomatic concerns governed decisions in London where an affront by the Ottomans was feared, the idea was abandoned.

In Hadhramaut, the Ottoman advancement was followed eagerly by the Kathīrīs, who still hoped for a renewed offensive against the Qu'ayṭīs. While they entertained a number of different channels to the Ottomans through their contacts in Jeddah, perhaps the episode involving Sayyid Faḍl b. 'Alawī b. Sahl (1824–1900) was the one which most worried the British.[183] Sayyid Faḍl's chequered career as an ambitious activist with close links to pan-Islamic circles can, in some ways, be compared to that of the famous pan-Islamic activist, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, although it has been far less studied.[184] His father, Tarīm-born 'Alawī (d. 1844), had become an influential Muslim leader in the Calicut region of Kerala.[185] The son continued his father's work, inspiring the wrath of the British by inciting local Muslims in word and deed to attack upper class Hindus as well as British troops. In 1852, the British finally forced Sayyid Faḍl into exile. He first escaped to Mecca and then made his way to Istanbul, where he was received with high honours. His aim to return to India, however, was never fulfilled.[186]

Sayyid Faḍl first seems to have visited Hadhramaut in 1264/ 1847–48. He immediately became involved in local politics on the side of the Kathīrīs, signing a letter to the Nizam of Hyderabad protesting about the conduct of his commander 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ al-Qu'ayṭī.[187] In 1860, Sayyid Faḍl suggested to the Ottomans to intervene in Dhofar, presumably to help the Kathīrīs of Hadhramaut whom he described as oppressed by the Qu'ayṭī.[188] Just when the British were worried about Ottoman advances towards Laḥij in 1289/ 1872–73, news was reaching Hadhramaut from Jeddah that Sayyid Faḍl, then residing in Mecca, had been appointed Ottoman governor of the Hadhrami coast and interior as well as of Dhofar. Given

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[183] For a short biography of Sayyid Faḍl, see 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, vol. I, pp. 308f. On his career, see Bang, Sufis, pp. 119–132.

[184] Dale, *Islamic Society*, p. 7.

[185] On Sayyid 'Alawī, cf. Dale, *Islamic Society*, pp. 113–118, 127f., on Sayyid Faḍl, ibid., pp. 128–135, 164–168.

[186] Cf. Dale, "The Hadhrami Diaspora", pp. 178–180 and Buzpinar, "Abdülhamid II", pp. 227–228.

[187] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 405, vol. II, p. 18.

[188] Buzpinar, "Abdülhamid II", p. 228.

that Ottoman warships had repeatedly visited al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā and demanded recognition of Ottoman sovereignty by their rulers since 1865, the story rang true.[189] Reportedly, Sayyid Faḍl was to depart rather soon with a large army.[190] As it turned out, he only left for Dhofar in 1292/1875, apparently following a request by Dhofari tribesmen for an Ottoman intervention. While the Ottomans had rejected the proposal for fear of failure and an increase in tensions between the Ottomans and British, Sayyid Faḍl had negotiated independently with the tribes. He departed for Dhofar with his family, declaring it an Ottoman territory in 1876. This did not result in the Ottoman support which Sayyid Faḍl had hoped for. Instead of rescuing the Kathīrīs of Hadhramaut from their Quʿaytī rivals, he himself had to leave Dhofar in early 1879 after a revolt by local Kathīrī tribesmen. This had been incited by the ruler of Muscat who himself had designs on the area.[191] In 1880/1881, a new bid to regain Dhofar, once again accompanied by speculations about Sayyid Faḍl's appointment as governor of Hadhramaut, remained equally inconsequential.[192]

   Interestingly, a similar uncertainty about Hadhramaut's Ottoman connections seems to have prevailed in Ottoman Yemen. The provincial gazette Ṣanʿāʾ twice discussed the position of Hadhramaut. First, it strongly denied that it was part of the province of Ṣanʿāʾ, whereas it later speculated that Hadhramaut might be a subordinate part of Dhofar, which it depicted as a short-lived Ottoman province under Sayyid Faḍl. On this rather speculative basis, the authors took issue with the British involvement and considered Hadhrami affairs to be an Ottoman responsibility.[193] Shortly thereafter, a fairly long article

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   [189] ʿAkāsha, Qiyām, pp. 95, 97; Hartwig, Hadramaut, p. 243; IO, L/P&S/9/44, Resident, Aden to Bombay, 10.8.1869, pp. 35–38. According to al-Muwaylihī, Mā hunālika, p. 268, Sayyid Faḍl had then asked the Ottoman Sultan ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz for support, but to no avail.
   [190] Ibn Ḥamīd, Tārīkh, vol. II, p. 334. Interestingly, British sources report a more cautious Ottoman stance, which made this appointment conditional on the completion of the conquest of Yemen. IO, L/P&S/9/46, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 16.1.1873, pp. 509–512 and Collins, "Hadramawt", pp. 33–35.
   [191] Buzpinar, "Abdülhamid II", pp. 229–231, Ibn Ḥamīd, Tārīkh, vol. II, pp. 359, 379–81.
   [192] Buzpinar, "Abdülhamid", pp. 233–237, for the rumor of Sayyid Faḍl's appointment, see Collins, "Hadramawt", p. 334.
   [193] Ṣanʿāʾ 37, 25 Rajab 1298/23.6.1881 and 44 of 14 Ramāḍān 1298/9.8.1881. Interestingly, Ṣanʿāʾ derived its information from a certain Jarīdat al-Waqt—possibly The Times.

on the basic geography of Hadhramaut was published, in order to inform the readers about a territory which had been much mentioned in the print media lately—this being a reference to the occasional reports about the Quʿayṭī-Kathīrī-Kasādī struggles as well as to the above discussion about Hadhramaut's political status.[194]

It took the British some time to realise that Sayyid Faḍl was not an agent of the Ottomans. They initially believed that his moves were part of the Ottoman expansion on the Arabian Peninsula, and even after they changed their evaluation of the situation, they kept a very close eye on his movements.[195] However, Sayyid Faḍl was not the only source of disquiet for the British on the Hadhrami coast. By the early 1870s, the fight for control of the main Hadhrami towns and in particular the ports meant that the three remaining contenders, namely the Kathīrī sultan, the Quʿayṭī *jamʿdār* and the Kasādī *naqīb*, increasingly vied for outside support. While Istanbul seems to have attempted to calm British concerns, the Ottoman governor in Baṣrā showed less restraint and in 1879 declared that all southern and eastern Arabian ports with the exception of Aden should be regarded as Ottoman.[196] This can be considered to be part of the wider imperial race. Nevertheless, for Istanbul, the South Arabian ports were clearly of minor importance, as Sayyid Faḍl's unsuccessful attempts to gain official backing for his ventures show. In contrast, the British regarded the region as part of the strategically crucial route to India.

Meanwhile, the Kasādī *naqīb* in al-Mukallā faced an increasingly desperate position. From 1867 onwards, he was dependent on Quʿayṭī military help to defend his position in al-Mukallā and beyond. To pay for it, he incurred large debts.[197] In 1873, *naqīb* Ṣalāh b. Muḥammad died. ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar al-Quʿayṭī arranged for the occupation of al-Mukallā and forced the *naqīb*'s sons to sell him half of al-Mukallā

[194] *Sanʿāʾ* 61, 29. Muḥarram 1299/21.12.1882.

[195] IO, L/P&S/9/46, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 4.1.1873, pp. 471f., IO, L/P&S/9/53, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 7.2.1876, pp. 53–55, for later observations see IO, L/P&S/9/54, Political Resident, Aden, to Bombay, 20.11.1877, pp. 187f., 8.1.1878, 29.2.1879, 5.6.1879.

[196] Kelly, *Britain*, p. 808.

[197] For the following, see Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 165–171, Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 275f., 280–290; Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl*, pp. 34–137; Collins, "Hadramawt" with a discussion of almost every letter which was exchanged. See also the correspondence in IO, R/20/A/519.

and the lesser port of Burūm. Ṣalāḥ's son ʿUmar was recognised as ruler of al-Mukallā on the condition that "he rules according to the Islamic *sharīʿa*, that he brings welfare and forbids evil, and that he does not oppress the subjects or anyone else."[198] Once again, the language bears close resemblance to the ideology of a *dawla*, as discussed earlier.

In addition, a treaty of mutual assistance was concluded, which Gavin has characterised appropriately as "a Protectorate and Advisery Treaty as complete as any signed by an Asiatic ruler with a European power".[199] After promises for mutual assistance, power relations were blatantly revealed in the following sentence: "Both sides have agreed that the Quʿaytī is the father and the *naqīb* his son, and that the *naqīb* owes the Quʿaytī compliance with his orders."[200] It was also clearly spelt out that the *naqīb* was not to entertain friendly relations with either the ʿAwlaqī or Kathīrī rulers, something which, however, he happily ignored by allying himself to the ʿAwlaqī.

At the same time, the *naqīb* sent urgent pleas for help to the British. They had for some time tried to avoid direct intervention by issuing regular calls for moderation to all sides.[201] When the ʿAwlaqī was ousted in 1876, tensions increased. Apparently in reaction to the unsettled situation, the Sharīf of Mecca offered his mediation in the name of the Ottomans. In apparent innocence, the *naqīb* asked the British government for advice and help on the issue, pointing out that his opponent continously received supplies from Hyderabad.[202] Given the long history of Hadhrami leaders who tried to gain outside support by playing outside rivals against each other, as well as the wide-ranging intelligence accessible from the different areas bordering on the Indian Ocean, it would seem likely that the

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[198] The text of the sales' agreement is reproduced in Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl*, pp. 92f., here p. 92.

[199] Gavin, *Aden*, p. 166.

[200] For the text, see Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl*, pp. 94–95, here p. 94.

[201] IO, L/P&S/9/46, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 20.10.1873, pp. 861–863, in which the *naqīb* asked for a British visit in al-Mukallā, 1.12.1873, cf. pp. 969f.; IO, L/P&S/9/47, Political Resident, Aden, to Bombay, 23.1.1874, pp. 89–92, 1.4.1874, pp. 129–131, see also pp. 137–141, 201–203; IO, L/P&S/9/52, pp. 261–267, 447–452. For a local account of events, see Bā ʿAṭwa's and al-Ḥabbānī's poems in Landberg, *Arabica*, vol. III, pp. 68f., 97f.

[202] IO, L/P&S/9/53, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 23.5.1876, pp. 145–147 and enclosed letter from Nakeeb Omer Sallah of Makallah to General Schneider, 1.5.1876, pp. 149–150.

naqīb's request aimed at encouraging a speedy British intervention by alluding to his rival's interest in Hadhramaut. When matters became more desperate, this tactic was repeated. In December 1880, ʿUmar b. Ṣalāḥ addressed the British Resident in Aden urging him to take over sovereignty of al-Mukallā against a regular stipend. Otherwise, he threatened to approach the Kathīrīs, the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Ottomans or even the French.[203] Indeed, the Ottomans received a similarly desperate plea for help via the *shaykh al-sāda* in Hodeida, and the sultan of Muscat was approached.[204]

Apart from imperial rivalry, the British clearly started to fear for the trade off the South Arabian coast, particularly after the outbreak of a naval war between al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā in 1875. A number of ships owned by Indians under British protection had been captured and diverted to al-Shiḥr.[205] These concerns were exacerbated by the plea of Indian merchants in al-Mukallā to protect their lives and properties in case of an attack.[206]

At first, the British tried to mediate in the conflict by presenting different solutions to the problems of Kasādī debt and Quʿayṭī possession of half of al-Mukallā and Burūm.[207] When negotiations broke down, the Aden Resident received orders in 1881 to force an agreement. The *naqīb* of al-Mukallā, however, continued to reject any of the British propositions. Instead, he repeated his offer to place himself under British rule. Exasperated and once more fearing outside intervention, the Aden Resident recommended accepting an offer by the Quʿayṭī to buy out the *naqīb*.[208] Acting to some extent against the Indian government which remained undecided on the matter, the Resident made one last attempt to obtain the agreement of the *naqīb* to the peaceful sale of the two ports. When this failed and it was once more reported that Sayyid Faḍl, at the request of the *naqīb*,

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[203] IO, R/20/A/528, Omar b. Salāh al-Kasadi to General Loch, 12.12.1880 and Naqīb ʿUmar b. Salāḥ to General Loch, 15 Muharram 1298/19.12.1880.

[204] *Ṣanʿāʾ* 44, 14. Ramaḍān 1298/16.8.1881; Collins, "Hadramawt", p. 304.

[205] Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 281.

[206] IO, R/20/A/528, Letter by 7 Indian merchants to Assistent Resident, Aden, 2.12.1880.

[207] These proposals are reproduced in Collins, "Hadramawt", pp. 344–350. For a detailed exposé of the following events, cf. Hunter, Sealey & Mosse, *Arab Tribes*, pp. 134–144.

[208] Collins, "Hadramawt", pp. 265–268; Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 290; ʿAkāsha, *Qiyām*, pp. 172–211; al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, pp. 4–10, Ṣanʿāʾ 30; 5. Jumādā al-ākhira 1298/5.5.1881 and 48, 20. Shawwāl 1298/15.9.1881.

had been appointed governor of al-Mukallā, the British struck an
agreement with the Quʿayṭī at al-Shiḥr. He agreed to guarantee a
subsidy for the Kasādī and to remain submissive to the British gov-
ernment.[209] These final obstacles removed, the British now provided
active help for the Quʿayṭī conquest of al-Mukallā. The *naqīb* together
with approximately 2,000 followers left and settled in Zanzibar and
Laḥij.[210]

In May of the following year, ʿAbdallāh, the brother of ʿAwaḍ b.
ʿUmar al-Quʿayṭī, signed a treaty of friendship with Britain in both
his own and his brother's name.[211] In addition to officially regulat-
ing the Quʿayṭī's payment to the Kasādī, it already foreshadowed
the protectorate treaty which was concluded in 1888.[212] Thus, the
Quʿayṭīs agreed not to sell, mortgage or otherwise dispose of any of
their Hadhrami possessions to any person or state other than the
British government, and not to subject them to any other govern-
ment or recognise its sovereignty without the clear agreement of the
British government. They further committed themselves to follow
British advice in all matters pertaining to their relations with neigh-
bouring rulers and foreign powers. In exchange, a yearly stipend of
360 *riyāl*[213] was fixed.

Why did the Quʿayṭīs, a few years later, agree to a protectorate
treaty which made all their contacts to foreign leaders subject to
British approval and obliged them to report any advances by for-
eign powers on the Hadhrami coast? British documents indicate that
ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar pursued three aims.[214] First of all, he hoped to
obtain British support *vis à vis* the Nizam.[215] He hoped that this
would increase his chances of collecting outstanding debts. Secondly,
ʿAwaḍ wanted to strengthen his position within his own family,

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[209] Hunter, Sealey & Mosse, *Arab Tribes*, p. 143; Ṣanʿāʾ 26, 6. Jumādā al-awwal
1298/6.4.1881.

[210] Collins, "Hadramawt", pp. 338–342.

[211] The text is reproduced in English in Hunter, Sealey & Mosse, *Arab Tribes*,
pp. 169f. and in Arabic in ʿAkāsha, *Qiyām*, pp. 279–280. The treaty came into
force in July 1882.

[212] For the English version, see Hunter, Sealey & Mosse, *Arab Tribes*, pp. 186f.,
for the Arabic version ʿAkāsha, *Qiyām*, pp. 282f.

[213] The *riyāl* probably refers to Maria Theresa dollars, cf. Hartwig, *Hadramaut*,
p. 312, fn. 5.

[214] IO, R/20/A/651, No. 25, Sultan Nawaz Jung asks for letter of Recommendation,
and Memorandum, Residency Aden, 28.3.1887, pp. 795–800.

[215] About these difficulties, see Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 206.

notably in relation to the sons of his recently deceased brother ʿAbdal-lāh. In his will, Sultan ʿUmar had appointed his three sons ʿAwaḍ, ʿAbdallāh and Ṣāliḥ as his successors and trustees of his will.[216] Ṣāliḥ, who had looked after family interests in Hyderabad, died in 1877, while ʿAbdallāh and ʿAwaḍ shared rule over Hadhramaut. This seems to have functioned reasonably well, however, ʿAwaḍ seems to have had premonitions about ʿAbdallāh's sons Munaṣṣar and Ḥusayn. After the death of ʿAbdallāh in November 1888, they did indeed lay claim to a share in the rule. ʿAwaḍ did not want his realm to be divided and had planned for the succession of his own son. Although he appointed them to the governorship of al-Mukallā (later al-Ghayl) and al-Shiḥr after the death of their father, they fell out with each other and with ʿAwaḍ in 1896 over questions of inheritance. A later dispute over the control of the revenues of al-Shiḥr exacerbated mat-ters further.[217] Finally, the Quʿayṭī's willingness to sign seems to have been triggered by his continuing apprehension of a Kathīrī threat. He feared that his opponents would not easily resign themselves to their fate.[218]

At first, the 1882 treaty at first seemed to take care of the British concerns discussed above. However, the 1880s were also marked by a series of events which increased British interest in the region (the occupation of Egypt in 1882 is most notable) but also seemed to threaten it. In 1880, the Italians had occupied Assab on the Somali coast, and in 1884, France expanded from the island of Obokh to the neigbouring Somali and Dankali coasts. In 1883, the Mahdi in Sudan revolted against Egyptian rule and in early 1885, the Germans laid claim to the Sultan of Zanzibar's continental possessions. In the same year, German travellers also made contacts on the Somali coast with its large Hadhrami community.[219] It is in the context of this

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[216] For the will, see Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, *Taʾammulāt*, pp. 123–125.

[217] On this matter, see al-Quʿaiti, A Resumé, pp. 4–6 and, in more detail and until the 1920s, ʿAbd al Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Badaʾiʿ*, vol. II, pp. 256–266, 273–285. Cf. Hunter, Sealey & Mosse, pp. 145f. al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 127, gives as addi-tional reason that Ḥusayn failed in the conquest of Ḥajar. A somewhat different account is given by al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, pp. 22f. Cf. Lekon, "The British", 89f., 254–258 and Al-Gaddal & Al-Quaiti, The cultural and financial impact

[218] Cf. al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 24.

[219] On the brief activities of the German East African Society on the Somali coast between 1886 and 1890 see Horst Gruender, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, 3rd ed., Paderborn etc. 1995, p. 88. British reports to Aden refer to this, IO,

'scramble for Africa' which gained further momentum after the Berlin conference 1884–85, that the British became interested once again in the idea of an Arabian protectorate, and between 1886 and 1890 concluded treaties with the South Arabian rulers.

Gavin has pointed to the fact that the protectorate policy always remained subordinate to overall British foreign policy considerations and in particular to the relations with the Ottomans.[220] From the discussions about the conclusion of a protectorate treaty with Hadhramaut, it can only be concluded that the Aden Resident occasionally would have liked to pursue a clearer forward policy, and used all means at his disposal to convince his superiors in Bombay and London. In 1886, he suggested such a treaty with the Qu'aytī to the Indian Government on the grounds of possible German intrigues with the Kasādī *naqīb* in Zanzibar.[221] The actual intelligence was less than conclusive on this point:

> The ex-Nakib scarcely leaves his residence and is considered by my agents [. . .] to take no active interest in the politics of his former Sultanate, but the agents of the German Colonization Society could easily communicate with him and there can be little doubt he would view very favourably any proposition for reinstating him at Makullah, and sign any secret treaty they might propose if it included such action.[222]

Unsurprisingly, the Resident's proposal received only lukewarm interest in India, where it was argued that the existing treaty satisfied British needs. Nevertheless, the Resident continued his quest for a protectorate treaty by painting the picture of a foreign power (i.e., the Germans) conquering al-Mukallā and reinstating the *naqīb*. Did, he asked rhetorically, "there now exist sufficiently strong grounds for effective diplomatic action? If we heard of any such proceedings as imminent are we justified in approving them by all means in our

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R/20/A/651, H.M.'s Agency & Consulate-General, Zanzibar to Political Resident, Aden, 25.10.1886, p. 807 (the volume is identical with the microfilm IOR Neg. 5076, which was made when the record still followed the old classification R/20/AIA/1019).

[220] Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 198–200.

[221] IO, R/20/A/651, Extract of Political Resident, Aden to Governor of Bombay, 18.10.1886, p. 803.

[222] IO, R/20/A/651, H.M.'s Agency & Consulate-General, Zanzibar to Political Resident, Aden, 25.10.1886, pp. 807–810, here 808f.

power?"[223] He also suggested to conclude a similar treaty with the Kathīrīs. That the Resident clearly preferred a forward policy becomes clear from the fact that even before receiving the report from Zanzibar, or indeed an answer to his letter to Bombay, he cabled Bombay to inform the Government of an impending visit. He wanted the *jamʿdār* to sign a facsimile of the Socotra protectorate treaty in his presence.[224] However, it was only in 1888, when general British foreign policy distanced itself once again from the Ottoman Empire, that the conclusion of protectorate treaties on a larger scale was officially sanctioned.

From a British perspective, the protection of Hadhramaut from foreign influences was achieved. For some time Hadhramaut did not feature high on the agenda of South Arabian politics. More important was the 1902–1905 negotiation of the border between Ottoman Yemen and the Aden Protectorate. Although in the end it was not ratified by the Ottoman sultan, this agreement was considered more or less valid. Attention briefly returned to Hadhramaut between 1901 and 1903, when ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar's sons made their bid for power from their base in al-Shiḥr. They had gained the support of the powerful Ḥamūm tribe.[225] The armed struggle was once more accompanied by a sea blockade and interference with trade.

The protectorate treaty worked well for ʿAwaḍ, who received support against his nephews from a British warship.[226] A year later, the Indian Government somewhat reluctantly sanctioned the purchase of arms by a ruler who was recommended by an enthusiastic Politcal Resident as an "enlighted" and civilised ruler surrounded by unruly Beduins,[227] but who was remembered in India for the participation of his troops in unrest during the Muḥarram celebrations of 1884.[228] In spite of apparent British difficulties in obtaining payment for the

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[223] IO, R/20/A/651, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 8.11.1886, pp. 811–812, here p. 812.

[224] IO, R/20/A/651, Extract from Telegram, Political Resident, Aden Bombay, 19.10.1886, p. 805.

[225] ʿAlī & al-Millāḥī, "Tārīkh", p. 230 for a copy of the agreement between Ḥusayn b. ʿAbdallāh al-Quʿayṭī and the Ḥamūmīs.

[226] IO, R/20/A/977, pp. 21–55, 355, cf. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Idām al-Qūt*, p. 58 and al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 23.

[227] IO, R/20/A/1047, Political Resident, Aden to Bombay, 26.7.1903 and 1.4.1904. For the whole affair, see also the other entries in this file, as well as IO, R/20/A/978.

[228] Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 176. At the time, his immediate departure was demanded.

arms supplied, the sultan was granted additional consignments of
arms and ammunitions in the period between 1903 and 1905, again
with the argument of support for a ruler who sought to ensure the
security and development of the Hadhrami coast.[229] While trade in
al-Mukallā and al-Shiḥr does indeed seem to have flourished in con-
sequence, such British backing changed the balance of power in
Hadhramaut even further in the Quʿaytī's favour. It allowed him to
consolidate his grip on the Hadhrami coast and parts of the inte-
rior, while Kathīrī rule effectively became limited to Sayʾūn, Tarīm
and some minor villages.[230] This should not blind us, however, to
the fact that such control still was rather tenuous in many parts, as
is particularly well exemplified by the conflict between the Quʿaytī
sultan and the neigbouring tribe of the al-Ḥamūm.[231] The laborious
efforts to build a state, both by the sultans and merchants, will be
the topic of the next chapters.

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[229] See the correspondence in IO, R/20/A/1047.
[230] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 24, ibid., pp. 16–34 for Quʿaytī expan-
sion until 1918.
[231] Boxberger, "Hadhrami politics", pp. 51–55.

SCHOLARS, MYSTICS AND MERCHANTS: REFORMERS AND POLITICIANS IN EARLY AND MID-19TH CENTURY WADI HADHRAMAUT

The historiographical discussion of the last chapter has shown how the early parts of the 19th century were characterised by Hadhrami historians as a period marked by the absence of dynastic rule. The historians argue that scholars, mostly *sayyid*s, stepped in to try and prevent further chaos. This is normally presented as a rescue operation by a religious class which in the hour of despair lived up to its religious and social responsibility without wanting to take over political power for themselves. The standard demand of the reformers in this version was rule of the *sharī'a* (normally not defined in much detail) which would ensure justice and restrain tyranny.[1] In order to achieve this goal, they backed various political leaders and in the absence of any credible leader and in exceptional circumstances temporarily assumed positions of political leadership.[2] Their opponents such as al-Bakrī, who was clearly annoyed about the anti-Yāfi'ī stance of many of these 'Alawīs and who himself was a prominent member of the *Irshād* movement with its outspoken criticism of 'Alawī claims to a special position, took a different view. He tends to present these same scholars as a hypocritical, power-hungry and scheming lot.[3]

With regard to earlier periods of Hadhrami history, both Peskes and Knysh have pointed to the links between the great wealth of the 'Alawīs and their increasing spiritual influence, thereby providing an alternative critical account of 'Alawī history.[4] An adoption of

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[1] About the problem of references to the *sharī'a* in such general terms see Mayer.

[2] Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, p. 114; 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 590–591; Bā Maṭraf, *al-Mu'allim*, p. 196. This view is reflected not very critically by Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 95, 292f. and passim.

[3] For example in the passage where he describes the activities of Isḥāq b. 'Umar b. Yaḥyā who in 1221/1806–7 tried to conquer al-Mukallā, as well as the early supporters of the Āl Kathīr who are by pro-'Alawī authors described as reformers, al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. I, pp. 154f.

[4] Peskes, "Der Heilige" and Knysh, "The Sāda".

Knysh's functionalist dictum on the earlier period that "the *sāda* clans of Ḥaḍramawt were consistently translating the wealth, which they had brought with them from Iraq [or, one could add for the modern history, which they transmitted from abroad], into political and social power and, subsequently, into religious authority as well"[5] would, in my view, not do justice to the complexities of 19th and 20th century developments. While I agree with Knysh and others as regards the necessity to incorporate the economic factor into an account of Hadhrami history, his approach seems to reduce culture to a derivative of economics. This does not mean that Hadhrami *sayyid*s themselves lacked a realistic appreciation of the importance of wealth in connection with questions of status, at least in the 20th century. Asked in 1966 by anthropologist Dostal what one needed to do in order to attain high social standing, only 10% of the *sayyid*s surveyed mentioned piety, while 85% saw wealth as the prerequisite to a high status. Interestingly, the other social groups, who often had a high regard for *sayyid* learning and piety, regarded piety as slightly more important than wealth![6] While one cannot, of course, simply reproject attitudes from the changed atmosphere preceding independence into the 19th century, I hope to show that the reformers had not only a clear sense of what constituted *sharᶜī* rule but also of what was economically beneficial.

Nevertheless, to privilege economic factors over other forces in history neglects the insights of cultural historians who argue that the relationship between "culture", "economics" and "politics" is one of enormous complexity. In their view, the various factors are considered to influence and shape each other. Religious and moral views thus are recognised to exercise a profound influence over social and economic behaviour and political institutionalisation, and thus cannot be simply derived from economic structures.[7] This implies that one needs to present both the religious and cultural milieu as well as the economic and political structures to arrive at a better understanding (albeit not any kind of complete explanation) of develop-

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[5] Knysh, "The Sāda", p. 221.
[6] Dostal, "Landherr", p. 285.
[7] On this issue, see the excellent discussion by Oexle, "Geschichte", particularly pp. 22–30 and Daniel, "Kultur", particularly p. 71. Cf. Friedrich Jaeger, "Der Kulturbegriff im Werk Max Webers", *GuG* 18 (1992), pp. 371–393, and Ute Daniel, "Clio unter Kulturschock" (I), *GWU* 48;4 (1997), pp. 195–219, especially pp. 200–205. My views owe much to discussions with Guido Steinberg.

ments in Hadhramaut.[8] This chapter attempts to do so, as far as the religiously-biased sources allow, and therefore aims at offering a fresh look at the history of a group which is best known for its pronounced attempts to return to proper Islamic government. It accepts the Weberian view that culture, of which religion is an integral part, plays a major role in shaping the outlook and actions of human beings. It also recognises that change in Hadhramaut was, until the 1940s and 50s consistently conceptualised in religious terms. Therefore, a brief discussion of religious learning in Hadhramaut, and of its main Sufi order, the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, needs to precede the main discussion. All biographical material currently available to a Western scholar will then be evaluated in order to assess the background of the reformers and their demands.[9]

The *Ṭarīqa* ʿAlawiyya *and Religious Learning in Hadhramaut until the 1880s*

In 19th and early 20th century Hadhramaut, higher religious learning and membership in the Hadhrami "family order", the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, were almost inseparable. Many children in towns and villages, although not amongst the Beduin were exposed to some basic study of the Koran. Those who pursued further religious instruction with *ʿulamāʾ* in the numerous mosques were almost invariably also exposed to and initiated into the prevailing Sufi tradition.

According to the dominant self-view of the ʿAlawīs, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAlawī, who died in 551/1155 and is better known as al-Faqīh al-Muqaddam, introduced Sufism to Hadhramaut and induced the *sayyids* to lay down the weapons which they had been carrying earlier.[10] Interestingly, two other non-ʿAlawī Hadhramis are repeatedly mentioned as having been introduced to Sufism together with al-Faqīh al-Muqaddam, namely Shaykh Saʿd b. ʿĪsā al-ʿAmūdī and

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[8] Oexle, "Geschichte", pp. 36f. argues convincingly that cultural history to a large extent situates itself outside the binary opposition of "understanding" and "explaining".

[9] The family histories by al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd* and by ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, show the potential wealth of information which is normally only accessible to insiders.

[10] ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAṭṭās, *al-ʿIlm al-nibrās*, p. 12, Serjeant, *The Saiyids*, p. 19, Bang, Sufis, pp. 33–36. Interestingly, al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 163 suggests that the son of Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā al-Muhājir, ʿAbdallāh (d. 383/993–4) was the first Sufi in Hadhramaut.

Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Bā Maʿbad.[11] While this early history
of Hadhrami Sufism as well as the association of Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā al-
Muhājir, the famed forefather of the Hadhrami *sayyid*s, with Shāfiʿī
Islam are shrouded in the mist of history and historiography,[12] we
know much more about the later tradition. This was firmly grounded
in Shāfiʿī jurisprudence (*fiqh*), of which the *Minhāj al-Ṭālibīn* by
Muḥīy al-Dīn Abū Zakariyyā al-Nawawī (d. 1277) and the com-
mentaries on this work by Ibn Ḥajar and al-Ramlī were most widely
read.[13] The central guide to the outer and inner life of the Hadhrami
Sufis became Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*
(written c. 1096).[14] In order to find the inner truth (*al-ḥaqīqa*), the
ʿAlawīs followed generally the same practices as members of the
Shādhiliyya order.[15] This is not surprising given that the spiritual
connection or *isnād* between al-Faqīh al-Muqaddam and the Prophet
is almost identical to the one propounded by Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī
(d. c. 1258). Both refer to Shuʿayb Abū Madyan (d. 1197), one of
the main influential figures of North African Sufism, as their recent
spiritual ancestor.[16]

The ultimate goal of the Sufis was the knowledge of the "Muḥam-
madan Reality" (*al-ḥaqīqa al-Muḥammadiyya*).[17] This could be obtained
only through following a prescribed method, in which purification
of the soul through Godfearingness (*taqwā*) played a major role. The
individual had to pursue religious knowledge in its diverse branches,
but also to remember God regularly by reciting specified *awrād* (sing.
wird: a kind of liturgy of Koranic verses, prayers and poems)[18] and
adopt a certain ethic (*ādāb*). A *murīd* (disciple) went through various
stages (*maqāmāt*). He was guided by his shaykhs who passed on their
knowledge and certified the disciples' progress with an *ijāza* (license).

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[11] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 77, Peskes, "Der Heilige", pp. 56f.
[12] Serjeant, "The Saiyids", pp. 8f.; Knysh, "The Sāda"; Peskes, "Der Heilige",
pp. 56f.
[13] On al-Nawawī, compare W. Heffening, "al-Nawawī", *EI* (CDRom).
[14] On *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, see Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, pp. 108–116, 151–154.
[15] ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAṭṭās, *al-ʿIlm al-nibrās*, p. 22 and ʿAlawī al-Ḥaddād, *ʿUqūd al-almās*,
pp. 65–74.
[16] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 77, gives the standard account of how Abū Madyan
asked his disciple ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad al-Ḥaḍramī al-Maghribī to go to
Hadhramaut, who in turn asked his student ʿAbdallāh al-Maghribī to carry out the
task of passing on his knowledge to Hadhrami scholars. For an analysis, see Bang,
Sufis, pp. 34f. On Abū Madyan, cf. G. Marçais Aast, "Abū Madyan", *EI* (CDRom).
[17] The following is based on Bang, Sufis, pp. 40–44, 160–166.
[18] L. Gardet, "Dhikr", *EI* (CDRom).

Occasionally, the *murīd* might also have been given a *waṣiyya* (testament, letter of advice) which contained practical and/or spiritual instruction.[19]

The *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, however, or rather its 19th and 20th century historians, added to this spiritual genealogy a second lineage which is based on direct descent of its leading members from the Prophet himself. Such a view clearly privileges the *sayyid*s among the members of the *Ṭarīqa*, although as we have seen a number of accounts mention both ʿAlawīs and non-ʿAlawīs among the first Hadhrami Sufis. Be that as it may, it is clear that among 19th and 20th century scholars and Sufis, there was a disproportionate number of ʿAlawīs. However, there were always outstanding and highly respected scholars and Sufis from other social strata, most notably the *mashāyikh*, who were regarded as members of the scholarly elite before the arrival of Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā al-Muhājir. Notable examples of such scholars are ʿAbdallāh b. Aḥmad Bā Sūdān (d. 1849) for the 19th century and the Zanzibari scholar ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr (d. 1925) for the 20th century.[20] Incidentally, Bā Kathīr gives a touching description of the regular Friday evening *mawlid* (celebration of the birth of the Prophet) by one of the great Sufi *shaykh*s of his time and founder of the *ribāṭ* (religious college cum Sufi convent) of Say'ūn, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī (d. 1333/1914), which conveys something of the spirit of charismatic Sufis:

> We arrived in Say'ūn after Maghreb and attended the *mawlid*, a great gathering of ʿAlawīs and others, which was celebrated by the Qurayshī scholar who is a knower in God,[21] our Sayyid ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī in his mosque which is called al-Riyāḍ. After the remembrance of the Chosen—prayers and peace be upon him—which is performed standing, our Sayyid ʿAlī sits down, as do those present. He explains morals and the remembering in a speech which flows from the bottom of his enlightened heart. His speech is so sparkling with light that it touches the hearts of his audience [. . .]. He is preaching in such a

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[19] Both *ijāza* and *waṣiyya* were quoted in order to justify an individual's claim to particular knowledge, i.e. by ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr in his *Riḥla* to prove to his East African audience his learning. In the case of famous scholars, such as ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī, they were collected and published, cf. his *Majmūʿ waṣāyā wa-ʾijāzāt*, Singapore 1990.

[20] On Bā Sūdān, see below, on Bā Kathīr Bang, Sufis, pp. 145–166.

[21] The Arabic term is "*al-ʿārif bi-l-llāh*", which refers to a Sufi who has been granted mystical insight through the help of God. I would like to thank Anne Bang for helping me to clarify this term.

completely absorbing manner, advising and shedding tears, that you
see the people fearful, with bowed heads, crying, not looking to their
left or right. You hear nothing but crying and sobs of the repentant
[. . .].[22]

As the theological and mystical aspects of both the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*
and Hadhrami Shāfiʿī learning in the 19th century have been dis-
cussed in considerable detail by Bang,[23] there is no need to go into
much further detail here. However, it seems worthwhile to briefly
comment on the outstanding figure of the blind 17th century scholar
ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-Ḥaddād. This gives some perspective to the
reformist activities of the 19th century and might help to prevent
some rash conclusions about their originality.

ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-Ḥaddād (1044/1634–35 – 1132/1719–20)
is not only known as a famed and creative poet who to this day is
widely read and quoted, but more importantly as the most promi-
nent scholar of his age (*ʿallāmat al-ʿaṣr*).[24] As such, he is remembered
for his revival of Hadhrami Sufism. In terms of the question of
defining whether certain issues were really new in the 19th century,
and of what had troubled Hadhramis for a much longer time, a
glance at his "al-Naṣāʾiʿ al-dīniyya" ("Religious advice") is revealing.
A certain Shaykh ʿAbdallāh Bā ʾl-Saʿīd al-ʿAmūdī asked the Shaykh
whether the denial of the wondrous deeds of the saints (*karamāt al-
awliyāʾ*) was outright blasphemy (*kufr*) or (only) an innovation (*bidʿa*).
Unsurprisingly, al-Ḥaddād recommended to believe in the *karamāt*
as these might be miracles attributable to (the revelation of) the
Prophet.[25]

Al-Ḥaddād was also noted for his strong conviction, expressed in
his many works, that even difficult theological questions needed to
be presented in such a manner that every believer could understand
them.[26] Not only was he interested in making himself understood by
his disciples, he also seems to have placed great importance on mis-

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[22] ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, pp. 26f.

[23] Bang, Sufis, chapters 1, 2 and 4.

[24] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 568. For the following, see ibid., pp. 568–571, al-
Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 320–336 and ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla* pp. 38–42. Some of
al-Ḥaddād's poems can be found on the webpage of the Bā ʿAlawī Society,
http://www.iqra.net (consulted on February 1, 2000).

[25] ʿAbdallah al-Ḥaddād, "al-Naṣāʾiḥ al-dīniyya" (first title in a collection of 11
different texts bound together under the title *al-Nafāʾis al-ʿalawiyya*), pp. 10f.

[26] For an incomplete list of his works, see al-Ziriklī, *Aʿlām*, vol. 4, p. 104.

sionary work in Hadhramaut, instructing two of his pupils to move to the area of Shibām in order to spread religious learning.[27] In addition, if we are to believe the later sources, al-Ḥaddād stood out among his contemporaries as a social reformer who dealt with a variety of issues. It seems that the 19th century reformers discussed in this chapter greatly resemble him and built on his ideas. For example, Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Zayn b. Sumayṭ, whose reformist ideas will be discussed below, constantly referred to al-Ḥaddād, and it seems that other scholars were also aware of his activities. [28]

Al-Ḥaddād seems to have been particularly troubled by the question of social (in)justice, repeatedly reminding the rich of their obligations vis à vis the poor. The rulers were not spared his advice with regard to the implementation of the *sharīʿa*. A famous issue in which he became involved was the question of whether or not the ruler should be allowed to collect and redistribute the alms tax (*zakāt*). He opposed this practice on the grounds that the rulers were usually unwilling to channel this money into proper investments benefitting the poor under the supervision of a rightly guided government (*taḥt ishrāf ḥukūma rashīda*).[29] Apparently, such advice did not endear al-Ḥaddād to the Yāfiʿī rulers of Tarīm, so he left the town and established a famous *ḥawṭa* on the outskirts. In many ways, this may be an early example of a notable and merchant who had come under pressure by the rulers, and therefore left the sphere of influence of these rulers to establish himself elsewhere, similar to the cases discussed in the last chapter. Furthermore, al-Ḥaddād became involved in mediation between warring tribes.

Interestingly, al-Ḥaddād was no poor blind scholar making a living from donations by his students, but rather a well-situated notable. Member of a family of great landowners, he himself apparently possessed sufficient land to be considered to be of "intermediary income".[30] Therefore, it is not surprising that he showed great interest in the

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[27] These two pupils were Muḥammad b. Zayn b. Sumayṭ and Aḥmad b. Zayn al-Ḥibshī. Bang, Sufis, pp. 64f. On al-Ḥaddād's high esteem for Muḥammad b. Sumayṭ, cf. Ibn Sumayṭ, "Majmūʿ al-kalām", p. 209. His tomb became the final destination of the major Shibāmī *ziyāra* in shaʿbān, Boxberger, *On the Edge*, p. 155.

[28] E.g. on the question of *zakāt*, on which he had left letters, al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 324, n. 1.

[29] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 324.

[30] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 325, calls him "*mutawassiṭī 'l-ḥāl*".

improvement of agriculture in Wadi Hadhramaut. Apart from sug-
gesting a system of three annual crops using increased amounts of
manure, al-Ḥaddād is famed as a chicken farmer. He was also
involved in long-distance trade, advising his relatives to travel abroad
to pursue trade (and presumably taking a share in this activity). By
the 1930s, the Āl Ḥaddād counted among the particularly well-rep-
resented families in the Netherlands East Indies.[31] Al-Ḥaddād seems
to have taken his own advice regarding the social obligations of
wealth to heart: he spent part of his fortune helping orphans and,
one may assume, his peace-making among the tribes also cost con-
siderable sums of money, given the inevitable demands on hospital-
ity and related expenditure.[32]

   In spite of al-Ḥaddād's primary fame as scholar and poet, we also
have to consider him as an active member of the economic elite of
Tarīm.[33] His political advice and involvement were not simply the
demands of a pious *sayyid* concerned about the decline in religious
standards and law, but those of a landowner and merchant con-
cerned about the safety of his income. I will return to this question
later. What is noteworthy here, however, is the fact that the com-
bined quest for religious and political reform, which has been noted
by Hartwig for the 19th century, was not a novelty except perhaps
in terms of its scale. Rather, many of the problems which concerned
al-Ḥaddād seem to have persisted or recurred.

Scholars and Community Leaders: Lives and Careers of Early 19th Century Reformers

The general slant of Hadhrami historiography makes it rather difficult
to discern much about the lives and careers of scholars apart from
their religious commitments. The extensive biography of the highly
respected 19th century scholar and reformer Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Hārūn

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[31] Bang, Sufis, p. 49.
[32] Although I have no evidence with regard to al-Ḥaddād in this matter, the fate
of Sayyid Abū Bakr al-Kāf, the famous mediator of the 1930s who, according to
all available accounts, spent all of his fortune on peace-making and other charita-
ble causes, may serve as an—albeit extreme—illustration of this point. See below,
chapter IX.
[33] It seems that the distancing of his descendants from the activities of the *sūq*,
which is reported by Serjeant, *The Saiyids*", p. 21, is a rather more recent phenomenon.

al-Junayd (1197/1783–1275/1858), which draws heavily on the memoirs of his son and thus on material relatively close to the deceased, therefore has to be considered a particularly valuable source.[34] It allows us to reconstruct in some detail the career and daily life of one of al-Ḥaddād's religious and worldly successors. In the absence of more detailed evidence, it is difficult to prove that al-Junayd's life was typical of the reforming 19th century scholars and notables. However, there are a number of indications that it was at least not extraordinarily different from the information on his colleagues which we can tease out from Ibn Ḥamīd and other biographical works.[35] For this reason, salient aspects of al-Junayd's biography will be presented in some detail here, with reference to comparable data, where available, about a number of reformers active in the first half of the 19th century. Their reform project will be discussed in the subsequent sections.

It has to be noted that not all scholars, and certainly not all members of the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, chose or even would have agreed with the words and deeds of the group described below. While the scholarly notables were very much part and parcel of the body politic, as will be shown, many of the mystics and scholars preferred to abstain from worldly affairs and often even limited their outside contacts.[36] Given the wide reading of al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn* with its criticism of scholars interested in worldly and political functions, it is clear that this attitude could be justified in theological terms.[37] It is reflected, for example, in ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī b. Ḥasan

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[34] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd al-asjadiyya*, pp. 16–162. About al-Junayd, cf. ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *ʿIqd*, vol. I, pp. 123–127, A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, pp. 184f., ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 287–291. Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 91 lists him as one of the leading reformers, without, however, discussing him further.

[35] This conclusion emerges if one compares the way in which Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, describes the network of teaching, travelling and religious commitments by the reformers. In talking of notables, I follow loosely Hourani's definition of a group of politically influential mediators between the ruler and the local population which is derived from the religious, economic, descent-based or other type of local influence on the one hand and access to the ruler, who depends on them to exercise certain necessary functions. See Hourani, "Ottoman Reform".

[36] Examples abound both in ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, e.g. Muḥīy al-Dīn b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn Balfaqīh, p. 81 and in ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥibshī, *Maṣādir*, e.g. biographies of Ṭāhā b. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Saqqāf, pp. 99–101 and of ʿUbaydillāh b. Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf, pp. 94–97.

[37] Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, pp. 108–116.

al-ʿAṭṭās'[38] book *al-ʿIlm al-nibrās*, in which he comments on the pref-
erences of *Ṭarīqa* members:

> They renounced the world and positions of leadership in it, and were
> content with the minimum of clothing, food and housing. None of
> them built except what he was forced to, and none of them accepted
> the money of the sultan or his aids, even if they were deserving. They
> would make do with a morcel of *ḥalāl* [permitted] food or some dates.
> If that was not found they would bear with it until they found some
> food, and would not appreciate if they were given any worldly pos-
> sessions.[39]

While this obviously echoes an ideal to which even some of the nota-
bles might have subscribed in spite of their worldly and religious
positions, it also expresses an ethic which differs considerably from
the kind of active involvement in reform (*iṣlāḥ*) which characterised
their lives. This dichotomy has long existed among Muslims, as the
example of al-Ghazālī shows. However, it gained additional poignancy
in the 18th and 19th centuries.[40]

Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd (1783–1858): Scholar, Traveller and Man of Wealth

Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd was born in Tarīm in 1783, where he
received his primary education from his parents, ʿAlī b. Hārūn al-
Junayd and his mother ʿAlawiyya. She was the sister of ʿAbdallāh
b. Abī Bakr ʿAydīd (d. 1255/1839), whose father was another major
reformer. After memorising the Koran, he studied with ʿAbdallāh b.
Shaykh al-ʿAydarūs in the well-known *ʿulma* Bā Gharīb. This was,
in terms of instruction, a local Koran school comparable to the *kut-
tāb* found elsewhere in the Muslim world. It had a particularly long
history, as it had been founded in the 10th century of the *hijra* (16th
century A.D.).[41] Al-Junayd then pursued his studies with *ʿulamāʾ* in
Tarīm and other parts of the Wadi. He is said to have read a wide
range of legal, linguistic and rationalist (*ʿaqlī*) subjects such as Koranic

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[38] ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās, d. 1334/1915–16, was born in Cirebon,
trained in Hadhramaut and taught in Calcutta. ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 254.

[39] ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAṭṭās, *al-ʿIlm al-nibrās*, p. 8.

[40] Voll, *Islam*, pp. 145–147.

[41] For the institution (and the vocalization of *ʿulma*), cf. al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 19
and Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 14, 111f. Ibn Hāshim calls the school
maʿlāma.

interpretation, tradition, jurisprudence and grammar, and to have studied the calculation of (prayer and other ritually important) times. He further learned logic, the art of Koran recitation and the different readings of the holy text.[42]

Al-Junayd visited Yemen three times, spending time in Zabīd, al-Mūkhā and Radā'. In Sana'a, where his brother 'Abdallāh was based, he stayed for an overall period of about six years. Among his Yemeni shaykhs were the prominent scholar Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Shawkānī (1760–1832), who had also taught the Shāfi'ī scholar 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān al-Ahdal (1766–1835).[43] Al-Ahdal had also been a teacher of al-Junayd's teacher 'Abdallāh b. Ḥusayn Balfaqīh.[44] For a number of reasons, this is a remarkable connection which is found repeatedly among the group of reformers.

First, al-Shawkānī was a leading religious reformer who was involved in the Sunnification of the Zaydī doctrine and rejected the division of Islamic law and practice into different schools. Instead, he promoted the notion of *ijtihād* or independent judgement by qualified scholars on the basis of thorough knowledge of Koran and *ḥadīth*.[45] Moreover, al-Shawkānī corresponded with Wahhābī scholars. In spite of differences with Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, he is still highly regarded in Saudi Arabia perhaps because the influence of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya is evident in his work.[46] While some of al-Shawkānī's doctrines must have appealed to those Hadhramī scholars who were themselves critical of certain excesses regarding the veneration of saints, his Wahhābī sympathies are likely to have repulsed them, given the recent experiences of Hadhramaut with the

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[42] Al-Junayd, *al-'Uqūd*, p. 25.

[43] There must be some mistake here on the part the author of *al-'Uqūd*, who lists Sulaymān b. Muḥammad and his son 'Abd al-Raḥmān as al-Junayd's teachers (p. 91). The famous Zabīdī scholars were Sulaymān b. Yaḥyā (not: b. Muḥammad) al-Ahdal, and his son 'Abd al-Raḥmān. However, Sulaymān died in the year of al-Junayd's birth, so that al-Junayd can only have partaken in his knowledge via the teachings of 'Abd al-Raḥmān or some of Sulaymān's other students. Cf. al-Ziriklī, *al-A'lām*, vol. 3, p. 138 for a short biography of Sulaymān, and p. 307 for a biography of 'Abd al-Raḥmān.

[44] On him Voll, "Linking Groups", pp. 79f. and Bang, Sufis, pp. 111f. Another student of al-Ahdal was Muḥammad, the father of 'Alī al-Ḥibshī discussed in ch. VI. Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, "Fuyūḍāt", p. 14.

[45] Haykel, "Order", pp. 87–132 provides a detailed discussion of Shawkānī's doctrine. Cf. Peters, "*Idjtihād*".

[46] Haykel, "Order", p. 102. I would like to thank Guido Steinberg for the information on the Saudi view of al-Shawkānī.

Wahhābī raids in 1805/6 and 1809/10 during which graves in Tarīm were destroyed, books burned, Sufi devotional exercises such as *rawātib* and *adhkār* banned and the inhabitants forced to pay ransom.[47] After all, one of the armed opponents of the second Wahhābī raid was Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir, one of al-Junayd's teachers.

Secondly, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān al-Ahdal, a Shāfiʿī scholar from the Tihāma, was a student and admirer of al-Shawkānī.[48] Stemming from a well-known family of *ḥadīth*-scholars, 'Abd al-Raḥmān had hosted Aḥmad b. Idrīs in Zabīd and studied with him. This probably marked the beginning of his initiation into mysticism, albeit of a very *sharīʿa*-based variant. Ibn Idrīs also seems to have encouraged al-Ahdal to exercise *ijtihād*, already promoted by al-Shawkānī.[49] Interestingly, both in terms of Islamic history and in comparison with European developments, Ibn Idrīs rejected the traditional role of the scholars as the authorised interpreters of *fiqh*, although he clearly did not object to scholarship as such. More important in his view was the piety (*taqwā*) of the believer.[50]

Furthermore, al-Ahdal was a student of Muḥammad Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, another prominent scholar of Indian origin who is said to have studied under Shah Walī Allāh.[51] Voll has shown in more detail how the scholarly circles of Zabīd were connected to "most major movements of the era", ranging from China and India and including the Wahhābīs and the influential Kurdish teacher of students

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[47] On the Wahhābī raids, see Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 120, 122. For a comment on the Wahhābī raids on al-Ḥurayḍa and Wādī ʿAmd, see ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, I; pp. 229–231. On al-Shawkānī's view re. the visitation of graves and the cult of the saints, see Haykel, pp. 156–171.

[48] Al-Shawkānī himself can be considered to have been a follower of the traditionist school (*ahl al-ḥadīth*), Haykel, "Order", p. 88.

[49] On Aḥmad b. Idrīs' period in the Yemen, see O'Fahey, *The Enigmatic Saint*, pp. 81–92. While Voll, "Linking Groups", p. 79, argues that 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ahdal became more involved with Sufism, possibly through the influence of Ibn Idrīs, at least the *ijāza* which Ibn Idrīs issued to al-Ahdal does not bear this out, O'Fahey, *The Enigmatic Saint*, p. 86. On the importance of the Ahdal-connection for the ʿAlawiyya, cf. Bang, Sufis, pp. 111f. For information on the relationship between al-Ahdal and al-Shawkānī, I would like to thank Bernard Haykel.

[50] On this and other important aspects of Ibn Idrīs' teachings, see Sedgwick, The Heirs, pp. 31–61.

[51] Voll, "Linking Groups", p. 78. On the Ahdal family's scholarly connections, see al-Ahdal, *al-Nafs al-Yamānī*. On Zabīdī and his links in the Islamic world, including the Ahdals, cf. Reichmuth, "Murtaḍā az-Zabīdī". On the Indian context, see Metcalf, *Islamic Revival"*, pp. 16–86.

from the Malay archipelago, Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (1615–90).[52] A number of influential Hadhrami scholars were at some time in their lives part of this intellectual milieu which shared an emphasis on *ḥadīth* scholarship in spite of the different orientations and backgrounds of its members.[53] Among them figure Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd, his teacher, ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn Balfaqīh, his colleague ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf al-Jifrī, and his student Abū Bakr b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭālib al-ʿAṭṭās (1801/2–1864/65) who also studied with Aḥmad b. Idrīs.[54] Furthermore, the influential scholar and friend of Aḥmad, Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr, corresponded with al-Ahdal.[55] We should not forget that the teachings of al-Ahdal and figures related to him spread more widely than these few names suggest, because most of their students became themselves influential teachers.[56]

The investigation of such networks can help us to describe the complexity of religious and social relations and their international range.[57] However, their interpretation is rather difficult exactly because of the multitude of these relationships. Voll has warned us of the difficulty of construing an agreement on doctrines and teachings among the *ḥadīth*-oriented scholars of the 18th and 19th centuries. However, he has alerted us to the fact that there existed a "relatively common mood" within the network, which is of particular relevance in the context of the Hadhrami developments discussed further on:

> There is a general sense of dissatisfaction with conditions as they are and a sense of hope for improvement. However, to the best of my

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[52] On al-Kūrānī, see A. Johns, "Al-Kūrānī", *EI* (CDRom).

[53] According to ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 324–328 and vol. II, p. 444 also Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAṭṭās and other Hadhrami scholars such as ʿUmar b. ʿUthmān Bā ʿUthmān studied with al-Ahdal. Additional Hadhrami links are mentioned by al-Ahdal, *al-Nafs al-Yamānī*, pp. 128f. and 231–239. For the emphasis on scripturalism among these reformist networks, which were often Sufi-led, cf. Commins, *Islamic Reform*, ch. 3, who discusses them in the Damascene context.

[54] On al-ʿAṭṭās, see Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, pp. 127–131 and Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, *Fuyūḍāt*, pp. 42–58. He was the most influential teacher of ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī, see chapter VI. Unfortunately, the biographies are quite silent on the nature of the influence of Aḥmad b. Idrīs.

[55] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 409.

[56] For example, Bang, Sufis, pp. 67f. points out how Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ was introduced to al-Ahdal's and Ibn Idrīs' teachings through his teacher, ʿUmar b. Saqqāf b. Muḥammad b. ʿUmar b. Ṭāhā.

[57] About the network approach, and its relevance for the Islamic context, see Roman Loimeier & Stefan Reichmuth, "Zur Dynamik religiös-politischer Netzwerke in muslimischen Gesellschaften", *WI* 36;2 (1996), pp. 145–185.

knowledge, this hope for improvement is oriented toward human activities rather than expectations of eschatological intervention. In this sense, the mood and mode of people within the network seem to have more of a *mujaddid* or revivalist tone than a Mahdist or messianic one.[58]

If we are to follow Voll's argument further, this revivalism was based on a combination of *ḥadīth* studies and membership in Sufi orders. Some of these were later sometimes characterised as "neo-Sufis". It is irrelevant here whether or not the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya* can or cannot be considered a "neo-Sufi" organisation, even if it is noteworthy that, at least in its 20th century practices, it seems to have been among the more austere Sufi orders.[59] It also shares an emphasis on al-Ghazālī's teachings with the "Neo-Sufis".[60] Far less speculative than the question of "Neo-Sufism" is the suggestion that the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, through the type of personal initiation and the close contacts between teachers and pupils, provided a framework within which dissatisfied Hadhramis could express and develop their ideas of how an unsatisfactory reality ought to be changed.

In addition to his Yemeni travels, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd undertook the pilgrimage to the *ḥaramayn* three times. He made one journey with his uncle ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Bakr ʿAydīd, and another as companion of his teacher and fellow reformer Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr (d. 1273/1856). While one of the biographies relates how Aḥmad and Ḥasan were robbed during their approach to Medina,[61] it does not give us much information about the important question of their Meccan shaykhs. Apparently, al-Junayd studied with ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Baytī and ʿAlawī b. ʿAbdallāh Mudahar, but little information is available on them. Al-Baytī also taught Aḥmad's teacher ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir (1191/1777–78 – 1272/1855–56).[62] Ḥasan report-

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[58] Voll, "Linking Groups", p. 81.

[59] Serjeant, *The Saiyids*, p. 20.

[60] On the emphasis on al-Ghazālī by Neo-Sufis, cf. Voll, "Hadith Scholars", p. 270. It must be pointed out, however, that it is not at all clear to what extent, if at all, this is a new development in Hadhrami Sufism.

[61] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 261.

[62] al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 92, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 590. ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 217 is extremely brief on this family, which seems to have had branches in Java, India and the Ḥijāz. Abū 'l-Khayr, *al-Mukhtaṣar*, pp. 351f., mentions al-Baytī as a recluse and gives little information. The most prominent family member seems to have been Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Baytī al-Saqqāfī, a famous poet who is mentioned by al-Murādī and al-Jabartī. I owe this information to John Voll. On him, see al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. 2, p. 129 and ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 217.

edly impressed the Meccan *ʿulamāʾ* and it seems that his writings were widely discussed,[63] although one can only speculate about the kind of scholarly exchanges in which the two Hadhrami scholars must have engaged. Finally, Sayyid Aḥmad travelled to Oman and Muscat ostensibly to study with ʿAlawī b. Ḥasan Mudahar.[64]

As befits such a learned individual, Sayyid Aḥmad became a devoted teacher. When he resided in the al-Nuwaydira quarter of Tarīm, he held a daily lesson in jurisprudence and doctrine in the mosque Bā Hārūn which lasted from the *al-fajr* prayer until after sunrise. Between the midday and afternoon prayers, he taught *ḥadīth* in the mosque of Shaykh Ḥusayn b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAydarūs after his teacher and predecessor had left for Java. Later, when he moved to the *ḥawṭa* of Tarīm, he gave up the early morning teaching in the mosque and instead received students in his home while the afternoon lesson was transferred to another mosque.[65] Al-Junayd acquired a reputation as a rigorous teacher who apparently did not hesitate to expose lazy students. He offered them a wide range of knowledge from traditional Shāfiʿī *fiqh* to literature and history. Among al-Junayd's students one finds, unsurprisingly, a number of individuals who were to play an outstanding role in the second half of the 19th century, such as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad al-Mashhūr (1834–1902) and ʿAlawī b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Bakr al-Mashhūr (1846/47–1922).

Aḥmad b. ʿAlī was not only a devoted teacher and the author of three (unpublished) books, he is also said to have led the life of an exemplary Muslim who observed the daily prayer times meticulously and spent much of the night praying and reading the Koran and *awrād*.[66] According to the account of his descendant, he generously supported charitable purposes and invested part of his property in

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Another, earlier member of this family, a certain ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, gained some influence over the Sultan of Sumenep (r. 1812–54) who, as a consequence, started to encourage Arab settlement in his realms. van den Berg, *Le Ḥadhramout*, p. 167. Sayyid Mudahar might have been the son of ʿAbdallāh b. Jaʿfar b. ʿAlawī al-Mudahar (d. 1747), who was a famous student of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-Ḥaddād, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 364f.

[63] Thus, Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās in 1908 recalled a discussion between Ibn Idrīs and his disciples about a *risāla* by Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr. Bā Faḍl, *al-Nafḥa al-miskiyya*, p. 79.

[64] For a detailed list of his teachers, see al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 29–93.

[65] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 95f., where he also describes later developments.

[66] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 100f. For the following, see ibid., pp. 101–103, 120.

the upkeep of mosques and graves, as suggested by al-Ḥaddād. Reportedly, he also owned and maintained a number of houses which were said to have belonged to famous scholars, most notably the house of al-Faqīh al-Muqaddam. This he incorporated into his own house and hoped to turn it into a place which could be visited by the followers of that famous Sufi.[67]

Al-Junayd was well-known for his hospitality. In a famous incident, his teacher Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr visited him with a large entourage. He apparently showed some apprehension about not being able to share the meal with all his companions who were distributed over two rooms. In old Hadhrami houses, the size of rooms was limited by the length of the mangrove poles which served as support for the ceiling. Al-Junayd noticed the dissatisfaction of his guest and, by dinner time, had builders knock down a wall so as to create one large dining hall to accomodate everybody in the same room.[68]

Such visits between teachers, students and friends, as well as the reception of visitors from overseas, were frequent occurrences in 19th century Hadhramaut and the means through which scholarly and political networks were built up and maintained.[69] When scholars visited each other, the visitors were offered lavish hospitality.[70] Such meals offered the opportunity for both scholarly and political exchange, which might explain Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ's dismay at the absence of some of his companions from the common session.[71] The visits also provided the occasion to pass on knowledge. This occurred not just between teachers and students, but was a widespread practice among scholars of equal rank who lived in different parts of the Wadi which was laborious and dangerous to cross.[72] Visitors might also have been taken to the graves of ancestors, either famous *ʿulamāʾ* and Sufis or

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[67] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 120. The likelihood of this episode is another question, as the mudbrick houses of Tarīm are not noted for their longevity.

[68] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 102–104.

[69] Ibn Ḥamīd's *Tārīkh* abounds with descriptions of the mutual visits. A number of *Riḥlāt* describe them, such as Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf's "Riḥla ilā Tarīm", al-Aḥqāf Library, Tarīm, manuscript no. 1030.

[70] Cf. Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, p. 27, where he describes the hospitality extended to him and his friends by ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī: "The table was covered with the best and most delicate foods, and very cold and sweet water".

[71] To this day, such meals, as well as other types of meetings, can be fairly formal occasions.

[72] A number of biographies explicitly discuss the "friends" and "colleagues" of their heroes, see, for example, Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, pp. 64–76, A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, pp. 303–362.

occasionally the forefathers of their hosts.[73] Collective visits of graves were commonplace among the Hadhrami *'ulamā'*, and Ibn Ḥamīd tells us how the Kathīrī Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin joined a group of *sayyid*s in their visit to a grave,[74] possibly to demonstrate his close association with them.

Where scholars could not meet face to face, they seem to have been engaged in intensive correspondence. Even *ijāza*s could be issued without immediate contact between teacher and pupil. An example is the famous *ijāza* issued by 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī, the above-mentioned Sufi from Say'ūn to Ṣāliḥ b. 'Alawī b. 'Abdallāh Jamal al-Layl (1844–1935), founder of the mosque-college of Lamu.[75] Unfortunately, not many of these letters are available to the historian.[76] However, those which are published are of great interest, as they show the mixture of religious and political interest as well as the exchange of personal information which probably also prevailed during the face-to-face meetings.[77]

The public demonstration of piety and respect for the forefathers, the charity, hospitality, communal visits of graves and the exchanges of *ijāza*s were, of course, more than just accidental manifestations of individual behaviour. "Prestige and authority exist to the extent that they are publicly displayed and reaffirmed", as Eickelman has pointed out.[78] Almost all biographies abound with accounts of these and comparable practices. They confirm the concept of public display, even if this should not cast doubt on the sincerity of the individuals' piety.

Aḥmad b. 'Alī was a pious Muslim, devout Sufi and devoted according to all accounts of his life. Nevertheless, we should not entirely ignore the circumstances which allowed him to lead such a

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[73] 'Abdallāh Bā Kathīr's *Riḥla* abounds with examples of this, see, for example, pp. 13, 47, cf. 'Aydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *'Iqd*, where he discusses his shaykhs and how he visited graves with them.

[74] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh* II; 157.

[75] On this issue, see Bang, Sufis, pp. 211–217. The *ijāza* was issued to three recipients, one of them being Ḥabīb Ṣāliḥ, who, in contrast to the other two, never met Sayyid 'Alī. For a copy of the text, see 'Alī al-Ḥibshī, *Majmū'*, p. 514.

[76] A number of the recently published biographies contain such letters and thus confirm that the practice seems to have been reasonably widespread. Cf. 'Alī al-'Aṭṭās, *Tāj*. Van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, pp. 163–290, contains a collection of private and business letters from the 1860s to 1880s, which he only analysed in linguistic terms, but which provide further evidence that letter-writing was a wide-spread practice in the 19th century.

[77] See the letters to Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Junayd in al-Junayd, *al-'Uqūd*, pp. 124–132.

[78] Eickelman, *Knowledge*, p. 127.

scholarly and charitable life. This was not a cheap affair, even if
one considers only the costs of travel, charity and hospitality. We
can identify some distinct sources of income of this prominent indi-
vidual who according to his descendant and biographer was "among
the people of great wealth" (*min ahl al-tharwa al-wāsiʿa*).[79] Firstly, al-
Junayd was a famous farmer who owned land in most of Hadhramaut,
a considerable portion of which was planted with date palms. Aḥmad
b. ʿAlī did not work the fields himself. Instead, he probably let his
land to members of a number of families who were presumably
members of the *ḥirthān* and worked according to the share-cropping
arrangements which were widespread in Hadhramaut.[80] Secondly,
al-Junayd regularly visited the villages of al-Sūm and al-Qawz, where
he held an estate. While we learn that he gave religious lessons in
the villages during these visits—possibly in pursuit of (inner) mission
(*daʿwa*)—presumably the main purpose of these excursions was eco-
nomic in nature. There is a certain likelihood that al-Junayd acted
as a creditor through the institution of *ʿuhda*.[81] *ʿUhda* transactions were
temporary sales of property which could be revoked once the seller
had gathered sufficient money to redeem his assets. Meanwhile, the
buyer had full usufruct of the property, i.e. in the case of agricul-
tural lands, he could either farm them himself or rent them to their
former owner.[82] One would expect that a combination of land own-
ership and credit, a common occurrence in societies without an insti-
tutionalised banking system, enhanced the prestige and power of
al-Junayd to the extent that it becomes difficult to separate one from

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[79] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 121.

[80] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 121 lists the Āl Jamīl and Āl al-Ṣāʿī in al-Fajīr, the Āl
al-Ḥamdī in al-Qawz and the Āl al-Qarawī in Tarīm and Damūn. On the prac-
tical arrangements of sharecropping, see Landberg, *Études*, vol. I, pp. 284–294. This
text indicates that most of the agricultural input had to come from the share crop-
pers. Cf. Bujra, *The Politics*, p. 65. An unrealised proposal for an agricultural law
from 1964, suggesting co-financing of agricultural input, seems to indicate that these
practices were rather persistent. The untitled document is contained in an unclassified
folder with the title "al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī
al-ṭullābiyya in the Sayʾūn Museum Archive. The archive also contains a large num-
ber of agreements pertaining to land (category VIII), which have, however, not
been analyzed for this study.

[81] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 98, writes: "*Fa-kāna kathīran mā yadhhab ilā qaryat al-Qawz,
wa-yadhhab ayḍan ilā qaryat al-Sūm, li-yataʿahhada baʿḍ amwālihi hunāka*". This could, of
course, also simply mean that he was supervising his estates there. Hadhramis whom
I have consulted on this matter could not tell with any certainty whether this means
that he simply oversaw his estates, or whether he engaged in *ʿuhda* transactions.

[82] On the institution of *ʿuhda* in Hadhramaut see Boxberger, "Avoiding *Ribā*".

the other.[83] Thirdly, an anecdote indicates that Aḥmad b. ʿAlī was also a merchant. When asked to issue an *ijāza* by a disciple, he reportedly answered:

> My son! I do not know anything about these matters, I do not know but the linens and merchandise in which I trade [. . .] do you want an *ijāza* in the sale of cotton?[84]

While this might have been a figurative way to show modesty, there clearly were family connections linking Aḥmad to linens. His brother ʿUmar in Singapore is credited with the introduction of muslin to Hadhramaut, and it is therefore not unlikely that Aḥmad acted as his agent in Tarīm.[85] However, his biographer reports that Aḥmad never wore any of the garments sent by his brother due to his concern for local cloth production,[86] which does not seem to be in line with trading in foreign cloth in Hadhramaut. Whether we are dealing here with a real contradiction, or rather with a particular type of moral discourse based not least on al-Ḥaddād's teachings and a certain vision of the issue of emigration cannot be resolved in this context.

Finally, al-Junayd received the annual sum of 100 *riyāl firansī* (Maria Theresia dollars) from his brother ʿAbdallāh in Sanaʾa. Unfortunately, we are told nothing else about this brother. A larger sum of 500 *riyāl* arrived every year from Singapore where Aḥmad's brother ʿUmar had become one of the foremost businessmen and to this day is celebrated as one of the city's pioneers.[87] Their uncle had already been an established trader in Palembang, Sumatra, and then called his nephew from Tarīm to Singapore to build up trade when the free port was established by Raffles in 1819. Unfortunately, there is currently no information available as to how long the family had maintained overseas branches. In any case, ʿUmar b. ʿAlī was extremely successful and might have returned to his homeland for good in 1835 following a request by Aḥmad had he not become a victim of

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[83] For a similar case of the coincidence of spiritual and economic power, see Bujra, *The Politics*.
[84] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 113f.
[85] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 168f.
[86] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 122.
[87] For ʿUmar's biography, see al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 164–183 and, from a quite different perspective, Pearson, *People*, pp. 91–96, for a history of the Junayd family branch in Singapore, cf. my "Arab Merchants".

the political divisions in Tarīm mentioned in the previous chapter.
Both brothers and their families were imprisoned and while Aḥmad
reportedly kept his resolve, 'Umar was so shocked that he returned
to Singapore after being freed upon payment of a large sum.[88]
Incidentally, he is best remembered among Hadhramis in Singapore
for traits shared with his brother Aḥmad, namely, *da'wa* among non-
Muslims, hospitality towards travellers, and charity including the
endowment of a number of mosques and a Muslim graveyard before
his death in 1858.[89] That this combination of *'ilm* (religious science)
and *tijāra* (trade) was the norm rather than the exception among
migrants is born out by many other family histories.[90] What is equally
interesting is 'Umar's ongoing involvement in Hadhrami politics
which is exemplified in his financial and material support for Sultan
Ghālib.[91] This constitutes a prime example for the translocal orien-
tation of such diaspora families.

Other Leading Notables in the First Half of the 19th Century

What do we know about the other leading reformers contemporary
to Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Junayd, most of whom were linked to him by
ties of learning, friendship and kinship? The list which Hartwig has
compiled on the basis of some published sources is by no means
complete. Unfortunately, it once again privileges *sayyid*s (and mem-
bers of the *Ṭarīqa 'Alawiyya*) over members of other strata who might
have participated in the reform process. Nevertheless, it can serve
as a useful starting point for an investigation into a group which has
effectively been recognised by Hadhrami historians as community
leaders.[92] Of the leading reformers listed by Hartwig, only two do
not seem to have maintained links with Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Junayd.
These are 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar b. Yaḥyā, one of the "seven 'Abdallāhs"
(*al-'abādila al-sab'a*) who became prominent 19th century reformers,
and Muḥammad b. Saqqāf al-Jifrī. Given 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar's close

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[88] Al-Junayd, *al-'Uqūd*, p. 141.
[89] Al-Junayd, *al-'Uqūd*, pp. 167, 176–178.
[90] Cf. Cannon, "Sharifian Intermediaries", about the al-Qadrī family in Kalimantan.
[91] Al-Junayd, *al-'Uqūd*, pp. 178, 180.
[92] Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 91f. Most biographies in 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, list
additional names, see, for example, p. 229, fn. 1, where 'Abdallāh b. Zayn Bā
Salāma is mentioned. As, however, the thirteen seem to be the ones most men-
tioned and cross-referenced, and as information on the others is often difficult or
impossible to find, this group will serve as the basis for the following analysis.

involvement with the Kathīrī sultanate, and the proximity of Tarīm and Masīlat Āl Shaykh, it is nevertheless likely that such a contact existed. Similarly, the proximity of Tarīs where ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf al-Jifrī and his brother (?) Muḥammad resided makes it likely that they were acquainted with Aḥmad.[93]

While Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd seems to have been somewhat exceptional in that he combined great wealth with very high religious standing,[94] the following short survey of what is known about the other leading reformers, all respected members of the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, may serve to illustrate the many traits which he shared with them.[95]

Ṭāhir (1184/1770–71 – 1241/1825–6) and ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn (1191/1777–1272/1855) played a major role in the reform movement, as will be discussed below. We know little about their family except that they had offspring in the Netherlands East Indies, but not whether they accrued any significant income either locally or from abroad.[96] In contrast to the widely travelled al-Junayd, the brothers seem to have stayed chiefly in Hadhramaut with the exception of a period of study and pilgrimage in the Ḥijāz.[97] Interestingly, one of ʿAbdallāh's teachers there was ʿAqīl b. ʿUmar b. Yaḥyā (d. 1247/1831–32) who also taught ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn Balfaqīh. ʿAqīl b. ʿUmar, who seems to have been of high integrity, was widely praised, not least by Aḥmad b. Idrīs.[98] The son of this *ālim*, Isḥāq b. ʿAqīl b. Yaḥyā (d. 1271/1854–55), became the head of the Meccan *sayyid*s and played a major role in intrigues in both the Ḥijāz and Hadhramaut such as the abortive attack on al-Shiḥr in 1851.[99] Ṭāhir

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[93] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 125, only mentions ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf as a "colleague" (*zamīl*) who pursued similar political aims, which does not, strictly speaking, prove any direct connection.

[94] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 132.

[95] To avoid lengthy references for each individual, only relevant passages from the biographies are directly referenced. For all individuals, the entries in al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, in ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *ʿIqd*, in ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj* as well as other biographical information available in al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, in ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla* and in the histories of Ibn Ḥamīd and al-Shāṭirī has been checked. Other sources, such as Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf's "Fuyūḍāt al-baḥr", are only quoted where their information stems from sources other than the above. The names of leading reformers have been underlined to ease reading.

[96] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 586.

[97] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 590.

[98] Abū 'l-Khayr, *Mukhtaṣar*, pp. 339f.

[99] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 313–314, Abū 'l-Khayr, *Mukhtaṣar*, p. 128. About the office of *raʾīs al-sāda*, cf. chapter IV.

Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Shawkānī (Sanaʿa)
(1760-1832)

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān al-Ahdal (Zabīd)
(1766-1835)

Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir al-ʿAlawī
(1770/71 - 1825/26)

ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir al-ʿAlawī
(1777/78 - 1855)

ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Bakr ʿAydīd (uncle)
(d. 1839)

ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn Balfaqīh
(1783/84 - 1849/50)

brothers

Sālim b. Abī Bakr ʿAydīd (uncle)
(d. 1813/14)

ʿAbdallāh b. Sālim b. Shihāb (uncle)
(d. 1847)

Aḥmad ʿAlī al-Junayd
(1783-1858)

Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr (co-hajjī)
(d. 1856)

Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ
(1769/70 - 1841/42)

ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf al-Jifrī
(d. 1856/57) father/son

ʿAbdallāh b. Aḥmad Bā Sūdān
(d. 1849)

Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf
(1796/97 - 1873)

ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar b. Yaḥyā
(d. 1849)

ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿd b. Sumayr
(d. 1845/46) father/son

ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. M. al-Mashhūr
(1834-1902)

Sālim b. ʿAbdallāh b. Sumayr
(d. 1873)

Shaykh al-Kāf
(d. 1910)

ʿAlawī b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. A. al-Mashhūr
(1846/47 - 1922)

→ teacher

↔ colleagues or listed as each other's teachers

Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd and the Reformers of the Early 19th Century

and ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn took a keen interest in developments in the wider Muslim world. In a letter to Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd in 1823, they report news gathered during the *ḥājj* such as the fighting between the Ottomans and Europeans, as well as Muḥammad ʿAlī's advance in the Sudan.[100]

Much more is known about Aḥmad's uncle ʿABDALLĀH B. ABĪ BAKR ʿAYDĪD (d. 1255/1839–40). His family seems to have had members in most regions to which Hadhramis migrated.[101] He is once again mostly mentioned as a pious Sufi, devoted teacher and charitable person. A student relates his last encounter with ʿAydīd, in which the latter's economic success is mentioned, on which the sources are normally silent:

> We were attending the Friday prayer in Tarīm together with the afore-mentioned *Ḥabīb*[102] ʿAbdallāh, who was very ill. I saw how he shed sweat from his forehead to his feet. This was because of the strength of his concerns with beneficial work and gainful trade [*al-aʿmāl al-ṣāliḥa wa-l-matājir al-rābiḥa*]. After the prayer, we left Tarīm for al-Masīla. Upon arrival, we heard about his death.[103]

Like Aḥmad, ʿAbdallāh was widely travelled. He had visited Aden and Highland Yemen and settled for some years in Sanaʾa. On the Peninsula, he also visited the Ḥijāz and Muscat. Furthermore, ʿAbdallāh spent time in Singapore, Malacca and Java. Java provided a refuge for him after ʿUmar b. ʿAbdallāh b. Muqayyaṣ' (r. 1826–28) failure to establish lasting political rule. ʿAydīd had supported Ibn Muqayyaṣ and served as his advisor (*mustashār*) or minister (*wazīr*).[104] Even before that episode, ʿAydīd, presumably a rather wealthy *ʿālim*, and his family seem to have come under considerable pressure in their hometown of Tarīm. After the killing of ʿAbdallāh's brother Sālim (d. 1813/14), he became convinced to join a number of *sayyid*s who left the town and settled on the outskirts, not unlike ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-Ḥaddād.[105]

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[100] Al-Junayd, *ʿUqūd*, p. 78.
[101] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 548. For the following biography, ibid., pp. 549–551.
[102] Literally: the beloved. In Hadhramaut, *ḥabīb* is used to address *sayyid*s.
[103] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 280f.
[104] On ʿUmar b. ʿAbdallāh b. Muqayyaṣ, Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 162f., ʿAydīd's role as *wazīr* is discussed also on p. 119, and Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 96.
[105] Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, p. 119, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 551.

ʿABDALLĀH B. ḤUSAYN BALFAQĪH (1198/1783–84 – 1266/1849–50)
was born in Tarīm where he is also buried. A well-known Sufi,[106]
he had a reputation as the most learned of the seven ʿAbdallāhs in
jurisprudence (*afqah al-ʿabādila al-sabʿa*), in addition to being well-
versed in the other Islamic sciences. Balfaqīh served as Imām in the
mosque of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf in Tarīm, and was a much
sought-after *muftī* according to his student and successor in that post,
al-Junayd.[107] The famous Yemeni shaykhs al-Shawkānī and al-Ahdal,
as well as a number of Meccan shaykhs figure among his teachers.[108]
Similarly, ʿABDALLĀH B. ʿALĪ B. ʿABDALLĀH B. ʿAYDARŪS B. SHIHĀB
AL-DĪN (1187/1773–74 – 1264/1847–48) is best known for his extra-
ordinary scholarship which reputedly he had acquired at a very early
age.[109] While not much is known about his circumstances or indeed
his career, his *ijāza* to ʿAydarūs b. ʿUmar al-Ḥibshī issued in 1254/
1838–39 contains a hint of regret at early political involvement. It
is worth quoting as it might help to explain the disillusionment of
the early reformers:

> Beware to enter into that which does not have meaning, particularly
> the affairs of the commoners and the harmful views of the ignorant.
> They are like phantoms, they cause the distant to approach you, and
> those close to you seem distant. This is a matter which we have tested,
> and thus lost the prime of our (life)time, youth and strength. Beware,
> beware.[110]

(AL-)ḤASAN B. ṢĀLIḤ B. ʿAYDARŪS AL-JIFRĪ AL-BAḤR was born in Khalʿ
Rāshid, also known as al-Ḥawṭa or *ḥawṭat* Aḥmad b. Zayn al-Ḥibshī[111]
near Shibām in 1191/1777–78. He studied with ʿUmar b. Zayn b.
Sumayṭ (d. 1207/1792–93), who is best known as the father of the
famous reformer Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Zayn b. Sumayṭ who will be
discussed below. It seems that he and his mother moved to his grand-

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[106] ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥibshī, *Maṣādir*, p. 244.
[107] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 36f. See also ʿA. al-Mashḥūr, *Shams*, pp. 399f. (fn. 2).
[108] ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *ʿIqd*, vol. I, pp. 130–150 and A. al-Mashḥūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol.
I, p. 168, fn. 1.
[109] ʿA. al-Mashḥūr, *Shams*, pp. 145f.
[110] ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *ʿIqd*, vol. I, p. 116. I would like to thank Anne Bang and
Knut Vikor for help in clarifying this section.
[111] Both names seem to have been used in the past, possibly because originally
the two places were separate and then grew into one. See, for example, Ibn Ḥamīd,
Tārīkh, vol. I, pp. 321f. and ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 259, who makes clear that
the two names referred to one place at the time of his writing (1373/1953–54). As
they might, in the 19th c., still have been separate, the names will be used as
recorded in the sources.

father's house in Dhū Aṣbaḥ after the early death of his father. His first teacher, who taught him the Koran and remained in close contact with him in later years, was ʿABDALLĀH B. SAʿD B. SUMAYR (d. 1845). In his youth, Ibn Sumayr was judge in Ḥaynin before moving as Imām and preacher to the *ḥawṭa* of Aḥmad b. Zayn al-Ḥibshī, i.e. into the proximity of al-Jifrī's family.[112] Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ's involvement in the scholarly network of the Yemen has already been mentioned as has his journey to the Ḥijāz with his friend Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd. It is possible that he undertook further journeys.[113] What we do learn, in contrast, is that he deeply loved all creatures. Once he took in an underfed dog (considered as dirty), which was interpreted as an expression of his fullhearted compassion.[114] Obviously, this also extended to humans, and he enjoyed a reputation as a particularly generous individual who, for example, invited the poor to a wedding dinner prepared for invited guests. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf, himself a prominent *ʿālim* in the 20th century, characterised Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ as the outstanding *ʿālim* of his time (*waḥīd Ḥaḍramawt*).[115]

Once again, the sources reveal little about the specific circumstances in which Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ lived. However, he came from a family with branches in many parts of the diaspora, notably India and the Malay world, but also in Aden and Laḥij. There are some indications that he received subsidies from outside, presumably like many of his colleagues. Thus, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī's brother ʿUmar bequeathed him 500 Maria Theresia dollars upon his death. When Aḥmad delivered the money to Ḥasan, the latter reportedly complained that God's punishment had been delivered prematurely (in the form of money). Reportedly, the money was then distributed on the spot to those in need.[116] Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, who died in 1273/1856, was closely involved with Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd in "the revolt

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[112] About this scholar, information beyond his scholarly network as recounted in ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *ʿIqd*, vol. II, pp. 47–50, is extremely scarce. He is, however, mentioned repeatedly as one of the seven ʿAbdallāhs (cf. al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 396) and as teacher or student of other reformers (cf. the entries in ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*). About Ibn Sumayr's relationship with Ḥasan al-Jifrī, see Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 340.

[113] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 409, speaks of journeys (*riḥlāt*).

[114] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 259–60. On the impurity of dogs, cf. F. Vire, "Kalb", *EI* (CDRom).

[115] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt" 31, p. 530.

[116] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 261. For a less flowery account, which insinuates that Ḥasan received money more than once, see ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 410.

against the tyrannical and corrupted rulers", which will be discussed below.[117]

Another particularly active reformer was the aforementioned AḤMAD B. ʿUMAR B. ZAYN B. SUMAYṬ (1183/1769–1257/1841) of Shibām.[118] Similar to his colleagues, he was well acquainted with the Sufi tradition of the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, including that of Ibn Idrīs and al-Ahdal. Reportedly, he also studied in the Ḥijāz and at al-Azhar in Cairo.[119] His criticism of the manners and customs associated with visits to the shrines of the 'saints' (*awliyāʾ*) bears testimony to these influences.[120] Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ was a particularly active reformer whose wide-ranging ideas will be outlined below. Although we do not know anything about Ibn Sumayṭ's personal circumstances, his close association with the merchants of Shibām is quite evident from the initiatives which he took, and it is by no means impossible that he or his family were active members of the business community.

ʿABDALLĀH B. ʿUMAR B. YAḤYĀ (1209/1794, d. 1265/1849) with the nickname *ṣāḥib al-baqara* (owner of the cow) was born and lived in the village of Masīlat Āl Shaykh.[121] He studied with distinguished scholars in Hadhramaut, among them his uncles, Ṭāhir and ʿAbdallāh, the sons of al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir. Of the group discussed here, Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ, Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr, ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Bakr ʿAydīd, ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿd b. Sumayr and ʿABDALLĀH B. AḤMAD BĀ SŪDĀN figured among them. The latter, who lived in al-Khurayba in Wadi Dawʿan (d. 1266/1849), was visited by von Wrede in 1843, who describes him as an old, much venerated scholar.[122] Besides his learning, he was most noted for his composure and dreams.[123]

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[117] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 86.

[118] If not indicated otherwise, the following is based on an anonymous article, "Khawāṭir sāniḥa, wa-arāʾ nāṣiḥa" [henceforth "Khawāṭir"], *Majallat al-Rābiṭa al-ʿAlawiyya*, vol. II, 7, rabīʿ al-thānī 1349/Sept. 1929, pp. 252–275, especially pp. 253–258, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 577–579 (who mainly uses the aforementioned article) and Bang, Sufis, pp. 67–72.

[119] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 250.

[120] This is expressed in his "Waṣāyā wa-mukātabāt", al-Aḥqāf Library ms. 2546. I would like to thank Mikhail Rodionov for this information.

[121] In comparison to his political role, the biographical information on ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar b. Yaḥyā is relatively scant. On him see ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 311, ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *ʿIqd*, vol. II, pp. 127–130, ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 269–275 and A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, p. 168, fn. 2.

[122] Von Wrede, *Reisen*, pp. 98f.

[123] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 317–322. The terms used are "*al-razāma wa-l-ʿulm*", ibid., p. 320. Given the reputation of Bā Sūdān, it is likely that these dreams

Among ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar's teachers, we also come across the figures of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān al-Ahdal in Zabīd and ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Rasūl al-ʿAṭṭār and Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAmūdī in Mecca.[124] ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar was among the widely travelled: he spent some time in Cairo, in Hyderabad (where he was given the eponymous cow which reportedly was to accompany him on his further travels)[125] and in Java. While we are only told about travels to spread the word of God[126] and while scholars like him were likely to be maintained to some degree by the gifts of their students, this must either have reached rather unusual proportions or ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar followed some additional wordly pursuits such as trade during these travels. At any rate, he became extremely rich which enabled him to support the Kathīrī Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin al-Kathīrī with substantial funds. In exchange, together with Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf and others he became an influential adviser to the sultan, as will be discussed in the next chapter.[127]

ʿALAWĪ B. SAQQĀF B. MUḤAMMAD AL-JIFRĪ (d. 1273/1856–57) who lived in Tarīs was another outstanding scholar who had studied in Sanaʿa with al-Shawkānī, as well as with scholars in Dhamār. He seems to have owned significant real estate for which he employed the historian Ibn Ḥamīd as land surveyor and writer. More importantly in our context, however, he was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of the Kathīrī dynasty.[128]

MUḤSIN B. ʿALAWĪ B. SAQQĀF AL-SAQQĀF (1211/1796–97 – 1290/1873)[129] in Sayʿūn is the last ʿālim and reformer of this wider circle who will be discussed here. Son of another supporter of the Ibn

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are what is characterised more generally under visions, cf. H. Daiber, art. "Ruʾya", *EI* (CDRom). On Bā Sūdān, cf. ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, pp. 148–150 and ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥibshī, *Maṣādir*, p. 244.

[124] Both are not entered in Abū 'l-Khayr, *Mukhtaṣar*.

[125] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 273.

[126] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 273: "*wa-lammā dakhal al-Hind li-nashr al-daʿwa*".

[127] Al-Shāṭirī, *Tārīkh*, p. 410, fn. 1.

[128] On ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf al-Jifrī, see the introduction by ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥibshī to Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, notably pp. 13–16 and ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *ʿIqd*, vol. II, pp. 19–23. He is not to be confused with ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf b. Muḥammad b. ʿUmar b. Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf (d. 1235/1819–20), who was another famous member of the circle surrounding the Ibn Ṭāhir brothers and who is discussed in ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 210f.

[129] On Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī, see ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 229–231, A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, pp. 182f., ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf, *Tārīkh al-shuʿarāʾ*, vol. 4, pp. 1–22, ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī, *ʿIqd*, vol. II, pp. 1–18, ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 489–500.

Ṭāhir brothers,[130] Muḥsin studied with Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd, continued in this tradition and became even more famous than his father as a social reformer (*muṣliḥ ijtimāʿī*).[131] He was a devout Sufi, who was appointed judge in Sayʾūn at the young age of 24 and upon the death of his shaykh, ʿAlī b. ʿUmar b. Saqqāf. He evaded this office by travelling to al-Shiḥr.[132] Although the judicial office then went to somebody else, upon his return, Sayyid Muḥsin was made "leader" of Sayʾūn.[133] Later he spent some time in Mecca, where he became the teacher and close associate of the Hadhrami scholar, traveller and reformer, Abū Bakr b. Shihāb, as well as the teacher of the above-named ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī.[134] It is noteworthy that the al-Saqqāf family was not only a notable scholarly family of Hadhramaut, but also of Jeddah and Singapore. There, they counted among the wealthiest Arabs who engaged in trade and shipping and owned plantations.[135]

An interesting aspect of Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī's career is the pact (*mīthāq*) which he concluded with ʿABDALLĀH B. ʿUMAR B. YAḤYĀ and Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn b. ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥibshī in 1251/1836. Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥibshī (1213/1798–99 – 1281/1865) was a preacher trained with the Hadhrami, as well as Yemeni, Egyptian and Syrian *ʿulamāʾ* who moved between different towns in Hadhramaut at the instruction of Sayyid ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir. He later settled in Mecca where he became Shāfiʿī *muftī*.[136] The three *ʿulamāʾ* committed themselves to call on the *sayyid*s and others to devote their efforts to (religious) science (*ʿilm*) and practical effort (*ʿamal*), and to follow the requirements of the *sharīʿa* and the traditions of the noble ancestors.[137] The contents of the pact are pretty much the standard

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[130] His father is ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf b. Muḥammad al-Saqqāf, mentioned in fn. 128 above.

[131] ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf, *Tārīkh al-shuʿarāʾ*, vol. 4, p. 6, ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 498f.

[132] This episode is also related by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt" 29, p. 249.

[133] Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, "Fuyūḍāt al-baḥr", p. 65: "*wa-lammā rajaʿa ilā Sayʾūn asnadat ilayhi zaʿāmat al-bilād*".

[134] On Abū Bakr b. Shihāb al-Dīn, see chapter IV, on ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī chapter VI.

[135] On the al-Saqqāf in Singapore, see Freitag, "Arab Merchants".

[136] See Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, "Fuyūḍāt", pp. 13–16 for a biography of Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥibshī.

[137] For the text of the agreement, see ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf, *Tārīkh al-shuʿarāʾ*, vol. 4, pp. 6–7 (fn. 1) and Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, "Fuyūḍāt", p. 15.

lore of the revivalists.[138] However, what seems unique as far as Hadhrami accounts of this and the preceding generation are concerned is the fact that three friends committed themselves to these aims in writing. This might be a first instant of the formation of an association, something which became very popular in the early 20th century, as will be seen in chapter VI.

If one tries to sum up the salient characteristics of the group introduced above, such an attempt is hampered by the very uneven distribution of information. It is fairly clear that we are dealing with a closely connected group of individuals who were linked through a tight network of scholarly contacts. These were enhanced by their common membership in the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya* which created the additional bond of *murshid* and *murīd* in particular between older and younger members. In religious terms, it can be observed that rather close connections existed to revivalist networks outside Hadhramaut, most notably in the Yemen. This is important in so far as we can observe the same drive towards the improvement of the human condition among a significant number of these scholars which has been noted by Voll for the revivalists elsewhere. It is furthermore remarkable that quite a few of them had travelled themselves rather than merely being acquainted with wider networks through teachers in Hadhramaut. They had broadened their outlook considerably and were likely reformers, given the importance of travel for introducing change in premodern societies.

It is also noteworthy that at least some of the individuals discussed seem to have formed part of the socio-economic elite of Hadhramaut. Their income was derived partly from local resources, most notably landownership and trade, and partly from their close connections with the diaspora. Did this in any way interfere with their role as scholars? The evidence seems to point to the contrary. Doumani, writing about a similar situation in Palestine, explained this phenomenon as follows:

> The surest way for merchants to accumulate this type of capital [reputation] was through the cultivation of religious status, whether by means of education, marriage into a well-known family of religious

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[138] It can be also found in the writings of Sayyid Faḍl Pāsha, such as his *Īḍāḥ al-asrār al-ʿalawiyya wa-minhāj al-sāda al-ʿalawiyya*, Cairo 1898, and in the works of Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ. I would like to thank Anne Bang for this information.

scholars, service in a mosque, charity to religious institutions, or mem-
bership in a Sufi order. Combining a religious career with a business
career was the norm rather than the exception and had the aura of
a time-honored tradition. The religion-trade connection was so deeply
ingrained, in fact, that the very language of merchants was, and still
is, heavily coded with religious phrases. This does not mean that reli-
gion was used cynically as a tool of manipulation. Rather, it served
as a medium of communication that reinforced actual or perceived
attitudes and behavior. The aim was not to encourage popularity as
much as to instill authority and respect, on the one hand, and to build
a sound reputation for piety, honesty, trustworthiness, and moral upright-
ness, on the other. From the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries
many of the Arafat men, like members of other established merchant
families, were educated religious scholars, as indicated by their titles
in the family tree [. . .].[139]

Even where there are no indications that individuals possessed great
wealth, their membership in this group might well have given them
some limited access to economic resources. However, it is well pos-
sible that in some cases their cultural capital as religious leaders com-
pensated them for the lack of economic resources.[140]

In the following discussion, this group will be considered as some-
thing of an elite which played a disproportionately important role
in the developments of 19th century Hadhrami history and which
liked to regard itself as the "people of unbinding and binding" (*ahl
al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd*), i.e., the representatives of the community.[141] In turn
they each had networks of students and followers, who helped to
contribute to the relative influence of the group's ideas. For exam-
ple, we are told that the father of the above-mentioned ʿAlī b.
Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī was a *dāʿī* who had moved between different
villages of Hadhramaut on the instructions of ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn
b. Ṭāhir "from whose orders he never diverged in anything".[142]

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[139] Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine. Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus,
1700–1900*. Berkeley etc.: University of California Press 1995, p. 66.

[140] Obviously, not all scholars of the period formed part of this elite. As there
has not yet been a thorough study of Hadhrami *ʿulamāʾ* in the 19th c., one might
only speculate about possible reasons (relations of kinship, marriage and other loy-
alties, origins, shared views, wealth) why somebody did or did not become part of
the group. However, we need to take Gilsenan's warning serious that "the ʿulama
are not and have never been either a social class or even a corporate group."
Recognizing Islam, pp. 52f.

[141] For such a view, cf. Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 55. On the concept, see
"Ahl al-Ḥall wa-l-ʿAḳd", *EI* (CDRom).

[142] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt: bilāduhā wa-sukkānuhā" 29, p. 243.

However, such a self-view should not blind one to the severe limitations of this image. First of all, such an approach means that a perspective is favoured which privileges the urban groups and the development of *dawla*-type polities over the tribal view. Secondly, the cooperation between the members of this group and a number of tribal leaders was only one albeit important step towards the establishment of political rule and institutions. In addition, the different cities and most likely also the rural areas were home to other groups who played a crucial role when it came to organising political and economic concerns. A systematic investigation of the Hadhrami 'elite' would thus demand a much wider perspective which is, however, impossible to reconstruct for lack of sources. Ibn Ḥamīd at least gives a few glimpses which confirm that other groups participated in the discussion of events. For example, he mentions how in 1260/1844 a number of *sayyid*s led by Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf al-Saqqāf met with the "leaders of the [taxpaying] subjects" (*aʿyān al-raʿīyya*) outside Sayʾūn to discuss the future of their city.[143] Similarly and in the context of a dispute between the population of Sayʾūn and the Kathīrī sultan about taxes in 1270/1853–54, we learn that the Kathīrīs "consulted the inhabitants of the city, *sayyid*s and Arabs",[144] which again suggests that the urban elite of Sayʾūn included people other than the dominant *ʿulamāʾ* and notables. It probably comprised the leaders of different strata, whose words and actions might have carried different weight. In matters which concerned the city or polity as a whole, they all had to be consulted regardless of their relations with each other.[145]

Although the above group only represents part of the elite, it was nevertheless an important part, not least because most of its members combined noble descent, scholarship and high economic status. Therefore, its suggestions and actions for change convey something of how the non-tribal elite of the Hadhrami population would have liked the country to be organised.

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[143] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, pp. 336f.
[144] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 123.
[145] For a similar phenomenon in Syria, see Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1985, pp. 131f.

Notables as Reformers and Political Leaders (c. 1790s–1840s)

The Hadhrami historians give some idea of the oppositional move-
ments which were led by members of the group of scholars discussed
above.[146] They report their different actions which consisted of emi-
gration (*hijra*) from the cities to the countryside, moral and financial
support for a number of different tribal leaders and most spectacu-
larly the brief attempt by one of their number, Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn
b. Ṭāhir al-ʿAlawī, to assume political leadership in 1805. As these
activities are generally presented as unspecified attempts to end dis-
cord and set up an Islamic government, it is worthwhile to consider
in some detail the reform programme by Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Zayn
b. Sumayṭ, which has been handed down in some detail. Until the
20th century, reformist scholars referred to it in their legal judge-
ments.[147] Notions like the ones developed by Ibn Sumayṭ dominated
the political discourse on which the notables based their reform ini-
tiatives, which will be discussed in the final part of this chapter.

The Reform Ideas of a Sufi: Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Zayn b. Sumayṭ

Like his fellow reformers, Ibn Sumayṭ called for a just ruler (*al-wālī
al-ʿadl*) and *sharʿī* rule. As befits a Sufi and scholar, however, the
notions about the reform of this world (*dunyā*), were integrated into
a wider perspective of the relationship between religion (*dīn*) and
dunyā.[148] Ibn Sumayṭ's reform programme was based on the convic-
tion that "Hadhramaut needs three qualities: conviction of the heart,
which is the basis, economy of expenditure and sufficient hands".[149]

By "conviction of the heart", Ibn Sumayṭ referred to the right
religion. It is thus unsurprising that Ibn Sumayṭ took keen interest
in the question of mission and education. A cornerstone of educa-

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[146] For a summary of the activities, see Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 89–98.
[147] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf thus quotes Ibn Sumayṭ on the
question of interest on loans, see his Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt, vol. II, pp. 324f.
[148] Many of Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ's teachings were collected by his student Daḥmān
b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar Bā Dhīb Laʿjam in Majmūʿ kalām sayyidinā al-imām . . . al-
Ḥabīb Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ. They reveal clearly the dominance of Sufi
influences on his thought and are used as the basis for the following analysis.
[149] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 137. The original reads: "Ḥaḍramawt taḥtāj ilā
thalāthat khiṣāl qināʿa fī 'l-qalb wa-hiyya ummuhinna wa-qtiṣād fī 'l-kharj wa-wa- [sic]kifāya
fī 'l-yadd".

tion was to spread the call to God (*daʿwa*), not least among the village dwellers who were suspected of religious laxity. Ibn Sumayṭ's pupil gives a touching description of how his master used to mount his donkey before the rise of dawn to avoid the heat of the sun, and headed for the villages to pursue *daʿwa*.[150] Ibn Sumayṭ also enlisted the help of fellow *sayyid*s for this purpose and financially supported the *duʿā* (sing. *dāʿī*, propagandists) who toured villages and often spoke from minarets to the population. The muezzin was also urged to read the *fātiḥa*, the first *sūra* of the Koran, from the minarets in order to instruct everybody including the women. Ibn Sumayṭ was particularly concerned about the mingling of men and women, be it due to sheer ignorance or as a consequence of the employment of female servants.[151]

Ibn Sumayṭ also tried to spread Koran schools and standardise their teaching.[152] He was particularly concerned about the Beduins who could not be reached this way. He offered them instruction whenever they visited Shibām, arguing that they could not be reproached for their religious ignorance as long as there was no serious effort to convey the religious message. Similarly, he advised the *qabāʾil*, not least the Āl Kathīr from whom he had taken a wife, to teach their children. Besides the obvious religious aims, this was the only way to achieve what Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir had preached, namely to convince the tribes to put down their arms and accept the jurisdiction of the *ʿulamāʾ* instead.[153]

Women also needed to study their religion. Ibn Sumayṭ emphasized that Islam was directed at both sexes. In the latter case, religious knowledge was particularly necessary to safeguard the proper education of future generations.[154] Therefore, Ibn Sumayṭ taught a group of women who were then charged with carrying the message to other women and girls in their houses, something which is supposed to have become a widespread practice. Reportedly, one additional benefit was that the women now could censure men for 'wrong'

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[150] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 26.
[151] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 76, 81.
[152] *Thumma akhadha fī taʿmīm al-katātīb li-l-taʿlīm wa-waḍaʿa lahā niẓāman*, "Khawāṭir", p. 255.
[153] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 186f.
[154] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 83–88, 135, 246–248. A number of 19th c. reformers had obtained their early religious instruction from both female and male elders in the family.

behaviour,[155] which might be interpreted as a tightening of religious censuring.

According to Ibn Sumayṭ, pious life almost inevitably brought greater economy in spending. This is reflected in the following typical saying: "The one whose mind has become perfected will abstain from worldly matters".[156] It contained his interpretation of Koran 62;11, qul mā ʿīnd Allāh khayr min al-lahw wa-l-tijāra ("Say: 'That which God has in store is far better than any merriment or any commerce'"). Consequently, Ibn Sumayṭ was a severe critic of emigration in pursuit of wealth. He feared for the emigrants' piety and for the (religious) education of their children. He also resented the neglect of the families who were left behind and whom he compared to orphans and widows.[157] Instead, he recommended that his countrymen pursue a more austere lifestyle and economise their resources. Emigration would only further enhance the neglect and decline of the homeland,[158] not least by the resulting decrease in the workforce. Once a man was no longer satisfied with the mere necessities, Ibn Sumayṭ argued, he would not be satisfied with anything.[159] Reportedly, his opposition to migration was so strong that would-be emigrants did not dare to inform him of their imminent departure as they expected to be severely reprimanded.[160] Incidentally, these arguments were not new: a dialogue which supposedly dates from the 16th century already contrasts the Hadhrami peasant cultivating his homeland with the emigrant who leaves in pursuit of wealth, exemplified by dishes of meat.[161]

An episode relates how Sayyid Aḥmad once prepared coffee, a drink he rejected as an unnecessary craving, for guests and visitors. He did so without the customary helping of sugar in order to demonstrate thrift.[162] In theological terms, Ibn Sumayṭ's argument went

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[155] "Khawāṭir", pp. 255f.

[156] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 28, for his use of sūra 62;11, see p. 24.

[157] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 25f., 89, 94f.

[158] For the connection between emigration and lifestyle which had already been criticized by older scholars, cf. Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 115f., p. 162.

[159] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 82.

[160] Ibn Sumayṭ was no exception in this opposition to migration. Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf seems to have shared his scepticism of emigration, ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf, Tārīkh al-shuʿarāʾ, vol. IV, p. 15.

[161] Bā Maṭraf, al-Hijra al-yamaniyya, pp. 34–37.

[162] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, Tāj, vol. I, p. 252 al-Shāṭirī, Adwār, p. 281, fn. 1. The topic of coffee appears frequently in Ibn Sumayṭ's Majmūʿ kalām, e.g. pp. 82f., 95f., 113, 141, 146, 327 etc.

back to the matter of *fuḍūl*: that which is superfluous and therefore best avoided, not only in terms of speech but also in terms of consumption, such as dress, food and furnishing.[163]

Furthermore and on the same basis of his rejection of *fuḍūl*, Ibn Sumayṭ opposed exaggerated hospitality extended to guests which could easily become a serious burden for hosts.[164] Even the sons of his shaykh were reportedly served only very modest dinners if that was what was available, quite a contrast to the customs which required elaborate hospitality.[165] His refusal to serve dinner to a large group of visitors[166] stands in stark contrast to Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd's above-mentioned building works, performed for the greater convenience of an honoured guest. The growing cost of hospitality and the increase in conspicuous consumption, i.e., consumption in order to demonstrate and maintain status, might well have been an unwelcome result of emigration and the resulting increase in wealth of at least some members of society, which placed everybody under growing pressure. Given the frequency of mutual visits among the notables, it is likely that they felt hard-pressed, particularly those *ʿulamāʾ* who enjoyed a high religious reputation without sharing in the wealth of the likes of Aḥmad al-Junayd. Perhaps this was also one of the reasons why Ibn Sumayṭ opposed emigration and argued for greater economy, although he makes this link only implicitly. However, his concerns show remarkable resemblance to a group of ordinances from Sayʾūn dating from the early 20th century. These decrees, put forward by notables, explicitly link conspicuous consumption, which they were trying to curb, to emigration.[167] However, it should be noted that this constitutes only one facet of Ibn Sumayṭ's arguments, as one might not do justice to his Sufi convictions by reducing them to such material considerations.

The economic problems of his day clearly troubled Ibn Sumayṭ. Apparently, he gave much thought to how the economy in general

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[163] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 31f. Interestingly, Ṭāhir b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir also warned of certain dress, namely silk, as well as jewelry for men. See his *khuṭba* in Ibn Ṭāhir, *Majmūʿ*, pp. 232–239, here p. 234, where moral concerns about the encounters of men and women are also voiced.

[164] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 102–104, cf. p. 160.

[165] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 175.

[166] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 176.

[167] Compare, for example, the above quoted issues, as well as Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 132, with the issues mentioned in the document discussed by Freitag & Schönig, "Wise men".

could be reorganised in accordance with the *sharīʿa* in order to solve some of the most obvious problems. In general, his anti-*dunyā* statements tend to obscure his belief that a pious life could well be rewarded materially. This becomes clear in a comment on the inhabitants of Shibām. He asserted that they had been pious and steadfast "until the blessings became manifest in their wealth".[168]

He organised credit for the poor by teaming up one rich and one poor person each, the former providing the capital, the latter the labour for a common venture. The proceeds were to be shared equally between the two. As there apparently existed a shortage of labour (possibly due to emigration) this arrangement might be interpreted as aiming at providing affordable labour.[169]

Due to the absence of moneylenders (the Arabic text uses the term *murāb*—usurer), merchants in Shibām had serious problems related to imports. These depended on international transport (i.e., the monsoon winds) and available caravans, which means that they did not necessarily coincide with the appropriate fairs (*sūq*) at which the merchants would normally have sold the goods. Instead of waiting for such a fair or for a favourable turn in prices, and in order to be able to redeem the debts which they owed their partners on the coast, Shibāmī traders had to sell the merchandise soon after its arrival and at low prices, which presented an obstacle to the development of trade. For this reason, Ibn Sumayṭ suggested and apparently successfully implemented a banking system whereby rich people would lend their money to a public institution. This in turn made credits available in cases such as the one described above. These credits were to be paid back after a certain period together with a fee which went towards a *waqf* administered by the institution. When this *waqf* had generated sufficient wealth to suffice as capital of this institution (or bank, as it would be called today), the original capital would be returned to its owners. Therefore the pious Muslim could be reassured: like Max Weber's Protestant puritans, "he did nothing ethically reprehensible, he did not resort to any lax interpretations of religious codes or to systems of double moralities, and

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[168] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 325: "*kānū ahlu waraʿin wa-taqwā ḥattā zaharat al-baraka fī-amwālihim*".
[169] "Khawāṭir", p. 256. For the following, see ibid., pp. 257f., ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 578 and Bang, Sufis, pp. 69f. For comparable problems with emigration later, see chapter VII.

he did not act in a manner that could be indifferent or even rep-
rehensible in the general realm of ethical validity." Perhaps a pious
Muslim did not "demonstrate his religious merit precisely in his eco-
nomic activity", as Weber has argued for Protestants, but his ʿulamāʾ
certainly had great understanding for his desire to trade, and went
to some length to make sure that this could not be attacked on reli-
gious grounds.[170]

Another famous story tells how Ibn Sumayṭ predicted to his fol-
lowers that the (food) prices would decline in the foreseeable future.
When this was questioned because the next harvest was still some
time away (and a food crisis apparently looming), he pointed to the
will of God. His awed followers, merchants of Shibām, thought that
the shaykh could tell the future, and started to sell their stocks,
whereupon the prices fell and a food crisis was averted.[171] This story
is telling in that it shows how Ibn Sumayṭ did not shy away from
infringing on the interests of those who normally supported him if
he felt that the communal welfare neccessitated such action.[172]

Obviously, economic reform and life in accordance with the sharīʿa
could only be pursued in the context of stable political rule.[173] Ibn
Sumayṭ called on his contemporaries to pray for a just ruler, as only
such an overlord would enable the people to follow their religion
properly. This was accompanied by a clear understanding that this
ruler needed proper funds. Ibn Sumayṭ argued in the context of a
discussion of coffee and sugar, the epitomes of a squandrous life,
that the money spent on such products would suffice to finance a
"ruler who will lead us to Paradise".[174] In the same vein, he appealed
to his compatriots and particularly the notables to support the polit-
ical leader, not least financially.[175]

Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ's interest in a just ruler has to be seen in
the context of the experiences of merchants of Shibām with their

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[170] Weber, *The Sociology*, p. 252. A certain affinity between the Muslim reform-
ers of the 18th and 19th century and the Puritan ethic is also noted by Peters,
"Islamischer Fundamentalismus". For a timely warning with regard to the inter-
pretative pitfalls of such analogies, see Metcalf, "Islamische Reformbewegungen".

[171] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 84.

[172] Cf. Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 226f. about the necessity of fair treatment.

[173] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 70, Ibn Ḥamīd, Tārīkh, vol. II, p. 68, he uses
the expression: "*wa-yadūm al-ʿadl li-ahl al-buldān wa-l-nawāʿī fa-yabqawn ʿalā ʾl-zirāʿa
wa-l-ʿimāra*". Cf. "Khawāṭir", p. 256, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Idām al-Qūt, p. 196.

[174] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, p. 214, cf. "Khawāṭir", p. 256.

[175] Ibn Sumayṭ, Majmūʿ kalām, pp. 204, 220.

numerous overlords who fought for control of the city.[176] One episode
in which the merchants became increasingly subjected to extortion
has already been quoted in the previous chapter. Ibn Sumayṭ first
offered resistance to Sultan ʿUmar b. Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī al-Kathīrī. However,
when this proved ineffective, he called on the merchants to leave
the city and seek refuge in nearby ḥawṭas. This hijra in order to avoid
what was considered to be extortionate claims was no singular
occurence. The extremely wealthy Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd was
reportedly arrested in 1268/1852 by the Kathīrī sultan because the
latter feared that Aḥmad might leave the city altogether.[177] Another
time, Aḥmad threatened to leave the city, thereby putting pressure
on the sultan, albeit apparently only to test his adherence to the
rules of the sharīʿa.[178] Both anecdotes reveal that the sultan was depen-
dent on contributions by his wealthy subject and that he was appre-
hensive of him leaving his sphere of influence. The historians report
emigrations of the leading families of Tarīm, such as the Āl Shihāb
al-Dīn, Āl Balfaqīh, Āl al-Kāf, Āl al-Mashhūr and others for the late
18th and early 19th centuries. It is highly likely that these acts lend
themselves to a similar interpretation, namely that the wealthy inhab-
itants of Hadhrami towns withdrew support from rulers who demanded
more than they were willing to pay.[179]

In addition to the financial implications, the collective emigration
of the sayyids signalled to other parts of the population who consid-
ered them as their spiritual leaders that the sayyids disagreed politi-
cally and more importantly religiously with the political authority.
After all, the concept of hijra was known since the Prophet's depar-
ture from Mecca as an act which symbolically broke off ties of kin-
ship or association. In Islamic law, it was furthermore a recognised
practice to avoid the rule of unbelievers.[180] It thus carried significance
well beyond the exodus by a few notables from a town. Possibly,
this practice of hijra was an older pattern of making political protest
felt in Hadhramaut, as the above mentioned similarity between these
episodes and the action of ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād would suggest.

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[176] For a survey of the conflicting versions of the history of Shibām between 1803
and 1858 see Hartwig, Hadramaut, pp. 72–80.
[177] Ibn Ḥamīd, Tārīkh, vol. II, p. 99.
[178] Al-Junayd, al-ʿUqūd, pp. 134f.
[179] For similar instances, see Ibn Hāshim, Tārīkh, pp. 117–119.
[180] W. Montgomery Watt, "Hidjra", EI (CDRom).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that *hijra* was an extreme form of action and not taken lightly because of the risks it entailed to those performing it.

The case of *hijra* also shows the mutual dependence of the sultan and the elite. In addition to the financial contributions which were to remain a constant bone of contention until the 20th century, the sultan needed the religious legitimation if he intended to act as a proponent of *dawla* rather than yet another tribal leader. This in turn afforded the elite a certain leverage for action, which it attempted to exploit to its fullest. One of the forms was the copious advice (*naṣīḥa*) offered by the scholars of this period and the next to the sultans in the form of letters, sermons and during consultation.[181]

There clearly existed differences between the Weberian Protestant Ethic and the Muslim *mujaddidūn* (revivalists) of the 18th and 19th century as Lapidus has pointed out. He stresses that:

> *Tajdid* favors dynamic worldly activity, but such activity is not directed to economic accumulation. Rather it is channeled in prescribed ways into religious devotion, control of emotion, pious good works, and the dynamic aggrandizement of the Muslim community, or warfare to expand the realm of Islam. The worldly activity called for by the Islamic ethos is not the systematic reconstruction of the world, but the correct practice of Islam and the extension of the boundaries of Islamic domination.[182]

Nevertheless, it might well be that the theoretical differences shrink if one examines the actual contents and consequences of the revivalists' teachings. In spite of the call for austerity and the repeated rejection of worldly riches, Sufis like Ibn Sumayṭ put forward practical suggestions to revitalise the local economy and create political conditions which favoured economic development in the wider framework of a revived religion.

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[181] Thus, 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 587, informs us that Ṭāhir (d. 1749), the grandfather of 'Abdallāh and Ṭāhir b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir already offered "much advice and guidance" (*wa-kāna kathīr al-nuṣaḥ wa-l-irshād li-l-sulṭān*) to the Kathīrī sultan 'Umar b. Ja'far. On this sultan, who ruled in the 1140s, see Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 109–111. Cf. Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, pp. 406–409 with a *qaṣīda* from Muḥsin b. 'Alawī al-Saqqāf to 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ al-Qu'ayṭī, pp. 428–432 with a letter from Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr to Naqīb 'Alī b. Nājī in Shiḥr.

[182] Lapidus, "Islamic Renewal", p. 454.

Steps Towards Change: Political Initiatives of the Hadhrami Notables

If we approach the different aspects of the reform movement chrono-
logically until the rise of the Kathīrī state, Hadhrami historians insist
that the movement of Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir was the first
significant step towards reform after a wave of emigration of nota-
bles from Tarīm.[183] Ṭāhir's younger brother ʿAbdallāh seems to have
played a lesser role in the political leadership, although it is evident
from his writings that he shared many of his brother's concerns with
the political situation in Hadhramaut. For example, ʿAbdallāh was
highly critical of the lawless behaviour of Hadhrami soldiers and
tribesmen, as a *risāla* of advice to soldiers shows. Not only was mal-
treatment and murder of defenceless people inacceptable, he argued,
to tolerate such behaviour was equally incompatible with religion.[184]
Nevertheless, he reportedly opposed *sayyid*s taking up arms them-
selves which is what his brother propagated.[185]

   The movement by Ṭāhir b. Ḥusayn is of particular interest because
we know much more about this enterprise than for example about
Sayyid Isḥāq b. ʿUmar b. Yāhya's unsuccessful bid to conquer al-
Mukallā with Egyptian help in 1221/1805–6.[186] Furthermore, there
is sufficient evidence to suggest that we are dealing with the collec-
tive action of a group of *sayyid*s. Given the importance of such a
step, it is highly regrettable that the available sources provide little
factual information and that even the beginnings of the movement
are shrouded in contradictory accounts. On the one hand, we are

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[183] This perspective is very much dominated by historians from the Eastern Wadi,
namely Sayʾūn and Tarīm. It is possible that a different perspective would emerge
were we to have histories from Shibām, al-Shihr or other places. Unfortunately, Bā
Ḥasan's *Kitāb Nashr al-Nafaḥāt al-Miskiyya fī Akhbār al-Shihr al-Maḥmiyya*, Tarīm mss
2201, is incomplete, see Serjeant, "Materials", pp. 295f.

[184] Ibn Ṭāhir, *Majmūʿ*, pp. 108–111. Compare this with the very similar concerns
expressed in Sayyid Ṭāhir's (undated) *khutba*, ibid., pp. 232–239, notably pp. 233f.

[185] Personal communication, Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah, 29.3.2000.

[186] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. I, p. 155. Another vague hint at this episode,
but without name or date, is contained in al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 387. I have not
been able to ascertain whether this Isḥāq b. ʿUmar b. Yahyā is the same as Isḥāq
b. ʿAqīl b. ʿUmar b. Yahyā (d. 1272/1855–56), who was the *shaykh* of the Meccan
*sayyid*s and a supporter of the Kathīrīs during their first attack on al-Shihr (on him
see ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 313f. and Bā Maṭraf, *al-Jāmiʿ*, vol. I, p. 173). As
Hadhrami authors often omit some patronyms, this is possible, but then Sayyid
Isḥāq would have to have had a particularly long active involvement in politics.
On the other hand, the fact that Muḥammad ʿAlī of Egypt only emerged in 1805
as the dominant power in Egypt might well mean that al-Bakrī's date is wrong.

told that Sayyid Ṭāhir was accorded the *bayʿa* at the age of thirty-six, i.e. in 1220/1805–6, and took on the bynames of *nāṣir al-dīn* (protector of the religion) and *amīr al-muʾminīn* (commander of the faithful) in this context.[187] On the other hand, all the available documents point to 1225/26, i.e., 1811/12, as the crucial years in which he gained widespread support.[188] This shows a remarkable coincidence with the Wahhābī incursion of ʿAlī b. Qamlā in 1224/1809–10. In this dangerous situation in which the Wahhābīs reportedly found some support among Hadhrami tribesmen who possibly sympathised with at least some of their ideas, Sayyid Ṭāhir seems to have taken the initiative and to have organised efficient armed resistance in ways similar to ʿAlī b. Jaʿfar al-ʿAṭṭās who defended al-Ḥurayḍa against the intruders.[189] It seems quite likely that this demonstration of leadership convinced his fellow *sayyid*s that Sayyid Ṭāhir was a suitable person to undertake the necessary reforms in the Wadi, while he might have been inspired by the example of the Zaydī Imām of Yemen.[190]

In early 1811, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAydarūs, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. Yaḥyā, ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn b. Shihāb al-Dīn, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Shihāb al-Dīn, ʿUmar b. Abī Bakr b. Yaḥyā, Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr ʿAydīd and ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Bakr ʿAydīd met in Masīlat Āl al-Shaykh where first Sayyid Ṭāhir's father al-Ḥusayn and later Ṭāhir and his brother had settled. They agreed that the leadership of the *sayyid*s both in religious and in wordly terms should be invested in Sayyid Ṭāhir on the basis of the *sharīʿa* and God's commandments.

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[187] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 587, this version can be also found in al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 388, whose discussion of Sayyid Ṭāhir is almost completely void of any data but all the fuller of flowery interpretation.

[188] See the documents in Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 137–146.

[189] On the Wahhābī raid of 1224/1809–10, see Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, p. 122, where Sayyid Ṭāhir's leadership is emphasized, albeit without any reference to the reform movement, Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 321, Bā Ḥanān, *Jawāhir*, p. 225, al-Bakrī, *ʿAdan*, pp. 97f. On ʿAlī b. Jaʿfar al-ʿAṭṭās, see ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 230.

[190] Such an impression is conveyed by Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, p. 147. In 1161/1748, Hadhramaut experienced a controversy over whether or not it was acceptable to adorn a grave with a wooden sarcophage. Originally, this seems to have started as a dispute between *sayyid* families, in which both sides recruited their tribal supporters, but it escalated and eventually all wooden sarcophages on graves were burnt and only later restituted. Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 115f. In view of the early date, this account seems probable and Wahhābī influence rather unlikely. Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that Wahhābī ideas disseminated later in Hadhramaut fell on fertile soil.

He was to act according to the best of his knowledge and interpretative abilities, both religiously and politically.[191] Free to consult with anybody he wished, those asking his advice were nevertheless obliged to comply with his views. If at all possible, the twenty-two signatories of the agreement pledged to speak with one voice.[192]

A few weeks later in late Muḥarram 1226/February 1811, another twenty-four *sayyid*s, among them members of the al-Ḥibshī, al-Jifrī and al-Kāf clans, declared their full support for Sayyid Ṭāhir. These meetings preceded an agreement with leaders of the Tamīmī tribe and the Āl Jābir in which they too agreed to accept the leadership of Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn, not to act without his agreement and to support his actions. Any inner-tribal vendettas for crimes committed before the agreement were to be suspended for two years while new crimes were to be submitted to Sayyid Ṭāhir for punishment according to the *sharīʿa*.[193] A second undated document shows the precariousness of such agreements: a dispute arose between the Tamīmīs and some unidentified landowners and 'capitalists' (*mutamawwilīn*), probably from among Sayyid Ṭāhir's inner circle. Apparently the landowners had acted in violation of *ʿurf*, which governed the relations between the urban landowners and the Tamīmīs in whose tribal areas many of the lands were situated. The *ʿurf* accorded the Tamīmīs certain customary rights which contravened the *sharīʿa*. Consequently, the landowners no longer felt bound by the agreements.[194] Instead of complying with an attempt to settle the matter according to the *sharīʿa* as was obligatory under the new order, the Tamīmīs (unsurprisingly, one might add) escalated the conflict and refused to follow Sayyid Ṭāhir's orders. Relations reached breaking point until an interpreter of dreams, presumably another *ʿālim*, saved the day by resolving the misunderstandings.[195] Eventually, the Tamīmīs gave in

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[191] "*wa-inna 'l-ishāra fī mā yataʿallaq bihim [. . .] li-l-sayyid al-sharīf Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir al-ʿalawī ʿalā qānūn al-sharʿ al-sharīf wa-ʾttibāʿ al-Ḥaqq ḥasab ijtihādih wa-naẓarih wa-ʿurfih sharʿan wa-siyāsatan*". Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, p. 138.

[192] Of these names, ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Bakr ʿAydīd and ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn Balfaqīh were later part of Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd's circle, as were the sons of a number of Sayyid Ṭāhir's supporters.

[193] Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 140–142, for the agreement with the Āl Jābir, see p. 146.

[194] This has been discussed in the last chapter with regard to the date palms, although the problem here seems to have been linked to herding. Ibn Hāshim, *Tārīkh*, pp. 144f. for a discussion of the event and the agreement.

[195] This is another reference to the importance of people who could interpret dreams (*kibār al-aʿlāmī*), cf. the characterisation of ʿAbdallāh Bā Sūdān.

and signed an apologetic agreement in which they renewed their submission to Sayyid Ṭāhir.

Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn also entered an agreement with the Kathīrī ruler of Shibām, Sultan ʿUmar b. Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī (r. 1224/1809–10 – 1240/1824–25).[196] This agreement stipulated a close relationship (al-ʿurwa al-wathīqa) between both sides. They would strive for "that which was desirable" (al-maṭlūb), which in this context probably refers to sharʿī rule, and withdraw all support from tyrants and breakers of the law (al-bāghī wa-makhālif al-ḥaqq). The effects of this agreement are somewhat questionable since Sultan ʿUmar b. Jaʿfar was a rather hopeless case according to Ibn Hāshim. It has already been related how his relationship with Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ, the eminence grise of Shibām and originally a strong supporter of this branch of the Kathīrī dynasty, broke down and led to the merchants' exodus from the city. However, as the agreement was concluded early in Sultan ʿUmar's rule, it might well have expressed earlier hopes of the sayyids in the amenability of the sultan.

Sayyid Ṭāhir also tried to mediate between various other rulers, such as the Āl Kasādī in al-Mukallā and the Āl Burayk in al-Shiḥr, and expel the Yāfiʿī rulers from Tarīm.[197] Supposedly, his aim was to unify Hadhramaut politically. However, he soon had to face the harsh reality, for example, the difficulties to uphold peace amongst the tribes without copious funds and a strong army. He is also reported to have been somewhat soft-hearted: when some old Tarīmīs complained that Sayyid Ṭāhir's siege of the city which was directed against its Yāfiʿī rulers severely harmed the population, he lifted the siege and, if we are to believe later historians, fell victim to a plot by those Yāfiʿī rulers.[198] At any rate, he resigned after less than a decade, leaving behind a committee of leaders of the Āl Tamīm and four sayyids to carry on his project.[199]

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[196] Ibn Hāshim, Tārīkh, p. 123, for the agreement p. 143, cf. ʿA al-Mashhūr, Shams, p. 588. For a comparison of the different versions of Sultan ʿUmar's rule, see Hartwig, Hadramaut, pp. 74f. and fn. 108.

[197] Ibn Hāshim, Tārīkh, pp. 132f., al-Shāṭirī, Adwār, p. 391.

[198] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, Shams, p. 589.

[199] Ibn Hāshim, Tārīkh, pp. 148f. for a copy of the waṣiyya advising and naming them. The four sayyids, whose families are unfortunately not named, were ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī (al-ʿAydarūs), ʿAlawī b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (?), Sālim b. Abī Bakr (ʿAydīd or b. Yaḥyā) and Aḥmad b. ʿAlī (b. Shihāb al-Dīn). For sayyids despairing of their ability to change the course of times, see also Ibn Ḥamīd, Tārīkh, vol. II, pp. 20f.

While the circumstances of Sayyid Ṭāhir's resignation are as hazy
as those of his accession, it could well be that he and his family had
to leave the Wadi due to difficulties resulting from his activities. At
least we know that by August 1822 he had retired with his brother
to al-Shiḥr from where he and ʿAbdallāh[200] wrote letters to their
supporters. Apparently, they had to depart rather suddenly because
of a revolt of soldiers.[201] In January of 1823, they wrote a very pos-
itive account of the situation under the *naqīb* Nājī b. ʿAlī b. Nājī al-
Buraykī (r. 1807–1827). The city, they report, was so calm that the
soldiers dedicated themselves to trade, travel and other business. The
ruler, a blessed and praiseworthy man in the opinion of his subjects,
managed to keep peace albeit by making occasional payments. The
brothers consulted with their correspondents as to whether they should
try to instigate *naqīb* Nājī to assume control of Hadhramaut, as the
setting up of order was necessary and obligatory (*lāzim wa-mutaʿayyin*).
The conspirative mode becomes clear from the side comment that
if the correspondents did not agree with the proposal, they should
destroy the letter.[202] This shows clearly that Sayyid Ṭāhir had not
retired completely from politics and also that help was now sought
elsewhere.[203]

While the project to involve the Buraykī *naqīb* does not seem to
have got beyond this letter, the following years saw a number of
projects aimed at establishing stable political rule in the Wadi. The
support of Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ for the Kathīrī dynasty of
Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī b. ʿUmar in Shibām and of Sayyid ʿAbdallāh b. Abī
Bakr ʿAydīd for the Yāfiʿī military leader ʿUmar b. ʿAbdallāh b.

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and the *ijāza* of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī b. Shihāb al-Dīn for ʿAydarūs b. ʿUmar al-Ḥibshī
quoted earlier in this chapter.

[200] Curiously, ʿAbdallāh is not mentioned in any of the documents related to
Ṭāhir's political activities, but is co-author of all the letters reproduced by al-Junayd.

[201] Letter by Ṭāhir and ʿAbdallāh, sons of al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir, to Muḥammad
b. Ḥāmid b. ʿUmar, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Hārūn (al-
Junayd), Ḥusan b. ʿAlawī b. ʿAbdallāh Mudayḥij, ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn Balfaqīh
and Ḥasan b. ʿAlawī al-Munaffir of 4. dhū al-ḥijja 1237/22.8.1822, al-Junayd, *al-
ʿUqūd*, pp. 126f. Cf. ibid., p. 79, where an undated letter from the brothers to al-
Junayd is quoted which shows their despair of the situation in Hadhramaut and
calls for *hijra*.

[202] Letter by ʿAbdallāh and Ṭāhir, sons of al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir, to ʿAbdallāh b.
Abī Bakr b. Sālim, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Hārūn al-Junayd, ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn b.
Muḥammad b. Shihāb al-Dīn, Salmān b. ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd Shāmī of 25. rabīʿ
al-thānī/9.1.1823, al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 128–130.

[203] According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Idām al-Qūt*, p. 57, Nājī b. ʿAlī was
at some stage advised by Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr.

Muqayyaṣ in Ḥuṣn Muṭahhar south of Tarīm have already been mentioned and need to be placed firmly in this context. How serious the concern for peace and stability was also comes across in a *risāla* by ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir to the tribes written in February 1829. He warned them urgently that the Day of Judgement was not as far away as they might think, and that they should therefore at least cease to do harm if they were unable to perform good deeds.[204]

It was not only tribal leaders who emerged as political figureheads but also other *sayyid*s. Apparently, in October 1837 in a letter to ʿUmar b. Zayn al-Ḥibshī, a colleague of Sayyid Ṭāhir, Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr suggested putting forward another bid for outright rule by a *sayyid* as a *khalīfa* or successor to Sayyid Ṭāhir.[205] He refers to the events of his time, the general fear, the cutting of roads, the random killing of people, and the urgent need to act. The *sayyid*s of the Āl Junayd, he argued, had the necessary qualifications for such a role, namely the theological and legal qualifications as well as a small army. Their great fortune could only be considered an asset in such an endeavour. According to Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd's biographer, Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ propagated these views widely; however, they never seem to have come to fruition.

The last initiative, about which the sources are once more regrettably scarce and contradictory, was led by Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Sahl (1213/1798–99 – 1274/1858).[206] Ibn Sahl had made a fortune during his stay in Pontianak (Kalimantan), where he had married into the family of a local Muslim sultan. He seems to have built up a small merchant fleet, and when he returned to Hadhramaut, he quickly became known for his great wealth. It is not known whether he settled immediately in al-Shiḥr or first returned to Tarīm. In al-Shiḥr, he introduced a currency which he had minted in Europe in 1258/1842–43. However, he remained involved in the politics of Tarīm. Therefore, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd, who was imprisoned in 1841 by the Yāfiʿī leader ʿAbd al-Qawwī Gharāma, seems to have been under the impression that the driving force behind this imprisonment was Ḥusayn b. Sahl, his maternal cousin, whom he saw as

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[204] Ibn Ṭāhir, *Majmūʿ*, pp. 195–197.

[205] Letter by Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr al-Jifrī to ʿUmar b. Zayn al-Ḥibshī, of 6. rajab 1253/6.10.1837, al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, pp. 131–133. On Sayyid ʿUmar b. Zayn (b. ʿAbdallāh?) al-Ḥibshī cf. ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 477.

[206] On Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Sahl, cf. ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 526–532, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 486, Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 97.

a supporter of Gharāma.[207] If the underlying reason for al-Junayd's imprisonment was yet another dispute over taxation, which was not unlikely we might well be dealing with a situation in which one rich man, Ḥusayn b. Sahl, felt that the tax burden ought to be shared by other rich men such as Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd.

In 1845/46, Ibn Sahl became involved in an attempt to secure part of Tarīm from its Yāfiʿī ruler, ʿAbd al-Qawwī Gharāma.[208] The underlying motives seem to have been mixed: we are told of the attempt by some of the *sayyid*s to mediate between the Āl ʿAbdallāh al-Kathīrī, who were just then preparing their bid for power, and Gharāma. Gharāma was offered 4,000 *qirsh* for one half of the city and a daily sum of eight *qirsh* for the other half as summary payment of its taxes so as to free the population from his extortions. While the meeting at which this agreement was reached was organised by ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar b. Yaḥyā, Ḥusayn b. Sahl was present and according to later sources seems to have footed much of the bill and therefore 'bought' half of Tarīm. The accounts vary whether this was for the Āl ʿAbdallāh, as Ibn Ḥamīd suggests, or in order to create a new *ḥawṭa* for the *sayyid*s.[209] According to al-Shāṭirī, ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir, Ibn Sahl's *shaykh al-fatḥ* who had introduced him to the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, played a major role in mobilising him for this task, which illustrates once more the close links created by the *Ṭarīqa* between the generations.[210] However, the shaykh seems to have feared that his disciple might become seduced, assuming the title of *amīr* himself, and therefore sent him a poem warning against such temptations.[211] Apparently as a result, it was agreed that Gharāma would remain *amīr*, but even so, he did not keep his agreements, which led to further fighting between him and the Kathīrīs.[212]

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[207] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 142.

[208] I am following the account by Ibn Ḥamīd, vol. I, pp. 341f. A different version is given by al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 397 and fns. 2, 3, which is, however, much more recent. Al-Shāṭirī names ʿAbdallāh ʿAwaḍ Gharāma(h) as the ruler in question.

[209] The idea of the *ḥawṭa* is introduced by ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 529f. According to him and to al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 397, the agreed price was 10,000 dollars. al-ʿAṭṭās reports that Ibn Sahl advanced 7000 dollars and then tried to collect the remainder in coordination with other notables and the *amīr*.

[210] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 397, fn. 2.

[211] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 530.

[212] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 342. According to ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 530, Ibn Sahl approached the *amīr* and assured him that the payment was sim-

Ḥusayn b. Sahl must have been an outstanding person even in the reformist milieu of which he was part—at least he is described in terms rarely ever found in the biographical collections. According to his colleague Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAṭṭās, his house seems to have been dominated by a "modern spirit" (*al-rūḥa al-ʿaṣriyya*) in which *kutub al-qawm*, which might be translated either as popular (i.e., entertaining) books or as Sufi texts,[213] were read in addition to accounts of the Prophet's life (*sīra*) and the (usual) religious sciences.[214]

The preceding discussion of events which are well known amongst historians of Hadhramaut has highlighted the very active role played by those people who are best known in their roles as Sufis and ʿulamāʾ but who in the context of social and political history are more accurately considered in their roles as notables. Their key interest in the first part of the 19th century was the establishment of stable political rule. Unsurprisingly, this could best be realised through the establishment of a *sharʿī* government in which they would play leading roles as the ones most qualified to advise on religious and legal questions. We are therefore dealing with a group which (due to its triple qualification as descendants of the Prophet, as ʿulamāʾ trained in Islamic law and as owners of the necessary economic means to make their views heard) attempted to lay claim to a leading role if not to outright leadership in the running of their country. Limiting factors and the reason for the failure of the attempts to build a more stable entity were the rival claims to power by various tribal leaders. As long as these latter acted as tribes, such as the Tamīmīs, and not as aspiring sultans, such as some of the Kathīrī leaders, the preponderance of *sharīʿa* over *ʿurf* remained an additional bone of contention.

The words and deeds of Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ and Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Sahl give some impression of wider concerns of this group of reformers. They show that their ideas went beyond

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ply meant as a gift, which somewhat contradicts Ibn Ḥamīd's account who is far more circumspect as regards the role of Ibn Sahl. While there might be reasons to explain the contradiction, i.e. possible sympathies by Ibn Sahl for Gharāma, who was hated by the followers of the Āl ʿAbdallāh and thus possibly by Ibn Ḥamīd (cf. the episode of al-Junayd's internment), the actual events cannot, on the basis of the existing sources, be reconstructed with any degree of certainty.

[213] I would like to thank Anne Bang for pointing me to this possibility.

[214] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 527. Ḥusayn is placed in the category of Ṣāliḥ al-ʿAṭṭās' peers: "*al-bāb al-khāmis fī tabādul al-akhdh bayn ṣāḥib al-manāqib wa-bayn aqrānih*".

the mere establishment of a stable polity. They considered, for exam-
ple, the necessary economic system of which they were, after all,
themselves a vital pillar.

By the mid-1840s, the reformers seem to have suffered from seri-
ous disillusionment. This might well explain why they tried to find
arrangements even with the Yāfiʿī rulers whom they had earlier
rejected, such as ʿAbd al-Qawwī Gharāma in Tarīm. The afore-
mentioned meeting of notables of all social groups outside Sayʾūn
in 1840 provides another example of such an attempt to accom-
modate a group of Yāfiʿīs who were too strong to be ousted. Muḥsin
b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf, who in this instance seems to have been the
leading personality, expressly referred to the earlier failed attempts
at reform in order to gain support for his suggestion.[215]

With the emergence of Ghālib b. Muḥsin al-Kathīrī in the 1840s,
the notables gained new hope. Their relationship with him as well
as the Quʿayṭī approach to political rule are the topic of the next
chapter.

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[215] Ibn Ḥamīd, vol. I, pp. 336f. Given the text, it is difficult to follow Hartwig's
interpretation of this meeting as a call for support for Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin,
Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 256.

SULTANS, NOTABLES AND *DAWLA*:
APPROACHES TO STATE BUILDING IN KATHĪRĪ
AND QUʿAYṬĪ LANDS (1840s–1920s)[1]

State-Building and Notables: The Kathīrī Sultanate

The towns of Sayʾūn and Tarīm were the stronghold of the learned notables who have been introduced in the previous chapter. As has been discussed, the notables wanted to establish a strong polity which could control the tribes with their *ʿurf*-based ethic and often opposing economic interests. Having failed with their own attempt to establish such a polity, they were on the lookout for a strong leader whom they could support. Ghālib b. Muḥsin al-Kathīrī seemed a promising candidate. He possessed a significant power base and wealth in Hyderabad and confessed to have been influenced by the ideas of the likes of Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ. Hartwig has discussed the high expectations which the reformers invested in this leader and very briefly refers to the disappointment caused by the refusal of Sultan Ghālib and his deputies to share his rule with them.[2] Without repeating the political events during Sultan Ghālib's rule, it might be worthwhile to examine somewhat more closely those episodes which shed additional light on the role of the notables. The sources, which are mostly sympathetic to the notables, tend to discuss three closely interconnected fields, namely the political role and self-view of the notables, the question of finance and taxes, and finally their relationship with the sultans.

As men of religion and in the absence of centralised political power, the notables conceived of their role as peace-brokers and guarantors.[3] For example, in *muḥarram* of 1266 (November/December

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[1] This chapter owes more to discussions with Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī than can be indicated in the footnotes. Obviously, the remaining misunderstandings and interpretations are mine.

[2] For the expectations, which were supported by premonitions, dreams and signs, see Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, p. 255, for the disappointment ibid., pp. 2492–294.

[3] For an example of the function of witnesses of peace, see Ibn Hamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 372.

1849), a peace between tribes and the sedentary population was declared for the duration of the great annual pilgrimage to Qabr Hūd in Eastern Wadi Hadhramaut. As during many major pilgrimages, a number of *ʿulamāʾ* used the occasion to mediate in conflicts. Truces arranged during such occasions were normally fairly stable, as their violation would have been considered a major offence by the tribesmen.

En route to Qabr Hūd, Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf, one of the leading notables of Sayʾūn, visited ʿAynāt where he reorganised religious instruction and instructed a new preacher as part of the inner mission which has already been discussed in the context of Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ. As this was in the early days of the revived Kathīrī sultanate, he also took the opportunity to canvass for the Āl ʿAbdallāh al-Kathīrī, thereby adding considerable strength to their claim to the sultanate.[4] When a new judge needed to be appointed in Sayʾūn in the following year, the strong man acting for Sultan Ghālib, ʿAbūd b. Sālim al-Kathīrī (sometimes described as his *wazīr*,[5] sometimes as sultan),[6] consulted with ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf, Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf and Shaykh b. ʿUmar b. Saqqāf before renewing the appointment of Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf. When the chosen candidate refused the appointment, his colleagues pressured him to accept.[7] This office was an honorary one at the time. Only a few years later in 1857, Sultan Ghālib appointed a judge with a fixed salary. Ibn Ḥamīd comments that this met with the approval of ʿAlawīs and the wider population of Sayʾūn, and his additional remark that "this will lead to what is required, or even more, if God so wishes" points to the problem that honorary judges were not necessarily always available when needed or possibly not quite as neutral as was desirable.[8]

As befits their role as notables, the *ʿulamāʾ* also tried to protect the sedentary population, the *raʿiyya*.[9] Ibn Ḥamīd reports how the

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[4] Ibn Ḥamid, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 11–13.

[5] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt" 31, p. 531.

[6] Often, members of the royal family would be called "sultan" out of respect. I will follow the usage of the sources.

[7] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 55. Sultan ʿAbūd b. Sālim was sent from Hyderabad to Hadhramaut by Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin, see ibid., vol. I, p. 338.

[8] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 159.

[9] It is controversial whether or not the *sayyid*s formed part of the *raʿiyya*. The sultans certainly tried to turn them into their subjects, albeit tactfully, but were not always particularly successful.

The tomb of the Prophet Hūd. Photograph by the author

sultans were reproached for their untoward treatment of this group.[10] In particular, the high financial demands made on the population are mentioned time and again as a matter of controversy.[11] In 1268/1852, Ibn Ḥamīd informs us that the *raʿiyya* had to sell their food stocks to pay the taxes, while the chronicler himself was forced to sell part of his library.[12] Of course, such despotism, which from the sultan's point of view was necessary taxation in order to sustain security and conduct wars, also hit the economic elite including those like Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd, Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf and ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar b. Yaḥyā, who had already shown the rulers by their enthusiastic support that they possessed great wealth.[13] One

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[10] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 63.

[11] For instances in which some *sayyid*s tried to protect the population from such demands, see Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 175, 321.

[12] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 98–116.

[13] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 410, fn. 1 for the support of the Kathīrīs by ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar b. Yaḥyā, al-Junayd, *ʿUqūd*, pp. 133f., for the al-Junayd brothers, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 229 for Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf.

dramatic example of this, the imprisonment of Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd during the financial crisis of 1852, has already been mentioned in the previous chapter.

It is not surprising that the *sayyid*s occasionally asked themselves whether their endeavours were worthwhile. In January 1850, Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf became troubled with the intensity of his involvement in the affairs of state. He had been instrumental in bringing Say'ūn under Kathīrī control and expelling the Yāfiʿīs, although this had brought him personal danger, including imprisonment and death threats.[14] Once Kathīrī rule had been established, he acted as close advisor for the sultan. Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī, together with a number of his fellow *sayyid*s, also participated actively in the first (abortive) Kathīrī attempt to conquer al-Shiḥr from the Āl Burayk in conjunction with forces recruited in the Ḥijāz. This turn against the Buraykī ruling family, which had been so highly praised only few years earlier by Sayyid Ṭāhir, might be an example of some abstract loyalty by the *sayyid*s to the Kathīrī dynasty. It might also, however, indicate that matters in al-Shiḥr had taken a turn for the worse, an impression which is enhanced by a British report from 1842 describing a rather chaotic situation.[15]

All of these activities might well have contributed to Sayyid Muḥsin tiring not only of the temporal but also of the financial efforts demanded by his political commitment.[16] These by far exceeded the kind of private support which wealthy individuals were able or prepared to offer. Consequently, the *ʿulamā'* attempted to use their moral weight in order to rally widespread help and thus divide the burden more evenly. For example, Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr wrote in 1264/1848 to his compatriots in Java asking for financial support for the Kathīrīs. He argued that even money designated for *zakāt* (alms) could be donated for this purpose because it was obligatory to aid those who tried to establish peace in the war-ridden Wadi.[17]

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[14] Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, "Fuyūḍāt al-baḥr", p. 65.

[15] About this attempt to conquer al-Shiḥr, see Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 207–230. British reports of 1842 describe a rather chaotic situation which was a far shot from the just rule described by Sayyid Ṭāhir under the *naqīb*'s predecessor. IO, R/20/A/31, M.C. to Captain Haines, 7.12.1842.

[16] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 20f., for his support of the Āl ʿAbdallāh, cf. ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 229.

[17] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 368, for a copy of the letter, ibid., pp. 415–419.

The kind of extortionism practiced by the Kathīrīs during the 1840s and 50s proved an intense irritation to these *'ulamā'* who suffered not only financial losses but public embarrassment. Both against this background and on the basis of their self-view as guardians of Islamic law, they formulated certain principles along which relations between sultans and notables, and in particular the financial administration, were to be organised. This was to be on the basis of the *sharī'a*, although there were disagreements about how much transitional time should be allowed.[18] In 1850/51, when the Kathīrī sultanate ran out of funds, views differed as to how to react. While Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr called for public help and declared his willingness to contribute himself financially, others were more circumspect. In the preceding year, 'Alawī b. Saqqāf al-Jifrī had declared that the Āl 'Abdallāh were a punishment, not a blessing. He argued that Hadhramaut would only see a *sharʿī* government comparable to the one in (Highland) Yemen if the sultan would consult with the *ahl al-ʿilm*, the scholars. He further suggested to appoint a *wazīr* (Prime Minister) from among them, as well as giving them a say on the choice of secretary and financial administrators.[19] These new officials were expected to organise the administration and to control the relationship with the tribes. Except in special cases, the sultan was to refrain from striking agreements, i.e., about extortion or warfare, with the *qabāʾil*. In spite of his harsh criticism of the sultan, Sayyid 'Alawī scolded his fellow *'ulamā'* for distancing themselves from him instead of offering their full support along these lines: "If only four others acted like 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar b. Yaḥyā, who has committed himself to the sultan with all his prestige and wealth in order to have the laws of the noble *sharī'a* implemented", matters would look different.[20]

Interestingly, al-Saqqāf's proposal had a precedent. In June 1847, Sultan 'Abdallāh b. Muḥsin al-Kathīrī, the brother and plenipotentiary of Sultan Ghālib, had agreed with 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar b. Yaḥyā and Sālim b. 'Abdallāh b. Sumayr that they would act as his advisors. The sultan committed himself to follow their advice in matters of the *sharī'a* as well as in anything related to his private and public

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[18] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 26.

[19] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 66: "*wa-jaʿalū lahu wazīran minhum, wa-kātiban wa-ḥāsiban wa-muḥtasiban ʿalā naẓarihim*".

[20] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 67.

affairs, matters concerning his soldiers and subjects, and the running of his kingdom. He would not consult with anyone else and agreed to send all his retainers to attend religious instruction. Besides Sayyid 'Alawī, the witnesses of this agreement were al-Ḥusayn b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr and 'Abdallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir.[21]

Sultan 'Abūd b. Sālim, who had a reputation as an ambitious and ruthless leader, was rather wary of accepting such limitations to his power.[22] In early 1852, when tax demands in Say'ūn once again rose to an unacceptable level, the local *sayyid*s negotiated with other citizens of the town.[23] They agreed to submit a suggestion to the sultan whereby tax collection should henceforth be delegated to two honourable people from among the population of the city. They would be responsible for assessing and collecting taxes. 'Abūd b. Sālim duly attended a meeting with (representatives of) the people of Say'ūn outside the town, i.e. on neutral ground. Although an agreement was reached, he immediately breached it and eventually had his slave soldiers forcibly collect the levies from the houses of both ordinary people and *sayyid*s, an act called hostile, tyrannical and ignorant by an enraged Ibn Ḥamīd who probably was amongst the victims of this action.

In reaction, a furious 'Alawī b. Saqqāf al-Jifrī in Tarīs wrote a strongly worded letter to the sultan to which he never received a reply:

> You should know, oh *dawla*, that when you took office you pretended and feigned to the people that you would make the *sharī'a* victorious, and appoint the *'ulamā'* as its guardians, and that you would follow the advice of the *sayyid*s of the Āl Abī 'Alawī, and not disagree with what they suggest. [. . .] The people supported you, and the *'ulamā'* spoke with you and called for your support in the country and helped you in every way. They were like children and brothers, they attacked the oppressors and enemies, and did not think of the money which they spent on this matter. In all of this they never thought of themselves, but put all their hope onto you and your implementation of the *sharī'a* [. . .].[24]

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[21] The agreement is reproduced in 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 617. The success of the agreement is not discussed there, but Ibn Ḥamīd indicates that it was not an unqualified success, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 121.

[22] For such a characterisation of Sultan 'Abūd, see 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt" 31, p. 531.

[23] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 123f. Alternatively, *'arab* could refer to the (sedentary) tribes people of Say'ūn who would, however, normally be called *qabā'il*.

[24] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 127.

Quoting from the popular 17th century historical work by Muḥammad Diyāb al-Itlīdī on the Barmakids,[25] he confronted Sultan ʿAbūd with the simile of a fictitious Barmakid ruler who had completely neglected his duties. Following the advice of a Zoroastrian preacher, the Barmakid returned to just rule and predictably the country flourished again. ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf compared Sultan Ghālib with this Barmakid and left no doubt that it was the sultan's duty to follow his advice, which was implicitly compared to that of the Zoroastrian preacher.[26]

When this did not change matters, the *sayyid*s chose the time-honoured measure of *hijra* and only returned after protracted negotiations.[27] Possibly because the sultan perceived disagreements among the *sayyid*s, he remained unwilling to accept the proposed financial administration, and relations continued to be very tense.[28] Only when Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin had to leave India in 1856 and therefore became more committed to consolidating the Kathīrī sultanate, and more dependent on local forces, did he show himself as more conciliatory. Within days of his arrival in Tarīm, he accepted the project of an independent financial administration in principle and when he reached Sayʾūn about a month later, he asked the *sayyid*s to nominate four trustworthy individuals who should supervise and administer the income and expenditure of the *dawla*.[29]

While this account seems in line with al-Ḥaddād's earlier ruling on the permitted usages of the *zakāt*, the pro-*sayyid* account seems somewhat too good to be true. At least there is little doubt that, while the *sayyid*s were happy to support a *dawla* which submitted to their advice, there were clear limits to their willingness to pay. In 1294/1877, the Kathīrī *dawla* found itself in another financial crisis. This was at least in part the consequence of a ten-year truce with the tribes. In order to solve the problem and pay the tribal stipends, the state seems to have attempted to register all private property as well as money endowed to mosques for various purposes in order

[25] Muḥammad Diyāb al-Itlīdī, *Kitāb iʿlām al-nās bimā waqaʿ li-l-Barāmika maʿa banī al-ʿAbbās*, 2nd ed. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Jamāliyya 1329/1911–12 (1st ed. 1325?), the quote, which runs from pp. 125–127 in Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, II, can be found on pp. 19–20 of the 2nd edition. Cf. al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. 6, p. 122.

[26] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 127: "*fa-l-wāji minkum al-istimāʿ wa-l-idhʿān wa-l-ittibāʿ*". Another letter of protest was composed by Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr, ibid., pp. 128f.

[27] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 132–136.

[28] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 137–141.

[29] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 151 and 159.

to levy monthly charges. The high cost of peace is confirmed by another incident from the same year: a number of 'Alawīs sent a request to their compatriots in Java demanding substantial financial support in order "to conclude peace (*sulḥ*) between the Āl 'Abdallāh and the Qu'ayṭīs in al-Nuwaydira, Tarīm". They calculated that in order to meet the costs of this local truce, they needed a contribution of $1,000 from the diaspora.[30]

A few months later, taxes were imposed on shops and commercial transactions as well as on a number of trades.[31] While one could argue that this might have been the beginning of a regular taxation system, Ibn Ḥamīd presents it as another manifestation of tyranny. Similarly, while one might sympathise with Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Junayd's attempts to protect his properties, the fact that he stored much of his harvests outside Tarīm in the houses of his share-croppers and in areas controlled by the independent-minded Tamīmīs could also be interpreted as a means of avoiding tax payment by transferring his wealth to areas outside of the reach of the rulers.[32] This, indeed, is an alternative interpretation of the whole issue of *hijra*.

Nevertheless, the above should only be considered as a corrective to the overtly pro-*sayyid* accounts without diminishing the overall problem of extortion, which continued well into the 20th century. Shaykh al-Kāf, a leading notable of Tarīm, was imprisoned some time between 1883 and 1901 for refusing to pay levies above the normal rate of taxation and was only released after relatives paid the dues. This prompted another instance of *hijra* by a wealthy family to a suburb of Tarīm.[33] A British official visiting Hadhramaut in early 1919 reported the following, which for all intents and purposes confirms the sources quoted above for the 19th century:

> There appears to be but one system among the Kathiri rulers, and that is extortion from all the Syeds, with a few notable exceptions. At Seyyun, it is stated, there are some thirty persons of whom the chief are Syed Abdulrahman-bin-Abdullah-bin-Mohsin Alsogoff, sometimes called Obeidullah [. . .],[34] Syed Mohamed-bin-Hadi, and Syed Muhsin-

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[30] SMA, III; 1, Mukātaba min al-'alawiyyīn. According to Sultan Ghālib al-Qu'ayṭī, the overall cost of this peace was 5,000 dollars. Personal communication, Jeddah, 29.3.2000.

[31] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 376 and 378.

[32] Al-Junayd, *al-'Uqūd*, pp. 121f. and 149–153.

[33] Ibn Hāshim, al-Kāf Family History, pp. 58f. More on this family in chapter VI.

[34] This is 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Ubaydillāh (and not: 'Abdallāh) b. Muḥsin b.

bin-Abdullah Alsagoff, who with their families are exempt from taxa-
tion of any sort. The above excepted, every well-to-do Syed and Sjech
(i.e., the vast majority of the householders of Seyyun, Terim, Ghurfa,
and Inat, whose ancestors for over two centuries had, like themselves,
regularly emigrated, mainly to Java, and there traded and made money)
is liable to domiciliary visits and exactions. Continued oppression of
this type, mainly on the part of Sultan Mohsin and Salim-bin-Aboud,
has led to a deep feeling of hatred for the two [Kathīrī] Sultans and
their régime. It is stated that whenever a Syed or Sjech returns from
Java he is expected to make a handsome payment to the 'Government.'
In the case of rich men this may run to a thousand dollars or more.
Nor is this all: his house is liable to search, and any jewellery or valu-
able commodity may be taken away. Syed Mahomed Aidid-bin-Ahmat
Aidid, for example, has paid over 10,000 dollars in the last twenty
years, and the rich house of Alkaff much more. Should a rich man
be about to marry, the occasion is taken for further extortion, and if
the plain hint is ignored a domiciliary visit from Salim's 'Abid' (or
slave-soldiers) results.[35]

While a number of *'ulamā'* (interestingly two of them grandsons of
Muḥsin b. 'Alawī al-Saqqāf, namely 'Abd al-Raḥmān and Muḥsin
b. 'Abdallāh) seem to have been able to negotiate tax exemptions,
the rest of the population seems to have suffered rather severely.[36]

The *'ulamā'*'s claim to political participation is further exemplified
in Ibn Ḥamīd's discussion of Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin's succession
in October 1870. Before his death, the sultan is said to have con-
sulted with a number of leading *'ulamā'* from the next generation,
among them 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī.[37] The *'ulamā'* impressed
on him the need to implement religious instruction for the *dawla*,
his wives, retainers and merchants (*ahl al-sūq*). Upon the sultan's
request, they appointed a suitable successor who surprisingly turned
out to be the sultan's son Manṣūr and who was confirmed in office
by Sayyid Muḥsin (b. 'Alawī al-Saqqāf) and other *sayyid*s as well as
leading members of the Kathīrī family.[38] Another albeit later version

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'Alawī al-Saqqāf, who is further identified as "Ali Said Pasha's envoy to the Kathiris
during the war", more about him later in this chapter and in chapter VI.

[35] PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-
Warner on his recent visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to
Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, pp. 8f.

[36] For a report on similar circumstances in Tarīm, see IO, R/20/A/1415,
Personalities (by Nasir-ud-Din Ahmad, 12.3.1920), section on 'Abd al-Raḥmān b.
Shaykh al-Kāf.

[37] More on 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī in chapter VI.

[38] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 314–316.

of the same event portrays a number of power-hungry relatives of
Sultan Ghālib, among them most notably his nephew 'Abūd, the
Sultan's brother 'Abdallāh, and his nephew 'Abdallāh b. Ṣāliḥ.
According to this version, the Sultan contemplated resigning in favour
of 'Abūd, which was prevented by the wise and determined Sayyid
Muḥsin, who placed the turban on Manṣūr's head, where it was to
remain until his death in 1929.[39] This version enhances the role of
the notables even further and seems to confirm Ibn Ḥamīd's view
of the notables' influence. At any rate, the new sultan obligingly
agreed once more with the notables of Say'ūn on the financial admin-
istration of the town.[40] Once again, the honeymoon seems to have
been of short duration: in 1288/1871–72, the year after Sultan
Manṣūr's accession, a committee of five notables considered asking
the Ottoman sultan for intervention in the affairs of Hadhramaut,
which indicates renewed problems. However, for reasons not stated
in the source, their planned journey to Istanbul never took place.[41]

Of course, the above account only highlights the role and expec-
tation of the notables to effectively domesticate the ruler. It does not
take into account the self-interest of the sultans who themselves might
have liked to dominate developments. While testimonies from the
Kathīrī sultans are unfortunately lacking, the views discussed below
for the Qu'ayṭīs show clearly that Hadhrami sultans had as clear a
view of themselves as the centre of legitimacy as the notables. However,
this required the means to impose rule, not only on the notables,
but also on the tribes. They needed to be convinced to accept the
sultan. If he tried to be recognised as a *dawla*, a necessity if the nota-
bles were to support him, he had to discipline the tribes. This meant
that those aspects of *'urf* which were connected to control of the
overland routes and to agricultural territories (levies and raids) needed
to be modified sufficiently to make them acceptable to the urban
population. One way to obtain this was to pay major stipends to
the tribes in exchange for the cessation of certain of these practices.
In addition, it was necessary to be able to enforce such agreements
militarily. This demanded considerable wealth, as is illustrated by
the increased financial crisis which resulted from the ten-year truce
of 1294/1877. While the truce should have delighted the *sayyid*s

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[39] 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt" 31, p. 531.
[40] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 321.
[41] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 46f.

whose trading and agricultural interests stood to profit, the accompanying tax raises prompted their dismay, as has been shown above.[42] The main problem of the Kathīrī and to a lesser extent the Qu'ayṭī sultans was that they did not command sufficient and stable resources to meet the demands of their office. This explains simultaneously the constant reproach of extortion by the sultans in the Kathīrī domains and their double dependency on notables and tribes.

In terms of internal organisation, it becomes clear that there existed fairly strong institutions on a local level which functioned to a large extent in the absence of a state. In the countryside, these were dominated by tribes and their relationships with the *manṣab*s. In the towns, the different groups of the *ḥaḍar* population had their own institutions which were based on the quarters, on the professions, on the lineage and on religious learning. The quarter organisations in particular exercised such strong powers that they seem to have been perceived as threatening by the notable elite of 'Alawī origin which had its own structure.[43] In a town such as Say'ūn or Tarīm, matters which could not be regulated within these institutions were brought to judges who ruled on the basis of the *sharī'a*. The *dawla* and *qabā'il* impacted on these local subsystems mainly by demanding taxes and by levying charges or raiding according to *'urf*. While the *qabā'il* had their own internal organisation, what was lacking even when a leading *qabīlī* clan such as the Āl 'Abdallāh claimed wider legitimacy as a *dawla*, were institutions which linked the *qabīlī* and the urban milieu. It was at this juncture that the notables were needed. Because of the difficulties this caused for them, they had an interest in institutionalisation, at least as long as that provided them with the leading role.

If we return for a moment to Tilly's earlier-mentioned model of state formation through force, we find that "European states built up their military apparatuses through sustained struggles with their subject populations and by means of selective extension of protection to different classes within those populations." He further argues that the "agreements on protection constrained the rulers themselves,

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[42] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 376f.
[43] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 58, fn. 1, cf. the ominous comments by al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 285 about considerations to abolish the quarter organizations. This topic is discussed in more depth, and with much more material on the perspective of quarter residents, in Camelin, 'Shihr, une grandissime cité'.

making them vulnerable to courts, to assemblies, to withdrawals of credit, services, and expertise."[44] Tilly's description seems to fit the troubled relationship between the urban notables and the sultans. The situation was further complicated because the Kathīrī sultans were trying to gain and maintain the support of two distinct groups with quite different interests and ethics. As a result, state-building in their realm turned out to be an almost impossible exercise which never got beyond the formation of a rather unstable chieftaincy in the 19th century. As has been shown, the urban notables demanded the implementation of their version of the *sharīʿa*, as opposed to customary law (*ʿurf*) practiced among the tribesmen. They further requested a set of rules for the protection of their interests (and this was the problem) from the very tribesmen who formed the major allies and final power base of the sultans. The conflict between the Kathīrī Sultan ʿUmar b. Jaʿfar, the merchants of Shibām and Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ nicely illustrates this point. If the notables found that their ideas were not implemented by the sultans, they had certain means of withdrawing their support and were more or less able to exert pressure on the sultans, not least due to their spiritual influence over large parts of the populace.

Given the legitimatory and financial power of the notables, it is not surprising that the sultans competed for their support. Thus, during crucial stages of the Kathīrī-Quʿayṭī struggle, both sides wooed the notables by declaring their firm intent to implement the *sharīʿa*.[45] In spite of repeated contacts with the Quʿayṭīs and a series of attempts to mediate or pay for an agreement between Kathīrīs and Quʿayṭīs,[46] the *sayyid*s of the area between Tarīm and Sayʾūn preferred the Kathīrīs at the end of the day. This prompted al-Bakrī to comment bitterly that exploitation by the Yāfiʿīs could not be the sole reason governing the *sayyid*s' political behaviour, as the Kathīrī sultans behaved in the same way and were still supported.[47]

While al-Bakrī's statement overlooks the criticism of the Kathīrīs by the notables, he points to the obvious weakness in the notables' position. Given that much of Eastern Wadi Hadhramaut was the main settlement area of the Kathīrī tribe, they had little choice but

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[44] Tilly, "War Making", pp. 185f.
[45] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 29f., 142.
[46] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. I, p. 352; Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 592, SMA III,1.
[47] Al-Bakrī, *Fī janūb*, p. 161.

to come to a settlement with the tribal leaders. Of course there were some Yāfiʿīs who had settled in the Wadi, having been orginally called in as soldiers. For some time, they had even played a leading political role. However, the presence of armed Yāfiʿīs in the towns probably contributed to the worsening of their relations with the townspeople, while the Kathīrī tribesmen often lived in the villages. In spite of occasional attempts at cooperation between *sayyid*s and Yāfiʿīs, that relationship seems to have been even more strained than the one between *sayyid*s and Kathīrīs. In other regions such as Wadi Dawʿan, Quʿaytī rule was appreciated as finally establishing some stability.[48] In the end, as much as the notables would have liked to determine the course of events, they remained dependent on military leaders and could only hope to be sufficiently indispensable to have a major say in events. Although information on the internal political developments in the late 19th and early 20th century is relatively scarce, the very fact that the *sayyid*s felt the need to repeatedly renew an agreement about consultation with the Āl Kathīr in the early 1920s indicates that crucial problems in the relationship persisted.[49]

Sultans as Dawla: *Quʿaytī Conceptions of Rule*

The Quʿaytīs resemble the sultans of the Āl ʿAbdallāh al-Kathīrī in that they were a leading family in the al-Quʿaytī section of the Yāfiʿī tribal confederation. Just as Ghālib b. Muḥsin had become sultan by virtue of his wealth, which had made him a suitable candidate for the job in the eyes of the notables, so ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ had been approached by Yāfiʿī tribesmen in Hadhramaut in order to support them.[50] Unsurprisingly, Yāfiʿī leaders therefore played an important role in the Quʿaytī administration.[51] Nevertheless, they

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[48] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 324.

[49] SMA I, 103 of 23 Kaʿida (*qaʿida*) 1341 (July 8, 1923) and 104 of 1922.

[50] Personal communication, Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿaytī, 29.3.2000, ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, 1.4.2000, both Jeddah.

[51] This is suggested by Hadhrami authors, such as ʿAlī & Millāḥī, "Tārīkh", p. 225. Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 37, claims that the Yāfiʿīs voluntarily bestowed the sultanate on ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar al-Quʿaytī. He argues that this was a consequence of the al-Mukallā agreement between the Kasādī and the Quʿaytī of 1867, which is reproduced in Bā Maṭraf, *Fī sabīl*, pp. 43–45. However, the text of that agreement

had greater room to manoeuvre than their rivals in the interior, which al-Shāṭirī explains with the influence of Indian customs. Arguably, the relatively larger wealth of the Quʿayṭīs might have been more important than ideological elements in determining their course of action.[52] This wealth made them less dependent on local notables, and the fact that coastal notables often did not come from the *sayyid* stratum, i.e. did not have the double legitimacy of high (religiously founded) status and wealth, might have further weakened their position. Finally, from 1882 onwards, the Quʿayṭīs could count on British support. Because of this leeway vis à vis local society, they seem to come closer than the Kathīrīs to Tilly's model of a "self-interested monarch".[53]

It is important to note but not to overemphasise this difference between Kathīrīs and Quʿayṭīs. It mainly manifested itself when it came to the control of the coastal towns which were accessible from the sea and could relatively easily be ruled with the help of a dependent slave army. In many parts of the Quʿayṭī-controlled sections of the Wadi, as well as on the coast outside the cities, it would seem from the extant sources that the Quʿayṭīs, very much like their Kathīrī counterparts, had to tread a narrow path balancing the interests of long-established Yāfiʿī families, local tribes and notables. They established relations with the Tamīmīs by recognising them as a force in their own right and by building on the shared animosity vis à vis the Kathīrīs. Relations with the powerful Ḥamūm tribe, which until 1870/71 controlled some smaller ports east of al-Shiḥr and afterwards continued to command the important caravan route between al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā, were marked by high levels of tension. The conflict was punctuated by periods of peace established through payments of stipends to the tribe's leaders by the Quʿayṭīs.[54]

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gives no hint as to why this should be so. Therefore, some scepticism as to the voluntary nature of the Yāfiʿī submission seems in order. Nevertheless, according to Baṭāṭī, p. 49, the Yāfiʿī leaders did yield considerable influence, for example during the Ḥamūmī revolt. Cf. Gavin, *Aden*, p. 162.

[52] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 408. H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 83, puts forward a similar view. According to Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, the sultans were influenced by developments in Hyderabad, but mostly in terms of institutionalisation. Personal information, London, 25.2.2000.

[53] Tilly, "War Making", p. 176. We need not be unnecessarily distracted by al-Miḥḍār's claim that the only aim was to erect an Islamic state, as he is a full-hearted apologist of Quʿayṭī rule. *Tarjama*, p. 37.

[54] On the relations between the Quʿayṭīs, Tamīmīs and Ḥamūmīs, see ʿAlī &

These stipends aimed at replacing the income which the tribes nor-
mally accrued from levies on caravans or from raiding.[55] As will be
discussed below, both Wadi Daw'an and Wadi Hadhramaut east of
Tarīm were controlled by virtue of the sultans' alliance with the Bā
Ṣurra family who were shaykhs of the powerful Khāmī section of
the Saybān tribe, as well as with *sayyid*s from the al-Miḥdār family
who became their *wazīr*s. Finally, the achievement and maintenance
of Qu'aytī control in Wadi 'Amd and lower Wadi Daw'an was
greatly facilitated by the famous *manṣab* of al-Ḥurayḍa, Aḥmad b.
Ḥasan b. 'Abdallāh al-'Aṭṭās (1841–1915).[56]

The Qu'aytīs developed their own version of *dawla* ideology. Sources
in the mid-19th century tell us about their claim to guard the *sharī'a*.
This resembles the Kathīrī claim and occurred in a context where
both competed for support of the notables. In 1849/50, these even
tried unsuccessfully to negotiate an agreement between the rival sul-
tans.[57] The will of 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ al-Qu'aytī gives some indication
of how he envisaged the Qu'aytī *dawla* to be organised and legit-
imised. This will or *waṣiyya*, which dates from *rajab* 1279/Dec. 1862,
therefore deserves to be paraphrased at some length.[58]

Jam'dār 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ commenced his will by stating his faith
in God and the basic tenets of Islam. He advised his sons and rel-
atives to remain faithful and give him a proper Islamic burial. This
was followed by a detailed list of his properties which were situated
in various villages, cities and harbours of Hadhramaut in the form
of money, precious metals, lands, date trees, springs, ships, houses,
she-camels, weaponry, commercial merchandise, debts, slaves and
other items. Furthermore, all his property in Hyderabad and other
Indian towns is listed, comprising once again money and gold, cred-
its, merchandise, slaves, all types of weaponry, real estate, military
workshops, etc. One third of the income generated by this property

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al-Millāḥī, "Tārīkh", pp. 226–252; al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 45–50 and Boxberger,
"Hadhrami Politics", pp. 51–55.

[55] Personal information, Sultan Ghālib al-Qu'aytī, London, 25.2.2000.

[56] About al-'Aṭṭās' political role, see 'Abdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, p. 118, 'Abd al-
Jabbār, *Siyar*, p. 68, 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 256. For his role in mediating peace
in Wadi Daw'an in 1908, see 'Alawī al-Ḥaddād, *al-Mawārid*. For a more detailed
biography, see 'Alī al-'Aṭṭās, *Tarjama*, pp. 9–41.

[57] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 30f.

[58] Ghālib al-Qu'aytī, *Ta'ammulāt*, pp. 123–125. According to the will of 'Umar's
son 'Awaḍ, the date of 'Umar's will was the first of *rajab*, i.e. December 23, 1862,
cf. al-Miḥdār, *Tarjama*, p. 55.

was to be spent in eternity for the benefit of Shibām, Ḥawra and other places in Hadhramaut. Although the term is not mentioned in the document, this constituted a *waqf* (endowment) or in local terminology a *ḥibs*.[59] The relevant governor was to dispose of the money to pay for the troops needed to protect these places, to develop and maintain them, to "extinguish malice, put down strife, repulsion of attacks and tyranny, and other matters which are of benefit for them and their leaders and subjects". They and their properties in and outside the towns were to be protected. Spending was to be supervised by special administrators, namely the three sons whom ʿUmar had singled out as his successors.

Hereby, the *jamʿdār* effectively provided a regular budget for the Quʿaytī sultanate in Hadhramaut and relieved his descendants of the need to find local allies, at least to some extent. Further advice concerned the kind of rule which should be implemented, and which in many ways resembled the desires of the notables:

> I advise them that they rule according to the precepts of God and the noble *sharīʿa* among themselves and among those Muslims whom God has put into their charge. They shall hear complaints, protect their subjects, and have impeccable intentions. They shall command right and forbid wrong.[60] They shall apply the rules of the noble *sharīʿa* and be merciful with the *ḍuʿafāʾ* and the *masākīn*. They shall help the oppressed and prevent tyranny. Their companions shall be righteous and their councils peaceful. I advise them to be merciful and friendly to their relatives and the friends of their father. The tithe and other income from the two towns Shibām and Ḥawra and other places shall be spent like the third of the income mentioned above under the supervision of the three aforementioned sons. I advise them to be gentle with the military slaves who will follow and listen to the one who exercises rule.[61]

The salient aspects of this will were repeated in the will of ʿUmar's son ʿAwaḍ on December 15, 1898.[62] He appointed his own son

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[59] Personal information, Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿaytī, London, 25.2.2000.

[60] The translation of *al-ʿamr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar* follows that of Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong*. He gives a most erudite discussion of the history of interpretation of this concept, noting interestingly that, in Shāfiʿī traditional thought, it did not play a major role, in contrast to, say, the Ḥanafī tradition, ibid., pp. 340–356.

[61] Ghālib al-Quʿaytī, *Taʾammulāt*, p. 124.

[62] The Arabic text of this will is reproduced in al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, pp. 54–59 and Ghālib al-Quʿaytī, *Taʾammulāt*, pp. 126–129, for an English translation, see the enclosure in PRO, CO 725/5, Political Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 16.5.1923.

Ghālib as his successor and not his nephew Munaṣṣar, who fervently aspired to the succession.[63] ʿAwaḍ authorised Ghālib to use the remainder of the money designated by ʿUmar, its proceeds and the taxes from the controlled land for the benefit of government and development. ʿAwaḍ also advised his son to prevent evil and tyranny and to obey the commands of his father and of God. He should—and this is significant with regard to the relationship with the nota-bles—respect the *ahl al-faḍl wa-l-ʿilm wa-l-sāda*—the people of virtue and learning as well as the descendants of the Prophet. Ghālib was further instructed to implement the *sharīʿa* and to consult with his brother ʿUmar who was to be his successor, as well as with those supportive relatives and other individuals whom he thought fit in matters of state. After Ghālib and ʿUmar, the succession was to alter-nate between the sons of Ghālib and ʿUmar.

In the will which Ingrams has compared to a constitution,[64] ʿAwaḍ spelled out a system whereby the ruler's successor should always gov-ern the second port city of Hadhramaut and act as the supreme administrator whose position could be filled by his heir in case of absence. While the administrator had the authority to appoint tax collectors and other officials, the ruler reserved the last say in these matters and determined who represented him in the cities of the interior. That person was also urged to "rule judiciously, protect the subjects, hear complaints, to promote what is right and to prevent what is wrong".[65] These governors or representatives were account-able to the ruler who could dismiss them if they disobeyed or ruled unjustly. The ruler was obliged to provide sufficient food, clothing, riding animals and a regular pension depending on the circumstances for the descendants of ʿUmar and Ghālib. This was conditional on their willingness to obey the ruler.

This approach to rule was clearly rather patriarchal. While the *ʿulamāʾ* and notables were to be accorded respect, it was the ruler who decided everything of importance and who consulted at his own free will with whomever he saw fit. Of course, he was bound by the

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As the English translation leaves much to be desired, I have used both the Arabic and English versions.

[63] Cf. chapter I. al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 12 recounts a touching story of how Ghālib offered to resign in favour of his cousin Ḥusayn who was not satisfied by this generosity.

[64] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 82.

[65] Al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 57.

sharīʿa. This model gave the *ʿulamāʾ* far less control than their own
suggestions which gave them the right to speak justice. In the *ʿulamāʾ*
version of *sharʿī* rule, the ruler became contractually obliged to follow
their advice on a wide range of issues. The treaty between the
Quʿayṭīs and Kathīrīs, which was concluded in 1918 and which will
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, reflects this Quʿayṭī
view: in paragraph 6, the contracting parties undertake to "enforce
justice according to the *sharīʿa*, to respect the ʿAlawī *sayyid*s, to assist the
oppressed and to maintain general justice in their known borders".[66]

If one compares the relationship between *dawla* and notables in
Quʿayṭī and Kathīrī territories, it becomes clear that the center of
authority and sovereignty was the ruler in the first case. In the sec-
ond case, the notables rivalled with the ruler (and the tribes) for
control. Both systems are justified in Islamic terms and it is worth-
while pointing out once more that the difference is exacerbated by
the different types of sources extant for the two sultanates, namely
emanating from the Quʿayṭī sultans in one case and from the nota-
bles and their retainers in the other. While the Quʿayṭī view has
been attributed to Indian and Persian influences, it might be more
accurate to argue that the points of view expressed by the *ʿulamāʾ*
in the Wadi and by the Quʿayṭīs in the 19th century reflect a spec-
trum long known in Islamic history.[67] Even if the 'centralist' trend
was influenced by Persian and Indian ideas as a consequence of the
Quʿayṭī's experiences in India and if this is not merely a topos aimed
at proving the foreign nature of Quʿayṭī rule by their foes, notables
still constituted a counterbalance in the Quʿayṭī realm.[68] If Quʿayṭī
rule was considered as something relatively new for Hadhramaut,
then this had more to do with the military and financial superior-

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[66] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 40. The English version of the treaty,
reproduced in Aitchison, *Treaties*, pp. 157–159 (here p. 158), is slightly misleading:
sāda ʿalawiyya is translated with "higher authority", and *al-ʿadāla al-ʿāmma* (common
or general justice) as "common law".

[67] Paul, "Herrschaft und Gesellschaft"; Musallam, "The ordering of Muslim soci-
eties", in particular pp. 173–186. Aziz al-Azmeh's thorough study, *Muslim Kingship*,
London, New York: I. B. Tauris 1997, amply shows the historical roots of these
positions. Ayyubi, *Overstating*, pp. 38–85, tends towards a somewhat modified model
of 'Oriental despotism' which Paul, arguing more historically than theoretically,
rejects. However, even Ayyubi has to concede that the hegemony of the state was
often incomplete and left room for resistance, cf. pp. 84f.

[68] See the first part of chapter I for other attempts to prove the foreign origin
of political opponents.

ity and the consequent ability to impose some kind of rule from
above than with the 'foreign' origins of its ideology.

Institutions of the Qu'aytī Dawla

In the Kathīrī realms, the existence of the *dawla* in the 19th and
early 20th centuries hinged on the presence of a strong personality,
such as Sultan Ghālib b. Muḥsin, in conjunction with sufficient mil-
itary and financial support to keep rival forces at bay. If the sources
mention a *wazīr* or a financial administration, the relevant officials
were usually appointed on an ad hoc basis and do not seem to have
remained in office for any considerable length of time. They seem
not have had any institutional legitimacy independent of individual
rulers or notables. While the terminology of a *dawla* suggests the
existence of certain institutions, these 'institutions' and the presence
of the *dawla* were so short-lived that apart from the ideological level,
they hardly deserved the name.[69] This state of affairs continued well
into the 20th century. Ingrams, who commented extensively on the
Qu'aytī government, briefly noted about their counterparts: "The
Kathīris have no organised Governmental institutions in the accepted
sense of the word, though the Sultan and his supporters, including
the wealthy Seyids of Tarim and Seyun, are very anxious for
progress."[70] As a consequence, the notables started to take initiatives
of their own, which will be discussed in chapters VI and VII.

In contrast, the Qu'aytīs managed to build some institutions which
helped to consolidate Qu'aytī rule and laid the foundations of a
more stable polity than in the Kathīrī case. They were constructed
in a loose sense around the principles laid down in the will of 'Awaḍ
b. 'Umar. Most of them seem to date from the very late 19th and
early 20th centuries. The latter years of 'Awaḍ b. 'Umar (d. 1909)
and the rule of his son Ghālib (d. 6 June 1922) mark a period of
consolidation of the Qu'aytī sultanate. Although it is possible that
we simply do not know enough about the earlier period, it would
seem likely that serious institution-building began then. Furthermore,
it needs to be kept in mind that the Qu'aytī rulers might not just

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[69] About 'institutions' in modern and premodern states, cf. Reinhard, *Geschichte*,
pp. 125–140. The contrast between the Kathīrī and Qu'aytī domains was noted
in 1934 by H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 78–87.

[70] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 133.

have been influenced by Indian 'customs', but as high officers in the
Nizam's system were witnesses of the process of modernisation which
Hyderabad underwent in the late 19th and early 20th century.[71]

From the very beginning, the Qu'aytī realms were divided into a
number of provinces. In each town and province, the ruler was rep-
resented, quite in line with 'Awaḍ's will. Some of these posts were
filled by members of the Qu'aytī family.[72] This was counterbalanced
by the appointment of leading members of other Yāfi'ī families else-
where.[73] As time progressed, important Yāfi'ī and local families in-
creased their share in these posts.

In contrast, the judicial system largely remained in local hands.
Judges tended to stem from the local scholarly elite or from the inte-
rior. Lee-Warner, who visited Hadhramaut in 1919, opined that at
least al-Mukallā had a "competent civil and criminal jurisdiction" in
which a *muftī* and a judge dealt with civil, religious and most of the
criminal cases.[74] By the 1920s, judges were appointed by the gov-
ernment and dealt mostly with issues relating to marriage and inher-
itance. Most smaller criminal cases were regulated internally, i.e. by
tribal leaders (*muqaddam*), by the *manṣab* of Beduin tribes or within
the urban quarters. In these cases, customary law (*'urf*) was gener-
ally applied. Where major crimes were concerned or the verdicts
disputed, cases came before the Qu'aytī governors. Commercial dis-
putes were delegated to a body of merchants whose decisions were
normally accepted by the state.[75] Although the system was reformed
during the rule of Sultan 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ (d. 1936), it seems to
have operated on a fairly informal level. While most issues of impor-
tance were put in writing, such as agreements between sultans and
tribes, even by the 1930s court records were not kept, each judge

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[71] See chapter IV.
[72] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 39–44, gives long lists of both governors and judges in
the various towns and provinces, albeit without any documentation or dates. Bent
& Bent, *Southern Arabia*, reporting on the situation in 1893/94, also mention that
most governors were members of the Qu'aytī family, p. 76.
[73] Personal information, Sultan Ghālib al-Qu'aytī, London, 25.2.2000.
[74] PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-
Warner on his recent visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to
Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 7.
[75] IO, R/20/A/1415, part I, Report by Captain Nasir-ud-din Ahmad, Political
Officer Aden, on his visit to the Hadramaut (12.3.1920), pp. 24f.

acted autonomously and the procedures appeared somewhat hap-
hazard at least to an outsider.[76]

In 1909, Sultan ʿAwaḍ formalised the system of consultation by
setting up a consultative council (*majlis shūra*).[77] Although the insti-
tution as such seems to have remained fairly inconsequential, this is
an interesting move in so far as it tried to put the matter of con-
sultation stipulated in ʿAwaḍ's will (or from a local perspective, the
necessity to cooperate with notables) on a legal basis. It is also a
very early example of constitutional government on the Peninsula.
While its existence in the absence of further detailed information
does not tell us much about the actual relationship between local
notables and the sultan, it shows how the latter tried to shape and
institutionalise this relationship. The idea of *shūrā* is deeply anchored
in Islamic conceptions of rule; however, to pass a law defining its
concrete form and even giving it a democratic aspect might well
have been influenced by ʿAwaḍ's experiences in India. The pream-
ble justifies the law with reference to Koran III; 159: *wa-shāwirhim
fī 'l-amr*: "take counsel with them"[78] and then continues:

> Obeying the commands of the sublime God, following the example of
> His noble Prophet, emulating his rightly guided successors and copy-
> ing the advanced nations, we have decided—and ask the sublime God
> to help us—to direct the matters of our kingdom to a consultative
> council. By this, we hope to exercise justice among those **over whom
> God has placed us** to rule. We are passionate about developing our
> kingdom and refining it in order to make it agreeable and pleasant to
> its inhabitants and to establish internal and external peace.[79]

The council was to consist of fifteen elected "elders and experienced
people" who had to swear that they committed themselves to work
for the benefit of the country and express their opinions accordingly.

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[76] Al-ʿArashī, *Bulūgh*, pp. 115f.; interview with Sayyid ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-
Mukallā, 13.10.1996.

[77] The original document, which was to take effect in rabīʿ al-thānī of 1327/April
1909, is in the possession of Sultan Ghālib b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿayṭī. I would like to
thank him for providing me with a copy. The text is reprinted in his *Taʾammulāt*,
pp. 131–133, with a commentary on pp. 130f. H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 91, men-
tions that "there was at one time a species of State Council in Mukalla, but it was
dissolved by the present *Wazir* and a Council of Qadhis instituted instead".

[78] The verse continues: "in the conduct of affairs; and when you are resolved,
put your trust in God".

[79] Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, *Taʾammulāt*, p. 131. The emphasis is mine.

The interior regions of Shibām, Dawʿan and others were to have subcouncils. Decisions had to be taken by consensus or majority rule. The council was to deal with the following issues:

– setting up civil (*sharʿ*), commercial and unspecified other courts, appoint the judges, settle arguments. These decisions had to be approved by the sultan or his representative,
– considering income and expenditure and setting up a budget for the Kingdom. It should set appropriate salaries for state officials and judges,
– deliberating the question of the education of the future generation and setting aside a budget,
– consulting with all tribes and entering into treaties and engagements with them to secure the roads and trade, or, if negotiations proved fruitless, subduing them by force,
– replacing delegates who were rejected by the majority of the people for a good reason or who were absent for a prolonged period or who died,
– appointing delegates to be entered into a special register,
– keeping a written record of the council's decisions,
– taking decisions only if a quorum of half of the delegates attended.[80]

The membership of the council seems to have varied over time and to have essentially comprised Yāfiʿī military leaders (*maqādima*), notably during Sultan ʿUmar's time, and leading merchants.[81] Some of these were very close to both the al-Miḥḍār family and the sultan.[82] Although little detail about the actual work of the council is known, in principle Hadhramaut certainly was a fertile soil for such an approach, as developments in the Wadi and in the diaspora confirm which are discussed in chapter VI. It seems that in the context of a wider reform initiative, the idea of such a council was revived in 1928, and the existence of a similar council was reported in the early 1930s.[83]

In terms of security, by 1919 the Quʿayṭī sultan maintained an army of about 1,000 Yāfiʿī tribesmen and about 400 East African slaves, in addition to a small police force in al-Mukallā.[84] During

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[80] Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, *Taʾammulāt*, pp. 131–133.
[81] Personal communiation, ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 25.3. and 26.3.2000.
[82] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 16.9.1992.
[83] *Al-Dahnāʾ* I; 6, June 1928, pp. 2f.; I; 10, October 1928, p. 19, cf. ch. 7.
[84] PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, pp. 7, 14f.

local wars, friendly Beduin tribes could be recruited against a share in the booty or payment. In some regions such as al-Qaṭn, the Yāfiʿī tribesmen who had lived in the country for generations defended their territory without official intervention.[85] Payment for the army and its equipment seems to have been a perennial problem during and after the Quʿaytī expansion, as is witnessed by the repeated Quʿaytī requests for British arms supplies and loans.[86] In addition, the fact that ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ introduced a financial regime, whereby the soldiers were paid directly by the state rather than through their commanders, would suggest that under the old regime funds dwindled before reaching their designation.[87] The question remains as to how successful this measure was. Ingrams reported as late as 1937 that many Yāfiʿī commanders still kept a portion of the soldiers' pay.[88] Although the practice of compensating soldiers for their services with land (*iqṭāʿ*) was a feature of the 19th century, reports from the early 20th century still described soldiers making ends meet by engaging in agriculture. Foreign observers feared that this might infringe on the military's readiness to engage in warfare.[89] Because of the problems faced in obtaining loans from the British, it seems that both Ghālib and ʿUmar continued the practice of their predecessors and transferred funds from Hyderabad to finance the Quʿaytī sultanate in Hadhramaut.[90] As far as overland travel was concerned, the Quʿaytīs tried to secure the roads by treaties with the Beduin, which were enforced through the practice of taking hostages from the Beduins to ensure safe passage of caravans. At certain times, this seems to have worked quite well.[91]

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[85] This is reported by al-ʿArashī, *Bulūgh*, p. 116 for the 1930s, but might well have been an older practice.

[86] See, for example, the correspondence in IO, R/20/A/1047; PRO, CO 725/6, Political Resident Aden to Colonial Secretary, 30.4.1924 and Omar b. Awadth El Gaiety to Political Resident Aden, 18.2.1924 and PRO, CO 725/7, Political Resident Aden to Colonial Secretary, 29.4.1925.

[87] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 80.

[88] PRO, CO 725/52/7, Ingrams, The Yafaʾi Situation in Hadhramaut, 2.11.1937, encl. in Acting Governor Aden to Colonial Secretary, 3.11.1937.

[89] PRO, CO 725/6, Political Resident Aden to Colonial Secretary, 30.4.1924, sees this phenomenon as a consequence of the financial crisis, whereas Hirsch, *Reisen*, p. 190, describes it as a mode of payment.

[90] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 51f.; personal communication, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 1.4.2000.

[91] IO, R/20/A/4647, Report on Mokalla, H.M.S. "Proserpine", at Aden, 26.12.1905, p. 2.

In the interior regions which were controlled by the Qu'ayṭīs, their rule seems to have brought some measure of stability. The inhabitants of Shibām, which for many years had been at the centre of the Kathīrī-Qu'ayṭī struggle and subject to exploitation by both Yāfi'ī and Kathīrī tribesmen, certainly appreciated when matters were settled and the town came under exclusive Qu'ayṭī control in 1274/ 1857–58.[92] Some of the governors, who were also called by the honorific title 'sultan' if they were members of the sultan's family, managed to maintain some degree of independence from the sultan. Thus, the Bents were told that "the sultan of Hagarein is not entirely under Makalla, but that he of Haura is."[93] Nevertheless, it would seem that the Qu'ayṭīs managed to impose enough stability and restrain their governors sufficiently, not least in terms of taxation, to make their rule seem fairly attractive, at least in the Western tributary Wadis such as Daw'an and 'Amd.[94]

Because it sheds some light on local politics, but also because two of the leading families involved emerged as major players in the history of the Qu'ayṭī sultanate, it might be worthwhile to consider in some detail the occupation of Wadi Daw'an. The area was an important agricultural center. Furthermore, it possessed great strategic importance as a major caravan route to the interior, particularly for the Qu'ayṭīs, who needed safe access to their realms in Western Wadi Hadhramaut.[95] It had first been under Kathīrī and later under Kasādī control, but in 1287/1870–71, when the latter had to withdraw his forces from Daw'an, the situation deteriorated once again.

Particularly the upper reaches of Wadi Daw'an were subject to an intense rivalry between the *mashāyikh* of the Āl 'Amūdī and the majority of the Saybān tribesmen, both of whom lived in different parts of the Wadi and on the plateaus to its south.[96] The Āl 'Amūdī,

[92] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. I, p. 175.

[93] Bent & Bent, *Southern Arabia*, p. 107.

[94] Bent & Bent, *Southern Arabia*, p. 76.

[95] PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 13.

[96] For a discussion of the different inhabitants of Daw'an and their relationship, albeit in the 1930s, see H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 110–114. The historical developments are described by al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, pp. 11–19 and in PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, pp. 13f.

whose leaders resided in al-Khurayba, commanded respect among the tribesmen of the Dayyin and Quthm, a branch of the Saybān. This was partly due to the fame of Shaykh Saʿīd al-ʿAmūdī, the ʿAmūdī ancestor and Sufi who had become a local saint,[97] but also due to common political and economic interest. The Khamʿ section of the Saybān, in contrast, entertained close relations with the Āl al-Miḥḍār who were *sayyid*s of the Shaykh Abū Bakr clan.[98] In al-Rashīd, the Khamʿ were led by ʿUmar b. Aḥmad Bā Ṣurra (1271/1854–55 – 1352/1933–34). He enjoyed a reputation for his fair treatment of the population. For those not intimately connected to one of the two camps, such as Shaykh ʿAbdallāh Bā Sūdān in al-Khurayba, the situation presented itself as follows:

> The matters of the people living in the area of *al-shawka* [where Wādī Daʿan forks into two branches] at the present moment are unsettled. The *mashāykh* Āl ʿAmūdī and the *qabāʾil* Saybān are engaged in strong conflict. If one side obtains more income than usual [in terms of harvest and/or taxes], the other becomes annoyed, and is only satisfied if they can get even more, and so on, and neither religion nor sultan is there to restrain or suppress them.[99]

Interestingly, Dawʿanī migrants in Aden seem to have approached Sultan ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar al-Quʿaytī, together with their kinsmen in the Wadi, to ask for help. According to al-Bakrī, they asked him explicitly to occupy their homeland and "to set up justice, to enforce order and peace".[100] Al-Nākhibī reports in a differing version that Sultan ʿAwaḍ first approached Bā Ṣurra and then Shaykh ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-ʿAmūdī to cooperate with him in salvaging the situation. In this version of events, Sultan ʿAwaḍ agreed with al-ʿAmūdī and sent a force which achieved nothing. When Bā Ṣurra returned from al-Ḥudayda where he had tended to his commercial concerns, he in turn was approached by Sultan Ghālib (standing in for his father) and agreed with him on common action. In the face of local

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[97] On Shaykh Saʿīd, see Serjeant, "Materials" I, p. 303. The pilgrimage to al-ʿAmūdī's tomb seems to have been particularly elaborate and therefore served as an example worthy of extended criticism for ʿAlī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr in his play of the 1930s, *Humām*, pp. 48–52.

[98] Quite unusually for a tribal *shaykh*, Bā Ṣurra had been educated in Cairo. For his biography, see al-Nākhibī, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 99–103.

[99] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, p. 323. For a similar view, see al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, pp. 16f.

[100] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 17.

opposition, the first intervention under al-ʿAmūdī's leadership had
made matters worse. The Quʿayṭī forces who had been sent in his
support and who were later reinforced under the command of ʿAbd
al-Khāliq Almās, one of the *mamlūk*s of the Quʿayṭīs, did not suc-
ceed to impose their rule. Only when Bā Ṣurra was entrusted with
the supreme command did he succeed to bring Dawʿan under Quʿayṭī
control and to establish peace (c. 1316/1898/99).[101] ʿUmar Bā Ṣurra
reigned "combining an iron fist with some politics", as al-Bakrī com-
ments.[102] He introduced regular taxation for land and palmtree own-
ers as well as traders, exempting, however, the Āl ʿAmūdī and the
Āl Bā ʿAlawī (i.e., mostly the al-Miḥḍār clan).[103]

The Āl al-Miḥḍār emerged as leading political figures shortly after
the conquest of Dawʿan. As descendants of the Āl Shaykh Abū Bakr,
the al-Miḥḍār clan entertained close links with the *sayyid*s of ʿInāt,
the major religious centre east of Tarīm, as well as with the Yāfiʿīs,
who considered the Āl Shaykh Abū Bakr as their religious authori-
ties after having been called to their aid against the Beduin around
the mid-19th century.[104] Some members of the Āl al-Miḥḍār had
emigrated to Bondowoso in Eastern Java and apparently made a
fortune.[105] A somewhat obscure episode relates an early meeting
between the young Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār (d. 1928), the son
of the influential Dawʿanī notable and scholar Ḥāmid b. Aḥmad
(1250/1834–35 – 1318/1900–1),[106] and the Quʿayṭī governor of al-
Shiḥr, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar al-Quʿayṭī. It tells us about the great
impact which a poem by Aḥmad, the grandfather of Ḥusayn b.
Ḥāmid, made on the governor who had a reputation as a particu-
larly pious individual.[107] He was so impressed by its moral content
that Ḥusayn returned with one hundred camel loads of foodstuffs

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[101] Al-Nākhibī, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 101f.

[102] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 19, mentions that he might have been killed, or else committed suicide.

[103] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 19. By the 1930s, the Āl Bā Wazīr also seem to have become exempt from taxes, al-ʿArashī, *Bulūgh*, p. 115.

[104] About this episode, see van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 75; Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 30 and al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 8.

[105] On the family, and its connections particularly with Eastern Java, see ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 280–286.

[106] About Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār, see ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. II, pp. 445–452.

[107] According to Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, he was known in the family as ʿAbdallāh al-muṣallī (the one who prays), personal communication, Jeddah, 1.4.2000. For a biography of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Miḥḍār (1217/1802–3–1304/1886–87), who was a famous scholar, see Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt al-baḥr, pp. 73–82.

and clothing to the Wadi.[108] The possibility should be considered that such a gift also enhanced links of loyalty between the ruling dynasty and the Āl al-Miḥḍār who were related to the *manṣab*s of the Yāfiʿīs, as shown above.

Shortly after this first meeting with a representative of the sultanate, Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār made his way to Java, and later to India.[109] In Hyderabad, he visited *jamʿdār* ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar and ultimately became his private advisor. When ʿAwaḍ was awarded the title 'sultan' in 1902, Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid was appointed his representative in case of absence.[110] As Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid had both an intimate knowledge of and close relations with many of the Hadhrami tribes and clans, he arguably became the most influential politician of the Quʿayṭī sultanate until his death in early June 1928.

In political terms, al-Miḥḍār contributed considerably to the expansion of the Quʿayṭī sultanate by concluding subsidiary treaties with a number of tribes. This was facilitated by his family's connections, his diplomatic skills and of course his office.[111] In addition to his salary, al-Miḥḍār and his family were richly honoured and rewarded financially. The documents reprinted in the 'biography' of Ḥusayn, written by the third and last *wazīr* from the family, Ḥāmid b. Abī Bakr, give some impression of this. On August 17, 1900, Sultan ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar exempted all descendants of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Miḥḍār[112] from all taxes and levies imposed on the population of Dawʿan. Furthermore, the income from and rule over the two villages, al-Quwayra and Ḥalbūn, the *ḥawṭa* of Aḥmad al-Miḥḍār, was transferred to the family, "and none of the representatives of the state, or its soldiers and retinue are to interfere with the *ḥabāʾib* [i.e., the *sayyid*s] or the inhabitants of these lands".[113] In November 1902,

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[108] Al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, pp. 7f.; Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām* 16.9.1992.

[109] This early career is more clearly presented in ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. II, pp. 452–453 than in al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, which does not give much precise information. Cf. ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 281f.

[110] This is confirmed in the document of November 1911 discussed below.

[111] Al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 100. The treaty system is described in some detail by H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 92f. Cf. PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 5.

[112] About Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlawī al-Miḥḍār (b. 1217/1802–3, d. 5.11.1886), see ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 280.

[113] The document is reprinted in al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 17. It also states that the Āl al-Miḥḍār are exempted from all "laws" (*qawānīn*), which in this context most likely refers to laws imposing taxes.

the descendants of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Miḥḍār were absolved
of any payments in the ports for merchandise imported for their
personal use, although they were still obliged to pay market dues on
goods imported for trading purposes.[114] Finally, according to a doc-
ument from November 1911, the *wazīr* was given full powers to
appoint judges and governors and to command the slave army as
part of his official duties. ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar accorded him far-reach-
ing financial authority, something which was limited some years later
when the revenues of al-Shiḥr, al-Mukallā and the tobacco growing
centre of Ghayl Bā Wazīr were removed from his control.[115]

It is not surprising that the "virtual ruler of the country"[116] became
tempted to try and play on rivalries in the family. It has been dis-
cussed earlier how both ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ and his son ʿAwaḍ tried
to settle the delicate matter of succession in their wills. Following
ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar's wishes, his son Ghālib succeeded him. Ghālib
hoped to circumvent his father's will and nominated his own son
Ṣāliḥ as next sultan, thus trying to sidestep his brother ʿUmar.
According to ʿAbd al-Khāliq al-Baṭāṭī, a former soldier who rose to
become governor of al-Shiḥr before the end of the sultanate, al-
Miḥḍār tried to encourage Ṣāliḥ to make a bid for power. He is
said to have feared that ʿUmar might be less willing to accord him
the same powers and influence as had been the case during the reign
of Ghālib, who was known for his generosity.[117] When the majority
of the (influential) Yāfiʿīs and the notables of al-Mukallā and al-Shiḥr
preferred to keep the succession in accordance to Sultan ʿAwaḍ's
will, however, al-Miḥḍār cleverly presented himself as neutral medi-
ator.[118] The matter was quickly resolved and by the end of June
1922, only a few weeks after Ghālib's death, Ṣāliḥ and ʿUmar had

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[114] Al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 18.
[115] Al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, pp. 19 and 14f.
[116] PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent Visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 5.
[117] According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Idām, p. 64, al-Miḥḍār faced certain problems after the accession of ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ. However, Baṭāṭī himself shows that Sultan Ghālib, and not al-Miḥḍār, had the final word in critical affairs. For example, the sultan did not hesitate to forbid his *wazīr* all intervention in the affairs of al-Shiḥr when a dispute arose about how to deal with insurgent Ḥamūmī tribesmen. Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 49f.
[118] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 51. al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 83 speaks vaguely of Ṣāliḥ's ambitions and that "he was supported in this matter by some others".

signed an agreement by which Ṣāliḥ recognised his uncle's rule.[119] The suspicion and rivalry between the two lingered, as will be seen when the political developments of the 1920s are discussed in chapter VII.

Taxation and State-Led Development in the Quʿayṭī Domains until the 1920s

Almost all sources, whether Arab or Western, agree that the Quʿayṭī sultans pursued policies which can be described as modernising in the widest sense. In particular al-Mukallā seems to have boomed, even if this had already started under the Kasādī rulers.[120] Although the city only became Quʿayṭī capital around 1915,[121] earlier visitors already commented on the town's development. In 1893, Hirsch mentioned that the governor planned to expand the quay.[122] After a short lull in 1902 due to the fighting between Sultan ʿAwaḍ and his nephews, trade quickly resumed and by 1905, the trade of al-Mukallā was described as very lively.[123] The development of construction mirrored the increasing prosperity. Little, who was part of a team invited by Sultan Ghālib in 1919–20 to conduct a geographical and geological survey of al-Mukallā and surroundings, to be discussed later, comments on the town:

> Most of the old houses are constructed of sun-baked bricks and white-washed both outside and in. They are mostly of four or five stories but smaller houses and even huts are sandwiched in between the larger ones. Large stone houses are now being built along the sea-front near the Palace.[124]

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[119] PRO, CO 725/5, Agreement between Sultan Omar b. Awad [. . .] and Sultan Saleh Bin Ghalib, Hyderabad, 24 June 1922, encl. in Acting Political Resident, Aden to Sec. to Gvt., Bombay, July 10, 1922.

[120] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 4, see also chapter I.

[121] Personal communication, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Millāḥī, al-Shiḥr, 14.10.1996. Ghālib b. ʿAwaḍ, representing his father in Hadhramaut, ruled over al-Mukallā. Because of the conflict with Munaṣṣar and Ḥusayn, the centre gradually shifted to al-Mukallā from that time onwards. ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ later wanted to return the capital to al-Shiḥr, but died before realising this plan. al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 85.

[122] Hirsch, *Reisen*, p. 290.

[123] IO, R/20/A/4647, Report on Mokalla, H.M.S. "Proserpine", at Aden, 26.12.1905, pp. 1f.

[124] Little, *The Geography*, p. 6.

Consequently, the British commented positively on these sultans. Sultan ʿAwaḍ was regarded as an "enlightened" ruler who deserved support, and his successor Ghālib was praised as a ruler who contributed greatly to the development of al-Mukallā and successfully furthered trade with India, Muscat and Aden.[125] This positive development was not limited to the coast. A study of Shibām emphasised the growth of that city from 2,000 inhabitants in 1880 to 6,000–7,000 by 1920, which was accompanied by a building boom, although no marked economic development in agriculture or manufacturing.[126] A report from 1919 indicates that the transfer of capital from abroad, in addition to strong local commerce, provided the basis for the prosperity of Shibām.[127] Therefore, much of the change resulted from the increasing wealth of migrants rather than from local development. This can also be observed in the Kathīrī territories where the palaces and mosques constructed in the first three decades of the 20th century can be admired to this day. However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Quʿayṭī sultans tried to further economic development, in addition to the fact that the relative peace in the Quʿayṭī domains provided favourable conditions for returning migrants. It should be noted that some of these changes were introduced against the wishes of the ʿulamāʾ. Both the Bents in 1893–94 and Little in 1919–20 note their opposition to change, the latter emphasising that "the Saiyids" probably also mobilised public opinion against "reforms and improvements".[128]

Given that Hadhramis made huge fortunes as traders abroad, it is somewhat surprising to note that a significant portion of the long-distance trade of al-Mukallā and al-Shiḥr was in Indian hands.[129] Only some merchant families from al-Mukallā and al-Shiḥr (notably Bā Sharāḥīl, Bā Zarʿa and Āl Bū Sabʿa) had offices in Bombay and

[125] On ʿAwaḍ, see IO, R/20/A/1047, Political Resident, Aden to Sec. to Gvt., Bombay, 26.7.1903, p. 8, cf. the letter of 1.4.1904, pp. 95–97. For further positive comments on trade during ʿAwaḍ's rule, cf. al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. 2, p. 24. On Ghālib, see IO, R/20/A/1408, Political Resident, Aden to Sec. to Gvt., Bombay, 13.5.1916, in particular paragraph 6. Cf. Little, *The Geography*, p. 10, who describes Ghālib as "enlightened and progressive", al-Nākhibī, *Yāfiʿ*, p. 141.
[126] Breton & Darles, "Shibam", p. 75.
[127] PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent Visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 4.
[128] Bent & Bent, *Southern Arabia*, p. 80; Little, *The Geography*, p. 10.
[129] Bent & Bent, *Southern Arabia*, p. 75.

Djibouti. This was largely the result of British and Indian predominance in (steam-)shipping,[130] while it seems that much of the dhow trade remained in Arab hands. By the early 1930s, Hadhramis may have tried to assume more control of this lucrative trade, possibly as a result of its growing importance.[131]

The import and export trade grew in proportion to the rising wealth of Hadhramis. While again we do not have any precise information, the travel reports allow at least an anecdotal reconstruction of the changing situation. Von Wrede described the Wadi in 1843 as a rather poor place with some islands of wealth.[132] Consequently, he suggests that trade between the coast and the Wadi occurred only on an ad hoc basis.[133] The Bents, travelling in 1893/94, were stunned by the luxuries found in some of the palaces, and Hirsch's description of the market of Shibām from 1893 shows that imported items such as Italian soap, French lights and Dutch porcelain were by then available to a wider public.[134] It has already been mentioned that ʿUmar al-Junayd is credited with the introduction of muslin to Hadhramaut. In contrast to the import of basic foodstuffs and wood which had a long history, the products mentioned by the travellers were clearly luxury items. Consumption patterns changed not only for a few. While the increased use of sugar in the customary coffee had provoked the wrath of Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ, the wide-spread introduction of tea and rice signalled far-reaching changes in culinary culture.[135] By 1935, a significant part of all imports was made up of 'new' items of mass consumption such as rice, tea, Japanese bales, kerosene and petrol, while 'traditional' imports such as wooden poles also increased as a result of the building boom.[136] Another indicator for the growing

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[130] Hunter, *The Aden Handbook*, pp. 58f., lists the (most frequent) steamer connections between Aden, India, the Far East and East Africa. From this, it would seem that P & O with its weekly service to Bombay offered the most frequent and cheapest connection to India. Fares to South East Asia and the Far East were lower with Messageries Maritimes. The British India Steam Company served the route to Zanzibar, while Messageries Maritimes ran to Mauritius. To what extent this mirrors freight transport, however, can only be conjectured.

[131] Van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 33.

[132] Von Wrede, *Reisen*, e.g. his description of al-Khurayba, pp. 102–107, and of Wadi ʿAmd, pp. 223–230. For descriptions of wealth, see pp. 101f., 107f.

[133] Von Wrede, *Reisen*, p. 17.

[134] Bent & Bent, *Southern Arabia*, pp. 111–113, 202; Hirsch, *Reisen*, p. 205.

[135] Van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 33 about tea replacing coffee.

[136] See the lists in H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 71f.

dependence on imports are the attempts to limit them, starting from
the teachings of Ibn Sumayṭ and continuing with a series of sump-
tuary laws which were issued from the late 19th century.[137]

Regardless of the redoubtable consequences of the imports for the
overall economy, the growing trade proved a great asset to the sul-
tans as it constituted their major source of local income. Goods were
taxed on arrival, as well as when leaving Quʿayṭī lands for the Kathīrī
sultanate, which remained a major source of friction between Kathīrīs
and Quʿayṭīs until the 1960s. The second local source of revenue
were the fertile lands of Ghayl Bā Wazīr, which were considered
crown property. Tobacco was grown for export by individuals who
had rented this right from the sultan. The only taxes charged on
farmers were those on date trees. Overall, the system seems to have
been more organised and fair on the population than that in the
Kathīrī lands.[138] It is worthwhile to note that this was easier to
achieve for wealthy sultans controlling the trade, than for rulers in
the land-locked interior who had lost their foothold in Hyderabad.
This is not to say that all was well in the Quʿayṭī domains. In 1903,
a certain Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh Bā Khawar (?) of Dīs appealed to
the British in Aden against his Sultan, arguing that he had been ill
treated and forced to cede part of his property in Aden to the
Sultan.[139] It is not clear whether this was a singular case or whether
it is singular only in that no similar pieces of evidence have sur-
vived. The general tenor of comments nevertheless indicates that
matters were much worse in the Kathīrī domains.

Until some time during Sultan ʿUmar's rule in the 1920s or 1930s,
the farming of the customs was auctioned publicly.[140] The success-
ful bidders, who came from both Indian and local families, paid the
sultans a set sum once a year.[141] In return, they were authorised to

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[137] On this issue, see in more detail Freitag & Schönig, "Wise Men".

[138] PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-
Warner on his recent Visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to
Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 7.

[139] IO, R/20/A/4697, Ahmad b. Abdulla Bakhwar to Resident, Aden, 11.12.1903.

[140] Given the very wide range in estimates for al-Shiḥr in 1902 in the following
table, it is somewhat doubtful that the practice of auctioning was already in place
in 1902.

[141] The best explanation of the system is found in PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern
Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent Visit to the
Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919,
pp. 6f. Cf. IO, R/20/A/1407, Notes by the Resident, Aden about a discussion

charge set rates of import and export duty. The following table gives some impression of how the income from these sources developed. It points to either a drastic increase in trading (and hence a much higher value of the tax farm at the auctions), a major leap in inflation, or a combination of the two between 1902 and 1924.

Table 2. *Annual Tax Income of the Qu'ayṭī Sultanate in Maria Theresia dollars*

	1902	1919	1924
al-Shiḥr (customs incl. minor ports of Dīs, al-Ḥāmī, Quṣayʿir, al-Rayda)	16,000–25,000	160,000	75,000
al-Mukallā (customs incl. port of Burūm)		160,000	160,000
Ghayl Bā Wazīr (lands, tobacco export)	25,000	180,000	150,000
income from interior (customs, date tax)			100,000

Sources: 1902: IO, R/20/A/978, Political Resident Aden to Sec. to Gvt., Bombay, 3.5.1902, 1919: PRO, FO371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent Visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 7, 1924: PRO, CO 725/6, Political Resident Aden to Secretary for Colonies, 30.4.1924, p. 4.

In spite of the constitutional initiative of 1909, the budget of sultanate and sultan remained closely intertwined. From a Qu'ayṭī point of view, both the private properties in Hyderabad and the income from Hadhramaut were "*amlāk al-qaʿṭa*", property of the Qu'ayṭīs.[142] While the sultans justified their requests for loans from the British with insufficient revenues, and emphasised that they were subsidising Hadhramaut from their private income in Hyderabad of which they transferred huge portions biannually, the British repeatedly suspected that they syphoned off revenue from Hadhramaut.[143] This

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with K. B. Syed Hussein al-Mohdar, 26.9.1917, p. 6. In 1917, the tax farmers were A. and J. Laljee in al-Mukallā, Bakr Bā Sharaḥīl in al-Shiḥr and Menahim Lueshe (?) Muḥayriz, an agent of a certain Abū Ṣalāḥ (Bū Sabʿa), at al-Ghayl. The end of this system is discussed by al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 52f. and H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 91.

[142] Personal communication, Sultan Ghālib al-Qu'ayṭī, London, 16.11.2000.

[143] PRO, CO 725/52/10, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Political Secretary, Aden, 5.10.1937, encl. in Political Secretary, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 25.10.1937. A similar divergence of views seems to have already existed in 1928, PRO, CO 725/17/14, Resident's visit to Mokalla, 20.10.1928, p. 2.

most probably reflects different perceptions of the two sides as to
what constitutes proper financial management, but also British sus-
picions of a system where no checks against the misappropriation of
funds existed. While the above contradiction cannot be resolved in
the absence of any proper evidence relating to the finances of the
Quʿayṭī family, one can at least gain a fairly good impression of the
iniatives taken by the sultans after World War I.

Sultan ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar's long rule (1865–1909/10) was marked
by the consolidation of Quʿayṭī rule. He began some smaller schemes
to extend port facilities in al-Mukallā and to improve the water sup-
plies in al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā.[144] Furthermore, he entered into
negotiations with the Eastern Syndicate about oil exploration. It
seems that he gave the Syndicate a concession but was rebuked by
the British, who forced him to revise the contract which was only
officially ratified in 1911.[145] Although the Syndicate's operations did
not yield any tangible results, the matter continued to trouble the
British, who sought to obtain fuller information on the actual oil
resources and agreed with the Sultan in May 1914 that he would
only grant future oil concessions to companies nominated by the
British Government.[146]

ʿAwaḍ's successor, Sultan Ghālib was characterised by Ingrams as
"a man of advanced views, who was extremely anxious for the devel-
opment of his country in which he established peace and good
order".[147] This judgement seems to be based on Ghālib's initiative
to ask the British High Commissioner to send an agricultural and
geological expert to al-Mukallā at his own expense in 1919. Their
task was to investigate the development potential of the Quʿayṭī
domains. Special attention was to be given to improvement of agri-
culture in Ghayl Bā Wazīr and Wadi Mayfaʿ (the lower section of
Wadi Ḥajar, which had been brought under Quʿayṭī control in 1318/

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[144] Bent & Bent, *Southern Arabia*, p. 206. According to al-Nākhibī, *Ḥaḍramawt*,
p. 62, the first efforts to bring piped water from the springs of Tabbāla to al-Shiḥr
were made during the reign of Sultan Ghālib b. ʿAwadh (i.e. between 1909/10/1922).

[145] Mehra, *Aden and Yemen*, p. 101; Lekon, "The British", p. 138, personal com-
munication, Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, Jeddah, 24.3.2000.

[146] IO, L/PS/11/75, Sultan Ghalib Bin Awadth Bin Umar Al Kaiti to Political
Resident, Aden, 9.5.1914 and H. Berridge, Chief Engineer, Aden Port Trust to
Political Resident, Aden, 11.5.1914.

[147] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 35.

1900−1)[148] with its perennial water supply. The second major aim
was to ascertain whether minerals, in particular oil and coal, could
be found in commercial quantities. As the sultan knew the potential
of income derived from mining from India, and surely was aware
of the growing importance of oil and the finds elsewhere on the
Peninsula, it is not surprising that he wanted to investigate the pos-
sibilities in Hadhramaut.[149] The prospects for commercial exploita-
tion of minerals were deemed unlikely,[150] and it is unclear whether
the agricultural report occasioned any consequences. Nevertheless,
negotiations about prospecting for oil continued for a number of
years albeit without tangible results.[151]

One might of course argue that given the lack of separation
between the sultan's finances and those of the sultanate as well as
the diminishing resources from India, this initiative aimed at least
as much at the improvement of the sultan's private income as at a
development of state finances. That the sultan did not act out of
shere altruism also becomes clear when one regards what other recent
developments Little describes:

> Public services are practically non-existent, but for his own benefit the
> sultan has had a water supply laid on for the Palace and the town,
> roads built for his motors and the Palace lighted by electricity, and
> all these innovations must undoubtedly have an educational effect on
> the inhabitants.[152]

Little described that, in addition to the sultan's four motor cars,
there were a few private carriages, as well as a bicycle and some
bullock carts in al-Mukallā. Therefore, the immediate number of
beneficiaries of the new roads built by the sultan to al-Fuwwa, al-
Ḥarshiyāt, Shiḥayr and Ghayl Bā Wazīr was somewhat limited.[153]

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[148] On the subordination of Wadi Ḥajar, see al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II,
pp. 20−22.

[149] Personal information, Sultan Ghalib al-Quʿayṭī, London, 25.2.2000. Cf. Little,
The Geography, p. 121. On the mission, see ibid., p. 1 and IO, R/20/A/5011, Report
on the Agricultural Mission to Mokalla (S.W. Arabia), December 1919, H. M. Heald
(Ministry of Agriculture, Egypt), p. 2. For the administrative side of this mission
see IO, L/P&S/11/163, P2541. A summary of the findings is contained in
H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 61−64.

[150] Little, *The Geography*, p. 142.

[151] PRO, CO 725/13/6, Oil Concession in Makalla and IO, L/P&S/11/227.

[152] Little, *The Geography*, p. 10.

[153] Little, *The Geography*, p. 7.

One may also surmise that the new wireless station (al-Mukallā or rather the sultan possibly already had a weak transmitter by 1910)[154] demanded by him and only installed under his successor ʿUmar in the 1930s were mainly intended for use by the ruler and a few traders.[155] Another project was to build a railway line from al-Mukallā to al-Shiḥr and from there to Tarīm and along Wadi Hadhramaut.[156] This latter project also seems to have interested the wealthy al-Kāf family from the Wadi, who was willing to help raise the necessary funds. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Millāḥī, a historian who was approximately seventy years of age in 1995, remembered the project and recalled that as a child he had seen rusty railtracks stored in al-Shiḥr.[157] Again, the railway project in Hyderabad in which Sultan ʿAwaḍ had been involved, served as a model. The negative side of these investment projects was the growing debt which Sultan Ghālib had accrued by the time of his death.[158]

Regardless of whether these initiatives by Ghālib, who felt genuine responsibility for the well-being of his people,[159] did indeed have the desired "educational effect" on the local population, there is some evidence to suggest that his policies inspired the trust of diaspora Hadhramis. Thus, Little mentions that the "Sultan told me that an Arab company with a capital of five lakhs of rupees was being formed to tin the small fish which are caught near Makalla and Shehr. Presumably this would compete with the sardine trade."[160] Although once again definite evidence is hard to come by, it would seem that the

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[154] See the reference to the Sultan of al-Mukallā sending a cable (presumably from al-Mukallā, although this is not entirely clear) in 1910 in Eric Rosenthal, *From Drury Lane to Mecca*, London: Sampson, Low Marston & Co. Ltd 1931 (reprint 1982), p. 84. I would like to thank Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī for this reference. On the other hand, Mehra, *Aden & Yemen*, p. 79 states that the Italians in 1910 proposed to build a wireless station at al-Mukallā, which was rejected by the British. It is not quite clear whether this would have been a new wireless, or whether the Sultan took an initiative of his own after this one was rejected.

[155] The new wireless seems to have operated only in the early 1930s. In 1929, the Aden merchant Besse showed interest in the project, but withdrew probably in the context of the economic crisis. PRO, CO 725/21/4, Wireless Station for Makalla. H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 68 mentions that it had "recently" opened. Cf. Ibn Hāshim, who in 1931 regretted the lack of telegraph facilities, *Riḥla*, p. 53.

[156] Little, *The Geography*, p. 15.

[157] Interview with ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Millāḥī, al-Shiḥr, 26.7.1995.

[158] IO, R/20/A/1414, Note by C.R. to Resident, 11.2.1924.

[159] Little, *A Report*, p. 11, tells us how Ghālib fed the population of one village and provided them with new seeds after a harvest had failed.

[160] Little, *A Report*, p. 11.

sultan alluded to an initiative originating from Java. Shaykhān b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb al-Dīn, probably from Batavia, headed a company which aimed at developing the fishing industry in the Arabian Sea. His brother ʿAlī (1865–1944), a Batavia-born Hadhrami landowner and trader of considerable wealth who played a leading role in the Hadhrami reform movement in South East Asia (as will be seen in chapters IV and V) undertook to raise support and capital for this company in Singapore, Penang, Madras, Bombay, Aden and Hadhramaut.[161] It seems that the project did not come to fruition.[162] The story of ʿAwaḍ b. Martaʾ, who returned from Surabaya to invest in a date palm plantation near Haynin, is another example of the growing confidence of Hadhrami migrants in Quʿaytī rule.[163]

Sultan ʿUmar continued to rule along the lines of his brother Ghālib, even though he seems to have imposed a much tighter financial regime and curbed the spending powers of his *wazīr*, Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār.[164] While the sources contradict each other as to whether this was due to ʿUmar's thriftiness or whether al-Miḥḍār had been wasting money, it seems clear that ʿUmar intended certain investments. He planned to build roads to the interior and to bring piped water to al-Mukallā which he hoped to finance through taxes.[165] ʿUmar's early building activities comprised palaces in al-Mukallā and Ghayl, a major mosque in al-Mukallā and a new customs' house in al-Mukallā.[166] By 1928, al-Mukallā had electric lighting at night.[167] Probably in the early 1930s, ʿUmar not only reorganised the customs' administration and thereby improved the cash flow of

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[161] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 164. On ʿAlī b. Shihāb, see chapters IV and V.

[162] Al-Baṭāṭī mentions an Italian fish factory which opened some time in the early 1930s, but this seems to have been an independent initiative which was supported by the then *wazīr*, Abū Bakr v. Ḥusayn al-Miḥḍār, probably as a result of his family's connections with Ethiopia. al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 76.

[163] van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, pp. 105f. The growing interest in agricultural development is confirmed by Captain Nasir-ud-din's report of 1920, IO, R/20/A/1415, pp. 14f.

[164] PRO, CO 725/6, Political Resident, Aden to CO, 30.4.1924, p. 2. British sources interestingly compare Ghālib's financial conduct with that of Ismāʿīl Pasha of Egypt, IO, R/20/A/1414, Political Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 20.10.1928, p. 3. For the conflict with al-Miḥḍār, see IO, R/20/A/1414, Mokalla news [1928] (the 'news' must have been somewhat dated) and al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 53–62.

[165] PRO, CO 725/6, Omar b. Awadth El Gaiety to Political Resident, Aden, 18.2.1924, the letter is also contained in IO, R/20/A/1414, the date on the Arabic original is 22.2.1924, rather than 18.2. as in the translation.

[166] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 52.

[167] PRO, CO 725/17/14,1, Resident's visit to Mokalla, 20.10.1928.

the state, but also expanded the storage facilities at the harbour and
built a dam to protect al-Mukallā from the ocean.[168] He also encour-
aged the establishment of schools and maintained a small hospital.[169]

In summary, the Quʿaytī sultanate not only proved militarily stronger
than the Kathīrī one, but also established some measure of peace
in the areas under its control through the conclusion of treaties with
the tribes.[170] In addition, it showed a higher degree of institutional-
isation by the early 20th century. This development, which may be
considered as an expression of the transition from chieftaincy to state,
was echoed in an ideology of rule which saw the sultan's rule justified
by God's will. Such a view, expressed in the wills quoted above, by
no means excluded consultation with notables. Instead, it became an
integral part of the system and was justified in religious terms as
shūrā. In addition, the sultans needed the support of Yāfiʿī tribesmen,
alliances with tribal shaykhs such as Bā Ṣurra, and support from
sayyids such as the Āl Abī Bakr b. Sālim, al-ʿAṭṭās, al-Kāf and Hadār.

In contrast, the Kathīrī sultan, who was much weaker militarily
and financially, straddled an uneasy course between his position as
a leader of the Kathīrī tribe and as a sultan who purported to pro-
vide sharʿī rule in his domains. As such, he depended more on the
alliance with powerful and wealthy notables than his Quʿaytī coun-
terpart. Because he did not succeed in restraining the qabāʾil nor his
local slave army, the notables repeatedly chose to withdraw from his
sphere of influence as a means of resistance. In the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, they once again started to look elsewhere for
support for their demands.

The Search for Allies in World War I:
Between the Ottomans and the British

Like their predecessors in the 19th century, Hadhrami (mostly Kathīrī)
notables and rulers in the early 20th century sought outside allies

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[168] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 78f.
[169] Saʿīd, *Mulūk*, p. 440; H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 98; al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 78 (al-
Baṭāṭī clearly does not distinguish the sultan's initiatives from private enterprise).
[170] Nevertheless, van der Meulen, who visited Hadhramaut in 1931, was warned
by the Quʿaytī sultan "that he had no authority outside his own gates", *Don't You
Hear the Thunder*, p. 98. He reports that the overland routes were rather insecure,
van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 19.

for their political projects. Matters were complicated by conflicts between the different chieftaincies as well as between sultans and notables. Furthermore, the South East Asian diaspora underwent a split which will be discussed in more detail in chapter V. It prompted the rivalling parties, *ʿAlawī*s and *Irshādī*s, to seek support against their compatriots from the Dutch and British as well as from other Arab rulers. In addition, the heightened international tensions and subsequently the outbreak of World War I raised the level of interest in the Hadhramaut among the Ottomans in Yemen and the British in Aden. For example, when a German warship was spotted off Burūm in August 1914, the Aden command urged London to secure the coast and generally become more involved in protectorate affairs:

> This Hadramaut littoral is the weakest spot in our Arabian Protectorate. German warships can at this time go there with impunity and are going there. We should know more about our belongings.[171]

We find that during this period as during the 1880s, there was a certain collusion of interests between scheming Hadhrami notables seeking outside intervention and powers who were at other times wary to intervene in this remote backwater of the Arabian Peninsula.

The story of Hadhramaut during World War I has been told several times and therefore does not need to be unravelled here in much detail.[172] The following account concentrates on those issues which are necessary for the understanding of subsequent developments and which shed some additional light on the aspirations of the Hadhrami political actors.

It seems that Hadhrami notables who showed particular activity during the war were partly acting on their own account and only partly as representatives of the different governments. The Ottoman leanings of some Kathīrī notables have already been alluded to in chapter I, and it is safe to assume that certain families continued to harbour pro-Ottoman sympathies. The official Ottoman provincial journal *Ṣanʿāʾ*, first issued after the reconquest of the Yemeni capital,

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[171] PRO, WO 106/558, 33. Weekly Letter, Aden Residency, 22.8.1914.
[172] The general context is discussed by Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 227–229 and, in more detail, by Ibn Yaccob, "Anglo-Ottoman Rivalries", pp. 116–256. Lekon, "The British", pp. 80, 138–144, 272–275; Boxberger, "Hadhrami Politics", pp. 55–59 and Freitag, "Hadhramis in International Politics", pp. 122–126 all discuss various aspects of the question.

seems to have reached Hadhramaut.[173] Its readers could follow the
Ottoman programme of modernisation. In addition, the notion of
the Ottoman sultan as caliph might have appealed to certain
Hadhramis, even after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908/9 much
reduced his powers.

A pro-Ottoman position could easily conflict with a positive view
of the Yemeni Imām, given the difficult situation in the Yemen. This
becomes clear from the considerations of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbay-
dillāh al-Saqqāf (1883–1956) who is commonly known as Ibn ʿUbay-
dillāh.[174] This grandson of Sayyid Muḥsin, who has been discussed
earlier in this and in the previous chapter, became one of the lead-
ing and most controversial scholars and politicians of the first part
of the 20th century. In his *Dīwān*, he spills much ink arguing that
contacts with the Ottomans did not constitute a betrayal of the
Imām.[175] Although the latter had been forced to cede much of his
political power over Highland Yemen to the Ottomans in the treaty
of Daʿān in 1911 while retaining his spiritual authority over all
Zaydīs, he remained highly respected among the Hadhrami *sayyid*s
as a fellow descendant of the Prophet. Obviously, it is difficult to
tell whether such respect for the Imam was partly motivated by
proto-Shiʿī feelings. Ibn ʿUbaydillāh, for example, tells us how he
first became interested in the Imam and Yemen by reading al-
Jarmūzī's *al-Sīra al-Mutawakkiliyya* in the library of the famous scholar
Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās in al-Ḥurayḍa. He was so moved by Imām
al-Mutawakkil ʿalā 'l-llāh Ismāʿil's willingness to help Sultan Badr b.
ʿUmar al-Kathīrī against his rivals, a move clearly inspired by the
Imam's own designs on Hadhramaut, that he decided to go to Sha-
hāra or Ṣaʿda, the Imamite strongholds and scholarly centres at the
time.[176]

This youthful enthusiast, who was initially more motivated by pol-
itical than by religious considerations, was frustrated when Ibn
ʿUbaydillāh did not find anyone in Aden able to assist him with his

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[173] About the early issues of *Ṣanʿāʾ* and its first editor, see Ursinus, *Ṣanʿāʾ*. According
to Sālim, *Majallat al-ḥikma*, p. 19, fn. 1, *Ṣanʿāʾ* was found in the private library of
the al-Ḥibshī family in al-Ghurfa.
[174] Estimates for his date of birth range between 1291 (1874) and 1300 (1884).
Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", 30.9.1992.
[175] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, p. 407.
[176] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 440f. For the Imam's claims, see
Dresch, *A History*, p. 39.

onward journey. This in itself might indicate the rather limited Hadhrami contacts with Yemen. However, when he turned instead to Singapore, he met with the proto-Shiʻī *sayyid* Muḥammad b. ʻAqīl. This controversial figure, to be discussed further in chapter IV, had contacted the Imām in 1912. Ibn ʻAqīl and some other *sayyid*s in Singapore, including Ibn ʻUbaydillāh, asked for his intervention in Hadhramaut.[177] This initiative might have had clearer religious overtones, and interestingly even Ibn ʻUbaydillāh was occasionally charged with hidden Shiʻī tendencies.[178] However, even those who were not suspected of Shiʻī sympathies, such as Sultan Manṣūr b. Ghālib al-Kathīrī, addressed the Imām as "our lord" (*mawlānā*) when this seemed politically expedient.[179]

It seems that two main issues motivated those who sought outside assistance like Ibn ʻUbaydillāh. They hoped for a regime in which the sultan respected the integrity of his subjects. In the case of the Ottomans, they might even have aspired to the extension of some of the reforms to Hadhramaut, notably in the educational sector about which they could read so extensively in Ṣanʻāʾ.[180] While they might have been at variance with their sultan on these matters, the notables could assume a certain commonality of interests with regard to their second concern: the limitation of Quʻaytī power and particularly free access to the coast or ideally possession of one of the ports.[181]

By 1915, contacts with the Ottomans seemed more promising than good relations with the British. In July of that year, they had occupied Laḥij and effectively encircled Aden, although the British managed to defend the wells at Shaykh ʻUthmān, which supplied Aden with drinking water.[182] Ibn ʻUbaydillāh, who once again played a major role as go-between and whose family had earlier maintained

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[177] Al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, p. 407, for the Hadhrami pleas for help and the Imam's reluctance to intervene, cf. pp. 444–466. For an account of al-Saqqāf's relationship with the Imam, see his biography in Zabāra, *Nuzhat al-naẓar*, pp. 344–346.

[178] This was alleged by one of my informants. It is possible that Ibn ʻUbaydillāh for some time came under the influence of Muḥammad b. ʻAqīl, whose views will be discussed in chapter IV. Interestingly, also Ibn ʻAqīl's pro-Imami tendencies seem to have waned over time, IO, R/20/A/1412, Political Resident, Aden to Consul-General, Batavia, 23.12.1927.

[179] SMA I; 44 of 1914.

[180] *Ṣanʻāʾ* 79, 4. Ramaḍān 1299/29.7.1882.

[181] The issue of the ports was raised in the correspondence between the Kathīrī Sultan and the Imām of Yemen, SMA I; 44–47.

[182] Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 247–249; Ibn Yaccob, "Anglo-Ottoman Rivalries", pp. 120–152.

relations with the Ottomans via the Sharīf of Maʾrib, now entered
into direct contact with ʿAlī Saʿīd Pasha, the military commander
of the Ottoman forces.[183] In 1915 and 1916, a lively correspondence
developed between ʿAlī Saʿīd Pasha and Ibn ʿUbaydillāh, Sultan
Manṣūr b. Ghālib, the Sharīf of Maʾrib and certain Kathīrī nota-
bles.[184] In order to support their case, the Ottomans sent glowing
reports of their own advances as well as of the chances of a victory
by their German allies.[185] ʿAlī Saʿīd, hoping for an easy expansion
of Ottoman territories, sent a blank declaration in which the *sayyid*s
and *ʿumarāʾ* (rulers) of Hadhramaut were to declare their rejection
of British rule, their recognition of Ottoman suzerainty and their
support for the Ottoman *jihād* against the British.[186]

In contrast, the British had repeatedly snubbed the Kathīrīs. In
January 1914, Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb al-Dīn, a scholar and
reformer whose life will be discussed in detail in the next chapter,
suggested to Colonel Jacob in Aden that it might be a good idea to
develop cordial relations with the Kathīrīs. He had hinted discreetly
that the Kathīrīs, who had many wealthy subjects in South East
Asia, might try to find support from other foreign powers, such as
the Imām.[187] Although he seems to have rejected the term "protec-
torate", Sayyid Abū Bakr appeared optimistic about the prospects
of a protectorate-like agreement with the British.[188] The latter had not
been interested and instead extended their support for the Quʿaytī.[189]

However, the crux of the matter were the Kathīrī subjects in
South East Asia. Sayyid Abū Bakr had attempted to threaten Colonel
Jacob by suggesting to agitate them. Many lived under British rule
in Singapore, and many of those settled in Java had substantial

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[183] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 406f. On this issue, cf. Boxberger,
"Hadhrami Politics", pp. 56f.

[184] SMA I; 49–58, 63, 68, 73.

[185] SMA I; 52, Saʿīd ʿAlī to Amīr Manṣūr b. Ghālib, 20. Jumādā al-akhīr
1334/24.4.1916; I; 53, Wālī al-Yaman al-ʿuthmānī Maḥmūd Nadīm to Amīr Manṣūr
al-Kathīrī, 12. Rajab 1334/15.5.1916, cf. the reports about Ottoman propaganda
in the various letters in IO, R/20/A/1408.

[186] SMA I; 49 is a copy of this blank document.

[187] IO, R/20/A/1410, Secret note about a discussion between Col. Jacob and
Sayed Bubakr bin Shehab, 11.1.1914.

[188] Jacob, *Kings of Arabia*, pp. 289f.

[189] For example, in April 1916, Sultan Ghālib b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿaytī had been
awarded a K.C.I.E. been given 500 rifles and 100,000 rounds of ammunition. IO,
R/20/A/1408, Political Resident, Aden to Secretary to Government, Bombay,
13.5.1916.

financial interests in Singapore. The same held true for many who had returned to Hadhramaut but still owned property in Singapore, al-Mukallā or Aden. Thus, Ibn ʿUbaydillāh, who undertook to collect signatures on the pro-Ottoman declaration, felt it his duty to warn enthusiastic signatories of the possible consequences of committing their names to this project.[190] In the same vein, the Kathīrī sultan wrote to ʿAlī Saʿīd Pasha in Ramaḍān 1334/July 1916, thanking him for his offer of support and promising Kathīrī aid in the Ottoman struggle. On the crucial subject of the declaration of submission, he wrote cautiously:

> We regret that we did not sign the declaration which you have sent us in order to safeguard the interest of the country, and fearing the repression which we expect because of the enemy's blockade of the ports of Hadhramaut, and the freezing of the remittances.[191]

On the latter problem, the sultan had already volunteered the information that Hadhramaut was suffering because of British control of Hadhrami capital in Singapore. His country, he had argued, was dependent on imports as it only produced dates, sorghum and wheat.[192]

It seems that the British were initially somewhat reluctant to openly help the Quʿayṭī sultan against the Kathīrīs, although the former continuously supplied them with glowing propaganda about the pro-Ottoman activities of the latter.[193] The Quʿayṭī sultan had started to block transport from the Hadhrami ports to the interior in order to weaken the Kathīrīs and possibly extend his own territories.[194] Originally, the British had done little except limiting communications between South East Asia and Arabia, which could also be explained by wartime pressures on vessels. However, they grew

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[190] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, p. 423.

[191] SMA I; 55, Sultan Manṣūr b. Ghālib to ʿAlī Saʿīd Pasha, 20. Ramaḍān 1334/21.7.1916.

[192] SMA I; 56, Sultan Manṣūr b. Ghālib to ʿAlī Saʿīd Pasha, ākhir Shaʿbān 1334/July 1 (or June, if ākhir means "end of") 1916.

[193] IO, R/20/A/1407, Ghalib b. Awad to Major-General Stewart, 20.9.1917, p. 2 and Notes of interview with Khan Bahadur Hussein al-Mohdar, Governor of Mokalla, 26.9.1917, pp. 4f.; IO, R/20/A/1408, Sultan Sir Ghalib b. Awadh to James Bell, Political Resident, Aden, 19. Moharram 1333/7.12.1914; Assist. Pol. Resident to Sultan Ghalib, 21.2.1916; Sultan Ghalib to Walton, Pol. Resident, Aden, 4.5.1916 and further correspondence in this file.

[194] IO, R/20/A/1407, Ghalib b. Awad to Major-General Stewart, 20.9.1917, p. 2 and IO, R/20/A/1410, Notes of interview with Saleh Ubed Ba Abdad (from Singapore) by Col. Jacot, 19.12.1917.

increasingly concerned about Ibn ʿUbaydillāh's activities and apparently investigated, albeit in vain, whether he owned any property in Singapore which could be confiscated.[195] Sultan Ghālib had asked the British to support his own war effort by taking the kind of actions against Kathīrī properties in Singapore which Sultan Manṣūr al-Kathīrī had feared, i.e., perhaps not to confiscate these properties, but to complicate transactions and to exclude Kathīrī subjects from British ports. In September 1917, the British rejected these ideas but decided to grant additional arms and ammunitons to the Sultan whose loyalty was repeatedly praised.[196]

Meanwhile, some Kathīrī subjects in Singapore felt that closer cooperation with the British rather than with the Ottomans was in their interest. In August 1917, a certain Ṣāliḥ b. Muḥammad b. Saʿīd al-Kathīrī approached the French consul in Singapore, suggesting that he could raise a Hadhrami contingent to support the allied war effort.[197] Others were more circumspect, but one British observer in Singapore came to the interesting conclusion that neither Ibn ʿUbaydillāh nor his ally Sayyid Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr nor the al-Kāfs were "known to be anti-British". Ibn ʿUbaydillāh, who had a high standing among Singaporean Arabs, was defended by them vis à vis the British to the extent that Aden's information about his Ottoman contacts was doubted. His real objectives, however, were understood quite clearly: "Abdur Rahman is apparently deadly opposed to the Hadarmaut being, in any way, under Maccala."[198]

It seems that the British attempted to use some unofficial channels for contacts with the Kathīrīs. They allegedly approached the aforementioned Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb al-Dīn in order to see if Hadhramaut could be turned into a military base against the

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[195] IO, L/P&S/10/551, Telegram, Pol. Resident, Aden to Secretary to Government, Simpla, 20.9.1916 and PRO, FO 371/2783/247849, General Officer Commanding the Troops, Straits Settlements to Secretary of State, 31.10.1916. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf was aware of the British suspicions, see his Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt, vol. II, pp. 312f.

[196] IO, R/20/A/1407, Notes of interview with Khan Bahadur Hussein al-Mohdar, Governor of Mokalla, 26.9.1917, pp. 7f.; Resident's Notes (on interview with the Quʿayṭī sultan), 9.10.1917; IO, R/20/A/1408, Walton, Pol. Resident Aden to Bombay, 13.5.1916, para 1;3.

[197] PRO, CO 273/462, Ambassade de France à Londres, 21.8.1917, encl. in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 25.8.1917.

[198] PRO, FO 371/2783/247849, General Officer Commanding the Troops, Straits Settlements to Colonial Secretary, 31.10.1916, p. 2.

Ottomans.[199] Eventually they seem to have decided on forcing a more long-lasting settlement. This was probably partly a result of the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict in which the *'Alawī*s had tried to enlist British (and Dutch) support by propagating that their foes were scheming with the Germans, Ottomans and the Imām of the Yemen against the British in Hadhramaut and beyond.[200] The British Vice-Consul in Brunei-Borneo, Captain Lee-Warner, reported on the views held by Arabs in the Netherlands East Indies and the Straits Settlements in late 1917.[201] These reflect mostly an *'Alawī* bias, but also show a clear desire for direct communications with Aden. He suggested posting a British officer in al-Mukallā and establishing a post office and a direct money order system there to allow for international transactions.[202] Colonel Jacob, former First Assistant Resident in Aden and Advisor on Southwest Arabia to the High Commissioner of Egypt between 1917 and 1920, commented on Lee-Warner's report concluding from his intelligence:

> It is manifestly better to have one ruler, if strong, than several, but the genius of the Arab peoples is diametrically opposed to our wish, and Makalla is too far from Aden for our power to be fully known there and exercised. Sultan Sir Ghalib is just a nominal ruler, and the sooner we recognize facts, the sooner will intrigue there cease, and Hadramaut begin to develop; and only then may we hope to have the Arabs in the Netherlands East Indies content and ranged on our side. It is a choice between persisting to recognize what does not in fact exist,—with the necessary and consequent chaos,—**and the alternative of extending our own influence in the countries further east**—if, indeed, this latter alternative is a desideratum."[203]

Thus Jacob effectively reminded his superiors of an idea, the extension of British influence, which had already been floated in 1914 and which he himself had supported since at least 1916.[204] This time,

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[199] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 452; the information was confirmed to me by al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah, 29.3.2000. al-Shāṭirī is the grandson of Abū Bakr's daughter Zahrā and his knowledge stems from family sources. It could be, however, that this refers to the same meeting which has been discussed above, rather than a different initiative.

[200] For details on this propaganda campaign see Freitag, "Hadhramis in international politics", pp. 122–126.

[201] PRO, FO 882/14/MIS/17/13, Arabs in Netherlands East Indies and Straits Settlements by Mr. Lee-Warner, Vice-Consul Brunei-Borneo, pp. 166–172.

[202] PRO, FO 882/14/MIS/17/15, H.F. Jacob, Cairo, 16.11.1917, pp. 175f.

[203] PRO, FO 882/14/MIS/17/15, H.F. Jacob, Cairo, 16.11.1917, pp. 175f., my emphasis.

[204] On May 10, 1916, Jacob, then still First Assistant Resident in Aden, wrote

it fell on more fertile ground among high India and Foreign Office officials.[205]

In late 1917, the British had imposed an embargo on remittances from Singapore. All the money was transferred into a special Kathiri Fund and instructions given as to how it should be administered until its eventual release.[206] This measure prompted a meeting of members of the leading Kathīrī-Arab families in Singapore in January in which they "unanimously agreed that Sheik Salim bin Mohamed bin Talib with Sheik Salim bin Jaffar bin Talib should proceed to Aden by the next French Mail (Passages have been booked) and use their best endeavours to bring the Kathiri from under Turkish influence."[207] A member of the meeting, Sālim b. Muḥammad b. Ṭālib, took the further step of writing to his son in Hadhramaut rebuking him for engaging in (anti-British) political adventures while the family was dependent on British good will and demanding him to henceforth advocate peace between the Kathīrī and Quʿayṭī sultans.[208] This was clearly a rational choice which does not necessarily reflect Ibn Ṭālib's own political preferences, as becomes obvious from a letter which he wrote to the Kathīrī sultans.[209]

Once in Aden, the delegation held discussions with the British administration and was confronted with the fall-out from Lee Warner's proposals. Already in March 1918, a hopeful Resident reported to Cairo that at least a temporary agreement seemed likely. Also in

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about the growing port of al-Mukallā: "This place calls for the presence of a British agent. The country has great potentialities, and there is a lot of discontent and unrest fomented by the Kathiri Sultan who is backed by Java and Singapore dollars. We should put all our money on the Kuaiti and bolster him up as best we can." IO, L/P&S/10/551, A Political Policy in our Hinterland, in *The Aden Protectorate* (secret B.231), pp. 8–11, here p. 11.

[205] IO, L/P&S/10/551, Shuckburgh, Under-Secretary of State, India Office to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 2.11.1917, draft letter and the answer by Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, of Dec. 8, 1917, expressing the agreement of the Foreign Secretary.

[206] For details, see IO, R/20/A/2955.

[207] IO, R/20/A/2941, Memorandum, Inspector-General of Police, Straits Settlements, 8.1.1918. The meeting was attended by members of the al-Saqqāf, Ibn Ṭālib, Ibn Marʿī, al-Kāf, al-Ḥaddād and ʿAfīfī families. It is not clear how this particular group constituted itself.

[208] IO, R/20/A/2941, Salim b. Muhammad b. Salim b. Talib to Ali b. Salim b. Mohamed b. Salim b. Talib, 14.1.1918 [I assume that this is the English translation of a real letter, but the file contains neither an original Arabic version nor an explanation of the letter's origin].

[209] SMA III; 13, Sālim b. Jaʿfar b. Ṭālib to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr al-Kathīrī, 1337/1918–19.

March, Lee-Warner was appointed as "Agent of His Majesty's Government at Mokalla, for the duration of the War, under the superintendence of the Political Resident at Aden", although for diplomatic reasons this appointment was kept secret.[210] The High Commissioner of Egypt commented optimistically:

> The advantage of having a British agent at Mokalla is evident and, once the approval of the Sultan of Mokalla has been obtained, and the situation as between him and the Kathiri Sultans is clearer, Mr. Lee-Warner should be able to take up his new appointment.[211]

However, the first priority was the settlement of the internal disputes. The Kathīrīs attempted to reach a deal independently of the Quʿayṭīs but the British refused. They had decided that they only wanted to deal with one ruler and seem to have hoped that, possibly with the help of a British representative in al-Mukallā, matters would then settle. Pressure from the British as well as from the Kathīrī delegation from Singapore (in addition to the diplomatic talent of the Quʿayṭī *wazīr*, Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār) led to the conclusion of the Aden Agreement in August 1918 in which the Kathīrīs recognised the 1888 Protectorate Treaty as applying to their territory.[212] Yet more importantly, they accepted that "the province of Hadramaut shall be one province" and that all future correspondence with the British would pass through the Quʿayṭī sultan. This implied his recognition as the de facto predominant ruler except for Sayʾūn, Tarīm and a number of villages. Kathīrī concerns about limitations on trade were to some extent met by a stipulation about "absolute commercial freedom" and equitable collection of tithes. Furthermore, both parties agreed on mutual assistance in promoting the well-being and prosperity of Hadhramaut and in pacifying it. The British were

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[210] IO, R/20/A/1409, Memorandum on The Proposal to place a British Agent at Makalla (by Lee-Warner, encl. in Memorandum to the Resident of 24.12.1918). For details on the appointment of Lee-Warner, see Ibn Yaccob, "Anglo-Ottoman rivalries", pp. 177–180. The post was placed under the Foreign Office, which was, from 1917–1921, responsible for Aden protectorate affairs, while in 1921, the Colonial Office took charge of the protectorate and, in 1928, of Aden as well.

[211] IO, L/P&S/11/134, High Commissioner, Egypt to Foreign Office, Cairo, 10.3.1918, p. 1246.

[212] SMA I; 75, Letter by Sultans Manṣūr and Muḥsin, sons of Ghālib al-Kathīrī, 25 Jumāda awwal 1337/26.2.1919; III;14, Ṭālib and Sālim b. Jaʿfar b. Ṭālib to Sultans Manṣūr and Muḥsin b. Ghālib al-Kathīrī, 5. Rabīʿ al-awwal 1337/10.12.1918; and the correspondence in IO, R/20/A/1409. For accounts of the negotiations, see al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 37f.; al-Miḥḍār, *al-Zaʿīm*, pp. 106–119.

accepted as mediators.²¹³ It took some time for the agreement to be
confirmed before the Aden Resident in April 1919 which might indi-
cate that the Kathīrīs were still seeking ways out.²¹⁴ Given the dis-
satisfaction expressed by the Kathīrīs in the following years, it seems
somewhat unlikely that Ibn ʿUbaydillāh's later explanation that the
Aden Agreement had effectively enlarged Kathīrī territory and there-
fore been a good deal was widely shared.²¹⁵

Once the war ended and the agreement was signed, the British
priorities changed again. Already in December 1918, Lee-Warner
wrote a somewhat sceptical memorandum. He argued that the Quʿaytīs
were not particularly keen on the presence of a British advisor and
viewed it as a limitation of his sovereignty, while the Kathīrīs rejected
the idea outright. Probably in April 1918, Kathīrī rule was divided
between Sultan Manṣūr in Sayʾūn and his brother Muḥsin in Tarīm.
Lee-Warner linked the three sultans' delayed departure to Aden to
the issue of a British agent.²¹⁶ Lee-Warner's subsequent visit to
Hadhramaut in January and February of 1919 basically confirmed
these views. He reported back to Aden that he did not make it to
Sayʾūn and Tarīm as this would have been "injudicious".²¹⁷ He
arrived at the conclusion that only Quʿaytī rule would promote
progress in the Wadi and developed this theme at some length. How-
ever, there were reformist Kathīrī elements in South East Asia which
the British should not let down. He therefore suggested pressing the
Kathīrīs to conduct better government and lifting the embargo on
remittances. The main point, however, was to continue to extend
the good relations with the Quʿaytī.²¹⁸ This was eventually done by

²¹³ For the text of the treaty, see IO, L/P&S/10/551 and H. Ingrams, *A Report*,
pp. 169f.

²¹⁴ IO, R/20/A/1410, correspondence in relation to the treaty. The British reacted
by noting that the confiscated remittances were not to be released until they had
received an actual copy of the treaty with all relevant signatures, Office Note by
the Resident, 5.9.1918.

²¹⁵ ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Idām, in *al-ʿArab* 31, June-July 1996, p. 532.

²¹⁶ IO, R/20/A/1409, Memorandum on The Proposal to place a British Agent
at Makalla, (by Lee-Warner, encl. in Memorandum to the Resident of 24.12.1918),
paras 7–9, 11. On Sultan Ghālib's rejection of a British agent, cf. al-Miḥḍār, *al-
Zaʿīm*, p. 99; on the division of Kathīrī rule, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt",
in *al-ʿArab*, June-July 1996, p. 533.

²¹⁷ PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, encl. 1 in No. 1, Captain
Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 2.

²¹⁸ PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, encl. 1 in No. 1, Captain
Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, pp. 11–13.

substantially raising Sultan Ghālib's stipend from a symbolic 60 rupees per month to one thousand, which was thought to compensate him for his higher expenditure resulting from the agreement.[219] Lee-Warner re-directed his energies to the encouragement of pro-British attitudes among the Hadhramis in South East Asia.[220]

It is indicative of the changed appraisal of the situation that by January 1919, and while Lee-Warner was still in Hadhramaut, the Foreign Office felt it was no longer a good idea to station a permanent British agent at al-Mukallā.[221] The final lifting on the embargo on British remittances in June 1919 was a further step which indicated that from a British point of view matters had normalised.[222] Hadhramaut slipped once again to the back of the colonial agenda as being "too far from Aden for the active exercise there of our influence. Sir Ghalib in his lifetime, and now his successor, are fully alive to the demands of the changed times and so long as the country is opened to trade, and is unfettered by the earlier and vexatious restrictions imposed at Makalla, all will go well."[223] This attitude only changed again in the 1930s.

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[219] IO, LP&S/10/551, Allenby to Foreign Office, 1.6.1919.

[220] PRO, CO 273/498 (7673), Memorandum of Discussion between Syed Ali bin Shahab of Batavia, Syed Mohamed bin Agil [. . .], R. J. Farrer, S.S. Civil Service, W. H. Lee-Warner, S.S. Civil Service, 27.11.1919.

[221] IO, LP&S/10/551, Cypher Telegram Foreign Office to Sir R. Wingate, Cairo, 19.1.1919.

[222] IO, LP&S/10/551, Foreign Office to General Allenby, Cairo, 4.6.1919.

[223] Jacob, *Kings*, p. 291, the earlier part of the quote is almost identical with his report of 1917 quoted earlier. Gavin, *Aden*, p. 251, puts it as follows: "The exclusion of other powers from Arabia, and from its coastline in particular and the containment of Arab nationalism represented the sum total of British objectives in the immediate post-war period."

HADHRAMI MIGRANTS AND REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD (C. 1860s–1920s)

It has been noted in the preceding chapters how Hadhrami *ʿulamāʾ* and sultans were exposed to and influenced by developments and trends in Yemen, the Ḥijāz, India and elsewhere. During the second half of the nineteenth century, this exposure to the wider Muslim world as well as to the expansion of the European powers increased in line with the growth of migration. The new means of travel and communications, namely steam-shipping, telegraph and the development of the press all increased information about and interest in developments in distant places, thereby tightening links between different parts of the Muslim world. While Hadhramaut itself remained at the margins of this revolution in communications until World War II, Hadhramis abroad actively participated in it. This is true for the economic benefits which steam-shipping, for example, offered, and which were seized successfully by the likes of the al-Saqqāf family in Singapore who derived great profit from transporting pilgrims to the Ḥijāz in the late 19th century.[1] Similarly, the Quʿayṭī family in Hyderabad seems to have run three steamers which were engaged in pilgrim transport.[2] They also seized political and cultural opportunities offered by the new lines of communication, as will be shown in the course of this chapter.[3] Nonetheless, personal exposure to new developments and ideas, and acquaintance with leading political and intellectual figures remained important.

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[1] Clarence-Smith, "Hadhrami Entrepreneurs", pp. 299–301.
[2] Personal communication, Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, London, 25.2.2000.
[3] On the connectedness of different regions, see Bayly & Fawaz, "Introduction".

*International Hadhrami Networks in the Second Half
of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries*

The trajectory of a few influential Hadhramis will be used to high-
light the kind of international networks and influences without which
neither the Hadhrami *nahḍa* (renaissance) in South East Asia nor the
developments in Hadhramaut can be understood. Given the general
emphasis of this work, the East African connections will be neglected.[4]
One particularly poignant case will serve as an example which will
then be compared to the wider picture.

A Travelling Merchant, Scholar and Teacher: Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb al-Dīn (1846–1922)[5]

Sayyid Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Shihāb was
born in Tarīm in 1262/1846. Today, he is perhaps best remem-
bered for his poetry and for his books on logic which are taught at
al-Azhar University in Cairo,[6] but at the time he was an important
propagator of reformist ideas among Hadhramis both at home and
in the diaspora. Sayyid Abū Bakr was the son of one of the nota-
bles who had opposed Tarīm's rulers in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries. He was taught the usual religious curriculum by the most
notable teachers of his time, among them Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf,
the political activist and companion of Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd.
Some others from the group of reformers discussed in chapter II,
such as ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī b. Shihāb (d. 1847), ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn
Balfaqīh (d. 1849/50), Ṭāhir (d. 1825/26) and ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn
b. Ṭāhir (d. 1855) also rank among his teachers. In some cases, this
seems to have been more of a spiritual bond as many of them were

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[4] On Hadhramis and their networks in East Africa, see Bang, Sufis.

[5] The following is largely based on the short biographical accounts in the pref-
ace to Abū Bakr b. Shihāb al-Dīn's *Dīwān* by Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl, pp. 3–8 (hence-
forth quoted as "Muqaddima"), which is identical with the biography in al-Amīn,
Aʿyān al-shīʿa, vol. 2, pp. 294–302. Cf. ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt, pp. 231–237.
The two authors were Sayyid Abū Bakr's contemporary and student, respectively.
The voluminous biography by his descendant Muḥammad Asad Shahāb (Shihāb/
Syahab), *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā* has been used extensively, in spite of its major chronolog-
ical problems and clear tendency to present Sayyid Abū Bakr as a committed
reformer.

[6] Personal communication, Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah, 29.3.2000.

either dead in 1846 or died within a few years of Abū Bakr's birth.[7] As Abū Bakr, according to all sources, studied with the sons of a number of this circle of *ʿulamāʾ*, they were more likely sources of the *ijāza*s referring to their fathers.

In 1286/1869–70, Abū Bakr, who had already made a name for himself as a poet and *ʿālim*, performed the *ḥajj* and spent some time studying in the Ḥijāz. He was taught by the most eminent Shāfiʿī scholar of the period, Aḥmad b. Zaynī al-Daḥlān, as well as by Sayyid Faḍl Pasha, the later governor of Dhofar. He returned to Hadhramaut only to leave again in 1288/1871–2 for Aden. Apparently, he impressed the Sultan of Laḥij, Faḍl Muḥsin (r. 1863–1898) so deeply that he was asked to remain there presumably as religious teacher. Instead, he decided to follow the stream of his kinsmen to South East Asia in 1289/1872–3, where he is said to have visited most cities. Surabaya in Eastern Java became his home and the centre of his unfortunately unspecified trading entreprise.[8]

About four years later, Sayyid Abū Bakr returned to Hadhramaut as teacher and *muftī*. His condemnation of (unspecified) *bidʿa* and frivolities did not only gain him followers, but overall, he was a highly respected member of the community of *ʿulamāʾ*. In economic terms, he possibly had agricultural and building interests.[9] Sayyid Abū Bakr became involved in the initiative to negotiate a settlement between the Kathīrīs and Quʿayṭīs in 1294/1877 as well as in the settling of disputes with the tribes. All of these snippets of information indicate that he, too, could be regarded as a notable. Around 1303/1885–86, possibly earlier, he had to leave because of disputes over his role within the family and between him and the ruler of Tarīm.[10]

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[7] These teachers are listed in Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, pp. 54, 538. Neither Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl in his "Muqaddima", p. 4 nor ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt, pp. 231f. mention these.

[8] According to Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, p. 307, he spent the years 1288–92 (1871–2–1875–6) in Surabaya.

[9] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 452.

[10] ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt, p. 234; al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 456. According to Aḥmad ʿIzzat Bāshā al-ʿUmarī al-Farūqī, *al-ʿUqūd al-jawhariyya fī madāʾiḥ al-ḥaḍra al-rifāʿiyya*, Cairo (Maṭbaʿat Muḥammad Affandī Muṣṭafā) 1306/1888–89, p. 137, Abū Bakr arrived in Istanbul already in 1302/1884–85, an information repeated in al-Bīṭār, *Ḥilyat*, vol. I, pp. 124–126. Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās mentions on the 1. Muḥarram 1303 cooperation with Sayyid Abū Bakr, which might indicate that he was already in Mecca.

Map 4: The Voyages of Abū Bakr b. Shihāb al-Dīn

He passed Aden and Laḥij on the way to the Ḥijāz where he once more performed the pilgrimage. He then turned north and passed Damascus and Jerusalem on his way to Istanbul where he received a high Ottoman decoration. On the way back, Sayyid Abū Bakr visited Egypt. He composed a famous poem in praise of Khedive Tawfīq (r. 1879–1892) who had been installed by the British after his father had resisted the formation of a European-dominated government.[11]

Either before or after this journey, Sayyid Abū Bakr reportedly visited East Africa. An anecdote tells about his meeting with Sultan Barqash of Zanzibar (r. 1870–1888), a reforming ruler in whose realms a number of influential Hadhrami ʿulamāʾ lived.[12] Then Sayyid Abū Bakr turned to Hyderabad. He was employed in the newly founded Academy of Sciences, the Dār al-ʿUlūm, where he became editor for the religous books printed in the state. In addition, he seems to have taught at al-madrasa al-niẓāmiyya.[13] His biographer emphasizes Sayyid Abū Bakr's high rank there by mentioning a marriage with a princess, as well as the offer to become Prime Minister which according to the author Sayyid Abū Bakr declined.[14]

Some time before World War I, Abū Bakr returned to the Malay Peninsula and Java. The lack of an exact date makes it difficult to ascertain whether he undertook this journey once again in pursuit of commerce, simply took a break to visit relatives, or whether for some reason or other he had to leave Hyderabad. For example, it is conceivable that his involvement in the controversy about Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān prompted his departure. Sayyid Abū Bakr publicly agreed with his student Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl on the pro-Shiʿī view that Muʿāwiya deserved to be cursed, following a tradition which had allegedly been established by ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib whose caliphate had not been recognised by Muʿāwiya. Such a position was unacceptable to Sunnī Muslims who felt that both Muʿāwiya and ʿAlī ought to be respected as companions of the Prophet. This might

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[11] For the dating see al-ʿUmarī, al-ʿUqūd (op. cit.), p. 137. I would like to thank Thomas Eich for the references to al-ʿUmarī. For his relationship with Khedive Tawfīq, see Shahāb, Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā, p. 310; ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt, p. 234 who indicates that he expected a reward for the poem.
[12] Bang, Sufis, pp. 172–174.
[13] Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl, "Muqaddima", p. 8.
[14] Shahāb, Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā, pp. 324f.

have made Sayyid Abū Bakr's position among the Sunnis in Hyderabad untenable.[15]

During one of his two visits to South East Asia (which could only have taken place before 1895), Sayyid Abū Bakr advised the Sultan of Johore, Abu Bakar b. Ibrahim (r. 1862–1895) on educational matters.[16] In Singapore and Surabaya, he is said to have contributed considerably to the "renaissance" (nahḍa) of the Arab community which will be outlined in the next chapter.[17] In 1913, Sayyid Abū Bakr returned to Hadhramaut where he was received with great honour. As mentioned in chapter III, the British are said to have approached him during World War I. A few years later, Sayyid Abū Bakr returned to India to settle his affairs and fetch his Indian family to Hadhramaut. However, he died there in 1922 before he could return to Hadhramaut.

Sayyid Abū Bakr's Career in a Comparative Perspective

Sayyid Abū Bakr's career might be outstanding in terms of the scope of his travels and contacts, but it was not unique. Another good example of a travelling merchant and scholar is his student, the above-mentioned Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl (1863–1931), a grandson of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar b. Yaḥyā, the "owner of the cow" introduced in chapter II, and of ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir on the mother's side.[18] Like his teacher, Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl was born in Wadi Hadhramaut, namely in Masīlat Āl al-Shaykh near Tarīm. He too

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[15] On Sayyid Abū Bakr's involvement in the affair and some of his letters see Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, pp. 271–298 and al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 450–452. Both authors do not comment on whether or not this caused him any tangible problems. For the wider context see Ende, "Schiitische Tendenzen", for Sayyid Abū Bakr's involvement and the situation in Hyderabad ibid., pp. 85f., fn. 21, p. 92.

[16] Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, p. 310, is silent on the chronology, as he discusses the connection with the Johore sultan thematically under the rubric of "contacts".

[17] This account follows Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl's chronology in his "Muqaddima".

[18] The following is based on the biographies in Mughniyya, *Maʿa ʿulamāʾ al-Najaf al-ashraf*, pp. 97–99; Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl's autobiography in Aḥmad Taymūr, *Aʿlām al-fikr al-islāmī fi 'l-ʿaṣr al-ḥadīth*, Cairo 1967, pp. 350–354, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 318–323; Shahāb, *Abū'l-Murtaḍā*, pp. 77–90; Zabāra, *Nuzhat al-naẓar*, pp. 557–559 and the obituaries in *Barhūt* 31, Rabīʿ [not specified] 1350/July-August 1931 and *al-Tahdhīb* 9;1, Rabīʿ al-Thāni 1350/16.8.1931, pp. 168–176. Some contacts of Ibn ʿAqīl are mentioned in PRO, FO 371/5236, Lee Warner, Singapore to Foreign Office, 15.7.1920, Memorandum, pp. 3–5, see also PRO, FO 371/505. For a detailed study of Ibn ʿAqīl's life and work, see Brunschwig, "Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut und Südostasien".

studied with the likes of Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Miḥḍār (another teacher of Sayyid Abū Bakr) and Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās, who has already been mentioned in the context of the Quʿayṭī expansion in Wadi Dawʿan. His father died when Ibn ʿAqīl was only seventeen. He travelled to Singapore and Java to earn money as a trader (once again we are ignorant about details) presumably because responsibility for the maintenance of the family had now fallen on his shoulders. Nevertheless, he read widely and corresponded with the Lebanese journalist Aḥmad Fāris Shidyāq (1804–1887), who was then serving as editor of *al-Jawāʾib*, the first Arabic newspaper in Istanbul. He also corresponded with Sayyid Faḍl, who was residing in Istanbul.[19]

Ibn ʿAqīl visited many parts of the Malay archipelago, as well as China, Japan (in 1898–9), Burma, India and Ceylon. Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and of course the Ḥijāz feature among the Arab countries to which Ibn ʿAqīl travelled. Furthermore, he spent some time in Istanbul and visited Europe (Berlin and Paris). Ibn ʿAqīl became most notorious for his aforementioned pro-Shiʿī views in the controversy about Muʿāwiya b. Abī Ṣufyān, which he started to publicise in 1908 and which had repercussions in many parts of the Muslim world.[20] Nevertheless, he met and apparently had long discussions with Wahhābīs while in Mecca and India.[21] In 1919, Ibn ʿAqīl left Singapore and headed for Mecca. In 1921, he settled in al-Mukallā but had to leave in 1928 after becoming involved in the political controversies surrounding the Singapore conference.[22] He died in the Yemeni port of al-Ḥudayda where he had spent his last years under Shiʿī (Zaydī) rule.

Merchants and notables often had similar networks to the ones introduced above. Only two further examples shall be briefly mentioned here, as they played a major role in the Hadhrami 'renaissance' of South East Asia: ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAṭṭās, who was

[19] PRO, FO 371/5236, Lee Warner, Singapore to Foreign Office, 15.7.1920, Memorandum, p. 3.

[20] In fact, Ibn ʿAqīl might have written on the matter before, possibly causing his expulsion from the Arab club in Singapore. The resultant court case repeatedly refers to "Mahawiya", which seems to be a misrendering of Muʿāwiya. Roff, "Murder". For a reply by the Syrian *salafī* reformer Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī, see Commins, *Islamic Reform*.

[21] PRO, FO 371/5236, Lee Warner, Singapore to Foreign Office, 15.7.1920, Memorandum, p. 4.

[22] See below, chapter VII.

born in the mid 19th century, was the son of a wealthy horsetrader in Batavia. He continued his father's business and presumably extended it to other commodities, travelling to China and Singapore. In spite of having enjoyed only a rather rudimentary education, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī met with the famous protagonists of Islamic modernism, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–97) and Muḥammad ʿAbdūh (1849–1905), and became a sponsor of the South East Asian Hadhrami *nahḍa*. His sons studied in Turkey, Belgium, Egypt and the Ḥijāz.[23] His contemporary, ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb al-Dīn (1865–1944), was a student of Abū Bakr b. Shihāb and another Batavia-born Hadhrami entrepreneur. He has already been mentioned in connection with the initiative to establish a fish-processing plant in Hadhramaut immediately after World War I. He too visited Egypt and perhaps Istanbul, performed the pilgrimage, travelled in Ottoman Yemen and visited Aden and Hadhramaut as well as India and Malaysia.[24] Interestingly, he was one of the correspondents of the Egyptian reformist journal *al-Manār* to which he suggested that the Arabs should establish modern schools in Hadhramaut, appealing to the rich to lend a hand in the endeavour. What, he asked, was the use of Hadhramaut educating only the migrants' children?[25]

While all of the above individuals at some point or another became involved in politics, there was finally the individual who can almost be considered as a travelling politician, even if the dominant self-image might have been that of an *ʿālim*. The Indian-born Sayyid Faḍl b. ʿAlawī has already been mentioned in connection with the British-Ottoman rivalry over Hadhramaut. He had established contacts with the Ottomans in the Yemen and in the Ḥijāz where he had also met Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb after being banned from India in 1852, i.e., during the first Sharifate of ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib b. Ghālib.[26] After a first visit to Istanbul in 1855, he returned there during the reign of Sultan ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (r. 1861–76) and visited

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[23] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 267f.; Arai, The History, pp. 7f. and interview with ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, 20.6.1997.

[24] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 160–165 and interviews in Jakarta, May-June 1997. For a more detailed account of Sayyid ʿAlīs career, see my "The Significance". Cf. chapter V for his role in Java.

[25] *Al-Manār* 13;8, 3.9.1910, pp. 604–606. Abaza, "Southeast Asia", p. 106, mis-quotes him as Ali Bin Shihad.

[26] They seem to have maintained correspondence, see Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, pp. 229–232 for the poem which Abū Bakr sent to Sayyid Faḍl in 1312/1894–95.

Istanbul again in 1879, three years after Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd II
had acceded to the throne. His friend from Meccan times, ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib b. Ghālib, who was reappointed Sharīf of Mecca in 1880,
recommended supporting Sayyid Faḍl's claim to Dhofar to the Sultan.
This was strongly opposed by court circles. Perhaps as a consola-
tion, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd appointed Sayyid Faḍl to the rank of *wizāra*.
Thereupon he moved his family from Mecca to the imperial capi-
tal where he lived until his death in 1900.[27] As shown in chapter I,
he did not renounce his ambitions to rule Dhofar until at least the
mid 1880s. In the new centre of political pan-Islam, Sayyid Faḍl
rose to the rank of one of four advisors of the Sultan on Arab and
Muslim affairs, the others being Muḥammad Ẓāfir b. Muḥammad
al-Ṭarābulsī (1829–1903), Aḥmad Asʿad and the influential Rifāʿī
shaykh Abū 'l-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī (d. 1909).[28] Sayyid Faḍl was consulted
on policy-making "concerning the south sea coast of the Red Sea
and the coasts of Arabia, from Aden to Muscat, as well as on com-
mercial relations with British India".[29] Although his influence in 1888
was described as "rather weak",[30] (perhaps not surprisingly, given
the relatively limited importance of his assignment for the Ottoman
Empire as well as Abū 'l-Hudā's polemics against him)[31] this posi-
tion enabled him to receive Hadhrami visitors from all over the dias-
pora in style and to act as a gate-opener for them.

From the Hadhrami point of view, Sayyid Faḍl's political position
was possibly less important than his scholarship. He had been trained
in India and used his stays in Mecca and his brief visit to Egypt to
deepen his knowledge. Sayyid Faḍl authored an introduction to the

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[27] On this period of his life, al-Muwayliḥī, *Mā hunālika*, pp. 268f. and Bang, Sufis,
pp. 128f. Cf. chapter I.

[28] About the four shaykhs, see al-Muwayliḥī, *Mā hunālika*, 252–292. Al-Muwayliḥī's
report is of particular interest because he lived in Istanbul between 1885 and 1895.
According to him, the Sultan was attached to the four shaykhs as his advisors and
propagators. They also exercised influence as Sufi shaykhs, given the Sultan's inter-
est in mystical matters. Ibid., pp. 252–254. For a short biography of Sayyid Abū
'l-Hudā, see al-Bīṭār, *Ḥilyat*, vol. I, pp. 72–94.

[29] Landau, *The Politics*, p. 322, reproducing a report by the French military attaché
in Istanbul to the French Minister for War, 17.2.1888. Al-Muwayliḥī, *Mā hunālika*,
p. 269 reports that Sayyid Faḍl informed the Sultan about developments in India
and among American Muslims.

[30] Landau, *The Politics*, p. 323.

[31] According to al-Muwayliḥī, *Mā hunālika*, p. 269, a major bone of contention
between these two was Sayyid Faḍl's insistence on the hereditary transmission of
mystical knowledge.

Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya as well as a number of works on law and Sufism. Thus, Hadhrami visitors might have come to see the Sufi shaykh as much as the Ottoman official. This is exemplified in Sayyid Faḍl's relationship with the influential Zanzibari Hadhrami *ʿālim* and judge, Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr b. Sumayṭ (1861–1925).[32] Their relationship was that of *shaykh* and student, although it is not unlikely that the Ottomans, probably through Sayyid Faḍl's prompting, won Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ to become some kind of official or unofficial Ottoman emissary in Zanzibar upon his return.[33] Given Sayyid Faḍl's propensity to act independently and then seek Ottoman sanction, this might well have been an individual act, if indeed it was more than a mere rumour. It might be worthwhile adding that Sayyid Faḍl's prestige remained high among Malabari Muslims. Until his death, he kept in close contact with that region both by correspondence and through visits.[34]

Another kind of Pan-Islamist and the last individual whose biography shall be introduced here was *Ḥabīb* ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zāhir al-Saqqāf (1833–1896).[35] His life sheds light on yet another dimension of activities of South East Asian Hadhramis, namely the military struggle against imperialism which is not discussed elsewhere in this book. Yet another native of Tarīm, he was brought up on the Malabar coast and is said to have been sent to Cairo to study at the age of five. Given his age at the time, this might or might not be true, but he could easily have called at Cairo later in his life when travelling to Istanbul.[36] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān studied at Calicut and in 1848 became supercargo on one of his father's ships in order to learn the trade. During this apprenticeship, he visited the shores of India, Ceylon and Arabia. In al-Mukhā, he married a rich orphan and settled for about a year and a half. He then took to travelling again, visiting Mecca, Istanbul, perhaps Cairo, and eventually returned to India.

After some years on the coast, the *ḥabīb* moved to Hyderabad where he allegedly converted the ruler to Islam and was made *jamʿdār*

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[32] Bang, *Sufis*, pp. 129–133.
[33] Landau, *The Politics*, pp. 67f.
[34] Dale, *Islamic Society*, pp. 166–168.
[35] Where not indicated otherwise, the following account is based on Reid's translation "Habib Abdur-Rahman", which forms the basis for both ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 169–174 and van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout*, pp. 198–200.
[36] On this issue, see the cautioning note by van den Berg, *Le Ḥadhramout*, p. 199, fn. 2.

over 1.000 soldiers. As the dynasty founded by Asaf Jah Nizam I in
the 1720s had been Muslim all along, this claim of conversion might
either be a misunderstanding by the biographer or one example for
the pompousness of the *ḥabīb* noted by van den Berg.[37] Possibly,
'Abd al-Raḥmān proselytised among Hindus or might simply have
been one of many Arab mercenaries in Hyderabad. After less than
a year, he left for Calcutta, where he worked as a goldsmith or
gilder. A few years later and apparently after making a small for-
tune, 'Abd al-Raḥmān travelled to Italy, Germany and France, pass-
ing through Istanbul and Mecca on his return journey to India. He
visited Bombay, Hyderabad and Calicut, spending a few months in
each place.

The next station was Singapore from where 'Abd al-Raḥmān
moved to neighbouring Johore as advisor to the Sultan Abu Bakar,
who had just acceeded to the throne and later would employ Sayyid
Abū Bakr b. Shihāb.[38] In 1864, he left for Penang and then for
Aceh in northern Sumatra.[39] At the court of Aceh, he quickly rose
to a high position and was appointed as *imām* of the Great Mosque
and head of a religious court, and was given control over some ter-
ritory.[40] In spite of further cementing his role by marrying the widow
of a former sultan, local notables regarded the newcomer with great
suspicion. Around 1868, he left for Mecca. Later in the same year
he returned with letters of recommendation and his influence increased
further. By 1872, Dutch pressure on Aceh increased, while 'Abd al-
Raḥmān felt once more the competition from local rivals. He returned
to Mecca where he learned about the outbreak of the Aceh war in
April 1873. Upon hearing this, he hurried to Istanbul to rally sup-
port for the small sultanate. As the Ottoman Empire was facing far
more pressing problems of its own and needed to keep the good
humour of the European powers, 'Abd al-Raḥmān proved some-

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[37] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥadhramout*, p. 200: "D'après la plupart de ceux qui le con-
naissent, il fait l'effet d'un énorme fanfaron [. . .]" and "Il a cependant une telle
idée de son importance [. . .]."
[38] Reid, "Habib Abdur-Rahman", pp. 45f. and p. 46, fn. 5.
[39] The Atjehnese context is discussed in Reid, *The Contest*. An Atjehnese view is
contained in 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 170–174, who translates from Mohammad
Said, *Atjeh Sepandjang Abad*, Medan 1961, from the colonial journal *De Java Bode*
(Semarang) and an unidentified work, possibly Snouck Hurgronje's *The Achehnese*,
Leiden, London 1906. I would like to thank Prof. Reid for helping me to identify
these titles.
[40] Reid, "Habib Abdur-Rahman", p. 48 and fn. 12–14.

thing of an embarrassment. After all, the universal claims and pres-
tige of the caliphate interfered directly with the necessary *realpolitik*.
By December 1873, the *ḥabīb* was politely asked to leave the Ottoman
capital.[41] He returned to Singapore where he was linked by mar-
riage to the al-Junayd family who acted as Ottoman consuls at the
time. It is likely that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān played a central role in attempts
to raise support among the Singaporean Arabs for Aceh.[42] For almost
five years he led the struggle against the Dutch, but in 1878 he
retired on a Dutch pension to Mecca after realising the futility of
the Aceh war. In 1884–85, he seems to have spent some time in
Beirut and possibly in other towns of Syria.[43] For a brief period in
1886, he was appointed *shaykh al-sāda* in Mecca but otherwise his
last years were devoid of political activity. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zāhir
died in 1896.

   The footnotes of the biographical collection *Shams al-ẓahīra* abound
with further examples of Hadhramis building international networks
and using them for scholarly, commercial and political goals in the
latter half of the 19th century. The following discussion will high-
light those developments in the most frequently visited regions which
might have contributed to shaping the outlook of these Hadhramis.
While it is almost impossible to prove conclusively whether or not
somebody was influenced and by which individuals or developments,
I hope to show that there was a general climate of change, at times
clearly innovative, at others more in defense against European expan-
sion. This is the wider context in which the Hadhrami 'renaissance'
in South East Asia and its demands for reform in the Hadhramaut
have to be embedded.

Change in the Muslim world (c. 1860s–1920s)

The following discussion is limited to the centres most frequently vis-
ited by the Hadhramis discussed above. The Ḥijāz emerges as the
major centre where everybody called. It was closely followed by

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[41] Reid, *The Contest*, pp. 119–129. On al-Zāhir's visit to Istanbul, cf. Schmidt,
Through the Legation Window, pp. 59–61.
[42] For the propaganda in Singapore, see Reid, *The Contest*, pp. 147–153.
[43] He is mentioned by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Jawād al-Qayyātī, *Nafḥat al-bassām fī
riḥlat al-Shām*, Beirut 1981. I would like to thank Thomas Eich for this reference.

Hadhramaut itself, Istanbul (as well as occasionally other Ottoman provinces), Singapore (and neighbouring Johore) and Java (mostly Batavia and Surabaya). Aden, the Yemen (we do not know which towns) and Cairo follow suit. In India, Hyderabad and the Malabar coast emerge as major centres for Hadhrami visitors. Two Hadhramis each of the above sample ventured to Europe and China, one each to Zanzibar and Japan.

It is impossible to discuss developments in each of those places in detail. The following selective account takes as its starting point once again the *vita* of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb and his (intellectual) contacts. The more that is known about developments in certain places, most notably Istanbul and Cairo, the less will be said about them here. Furthermore, the discussion focuses on what seems to have been of most importance to the visitors, as far as this can be judged from the overall extant evidence from the Hadhrami community. Therefore, in the case of the Ḥijāz, the figure of the larger-than-life Shāfiʿī *muftī* Aḥmad b. Zaynī al-Daḥlān dominates the narrative, while in the case of Istanbul its role as the capital of the only Muslim Empire of the period needs to be accounted for. Some cities and regions, notably the Ḥijāz and Hyderabad, featured large Hadhrami communities while Cairo and Istanbul had few Hadhrami residents, and Hadhramis venturing to Europe and Japan could probably not rely on Hadhrami or Muslim networks at all.[44]

The discussion begins in the Ḥijāz, the main meeting point between scholars of the whole Islamic world who partook in very different regional networks, and then moves on to Istanbul and the other Middle Eastern centres. As far as the Yemen is concerned, it seems that Zabīd had somewhat lost its role as a great scholarly centre, at least from a Hadhrami perspective.[45] Contacts were probably more

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[44] Unfortunately, none of the reports about Hadhramis in Europe relate their mode of travelling.

[45] The list of important recent *ʿulamāʾ* families in the city, given in al-Ḥajarī, *Majmūʿ buldān*, vol. 2, p. 387, does not contain any teachers of Hadhrami scholars known to me. Zabīd remained the centre of Shāfiʿī scholarship for the Yemen, but its commercial role declined in the late 19th century when the Ottomans built a direct road from al-Ḥudayda to Ṣanʿāʾ. Although the relationship between the scholarly and the commercial development of the town has not, to my knowledge, been investigated, it is likely that there was some kind of correlation, and be it only for visiting scholars who might have combined scholarship with trade. For a brief account of the history of Zabīd, see R. Strothmann, "Zabīd", *EI*[1], vol. VIII, pp. 1183–1184.

intense with Ṣanʿāʾ, the seat of the Ottoman authorities, and the respective Zaydī centres of learning.[46] While there certainly were exchanges with Yemeni scholars, these are not usually mentioned, in contrast to the early 19th century. For this reason, Yemen will not be discussed in the following survey. Aden was the closest imperial centre for Hadhramaut-born Hadhramis and the main seaport for far-flung journeys. Hadhramis calling there might have come into contact with the British, as well as having met other Yemenis. Perhaps because Aden was a commercial colonial centre where no major intellectual movements emerged during this period, it did not leave much trace in the Arabic biographical sources. Laḥij, the seat of the ʿAbdalī Sultan, emerged during the rule of Sultan Faḍl Muḥsin as a political centre with expansionist ambitions. The sultan shrewdly used his British connections in pursuit of these aims, but we currently know too little about internal developments to include it in the following discussion.[47]

The Ḥijāz: Centre of Learning and International Crossroads

Through the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the Ottoman province of Ḥijāz had long served as the meeting point for Muslims around the world, a role which was enhanced by the improvement of transport facilities. Thus, it was in Mecca where an envoy of the Batavia-based Hadhrami *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* (Charitable Society) recruited a Sudanese scholar, Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Sūrkittī, in 1911, as will be discussed in the next chapter. It has already been noted that the Ḥijāz was home to a large Hadhrami colony, feeling almost like home to many Hadhrami voyagers arriving.

In the 1850s, the Ḥijāz had been the scene of considerable upheaval which was partly a consequence of the Ottoman reassertion of power after an interlude during which Muḥammad ʿAlī of Egypt had controlled the province.[48] By the early 1850s, rivalry between the Ottoman governor and the Sharīf (or *amīr*) of Mecca, the major local power-

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[46] The Imām had left Sanaʾa after it fell to the Ottomans in 1872. Dresch, *A History*, p. 4.

[47] The best survey on Aden and Laḥij during this period remains Gavin, *Aden*, chapters 4–9.

[48] For political events in the Ḥijāz between 1840 and 1908, see Ochsenwald, *Religion*, pp. 131–219.

holder, had come to a head. The Egyptian-appointed Sharīf Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Muʿīn was replaced by Sharīf ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib b. Ghālib in 1851. The Hadhrami *shaykh al-sāda*, Isḥāq b. ʿAqīl, who had the ill fortune of being close to Sharīf Muḥammad, fell victim to this rivalry.[49] In the mid-1850s, these problems were exacerbated by the abolition of the slave trade by the Ottoman Empire. The merchants of Jeddah, including the Hadhramis, and the *ʿulamāʾ* of Mecca participated in revolts in 1855 and 1858 which were at least partly directed against attempts to curb this lucrative commerce. During the latter revolt, the French consul, the British vice-consul and a number of their protegés were killed.[50] In retaliation, a British warship bombarded Jeddah and the Ottomans pursued the perpetrators of the revolt, executing and banning a number of them, thus securely re-establishing their control of the province. Nevertheless, authority in the following decades was mostly vested in the Sharīfs, particularly after 1886 when Sharīf ʿAwn al-Rafīq assumed control of Mecca.

Scholars and pilgrims visiting the Ḥijāz after the revolts probably learned about these events, particularly if they were close to Hadhramis who had been involved. However, their primary interest was the religious experience of the *ḥajj* and the opportunity to learn from leading scholars of their time. Many Hadhramis studied with countrymen who had settled more or less permanently in Mecca. They were so numerous that a special *shaykh al-sāda al-ʿalawiyyīn* was in charge of representing them both *vis à vis* the Sharīf of Mecca and the Ottoman governor. Furthermore, the *shaykh al-sāda* was responsible for overseeing the administration of the ʿAlawī *awqāf* and acted as the adjudicating religious authority in the case of disputes.[51] A

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[49] Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, vol. I, p. 167; Ochsenwald, *Religion*, p. 137; ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 313.

[50] Daḥlān, *Khulāṣa*, pp. 321–323. The account of the revolt is also reproduced in Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide Geschriften*, vol. III, pp. 118–122.

[51] Personal communication, Dr. ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥiyyad, Jeddah, 28.3.2000. There is some confusion as to whether the (predominantly political and financial) office of *shaykh al-sāda al-ʿalawiyyīn* was a more recent version of the *naqīb al-sāda* in Mecca, who was responsible for keeping the genealogical records of all *sayyid*s and who was occasionally, although not consistently mentioned (cf. Ochsenwald, *Religion*, p. 53). According to Jamal al-Layl, *al-Shajara al-zakiyya*, the *naqīb* over time became called *shaykh al-sāda* in Mecca and Medina, p. 519. Ibid., pp. 504–523, for a description of the office, followed by an interesting collection of documents showing his preoccupations. Al-Ḥiyyad, on the other hand, contends that the *naqīb al-sāda* served all descendants of al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, thus extending beyond the more

number of Hadhramis filled the prestigious office of Shāfiʿī *muftī* of Mecca at some time, and thus received Ottoman salaries.[52] Among them numbered Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥibshī, father of the famous Sayyid ʿAlī who had founded of the *ribāṭ* of Sayʾūn, Muḥammad b. Saʿīd Bā Būṣayl[53] (d. 1330/1911–12) and his son ʿAlī (1273/1856–57 – 1353/1934–35).[54] These scholars were usually in quite close personal touch with their homeland.

In terms of our current concern with new influences on the Hadhrami travellers, teachers from outside the Hadhrami circle are therefore more interesting. One individual stands out as particularly influential: Aḥmad b. Zaynī Daḥlān (1233/1817–18 – 1304/1886) who was appointed Shāfiʿī *muftī* of Mecca in 1871.[55] As such, he became the most popular addressee of questions posed by Muslims from the Malay archipelago.[56] Furthermore, he held the office of *shaykh al-ʿulamāʾ* and thus served as an official link between the Ottoman government and the Meccan scholars.[57] This was probably the culmination of his membership in the Meccan council of *ʿulamāʾ* which comprised the four *muftī*s of the Sunni legal schools, as well as certain preachers, religious teachers, the *shaykh*s of the muezzins, the pilgrimage guides, the caravan leaders of Medina and the guardian of the key of the Kaʿba.[58] Daḥlān was an important teacher who was also published widely, including a famous history of Mecca.[59] Like a number of his Hadhrami contemporaries and

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limited group of the descendants of ʿAlawī b. ʿUbaydillāh b. Aḥmad b. ʿĪsa al-Muhājir.

[52] Kaptein, *The Muhimmāt*, p. 2.

[53] His name is rendered Bā-Beçêl in Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide Geschriften*, vol. III, p. 68, where he calls him *amīn el fetwa*, and Babāṣīl in Kaptein, *The Muhimmāt*, p. 6.

[54] Bā Buṣayl's holding of office is not mentioned in his biography in ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, p. 244, ibid., pp. 149–151 for the biography of his son ʿAlī. For a list of outstanding Hadhrami scholars in Mecca in the 19th century, see Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, Hadhrami Migration, pp. 22f. ʿAbd al-Jabbār lists at least thirteen Hadhrami scholars in the 14th century h./1882–1978. On Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥibshī and his son Ḥusayn in Mecca, see Abū'l-Khayr, *al-Mukhtaṣar*, pp. 177–179.

[55] For this and the following, see the biography by Daḥlān's student Abū Bakr Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*. I would like to thank Dr. Nico Kaptein for providing me with a copy of this book.

[56] Kaptein, "Sayyid ʿUthmān", p. 91.

[57] Kaptein, *The Muhimmāt*, p. 4. al-Bīṭār, *Ḥilyat*, vol. I, p. 183 calls him *raʾīs al-ʿulamāʾ*, presumably hinting at the same position.

[58] A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, Paris: Macon 1887, pp. 7f.

[59] For a list of his publications, see Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*, pp. 9–18.

students, Daḥlān did not limit himself to teaching in the scholarly environment of the Meccan *ḥaram* but also visited tribal areas near Ṭā'if to teach among the villagers.[60]

Most Hadhramis who passed through Mecca and many influential teachers such as 'Aydarūs b. 'Umar al-Ḥibshī, 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī, Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-'Aṭṭās, Abū Bakr b. Shihāb and 'Alawī b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mashhur had studied with Daḥlān. Another prominent student was Sayyid 'Uthmān b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Aqīl, *muftī* of Batavia and adviser to the Dutch on Arab affairs.[61] Daḥlān seems to have been first initiated into the Khalwatiyya order by his most influential teacher, 'Uthmān b. Ḥasan al-Damyāṭī (d. 1265/1848–49), and to have practiced the *dhikr* (a Sufi prayer aimed at "reminding oneself" of God) and *khalwa* (Sufi seclusion) according to Khalwatī traditions.[62] Nevertheless, he taught the books of the *Ṭarīqa 'Alawiyya* and read their *awrād* because one of his *shaykh*s had been initiated into the *Ṭarīqa 'Aydarūsiyya*, a branch of the *'Alawiyya*. This association was further enhanced by a large number of *ijāza*s which Daḥlān obtained from leading Hadhrami *sayyid*s.[63] As was rather common in his time, Daḥlān had also been initiated into the Qādiriyya, Naqshbandiyya and Shādhiliyya orders.[64]

In theological terms, Daḥlān was a staunch opponent of the Wahhābīs, against whom he wrote a treatise and who received negative press in his history of Mecca.[65] Daḥlān defended the visitation of tombs, for example, and accused Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, the founder of the Wahhābī movement, of abusing a wrong interpretation of Islam to seduce ignorant Beduins for political purposes.

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[60] Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*, pp. 29–32.

[61] Bang, *Sufis*, pp. 110f. On Sayyid 'Uthmān, cf. Azra, "A Hadhrami Religious Scholar".

[62] Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*, pp. 18–20; 'Alī al-'Aṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. 2, pp. 703f., about Daḥlān's teacher 'Uthmān b. Ḥasan al-Damyāṭī cf. A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, p. 275.

[63] Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*, pp. 20–22 with a list of the *sayyid*s on p. 22. See A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, pp. 274–77 for Daḥlān's relationship with Hadhrami scholarship. He taught "al-Maslak al-qarīb", a collection of *adhkār* and *awrād* by Ṭāhir b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir, Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*, p. 23. Cf. Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, *Fuyuḍāt al-baḥr*, p. 59, ibid., pp. 58–61, for his relations with Hadhrami scholars. Among the 'Alawī books he particularly favoured some of 'Abdallāh al-Ḥaddād's writings, ibid., p. 57.

[64] Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*, p. 19.

[65] The title of the anti-Wahhābī treatise is *Kitāb al-durar al-saniyya fī 'l-radd 'alā 'l-Wahhābiyya*, Cairo, n.d., for a summary of Daḥlān's arguments see Peskes, *Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb*, pp. 133–152.

Even those among the Hadhrami scholars who felt that certain prac-
tices during annual *ziyāra*s (pilgrimages to tombs, of which the most
famous in Hadhramaut was the *ziyāra* of Qabr Hūd) were exagger-
ated and who might have preached moderation would not have dis-
agreed with such views.[66] Daḥlān defended not only a theological
point of view, he also spoke as part of the religious establishment in
the Ḥijāz that profited greatly from the many pilgrims who came
not just to visit the Kaʿba but the graves in Mecca and Medina as
well.[67] Snouck Hurgronje paints a not altogether favourable picture
of this scholar who "was not free from ambition", valued what this
world had to offer and took care not to offend the powers that be,
namely the Ottomans.[68]

Daḥlān was very aware of the European expansion and the dan-
gers it presented to the Muslim world. Therefore, in his history of
Muslim conquests, *al-Futūḥāt al-islāmiyya*, he notes the progressive
advance of European powers and the consequent shrinking of terri-
tories under Muslim control.[69] Daḥlān had the opportunity to observe
this from close by during the aforementioned 1858 revolt in Jeddah.[70]
In this context, the Ottoman governor had consulted with *ʿulamāʾ*,
merchants and notables in Mecca. It is quite likely that Daḥlān was
privy to or at least closely informed about these discussions, during
which the locals suggested defending the Ḥijāz by force against the
foreign warships. He would therefore have heard the Ottoman warn-
ing that such action would make matters even worse, as the British
might then be inclined to take control of the remaining Muslim lands
(including most outrageously the two holy cities) and declare war on
the Ottoman government. In such a case, the governor argued, the
tribes would not be of much use, as they had neither ships nor
sufficient arms and supplies for an all-out war. The governor thus
insisted on a negotiated settlement. It entailed trialing and publicy
executing the (according to Daḥlān: supposed)[71] ringleaders and the

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[66] See chapter II, section on Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ.
[67] Cf. the public dispute with a certain Ḥasaballāh about graves, Snouck Hurgronje,
"Een Rector", pp. 74f. [*Verspreide Geschriften*, vol. III, pp. 67–122].
[68] Snouck Hurgronje, "Een Rector", pp. 68f. Unsurprisingly, Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-
raḥmān*, presents a different view, emphasizing, for example, how Daḥlān spent all
his money on students, the poor and other worthy causes, pp. 39f.
[69] Sharkey, "A Contemporary View", p. 68.
[70] The following account is taken from Daḥlān, *Khulāṣa*, pp. 321–323.
[71] Daḥlān, *Khulāṣa*, pp. 322f. goes into some detail about what he considered to
be a most unfair process of interrogation and trial.

banishing of some others from Jeddah by the governor and the
British and French consuls.[72] Daḥlān adds an interesting episode to
this account. No matter whether or not it refers to a historical occur-
rence, it shows that he was aware not only of the superior military
force, but also of some of the motives of the Europeans. These were
truly peculiar from a Muslim perspective. The new Sharīf of Mecca
arrived just after the trial and before the foreigners had departed.
They asked him to consent to them visiting the holy city. According
to Daḥlān, the Sharīf reacted as follows:

> When they asked me this, I was at a loss. They would not accept my
> answer that this was forbidden according to our law, and that the
> Muslims would not be content about it. But then God inspired me to
> give them a rational and convincing reply [*jawāban ʿaqliyyan iqnāʿiyyan*].
> I told them: You have seen pictures of Mecca on the maps and in
> the geographical publications [*jughrāfiyyāt*]. She [Mecca] features nei-
> ther gardens nor rivers and there are no mosaics. She is a Wadi with-
> out agriculture, situated between mountains. If you went there, you
> would not gain anything beyond what you have seen on the pictures
> and maps. I can see that it would require a great effort from you
> without providing benefits.[73]

To this logic, the envoys succumbed and left without further ado.
Incidentally, the account of the 1858 revolt might also shed some
light on Daḥlān's privately voiced scepticism *vis à vis* the Ottomans
and their reform programme. While he recognised the caliphate as
an institution symbolising the unity of the Muslim world, he was
painfully aware of the relative impotence of the sultan/caliph and
rather sceptical as to whether the 19th century reforms improved
the situation.[74]

  Daḥlān's awareness of the European danger comes across well in
his views on the Sudanese Mahdi, Muḥammad Aḥmad, who launched
a movement against the Turco-Egyptian and later the British-Egyptian

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[72] Among the executed was Saʿīd al-ʿĀmūdī, among the exiled the *shaykh al-sāda*,
Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b. ʿAqīl, as well as Saʿīd Bā Ghalaf (Baghalaf) and ʿAbdallāh
Bā Hārūn. This might be the son of ʿUmar b. ʿAlī al-Junayd of Singapore, who
arrived in the Ḥijāz some time after 1852, and died in Mecca in 1864, although
the biography by al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 183, only mentions him as resident of
Mecca. The Governor and two consuls probably formed a 'mixed court' accord-
ing to the capitulations.
[73] Daḥlān, *Khulāṣa*, p. 323.
[74] Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide Geschriften*, vol. 3, pp. 83, 90.

rule over Sudan in 1881.[75] Daḥlān argued in his *al-Futuḥāt al-islāmiyya* that Muḥammad Aḥmad might well be a *mahdī*, i.e., a rightly guided leader who aims at restoring faith and establishing the rule of justice and *sharīʿa*, although not the *mahdī* whose appearance heralds in the end of time. Daḥlān hoped that Muḥammad Aḥmad would help to expel the British from Egypt (occupied in 1882) and therefore reverse the trend of European expansion into Muslim lands. This does not imply that Daḥlān was opposed to making use of such 'Western' innovations as printing, which had been brought to Mecca by the Ottomans[76] as a government press and was also used to print his books. That such a position is by no means natural is exemplified by the great scepticism towards printed matter in the more conservative milieu of Hadhramaut.[77] Daḥlān also did not mind contact with Europeans per se; indeed, he maintained a lively relationship and correspondence with the Dutch Orientalist, Snouck Hurgronje, during the latter's stay in Mecca in 1885.[78]

While it might be of interest how the most important Shāfiʿī *muftī* commented on current events, it is particularly relevant here because the discussion about the *mahdī* is one of the rare cases where a detailed scholarly discussion with colleagues preceded the publication of a book. Daḥlān corresponded about the issue with Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās, one of his favourite students, whom he would eventually have liked to become his successor.[79] The episode shows further that the exchange of letters was a public affair, as letters of important individuals were copied and distributed within scholarly networks. Commenting on this phenomenon, which was greatly

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[75] About the Mahdist movement, see P.M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881–1898*, 2nd ed. Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1970. Daḥlān's views on the *mahdī* are discussed by Sharkey, "A Contemporary View", on whom the following is based.

[76] About this press, see Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 165 and Ochsenwald, *Religion*, pp. 79f. The first book was printed in Mecca in 1300/1882–83. In Yemen, printing seems to have started after the Yemeni government installed a printing press in Ṣanʿāʾ in 1877. By 1879/90, it published the journal *Ṣanʿāʾ*. Obermeyer, "al-Iman", p. 180 and Ursinus, "Ṣanʿāʾ", pp. 101f.

[77] See chapter VI. About the significance of print culture in the Middle East and the links with modernity, see the contributions in *Culture & History* 16, 1997, notably Schulze, "The Birth of Tradition", pp. 29–72 and O'Fahey, "'His Masters Voice'", 136–144.

[78] Leiden University Library, Cod. Or. 7111. I would like to thank Dr. Michael Laffan for sharing his notes from Leiden with me. On the relationship between Daḥlān and Snouck Hurgronje, see Freitag, "Der Orientalist und der Mufti".

[79] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, pp. 67–69.

enhanced by modern means of communication in the case of Ibn
ʿAqīl, Lee-Warner noted that the scattered community of Muslims
"is yet bound together in a surprising manner by means of postal
communications."[80] The exchange of letters further illustrates the
close cooperation of scholars in a number of fields and therefore
deserves to be summarised briefly.

On 1 Muḥarram 1303/10 October 1885, Daḥlān wrote to Aḥmad
al-ʿAṭṭās.[81] He asked about his health, thanked al-ʿAṭṭās for his let-
ters and promised that a collection of biographies of *sayyid*s by Daḥlān
which interested al-ʿAṭṭās was being copied by Daḥlān's student and
later Shāfiʿī *muftī* of Mecca, Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī "because
he can read my handwriting easily".[82] It seems that this was the tab-
ulatory version of the 17th century work *al-Mashraʿ al-rawīy* by al-
Shillī which proved highly popular in Hadhramaut.[83] Daḥlān had
asked al-Ḥibshī to add information to this book, including materi-
als collected by Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb. Its arrangement fol-
lowed that of a book of his on the Prophet's companions, which he
had arranged according to tribal affiliation, eliminating controversial
discussions. This work was being corrected and copied by Abū Bakr
b. Shihāb, who presumably was passing through Mecca at the time.[84]

Daḥlān further explained that he had written a history of the
Muslim conquests. This topic was close to his heart because many
of the great events could "encourage the hearts of the Muslims and
strengthen their faith", and because the material was currently not
presented anywhere in a coherent fashion.[85] The underlying approach
thus seemed similar to the one pursued in the biographical collec-
tions, namely to order and synthesise unwieldy material in a way
which made it accessible to the ordinary Muslim reader. Daḥlān
aimed to find a new style for historical presentation, and it is worth

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[80] PRO, FO 371/5236, Lee-Warner, Singapore to Colonial Office, 15.7.1920,
p. 2.

[81] Aḥmad al-ʿAṭṭās, Mukātabāt, pp. 9–15. I would like to thank ʿAlī Muṭahhar
of Gresik, Java for allowing me to consult and photocopy this manuscript.

[82] Aḥmad al-ʿAṭṭās, Mukātabāt, p. 9. The term for copying used is *bayyaḍa*, imply-
ing that these were fair copies from the original manuscript. About Ḥusayn b.
Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī (1258/1842–43 – 1330/1911–12) cf. Bā Maṭraf, *al-Jāmiʿ*, vol.
1, p. 381; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, p. 99.

[83] For a reference to this work see Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*, p. 12, for the posi-
tive response al-ʿAṭṭās, Mukātabāt, p. 3.

[84] According to Shaṭṭā, *Nafḥat al-raḥmān*, pp. 11f., this work was not completed.

[85] Aḥmad al-ʿAṭṭās, Mukātabāt, p. 12.

noting that as the proud author reported, "*al-Futūḥāt al-islāmiyya*" found great acclaim among the *ʿulamāʾ*.

Daḥlān then broached the question of the *mahdī*. Basically, he outlined the arguments later included in *al-Futūḥāt al-islāmiyya* to al-ʿAṭṭās, asking for the latter's comments. While the real *mahdī* could only appear in Mecca, Daḥlān had found some indication that before the real *mahdī*, somebody would appear in Sudan. "Possibly", Daḥlān suggested, "this was him, or somebody else, and God alone knows".[86] As he continued his letter with the military news from Sudan and concluded by asking God for help for the Muslims, Daḥlān avoided any definite statement.

In the answer of Shawwāl 1303/July-August 1886, al-ʿAṭṭās informed Daḥlān about his busy life in Hadhramaut. He had heard about Daḥlān's history (presumably the *Futūḥāt*) which he considered to be of much value, wished him luck with the printing and asked for a copy in case he was not able to travel to Mecca during that year. Furthermore, al-ʿAṭṭās replied to Daḥlān's views on the Mahdi. He summarised a treatise by ʿAlawī b. Aḥmad al-Ḥaddād (1162/1748–49 – 1232/1816–17) in which the Najdī, i.e., Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and the (question of a) *mahdī* was discussed and which he had seen in the house of a relative upon his return from Mecca.[87] He had further discussed the problem with his friends, who basically agreed with Daḥlān's conclusions on the matter.

Besides their insights into scholarly work and cooperation, the letters show the intensive cooperation of scholars such as Abū Bakr b. Shihāb, Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās and Ḥusayn al-Ḥibshī with Daḥlān. They allow a glimpse at the substance of scholarly interactions within the networks of which Hadhramis formed an integral part, something rarely ever found in the traditional *manāqib* literature on the basis of which we usually reconstruct such networks. In terms of contents they also show how the question of European expansion and Muslim defense was discussed in these circles. Unfortunately, they do not give further insight into links with Muslims of other origin or indeed members of other religious schools. For a slightly later

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[86] Aḥmad al-ʿAṭṭās, Mukātabāt, p. 14.
[87] Aḥmad al-ʿAṭṭās, Mukātabāt, p. 4. About ʿAlawī b. Aḥmad al-Ḥaddād, see ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 571f. A treatise by this author titled "Miṣbāḥ al-anām wa-jalāʾ al-ẓalām fī radd shubhat al-bidaʿī al-Najdī allatī aḍalla bihā al-ʿawāmm" was printed in Cairo in 1325 on the margins of Daḥlān's *Risāla fī jawāz al-tawassul*. Brockelmann, *GAL*, suppl. 2, p. 813.

period, such contacts can, however, be restored using the *riḥla* genre. Therefore, the reports about Sayyid Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās' journeys by his co-travellers allow us to show something of his wide-ranging contacts with scholars, mostly from the Ḥijāz, Syria, Egypt and the Maghreb.[88]

Istanbul

For a Hadhrami visitor in the late 19th century, Istanbul must have presented a significant contrast to the scholarly milieu of Mecca. Situated in Europe, this capital of a crumbling but still powerful empire offered imperial splendour and claimed respect beyond Ottoman boundaries as the seat of the Caliph. While the main contacts of our travellers in Mecca were of a familial or scholarly nature, Istanbul was very much a political centre from which ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zāhir and many others in the Muslim world expected help in their struggle against imperialism. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire, and Istanbul in particular, had changed its face during the *Tanẓīmāt*, the modernising and centralising reforms of the 19th century. Although Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd II (r. 1876–1909) assumed rather direct control over the political developments after the constitutional interlude of 1876–78, he continued the modernising programme of his predecessors in many other fields.[89] Of course, some of this was not new to the travellers, who might have witnessed new type Ottoman schools in Ottoman Yemen and Ḥijāz or read about them in Ṣanʿāʾ. Nevertheless, the changes were particularly manifest in Istanbul, which emanated imperial power as well as modernity.[90]

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[88] See in particular the accounts of his journeys to Egypt and the Ḥijāz, ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, *Riḥla* and Bā Faḍl, *al-Nafḥa al-miskiyya*. Given the international contacts of Hadhramis and the fact that al-ʿAṭṭās visit took place during the *ḥajj*, when Muslims from all over the Muslim world gather in Mecca, it is interesting to see that Bā Faḍl lists almost exclusively Arabs as al-ʿAṭṭās' Ḥijāzī contacts (notable exceptions are the Meccan born *Jāwī* scholar ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Qudus and Ismāʿīl b. Ayka (?) al-Dāghistānī, who kept a major library of Daghestan and therefore had a shared interest with al-ʿAṭṭās). It would be interesting to know whether this reflected personal preference or indicates a more widely shared prejudice of the established Arab *ʿulamāʾ* against non-Arab scholars. Such a possibility is indicated by Laffan, The umma, chapter 4.
[89] Erik Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*. Corr. repr. London etc. (I. B. Tauris) 1998, pp. 52–74 and 80–94.
[90] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, p. 31.

Of particular importance to Hadhrami visitors was the policy of pan-Islam.[91] ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II focused much on the presentation of his regime as guardian of Islamic orthodoxy and defender of the faith the world over. The Friday prayer ceremony, often attended by visitors, served as a prime reminder that this was an Islamic regime, while characteristically combining traditional and modern elements. The sultan's pan-Islamic propaganda was enhanced by symbolic acts such as the annual pompous departure of the sultan's gifts to the holy cities in the Ḥijāz.[92] While this continued older practices in a modified form, Islamic legitimacy was further strengthened by such acts as the building of the Ḥijāz railway. A keen Hadhrami biographer suggests that this was proposed to the sultan by none other than Sayyid Faḍl b. ‘Alawī b. Sahl.[93] ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd also hosted pan-Islamists such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, who found final refuge in Istanbul in 1892 and lived there until his death.[94] The decoration of visitors such as Sayyid Abū Bakr aimed at co-opting them into the realm of Ottoman influence.[95]

It has been already mentioned above that the Sultan had a number of advisors on pan-Islam, among them Sayyid Faḍl Pāsha. Emissaries were sent to Muslim countries, consulates set up and pan-Islamic organizations supported. The question as to how pan-Islam worked outside the Empire, i.e., whether we have to see pan-Islam mainly as a metropolitan phenomenon emanating from legitimising needs of Istanbul or as resulting from outside expectations and demands with which the Ottomans then dealt according to their own interests, would merit closer investigation. The cases of certain *sayyid*s calling for support for their position in Hadhramaut, as well as the example of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Zāhir, seem to suggest that the latter played at least some role.

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[91] The following is based on the detailed discussions in Landau, *The Politics*, pp. 9–72, Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures" and Deringil, "Inventing Tradition".

[92] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, pp. 22–25.

[93] A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, p. 283. According to Jacob Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1971, p. 13, the idea was first launched in a report on the insurrection in the Yemen in 1898 by a Damascene Arab working in the palace.

[94] Al-Afghānī's stay allowed the Sultan to control the movements of this colourful personality, so that Hourani compares al-Afghānī's final years to virtual imprisonment, *Arabic Thought*, p. 112.

[95] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, pp. 35–37.

The Ottomans certainly had come to play an increased role among the Arabs in South East Asia in the 1870s and 80s. Since 1864, ʿAbdallāh al-Junayd in Singapore had acted as Ottoman consul and was later replaced by a member of the al-Saqqāf family.[96] In 1873, the very year when Ḥabīb ʿAbd al-Raḥmān was turned away from Istanbul with little more than warm words, a group of forty Arabs from Batavia and Semarang complained to the Ottomans about their treatment by the Dutch.[97] Ten years later when an Ottoman consul was stationed in Batavia, he acted to a large extent as an agent propagating the Ottoman Empire, the caliphate and pan-Islamic ideas.[98] It is therefore not at all surprising that he became a regular addressee of these complaints. Many Arabs wished to be recognised as Ottoman subjects which afforded them the status of Europeans in the Netherlands East Indies and spared them discrimination as Foreign Orientals.[99] The racial segregation of these 'Orientals' from the 'native' population as well as from Europeans had far-reaching consequences which ranged from restrictions on settlement and movement to the limitation of educational opportunities.[100] In 1898, the Ottomans offered scholarships to the children of leading notables in Singapore and Java. Interestingly, all of the young boys were Arabs, as the consul maintained the closest relations with the Arab community in Batavia.[101]

Why would they have sent their children to Istanbul? A report by the Ottoman consul Kāmil Bek details "how a wealthy Javanese merchant, one Sayyid Ali Şehab [this being ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb al-Dīn, the earlier-mentioned entrepreneur] had managed to enroll his children in a Dutch school. He was promptly ridiculed in the local press for 'forgetting himself' and 'thinking he was European'."[102] Consequently, Sayyid ʿAlī Shihāb sent his son ʿAbd al-Muṭallib to study in Istanbul together with Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-ʿAydarūs and Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAṭṭās, son of the aforementioned

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[96] On the issue of the Ottoman consulate in Singapore, see my "Arab Merchants".

[97] Mandal, "Finding their Place", p. 133.

[98] Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, p. 86.

[99] de Jonge, "Dutch Colonial Policy", pp. 102f., Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, pp. 86f.

[100] For a description of those measures, see de Jonge, "Dutch Colonial Policy". For more details on the educational system, see chapter V.

[101] Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures", p. 351, Mandal, "Finding their Place", pp. 147f., Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, pp. 86f., van Dijk, "The Fear".

[102] Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures", p. 351.

'Abdallāh b. 'Alawī. The boys attended the Galatasaray Lyceum, which provided European-style education in a non-discriminatory environment. 'Abd al-Muṭallib continued his studies at the military academy; 'Abd al-Raḥmān went on to study political sciences in Belgium; and Muḥammad became a member of the *Volksraad*, the legislative council of the Netherlands East Indies.[103] The next group of seven students was sent in the following year. Again, it consisted exclusively of Arabs, two sons of Shaykh 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Abdallāh Bā Junayd of Buitenzorg (Bogor), four sons of the Sunkar family of Batavia and one Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Sayyidī of north Sumatra. They were to attend the *Aşiret mektebi* in Istanbul once again at the expense of the Ottoman government.[104] The children thus were meant to profit from the new educational system which had been initiated during the *Tanzīmāt* and which instilled Ottoman loyalties in its clients.[105] Foreign pupils would at least have become drawn into the wider Ottoman realm.

Overall, the result of these missions was rather mixed. Of the seventeen South East Asian Hadhrami boys in Istanbul in 1900, four died the following year, and only a few seem to have successfully completed their education.[106] Nevertheless, a trickle of youngsters continued to study in Istanbul. Upon returning to the Indies, they faced problems due to Dutch fears that they might spread Pan-Islamic ideas, harbour notions of loyalty to Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamīd II and use their Ottoman passports to ensure European status. The intelligence which seems to have confirmed some of these fears indicates that the Hamidian educational system was not entirely unsuccessful in translating its aims into practice.[107]

After Sayyid Faḍl had moved to Istanbul around 1880, he would have been the first port of call for Hadhrami visitors with no other relations in the city. He would have introduced high-ranking visitors such as Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb and Sayyid Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ to other supporters of pan-Islamism which is probably how Sayyid

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[103] Personal information, Muḥammad Asad Shahāb, Jakarta, 20.6.1997.
[104] Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, pp. 93f.
[105] On the topic of education, see Fortna, *Imperial Classroom* and Derigil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, pp. 93–111.
[106] Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, p. 98. Ibid., pp. 98–102, for an account of their careers.
[107] Laffan, The umma, chapter 4; Snouck Hurgronje, *Ambtelijke Adviezen*, vol. 2, pp. 1737–1741.

Abū Bakr came to meet Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī.[108] Furthermore,
Sayyid Faḍl would have arranged their reception at court. Interest-
ingly, Sayyid Abū Bakr also seems to have built a close relationship
with Sayyid Faḍl's rival Abū 'l-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī. Abū 'l-Hudā initi-
ated Sayyid Abū Bakr into the Rifā'ī order and issued him with an
ijāza, which is interesting in so far as this order is not normally asso-
ciated with the reformist ideas which seem to have been current
among adherents of the Naqshabandiyya or Idrīsiyya.[109] This might
be a further indicator that the boundaries between traditionalists and
reformers were far more fluid at the time than they tend to be con-
sidered by historians writing in the 20th century for ideological and
analytical purposes alike.

However, there was another side to Istanbul which visiting digni-
taries could not fail to note. Istanbul was neither a fully European
nor a colonial city. For a long time, the quarter of Galata had been
the centre of the city's non-Muslim population and it became its
economic centre in the 19th century. In contrast to 'old' Istanbul
across the Golden Horn, Galata featured banks, insurance compa-
nies and a stock exchange, but also apartment houses, hotels, clubs,
theatres, beerhalls and art galleries. Although only of provincial stan-
dard in European comparison, this Westernisation of the uncolonised
Ottoman capital stood in contrast not only to the more conserva-
tive appearance of 'old Istanbul', but also to other Middle Eastern
cities and certainly to Hadhramaut.[110]

Modernisation, however, was not limited to the organisation and
appearance of Istanbul. Istanbul was home to newspapers which,
although under strict supervision by the Sultan, discussed issues and
topics which lay quite outside of what preoccupied *'ulamā'* tradi-
tionally.[111] This press, which was arguably even livelier outside the

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[108] About al-Afghānī, see Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī*, Keddie, *An Islamic
Response* and Pakdaman, *Djamal-Ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani*.

[109] To what extent this view of the Rifā'ī order is correct remains an open ques-
tion. About Abū Bakr's relationship with Abū 'l-Hudā, see Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*,
p. 539, al-'Umarī, *al-'Uqūd* (op. cit. fn. 9), p. 137. Thomas Eich pointed out this
connection to me.

[110] For more information about the development of Istanbul, see Zeynep Çelik,
The Remaking of Istanbul. Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century. Seattle,
London: University of Washington Press 1986 and Edhem Eldem, "Istanbul: from
imperial to peripheralized capital", pp. 135–206 in Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman
& Bruce Masters, *The Ottoman City between East and West*, CUP 1999.

[111] On the emergence of the Arabic language press in the Ottoman realms, see
"Djarīda" (by a number of authors), *EI* (CDRom).

immediate Ottoman domains, namely in Cairo, Alexandria and even Europe, was read with interest by a section of the Hadhrami community abroad. Van den Berg, writing in 1886, the year when Sayyid Abū Bakr probably visited Istanbul, lists the following journals as being read by Arabs in South East Asia: *al-Iʿtidāl* and *al-Insān* from Istanbul, *al-Janna*, *Thamarāt al-Funūn* and *Lisān al-Ḥāl* from Beirut, *al-Waṭan* from Cairo, *al-Ahrām* and *Rawḍat al-Iskandariyya* from Alexandria and *al-ʿUrwā al-Wuthqā*, the famous publication by Muḥammad ʿAbdūh and al-Afghānī, from Paris.[112] However, many of the more conservative Hadhramis retained their reserve against such untoward innovations, *bidaʿ*. A member of the al-Saqqāf family in Surabaya remembered how even in the 1930s his father remained staunchly opposed to reading anything but religious texts and poetry.[113]

It was therefore a mark of the open-mindedness of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb, and later Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl, to have been in contact with the journalist Aḥmad Fāris Shidyāq.[114] This is all the more remarkable as Shidyāq was a convert to Islam and held rather favourable views of the European way of life in spite of propagating the caliphate and generally defending Ottoman policies. The virtues expounded here as European, namely industriousness, productiveness, social cohesion, religious tolerance, social participation of women and education of children, became standard demands of Arab and among them Hadhrami reformers.[115]

The Syrian Cities

Beirut, which Sayyid Abū Bakr almost invariably passed on his way to Jerusalem and Damascus, was home to one of the liveliest intellectual scenes in the Ottoman Empire. It must have been here that he met ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Qabbānī (1848–1935), editor of *Thamarāt al-Funūn*.[116] Al-Qabbānī was also one of the founders of the famous charitable society *al-Maqāṣid al-Khayriyya al-Islāmiyya* in 1879. The

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[112] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥadhramout*, p. 174, fn. 1.

[113] Personal information, ʿAlī ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf (Alsagoff), Gresik, 11.6.1997.

[114] Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, p. 76, lists him among Sayyid Abū Bakr's friends, although he is otherwise silent about the nature of this contact. As he also lists the editor of *al-Muʾayyad*, ʿAlī Yūsuf, in Cairo, there is a certain likelihood that such contacts really existed, whether directly or by correspondence.

[115] About Shidyāq and his journal see Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 97–99.

[116] About al-Qabbānī, see al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. 4, p. 46.

distinguished Sufi served on the city council of Beirut and became director of education and *awqāf*. A series of articles on the discrimination against Muslims and notably Arabs in the East Indies, published in 1897 and 1898 in *Thamarāt al-Funūn*, was authored by a certain Sayf al-Dīn al-Yamanī—a pseudonym of Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl, Sayyid Abū Bakr's student, who also published anti-colonial articles in other Middle Eastern journals.[117] Unfortunately, Sayyid Abū Bakr's biography tells us nothing about his other contacts in this buzzing city. However, we do know that Ḥabīb ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zāhir met Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Jawād al-Qayyātī, a participant in the ʿUrābī revolt who had taken refuge in Beirut together with Muḥammad ʿAbduh and some others.[118] Al-Qayyātī was an adherent of the Khalwatī order. This encounter constitutes another interesting link between (ex-)fighters against European expansion and enhances the scenario of a largely unofficial network of proto-nationalists and Sufi pan-Islamists who were in loose contact with each other.

We know even less about the contacts of Sayyid Abū Bakr or other Hadhrami visitors in Palestine and Damascus. His prime object might simply have been to see the holy cities of Jerusalem and Damascus. However, in the late 1870s and early 1880s, Damascus itself was resounding with new ideas which might have appealed to such a visitor, and we know from travelogues of other Hadhramis that they usually took every chance to meet fellow *ʿulamāʾ*.[119] One should therefore not exclude that Sayyid Abū Bakr heard about or even met Ṭāhir al-Jazāʾirī (1852–1920), founder of the first public library of Syria and a supporter of the new Ottoman educational system. Perhaps he even encountered the young but promising Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (1866–1914), who was just beginning his religious career around 1886. If his visit took place before May 1883, he might have also met the famous ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī who was the retired hero of the anti-French Algerian resistance and had become a very *sharīʿa*-minded Sufi after a visit to the Ḥijāz from 1862–64.[120]

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[117] Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, pp. 119–123 and Brunschwig, Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut und Südostasien, pp. 126f.

[118] Al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. 6, p. 185.

[119] Al-Ḥiyyad, "Riḥlāt", pp. 577–582. On the journey of one of them, Shaykh b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī (1265/1848–49 – 1348/1929–30) cf. Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, al-Fuyūḍāt, pp. 162–165.

[120] On al-Qāsimī, see Commins, *Islamic Reform*, pp. 34–48 and Weismann, *Taste*, pp. 291–298; on al-Jazāʾirī Commins, pp. 26–30 and Weismann, pp. 193–204.

Cairo

A visit to Cairo demanded only a short detour from anyone travelling between the Ḥijāz and Istanbul. Cairo was home of al-Azhar, a major centre particularly of Shāfiʿī religious learning and almost comparable to Mecca and Medina as an international meeting place for scholars. It was a destination worth visiting in its own right.[121] From the 1870s onwards, Cairo increasingly became the major centre for new ideas about Muslim reform, which reached other parts of the Muslim world through word of mouth and publications.[122] Although Egypt officially remained part of the Ottoman Empire until the outbreak of World War I, it had become virtually independent under Muḥammad ʿAlī (r. 1805–1848). In 1882, British forces occupied the country following state bankruptcy and the ʿUrābī uprising and established a veiled colonial regime which extended to Sudan.

The years preceding the British occupation had seen lively intellectual movement, much of which was centred around Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī who had come to Egypt in 1871. Until his expulsion in 1879, he worked closely with his disciple, the Egyptian ʿālim Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905), who was himself expelled in 1882. In both cases, the expulsions were due to their strong resistance to foreign intervention. Al-Afghānī travelled to India, Paris, London and Istanbul. In 1884, ʿAbduh joined him in Paris where they issued the already-mentioned journal *al-ʿUrwā al-Wuthqā*. ʿAbduh later moved to Beirut until his return to Egypt in 1888.[123] As a judge and as *muftī* of Egypt from 1899 he dedicated his last years to the reform of al-Azhar university which had come under increasing pressure from competition by new educational establishments. Among the latter was the *Dār al-ʿUlūm*, founded in 1872 to offer additional training in non-religious subjects to Azhar graduates in order to prepare them for teaching in new schools.

The *Dār al-ʿUlūm* became the centre for a new type of learned person, the intellectual. In contrast to the religious scholars (*ʿulamāʾ*), intellectuals were not active (or not exclusively) in the traditional

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[121] About al-Azhar, see J. Jomier, "al-Azhar", *EI* (CDRom).

[122] On Cairo's influence on Javanese Muslims, as well as for a good summary of the reform movement see Laffan, The umma, chapter 4; for its current role, Abaza, "Islamic Educational Networks".

[123] On ʿAbduh, see Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 130–160 and on ʿAbduh and al-Afghānī Adams, *Islam and Modernism*, pp. 4–176.

fields of Muslim scholarship. Although they were often products of
the same education as the *ʿulamāʾ* in this period, they pursued different
careers particularly in the cultural and administrative sphere and/or
were driven by different concerns. Unsurprisingly, the *ʿulamāʾ* often
refused to recognise them as being of their kind, particularly because
the intellectuals began to challenge the *ʿulamāʾ*'s claim to leadership
of the community. They questioned the relevance of their knowl-
edge as much as their ability to ask the right questions (and find
the right answers) in a rapidly changing world. Some *ʿulamāʾ*,
Muḥammad ʿAbduh prime among them, strove to change the out-
look of the *ʿulamāʾ* and thus defend their position as intellectual and
spiritual community leaders.[124]

When Sayyid Abū Bakr arrived around 1886, the aftershocks of
the occupation and the departure of part of the intellectual elite
would still have been very vivid. Sayyid Abū Bakr, who according
to Shahāb established links with a good number of journalists and
scholars, must have been well aware that Khedive Tawfīq, whose
patronage he supposedly sought, was a controversial figure regarded
by many Egyptian intellectuals as a European stooge. Therefore, his
relationship with the Khedive possibly indicates a certain pragma-
tism which can be regarded as typical of Hadhramis who followed
similar trajectories and who must have depended on the good will
and support of the rulers of many different territories. Interestingly,
Shahāb does not engage with the potentially problematic nature of
what he calls "ties of companionship and brotherhood" between a
ruler installed by the Europeans and an individual whom he other-
wise portraits as a major anti-imperialist.[125]

Visitors in the late 19th and early 20th century came when the
Azhar reform was in full swing. One example is the aforementioned
manṣab of al-Ḥurayḍa, Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās, who travelled to
Egypt in 1325/1907–8. He gained some impression of both the threat
to religious learning and the opportunities inherent in its adaptation
to new methods and its opening to new subjects.[126] Similarly, Hadhrami

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[124] Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus*, pp. 17–46, here particularly p. 27. For
the Ottoman context, Fatma Müge Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Em-
pire, Oxford: OUP 1996, p. 118 argues that the intellectuals, whom she distinguishes
from older Ottoman "thinkers" dependant on imperial sponsorship and support
from *ʿulamāʾ*, had "an alternate source of sustenance lodged in the public sphere".
[125] Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, p. 310.
[126] About al-ʿAṭṭās' visit to Egypt, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, p. 69 and ʿAbdallāh

students at the venerated institution, like ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Junayd's student ʿAlawī b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mashhūr (1263/1846–47 – 1341/1922) who studied in Cairo for five years from 1873–74, would have been privy to the introduction of new educational establishments, as well as the nationalist mood prevailing in Egypt at the time.[127]

Hyderabad

In India, Hadhramis were in contact with a number of regions. Sayyid Faḍl was born on the Malabar coast where his family had become part of the *ʿulamāʾ* of the Mappila community. While Sayyid Faḍl and his colleagues obviously played a role in the unfolding events both on the Malabar coast and later in Hadhramaut, there are as yet few indicators that developments on the Malabar coast had any direct influence on Hadhramaut. An obvious exception are the revenues transmitted and the fact that Hadhrami Muslims in many places in India had the opportunity to observe European expansion first hand.

Even if Hyderabad was not one of the great Indian centres of Islamic learning, it attracted a large and politically significant group of Hadhrami migrants as well as prominent Indian Muslims. The developments discussed here are therefore not only of importance to Sayyid Abū Bakr but also form the backdrop against which the Quʿayṭī sultans developed their ideas, as has already been indicated in the previous chapter. Hyderabad had come under indirect British rule since the late 18th century.[128] The British Residents, the first of whom had arrived in 1798, were instrumental in the expansion of British rule. Originally representing the East India Company, they increasingly took on diplomatic and political tasks. British expansion probably owes more to them than the Governor General.[129]

Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, p. 118. According to Bang, Sufis, pp. 105f., he first visited Egypt around 1890, associating with a number of Azhar shaykhs and learning about the reforms taking place there.

[127] The three travellers discussed by al-Ḥiyyad, "Riḥlāt", who visited Egypt in the early 20th century, also met with Azhar *shaykh*s and thus probably caught up with recent intellectual developments.

[128] Where not indicated otherwise, this discussion largely follows Schwerin, *Indirekte Herrschaft*.

[129] Schwerin, *Indirekte Herrschaft*, pp. 28f. The expansion of British rule through the residents is discussed in detail by Fisher, *Indirect Rule in India*.

To the great relief of the British, Hyderabad did not in any sig-
nificant way participate in the Mutiny of 1857. On 1 November
1858, the British declared their intention to recognise all existing
treaty relationships and not to annex further territory, therefore
confirming Hyderabad's rather tentative independence.[130] The reforms
under Salar Jung (in office 1853–1883), the Minister and link between
Nizam and administration, have to be understood in this context.
They aimed primarily at a centralisation of the bureaucracy and at
the improvement of the financial position of the state.[131] This was
to be achieved not least by the phasing out of tax farming, in which
Hadhrami mercenaries had played some part. An attempt was made
to build a modern army. Furthermore, the Anglo-Indian legal codes
were partly adopted and the legal system overhauled.

The above-named changes affected the position of Arab merce-
naries and moneylenders, as has been discussed in detail by Hartwig,
who argues that this greatly contributed to the renewed interest of
the migrants in Hadhramaut.[132] They also offered an example of
how a Muslim state could reform its administration and increase its
efficiency. Reform was not limited to administrative matters. The
city of Hyderabad saw certain improvements of its infrastructure,
such as new drinking water supplies and the installation of a tele-
phone system in1884. In spite of the many problems associated with
finance, the development of railways and a mining system seem to
have inspired the Quʿaytī rulers of Hadhramaut.

When Sayyid Abū Bakr arrived in Hyderabad around 1884 and
started to work at the *Dār al-ʿUlūm*, this school did not differ dramatic-
ally from more traditional Muslim schools.[133] However, it was the first
state school in Hyderabad and aimed at training future civil serv-
ants.[134] In addition to offering instruction in Arabic, Persian, English,
Telugu and Maratha, it also engaged in an ambitious program of
publishing works by Muslim scholars. The educational program in
Hyderabad might not have been very impressive to some contem-
poraries; nevertheless, it offered opportunities which were still fairly

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[130] Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 187f.
[131] On Salar Jang and his reforms, cf. Bawa, *The Nizam*, notably pp. 56–137.
[132] Hartwig, *Hadramaut*, pp. 220–224, 258f.
[133] Schwerin, *Indirekte Herrschaft*, p. 152, my translation.
[134] Bawa, *The Nizam*, p. 85.

rare outside the centres of Muslim education and publishing in Cairo, Istanbul and Beirut, and certainly unheard of in Hadhramaut.[135]

In spite of subsequent efforts to build a modern educational system, the demand for trained bureaucrats quickly exceeded supply.[136] Salar Jung turned to Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, the founder of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College of Aligarh and an intellectual convinced of the necessity to modernise Islam, to ask for suggestions of individuals who might be suitable to serve in Hyderabad. The two men had come into contact when Salar Jung responded positively to an appeal by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān to support the college at Aligarh.[137] As the number of intellectuals and scholars in Hyderabad was limited, it is not surprising that Sayyid Abū Bakr became acquainted with the major personalities.

Among his friends we find Sayyid Mahdī ʿAlī Khān Muḥsin al-Mulk (1837–1907), one of the co-founders of the All India Muslim League in 1906.[138] Mahdī ʿAlī, a Shiʿī and follower of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's ideas, had received a traditonal education in the North-Western Province. After serving in the administration and studying at a secondary school, he was engaged by Salar Jung in 1874 to overlook the financial reforms of Hyderabad. His remarkable career in Hyderabad came to an unfortunate end in 1895 and he left for Aligarh where he helped to collect donations for the College. In 1898, he succeeded Sayyid Aḥmad Khān as its director. Mahdī ʿAlī is also noteworthy for his call to renew the study of *ḥadīth* by emulating the Prophet directly, rather than by following centuries of *fiqh* tradition. The stress on individual responsibility in interpreting the meaning of the law, which was fostered by Mahdī ʿAlī and the Indian *ahl al-ḥadīth*, thus shows considerable similarity to some of the Sunni revivalist tendencies discussed in chapter II.[139] This might well be linked to similar tendencies which were then prevalent in the Ḥijāz and transmitted to India by itinerant scholars, the most prominent among them Shāh Walī Allāh.[140]

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[135] Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, pp. 317–329.

[136] Bawa, *The Nizam*, pp. 85–87.

[137] Bawa, *The Nizam*, pp. 111–117 for the connection and the individuals involved.

[138] Mahdī ʿAlī is included on Sayyid Abū Bakr's list of friends, Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, p. 76. About him, cf. Schwerin, *Indirekte Herrschaft*, pp. 175–177; Malik, *Islamische Gelehrtenkultur*, p. 273 and fn. 36.

[139] On Mahdī ʿAlī and the *ahl al-ḥadīth* see in more detail Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp. 268–296.

[140] On this topic, see Voll, "Scholarly Interrelations", pp. 54f.

Sayyid Abū Bakr was also in contact with Sayyid Ḥusayn al-Bilgrāmī (1844–1924), although he might have differed with him on a number of issues.[141] From 1874 onwards, al-Bilgrāmī served in various functions in the Hyderabad government, including that of Director of Education (1884–1907). Sayyid Ḥusayn, who came from a Shiʿī family that had for some time served in the administration of Oudh (Awadh), had been a teacher of Arabic at the Canning College in Lucknow before he was engaged by Salar Jung, whose private secretary and advisor he became.[142] He maintained close links with the circle of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, with whom he shared an appreciation of British rule in India and ideas about the necessary modernisation of Islam, although he is not considered as one of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's followers in the more narrow sense.[143]

Europe and Japan

Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zāhir reportedly visited a number of European cities, while ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAṭṭās was not the only one to send one of his sons to study in Europe. One can only speculate about the actual impressions of most of these visitors which must have varied widely. However, it is not unlikely that they shared at least some of the ambivalence of many Arab visitors to Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries which has been described in countless studies: on the one hand, they were fascinated with industrialization, new political systems and ideas, on the other hand, they were confronted with colonial rulers and with non-Muslims of redoubtable beliefs and morals who were convinced of their own superiority. This was an obvious insult to anybody considering Islam as the most exalted religion.

This ambivalence is well exemplified in the following rather apocryphal episode which has been related in connection with Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl's visit to Paris:

> He went to the World Trade Exhibition in France [presumably in 1900]. He saw the flag of an Islamic state, under which a *minbar* [pul-

[141] Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, p. 75.
[142] Schwerin, *Indirekte Herrschaft*, pp. 177–182, a brief biography of al-Bilgrāmī is also contained in Bharati Ray, *Hyderabad and British Paramountcy 1858–1883*, Delhi etc., OUP, 1988, p. 210, fn. 17.
[143] The latter point is stressed by Bawa, *The Nizam*, p. 115.

pit] was standing. He mounted the pulpit and gave an eloquent speech in which he expounded the life of the Prophet and the merits of Islam. A crowd listened to him, among them important Orientalists. When he descended from the pulpit, they shook his hands and congratulated him, and held a feast in his honour in one of the great hotels.[144]

There can be little doubt that Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl actually visited Europe at some stage.[145] However, this exact episode is only related in some of the sources, and its veracity remains rather questionable.[146] In terms of historiography, it is nevertheless highly symbolic, as it shows the problems of the Arab encounter with the West in a nutshell. The World Exhibitions were the epitome of European technological advancement, displaying not just new products but representing the boasting image of European confidence and superiority and serving as "arenas of international competition and the struggle for cultural hegemony".[147] In the exhibition of 1900, most Muslim countries, namely Egypt, Sudan, Senegal, Tunisia, Algeria and the Netherlands East Indies were spatially assembled in an area devoted to foreign and French colonies and protectorates. The only exceptions were the Ottoman Empire (*Turquie*) and Persia which had their pavilions among the 'foreign powers'.[148] The curiously unnamed Muslim state's exhibit featured a *minbar*. Although the accounts do not offer any other details about the exhibition or the particular section, this must have presented a stark contrast to the marked modernity of the European pavilions.[149] The message of the above account

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[144] Mughniyya, *Maʿa ʿulamāʾ al-Najaf al-ashraf*, p. 98. The same episode is related in al-Amīn, *Aʿyān al-shīʿa*, vol. 9, pp. 399–400. Interestingly, Muḥammad Asad Shahāb, author of this entry, does not mention the episode in his lengthy appreciation of Muḥammd b. ʿAqīl in *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*.

[145] IO, R/20/A/3297, 2nd Assistant Resident to Political Secretary, 2.2.1929.

[146] This and the following is based to a large extent on Brunschwig, Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut und Südostasien, pp. 129–133.

[147] Eckhardt Fuchs, "Nationale Repräsentation, kulturelle Identität und imperiale Hegemonie auf den Weltausstellungen: Einleitende Bemerkungen". In: Eckhardt Fuchs (ed.), Weltausstellungen im 19. Jahrhundert, *Comparativ* 9;5–6 (1999), pp. 8–14, quote (in German) on p. 9.

[148] *Exposition Universelle de 1900. Plan Général* [A. Taride] Paris 1900. The national pavillons constituted just one sector of the Exhibition, which centred on industrial production. Only the Ottoman pavillon was on the prestigious Rue des Nations. On the Ottoman presence in Paris 1900, see Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, pp. 162–164.

[149] About the representation of the Middle East at world exhibitions, and the encounter of East and West, see Mitchell, *Colonial Egypt*, pp. 1–13, on the Ottoman participation in the exhibitions, and the dilemma posed by the exotizing Western perception, Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, pp. 154–165.

is that the participating Muslim state as well as Ibn ʿAqīl set faith against the technological superiority of the West. The success of this strategy and the restored equality of both sides is embodied in the positive echo to Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl's speech. The congratulating Orientalists add another symbolic dimension: Arab literature of the period employs Orientalists as figures confirming the worthiness and indeed the superiority of the Muslim faith. They were therefore a literary device to enhance Muslim confidence.[150]

Japan, reportedly visited by Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl in the preceding year (1898/99), presented a different case. Here Middle Easterners as well as South East Asians were dealing with an Asian country which was successfully modernising without forgoing its cultural identity. Japan therefore disproved any European claims to exclusive ownership of modernity. Although this was not a Muslim country, it was considered a suitable developmental model.[151] This is reflected in the literature. The influential author Jurjī Zaydān entered the biography of Prince Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), builder of the first Japanese railway line, moderniser of the financial system and the army, and author of a draft of the Meiji Constitution, into his series of biographies of important 19th century personalities from the East which were published in 1902.[152] Hirobumi, he argued, had "added the knowledge of the West to the knowledge of the East" as a result of his studies in the West, and the resulting mix enabled him to lead the Japanese renewal.[153] An Iranian author, writing around the turn of the century, criticised his homeland by comparing the Shah's rule with the progressive and modernising reign of the Japanese Emperor.[154]

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[150] Rotraud Wielandt, *Das Bild der Europäer in der modernen arabischen Erzähl- und Theaterliteratur*. Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 1980, p. 57, has coined the term "europäischer Bestätiger vom Dienst" for this phenomenon.

[151] Kreiser, "Der japanische Sieg".

[152] Jurjī Zaydān, *Tarājim mashāhīr al-sharq* 3rd ed., Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, n.d., vol. I, pp. 361–365.

[153] Zaydān, *Tarājim*, p. 361. Interestingly, the Egyptian nationalist writer Muṣṭafā Kāmil, writing two years later (*al-Shams al-mushriqa*, Cairo 1904) also devoted a chapter to Hirobumi. I would like to thank Dr. Michael Laffan for this information.

[154] Kreiser, "Der japanische Sieg", p. 219. On the Iranian fascination with Japan, cf. Roxane Haag-Hijuche, "A Topos and Its Dissolution: Japan in Some 20th Century Iranian Texts, *Iranian Studies* 29;1–2, pp. 71–83 and Anja Pistor-Hatam, "Progress and Civilization in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Far Eastern State as a Model for Modernization, *Iranian Studies* 29;1–2, pp. 111–126.

It is telling that Maharaja (Sultan from 1885) Abu Bakar of Johore (r. 1862–1895) visited Japan in 1883. He was the modernising ruler of Singapore's neighbouring town and employer of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb as well as a number of other Hadhramis. The Sultan, who quite enjoyed travelling and had already "toured England with an eye to the needs of his own country", had also visited India and was later to travel to Cairo, Istanbul and Germany.[155] Relatively little is known of his visit to Japan, in spite of the existence of an exact itinerary written by Muhammad b. Salleh, his companion and member of the Council of State and State Secretariate.[156] However, a number of the final observations of Muhammad b. Salleh are worthwhile recounting, as they might give some impression about what an Asian visitor to Japan who was closely acquainted with the colonial city of Singapore found remarkable. The list of twelve major observations is topped by the Japanese respect for their cultural heritage and the absence of pork and pigs which is considered impure by Muslims. Other remarkable issues were the good health of the Japanese, their prosperity and good manners, the functioning educational system for both sexes and the cloth industry.[157] Particularly interesting is the combination of what was observed; while some of the material aspects of modernity are mentioned, such as machines in cloth-production, many others such as railways are not.[158]

The Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905 further enhanced the attraction of this Asian nation. Indian Muslims, notably in Calcutta, followed developments in Japan closely and started to consider it as an alternative destination for scientific instruction. Elsewhere, great hopes were invested in close cooperation with a state which according to much wishful thinking would become a leading Muslim nation.[159] In 1906, the Singaporean journal *al-Imām*, in which Hadhramis played an important role, urged the Japanese emperor to convert to Islam.

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[155] R. O. Winstedt (ed.), *A History of Johore*, MBRAS Reprint No. 6, Kuala Lumpur 1979, p. 108. On the sultan's travels, see J. M. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents. Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870–1920*, Singapore etc.: OUP 1992, pp. 241–248.

[156] There were speculations that his visit was mainly linked to the sultan's preference for Japanese ladies. Personal communication, Dr. Michael Laffan.

[157] Amin Sweeney, *Reputations Live on. An Early Malay Autobiography*, Berkeley etc.: University of California Press 1980, pp. 129f.

[158] Sweeney, *Reputations*, pp. 24f.

[159] For details, see F. Farjenel, "Le Japon et L'Islam", *Revue du Monde Musulman* 1, 1907, pp. 101–114.

Already in 1904, the Egyptian nationalist Muṣṭafā Kāmil had writ-
ten a book on Japan. The author explicitly recommended Japan as
an example which ought to be emulated by the Egyptian nation.
This seems to have struck such a chord with the editors of *al-Imām*
that they sponsored its translation.[160]

The Japanese victory over Russia is said to have boosted the
emerging Indonesian national movement, and increasing numbers of
Malays travelled to Japan both in private and official capacity. By
1917, students seem to have flocked to Tokyo.[161] Reportedly, even
simple Sumatrans started to be interested in this successful Asian
nation, the members of which had even been granted the status of
Europeans by the Dutch since 1899, instead of being grouped as
'Foreign Orientals' like the Chinese and Arabs.[162]

The Japanese concern for traditions and chaste women did not
fail to impress the Ottomans. The Committee of Union and Progress
explicitly pointed out that its aim was to follow the Japanese in the
adoption of European sciences and technology, while preserving its
superior traditions and ethics.[163] Shakīb Arslān dedicated a whole
section to the question of Japan serving as a model in his famous
book "Why did the Muslims remain behind and did others progress".[164]
This is significant because of his wide reception in Hadhrami cir-
cles. Similarly, the widely read reformist journal *al-Manār* praised it
as an example of progress which might well overtake the West.[165]

Finally, it is noteworthy that although not many Hadhramis vis-
ited Japan until World War I, the British thought that Javanese Mus-
lims who had been to Japan might influence Hadhramis.[166] During
and after the War, numbers of Hadhramis in Japan increased slowly.
There was a Hadhrami bookseller in Osaka in the interwar period

[160] Laffan, "Mustafa and the *Mikado*: A Francophile Egyptian's Turn to Meiji
Japan", *Japanese* Studies 19;3 (1999), pp. 269–286. On *al-Imām*, see chapter V.
[161] Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 29, Laffan, "The umma", chapter 5.
[162] Van Dijk, "The Fear of Islam".
[163] Kreiser, "Der japanische Sieg", pp. 225, 228.
[164] Shakīb Arslān, *Li-mādhā taʾakhkhara al-muslimūn wa-taqaddama ghayruhum*, Beirut:
Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt 1975, pp. 91–94; Kreiser, "Der japanische Sieg", p. 237.
[165] Abaza, "Southeast Asia", pp. 102f.
[166] PRO, CO 273/498, Memorandum of Discussion between Syed Ali bin Shahab
of Batavia, Syed Mohamed bin Agil, The ablest Arab in Sigapore [. . .] R. J. Farrer,
S. S. Civil Service, W. H. Lee-Warner, S. S. Civil Service, 27.11.1919. The doc-
ument states that 40 Muslims of unspecified ethnicity from Java were already in
Japan (p. 2).

and Arab traders established direct business contacts.[167] The Indonesian journalist Parada Harahap visited Japan in 1933–34 and left a fascinating travelogue describing Japan and its economy which was published in 1934 and might have further kindled the interest in Japan amongst Hadhramis in South East Asia.[168] Four Hadhramis from Johore went to Japan during World War II, one of whom was killed by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima.[169] In the early period, they might also have been confronted with the Japanese in South East Asia. Again, this early small scale influence is not comparable to developments in the 20th century after Japan began its own imperial expansion. This started in 1905 with the occupation of southern Manchuria and reached its peak during World War II with the occupation of Indochina, Burma, British Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. The comment in Hadhrami journal in Surabaya in 1929 that Japan would soon become the "England of the East", retrospectively bears an imperial connotation probably unintended by its author.[170]

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[167] Peter Post, "The formation of the pribumi business élite", *BKI* 152;4 (1996), pp. 609–632. I would like to thank Prof. W. G. Clarence-Smith for this reference.

[168] Denys Lombard, "Le voyage de Parada Harahap au 'Pays du Soleil levant' (1933–34)", in: Claudine Salmon, *Récits de voyage des Asiatiques*, Paris: Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient 1996, pp. 281–296.

[169] Personal communication, Kazuhiro Arai.

[170] Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAmūdī, "Kitāb maftūḥ ilā yaʿsūb Ḥaḍramawt", *al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 2, Jan. 1929, pp. 30–31, here p. 31.

THE HADHRAMI 'RENAISSANCE' IN SOUTH EAST ASIA (1880s–1930s)

*Reform and Nationalism in the Malay World in the
Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries*

The intellectual developments among Muslims in South East Asia are intimately linked to trends in the Middle East and elsewhere sketched out in the previous chapter. Both the structural changes discussed in connection with local reform, such as new administrative forms, education, infrastructure and political developments can be traced as influences on early nationalism and modernist reform in South East Asia.[1] Central in conveying these experiences to South East Asia was the *ḥajj*, both in terms of the actual experience and with regard to the exposure to new interpretations of Islam. Pilgrims brought the teachings of revivalists, both moderates and Wahhābis, and their ideas about the necessary purification of Islam back to South East Asia. They learned about Ottoman pan-Islamism, the Sudanese Mahdi, the Indian Mutiny and came to be influenced directly or indirectly by the "international and distinctly anti-colonial outlook of the holy city".[2]

The Hadhrami *nahḍa* or 'renaissance' formed a small part of this wider movement in South East Asia and was to a large extent integrated into Malay-Muslim developments. One should not forget that these evolved in the shadow of increasing European intervention in the internal economic and political structures of the region, both by the British on the Malay peninsula and the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, most notably on Java and Sumatra.[3] Both the South

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[1] Ileto, "Religion", p. 228, Kratoska & Batson, "Nationalism", pp. 252f.

[2] Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam", p. 269; Ileto, "Religion", pp. 210, 223–226, Roff, *The Origins*, pp. 38–43.

[3] This connection between European intervention and local intellectual (nationalist) development is particularly well demonstrated in Roff, *The Origins*. For a survey of political and economic developments, see Nicholas Tarling (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. II, Cambridge: CUP 1992, chapters 1–3.

East Asian and more specifically the Hadhrami 'renaissance' were characterised by the emergence of three distinct organisational forms, namely associations, new types of schools, and journals. These were often connected with one another.[4] Together they constituted a new form of public sphere which became dominated by a novel type of public person, the intellectual, who has been mentioned in the context of changes in Egypt. Muḥammad b. 'Aqīl, who was introduced in the previous chapter, embodies an early Hadhrami intellectual who combined a traditional education with new concerns. The following short survey aims at no more than a basic contextualisation of the more detailed discussion of developments among the Hadhramis which follows.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Singapore became a major centre for the intellectual development of Malay-Muslim thought. Given that in 1901 some 72% of its population were Chinese, this might surprise the outside observer at first.[5] However, the economic opportunities offered by the free port in conjunction with Singapore's role as the major point of call for ships traversing the Indian Ocean and the Chinese Sea greatly encouraged Malay-Muslim, as well as Indian and Arab immigration. The British intervened little in the local cultural and political developments, in contrast to the Dutch, with the result that Singapore also became a centre for oppositional Muslims from the Netherlands East Indies.[6] A major reason behind this British position might have been the relatively peaceful penetration of much of the Malay archipelago which stood in stark contrast to the resistance faced by the Dutch among the Muslims of Aceh but also among other sectors of the population of the Indies.[7] Finally, the technological factor, namely the introduction of litograph and typographic presses, enhanced Singapore's role and sparked contacts with journalists in the Middle East.

The early press in Singapore was mainly in the hands of Muslims of mixed Indian-Malay origins (so-called *Jawi Peranakan*), while book printing seems to have been a privileged domain of Javanese Muslims.[8]

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[4] On such connections, cf. Roff, *Bibliography*, pp. 12–15.
[5] If not indicated otherwise, the following is based on Roff, *The Origins*, pp. 32–55.
[6] Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam", p. 271.
[7] Ileto, "Religion", pp. 226, 230f.
[8] According to Roff, *The Origins*, p. 48, the *Jawi Peranakan* were (almost exclusively) Malay-Indians. As the term *peranakan* was also used—in Indonesia at least—to denote Arabs of mixed race, it might be interesting to investigate to what extent

In 1876, the first of a spate of Malay-language journals was established by *Jawi Peranakan* who identified themselves fully with Malay society and its problems.[9] In an interesting parallel, the emergence of the non-European and Muslim press in the Netherlands East Indies also seems to have been spearheaded by Indians.[10] From the early 20th century, one can identify individuals of Hadhrami or *muwallad* origin participating in Malay journalism.[11] It is noteworthy that with very few exceptions[12] Arabs (i.e., mostly Hadhramis) in Singapore only started to publish journals in Arabic in the 1930s.[13] This stands in marked contrast to the situation in the Netherlands East Indies where the first journals in which Arabs were involved were published either bilingually (Malay/Arabic) or exclusively in Arabic. There Arabs only started to publish in Malay from the mid-1920s in the context of a movement for greater integration into local society.[14] This phenomenon reflects both the different political developments in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies as well as the much smaller Arabic-speaking audience in Singapore.

While a more detailed discussion of the Malay-Muslim press, which in its second phase (1906–16) was marked by the appearance of major 'national' dailies as well as reformist religious journals, is outside the scope of this study,[15] the journal *al-Imām* (published 1906–1908)

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this wider definition of the term could not apply to Singapore as well. On book printing, see Ian Proudfoot, *Early Malay Printed Books*, p. 32. Although the names do not always permit ethnic identification, his index of names contains a number of Hadhrami Arabs who played a part in this venture as authors, proprietors and sales agents, see, for example, the entries under A, H and M. In Java, Arabs seem to have played a role in the development of printing, Kaptein, "An Arab printer in Surabaya in 1853", van Bruinessen, "Kitap Kuning", p. 231.

[9] For a survey of the development of the press, see Roff, *Bibliography*, pp. 1–25. More specifically on *Jawi Peranakan* and *Wazir Indië*, which claimed to be the colony's first truly Muslim journal, see Laffan, "The umma", chapter 5.

[10] Adam, *The Vernacular Press*, pp. 40f.

[11] The earliest case seems to be *Khizanah al-Ilmu*, published in 1904 in Kuala Kangsar by judge Sayyid ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Bakr al-ʿAṭṭās, who also wrote a number of religious treatises. Roff, *Bibliography*, p. 31. I would like to thank Ian Proudfoot for information on al-ʿAṭṭās.

[12] Information about *al-Iṣlāḥ*, founded in October 1908 and its contemporary or possibly successor, *al-Waṭan*, both of which reportedly were published in Arabic ca. 1908, remains scarce. See Ende, "Schiitische Tendenzen", p. 96, Brunswig, "Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut", p. 112 and chapter VI.

[13] For a list of the Arab press of Singapore see Roff, *Bibliography*, pp. 59–61. Cf. el Zine, pp. 164–187.

[14] Mobini-Kesheh, "The Arab periodicals", pp. 239–244.

[15] The discussions in the Malay religious press are discussed by Safie bin Ibrahim, "Islamic Religious Thought in Malaya 1930–40".

deserves at least a brief mention. It was modelled on the Cairene modernist journal *al-Manār*, the rallying point of *salafī* opinions.[16] *al-Imām* is notable in our context for the considerable Arab participation, both on the editorial side (the second editor was Sayyid Shaykh b. Aḥmad al-Hādī, a *muwallad* from Malacca)[17] and through financial support, not least by Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl b. Yaḥyā and two Malay-Arab merchants.[18] It exemplifies the close integration of the early Arab and Malay-Muslim religious and national movements before World War I due to the shared religion.[19] They only emerged later as clearly distinct movements as a result of colonial policies which emphasised racial distinctions, and as a consequence of ethnically-based nationalism. In the period after World War I, this eventually served to exclude such immigrant Muslim communities as the Arabs, leaving those born in the Netherlands East Indies in a difficult position between full-fledged assimilation and the 'return' to their Hadhraminess.[20] Secondly, *al-Imām* is of interest because it took up many of the religious and social issues which were to fill the pages of the Arab press in South East Asia in the following years.[21] It also expressed a trend which was to become dominant in modernist Malay reform until the 1940s.[22] Thirdly, *al-Imām* and the group of Arab intellec-

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[16] The following discussion of *al-Imām* is based on Hamzah, *Al-Imam*, Roff, *The Origins*, pp. 56–67, Laffan, "The umma", chapter 5, Safie bin Ibrahim, "Islamic Religious Thought", pp. 22–24 and Brunswig, "Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut", pp. 102–114. Further on the connections between *al-Manār* and South East Asia see Bluhm, "A preliminary statement" and Abaza, "Southeast Asia". On Islamic modernism and al-Manār, see Adams, *Islam and Modernism*.

[17] On Shaykh b. Aḥmad see Safie bin Ibrahim, "Islamic Religious Thought", pp. 20f. He later came to play a considerable role in Penang, Ahmad, "The Arabs", pp. 7f.

[18] While the Arab biographies tend to portray Ibn ʿAqīl as the founder or at least main force behind *al-Imām*, Roff and Hamzah mention him only as one of the merchants supporting *al-Imām*. For a discussion see Brunswig, 110–112. Roff, "Murder", further mentions Ḥasan b. Shihāb al-Dīn as a co-director of the Al-Imam Printing Company. On Ḥasan b. Shihāb al-Dīn cf. chapter VI.

[19] Thus, Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, pp. 33–35, discusses the editor of *al-Imām*, Shaykh Tahir Jalaluddin as one of the earlierst Indonesian reformers.

[20] The question of linkage between the two phenomena exceeds the scope of this discussion. See Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 41–48. On the issue of racialization, see Mandal, Finding their place, pp. 53–94, for a description of the measures taken by the Dutch colonial authorities, de Jonge, "Dutch Colonial Policy".

[21] Interestingly, and with the notable exception of *al-Nahḍa al-Ḥaḍramiyya*, the Singaporean Arab press is less devoted to such issues, and more concerned with either (international) politics or literature, according to a brief survey of this press which I conducted in London. However, a full study of this material remains desirable.

[22] Kratoska & Batson, "Nationalism", p. 301. For *al-Imām*'s views on Malay society and politics see Milner, *The Invention*, pp. 138–149.

tuals more or less directly involved with it are often credited with triggering the Arab 'renaissance' in South East Asia.

The basic ideas promoted by the journal are a close reflection of standard *salafī* positions: if Muslims returned to their religion and practised it properly (i.e., according to the *salafī* interpretation which had strong anti-Sufi tendencies), they would overcome both their internal weaknesses and problems and the external threat through colonialism. This aim could be achieved through proper education which ranged from humility in personal conduct to the love of king and country and included the duty to serve one's fatherland. The close link of words and deeds in this matter is amply demonstrated by the association between *al-Imām* and the al-Iqbāl school, opened in 1908 and staffed with Egyptian teachers.[23] For the journalists of *al-Imām*, their profession was just another way of educating the public and promoting reform ideas.

These views are not surprising if one considers that the first editor, Shaykh (Muḥammad) Ṭāhir b. Jalāl al-Dīn from Sumatra, studied in Cairo under Muḥammad 'Abduh and befriended Rashīd Riḍā, the editor of *al-Manār*.[24] Perhaps the support of Muḥammad b. 'Aqīl is more noteworthy and, as I will argue, indicative of a position found frequently among Hadhrami *sayyid*s in South East Asia. Ibn 'Aqīl is most famous for his previously mentioned defence of the high position of the Prophet's descendants, an anathema for *salafī*s. This, however, did not preclude him and many of his colleagues from supporting many *salafī* ideas as these were generally considered to be imperative for a revival of a strong Muslim community. Interestingly, this view of Ibn 'Aqīl is supported grudgingly by a source quite unsuspicious of any pro-'Alawī tendencies, namely 'Umar Sulaymān b. Nājī, who was a leading member of an association rather critical of 'Alawīs. He attributes the origins of the Hadhrami *nahḍa* to three 'Alawīs temporarily settled in Singapore, namely the much travelled Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb, Muḥammad b. 'Aqīl and Ḥasan b. 'Alawī b. Shihāb.[25] This contribution of the 'Alawīs to the Hadhrami *nahḍa* and their basic agreement with many mod-

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[23] For details on the school, see Hamzah, *Al-Imam*, pp. 73–79.
[24] Hamzah, *Al-Imam*, rather closely summarizes the relevant context of *al-Imām* in chapters 3 and 4.
[25] 'Umar b. Sulaymān al-Nājī, "Muqaddima", pp. 17–21 in Abū Shawk/al-Anṣārī, *Tārīkh.*

ernist ideas have long been somewhat understated as the result of disputes in the South East Asian diaspora which will be discussed below.[26]

In addition to publishing and schools, associations played a major part in the Malay cultural revival. On the peninsula, the first of a series of cultural welfare associations was set up in Johore Bahru, Singapore's twin city, in 1888. It concerned itself with the development of the Malay language, often an issue of concern among cultural nationalists.[27] In 1897, a *Jam'iyya Khayriyya* (charitable association) was set up in Singapore, which according to the only source at my disposal intended to set up a Koran school.[28] It seems to have been identical to or a predecessor of the better known Arab Club, which followed the British model of a social club.[29]

The Malay-Muslim as well as Arab developments were not only connected with Islamic movements elsewhere but also influenced by the activities of other ethnic groups in South East Asia, most notably the Chinese, as Mobini-Kesheh has convincingly demonstrated with regard to the Indonesian-Arab society *Jam'iyyat al-Khayr* (Charity Society) and its school, discussed below. The Chinese role as a forerunner and example for the Arab and Indonesian movements has been well captured by the Indonesian novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer, in his novel *Footsteps*. He summarised the Chinese and Arab revivalist movements to come to the conclusion that "The score at the moment is [...] Chinese 4 – Arabs 2, and Arabs 2 – Natives 0."[30] A short account of the Chinese cultural revival, which preceded the one among the Arabs, might therefore give a better sense of the extent to which many of the phenomena discussed in this chapter are a consequence of developments in East Asia as well as of those in the Middle East.

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[26] For example Kostiner, "The Impact", p. 214, concentrates on the polarization between *sayyid*s and others, and plays down the role of the *sayyid*s in the formation of *Jam'iyyat al-Khayr*. For a detailed discusion of this historiographical problem, see Brunswig, "Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut", pp. 108–114.

[27] Roff, *Origins*, p. 51. For the comparable development of such academies, and their links to the rise of Arab cultural nationalism, see J. Waardenburg, "Madjma'", *EI* (CDRom).

[28] *Al-Manār* 9;6, 23.7.1906, pp. 453f.

[29] Roff, "Murder".

[30] Pramoediya Toer, *Footsteps*, New York, London: Penguin Books 1990, p. 127; cf. Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 42, fn. 44.

By the 1860s, the Chinese began to form socio-religious associations in Java.[31] In the 1880s, temple organisations aimed to "promote the welfare and religious customs of members such as by holding [religious] feasts in the temples",[32] while at the same time private schools were founded by wealthy individuals. Therefore, one can observe an intensification of activities in the late 19th century which might well be considered 'traditional' in the sense that they did not promote new ideas or even organisational forms. Nevertheless, they prepared the ground for the coming changes by widening and deepening the circle of individuals involved in religious affairs. A real change was triggered by the publication of *The Story of Confucius* (*Hikajat Konghoetjoe*) by the journalist Lie Kim Hok in Batavia in 1897. Written against the demoralisation which followed the Chinese defeats in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, the book became one of the sources of the Confucianist revival movement. This movement originated from mainland China and spread via Singapore to the Netherlands East Indies. Its adherents proposed the modernisation of China along Western lines, as far as government, law and education were concerned, but at the same time emphasised values based on a religion purified of superstitions.[33] The aims of the Chinese Association in Batavia (*Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan*), legalised in June 1900, included first and foremost the promotion of "the customs of the Chinese as far as possible in accordance with the teachings of Confucius and without impropriety, and to promote knowledge of [Chinese] languages and literacy among the [Indies] Chinese."[34] The Chinese nation could be reformed on the basis of a true understanding of Confucian teachings, only accessible to those who read Chinese properly. This emphasis on individual access to the classical texts shows an interesting parallel to the development of an individual and subjective piety in Europe.[35] However, that this was not simply a quietist return

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[31] The following is based on Adam, *The Emergence*, pp. 62–77. These organizations are very different from the Chinese associations in 19th c. Singapore, which were secret societies often formed to facilitate immigration. On the latter, see M. Freedman, "Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in Nineteenth Century Singapore", *CSSH* 3 (1960–61), pp. 24–48, notably pp. 29–42.

[32] Adam, *The Emergence*, p. 62.

[33] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 35. Ibid., pp. 35–41, for a detailed comparison of Chinese and Hadhrami activities.

[34] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 40. A slightly different translation of the same text is given by Adam, *The Emergence*, p. 74.

[35] On the issue of European pietism and its comparability with Muslim developments, see O'Fahey, "Pietism".

to religion is exemplified in the new Chinese schools, which began to teach English, mathematics, geography and other subjects besides Chinese and Confucianism.[36] In these schools, a new Chinese consciousness emerged. The similarities of the Hadhrami revival to this Chinese awakening are striking, both in terms of the organisational forms chosen and with regard to an approach which stressed the individual's access to key religious texts.

The Emergence of a Hadhrami 'Bourgeoisie' in South East Asia[37]

If the Hadhrami *nahḍa* in South East Asia can be linked to any particular event, it is the establishment of the above-mentioned *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* in Batavia around 1901. It was officially registered in July 1905.[38] Its aim was to "spread the reformist call"[39] through the establishment of a school for Arab children in order to offer the kind of educational opportunities not available otherwise.[40] The colonial government provided different schools for European, 'native' and Chinese children, but the Arabs fitted none of these categories. Some parents managed to enter their children into either the European or the 'Dutch-Native' schools, however, this was wrought with serious difficulties and often resistance by the Dutch authorities.[41] In addition, many Arabs were reluctant to even consider such a route, as they feared that their children might be exposed to a missionary agenda.[42] Arabs thus had the choice between educating their children at a local Koranic school or sending them to Hadhramaut. There, the *muwalladīn* of Malay or Chinese mothers were forced to communicate in Arabic, were socialised into Hadhrami society and

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[36] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 35f.

[37] The following discussion centres on the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore, while it does not consider the less studied Arab communities of Malaysia.

[38] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 36, cf. Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 54f., Noer, *The Muslim Modernist Movement*, pp. 58f. According to Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, p. 330, the idea of founding a society developed around 1898.

[39] Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, p. 330.

[40] According to Noer, *The Muslim Modernist Movement* and al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 243, the elementary school was founded in 1905, Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 37, gives 1906 on the basis of an Arabic source close to the ʿAlawīs. ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 166 gives 1909 as the opening date of the school. For a discussion of these conflicting dates, see below.

[41] For the ridicule to which children in such schools could be exposed, see chapter IV.

[42] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 72–74.

were given a religious education. While ideas of founding a modern
school in Hadhramaut, first aired in the 1880s, had led to nothing,
the religious college in Tarīm, endowed by Hadhrami merchants in
South East Asia in 1886, at least guaranteed solid and structured
religious instruction.[43] As mentioned in the previous chapter, a num-
ber of parents who were dissatisfied with these options also took
advantage of their connections with the Ottoman Empire and sent
their children to Istanbul. Before the activities of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*
are discussed in more detail, however, it is necessary to say a few
words about those who were interested in providing their children
with a good education and who had the means to support the var-
ious initiatives mentioned above.

Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr was set up and supported by a number of
Hadhrami merchants, among them two already mentioned in the
context of Hadhramis maintaining international networks, namely
ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb al-Dīn and ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAṭṭās.
In addition to ʿAlī's brothers ʿAydarūs and Shaykhān and his nephew(?)
Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, we know of Sayyid Muḥammad al-Fākhir
b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mashhūr, Shaykh Saʿīd b. Aḥmad Bā Ṣandīd
(the society's first chairman), Sālim b. ʿAwaḍ Bā ʼl-Waʼīl and ʿUmar
Manqūsh as early members and/or supporters of the association.[44]
Although details about the economic activities of these individuals
are scarce, many of them seem to have owned great wealth.[45] Manqūsh
was apparently a major merchant who was appointed *kapitein* of the
Arabs of Batavia in 1902. Of Bā ʼl-Waʼīl, we only know that he
owned considerable lands in Tangerang near Batavia.[46] Although it
has been shown that only a few Arabs held what were considered
to be major private landholdings in Batavia, many more probably
owned smaller or disjointed patches of land, profiting from their rent
as shophouses and the like.[47]

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[43] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥadhramout*, p. 96; on educational reform in Hadhramaut,
see chapter VI.

[44] Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 58, fn. 75; ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 166
and Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 36.

[45] Shahāb's statement that the idea was born during a meeting of "enlightened
youth" might indicate that the initiators were educated but not necessarily successful
merchants, *Abū ʼl-Murtaḍā*, p. 330. However, their family background indicates that
they were at least close to sources of considerable wealth.

[46] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 64, on Manqūsh cf. Snouck Hurgronje,
Ambtelijke Adviezen II, 1557f.

[47] On Arab urban landownership in Batavia, see Heuken, Arab Landowners.

Initially, the organisation was joined by some prominent Indonesians, such as Kiyai A. Dahlan of Yogyakarta, the later founder of the Muhammadiyya which became the most significant Indonesian reformist movement. These Indonesians are reported to have remained passive.[48] It is possible that they hoped that *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* might foster closer cooperation between Arabs and Indonesians particularly at a time when West Sumatrans and Arabs felt increasing Chinese competition.[49] If this suggestion by van Niel (which would warrant further investigation) was to hold true, *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* would have served as an early platform that encouraged the founding of commercial organisations. A few years later, such a joint Arab-Indonesian enterprise which was quite clearly directed against the Chinese was set up under the name of *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Company). Unsurprisingly, *Sarekat Islam* was said to be implicated in the Sino-Arab and Sino-Indonesian clashes between May and November 1912.[50] Only between 1916 and 1919 did the Arabs begin to withdraw from that organisation as a result of political differences and increasing resentments against the 'foreign' Arabs.

While no comprehensive study exists of socio-economic developments of the Arab communities in Java and Sumatra, which for our purposes are the most important localities, it would seem from the available literature that some of the trends described by Vuldy for the northern Javanese town of Pekalongan and by de Jonge for Batavia can be generalised.[51] Although the number of Hadhramis of

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[48] Noer, *The Muslim Modernist Movement*, p. 58, fn. 76. According to ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 167, H. A. Dahlan met ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAṭṭās through *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*, where the latter proposed to found the Muhammadiyya, to which al-ʿAṭṭās contributed a significant sum of money.

[49] This view is advanced by van Niel, *The Emergence*, p. 88, and finds some support in the footnotes to ʿA. al-Mashhūr by Muḥammad Ziyāʾ Shahāb, who emphasizes the close relations of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* with the emerging nationalist organizations, *Shams*, p. 167. In any case, it is worth noting the significant role of the Arabs in the early development of *Sarekat Islam* and its predecessor, *Sarekat Dagang Islamiah* (1909–1911), Adam, *The Emergence*, pp. 116–118. For a discussion of the role of Arab merchants in these organisations, which has been downplayed in accounts influenced by Indonesian nationalism, see Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 41–48.

[50] Adam, *The Emergence*, p. 161 and fn. 8. For details on the Arab-Chinese riots in Surabaya, Bangil and Cheribon in October 1912 see Lohanda, The Arab-Chinese Conflicts.

[51] Patji, The Arabs of Surabaya, offers only limited insights, while linguistic limitations prevented me from using Hussain Haikal's PhD thesis, Indonesia-Arab dalam Pergerakan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (1900–1942), Universitas Indonesia 1986. The

sayyid origin might have been higher in Pekalongan than elsewhere, the trend of increasing non-*sayyid* immigration in the late 19th century seems to have been a general one.[52] Economically, the new arrivals proved to be as successful as the older families, if not more so. Their success was quite independent of their status in Hadhramaut and might well have been a result of their position as newcomers.[53] Once they settled, integrated and lost their status of 'strangers', it seems that some of the original business drive was lost, possibly because the original thriftiness, "a product of a willingness to suffer short-term deprivation to hasten the long-term objective of returning to the homeland", was lost.[54] This might, of course, be attributed partly to cultural adaptation and the social demands on a wealthy inhabitant of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies discussed below. The general trend is exemplified beautifully in an interview with an elderly descendant of the al-Kāf family in Singapore who explained that the generation of his grandfather had saved 80% of their income while his father's generation had saved 20% and his own generation spent 110%.[55]

One example of such a successful newcomer of tribal origin is Sālim b. Ṭālib, the illiterate son of a Hadhrami trader in Surabaya, who arrived from South Arabia in the 1880s (?) to join his father's business but quickly fell out with him. Sālim then moved to Kalimantan. Once he had accumulated sufficient capital, he established himself in Batavia as a merchant in cloth and other commodities, investing part of his profits in real estate. He made his real fortune in Singapore where he had settled some time after the turn of the century. During World War I, he profited from a rise in rubber

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following is based, if not indicated otherwise, on Vuldy, "La communauté arabe" and de Jonge, "A divided minority". For a description of the major Arab colonies in the 1880s, see van der Berg, *Le Ḥaḍramout*, pp. 104–122.

[52] Vuldy, "La communauté arabe", p. 113; de Jonge, "A divided minority", pp. 149–151. This tension is reflected in the comments on new (non-sayyid) immigrants by al-Jifrī, "al-ʿArab fī Indūnisyā" I, pp. 556f.

[53] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥaḍramout*, p. 126, fn. 1.

[54] Bonacich, "A Theory", p. 585, for Batavia, de Jonge, "A divided minority", p. 150. Another question would be to what extent this is a characteristic only of the business enterprises of migrants or a more general human characteristic. For example, Ibn Khaldūn has commented that, due to the adaptation to a luxurious lifestyle, dynasties usually lasted three generations. *The Muqaddimah*. Transl. Franz Rosenthal, abr. ed. by N. Dawood, London: Routledge etc. 1967, pp. 136–138.

[55] NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, reel 1, p. 40.

prices, selling large stocks and investing the proceeds in real estate which had suffered a simultaneous slump. The shophouses, which were rented out profitably, provided the foundation of the family fortune in future decades. Incidentally, Sālim almost realised his dream of return to the homeland but died in Aden before reaching Hadhramaut. Thereupon, the family hastily returned to Singapore.[56]

It is difficult to assess the size of the Arab economic elite. Van den Berg rightly warns us that many Hadhramis went bankrupt because of lack of capital.[57] His figures, which indicate the numbers of Arabs with a capital of more than 10,000 Florin (80 in Singapore, 43 in Surabaya, 37 in Palembang, 22 in Batavia, 18 in Pekalongan, 14 in Semarang and another 62 in various places),[58] might provide some rough guideline. However, we do not know whether he takes into account the spreading of family capital between a variety of places which is exemplified in the case of Sālim b. Ṭālib. The actual number of individuals who formed part of the elite was probably much higher because in the case of family enterprises a number of sons, nephews and the like ususally formed an integral part of the business. Nevertheless, de Jonge has shown that living standards in Batavia seem to have varied a great deal.[59]

The successful Hadhrami families of all status groups shared certain traits both in their economic and in their social behaviour. In many ways, these two were closely intertwined, similar to what has been observed with regard to European merchants in the early modern period.[60] It would seem that the investment in real estate was typical, as discussed above in the context of Sālim b. Ṭālib.[61] Certainly, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this was a shrewd move, as Singapore, but also the colonial capital Batavia were rapidly expanding. Furthermore, even in times of a less rapid rise in the price of real estate, this was a fairly safe investment which was considered

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[56] Information obtained from family members, Ṣanʿāʾ, London and Singapore between October 1996 and June 1997. For more information on the family, see my "Arab Merchants".

[57] Van den Berg, Le Ḥaḍramout, pp. 139–142.

[58] Van den Berg, Le Ḥaḍramout, pp. 146f. 12 florin or Netherlands guilder equalled 1 £ in the period from 1820–1914. I would like to thank W. C. Clarence-Smith for this information.

[59] De Jonge, "A divided minority", p. 146.

[60] On merchants in Antwerp around 1600, see Kooijmans, "Risk and Reputation".

[61] For a survey of the existing literature on this topic, see Clarence-Smith, "Hadhrami Entrepreneurs", pp. 303f.

a kind of insurance against the considerable risks of trade.[62] This
changed only after the onset of rent control and nationalisations in
the 1940s. After 1919 when the quarter system was lifted, a num-
ber of Arabs in Batavia acquired significant real estate for their own
use outside the Arab quarter to which they had been confined ear-
lier. Investment in real estate could also free up time so that Noer's
following comment on the founding members of the *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*
rings true: "The members and leaders of the committee of the organ-
isation were in general wealthy people who were able to devote part
of their time to the new organization without having to worry about
earning a living", if we except that these individuals probably were
involved at some level in the administration of their wealth.[63]

   The involvement with charity, already indicated in the name of
Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr, was only one aspect of the public life which the
merchants were leading and which indicates that they were part of
a group that can be characterised as (economic) *bourgeoisie*. It is par-
ticularly interesting to note this participation in a bourgeois lifestyle
or culture. In the context of European historiography, culture is often
considered to be the one common feature of various groups which
are lumped together under the label of *bourgeoisie*.[64] From the lead-
ing families in Singapore and Batavia, it is known that they led the
lives of wealthy gentlemen and women who lived in luxurious houses,
built parks, entertained guests and generally participated in the social
and political life of the elites, no matter whether they preferred to
limit their social contact to Muslims or included Europeans and Chi-
nese in their circles. They became members in the *Volksraad* in the
Netherlands East Indies and Justices of Peace in Singapore, Ottoman
consuls and founders of charitable organisations.[65] It should be noted,

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[62] Cf. Kooijmans, "Risk and Reputation", pp. 25, 28f., 33 on this issue.

[63] Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 59.

[64] Jürgen Kocka, "Bürgertum und Bürgerlichkeit" and Kaschuba, "Deutsche
Bürgerlichkeit nach 1800. Kultur als symbolische Praxis".

[65] A particularly vivid description is given in Alsagoff, *The Alsagoff Family*, notably
pp. 21–38. It comes across even better in the interviews held by the National
Archives of Singapore, Oral History Centre, with contemporaries, i.e. Pioneers of
Singapore series, A00083, transcript of interview with Rajabady Jumabhoy, A000124,
transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, B00523/07, interview with Professor Syed
Mohsen Alsagoff. For Batavia, the house of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAṭṭās, which
nowadays houses a textile museum, is a good example. There, he held a regular
salon featuring theatre and music performances. Personal communication, Zayna
and ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās, Jakarta, 20.6.1997.

however, that this behaviour might constitute a process of adaptation to the colonial society. Van den Berg observed that the Arabs, in contrast to the Chinese, were reluctant to display their wealth and often made themselves appear poorer than they were. He pointed to the exception of the *sayyid*s and "*les bourgeois*" who were, as he put it, more presentable. Van den Berg attributes this to their higher degree of civilisation or perhaps more precisely their adaptation to a particular type of civilisation. In addition, he emphasised the reluctance among many to accept public functions,[66] which again seems to have decreased with time among the elite, as shown above.

In addition to the institutions discussed below in more detail, a wide variety of charitable activities was displayed in the Muslim tradition of "doing good in accordance with religious precepts".[67] For example, the four leading Singaporean Hadhrami families set up family endowments (*waqf, awqāf*), a considerable portion of which was earmarked for charity beyond the immediate family circle, such as providing free meals and other forms of poverty relief, supporting pilgrims, paying for the upkeep of mosques, etc.[68]

Both conspicuous consumption and charity were necessary in order to build and protect the reputation or cultural capital without which the business could not flourish in the international, capitalist and colonial environment of South East Asia.[69] While the specific form or expression of cultural capital was thus closely linked to Islam and Islamic institutions, the phenomenon of pious merchants engaging in community work is familiar to students of European history. Prussian merchants and manufacturers of all creeds in the late 18th and early 19th century, for example, displayed a similar type of voluntary engagement through their participation in magistrates, guilds, school and church administration and their donations to and endowments of almshouses, orphanages, churches, etc.[70] At the same time

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[66] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥadhramout*, pp. 131, 129.

[67] M. Berger, "Khayr", *EI* (CDRom).

[68] See, for example, the extract of the will of Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Saqqāf (d. 1906) in Sia, "The Arabs of Singapore", pp. 78–86. About family endowments, cf. Heffening, "Waḳf", *EI¹*, vol. 4, pp. 1187–1194, part. p. 1191.

[69] Cf. chapter II for a discussion of links between merchants and religion.

[70] Straubel, *Kaufleute*, pp. 431–433, 461. Cf. Hancock, *Citizens*, pp. 301–309, Schulz, *Weltbürger*, pp. 22–24. All these studies also confirm the observations about conspicuous consumption.

as aiding their business, this reputation or respectability marked them as belonging to the bourgeoisie.[71]

What is noteworthy with regard to *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*, and what distinguishes it from the family endowments, is the choice of a new type of organisation, the "society" (*jamʿiyya*). It is typical of this type of volitional organisation that its members pursued a common goal and stemmed not only from one (more or less extended) family nor even from only one status group. This holds true in spite of the dominance of *sayyid*s. This was reflected in the praise of the advantages of such societies as serving the local or general good.[72] At the same time, the associations provided a novel ground for the meeting and development of new ideas. Associations first appeared as a new organisational model in the Middle East in the mid-19th century, if we except organised monastic communities. Organisations devoted to practical aims (in particular charity) can be traced back to the late 1870s when *al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Islāmiyya* (The Islamic Benevolent Society) was set up in Alexandria to found national schools for boys and girls.[73] According to the Arabic literature on the topic,[74] the founders of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* were inspired by such explicitly political organisations as the National Party (*al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī*) in Egypt and the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in the Ottoman Empire. As both organisations were set up after *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*, the previously mentioned Chinese influence is much more likely in the early stages of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*'s development. This does not preclude the influence of Middle Eastern political ideas such as those of the CUP which arrived somewhat later. These were transmitted through teachers such as ʿAbdallāh b. Ṣadaqa Daḥlān. He is credited with founding the Meccan branch of the CUP before travelling to Batavia in 1908 and joining the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* as a teacher.[75]

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[71] Cf. Lothar Gall, "Stadt und Bürgertum im Übergang von der traditionalen zur modernen Gesellschaft", in Lothar Gall (ed.), *Stadt und Bürgertum im Übergang von der traditionalen zur modernen Gesellschaft*, München 1993 (*Historische Zeitschrift*, Beiheft 16), pp. 1–12, here pp. 7f.

[72] *Al-Dahnāʾ* I; 6, June 1928, pp. 6f.

[73] A. Hourani, "Djamʿiyya", *EI* (CDRom).

[74] Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, p. 330, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, p. 209.

[75] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, pp. 208–211. According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Daḥlān returned to Mecca in 1911/12. Although he again took to travelling and seems to have become something of a professional founder of schools in places as diverse as Baḥrayn and Ceylon, and was involved in the al-Junayd school in Singapore, he

As discussed in the introduction, the rise of associations in Europe has been linked to the development of *Gesellschaft*, replacing the primordially based *Gemeinschaft* of pre-industrial and pre-modern times.[76] If one adds the capitalist entrepreneurship of the Hadhrami merchants to the information available on the membership and goals of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*, it seems only reasonable to see the society as an early sign of similar developments. Obviously, this was a lengthy process, and one should not expect the first societies to be full models of volitional associations. Therefore, it is not surprising to find a clear predominance of members of the same families and status groups in *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*, as well as in other early Hadhrami associations. In the case of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr, sayyid*s from the Ibn Shihāb and al-Mashhūr families dominated. Similarly, the formation of specifically Kathīrī and Yāfiʿī associations in South East Asia in the 1920s shows that, no matter what the form, tribal affiliation continued to play a major role in motivating organised political engagement. We consequently should once more avoid the pitfalls of a simple opposition between 'traditional' and 'modern' and instead examine each case on its own merit. Nevertheless, societies were not simply conceived as a new form for older types of affiliation and the idea of volitional societies to promote common interest was accepted, albeit perhaps more slowly than the mushrooming of societies seems to indicate. This is exemplified by the aforementioned Hadhrami role in setting up and supporting societies for the defence of Muslim traders against their Chinese competitors.

The formation of *Gesellschaft* was no smooth process. In the capitalist colonial society older forms of social control were at least partly removed. Descent-based status was gradually challenged by a recognition of economic success, at least where Hadhramis interacted with colonial society.[77] This affected Hadhramis not only in South East

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did not return to the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*. In contrast, Noer, *The Muslim Modernist Movement*, p. 63, fn. 91 claims that Daḥlān (whom he erroneously calls Abdullah Fadaqa Dahlan) came to Batavia in 1914 to head the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*, possibly succeeding Aḥmad al-Sūrkittī. This contradicts Muḥammad b. Hāshim's contemporary account according to which he was urgently called to Batavia in 1914 to replace Sūrkittī. *al-Bashīr* 17, 18.12.1914, p. 3.

[76] In addition to the literature discussed in the introduction, the studies by Dann seem to support this view. See his "Die Anfänge politischer Vereinsbildung in Deutschland" and the contributions in Dann (ed.), *Lesegesellschaften und bürgerliche Emanzipation*.

[77] Incidentally, this seems to be a typical consequence of the process of capital-

Asia, but also East Africa, as Romero has shown.[78] In the Indies, the Dutch appointed as headmen or *kapiteins* of the Arabs their economically most successful members. They could, but did not have to be of *sayyid* descent. The above-mentioned appointment of ʿUmar Manqūsh in Batavia is a case in point. Of course, this caused considerable tensions. Van den Berg, writing in 1886, commented:

> un chef n'appartenant point aux notables de la colonie serait sûr d'avoir de la part de ses compatriotes une vie de chien. Un Sayyid n'aime pas à être sous les ordres d'un Bédouin presque illetré; un parent, même éloigné, d'un chef de tribu ou un membre d'une famille respectable n'obéissent qu'à leur corps défendant à un individu qui, en Ḥadramout, serait artisan ou domestique. [...] Parmi les causes de discorde, les plus ordinaires sont l'antipathie des Arabes nés en Ḥadhramout contre les métis, ou bien celle des Sayyid pauvres contre les riches marchands de basse extraction.[79]

In order to avoid such problems, Van den Berg advised following the recommendations of the community leaders (implicitly referring to the *sayyid*s) when appointing a *kapitein*, thereby acknowledging and reinforcing Hadhrami stratification.[80] When the rivalry between members of different strata escalated in 1914, both sides consequently vied for access to the colonial authorities in order to further their cause. ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb, for example, was the main British informant until the early 1920s. He continuously defamed members of the *al-Irshād* association which was critical of the ʿAlawīs and attempted to incite the British against them.[81] Inter-family rivalry even within the same status group caused additional friction.[82]

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ist development, see Kooijmans, "Risk and Reputation", p. 26, who describes how successful merchants, members of the 'third estate', increasingly saw themselves as a match for the nobility.

[78] Romero, *Lamu*, pp. 170f.

[79] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥaḍramout*, p. 129.

[80] Already in 1818, an Egyptian had voiced his criticism of the Hadhrami hierarchy in the Indies, Mandal, Finding their place, p. 30.

[81] Cf. my "Hadhramis in International Politics", pp. 124–126 with a discussion of ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb's role. For his employment by Lee Warner, see FO 371/5236, Lee-Warner, Singapore to Colonial Office, 15.7.1920, p. 3.

[82] Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 58.

Educational Reform and the Split in the Community

What was new about the school of *Jam'iyyat al-Khayr*, which according to al-Bakrī was "the first of its kind"? He notes that it mainly taught reading, writing, the principles of Arab grammar and religion.[83] Once again, we need to consider an evolutionary process, which started with a (probably reformed) Koranic school in 1905 and developed within a few years into something quite different.[84] The recruitment of teachers from abroad did much to transform the school and to introduce new ideas. They arrived from the Ḥijāz in 1908, from Tunisia, Morocco, Mecca and Sudan around 1911 and again in 1913. Sūrkittī's successor Muḥammad b. Hāshim claims that the Ḥijāzī 'Abdallāh Daḥlān was the school's founder, which probably needs to be read figuratively given that Daḥlān arrived only in 1908. Muḥammad al-Hāshimī from Tunisia began to teach sports and founded a boy scouts movement among the students. Among the other teachers, the Sudanese Aḥmad al-Sūrkittī and his friends were deeply influenced in their teaching by modernist ideas promoted by Muḥammad 'Abduh and his followers in Egypt.

Noer emphasises that the school "was not a school of an exclusively religious character, but an ordinary elementary school where various subjects, like arithmetic, (Islamic) history and geography were taught."[85] In this case, as in many more that followed its example in South East Asia and later in Hadhramaut, the opposition suggested by the terms 'Koran school' and 'ordinary elementary school' seems rather misleading. Rather, these new schools present an effort to combine both a new type of religious instruction with what was considered to be relevant 'modern' knowledge. An almost parallel development was the founding of comparable schools, called *al-Falāḥ*, in Jeddah (1905), Mecca (1911), Dubai, Bahrayn and Bombay by the merchant Muḥammad 'Alī Riḍā Zaynal. He emulated educational

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[83] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 243.

[84] This would account for the different dates of the school's founding, although al-Bakrī's statement might be a polemic against the *sayyid*'s initiative, as he was a member of *al-Irshād*. Nevertheless, the fact that new teachers increasingly joined the staff of the new school tends to support my interpretation.

[85] Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 59. The following is based on ibid., pp. 59–61; Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 36–38 and 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 166–167.

developments in Egypt and Bombay.[86] In their approach, these schools with their combination of traditional and new subjects and methods resembled educational innovations in other Muslim countries, such as those which Fortna has discussed for the Ottoman Empire in the Hamidian period and Adeeb for Central Asia.[87]

But it was not only a broadening of content (including the teaching of English rather than the colonial language Dutch) which distinguished the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* from the older Koranic schools. The school had a fixed curriculum, and students were divided into graded classes in which they sat at desks and used illustrated textbooks. Rote learning was rejected in favour of a teaching style which aimed at the individual's understanding of the subjects and most notably the holy texts. As new forms of order and discipline were introduced, the individual's confidence in him- (and in time her-) self and his or her ability to influence the world in which they were living greatly increased.[88]

Another important novelty was the educational outreach work introduced by the school through its weekly public lessons for adult men and women. This can be seen as a kind of continuation of the *daʿwa* efforts described in chapter II for the religious reformers of the 19th century, although of course with different means and most likely different contents. Furthermore, *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* engaged in many other activities, such as collecting donations for the Ḥijāz railway and for victims of the war against Italy in Tripolitania. They show its pan-Islamic outlook and the close links maintained by its members with the Arab and Ottoman realms and enhanced by their contacts to a number of prominent journalists in the Middle East.

While Dutch law did not allow for the extension of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*'s activities beyond Batavia, similar organisations were set up in other cities of the Netherlands East Indies.[89] Private schools, such as the mixed one established by ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAṭṭās around

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[86] Abdullatif Abdullah Dohaish, A Critical and Comparative Study of the History of Education in the Hijaz during the Periods of Ottoman and Sharifian Rule between 1869–1925, PhD thesis, Leeds 1974, pp. 159–160; 162–167; 287–289; Field, *The Merchants*, p. 23. I would like to thank Guido Steinberg for these references.

[87] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom* and Adeeb, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform.

[88] Adeeb, "The Politics", p. 26. In contrast, Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, pp. 74–87, seems somewhat one-sided in his emphasis on the disciplinary effects of new type schools.

[89] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 37.

1912, further added to the new educational landscape.[90] Add to this the development of a lively press, and it becomes evident that reformist ideas were falling on fertile ground among a certain number of Arabs of South East Asia. Presumably, most Arabs remained rather sceptical about such changes which they considered to constitute a threat to time-honoured practices in general and their cultural identity in the diaspora in particular. Although they did not participate in the newspaper debates and their views are thus much less documented, interviews confirm that a number of wealthy Hadhramis of different strata preferred private teachers over the exposure of their children to new ideas, and exercised strict censure over their children's reading materials.[91]

Besides this rift between reformers or modernisers on the one hand and conservatives on the other, a second split occurred, this time between the reformers. It goes back to the above-mentioned unease among many *sayyid*s about the rise of non-*sayyid*s in a society which rewarded economic advancement with social recognition.[92] To make matters worse, this social change increased resentments against certain traditions that embodied the symbolic acknowledgement of the *sayyid*s' superiority. Two issues in particular caused conflict: the kissing of the *sayyid*s' hands as a sign of respect (*taqbīl* or *shamma*) and more crucially the principle of *kafā'a* (equivalence in marriage). This latter question was interpreted by traditionally-minded Shāfi'ī jurists as limiting the eligibility of the daughters of *sayyid*s (*sayyida* or more commonly *sharīfa*), to men of similar descent, while men were allowed to choose their wives freely from all strata although once again preference was given to marriage within one's own different strata.[93] The issue first surfaced in 1905, when an Indian, whose descent from the

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[90] On the al-'Aṭṭās school, see Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 59, fn. 79 and *al-Bashīr* 22, 15.4.1915, p. 11.

[91] Personal communication, Ḥilmī Ṭālib, Singapore, 8.5.1997 and 'Alī 'Abdallāh Alsagoff (al-Saqqāf), Gresik, 11.6.1997. Unfortunately, there is no statistical information available to me on the participation of children of Arab origin in the new educational ventures.

[92] This general statement warrants further differentiation, as Indonesian Muslims attributed great value not only to Arab descent, but particularly to that from the Prophet's family. Cf. Brondgeest, "Een zonderlinge appreciatie".

[93] *Mutatis mutandis*, this principle of equality was adopted by all strata. Thus, a Singaporean Hadhrami of *qabīlī* origins at length condemned the *sayyid*s's arrogance in this matter, before telling me in 1996 that he would never marry his daughter to anybody but a *qabīlī*, and most certainly not to anyone from a lower status group.

Prophet was not undisputed, married a *sharīfa* in Singapore. This caused a stir in the Hadhrami community. One of its members asked the editor of *al-Manār*, Rashīd Riḍā, for a legal opinion. He condoned the legality of the marriage as it was between two Muslims. This incensed another Hadhrami who obtained a *fatwā* to the contrary from Sayyid ʿUmar Sālim al-ʿAṭṭās to which Riḍā replied once again.[94]

While the marriage issue troubled the community, it is interesting to note that *al-Manār* also mentions further controversies about the status of the *sayyid*s. Among them range the question of whether to give them (part of) the obligatory *zakāt*, or the controversy stirred by Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl about Muʿāwiya b. Abī Ṣufyān.[95] This indicates that quite a lively discussion had already set in among Hadhramis in South East Asia by 1905, once again centring on Singapore. Ḥasan b. ʿAlawī b. Shihāb al-Dīn's criticism of education in Hadhramaut, *Niḥlat al-waṭan*, published in 1905, has to be added to the list of such issues. It prompted almost as heated a controversy as Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl's propositions.[96] Already at this early stage, these discussions and controversies created tension and unpleasantness for some of their participants. Thus, Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl was expelled from the Arab Club and shortly thereafter accused of the murder of a fellow countryman. Ḥasan b. ʿAlawī b. Shihāb al-Dīn endured angry attacks and was also expelled from the club, allegedly because he had attacked Sayyid ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-ʿAṭṭās.[97] This seems to have resulted from a letter which Ibn Shihāb had sent to *al-Manār*. In it, he accused an unnamed member of the al-ʿAṭṭās family of pushing through the controversial marriage between the *sharīfa* and the Indian.[98]

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[94] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, pp. 243–253 with the text of al-ʿAṭṭās' *fatwā* and Rashīd Riḍā's reply, quoting *al-Manār* 8;15, 3.9.1905, pp. 580–588; cf. al-Ḥajjī, *Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Rushayd*, p. 245. The original *fatwā* by Rashīd Riḍā was published in *al-Manār* 8;6, 21.5.1905, pp. 215–217. For another comment on the affair by Ḥasan b. ʿAlawī b. Shihāb al-Dīn see *al-Manār* 8;24, 10.2.1906, pp. 955–957. Further comments on the issue are contained in *al-Manār* 9;6, 23.7.1906, pp. 454f.

[95] *Al-Manār* 8;16, 15.10.1905, pp. 621–625 and 625–631.

[96] This will be discussed in connection with Hadhrami education in chapter VI.

[97] *Al-Manār* 9;6, 23.7.1906, pp. 453f. Cf. Roff, "Murder" and A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, p. 347. Shaykh ʿUmar al-Khaṭīb in Singapore, asked in May 1997 about Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl and Ḥasan b. ʿAlawī b. Shihāb (1908–1997), still held strong opinions on these two intellectuals whose views he rejected.

[98] *Al-Manār* 8;24, 26.1.1906, pp. 955–957. The expulsion thus seems to have been the result of a personal dispute, because Ibn Shihāb reminded the readers that even

These controversies did not polarise the community sufficiently to cause a lasting rift, however, possibly because the fronts between the proponents of different opinions were less than clear.[99]

Into this troubled milieu, Aḥmad Muḥammad Sūrkittī (1292/ 1875–76 – 1943) arrived as a teacher at the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*.[100] Stemming from a scholarly family in Sudan, Sūrkittī had received his first education from his father. He had been supposed to study at al-Azhar like his father, however, since travel to Egypt was forbidden by the Mahdist government, Sūrkittī made his way to the Ḥijāz instead. He studied in Medina and Mecca, becoming the first non-Ḥijāzī scholar officially registered in Mecca, if we are to believe his biographers. This entitled him to a regular Ottoman salary.[101] While studying and teaching in the Ḥijāz, Sūrkittī followed the theological discussions evolving in Egypt and abroad. He received and discussed with his students such publications as *al-ʿUrwā al-wuthqā* and *al-Manār*. He also corresponded with Rashīd Riḍā.[102] Sūrkittī's interest in education was already evident at this time: he became a teacher in Shaykh ʿAbdallāh Ḥamdūh's new school in Mecca, an improved type of *kuttāb*. This in turn formed the basis of the *al-Falāḥ* school of which Ṭāhir al-Dabbāgh became a director.[103]

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if the *kafāʾa* issue was interpreted differently by Hadhramis, this was no reason for spite or even the discontinuation of the practice.

[99] On this problem, see Brunswig, Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut und Südostasien, pp. 102–114.

[100] The literature on Sūrkittī is rather voluminous, although a critical biography remains to be written. For extended biographical information from the Sudanese perspective see ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, 'al-Nidāʾ', pp. 285–313, on which O'Fahey and Abu Salim, "A Sudanese in Indonesia" is largely based. Abū Shawk/al-Anṣārī, *Tārīkh*, centers to a large extent on Sūrkittī and, if not indicated otherwise, serves as the basis for the following brief account as it seems to have formed the basis of many of the other studies and was written by Sūrkittī's brother and al-Hāshimī, pp. 26–43. Most of the studies concerned with *al-Irshād* and modernism in Indonesia also devote sections to Sūrkittī. For his role in transmitting the ideas of *al-Manār* in Indonesia, see Bluhm-Warn, "Al-Manār and Ahmad Soorkattie".

[101] Sātī al-Sūrkittī, "Tarjamat al-ustādh Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Sūrkittī" in Abū Shawk/al-Anṣārī, *Tārīkh*, p. 35. To what extent this is credible, is a different question, given, for example, the rise of Hadhramis to high office in the 19th century.

[102] Bluhm-Warn, "*Al-Manār*", p. 303.

[103] ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, pp. 165f. I would like to thank Guido Steinberg for drawing my attention to this connection. On Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Dabbāgh, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, pp. 282–285 and Muḥammad al-Maghribī, *Aʿlām al-Ḥijāz fī 'l-qarn al-rābiʿ ʿashar li-l-hijra*, Jeddah: Dār al-Tihāma 1981, pp. 271–276. About the role of him and other family members in the education of Hadhramaut, see chapter VI.

Aḥmad al-Sūrkittī in the 1940s. Photograph provided
by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Tamīmī, Surabaya

A few years later, Sūrkittī was approached by the Shāfiʿī *muftī*,
Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī (d. 1330/1911–12) who had been
asked by his compatriots in Batavia to recruit suitable teachers for
the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*.[104] From 1908 onwards, Sūrkittī
played a major role in the development of the curriculum of the new school,
as well as in the recruitment of further teachers, among them his
brother.[105] At the end of his second year as school director, inspec-
tor and teacher, Sūrkittī travelled to visit some other Javanese cities
with Hadhrami communities, possibly in connection with efforts to
set up schools. In Surakarta (Solo), he stayed with the local *kapitein*
of the Arabs, ʿAwaḍ b. Sunkar.[106] Asked about his views on the mar-

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[104] Al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, p. 245; al-Sūrkittī, "Tarjama", pp. 36f. About Ḥusayn b.
Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī see Abū ʾl-Khayr, *al-Mukhtaṣar*, pp. 177–179.

[105] Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, pp. 59f. and O'Fahey & Abu Salim, "A
Sudanese", p. 70.

[106] The following account is based on Abū Shawk/al-Anṣārī, *Tārīkh*, p. 226, which
is followed by the pro-*Irshādī* accounts in al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. 2, pp.
255f. and al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 246f. al-Bakrī's *Tārīkh al-Irshād* is in large parts
identical with the latter sections of *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt* and will be quoted only where
it incorporates new material. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, has an even more
detailed story about the background of the split. An ʿAlawī version can be found
in Abū Shawk/al-Anṣārī, *Tārīkh*, pp. 231–242.

riage of a *sharīfa* with a Muslim of non-*sayyid* descent during a din-
ner, Sūrkittī suggested that this was permissable.[107] Upon his return
to Batavia, he quickly discovered that his employers had already
been informed of his views of which they disapproved. If we are to
believe his biographer, some of them had already become wary of
Sūrkittī's views earlier, as he considered faith and learning to be of
more importance than status.[108]

At any rate, Sūrkittī handed in his resignation on 6 September
1914, originally intending to return to Mecca. However, he was con-
vinced by his colleagues and a good number of Hadhramis, among
them the influential 'Umar Manqūsh, to remain in Batavia and to
continue teaching. Funds were quickly raised for a new organisa-
tion, *Jam'iyyat al-Irshād wa-l-Iṣlāḥ al-'Arabiyya* (Arab Association for
Reform and Guidance), which was registered in August 1915 and
opened a new school operated by Sūrkittī. The society quickly spread
to the major Arab centres, where it established schools and later
extended its activities in the area of journalism and the provision of
community services, most notably hospitals.[109]

It is difficult to assess why Sūrkittī's actions triggered the split of
the community which had hitherto been avoided. An important fac-
tor might be the existence of organisations backing the different posi-
tions. Another aspect which would need to be investigated closely,
might be the growing number of successful non-*sayyid* immigrants
and the resulting increase in tensions. What might have further fuelled
but not sparked, the conflict were the growing tensions in Pekojan,
the ghetto-like quarter of Batavia where most Arabs had been obliged
to settle. De Jonge suggested that once Arabs were allowed to move
out of this quarter (i.e., after 1919),

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[107] In 1915, i.e. after this opinion had already created a stir, Sūrkittī put down
his arguments on paper in response to an article in the Malay newspaper *Soeloeh
Hindia* which, he felt, had abused his position. The text, later published separately
as *Ṣūrat al-Jawāb*, is reprinted in al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, pp. 262–272
and in his *Tārīkh al-Irshād*, pp. 59–74. For an English summary and discussion of
the arguments, see Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 93–95.
[108] Abū Shawk/al-Anṣārī, *Tārīkh*, pp. 222–226. It would be interesting to know
whether these disputes were in any way linked to al-'Aṭṭās opening his own school.
[109] About the *Irshādī* journals, see Mobini-Kesheh, "The Arab periodicals", about
the other activities, see al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh al-Irshād*, pp. 216–217, ibid., pp. 275–284,
for a pictorial impression of some of *al-Irshād*'s establishments. Cf. Boxberger, *On
the Edge of Empire*, pp. 55–63.

the pent-up feelings and suppressed opinions [. . . found] an outlet. As a matter of fact, moving outside the physical borders of the community was accompanied by the transgression of social and cultural borders.[110]

As the founding of schools was the core activity and *raison d'être* of *al-Irshād* branches, it is not surprising that it overtook *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* in this field rather quickly, not least because it hired the latter's most experienced teachers. The evolution of its schools, whose main aim was "learning to be modern" as Mobini-Kesheh has amply demonstrated,[111] mirrors how the manifold ideas about reform were translated into practice. Students were taught Arabic and Islam side by side with Western languages, sciences, geography, history, mathematics, bookkeeping, health education and sports. The topics for Arabic conversation in the fifth year of primary school in Surabaya in 1936 mirror the expected profession of the students, namely shopkeepers and merchants, as well as the most important practical and moral issues confronting them:

> the advantages of electric light and of promenades, advantages of (keeping) stores, honesty, gentleness to animals, cooperation, different types of shops and what is sold in them, duties of shopkeepers and their assistants with regard to order, cleanliness and avoidance of fraud, the duties vis à vis one's profession, [they should learn to follow], [the meaning of] commanding right and forbidding wrong (*al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar*),[112] unemployment and its harm, work and the honour associated with it, self-reliance, Godfearingness as the basis of grace, the one who is slowed down [in obtaining of redemption] by his actions is not advanced by his descent, merits and attractions of *al-Irshād*, the created is impotent to revolt against the Creator, the one who has no mercy on the children and does not revere the elder is not one of us, brotherhood and the duties associated with it, the duties of a person towards their family and religion, the keeping of order, members of one association.[113]

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[110] de Jonge, "A divided minority", pp. 154f. de Jonge himself has shown that the quarter system was only abolished in 1919, so that it can be ruled out as the cause for the open division, albeit not for the large support which both factions found beyond Batavia. de Jonge, "Dutch Colonial Policy", p. 105.

[111] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 84. For an extended discussion of the schools and their activities, see ibid., pp. 72–90.

[112] It would be interesting, but beyond the scope of this study to investigate to what extent the *Irshādī* interpretation of "commanding right and forbidding wrong" reflects some of the notions which were developed in response to Western rule and lifestyle. On this topic in general, see Cook, *Commanding Right*, pp. 505–560.

[113] *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād, Sūrābāyā 1935–1936*, p. 19. This publication, apparently the

Apart from the attack on those who considered descent as crucial and apart from the open pro-*Irshādī* propaganda, this vision of a pious modern man was shared by reformers across the *ʿAlawī-Irshādī* divide. As many of the *al-Irshād* schools were boarding schools, they also provided ample room to translate some of the more practical prescripts into practice. Therefore, health and hygiene, as well as discipline and patriotism were greatly emphasised and taught in the clean, airy environment of modern school buildings.[114] Given that some Hadhramis, according to a Hadhrami teacher, even considered tables, libraries and blackboards as attributes of disbelief (*kufr*), the significance of living in a modern boarding-school can hardly be overestimated.[115]

This emphasis on education was entirely in line with Islamic modernism. A central tenet of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā was the responsibility of individual Muslims for *daʿwa*, which required the adequate training of these Muslims. In contrast to earlier periods when mosques had been the locus for such training, it was now understood that schools took this role, which meant that they had to offer sufficient religious instruction. Interestingly, since 1906 Rashīd Riḍā considered forming a *Jamʿiyyat al-Daʿwa wa-l-Irshād*. The aim of this society was to counter the Christian missionary societies, and in 1912, when it was finally realised in Cairo, it founded a college by the same name which recruited students from all parts of the Muslim world. Could it possibly be that the Hadhrami *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād* was not just inspired by the general ideas, but even by the name of this modernist organisation in Egypt, which might have been known to its founders through the pages of *al-Manār*, as well as through personal contact?[116]

Once the dispute between ʿAlawīs and Irshādīs had surfaced, it quickly developed into a major controversy which repeatedly escalated

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annual report for 1935–36, seems to be identical with the one cited by Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 81.

[114] The principles of education are discussed in *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād, Sūrābāyā 1935–1936*, pp. 9–12.

[115] Abaza, "Southeast Asia", p. 100, quoting from a letter by Muḥammad b. Hāshim to *al-Manār*. Similar attitudes seem to have prevailed among Indonesians: in the 1920s and 1930s, schools of the reformist organization Muhammadiyya were still called *sekolah kafir* (schools of unbelievers). Personal communication, Michael Laffan.

[116] Adams, *Islam and Modernism*, pp. 195–198.

into small scale violence between both sides.[117] While it seems to have raged mostly in Java and particularly in Surabaya, its repercussions were felt throughout the South East Asian diaspora, in Hadhramaut and in India.[118] For some time, *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* (initially representing reformers from different strata) was eclipsed in terms of organisational strength by *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād wa-l-Iṣlāḥ*. Although the new organisation did have some ʿAlawī backers, and although a number of issues such as the kissing of the hands of *sayyid*s (*taqbīl*), were discussed controversially among the ʿAlawīs,[119] *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād* was an over-whelmingly non-*sayyid* and at times passionately anti-*sayyid* organisation. The fact that its statutes excluded ʿAlawīs from serving on its board seemed to epitomise this position.[120] By 1927, the ʿAlawīs founded their own representative body, *al-Rābiṭa al-ʿAlawiyya* (The ʿAlawī League).[121]

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[117] For example, in mid-January 1933, Sayyid Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. ʿAydarūs was killed in Bondowoso and five *sayyid*s and two *Irshādī*s killed in the ensuing clashes. FO 371/16849, Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Secretary, 4.2.1933. Cf. al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 447 and 455f. for attacks in 1925, 1932 and 1933 on journalist involved in the debates; al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Hadhramawt*, vol. II, pp. 335f.; Bujra, "Political Conflict" I, p. 360 and de Jonge, "Discord and Solidarity", p. 82.

[118] Thus, *al-Manār* 14;7, 26.7.1911, pp. 540f., printed the letter of a Hadhrami from Bombay in which he expressed his bewilderment at some of the deeds ascribed to the Hadhrami saints, which Rashīd Riḍā explained by an "exaggeration" of the role of the saints; ibid., p. 541.

[119] Sayyid ʿUthmān b. ʿAqīl b. Yaḥyā (1822–1913), *muftī* of Batavia and a staunch opponent of the marriage between a *sharīfa* and a non-*sayyid*, did not support the practice of *taqbīl*. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 62. On Sayyid ʿUthmān as a reformer who is not easily pigeon-holed see Azra, "A Hadhrami Religious Scholar". Sayyid ʿUthmān founded the first Arab printing house in Batavia, Serjeant, "al-Ḥaraka al-adabiyya", p. 5.

[120] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, p. 260 (para. 5 of the statutes). This tends to cloud the fact that a number of reform-minded *sayyid*s such as ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAṭṭās and ʿAbdallāh b. Abū Bakr al-Ḥibshī supported the society, just as *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* and the ʿAlawīs continued to enjoy the support of some non-ʿAlawīs, IO, IO, R/20/A/1409, Dunn to F.O., 27.9.1919, encl. "Index of Arabs in the Netherlands East Indies, Anti-British and Friendly", and Mobini-Kesheh, "Islamic Modernism", p. 235.

[121] Al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 269–271, who, apart from Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Shihāb, ʿAlawī b. Ṭāhir al-Ḥaddād also mentions a Shaykh, namely Sālim b. Aḥmad Bā Wazīr as a founder member of the *Rābiṭa*. In addition to the aforementioned, the following were members of the Central Committee of the organization: Abū Bakr b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAṭṭās, ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAydarūs, Abū Bakr b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī, ʿAydarūs b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb, Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf, ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥibshī, ʿAlawī b. Muḥammad al-Ḥaddād, ʿUmar b. ʿAbdallāh al-Zāhir, ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Bakr al-Ḥibshī. *al-Rābiṭa* I; 1, Shaʿbān 1346/Jan. 1928, p. 29. Thus, only one non-ʿAlawī formed part of this highest body of the *Rābiṭa*.

Founding Congress of *Rābiṭa ʿAlawiyya*. Photograph provided by
M. A. Shakab, Jakarta

While the organisation's official registration might have been linked
to the political events to be discussed in chapter VII, the idea to
found an ʿAlawī association was older. According to the *Rābiṭa*'s
journal, it had been launched in 1919 by the Quʿayṭī *wazīr*, Ḥusayn
b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār, the brothers ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Abū Bakr
al-Kāf, ʿAlawī b. Ṭāhir al-Ḥaddād and Ḥāmid b. ʿAlawī al-Bār.[122]
Therefore, the controversy over the type of reform needed for Hadhra-
maut became predominantly couched in the language of class (or
more precisely status group) rather than religious expression (i.e.,
Islamic modernism vs. traditionalism). This constitutes an interesting
difference to developments among Hadhramis in Lamu. There, the
emphasis on saintly blessings (*baraka*) as well as the introduction of
musical instruments, rhythmic swaying and chanting by the saint of
sayyid origin, Ḥabīb Ṣāliḥ, alienated many of the *sunna*-oriented old
sayyid families but drew crowds of poorer Hadhramis as well as
Africans.[123]

Although the course of events did not please Aḥmad Sūrkittī, who
seems to have been taken somewhat by surprise and repeatedly tried
to heal the rift, both sides sometimes resorted to vitriolic attacks on
each other in their respective newspapers.[124] They also tried to manip-
ulate the colonial and Hadhrami authorities, for example demanding

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[122] *Al-Rābiṭa* I; 6, Muḥarram 1347/June 1928, pp. 344–346.
[123] Romero, *Lamu*, pp. 169–171.
[124] According to Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, p. 64, fn. 94, Sūrkittī even
resigned for four years from his teaching post to appease *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*, while

the limitation of travel by their opponents. They further appealed to Muslim authorities in Mecca, Riyadh and Cairo for support of their views.[125]

An interesting sideline is the almost immediate conflict among the opponents of *sayyid*-domination, once again along the lines of status groups. If one is to believe the British Consulate in Batavia, the Kathīrī members of *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād* would have preferred to rid the society of its non-*qabīlī* members and vice versa. This eventually caused the resignation of two leading members of the society, Shaykh Saʿīd b. Sālim Mashʿabī and Shaykh ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Harhara and a struggle for control which was brought to the courts.[126] Without further evidence, it is difficult to say how significant or long-lasting this split was, but by 1921, a *Jamʿiyya Kathīriyya* was collecting funds and can be traced in the sources on South East Asia and Hadhramaut as a group trying to shape its own vision of policy and reform in a tribal context.[127] It is quite possible that the Kathīrī organisation was also a result of differences between Yāfiʿī and Kathīrī sympathisers of *al-Irshād*, which seems to have occurred much earlier than hitherto assumed in the literature.[128] The dynamics and chronology of these inner-Hadhrami splits and rivalries probably varied greatly between different cities of the Netherlands' East Indies.

In the following years, a number of additional questions arose in the wider context of Islamic modernism and reform, which concerned the position of the *sayyid*s. The veneration of saints, a widespread practice in Sufi-inspired popular Islam, was one of these

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al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh al-Irshād*, pp. 175–181 and al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 258f. agree that this resignation was due to *al-Irshād*'s refusal to approve of his further educational reform ideas. One of Sūrkittī's reconciliation attempts, during which he negotiated with Sayyid Ibrāhīm ʿUmar al-Saqqāf in Singapore, is documented in an exchange of letters between October 1931 and July 1933 which are held in the headquarters of Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād in Jakarta. In this connection, cf. the intervention by Rashīd Riḍā in *al-Manār* 33;1, 3.3.1933, pp. 73–78.

[125] For a discussion of the attempts to manipulate the colonial authorities, see my "Hadhramis in International Politics", pp. 124–126; cf. al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh al-Irshād*, pp. 82–84 for ʿAlawī contacts with the Sharīf of Mecca and the Quʿayṭī sultan (through Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār), for Ibn Saʿūd's involvement see al-Ḥajjī's account of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Rushayd's stay in Java, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 239–470.

[126] FO 371/5236, British Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Secretary, 26.2.1920.

[127] FO 371/6256, List of principal Donors and monthly subscribers to the Fund of "Aljamiat Alkathiriah", encl. in Acting Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Office, 11.11.1921. Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, does not refer to this split.

[128] Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, p. 59, only mentions the *Jamʿiyya Kathīriyya* for 1933.

issues.[129] As has been discussed in chapter II, the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya* played a major role in Hadhrami Islam. Religious education in the Wadi and among Hadhramis elsewhere was coloured by its teachings, and veneration for some of its outstanding members, who were said to possess special *baraka*, was widespread beyond the ranks of *Ṭarīqa* membership. This veneration extended to the graves of the saints (*walīy*, pl. *awliyāʾ*). In addition, the 'birthdays' (*mawlid*, pl. *mawālīd*) of some of these 'saints' provided opportunities for minor and major pilgrimages (*ziyāra*, pl. *ziyārāt*) during which, in addition to their religious function, mutual visits and political deals as well as major trade fairs were arranged. Given the prominent role of *sayyid*s in the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*, it is not surprising that many, although not all, of these 'saints' were of *sayyid* origin. A number of practices associated with the cult of the saints had become subject to criticism by Hadhrami *ʿulamāʾ* of all strata since the 19th century, as has been shown in chapter II.[130] Nevertheless, in the 20th century, criticism of the cult of saints grew in intensity and to a large degree was conflated with the ʿAlawī-Irshādī conflict. Thus, al-Bakrī accused the ʿAlawīs of abusing their spiritual power and acting contrary to ideals of Islamic brotherhood and *sharʿī* equality.[131] Again, the complexity of the situation becomes clear in ʿAlī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr's attack on the veneration of saints in which he chose a non-ʿAlawī grave as the focus of his attack by a young, reform-minded *sayyid* in an attempt to unite reformers of both sides.[132]

A second major issue was the use of the title *sayyid*. At the congress of *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād* in Batavia in May 1931, it was decided "that in view of misunderstanding . . . in regard to the terms Sheikh and seyyid . . . the fact shall be made known to the public that the word "Seyyid" is equivalent to the term "Tuan" (Malay for "Mister") and applicable to any respectable man, and that the word "Sheikh" means "Head", or a man versed in some particular branch of knowledge."[133] *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād* spelled out that the Bā ʿAlawī had themselves

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[129] For the following, see Knysh, "The Cult of Saints".

[130] In this respect, I tend to disagree with Knysh's statement that the Hadhrami *ʿulamāʾ* were "remarkably, and self-consciously, impervious to the 'puritanical' agitation launched by reformers." Knysh, "The Cult of Saints", p. 203.

[131] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh Ḥaḍramawt*, vol. II, pp. 119–122.

[132] ʿAlī Bā Kathīr, *Humām*, particularly pp. 49–52, 59–62, for an interpretation see Knysh, "The Cult", pp. 208–210 and my "Dying", pp. 25–27.

[133] IO, R/20/A/3413, British Consulate-General, Batavia to Resident Aden,

originally only used the title of *shaykh* as an honorific for the learned among them and therefore claimed that the insistence on *sayyid* as an exclusive title for ʿ*Alawī*s was a new development.[134] Given that a significant number of 19th century ʿAlawīs were busy proving the ancient roots of their *Ṭarīqa* and thereby establishing the historicity of their special role in Hadhramaut, it would not seem completely unreasonable to give the *Irshādī* point of view some credence.[135] Once again, the colonial governments as well as the Hadhrami sultans were drawn into the debate, although the ʿAlawī requests to have the title "*sayyid*" protected were rejected by the Dutch authorities as well as by the British, who did not want to be drawn into the internal struggles of the community.[136]

One interesting offshoot of the debate is a conflict which arose in Singapore in the 1930s between the editor of the staunchly anti-*sayyid* journal *al-Hudā*, ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Jaylānī, and *sayyid*s writing in *al-ʿArab*. Al-Jaylānī allegedly defended Darwin's theory of evolution. This caused his opponents to brand him an atheist and develop their theological attack on Darwinism.[137] However, it is unclear to what extent this controversy was representative of the views of other anti-*sayyid* and pro-*Irshādī* intellectuals.

Not surprisingly, younger *muwalladīn* were less concerned with these matters than their elders, many of whom were first generation immigrants. As a result, the members of the *Indonesisch-Arabisch Verbond*, a

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24.7.1931, p. 1. For a slightly different wording, see Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 104.

[134] IO, R/20/A/3413, Untitled translation of a pamphlet of *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād* spelling out position on title question, encl. in Acting Consul-General, Batavia to Resident, Aden 11.12.1931.

[135] Peskes, "Der Heilige", p. 62, fn. 171 and Knysh, "The Sāda". It is not unlikely that this 19th c. historiographical effort was in itself a response by the more conservative elements to reformers from within, such as Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ, and from without, such as the (far more radical) Wahhābī movement.

[136] For the British position, see IO, R/20/A/3413, Acting Resident, Aden to Consul-General, Batavia, 19.8.1931, which seems to indicate that, in Aden, the *sayyid*s' wishes were complied with [although their request to have a law passed rejected], whereas the British Legation in Jeddah had salomonically decided to follow the wishes of passport applicants in this matter, ibid., British Legation, Jedda to Consul-General, Batavia, 30.8.1931. Ibid., Sultan ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿayṭī, in a letter to the Protectorate Secretary, 10.9.1932 supported the ʿAlawī position, possibly following a letter to him by a number of *sayyid*s requesting his support. This latter, dated 15.6.1932, is contained in SMA I; 193. Cf. SMA III, 180; Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 106f. and de Jonge, "Discord", pp. 82–86.

[137] Safie bin Ibrahim, "Islamic Religious Thought in Malaya", pp. 142–151.

federation of *muwallad* organisations, only used the Malay title "*Tuan*" in order to circumvent the problem.[138] In 1934, *Persatuan Arab Indonesia* or PAI (Arab Indonesian Association) emerged as a new organisation of *muwalladīn* who consciously declared Indonesia rather than Hadhramaut to be the homeland to which they owed loyalty. Its founders came from both factions but agreed to bury the old conflict in order to further their integration into and advancement in Indonesian society. Formed against the backdrop of considerable Indonesian resentment against Hadhramis, PAI should be seen not as another movement promoting integration but as the representative of the interest of younger Hadhramis who wanted to build their future in the Indies rather than waste their time prolonging the disputes of the older generation.[139] A similar attitude was already displayed by a group of young *sayyid*s some months prior to the founding of PAI. At a 'General 'Alawī Sayyid Congress' in Pekalongan, they succeeded in avoiding a renewed discussion of the title issue and instead returned to the original concern of all reformers, namely the modernisation of education.[140] By that time, Arabs were becoming disillusioned with the reforms instigated by both *Jam'iyyat al-Khayr* and *Jam'iyyat al-Irshād*. Shaykh 'Awaḍ b. Sha'bal, the head of the Arab Islamic Association of Solo, issued a pamphlet denouncing the new Arab schools as not much better than traditional Koranic schools. He suggested turning them into governmental schools while preserving instruction in Arabic and religion. Unsurprisingly, this caused outrage on all sides but did not silence the critics.[141] It might well be that the drive towards the opening of Dutch-Arab schools along the lines of Dutch-Chinese schools, which can be noted in this period, was another reaction to this problem.[142]

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[138] IO, R/20/A/3413, Consul-General, Batavia to Chief Commissioner, Aden, 6.1.1933. On the early organizations of the *muwalladīn*, see Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 128–132, although her statement that the IAV was virtually moribund by September 1932 as a result of the title fight (pp. 198f.) seems at odds with the British Consul's comment.

[139] About PAI, see Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 136–139 and Patji, The Arabs, pp. 91–98.

[140] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 107.

[141] Al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 281f. For other critical voices, see *Barhūt* 2, Jumāda 'l-ākhira 1348/Nov. 1929, p. 3, *al-Miṣbāḥ*, 1–2, Jan. 1929, p. 27.

[142] *Barhūt*, 2, Nov. 1929, p. 3; *al-Mishkāh*, I; 10, 3.7.1931; p. 3, Vuldy, "La communauté arabe", p. 114.

These events show that the internal disputes had somewhat run out of steam by the mid- to late 1930s.[143] A closer scrutiny of the Hadhrami press in the Netherlands East Indies reveals that even during the height of the ʿAlawī-Irshādī conflict between 1914 and 1934, the reform ideas of both sides were not as far apart as the mutual polemics suggest. It is the general outlook of the Hadhramis which will be the topic of the next section, while its more concrete proposals for Hadhrami reform, which sometimes occupied the bulk of the space, fall within the framework of the next chapter.

The Development of an Arab Press in the Netherlands East Indies

Mobini-Kesheh, author of the first systematic discussion of the Hadhrami press in the Netherlands East Indies, has shown that the majority of Hadhrami journals were edited by the "men of the awakening" (rijāl al-nahḍa) while also being the mouthpieces of the conflicting ʿAlawī and Irshādī parties.[144] This makes it somewhat less surprising that one finds signs of cooperation along with the predominant polemics. In July 1920, al-Irshād in Surabaya proudly announced to its readers that Muḥammad b. Hāshim had visited the Irshād school in Pekalongan and commented positively on its achievements.[145] This was all more surprising, the journal added, because Ibn Hāshim had earlier shown himself to be an opponent of the movement. Little wonder, if one considers that Ibn Hāshim was not only editor of the first Arab journal, al-Bashīr, published in 1914–15 and of a subsequent series of ʿAlawī-sponsored journals but, more importantly in the present context, the successor of al-Sūrkittī in Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr's school in Batavia.[146] In addition, both sides were inspired by the same sources, most notably al-Manār. Consequently, the battle between ʿAlawī and Irshādī reformers was more about leadership of the reform

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[143] Nevertheless, Singaporean newspapers continued the debate even during the 1930s, Safie bin Ibrahim, "Islamic Religious Thought in Malaya", pp. 219–228.

[144] Mobini-Kesheh, "The Arab Periodicals", p. 241. Earlier discussions of the Arab press in the Netherlands East Indies are el-Zine, Les Moyens, pp. 182–189, Zwemer, "East Indies" and H.K., "La presse musulmane". Because of the different orientation of the Singaporean Arab press, it will not be included in the following discussion, see above, footnote 20.

[145] Al-Irshād 6, 22.7.1920, p. 3.

[146] Al-Bashīr 17, 18.12.1914, p. 3.

movement than about the actual contents of reform. While fighting one another, they both confronted the conservative majority of Hadhramis who resented any change.

With the notable exception of *al-Bashīr*, many of the early editors were foreigners, often doubling as teachers in the new schools. Muḥammad al-Hāshimī from Tunis and the Sūrkittī brothers are examples of this phenomenon, which Mobini-Kesheh attributes to the higher educational standard abroad. Familiarity with the medium 'press' might have been another reason. Arab and Ottoman journalism already had a history of several decades, whereas Hadhramaut had yet to wait another two decades to see its own first newspaper.[147] Finally, it is noteworthy that the development of the press received a considerable boost from the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict. Possibly as a result of the greater dynamics of the *Irshādī* movement in terms of membership and activity and possibly also due to its role as a radical break-away faction of the reform movement, the number of pro-*Irshādī* periodicals is far greater than the number of those which promoted pro-*'Alawī* views.

As discussed in the case of *al-Imām*, journals were often closely associated with schools. Nevertheless, *al-Madrasa*, published in Pekalongan by Abū Bakr b. Muḥammad al-'Aṭṭās, 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Raḥīm al-Khūjā and (the association of) *Shamā'il al-Hudā* might be an exception in its very immediate orientation towards pupils. *Shamā'il al-Hudā*, an early emulation of *Jam'iyyat al-Khayr*'s initiative in Pekalongan, had opened a school in that city by 1911.[148] *Al-Madrasa*'s audience is obvious from its name as well as from the contents of the one issue of 1922 which I was able to consult.[149] The journal seems to have consciously promoted loyalty to the colonial power, featuring a photograph of Queen Wilhelmina on its first page and an article about her upbringing which pedagogically stressed how her mother taught her respect. Otherwise, it combined religious

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[147] For the development of the press in Hadhramaut, see chapter VI and my "Periodicals". For the development of the Middle Eastern press, see "Djarīda", *EI* (CDRom), by a number of authors.

[148] On *Shamā'il al-Hudā*, see Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 37 and Vuldy, "La communauté arabe", p. 114.

[149] This issue, I; 6 of "ghurrat al-qa'da 1340" (Dhū al-Qa'da began on 28.6.1922) is preserved in the University Library of Leiden. This is noteworthy because it is not mentioned in Mobini-Kesheh's bibliography ("The Arab periodicals", p. 250). It is likely that further copies are held in Pekalongan.

topics with information on natural sciences. It discussed the necessity to keep the streets clean, spoke about the architecture (although not the religious significance) of the ancient Buddhist temple of Borobodur and informed its readers about the use of the gramophone in European schools for instruction purposes. Entertainment included brainteasers, aphorisms and stories.

While *al-Madrasa* stands out in terms of its intended audience, it shares with other publications the decidedly pedagogical thrust. Senior students were regularly among the readers of and contributors to the journals, as they harboured a sense of forming the vanguard of the Hadhrami *nahḍa*, an impression which was imbued in them by their schools. Readership was very limited, even if we take into account that journals were read and circulated beyond the small circle of subscribers and buyers. This stands in stark contrast to their comparatively wide geographical distribution. Therefore, of the 349 copies of an issue of *Būrūbūdūr* sent to subscribers, fifty went abroad to the Straits Settlements, Turkey, Aden, British India, Europe and China.[150] This points to the international connections of the individuals involved in editing, which could be familial and/or ideological in nature, but also shows that the educated, many of whom were still in the process of completing their education, did indeed form some kind of reformist vanguard. It is not surprising, therefore, that a good number of the journals took a keen interest in educational questions and participated in the quest for the schools' further improvement, as mentioned above.

Mobini-Kesheh has pointed out the self-view of the journals as a "sign of the perfection of the nation" as well as the means by which further advance could be achieved through education of the readership.[151] Journals also entertained their readers and informed them about events in far-away places, thereby serving the interests of politicians as well as merchants. This self-view, which can already be found in *al-Imām* and other early publications, has significance beyond the self-justificatory stance of contributors to a new medium.[152] Its

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[150] Mobini-Kesheh, "The Arab periodicals", p. 245. Ibid., pp. 244–245 for a discussion of what is known about the journals' finance and readership.

[151] Mobini-Kesheh, "The Arab periodicals", p. 247, quoting from *al-Irshād*, 21, 11.11.1920.

[152] For other examples from the Hadhrami press, see *al-Bashīr* 18, 1.1.1915, p. 4; *al-Dahnā'* I; 1, January 1928, p. 1; *al-Irshād*, 14, 23.9.1920, p. 3; *al-Nahḍa al-ḥaḍramiyya* 10, Oct. 1933, pp. 34f.; about *al-Imām*'s view cf. Roff, *The Origins*, p. 50.

almost missionary vigour, which it shares with proponents of the new educational system who often made their voices heard in the journals, shows that more was at stake than winning over the reading public to one's cause. It should be added that this view is shared by historians of the press, who have argued that journals were the favourite and often only reading material of the "uneducated" readers and thus contributed to the widening of their intellectual horizons, becoming one of the most important media of societal education.[153]

Many of the topoi just discussed can be found already in Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī's list of the advantages of the press. He emphasised that journals could communicate the ideas of philosophers or intellectuals, to use the terminology introduced earlier, thereby facilitating their acquaintance and communication with each other. They could therefore unify dispersed groups and rally a nation against an outside offender.[154] They created a new cultural sphere outside that of the *ʿulamāʾ* in which novel topics were discussed. This development was partly attributable to the types of authors and readers, partly to the ephemeral nature of the new medium. Journalists used a different language from the *ʿulamāʾ* and dealt with different societies and ideas. Consequently, reading a newspaper "constituted an act of acquiring knowledge about the everyday world, and therefore it implied an orientation to society and nature [. . .]."[155] In my view, this does not necessarily imply a step towards secularisation as suggested by Commins, who argued that the periodicals' "orientation to society and nature" stood in contrast to a religious orientation because it contributed to the loosening of "the habit of referring all practices, finally, to some central faith".[156] On the contrary, the vast majority of journalists sought to justify their views on a wide variety of topics with reference to Islam (from this perspective, *al-Madrasa* is extremely atypical). The difference was, however, that they were not *ʿulamāʾ* but intellectuals with a different view of what constituted Islam, Islamic behaviour and an Islamic reform of life in all its aspects. We are therefore dealing with a struggle for hegemony over

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[153] Welke, "Zeitung", pp. 83f.
[154] Al-Afghānī's views are reprinted in Pakdaman, *Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi*, pp. 261–267, see here pp. 264f.
[155] Commins, *Islamic Reform*, p. 19.
[156] Commins, *Islamic Reform*, p. 19 quoting Raymond Williams, *Culture*, Glasgow 1981, p. 130. On the difficulty of establishing a causal nexus between printing, social change and secularization, see Eisenstein, *The Printing Revolution*.

the interpretation of Islam and eventually the world between ʿulamāʾ and intellectuals, be they journalists, teachers in modern type schools or members of reform societies.

In the Hadhrami context, this does not necessarily mean, as has been suggested for other parts of the Muslim world,[157] that the very limited role of the ʿulamāʾ in the organisation of everyday life contrasted with a much wider involvement by the intellectuals. As has been shown in chapters II and III, in the 19th century Hadhrami ʿulamāʾ tried to play the kind of role which intellectuals envisaged for themselves. If the ʿulamāʾ's success was very limited, this was a result of the same political factors which had prompted them to enter politics in the first place, namely the prevalence of armed power politics over urban conceptions of political rule. In the different social and political environment of South East Asia, but also of other parts of the Hadhrami diaspora, urbanised Hadhramis were able to discuss and elaborate their ideas of how an Islamic society in general, and the Hadhrami one in particular, ought to be organised in order to partake in civilisation (ḥaḍāra, tamaddun), progress (ruqīy, taqaddum) and refinement (tahdhīb). That this came to encompass new fields of activity such as health has more to do with the expansion of the state and politics in a modern context than with the contrast between ʿulamāʾ and intellectuals.

Even a cursory glance at the majority of the journals' titles illustrates their claim to the moral high ground. They were called Messenger (al-Bashīr), Advent (al-Iqbāl), Guidance (al-Irshād), Remedy (al-Shifāʾ) or Education (al-Maʿārif). Regional denominations such as al-Aḥqāf (the Koranic name for Hadhramaut) or Borobodur (after the famous temple in Java) were much rarer.[158] One cannot help but notice a certain analogy to the titles chosen by the "Moral Weeklies", a genre which was widespread in the European 18th century and which aimed at improving humankind in accordance with reason and religion and at educating them to become useful members of society.[159] While I have argued elsewhere that any such comparison is limited, it nevertheless allows us to conceptualise the

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[157] Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus*, pp. 43f.

[158] Of the 26 Arab language titles listed by Mobini-Kesheh until 1942, seven have titles which either point to a region or to education (which is at least ambivalent).

[159] Wolfgang Martens, *Die Botschaft der Tugend. Die Aufklärung im Spiegel der deutschen Moralischen Wochenschriften*, Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1971, p. 17.

combined moral, religious and educational thrust in a perspective that transcends cultural specificity and thus opens the eye to the potentially enlightening function of a combination of religion and reason.[160]

Behind the idea of education stood the concept of individuals who were able to improve themselves and their surroundings if provided with proper guidance.[161] The more radical pro-*Irshādī* journals such as *al-Qisṭās* (Scale) developed this idea further by arguing that man was judged (by God) only on the basis of his deeds, not by virtue of his origin, something which was clearly directed against the more conservative *'Alawīs*.[162] Such "improvement" or "refinement" is often called *tahdhīb*, a term originally denoting the spiritual discipline of the aspiring Sufi disciple. This was widened to a general *tahdhīb al-akhlāq* (improvement of character) which came to include those virtues which were necessary for the intended reforms without, however, entirely shedding the religious connotation.[163]

In spite of this religious overtone, the whole idea of "improvement" was greatly influenced by ideas such as those promoted in Samuel Smiles' *Self-Help* (1859). This book was not only hugely influential in the Middle East,[164] it also was translated into Japanese in 1870 and very widely read.[165] It advocated hard work as the way to improvement. Obviously, it is difficult to prove the direct influence of such a work. However, it is striking that not only Malay periodicals, such as *Utusan Melayu* (1905–1921) promoted similar values of

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[160] See my "Periodicals". Incidentally, the link of moral admonition with modernity becomes also clear in a side comment by Proudfoot, *Early Malay Printed Books*, p. 54, where he notes that this was one of the two genres with "contemporary reference" and "authored by contemporary writers" (the other incidentally being reportage and semi-contemporary history) for which typography rather than litography was the favoured printing technique.

[161] See, for example, *al-Bashīr* 18, 1.1.1915, p. 1: "every individual has duties vis à vis his religion and fatherland". Similar ideas, usually in connection with a discussion of reform, can be found in *al-Miṣbāḥ*, I; 2, January 1929, p. 26; *al-Dahnā'* I; 1, Jan. 1928, p. 1; *al-Rābiṭa* I; 2, Feb./March 1928; *al-Mishkāh* I; 17, 16.11.1931, p. 1; *al-Irshād* 5, 15.7.1920, p. 4; *al-Iṣlāḥ* 1, 22.9.1930, pp. 1–3; *Barhūt* 1, Oct. 1929.

[162] *Al-Qisṭās* 1, 3.2.1923, pp. 1f.

[163] This is particularly evident in Ḥasan b. Shihāb's criticism of Hadhrami education, *Niḥlat al-waṭan*, p. 14.

[164] Chakrabarty, "The Difference-Differal", p. 55 on Smiles' adaptation in India, on his influence in the Middle East, see Thomas Philipp (ed.), *The Autobiography of Jurji Zaidan*, Washington: Three Continents Press 1990, pp. 44f. and, for Egypt, Mitchell, *Colonizing*, pp. 108–110.

[165] Milner, *The Invention*, p. 125.

individual commitment and industriousness, but that these are also
reflected in many of the Hadhrami journals.[166] Sayyid Abū Bakr b.
Shihāb, the widely travelled teacher and friend of a number of Hadh-
rami journalists, teachers and activists of the younger generation,
such as Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl, Muḥammad b. Hāshim, ʿAqīl b. Zayn
al-ʿĀbidīn al-Jifrī (a journalist and publisher in Surabaya), Muḥammad
b. Sālim Bā Rajāʾ (editor of *al-Iqbāl*) and others, is said to have
emphasised the responsibility of individuals for their success in his
teachings and to have used examples from East and West to incite
their ambition.[167] Was it really an accident that he reportedly em-
ployed the same method as the widely read Smiles? It is almost irrel-
evant in this context whether Sayyid Abū Bakr had read Smiles
himself or whether he had become influenced by one of his many
contacts, for example, Aḥmad Fāris Shidyāq, whose ideas also res-
onate Smiles' ideas and values.

What were the components of such an improved society of indus-
trious individuals? In spite of many differences in details, the con-
cept of *tamaddun* was spelt out in a programmatic article by a certain
Muḥammad ʿAwaḍ Bā Ḥashwān, writing from Marka, a port south
of Mogadishu in Somalia, to *al-Miṣbāḥ*, a journal edited by students
of the *al-Irshād* school in Surabaya. "Are we civilised—and what are
the pillars of civilisation?" was the programmatic title of his article.[168]
Bā Ḥashwān aimed at clarifying a term which had acquired a wide
range of meanings and based his analysis on "one of the great writ-
ers on social affairs".[169] He argued that ten criteria could measure
a nation's civilisation:

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[166] *Al-Irshād* 5, 17 July 1920, p. 4; *al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 2, January 1929, pp. 23f.

[167] For a list of Sayyid Abū Bakr's students with biographies, see Shahāb, *Abū
'l-Murtaḍā*, pp. 77–118, for his friends ibid., pp. 64–76, for his teaching method
ibid., pp. 365f.

[168] *Al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 5–6, May 1929, pp. 104–107. The article is introduced by an
editorial comment on pp. 104–5, and properly starts on p. 105. Unfortunately, the
comment gives no additional information on the author.

[169] *Al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 5–6, May 1929, p. 105. Many of the criteria which Bā Ḥash-
wān identifies as indicators of *tamaddun* are discussed in the widely read book *Ḥāḍir
al-ʿālam al-islāmī* by Lothrop Stoddard, transl. and comment by Shakīb Arslān, Cairo:
al-Maṭbaʿa al-Salafiyya 1925, notably in chapters 7 and 8. The similarities are, how-
ever, insufficient to identify this book as Bā Ḥashwān's source. He might well refer
to an unidentified Western sociologist, either a German critical of German policies,
which are repeatedly referred to in the text, or somebody who discussed Germany
in the context of civilization.

1. Public health, as improvements in health care were one of the prime achievements of progress. It could be measured in various ways, most importantly by considering the death statistics.
2. Material wealth was necessary to build a civilisation and included the means of industrial and agricultural production, transport, etc.
3. The just distribution of this wealth.
4. The social system (by which he meant the safeguarding of security) which ought to be measured on the basis of criminal statistics.
5. Good government, i.e., the setting of a framework within which the subjects (raʿiyya) could conduct their affairs and which safeguarded their interests, providing justice and economic opportunities.
6. Freedom: the duties of good government and progress needed to be balanced with the freedom of the individual in leading his life and expressing his thought.
7. The spreading of education (taʿlīm) and refinement (tahdhīb). Bā Ḥashwān does not discuss the religious connotations of the latter term.
8. Scientific progress: an advanced nation needs scientists (Bā Ḥashwān refers to ʿulamāʾ, inventors and researchers, therefore making clear that all sciences are implied) who contribute new knowledge.
9. Advanced arts which help to comprehend beauty and express the spiritual component of progress.
10. The equal position of women which is needed for balanced progress. Bā Ḥashwān specifically refers to the development of family life as the nucleus of human development.[170]

To answer the question asked initially, Bā Ḥashwān concluded:

> Now we can measure mathematically and exactly the degree of civilisation of peoples: Take the number ten as indicating the highest mark for all of the criteria listed above. Give the people whom you want to investigate the mark they deserve for each of the ten criteria, then add the numbers and take the average. You then know approximately the degree to which a people has progressed. Make this calculation and then conclude: are we civilised?[171]

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[170] *Al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 5–6, May 1929, pp. 105–107.
[171] *Al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 5–6, May 1929, p. 107.

While sociologists might be grateful for finally being presented with
an easy formula for the complex problems they have been grappling
with for many decades, Bā Ḥashwān's comment is interesting in a
number of ways. The mathematical precision to which he aspires
shows his ambition to proceed scientifically.[172] Furthermore and in
spite of obviously copying from a European sociologist or somebody
quoting one (this is clear from the references to Germany, as well
as from the consideration of arts and music as an indicator of civil-
isation), Bā Ḥashwān clearly describes the kind of topics that con-
cerned his fellow Hadhramis, as a reading of the journals shows.[173]

Prominent themes in the Hadhrami press were health and hygiene,[174]
the necessity to promote scientific progress[175] and the need to treat
women equally and educate them to advance the nation.[176] The dis-
tribution of wealth, or rather the obligation to provide for the needy,
is another topic which recurs frequently,[177] while the journals' spe-
cial interest in education has already been mentioned. Political and
economic questions are often discussed with special reference to the
problems of Hadhramaut. *Ḥaḍramawt* featured a leading article enti-
tled "Reconstruction of the homeland through betterment of the eco-
nomic situation".[178] International examples are invoked to give a

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[172] While this might seem formalistic to the degree of naivity, one might want
to consider the optimism about exact measurement of progress which is visible, for
example, in Lerner's *The Passing*, when he gives 'exact' figures, for example mea-
suring the number of "modern", "transitional" and "traditional" people (p. 164).
Obviously this does not mean that I suggest to compare the methodology of Lerner
to Bā Ḥashwān's proposal.

[173] The following is based on my reading of all Arabic language Hadhrami jour-
nals available in the National Library of Jakarta. As the aim was not a systematic
content analysis, the following references should only be taken to indicate some top-
ics, the naming or otherwise of certain journals in connection with certain issues
does not mean that the others did not discuss these topics. For a more thorough
analysis of one journal, see Witkam, "The weekly 'Hadramaut'".

[174] E.g. *al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 4, March 1929, pp. 69f. with criticism of cultural attitudes
which impeded parents to take their children to (Western style) doctors; *Barhūt* 2,
Jumād al-ākhira/Nov. 1929, p. 3 about the lack of doctors; *al-Madrasa* I; 6, ghur-
rat al-qaʿda 1340, p. 8.

[175] An interesting caveat is contained in the suggestion of *al-Qisṭās* 5 of 3.3.1923,
p. 1 where in the context of the founding of a *jamʿiyya ḥaḍramiyya* it is suggested to
teach sciences without any "Israelite blemishes". On the necessity of sciences cf. *al-
Irshād* 5, 15.7.1920, p. 4.

[176] *Al-Irshād* 5, 15.7.1920, pp. 4, 21, 11.11.1920, pp. 3–4; *al-Mishkāh* I; 14,
10.9.1931, p. 3.

[177] *Al-Rābiṭa* I; 4, Muḥarram 1347/June 1928, p. 344; *al-Qisṭās* 5, 3.2.1923, p. 1;
al-Irshād 31, 20.1.1921, p. 4.

[178] *Ḥaḍramawt*, 22.5.1930, p. 1.

sense of added urgency, for example, when *al-Dahnā'* informed its readers about the Chinese budget. It provided for, the journal asserts, repairs of the ports, the building of railways as well as agricultural improvements and special measures to control the rivers.[179]

Two noteworthy issues were raised with regard to the Netherlands East Indies. Firstly, almost all the journalists who were contributing to the escalation of the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict through their articles called for the cooperation of all Arabs (of course on the terms of their own faction). Secondly, cooperation was also an issue with regard to economic advancement: the journals lamented that while foreigners combined their capital when necessary for a particular economic venture, Hadhramis preferred to work alone and put their profits into safe investments such as real estate.[180] Needless to say, economic practices had to comply with Islamic prescriptions which means that usury (*ribā*) was attacked as an unacceptable practice.[181] This latter issue points less to self-criticism than to one of the points of conflict between *muwalladīn* and new arrivals.[182] The latter, in their quest for quick wealth, were accused of exploiting the local population ruthlessly and thus ruining the Arabs' reputation. Although the practice has been described for an earlier period as well, Indonesian Hadhramis claim that it increased during the world wars as a result of narrowing economic opportunities. In 1935, Arabs (presumably mostly *muwalladīn*) and other Muslims even founded an anti-usury association (*anti-woekereijvereeniging*).[183]

By contrast, individual freedom is hardly ever discussed in the journals. The important exception to this rule, namely that individuals should be judged by their deeds, not their descent, as well as the very fact of the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict, which concerned the emancipation of individuals from their social status group and their equality before the law, showed that the process of individuation was nevertheless an important issue at the time.[184] However, given the

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[179] *Al-Dahnā'* II; 2, December 1928, p. 19.
[180] *Al-Dahnā'* II; 13, mid-June 1929, pp. 2, 12f.
[181] *Barhūt* 6;1, Sha'bān 1348/Jan. 1930.
[182] Already van den Berg noted that Hadhramaut-born Arabs often detested *muwalladīn*, *Le Hadhramout*, p. 129.
[183] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥadhramout*, pp. 136f., personal communication, Muḥammad Asad Shahāb, Jakarta, 20.7.1997.
[184] A good example for articles dealing with this particular aspect of individualism is Ṣalāḥ al-Bakrī's "al-Ḥurriyya al-fikriyya" [sic!], *al-Dahnā'* I; 1, January 1928, pp. 2f. Cf. Witkam, "The weekly 'Hadramaut'", p. 9.

lack of just government in Hadhramaut, discussing civil liberties
would have seemed outlandish. The major concern from the early
19th century until the mid-1930s was the establishment of basic secu-
rity and the very creation of government authority.[185]

What is striking if one reads this reformist press, no matter what
its precise orientation, is the very clear implicit and explicit link
between religious reform and improvement of one's concrete cir-
cumstances.[186] This probably has some roots in the economic con-
cerns of the reformist notables discussed in chapter II, but it is also
a rather widespread phenomenon in 20th century reformist Islam.
Al-Manār argued that in order to achieve reform, good intentions
could not substitute for the necessary funds.[187] In a penetrating analy-
sis of the thought of the Saudi author ʿAbdallāh al-Qaṣīmī (1907–1996),
Wasella has demonstrated the interesting parallels of such an approach
with what Max Weber has characterised as the innerworldly ascetism
of Calvinists.[188]

One final point needs to be made with regard to the Hadhrami
press. While the main thrust of its development laid after 1920, many
of the ideas which it discussed have their roots in the last decade
or two of the 19th and the first decade of the 20th centuries among
the travellers discussed in the previous chapter. Even if we read
Shahāb's account of Abū Bakr b. Shihāb's thought very critically, it
is remarkable that Shahāb stresses Ibn Shihāb's economic ideas.
According to him, Ibn Shihāb considered the economy as an inte-
gral and essential part of civilisation. He is said to have encouraged
the youth to train in the crafts. His recipe for success closely resem-
bles the code of honour taught in *al-Irshād*'s schools. He stressed the
central role of an entrepreneurship in national development that was
geared towards the domestic market.[189] Even if Shahāb retrospec-
tively elaborates Ibn Shihāb's thought, Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl's report
about the potential of agricultural development in Hadhramaut, writ-
ten in 1913 and published by *Ḥaḍramawt* posthumously in 1931, illus-

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[185] See chapters III and VI.
[186] For example *al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 2, January 1929, p. 26; *al-Dahnāʾ* I; 6, June 1928,
pp. 5–7; *al-Qisṭās* 2, 22. Jumāda 'l-thānī 1341/10.2.1923, p. 1.
[187] *Al-Manār* 3;22, 15.10.1900, pp. 505–509.
[188] Jürgen Wasella, *Vom Fundamentalisten zum Atheisten. Die Dissidentenkarriere des
ʿAbdallāh al-Qaṣīmī 1907–1996*, Gotha: Justus Perthes Verlag1997, pp. 76–102.
[189] Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, pp. 362–367.

trates that the proponents of reform had concrete ideas about their country's development.[190]

The Emergence of a Hadhrami Intelligentsia in South East Asia

Is it possible to reconstruct the ideal-type reformer who was to carry out the noble tasks outlined above? Some features of that person emerge clearly from the press. The ideal candidate was a pious person educated in one of the new schools. He had studied religion, modern sciences and languages. He had to be a man of action—the eloquent journalists spilled much ink regretting the proclivity to talk about, rather than to enact the required changes. Finally, he needed to be able to mediate between the different factions and to represent them *vis à vis* outsiders such as the colonial power.

It has been shown how early reformers such as Muḥammad b. 'Aqīl combined traits of the *'ulamā'* with those of the intellectuals. The import of teachers-cum-journalists from the Middle East points to the perceived need for a person with a different type of training and outlook. By the 1920s, we find a small but increasing number of Hadhramis who more clearly fit this description.[191] That their impact reached beyond the Hadhrami circles becomes clear when one realises that through an arrangement between *al-Irshād* and the largest Indonesian modernist movement, the Muhammadiyya, graduates of *al-Irshād* became cadres of the Muhammadiyya. Given the common intellectual roots, this is not very surprising. To name but one example, the founder of the Muhammadiyya, K. Achmad Dahlan, spent considerable time in Mecca and was influenced by the writings of Muḥammad 'Abduh.[192]

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[190] *Ḥaḍramawt* 303, 1.10.1931, pp. 2 and 304, 19.10. 1931, p. 2. In 1919, Ibn 'Aqīl incorporated these ideas into a suggestion to the British of how to contain *Irshādī* influence in Hadhramaut. PRO, CO 273/498, Memorandum of Discussion between Syed Ali bin Shahab of Batavia, Syed Mohamed bin Agil [. . .], R. J. Farrer [. . .], W. H. Lee-Warner [. . .], 27.11.1919, p. 7.

[191] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, notes the emergence of a new leadership of *Jam'iyyat al-Irshād* by the 1920s who had been trained in the organization's schools and worked for it as teachers for some time, pp. 65f.

[192] Bluhm-Warn, "*Al-Manār*", p. 307. Presumably, *'Alawī*-run schools had comparable effects, albeit in a smaller and less organized scale. On 'Abduh's influence on Dahlan, see Marcel Bonneff, "De l'esprit d'entreprise à Java", in Lombard & Aubin, *Marchands*, pp. 279–287.

The gradual rather than abrupt nature of this change, which cannot be overemphasised, is well exemplified in the career of the aforementioned Muḥammad b. Hāshim (1882–1960), a descendant of ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir, one of the major reformers of the 19th century.[193] Like Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl, Muḥammad b. Hāshim was born in al-Masīla in Wadi Hadhramaut. After elementary studies in his home town, Muḥammad b. Hāshim pursued his education in Tarīm, possibly in its new religious college.[194] During this period, he lived with the al-Kāf family (which shows us how study in different towns was arranged) and took lessons with their sons.[195] His life resembles Ibn ʿAqīl's in so far as both came to South East Asia as traders and became involved with the *nahḍa*, but while Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl was very much a restless traveller in pursuit of trade and Islamic reform, Muḥammad b. Hāshim concentrated on education in a wider sense. In spite of being a 'transitional' figure, Hadhrami writers consider him to be a "man of letters, historian and journalist" and therefore clearly do not perceive him as an *ʿālim*.[196] Consequently, his career shall be discussed here as one example of the new type of intellectuals because of his significant role as editor of the first Arabic journal and as a teacher in the Netherlands East Indies as well as later in Hadhramaut.[197]

Muḥammad b. Hāshim arrived in South East Asia in 1907 at the age of 25. He worked in trade for an unspecified time. One wonders whether he also pursued further education because he seems to have acquired a sound knowledge of the South East Asian *lingua franca*, Malay, to the extent that he published an Arabic-Malay dictionary.[198] He also became proficient in English. Furthermore, he seems to have established contacts with Arab intellectual circles rather

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[193] His full name is Muḥammad b. Hāshim b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad b. Hāshim, ʿA al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 593. al-Mashhūr calls ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn his *jadd*, which might mean both ancestor or grandfather. For example, he might be Muḥammad the son of Hāshim or Muḥammad b. Hāshim, son of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān.

[194] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 593 does not elaborate on this point, but mentions as one of his teachers ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar al-Shāṭirī, the founder of the *ribāṭ* of Tarīm. More on this institution in chapter VI.

[195] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 112f.

[196] S. Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr wa-l-thaqāfa*, p. 178.

[197] If no other source is given, the following account is based on ʿA al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 593–597; Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, pp. 94–102 and S. Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr wa-l-thaqāfa*, pp. 178f., although the latter contains many errors re. South East Asia.

[198] Mandal, Finding their Place, p. 188.

quickly, reportedly writing in the Singaporean paper *al-Iṣlāḥ* in which
Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl seems to have been involved.[199] It was most
likely in this context that he met Abū Bakr b. Shihāb, whose stu-
dent he became.[200] By 1909, Ibn Hāshim was involved in corre-
spondence with *al-Manār* to which he had already subscribed in
Hadhramaut.[201] It seems that he did not study it merely for the
Islamic reform ideas for which it was famous. In a letter to *al-Manār*
in 1911, he deplored the educational standard of the local Muslims,
particularly in comparison to the Europeans. They threatened to
undermine Islam in missionary schools, which made improvement
an even more urgent affair. He then reported the great success of
the Berlitz method of teaching foreign languages, which he had intro-
duced in the Palembang school where he was teaching by then. He
used it to acquaint young boys of Arab origin with their mother
tongue. In doing so, he was following the advice of an article in *al-
Manār* on the teaching of languages, as well as profiting from his
own experiences during his study of English. The journal, he enthu-
siastically pronounced, was the greatest teacher and affectionate father
of the reform movement among the youth.[202] Interestingly, these
modern methods seem to have brought him into conflict early on
with more traditionally-minded Hadhramis such as his grandfather
Sayyid ʿUthmān b. ʿAqīl, the famous *muftī* of Batavia whom many
saw simply as a colonial collaborator.[203] Perhaps in response to this

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[199] The little existing information on *al-Iṣlāḥ* is extensively discussed by Brunswig,
"Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut", pp. 112–114, for Ibn Hāshim's involvement see S. Bā
Wazīr, *al-Fikr*, p. 178 and Serjeant, "Nashāt al-muʾarrikhīn", p. 9.

[200] To what extent this was a direct teacher-student relationship, and to what
extent he was influenced by Ibn Shihāb's writings cannot be established at present.
It is not unlikely, however, that Ibn Hāshim and Ibn Shihāb met during Ibn Shihāb's
second journey to South East Asia, which in this case would have taken place some
time between 1907 and 1914. About Ibn Hāshim as Ibn Shihāb's student, see
Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, p. 97.

[201] See chapter VI.

[202] *Al-Manār* 14;10, 22.10.1911, pp. 761–765, for a summary see Bluhm, "A
Preliminary Statement", p. 38; Abaza, "Southeast Asia", 100f. The name of the
school is given by Abaza as "*al-Madrasa al-ʿarabiyya*", and it is not quite clear whether
this is identical with "*Madrasat al-Munawwar*" which Ibn Hāshim directed from some
unspecified date in Palembang according to ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 593. The
latter name presumably refers to the school's sponsors, presumably members of the
Āl al-Munawwar who originated from Sayʾūn and migrated to Java and Sumatra,
ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 197 and fn. 1.

[203] On the perception of Sayyid ʿUthmān see *al-Manār* 14;10, 22.10.1911, p. 766.
Cf. footnote 120 above.

conflict, he denounced the resistance of more conservative Arabs to these endeavours. While in Palembang, Ibn Hāshim began to edit the bilingual journal *al-Bashīr* jointly with a certain ʿAbd al-Khāliq b. Muḥammad Saʿīd.[204]

It has already been mentioned that Ibn Hāshim was called to Batavia in 1914 to direct the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*.[205] While serving either in Batavia or in the schools of *Shamāʾil al-Hudā* in Pekalongan and the *Ḥaḍramawt* school in Surabaya, Muḥammad b. Hāshim startd to write school textbooks on such topics as composition, Arabic language, geography and natural science. He taught a similarly wide range of subjects, including Arabic, English, literature, philosophy and history.[206] In Batavia, he also composed a hymn for the school which started with the programmatic line "Through *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* the fatherland advances, and the tyranny of discords disappears".[207] He seems to have enjoyed such an outstanding reputation that some pupils followed him when he changed schools.[208] Given Ibn Hāshim's interest in journalism, it is not surprising that he participated for some time in (and possibly initiated the founding of) the above-mentioned school newspaper *al-Madrasa*. Later, he set up the weekly *Ḥaḍramawt* in Surabaya some time in 1923 or 1924.

In 1924 or 1925 Muḥammad b. Hāshim accompanied a group of Hadhrami students from the Indies to Cairo where they studied at different universities. Besides attending to the students' affairs, Ibn Hāshim used the time to meet with Egyptian scholars, write in Egyptian journals and pursue his intellectual interests. Daan van der Meulen, a Dutch colonial official who at the time was consul in Jeddah, gives an interesting account of an encounter with Ibn Hāshim in Cairo. He gave a "critical but in general appreciative picture of Dutch rule" during a lecture in Cairo. In the different political climate of Cairo, this caused an uproar. The incident may give some hints as to Ibn Hāshim's own political convictions.[209] In 1345/1926–27,

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[204] Interestingly, Sumatra also had been the location of the second reformist Malay journal after *al-Imām. al-Munīr* started in 1911 in Padang.

[205] *Al-Bashīr* 17, 18.12.1914, p. 3.

[206] Muḥammad Asad Shahāb, personal communication, Jakarta, 21.6.1997.

[207] Shahāb, *Abū ʾl-Murtaḍā*, p. 96.

[208] Thus, his pupil Muḥammad Asad Shahāb first attended the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr* in Batavia and then followed his teacher to Palembang and Surabaya at the insistence of his mother. Personal communication, Jakarta, 20.6.1997.

[209] Van der Meulen, *Don't you hear*, p. 79. For Muḥammad b. Hāshim's views on colonialism with regard to Hadhramaut, see my "A poetic exchange".

he returned to Hadhramaut, teaching and later directing the school of a *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* (Truth Association)[210] and playing a major role in this association. As this school was mostly financed by the al-Kāf family with whom Ibn Hāshim was closely linked since his youth, he probably went to Hadhramaut at their request.[211] In 1936–37 he joined the Kathīrī government as State Secretary but soon left politics to concentrate on his pedagogical and cultural interests.[212]

While Muḥammad b. Hāshim's activities in Hadhramaut do not need to concern us at this stage, it is important to note his manifold activities in schools, associations and journalism. These three main media of the reformers through which they constituted a new type of public sphere, as discussed above, were the natural outlet for his activities. As has been shown, it was typical of reformers to partake in more than one of these types of new organisation.

Serjeant comments on this intellectual point to a characteristic not only of Ibn Hāshim's life but that of an increasing number of Ibn Hāshim's colleagues. Although Ibn Hāshim had pursued trade early in his life in Sumatra, he seems to have given it up due to the demands of his job as teacher and school director. This stands in contrast to the older-type *ʿulamā*ʾ whose commitments to preaching and teaching often left them sufficient time to tend to their commercial affairs. Serjeant writes:

> Not over-well provided with the goods of this world, b. Hāshim has had always to earn his living through his pen or by teaching, and so came to the field of history writing from journalism and politics. [. . .] Apart from articles his published work has clearly been written with a patron in mind, as in the case of his *Riḥla* which has some historical matter, and the story of the Āl Kāf family [. . .].[213]

Can this dependency of an intellectual on certain sponsors only warn us of some historical bias in his works, or can it help us interpreting

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[210] *Al-Ḥaqq* has a wide range of different meanings. As it is an attribute of God as well as a widespread Sufi term, "truth" seems to be the most appropriate translation.

[211] This association becomes clear from the attacks by al-Hāshimī in *Būrūbūdūr*, i.e. 4;1, 5.7.1924, p. 2. Al-Hāshimī at this time was connected with the Āl al-ʿAydarūs who rivalled the Āl al-Kāf, cf. *Būrūbūdūr* 4;5, 30.8.1924. In issue 4;9, *Būrūbūdūr* suddenly becomes very positive about Sūrkittī. According to Muḥammad Asad Shahāb, Muḥammad b. Hāshim returned to Hadhramaut at the instigation of the Kathīrī sultan. Personal communication, Jakarta, 21.6.1997.

[212] S. Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr*, pp. 178f.

[213] Serjeant, "Historians", p. 255. Serjeant's version was confirmed to me by Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah 29.3.2000.

Ibn Hāshim's role any further? It might be useful at this juncture to pause for a moment in the further consideration of Hadhrami history and cast a glance at European history where such phenomena have been discussed far more intensely and theoretically.

Sociologist Rainer Lepsius has shown how an economic bourgeoisie emerged in 19th century Germany which laid claims to political participation, to free market economy and to the free association of interests between people who were regarded as equal on the basis of natural law. This was paired with a new idea of an individual educating himself without religious dictate. Against this background, the interests of the educated classes or *Bildungsbürgertum* met with those of the economic bourgeoisie (*Wirtschaftsbürgertum*). Intellectuals developed new ideas in new types of volitional social organisations, such as secret societies, clubs, masonic lodges and associations. They disseminated these ideas in journals and thereby created a new public sphere which addressed mostly a bourgeois public. Because of the collusion of interest (well illustrated in *al-Irshād*'s praise of public-spirited entrepreneurs) the bourgeoisie financed the new educational system and other cultural institutions, thereby offering employment to the intelligentsia and a structural chance for cultural innovation which always included behaviour deviating from older cultural norms.[214]

While not only the concrete historical circumstances, but also the underlying philosophies show obvious differences, a number of Lepsius' observations seem to apply to developments among the Hadhramis in South East Asia. I have argued above that the developments among the Hadhrami economic elite in many ways seem to indicate that their behaviour was not all that different from that of other bourgeoisies in the colonial context. It is tempting to interpret the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict as a struggle for more social equality. While in Germany the philosophy of natural law was used to justify the rejection of the old corporate system, the prevalent social stratification among Hadhramis came to be questioned on the basis of Islamic modernism. The result, namely that "self-acquired wealth and education justified the demand for social recognition and privileged status"[215] does not seem to differ dramatically.

I have further contended that the emergence of associations seems to be a step towards a public spirit typical of *Gesellschaft*. The spon-

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[214] Lepsius, "Zur Soziologie", particularly 89–98; *al-Irshād* 16, 7.10.1920, p. 4.
[215] Lepsius, "Zur Soziologie", p. 96.

sorship of intellectuals such as Muḥammad b. Hāshim by the quin-
tessentially rich al-Kāf family suggests the nucleus of a coalition of
enlightened entrepreneurs and intellectuals as discussed by Lepsius.[216]
If one suspects that the Āl al-Kāf were simply buying a compliant
mouthpiece, I would counter that one underestimates their class as
well as Ibn Hāshim's intellectual format. Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-
Kāf also supported the originally handwritten Hadhrami journal, *al-
Tahdhīb*, which was edited by ʿAlī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr, later a famous
author in Egypt with close links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Bā
Kathīr was repeatedly accused of an anti-*sayyid* bias, and if we con-
sider that the Āl al-Kāf were albeit liberal supporters of the *ʿAlawī*s,
their support for *al-Tahdhīb* must have been based on somewhat wider
considerations than the mere purchase of partisanship.[217]

Obviously, Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf, whose activities
will be examined in some detail in the next chapters, was an out-
standing personality. Nevertheless, even the limited data available on
individual entrepreneurs suggest that he was not a singular case.
ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī al-ʿAṭṭās is another obvious case of an entre-
preneur-cum-sponsor of intellectual and artistic life, as are a num-
ber of the Ibn Shihāb who played such a major role in the founding
of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*. Similarly, the backers of the various associations
in Java, whether they were generally aiming at setting up schools or
more decidedly supporters of *Irshādī* or *ʿAlawī* positions, also fit the
general description of entrepreneurs sponsoring intellectual life in the
context of education and journalism. In Singapore, the administrator
of the al-Junayd family trust, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Junayd (1874–1950),
endowed a school in 1927 in which the colourful Muḥammad b.
ʿAqīl is said to have played a role and in which the historian Muḥam-
mad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī later taught.[218]

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[216] For the notion of enlightened entrepreneurs and "practical Enlightenment"
see Hancock, *Citizens*, p. 396.

[217] For the al-Kāf sponsorship of *al-Tahdhīb*, see the dedication of *Majmūʿat aʿdād
al-sana al-ūlā min ṣaḥīfat al-tahdhīb*, Cairo 1961, as well as number 1;2, 1. Ramaḍān
1349 (20.1.1931), p. 33 thanking Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf for the donation of
paper, p. 33; 4;1, 1. Dhī al-qaʿda 1349 (20.3.1931), p. 77 with a letter of support
by Sayyid Abū Bakr. It is likely that Sayyid Abū Bakr financed the first print edi-
tion of *al-Tahdhīb* (it is likely that the 1961 print is a reprint, but no original print-
date is given).

[218] Al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*, p. 263, about Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl's role in the school
see Shahāb, *Abū 'l-Murtaḍā*, p. 78, about al-Shāṭirī as teacher in the school see
NAS, Interview with Syed Hussain Bin Abdul Gadir Aljunied, A 000320/03, reel 1.

The following comments could well characterise one of these entre-
preneurs, obviously with variation in detail:

> [He] stood in close contact with all important contemporaries, the
> major thinkers as well as the political leaders. He himself, however,
> was not a conceptual thinker. Completely immersed in active life, he
> hardly penned down his ambitions and motivations [. . .]. Nevertheless,
> he [. . .] was a personality of wide interests. [. . .] He was a deputy
> and diplomat, he furthered the arts as well as pioneers of aviation, he
> had an advanced agricultural estate and invested in steam ships.[219]

This description of Johann Friedrich Cotta (1746–1832), publisher
of the leading German newspaper in the 19th century, exemplifies
a certain entrepreneurial type which can be found both in Europe
and among the Hadhrami diaspora, even though it appeared some-
what later in the Hadhrami case. And just as Cotta financed a plat-
form for critical discussion through his newspaper, a number of
Hadhrami entrepreneurs also helped to create an intellectual forum
through their sponsorship of associations, schools and newspapers.
Therefore, in spite of a time-lag and different cultural backgrounds,
structural similarities emerge which are attributable both to the inter-
national exposure of Hadhrami migrants and to the changes within
their own society.[220]

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[219] Günter Müchler, *"Wie ein treuer Spiegel". Die Geschichte der Cotta'schen Allgemeinen
Zeitung*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1998, p. 5.
[220] Interestingly, Milner, *The Invention*, makes a quite similar argument with regard
to the development of Malay journalism in a chapter fittingly entitled "Building a
Bourgeois Public Sphere", pp. 114–136.

SOCIAL CRITICISM AND REFORM IN HADHRAMAUT,
1880s–MID 1930s

A number of features of the political developments in the Kathīrī
and Quʿayṭī domains in the 19th century have been discussed in
chapters I to III, and special attention has been given in chapter II,
to the role of the notables of Wadi Hadhramaut and to their reform
projects. This chapter returns to the reform movement in Hadhramaut,
albeit in a later period, and investigates initiatives to introduce change
in close cooperation with the diaspora. Therefore, it is not surprising
to note this movement expressing itself in ways which echo devel-
opments in the diaspora. Sponsorship by notable merchant families
played a crucial role in its growth. The first moves towards the estab-
lishment of new types of schools and associations were rather hesitant
and in many ways inspired as much by the activities and example
of the reformers discussed in chapter II as by the diaspora. The pace
of change increased only in the 1920s. Given frequent travel back and
forth by the most important proponents of reform, it is not surprising
to find close parallels between the reform discourse among the Arab
periodicals on Hadhramaut in South East Asia and the projects and
ideas launched in the Wadi.

The Reform of Religious Education in Wadi Hadhramaut

It has been shown in the last chapter that a major driving force
behind the Hadhrami *nahḍa* in South East Asia was the quest for
an education which combined religious instruction with the knowledge
needed to succeed in a capitalist colonial society, such as foreign
languages, mathematics, science, business ethics, etc. While the latter
subjects did not make an appearance in Hadhrami schools until the
1920s and 30s, even in religious studies there hardly existed any clearly
defined structure of teaching beyond the basic skills taught in the
Koran schools in the major towns. A student who had studied there
and enjoyed some additional tuition from his family or relatives, then

moved to study with a smaller or larger number of individual *'ulamā'* who taught in prayer rooms, mosques or their houses. The emphasis was on the transmission of knowledge about religious duties and the fostering of moral development, not on the acquisition of skills.[1] In the 1880s, two institutions were founded which slowly changed this pattern, although their existence complemented rather than substituted the earlier practices. In spite of their semblance in name and form, the two *ribāṭ*s in Say'ūn and Tarīm differed significantly from one another and deserve a more detailed consideration.

By *ribāṭ* (pl. *arbiṭa*), 20th century Hadhrami scholars mainly denote an advanced educational institution.[2] While the first *ribāṭ*s, as well as later foundations in Ghayl Bā Wazīr (1902) and other smaller towns were certainly centres of learning, the term *ribāṭ* points us to the strong Sufi tradition in Hadhramaut.[3] This is particularly true for the *ribāṭ* of Say'ūn, which was founded by 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥibshī (1842–1914). It was very much centred on this charismatic *'ālim* and Sufi, while the *ribāṭ* of Tarīm was a much more collectively organised effort to build a new type of school. Since the *ribāṭ*'s founding, many overseas students have flocked to Tarīm to enrol and study at this school. It was closed only during the socialist period.[4]

To explain the difference between the two *ribāṭ*s and because al-Ḥibshī was a central figure of his age as a Sufi and teacher whose influence was particularly felt in East Africa, it is necessary to briefly discuss his biography.[5] In terms of the emerging reform movement, al-Ḥibshī is interesting because he was closely linked to the group of reformers introduced in chapter II. Some of the reformist ideas are evident in the highly unusual account about how his father Muḥammad, an associate of the earlier reformers, chose his spouse. He was looking for a wife who could open women's classes in Tāriba

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[1] Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 164–167.

[2] S. Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr*, p. 166.

[3] In Yemen, *ribāṭ* primarily denoted Sufi convents, cf. Mohamed Ali Al-Arousse, "Les Madrasas de la Ville de Zabid au Yemen", unpubl. PhD thesis, Aix-Marseille 1994, p. 340. For the development of the term and institution *ribāṭ* cf. J. Chabbi, "Ribāṭ", *EI* (CDRom).

[4] Abdulkader Alhadad, "Student Visas to Yemen Restricted", *al-Mahjar* 5;1 (2000), p. 6.

[5] The following is based, if not otherwise indicated, on Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt al-baḥr, because the author has incorporated most earlier biographies. For a brief summary of al-Ḥibshī's biography in English, cf. Bang, Sufis, pp. 103f. and Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 159–161.

where he resided before moving first to al-Qasam and then to Mecca in 1266/1849–50. He asked Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ to suggest a suitable candidate. This was a student of Sayyid Aḥmad, ʿAlawiyya bte Ḥusayn b. Aḥmad al-Hādī al-Jifrī (d. 1309/1891–92) who seems to have been a truly outstanding individual.[6] There are indications that Sayyid ʿAlī shared his parents' view of women as an active part of Muslim society. Thus, it is reported that al-Ḥibshī's wife and daughter were present during his private receptions, albeit behind a curtain.[7] Sayyid ʿAlī studied with his father, who is likely to have conveyed the ideas of the earlier reform movement to his son. The second major influence on Sayyid ʿAlī and his prime Sufi shaykh was Abū Bakr b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭālib al-ʿAṭṭās.[8] In addition to these, Sayyid ʿAlī studied with other famous *ʿulamāʾ* in Hadhramaut and Mecca, including ʿAydarūs b. ʿUmar al-Ḥibshī (1821–1896), the most influential Sufi teacher of his age and Aḥmad b. Zaynī al-Daḥlān. He further referred to Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ, who died before Sayyid ʿAlī's birth, as a "teacher", implying a spiritual rather than actual bond.[9]

Al-Ḥibshī is a prime example of how these intellectual and spiritual roots could be given a very strong Sufi turn. He started his teaching in the Ḥanbal mosque in Sayʾūn and quickly acquired a wide following in Hadhramaut and the diaspora as a Sufi shaykh.[10] The vivid description by ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr of the way in which al-Ḥibshī's preachings moved his audience has already been quoted in chapter II. Al-Ḥibshī's spiritual importance among members of the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya* can hardly be overestimated.[11] Weekly, he celebrated a small *mawlid* (celebration of the Prophet's birth) which drew many participants who enjoyed the songs and Sufi music, in addition to al-Ḥibshī's address.[12] His annual celebration of the Prophet's anniversary became particularly famous and was attended by such

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[6] Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt, pp. 8–12 for a biography of the mother, and pp. 13–16 for one of the father.

[7] ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, p. 9 (footnote).

[8] On Sayyid Abū Bakr b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭālib al-ʿAṭṭās, see chapter II.

[9] For a list of Sayyid ʿAlī's teachers, see Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt, pp. 20–25. On ʿAydarūs b. ʿUmar al-Ḥibshī's central position in the ʿAlawī chain of transmission Bang, Sufis, pp. 102f. and 105.

[10] Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt, p. 92; Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 159–161.

[11] Cf. for example al-Ḥafīẓ, Minḥa, pp. 46–67 for the *ijāza*s which this *ʿālim* obtained from al-Ḥibshī, and for those of al-Ḥibshī's sayings which he considers worth transmitting.

[12] ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, p. 8.

notable scholars as Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās from al-Ḥurayḍa.[13]
Helped by significant donations from the population of Sayʾūn, Sayyid
ʿAlī provided lavish meals for the visitors. The celebrations of the
mawlid accoring to Sayyid ʿAlī's example spread beyond the confines
of Hadhramaut to the Ḥijāz, Dhofar and beyond.[14] It was emulated
in Lamu by Ṣāliḥ ʿAlawī ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥasan b. Aḥmad Jamal al-
Layl to great effect.[15] It was the playing of music which proved to
be among the main attractions of the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*. In combina-
tion with its opening of education to slaves, it gained many adherents
in East Africa even if it did not resonate among the more established
Hadhrami families in Lamu.[16]

  Al-Ḥibshī also taught classical subjects such as *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*. In
scholarly terms, he is probably most noted as a grammarian.[17] In
1295/1878, he built a mosque and adjacent to it a *ribāṭ* which
became the centre of his teaching and Sufi activities.[18] The building
was financed with the generous donations of Sayyid ʿAlī's students
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Sharbāb (?) of Tarīm and ʿAbdallāh b.
Saʿīd Bā Salāma of Sayʾūn, both of whom possessed great wealth
in Batavia. Further donations came from supporters in India and
elsewhere and it is possible that al-Ḥibshī, who owned agricultural
land in the vicinity of Sayʾūn, contributed personally to the building
of the *ribāṭ*.[19] He later funded its renovation and the construction of
the minaret. Much of the donations were invested in lands in Singa-
pore, the returns of which covered the running expenses. The *ribāṭ*
provided lodging and scholarships for students and rooms for itin-
erant Sufi visitors.[20] Large numbers of students (estimates range from

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[13] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 413.
[14] On the *mawlid*, see Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt, pp. 102–114.
[15] On Habib Saleh, as the founder of the Riyāḍ mosque-college of Lamu is known, see Badawī, *al-Riyāḍ*; Lienhardt, "The Mosque College of Lamu"; el Zein, *The Sacred Meadow* and Romero, *Lamu*, pp. 94–102.
[16] Personal communication, Prof. Ibrahim Soghayroun, London, 2.10.2000. Music in Muslim ceremonies was first brought to East Africa by the *Qādiriyya* order and had proven very attractive.
[17] Personal communication, Sayyid ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ḥibshī, Sayʾūn, 16.8.1995.
[18] This date is given in most sources. Balfaqīh, *Tadhkira*, p. 11, fn. 1 mentions 1296/1879, but since such projects took some time from their inception via the collection of funds to the registering of the *waqfiyya* and the completion of the actual buildings, such differences are of no major significance.
[19] ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, p. 5.
[20] Ibn Ḥamīd, *Tārīkh* II; 396, on the building of the *ribāṭ* Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt, pp. 95–102, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt" 29; p. 248.

three hundred to one thousand)[21] attended the lessons and Sufi sessions with Sayyid ʿAlī and stayed for different lengths of time. His fame was so widespread that even non-Arabic speaking East Africans came to see this *walīy*.[22]

Al-Ḥibshī was not uncontroversial in his time. The footnote in Bā Kathīr's description of Sayyid ʿAlī's personal circumstances shows a rare tinge of surprise, although it remains unclear whether it stems from the author of the travelogue or from its editor:[23]

> If you walk [from the *ribāṭ*] to his house, it dazzles you [to see] the servants, entourage, male and female slaves, the furnishings and wealth, the excellent dining rooms, the plentitude of freshly slaughtered meat and visitors. You are perplexed by the private horses, mules and donkeys and livestock and the lodgings of the commoners and other sights, which are rare even among the kings and rich people, let alone others.[24]

We can only speculate at this point whether this wealth, which might or might not have been connected with Sayyid ʿAlī's success as a *walīy*,[25] caused antagonism or whether the increased demands on the hospitality of Sayʾūn annoyed part of the population. At any rate, it is interesting to note that the grandson of Sayyid ʿAlī was keen to downplay his ancestor's wealth in the 1990s, showing a certain embarrassment, which might reflect not only the present situtation but mirror older controversies.[26] It is not unlikely that the very rise of a *walīy* who conducted elaborate Sufi ceremonies and built himself a domed grave prompted the intervention of scholars and Sufis who felt that this overstepped the acceptable limits of Sufism, just as the

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[21] Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, *Fuyūḍāt*, p. 99, gives the figure of 300, while ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī, a descendant of Sayyid ʿAlī, estimates the number of his students at 2000. Personal communication, Sayʾūn, 16.8.1995.

[22] Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, *Fuyūḍāt*, p. 99.

[23] On the difficult question of the authorship of the footnotes, see Hartwig, "Contemplation, Social Reform and the Recollection of Identity", pp. 317–319. If al-Saqqāf has written the footnote, it expresses a family dispute between rivaling *ʿulamāʾ* and needs to be read much more sceptically.

[24] ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, p. 7. The commentator could be ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Saqqāf.

[25] Many holy men received gifts and other sustenance from their supporters, sometimes exploiting this position, Bā Kathīr's *Humam*, pp. 49–51,59,61. The rise of al-Ḥibshī is reflected in the changing terminology in Ibn Ḥamīd, who in 1880–81 called al-Ḥibshī "*al-Ḥabīb al-ʿallāma al-shāb al-nāshī*" and in 1306/1888–89 "*al-imām al-ʿallāma quṭb al-wujūd al-fahāma al-ḥabīb*", *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 396, 413.

[26] Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, p. 269, note 23, where she quotes Sayyid Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir refuting some aspects of Sayyid ʿAlī's lifestyle which are expounded in ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf, *Tārīkh al-shuʿarāʾ*, vol. IV, pp. 132–138.

old Arab families in Lamu had kept their distance from Sayyid ʿAlī's disciple, Ḥabīb Ṣāliḥ. This might have been an outgrowth not only of direct rivalries, but also different theological orientations. Therefore the respect of the highly regarded Sayyid Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās for al-Ḥibshī is not surprising, given the sympathies of al-ʿAṭṭās for scholars defending the worship of saints and condemning reformists, such as the Palestinian writer and judge Yūsuf al-Nabhānī.[27]

Among Sayyid ʿAlī's critics, we find some members of the al-Saqqāf family, one of Sayʾūn's foremost notable families and contributors of major funds to the development of Hadhramaut, similar to the al-Kāf in Tarīm.[28] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh b. Muḥsin al-Saqqāf, who has already been discussed in chapter III in connection with the political intrigues of World War I, reports:

> the aversion of the people against this meeting [i.e., the *mawlid*] grew. There was fear of internal dispute [*fitna*]. [Therefore,] our uncle ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥsin al-Saqqāf went to the Sultan to put an end to this practice, and he stopped it [the *mawlid*] approximately in 1309/1891, which impacted on the people.

Sayyid ʿAlī's followers were not amused and found their way to avenge this deed, as the follow-up to the above story shows:

> When our uncle died in Ramaḍān 1313/February 1896, a cry was heard above his grave for a number of nights, which greatly frightened the people. The followers of Bā Ṭuwayḥ [a disciple of al-Ḥibshī whom al-Saqqāf particularly criticises] claimed that this was nothing other but God's punishment for the ban of the *mawlid*.[29]

According to al-Saqqāf, a slave of the Sultan later admitted that he had been hired by Bā Ṭuwayḥ's agents to frighten the people. At some unspecified time after this interlude al-Ḥibshī must have been able to resume the annual celebrations at their earlier scale.[30] As will be seen later, Ibn ʿUbaydillāh's account is likely to reflect his own convictions which became influenced by *salafī* positions after the initial enthusiasm for Shiʾism.

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[27] For the links between al-ʿAṭṭās and al-Nabhānī, see Bā Faḍl, *al-Nafḥa al-miskiyya*, pp. 76, 97, 103, for al-Nabhānī compare al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. 8, p. 218.

[28] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 86.

[29] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt", 29, pp. 245f. When ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr visited Hadhramaut in 1897, the *mawlid* still seems to have been disfunctional for unspecified "political reasons". ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, p. 8. Interestingly, Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt, is silent on the issue.

[30] According to Ṭāhā al-Saqqāf, Fuyūḍāt, p. 114, a major *mawlid* "reminding us of the former old *mawlid*" was held in 1331/1913.

The above discussion attempts to reflect the literature on Sayyid
ʿAlī. It is noteworthy that the *ribāṭ* is hardly mentioned as an inno-
vative educational institution. This probably mirrors the fact that its
major role was to serve as a visitor centre for Sufis who wanted to
spend some time with Sayyid ʿAlī al-Ḥibshī. A British officer, visit-
ing six years after Sayyid ʿAlī's death, noted that "since the death
of its late Principal Sayyed Ali-al-Habashi, no one takes much inter-
est in the institution".[31]

As mentioned earlier, the *ribāṭ* of Tarīm had quite a specific agenda.[32]
A number of prominent Tarīmīs, as well as Singaporean and Javanese
merchants of Tarīmī origin, were dissatisfied with the state of teach-
ing in this city. Members of the al-Ḥaddād, al-Sirrī, al-Junayd and
al-ʿIrfān families collected donations among wealthy merchants.
Following the example of al-Ḥibshī, this money was transferred into
a *waqf* which was registered in Singapore on March 10, 1886 in the
names of ʿAqīl b. Sālim al-Sirrī and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī al-
Junayd (1857–1927), grandson of ʿUmar, the "pioneer of Singapore"
discussed above in chapter II. A part of these funds was invested in
real estate in Singapore, another part registered as a *waqf* in Tarīm
and used for the acquisition of houses and land for the future *ribāṭ*.
This was later complemented by additional donations.[33] The real
estate in Singapore was to yield income from which the following
tasks were paid:

– the renovation and upkeeping of the *ribāṭ*,
– the hiring of teachers knowledgeable in the *sharīʿa* and the sciences
  of the Muslims to teach poor Arabs their religious duties,
– the provision of dwellings and houses for those staying [i.e. the
  students].[34]

The fact that teachers should not only know the *sharīʿa* but also "the
sciences of the Muslims" indicates, according to the *ribāṭ*'s historian,
that the scope of teaching was to include sciences formerly practiced
by Muslims but not immediately related to the study of religion.[35]

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[31] IO, R/20/A/1415, Report by Captain Nasir-ud-din Ahmad, Political Officer
Aden, on his visit to the Hadramaut. 12.3.1920, p. 21. Cf. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt" 29, p. 246.
[32] If not indicated otherwise, the following is based on Balfaqīh *Tadhkirat*.
[33] For example, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī al-Junayd, when he returned to settle
in Tarīm, donated additional land for a well and a building, al-Junayd, *al-ʿUqūd*,
p. 190. Cf. Balfaqīh, *Tadhkira*, pp. 42, 45–47.
[34] Balfaqīh, *Tadhkira*, pp. 25f.
[35] Balfaqīh, *Tadhkira*, p. 25, fn. 1.

According to the *waqfiyya*, the students were to be poor Arabs of any *madhhab*. The *waqf* was administered by a board of trustees who appointed a headmaster.

On Muḥarram 14, 1305/3 October 1887, the new school opened its doors with a reading of the story of the Prophet's birthday. The overall academic responsibility was entrusted to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad al-Mashhūr (1834–1902), the most prominent *ʿālim* of his age who was accorded the honorific title of *muftī* of Hadhramaut.[36] He divided the instruction into lessons for the students of the *ribāṭ* and lessons for the wider Tarīmī public. The latter were held twice weekly and met with much enthusiasm.

Most of the teaching was initially conducted by the following six prominent *ʿulamāʾ*: ʿAlawī b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Bakr al-Mashhūr (1263/1847–48 – 1341/1922), the *qāḍī* Ḥusayn b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Kāf (d. 1333/1914–15), Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Bakrī al-Khaṭīb (1257/1841–42 – 1331/1913), his sons Abū Bakr (d. 1333/1914–15) and Muḥammad (1284/1867–68 – 1350/1931–32), and Ḥasan b. ʿAlawī b. Shihāb (1852–1914).[37] In contrast to the earlier mode of instruction in mosques where the regular study circles of individual teachers could be joined more or less frequently, and in contrast to Sayʾūn where students still came to study with one outstanding shaykh, students in the *ribāṭ* of Tarīm were taught by a number of teachers in one purpose-built school. They followed a coherent, four-year curriculum in groups which were arranged according to ability and based on the principle of progression. The students, whose numbers rose slowly until they reached about 200 by the 1930s, normally stayed in the *ribāṭ* and were treated to an austere diet of coffee, dates and rice, with the exception of a few descendants of wealthy families who were sustained by special family *waqf*s.[38] The earlier free association between the general population of Tarīm and individual scholars teaching in various mosques now became limited to the above-mentioned public lessons as far as

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[36] In contrast to the office of Shāfiʿī *muftī* in Mecca, for example, this was a honorific title. Biographies of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mashhūr can be found in A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, pp. 173–177; al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. 3, p. 334; ʿAbdallāh Bā Kathīr, *Riḥla*, pp. 52–54 (footnotes); Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 76–82. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mashhūr compiled the first edition of *Shams al-ẓahīra*.

[37] For their names and biographies, see Balfaqīh, *Tadhkira*, pp. 22–25. For ʿAlawī al-Mashhūr, see in great detail A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ al-nūr*, vol. I.

[38] Personal communication, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, 16.10.1996. The number of 200 is also given for 1944 by Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 54.

the teachers in the *ribāṭ* were concerned, unless of course the individual teacher chose to offer public lessons elsewhere.

In spite of the opposition by some *'ulamā'* who felt that this institutionalisation of religious instruction was a deviation from time-honoured practice, the *ribāṭ* still maintained many features of traditional education. For example, the spatial order resembled earlier arrangements, as students were still seated in circles around their master.[39] Although students came to Tarīm primarily to study at the *ribāṭ*, they were obviously free to attend lectures by other *'ulamā'* elsewhere in the city. Depending on their intellectual curiosity, they made good use of this opportunity, which exists in Tarīm, Say'ūn and other Hadhrami towns to the present day.[40]

Although the definition of what was to be taught in the *ribāṭ* of Tarīm was quite broad, instruction centred on the religious and linguistic sciences. Probably the major innovation was the privileged teaching of jurisprudence rather than *taṣawwuf* in the instruction of the students. This might have eased the students' entrance into careers as judges and teachers, and thus have contributed to the functionalisation of religious knowledge.[41] Nevertheless, *taṣawwuf* still played a role in the public lessons, most notably in the *sidāra*, the weekly lecture of the most prominent Sufi and *'ālim* of his time.[42] Furthermore, Sufism was practiced by students and teachers alike, which is not surprising given that the teachers in Tarīm had mostly studied with the same *'ulamā'* who had taught 'Alī al-Ḥibshī.[43]

The *ribāṭ* certainly boosted religious teaching and infused enthusiasm to emulate its example. Shaykh Muḥammad b. 'Umar b. Salim (1274/1856–57 – 1329/1911) from al-Shiḥr, a graduate of al-Azhar in Cairo, founded a religious institute in the agricultural town of Ghayl Bā Wazīr. *'Ulamā'* of the Wadi encouraged him, most notably

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[39] Compare the photograph in Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. 1, p. 57. In many aspects, this teaching probably resembled what is described in great detail by Messick for the North Yemen, *The Calligraphic State*, pp. 75–98. That Egypt and the Ḥijāz functioned as examples that the *ribāṭ* attempted to emulate, was suggested by Karāma Sulaymān, Tarīm, 11.12.1996.

[40] Personal communication, Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, 16.10.1996.

[41] For a curriculum and the educational aims see Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, pp. 90f.

[42] Personal communication, Karāma Sulaymān, Tarīm, 11.12.1996; Balfaqīh, *Tadhikra*, p. 28: "*amma 'l-ṣidāra fī hadhā al-madras fa-hiyya liman yakūn bi-mithāba 'ayn al-'ulamā' bi-Tarīm*".

[43] Personal communication, Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, 13.10.1996; Balfaqīh, *Tadhkira*, p. 28.

ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī. Indeed, Ibn Salim's *ribāṭ*, in which he seems to have been the major teacher, mostly catered for students from the coast and seems to have leaned heavily towards Sufism.[44]

In spite of an overall positive response to the renewal of religious teaching, it did not satisfy everybody. The first criticism came from Singapore in 1905. Former teacher at the *ribāṭ* of Tarīm, Ḥasan b. ʿAlawī b. Shihāb, published a small booklet entitled *Niḥlat al-waṭan*. This was an outspoken critique of the teaching in the *ribāṭ*, which Ibn Shihāb considered as unsatisfactory even within the framework of an exclusively religious education. The attack extended both to the limited scope of teaching which Ibn Shihāb suggested should be widened in the fields of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, logic and rhetoric, as well as to the teaching methods. According to Ibn Shihāb, these were a far shot from the progress achieved lately in Mecca and Egypt, notably in terms of forming groups of students of the same level.[45] It seems that Ḥasan b. Shihāb, already a controversial member of a wealthy notable family, developed this critical attitude after he emigrated to become administrator of the family's properties in South East Asia. This did not mean that Ibn Shihāb forfeited his scholarly interests. He joined Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl as a partner in trade and journalism, contributing to *al-Imām* and *al-Iṣlāḥ* in addition to corresponding with the *al-Manār* and *al-Muʾayyad* in Cairo.[46] Only a few years later he fell out with Ibn ʿAqīl, one of the reasons being Ibn ʿAqīl's pro-Shiʿī tendencies which Ibn Shihāb publicly denounced.[47] It is worthwhile mentioning that Ibn Shihāb continued in publishing after the faltering of his cooperation with Ibn ʿAqīl. From February 1910 onwards, he cooperated with Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mashhūr (possibly the co-founder of *Jamʿiyyat al-Khayr*) on the Arabic language journal *al-Waṭan* in Singapore.[48]

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[44] S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, pp. 201–213, and [Mudhakkirāt], pp. 2–6, in which he gives some impression of the later development of the *ribāṭ*.

[45] Ḥasan b. Shihāb, *Niḥlat al-waṭan*. For a summary of Ibn Shihāb's criticism, see ʿAlī Bukayr, "Daʿwa" and Freitag, "Hadhramaut", pp. 173–177.

[46] ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf, *Tārīkh al-shuʿarāʾ*, vol. V, pp. 23–26; ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 168.

[47] Cf. Ende, "Schiitische Tendenzen", p. 96; Roff, "Murder".

[48] *Straits Settlements Government Gazette*, 1.7.1910, p. 1457, reg. no. 722. I would like to thank Ian Proudfoot for this information. *al-Waṭan* is mentioned as Ibn Shihāb's publication in ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 168, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, p. 221 and Balfaqīh, *Tadhkira*, p. 24, fn. 2. All authors do not mention al-Mashhūr as editor.

Ibn Shihāb's criticism of the *ribāṭ* occasioned a major outcry among Hadhrami *ʿulamāʾ* and sparked passionate exchanges.[49] One of his defenders was ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf. In 1323/ 1905–6, al-Saqqāf was in turn accused by *ʿulamāʾ* from Java of having strayed from the path of the pious forefathers on the occasion of an article in *al-Manār*.[50] One can easily assume that the very fact of him writing in this mouthpiece of modernism sufficed to raise suspicions. Moreover, he had taken Ibn Shihāb's side in the article. Characteristically for his time, al-Saqqāf defended himself by composing a poem which takes up the major arguments.[51]

Ibn ʿUbaydillāh, as he is commonly known, was an outstanding student of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shihāb. In the course of the early 20th century, he became a very influential but controversial figure thanks to his outspoken views on many political and religious issues.[52] His above-mentioned criticism of Sayyid ʿAlī al-Ḥibshī is a good example of how this particular reformer viewed his prominent elder.[53] Ibn ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf, who was al-Ḥibshī's junior by some forty years, commented on Sayyid ʿAlī's tendency towards self-aggrandisement. He based his views on Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the preferred sources of Wahhābī (and consequently anti-Sufi) scholars, which must have been unpopular with his fellow *sayyid*s.[54] Again, this should not lead one to assume that al-Saqqāf generally opposed Sufism, as he often reaffirms his own commitment to *taṣawwuf* and his belief in the *awliyāʾ*.[55] However,

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[49] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 143, 156, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 261–269, 361f., ʿAlī Bukayr, "Daʿwa", p. 156.

[50] This article is presumably the open letter by Ibn ʿUbaydillāh to Ibn Shihāb in *al-Manār* 9;6, 23.7.1906, pp. 450–452, in which he demands Ibn Shihāb's and Ibn ʿAqīl's help in denouncing a *risāla* according to which Hadhramis showed joy on the day of *ʿāshūra*, on which the death of al-Ḥusayn is remembered and which is considered a day of mourning by Shīʾites. This is an interesting indication of discussions of Shīʿa-related questions prior to 1908, when Ibn ʿAqīl's publication brought matters to a heed.

[51] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 366f.

[52] For a critical evaluation of one of his works (unfortunately it is not clear which), see the letter by Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl that is quoted in Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 28.10.1992.

[53] For short biographies, see al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. III, pp. 315f.; ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 239–241 and the biography by his son Ḥasan in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 547–549. The *Dīwān* contains much autobiographical material, as do a number of other publications by Ibn ʿUbaydillāh. For a list of his publications, see al-Jaruw, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 22f.

[54] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, "Ḥaḍramawt", 29, pp. 243–245.

[55] See, for example, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 258f.

The mosque and ribāṭ of Sayyid ʿAlī al-Ḥibshī in Sayʾūn.
Photograph by the author

the correct interpretation of mysticism and the distinction between
proper *taṣawwuf* and superstitions (*khurāfāt*) was what incited al-Saqqāf
time and again. In 1928, it spurred him to attempt to mediate
between *Irshādī*s and *ʿAlawī*s, which again increased the wrath of his
opponents.[56] The debate about innovations and superstitions contin-
ues in Hadhramaut to this day.

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[56] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 238–269, 400f. About the reconcilia-
tion attempt, see al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 271f.

Associations and Schools: the Organisational Structure of Reform

Because of the rather fragmented political scene in Hadhramaut, it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty when the first reform associations were founded.[57] Even the few historians interested in the issue were often only aware of what happened in their own towns or what was transmitted by their own networks. This problem is exacerbated by the ephemeral nature of the first associations and by the rivalries between them. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess whether the early associations can be characterised as 'volitional' in the sense discussed in the last chapter. Wadi Hadhramaut had a tradition of association on the basis of tribal or, in the case of the quarter associations, of regional proximity.[58] In the early 19th century, the al-'Aṭṭās family in- and outside of al-Ḥurayḍa agreed on a 'Constitution' which formalised the political structure of leadership and decision-making in the family.[59] While clearly being limited to a status and large family group and occurring within a culture which gives great value to written agreements, this new arrangement, which centred around the institution of a regular family council, nevertheless seems to have constituted a new degree of organisation deemed noteworthy in oral and written memory. One might also point to the pact between the three reformers and friends Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥibshī, Muḥsin b. 'Alawī al-Saqqāf and 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar b. Yaḥyā, discussed in chapter II. They committed themselves in writing to pursue reform, and although they again shared the same status and religious background, their pact might well constitute another step towards a new type of association. We probably have to assume that the first of those associations, which are presented to us as a new phenomenon by authors such as al-Ṣabbān and about which we often know little beyond the fact that they existed, closely resemble some of these earlier forms of association.[60] However, it is interesting that the idea of associations which were increasingly volitional

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[57] Annex B provides a survey of the information discussed below.

[58] Al-Ṣabbān, in al-'Ādāt, vol. II, pp. 259–262 and in his Nushū' al-ḥaraka, pp. 6–8 thus regards tribes, quarter organisations and an association of the 'Alawīs in the 10th c. h./16th c. A.D. as predecessors of the modern associations.

[59] 'Alī al-'Aṭṭās, *Tāj*, vol. I, pp. 228f. calls it "*khaṭṭ 'Alī b. Jaʿfar*", while Bujra, *The Politics*", p. 19 talks of a "constitution".

[60] Al-Ṣabbān, al-'Ādāt, vol. II, p. 262 mentions that associations were formed since 1905 in Dawʿan, Ribāṭ Bā 'Ashan, al-Ḥurayḍa, Sayʾūn and Tarīm without giving any further information until 1912.

in nature seems to have spread in Hadhramaut before it gained wide currency in other parts of South Arabia including Aden.[61]

The first Hadhrami association about which slightly more than the very fact of its existence is known has been documented by Ibn ʿUbaydillāh.[62] He tells us how a group of (presumably young) men of *sayyid* origin agreed in writing on the statutes of an association around 1907. It aimed at "bringing into the open the views of the elite (*zubda*) and weighing them" in order to "achieve civilisation (*ʿumrān*), to improve the affairs of the world (*iṣlāḥ amr al-ʿālam*) and to ensure security, peace, the rule of law and justice".[63] The justification for the society's founding was based on a lengthy exegesis of the Koran, and our source explains that the members were despairing of the possibility to reform their homeland until they resolved to found an association. The work of the association was to be grounded in the Koran and the example of the Prophet (*sunna*). It was hoped that these aims could be achieved through *tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, the "refinement of character", which had also been a key word in the South East Asian context.[64]

The society, which al-Saqqāf described as "tiny" (*ḍaʾīl*),[65] is said to have "brought about many reforms and solved problems".[66] However, some doubt regarding the veracity of this claim seems in order. Firstly, the society was quickly criticised by Ḥasan b. Shihāb al-Dīn in *al-Waṭan*. The attack illustrates the internal divisions among reform-minded Hadhramis, before and beyond the split into ʿAlawīs and Irshādīs.[67] Secondly, al-Saqqāf reported how he became frustrated with his initiative and only gained new hope during a journey to Singapore and Java in 1911–12. There, he was assured of the ascendancy of the reformers as well as of their lack of organisation. In consequence, he suggested the founding of a party of "Renaissance and Straightening" (*al-nuhūḍ wa-l-iʿtidāl*) which was to embrace reformers in Hadhramaut and South East Asia. The aim was to strengthen the community, to resurrect its former glory and strength, to teach and to generally increase observance of the *sharīʿa*.[68]

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[61] On developments there, see Nājī, "Dawr", p. 8.
[62] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 87, names the al-Saqqāf family next to the Āl al-Kāf as those involved in reform and budget subsidies.
[63] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt*, vol. III, p. 133.
[64] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt*, vol. III, p. 134. Cf. chapter V.
[65] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, p. 220.
[66] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt*, vol. III, p. 134.
[67] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, p. 221.
[68] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 290f. It is not entirely clear whether

It is interesting to note that people like al-Saqqāf tried to change matters not only through such associations. His *Dīwān* contains a number of poems which raise the issue of reform. Some of them were sent to specific people such as Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār, the Qu'ayṭī *wazīr*, while others were probably recited during men's receptions or on the occasion of travellers returning from abroad.[69] These must have fulfilled a function comparable to that of political leaflets elsewhere and occasionally caused similar reactions. For example, Ibn 'Ubaydillāh composed a poem on the occasion of the return of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb to Tarīm in 1913. He used it to attack *bida'* and complained about the lacking resonance of the reform calls while expressing his confidence that Sayyid Abū Bakr's return would change these matters. Because some students complained about the poem, a meeting (*majlis*) of scholars and notables was convened. Ibn 'Ubaydillāh proudly proclaims that it "ended with our victory in argument and evidence".[70] Nevertheless, the reformer, who did not hide his claim to leadership, continued to complain time and again that "I cry out while my people is immersed in its sleep".[71]

In approximately 1916, the "Truth Society" (*Jam'iyyat al-Ḥaqq*) was established in Tarīm. While its origins and activities in this town will be discussed in the next section, it is noteworthy that a British report states that the society aimed at advocating religious, literary and ethical sciences as well as jurisprudence. It also wanted to enhance the teaching facilities for the children of emigrants who did not speak Arabic.[72] In 1916, the society founded a school bearing its name in Tarīm.[73] This was the first school to include some secular subjects such as history, mathematics, geography and some sciences in its curriculum. When it ran into financial difficulties, the al-Kāf family continued the al-Ḥaqq school in their own name until the cessation

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this suggestion is identical with his reported founding of a party in 1330/1911–12 in Java, Badā'i' al-tābūt, vol. II, p. 135.

[69] For example 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 282–284, 298–303. For a short appreciation of the *Dīwān*, see al-Millāḥī, "al-Shā'ir 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Ubaydillāh al-Saqqāf".

[70] 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 368–371, quote p. 368.

[71] 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, p. 300 (poem from 1325/1907–8).

[72] IO, R/20/A/1409, Report by Sayyid 'Alawi b. Bubakr El Jifri, 21.4.1916, p. 1.

[73] Personal communication, Aḥmad 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr, al-Mukallā 30.10.1996 and Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, pp. 64f. Cf. on this and other schools Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 168–171.

of remittances during World War II forced its closure.[74] In spite of
the backing by a family noted for its charity and devotion, the intro-
duction of the new school encountered great scepticism. In 1920, a
British observer remarked on the society's chairman, Sayyid ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh al-Kāf:

> He was very strongly opposed for his efforts to introduce reforms in
> the teaching of boys, and ultimately prevailed on his family to give
> his methods a trial. These having proved successful, he invited the
> opposing Sayyeds and Ulemas to the first annual examination of the
> students and asked them to examine them. The result was that the
> opposition fell through, and the leading opposer S.Ali Ashor thereafter
> himself founded a school on the same lines at Shehr.[75]

In 1926–27, Muḥammad b. Hāshim, who was introduced in the pre-
vious chapter as a teacher and journalist in South East Asia, joined
the school and later became its director. According to the journalist
Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, it was only under his leadership that new
subjects were introduced. Ibn Hāshim also initiated a new seating
order by which students were placed at desks which were arranged
in rows.[76]

If one consults the list of former students of this controversial
school, one notes how many of the graduates later assumed leading
political and administrative roles. The historian Muḥamad, son of
Aḥmad b. ʿUmar al-Shāṭirī (b. 1914), became legal advisor to the
State Council; Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Sirrī later headed the firm trans-
porting goods between the coast and the Wadi; ʿAlī b. Shaykh Balfaqīh
directed the Kathīrī Department of Education; and others became
teachers, government administrators, etc.[77] A number of these individ-
uals combined education in the al-Ḥaqq school with further religious
training in the *ribāṭ*. This strengthens the view that the introduction
of secular education was a very gradual process, which in the eyes
of those undergoing it did not necessarily contradict religious train-
ing. However, this did not ease the opposition of religious scholars
fearing for their monopoly as intellectual leaders of the community.

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[74] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 423; Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 125f. On
Muḥammad b. Hāshim, cf. chapter V; Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1468/1949,
p. 15.
[75] IO, R/20/A/1415, Personalities (by Nasir-ud-Din Ahmad, 12.3.1920), p. 1.
[76] Personal communication, Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, al-Mukallā, 30.10.1996.
[77] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 125f. For a biography of Muḥammad
al-Shāṭirī, see Ḥusayn al-Saqqāf, Tarjama.

Again in Tarīm, a society aiming at "the improvement of character and cooperation in every matter concerning public interest" was founded around 1918.[78] Not very much is known about the activities of *Jamʿiyyat Nashr al-Faḍāʾil*, except that it seems to have been predominantly occupied with religious teaching and inner mission (*daʿwa*). Therefore, it has been credited with the founding of four presumably elementary, *kuttāb*-style schools in different quarters of Tarīm, as well as with attempts to spread Islam by public teaching in outlying suburbs in the tradition of the 19th century reformers.[79]

Among its founders was Aḥmad b. ʿUmar al-Shāṭirī (1884/85–1941), who had studied in the *ribāṭ* and later joined it as teacher. Al-Shāṭirī was probably a typical example of the open-minded scholar with wide-ranging intellectual interests. We are told that he was very interested in reading newspapers and journals. This was very rare at the time, given that journals had to be imported via Aden and Mukallā and no press existed in Hadhramaut. Consequently, al-Shāṭirī's knowledge by far surpassed what fell within the usual range of scholarly knowledge. His son tells us that:

> He was informed in detail about all inhabited lands, and about their rulers, ministers, leaders and conditions. He also knew some modern European and American history, and was more familiar with their inventions than many who had witnessed them. He spoke of the Arab countries, and in particular of Egypt with such knowledge that some travellers whom he met did not believe that he had never travelled abroad.[80]

It is thus not surprising that al-Shāṭirī soon joined the newly founded school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*. He too is credited with the introduction of new subjects.[81] Later, he seems to have taken up independent teaching, mostly of *fiqh*, but remained interested in youth work. He participated in a later association, *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana*, and played a crucial role in founding a youth club (*Nādī al-Shabība*) in Tarīm. This is significant in so far as the youth clubs, which from the 1930s spread more widely, became an important way by which

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[78] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 458, who quotes from Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī's biography of his father in Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī's *al-Yāqūt al-nafīs fī madhab al-Imām Ibn Idrīs*, gives 1337 (1918–19) as the founding date of the society, while Muḥammad al-Shāṭirī, "Tārīkh al-ṣiḥāfa", p. 57 himself gives 1917 as the date when a journal was proposed by a member of the (already extant) organisation.
[79] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 458; personal communication, Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah, 29.3.2000.
[80] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 458.
[81] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 457.

the youth, mostly students at the new schools, were politicised. Thus, the youth clubs performed the same role as the boy scouts movement of *Jam'iyyat al-Irshād* in Netherlands East India. Both types of organisation served as forums for new ideas.

As in the case of Ibn 'Ubaydillāh, al-Shāṭirī's modernist orientation was deeply rooted in Sufism. Like a number of the 19th century reformers, he was influenced by the Idrīsī tradition. Among his publications we find "The precious sapphires in the *madhhab* of Imām Ibn Idrīs" (*al-Yāqūt al-nafīs fī madhhab al-imām Ibn Idrīs*), was printed in Cairo in 1932. In spite of the many differences between the widely travelled and politically active Ibn 'Ubaydillāh and al-Shāṭirī, who never left the Wadi and seems to have avoided the political intrigues of this period, it is interesting to note this common background. The early 20th century "revivalist mood" expressed itself in Hadhramaut, as well as in South East Asia and other parts of the diaspora in the founding of associations.[82]

The late 1920s and early 1930s witnessed a rapid increase in the formation of associations in Say'ūn.[83] The fact that in 1937 and 1938 six associations existed in this town alone might point to their short-lived nature, but it could also indicate the factionalism among the reform-minded youth who competed for the most radical approach.[84] Without further information it is difficult to comment on this phenomenon, and it certainly would be rash to attribute it to a simple spillover of the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict. The names given by al-Ṣabbān show the consistent cooperation of members of different strata in the associations, which incidentally supports the view that they increasingly became volitional, and thus 'modern', organisations. Furthermore, it would seem that by the 1930s, not only Ibn 'Ubaydillāh, but many educated young *sayyid*s considered some of the privileges enjoyed by their class as slightly antiquated, while obviously still admiring the learning and leadership of their ancestors.[85]

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[82] Although little is yet known about such organisations in East Africa, one group called "*Nādī al-Ittifāq al-Islāmī*" (Association of Islamic Convention) is mentioned by Bā Faqīh for Addis Abeba, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 28.10.1992.

[83] Al-Ṣabbān, "al-'Ādāt", vol. I, p. 265. Cf. his *Madīnat Say'ūn*, pp. 39f. and *Nushū' al-ḥaraka*, pp. 8–10. Interestingly, the authors of *al-Nahḍa*'s article on the history of associations in Say'ūn seem to have been oblivious of the earlier associations. *al-Nahḍa* 10, Dhū al-ḥijja 1341/Jan.-Feb. 1942, p. 3.

[84] Personal communication, 'Abd al-Qādir al-Ṣabbān, Say'ūn, 27.11.1996.

[85] Personal communication, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Millāḥī, al-Shiḥr, 14.10.1996. This can be further substantiated by an analysis of the early Hadhrami journals,

The associations ranged from talking clubs to well structured, efficient organisations. The most notable example of the latter is *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*, as will be shown below. However, it is also worthwhile to briefly mention its successor, *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana*, in Tarīm in this context. It was founded some time between 1928 and 1932 by students of the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* who felt that the latter's curriculum was still too traditional.[86] One of the founders, the *ʿālim* and historian Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, noted that it initially encountered opposition by the sultan's slaves as well as the elder generation of reform-minded families such as the Āl al-Kāf.[87] By October 1936, Muḥammad b. Hāshim informed the Kathīrī Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr about the society and suggested setting up a committee to formulate "the thoughts of the nation".[88] *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* took its turn establishing a school which gave secular subjects even more prominence than the earlier school.[89] The youth club, which quickly formed in the school, further politicised the students, for example, by collecting money in support of the Palestinian struggle.[90] While this might have been a rather symbolic gesture, it is significant in that it raised awareness of wider Arab issues. In 1938 or 39, the *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* was the first Hadhrami organisation to set up a girl's school.[91] Its wider aims will be discussed more fully in chapter VII, and combined political and moral reform.

In 1926, an association was founded in Sayʾūn to provide credit for peasants, but it is unclear whether this was some commercial venture or indeed an organisation comparable to the voluntary associations discussed here. *Jamʿiyyat al-ʿAdl*, the Justice Society in Sayʾūn of which we only have the statutes from 1931, is remarkable for its programme

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in which both *sayyid*s and others joined hands to criticise what they considered to be antiquated customs.

[86] Al-Ṣabbān, *Nushūʾ al-ḥaraka*, p. 13. According to *Ṣawt Ḥaḍramawt*, 6–7, 12.6.1935, p. 6, it was founded in 1934. Ḥusayn al-Saqqāf, Tarjama, p. 16, gives the founding date of 1351/1932–33; Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza", pp. 168f., claims that it was clandestinely founded in 1929. This date seems confirmed by Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, p. 8.

[87] Personal communication, Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah, 29.3.2000.

[88] SMA III,463, Muḥammad b. Hāshim to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr al-Kathīrī, 5. Shaʿbān 1355/21.10.1936.

[89] According to a "Bayān" published by the association, this school was set up in 1354/1935–36.

[90] Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza", p. 169.

[91] Personal communication, Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, al-Mukallā, 30.10.1996; Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 65; Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, p. 16.

which combined precise economic demands, i.e., the capping of the wages of guildmembers and craftsmen and the improvement of the alimentary conditions, with political and moral reform.[92]

It would seem that the founding of associations on the coast occurred somewhat later. At some point probably in the early 1930s, a "Reform Club" (*Nādī al-Iṣlāḥ*) was founded in al-Shiḥr under the leadership of 'Abd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh. According to Baṭāṭī, this club considered itself to be some kind of legislative council. It must remain open whether this club can be seen in the context of constitutional evolution under the auspices of the Qu'ayṭī sultanate or as an assembly of notables aiming at greater representation.[93] The initial meeting of the club took place in the house of the Bā Sharahīl family.[94] This is a further indication of the role which leading merchants of non-*sayyid* origin played on the coast. Bā Faqīh also authored a hand-written journal called "Wādī Sam'ūn" around this time.[95] Both events might have been related to the opening of a new building for *Madrasat Makārim al-Akhlāq*.

This school was founded in al-Shiḥr by the Qu'ayṭī sultan in November 1918. It was to be a school "along the lines of the new system" and its programmatic name translates as "the school of noble traits of the character".[96] For a long time, it was the major school on the coast and seems to have been comparable to the one run by *Jam'iyyat al-Ḥaqq* in terms of educating the leading judges, scholars and intellectuals of the next generation. Like its Tarīmī counterpart, it concentrated on the religious sciences but offered some Arabic, classical literature, geography and mathematics. The students, graduates of the *kuttāb*, studied for a course of six years after which they could enter the judicial system and the state administration.[97]

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[92] Al-Ṣabbān, *Nushū' al-ḥaraka*, pp. 11–12. For a more detailed discussion of *Jam'iyyat al-'Adl*, cf. Freitag, "Dying of Enforced Spinsterhood", pp. 8f.

[93] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 77. While al-Baṭāṭī's account seems to indicate a date in the early 1930s, SMA III; 555, a letter to Sultan 'Alī b. Mansūr al-Kathīrī of 9. Ṣafar 1356/21.4.1937 mentions that there had been a meeting only two days earlier to discuss such an organisation. Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 4.11.1992, professes to have no additional knowledge to that of al-Baṭāṭī but gives the names of the club's members. Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza", pp. 168f. also only names clubs and associations in coastal cities from 1936 onwards.

[94] SMA III; 555, a letter to Sultan 'Alī b. Mansūr al-Kathīrī of 9. Ṣafar 1356/21.4.1937.

[95] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 4.11.1992.

[96] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 20; cf. Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 73, Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, p. 168.

[97] The importance of the school for the following generation of intellectuals was

On the coast and in the Wadi, a number of smaller, mostly elementary schools opened from the early 20th century onwards.[98] In the interior, *Madrasat al-Hudā* in al-Qaṭn, *Madrasat al-Najāḥ* in Shibām and *Madrasat al-Nahḍa* in Say'ūn (since 1920) deserve special mention. While most of these schools were sponsored by individuals or associations and often received support from abroad, three schools in al-Mukallā, one of which taught in English, received substantial support from the Qu'ayṭī sultan.[99] All of them combined religious subjects with some other topics. Ibn Hāshim describes students of *Madrasat al-Falāḥ* in al-Mukallā who appeared in scouting outfits and with flags. During an evening celebration in *Madrasat al-Ḥaqq*, hymns were recited, speeches held and students examined by approving visitors.[100] This resonates Mobini-Kehseh's description of the schools of *Jam'iyyat al-Irshād*. Nevertheless, to an outside visitor like al-Bakrī, the situation in 1936 was as follows:

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impressed on me by 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Millāḥī, al-Shiḥr, 14.10.1996. For a list of some of the graduates of the schools in al-Shiḥr, Tarīm and Ghayl Bā Wazīr, who came to play a political role later, see Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza", p. 177, fn. 4.

[98] The information on the schools before 1937 is extremely scattered. The list in S. Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr*, pp. 165f., seems incomplete; cf. al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 165f. and the various schools mentioned in van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*. For coastal schools, see H. Ingrams, *A Report*, pp. 100f. and IO, R/20/A/3907, Report by Sheikh Abdul Qadir Okeir on the coastal schools of Hadhramaut, 25.6.1937.

[99] On the issue of support from abroad Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 110. Possibly, money collected in Surabaya for a school in Say'ūn went towards *Madrasat al-Nahḍa*, which was founded by Saqqāf b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf with funds from Singapore and the Indies in 1920 and in 1922 moved into its current premises. It offered a 9 year programme (later extended to 12 years), which probably was the most comprehensive at its time. Personal communication, Aḥmad 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr, al-Mukallā, 30.10.1996; *Madāris al-nahḍa al-'ilmiyya*, pp. 5–12; Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, pp. 65f. In al-Mukallā, *Madrasat al-Falāḥ* was founded by Ṭāhir al-Dabbāgh who had earlier directed a school by the same name in Mecca, participated in the Ḥijāzī government and fled the country after the Wahhabi conquest. Whether he, or one of his cousins 'Alī and Ḥusayn, directed the school in early 1930 remains open, as Ṭāhir, in contrast to his brothers, also visited the Indies and supported 'Alawī schools and publications there. Ghālib al-Qu'ayṭī, Hadhrami Migration, p. 24; on Ḥusayn's trajectory see Dresch, *A History*, p. 55. To what extent this school formed part of the network of the *al-Falāḥ* schools mentioned in chapter V, cannot be answered at present. Cf. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Idām al-Qūt, p. 39. For a memory of the Indian school, see Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 11.11.1992.

[100] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 42, 45, 53; Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 72–91.

The way of teaching in all schools is old and antiquated, and the spirit
almost extinct. They do not inspire energy, activity and the love of
work in the youth. They do not stir their minds or enlighten their
brains, they do not end the superstitions and delusions in their beliefs.[101]

It should be added that this view was not specific to an outspoken
member of the *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād* but was shared by the equally out-
spoken ʿAlawī Ibn Hāshim.[102] It exemplifies the widely shared impa-
tience with developments in Hadhramaut by Hadhramis familiar with
the Hadhrami 'renaissance' in South East Asia. However, their crit-
icisms tend to obscure the important steps towards educational reform
that were made in the fifty year period discussed in this chapter.
While in the 1880s it was a matter of great dispute whether a reli-
gious school organised along a classroom system was acceptable at
all, by the early 1930s, young Hadhramis, some of whom had never
left the country, strove to introduce subjects which in 1880 would
have been rejected as outright *bidʿa*.

Merchants or Sultans? Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq *and the Administration of Tarīm*

In 1912, a society by the name of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* (Truth Association)
was founded in Sayʾūn.[103] Given the timing, it is not unlikely that
it was the result of the above-mentioned contacts and activities of
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf during his journey to South
East Asia. A report to the British by a Hadhrami *sayyid* attributes
the society's founding to a meeting in Batavia of Hadhrami notables,
among them ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭālib al-Kathīrī, Muḥammad b.
Aḥmad al-Miḥḍār and Sālim b. Muḥammad Manqūsh. As discussed
above, the British report states that the society aimed to advance teach-
ing and science. Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, who was present at the
meeting, was asked to found a branch of the society in Hadhramaut.
The society's president tried to widen the scope of its activities by
buying the town of Tarīs in order to turn it into its headquarters.
When the sultan reneged from his initial agreement, the society's
president is said to have contacted the Imām of Yemen for support.[104]

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[101] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 165f.
[102] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 53, fn. 1.
[103] Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 230–232.
[104] IO, R/20/A/1409, Report by Sayyid ʿAlawi b. Bubakr El Jifri, 21.4.1916,
p. 1. According to Ibn ʿUbaydillāh's own account, he was involved in the founding

No matter whether the British report is reliable or whether it tries to present the society, and Ibn ʿUbaydillāh in particular as some-body prone to intrigue (see below), the statutes of the society state religious and political aims, but do not specifically mention educa-tion. This might, of course, reflect different preoccupations of Hadhramis in Hadhramaut and South East Asia. According to these statutes, the society intended to "strive for justice and *sharīʿa*, to care for matters of livelihood, politics and the military, and to cooperate with the state/ruler [*dawla*] in these matters".[105] One wonders if the founders had been influenced by events elsewhere in the Middle East, as the aims further include "progress of civilisation" (*taraqqī al-ʿumrān*), only four years after a society by the name of *Ittiḥād wa-Taraqqī* (Committee of Union and Progress) had staged a successful coup in the Ottoman Empire.[106] According to *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*'s statutes, it had been formed on the basis of an agreement between the unnamed founders to improve conditions in Hadhramaut. This was to be achieved in close cooperation with the ruler(s):

> The *dawla*s Manṣūr and Muḥsin, sons of Ghālib b. Muḥsin,[107] have been asked to cooperate in this, to take the society by its hands and to support it in word, deed and intention by negotiating rulings based on customary as well as on *sharīʿa* law, and by political decisions with the leaders of this society.

This support was institutionalised by the mandatory election of one of Ghālib b. Muḥsin's descendants as president of the society. This was to change only after the society's membership exceeded one hundred paying members. Then it became free in its choice of pres-ident. The president was to be assisted by a secretary (*amīn*) and two directors (*mudīrayn*) if necessary. These officers were due for re-election every three years and had to swear an oath to the society's goals, like all members. If this council decided something, the Sultan was nor-mally obliged to sign it. His approval was needed for matters pertaining

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of two separate societies, one in 1330 in Java and one in Hadhramaut in 1331, which in light of its aims must be identical with *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt, vol. III, pp. 135–138.

[105] SMA, III; 2, Dustūr Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq, cf. *al-Bashīr* 22, 15.4.1915, p. 10. The following discussion of the aims and organisation of the society is based on these statutes, from which all quotations are taken.

[106] Nājī, "Dawr", p. 8, mentions that the Adenis engaged in lively discussions about the Committee of Union and Progress. It is likely that the debate found its way to the Hadhramaut via travellers.

[107] See chapter III on the division of the Kathīrī sultanate in April 1918.

to international treaties, while minor agreements with the tribes could
be passed without his consent. The statutes could be changed, however,
nobody was allowed to question the legitimacy of the Sultan, just as
he had no right to interfere in matters of the society at will. The
crucial point came last: Paragraph 14 stated that the Sultan had per-
mitted the society to determine the appropriate level of taxation. His
slaves were allowed to keep their property, but henceforth were
placed under the society's orders. The society was to choose as its
headquarters either Tarīm or Say'ūn, branches were to be established
in other parts of Hadhramaut, in Singapore, Java, Aden, al-Mukallā,
Shiḥr and elsewhere. This is in itself an interesting feature, as it
shows that the parochialism emphasised by British authors such as
Ingrams did not hold true for all sections of Hadhrami society.[108]

In many ways, this society constitutes an interesting combination
of familiar demands by the urban notables and a new democratic
form of association. It was not a council of notables which negoti-
ated for the urban population, but rather a (theoretically open) forum
which could be joined by anybody willing and able to pay one dol-
lar upon joining and a quarter of a dollar each month. Obviously,
this does not mean that the membership of the society, about which
we know very little, really was a wide one. There is no reliable con-
temporary information which would allow us to estimate who could
afford such payments. According to Ingrams, a town labourer earned
around one rupee per day in 1919, i.e. about one third of a dol-
lar.[109] This would mean that membership might have been afford-
able relatively widely, but still leaves open the question of whether
social and cultural barriers would have prevented a mason, for in-
stance, joining the society, quite apart from the further question of
whether he might have been interested to become a member.[110] From
all the information available on this as well as other societies, it would
seem that until World War II, the membership of the societies in
Hadhramaut was constituted almost exclusively from members of the
sayyid and *mashāyikh* strata, with a few scholars and intellectuals from
among the *qabā'il* and *ḥaḍar* joining occasionally.

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[108] Cf. chapter I.
[109] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 40, for wages in 1934, ibid., p. 39. For want of other
data, this is calculated on the basis of the exchange rate in 1924 as reported in PRO,
CO 725/6, Political Resident, Aden to Secretary for the Colonies, 30.4.1924, p. 7.
[110] If *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* is identical with Ibn ʿUbaydillāh's third association, it seems
that membership consisted exclusively of *sayyid*s. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Badāʾiʿ
al-tābūt, vol. III, p. 135, 137.

The longevity and development of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* in Tarīm are fascinating[111] Before outlining it, the scanty and contradictory information on its development in Sayʾūn needs to be summarised. If one believes the British report, the society encountered opposition from Sultan Manṣūr b. Ghālib, who rejected the idea of leasing a town. Ibn ʿUbaydillāh refused to accept the Sultan's "no", accusing him of tyranny and seeking support among members of the diaspora. He is said to have further contacted the Imām of Yemen with the eventual aim of removing the Sultan. Thereupon, Ibn ʿUbaydillāh, who enjoyed the support of other members of his family, encountered opposition from influential scholars, among them Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭās of al-Ḥurayḍa, ʿAlī al-Ḥibshī of Sayʾūn and Abū Bakr b. Shihāb, who was staying in Tarīm at the time. Through intermediaries, they approached Ibn ʿUbaydillāh's supporters in Java asking them to withdraw their help. This incident eventually brought about the society's failure.[112] The trustworthiness of this report is difficult to assess. After all, Ibn ʿUbaydillāh reportedly maintained good relations at least with Sayyid Abū Bakr, although they might have differed on this occasion, for example, over the question of relations with the Imām. It could also be, of course, that in the intrigues of World War I, issues pertaining to the society became entangled with the wider question of political orientation, not least because of Ibn ʿUbaydillāh's central role both in the society and in liaising with Yemen. Certainly, the British information that the society was "antidynastic" was wrong as far as its stated aims go, while the information could of course refer to conflicts between Ibn ʿUbaydillāh and the sultan.[113]

Around 1918, Ibn ʿUbaydillāh founded another society, the *Jamʿiyya li-l-Ḥisba wa-l-Naẓar fī ʾl-Maẓālim*, in Sayʾūn. Its members came from the al-Ḥibshī, al-Saqqāf, Bā Kathīr and Bā Rajāʾ families. According to its name, it aimed at containing the abuse of power and controlling the (state's) finances.[114] This would suggest that it was either an attempt to revitalise *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* or at least a successor organisation.[115]

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[111] For a summary of this issue see *al-Nahḍa al-Ḥaḍramiyya* 9, September 1933, pp. 10f.

[112] IO, R/20/A/1409, Report by Sayyid ʿAlawi b. Bubakr El Jifri, 21.4.1916, pp. 2–4. Cf. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt, vol. III, pp. 135–139, where he emphasises in particular al-Ḥibshī's opposition to the project, possibly because of disputes over the use of *awqāf* funds.

[113] *The Arab Bulletin*, vol. II, no. 67, 30.10.1917, "Makalla Politics" by H.[arald] F.[endon] J.[acob]. This account also found its way into Jacob's *Kings of Arabia*, p. 291.

[114] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 271f.; Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt, vol. III, pp. 139f.

[115] Al-Ṣabbān, al-ʿĀdāt wa-l-taqālīd, vol. II, p. 264 and Nushūʾ al-Ḥaraka, p. 9,

Sultan Manṣūr b. Ghālib initially agreed to the initiative, thereby much improving life in the town, as the society's proud founder tells us. However, the worst perpetrators of abuse (possibly a reference to military slaves or tribesmen) successfully asked for the sultan's support. Thereupon, the society faltered and the brave reformer suffered additional scorn.[116]

The Tarīmī branch[117] of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* under the leadership of Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh al-Kāf (c. 1880–1950) fared quite differently. It was apparently founded around 1916 following a fairly major attack by the sultan's slaves on the houses of notables in 1333 (1914–15). This action was apparently prompted by the slaves not receiving their regular pay for some time.[118] Possibly, this was a result of the worsening economic situation in the Wadi during World War I. The wealthy al-Kāf family was particularly hit by the attack, and the Sultan, who at the time was staying in Sayʾūn, had to profess his inability to intervene.[119] The notables called on both Kathīrī tribesmen and the Quʿayṭīs to quell the uprising. Under the leadership of Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh, then head of the al-Kāf family, and with the active participation of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh, they then decided to found the society.[120]

In its early years, the society was most noted for its political and economic role. According to a memorandum by Sayyid ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb, the society rented the town of Tarīm from the sultan against an annual payment of $10,000 some time between August

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mentions for 1917 a *Jamʿiyyat al-Taʿāḍud*, founded by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh and Shaykh b. Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn. It is possible that this is the association to which Ibn ʿUbaydillāh refers.

[116] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Dīwān*, pp. 271–273.

[117] The sources on *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* in Tarīm never mention it as a branch, but rather as an organisation in its own right. However, given the constellation of individuals, one might assume that it was originally founded in Sayʾūn, and established a branch in Tarīm. Whether a branch or a new organisation after the faltering of the Sayʾūn venture cannot be properly resolved at present. This is regrettable as— considering the activities of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* in Tarīm—it would be interesting to know whether the society there was also relatively open for individuals to join.

[118] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 54.

[119] This incident is mentioned in IO, R/20/A/1408, Letter to the Resident, Aden, 20.11.1916.

[120] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 116f.,123,127; al-Ṣabbān, al-ʿĀdāt, vol. II, p. 264. Although *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* is not explicitly named in this context, it is quite clear that the report by Nasir-ud-Din Ahmad refers to the same events and confirms Ibn Hāshim's account. IO, R/20/A/1415, Personalities (by Nasir-ud-Din Ahmad, 12.3.1920), p. 1.

1919 and December 1920. The agreement also transferred the command and maintenance of the sultan's 200 African slaves to the society.[121] The defensive agreement included the right to build a new city wall.[122] This arrangement, first concluded with Sultan (or Amīr) Muḥsin, was continued after his death in December 1924 under his successor, Sālim b. ʿAbūd b. Muṭlaq al-Kathīrī.[123] The following report by Captain Nasir-ud-din Ahmad, who visited Hadhramaut at the invitation of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*'s Tarīmī chairman, describes the situation in that town and possibly in a number of Quʿayṭī domains:

> The townspeople constitute the tax paying community of the country. They are mostly merchants and artificers, or agriculturalists & carry no arms. Some of them are considerably rich and influential. In such towns where town councils exist, they have seats on it and are the most useful members of the population. They are generally given the courtesy title of 'Shaikh'.[124]

Even al-Bakrī, not normally known as a particular friend of ʿAlawī initiatives, conceded that the society aimed at a juster distribution of taxes and wanted to ensure regular pay for the slave soldiers.[125] According to the Hadhrami historian al-Shāṭirī, who compares the society to a parliament, peasants, merchants, *sayyid*s and the Āl al-Kāf had to pay one quarter of the taxes each, while the *qabāʾil* and the poor were exempt.[126]

Unsurprisingly, the question of taxation prompted controversies. Thus, *al-Irshād* reported in November 1920 that some members of the Āl (Bā) Salāma refused to pay taxes to a "*jamʿiyya ʿalawiyya*" of Tarīm with the argument that their loyalty (and obligation to pay) was to the Sultan and nobody else.[127] This doubtlessly refers to *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*. A number of *sayyid*s were also dissatisfied. This is reflected in al-Shāṭirī's presentation of events which he (probably erroneously) dates in 1896–97. According to his account, Shaykh b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān conducted a virtual war against the Sultan with the help

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[121] IO, R/20/A/1409, Translation of secret Memorandum by Said Ali bin Ahmed Bin-Shahab, encl. in Acting Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Secretary, London, 4.12.1920.
[122] Jaʿfar al-Saqqāf, "Min tārīkh al-ḥarakāt", p. 26.
[123] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 54.
[124] IO, R/20/A/1415, part I, Report by Captain Nasir-ud-din Ahmad, Political Officer Aden, on his visit to the Hadhramaut, 12.3.1920, p. 13.
[125] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 54f.
[126] Personal communication, Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah, 29.3.2000.
[127] *Al-Irshād* 20, 4.11.1920, p. 3.

of Tamīmī tribesmen. Finally, an agreement was reached by which
Shaykh agreed to pay a flat tax of some 2000 dollars annually, cov-
ering all expenses for himself and his family. As a consequence, al-
Shāṭirī, member of another notable Tarīmī family, notes sourly:

> the taxes came to weigh heavily on the backs of the remaining citizens
> who had neither an escape nor a tenth of the income of Sayyid Shaykh.
> In addition, his and his family's influence in the Kathīrī sultanate
> increased steadily. Partly out of their own desire, partly for reasons of
> fear, the sultans refused them nothing, while the other citizens became
> nothing but sacrificial sheep. Al-Kāf shared the Sultan [in his power]
> without much burden, and the people only became somewhat more
> equal after the taxes were reorganised under direct British supervision.[128]

From the al-Kāf family history as well as from British sources it would
seem that these events took place during and immediately after the
establishment of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*. In these sources, the *manṣab* of the
Āl ʿAydarūs, who had hitherto enjoyed tax exemption, played a par-
ticular role. When *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* tried to extend its influence among
the neighbouring Āl Tamīm, with whom relations were of crucial
importance to agriculturalists from Tarīm, the Āl al-ʿAydarūs mobilised
their adherents among certain branches of the Āl Tamīm. They had
already previously been in conflict with the Kathīrī sultan, and annual
agreements had been brokered by the *sayyid*s in the period before
Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq made other arrangements.[129] Thus, the al-ʿAydarūs
could probably appeal to a longstanding animosity. As a result,
repeated armed clashes occurred between Tamīmī followers of the
Āl al-ʿAydarūs and the al-Kāf family and its adherents, to the extent
that one Hadhrami chronicler described the conflict as an expression
of rivalry between two families.[130] This conflict between the al-ʿAydarūs
and the al-Kāf seems to have been settled in 1926 after Yāfiʿī sol-

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[128] Al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 412. Ibn Hāshim's account differs from Shāṭirī's. If we
were to follow him, an armed confrontation took place during the first dispute with
the sultan during ʿAbdallāh's leadership of the family, and it was the ʿĀmirī tribe
who supported the al-Kāf. [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 47–49. He then reports a
long-term *hijra* to Damūn (pp. 58–60) and a slave uprising in 1914 which prompted
the founding of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*, pp. 116f., 123f.

[129] Sajid M. Alatas, *Beknopt overzicht*, pp. 34f.

[130] ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 66. According to Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History],
p. 154, there also existed a conflict between the Āl ʿAydarūs and a clan of the Tamīmīs
on the one hand, and the Kathīrī sultanate on the other, which Sayyid Abū Bakr b.
Shaykh al-Kāf settled. Some confused reflection of the dispute between the Āl ʿAydarūs
and the Āl al-Kāf can be found in *Būrūbūdūr* 1, 5.7.1924, pp. 4 and 5, 30.8.1924.
For a further reference to the conflict, see ʿAlawī al-Ḥaddād, *al-Shāmil*, p. 119.

diers were called in.[131] It is a measure of the persistently different self-views of these two families (the more worldly al-Kāf and the distinctly religiously legitimated al-ʿAydarūs) that the memory of the conflict in the al-ʿAydarūs family has been couched in religious terms. According to this narrative, the conflict started with girls (possibly Chinese women) singing loudly in the al-Kāf gardens outside Tarīm. As their voices were heard outside, the al-ʿAydarūs protested and condemned the practice in a *fatwā* which prompted the wrath of the al-Kāf. Thereupon, the latter decided to demand the payment of taxes.[132]

Another tax-linked issue is that *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq* started to collect and distribute the alms tax (*zakāt*) which until then was an imminently private affair.[133] It is possible that this resulted in higher yields of *zakāt*. However, it constituted an obvious interference by an abstract authority with an Islamically-prescribed but privately executed practice, which might not have found general approval.

Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq also undertook a number of tasks which one might expect of a modern municipal administration. It organised a committee which was responsible for the cleansing of the town, a feature which seems to have also existed in towns of the Yemeni highland before the state extended its authority to municipal organisation.[134] At the expense of the al-Kāf family, a doctor was employed who treated everybody and dispensed medicine free of charge, although we are told nothing about the population's response to Western medicine.[135] The association, presumably guided by this doctor, undertook (unspecified) measures to maintain public health in particular with regard to the spreading of smallpox and various fevers. It further determined the correct dates of *Ramaḍān* and coordinated the fast's beginning and end with the inhabitants of Say'ūn. Earlier, each city had relied on their own authorities and started their fast on different days if the weather conditions were unfavourable.

The *Jamʿiyya* apparently was the driving force behind the "limitation of many bad customs among the women, judging those practising them and executing the judgements regardless of their social

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[131] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 55; Sajid M. Alatas, *Beknopt overzicht*, p. 35; IO, R/20/A/1409, Translation of secret Memorandum by Said Ali bin Ahmed Bin-Shahab, encl. in Acting Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Secretary, London, 4.12.1920.

[132] Personal communication by a member of the al-ʿAydarūs family, Bergen, 4.12.2000.

[133] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 129.

[134] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 129; interviews in ʿIbb, February 1990.

[135] Cf. chapter VIII.

position".[136] This refers to the regulations which attempted to limit conspicuous consumption, most notably in the areas of dress and food. It has been noted earlier that emigration had changed local consumption patterns, which had already caused concern in the 19th century. By the early 20th century, it seems that expenditures for dress, the decoration of houses and life-cycle celebrations, all areas in which women played a leading role in terms of preparation and execution, became an increasing headache for the notables. This resulted in a series of decrees in Say'ūn. Although the oldest currently known document dates from Say'ūn in 1923, it is highly probable that around this time similar decrees were published and more or less successfully executed in other Hadhrami towns as well.[137] The degree to which this problem troubled Hadhramis in the 1920s and 30s becomes clear from the regularity with which the decrees were repeated, as well as from the comments in two surviving Hadhrami journals from the 1930s.[138] Quite apart from the practical problems underlying the decrees, the criticism of conspicuous consumption by the rich, who should have been investing their wealth in socially-relevant projects, is a typical topic of Islamic modernist writings.[139]

Around 1928, the association seems to have run out of steam due to the foundering of its attempts to reorganise Hadhramaut in its entirety (see next chapter). However, it was soon replaced by new organisations. On July 30, 1929, Muḥammad b. Hāshim wrote to Ibn ʿUbaydillāh, asking him to attend the inaugural meeting of a Reform Party (al-Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥī). Although it is unclear whether this party was ever founded or whether it became the core of the aforementioned Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana, its aim of comprehensive economic and political reform very much resembles the earlier ventures.[140]

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[136] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 129. This was confirmed to me by Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah 29.3.2000.

[137] For a detailed discussion of this matter with the translation of a sample document, see Freitag & Schönig, "Wise Men".

[138] Al-Tahdhīb 3, 1. Shawwāl 1349/19.2.1931, pp. 54–57 and al-Nahḍa 3, Jumādā al-awwal 1361/May-June 1941, pp. 1–2, 6 and 4, Jumādā al-akhira 1361/June-July 1942, p. 2.

[139] Khalid, The Politics, pp. 232f.

[140] The letter and proposed statutes of the association were shown to me by Muḥammad Zayn al-Kāf, Ṣanʿāʾ, on 6.11.1996. Ḥaḍramawt 230 of 6.2.1930 reports that a visit by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf in Surabaya resulted in the formation of a short-lived society, which might be a reference to either al-Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥī or Jamʿiyyat al-ʿAdl.

Reform in Theory and Practice: the Debate in Diaspora and Homeland

The slow growth of new schools and associations in Hadhramaut was accompanied by a rather impatient debate abroad and in Hadhramaut from the 1930s where the reform movement should go and what its aims ought to be.

"Dreadful Drought, Horrid Fear, Quick Ruin": Visions of the Homeland and its Reform in the Hadhrami Press in South East Asia[141]

An anonymous "servant of his fatherland" (presumably Muḥammad b. Hāshim, editor of *al-Bashīr*) wrote a programmatic article on "Reform and the homeland" in 1915. It opened a debate that was to preoccupy most Hadhrami journals until the 1930s when a significant part of the younger generation of *muwalladīn* turned towards Indonesia as their *waṭan*.[142] Much of the debate reflects the reformist outlook which has been discussed in the last chapter. Therefore, the general aims of *taraqqī* (progress), *iṣlāḥ* (reform), *ḥaḍāra* (civilisation) and *tahdhīb* (refinement) expressed in this context are in line with the general reform debate and call for religious and moral reform as well as practical changes. The degree to which religious reform implied a cleansing from unlawful innovations (*bidaʿ*) and superstitions (*al-khurāfāt*) depended on the individual journals. Thus, the mouthpiece of the *Rābiṭa ʿAlawiyya* warned that *iṣlāḥ* was often confused with the abolition of Islam.[143]

"Love of the fatherland" was usually considered to be the main force driving these debates.[144] In terms of the development of a Hadhrami identity which transcended narrow regional or tribal considerations, it is interesting to note that *al-Mishkāh* explicitly proposed a wide definition of this homeland by 1923. Instead of implicitly or explicitly referring to either the Quʿayṭī or Kathīrī domains, it argued that "the Hadhrami nation and the Hadhrami region" encompassed

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[141] Headline of *Ḥaḍramawt* 167, 18.10.1928, p. 1. For the following, cf. Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, pp. 108–120.

[142] *Al-Bashīr* 18, 1.1.1915, pp. 1f., on the article, see Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 109.

[143] *Al-Rābiṭa* I; 8–9, Rabīʿ 1347/Aug.-Sept. 1928. For a polemical view clearly linking ʿAlawīs and/or *ʿulamāʾ* to superstitions see *al-Mishkāh* 2, 10.2.1920, p. 1 and *al-Dahnāʾ* I; 2, Feb. 1928, p. 2.

[144] *Al-Bashīr* 22, 25.4.1915, p. 1; *al-Irshād* 6, 22.7.1920, pp. 1f.; *al-Dahnāʾ* I; 1, Jan. 1928, p. 3.

"all the lands in which people called Hadhramis live—the coast and the interior, including Dawʻan".[145]

In addition to such rather theoretical matters, the journals make a number of more mundane suggestions. These will be the focus of the following discussion. Obviously, a number of them also provide a running commentary on political developments in Hadhramaut. Where relevant, this will be discussed in the next chapter.

In view of the level of unrest and violence in Hadhramaut, calls for unity figure high on the reform agenda. The concern for peace and the search for the roots of the constant unrest sparked a controversy about the role of tribesmen. Ṣalāḥ al-Bakrī opined in *al-Dahnāʾ* that to blame *qabāʾil* as source of all unrest overlooked the deeper responsibility of scholars. Unsurprisingly in view of al-Bakrī's *Irshādī* and *qabīlī* affiliation, he sees the real origin of Hadhramaut's trouble in the advent of outsiders (read *sayyids*) who had arrived, misled and divided a peaceful and hospitable people by introducing heathen customs.[146] A few months later, an "enthusiastic Hadhrami" claimed that the tribes were drinking blood, thus contradicting al-Bakrī's views. Yet another author angrily rejected this proposition and argued that *qabāʾil*, ʻAlawīs and rulers all shared responsibility. The image of "wild tribes" (*ʻashāʾir mutawaḥḥisha*) gave an entirely wrong impression to the outside world.[147]

The economic decline of Hadhramaut and of Hadhramis abroad (i.e., the *muwalladīn*) was attributed to the disastrous state of affairs. Under the headline "dreadful drought, horrid fear, quick decline", *Ḥaḍramawt* featured an article which listed the Hadhrami security problems and resultant economic troubles. It calculated that some twenty million rupees went anually to Iraq for the purchase of dates and some four million to Somalia for livestock because the unrest did not allow sufficient cultivation and animal husbandry in the Wadi. Hadhramis abroad wasted their money supporting their relatives instead of investing in their host countries. They thus became threatened by Chinese competition which did not suffer from a similar drain of resources.[148]

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[145] *Al-Mishkāh* 2, 10.2.1923, p. 1. This is not to deny that a similar view was inherent in, for example, *al-Bashīr*'s articles.

[146] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 1, mid-Dec. 1928, pp. 9f.

[147] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 17, Aug. 1929, p. 7 and II; 19, Sept. 1929, pp. 6–9. The latter article was written by an author using the pen-name of al-Maʻarrī.

[148] *Ḥaḍramawt* 167, 18.10.1928, pp. 1f.

One of the new merchant town houses in Tarīm. Photograph by the author

Given the links between associations and journals, it is not surprising to note that Hadhrami journals in South East Asia considered associations as some kind of miracle cure for all sorts of social, moral and political problems in the homeland and abroad. Already *al-Bashīr* reported the formation of an association formed by "the major notables and the people of binding and unbinding" in Hadhramaut and printed the statutes of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*.[149] *al-Irshād* suggested that all parties and associations held a conference in order to further their cooperation.[150] In *al-Qisṭās* in 1923, Shaykh ʿUmar b. ʿAlī al-Makārim suggested forming a *Jāmiʿa Ḥaḍramiyya* which was to absorb all associations and councils in Hadhramaut and diaspora and which was to take charge of directing the reform of the homeland.[151] *al-Miṣbāḥ* demanded that the country should open itself to the associations which were bringing it science (*ʿilm*) and rebuilding it.[152] The associations were presented as an effective way to mobilise civil society

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[149] *Al-Bashīr* 18, 1.1.1915, p. 6 and 22, 15.4.1915, p. 10.
[150] *Al-Irshād* 39, 17.3.1921, pp. 1–2.
[151] *Al-Qisṭās* 5, 15. Rajab 1341/11.3.1923, p. 1; Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 110.
[152] *Al-Miṣbāḥ*, I; 2, Jan. 1929, p. 31.

in light of the failure of the sultans to effectively improve conditions. Interestingly, such cooperative action was recommended both in general terms and with regard to the solution of specific problems. Thus, *al-Dahnāʾ* suggested the formation of cooperative enterprises (*sharika*) in trade and agriculture.[153] It is not unlikely that the great enthusiasm for cooperative agriculture (see below) might in part have stemmed from similar ideas, although it also resulted from economic necessities and might have had older precedents.

In mid-July 1929, a certain Ibn ʿUmar from Pekalongan formulated principles for the rebuilding of Hadhramaut which will serve as the guideline of the following discussion as they name the major issues under discussion in most of the journals and can thus be considered to be commonly accepted priorities.[154] Ibn ʿUmar emphasised that the first principle was security and justice. He complained that all transport needed Beduin safeguards, which slowed matters down considerably. Instead of this *ʿurf*-based *sayyāra*, he demanded *sharʿī*-rule, obviously assuming that this in itself would guarantee free passage of people and goods.

Secondly, Ibn ʿUmar demanded the improvement of Hadhrami schools. The attendance of government-run schools should become compulsory between the ages of seven to fourteen. Both religious and secular sciences (*ʿulūm dīniyya wa-dunyawiyya*) were to be taught. By December 1928, *al-Dahnāʾ* had demanded the establishment of an agricultural and trading school, and just a month later, *al-Miṣbāḥ* suggested sending selected Hadhrami students abroad for higher education.[155] It seems that *al-Rābiṭa*'s earlier announcement of the establishment of an industrial school in al-Shiḥr by Sultan Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib, the deputy ruler, was premature.[156] Such views clearly reflect the criticism of the Hadhrami educational system by Java-trained Hadhrami intellectuals. They also indicate a growing appreciation of the need for a well-trained workforce. In this context, it is interesting to note that *al-Irshād* regretted the neglect of modern industries which needed a sound knowl-

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[153] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 13, June 1929, p. 5, cf. ibid., p. 12 and *al-Mishkāh* I; 10, 3.7.1931, p. 1.

[154] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 15, mid-July 1929, p. 13. For the very similar topics treated in the pro-ʿAlawī weekly *Ḥaḍramawt* see Witkam, "The weekly 'Hadramaut'", p. 10.

[155] *Al-Dahnāʾ* I; 12, Dec. 1928, p. 11; *al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 2, Jan. 1929, p. 27. Cf. the reform proposals in *al-Qisṭās* 5, 15. Rajab 1341/11.3.1923.

[156] *Al-Rābiṭa* I; 3, Shawwāl 1346/March 1928, p. 174.

edge of chemistry and mechanics. Without such know-how, the jour-
nal contended, the advanced nations would not have succeeded.[157]

Thirdly, Ibn ʿUmar demanded the improvement of the economic
situation. His suggestions are an echo of the (failed) plans of the
Singapore conference, discussed in the next chapter. He proposed
introducing national companies and trading organisations in order
to compete with foreign (presumably mostly Indian) capital.

Next he addressed the transport system. Its improvement was
deemed important not merely in terms of ferrying goods and pas-
sengers between the coast and the interior, although the latter was
itself in popular demand. *Al-Dahnāʾ* had voiced the same concern.
When a drought hit the Wadi and people died of hunger in spring
1929, the journal regretted that the road which Sayyid Abū Bakr b.
Shaykh al-Kāf had begun to construct at his own expense some time
in 1340/1921–22 was not finished and therefore could not facilitate
transport.[158] *Al-Rābiṭa* linked rising inflation to the security issues sur-
rounding the road.[159] *Al-Dahnāʾ* also regretted the absence of a reli-
able telegraph connection.[160] Ibn ʿUmar stressed the importance of
this type of infrastructure for the overall economic development, as
well as for the maintenance of security.

His next point was the development of agriculture, a favourite
topic of Hadhrami journals.[161] Ibn ʿUmar demanded increased gov-
ernment intervention through the purchase of agricultural machin-
ery and the introduction of new varieties of grain and fruit which
were suitable for the Hadhrami climate. In addition, Ibn ʿUmar
argued that peasants ought to be protected from debt and be given
tax incentives. A separate albeit closely connected point was the
demand for improved irrigation. He presented detailed requests for
re-opening wells to which access was currently denied by force and
setting up an administration which oversaw the distribution of flood
waters and built dams to direct the flood waters to the fields. Given
that a number of private initiatives were started in agriculture and
irrigation, this list refers to persistent problems which demanded a

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[157] *Al-Irshād* 5;15.7.1920, p. 4.
[158] For the starting date of the road's construction, see Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf
Family History], p. 213.
[159] *Al-Rābiṭa* I; 8–9, Rabīʿ 1347/Aug.-Sept. 1928.
[160] *Al-Dahnāʾ* I; 12, Dec. 1928, p. 11; II; 6–7, March 1929, p. 29; II; 13, June
1929, p. 4.
[161] Cf. *al-Miṣbāḥ* I; 2, Jan. 1929, pp. 1, 22–24 and *al-Irshād* 5, 15.7.1920, p. 4.

more centralist approach to the issue. Interestingly, a later article in
al-Dahnāʾ shows the awareness of the advantages of self-sufficiency
in food production. Given the high import and transit dues, this is
not surprising. The journal suggested bringing in Egyptian experts
both for agricultural and geological development, thus emulating the
Quʿayṭī sultan's initiative of 1919.[162]

Interestingly, there are occasional critical reflections about the
problems of such an intellectual reform discourse. Thus, *Būrūbudūr*
introduced its readers to a fictional blacksmith, the choice of pro-
fession pointing to the imminently practical demands of reform. This
character, the author wrote, had not been able to practice his craft
among the *sayyid*s in the towns, who were determined to reform
Hadhramaut by their pens alone. The *qabāʾil* had some restricted
use for him, but only in the arms sector, while the Beduin were pre-
sented as useless parasites.[163]

Much of the South East Asian reform discourse was very out-
spoken if compared to what was demanded by youthful journalists
in Hadhramaut. To understand this situation, one needs to consider
briefly the development of journalism in Hadhramaut and its weak
position in comparison to South East Asia, before discussing the local
discourse of change.

The Development of Journalism and the Discourse of Change in Hadhramaut[164]

The idea of publishing a journal in Tarīm was first vented in 1917
by some young men in the milieu of one of the reform societies,
namely the *Jamʿiyyat Nashr al-Faḍāʾil*.[165] It is the first one about which
some details are known.[166] They planned both to engage with literary
issues and publish news. These always reached Hadhramaut rather
late and even then were not readily available. The youngsters were
possibly inspired by Aḥmad b. ʿUmar al-Shāṭirī and his interests,
and encouraged by the intellectual climate prevailing among the

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[162] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 17, mid-August, p. 9.
[163] *Būrūbudūr* 1, 5.7.1924, p. 1.
[164] For a more detailed history of the press in Hadhramaut cf. Freitag, "Periodicals",
for a survey of themes covered in *al-Tahdhīb*, Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp.
171–180.
[165] The following account is based on al-Shāṭirī, "Tārīkh al-ṣiḥāfa", p. 57.
[166] For a list of journals and journalists, see annex C.

younger generation of certain notable families such as the al-Kāf. It is also possible that some of these young men had lived for some time abroad and were inspired by what they had seen and read there. However, in the conservative climate of Tarīm where reading journals published elsewhere was already potentially disreputable, producing a journal certainly could severely damage one's reputation (and thus the social capital necessary for anything from social intercourse to marriage and business). Many of the society's members seem to have been enthusiastic but preferred silent supporting the journal over committing their name to paper. Their scepticism proved to be very justified: the young man who eventually had the courage to assume editorship was defamed and scorned. After only four issues, the journal *Ḥaḍramawt* (not to be confused with the Surabayan *Ḥaḍramawt*) was discontinued. Presumably, this is also what happened to its predecessors in Say'ūn of which no trace is left.

An additional problem which plagued enthusiastic journalists until the 1930s and dampened many projects was the lack of a printing press.[167] The journals had to be copied out by hand and distributed, which severely limited their availability. Although a printing press for the publication of a short-lived political journal, *al-Nahḍa al-Ḥaḍnamiyya*, was bought in the late 1920s, the journal did not survive. It is possible that the same press was used in 1937 to publish *al-Minbar* in al-Mukallā.[168]

The opposition even to handwritten journals by the (majority of the) scholarly community shows how they feared for their authority in matters pertaining to religious and worldly affairs. While handwritten journals had only a very limited audience, printing would have augmented the audience and therefore given their discourse even wider currency. When *al-Ikhā'* lamented the lack of a printing press in 1939 and argued that it did not cost more than a car,[169] it did so against the background of the existence of a substantial number of motor cars in the Wadi as well as that of generous support to other reform projects by wealthy families. One might consequently

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[167] Thus, *al-Tahdhīb* ceased after one year. *al-Tahdhīb* 10, 1. Jumādā al-ūlā 1350/14.9.1931, p. 214.

[168] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 155. Ibn Hāshim's text does not show conclusively that the press ever arrived in Hadhramaut, or that the journal was actually printed on it, although the journal's existence is mentioned in a number of places. However, this seems to be the assumption of Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 21.10.1992.

[169] *Al-Ikhā'* 2;4, June 1939, p. 3.

assume that it was fear of social stigmatisation by the *'ulamā'* which
prevented even families such as the al-Saqqāf or al-Kāf from pro-
viding such a machine.

Although journals in Hadhramaut made a late appearance in com-
parison with countries such as Egypt, they were among the first on
the Arabian Peninsula, particularly if one considers the independent
press. The Ottoman government gazette, *San'ā'*, was as much state
controlled as *al-Imān*, published by the Imām in 1926.[170] This was
followed by *al-Ḥikma*, the first not-quite-official publication which
was, however, printed by a press which was located in the Ministry
of Education.[171] In the Ḥijāz, the first official Ottoman and Sharīfian
papers predated World War I, while the first two independent news-
papers were launched in 1920.[172] The handwritten Hadhrami jour-
nals have been mostly overlooked by historians of the press.

In the self-view of the Hadhrami writers, they were the vanguard,
a role hitherto claimed by the *'ulamā'*.[173] Under the innocent heading
of "Good Expression" (*ḥusn al-ta'bīr*), 'Umar b. Muḥammad Bā Kathīr
stated the central argument:[174] although the Hadhrami *'ulamā'* had made
worthy contributions to their science, they were unable to express
clearly what was weighing on their minds. The first reason was that
they only ever read the same complicated books and refused to exam-
ine, for example, the sayings of Imām 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, of the Pro-
phet's companions, or writings of authors and historians such as Ibn
Muqaffa' and al-Hamdānī. Bā Kathīr attributes this to a lack of self-
confidence. Secondly, they refused to read journals and magazines,
therefore not learning to express themselves well or, more importantly
in our context, analysing the current state of affairs. Thirdly, they
only followed the time-honoured traditions of their forefathers, who
themselves had only copied their ancestors. Finally, they also rejected
reading poetry. Besides suggesting a different type of reading, Bā
Kathīr implicitly discusses the assumed incompetence of the *'ulamā'*

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[170] Ursinus, "Ṣan'ā'" and Obermeyer, "*Al-Iman* and Al-Imam".
[171] On *al-Ḥikma*, see Muṣṭafā Sālim, *Majallat al-Ḥikma al-yamāniyya 1938–1941 wa-
Ḥarakat al-iṣlāḥ fī 'l-Yaman*, Ṣan'ā' 1988 (2nd ed.), on the problem of its relation-
ship with the government, pp. 32–34.
[172] See M. Chenoufi, "Ṣiḥāfa", *EI* (CDRom ed.).
[173] See the answers to the question on the future role of the press, *al-Nahḍa* 10,
Dhū al-Ḥijja 1361/Jan.-Feb. 1942, pp. 6f.
[174] 'Umar b. Muḥammad Bā Kathīr, "ḥusn al-ta'bīr", *al-Tahdhīb* 6, 1. Muḥarram
1350/19.5.1931, pp. 110–112.

in understanding the present world and therefore dealing with it. Later, the same author discussed the linguistic history of the term journal (*majalla*), mentioning that in the past Christians had used it to denote the bible.[175] This reference to *majalla* in the context of a holy text (albeit a thwarted one from a Muslim point of view) indicates the high esteem accorded the new journals by the author.

After the foundering of *Ḥaḍramawt*, it took until 1930–31 for another attempt to broach wider social, religious and moral issues, as well as literary ones. These had been the exclusive concern of *al-'Ukāẓ*, published since 1929. *Al-Tahdhīb* in Say'ūn was written by hand but soon afterwards printed in Cairo and therefore has been preserved.[176] The late 1930s and early 1940s brought a virtual boom of short-lived, mostly hand-written journals produced by students and teachers of the new schools which seem to have circulated locally as well as among migrants from the towns where the journals originated. The only journal which apparently was read fairly widely in Hadhramaut before World War II was *al-Ikhā'*. It was published by *Jam'iyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Mu'āwana* in Tarīm and acquired a hand-press some time after 1939.[177]

The social composition of journalists in Hadhramaut did not differ much from what has been said with regard to South East Asia. The very first journalist whose name has been transmitted in connection with *Ḥaḍramawt* was a member of *Jam'iyyat Nashr al-Faḍā'il* as well as a teacher in one of its schools. Of the 29 authors who could be identified as being prominently involved in approximately 26 Hadhrami journals between 1917 and 1967, usually as editors or main contributors, 14 could be identified. They were members of associations, teachers in schools, maintained literary circles and/or were actively engaged in politics. Muḥammad b. 'Aqīl, the co-publisher of *al-Imām*, seems to have used his visit to Hadhramaut in 1912–13 to launch a journal (which would have been the very first one), while Muḥammad b. Hāshim, former editor of a series of Arabic journals in the Netherlands East Indies, became a leading author in *al-Ikhā'*.

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[175] 'Umar b. Muḥammad Bā Kathīr, "Lafẓat majalla", *al-Tahdhīb* 10, I. Jumādā al-ūlā 1350/14.9.1931, pp. 196f.

[176] *Al-Nahḍa al-Ḥaḍramiyya* reported in its no. 8 of July-Aug. 1932, p. 37 that the journal had been printed.

[177] *Al-Ikhā'*, 2;4, June 1939, p. 3 still complained about the lack of a press, but at some unspecified later stage, it must have acquired (or rather been given) a (lithograph?) handpress, al-Shāṭirī, "Tārīkh al-ṣiḥāfa", p. 58.

It is against the background of widespread hostility and of a very small group of intellectuals in an *'ulamā'*-dominated environment that one has to weigh the contents of the journals in Hadhramaut, as far as can be judged from *al-Tahdhīb, al-Nahḍa* and scattered issues of *Zahrat al-Shabāb* and *al-Ikhā'*.[178] One author addressed the development differential between the diaspora and Hadhramaut and therefore the resulting need for a careful and well-considered approach to change as follows:

> Many of our intellectuals and entrepreneurs return from their places of emigration in the Indies and elsewhere after having mixed with important foreigners and having absorbed their ideas. This intellectual climate has influenced them. Once they arrive in Hadhramaut, they see its misfortunes, the hardship and deterioration. The comparison shows them clearly a disgraceful lag and regrettable underdevelopment. Thereupon, they do not hesitate to dispense to their brothers the valuable advice and considered views which come to their minds. They cry out loudly in the meetings and assemblies, calling their brothers to reform and build, expressing their sorrow about the morass of chaos in their homeland [. . .].[179]

Why, asks the author, are the returning migrants so often ignored? He argues that as long as the Hadhramis did not understand the meaning of progress, the calls of migrants would go unheard. One first needed to raise the consciousness of the population so that they could understand the criticism and then start to change the situation accordingly.

The anonymous author M.S. seemed to speak from experience. A dim echo of this conflict between diaspora and homeland can be found in an article in the Surabayan weekly *Ḥaḍramawt*, which in its early stage had been (co-?)edited by Muḥammad b. Hāshim. In 1932, a disappointed article asked "Where is the reform in Hadhramaut"? In Hadhramaut, boy scouts and football clubs were spreading rapidly. While this in itself was not a bad development, the author expressed his disappointment with individuals like Muḥammad b. Hāshim. Did this former leader of the Hadhrami renaissance in the Indies who had electrified the youth, feel impeded by circumstances in Hadhramaut? Was the dry climate to blame, or Ibn Hāshim's present surroundings?[180] As Muḥammad b. Hāshim was still one of the most engaging teachers

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[178] None of the other journals have been accessible to me, and many seem not to have survived.

[179] *Al-Tahdhīb* 3, 1. Shawwāl 134919.2.1931, pp. 46–49, here p. 47.

[180] *Ḥaḍramawt* 356, 6.10.1932.

and activists in the Wadi and had by no means resigned to the climate or other vicissitudes of life, in spite of being attacked for his modernist stance,[181] the article by M.S. seems to provide the perfect answer to the impatience expressed in such an outburst.

In light of the above it comes as no surprise that most of the Hadhrami publications placed even more emphasis than their South East Asian models on uncontroversial issues of religious and moral reform. While this partly reflected the general climate, it was also the result of practical constraints such as the difficulty of obtaining current news. This is exemplified in the following comment from *al-Tahdhīb*, which introduced a rare article on the Italian policy in Tripolitania:

> I know that it is not the policy of the noble *al-Tahdhīb* at present to publish news about what occurs outside of Hadhramaut, no matter whether important or not. The reason for this is that this journal—which is one written by a pen [i.e. by hand]—would, if it committed itself to such a task—cease to appear by the very nature of things.[182]

A major exception to this general rule are those journals which more or less explicitly made it their task to spread news after the arrival of the first radio transmitters in the late 1930s, which in itself shows the rarity of this new medium in the Wadi.[183] Meanwhile, in al-Mukallā and al-Shiḥr, radio emissions in such venues as young mens' clubs proved so attractive that the Britih, fearful of German propaganda broadcasts, started their own loudspeaker broadcasting programme in October 1939.[184]

The general discussion of religious and moral reform resembles that of the Arab journals of South East Asia.[185] In religious and literary terms, Egypt was the major model. The Egyptian predominance is probably attributable to the wide distribution of *al-Manār* and

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[181] *Al-Tahdhīb* 8, 1. Rabīʿ al-awwal 1350/17.7.1931, p. 156.

[182] *Al-Tahdhīb* 6, 2. Muḥarram 1350/21.5.1931, p. 101.

[183] van der Meulen, *Aden*, p. 148 and personal communication, Jaʿfar Muḥammad al-Saqqāf, Sayʾūn, 16.11.1996. According to al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, p. 29 and p. 121, note 29, the first radio arrived in Hadhramaut in 1943–44, but van der Meulen observed radios (albeit not in Sayʾūn) in 1939. According to al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, p. 29, in 1943–44 only three people in the whole town of Sayʾūn owned a radio.

[184] PRO, CO 725/65/5, Hadhramaut Political Intelligence Summary 119, week ending 4.11.1939 and 122, week ending 25.11.1939; Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 16.12.1992.

[185] For a general discussion of this issue, see Freitag, "Periodicals".

Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb's *al-Fatḥ*.[186] However, the distribution of
the diaspora favoured an international outlook which would not nor-
mally have been expected: an author in *al-Tahdhīb* who complained
about stagnation even in traditional sciences mentioned that students
traveled to Egypt, Syria, the Ḥijāz and India in search of knowledge.[187]
Through their references to non-Hadhrami 19th and 20th century
authors, the journals give us some indication as to the intellectual
horizon of those who, without leaving Hadhramaut and with only
limited access if any to foreign journals, were becoming part of a
slowly growing movement which demanded change in the homeland.[188]

Al-Tahdhīb mentions most foreign names. The milieu of *Madrasat
al-Nahḍa al-ʿIlmiyya* in Say'ūn, in which at least one of its editors,
ʿAlī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr (1910–1969), was a teacher at the time, exer-
cised a major influence on the general orientation of the authors.
Before being sent from Surabaya to Say'ūn at the age of ten, Bā
Kathīr had attended the *al-Irshād* school. In Say'ūn, he not only
attended *Madrasat al-Nahḍa*, but also studied with his uncle and friends,
reading, for example, the poems of the Egyptian poet laureate Aḥmad
Shawqī and the legal texts of al-Shawkānī. He reportedly maintained
a significant private library with journals such as *al-Manār* and *al-
Hilāl*, which at some stage he seems to have considered opening to
the public.[189] Shortly after *al-Tahdhīb* ceased to appear, ʿAlī Aḥmad
left Hadhramaut for the Ḥijāz, which was partly a result of a pri-
vate crisis (the death of his wife), but partly a result of the pressure
exerted on the prominent co-editor of *al-Tahdhīb*.[190] He later settled
in Cairo where he became a prominent author.

The Syrian journalist and member of various Arab academies,
ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maghribī (1868–1956), was mentioned in *al-Tahdhīb*.
Al-Maghribī, who during World War I had worked closely with
Shakīb Arslān and Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, was presented as an

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[186] About al-Khaṭīb, see al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. V, p. 282 and Rainer Hermann,
Kulturkrise und konservative Erneuerung, Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag 1990, p. 198–202.
al-Fatḥ's influence was confirmed to me by Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, al-Mukallā
27.10.1996.
[187] *Al-Tahdhīb* 1;2, 1. Ramaḍān 1349/20.1.1931, p. 38, cf. *al-Tahdhīb* 8, 1. Rabīʿ
al-awwal 1350/17.7.1931, p. 152.
[188] Given the limited availability of the journals, such an account has to remain
impressionistic.
[189] A. Bā Wazīr, "ʿAlī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr", pp. 56f.; *al-Tahdhīb* 8, 1. Rabīʿ al-
awwal 1350/17.7.1931, p. 158.
[190] Personal communication, Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, al-Mukallā, 27.10.1996.

important voice who urged Islamic reform.[191] His view of Islam as a rational religion was praised, and he is quoted as a supporter of scientific freedom in Islam.[192] From Shakīb Arslān, the reader learns that "Islam is a religion of deeds, not a religion of prayers without deeds",[193] which sounds like a remote echo of Smiles' *Self-Help*. The pan-Islamic activist al-Afghānī is credited with the following saying:

> How did Europe advance? The progress of Europe and its development are one of the results of the intellectual freedom for which Luther strove.[194]

Given that al-Afghānī seems to have regarded himself as something of a Muslim Luther[195] and the editors of the early Hadhrami journals considered themselves as the local equivalents of al-Afghānī, this aphorism expressed their aims as well as their self-view. It must have troubled those *'ulamā'* who already were sceptical about the reform-obsessed youth.

A "defender of science" took up an ongoing debate about the reading of *ḥadīth* during the Muslim month of *Rajab*. He suggested reading collections other than al-Bukhārī, as well as more of the orginal *ḥadīth* texts.[196] While this in itself is a reflection of the *salafī* trend to consult original sources, the discussion then widens to include the issue of educational priorities (*fiqh* or natural sciences).[197] In the concluding article, the "defender of science" makes a case for *ijtihād*.[198] He refers to al-Shawkānī as well as to al-Shawkānī's teacher's teacher, Muḥammad b. Ismāʾīl al-Amīr (1688–1769). Further points of reference, who serve to strengthen his argument, are Ibn al-Wazīr al-Yamānī (presumably Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr, d. 1436, who had initiated Sunni tendencies in Zaydī theology)[199] and Rashīd Riḍā.

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[191] *Al-Tahdhīb* 5, 1. Dhū al-Ḥijja 1349/19.4.1931, p. 83. About al-Maghribī, see al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. 4, p. 74 and Cleveland, *Islam*, pp. 17, 38.

[192] *Al-Tahdhīb* 6, 1. Muḥarram 1350/19.5.1931, p. 118; *al-Tahdhīb* 7, 1. Ṣafar 1350/18.6.1931, p. 10.

[193] *Al-Tahdhīb* 8, 1. Rabīʿ al-awwal 1350/17.7.1931, p. 154.

[194] *Al-Tahdhīb* 4, 1. Dhī al-qaʿda 1349/20.3.1931, p. 79.

[195] Keddie, *An Islamic Response*, pp. 42, 45, 82.

[196] Contributions to the debate, which seems to have been ongoing among students, in *al-Tahdhīb* 1, 1. Shaʿbān 1349/22.12.1930, pp. 11–13;3, 1. Shawwāl 1349/19.2.1931, pp. 51–53 and 10, 1. Jumādā al-ūlā 1350/14.9.1931, pp. 190–195. The debate is also discussed in Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 175f.

[197] *Al-Tahdhīb* 3, 1. Shawwāl 1349/19.2.1931, p. 52.

[198] *Al-Tahdhīb* 10, 1. Jumādā al-ūlā 1350/14.9.1931, pp. 192f.

[199] On these authors and the Yemeni legal tradition see Haykel, Order and Righteousness.

A number of modern Arab authors were introduced to the readers of *al-Tahdhīb* and other journals. *Al-Tahdhīb* printed a four-liner in praise of rationality, authored by the translator, story writer and one-time editor of *al-Ahrām*, Niqūlā Rizqallāh.[200] The prolific Egyptian poet 'Abbās Maḥmūd al-'Aqqād was quoted with "advice of the shaykhs to the youth", in which he encouraged the young to be open beyond the suggestions of their elders so as not to waste life's chances.[201] Muṣṭafā Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī's "Sketches", published in the Cairene weekly *al-Mu'ayyad* and expressing scepticism about a rash repudiation of sound traditions in favour of the uncritical acceptance of European ways, was recommended to *al-Tahdhīb*'s readers.[202] In one of the rare incidences of a reader's testimony, Sa'īd 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr (1915–78), a later teacher, journalist and historian, gives us a measure of al-Manfalūṭī's influence among the youth.[203] Himself a student at the *ribāṭ* of Ghayl at the time, he reports that his political consciousness in the early 1930s was influenced by al-Manfalūṭī's "Sketches". Bā Wazīr writes that this author inspired him to write his memoirs in orderly form, and awakened his nationalist feelings.[204] Similarly, al-Manfalūṭī was read by the Arabs in the Indies and is quoted as witness for Muslim decline by *Irshādī*s.[205]

At that time, Bā Wazīr had not travelled abroad. It is worthwhile to mention the other titles and authors read by this dissatisfied graduate of the *ribāṭ* who wanted to change the world, since they might give a wider impression of the central influences on his generation. He read Muḥammad 'Abdūh, Rashīd Riḍā as well as the influential *Ḥāḍir al-'ālam al-islāmī* by Lothrop Stoddard with Shakīb Arslān's annotations.[206] While he had started to read modern literature in Ghayl, the newly founded *Maktaba Sulṭāniyya* (Sultan' Library) in al-

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[200] *Al-Tahdhīb* 5, 1. Dhū al-ḥijja 1349/19.4.1931, p. 86; on Rizqallāh (1870–1915) see al-Ziriklī, *al-A'lām*, vol. 8, p. 46.

[201] *Al-Nahḍa* 5, end of Rajab 1361/August 1942, p. 4; on al-'Aqqād (1889–1964) see al-Ziriklī, *al-A'lām*, vol. 3, pp. 266f.

[202] *Al-Tahdhīb* 7, 1. Ṣafar 1350/18.6.1931, p. 138; on al-Manfalūṭī (1876–1924) see Ch. Vial, "al-Manfalūṭī", *EI* (CDRom. ed.).

[203] For a short biography of Sa'īd 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr, see Jam'iyyat aṣdiqā' al-mu'arrikh Sa'īd 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr al-thaqāfiyya, n.t., 20.9.1995, pp. 2f.; for his writings, *al-Fikr* (Ghayl Bā Wazīr) I, Jan.-March 1996, pp. 4f.

[204] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], p. 1. On al-Manfalūṭī's influence on Bā Wazīr's nationalist feelings, see Najīb Sa'īd Bā Wazīr, "Mafhūm al-waṭaniyya 'inda Sa'īd 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr", *al-Fikr* 9, April-June 1998, p. 4.

[205] Abū Shawk/al-Anṣārī, *Tārīkh*, p. 11.

[206] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], pp. 6f., 10.

Mukallā exposed him to books by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, al-ʿAqqād, al-Māzinī, Zakī Mubārak, Aḥmad Shawqī, ʿAbdallāh Fikrī and other contemporaries.[207]

In line with the growing interest in history, the Arab (and notably the ʿAlawī) contribution to the past was celebrated. *Zahrat al-Shabāb*, a "monthly moral and national journal" published by the youth club of Sayʾūn, printed a lengthy article by the Hadhrami poet and historian, Ṣāliḥ ʿAlī al-Ḥāmid, on the Islamisation of Java. He left no doubt about the decisive role of the ʿAlawī Arabs in this process, not even mentioning alternative theories according to which Iranian or Indian Muslims first brought the new faith to the Indies.[208]

In view of the general situation, political problems were treated with particular caution, as the following cautioning remarks by *al-Tahdhīb* show:

> In sum, she [*al-Tahdhīb*] seeks to excel in her dedication to the service of the Hadhrami people and homeland in all aspects, the scientific, literary, religious, and moral. She [seeks to remain] aloof from attacks on individuals, and to avoid as far as at all possible anything which might hurt the feelings through the mention of personal traits which are irrelevant to politics, except where they are important with regard to civic matters. There will be no talk of news which do not carry scientific or literary interest.[209]

While in different circumstances, this would be taken as commitment to a code of good journalistic practice, it has to be understood here in the context of a new medium battling for its survival and thus promising to exercise extreme self-constraint. Therefore the divisions between Hadhramis, thematised in no uncertain terms in the diaspora media, are tackled in a rather different tone in the homeland. For example, the anonymous M.S. acknowledges the existence of divisions, only to add apologetically that other nations had overcome similar problems.[210] In comparison with the diaspora journals, this was an extremely cautious approach. Similarly, *al-Nahḍa*'s examination of the advantages of political consultation and its Islamic nature remained

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[207] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], p. 14. He also lists Abāẓa, Mikhāʾīl Naʿīma, Jibrān, Maṭrān, Ruṣāfī, al-Kāẓimī and al-Zahāwī. Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr confirmed to me that he read these works in the library, al-Mukallā 30.10.1996.

[208] *Zahrat al-Shabāb* 4, Jumādā al-akhira 1361/June 1942, pp. 1–3 and 5, Rajab 1361/July 1942, pp. 1f. The article was continued in later issues which I have not been able to consult.

[209] *Al-Tahdhīb* 1, 1. Shaʿbān 1349/22.12.1930, p. 4.

[210] *Al-Tahdhīb* 1, 1. Shaʿbān 1349/22.12.1930, p. 7.

abstract in the extreme and did not even refer to Hadhramaut.[211]
Articles pinpointing concrete social problems, such as the misap-
propriation of orphan's inheritance, usually contain few details but
abound in religiously-founded generalities against such abuse.[212]

In this general context, it is not surprising that less immediately
political issues such as education take pride of place. Questions such
as what constitutes proper education or how curricula should be
structured are discussed enthusiastically. Journals report on attempts
to coordinate innovative teaching, such as the visit of two representatives
from *Jam'iyyat al-Ukhuwwa* in Tarīm to *Madrasat al-Nahḍa* in Say'ūn.[213]
Teachers are accused of teaching only book knowledge and of being
more interested in their salary than in their students or new books.[214]
The necessity of educational missions abroad, both to other Arab as
well as Western countries, is impressed on the readers of *al-Nahḍa*, and
the possible objection of the loss of an Islamic identity pre-emptively
countered by the argument that equipped with a proper Islamic edu-
cation and the knowledge of European writings, Muslims would be
in an even better position to defend their faith effectively.[215] Similarly,
the authors use the journals as a medium to convey concrete edu-
cational ideas to their readers, ranging from personal hygiene to his-
tory.[216] Girls' education, hitherto limited to their participation in
Koran schools and private instruction, was thematised. 'Umar Bā
Kathīr, writing in *al-Tahdhīb*, argued that Hadhrami girls were so
ignorant that they were incapable of being "a proper mother who
knows how to organise her house, educate her children and to make
life pleasant for herself and her husband and family. She does not
[even] know her religious duties [. . .]".[217] Bā Kathīr argued that this
was due to the spiteful and negligent attitude of men, which ran
counter to Islamic prescriptions of religious equality. Aware of the
controversial nature of this issue, Bā Kathīr added soothingly:

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[211] *Al-Nahḍa* 6, Sha'bān 1361/Aug.-Sept. 1942, pp. 4f.
[212] *Al-Tahdhīb* 4, 1. Dhū al-qa'da 1349/20.3.1931, pp. 72–75. The appropriation
of charitable funds seems to have been somewhat of a problem in Hadhramaut,
Barhūt 2, Jumādā al-ākhira 1348/Nov. 1929, p. 12.
[213] *Al-Nahḍa* 4, Jumādā al-akhira 1361/June-July 1942, p. 2.
[214] *Al-Tahdhīb* 8, 1. Rabī' al-awwal 1350/17.7.1931, pp. 149–152.
[215] *Al-Nahḍa* 5, Rajab 1361, July/Aug. 1941, p. 4.
[216] Cf. the series of articles by Muḥammad b. Hāshim, *al-Nahḍa* 5, Rajab 1361/
July/Aug. 1941; 6, Sha'bān 1361/Aug./Sept. 1941 and 7, Ramaḍān 1361/Sept./Oct.
1941.
[217] 'Umar b. Aḥmad Bā Kathīr, "Ta'līm al-bint", *al-Tahdhīb* 6, 2. Muḥarram
1350/21.5.1931, pp. 113–115, here p. 113.

I do not ask you, oh people, to teach her to the degree which would allow her to become a judge or to open a shop for trade, or [to perform] anything else of the labour which is only assumed by men. However, I want you to teach her what is indispensable to know about the principles of religion and morals, and what she needs to know about the conjugal rights and proper education, so that she will equip your children with high morals and laudable dispositions, so that they may become the men of the future who will serve their country and people. The education provided by a mother for her children is their first school [. . .].[218]

The article follows a standard argument also found in Hadhrami journals abroad such as *al-Irshād*.[219] A poem by Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, composed in 1935, further attests to the widespread concern of reform-minded youth with this problem.[220] While the writer in *al-Irshād* referred to the Egyptian author Qāsim Amīn as the source of his reasoning, the education of women had already been an issue for Hadhrami reformers such as Ibn Sumayṭ in the early and mid-19th century.[221] This notwithstanding, female literacy even in towns like Shibām, which had a high rate of migration, remained highly controversial even in the 1950s.[222]

What distinguishes Bā Kathīr's article from a comparable one published in Surabaya is his engagement with the possibility of women earning their own living. Contrary to Amīn, who suggested that education should enable women to provide for their own living, Bā Kathīr treads this ground most carefully, presumably against the background of opposition even by open-minded Hadhramis to what they had observed abroad and objected to. As elsewhere, this debate, conducted between men, referred to educated townswomen working publicly only. Neither women in the countryside working in agriculture and animal husbandry nor townswomen engaged in home production (both of which were part and parcel of Hadhrami every day life) were mentioned in such arguments. Interestingly, ʿUmar's brother ʿAlī also took issue with the position of women in his play

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[218] ʿUmar b. Aḥmad Bā Kathīr, "Taʿlīm al-bint", *al-Tahdhīb* 6, 2. Muḥarram 1350/21.5.1931, p. 114.

[219] *Al-Irshād* 21, 11.11.1920, pp. 3–4.

[220] Al-Shāṭirī, *Dīwān*, pp. 35–38.

[221] On Q. Amīn, cf. U. Rizzitano, "Ãāsim Amīn", *EI* (CDRom.) and Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 164–170.

[222] Hoeck, *Doctor*, p. 131.

Humam aw fī ʿāṣimat al-Aḥqāf, where not only female education, but also the quest of Muslim men for equal women is thematised.[223]

In 1940, *al-Ikhāʾ* printed a call by an international club for Islamic correspondence. It thereby hoped to create contacts between Muslims from all over the world, which would enhance the exchange of new ideas and create friendships. This is interesting because it shows a growing internationalist orientation among the young generation which was picked up eagerly by the editors of *al-Ikhāʾ*, who recommended the club to its readers.[224] If one is interested in the channels of communication and the creation of international networks, such organisations would deserve closer attention.

In line with the educational thrust of the journals, they emphasised the need for libraries. In August 1930, ʿUmar b. Aḥmad Bā Kathīr regretted in *al-Tahdhīb* the lack of such an institution in Sayʾūn and called on people to donate books.[225] A month later, Ḥusayn b. Abī Bakr b. Yaḥyā reported from Tarīm that Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. ʿAbdallāh b. Yaḥyā had bought a house in central Tarīm which he planned to convert into a libary building housing the private library of his grandfather. He had instructed his sons to catalogue the books and sent his son ʿAbdallāh to Egypt to study how such libraries were organised.[226] A few years later in 1935, Sultan ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿaytī founded the already mentioned Sultan's Library in al-Mukallā with 300 volumes, which was greatly extended and endowed as a *waqf* by his nephew and successor Ṣāliḥ. Thanks to Ṣāliḥ's generous provisions, by the 1940s it already comprised over 6000 volumes.[227] The library proved very popular among the local population and by the 1950s and 60s had also become a prime venue for lectures and political rallies.[228] The provision of such a public space was particularly remarkable as most Hadhrami towns, with the notable exception of al-Shiḥr and to a lesser extent al-Mukallā had hardly any venues where people could meet for discussion. There were mosques and open spaces as well as gatherings in the *majālis* (reception rooms) of individuals, but none of the coffeehouses which emerged as centres

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[223] For a detailed analysis, see Freitag, "Dying of enforced spinsterhood", pp. 19–22.

[224] *Al-Ikhāʾ* 2;9, Ṣafar 1359/April 1940, pp. 3f.

[225] *Al-Tahdhīb* 8, 1. Rabīʿ al-awwal 1350/17.7.1931, pp. 157f.

[226] *Al-Tahdhīb* 10, 1. Jumādā al-ūlā 1350/14.9.1931, pp. 186f.

[227] ʿAbdallāh ʿUmar al-Sakūtī, untitled typescript about the library's history, al-Mukallā 1996.

[228] On the library's popularity, see PRO, CO 725/65/5, Political Intelligence Summary for week ending 18.3.1939.

of 18th and 19th century European intellectual and political life.[229]

By the early 1950s, a smaller branch of the library opened in al-Shiḥr.[230] This demand for a greater variety of books (instead of the concentration on a few, usually religious texts which were studied in much detail) marks an important transition in reading culture. When a similar change occurred in Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, public libraries became an important means for the moral instruction of the young generation, while at the same time improving the latter's abilities to think clearly and rationally and widening their knowledge.[231] The complementary functions of libraries and the press became very clear when *al-Nahḍa* in its last issue published the views of five intellectuals on the future of the press in Hadhramaut. ʿUmar b. Muḥammad Bā Kathīr explicitly mentioned the press together with printed books as a welcome means to acquire knowledge. He explicitly contrasted it with the limited outlook of the *ʿulamāʾ*, thereby implictly criticising them.[232]

Only a few articles concerned the everyday life of most Hadhramis. Unemployment and idleness caused by the lack of economic opportunities as much as by remittances from abroad, which absolved many youngsters from the need to work, were brandished as a source of moral decay in *al-Nahḍa*.[233] It is typical for the social milieu of the journals that upper-class unemployment rather than economic problems among landless labourers or Beduin were thematised. This is not to deny that the problem existed: van der Meulen's description of the Hadhrami *jeunesse dorée* from 1939 seems to support the view that quite a few young men from wealthy families spent their time idly.[234] Could it be that the following quotation in *al-Tahdhīb*, written some nine years earlier, hints in a similar direction? It quoted the following saying of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal:

> I love the dirhams which were gained by trade,
> I hate those which were given to me as presents by my brothers.[235]

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[229] On coffee- and teahouses in al-Shiḥr and al-Mukallā see Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 99, 105.

[230] *Al-Akhbār* 2;13, 20.1.1954, pp. 10f.

[231] Jochum, *Kleine Bibliotheksgeschichte*, pp. 147–150.

[232] *Al-Nahḍa* 10, Dhū al-Ḥijja 1361/Jan.-Feb. 1942, pp. 6–7.

[233] *Al-Nahḍa* 6, Shaʿbān 1361/Aug.-Sept. 1942, p. 7.

[234] Van der Meulen, *Aden*, pp. 189–192.

[235] *Al-Tahdhīb* 10, 1. Jumādā al-ūlā 1350/14.9.1931, p. 185.

Finally, the crucial topic of agriculture and the dangers related to its neglect and the abuse of its resources occupy the journals.[236] As agriculture was such a crucial issue for the well-being of the Hadhrami population, and since it is one of the few areas where at least a few indications exist of the practical obstacles confronting change, this topic deserves somewhat closer attention in our context.

Change and Its Obstacles: The Case of Agricultural Development[237]

The opposition to change noted above in the context of education and journalism extended to such vital fields as agricultural technology. Although the source base here is far more patchy, it suffices to show how technological and organisational change could only slowly take root in the Wadi during the period under discussion in this chapter. The major difference between developments in the Wadi and on the coast is probably that, as discussed in chapter III, the Qu'ayṭī sultan took a lead in introducing development, often against the opposition of the *'ulamā'*. In the Wadi, by contrast, landowners (whether notables or not) risked the scorn of their compatriots without enjoying official backing. An additional obstacle was obviously the political instability, which again affected the Wadi more than the coast.

Hadhrami journals in South East Asia in the early 1920s emphasise the need for agricultural improvement.[238] An article in *al-Tahdhīb* echoes these views. Written in June 1931 with the clear aim of spurring change, it gives interesting albeit possibly polemical insights into the chequered history of agricultural change under the title "The movement [towards the introduction] of water-raising machinery in Hadhramaut".[239] The article opens with a general discussion of the necessity of agricultural development which would help to dampen high prices (for food imports), relieve hardship and support the national economy by reducing imports. It then quotes experiments with the growing of exotic fruit, as well as statements of visitors to underline the developmental potential of the region. It discusses the various abortive attempts to introduce a way of raising water different from

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[236] *Al-Ikhā'* 2;9, April 1940, p. 2; *Zahrat al-Shabāb* 4, Jumādā al-akhira 1361/June 1942, pp. 3–5, 7f.
[237] On this topic cf. Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 92–94.
[238] See, for example, *al-Irshād* 5, 15.7.1920 and *al-Qisṭās* 13, 16.6.1923, p. 1.
[239] *Al-Tahdhīb* 7, 1. Ṣafar 1350/18.6.1931, pp. 121–127.

the traditional system of *sināwa* (wells from which water was raised by lowering a vessel and pulling it up with the help of oxen).[240] Around 1860, Shaykh Zayn Bā Salāma and a relative had installed a first handpump which became very famous. However, once it broke and could not be repaired, the unlucky owners were showered with scornful remarks, including poetry celebrating their misfortune.[241] In 1884, a member of the al-ʿAydarūs in al-Ḥazm called on the people to found a cooperative with the aim of drilling artesian wells. People agreed, dug holes and put down pipes of sugar cane, but nothing happened. Then a member of the al-Mashhūr family bought proper pipes and wanted to construct a machine himself but did not succeed. Interestingly, this initiative seems to have its roots among merchants in the Indies, who had observed such wells and brought Indonesian experts to Hadhramaut.[242] The introduction of a camel-driven well was more successful. However, it was abandoned after the death of the animals.

Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl, residing in Singapore at the time, visited Hadhramaut in 1913 and made rather detailed suggestions on how agriculture could be revived, most notably in the vicinity of the famous Nuqrā-dam, the destruction of which is often blamed for the decline of Hadhramaut.[243] This interest seems to have run in the family, as already Ibn ʿAqīl's father had built an important dam for irrigation.[244] Interestingly, Ibn ʿAqīl, who was a political schemer throughout his life, took part in a discussion a few years later in the British consulate in Batavia. The possibility of British intervention was suggested, which would then allow serious agricultural development in Eastern Wadi Hadhramaut and turn it into the granary of Eastern Arabia. Another interesting aspect of this meeting is that Sultan Ghālib b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿayṭī's initiatives were explicitly mentioned as a possible starting point for this policy.[245]

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[240] The system of *sināwa* is described in Landberg, *Etude*, vol. I, pp. 288f.

[241] Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, p. 92, dates this to 1882/83, while *al-Tahdhīb* 7;1, p. 123, writes that people began to consider irrigational change, whereupon Bā Salāma imported the pump.

[242] Van den Berg, *Le Ḥaḍramout*, p. 81.

[243] *Ḥaḍramawt* 303, 1.10.1931, p. 2. The reprint of the article continues in *Ḥaḍramawt* 304, 19.1.1931, p. 2.

[244] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 319.

[245] PRO, CO 273/498 (7673), Memorandum of Discussion between Syed Ali bin Shahab of Batavia, Syed Mohamed bin Agil [. . .], R. J. Farrer, S. S. Civil Service, W. H. Lee-Warner, S. S. Civil Service, 27.11.1919.

The idea of artesian wells was also discussed in Shibām in 1920, although "absence of any engineering and technical knowledge as well as facilities of communication are a great drawback".[246] Therefore, the British official reporting this suggested the introduction of a less effective but cheaper technology. He continued,

> The people of Hadramaut are alive to the necessity of developing their country, but as stated in a preceding paragraph, want a strong personality to give them a lead. They appeared anxious to get expert advice for the construction of dams in order to utilise the flood water, and on possiblities [sic!] of sinking artisan [sic!] wells for regular irrigation. It is useless to force this advice on them unless they themselves make a request for it and are ready to bear the heavy expenditure that the improvements will entail. It was their inten [sic!] to collect money from the well to do people in return for reasonable annual profits on the lines of Joint Stock Companies, at so much per share. Whether this scheme matures, is on the knees of the gods, but it is the only solution whereby people could be induced to buy shares and be jointly responsible for the welfare for the country.[247]

According to *al-Tahdhīb*, modern machinery was only introduced in 1340/1921–22. Another purpose-formed company had imported an English pump which once again broke down quickly and could not be repaired. Interestingly, the authors claim that the resulting break-up of the company was linked as much to machine failure as to the lack of trust among the members who abused funds and lacked the necessary managerial understanding. In another incident, an Egyptian had promised the purchase of suitable machinery from Berlin and then disappeared with the money which he had collected from prospective customers. *Al-Tahdhīb* commented, that only recently successful companies had begun to operate under the leadership of the al-Kāf in Tarīm and the al-Saqqāf and Bā Rajā' families in Say'ūn, and that a number of individuals had started to import pumps privately from Aden.[248] It becomes clear that this was still not without problems in an anecdote related by Helfritz. He visited Hadhramaut in 1931 and was recruited to repair a pump in Say'ūn.[249] Similarly

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[246] IO, R/20/A/1415, part 1, Report by Captain Nasir-ud-din Ahmad, Political Officer Aden, on his visit to the Hadhramaut, 12.3.1920, p. 15.

[247] IO, R/20/A/1415, part 1, Report by Captain Nasir-ud-din Ahmad, Political Officer Aden, on his visit to the Hadhramaut, 12.3.1920, p. 28.

[248] *Al-Tahdhīb* 7, 1. Ṣafar 1350/18.6.1931, pp. 126f.

[249] Helfritz, *Glückliches Arabien*, pp. 53f.

in 1935, a Japanese expert was invited to advise on water pumps in the Wadi.[250]

Once again, a recurrent theme in all these accounts is the emphasis on the need to cooperate, and the frequent documentation of associations founded for the distinct purpose of irrigation. While this probably indicates earlier forms of cooperation in the field of irrigation as well as a long history of cooperative ventures in trade, the specific type of partnership in greater agricultural projects seems to have been new.[251]

Reformers on the Road: Ibn Hāshim's Riḥla ilā 'l-taghrayn

A particularly interesting example of the reform discourse is Muḥammad b. Hāshim's description of his journey from Wadi Hadhramaut to the coast, first given in the form of a speech to the Tarīm United Youth Club. The published version depicts the author in a Western suit, wearing a turban and reading a book. It provides unique insight into the views of a leading Hadhrami reformer. The contents of the speech, which for the printed edition was enlarged by learned footnotes about the history of Hadhramaut and the political context, clearly betrays the modernist but even more so the urban and to some extent the ʿAlawī background of its author.[252] The following discussion will only highlight those issues which add to the wider debate of reform and will neglect the lengthy passages about the lack of security. If mention is made of certain places visited by Ibn Hāshim and those in his company (mostly members of the Youth Club of Tarīm in addition to Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf) it is because the itinerary shows their preoccupations and interests.[253] The aim of the journey in 1931 was political: Abū Bakr and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān,

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[250] PRO, CO 725/30/1, Political Intelligence Summary 452 (week ending 18.9.1935), p. 1.

[251] On older modes of agricultural organisation, see Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 85–92.

[252] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*. Ibn Hāshim's intentions were clear to his contemporaries, see the "Eulogy" (*Taqrīz*) by ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Saqqāf, pp. 65f. For a similar analysis of this work, which was written parallel to this one and recently published, see Hartwig, "Contemplation, Social Reform and the Recollection of Identity", pp. 328–334.

[253] The text also discusses many interesting aspects of Hadhrami folklore, such as the *shabwānī* dance, the system of urban quarters, as well as many of the customs related to long and short distance travelling.

sons of Shaykh al-Kāf, Sultan ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿayṭī and other reformers held discussions about the situation in Hadhramaut. The journey also provided an excellent opportunity for the exchange of views between reformers. Therefore, Ibn Hāshim visited all major schools on the coast and was greeted with specially organised receptions. Together with the numerous social gatherings, these occasions afforded the travellers with ample opportunities to exchange notes and coordinate political moves with like-minded people on the coast.

The group of nineteen started its journey by car on the road built by Sayyid Abū Bakr. The enthusiasm with which the comforts are described (and later contrasted with the discomforts of travel on donkey, mule and by foot) still conveys a sense of novelty.[254] Although much of the road was completed, the group still faced a journey of several days, and it is with great regret that Ibn Hāshim noted that they had forgotten to take along rice, therefore being forced to eat fresh grilled or boiled meat. Ibn Hāshim's comment that this meal tasted unacceptable gives an inkling of the contrast between the Java-influenced cuisine of the Wadi and what would already have been a feast for most Beduin and country dwellers.[255] The problems encountered with the Beduin are discussed in the obvious context of security. More interesting is Ibn Hāshim's commentary on their women, whose marvel at the cars and other gear is amply described. The superiority felt by the urban reformer comes across when he mentions their manifold questions "to which we answered to the degree of their understanding".[256]

Once in al-Shiḥr, the almost romantic description of the ocean, "a marvellous sight impacting on the self", deserves mention.[257] In contrast to this uplifting sight, Ibn Hāshim described a town which, he suggested, had been on the decline for some forty years. Were it not for the city's port, "a desolate sight and in a bad state", he argued that the place would long have lost its role.[258] From al-Shiḥr, the group travelled to al-Mukallā by a new motor boat which had just been imported by Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kāf from Singapore. Before leaving, they were treated to an evening of *shabwānī*, a dance

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[254] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 9f., 23.
[255] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 13.
[256] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 21, cf. p. 20 and the comments on the return journey, p. 62.
[257] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 29f.
[258] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 31, cf. p. 36.

which combined movements with music and poetic competition. Ibn Hāshim praises this all-male event for its organisation, poetry and music.[259] There might well be a second element to this praise: part of the *shabwānī* represents the reconciliation of two groups after a battle in which ʿAlawīs play a central role as mediators and are consequently portrayed in very positive terms.[260]

The appreciation of order also comes across in Ibn Hāshim's description of a kind of parade in al-Mukallā where "chairs were put up and the organisation was thorough".[261] In contrast, he expresses his disgust at a mixed dance of the *ṣubyān* which he clearly sees as the incarnation of backwardness:

> a frightening dance with a reprehensible organisation, closer to what we see in the cinemas of the firedances which the negroes[262] perform in Africa when they kill their human sacrifices. The women stand opposite the men, then they start to sing and dance in a way repulsive to those with good taste.[263]

It seems that this view was to a large degree influenced by the public appearance of women. Ibn Hāshim was also highly critical of the presence of a substantial number of women at the funeral of one of the most important spiritual figures of al-Shiḥr, Sayyid ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī b. Shaykh al-ʿAydarūs.[264] Nevertheless, there might easily be a class element in Ibn Hāshim's interpretation. In contrast to the *shabwānī*, which gives the ʿAlawīs their due, this second dance seems to have been one of the *ṣubyān* which simply ignored the other groups and therefore can be seen as a celebration of what was the lowest of all social groups in the ʿAlawī reformer's eyes.

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[259] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 35f., on the *Shabwānī*, cf. al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, p. 285 and Serjeant, *Prose and Poetry*, pp. 26–29.

[260] I owe this information to Dr. Sylvaine Camelin.

[261] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 46, cf. p. 47.

[262] The term chosen by Ibn Hāshim is *zunūj*, I have chosen the term "negroe" to convey the pejorative tone.

[263] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 42f. This might be the dance described by Serjeant, *Prose and Poetry*, pp. 20f. It is noteworthy that there were no public cinemas in Hadhramaut at the time, Ibn Hāshim's point of reference here is clearly South East Asia. However, it seems that Sultan ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿayṭī had a private film projector (ibid., p. 48) and it cannot be excluded that wealthy individuals in the Wadi also owned such machines and made them available to the youth clubs. From 1936, Sultan Ghālib had the habit of entertaining his guests with films. Hickinbotham, *Aden*, p. 140. A public cinema was started in 1943, D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, p. 71.

[264] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 59.

In al-Mukallā, "beautiful and pleasing from the sea, but if you
entered it, narrow and with dirty streets",[265] Ibn Hāshim met a friend
from his days in Java and Sumatra, who had since joined King
Fayṣal's escort in Syria and later Iraq. Besides receptions and official
negotiations, the travellers enjoyed an outing on the sea. They vis-
ited the new hospital of al-Mukallā and went to the airfield of al-
Fuwwa to inspect two British planes en route from Aden to Dhofar.[266]
In a footnote typical of the ardent supporter of modernisation, Ibn
Hāshim attacked the quarter system as "causing grave harm" to
those not willing to submit to its rigid system.[267] This view can be
interpreted as a liberal, individualistic attempt to promote greater
freedom of movement and services in the towns. Equally, however,
the quarter system was an organisation from which *sayyid*s such as
Ibn Hāshim were excluded and which constituted an independent
centre of power on which they depended at times.

An interesting incident is the (probably fictional) encounter with
two German tourists in al-Shiḥr who, if we are to believe Ibn Hāshim,
wanted to visit Hadhramaut with little money and even less knowl-
edge of Arabic or English but could not be advised to give up their
plans.[268] He writes little about the travellers but ponders the European
willingness to step into the unknown and explore the world. The
desire to explore geography was coupled with the pride of adven-
turers. However, Ibn Hāshim warns us that such tourism hardly
remained innocent: "This matter has consequences, as it is obvious
that as soon as the European sets his foot anywhere he is followed
by imperialism or missionaries—or both."[269] This occurred, he argues,
to the ignorant nations, and Hadhramaut was a prime potential vic-

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[265] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 51.

[266] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 38–41.

[267] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 59, fn. 1 (the footnote commences on p. 58).

[268] The identity of these tourists remains mysterious as they fit none of the known
travellers. Hans Helfritz visited Hadhramaut in 1931–32, as well as on a number
of later occasions, but was well known to the Quʿayṭī sultan and the al-Kāfs. It is
thus unlikely that Ibn Hāshim, a close associate of the al-Kāfs, would have described
him in this way, apart from the question who Helfritz' companion would have
been. See Helfritz *Glückliches Arabien*, p. 13 and his *Neugier trieb mich um die Welt*,
Köln: DuMont Buchverlag 1990, pp. 16–23. van der Meulen and von Wissmann
visited al-Shiḥr in June 1931, but once again were neither destitute nor without
the necessary contacts for their exploits. I therefore disagree with Hartwig,
"Contemplation, Social Reform and the Recollection of Identity", p. 333, fn. 62,
who identifies them as the likely "tourists".

[269] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 56. Cf. chapter IV with Daḥlān's comments on the
European desire to visit Mecca.

itim of such European expansion, given the general state of igno-
rance. Hadhramaut could not avoid this natural law unless it began
immediately to spread education, develop noble national feelings in
the youth and generally prepare for the struggles ahead.

An Exemplary Notable Family of the Period: The Āl al-Kāf

All sources agree on the leading role of the al-Kāf family in Tarīm
since the late 19th century, but disagree on whether they acted out
of social commitment or well-understood self-interest, or were motivated
by a combination of these factors. The family has appeared in earlier
chapters as wealthy notables and sponsors of the *nahḍa* in South East
Asia. It also played a crucial role in Hadhramaut until the 1950s when
its members in Tarīm alone numbered some six hundred individuals.[270]
The al-Kāf palaces in Tarīm, most notably al-Tawāḥī, the splendid
home built by Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf in the very centre
of the town, to this day serve as timely reminders of the family's
wealth and political importance.[271]

   Therefore, a short account of what is known of the family history
seems appropriate. Once again, details about the economic founda-
tions of this family's wealth are hard to come by, but what is known
supports the view of the al-Kāf family as members of a translocal
bourgeoisie. Although they might have been the richest family in
their time, their history can also be regarded as typical for a par-
ticular section of the elite.

   The al-Kāf were *sayyid*s. The fact that Ibn Ḥamīd hardly mentions
members of the family would seem to indicate that they did not play
a major role in the early and mid-19th century, at least as far as not-
able reform politics in Sayʾūn and Tarīm are concerned. Some mem-
bers of the al-Kāf family figured as *qāḍī*s and *faqīh*s even before the
19th century, and they might have been one of many minor notable
families involved in science and migration to all areas adjacent to the
Indian Ocean.[272] It seems that they started their social rise around the

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[270] Hoeck, *Doctor*, p. 102. To this need to be added the family members in Sayʿūn,
as well as those in Singapore, Java, the Ḥijāz and elsewhere.
   [271] On the family's houses, see Boxberger, Conflicts, p. 108.
   [272] Interestingly, ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 414–418, emphasises that they were
an important family, but most of those individuals who are actually mentioned and
for whom dates are supplied seem to have lived in the 19th and 20th centuries,

mid-19th century. Ibn Hāshim, the family historian, speaks of this period as the "al-Kāf epoch" (al-dawr al-Kāfī).[273] His history is the major source of the following survey and as he was either commissioned or at least paid to write it, the information needs to be taken with more than a grain of salt. The history was first written in 1939 or 40 but later continued until 1958. Some additional notes were added by the historian Saqqāf ʿAlī al-Kāf and his son Muḥammad.[274]

The founders of the family fortune were the three brothers ʿAbdallāh (d. 1297/1879–80), Muḥammad (d. 1318/1900–01) and Shaykh al-Kāf (d. 1910), sons of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad (d. 1280/1863–64). Shaykh, on whom the existing family history centres and who seems to have been the youngest among them, was born in 1255/1839–40 in Tarīm. He grew up between Tarīm and Masīlat Āl al-Shaykh where he came into close contact with the great reformer ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn b. Ṭāhir. He received his primary education in the ʿulma Bā Gharīb where Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd had studied. Among his later teachers we find a good number of the scholars discussed in chapter II, such as Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Junayd, ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥusayn Balfaqīh of Tarīm and Muḥsin b. ʿAlawī al-Saqqāf. Furthermore, Shaykh knew the likes of Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥr, ʿAlawī b. Saqqāf al-Jifrī, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Mihḍār and ʿAbdallāh b. Aḥmad Bā Sūdān.[275]

In 1272/1855–56, the eldest brother Muḥammad travelled to Singapore to replace his father ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. According to Ibn Hāshim, the latter was weighed down by his responsibility for a family of six children. Regardless of his feelings, it is possible that he could already build on a well-established network of relatives in South East Asia. For example, a certain ʿAlawī "Yasrīn" b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kāf had established himself in Palembang, although we know neither when exactly this occurred nor what the relationship between him and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad was.[276] Presumably, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān married

which could imply that their rise to notable status began during the course of the 19th century. Similarly, their near-absence from ʿAydarūs al-Ḥibshī's *ʿIqd al-yawāqīt* suggests that they did not play a major part in the *Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya*.

[273] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 4.

[274] For the original date of writing as 1358/1939–40, see Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 51, for the enddate (5.4.1958) ibid., p. 256. Serjeant, "Nashāt al-muʾarrikhīn", p. 9 confirms that Ibn Hāshim in 1950 was still working on the manuscript. Given the different scripts in the manuscript, and the repetition of large chunks of material, it is difficult to discriminate between Ibn Hāshim's text and later additions. Thanks to Muḥammad Saqqāf al-Kāf in Jeddah who made the manuscript available to me.

[275] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 13–15.

[276] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, pp. 414f.

in South East Asia, as Ibn Hāshim later mentions a son in Java.

At the time of Muḥammad's arrival, the al-Junayd, al-Saqqāf, al-Mashhūr and al-Sirrī families were the major Arab merchants in that town. From Singapore, Muḥammad moved to Surabaya where he began to engage in trade and was later joined by his brother 'Abdallāh.[277] Major trading items seem to have been spices, sugar, coffee, and also cloth imported from Europe and India.[278] The international nature of this trade and the fact that 'Abdallāh asked his brother to join him, point to the trade being somewhat wider than Ibn Hāshim's account wants us to believe. He portrays 'Abdallāh as somebody who built the business from scratch and makes no further reference to his father's business or to the existence of a half-brother.[279] This is not surprising as the account is clearly stylised to emphasise the ethos of the al-Kāf brothers as "self-made men", which again resonates Samuel Smiles' ideas.

There exists an interesting hint which might help us to imagine how such trade with India might have been conducted. We are told that 'Abdallāh maintained close personal links of a spiritual nature with al-Ḥusayn b. 'Umar b. Sahl (1225/1810–11 – 1303/1885–86). This scholar, who is said to have been knowledgeable not least in matters such as the writing of talismans, was born in Malabar. His family is said to have exercised great spiritual power. More to the point, they were renowned owners of pepper plantations, which financed their extravagant lifestyle. It would seem not improbable that the links between the two families were of both a spiritual and commercial nature.[280]

When Shaykh reached his twenties, he too joined his brothers in South East Asia. If we are to believe Ibn Hāshim, Shaykh travelled

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[277] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 16. According to Alwee Alkaff, Muḥammad was the first in the family to come to South East Asia. He began his trading career in India. NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, p. 18.

[278] Samuel, *Singapore's Heritage*, p. 88, NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, pp. 1f. The interview differs on a number of issues from Ibn Hāshim's older account, i.e. it does not mention Ḥusayn and claims that 'Abdallāh never left Hadhramaut. As Sayyid Alwee was not a historian, much of the following information on family movements is based on Ibn Hāshim, which also explains the differences of this account from Freitag, "Arab Merchants", which was written before I had access to Ibn Hāshim's account. Obviously, the differences might indicate problems between the various branches of the family.

[279] Ibn Hāshim describes the events as follows: "*Thumma ghādara Sinqāfūrah ilā madīnat Surabāyah bi-Jāwah wa-ṭafaqa bihā yubāshira 'l-tijāra al-awwaliyya bi-rāsmāl*". [al-Kāf Family History], p. 16.

[280] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 41–43. Unfortunately, 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 307, gives little information on Sayyid Ḥusayn b. Sahl.

via Shiḥr where he took a fishing boat to al-Mukallā. There he found a dhow for his journey to Aden. Upon arrival, Shaykh booked a place on a French steamer to Singapore.[281] From there he wrote to his brothers in Surabaya, who did not reply at first. Ibn Hāshim's tale of how Shaykh had to enter service with the al-Sirrī family as secretary (*kātib*), then started a side trade with commissioned goods and was only contacted by Muḥammad when he had proven his worth, may or may not be an idealised account of how even wealthy Hadhrami families liked to train their members the hard way.[282] Of course, it once again emphasises the fact that as a member of a family which by now was well-established in the Indies, Shaykh first proved his worth and only then was welcomed into the family business. A rivalling account tells us that Shaykh's journey first went to India and that he travelled at the expense of his brother Muḥammad, indicating a much less dramatic start to his career and reinforcing the impression that the family had important business connections there.[283]

Around 1280/1863–64, another son of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān by the name of Ḥusayn (presumably a half-brother of the three sons discussed above) died in Java. As he did not have children, his brothers inherited his property, which became the basis of their fortune and greatly increased the scope of their trade between Java and the Malay Peninsula. Shaykh extended the trading operations to include scrap iron, and at some stage he started to invest in real estate in Singapore where he and Muḥammad were now based.[284] The Surabaya branch of the business was taken over by ʿAbdallāh's son ʿAlī (d. 1293/1876–77). Meanwhile, ʿAbdallāh had returned to Hadhramaut, where he began to acquire agricultural land. Furthermore, he built political contacts and engaged in charity such as the distribution of sugar, coffee and clothing to the poor. This seems to indicate that he began to establish the reputation and connections which characterised a major notable.[285] After ʿAbdallāh's death, Muḥammad

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[281] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 21–24.

[282] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 28–30. This is confirmed in NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, p. 35.

[283] NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, p. 1.

[284] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 35f., NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, reel 1, p. 1.

[285] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 37–41. Alwee Alkaff seems oblivious of ʿAbdallāh ever coming to South East Asia, which might indicate that he stayed there only very briefly. NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, reel 1, p. 2.

Family Tree of the al-Kāf Family according to Muḥammad b. Hāshim[286]

Aḥmad — **ʿAbd al-Raḥmān** d. 1863/64

- **Ḥusayn**, b. Java, d. 1863/64 —— no children

- **Muḥammad**[287] b. Tarīm d. 1900/1 — Aḥmad —— **Ḥusayn** (Qāḍī) d. 1914–15

- **ʿAbdallāh** b. Tarīm d. 1879/80
  - Ḥusayn
    - **Abū Bakr** (1880–?)
    - ʿAbdallāh
    - **ʿUmar** (al-Miḥḍār)
  - ʿAlawī
  - **Ḥasan** c. 1878–?
    - ʿUmar (1909)
    - Muḥammad
    - ʿAydīd
  - **ʿAlī**
  - ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (mother Fāṭima b. Sumayṭ)
  - ʿUmar

- two daughters?

- **Shaykh**, b. Tarīm 1839/40–1910
  - Ḥusayn (d. 1918), born Singapore
    - ʿAbd al-Qādir
    - Muḥammad
  - Ḥasan
  - **ʿAbd al-Raḥmān** 1885–1950, b. Singapore mother of Āl Hindwān
    - **Jamal al-Layl**
    - Ḥusayn
    - Shaykh
  - **Abū Bakr** 1886/87–1965, b. Singapore (same mother as above)
  - Aḥmad d. 1906 b. Singpore? —— Shaykh Muḥammad[288]
  - **ʿUmar**, b. 1895/96–?

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[286] Bold characters indicate that the individuals are discussed in this work.

[287] According to Alwee Alkaff, NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, p. 2, Muḥammad died without offspring. In this case, Ḥusayn b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad might be member of a different branch of the family.

[288] Alwee Alkaff, NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, p. 4, names his own father as Shayk Mohamad bin Ahmad bin Shaik Alkaff.

returned to Hadhramaut as head of the family, and Shaykh became head of the family's operations in South East Asia until his return to Hadhramaut in 1301/1883–84.[289]

Sultan Muḥsin b. Ghālib al-Kathīrī seems to have demanded more taxes than the wealthiest Hadhrami of his time was prepared to pay.[290] Consequently, Shaykh migrated to a suburb and threatened to stay there. Probably in 1897, Shaykh had coins minted in the family name in Birmingham which he guaranteed with his private property.[291] It is not clear whether this might be linked to his money-lending activities.[292]

The management of the family business changed regularly over the following years. First, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbdallāh took control. In 1888, he seems to have bought a particularly valuable piece of land in the centre of Singapore where he built a shopping arcade and garage. Other properties were developed into Japanese tea gardens, racing grounds, etc.[293] 1888 is also mentioned as the date when much of the family fortune was invested in an endowment (waqf) which was to secure considerable income for charitable purposes as well as for the sustenance of family members. This waqf probably became the source of much of the expenditures by the family in Tarīm, i.e., of its contributions to Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq as well as of the considerable sums spent in the 1920s and 30s by the family on peace treaties, the building of a road, subsidies to the sultanate's budget, etc.[294] A number of Shaykh's sons joined and relieved him for some time. In 1325/1907–8, ʿAbdallāh's grandson Abū Bakr and Shaykh's son ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, whom we have encountered above as the president of Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq, were sent to Singapore by the order of Shaykh. The document (waṣiyya) ordering them to travel so that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbdallāh could return to Hadhramaut to relax contains many interesting points concerning the journey, which was to

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[289] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 50. The date could be 1309, which would fit better in the context of the subsequent discussion of the question of succession to the leadership of the firm from 1310 (starting p. 51).

[290] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 58f. On earlier tax-related problems of Shaykh's brother Muḥammad, see Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 48–50, cf. chapter III for the context.

[291] ʿA. al-Mashhūr, Shams, p. 486, fn. 2; R. Smith, "Notes", p. 501, fn. 6.

[292] These are discussed in Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 74, although only under the aspect of the generous provision of credit without securities to the poor.

[293] Samuel, Singapore's Heritage, pp. 88–90.

[294] IO, R/20/C/1491, Seyid Abubaker bin SheikhAl Kaff to Resident Adviser, al-Mukallā, 12.9.1955. On the endowments by the al-Kāf, al-Saqqāf, al-Junayd and Bin Ṭālib families see Freitag, "Arab Merchants".

lead the youngsters via Aden and possibly the Ḥijāz to Singapore. Shaykh gives detailed instructions as to how the newcomers were to learn the running of the business from their elder and how they were to keep a certain distance from their employees. He ordered them to remarry in Singapore. Alternatively, he suggested to buy female slaves, presumably so as to avoid illicit sexual relationships.[295] Between 1310/1892–93 and 1939–40, some sixteen changes took place in the actual management of the firm, which was registered in 1907–8 as Alkaff & Co. and which was the biggest property owner and taxpayer of Singapore after the port.[296]

These movements were normally coordinated by the respective head of the family who resided in Tarīm, as becomes apparent from the *waṣiyya* by Shaykh b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān as well as from passing comments by Ibn Hāshim. This points to a tightly organised, patri-archally run family which placed great emphasis on the maintenance of close ties between its members in Tarīm and Singapore. Shaykh left a will in which he named the five descendants who were to take charge of the family business, rotating between his own descendants and those of his brother ʿAbdallāh.[297]

Alkaff & Co. was founded by Abū Bakr b. Ḥusayn b. ʿAbdallāh (c. 1880–?)[298] and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh after Shaykh's death. It took up commissions and acted as agents for Arabs in Java with investments in Singapore, as well as for some Adenis and absentee landlords residing in the Hadhramaut.[299] A report from 1920 names them as agents for the Quʿayṭī *wazīr* Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār.[300]

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[295] The document is reprinted in Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 65–70. I was shown an identical copy, held in the family, by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf in Sayʾūn.

[296] For the different tos and fros, see Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 51–54, for the economic position of Alkaff & Co. Wright, *Twentieth Century*, pp. 710–712.

[297] These five individuals were, in chronological order, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbdallāh, Ḥusayn b. Shaykh, Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh, Abū Bakr b. Ḥusayn b. ʿAbdallāh and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh. Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 89–145 with their biographies. Apparently, Muḥammad left no (male?) issue, NAS, Oral History Centre, transcript of interview with Alwee Alkaff, A 000124/04, reel 1, p. 2.

[298] Unfortunately, the date of his death is incomplete. Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 110.

[299] Mandal, Finding their Place, p. 164, Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 101.

[300] IO, R/20/A/1409, Translation of secret Memorandum by Said Ali bin Ahmed Bin-Shahab, encl. in Acting Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Secretary, London, 4.12.1920, p. 4.

In 1340/1921–22, Sultan Manṣūr b. Ghālib appointed Sayyid ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh al-Kāf as his representative in Singapore, giving
him full authority to conduct any necessary business transactions.[301]

Shaykh al-Kāf chose to educate his children (many of whom were
born in Singapore) in Hadhramaut so as to maintain the clear Arab
identity of his family in terms of religion and behaviour.[302] This stands
in contrast to members of the al-Saqqāf family, who did not hesitate
to educate their offspring in the leading public schools of Singapore
or send them to Beirut and even Europe. These different choices
illustrate the range of options open to successful migrants. Shaykh,
whose *waṣiyya* conveys the image of a very concerned and affectionate
father (he asked his son and nephew to write regularly and send
presents) was probably a conservative individual. After his return to
Hadhramaut and until his death in April 1910, he attended Sufi ses-
sions as well as religious instruction and sponsored itinerant schol-
ars.[303] In spite of this traditionalist orientation, a rare personal anecdote
illustrates his open-mindedness. It further sheds light on how mod-
ernist thought was transmitted to Hadhramaut. Ibn Hāshim reports
how he had subscribed to *al-Manār* when staying with the al-Kāf
family during his studies in Tarīm, i.e., some time before his depar-
ture to South East Asia in 1907. The reputation of this modernist
journal in Hadhramaut was rather negative. Its Hadhrami readership
is said to have consisted mostly of people with trading connections
in South East Asia.[304] Nevertheless, Shaykh's son ʿAbd al-Raḥmān,
whom Ibn Hāshim had befriended, started to read the journal. This
was noticed by conservatives who reported ʿAbd al-Raḥmān to his

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[301] SMA, VIII, 1098. According to an unnumbered document from SMA, dated
15 Jumād al-awwal 1348 (19.10.1929), Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr asked Muḥammad
Ibrāhīm and Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Muḥammad al-Saqqāf to administer the legacy
of Sultan Manṣūr, which would imply that at some point in between the two dates,
some problems occurred between the Kathīrī sultans and the al-Kāf family.

[302] On his educational convictions, as interpreted by Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family
History], pp. 54–58. The whole tone of the *waṣiyya* would seem to lend credence to
Ibn Hāshim's interpretation, although his discussion is clearly coloured by his own
views, as can be seen from the vocabulary employed (i.e. "*al-tarbiyya al-waṭaniyya*",
p. 56).

[303] See the episode in A. al-Mashhūr, *Lawāmiʿ*, vol. I, pp. 357f., which describes
how ʿAlawī b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mashhūr refused to accept Shaykh's endowment
of three houses in Singapore for his maintenance. On Shaykh's relations to the
leading *ʿulamāʾ*, among them ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mashhūr, the head of the *ribāṭ*,
and on his devotion cf. Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 75–84.

[304] Al-ʿAmrī, *al-Manār*, pp. 56f., quoting from *al-Manār* 9;7, Aug. 1906.

father. Shaykh demanded to see some copies of the suspicious pub-
lication, returning it approvingly and commenting that he did not
understand the reservations against it.[305] In many ways, this education
paid off, as the further account of the family history will show. While
other families might have considered Hadhramaut an impoverished
backwater where poor relatives needed to be supported, many mem-
bers of the al-Kāf family, not least Shaykh's sons 'Abd al-Raḥmān
and Abū Bakr, are hardly ever denied tribute on account of their
magnanimity and contribution to the development of Hadhramaut.

Much of this development took place in the name of charity, which,
as already noted in the previous chapter, constituted an obligation
as well as a worthwhile exercise in terms of reputation. Ibn Hāshim's
account shows the range of charitable activities by the al-Kāf family.
They included the construction, maintenance and restoration of
mosques; meals and other gifts to the poor on manifold occasions;
the distribution of alms donated both by the al-Kāf and by other
families, the founding of schools; and the provision of clean drinking
water in places of religious importance such as Qabr Hūd.[306] Other
activities, such as support for *Jam'iyyat al-Ḥaqq* or the brokering of
peace between warring tribes, are also listed in this context and high-
light the close connection between charity and politics. Many of the
al-Kāf's actions are presented as *iṣlāḥ*, reform or improvement. In
addition to the activities mentioned above, this includes the participation
of Ḥusayn b. Shaykh (d. 1918) in judicial reform, as well as many
of the activities conducted under the auspices of *Jam'iyyat al-Ḥaqq*
and discussed in this and the next chapter.

It has been shown in the context of South East Asia how some
members of the al-Kāf family (and indeed many of their compatriots)
acted as major patrons of associations, journals and schools. A sim-
ilar observation holds for their activities in Hadhramaut, at least until
the early 1950s. Their links with *Jam'iyyat al-Ḥaqq* are epitomised by
'Alī b. Shihāb's report to the British that "Al-Hak Society represents,
in reality, the Alkaff family".[307] 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh reportedly

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[305] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 114f.
[306] See the biographies in Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 89−145 for
details of the charitable involvement of Shaykh's four successors.
[307] IO, R/20/A/1409, Translation of secret Memorandum by Said Ali bin Ahmed
Bin-Shahab, encl. in Acting Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Secretary, London,
4.12.1920, p. 1. Cf. H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 86, who stresses the willingness of the
al-Kāf and al-Saqqāf families to subsidise the budget.

supported a range of youth activities.[308] He not only opened his private swimming pool to young men, but more importantly in intellectual terms, he organised literary competitions as well as events in which the best reciters of the Koran were honoured. In Say'ūn in the late 1930s, a number of quite similar youth clubs were founded and attracted youth from different strata. Even if we do not know whether the young men of Tarīm chose a similar form of association, one might assume that the spirit in the youth groups did not differ all that dramatically.[309]

Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān assembled an important private library, which he endowed and opened to the public. As the library is not mentioned in Bā Kathīr's article on libraries, it would appear that it was only opened some time after 1930. In line with the above-mentioned change in reading habits and the demand for new types of knowledge, Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān subscribed to a number of journals from abroad, which he made available to the public free of charge.[310] He thus created what might be comparable to the subscription circles so widespread in the bourgeois society of 17th–19th century Europe.[311] In terms of the development of Hadhrami thought, the range is particularly interesting and a testimony to the openness and wide interest of this patron: ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, who in his youth read *al-Manār*, kept with his modernist sympathies by subscribing to the earlier-mentioned Cairene journal *Majallat al-Fatḥ*. Al-Kāf reportedly also supported al-Khaṭīb's press, the *Maṭbaʿa salafiyya*, which printed al-Bakrī's controversial history of Hadhramaut among many other *salafī* publications.[312] On the other side of the spectrum, we find the two Hadhrami and ʿAlawī journals from South East Asia, *al-Rābiṭa*

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[308] The following is based, if not indicated otherwise, on Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 133–135.

[309] For a list of the associations in Say'ūn, see al-Ṣabbān, al-ʿĀdāt, vol. II, pp. 264–266.

[310] Ibn Hāshim does not tell us when this happened. As one of the journals, *Majallat al-Fatḥ*, was published from 1926–27 onwards, one might assume that we are looking at the late 1920s or early 1930s.

[311] See the contributions in Dann, *Lesegesellschaften*. The wide time span indicates the time differential within Europe: While Western Europe experienced these developments in the 17th and 18th centuries, similar institutions appear in Eastern and South Eastern Europe only in the 18th and 19th centuries.

[312] Ibn Hāshim's text [al-Kāf Family History], p. 134, is not quite clear on the exact nature of the relationship between al-Kāf and al-Khaṭīb. Although he suggests that al-Kāf somehow participated in the printing house ("*wa-sāhama fī sharikat maṭbaʿatihā*"), this seems not to be mentioned anywhere else. I would like to thank Prof. Ende for information on al-Khaṭīb and the press.

and *Ḥaḍramawt*. As mentioned before, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's brother Abū
Bakr financed the printing of *al-Tahdhīb* in Cairo.

Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān not only supported the school of *Jamʿiyyat
al-Ḥaqq* and later continued it in the name of his family, but also
organised smaller schools for basic instruction.[313] In terms of his edu-
cational activities, the most interesting aspect was the founding of a
special school (or probably rather a study circle) for future legal prac-
titioners. It particularly aimed at training future judges and seems
to have taught them practical skills such as how to approach legal
cases or compose legal opinions.[314] This clearly is a much more dra-
matic step towards the functionalisation of knowledge than the *ribāṭ*
ever was. At the same time, it tells us something about the scepti-
cism with which the reformers viewed the practical skills of the grad-
uates of this institution.

Obviously, the influence of the al-Kāf family was never undis-
puted and their wealth attracted much greed. In 1934, the sultan's
slaves drove Sayyid Abū Bakr and many of his followers from Tarīm,
whereupon they set up a new home in Sayʾūn.[315] According to Ibn
Hāshim, this was just another incidence of the time-honoured prac-
tice of *hijra* to show the ruler that the limits of tolerance had been
overstepped. In this case, according to Ibn Hāshim, the sultan was
so weak that he was unable to rein in his slave soldiers. It is per-
haps not all that surprising that the slaves attacked the al-Kāf in
their quest for money. After all, *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*, in which the al-
Kāf had played such a leading role, had been quite inimical to these
soldiers. Abū Bakr, who exercised great influence over a number of
tribes and therefore commanded a following which responded to his
hijra with rebellion only returned to Tarīm after protracted negoti-
ations with the sultan.[316]

There is little doubt that the al-Kāf family, as well as other mer-
chant families discussed in this and preceding chapters, in many ways
resemble the "improvers", the Scottish trans-Atlantic merchants
described by Hancock as follows:

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[313] About ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's educational activities, cf. *al-Nahḍa al-Ḥaḍramiyya* 8,
rabīʿ al-thānī 1352/July-August 1933, pp. 8, 36.

[314] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 136.

[315] Stark, *The Coast of Incense*, p. 81.

[316] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 179–204. It seems that the al-Kāf
school was closed in the context of Abū Bakr's *hijra*, al-Shāṭirī, *Dīwān*, preface by
Muḥammad b. Hāshim, p. 4.

The associates were "improvers"; they were not content with main-
taining the status quo. This is clear toward the end of their lives, as
they built estates, houses, art collections, gardens, farms, factories, and
charities. Improvement, as they defined it, meant more than an increase
in crop yields; it touched most aspects of everyday life, and it manifested
itself in programs that were at once polite, industrious, and moral.
Running through most of their noncommercial activities and even some
of their business ventures is an intense drive for a broadly based civil-
ity, a persistent attention to the possibility of bettering man's condition:
their own, as they became gentlemen, and other', since they believed
society as a whole was advancing from barbarism toward civility.

Improvers also acted, developing estates, promoting transportation
and industrial projects, patronizing charities, and pushing an agenda
of commerical and agricultural legislation in Parliament.[317]

A far more difficult question is whether their engagement shows a
qualitative difference to what one can notice among the notables of
the 19th century discussed in chapter II. There is much evidence to
support the view of strong continuities. Nevertheless, one can observe
a marked tendency towards new types of organisation in associations,
which (at least in theory) were more open towards other social strata
and based on openly-declared social or political aims instead of the
(often implied) interests of a particular group into which one was born.

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[317] Hancock, *Citizens*, pp. 16, 283.

THE AL-KĀF ROAD TO INGRAMS' PEACE: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN HADHRAMAUT, 1918–1937

The discussion of political developments in Hadhramaut in chapter III ended with the Aden Agreement. The Hadhrami sultans had agreed to act as one province under Qu'aytī leadership *vis-à-vis* the British, while internally cooperating on issues such as road security and development. For the British, this accord had settled matters for a while, and as the immediate threat to their influence had receded with the end of World War I, their attention was directed elsewhere. While this might have been true from the imperial perspective, not all was well from a Hadhrami and notably from a Kathīrī perspective. While a number of local problems could be tackled by individuals and small associations, as we have seen in the previous chapter, a number of more substantive issues continued to trouble Hadhramis in the Wadi and abroad. It is these larger issues of Hadhrami politics to which this chapter is devoted.

Hadhrami Political Concerns, c. 1919–1926

From the Kathīrī point of view, the Aden Agreement left much to be desired. It was concluded under duress, it did not effectively solve the security problems, and since neither sultanate was willing to forfeit its customs, imports to Kathīrī territories were still double taxed. Finally, since the agreement forced the Kathīrīs to conduct their contacts with the British through the Qu'aytīs, they were deprived of all hope to act independently and perhaps even recruit British help against their foes. Neither correspondence nor repeated meetings achieved a lasting settlement between the two sultanates.[1] These problems even affected those merchants in the interior who, like the al-Kāf family, had managed to maintain reasonably good relations

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[1] SMA I,105,113,119. On this issue cf. Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 211–214.

with both sultans. Following the Aden Agreement to which they had contributed through their mediation,[2] they had, in 1919, rented from the Qu'ayṭī sultan the customs of al-Shiḥr and four minor ports, as well as the right to collect and sell guano, against an annual payment of 60,000 dollars. After only three years, they had to give up these concessions under pressure from fellow *sayyid*s, presumably because they were collecting the very customs against which the sultans and many interior merchants protested.[3] According to another version which confirms that the Kathīrī-Qu'ayṭī conflict was at the heart of the al-Kāf's troubles, they smuggled arms to the Kathīrīs and thus were forced by the Qu'ayṭīs to withdraw from the contract.[4]

One of the major security problems was caused by a section of the Āl 'Amr branch of the Kathīrī tribe under the leadership of 'Umar and Ṣāliḥ b. 'Abdāt in al-Ghurfa, a rather important local centre of cloth production and a market town on the main trading route crossing the Wadi.[5] The Ibn 'Abdāt brothers had fortified the town heavily and had built their private army of slaves and tribesmen. The Qu'ayṭīs, whose territories bordered on al-Ghurfa and whose freedom of movement was affected by the events, asked the Kathīrī sultans for an intervention on the basis of the Aden Agreement.[6] It seems that the letters exchanged between the two sultanates during this period which were dealing with peace had the settlement of the Ibn 'Abdāt problem as its underlying issue. The Qu'ayṭīs resented the rulers of al-Ghurfa not least because they allied themselves to the Ḥamūmī tribe which almost continuously stirred against the Qu'ayṭīs.[7]

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[2] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 117–122.

[3] IO, R/20/A/1409, Translation of secret Memorandum by Said Ali bin Ahmed Bin-Shahab, encl. in Acting Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Secretary, London, 4.12.1920, p. 1; PRO, CO 725/6, Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 30.4.1924, p. 4.

[4] Interview with Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 26.3.2000.

[5] For summaries of this complicated issue, see Boxberger, "Hadhrami Politics", pp. 59f. and Lekon, "The British", p. 279 and, for a detailed discussion including the economic circumstances, Dā'ūd, "Ḥarakat Ibn 'Abdāt", notably pp. 47–51. Cf. al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 49–53; Nājī, *al-Tārīkh al-'askarī*, pp. 145–147 and al-Qaddāl & al-Qu'ayṭī, *al-Sulṭān*, pp. 107–112. For the correspondence on the issue in the 1920s, cf. SMA I,118,126,131,145; III,50,55,56.

[6] SMA I,126,131; the correspondence in IO, R/20/A/1413; al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 63–65. The story is also related in 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Idām al-Qūt, in a section on "ḥālāt al-Ghurfa al-siyāsiyya", of which I have seen only the first two pages (pp. 421f. of the copy in the possession of 'Abdallāh al-Ḥiyyad, Mecca).

[7] On Qu'ayṭī-Ḥamūmī relations, see Boxberger, "Hadhrami Politics", pp. 51–55 and 'Alī & al-Millāḥī, "Tārīkh al-ṣirā'".

The Ibn ʿAbdāt 'problem' effectively troubled the Kathīrī and Quʿaytī sultans until the final submission of al-Ghurfa in March 1945.[8]

While the Ḥamūmī and Ibn ʿAbdāt incidents were only the tip of the iceberg of disturbed security, the latter is interesting because the Ibn ʿAbdāt brothers and later their descendants were driven by a complicated mixture of motives. Obviously, they attempted to build a power base independent of the Kathīrī or Quʿaytī sultanate. Similar motivations can explain a number of other minor rebellions. However, there are numerous indicators which link the Ibn ʿAbdāt brothers to the *Irshād* movement in the Indies. Ṣāliḥ b. ʿUbayd b. ʿAbdāt was vice-chairman of the first *Irshād* executive, although the ideological commitments of his brother are somewhat more questionable.[9] Many of the measures which these wealthy property owners from Batavia took in al-Ghurfa are hardly distinguishable from the programmes and actions of the reform societies discussed in the previous chapter. According to interviews which a historian conducted with contemporaries of the events, they founded a school along *Irshādī* lines and attempted to employ Egyptian teachers. The British prevented these teachers from reaching Hadhramaut. They are also said to have encouraged local production and trade and to have struck a silver coin for circulation in the town. Lawful rule and equality of all citizens was introduced, and massive transfers of wealth guaranteed not only the continued defence of this statelet but provided aid for the poor.[10]

The pro-*Irshādī* tendencies seem to have expressed themselves in the marked anti-*sayyid* stance of the Ibn ʿAbdāt brothers.[11] Although the clear pro-ʿAlawī views and policies of Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿaytī gave way to a more *Irshādī*-oriented outlook under his successor ʿUmar, his energetic *wazīr* Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār nonetheless managed to forge an eventually unsuccessful alliance with the Kathīrīs against Ibn

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[8] IO, R/20/B/2090, Report on Operations Undertaken During February & March 1945 in Aden Command Against Sheikh Obeid Saleh Bin Abdat of Al Ghurfa in the Hadhramaut.

[9] Nājī, *al-Tārīkh al-ʿaskarī*, p. 146, casts serious doubts on ʿUmar's sanity.

[10] Dāʾūd, "Ḥarakat Ibn ʿAbdāt", pp. 48f., for a similarly positive view of developments in al-Ghurfa, see al-Bakrī, *Fī janūb*, p. 210 and Maḥrūs, *Qāl Kindī*, pp. 31–36. Cf. ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 20–22.

[11] This is evidenced by *sayyid* anxieties about Ibn ʿAbdāt, see, for example, IO, R/20/A/1412, Sayyid ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Shihāb to British Consul-General, Batavia, 1.5.1922 and the list of people denounced by Ṣāliḥ b. ʿUbayd b. ʿAdāt as "wicked" and "scoundrels", ibid., encl. in British Conl-General, Batavia to Political Resident, Aden, 27.10.1927.

'Abdāt.[12] Again, it is not quite clear what role the actual ideological
differences played in this and to what extent the military action
resulted from the other political and military exigencies. Otherwise,
there is little evidence that the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict played a major
role in Hadhrami politics in Hadhramaut before the late 1920s or
even the early 1930s when the conflict in South East Asia intensified.[13]

The *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict had significant consequences neverthe-
less, notably for those pro-*Irshādī* Hadhramis who considered travel-
ling or sending money between South East Asia and Hadhramaut.
The British authorities became somewhat obsessed with preventing
Irshādī views from spreading in Hadhramaut.[14] This was in part a
reaction to the anti-*Irshādī* pronouncements of the Qu'aytī sultan, in
part a reflection of British anxieties about other potentially anti-
British (but otherwise very heterogeneous) powers and groups such
as Republican Turkey, the Caliphate Movement in India, Ibn Sa'ūd,
etc.[15] Similarly, the British nervously observed the contacts between
the Kathīrīs, the Imām and the Sharīf of Mecca, who was desper-
ately seeking allies against the Saudis.[16] Obviously, the major British
concern was not Hadhramaut but Aden and the adjacent Protectorate
areas. In 1919, Colonel Jacob was sent to Sana'a to arrange an
agreement with the Imām. The aim had been to encourage the
Imām to extend his rule on the Peninsula in exchange for chan-
nelling his European contacts through Britain. Far from succeeding,
Jacob was arrested and never reached Sana'a.[17] Shortly thereafter,

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[12] Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 267f. Nevertheless, even Sultan Ghālib was sometimes men-
tioned in connection with pro-Irshādī tendencies, PRO, FO 371/5236, summary
of letter by Said b. Awadh Bashumeila, Uthman b. Mohamed bin Ahmat al Amudi,
Mohamed bin Abdullah Basahi, Salim Awadh Bashumeila and ? to Saleh bin
Abdullah Ba Rahim and Saleh bin Salim Musafir of 1 Sha'bān ?, encl. in Lee
Warner to Colonial Office, 15.7.1920.

[13] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 110. Even in the early 1930s, British
sources reported that the conflict was not overly important in Hadhramaut, PRO,
FO 371/16849, Resident, Aden to British Consul-General, Batavia, 15.4.1933;
R/20/A/3413, British Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Office, 18.1.1935. van
der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 32,191 and Stark, *The Coast*, pp. 243,
247f. mention 'Alawī concern about *Irshādī* propaganda in the Wadi.

[14] Correspondence in IO, R/20/A/1409, sections 3. Arab activities in the
Netherlands East Indies, 5. Re the proposed modifications in the rules issued by
the Netherlands East Indies Govt. governing the immigration of the Arabs from
the Hadhramaut; cf. IO, R/20/A/1411 and IO, R/20/A/1412.

[15] Cf. Freitag, "Hadhramis in International Politics", pp. 124−126.

[16] SMA I,100, anonymous letter from Aden to Sultan 'Alī b. Manṣūr, of 26.
Jumādā al-awwal 1340/15.1.1922; CO 725/5, Political Resident, Aden to Colonial
Office, 2.8.1923, 30.8.1920, 27.2.1924, 30.4.1924,

[17] Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 259−261.

Lee-Warner, the erstwhile British representative in al-Mukallā and now posted in Singapore, suggested to entrust the colourful figure of Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl with a mission to the Imām of Yemen. He argued that Ibn ʿAqīl yielded influence over the Imām, while at the same time maintaining close contacts with the Sharīf of Mecca and commanding wide respect among Hadhramis.[18] In spite of initial interest, the proposal seems to have come to nothing and the British later denied that the journey had anything to do with them, although Ibn ʿAqīl never ceased to be suspected of cooperation with British intelligence during his repeated visits to Yemen.[19]

It is in this wider context of unrest on the Arabian Peninsula that the British were troubled by the reputed anti-British attitude of the Ibn ʿAbdāt brothers. This has been given due attention in post-independence scholarship.[20] While Dāʾūd concludes from Ṣalāḥ b. ʿAbdāt's rejection of the Aden Agreement that he was an early anti-imperialist champion, al-Qaddāl & al-Quʿayṭī arrive at a more sobering judgement. Ibn ʿAbdāt, they argue, was opposed to the Aden Agreement not because of a general anti-imperialist drive, but because it subjected him to the Kathīrī sultan while he aimed at independence in his own right.[21] Even if this latter judgement fits the particular case of Ibn ʿAbdāt, there can be little doubt that the Aden Agreement created some doubts about the degree of independence of the Hadhrami sultans. Thus, when the Prince of Wales visited Aden in 1922, the British invited Sultan Ghālib to meet with him. When the sultan made clear that he did not intend to travel from Hyderabad for this occasion, the British tried to apply some pressures, arguing that the well-being of his country required his presence. The Government of Bombay, probably less concerned about the visitor's programme,

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[18] PRO, FO 371/5236, Lee-Warner, Singapore to Colonial Office, 15.7.1920, pp. 2f. and the enclosed memorandum, pp. 1–4.

[19] PRO, FO 371/5537, Foreign Office to Resident, Aden, 17.9.1920; PRO, CO 725/13/12, List of Arab Personalities, 29.11.1927; PRO, FO 371/13004, Political Resident, Aden to British Consul-General, Batavia, 26.1.1918.

[20] PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699, Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 9. On Ṣalāḥ b. ʿAbdāt's views of the British, cf. R/20/A/1409, Inspector General of Police, Straits Settlements to Political Resident, Aden, 7.11.1919 and the office note of 8.2. on the back of this letter, as well as the letter by Ibn ʿAbdāt to Sultans Manṣūr and Muḥsin b. Ghālib al-Kathīrī in this file and Acting Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Office, 26.8.1920, which reports that Ibn ʿAbdāt was recruiting family members to travel to Hadhramaut to incite differences between the Kathīrīs and Quʿayṭīs.

[21] Dāʾūd, "Ḥarakat", pp. 37f., 43f.; al-Qaddāl & al-Quʿayṭī, al-Sulṭān, pp. 108f.

took a more relaxed attitude and suggested droping the matter.[22]

Finally, the vexed issue of the internal organisation of the Kathīrī sultanate, and particularly the relations between notables and sultans, remained unresolved. Although the reform societies, and notably *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*, had come to local arrangements of different durability, the solutions were less than satisfactory, as the multitude of associations and agreements show.[23]

Against the background of such concerns at the local, the Hadhrami and the international level, notables started to search for solutions.[24] It is safe to assume that a number of families were involved, although once again the available sources give particular weight to the role of the al-Kāf family in coordinating efforts between South East Asia and Hadhramaut. This gains some credibility if one considers that a number of interests of the al-Kāf were seriously harmed by the ongoing state of affairs. As mentioned above, they had been forced to renounce the tax-farming contract at al-Shiḥr. The road planned by Sayyid Abū Bakr suffered from the prevailing insecurity. According to Ibn Hāshim, this prompted Sayyid Abū Bakr to contact Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib in 1345/1926–27 when he was regent for his uncle ʿUmar in al-Mukallā with a request for reforms. At the same time, Sayyid Abū Bakr's brother ʿAbd al-Raḥmān headed the family business in Singapore and had developed close contacts with a number of different groups. He also engaged in correspondence with Sultan Ghālib and with Sultan ʿUmar in Hyderabad after Ghālib's death. Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān followed an invitation to Hyderabad where he was well-received by Ṣāliḥ and discussed possibilities of reforming Hadhramaut.[25]

Although Ibn Hāshim is at pains to stress the involvement of both Sultan ʿUmar as well as Sultan Ṣāliḥ, it was Ṣāliḥ who met Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and then received Sayyid Abū Bakr's letter. It is not surprising that the ideas of the al-Kāf brothers fell on fertile ground.

[22] IO, R/20/A/3012, Exchange of letters between Political Resident, Aden and Political Department, Bombay, October 1921.

[23] In addition to what has been discussed in chapters III and VI, see the documents on cooperation between the *sayyid*s and the Āl Kathīr of 1922 and 1923, SMA I,103,104.

[24] Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, pp. 230–240.

[25] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 130f., 154. Unfortunately, Ibn Hāshim provides us with no clear dates. The only indication of when Sayyid Abū Bakr contacted Sultan ʿUmar thus comes from the British archives, which mention that Sultan ʿUmar had left Hadhramaut for Hyderabad in September 1926. PRO, CO 725/11/1, 9th Aden News Letter, 6.10.1926.

Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī (1884–1956) was extremely well educated and had clear ideas of his own about modernising Hadhramaut.[26] Due to his family's position in Hyderabad, Ṣāliḥ had first received a military education but later specialised in Islamic law. He authored a three-volume work on *fiqh* in which he recommended a return to the original sources of Islam, notably the Koran and the *sunna* of the Prophet. He argued that it was only sensible to combine the four legal schools. Such modernist argumentation, which was explicitly directed against the ultraconservatives (*al-jāmidūn*) was based to a large extent on his reading of al-Shawkānī.[27] However, Sultan Ṣāliḥ was also influenced by authors such as Shaykh Ṭanṭāwī al-Jawharī. Notably, he quoted al-Jawharī's Koranic commentary which has been described by one analyst as "a manual for the general public on biology and other sciences, accompanied with practical advice and paternal admonitions addressed to the reader".[28] In addition, Ṣāliḥ showed a keen interest in technical matters and was well versed in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, English and French.[29]

When Sultan Ṣāliḥ started his regency, he was keen on reforming the country, as is exemplified by his invitation to the Kathīrī sultans and notables to the coast to discuss change. In contrast to his reformist attitude, Ṣāliḥ's relationship with his uncle ʿUmar was more controversial. The stories surrounding how he became regent in 1927 illustrate this matter. While some hold that he simply became regent according to the normal rules because his uncle wanted to return to Hyderabad,[30] al-Baṭāṭī constructs a complex plot in which Ṣāliḥ demanded the sultanate from his uncle. According to this version, ʿUmar happily concurred and even returned to Hadhramaut to ensure that his nephew was accepted by the local commanders. However, within two months, the *wazīr* Sayyid Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid died and left

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[26] On Sultan Ṣāliḥ, see al-Quʿayṭī, *Taʾammulāt*, pp. 98–105; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. II, p. 316–330; S. Bā Wazīr, *Ṣafaḥāt*, pp. 244–256.

[27] Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, *Maṣādir al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya*, 3 vols. For his views on how to interpret the *sharīʿa* see vol. I, pp. 3–23.

[28] On Ṭanṭāwī al-Jawharī, see Baljon, *Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation*, p. 5 and passim. Sultan Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī quotes this commentary in Riḥlat al-sulṭān ilā Dawʿan, p. 46.

[29] His technical interest becomes evident in his Riḥlat al-sulṭān ilā Dawʿan, pp. 1–12.

[30] Thus, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī maintains that Ṣāliḥ had no problems with his uncle, personal communication, Jeddah 26.3.2000. That matters followed a normal course of events is also suggested by an otherwise somewhat maliciously worded report in SMA III; 61, Tasbīl baʿḍ al-akhbār ʿan al-dawla al-quʿayṭiyya . . ., p. 1.

the inexperienced Ṣāliḥ in the hands of equally unexperienced advis-
ers.[31] The resultant chaos eventually caused ʿUmar's intervention.
Even if this version is unlikely, not least because al-Miḥḍār did not
die until June 1928, the events in 1927 and 1928 did not do much
to improve relations between the two men.[32]

<p style="text-align:center;">The Conferences at al-Shiḥr (1927) and Singapore (1928)[33]</p>

In September 1927, Sultan Ṣāliḥ officially invited a delegation from
the interior to al-Shiḥr to discuss possible reforms. Sultan ʿAlī b.
Manṣūr al-Kathīrī, Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf and a delegation
of notables from the interior made their way to the coast where they
deliberated with Ṣāliḥ and Quʿayṭī notables. It seems that Muḥammad
b. ʿAqīl, the political schemer who had earlier resided in Singapore, was
somehow involved in the discussions. Another member of the nego-
tiating team was al-Ṭayyib al-Sāsī (1301/1883–84 – 1378/1958–59).
This former teacher and journalist from the Ḥijāz had left after the
Wahhābī conquest and taken refuge in Hadhramaut where he estab-
lished political contacts.[34] A first meeting was held in September
which resulted in a joint public declaration of the two sultans in
which they declared their future cooperation in all matters pertain-
ing to reform and justice, as well as their determination to cooperate
against their enemies, a possible hint at the likes of the Ibn ʿAbdāt
brothers.[35]
    On October 23, 1927, the Treaty of al-Shiḥr was signed by the
Quʿayṭī and the two Kathīrī sultans and witnessed by eigthteen nota-
bles, confirming the earlier agreements. They agreed to cooperate
fully in the establishment of peace and security and to combat any
tribe violating this agreement. Each sultanate was to have a repre-
sentative in the other. The Quʿayṭī sultan undertook to raise and

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[31] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 67–70.
[32] About Sayyid Ḥusayn b. Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār, see al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 76.
[33] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 63, fn. 1 argues that only Singapore was a con-
ference, whereas the meetings in al-Mukallā and al-Shiḥr were of a preliminary
nature.
[34] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 1, Rajab 1347/December 1928, pp. 14f. About al-Sāsī, see ʿAbd
al-Jabbār, *Siyar*, p. 76–79.
[35] The resolution, dated 24. Rabīʿ al-awwal 1347/21.8.1927, is reprinted in al-
Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 56f. For the developments, cf. Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family
History], pp. 154–156.

arm a contingent to guard the roads and help secure mutual inter-
ests. A *Jamʿiyya* (Patriotic Association) was to be established which
was meant to assist the sultans. It initially consisted of the members
of the delegation. Delegations were to be sent to Hadhramaut and
South East Asia to explain developments and rally support.[36]

Further meetings were held in November. Among the decisions
taken was the acquisition of a printing press and the establishment
of a national newspaper under the leadership of al-Sāsī, a former
editor of *Barīd al-Ḥijāz* in Jeddah.[37] An enthusiastic letter from Sultan
Ṣāliḥ to the Hadhramis in South East Asia explained the objectives
of the delegation in much detail. He praised the reforms which would
further education, agricultural improvement, the formation of national
companies and industries, etc. The main idea now, he explained,
was to rally as much support as possible since all earlier reform ini-
tiatives had suffered from their local and limited nature.[38] The sup-
porting letter by the Kathīrī sultans ʿAlī b. Manṣūr and ʿAbdallāh
b. Muḥsin called for an end to the struggles and support for the
project.[39] Probably around the same time, money was collected and
a general truce of fourteen months agreed.[40]

All seemed to go unusally well. Nevertheless, opponents seem to
have been gathering their forces. A curious piece of intelligence in
the British archives dates from September 1927. It claimed that Ṣāliḥ
was plotting the overthrow of Sultan ʿUmar.[41] Developments in
Singapore also took a worrying turn. In October, preparations were
started for the founding of a new association by the name of *al-
Rābiṭa al-ʿAlawiyya*. Although it aimed at "the joining of the hearts
and reconciliation, the unification of the voice of the members of
the Hadhrami people, the end of misunderstandings and their ral-
lying around what is good for them in the present and future", and
although its membership was open to everybody, the name caused

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[36] Jaʿfar al-Saqqāf, "Min tārīkh al-ḥarakāt", pp. 33f. It is interesting that only
the South East Asian diaspora was explicitly mentioned in this context, which is a
tribute to its importance in this phase.

[37] Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, *Taʾammulāt*, pp. 141–144; Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family
History], p. 155; Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām* 21.10.1992.

[38] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 57–60, open letter by Sultan Ṣāliḥ al-Quʿayṭī, 15.
Jumādā al-awwal 1347/10.11.1927.

[39] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 60–62, open letter by Sultans ʿAlī b. Manṣūr and
ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥsin al-Kathīrī, 15. Jumādā al-awwal 1347/10.11.1927.

[40] SMA III,61, Tasbīl baʿḍ al-akhbār, p. 1.

[41] IO, R/20/A/1414, Mokalla news (furnished by our No. 1), 12.9.1927.

immediate suspicions.[42] "Why", asked some, "was it called the ''Alawī
League' instead of Arab or Hadhrami League?" The answer, accord-
ing to the pro-*Alawī* newspaper *Ḥaḍramawt*, was that there was noth-
ing better than belonging to the House of the Prophet.[43] Was it
really that the notables of Singapore, among them Muḥammad b.
'Abd al-Raḥmān Shihāb, the *Rābiṭa*'s first president; 'Alawī b. Ṭāhir
al-Ḥaddād, *muftī* of Johore; Shaykh Sālim b. Aḥmad Bā Wazīr and
others simply sought to organise themselves and that the timing was
a coincidence? Or did the Singaporean *Alawī*s look for an organi-
sation of their own to represent their views *vis-à-vis* the sultans' envoy
and thereby strengthen their influence after their compatriots had
successfully engineered the Hadhrami conference?[44] Even the nor-
mally pro-*Alawī* British feared that the *Rābiṭa* would re-ignite the
Alawī-Irshādī conflict, and pro-*Irshādī* circles felt it unnecessary to
even ask such a question.[45]

   Although the reformist writer 'Alī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr wrote a poem
praising the establishment of the *Rābiṭa*, this choice of name was at
best unfortunate in the tense climate. Indeed, an article published in
the League's journal, *al-Rābiṭa*, confirmed that the *Rābiṭa 'Alawiyya* was
in many ways the incarnation of an earlier project of founding an
explicitly pro-*Alawī* association.[46] It is noteworthy that the *Rābiṭa* also
allegedly expressed a split among the Hadhrami *sayyid*s in which some
less prominent families were asserting their claim to speak for the
*Alawī*s.[47] Although this is an interesting suggestion, it can hardly be
substantiated at present since the Central Committee of the organisation
seems to have reflected both more and less prominent *sayyid* families.[48]

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[42] Al-Rābiṭa al-'Alawiyya, *Maqāṣiduhā wa-āmāluhā*, p. 2.

[43] Al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 269f., quoting from *Ḥaḍramawt* 128, 27.10.1927 and
139, 9.2.1928.

[44] Interestingly, this suggestion is accepted by the British Consul-General, who
normally was rather suspicious of *Irshādī* and anti-*Alawī* propaganda. R/20/A/1412,
British Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Office, 11.4.1929.

[45] IO, R/20/A/1412, British Consul-General, Batavia to Resident, Aden, 9.12.1927;
PRO, FO 967, British Consul-General, Batavia to Foreign Office, 11.4.1928; *al-
Dahnā'* I,1, Jan. 1928, I; 2, Feb. 1928. Could there be a parallel between this split
among the *sayyid*s, and the one noted by Lee-Warner in 1920 between pro- and
anti-British Kathīrī subjects? PRO, FO 371/4194, Eastern Confidential 50699,
Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent visit to the Hadhramaut, encl. in
Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden, 3.3.1919, p. 9.

[46] *Al-Rābiṭa* I; 4, Muḥarram 1347/June-July 1928, pp. 344f.; 'A. al-Mashhūr,
Shams, p. 418.

[47] IO, R/20/A/1412, enclosure in Batavia Despatch 41, confidential of April 11,
1928.

[48] See chapter V, footnote 121.

Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Shihāb, first president of the
Rābiṭa ʿAlawiyya. Photograph provided by M.A. Shahab, Jakarta

The *Rābiṭa* certainly took a keen interest in developments in
Hadhramaut. In early October 1927, a delegation had already been
sent to Hadhramaut to meet notables and rulers.[49] In Hadhramaut,
the delegation, which met with sultans and tribesmen, but mostly with
other *ʿAlawī*s, expressed its appreciation of the reform efforts and tried
to recruit members.[50] It seems that not all Hadhrami *sayyid*s felt

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[49] IO, R/20/A/1412, British Consul-General, Batavia to Resident, Aden, 9.12.1927,
encl. al-Rābiṭa al-ʿAlawiyya, 10.10.1927.
[50] IO, R/20/A/1412, *al-Rābiṭa* I; 1, p. 27.

comfortable. Ibn ʿUbaydillāh, who had by now changed his earlier views on the Imām, reportedly attacked the allegedly pro-Imām propaganda of the *Rābiṭa* during a visit to Singapore.[51] Even if the British assumptions that he wanted to counter the activities of the *Rābiṭa* cannot be substantiated from Arabic sources at present, it is curious that al-Saqqāf should have travelled at exactly this time and spent much effort trying to arrange an agreement between *ʿAlawī*s and *Irshādī*s.[52] In a famous Friday sermon at the Ṣaranj mosque in Surabaya on 9 March, he attacked the Hadhrami tendency to fight each other and suggested peace on the basis of an immediate cessation of mutual recriminations and the recognition of the common Shāfiʿī convictions. A significant number of *Irshādī* and *ʿAlawī* leaders, including ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh al-Kāf and Ibrāhīm b. ʿUmar al-Saqqāf accepted these terms, although once Ibn ʿUbaydillāh left the country, the conflict came to the fore once more.[53]

This might have been a result of events in Singapore. Al-Sāsī arrived in March or April 1928 and instead of proceeding to Java remained in Singapore as guest of the al-Kāfs and entrusted his hosts with the further proceedings. Even al-Bakrī, who is extremely critical of this, attributes it to al-Sāsī's naivity.[54] According to his account, the *ʿAlawī*s in Singapore then contacted their relatives in Batavia and planned the next steps. *Jamʿiyyat al-Irshād* refused to accept the invitation to Singapore due to the sectarian character of the conference, while *Jamʿiyya Yāfiʿiyya*, of which al-Bakrī was a leading member, was not invited—al-Bakrī assumes that the *ʿAlawī*s feared the *Irshādi* orientation of the Yāfiʿīs. Therefore, a very truncated conference was held during the second half of April 1928, attended only by pro-*ʿAlawī* Hadhramis. Even if al-Bakrī's views are coloured by his political convictions and if there was more misunderstanding and amateurish

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[51] For al-Saqqāf's earlier flirtations with the Imām of Yemen, see chapter III. IO, R/20/A/1412, Political Resident Aden to British Consul General, Batavia, 23.12.1917, the *Irshādī*s also accused the *Rābiṭa* of a pro-Yemeni stance, ibid., British Consul-General, Batavia to Political Resident, Aden, 9.12.1927.

[52] IO, R/20/A/1412, Political Resident, Aden to British Consul-General, Batavia, 23.12.19127; British Consul-General, Batavia to Political Resident, Aden, 6.2.1928 and 30.3.1928 with reports on Ibn ʿUbaydillāh's moves. Neither Ibn ʿUbaydillāh himself, nor al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, discuss this more than curious coincidence.

[53] Al-Ḥajjī, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 271f. The problems were already in the open in April 1928, *al-Dahnā'* I; 4, April 1928, pp. 3–6; cf. on the issue *al-Rābiṭa* I; 5, Dhū al-Ḥijja 1347/May-June 1929, pp. 299f.

[54] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 62. For the following, see ibid., pp. 62–66.

management than evil intent and conspiracy, the result was the absence of pronounced *Irshādī* views from the conference.[55]

Meanwhile, the conference proceeded. Its decisions further confirm and specify what had been agreed in al-Shiḥr, and some of the financial arrangements clearly reflect the migrants' preoccupations.[56] The conference elected 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kāf, Abū Bakr al-'Aṭṭās, Sa'īd Bā Juray and Abū Bakr al-Tawī as its representatives. They were to transmit the conference's decisions to the Hadhrami sultans. They were also authorised to discuss the details of the National Association in which the diaspora organisations were to be represented. Another coordinating committee was to see through the implementation of the conference's decisions and appoint the delegations that were to travel all over the Indies to collect financial aid for the project. In exchange for the aid, the conference asked the sultans to present an annual budget to the Patriotic Association and confirmed that this was not a negotiable suggestion.[57] The customs were to be reorganised along clear principles, and the double-taxation, which so long had angered the Kathīrīs, was to be abolished. Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh al-Kāf was asked to found a national trading company. It was promised preferential treatment by the two governments which were asked to buy 5% each of the shares. The company was to spend 5% of its profits on charitable activities in the homeland such as education, hospitals and hospices for the poor. The governments were asked to form a Department of Education or to appoint an Inspector General of Education.[58] Detailed stipulations for an independent judiciary were made. Interestingly, the conference also suggested mediation in the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict by a committee comprising Sultan Ṣāliḥ as well as one *'Alawī* and one *Irshādī*. This would seem to counter al-Bakrī's theory of the conference as an anti-*Irshādī* conspiracy. Similarly, the governments were asked to arrange for a five-year truce in Hadhramaut, and all tribes

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[55] See the list of conference participants (including a reference to their organisations) in Ja'far al-Saqqāf, "Min tārīkh al-Ḥarakāt", p. 28 with somewhat more extensive biographical information on p. 32.

[56] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 66–75 and IO, R/20/A/3293, Qarārāt mu'tamar al-iṣlāḥ [. . .], Singapore 1346 for the decisions of the Singapore Conference; cf. ibid., Note on Proceedings of "Second Hadhrami Peaceful Conference" at Singapore in May 1928.

[57] The matter is first spelt out in paragraph 3, and its non-negotiability confirmed in paragraph 19, al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 67, 73.

[58] Paragraphs 10, 20 of the decisions, see al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 69, 73.

were encouraged to assist in its implementation. It was suggested to press for a Hadhrami representative in the British consulates in order to facilitate the issuing of Hadhrami passports.

The Hadhrami newspapers in Surabaya, the centre of Hadhrami journalism, followed developments closely. The pro-*ʿAlawī Ḥaḍramawt* published enthusiastic comments on the conference while the pro-*Irshādī al-Dahnāʾ* reacted with reserve and presented the initiative as an *ʿAlawī* ploy. Nevertheless, it agreed on the need for reform.[59] Initially, matters seemed to go well in spite of such forebodings. In *al-Dahnāʾ* of June 1928, al-Bakrī commented on a new law which instituted a consultative assembly in al-Mukallā. However, he seems to have had little precise information.[60] Even if this initiative was not directly connected with the conferences, it can be seen in the wider context of Ṣāliḥ's reforms. In early 1928, the sultan travelled to Egypt, where he inspected schools and negotiated future Hadhrami educational missions. Hadhrami cadres were to train in engineering, agriculture, mechanics and other subjects in order to teach Hadhramis and (at least in the medium term) reduce the country's dependence on foreign (i.e., Arab) know-how.[61]

In early summer, notables in Sayʾūn founded a *Jamʿiyya Waṭaniyya* to reform the country, presumably in anticipation of the all-Hadhrami Patriotic Association. ʿAlī b. Manṣūr al-Kathīrī entered an agreement with this new body which aimed to secure justice and draft laws. The main priority was to revive agriculture and reduce the tax burden on peasants.[62] *Ḥaḍramawt* informed its readers about a planned visit by Sultan ʿUmar and about the plan to buy airplanes from the British.[63] In August, Sultan ʿUmar visited Egypt and en route seems to have paid a visit to Hadhramaut. Most likely he spent July to October in Hadhramaut before returning to Hyderabad.[64] A report in *al-*

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[59] *Ḥaḍramawt* 147, 19.4.1928; 149, 3.5.1928; 150, 17.5.1928; *al-Dahnāʾ* I; 1, Jan. 1928; I; 2, Feb. 1928; I; 3, March 1928; I; 4, April 1928.

[60] *Al-Dahnāʾ* I; 6, June 1928, pp. 2f.

[61] *Ḥaḍramawt* 146, 5.4.1928, p. 2. As the exact chronology of events is not clear, there are different interpretations of this journey. Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 4.11.1992.

[62] *Ḥaḍramawt* 153, 5.7.1928, p. 2.

[63] *Ḥaḍramawt* 153, 5.7.1928, p. 3.

[64] *Ḥaḍramawt* 157, 2.8.1928. According to al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 75, Sultan ʿUmar hired a boat in India, went on the *ḥajj* and, on this occasion, met King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Saʿūd. According to this version, he only reached al-Mukallā in April 1930, where he took power again. Sultan Ṣāliḥ heard about these developments, attempted to return from Egypt, but only reached Aden and from there travelled on to India

Dahnā' about widespread rejection of the conference's results by the Yāfi'ī and Kathīrī associations was angrily rejected. Why, *Ḥaḍramawt* asked, did they not attend the conference? That al-Sāsī had been received by the al-Kāf was a mere coincidence—after all, the al-Kāf maintained a major guest-house in Singapore—and had not precluded any decisions. The journal denounced reports about the rejection of the conference results in Hadhramaut. With the delegation still in Singapore and the sultans abroad, there had not even been widespread consultation in the homeland, it argued.[65] Meanwhile, there clearly was some discussion in the Wadi, as is reflected in *Ḥaḍramawt*'s report about suggestions by merchants from Shibām to unify the currency by abolishing the Maria Theresia dollar. They also planned to organise a regular postal service.[66] This was to replace the individual messengers to the coast, who passed letters to agents who in turn entrusted them to travellers.

By late August, opposing camps tried to rally support for or against the project. By mid-September, *Ḥaḍramawt* still printed letters by Sultan Ṣāliḥ from July and late August in which he expressed his support of the conference and asked the executive committee to come to al-Mukallā as soon as possible.[67] Then, the topic suddenly disappeared from this newspaper. An explanation can be found in an open letter from Sultan 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ to all Hadhramis, printed in *al-Ahrām* in Cairo as well as in *al-Dahnā'*.[68] He declared that the reform initiative had been the result of Sultan Ṣāliḥ's well-meaning enthusiasm for reform. Unfortunately, he wrote, Ṣāliḥ had picked the wrong person to convey the message. Due to al-Sāsī's inexperience and the fact that he was little known, many had not accepted the invitation to the conference. The conference decisions therefore merely reflected personal interest and harmed Hadhramaut instead of contributing to its much-needed reform. Sultan 'Umar consequently

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as his uncle was already in Hadhramaut. However, when the British Resident visited al-Mukallā in mid-October 1928, he met with Sultan 'Umar. PRO, CO 725/17/14, Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 20.10.1928. According to another British source, Sultan 'Umar was in al-Mukallā between December 1926 and May 1927. He then returned next in July 1928, staying until October of the same year. IO, R/20/A/1414, Office Note, 11.1.1930.

[65] *Ḥaḍramawt* 159, 16.8.1928, pp. 1f.; cf. 160, 23.8.1928. Unfortunately, the issues I; 7–9 (July-September 1929) of *al-Dahnā'* are missing from the National Library of Jakarta.

[66] *Ḥaḍramawt* 160, 23.8.1928.

[67] *Ḥaḍramawt* 163, 15.9.1928.

[68] *Al-Dahnā'* I; 10, October 1928, pp. 3f.; al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 64f.

rejected the decisions and entrusted true reform to his supporters. In the same issue, *al-Dahnāʾ* reported that al-Sāsī was arrested upon his return to al-Mukallā.[69] Shortly thereafter, both al-Sāsī and Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl were banned from the country.[70] The consultative assembly was dissolved under the pretext that most of its members were foreigners unqualified for the task.[71] A number of officials were replaced and court cases reopened.

This was the end of the Shiḥr and Singapore initiative. Two issues seem to have been at its heart.[72] The first, to which al-Bakrī's writings bear ample testimony, is that the Yāfiʿīs felt threatened by the new arrangements. These would have significantly reduced their influence in the Quʿayṭī sultanate and possibly limited their military power and room of manoeuvre *vis-à-vis* the Kathīrīs.[73] A second issue transpires from later correspondence between Sultan ʿUmar and the British authorities in Aden. He expressed his support for a second attempt to hold a conference, with a crucial exception which touched the heart of what had been decided at Singapore:

> The only thing we object to, is the interference on the part of any one in the internal administration of our State such as the revenues of our State, its expenditure and other important matter which may prove to be of very harmful consequences to us in case we leave their management in the hands of men other than ourselves. In case, however, the persons who will join hands with us will assure us and that they will not—interfere with our vital interests, position and reputation, we will gladly participate with them in each and every undertaking conducive of good to our respective countries in the maintenance of order therein. In order to carry out these objects into effect we shall—necessarily fall in need of the support of His Majesty's Government.[74]

The idea of a new conference continued to move Hadhramis for the next four years. All sides were agreed in principle that this was a good idea. The Hadhrami press in South East Asia stressed the need

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[69] *Al-Dahnāʾ* I; 10, October 1928, pp. 3f.

[70] *Al-Dahnāʾ* I; 12, December 1928, p. 5.

[71] *Al-Dahnāʾ* I; 10, October 1920, p. 19. This might be a reference to some of the Ḥijāzī refugees who had settled in al-Mukallā.

[72] Both motives are alluded to in IO, R/20/A/3227, Sultan Saleh b. Ghalib, Hyderabad to Pol. Resident, Aden, 5.11.1928.

[73] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 62; Jaʿfar al-Saqqāf, "Min tārīkh al-ḥarakāt", p. 28. This view is, in somewhat hazy terms, also reflected in R/20/A/1414, Report by Abdul Rahman b. Ali Algifri (no date), pp. 12f.

[74] IO, R/20/A/3316, Sultan ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿayṭī to 2nd Ass. Res. & Protectorate Secretary, Aden, 28.12.1929.

for another attempt. The al-Kāf brothers Abū Bakr and 'Abd al-Raḥmān spent much time negotiating the preliminaries. Nevertheless, the conference was eventually postponed *sine die*, ostensibly for technical problems, but de facto because the chances for success did not seem good.[75]

Even if relations between Sultan 'Umar and Ṣāliḥ had not been easy before the conference, they now seem to have reached breaking point. In September 1928, Ṣāliḥ, now in Hyderabad, addressed the Political Resident in Aden with a letter accusing his uncle of asking for loans to enrich himself.[76] This was to be the first in a number of similar interventions.

Whither Hadhramaut? (1929–1936)

The failure of the Singapore initiative had left the question of the future wide open. There are indications that it caused widespread disappointment and incited renewed unrest in Hadhramaut. The newspapers and journals in South East Asia abound with news about plunder in the cities, the cutting of roads, murder and general upheaval. Petty warfare between minor tribal sections resumed. A lengthy drought worsened conditions.[77] Camels and date palms died and refugees gathered on the coast, hoping to emigrate. The ensuing inflation aggravated the famine for most people, while some brokers

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[75] See the correspondence in IO, R/20/A/3316; SMA I,161,178,193; III,78,80,83,112,113,116; Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 43–48, fn., for articles dealing with the idea of a new conference or else stressing similar ideas for cooperation, see *al-Dahnā'* II; 2, Dec. 1928; II; 1, mid-Dec. 1928, II; 13, mid-June 1929; II; 15, mid-July 1929; II; 17, mid-August 1929; *al-Misbāḥ* I; 2, Jan. 1929, pp. 24, 30; *Ḥaḍramawt* 168, 25.10.1928; 171,15.11.1928; *al-Mishkāh* I; 10, 3.7.1931; *Barhūt* I, Jumād al-ākhira 1348/Nov.-Dec. 1929.

[76] IO, R/20/A/1414, Sultan Salih bin Ghalib Alkaity, Hyderabad to Pol. Res., Aden, 12.9.1928. To what extent this was an expression of rivalry and to what extent it actually reflected different reform commitments of the two rulers must be determined by future historians. Certainly, when 'Umar asked for a loan from the British in 1924, he presented his case as one of improvement, although the British linked it to the problems between the sultan and the al-Kāf family. IO, R/20/A/1414, Sultan 'Umar b. 'Awaḍ al-Qu'ayṭī to Political Resident Aden, 22.2.1924 (the date in the translation is rendered as 18.2.), for the British interpretation, see ibid., Political Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 30.4.1924.

[77] According to *al-Dahnā'*, II; 13, mid-June 1929, pp. 3–5, this drought had started two years earlier, which would indicate that the reform efforts fell within this period. As this is the only indication, however, it would be rash to attribute the conferences to the ecological problems.

and agents exploited this opportunity for personal gain to the fullest.[78] When rains began to fall in April 1929, this did not immediately improve the situation.[79] Although the effects of the Great Depression on Hadhramaut and the diaspora have not been studied in great detail, it certainly impacted on trade.[80] Hides, one of the main export items of Hadhramaut, dropped by two thirds of its earlier value, and the value of silver dwindled.[81] Furthermore, emigration to Singapore and the East Indies was affected, and as the recent troubles had, if anything, increased Hadhramaut's dependence on remittances, this must have contributed to an acute sense of crisis which increased willingness to seriously engage in the search for solutions.[82] Much of the discussion, as far as it is reflected in the South East Asian press, centred on the need and conditions for a new conference. Meanwhile, Hadhrami associations in South East Asia tried to influence the sultans, particularly from the early 1930s when the *'Alawī-Irshādī* conflict intensified for a while.[83] At the same time, strategic and geopolitical considerations prompted the British to rethink their strategy with regard to the Protectorate and notably Hadhramaut.

Developments in Hadhramaut

Sultan 'Umar remained in Hadhramaut for only a few months before returning to Hyderabad. He therefore never became closely involved in Hadhrami government, presumably because of his successful career in Hyderabad where he was entrusted with the guardianship of the treasury and the Nizam's palaces.[84] It seems that the reforms for which 'Umar had expressed his support in 1928 did not get very far.[85]

During his absence, Sultan 'Umar left matters in the hands of the politically inexperienced Sayyid Abū Bakr al-Miḥḍār. According to

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[78] *Ḥaḍramawt* 167, 18.10.1928; 168, 25.10.1928; 203, 11.7.1929; *al-Dahnāʾ* I; 12, Dec. 1928; II; 6–7, March 1929; *Barhūt* I, Jumād al-ākhira 1348/Nov.-Dec. 1929.

[79] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 9, mid-April 1929; II; 19, mid-Sept. 1929.

[80] PRO, CO 725/21/4, Political Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 19.3.1930 reports that in 1929 Indian merchants in Aden had asked to open a wireless station in al-Mukallā. In a letter from Cowasjee Dinshaw & Bros. to Protectorate Secretary, ibid., 3.10.1930, they withdrew the suggestion with reference to slack trade.

[81] Footman, *Antonin Besse*, p. 71.

[82] Lekon, "Impact", p. 271.

[83] Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening*, p. 103.

[84] Al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 79. It is interesting that al-Nākhibī, *Riḥla*, p. 142, only writes a few lines about 'Umar.

[85] PRO, CO 725/17/14, Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 20.10.1928.

al-Bakrī, he was mainly interested in his own business affairs, mostly trade with Ethiopia.[86] Given the Italian interest in Ethiopia, it is not surprising that al-Miḥḍār gave an Italian a licence to build a factory for tinned fish in al-Mukallā and allowed another to open a medical practice. While this might have been a result of al-Miḥḍār's personal relations, it nevertheless came at a time when the British were anxiously observing Italian moves in the Yemen.[87] However, the fish factory never opened at the time although in 1954, a fish tinning factory was opened which had to be constructed according to the advice of Italians who had been in Hadhramaut some fifteen years earlier.[88] Al-Miḥḍār declared that the state was not responsible for the settlement of tribal problems, which effectively reneged on the government's previously declared intent of enforcing peace. This might be one of the major reasons for the above-noted renewal of tribal fighting. Both of these matters caused widespread concern and were only settled after Sultan 'Umar's return.[89]

In January 1930, the British Resident reported to London that Sultan 'Alī b. Manṣūr al-Kathīrī had succeeded his father who had died the preceding year during the pilgrimage. The new sultan asked for British help in organising a peace conference. The British, who had already held a rather dim view of the Singapore resolutions, did not believe in the prospect of such a venture. The British also report some interesting details about the situation in al-Mukallā. Sultan 'Umar had asked for a new loan, arms and the appointment of a military adviser. The British felt that 'Umar, whose standing as a mostly absent ruler was not the best, wished for their help in securing his rule. For this, he was even willing to concede part of his powers, as long as his rule and honour were not in jeopardy. The Resident assessed this demand as a costly liability.[90] This provides an interesting contrast to the rather vague assertions by al-Baṭāṭī and al-Miḥḍār that the British tried to impose an adviser which Sultan 'Umar rejected.[91]

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[86] For a devastatingly negative view of Abū Bakr b. Ḥusayn al-Miḥḍār, see al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 76f.

[87] See the correspondence in PRO, CO 725/19/1.

[88] *Al-Akhbār* 15, 15.2.1954, for the ill fate of the short-lived enterprise, see Lekon, The British, p. 310.

[89] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 76f. Unfortunately, al-Baṭāṭī is once again not helpful with regard to chronology.

[90] PRO, CO 725/20/12, Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 22.1.1930, for the British scepticism re. Singapore, see IO, R/20/A/3293, Note on Proceedings of "Second Hadhrami Peaceful Conference" at Singapore in May 1928, Resident, Aden, 4.5.1929.

[91] Al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 99 and al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 76.

It seems that when the wish for military aid was repeated in 1935, it fell on more fertile ground.[92] The growing British interest in Hadhramaut is evident from the recommendation in 1932 to pay the sultan his stipend as well as unclaimed arrears from past years.[93]

Hopes for a peaceful settlement on the basis of the 1918 treaty decreased further after an abortive visit of Sultan ʿUmar in Kathīrī lands. When negotiating with the al-Kāf brothers in 1931 (see below), Sultan ʿUmar argued that he needed to study Hadhrami affairs in more detail before engaging in discussions on "general reform". These talks were to include the issue of relations with the Kathīrīs.[94] In spite of the fact that both Kathīrīs and British did not place much hope in ʿUmar's willingness to reform, he was determined to visit the Wadi in 1934, including Kathīrī territories. When the planned visit approached, a Kathīrī in Aden sent detailed instructions to his sultan. ʿAlī should invite ʿUmar to discuss the tedious question of customs, road security, justice, the acquisition of arms and other issues. He suggested that the negotiations should be conducted both in writing and orally and continued:

> [. . .] so that in future, there is evidence against him if the British want to enquire responsibilities [for the breakdown of discussions] and so that they understand who is the victim and who the oppressor. Thus you should be able—in the future—to break the treaty and change it, and you will not be blamed for it. This is the greatest chance you have, so do not loose it.[95]

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[92] PRO, CO 725/31/1, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 17.4.1935, pp. 2f.; PRO, CO 725/31/2, Committee of Imperial Defence, Standing Official Sub-Committee for Questions concerning the Middle East, Minutes of Meeting, 21.8.1935, p. 3.

[93] PRO, CO 725/23/16, Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 26.10.1932; PRO, CO 725/23/16, Colonial Secretary, London to Resident, Aden, 4.1.1933; PRO, CO 725/28/11, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 4.4.1934 and Colonial Secretary, London to Resident, Aden, 23.11.1934. Until 1932, the highest British representative in Aden was known as Resident, between 1932 and 1937 as Chief Commissioner, and thereafter as Governor. However, much of the correspondence continues to use "Resident" instead of "Chief Commissioner". This only changes with the introduction of the title "Governor". I follow the usage in the sources.

[94] Sultan ʿUmar al-Quʿayṭī to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Abū Bakr sons of Shaykh al-Kāf, 22. Jumādā al-ūlā 1350/8.10.1930, quoted after Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 45. Sultan ʿUmar literally says: "*yalzim awwalan an natafāqad dākhiliyyat al-bilād*", which could be translated as "we first need to study/visit the interior of the country".

[95] SMA III,280, Ḥusayn Shabīh, Aden to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr, 8. Rabīʿ al-thānī 1353/21.7.1934.

Other notables, such as Sālim b. Jaʿfar b. Ṭālib, who had been party to the negotiations of the Aden Agreement, were quick to add to this advice.[96]

Al-Baṭāṭī claims that ʿUmar visited Sultan ʿAlī in Sayʾūn, continued to Tarīm and ʿAynāt and returned once more via Sayʾūn. In al-Baṭāṭī's version, the two sultans agreed on necessary steps for reform. During the visit, ʿUmar also initiated the building of a second motor road from the Wadi to the coast, starting at Shibām and leading directly to al-Mukallā.[97] Kathīrī documents, on the contrary, sound as if practical complications, namely the lack of a motorcar to bring Sultan ʿUmar from Shibām to Sayʾūn, as well as an impending visit of the al-Kāfs on the coast prompted ʿUmar to cancel his visit at the last minute. If these documents do not refer to an additional trip between Shibām and Sayʾūn and if they are complete, the two sultans never met. At any rate, Kathīrī documents leave no doubt that Sultan ʿUmar's journey ended with mutual recriminations and worsened relations rather than improving them.[98]

Nevertheless, it is not only al-Baṭāṭī who credits ʿUmar with a number of reforms. In a book first published in 1933, Amīn Muḥammad Saʿīd mentions a consultative council in al-Mukallā to which "important people" were appointed and which was consulted on all significant matters. It was supposed to sanction the imposition of any new taxes. Saʿīd also reports a second council which was headed by the sultan.[99] Unless Saʿīd's information was very dated and referred back to the institutions of Sultan ʿAwaḍ discussed in chapter III, it appears that the Quʿaytī institutions were more permanent than is recorded in the documents.

Meanwhile, Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib in Hyderabad sent increasingly urgent requests to Aden asking to return. In December 1934, he wrote a

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[96] SMA III,285, Sālim b. Jaʿfar b. Ṭālib to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr, 25. Rabīʿ al-thānī 1353/7.8.1934, referring to a letter by notables from Sayʾūn who had consulted him on an agenda for reform, and SMA III,294, ʿAbd al-Raḥmn ʿAlī al-Jifrī to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr, 10. Jumādā al-ūlā 1353/20.8.1934.

[97] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 84.

[98] SMA I,214–216 and SMA III,298–299, exchanges of letters between Sultan ʿUmar al-Quʿaytī and Sultan ʿAlī al-Kathīrī, Jumādā al-awwal 1353/August-September 1934. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf's account, according to which ʿUmar did not stop in Sayʾūn on his way back, would allow to reconcile the two conflicting narratives. Badāʾiʿ al-tābūt, vol. II, p. 316.

[99] Amīn Muḥammad Saʿīd, *Mulūk al-muslimīn al-muʿāṣirūn wa-duwaluhum*, Cairo: Maktabat al-Madbūlī 1999, pp. 505f. I wish to thank Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿaytī for providing me with this reference.

letter which reflected on ʿUmar's visit. It confirms the impression
that it had not been quite the success which al-Baṭāṭī claims:

> When the Sultan had gone to Hadramout, the tribes, chieftains, Sadats
> and leading men were in expectation that there would be reforms,
> union, peace and harmony but all their hopes have been shattered
> and lost for ever and now according to my information they have
> decided to stand upon their own legs and to manage their own affairs
> independently which is a serious blow to the honour and prestige of
> the Sultan as well as to the State. Now according to my latest infor-
> mation I have come to know that these tribes and Chieftains and lead-
> ers have resolved to unite and make a common cause among themselves
> with a view to oppose our State and if it is true the condition of our
> State will be affected very seriously, and I hope you will not allow to
> reach our State into such perilous condition. I have also heard that a
> private agreement has been made with Beer Ali to get a port so the
> Makalla Custom will be decreased. [. . .] If I go there under the advice
> and permission of your honour which I always ask considering you as
> my patron and wellwisher I am sure that all the officials, army and
> Sadat and tribes from Makalla to Hadramout will co-operate with me
> and I shall be able to restore peace and harmony in the State and
> the causes of the discontentment will be removed.[100]

The Resident replied that the British would not object to Ṣāliḥ's
presence if he promised not to conspire against ʿUmar.[101] In the end,
Ṣāliḥ deferred his journey, although rumours about him plotting
ʿUmar's overthrow did not disappear.[102]

Ṣāliḥ's intelligence about growing Kathīrī concerns had a sound
basis. In 1932, the Kathīrī sultan wrote to the Resident of Aden
complaining that customs were raised on all imports to Kathīrī ter-
ritory instead of treating them as transit goods. As the Kathīrīs them-
selves taxed these imports upon arrival in the Wadi, they therefore
became rather expensive. It is not surprising to see that Kathīrī sub-
jects not only took issue with Quʿayṭī regulations but also complained
to their own sultans about high taxes and customs.[103] In his letter,

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[100] IO, R/20/A/3580, Sultan Saleh to High Commissioner, Aden, 23.12.1934.
[101] IO, R/20/A/3580, Resident, Aden to Sultan Salih b. Ghalib, 16.9.1933.
[102] Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", al-Ayyām, 18.11.1992, mentions that Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār,
who was later appointed wazīr by Ṣāliḥ, left Hyderabad for al-Mukallā before ʿUmar's
death, and reacted ambiguously when asked whether his departure was related to
plans for a coup.
[103] SMA III,604, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh al-Kāf to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr,
25. Jumāda al-ākhira 1356/2.9.1937. The letter dates from 1937, but given the
many interventions by the al-Kāf through Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq, it is safe to assume that
this was not a new concern.

the sultan demanded that the British convince the Quʿayṭī to levy only transit customs. He further asked for arms and for a channel of direct communication with Aden.[104] A subsequent letter by *sayyid*s from the Wadi impressed upon the Resident of Aden the trust which they put in him. A major aim of the letter was to rally support for anti-*Irshādī* measures, but the request for help constituted another attempt to establish direct communications with the British and conveyed a sense of the above-mentioned breakdown of order, explicitly linked to the failure of the Singapore resolutions.[105]

On 28 August 1931, Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf wrote to the Quʿayṭī authorities asking them to cancel a fee on camel loads. He suggested that it was detrimental to the Quʿayṭī reputation.[106] A few months later, the Quʿayṭīs raised taxes on sugar, gas and petrol, which prompted another round of protest.[107] In 1931, the al-Kāf brothers met with Sultan ʿUmar in al-Mukallā, as discussed in Ibn Hāshim's *Riḥla* in the previous chapter.[108] While the brothers hoped to discuss "general reform" (*al-iṣlāḥ al-ʿumūmī*), the sultan argued that his short stay in al-Mukallā did not allow the resolution of this complicated issue. He wanted to limit the discussions to private agreements with the brothers.[109] He also seems to have deliberately attempted to draw out the negotiations. Arguably, this move resulted less from the sultan's limited time than from his hesitation to change matters in al-Mukallā. He might have feared to disturb the balance of power which secured his rule by upsetting the Yāfiʿī officers who had so dramatically opposed the Singapore resolutions. The al-Kāf brothers also demanded the lifting of the "rupee which has been imposed at the city gate" (i.e., they asked to abolish an extra tax) and discussed matters pertaining to Sayyid Abū Bakr's road project.[110] It

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[104] SMA I,161, Musawwada li-mudhakkira rufiʿat li-wālī ʿAdan, 1351/1932–33. On the issue of direct communication, cf. SMA II,43, Lake to Sultan ʿAlī, 13.2.1935 and II,46, Sultan ʿAlī to Lake, 26. Qaʿida 1353/4.3.1935.

[105] SMA I,194, Letter of 12. Dhī al-qaʿda 1351/30.11.1932; SMA III,61, Tasbīl baʿd al-akhbār, p. 2.

[106] SMA III,101, Letters by Abū Bakr Shaykh al-Kāf to Yūsuf Sharīf and Jamʿadār Sālim b. Aḥmad al-Quʿayṭī, 13. Rabīʿ al-thānī 1350/28.8.1931.

[107] SMA III,115, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf to Sultan ʿAlī al-Kathīrī, 5. Rajab 1350/16.11.1931; SMA III,120, ʿAbdallāh Jaʿfar to Sultans ʿAlī and ʿAbdallāh al-Kathīrī of 1350 (exact date illegible).

[108] The following is based on Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 43–48, fn. A short version of the negotiations is found in a report by Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr b. Ghālib of 22. Jumādā al-awwal 1350/5.10.1931, SMA III,110.

[109] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, pp. 45f.

[110] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf to Sultan ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ al-Quʿayṭī, 11. Jumādā al-ākhira 1350/24.10.1931, quoted after Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 48.

seems that the latter was the only issue on which the sultan showed
support. He promised to deal with those disturbing the road's com-
pletion, namely the tribes.[111] Although the sultan later wrote to the
brothers, permitting them to buy property in the ports and promis-
ing them that he would encourage trade (presumably by cutting
duties), policies on the ground contradicted these commitments.[112]

All these problems persisted during the next few years. In 1935,
the al-Kāf road was still incomplete, and the British became con-
vinced that this was due to the Quʿaytī sultan's wishes.[113] In February
1936, when Sultan ʿUmar died and was succeeded by Ṣāliḥ, mat-
ters did not change much initially.[114]

Ṣāliḥ's fear that Kathīrīs would seek to circumvent Quʿaytī ports
was not entirely unfounded. During the famine in 1929, Ḥaḍramawt
reported on a consignment of food stuffs that had been landed at
Biʾr ʿAlī, a port west of al-Mukallā and seat of a Wāḥidī sultan.
Although transport from the coast to Shibām had taken sixteen days,
it had cost only 18 dollars, as opposed to 45–55 for transport from
al-Mukallā. The effect (and aim) of this circumvention, Ḥaḍramawt
argued, was to reduce freights between the Hadhrami ports and the
interior.[115] Some months later, the newspaper reported that the east-
ern port of Sayḥūt had been used successfully as well.[116] The fact
that the food consignment went to Quʿaytī territories at least in the
first case shows that the Quʿaytī government was not to blame for
all problems related to high transport cost. Given the wide-spread
death of pack animals, there might have been a real transport cri-
sis, in addition to Beduins exploiting their transport monopoly to the
fullest. Nevertheless, this did not entirely absolve the Quʿaytī gov-
ernment in the eyes of Ḥaḍramawt's editors. They argued that a gov-
ernment had the duty to agree with the tribes in the hinterland on
safe and affordable transport. Low customs and well-maintained roads
were also deemed crucial. Ḥaḍramawt coupled this with a call on the
Quʿaytī sultan to support the completion of the al-Kāf road.[117]

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[111] Ibn Hāshim, *Riḥla*, p. 59.
[112] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 132f.
[113] PRO, CO 725/24/12, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 27.3.1933, p. 6;
PRO, CO 725/31/1, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 17.4.1935.
[114] SMA III,428, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī al-Jifrī to Sultan ʿAlī al-Kathīrī of
1355/1936 (exact date illegible).
[115] *Ḥaḍramawt* 180, 24.1.1929.
[116] *Ḥaḍramawt* 203, 11.7.1929.
[117] *Ḥaḍramawt* 204, 18.7.1929.

It seems that eventually the Quʿayṭī authorities became so con-
cerned about rival ports that they closed the main road to Biʾr ʿAlī.
Nevertheless, the idea of using this port for Wadi Hadhramaut was
revived in 1934. Although this was at the initiative of the *Jamʿiyya
Kathīriyya*, which was suspected of *Irshādī* leanings, it reflects more
widely the problems of the interior population, *qabīlī*s, *shaykh*s, *sayyid*s
and sundry with customs and transport.[118] In a similar vein, Sayyid
Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf considered buying a private plane to
facilitate travel to the interior. When peace seemed a realistic propo-
sition, this project become integrated into the wider reform plans.
After the failure of Singapore, the *sayyid* pursued the project further
in order to ensure safe transport.[119] Sultan ʿUmar disapproved of
it.[120] Even if the al-Kāf family pursued matters further on their own
accord, it seems that a report in the Netherlands East Indies about
the al-Kāfs actually acquiring a plane in 1934 was premature.[121] The
first passenger air service between Aden, al-Mukallā, Shibām and
Sayʾūn did not open until summer or autumn 1937 and closed again
in 1939 with the outbreak of World War II.[122]

In December 1931, Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf informed the Kathīrī
Sultan that at least some British (he referred to Colonel Boscawen
who had visited the country in 1929 and again in 1932 in a pri-
vate capacity) had expressed sympathies for Kathīrī concerns.[123] This
encouraged those who felt that they needed to impress their demands
on the British more strongly. While not all Hadhramis were at ease
with the increasing number of foreign visitors, others considered this
to be a chance to put relations with the British on a new footing.[124]
Therefore, after the failure of Singapore, the idea of renegotiating

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[118] IO, R/20/A/3413, British Consul-General, Batavia to Resident, Aden, 12.3.1934
and Resident, Aden to Consul-General, Batavia, 14.4.1934.

[119] See the correspondence in IO, R/20/A/3277 and van der Meulen & von
Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, pp. 133–135.

[120] IO, R/20/A/1414, Office note of interview with Sultan ʿUmar, 10.1.1930.

[121] *Barhūt* 33, Jumādā al-thānī 1350/Aug.-Sept. 1934, p. 2. When H. Ingrams
concluded his *A Report*, he still wrote: "The Seyids of Tarim are anxious to start a
commercial aeroplane service.", p. 68.

[122] Footman, *Antonin Besse*, pp. 129f., 132.

[123] SMA III,133, Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf to Sultan ʿAlī al-Kathīrī, 7. Shaʿbān
1350/21.12.1931. About Boscawen's visit, see van der Meulen & von Wissmann,
Ḥaḍramaut, p. 129; H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, p. 138.

[124] For an expression of worries about British visits, see SMA I,188 and III,177;
for a list of foreign visitors to Hadhramaut, Fuhrmann, Die Ausbreitung, pp. 10–24
and Talib, Les Etudes Européennes, pp. 13–17. For an expression of hopes, see
SMA I,194–195.

the treaty of 1918 became popular and Kathīrī leaders felt that they received some British support. Demands for a treaty revision became a regular theme in Kathīrī correspondence both internally and in exchanges with the Quʿayṭī sultan.[125] The request for a British landing ground on Kathīrī territory, after similar airfields had been constructed in Quʿayṭī lands both on the coast and near Shibām, needs to be seen in this context.[126] From the rather guarded British responses, it would seem that the Kathīrīs engaged in much wishful thinking, possibly based on polite responses and personal sympathies.[127]

It is notable that it was not only the *sayyid*s who put their pen to paper when it came to advising the Hadhrami sultans. In the Netherlands East Indies and probably in connection with the *ʿAlawī-Irshādī* conflict, many tribesmen of the Yāfiʿīs and Kathīrīs had organised themselves. It seems that the Yāfiʿīs were the first to do so. When Ṣalāḥ al-Bakrī, whose views on the Singapore resolutions have already been discussed, took leadership of the *Jamʿiyya Yāfiʿiyya* in 1929, the organisation had already existed for some four years, even though it had been more or less dormant. The *Jamʿiyya Yāfiʿiyya* constituted an interesting mixture of a tribal and proto-nationalist association, declaring that its membership consisted of Yāfiʿīs and subjects of the Quʿayṭī sultan.[128] It was revived in the context of the Singapore conference in order to organise and coordinate the anti-Singapore campaign.[129] It vowed to inform (one might assume: to lobby) the Quʿayṭī sultans, slaves and representatives in Hadhramaut and India about its resolutions.[130] The organisation's original representatives

[125] In addition to the above-quoted documents, see SMA I,246 by Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr, 25. Rabīʿ al-thānī 1355/15.7.1936; 274, Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr al-Kathīrī to Sultan Ṣāliḥ al-Quʿayṭī, 21. Ramaḍān 1355/2.12.1936; SMA III,423, Muḥammad b. Hāshim to Sultan ʿAlī al-Kathīrī, 8. Jumādā al-awwal 1355/27.7.1936; 428, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī al-Jifrī to Sultan ʿAlī al-Kathīrī of 1355/1936–37; SMA II,63, Sultans of the Āl Kathīr to Ingrams, 20. Rabīʿ al-thānī 1355, 10.7.1936; and a letter from Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr to Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Abū Bakr sons of Shaykh al-Kāf, 5. Rabīʿ al-thānī 1355/25.6.1936, in the possession of John Shipman, London.
[126] IO, R/20/A/3316, Sayyid Abdul Rahman Gifri to Assistant Resident Protectorate Secretary, Aden, 10.10.1930.
[127] SMA I,265, Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr to ʿUmar b. ʿUbaydāt b. Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbdāt, undated. For the Kathīrī demand to renegotiate the treaty and the cautious British response, see IO, R/20/A/3315, Sultan Ali b. Mansoor b. Ghalib Alkathiri to Col. Boscawen, Seyun, 27. Ramadan 1348 (26.2.1930) and Col. Boscawen to Sultan Ali b. Mansur, 2.4.1930.
[128] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 9, mid-April 1929, pp. 10f.
[129] Jaʿfar al-Saqqāf, "Min tārīkh al-ḥaraka", p. 28.
[130] *Al-Dahnāʾ* II; 9, mid-April 1929, p. 11.

were in the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore, but it seems that its activities spread to Yāfiʿ. In the 1960s, the Yāfiʿī Reform Front became one of the tribal organisations supporting the National Liberation Front against the British.[131]

As mentioned in chapter V, a first Kathīrī organisation had been founded in 1920 as a splinter group of the *Irshadī* movement. It seems that although many of its ideas as well as its general pro-Saudi political view closely resembled the aims of *al-Irshād*, the primary orientation of the association was tribal. Over the years, a number of internal splits occurred.[132] It is difficult to comment on the organisational history on the basis of the source material presently available, but it seems that the Singapore conference also stirred the Kathīrīs. In 1931, *al-Mishkāh* reported the founding of a Kathīrī Society in Batavia, the aims of which were closely linked to those of *al-Irshād*. It is possible, although not entirely clear, that this constituted a revival of the earlier association.[133] The society aimed at founding an orphanage and schools in Hadhramaut and at facilitating trade by establishing a bank with branches in Java, Aden, al-Mukallā and Wadi Hadhramaut. It also aimed at "safe-guarding the honour of the Āl Kathīr".[134] A major interest was, as in the case of the Yāfiʿīs, to influence Hadhrami politics.

From 1932 onwards, the society directed a stream of letters to the sultans. Some concerned internal tribal matters, while others dealt with the future direction of Hadhrami policy or propagated closer relations with Muslim rulers such as Ibn Saʿūd.[135] It is an interesting comment on the relative powerlessness of the Kathīrī sultans that it was a migrant organisation rather than the sultans which decided on a five-year truce among the different branches of the Shanāfir tribal confederation and imposed sanctions on those who

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[131] Carapico, *Civil Society*, pp. 94f. For a list of the Yāfiʿīyya representatives in 1929, see *al-Dahnāʾ* II; 13, mid-June 1929, p. 14.

[132] See for example SMA III,882, Ṣāliḥ b. Saʿīd b. ʿAwaḍ b. Ḥaydara of the Ḥizb al-Shabāb al-Kathīrī (Kathīrī Youth Party), to Sultan Jaʿfar b. Manṣūr and SMA III,929, Sālim Jaʿfar ʿUmar ? and ʿAbdallāh ʿUmar ? to Sultan Jaʿfar b. Manṣūr, 6. Rajab 1358/4.8.1939, disowning the writer of the previous letter.

[133] *Al-Mishkāh* I; 14, 10.9.1931, pp. 1f.; for the aims of the society, see *al-Mishkāh* I; 16, 31.10.1931 (or 1.11.1931, as indicated in the interior of the journal), p. 4. It seems that the undated statutes of a *Jamʿiyya Kathīrīyya* in an unlisted booklet in the Sayʾūn Museum Archives are of this society.

[134] *Al-Mishkāh* I; 16, 31.10.1931, p. 4.

[135] For example SMA III,167;444.

contravened this decision.[136] Unfortunately, we do not learn about
the success of this venture. In November 1934, the association decided
to found a "Committee for National Reform" (*Lajnat al-Iṣlāḥ al-
Waṭanī*) and planned to send some delegates to Hadhramaut to imple-
ment reforms. Among its aims was to found schools, including one
boarding school which taught "religious and modern sciences" as
well as languages such as English and Dutch.[137] In October 1935, a
"Kathīrī Reform Committee" (*Lajnat al-Iṣlāḥ al-Kathīriyya*), compris-
ing three leading members of the al-Kathīrī tribe and some unnamed
"intellectuals" (*mufakkirīn*), asked for the diaspora's aid in negotiating
peace. It further suggested sending a delegation under tribal leader-
ship to Ibn Saʿūd for advice on how to reform Hadhramaut.[138]
Although, once again, no explanations are provided, it seems likely
that there is some connection between these two committees. The
attempts to limit a spill-over of the ʿAlawī-Irshādī conflict to
Hadhramaut were marred by a number of differences between the
factions, for example the question of potential allies.[139]

As outlined above, most of the available source material on the
late 1920s and early 1930s warns of chaos or indicates that law and
order had already broken down. There is some evidence that this
was not the whole picture. As shown in the last chapter, this was
also the period of a literary and educational revival in the major
towns. We simply know too little to comment on how the mechanisms
of internal municipal organisation developed. Was *Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥaqq*
in Tarīm simply replaced by another association or perhaps some
older urban structures? There exists one document from Sayʾūn
which shows that consultative mechanisms were clearly still in place
and presumably functional. Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr al-Kathīrī's so-
called "Labour Code" of June 1932 set out rules of employment and
wages "after having been examined by the governing Sultan [. . .]
and by the notables of the city".[140] The document seems to indicate
that labour was in short supply, thereby limiting the mobility of

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[136] SMA III,207 of 1351/1933 with a summary of the decisions of a meeting in
Batavia on July 28, 1933.

[137] SMA III,325, al-Jamʿiyya al-Kathīriyya to Sultan ʿAlī al-Kathīrī. Unfortunately,
only the first page of the document is preserved.

[138] SMA III,464, Lajnat al-Iṣlāḥ al-Kathīriyya, 12. Shaʿbān 1355/28.10.1936.

[139] On the attempts to involve the Kathīrī sultan in the title fight, and on attempts
to reduce tensions, see SMA III,180;189;195;202;205.

[140] Rodionov, "The Labour Code", p. 200. Rodionov's article contains a fac-
simile of the original document in Arabic and annotated translation, as well as a
short introduction.

labourers and their wages. This in turn would suggest that the town was not exactly on the brink of economic collapse. Indeed, the decree might have been either a response to or the cause of a strike by builders who had demanded higher wages.[141] Similarly, the earlier discussion of events in the Qu'ayṭī sultanate suggests that the developments within the towns did not suddenly suffer serious disruption. Therefore, much of the problem really concerned relations between the cities and the countryside as well as between the sultanates. It resonates to some extent the earlier theme of the confrontation of urban versus tribal ethos with one marked difference: tribal organisations in the diaspora had joined the urban dwellers in their quest for an all-encompassing peace and development. Anecdotal evidence supports such a view: descendants of one major *qabīlī* family told me how they had asked their sons to come to South East Asia. Instead, they sent Bugis slaves to Hadhramaut in order to evade the tribal blood feuds of the 1930s.[142]

There was a marked change of tone when Sultan Ṣāliḥ ascended the throne. In Ṣafar 1355/April-May 1936, he gave his King's speech, calling for the cooperation of all Hadhramis in changing the country.[143] As far as his political programme was concerned, Ṣāliḥ wanted to keep cordial relations with Britain and hoped for British aid in the development of the country.[144] He planned to develop education and agriculture, ensure road security and reform the justice system. He further planned to install a consultative council. These plans were not very different from the main gist of the Singapore resolutions, even if they envisaged significantly less control over the sultan.

The speech prompted the Kathīrī Association to contact Sultan 'Alī b. Manṣūr. According to their letter, Ṣāliḥ had demanded their support for his plans. In return, the Association asked its sultan for cooperation "in the name of Islam, the fatherland and Arabism".[145]

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[141] Serjeant, "Social Stratification", p. 146.

[142] Interviews in London, March 1997.

[143] The speech is reproduced in al-Bakrī, *Tārīkh*, vol. II, pp. 81–84.

[144] The question of slave trade also worried the Kathīrīs in 1936, when they discussed whether they should declare a general prohibition of the trade or send individual letters to their followers. SMA I,265, Sultan 'Alī b. Manṣūr to 'Umar b. 'Ubaydāt b. 'Abdāt, in reaction to SMA II,67, Captain Seager to Sultan 'Alī of 25.9.1936. As regards the issue of the Ethiopian war, this had already been negotiated with Sultan 'Umar, PRO, CO 725/30/2, Resident, Aden to Secretary of the Colonies, 11.12.1935 and 18.12.1935.

[145] SMA III,416, al-Jam'iyya al-Kathīriyya, Batavia to Sultan 'Alī b. Manṣūr, 21.7.1936.

It went public with a "Call to the Hadhrami people" in which it discussed the numerous internal divisions and feuds.[146] But while the Hadhramis were still desperate for hope,

> a voice for good and for reform has come out from the summit of the mountain of Mukalla. The tune of the voice gave pleasure among those who favoured reform because when a believer hears the call for reform he responds to it without looking into the personality or status of the caller [. . .]. All of us have read the address of His Highness Sultan Salih Ghalib al-Qu'aiti and we became glad at its contents. The Kathiri society in its capacity as representative of the principal Hadhrami communities thank the Sultan for his address in which he showed zeal and love for his people and country. It pleases us very much to see, the Sultans of the country calling for reform and for the prosperity of the country. In fact they are the best people to carry this duty into effect. No hope can be achieved except through the Sultans. If the Sultans come to an agreement and are supported and assisted by the tribesmen, the desired reforms will be achieved.[147]

This enthusiasm for the Qu'aytī sultan is all the more surprising if one considers that the call ended with an appeal "to join the Arab Union under the leadership of the Lion of the Peninsula and its master His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia."[148] Although the Chief Commisioner's belief that both the sultans and the al-Kāfs were suspicious of Ibn Sa'ūd's intentions may not entirely reflect local views, given the Hadhrami awareness of British sensitivities, and although Ṣāliḥ certainly held modernist views, it would seem unlikely that he held such strong sympathies for Ibn Sa'ūd.[149] Nevertheless, it might

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[146] SMA III,426, Nidā' ilā 'l-sha'b al-ḥaḍramī, 27.7.1936, a translation of this can be found as "Notification" in PRO, CO 725/39/16, Lake, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 7.10.1936.

[147] PRO, CO 725/39/16, "Notification", encl. in Political Secretary, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 7.10.1936, p. 2. In spite of the bad translation, I use the PRO document as I did not copy out the original in Say'ūn.

[148] PRO, CO 725/39/16, "Notification", encl. in Political Secretary, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 7.10.1936, p. 3.

[149] While Lake, the Political Secretary, reported that the sultans and al-Kāfs were content to report about the pro-Saudi activities of Philby following his visit in 1936, he cannot have been aware that the Hadhramis warned each other of mentioning their contacts with Ibn Sa'ūd. PRO, CO 725/39/16, Political Secretary, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 30.9.1936. That Ṣāliḥ was possibly not happy about Ibn Sa'ūd's influence seems to transpire from an undated letter by him to Lake enclosed in the above. However, he is said to have maintained secret contacts with Ibn Sa'ūd through trusted individuals, personal communication, Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Nākhibī (who was one of the transmitters of such messages), Jeddah, 1.4.2000. As for the Kathīrīs, see SMA I,258, 'Alī b. Manṣūr al-Kathīrī to 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, Rajab

well be that the hope for reform overrode other considerations and appeased even the sultan's most vociferous erstwhile opponents for a while, indicating the wariness of most Hadhramis of the conditions in their country.[150]

A first round of negotiations which Ṣāliḥ had called, and in which the Kathīrīs demanded the abrogation of the 1918 treaty, failed and threatened the 'honeymoon'.[151] Similarly, not all Kathīrīs shared their association's views as a letter by "The Kathīrī Youth" shows.[152] In addition, Sultan Ṣāliḥ was regarded with suspicion by those who feared that his reform initiative might threaten their own interests, as well as by those who had preferred his uncle 'Umar.[153] Once again, matters seemed in the balance by the late summer of 1936 in spite of continued calls for reform and negotiations.

The Changing British Perspective on Hadhramaut

Until the 1930s and 40s, the Aden Protectorate had been a rather loose assembly of territories united only by the treaties which the individual rulers had concluded with the British authorities in Aden. Although by and large these treaties had accorded Britain the control over the external relations of a large stretch of Arabian coast, the sultans and rulers had found ways to circumvent these regulations, as the example of the Hadhrami contacts with Ibn Saʿūd illustrates. Even older obligations such as the ending of the slave trade, which had been enforced by rather rigorous British interventions in the coastal waters, had not been entirely carried out. Even by the 1930s, it had not ceased altogether.

Gavin attributes the expansion of British influence in the Protectorate, which began in the 1930s, largely to the fact that Aden was controlled by bureaucrats who pursued a forward policy which would

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1355/Sept.-Oct. 1936 and SMA III,457, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAlī al-Jifrī, Aden to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr, 23.9.1936, warning the sultan that the British had heard about Philby's arrival. Cf. SMA I,256;258.

[150] Note al-Bakrī's enthusiastic comments on the sultan in *Tārīkh*, vol. II, p. 81; SMA III,382, ʿAlawī b. ʿAbdallāh al-Saqqāf to Sultan ʿAlī, 10. Ṣafar 1355/2.5.1936; SMA III,424, Ḥāmid b. ʿAlawī al-Bārr to Sultan ʿAlī, 8. Jumādā al-awwal 1355/27.7.1936.

[151] SMA III,389;40;1410;423;431.

[152] SMA III,430, Shubbān Āl Kathīr, 15. Jumād al-awwal 1355/3.8.1936.

[153] For a rather sobering account by someone whose father apparently fell from favour, see Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 25.11.1992.

have been considered anachronistic by the democratic bodies of
Britain. He identifies Bernard Reilly as the central figure: Reilly came
to Aden before World War I and rose to become its Resident and
Governor until his departure in 1940. A crucial issue, which made
the kind of forward policy advocated by Reilly possible, was the
change in military technology and command. In 1928, the Air Ministry
had taken control of the defence of Aden. The major advantage of
planes was their fast access to remote areas which could be bombed
without much danger of reprisal. Air control, however, required
space, landing grounds and intelligence about impending attacks in
order to maximise its effects. The Air Ministry, intent on extending
its influence in the armed forces, was keen on linking the various
parts of the empire by air. It therefore encouraged the expansion of
British involvement in the Protectorate. In 1929, Symes, Reilly's pre-
decessor as Resident, the Colonial and India Offices and the Air
Ministry agreed that the general future policy aimed to create a
friendly protectorate integrated "along native and federal lines".[154]
This policy allowed Britain to take a firmer stand *vis-à-vis* the Imām
of Yemen's ambitions in the Protectorate. This in turn increased the
frictions with him and made further British engagement necessary.[155]
Different political and economic strategies were pursued to encour-
age closer relations with the Protectorate, including the establishment
of a boarding school for the rulers' sons in Aden in which they were
to be educated at British expense. This was a perfect example of
the future policy: Reilly did not want to expand expensive direct
rule; instead, he argued for closer political contacts through the
increase of political staff, the establishment of a "Protectorate par-
liament" at Laḥij, the setting up of dispensaries providing a basic
medical service, and founding of the school discussed above.[156]

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[154] PRO, CO 725/19/8, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 30.1.1929, para.
8, Colonial Office to Foreign and India Office and Air Ministry, 28.2.1929 and
the letters from the Air Ministry and India Office to the Colonial Office, 8.3. and
9.3.1929 respectively.

[155] Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 276–301; Lekon, "The British", pp. 207–209. On air power
in the Aden Protectorate cf. Omissi, *Air power*, pp. 50–52, 159f., on the strategic
advantages of air control in difficult geographical conditions, pp. 84–106. In the
1950s, Hickinbotham, Governor of Aden between 1951 and 1958, wrote a spirited
defence of air power, see his *Aden*, pp. 100–108.

[156] PRO, CO 725/29/10, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 19.9.1934, encl.
"Report on objectives and organisation of the proposed Aden Protectorate College
for the sons of Chiefs", by H. Ingrams, p. 8. Reilly' supporting letter shows that
he fully concurred with these views, ibid., letter of 2.1.1935 to Parkinson.

How did these changes affect British relations with Hadhramaut? Initially, neither Symes nor Reilly were particularly interested in the region, although Symes acknowledged that the sultanate of al-Mukallā was one of only two protectorate regions "which present the semblance of an orderly native State."[157] A number of factors help to explain the revival of British interest in Hadhramaut.[158] Firstly, the expansion of air control necessitated the building of landing grounds in Hadhramaut, which, as mentioned earlier, were duly cleared on the coast and near Shibām. Secondly, the question of Hadhramaut arose in the context of relations with the Yemen and the Najd. As will be seen, this concerned both the issue of borders and that of foreign relations.

A first indication of the changing attitudes can be found in 1932 when a Foreign Office circular differentiated between the Protectorate and Hadhramaut. Reilly objected, arguing that the treaty with the Qu'aytī resembled other protectorate treaties and concluded:

> I recommend that the 'Aden Protectorate' be regarded as including the 'Hadhramaut' and as extending to the western limits of the Sultanate of Muscat and Omand, and that the Foreign Office Instructions referred to be amended accordingly.[159]

The Foreign Office eventually supported this view, except that it wanted to avoid the impression that the British were "adopting a forward policy in Southern Arabia and [. . .] tightening their hold over this area".[160] The memorandum on borders in Arabia shows how marginal Southern Arabia had previously been to Foreign Office officials in London, who decided to include the Qu'aytī, Kathīrī and Mahra sultanates in the territory now defined as "Hadhramaut". It further argued that, since the term "Protectorate of Aden" had been a very loose one and the Protectorate had never been declared officially,

> There is no obvious reason why the same measure of protection should not in fact be accorded in respect of the whole of the Southern Coast

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[157] PRO, CO 725/19/8, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 30.1.1929, para. 6.
[158] The following has been discussed in detail by Yousif, British Policy, pp. 81–101 and Lekon, The British, pp. 209–215. If not indicated otherwise, I follow their arguments.
[159] PRO, CO 725/23/17, Resident, Adent to Colonial Secretary, 3.8.1932. The issue was triggered by a Foreign Office Circular of 10.3.1932, CO 935/3, no. 174, pp. 175–177.
[160] PRO, CO 725/23/17, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 12.12.1932.

of Arabia, as far as the Eastern limits of the Mahri tribe as is now
accorded to the area in the immediate vicinity of Aden.[161]

The Colonial Office happily agreed and advised Reilly in February
1933 to be tactful about changes in the current state of affairs. Reilly
answered reassuringly that "no overt action is required in order to
implement the present formal decision taken in regard to the status
of the Hadhramaut."[162] However, even before the decision on this
matter was formally communicated to Aden, Reilly asked for periodic
visits to the eastern part of the Protectorate in order to establish closer
contacts.[163] Shortly thereafter, he visited Hadhramaut and Mahra,
where the building of a landing ground had to be forced. He reported
back on the problems between the Kathīrīs and Quʿaytīs. While the
former were of disproportionate importance because of their role in
South East Asia, the British were bound by their treaty with the
Quʿaytīs and could only encourage them to be more accommodat-
ing to Kathīrī wishes.[164] This view must have come as a bitter dis-
appointment to the Hadhrami *sayyid*s.[165]

By February 1934, the Colonial Office argued for additional posts
in Aden. "I am horrified", wrote the Colonial Secretary, "at our
lack of control over the Protectorate. No fault. There are no officers.
But we must get our house in order, or we shall lose the through
trade the treaty guarantees because our territory is not safe."[166] In
the context of possible border negotiations with Ibn Saʿūd, the
Colonial Secretary asked Reilly shortly afterwards to comment on
the boundaries of Hadhramaut. Reilly replied that information about
the northern borders in particular was difficult to come by and sug-
gested sending his Political Officer, Harold Ingrams, to Hadhramaut
for further reconnaissance.[167]

This proved to be a crucial step. If Reilly was the proponent of
forward policy in the Protectorate at large, William Harold Ingrams

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[161] PRO, CO 725/23/17, "The Hadramut. Its extent and relations with His
Majesty's Government", encl. in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 12.12.1932.
[162] PRO, CO 725/24/11, Colonial Secretary to Resident, Aden, 25.2.1933 and
Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 22.3.1933.
[163] PRO, CO 725/24/12, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 4.1.1933.
[164] PRO, CO 725/24/12, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 27.3.1933.
[165] SMA I,194, letter of 12. Dhī al-qaʿda 1351/30.11.1932.
[166] PRO, CO 725/27/11, extract from a letter by the Colonial Secretary to Sir
John Maffey, 26.2.1934.
[167] PRO, CO 725/27/12, Colonial Secretary to Resident, Aden, 24.9.1934 and
Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 3.10.1934.

(1897–1973) played that role for Hadhramaut. He himself gives an inkling of his romantic Arabism in his prelude to *Arabia and the Isles* where he describes how he became interested in the Middle East as a boy.[168] At the outbreak of World War I, he joined the army and in 1919 applied to the Colonial Office.[169] He was sent to Zanzibar where he met Hadhramis and became interested in their country.[170] His numerous occupations in Zanzibar involved a stint on an advisory commission on religious instruction with the chief sunni *qaḍī* of Zanzibar, Sayyid Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr b. Sumayṭ, who was of Hadhrami extraction.[171] According to Ingrams' original account, he told Ibn Sumayṭ about his desire to visit Hadhramaut and was given letters of introduction. In the introduction to the third edition of the same book, which is a justification of Ingrams' role in Hadhramaut and an indictment of later British policies there, the following elaborate account is presented:

> The key figure was a beloved and most respected friend, Seiyid Ahmed bin Sumeit (. . .). Seyid Ahmed had made me appreciate the true Arab reactions to foreign rule and though he knew how keen I was to go to his homeland, he did nothing to encourage me to do so until a few days before his death in 1925. Then he sent for me. I found him on his simple narrow bed, his thin old arms stretched over the sheet which covered him. He took my hand and told me that he thought I might be able to help the Arabs of the Hadhramaut. He explained how the British descent on Zanzibar had in the end resulted in it coming under British rule and although that might have done good in Zanzibar, he did not want it to happen in the Hadhramaut. He now hoped I would go there. Then, feeling under his pillow, he brought out the letters of introduction to his friends and gave them to me.[172]

The anecdote is certainly telling as far as Ingrams' self-view is concerned, namely that he acted at the request of the locals and merely intended to "teach people to govern themselves".[173] While the latter question will be discussed in the next chapter, what is important in the current context is Ingrams' strong drive to improve Hadhramaut.

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[168] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, prelude to 3rd ed., p. 101.

[169] If not indicated otherwise, the following is based on Bang, Sufis, pp. 300–307 and Lekon, The British, pp. 217–222.

[170] For a romantic account of how H. Ingrams became fascinated by Hadhramaut, see his *Arabia and the Isles*, pp. 40–46.

[171] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, pp. 43f.; Bang, Sufis, p. 261.

[172] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, introduction to 3rd ed., p. 13.

[173] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, introduction to 3rd ed., p. 7.

When Ingrams returned from his 1934 journey to Hadhramaut, he not only provided comments on the boundaries, but drafted suggestions on further policy in Hadhramaut.[174] He highlighted the desire for political change among a broad range of the population, including members of the Tamīmī tribe who had spent some time in East Africa. Ingrams noted the drive to promote educational and social services and improve administration in the Qu'aytī sultanate. However, mistrust between the sultans and lack of organisation in most Kathīrī territories hindered progress. He commented that, given the desire for change, "a policy which declines assistance itself and refuses outside intervention to be sought becomes indefensible".[175] The latter was a reference to the above-mentioned requests by Sultan 'Umar for a military adviser, as well as possibly to Kathīrī overtures. For the future, he outlined several options: the abandonment of protection for Hadhramaut (which he ruled out), the establishment of separate relations with the Kathīrīs (which he considered to be problematic), and a British attempt to mediate between the Qu'aytīs and Kathīrīs, thus implementing the 1918 agreement. This was his favoured option.

Ingrams made rather detailed suggestions regarding the equipment and training of a Kathīrī tribal guard, the arming of the Qu'aytīs, guarantees about mutual non-aggression, promises by the Qu'aytīs to allow for the completion of the al-Kāf road and other developmental measures. He also suggested that the Qu'aytīs be allowed to take over the Mahra sultanate. Most consequential was the following suggestion:

> The appointment of a Political Officer for the eastern part of the protectorate and adviser to the Kathiri and Quaiti. To reside in the Hadhramaut and to be paid partly by Kathiri and Quaiti. I think this would be welcomed by the Kathiri and I believe the Quaiti could be persuaded to accept it. The Kathiri wants it and the Quaiti needs it [. . .] As internal adviser I think the Quaiti needs him very much, for development has reached a stage there where guidance is necessary. It would be possible to appeal to the Quaiti's vanity for he looks on himself as a 'civilized monarch' and with advice many of his social schemes could be better directed.[176]

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[174] PRO, CO 725/31/1, "Policy in the Hadhramaut", enc. in Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 17.4.1935. For the comments on the boundary questions, see PRO, CO 725/31/7, Political Secretary, Aden [Lake] to Colonial Secretary, 5.6.1935, encl. "Note on the Eastern Boundary of the Aden Protectorate", by Ingrams.

[175] PRO, CO 725/31/1, "Policy in the Hadhramaut", enc. in Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 17.4.1935, p. 2.

[176] PRO, CO 725/31/1, "Policy in the Hadhramaut", enc. in Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 17.4.1935, p. 4.

It is impossible to know to what extent the Kathīrīs had officially requested an adviser. Their desire for immediate contact with the British has already been discussed. Van der Meulen, who visited Hadhramaut three years prior to Ingrams, reported a number of private demands for foreign aid and intervention but no official request.[177] Freya Stark, who travelled to Hadhramaut in 1935, doubted these reports.[178] Certainly, the question of closer relations with the outside had been pondered for some time in Hadhrami circles, and Ingrams' visit had raised expectations for a solution to the Hadhrami problems.[179] Nevertheless, it is quite possible that Ingrams confounded views expressed privately with an official request.[180]

Reilly's covering letter to the Colonial Office basically agreed with Ingrams but modified his proposal by suggesting that military control ought to be maintained after the departure of the military adviser.[181] Around the same time, the Foreign Office became concerned about close relations between Hadhramaut, the Yemen and Saudi Arabia.[182] This seems to have contributed considerably to the adoption of Reilly's suggestions by the Committee of Imperial Defence.[183]

Meanwhile, contacts between Aden and Hadhramaut intensified. In November 1934, Reilly asked for the establishment of a telegraph system in the Protectorate to accompany and facilitate the growing political involvement.[184] By August 1935, a wireless station was established in al-Mukallā.[185] Also in 1935, the number of visitors to Hadhramaut increased substantially. They comprised Aden officials, scientists as well as private travellers.[186] Cooperation with Sultan

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[177] Van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, pp. 124, 184, 189, 196.

[178] Stark, *The Southern Gates*, p. 173.

[179] SMA III,295, 'Alawī b. Abī Bakr al-Kāf to Sultan 'Alī al-Kathīrī, 17. Jumādā awwal 1353/28.8.1934 and III,332, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Alī al-Jifrī to Sultan 'Alī, 3. Ramaḍān 1353/9.12.1934.

[180] PRO, CO 725/31/1, "Policy in the Hadhramaut", enc. in Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 17.4.1935, p. 3. Here, he talks about "the Kathiris (i.e. the Seyyids of Terim) being allowed to build their road". Matters are further complicated by the fact that the Kathīrī sultans had appointed Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf as their negotiator with Ingrams on 18.10.1936, SMA II,63, Sultans of the Āl Kathīr to Ingrams, 20. Rabī' al-thānī 1355/18.10.1936.

[181] PRO, CO 725/31/1, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 17.4.1935

[182] PRO, CO 725/31/1, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 30.5.1935 and Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 18.7.1935.

[183] PRO, CO 725/31/2, Committee of Imperial Defence, Standing Official Sub-Committee for Questions Concerning the Middle East, Minutes of Meeeting, 21.8.1935.

[184] PRO, CO 725/28/13, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 21.11.1934.

[185] PRO, CO 725/30/1, Political Agent, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 28.8.1935.

[186] PRO, CO 725/30/1, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 13.2.1935 and

ʿUmar and his representatives seems to have been fairly smooth.[187] However, the British did not have a chance to discuss their new policies with ʿUmar due to his ill health and long absences to India.[188]

A few months after Ṣāliḥ had ascended the throne, the Acting Resident, Lake, wrote to him. He confirmed the mutual agreement that the British were to assist the Kathīrīs with the raising and training of tribal guards, and with the completion of the al-Kāf road between Tarīm and al-Shiḥr. Lake discussed details of the military training and equipment of Quʿaytī troops that had been requested by the late Sultan ʿUmar and which Britain was prepared to provide. The most interesting passage of the letter, however, is the one which treats the question of the loan of a British officer for the training of the Quʿaytī forces. It hints at the hesitations and doubts of the new sultan who, it should be stressed, had asked for an "Arab Commanding Officer to reorganise my state army".[189] It furthermore confirms that he seems to have found certain difficulties in establishing his authority. Lake insisted that the presence of a British officer, as well as the subsequent regular control of the armed forces by the British, was more necessary than ever in view of "the succession of a new ruler over Quʾaiti territory who has yet to establish himself and gain the confidence of his subjects."[190] On the subject of a British officer, he writes:

> His Highness candidly expressed his fear that such an appointment might be regarded with suspicion by his subjects and indicated his reluctance, on this account, to agree to this proposal as he has only just succeeded to the chieftainship. Sir Bernard Reilly did not wish to press His Highness but he hopes, as do I myself, that this fear may, in due course, be proved to be groundless and that, when His Highness has established his position as ruler, he may be persuaded to consent to a British Officer being lent.[191]

10.4.1935; PRO, CO 725/30/2, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 30.10.1935 and 11.12.1935.

[187] PRO, CO 725/30/1, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 18.9.1935 and PRO, CO 725/30/2, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 18.12.1935. For smaller conflicts, see al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 80, who claims that ʿUmar insisted on the telegraph station being under the exclusive control of the Quʿaytī sultanate. Al-Nākhibī relates how the airfields at Fuwwa and Riyyān were built by ʿUmar and flew the Quʿaytī flag after the removal of a British flag. Personal communication, ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 25.3.2000.

[188] PRO, CO 725/34/7, Acting Resident, Aden to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, 22.9.1936, p. 1.

[189] IO, R/20/A/3826, Sultan Ṣāliḥ to Political Secretary, Aden, 27.4.1936.

[190] PRO, CO 725/34/7, Acting Resident, Aden to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, 22.9.1936, p. 4.

[191] PRO, CO 725/34/7, Acting Resident, Aden to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, 22.9.1936, pp. 1f.

Meanwhile, British worries about Saudi intentions in Hadhramaut increased following Philby's visit in 1936, as did their concerns about *Irshādī* activities which were seen in connection with Ibn Saʿūd.[192]

Ingrams had spent the spring and summer of 1936 on home leave in Britain, speaking and writing about Hadhramaut and hoping for his appointment as political officer there. While this was not in the offing, he was informed by Reilly that he should spend six weeks in Hadhramaut to inaugurate the new policy of closer cooperation.[193] This stint began on 16 November 1936 and ended in late December.

Crossing The Line

Ingrams' Visit to Hadhramaut in 1936/37 and the Consequences

Unfortunately for the historian interested in the local point of view, there exists only one major source for what happened during Ingrams' visit, namely Ingrams himself.[194] According to his account, Sultan Ṣāliḥ was interested in the quick modernisation of his country and had precise ideas about the development of agriculture and fisheries and about medical, infrastructural and educational improvements. The sultan's problem were his two advisers, namely the *wazīr*, Ḥāmid b. Abī Bakr al-Miḥḍār, and Aḥmad Nāṣir al-Baṭāṭī, an ex-soldier, minister and commander of the armed forces who effectively opposed change and stifled all initiatives.[195] Al-Baṭāṭī's explanation that changes in personnel and policies under Ṣāliḥ had caused rivalries and mistrust seems more plausible, particularly as al-Miḥḍār had helped Ṣāliḥ in establishing his authority.[196] This might have contributed to

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[192] PRO, CO 725/39/15, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 9.9.1936 and PRO, CO 725/39/16, Lake, Political Secretary, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 30.9.1936 and the enclosures in this letter about Philby's activities; ibid., Lake to Colonial Secretary, 7.10.1936 and the enclosed call for reform by the *Jamʿiyya Kathīriyya* with its pro-Saudi leaning.

[193] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the* Isles, p. 225.

[194] The following account of the journey is based, if not indicated otherwise, on H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, pp. 226–256.

[195] This view is confirmed by IO, R/20/C/1268, Abdel Rahman Aly El Gefree, Aden to Political Secretary, Aden, 2.11.1936, but probably ought to be seen in the wider context of local suspicion *vis-à-vis* the sultan's intentions.

[196] Al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 88. This is confirmed by IO, R/20/A/3826, Flying Officer, Air, Makalla Intelligence, 1.5.1936. Interestingly, Philby, *Sheba's Daughters*, p. 260, confirms Ingrams' observation of a climate of fear in al-Mukallā.

the initial rivalry between al-Miḥḍār and Ingrams.[197] While Ingrams
claims that he could not do much in this general climate and there-
fore headed inland, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, then an *imām* and
teacher in al-Mukallā, states that Ingrams suggested the idea of a
Resident Adviser to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, which was rejected.[198]

Matters were easier in the Wadi due to the Kathīrī hopes and
needs discussed above. Ingrams outlined the new British policy to
Sultan ʿAlī and Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf. The sultan was,
according to his account, disappointed because he did not expect
the tribal guards to be able to enforce peace. He also did not want
to pay for them and felt that the al-Kāfs should not have to meet
the bill of the state forever.

> I asked what they had expected and found that what they wanted
> practically amounted to the taking over and putting in order of the
> country by the British Government. Nothing would happen, they were
> certain, unless forces were available.[199]

Ingrams, who claims that he found widespread hopes for British
intervention, discussed matters further with Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-
Kāf. The *sayyid* suggested consulting ʿAlī Ṣalāḥ al-Quʿayṭī, the governor
of Shibām, and Sālim b. Jaʿfar b. Ṭālib, the co-signatory of the Aden
Agreement. Together with dignitaries from Sayʾūn, they decided to
promote a three year-peace plan. All the while, Ingrams was acting
on his own accord. Consequently, he feared that his ideas might
meet with disapproval in Aden, and he could not offer any guarantees
for the peace plan. He only promised in vague terms that the British
were supporting it "and that if it were made it was possible they
might intervene to deal with anyone who broke it, if the circum-
stances of any particular case warranted intervention, and if they
were sure that the people were doing their best to help themselves."[200]

The truce found cautious support. While Ingrams was still in
Sayʾūn, a British engineer helping with road-building was attacked
by tribesmen of the Bin Yamānī. Ingrams informed Aden and was

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[197] Personal communication, ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 1.4.2000.
[198] Yousif, British Policy, p. 93, referring to an interview with Shaykh ʿAbdallāh
al-Nākhibī.
[199] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, p. 240.
[200] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, p. 250. About his concerns with the British
reaction, see his comment that he insisted on a three year truce because he feared
delays since the government was not yet convinced that help for the Hadhramis
was possible or desirable, ibid., pp. 249–50.

called back immediately for further consultation. Reilly assured him of his support, provided that the use of air power remained the last resort. Ingrams returned to Hadhramaut, and a trial was held in which the tribe was condemned to pay a fine and send hostages to Say'ūn to prevent further troubles. When they did not comply, the Royal Air Force bombed the village, whereupon the Bin Yamānī submitted. "The real difficulty", says Ingrams, "was again that of rubbing into people that when the British Government said a thing it meant it, and that its decisions were not the empty threats to which they had been accustomed."[201] This action duly 'convinced' the majority of the Hadhrami tribes to sign up for the truce which to this day is known in Hadhramaut as *ṣulḥ Injrāms*, Ingrams' peace.[202] However, according to al-Nākhibī the reduction of tribal warfare was paralleled by growing scepticism about the need to call in a foreign power.[203]

Ingrams himself, entirely ignoring the events of the late 1920s which had paved the way to this success and the crucial role which Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf and others had played, described the peace as:

> entirely unprecedented. [. . .] I merely wish to emphasise that it was most spectacular and that never before had anything like it happened. Until it was achieved nobody ever believed that it would happen, except myself and a handful of helpers.[204]

This enthusiasm was shared by Muḥammad b. Hāshim, who wrote to Ingrams that "Hadhramaut has not known, since numerous centuries, anything called a 'universal peace'" and who said that if it was maintained, it would be celebrated by future historians.[205] This is not surprising because the same Muḥammad b. Hāshim considered Ingrams as a usefully ally. This is expressed in a letter of thanks by 38 *sayyid*s to the Aden Resident of which Ibn Hāshim is a cosignatory.[206]

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[201] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, p. 262.

[202] On these developments, see the weekly intelligence summaries 522–525 in PRO, CO 725/42/2, enclosed in Political Secretary, Aden, to Colonial Secretary, 27.1.1937, 3.2.1937, 10.2.1937 and 17.2.1937.

[203] Al-Nākhibī, *al-Kawkab*, pp. 127–129.

[204] IO, R/20/A/3901, Ingrams to Political Secretary, Aden, 5.5.1937.

[205] English translation of an undated letter (presumably to Harold Ingrams) from Seyid Muhammad bin Hashim bin Tahir al 'Alawi, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College Oxford, Ingrams' Papers, Box V/1.

[206] English translation of an undated letter by 38 *sayyid*s to the Resident of Aden, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College Oxford, Ingrams' Papers, Box V/1.

While Ingrams himself is rather reluctant to comment on the background of the other major development of the spring of 1937, namely the conclusion of an advisory treaty, it is this matter which significantly changed the status of Hadhramaut.[207] In the light of growing British concerns about Italian and Saudi designs on the Hadhramaut and against the background of the expectation to find oil and other minerals, in January 1937 Reilly suggested appointing Ingrams as an adviser to the Quʿaytī sultan.[208] Given wider Kathīrī interests and the strong influence of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf, who had so closely cooperated with Ingrams on the peace issue, it is not surprising that the Kathīrīs requested Ingrams as British adviser in March 1937.[209] Although Reilly had made it known in London that he favoured a more cautious approach than did Ingrams, he recommended that the request be accepted.[210]

The problem from Ingrams' and Reilly's perspective was Sultan Ṣāliḥ. In March 1937, Reilly reported that he had suggested a package deal to the Quʿaytī sultan whereby the sultan was granted a loan in exchange for an adviser. The sultan had politely reassured the Resident of his loyalty and confirmed interest in the loan. However, he made it clear that he rejected the idea of a Resident Adviser, not least because rumours had already spread among his subjects that the British were taking over his sultanate. Reilly suggested that the sultan should be cautiously encouraged to accept counsel. However, a chance to "bring the Sultan to a frame of mind in which his apprehensions will be allayed and he will willingly consent to accept an Adviser"[211] was already presenting itself and proved irresistible to the British.

In March 1937, Muḥammad, son of the late Sultan ʿUmar and official successor of Ṣāliḥ, planned to visit Hadhramaut, which Ṣāliḥ tried to prevent.[212] The sultan was very keen to have his own son ʿAwaḍ acknowledged as heir apparent, contrary to the will of Sultan

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[207] Ingrams himself only offers the dry comment that he had been asked to return as an adviser. H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, p. 295.

[208] PRO, CO 725/42/7, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 1.1.1937. In December 1936, the Committee of Imperial Defence had recommended the more direct and effective establishment of British authority in the Aden Protectorate, PRO, CO 725/42/9, Committee of Imperial Defence, Standing Official Sub-Committee for Questions concerning the Middle East, Minutes of Meeting, minutes of meeting 14.12.1936, p. 15.

[209] PRO, CO 725/42/7, Sultan Ali b. Mansur (Kathiri Sultan) to Lake, 18.3.1937.

[210] PRO, CO 725/42/7, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 14.4.1937.

[211] PRO, CO 725/42/7, Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 31.3.1937, p. 6.

[212] PRO, CO 725/42/7, Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 17.3.1937.

'Awaḍ b. 'Umar.[213] By April 1936, his cousin Muḥammad was wor-
ried and began to fear for his own rights.[214] Further discussions
between the British and Ṣāliḥ linked these two issues, and Reilly
passed on to London Ingrams' suggestion to link the question of suc-
cession to that of an adviser.[215] The sultan slowly edged closer to
the idea. Reilly would have preferred an informal arrangement to
the appointment of an adviser. He somewhat late discovered his dis-
taste for the quid (of a change in the order of succession) pro quo
(of an adviser). Nevertheless, he now pressed for a revised treaty with
the Qu'ayṭī sultan.[216] In order to make the decision more palatable
for the sultan, the British were even prepared to pay for the adviser
themselves, contrary to the original idea.[217] On August 13, 1937,
Sultan Ṣāliḥ signed a treaty in which he accepted British advice in
"all matters except those concerning Muhammadan religion and cus-
tom", while the British government recognised "the right of the
Sultans of Shihr and Mukalla to nominate their successors, subject
to the approval of His Majesty's Government in each case".[218]

While the question of succession emerges in most accounts as
the issue which finally convinced the sultan to accept British advice,
Ibn 'Ubaydillāh mentions another important factor. According to
him the sultan faced a campaign by his adversaries who complained
to Aden and published critical newspaper articles (presumably in
Aden and Cairo). This alarmed the British, who started to flock to
Hadhramaut to check the situation. In order to disarm his adver-
saries, the sultan finally signed the treaty with the British.[219] This
had the additional benefit of creating the opportunity to build an
army which was able to control the tribes.[220] From what has been

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[213] See above, chapter III.

[214] IO, R/20/A/3826, Sultan Mohamed Bin Omer Al-Ghaiti, Hyderabad to High
Commissioner, Aden, Aden, April 1936 and June 12, 1936.

[215] PRO, CO 725/42/7, Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 21.4.1937.

[216] PRO, CO 725/42/8, Resident, Aden to Colonial Office, 23.6.1937.

[217] PRO, CO 725/42/8, Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 18.8.1937, pp.
3f.; for the original proposal, see PRO, CO 725/31/1, "Policy in the Hadhramaut",
encl. in Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 17.4.1935, p. 4.

[218] PRO, CO 725/42/8, Treaty between HMG in the United Kingdom and His
Highness the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla. Boxberger, *On the Edge of Empire*, p. 214,
mentions 1936 as the date of an Advisory Agreement. This probably is a reference
to one of the many steps leading up to the conclusion of the actual treaty. Lekon, The
British and Hadhramaut (Yemen), discusses this extensively, pp. 211–217, 287–292.

[219] 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Badā'i' al-tābūt, vol. II, p. 319.

[220] Personal communication, Sayyid 'Abdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, 13.10.1996.
al-Ḥaddād's analysis closely resembles that of al-Saqqāf.

discussed above, it is clear that during his first year in office, Ṣāliḥ had been under intense pressure from supporters and opponents of reform. At the same time, his Yāfiʿī commanders mistrusted him. Ṣāliḥ possibly hoped to use the British support and adviser in ridding himself of some adversaries and thus strengthen his own position. The fact that he agreed with Ingrams on many issues might well have helped to ease the decision.[221]

There remained the question of what to do with the Kathīrī request for an adviser. By August 1937, London still pondered the question, and the idea of a separate treaty with them was floated.[222] This suggestion was eagerly grasped by the Kathīrīs and negotiations started.[223] Nevertheless, once Ingrams installed himself in al-Mukallā, he effectively began to act as an adviser to the Kathīrīs, too.[224] More important than the formal agreement, which was eventually signed in 1939, was the new treaty between Quʿayṭīs and Kathīrīs. It revised the Aden Agreement by giving the Kathīrīs a slightly higher status and lifted the ban on direct Kathīrī-British communication.[225]

'Help' or 'Imperialism'? Hadhrami Perspectives

Why did Hadhramis enter the advisory treaties, and what where their views on this matter? Was it simply the search for external support against a rival ruler (in the Kathīrī case) or the securing of a new order of succession (in the Quʿayṭī case)? Was it the "buying in" of a different kind of "development agency" by reformers? And how was the move viewed by those not involved in the decision-making process?

It seems fairly clear, both from travel reports and from the above-mentioned expression of concerns about the growing number of foreigners in Hadhramaut, that there was a division of views between Hadhramis who had lived abroad and those who had remained in Hadhramaut. The latter were most sceptical about and sometimes even

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[221] PRO, CO 725/42/7, "Note by Mr. W. H. Ingrams [. . .] on his conversation with His Highness the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla on the 14th April 1937", encl. in Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 21.4.1937, p. 2.

[222] PRO, CO 725,51/1, Resident, Aden, to Colonial Office, 25.8.1937

[223] SMA III,661, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAlī al-Jifrī to Sultan ʿAlī al-Kathīrī, 6. Shawwāl 1356/10.12.1937. For the appointment of al-Jifrī to that role, see SMA II,77–79.

[224] IO, R/20/C/198, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 22.12.1937.

[225] For the text of the Agreement, see H. Ingrams, *A Survey*, pp. 175–177, for a comment Lekon, The British, pp. 287f.

outright hostile to foreign presence in Hadhramaut. Therefore, the clue to answering the above questions lies once again in the diaspora.

It has been noted repeatedly that Hadhramis abroad were mostly pragmatic in their views of foreign powers. While many of the travellers introduced in chapter IV were interested in pan-Islamic ideas, and while ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zāhir even fought the Dutch in Aceh, most migrants had no objections in principle to cooperation with colonial powers. Even if Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl published anti-colonial articles in Middle Eastern journals, this did not prevent him from suggesting close cooperation to the British for both political (i.e., anti-*Irshādī*) and developmental (expansion of agriculture) reasons.[226]

Obviously, most of the migrants were primarily interested in making a living which normally entailed neutrality in political matters or accomodation with the powers that be.[227] Such an attitude could clearly pay off, as Romero has shown for East Africa. In the 1920s and 30s the British favoured the non-politicised Hadhramis over other groups.[228] The case of the Netherlands East Indies shows, however, that this cannot be generalised as a rule.[229] While Ingrams' account of his last meeting with Ibn Sumayṭ might be of redoubtable authenticity, there is little doubt that Ibn Sumayṭ, like his co-*qāḍī*s and administrators in Zanzibar, normally cooperated closely with the British, even if occasional differences of opinion transpired.[230]

Tolerance of European rule and even cooperation with imperial powers in foreign countries seems to have been generally acceptable, although outright support was another matter. When Sayyid ʿUthmān b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAqīl b. Yaḥyā wrote a prayer on the occasion of the coronation of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, this caused both positive reactions and "murmurs of discontent".[231] Sayyid ʿUthmān defended his action in a *fatwā* in which he argued that such a prayer

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[226] PRO, CO 723/498, Memorandum of Discussion between Syed Ali bin Shahab, of Batavia, Syed Mohamed bin Agil [. . .], R. J. Farrer [. . .], W. H. Lee-Warner [. . .], 27.11.1919. Brunswig, "Zwischen Ḥaḍramaut" has argued that there is strong reason to believe that Ibn ʿAqīl worked for some time for the British, pp. 125f.

[227] For a politically quietist attitude *vis-à-vis* European rule, see van den Berg, *Le Ḥaḍramout*, pp. 175–181.

[228] Romero, *Lamu*, p. 169.

[229] de Jonge, "Dutch Colonial Policy".

[230] Bang, Sufis, pp. 251f. About Ibn Sumayṭ's personal views, Bang quotes an interesting line from Ibn Sumayṭ's advice to his son: "The painful experience of the free man is that he has to befriend his enemy. You come and you go, and you dislike the connection. These are bad days", ibid., p. 252.

[231] For a full discussion of this prayer and the reactions to it, see Kaptein, "The Sayyid and the Queen".

helped to uphold an order under which Muslim religion and the
lives and possessions of Muslims were respected. He was supported
in his view by an Azhar-trained Hadhrami who had spent some
years in Java.[232] Although Sayyid 'Uthmān's outspoken pro-Dutch
stance might have been somewhat extreme, the pro-Dutch attitude
of many Hadhramis was repeatedly noted.[233] Even though the ruler
defended in this particular prayer was not a Muslim, the basic argu-
ment of the Hadhrami scholars involved in the controversy concerned
the upholding of law and order. Given that this was a major con-
cern in Hadhramaut (quite apart from general Islamic considerations
regarding this issue) it is quite understandable that the migrants had
an appreciation of lawful rule, even if established by non-Muslims.[234]

In his call for reform published in Batavia in 1915, the anony-
mous "servant of his fatherland" made an interesting comment:

> we do not hear anything from our homeland except for daily news
> that such and such was killed or beaten [. . .]. By God, God forbid,
> if our dear fatherland was ruled by some foreigner, even if his reli-
> gion was not the religion of Islam, not a tenth of the deeds which his
> sons commit would occur. Until when this tyranny, until when this
> hostility [. . .]![235]

This was not yet an appeal for foreign rule but aimed to show how
dramatically Hadhramis had neglected their homeland. Other Arabs
interpreted such views of imperial rule differently, as shows the out-
rage caused by Ibn Hāshim's views in Cairo.[236]

After the failure of Singapore in mid-August 1929, al-Dahnā' fea-
tured one of its commentaries about the need for reform. Its author
pondered the violence in Hadhramaut and then reminisced about
what a friend had once told him:

> The Arab rulers will never unite unless they feel the burden of impe-
> rialism, the strength of oppression and its burden. Then they will feel
> that they cannot win unless they cooperate and work hand in hand
> for freedom and independence. Besides, the pressure of the imperialists

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[232] On Sālim b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Miḥḍār, see 'A. al-Mashhūr, *Shams*, p. 284.
[233] Azra, "A Hadhrami religious scholar", p. 253.
[234] Another example dates from 1918, when Ismā'īl, Regent of Pasoerroean and
Malang and son of 'Abdallāh al-'Aṭṭās who was discussed in chapters IV and V,
wrote a prayer on the occasion of the Dutch queen's anniversary. Leiden University
Library, manuscript Or. 7937a.
[235] *al-Bashīr* 18, 1.1.1915, pp. 1f.
[236] See above, chapter V.

will reduce the chaos, as it is not in their interest that the country remains in turmoil and ignorance. And if the sons of the country awaken even a little and feel the burden of imperialism then we can hope that they really awaken and can hope for their progress, their independence and that they become able to manage matters themselves. Oh.

I remembered these words, which my friend said some years ago, and told myself: Is it possible that this prescription would heal the illness of Hadhramaut? I pondered over these thoughts in my mind . . . and when I read in the journal *al-Hilāl* a medical article which confirmed that some illnesses, such as semi-paralysis for example, disappear when another illness, namely malaria, is contracted . . . I said: is it possible that Hadhramaut can be healed by the illness of imperialism?[237]

The article continued in an even more curious vein: Hadhramaut, the author wrote, was not sufficiently well situated to become a major military base or centre of communications. If one added to this obvious disadvantage the harshness of its inhabitants and the aridity of its soil, one could easily understand why the imperialists had never shown interest in the area. Since thus not even the bitter pill of imperialism was a realistic cure for Hadhramaut, the author turned to the Hadhramis as his only possible source of help.

Although it would seem unlikely that this author uses imperialism as anything but a literary device to stir the readers, it is nevertheless interesting as the second instance of such an argument. I would suggest that the two articles reflect the growing willingness of some Hadhramis to put their affairs in foreign hands or at least to expect substantial outside help. In 1929 *Ḥaḍramawt* regretted that the transfer of the administration of the Aden Protectorate from the India to the Colonial Office had resulted in the spending of less, not more funds. After the change had initially raised high hopes, the newspaper noted with disappointment that neither reforms nor infrastructural improvements such as a wireless or a railway had been realised.[238]

In its very first issue, *al-Tahdhīb* warned of such views:[239]

I accuse the few extremists who do not envisage the reform of Hadhramaut except by way of the foreigners. You see them hoping that a foreign government from among those which organised their kingdoms

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[237] *al-Dahnāʾ* II;17, mid-August 1929, pp. 7–9, here p. 8.

[238] *Ḥaḍramawt* 212, 12.9.1929, p. 2.

[239] *al-Tahdhīb* I;1, 1. Shaʿbān 1349/22.12.1930, pp. 6–10. About the nation as a body and illness as a metaphor, see Alexander Demandt, Metapher für Geschichte, Sprachbilder und Gleichnisse im historisch-politischen Denken, München: C. H. Beck 1978, pp. 20–27.

takes over the rule of Hadhramaut, offering luxury goods and ameni-
ties and other things which the dreaming fools desire. They are aroused
by the influences of progress and do not consider the consequences.[240]

Who were those "dreaming fools"? As far as Wadi Hadhramaut was
concerned, prime among them ranked the very person to whom the
printed edition of *al-Tahdhīb* was dedicated, the "great reformer with
white hands", Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf.[241] Van der Meulen
described his visit to Abū Bakr's *majlis* in 1931 in *Faces in Shem*:

> I saw him thus many a time and hear him explaining to those around
> him that there was no other way towards peace and progress in their
> country but by trying to bring in the *Ingliz*. In this same attitude I
> saw him when he spat out his disgust of the situation his country and
> its people were in when I first met him. With words of contempt he
> replied to the arguments of those who spoke of their freedom and
> independence which they said should not be thrown away. He was a
> dedicated man. Perhaps that is why there was a distance between him
> and all the others. None of them seemed to understand his love for
> the poor, and the distressed among his people; none believed in a way
> of relief for them as he did. None had his vision, none his courage.[242]

Sayyid Abū Bakr, whom van der Meulen significantly describes as
a rather lonely figure inspired by a vision for the future of his home-
land, also tried to gain Dutch support to cut off remittances from
the Netherlands East Indies which were used for tribal warfare.[243] If
we follow Ingrams, Sayyid Abū Bakr's positive views of the British
originated in his experiences with British tolerance in Singapore.[244]
However, by all accounts, Sayyid Abū Bakr was not only an extra-
ordinary individual but also a member of a major Tarīmī notable
family. As such, he pursued not just the general interests of Hadh-
ramaut in a rather unique way but also specific interests. Some of
these were of the kind of particularist nature (for example the feud
with the Āl ʿAydarūs or their pro-ʿAlawī stance) which the European
sources tend to overlook. It is in this context that the pro-British
orientation of the al-Kāf family and Ibn Hāshim are presented in
Būrūbūdūr.[245]

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[240] *al-Tahdhīb* I;1, 1. Shaʿbān 1349/22.12.1930, p. 8.
[241] *al-Tahdhīb*, dedication.
[242] van der Meulen, *Faces in Shem*, p. 163.
[243] Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf to D. van der Meulen, 29.6.1931 and
16.9.1931, University Library Leiden, Or. 14.391, Papieren D. van der Meulen,
box 1.
[244] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, pp. 242f.
[245] *Būrūbūdūr* 4;1, 5.7.1924, p. 2.

Sayyid Abū Bakr's concerns with security can also be explained both by family and by political concerns, although they clearly expressed a widely-held desire. Somewhat more unusual, however, is his perception of how this could be achieved. If we are to believe van der Meulen, Sayyid Abū Bakr had considered acquiring an aircraft for the transport of merchandise since 1927. He did not only want to transport goods by air.[246] Presumably frustrated by the lack of progress with the road due to Beduin (and possibly sultanic) interventions, he reasoned in front of his European visitors that airplanes (particularly if they could drop bombs) were a useful tool to frighten Beduins into submission.[247] As has been shown above, Ingrams also felt the need to demonstrate power and might well have been strengthened in his resolve by Sayyid Abū Bakr, his closest collaborator. The view that military strength was needed in order to be respected and to realise one's political aims is, incidentally, shared by a very vocal opponent of close cooperation with the British. In a poem attacking the treaty with the British, a Yāfiʿī poet from India, Ṣalāh al-Aḥmadī (d. 1954), mockingly commented:

> The Land of al-Aḥqāf has calmly gone, as if meat spoilt by an axe.
> It went with the ṣāḥib for no price, and with no soldiers in his train![248]

It is quite clear from Ingrams' accounts that the al-Kāf family, and most notably Sayyid Abū Bakr, played a crucial role in the peace negotiations. By doing so, he and the other notables and rulers involved were fulfilling traditional roles. As this was by no means the first truce, the role of Ingrams was that of a possible guarantor of the agreements which was nothing novel in itself.

It is worthwhile to remember how widespread the desire for peace was at this time, no matter what the cost. This is confirmed by the reform debate in South East Asia as well as by more concrete expressions of a need for British intervention. In 1927 Sūrkittī visited the British Consul-General in Batavia in the company of two leading officals of al-Irshād, namely ʿUmar Manqūsh and Ṣāliḥ b. ʿUbayd b. ʿAbdāt. He demanded that the British appoint a Resident in al-Mukallā. According to the Consul's report, Manqūsh supported Sūrkittī, arguing that lest the British "introduced order into the Hadhramaut,

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[246] On the issue of the planned acquisition of the aircraft, see the correspondence in R/20/A/3277.

[247] van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 134.

[248] *Qaṣīda* by al-Aḥmadī, repr. in al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, here p. 101; cf. al-Nākhibī, *al-Kawkab*, p. 145.

he would never see his native-land again, since, if he went back there now, his enemies would assuredly put an end to his life".[249] The Consul then went on to reason that this matched exactly what he had heard from Sayyid ʿAlī b. Shihāb and other *ʿAlawī*s.

Another indicator of such an attitude is the relatively quick success of "Ingrams' peace". Van der Meulen, von Wissmann and Philby all reported repeated demands for foreign intervention and therefore basically confirm Ingrams' account. Of course it is only natural that they would have heard pleas for intervention from the respective powers with which they were associated.[250] Obviously in Philby's case, the pro-Saudi attitudes of those influenced by the *Irshādī* movement cannot be discounted and one must distinguish between the intervention of a European and another Muslim power. Nevertheless, the calls for Saudi intervention at least confirm the widespread dissatisfaction with the state of things and the willingness to involve outsiders. It is also important to note that intervention was not an issue limited to *sayyid*s but seems to have been discussed more widely. It further appears that the pro- and anti-British attitudes of a number of leading families were influenced by the areas where migrants had settled and by whether they were of urban or rural origin. Other decisive factors were the *ʿAlawī-Irshādī* conflict and British policies during and after World War I. Additional factors entered the equation such as internal rivalries between different factions. Thus, Sayyid Abū Bakr's prominent role has to be seen in the context of many voices calling for change and even for foreign intervention. How popular European intervention was, however, is a matter of dispute.

If one has another look at the negotiations over the appointment of an adviser to the Quʿayṭīs, this becomes quite obvious. There is no doubt about Sultan Ṣāliḥ's own reform agenda and his rather positive view of the British in general and Ingrams in particular. It is also quite clear, however, that he did not like to formalise support quite in the way suggested by the British. Like his predecessors, he would have preferred British aid without the strings of an adviser attached, and only his strong desire to make his son heir apparent eventually convinced him to accept the British condition of a Resident

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[249] R/20/A/1412, British Consul-General, Batavia to Political Resident, Aden, 27.10.1927.

[250] van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, pp. 103f., 190f.; Philby, *Sheba's Daughters*, pp. 82, 105, 153f., 157f., 165f., 257.

Adviser. Was it an accident that the British silently dropped the idea of the Hadhrami sultans paying for the Resident Adviser and decided to shoulder the costs themselves?[251] It is extremely telling of Sultan Ṣāliḥ's evaluation of public opinion that he asked the British to officially deny any rumours of annexation and reassure the Hadhramis that they were only providing the sultan "with the necessary advice and assistance to achieve his desires". He also asked for the treaty not to be announced for a month after its ratification "during which time the opposition will get more used to the idea".[252] At the same time, the sultan himself published a Public Notice in which he asked for all false rumours about a British takeover to be stopped immediately:

> Only for the welfare and vast improvements of our State I have asked the services of Mr. Ingrams from the British Government to work under me as my Resident Adviser because without an expert British officer the British Government will not give us all sorts of help for the vast improvements of our State as our means are limited.[253]

He then announced the new order of succession. In view of the Sultan's acceptance of British advice, his rather liberal official interpretation of the new post was clearly designed to calm an anxious public.

One might similarly argue that the almost immediate development of tensions between the British and the Hadhrami sultans, as well as the more gradual alienation of Sayyid Abū Bakr, constitute some kind of resistance to the definite shift in power relations.[254] When Sultan Ṣāliḥ was in India and represented by his son, the latter received a stern warning about his obligation to follow Ingrams' advice. Sultan Ṣāliḥ's indignant response ensured the British of his loyalty but reminded them "that we should discuss and decide such matters [on which misunderstandings exist] in a friendly way". This betrays emerging tensions in a relationship which in the case of the Malay model for the Hadhrami arrangements has been likened to a British prime minister's relation to his head of state.[255]

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[251] PRO, CO 725/42/8, Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 18.8.1937, p. 3, para. 9.

[252] PRO, CO 725/42/8, "Notice", its purpose is explained in the covering letter, Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 18.8.1937, para. 8, p. 3.

[253] PRO, CO 725/42/8, "Public Notice", encl. in Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 18.8.1937.

[254] These tensions are discussed by Lekon, The British, pp. 293–299. Interestingly, al-Nākhibī claims that both Ibn Hāshim and Sayyid Abū Bakr later regretted their move. al-Kawkab, p. 149.

[255] IO, R/20/C/251, Governor, Aden to The Regent, al-Mukallā, 23.3.1938 and

Another interesting case in point is the reform of the Kathīrī troops who had caused the notables much grief in the past. The sultans had repeatedly been reluctant to control them, possibly out of self-interest and to subdue the notables. When the British set about reforming them, two British officers felt unable to achieve much. An exasperated Assistant Resident Adviser wrote to Sultan Jaʿfar al-Kathīrī that his outspoken support for reorganisation as the only means of change was absolutely required.[256] From the British point of view, the sultans were weak characters, uninterested in change and incompetent. Such views neglect that the rulers might have mounted passive resistance which consisted in ignoring British advice, dragging one's feet over unpopular and undesired measures, etc. Possibly, this was their last means by which they could pursue their own policies if these differed from those of the British.[257]

Who were the open opponents of collaboration? Once again, the sources are rather scarce. It seems fair to assume that Ingrams' "TWO BAD MEN" in al-Mukallā, namely al-Miḥḍār with his Italian links and al-Baṭāṭī whom he simply characterises as a "villain", differed not merely on fine points of political orientation, but were decidedly opposed to closer British involvement.[258] It further appears that the Yāfiʿī commanders, who already had felt threatened by the reforms planned in 1928, now reacted with similar reservations which could explain al-Baṭāṭī's stance. The fact that many of the Yāfiʿī officials and military leaders lost their posts did not endear the Resident Adviser to them.[259] By October 1937, Yāfiʿī commanders complained to Sultan Ṣāliḥ about the policy of the "Christian man".[260] The problems persisted and in early 1938, Ingrams took his turn to write to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, mentioning that the Yāfiʿīs were causing him headaches.

Sultan Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib, Hyderabad to Governor, Aden, 14.4.1938. Roff, *The Origins*, pp. 14f.

[256] SMA II,276, Figgis to Sultan Jaʿfar al-Kathīrī, 9.8.1939.

[257] For H. Ingrams' view of the sultans, see his introduction to the third ed. of *Arabia and the Isles*, pp. 17f.,31f.

[258] PRO, CO 725/42/7, "Memorandum" by H. Ingrams, encl. in Resident, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 31.3.1937. This interpretation of al-Miḥḍār's dismissal as *wazīr* was suggested to me by Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, London, 29.11.1995. Cf. al-Miḥḍār, *Tarjama*, p. 222 and passim and al-Nākhibī, *al-Kawkab*, pp. 155f.

[259] al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 88. This notwithstanding, Ibn ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf, not exactly a friend of the British, attests Aḥmad Nāṣir al-Baṭāṭī a bad character, but this might well be a result of Aḥmad Nāṣir's Yāfiʿī convictions. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Idām al-Qūt, p. 155.

[260] IO, R/20/A/3923, All the Yafaʾi Muqaddams (both men born in the country and strangers) to Sultan Salih b. Ghalib, 16.10.1937.

As I will tell you some time we have tried to get rid of them and will go on trying, but the fact of the matter is that we have not got sufficient strength yet to be able to rid ourselves of their intrigues without the risk of causing trouble which might end badly for us.[261]

Possibly the clearest formulation of Yāfiʿī opposition to the advisory treaty came from a mercenary in India, in the form of the poem quoted above which was composed by Ṣalāh al-Aḥmadī (d. 1954) in 1939. It was a scathing denunciation of the agreement with the British.[262] Al-Aḥmadī deplored the absence of strong local leaders, suggesting that emigration was better than life under British rule. He described the prospect of life under Christian rule when religious education was in peril: wine was on sale in the markets and women were running around bare-faced. An anonymous respondent, most likely Muḥammad b. Hāshim, who might have written at the suggestion of Ingrams[263] or of Sayyid Abū Bakr, unsurprisingly praised the new peace and justice. After all, Hadhramis had been incapable of achieving this on their own. Al-Aḥmadī's reprise shows that for him this did not counterbalance the grave disadvantages. Possibly peace and civil justice were consequences of the intervention, but what about religion and morality?[264]

The extent to which the whole question moved the Hadhramis becomes evident from the fact that many Hadhrami poets joined the controversy, poetry being the most widely spread medium of political debate and mobilisation available at the time.[265] Incidentally, this might explain why the British, or more precisely Ingrams, might have felt it necessary to challenge al-Aḥmadī. The popular poet Khamīs Sālim Kindī (1914−1990), for example, sided with ʿUbayd Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbdāt, the last semi-independent ruler of al-Ghurfa. Although ʿUmar b. ʿAbdāt had entered 'Ingrams' Peace' with some reluctance,

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[261] IO, R/20/C/1270, Ingrams to Sultan Salih, 15.2.1938, cf. ibid., British Agent, Mukalla to Political Secretary, Aden, 25.9.1937.

[262] For reprints of the poem as well as the answer to it and al-Aḥmadī's final reply, see al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, pp. 101−108, Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, *Taʾammulāt*, pp. 164−171, with introductory comments on p. 163 and al-Nākhibī, *al-Kawkab*, pp. 113−123, commentary pp. 123−161. For an analysis of the main points of the poetic exchange, see my "A poetic exchange".

[263] This is suggested by Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, *Taʾammulāt*, p. 163.

[264] al-Nākhibī, *al-Kawkab*, p. 131, referring to the couplets in the third *qaṣīda* starting with: "*amma 'l-sharīʿa yā rafīqī bi-tawārī fī 'l-luḥūd*".

[265] al-Nākhibī, *al-Kawkab*, p. 159, on the issue of poetry as a "mass medium" or source of information, together with letters, travellers and official (town) criers, ibid., pp. 35−40.

his nephew was to renew his independent policies irrespective of such contractual agreements.[266] Kindī greeted ʿUbayd's return from Java with a poem in which he lamented the "great tragedy" that had befallen the country and the presence of the "unbelievers".[267]

The debate was not confined to Hadhramaut. In May 1937, the Egyptian newspaper *al-Shabāb* reported negatively on events in Hadhramaut, whereupon the British considered banning it. They felt sufficiently concerned to solicit an article by an anonymous Hadhrami for publication in *The Times* or the *Daily Herald* emphasising the mutual interests of the British and Hadhramis. It bears interesting semblance in tone with the anonymous poet who had answered al-Aḥmadī.[268] By October, reports arrived about negative press in Batavia.[269]

Yāfiʿī concerns ranged beyond their loss of a privileged position. In May 1937, a group of them wrote to their *manṣab* Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Sālim b. Shaykh Abū Bakr, denouncing him for cooperating with the British. Their main concern was "the admission of Christians in an Islamic province", which according to their interpretation approached apostasy.[270] Others believed that the British might bring Jews to Hadhramaut, which was countered by an official dementi of the sultans.[271] By November 1937, Yāfiʿī discontent had become so widespread that Ingrams was fearing a rebellion and suggested that possible ringleaders might be deported to the Seychelles if unrest did indeed break out.[272]

Others presumably shared Yāfiʿī apprehensions and/or became irritated with the amount of power exercised by Ingrams. It seems that ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ al-Quʿaytī (1898–1948), the aforementioned gov-

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[266] On Ibn ʿAbdāt entering the peace, see H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, pp. 269–271, on the events, Boxberger, "Hadhrami Politics", p. 60.

[267] Maḥrūs, *Qāla Kindī*, p. 38. He even echoes some lines of al-Aḥmadī.

[268] IO, R/20/A/3923, Acting Political Secretary, Aden to First Political Officer, Mukalla, 28.5.1937 and Enclosure in First Political Officer, Mukalla to Political Secretary, Aden, 15.7.1937.

[269] IO, R/20/A/2923, British Consul-General, Batavia to Governor, Aden, 16.10.1937.

[270] IO, R/20/C/1267, The natives of Yafa united in Islam [. . .] to Mansab Ahmed b. Ali [. . .] al-Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Salim al-ʿAlawi, 27. Safar 1356/9.5.1937.

[271] IO, R/20/C/1341, Iʿlān rasmī, received in Residency 16.5.1939. It might be that the background to this rumour was an enquiry by the Colonial office whether Soqotra was a suitable abode for Jewish refugees from Germany. Ibid., Colonial Secretary to Governor, Aden, 23.3.1938 and Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 25.4.1939, rejecting the idea.

[272] PRO, CO 725/52/7, Ingrams, The Yafaʾi Situation in Hadhramaut, 2.11.1937, encl. in Acting Governor to Colonial Secretary, 3.11.1937.

ernor of Shibām when the peace treaties were negotiated in 1936/37,
might have been one of them. While he was recognised as some-
one interested in reform and for some time closely cooperated with
Ingrams, it appears that by 1940 he had become disillusioned with
the lack of consultation. Furthermore, like many Hadhrami notables,
ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ maintained external contacts which, when they became
known, did not please the British. They felt that foreign relations
were their own exclusive realm under the Protectorate Treaties. In
addition to local intrigues and pro-*Irshādī* sympathies, these actions
seem to have brought about the fall from grace of the erstwhile
deputy of Sultan Ṣāliḥ.[273]

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[273] For a differentiated discussion of ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ's complicated relationship with
Sultan Ṣāliḥ and Ingrams, based on familys documents, interviews and the existing
literature, see al-Qaddāl & al-Quʿayṭī, *al-Sulṭān*, pp. 51–103.

CONTESTED REFORM: DEVELOPMENT IN HADHRAMAUT UNDER BRITISH TUTELAGE, 1937–1960s

During the thirty years in which British advisers were present in Hadhramaut, this part of the Eastern Aden Protectorate underwent considerable change. While the sultanates in the mid-19th century resembled 'chiefdoms', I have shown in chapter III how at least the Qu'ayṭī sultanate had formalised certain institutions and developed new ones in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. At the same time, leading notables in some interior towns had similarly worked towards the establishment of clearer structures, as discussed in chapters II and VI. This process accelerated considerably after the conclusion of the advisory treaties, as will be seen in this chapter. It was characterised by a strong British drive to realise certain ideas which were often contested, challenged and modified by the lively civil society.

Whose Reform?

Hadhrami accounts of Sultan Ṣāliḥ's rule usually praise him for his reforms. Although they mention the advisory treaty, it appears that until 1956, the sultan initiated many of the developments.[1] In contrast, British sources convey the impression that the initiative was theirs,[2] in spite of Ingrams' regular claims that he only aimed at strenghtening the sultans' authority.[3] Before Ingrams became Resident

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[1] For example 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Badā'i' al-tābūt, vol. II, pp. 328–330; Ghālib al-Qu'ayṭī, Ta'ammulāt, pp. 98–105. S. Bā Wazīr, Ṣafaḥāt, pp. 246–256 mentions that peace would not have been possible without external help, but proceeds to discuss reform while hardly mentioning the British.

[2] A third version is that Shaykh al-Qaddāl Sa'īd al-Qaddāl initiated judicial and administrative reform while Prime Minister between 1950 and 1957, al-Qaddāl, al-Shaykh, pp. 115–123.

[3] Incidentally, this view of Ingrams as acting in the name of the sultans and not of the British government is supported by Trevaskis, Shades, pp. 13f., who accepts the contradictory nature of the resulting policies.

Adviser, he regularly put new initiatives to the Colonial Office.[4] By the summer of 1937, he commented on the proposed budget for the Eastern Aden Protectorate and effectively presented a development plan which ranged from military reform to agricultural development. He himself claims that he often had "to *press* for things to be done, and at the same time to be careful in trying to make it appear that the initiative came from them."[5] As discussed in the previous chapter, this might indicate the sultans' resistance rather than their weakness as Ingrams suggests.[6] After all, Ingrams himself at the time pointed out that he occasionally felt that the rulers changed matters rather too quickly and that he had to slow them down.[7]

The rationales behind both views are fairly obvious, but their very discrepancy reminds us of the strong reform drive and initiatives which had existed before Ingrams and which did not disappear with his arrival. The uneven source basis makes it difficult to actually gauge which influence Hadhramis exerted in determining specific measures and policies, except in a few instances. As far as the Quʿaytī territory is concerned, it is quite plausible that the elderly Sultan Ṣāliḥ was more interested in the overall direction of reform than in the details.[8] This does not mean, however, that he did not initiate certain institutions. One case, about which two conflicting versions exist, is the creation of the Quʿaytī State Council (*majlis al-dawla*). According to Ingrams, he set up this council in 1939 following the example of the Malayan State Councils.[9] In contrast, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī claims that its establishment was suggested by Sultan Ṣāliḥ.[10] Given the earlier existence of such a council in the Quʿaytī sultanate, this rings true. A likely explanation for the divergence of

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[4] PRO, CO 725/51/1, Memorandum on the Estimates proposed for the Eastern Aden Protectorate, encl. in Governor Aden to Colonial Secretary, 25.8.1937; cf. the correspondence on the establishment of a bank in PRO, CO 725/51/2 and on cigarette production in PRO, CO 725/50/11 as well as Ingrams' initiative to set up a plant for the extraction of sardine oil, D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, p. 131. Already in 1936, he had considered fishery development, see the correspondence in PRO, CO 725/41/2.

[5] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, introduction to 3rd ed., p. 18.

[6] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, introduction to 3rd ed., p. 17.

[7] PRO, CO 725/52/7, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Political Secretary, Aden, 17.11.1937, encl. in Political Secretary, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 3.12.1937.

[8] Personal communication, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 26.3.2000.

[9] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, 1st ed., p. 349.

[10] Personal communication, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 26.3.2000.

views in this particular case is that Sultan Ṣāliḥ did indeed suggest or perhaps create a council in 1939 which might have been adapted to the Malay model. It became "the Sultan's cabinet"[11] and dealt with legislation, budget, judicial and army reform.[12]

The State Council also seems to have become a forum to which concerned citizens could address their requests. In 1946, "the inhabitants of Duʾan" raised fifteen points, ranging from judicial reform and taxation to the building of hospitals and schools, the local allocation of charity raised from public revenues, the provision of credit, and improvement of postal services.[13] This list reflects the developmental concerns of local community leaders.[14]

Similarly, it appears that in the Kathīrī sultanate, the formation of a State Council sometime between 1948 and 1953 resulted from local demands.[15] Notables in the interior had organised themselves in Sayʾūn in a "Committee for the Request of Rights for the Kathīrī People" (*Lajnat al-Muṭālaba bi-Ḥuqūq al-Shaʿb al-Kathīrī*) under the leadership of Abū Bakr b. Ḥusayn b. ʿAbdallāh al-Kāf. It opposed attempts to promote Hadhrami unity, notably the National Party in al-Mukallā which demanded Quʿayṭī hegemony.[16] The committee further demanded the abolition of certain taxes and later broadened its concerns, i.e., suggesting the formation of a State Council to the Resident Adviser.[17]

Obviously, the way in which the advisory system worked depended much on the personality of the adviser.[18] As the first adviser and instigator of the system, Ingrams established much of the administrative framework and routines. He was not quite as reticent in his advice as he liked to claim. Therefore, not everybody in Hadhramaut, nor indeed in Aden, was sad to see him leave.[19] It seems that the other long-serving and influential Resident Adviser, Hugh Boustead (1949–1958), very much resembled Ingrams in this proactive

[11] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, 1st ed., p. 349.

[12] Personal communication, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 26.3.2000. For the Council's minutes from 1941–1954, see IO, R/20/C/1370–7373.

[13] IO, R/20/C/1370, Translation: Points raised by the inhabitants of Duʾan, 24.6.1946.

[14] The latter assumption is based on specific demands regarding legal practices.

[15] Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 119 describes the leadership as "*aṣḥāb al-māl wa-l-jāh wa-l-nufūdh*".

[16] See below, chapter IX.

[17] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 108f.; R. Smith, "Notes", p. 501.

[18] For a general survey, see S. Smith, "Rulers".

[19] IO, R/20/B/2434, Personal and Confidential (by whom?) to Sir G. Gater, Colonial Office, 6.11.1944.

approach.[20] He remembered intervening as little as possible in State Council decisions but "lobbying beforehand or between sessions".[21] When he sensed real opposition, he did not hesitate to interfere. Thus he insisted on the replacement of the State Secretary, who had been appointed initially at the suggestion of Ingrams. This Zanzibari Arab of Omani origin pursued too much of a centralising policy in Reilly's view.[22] Interestingly, this very same State Secretary, Shaykh Sayf b. ʿAlī al-Bū ʿAlī, is said to have threatened to resign in the event that Ingrams returned to Hadhramaut.[23]

Much has been written about the changes after 1937, therefore a relatively brief outline will suffice here.[24] The aim is not to give a comprehensive survey but rather to assess, as far as possible, whether these reforms were in line with earlier ideas of Hadhrami rulers and notables and what impact they had on the country. I will argue that tensions were raised by the very fact that the British, in contrast to the Hadhrami rulers and notables acting earlier, were able to impose their ideas. In addition, the strengthening of the ruling families in the course of state-building increased local differences.[25] These factors contributed to later manifestations of discontent and eventually fed the anti-British movement of the 1960s. The discussion focusses mostly on the period from 1937 to the late 1950s. This is partly due to the central role of the cooperation between Sultan Ṣāliḥ (d. 1956) and the British, partly to the fact that many structural changes were initiated during this period. For the most part, Sultan Ṣāliḥ's son and successor, ʿAwaḍ (d. 1966), did not play an active role in politics. During his reign, the important decisions were taken by a specially appointed Sultanic Council representing the highest officials of the land in cooperation with the Resident Adviser.[26] Sultan Ghālib,

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[20] Lekon, The British, pp. 222–226; Boustead, *Wind*, p. 186; Hickinbotham, *Aden*, pp. 141f.

[21] Boustead, *Wind*, p. 185.

[22] Boustead, *Wind*, p. 186, for a fuller discussion of the resulting riot, see chapter IX.

[23] IO, R/20/B/2434, Personal and Confidential (by whom?) to Sir G. Gater, Colonial Office, 6.11.1944.

[24] H. Ingrams, "Peace in the Hadhramaut"; "Education in the Hadhramaut"; "Political development in the Ḥaḍramaut"; *Arabia and the Isles*, pp. 348–366; D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, pp. 60–63, 66–70, 74–79, 85–88; Lekon, The British, pp. 102–120, 222–228; al-Bakrī, *Fī Janūb*; al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 416–439.

[25] Dresch, "Colonialistes, communisted et féodaux", pp. 219–238.

[26] On the institution of the Sultan's Council, see IO, R/20/B/2469, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 10.4.1957 and Acting Chief Secretary to Government, Aden to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 3.9.1957.

the last sultan, was only eighteen when he took office. Since he was forced out merely a year later, he had little opportunity to leave his own mark on the politics of al-Mukallā.

Security and the Extension of State Power

Security had been the paramount concern of urban Hadhramis for a long time. Outside help for military endeavours in Hadhramaut had been sought since the 19th century, as has been discussed in chapters I and III. Originally, this was mainly in the context of the Quʿayṭī—Kathīrī struggle. The other area in which significant military force was regularly used was the states' expansion into tribal areas by force and treaty. Sultan ʿUmar had been the first to request a military adviser in 1930 and the same question had preoccupied negotiations between Sultan Ṣāliḥ and the British before the idea of a Resident Adviser appeared.[27] Now it was Ingrams who developed the general outline of what should be done.[28]

In the spring of 1937, two British officers arrived from Aden to assist in the reorganisation and training of the Quʿayṭī army. Former slave soldiers were trained to become the regular army. This seems to have been a compromise to the problem of military slavery. Originally, the British had simply proposed their manumission but the sultan warned of unrest in the event that no alternative employment was offered.[29] The Kathīrī Armed Constabulary was formed along similar lines, except that it mainly fulfilled policing functions. These were provided in Quʿayṭī territory by a gendarmery which consisted of former Yāfiʿī irregulars.[30] In addition, the Hadhrami Beduin Legion

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[27] See chapter VII.

[28] IO, R/20/A/3846, W. H. Ingrams, Defence in the Hadhramaut, 29.4.1937 and the subsequent correspondence.

[29] Hickinbotham, *Aden*, pp. 97f. His account was confirmed by Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, Jeddah, 28.3.2000, who also mentioned a brief slave revolt against manumission in 1941. On the position and status of slaves, see Ingrams, Memorandum on Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Aden Protectorate, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College Oxford, Ingrams' Papers, Box V/1. In spite of the abolition of slave trade, confirmed in 1936 by the Kathīrīs (SMA II;67,69) and the outlawing of slavery (22.2.1939 in Quʿayṭī territory, 1957 by the Kathīrīs, see IO, R/20/B/2003 and IO, R/20/C/2047), slavery remained an issue until the late 1950s, see IO, R/20/C/1326, Decree No. 7 of 1357 and IO, R/20/C/2044, 2045, 2047.

[30] PRO, CO 725/42/8, Governor Aden to Colonial Secretary, 26.5.1937 and encl. Governor Aden to Commanding Air Officer, 11.5.1937; PRO, CO 725/54/8,

was formed along the lines of a special Desert Patrol of the Trans-jordanian Arab Legion. It was to intervene in tribal problems, patrol the borders, and integrate Beduins into the state apparatus, not least through offering them education.[31] Although the Beduin Legion swore allegiance to the Qu'aytī sultan, it was considered to be most loyal to the Resident Adviser and under his effective control.[32]

These measures were viewed favourably by townspeople but raised the suspicions of both Yāfi'īs and tribesmen. The discontent of the former has already been mentioned in the previous chapter. The reorganisation of the army meant that the powerful *muqaddam*s no longer collected and distributed their soldiers' pay which had been a lucrative source of income.[33] It also limited the regular immigra-tion of warriors from Yāfi'.[34] Most of all, it spelled the end of the decisive influence which Yāfi'īs had exercised during earlier periods, including Sultan 'Umar's reign. Al-Baṭāṭī comments bitterly:

> In early *muḥarram* 1356 [March 1937] the administration of the Resident Adviser in al-Mukallā was openend, and Mr. Ingrams began his work.[35] He dissolved all civil and military Yāfi'ī ranks ... and this completed the divorce of the Yāfi'īs from their sultans of the Qua'ytī [family] and the separation of the Qua'ytī sultans from their Yāfi'ī troops. The links between the Qua'ytī sultans and their Yāfi'ī troops in Hadhramaut had been indissoluble.[36]

As far as the tribes were concerned, three related issues caused wide-spread concern: the expansion of roads, the extension of state author-ity, and disarmament. Of these, only the first has been discussed systematically in the context of the transport revolution. The exten-sion of the road network in the Eastern Aden Protectorate also

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Governor Aden to Colonial Secretary, 27.4.1938; H. Ingrams, "Peace in the Hadhramaut" and *Arabia and the Isles*, 1st ed., pp. 343–346; D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, pp. 60f.

[31] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, 1st ed., pp. 344–346; Lekon, The British, p. 107; Hutchison, "The Hadhrami Bedouin Legion".

[32] Personal communication, Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 26.3.2000; H. Ingrams, "Political Development", p. 245.

[33] See above, chapter III.

[34] PRO, CO 725/52/7, Ingrams, The Yafa'i Situation in Hadhramaut, 2.11.1937, encl. in Acting Governor Aden to Colonial Secretary, 3.11.1937.

[35] al-Baṭāṭī is notoriously imprecise with regard to dates, but it is true that Ingrams de facto set up office in al-Mukallā in April 1937 during the sultan's absence and that the reorganisation of the army started during this period. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, introduction to 3rd ed., pp. 24–26.

[36] al-Baṭāṭī, *Ithbāt*, p. 88.

significantly contributed to the expansion of state and thereby to the diminution of tribal power. In 1946, Doreen Ingrams reported that "Motorable roads in the Eastern Aden Protectorate have been increased to such an extent in recent years that there are now few districts in the Qu'aiti and Kathiri States which cannot be reached by car."[37] As discussed before, this expansion was driven by both the leading merchants and the sultans, endangered Beduin rights in a number of ways, the most obvious of which was the loss in caravan revenue.

During the early years of road construction, road transport had been kept artificially expensive. Perhaps more crucially, tight limits on freight transport by lorries had been imposed. Nevertheless, the Ḥamūmīs still carried out raids on the al-Kāf road. While this might have been linked to their wider conflict with the Qu'aytīs, the reason given by them for their attacks in 1937 and 1938 was the carrying of goods by lorry. Ingrams suggested that the incidents had been instigated by Yāfiʿī commanders unhappy about the changes in al-Mukallā, but he denied that freight regulations could be a possible cause.[38] However, it would seem plausible that discontented Yāfiʿīs who saw their role in the sultanate threatened and Ḥamūmīs who were concerned about the changing transport provisions acted jointly.

Two major famines struck Hadhramaut in 1943–45 and 1948–49. Their most prominent victims were from the *ḍaʿīf* stratum, about 75% of whom perished in the Wadi.[39] However, the famines also affected the Beduins. Firstly, the camel population dwindled considerably, at times necessitating the replacement of caravan transport by trucks. These consequently entered Hadhramaut for the first time in numbers which threatened cavaran trade.[40] In the context of famine relief and to enable these trucks to serve wide areas, the state organised road building projects. These measures reduced transport costs in the medium term. While Doreen Ingrams, writing shortly after World

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[37] D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, p. 141. The book was written in 1946, but published only three years later.

[38] IO, R/20/C/101, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Political Secretary, Aden, 1. 2. 1938.

[39] D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, p. 169.

[40] These numbers were still rather small: On 7.8.1953, the American Consulate, Aden reported to the Department of State that about twenty trucks carried about 800 pilgrims overland to the Ḥijāz for the annual *ḥajj*. This had raised concerns in Hadhramaut "since the proposed caravan will virtually strip the Wadi Hadhramaut of trucking facilities required to bring in essential imports." *Records of the Hajj*, vol. VIII, p. 151.

War II, could still speculate that new educational and professional opportunities would compensate for the expected loss of income to Beduin,[41] by 1953 it had become clear that the effects were somewhat more severe. Road transport had become so cheap that merchants, sometimes aided by government officials, attempted to bypass the transport regulations.[42] A medium-sized lorry could carry the equivalent of the loads of more than a dozen camels, in addition to travelling at almost tenfold speed.[43] These problems caused more than the normal level of disruption. In 1946–47, a series of tribal conferences were held, although the demands formulated there are unfortunately not available.[44] By the early 1950s, tribal discontent translated into unrest and serious disturbances. For example, in 1953 the Manāḥil tribe prevented lorries from transporting pilgrims during the annual pilgrimage to Qabr Hūd in eastern Wadi Hadhramaut, thereby salvaging their own income from the lucrative pilgrims' transport.[45]

In 1955, the Mukallā newspaper *al-Akhbār* reported that the State Council had considered the matter of transport. It had been alarmed by high prices in the interior and a feeling that camel transport was inadequate at a time when the demand for heavy goods such as agricultural machinery increased in the interior. In late spring of 1954, a new agreement was negotiated with the tribes allowing the government to modify rules as long as caravan transport was still prioritised. According to *al-Akhbār*, whose language shows a clear urban prejudice, this agreement worked perfectly except that "some tribal leaders do not like life if there is no disturbance and breach of security. They wanted to return to the agreement of 1940 which has been discussed above [. . .]."[46] *Al-Akhbār* therefore blames stubborn Beduins who refused to accept the reasoned proposals of government. Instead of coming to a peaceful agreement, they preferred to attack roads. This account justifies subsequent punitive actions involving the Royal Air Force in June 1955. Even the Resident

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[41] D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, pp. 141f.
[42] Boustead, *Wind*, pp. 206–210; Leidlmair, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 43; van der Meulen, *Don't you hear*, p. 135.
[43] Hickinbotham, *Aden*, p. 157.
[44] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 20.1.1993.
[45] American Consulate, Aden to Dept. of State, 7.8.1953, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, p. 151. For the negotiations carried out between the state and various Beduin tribes about transport, see al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 116–119.
[46] *al-Akhbār* 3;49, 15.7.1955, pp. 1, 7–8; for the Beduin attack, cf. *al-Akhbār* 3;48, 30.6.1955, p. 8.

Adviser Boustead took a more balanced view by openly admitting
that there was no fair solution to this conflict of interest. He conceded
that the Beduins had a case. Like Doreen Ingrams, he pointed to
the readiness of Beduins to accept alternative jobs, as well as Beduin
emigration to the Ḥijāz, the Gulf and Aden as possible ways out.[47]

These problems persisted well into the 1960s.[48] By 1965, road trans-
port not only threatened the livelihood of the remaining Beduins but
started to have wider implications. The local Assistant Adviser warned
the Resident that direct haulage from Aden to Wadi Hadhramaut,
which had started in 1951,[49] was dramatically increasing. Unfortunately
he did not hint at whether this was due to transport costs or customs'
charges, however, the implication was that by that time, not only
the Beduin but also the Hadhrami ports were in danger of losing
their role to the roads.[50]

The sultanates, most notably the Quʿayṭīs, were not just building
roads and protecting transport. They basically agreed with Ingrams
that "2,000 separate governments in the Hadhramaut—the 1,300 or
1,400 tribal units who had signed the truce and a large number of
autonomous villages belonging to sheikhs and seyids of the unarmed
classes [. . .] should surrender something of their independence to
central governments and should rule their little units as parts of
larger entities."[51] The truce was only the first step towards such an
extension of authority.[52] A major issue was, of course, the question
of tribes bearing arms and therefore being able to mount raids and
more serious opposition against government troops. Although Ingrams
reported a slump in arms prices following the conclusion of the ini-
tial truce, it did not end the bearing of arms.[53] Thus, separate attempts
were made to institute arms control with the eventual aim of estab-
lishing if not a state monopoly of power then at least the state's mil-
itary superiority.[54] Limitations on arms bearing in the major towns

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[47] Boustead, *Wind*, p. 211.

[48] For examples of unrest, see MM, Mukhtaṣar ijtimāʿ majlis al-sulṭān 3.6.1958,
6.8.1958; cf. the correspondence in IO, R/20/B/3075.

[49] The first trucks from Aden arrived in Hadhramaut in February 1951. MM
175, E. H. Boustead, Memorandum on Administrative and Agricultural Development
in the Eastern Aden Protectorate (From April 1950 to March 1951), p. 27.

[50] IO, R/20/C/1944, Assistant Adviser, Northern Areas to Resident Adviser,
Mukalla, 28.11.1965.

[51] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, 1st ed., p. 348.

[52] For a critical view of these policies, see ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 27.

[53] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, p. 283.

[54] On this issue Lekon, The British, pp. 103–105, 340f.; Yousif, British Policy,
pp. 221, 245f.

had occasionally been in place before.[55] However, the idea to generally ban the display of arms in the cities and the further move to disarm the tribes proved highly controversial. Evidence of this can be found in letters by the chairman of the *Jamʿiyya Kathīriyya*, Ṣāliḥ b. Jaʿfar b. Sanad, who met with Ingrams during his visit to South East Asia in 1939. He argued that a general ban on arms bearing in cities was contrary to tribal honour.[56] This argument seems significant in so far as it is one of the few indicators that both tribal power and ethos were at stake, at least from a tribal point of view. Such a view is confirmed in a subsequent letter by Ṣāliḥ b. Jaʿfar to Sultan Jaʿfar al-Kathīrī. He expressed the association's approval of the permanent truce negotiated by Ingrams, but voiced its anxieties over the general ban on arms, asking the sultan for his suggestions to resolve the issue.[57] This appears to be a desperate attempt by urbanised *qabīlī*s to reconcile the ideologies of *dawla* and *qabāʾiliyya*.

Although the outcome of this particular correspondence remains unclear, other evidence suggests that the carrying of and trading in arms remained controversial well into the 1960s. Decrees outlawing both practices were passed repeatedly.[58] It seems that the implementation varied considerably from place to place. In one instance, the Quʿaytī representative in al-Qaṭn defended his lax attitude by arguing that he had instructions not to alienate too many people. This implies widespread resistance against arms control.[59] It seems that in the mid-1950s, the Shanfarī Association was openly encouraging arms bearing in contravention of local laws, which was applauded by emerging nationalist forces.[60]

A further aspect of the extension of state power was the curbing of the tribes' customary rights to levy certain taxes and the additional

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[55] van der Meulen & von Wissmann, *Ḥaḍramaut*, p. 20.

[56] SMA III;939, Ṣāliḥ b. Jaʿfar b. Sanad (Chairman, Jamʿiyya Kathīriyya) to Ingrams, 9.9.1939. H. Ingrams' Report of a Tour, pp. 108–115, is silent on the issue although it confirms (p. 108) his meeting with the society in Batavia. The meeting is also mentioned in SMA III;920 of 31.7.1939.

[57] SMA III;940, Ṣāliḥ b. Jaʿfar b. Sanad to Sultan Jaʿfar al-Kathīrī, 24.9.1939.

[58] A number of these laws and decrees are contained in IO, R/20/C/2049. Cf. IO, R/20/C/2056 with a decree of 1958 banning arms' imports; SMA, Bayānāt al-dawla al-kathīriyya, Bayān ʿamm by the acting Secretary of State, 22.8.1965.

[59] IO, R/20/C/2051, Assistant Adviser Northern Areas to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 14.6.1956.

[60] IO, R/20/B/2466, Chief Intelligence Officer, Aden to Chief Secretary to Government, 15.11.1957. The Shanfarī Association seems to have been a group which grew out of the Kathīrī Association.

imposition of taxes by the states on the tribes. Hartley, writing about the Nahd, reported that:

> The most serious changes in the eyes of the tribesmen have been their loss of the right to exact payments from settled non-tribesmen for the protection of lives and crops, and the prohibition of the carrying of rifles within the Hadhramaut Valley.[61]

In the eastern Wadi, a similar situation seems to have prevailed. This is illustrated in renewed conflict between townspeople of Tarīm and the Tamīmī tribe. In early 1941, the tribesmen sent a letter to the Kathīrī sultan's representative "asking him to lift the 'Shatti' (Gate pass) and taxes from them and their subjects and telling him that this is an innovation".[62] As a reprisal, the Tamīmīs had agreed that members of their tribe would no longer provide safeguard for travellers and that they themselves would levy taxes on travellers as they apparently had done before the latest expansion of state power.[63] At the same time, the conflict over Tamīmī customary rights to protection dues for date palms owned by inhabitants of Tarīm was far from settled. Following the truce, the townspeople had hired a Qu'aytī garrison as private guards during the harvest season. By 1941, it seems that they felt secure enough to relax their guard. Promptly, the Tamīmīs asked for their customary dues. The townsmen first appealed to the Residency, arguing that the dues had been abolished with the truce. It emerged that the economic side of this matter, which provided the Tamīmīs with vital funds, had not been thought through.[64] Eventually, the idea of compensatory payments was introduced, but the matter does not seem to have been settled as the conflict flared up again in 1944.[65]

The settling of inner tribal conflicts was another bone of contention. In 1938, the Āl Mar'ī b. Ṭālib wrote to Sultan Ja'far al-Kathīrī complaining of the slow and unreliable proceedings of the courts. They therefore suggested regulating their internal matters themselves through a Reform Committee and asked the sultan's sanction. His advisers reported that the Āl Tamīm had already presented a similar

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[61] Hartley, The Political Organization, p. 27.
[62] IO, R/20/C/1669, O.C.H.B.L. (Officer in Command, Hadhrami Beduin Legion), Tarim, to Seyyid Bubakr bin Sheikh al Kaf, Seyun, 22.2.1941.
[63] IO, R/20/C/1669, O.C.H.B.L. to F.A.R.A., Seiyun, 10.2.1941.
[64] For a summary of the case see IO, R/20/1699, Office Note at Seyun, 23.6.1941.
[65] IO, R/20/C/1669, Tarīmī notables to the Governor, Aden, 19.6.1944.

request to the Resident Adviser. This earlier case had ended with the suggested modification to the internal statutes of the tribe (the document uses the term *qānūn*). Since the state felt that this matter might infringe on its powers and feared that the issue of taxation might be involved (which it considered its prerogative) it eventually rejected the request.[66]

However, there were also instances when outside intervention was welcomed by tribes. Hartley describes how the bitter conflict between two main sections of the Nahd only ended with Ingrams' peace. The conflict, he argues,

> could be contained only by the intervention of outside authority. The newly established peace was backed by the civil authorities, both British and Qu'aiti. Ingrams was able to end hostilities in the Wadi al-Kasr, as elsewhere, because the tribesmen wanted peace and because the British authorities clearly had the power to effect settlement by force if necessary.[67]

By the 1950s, at least two large tribal confederations, the Āl Dhī Saybān and the Āl Dhiyeb (?) Sa'd had begun to split into smaller units, each of which was seeking direct relations with the government. This shows vividly how the sultans and, ultimately, the British were becoming the centre of political and military gravity.[68]

Obviously, the British "power to effect settlement" affected not only the tribes. It deprived traditional mediators of their role. Hence, it is not surprising that some *sayyid*s, notably *manṣab*s, felt threatened by the British intervention. Commenting on the violent submission of the Ḥamūmīs after their raids in 1938 described above, a British Air Officer remarked that their peaceful submission had been possibly prevented not only by rivalries between different *sayyid*s but, more importantly, by

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[66] SMA III;839, 'Arīḍat min Āl Mar'ī b. Ṭālib, Jafal, to Sultan Ja'far, 7. Shawwāl 1357/30.11.1938; 843, copy of the reply by the Āl Kathīr, 844, Muḥammad b. Hāshim & 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Shaykh al-Kāf to Sultan Ja'far, 11. Shawwāl 1357/4.12.1938.

[67] Hartley, The Political Organization, pp. 191f., this interpretation is confirmed by a letter from Ombarek bin Muhammad Al Hakm bin 'Ajaj, Paramount Chief of the Nahd tribe to 1st Political Officer, 6.2.1937, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College Oxford, Ingrams' Papers, Box V/1. The same box also contains comparable letters from a Tamīmī *muqaddam*, and others in English translation.

[68] IO, R/20/G/190, I. E. Snell, Political Officer, Brief Notes on the History of the Tribes Now Residing in the Eastern Aden Protectorate [. . .], 1.10.1952 (corrected to 1st July, 1955), pp. 10, 13.

The fact that the seyeds have always made a very good thing out of being the only link between the towns and the badu and they now fear that if Govt can force the tribes into direct submission and negotiation they will lose their influence and a substantial income.[69]

In 1945, a conflict over who exercised authority over al-Būr erupted which shows yet another facet of *sayyid* concern. The Say'ūn government complained to the Resident Adviser that the population of al-Būr caused trouble, while Sayyid ʿAbd al-Qādir al-ʿAydarūs complained of the mingling of the state in local affairs.[70] Thirteen *sayyids* supported al-ʿAydarūs, arguing that they recognised the Kathīrī ruler of Tarīm and respected the *sharīʿa*, but that the Kathīrīs had no rights over their *ḥawṭa*. Instead, they recognised the supreme authority of Britain.[71] Meanwhile, the sultan could present a letter from 1937 or 1938 from members of the Āl Bā Juray which explicitly recognised his authority, entrusted him with the implementation of the *sharīʿa* and delegated the protection of the unarmed citizens of al-Būr (including the *sayyids*) to him.[72] The Kathīrī State Secretary told the Resident Adviser that the *sayyids* were mainly attempting to evade taxation, a view which was accepted by the Resident Adviser after much further toing and froing.[73] He wrote to the *manṣabs* of five villages, explaining that the government had to "administer all parts of the State with integrity and without bias, and that the laws and enactments which are promulgated must be adhered to by all members and classes within the State", while taxation, a necessary state requirement, "must be paid by all classes without regard to social or other positions". Even if he claimed that the state did not intend to "interfere with your honour and known beneficial works", this was, of course, how it felt for the *manṣabs*.[74] The dispute which

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[69] IO, R/20/C/1669, Flight Lieutenant Air "I", Hamumi Operations: Situation 16.2.1938, p. 2.

[70] IO, R/20/C/1475, Kathīrī State Secretary, Seyun to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 19.4.1945; Sayyid ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAlī al-ʿAydarūs to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 17.5.1945.

[71] IO, R/20/C/1475, Letter by 13 *sayyids* to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 17.5.1945.

[72] IO, R/20/C/1475, Letter by members of the Āl Bā Juray to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr b. Ghālib, Shawwāl 1356/Dec. 1937.

[73] IO, R/20/C/1475, State Secretary, Seyun to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 19.6.1945; Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 15.12.1946 and Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Mansabs of Bor, Tarba, Hazm, Raydha and Thibi, 13.2.1946.

[74] IO, R/20/C/1475, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Mansabs of Bor, Tarba, Hazm, Raydha and Thibi, 13.2.1946.

concerned not only the payment of taxes by *sayyid*s but also their customary rights to payments in cash and kind continued for some time. The British felt that a point of principle had to be made "because it is a critical issue between the Old and the New Orders in Hadhramaut".[75] In the end, the new order was victorious, albeit ostensibly under the cover of the *sharī'a*. In one case, the Kathīrī sultan agreed with the *manṣab* of al-Būr that the state was allowed to tax certain palm plantations. When a conflict erupted over the matter, the Resident Adviser could report to Aden that this was subject to Kathīrī law, i.e., the *sharī'a*, and therefore not the business of the British.[76] However, a letter from the Resident Adviser to the sultan clearly strengthened the latter's position by assuring him that it was unacceptable for *sayyid*s to claim tax exemptions.[77]

It is significant to note that Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf sided with the *sayyid*s on this occasion which did not endear him to the British.[78] This was one of a number of issues where this champion of Hadhrami reform felt that the British were overstepping the acceptable boundaries. This incident shows clearly how matters which were subject to protracted local negotiation and conflict in earlier times, were now resolved by the British, who had already proven their capacity to implement settlements by force if necessary. The controversy also shows, however, that for the quintessential *sayyid*-reformer change needed to preserve certain *sayyid* privileges. For all of Sayyid Abū Bakr's efforts at state-building, he confronted the same dilemma as some of the 19th century reformers discussed earlier, namely how to modernise without threatening *sayyid* supremacy.

Since structural changes were clearly and irrevocably under way, many *sayyid*s decided to join the process, trying to direct it as far as possible. Bujra has shown how the *sayyid*s attempted to retain their hold on power in al-Ḥurayḍa through the monopolisation of new institutions such as the Village Council. Nevertheless, while his presentation of the *sayyid*s as general advocates of the status quo might have applied

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[75] IO, R/20/C/1475, Acting Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to the Government, Aden, 7.9.1946, p. 2.

[76] IO, R/20/C/1475, British Agent, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 23.12.1948.

[77] SMA, II;385, Resident Adviser to Sultan Ja'far al-Kathīrī, 15.5.1947.

[78] IO, R/20/C/1475, Acting Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to the Government, Aden, 7.9.1946, p. 2; for this and the following, see Lekon, The British, pp. 298–300.

to al-Ḥurayḍa, it should not be generalised. Their higher-than-average education allowed them to play a leading role in state institutions for a long time and prompted a number of them to become active proponents of radical change, as will be seen in the next chapter.[79]

These changes to the status of both tribes and *sayyid*s can be summarised as follows:

> [. . .] the British had engaged in a programme of massive social deconstruction. [. . .] Even more marked was the outcome of this policy in the Eastern Protectorate, where Ingrams was so successful in promoting peace treaties and centralizing authority that in 1953 Sayyid Abu Bakr al-Kaff said of the newly gunless Hadrami tribes, 'They are dead'. At the same time the *sayyids*, the traditional mediating class, were denied the role on which much of their standing in society depended. Some of them became characters in search of parts.[80]

Finally, it needs to be noted that although urban dwellers usually celebrated improved security, this does not mean that they lightly accepted state interference in their own affairs. One controversial issue was the official abolition of the urban quarters which, as mentioned in chapter I, fulfilled certain functions in the internal organisation of the *ḥaḍar* population and which were criticised by reformers as oppressive (see chapter VI). Certain restrictions on movement in the cities usually resulting from rivalries between quarters and linked to ceremonial occasions such as marriages and deaths were abolished in 1945. This does not seem to have changed much on the ground and after clashes in al-Shiḥr, where the quarter organisation had been particularly strong, *al-Ṭalīʿa* demanded a confirmation of the older decision in 1961 and commented:

> It is necessary that the masses understand that the land is the land of the state, and that nobody, regardless of their social position, can rule in the land and define borders of different quarters.[81]

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[79] Bujra, "Political Conflict" II, pp. 7–13; Serjeant, "Social Stratification", pp. 134f. For Bujra's presentation of the *sayyid*s as defenders of the status quo, see his "Political Conflict" I, p. 355.

[80] Mackintosh-Smith, *Travels*, p. 164.

[81] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 106, 6.7.1961.

State Administration and the Budget

On Ingrams' agenda, the building of state administrations was second only to military reform and the establishment of control over Hadhramaut.[82] This applied in particular to the Quʿayṭī sultanate where Sultan Ṣāliḥ was prepared for wide-ranging changes in order to speed up modernisation. The establishment of new structures in the Kathīrī sultanate never measured up to developments on the coast. This might be attributable to the smaller scale of this sultanate, the lesser level of institutionalisation, possibly a lesser degree of cooperation between Adviser and sultan, as well as the greater role of local notables who were reluctant to see their influence diminished. In addition, the Kathīrī sultanate remained de facto divided between the branch ruling Tarīm and the predominant one in Sayʾūn. According to Doreen Ingrams, this state of affairs ended only with an agreement in January 1945 which unified control over the two cities.[83]

The Quʿayṭī reorganisation in 1939–40 formalised the earlier system in which a *wazīr*, a treasurer, Yāfiʿī commanders and various notables, schoolmasters and a doctor advised the sultan. The new system created different departments such as the treasury, military, health and education, customs, public works, Beduin affairs and a State Council as an advisory body. More important than most of these institutions was the dominant role of the Resident. The provincial administration was extended by dividing the former provinces into districts. The *nāʾib*s and *qāʾim*s of provinces and districts were advised to tour their realms regularly and to carry out thorough planning of changes and inspections of implementation.[84]

In some towns, special councils existed. By 1950, town and village councils were officially instituted in both sultanates. They were responsible for local legislation, the maintenance of law and order, irrigation channels and dams and for public health and cleanliness.[85] These

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[82] For a survey of the administrative reforms, see Liebesny, "Administration".

[83] IO, R/20/C/1493, Agreement of Tarim Sultans, 4. Muḥarram 1364/21.12.1944; D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, p. 28. I have not seen the agreement to which she refers, and the one concluded in December 1944 explicitly recognises the continued bipolarity of power, fn. 83.

[84] PRO, CO 1015/1211, Government Administrative Order no. 12, Instructions to Naibs & Qaims.

[85] IO, R/20/B/2001, Kathiri State, Decree to establish and appoint Villlage and Town Councils, No. 1 1369 (8.4.1950); Yousif, British Policy, p. 237. A law specifying

councils mostly turned into assemblies of local notables. Occasionally, it seems that the councils caused tensions between the notables and local state representatives, who were supposed to control them. Overall, however, they were a means of increasing participation in government.[86]

The Resident Adviser, who defined the task of the Residency as "advice, instruction and inspection",[87] had his own staff of eight European assistants. These were experts in matters such as military training, finance and accountancy. Thus, the Residency almost resembled a second tier of government with both the ability to impress certain measures on the sultans and to follow up Hadhrami initiatives. This system was modelled on the one employed by the British in the unfederated Malay states.[88] While the Colonial Office felt that Ingrams was pushing matters too much,[89] he was at pains to stress that the initiative came from the Hadhrami people and rulers.[90] In his later reflections on the events, he further commented on the impatience of his European staff which prompted him to reduce their number to two and employ Arabs and Indians in 1942. Reasoning about his own role some thirty years after the events, he admitted that he had taken many initiatives and pushed them through. With the benefit of hindsight, he reasoned:

> However much one may try it is probably impossible for any European to think entirely like an Arab and in one way or another Western upbringing causes breaks with the best Arab traditions.[91]

The documents left by Ingrams show him in a less reflective mood. It might well be that he took more pains to explain his measures to the Hadhramis than did his colleagues, but he certainly involved himself

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the courts run by local councils was passed by the Kathīrīs in 1952, for a reproduction of the original text and a translation into English, see Maktari, "Notes".

[86] al-Akhbār, 31.5.1954, p. 2; Bujra, The Politics, pp. 139–145; PRO, CO 1015/1211, Government Administrative Order no. 12, Instructions to Naibs & Qaims.

[87] H. Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, introduction to 3rd ed., p. 33.

[88] For a detailed comparison of the two systems and his conclusions from the visit see H. Ingrams, Report on a Tour, pp. 25–103; for brief accounts of the changes Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, introduction to 3rd ed., pp. 31–34; Yousif, British Policy, p. 112; Lekon, The British, pp. 105–107; Bā Maḥsūn, al-Taṭawwur, pp. 134–139.

[89] PRO, CO 725/52/2, Office Note by Glowell (?), 8.11.1937, in reaction to a demand from Aden for detailed instruction regarding legal advice for the sultan.

[90] PRO, CO 725/52/7, Copy of a Confidential Memorandum from the Resident Adviser Mukalla to the Political Secretary Aden, 17.11.1937, encl. in Acting Governor to Colonial Secretary, 3.12.1937.

[91] H. Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, introduction to 3rd ed., p. 34.

in the affairs of Hadhramaut in great detail.[92] He did not lose sight of bigger issues, either. Less than a month after his appointment, he wrote to Aden requesting copies of legislation and Orders in Council. "It will", he argued, "now be necessary for me to advise H.H. to enact laws, for the Qu'aiti state has as yet no laws at all beyond the Sharia and other matters are simply dealt with by notes on small pieces of paper sent to various departments or to provinces, or even by word of mouth."[93] In April 1938, after consulting both Aden legislation and laws passed in Transjordan and the Malay state of Kedah, Ingrams wrote the following letter to Sultan Ṣāliḥ:

> Dear Sultan Salih,
> I am enclosing herewith copies in Arabic and English of five laws which I advise you to enact. I do not think it is necessary to explain them further to you as they are self explanatory and you will see from the attached submission that of the Arabic originals one should be kept in the Palace from which copies can be made and sent to the authorities concerned and the English versions will be sent to Government so that they know what the law of the State is.
>   Would you please be so good as to sign them where marked with a cross in pencil and return them to Mr. Figgis here to do what is necessary.
>
> Yours sincerely . . .[94]

Unfortunately, the contents of these first laws proposed by Ingrams is not clear, except that he introduced regulations regarding court fees. What becomes clear, however, is his general role as a very proactive Resident.

By 1943, seven new decrees had been implemented which dealt with administrative reorganisation (army, customs, courts, state council, control of commodities, and standard weights and measures) as well as "Trading with Enemy". Further initiatives were under way.[95] Ten years later, some 37 laws were in force, dealing with issues from regulations of public markets and slaughter houses to the destruction

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[92] Particularly instructive is the table of contents of IO, R/20/B/847 which lists issues ranging from prison construction in Say'ūn to murder cases in which the Resident Adviser took interest and action.

[93] IO, R/20/C/1290, Memorandum starting "It will now be necessary", 2/9 [1937].

[94] IO, R/20/C/1290, Resident Adviser to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, 12.4.1938. The file contains his letters requesting foreign legislation.

[95] IO, R/20/B/2001, Resident, Mukalla to Chief Secretray, Aden, 15.4.1943.

of records.[96] The idea of a constitution for Hadhramaut, briefly con-
templated by Ingrams, was dropped after he learnt about the absence
of a constitution in Transjordan, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain.[97]

It is generally difficult to evaluate how legislative measures were
regarded, and highly likely that only a small circle of educated peo-
ple took note of them. However, a rare document of March 1950
shows that there were at least some people in al-Mukallā who felt
that legislation initiated by the Residency, discussed by an appointed
State Council and finally decreed by the sultan was somewhat out
of step with developments elsewhere. Sultan Ṣāliḥ received a peti-
tion complaining that it was now "customary in all countries of the
world, among them Aden, which was close to us, that new laws were
not enforced unless they were first published to the general public"
and after experts had been consulted. The petitioners demanded the
creation of a legislative council (*majlis tashrīʿī*) for which serious plans
were only made some fifteen years later.[98] It is possible that this peti-
tion was triggered by the codification of the penal code in that year.
With the growth of a bolder nationalist movement in the interior,
similar voices appeared there by 1960.[99]

While this document confirms a certain public unease, the matter
of budget control affected the sultan directly. While Sultan ʿUmar had
opposed the Singapore resolutions because he would have been
obliged to render control of the budget to the "Patriotic Association",
the British sources contain no evidence that the wider-reaching
financial changes instituted by Ingrams met with similar opposition
from Sultan Ṣāliḥ. The British had long complained that the private
sultanic and the public state incomes and expenditures were not sep-
arated and that money was siphoned off to India or for personal
needs.[100] "In reality", Ingrams reported in October 1937, "the State
has been run as a sort of business concern on Arab lines, with all

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[96] IO, R/20/B/2003, Resident, Mukalla to British Agent, Western Aden Pro-
tectorate, 6.3.1953.

[97] IO, R/20/B/847, correspondence between the Acting Resident Adviser and
the British representatives in Amman, Bahrain, Muscat and Kuwait, August 1939.

[98] IO, R/20/C/1325, Petition by 45 citizens of al-Mukallā to Sultan Ṣāliḥ b.
Ghālib, 13.3.1950/24 Jumādā 'l-ūlā (in Arabic).

[99] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 57, 14.7.1960, p. 1.

[100] For example PRO, CO 725/51/4, Hadhramaut Political Intelligence Summary
for week ending 26.6.1937, reporting that Sultan Salih had taken 205,000 rupees
from the treasury for personal needs among which, incidentally, the state visit to
Britain on the occasion of the coronation is listed! Cf. chapter III.

the profit taken by the ruler".[101] Ingrams felt that a reorganisation was required, although he accepted that the ideal solution (from a colonial point of view) of one budget for the whole of Hadhramaut was politically not feasible.[102]

Ingrams quickly went to work. In late September, he proposed to the sultan that he would receive a monthly salary of 10,000 rupees with an additional 1,000 rupees for his son. The remaining revenue was to go to the treasury. The sultan agreed.[103] A month later, Ingrams forwarded new "Financial Regulations for H.H. The Sultan's Service" to Aden.[104] These specified that the Resident Adviser also acted as Chief Financial Adviser whose guidance had to be followed by the Treasury. The Resident Adviser would prepare a budget proposal (known as "annual estimates") to be submitted to the sultan for approval. While public money was to be spent through the Treasury, it was subject to supervision by the Adviser or his staff. As far as loans were concerned, expenditures had to be approved by the sultan in accordance with the views of the Adviser.

At present, one can only speculate why the sultan who had not been terribly keen on a Resident Adviser in the first place, effectively agreed to become a salaried Head of State. It is conceivable that his apparent lack of resistance had to do with the fact that the bulk of his income came from Hyderabad, and that this was not touched. Indeed, one could even speculate that he was glad that he no longer needed to subsidise Hadhramaut and quite happily delegated that responsibility to the British.[105]

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[101] PRO, CO 725/52/10, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Political Secretary, Aden, 5.10.1937, encl. in Political Secretary, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 25.10.1937, cf. above, chapter III. This view was typical of the British approach, for a similar evaluation in the Western Protectorate, see Trevaskis, *Shades*, pp. 26f.

[102] IO, R/20/A/3916, Ingrams, 1st Pol. Officer to Pol. Secretary, Aden, 15.7.1937.

[103] PRO, CO 725/52/10, Ingrams to Sultan Salih b. Ghālib, 28.9.1937. A further provision dealt with payments to the sultan's disenfranchised nephew. The file contains a draft letter by the sultan (unsigned and undated) giving Ingrams power of attorney for the reorganisation of the sultante's finances and advising all departments "to obey his orders".

[104] PRO, CO 725/52/10, Government of Mukalla, Financial Regulations for H.H. The Sultan's Service", encl. in Acting Governor to Colonial Secretary, 25.10.1937.

[105] In his general declaration after the signing of the advisory treaty, he had argued that a major reason for his acceptance of British aid in the "development and amelioration of my kingdom" had been the limitation of his finances. IO, R/20/C/1270, Sultan Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib, Ishār ʿāmm li-l-shaʿb, 22.10.1937.

During Sultan ʿAwaḍ b. Ṣāliḥ's time, the new sultan's authority was limited even further "in view of the present Sultan's state of health and education".[106] A "Sultan's Council" was formed, consisting of the Financial Secretary, the Director of Education, the Officer commanding the Sultan's Armed Forces, the Chief of Customs and the Chief *qāḍī*. Practically everything was now decided by the Resident Adviser and this council while the Sultan was reduced to the role of signatory of new decrees and laws.[107]

Judicial Reform[108]

Changes to the judicial system were another field of contestation. As discussed in chapter III, legal reform had been on the agenda since the reign of Sultan ʿUmar. Sultan Ṣāliḥ who, as has been noted above, was himself a legal scholar, also had great interest in the issue. This is exemplified in an exchange of letters between the sultan and Ingrams in which the sultan asked whether a qualified *sharʿī* judge knowledgeable in civil law could be found in the Sudan or Egypt as he envisaged a court system comparable to that of Egypt. Some months later, Ingrams replied that he had tried in vein to find a suitable chief judge in Egypt, the Sudan and Tanganyika. He continued his search in Tanganyika and Kenya, and eventually an Indian judge was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1946.[109] He left four years later in the face of opposition from local *ʿulamāʾ* "who resented any limitation of their own jurisdiction or the bare suggestion that there were any cases 'not decided by the Sharīʿa'".[110]

A thorough reform of the judicial system was undertaken. The

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[106] IO, R/20/B/2469, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 10.4.1957.

[107] IO, R/20/C/1770, The Memorandum, Referred to in the letter from His Highness . . . to the Resident Adviser . . . 1957. This was approved by the Acting Chief Secretary to the Government, Aden in a letter to the Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 3.9.1957, IO, R/20/B/2469.

[108] For a survey of this topic, see Anderson, *Islamic Law*, pp. 11–27. The judicial system is also reviewed in Bā Ḥuwayrith, "Lamḥa".

[109] IO, R/20/C/1324, Sultan Salih to Resident Adviser, 3.12.1938 and Resident Adviser to Sultan Salih, 2.4.1939.

[110] Anderson, *Islamic Law*, p. 15; MM 175, E. H. Boustead, Memorandum on Administrative and Agricultural Development in the Eastern Aden Protectorate (From April 1950 to March 1951), p. 26.

preceding exchange of letters suggests close cooperation between the sultan and Ingrams in this matter.[111] On the lowest level and for small offences, customary law was applied by tribes and shaykhs in urban quarters. Smaller penal offences were brought to the state's local or district representatives who later ruled in conjunction with locally appointed courts. All major civil cases as well as appeals for cases from outside al-Mukallā were brought to the *maḥākim al-quḍā* (courts of law). The final court of appeal, *al-maḥkama al-ʿulyā*, comprised both a *ḥākim* ("secular judge") for non-*sharʿī* and two judges for all other cases. Finally, a commercial court was instituted which comprised a judge and two merchants.[112]

In al-Mukallā, *al-majlis al-aʿlā li-l-qaḍāʾ al-sharʿī* (Supreme Council for *sharʿī* Jurisprudence) was formed which had to sanction local legislative initiatives before they were presented to the State Council. While this might be viewed as offering a degree of consultation, the standardisation inherent in the creation of such a clear-cut hierarchy prompted criticism from independent-minded *ʿulamāʾ* such as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh.[113] It was possibly this Council which the British described (in apparent agreement with Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān) as "something between those of a vigilance committee and the inquisition".[114] This seems to reflect certain fears of the *ʿulamāʾ* about slackening morals. They also became concerned that the non-Muslim foreign representative might interfere in their own field. This was not entirely unfounded. In July 1937, i.e., even before the advisory treaty was signed, Ingrams seems to have adjudicated in the case of an Indian woman who had been beaten by her husband. He argued that, "It will be observed that I made no claim to any British jurisdiction, but took my authority as coming from the state" and noted further, "(a) that the state authorities would have no objection to the exercise of British jurisdiction (b) that the exercise of such jurisdiction is welcomed by the British Indian community."[115] He argued

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[111] According to Sayyid ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, the initiative for the reform came from the sultan. Personal communication, 13.10.1996.

[112] Bā Maḥsūn, al-Taṭawwur, pp. 141–147.

[113] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Idām al-Qūt, p. 41. He argued that the council could easily become a source of tyranny.

[114] IO, R/20/C/1357, untitled [important events in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, 1947], p. 3.

[115] IO, R/20/B/847, 1st political Officer, Mukalla to Political Secretary, Aden, 17.7.1937; Bā Ḥuwayrith, "Lamḥa", pp. 97f.

that he had followed a request from the Qu'ayṭī authorities, possibly because they assumed that he was knowledgeable in English law which the Indian community wanted to see applied.[116]

However, the tolerance of British jurisdiction might have been somewhat more limited than Ingrams suggested. If we are to believe 'Abdallāh al-Ḥaddād who joined the judiciary in 1946, the *'ulamā'* were unhappy about British influence on the judiciary.[117] Al-Ḥaddād illustrated this point with an anecdote: when he was a judge amongst the Ṣay'ar, the new Resident Adviser Boustead and political officer A. J. McIntosh came to visit. Boustead proclaimed that he had come to control al-Ḥaddād, which the latter rejected by arguing that all matters pertaining to religion had been excluded from the Resident's advice. According to al-Ḥaddād, Boustead became annoyed, while the political officer had to agree with the Hadhrami judge.

In 1940, the *sharī'a* was officially proclaimed the law of the land which it had, of course, been all along. The difference was that it now became codified in many areas after being scrutinised by a "Board of Ulema in Mukalla", possibly the above-mentioned "Supreme Council for *shar'ī* Jurisprudence".[118] In 1950 a Penal Code was introduced which at least partially replaced the former case law. This codification, which seems to have been initiated by Sultan Ṣāliḥ, had the important effect of limiting British legislative initiatives and of turning most jurisprudence into an area where British intervention was difficult to justify as it concerned religion. According to al-Ḥaddād, this was exactly what the lawyers intended.[119] From the perspective of legal implementation, it is interesting to note that the new code was apparently explained to *nā'ib*s and *qā'im*s, i.e., lower members of the judiciary and executive, but not made available to local barristers before it was enacted.[120]

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[116] PRO, CO 725/51/4, Hadhramaut Political Intelligence Summary for week ending 3.7.1937.

[117] If not indicated otherwise, the following is based on an interview with Sayyid 'Abdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, 13.10.1996.

[118] MM, 175, E. H. Boustead, Memorandum on Administrative and Agricultural Development in the Eastern Aden Protectorate (From April 1950 to March 1951), p. 26.

[119] Personal communication, Sayyid 'Abdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, 13.10.1996.

[120] IO, R/20/C/1325, Muhammad Ahmed Barakat, Ahmed Umar Ba Faqih and other local barristers to State Secretary, Mukalla, 16.3.1950. The signatories are partially identical with those of the letter demanding a legislative council.

However, the legislation had another important aspect which pleased Muslim reformers as well as the British: it limited the application of customary law (ʿurf) by the district and provincial governors and thus unified the law.[121] From a Muslim reformist point of view, this was another step towards "proper" Islamic rule amongst the tribesmen. They had always felt the need to impart 'proper' religious knowledge on the tribesmen and Beduin: one may remember the case of Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ as well as the intentions and activities of many of the reform societies discussed earlier.[122] From a statist point of view, the law marked further centralisation in a court system which was organised hierarchically and increasingly subject to central inspection. Finally, the legal system was a useful tool of government not only from the sultan's point of view, but also that of the British. Although it might have limited British influence to some degree, it was regarded as "'tidier' than the vagaries of local custom from the administrative point of view" and as providing "better political propaganda".[123] Obviously, such codification provided (in theory) for the application of similar standards throughout the Quʿayṭī state, although legal practice did not change immediately. Instead, the codification should be understood as setting a drawn-out process of change in motion. More often than not, the initial point of reference in conflicts remained the local manṣab, tribal leader or quarter headman. Although from 1940 onwards, they were advised to apply the sharīʿa in theory, many matters were probably still settled more or less informally according to time-honoured practices.[124]

Although codification enforced the role of the sharīʿa, this did not mean that it was necessarily conservative. In 1942, Sultan Ṣāliḥ passed a decree in which he specified in almost one hundred matters how Islamic law should be applied.[125] In many of these questions,

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[121] IO, R/20/G/10, Report on the Eastern Aden Protectorate for the Years 1958–1962, p. 59.

[122] See above, chapter II.

[123] Anderson, *Islamic Law*, p. 12.

[124] On those courts see IO, R/20/C/1314, A Decree to provide for the Constitution of Tribal Courts, 14 Ṣafar 1358/25.3.1940.

[125] Sayyid Muḥammad al-Shāṭirī, Jeddah, 29.3. and Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 4.4.2000 claim that this referred to 99 distinct matters; Anderson, *Islamic Law*, pp. 16f., names one decree of 92 articles and another of 4 articles passed a few years later. It could be that al-Shāṭirī and al-Nākhibī, both lawyers, added the number of the issues dealt with in these two decress and perhaps another one passed after Anderson's fieldwork was completed in 1951.

the sultan's decree deviated from hitherto leading Shāfiʿī interpretations. Instead, he drew on the rulings of different legal schools, a method which he defended theoretically in his work on *fiqh*. On occasion, he preferred Ḥanafī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī rulings to those by Shāfiʿī scholars.[126] In some cases, he applied the principle of *al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala* which allowed the deviation from *sharʿī* prescriptions for the good of the community. Such community welfare, the sultan argued, had required that the *ḥadd* punishment for thieves, namely the severing of their hand, was suspended during the famine of 1943–45.[127] These two methodological choices became crucial elements in a new interpretation of the *sharīʿa* which was based on *ijtihād*.[128] According to al-Ḥaddād, it was due to the sultan's initiative that these principles became dominant in the Quʿayṭī sultanate. They clearly encouraged other scholars to voice their views on legal reform. Therefore, ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād convinced the members of the "Supreme Council for Jurisprudence" to legalise *khulʿ*, a divorce initiated by women in which they renunciated their *mahr* in exchange for a divorce.[129] This measure was rejected by the four legal schools but favoured by certain jurists. The aim was to enable tribal women in particular, who were often married against their will, to divorce and then marry the person they loved.[130] The initiative was stopped by the State Council.[131] This case is not only an interesting example of a local legislative initiative, it also shows the process of developing Islamic law in a codified form.

The sultan's legal interpretations were not uncontroversial. Some *ʿulamāʾ* criticised the Penal Code because "it represents another example of what they term '*talfīq*,' or the combination in a single whole of precepts drawn from a number of different schools and jurists."[132] Nevertheless by 1951, Anderson reported that the system whereby the sultan chose which "view of any recognised Imām in any mat-

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[126] See above, chapter VII. For examples, see Anderson, *Islamic Law*, pp. 16f.

[127] Ṣāliḥ al-Quʿayṭī, *Maṣādir*, vol. I, pp. 21f.

[128] Ṣāliḥ al-Quʿayṭī, *Maṣādir*, vol. I, 3–23.

[129] J. Schacht, "Ṭalāḵ", *EI* (CDRom).

[130] It is doubtful whether urban women or those of *sayyid* origin were more consulted over their marriage partners than Beduins. However, the likelihood of Beduin girls meeting men, and thus actively seeking a particular marriage partner, was probably higher than for urban women who had to observe strong purdah. For a literary portrayal of these issues, see ʿAlī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr, *Humam*, p. 21.

[131] Personal communication, Sayyid ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, 13.10.1996.

[132] Anderson, *Islamic Law*, p. 18.

ter of controversy" ought to be applied was widely used and "found general acceptance among local jurists."[133] The British did much to encourage what they considered to be progressive Islamic legislation. Future judges were recruited from among the best students of the *ribāṭ* of Tarīm and then sent on a course of six to twelve months. Those who seemed capable of rising to the post of chief *qāḍī*, such as ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbdallāh Bukayr, obtained scholarships to study in the Sudan. The latter was the son of the chief *qāḍī* who later became a judge in his own right. Two publications are typical of the new mood prevailing among these scholars. The first was published in 1954. It aimed at facilitating legal complaints by detailing a number of frequent issues arising in common commercial transactions.[134] The second was an introduction to selected legal issues authored by Bukayr in the mid-1960s.[135] It was presented in a style which aimed at making legal matters intelligible to a wide audience, most notably with regard to the law of contracts. The book had originated from a series of lectures broadcast from Aden.[136] The author was praised as one of the few Hadhramis who combined knowledge of modern legal systems with "a complete commitment to Islamic spirit".[137] The writer of these lines, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf, was himself a politically engaged, British-trained former administrative official and writer. His interest in legal modernisation transpires in every line of the introduction, and he strongly supports the principle of *talfīq*.[138] A report to the United Nations written in the early 1970s acknowledged just how innovative the Hadhrami system of combining the Islamic legal system with new modes of interpretation was.[139]

Both Anderson and al-Ḥaddād agree that the rather dramatic legal changes outlined above applied almost exclusively to the Quʿayṭī sultanate.[140] *ʿUlamāʾ* in the Wadi, most notably in Tarīm, were far more

[133] Anderson, *Islamic Law*, p. 19; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Bukayr, *Madkhal*, pp. 14–16 and personal communication, Sayyid ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā, 16.10.1996.

[134] Bū Namī, *Hādhihi ʾl-risāla tusamā bi-tashīl al-daʿāwā fī rafʿ al-shakāwā*, n.p., 1374/1954.

[135] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Bukayr, *Madkhal ilā ʾl-Masāʾil al-mukhtāra li-maḥākim Ḥaḍramawt*, Cairo, n.d. [the preface is dated May 1964].

[136] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Bukayr, *Madkhal*, p. 11.

[137] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Bukayr, *Madkhal*, introduction by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf, p. 6.

[138] For a survey of Bā Maṭraf's life, see Bā ʿĀmir, "Bā Maṭraf fī suṭūr".

[139] al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, p. 121.

[140] Bā Ḥuwayrith, "Lamḥa", only notes vaguely that some valuable instructions for

conservative, and exceptional scholars such as Ibn ʿUbaydillāh did
not find much support for opinions not based on *taqlīd* (strict adher-
ence to precedence according to one legal school). The jurists of
Tarīm also expressed strong opposition to the Penal Code of al-
Mukallā "on the broad ground that the Sultan of Mukallā had no
right to command his Qāḍīs to forsake the authoritative view of their
school".[141] While Anderson is at pains to refute the jurists' point his-
torically and suspects them, perhaps not without reason, to take this
stance for fear that the principle of *kafāʾa* might be endangered, this
resistance might also be placed in the distinct history of struggle
between Kathīrī sultans and the local *ʿulamāʾ*. The latter had fought
long and hard for the right to advise the sultan on political matters
as well as on all matters pertaining to the *sharīʿa*. The developments
in al-Mukallā meant another significant shift of authority and power
from the learned elite to the sultan. Given the prominent role of
wealthy *sayyid*s-cum-scholars in Tarīm, in contrast to the different
social composition of the coastal towns, it is understandable that they
put up more resistance to suggestions to apply the Quʿaytī model
at home.[142] An additional aspect is, of course, that Sultan Ṣāliḥ was
an exceptionally well-trained sultan who was respected by many
scholars as a fellow *ʿālim* which made the acceptance of his advice
much easier. The Kathīrī sultans who ruled Tarīm and Sayʾūn did
not boast of similar qualifications.

While the reorganisation of the courts and legislation on the coast
thus made quick advances, the practice of the courts took some time
to change. A report on the courts in the eastern province of the
Quʿaytī sultanate, written in 1944, paints a picture of widespread
mismanagement and corruption. The author of the report, the Deputy
Governor of al-Shiḥr, not only suggested imposing the issuing of
receipts for the payment of penalties (in order to control misappro-
priation) but proposed the removal of a particularly corrupt local
commissioner (*qāʾim*).[143] It seems that the installation of a regular sys-

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judges were passed in Sayʾūn (p. 97) and else limits his discussion to the Quʿaytī
sultanate.

[141] Anderson, *Islamic Law*, p. 23.

[142] Significantly, Anderson mentions that in other towns of the interior, the re-
sponse was much more positive, *Islamic Law*, p. 23. Sultan Ṣāliḥ had recommended in
1942 that the principle of *kafāʾa* might be disregarded in specific cases, ibid., p. 16.

[143] MM, Taqrīr ʿan sīr al-ʿamal fī ʾl-maḥākim bi-l-minṭaqa al-sharqiyya li-l-dawla
al-quʿaytiyya, 5.6.1944. Correspondence in R/20/C/1326 corroborates the findings
of the report.

tem of inspection somewhat ameliorated the situation without, how-ever, changing it completely.[144]

It is worthwhile mentioning that the judiciary in the Kathīrī sul-tanate was also changed. In December 1939, a Legal Consultative Board (*al-hay'a al-istishāriyya al-shar'iyya*) consisting of ten members was formed to supervise the work of the judiciary.[145] A few days later, the sultan appointed one of the members of this Board as a judge and, quite in contrast to the developments in the Qu'aytī sultanate, not only determined the legal school but even the author (Aḥmad b. Ḥajar al-Haythamī) by whose precedent his judgements ought to be guided. Another decree stipulated procedures for the registration of cases as well as the salary and working days of the judge.[146]

Education and Health

There can be little doubt that the educational revolution in Hadhra-maut, which had begun in the 1920s and 30s with the private initia-tives discussed in chapter VI, received a major boost after 1936. This view is shared by both British and Hadhrami writers and is perhaps best summarised by Sa'īd 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr who considered 1940 as a watershed and the beginning of the "modern cultural movement". Again, he vests the agency clearly with the Qu'aytī sultan:

> It is possible to say that this cultural movement began after the late Sultan Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib al-Qu'aytī took over the reins of power. In 1940 [sic], his government, through the intermediary of the Resident, had Shaykh al-Qaddāl Sa'īd al-Qaddāl come from Sudan and take over the administration of education in the Qu'aytī sultanate. He was the first inspector of education in the known sense in the history of the Hadhrami governments.[147]

Al-Qaddāl's arrival in Hadhramaut in 1939 was preceded by a visit of V. L. Griffiths, Principal of the Sudanese Teacher's Training

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[144] IO, R/20/G/10, Report on the Eastern Aden Protectorate for the Years 1958–1962, p. 59.

[145] SMA, III;954, Niẓām al-hay'a al-istishāriyya al-shar'iyya, 1. Dhū al-qa'da 1358/13.12.1939.

[146] SMA, III;957 of 21. Dhū al-qa'da 1358/3.1.1940 and III;958, 27. Dhū al-qa'da 1358/4.1.1940.

[147] S. Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr wa-l-thaqāfa*, p. 188; this view is shared by al-Rabākī, *'Arḍ*, p. 9 and Luqman, "Education", p. 260. For Ingrams' view, see his "Education in the Hadhramaut".

College in Bakht al-Ruḍā,[148] who had assessed the educational situation and needs of Hadhramaut. He observed that particularly young men asked (usually in a rather vague way) to have modern subjects such as Geography, History and English introduced into Hadhrami schools. Some more concrete ideas were also voiced:

> One or two thought a more modern education was needed if Hadhramaut Arabs were to continue to compete with the modern education [sic!] Javanese in trade. An occasional one thought the teaching of agriculture might be useful.[149]

The wide-spread support of the notables was particularly encouraging. In Say'ūn, Griffiths was even presented with a written proposal for adult education. He noted that Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf, once again the most vocal reformer, expressed a wide vision which linked education to the development of Hadhramaut: "He believed that the right type of education could be of great benefit to the country in breaking down inter-tribal jealousies and developing spirit of co-operation and public service."[150] Griffiths made detailed suggestions for educational reform in terms of contents as well as organisation and administration. As for staffing, he suggested sending a few Sudanese teachers to Hadhramaut and training Hadhramis in his college.

According to Ingrams, this visit increased the demand for education, possibly because the notables felt that this was their chance to obtain substantive support for what had hitherto been almost entirely a matter of civic engagement. As a result of the report, which has been described as "the cornerstone of the modern educational revival", Ingrams asked for an assistant to help coordinate education. This is how al-Qaddāl (1903–1975), at that time director of a school in Sudan, came to be appointed.[151] First as Educational Assistant to the Resident Adviser, later as Director and Minister of Education, al-Qaddāl began an energetic programme of reorganising the educational system along Sudanese lines. By the time he became Qu'ayṭī Prime Minister in

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[148] This is the way in which the college is consistently spelt by al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, e.g. pp. 53, 68.

[149] IO, R/20/C/210, V. L. Griffiths, Report on Education in the Hadhramaut, July 1938, p. 6.

[150] IO, R/20/C/210, V. L. Griffiths, Report on Education in the Hadhramaut, July 1938, p. 7.

[151] al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, p. 54; IO, R/20/C/210, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Political Secretary, Aden, 27.11.1938; for the correspondence leading to al-Qaddāl's appointment, see IO, R/20/C/211.

1950, education on the coast had changed profoundly. Although appointed in theory to both states as Educational Assistant, it seems that his major impact was on the Qu'ayṭī sultanate.[152]

With the aid of six Sudanese colleagues, some of whom were his relatives, and five Hadhramis, al-Qaddāl organised the opening of new schools, introduced a gradual standardisation of curricula in state schools and extended state control over private schools. His reports bear witness to the initial difficulties. School standards varied greatly, there were insufficient numbers of qualified teachers, and Egyptian and Sudanese textbooks proved unsuitable for instruction in Hadhramaut.[153] Al-Qaddāl does not mention the difficulties encountered by a stranger who quickly introduced a new style of teaching in an environment which had previously resisted even lesser degrees of change. In addition, some of the local pioneers of education might have felt sidelined by the appointment of an outsider. It seems that al-Qaddāl's careful approach and his attempts to adapt as much as possible to local society helped him to overcome opposition and gain acceptance into local society. In addition, his educational qualifications, his Sufi background and his poetic talent eased resistance.[154] By April 1945, there were twenty primary schools, schools training military and administrative personnel and a number of other institutions. The figures for 1950 show a steady growth in the numbers of both schools and pupils. An intermediary school was founded in al-Mukallā by joining the English school with some classes from the sultan's school. In 1944, it was moved to Ghayl Bā Wazīr and became a boarding school which was regarded as something of an elite institution. The school developed into a centre of lively student activity. Many boys joined the scouts' movement, participated in the first theatre plays, etc.[155] These activities were initiated by al-Qaddāl and some local

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[152] For a survey of these activities, see Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 140; D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, pp. 66–69; Luqman, "Education", pp. 260f.; for details see al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 67–84.

[153] IO, R/20/B/2023, Education Assistant Resident Adviser (Qaddal) to Resident Adviser, Mukalla (Ingrams), 1.5.41 and Education Assistant Resident Adviser to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 15.5.42.

[154] For a description of al-Qaddāl's approach to the culture of al-Mukallā, see al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 56–62, his difficulties are mentioned on pp. 73f.; S. Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr*, p. 189; personal communication, Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 1.4.2000.

[155] al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 71f., 74–76; Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 23.12.1992 and 30.12.1992 with a good description of student life; IO, R/20/B/2472, Report on a Visit by Mr. Griffiths and Prof. Serjeant to the EAP, 20.–30.3.1957, p. 32.

teachers, but it is noteworthy that some Hadhramis were already familiar with a similar model, i.e., from the *al-Irshād* schools in the Netherlands East Indies. While a systematic analysis of the body of teachers is beyond the scope of this study, there exists some evidence that young men who had been trained in South East Asia now entered the teaching profession in Hadhramaut.[156]

The opening of a government-controlled religious institute in Ghayl Bā Wazīr proved highly controversial.[157] In the late 1950s, it was given a similar curriculum to the intermediary school, which raised fears of neglect of the central religious subjects. The press questioned whether this was possibly a missionary initiative by the British.[158] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbdallāh Bukayr wrote an angry article in which he argued that the institute had been founded in the name of "modern education" and the teaching of "the right religion". In reality, it not only undermined the older religious institutes but due to its stagnation, it killed the teaching of religion and Arabic language.[159]

A school for Beduin boys was opened, originally for those who had fled from the famine to the cities. It turned into an institution which served to educate the boys and brought them, and eventually their tribes, more closely into the orbit of government. In this regard, its function resembled that of the Beduin Legion. In addition, an adult literacy programme was launched in the coastal towns.[160] By 1950, a total number of twenty-eight students had been sent abroad for further training, most of them to the Sudan, but also a few to Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Among them was Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh, who wrote a touching description of his own journey to and experiences in Sudan and also described how he came to be influenced by the rising anti-imperialist tide there.[161]

At the same time, it seems that the official drive also boosted local educational initiatives. Thus, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī (b. 1323/ 1905–6), director of a school in al-Mukallā, opened the first girls'

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[156] al-Bakrī, *Fī janūb*, p. 59, describes meeting a former pupil of the *al-Irshād* school in Surabaya who had, by 1947, become a teacher in the intermediary school of Ghayl Bā Wazīr.

[157] This is possibly a continuation of the originally private *ribāṭ* by the government.

[158] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 137, 8.2.1962, p. 3,5.

[159] *al-Rāʾid* 75, 9.4.1962, p. 4,8. For a similar reaction to British educational efforts in Malaya, see Roff, *The Origins*, p. 26.

[160] D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, pp. 71f.; Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, pp. 140–143; S. Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr*, pp. 190f.

[161] Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 30.12.1992; 6.1.1993.

school. In a revolutionary move for a man of his position and time, al-Nākhibī taught and recruited his own wife and daughter as the first teachers of the up to ninety girls in the school. He had great trouble obtaining the cooperation of parents but succeeded by running the school primarily as a Koran school. Al-Nākhibī added writing, reading and arithmetic to the curriculum. This school was later integrated into the state system and greatly expanded.[162]

Given the slow start and public opposition, the expansion of girls' education owes much to Shaykh al-Nākhibī's pioneering efforts, as well as to the increasingly public debate about the role of women in society which had started in the 1920s and 30s.[163] Some parents were willing to send their daughters to secondary schools in Aden and even to Iraq for further training. However, by 1964–65, the shortage of female teachers prompted suggestions to open a teachers' training college for girls.[164]

The educational efforts were accompanied by other cultural and educational activities. These were aimed both at teachers, such as the Teachers' Cultural Club founded in 1940, and at the general public. For example, public debates were organised on controversial issues such as the appropriate age for marriage. A convenient venue became the Sultan's Library.[165] It is not unlikely that this example of civic activity, encouraged by the state in contrast to earlier and sometimes clandestine activities in the Wadi, served as a model which spread quickly to small towns. Thus, Saʿīd ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, director of a school in al-Qaṭn since 1939, corresponded with al-Qaddāl about the necessary measures for educational reform.[166] Although Bā Wazīr probably held stronger views on the dangers which European influence could entail than did the Sudanese educator, he seems to have agreed with much of what al-Qaddāl was doing. In particular, he founded a "cultural chamber" (al-ghurfa al-thaqāfiyya) for the teachers to enhance their knowledge and provide a forum for exchange.[167] This appears to be a clear emulation of al-Qaddāl's "Teacher's Club" in al-Mukallā.

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[162] Sulaymān, al-Tarbiya, vol. I, p. 141; D. Ingrams, A Survey, p. 67; al-Akhbār, 20.1.1954, p. 8; personal communication, Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 1.4.2000; on girls' education cf. Aḥmad Bā Wazīr, Ṣafaḥāt majhūla.

[163] See the article on girls' education in al-Akhbār, 20.1.1954, pp. 8–10; cf. chapters V, VI.

[164] al-Rabākī, ʿArḍ, pp. 23f.

[165] al-Qaddāl, al-Shaykh, pp. 77f.

[166] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], p. 53; al-Qaddāl, al-Shaykh, p. 67.

[167] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], pp. 58f.

In 1942, a public reading room was opened as part of the British propaganda effort during the war. It made Adeni and Egyptian newspapers available to the public and seems to have greatly influenced the youth.[168]

From the opening of the intermediary school, its students engaged in student clubs which resembled earlier models. However, the massive growth of education allowed these activities to expand on a scale hitherto unknown. Attempts to coordinate between the clubs quickly ran into difficulties. As early as 1940, students at the intermediary school in al-Mukallā tried to form a Literary Students' Union (*Jam'iyyat Ittiḥād al-Talāmīdh al-Adabiyya*) which was no longer tied to a single school but aimed at students from all schools in the region. Far from being a subversive organisation, the society's secretary was the son of the State Secretary, and his father attended the opening ceremony.[169] A few months after its opening in 1941, the same students' union was forbidden by al-Qaddāl, presumably because of government fears that it might lead to the formation of other organisations such as trade unions.[170] Later, a non-political organisation of students was tolerated.[171] This shows the limitations on civic activities which were imposed by the Qu'ayṭī sultanate. Given the developments in the student milieu which will be discussed in the next chapter, it seems that the authorities had a clear idea of the potential for political mobilisation among the educated youth. In spite such limitations, the memoirs of Muḥammad 'Abd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh show the students organising a multitude of clubs during this period. Many of these clubs issued handwritten journals which were not, however, clear political publications.[172]

These activities during the first decade of concerted government involvement in the Hadhramaut (hampered partly by the disruptions of World War II) seemed a great success by previous Hadhrami standards. From an outside perspective such as that of the *Irshādī* author al-Bakrī who visited Hadhramaut in 1947, matters looked quite different. Al-Bakrī made scathing comments on the state of the schools, both in academic terms and with regard to standards of hygiene.[173] Unsurprisingly, the Ingramses report on the achievements

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[168] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 23.12.1992.
[169] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 23.12.1992.
[170] Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza", pp. 169–171.
[171] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 13.1.1993.
[172] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 23.12.1992; 30.12.1992.
[173] al-Bakrī, *Fī janūb*, pp. 251–262, for his criticism see pp. 250f.

of this educational revolution in a much more positive way, while recognising persistent problems such as insufficient funding.[174]

Until 1967, the expansion of the state sector in education continued almost unabated and slowly began to encompass the Kathīrī sultanate as well. While it had sometimes been problematic to convince parents of the need to educate their children in the new way during the first years, studying became so popular that by 1957 demand for intermediate and secondary education surpassed available places. The question was raised whether the sector should be expanded, but Griffiths, who visited Hadhramaut once again in 1957, warned that the labour market could not absorb the graduates. Expansion, he suggested, was only sensible if this improved the chances of potential emigrants to find jobs abroad.[175] It would certainly seem that educated boys had problems finding adequate jobs. However, it is worthwhile to recall the observation Roff made with regard to the Malay states. He noted that on the one hand the British were interested in providing education for the sons of the elite, not least to employ them in administration; on the other hand, he noticed a certain fear of "the creation of an educated class of malcontents who might challenge colonial authority".[176] Given that these considerations moved the British in Malaya as early as in the first years of the 20th century, and that the decades since had seen the rise of nationalisms almost throughout the British Emire, it does not seem far-fetched to suspect similar British afterthoughts. As will be seen in chapter IX, educating Hadhramis did indeed produce a new generation of anticolonial nationalists.

It has been argued that "The decline of the (native) schools meant the decline of traditions of self-help" in the Gulf.[177] While the expansion of the state sector in Hadhramaut doubtlessly increased public expectations and might have lowered the willingness of individuals to contribute, this needs to be seen as a very gradual process indeed. For a long time governmental and private education existed side by side, and private education continued to dominate in the Wadi. In addition, due to the constraints on public finance, private contributions were used to fund part of the government programme. This

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[174] Ingrams, "Education", p. 151; D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, p. 69.
[175] IO, R/20/B/2472, Report on a Visit by Mr. Griffiths and Prof. Serjeant to the EAP, 20.–30.3.1957, p. 2.
[176] Roff, *The Origins*, p. 25.
[177] Rich, The Rule, p. 184.

was done through a charitable association which was originally founded to alleviate the plight of famine refugees. Although it started through the efforts of individuals, the state became involved and agreed to a regular payment to the charity from customs' revenues. It would therefore seem that the charity became a mixed public-private association with Shaykh al-Qaddāl, one of its initiators, as its first chairman.[178] Its budget for 1953–54 shows that it supported both private and governmental schools, educational missions abroad, medicine and the salary of a doctor in Dawʿan.[179]

Health was another albeit far less intensive area of government activity. As discussed in chapter VI, some private doctors and pharmacists had been employed at various times by the Quʿaytī sultan and the al-Kāf family. The initial plan, namely to commission a study by a medical officer (similar to that of Griffiths in education) was cancelled in early 1939 due to the looming war.[180] Nonetheless, Ingrams decided to ask for a medical assistant in March 1939. His main concern was maternity care and child welfare, as well as the eventual training of doctors for Hadhramaut.[181] Although this does not seem to have been realised, and medical provisions remained erratic at best, eventually a Protectorate Health Service was created in Aden. By 1958, it ran three hospitals and a number of Health Units. Furthermore, the service worked in the fields of combatting malaria and other infectious diseases.[182] From the report of a German doctor working in Shibām, it seems that the offer of health care was readily taken up by most Hadhramis, although issues such as the treatment of women remained highly sensitive.[183]

As in the case of education, public-private cooperation was the key to the expansion of the health service, a testimony to the commitment of the population. It seems that some of the previously private hospitals were incorporated into the public sector. In 1954, a wealthy merchant from Dawʿan, who had been living in Saudi Arabia for a long time, presented the al-Mukallā hospital with a wing to treat tuberculosis.

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[178] al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 78–80.

[179] *al-Akhbār*, 30.9.1953, pp. 6f.

[180] For the plan and its cancellation see the correspondence in PRO, CO 725/60/2.

[181] PRO, CO 725/65/4, Memorandum on Medical Assistant to the Resident Adviser, W. H. Ingrams, 3.3.1939.

[182] Hickinbotham, *Aden*, pp. 155f.

[183] Hoeck, *Doctor*, pp. 148f. According to Hoeck, Shibāmīs had demanded a modern hospital and indicated their willingness to contribute to it. It might be that exposure to Western medicine outside Hadhramaut eased its acceptance.

The al-Kāf family, who seem to have continued their well-equipped Tarīm hospital privately, offered free treatment for all citizens, thereby effectively running a privately financed public service.[184]

Economic Development

As noted earlier, at the onset of his term as Resident Adviser, Ingrams had proposed a wide range of measures for agricultural improvement. This had long been a major concern of Hadhramis both in Hadhramaut and abroad, as has been shown in chapter VI. As the building of institutions had hitherto been the main focus of attention, however, it took the famines to focus British attention on the issue which was now regarded as a priority. There had been warning voices before, both local and British, arguing that agricultural lands should not be built up and scarce labour that was needed in agriculture should not be wasted on building pompous houses.[185]

It seems that the devastating degree of the famine took the British by surprise. A number of factors such as the lack of rain, a particularly high occurrence of parasites, tribal disturbances and reduced international transport capacity had combined to create widespread death and suffering.[186] The local situation was worsened by the simultaneous drought and resultant poor crops in East Africa which prevented quick substitution with imports.[187] In addition, due to the Japanese occupation of South East Asia, remittances had stopped, causing a severe shortage of funds.[188]

The famine caused widespread death and seriously undermined the social fabric of Hadhrami society. Saʿīd ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, then residing in al-Qaṭn, commented:

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[184] PRO, CO 1015/1091, Photocopy of a section of a report on medical and public health (possibly of 1954).

[185] SMA, II;281, Resident Adviser to Sultan Jaʿfar al-Kathīrī, 14.10.1939; Muḥammad b. Hāshim in *al-Ikha* 2;9, April 1940, pp. 1–2. Boustead's assumption that Hadhramaut was self-sufficient in terms of agriculture until the 1920s seems rather optimistic, *Wind*, p. 189.

[186] IO, R/20/B/2033, Proposals for a scheme [. . .], by Allen, Agricultural Officer [Aden], 5.1.1946.

[187] University Library Leiden, Papers of D. van der Meulen, Or 14.391, Box II, "Hunger in the Hadramaut" (undated British report).

[188] van der Meulen, *Don't you hear*, pp. 133–142; *Faces*, pp. 167–187.

We would like to emphasize here that this crisis changed the course of the social life and shook the confidence of the nation in those responsible for them, or rather ended this confidence. The thoughts went in previously unimaginable directions, and it would produce in the future what no-one of the ordinary Hadhramis would have imagined.[189]

Limited by their own far-stretched wartime commitments, the British tried to alleviate suffering as much as they could. It has already been discussed how trucks were imported to distribute grain speedily. Airdrops were used in both famines to alleviate the worst suffering but were simply too limited in capacity for any major relief effort.[190] Although British aid was crucial, local efforts to improve the situation should not be overlooked. Even before the dimensions of the disaster became obvious, notables from the interior, among them members of the al-Kāf, al-Saqqāf and Balfaqīh as well as of the Laʿjam (Shibām) and the Rubayʿa families, decided to found an agricultural company. It apparently aimed at alleviating the crisis by farming new land, but also pursued economic objectives as agriculture was a promising business particularly in times of shortages.[191] This activity could be placed in the wider context of the agricultural concerns of the *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana* around 1940 when it had started an agricultural loan scheme. This aimed at reversing a trend whereby small scale peasants found it easier to emigrate than to work their lands due to the shortage of available loans.[192] By 1941, the association offered interest-free loans to peasants to alleviate food shortages.[193] In spite of such efforts, the efficacy

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[189] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], p. 45. To what extent the dark warning is a hint at the events of the "peasant uprisings" of the early 1970, resulting from a later edition of the memoirs, is not quite clear.

[190] van der Meulen, *Faces in Shem*, pp. 186f. for the first famine; PRO, AIR 23/8462, Secret Report on Grain Dropping Operation in the Hadhramaut, February 3rd to March 3rd 1949. For details of the famine relief, see PRO, CO 725/98/5.

[191] Document in the possession of Sanad Bā Yaʿshūṭ, al-Mukallā, dated 3. Jumādā 'l-ūlā 1361/19.5.1942. The two rationales are stated clearly in the preamble.

[192] 1360/194 is given as date in Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, p. 46. The same letter is contained in the bundle of papers in the possession of Sanad Bā Yaʿshūṭ, al-Mukallā, which is the only one in the collection written on the headed paper of the association. The other pages contain data which apparently refer to money lent and to the budget of the committee dealing with peasant loans. The earliest date found on any of those documents is Shawwāl 1359/November 1940. It is possible that the undated "Qanūn" in SMA IV;15 on agricultural loans provided the legal basis for this loan scheme.

[193] Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, p. 47.

of which failed to impress the British, it appears that much of the land was simply abandoned and/or appropriated by usurers.[194]

After two subsequent famines, the question arose as to how similar catastrophes could be prevented in the long term. During the famines, the necessarily quick and sometimes spontaneous decisions had made regular consultation difficult.[195] It seems that Fletcher, the Acting Resident Adviser in 1949, found an authoritarian approach to be suitable and suggested following it more generally. He proposed a fifteen-year period during which the Resident Adviser was to administer the country directly, streamlining administration, reorganising land tenure and fisheries, and preventing soil erosion.[196] His suggestions caused consternation in Aden and were not pursued any further.[197] Nevertheless, it is clear that famine relief and the subsequent measures to increase agricultural production marked the onset of far greater British involvement in Hadhrami affairs, and made the British presence felt much more outside the cities. In the biography of his father, ʿAbbās b. ʿAqīl reports how a fairly large contingent of British (and British-employed) staff moved to al-Ghuraf (between Tarīm and Sayʾūn) after the famine, causing significant frictions with the local population. Until then, the British had had no permanent base in the interior. Ibn ʿAqīl also relates how the British distributed seeds and demanded that they be planted out of season. The peasants resisted, arguing that the yield would be too insignificant, and when local notables defended them, they were arrested.[198]

After much discussion between British officials in Aden and al-Mukallā, a bundle of measures to increase agricultural production was agreed.[199] Like many of the public service developments, it was

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[194] IO, R/20/B/2033, Proposals for a scheme [. . .], by Allen, Agricultural Officer [Aden], 5.1.1946. For a British view on the local agricultural loan scheme, see the following comment in IO, R/20/B/2034, Note on the Loan Scheme in the Hadramaut, "Those of the rich who interested themselves in farming did so in a dilettante fashion. They cared little for profits or losses and, in too many cases, little for the welfare of their labourers and tennants."

[195] SMA II;387, Resident Adviser to Sultan, n.d. (1949?).

[196] IO, R/20/B/2444, Acting British Agent, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to the Government, Aden, 17.2.1949.

[197] IO, R/20/B/2444, Office Note of 22.2.1949; Lekon, The British, pp. 302f.

[198] ʿAbbās b. Yahyā, "Mutābaʿa", p. 21.

[199] For a survey, see Leidlmeir, Ḥaḍramaut, pp. 33–41; for a rather detailed account, MM 175, E. H. Boustead, Memorandum on Administrative and Agricultural Development in the Eastern Aden Protectorate (From April 1950 to March 1951), pp. 6–12.

financed from both British and local contributions.[200] Dams and
deflector systems were built to make better use of the perennially
flowing water (*ghayl*) and the flash floods (*sayl*). More importantly,
it was decided to implement a major scheme introducing diesel
pumps.[201] While only a few pumps had been used previously, large
numbers were now imported. Through a credit scheme financed by
the two sultanates, the new technology became available to a much
wider range of producers, even if this did nothing to solve the prob-
lem of peasant indebtedness.[202] The scheme was organised locally
through committees which seem to have been composed of local
notables but excluded peasants and agricultural labourers (i.e., those
not owning any land).[203] Initially, a number of problems arose such
as the lack of maintenance, the choice of unsuitable pumps and lack
of experience in digging wells for pumps.[204] Nevertheless, by 1958
the number of pumps had increased from 120 to 1,200, and a change
in cultivation patterns was well under way, oriented towards high
yielding crops which were in need of more water.[205] Some of these
pumps were still in use in 1996.

In order to revitalise agriculture, a law was passed in 1950 which
gave the state priority in renting fallow lands which could then be
let to peasants at favourable conditions.[206] A major difficulty was the
lack of manpower due to widespread death and landflight during
the famines.[207] In January 1950, the Qu'ayṭī State Council appealed
to the people of Shibām and Daw'an to engage in agriculture instead
of emigrating and offered land for rent from the state. It decreed

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[200] A detailed consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this work. For
considerations about how to finance various measures, both in the service sector
and in development, see IO, R/20/C/1947; IO, R/20/B/2740; IO, R/20/B/2742
and PRO, CO 1015/1825.

[201] IO, R/20/B/2033, Governor, Aden to Colonial Office, 27.8.1948.

[202] IO, R/20/C/2018, Information Transmitted to the Secretary General of the
United Nations [. . .] for the year 1957, p. 4.

[203] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, pp. 52f.

[204] The peasants were particularly concerned about maintenance, al-Ṣabbān, *al-
Zaʿīm*, pp. 49–52.

[205] Leidlmeir, *Ḥaḍramaut*, pp. 40f.; Boustead, *Wind*, pp. 190f. Some of the prob-
lems are reflected in SMA II;396, Resident Adviser to pump owners, 1950 (no exact
date given). For a report on the progress of the pump scheme between 1954 and
1957, see R/20/C/2018, Information Transmitted to the Secretary General of the
United Nations [. . .] for the year 1957, pp. 2–12.

[206] Qānūn yanuṣṣ ʿalā tawsīʿ al-arāḍī [. . .], 18.1.1950. This law was made avail-
able to me by Sayyid ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād, al-Mukallā.

[207] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, p. 28.

that all irrigated lands had to be cultivated within six months or else was nationalised and redistributed.[208] In a letter to members of the new pump scheme, the Resident Adviser regretted the lack of labour for the construction of dams and roads (now more necessary than ever to secure the diesel supplies) as well as for cultivation. He pondered whether Hadhramis from Zanzibar could be recruited and suggested that peasants ought to be offered a better deal.[209] Nevertheless, between 1954 and 1957, the population in the Wadi decreased further, indicating that the British measures did not convince peasants that it was worthwhile to stay.[210] From the peasant's point of view, their rather poor situation was exacerbated by new and controversial taxes on dates and other agricultural produce as well as on households.[211] In fact, the protest against the agricultural tax led to the first demonstration of agricultural workers and peasants from the region of Say'ūn in 1944. They eventually managed to negotiate a settlement whereby they only had to pay taxes after the harvest, i.e., when they had some cash at their disposal.[212] Nevertheless, the conflict dragged on because a dispute arose over whether the tree owners or the peasants had to pay the palm tax. In 1946, the peasants organised a strike, refused to water the land, and even managed to involve workers from other trades. According to ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣabbān's account which is very sympathetic to the peasants as its author was himself a participant in the events, this strike was dealt with in a very heavy-handed manner and one of the peasant leaders, Ḥamūd Bā Ḍāwī (1880–1967), was exiled to Ghayl b. Yamīn for three months.[213]

Between 1947 and 1952, it seems that the peasants' movement had such impetus and popular support that Bā Ḍāwī founded an association (*Jamʿiyyat al-Muzāriʿīn*) aimed at improving the economic position of the peasants. It seems to have been a reaction to the non-involvement of peasants in the pump scheme committees. One of the suggestions which was apparently realised was to double the peasants' share of date crops from one quarter to half. Other implemented

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[208] IO, R/20/B/2445, To the People of Shibam [. . .], January 1950.

[209] SMA II;396, Resident Adviser to pump owners, 1950.

[210] IO, R/20/C/2018, Information Transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations [. . .] for the year 1957, p. 1.

[211] SMA II;363; al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, p. 28.

[212] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, pp. 33–39.

[213] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, pp. 43–48. A reference to the strike can be found in R/20/C/1357, Eastern Aden Protectorate, Most Important Events During 1946, p. 2.

measures aimed at improving peasants' agricultural production on their own plots. Because of suspicions that the association was pursuing political aims, it was closed by the government in 1952. According to al-Ṣabbān, this contributed to renewed demands by peasant leaders for political participation.[214]

The next peasants' association was founded in 1959. For the first time, it united peasants and agricultural labourers not only from different quarters of a town, which had been the traditional organisational form, but also from both sultanates.[215] Among their demands and plans were the following: a decrease in the price of diesel fuel, the right to market dates themselves, their representation in the newly created local councils, the opening of night schools to enable peasants' children to study, mediation in agricultural conflicts, and the coordination of demands by labourers and peasants.[216] It seems that the results of their efforts were mixed: apparently, fuel prices were somewhat lowered after they threatened with a strike, and the peasants managed to negotiate a contract by which they supplied the Beduin Legion with dates.[217] By December 1958, Bā Ḍāwī, elected for Sayʾūn, was the first elected peasant representative in any Hadhrami city council.[218] In Tarīm, the head of the peasants' association, Umbārak Sulaymān Bā Muʾmin represented their demands. It is not unlikely that the raising of the date palm tax in Kathīrī territories resulted from the repeated protests of these peasant leaders.[219]

In addition to a number of practical proposals, in 1964 Bā Ḍāwī submitted a proposal for a new agricultural law to regulate the relationships between landowners and peasants and replace individual arrangements.[220] The stipulations of the proposed law, which was

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[214] For al-Ṣabbān's participation in the events, see the interview with him in *Āfāq* 14, November 1989, p. 76–81.

[215] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, pp. 53–56, the importance of overcoming the quarter divisions is borne out by Bā Ḍāwī's speech at the first meeting, quoted in ibid., pp. 59–62, here pp. 60f., cf. pp. 90f. where again quarter boundaries were invoked in an attempt to limit a public occasion by a peasants' school.

[216] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, p. 63.

[217] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, for the struggle about the diesel price, see pp. 63–74, for the marketing of dates pp. 74f. For the threat of a strike over fuel prices, cf. *al-Ṭalīʿa* 82, 5.1.1961, p. 5.

[218] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, p. 76.

[219] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 108, 20.7.1961, p. 4.

[220] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, pp. 78–83, the proposed law, which al-Ṣabbān reproduces, is also preserved in SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-ṭullābiyya, Proposal by the peasants for an agricultural law, 1964. For

never passed, differed in some significant aspects from the customary arrangements of *mukhābara* (sharecropping) and *mukhālaʿa* (co-financing) contracts. The major advantage would have been the compulsory registration of such contracts and their five year duration. This was to replace the earlier two-year period and encourage investment in the context of the widespread (and expensive) introduction of pumps for irrigation. The law would have greatly increased the security of the peasants as the contracts had to be respected by new landowners. It provided sanctions for the new arrangements to share the produce of date palms evenly between landowner and sharecropper. Finally, it contained detailed regulations about how to mediate in agricultural conflicts. After its failure, it seems that Bā Ḍāwī exercised the role of mediator to some extent in cases which were not referred to the courts.

To round up the question of local initiatives to improve agriculture and the economic conditions of peasants, it should be noted that in 1962 yet another peasants' organisation was founded. It aimed at sharing machinery, making spare parts available, helping with marketing, and generally promoting the welfare of small-scale land and pump owners. In addition to furthering the economic welfare of the peasants, about ten percent of the budget was to be devoted to alphabetisation. This indicates that the association was linked to the organisations discussed earlier, as they also took great interest in the issue of peasant literacy.[221] It was to be organised as a joint stock company.[222]

While the initiatives described above were mostly centered on Sayʾūn and Tarīm, a number of cooperative ventures were founded elsewhere in Hadhramaut. Among the most successful, the Ghayl Bā Wazīr Tobacco Credit Corporation Society, founded in 1956 with the help of a generous British credit, greatly increased the income of the cultivators.[223] The extent to which such activities were initiated by local peasants in the tradition of earlier cooperative experiences, encouraged by changes in the Wadi and informed by developments

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the normal conditions of *mukhābara* and *mukhālaʿa* contracts, see the numerous documents with such contracts in SMA, VIII.

[221] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, pp. 84–90.

[222] SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wal-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-ṭullābiyya, Dustūr al-jamʿiyya al-taʿāwuniyya li-l-muzāriʿīn al-maḥdūda, 1.8.1382/ 3.6.1962. For the success of the alphabetisation programme, see a document dated 1965 in the same file.

[223] M. al-Ḥibshī, *al-Yaman al-janūbī*, pp. 201f.

in the wider world is difficult to gauge. Internal traditions might have provided fertile soil for British enthusiasm to found cooperatives which is evident in the Protectorate Development Plans.[224]

In terms of a wider evaluation of the success of agricultural revival, a mixed picture emerges. There were some success stories, and overall production undoubtedly increased. A number of attempts were made to form commercial agricultural companies, one in the 1940s by *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* and one in the late 1950s by a number of Mukallā merchants who formed an agricultural joint stock company. It aimed at developing agriculture, mainly in Wadi Mayfaʿ, one of the few areas of Hadhramaut with perennial water supply.[225] Opinons varied widely about whether Hadhramaut would have been able to withstand future droughts without outside help. Even the best improvements in agricultural production did not solve one of the key problems of 1942 and the subsequent years, namely the sudden disruption of remittances on which the country had come to rely so heavily. Although after 1942 the South East Asian diaspora could no longer contribute to the country as much as before, the overall dependency on remittances remained a major structural feature of the Hadhrami economy. In 1960, estimates of the share of remittances in the overall revenues of Hadhramaut still ranged between 90–95%.[226]

The only other area in which serious change was expected by the Hadhramis was oil production.[227] As noted in chapter III, such hopes had first surfaced in the early 20th century. From the late 1930s until 1960, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Petroleum Concessions Limited held a concession for the Aden Protectorate. However, the company was not very keen on exploration and seems to have been

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[224] *Handbook to the Eastern Aden Protectorate*, parts I & II, 1964, pp. 31f. certainly conveys the impression that the cooperatives resulted from financial aid by the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Fund.

[225] al-Sharika al-Zirāʿiyya al-Ḥaḍramiyya, *al-Qānūn al-asāsī*, Aden: Maṭbaʿat al-Kamāl, n.d. (1958 or 59), document in the possession of Sanad Bā Yaʿshūd, the Wadi Mayfaʿ project is mentioned by Adolf Leidlmair, "Die britischen Protektorate in Südarabien", *Geographische Rundschau* 18 (1966), pp. 41–50, here p. 49. I am not aware of information about its success or otherwise. For a short reference to the company organised by *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana*, see ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 67.

[226] For a considered discussion of the issue on the basis of the available British sources, see Lekon, The British, pp. 306–310; for further cautioning comments Leidlmair, *Ḥaḍramaut*, pp. 42f.

[227] There were some attempts at bolstering the fishing industry, but they seem to have foundered. Lekon, The British, pp. 310f.

mainly concerned with using the concession as a fence to keep out potential rivals.[228] In 1961, the Pan American International Oil Company (PAIOC) entered into negotiations with the Hadhrami sultanates. Although the prospect of finding oil was still remote, it caused major frictions between the sultanates about the exact demarcation of their borders.[229] In spite of various agreements over the joint administration of the revenues, tensions remained high.[230] In the end, this turned out to be much ado about nothing, as PAIOC did not prove luckier than its predecessor in discovering oil in the Hadhramaut. Nevertheless, for a short time its presence did raise significant expectations among Hadhramis, who had been attested in a World Bank report that their economy could not change much unless oil was discovered in significant quantities.[231] When PAIOC withdrew, reportedly after a worker had been murdered by a Beduin, the search for oil was taken over by Agip, with no more success.[232]

Civic Activity: The Contribution of Jam'iyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Mu'āwana

Chapter VI has introduced a variety of associations which engaged in a lively debate and aimed at the reform of Hadhramaut and its society. As has been shown, many of these were extremely short-lived and quickly replaced by new associations. However, one of them, *Jam'iyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Mu'āwana*, showed a remarkable longevity and continued to play a major role in developments in Tarīm, the Wadi and to some extent beyond this region until the 1960s. While many of its activities in Tarīm resemble those of *Jam'iyyat al-Ḥaqq*, albeit without the latter's quasi-governmental authority, *Jam'iyyat al-Ukhuwwa* became an important player in other interior cities such as Say'ūn. Some of its initial educational activities, as well as the provision of credit to peasants, have already been discussed. Nevertheless,

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[228] If not indicated otherwise, this and the following is based on Lekon, The British, pp. 157f., pp. 233–235, 327–331.

[229] IO, R/20/B/3099, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary, Aden, 29.7.1962.

[230] IO, R/20/B/3080 for an agreement of 1959; M. al-Ḥibshī, *al-Yaman al-janūbī*, pp. 300f.

[231] *al-Ṭalī'a* 167, 20.9.1962, p. 1; 174, 8.11.1962, p.1.

[232] Personal communication, Sultan Ghālib al-Qu'ayṭī, London, 25.2.2000.

it is worthwhile to consider this significant constituent of civil soci-
ety in more detail. It initiated a good number of activities directed
at state building and modernisation in the Kathīrī sultanate and sup-
ported a number of the measures introduced by the Resident Adviser.
This strong involvement of a civil element might well be a measure
of the physical distance of al-Mukallā where the Resident Adviser
was based. Before an assistant to the Kathīrī sultanate was appointed,
direct British intervention had been limited, and the success of advice
depended much more on cooperation with local forces than on the
coast.[233] The following account of the association's activities is by no
means complete. There are indications that it went through less
active phases which might be linked to the frequent and sometimes
sustained absences of its chairman and probably some of its members.[234]

    While new types of organisations appeared on the coast after 1945,
and somewhat later in the Wadi as will be shown in the next chap-
ter, *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* was an element of continuity. It was started
in the late 1920s as a radical organisation by discontented youth
who were regarded with great suspicions in Tarīm, the "fortress of
conservatism in Hadhramaut".[235] However, by the 1960s the associ-
ation was regarded as somewhat outdated by the leading generation
of young activists who had often studied in its schools.[236] This might
have been a result of the social composition of association which
was founded by Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī (b. 1914–15). In addi-
tion to al-Shāṭirī, three more of the five founding members came
from *sayyid* families, namely Sālim Khirid, ʿAydarūs al-Sirrī and ʿAlī
b. Shaykh Balfaqīh.[237] Both association and school were funded by
ʿUmar Miḥḍār al-Kāf.[238] The *sayyid* dominance among its member-
ship caused suspicions: Serjeant reports rumours that the association

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[233] I do not know when exactly the Assistant Adviser for the Northern Areas was
appointed. The earliest reference I have is from 1955. See IO, R/20/C/2050:
Handing Over Notes from R. H. Daly to J. Weakley, Northern Areas, March 1959,
p. 2.

[234] For example, *al-Ṭalīʿa* 118,28.9.1961, p. 4, reported the reopening of the asso-
ciation's "club" after a lull of ten years. For the journeys of the chairman, al-Shāṭirī,
see Ḥusayn al-Saqqāf, Tarjama. For a good overview of the association's early his-
tory and activities, see Ṭāhir, "al-Maʿāhid al-dīniyya", pp. 163–170.

[235] Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, p. 11, cf. pp. 9–11.

[236] Personal communication, Karāma Sulaymān, Tarīm, 11.12.1996.

[237] Only in the case of Muḥammad Sālim b. Ḥafīẓ, I am not sure about the ori-
gin. Of the 48 registered members in 1949, only four were not *sayyid*s. Jamʿiyyat
al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, pp. 48–50.

[238] Personal communication, Karāma Sulaymān, Tarīm, 11.12.1996.

intended to limit the education available to children of peasants, and I was pointed to the clear predominance of *sayyid*s among those sent abroad for study.[239] The view of the society as a representative of the *ancien régime* in the 1960s was more often than not put forward by young *sayyid*s themselves who had become influenced by nationalist ideas and were suspicious of the participation of the society's leading members in the Kathīrī administration.[240]

How closely the association and the Kathīrī sultanate's administration became intertwined becomes evident when one considers that a significant number of its members rose to high positions. Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī, a former student at the al-Ḥaqq school and the *ribāṭ* of Tarīm, worked in the al-Kāf and the *al-Ukhuwwa* schools before a spell as teacher in the al-Junayd school in Singapore. When he returned to Hadhramaut in 1940, he took up teaching in Tarīm before being appointed to the Quʿayṭī Supreme Council for *sharʿī* Jurisprudence and inspector of courts in 1944. A year later, he was invited to become *muftī* for the Kathīrī sultanate and, in March 1948, he joined the new Kathīrī State Council.[241] He also headed the first city council of Tarīm.[242] ʿAlī b. Shaykh Balfaqīh served as Director of Education for some time; Muḥammad b. Hāshim was State Secretary for a few years; ʿAlī b. Sumayṭ served on the State Council; and Ibrāhīm Balfaqīh officially represented the sultanate in Tarīm. When a *majlis al-iftāʾ al-sharʿī* (Council for Legal Advice) was founded in Tarīm, two of the association's members, Muḥammad b. Sālim b. Ḥafīẓ and ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥasan Balfaqīh were appointed, and it seems that only the head of the Council, Sālim Saʿīd Bukayr, was not associated with *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa*.[243] Many more took an active part in the social, educational and political life of their towns. This is not surprising if we consider that the association attracted mostly educated youth from notable families.[244] The links between the association and the government extended to the financial level. Presumably, recognising that the association fulfilled some quasi-governmental

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[239] Serjeant, *The Sayyids*, p. 26; interviews in Tarīm, December 1996.

[240] Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 119. The founder of the Baʿth Party of Southern Yemen, ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl b. Yaḥyā, who had himself been trained in the school and taught there, presents a very favourable picutre of the association, see his *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 66f.

[241] IO, R/20/C/1513, Minutes of the Kathiri State Council Meeting, 25.4.1948.

[242] Ḥusayn al-Saqqāf, Tarjama, p. 18.

[243] Personal communication, Karāma Sulaymān, Tarīm, 11.12.1996.

[244] See the list of members with their professions or interests in Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, pp. 48–50.

functions in Tarīm, *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa*, which was otherwise mainly financed by emigrants' and members' contributions, was subsidised by the state.[245]

The association aimed at spreading a cooperative spirit and education. The latter was strongly informed by a combination of secular knowledge with religious mission (*daʿwa*), because *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* rejected reform which aimed exclusively to change the world. This is presumably a reference to secular political organisations which existed in the regions adjacent to the Indian Ocean and in the Middle East. In a programmatic speech of 1946 entitled "What is the road to a true revival?", which was delivered in the Sultan's Library in al-Mukallā, al-Shāṭirī outlined many of the central issues.[246] Both the order and the relative space devoted to the individual issues are significant: al-Shāṭirī started with general comments on revival (*nuhūḍ*), then quoted Bernard Shaw, another English language author (w-l-z, possibly H. G. Wells) and the Egyptian author Aḥmad Amīn with the aim of showing that Islam was a flexible religion and able to adapt to present and future challenges. After a brief attack on an uncritical belief in saints, he discussed the necessity for moral improvement, called for the development of a sound patriotism (*waṭaniyya*) and only then discussed more concrete measures. Prime among them was education, although the last three pages (of a total of 23 excluding the table of contents) are devoted to the necessity for an economic revival, most notably in agriculture. The speech shows al-Shāṭirī's awareness of discussions in the wider Islamic world about the suitability of Islam for modernisation (he again quotes Europeans to confirm his view) and his familiarity with and approval of *salafī* arguments criticising the worship of saints. His talk generally resembles the *salafī* discourse on reform. This should not distract us from the fact that al-Shāṭirī—and probably most of the members of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa*—were devout Sufis.[247] Once again, we find a strong trend of Sufi reformism, couched in a language familiar from non-Sufi reformist milieus.[248]

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[245] Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, p. 12.

[246] al-Shāṭirī, "Muḥāḍara tārīkhiyya".

[247] When I visited al-Shāṭirī in Jeddah in April 2000, it was evident that he not only was a recognised Sufi authority but also had no qualms about suggesting a special *duʿāʾ* (supplication) to a visitor. Both sides accepted that the supplication might help the visitor with his specific problem.

[248] The continuities and links between Sufi and *salafī* thought were also noted by Weismann for Damascus, *Taste of Modernity*, p. XI and 305–316.

A similar mixture of new language and older arguments is evident in the association's analysis of the situation after the famines in 1949. It talks of the necessity of enhancing "national products" and reducing imports from abroad. Although couched in a different terminology, the view that imports such as rice, sugar and grain bought with remittances caused a potentially dangerous dependence on the diaspora was already familiar to Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Sumayṭ. He would have wholeheartedly agreed with the association's statement that the relative wealth of the Hadhramis (or certain families thereof) was "flawed civilization without solid foundations".[249]

In addition to maintaining its own schools, which by no means taught exclusively religious subjects, the association sent groups of youth to the suburbs and villages surrounding Tarīm on Friday nights to preach to the local people. It also pioneered the development of special teaching materials on Hadhramaut past and present. Once before and once after World War II, groups of three and five students respectively were sent to Iraq and Syria.[250]

Given the background of many of its members, it is not surprising that legal issues attracted the attention of the association. It took the initiative to reorganise the judicial system in Tarīm which, to quote the association's view, had been "enveloped by chaos from all sides" in spite of the reorganisation discussed above.[251] Cases were often delayed and judges were not overly active in pursuing their profession due to the lack of regular pay. This opened the field to private brokers (samāsira), i.e., lawyers, who promised to secure quick hearings and thereby made huge profits. This reorganisation was later sanctioned by the sultan—an interesting procedure as it shows the measure of authority exercised by this voluntary association in Tarīm. The judicial changes allowed the association to tackle another major problem, namely the administration of the religious endowments (awqāf), many of which had become alienated from the founders' wills. This seems to have greatly increased the productivity of agricultural lands under waqf administration, and therefore to have contributed to the revival of agriculture.[252]

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[249] Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana, *Bayān*, 1368/1949, p. 8.
[250] Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 158.
[251] Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, p. 38. This seems to have taken place some time after October 1943, i.e., clearly after the judicial reorganisation of 1939.
[252] Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, pp. 42f.

Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa became most noted for its social work: it organised credit for the poor, it collected and distributed alms taxes and founded a library. ʿUmar b. ʿAlawī b. ʿAbdallāh al-Kāf began to organise and teach workers and aimed to improve the level of local handicrafts. The first organisation of this type was a guild of tailors and leather workers.[253] Obviously, it appears doubtful that the enthusiastic ideas of a young man of wealthy background changed anything for the workers, but it is not impossible that programmes for alphabetisation, or perhaps common discussions of problems, served to raise their awareness and might have contributed to the increasing number of professional organisations by the late 1950s and early 1960s. Both the association and its individual members played a major role in the local running of the pump and agricultural schemes. They also initiated a number of development schemes, such as the Tarīm Water and Electricity Companies.[254] Furthermore, the association founded a trading cooperative in Tarīm.[255] Later, al-Kāf turned his attention to the problems with the financial administration of the Kathīrī sultanate.[256]

Given the merchant background of many of the members' families, it is not surprising that the association was strictly opposed to the ongoing taxation of imports by the sultans. It demanded an end to this practice and favoured the unification of Hadhramaut as a possible means to this end. However, one can also note the beginnings of Hadhrami nationalism in its statements.[257] In 1956, *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* suggested unification to the Kathīrī sultans who, unsurprisingly, were not terribly keen on a scheme which only threatened to further diminish their role. Instead, they suggested a unification of the Hadhrami interior, i.e., of the Quʿaytī district of Shibām with the Kathīrī sultanate.[258]

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[253] Bayān ʿan Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana; Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa, *Bayān* 1368/1949, p. 46.

[254] Personal communication, Karāma Sulaymān, Tarīm, 11.12.1996. Again, the al-Kāf family seems to have played a major role, Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], p. 107.

[255] Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana, *Bayān*, 1368/1949, p. 46.

[256] Ibn Hāshim, [al-Kāf Family History], pp. 235–240.

[257] Personal communication, Karāma Sulaymān, Tarīm, 11.12.1996.

[258] Letter from Sultan Husayn b. ʿAlī al-Kathīrī to Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Shāṭirī (chairman of J. al-Ukhuwwa) and Ahmad b. Zayn Balfaqīh (its secretary), 18.3.1956. One of the practical steps demanded by the association was the coordination of *Ramaḍān*. Letter from the Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa to the Kathīrī sultans, 23.2.1956. Both letters are in the possession of Sanad Bā Yaʿshūd, al-Mukallā.

Such demands were not merely the result of the economic interests of the association's members, they also reflect its increasing politicisation and presumably the rise of Hadhrami nationalism. As mentioned in chapter VI, the question of Palestine stirred Hadhrami youth in the late 1930s, and a symbolic sum of money was transferred to the Palestinians through the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1366/ 1946–47, a committee of "notables from the interior region" under the leadership of ʿUmar b. Shaykh al-Kāf held a meeting in Tarīm. Muḥammad b. Hāshim reported on the plight of the Palestinians, and the committee decided to raise funds in support of Palestinian attempts to buy lands.[259] By 1956, the local British officer commented that the association was "originally a religious organisation but lately become decidedly political + in sympathy with the 'Rabatat el Jenoob' in Aden".[260] By this, the association had entered the field of party politics as it had first developed in Aden and Hadhramaut which will be discussed in the next chapter.

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[259] Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana, *Bayān*, 1368/1949, pp. 44f.
[260] IO, R/20/C/2056, Further Report by Assistant Adviser Northern Areas on Events in Kathiri State [. . .], 6.8.1956, p. 12.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ELITES AND
THE DEMISE OF EMPIRE

Testing the suitability of Robinson's theory of collaborative imperialism, Lekon has noted that the collaboratorative arrangement did not collapse before the end of British rule in the Aden Protectorate. He suggests that the model needs to be reversed as "ultimately, it was the collaborators who ran out of a patron, not vice versa".[1] Lekon is right in that the British unilaterally announced in 1964 that they would grant independence to the Federation of South Arabia but keep the base in Aden.[2]

Throughout the history of the region, British interest had concentrated on Aden: first as a military base, for some time in the 1960s as headquarters of the Middle East Command, and as a bunkering port. When the British discussed a long range policy for Protectorate and Aden Colony in the mid-1950s, the Colonial Office decided to treat the future of the Protectorate differently from that of Aden. Harold MacMillan, the Foreign Secretary, argued:

> The Aden Colony is the last remaining British territory in the gulf area and is, I think, vital to our general position in that area. It is surely an essential interest to hold on to it as long as we possibly can and not to encourage any development which will speed up a demand for independence.[3]

In contrast, he agreed more or less with the view that with the possible exception of oil finds the Protectorate was only of interest as "a glacis for the protection of the Colony".[4] MacMillan concluded from this that:

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[1] Lekon, The British, p. 367.
[2] Balfour-Paul, *The end*, pp. 81f.
[3] PRO, CO 1015/1212, Harold MacMillan, Foreign Secretary to Lennox-Boyd, M.P., 14.10.1955. For a survey of the debate, see Balfour-Paul, *The end*, pp. 66f.; for the view of a British official in Aden at the time, Trevaskis, *Shades*, p. 126.
[4] PRO, CO 1015/1212, Her Majesty's Government's long range policy in the Aden Protectorate and Aden Colony, Colonial Office, 6.6.1955.

> If we want to hold on there, surely it is better to leave the local Sheikhs and Rulers in a state of simple rivalry (sic) and separateness, in which they are glad of our protection and can, where necessary, be played off one against the other, rather than to mould them into a single unit, which is most likely (and indeed seems expressly designed) to create a demand for independence and 'self-determination'.[5]

Meanwhile, pressure on the British in Aden and the (Western) Protectorate was mounting, as was international concern, not least by the United Nations. By February 1966, resistance in Aden had mounted to a level which caused the British government to decide that the Aden base had become untenable. It announced its intention to evacuate by 1968. In the face of increasing violence, the British withdrawal was speeded up and, by November 29, 1967, the last British soldiers left Aden.[6] The Protectorate was abandoned even earlier.

While the British decision to withdraw caused the collapse of the Hadhrami sultanates, the weakening of the old (collaborating) elites nevertheless warrants explanation. When the British Adviser took office, the sultanates had been fairly stable polities. I will argue that it was a mixture of British policy and the emergence of new forces which explains the amazingly rapid disintegration of the sultanates, although not necessarily the victory of the National Liberation Front.

This view is at variance with much of the local tradition. I was told by many Hadhramis of different origin that there really were no revolutionaries in Hadhramaut, and that outside forces overthrew the old order. Sometimes this view reflects the former (high) position of the speakers, sometimes it is an expression of disapproval at what happened after independence. While in general the socialist regime can nowadays be occasionally glorified, bitter memories of the so-called "peasant uprisings" (*al-intifāḍāt al-fallāḥiyya*) of the early 1970s prevail. In these well-organised 'uprisings', peasants were meant to appropriate land in a revolutionary way and to hasten a land reform which until then had not been particularly effective. However, the 'uprisings' "became a golden opportunity to settle personal and tribal scores under the cloak of spurious revolutionary legality."[7] In

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[5] PRO, CO 1015/1212, Harold MacMillan, Foreign Secretary to Lennox-Boyd, M.P., 14.10.1955.

[6] For a detailed discussion, see Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 337–351.

[7] Ismael & Ismael, *P. D. R. Yemen*, p. 85. On the uprisings cf. Lackner, *P. D. R. Yemen*, pp. 174f.

Hadhramaut today, they are mainly remembered for dragging some dozen 'feudalists' to death.[8] Against this background, Hadhramis are not keen to be associated with a movement that caused such outrage.

Without wanting to argue that by 1967 Hadhramaut itself would have been ripe for a revolution, I would like to suggest in this chapter that events during and after World War II initiated important changes. By the late 1960s, they provided a fertile ground for revolutionaries. However, the course of events was primarily determined by developments in Aden, the Western Aden Protectorate, the Yemen and the wider Arab world. Prime among these changes are the upheavals to which the diaspora was exposed as a result of the rise of nationalism around the Indian Ocean. Regional developments, the partial 're-Arabisation' of the diaspora and ideological trends prevalent in the Arab world such as rivaling notions of Arabism and socialism therefore influenced a new generation of educated youth. They were organised in youth and sports clubs, associations and political parties. When the time came, they found allies among discontented tribesmen and peasants. Finally, the account would be incomplete without a brief discussion of the British decision to withdraw from Aden and the Protectorate. To the allies of the British, this was nothing less than a betrayal.

The Reconfiguration of the Diaspora[9]

The famines towards the end of and after Word War II had highlighted the dependance of the region on overseas remittances and demonstrated what could happen if these were cut in unfavourable circumstances.[10] As has been shown before, much of the social and political order that had emerged during the 19th and early 20th cen-

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[8] None of my contacts in Hadhramaut or the diaspora seemed to associate anything positive with the "peasant uprisings", although land disputes are once again the order of the day. For a similar impression, see the views of Engseng Ho related in Dresch, *A History*, p. 128 and p. 243, note 24. For a description from the perspective of a member of the notable families, see al-Kāf, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 108–110.

[9] While using new materials, the arguments of this section resemble those in my "Conclusion", notably pp. 315–323.

[10] In addition to the severance of remittances from South East Asia, a prolonged drought, crop failure in East Africa, international shortages and limitations on transport capacity due to the World War as well as local speculation have been identified as causes of the famines. Lekon, "The Impact", pp. 270–272.

turies had been the direct or indirect result of the close relations between Hadhramis and their diaspora. The Japanese occupation of British Malaya, Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies in 1942, which lasted until August 1945 and caused the rupture of remittances from South East Asia during the first famine, appears retrospectively not only as a wartime event which badly affected Hadhramaut, but as the beginning of the end of the integrated Indian Ocean world which Hadhramis had known for centuries. While scholars of globalisation who paid attention to transatlantic integration have argued that World War I spelled an end to a first phase of international integration for the Indian Ocean, it was rather World War II and the two subsequent decades which prompted similar results.[11] During this period, the colonial empires disappeared and a new spirit of political and economic nationalism came to dominate many of the newly independent countries.

The immediate effects of the Japanese occupation of Singapore were dramatic: the properties of numerous Hadhramis were confiscated because they were regarded as pro-British enemies. Many chose to leave Singapore for the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia where they felt less exposed and where Hadhramis seem to have been considered as part of the Muslim-Malay population by the Japanese.[12] This meant that they lost access to their usual incomes.[13] Others chose to cooperate with the Japanese whom they had long admired as an Asian model of development, but this usually caused problems after the war with the British and the Indonesians. In any case, remittances between Japanese-occupied South East Asia and British-protected South Arabia were cut almost completely, thus stripping much of Wadi Hadhramaut of the cash necessary to procure foodstuffs.

The end of the war and the brief Dutch re-occupation of the Netherlands East Indies and the British reassertion of control over Singapore and Malaya did not spell a return to the old order. In Singapore, measures introduced in 1947 such as rent control for pre-war buildings and other measures which aimed at the structured development of the city but which harmed owners of large estates like the Hadhramis, began to severely curb the massive incomes which had been

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[11] O'Rourke & Williamson, *Globalization*, pp. 29f.

[12] On the mild treatment of Hadhramis by the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies see Kroef, "The Arabs", p. 323.

[13] NAS, A000124, Alkaff transcript pp. 34, 41; interviews in Singapore, May 1997.

derived from rent. The resulting loss of income and confidence caused a number of families to relocate to Aden and Cairo or at least to diversify their investments.[14] The decline of the fortunes of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf, who had been exceptionally generous during the 1930s and spent much of his personal wealth during the famine only to end up with huge debts and continuous cash flow problems, is perhaps the most dramatic example of the effects which these developments could have on individuals and their families.[15]

Although exceptionally wealthy, Hadhramis in Singapore formed only a tiny minority of the Indian Ocean diaspora. The larger community in the Netherlands East Indies was also exposed to major changes during and after the war. It was estimated that before the war, about 70,000 Hadhramis (out of an estimated 100,000 migrants overall) had sent remittances of more than £600,000 annually.[16] During the war and after independence, migration slowed down considerably.[17] By 1956, the number of Hadhramis in Indonesia had risen to about 100,000, but they no longer contributed critically to the Hadhrami economy.[18] The Indonesian struggle for independence until 1949 also disrupted the economy. While some Arab landowners had lost their land during the Japanese occupation, others had to sell it cheaply in the 1950s and 60s due to land reforms.[19] Indonesian attempts to limit not only foreign economic activities in the newly independent country, but also those of Indonesians of foreign origin caused great anxieties. This measure seems to have been directed particularly at Chinese traders, but Hadhramis contacted the British embassy anxious for support. By the 1950s, many considered returning to Hadhramaut, following rumors of major oil finds. Community leaders even proposed repatriating poor Arabs to Hadhramaut, pre-

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[14] A. Talib, "Hadhramis", p. 92; Lim Lu Sia, "The Arabs", p. 44; for a more detailed discussion see my "Arab Merchants".

[15] For al-Kāf's generous spending, see Bā Maṭraf, al-Hijra al-yamaniyya, p. 4; for his financial problems and British considerations to support him financially, IO, R/20/B/2961, Resident, Mukalla to Governor, Aden, 5.3.1959 and Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 20.6.1959, Resident, Mukalla to Colonial Office, 6.9.1961; cf. IO, R/20/C/2055 and Lekon, The British, p. 298 on the sale of the al-Kāf road to the Hadhrami sultanates.

[16] D. Ingrams, A Survey, p. 37.

[17] Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening, p. 153.

[18] IO, R/20/B/3094, British Embassy, Jakarta to Chief Secretary's Office, Aden, 2.10.1956.

[19] Heuken, Arab Landowners, p. 9.

sumably for fear that they might have to care for impoverished compatriots.[20] It is possible that ʿUmar b. Salim al-ʿAṭṭās' book "*The blissful life in Hadhramaut*" (*al-Ḥayāt al-saʿīda bi-Ḥaḍramawt*), published in Singapore around 1953, has to be seen in this wider context.[21]

These worries, however real their impact, should not be exaggerated. Hadhramis, particularly those with a background in the Arab Indonesian Party, had been closely involved in Indonesian politics during the Japanese occupation. After 1945, they joined new political parties and supported Indonesia's struggle for international recognition in the face of Dutch opposition. Most Hadhramis seem to have been offered and to have accepted Indonesian citizenship, but as non-native Indonesians they were categorised as members of a 'minority', together with the Indo-Chinese and Indo-Europeans. To this day, the community has not completely shed this second-class status.[22] The subsequent integration into Indonesian parties and Arab participation in politics up to cabinet level show clearly that although still marked as non-native Indonesians, they are given preferential treatment in comparison to the Chinese. Although Arabs might have lost some of their earlier economic status, they are well represented in the economy as well as in white collar professions.[23] It is true that the emergence of Indonesia as a nation state speeded Hadhrami integration, but the trend as such was not new. While to this day Hadhramis can draw some benefits from their Arab origin, such as playing a major role in the trade with Saudi Arabia, most are content to consider themselves as Indonesians.

The ban on remittances cut many links with Hadhramaut. The only apparent concession was the agreement "to the remittance by heads of families in Indonesia of sufficient funds to keep their dependents in the Hadhramaut from becoming destitute". A Hadhrami committee was to investigate the applications, although the scheme

[20] IO, R/20/B/3094, British Embassy, Jakarta to Colonial Secretariat, Aden, 7.11.1959; on the issue of evacuation ibid., British Embassy, Jakarta to Consular Department, Foreign Office, London, 13.11.59 and PRO, CO 1015/2005, M. B. Alamoedie, Surabaya, 22st September 1959 to Consul of Great Britain and Ireland, Surabaya; confidential paper: British Protected Persons (Hadramaut); British Embassy, Consular Section, Jakarta to Consular Department, Foreign Office, 13.11.1959 and Rosling (Foreign Office) to Moffat (Colonial Office), 3.12.1959.

[21] ʿUmar al-ʿAṭṭās, *al-Ḥayāt*, notably pp. 3–7, 21f., 33.

[22] De Jonge, The Arabs, p. 8.

[23] Algadri, *Dutch Policy*, pp. 122–145; observations and interviews in Indonesia, May-June 1997.

encountered "some difficulties" right at the beginning.[24] This was only a short term remedy and in February 1950, the Kathīrī sultan urgently requested President Sukarno to allow "Hadhrami funds in Indonesia to be remitted and utilised in Hadhramaut for its welfare."[25] In January 1954,

> the Indonesian Government imposed a ban on all remittances abroad by foreign-exchange residents of Indonesia, with the exception of certain foreign experts. Approaches made in 1955 and again in 1957 stressing the hardship in the Hadhramaut resulting from this restriction elicited replies from the Indonesian Government to the effect that while the difficulties were appreciated the economic situation in Indonesia would not yet allow of the withdrawal of this regulation, but that the matter would be reviewed during the course of the year 1958. There is as yet no news of any change in the situation.[26]

In 1956, the reformist *Jam'iyya Kathīriyya* in Say'ūn suggested to the Resident Adviser that the British act as an intermediary. The Indonesian branch of the association would pay the British embassy 32 million rupees annually and the British would transfer one million pounds to Hadhramaut. As this would have still amounted to the transfer of remittances, albeit this time by the British rather than Hadhramis, the proposal came to nothing.[27] Many people of different strata in Hadhramaut were badly affected. In political terms, notable families who had derived their wealth from Indonesia were severely weakened. At the same time, some Indonesian Hadhramis (mostly from the *qabīlī* stratum and linked to such organisations as the *Jam'iyya Kathīriyya*) who doubted their prospects in Indonesia, became passionately interested in their original homeland's policies, as will be shown later. Overall, however, Hadhramis with South East Asian connections lost much of their influence on Hadhrami politics after World War II.

In 1947, Indian independence and the partition of India and Pakistan spelled disaster for Hadhramis in Hyderabad.[28] Initially,

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[24] PRO, FO 371/83743, British Consulate General, Batavia to Governor, Aden, 18.1.1949.

[25] PRO, FO 371/83743, translated letter from Hussein bin 'Ali Al Kathiri to Ahmed Abdulkarim Sokarno, 26.2.1950.

[26] IO, R/20B/3094, Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 27.4.1959.

[27] IO, R/20/C/2054, Wafd al-Jam'iyya al-kathīriyya al-shanfariyya al-iṣlāḥiyya, Say'ūn to Resident Adviser, Say'ūn, 9.12.1956 and Resident Adviser to President, Kathiri Shanfary Union, Say'ūn, 30.12.1956, as well as British Embassy, Jakarta to South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, 13.10.1959 and 30.12.1959.

[28] The following is based on Khalidi, "The Hadhrami Role", pp. 80f. and the detailed discussion in Rao & Manger, *Winners*, pp. 47–53. For an inside view see El Edroos & Naik, *Hyderabad*, pp. 99–161.

Hyderabad did not want to join India. Following attacks on Hindus by Muslim fighters vowing to combat the partition of India and Pakistan, the Indian army intervened. Given that this annexation resulted from communal tensions, it is not surprising that Hindu gangs retaliated and killed between 50,000 and 200,000 people. Many Hadhramis fled to Pakistan. The Nizam's armed forces were disbanded under the supervision of the Commander in Chief, Sayyid Aḥmad al-ʿAydarūs (El Edroos). The different groups of mercenaries were repatriated: the Pathans to Pakistan, the Moplas to the Malabar coast, and some 7,000 Arabs via Bombay to Arabia.[29] About 800 arrived in al-Mukallā in October 1949, just after the second famine and were ferried back to their places of origin.[30] So keen was the Indian government to discharge these people, who were clearly considered a danger, that it offered to send them back at its own expense, although some were retained as the Nizam's private guards and police.[31]

Up to now, there has been no reliable information on the overall demographic development of the Hadhrami community in Hyderabad, nor on the fate of the Arabs on the Malabar coast. There are indications that some continued to prosper, while many shared the economic problems of the larger Muslim community or fared worse as their original fields of employment broke away.[32] Not only was the military disbanded, but the landholding system was also reformed. Many Hadhramis ended up in the informal economy or went into small business. Labour migration to the Gulf became an important source of maintenance. Therefore, the economic influence of the migrants on Hadhramaut was reduced and the intensity of contacts appears to have decreased sharply.[33] The Quʿayṭīs lost their military profession and much of their property. Internal quarrels over inheritance further exacerbated their problems.

Until the 1960s, East Africa offered a respite for potential migrants from Hadhramaut. Although the war had interrupted migration and remittances and although new visa requirements posed problems in the war and post-war era, Hadhramis managed to circumvent many

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[29] El Edroos & Naik, *Hyderabad*, pp. 144f.; Khalidi, "The Hadhrami Role", pp. 80f.

[30] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 24.2.1993.

[31] Khalidi, "The Arabs", p. 229, n. 106; El Edroos & Naik, *Hyderabad*, pp. 192f.

[32] Rao & Manger, *Winners*, pp. 63–73; for some indication of developments on the Malabar coast, see Dale, "The Hadhrami Diaspora", pp. 181–184 who limits his discussion, however, to the *sayyid*s.

[33] Rao & Manger, *Winners*, pp. 75–81.

of these obstacles, sometimes choosing the route to emigrate through neighbouring Mahra.[34] The East African economic boom of these years, which included many although not all places of Hadhrami settlement, meant that they succeeded in the areas in which they were best skilled, namely trade and real estate. There is some evidence that they expanded their region of activity into northern Kenya.[35] In 1964, the British High Commission in Kampala estimated that some two hundred Hadhramis lived in Uganda, while several thousand (according to Hadhrami estimates as many as 20,000) lived in Kenya.[36] Estimates for Tanganyika lay in the region of 25,000.[37] To some extent, these growing opportunities extended to the Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. By the mid-50s, Nasser's economic socialism made the latter destination distinctly unattractive, at least for entrepreneurs.

One issue is of particular importance with regard to the Hadhrami presence in East Africa: the social and regional composition of the diaspora differed significantly from both that in Indonesia, which had accommodated mostly migrants from the interior, among them many *sayyid*s and Kathīrīs, and that in India where Yāfiʿīs had been the major element, at least in Hyderabad. In East Africa, many Hadhramis stemmed from the Western Wadi, plateaus and the coast, and although there were some *sayyid* families, the majority came from lesser tribes or the *ḍuʿafāʾ*.[38] For want of opportunity as well as education, these groups had not normally been involved in political developments in Hadhramaut beyond the local and tribal level, and they had certainly not formed part of the reform movement. Until the 1940s, this pattern had replicated itself in East Africa where members of migrant communities hardly ever made their voice heard. While some smaller community associations seem to have existed in different regions,

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[34] Bā Maṭraf, al-Hijra, pp. 52f. For a survey of British immigration regulations in East Africa, see Hartwig, "The Segmentation of the Indian Ocean Region".

[35] For a survey, see Clarence-Smith, Cape to Cairo, pp. 12f. For a case study of Lamu and its economy until the 1950s see Romero, *Lamu*, pp. 216–226; for Arab and other traders in northern Kenya, Manger, Northern Sudan, p. 21.

[36] PRO, CO 1055/241, British High Commission, Kampala to East Africa Department, Commonwealth Relations Office, 14.2.1964 and British High Commission, Nairobi to Commonwealth Relations Office, 21.2.1964. British estimates were that of the 34,000 Arabs in Kenya, only some 8000 came from Hadhramaut and the remainder from Oman. Ibid., British High Commission, Nairobi to High Commission, Aden, 27.5.1965.

[37] PRO, CO 1055/241, British High Commission, Tanganyika, to Commonwealth Relations Office, 12.5.1964.

[38] D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, p. 39; al-Ṣabbān, *al-Zaʿīm*, p. 13.

they did not normally get involved in the affairs of Hadhramaut.[39]

If anecdotal evidence is to be believed, this seems to have slowly changed. Two examples might illustrate this. Ḥamūd Bā Ḍāwī, the peasant leader from Say'ūn discussed in the last chapter, spent approximately fifteen years in Mombasa. Prior to that, he had made a rather miserable living with his parents in Būr. They later moved to Say'ūn after a dispute with the tribe protecting them. There, Bā Ḍāwī worked as a an irrigation labourer. Probably in the early 20th century, Bā Ḍāwī went to Mombasa and for some years worked in the armed forces. According to his own account, this experience gave him the self-confidence without which he could not have played his later role in Hadhrami peasant politics. Perhaps crucially, it also allowed him to amass a small fortune which he invested in land and wells in Hadhramaut.[40] Although his biographer does not say so, it is conceivable that some of the respect which Bā Ḍāwī earned was enhanced by his own success. It is at least doubtful whether a landless labourer could have risen to the same position of leadership and respect.

While Bā Ḍāwī is a very early (documented) example, Mubārak b. Duhrī is a late one. As discussed in chapter I, he was a carpenter who became one of the wealthiest Hadhramis in Mombasa. Illiterate like Bā Ḍāwī, Ibn Duhrī taught himself to read and write in Kenya. Apparently, he became politicised during the Kenyan struggle for independence. Subsequently, he voiced anti-imperialist sentiments with regard to Yemen. While these were initially rather vague, as he himself says, they became much more focussed when he met 'Alī Sālim al-Bīḍ and 'Alī Nāṣir Muḥammad in Mombasa. These leaders of the National Liberation Front (NLF) visited East Africa in 1967 prior to independence. Like their rivals from the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), they hoped to rally support in the diaspora.[41] When the revolution started, Ibn Duhrī founded a club which served as a center for the dissemination of news about Yemen. It was suitably called "Radfān Union" after the region in the east Dāli' mountains of the Western Aden Protectorate where fighting had started in 1963. Radfān became a symbol for the National Liberation Front's armed struggle against imperialism,

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[39] H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 159, mentions two such associations for Zanzibar.
[40] al-Ṣabbān, *al-Za'īm*, pp. 12–14,18.
[41] *al-Nidā'* I;3, 31.3.1977, p. 6 and personal communication, Muḥammad b. Duhrī, London, 5.1.1999.

regardless of the fact that the dynamics of the fighting were driven by local rivalries as much as by anti-imperialist convictions.[42] After independence, Ibn Duhrī represented the Kenyan Hadhramis at a conference of migrants in Aden. His son worked for some time in Aden, hoping to contribute to the new country. Like many others, he left in 1972 when banks were nationalised and the climate became generally unfavourable for investors.[43]

While Bā Ḍāwī's case shows the transformative effects which migration could have on individuals particularly of poor rural origin, Ibn Duhrī's political orientations can be somewhat more firmly embedded in what is known about the politicisation of East African Hadhramis. In 1962, the Arab Community in Eritrea under the leadership of Muḥammad Aḥmad Bā Junayd wrote to the Governor of Aden, supporting the demands of notables from al-Mukallā who demanded improved administration and a Legislative Council.[44] Sometime before August 1963, the Hadhrami League of East Africa (H.L.E.A.), over which Ibn Duhrī presided, was founded in Mombasa.[45] The language of its programme betrays the clear influence of nationalist ideas as well as the reformist ideas encountered elsewhere from the early 20th century: it aimed at unifying the Hadhrami immigrants to East Africa and wanted "to guide them socially and politically towards a constructive Arab Nation, and to raise their standard culturally, economically and educationally". It intended to work towards closer relations between East Africa and Hadhramaut and "to respond practically to the national causes in the Homeland and the migration place and South Yemen in general and with the Trade Unions". This is a clear reference not only to the wider South Yemeni outlook of the migrants, but also to the trade unions which dominated nationalist politics in Aden during the 1950s. Finally, and here one finds echoes of the tribal reform movements as well as of the social fault lines in Hadhramaut, the League intended to "eradicate class differences and the tribal systems which dominate Hadhramaut

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[42] *al-Nidāʾ* I;3, 31.3.1977, p. 7, it remains unclear whether the club was founded in 1963 or only in 1967. For the events in Radfān, see Dresch, *A History*, pp. 96–98 and Kostiner, *The Struggle*, pp. 71–77.

[43] *al-Nidāʾ* I;3, 31.3.1977, p. 7 and personal communication, Muḥammad b. Duhrī, London, 5.1.1999.

[44] IO, R/20/B/3075, The Arab Community, Eritrea to Governor, Aden, 22.6.1962.

[45] IO, R/20/D/128, Aden Trade Union Congress, Report by ʿAbdul Khalil Suleiman about visit to Mombasa, 9.9.63, the report is also contained in R/20/C/1944.

and the migration place and to create the spirit of equality and brotherhood amongst all citizens. The League believes strongly in unity, in that Hadhramaut is part of the greater Arab Homeland and realising justice and perfect democratic systems in it."[46]

When the president of the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC) visited the League in August 1963, he confirmed that it was "separatist" (i.e., exclusively Hadhrami) only in name.[47] This Yemeni and Arab outlook, which contrasts sharply with what most Hadhramis considered desirable at the time, might have been the result of a number of factors which would warrant closer investigation. Firstly, many migrants to East Africa had relatively close connections with Aden. Secondly, given the origin and professions of many of the emigrants, they might have been more susceptible to nationalist propaganda emphasising the abolition of social differences and injustice, as well as to trade union ideas. Thirdly, East Africa hosted a considerable community of Yemeni immigrants, notably from the Ḥujariyya. People from this northern region played a major role in Aden politics, and it might be that their compatriots in East Africa spread similar ideas.

While not much is known of the activities of the League, a telegram from December 1954 from its secretary to the Secretary General of the United Nations has survived. It illustrates the League's radical nationalist rhetoric. The UN had become involved with South Arabian affairs when disaffected Adeni politicians had appealed to it in the early 1960s during negotiations over the accession of Aden to the Federation of South Arabia, which had been formed in February 1959.[48] The telegram reads as follows:

> On behalf of thousands of South Arabians living in East Africa our League appeals for the immediate intervention of United Nations and individual nation states into the existing 'army rule' in Aden stop in the name of humanity justice and freedom embodied in the United Nations Charter of International Human Rights we appeal for the protection of those tortured human souls suffering savagely treatment in the prison cells of Aden the souls of political detainees and prisoners who are presently on hunger strike in the "Death Cells of Aden" stop Persuade Britain to give up existing political oppression in South Arabia stop

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[46] IO, R/20/D/128, The East African Hadhrami League (Mombasa).

[47] IO, R/20/D/128, Aden Trade Union Congress, Report by 'Abdul Khalil Suleiman about visit to Mombasa, 9.9.63.

[48] On these events see Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 340–343. Much of it is discussed in Trevaskis, *Shades*, part II.

Britain be forced to abide by the recommendations of the investigation
Committee on Self-Determination of the Area—Abdalla Baatwa, Sec-
retary, H.L.E.A.[49]

This growing interest of migrants to East Africa in developments in
South Yemen might have been motivated by more than mere sym-
pathy for hard-fighting compatriots in the homeland. By the 1960s,
national independence loomed for most of the East African territories.
The same nationalism that influenced the language of the Hadhrami
League of East Africa had gripped East Africa. Between 1960 and 1964,
Somalia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya and Zanzibar became inde-
pendent. Economic legislation that was directed at appropriating large
European and Asian properties also affected wealthy Hadhramis.[50] In
Kenya, Hadhramis were asked to leave or to apply for Kenyan cit-
izenship. The fee of 400 shillings was prohibitive for many poten-
tial applicants.[51]

   Migration figures compiled on the basis of the al-Mukallā pass-
port and visa office clearly indicate these trends, although, strictly
speaking, they are not commensurable. The first set of figures gives
the number of visas issued, which exceeds the number of actual jour-
neys which are mentioned in the second set. From 1959 to 1962,
between 3,310 and 4,501 visas were issued for East Africa annually,
in addition to between 100 and 338 for Somalia. Returnee figures
fluctuated between 804 and 1,566 in East Africa, and between 217
and 287 for Somalia.[52] During the following seven years from 1963
and 1969, a mere total of 2,849 Hadhramis (less than the number
of visas issued for a single year in the preceding period) left for East
Africa and an additional 342 for Somalia. In the same period, 4,927
Hadhramis arrived from East Africa and 1,056 from Somalia.[53] *Al-
Ṭalī‘a* reported that most Hadhramis were set to leave Tanganyika
before its complete independence at the end of 1961.[54] The H.L.E.A.
urgently appealed to the sultans as well as to the British for their
intervention. By January 1964, the sultans were "most anxious to obtain

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[49] IO, R/20/D/128, Telegram from the Secretary, Hadhramy League of East
Africa to Secretary General, U.N., 30.12.1964.
   [50] Bā Maṭraf, al-Hijra al-yamaniyya, p. 54.
   [51] PRO, CO 1055/241, High Commissioner, Aden to Colonial Secreatry, 30.5.1965
and Colonial Secretary to High Commissioner, Aden, 28.6.1965.
   [52] *Handbook to the Eastern Aden Protectorate*, parts I & II, 1964, pp. 11f.
   [53] Bā Maṭraf, al-Hijra al-yamaniyya, p. 55. Bā Maṭraf drew his information from
the Immigration Office, counting real journeys, rather than visas issued.
   [54] *al-Ṭalī‘a* 107, 13.7.1961, p. 7.

information regarding the position and treatment of their Hadhrami subjects in East Africa and the island of Zanzibar."[55] The Hadhramis were possibly worst affected in Zanzibar, where Arabs (although more Omanis than Hadhramis) became victims of racial violence during politically-motivated clashes in 1961 and on a grand scale in 1964 just after independence.[56] In February 1964, 140 Arabs were evacuated from the island by the Red Cross, while more chose to leave by dhow.[57] Therefore, the interest and involvement of East African Hadhramis in their homeland might well have been the result of an acute feeling that this was their refuge in times of dire straits.

The ordinary migrant of working age who was expelled or fled from a now insecure host country normally did not find the economic conditions in Hadhramaut appealing and might also have had second thoughts about the attraction of daily life there. The same holds true for those who returned after hearing rumors of the oil finds.[58] Interviewed about the current situation, Aḥmad al-ʿAṭṭās, the Prime Minister in 1964, reported that ships brought thousands of returnees from Indonesia, Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar:

> But we praise God because the Hadhrami does not resign himself, and after he stays a little in his homeland, you will find that he embarks once again on a migratory journey . . . to the extent that our most important export became human beings . . . we export him by ship and plane from the ports of al-Mukallā, on a yearly average of 100,000 Hadhramis. While, in the past, they turned to Southeast Asia and the African coast . . . they are today heading to the lands of their Arab brothers in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf and elsewhere.[59]

Saudi Arabia had always been a destination for Hadhrami pilgrims who stayed on for work if the opportunity arose.[60] In the mid-1950s

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[55] al-Rāʾy al-ʿāmm I;32, 21.2.1964; PRO, CO 1055/241, High Commissioner, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 27.1.1964.

[56] On these events, see Samuel G. Ayamy, A History of Zanzibar, Nairobi, Dar Es Salaam, Kampala: East African Literature Bureau 1970, pp. 85–89 and 118–132. Hadhramis adapted better than Asians in Uganda, PRO, CO 1055/241, British High Commission, Kampala to East Africa Department, Commonwealth Relations Office, 14.2.1964.

[57] PRO, CO 1055/241, Letter from A. F. Watts, Acting Deputy High Commissioner, Aden, to British High Commission, Zanzibar, 4.4.1964 and British High Commission, Zanzibar to Acting Deputy High Commissioner, Aden, 29.4.1964.

[58] Bā Maṭraf, al-Hijra al-yamaniyya, p. 60; cf. the discussion of Ho, "Hadhramis abroad".

[59] Zabbāl, "al-Mukallā", p. 82.

[60] In November 1955, the British Consul in Jeddah reported that he had already issued over 5000 Quʿayṭī passports, although he indicates no period. IO, R/20/C/1373, British Consul, Jeddah to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 24.11.1955.

there were rumours about restrictions, for example on remittances. More seriously, the Saudis demanded Yemeni visas from Hadhramis, possibly to support claims by the Imām to rule all of Yemen. After the intervention of the wealthy Saudi merchant of Hadhrami origin, Aḥmad Buqshān, this restriction was raised.[61] Later Buqshān, who originated from Wadi Dawʿan, became the major sponsor of the Hadhramis in Jeddah.[62]

The combination of work and pilgrimage makes the migration figures difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, they seem to indicate a change some time in the early 1960s.[63] For the period between 1959 and 1962, the data show a net return from Saudi Arabia of 1,188 people, while between 1963 and 1969, 6401 more people left Hadhramaut for Saudi Arabia than returned. Moreover, during the latter period, more people left than returned in each individual year with the exception of 1968. Given the proximity of Saudi Arabia, it is also likely that many travellers returned only for brief home visits. Real figures of migrants (and returnees) are bound to be higher as the statistics do not include the estimated 15,000 people who travelled overland.[64] It is possible that this increase in migration to Saudi Arabia occurred in response to a decision taken by the Saudi Ministry of the Interior in September 1961 to "allow the Hadhramis the pursuit of all professions and to simplify their [conditions of] sojourn."[65] However, only a few months later, they demanded securities from Hadhrami pilgrims in order to ensure their return to Hadhramaut after the pilgrimage.[66] Overall, it was estimated that between 150,000 and 180,000 Hadhramis lived in Saudi Arabia in 1969.

Although the overall figures for the Gulf countries including Kuwait are much lower (an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 Hadhramis lived there in 1969) it seems that the diaspora was a new one resulting directly from the pull factor of oil and the push factors discussed earlier.[67] It is likely that the relatively sudden influx of Hadhramis

[61] IO, R/20/C/2051, British Agent, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to the Government, Aden, 15.3.1956.

[62] On Buqshān's role, see Pritzkat, "The community", pp. 404–406.

[63] This in confirmed by the investigations of Redkin, Migration.

[64] For the figures, see *Handbook to the Eastern Aden Protectorate*, parts I & II, 1964, pp. 11f.; and Bā Maṭraf, al-Hijra al-yamaniyya, p. 60.

[65] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 136, 1.2.1962, p. 8.

[66] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 152, 7.6.1962, p. 8.

[67] For observations on Hadhrami migrants to Kuwait see Camelin, "Shihr, une grandissime cité . . .", pp. 330–338.

was also due to internal considerations in countries like Kuwait, Baḥrayn and the Emirates. By 1965, they seem to have considered replacing the large Iranian workforce in the Gulf. Hadhramis seemed good candidates among the Arabs because of their relatively high skills.[68] From 1960 onwards, 1,500 to 5,700 Hadhramis travelled between Hadhramaut and the Gulf annually. To these, one needs to add an unknown number of Hadhramis arriving from elsewhere.[69] For example, Arabs from Hyderabad kept numerous shops in the United Arab Emirates in the 1950s and 60s; played a role in the Dubai police force in the 1990s; and provided a supply of second, third or fourth wives for elderly men in the Emirates in the same decade.[70] After South Yemeni independence, a new wave of emigrants headed for the Gulf.

As yet, not very much is known about the Hadhrami communities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. So far, it seems that their overall composition resembled that of East Africa rather than that of the South East Asian diaspora. With the exception of Bin Maḥfūẓ, the wealthiest of its members came from Wadi Dawʿan. In contrast to the situation in Singapore, *sayyid*s did not figure among the leading merchant families, although a good number of them were very comfortably installed in Saudi Arabia.[71] There is scant evidence about their political orientations, but it seems that the Saudis favoured the *Irshādī*s and certain tribal elements. This might have been partly linked to tensions between the British and Saudi Arabia over borders and oil, as well as ideological affinities.[72]

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[68] IO, R/20/C/1831, Deputy High Commissioner, Aden to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 26.6.1965. I would like to thank Friedhelm Hartwig for sharing this information with me.

[69] Visa numbers are so low between 1959 and 1962 as to raise the question whether Hadhramis with a Hadhrami passport required visas at all, since the returnee numbers for these years are very much higher (between 839 and 2071). *Handbook to the Eastern Aden Protectorate*, parts I & II, 1964, pp. 11f. and Bā Maṭraf, al-Hijra al-yamaniyya, p. 60.

[70] Karen Leonard, South Asians in the Indian Ocean World: Language, Policing, and Gender Practices in Kuwait and the UAE, unpubl. paper presented to the conference *Cultural Exchange & Transformation in the Indian Ocean World*, UCLA 5.–6.4.2002.

[71] The names reiterated time and again as the wealthiest Hadhramis are Bin Maḥfūẓ, Bin Lādin, Buqshān, Bā Daḥdaḥ, Bāghlāf, Bā Khashab, al-ʿAmūdī, Bā Wazīr, Bin Saqr, Bā Rūm, Baḥlas, Baeshen (Bā ʿAshan?) and Bassamah (Bā Sāma? Bassāma?, Bā Shammākh?). Pritzkat, "The Community", p. 409; Field, *The Merchants*, p. 75; personal communication, Shaykh ʿUmar b. Aḥmad al-Sibāʿī Bā Daḥdaḥ, Jeddah, 29.3.2000.

[72] IO, R/20/C/2051, British Agent, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to the Government, Aden, 15.3.1956; for the context, see Lekon, The British, pp. 170f.

It is therefore likely that remittances from Saudi Arabia strength-
ened those who had not been playing a leading role in local politics
earlier, just as in the case of the East African diaspora. The question
of tribal rearmament, which could be observed in parts of the inte-
rior from the middle of the 1950s, can be partly explained by the
new financial means available from migration to Saudi Arabia, in
addition to heavy use of the overland routes for arms smuggling.[73]
In 1961, members of the al-ʿAmūdī family were accused of conspiring
with Beduins against the government in a revolutionary fashion.[74]
Members of prominent Hadhrami families in Saudi Arabia repeatedly
intervened on behalf of the Beduins in Hadhramaut, arguing that
they would need more support and education if troubles such as dis-
turbances of the peace were to be avoided. This in turn led to accu-
sations against Aḥmad Saʿīd Buqshān in 1961 that he was actively
supporting Beduin insurgency, possibly in connection with the al-
ʿAmūdi family.[75] A year later, a Hadhrami association in Jeddah was
put on trial for revolutionary activites.[76] In 1966, members of the Bā
Khashab and Buqshān families in Jeddah were reported to the British
by FLOSY. It denounced them for plotting with other wealthy Hadh-
ramis "to swing these tribesmen in a direction adverse to the revo-
lution", i.e., towards support of the rival National Liberation Front.[77]

Finally, Aden, which had long hosted a community of rich Hadhrami
merchants as well as Hadhrami labourers, became a major destination
of migrants. It is estimated that some 200,000 inhabitants from Wadi
Dawʿan flocked there in the 1950s, often in search of temporary
work.[78] Many engaged in manual and industrial labour and probably
became involved in the trade union movement which was evolving
in Aden at the time. By 1962, Hadhramis in Aden had their own
association, the Hadhrami Patriotic Association (al-Jamʿiyya al-Waṭaniyya
al-Ḥaḍramiyya).[79]

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[73] See, for example, IO, R/20/C/2054, Report by Assistant Adviser Northern
Areas (H. Daly) on the Activities of the Wafid, Kathiri Shenafir Association, dur-
ing the Visit of his Highness Sultan Sir Ali Abdel Karim of Lahedj to the Kathiri
State, 31.7.1956.
[74] al-Ṭalīʿa 147, 26.4.1962.
[75] al-Ṭalīʿa 112, 17.8.1961; 116, 7.9.1961 and 118, 28.9.1961.
[76] Bā Maḥsūn, al-Taṭawwur, p. 153.
[77] IO, R/20/C/1944, Statement by F.L.O.S.Y. on Saudi Arabian Activities in
the Eastern Aden Protectorate, enc. in Ag. D.A.B.A. to Resident Adviser, 18.7.1966.
[78] Redkin, Migration, pp. 9f. Given overall population figures, this seems an unre-
alistically high number.
[79] al-Ṭalīʿa 135, 25.1.1962, p. 6.

In addition, Aden often served as a stopping point on journeys elsewhere. Educated travellers were likely to call at the Hadhrami association where they would have encountered the changing political mood of their times. Saʿīd ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, an aspiring young intellectual who left Hadhramaut in 1939 in search of greener pastures, gave an account of such a sojourn in Aden just before World War II. He was probably quite typical of the young men who formed the educated and increasingly politicised elite that became the new leadership after the war. In February 1939, Ba Wazīr travelled to Aden with three students from the school of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana* on their way to Baghdad.[80] Bā Wazīr would have liked to join them but did not want to burden his parents with caring for his wife and two children. He therefore decided to travel to South East Asia to satisfy his spiritual as well as material needs. As he had no family there (Bā Wazīr had been born in Ghayl Bā Wazīr, i.e., on the coast) in contrast to most of his friends, he needed to wait for his father's imminent arrival from East Africa for approval and financial support.

In order to make good use of the time, he contacted Adeni intellectuals and clubs, frequenting in particular the Arabic Literary Club (*Nādī al-Adab al-ʿArabī*). It had been founded by Amīr Aḥmad Faḍl, the brother of Sultan ʿAbd al-Karīm of Laḥij, and was headed by Muḥammad ʿAlī Luqmān. Most of its members came from old Adeni families and played a role in Adeni politics until independence. For example, Luqmān became editor of the first Adeni newspaper, *Fatāt al-Jazīra*, founded in January 1940.[81] He was also headmaster of the first Arab secondary school in Aden and regarded as a leading reformer.[82] The club, founded at the suggestion of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Thaʿālibī, the early Tunisian nationalist who had visited Aden in 1925, also tried to involve leaders from the protectorate. This is exemplified by a letter to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣūr al-Kathīrī, which urged him to join and to support the club financially.[83] In the late 1930s, it was probably the most important Arab political organisation

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[80] The following recounts S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], pp. 30–36.

[81] About the newspaper see Luqman, "Education", pp. 265–267.

[82] On Muḥammad Luqmān and his nationalist ideas, see Nagi, "The Genesis", pp. 244–246, 248; Adhal, *al-Istiqlāl*, pp. 141f., fn. 2.

[83] On the Arabic Literary Club of Aden, see M. al-Jifrī, *Ḥaqāʾiq*, pp. 43f.; Nājī, "Dawr al-jamʿiyyāt", p. 8 and Lackner, *P. D. R. Yemen*, p. 27; on ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Thaʿālibī al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*, vol. 4, pp. 12f.; SMA, III;68, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī al-Jifrī to Sultan ʿAlī b. Manṣur, 18. Muḥarram 1348/27.6.1929.

of Aden. The club supported the view of a unitary Yemen comprising highland Yemen, Aden and the Protectorate. This vision owed much to the close contacts of reformers from all parts of Yemen who met in Aden.[84]

Bā Wazīr also met with leaders of other religious groups, such as the head of the (Indian Shīʿī) Bohra community with whom he discussed religion as well as Middle Eastern politics. He took private English lessons and was soon asked to take charge of the administration of *Madrasat al-Falāḥ*. Through these activities, he came in contact with a number of other reform associations that had sprung up in Aden, as well as with visitors. Thus, Bā Wazīr spoke at a reception for the prominent Wafdist politician and former President of the Egyptian Senate, Maḥmūd Basyūnī. He had stopped in Aden en route to India on a mission to mediate between Muslims and Hindus. Bā Wazīr's speech is remarkable as an early example of outspoken Arab-Islamic nationalism by a Hadhrami, even if we consider that he might have edited his words later and that the occasion required a certain kind of discourse. The meeting featured "important speeches in Arabic, Hindi, Persian and English".[85] Bā Wazīr also describes the flying of black flags and the closing of the markets upon the death of the Iraqi King Ghāzī I on April 4, 1939.

Bā Wazīr came in contact with the first generation of Adeni nationalists and was exposed to the wider arena of Arab nationalism.[86] Bā Wazīr's tale offers a first glimpse of the stirrings which, after World War II, were to develop into fully-fledged political activities directed at Yemen, India and eventually Aden itself. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Aden Association was founded with the aim of establishing Adeni independence within the British Commonwealth. In parallel, a trade union movement emerged, which was boosted by the establishment of a refinery in Little Aden in 1952, which ushered in the rapid expansion of Aden port until 1958 when it became second only to New York. This went hand in hand with a rapid influx of labour. After a series of strikes in the early 1950s, sustained labour conflict emerged in 1956. It resulted in the foundation of the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), which united a significant

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[84] Nagi, "The Genesis", pp. 244f.; on the clubs in Aden, cf. Ṭāhir, "al-Nawādī".
[85] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], p. 35.
[86] For other prominent visitors to Aden, and contacts between nationalists there and elsewhere, cf. Muheirez, "Cultural Development", pp. 205–211.

number of the hitherto highly fragmented trade unions for the first time. In addition to voicing demands for the improvement of working conditions, ATUC became the mouthpiece of Yemeni nationalism in Aden. Highly influenced by Nasserist policies, it rejected the 'Aden only' aims of the Aden Association, which became particularly pronounced after the mid-1950s. ATUC opposed British immigration policies which favoured a Commonwealth workforce over labour from Yemen and the Protectorate.[87] It also opposed an earlier nationalist organisation, the South Arabian League, which will be discussed below and which was branded as reactionary because of its contacts with Saudi Arabia.[88] Although Hadhramaut remained quite firmly an entity in its own right until 1967, these developments did not fail to make an impression on the many visitors, and contacts intensified during the 1950s and 60s.

A New Generation in Hadhramaut

Many of the Hadhrami nationalists and revolutionaries stemmed from the old elite of *sayyid*s and *mashāyikh*—one need only think of the likes of ʿAlī Sālim al-Bīḍ, Fayṣal al-ʿAṭṭās, Nāṣir al-Saqqāf, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh and Ḥaydar Abū Bakr al-ʿAṭṭās. They were all *sayyid*s who emerged as leading adherents of the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN, *Ḥarakat al-Qawmiyyīn al-ʿArab*) and made their careers in the National Liberation Front. Lekon, in his discussion of the changing collaborative relationship between British and Hadhramis, has interpreted this as an attempt by the political elite "to keep their feet in both camps", that of the emerging nationalists as well as that of the British.[89] Using the careers of Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf (1915–1988),[90] an Assistant Political Officer in the early 1950s, deputy Quʿayṭī *wazīr* in the early 1960s and nationalist author in the journal *al-Ṭalīʿa*; Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh, Quʿayṭī Director of Education and member of the State Council in the

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[87] For a brief account of these early activities, see Nagi, "The Genesis", pp. 248f. and 255–258; Adhal, *al-Istiqlāl*, pp. 139–148; Halliday, *Arabia*, pp. 180–189; Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 323–331; al-Miṣrī, *al-Najm*, pp. 85–94; Bujra, "Urban Elites"; Dresch, *A History*, pp. 54–56, 71–73; Lackner, *P. D. R. Yemen*, pp. 26–30.

[88] Kostiner, *The Struggle*, pp. 43f.

[89] Lekon, The British, p. 358.

[90] For a short biography, see Khurayṣ, *Dumūʿ*, pp. 24–26.

1960s; and the Kathīrī *wazīr* Bin Sumayṭ as examples, he shows
convincingly how these individuals balanced their cooperation with
the state apparatus, the British, and their establishment of national-
ist credentials.[91] But while it would only be human to assume that
some degree of opportunism helps to explain such otherwise con-
tradictory behaviour, I suggest that it might be useful to embed these
cases in the wider picture of generational change. This began in the
early 1950s but by no means did it bear fruit quickly, as is shown
in the following description by a Kuwaiti journalist in 1965:

> The rare hushed laughter in this closed society hides a silent intellectual
> struggle between the elders [*shuyūkh*] and the youth [*shabāb*] both of
> whom live in the Wadi: The elders think that the youths are extremist
> and hotheaded . . . and the educated youth who studied abroad is con-
> fused . . . he wants to apply what he saw and learned but cannot, in
> front of him there are obstacles and steep tracks, embodied in the cus-
> toms and traditions.[92]

Karl Mannheim has pointed out that people living at a certain time
and sharing particular experiences can become a generation in the
sense of a concrete social group. Similar to classes, they participate
"in the common destiny of this historical and social unit".[93] Obviously,
not all participants in this historical process can be lumped together:

> Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said
> to be part of the same actual generation; while those groups within the
> same actual generation which work up the material of their common
> experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generation
> units.[94]

Thus, it makes sense to consider the reformers discussed in chapter
VI as a generation, although their different socio-economic positions
(merchants, intellectuals) and different orientations (i.e., *'Alawī, Irshādī*)
might allow us to construct different "generation units". The transition
from the late 19th century to the 20th seems more gradual than
that from the early 20th century to the post World War II genera-
tion. Therefore, the concept of a 'new generation' appears to become
most relevant for the latter group which will be discussed here.
Because of the growing speed of change, the chances for the for-

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[91] Lekon, The British, pp. 358–363.
[92] Zabbāl, "al-Mukallā", p. 87.
[93] Mannheim, *Essays*, p. 303, for the concept of generation see pp. 276–320.
[94] Mannheim, *Essays*, p. 304.

mation of a social group according to Karl Mannheim's criteria were particularly good. One can argue for that group that "a concrete bond [. . . was] created between members of a generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic de-stabilization."[95] Associations and clubs, which multiplied after World War II with the return of many migrants,[96] provided a ready place for common socialisation, as did the new schools which were created under Shaykh al-Qaddāl's auspices.

Obviously, any proper sociological study of the members of this "actual (postwar) generation" would need to distinguish between a number of "generation units". Unfortunately, the historical record tells us very little about peasants who might have been mobilised by Bā Ḍāwī's activities. Nor do we know very much about young qabīlīs who were not part of any association but who were later clearly counted as supporters of the new nationalist forces through their participation in various events. We would need to distinguish between returnees from different diasporas who made an impact on the political and social life of their places of origin.[97] In short, a wide prosopographic basis would be required to provide a sound basis for such an examiniation.

The extant evidence tends to focus on the urban nationalist leaders. It gives some insight into the motivations of the descendants of the old elite to embrace nationalism instead of continuing the cooperation with the British. Were there any specific experiences which distinguish this generation from their forefathers? Already in 1939 van der Meulen had noted that the generation following that of Sayyid Abū Bakr had stood aloof from the modernisation process so enthusiastically promoted by their elders and formed an idle and somewhat discontented *jeunesse dorée*. It regarded the process of "massive social deconstruction" described in the last chapter rather sceptically.[98] A matching study should investigate the tribesmen about whom Sayyid Abū Bakr commented in the early 1950s that "the meaning has gone out of their lives".[99]

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[95] Mannheim, *Essays*, p. 303.
[96] Bā Maḥsūn, al-Taṭawwur, p. 150.
[97] For a short but perceptive insight into changes introduced and experienced by migrants, notably with regard to the daily lives of women, see Zabbāl, "al-Mukallā", pp. 90f., 94; for their political importance, Halliday, *Arabia*, p. 179.
[98] van der Meulen, *Aden*, pp. 189–192.
[99] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, introduction to 3rd ed., p. 36.

At the same time, a part of the young urban elite grasped the new educational and cultural opportunities open to them. As in Aden, the cultural clubs and associations of Hadhramaut became increasingly politicised and expressed this in the idiom of nationalism. When Harold Ingrams visited the intermediary school in Ghayl Bā Wazīr in 1953, he read on a wall-newspaper:

> We are gratefull for all the Sudanese teachers have done to help us start our schools, but now we have got our first B.A. and can manage them ourselves and we would like to say goodbye to the Sudanese and to the British.[100]

Ingrams is right in attributing this to a "more robust modern variety" of nationalism. Obviously, certain elements of a nationalist discourse had already appeared earlier, as noted in the context of the journalism of the 1920s.[101] After World War II, when full-fledged nationalist movements evolved, Hadhramis became influenced by various trends in Arab nationalism. Although many rejected the idea of a larger Yemen, whether within the limits of the British controlled regions or including Highland Yemen, they would nevertheless have considered themselves as Arab nationalists. Therefore, just as Kostiner has convincingly argued that Yemeni nationalism had very distinct traits and "was anchored in the unique variety of different and sometimes contradictory influences and forces characteristic of the milieu of the country",[102] the same can be said about the Hadhrami variety, which differed from developments in Aden and the Western Aden Protectorate.

In al-Mukallā, the Sultan's Library emerged as the central venue for cultural and increasingly political gatherings.[103] Weekly lectures in the library became a major feature in the intellectual calendar of al-Mukallā, and began to include political topics. When Shaykhān al-Ḥibshī of the South Arabian League visited Hadhramaut in 1965, the library was the obvious venue for his lecture. Such lectures could attract as many as one thousand listeners.[104]

Many of the associations can be traced back to the clubs of the 1930s and 40s described in chapter VI. In Say'ūn, *Nādī al-Shabāb* emerged as a centre of activity. It had been founded in 1357/1938–39

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[100] H. Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, introduction to 3rd ed., p. 36.
[101] *al-Mishkāh* 2, 10.2.1923, p. 1; cf. chapter VI.
[102] Kostiner, "Arab Radical Politics", p. 471.
[103] Cf. above, chapter VI.
[104] Personal communication, Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, 1.4.2000.

by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣabbān (d. 1999), who had studied in Saudi Arabia and joined the Education Department in al-Mukallā in 1944.[105] The club, later headed by ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Aḥmad Bā Kathīr and Ḥusayn b. Shaykh al-Ḥibshī, issued three journals. The first was the aforementioned *Zahrat al-Shabāb*. Its later publications, apparently also distributed in handwritten form, were called *Nahḍat al-Shabāb* (Awakening of the Youth) and *al-Shabāb* (Youth). As all of its presidents were well-known local poets and authors, the club defined its mission as "cultural and social". In addition to literary events and competitions, it organised lectures on the history of Islam and liberation movements in other Arab countries. As it became more politicised and attracted an increasingly wider membership (in 1963 it had 300 registered members), the authorities became wary. This in turn strengthened the nationalist determination of the club's members and increased its popular credibility. In 1966, the club was closed and only allowed to reopen after the revolution of 1967.[106]

The example of al-Ṣabbān (about whose background unfortunately rather little is known to me) is instructive as it shows how once again it was a few individuals who dominated the intellectual and political life of a town. In 1954, al-Ṣabbān headed the city council of Sayʾūn. Later, he also became secretary of the *Jamʿiyyat al-Fallāḥiyyīn* (probably the Peasants' Association which was refounded in 1959) and cooperated in the founding of schools for peasants. In addition, he administered the Charitable Pharmacy (*al-Ṣaydala al-khayriyya*) of Sayʾūn which made medicine available to wider strata of the population.[107]

In the early 1960s, al-Ṣabbān became secretary of the Party of National Unity (*Ḥizb al-Ittiḥād al-Waṭanī*) which had been founded in Sayʾūn in 1956 under the leadership of the poet and well-to-do merchant Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī al-Ḥāmid (1320/1902–3–1386/1966–67).[108] The

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[105] For al-Ṣabbān's biography, see the interview with him in *Āfāq* 14, November 1989, pp. 76–81, p. 77 for a list of the different positions he held in reform and nationalist organisations. Unfortunately, this leaves us somewhat guessing about the chronology.

[106] Aḥmad Bā Kathīr, "Nādī al-shabāb"; the club is also briefly mentioned by Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt", p. 174.

[107] The document setting up the pharmacy, dated 29. Ṣafar 1383/20.7.1963 is contained in SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-ṭullābiyya. In contrast to Ṣabbān's own contention, it does not mention him as one of the founding members of the pharmacy.

[108] IO, R/20/C/2054, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Assistant Adviser Northern Areas, Saiʾun, 9.6.1956 and Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Assistant Adviser Northern Areas, 19.6.1956.

statutes of this party with its emphasis on education, health and trade
read like one of the general reform programmes of the 1930s. Their
widespread use of the term 'homeland' (*waṭan*) was new. The party
purported to promote "the spreading of progressive principles" while
paying ample respect to the Islamic spirit (*al-rūḥ al-islāmiyya*) of the
country. It aimed to raise living conditions of the "working and poor
classes" whose rights it claimed to defend.[109] The party mainly focussed
on the Kathīrī sultanate and the preservation of its interests, particularly
in oil negotiations. Its membership included merchants, members of
the sultan's family and high ranking officials. They demanded the
unity of Hadhramaut (not least due to the continuing problem of
double taxation), a legislative council and a constitution, the official
registering of political parties and freedom of the press.[110] Supportive
of the UN resolution demanding the independence of South Arabia,
the party nevertheless demanded more British aid.[111]

To complete the picture, it is noteworthy that al-Ṣabbān started
to direct the local printing company in 1964. After the revolution,
he continued his political career by taking responsibility for the legal
and financial matters of the municipality of Say'ūn. From 1978
onwards, he was director of the Department of Culture, Research
and Antiquities.

As indicated above, students were an important factor in the politi-
cisation on the coast, particularly in Ghayl Bā Wazīr with its con-
centration of schools and in nearby al-Mukallā. Their various activities
and the dispute over the setting up of a students' union have already
been discussed in the previous chapter. With the growing influence
of Nasserism in the mid-1950s, this movement gathered speed.[112] As
far as Ghayl Bā Wazīr was concerned, the annual 'end of the year'
event became a particular rallying point for politicised students.[113]

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[109] SMA, al-Hay'āt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-
ṭullābiyya, document entitled: Ḥizb al-Ittiḥād al-Waṭanī and IO, R/20/C/2054, An
Introduction to the Aims of the Hizb, encl. in Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Assistant
Adviser Northern Areas, 19.6.1956.

[110] The law for the registration of associations, which included parties, associa-
tions, clubs and other types of organisations, was published on 20.7.1965 as *Qānūn
tasjīl al-jamʿiyyāt*, al-Mukallā: Maṭābiʿ al-Mustaqbal.

[111] Lekon, The British, pp. 347f.

[112] Boustead, *Wind*, pp. 202f. For the wider importance of the Nasserist influences on
different parts of the Yemen, which cannot be underestimated, cf. Dresch, *A History*,
p. 61; Balfour-Paul, *The end*, pp. 66, 148f.; Halliday, *Arabia*, pp. 21f. An interesting
investigation into Nasserist influences on local opionion is Dostal, "Vorläufige
Ergebnisse".

[113] For this and the following see Bā Ṣurra, "Intifāḍat talāmīdh".

The first such ceremony in 1957 featured sporting competitions, followed by poems and speeches about "Port Said and the aggression on Egypt", i.e., the Anglo-French attack during the Suez War. In spite of the presence of Mr. "Sargent" (Robert Serjeant?) and Mr. Griffiths, the authorities did not intervene. They reacted neither to the exhibit of a picture of British soldiers being shot in Port Saʿīd nor to the performance of a play about Saladin which "expressed the situation of the Arabs in the present time and how the colonists relied on traitors, but their comspiracies [sic!] failed." Therefore, the occasion was considered a "success of the nationalists in supervising education without relying on foreigners".[114]

The school's celebration in March 1958 became another major nationalist event. A letter of solidarity from Jamīla Bū Ḥirayd, a prominent member of the Algerian National Liberation Front, was read out to the audience. Students presented their own texts and poems in which they dealt with Arab unity, the Algerian liberation movement, the (Palestinian?) refugee crisis, the Egyptian revolution, and discussed the prospects of petroleum finds in Hadhramaut. If we are to believe Bā Ṣurra, the Resident who attended the event was most annoyed by the performance of a short play about Port Saʿīd. A second Egyptian play, fittingly entitled "*The course of betrayal*" was performed the next evening. It decried Arab states for cooperating with imperialism.[115] It seems that the Resident's attendance and reaction caused the event to become a state affair. The Resident's attention resulted from the earlier celebration and possibly from the formation of the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt in February 1958, which in some ways marked a high point for Arab nationalism. Much to the dismay of the British, Imām Aḥmad decided to join the union, primarily because of his opposition to British expansion in the Aden Protectorate.[116]

A few days after the event, the Sultan's Council decided to dismiss the headmaster of the school, Sālim Yaʿqūb Bā Wazīr. This was greeted by a demonstration in which students from most schools in Ghayl Bā Wazīr participated. When teachers decided to go on

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[114] IO, R/20/B/2458, copy of a letter from Saʾid ʿAbdul Khair to Ahmad ʿAidrus Fadaʾq, al-Mukalla, 2.4.1957.
[115] Bā Ṣurra, "Intifāḍāt talāmīdh", p. 146. I am not sure from where Carapico, *Civil Society*, pp. 9. has her version of the play being set on the Arabian Peninsula during early Islamic times, as this is not mentioned by Bā Ṣurra whom she indicates as her source.
[116] Dresch, *A History*, p. 82; Trevaskis, *Shades*, pp. 68f.

strike in support of the headmaster, four of them were suspended
and the Sultan's Council decided to try both the headmaster and
the teachers.[117] The subsequent decision to suspend teaching at the
school, and to send students back to their towns and villages of ori-
gin, had the unwarranted consequence of quickly publicising an event
which now became a symbolic and patriotic rejection of imperialism.[118]

Support for the students and their headteacher spread quickly.
Tribal shaykhs expressed their worry in letters to the Residency,
while in Aden, students and journals took up the issue. The students'
cause was supported in al-Mukallā by the Cultural Club (*al-Nādī al-
Thaqāfī*), founded in early 1957, which had for some time worried
the British authorities.[119] Its membership consisted of Quʿaytī officials
and school masters, which explains its strong focus on educational
issues. A number of these officials had been involved in the abortive
attempt to create a Hadrami student union, most notably the club's
president, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh, who by 1957 had
become Deputy Director of Education. According to British intelligence,
the club opposed the Residency and called for the non-recognition
of al-Qaddāl (by now Quʿaytī *wazīr*) and the expulsion of "coloniz-
ers".[120] The collection of donations in support of the Algerian war
of liberation had been among the club's earliest activities, which indi-
cate its pan-Arab orientation.[121] A month and a half before events
in Ghayl, a Residency Official had warned other British staff that
the club was about to turn into a political party.[122] It seems that the
Cultural Club's decision to back the protest in Ghayl and to send
a delegation to the Director of Education pleading for the resump-
tion of teaching, convinced the British to close it. Less than a month
after the meeting, the club was suspended by the Sultan's Council,
allegedly because it undermined the educational system of the Quʿaytī
sultanate. In a language closely echoing the British views, the Sultan's

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[117] MM, Mukhtaṣar ijtimāʿ majlis al-sulṭān al-munʿaqad bi-dār al-wazīr 25./
27.3.1958.
[118] This view clearly transpires in the declaration by the teachers, Bā Ṣurra,
"Intifāḍāt talāmīdh", p. 148.
[119] Bā Ṣurra, "Intifāḍāt talāmīdh", pp. 149f.
[120] IO, R/20/C/2054, Josh Snell, Mukalla to Assistant Adviser, Northern Areas,
3.2.1958.
[121] MM, Mukhtaṣar ijtimāʿ majlis al-sulṭān al-munʿaqad bi-dār al-wazīr 6.9.1958.
[122] IO, R/20/C/2054, Josh Snell, Mukalla to Assistant Adviser, Northern Areas,
3.2.1958. According to Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza", p. 174, the club had only
been founded on February 8, 1958.

Council recorded in its minutes that the club "encouraged irresponsible elements in the country to become active in ways opposed to the common good".[123] Shortly thereafter, the Youth Club of Tarīm was warned of a similar fate if it started to political agitation.[124]

By the end of April, the school was reopened. This did not prevent the further politicisation of Hadhrami students. In 1960, Hadhrami students at Aden College, a secondary school organised along British lines, founded a "Temporary Committee of the Club of the Hadhrami Student Union". The Student Union was finally legalised in 1960 for the Kathīrī and 1961 for the Qu'aytī sultanate. Its aims were to "end the void", educate the students, and enhance links among themselves as well as with their "brother Arab students in all parts of the Arab fatherland".[125] The Union became a major agent of the Movement of Arab Nationalists, one of the forces fighting for and eventually gaining superiority in the wider South Yemeni nationalist movement.[126]

To the clubs and associations above, many others could be added.[127] In the late 1950s, sports clubs, about which relatively little is known, gained importance. While only four such clubs were registered in 1956 (all of them in the Qu'aytī sultanate) they seem to have quickly multiplied thereafter.[128] Resident Adviser Boustead reported how football matches drew huge crowds.[129] What he did not mention was that many sports' competitions were accompanied by performances of theatre plays. Although these were very often abridged translations of Western authors such as Shakespeare, theatre was increasingly used as a means for political agitation. As has been shown, this was the case in the incident in Ghayl Bā Wazīr. Theatre performances became a regular feature during the 1960s when the Hadhrami Student Union assumed its activities. In 1964, a play by a local author, entitled

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[123] MM, Mukhtaṣar ijtimāʿ majlis al-sulṭān al-munʿaqad bi-dār al-wazīr 21.4.1958; cf. the protocol of the meeting on 24.4.1958. For the British perspective, see IO, R/20/C/2054, Intelligence Report, 23.4.1958, by Hugh Boustead; Lekon, The British, p. 345.

[124] IO, R/20/C/2054, Assistant Adviser, Northern Areas to Arthur, Mukalla, 26.4.1958.

[125] al-Ṭalīʿa 102, 8.6.1961, p. 6.

[126] Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza", pp. 175f. with a list of its activities.

[127] For a general observation on the following, see Carapico, Civil Society, pp. 102f.

[128] IO, R/20/B/2458, Clubs & Societies in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, 26.9.1956; Zabbāl, "al-Mukallā", p. 83, reported that, by 1965, al-Mukallā alone had eight sports clubs.

[129] Boustead, Wind, p. 188.

"*Inspired by Radfān*" (*Min Waḥīy Radfān*), was staged in al-Shiḥr, allud-
ing to the famous fighting of the preceding year.[130] Ḥurayḍa-born
Ḥaydar Abū Bakr al-ʿAṭṭās (b. 1939–40 as son of a former emigrant
to Indonesia) is an example of a later politician participating in a
sports club. In January 1962, he was elected Administrative Secretary of
the al-Mukallā Sports Club.[131] A year later, he was denied a scholar-
ship to study engineering in Britain on grounds of his anti-British
and pro-NLF stance. Among other things, he had participated in
demonstrations when the Governor of Aden visited Hadhramaut in
1961.[132] Instead, he went to study in Cairo, graduated in 1966, and
subsequently became responsible for public works in Hadhramaut.
From 1969, he headed various South Yemeni ministries until he
became Prime Minister of South Yemen in 1985 and its President
in 1986. Later, he was Prime Minister of unified Yemen until the
Civil War of 1994.[133]

Al-ʿAṭṭās' political socialisation seems to have taken place during his
intermediary and secondary school days, i.e., around the mid-1950s.
Returning migrants had brought nationalist ideas to Hadhramaut
and influenced younger students. For a number of later nationalists,
study abroad proved another important influence. Muḥammad ʿAbd
al-Qādir Bā Faqīh related how in 1946 students from Aden, the
(Western) Protectorate and Hadhramaut who were then in Sudan
followed a call published in *Fatāt al-Jazīra*. They formed what was
possibly the first South Yemeni organisation, the activities of which
remain unclear. The composition of the organisation's committee
was indicative of the importance of such experiences: it was headed
by ʿAbdallāh ʿAlī al-Jifrī, later a leading member of the League of
Southern Arabia; and Qaḥṭān al-Shaʿbī, co-founder of the South
Arabian League, later one of the NLF leaders and the first South
Yemeni President. Bā Faqīh was another member of the commit-
tee.[134] While a systematic study of the careers of students abroad
would merit an investigation in its own right, the present discussion

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[130] al-Millāḥī, al-Masraḥ and personal communication, 14.10.1996.
[131] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 135, 25.1.1962, p. 8.
[132] IO, R/20/C/1944, Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary, week ending
25.2.1962.
[133] Specialist diplomatic source. Ḥaydar Abū Bakr al-ʿAṭṭās is related to the for-
mer Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, ʿAlī al-ʿAṭṭās. Ḥaydar is a descendent
of the same branch of the al-ʿAṭṭās family as ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlawī, who was dis-
cussed in chapter IV. Arai, The History, chart 2.
[134] Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 6.1.1993 and 22.3.1993.

will limit itself to one *sayyid* who played a role in the Southern Yemeni political scene for some time.[135]

The biography of ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl b. Yaḥyā (1923–1987) is typical of the changing political climate as well as the profound impact which studies abroad could have.[136] Sayyid ʿAlī, a grandson of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shihāb al-Dīn (who has already been discussed in chapter IV) was born and raised in Masīlat Āl Shaykh. He first attended a Koran school and, in the 1930s, two private schools established by the Āl al-ʿAydarūs. One of his teachers was Ḥamza b. ʿUmar al-ʿAydarūs, an opponent of the Dutch in Indonesia who had studied in Iraq and then returned to Hadhramaut, apparently carrying with him very strong anti-imperialist sentiments.[137] Sayyid ʿAlī later attended the *ribāṭ* in Tarīm. He quickly found the more secular *Ukhuwwa* school more congenial and studied there from 1936 to 1938. Thereafter, he spent some time in Sayʾūn, studying with a member of the Bā Kathīr family. Between 1938 and 1945 or 1946, Sayyid ʿAlī lived in Masīlat Āl Shaykh, farming his land and issuing a handwritten journal by the name of *al-Ḥalba*. When the British started to become involved in Hadhrami agriculture, ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl is reported to have defended the peasants on a number of occasions. According to his son, his scholarship to the military school in al-Mukallā, which trained future military and civilian leaders, aimed at ridding the Wadi of a troublemaker.

In al-Mukallā, one of Sayyid ʿAlī's teachers was Ḥusayn al-Bār who edited *al-Akhbār*, the official mouthpiece of the Quʿayṭī sultanate, between 1952 and 1956. From 1960 to 1964, he published *al-Rāʾid*. ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl did not last long at the school. Within a few months, he organised resistance to the salute to the British flag. He also refused to greet the Governor of Aden during his visit to Hadhramaut, an offence for which he was due to be tried by the military court. With the help of al-Bār, he escaped to Masīlat Āl Shaykh where he founded a cultural club and shortly thereafter joined the *Ukhuwwa* school as

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[135] Unfortunately, the available material on Bā Faqīh does not continue systematically until independence, but breaks off in the 1950s, otherwise, he might have proven to be a better case study due to his membership in the ASP and NLF.

[136] Where not indicated otherwise, the following is based on Ibn Yaḥyā, "Mutābaʿa".

[137] Ibn Yaḥyā, "Mutābaʿa", p. 18. Harold Ingrams, Report of a Tour, p. 125 and 134, had already noted that Hadhramis in Indonesia with contacts to Egypt, Syria and Iraq were far more vociferous in demanding national independence than people in Hadhramaut, so that it is not surprising that Ibn ʿAqīl was influenced by a returnee.

teacher.[138] At the same time, he was drawn into political life in Tarīm.

Together with Shaykhān al-Ḥibshī, an Indonesian-born Hadhrami who had studied in Iraq and was invited to reorganise the al-Kāf school in 1947, Sayyid ʿAlī participated in a committee demanding Hadhrami unity (*Hayʾat Waḥdat Ḥaḍramawt*). Similar to the Party of Hadhrami Unity discussed below, the committee was supported by some leading Kathīrī officials who resented double taxation.[139] It found support among the *sayyid*s of Dawʿan, among them the former Quʿayṭī *wazīr*, Ḥāmid al-Miḥḍār. The ʿAmūdī tribe also expressed agreement with its demands, which included educational, economic and judicial reform.[140] Interestingly, the movement, which was supported by future members of the South Arabian League, Shaykhān al-Ḥibshī and ʿUmar Miḥḍār al-Kāf, as well as by ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh and Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf, was suspected by "some people on the coast" to be "an effort on the part of the seyids to regain their traditional power in a new disguise".[141]

In the same year, ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl was selected to lead the group of five students chosen by *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* to study on Syrian scholarships in Damascus at the intermediary and secondary school level.[142] In Damascene student circles, he met Michel ʿAflaq and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Bīṭār and joined the Baʿth-Party, becoming a prime propagator of its aims among Hadhrami and Syrian students. He began to publish articles on the situation in Hadhramaut in Syrian, Iraqi and Adeni newspapers. In August 1949, the Egyptian Wafdist newspaper *al-Miṣrī* received an article in which he voiced strong criticism of the British administration. Prime among his accusations were that

> the administration has failed (a) to set up agricultural credit bank to guard against famines (b) to reach agreement with Dutch on release of Hadhrami funds in Java (c) to pacify the Beduin and establish security (d) to unite the two "Emirates" of the Hadhramaut (e) to grant remission of customs dues on imported foodstuffs destined for famine areas.[143]

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[138] Ibn Yaḥyā, "Mutābaʿa", pp. 21–23.

[139] Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 118; Lekon, The British, p. 302; Yousif, British Policy, p. 226.

[140] Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 13.1.1993, who dates the orgins of the Dawʿanī movement to 1946.

[141] IO, R/20/C/1357, Eastern Aden Protectorate, Most Important Events During 1946.

[142] Sulaymān, *al-Tarbiya*, vol. I, p. 158 with a picture of the student group; for this and the following Ibn Yaḥyā, "Mutābaʿa", pp. 26–30.

[143] PRO, FO 371/74960, Telegram from British Middle East Office, Cairo to Foreign Office, 5.8.1949.

The British suggested to *al-Miṣrī* that the article should not be published. The Embassy in Syria confirmed that a similar article had been published in the Damascene *al-Inqilāb*, but that otherwise they knew little about Ibn ʿAqīl or the educational mission.[144]

During his stay in Damascus, Ibn ʿAqīl authored a small book on his homeland in order to inform Arab students about Hadhramaut. He described his homeland as "a natural part of Yemen" and "a region with its own history and its active ambitious people".[145] This reflects how a young Baʿthist viewed Hadhrami modern history and politics. He argued that Yemen, which rightfully considered Hadhramaut as part of its territory, had always refused to recognise the British Protectorate, while the British continually extended their influence because of Hadhramaut's strategic importance.[146] Intent on stressing the wider Arab connections and the nature of Hadhramis, the book also gives a brief survey of Hadhrami economy, society, culture and migrations. It therefore presents a strong image of a region in its own right which, however, was unjustly divided into two sultanates exercising "downright tyranny".[147] The elite of enlightened nationalists, Ibn ʿAqīl argued, eventually hoped for greater Yemeni or Arab unity. Because of "unnatural conditions" in the region such as tribalism, Hadhrami unity needed to be realised in a first step. This was only possible through proper popular representation.[148]

Ibn ʿAqīl describes the first political parties in Hadhramaut with a clear bias for the above-mentioned *Hayʾat Waḥdat Ḥaḍramawt*, in which he had participated himself and which, he claimed, was supported by the little-known Hadhrami League (*Rābiṭa Ḥaḍramiyya*) in al-Mukallā and the National Association (*al-Jamʿiyya al-Waṭaniyya*) in Aden.[149] Its opponents were organised in the National Party (*al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī*) which aimed at a union that gave precedence to the Quʿayṭīs. It had been founded at the initiative of the sultan, not unlike its Kathīrī counterpart, the Committee Demanding the Rights of the Kathīrī State (*Lajnat al-Muṭalaba bi-Ḥuqūq al-Dawla al-Kathīriyya*).[150] Ibn

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[144] PRO, FO 371/74960, British Embassy, Damascus to Foreign Office, 5.8.1949.

[145] ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, introduction.

[146] ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 18f.

[147] ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 23, cf. pp. 24, 72f.

[148] ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 71–73.

[149] Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 20.1.1993 mentions that the *Rābiṭa* had come into existence by the summer of 1947, but professes ignorance as to its fate.

[150] ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 70f. Ibn ʿAqīl's view was basically confirmed by the British, IO, R/20/B/2433, Boustead, 'Note on the National Party', encl. in

'Aqīl conceded that none of these parties were based on clear ide-
ological principles (the contrast to his view of the Ba'th Party is
rather obvious) but were influenced by local and tribal clannish-
ness.[151] One might argue that Ibn 'Aqīl's views were vindicated by
the failure of Residency proposals for a Hadhrami federation, put
forward in the early 1950s in response to suggestions from Kathīrī
*sayyid*s due to the distrust between the potential partners involved.[152]

In 1954, Ibn 'Aqīl was engaged as a teacher by the Kuwaiti
Ministry of Education and in the following year moved his family
to Kuwait, too. He immediately plunged himself into the cultural
life, writing articles, organising and giving lectures, and participat-
ing in literary events. He became the Ba'th Party representative for
Kuwait and Yemen, trying to found branches in various Gulf emi-
rates and corresponding with teachers in Aden.[153] At the same time,
he helped Hadhrami teachers to find employment in Kuwait, organ-
ised scholarships for Yemeni students and support for schools in
Hadhramaut. Furthermore, he assisted the Kathīrī government in
secret negotiations with a Japanese oil company which aimed at cir-
cumventing the British monopoly and presumably evading a split of
revenues with the Qu'aytīs. However, the sultanate failed to pursue
an independent policy in this matter.[154]

After the revolution in North Yemen in 1962, Ibn 'Aqīl decided
to return to Yemen. He did not find employment in Aden and settled
in Say'ūn where he became director of *Madrasat al-Nahḍa*. He par-
ticipated actively in the national and cultural movement in Hadhramaut
and turned his school into a political and cultural centre. In political
terms, he tried to spread Ba'thist ideas by founding the Workers'
Association (*Jamʿiyyat al-ʿUmmāl*) in Tarīm, working with similar asso-
ciations in Say'ūn, and attempting to link them to the Aden Trade
Union Congress, the major nationalist association.[155] A number of

Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 29.12.1950,
p. 1; on the early National Party and its links to Qu'aytī interests, cf. A. Bā Wazīr,
Shuhadāʾ, p. 52, ibid., pp. 53–55, on the Hadhrami League.
    [151] 'Alī b. 'Aqīl, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 71, he uses the word *ʿaṣabiyya*, which is anathema
to the Ba'th vocabulary.
    [152] Lekon, The British, pp. 318–321.
    [153] IO, R/20/C/1944, The Ba'athist Movement and Aden, 18.11.1963, Aden
Intelligence Centre.
    [154] Ibn Yaḥyā, "Mutāba'a", pp. 31–34.
    [155] On the very limited impact of the Ba'th in Yemen, see al-Miṣrī, *al-Najm*, pp.
101f.

documents from this time show that a Higher Committee of the Peasants' and Workers' Associations was founded, which is possibly identical with the 'League of Hadhrami Workers'. It strove for better job security and an improvement in working conditions. Although Ibn 'Aqīl's name does not appear on these documents, it is likely that he was somehow involved.[156] The youth and government officials of Say'ūn and Tarīm seem to have been reluctant to accept Ba'thist ideas. Students of *Madrasat al-Nahḍa* refused to name their school newspaper "al-Ba'th" and thus link themselves to one particular party.[157]

After trying to organise a nationalist conference that was outlawed, Ibn 'Aqīl was forced to resign from his teaching post and moved to Aden in 1965. After a year spent on political work, Ibn 'Aqīl was elected to the National Leadership of the Ba'th Party as the Yemeni representative and returned to Syria.[158] He helped to organise military and material support for South Yemeni insurgents and North Yemeni revolutionaries in spite of their broad Nasserist orientation and the bitterness between Ba'thists and Nasserists following the split of the United Arab Republic in 1961. He was also looking after Yemeni students sent to Syria for their studies. Threatened with arrest after Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad's coup in 1970, he fled to Beirut and from there returned to Yemen in 1971 where he spent some time in Say'ūn before joining the newly founded Yemeni Centre for Cultural Studies and Museums.[159] It was presumably his Ba'thist orientation which prevented him from playing a more openly political role after 1970.

From Stable Chiefdoms to Fragile States: The Changing Nature of Hadhrami Politics in the 1950s and Early 1960s

How did the new generation of youthful Hadhrami leaders envisage the future? As discussed in the previous section, they tended to express their aims in vaguely nationalist terms which only rarely were clearly

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[156] SMA, al-Hay'āt al-sha'biyya wa-l-jam'iyyāt al-'ummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-ṭullābiyya, undated document which records the founding of a "Supreme Committee of the Workers' and Peasants' Associations"; documents of 4.1.1964 (Dustūr rābiṭat al-'ummāl al-ḥaḍārim) and of 9.1.1964 (untitled, marking the accession of a number of people and organisations to the Supreme Committee).

[157] IO, R/20/C/1944, The Ba'athist Movement and Aden, 18.11.1963, Aden Intelligence Centre.

[158] Ibn Yaḥyā, "Mutāba'a", pp. 35–39.

[159] Ibn Yaḥyā, "Mutāba'a", pp. 40–45.

ideologically identified with a particular party or ideology as in the
case of ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl. One of the candidates suggested for the office
of *wazīr* in 1950, London and Sudan-trained Muḥammad ʿAbd al-
Qādir Bā Maṭraf (1915–1988), described the prevailing mood:[160]

> In the 1930s and 40s we were superficially influenced by the political
> changes that occurred at the time in some Arab, Asian and African
> regions. The national struggle in those areas took generally the form
> of gradual constitutional development or the lifting of oppression or
> the struggle for government offices. There was no experience with vio-
> lent movements [. . .]. We were lacking the political culture, and our
> discussions and views echoed what we heard or read of foreign events.
> We had no clear position, or rather we held positions of quicksilver
> without a clear plan of action.[161]

Instead, specific demands were articulated in relation to political devel-
opments, making it necessary to provide a brief survey of key events
during the 1950s and 60s.

The early stirrings of Hadhrami nationalism aimed at uniting the
two sultanates have already been discussed in connection with Sayyid
ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl. None of the three organisations founded in the late
1940s survived for long.[162] However, the National Party in al-Mukallā
saw a revival in 1948 and achieved notoriety through its participation
in a major riot in late 1950s. The party's origins probably link it to
the Club of Civil Servants (*Nādī al-Muwazzafīn*) which provided a
venue for reading official news announcements and listening to the
radio during World War II.[163] As National Party, it later developed
an aggressively pro-Quʿayṭī unitary stance. When it was revitalised
in 1948, it was no longer a party of civil servants. Prominent mem-
bers were tribal and quarter leaders, as well as individuals hoping
to promote their personal interests. Crucially, this meant that issues
such as rivalries between quarters were carried into the party, the
official dissolution of the quarter organisations notwithstanding. The
quarters had been replaced by committees which were to solve inter-

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[160] For a short biography of Bā Maṭraf, see Khurayṣ, *Dumūʿ*, pp. 24–26.

[161] A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, Introduction by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf,
p. 10; cf. al-Qaddāl's analysis of Hadhrami nationalist expressions in the Adeni
Fatāt al-Jazīra during the late 1940s, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 90f.

[162] The National Party is said to have first dissolved following the return of the
territory of the Sāh tribe to the Kathīrī sultanate, A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, pp. 10.;
al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 93f.

[163] Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 23.12.1992. On the origins of the National Party,
cf. al-Quʿayṭī, *Asʾila*.

nal problems as well as those between quarters, but these simply seem to have continued to harbour old rivalries.[164] The National Party, which was still committed to supporting the sultan, now persistently put forward demands such as better control of the budget of *Jamʿiyya Khayriyya*, the improvement of the water supply in al-Mukallā and constitutional improvements.[165] The party might also have been behind the petition for a legislative council in March 1950 mentioned in the previous chapter. By October 1950, the party tried to extend its activities beyond the confines of al-Mukallā.[166]

The Palestinian question contributed to the mood of politicisation among different sections of the population. In November 1947, the fishermen of al-Shiḥr went on strike in protest against the partition of Palestine. Eventually, they were convinced to return to work and to donate one load of sardines as aid to Palestine. In early December, a demonstration was held in al-Mukallā. It culminated in a few enthusiastic individuals entering the Residency. They called for its closure and the expulsion of the "infidels".[167]

"The Event of the Palace": A Riot in al-Mukallā 1950 and its Consequences

The so-called al-Mukallā riot or "event of the palace", as it became known locally, had its origins in Resident Adviser Boustead's decision to appoint a new Quʿayṭī *wazīr*.[168] When discussing the incident in his memoirs, he wrote that it was the "age and maladministration" of Shaykh Sayf b. ʿAlī al-Bū ʿAlī which prompted him to press for the shaykh's resignation. However, elsewhere Boustead expressed his disquiet at the *wazīr*'s power and influence on local politics.[169] The question of Shaykh Sayf's employment was particularly pressing

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[164] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 13.1.1993.

[165] al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 95f.; A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadā'*, pp. 53–58, for the party's principles, see ibid., p. 45 (footnote) and *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 552, 31.12.1950. I would like to thank Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Qaddāl for providing me with his copies of the articles in Aden newspapers related to the events.

[166] *al-Nahḍa* (Aden), 50, October 1950.

[167] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 27.1.1993.

[168] For surveys of the affair presenting different Arabic interpretations, see al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 85–112 and A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadā'*, for a brief survey in English, Lekon, The British, pp. 303–306.

[169] Boustead, *Wind*, p. 193, 186. For the following, pp. 193–198.

because his contract was due to expire in April 1951, although it could have been extended.[170] *Fatāt al-Jazīra* argued that the shaykh, whose salary had increased dramatically since he had first been appointed, did "nothing out of the ordinary" for his high rewards and suggested that he was strongly interested in continuing his employment for financial reasons.[171] The sultan seems to have hoped to appoint the deputy *wazīr*, Sālim Aḥmad Bā Ṣadīq, as Shaykh Sayf's successor. According to Bā Ṣadīq and a number of other contemporaries, he hoped that Bā Ṣadīq would be a more compliant Prime Minister. The deputy *wazīr* even asserted later that the sultan had suggested that the National Party demand a local *wazīr*. This would have made it easier for him to voice his own wishes vis à vis the British.[172] Boustead confirmed the sultan's unhappiness with the suggested appointment of al-Qaddāl as new *wazīr*. They finally agreed that the changeover should occur after a prolonged journey of Sultan Ṣāliḥ to Hyderabad. Until then, the matter was to be kept silent since Ṣāliḥ's son 'Awaḍ, in whom the British had little faith, became acting sultan.

From the perspective of younger nationalists, the matter was less a question of replacing an Omani-Zanzibari shaykh with a Sudanese, but rather one of foreigners occupying most of the prominent positions in the state: the *wazīr* and the governor of Ḥajar were Zanzibaris, the Director of Education was Sudanese, the leaders of the army and security services were Transjordanians, the Customs' Director and the President of the Supreme Court were Indians. A number of other foreigners were employed in prominent positions. This had been the topic of an exchange of letters between Shaykh 'Alī al-Bū 'Alī and an anonymous Hadhrami in the Adeni newspaper *Fatāt al-Jazīra* as early as 1946/1947. Shaykh 'Alī had argued that Hadhramis lacked the qualifications to fill these offices. His respondent suggested that this depended very much on the jobs in question, and skilled overseas Hadhramis ought to be considered. He expressed surprise that the issue did not arise in the Kathīrī sultanate where no foreigners were employed.[173] The problem of foreigners in prominent positions was even taken up by local poets.[174]

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[170] al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, p. 97.
[171] *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 537, 10.9.1950.
[172] Bā Ṣadīq in A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadā'*, p. 93; Bā 'Āmir, ibid., p. 104.
[173] *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 346, 17.11.1946 and 353, 5.1.1947.
[174] al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, p. 92.

The decision to appoint Shaykh al-Qaddāl was leaked to Adeni newspapers.[175] In mid-December 1950, when Shaykh ʿAlī was about to go on leave, the National Party demanded that Sultan ʿAwaḍ should appoint a local *wazīr* out of a list of five candidates or should delay Shaykh ʿAlī's leave until the return of his father. Nevertheless, Shaykh ʿAlī left and the future appointment of al-Qaddāl was confirmed. Sultan ʿAwaḍ showed some sympathy for the National Party by visiting their headquarters.[176] When a demonstration against this appointment gathered in front of the palace, ʿAwaḍ told the crowds that his father would take a final decision upon his return.[177]

Sultan Ṣāliḥ returned on December 25 to a great reception. The next day, the State Council convened for an extraordinary meeting, approving al-Qaddāl's candidature for the post of *wazīr*. When the news spread, the National Party met and decided to send the leaders of the three quarters of al-Mukallā as representatives to the Sultan. They were to repeat the demand for a local *wazīr*. When they arrived in the palace the next morning, they were only given a brief chance to present their demands. The sultan then called for a second meeting with the Resident Adviser and the State Council and decided to invite ten party representatives to another meeting later that same morning.[178]

The second delegation was accompanied by a huge crowd. Given the particpation of quarter leaders in the party, this rapid mobilisation is not surprising, although not all quarters were represented equally. The leader of al-Ḥāra, Bā ʿĀmir abstained from attending as did most of its inhabitants. He disapproved of Bā Ṣadīq, the deputy *wazīr*, whom he judged as incompetent, possibly because Bā Ṣadīq's originated from a rival quarter. It seems that Bā ʿĀmir feared that the sultan might appoint Bā Ṣadīq—who was not amongst the candidates suggested by the party. Therefore, the demonstration

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[175] *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 539, 1.10.1950; *al-Nahḍa* (Aden) 50, October 1950.

[176] It is very difficult to evaluate ʿAwaḍ's role in these events. For a careful discussion, see Bā Faqīh, "Shayʾ", *al-Ayyām*, 5.5.1993.

[177] According to Boustead's memoirs, this happened in October, Boustead, *Wind*, pp. 195f. However, both the British reports and the Arabic discussions indicate that it occurred only in December. R/20/B/2433, Boustead, Note on the National Party, encl. in Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 29.12.1950, pp. 2–4; *al-Nahḍa* 55, December 1950, gives the date as December 13.

[178] Boustead, *Wind*, p. 196 f. mentions only one meeting, but the official declarations issued by the palace after the events confirm A. Bā Wazīr's version of events, MM, Wathāʾiq ʿan ḥādithat al-qaṣr 155, 157, 158. For a good comparison of the different versions emerging from Boustead, Bā Wazīr and the offical declarations after the events, see al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 102f.

might run against his own interests.[179] There is some controversy over whether the demonstration was planned by the party (or some of its members), or whether the crowds just followed their leaders to the palace expecting a speech by the sultan or some other event.[180]

During the demonstration, all shops closed, partly in support of the political demands and partly for fear of rioting. The crowd entered the palace courtyard through open gates, while the delegation negotiated inside. According to Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, who was present at the talks, the sultan suggested appointing al-Qaddāl for one year and then considering local candidates. The delegation informed the party of the sultan's suggestions, which were deemed unacceptable. Thereupon, they retuned to the palace, followed by a new crowd. When the sultan wanted to address those waiting in the courtyard, they threw stones. He withdrew and a confrontation started.[181] In contrast, Boustead recorded a speech by al-Qaddāl in which he made clear that he would use his appointment to train a Hadhrami for his job. Thereupon, the delegation agreed to his candidature.[182] The delegation then left and tried to announce to the crowd their recognition of al-Qaddāl. When the crowd refused to disperse, the delegation went home. It is unclear whether the uproar was a matter of the crowd disagreeing with the delegation (a number of eye witnesses reported that shouts of "They have sold us" were heard) or whether the situation simply got out of hands.

In any case, one person grabbed the rifle of a frightened palace guard, which sparked a fight. At this moment, the army arrived and began to shoot when the crowd did not disperse.[183] The ensuing struggle left eleven dead and forty-seven others wounded.[184] The majority of the dead were in their thirties and seem to have been poor fishermen and workers, who had probably joined the crowd out of

[179] Bā ʿĀmir in A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, pp. 103–105. The proposed candidates were ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf, ʿUmar Muḥammad ʿAwaḍ Muḥayriz, Ṣalāḥ al-Bakrī, Aḥmad Sālim Bā ʿAshan and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jīlānī. *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 553, 7.1.1951.

[180] A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, pp. 74f.; cf. p. 95, the statement of Bā Ṣadīq and footnote 3 by Bā Wazīr rejecting his version.

[181] al-Quʿaytī, *Asʾila*.

[182] Boustead, *Wind*, p. 197; MM, Wathāʾiq ʿan ḥādithat al-qaṣr 157, Balāgh ṣādir min qaṣr ṣāḥib al-ʿuẓma al-sulṭān Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib al-Quʿaytī.

[183] MM, Wathāʾiq ʿan ḥādithat al-qaṣr 157, Balāgh ṣādir min qaṣr ṣāḥib al-ʿuẓma al-sulṭān Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib al-Quʿaytī.

[184] The figures vary: Boustead, *Wind*, p. 198, talks of 18 dead and 47 wounded; *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 552, 31.12.1950, of 8 dead and 5 wounded soldiers.

curiosity.[185] A curfew was immediately announced.[186] In January and early February, suspected ringleaders and troublemakers (altogether some seventy individuals) were tried on various charges including incitement of the crowd, the formulation of nationalist demands, the leading of party meetings, wrongful claims to be representatives of the people, and a charge of writing an inflammatory article in the Aden journal *al-Nahḍa*. The sentences ranged from a few months to ten years.[187]

Although calm was quickly restored and the trials concluded within six weeks of the events, they left both the British and the Quʿayṭī government shaken. They were surprised by the public support for nationalist demands. The Aden press reported the events, enthusiastically underlining their nationalist nature and praising the political awakening of the Hadhramis.[188] *Al-Nahḍa* proclaimed that the forthcoming trial of the suspects should consider the demonstrators as citizens demanding their due: "It is not right to regard a whole people as criminals", it argued, confirming that "demonstrations are a right in every democratic and undemocratic country. This was a social protest by the people."[189] Thereafter, it stopped publishing reports on Hadhramaut in protest against press censorship.[190] *Fatāt al-Jazīra* made a point of publishing support messages from Hadhramis in Somalia, Mogadishu, the Ḥijāz and Aden.[191] A lengthy report from Eritrea confirmed that the diaspora there sympathised with the demands put forward by the National Party.[192] In March 1953, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Ḥarb Bāshā, the head of the Association of Young Muslim Men in Egypt, wrote a letter to Sultan Ṣāliḥ. He defended the rioters as *mujāhidīn* (freedom fighters) whose brave action had left a great impression on the Egyptians and the Islamic world in general. He pleaded with the sultan to treat those arrested well. In his

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[185] See the compilation of biographical information in A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, pp. 88f.

[186] For a discussion of these different views, see al-Qaddāl, *al-Shaykh*, pp. 195–109; cf. Boustead, *Wind*, pp. 197f., A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, pp. 71–73. The official British version is contained in R/20/B/2433, Boustead, Note on the National Party, encl. in Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 29.12.1950, pp. 8–11.

[187] The documents of the trial are preserved in MM, Wathāʾiq ʿan ḥādithat al-qaṣr, 171–174,176; cf. A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, pp. 86–88.

[188] *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 551, 24.12.1950; 552, 31.12.1950.

[189] *al-Nahḍa* (Aden) 57, 4.1.1951.

[190] A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, p. 80.

[191] *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 554, 14.1.1951.

[192] *Fatāt al-Jazīra* 555, 21.1.1951.

answer, the sultan replied that the intention of the crowd was not national enthusiasm but chaos. Nevertheless he had taken a lenient view, released the prisoners quickly and even provided their families with "sympathy and aid".[193] What he did not mention was that the money he referred to had been donated by a group of merchants who had previously declared their support for National Party demands.[194]

The British decided to mount a campaign of counter propaganda and to seize Aden newspapers upon arrival in al-Mukallā. Their version was that *Ḥizb al-Waṭan* consisted of "a comparatively small group of mainly illiterate and uneducated persons who have stirred up hooligans to do the rioting", that the situation had returned to calm and that there were "no sympathetic reactions in the provinces, in fact the opposite."[195] Given that the trial drew wide attention and that the sultan received petitions from various towns asking for mercy, this sounded hollow.[196] Censorship of mail to the interior was introduced.[197] In addition to issuing official statements about the events, the sultan addressed a special declaration to Hadhramis in the diaspora and had it distributed by some of his followers.[198] A number of letters from Aden, Jakarta and Djibouti show that the propaganda

[193] MM, Wathā'iq 'an ḥādithat al-qaṣr, 163, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Ḥarb Bāshā, Cairo to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, 17.3.1951 and 164, Sultan Ṣāliḥ to Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Ḥarb Bāshā, undated. Much of this and the subsequent correspondence was apparently published in Aden newspapers, see A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadā'*, pp. 82–85.

[194] IO, R/20/B/2433, Sayyid Ḥamid 'Alawī al-Bār, Sayyid Aḥmad b. Ḥussayn al-'Aṭṭās, 'Alī b. Muḥammad Bāzar'a, Ṣāliḥ b. 'Abdallāh Bā Raḥīm, Sa'īd b. Aḥmad Bāzar'a, Salim (Sālim?) Muḥammad Bā Shanfar, 'Umar b. Salim Bā 'Ubayd to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, 8.1.51; MM, Wathā'iq 'an ḥādithat al-qaṣr 161, undated, in which the sultan advises Shaykh 'Abdallāh 'Ubayd Bā Maṭraf to hand 133,000 riyāl to the head of the lawyers (association?) for the families of those killed in the uprising and 162, Sultan Ṣāliḥ to Aḥmad Ḥusayn Kharūn al-'Aṭṭās, Ḥāmid b. 'Alawī al-Bār, 'Alī b. Muḥammad Bā Zar'a, Ṣāliḥ b. 'Abdallāh Bā Raḥīm, Sālim b. Muḥammad Bā Shanfar, Sa'd Aḥmad Bā Zar'a and Muḥammad b. 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr, 29.3.1951, in which he thanks for the money and promises to consider the release of the prisoners.

[195] IO, R/20/B/2433, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 29.12.1950; Bill Goode, Aden to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 21.1.1951 and British Agent, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to the Government, 2.2.1951.

[196] IO, R/20/B/2433, Secret Report on Subsequent Action taken in connection with the Disturbances in Mukalla, Resident Adviser, 22.2.1951.

[197] MM, Wathā'iq 'an ḥādithat al-qaṣr, 169, Nā'ib al-dawla to Telegraph Officer, Shibām, 29.12.1950.

[198] MM, Wathā'iq 'an ḥādithat al-qaṣr, 159, Balāgh min qaṣr al-'uẓma al-sulṭān al-sirr Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib al-Qu'ayṭī ilā jamī' al-ḥaḍārima bi-l-mahjar; 168, 'Alī and Sa'īd Muḥammad b. Kuwayr, al-Mukallā to Shaykh Nūr Ḥusayn, Shaykh Manṣūr b. 'Abdallāh al-Qu'ayṭī and Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abādī al-Yāfi'ī, representative of the Hadhramis in Moqadishu, 10.1.1951.

did not fail to make some impact, at least on the official level.[199] Nevertheless, it seems that even within the administration there was growing pressure to show clemency, and between February and April, all but two of the convicts were granted an amnesty.[200]

The events did not spark the emergence of a large scale nationalist movement, not least because the bloody escalation left everyone in a state of shock. However, they were unprecedented in Hadhrami history in terms of the participation of a wide spectrum of the population in a political event, even if this happened almost by default. The events helped to establish nationalism as the new language of politics. In some ways, one could argue that "nationalist demands" (*maṭālib waṭaniyya*) now replaced the older calls for *iṣlāḥ* (reform). This did not yet mark a significant shift in content. Agricultural and economic improvement, education, the development of state institutions and even the maintenance of the ever fragile truces with the tribes were still high on the agenda, as was shown in the previous chapter. They were now merely labelled differently. This is borne out by a survey of articles in the al-Mukallā weekly *al-Akhbār* between early 1952 and the summer of 1955. Even if we take into account that it was an official journal, its editor Ḥusayn Muḥammad al-Bār held nationalist convictions, as has been shown in connection with ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl.[201] He wrote about "the national economy" and historical incidences of the unity of "larger Hadhramaut", as well as reporting about local events and institutions such as town and village councils.[202] The tone resembles that of the South East Asian and Hadhrami journals of the 1920s and 30s in its desire to spread enlightenment, except that *al-Akhbār* was a secular newspaper lacking the religious topics and language of its predecessors.

How widely this agenda was shared is exemplified in a book by Aḥmad Muḥammad Zayn al-Saqqāf, an emigrant (possibly to a Gulf emirate).[203] Written after his first visit to Southern Yemen in twenty

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[199] MM, Wathāʾiq ʿan ḥādithat al-qaṣr 165, Sayyid ʿAlawī b. Abū Bakr al-Kāf, Aden, to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, 2.1.1951; 166, [ʿAlawī?] Abū Bakr al-ʿAṭṭās, Jakarta, to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, 12.2.1951 and ʿAbūd Mubārak Ḥubayshān, Djibouti, to Sultan Ṣāliḥ, undated.

[200] A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadāʾ*, pp. 87f. Shaykh ʿAbdallāh al-Nākhibī, Jeddah, confirmed to me that he and other officials pressed for the speedy release of the prisoners, 1.4.2000.

[201] The collection in the Mukallā museum is unfortunately incomplete and best for the years 1953 and 1954.

[202] *al-Akhbār* 17; 15.3.1954, 18; 31.3.1954 and 13; 20.1.1954.

[203] Aḥmad al-Saqqāf, *Anā ʿāʾid min janūb al-jazīra al-ʿarabiyya*. The introduction is dated from 1955, although the date of the visit is not indicated. The book was

years (probably around 1954), he commented positively on devel-
opments, particularly in the educational sector. Al-Saqqāf showed
appreciation of Hadhrami cultural achievements both at home and
in the diaspora: he credited them not only with introducing Islam
to South East Asia but also with teaching the Indonesians the meaning
of freedom and helping them to achieve independence.[204] Nevertheless,
he took issue with a number of traditions, some of which had long
been controversial. Among them were the early marriage of girls,
the visitation of the tombs of saints, and the kissing of the hands of
*sayyid*s: "It is preferable to have them [the hands] cut off than
kissed".[205] He argued that it was not the *sayyid*s' fault to have behaved
in such a manner as to become worthy of admiration. However, this
tradition was no longer commensurate with the ideas of Arab nation-
alism. While such views had been limited to a minority group of
sayyid reformers before World War II, they now became the gener-
ally shared conviction of the new generation.[206]

   An ever widening circle of groups and individuals claimed a stake
in this reform agenda. Indeed, the appearance of a printed newspaper
in itself indicates how the realms of politics were changing, even if
it was an official one which doubtlessly was considered a useful tool
for propaganda. While the events of 1950 seemed almost like a freak
incident at the time, quite atypical of the polite, orderly and consensual
manner in which the politics of al-Mukallā had been conducted for
some time, they also showed the tensions which had started to emerge.
One could argue that the integration of Hadhrami society into a
state, which was already a controversial process, became further com-
plicated by the visible British involvement, notably in light of the
rising tide of nationalism and British actions in Palestine. This led
to a loss of confidence between the sultan (increasingly identified
with the British) and his subjects.[207]

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printed in Kuwait, and as al-Saqqāf comments on Saudi visa requirements, one
may assume that he had lived either there or in Kuwait.
   [204] Aḥmad al-Saqqāf, *Anā 'ā'id*, p. 73.
   [205] Aḥmad al-Saqqāf, *Anā 'ā'id*, p. 79.
   [206] 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Millāhi, al-Shiḥr, 14.10.1996, confirmed the widespread
nature of such views in the early 1950s.
   [207] For a similar case in Togo, and a sociological conceptualisation, see von
Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, pp. 331–334, 440 and fn. 24. As for the view of the
sultan as a British stooge by a popular quarter leader (rather than intellectuals
influenced by nationalist ideologies), see 'Abdallāh Sa'īd Bā 'Āmir's statement of
1953: "I tell you how it is, and you interpret it as you like—the sultan is himself
in the bag of the English, now what about his Secretary of State." [*al-sulṭān nafsuh
fī kīs al-Injlīz . . .*], A. Bā Wazīr, *Shuhadā'*, p. 105.

This caused the Resident Adviser some concern. In a confidential circular to Residency officials which reflects worries fuelled by the unrest of 1950, Boustead noted that the leading state officials, mostly foreigners, were about to be replaced by Hadhramis trained in the Sudan and Middle East, areas where "nationalism has become the main feature of the political scene during and since the last War." He continued:

> Like all Middle East youth they will nearly certainly return with nationalist ideas which may well spread among the officials of the government and the merchant and educated class. They will be over anxious to take over the responsible posts of government before in fact they have the wisdom and experience to do so. They may well tend to cause the form of political unrest which has been such a marked feature in the Sudan and in Africa in the last few years.[208]

Boustead further warned his staff not to give any evidence of "direct colonial control", of which Hadhramis in England and the Ḥijāz had already accused him, and reminded all officials to maintain high standards in their work. The Hadhramis were only moderately impressed. Commenting retrospectively, Boustead remarked on the paramount influence of Radio Cairo (which at one stage even announced his death somewhat prematurely) notably among schoolboys, students and schoolmasters.[209] As noted earlier, this phenomenon was not limited to Hadhramaut but could be observed in Aden and throughout the Arab world. The Egyptian revolution of 1952, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Suez War, all of which were broadcast by Radio Cairo, did much to radicalise the Arab youth, and Hadhramaut was no exception.[210] The Governor of Aden, Tom Hickinbotham, wrote in December 1955 that there were already strong tendencies "towards a democratic nationalism" among "the very intelligent youth of the Protectorate".[211]

In the context of the debate about the future of Aden and the Protectorate mentioned at the outset of this chapter, an interesting controversy developed between Bernard Reilly, who had ruled Aden between 1931 and 1940, and Tom Hickinbotham, the Governor of Aden at the time. While one needs to take into account that they

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[208] PRO, CO 1015/1211, Boustead, Guide to all political & technical officers, 13.12.1953, pp. 1–2.
[209] Boustead, *Wind*, pp. 202f.
[210] Dresch, *A History*, p. 61; Bujra, "Political Conflict", part II, p. 14; cf. Serjeant, "al-Ḥaraka", p. 5.
[211] PRO, CO 1015/1212, Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 15.12.1955.

might have held different political opinions, their argument also
reveals new fissures in the political structure of Hadhramaut. Reilly
suggested that al-Mukallā might soon demand independence and that
because of its well-organised structure, "no serious harm would be
done by agreeing to give this State independence, preferably within
the Commonwealth, but, if it wishes, outside it." He proposed a sim-
ilar policy for the Kathīrīs, although he would have preferred to
continue the Protectorate there.[212] These views reflect Reilly's expe-
rience with the two sultanates which were the most advanced in the
Protectorate during his tenure of office in Aden.

Tom Hickinbotham, disagreed strongly:

> There seems to be some misconception about the political and eco-
> nomic stability of the Quaiti State . . . The fact is that the Quaiti state
> has not the financial resources even to maintain the present limited
> scale of social service without aid from Her Majesty's Government and
> I see no immediate prospect of any sufficient increase in revenue to
> enable her to do so. Added to which is the fact that the educational
> and medical services are already considerably below what is essential
> and must be expanded. The state would be quite incapable of undertaking
> her own external defence or for that matter complete responsibility of
> the maintenance of internal security. The withdrawal of the British
> advisers would bring the administration tumbling down, for though
> steady progress is being made it is still but a facade and much time
> and labour are required before the edifice can hope to stand alone.
> The present ruler is an intelligent and a wise man of some eighty
> years of age crippled by arthritis and a sufferer from Brights' disease.
> His son, who in our wisdom we have accepted as heir apparent, is a
> man of between thirty and forty who is a morphine addict [. . .].[213]
> The people suffer from the continual fear of another famine which it
> would be beyond the financial resources of the state to deal with. How
> can such a state hope to be independent in the immediate or indeed
> reasonably near future . . .[214]

Hickinbotham's views, which amounted to a pledge for continued
British involvement, reflected the changed situation: the Qu'aytī state,

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[212] PRO, CO 1015/1211, Reilly, Draft of a Colonial Office memorandum enti-
tled: note on Long-Term Policy for the Colony of Aden and the Aden protectorate,
July 1955, p. 2.
[213] The remainder of the characterisation amounts to slander. While most sources
agree on Sultan 'Awaḍ's somewhat erratic performance as a ruler, his occasional
resistance to British instructions did certainly not win him any favours with the
British officials and may account for some of the scathing criticism.
[214] PRO, CO 1015/1211, Tom Hickinbotham, Governor of Aden, writing from
the Travellers Club in London to Morgan, Colonial Office, 6.8.1955.

which at the time of Ingrams' appointment was in debt but considered capable of paying for an adviser, was now seen as too weak to stand alone. Obviously, this has to do partly with new notions of the tasks of a state, such as the provision of educational and medical services, but it also reflects changed realities on the ground: while the tribes had previously stood in rather fragile treaty relations with the sultans, they were now considered a part of the sultanates which demanded a far larger repressive force to maintain peace. Therefore, the different views are partly the result of a transition from chiefdom to state. Nevertheless, it is revealing that after almost twenty years of British state building efforts, the sultanates appeared weaker rather than stronger in the eyes of the Governor of Aden. This trend continued throughout the second half of the 1950s.

As noted earlier, the mid-1950s marked the first serious challenges to British rule in other parts of South Arabia. The memoirs of Kennedy Trevaskis, who served in Aden in the 1950s and 60s (from 1963–64 as High Commissioner), convey the prevailing sense of a crumbling empire, which contributed to British fears and insecurities.[215] Labour conflicts escalated in Aden. The focal point of opposition, however, became the British proposal to form a Federation of Arab Emirates of the South in the Western Aden Protectorate. This idea originated from increasing British involvement in local development in the early 1950s which the British now aimed to coordinate.[216] From the local perspective, this move appeared to threaten some of the rulers' prerogatives, while others under the leadership of Sultan ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Karīm of Laḥij who favoured greater union under the influence of Arab and Yemeni nationalism rejected the notion of union under British leadership. In 1958, it was even rumoured that Sultan ʿAlī wanted to join the United Arab Republic. After fomenting resistance in Upper ʿAwlaqī against the imposition of an advisery treaty, he was deposed in 1959 and a Federation was created.[217] However, it "conformed to the realities of the British predicament in South Arabia, although much less to the realities of the world on the eve of 1960."[218]

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[215] Trevaskis, *Shades*, for example p. XV, 36, 49–66, 79. Tellingly, he calls the second part of his book "The years of anxiety".

[216] Trevaskis, *Shades*, pp. 33f.

[217] For the negotiation (and conclusion) of advisory treaties with Laḥij, the ʿAwdhalī and ʿAwlaqī sultans, see Trevaskis, *Shades*, pp. 22–25, for a characterisation of Sultan ʿAlī and his views pp. 37f., 69f., 92f.

[218] Gavin, *Aden*, p. 340, cf. ibid., pp. 337–343; on Laḥij and its sultan as a center for resistance against the British, see M. al-Jifrī, *Ḥaqāʾiq*, p. 47.

The South Arabian League and Its Contacts in Hadhramaut

Although conflict about the Federation was mostly confined to Aden
and the Western Protectorate, one party was linked to Hadhramaut
in more ways than one. This was the South Arabian League (*Rābiṭat
Abnāʾ al-Janūb*).[219] In 1947, Shaykhān ʿAlī al-Ḥibshī was invited by
to Hadhramaut by the Āl Kāf to develop their private school. He
began to work with the Committee for Hadhrami Unity and briefly
became secretary of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* while serving as headmaster
of its school.[220] Al-Ḥibshī forged close links with like-minded indi-
viduals such as ʿUmar Miḥḍār al-Kāf, ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl and Muḥammad
b. Hāshim.[221]

When he returned to Aden, he became one of the co-founders and
the Secretary General of the League.[222] Its Chairman was Muḥammad
ʿAlī al-Jifrī, a *sayyid* born in ʿAwlaqī territory and Chief Minister in
Laḥij at the time. In a speech that was later published, al-Jifrī dis-
cussed how, in the period between 1947 and 1950, educated youth
from the Arabian Peninsula started to gather in Aden. These young
men, many of whom had studied in Egypt, Iraq and the Sudan,
began to meet in the associations and clubs of the city.[223] They were
opposed to the exclusivity of the Aden Association, but equally con-
sidered the existence of Aden and more than twenty sultanates in a
territory of just over one million people as an oddity. They also
rejected British rule which had alienated them from the Yemen. The
reactionary "class system" (possibly a reference to social stratification)
was seen to prevent "social equality".[224] In 1950, they founded the
South Arabian League. It professed belief in Arab nationalism and
unity and ultimately aimed at uniting "the people of greater Yemen"
(but in the short term of the south) "under one progressive inde-

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[219] About the founding and aims of the League, see al-Miṣrī, *al-Najm*, pp. 80–85;
Adhal, *al-Istiqlāl*, pp. 165–167; al-Kāf, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 81–84.
[220] IO, R/20/C/2054, Secret, Assistant Adviser Northern Areas to Resident
Adviser + British Agent, Mukalla, 2.10.1956.
[221] M. al-Jifrī, *Ḥaqāʾiq*, pp. 4.
[222] Personal communication, Karāma Sulayman, Tarīm, 11.12.1996.
[223] For this and the following, see M. al-Jifrī, *Ḥaqāʾiq*, pp. 45–62. al-Jifrī names
Sālim al-Ṣāfī, Rashīd al-Ḥarīrī, Aḥmad ʿAbdūh Jamza, Shaykhān ʿAbdallāh al-
Ḥibshī, ʿAbdallāh Bā Dhīb, ʿAlī Ghānim Kulayb, Qaḥṭān al-Shaʿbī, ʿAbdallāh ʿAlī
al-Jifrī, ʿAbdallāh Aḥmad al-Faḍlī, Ḥusayn Hādī ʿAwlaqī, ʿAlī Muḥammad Sālim
al-Shaʿbī and himself, p. 49. On the League, cf. Kostiner, *The Struggle*, pp. 42–44;
Nagi, "The Genesis", pp. 149–152 and Lekon, The British, pp. 351f.
[224] M. al-Jifrī, *Ḥaqāʾiq*, p. 51.

pendent government". It further demanded social justice and considered imperialism "the first enemy of the Arab nation".[225] In the conflict over the Federation, the League opposed the proposed separation of the Federation from Aden and demanded full independence and a democratic government. It also declared that all mineral wealth was a national rather than a personal resource, which shows socialist influences.

The League, whose members were considered dangerous enemies of the British, had stronger contacts in the Western than in the Eastern Aden Protectorate.[226] Nevertheless, ʿUmar Miḥḍār al-Kāf, President of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa*, joined the League and eventually became its treasurer.[227] A number of other Hadhramis and members of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* were either confirmed members or at least supporters of the League, such as al-Shāṭirī; ʿAlī b. Sumayṭ, a state councillor; Aḥmad b. Zayn Balfaqīh, the headmaster of the *Ukhuwwa*-school in 1956 and the association's secretary general; and Jamal al-Layl al-Kāf.[228] It is therefore not surprising that when the League appealed for support in 1956, possibly in connection with its opposition to the Federation plans, *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa* declared its full support. Similarly, members of the Bā Faqīh family in al-Mukallā, who had played leading roles in local events in 1950 and during the troubles in the intermediary school in 1957, were known supporters of the League.[229]

Furthermore, the League found support among Hadhramis in South East Asia, notably in circles close to the Kathīrī Association. In 1955, the League of Warriors for Independence of the Arabian South was founded, aiming for independence of the Arabian South including Aden. It demanded democracy and the spreading of Islam.[230]

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[225] M. al-Jifrī, *Haqāʾiq*, p. 59, 61.

[226] PRO, CO 1015/1150, Telegram from Deputy Governor, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 12.6.1956, demanding the deportation of Muḥammad and ʿAlawī, sons of ʿAlī al-Jifrī, as well as their cousins ʿAbdallāh and Muḥammad al-Jifrī.

[227] IO, R/20/C/2054, Assistant Adviser Northern Areas to Resident Adviser + British Agent, Mukalla, 2.10.1956, about al-Kāf being treasurer at the time of writing, see al-Jifrī, *Haqāʾiq*, p. 46. Similarly, ʿAlī b. ʿAqīl, then in Kuwait and a member of the Baʿth Party, was considered a member.

[228] IO, R/20/C/2054, Assistant Adviser, Northern Areas to Resident Adviser + British Agent, Mukalla, 2.10.1956; IO, R/20/B/2458, Clubs & Societies in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, 26.9.1956.

[229] Jibrīl, *Madīna*, pp. 42f., 47; Kostiner, *The Struggle*, p. 43.

[230] IO, R/20/C/2054, The Fundamental rule of The League of Warriors for Independence of the Arabian South; cf. ibid., Commissioner of Police to Acting

It seems to have been founded in the context of the Bandung Conference (when anti-imperialist feelings were running particularly high) and to have received financial support from Northern Yemen.[231] Presumably the same group reconstituted itself a year later as the Committee for the Liberation of Southern Arabia. This was apparently linked to the Saudi King's visit to Indonesia. The group apparently received substantial support from the Saudi Embassy as well as from the *Irshād* Youth Movement.[232]

In May 1956, a group of five Kathīrīs, who were in contact with members of the League, travelled from Jakarta to Aden.[233] One of their tasks was to establish schools. They demanded that the Governor of Aden include the disputed region of Thamūd, where oil was suspected, as Kathīrī rather than Qu'aytī territory.[234] In July, they accompanied Sultan 'Alī 'Abd al-Karīm on a visit to Say'ūn where they were joined by an Abyssinian member of the Bā 'Abūd family whose deportation was being considered by the British. They all tried to convince the Kathīrī sultan of the League's aims. Even if they were not very successful, Sultan Ḥusayn had his own grievances against the British: he feared that the British wanted to submit both the Kathīrī and Wāḥidī sultanates to the Qu'aytīs and then rule them all directly.[235]

After deliberations in Say'ūn, the group proceeded to al-Ḥawṭa. A major meeting with tribesmen was held, during which guns were fired. This annoyed the British Assistant Adviser, prompting a strong protest and an ill-tempered exchange of letters between the Resident Adviser and Sultan Ḥusayn al-Kathīrī.[236] The delegation did not

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Chief Secretary, Aden, 17.8.1955 and, with a list of the leadership and the aims, Committee for the Liberation of South Arabia, encl. in British Embassy, Jakarta to Government of Aden, 6.5.1957.

[231] IO, R/20/C/2054, British Embassy, Jakarta to Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 19.7.1955.

[232] IO, R/20/C/2054, British Embassy, Jakarta to Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 19.7.1956 and Committee for the Liberation of South Arabia, encl. in British Embassy, Jakarta to Government of Aden, 6.5.1957. Since both the League and the Committee supported the Saudis against the British in the conflict about the Buraimi oasis, this common stance is a further indicator of the close connections, Kostiner, *The Struggle*, p. 42.

[233] IO, R/20/C/2054, Acting Resident, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 8.5.1956.

[234] IO, R/20/B/2435, Secret Memorandum, The Kathiri Shanfari Society, from Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, Aden, 8.5.1956. About the rivalry over Thamūd, see M. al-Ḥibshī, *al-Yaman*, pp. 300f.

[235] IO, R/20/B/2435, Secret, Pro/Sor/8/5, 28.2.1956.

[236] IO, R/20/C/2054, Report by Assistant Adviser Northern Areas on the Activities

convince the assembled tribesmen to support the aims of the Kathīrī-Shanfarī Association (which presumably included the programme of the Committee for the Liberation of Southern Arabia).[237] Sultan ʿAlī then proceeded to Tarīm where he visited Sayyid Muḥammad Jamal al-Layl al-Kāf and met the Assistant Adviser. He was also received by *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa*, whose members were disappointed by the sultan's suggestion to only gradually implement the South Arabian League's aims.[238]

During the visit, a pamphlet appeared denouncing a number of high Kathīrī officials as well as the Adviser.[239] In mid-August, two abusively phrased pamphlets attacking a number of government officials were attached to government notice boards, in one case making allegations of malpractice and corruption against the Chief *qāḍī* and praising Nasser.[240] Ten days later, two further pamphlets appeared in Tarīm. The first mentioned a "Secret Organisation" which had allegedly been formed four years earlier. It claimed to combat imperialism and denounced corrupt state officials. The second pamphlet accused ʿAlī al-Ṣabbān and Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUbaydillāh al-Saqqāf of leading the "Secret Organisation" and being the authors of the pamphlets in Say'ūn and Tarīm.[241]

Nothing shows the changing climate better than an attack on Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf as collaborator of the imperialists. As

of the Wafid, Kathiri Shenafir Association, during the Visit of his Highness Sultan Sir Ali Abdel Karim of Lahedj to the Kathiri State, 31.7.1956; Translation of Arabic letter, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Sultan Hussein bin ʿAli al-Kathiri, Seyun, 5.8.1956; Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Assistant Adviser Northern Areas, Seyun, 5.8.1956 and translation of Secret letter from the Kathiri Sultan [Hussein b. Ali] to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 13.8.1956.

[237] IO, R/20/B/2435, Secret: Visit of H. H. Sultan Sir Ali Abdulkerim of Lahej to the Kathiri State—Activities of the Kathiri Shenfari Association, 15.8.1956, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Assistant Adviser (Intelligence), Aden.

[238] IO, R/20/C/2054, Further Report by Assistant Adviser Norther Areas on Events in Kathiri State [. . .], 6.8.1956.

[239] IO, R/20/C/2054, Pamphlet, dated 28.7.1956, signed by The Voice of the People.

[240] IO, R/20/C/2054, Assistant Adviser Northern Areas to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 18.8.1956, enclosing two pamphlets, one of which appeared in the afternoon of 15/8/1956 on government notice board Say'ūn, the other in the morning of the same day on the government notice board in the Say'ūn market. Similar pamphlets continued to appear until February 1958; IO, R/20/C/2052, Assistant Adviser, Northern Areas to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 25.9.1956 and 9.2.1958.

[241] IO, R/20/C/2054, Assistant Adviser Northern Areas to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 28.8.1956, enclosing pamphlet appearing on 21.8.1956 in Tarīm market and on 22.8.1956 on the government notice board in Tarīm. A further pamphlet denounced Boustead, IO, R/20/C/2054, Assistant Adviser, Northern Areas to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 26.9.1956, the pamphlet was found on 12.9.1956.

might be remembered, al-Kāf had himself sometimes been critical of the British and in earlier times had been praised across the ideological divides as a benevolent reformer. During Sultan ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Karīm's visit, he took issue with the carrying and firing of arms at the meeting in al-Ḥawṭa. While this was a matter of importance to the British, it might be worthwhile to remember that the very establishment of peace and the limitation on arms bearing had been at the heart of Sayyid Abū Bakr's efforts to reform the country, in line with many of the urban elite. In contrast, many of the new nationalists, who often came from the very same background, as shown above, made a different political choice and allied themselves to the tribes. As they were by now used to peace, they saw less harm in the presence of arms during the meeting at al-Ḥawṭa than Sayyid Abū Bakr.

The head of the Kathīrī delegation seems to have considered the visit to Hadhramaut a failure. It is quite possible that the old antagonism between tribal interests and those of the older generation of urban notables such as Sayyid Abū Bakr played a role in this. Consequently, the association distanced itself from Sultan Ḥusayn for some time. When he was denied a visa to Indonesia during a journey to Singapore in January 1959, the association was blamed.[242]

Such cleavages resulted from a complex mixture of older Hadhrami conflicts, internal factionalism, conflicting leadership personalities and different ideological choices. They were also subject to situational change. By January 1959, the Kathīrī Association, which in 1956 seemed to British observers to be a radical, pro-Nasserist organisation intending to break with the old elites, had elected a new leadership which was strongly opposed to Nasserism and Communism.[243] They wrote a conciliatory letter to Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf and all members of his family, calling for the unity of the Kathīrī people. In particular, the leaders were concerned with the possibility of Thamūd being ceded to the Quʿayṭīs.[244] The following year, the British Embassy in Jakarta reported that the Kathīrī Association had

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[242] IO, R/20/B/2466, Chief Intelligence Officer, Aden to Chief Secretary to Government, 15.11.1957 and IO, R/20/B/3080, British Embassy, Jakarta to Colonial Secretariat, Aden, 16.1.1959.

[243] IO, R/20/C/2054, British Embassy, Jakarta to Colonial Secretariat, Aden, 3.4.1959. Obviously, British labels of this sort need to be taken with more than the usual pinch of salt, given the antagonism between Britain and Nasser, as well as the wider context of the cold war and its manifestations in the Middle East.

[244] IO, R/20/C/2054, The High Committee of the Kathiri Association, Jakarta, to Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf, 27.7.1959.

reverted to a more Nasserist stance because of the Egyptian leader's popularity. Nevertheless, it continued to pursue its struggle against the Committee for the Liberation of South Arabia, which was "falsely accusing their opponents of being tools of the imperialists".[245] This points to a possible split among nationalists with a Saudi orientation (i.e., the South Arabian League and its various branches) and those with a more Nasserist outlook, reflecting the rivalry between these two Arab powers which went to war in the Yemen in 1962. More likely, different issues were emphasised by different factions at different times. Seen from Jakarta or Hadhramaut, it might not have made a great difference whether Nasser, the Saudis or the Ba'th championed Arab nationalism and anticolonialism. Finally, factional and personality clashes almost certainly were behind changes in rhetoric, if not in actual positions on Hadhrami matters.

An important factor in these events was the emerging alliance between nationalists and tribes. This is also borne out by conflicts between tribes and the government in 1955–58. A number of minor and probably separate tribal uprisings occurred in this period. In 1958, when the British used the airforce against tribesmen, the South Arabian League protested. The aforementioned conflicts over the prohibitions on arms bearing prompted further complaints.[246] Renewed tribal unrest in 1959–61 caused further conflict and on at least one occassion, Sayyid 'Alawī al-Jifrī, the "Director of the Arab South Bureau" and Chairman of the South Arabian League, published a statement in a Saudi newspaper as an all-Arab appeal. He regretted the demolition of villages and towns by aircraft, continuing:

> The South people on whose lands atomic bases are built and imperialist projects and orders imposed, whose wealth robbed and sacred things violated, appeal to you in the name of religion, nationalism and humanity to interfere to stop these unjust judgements and to put a stop to the war of extermination which is waged by Britain with a handful of her clients.[247]

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[245] IO, R/20/B/3094, British Embassy, Jakarta to Colonial Secretariat, Aden [?], 1.2.1960.

[246] IO, R/20/B/3083, Anon. to Sultan Ghalib, to the Governor of Aden and the people of the Hadhramaut, undated.

[247] IO, R/20/B/3075, (translated) Extract from Jaridat al-Nadwah al-Saudiyah, 16.7.81/24.12.1961, incl. in Chief Intelligence Officer Aden to Acting Chief Secretary, 15.1.1962.

In December 1957, the Qu'aytī army of former slaves and tribesmen went on strike over soldiers' pay which was lower than that of the Hadhrami Beduin League. In 1958, military manoeuvres were interrupted after soldiers chanted Nasserist slogans.[248] Tribal organisations such as the *Jam'iyya Tamīmiyya* (Tamīmī Association), founded in 1961, were celebrated in the press as a 'popular organisation' (*munazzama sha'biyya*). Often, they were founded by tribesmen who had come in contact with nationalist and socialist forces.[249] Obviously, the extent to which this alliance went beyond mere slogans is an entirely different matter, given that even the most fervent urban nationalists would probably have been averse to the renewed domination of what was left of the tribal ethos. This was possibly more an issue in Hadhramaut than among the urbanised Hadhramis in Indonesia.

It was not only proponents of Arab unity, no matter how defined, who flourished in this general political climate. The aforementioned Party of Hadhrami Unity was founded in June 1956, presumably in the context of the impending visit of the Laḥjī sultan, 'Alī 'Abd al-Karīm. Although reportedly aimed "at protecting Kathiri State interests", it also intended "to put pressure on the Kathiri Sultan to agree to accept the advice of a state Council of 'Ulama on all matters affecting Kathiri external relationships". In light of what else is known about the party, this presumably means that it wanted to convince the Kathīrī sultan of the merits of wider Hadhrami integration in the interest of the merchants. It therefore pursued a middle line between Kathīrī parochialism and Yemeni or even Arab nationalism. Typical for the prevailing *Zeitgeist*, lip service was paid to Hadhramaut as being part of the Arab world.[250] It seems likely that this party was either identical to or replaced by the Party of National Unity (*Ḥizb al-Ittiḥād al-Waṭanī bi-Say'ūn*) which demanded an independent republic in Hadhramaut by 1960.[251]

The general politicisation worried the British. After Sultan Ṣāliḥ's

[248] Jibrīl, *Madīna*, pp. 45f., 52–59; Kostiner, *The Struggle*, p. 43.

[249] *al-Ṭalī'a* 198, 20.7.1961, p. 4; the ideological orientations of these organisations were confirmed by Dr. 'Abd al-'Azīz b. 'Aqīl, al-Mukallā, October 1996 and 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Millāḥī, al-Shiḥr, 14.10.1996.

[250] IO, R/20/C/2054, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Assistant Adviser Nothern Areas, Seyun, 9.6.1956 and 19.6.1956, including An Introduction of the Aims of the Hizb; IO, R/20/B/2458, Clubs & Societies in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, 26.9.1956, p. 2.

[251] IO, R/20/C/2052, Resident Officer, Northern Areas to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 24.8.1960, List of the clubs in Seyun.

death, Shaykh al-Qaddāl decided to resign from the office of Prime Minister before the end of his term in 1958. Given his wide-ranging powers and integrity, the Resident Adviser complained about the difficulty in finding a replacement internally.[252] Mindful of the problems of 1950, the Sultan's Council suggested appointing the Pakistani Financial Secretary, Jehan Khan, rather than importing an unknown foreigner. While the transition passed without serious problems, the renewal of the State Council's term two years later, without election, prompted complaints. "The Oppressed" wrote to the Resident Adviser in June 1959, denouncing the State Secretary as a "dirty Pakistani" and the Sultan as "laughing stock". The attack was directed in particular against Abū Bakr Bā Raḥīm, council member and treasurer of the *Jamʿiyya Khayriyya*. He was accused of exploiting his monopoly of the cigarette trade, misusing the welfare funds for his trade and generally abusing his position for striking private deals with the government.[253] While the Resident Adviser suspected internal quarrels in the Sultan's Council behind this letter, complaints about the misuse of *Jamʿiyya Khayriyya* funds continued until the society's reform in 1961.[254] In September 1961, Jehan Khan resigned but was eventually convinced by the British to stay on for another three years with a higher salary and home leave, as (according to a British source) none of the potential local candidates would have been able to deal with the sultan.[255] Only by October 1964 was the long-held Hadhrami desire for a "national *wazīr*" vindicated with the appointment of Aḥmad Muḥammad al-ʿAṭṭās.

Matters were further complicated when the State Secretary in Sayʾūn, ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī, resigned in 1958. The sultan had hoped that his cousin would be appointed, while his advisers had suggested Sayyid ʿAlī b. Sumayṭ or Sayyid ʿUmar Miḥḍār al-Kāf, much to the dismay of the British. The Assistant Adviser, influenced by British aversion to Sayyid ʿUmar's political views, described him as "a mischievous meddler in State + other affairs, member of the Southern League in Aden, Uniform (?) agency manager in Tarim and at that

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[252] IO, R/20/B/2434, E. A. P. Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Secretary to Government, 9.1.1957.
[253] IO, R/20/B/3083, "The Oppressed" to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 4.6.1959.
[254] IO, R/20/B/3083, Resident, Mukalla to Protectorate Secretary, Aden, 14.6.1959, Petition by Abdullah Abdurrehman Ba Hormoz and 308 others to Prime Minister, 4.3.1961 and Resident Adviser to Chief Secretary to Government, 18.6.1961.
[255] IO, R/20/B/3083, Wise, Mukalla to Secretariat, Aden, 18.9.1961.

time President of the Akhūa association—[. . .] in Tarim, now for-
tunately living in Singapore supposedly looking after the Kaff affairs
there but said to be living a debouched + drunken life. If he should
ever return to the Hadhramaut be prepared for trouble".[256] Eventually,
the Sudanese Amīn ʿAbd al-Majīd, who had lived in Hadhramaut
for eighteen years in various roles, was appointed as Acting State
Secretary after an intervention by Sayyid Abū Bakr al-Kāf. The
Resident Adviser threatened to demand the assistance of the Governor
of Aden in obtaining a proper appointment for Shaykh Amīn, but
he was only offered a two year contract.

Even natural disasters, such as a flood in Sayʾūn in 1957, became
politicised. Immediately after the news broke, Hadhramis in Aden
formed a relief committee which tried to organise international and
Arab help. As both the South Arabian League and the Yemen
became involved, the British began to worry and tried to prevent
their participation in the committees by providing a rather large sum
for flood relief.[257]

The New Politics and the Press

One remarkable new aspect in the events surrounding the visit of the
Sultan of Laḥij to Sayʾūn as well as in the events in Ghayl Bā Wazīr
described earlier was the type of propaganda employed in the conflicts.
Earlier, journals were circulated either openly or clandestinely, and
people discussed politics at social meetings. The use of pamphlets
displayed in a public space was a novelty. Although by their very
nature still primarily directed at the literate elite, they had a poten-
tially far wider audience, as any literate person could not only access
them easily, but also read them to any bystanders. While this is obvi-
ously a far shot from mass politics, it does mark a step away from
the earlier elite orientation. Something similar can be said about the
use of the wall newspaper, initially introduced for educational pur-
poses in the intermediary school.

1959 also marked the beginning of an independent printed press
in Hadhramaut, if we except the earlier, roneographed publication
of *al-Ikhāʾ* by *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Muʿāwana*. The availability of

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[256] IO, R/20/C/2050, Handing Over Notes from R. H. Daly to J. Weakley,
Northern Areas, March 1959, pp. 14f.
[257] For details, see IO, R/20/C/2057.

a printed medium greatly increased the scope of both debate and readership.[258] As mentioned before, some newspapers and journals from Egypt, as well as *Fatāt al-Jazīra* and other journals from Aden, had been available in limited numbers in Hadhramaut, but the region had been tangential to their interests at the best of times. *Al-Akhbār*, published between 1952 and 1956, provided a printed medium with a focus on Hadhramaut, but was also the official mouthpiece of the sultanate. Nevertheless, it prepared the grounds for later publications, both in terms of journalistic and technical know-how and readership.

The first independent newspaper was published weekly and founded by Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, brother of the historian Saʿīd. He seems to have shared many of the views of his brother who was influenced by Islamic modernism and nationalism. This becomes evident both from interviews with him and from reading *al-Ṭalīʿa* (The Vanguard).[259] This explains why the British observed the newspaper with some concern.[260] In April 1962, *al-Ṭalīʿa* announced that it could no longer be sold in Jeddah because of its Nasserist tendencies.[261] This stance increasingly reflected wider trends among the educated in al-Mukallā.[262]

By 1963, Bā Wazīr was joined by Sayyid Ḥusayn Muḥammad al-Bār, the erstwhile editor of *al-Akhbār*, who published the more pro-ʿAlawī *al-Rāʾid* (The Leader).[263] By July 1963, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Bā Faqīh joined the scene with his weekly *al-Rāʾy al-ʿāmm* (The General View). Now, enthusiasts could read a local weekly on Mondays (*al-Rāʾid*), Thursdays (*al-Ṭalīʿa*) and Fridays (*al-Rāʾy al-ʿāmm*).[264] In addition, *al-Ikhāʾ* seems to have been revived, or perhaps more widely

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[258] About the importance of printing, see Eisenstein, *The Printing Revolution*, notably pp. 26–54.

[259] Interviews with Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, al-Mukallā, 27.10. 1996 and 30.10.1996. When he launched a short-lived cultural monthly in 1962, the British remarked on its political orientation and that it provided "a useful vehicle for expression of view of politically entire Ba Wazir family", IO, R/20/C/1942, Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary for week ending 25.2.1962. This also points to the rather similar views of the brothers and possibly other family members.

[260] IO, R/20/B/3074, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Protectorate Secretary, Aden, 9.6.59.

[261] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 145, 12.4.1962, p. 1.

[262] IO, R/20/C/1947, British Embassy, Khartoum to North and East African Department, Foreign Office, 24.6.1964, reporting that a Sudanese teacher from al-Mukallā had told the Embassy about widespread Nasserist views in al-Mukallā.

[263] Personal communication (by the rather anti-ʿAlawī) Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr, al-Mukallā, 27.10.1996.

[264] IO, R/20/C/1942, Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary for week ending 24.8.1963.

circulated, in the 1960s. Although produced in bad quality, it was the only journal from the interior. Less concerned with daily politics than the al-Mukallā publications, and resembling the older style journals, it nevertheless became a mouthpiece for the more radical younger generation of members of *Jamᶜiyyat al-Ukhuwwa*. In June 1963, the British reported:

> Last month's issue follows general Arab press line and welcomes U.N. Committee for liquidation of Colonialism and hopes this committee will visit Hadhramaut 'which is part of South Arabia'. Latest number includes poem by Hasan bin Zain Bal Faqih referring to victorious military revolts Iraq, Syria, Yemen. Issue also contains complaints from Hadhrami labourers against 'unfair treatment by Pan-American through certain non-hadhrami employees on loan'.[265]

The August edition showed that views within the Brotherhood Association were not homogenous: it urged the readers to concentrate on discussing and solving their own problems rather than "wasting time in useless conversations about other countries."[266] Given the generally low degree of higher schooling and organisation in political parties, and the limited audience, the contribution of this rather lively journalistic scene to the formation of a political consciousness, particularly among the younger generation, can hardly be overestimated.[267]

Al-Ṭalīᶜa contributed greatly to the nationalist mood both in Hadhramaut and the diaspora where it was quite widely distributed.[268] It provided a running commentary on the bigger and lesser events of al-Mukallā daily life: it debated the pros and cons of opening a cinema and reported the prison sentence for youth for drinking and dancing, and the suicide of a woman accused of pregnancy outside wedlock.[269] Demands to improve the situation of workers were taken up, as were those for an improvement of al-Mukallā port facil-

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[265] IO, R/20/C/1942, Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary for week ending 1.6.1963.

[266] IO, R/20/C/1942, Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary for week ending 3.8.1963.

[267] On the role of newspapers in politicisation see Welke, "Zeitung", p. 89.

[268] The following analysis is based on a survey of the copies preserved in the Mukallā Museum. The journal had a print run of 2000. al-Zabbāl, "al-Mukallā", p. 90.

[269] *al-Ṭalīᶜa* 81, 29.12.1960; 82, 5.1.1961; 144, 5.4.1962. By 1965, films were still shown in the open courtyard in front of the sultan's palace and subject to strict censorship, while the installation of a regular cinema was hotly debated. al-Zabbāl, "al-Mukallā", p. 86. It seems that the cinema operated in the 1940s was indoors, but was abandoned at some unknown date. Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", *al-Ayyām*, 16.12.1992.

ities.[270] Matters of education and security featured regularly, in line with the earlier reformist discourse. The Egyptian revolution was thematised time and again, as was the Algerian struggle for independence and the confrontation with Israel.[271] The Yemeni revolution met with great acclaim and was used for lengthy expositions about the fate of regimes which allowed political and social tyranny.[272] Obviously, these general issues were always open to specific interpretation: Bujra reports how the Yemeni revolution was greeted by some widows in al-Ḥurayḍa because they hoped it would abolish the rule of *kafāʾa* and therefore enable them to remarry.[273]

The reader was therefore constantly reminded of the wider Arab world, occasionally even of its internal ideological divisions. Even such concepts as "Islamic Socialism", widely discussed in the 1950s in response to ideological challenges from socialists and Arab nationalists, found their way to al-Mukallā. The judge of al-Shiḥr, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-ʿAmārī, wrote an article about Islam and Socialism, arguing that they both strove for justice, human dignity and the common good. Islam did not, he argued, oppose nationalisation, even if it protected private property in principle.[274]

Al-Ṭalīʿa criticised the institutions for inefficiency, for example, in 1963, when Aḥmad Bā Wazīr and eight others sent an open letter to the elected city council complaining of vain promises.[275] It backed constitutional demands, such as the demand for a Legislative Council in Sayʾūn, brought forward by *Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhūwwa* in July 1960 on the occasion of a visit by the Governor of Aden.[276] In a later meeting with the Sultan and notables, the Resident Adviser delayed the proposal with the argument that a legislative council demanded more governmental experience.[277]

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[270] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 175, 15.11.1962; 178, 6.12.1962; 179, 13.12.1962.

[271] For example *al-Ṭalīʿa* 104, 22.6.1961; 106, 6.7.1961; 107, 13.7.1961; 109, 27.7.1961.

[272] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 170, 11.10.1962; cf. 171, 18.10.1962; 172, 25.10.1962; 173, 1.11.1962; 174, 8.11.1962.

[273] Bujra, *The Politics*, p. 181.

[274] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 141, 15.3.1962.

[275] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 185, 24.1.1963.

[276] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 57, 14.7.1960. Strangely, the topic is not discussed in the Quʿaytī context in this or the following issues. For the full petition, see IO, R/20/B/3084, Petition by J. al-Ukhuwa to Sultan Hussain Bin Ali Al Kathiri, 18.7.1960, encl. in Resident, Aden to Protectorate Secretary, 3.8.1960.

[277] IO, R/20/B/3084, Memorandum, 22.11.1960, by Resident Adviser, on a meeting on 9.11.1960 with Sultan Hussein Bin Ali al-Kathiri and others.

Constitutional Development: Individual Sultanates, a Hadhrami
Federation or Accession to the Federation of South Arabia?

The Governor's visit in 1960 sparked constitutional discussions in
the government circles of al-Mukallā.[278] It prompted a rare intervention
by Sultan ʿAwaḍ in which he demanded a more democratic gov-
ernment, presumably at the initiative of the Sultan's Council.[279] When
the Governor met with the Sultan's Council, he was reminded that
Ingrams had promised that the half-elected, half-appointed State
Council would be replaced by a proper legislature after five years.
Abū Bakr Bā Raḥīm, member of both the Sultan's and State Councils,
suggested that this could be linked to a revision of the Protectorate
Treaty, which would allow the Quʿaytī government more freedom
with regard to loans from states other than Britain. The Governor
made clear that he preferred legislative development within the treaty
framework and seems to have used the possible withdrawal of all
British subsidies as a thinly veiled threat against further demands for
a more independent development.[280] In the following months, pres-
sure for British concessions increased.

Besides hoping for more room for independent manoeuvre, a prime
motive for both the Quʿaytī and Kathīrī demands for a constitution
was the hope of aid from Arab countries. Given the wider context
of Arab nationalism and the Cold War, the British took a cautious
stance on this issue, while Hadhramis were keen on development
aid from whereever they could obtain it.[281] Some obviously pursued
a wider political agenda, but many politicians were simply interested
in finding support in areas in which they felt Britain was not help-
ing enough. Education in particular was contested because of its
potential to influence children politically. For some years, Egypt had
offered to send teachers.[282] Colonial officials suspected that this might

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[278] For a survey, see Lekon, The British, pp. 331–335.
[279] IO, R/20/C/1770, Sultan Awadh to Resident Adviser, 18.4.1960.
[280] IO, R/20/C/1771, Notes of Meeting at the Residency, Mukalla, between
H.E. the Governor and the Sultan's Council, 17.7.1960.
[281] IO, R/20/C/1771, Members of Quʾaiti Council to Ian Macleod, Secretary of
State for the Colonies, Mukalla, 5.4.1961 [written on the occasion of McLeod's visit
to al-Mukallā]; cf. IO, R/20/B/3084, Memorandum, 22.11.1960, by Resident Adviser,
on a meeting on 9.11.1960 with Sultan Hussein Bin Ali al-Kathiri and others.
[282] IO, R/20/C/2054, Kathīrī State Secretary (ʿAlī Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ) to Assistant
Adviser Northern Areas, 2.9.1956 and the following exchange of telegrams in the
same file. The outcome of the initiative is not clear from the British documents.

be a subvertive move to promote Nasserism. The matter became one of increasing urgency after Kuwaiti independence in 1961 when the Emirate announced that it was happy to offer help to fellow Arab countries. By 1964, the Hadhrami governments contacted other Arab countries and had some success in securing scholarships and teachers, the latter notably from Egypt. The Resident Adviser backed this while the Foreign and Colonial Offices were strongly opposed and blocked further Hadhrami attempts to recruit from Egypt. This caused violent demonstrations in al-Mukallā and Say'ūn in August 1964 and resulted in a government crisis.[283]

With regard to the issue of constitutional development proper, the British were particularly hesitant as they feared that this might be considered a precedent which could be taken up by members of the South Arabian Federation.[284] In addition, they probably quite rightly perceived constitutional demands as a means "of shaking off the burden of foreign rule or influence; we can so easily be beaten with our own democratic sticks for ulterior and undemocratic motives".[285] This dampened their earlier developmental drive significantly. For both Hadhramis and British, the issue of constitutional development became closely intermingled with the wider question of the future of Hadhramaut and its relation to the Federation.[286] This became even more important after Aden agreed to join the Federation in September 1962 following acrimonious negotiations.[287] In spite of the eventual production of a draft, the constitutional debate petered out in the end without any conclusive result.[288] However, it was important both as an exercise in political debate and opinion building, and in achieving smaller changes. In 1965, the State Council was substituted with a National Council of which the Resident Adviser was not a

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[283] PRO, FO 371/185244, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Governor, Aden, 19.9.1966, p. 3,6; Crouch, *An Element*, pp. 163f. For details, see Lekon, The British, pp. 337–339.

[284] IO, R/20/C/1771, Memorandum by the Resident Adviser, 17.10.1960, about a meeting with the Minister, the Sultan's Council and ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf, the deputy *wazīr*; Copy of Note on File 10727—Treaties with E. A. P. States and Constitutional Reform, 15.6.62, Ag. Protectorate Secretary.

[285] IO, R/20/G/10, Report on the Eastern Aden Protectorate for the years 1958–1962, p. 2.

[286] See, for example, *al-Ṭalīʿa* 85–86, 2.2.1961.

[287] Trevaskis, *Shades*, pp. 166–181. On January 18, 1963, Aden became the 12th state of the Federation. Pieragostini, *Britain*, p. 38.

[288] IO, R/20/C/1929, Acting Resident Adviser, Seyun to High Commander, Aden, 21.6.(1965).

member.[289] At the same time, it was suggested that political parties be legalised and press censorship be liberalised, which had for some time been among the demands put to the Quʿayṭī government.[290]

The positions which emerged over the question of federation, both in the official bodies and in the press, show the different views held among the Quʿayṭī and Kathīrī political and intellectual elite. They illuminate Hadhrami ambivalence over the question of wider South Arabian, Yemeni and Arab unity. Since the question was resolved in the end by the British withdrawal and the advance of forces of the National Liberation Front, i.e., a decision making process which did not give the local actors much room for a considered response, it is worthwhile to briefly sum up the different positions in the discussion as a reflection of the local elites' freely articulated views.[291]

As mentioned in the context of political parties, certain members of the Kathīrī and Quʿayṭī elites favoured Hadhrami unity.[292] This also holds true for some emigrants as the 1960 founding of a "Hadhrami Union" by Hadhramis in Jakarta shows. Most of its members seem to have been closely linked to the *Jamʿiyya Kathīriyya*. The Union was based on "Hadrami Nationalism which cannot be separated from Arab Nationalism", and called for the political and economic union of all of Hadhramaut "with full consideration and recognition of the existing rights of the sultans and tribes' leaders in Hadramaut."[293] This formula glossed over the old question of Kathīrī—Quʿayṭī rivalry which dominated the whole debate, both on the official level and in the press. From a Quʿayṭī perspective, there were no obstacles to full unity, which would have meant the fulfillment of the old dream of Quʿayṭī supremacy. Quʿayṭī officials had to be warned by the Resident Adviser not to push too hard.[294] Their view

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[289] For details of the developments, see IO, R/20/C/1771–1773, for a copy of the draft constitution, IO, R/20/D/321.

[290] IO, R/20/C/1773, Extract from M.T.S./Council Meeting Held on 15/12/64. For petitions requesting more liberties and the answers of the Quʿayṭī government, see IO, R/20/C/1771, e.g. Quʾaiti Minister to petitioners, 11.7.1962 and General Notice (in translation), 22.8.1962, signed by Salim Mohammed Shammakh, President of the People's delegation.

[291] For a survey of the topic, see Lekon, The British, pp. 318–327.

[292] IO, R/20/C/1771, The signatories ("eminents, notables and heads of the Hadhramis territory, Quaiti State") to Minister to the Sultanate, Mukalla, undated.

[293] IO, R/20/B/3094, Basic Constitutions of "*Hadrami Union*" Organisation, established on 4.9.1960.

[294] IO, R/20/C/1772, Notes on a Meeting held at the Residency on the 2nd July, 1963, at 6.30 p.m.

on the desirability of Hadhrami union was shared by most of the authors of *al-Ṭalīʿa*.

While the idea of joining the Federation did not seem overly appealing to Quʿaytī intellectuals, it seemed to offer the Kathīrīs at least some alternative to Quʿaytī domination, which they assumed underlay the suggestions of Hadhrami unity. In the autumn of 1961, a delegation from the coast visited Sayʾūn to discuss unity. At first it wanted to hold its meetings in the house of Sayyid Abū Bakr b. Shaykh al-Kāf. He had to retract his offer of a venue because of the intervention of the government.[295] By January 1962, the Kathīrīs threatened to join the Federation for fear of Quʿaytī domination.[296] This, however, seems to have been more of a gesture since a year later, the Kathīrīs still went on record as enemies of the Federation and had taken no practical steps towards joining.[297] Instead, the threat has to be seen in the context of a crisis in talks between the sultanates. In late January 1962, the Kathīrī members of the National Organisation for Public Services were not allowed to participate in meetings held in al-Mukallā.[298] A negative article by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Bā Maṭraf on the Federation was greeted with Kathīrī outrage and accusations that the Quʿaytīs wanted to force them into Hadhrami unity under the pretext of necessary arrangements over oil-related issues.[299] The most the Kathīrīs were ready to concede was a Hadhrami federation (*ittiḥād*), rather than full-fledged unity (*waḥda*).[300] This position was supported overseas.[301]

De facto, both sultanates distanced themselves from any commitments to the Federation. In autumn 1964, the State Councils of both sultanes demanded independence parallel to that of the Federation.[302] In February 1965, the Kathīrī and Quʿaytī sultans announced that they had been visited by a representative of the Federation and agreed to attend a conference in London where the Federation's constitutional future was to be discussed. They had, in principle,

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[295] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 118, 28.9.1961.

[296] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 131–132, 4.1.1962.

[297] IO, R/20/C/234, excerpt from *The Recorder*, Aden, 17.11.1963.

[298] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 135, 25.1.1962.

[299] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 148, 3.5.1962 and 150, 24.5.1962.

[300] IO, R/20/B/3081, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Protectorate Secretary, Aden, 31.12.1961, Annex D., p. 2.

[301] IO, R/20/C/1936, Pol. Saiun [sic] to Resident Adviser Mukalla, 8/7, referring to a recent bulletin of the Shanfarī Association in Jakarta.

[302] Pieragostini, *Britain*, pp. 225f., note 11, quoting *The Sunday Times*, 29.11.1964.

agreed to join a new currency.[303] However, this was a far shot from full membership, and at any rate the conference never took place due to divisions between the Western Protectorate states and Aden.[304] This reluctance to commit themselves seems to have continued until 1967. In September 1966, the parting Resident Adviser reported to Aden that most Hadhramis still wanted peace and security and were wary of the troubles which were shaking the Federation by then.[305] In addition, they felt superior to the Western Protectorate in terms of civilisation, and feared that Hadhramaut might become submerged in a greater union.[306] Economically, Hadhramaut depended far less on Aden than the Western states and in many ways was more closely linked to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, from where most remittances now arrived.[307] During a discussion in the same month, Ghālib b. ʿAwaḍ, heir to the Quʿayṭī throne, told the Governor of Aden that the Federation would collapse once British support was withdrawn. In contrast, he felt assured that the Quʿayṭī sultanate could survive on its own.[308] Adding to his political concerns were financial problems resulting from the high level of salaries in the Federation and its army. In the case of Hadhramaut joining the Federation, such pay would have become mandatory in Hadhramaut, too, exceeding the Quʿayṭī financial means.[309] The views of Sultan Ḥusayn al-Kathīrī are less clearly recorded.[310]

It seems that some Hadhrami residents of Aden saw real benefits in a wider union. In May 1962, Shaykh Sālimīn Bā Sunayd, characterised as "one of the important Hadhrami personalities" in Aden, called for both Adeni and Hadhrami accession to the South Arabian Federation. Did the hope for oil, unproven as it was, underlie the enthusiasm for a separate Hadhrami state?[311] A similar view was put

[303] SMA, Bayānāt al-dawla al-kathīriyya, Bayān ʿāmm min al-dawlatayn al-kathīriyya wa-l-quʿayṭiyya, 19.2.1965.

[304] For the wider context, see Pieragostini, *Britain*, 92–100. An announcement by the Deputy Kathīrī State Secretary blamed the British for the failure, SMA, Bayānāt al-dawla al-kathīriyya, Bayān ʿāmm 22.8.1965.

[305] PRO, FO 371/185244, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Governor, Aden, 19.9.1966.

[306] al-Bakrī, *Ittiḥād al-janūb*, p. 312.

[307] al-Nākhibī, *Riḥla*, pp. 151f.

[308] PRO, FO 371/185244, Note of a discussion with Amir Ghaleb the son of Sultan Awadh of Qaʾiti State at Mukalla on the 8th September, 1966, R. G. Turnbull, H.c., 13.9.1966.

[309] al-Bakrī, *Ittiḥād al-janūb*, pp. 313f.

[310] PRO, FO 371/185244, Note of a discussion with Sultan Hussein of Kathiri State at Seyun on the 10th September, 1966, R. G. Turnbull, H.c., 15.9.1966.

[311] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 151, 31.5.1962.

forward by Shaykhān al-Ḥibshī in 1963 when he represented the South Arabian League during talks in London.[312] During a visit to Wadi Hadhramaut in early 1965, al-Ḥibshī characteristically found support for his views of "the need for a unified government in the South but without prior federation within the E.A.P." In contrast, he was denounced during a meeting in the Sultan's Library in al-Mukallā as a British stooge.[313] This can be explained by the greater tendencies towards Federation in the Wadi (albeit only *faute de mieux*), as well as by the dominance of different political parties in the two sultanates.

What were the British views on the future of Hadhramaut? It is remarkable and indeed indicative of British concentration on Aden and the Western Aden Protectorate in the crucial early 1960s that Trevaskis hardly mentions the Eastern Protectorate. The major linkage was in terms of subsidies and fears about Hadhrami constitutional demands as an undesirable precedent for the Western Protectorate.[314] For reasons similar to those initially put forward in favour of the Federation, namely development, in July 1962 the Resident Adviser suggested promoting "an association of all three [Eastern] states [the third is Mahrā] independent of the Western Federation". This would not, he argued, preclude any later adherence to the Western Federation should the sultanates wish so.[315] A year later, the High Commissioner of Aden tried to convince the sultans to join the Federation, arguing that this would end the advisory treaties while maintaining British support.[316] Little progress had been made on any of these issues by late 1964.[317] A number of reasons explain this: the reluctance of the sultans; uncertainty among the British as to the best course of action for a region which was of little concern to them in the greater scheme of things; and more urgent developments in Aden and the Western Protectorate where civil unrest had begun in 1963 and had escalated by 1965. This presumably prevented any concerted initiatives such as the ones which had coaxed Aden into joining the Federation. A rather dispirited report in June 1966 pronounced that it was still

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[312] Trevaskis, *Shades*, p. 191.

[313] IO, R/20/D/292, Resident Adviser to Chief Intelligence Officer, Aden, 11.1.1965.

[314] IO, R/20/G/10, Report on the E.A.P. for the years 1958–1962, p. 2.

[315] IO, R/20/C/1771, Resident Adviser to Government, Aden, 12.7.1962, R/32/II/6, Secret.

[316] IO, R/20/C/1772, Notes of a Meeting held in Sai'un on the 30th June 1963.

[317] IO, R/20/C/1773, Resident Adviser to Deputy High Commissioner, Aden, 29.10.1964; Balfour-Paul, *The end*, p. 81.

the British aim to convince the Eastern sultanates to enter the
Federation. It remarked pessimistically that:

> At present it seems most unlikely that this can be achieved on terms
> acceptable to Federal Ministers, and even if achieved it appears prob-
> able that soon after independence attempts at secession would be made
> with the possibility of help being sought by the secessionists from var-
> ious interested countries.[318]

The British Retreat

Developments in Aden and the Federation

In 1964, when the British announced their decision to grant inde-
pendence to South Arabia, they intended to negotiate the future with
the Federation. A number of factors complicated this process, one
of which was the aforementioned rivalry and suspicion between Aden
and the Federation. Another was the emergence of two rival left
wing liberation movements, the Organisation for the Liberation of
the Occupied South (OLOS) and the National Liberation Front
(NLF). The OLOS had its roots in the People's Socialist Party (PSP),
which had been formed in July 1962 by leading members of the
Aden Trade Union Congress in order to broaden its political basis.[319]
Its major Arab supporter was Egypt. The PSP demanded a demo-
cratic and independent South Yemen but true to its Aden bias
rejected the merger of Aden with the Federation. In 1965, it united
with the South Arabian League and a number of individuals to form
OLOS, which now adopted armed struggle as one of its means to
achieve independence.[320]

From 1963 onwards, the PSP's main rival was the National Libera-
tion Front, which was ideologically rooted in the Arab nationalism
as promoted by the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN). The
MAN had come to reject Nasserism, notably after the failure of the
United Arab Republic in 1961. Following two conferences in post-
revolution Sana'a in February and June 1963, the National Liberation

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[318] IO, R/20/C/1949, The Residency, Mukalla, 21.6.1966: Assessment of the
Security Threat to the Eastern Aden Protectorate with Notes on Matters Pertaining
to Security, pp. 1f.
[319] Adhal, *al-Istiqlāl*, p. 169, gives 1961 as the founding date of the PSP.
[320] al-Misrī, *al-Najm*, pp. 94–100; Lackner, *P. D. R. Yemen*, pp. 28–32.

Front for the Liberation of South Yemen was founded. Besides the core of MAN supporters, it assembled a number of revolutionary splinter groups as well as tribal groups. These gave it a vital link to the rural areas which eventually proved to be decisive in the struggle with OLOS. Its other distinctive feature, again attractive to the tribes, was its commitment to armed struggle as the only proper revolutionary path to independence. This was inspired partly by Maoist ideas introduced by returning emigrants from the East Indies.[321] For a short time in 1966 and under intense pressure from Egypt, a number of NLF leaders announced their cooperation with OLOS in the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), but by June 1966, these leaders were expelled and thereafter the NLF considered FLOSY as its main rival.

The story of Aden's and South Arabia's descent into chaos has been told a number of times from different perspectives. It was due to a growing number of attacks on British installations and personnel, fighting between the rival organisations, and the failure of increasingly desperate attempts to negotiate some kind of solution.[322] Therefore, a brief summary suffices here as necessary background to events in Hadhramaut. Besides the local players, Yemen and Egypt, the United Nations became involved and increasingly turned into a stage on which the different interest groups lobbied their case. The Federation, whose rulers still hoped for survival in a new system, received a serious blow in February 1966 when Britain announced that it would abandon its Aden base in favour of Baḥrayn in the oil-rich Gulf. By April 1967 and after an abortive visit by a UN delegation to Aden, the situation had become so muddled that the British Prime Minister enquired discreetly whether it might be an option to hand the entire problem over to the United Nations. He was interested both in the practical question as well as in the possible publicity effects.[323] Rather than ceasing their attacks and following British invitations to

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[321] Kostiner, "Arab Radical Politics", notably pp. 457f.; Lackner, *P. D. R. Yemen*, pp. 35–42; Halliday, *Arabia*, pp. 189–195, pp. 189–195; al-Miṣrī, *al-Najm*, pp. 108–116 and 127–179; Adhal, *al-Istiqlāl*, pp. 213–216; Weidlich, "Zu einigen Problemen"; al-Kāf, *Ḥaḍramawt*, pp. 88–92.

[322] For a view sympathetic to the Federation, see Trevaskis, *Shades*, part IV; for that of the last High Commissioner Trevelyan, *The Middle East*, pp. 242–266; for a NLF-centered perspective Kostiner, *The Struggle*. Surveys are Balfour-Paul, *The end*, pp. 82–95 and, with much detail, Pieragostini, *Britain*, pp. 38–212.

[323] See the correspondence in PRO, FCO 8/324 between the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Office, April-May 1967.

negotiate the establishment of an interim government, the NLF stepped up its attacks. By mid-August, talks opened in Geneva between the UN delegation and representatives of the Federation and the Eastern Protectorate. The nationalists boycotted the meeting, although FLOSY members met with the delegation in Egypt in early September.

Meanwhile, the NLF created facts on the ground. In June 1967, Ḍāliʿ was the first sultanate to fall unter its control. On 21 August 1967, the High Commissioner in Aden telegraphed the Foreign Office what was the first of a number of messages which showed increasing panic:

> The situation is deteriorating rapidly on a steepening curve. Without a sudden transformation of the political situation, which is most unlikely, we much expect this to continue and to force us continually to reappraise our plans.[324]

He recommended a rapid redeployment of British forces and only eleven days later reported, "This is a turning-point in our negotiations here. The Federal Government has ceased to exist."[325] The British thereupon declared that they recognised the nationalists as "representing the people of the country" and wanted to negotiate with them.[326] This intensified fighting between FLOSY and NLF, who could only be brought to the negotiating table by mid-October.[327] In late November, the British agreed to a handover with the NLF. When the last British troops left Aden by air on 29 November 1967, the next day was proclaimed Independence Day of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen.[328]

Developments From Within: The Rise of Nationalist Parties in Hadhramaut

How did these developments affect Hadhramaut? As shown above, the governments took a cautious approach towards all plans of merger with the remainder of British controlled South Arabia. By contrast, the prospect of independence was appreciated. The rift between the

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[324] PRO, FCO 60/25, High Commissioner, Aden to Foreign Office, 21.8.1967; Kostiner, *The Struggle*, pp. 166–173.

[325] PRO, FCO 60/25, High Commissioner, Aden to Foreign Office, 1.9.1967.

[326] Trevelyan, *The Middle East*, p. 247.

[327] PRO, FCO 60/26, Aden to Foreign Office, tel. no. 752, 11.10.1967.

[328] PRO, FCO 60/26, UK Mission Geneva to Foreign Office, tel. no. 1050, 29.11.1967.

old generation of Hadhrami leadership and the increasingly assertive new generation widened during these years, although even the latter oscillated between hopes for a united Hadhramaut and South Arabian unity, as shown above. It is difficult to assess the extent to which such views were a concession to what was considered to be the predominant political opionion. In a revealing report on constitutional discussions held in Say'ūn in December 1965 with Sayyid Aḥmad al-ʿAṭṭās, the Quʿaytī Prime Minister, and Sultan Ḥusayn al-Kathīrī, the Acting High Commissioner reported views which themselves might have been coloured by tactical considerations:

> In 'off the record' talks all those present admitted to each other that the line they were taking was not that which they would themselves wish to take if they felt they had a free hand in the matter, but that they were forced into it by circumstances beyond their control. Their personal inclinations were to give full support to any efforts made by Britain to create a strong central government for South Arabia, but owing to the weakness of their own state Governments they had either to bow to public opinion and to try so to engineer matters that they carried it with them or else to run the risk of loosing control altogether.[329]

In terms of party politics, the South Arabian League was probably the strongest force in Hadhramaut.[330] This seems to have been the result of the (temporary) alliance of Aḥmad Buqshān and other Hadhrami merchants in Jeddah with the League. Būqshān's immense wealth allowed him to freely distribute presents during his visit to Hadhramaut in November 1964. Inevitably, this gained him supporters.[331] However, it is not unlikely that Buqshān and some other Jeddah merchants pursued policies which had as much to do with tribal politics in Wadi Dawʿan as with their own interests as expatriate businessmen in Saudi Arabia.[332] This might explain the rising popularity of FLOSY, notably in al-Mukallā. An Arab Socialist Party (ASP) which was closely linked to the Adeni People's Socialist Party

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[329] IO, R/20/C/1929, Acting High Commissioner to Deputy High Commissioner, Aden, 29.12.1965, p. 2.

[330] For a survey of the following, see Lekon, The British, pp. 355–358; for the situation in June 1966, IO, R/20/C/1949, The Residency, Mukalla, 21.6.1966: Assessment of the Security Threat to the Eastern Aden Protectorate with Notes on Matters Pertaining to Security, pp. 2–4.

[331] IO, R/20/C/1942, The Residency Office, Northern Areas, Seyun, 14.12.1964 to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 14.12.1964.

[332] IO, R/20/C/1942, Statement by FLOSY on Saudi Arabian Activities in the E.A.P., encl. in Ag. D.A.B.A. to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 18.7.1966; Kostiner, The Struggle, p. 135.

had been founded in 1965. It rather vaguely declared its support for
Arab unity and the unity of the national movement in the South.[333]
In its early days, it had also entertained links with the South Arabian
League (SAL) to the extent that it had used the same flag. Presumably
this reflected the alliance which PSP and SAL had struck when
founding OLOS. It is indicative of these links that when ʿAbd al-
Qawwī al-Makkāwī, Chief Minister in Aden and a leading member
of the PSP, visited al-Mukallā in early July 1965, he was accompa-
nied by Shaykhān al-Ḥibshī of the SAL.[334] The existence of links
between Hadhramis (some of them presumably in Aden) and the
PSP also becomes evident from the list of seven students accepted
for PSP scholarships to Iraq.[335] All these formations were, however,
rather short-lived. For example, in late 1966, the ASP split into a
"People's Democratic Front" (*al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya*)
under the leadership of ʿAlī Sālim al-Bīḍ and the "Union of Popular
Forces" (*Ittiḥād al-Qūwā al-Shaʿbiyya*).[336]

The NLF made its first appearance in Hadhramaut in September
1964 when it claimed to have assassinated a suspected collaborator
with the British Intelligence Services.[337] Shortly thereafter, anony-
mous letters were received by the Kathīrī Armed Constabulary. In
November, a wireless operator was caught at al-Rayyān airport car-
rying NLF publications for distribution in the Eastern Protectorate.[338]
By 1965, gun running was widespread and lists of NLF suspects,
arms' smugglers and 'troublemakers' circulated among the British.
Apparently, dozens if not hundreds of Hadhramis went to Yemen
for military courses and small scale training was carried out in the
mountains near Say'ūn. Among the NLF sympathisers were many
teachers and pupils as well as landowners, farmers, mechanics and
one of the Kathīrī sultan's brothers. Many of them had already been

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[333] PRO, FO 371/185244, Miss J. Goodchild, I. R. D., Foreign Office to Mr.
Blatherwick, Arabian Department, Foreign Office, 12.8.1966, Translation of Statement
in Damascus by "Voice of the Arabian Peninsula", 24.7.1966.

[334] IO, R/20/C/1929, Secret, Acting Resident Adviser, Mukalla, to Chief
Intelligence Officer, Aden, 1.7.1965.

[335] IO, R/20/C/1942, Acting Chief Intelligence Officer, Aden, to Resident Adviser,
Mukalla, 6.10.1963. The seven were: Abū Bakr Muḥammad Balfaqīh, Muḥammad
Ḥasan al-Bār (presumably Ḥusayn Muḥammad al-Bār), Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Yaḥyā,
ʿAlī Sālim al-Bīḍ, Nāṣir ʿAbdallāh Surur (?), Ḥaydar ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAṭṭār, Aḥmad
ʿAbdallāh Bā Ḥakīm.

[336] al-Bakrī, *Ittiḥād al-Janūb*, p. 315; Lackner, *P. D. R. Yemen*, p. 46.

[337] IO, R/20/C/1948, Excerpt, Sana Radio, 25.9.1964.

[338] IO, R/20/C/1948, Extract from Military Intelligence Summary for the month
of November 1964.

politically active: a former Kathīrī state councillor, the treasurer of
the Hadhrami Patriotic Association, and a suspected member of the
Union of Hadhrami Students were among those suspected of NLF
leanings. Quite a number of individuals had (former) links to the
Hadhrami Beduin Legion and the Beduin school. A number of them
were connected to East Africa.[339] By October 1965, strikes and demon-
strations became fairly widespread in the Wadi.[340] In March 1966,
the Kathīrīs announced full freedom of association and expression
but added that government representatives would be present at meet-
ings held by non-authorised groups.[341]

In March and April 1966, FLOSY held a number of meetings of
'Popular Organisations' at Sayʾūn. Presided over by the president of
the Sayʾūn Youth Club and the Deputy Chairman of the Teachers'
Union, it demanded the end of colonialism, compliance with UN
decisions, Yemeni unity and the sending of a delegation to the Arab
League. Local meetings were to be organised to spread this message.[342]
On April 16, a conference supported by the ASP of al-Mukallā and
Dammūn was organised by the Union of Hadhrami Students in al-
Mukallā and al-Qaṭn, by the General Union of Trade Unions in
Hadhramaut, by the Cultural Sports Club of al-Furṭ near al-Qaṭn, and
by a Youth Organisation from al-Ḥāmī.[343] The Worker's Cooperative
Association of Tarīm, presumably a successor of the outfit founded
by Ibn ʿAqīl, also supported FLOSY.[344] This list of supporting organ-
isations probably gives a fair profile of those demanding independence.
In late April, the conferences were apparently outlawed as disturb-
ing the peace.[345]

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[339] IO, R/20/C/1948, Eastern Aden Protectorate, Aide-Memoire on Subversive
Elements, 15.6.1966, encl. in Acting Deputy Adviser and British Resident, Mukalla,
to Aden Intelligence Centre, 16.6.1966, pp. 3–5; cf. Extracts from Daily Intelligence
and Situation Report 20.9.1965, 2.10.1965 and 9.11.1965; Assistant Adviser, Northern
Areas to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 25.10.1965, Some Aspects of the Security
Situation in Kathiri State, Training Officer, 21.10.1965.

[340] SMA, Bayānāt al-dawla al-kathīriyya, Deputy State Secretary, Bayān ʿāmm
of 3.10.1965, calling on the people to restore calm.

[341] SMA, Bayānāt al-dawla al-kathīriyya, Decree by State Secretary, 24.3.1966.

[342] SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-
ṭullābiyya, documents of 25.3.1966 and 5.4.1966.

[343] SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-
ṭullābiyya, undated publication of Muʾtamar al-hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya; cf. Kostiner, *The
Struggle*, p. 134.

[344] SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-
ṭullābiyya, declaration by the Jamʿiyyat al-ʿUmmāl al-Taʿāwuniyya, Tarīm, 24.3.1966.

[345] SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-
ṭullābiyya, Open letter of the conference (?) to the Sultan, 24.4.1966.

The political fronts in Aden, and even more so in Hadhramaut with its smaller constituency of politically-interested individuals, were much more in flux than the lists of parties and their members suggest. As in the case of the East African Hadhramis, many seem to have switched allegiance from one group to another rather easily.[346] The Hadhrami Patriotic Association, whose treasurer was arrested in 1965 for suspected NLF membership, had hitherto been considered as "the P.S.P. organ for creating industrial unrest in the Hadhramaut."[347] Two years earlier, the British described its President, who had close links to East Africa and Saudi Arabia (as did many other political activists in these years) as a "leading light in the United Organisation of Yemeni Youth". He was suspected of communist sympathies.[348] A report from 1966 further indicated the lack of clear ideological boundaries. The General Federation of Hadhrami Trade Unions rejected the SAL, while the sultanates favoured it but feared the wrath of the NLF if they declared their views openly. The only thing that was confirmed by the report was the existence of tribal support for the SAL (particularly among the Saybān, Nahd and Bā 'l-ʿUbayd) and the SAL's connections with rich merchants in Saudi Arabia.[349]

By 1966, the NLF had stepped up its activities in Hadhramaut, however, it is difficult to gauge the extent of this, as British intelligence reports, which contain their fair share of denunciations based on personal motives, are a problematic source.[350] A three-day strike by fishermen in al-Mukallā over the question of the use of light during night fishing was interpreted as a (rather undefined) political demonstration.[351] Even more problematic was the assumption that a

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[346] For an example from Aden, see IO, R/20/C/1942, The Baʾathist Movement and Aden, 18.11.1963, Aden Intelligence Centre, p. 1, where Shaykhān al-Ḥibshī is mentioned as a pro-Nasserist Baʿthī in spite of his SAL credentials and a number of former Baʿthī sympathisers are described at having become "now pronounced Communist sympathisers".

[347] IO, R/20/C/1948, Chief of Intelligence, Aden to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 28.4.1965.

[348] IO, R/20/C/1944, Acting Chief Intelligence Officer, Tawahi, Aden, to Resident Adviser, Mukalla, 17.7.1963.

[349] IO, R/20/C/1949, The Residency, Mukalla, 21.6.1966, Assessment of the Security Threat to the Eastern Aden Protectorate with Notes on Matters Pertaining to Security.

[350] It is no accident that the British had trouble finding reliable intelligence staff, see the correspondence in IO, R/20/C/1945.

[351] IO, R/20/C/1949, Acting D.A.B.A. to Aden Intelligence Centre, Aden, 25.7.1966.

visit to Egypt by Sayyid ʿAlawī, the President of the al-Aḥqāf sports club of Sayʾūn, was aimed at raising funds and preparing for the expansion of the NLF in the Wadi. The Resident Adviser had to correct this report and noted that Sayyid ʿAlawī had used the occasion of the pilgrimage to visit the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean and collect funds for his club, but had not pursued any subversive aims.[352]

In early March 1966, a meeting was held at the Sultan's Library of al-Mukallā. According to a publication by the organisers, this gathering continued the earlier FLOSY conferences in Sayʾūn. However, its leaders now declared its recognition of the NLF as the legitimate representative of the people.[353] Among those who emerged as NLF supporters was ʿUmar Saʿīd Bā Rajaf al-Akbarī, a refugee from East Africa and former temporary clerk in the Residency, who was a "committee member and mouthpiece for the Arab Socialist Party". Sālim Ḥasan Bā Joh (?) of al Marshadi (?), a shopkeeper in Dīs and committee member of the South Arabian League in Hadhramaut, was also listed as a NLF adherent, together with Fayṣal al-ʿAṭṭās. The latter was a teacher in the Western Intermediate School of al-Mukallā, a one-time bank clerk and the first secretary of the Arab Socialist Party. From this, the Resident Adviser concluded, "It is at least probable, therefore, that the NLF have already infiltrated both the SAL-in-H and the A.S.P."[354] Indeed, one of the two secretaries of the pro-NLF meeting was none other than Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Balfaqīh, the Director of Education (since 1962) and head of the ASP. Indeed, in 1965, the ASP in al-Mukallā had decided to set up a 'Front', presumably aimed at uniting all nationalist forces. This followed a visit to Cairo, then seat of the NLF, which might originally have been conceived as a show of cooperation similar to the short-lived PSP-NLF alliance in FLOSY.[355] For its part, the SAL, which preferred Hadhrami independence and disputed the NLF's legitimacy, lost support after unrest which accompanied the High Commissioner's visit to Hadhramaut in September 1966.[356]

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[352] IO, R/20/C/1949, Acting D.A.B.A. to Resident Adviser, 6.9.1966 and Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Aden Intelligence Centre, 23.8.1966.

[353] SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-ṭullābiyya, publication of the Qarārāt al-muʾtamar al-shaʿbī al-munʿaqad fī 'l-maktaba al-sulṭāniyya bi-l-Mukallā, 6.3.1966.

[354] IO, R/20/C/1948, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Chief Intelligence Officer, Aden, 17.3.1966.

[355] Bā Faqīh, "Shay'", al-Ayyām, 18.11.1992 and 22.3.1993.

[356] SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-

At the same time as NLF activities increased, the British noted a resurgence of tribalism. The security report of June 1966 clearly links the two issues and comments on a "general feeling of unrest and a possible breakdown in Administration".[357] The different scenarios foresaw anything from occasional clashes to an outright tribal war and possible breakdown of order resulting from a confrontation between the ASP and SAL.[358] Unfortunately, there is little information as to the extent to which the tribal unrest, some of which has been discussed in this and the previous chapter, was fuelled by the near-drought conditions of that year.[359] They could have easily sparked tribal encroachments on agricultural areas, which could then be interpreted or justified in revolutionary terms. It would also have enabled the NLF and other organisations to 'buy' support rather easily. The only indication of tribal dissent—in this case showing a split among the ʿAwāmir, apparently over another NLF conference probably held at al-Qāra in July 1966—can be found in letters by members of the tribe to Sultan Ḥusayn al-Kathīrī, protesting against the conference's claim of representing the entire tribe.[360]

The anxieties expressed in the British reports were fuelled by the explosion of a rather amateurish bomb outside a British Assistant Adviser's house in al-Mukallā on the night of June 7 to 8, 1966. Although nothing happened, this marked the first act of terrorism or armed liberation struggle in the Eastern Aden Protectorate. It resulted in the arrest of a number of SAL members.[361] The killing of a British officer a year earlier had been attributed to personal grudges.[362] This first bomb was followed by the murder of another officer serving with the Beduin Legion, although it remained unclear

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ṭullābiyya, Letter to the State Secretary from the Lajnat al-mutābaʿa al-munbathaqa ʿan muʾtamar al-hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya bi-minṭaqat al-sāhil, 22.9.1966. As for the SAL's view of the NLF, see ibid., Bayān min Rābiṭat al-Janūb al-ʿArabī, 11.5.1966.

[357] IO, R/20/C/1949, The Residency, Mukalla, 21.6.1966, Assessment of the Security Threat to the Eastern Aden Protectorate with Notes on Matters Pertaining to Security, p. 6.

[358] IO, R/20/C/1949, The Residency, Mukalla, 21.6.1966, Assessment of the Security Threat to the Eastern Aden Protectorate with Notes on Matters Pertaining to Security, p. 7.

[359] PRO, FO 371/185244, Resident Adviser, Mukalla to Governor, Aden, 19.9.1966.

[360] SMA, al-Hayʾāt al-shaʿbiyya wa-l-jamʿiyyāt al-ʿummāliyya wa-l-nawādī al-ṭullābiyya, Letters from the ʿAwāmir in al-Mukallā and Tāriba to Sultan Ḥusayn al-Kathīrī, 25.8.1966 and 22.7.1966.

[361] IO, R/20/C/1949, Acting High Commissioner, Aden to Foreign Office, London, 12.6.1966; al-Bakrī, Ittiḥād al-janūb, pp. 314f.

[362] IO, R/20/C/1942, Jim Ellis to Colonel O. D. Le Feurvre, 19.6.1965.

whether it was caused by political motives.[363] More violence followed: for example, shots were fired into the crowd during a visit by the High Commissioner.[364] The British had been planning since 1961 for the eventuality of things going wrong—albeit because of the dissatisfaction of Hadhrami troops with their pay. Indeed, disputes in 1964–65 over the higher pay of the Beduin Legion culminated in serious concerns about a possible mutiny in al-Mukallā.[365] In response to the violence, the British reinforced their military presence at the airport in al-Rayyān.[366]

Developments From Without: The Final Year

In spite of the nationalist excitement and increasing activities of secret organisations and tribes, part of which was reflected in the anti-imperialist stance of *al-Ṭalīʿa*, the newspaper reports for 1965 and 1966 still convey a remarkable sense of normality. This might have been partly due to the willingness of the Quʿayṭī government to make constitutional changes. In addition, Sultan ʿAwaḍ died in October 1966 and was succeeded by his son Ghālib who, although only eighteen years of age, was greeted with much enthusiasm, not least because of his support for reforms.[367] He made clear that he favoured a constitutional monarchy and held a positive view of Nasser as an Arab patriot (*rajul waṭanī*).[368] Among his priorities were the improvement of the administration and the (re)gaining of the trust of the tribesmen who, he felt, had been neglected by the state for some time. For

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[363] For details, see IO, R/20/C/1933, a far more sympathetic view of the murdered officer is given in Crouch, *An Element*, pp. 186f.

[364] Crouch, *An Element*, p. 189; Kostiner, *The Struggle*, p. 135. A statement issued by the Kathīrī State Secretary to "the noble people" presented this as a kind of individualistic revenge for the denial of permission to found a party and newspaper. SMA, Bayānāt al-dawla al-kathīriyya, 10.10.1966.

[365] PRO, CO 1055/183, Acting High Commissioner, Aden to Colonial Secretary, 16.1.1965; cf. Lekon, The British, pp. 335f.

[366] IO, R/20/C/1946, The Secretariat, Aden to Resident, Mukalla, 28.12.1961, cf. Resident Adviser, Mukalla to McIntosh, Aden, 13.7.1963(?) and other correspondence in the file; Crouch, *An Element*, p. 189.

[367] If not indicated otherwise, compare for the following al-Bakrī, *al-Janūb al-ʿarabī*, pp. 310–327; al-Nākhibī, *Riḥla*, p. 146–157; Boxberger, "Hadhrami Politics", pp. 64f. His inaugural address to the nation was printed in *al-Ṭalīʿa* 379, 7.12.1966, pp. 1–3, see also the first edition of al-Bakrī's *al-Janūb al-ʿarabī*, 1967, pp. 185–187. Kostiner, *The Struggle*, p. 134, gives a slightly different narrative, according to which Sultan ʿAwaḍ was deposed in August 1966 because of his support of Aḥmad al-Faḍlī.

[368] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 379, 7.12.1966, p. 5; cf. *al-Ṭalīʿa* 373, 2.11.1966.

this purpose, he held the first gathering of all Hadhrami tribes, which provided them with an opportunity to have their voice heard directly by the sultan and to assure him of their loyalty. After the decline of order due to intrigues by leading government officials and the virtual absence of any sultanic interest in events, Ghālib quite successfully restored order, according to the accounts of both al-Nākhibī and al-Bakrī.

However, the Hadhrami sultans had little effective influence over developments on the diplomatic level where the British were increasingly concerned about finding someone whom they could hand over South Arabia. The Hadhrami refusal to join the Federation proved to be simply an additional irritant in an already difficult situation. In December 1966, during negotiations in London, Sultan Ghālib suggested an eastern federation as an interim solution. The British made clear that a solution had to be found by 1968 otherwise they would withdraw without any further subsidies. As the Hadhrami Beduin Legion had been fully subsidised by the British, with the other armed forces receiving up to fifty per cent, this was a serious threat to the sultanates' stability. The obvious obstacle to the Qu'aytī proposal, namely Kathīrī fears over the division of revenues and Qu'aytī dominance, meant, however, that little progress was achieved.[369]

Little detail is available on events during the first half of 1967.[370] In May, the Residency in al-Mukallā was attacked and British women and children were evacuated.[371] Nervousness increased rapidly as an anecdote from June illustrates. When Nasser announced his resignation following defeat in the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbours, a huge demonstration was held in al-Mukallā in his favour. The Hadhrami Beduin League, afraid that matters might get out of hand, fired in the air to frighten the crowd. The regular army, unsure of what was going on, refused to follow its commanders and eventually aimed at the Resident's private lodgings. The situation was only saved by the intervention of the Sultan himself.[372] By early July, "Mukalla was virtually in a state of siege, although on the surface most days passed normally enough", as the Deputy British Agent noted.[373]

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[369] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 381, 21.12.1966, p. 1 and 382, 28.12.1966, pp. 4–5.
[370] British files are not yet fully available, and most issues of *al-Ṭalīʿa* are missing in al-Mukallā.
[371] Crouch, *An Element*, p. 208.
[372] al-Bakrī, *al-Janūb al-ʿarabī*, p. 315; Trevelyan, *The Middle East*, pp. 239f.
[373] Crouch, *An Element*, p. 213, cf. pp. 214f.

In early August, the three eastern sultans held a conference regarding the future joint command over the Hadhrami Beduin Legion. They were informed by the British that the advisory treaties would terminate on 9 January 1968, while the Residency was to be closed on 10 October 1967. On 2 August, the High Commissioner of Aden flew to al-Mukallā where he met with the sultans and asked them to travel to Geneva for consultations with the UN committee. He also made clear that any future subsidies would depend not only on joint administration of the Beduin Legion, but more crucially on the Hadhrami sultans joining South Arabia. The sultans were more than unhappy about this, but eventually felt compelled to travel to Geneva.[374] Sultan Ghālib was concerned about his proper representation during his absence and made detailed arrangements. According to al-Bakrī, these were never put in place in spite of British promises to the contrary. Even the High Commissioner commented pessimistically that "The general malaise in the E.A.P. is such that the failure of our proposal and consequent disintegration of the H.B.L. cannot be ruled out."[375] By contrast, the sultans issued a joint statement confirming the British proposals and announcing their close cooperation.[376]

The Kathīrī and Quʿaytī sultans first headed to Cairo where they met with a number of Egyptian and Arab leaders. Their aim was to convince them—and the Arab League, which was to meet shortly in Khartoum—of their cause. Pushed by the British to delay their visit to Khartoum, they arrived in Geneva at the end of August.[377] On 31 August, they held their first meeting with the UN committee. Upon their return to the hotel, they received two letters. In the first, the Administrative Secretary in al-Mukallā reported the decampment of the Residency from al-Mukallā to the airport in al-Riyān. In the second, the High Commissioner warned of the impending British withdrawal, which was now planned earlier than the original October

[374] PRO, FCO 60/25, High Commissioner, Aden to Foreign Office, 3.8.1967, tel. no. 1075; Trevelyan, *The Middle* East, pp. 240f.; Crouch, *An Element*, p. 217, for a rather cursory description of the meeting.

[375] PRO, FCO 60/25, High Commissioner, Aden to Foreign Office, 3.8.1967, tel. no. 1075; cf. High Commissioner, Aden to Foreign Office, 3.8.1967, tel. no. 1076. The very critical Hadhrami view can be found in al-Bakrī, *al-Janūb al-ʿarabī*, pp. 316–318; for a shorter, but otherwise similar version see al-Nākhibī, *Riḥla*, pp. 355f. These versions owe much to the account of Sultan Ghālib himself.

[376] SMA, Bayānāt al-dawla al-kathīriyya, Bayān mushtarak ʿan muḥādathāt al-salāṭīn al-quʿaytī wa-l-kathīrī wa-l-mahrī, 9.8.1967.

[377] PRO, FCO 60/25, High Commissioner, Aden to Foreign Office, 15.8.1967, tel. no. 1177.

date. This appears to have been a British emergency measure in
light of the deteriorating situation, which even surprised the British
Deputy Agent in al-Mukallā.[378] After another meeting the next day,
the sultans expressed their desire to return as quickly as possible to
Hadhramaut while the UN mission wanted them to wait either in
Geneva or Beirut for further consultations. The British tried to allay
the sultans' fears, arguing that "There were no particular troubles
in their states which required their immediate return and it was
important that their case should be fully heard by the United Nations
and represented in any negotiations which took place."[379]

The British and Hadhrami stories now increasingly diverge.[380] Ac-
cording to al-Bakrī, the British tried to delay the sultans in Beirut, some-
thing that cannot be substantiated by the British sources, at least at
present. The sultans then proceeded to Jeddah where they consulted
with Saudi leaders and Hadhrami businessmen. In order to return
safely, they decided to use a private boat. When they approached
al-Mukallā, Sultan Ghālib communicated that they would arrive on
September 17 so that preparations for the hosting of the Mahrī and
Kathīrī sultan could be made. According to the Sultan's version, the
leaders of the Beduin Legion and the Armed Constabulary had been
informed by the British that the sultans would not return, and there-
upon followed British advice to come to an understanding with the
local People's Democratic Front. Al-Jābirī suggests that British intel-
ligence services spent eight million shilling to buy off certain admin-
istrative officers in the three eastern sultanates and pay for weapons,
which were smuggled in from Djibouti via Aden on a French airliner.
According to al-Jābirī, the British aim was to secure the surrender of
the Beduin Legion to the NLF, create bases for the NLF, and secure a
smooth transition to civilian government by removing the highest repre-
sentatives of the old regime. Adhal points out that the new com-
mander, Fayṣal al-Nuʿayrī, was a nephew of the last Quʿayṭī *wazīr*.[381]

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[378] PRO, FCO 60/25, British High Commissioner, Aden to Foreign Office,
30.8,1967, tel. no. 1288; Crouch, *An Element*, pp. 215, 220f.; Trevelyan, *The Middle
East*, p. 251.
[379] PRO, FCO 60/25, UK Mission Geneva to Foreign Office, 1.9.1967, tel. no.
792.
[380] al-Bakrī, *al-Janūb al-ʿarabī*, pp. 321–326; cf. al-Nākhibī, *Riḥla*, 156f. and Sultan
Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī speaking on BBC 1, 19.12.2000, 11.25pm. Sabʿa, *Min Yanābiʿ*,
pp. 118–134, is almost identical with al-Nakhibī (long passages have been copied
verbatim) and, particularly in the latter part, with al-Bakrī.
[381] al-Jābirī, *al-Janūb al-ʿarabī*, p. 170; with identical wording Adhal, *al-Istiqlāl*,
p. 245, on al-Nuʿayrī's relations see ibid., p. 246.

With the ship just outside al-Mukallā, the deputy commander of the Beduin Legion assumed the initiative. He declared a curfew and stationed armoured cars opposite the palace in order to neutralise the palace guard. Armed forces at the harbour prevented the sultans from landing. A committee then went on board to negotiate the handing over of power with Sultan Ghālib. The sultan played for time but then wrote a note to his people asking to avoid bloodshed. This note was later complemented (presumably by the committee) by a sentence in which he abdicated. Tribes rose to defend the sultan, took over a number of posts along the frontier and laid siege to Ḥuṣn al-ʿAbr on the strategic route to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the Beduin Legion reconquered the fort with the support of British aircraft. Intimidated by the airforce intervention, the tribes decided to cease fighting until independence. For al-Bakrī, it seems quite clear that the British followed a plan to hand Hadhramaut over to the NLF, in spite of the fact that the NLF (or rather the People's Democratic Front) had only some sixty supporters in all of Hadhramaut.[382] This view is shared by Sultan Ghālib, according to whom the last Resident Adviser later confessed that the British followed the above-described course of action in Hadhramaut because of their concern that the sultan would not leave the country on his own account. They feared that his resistance might cause great loss of life, including possibly his own.[383]

Al-Jābirī adds that the Quʿayṭī armed forces had no alternative but to negotiate with the NLF. According to his version, the Kathīrī tribes decided to oppose the changes, although their resolve was weakened by the Sultan's return to Jeddah. By early October, the badly armed tribes lost the war of nerves against the better armed NLF and the sultan's deputy handed power to the NLF on October 3.[384] In contrast to this story of British betrayal of their Hadhrami allies, al-Ṭalīʿa (which in January 1967 still favoured an independent Hadhrami decision over its future) now welcomed the revolution.[385]

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[382] al-Jābirī, al-Janūb al-ʿarabī, p. 175 and Adhal, al-Istiqlāl, p. 247, speak of one hundred supporters, 4 among them in Kathīrī lands. In an interview with *Majallat al-Khalīj*, recorded on 23.10.1996, the night before his death, Sayyid ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥaddād also emphasised the flimsy support which the NLF—and other political parties—enjoyed. Transcript of interview, p. 6.

[383] Personal communication, Sultan Ghālib al-Quʿayṭī, 26.4.2002.

[384] al-Jābirī, al-Janūb al-ʿarabī, pp. 176–182; Adhal, al-Istqlāl, pp. 247–251, follows this version closely.

[385] *al-Ṭalīʿa* 394, 11.10.1967 and 396, 25.10.1967, for its earlier stance, see 383–384, 7.1.1967.

The British documents, which were directed to the United Nations and pursued the clear intention of presenting the British position in as positive a light as possible, claimd that the sultans, notably the Kathīrī, prevaricated in Jeddah and did not return as quickly as would have been possible. British support for the Beduin Legion was, they protested, merely in compliance with their duty to reinforce law and order. The Legion was the only legitimate force and was fighting against an unruly tribe. According to this version, the bombardment therefore did not constitute active support for the NLF.[386]

From a political point of view, the British position might have appeared logical, although legally dubious. The British were still officially in a treaty relationship with the Hadhrami rulers. Consequently, they were still the legitimate rulers, rather than the H.B.L., which had prevented the sultans' return and turned against those supporting them. While there might not have been any 'plot' to abandon the sultans, it becomes quite clear from the documents available that the British were not particularly interested in allowing the creation of an independent eastern federation, hence their demand for the coordination of military matters between the South Arabian Federation and the Eastern Aden Protectorate as a precondition for future support. It is highly likely that this stance resulted from the consideration of British interests, both in terms of relations with the future rulers of South Arabia and of British reputation worldwide. The interests of the rulers of the Eastern Aden Protectorate weighed little in comparison. Given the growing strength of nationalism, it is not unlikely that local pressure to join an independent South Arabia would ultimately have succeeded. However, what is important in our context is that, for one last time, the British decision prevented the Hadhramis from negotiating the appropriate path for future development among themselves.

This does not mean that Hadhramis no longer participated in the shaping of events. As shown above, a number of them participated in the new government. In many ways, they were no more or less democratically chosen than earlier rulers, but there was one big difference: the sultans had always had to negotiate their position with the local elites, as discussed in the early parts of this book. Although

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[386] PRO, FCO 60/26, Foreign Office to UK Mission, New York, 26.10.1967, tel. no. 5766; cf. PRO, FCO 60/25, Beirut to Foreign Office, 4.9.1967, tel. no. 992; Trevelyan, *The Middle East*, pp. 252f.

they had been empowered by outside wealth, just as the new rulers were empowered by outside force, they had in many ways confronted a much stronger local society. By 1967, the tribes had been disarmed, the old merchant elites weakened and the civil associations partly superseded by state intervention. The nationalist parties with their ideologically flexible memberships widely applauded independence. However, rifts quickly began to emerge under the surface. These were suppressed while the state incorporated many political organisations, nationalised private property and forced opponents into exile. Tribalism and other types of clannishness were officially shunned, even if they continued to play a role below the surface. Certainly in military terms, the tribes could no longer effectively resist the new centralised state. The old elites, who together with the British had done so much to disarm the tribes in the name of state-building, now found themselves bereft of a powerful element which might have helped to defend them, or rather the old order, against the new state. For some time, this state even erased the name of Hadhramaut from the political map, replacing it with the rather anonymous designation of "fifth province". As far as the project of state-building went, it might be said that the old elites fell victim to their own success. To what extent were the hopes of the alliance of a new generation of nationalists, dissatisfied tribesmen and peasants vindicated by the radical policies of the new state, and to what extent was the old social fabric destroyed in a lasting manner? These questions will have to be asked anew once the dust of the renewed upheavals of the 1990s has settled and the historian can take a more distanced view of developments after 1967.

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CHRONOLOGY OF QUʿAYṬĪ AND KATHĪRĪ RULERS

Quʿayṭī Family

[ʿAwaḍ b. ʿAbdallāh]
ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ	1843–1865
ʿAwaḍ b. ʿUmar	1865–1910
Ghālib b. ʿAwaḍ	1910–1922
ʿUmar b. ʿAwaḍ	1922–1936
Ṣāliḥ b. Ghālib	1936–1956
ʿAwaḍ b. Ṣāliḥ	1956–1966
Ghālib b. ʿAwaḍ	1966–1967

Kathīrī Family

Sayʾūn   Tarīm

Ghālib b. Muḥsin	1844[1]–1870		
Manṣūr b. Ghālib	1870–1929	Muḥsin b. Ghālib	1919–1924/25
ʿAlī b. Manṣūr	1929–1938	ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥsin	1924/25–?
Jaʿfar b. Manṣūr	1938–1949	and Muḥammad b. Muḥsin–?[2]	
Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī	1949–1967		

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[1] Al-Kāf, *Ḥaḍramawt*, p. 64, considers 1865 as the founding date of the second Kathīrī sultanate. 1844 indicates the first land acquisitions by Ghālib b. Muḥsin's supporters.

[2] According to D. Ingrams, *A Survey*, p. 28 and al-Shāṭirī, *Adwār*, pp. 410f., Tarīm returned in 1945 under the control of Sayʾūn. However, in 1944, Jaʿfar b. Manṣūr in Sayʾūn once again recognised the rule of ʿAbdallāh and Muḥammad, sons of Muḥsin b. Ghālib, and agreed to pay them a stipend in exchange for loyalty. See above, chapter VIII.

ASSOCIATIONS IN HADHRAMAUT UNTIL 1950[1]

Name	Place/year	Founding members
???	Say'ūn c. 1907	'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Ubaydillāh al-Saqqāf
Jam'iyyat al-Ḥaqq	Sa'yūn 1912	'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Ubaydillāh al-Saqqāf
Jam'iyyat al-Ḥaqq	Tarīm 1916	Ḥasan 'Abdallāh al-Kāf
al-Ta'āḍud	Say'ūn c. 1917	Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Ubaydallāh al-Saqqāf
J. al-Ittiḥād wa-l-Tarāḥum (possibly identical with above)	Say'ūn c. 1918	'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Ubaydillāh al-Saqqāf, Saqqāf b. 'Alawī al-Saqqāf, Shaykh b. Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī, Muḥammad b. Ḥāmid al-Saqqāf, 'Alawī b. 'Abdallāh al-Mashhūr, 'Awaḍ b. (?) Bā Kathīr, 'Abdallāh 'Alī Ḥusān (?) et al.
J. Nashr al-Faḍā'il	Tarīm c. 1918	Aḥmad b. 'Umar al-Shāṭirī
J. al-Maskīn	Say'ūn c. 1926	Muḥammad Shaykh al-Masāwī, 'Āshūr Bā Majīd
J. al-Ukhuwwa wa-l-Mu'āwana	Tarīm c. 1927	Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Shāṭirī
Jam'iyya Waṭaniyya	Say'ūn 1928 (and potentially in all of Hadhramaut)	notables and Sultan 'Alī b. Manṣūr
Nādī al-Iṣlāḥ	al-Shiḥr c. 1930	'Abd al-Qādir Bā Faqīh

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[1] Compiled on the basis of al-Ṣabbān, "al-'Ādāt", vol. 2, p. 265, Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza" and the literature quoted in chapter VI. There certainly existed more clubs, usually linked to schools, but the information on them is even patchier than that on the associations listed above. After 1945, the number of associations rose at a speed which makes any attempt at listing them systematically futile.

Table (*con't.*)

Name	Place/year	Founding members
Jam'iyyat al-Iṣlāḥ	Say'ūn 1931	Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Saqqāf, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥusayn
Jam'iyyat al-'Adl	Say'ūn 1931	Muḥammad Shaykh al-Masāwī
al-Nādī al-'Ilmī	Say'ūn 1936	'Abdallāh Sālim al-Saqqāf, 'Abd al-Qādir b. Aḥmad al-Saqqāf
al-Majma' al-Adabī	Ghayl Bā Wazīr 1936 or 37	Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Sirrī, 'Alawī b. Zayn Balfaqīh,[2] Sa'īd 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr
Nādī al-Shabāb	Say'ūn 1937[3]	'Abd al-Qādir al-Ṣabbān, Ḥusayn Shaykh al-Ḥibshī
Jam'iyyat al-'Āṣima	Say'ūn 1938	Majīd b. 'Alī al-Kathīrī, Muḥammad 'Abdallāh Bā Naql
Nahḍat al-Shabāb	Say'ūn 1938	'Abd al-Raḥmān Aḥmad Bā Kathīr, 'Awaḍ Bā Jisr (?)
al-Iṣlāḥ [= Majlis al-Iṣlāḥ?][4]	Say'ūn 1938 [1937?)]	Bū Bakr Bā Dhīb, Muḥammad Barakāt ['Abdallāh Aḥmad al-Saqqāf]
Nādī al-Ikhā' wa-l-Ta'āwun	Dīs 1938	Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-'Umārī
J. al-Mu'āmirāt al-Mukhābirāt (?)	??? 1940	Ḥamūd Ḍārī [Bā Ḍāwī?)]
Nādī al-Iṣlāḥ	al-Mukallā 1940	???
Ṣawt al-Waṭan	Say'ūn 1942	'Alawī 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Saqqāf, Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Ṣabbān
Ghurfa Thaqāfiyya	Rayḍat al-Qaṭn	Sa'īd 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr[5]
J. al-Muzāri'n	Say'ūn 1943	Sa'īd Bā Maẓam (?), Ambār Sulaymān
Jam'iyyat al-Ṭullāb	Rayḍat al-Qaṭn 1945	Sa'īd 'Awaḍ Bā Wazīr[6]

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[2] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], p. 20.

[3] According to Bā Ṣurra, "Lamaḥāt mūjaza", p. 168, this was founded in 1938.

[4] al-Ṣabbān, "al-'Ādāt" mentions for 1937 a *Majlis al-Iṣlāḥ*, which might or might not be identical with *al-Iṣlāḥ* and has not been listed separately as it might well have been some kind of city council.

[5] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], pp. 58f.

[6] S. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], p. 60.

ANNEX C

CHRONOLOGY OF JOURNALISM IN HADHRAMAUT[1]

Year	Name	Place	Editors
1912/13	Say'ūn	Say'ūn	Saqqāf Muḥammad al-Saqqāf
1912/13	al-Sabīl	???	Muḥammad b. 'Aqīl
Some time between 1917 and 1919	Ḥaḍramawt, weekly, 4 issues only	Tarīm	Shaykh b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Hāshim al-Saqqāf
Some time between 1927 and 1929[2]	al-Nahḍa al-Ḥaḍramiyya, only 1 issue printed for political reasons	al-Mukallā	al-Ṭayyib al-Sāsī
since 1346?	al-'Ukāẓ, cultural monthly	Say'ūn	'Abdallāh b. Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā, 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Ḥāmid al-Saqqāf.[3]
1349/50 (1930/31)	al-Tahdhīb, moral and cultural monthly	Say'ūn	Muḥammad b. Ḥasan Bā Rajā', links to 'Alawī b. 'Abdallāh, 'Aydarūs b. Sālim al-Saqqāf, Ṣāliḥ b. 'Alī al-Ḥāmid, 'Alī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr
1350 (1931/32)	al-Nahḍa	Say'ūn	Nādī al-Shabāb
1937, 1939−41 or 1943−44	al-Minbar, printed	al-Mukallā	Maḥfūẓ b. 'Abduh, Yuslam b. 'Abduh
From 1938	al-Ikhā' (first handwritten, later hand press)	Tarīm	Jam'iyyat al-Ukhuwwa

[1] The following list has been compiled on the basis of al-Ṣabbān, vol. II, "al-'Ādāt", p. 268, al-Shāṭirī, "Tārīkh al-ṣiḥāfa", Bā Wazīr, *al-Fikr*, pp. 167−169 and on what I have seen myself of these publications. Unless indicated otherwise, the journals were handwritten.

[2] This is the only Ḥaḍramī publication listed by Fīlīb dī Ṭarāzī, *Tārīkh al-ṣiḥāfa al-'arabiyya*, vol. 4, Beirut 1933, pp. 506f.

[3] Serjeant, "Historians", p. 257.

Table (*con't.*)

Year	Name	Place	Editors
1361/62 (March/April 1941–Jan. 42.	al-Nahḍa, printed by roneograph, monthly	Say'ūn	Nahḍat al-Shabāb
? in existence in April/May 44	al-Shabāb	Say'ūn	"some youth"
1941/42– [at least] April/ May 1944	Zahrat al-shabāb	Say'ūn	Muḥammad b. Sālim b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥāmid, 'Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad al-Ṣabbān, Ja'far Muḥammad al-Saqqāf
some time between 35 and 44, in existence in 44	al-Ustādh	Ghayl Bā Wazīr	?
some time between 1935 and 45	???	al-Shiḥr	'Abd al-Qādir b. Aḥmad Bā Faqīh
around same time	al-Ḍamīr	Shibām	?
around same time	Say'ūn	Say'ūn	?
around same time?	Shams al-Āfāq	Shibām	Aḥmad Sa'īd Balfaqīh
around same time?	al-Ittiḥād	'Aynāt	Nādī al-Shabāb
Febr. 1944 still in existence 2 years later	Lisān al-Rīf	al-Qaṭn	Ṣāliḥ b. 'Alī al-Qu'ayṭī, 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad Bā Maṭraf, from Jumādā al-akhira 1365 Aḥmad b. 'Alī Bā Faḍl.[4]
1365 (Dec. 45–46)	al-Ḥalba	Masīlat Āl Shaykh	'Alī 'Aqīl b. Yaḥyā, Mūsā Kāzim b. Yaḥyā, advisor Muḥammad Bin Hāshim.

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[4] This journal is discussed also by Ṣ. Bā Wazīr, [Mudhakkirāt], p. 60.

Table (*con't.*)

Year	Name	Place	Editors
1366 (Nov. 46–47)	al-Amal	al-Mukallā	Maḥfūẓ b. ʿAbduh
Feb. 1952–July 1956	al-Akhbār, twice monthly, official mouthpiece of Quʿaytī sultanate	al-Mukallā	Ḥussayn Muḥammad al-Bār
May 1959–1967	al-Ṭalīʿa, weekly, printed	al-Mukallā	Aḥmad ʿAwaḍ Bā Wazīr
1963–1967	al-Rāʾy al-ʿĀmm, weekly, printed	al-Mukallā	ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Bā Faqīh
1960–1964	al-Rāʾid, printed	al-Mukallā	Ḥusayn Muḥammad al-Bār

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[1] Titles of published or forthcoming books are set in italics, titles of articles in quotation marks. Titles of unpublished work are not marked in any special way.

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1) Author's names have only been included if the authors played a historical role.
2) All dates are A.D.
Abbreviations: (b.) date of birth, (d.) date of death, (n.) a name only in a footnote, (r.) dates of rule, (t.) a name only in a table.

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