MARTIN ENDRESS, GEORGE PSATHAS
AND HISASHI NASU (EDS.)

Explorations of the Life-World

Continuing Dialogues with Alfred Schutz

EXPLORATIONS OF THE LIFE-WORLD

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY

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
Scope

The purpose of this series is to foster the development of phenomenological philosophy through creative research. Contemporary issues in philosophy, other disciplines and in culture generally, offer opportunities for the application of phenomenological methods that call for creative responses. Although the work of several generations of thinkers has provided phenomenology with many results with which to approach these challenges, a truly successful response to them will require building on this work with new analyses and methodological innovations.

EXPLORATIONS OF THE LIFE-WORLD

Continuing Dialogues with Alfred Schutz

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Preface

This anthology originated from three conferences, which were held at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan, on March 26-28, 1999, at the University of Konstanz, Germany, on May 26-29, 1999 and a session at the SPHS annual meeting at the University of Oregon, USA, on October 5-7, 1999. With one exception the contributions to this volume are revised versions of papers read at these meetings. Each of these conferences took place in order to celebrate the centennial of the birthday of Alfred Schutz, who was born April 13, 1899, and died May 20, 1959.

First of all we would like to thank Evelyn Schutz-Lang, the daughter of Alfred and Ilse Schutz, for her continuing support and encouragement. Moreover, Evelyn Schutz-Lang as well as Claudia Schutz, the granddaughter of Alfred and Ilse Schutz, and the daughter of his son George, gave us the honor of visiting the Konstanz conference in 1999. Evelyn also came to the Oregon conference and sent her personal greetings to those attending the Tokyo conference.

We would like to thank Waseda University, the Waseda Sociological Association, the Waseda University International Conference Center, and the Center for Research in Human Sciences in Japan for their generous financial support, as well as the German Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), the University of Konstanz, the Alfred Schutz Memorial Archives in Konstanz, and the Sparkasse Konstanz for their considerable financial assistance in making the conferences possible.

We would like to thank, further, all the participants of the 1999 conferences, especially those whose contributions did not find their way into this volume and who also provided thoughtful and stimulating papers.

Finally, the production of this volume would not have been possible without the assistance of Eva-Maria Walker (Tuebingen) and Gunnar Schwab (Tuebingen).

Martin Endress   Hisashi Nasu   George Psathas

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Introduction:
Alfred Schutz and Contemporary
Social Theory and Social Research[*]

Martin Endress
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> *His work stands before us, his successors,*
> *not as a monument but as a task and a mandate.*
> Helmut R. Wagner on Alfred Schutz

I.

Alfred Schutz, in addition to Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Karl Mannheim, belongs to the group of German speaking sociologists, whose work brought widespread international attention to social theory and social research. Furthermore, he is one of the most important scholars whose work is influenced by the founder of Phenomenological Philosophy Edmund Husserl. Thus, his name exemplifies that generation of social scientists, for whom the analysis of social scientific problems without philosophical foundation was impossible. As far as the theoretical landscape of sociology is concerned, Schutz founded the type of phenomenologically based sociology, which led to many significant changes in the social sciences since the 1960s in the United States as well as in Europe and in Asia.

Starting with the attempt to give Max Weber's conception of interpretive sociology a (philosophical) foundation Schutz developed a socio-pragmatic transformation of Husserl's theory of the life-world, which focuses on the processes of the self-constitution of social reality. Therefore, his analyses basically are concerned with the interactive and communicative processes among human beings. This paradigm initiates an action-oriented shift in social theory and social research by which the processes of the constitution of meaning in the social world became the focus of sociological inquiry. The main concept Schutz introduced to the social sciences is the concept of the life-world ("Lebenswelt"). Schutz's

analyses of the structures of the life-world have to be viewed as one of the most important contributions to general sociological theory.

Schutz's research program has not only been continued in different forms by Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel, Aaron Cicourel, Anselm Strauss, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann but also by a broader stream of contributions usually labeled as "phenomenological sociology". (cf. Psathas, 1973) Moreover, main contributions to contemporary social theory discourse would not have been possible and cannot be understood without reference to the work of Alfred Schutz. The theoretical relevance of his theory of the life-world is due to its provocative character. Further- more, because of its continuing development and empirical utilization in a broad spectrum of theoretical and empirical sociological approaches (for example, Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis, "Social Con- structivism", Cognitive Sociology, Ethnography)[1] Schutz's theory of the life-world understood as a sociology of everyday life (Adler/Adler/Fon- tana, 1987) has had a great impact on many specialized fields of socio- logical research.

Alfred Schutz never showed any interest in founding a school of scholars around him. From the beginning his thought concentrated on theoretical problems in various disciplines and intellectual fields of interest. This open-mindedness is reflected in contemporary social and human sciences: there is a great variety of theoretical and empirical research using conceptions and analytical differentiations introduced by Schutz. Thus, it turns out that there is no specific research program which Schutz developed in his work, but rather a certain style of thinking which is demonstrated in different fields of social theory and social research.

II.

The growing interest in continuing the project of a Schutzian social science also is documented by the development of several academic

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[1] See, for example, the special volumes of *Human Studies* on "Ethnomethodology" (Vol. 18, 1995, No. 2-3, ed. by George Psathas), and on "Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis." (Vol. 22, 1999, No. 2-4, ed. by George Psathas and Hisashi Nasu) In Japan the new journal *Culture & Society* published special issues on the "Dialogue between the Social Sciences and Phenomenological Philosophy" (Vol. 1, 1999, ed. by Hisashi Nasu and Kazuhiko Okuda), and on "Constructionism." (Vol. 4, 2003, ed. by Hisashi Nasu, Masataka Katagiri, and Chihaya Kusayanagi)

organizations. The process of institutionalization of phenomenologically based social research is demonstrated by the widespread adoption and elaboration of his work[2] as well as by the ongoing attempts to present complete editions of all of his texts.[3] Additional developments are the annual "Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture"[4] conceived by Lester Embree and George Psathas to take place at the annual meetings of the *Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences* (SPHS)[5] and the great variety of Phenomenological Organizations in the Human and Social Sciences which are to be found in many different countries.[6] Furthermore, the work of Schutz is presented in most handbooks of the social sciences[7] and in recent years there have appeared a number of publications which provide extensive discussions of various aspects of Schutz's work.[8]

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[2] See, for instance, the Japanese translations of his *Collected Papers* and of his *Reflections of the Problem of Relevance* by Hisashi Nasu.

[3] See the publication of his *Collected Papers IV* (Schutz, 1996, ed. by Helmut Wagner, George Psathas and Fred Kersten), the documents published in the volume *Schutzian Social Sciences* (ed. by Lester Embree, 1999, cf. esp. Embree, 1999) and, especially, the project of the German edition of his work in the *Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe*. (see Endress, 1999b, and first four volumes Schutz, 2003a, Schutz, 2003b, Schutz 2004a, and Schutz 2004b)

[4] Sponsored by the *American Philosophical Association* (APA) and the *Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology* (CARP).

[5] Speakers since 1995 had been in chronological order: Maurice Natanson, Ilja Srubar, Richard Zaner, Thomas Luckmann, Fred Kersten, George Psathas, Lester Embree, and Kurt H. Wolff; cf. Srubar (1998), Zaner (2002), Luckmann (2002), Kersten (2002), and Psathas (2004).

[6] Initiated by Lester Embree an international as well as interdisciplinary organization of Phenomenological Organizations was founded in Prague, Czech Republic, in November 2002. See the homepage (www.o-p-o.net) of the *Organization of Phenomenological Organizations* (OPO).

[7] See: Endress (1999a), Fay (2003), Ferguson (2001), Kersten (1997), Orleans (1991), Preglau (1999), Rogers (2000), Vaitkus (2000) as well as Hanke (2002).

[8] Cf. Bäumer/Benedict (Eds. 1993), Sprondel (Ed. 1994), Protti (1995), Welz (1996), Grundmann (1997), Cefaï (1998), Embree (Ed. 1998, 1999), Weiss (2000), Eberle (2000), and Srubar/Vaitkus (Eds. 2003). An extensive and open-ended bibliography of secondary literature devoted to or related to Schutz's oeuvre can be found on the website of the *Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology*, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, USA (http://www.phenomenologycenter.org) as well as on the website of the *Schutz Archives* in Waseda University which includes a "Database on Bibliography on Schutz on Japan" (http://www.littera.waseda.ac.jp/ schutz).

There are especially seven topics which have continued to be discussed and which are devoted to some theoretical and conceptual problems of Schutz's project of a phenomenologically based social science:

(i) The core methodological problem still is the question whether Schutz's foundation leads to what has been called "protosociology" (Luckmann) or if a phenomenological sociology is possible (Psathas, Grathoff). In this debate the underlying problem is the question of whether phenomenological methods belong to philosophy or whether they can be understood as an empirical research method. (Psathas, 1989: 1ff.; Grathoff, 1989: 112ff.; cf. Carr, 1994; Nenon, 1999; Vaitkus, 2000; Krasnodebski, 2003; for a most recent discussion: Eberle, 2000: 55 ff.. I prefer to speak of a "phenomenologically based sociology" in order to overcome these conflicting interpretations and to show that Schutz's theory of the life-world is much more complex and cannot be reduced to one special research program.

(ii) Conflicting interpretations of Schutz in the controversy within the theory of action are discussed between phenomenologists and rational choice theorists. (Esser, 1991; Srubar, 1993; Cefaï, 1996; Foss, 1996; Pie-trykowski, 1996; Ebeling, 1999) While Schutz, on the one hand, follows Ludwig von Mises's idea of a unified science insofar as the general laws of thinking keep their validity for the production of social scientific knowledge, he adheres, on the other hand, with Weber and Husserl to the typological character of human knowledge and elaborates a sociological analysis proceeding typologically. Thus, arguing for a structural homology between scientific and everyday knowledge any social science approach, like the one of rational choice theories, devoted to a concept of measurability is not able to correspond to the type of empirical proving or of phenomenal adequacy which is characteristic of phenomenologically based sociology and its link between social theory and theory of the life-world.

(iii) In a field that also is widely dominated by rational choice approaches, the theory and sociology of trust, Endress (2002) argues that, on the basis of Husserl's differentiation between "functioning" and "being thematic" for systematic reasons we have to distinguish between two types of trust, "functioning trust" and "reflexive trust". While the latter refers to a process of choosing among projects of action on the basis of rational calculation, the first has to be understood as a background assumption remaining essentially implicit. Therefore, reflexive trust can

neither serve as the primary, or essential, nor as the only resource of cooperative interactions. For sociology's analytical purpose we have to include the dimension of pre-reflexive trust as a pragmatically implicit mode and as the kernel of the phenomenon in question. Trust in its pre-reflexive, implicit form is one of the basic resources of social acting and social relations. Functioning trust has to be viewed as the founding type, the understanding of which refers back to Husserl's phenomenology and its Schutzian transformation.

(iv) Of central importance to understanding the nature of Schutz's contribution to the social sciences is the question of an anthropological foundation of sociology. Here Cefaï (1998), following Helmut R. Wagner as well as Srubar (1988), renewed the thesis that Schutz's later work and especially his criticism of Husserl's phenomenology was, more or less, devoted to the question of an anthropological foundation for sociology. Nonetheless, this thesis still needs further elaboration as far as the understanding of anthropology and its relation to phenomenology is concerned. Moreover, there remain unsolved questions concerning the phenomenology of the body and of intersubjectivity. (see, for example, Crossley 1996)

(v) Further developments of Schutz's theory of the pragmatic and communicative construction and reconstruction of the life-world (Luckmann, 2002b: 157ff.) and of special social areas (Knoblauch, 1999; Luckmann, 2002) throw light on the genetic mechanisms of the life-world. Those studies need further extension in order to solve the problem of meaning constitution which is the most crucial methodological question for the social sciences. (cf. Srubar, 2003)

(vi) Within the broader stream of feminist sociological theory there are special developments in feminist phenomenology extending Schutz's concerns about subjectivity and intersubjectivity to the feminist concern with the issue of domination. Farganis (1986) evaluates the links of women's studies with Critical Theory and argues for a new critical feminist theory following Dorothy Smith (1979) who first draws upon Schutz in order to form Feminist Phenomenology. Stressing the striking lack of any extended consideration of power in Schutz's writings, Lengermann/Niebrugge (1995) expand some of his concepts and elaborate a feminist understanding of relationships of domination.

(vii) While the discourse of contemporary social science is dominated by discussions about problems of globalization, multiculturality, trans-

national migrations, and social integration, those contributions which
throw light on processes of intersubjective and intercultural understand-
ing, and which discuss problems of intercultural translation and open
them up to empirical research without arguing from a normative
standpoint gain widespread attention. It is Schutz's theory of the life-
world, of its meaning structures and multiple provinces of meaning
("multiple realities") which provides fruitful conceptualizations for
analyzing the ambivalent current processes of an increasing
communicative interconnectedness on the one hand, and an ongoing
social differentiation on the other hand. The potential of Schutz's theory
of multiple realities for analyzing the problems of communication, for
understanding the Other, and for intercultural comparison and translation
are discussed in studies concentrating on the fundamental difference
between ownness and foreignness, in contributions discussing the
assumption of the "naturality" of familiarity as well as in studies
focussing on the pragmatics of communicative relations.[9]

Thus, we find new and intensive debates about the systematic reach
and empirical connectability of Schutz's theory of the life-world.[10]

III.

The present book contains three sections devoted to different topics
discussing theoretical, methodological and empirical aspects of Schutz's
work. Scholars from Asia (Kim, Nasu, Yu), Europe (Endress, Srubar,
Vaitkus) and the United States (Barber, Embree, Psathas, Wilson) focus
on theoretical as well as empirical possibilities which the phenome-
nological-interpretive paradigm offers for the analysis and understanding
of different aspects of social reality.

The essays in *Part I: Theory of the Life-World and Contemporary
Social Theory* provide some new perspectives on the understandings of
subjectivity (Wilson), and of the structural-theoretical aspects of Schutz's
approach (Endress). The contributions share the assessment, that the
comparison of theoretical perspectives in the social sciences gain

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[9]   Cf. Geenen, 2002: 54ff., 245ff.; Renn, 2002; Reuter, 2002: 104ff.; Srubar, 2002;
      Waldenfels, 1995, 2003; and Yu, 1999.
[10] One should add contributions focussing on developments in phenomenologically
      based sociology in several national areas: Nishihara, 1992; Endress/Srubar, 1997;
      Nasu, 1997; Psathas, 1997.

increasing importance under the condition of the multi-paradigmatic structure of contemporary theoretical discourse. Consequently the analyses presented in this section of the book emphasize the distinctive profile of Schutz's approach in contrast to other traditions of methodological individualism (Wilson), and to current variants of structuralist thinking in sociology (Endress).[11]

Tom Wilson opens a new chapter in analyzing the Schutz-Parsons-dialogue by focussing on their approaches to the solutions of the problem of subjectivity. Analyzing the discussion between Schutz and Parsons is crucial for an understanding of how Schutz remained an outsider to the American sociological mainstream and to the central developments in American sociology in the 1940's and 1950's. According to Wilson the crux of the problem of subjectivity is the assumption that an objective understanding of social phenomena can only be achieved through a rigorous application of precisely defined concepts and principles that transcend particular times and places. Therefore, Schutz's and Parsons's theories of concept formation need to be discussed in detail. Wilson argues that for Parsons the problem of subjectivity is reduced to issues concerning empirical research methodology, while for Schutz, following the radical methodological individualism of Carl Menger and the Austrian School of Economics, a satisfactory scientific solution to the problem of subjectivity is only provided by the requirement of meaning adequacy.

Martin Endress critically evaluates Bourdieu's criticism of phenomenology as a so-called subjectivism. The analysis of the concepts of reflexivity, reality, and relationality in Schutz as well as in Bourdieu shows the remarkable continuity between Schutz's phenomenologically based sociology and Bourdieu's "theory of practice." (see also Bonner, 2001)

The essays in *Part II: On Methodology and Theory of Social Sciences* are centered around methodological questions of Schutz's contribution to social science discourse. Questions are addressed concerning the reach and the limits of Schutz's methodological contributions for sociology as well as for the social sciences in general (Embree), aspects of the problem of Schutz's phenomenological foundation (Vaitkus), a consideration

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[11] Cf. in this context also Weiss (2000) who provides a detailed analysis of the correspondence between Schutz and Eric Voegelin centered around the problems of their conceptualizations of phenomenology, and of their understandings of historicity and truth.

of the founding problems of a social science which proceeds typologi-
cally and the question of empirical research with a Schutzian perspective
(Nasu, Psathas).

Lester Embree discusses how certain aspects of Schutz's work are
mainly responsible for the attraction his work has achieved in non-philo-
sophical disciplines. While placing emphasis on the choice of terms and
the change of cultural contexts he tries to clarify Schutz's understanding
of "science" and "social science", discussing the difference between
"cultural science" and "social science".

Steven Vaitkus provides arguments for clarifying Schutz's notion of
the "natural attitude" and analyzing the (subjective) natural attitude of the
life-world as both a methodological level of analysis and as the subjective
side of the life-world. This contribution is focussed on the question of
what happens to the natural attitude of the world of everyday life within
the phenomenological concepts of reduction and constitution. By dis-
covering two lines of investigation in the 'naturality' of the natural atti-
tude of the world he stresses Schutz's non-ontological view which
considers the phenomenological epoché as a certain subjective tension of
consciousness. Therefore, Schutz is focusing on the "in-between realm"
of social phenomenology.

Even though it has always been one of the major tasks for an under-
standing of Schutz's phenomenologically founded sociology to discuss
its relation to Max Weber's conception of interpretive sociology, one
cannot say that this relationship has fully been understood thus far.
Therefore two of the essays of this part of the book are devoted to a
discussion of the analogies and controversies between Weber and Schutz.

Hisashi Nasu provides an analysis of the differences between Weber
and Schutz using the latter's typology of the expert, the well-informed
citizen, and the man-on-the-street in his sociology of knowledge to
clarify both the understanding of types and ideal-types. His special
emphasis is on a discussion of Schutz's methodological postulates in
order to understand Schutz's radicalization of Weber's foundation of
interpretive sociology.

In continuing this effort *George Psathas* concentrates on the develop-
ment and use of ideal type constructs in Weber and Schutz. His basic
assumption is that their differences derived from basically different
research programs: While Weber is interested in ideal-typical reconstruc-

tions of socio-historical life-worlds, Schutz concentrates on structural-theoretical analyses of the constitution of social reality.

The volume concludes with a number of essays in *Part III: The Political and Socio-Cultural Dimension of the Life-World* concentrating on newly discovered and highly topical aspects of his work. The essays assembled here are devoted to the ethical side of Schutz (Barber), and to his thoughts on the political sphere (Kim) thereby continuing the recent discussions of some of these problems.[12] Furthermore, the line of argument concerning intercultural understanding, translation and comparision is picked up (by Srubar) and related to one of the main foci of Schutz's thought, that is the theory of multiple realities (Yu).[13]

Michael Barber focuses on ethical values that on a practical level serve as a foundation for Schutz's commitment to theoretical value-neutrality. He argues that in some of Schutz's unpublished works on political questions one can discover potentialities for the development of a formal ethical theory.

Hongwoo Kim on the other hand, in contrast to Vaitkus, interprets Schutz's analysis of the social world as an ontological one. His main emphasis is on a discussion of the relation between the natural givenness of the social world and its publicness.

The two concluding essays concentrate on experiences of the various modes of transcendence and questions of whether the theory of the life-world provides an answer to this problem.

Ilja Srubar provides a phenomenologically based account for the analysis of the cultural diversity of the social world (see Srubar 1998, 2002), showing that the same constitutive mechanisms are responsible for the unity and diversity of the life-world, i.e., for its identity and difference. Differentiating three levels of intersubjectivity (anthropological, social, and cultural) he understands the theory of the life-world as a proto-scientific language being able to function as a *tertium comparationis* for intercultural studies, i.e., for the comparison of different socio-cultural life-forms.

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[12] See also Cefaï (1999), Embree (1999), Kersten (1999), Srubar (1998, 1999), Yu (1999).

[13] See also McDuffie (1995), Endress (1998), Kersten (1998), Knoblauch (1999), Nasu (1999), Psathas (1998), Dreher (2003).

Chung-Chi Yu starts from the different interpretations of Schutz's work by Luckmann (continuity thesis) and Srubar (discontinuity thesis). Being sceptical about a purely pragmatic understanding of Schutz's approach he accentuates the parts of his work which are devoted to the problems of transcendence and appresentation, especially to the experiences of transcendence and appresentational references in order to provide a more synthetic view of his theory of the life-world.

The contributions of the present volume refer to different aspects of Schutz's analysis of the structures of the life-world and show the relevance of this concept for contemporary social science as well as its relevance for empirical research. They demonstrate the fruitfulness of Schutz's work in various disciplinary contexts, within different theoretical perspectives, and in different fields of social research. For this reason, the editors of the current volume hope that this collection of essays can stimulate further theoretical and empirical research in various fields of inquiry.

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Part I

Theory of the Life-World
and Contemporary Social Theory

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The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons[*]

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Abstract. *Schutz and Parsons had fundamentally different conceptions of sociology that led them to quite different approaches to the problem of developing theory based on general concepts and having claims to universal validity but nevertheless incorporating the actor's subjective point of view. Their treatments of this problem of subjectivity and the controversy that arose between them over this issue are examined in detail. In both cases, despite programmatic insistence to the contrary, the concrete subjective view of the actor ends up being treated as irrelevant to their systematic theories. It is suggested that the nature of general concepts in sociological inquiry must be reconsidered if the subjective view of the actor is to be retained as central to sociological inquiry.*

The problem of subjectivity in social theory arises when one wants to give a central place to actors' understandings and motives in the concrete situations in which they act while seeking to describe and explain social phenomena in terms of fixed categories specified in a theoretical framework. The challenge then is to represent the actors' subjective views within those categories in a way which preserves that centrality. Although the problem appears in many forms of theorizing, it is especially urgent when theoretical concepts are proposed as universal, holding irrespective of time and place. The purpose of this essay is to examine the way two important mid-twentieth century theorists, Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, addressed the problem of subjectivity within the contexts of their fundamentally different conceptions of sociological theory, with the aim of illuminating an issue that still has relevance in contemporary theorizing.

Schutz's most widely known and influential writings are his phenomenological investigations and especially his studies of the actor in the attitude of everyday life. These have served as inspiration for phenomenological sociology, and in a rather different way they profoundly influ-

enced Garfinkel's classical empirical studies in ethnomethodology. However, Prendergast (1986) has called attention to another side of Schutz's work: his commitment to the distinctive view of social science held by the Austrian School of Economics and his methodology of concept formation. Schutz's methodology, presented most fully in *The Meaningful Structure of the Social World* (1932/1967),[1] was directed to two critical problems in the foundations of the Austrian School: giving an account of how actors can have knowledge of one another's beliefs and motives sufficiently reliable to allow stable economic exchange; and providing a foundation for the School's fundamental assumption that basic theoretical concepts cannot be contingent but instead must be valid *a priori*.

In addition, however, Schutz was concerned with a deeper question. Following the Austrian view, and in common with virtually all social scientists at the time, he assumed that at the most fundamental level sociological theory must be universal, holding across all times and places and perforce standing outside societal members' motives and subjective understandings of their social world at any particular time and place. Nevertheless, strongly influenced by Max Weber and in explicit opposition to behaviorism and logical positivism, he insisted that those subjective understandings must be taken into account in any tenable theory of action. Consequently, Schutz faced the problem of subjectivity in social theory: how can one have an understanding of the social world based on universal concepts when that world is founded on the subjective experience of its members? His methodology of concept formation was directed in part to this problem.

It is illuminating to compare Schutz's approach with that of Parsons, whose classic study *The Structure of Social Action* (1937) laid the basis for the dominant theoretical position in mid-twentieth century American sociology. Schutz and Parsons both sought a theory of action that holds universally, though for Parsons that claim to universality is empirically contingent rather than *a priori*. They likewise agreed that the subjective

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[1]   Walsh and Lehnert translate the phrase, 'sinnhafte Aufbau' in the title of Schutz's book as 'Phenomenology.' Instead, I have followed Kauder's rendering as "Meaningful Structure" (1965: 122), and I use this as a short title in the text to help make citations transparent. Schutz maintained the methodological position presented in *Meaningful Structure* throughout his subsequent work. (e.g., 1943/1964; 1953/1962; 1954/1962; 1945/1962a)

view of the actor cannot be ignored in a tenable theory of social life. As a result they both faced the problem of subjectivity. However, they held radically different ideas about the nature of theory in the social sciences, and consequently they addressed the problem of subjectivity very differently. This surfaced explicitly as one of the major points of contention in the exchange between them in 1940-1941 over Parsons' *Structure*.

We shall see that despite their strongly expressed concerns for incorporating the subjective view of the actor, Schutz and Parsons were each forced by the logic of their approach to treat the actor's concrete subjective understandings as in fact irrelevant. Thus, though their conceptions of theory were fundamentally different, in each case the problem of subjectivity was not solved but evaded. I shall suggest that the intractability of the problem arises from one central presupposition that Schutz and Parsons did in fact share, namely that sociological inquiry should be framed in terms of clearly defined fixed concepts. It is this, I propose, that must be called into question rather than the importance of the subjective view of the actor.

I. Antecedents to Schutz

Schutz is sometimes regarded as a phenomenologist who came to apply Husserl's method to the social sciences. However, as Wagner (1983) and Prendergast (1986) have made clear, this view is untenable.[2] Instead, the origins of Schutz's work lie in the Austrian School of Economics and the interpretive sociology of Max Weber. Schutz did indeed acquire a sophisticated command of phenomenology that deeply informed his work and became a central interest in its own right. However, his initial involvement with phenomenology was as a means for clarifying Weber's concepts of action and subjective meaning, and for transforming his methodology of concept formation to address problems in the foundations of the Austrian School. It is this conception of theory and the treatment of

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[2]   Wagner's and Prendergast's studies must be taken together. Wagner understates Schutz's involvement in the Austrian School and in particular the extent to which his work in the late 1920's and early 1930's was influenced by methodological issues confronting the Austrian economists. Conversely, Prendergast neglects the importance of Schutz's antecedent and independent reasons for studying Weber, Bergson, and then Husserl. The two accounts are not contradictory in substance, but rather supplement one another in essential ways.

the subjective view of the actor it entails that concerns us here. I begin, then, with a brief review of the sources of this perhaps less familiar aspect of Schutz's thought.

The Austrian Heritage[3]

The Austrian School originated with Carl Menger's *Principles of Economics* (1871/1981) and *Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Economics* (1883/1985). In the first of these, Menger put forward his version of the principle of marginal utility, and in the second he touched off the Methodenstreit with the German historical economist Gustav Schmoller, the aftermath of which a generation later drew Weber into methodological debates. After Menger's retirement, his follower Eugen Böhm-Bawerk continued the tradition, and the third generation, centered around Ludwig von Mises and including Schutz, Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Machlup, and Friedrich von Hayek, carried the School through the middle of the twentieth century. At the University of Vienna Schutz trained in economics with Mises and law under Hans Kelsen. Following his degree in 1921 he was employed in legal and economic research and consulting, and he participated regularly in Mises's ongoing seminar dealing with basic issues in the social sciences.

The Austrian School held a distinctive conception of theory, not as a body of ideas that can in principle be put to empirical test, but rather as an *a priori* framework for the elaboration of concepts in terms of which empirical materials can be arranged and interpreted. Although the School developed within the broad context of German-language scholarship, it did so outside the Neo-Kantian revival in German philosophy in the 1870's and 1880's. Instead, Menger based himself on an Aristotelian notion of essential features. (Kauder, 1965: 95-98; Cebeddu, 1993: ch. 1, 2) Thus, he held that the fundamental concepts of social science, including above all the principle of marginal utility, are not found by induction from empirical evidence, but instead are arrived at through careful reflection on perspicuous instances to discern their essential features.

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3   In the following I rely on Menger (1883/1985), Mises (1933/1960), Cebeddu (1993), Helling (1984), Kauder (1965), and Prendergast (1986).

Though perhaps revealed through encounters with empirical materials, they hold *a priori* and cannot be challenged by empirical evidence. For Menger, following Aristotle, these essential features belong to the object itself, in this case economic action. Moreover, like much of economic theory, the Austrian School was committed to radical methodological individualism: collective phenomena are nothing but aggregations of individual actions. Consequently, for Menger the task of theory is to determine the essential features of individual economic action and the logically consequent principles of their combination with one another. Methodological issues, then, are not primarily those of evidence and inference in empirical research, but instead concern the proper proce- dures for concept formation. As a result, Menger assumed a fundamental distinction between 'theoretical sciences,' which are universally valid *a priori*, and 'empirical sciences,' which give only contingent knowledge. In particular, theoretical economics consists of the principle of marginal utility and the concepts derived from it, while disciplines such as historical economics consist of empirical findings organized in terms of the *a priori* categories provided by theoretical economics.

Mises and his students accepted Menger's fundamental principles. However, by the late 1920's, the foundations of the Austrian School in Aristotelian essentialism had been effectively challenged, particularly by the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle.[4] Moreover, because of their aprioristic approach and highly abstract conception of the individual, the Austrian theorists had no adequate account of an individual's knowledge of the social world, particularly with respect to how one individual could know another's intentions sufficiently to permit stable economic ex- change. Nevertheless, the commitment of the Mises Seminar to the *a priori* status of the principles of theoretical economics was too deep to permit abandoning it. Thus, for some participants, Schutz among them, the problem of finding alternative foundations became an urgent matter. It was to this that Schutz directed his first major work, *Meaningful Structure*, using Max Weber's Interpretive sociology as his point of departure.

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[4] The Vienna Circle and the Mises Seminar were distinct, both in intellectual approach and in membership: apparently Kaufmann was the only person participating in both. Prendergast (1986: 12) suggests that it was through Kaufmann that the logical positivist critique of Aristotelian essentialism became important for the Mises Seminar.

Weber's Method of *Idealtypen*[5]

In his late systematic treatise, *Economy and Society*, (1922/1978: 26) Weber began with a series of definitions: action is behavior to which the actor attaches subjective meaning (4); action is *social* insofar as it is oriented to the behavior of others (4); and a social relationship is one in which each of the actors takes account of the actions of the others. From these concepts Weber developed an elaborate framework of *Idealtypen* for the investigation of economic, political, legal, administrative, and religious arrangements. However, it was not these latter that occupied Schutz's attention, but rather Weber's fundamental definitions and his method of *Idealtypen*.

Weber was drawn into methodological debates by the need to secure his own work against criticisms implied in then current disputes, notably those originating in the *Methodenstreit* between Menger and Schmoller. For Weber the central issue turned on whether general concepts have any place in the study of social phenomena. Menger's position required interpreting the facts of social life in terms of an *a priori* conceptual scheme, whereas Schmoller's implied that general concepts have no place at all. In Weber's view, neither position was tenable, and his solution was the device of the *Idealtypus*.

Following the Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert, Weber distinguished between two kinds of general concepts: class concepts, fundamental to the natural sciences, and type constructs essential to the historical sciences. A class concept collects together phenomena on the basis of specific features that they have common and has its justification in an interest in general knowledge. In Rickert's and Weber's view, the natural sciences proceed by making ever wider generalizations, in the sense of more inclusive classes, in the course of which progressively less empirical content is retained. However, Weber argued, class concepts are unsuited to the historical sciences, in which he included investigations into contemporary social life, with their concern for concrete phenomena.

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[5] I use the German 'Idealtypus' instead of 'ideal type' in connection with Weber's methodology to avoid confusion with Schutz's quite different concept of ideal type. The former is grounded in Weber's Neo-Kantian epistemology, whereas Schutz's notion of typification is based on Husserl's phenomenology. In this section I draw on Burger (1976), Muse (1981), Oakes (1988), and Wagner/Zipprian (1986).

For, precisely to the extent that a particular historical event is subsumed under more inclusive categories for the purpose of attempting wider generalizations, we lose touch with those features of the event that motivated our interest in it in the first place. Nevertheless, Weber insisted, general concepts are indispensable in historical research, but instead of class concepts one must employ *Idealtypen*.

According to Weber, an *Idealtypus* is a construct defined by the investigator consisting of a clearly formulated constellation of features that, on the one hand, cohere in the sense of being mutually compatible, and, on the other, is empirically possible. *Idealtypen* are not given *a priori*, nor are they attempts to formulate class concepts that capture features common to all relevant instances. Thus an *Idealtypus* such as bureaucracy is used, not to represent the properties all bureaucratic organizations have in common, but rather as a pattern against which historical administrative organizations can be compared in terms of the ways they conform to or depart from the pattern, and Weber formulated it to illuminate specific aspects of events and social arrangements that were relevant to the value interests that motivated his research.

In Weber's view, *Idealtypen* are constructs formulated by the investigator and do not refer to independently existing entities entering into causal relations with other things. This methodological individualism accords with the presuppositions of the Austrian School, as does Weber's conception of methodology as concerned with correct procedures for concept formation. However, we must note, his distinction between 'natural' (generalizing) and 'historical' (particularizing) sciences does not correspond to the Austrian contrast between 'theoretical' (*a priori*) and 'empirical' (contingent) sciences.

II. Schutz: Theory as an *a priori* Scheme of Interpretation

Weber's emphasis on subjective meaning and his concepts of action and social relationship impressed Schutz as pointing the way to solving one of the fundamental problems facing the Austrian School, that of accounting for actors' knowledge of each others' intentions in a way that allows for stable economic exchange. However, the Austrians had serious objections to the contingent character of Weber's *Idealtypen*: they are fashioned for the purpose of particular inquiries, whether detailed investigations of specific times and places or broad comparative-historical

studies, and they are tied to the value interests motivating the inquiry. To fit within the Austrian conception of theory, the empirical specificity of Weber's *Idealtypen* had to be eliminated: Weber's method had to be reformulated so as to yield instead concepts having universal and *a priori* validity. In *Meaningful Structure* Schutz drew on Husserl's phenomenology to refashion Weber's methodology in a way that answered these objections while attempting to retain the centrality of the actor's subjective view.

The Actor in the World of Everyday Life

Schutz's point of departure for his formal methodology of concept formation is the actor in the world of everyday life, and he developed a phenomenologically based account of this in the first four chapters of *Meaningful Structure*. In Chapter 1 he reviewed appreciatively but critically Weber's notions of subjective and objective meaning and his concept of action, and in Chapter 2 he presented a detailed phenomenological analysis of subjective meaning and action for a solitary actor. Then in Chapters 3 and 4, moving beyond a strictly phenomenological method, he developed an extended discussion of the actor in the world of everyday life, focusing on intersubjective understanding and the structure of the social world from the point of view of the actor. Here Schutz drew a methodologically crucial distinction between consociates and mere contemporaries: consociates are others with whom the actor interacts directly in a "We" relationship and can be known in concrete ways; in contrast, Schutz assumed that an actor's knowledge of mere contemporaries in a "They" relationship takes the form of typical kinds of persons and typical courses of action. These common-sense typifications constitute the actor's stock of knowledge, which varies from actor to actor and is varyingly clear, precise, and coherent.[6] Central to all this is the conception of sign systems, and especially language as a system of signs embodying socially standardized typifications.

With these ideas Schutz suggested a basis for addressing a deep flaw in the received Austrian tradition, namely its inability to give an account

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[6]   Schutz used the term 'ideal type' in this context. I have instead used 'typification' to mark the distinction between these common-sense notions held by actors and theoretical ideal types constructed by the sociologist according to Schutz's formal methodology.

of how one actor could anticipate another's likely course of action in a way that would permit the coordination of activity, particularly economic exchange. However, he still needed to provide for theoretical concepts that, at the most general level, are universally valid *a priori*, as required by the Austrian conception of theory. And he needed to do so in a way that preserves the importance of the subjective view of the actor. It was this task that he undertook in the fifth and last chapter of *Meaningful Structure*: "Some Basic Problems of Interpretive Sociology."

The Methodology of Theoretical Concept Formation

For Schutz the central problem of concept formation in the social sciences is posed by his assumption

> that science is always an objective context of meaning, and the theme of all sciences of the social world is *to constitute an objective meaning-context either out of subjective meaning-contexts generally or out of some particular subjective meaning-contexts*. The problem of every social science can, therefore, be summarized in the question: *How are sciences of subjective meaning-context possible?* (1932/1967: 223)

Schutz took as his problem that of constituting an objective meaning-context out of subjective meaning-contexts generally rather than out of particular meaning-contexts. To address this, he adapted Weber's methodology of *Idealtypen* to fit within the Austrian framework and to accommodate phenomenological foundations.

Personal and Course-of-Action Ideal Types

Schutz's starting point for the construction of theoretical ideal types is the notion that an actor in the world of everyday life deals with other actors through typifications of persons and courses of action. However, he argued, the sociologist can never have access to the actual subjective meanings held by an individual in a concrete situation, for he took for granted that the sociologist stands in a "They" rather than a "We" relation to the actor. Moreover, he held that actors' common-sense typifications are in any case un-suited for scientific theorizing because of their varying clarity, precision, and coherence. Schutz's procedure, then, is not to ascertain or describe those typifications that particular persons actually

employ on a given occasion. Rather, it is to substitute ideal types con-
structed by the investigator for the typifications the real actors in fact use.
The method is first to formulate ideal-typical courses of action,
"course-of-action types," that would produce the events under investiga-
tion, and then to construct ideal types of persons, "personal ideal
types"—"puppets" to use Schutz's term, endowed with stocks of knowl-
edge and motives specified by the sociologist such that puppets so
equipped would engage in those typical courses of action and thus would
produce the events of interest. (1932/1967: 220-228) But, Schutz main-
tained, the so-ciologist is not free to formulate theoretical
course-of-action and personal ideal types arbitrarily. Instead, concept
formation is constrained by the requirements of causal and meaning
adequacy (228-239) and by the postulate of rationality. (239-241)

Though Schutz borrowed the terms "causal adequacy" and "meaning
adequacy" from Weber, he redefined them within the context of his own
approach. For Schutz, causal adequacy is the requirement that a
course-of-action ideal type must be one that can actually be performed
and is likely to be repeated. (231) And meaning adequacy is the require-
ment that the ideal-typical knowledge and motives the sociologist attrib-
utes to the puppets be intelligible to the actors whose behavior is the
starting point for the inquiry, consistent with other characteristics attri-
buted to the puppets, and coherent with the relevant course-of-action
types. (234-239)

The requirement of meaning adequacy is fundamental to Schutz's
methodology of concept formation, and subsequently, in "The Problem
of Rationality in the Social World," he formulated it in the following
way:

> each term used in a scientific system referring to human action must
> be so constructed that a human act performed within the life-world by
> an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construction
> would be reasonable and understandable for the actor himself, as well
> as for his fellow-men. This postulate is of extreme importance for the
> methodology of social science. What makes it possible for a social
> science to refer at all to events in the life-world is the fact that the
> nterpretation of any human act by the social scientist might be the
> same as that by the actor or by his partner. (1943/1964: 85-86)[7]

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[7]   Although the paper from which this passage is taken was published in *Economica* in
      1943, it was presented as a lecture at Harvard in 1940 (Schutz, 1978a: 59 n. 77), and

It is essential to be clear about what meaning adequacy demands. The requirement is not that the knowledge and motives attributed to a puppet accurately describe the actual knowledge and motives of the real actor on the occasion of the action itself. Rather, it is that the imputed knowledge and motives be "reasonable and understandable" to the real actor and his or her fellows.[8] It is this, Schutz held, that provides the connection between the subjective view of the actor in the social world, on the one hand, and the puppet model of the social world constructed by the sociologist, on the other.

Concept formation is further constrained by a principle of rationality. For Schutz, action is "rational" when both the end and the means are clearly and distinctly conceived and the ends are pursued in the most effective way possible. Though he rejected this as a standard for describing action in the world of everyday life, (e.g., 1943/1964: 79-80; 1953/1962: 30-33) he argued that sociology has a preference for ideal types of rational action. (1932/1967: 239-241; 1943/1964: 86; 1953/1962: 44-45) Thus, while Schutz argued that real actors in the world of everyday life do not, indeed cannot, have the clarity of motives and completeness of knowledge required by this standard of rationality, he maintained that the motives and beliefs assigned to puppets in a scientific model must have these characteristics.

Finally, we must note that ideal-typical actors and courses of action do not inhabit the real world of everyday life but an ideal world constructed by the sociologist. Thus, while Schutz maintained that scientific theorizing is carried out in the natural attitude, he held that scientific terms

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Prendergast (1986: 8) suggests it may have originated indirectly from a request in 1936 from Hayek, editor of *Economica*, for a summary of the central ideas of *Meaningful Structure*. (cf. Wagner, 1983: 52)

[8] It appears that Gurwitsch misunderstood Schutz on this point (1966: xxix). While, as he suggests, Schutz's requirement of meaning adequacy does rely on the sociologistís knowledge of the 'typifications and idealizations that are continually practiced in everyday life,' this does not mean that the actor 'must recognize himself in the homunculus and see in it an idealization of himself.' Rather, the knowledge and motives attributed by the sociologist to the puppet need only be intelligible to the actors in terms of socially shared typifications in the circumstances under investigation.

refer, not to the world of everyday life, but to an ideal world of scientific theory. (Schutz, 1945/1962a: 208; Husserl, 1913/1982: 53-55)

The Elaboration of Theoretical Concepts

To satisfy the Austrian requirement for *a priori* universal validity, theory construction and concept formation in the social sciences cannot stop with personal and course-of-action ideal types derived immediately from concrete materials. Instead, such immediate theoretical ideal types form the basis for the development of more abstract concepts, or, in Schutz's terminology, more "anonymous" ones. These more anonymous ideal types then provide the framework for devising appropriate course-of-action and personal ideal types for interpreting particular phenomena. And, in accord with the Austrian view, Schutz held that at the highest levels of anonymity these theoretical ideal types are required to be valid *a priori*. Schutz's challenge in this regard was posed by the increasing perception in the Mises Seminar that the earlier Austrian appeal to Aristotelian essentialism was untenable. His solution, as Prendergast (1986) has noted, was to shift the basis for the claim of *a priori* validity from an Aristotelian concept of essential features of an object itself to a Husserlian notion of phenomenal essential features constituting how one can think about the object. (Schutz, 1945/1962b: 114)

Schutz's procedure, drawn from Husserl, is that of formalization—ignoring part of the content of the original concepts to isolate their logical features, and generalization—going from more specific to more inclusive concepts. By these means one moves from less anonymous ideal types to more anonymous ones. (1932/1967: 244) The result is a hierarchy of theoretical ideal types of increasing anonymity. At the bottom are the immediate personal and course-of-action types pertaining to observed phenomena formulated by the social scientist in conformity with the requirements of causal and meaning adequacy and the postulate of rationality. Successively higher levels, each obtained by formalization and generalization from the preceding one, show increasing anonymity. And at the most anonymous levels it is this formalization and generalization which give the ideal types universal validity. (1932/1967: 244)

Schutz interpreted the most anonymous concepts in a theoretical social science as "stipulations" that define a field of inquiry. (1932/1967: 245) The earlier Austrian position had been that the fundamental prin-

ciples of a field were essential features of the objects or events themselves. In contrast, following Kaufmann, (1932/1967: 245 and note 4) Schutz held that principles such as Kelsen's notion of the Grundnorm and Menger's formulation of the principle of marginal utility define what it means for something to be relevant to jurisprudence or to economics. Consequently, if some event that seems to be in the domain of economics does not conform to economic principles, the conclusion is not that the economic principles are wrong but rather that the event was mistakenly taken to be economic in character. Thus,

> in pure economics the principle of marginal utility is the defining principle of the whole field and presents a highest interpretive scheme which alone makes possible the scientific systematization of the subjective meaning-contexts of individual economic acts. Correspondingly, in the realm of pure jurisprudence, as Kelsen himself clearly recognizes, application of a presupposed basic norm [*Grundnorm*] determines the area of invariance for all those subjective meaning-contexts of legal acts which are relevant for jurisprudence ... (1932/1967: 247)

In Schutz's view such stipulations are not arbitrary but rather are the result of detailed analyses of meaning structures within a given domain as developed through the formation of successively more anonymous theo-retical ideal types by formalization and generalization. Once established through this process these concepts are, he held, universally valid.

The character of Schutz's conception of theory stands out clearly if we consider the fundamental differences between his method of ideal types and Max Weber's employment of *Idealtypen*. First, for Weber, *Idealtypen* are constructed to present as clearly as possible formulations of social or cultural forms that can be used as patterns for organizing and comparing concrete phenomena in terms relevant to the investigator's particular investigation. Thus, the purpose of constructing *Idealtypen* is not to develop a universally valid scheme of interpretation for some given domain but to illuminate concrete phenomena, particularly with respect to how and why they resemble and depart from those patterns. Second, Schutz's theoretical ideal types have the essential feature of Weber's class concepts: because of their method of formation, through formalization and generalization, they indeed collect together phenomena on the basis of specific features they have in common for the purpose of exhibiting features that hold across the collection. Thus, as Prendergast (1986: 17)

has observed, Schutz treated all general concepts in the natural as well as the social sciences as theoretical ideal types in his sense (1932/1967: 246) and ignored the point of Weber's distinction between class concepts and *Idealtypen*.

Schutz and the Problem of Subjectivity

Schutz's resolution of the problem of subjectivity reflects his conception of theory as an objective scheme of interpretation. Within that framework, the aim cannot be to represent the actual motives and beliefs of the actors whose conduct constitutes the phenomena under investigation. That task, as Schutz conceived it, is impossible since the sociologist necessarily stands in a "They" relation to those actors, and hence their subjective states are available only in typified form. Instead, the relevance of the actors' subjective states is incorporated into the theory by formulating ideal-typical actors, puppets, having motives and stocks of knowledge that, while supplied by the sociologist, would—because of the requirement of meaning adequacy—be intelligible to the real actors. In this way, Schutz held, the relevance of subjective orientation is maintained in the context of objective theory.

III. Parsons: Theory as a Framework for Empirical Explanation

We turn now to a completely different approach to social science represented by Talcott Parsons' *The Structure of Social Action* (1937). Parsons, like Schutz, was trained in economics, but in the Anglo-American rather than the Austrian tradition. Thus, substantively he looked to Jevons and Marshall rather than to Menger, and his methodological attitudes went back to natural scientists and J. S. Mill rather than either to Menger and Aristotle or to Weber and Kant. However, Parsons was familiar as well with the strongly empirical tradition of American sociology, and he was concerned particularly with the theoretical issues raised by considering economics in the more general context of society. This interest led him in 1931 to move from the Department of Economics to the newly formed Department of Sociology at Harvard. Parsons' outlook, then, was firmly in the Anglo-American tradition of the social sciences, which sought explicitly to model itself on the natural sciences

and took for granted that scientific knowledge is contingent rather than *a priori*.[9]

Parsons' aim in *Structure* was three-fold. First, he sought to establish a basis for sociology as an autonomous science of social life based on a sophisticated understanding of natural sciences. Second, he analyzed the structure of a class of social theories falling within the framework of what he called the "action frame of reference," exposing the logical and empirical difficulties in several historical variants and proposing what he called the "voluntaristic" theory of action as a more satisfactory alternative. And third, he attempted to show in closely argued detail that though they started from traditions far removed from each other and from the voluntaristic theory itself, Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber converged on the essential ideas of the voluntaristic theory. Though the last of these occupies the major portion of *Structure*, it is Parsons' underlying conception of sociological inquiry and the voluntaristic theory of action that are important here.

The Voluntaristic Theory of Action

Parsons organized the argument of *Structure* in terms of a critique of the theory he attributed to Thomas Hobbes of society as an aggregate of actors all pursuing their respective ends using the most effective means available, with failure to employ those means being attributed to ignorance and error. Following Hobbes, Parsons argued that such a society would collapse immediately, since the availability of force and fraud as preemptive strategies would lead at once to a war of all against all. However, most societies, while decidedly not free from conflict, nevertheless persist for substantial periods far removed from such a condition, so the question is, what accounts for the relative lack of overt and threatened violence that we do observe? Parsons called this theoretical question the 'problem of order' and argued that Hobbes' proposed solution, the social contract with a sovereign, is untenable. The central theme of *Structure* is pursuit of a theory offering a more satisfactory resolution.

Parsons began with a conceptual scheme he called the 'action frame of reference:' an *actor* pursuing *ends* in a situation consisting of *conditions*, over which the actor has no control, and means, which the actor can

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[9]   In the foregoing I have relied on Camic (1991) and Parsons' own account (1970).

employ in pursuit of his or her ends, where the selection of means is governed by some normative element. (1937: 43ff.) In explicating this last idea Parsons wrote,

> the term normative will be used as applicable to an aspect, part or element of a system of action if, and only in so far as, it may be held to manifest or otherwise involve a sentiment attributable to one or more actors that something is an end in itself, regardless of its status as a means to any other end (1) for the members of a collectivity, (2) for some portions of the members of a collectivity or (3) for the collectivity as a unit. (1937: 75)

Thus, a norm has an intrinsic collective as well as subjective orientation, which builds a social element into the foundations of the action frame of reference. Parsons did devote considerable attention to what he called the "unit act," that is, the smallest event that is analyzable in terms of the action frame of reference. However, he was explicit that this is an abstraction: unit acts invariably occur as parts of systems of such actions involving a plurality of actors. In contrast with Schutz, Parsons was not attempting to build a theory starting with a conception of an isolated actor and then placing such actors in one another's presence. Instead, his con-cept of action is social from the outset, and the social systems in which actions are embedded are real objects in the social world, not fictions constructed by the sociologist.

In Parsons' analysis, the problem of order arises from two features of any radically individualistic rational choice theory such as Hobbes': neglect of the fact of systematic coordination between the ends sought by individuals, and the assumption that the only standard governing the individual's choice of means is that of maximizing effectiveness in achieving his or her ends.[10] Parsons' proposal is that as a matter of empirical fact, normative elements are crucial in both these respects. First, in a stable society, the ends of individuals tend to be organized in coherent systems of shared values so that individuals in seeking their own ends generally, though of course not always, tend to facilitate rather than

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[10] Parsons refers to this assumption as the 'norm of rationality.' However, it is misleading to call it a 'norm' in the sense he defined, for, since it is based on pure egoism, it requires no reference to a collectivity for its formulation. It is, then, a 'norm' only by courtesy and the role it plays as a standard for choosing among alternative means to ends.

frustrate the ends of others. Second, a person's choice of means is governed by a variety of norms other than the standard of instrumental success, so that effectiveness in achieving ends is not the sole criterion in selecting means. Parsons argued, then, that the empirical stability of society is enhanced by the degree to which individuals have assimilated common values and norms so that conformity to them is a motivating factor independent of both their ends and their understandings of the means and conditions in the situations in which they find themselves. Thus, the stability of social life depends not just on the happenstance of perhaps momentary alignments of interests of the parties, or on repetition of habitual or traditional forms, but most importantly on the commitment of the participants to a shared system of norms and values.

This Parsons called the 'voluntaristic' theory of action.[11] A central thesis of *Structure* is that Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber, though they started from positions fundamentally different both from the volun-taristic theory and from each other, all converged on this view under pressure of empirical considerations. (1937: 721-722)[12]

Empirical Theory, Analytical Realism, and Scientific Method

The kind of solution to the problem of order Parsons required cannot be provided by Schutz's methodology. Parsons did not seek an account

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[11] Parsons' terminology is sometimes confusing. Rather than closely following generally established usages, he seems to have been attempting to find words to organize and address what he saw to be the basic issues in the controversies in which he was engaged in his early years at Harvard. (Camic, 1991) Thus, he does not use 'voluntarism' in its standard philosophical meaning that intellect is dominated by will, appetite, and desire (Taylor, 1967)—in effect, reason is the servant of the passions, but rather in opposition to doctrines that attempt to reduce behavior to the interaction of heredity and environment. Similarly, Camic (1979) has noted that Parsons' choice of 'utilitarian' to refer to Hobbes' theory was unfortunate since Hobbes ante-dated the Utilitarian movement, and the Scottish Moralists and Classical Utilitarians placed much the same emphasis on values as did Parsons. It must be noted, though, that Parsons was aware of these terminological problems. (e.g., 1937: 60)

[12] Parsons' interpretations of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber have been disputed, and in particular his accounts of Durkheim and Weber are mistaken in important ways. However, these are not at issue here: rather, the central point is the structure of Parsons' argument and his emphasis on the importance of empirical concerns for theoretical development.

based on a scheme of interpretation: he was not interested in constructing a hypothetical puppet model of a plausible but imaginary society that would not collapse into a war of all against all. Instead he looked for a theory that explains why real societies exhibit such stability as in fact they do and the conditions under which that stability is enhanced or diminished. For this it is necessary first that the proposed explanatory conditions in fact hold for the societies in question, second that those conditions rather than others be the ones responsible for the observed states of affairs, and third that the connections between the explanatory conditions and the conditions to be explained be correctly represented by the theory. Theories that are answerable to these requirements in empirical terms—whether or not they are in fact correct—I shall call "empirical theories," and the explanations they produce, "empirical explanations." Parsons did not specify these criteria explicitly, but they are directly implied in his discussion of theory, fact, concepts, and methodology in Chap. I of *Structure*. Although he dealt above all with theoretical issues, his concern was for empirical theory.

Parsons took for granted a distinction between objects, in the most general sense of things or events about which one might want to say something, on the one hand, and properties of those objects, on the other. (1937: 27-36) Thus for Parsons concepts are of two kinds: those referring to objects (e.g. "salt"), and those formulating properties that can be ascribed to objects ("soluble in water"). For Parsons, in contrast with both Austrian and Neo-Kantian epistemologies, concepts by themselves do not embody discursive knowledge; instead such knowledge is expressed in propositions formulated in terms of such concepts ("salt is soluble in water") and the larger theoretical frameworks that give order to them. These ideas are, of course, quite commonplace, but Parsons' terminology is idiosyncratic: instead of "object," he used "type-part" (1937: 34) or "unit" (35 n. 1), and he used "analytical element" for a property that can be predicated of an object. (34) Parsons based this conception on what he called 'analytical realism:'

> as opposed to the fiction view [e.g., Weber's Neo-Kantianism] it is maintained that at least some of the general concepts of science are not fictional but adequately 'grasp' aspects of the objective external world. This is true of the concepts here called analytical elements [i.e., properties of objects]. Hence the position here taken is, in an epistemological sense, realistic. At the same time it avoids the objectionable

implications of an empiricist realism, These concepts correspond, not to concrete phenomena, but to elements [properties of them] which are analytically separable from other elements [properties]. There is no implication that the value of any one such element [property], or even of all those included in one logically coherent system, is completely descriptive of any particular concrete thing or event. Hence it is ne-ces-sary to qualify the term realism with 'analytical.' (1937: 730)[13]

And,

it is a philosophical implication of the position taken here that there is an external world of so-called empirical reality which is not the crea-tion of the individual human mind and is not reducible to terms of an ideal order, in the philosophical sense. (1937: 753)[14]

Thus Parsons explicitly assumed an objective social world external to the sociologist, the world of everyday life to use Schutz's language, and he assumed that scientific description refers to objects in that world but necessarily involves abstraction from the entirety of an object to isolate those features that are specifically relevant to the theory being employed. In Parsons' view, then, theoretical problems are substantive in nature, having to do with formulating what is known about how the world works, and methodology is concerned with 'the grounds of empirical validity of scientific propositions.' (23) But concept formation evidently did not interest him as such beyond the obvious requirements that one be clear and consistent.

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[13] Again Parsons' terminology can be misleading: in *Structure* he generally used 'empiricism' to refer, not to British empiricism in the tradition descendent from Locke and Hume, nor in the sense of mere fact-gathering, but to the notion that the categories of some favored theory exhaust the empirical reality of objects. (e.g. 1937: 10, 23, 69ff.)

[14] Occasionally Parsons appears to have thought of his position as Neo-Kantian, (e.g. 1978: 115-116) but in doing so he confused the concepts in a scientific theoretical framework with the Kantian categories of understanding. The former are the terms in which specific substantive knowledge in a particular scientific field is formulated, whereas the latter are held to be fundamental forms of understanding independent of substantive content or theoretical framework. It should also be noted that the distinction between facts and values, to which Parsons clearly subscribed, though central to Rickert's and Weber's thought, is by no means an exclusively Neo-Kantian idea.

Like most of his predecessors and contemporaries in American socio-logy, Parsons assumed without question that natural science is the appro-priate intellectual model for understanding society. (Ross, 1991) In particular, he sought to develop concepts that apply, not just in a parti-cular historical context, but to action and social systems universally, and he took the ultimate goal to be the discovery of general but empirically contingent laws describing the fundamental aspects of social systems much on the model of classical physics. In short, like Schutz he en-visioned a universal theory of action, though one of a very different kind.

Parsons and the Problem of Subjectivity

Within the framework of his underlying assumptions, Parsons dealt with the problem of subjectivity in a seemingly very straight-forward way. The actor's subjective states are treated as objects in the world external to the sociologist that can be described empirically in terms of a scientific conceptual framework. Thus he distinguished between the 'concrete level,' the actor's ends, knowledge of means and conditions, and norma-tive commitments as they actually exist in the mind of the actor, on the one hand, and the 'analytical level,' these things conceptualized in terms of the theory of action, on the other. (1937: 48-51)[15] Consequently, a major locus of methodological problems in the social sciences is the task of obtaining reliable and valid empirical data on which to base scientific descriptions of actors' subjective states. The elaborate methodology of social research that has developed in American sociology and social psychology since the early 20th century can be seen as directed in sub-stantial part to dealing with these problems as technical matters in em-pirical research. Thus, for Parsons, the problem of subjectivity reduced to issues concerning empirical research methods.

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[15] By this point Parsons' use/overuse of the word 'analytical' has become almost intolerable. In particular, 'analytical elements' (properties) do not distinguish the 'analytical level' from the 'concrete level' but instead are central on both. And 'ana-lytical realism' underlies Parsons' whole approach, whether on the 'analytical' or 'concrete' level.

IV. The Schutz - Parsons Exchange

Schutz read *The Structure of Social Action* shortly after its publication in 1937 (Wagner, 1983: 74-75), and it would have attracted his attention on several counts. Parsons seemed to be using ideas similar to Schutz's own: a concept of action defined in terms of pursuit of goals, an emphasis on the subjective view of the actor, and pursuit of a universal theory of action. He presented a detailed and penetrating analysis of Weber, who had occupied Schutz's attention. He displayed a familiarity with the German literature rare in Anglo-American work at the time, including a bibliographic reference to Schutz's own *Sinnhafte Aufbau*. (1937: 791) And Parsons' assumption of analytical realism is superficially similar to Schutz's view that scientific inquiry is conducted within the natural attitude. However, this appearance of congruence is illusory. Parsons in fact differed deeply and systematically from Schutz on crucial issues concerning the nature of scientific inquiry and, particularly, of theory in the social sciences. In 1940 Schutz completed a lengthy review of *Structure* but did not publish the essay, instead forwarding it to Parsons, and there ensued a brief but vigorous correspondence which ended with the two acknowledging in effect that they had no meeting of minds. Schutz's review and the correspondence were finally published in full 37 years later. (Grathoff, 1978)[16]

To begin with, Schutz held that scientific inquiry, though conducted in the natural attitude, was fundamentally different from everyday life. (1945/1962a) whereas Parsons rejected such a sharp distinction. (1978: 76) Against Parsons' commitment to empirical theory always contingent in principle, Schutz embraced a notion of theory as a scheme of interpretation that is valid *a priori*. Schutz, we have seen, held to a subsumptive notion of objective knowledge, in which concepts are ideal types graded in terms of formalization and generalization such that more anonymous concepts subsume the content of less anonymous ones. Thus, contrary to Parsons' view that the substantive content of knowledge is expressed in propositions formed using concepts, Schutz held that concepts themselves already contain the content of knowledge at varying levels of abstraction.

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[16] The second half of Schutz's review had been published earlier (1960) and was reprinted in Volume II of his *Collected Papers* (1960/1964).

Further, contrary to Parsons' location of methodological problems as con-cerned with establishing the empirical grounds for scientific claims, for Schutz methodology is concerned with principles of correct concept formation, and the question of empirical evidence did not concern him beyond the requirements of causal and meaning adequacy. Moreover, for Schutz theoretical concepts refer to an ideal world of theory, whereas for Parsons they may refer directly to the real social world. Finally, for Parsons, sociological concepts such as the notion of a social system point to real objects not entirely reducible to individuals and their actions, but Schutz took radical methodological individualism for granted and viewed such concepts as theorist's fictions.

Apparently unaware of the lack of common ground, and in particular the significance of Parsons' commitments to empirical explanation and to the irreducible reality of social systems, Schutz did not address these issues but instead took his own position on them for granted without remark and proceeded to criticize the particulars of *Structure*. As Parsons put it in response to Schutz,

> you do not attack my general position in general terms, and yet in de-tail you do not seem to accept it, but again and again make state-ments which would imply that is not tenable. (1978: 66)

Parsons was largely justified in this complaint as well as in his detailed responses to Schutz's comments. A great deal of what Schutz had to say in exposing Parsons' position was simply wrong and his criticisms were misdirected. For instance, Schutz assumed that Parsons was engaged in an epistemological and methodological study, (1978a: 8-9) whereas Parsons insisted that he was concerned only peripherally with those matters and that his principal interest lay instead in substantive issues. Schutz incorrectly identified what Parsons called "analytical elements" with the "analytical level." (Schutz, 1978a: 23-26; Parsons, 1978: 63f.)[17] And Schutz wrongly extended Parsons' remark that the categories of the action frame of reference turn out to be irrelevant in a radically posi-tivistic theory to the claim that they are irrelevant in all theories within the action frame of reference. (Schutz, 1978a: 20; 1978b: 99f.; Parsons, 1978: 64) For his part, Parsons' replies were mostly limited to objecting

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[17]   Schutz's misunderstanding here is somewhat understandable: see note 15 above.

to the details of Schutz's misunderstandings of his position. Consequently, the general view has been that the two talked past one another. (e.g. Grathoff, 1978; Coser, 1979; Giddens, 1979; Wagner, 1979) However, this assessment overlooks two major points on which Schutz and Parsons did join issues directly and forcefully, namely the place of normative elements in action and the problem of subjectivity. The first of these illuminates Schutz's general position, and the second is central to our concerns.

The Normative Element in Action

Recall that Parsons' central move in addressing the problem of order was two-fold. First, he proposed that in a stable society there is a shared value system that has the effect of mitigating conflicts of interest between individuals' ends; and second, he argued that actors are oriented to norms other than the standard of instrumental effectiveness in selecting means to ends. However, Schutz confessed to not understand Parsons on this, con-tending that norms and values reduce either to further motives of the individual or to situational conditions to which the actor must adapt. (1978a: 30ff.) Thus, Schutz assimilated norms to the actor's ends and understanding of the situation.

Schutz's position here reflects his commitment to treating putatively collective phenomena as wholly reducible to individuals' experiences and actions, his consequent attempt to develop a phenomenologically based concept of action entirely in terms of the subjective experience of the solitary actor, and his attempt to build a theory of social phenomena by simply considering a multiplicity of such actors. From this point of departure, Schutz could not in a principled way distinguish norms from motives and conditions. However, by giving norms an essential collective reference, as did Parsons, it is possible to treat them as an independent element in the constitution of action. Schutz was, of course, fully aware that people make moral judgments, but he provided no systematic place for these in either individual action or social interaction.[18] Schutz, then,

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[18] Gurwitsch summarizes Schutz's view of the social character of rules and recipes in the following way: "The overwhelming majority of the rules and recipes are complied with as a matter of course, and are hardly ever explicitly formulated, still less reflected upon. They define the modes of procedure and conduct regarded as correct, good, and natural by the society in question; they are the ways in which 'one' does

dismissed the normative element as a fundamental characteristic of action and instead sought to develop an understanding of the social world that made no essential use of it.

Parsons' response was direct reassertion of the independent importance of the normative element. (1978: 80) Clearly this disagreement does not originate in a superficial misunderstanding between Schutz and Parsons but rather in their fundamentally different points of departure for the development of sociological theory.

The Problem of Subjectivity

Schutz's most important challenge to Parsons concerned the subjective view of the actor. After a discussion of what he saw as the difference between a subjective and an objective interpretation of the unit act, (37-43) Schutz wrote,

> Professor Parsons abstains from showing, on the one hand, why reference to the subjective point of view is an indispensable prerequisite for the theory of action and, on the other hand, how it is possible to deal with subjective phenomena in terms of an objective conceptual scheme. (43-44)

Schutz's objection was not to Parsons' claim that the subjective point of view is indispensable but rather to what he took to be Parsons' inadequate treatment of that position.

The central point of Schutz's criticism was that an observer cannot know what is actually going on in the mind of the actor: what ends the actor in fact is pursuing and what he or she sees as the circumstances to be dealt with in pursuing those ends. Schutz's conclusion, then, was that Parsons' insistence on the possibility of objective scientific description of

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things. Their social approval in the form of inexplicit and silent acceptance and compliance is but another expression and aspect of their social derivation. ... the recipes under discussion are followed and observed because, and only because, of their usefulness." (1966: xvif.) Here, the element of normative obligation is alluded to ('correct,' 'good,' 'social approval') but not connected with the actual production of or responses to action, and it quickly disappears in favor of utilitarian motives. The contrast with Durkheim's treatment of these same features of 'inexplicit silent acceptance and compliance' as reflecting an un-derlying moral order is striking.

the subjective view of the actor is misguided, and that his solution to the problem of subjectivity fails. To emphasize his point, Schutz then turned to an extended exposition of his own methodology of ideal types as the proper resolution of the issue. (1978a: 44-60) Parsons' response was un-compromising:

> In the middle of page 40 you state that all this is open only to the knowledge of the actor himself ... For the observer has no other access to the action of the actor but the acts once accomplished. I take it you mean physically observable overt actions. I beg to differ fun-damentally. (1978: 85)

And he continued,

> The observer has, in addition to the observation of overt acts, an enor-mously large accumulation of phenomena which we interpret as sym-bolic expressions of the actor's states of mind. Obviously the most import class of these are linguistic expressions of the most various sorts. It is not confined to language but includes all kinds of facial ex-pressions and aspects of the context of action. (85-86)

In addition, Parsons could have referred to empirical techniques such as ethnographic fieldwork, participant observation, and interviewing devel-oped in British and American sociology and anthropology that approxi-mate a "we"-relationship. Implicitly, then, Parsons proposed treating re-ports from such encounters as data. Schutz would have had difficulty re-plying to this, for Parsons appealed to just those resources available to the actor in the "we"-relationship that Schutz himself emphasized. How-ever, Parsons did not press this point and Schutz did not pick it up in his sub-sequent replies, perhaps because in the Austrian tradition such em-pirical procedures are entirely irrelevant to theoretical social science.

Finally, Parsons went on to make clear that, in his view, a scientific description of the actor's subjective state does not attempt to reproduce that state in all its particularity and detail, but rather seeks only to repre-sent accurately those selected aspects that are relevant to the scientific frame of reference being employed. (1978: 90) Schutz did not respond to this directly but instead suggested that Parsons needed to engage in a

more radical analysis of subjectivity, presumably along phenomenological lines. (1978: 104)

V. Conclusion:
The Problematic Character of the Subjective View of the Actor

Schutz's writings are curiously disjointed. On the one hand, his discussions of the actor in the attitude of everyday life are detailed and nuanced examinations of an actor encountering the physical and social world, and his notion of actors' common-sense knowledge is extraordinarily important. But on the other hand, he did not incorporate this in his formal methodology of concept formation. Instead he sought to accommodate the idea of the subjective view of the actor within the framework of the Austrian conception of theory as based on concepts that are universally valid *a priori*; and his device for doing this was the construction of puppet models subject to the requirement of meaning adequacy. The difficulty with Schutz's solution to the problem of subjec-tivity, then, is that it is not a solution at all. For in his methodology the question of whether or not the real actors actually had the motives and understandings ascribed to the puppets does not arise, and in the end the real actors' actual motives and understandings of their circumstances do not figure in the interpretation of social phenomena.

Parsons' treatment of the problem of subjectivity is also unsatisfactory. However, the important criticism is not Schutz's, for as we have seen Parsons had available a cogent reply. Instead it is that mounted by Blumer (1956) and more deeply by Garfinkel. (1952: 145; 1964/1967: 66-68; Heritage, 1984: 19-22, 33, 110ff.) The central point is that in Parsons' theory what matter are only those aspects of the actor's actual understandings explicitly formulated in the observer's scientific conceptual scheme. And, it will be recalled, Parsons insisted that a conceptual scheme cannot exhaust the concrete reality of the phenomena it describes. Nevertheless, within the theory, these selected features of the actor's subjective view—and only these—are taken to be the determining factors that account for the actor's behavior. In short, what count are those aspects of the subjective view of the actor that are represented in terms of the theorist's concepts, and once again the actor's concrete motives and understandings disappear from sociological inquiry.

For both Schutz and Parsons the crux of the problem is not their emphasis on the subjective view of the actor, but rather their assumption that objective understanding of social phenomena must be through fixed concepts and principles. Neither intended sociological concepts to be taken figuratively, as *Idealtypen* in Weber's sense, or as 'sensitizing concepts.' (Blumer, 1954) Instead, they meant them to be applied literally and rigorously, and it is this that makes the subjective view of the actor problematic. Schutz's approach has the virtue of preserving the idea that the springs of action in the world of everyday life lie in the individual actor's concrete motives and understandings. However, to maintain this view in the context of the demand for a universal theory, he had to segregate the actor's subjective view from the theoretical puppet model. In contrast, Parsons' approach allows for directly incorporating aspects of actors' concrete subjective states into explanations, but it does so at the cost of assuming that action is the product, not of the actor's concrete motives and understandings as such, but of only those aspects of them that are captured in the fixed categories of the theorist's conceptual scheme.

It may be suggested, then, that the appropriate move is to retain the subjective view of the actor as central but abandon the insistence that explanation of social phenomena must be by application of fixed universal categories. And indeed there is a substantial tradition in the social sciences that, while committed to empirical explanation, does not seek to understand social phenomena in terms of fixed theoretical categories. Instead, explanation is on the basis of particular historical arrangements and the historically specific regularities that they produce and which in turn sustain and transform them. Inquiries of this kind seek to establish explanatory conditions empirically and to make cogent empirical cases that those conditions rather than others are the ones actually at work. Clearly, general concepts play an important role in such historically situated studies, particularly in comparative investigations, but they are used, not in a literal fashion such as that required by Schutz or Parsons, but instead more in the way of Blumer's sensitizing concepts or Weber's *Idealtypen*. In such inquiries the motives and understandings of the participating actors are treated as among the explanatory conditions, with the requirement that the relevant features of the actors' actual motives and beliefs be, not imputed theoretically, but established empirically.

If Schutz's and Parsons' contributions are to be incorporated in this form of sociological inquiry, their commitments to fixed universal categories, albeit of quite different kinds, must be set aside. From Parsons we can then take his insistence on the crucial role of normative orientations in the organization of systems of action and on the availability of information about actors' subjective states in particular situations through empirical research. And Schutz's sociological contributions then rest with his studies of the actor in the world of everyday life and his emphasis on the role of common-sense knowledge. In all of this, the subjective orientation of the actor returns as central, not merely programmatically but in substance.

There is some opinion that taking the subjective view of the actor seriously is naïve and misguided. One such school maintains that the real explanation of social phenomena is to be found in what Parsons called the non-subjective categories of "heredity" and "environment"—some early versions of sociobiology and their vulgar descendants come to mind. Another, structuralism, dismisses the actor's subjective view as an epiphenomenon, not of heredity and environment, but of macro-level social or cultural forms. Still another school insists that the subjectivity of the actor is merely something to be deconstructed to show it as nothing but an interplay of differences and absences. What all of these have in common is that they do not deal with actors' actual motives and understandings of their circumstances in relation to the production of action in concrete situations, but instead attempt to explain those subjec-tive states away in the name of *a priori* metaphysical commitments. And they fail entirely to address the question of how the topics of the social sciences can even be specified in entirely non-subjective terms. Against such views, we can hold with Parsons and Schutz that the subjective view of the actor cannot be avoided. The problem is how to take proper account of it, and perhaps the foregoing reflections suggest a direction for a solution.

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Reflexivity, Reality, and Relationality.
The Inadequacy of Bourdieu's Critique of the Phenomenological Tradition in Sociology[*]

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Abstract. *The purpose of this paper is to discuss Bourdieu's criticism of what he calls "subjectivism," that is, the tradition of phenomenologically based sociology, especially in the works of Schutz, Garfinkel and Goffman, as well as their followers. This critique can be summarized by six points, two of which will be discussed here: Bourdieu's criticism of this tradition (i) as based on an inadequate conception of reflexivity and (ii) as a form of naive realism. In responding to these two aspects of his critique, not only the differences between Bourdieu's and Schutz's views become clear, but also the remarkable continuity between phenomenology and Bourdieu's "theory of practice" can be shown. Focusing the discussion on three meta-theoretical notions, i.e. reflexivity, reality, and relationality, this discussion presents some aspects relevant for clarifying the term "social construction." Popularized by Berger/Luckmann in their "The Social Construction of Reality," this concept has since then become a "dead metaphor" (Hacking). Thus, expounding several misreadings in Bourdieu's criticism of phenomenology, the paper will demonstrate that there are still systematic reasons for bringing so called "subjectivism" back into contemporary social theory discourse.*

Analyzing contemporary debates in social theory, we are confronted by the fact that Alfred Schutz's work remains marginal. At first glance phenomenology or the conception of a phenomenologically based sociology seems to have no important role to play in the theoretical debates in the discipline. It is widely held that phenomenologists are a "sect" which gets itself entangled in a rather antiquated language whose transferability to the problems currently discussed in sociology is seldom considered and whose systematic significance can be regarded as miniscule. At second glance, however, something astonishing appears: Almost none of the theoretical debates on the contemporary schemes in the discipline can

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get around an explicit or implicit confrontation, in part centrally located, with the phenomenological tradition. There are several references, for example, in the works of such different authors as Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, even though one cannot really say that Schutz's conceptions, his theoretical framework or his central methodological positions play a major part in these debates.

There are various possible reasons for this situation, and some might also argue that there is no substantial reason for discussing Schutz, because there is nothing more to learn from him in regard to the state of contemporary sociology and social theory discourse. But for those who think it is still worthwhile to read and discuss Schutz, there remains a clear task: It is not enough just to repeat Schutz's conceptions again and again or just to compare his views with those of other theoreticians— even though it is worth doing so in order to clarify Schutz's position itself. But what is needed is the examination of leading meta-theoretical notions in relation to which the systematic relevance of Schutz's writings and those of his followers for contemporary social theory discourse can be demonstrated.

As far as contemporary social theory is concerned, Pierre Bourdieu may be the most prominent synthesizer of the classics in sociology. As Swartz' mentioned, (1997: 5) "his work can be read as an ongoing polem-ic against positivism, empiricism, structuralism, existentialism, pheno-menology, economism, Marxism, methodological individualism, and grand theory." But, as Swartz also points out rightly, this is just half of the story. Bourdieu not only borrows from each of these traditions of sociological thought but his work is especially highly dependent on structuralism, Marxism and phenomenology. But while Bourdieu draws heavily from their theoretical insights he refrains from indicating such intellectual continuities and sources. (cf. Brubaker, 1985) Instead, his writing is converned with the overall subjectivism/objectivism dichotomy with extensive misunderstandings of those theoretical traditions most important to his own "theory of theory."[1] In the case of phenomenology this importance is among other things documented in Bourdieu's work by his study situating Heidegger in his political and intellectual milieu

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[1]   This as well holds good for the works of Karl Mannheim and Michel Foucault. But with respect to the great attention Bourdieu's work provokes in contemporary social theory discourse, the following discussion is limited to his work and does not take into account his far-reaching dependence especially on Foucault's analyses.

(1975) and his study of Flaubert motivated by Sartre (1992). Moreover, Bourdieu in a biographical interview recalls his early reading of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* and the works of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, Heidegger and Schutz (1987a).

Thus, regarding the aforementioned necessity to reach a meta-theoretical level of argumentation, the following discussion is not interested in pointing out the obvious affinities between Schutz and Bourdieu, e.g., the differentiation between the cognitive styles of everyday life and that of science, the analogies between fields and multiple realities, the habitus and the world as taken-for-granted through processes of sedimentation, and so on. Instead, the main purpose of this paper is to discuss, at least briefly, two of the main critiques that Bourdieu addresses to the phenomenological tradition and to respond to them. Both can be classed under the question of what the term "social construction" means. This discussion leads of necessity to a clarification of three meta-theoretical notions: reflexivity, reality, and relationality.

I. Pioneers of "Social Constructionism"

A work which has by now become a classic, Peter Berger und Thomas Luckmann's 1966 *The Social Construction of Reality,* was the first book which included the term "social construction" in its title and in this way introduced it into general language usage in the social sciences. (cf. also Hacking, 1999: 24 and 97)

But the clarification of this concept by Berger/Luckmann is rather limited in the frame of the text. Only in two places in the "Introduction" do we find clues. The authors state: "A 'sociology of knowledge' will have to deal ... with the processes by which *any* body of 'knowledge' comes to be socially established *as* 'reality.' ... The sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which ... a taken-for-granted 'reality' congeals for the man in the street. In other words, we contend that *the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality*" (3). And later on the authors state: "The sociology of knowledge must first of all concern itself with what people 'know' as 'reality' in their everyday, non- or pre-theoretical lives. In other words, common sense 'knowledge' ... must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge. It is precisely this 'knowledge' that constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could exist. The

sociology of knowledge, therefore, must concern itself with the social construction of reality" (15). In summary, we can say that the key point for Berger/Luckmann is that knowledge and social reality should be viewed as having a relationship of mutual constitution. We will see, however, that the actual problem of this specification is hidden in the concept of social reality, which is presumed to be self-evident and unproblematic.

Aside from these programmatic specifications, however, later on not only Berger, but also Luckmann have expressed strong reservations against the currently fashionable attachment of the labels "constructivism" and "constructivist" to *Social Construction.* (cf. Berger, 1992: 2; Luckmann, 1992: 4) Thus Berger (1992: 2) writes distancing himself from the term "constructivism:" "I may have missed something, but the 'constructivist' literature that I have seen seems to come from the ... ideological cauldron [i.e., "the orgy of ideology and utopianism that erupted all over the academic scene in the late 1960's", M.E.] with which I have no affinity whatever. The notion of the social construction of reality is here reinterpreted in neo-Marxist, or 'critical,' or 'post-structuralist' terms, and it is radically altered in this translation." And Luckmann (1992: 4) emphasizes: "Whenever someone mentions 'constructivism' or even 'social constructionism,' I run for cover these days."

But what are the reasons for these—expressed cautiously—reservations? Berger (1992: 2) offers as a justification that: "It is one thing to say that all social reality is interpreted reality (which is what Luckmann and I said in all our various propositions); it is an altogether different thing either to say that there are privileged interpreters or, on the contrary, to say that all interpretations are equally valid." If one wishes to stipulate the critique articulated in this demarcation, it is that the authors—insofar as we can infer that Berger's evaluation holds for both authors as well as for Schutz—are speaking out against a (specific) epistemological interpretation of their position—thus against both "objectivism" and "relativism." The authors thus object to a reception of their work which reintroduces a conception of the sociology of knowledge into their work which they explicitly rejected in the *Social Construction*. That is to say that in this work the authors connected their new conception of the sociology of knowledge with a critique of Scheler's and Mannheim's conceptions and justified this by saying that they wanted to "exclude from the sociology of knowledge the epistemological and methodological problems that bothered both of its

major originators." (Berger/Luckmann, 1966: 14-15) So far so good, but does this demarcation solve the problem confronting us here?

Do these statements clarify Schutz's most prominent conclusion, which Berger and Luckmann intend to follow? Schutz wrote:

> All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, namely a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, namely, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case they carry along their interpretational inner and outer horizon. This does not mean, that, in daily life or in science, we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that we grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant to us. (Schutz, 1953: 5)

Thus one can say that having in mind the involvement of constructs and the process of selection and interpretation is to be understood as clarifying or describing the conception of "reflexivity." And having in mind the specific frame of reference and, as Karl Mannheim used to say, the aspect structure of our knowledge, this clarification has to be understood as referring to a "relational" conception of "reality." It is these three metatheoretical notions that have to be discussed in order to develop a more lucid understanding of the theory of social construction as well as to provide a platform responding to Bourdieu's criticism of the phenomenologi-cal tradition in sociology.

II. Bourdieu's *tableau*

If one examines Bourdieu's comments on the situation of sociology, his evaluation of the dominant relationship of theoretical and empirical studies in the discipline, along with his evaluation in this regard of the theoretical discussion within sociology, then it appears that a contribution which discusses Bourdieu's work before considering the background of a few aspects of the sociological tradition, thus its classics, might provoke his vehement critique of theoretical research which tends to degenerate

into pure philology.[2] But one has to respond to this reservation—which is often correct, but not infrequently too hastily presented—with two arguments: (i) first of all one should point out an ambivalence of Bourdieu's in this regard. On the one side, we do find him making vigorous attacks on "eclectic and classificatory compilations," on "the fetishism of concepts, and 'theory'" and the "academic cult of the classics,"[3] along with his mantra-like repetition rituals attacking "lazy thinking ... in sociology." (1987b: 224, 228, 249) But on the other side, an historically-oriented reflexivity conception of sociological research forms one of the core points of his intellectual self-understanding; and without critical reference to the history of sociological theory this is surely unrealizable. This leads to a second point: (ii) Contrary to widespread subjectivist conceptions, Bourdieu's reflexivity conception—following Foucault—is oriented precisely, in distinction to a charismatic model of the author, to reconstructing the entire discursive field of a text and a discipline, that is, to objectifying it. This inevitably involves the reflexion of the historical development of social theory, the historical construction of the sociological classics and thereby the formative period of the discipline. If an "epistemological break" or "rupture" occurs, a conception which will be discussed later on, then it must include the social history of his own discipline and its central theoretical turning points, thus the reflexion of "the societally dominant discourse in sociology." (1987b: 249) After all, what holds for the so-called publicly legitimate social problems also holds analogously for every research problem of sociology: it "has been *socially produced*, in and by a *collective work of construction of social reality*." (Bourdieu, 1987b: 239) Thus, in order to discuss Bourdieu's

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2   Besides, for several reasons there is a certain scepticism regarding an equation or comparison of theoretical conceptions from different generations. This scepticism is right in some way but the fruitfulness, correctness and systematic relevance of such a contribution has to be recalled: This is the way to face the core of the idea of sociological analysis in different theoretical conceptualizations and to clarify its systematic sense apart from historically changing contexts of its expression. So it is not only the author's conviction, following Bourdieu, "that it is possible to define the principles of knowledge of the theories of the social which separate theoretical schools and traditions," (Bourdieu et al., 1968: 80) but also that this is possible independently of the generationally contingent specific aspects of problem focusing and theory representation. In such a perspective it is then a matter of analyzing in the frame of a later theory the new approach which is relevant in view of the constitutive core problem.

3   Cf. Bourdieu, 1987b: 282; this passage is not included in the English translation.

criticism of phenomenologically based sociology one has to analyze his way of looking at the discipline's heritage, i.e. his way of constructing the discipline's collective work of constructing social reality.

A step toward clarification can thus be attempted by way of a critical distancing from and linkage with the tradition of this sociological thinking represented by the names of Schutz and Berger/Luckmann, such as is found in the works of Pierre Bourdieu. The idea of an interactive reading of Schutz and Berger/Luckmann, as well as of Bourdieu, follows the guiding line of an arrangement or mediation of phenomenology (Husserl, Schutz, Merleau-Ponty, Berger/Luckmann) and structuralism (Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Bourdieu). In both approaches we find a respectively specific understanding and a respectively specific combination of social constructivism and structural analysis. This is evident in the case of Schutz's project of *The Structure of the Life-World,* as is also the case with Bourdieu's *Theory of Practice*. As Wacquant (1992: 11) puts it: Bourdieu's "social praxeology weaves together a 'structuralist' and a 'constructivist' approach." And Bourdieu himself chose the terms "constructivist structuralism" and "structuralist constructivism" to label his work. (1987a: 135) The declared aim of Bourdieu's theoretical position is thereby to reconcile two basically mutually exclusive epistemological positions, a 'subjectivist' philosophy and an 'objectivist' philosophy. Thus the programmatic first sentence of the first book in Bourdieu's *Le sens pratique*: "Of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the one that is set up between subjectivism and objectivism." (1980: 25) As Loïc Wacquant (1992: 3: note 3) states: "the opposition of objectivism and subjectivism ... forms the epicenter of Bourdieu's project."

But what does Bourdieu mean by the slogan-like label 'subjectivism,' and with what positions does he classify this concept? For Bourdieu the concept of 'subjectivism' (cf. Wacquant, 1992: 9f. and 12f.) is a collective term for so-called 'phenomenological sociology' in the tradition of Edmund Husserl, especially for the writings of Alfred Schutz and in connection with him for the works of Harold Garfinkel and ethnomethodology, as well as Erving Goffman and interactionist sociology (thus generally the representatives of the so-called "interpretive paradigm"). And within philosophy Bourdieu especially considers the work of Jean-Paul Sartre to be representative of what he means by subjectivism. Thus, there might be some good reasons for stopping the discussion at this

point, because these are highly diverse conceptualisations mixed up with each other. But we should go into more detail in order to overcome Bourdieu's critique which is swallowed up not only by sociologists.

Clarifying the substance of this critique we are confronted with six—in part mutually referential—criticisms which Bourdieu introduces against 'phenomenology' in the sense labeled as 'subjectivism:' (i) an inadequate conception of reflexivity, (ii) a form of naive realism, (iii) a specific type of reductionism, (iv) of cognitivism, (v) of structural conservatism or positivism and (vi) the removal of the analysis of the field of (symbolic) power. Some of these critical points are very well known from other critics of the phenomenological approach in sociology. And it goes without saying that Bourdieu draws heavily from those. But, as the core of his arguments will be found in his comments on reflexivity and realism, the following discussion can be limited to these two points which will be investigated in more detail. Moreover, it will be shown, that a discussion of the conceptions of reflexivity and realism will enable a comment concerning Bourdieu's criticism of phenomenology's removal of the analysis of power.

III. Reflexivity

We have to start with Bourdieu's criticism of phenomenology's inadequate conception of reflexivity. This critique runs as follows: "The knowledge we shall call *phenomenological* ... (or, to speak in terms of currently active schools, 'ethnomethodological') sets out to make explicit the truth of primary experience of the social world, i.e., all that is inscribed in the relationship of *familiarity* with the familiar environment, the unquestioning apprehension of the social world which, by definition, does not reflect on itself and excludes the question of the conditions of its own possibility." (Bourdieu, 1972/7: 3; cf. 1993b: 365-368 and Bourdieu/Wacquant, 1992: 73f.) Thus, the central inadequacy of subjectivism (as well as of objectivism) consists for Bourdieu in that this mode of thinking, in his opinion, brackets out the question of the conditions for the possibility of objective knowledge. (1972/76: 147) Therefore, phenomenologically based sociology is guilty of a specific "*epistemic doxa*: thinkers leave in a state of unthought (*impensé*, doxa) the presuppositions of their thought, that is the social conditions of possibility of the scholastic point of view and the unconscious dispositions, productive of uncon-

scious theses." (1989: 129) For, according to Bourdieu, "when we un-thinkingly put to work our most ordinary modes of thinking, we inflict upon our object a fundamental adulteration, which can go all the way to pure and simple *destruction* and that may well remain unnoticed." (1989: 134) Bourdieu's conclusion is that "we must sociologize the phenomeno-logical analysis of *doxa.*" (1993b: 367)

To make this clear: Bourdieu's criticism of phenomenology does not address Schutz's analysis of the life-world as such, which for him is "the world as taken for granted." It addresses instead the fact that, according to him, phenomenology does not ask how this "taken-for-grantedness" comes into existence as a conditioning factor making social experience possible. In other words: according to Bourdieu, phenomenologists fail to ask why the social world as taken for granted by a natural attitude is experienced in just this way and in no other. Phenomenology identifies the natural attitude adequately as 'doxa,' as a kind of unquestioned belief, but does not inquire as to its genesis. In this way the "taken for granted" of the life-world assumes the state of something "taken for granted," as well by the theorist. Thus, in Bourdieu's view the phenomenological ap-proach not only leads to an unreflected doubling of everyday reality, but also eliminates the space of what was historically-structurally, i.e., "ob-jectively possible,"[4] from its analytical focus and thereby deprives itself of the possibility of reflecting systematically on the contingent character of the "having been thus and so" of social reality.

At first glance this evaluation is surprising, at least to the extent that one has to face, conversely, a turn toward a "reflexive sociology" in specifically the works of Schutz and particularly in the redefinition of the object of the sociology of knowledge undertaken in this theoretical context by Berger/Luckmann. Thus Bourdieu, while pleading for taking even the most mundane activities of human beings as a subject for sociological inquiry, not only follows phenomenological philosophy in general but especially Berger/Luckmann's thesis (1966, esp. 15) that a renewed sociology of knowledge has, namely, all knowledge as its object, thus, as well, everyday knowledge. This is not to mention Garfinkel's and Sack's notion of "ethnomethodological indifference" as a "procedural policy." (1970: 345f.) Nor is it an accident that Bourdieu, for example,

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[4]   The category "objective possibility" was introduced to the social sciences by Max Weber (1906, esp. 164ff.) referring to the work of the physiologist Johannes von Kries.

refers in an early work to Goffman's *Asylums* (1961), clearly indicating that Goffman here warned against, "accepting the 'given' social definition of insanity according to which this is constructed." (Bourdieu, 1968: 28) And referring to Schutz's own work one has to place emphasis on his fundamental thesis that it is sociology's task "to question the 'self-evident.'" (1932: 17, my translation; cf. 1967: 9) As Schutz puts it elsewhere: it is "one of the most urgent tasks of the theory of the social sciences to uncover the basic connections and to investigate the structural relations of the meaning structure of the social world." (1932: 19, my translation; cf. 1967: 10). Thus contrary to Bourdieu's assumption it seems one has to face him mainly as a follower of Schutz's methodological instruction.

But maybe we should go into more detail to clarify Bourdieu's thesis. Bourdieu indeed reveals a serious problem of phenomenologically based sociology here. The question is whether the contours of the life-world in the "natural attitude" which are given by what is "taken-for-granted" in everyday life are by themselves universal boundaries of the social world, or whether these boundaries have a history of their own which sociology has to take into account. To analyze this history in order to understand the forgotten fields of power active in their constitution is the central aim of Bourdieu's sociology. The form of reflexivity which Bourdieu is striving for[5] is thus a matter of an analysis which "contributes to our knowledge of the subject of cognition by introducing us ... to the unthought categories of thought which limit the thinkable and predetermine what is actually thought." (1982: 178; cf. 1980: 15 and 44) Thus one can say that Bourdieu's main criticism of phenomenologically based sociology has to be labeled as its lack of any analysis of knowledge generating processes as always being structured by power. According to Wacquant, it is a matter of the analysis of "knowledge-producing relations objectified in the web of positions and 'subjectified' in dispositions," of "the inclusion, at the heart of a theory of practice, of a theory of theoretical practice." (1992: 48 and 43) This line of analysis, introduced to sociology by Mannheim and especially Foucault, indicates what might be called Bourdieu's

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[5] Bourdieu (1993: 369f.) differentiates three main aspects of reflexive analysis: it has i) to objectify the conditions of the production of the producers, ii) the position, which the analyzing scientist holds within the scientific field, has to be illuminated, and iii) the "invisible determinations, which are impressed on the position of the scientist," have to be analyzed. (see: Wacquant, 1992: 36ff.)

most important impact on the further development of the sociology of knowledge as well as a phenomenologically based social theory.

In addition to that, according to Bourdieu, we need a reflection on the claims to validity and their range, as well as a reflection on the limits of these claims to validity and thereby also of the limits of the knowledge acquired in their frame, for "a scientific practice that fails to question itself does not, properly speaking, know what it [is] do[ing]." (1987b: 236) Bourdieu believes that only in this way is it possible to avoid the "illusion of immediate knowledge" (subjectivism) and also the "illusion of absolute knowledge" (objectivism). (1988: 250) Therefore, the development of a praxeological way of knowledge aimed at by Bourdieu proves itself, among other things, in a 'critique of theoretical reason' preceding it—as in the German subtitle of *Le sens pratique.* (1980: 49) Clearly, this demand calls for a continual intellectual *Parallelaktion*, to use a term from Robert Musil, complementing each practice of theorizing with a sociology of the scientific knowledge it produces.

Bourdieu (1989: 132) states, consistent with this view: "It is only on condition that we take up the point of view of practice—on the basis of a theoretical reflection on the theoretical point of view ...—that we have some chance of grasping the truth of the specific logic of practice." Contrary to this thesis, however, it has to be maintained critically: this is and remains probably necessarily an action from an objectifying distance, and this can in principle not be systematically objectified itself. It would appear that the only conceivable solution is one in the sense of Karl Mannheim, i.e., an historical-processual cognition or elucidation model— definitely in the sense of the explication of the figure of the hermeneutic circle from Schleiermacher and Dilthey to Mannheim and Heidegger. Accordingly, Mannheim reminds us that "this circle is always unavoidable." (1921/22: 153; my translation)[6] In the light of appropriate methodological assumptions Interpretive Sociology, or so-called "subjectivism," has developed the idea of "triangulation" as a strategy of validation in order to give its conceptions of reflexivity and objectivity an adequate methodical expression. Having these aspects in mind, Bourdieu's criticism of phenomenologically based sociology has to be rejected in so far as the conception of reflexivity in general is concerned. But what still remains

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[6]   Quotation from a paragraph of Mannheim's essay which is not included in the English translation of the German originals: cf. Mannheim, 1993: 184-185. For a detailed discussion of Mannheim's conception, cf. Endress, 2000.

as a challenge for this sociological tradition is Bourdieu's aim to analyze the forgotten fields of power active in meaning generating processes.

IV. Realism and Relationality

This leads to the second focus which is on Bourdieu's criticism of phenomenology's naive realism. Under this heading Bourdieu tries to show in more detail that there is an unreflected doubling of everyday reality in phenomenologically based sociology.

Thus a limitation of the object of sociological study to the "subjectively intended meaning" implies for Bourdieu an unreasonable shortening or limitation of the sociological research interest, indeed of reality, for "agents never know completely what they are doing, that what they do has more sense than they know:" (1980: 69) "There is no cognition which does not include an unconscious code." (1970: 162) Here Bourdieu is concerned with a "breaking with naive realism," (Bourdieu et al., 1968: 33) which has to be understood as a "*breaking* with all 'preconstructed' representations," (1972/76: 149) and which, in his view, was already realized by Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber. (Bourdieu et al., 1968: 15-19, 33[7]—cf. his thesis of a two-step objectivity[8]) Read differently, this could only mean that in Bourdieu's opinion Schutz, Garfinkel and Goffman failed to achieve this level of reflection. And Bourdieu published this estimation in almost identical formulations in 1968, 1972, 1980, and 1993, i.e. from *Le métier de sociologue* and *Le sens pratique* to *La misère du monde*. Thus we can speak of his having as it were an *idée fixe*.

For Bourdieu, in agreement with Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem and Alexandre Koyré, the only possible solution for breaking with "naive realism" lies in the demand that there must be "primacy given to construction. The fundamental scientific act is the construction of the object." (1988: 248) This is his methodological credo. And he continues: "In the case of sociology, this attention to construction is particularly necessary because the social world constructs itself in a sense. Our heads are full of preconstructions ... The need to break with preconstructions, prenotions, spontaneous theory, is particularly imperative in sociology, because our minds, our language, are full of preconstructed objects."

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[7]   See Wacquant, 1992: 5: note 7 and p. 8: note 14.

[8]   On this see also the reference in Wacquant, 1992: 11f.: note 23.

(ibid.: 249) It is precisely this, Bourdieu holds, the systematic avoidance of "'spontaneous sociology,'" (1968: 18) of every "'spontaneous theory of the social,'" (1968: 19) which is, "the sociologist's *métier* ...—a theory of the sociological construction of the object, converted into a habitus:" (1988: 253) For "when dealing with the social world, the ordinary use of ordinary language makes metaphysicians of us." (1987a: 54)

That goes without saying. But does Bourdieu really think that Schutz and his followers are lacking an understanding of the difference between subjective and objective meaning, that they have no idea of methodical constructivism and that they are making an "ordinary use of ordinary language?" Does he really think that this tradition of sociological research "simply converts social problems into sociological problems?" (1988: 249) Is this really what he thinks Schutz's or Garfinkel's methodo-logical claims are about? It seems that way. For Bourdieu argues that "subjectivism" has to be understood as the attempt "of identifying the science of the social world with scientific descriptions of pre-scientific experience or, more precisely, of reducing social science, as the phenomenologists do, to 'constructs of the second degree, i.e. constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene,' (Schutz, 1962: 59) or, as Garfinkel and the ethnomethodologists do, to 'accounts of the accounts which agents produce and through which they produce the meaning of the world' (Garfinkel 1967)." (Bourdieu, 1980: 26; cf. 1968: 19f.; 1972/76: 149; 1988: 249)

In Bourdieu's opinion the *conditio sine qua non* of every sociology is a reflexive consciousness of the fact "that the social world is ... 'will and representation,'" that "what we consider to be social reality is to a great extent representation or the product of representation." (1987a: 53) We could of course suppose that his arguments imply a simple recourse to the views of Schutz and so-called phenomenological sociology (cf. "double hermeneutics" in Giddens), but Bourdieu sees this differently when he maintains, (1988: 249) "some of the ethnomethodologists were discovering that at about the same time, but they failed to arrive at the idea of the necessary *break* that is set out by Bachelard."

But what is precisely intended by this 'epistemological rupture' and doesn't the position taken by Schutz and his followers in particular avoid this criticism by Bourdieu? Bourdieu states: "What is called 'epistemological rupture,' that is, the bracketing of ordinary preconstructions and of the principles ordinarily at work in the elaboration of these construc-

tions, often presupposes a rupture with modes of thinking, concepts, and methods that have every appearance of *common sense*, of ordinary sense, and of good scientific sense ... going for them." (1987b: 251) And he goes on to explain what kind of research he is aiming at: "One of the most powerful instruments of rupture lies in the social history of problems, objects, and instruments of thought, that is, with the history of the work of social construction of reality." (1987b: 238) For "to avoid becoming the object of the problems that you take as your object, you must retrace the history of the *emergence* of these problems;" (1987b: 238; cf. 1968: 26; 1993b: 372) that is, in Schutzian terms, one has to ask for a sociology of (scientific) knowledge. Thus at this point it becomes obvious that Bourdieu is misguided in arguing against Schutz and ethnomethodology and ethnography at the same time. In providing certain critical aspects for discussing especially Garfinkel's and Goffman's methodological positions, he fails to reach an adequate and proper level to discuss Schutz's contribution in this area. For the indicated level of a historically proven sociology of knowledge is exactly what Schutz was heading for. Moreover, Schutz reflected intensively the "break" or "epistemological rupture" between everyday language and its scientific analysis. This problem he labels as the one between first order and second order types presenting several methodological rules for transforming the first ones into the latter. (Schutz, 1932: 261ff.; 1953: 34ff.; 1967: 186ff.) And Bourdieu fails to clarify his criticism of this strategy as being a form of reductionism. Moreover, this desciption holds good even for his aim of developing "a theory of the sociological construction of the object." That is what sociologist's work since Weber's discovery of the "ideal type" is about.

Bourdieu brings together his criticism of the inadequate reflexivity and naive realism of a phenomenologically based sociology with his considerations on the methodical problem of the construction of the object as a relational one: (cf. 1987b: 269-287) It requires, according to him, a double discontinuity, first a break with ordinary (everyday) and academic (scientific) *common sense* and then with the instruments of this break itself. (1987b: 284) Here, as well as in the aforementioned paragraphs, it seems that speaking of a 'break' is misleading, insofar as it suggests the possibility of taking, so to speak, an objective standpoint beyond any continuity with the knowledge stocks and interpretive schemata available in everyday life and science. The "break with common sense"

(1988: 249) proclaimed by Bourdieu first of all presupposes its recon-struction—or more appropriately and dialectically formulated: this break, or this rupture, must depend as much on the basis of the reconstruction as the reconstruction is always dependent on the break, in order that it will not, on its part, become bogged down in the categorical net of pre-constructions and thereby miss its mark, the preparation of a scientifically reflected reconstruction. Therefore a continuous mutual correction of 'reconstruction' (continuity) and 'discontinuity' (break) is necessary in order for the methodical purpose which Bourdieu aims to realize. The knowledge generating process thereby sketched out is thus methodically unachievable. (cf. Mannheim, 1921/22)

Once this has become clear, Schutz's methodological call to connect social scientific language to everyday language maintains its own good sense. And this is so not only in regard to securing its objective reference, but also in regard to its typological grasp. Bourdieu does not seem to have adequately explicated this when he says that the constructivism he advocates, in contrast to so-called subjectivism, also means to know that "you have to make explicit the presuppositions, to construct sociological-ly the preconstructions of the object." (1988: 253) This appears correct to the extent that sociology cannot allow its problems to be imposed on it by everyday life, thus that social problems should not be confused with sociological ones. But the typological grasp in the frame of phenomeno-logically based sociology is by no means conceived in this way as far as Schutz's methodological explanations are concerned.

Thus, one cannot see clearly that Bourdieu succeeded in overcoming Schutz's foundation and replacing it with a more reflective and better ela-borated methodological platform. Also, with Bourdieu, essential aspects of the methodological problems of the social sciences remain which merely acquire a new garb with his metaphor of a new 'praxeological' cognitive mode. This becomes clear in particular when Bourdieu—be-yond the consistent emphasis on the meaning of objectivation processes (cf. Schutz, 1932) and explicating logics—at the same time formulates a warning against too much logic. For, in fact, the specific difficulty of sociology as an exact science consists, among other things, in being a science of a thoroughly inexact, imprecise praxis or reality as Bourdieu himself noted; (1980: 352ff.) a problem which a tradition of under-standing sociology going back to Weber and Schutz attempts to do justice to precisely in the form of a typologically developing social science.

Accordingly it remains crucial to ask, whether there is more than a difference in language between this view and Schutz's. For what is the demand, which was made as early as Weber (1904), that ideal types should be constantly revised in the course of research, if the horizon of cultural problems is drawn farther, other than a reminder of two things: (i) The social conditions from which preconstructed objects derive are of constitutive importance in sociology for an "adequate theory of an ob-ject," and we are thus in need of a social-historical support of sociological research, and (ii) this requires a continuous dialogue with the scientific conditions of construction of the object itself!

Thus, the discussion of a praxeological cognitive mode, or of praxeological knowledge, by Bourdieu cannot be read in the sense of a correction of a phenomenologically based sociology's main insights. Instead it must be read as a continuation of the lines of tradition of sociological research founded by Weber and Schutz.

V. The Analysis of Power and the Sociology of Knowledge

Of decisive significance for a critique of Bourdieu's analysis against the background of Schutz's work is a consistent neglect of questions of the generation of the meaning of objects within their social "matrix." It is precisely the social constructionist works that concentrate centrally on the analysis of the process of generating knowledge, its origin and genesis. This makes clear the significance of the works of Schutz and Berger/ Luckmann and the recent analyses by Luckmann for what is called "social constructionism." For the reference to the interaction of namings and classifications with things or persons is only half of the problem. The other is the question of the genesis and change of namings and classifications, that is, the analysis of the processes of generating and changing knowledge by communicative processes. And here Luckmann's recent works on the communicative construction of the social world (1995) are a step in the right direction. With Bourdieu there is an insufficient specification in the analysis of the communicative processes of generating knowledge and interpretive patterns and their structures.

What then can be said in conclusion about the starting question of this paper? Berger explains that the program of *Social Construction* merely meant "that all social reality is interpreted reality." (1992: 2) But the brief discussion of the three meta-theoretical notions of reflexivity, realism and

relationalism provides a certain perspective for the direction in which the notion of "social construction" has to be worked out with respect to Bourdieu's argumentation. Bourdieu concentrates on the analysis of forgotten and concealed power configurations for the establishment of knowledge systems. Following Foucault he thus calls for a much stronger emphasis on the fact that all knowledge generating processes from their very beginning are constitutively mediated through power structures. This seems to be the very reason for his calling for a sociological history of the instruments of thought. Thus the conceptions of reflexivity, realism and relationality lying at the heart of an adequate approach to the sociology of knowledge have to be given a historical grounding as well as an extension to the analysis of the dominance structures of social reality.

The works of Schutz, the *Social Construction* by Berger/Luckmann and Luckmann's recent contributions seem to point in the direction of a two-step analysis of the social construction of reality, which can be supplemented and strengthened using Bourdieu's sociological perspective of domination, but cannot be replaced by it. According to phenomenol-ogically based sociology interpreted phenomena are a first step in all the states of affairs which belong for human beings to social reality, that is, which are thought of, communicated and dealt with by people (the conception of reality). And with all of them it is, to some degree, basically a matter of their interactive character. (see: Hacking, 1999) But what is crucial here is a second step of the analysis, again following Schutz, that in a supplementary manner takes into account the meaning specific phenomena have in the frame of a societal relevance hierarchy. Only with this second step is the criterion of the graduation of the interactive character of different aspects or objects of social reality employed (the conception of relationality). Furthermore, the social construction of the societal relevance hierarchy is due to an analysis focusing on the power structure involved in the process of its genesis (the conception of reflexivity).

Beyond this we can point out a limitation in view of the significance which Bourdieu rightly attributes to questions of the dominance structuring of the social, the "hidden mechanisms of power" for the question of the construction of interpretive patterns. Bourdieu, in his critique of phenomenologically based sociology which claims that this tradition almost completely neglects this viewpoint, ignores the circumstance that for Schutz as well as for Berger/Luckmann the reference to the "social

construction of reality"—virtually in the sense of the Marxian tradition—
by definition has significance as a criticism of power. Insofar as this also
refers to Schutz one has to keep in mind the following:

Schutz was unable either to outline or complete his actual contribution
to the sociology of knowledge. So in this case further analysis is de-
pendent, aside from his few published contributions, on his notes for the
preparation of the *Structures of the Life-World*. In the 1958 disposition
for the *Structures* one will find the relevant entries under Chapter III:
"Knowledge of the Life-World. Relevance and Typicality." In section
(D), sub-section (d) reads "Social conditionedness of the relevance struc-
ture;" however, not until point (11) of the outline is reference made to the
"Problems of a genuine sociology of knowledge" (1958: 170). Here the
problem arises that for sections (2)-(11) there are only scattered further
references and notes. However, at many points in the notebooks one can
find formulations which help to clarify what Schutz calls the "problems
of true sociology of knowledge." Thus he states here that in regard to the
"social distribution of knowledge," (1958: 170 and 196) the "inequality
of this social distribution of knowledge [from individual to individual,
within social groups, and from group to group]" is to be regarded "as the
main problem of the sociology of knowledge." (1958: 196; cf. also 202,
211, 287) Another passage allows somewhat more precise inferences as
to the character of the analyses Schutz planned here: He states that the
"social (cultural) structuring of the distribution of knowledge (secret
knowledge, shared knowledge, etc.) [can be explained as] based on
political (dominance-related, group-, status-, class-, gender-, age-related),
economic [and] professional organization." (1958: 202, my completions)

These very brief remarks provide at least an idea of the directions
Schutz's further analyses might have gone. For the present purpose it is
of primary importance to point out the fact that contrary to what Bourdieu
criticizes as phenomenologically based sociology's most important
failure lies conceptually at the heart of its approach to the sociology of
knowledge even though Schutz was not able to give a final presentation
of his ideas. It is not Schutz's fault that his followers did not succed in
giving his conceptual framework its full expression.

VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks

The foregoing criticism of Bourdieu's criticism of the phenomenological tradition in sociological theory and empirical research was organized around the discussion of three metatheoretical notions: reflexivity, reality, and relationality. The main theoretical outcome of this discussion can be summed up as follows:

1) *reflexivity*: Bourdieu's "theory of practice" or "science of practices", by focusing on the reflexivity of scientific understanding adds to the conception of phenomenologically based or interpretive sociology by emphazising the fact that we are in need of an explicit socio-historical reconstruction and reflection on the development of the theories and concepts ordinarily used in our analyses. Thus he radicalizes the already reflexive type of sociology elaborated within the phenomenological tradition by giving attention mainly to the forgotten history of its scientific habitus on the one hand, and to its categorical framework on the other hand. Drawing heavily on the works of Foucault, Bourdieu therefore continues the phenomenological account rather than being able to criticize or overcome it. On the other hand, Bourdieu here adds an important aspect while arguing for a reconstruction of the "objective possibilities" lying in historical si-tuations.[9]

2) *reality/realism*: Contrary to Bourdieu's thesis that the phenomenological tradition has to be accused of a "naive realism," it has been shown, using a term introduced by Hammersley, (1992: 50) that for this tradition of social theory a conception of "subtle realism" is characteristic. This means that (a) the validity of knowledge is not understood as definite, that (b) phenomena exist also independently of our assumptions about them, i.e., they can be more or less adequate, and that (c) reality comes into being within sociological research through a multiplicity of perspectives on the phenomena. Thus Bourdieu also fails to show the inadequancies of the conception of reality constitutive of phenomenologically based sociology.

3) *relationality/relationalism*: Bourdieu's thesis that "the real is relational" (Bourdieu, 1988: 253; cf. 1987b: 262 and Bourdieu/Wacquant,

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[9]   For an elaboration of this idea for further research in the field of the history of sociology, cf. Endress, 2001.

1992: 126f.) takes up insights of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as well as Schutz's theory of multiple realities.[10] As Luckmann formulates it: "Meaning is a relation," (1992: 31) i.e., meaning means that between two experiences or between one experience and another phenomenon a relation is established by an individual actor in his so-cial "matrix," which means something for both sides.[11] Here as well Bourdieu continues the tradition of phenomenologically based sociology.

Thus, reflecting on some metatheoretical notions constitutive for Bourdieu's conception of sociology as well as for his criticism of Schutzian social theory and empirical research, it develops that there seems to be nothing unique in his argumentation besides his emphasis on power for socio-historical reconstruction. Therefore, Bourdieu should avoid overemphasizing the difference between what he calls "subjecti-vism" and his own approach. His analysis is excessively concentrated on power structures involved in meaning generating processes which make him ignore the extent to which he shares his core methodical and methodological claims with phenomenologically based sociology. It is misguiding to argue, as Bourdieu does, that phenomenology is not able to reach the level of objective knowledge. Because, even if sociologists are going to successively add one strategy of objectivating after the other, they are not able to overcome the constitutive problem of reflexivity, i.e. the processual and hermeneutical character of social scientific knowledge.

And it is this fundamental insight which the sociological tradition since Weber and Simmel shares and which leads the discussion back to the concept of "social construction." Far from denying reality this conception mainly focuses on the processual character of our understanding of reality. Thus it is to be taken seriously as a call for hermeneutical sensitivity in analyzing the social world. In the works of Schutz and Berger/Luckmann the term "social construction" reflects the type of

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[10]   There is another interesting parallel between Bourdieu and Schutz to be mentioned: While Schutz (1955) wrote about Cervantes' *Don Quixote* to illustrate his conception of multiple realities (cf. Endress, 1998), Bourdieu (1992) wrote on Flaubert's *L'Education sentimentale* in order to demonstrate the power of his conception of "fields." Thus both thinkers tried to show the relevance and significance of one of their most important theoretical considerations in the area of classical literature.

[11]   This is the core idea of interpretive sociology, which Hacking (1999) tries to elaborate within his discussion of "interactive kinds."

methodical orientation towards social reality already introduced to sociology by Max Weber's concept of idealtypical understanding.[12] And thus it concerns the process of scientific as well as of everyday understanding.

The concept of "social construction" as explored within phenomenologically based sociology points out that sociology is a science of meaning, of which people might or might not be fully aware. There is no other "reality" relevant according to its conceptual and methodological framework. And its leading question is not simply: "What is reality?," but: "For *whom* is *what* reality in *which* respect." And facing things that way is no relapse into "culturalism," "idealism" or "subjectivism," because so-called objective structures become an object of the sociologist's analysis "only" as reconstructed preconditions of people's world views. Any analysis of their underlying power structures has to be an integral part of this analysis.

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[12] Even though the relation between Weber's and Schutz's use of the term "ideal type" needs further clarification; cf. on this matter Psathas's paper in this volume.

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Part II

On Methodology and Theory
of Social Science

Blank

The Appeal of Alfred Schutz
in Disciplines beyond Philosophy, e.g. Jurisprudence[*]

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> *Dr. Schutz said he was not an economist, that he had studied philosophy of law and that he had been a student of Kelsen. He came to the social sciences from that angle and developed an interest in sociology especially.*
> Interview with Bettina Greaves, Nov. 20, 1958

Abstract. *The theory of cultural science can be participated in by cultural scientists as well as philosophers and the latter must respect the actual practice of the scientists. Theory of science is about basic concepts and methods. For Schutz, all science is theoretical, which makes the question of application clearer, and cultural science addresses the field of objects always already interpreted in everyday life. Scientifically social science differs from the historical and psychological sciences in focusing on the world of contemporaries, who share time but not space with a self. Schutz's remarks about the theory of law in particular are used to concretize this study of a position that has interested colleagues in at least eighteen disciplines other than philosophy.*

The secondary bibliography on the philosopher Alfred Schutz published for the Schutz centennial on the website of the *Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology* (www.phenomenologycenter.org) contains over 1,400 items. These items are chiefly in English, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, and Spanish and the main disciplines represented are communications, economics, education, ethnology, geography, history, management studies, medicine, nursing, occupational therapy, philosophy, political science, psychology, psychotherapy, psychiatry, religious studies, sociology, and women's studies. This is seven languages and eighteen disciplines, seventeen beyond philosophy. Most of the attention to Schutz's thought comes from outside philosophy,

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something many philosophers will envy. *What is it about Schutz's thought that has attracted more and more interest in non-philosophical disciplines during the past seven decades?*

One way of answering this question would involve questionnaires and interviews and reading over 1,400 items in more than seven languages. That task has not been undertaken here. Instead, certain aspects of Schutz's basic effort that might be thought to attract and support interest in the various non-philosophical disciplines will be identified. This will involve, among other things, reflecting on the nature of his work as a whole and determining how best to characterize it as well as showing how far he considered the scope of his reflections to extend.

I.

What is the main thrust of Schutz's thought? And how does this bear on the question of why this thought is so widely appreciated in non-philosophical disciplines? This question may conveniently be approached through asking a question regarding nomenclature: What title might researchers today best use to call Schutz's basic effort? In 1940 he mentions something significant to Talcott Parsons: "I fear that in this country the terms methodology and epistemology are used in a more re-stricted sense than their equivalents in German and I accepted these terms only because I could not find any better translations for '*Wissenschaftslehre*' ..." (Schutz, 1978: 101) (Schutz does not refer to the term "philosophy of science" on this occasion, although it would also be a plausible translation for "*Wissen-schaftslehre*"). What to call his endeavor in English thus not only appears to be somewhat problematical, but also refers to the broader issues of thematic concern to the author himself, for he knew that his emigration to America involved more than a change of language: the choice of a term carries implications that vary with the cultural context. Is "methodology and epistemology" the best way to refer to what is at the heart of his work, or is there a better term today?

Alfred Schutz does use "epistemology and methodology" later (Schutz 1962: 251 and 1964: 64) and this phrase will be returned to presently. He does not seem to use "*Wissenschaftslehre*" elsewhere, but early in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932) he also uses "*Wissenschafts-theorie,*" (Schutz, 1967: 7) which appears synonymous with "*Wissen-schaftslehre,*" and the former expression is also used in a manuscript from

1936: "*Solche Kritiken moegen fuer eine gewisse Art der wissenschaftstheoretischen Einstellung nicht ganz unzutreffend sein.*"[1] Another expression in English is then possible: "theory of science" (or alternatively, "science theory," which then yields the modifier "science-theoretical"). Schutz seems not to use "theory of science" as such in English, but he does use "theory of the social sciences" at least once. (Schutz, 1997: 137)

"Theory of science" is preferable to "methodology" (and also to "epistemology and methodology" and "philosophy of science") in English today for at least three reasons:

(1) While it was probably not the case in the 1930s, especially in Austria for "*Methodenlehre,*" today, at least in the United States, "methodology" often refers in social science and the philosophy thereof to formal analysis, which is to say statistics and logic. From early on Schutz was quite familiar with this formalistic signification of "methodology" from the work of his friend Felix Kaufmann, but he does not emphasize it. Instead, for him "the problem of dealing with subjective phenomena in objective terms is *the* problem for the methodology of the social sciences," (Schutz, 1978: 36) which is a problem he neither sets up nor solves through logical analysis. (It deserves mention that he does use the word "logic" on occasion in a way that seems equivalent to "theory of science," e.g., "logic of science," (Schutz, 1962: 251) but one can also wonder if the word "logic" retains that signification in philosophical English today.) In sum, the expression "theory of science" can name a discipline possibly including but not focused on formal analysis, which the phrase "methodology and epistemology" can no longer easily do in English.

(2) The expression "philosophy of the social sciences" is used by others with reference to the main thrust of Schutz's thought, but it can have exclusionary connotations, i.e., it can intimate that only philosophers can engage in the effort in question, and this would seem even more true of "epistemology." Schutz, however, seeks to include of scientists, e.g., Talcott Parsons, in science-theoretical discussions, writing at one point, for example, about "we the social scientists and philosophers concerned with the method of the social sciences." (Schutz, 1997: 134, cf. Embree, 1980) Such scientists can be involved because "it is a basic

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[1]   Martin Endress is thanked for communicating Schutz's original German for this sentence. Helmut Wagner translates it as "Such criticisms may not be completely misplaced with regard to a certain kind of theoretical-scientific approach." (Schutz 1996: 121)

characteristic of the social sciences to ever and ever again pose the question of the meaning of their basic concepts and procedures. All attempts to solve this problem are not merely preparations for social-scientific thinking; they are an everlasting theme of this thinking itself." (Schutz, 1996: 121) Thus conceived, "science theory" can include critical reflections on science by scientists as well as by philosophers, which "philosophy of science" might not.

(3) Finally, there is the attitude in which Alfred Schutz consciously approaches the disciplines that interest him:

> As long as [the social scientists] successfully use methods which have stood the test and still do so, they are justified in continuing their work without bothering with methodological problems. I have no intention to share the presumptuousness of certain methodologists who criticize what is performed in the social sciences with genuine workmanship ... Methodology plays a humbler part. It is not the preceptor or tutor of scientists, the methodologists are always their pupils.—There is no great master in any scientific field who could not teach the methodologists how they should proceed ... The methodologist in his role has to ask the intelligent questions about the techniques of his teachers. He has performed his task if his questions help others to reflect on what they actually do and perhaps induce them to eliminate certain intrinsic difficulties hidden in the foundations of the scientific edifice which the scientists themselves have never inspected. (Schutz, 1996: 24; cf. Schutz, 1996: 146 and Schutz, 1964: 88)

Schutz's position might therefore be called a *gentle prescriptivism*. He does indeed hope to "induce" changes in how science is done, but he does not attempt to command the actions of scientists; rather he presents respectful as well as penetrating accounts of difficulties that may affect their work. Then the scientists themselves should decide whether or not to change what are of course their own approaches. In this way the scientists are not only invited into the conversation, but are explicitly left in charge of whether or not science-theoretical reflection should affect actual practice. This attitude of respect for their authority must also contribute to Schutz's appeal to practicing scientists. But it is not only the aspects of inclusiveness and respect that play a role here; the fact that he is concerned with something more than the merely formal, statistical analysis is probably a crucial part of his appeal as well.

If the foregoing might induce some to speak of "theory of science" instead of "methodology" today, then the key question becomes*: What is the theme of science theory for Schutz?* This theme is, as quoted above, located in the "foundations of the scientific edifice" that scientists may never have inspected and the phrase "basic concepts and methods" used above covers much if not all of it. The notion of "subjective meaning" (a notion coming from Max Weber but not immune to reconsideration) is, for Schutz, the central basic concept, and will be discussed below. As for methods, those familiar with Schutz's work will at this point think of his postulates for scientific thinking, and some of these will also be considered below. At this point, however, there is need for an answer to the prior science-theoretical question of *what* "*social science" is*.

The question of what social science is itself presupposes an answer to the question of what science in general is for Schutz. Briefly speaking, he devotes "On Multiple Realities" (1945) to showing how the sciences in general are *theoretical*. The attitude of the scientist is then contemplative, but since there are other contemplative attitudes, e.g., the religious attitude, something must be added. For Schutz this is participation in an already established scientific discipline:

> Of course, the theoretical thinker may choose at his discretion, only determined by an inclination rooted in his intimate personality, the scientific field in which he wants to take interest and possibly also the level (in general) upon which he wants to carry on his investigations. But as soon as he has made up his mind in this respect, the scientist enters a preconstituted world of scientific contemplation handed down to him by the historical tradition of his science ... Any problem emerging within the scientific field has to partake of the universal style of this field and has to be compatible with the preconstituted problems and their solution by either accepting or refuting them. (Schutz, 1962: 250, cf. Embree, 1988)

Next, Schutz has a position on the taxonomy of the sciences somewhat different from what at least most American social scientists and philosophers of science currently take for granted. He says little about the *formal sciences* of logic and mathematics, although he did agree with Husserl on the use of logic to unify the empirical sciences formally. (Schutz, 1962: 49; Schutz, 1997: 128) The various remarks about the *naturalistic sciences* also appear Husserlian and nothing more needs to be said about them directly here.

Something must and can be said, however, about the *difference* between the naturalistic sciences and those sciences Schutz came to call "*die Kulturwissenschaften*" in Austria—sciences he called "the social sciences" (in a broad signification) in America later: "The researcher who occupies himself with the objects of the world of nature is in no way in the same relationship to the objects of his interest as the sociologist, the economist, the theorist of law, or the historian. Any well-founded consideration of the methodological problems of the social sciences needs to begin with clarification of this difference." (Schutz, 1996: 121)

What is crucial is that the observational field in a cultural science is always already meaningful in common-sense interpretation:

> It has a particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein. They have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life, and it is these thought objects which determine their behavior, define the goals of their actions, and the means available for attaining them, in brief, which help them to find their bearings within their socio-cultural environment and to come to terms with it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientist refer to and are founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man living his everyday life among his fellow-men. (Schutz, 1997: 136)

In contrast with the meaningfulness constituted or, better, constructed in common-sense thinking,

> The concept of nature ... with which the natural sciences have to deal is, as Husserl has shown, an idealizing abstraction from the *Lebens-welt*, an abstraction which, on principle and of course legitimately, excludes persons with their personal life and all objects of culture which originate as such in practical human activity. Exactly this layer of the *Lebenswelt*, from which the natural scientists have to abstract, is the social reality which the social sciences have to investigate. (Schutz, 1962: 58; cf. Schutz, 1996: 133)

Since it includes persons and cultural objects, the meaningful socio-cultural world is concrete and thus prior to the nature that is abstracted from it by the naturalistic scientist. Moreover, this socio-cultural world is the overall theme of the genus of theoretical sciences that Schutz calls the

cultural sciences in his pivotal and programmatic essay, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences" (1940), which was projected in its German title as being about *die Kulturwissenschaften*, an expression that also occurs within the German original. (Schutz, 1996: 106)

The expression *die Kulturwissenschaften* has, of course, neo-Kantian connotations. Moreover, Schutz is reluctant to endorse Max Weber's position in this connection because it is idiographic and particularizing. (Schutz, 1997: 126f.) Nevertheless, it remains the case that concern with the cultural world is what defines the cultural sciences for Schutz. As for what "culture" signifies, Schutz asserts in the 1950 manuscript "T.S. Eliot's Theory of Culture" that culture is that which is "taken for granted by a given social group at a certain period of its historical existence." (Schutz 2004) And it may be added that the first place in which to look for the meanings making up the meaningfulness of the taken-for-granted cultural world of everyday life is the vernacular of the group in question:

> The greater part of our knowledge does not originate within personal experience but is socially derived, handed down by friends, parents, teachers, and the teachers of my teachers. I am not only taught how to define the environment with its typical features, but also how typical constructs have to be formed in accordance with the system of relevances, which are accepted from the unanimous unified point of view of the group in which I live. A particular role in this context is played by the vernacular of everyday life, which is primarily a language of names of things and events, and any name includes the typification and generalization referring to the relevance system prevailing in the linguistic in-group which found the named thing significant enough to provide a separate term for it. The pre-scientific vernacular is a treasure house of ready-made pre-constituted types and characteristics, all socially derived and carrying along open horizons of unexplored contents. (Schutz, 1997: 141)

If this suffices to define the genus of cultural sciences in contrast with the naturalistic sciences, what about the specifically *social* sciences? One could think that there is no difference for Schutz between the social and the cultural sciences. After all, in Austria, he sometimes uses "*Sozialwissenschaft*" in a broad signification that includes art history, biography, economics, jurisprudence, political science, and sociology, (Schutz, 1967: 242) and in the United States he sometimes uses the "social sciences" to include economics, history, psychology, social anthropology, social

psychology, and sociology. (Schutz, 1997:127; Schutz, 1962: 49) Although they do indeed address aspects of the socio-cultural world and are thus cultural sciences, art history, biography, history, psychology, and especially jurisprudence are rarely if ever considered specifically "social sciences" in the United States today. Are there, for Schutz, species of cultural science like there are species of biological and also physical sciences in the genus of naturalistic science?

Schutz appears to recognize three species of cultural science. Art history and history (one could add archaeology) are best classified as specifically *historical sciences*, since they thematize aspects of the worlds of predecessors. Biography might also belong there when dead individuals are studied, but might also come under the theory of art and specifically literature, to which Schutz has also contributed. (Embree 1998) He does not name them as a species, but *the psychological sciences* would seem to be another group of cultural sciences, a group that thematizes essences and facts of individual cultural life and includes the "phenomenological psychology" (Schutz, 1996: 26) of "On Multiple Realities" and also other texts, such as Part II of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, as well as the social psychology of "The Stranger" (1944) and "The Homecomer" (1944). Certainly, however, economics, ethnology, political science, sociology, and also linguistics are *social sciences* in the strict signification that excludes sciences of both the psychological and historical sorts. (cf. Kersten 2004) Sciences of this species thematize "contemporaries" in the strict Schutzian signification that includes only those others whom a self in everyday life can understand and influence indirectly and reciprocally. Defining the theme of the social and other species of cultural science is part of the theory or methodology of science and Schutz's position is one in which many disciplines concerned with cultural objects and conscious life can find places. Because of the inclusion of those central subject matters, this position is in opposition to positivism and, since most appreciaters of Schutz are also opposed to positivism, this is probably another part of his appeal beyond philosophy.

Schutz's work consciously offers a clear alternative to positivism. As he writes, "methodology and studies of the logic of science have been concerned for more than two centuries primarily with the logic of the natural sciences and assume that their techniques of classification, measurement, theory-building, and empirical correlation are the only scientific ones." (Schutz, 1997: 125) In other words, "the development of

the modern social sciences occurred during a period in which the science of logic was mostly concerned with the logic of the natural sciences. In a kind of monopolistic imperialism the methods of the latter were frequently declared to be the only scientific ones and the particular problems which the social scientists encountered in their work were disregarded." (Schutz, 1962: 49) Interestingly, "the particular methodological devices developed by the social sciences in order to grasp social reality are better suited than those of the natural sciences to lead to the discovery of the general principles which govern all human knowledge." (Schutz, 1962: 66)

II.

Did Alfred Schutz actually intend his theory of the cultural sciences to extend as far as the above stated taxonomy and thus the earlier list of eighteen disciplines, most of which can easily fit that taxonomy? For many, of course, he is merely a philosopher or theorist of sociology, but there are passages that show that he intended his theory of science to extend far beyond sociology. Indeed, a study of how jurisprudence can be said to be a social science for him should make it very clear how broad the scope of Schutz's science theory is.

The examination of Weber's basic methodological concepts in Part I of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau*, the correspondence with Parsons, and the facts that he mostly taught sociology and had important students and early followers in sociology at the New School for Social Research during the 1940s and 1950s do tend to support that view that he is merely a philosopher of sociology. In addition, he himself writes, "Since my early student days, my foremost interest was in the philosophical foundations of the social sciences, especially of sociology." (Schutz, 1977: 124) However, in Section 41 of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau* he also clearly seeks to contribute to the theory of *history*. Moreover, in the already cited letter to Parsons of 1940 he also writes, "I did not start my scientific endeavors as a philosopher or logician although these problems had always evoked my deepest interest since my undergraduate days. I came from the most concrete problems of economics and the theory of law." (Schutz, 1978: 102) Furthermore, in Section 49—"Objective and Subjective Meaning in the Social Sciences," the penultimate section of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau*— he asserts that "all social sciences are objective meaning-contexts about subjective meaning-contexts" (Schutz, 1967: 241) and goes on to discuss

economics and *jurisprudence*, which he considers "the two most advanced 'theoretical' social sciences," (Schutz, 1967: 248) a remark that implies that sociology is less advanced!

What of economics and jurisprudence? According to the unpublished interview he gave Bettina Greaves in November 1958, Schutz did not consider himself an economist. Nevertheless, economics rather than sociology may actually be the particular science most discussed in his oeuvre, and there can be no doubt that it is a social science in the strict signification. This is not, however, the occasion for the presentation of Schutz's theory of economics.

It may seem odd to consider jurisprudence a social science. That Schutz did so shows more than anything else how broadly he intended his theory of social science to be taken. His scattered remarks about law are few enough that almost all of them can be quoted and commented upon. To begin with, and at first without explicit mention of law, there is the in-order-to motive goal that all the social sciences share:

> The primary goal of the social sciences is to obtain organized knowledge of social reality. By the term "social reality" I wish to have understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural [sic] world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects and social institutions into which we are all born, within which we have to find our bearings, and with which we have to come to terms. (Schutz, 1962: 53)

Then, in discussing means to attain such "organized knowledge of social reality," Schutz does refer to law: "a theory which aims at explaining social reality has to develop particular devices foreign to the natural sciences in order to agree with the common-sense experience of the social world. This is indeed what all theoretical sciences of human affairs—economics, sociology, the sciences of law, linguistics, cultural anthropology, etc.—have done." (Schutz, 1962: 58)

That Schutz speaks of "sciences" of law in the plural here would seem to be because there is sociology of law, which will be considered below, and also history of law (Schutz, 1967: 242), which, as history, is probably distinct from law as it would be regarded in the perspective of social

science in the strict Schutzian signification. He does, however, discuss legal training in a somewhat historical and comparative perspective:

> Any subject requires its particular form of approach and this form varies among the cultures and times ... To give just one example, it cannot be said that the well-trained American lawyer is superior to the well-trained French lawyer or vice versa. Yet in civil law countries, the student of law is trained for several years in the system first of Roman law, then of the national law of his country, then in the techniques of application and interpretation of the law, and only in the last stage of his training does he study actual cases. The student in an American law school will start with case analysis and will from there arrive at an insight into the theory of law as such, of evidence, of interpretation, and so on. (Schutz, 1970: 98)

The history of law and the sociology of law probably contrast with theoretical jurisprudence in the same way that economic history and economic sociology contrast with theoretical economics. (Schutz, 1967: 137) As for theoretical jurisprudence, Schutz even holds that "the modern system of theoretical jurisprudence is, as a theoretical system, as far developed as, let us say, the system of chemistry or biology." (Schutz, 1997: 131) Even so, he nevertheless writes that "we have a series of well-advanced sciences which nevertheless cannot adequately define their subject matter ... [M]any schools of thought conflict in their attempts to define the nature of law." (Schutz, 1970: 99)

An earlier passage does in fact suggest some specification of the science of jurisprudence in relation to other disciplines—a specification that would distinguish the science as such, while remaining prior to differences among schools of thought within jurisprudence:

> In philology it is always a basic question whether what is being studied is the objective meaning of a word at a definite time within a definite language area or, second, the subjective meaning which the word takes on in the usage of a particular author or of a particular circle of speakers or, third, the occasional meaning which it takes on in the context of discourse. Again, every student of law is familiar with the distinction between considering a point of law as a proposition within the legal system in accordance with philological and juridical canons of interpretation, on the one hand, and asking, on the

other hand, what the 'intentions of the legislator' were. (Schutz, 1967: 138)

This is, of course, an allusion to the distinction between objective and subjective meaning. Probably, then, for Schutz the juridical canons of interpretation and the emphasis on legal rather than other types of linguistic expressions would specify the science of jurisprudence regardless of any further specification by school of thought. It is also readily conceivable that he could have additionally specified law by the types of evidence relied upon within it, but he seems not to have done so.

Schutz studied law at Vienna with Hans Kelsen, the only person he calls his teacher. What he says about Kelsen and his pure theory of law as well as about Felix Kaufmann, who lead him (Schutz) to phenomenology, is also of relevance here:

> Kelsen was not only a fascinating personality and teacher, he offered his students a unique approach to the social sciences. The pure theory of law was in the true sense a theoretical system designed to explain concrete human behavior, in so far as it is relevant for the jurist. Based upon the epistemological teachings of the neo-Kantian school, according to which it is the method that constitutes the object of inquiry, Kelsen's theory distinguishes between the sociological and juridical aspects of law. The latter consists in a body of propositions of specific character, called norms, the normative validity of which cannot be derived from facts. The "is" and the "ought," Kelsen says, lie in different planes.—Kaufmann recognized immediately the merits and shortcomings of this theory. He familiarized himself in the shortest time with the literature and became one of the prominent members of the circle around Kelsen. His main contributions to the development of Kelsen's theory consist in the replacing of the neo-Kantian epistemology by the phenomenological one, in a clear analysis of the double character of the norm which is both substantive norm and sanction, in the reduction of the realm of the "ought," (the norm) to the realm of the "is" (the underlying human behavior), and in a careful elaboration of the criteria of the legal norm, based upon human conduct. (Schutz, 1996: 137; cf. Schutz, 1977: 125)

How much Schutz agreed with Kaufmann's phenomenological theory of law is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that he followed the Neo-Kantians and Husserl as well as Kelsen and Kaufmann in

recognizing a distinction between theoretical and normative propositions and disciplines. If so, then a purely social-scientific account of human behavior "insofar as it is relevant to the jurist" might be rendered normative through the addition of norms.

Recently published manuscript material (Embree 1999) as well as "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1955) and especially "In Search of the Middle Ground" (1955) show that Schutz does indeed sometimes go beyond the purely theoretical with respect to human conduct. (cf. Embree, 2000) In the "Homecomer," for example, Schutz's "practical conclusion" about veterans returning from war is another example of a position that is more than theoretical (perhaps the implied norm can be explicated as 'Receiving group and returning member ought to become adjusted to each other as quickly and smoothly as possible'):

> Much has been done and still more will be done to prepare the home-coming veteran for the necessary process of adjustment. However, it seems to be equally indispensable to prepare the home group accordingly. They have to learn through the press, the radio, the movies, that the man whom they await will be another and not the one they imagined him to be. It will be a hard task to use the propaganda machine in the opposite direction, namely, to destroy the pseudotype of the combatant's life and the soldier's life in general and to replace it by the truth. But it is indispensable to undo the glorification of a questionable Hollywood-made heroism by bringing out the real picture of what these men endure, how they live, and what they think and feel—a picture no less meritorious and no less evocative. (Schutz, 1964: 118)

In short, theory for Schutz is not opposed to practice, but can indeed suggest practical applications once norms are added. If a norm were cast in terms of ends qua best actualizable possibilities and if "the most appropriate end" refers to such a possibility, then Schutz's postulate of rationality is relevant here:

> The ideal type of social action must be constructed in such a way that the actor in the living world would perform the typified act if he had a clear and distinct scientific knowledge of all the elements relevant to his choice and the constant tendency to choose the most appropriate

means for the realization of the most appropriate end. (Schutz, 1964: 86)

Be that as it may, if members of various non-philosophical disciplines, sociological as well as beyond, sense such an implied practical usefulness of the theoretical science that is undoubtedly focused on by Schutz, this could well be another aspect of his appeal.

III.

Something needs to be said about basic concepts and methods—again, first in general, and then in the case of jurisprudence as a social science. The most fundamental basic concept in social and, for that matter, cultural science is subjective meaning. Early in "The Stranger" (1944), Schutz asserts that "this cultural pattern of a group, like any phenomenon of the social world, has a different aspect for the sociologist and for the man who acts and thinks within it," adding in a footnote that "this insight seems to be the most important contribution of Max Weber's methodological writings to the problems of social science." (Schutz, 1964: 92 and fn. 2) Late in his life, Schutz particularized subjective meaning for law in "Some Equivocations in the Notion of Responsibility" (1957): "Any law means something different to the legislator, the person subject to the law (the law-abiding citizen and the law-breaker), the law-interpreting court, and the agent who enforces it."[2]

And if subjective meaning is Schutz's fundamental basic concept, then subjective interpretation is his fundamental method. The postulate for it is

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[2]   Earlier in that same essay and on a more general level, Schutz is critical of Weber's terminology: "In using the expression 'the subjective aspect' for the notion of 'feeling responsible' in terms of the first person, we adopt an unfortunate, but by now generally accepted, terminology of the social sciences, viz., the distinction between the subjective and the objective meaning of human actions, human relations, and human situations. It was Max Weber who made this distinction the cornerstone of his methodology. Subjective meaning, in this sense, is the meaning which an action has for the actor or which a relation or situation has for the person or persons involved therein; objective meaning is the meaning the same action, relation, or situation has for anybody else, be it a partner or observer in everyday life, the social scientist, or the philosopher. The terminology is unfortunate because the term 'objective meaning' is obviously a misnomer insofar as the so-called 'objective' interpretations are, in turn, relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreters and, therefore, in a certain sense, 'subjective.'" (Schutz, 1964: 275; cf. Embree, 1991)

formulated on one occasion as follows. "The scientist has to ask what type of individual mind can be constructed and what typical thoughts must be attributed to it to explain the fact in question as the result of its activity within an understandable relation." (Schutz, 1964: 85) The particularization of this postulate for the law can be seen it the following passage (Schutz, 1967: 264):

> According to Kelsen, the subjective meaning which the individual legal acts have for those enacting or performing them must be ordered within an objective meaning-context by means of what *we* should call ideal-typical constructions on the part of the interpreting science of jurisprudence. The ideal-typical construction that we find in jurisprudence is carried out through formalization and generalization, just as in pure economics. In pure economics the principle of marginal utility is the defining principle of the whole field and presents a highest interpretive scheme which alone makes possible the scientific systematization of the subjective meaning-contexts of individual economic acts. Correspondingly, in the realm of pure jurisprudence, as Kelsen himself clearly recognizes, application of a presupposed basic norm determines the area of invariance for all those subjective meaning-contexts of legal acts which are relevant for jurisprudence or which, to use technical terminology, bear the mark of positivity.

It seems that Schutz recognizes a theoretical-scientific component within Kelsen's so-called "pure jurisprudence." Mentioning another postulate, which does not need explication here, he offers the following concerning method in legal sociology, which would seem a theoretical rather than a normative discipline:

> Interpretive sociology ... must construct personal ideal types for social actors that are compatible with those constructed by the latter's partners. This aim may be regarded as a postulate for interpretive sociology. Upon closer scrutiny, it reduces to a more basic principle—the postulate of meaning-adequacy. This postulate states that, given a social relationship between contemporaries, the personal ideal types of the partners and their typical conscious experiences must be congruent with one another and compatible with the ideal-typical relationship itself.—A good example of the type of clarification that is required lies in the field of legal sociology. This discipline encounters great difficulties when it seeks to formulate descriptions of legal

relationships between various partners, e.g., legislator and interpreter of the law, executor, and subject of the law. Legal sociology seeks to interpret these relationships in terms of the subjective meanings of the persons in question.[3]

The legal sociologist can thus proceed in her investigations independently of normative considerations and thus purely theoretically. One may wonder if Schutz might recognize a "legal economics," so to speak, concerned with aspects of concrete economic behavior "in so far as it is relevant for the economist," but no sign of reliance on any other social science than sociology of the law has been noticed in the oeuvre. In any case, one can thus see how, with respect to its foundations at least, Schutz can view jurisprudence as a theoretical social science. Moreover, fragmentary as it is, his theory of law shows how broad the scope of his theory of science truly is. And, once again, the breadth of Schutz's science-theoretical vision may well appear welcoming to members of other non-philosophical disciplines.

IV.

Finally, the issue of the practical can be returned to, beginning not from theoretical but from practical disciplines. Many of the non-philosophical disciplines listed at the outset of this essay—i.e., education, management studies, medicine, nursing, psychiatry, and psychotherapy (and others are easily imagined, e.g., social work)—are not strictly theoretical or cognitive disciplines. Often economics and law seem actually more practical

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[3]   The passage interestingly continues as follows: "But, in doing this, it confuses the ideal types in terms of which each of the persons imagines his real partner with the sociologist's own ideal types of the partner. There are only two possible ways to remedy this situation and make possible a genuine descriptive concept of the kind desired by legal sociologists. The first would be to find from the beginning the standpoint from which the type is to be constructed. This would mean that the legal sociologist would identify himself with one of the actors, postulating as invariant not only the latter's acts but also his interpretive schemes of his partners. The sociologist would then have to regard the ideal-typical concepts so constructed as binding upon himself. If this were the procedure adopted, the kind of sociological concept used would be directly derived from the field of law itself: legislator, judge, lawyer, partner, verdict, execution, etc. The alternative would be to come up with a principle according to which these more general types can be transformed into the individual ideal types which the partners have of each other in concrete situations." (Schutz, 1967: 206)

than theoretical. In other words, how are there applied as well as pure disciplines? Schutz does speak about so-called "applied sciences:"

> All applied sciences have the goal to invent "workable" devices for the mastery of the world. But it neither injures the dignity of science nor impairs the merits of applied sciences if we separate the mere theoretical attitude of contemplation—which is an integral element of the scientific process—from their practical application. "In other words, we" abstract from the fact that "scientific-contemplative" results may be used for "worldly" purposes. Scientific theorizing is one thing, dealing with "aspects of scientific knowledge that are applicable" within the world is another.[4]

The just mentioned disciplines that go beyond the theoretical attitude of contemplation nevertheless do have theoretical components within them, and it is in relation to them that Schutz's theory of science might also be extended beyond its original scope (or at least beyond its emphasis on the purely theoretical disciplines). This possibility, if sensed, may also contribute to Schutz's appeal in practical disciplines.

To go now just one small step beyond Schutz's letter but still in his spirit, it may be observed that it can be misleading to speak of "applied science," because that might suggest that wholes or parts of single sciences are first developed and then later applied to practical problems such that a discipline took shape, while in fact the practical discipline usually comes first (e.g., there was nursing long before it had a scientific basis) and the search for theoretical results with which to improve practice comes later. Furthermore, the pursuit of such results is often engaged in by members of the practical discipline in question, not by

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[4] Schutz (1996: 45), cf. Schutz (1962: 245): "Here I wish to anticipate a possible objection. Is not the ultimate aim of science the mastery of the world? Are not natural sciences designed to dominate the forces of the universe, social sciences to exercise control, medical sciences to fight diseases? And is not the only reason why man bothers with science his desire to improve his everyday life and to help humanity in its pursuit of happiness? All this is certainly as true as it is banal, but it has nothing to do with our problem. Of course, the desire to improve the world is one of man's strongest motives for dealing with science, and the application of scientific theory leads of course to the invention of technical devices for the mastery of the world. But neither these motives nor the use of its results for 'worldly' purposes is an element of the process of scientific theorizing itself. Scientific theorizing is one thing, dealing with science within the world of working is another."

"pure scientists" external to it, especially when the relevant theoretical disciplines fail to address the problems that are of immediate concern for the practical discipline. In addition, even when results of purely theoretical disciplines are used in a practical discipline, they often come from more than one pure science (e.g., ethnology as well as neurology in psychiatry). Thus, it seems better to avoid the term "applied science" and to use terms such as "scientific" or, better, "science-based." But, once more, it is for the members of practical disciplines to decide whether or not to adopt such a science-theoretical suggestion that, incidentally, goes beyond the letter of Schutz.

To summarize, it has been speculated that Alfred Schutz's appeal beyond philosophy consists in how his theory of science (1) has a broad and welcoming notion of the non-naturalistic sciences as concerned centrally with culture and persons and best expressed as "cultural science;" (2) clarifies basic concepts and methods, beginning with those pertaining to subjective meaning and interpretation, which are basic in all of the cultural sciences, and plays down formal methods and thus can be called qualitative and or interpretative; (3) approaches non-philosophical disciplines in a respectful and helpful rather than a domineering way, including reflections on their own disciplines by cultural scientists, who are the ones who decide about any proposed changes; and (4) provides at least the beginning for reflections on science-based practical disciplines.

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The "Naturality" of Alfred Schutz's Natural Attitude of the Life-World

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Abstract. *The everyday world, the life-world, the world of everyday life, the practical taken for granted world, and the like are now commonly used concepts in the social sciences and to an extent even in philosophy. However, much debate and even entrenched positions in regard to them in the social sciences primarily occur only by a reliance upon their mediated reinterpretation as abstract units within later theories and without regard to their original emerging phenomenal meaning within phenomenology and especially social phenomenology. In taking up the work of Alfred Schutz, which more than any other was responsible for the introduction of these notions into the social sciences, this paper focuses upon his more general, inclusive, and refined notion of the "natural attitude of the life-world" which appears throughout all of his lifework. Schutz's notion of the natural attitude of the life-world is seen to be related to the works of Husserl, Fink, and Gurwitsch, and as possessing a continually developing character in regard to concrete living or what is here called "naturality." The natural attitude of the life-world is especially seen as that which cannot be reduced to any one-sided theoretical conceptualizations, as an ongoing social phenomenological research realm which in principle is always open for further fruitful investigative explorations, and as fundamentally lending to his entire work that sense of a "living class" for future generations of both social phenomenological and social scientific researchers.*

When Alfred Schutz needed to distinguish his own work from Edmund Husserl, or for that matter any of the more well-known phenomenologists of his day, he simply, but emphatically always referred to it as a "phenomenology of the natural attitude." To take an illustrious example, when Aron Gurwitsch once suggestively inquired into whether Schutz's work had fallen into certain phenomenological formalizations in his specific analyses, formalizations which they both strove to avoid, Schutz would even somewhat sternly remark: "You know very well that my goal in all of my works and also in this one is a phenomenological analysis of the

natural *Weltanschauung* ... If such a phenomenological analysis is to suc-
ceed, it has to present and describe what it finds exactly as it finds it, and
with that the analysis of the *common* sense world is phenomenologically
clarified." (Grathoff, 1989a: 177) Thus, from the very beginning, the
"phenomenology of the natural attitude" would refer to both a certain
methodological perspective and to a subject matter of analysis, the latter
coming to be ultimately called by Schutz "the natural attitude of the
life-world." (see, for example, 1970a: 83; 1970b)

For the most part, when taken up or treated at all, the "natural
attitude" (*natürliche Einstellung*) would be considered by most
phenomenologists, and especially philosophical phenomenologists, as
merely a first methodological level or step on the way towards much
deeper phenomenological analyses. On the other hand, in coming to view
the "natural attitude of the life-world" as a matter of complex
phenomenological features while simultaneously rejecting any
consideration of a transcendental ego the social sciences would
essentially appropriate a notion of the life-world lacking any subjective
natural attitude. More specifically, Schutz's natural attitude would come
to be eradicated from the life-world, so that society itself could be treated
as a life-worldly context. The life-world, on the other hand, in being then
abstractly taken up into the most diverse of sociological theories, ranging
from Habermas to Giddens to Luhmann, would come to be generally
reinterpreted in terms of the most different theoretical perspectives.[1] In
general, a hoped for and even apparently founding paradigm of the
life-world in sociology becomes reinterpreted and absorbed into different
formalized conceptions within various theories of society.

In contrast to the mathematical natural sciences generally required
theoretical *recourse* or reflexive grounding in the life-world as demon-
strated by Husserl in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcenden-
tal Phenomenology* (1970), a further need is here seen and proposed for
the social sciences, particularly when taking into consideration Schutz's
insightful remark that the social sciences stand in an even greater and
more eminent danger in the sense of taking their theoretical abstract

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[1]   For in-depth critiques of Habermas' and Luhmann's conception of the life-world, see
      Grathoff, (1989b: 413-438; 1987) Landgrebe, (1975) and Matthiesen. (1983) With
      respect to Giddens, a similar critical situation may be said to exist with his intro-
      duction of a notion of a "cocoon" for the life-worldly subject correspondingly
      involving all its darkness and restrictedness. (see Giddens, 1991)

idealizations as true social being. (see 1973a: 138) More specifically, whatever their theoretical leaps and bounds into higher abstract conceptual contexts, a need is here seen for a permanent "*incourse*" or ongoing regenerative grounding. Their absolute beginning point is in the natural attitude of the life-world understood in Schutz's words as "the pre-scientific life-world ... which is the one and unitary life-world of myself, of you, and of us all." (1973a: 120) It is this subjective natural attitude of the life-world which is outlined and meaningfully elaborated in the works of Alfred Schutz where it is explicated as our *one and only unitary social life-world*. In the end, it will be seen that this natural attitude of the life-world is still a wide-open and relatively virgin field of investigative social phenomenological research which, as our pre-scientific world, resists any one-sided theoretical conceptualizations.[2]

I. The Phenomenology of the Natural Attitude as a Phenomenological Psychology

In an Appendix to the first section of his *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* where Schutz attempts to explicitly clarify the phenomenological character of his investigations, he first introduces and characterizes his notion of the "phenomenology of the natural attitude" as follows:

> We will be pursuing then ... under a conscious abstained foregoing of the problematic of transcendental intersubjectivity and subjectivity— which, to be sure, can first become visible only after the execution of the phenomenological reduction—in general that "phenomenological psychology" which according to Husserl ... is nothing else than a "constitutive phenomenology" of the natural attitude. (1932: 56, my translation)

Schutz here follows Husserl's methodological connection between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology involving

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[2] Of course, this does not involve an overlooking, but rather even an emphasizing of the insightful groundbreaking character of the works of such authors as Natanson, Luckmann, Berger, Grathoff, and O'Neill which, while we cannot enter into them in detail here, constitute essential reading before pursuing any independent analyses of Schutz's natural attitude of the life-world. In regard to these authors' place within and their contributions to the social phenomenological movement. (see Vaitkus 2000a: 284-293)

a certain isomorphic unity of levels, whereby everything discoveringly
revealed at the psychological level has its transcendental analogue, and
everything revealed at the transcendental level has its mundane correlate.
(see: Husserl, 1971) Of course, phenomenological psychology, while al-
ways presupposing the natural attitude, transcends the latter to a certain
respect and itself consists of various levels of possible analysis stretching
from the empirical domain to a reflexive examination of intentional con-
sciousness. (see, for example: Husserl, 1971; 1962) However, Schutz's
phenomenology of the natural attitude interpreted first as a phenomeno-
logical psychology would be concerned with the deepest aspect, namely,
a science of essences. In his early article entitled "Phenomenology and
the Social Sciences" which was written for Farber's (1940) edited
volume on Husserl, he would put it as follows.

> However, a psychology from which a solution of the problems of the
> cultural sciences might be expected must become aware of the fact
> that it is not a science which deals with empirical facts. It has to be a
> science of essences, investigating the correlates of those transcenden-
> tal constitutional phenomena which are related to the natural attitude.
> (Schutz, 1973a: 132)

Thus, the phenomenological psychology of the natural attitude would be
first put forth within a *unitary isomorphism of levels* ultimately involving,
through the transcendental reduction, that founding and absolutely clari-
fying transcendental level concerned with the transcendental ego. (see:
Husserl, 1962) As such, this phenomenological psychology, interpreted
within this context as a limited science of essences, could provide a
foundation for the social sciences and help in the clarification of social
scientific methods, although, as an eidetic method investigating the corre-
lates of transcendental constitutional phenomena, it was never to be
applied to the specifically formulated problems of the social sciences
without becoming thereby involved in a naive use of this method. The
fundamental question which we must pose in investigating the
development of the phenomenology of the natural attitude, however,
concerns what happens when these transcendental foundations begin to
crack and shift as Schutz himself ultimately placies into question
Husserl's transcendental account of intersubjectivity and the involved
transcendental ego.

II. The 'Categorical' Natural Attitude of the Life-World

In order to understand Schutz's further development of the natural atti-tude of the life-world and its full phenomenological importance and ramifications, it is necessary to turn to another different and important de-veloping phenomenological conception of the natural attitude of the world. It came to be expressed perhaps in its most extreme form by Eugen Fink in his 'phenomenological answer' to the critique of Husserl carried out by the neo-Kantian school of Rickert.[3] Schutz was apparently aware of this development in the sense of being generally expected to follow the work of Husserl's close assistant Fink, who is always respectfully discussed in *Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1959* (Grathoff, 1989a). He even refers to the article in which it occurs "Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik" (1933) in the text of his own "On Multiple Realities" (1973b) as "a now famous essay" and as will be seen later develops a quite contrasting perspective for social phenomenology.

Although it is here impossible to enter into all the subtle details of this article addressing the neo-Kantian critique of Husserl, an article which in length may be said to amount to a small book, what is of general impor-tance for our purposes is that, after drawing out the anti-formalistic and anti-constructionistic aspects of phenomenology, Fink pursues a clarific-ation of the concept of *"dogmatism"* which he claims lies in a "fog of formal indefiniteness" within this Kantian tradition. (1933: 327) In start-ing out from the fundamental epistemological position of this neo-Kant-ianism whose essential problem is said to concern the question of the possibility of objective cognition *(Erkenntnis)*, Fink goes on to maintain that its essential unitary focus is ultimately upon the general presuppo-sition of all existents or the *a priori* form of the world. More specifically, Fink suggests that this Kantianism consists of a certain overturning of the "straight forward attitude" of naive involvement in existents and our naive knowledge obtained about objects in the world. This neo-Kantianism reveals the *a priori* conditions of objective cognition

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[3]   In responding to this critique of the neo-Kantian school of Rickert, Fink primarily focuses upon the well thought-out formulations of Zocher (1932) and Kreis (1930).

which lie at the basis of every actual, objective-true execution of cognition as the *a priori* constitution of the object of knowledge. However, we can only bring this into view through the construction of a model of the theoretical object. Nevertheless, in remaining focused on an *a priori* world form, Fink then claims that this Kantianism is and remains a mundane world philosophy. It is argued that it remains bound to the *world of the natural attitude* and is, thus, in the phenomenological sense "dogmatic." The fundamental problem of phenomenology is said to concern the very "origin of the world" within the constitution of transcendental subjectivity, along with thereby revealing a completely new sense of the transcendental ego.

Now, although claiming that it is impossible for him in the present context to present any detailed concrete phenomenological analyses, Fink does maintain that this his proposed general conception of the natural attitude of the world, and most importantly the conception of the origin of the world as phenomenology's fundamental question, does throw a certain light on what he calls those "dark phenomenological concepts of 'reduction' and 'constitution'" introduced by Husserl, so as to lend them a profile. (1933: 344) Of course, our concern is with what happens to the world of the natural attitude as experienced by us within Fink's fairly abstract argumentations. Let us turn then to his more specific phenomenological formulations.

In this critique of neo-Kantianism carried out by Fink, one first finds that not only the world of scientific thinking, the naive view of the world, and all other philosophies are summarily collected into the concept of the natural attitude of the world, but in the end "all attitudes," except for the phenomenological attitude. (see, for example: 1933: 332 and 348) Second, in adding his descriptions together, the natural attitude is, thereby, characterized as a dogmatic, barricaded restrictedness, and is powerlessly ensnared in a receptive blind living of confusion from which only the phenomenological reduction can provide escape (*Entkommensein*). Finally, although a withholding of the world is given its required due mention, the universal change of attitude from the natural attitude put forth as the "phenomenological reduction" by Husserl in the *Ideas* (1962) is said to be, unfortunately, limited as this natural attitude of the world must be in essence *fundamentally burst through* and gotten out of. The phenomenological reduction is said to consist in precisely this fundamental "breaking-through" (*Durchbruch*) that. (see: 1933: 347-348)

In sum, Fink's conception of the natural attitude of the world and of phenomenology are posited as being so deeply antithetical to one another that they take on the character of being categorical opposites. Moreover, the natural attitude of the world in the end is then proclaimed to be itself ultimately a "transcendental concept," (1933: 348) insofar as it cannot be even properly identified, investigated, or developed without first carrying out the transcendental phenomenological reduction. Thus, Fink twice states in almost the same words that: "There is no phenomenology which does not go through the reduction. Whatever else may designate itself as phenomenology ... is 'dogmatic' (as phenomenologically understood)." (1933: 342 n. 1, my translation, see also 380)

III. The Path Towards Establishing the Foundations of a 'Living' Natural Attitude of the Life-World

Schutz too would no doubt be in favor of a phenomenological answer to and critique of any neo-Kantian arguments against phenomenology. However, in regard to the advancement of his own work involving a phenomenology of the natural attitude, it could be said that he was now generally confronted with not only one, but even two categorical encroaching conceptions of the world of the natural attitude leading to its methodological dissolution. The neo-Kantian conception of the natural attitude put forth by Fink in terms of a cognitive *a priori* world form could be fairly easily dealt with by Schutz through his claim that it is a fundamental error of neo-Kantianism to believe that the method creates the object of inquiry, and, furthermore, by pointing out that no Copernican revolution can ever account for nature as it appears experientially and orientationally to the lived bodily subject, namely, as the surface of the earth, that "primal arch" (*Urarche*). (see, for example: Schutz, 1970c: 129 and 170) However, Fink's phenomenological conception, which ultimately strives towards a clarified experiential foundation of this world of the natural attitude, has to be taken up more cautiously and in detail.

In general, Fink's presentation of phenomenology not only implies that Schutz's social phenomenological analyses of the natural attitude of the world must be considered as "non-phenomenological," but, furthermore, that one can never even hope to succeed without carrying out the transcendental reduction. In short, the natural attitude of the world is here

not only first turned into a negative collective category of what phenome-
nology is not, but then disappears into transcendental phenomenology.

Of course, this is only one possible line of interpretation of Husserl's
general phenomenology and it even goes against other very clear claims
made by him concerning phenomenological psychology as a primary
mode of access to the transcendental realm, along with his claim that the
reduction does not involve "a transformation of ... thesis into ...
antithesis, of positive into negative." (1962, sec. 31) However, with
Husserl's full endorsement of Fink's article including writing a preface
for it, with Schutz's increasing discovery that the problem of
intersubjectivity in Husserl is insolvable, and with the further
development of his own general thesis of the alter ego sharing in a vivid
present of consciousness within the natural attitude of the world,[4] Schutz
appears to have interpreted Husserl as clearly himself at times tending
towards this direction. Thus, after this article by Fink and what was only
his third article after the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, "Scheler's Theory of
Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego," Schutz now
openly questions in writing whether intersubjectivity or "the origin of the
'We' refers to the transcendental sphere at all." (1973c: 175) He then, in
apparent agreement with the antithesis proposal, although in what could
be said to be now a reinterpreted sense stressing the phenomenological
independence of his own work, writes: "All that we have described ... is a
piece of 'phenomenological psychology,' as Husserl calls it *in antithesis*
to 'transcendental phenomenology.'" (1973c: 175, my emphasis)

It is to Schutz's article "On Multiple Realities" that we must now turn
for it is precisely here that the "*naturality*" of Schutz's conception of the
natural attitude of the world most clearly begins to be developed and
comes into the foreground. Of course, "naturality" as here used is not to
be confused with any sort of naturalism or concept of nature from the
natural sciences, but is to be understood in a much deeper lived sense and
precisely in relationship to the above potentially developing direction
taken by transcendental phenomenology.

First to be considered in "On Multiple Realities" for our specific inter-
ests is the well-known, but extremely puzzling Footnote 36. In referring

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[4] For the specific development of Schutz's critique of Husserl's analyses of
     intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem and the ever increasing advancement of
     his own social phenomenological analyses of the problem. (see Vaitkus 1991a: 75-
     160)

to the finite province of meaning of scientific theorizing, Schutz writes that this scientific theorizing or "theoretical thinking has to be characterized as belonging to the 'natural attitude,' this term [natural attitude] *here (but not in the text)* being used in contradistinction to 'phenomenological reduction.'" (1973b: 249 n. 36, my added emphasis)

In general, Schutz here distinguishes between two senses of the natural attitude: (1) the natural attitude understood as the world of positive scientific thinking and its empirical realism, and (2) the natural attitude as referring exclusively to the world of everyday thinking. The first sense is used in the footnote in contradistinction to the phenomenological reduction and the second sense in the ongoing text of "On Multiple Realities" lacks any such reference. In regard to the first, the increasing stance in phenomenology of an "unmotivated agnosticism" or being noncommittal towards natural science, which was promoted by Fink in his attempt to distance phenomenology from any neo-Kantian epistemological critique of science and which it may be said contributed to his choice of an antithetical conception of the everyday world, is here first overturned. More specifically, in Schutz's account of the natural attitude of scientific thinking, mathematical natural science is indeed to be once more interpreted in direct contradistinction to the phenomenological reduction. Here phenomenology's original and clearly expressed aim to investigate all scientific knowledge as a constitution of meaning structures on the basis of a first science of consciousness is reintroduced. In regard to the second sense of natural attitude concerned exclusively with the everyday life-world and as used throughout "On Multiple Realities," a fundamental "naturality," an independent phenomenon and field of work, is not in any way to be interpreted as antithetical to the phenomenological reduction which is simply concerned with a separate focus and task.

Of further importance to us in the present context is Gurwitsch's failure to grasp these points in his own book *The Field of Consciousness* where in an in-depth critical analysis of this Schutzian article "On Multiple Realities," he simply writes: "'Natural attitude' is here understood in Husserl's sense as opposed to the phenomenological attitude." (1964: 399 n. 47) In the *Correspondence*, Schutz not only calls this specific statement into question, but now even goes one step further and says: "I am not so entirely sure whether Husserl's εποχή is not precisely just a special case of the series of possible εποχής that I have worked out." (Grathoff, 1989a: 157)

In general, Schutz would be unable to provide a final or definitive investigation into the latter, but as will be seen he was clearly pursuing this direction in his essay "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy" (1970d) just before his untimely death. In any case, two interrelated lines of investigation and results in relation to the "naturality" of the natural attitude of the world had now been established in "On Multiple Realities" which may be briefly summarized as follows.

First, the natural attitude of the world of daily life fundamentally involves an eminently practical motive within an intersubjective *Wirkwelt* (world of working) which is the scene and object of our actions. It is into this *Wirkwelt* which we have to gear ourselves bodily change to realize our purposes among Others as it offers resistance to us which we must either overcome or to which we must yield. Insofar as this *Wirkwelt* is the world of our practical actions, bodily operations, tasks, resistances, and communication it is said to be our *paramount reality*.

Second, the many other orders of reality in which we live, from scientific theorizing to religion, art, theater, dreams, and phantasms, are ultimately founded in this *Wirkwelt* with each consisting of a specific epoché or tension of consciousness involving a withdrawal from the reality of this *Wirkwelt*.

In clarifying this second line of investigation into the natural attitude of the world, Schutz concludes the essay by directly citing Fink's article and then the latter's proposed '*communicative paradoxes*' besetting the phenomenologist. (see: Fink, 1933: 381-383; Schutz, 1973b: 256-259)[5] The first paradox concerns the difficulty, in having performed the reduction, of the phenomenologist communicating his knowledge to the "dogmatist" within the world of the natural attitude, even when, while remaining in the transcendental attitude, he places himself "in" the natural attitude as a transcendental situation seen through by him. The second paradox then concerns the mundane world concepts and language through which the phenomenologist must attempt to convey a non-worldly meaning which cannot be remedied by the invention of an artificial language.

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[5] Although Schutz does not take up Fink's third paradox concerning "*die logische Paradoxie transzendentaler Bestimmungen,*" (see: Fink, 1933: 383) it may be conjectured that it is also dissolved, but then at a general level within the entire article "On Multiple Realities" by Schutz developing a notion of "multiple finite provinces of meaning."

In general, Schutz argues that there are no necessary unsolvable communicative paradoxes as there is no necessary "inner conflict" between the mundane and the transcendent world in itself. More specifically, he argues that these phenomenological paradoxes are merely specific instances of the age-old problem of "indirect communication" of any pure meditation and "exist only as long as we take ... the finite provinces of meaning as ontological static entities, objectively existing outside the stream of individual consciousness within which they originate." (Schutz, 1973b: 257-258)

It may now be concluded that the claimed antithesis between the mundane and transcendental realms has essentially arisen from Fink's ontologizing of them and then in three general steps. First, by confronting the neo-Kantian formalization of the phenomenological reduction with a notion of a "first literary objectivation" of the reduction by Husserl, so as to interpret Husserl's *Ideas* as highly provisional, involving an equivocal and fluid terminology. (see, for example: Fink, 1933: 347 and 362) Second, in claiming that all this is necessarily due to an unavoidable "falsity" (*Falschheit*) involved in having to begin the reduction within the determinations of the dogmatic natural attitude. (see, for example, Fink, 1933: 347 and 357) Third, in Fink's attempt to clarify phenomenology by positing hypostatized categories of a "transcendental realm" and a "realm of the natural attitude" which essentially lack an explicit reference to individual consciousness.

Schutz, instead of considering the phenomenological epoché in terms of a formalized method or unsolvable paradox between two ontologically hypostatized realms instead focuses on the epoché as a certain subjective tension of consciousness, thereby, once more turning back towards the original subjective side of the philosophizing spirit of phenomenology as an original activity of self-reflexion, while still taking into consideration that relationship to what in a very early letter he already calls the lived bodily "act of writing." (Grathoff, 1989a: 8) In focusing upon the lived starting point of the reflective epoché within the world of the natural attitude which, furthermore, does not reduce those higher philosophical thoughts to this starting point, Schutz could indeed properly carry out an analysis of Husserl's epoché and, more generally, other types of epochés precisely within his more limited self-reflexive analyses of a phenomenology of the natural attitude of the life-world. Indeed, he would be working within what he calls an "*in-between realm"* (*Zwischenreich*)

in which "the philosophical categories are just as insufficient as the sociological towards the solution of the most modest philosophical problems." (Grathoff, 1985: 134, my translation) Yet, this modest claim and goal would lead to his developing for phenomenology an entire realm of social phenomenology understood as an attempted clarification of our always lived starting point in the natural attitude of the life-world.

IV. The 'Living' Natural Attitude of the Life-World

After "On Multiple Realities" and then in completing "Making Music Together" (1976a) and "Choosing Among Projects of Action" (1973d) with all their analyses of intersubjective and subjective "potentiality" (*Vermöglichkeit*) starting out from the world of the natural attitude, Schutz informs Gurwitsch in their correspondence of the following. "And then something else happened to me ... 'I am with book' ... The whole thing will be entitled *The World beyond Question or The World as Taken for Granted*, and will be a phenomenology of the natural attitude." (Grathoff, 1985: 194, my translation; see: Schutz 1970c)

Schutz's choice of these at first apparently dull titles to express his excitement concerning new insights, ideas, and thoughts about the phenomenology of the natural attitude in a now projected second book is at first a bit bewildering. However, all this quickly vanishes when interpreted in terms of the above developing context. Remaining unanswerable in transcendental phenomenology is how the transcendental ego understood as the ultimate constitutive sense origin of the world is ever to account for how the mundane ego then "paradoxically" enters into a so-called blind dogmatic living in that world. Thus, in folding the above manuscript into his later developing *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*. (Schutz/Luckmann 1979, 1984) Schutz would continue to maintain this general guiding theme now expressed even more clearly as a motto for that book. Quoting Lessing, he writes: "The greatest wonder of all is that the true genuine wonders should become and can become so everyday-like." (Schutz, 1984: 246, my translation) More specifically, in analyzing the taken for grantedness of the world of the natural attitude, Schutz would be focusing upon how the experiences of transcendence, including not only transcendences of existents (*Seienden*), but all immanent transcendences and even transcendences of the world itself, are incorporated within the "Here and Now" and which, thus, makes possible the very taken for granted

structure of the life-world. (see, for example: Grathoff, 1989a: 234-238; Schutz, 1973e) Although admitting other means, Schutz would ultimately focus upon and analyze the appresentational relationships of marks, indications, signs, and symbols. In general, the "taken for grantedness" of the world of the natural attitude, instead of a blind dogmatic confused living, is shown to be and analyzed as what makes the life-world at first liveable and then is our own intersubjective world. At the same time important new subjective transcendent experiences are admitted in which this world as a whole is reflected upon and interpreted through symbols.

Of course, it is here impossible to provide even a summary-like representation of all the various aspects and features of what we have called this now ever increasing concrete and living natural attitude of the life-world. In general, it may be said that even Husserl's analyses of the life-world in regard to their social aspects would be considered as a "ship run aground" (*Scheitern*) and in disarray (see: Grathoff, 1985: 379-380. Husserl, 1970) Schutz would be more involved in carrying out such concrete analyses of the social world as indicated under such titles as "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality," (1976b) "Symbol, Reality, and Society," (1973e) "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," (1976c) and "Some Structures of the Life-World." (1970b) In the following, we shall limit ourselves to four of his most important general and interrelated lines of investigation and results which may be said to be foundational and essential for his continuing social phenomenological analyses of the natural attitude of the life-world.[6]

First, the subjective actor is now analyzed in terms of the social "Person" with topical, interpretational, and motivational relevances by which this taken for granted world achieves various intersubjective artic-ulations with Others. This resembles, as Schutz puts it, not a political map with closed realms of various provinces of knowledge, but rather a topo-graphical map of a mountain range with various interpenetrations, en-claves, fringes, and sliding twilight zones, including contour lines and various diversified configurations. Obviously, this goes well beyond any simple theme, field, and horizon analyses of the world and underlies any of those higher functional analyses of the division of labor or the distri-bution of knowledge in society.

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[6] For the more specific details of the development of these four areas in the work of Schutz. (see: Vaitkus, 1991a, also 2000b)

Second, Schutz now claims that the *Wirkwelt* and the "world of everyday life" no longer coincide as he begins to offer his more general and embracing theory of intersubjectivity integrating one's knowledge of the *Dasein* or consciousness of the Other, the *So-sein* or relative natural world view, the understanding of the concrete motives of the Other's action, and, finally, our symbolic understandings, all based within the person's natural attitude of the life-world.

Third, Schutz now begins to develop a deep and wide-reaching analysis of language which is not only related to the previously mentioned multiple realities, experienced transcendences, and general appresentational relationships, but, more specifically, to apperceptual, appresentational, referential, and contextual orders all of which display an intricate multiplicity and multidimensionality of sense in regard to any mark, indication, sign, or symbol.

Fourth, the symbol is most importantly analyzed as the subjective actor's creative and reflective general expression of the transcendent world, and is said to be only genuinely interpretable through other symbols and then by those who have found the keys to decipher them. Although the symbol will be at times more generally analyzed by Schutz, it is always this subjectively reflective origin and its continuing preservation upon which he remains focused. For example, while the symbol is further analyzed in terms of its involvement in the self-reflective understanding and constitution of the social group, it is simultaneously in this regard also to be further analyzed in terms of its possibly becoming taken for granted and imposed upon the subjective individual, or different social groups. (see, for example: Schutz, 1976c) More generally speaking, the symbols of a finite province of meaning are also to be analyzed in relation to the dominating contemporary archetypal closed symbol system of the mathematical natural sciences, and in relation to their possible continuing potentiality in passing through the official so-called "sluice gates" of society.

V. Some Incipient Speculative Themes in Regard to the 'Living' Natural Attitude of the Life-World

In having generally drawn out and analyzed the development of Schutz's social phenomenology of the natural attitude of the life-world, we may now take up a number of incipient speculative themes in regard to it

which, although manifested in clear hints or discernable traces in Schutz's work, remain highly undeveloped. The importance and even necessity of considering them consists in displaying the creative developing character of Schutz's phenomenological analyses of the natural attitude and in providing some further openings for its future development. Of course, in attempting to present and especially to draw out such incipient speculative themes, it will be at times necessary to rely upon our own imaginative resources more so than is usually the case.

In order to approach these speculative themes let us begin with Schutz's investigations into the processes of typification with which most readers of Schutz should be familiar and which have been insightfully commented upon by such expert interpreters as Gurwitsch and Natanson who were not only closely associated with Schutz, but who are outstanding social phenomenologists in their own right. Schutz's investigations into the processes of typification would clearly continue to constitute an essential aspect of his work just as they did from the very beginning. In his "Introduction" (1970) to Schutz's *Collected Papers III*, Aron Gurwitsch, who primarily focuses there upon Schutz's notion of the life-world, rightly stresses these analyses of typification. Likewise, Maurice Natanson in his re-entitled essay "The World as Taken for Granted" (see: 1974) does the same. Furthermore, both also correctly point towards the subjective and active side of typification within Schutz's natural attitude of the life-world. However, it must now be seriously questioned whether interpreting this typification as a 'specification of types' as in Gurwitsch or, on the contrary, as anonymous types through which the transcendental self existentially projects itself as in Natanson is fully adequate. The former still appears to rely upon Schutz's earlier transcendental groundwork involving a phenomenological psychology, while the latter upon the also earlier and what may now be called "inverted conflicting worlds" of the transcendental and mundane. In both the subjective side of the natural attitude is, thereby, largely narrowed and restricted. In Gurwitsch's account as a more limited specification of the transcendental, and in Natanson's, particularly in his more specific further analyses, as a mundane "faith" or belief in types interpreted as a mundane analogue through which the transcendental may erupt in continuing acts of illuminated commitment to the taken for granted typifications of that world. It is without question important and even a welcome surprise to find Natanson in this one place, as far as can be

presently determined, drawing upon this most important and largely neglected side of Schutz's work, namely, the mundane subjective actor's basic faith or belief in the world. Yet, he essentially allows it to then vanish as a fugitive mundane experience in service of a transcendental existentialism's acts of commitment always involving a Yes or No to the world.

Schutz, in a number of sketchy remarks never worked out, clearly and indisputably points to the foundational importance of the subjective actor's faith or belief in the world of the natural attitude. For example, he not only states that "intersubjective experience, communication, sharing of something in common presupposes ... in the last analysis faith," (Schutz, 1976b: 155) but, furthermore, that "if this belief in ... the inter-subjective experience of the world breaks down, then the very possibility of establishing communication ... is destroyed." (Schutz, 1976b: 143) Moreover, in pointing out that any explicit acts of believing or disbe-lieving in this intersubjective experience of the world already represents a bankruptcy of this belief, (see, for example: Schutz, 1976b: 156) Schutz clearly points to a most primordial subjective aspect of this belief which permeates then all typifications and the very horizons of this world.

In relation to all of the foregoing, it may now be suggested that further more specific investigations in this direction by Schutz were perhaps still blocked by holding on to, (no doubt for purposes of continuing phenomenological identification and location) that most general and widely-held, yet preconceived designation of the natural attitude as a mere "belief" (*Glauben*) in the world. (see: Husserl, 1973, sec. 8; 1962, sec. 31ff.; Fink, 1933: 348ff.) However, as a mere "belief," the natural attitude still remains abstractly preconstrued in primed readiness and in direct immediacy to being then simply transformed into that absolute knowledge of the world of the transcendental ego. It may be here asked whether a 'fiduciary attitude of the life-world' (see, for example: Vaitkus, 1991a, 1991b, 1995, 2000b) generally understood as a proto-trust (*Urvertrauen*) within intersubjectivity and then ultimately in the world would, perhaps, open up and further promote such later Schutzian investigations. In place of any analyses of a mere general "belief in" types and the world, some of the first research themes of such future investigations could then focus on the primordial trust in one's lived body, care-taking mother or Other, one's own newborn, and the very

suppressing of "difficulties" in controlling of types leading out to the world.

In any case with respect to another different developing theme concerning typification and the natural attitude of the life-world what neither Gurwitsch nor Natanson touch upon is Schutz's last article "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy" (1970d); an article which many other readers have often bypassed as a mere complicated philosophical critique of Husserl's notion of the eidetic reduction. Although it is here impossible to go into the subtle details of this article which summarily examines the notion of type throughout Husserl's late works, what is of general importance to us is that it does *not* involve a critique of the eidetic reduction or the carrying out of it per se, but rather concerns a certain phenomenological understanding of it. In concluding, Schutz writes:

> The question of first importance which presents itself is whether the "free variations" ... are indeed as free as they seem ... Is it possible, by means of free variations in phantasy, to grasp the eidos ... unless these variations are limited by the frame of the type in terms of which we have experienced, in the natural attitude, the object from which the process ... starts as a familiar one? ... Then there is indeed merely a difference of degree between type and eidos. (1970d: 114-115)

While Schutz does not claim to have definitively investigated or answered this question, and while the question was no doubt intended to point the direction towards future work, what he does claim to have established is the initial more general claim that the notions of the eidetic reduction and type in Husserl's work are primarily "operative" as opposed to "thematic" notions.[7] In general, *thematic notions* are defined as aiming at "the fixation and preservation of ... fundamental concepts," while *operative notions* are instead viewed as *vague* devices in forming the thematic notions and as "models of thought or intellectual schemata

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[7] Although Schutz borrows these notions from Fink, (see: Fink, 1959 or 1957) his use of them in the context of a theory of symbols, transcendent finite provinces of meaning, the subjective act of writing, and the *Wirkwelt* of the natural attitude of the life-world in contrast to Fink's use within a broad hermeneutic of naïveté and reflection which he admits involves a dialectic already points to fundamental differences and an important research topic for future investigation.

which ... remain opaque and thematically unclarified." (Schutz, 1970d: 92)

In beginning to focus upon Husserl's notions of the eidetic reduction and typicality as operative notions or such vague devices, simply offer in a new clarified methodology of the eidetic reduction would not immediately lead Schutz back towards Husserl's transcendental thematic analyses, a consequent more precise clarification of them, and even new transcendental phenomenological findings. Rather, it appears safe to assume that he continues to proceed precisely in the other direction related to the world of the natural attitude, and instead wishes to demonstrate in what way the eidetic reduction remains an operational concept, namely, in its being potentially limited by and founded within the types already given in the natural attitude of the life-world such that, as he says, the whole process may begin as a familiar one. In generally putting forth and further stating that thematic and operative notions are distinguishable in the work of *any major* philosopher, and we may add social scientist, it is suggested that the most general lines of possible future investigation here concern the very inner development of these notions, but then in a specifically Schutzian sense different from that of any other scholars.[8]

In general, the thematic notions of theoreticians are of course always open to inner theoretical critique. However, from the perspective of a phenomenology of the natural attitude, while the thematic notions may be analyzed no more than as general symbols involving an inner striving towards truth of a pre-thematized subject-matter, the related operative symbolic notions may be more specifically analyzed, precisely in all their ambiguity, as involving a certain '*symbolic transformation*' of the natural attitude, while being appresentationally grounded in the taken for granted world and, ultimately, in the *Wirkwelt* of the lived bodily Act of writing. As Schutz once referred to these matters at a very general level in the *Correspondence*: "To put it metaphorically, it is a matter of whether I write 'a + b + c + d' or 'a + (b + c + d)' or 'a + b + (c + d)', etc., etc. I hope that you understand me." (Grathoff, 1989a: 157)

In moving on to another theme, it could be said that as the concrete livingness of the natural attitude of the life-world became ever more fully developed in his later works, Schutz would be investigating the

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[8]   See note 7 above.

grounding of various operative notions involved in different social theories, both explicit and implicit, within the original natural attitude of the life-world. In regard to his own social phenomenological work, there are grounds to believe that he may have been developing a most profound and deep-reaching notion of the "aphorism" understood as an operative notion. Already in his 1952 essay, "Santayana on Society and Government," Schutz writes that the "aphorism" belongs to the typical masterworks of old age, thereby phenomenologically defining aphorism as that "pithy maxim, which, as the Greek root of the term indicates (apo-horizo), detaches its meaning from its horizon." (1976d: 202) He then immediately adds: "Yet this horizon, consisting of the fringes around the conceptual kernel of the proposition, is precisely the undisclosed pattern to be explored."

The social phenomenological aphorism in this sense would consist of a *grasping insight* in the very radical sense of reaching out into the horizon and depths of the life-world as far as possible and detaching a vague general meaning which, in being then concisely expressed in symbols, would constitute that which is to be thereafter explored and investigated in detail. In our further recognizing that this social phenomenological aphorism is essentially a critically reflexive "in-between insight" which is related and located between, but goes beyond both Husserl's philosophical eidetic reduction and the more limited and often implicit operational notions of the social sciences, it may be said that a much closer possible relationship between social phenomenology and the social sciences is being set forth and established. In regard to the social sciences, Schutzian-like investigations could now be said to provide a proper reflexive foundation for the social sciences in the natural attitude of the life-world and broadening out of this very horizonal basis of the social sciences through an ever further disclosure of that world.

Upon the basis of the social phenomenological "aphorism," social phenomenology could potentially provide continually new "eruptive insights" into the social sciences themselves to further serve not only as guides, but to contribute to the respective procedures and required empirical specifics of that level of work. It remains an open question, for example, whether Luckmann's proposed architectonic of social research levels in regard to any specific research theme depends upon some such sort of "initial insight" for the very possibility of their inner concrete arrangement and developing relationality in researching a specific theme.

However, his very clear claim that phenomenology must remain open to the correlative findings of the specific social sciences must be readily admitted. (see, for example: Luckmann, 1995, 1983, 1970; see also: Vaitkus, 2000a: 286-288) The above development of the social phenomenology of the natural attitude of the life-world demonstrates that it is precisely the recognition of its findings as fundamental and firm but essentially always incomplete which provides social phenomenology with one of its essential reflective principles, creative potentiality, and guarantee of an unlimited productive longevity. Finally, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be clearly stated that this notion of the social phenomenological aphorism cannot be interpretively subsumed by any of the established linguistic or literary perspectives. The "aphorism" in Schutz's sense is a distinctively social phenomenological notion which involves an *inner unity* of apparently contradictory formal propositions; symbolic, indirectly communicable, vague (or even "literary") meaning; a directive for social research into the horizon; and, of course, everyday common linguistic sense within the natural attitude of the life-world.

Proponents of more recent philosophical phenomenology, particularly social phenomenology, are asked now to include these speculative themes.[9] It must be stated that we must and do all begin obviously from within first of all the natural attitude of the everyday life-world itself. However, as a situated consciousness in the sense of a radical lived bodiliness engaged in immediate contact with what Schutz ultimately called a fundamentally intransparent world, (see: Schutz/Luckmann, 1979: 209; Grathoff, 1989a: 210-212) it is here further recognized that this world is also immediately experienced as offering resistances which require efforts to overcome. It is eminently and by necessity a *typified social world* in which we carry out far-reaching and sometimes global projects of action, but in which we nevertheless still write with pen or other utensils. Moreover, as social beings it is understood that it is only we who are uniquely capable of recognizing this lived world as our paramount reality, and then only through being able to enter into other worlds or multiple realities by which we not only sustain it as our existent world, but through which we attempt to comprehend all life and imaginative spirit. If such a complexity of social ambiguities in tension,

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[9] In this regard, see, for example, the insightful works of Waldenfels. (e.g. 1980, 1987, and 1997)

starting out from the natural attitude and involving numerous "in-between realms" yet to be discovered, can be upheld in the face of such gross philosophical categories as idealism and materialism, and then reason, consciousness, thinking (*Denken*), Being (*Sein*), and so forth, then Schutz's unique social phenomenological perspective, and his interest and in the concrete contributions of the social sciences may be understood. Clearly, the social phenomenological aphorism is itself, philosophically speaking, no mere scientific overseeing of given objects. Rather, since it occurs before or on this side of the subject-object difference, an "inner seeing" involving a simultaneous outwardness and inwardness, and thereby a unity of description and constitution, or a reflective genesis of sense. As such it ultimately has to do with that irresolvable tension between phantasy and the reality of our living world.

With this long and complex development of Schutz's notion of the natural attitude of the life-world now before us, it is possible to put forward without fear of misinterpretation four of his most advanced representative aphorisms which outline this general context of his phenomenology of the natural attitude of the life-world.

St. Thomas's angels ... reciprocally share their entire conscious life. Angels have ... thus no life-world. (Grathoff, 1989a: 235)

Our own history is nothing else than the articulated history of our discoveries and their undoing in our autobiographically determined situation. (Schutz, 1979c: 132)

Only a careful investigation of all the implications of the general thesis of the alter ego will bring us nearer to the solution of the enigma of how man can understand his fellow-man. (Schutz, 1973c: 179)

As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity and the we-re-lationship will be the foundation for all other categories of human existence. (Schutz, 1970a: 82)

VI. Conclusion

Schutz's social phenomenology of the natural attitude of the life-world clearly displays an *ongoing social phenomenological research realm*. This has been shown in the several arguments advanced here: an

interpretation of social phenomenology as a phenomenological psychology running parallel to, but grounded in Husserl's transcendental analyses; confronting its reinterpretation and possible erosion through Fink's neo-Kantian and then antithetical conception based upon the conflicting worlds of the transcendental and mundane; overcoming the latter as a categorical ontology by re-emphasizing the subjective side of the epoché and then introducing multiple sense realities founded in a *Wirkwelt*; focusing upon subjective and intersubjective "potentiality" within the world of the natural attitude and how the natural life-world becomes taken for granted as our "living world" through the appresentational relationships of marks, indications, signs, and symbols with interrelated analyses of the social person, social action, relevance, and language which still emphasizes the subjective transcendent character of the symbol; and, finally, pointing towards such incipient speculative themes as belief, operational concepts, and the aphorism. Only by bearing in mind this encompassing inner development does the full significance of Schutz's social phenomenological program involving an ever increasing disclosure of a 'naturality' in regard to the natural attitude of the world come into view, along with the open character of his continual effort to reveal the experienced multiplicity and multidimensionalities of sense in this world.

Schutz's social phenomenology, in being always directed towards and focused upon our subjectively experienced naturally lived life-world in all its subjective potentiality and the inexhaustible phenomenal aspects from which any social scientific thinking must and does start, can thus never essentially be reduced to any one-sided social theoretical conceptualization or theory of society. In being best understood as a social phenomenological dynamic unity of phenomenological reflection and research work where the final concern was with the social theorizing subjective spirit in general, it does not essentially involve drawing out any one particular concept, mere definitions, the carrying out of formal analyses of concepts, the tying of connecting knots between terms, the mere summating of various theories, or even the erection of conceptual building blocks. It rather partakes in Husserl's original phenomenological program clearly expressed in the maxim of an "original self-activity" directed back towards experience and like all phenomenology is a "moving, in contrast to a stationary, philosophy." (Spiegelberg, 1976: 2) In this sense, today just as before, Schutz's social phenomenology may be

said to present an extensive field of research work which in principle is always open for fruitful further investigative exploration. Here, Schutz's work may not only be characterized in terms of its rightful place as a "*classic*," but, moreover, as a "*living classic*" by in essence opening up and out into the most profound depths of our living experience of the social world, while the integrated full humanity of the social thinker is inwardly brought back into the social sciences as a matter of ever expanding foundations and the social phenomenological aphorism.

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Between the Everyday Life-World and the World of Social Scientific Theory—Towards an "Adequate" Social Thory[*]

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Abstract. *The aim of this paper is to explore the kind of social science Alfred Schutz conceives as one firmly founded on phenomenological insights. To achieve this aim, I first discuss the methodological postulates formulated by Schutz for the construction of social scientific constructs, considering their relations as well as his intention in formulating each of them. Second, I paraphrase his arguments about "types of knowledge," i.e., the "expert," the "man on the street," and the "well-informed citizen." In the course of this discussion, I turn to Max Weber's conception of the "adequacy of ideal typical construction" and attempt a comparison between Weber's "cultural beings" (Kulturmenschen) and Schutz's "well-informed citizen."*

I. Preliminary Remarks

Alfred Schutz's discussion of the methodological postulates is founded on his arguments about multiple realities, which in turn are founded on the insights derived from his phenomenological analysis of the life-world on both the pre-predicative and predicative levels: The everyday life-world and the world of social science are *finite provinces of meaning*, conceived of not as already constituted ontological entities but as relative to the characteristics of constitutive elements of reality. Some of these elements he describes as "cognitive styles." Every meaning-reference in the everyday life-world, self-evident to the naïve person, must therefore, for the social scientist, undergo a fundamental specific modification in reference to the cognitive style characteristic of the world of social science. Consequently each social science has to develop the type of such modification proper to it, that is to work out its particular methods.

The conception of social science based on such arguments has therefore to provide an "*equation of transformation* according to which the phenomena of the life-world become transformed by a process of ideali-

zation." (Schutz, 1940a: 138, emphasis added) The methodological postu-lates of social scientific constructs can be considered as kinds of "equa-tions of transformation" for relating the world of social scientific theory to the everyday life-world.

This "equation of transformation," however, must not be conceived of as the so-called "scientific method," e.g., techniques for doing experiments or methods for manipulating empirical data. Those techniques and methods, used for attaining what are taken to be accurate results from experiments or empirical research, can be thought of in an analogy to, for example, the U.S. dollar - Japanese Yen exchange rate. The exchange rate can be established insofar as the "fields" of Japanese Yen and US dollar have been already established on the same "level" in the Schutzian sense, (Schutz, 1945b: 38) and independent of each other. Thus, if both the everyday life-world and the world of scientific theory could be assumed to have been already established in themselves—borrowing from the Schutzian terms, "as ontological entities, as objectively existing outside the human mind who thinks them" (Schutz, 1945a: 191)—the assumption might be made that "accurate" data could be obtained, that is, the everyday life-world could be transformed into the world of scientific theory simply by applying the proper "scientific methods." Schutz's discussion of finite provinces of meaning, by contrast, makes clear that the transformation of common-sense constructs into social scientific constructs is far from straightforward.

Schutz conceives of finite provinces of meaning as "names for different tensions of one and the same consciousness, and it is the same unbroken life which is attended to in different modification." (Schutz, 1945b: 258) In his discussion, the four moments—the moment by which experience is constituted; the moment by which meaning is bestowed on experience; the moment by which reality is articulated and constituted; and the moment by which the experiencing self is constituted—are equivalent. (Nasu, 1997: 41; 1999b: 80) It then follows that no province of meaning can be an entity existing in itself, and "there is no possibility of referring one of these provinces to the other by introducing a formula of transformation." (Schutz, 1945b: 232) The analogy of the exchange rate for U.S. dollar—Japanese Yen does not apply to the transformation of common-sense constructs into social scientific constructs. There is no definite rule leading to the transformation of the tension of consciousness.

What kind of "equation of transformation" can be referred to in a discussion of Schutzian methodological postulates? What do these postu-

lates require of a social scientist? When these postulates are fulfilled, what kind of social science can be achieved?

II. What do the Methodological Postulates mean?

Although Schutz had already discussed some postulates for the social sciences in his *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932), he formulated them in definite form for the first time in his paper prepared for the "Harvard Seminar for Rationality" organized by Talcott Parsons and Joseph Schumpeter in April 1940. In this paper, he introduced the "postulate of subjective interpretation" and the "postulate of adequacy" as being applicable to all levels of the social sciences and therefore governing all the *historical* sciences, and the "postulate of rationality" as being applicable only to the *theoretical* sciences. (Schutz, 1940b: 22-23; 1943a: 85-86, emphasis added)

The postulate of rationality is formulated as follows:

> the mean-end relations together with the system of constant motives and the system of life-plans must be constructed in such a way that: (a) it remains in full compatibility with the principles of formal logic; (b) all its elements are conceived in full clearness and distinctness; (c) it contains only scientifically verifiable assumptions, which have to be in full compatibility with the whole of our scientific knowledge. These three requirements may be condensed into another *postulate* for the building up of the ideal types, that of *rationality*. (Schutz, 1940b: 23; 1943a: 86)

This postulate might be said to have been formulated so as to guarantee the claim that the social sciences are *theoretical*.

The term, "postulate of rationality," cannot, however, be found in any other of Schutz's papers. In his essay reviewing Parsons' *The Structure of Social Action*, written in the summer of 1940, Schutz described four postulates: "relevance," "adequacy," "logical consistency," and "compatibility." (Schutz, 1960: 18-19) In one of his most famous papers, "Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," read at the Princeton meeting organized by Harold Garfinkel in 1952, Schutz presented three postulates: "logical consistency," "subjective interpretation," and "adequacy," (Schutz, 1953: 43-44) and these three postulates were

maintained in his paper read at the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Science in 1953. (Schutz, 1954: 62-64)

It is, however, by no means correct to insist that Schutz abandoned the postulate of rationality after his lecture at Harvard. As a matter of fact, three of the four postulates in his review essay for Parsons' book (i.e., the postulates of logical consistency, of relevance, and of compatibility) correspond to the three requirements of (a) (b) (c) in the formula of the postulate of *rationality* in the Harvard seminar. Again the contents of (a) (b) (c) are condensed into the postulate of *logical consistency* in the Princeton paper.

Taking these situations into account, I shall investigate the three postulates of subjective interpretation, logical consistency, and adequacy in more detail.

Three points about the postulate of *subjective interpretation* are of particular importance here. First, Schutz points out clearly that this postulate is a general principle for constructing course-of-action types in common-sense experience. (Schutz, 1953: 25 and 34) Second, this postulate, which requires social scientists to "refer to the subjective meaning of the actions of human beings from which social reality originates," (Schutz, 1954: 62) takes aim at maintaining *continuity* between common-sense and social scientific interpretations as well as *differentiation* between the social and the natural sciences. Third, this postulate is formulated in two ways, that is, on the one hand, as the *posture* or *readiness* of social scientists to ask "the experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs," (Schutz, 1954: 57) and, on the other hand, as the procedure for constructing social scientific constructs. (Schutz, 1943a: 85; 1953: 43)

By contrast, both the postulates of *logical consistency* and of *adequacy* are formulated for providing guarantees that the social scientific constructs "are by no means arbitrary." (Schutz, 1954: 64) These postulates are however different from each other in their way of achieving that guarantee.

The *postulate of logical consistency* is intended to give such guarantee by *differentiating* the world of social science from the everyday life-world and then establishing the "*unification* of the social scientific field." (Schutz, 1945c: 583-585) It is important to recognize here that this postulate is also formulated in two ways, in a broad sense and in a narrow one. The postulate of logical consistency in a *broad sense*, shown above to be equivalent to the *postulate of rationality* in the Harvard lecture and formulated together with the postulate of subjective interpretation and

that of adequacy in the Princeton paper, contains *not only* the postulate of logical consistency in a *narrow sense*, which requires the system of ideal types to be "in full compatibility with [*only*] the principles of formal logic." (Schutz, 1960: 19) It *also* contains the postulates of relevance and of compatibility.

This point, although often overlooked, is of great importance. It shows clearly that Schutz does *not* think the scientificness of the social sciences, i.e., the highest degree of clarity and distinctness of their conceptual framework, (Schutz, 1953: 43) is achieved only by full compatibility with the principles of formal logic.

The postulate of relevance is formulated as follows: "The formation of ideal types must comply with the principle of relevance." (Schutz, 1943a: 18) The *principle of relevance* means the *principle of reflexivity* between the objects constituted by the subjects and the subjects constituting the objects, that is, the principle of organization of experience itself. (Schutz, 1943a: 84; 1970; Nasu, 1997; 1999b) As such, this principle governs not only the construction process of scientific reality but also that of common-sense reality. This principle is "applicable at each level of social study" (Schutz, 1940a: 86; 1940b: 23) and also to "Verstehen as the experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs." (Schutz, 1953: 57)

It follows that there is an additional factor introduced when the *principle* of relevance is presented as one of the *postulates* of social scientific activities. The postulate of relevance as a constituent of the postulate of logical consistency requires that social scientists must not orient their research in terms of the pragmatic motives prevailing in the everyday life-world. Instead they are required to put into brackets the frame of recognition which they have learned naturally through the socialization process. Furthermore the postulate of relevance requires them to determine what has to be investigated and what can be taken for granted, that is, the "level" of investigation,[1] solely on the basis of the scientific problem which they themselves have posited.

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[1] The "level" of investigation is "just another expression for the demarcation line between all that does and does not pertain to the problem under consideration, the former being the topics to be investigated, explicated, clarified, the latter, the other elements of scientist's knowledge which, because they are irrelevant to his problem, he decides to accept in their givenness, without questioning, as mere data." (Schutz, 1945b: 249-250) This idea of unifying the social scientific field through establishing the "level" of one's own investigation by oneself, which is contained in the postulate

Thus, the postulate of logical consistency in a broad sense aims at guaranteeing social scientific constructs to be "by no means arbitrary" not only by full compatibility with the principles of formal logic. In so far as it contains the postulate of relevance, it also aims at providing such guarantees by unifying the social scientific field through bracketing the "natural attitude" and positing the "level" of investigation solely on the basis of the scientific problem which social scientists have established by themselves. In other words, the unification of the social scientific field can be adequately achieved as a *finite province of meaning* only in compliance with the postulate of relevance.[2]

How is *the postulate of adequacy* intended to provide guarantees that social scientific constructs are by no means arbitrary? What does adequacy mean?

One might say that a social scientific construct is *adequate* if one can actually find such events and behaviors in the "factual" world as seem to follow the courses depicted in the construct. If this is the case, adequacy might be synonymous with *empirical verification*. Under this criterion, *the more approximate* the construct is to the "factual" events, *the more adequate* the construct is, and *vice versa*. However, this *does not* hold true for the concept of adequacy in the Schutzian sense. I now turn my attention to the work of Max Weber in order to make this point clear, since Schutz said that "I propose to call (this postulate), borrowing a term of Max Weber, the *postulate of adequacy*." (Schutz, 1943a: 85)

III. The Concept of Ideal-Type and Adequacy in Max Weber

Max Weber discussed the concept of adequacy in terms of "adequacy of ideal typical construction," "adequacy of ideal types," and "adequacy of interpretation." Since these three topics are interrelated, concern here is

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of logical consistency *in a broad sense*, gives foundation for criticism of Parsons' argument for tacitly importing common-sense interpretation into scientific inquiry on the one hand, and for covering common-sense interpretation with scientific statements, i.e., "the garment of idea," on the other hand. (Nasu, 1997, chaps. 3 and 5)

2   If social scientific research is done on the assumption that the field of social science can be unified only in full compliance with the postulate of logical consistency in a *narrow* sense, i.e., with the principles of formal logic, such research can be said to be led by the basic attitude which "accepts naively the social world with all the alter egos and institutions in it as a meaning universe." (Schutz, 1960: 5) As for the serious problems with such social sciences. (see Nasu 1999a, esp. 5-7)

mainly with his discussion of the adequacy of ideal typical construction. Then, what is an ideal type?

Weber characterized the nature and the function of the ideal type as being "like a *utopia* which has been arrived at by *imaginative* accentuation (*gedankliche* Steigerung) of certain elements of reality." (Weber, 1904: 190) "It (the ideal type) has the significance of a purely ideal *limiting* concept (rein ideale *Grenz*begriff) with which the real situation or action is *measured* and *compared* for the explication (Verdeutlichung) of its certain significant components." (Weber, 1904: 194)

How precisely can this "*imaginative* accentuation of certain elements of reality" be achieved? How can "certain elements" be selected from reality? I find no answer to these questions in Weber's description. However it is clear that he introduced the *objective* and *hypostatized* category of "cultural significance" as a principle of ideal typical construction. The reason for his introduction of this category can be found in the fact that the type of social science which he pursued was an "*empirical science of concrete reality*" (*Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*) or "*cultural science*" (*Kulturwissenschaft*). Empirical science "aims at understanding (Verstehen) our surrounding concrete reality of life *in terms of its uniqueness*—the relationships and cultural *significance* of its individual phenomena (Erscheinung) in their contemporary manifestation (Gestaltung) on the one hand, and the causes of their being historically so and otherwise on the other hand." (Weber, 1904: 170) Cultural science tries to "recognize (erkennen) the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural *significance*." (Weber, 1904: 175) For Weber, the ideal type serves as a methodological tool with the help of which empirical and cultural sciences can explicate the con-crete reality of life in terms of its cultural significance.

I would like to attend here in particular to Weber's statement that the ideal type must be a "purely ideal *limiting* concept" in order for it to be a useful, helpful, and effective methodological tool. What does the adjective phrase "purely ideal limiting" mean? Although Weber did not say clearly, it would seem that such ideal types contain *only* elements which are worthwhile knowing because of their bearing certain reference to *cultural significance*. Furthermore, according to Weber, such elements can be determined definitely. Adequate ideal types must be in this sense "relatively lacking in the fullness of concrete content." (Weber, 1920: 9)

From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that the concept of the "adequacy of ideal typical construction" in Weber's sense is by no

means synonymous with *empirical verification*. There is no positive relation between its approximation to factual events and its adequacy. Rather, the ideal type in Weber's sense can serve as a methodological tool for empirical and cultural sciences only when the ideal type "*recedes* (*entfernen*) from the concrete reality," (Weber, 1920: 10) i.e., has the nature of *utopia*, being *pure*. For Weber, this receding is performed by selecting and choosing only certain parts, phases or aspects from the infinitely complex concrete phenomena. Such selection and choice is not performed arbitrarily, but in relation to the "*cultural value* (*Kulturwertideen*) with which we approach reality." (Weber, 1904: 178)

IV. Adequacy in the Schutzian Methodological Postulate

Weber introduced the objective and hypostatized category of *cultural value* (or *cultural significance*) as a *guiding principle* of ideal typical construction. The reason for the introduction of this category is claimed to be to provide guarantees for the ideal type by focusing on culturally significant phenomena instead of arbitrary construction. In other words, Weber introduced such categories for making the ideal type *adequate*.

How did Schutz address this matter? By means of the postulate of ade-quacy Schutz, like Weber, aimed at constructing a *purely ideal limiting* concept by *receding from factuality* and arriving at a *sufficient explication* of concrete reality of life. Both Weber and Schutz tried to guarantee ideal types or social scientific constructs against their arbitrary construction and to construct the *adequate* ideal type by selecting, choosing and imag-inatively accentuating certain elements or aspects of reality.

This similarity is a result, I think, of the similarity of the goal of the social sciences which Weber and Schutz pursued. Both conceived of the social sciences as activities which have the goal *not* of discovering the laws of society assumed to actually govern social reality *but* of understanding and recognizing *certain* social phenomena in terms of their uniqueness by their comparison to the *pure* ideal type.

However, Weber and Schutz differ significantly from each other in their conception of "*purity.*" Weber tried to guarantee the purity of ideal type by limiting its elements to those which are worthwhile knowing *because of* their certain reference to *cultural significance*; Schutz tried to guarantee purity by including only those elements *relevant* to the *scientific problem* for the sake of which the ideal type is constructed.

This difference derives, I think, *firstly* from their difference with regard to the goal of the social sciences as it can be achieved with the help of ideal types. More precisely, it results from their difference with regard to the conception of "understanding" (Verstehen), which in turn derives from their difference with regard to the meaning of meaning (Sinn). Weber is a social scientist *per se*. The subject matter of social science is, borrowing the terms from Schutz, (Schutz, 1932: 283) "the real-ontological content of the social world," and the goal of social science is "to explain the general properties of the objective social world and to make some propositions about the social world." (Eberle, 1999) Weber therefore aims at "understanding our surrounding concrete reality of life *in terms of its uniqueness*" and "recognizing the phenomena of life in terms of their *cultural significance,*" which social scientists assume implicitly to be shared in common and introduce into their analysis. Schutz is however a social scientist *with a firm foundation in phenomenology*, and the goal of phenomenology is "to describe the universal structures of subjective orientation in the everyday life-world and to make some propositions about the structure of experience." (Eberle, 1999) He therefore tried to "grasp (erfassen) by a pure description the constitution of social relationships and social structure in the conscious process of individuals who live in the social world." (Schutz, 1932: 283) For Schutz, "an action is sufficiently explained (erklären) through an ideal type only when its *motives* are grasped as typical ones." (Schutz, 1932: 270)

Secondly, the difference between Weber and Schutz in the conception of purity can be considered to derive from the difference in their basic conception about the nature of social reality. Weber started his methodological discussion from a basic assumption that "it (life) presents an absolute infinite multiplicity of successively and co-existently emerging and disappearing events, both 'within' and 'outside' ourselves," (Weber, 1904: 171) and "every single perception discloses … an infinite number of constituent perceptions which can never be exhaustively expressed in a judgement." (Weber, 1904: 177) As Schutz understands him, Weber is claiming that "to the actor within the social world this social world appears as a full-blooded all-embracing reality." (Schutz, 1955: 141) Weber, therefore, continued to be bothered with the so-called "*irrational cleft* (*hiatus irrationalis*) between concept and reality." (Weber, 1903-1906: 15)

By contrast, Schutz obtained from his phenomenological analysis of the life-world the insight that "(t)he world, the physical as well as the social-cultural one, is experienced from the outset in terms of types." (Schutz, 1957a: 233) From the point of view of Schutz, "(s)trictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind." (Schutz, 1953: 5) Taking such a position, he can rightly say that "the postulate of 'subjective interpretation of meaning' … is not a particularity of Max Weber's sociology or of the methodology of the social sciences in general but a principle of constructing course-of-action types in common-sense experience." (Schutz, 1953: 24-25)

Taking the basic position shown above, Weber introduced the *objective* and *hypostatized* category of *cultural value* (or *cultural significance*) as a guiding rule for constructing ideal types in order to guarantee its purity, that is, to prevent its arbitrary constitution. He saw the ideal type as a purely limiting concept to the extent that it is constructed by selecting and choosing *only* certain parts, phases, or aspects which bear reference to *cultural values*, disregarding all others.

Schutz, however, did not introduce such categories as cultural value or cultural significance. Instead, for him, the purity of social scientific constructs can be attained only by "eliminating all *type-transcendent* behavior," (Schutz, 1932: 270, emphasis added) i.e., just the behavior *irrelevant to the topic or problem* for the sake of which the type has been estab-lished. (Schutz, 1932: 217; 1953: 38, 46; 1970: 63-64)

The important point here is that in the Schutzian conception "the topic or problem for the sake of which the type has been established" is *not* the topic or problem of the social scientist *but* of the actor(s) because his social science is intended to follow the postulate of subjective interpretation. The judgement of whether or not the social scientific construct is *pure* in the sense of *adequate* is left *not* to the social scientist who uses "second level constructs" *but* to actors and their fellows who use "first level constructs." It is not the ephemeral *objective* category of cultural value but the *subjective* category of actor's motives[3] that Schutz introduced for guaranteeing social scientific constructs against arbitrary construction and for its adequacy.

Thus Schutz formulated the *postulate of adequacy* as follows:

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[3]   This statement here would hold true unless the actor's motives were reduced to the "normative orientation" as Parsons actually does.

> Each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be (reasonable and) understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life. (Schutz, 1940b: 22; 1943a: 85-86; 1953: 44; 1954: 64)[4]

This condition means that "the actor [on the scene of social reality] must recognize himself in the homunculus [that is, the social scientific construct] and see in it an idealization of himself." (Gurwitsch, 1962: xxix) When such a condition is fulfilled, social scientific constructs can be said to be adequate.

V. Between the Everyday Life-World and the World of Social Science

One way that Schutz tried to prevent the arbitrary construction of social scientific constructs is by the *postulate of logical consistency*. This postulate, which is applicable only to "theoretical sciences," is intended to do its task by introducing standards such as the principles of formal logic *from the outside* and by requiring social scientists to comply with their own relevance which is *external* to actors and their partners. In order to comply with this postulate, social scientists have to *put* their own *common-sense* interpretations *into brackets*, and then have to select and choose only those elements which are *relevant not to the action on the social scene but to their own scientific problems*.

This postulate, however, risks leading to the establishment of a *closed* field of social science by *differentiating* the world of social scientific theory from the everyday life-world. To avert this risk, whenever the postulate of logical consistency is presented in Schutz's papers, he adds the *postulate of subjective interpretation*, which is formulated as the *posture* or *readiness* of social scientists for maintaining *continuity* between the everyday life-world and the world of the social sciences. Therefore, Schutz has to devise *another way* which leads to the prevention of social scientific constructs from arbitrary construction, maintaining *not differentiation,* as does the postulate of logical consistency, *but continuity* be-

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[4]   Eberle (1999: 7-8) turns his attention to some minor changes in Schutz's formulation of the postulate of adequacy and points out a "considerable shift of meaning over time" of this postulate.

tween these two worlds. He therefore formulates the *postulate of adequacy*, which means to leave the final judgement of the adequacy of social scientific constructs to the actors and their partners on the scene of social reality.

As shown above, Schutz said about the postulates of subjective interpretation and adequacy, which are applicable to theoretical sciences *as well as* all the historical sciences, that the postulate of subjective interpretation "finds its complement in ... the postulate of adequacy." (Schutz, 1943a: 85) I would add that the postulate of logical consistency finds its complement in the postulate of adequacy. In my view the Schutzian methodological postulates for social scientific constructs make sense only when these three postulates are formulated *together with the others*. If my view is justifiable, it is necessary to ask how these three postulates are met *together*.[5]

To reiterate, Max Weber as a social scientist *per se* introduced the objective and hypostatized category of *cultural values* to prevent the ideal type from arbitrary constitution. However, an objective category can be introduced in the field of the social science only when the existence of the life-world and the way in which it is interpreted, that is, the typicality of its contents, are taken for granted and accepted as unquestionably given, and *in addition*, when the existence of the world of social science and the way in which it is interpreted are also taken for granted and accepted as unquestionably given. In sum, an objective category rests on the tacit assumption that both worlds have already been established and have the nature of "ontological entities." Social science founded on such an assumption can adopt a basic attitude which "accepts naively the social world with all the alter egos and institutions in it as a meaningful universe." (Schutz, 1960: 5) Weber seems to adopt just such a basic attitude and to simply assume as already established the existence of both worlds and the way in which each of them is interpreted. Schutz criticizes Weber for being "satisfied to assume naively the world in general and the meaning phenomena of the social world as a matter of *intersubjective*

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[5] This question must be broken down into two levels. Firstly, can three postulates *in principle* be met together at all? Are these postulates not contradictory to each other, and is it not impossible to meet them together? This question refers to the first aspect of a "dialectical problem" which Schutz deals with in his essay on multiple realities. (Schutz, 1945b: 253-255) And secondly, how is it *practically* possible to meet them together? In this paper, I restrict myself to discussion of this second level. As for the first level, see Nasu, 1997, chaps. 2 and 7, and also Nasu, 1999a: 9-10.

agreement in precisely the same way as we all in daily life naively assume the pregivenness of a homogeneous external world conforming to our understanding." (Schutz, 1932: 6)

By contrast, Schutz, as a social scientist firmly grounded in phenomenology, made the very taken-for-grantedness of the everyday life-world his major topic for research, firmly founding social science on his phenomenological analysis of the life-world. Consequently he conceives of social science not as a science which "begins inquiry with the object of knowledge" but as a science which "turns to the conditions for the possibility of knowledge." (Natanson, 1978: xii)

In order to *do* social science developed on the basis of the Schutzian conception of multiple realities, not only the existence of the everyday life-world and the typicality of its contents but also the existence of the world of social science and the typicality of its contents have to be *put into brackets*. If social scientists make up their mind to follow the Schutzian methodological postulates, they have to put into brackets *not only the natural attitude*, *but also the scientific attitude* that takes the system of that science for granted. In sum, the three methodological postulates are condensed into the postulate which requires social scien-tists to leave both the everyday life-world and the world of scientific theory already established. In order to meet the three postulates together, social scientists must choose to *stand between* the everyday life-world and the world of social science already established.

VI. From "Kulturmenschen" to "Well-Informed Citizen"

What does it mean "to stand between the everyday life-world and the world of social science?" In order to obtain an image of it, I turn my attention to Schutz's discussion about the ideal types of the expert, the man on the street, and the well-informed citizen "who *stands between* the ideal type of the expert and that of man on the street." (Schutz, 1946: 122, em-phasis added)

It is important to realize that these ideal types are formulated as types of knowledge, and these three types of knowledge, he says, "differ in their readiness to take things for granted." (Schutz, 1946: 123) The man on the street is defined as the one who "lives ... naively in his own and his in-group's intrinsic relevances." (Schutz, 1946: 126) In this type, the system of relevance, which is a fundamental frame of reference for approaching things and events, is taken for granted and accepted as it is.

The man on the street can be therefore characterized by the "epoché of the natural attitude."

It is not only the man on the street who is characterized by taking one's own system of relevance for granted. This holds true for the expert, since the expert is defined as the one who "starts from the assumption not only that the system of problems established within his field is relevant but that it is the only relevant system." (Schutz, 1946: 130) Experts also take their own system of relevance, a system called the scientific system, for granted and accept it as it is, disregarding all the problems outside the particular field of science in which they are working. The expert can be therefore characterized by, so to speak, the "epoché of the scientific attitude." As a matter of fact, scientific activities might be, for scientists, activities in their "everyday life."

It is possible, indeed likely, that people may be "men on the street" in some situations and times and "experts" in others. Mr. K may an "expert" in the field of sociology and a "man on the street" (or "layman") in the field of baseball. However this possibility does not hold true for the well-informed citizen. It can not be said that Mr. K is a well-informed citizen in such and such field and not in such and such field. The well-informed citizen has no field which has been already defined, demarcated, established, and is out there. The well-informed citizen is in this sense *fundamentally different* from the expert and the man on the street.

The well-informed citizen inhabits the domain which belongs to an infinite number of possible frames of reference. For the well-informed citizen "(t)here are no pregiven ready-made ends, no fixed border lines within which he can look for shelter." (Schutz, 1946: 130) The well-informed citizen cannot take a personal system of relevance for granted. Rather "(h)e has to choose the frame of reference by choosing his interest; he has to investigate the zone of relevances adhering to it; and he has to gather as much knowledge as possible of the origin and sources of the relevances actually or potentially imposed upon him." (Schutz, 1946: 130-131)

Based on the preceding discussion, it is possible to build up a certain image of the well-informed citizen's position as standing between the expert and the man on the street. "To stand between" is not equivalent to occupying a middle position in a continuum in which clear and distinct knowledge of science is posited on the one pole and vague and confused knowledge of common-sense on the other. The well-informed citizen is not also equivalent to the so-called dilettante, who is casually interested in many fields, with more clear-distinct knowledge of each field than the

man on the street, but more vague-confused knowledge than the expert. Nor does the well-informed citizen have direct reference to the "non-scholarly observer" or the "lay observer" which Fritz Machlup posited as a "middle category" between the "acting man" and the "scientific observer." (Machlup, 1970: 134-135)

From the standpoint of the well-informed citizen, the expert and the man on the street stand on the same plane. Both of them stand ready to take their own systems of relevance for granted, to accept them as they are, and to disregard all other possibilities. By contrast, the well-informed citizen stands ready to turn reflexively to one's own system of relevance, to objectify and relativize it, and to open one's mind to other possibilities. It is in just this sense that the well-informed citizen is *fundamentally different* from the expert and the man on the street.

From the analogy of the position of the well-informed citizen, it is possible to suggest the position between the everyday life-world and the world of social science where the social scientist can stand, a position which is required by Schutzian methodological postulates. This position is designed to guarantee social scientific constructs against arbitrary construction by searching at the same time for *differentiation* and *continuity* between the everyday life-world and the world of social science, putting *both* the natural attitude *and* the scientific attitude into brackets.

A position that seeks both differentiation and continuity might seem paradoxical, but in practice does not lead to a vicious circle. Instead within this "paradoxical" situation, turning to the everyday life-world serves as a moment to relativize and objectify the world of social science, and *vice versa*, and consequently as a way to ensure the open and creative circular-relationship between these two worlds. Indeed, as Schutz clearly said, "it is exactly this paradoxical situation which prevents theorizing from [freezing into (added by Helmut R. Wagner)] a strange solipsism by which any thinking self would remain secluded in its own private and fictitious world." (Schutz, 1943b: 50)

VII. Concluding Remarks

Weber started his inquiry into cultural science with the "transcendental presupposition" that "we *are* cultural *beings* (Kultur*menschen*) endowed with the capacity and the will to take an *attitude* consciously towards the world and to bestow *meaning* on it." (Weber, 1904: 180) He then introduced the objective and hypostatized category of cultural values (or

cultural significance) in order to prevent the ideal type as a tool for cultural science from arbitrary construction. By contrast, the Schutzian methodological postulates for preventing social scientific constructs from arbitrary construction require the social scientist to search for the type of knowledge named the "well-informed citizen." One phase of the Schutzian radicalization of Weberian thought can be found in this transition from *Kulturmenschen* to the *well-informed citizen*.

This radicalization can be expressed in short as a modification of the meaning of "*purity*." Instead of the term purity, it might be more useful to use the term "*essence*." For Weber, certain finite aspects which are selected as culturally significant are "*essential*," and therefore constitute the objects of social scientific investigation. (Weber, 1904: 171) For Schutz, however, the set of characteristics, unchanged among all the imagined transformations of the concrete thing perceived, are "the *essential* characteristics" of this concrete thing perceived. (Schutz, 1945d: 114)

Radicalization can also be found in the transition from the Weberian "*experiment in thought*" to Schutzian "*Ideation*." A series of Weberian experiments for reaching the essential, e.g., isolation, generalization, judgements of objective possibility (objektives Möglichkeitsurteil), construction of imaginative constructs, and so on, always refers to "empirical rules" (Weber, 1906: 269ff.) and "our habitual modes of thought and feeling." (Weber, 1920: 5) Furthermore, for Weber, these empirical rules and habitual modes are conceived of as already established and being out there, and therefore inducible from many observed "facts." By contrast, for Schutz, empirical rules and habitual modes of thought and feeling are themselves topics for research, *not* on the assumption that they have already been established and been out there, *but* in terms of their *geneses* and *constitution*.[6] Operations to put into brackets their existences and the common-sense and scientific ways in which they are interpreted, required by the Schutzian methodological

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[6]   It is important to give attention to and appreciate the passage and note which Schutz appended for "genesis" and "constitution." He said that "Husserl's term 'genesis' refers to the process by which knowledge arises in its 'origin-form' of self-givenness, and has nothing to do with the factual process of meanings arising out of a definite historical subjectivity." (Schutz, 1945d: 104, n. 4) He also said that "at the beginning of phenomenology, constitution meant clarification of the sense-structure of conscious life, inquiry into sediments in respect of their history, tracing back all cogitata to intentional operations of the on-going conscious life." (Schutz, 1957b: 83) Each term, *genesis* and *constitution*, is used here in the same meaning as Schutz's description above.

postulates, is no more than a methodological device to inquire into them—*phenomena* as they appear.

The implication of this transition does not, for Schutz, remain on a theoretical or meta-theoretical level. Some implications of this transition can also be found on the *empirical research level* when social scientists actually enter into empirical research on the role of the "well-informed citizen" in the topics of, for example, "equality-inequality," the transmission of "knowledge" in "education"—each term considered in its broader sense[7]—and social movements dealing with the prevailing obdurate structures but seeking to interpret them in alternative ways and to construct alternative realities. Elucidation of such implications would, however, go far beyond this paper's limits.

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[7] "Knowledge in a broader sense" means that it includes not only so-called "packaged" or circumscribed knowledge which could be transmitted by intentionally and purposefully educational or transmissive activities, but also meta-knowledge or a undamental frame of reference in the sense that makes such packaged or circumscribed knowledge possible.

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The Ideal Type in Weber and Schutz[*]

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Abstract. *The development and use of the ideal type construct in the methodology of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz is considered in order to contrast the different purposes for which each of these sociologists made use of the construct. Weber's focus on substantive empirical historical and comparative problems led him to select the ideal type as a methodology suited for making comparisons between the type and empirical reality.*

Schutz's original interest in the ideal type was to clarify the epistemological and theoretical foundations of the methodology and provide clarifications and explications via a phenomenologically based analysis. His endorsement of the ideal type methodology for sociology was consistent with his view of the theoretical attitude of science and of scientific work but led him away from the detailed empirical study of the world of everyday life which his phenomenological grounding would have made possible.

In this paper I wish to consider the ideal type as a form of construct, its relevance for the social sciences, and its use and significance in the sociologies of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz. It is difficult to discuss the ideal type construct apart from a consideration of Max Weber's first formulations and uses of it. However, for reasons of clarity let me first offer a contrast between the ideal type construct and other kinds of conceptualizations that may be used in empirical studies (and which were available to Weber and Schutz). In this discussion I am talking about the sociological observer/analyst whose purposes are to achieve an understanding of the events and activities in the world of everyday life[1] and who may or may not be interested in causal analysis. First, of course, we

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[1] This is formulated by Schutz (1962: 137) as follows: "All science presumes a special attitude of the person carrying on science; it is the attitude of the disinterested observer. ... as a disinterested observer, not as a private person, which certainly he also is, the scientist does not participate in the life-world as an actor, and he is no longer carried along by the living stream of intentionalities. ... The life-world, as an object of scientific investigation, will be for the investigator qua scientist predominantly the life-world of Others, the observed.

assume that the observer has a purpose, a set of interests, which have led to the formulation of a project, a research aim or set of aims which motivate and guide his study in important and innumerable ways. The purpose of the observer is persistently present though efforts will and must be made to set aside these interests in the analysis of observations in order not to be unduly influenced by them. Such a "bracketing" or "suspension" of interests, or value neutrality, would seem omni-relevant in the development of a social science.

I. Types of Concepts[2]

Descriptive Concepts: Such concepts make reference to the detailed empirical instance, attempting to provide clear and precise characterizations of all its particularities. Description aims at completeness but is limited to specific, actual occurrences, events or activities as these can best be observed and understood. Description of this kind does not aim for generality or generalization; its focus is on the concrete, actual, verifiable particularities.

Empirical generalizations: These are concepts which formulate generalizations concerning empirical occurrences, their salient characteristics and the frequency, range and distribution of their occurrence. Such concepts reference how often and how pervasively the events and activities they describe are found to occur; their distribution across empirically distinguishable populations and sub-groupings; their regularities (and possibly their variations) and their relation to other observed uniformities or patterns of activities. They may enable quantifiable measures of the frequencies of the occurrences of their referents. For example, how frequently certain activities are found in a specified population.

The Average Type[3]: "A summation of elements common to empirical phenomena" (Kalberg, 1994) which would express or describe particular

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2   McKinney (1970: 253) notes: "... it can be asserted that types and typologies are ubiquitous, both in everyday social life and in the language of the social sciences. Everybody uses them, but almost no one pays any attention to the nature of their construction. Despite the omni-presence of typologizing in social inquiry it remains a relatively underdeveloped aspect of methodology generally."

3   McKinney (1970: 262) notes that "a primary function of types is to identify, simplify, and order data so that they may be described in terms which make them comparable. They function in this way at any level of abstraction, and hence can be utilized with respect to problems varying from a limited to a very broad scope. Indeed, a primary role of the constructed type would seem to be that of a 'sensitizing device.' In effect, a type constitutes a reduction from the complex to the simple; hence the careful

central tendencies. An expression such as the "average worker" or the "average nurse" would refer to characteristics that have been observed across a range of members of a particular, specified population and added together in such a way as to arrive at a summation or average for the total. Thus, measures of compensation, or heights and weights for a population may be developed including indications of frequencies, ranges and various kinds of averages (such as mean, median and mode). Such notions could be extended to non-quantifiable characteristics which could be summarized by the analyst to reference "average traits," or "average personality characteristics" of particular populations or average course of action patterns.

The average type would be anchored to empirically specifiable units and would require similar summations to be made for any other units to be compared with it.

Laws: A "law" as a concept may be said to be a universal generalization which provides a conceptualization of regular patterns of events or activities as always or invariably occurring in the manner described by the law." As a universal and general proposition, the law would admit of no exception.[4]

The effort to develop and formulate laws or "general invariant principles" of social action or social relationships would most likely focus on general rather than specific patterns, define the characteristics and features of historical circumstances in broad and general ways, and formulate relationships and interconnections in an abstract and general fashion given that social relations, social actions and historical events are enormously diverse. The "laws" of economics, for example, the relationships between prices and wages or the "law of marginal utility" are proposed not with regard to a specific historical period or a particular society but as universally valid under the conditions specified by the law, i.e. for all societies in which such conditions are present. Weber, as a student of economics, was familiar with the argument that the natural sciences attempt to develop laws and discover principles of invariance. He rejected this position for the social sciences and believed that laws were of such generality and abstraction that they would be of no value in the study of specific historical social phenomena or in the search for adequate causes of such events and occurrences. However, we must recognize that despite

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construction and use of types, as an intermediate procedure, can potentially make many large-scale problems accessible to more refined methodology and technique."

4   Cf. "A statement of an order or relation of phenomena that so far as is known is invariable under the given conditions." Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed.

being offered as invariant and universal, laws, even those developed in the natural sciences, do not "hold" in each and every particular instance because the conditions under which they are purported to be valid may not be present in the form or degree to which the law assumes. Thus, even the rate of speed of falling bodies or the relation between pressure, temperature and volume as proposed in physics may fail on each and every empirical demonstration since the required conditions are unattainable.

The law is itself an idealized representation of relationships which hold only under ideal conditions. It could be argued that laws are ideal types which specify idealized relationships under idealized conditions. They are universally valid only under the specified conditions.[5]

The Classificatory Type: The interest here is in developing typologies which enable the classification (and naming) of collections of phenomena which are observed to have particular features in common.[6] From such elaborations it is also possible to discern variations or sub-classes and types. Relationships between the classes so developed may be those of genus and species, for example. Ranges of types may be arrayed along a scale with extreme points with specifiable alternate or varying types between the two extremes all of which are differentiated according to specifiable criteria. Uses of such typologies can be found in social science as for example in social types, personality types, attitude types, or

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5   von Mises (1981: 90-91) characterizes laws for sociology as "neither ideal types nor average types. Rather, they are the expression of what is to be singled out of the fullness and diversity of phenomena from the point of view of the science that aims at the cognition of what is essential and necessary in every instance of human action. ... the causal propositions of sociology are not expressions of what happens as a rule, but by no means must always happen. They express that which necessarily must always happen as far as the conditions they assume are given." Von Mises considered economics a part of sociology so his statement can best be understood as applying to both.

6   Weber rejects "class, or generic, concepts" because "no class, or generic, concept as such has a "typical" character, and there is no purely generic "average" type. ... The more it is a matter of the simple classification of events which appear in reality occur as mass phenomena, the more it is a matter of class concepts. However, the greater the event to which we conceptualize complicated historical patterns with respect to those components in which their specific *cultural significance* is contained, the greater the extent to which the concept——or system of concepts——will be ideal-typical in character. The goal of ideal-typical concept-construction is always to make clearly explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena." (Weber, 1949: 100-101)

societal types, such as Apollonian and Dionysian or "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft."[7]

Classificatory types are clearly anchored in empirical reality since they presume to be descriptive or analytic typologies which reference actual phenomena. The aim of studies may be limited to the development and elaboration of such typologies.

The Ideal Type: The ideal type is a construct developed by the analyst for particular purposes.[8] It represents a selection of features or elements considered significant, essential or exemplary. It is based on or derived from observations of empirical reality and compared with that reality in its formulation but it does not purport to be a fully accurate and complete depiction of that reality in all of its features. It systematizes and organizes a number of features by drawing out or focusing on these and selectively excluding others. In the view of the analyst who develops the ideal type, empirical reality consists of multiplicities of events and activities which are manifest in a virtually chaotic and unending flow of discrete particularities thereby necessitating selection, focus and reduction in order to achieve a more coherent formulation.

As its name implies, the ideal type is an idealization,[9] more accurately perhaps an "ideational type," which may purport to reference

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[7]   A more recent development in the social sciences (in the 60s in the US and particularly in anthropology) examined "folk classifications" as found among members of particular societies or sub groups with regard to such things as animals, plants, and kinship. Fields of study such as ethnobotany and ethno-musicology have developed which focus on empirical studies of such emic (or endogenous) classification systems, as well as their meanings and uses within such groups or communities of users.

[8]   Schutz (1970: 284) says with regard to the personal ideal type, for example: "... the personal ideal type is itself always determined by the interpreter's point of view. *It is a function of the very question it seeks to answer.* It is dependent upon the objective context of meaning, which it merely translates into subjective terms and then personifies.

[9]   Schutz (1962: 138) says in this regard: "For idealization and formalization have just the same role for the social sciences as the one which Husserl has stated for the natural sciences, except that it is not a question of *mathematizing the forms* but of developing a *typology of "fullnesses"* (Füllen). Also, in the social sciences the eminent danger exists that their idealizations, in this case typologies, will not be considered as methods but as true being. Indeed this danger is even greater in the sciences which deal with the human being and his life-world, because they are always obliged to work with a highly complex material involving types of a higher order. This material does not refer back immediately to the subjective activity of individuals, which is always the chief problem if it is in the sphere of mundane apperception."

concrete,historical, empirical reality with varying degrees of approxima-
tion and can thereby range from broad, general and generic pure types to
specific, focused and limited ones. It is generally not purported to be a
law or to formulate universals though, when used in relation to other type
concepts to formulate relationships among social phenomena, e.g. as in
ideal type models, such formulations may indeed be proposed as lawlike.

II. Weber's Interest in the Ideal Type

Weber was interested in understanding and explaining complex social-
cultural historical phenomena. His interests were both theoretical and
empirical but his theoretical interest was not in the formulation of ab-
stract, general or universal lawlike propositions. His empirical interests
were in understanding significant historical, comparative, synchronic and
diachronic activities and events. His overall view was that of an analyst/
interpreter/observer; a historical sociologist; a comparative historian/so-
ciologist.

The modes of analysis which he rejected were the abstract, general,
theoretical or nomothetic perspective and the concrete, descriptive ideo-
graphic perspective. The former was rejected on a number of grounds as
being too abstract, too universalizing and as unable to explain specific
historical events. The latter approach was too particularistic and limited;
it may provide an understanding of an unique historical event but could
not offer insight into and understanding of other, similar events which
may have occurred in different time periods or in different civilizations.
The particularistic, ideographic, narrative historical approach thus lacked,
for Weber, the possibility of comparative historical analysis as well as
ignoring the extent to which the values of the historian-analyst were
involved   in   the   selection   of   historical   "facts."   A   form   of
conceptualization which would address the problems of these two
approaches and achieve a solution was found by Weber in the ideal type
construct and the ideal type model.[10]

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[10] Ringer (1977: 110-111) notes that the ideal type concept "was at least partly inspired
by Carl Menger. ... another ... source of Weber's typological approach was the work
of the legal and political theorist Georg Jellinek, one of Weber's friends. Jellinek
noted that the social sciences lack the strict causal laws and empirical regularities
characteristic of the natural sciences. ... He recommended the "inductive"
establishment of "types" based upon commonalities among sufficiently similar
political systems. Carefully limited generalizations about such "types" he thought
might have a certain predictive force while also helping to point up the distinctive
traits of particular states. Obvioiusly, there are parallels between Jellinek's and

The ideal type would allow for an analyst's solution which was both general and specific. The ideal type construct was an abstracted, selective, construct which could be formulated in various degrees of abstraction but which could be based on an understanding of empirical reality and which could reference specific empirical phenomena. Given Weber's theoretical presuppositions concerning meaning, meaningful social action, subjective interpretation, etc., the ideal type construct would enable him to develop theoretical models which could vary in their range of applicability but which could consistently retain reference to the empirical. The advantages for Weber can be enumerated as follows: [11]

a) they do not attempt to provide an elaborate, complete or detailed description of empirical reality;
b) they do not propose general, nomothetic theories;
c) they provide a means for the conceptualization of "patterned orientations of meaningful actions;"
d) they provide a "level of analysis" which is different from historical laws or historical narrative;
e) they provide for the inclusion of "historically distinctive context;"
f) they allow for the selection, ordering, and organization of the "unending flow of concrete occurrences, unconnected events, and punctuated happenings;"
g) they allow a focus on individual cases since they need not aim for general laws.

The result for Weber can be a sociology with general concepts referencing significant, meaningful human actions and social phenomena which can also be included in theoretical conceptualizations of relationships in ideal type models. As "idealizations" they are not concrete, descriptive and specific but since they can be formed for descriptive, analytic, and explanatory purposes they can remain anchored to empirical reality.

II.1 Weber's Specific Aims

The type of social science in which we are interested is an *empirical science* of concrete *reality* (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). Our aim is the understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which

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Weber's conceptions. Yet Weber surely owed more to Menger than to Jellinek, even though Jellinek may be said to have *named* the ideal type."

[11] This enumeration is indebted to Kalberg. (1994: 84 ff.)

we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations and on the other the causes of their being historically *so* and not *otherwise*. (Weber, 1949: 72)[12]

Weber's aim for sociology (social science) is condensed in this quotation but contains almost all that is essential in his view of the purpose of sociology. It is to understand reality (and here I prefer to say "social reality" in order to distinguish it from the natural world). Social reality consists of an "infinite multiplicity of successively and co-existingly emerging and disappearing events" (Weber, 1949: 72) and a selection from among these is necessary. Such selection includes some and omits other elements and features and takes place in terms of a coherent referential description which serves to delineate and define the "event" as an "event of cultural significance."

To understand such events means (a) to understand the subjective meaning(s) the actor attributes to their actions, the meanings for those who lived at a particular time and were engaged in the activities under study; (b) their historical significance in relation to subsequent developments; and (c) their meaning *for us* in our contemporary time period since it is we who are asking questions and conducting inquiries to develop insights into the nature of our contemporary world from our study of the past.

To "understand" events[13] first means we recognize that events are interconnected, not isolated or random, that they occur in contexts, and that, as contexted events, have been produced or caused in various ways. To understand their causes, the *various* causes that have led to the contexted events, means that we are necessarily involved in an historical, i.e. temporally oriented, study. There were preceding or prior states which did not include these events or were not configured in the same way. This means that Weber, as analyst, or the social scientist following his

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[12] Kalberg (1999: 82) translates this section as follows: "We wish to understand the reality that surrounds our lives, in which we are placed, *in its characteristic* uniqueness. We wish to understand on the one hand its context (Zusammenhang) and the cultural *significance* of its particular manifestations in their contemporary form, and on the other the causes of it becoming historically so and not otherwise."

[13] Kalberg points out that for Weber the central issue was understanding subjective meaning and, strictly speaking, orientations of action. Weber's phenomena were the subjective meanings and orientations of action of actors. (Kalberg, personal communication) I have used "event" and "phenomena" much more broadly in my interpretation.

approach, must select from an historical period some occurrence(s) which would be considered as constituting unique but culturally significant social phenomena. A delineation of any such phenomenon would require at least a preliminary "understanding" of it since it must be identified, selected, and focused upon.

The analyst's task is to delineate the phenomenon in such a way as to enable others to recognize it, understand his/her descriptions, i.e. understand his understandings, by using natural language and reasoning practices which are already familiar to the readers of his delineation/description/identification.

The "cultural significance," i.e, meanings, which may be delineated would require the analyst's assessment and interpretation since events and occurrences do not define or declare themselves.[14] "Significance" would require an interpretive/analytic/value embedded framework which the analyst utilizes, implicitly or explicitly. To the extent that "particular historical events" have multiple meanings and can be interpreted differently according to differing interpretive schemes, the schemas and value systems which affect the analyst's selection and focus, as well as his interpretations of "cultural significance" are inevitably involved.

Thus far, value neutrality is not involved since problem selection, topic identification, event description and interpretation of cultural significance are necessarily value laden enterprises. Subsequently such values need to be "set aside" and a value neutral stance adopted when examining and comparing the empirical occurrences which instantiate or represent the social phenomena identified by ideal typical concepts and theorizings particularly as the analyst then seeks to discover "the causes," or "probably causes" which led to, affected, shaped, or produced the social phenomena under investigation. Nevertheless, some theories of cause, some causal interpretive schemes, which themselves identify those elements or features or contextual particulars, and assign varying degrees of relevance and prominence to them is necessarily involved. The location of causes is assisted by locating events where these causal elements/factors are missing and where the event/outcome took a different form. For an event to have occurred and taken shape, form or direction, to have achieved one form of configuration rather than another, can also involve an assessment, examination, consideration, and interpretation of those events which turned out differently. The proof,

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[14] The analyst's interpretation of events involves various procedures of practical reasoning and is what provides for us the sense that these events were indeed "events" and not mere random happenings.

validation, or confirmation or mere "support" for a causally adequate interpretation is benefited by comparison with those instances in which these elements/factors are missing.

Weber's view of sociology (social science), as outlined in the paragraph quoted above from his writings, is that it is a historical, comparative enterprise in which actual, empirical events, and activities are examined to formulate conceptualizations which select and organize their constitutive features. These events and activities are selected because of their "cultural significance" and are to be explained, if at all possible, by discovering their probable causes.

II.2 Weber and the Use of Ideal Types

Weber saw the importance of ideal types for causal analyses:

> ... criteria for causal explanation *require* that whenever 'interpretation' is possible in principle it should be undertaken, i.e. in the interpretation of human "action" we are not satisfied by merely establishing a relation between the action and a purely empirical *generalization*, regardless of how strict this generalization may be. We require the interpretation of the 'meaning' of the action.
>
> Suppose ... this meaning is immediately self-evident. Then we have no interest in *formulating* a generalization which covers the concrete, individual case.
>
> In addition, ... such a generalization ... could never replace by a simple reference to a law that which is achieved by a 'meaningful' interpretation. Moreover, such 'laws' are *intrinsically* of absolutely no significance for the interpretation of 'action.' (Weber, 1975: 128)

Thus, causal explanations require that interpretations be made; simple empirical regularities or empirical generalizations lack significance without interpretation.[15] He goes on to say:

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15 Ringer (1997: 119) analyzes Weber's uses of the ideal type and comments on three of its functions. "... Weber's 'ideal type' has three main functions. First, it spells out the stages in the process of interpretation, along with the broader strategy of causal analysis. In a theoretically heightened form, it demonstrates how the several elements in a sequence of behaviors may be ascribed to the various factors within the complex of causally relevant motives, beliefs, and other conditions. Second ... it allows interpreters to articulate the *relationships of meaning* they take to be involved in particular actions or texts. ... Third ... the 'ideal-typical' approach emphasizes the active role of the investigator in the interpretation of actions and beliefs. Against the

It follows that every interpretive scheme is not *only* ... a 'hypothesis,' analogous to the hypothetical 'laws' of the natural sciences. They can *function* as hypotheses when the interpretation of concrete processes is employed for heuristic purposes. However, in contrast to hypotheses in the natural sciences, to establish in a concrete case that an interpretation is *not* valid is irrelevant to the question of the theoretical value of the interpretive scheme. (Weber, 1975: 190)

In sum, for Weber, the ideal type is related to the empirical but when used in an interpretive scheme the result is not a "law." And, although it is compared with the empirical, the assessment of its validity is problematic.

The ideal type, developed for analysis and interpretation, is relevant for the concrete case but the theoretical value of the interpretive scheme is not invalidated by a single case. A law, on the other hand, proposed as generally valid, fails with its failure in a single case.

An explanatory model, using ideal types, then may not be disconfirmed by empirical evidence although it may be derived (inductively) from empirical evidence. But it is not offered as an empirical generalization. As Kalberg states:

As a consequence of the manner in which the ideal type is formed (empirical induction on the one hand and synthetic systematization on the other hand) as well as its purely heuristic character, a particular empirical disconfirmation of an hypothesis formed by a model does not necessarily imply a refutation of the model's usefulness. (Kalberg, 1994: 95: fn. 6)

What would disconfirmation mean? That the empirical instance doesn't conform to the model? But it was not proposed as an empirical generalization or as a "law" in the first place. The model itself can stand as a model. It may be modified, but since it was never proposed as a one to one fit with any particular empirical instance, its failure to fit may not be unexpected. Its value persists in terms of its relevance for understanding empirical reality.

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illusion of empathetic reproduction, it highlights the engagement of the interpreter's own norms of 'right rationality.' It also portrays the interpretive process as a complex *interaction* between the conceptual world of the investigators and that of the agents and texts they seek to understand."

As a model, it works to achieve heuristic and analytic purposes and serves to orient empirical study. It may formulate logical relationships among several constructs within a theoretical framework. In this sense it may be a "limited analytic generalization" but it is not an empirical generalization. (Kalberg, 1994: 116) As used by Weber, it retains its power by being useful in a number of ways:

a) to postulate delimited and empirically-testable causal relationships;
b) to isolate and define significant causal action-orientations;
c) to provide theoretical frameworks ... to order and conceptualize the interaction under investigation;
d) to locate these interactions within a theoretical framework anchored by sociologically significant domains and domain-specific ideal types. (Kalberg, 1994: 116)

Its explanatory value derives from its analytic power and not from its correspondence with particular empirical events. Therefore to say that it may be used in hypotheses which can guide research is not to propose that hypotheses are being "tested" and possibly "rejected" by empirical evidence as is the case in a natural science model of hypothesis use. Rather, it provides a guide to the researcher to observe empirical instances of those matters to which the ideal typical constructs refer as well as of proposed relationships among various constructs included in the theoretical model.

In the construction of ideal types Weber would draw on his knowledge of the empirical to produce selected, abstracted, organized and constructed types, which could be understood as based on and referring to empirical reality. His own understanding of significant social phenomena (social action, values, beliefs, ideas), known about and studied (available to him in various studies, writings, histories, etc. as well as his own common sense knowledge of society) involved a preliminary theorizing, i.e. his selection of how to constitute the type, the naming and organization of the features of the type, its referents, what is included/excluded, its range, diversity, internal organization, all represent a preliminary theoretical systematization of his own common sense thinking.

The construction of a type and of a model using ideal type concepts referring to particular domains of the society is a form of analysis. The types would include the necessary or essential characteristics which the analyst could best determine to be relevant for understanding the social phenomena being analyzed. A comparison with an empirical instance

could lead to reformulations of the type in order to make revisions which the analyst thought might be necessary for achieving a better understanding. But such revision would be related to the purpose of the study and not be due to the discovery of some empirical particulars which had not been included in the original formulation. Such discoveries may or may not be relevant, in the analyst's estimation and it is his/her judgement which would be crucial in making such a decision. The type-model would have to be adequate for the purpose intended, based on the analyst's knowledge of society and his interests in the particular social phenomena being studied. As such, the model need not be abandoned or considered as "disconfirmed" when compared with empirical reality.[16]

For Weber, the important starting point is a substantive problem. For example, the aim to understand action patterns, developments in and relationships among/between various patterned social actions. Types are used as conceptual tools, conceptual frameworks for the purposes of analysis and understanding. They are used for the purpose of studying particular social phenomena which the analyst has noted as interesting and significant based on some set of value positions and interests. In their use, such conceptual schemes, as Weber (1975: 189) says:

> are of extraordinary heuristic value for the causal analysis of historical relations. ... (they may) have purely concrete character: hypotheses for the interpretation of single, concrete complexes. (or they) can be ideal typical constructions of a general character, like the 'laws' of abstract economics which theoretically deduce the consequences of certain economic situations by presupposing strictly rational action.

Their use is to facilitate the interpretation of the "given facts" and to provide a possible interpretation, an *interpretive scheme*. Their assessment of adequacy is related to their power to provide understandable, recognizable and acceptably valid interpretations not in their direct, comprehensive or detailed conformity with empirical reality.

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[16] Some misguided efforts to attempt to "validate" the "reality of types" fail to understand this. For example, McKinney (1970: 258) praises the development of multivariate techniques to refine types and to establish an "empirical determination" of their dimensions, to establish "the reality of types as discrete entitities," i.e. as present in the real world and a measurable in their features. (256)

III. Alfred Schutz and Ideal Types[17]

Weber's sociology placed an importance on the individual and on subjective meaning. His interest in developing causal analyses led him to look at the motivated, intentional actions of individuals in an effort to discern the meanings of their actions. His approach stressed that it was the subjective meanings of individuals, as found in their socially oriented actions, that would be the fundamental starting point for his interpretive sociology.[18]

Schutz (1967) found such an approach compatible. He adopted Weber's sociology and sought to provide a firmer epistemological and methodological grounding for it. His *Phenomenology of the Social World* takes up this task as he sought to explore some of Weber's basic concepts and his starting point in the subjective, intended meanings of the individual. By a close examination of Weber's work he sought to examine and clarify in a more systematic fashion, many of Weber's conceptualizations. I will focus particularly on the ideal type methodology and construct formation.

Schutz's project differed considerably from that of Weber, however. Schutz had a deep understanding of philosophy, had studied Bergson and Husserl's thought very early in his career and was closely associated with Felix Kaufmann. His starting point was different from Weber who was uninterested in exploring foundational epistemological or methodological issues. Weber's development of the ideal type was for him a methodological *tool*[19] to be used in comparative historical studies. His primary

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[17] Schutz (1970: 282) asks the question: "Why form personal ideal types at all? Why not simply collect empirical facts? Or, if the technique of typological interpretation may be applied successfully, why not restrict oneself to forming types of impersonal events, or types of the behavior of groups? Why go back to the scheme of social action and to the individual actor? The answer is this. It is true that a very great part of social science can be performed and has been performed at a level which legitimately abstracts from all that happens in the individual actor. But this ... is in any case nothing but a kind of intellectual shorthand. Whenever the problem under inquiry makes it necessary, the social scientist must have the possibility of shifting the level of his research to that of individual human activity, and where real scientific work is done this shift will always become possible."

[18] We shall see however that Schutz's critique of Weber challenges Weber's understanding of the possibility of studying individual motives and subjective meanings for contemporaries and predecessors.

[19] One of its purposes and uses has been proposed as that of a "yardstick." Kalberg (1994: 87-91) notes: "Utilized as 'yardsticks,' ideal types serve to define discrete empirical cases. Each can be employed as an orientational instrument that provides a

interests were substantive ones, the study of macro-historical and societal events, developments over historical periods, and basic social actions as these were to be found in significant patterns of organization such as rulership or domination, bureaucracy, the relation of religion to society, etc. The range and scope of his interests was enormous as, for example, his studies in the sociology of religion which led him to the examination of ancient Judaism, Hinduism in Indian society, the religion of China, and the relation of the Protestant ethic to the spirit of capitalism. His studies had a broad historical scope and his sociology could well be characterized as historical and comparative. His methodological writings were not extensive and his original formulation (1904-1917) of the ideal type is in part embedded in the *Methodenstreit* debate as well as in an explication of its usefulness in developing adequate causal or explanatory models of culturally significant events and occurrences. It is fair to say that he was not concerned with an analysis or explication of the epistemological foundations of his methodology or of his key conceptualizations but rather more interested in using the ideal type in analyzing and interpreting significant cultural events and phenomena.

Schutz's interest in this respect could be said to complement Weber's. Schutz *was* interested in epistemological issues, he did have philosophical analytic skills and interests, and he accepted Weber's basic conceptualizations as significant for an interpretive sociology.[20] Schutz's knowledge of phenomenological philosophy, particularly that of Husserl, led him to a clearer understanding of subjectivity and of subjective meaning and to the distinction between what he came to call the scientific

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clear 'standard' against which given patterns of action can be 'measured.' ... Instead of 'capturing reality,' the ideal type, as a logical construct that documents patterned action, establishes clear points of refrence and orientational guidelines against which a given slice of reality can be compared and measured. An examination of the ways in which the regular action-orientations under investigation approximate or diverge from those 'documented' by the concept discloses the characteristic features of the empirical case and defines it clearly ..."

[20] Wagner comments that it is possible to see where "Schutz and Weber got their ideal types. To a considerable degree, both used secondary sources augmented by any primary historical or personal documents like letters that had been published. In his historical interests, Weber depended completely on such sources; in his focus on contemporary problems, Schutz relied on his own experiences as most direct and immediate source materials. In doing so, he pointed to a heretofore almost completely unrecognized aspect of the activities of sociologists. If they define their task as that of observers of the social conduct of others, including their statements about selected social experiences, then sociologists have no reason for not observing themselves in their own social conduct." (Wagner, 1983: 131)

attitude and the natural attitude of everyday life. He undertook in his first major work (1967) to focus on Max Weber's theoretical writings in order to provide what he hoped would be a firmer foundation for an interpretive sociology.[21] Schutz's aims were wide-ranging; his effort, if successful, would provide a firmer foundation for and a clarification of much of Weber's methodology and theoretical construct formation.

What did Schutz provide in his analysis that could be said to have clarified the ideal type as it might be used in sociological studies and of what significance are these contributions not only for an interpretive sociology but also for sociology in general?

With regard to the ideal type Schutz agreed with Weber that this was a basic methodological tool for sociological analysis. The ideal type was suited for the comprehension of "the world of contemporaries and the world of predecessors" (Schutz, 1967: 226) because this was the only way they could be studied. Actions of predecessors and contemporaries are "more or less anonymous and belong to typical courses of consciousness" (Schutz, 1967: 218). But Schutz showed that Weber did not understand that intended meanings, i.e. the subjective context of meaning, of actors in an *indirect* relationship with the observer were inaccessible to the observer. The observer has differential access to subjective meanings of the actor in situations involving different forms of relationships. When co-present, face-to-face, with the actor (or in the we-relation), when one is able to observe directly rather than indirectly, the subjective experiences of the other can be understood "signitively," i.e. through the various indications and expressions provided by the other one can discern their meaning context. Insight into the "inner life" of the other is possible as a subjective context of meaning. However, as the Other becomes anonymous, in the world of contemporaries and predecessors, all that is available to the observer is an ideal type of the other, "constructed out of

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21 Schutz writes (1967: xxxi) "I became convinced that while Weber's approach was correct and that he had determined conclusively the proper starting point of the philosophy of the social sciences, nevertheless his analyses did not go deeply enough to lay the foundations on which alone many important problems of the human sciences could be solved. ... Only when we have grasped the nature of the internal time-consciousness can we attack the complicated structure of the concepts of the human sciences. Among these concepts are those of the interpretation of one's own and others' experiences, meaning-establishment, and meaning-interpretation, symbol and symptom, motive and project, meaning-adequacy and causal adequacy, and, above all the nature of ideal-typical concept formation, upon which is based the very attitude of the social sciences toward their subject matter."

previously given experiences of certain courses of action." (Schutz, 1967: 218-219)

Thus, for the observer, intended and subjective meanings of the actor, are describable in terms of objective meaning contexts, as interpreted by the observer, rather than directly grasped or "understood." as might be possible in a direct social relationship.

In this sense, ideal types of motivated actors, or rational action, are constructs developed by the interpreter/sociologist.

> When such ideal types (of contemporaries) are being constructed, the selection of their fixed and essential elements depends on the point of view of the observer at the moment of interpretation. It depends on his stock of knowledge at hand and upon the modifications of his attention to his knowledge of the world in general and of the social world in particular. Even the construction of scientific ideal types depends on the total context of scientific knowledge or ... on the total context of clear and distinct judgments about the world ... Science is always an objective context of meaning and the theme of all sciences of the social world is to *constitute an objective meaning-context either out of subjective meaning-contexts generally or out of some particular subjective meaning-contexts.* (Schutz, 1967: 222-223)

In answer to the question of "how are sciences of subjective meaning-context possible" Schutz provides an answer. It is with the construction of the ideal type for contemporaries and predecessors that the social scientist is able to develop personal ideal types based on course-of-action types.

> The actual on going subjective experiences of his acts within the consciousness of the actor are unavailable for the social scientist. Instead, the achieved goals of action, once identified, enable the social scientist to deduce the in-order-to and because-motives ... (and) since the act is by definition both repeatable and typical so is the in-order-to motive. An agent can be postulated as the one behind the action, a person who, with typical modification of attention, typically intends this typical act, in short, a personal ideal type. (Schutz, 1967: 188-189)

It is clear, in Schutz's view, that subjective meaning is attributed to the typical actor by deduction or inference from the outward achievements of action. The ideal type so constructed will assure that the typical actor will

achieve the "intentions" and "motives" of his projected actions since these are already known and "success has been built into it by definition." The personal ideal type is postulated as a person whose "actual living motive could be the objective context of meaning already chosen to define a typical action. ... (this) must be the person whose own lived experiences provide the subjective context of meaning which corresponds to the objective context, the action which corresponds to the act." (Schutz, 1967: 189) There is no need to examine consciousness, as if that were possible, but rather the analyst "inserts into consciousness" all that is needed in order for a given subjective meaning context to result in a particular course of action.

This, then, according to Schutz, is how Weber had constructed ideal types of actors (personal ideal types) and (course-of-action) types of social relationships of rulership, domination, bureaucracy, etc. The analyst's role as interpreter is clear. However, he is subject to the restrictions of other requirements of an interpretive social science as Weber and Schutz define these: to be value free (*wertfrei*) in his consideration of empirical materials; and to follow what Schutz delineated as the postulates of logical consistency, subjective interpretation, and adequacy of meaning. (Schutz, 1962: 43-44)

Disregarding the changes in Weber's use of ideal types[22] and noting that early in his writings Weber saw ideal types as "in principle applicable only to historical data," Schutz sees in his own theory of ideal types the possibility for a theoretical sociology that can develop ideal types of "universal validity." (Schutz, 1967: 243-244) These would be more

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[22] Schutz notes: "Max Weber's well known formulation of the concept of ideal type, made in 1904, which he himself called "sketchy and therefore perhaps partially incorrect" is indeed fragmentary because it has in mind chiefly the ideal type of his theory of history. It must be strongly emphasized that once Weber's thought makes the transition to sociology, the conception of the ideal type itself undergoes a thorough change. Unfortunately this is only hinted at in a few statements of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* ..." (Schutz, 1967: 244: fn. 26)

Weber (1949: 110) states in this section that "... it is necessary for the sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the corresponding forms of action which in each case involve the highest possible degree of logical integration by virtue of their compete adequacy on the level of meaning. But precisely because this is true, it is probably seldom if ever that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types ... Theoretical analysis in the field of sociology is possible only in terms of such pure types. ... in addition it is convenient for the sociologist from time to time to employ average types of an empirical statistical character. ... but when reference is made to 'typical' cases, the term should always be understood, unless otherwise stated, as meaning *ideal* types ..."

formalized and generalized types, which "do not refer to any individual or spatio-temporal collection of individuals." His example is of the formulations of "pure economics" which offers an "objective meaning complex about subjective meaning-complexes, in other words, of an objective meaning-configuration stipulating the typical and invariant subjective experiences of anyone who acts within an economic framework." The principle of marginal utility, for example, as purely formal action, provides a formulation not of what happens frequently or on the average, but of "what necessarily must happen" according to the model, under specifiable conditions, *mutatis mutandis*. Schutz foresees the possibility of two types of social science one with

> *pure theories of the form* of the social world, which deal with the constitution of social relationships and social patterns, the act-objectivities and artifacts in the conscious processes of individuals who live in the social world, meanwhile comprehending all these things by a purely descriptive method. ... and the other focusing on the *real-ontological content* of the social world as already constituted and study the relationships and patterns in themselves—the already given historical or social acts and the artifacts as objects independent of the subjective experiences in which they were constituted. (Schutz, 1967: 248)[23]

Weber, on the other hand, chose not to move in this direction. Aside from a position that resisted the notion of universals or laws for social phenomena, his interest in specific socio-cultural and historical phenomena ranging from religion to bureaucracy, consistently held his focus on the empirical. His ideal type formulations were to be used in making comparisons across societies, cultures or epochs since they proposed models abstracted from the empirical. They were intended as interpretive models in two senses:

a) they represented the results of interpretive sociological analyses of social action patterns, regularities and forms and

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[23] It is possible to characterize Garfinkel's ethnomethodology as concerned with the constitutive processes whereby the social world achieves its patterns, organization and sense. Garfinkel wants to examine what Schutz takes-for-granted, i.e. the direct study of the processes that operate to achieve the "relationships and patterns" which are found in Schutz's (and Weber's) studies.

b) they were to be used in further studies of cases and instances not pre-
viously examined and, as such, to provide guides for analysts con-
ducting subsequent interpretive sociological studies.

Weber's interest in explaining particular historical and societal develop-
ments and patterns of organization of social action required a focus on
actual events. He rejected universals or laws precisely because he be-
lieved they did not help in explaining the particular.

It is interesting that Schutz's phenomenological grounding did not
move him in the direction of studies of the particular, concrete, specific
situation and of the specific contexts of action and social relationships
nor. Perhaps it was the clarity of the ideal typical construct that attracted
him to the idea of the possibility of increasingly formalized and general-
ized formulations. Or perhaps it was the opacity, complexity and ambigu-
ity of the subjective meaning contexts in the world of everyday life that
appeared impenetrable without the clarity of vision provided by the
procedures of ideal type construction. Whatever it was, Schutz's adher-
ence to the ideal type model of construct formation and his personal
situation[24] which prevented his conducting empirical studies kept him
consistently focused on this methodological approach.

His own studies of the "stranger," the "homecomer," and the "well-
informed citizen" as an ideal type of knowledge (1944, 1945, 1946, in:
Schutz, 1964), on the other hand, although presenting ideal typical anal-
yses are filled with observations and descriptions of everyday situations
of choice, ambiguity, confusion, contradictions, and perplexity as well as
of typical courses-of-action, stocks of knowledge and habitual patterns of
action. Although abstract and analytic, they are also filled with details
and specifics—though these may be anonymized and often decontextual-
ized descriptions. His phenomenological approach brought him to an
appreciation and explication of the details of everyday life, to the study of
common sense knowledge, the examination of the role of types and
typifications in the mundane world, and to, a "constitutive phenomenol-
ogy of the natural attitude." (Embree, 1988: 257)

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[24] His personal situation refers not only to his full time employment outside academia
for most of his life but also to his lack of interest or involvement in political activities,
his lack of training in history, and his training and interest in philosophy, economics
and law. In the latter two fields, the approaches of Kelsen in law and von Mises in
economics, were congruent with the ideal type model of theoretical construction. He
may have lacked awareness of developments in empirical sociology, particularly in
anthropology or in the Chicago School sociologists who introduced field studies, the
uses of biographies, personal documents, and case studies and direct participant
observation of every day life activities (beginning in the 1920s and 30s).

His focus on types and typification in the world of everyday life represents, in part, a shift of emphasis in that he shows that "ideal types" operate in pragmatic ways, in the natural attitude, and that members of society are actively engaged in their construction and use, and that sedimented and pre-given types are already present in language, beliefs and action systems. In this respect, since the world is already experienced in terms of types and typifications which are part of common sense knowledge, he is able to develop his model of science as one in which second order constructs would be based on first order ones. The ideal type is not unique to the analyst, an insight which seems lacking in Weber, and therefore Schutz's phenomenological grounding on the actualities of common sense knowledge provides for the possibility of a more explicit focus on the ways in which ideal typical reasoning operates in the world of everyday life. Schutz's insight may be said to also provide a firmer foundation for the analyst's use of the ideal type.

Rather than shift his approach to the study of everyday rationalities and their operative significance, Schutz remained committed to a model of science which would develop second order constructs based on first order ones. The social scientist would develop clear and consistent constructs[25] and models fitted within modes of scientific problem formulation and theorizing, similar to Weber's approach, that preserved the social scientist's role, as the analyst, theorizer, interpreter whose theoretical constructs would supersede those actually in use in the world of everyday life. It is perhaps this commitment to a transcendent model of a scientist, committed to a discipline, constrained by the already formulated rules and methods (e.g. ideal type constructs and models) of the science, and dedicated to building on the already received interpretations and findings of prior empirical studies, which occluded Schutz's vision of alternative possibilities.[26]

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25 And, as noted by Schutz (1962: 38 and 46; 1964: 83 and 87) "each construct (including the ideal type) carries along a subscript referring to the problem for the sake of which it has been established."

26 Wagner (1983: 241) notes that Garfinkel corresponded with Schutz and sent him a paper titled "A Comparison of Four 'Pre-Theoretical' Problems by Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz" in 1953 in which he noted that Parsons presents a "correspondence theory of reality" and Schutz a "congruence theory" an equivalent of Kaufmann's "adequate coherence theory." The latter theory finds "concreteness exclusively 'in the object constituted as a unity of meanings' and thus leads to the conception of 'multiple realities.'" Schutz responded that he "doubted that the essential differences between him and Parsons were 'pre-theoretical' and was not sure what Garfinkel meant by the terms 'correspondence' and 'congruence theories.'" It is

Phenomenologically grounded studies of the practices of meaning constitution, the methods of ordinary reasoning, the ways in which social action was ongoingly organized and made accountable, everyday types and typifications and their uses, the practical theorizings found in the mundane world, all had been noticed by Schutz. And it is his explications and analysis of some of these phenomena which undoubtedly contributed to the development of Garfinkel's (1967) ethnomethodology.

But the scientific model of ideal type construct formation and his acceptance of a unified model[27] of scientific procedure[28] led him to support the existing system of scientific activity and theorizing. His connections to the methodological perspectives of Felix Kaufmann and Ludwig von Mises, and his Bergsonian and Husserlian philosophy assisted him in critiquing and clarifying the methodology and construct formation found in the prevailing models of interpretive sociology, such as Weber's. However, these perspectives were not utilized by him to develop a different kind of social science which would be oriented directly to the study of the practical actions and reasoning practices of ordinary actors as they engaged in specified kinds of activities in the world of everyday life. Such a development would have more directly contributed to the development of a sociology enriched by detailed phenomenological descriptions and constitutive analyses, a possibility nevertheless made possible in a direction illuminated by the first efforts and the remarkable insights of Alfred Schutz.

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significant that Garfinkel, who had studied under Parsons and had developed a detailed critique of his mode of theorizing which was in part influenced by his reading of Schutz and Husserl, was not understood by Schutz. If followed to their logical conclusion, the "congruence theory" would undermine the ideal type form of analysis or at least provide a radically different interpretation of it. Weber, it seems, accepted a correspondence theory and therefore could claim that ideal types referred to an actual empirical reality. I consider Garfinkel's relation to Schutz more extensively in another paper. (Psathas, 2004)

[27] Lynch (1988: 73), states it as "Schutz assumed that the various natural and social science disciplines are regulated under a unitary set of rational and methodological principles. ... For Schutz the unity of the sciences is found in an explicit regard for the rules of experimental method and the cognitive presuppositions of the "scientific attitude." See also Psathas (1999).

[28] Schutz (1962: 49): "(The scientific attitude as) a set of rules for scientific procedure is equally valid for all empirical sciences whether they deal with objects of nature or with human affairs. ... the principles of controlled inference, and verification by fellow human scientists and the theoretical ideals of unity, simplicity, universality, and precision prevail."

Addendum

Features of and Practical Usages of the Ideal Type Construct and Model

The following represents my formulation of the main features and uses of the ideal type construct and model as used primarily by Weber but also, in part, endorsed and incorporated in Schutz's thinking.[29] It is also an effort to clarify for sociological methodology in general what the ideal type construct's features are and to separate its methodological features from its uses in applications to substantive analytic problems.

1) To provide order:
   As a construct, the ideal type provides order, i.e., makes more intelligible, what might otherwise appear to be a confusing, flux of activities.
2) To select the significant:
   It separates and selects what is proposed by the analyst as significant, essential and/or relevant from all the less significant, inessential, and/or less relevant.
3) To provide understanding:
   Such selection and shaping provides for an understanding of the social phenomena being referenced by the ideal type.
4) As a guide:
   The reader of ideal type analyses or the sociological observer about to use these ideal types in conducting their own research is guided to notice those aspects of occurrences or activities included in and referenced by the ideal type and to disattend the not included features.
5) For heuristic purposes:
   It can serve an heuristic purpose in that it leads others, in examining instances, situations or historical periods other than those originally studied by the analyst, to discover these same phenomena. This can lead to comparisons and contrasts with prior studies as well.
6) As orienting definition:
   Depending on how it is formulated and what it includes, the ideal type may serve as an orienting definition. Anyone using it is constrained

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[29] I draw especially from Kalberg's (1994) analysis as well as from the writings of Weber and Schutz. It is significant, I believe, that virtually no sociology methodology texts examine the ideal type as part of social science methodology other than in discussions of Weber's studies.

thereby to look for that which is contained within it in order to be said to be using it properly in the same fashion as proposed by the original formulation.

7) As open and modifiable:

To the extent that the ideal type references empirically observable social phenomena, subsequent usages and applications may lead to modification, re-specifications, and re-formulations of the ideal type. In this sense the ideal type is not "closed" but "open" to subsequent modifications which are proposed as relevant by virtue of a lack of goodness of fit in a particular application or usage.

8) In theoretical models:

Ideal type concepts can be used in theoretical models of proposed relationships and interconnections in such a way that an ideal typical model of social phenomena can be developed. In such formulations, the model or theory can be used in an explanatory fashion since it proposes a way of understanding linkages of various kinds.

9) As guide for comparisons:

Such theoretical models can also be used to guide research in that proposed relationships may be regarded as hypotheses to be explored and "tested" or compared with the model in concrete empirical instances.

10) As incorporating the analyst's purposes:

Since the ideal type may not be proposed as universally or generally valid, nor presented as having a "lawlike" significance, but rather may be formulated for particular purposes, the purposes of the analyst remain relevant in understanding its meaning and range of application. Since different analysts will have different purposes at different times, differing ideal types, even though they refer to the same social phenomena, can be constructed.

11) As different from essential or necessary features:

The ideal type is not an analysis of the essential or necessary features of a social phenomenon since it cannot be considered apart from the purpose for which it is constructed. It differs in this respect from a phenomenological analysis of essential or constitutive features of a phenomenon which are offered as universally valid. (cf. Spiegelberg, 1982: 696-703)

12) As relevant for abstract, formal and general theorizing:

It is theoretically possible for ideal types to be formulated which are abstract, and general, and which are stipulated as universally valid. Such types may not be offered as directly relevant for concrete, em-

pirical studies but rather as relevant for abstract, formal, and general theorizing. (cf. some of Schutz's references to the models of economics and jurisprudence. Schutz, 1967: 243-249) When ideal type constructs are used in theoretical formulations of relationships the model so constructed may or may not be proposed as a "lawlike" formulation of such relationships.

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Part III

The Political and Socio-Cultural
Dimension of the Life-World

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If only to be heard: Value-Freedom and Ethics in Alfred Schutz's Economic and Political Writings

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Abstract. *Alfred Schutz's critique of Ludwig von Mises, while not sacrificing value-freedom within economic science, opened up possibilities for a politico-ethical critique of the economic sphere. Schutz's account of rationality, however, lacked resources for developing the theoretical bases of this critique. Although his political writings proceeded formally and descriptively, observing the constraints of value-freedom, there are potentialities in some published and unpublished works for developing an ethical theory, albeit a rather formal one. This paper articulates the lineaments of that theory, based on a concept of "participative agency" that emerges from the ethical commitments underpinning the Austrian economic tradition.*

Although Alfred Schutz dedicated many of his published writings to the philosophy of the social sciences, he did venture ever so tentatively—and often in unpublished rather than published works—into the domains of economics and political science. In these areas, he tended to share a commitment to value-freedom that characterized the intellectual climate in which he received his graduate education, namely that of 1920's Vienna, and that pertained to his social-scientific intellectual mentors, such as Hans Kelsen, Ludwig von Mises, and Max Weber. But while sharing such a commitment, Schutz conceived the intersection between economics and ethics differently from Mises. Since this debate was intramural to the Austrian tradition of economics, it will be useful to trace briefly how various representatives of that school developed a notion of value-freedom and explored the interface between ethics and economics. Interestingly enough, the Austrian endorsement of *theoretical* value-freedom correlated with certain ethical values that Austrian economists believed to be embodied in the *practical* economics of the free market for which they usually advocated. I hope to focus on Schutz's critique of Mises and to indicate how that critique, while not sacrificing value-freedom within economic science, nevertheless opens up greater possibilities for a politico-ethical critique of the economic sphere from without. However, Schutz's own account of rationality lacked the

resources for developing the theoretical bases of such a critique. Schutz's specifically political writings tended to proceed formally and descriptively, observing the constraints of value-freedom, and yet in some published and unpublished works on political questions one can discover potentialities for the development of an ethical theory, albeit a rather formal one. I hope to articulate the lineaments of that theory, based on what might be called a concept of "participative agency," and to show how this theory grows out of some of the ethical commitments underpinning the Austrian economic tradition to which Schutz belonged.[1]

From the outset it is important to be clear about the meaning of value-freedom. Max Weber (1968) in his classical formulations recognized that the very selection of what should be a topic of scientific investigations depended inescapably upon some context of value-relevance (*Wert-Beziehung*). For instance, the values of social scientists' cultures induce them to single out for investigation only parts of the empirical reality surrounding them, such as law, religion, or economic activity; values are unavoidably involved in the selection of topics for study. However, once that direction of interest is adopted, the social scientists for the purposes of their empirical discipline undertake a "value-free" (*wertfrei*) investigation, that is, they seek to refrain from any value-judgments on the material to be described and to produce propositions that are objective, verifiable, valid, and true. As Schutz (1962b: 63) put it:

The scientific problem, once established, alone determines what is relevant for the scientist as well as the conceptual frame of reference

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[1]   While it is a messy task to determine which of Schutz's writings are "specifically" economical or political, the contents of the essays "Basic Problems of Political Economy" (Schutz, 1996a: 88-92) and "Political Economy: Human Conduct in Social Life," (Schutz, 1996d: 93-105) and "Choice and the Social Sciences" (Schutz, 1972: 565-590) take as their focus Schutz's engagement with Mises and the Austrian Economic School more than other writings. Similarly, Schutz addresses political issues as directly as he ever does in the essays: "In Search of the Middle Ground" (Schutz, 1996c: 147-151), "The Well-Informed Citizen" (Schutz, 1964e: 120-134) and "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (Schutz, 1964b: 226-273) and a series of brief unpublished texts: "Some Considerations concerning Thinking in Terms of Barriers," (Schutz, 1998d: 287-289) "Memorandum (to Doctor Harold Lasswell, June 7, 1956)," (Schutz, 1998b: 291-295) and "Report on the Discussions of Barriers to Equality of Opportunity for the Development of Powers of Social and Civil Judgment," (Schutz, 1998c: 297-311) and "Letter of Alfred Schutz to Clarence H. Faust, The Fund for the Advancement of Education, December 10, 1957." (Schutz, 1998a: 313-318)

to be used by him. This, and nothing else, it seems to me, is what Max Weber means when he postulates the objectivity of the social sciences, their detachment from the value patterns which govern or might govern the behavior of the actors on the social scene.

I. Austrian Economics, Value-Freedom, and Ethics

Following predecessors such as W. v. Hermann, K. H. Rau, Hufeland, Shaffle, Mischler, and Schutz, Carl Menger, simultaneously with William Jevons and Léon Walras and in conjunction with his own colleagues F. Wieser and E. Böhm-Bawerk, initiated what gradually came to be recognized as the "marginal revolution" in economics. This revolution extended over several generations, including a second generation of Mises and Schumpeter and a third of Haberler, Hayek, Machlup, Morgenstern, and Rothbard. Before Menger, classical economics questioned why objects of greater utility (e.g. iron) were valued less than those of lesser utility (e.g. gold) and concluded that the price of objects depended not on their use value but on the *objective* processes conferring value on them (e.g. production costs, labor time invested). Menger, however, focused on the *subject* who in different times, places, and conditions and in accord with what afforded greater or smaller satisfaction, chooses to purchase. For Menger (1950: 58, 115), "the goods-character is not a property inherent in the good themselves" but rather one finds "the causal source of market phenomenona in the actions of human participants in the market process."

In the view of Mises (1963: 315), Menger's rediscovery of the subjectivity of the consumer (and producer) dispels the ghost of the mechanistic market haunting classical economics:

It is customary to speak metaphorically of the automatic and anonymous forces actuating the "mechanism" of the market. In employing such metaphors people are ready to disregard the fact that the only factors directing the market and the determination of prices are purposive acts of men. There is no automatism; there are only men consciously and deliberately aiming at ends chosen. There are no mysterious mechanical forces; there is only the human will to remove

uneasiness. There is no anonymity; there is I and you and Bill and Joe and all the rest. And each of us is both a producer and consumer.[2]

Rejecting a utilitarian anthropology characterizing human beings merely as hedonistic passive recipients interested in maximizing pleasure, the Austrians generally considered the essence of humanity to reside in purposeful activity and thus preferred a cognitive psychology focused on choice and preference. Attunement to subjective, psychological processes led Menger (1985: 64, 84) to recognize motivational complexity since "along with self-interest, which at most can be recognized as the mainspring of human economy, also public spirit, love of one's fellow men, custom, feeling for justice, and other similar factors determine man's economic actions." Menger (1985: 84) even included among these psychological factors *error*, that is, the fact that people can be mistaken about their economic interests or economic state of affairs. Menger's (1950: 115, 146) appreciation for the complexity of motivations and the different intensities of preference for each person that complexity entails led logically to the law of marginal utility—which Mises (1963: 121-125) claimed is already implied in the category of action. According to this law, consumers, aware of their subjective wants and the objective conditions for satisfying those wants, attribute to physical things particular degrees of importance. They end up choosing between two satisfactions (e.g., whether to pursue an increment to n-units or remain at n-1 units)—both of which they cannot have together. Granted the complexity and differing intensities of motivations, Stephen Kresge (1989: 7-8) observed that "Only the individual can know what one is prepared to give up or substitute to obtain the use—that is, the value—of something else."[3]

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[2]   Mises (1960: 93) further argues that to conceive the economy as springing from the business like calculation, based on knowledge of all the relevant conditions, is typical of classic economics. Modern economics, in contrast, starts with the conduct of consumers that "governs and directs the conduct of the business man and entrepreneur."

[3]   Hayek (1984: 200-201) points out that Menger does not use the terminology of "marginal utility" in the *Grundsätze*, but rather the term was introduced 13 years later by Friedrich von Wieser. Mises (1966: 204-205) also reflects on the importance of the different intensities with which people desire goods. "If a man exchanges two pounds of butter for a shirt, all that we can assert with regard to this transaction is that he—at the instance of the transaction and under the conditions which this instant offers to him—prefers one shirt to two pounds of butter."

The Austrian subjective turn shook economics to its methodological roots. First of all, Menger (1985: 63) endeavored to get beneath market laws to the subjective activity of consumers, to reduce "the complex phenomena of human economic activity to the simplest elements that can still be subjected to accurate observation," and thus to pursue a methodological individualism. Echoing Schutz's (1962b: 53, 58; 1964d: 6-7; 1964c: 84-85) own description of economic generalizations, Barry Smith (1994: 337) explained such a methodological strategy through the principle that "all talk of nations, classes, firms, etc. is to be treated by the social theorists as an in principle eliminable shorthand for talk of individuals." Secondly, the complexity of subjective motivation of each individual and the disharmony of individuals' knowledge and intentions render the market and market equilibrium more fluid and less predictable, as Hayek (1948) emphasized in his 1936 essay "Economics and Knowledge"—originally a lecture attended by Schutz. Just as Schutz (1964d) would later point to the unpredictability constitutive of everyday life in "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World," so Mises (1963) and Hayek (1948: 37, 43-45; 1989: 50-51) concurred in conceiving economic human decision-making as grappling with an undetermined future fraught with uncertainty. The knowledge imbalance between economic participants produced, as one commentator (Kirzner, 1995: ix) expressed it, a "dis-equilibrium world." Thirdly, the inconstancy and unforeseeability of subjective human action prevented, according to Hayek (1989) and Mises (1963), any easy reconciliation with positivistic, quantitative methodologies, such as E. Mach's. Furthermore, the difficulties of applying such methodologies suggested a distinction between the "objects" of economic science and those of the natural sciences—of central importance to Schutz (1962b) in his "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences."

The Austrian incorporation of the subjectivity of economic agents, provoking the methodological accommodations of individualism, a dis-equilibrium approach to the market, and a hesitancy about quantitative positivism, in effect put in place dimensions of an economic foundation that future economic theories could not afford to overlook. This foundation addressed issues of consumption, demand, and the restoration of economic ends to their rightful place in the interpretation of economic behavior and its organization. Moreover, by acknowledging the subjectivity of economic agents at the foundation of economic science, Menger, Mises, and Hayek all found themselves becoming self-reflective

about economic theory itself, about its limits, and in particular about the value-freedom appropriate to it. In addition, they became reflective about the values in the practical domain paralleling *theoretical* value-freedom.

Menger's (1950, 1985) turn to the subjective, revealing the indeterminable factors motivating economic actors from greed to altruism, including error, ignorance, external compulsion, and the differing intensities of preference, knowable only to those actors and varying according to circumstances, led him to sideline any ethical assessments of these preferences. Instead, attention turned to how consumer preferences, whatever their motivation, evoke entrepreneurial creativity as a response. Value-free economic science here came to mean simply describing such preferences, regardless of their motivation, and thus one could conceive such value-freedom under the rubric of a "tolerance of motivations."

While value-freedom in the conduct of economic science implied setting aside one's own values to describe the consumer preferences at the base of the economic system, Menger (1985: 91) also explored the subsequent question of the relationship between values and the economic system that economists explained. After having reduced the "complex phenomena of human activity to its simplest elements," Menger became all the more fascinated about how from this anarchy of subjective preferences behavioral regularities and even more or less well-functioning institutions could emerge at all, as they have. Although he had opposed the German Historical School on some counts, he (Menger, 1985: 91) acknowledged the partial validity of their views on a "subconscious wisdom" manifested in institutions, such as law, language, the state, markets, prices, interest rates, that had developed "organically," without intentional direction, high above "meddlesome human wisdom." An organicist account of economic institutions, flowing from the Austrian subjective turn, could imply a laissez faire approach to the economy, refraining from meddlesome value-based interventions into it, bracketing one's values in one's *practical* relation to the economy as one had to do in the conduct of *empirico-theoretical* economic science. But because Menger recognized the central importance of subjective activity, including intelligent, purposive activity, he thought that it was also possible to give intelligent direction to institutions through a common will expressed for instance by mutual agreements or legislation. Having recognized the validity of this "pragmatic" approach to the economy, in tension with an organicist one, Menger relativized economic theory by claiming that it described only the *homo economicus* and abstracted from

a mesh of other human factors and motivations never totally comprehensible. This limitation of economic theory raised the possibility that non-economic aspects of human existence might call for value-guided interventions in the economic domain.

Concurring with Menger's sensitivity to the diversity of subjective motivations underpinning economic preferences, Mises (1960, 1963) developed further value-freedom under the rubric of its tolerance of motivations. Similar to Menger, Mises insisted that the motives directing people were irrelevant for the formation of prices. It was economically unimportant whether the demand for weapons on the market came from those on the side of law and order or from criminals and revolutionaries—what alone was decisive was that a demand existed in a definite volume.

While the tolerance of motivations provides one lens through which to view value-freedom, Mises also understood value-freedom in terms of adopting an instrumental approach to rationality. If, as Mises (1960, 1963) thought, rational action involved choosing between given possibilities in order to attain one's most ardently desired goal, then the role of economic science was not to tell people what goals they ought to desire. Thus bizarre actions (e.g. buying an expensive house to sip cocktails in the neighborhood of a duke) or unhealthy choices (e.g., purchasing poisonous alcohol or nicotine) ought to be conceived as "rational" insofar as they were directed, as means, to one's own state of satisfaction. The economist ought to abstain from judging such purchases aimed at satisfaction as "irrational" since "notions of abnormality and perversity have no place in economics"—and thus the instrumental-rational interpretation of value-freedom converges with a tolerance of motivations understanding. Since rationality only concerned choosing means to one's goal, any attempt to apply even the terms "rational" or "irrational" to ends would fail. Mises (1963: 242) supported this value-freedom regarding ends by aligning himself with a long philosophical tradition that considered all value-judgments to be non-rational and arbitrary, and hence "to call something fair or unfair is always a subjective value judgment and as such purely personal and not liable to any verification or falsification." Mises even perceived difficulties in attempts to assess the rationality of means to ends since such means always refer to a specific technology, and deviations from that technology could result either because rational means were unknown or because the actor actually sought other means. In neither case could one judge the "deviant" actions as irrational. In conclusion, for Mises (1963:

19) every human action, beyond merely the reactive behavior of the organs of the human body, turned out to be rational. This position differentiated him from Max Weber who was more willing to judge actions as rational or irrational in the light of his distinction between purposive-rational action and value-rational, affective, habitual, and traditional action.[4]

Mises's perspective holds further implications for the interaction between ethics and economics since he opposed the idea of a *homo economicus* by which Menger limited economics to the study of one aspect of human existence and made possible a critique of economics on the basis of other aspects. In other words, Mises (1960) deprived Menger's theory of its only basis for some value-based regulation of economic processes from beyond them. To appreciate Mises's elimination of the *homo economicus*, it is necessary to begin with his understanding of the epistemological status of his own categories of human action. In opposition to the relativizing tendencies of the Historical School, Mises (1960: 95-96) argued that his conception of action—originating in discontent and leading to a choice of possibilities as means to one's "most ardently desired goal," satisfaction—was *a priori* and not historically relative or merely empirical, as were Weber's ideal types.

> Though the men of the Middle Ages would not have understood the law of marginal utility, they nevertheless did not and could not act otherwise than as the law of marginal utility describes. Even the man of the Middle Ages sought to apportion the means at his disposal in such a way that he attained the same level of satisfaction in every single kind of want ... Even in the Middle Ages no one voluntarily exchanged a horse for a cow unless he valued the cow more highly than the horse.

The a priori features here discussed have to do with the choices and preferences from which action flows, but it would seem that these features, instantiated in the Middle Ages, pertain to all times and cultures. This theory of choices and preference, Mises (1963: 3) claims, "goes far be-

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4   Paradoxically, for a movement whose hallmark was its focus on subjective, conscious activity, psychology became somewhat irrelevant for Mises since there was no need to inquire into the decisions of acting people, why they act as they do or what psychic precedents led to an action. The only thing that counted was choosing in accord with one's goals.

yond the horizon which encompassed the scope of economic problems as circumscribed by the economists from Cantillon, Hume, and Adam Smith down to John Stuart Mill." This new a priori choice/preference theory, which Mises (1963) dubs "praxeology," emerges "out of the political economics of the classical school," and "enlarges the field of economic studies." In giving birth to a theory of choice and preference, economics, Mises (1963: 232) contends, "widens its horizon and turns into a general science of all and every human action." For Mises, the real problem now becomes how to distinguish from general praxeology the narrower study of specifically economic problems, or what he refers to as "catallactics," which focuses on the determination of money prices of goods and services exchanged in the market on the basis of monetary calculation.

For Mises (1963: 240), classical economics took as its starting point the activities of the business person only and not the choices of the consumer. This business person, interested only in maximizing profit, became the model for someone driven by "economic" motives with other motives being consigned to the bin of non-economic motives. As a result, economic scientists, including Menger, limited their investigations to the "economic" aspects of human action. They constructed that fictitious image of a person driven solely by economic motives to the neglect of all others, "a perfectly selfish and rationalistic being for whom nothing counts but profit": the *homo economicus*—although there was an awareness that other motives guided real persons. For Mises, the shift to the subjectivity of the consumer, whose motives for entering the market can be as materialistic or idealistic as one pleases, broke down the distinction between economic and non-economic motives. In Mises's opinion, any motives, from generosity to greed, could be economic motives, underlying the consumer preferences on which economics concentrated. On a praxeological plane, this distinction also collapsed since all motives resemble each other insofar as they aimed at removing uneasiness and improving one's state of satisfaction, and with this aim in mind agents participated as consumers exercising their preferences in the narrower sphere of the market. Moreover, Weber's distinction of purposive-rational, value-rational, traditional, affective, and habitual behaviors would also be of little use since market preferences based on religious or traditional values would be as rational (in the sense of taking actions to remove uneasiness and improve one's satisfaction) as that of the most cunning trader.

By doing away with the idea of the *homo economicus*, Mises took value-freedom (including the tolerance of motivations reading of it) to new heights. From now on, economists could no longer look down with evaluative scorn upon those whose motives were formerly considered "non-economic" and irrational because they did not calculate as effectively as the *homo economicus*. Similarly, moralistic foes would no longer be able to denounce the entirety of economic activity as egocentric, as they could have when the *homo economicus* was paradigmatic, since behind many economic preferences lay the loftiest of motives. Finally, not even purposive-rationality would be normative since, value-directed, traditional, and habitual actors could equally demonstrate preference-rationality. All motives could be economic insofar as they underlay the not-to-be-judged market preferences, and all preferences could be rational insofar as they sought to remove uneasiness and procure satisfaction. Moreover, Mises (1963: 113, 153, 377, 387) stressed that his unconditioned support of value-freedom in the theoretical sphere could be of great significance if translated into the practical domain. In that sphere, dictators, totalitarians, fanatical majoritarians in democracies, social engineers, monopolies, and labor unions often presumed to decide what is in the best interests of others. As a result, they ended up massacring these others, running roughshod over their rights, excluding them, and treating them "in the same way in which the engineer treats the stuff out of which he builds bridges, roads, and machines."

While Mises's *a priori* economics upheld the rationalistic dimensions of the Austrian tradition, it devolved more upon Hayek to reassert the importance of the organic processes, which resisted value-guided interventions from spheres beyond the economy. Beginning with his early essay "Economics and Knowledge," Hayek (1948) opposed classical economics's presupposition of quasi-omniscient participants in the market. In accord with the organic approach that Menger never completely endorsed, Hayek (1967: 92) stressed the organic origins of institutions since "most of the rules which do govern existing society are not the result of our deliberate making." Rather, they were the products of a slow process of evolution in which more experience and knowledge had been precipitated than any one person could fully know. While opposing positivism for assuming a predictability in human affairs that was only possible in the natural sciences, Hayek (1989) also took exception to Mises's *a priori* approach, which in its excessive rationalism could not

adequately oppose socialism. Socialism had formed a part of the rationalistic tradition of classical economics from Adam Smith to the French Enlightenment, although, of course, unlike Mises, it had advocated for value-informed interventions in the economic sphere. In addition, Hayek (1967) cemented his own take on value-freedom within economic science by highlighting with Mises the instrumentalist nature of rationality, which David Hume restricted to the role of serving human ends by clarifying alternatives, value-conflicts, and means-ends relationships. Like Hume, Hayek claimed that when it came to determining what were ultimate ends reason could not serve as a judge because "the rules of morality are not the conclusions of our reason."

Like Mises, Hayek (1944) commented at length upon the values to be realized in the practical sphere if it bracketed values after the fashion of the value-freedom required within the theoretical realm. He did this most explicitly in *The Road to Serfdom*, a copy of which Schutz had personally presented as a gift to Adolf Lowe. In that book, Hayek warned against imposing values on others, against not being "unselfish" at other people's expense, and against the hurt that can be inflicted on others in the name of majoritarian politics or union and monopoly economic strategies. He cautioned against trying to master society as one might nature, criticized totalitarian systems for reducing human beings to mere means, and argued that free enterprise systems tended to be more sensitive to their weak and infirm. In addition, he (Hayek, 1944: 166) characterized methodological individualism as "an attitude of humility before this social process and of tolerance to other opinions, ... the exact opposite of that intellectual hubris which is at the root of the demand for comprehensive direction of the social process."

II. Alfred Schutz: Value-Freedom and the Context of Economics

In his three essays "Basic Problems of Political Economy" and "Political Economy: Human Conduct in Social Life" in *Collected Papers IV* and the essay "Choice and the Social Sciences" in *Life-world and Consciousness*, Schutz (1972, 1996a, 1996d) more explicitly than elsewhere presented his own views on economic theory and criticized Mises. From the very start, though, Schutz agreed with the many of the basic premises of Mises and the Austrian economic school. Like them, he criticized the objective method of the economic sciences focused on statistics, price fluctuations, and formulae of market equilibrium, as if the knowledge of the economist

about these interrelations were the only relevant knowledge. By contrast, Schutz (1962b) insisted in his later methodological writings that the social scientist, unlike the natural scientist, was not the sole person to confer meaning on the world but had to seek to determine the meanings that social agents gave to their world. So also in these early writings he called on the economist to undertake the "Copernican turn" that the school of marginal utility had introduced, a "decisive, methodological step," the turn to the subjective mode of consideration. After this turn, one would no longer be able to describe human behavior merely in terms of causes and effects as if one were describing purely physical phenomenon, but would inquire into the intentions, purposes, and meanings that actors linked to their acting. In "Choice and the Social Sciences," Schutz interpreted Mises's "feeling of uneasiness," the need to be satisfied, as a type of because-motive, provoking an in-order-to project. Also, in accord with the outlook of the marginalists, Schutz (1972: 585) stated that any project originated in "a choice between the problematic possibilities accessible to him and ... each of these possibilities has for him its own weight, although this weight is not the same for his fellow-actor, to whom other possibilities—also problematic—are accessible." Any disagreement with Mises on Schutz's part occurred against the backdrop of the shared premises of the Austrian economic school.

Schutz (1996a) not only agreed with the premises of the Austrian school, he also affirmed in "Basic Problems of Political Economy" Mises's general value-free stance as it appeared in his critique of Werner Sombart's introduction of value-judgments into empirical economic science. Schutz (1996a: 92) concurred further with Mises's prescription that one ought not inquire behind preferences to assess motivations when he cited favorably Mises's (1960: 135) comment, "For the science of human action, the valuations and goals of the final order at which men aim constitute givens which it is unable to explain further." Schutz (1996a: 92) also appeared to subscribe to Mises's and Hayek's instrumental notion of rationality when he asserted that "Values are the irrational as such; the latter never can be an object of science." This position of the early Schutz on value-freedom calls to mind his later demand that social scientists replace the values of their personal biographical situation with those of the scientific situation.

While Schutz was in accord with value-freedom, understood both as tolerance of motivations and restriction to instrumental rationality, he

retrieved the *homo economicus* whose elimination had fended off possible interventions into the economy from non-economic spheres. This retrieval, though depended upon rather extensive adjustments in the understanding of economic theory and human action that he might have been exposed to in Mises. Embracing Max Weber's thought in spite of his mentor Mises's critique, Schutz (1962b, 1996d) understood the ideal type of the *homo economicus* as a fictive being that economic scientists constructed and equipped with conscious experiences sufficient for economists to understand human behavior with reference to an economic problem. For Schutz (1996d: 99), as for Menger, the *homo economicus* gave expression, as Schutz put it, to "merely *one* side of our being human." Schutz (1996d: 99) was quite clear that such conceptual models are formed in abstraction from the "actual world." In that "full existence," one deals with "you and me, with Peter and Paul, or finally with everyone who is a human being in daily life and as such is also producer and consumer, householder or economic leader or employed," who "plans, acts, expects, is disappointed in all his rational and non-rational thinking." Schutz attempted here to self-reflect in phenomenological style on the enterprise of economic theorizing and situate it with reference to its own non-theoretical horizon, namely, the life-world out of which it arises and from which it abstracts. Ironically, Mises, for all his reflection on the a priori epistemological status of his own economic claims fell short of adequate self-reflection insofar as he neglected this life-world ground of economic theory.

But by marking off the life-world basis from theory, Schutz (1964c, 1996d) correspondingly was also able to offer an alternative definition of economic theory that is constructed in accord with the regulative principle for building up its system of ideal types: the principle of marginal utility. Hence, the economist is to build ideal types as if all actors had oriented their life-plan and activities to the chief end of realizing the greatest utility with the minimum cost. Correlatively, only those actions become the focus of economic theory which are oriented according to this principle, whereas Mises, according to Schutz, thinks that *all* action follows the principle of marginal utility and reduces *all* acting to economic acting "because it implicates preference and planning." By dispersing marginal utility throughout the life-world instead of limiting it to a defining principle of an economic theoretical approach to the life-world, Mises effectively conflates economic theory with the life-world.

By rehabilitating Weberian types within economics, such as the *homo economicus*, Schutz (1967, 1996d) nevertheless claimed that he did not succumb to the historicism and relativism of the Historical School that Mises also opposed. Though the early Weber's types were applicable only to historical data, Schutz argued that his own types did not refer to the action of specific individuals but rather described the action of "anyone." Since Schutz's types occurred in complete anonymity and without temporal or spatial specification, he believed that he could attrib-ute to them fixed and invariant motives and claim for them a "universal valid-ity" (pace the Historical School). Of course, one always had to add the proviso that "the theoretical realm, as delimited by the principle of mar-ginal utility, will not be abandoned." Indeed, for Schutz, Mises's own expressions of the economic principle, the basic laws of price formation, etc., made use of ideal types in precisely this sense. Schutz (1996d), however, immediately recognized that this effort to counter relativizing and historicizing tendencies would probably not go far enough for Mises since the laws of political economy for him were of an a priori character. But then the question turns on what *a priori* means, and, given the con-flicting definitions of the a priori by neo-positivists, Husserl, and Berg-son, Schutz (1996d: 103) felt that methodologists of the social scien-ces did not have to preoccupy themselves with a question to be handled only in the "so-called transcendental sphere." One must adopt a higher level philosophical reflection upon one's social scientific methodological reflections to address this question of a priorism, and once again Mises, who earlier conflated theory and life-world, seems to have failed to dis-tinguish the higher level reflective plane from the plane beneath it.

Schutz in "Political Economy: Human Conduct in Social Life," op-posed also an alternative version of Mises's a priorism, namely that "no action is conceivable that does not occur following the principles of marginal utility: all acting is economic acting." Schutz (1996d) saw the question as ultimately a "terminological" one since Mises would have to explain why some actions are interpreted as non-economic in psychology and philosophy. Conversely, anyone who opted for a more general under-standing of action would be faced with the need to demonstrate why it is that people usually refer to some actions as specifically economic. Schutz (1996d: 104) concluded without much elaboration that "it seems purposeful to separate acting turned toward so-called economic goods from other acting," and to see choosing and preferring as subspecies of the classification "action." To be sure, Mises too separated a general

understanding of action (praxeology) from a narrow sense of economics (catallactics). Nevertheless, he also intimately connected the two insofar as, in his own words, economics (catallactics) "widens its horizon and turns into a general science of all and every human action (praxeology)." Mises generated his understanding of human action out of economics rather than develop first a theory of action within which to situate economics. Praxeology, in turn, amounted to only a choice and preference theory (which, for Schutz, did not constitute the model of all activity but only a sub-species). Clearly, Schutz's tactic here was once again to locate economic action and theory within a more ample context (that included non-economic actions also), just as he had done by situating economic theory with reference to the phenomenological life-world.

Schutz's rather cursory separation of economic from non-economic actions in "Political Economy: Human Conduct in Social Life" received fuller elaboration in "Choice and the Social Sciences." In that essay, Schutz (1972) disputed Mises's collapsing of Weber's distinctions between purposive-rational actions and the irrational actions of habitual, traditional, and affective action on the grounds that any action involving choice between possibilities to achieve one's most ardently desired goals is rational. Schutz began by appropriating Leibniz's notion of those complex, unreflected upon "small perceptions," which determine many of our actions without deliberation (our doing or thinking without a previously projected act in Schutz's terminology). It was precisely these small perceptions that produced those states of uneasiness that lay at the base of projected actions, *but as their because-motives* (which could have been recovered via a retrospective reflection after the completion of the projecting or action). In these so-called automatic activities of inner or outer life—what Leibniz called "the class of empirical behavior," Schutz located Weber's notion of habitual, traditional, or affective actions. Schutz, however, with Leibniz, insisted that these unprojected activities could not serve as ultimate explanations of human activity. Such activity consisted also of devising projects, the in-order-to motives of actions, and considering how those projects related to each other as well as which means might best achieve those ends and whether one project is to be chosen over another. To illustrate the difference between automatic activities and rationally determined in-order-to motives, Schutz repeatedly brought up the example of someone walking through a garden discussing a problem with a friend and then turning left or right because

a chain of small unapperceived perceptions producing slight unease so prompted one. Schutz insisted that such turning involved no conscious choice between alternatives, which would have presupposed reflection, a comparison of alternatives, and volition—all leading to the purposive-rational action paramount for Weber. Economic science illuminates this kind of rational economic activity by delineating how an actor would perform "if he had a clear and distinct scientific knowledge of all the elements relevant to his choice and the constant tendency to choose the most appropriate means for the realization of the most appropriate end." Perhaps to avoid any judgment on actor's preferences as less than rational, Mises ended up de-emphasizing precisely this deliberative activity, which both consumer and entrepreneur perform and whose scope and predictiveness scientific economics could enhance.

By bringing the resources of his entire theory of action and motivation to bear and by utilizing examples, such as that of walking through the garden, Schutz was not only able to uphold the distinctiveness of Weberian purposive-rational action against its alternatives. He was also able to delineate more clearly the realm of human action beyond economic action. First all, he clarified economic preference not just as "selection" or "the singling out without comparison of alternatives" (e.g., of a pathway in the garden), but as "conscious choice between alternatives which presupposes reflection, volition, and preference." By adding this reflective dimension, usually associated with the meaning of economic preference in both commonsense and economic theory, Schutz not only exposed a field of activity (e.g. making a turn in the garden walk) beneath the threshold of economic preference as Schutz defined it. But also by including such preference within the broader classification of "rational purposive actions," Schutz made it possible to distinguish economic purposeful actions from others since economic theorists treated *only* those rational-purposive actions as "economic" which were oriented toward the principle of marginal utility definitive of economic science. Via his theory of action and his understanding of economic theory, Schutz was thus able to isolate economic action from a more encompassing non-economic life-world. In comprehending economic action and science as emergent strands within a larger realm of experience, Schutz stood in contrast with Mises, who without first clarifying life-world structures and processes read back into them a rationality born in scientific economic theory (preferences aimed at satisfaction). Mises thus interpreted the world of experience through the filter of economics.

Finally, it is possible to deepen Schutz's critique of Mises's reductionistic approach to human action by referring to Schutz's notion of temporality. In "Choice and the Social Sciences," Schutz (1972: 578) affirms the diversity of action regions since one may have to choose between God and Caesar, between ethics and law, between life and science, and he concludes, "all attempts at bringing these systems under one single denominator must fail, whatever this denominator is." Utilitarianism, though, often homogenizes this diversity of realms by retrospectively interpreting completed acts in its own terms. Thus Schutz (1972: 578) repeats the utilitarian argument: "everybody seeks pleasure; there are, however, ascetics who refrain from seeking pleasure; consequently their asceticism brings them more pleasure than the pleasures from which they refrain." One could extend this same critique to Mises's view also insofar as he assumed that all rationality consisted in seeking to remove uneasiness and achieve satisfaction. Thus, if someone acted in a way resulting in increased ease and satisfaction, Mises would read his own truncated notion of rationality into the actor from a retrospective perspective by claiming after the event that the actor only "aimed at removing uneasiness and at improving ... [his or her] state of satisfaction." In so doing, he would fail to pay sufficient attention to the actual in-order-to motives of the actor and the actor's deliberation about them and the means to be taken to realize them.

In summary, Schutz clearly agreed with Mises on the subjective turn, the need for an economics that was value-free (in opposition to Sombart) under the auspices of both the tolerance of motivations and instrumental rationality. Indeed, Schutz's elaboration of an account of rationality by which actors deliberate about their "in-order-to-motives" beyond merely seeking means to their satisfaction continued to maintain a value-free epistemology. After all, the economist pronounces no value-judgment on those projects and only inquires into how well coordinated projects are with each other and with the means taken to bring them about. However, in contradistinction to Mises who tended to subsume all action under economic action, Schutz, through the revitalization of the Weber's *homo economicus*, signaled his intent to place economic action and theory within a broader context. He achieved this intent by delimiting economic theory as a reflective stance governed by the principle of marginal utility, directed toward a more encompassing life-world, and relying on non-historicist but not a priori conceptual schemes. In addition, Schutz resisted Mises's reduction of all action to economic action by accommo-

dating Mises's account of action within a more comprehensive theory. That theory included the deliberative coordination of projects and means, only some of which are susceptible to an analysis by an economic science defined according to the principle of marginal utility.

To be sure, circumscribing the domain of economic action and theory does little to indicate what the non-economic domains and their values might be or whether they even should play a role in relation to the economic sphere. Nevertheless, Mises's reduction of all action to economic action has the curious effect of eliminating a distinctive non-economic sphere capable of interacting with the economic domain. As a result, for Mises, the only manner of introducing ethical values into the economic sphere would seem to be by registering one's values through market preferences (e.g., not purchasing from companies engaging in pollution). Furthermore, given the reduction of all rationality to instrumental rationality and the consequent impossibility of any rational assessment of ends, this preference would be no more rational than another (e.g., purchasing from that company because its prices are lower). But if a distinction can be drawn between non-economic and economic spheres, then it is possible that values originating in the non-economic spheres (e.g. ethics, politics) could be brought to bear on the economic sphere. Of course, in order to introduce such non-economic values into the economic area, one along with Menger cannot believe in a totally organicist understanding of the economy that would prohibit any value-directed interference with economic processes.

Schutz was fully aware that individuals, at the intersection of various roles and relevances, faced difficult problems of reconciling conflicting relevances, such as economic and non-economic ones. He (Schutz, 1964c: 121) had observed that "the interests I have in the same situation as a father, a citizen, a member of my church or of my profession, may not only be different but even incompatible with one another." The problem, however, becomes more complex when a whole society seeks to determine how different spheres (e.g. the economic and political) ought to interact. Mises (1993) and Hayek (1944), of course, were highly suspicious of any attempt to provide any ethical or political direction for the economic sphere since they believed that such direction would deprive agents of their autonomy at a practical level. A society better protected this autonomy by bracketing rather than introjecting values into the economy, just as bracketing values on the theoretical level led to better economic science. For Mises (1993) and Hayek (1944), intervention was

the first step toward tyranny. While Schutz never recommended any value-guided interventions in the economy, his political writings reveal an ethical value that might have been theoretically elaborated into a moral principle. As we shall see, this principle, in turn, could have served to guide non-economic interactions with the economic domain without falling into the tyranny of which Mises and Hayek were wary.

III. Value-Freedom and Ethical Values in Schutz's Political Writings

Schutz's political writings, that is, those which mentioned in their titles themes usually the concern of political philosophy (such as equality, citizenship, etc.), generally shared the value-free stance of his economic writings. In line with his Austrian predecessors, Schutz set aside his own values in an effort to describe as accurately as possible the motivations and meanings of political actors, even if those motivations or meanings would have been at odds with his own. Hence, in "The Well-Informed Citizen, An Essay on the Social Distribution of Knowledge," Schutz (1964e) accommodated through value-free type construction the differing "distributions of knowledge" of the expert, well-informed citizen, and man-in-the-street. Schutz envisioned his own study as complementing the work of economists, such as fellow Austrian Fritz Machlup. Machlup (1962) depicted without evaluating how "the various actors in the world of economics are conceived as possessed of a varying stock of knowledge of the economic means, ends, procedures, chances, and risks involved in the same situation." Similarly, in "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," Schutz (1964b) laid out basic categories for interpreting the social world, discussed different meanings of equality, and distinguished in-group and out-group interpretations. He then proceeded to sketch various subjective and objective interpretations of "the social group," of equality, and of equality of opportunity. Rather than giving a sustained argument for any ethical norm of equality, Schutz followed a more value-free course by simply presenting the various positions that would have to be taken into account as a starting point for any discussion of what equality ought to mean.

Furthermore, in an invitation to a 1956 Institute on Ethics concerned with various barriers to equality of opportunity, Louis Finkelstein asked for an analysis of the philosophical framework "in which the barrier was raised and the philosophical ethic required to destroy it." Schutz (1994, 1998d), ever committed to dispassionate, value-free social science,

underlined the emotionally charged words "raised" and "destroyed" in the invitation, and in response to Finkelstein he immediately pointed out the many possible meanings of "barrier:" objective, subjective, barriers within a nation, barriers to equality of opportunity among different nations, etc. In addition to his effort to provide a non-evaluative account of the various meanings that "barrier to equality" possesses for different actors, Schutz, manifested an organicist resistance to value-guided interventions in social systems. He (Schutz, 1998d: 288) cautioned that barriers to equality of opportunity were often not deliberately raised, but rather might have been the outcome of historical developments "that might have highly important features for the maintenance of the social system and their being a barrier to equality of opportunity is an unfortunate by-product." Since such barriers might guarantee the realization of an ethical higher value and since inequality of opportunity might be the price of such a higher value, Schutz urged Finkelstein not to assume that all barriers were completely unethical. Finally, Schutz acknowledged that unequal access to information sources functioned as a barrier to equality of opportunity for developing powers of social and civil judgment. However, he also pointed out that it was a basic fact in the societal life that knowledge was socially distributed among social groups with regard to clarity and completeness of contents. Basic features in the human condition as such, for example, those institutionalized features necessary for the maintenance of group life at any historical period, also constituted barriers, however much other non-essential features of group life might be modifiable. Here Schutz's commitment to the scientific, value-free analysis tempered ethical projects for total transformation by elucidating the unmodifiable factual and structural limits within which any ethical impetus to change must function. Just as organicist accounts dissuaded value incursions from without upon economic and social systems, Schutz described via a phenomenological-structural analysis limits with which any value-guided interventions had to come to terms.

Finally Schutz (1964e: 129) reiterated the Austrian school's conviction that science was to be value-free and rationality only instrumental in "The Well-Informed Citizen." He did this when he asserted that the non-expert "can expect from the expert's advice merely the indication of suitable means for attaining pregiven ends, but not the determination of the ends themselves." Paradoxically, though, by limiting science to mere means-ends explanation, one made it possible that on the practical plane it would be left to citizens to determine the "more comprehensive ends"

that might guide the use of the knowledge provided by value-free science and technology. Schutz (1964e: 130) acknowledged just this point when he commented that "Clemenceau's famous statement that war is too important a business to be left exclusively to generals illustrates the way in which a man oriented to more comprehensive ends reacts to expert advice."[29]

However, one can discover in some of Schutz's political writings an inchoate ethics at play on the boundaries of Schutz's usual scientific analyses. For instance, in the essay on equality, Schutz (1964b) was firmly convinced of the immorality of racial discrimination, and in support of this normative commitment, he often cited extant documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations or, indirectly, the United States Declaration of Independence. Indeed Arthur Goddard (Schutz, 1994) perceived in the tone and context of some of Schutz's statements in the equality essay, including quotations from the United Nations document on human rights, a functioning prescriptive norm against discrimination, beyond the mere factual reporting of disparity of in-group and out-group interpretations. Goddard further objected to Schutz's reference to an implementation of the United States Internal Security Act ("a Senatorial committee turns loyal civil servants into security risks") in the same paragraph with Hitler's Nurmberg laws, both of which, Schutz contended, converted subjectively irrelevant factors into imposed problems. In addition, in surveying the daunting problem of realizing subjective equality of opportunity, Schutz cited without criticizing Crane Brinton's claim that collectivism would be necessary. For that citation, Adolf Lowe (Schutz, 1994), to whom Schutz had given Hayek's book, argued in a letter to Schutz that "it is not true that only under collectivism can the prevailing stratification be altered." Lowe added that "contrary to all Hayekian slogans, there is large middle ground between laissez faire and collectivism." Similarly, in the final paragraph of "The Well-Informed Citizen," Schutz (1964e: 134) adopted an evaluating tone, criticizing the "misinterpretation" of democracy that might take it to favor the opinion of the uninformed man on the street, whose opinions contemporary polls, interviews, and questionnaires try to gauge. Perhaps Schutz here echoed the Austrian school's misgivings about majoritarian interpretations of democracy that have a tendency to run roughshod over the rights of individuals and creative entrepreneurs.

Schutz did, however, become a bit more explicit about his own ethical values in certain unpublished writings after 1955.[5] In these writings, too, Schutz (1998a, 1998b: 294, 1998c) criticized majoritarianism, as he sought to abolish barriers to information and to promote wise citizen participation "by fighting the tendency of the average American to believe that in order to be a 'regular fellow,' one has to submit to the judgment of the majority." But this opposition formed part of a broader resistance to conformism and subservience to public approval. The media is particularly prone to promote these kinds of maladies insofar as it avoids controversial and nonconformist opinions and refuses to take a stand by presenting both sides of an issue as equal in value. Additionally dangerous is its tendency, Schutz (1998c: 307) observed, to ridicule "the man of fervent gesture and florid speech," portraying him or her as "a crackpot, pretentious intellectual, or uneducated haranguer." Economic institutions, too, intent on functioning smoothly, can discourage controversiality and nonconformism. Schutz (1994, 1998a: 314), however, hoped for a less conformist and submissive society for his children than he experienced under the Habsburg Monarchy in the Austrian gymnasium in which he studied up until age 18 and in which those "who engaged in any kind of political discussion were threatened with immediate expulsion."

The value underlying Schutz's critique of majoritarianism emerged when he defined what a barrier was in his "Report on the Discussions of Barriers to Equal Opportunity for the Development of Powers of Social and Civil Judgment." For Schutz (1998c: 299), "Barriers are also understood to be factors that limit the willingness of the citizen to recognize his civic responsibility, to seek relevant information about topics beyond the range of his immediate and narrowly personal interests, and to participate actively in the process of social and civic choice." The willingness to recognize responsibility and to seek information beyond the range of one's narrowly personal interests would appear to be steps in a process that culminated in the final element of this series: active participation in a process of social and civic choice. That Schutz (1998c) placed a high value on this goal of fostering political agency becomes evident when he bemoaned its loss through the "the increasing sense of helplessness" that

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[5]   It should be added that Embree (1998: 264-265) argues that Schutz was fully involved in the production of the report on the discussions of barriers, even though Harold Lasswell is named as a co-author of the report.

the information explosion produced since one must increasingly rely on others. He further worried that the central government may have reduced the importance of local government to the point that civic initiative had been allowed to atrophy. Moreover, he found it problematic that families of lower class status in the United States might not develop in their children an "active posture" toward public affairs, and he hoped that the growth of leisure and assured income basis would modify this result. Finally, it was troubling to Schutz (1998c) that efforts by government bureaucracy to guarantee the patriotism of its public employees might produce an atmosphere of intimidation in which an ever enlarging fraction of the body politic might "withdraw from participating in the principal civic choices of policy and personnel."[6]

The mention of "active participation" in "choice" calls to mind Austrian economic theory. For the major insight of the Austrian school was to delve beneath supply and demand curves, anonymous processes in which human agents were only cogs in a market mechanism beyond their control. The Austrian school sought to bring to focus the active, economic consumer whose choices and preferences determine the entire economic system and inspire entrepreneurial creativity intent on satisfying them. Here, Schutz seizes on this same notion of an active, participative subjectivity but takes it in a political direction, criticizing societal currents that suppress it: mindless majoritarianism, pervasive conformism and submissiveness, the information explosion, governmental centralization, economic and leisure deprivation, and bureaucratic intimidation.

Moreover, just as Mises (1963) and Hayek (1948) steered the subjective focus of the Austrian school in an intersubjective direction by elucidating the mutual awareness of market participants, Schutz (1962c, 1966b, 1967) also from his earliest encounter with and adaptations of Husserlian phenomenology was always aware that subjectivity emerged from intersubjectivity. It comes as no surprise, then, that for Schutz (1998b, 1998c) political agency was not a matter of solipsistically making one's choices and pursuing one's own interests. On the contrary, he repeatedly spoke of the difference between cultivating the "immediate

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6 It should be pointed out that this report was part of a series of meetings on equality begun in 1955, shortly after the Supreme Court decision of *Brown* v. *Board of Education*. As such, Schutz's concern about active participation could be seen as at least in part a response to centuries of exclusion of African-Americans on the basis of race from political and economic participation.

and narrowly personal interests," mentioned above, and seeking inclusive conceptions of the public good. The citizen, in spite of limits to political participation, could still foster such inclusivism insofar as "He may educate his children in the art of formulating independent judgments and of taking into consideration *the point[s] of view of others* [my italics]." Preparation for wise citizenship involved educating one "to see things, not only in terms of his personal system of relevance, but also in terms of the system[s] of relevance of others." In exposure to the other, one obtained information and clarified one's own motivations, listened to the other and was heard by the other. Schutz further deplored the lack of "two way" intercourse between the ordinary citizen and those in the mass media or in large organizations who could not be reached by the replies or questions of the isolated viewer. Ideally, active *subjective* participation really ought to involve active *intersubjective* participation. As a result, Schutz (1998c) expressed reservations about a balancing process of solipsistically pursued self-interests whose automatic operation was supposed to devise and discover the goals of common action. Instead, Schutz (1998c) questioned whether the "invisible hand" would achieve the common good without an open exchange between participants that would be central for the goal-setting intelligence that Menger had acknowledged. In place of vested interests blocking national consensus in order to increase their private advantage, Schutz (1998c) favored encouraging pluralistic interests that would keep alive a pattern of diversity without the costs of a totally hierarchized and centrally administered system.

In a fragment in the Schutz archives (1994; Embree, 1998: 262-263) entitled "Barriers of equality of opportunity of bringing about the alternative chosen by the individual or at least of being heard by those who make the decision," Schutz suggested a relationship between processes of choice and preference and the experience of "being heard." In the fragment, Schutz contrasted the experience of a group of *consocii* who talk to each other, answer questions in immediacy, and argue in vivid discussion with the extreme opposite case of the individual voter who may write to a congressperson or editor of a newspaper. Such a voter's actions resemble dropping a recommendation in a suggestion box of a large corporation with ever knowing whether the box will be opened or whether the suggestions will be considered or even less accepted. Modern society and its institutions tend in the second direction, appearing opaque and anonymous to the individual citizen. The only remedy is to be found in

engaging actively a smaller public, as the following fragment, written in Schutz's (1994; Embree, 1998: 262-263) own handscript, suggests:

> The only hope for a remedy consists in the assumption that by speaking out among the familiar group of *consocii* a kind of chain reaction can be created which might bring about the desired result. By the very reason the activity of the responsible citizen in the smallest circle accessible to him—the family, the classroom, the discussion group, the local political or professional organization—is of the highest importance and should be encouraged. By the same reason all forms of expression of opinion in which the citizen speaks not as an individual but just as one of many (polls, etc.) should be discouraged ... It has, however, to be understood that at least the majority principle upon which the democratic way of life is founded is incompatible with the ideal of equality of opportunity to the single individual to make his personal opinion be heard and appreciated.

Beneath the anonymity of the market and large-scale political processes lies the individual agent whose choices and preferences drive the economy and whose political wish is to be heard.

IV. Conclusion: A Schutzian Ethics

In his economic and political writings, Schutz concurred with the tolerance of motivations and instrumental rationality aspects of value-freedom that the Austrian economic school took to be necessary for the doing of economic science. In addition, like the Austrians, he conceived social systems as organic developments not amenable to facile value-interventions, and he pointed to certain phenomenological-structural features that value-governed interventions might not eliminate. And yet by opposing Mises's reduction of all action to economic action, he opened up the possibility of a realm of non-economic values that could have been brought into relationship with the economic domain. Indeed, his political writings suggested a moral-political value that might have been brought into critical interaction with economic values: participative agency—a value that seemed to have inspired the Austrian economic school in its struggle against the market understood as mindless and mechanistic. Although Schutz never engaged in ethical theorizing about his life-world conviction concerning participative agency; had he done so, he would have

brought his ethics in line with his economics since he endorsed the role of economic *theory* in clarifying and criticizing life-world economic beliefs.

How, though, would Schutz have theorized about the ethical value of participative agency? First of all, he would have had to adopt a type of moral-practical rationality, validating its claims by appeal to first principles, in contrast to a cognitive-instrumental rationality seeking to verify its findings against empirical evidence. But Schutz (1996a: 92), following Weber, seemed committed only to instrumental rationality when he states in "Basic Problems of Political Economy" that "Values are the irrational as such; the latter can never be an object of science." In addition, Schutz never discussed at length an alternative kind of ethical rationality, even though there were precedents in Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Mill. Furthermore, Schutz was probably simply not interested in such an alternative rationality since his preoccupation was with the descriptive, value-free social sciences. Perhaps, too, since Schutz was always most adept at distinguishing levels of rationality and avoiding confusion of them, he might well have preferred not to venture beyond the level of the methodology of the social sciences. Indeed, in order to account for types of rationality, to become self-reflective on one's social-scientific rationality as one among others, one would have to occupy that "so-called transcendental sphere" from which he had chased Mises when he unnecessarily claimed a priorism for his own categories. Furthermore, even though Schutz never explored such an alternative type of rationality, his own notion of instrumental rationality, involving deliberation about projects and means, was certainly more robust than Mises's, which reduced rationality to taking means to remove uneasiness and find satisfaction. As a result, one could say that Schutz was at least farther down the road toward a more comprehensive notion of rationality than Mises.

If Schutz would have embraced a version of moral-practical rationality, he would have had to articulate the *value* of participative agency into a *principle*. A possible formulation of this principle might be: "All agents ought to be participants in the choices affecting their lives in mutual interaction with other agents in such a way that each participant feels appreciated and heard (even if not agreed with)." This principle sounds very much like Immanuel Kant's (1981) third formulation of the categorical imperative, that every one ought to act as a co-legislator in a universal kingdom of ends. Or it resembles Jürgen Habermas's (1991: 66) ultimate principle D: Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or

could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. Indeed one can imagine a justification of Schutz's first principle that, like Habermas's (1991) justification of his principle, would try "maieutically to open the eyes" of one's opponent to the fact that she has already presupposed something like Schutz's norm of participative agency insofar as she has entered an argumentation process about it at all.

Such a first principle, however, would never warrant the kind of totalitarian reduction of persons to means [and the expression suggests Mises's and Hayek's latent Kantianism] that Mises (1963) and Hayek (1944) resist. Such disrespect on the practical level runs counter to the toleration of motivations that is a corollary of the value-freedom to be adopted in conducting theoretical economics. Tyrannical abuse of others runs counter to the principle of participative agency that lies at the heart of both the Austrian economic school and Schutz's economic and political writings. At the same time, however, it is conceivable that a society might have to take steps to foster the participative agency of those to whom it has been denied—even if one were to overstep the boundaries of an organicist understanding of socio-economic systems, as Menger (1985) thought might be necessary. But such policies aimed at expanding participative agency would fall into self-contradiction if they were simply imposed coercively on others. The norm of participative agency mandates that the very processes taken to realize it also involve the dialogic, democratic participation of all concerned, those seeking greater participation and those incurring the costs of increasing that participation. Hayek (1944) and Mises (1963) rightly fear the tyrannical imposition of ethical principles, but a principle of active participation is unique in that it would apply to its own implementation and thus preclude tyranny. Such a principle calls for democratic, public dialogue in which one avoids the extremes of being a plaything, disregarded or used by anonymous processes, or of proceeding solipsistically, oblivious to others who, like oneself, seek to be heard.

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In Search of a Political Sphere in Alfred Schutz

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Abstract. *In my paper, I deal with three points: 1) Schutz's notion of the social world; 2) the differentiation of the public sphere within the social world; 3) a comparison of Arendt's "space of appearance" with Schutz's "musical space." I conclude that they have similarities as well as differences in two respects: first, both indicate a space of common appearances in direct communication within the actual reach, that is, the space being seen and heard simultaneously; second, none of them is meant to be a receptive space, that is, the space of mere passivity. On the other hand, they reveal differences, too: in the first, Schutz is concerned primarily with "making" (poiesis), whereas Arendt is concerned with "doing" (praxis). This difference is due to the fact that the space for Schutz is one of (polythetic) sound, whereas for Arendt, it is that of (monothetic) speech.*

I.

In the following discussion, I will concentrate on Alfred Schutz's notion of the social world. In connection with that, I will explicate Schutz's ontological standpoint in contradistinction to Husserl's constitutional standpoint. Then, I will turn to the problem of the constitution of a political or public sphere within the social world.

At first glance, Schutz seems to develop his notion of the social world along the line of Husserl's idea of the life-world. Schutz includes the social world within the realm of the life-world. As Schutz says, the life-world is "man's fundamental and paramount reality." (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 3) And it is only in this pre-eminent reality of everyday life that we can find the social world. According to Schutz, the life-world is "the province of reality" which is given to "the wide awake and normal adult" in the "attitude of common sense" or "natural attitude." The life-world is "what is plainly given to us in the natural attitude." Schutz sees in this life-world two different realms, the realm of "nature" or "the province of things in the outer world" and the realm of "fellow-men" or the "social world." The life-world includes, in its totality, both the "natural" and

"social" world. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 6) This means that the social world is one realm of the life-world: the social world is the life-world shared among fellow-men. The life-world can be experienced only intersubjectively. To put it another way, the individual experiences in the life-world a social world, and enters the realm of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity, Schutz reiterates, is one of the basic categories of the life-world:

> As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of human existence. (Schutz, 1970b: 82)

The critical point Schutz raises here is that it is only in the pre-scientific life-world that we can enter the realm of intersubjectivity; intersubjectivity is possible only in correlation with this "social, natural attitude" (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 59-61) and the world given to it, that is, the life-world. This is the point where Schutz departs from Husserl, or, as Gurwitsch points out:

> He deliberately abstains from raising questions of transcendental constitution and pursues his phenomenological analyses within the framework of the 'natural attitude.' (Gurwitsch, 1970: xv; 1974: 116)

Schutz disagrees with Husserl on the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity. Schutz posits intersubjectivity of the social world as essentially an ontological problem of the natural attitude rather than a constitutional problem of the transcendental ego. Schutz argues that any attempt to constitute the intersubjective social world from the activities of transcendental subjectivity necessarily leads to solipsism. Thus, no concrete problems of social science, i.e., the problems arising in the intersubjective social world, can be solved by transcendental phenomenology.

In particular, in a critical essay, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," Schutz sums up "Husserl's attempt to account for the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity" as a failure. The reason for this failure, Schutz says, is that "intersubjectivity" is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (Gegebenheit) of the life-world. "Intersubjectivity" is the fundamental ontological category of the

human life-world. The social world has a prior existence in prescientific life-experience, in common-sense perception. The social world in which men actually live with other men is a world built up in the naive natural point of view of everyday life. It is the world where men's lives are lived spontaneously in the natural attitude. In this sense, the social world is an original or pre-predicative construct. (Schutz, 1973a: 5-6) Schutz's ontological standpoint concerning the social world is fundamental in two senses: first, it is the point where Schutz departs from Husserl; second, it is the point where Schutz's own "phenomenology of the social world" begins.

We can contrast Husserl and Schutz in terms of two parallel terms: "transcendental" and "mundane." Against Husserl's notion of transcendental phenomenology and transcendental intersubjectivity, Schutz develops mundane phenomenology and mundane intersubjectivity. Schutz agrees with Husserl that my living body is always present and given as the primal instituting organ. But Schutz question is that the constitution of the other must be distinguished from the way in which my own psychophysical ego is constituted. I observe merely the exteriority of the other's body whereas I experience my own body from within. Accordingly, my living body is

> present precisely in a way which is as dissimilar as possible from the external perception of an animate body other than mine and therefore can never lead to an analogical apperception. (Schutz, 1970b: 63)

Another problem, which Schutz sees in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, is that the second epoché does not yield a "transcendental" alter ego but merely a "psychophysical" alter ego. Schutz asserts,

> The second epoché could never yield the constitution of the Other as a full monad within my monad, but at most it yields appresentation of another psychophysical ego beginning from the substratum of my psychophysical ego. (Schutz, 1970b: 67)

According to Husserl, the first epoché reveals the world as a transcendental phenomenon. The world effected by the first epoché, however, is not the world "properly" given to the ego; the sense of the world is still codetermined by "strange" elements, by what is not "properly" of the ego.

Another epoché is necessary, Husserl says, "to create a unique philo-
sophical solitude which is the basic methodological requirement for a
genuinely radical philosophy." Thus, a second epoché is performed to
obtain the realm of "what is peculiarly my own" (des Selbst-eigenen).
The aim of the second epoché is then twofold: the first is to separate out
all that is "properly" of the ego from all that is not; the second is to yield
the constitution of the other as a full monad within my monad. (Schutz,
1970b: 55-61)

   Schutz further argues that the transcendental intersubjectivity as
constituted by Husserl is not yet an "intersubjectivity." The "transcend-
dental intersubjectivity" which Husserl constitutes is a "subjectivity"
existing purely in me, in the meditating ego. It is constituted purely from
the sources of my intentionality, though constituted in such a manner that
transcendental subjectivity in every single human being may be the same.
To put it more exactly no transcendental "community," no transcendental
"We," is established by the second epoché. On the contrary, "each
transcendental ego has constituted for himself, as to its being and sense,
his world." Thus the world which the transcendental ego has constituted
is "just for himself and not for all other transcendental egos as well." This
is why Husserl's "transcendental intersubjectivity" would be a
community for "me" or for "you", even "a cosmos of monads" but not an
"inter"-monadic relationship or "inter"-communication between a plural-
ity of transcendental subjects. (Schutz, 1970b: 75-77)

   At this point, Schutz refers to a similar view as advanced by Eugen
Fink, a later assistant to Husserl. According to Fink,

> [t]he creation of a universe of monads and of the objective world for
> everyone proves to be impossible within the transcendental
> subjectivity of the meditating philosopher, a subjectivity which is
> supposed to subsist for him, and for him alone. (Schutz, 1970b: 84)

In short, Schutz's critical arguments are three: first, no transcendental
constitutional analysis can disclose the essential relationship of inter-
subjectivity; second, no social science can find its true foundation in
transcendental phenomenology; third, we have to turn to the intra-
mundane center of the life-world, that is, the mundane ego. For Schutz,
intersubjectivity, the most fundamental category of the social world and,
for that reason, of social science, is a realm belonging to the mundane ego.

II.

Mundane ego or its underlying natural attitude is the foundation upon which Schutz establishes his "ontology of the social world." For Schutz, "the mundane world" given to the "mundane ego"—this world alone "is the topic and ought to be the topic" of a social ontology. (Schutz, 1973b: 131) The central point Schutz drives at concerning the mundane ego is its "natural attitude." "Mundane ego" refers to the human being living in the "natural attitude" within the everyday life-world as the basis of his actions and thoughts. Schutz founds on this "natural attitude" of the mundane ego the whole realm of an ontology of the social world. "Natural attitude" is the matrix within which the mundane ego experiences the world in the mode of self-givenness. (Schutz, 1970a: 5)

Schutz's ontology of the social world can be summed up by what Husserl calls the "general thesis of the natural standpoint." To put it in the simplest way: "in the natural attitude of everyday existence one accepts the existence of other men as taken for granted." (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 59) Schutz takes, from the outset, the intersubjective social world as unquestionably given in the natural attitude and starts "by simply accepting the existence of the social world as it is always accepted in the attitude of the natural standpoint." (Schutz, 1967: 97) To the naive attitude of our everyday life, others are simply given as subjects. From the outset, the other-subjects are given to me in the unquestioned assurance of an uncontested "belief," and thus not on the ground of a particular act of positing or judgment. For Schutz, the other's existence does not require proof. The existence of other subjects is unquestionable. Only radical solipsists or behaviorists, Schutz argues, would demand proof of this fact—the fact that other intelligent fellow-men do exist. In point of fact, even these thinkers do not doubt in their natural attitude the existence of their fellow-men.

In the natural attitude, all men—that is, "men" in the sense of "healthy, grown-up, and wide-awake human beings" (Schutz, 1973b: 135-136)—naively presuppose the sphere of "We." "We," the basic relationship of the social world, is the first and most original experience given by the very ontological condition of my being in the world. I was born and brought up by others and live among others. The "basic we-relationship," Schutz points out, "is already given to me by the mere fact that I am born

into the world of directly experienced social reality." (Schutz, 1967: 165)
My knowledge of my "birth" and my expectation of my "death" assures
my existence in the intersubjective social world. Or "I can not locate my
birth in my inner duration;" nor can I derive the certainty of death from
my solitary existence; they all arise out of my "existence in the
intersubjective world." (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 46-47) At this point, we
need to keep in mind the comments made by Michael Theunissen about
Schutz, that is:

> When, in the transition to the social world, he leaps out of the
> transcendental into the natural attitude, this only means that he
> situates his social ontology at a level on which the transcendental
> constitution of the Other is already presupposed. (Theunissen, 1986:
> 345)

Nonetheless, this should not be taken to mean that Schutz rejects any
possibility of questioning the existence of others. The existence of other-
subjects is an unquestioned but always questionable background. Schutz
goes even further arguing that any

> circumstance that what has up until now been taken for granted can be
> brought into question is a point with which, of course, we will still
> have to deal. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 4)

Schutz, however, asserts that in the "natural attitude," there is no reason
to question the existence of others. In the natural attitude,

> [n]o motive exists for the naive person to raise the transcendental
> question concerning the actuality of the world or concerning the
> reality of the alter ego, or to make the jump into the reduced sphere.
> (Schutz 1973b: 135)

Rather, the person living in the life world

> posits this world in a *general thesis* as meaningfully valid for him,
> with all that he finds in it, with all natural things, with all living beings
> (especially with human beings), and with meaningful products of all
> sorts (tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, etc.). (Schutz,
> 1973b: 135)

Schutz insists that naively living persons hold fast to the belief that other-subjects exist; that they live in and endure and support this belief. What Schutz indicates here is that "the natural attitude of daily life has a special form of epoché." Natanson calls this epoché the "epoché of the natural attitude." (Natanson, 1973: xviii)

In the natural attitude, Schutz continues, the epoché is performed in a "special" or in a "positive" way by affirming the belief in the existence of others. In the natural attitude, we suspend not "the existence of other-subjects" but the very "doubt" concerning the existence of other-subjects and, more generally, the "doubt" concerning the existence of the world and its objects:

> In the natural attitude, a man surely does not suspend his belief in the existence of the outer world and its objects. On the contrary, he suspends every doubt concerning their existence. What he brackets is the doubt whether the world and its objects could be otherwise than just as they appear to him. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 27, 36)

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, Schutz holds that the "everyday life-world" is "fundamentally intersubjective" or "a social world;" it "is not my private world nor your private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world of our common experience;" "it is from the outset an intersubjective world of culture." (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 16, 68; Schutz, 1973a: 10) These statements can be easily under-stood in terms of Schutz's basic thesis—the "general thesis of the natural standpoint." In particular, it is of critical importance to notice that he means by the natural attitude "fundamentally intersubjective" as well as "social," "common" or "public." In his posthumously published work, *The Structures of the Life-World*, Schutz uses the term "social, natural attitude" instead of merely saying "natural attitude." (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 59-61) For Schutz, what is "social" is already pregnant in "natural attitude;" "sociality" is something prepredicatively given in the natural attitude.

Schutz's arguments can be restated as follows: the social world has near and far zones. In the first, there is the domain of fellow-men or consociates (*Umwelt*), that is, the so-called We-relation. In this domain, you and I experience one another in spatial immediacy and temporal simultaneity. Beyond this domain, there is the domain of contemporaries

(*Mitwelt*). Contemporaries are those others with whom I do not share my spatial immediacy but only temporal simultaneity. I share temporal simultaneity with my contemporaries not in terms of "inner time" or "lived time" but only in terms of "clock time" (Dauenhauer, 1969: 83-90) or world time (chronological or cosmic time). In multiple transitions, this domain passes over into those domains of predecessors (*Vorwelt*) and successors (*Folgewelt*). The social world is given from the outset as a "structured world;" it is given "within a horizon of familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship which is, as such, just taken for granted." The structures of the social world are understandable by reducing them to human actions; they are, so to speak, sediments of human actions. Human actions, in turn, are understandable by referring to their typical motives out of which these actions arise; the subjective or immanent meaning the action has for the actor can be made understandable by revealing the motives, that is, by revealing either the in-order-to motives (*Um-zu-Motive*) or the because-motives (*Weil-Motive*) which, in turn, determine a given course of action. According to Schutz, the motive signifies an intentional meaning of an action.

The fundamental methodological problem Schutz sees in social science is that the social scientist, qua scientist, cannot experience the social world as it is experienced by a man living naively within his everyday life, within the social world. This is due to the particular attitude of the social scientist. First of all, Schutz characterizes the "attitude of the social scientist" as "that of a mere disinterested observer of the social world." Then he analyzes observation and the observer in correlation with the "one-sided Thou-orientation." There are two types of Thou-orientations: one-sided and reciprocal. One-sided Thou-orientations are correlated with the observational situation, while reciprocal Thou-orientations are correlated with the face-to-face we-relation. Schutz's analysis of the attitude of the social scientist begins from that of the reciprocal Thou-orientation.

In a reciprocal Thou-orientation, the unique biographical situation, i.e., the physical and socio-cultural environment as defined by individual persons, is equally accessible to all fellow-men or consociates. In reciprocal Thou-orientations, I turn to you and you turn to me; we grasp each other in spatial immediacy and temporal simultaneity; each of us is experienced "in person"—although only certain layers of the whole personality become apparent—and "in unique biographical situation"—

although this is revealed fragmentarily. In reciprocal Thou-orientations, each other's stream of consciousness flows in "common time-form" and remains "tuned in" upon one another; we are growing older together. Richard M. Zaner elaborates.

> To be with another is for Schutz to grow older with another … you and I grow older together by caring what becomes of each other. (Zaner, 1968: 83, 94)

In reciprocal Thou-orientations, Schutz adds, "[e]very phase of my inner duration is co-ordinated with a phase of the conscious life of the Other;" (Schutz/ Luckmann, 1973: 66) step by step, I grasp the conscious process of my fellow-man, i.e., my consociate; I submerge in the subjective contents of my fellow-man; the experience of each fellow-man is reciprocally determined, interwoven together; fellow-men are mutually involved in one another's biography in vivid present; they live, as it were, in a common flow of experiences.

As unique to reciprocal Thou-orientation, Schutz calls attention to the "reciprocal mirroring of self." In reciprocal Thou-orientations, "my fellow-man is ... presented to me as more 'alive' and more 'immediate' than I am to myself;" my fellow-man experiences himself vividly through me and I through him. Schutz calls this "the reciprocal mirroring of self." (Schutz/Luckmann, 1973: 66-67) In complex refractions of mirror-reflexes, the intersubjective "We-relation" is developed and continually affirmed. The essential characteristics of the reciprocal Thou-orientation lie in "the mutual participation in the consociate's onrolling life." As Schutz observes, "we direct our acts and thoughts towards other people;" "we live rather in Others than in our own individual life." In this way, in pure we-relation, the action is "understood" from within or "in terms of the meaning the action has for the actor." In a reciprocal Thou-orientation, the partner grasps the subjective meaning of the actor's action. I "understand" what you mean by your action in the same way I would "understand" my own analogous action if I were "There" (*illic*) instead of "Here" (*hic*). This is what is meant by "the subjective interpretation of meaning" or "Verstehen." It is, for Schutz, the proto-mode of everyday experience, the mode according to which man in daily life experiences the social world immediately and organizes this experience in direct relationship.

But, if I am merely observing, my Thou-orientation is one-sided. In observation, my conduct is oriented to the observed, but his conduct is not necessarily oriented to me. The observer confronts a fellow-man, but the fellow-man does not take account or is not aware of the presence of the observer at all. In observation, the body of the other is given to the observer as a field of direct experience. The observer may make observations of expressions that indicate the other's conscious processes. Thus, the observer may apprehend both the manifestations of the other's conscious processes and the step by step or "polythetic" constitution of the processes manifested. This is possible because he witnesses the other's ongoing experiences in synchrony with his own interpretations of the other's overt conduct in an objective context of meaning. But the observer is not in a position to verify his interpretation of the experiences by checking them against the other's own subjective interpretations. The observer cannot project his "in-order-to" motives so that they will become understandable to the observed as his "because"-motives. The "disinterestedness" or "detachment" of the observer makes it impossible to interlock their respective motives into common intentionalities for enactments of single projects. Under all circumstances, it is merely the manifested fragments of the overt conduct of the observed that are accessible to the observer. The overt conduct of the observed does not offer adequate clues to the subjective interpretation of the meaning the action has for the actor. The observer cannot tell whether and how the course of action is fulfilling the actor's subjective projects.

Schutz even mentions that the observer cannot say whether the observed fragments of overt conduct constitute an action—"action" defined as "conduct based upon a preconceived project"—in the pursuit of a projected goal and whether they are mere behavioral or physical movements. The observer cannot apprehend the subjective meaning of the action as intended by the observed as could a partner in a reciprocal We-relation. (Schutz, 1971b: 33-36) What Schutz brings up here is the necessity of constructs of ideal types. In observational situations, Schutz argues,

it is possible to construct a model of a sector of the social world consisting of typical human interaction and to analyze this typical interaction pattern as to the meaning it might have for the personal types of actors who presumptively originated them. (Schutz, 1973a: 36)

Social science can actualize the idea of "Verstehen" by a modification of the first-order construct of the social world. That is the method of ideal types. Schutz explains:

> By this method the meaning of particular social phenomena can be interpreted layer by layer as the subjectively intended meaning of human acts. In this way the structure of the social world is disclosed as a structure of intelligible intentional meanings. (Schutz, 1967: 7)

The crucial point is that Schutz takes the method of ideal types as the "only" one by which social science can "understand" or, rather, explain the social world. The social scientist, therefore, has to construct "thought objects" of his own, that is, the second order constructs which would then supersede the "thought objects" of common sense thinking, i.e., the first order constructs. In connection with this, let me quote Psathas' very perceptive comments:

> It is perhaps this commitment to a transcendent model of a scientist, committed to a discipline, constrained by the already formulated rules and methods (e.g. ideal type constructs and models) of the science, and dedicated to building on the already received interpretations and finding of prior empirical studies, which occluded Schutz's vision of alternative possibilities. (Psathas, 2004: 210)

Psathas continues:

> His connections to the methodological perspectives of Felix Kaufmann and Ludwig von Mises, and his Bergsonian and Husserlian philosophy assisted him in critiquing and clarifying the methodology and construct formation found in prevailing models of interpretive sociology, such as Weber's. However, these perspectives were not utilized by him to develop a different kind of social science which would be oriented directly to the study of the practical actions and reasoning practices of ordinary actors as they engaged in specified kinds of activities in the world of everyday life. (Psathas, 2004: 184f.)

III.

What I am going to do in the following two sections is to differentiate the public sphere within the social sphere, so that the realm of intersubjectivity is to be seen as divided into two different spheres, that is, the sphere of mere intersubjectivity or the naive social sphere on the one hand and the public or political sphere on the other. There is no doubt that the life-world is an intersubjective world. What I suspect, however, is that the intersubjectivity of the life-world does not necessarily mean publicness. Although the life-world is not solipsistic, it still belongs to the realm of intersubjectivity, which lacks publicness and, in that sense, is private. In this regard, I think Schutz and, along with him, Gurwitsch and, to some extent, Natanson too, are misleading.

As indicated above, Schutz maintains that the

life-world is not my private world nor your private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world of our common experience. (Schutz, 1973a: 10)

More definitely, Gurwitsch characterizes "the life-world" as "a public world" by saying that:

Each of us does not experience the life-world as a private world; on the contrary, we take it for a public world, common to all of us, that is, for an intersubjective world. (Gurwitsch, 1970: xxii-xxiii; 1974: 123, 115)

In a similar vein, Natanson calls Schutz's "common-sense world" "the public domain:"

As common-sense men living in the mundane world, we tacitly assume that, of course, there is this world, all of us share as the public domain within which we communicate, work, and live our lives. (Natanson, 1973: x, xvi)

The points I am arguing for are these: mere intersubjectivity or what is social is not simply identical with the public. In a more challenging way, Ilja Srubar also charges that

we cannot just assume that the structure of the life world—as the basis for the relatively natural attitudes—also includes the political as one of its distinct components since the figure of the life world derives its critical and substantiating intention by setting the pre-political 'natural' order of the life world in opposition to all other orders. (Srubar, 1999: 6)

Then Srubar questions:

How the move from life to political life is made, or more precisely, from which moments of the structure of the life world can this transition emerge? (Srubar, 1999: 6)

In order to answer this question clearly, we need to examine, after the fashion of David Hume, the emergence of the "civil" or political society out of the "natural" or smaller social relations.

According to Hume, men can live, as shown "in the American tribes," "in concord among themselves without any established government," and are able to maintain "three fundamental laws concerning the stability of possession, its translation" or transference "by consent, and the performance of promises" without having recourse to government. It is, however, "in time of war" or with the emergence of "a larger society" and, with this, the occurrences of disturbance or disorder in "the enjoyment of peace and concord," that men are prompted to "form" or "invent" govern-ment. What Hume means here is: first, men, "in the ordinary conduct of life, look not so far as the public interest;" rather, they are "naturally selfish, or endowed only with a confined generosity;" second, with the intervention of self-interest as well as of thought or reflection, especially on convenient as well as inconvenient experiences of human life, there arises the sense of public interest; third, the sense of instability of this public interest causes men to quit non-political social life and to enter into political society.

Let me put the third point in detail: with the development of society, men easily tend to forget the interest they have in common for their peculiar interests. All men are subject to the same weakness of preferring "any trivial advantage that is present, to the maintenance of order in society." Now, the trust in convention or in the common system of conduct and behavior becomes unstable in the sense that, though the

systems of conduct and behavior be sufficient to maintain any society, yet it is impossible for men to observe these systems "of themselves:"

> You have the same propension, that I have, in favour of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carried to commit acts of injustice as well as me. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by shewing me, that I should be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraints amidst the licentiousness of others. (Hume, 1968: 535)

There arises then a sense of instability or ineffectiveness of voluntary observance of public interest. On the other hand, men "cannot change their nature." As Hume emphasizes:

> Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others that narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer the present to the remote. ... All they can do is to change their situation [that is, to establish government] and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons [the persons, whom we call civil magistrates, kings and ministers, our governors and rulers.] (Hume, 1968: 537)

This is what Hume calls "the origin of civil government and society." (Hume, 1968: 537) The emergence of civil government, however, means that the ruler is differentiated from the ruled, the realm of inter-subjectivity is divided into two different spheres, that is, the public and the private, and political life follows upon social life or, to put it another way, "natural society" is succeeded by "civil society or government." (Hume, 1968: 539-542) As Robert S. Hill summarizes it:

> Some men are made rulers, i.e., they are placed in a position where they have an immediate interest in the impartial administration of justice and no interest or only a remote one in the contrary. The rest of men are ruled [that is, they are] made [or] placed in a position to see obedience to government as their immediate interest. (Hill, 1987: 550-551)

In short, the sense of public interest is not natural but artificial; it is, as it were, something constituted either by "interest" or from "reflections," but

is not itself a nature like "hunger, attachment to offspring, and other passions;" it is more the creation of human convention or the artifice of human contrivance, than naturally inherent in human mind; there is no such a nature as public interest in human mind itself; it comes rather from the labor of reflections—the reflections on the common experience or interest of human life; it is formed, neither by nature as such nor by instinct of human mind, but by reflection which "insensibly and by degrees" alters the direction of mind and remedies "in the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections." (Hume, 1968: 481, 499, 519, 538-539, 543; 1902: 201) Here, Hume makes it very clear that the intersubjective sense of public interest is something artificial or invented, not something natural or given. From this stance, he declares:

> Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish political society, in order to administer justice; without which there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual intercourse. (Hume, 1985: 37)

To our surprise, Husserl also shows a similar position in a manuscript of 1910, entitled as "Die menschlichen Gesellschaften und Gemeinschaften." In it, he lays down the:

> Unterschiede zwischen offenen und personal gebundenen, geschlossenen geselligen Verbindungen. Eine Räuberbande, gemeinsame Verabredung zum Raub. Ein Verein, der Statuen hat, in denen er die Neuaufnahme von Mitgliedern offen lässt und regelt.[1] [And he adds up:] Der Staat eine offene Gemeinschaft wie auch der Verein. (Husserl, 1973a: 109-110)[2]

In a way, Husserl differentiates two different regions within intersubjectivity: one is an open one like "Verein" (association) or "Staat" (state) and

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[1] Difference between open and personally bound, closed social associations. [The latter is the case of] a gang of robbers with common agreement on robbery. [The former is the case of] an association that has the statutes, in which it makes open the new admission of members and by which it rules them.

[2] The state [is] an open community just like the association.

the other is a closed one such as "Räuberbande" (gang of robbers). In any way, Husserl distinguishes the state from "a robber band," even though he recognizes some states are hardly that distinct. To repeat, the state is the sphere to which is attributed the "open" or "public" intersubjectivity. This implies a paradoxical and thus an infinite task inherent in the political life. That is, the state ought to effectuate a public realm with members born private. At least, I read Husserl in this way, when he says that:

> Im Staat scheidet sich das Private und das Staatliche, und es scheiden sich auch die Menschen in solche, die normalerweise ganz in der All-täglichkeit, im Privaten aufgehen, was einen bestimmten Begriff von Alltagsmenschen ausmachen würde, und solche, die „berufs-mässig" staatlich beamtet sind, Staatsfunktionäre, und eine neuartige Alltäglichkeit, Normalität von Lebensinteressen und Lebenstätigkeiten haben. Für sie ist das ursprünglich Alltägliche das Sekundäre, wenn auch nicht geradezu Anomale, da es sich stets meldet und seine Fürsorge braucht, die aber sekundär wird und zum grössten Teile ihnen abgenommen ist durch die Organisation der alltäglichen Ge-meinschaftskultur und die ihr zugehörige Gliederung der privaten Be-rufe, der durch sie ermöglichten Güteransammlungen, durch die (staatlich geordnete) Geldwirtschaft usw. Andererseits, im privaten Leben, in seinen verschiedenen Berufsformen als Formen des ganzen Interessendaseins und Interessenlebens der privaten Menschen, fehlt es nicht an Lebensweisen staatlicher Funktion. In gewisser Weise ist jeder gelegentlich Funktionär, aber eben nicht in der Weise des Be-rufes, der ständigen Hinrichtung darauf und in der Weise ständig einheitlicher Auswirkung dieser Willensrichtung. Sowie der Beamte als Beamter mit ihm in Konnex tritt, wird er zum Bürger oder wird er als Bürger aktuell und steht damit in Korrelatfunktion. (Husserl, 1973b: 413-414)[3]

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[3]   In a state, there is a division between the private and the public, and human beings are also divided by that criterion. There are those, if we apply the exact definition of everyday men, who are singularly engaged in private matters in their everyday lives, and the others who are civil servants by "profession" with their own new routines and standards about interests and activities in life. For them [the latter], everyday life which is fundamentally ordinary is not something completely extraneous, but secondary. The reason is that the everyday things are constantly going on, and need personal care. However, this care becomes something secondary, and most part of it is taken over from them by organizations of everyday community culture, sub-divisions of private occupations, with the accumulation of products which has become possible by the differentiation of monetary economy which is arranged by the state. On the

As Schutz already mentioned, "man is born of woman." In this sense, man is a being condemned to intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, he is not conceived to be born public from the very beginning. Of course, publicness has been thought, from ancient times on, as something noble any intersubjectivity could attain only on its highest level, but not in its ordinary reality. In this sense, it is more like "something," if we are allowed to paraphrase Husserl, "which mankind could have only in the form of the struggle for their truth, the struggle to make themselves true." (Husserl, 1970b: 13) And I would even argue that Kant's essay on "What is Enlightenment?" can be read in a similar way, that is, as exhorting "publicness," especially in the use of human reason. Kant urges:

> The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind. (Kant 1992: 41)

It is also intriguing to note that Kant sets off the "scholar," in a sharp contrast to the "citizen" in general, as the unchallengeable carrier of publicness and that publicness in a Kantian sense is transnational or even transpolitical showing an inclination to cosmopolitan or "eurocentric" taste. (Kant, 1992: 41-48; Jung, 1998: 19-30)

Anyhow, the point I am arguing is that both Hume and Husserl conceive of publicness as something acquired or constituted on a higher level of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, I want to contend that the acquisition of the sense of publicness is a process as much agonistic as antagonistic, demanding choices, struggles and above all else, using Kant's own expression, "audae" or courage and a process, somehow, entailing a sense of tragedy, that is, the sense of absence of communion or "unhappy consciousness." These conflicts and agonistic consciousness arising out of the division of intersubjectivity are shown in an acute form in Greek tragedies. Hume, however, does not go deeply into this matter.

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other hand, even in the private life, because of its variety of occupations and its individuals' completely worldly and interest-seeking ways of being of the private man, the function of the state can't be omitted there. In some ways, everyone is a temporary civil servant, even though not in such a way by profession, with constant work to execute and constant willpower for unified effects. In addition, the civil servant who has some relations with other civil servants as a civil servant is a citizen, or has some relationship with the citizens as an actual citizen.

No sooner had he entered the domain, as Husserl quipped, than his eyes were "dazzled," (Husserl, 1952: 183) whereas Hannah Arendt seems to meet it frontally. Hence I expect in her accounts of the political sphere much more enlightenment.

Firstly, Arendt contends that in the ancient city-state,

the division between the public and private realms, between the sphere of the polis and the sphere of household and family, and, finally, between activities related to a common world and those related to the maintenance of life [was] self-evident and axiomatic. (Arendt, 1958: 23)

She goes on:

The foundation of the polis was preceded by the destruction of all organized units resting on kinship, such as the phratria and the phyle; … the rise of the city-state and the public realm occurred at the expense of the private realm of family and household; … [even] Aristotle's definition of man as zoon politikon [was] opposed to the natural association experienced in household life. (Arendt, 1958: 24)

In order to bring out more clearly this "sharp distinction" underlying the two realms, she even quotes the authority of Fustel de Coulanges' *The Ancient City*:

The regime of the gens based on the religion of the family and the regime of the city were in reality two antagonistic forms of government. ... Either the city could not last, or it must in the course of time break up the family. (Arendt, 1958: 27)

And she adds: "the gulf between household and city" was "much deeper in Greece than in Rome." (Arendt, 1958: 28) But "with the rise of society" in the modern age, that is, "the rise of the 'household' (oikia) or of economic activities to the public realm," the dividing line has become "entirely blurred" and finally disappeared. In this sense, the "disappearance" can be said to be "an essentially modern phenomenon:"

The disappearance of the gulf that the ancients had to cross daily to transcend the narrow realm of the household and 'rise' into the realm of politics is an essentially modern phenomenon. (Arendt, 1958: 33)

Secondly, Arendt excludes "everything merely necessary or useful" from the "realm of politics" and includes in the latter only two things: action (praxis) and speech (lexi). These two are what constitute the political life (bios politikos) in the original sense. In this way, she begins to constitute the political sphere. Let me start out from her descriptions of "the" political sphere (polis):

(1) "To be political," she says, is "to live in a polis;" it means that everything is "decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence;" it refers to "a way of life in which speech and only speech" makes sense and "where the central concern of all citizens" is "to talk with each other;" on the other hand, everybody living outside the polis, that is, the slave or the barbarian, means to be deprived of such a way of life (Arendt, 1958: 25-27);

(2) if everything is "decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence," then speech and action are considered "to be coeval and coequal, of the same rank and the same kind;" it is only in the pre-political realm of violence or in the life of sheer survival as found in the family or in the barbarian empire of Asia, that man is in no need of words; violence is mute; it is only in so far as political action "remains outside the sphere of violence," that it is "transacted in words" and, to that extent, both action and speech meet together; what is fundamental in understanding the sphere of polis, she stresses, is that "finding the right words at the right moment is action;"

(3) action and speech are closely related; or "[n]o other human performance requires speech to the same extent as action;" speechless action is no longer action, because there is no longer an actor, and the actor is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words; as often as not, an action can be perceived, even without verbal accompaniment, in its brute physical appearance, but it becomes relevant only through the spoken word; an action is disclosed by words; and by means of these words alone, man identifies himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done and intends to do. The critical point, however, is this: man as an actor or as an agent, is not identical with an author or a producer: since every actor "moves in relation to other acting beings," he is not

only an actor, but at the same time a sufferer, but never an author. (Arendt, 1958: 178-181, 185, 186, 190) This is the reason why in the world of politics, that is to say, in the world of speech and action, there is no such being as an author. Arendt explicates:

> In any series of events that together form a story with a unique meaning we can at best isolate the agent who set the whole process into motion; and although this agent frequently remains the subject, the 'hero' of the story, we never can point unequivocally to him as the author of its eventual outcome. (Arendt, 1958: 185)

(4) "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities." Here we need to note that Arendt distinguishes "the disclosure of who somebody is"—the "person" or "human essence"—from "what somebody is"—one's "qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings" or "human nature;" what is disclosed in one's speaking and acting is not his "what" but "who;" and the revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer "human togetherness;" and for her, the Ancient Greek polis is a paragon of such a "human togetherness;" it was supposed "worthwhile for men to live together (syzen)" in polis not only to win "fame" and to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinction, but above all else to keep this memory of greatness immortal; but "whenever human togetherness is lost" and "when people are only for or against other people," the "speech becomes 'mere talk'" losing its revelatory quality; and along with that, action, too, loses "all human relevance." (Arendt, 1958: 179-182, 193, 196-198)

Thirdly, Arendt, on the basis of the above descriptions of speech and action, undertakes to constitute the political sphere. In the beginning, she continues the previous descriptions: (1) "action and speech are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of the acts and words of other men;" they are dependent "upon the constant presence of others;" they "need the surrounding presence of others;" plurality is "the basic condition of both action and speech." This means that speech and action have "intimate relationship to the public," or they are the very activities which "constitute the public." Between men, she goes on, there lies the world of objective things "in which men move, which physically lies

between them and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests;" and these "interests," as Arendt interprets, are what

> constitute, in the word's most literal significance, something which interest, which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together. (Arendt, 1958: 23)

Now, Arendt re-designates "interests" as "interest" which is then identi-fied with "in-between" or "web." The point is that the "in-between" or "web" owes "its origin exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one another." (Arendt, 1958: 175, 182, 183, 188, 198) Virtually, the last expressions, that is, "men's acting and speaking directly to one an-other" reminds us of Schutz's "'face-to-face relationship' between con-sociates"—a relationship in which consociates share "a 'vivid present'" within the space of "immediate observation of gestures and other physio-gnomic expressions" and by which each consociate grasps "one another's thoughts, plans, hopes, and fears" (Gurwitsch, 1974: 124-125; 1970: xxiii-xxiv) or a relationship which Natanson characterizes, in contrast to a realm of "anonymity" and "agency," as the realm of "recognition" and "personhood." (Jung, 1999: 96) The real significance, however, lies in that the "in-between" or "web" is finally integrated into a more compre-hensive concept of "the space of appearance."

(2) "Action and speech create a space between the participants;" previously Arendt named it as the "in-between" or the "web;" now she renames it as

> the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word; … the space of appearance [is that] space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly, [i.e.] the revelation of men's own authentic Being through the appearance of speech and action. (Arendt, 1958: 194f.)

When people gather together, the space of appearance is potentially there, "but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever;" it is only when "men are together in the manner of speech and action," that the "space of appearance comes into being;" the being of that space "ultimately resides on action and speech." The space of appearance is peculiar in

that, unlike the spaces which are the work of our hands, it does not survive the actuality of the movement which brought it into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of men, [but also] with the disappearance or arrest of the activities themselves. (Arendt, 1958: 198)

It is Arendt's opinion that the first public space of appearance—that is, polis—came into being when

the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to make permanent the space of action which had arisen from their deeds and sufferings, to prevent its perishing with their dispersal and return to their isolated homestead. (Arendt, 1958: 198)

In this sense, the authentic carriers of the polis are "not Athens, but the Athenians," not the tangible locations but the intangible qualities arising out of the people; of course, before a man could act, "a definite space [has] to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions could take place;" but Arendt argues that "these tangible entities themselves [are] not the content of politics;" they are pre-political, though not non-political. The publicness, and thus the political character, of the space of appearance consists in

the presence of others, [in] its appearing to all; [its reality comes] from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men; … whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream. (Arendt, 1958: 199f.)

The dream as the most "intimate" and "exclusive" domain of the private. (Arendt, 1958: 200)

IV.

Now, I ask, from the standpoint of Arendt, whether we can locate a "space of appearance" in Schutz. In the following, I am going to argue that there exists in him a similar conception. Schutz prefigures a sort of public space in his "Making Music Together: A Study of Social Relationship." He discloses a musical space approaching quite closely to that "space of appearance." Furthermore, by focusing his "analysis" on the

"character of all social interactions connected with the musical process", he goes beyond Arendt.

Schutz's develops his analysis of the "social interactions" of the musical space in three phases. First, the musical space presupposes the existence of a "web of socially derived and socially approved knowledge" of music. (Schutz, 1971c: 169) He designates this pre-knowledge as "the stock of knowledge at hand." This knowledge refers to the "past and present fellow-men whose acts or thoughts have contributed to the building up" of it. According to Schutz, no performers or audience, that is, the direct or immediate participants in the musical space, can be said to be in the blank state deprived of any previous knowledge, but more or less stuffed with sedimented experience. A performer, for example, "sitting at his piano before the score of a sonata by a minor master of the nineteenth century" and anticipating to play that piece of music, is taken to "have a well-founded knowledge of the type of musical form called 'sonata within the meaning of nineteenth century piano music'," with a "set of his previous experiences, which constitute in their totality a kind of pre-knowledge of the piece of music at hand." So it is the same with the rest of the performers or, in different degrees, with the audience, too. The presupposed pre-knowledge refers to what the participants—the direct or immediate participants—have learned from their parents, their friends or their teachers, and these, in turn, from their parents, friends or teachers; what they have taken in from other players' performance; or what they have "appropriated from the manifestation of the musical thought of the composer" etc. (Schutz, 1971c: 167-168) Among the "past and present fellow-men" referred to in the stock of knowledge, Schutz selects out the composer as one of the leading co-makers of music. In this way, the musical space is constituted by three principal participants: the performers, the audience and the composer. Though the composer participates only indirectly or mediately through the actual performance of the players and/or through the memories of the audience, he nevertheless conditions or co-determines, with the other two, the musical process going on within the musical space. Second,

> all musical notation remains of necessity vague and open to manifold interpretations, and it is up to the reader or performer to decipher the hints in the score and to define the approximations. (Schutz, 1971c: 166)

Here, we need to distinguish between musical language and musical notation. By musical language, Schutz means "sounds" and "combinations of sound." By musical notation, he means conventional means approximating the musical language—the sound. Musicians live in "a world exclusively filled with sounds" and are "interested in nothing else but creating or listening to a combination of sounds." The "creative act of the composer is merely a discovery" of "sounds" in the "world of sounds that is accessible exclusively" to musicians. (Schutz, 1971c: 163) On the other hand,

> the composer has to communicate his musical idea to the performer by way of a system of visible signs [so that] the performer can translate these ideas into sounds to be grasped by the listener.

The signs or the system of signs of musical notation, however, are "by no means identical with musical language." They are neither "sounds" nor "images of the sounds." They are "just one among several vehicles" of communicating musical experience of sound, "expressing in a conventional language all the commands which the musicians must obey if he wants to reproduce a piece of music properly." In other words, the musical sign is an approximation or an

> instruction to the performer to produce by means of his voice or his instrument a sound of a particular pitch and duration, [a suggestion] as to tempo, dynamics, and expression, [a direction] as to the connection with other sounds [or] a hint about how to secure in performance a convincing transmission of the work's feeling content without destroying its emotional and intellectual community. … The composer's specific indications are themselves not always a part of his original creation but rather one musician's message to another about it. (Schutz, 1971c: 163)

This is why, Schutz claims, "the indicated effect" or "the way to obtain" that effect "is left to the performer" and, for that sake, "an improvisation" is "executed by one or several instrumentalists." In short, the semantic system of musical notations is "of quite another kind than that of ideograms, letters, or mathematical or chemical symbols." As Schutz illustrates, the "ideogram refers immediately to the represented concept

and so does the mathematical or chemical symbol." Whereas "the signs of musical notation and their combination" could bring about their effect only "by continuous reference to the group which invented and adopted them." (Schutz, 1971c: 165-166)

In order to understand what Schutz means here, we need to remind ourselves of Husserl's distinction between "subjective and occasional expressions on the one hand, and objective expressions, on the other." According to Husserl,

> an expression [is] objective if it pins down (or can pin down) its meaning merely by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be understood without necessarily directing one's attention to the person uttering it, or to the circumstances of the utterance. (Husserl, 1970a: 314)

On the other hand, "an expression" is "essentially subjective and occasional" if it is essential "to orient actual meaning to the occasion, the speaker and the situation." So the "word 'I'" (including such words as "this," "here," "there," "above," "below," "now," "later," "yesterday," "tomorrow" etc.) "names a different person from case to case, and does so by way of an ever altering meaning." Thus an occasional meaning, Husserl summarizes, "can be gleaned only from the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it." (Husserl, 1970a: 314-315) I think this is the sense Schutz is also trying to make us understand in connection with the musical notation. In a similar context, Schutz quotes Wilhelm Furtwängler, a conductor, as follows:

> the composer's text 'cannot give any indication as to the really intended volume of a forte, the really intended speed of a tempo, since every forte and every tempo has to be modified in practice in accordance with the place of the performance and the setting and the strength of the performing group' and that 'the expression marks have intentionally a merely symbolic value with respect to the whole work and are not intended to be valid for the single instrument, wherefore an 'ff' for the bassoon has quite another meaning than for the trombone.' (Schutz, 1971c: 161)

Third, any meaningful analysis of musical process must be focused not on the character of musical signs but on the flow of musical sound. Sound

must be the primary concern of musical analysis. And in the light of this concern with sound, Schutz proceeds to deal with the social relationships existing among the participants in the musical space. To begin with, Schutz defines "a piece of music" as "a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time." The very essence of music consists in the non-conceptual "occurrence in inner time." (Schutz, 1971c: 170) This means that the "outer time" such as measurable by metronomes or clocks cannot be the medium within which the musical being can be given. Only "inner time" or what Bergson calls "durée" can be "the very form of existence of music." To a beholder listening to a record, for example, the outer time means nothing.

> While listening he lives in a dimension of time incomparable with that which can be subdivided into homogeneous parts. The outer time is measurable. [But, there is] no such yardstick for the dimension of inner time the listener lives in. [For him,] the musical content itself, its very meaning, [can neither be] related to a conceptual scheme, [nor be grasped] monothetically, [that is] in a single glance [or independently of the actual process of inner time, but only be lived by submerging oneself] in the ongoing flux, by reproducing thus the articulated musical occurrence as it unfolds in polythetic steps in inner time. (Schutz, 1971c: 166)

Since the meaning structure of a musical work is not capable of being "translated and conveyed to the other partner by way of a common semantic system," but articulable only in terms of "step by step occurrence in inner time, in polythetic constitutional process itself," every single phase of the musical tone must be co-performed or re-performed polythetically, that is, step by step in the inner time of the beholder which then brings in a quasi-simultaneity of stream of consciousness between the beholder and the composer. This is how, Schutz argues,

> a beholder of a piece of music participates in and to a certain extent re-creates the experiences [of the composer.] (Schutz, 1971c: 169-170)

According to Schutz, the composer arranges tones, by means of specific "acts" (such as rhythm, melody, technique of diminution, tonal harmony or large harmony like that of Sonata, Rondo, Variations, and so on) in such a way that

the consciousness of beholder is led to refer what he actually hears to what he anticipates will follow and also to what he has just been hearing and what he has heard ever since this piece of music began (Schutz, 1971c: 170)

and thereby evokes in the hearer's stream of consciousness interplay and interrelations of "the successive elements" of sound. Of course, "the sequence of tones" flows in "the irreversible direction of time," but Schutz emphasizes that "this irreversible flux is not irretrievable." (Schutz, 1971c: 170) Although the beholder is separated from the composer, let us say, by hundreds of years, he can participate in the latter's "stream of consciousness by performing with him step by step the ongoing articulation of his musical thought." In this way, Schutz says, the beholder shares with the composer "a form of vivid present." This "living through a vivid present in common"—the form of time prevailing in such a relationship as between "speaker and listener" as in "a genuine face-to-face" situation—is what unites the beholder with the composer. Schutz also calls it a "mutual tuning-in relation" or "the 'we' relation." (Schutz, 1971c: 171-173) What is striking here is that Schutz dose not take the listener's activity as "merely an internal activity," but, following Weber's "famous definition," as "a social action," which involves "the action of Others" and is "oriented by them in its course." In short, Schutz stresses purposively the active role of the listener. He is now not a mere passive recipient, but an active agent participating in the process of "Making Music Together." In this sense, Schutz's "beholder" looks more like what Hisashi Nasu calls "the beholder in a drama" than "the beholder in a novel." Nasu makes this point very clear, when he says that

[t]he beholder in the novel is ⋯ always simply an 'interpreter of meaning' of the completed and unchallengeable events. In drama, [however], the beholder is 'omniscient' in relation to the individual character by virtue of the author who performs 'the technical task' of presenting, immediately and without interpretation, the relations between characters to the beholder. He is both the 'eye-witness' to the drama and the 'completer of meaning.' He is in this sense a co-constructor of the ongoing drama. (Nasu, 1998: 133)

Schutz then moves to that relationship between the performers and describes a musical space consisting of co-performers with "a soloist accompanied by a keyboard instrument." The co-performers, as the intermediaries between composer and listener, have to execute activities gearing into the outer world and occurring in spatialized outer time, because "all performance as an act of communication is based upon a series of events in the outer world." Since "[t]he process of the communication proper is bound to an occurrence in the outer world," all the activities of performing must occur in "outer time," which, however, synchronizes in this face-to-face relationship with "the fluxes of inner time." The critical point Schutz assures us is that "making music together is an event in outer time, presupposing … a community of space." So each performer's action responds not only to the composer's thought and to the feeling of the audience but also to the experiences going on in inner and outer time of his co-performers. One's facial expressions, his gestures in handling the instrument, and all the other activities of performing, gear into the outer world and are grasped by others in immediacy. Each finds in the music sheet his portion of that musical content which the composer has assigned to his instrument for translation into sound. Each of them takes into account what the others have to execute in simultaneity. He has not only to interpret his own part, but he also has to anticipate the other players' interpretations of his. His freedom of interpreting the composer's thought is constrained by the freedom granted to the others. He has to foresee, by listening to the others, by protentions and anticipations, any turn the others may take and has to be prepared at any time to lead or to be led. Any activity, even if performed without communicative intent, is received by the one as an indication of what the others are going to do and therefore as a suggestion or a command for one's behavior. Each of them undergoes the inner dureé, but everyone also shares each other's stream of consciousness in vivid present. They make music together in a face-to-face relationship, sharing not only a section of time but also a sector of space. Where a larger number of executants is required, one of them—a song leader, concert master, or a continuo player—assumes the function, establishes with each of the performers the contact which they themselves are unable to find with one another in immediacy. The evocative gestures of the conductor translate the musical events going on in inner time and takes up for each performer the immediate grasping of the expressive activities of all his co-performers. And these co-performers,

including the singer, the player of various instruments, and the conductor, participate, by re-creating the "musical process," in "the stream of the composer as well as of the listener." (Schutz, 1971c: 174-178)

It is surprising to see that a rigorous analysis of social relationship such as Schutz's ends up with moving and vivid description of musical scenes. And I think the above analysis shows certain underlying similarities between Schutz and Arendt. In particular Schutz's description of the musical space comes very close to Arendt's "space of appearance" in two senses: first, both indicate a space of common appearances indirect communication within the actual reach, that is, the space being seen and heard simultaneously; second, neither is meant to be a receptive space, that is, the space of mere passivity. On the other hand, they reveal two differences: first, Schutz is concerned primarily with "making" (poiesis), whereas Arendt is concerned with "doing" (praxis); second, the space for Schutz is the one of (polythetic) sound, whereas for Arendt, it is that of (monothetic) speech.

To sum up: the life-world is an intersubjective world, but it is not yet public. How then can it be public or political? According to Arendt, it is when men are together in the manner of speech and action that the space of appearance comes into being. This space is peculiar in that it disappears not only with the dispersal of men, but also with the disappearance of the activities themselves. Thus the publicness and political character of the space of appearance consists in its "being seen, being heard, and generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men." In a similar way, Schutz prefigures a sort of public space in his "Making Music Together." By focusing on the social relationships existing among the participants in the musical space, Schutz describes vividly the process of making music together. Mutatis mutandis, Schutz's musical space can help us in understanding and describing the actual process of constituting the publicness or the political, of which, however, Arendt's space of appearance is not capable.

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The Pragmatic Theory of the Life-World as a Basis for Intercultural Comparisons

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Abstract. *This contribution examines how far the concept of life-form can be used for intercultural understanding and comparisons. It agues that life-forms must be understood as a synthesis of forms of speech, action and thought whose basic structures can be disclosed by the means of Schutzian theory of the life-world. It is shown that the Schutzian approach, stressing the innerwordly transcendence of multiple realities on the one hand and the necessity to bridge that transcendence by semiotic systems and communication on the other, always respects the authentic strangeness of others and of their life-forms without giving up the possibility of understanding and therefore can avoid ethnocentrism and "westernization" of foreign cultures. Therefore it can be used to generate a comparative meta-language which is based in the structures of life-world. In accordance to the Schutzian perspective, the paper develops some basic items of such meta-language and shows that they can be used to synthesize the relevant results of social and cultural sciences and thus to bridge the controversial positions in the present discourse on intercultural comparison.*

I. On the Genesis and Definition of the Concept of Life-Forms

The multiculturality of the world today which we are vividly confronted with in the form of globalization, calls for closer examination of intercultural understanding and comparisons. The objective of the present paper is, therefore, to examine phenomenologically whether the theoretical concepts of life-forms and the life-world can help elucidate this issue.

Our investigation starts with an inquiry into the concept of life-forms since it has been often preferred to that of life-world because, with respect to the study of culture, the concept of life-forms is considered as more discerning. As a matter of fact, the concept of life-forms implies a plurality of forms that differ from one another. But the word "life" here only hints at what takes shape in these forms and why they differ from one another both requiring more explanation. The concept of life-forms stems from the philosophy of life in the beginning of the twentieth

century. Eduard Spranger (1966), a student of Dilthey's, used this term to describe typical forms of human inner life. Theodor Litt (1919) saw ego as existing in a multitude of life-forms and even Alfred Schutz's first attempt (1981) to analyze the meaning strata of human approaches to reality was titled, *Theorie der Lebensformen.* This concept, thus, originally referred to forms of meaningful understanding of human reality, in the plurality in which subjects experience the world, and the synthesis which constitutes the identity of the individual on the one side, and the individual's life reality on the other. The concept, therefore, addresses how humans meaningfully experience reality in a form that exists before the intervention of science, and thus adopts the "radical empiricism", (Edie, 1969) which at that time belonged to the innovative philosophical schools such as the philosophy of life, phenomenology and pragmatism. (Edie, 1969; Srubar, 1988)

Different forms of experience, of course, are not simply conditions immanent to the consciousness but are also generated by action and interaction. Spranger distinguished between theoretical, aesthetic, social and political forms of life. Schutz in his younger years (1981) already saw the connection between forms of thought, action and language and thus his theory not only includes streams of consciousness but also attributes a reality constituting role to the life-form of the acting, the thou-related and the speaking ego from the very beginning. Action, sociality and language are always present as constitutive elements of the subject that exist in life-forms.

In line with the semantics of the concept of "life-form" as used in the philosophy of life, Wittgenstein (1971) used "life-form" to place language—which was his preferred approach to reality—in the context of an individual action and at the same time putting it into a framework of rules given by the social context of everyday life practice. Wittgenstein saw speaking as a language game, as "part of an activity or of a life-form." (1971: 23) He obviously used the term life-form to integrate the paralinguistic components of the language game into his concept; how-ever, he had to leave these components undetermined in the end because they could not be determined by his linguistic holism considering lan-guage as the exclusive approach to reality. (Reckwitz, 1999) Thus, de-spite Wittgenstein's innovative investigations into pragmatically prod-uced language games, that which is genuinely "formed" in life-forms re-mained also in his thought ambivalent.

Nevertheless, in order to be able to work with the term "life-form" it is necessary to know what exactly is being formed in a life-form (identity) and what the distinguishing mechanisms are that diversify life-forms (difference). To that end, we must compare life-forms and correspondingly need a means and method to do this. If we were to define the identity of a life-form just as experiences of the subject (Litt, Spranger) *or* as the circumstances of practical speech use (Wittgenstein) then we would see that each of these bases is too narrow. Only in their comparative synthesis do these moments hint towards one of the basic generative features common to every life-form, and that is, human acts and the manner of their objectification, whereas the aforementioned linguistic objectification only constitutes one of the many objectifying possibilities. Subsequently, the difference between life-forms results from the generative mechanisms themselves, i.e., from divergent types of experience, action and interaction executed or from various practices of the language game. In this case, too, human acts and objectifications can be identified as the common mechanisms that differentiate life-forms. Via the results of an elementary comparison that simply extracts its reference point from the induction by asking for the common denominator of two types of definitions, we come upon a more significant universal characteristic of life-forms and their reciprocal relationship: *the same mechanisms that constitute life-forms (identity) also effect their differences*. Now let us combine this thesis with another one that is also concerned with the relationship of life-world forms, qua forms of approaching reality, which was familiar to Wittgenstein as well as to the ethnomethodologists who succeeded Schutz. It reads as follows: *The methods used by humans to create a situation/language game are the same methods used to understand the situation/language game.* (Garfinkel, 1967: 33f.) Thus, a combination of the two theses says that *human activities, in which the production and differentiation of life-forms are anchored, are also accompanied by objectified "practices" that, on the one hand, endow meaning to the life-forms and make them understandable on the other*.

II. Life-World Structures and the Constitution of Life-Forms

The question now is how the structure of life-forms that enables identity and difference, as well as the objectification of meaning and understanding is constituted. If we were to formulate this problem in the sense of a

constitution theory of social reality, it would read as follows: Are there constitutive mechanisms on which the genesis and differentiation of life-forms are founded, and the description of which would also disclose the structure of life-forms revealing a "meta-order" which could provide us with a basis for their comparison and offer us a language to describe the individual cases of life-forms? I would now like to show that this kind of constitutional theoretical approach can benefit from the application of Alfred Schutz's pragmatic theory of the life-world and be *further developed*. A proposal of this kind, however, must face up to various objections currently at issue. I believe four of the most significant arguments are as follows:

1a) Schutz's approach in principle comes from the point of view of the philosophy of consciousness and does not reach the pragmatic communicative level of the constitution of social reality. (Habermas, 1981, II: 189ff.)

1b) Argument 1a has a logical paradoxical subvariant: Schutz attempts to compensate for the deficits of the philosophy of consciousness, and therefore he has to depart from the basis of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and thus loses the legitimacy of his theory with this a prioric transcendental basis. In plain language this means that in order to be valid Schutz's approach must remain in the realm of the philosophy of consciousness even though it would became invalid because of this. (Welz, 1996)

2) The concept of the life-world is based on the idea of a cultural world characterized by homogeneity, identity and integration in which the difference between life-forms cannot be reproduced. (Habermas, 1981, II. 189ff.; Straub, 2000: 71ff.)

3) The phenomenological approach must keep arguments concerning the structure of the life-world on a proto-sociological level qua a proto-science and thus does not offer a connection to empirical findings. (compare Luckmann's warnings concerning this issue: 1979, 1999)

4) The structure of the life-world does not have any claims to universal validity, since it is an ethnocentric construction which does not allow for an adequate constitution of "the other." (Straub/Shimada, 1999; Matthes, 1992, 1999)

I would now like to take a closer look at these arguments and while doing so present the essence of Schutz's theory of the life-world that is relevant to our context. I will present the following points:

1) The analysis of the structures of the life-world reveals mechanisms that lead to the genesis and differentiation of individual life-forms. In this way, life-forms can be considered to be culturally determined cases of the life-world structure;
2) These mechanisms enable adequate reconstruction of the strangeness (difference) in the life-forms of others thus opening the path to their understanding;
3) The formal structure of the life-world is capable of providing us with a language to describe life-forms and to compare cultures in the sense of a *tertium comparationis* that is not necessarily eurocentric.
4) This concept is compatible with findings of the empirical sciences.

However, this is not the place to do a philology on Schutz's works. A reconstruction of Schutz's pragmatic concept of the life-world, that emanates from human action and communication, has already been written years ago based on text analysis and the genesis of his works. (Srubar, 1988; Embree, 1988) Therefore, I will only outline the core of the constitutive theory in his approach.

Schutz's constitutive theory of the life-world pursues two convoluted goals:

1) To show, based on the theory of action, how the constitution of social reality with its intersubjective meaning structured by typifications and relevances takes place in acts of consciousness, communication and action.
2) To describe the structure and the manifold stratification of the life-world that result from constitutive processes included in the first goal. Schutz's theory thus envisages the issue of the unity of the life-world and the difference between life-forms and makes it discernible and operable.

Schutz's theory of action proceeds in three steps which are directed toward questions which every theory that deals with the constitution of social reality has to answer:

1) How does meaningful orientation of action originate?
2) How can we understand the other?
3) How does common knowledge originate, i.e., how is an intersubjec-
   tive valid stock of knowledge established?

Schutz bases his theory on methodological individualism and begins
with the question of the subjectively constructed meaning of action.
(Schutz, 1974) At this point, Schutz's theory joins Husserl's and
Bergson's analyses of the stream of consciousness, which are also the
reason behind the objections based on the philosophy of consciousness.
One point that is often overlooked is that the analyses conducted here are
connected to steps 2) and 3) mentioned above that inevitably transcend
the limits of the philosophy of consciousness. Nevertheless, the mean-
ingful acts of consciousness described by Schutz are of vital importance
in our context, because they lead directly to the topic of "identity and
difference:" On the one hand, meaningful acts of consciousness, which
are phenomenologically revealed, constitute the basis of the human ap-
proach to the world par excellence: the intentionality of lived experience,
temporality of consciousness, corporeality and embodiment of meaning
are characteristics of man-centered reality constitution which are diffi-
cult to eliminate, even though Husserl—and after him Schutz—describe
them, using a possibly Eurocentric language game. On the other hand,
however, these are the acts that help to bring about the difference in
people's "worldviews." The plasticity and reflexivity of consciousness,
on which the varieties of the life-form are also based, have their
foundation in these acts. The variations of the intentional attention to
lived experiences that are anchored in their noetic-noematic structure can
be regarded as laying the groundwork for how the "perspective" in the
perception of the world takes place. (Husserl, 1952, §§ 87ff.; Schutz,
1974: 93ff.) Because acts of lived experience do consist of a noematic
core and a noetic "glance" at that core, they bestow to the stream of
consciousness both identity and difference in the sense of perspectivity,
flexibility and the ability of interpretation. The same applies to
temporality: objects of consciousness as the temporal syntheses of
experiences are always temporal objects; therefore they are transitory
and—depending on where they are temporally localized in the
consciousness—also changeable. Reflexivity and plasticity of
consciousness as experiencing my actions as an internal and external
process are ultimately connected to corporeality. Based on this

experience, subjects can take an "excentric" position to their experiences, (Plessner, 1975: 288ff.) i.e., to experience that it is possible to exist in different parallel running situations. Corporeality does not only function as the vehicle of an experience of an action, but also as the vehicle of reflexivity, dynamics and plasticity of consciousness that are essential to the differentiation of individual and collective life-forms.

We will have to analyze more than just the level of consciousness, however, to clarify the constitutive and differentiating mechanisms of the life-world and its structure. Schutz (1974: 204ff.) transcends this boundary by analyzing the constitution of reality within social action—i.e., in interaction and communication—in addition to analyzing acts of consciousness. Schutz's answer to the problem of intersubjectivity or the question of understanding the other also lies in these analyses. He proceeds from the assumption that an intersubjective coordination of two streams of living experience is possible—in dialogue form—within social interaction. By this he means a social relation in which the meaning of an action is to evoke a reaction from the other (1974: 162ff.). Thus actions have here a character of signs which, however, does not directly indicate the condition of the other's consciousness but refers to the context of the situated and temporal realization of the action. This also signifies that the subjective meaning of an action is modified by the re-action of the other person. In this way, the subjective consciousness and its schemes of experience are modified, or differentiated in social inter-action by the plasticity of the acts of consciousness.

Thus, the paradox connected to intersubjective understanding is cleared up, i.e., how can we adequately explicate the other if self-explica-tion results from the interpretation of oneself? Schutz enables us to show that the plasticity of consciousness and the communicative construction of intersubjective knowledge result in self-explication having to revert back to social constructs. Proof that self-explication eventuates on the basis of social, i.e., communicatively generated recognitional schemes, however, can also signify that even the knowledge acquired communi-catively in dialogue can only be understood when used in connection with self-explication. This has consequences for the idea that in the dialogue with members of other life-forms/cultures one can disregard the compulsion for self-explication. (Straub/Shimada, 1999) We will address this problem that is significant for the adequacy of the construction of the other at a later point.

The fact that the subjective as well as the collective stock of knowledge depends on action leads Schutz to the supposition that pragmatic relevance, i.e., attention to reality which is guided by everyday action, shapes and differentiates the structures of typifications and relevances which characterize the everyday core of the life-world. (Srubar, 1988: 132ff.) Once more, pragmatic relevance represents here a constitutive mechanism of the life-world that can be regarded as identical for all everyday life-forms, which however, when implemented, always leads to different results, i.e., to constructions of reality which are related to a specific time and group. Since we only encounter the life-world by enactment of the praxis that in effect realizes the life-world as a cultural one, we always encounter the life-world in diverse life-forms. But it does not mean, as can be shown with Schutz's theory, that this diversity is not based on common constitutive mechanisms. On the contrary, the constructiveness, historicity, and thus the variability of life-forms are established therein: intentionality, bound to the action as pragmatic relevance, temporality, corporeality as the basis of spatial relations, communication as the origin of intersubjective sociality, represent those constitutive mechanisms from which the pragmatic, temporal, spatial and social dimensions of the life-world as well as the chance of their cultural differentiation do originate.

Did we, however, just move away from phenomenology's field that Husserl secures transcendentally by treating the acts of consciousness of the transcendental ego not in a psychological way but as a condition of the possibility for the constitution of the world's grantedness? How can we estimate the validity of phenomenological propositions if the basis of the conditions immanent to consciousness has been abandoned? (Welz, 1996) If the validity of the *phenomenological propositions* results in the evidence of acts the execution of which is necessary for the constitution of the validity of a phenomenon in the strict sense, (Husserl, 1962, §§ 38ff.) then we can say that Schutz—via his proof of the inalterability of action for the meaningful constitution of the life-world—never departed from phenomenology. He did, however, extend its dimensions significantly and thus also made the findings of phenomenological analysis more compatible with social scientific and cultural studies. It is evident also in our context, that his conception of a pragmatic constitution of the life-world which is based on interaction and communication, can introduce us to mechanisms capable of describing the identity of life-forms and their differences. His solution to the problem of understanding the

other person also moves away from the scope of perceptual phenomenology—endangered by solipsism—and basically resolves the contradiction of understanding the other person via self-explication.

One might, however, ask whether resolving this problem is conditioned by the fact that Schutz seems to consider the life-world as a homogeneous cultural space, where the communicatively socialized Egos fall back on homogenous intersubjective shared knowledge. In this kind of model the strangeness of other seems to be cancelled out within the familiarity of the collective stock of knowledge making it a not very suitable approach for clarifying the relation between one's own life-forms and that of the other's or even between foreign life-forms.

Indeed, for Schutz (and Husserl, 1962, § 34) the temporal, spatial and social dimensions of the structure of the life-world are classified along the axis of familiarity and unfamiliarity into distinct and less distinct areas of knowledge. Schutz (1972) also suggests that familiarity is a characteristic of the stock of knowledge inherent to a group. This particular sociological approach to the life-world concept should not, however, cover up the differentiation of the life-world that is already addressed in the distinction between familiar/unfamiliar which is immanent to the life-world. Since this distinction traverses the entire structure of the life-world, the life-world cannot be represented as a harmless, domestic place, (this is one interpretation that Habermas apparently had in mind 1981; see also: Srubar, 1997) that stands out against the strangeness and the unfamiliarity by means of consensus, homogeneity and freedom from contradiction of its stock of knowledge. On the contrary, it can be shown that "strangeness" belongs to one of the most typical life-word experiences. The constitutive mechanisms discussed above are anchored in two moments from which the differentiation of the various strata of reality and meaning provinces within the life-world originate. On the one hand, the reflexive plasticity of consciousness modifies the pragmatically constituted core of everyday life in the life-world and shapes it into forms of game, fantasy world or theoretical world, which are transcendent to the everyday world, that can occur as subjective life-forms of the ego shaded by the different degrees of reflection. On the other hand, the pragmatic relevance of the worldly reference and the interactive/communicative genesis of the interpretive schemes that generate the different everyday worlds and thus also the different "bases" for their reflexive modification. These mechanisms of subjective and social modification of the life-world's everyday core therefore stand for the

essential stratification or, more precisely, for the necessary realization of the life-world structure in diverse life-forms. The following will illustrate that these various life-forms are in no way "harmoniously" connected to one another but rather that the experience of their difference and recipro-cal strangeness is a part of the relatively natural attitude of humans.[1]

The multiplicity of perspectives immanent to the human approach to reality is inseparably connected to the constitutive mechanisms of the life-world from which it originates. The life-world is thus always divided into several areas of reality which transcend each other. This not only concerns the transcendence of reality areas which do not belong to the everyday realm of the life-world, even the core of everyday life is charac-terized by transcendent relationships. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1984: 139 ff.) My experience of the difference between consciousness and the outside world, of the temporality of my knowledge and biography as well as my knowledge that my stock of knowledge is based on constructs qua types that must not "actually" be valid, all this allows for a lived evi-dence of transcendences and—associated with it—for strangeness that is omni-present within the life-world. The transcendence of the other and his in principle inaccessibility as well as the transcendence of extra-everyday areas of reality mentioned above represent other omnipresent sources of unfamiliarity/strangeness that are contained in the life-world structure.

Does this, however, not simply signify that otherness occurs within the framework of the life-world as "familiarity," i.e., as something that is not "actually" strange but that has always already been "naturalized (nostrifiziert)?" (Matthes, 1992) The concept of the life word presented here allows for the differentiation between what I would like to call "comparative strangeness" and "existential strangeness," which Walden-fels (1997) also has in mind when he speaks of "the strangeness which addresses us." "Comparative strangeness" denotes the result of "relation-al" discursive comparisons between a stock of knowledge that is familiar to us and one which is not. This strangeness can evince a series of nuances and gradations that are dependent on the extent of the recipro-city of perspectives with which everyday actors encounter each other as Schutz has shown. (1971b: 12) The hypothesis of the reciprocity of perspectives on which every intersubjective relation is based, aims at a

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[1]   Husserl (1955) and Schutz (1974) differentiate between reflexivity of the conscious-ness——in the sense of a principle of self-reference——and reflexivity in the sense of an intended act of consciousness. (cf. Srubar, 1988)

constitutive process in the life-world which in today's discourse is called the "rule of acceptance of strangeness." (Taylor 1993, Waldenfels 1997, Straub 2000) As a moment of the structure of the life-world, this reciprocity, however, not only has evaluative implications required by today's normative discourse but consequently also has pragmatic structural implications. Following this supposition of reciprocity, the actor in the relative natural attitude assumes that the systems of knowledge belonging to others were created by alter egos with pragmatic intentions within a temporally, spatially and socially structured situation. They thus follow the pragmatic principle of relevance which, however, is expected to differ from that of the observer's. In regard to the other, the supposition holds true of the interchangeability of the position (you would see what I see if you were in my position) and the temporary assumption of the partial congruency of the systems of relevance. We must, however, distinguish between different levels of this congruency, i.e., between the degrees of its expected realization in concrete interactions. The most general form of this expectation that I call "anthropological intersubjectivity" includes the classification of the other as a "fellow-being." This is reflected in the suppositions that are linked to the interchangeability of positions and proceed from the assumption that humans have comparable facilities of sense, language and action. "Social intersubjectivity" represents the second level of expected reciprocity which presupposes an interactive relationship, i.e., typical knowledge that allows me to recognize/expect social relationships and actions in their simplest form (communicative intentions, material exchange, the deixis of gestures, superiority and subordination, etc.), which are manifested in face-to-face relationships. "Cultural intersubjectivity" makes up the third level, that is, the specific deep-reaching interpretive scheme, which includes struc-tures of relevance and typicality and their thematic, interpretive and pragmatic dimensions. The congruency of these three dimensions can only be expected amongst members of "in-groups." And even here these expectations can be interwoven by everyday transcendence. Beyond this congruency, the differentiations immanent to the life-world apply which constitute the "jungle of the life-world"—to borrow a term of Ulf Matthiesen's (1983). We can thin out this jungle via pragmatic or communicative restraints transforming unfamiliarity into familiarity. Nevertheless it also includes the moment of strangeness, that I call "existential." No efforts can erase existential strangeness, the evidence of which goes hand in hand with the lived experience of transcendence,

although efforts in the sense of signs and communication belong to the life-world practices dealing with it. To fall back on Heidegger (1967), Schutz sees the source here in the "fundamental anxiety" generally brought about in us by the transcendence of the world. We can banish this moment of strangeness and of non-identity by efforts of pragmatic action for some time, yet we cannot delete it from our everyday life-worldly horizon of experience. (Schutz, 1971a: 262; Srubar, 1988)

What constitutive role does experience of transcendence play as an experience of strangeness in the structure of the life-world? It remains to be seen whether it can be considered an essential motive for action within the world or whether this idea represents just a *topos* in a seman-tics to describe the world that is specific to a particular culture. The de-cisive factor in our context is that the lived experience of transcendence in the context of the life-world concept is linked with a universal human social praxis that is evidently used in various cultures to overcome the transcen-dence, i.e., with the communication and the generation of sign systems. Expressed schematically, this means that communication bridges the gap between the transcendence of the ego and alter ego via the coordination of two streams of consciousness by means of the con-stitution of a com-mon sign system. The communication process, too, is founded on phenomenologically describable constitutional mechanisms in the struc-tures of the life-world and its basis in the human approach to the world. There is, on the one side, the temporality of consciousness and its poly-thetic acts which renders the synthesis of appresentation possible and thereby also constitutes the precondition of forming signs, i.e., they link "signifiant" and "signifié." On the other side, appresentational struc-tures are subject to social modification by communication and inter-action. From a Schutzian point of view, the results constitute objectiv-ated sign systems and especially linguistic ones. Since languages are pragmatically used, their semantic structures originate from the multiple perspectives provided by action of the persons using them. In this respect language quasi reproduces the differentiated multiple realities of the life-world into structures in the form of diverse semantic areas and dis-courses, which comes quite close to Wittgenstein's idea of life-forms. Thus, the prag-matic, temporal, spatial and social dimensions of the struc-ture of the life-world are also a constitutive part of language and its inherent semantics.

We have just seen that transcendence/strangeness and its pragmatic and communicative bridging make up an essential part of the structures

of the life-world. We also saw, however, that although this communicative bridging is capable of semantically linking transcendent areas together or of changing something unfamiliar into something familiar, it is not able to remove the moment of existential strangeness from the context of the life-world. In other words, the concept of the life-world does not necessarily smooth out strangeness by "naturalizing" it, i.e., making it more familiar. On the one hand, it enables us to see that even when building a communicative bridge to the other we risk a "naturaliza-tion" (in view of the necessary compulsion of self-explication) and shows that communication creates a "third realm", i.e., a common system of representation that differs from the meanings intended by the single interacting subjects and therefore in no way denotes their "authentic" representation. On the other hand, it also shows us that all this is accompanied by the lived experience of strangeness as a constitutive part of the other.

III. The Reconstruction of Life-Forms as a Means of Intercultural Comparisons

Against this background, we can take the next step in our investigation and ask what means our approach provides us with to reconstruct life-forms, particularly of foreign life-forms. First of all we see that within this framework we come very close to the formulation of the question of the current discourse in the field of intercultural comparisons. The life-world has not in any way manifested itself as a homogenous cultural world, which is predominantly focused on groups, but as a formal structure that is differentiated by its constitutive mechanisms and that generates heterogeneity and contradiction within the diversity of its provinces of meaning. We have also seen how close the theory of the life-world is to the problems of the "dialogic" approaches (trying to reconstruct the otherness adequately in a dialogue) and how sensitive it is to the problem of naturalization. The crucial question about the possibility of intercultural comparisons is, however, not only whether an approach is sensitive enough to allow for the strangeness in its dissimilarity but much more whether the conceptual means of the approach in question can adequately reconstruct the "strangeness" of a life-form in order to make it the object of comparison.

To attain this kind of adequacy, we must first prove that the reconstruction is not "ethnocentric," i.e., that I am not forcing the order of my

own life-forms and normality on the other. This perquisite is homologous with the classic precondition that Schutz and the inter-pretive sociologists make on the methodology of the social sciences concerning the relation-ship between scientific formation of types and the everyday structure of types of the investigative object. According to this precondition, scien-tific typifications are only adequate when the con-structions on which they are based can be performed and understood by everyday actors. When applied to life-forms this would mean that a life-form is adequately reconstructed when a competent actor within the cultural life-form con-cerned is also able to understand this reconstruc-tion. (Schutz, 1971b: 51)

Taking account of the Schutzian postulates of adequacy should pro-mote the methodological sensibility for the risk of a scientific ethno-centric "naturalization." In our context, the postulate of adequacy can practically be satisfied in three ways. The first possibility lies in the at-tempt to "go native," as Kurt H. Wolff (1976) describes it in his *Surren-der and Catch*. Here we are referring to actively submerging ourselves into a foreign life-form although it is clear that full identification with this life-form can never be achieved. The second possibility is to involve the subjects of investigation in a dialogue to help evaluate, assess and formulate the findings as, for example, in the approach taken by "participatory" researchers. (Eckerle, 1987) Even though these two ap-proaches draw us very near to everyday typifications and thus to the intrinsic understanding of the life-form under investigation they, how-ever, do not solve the problem of the inevitable gap between under-standing a foreign life-form attained via interaction and communication and the necessary description of this "data" in a meta-language that would enable us to make a comparison. Even if we were to assume counterfactually that no elements of our everyday knowledge or, in par-ticular, of our own scientific knowledge have snuck into our under-standing of the other's life-form, the problem of the difference between *emic* and *etic* processing (Pike, 1967; Goodenough, 1970) of the other's reality will become virulent at the moment when we try to make a con-nection between the other's reconstructed reality and further different life-forms for a comparison. We could perhaps bypass this problem by doing without comparisons, i.e., by retreating to a radical culturalistic relativistic position (for example by reading Wittgenstein with Lyotard (1994). But this would not solve our comparability problem either be-cause the "operation called 'comparison'," (Matthes 1992) i.e., the act

which relates ego's and alter's life-forms, has always to take place in the two methods described above. Thus, even when intercultural comparisons appear impossible for *theoretical* reasons we are still not exempt from the need for a *methodology* to make controlled comparisons. The need for an extrinsic meta-language therefore still remains in each case.

At this point, the third possibility for satisfying the postulate of adequacy proves to be helpful. Adequacy can also be attained by making sure that when constructing scientific typifications we take the constitutive mechanisms of the life-world into account that, on the one hand, constitute the common frame of life-forms, and, on the other, represent the lines of its differentiation along the structure of the life-world as comprehensible. Since these are the mechanisms that delineate the approach to the world in the relative natural attitude and thus also are constitutive for the everyday understanding, they therefore also fulfill the conditions of the everyday bond of the scientific typification. Moreover, these mechanisms allow for a descriptive language that can be used to describe the various life-forms and their differences and also keeps the chance of a comparative correlation open which preserves the differences and similarities as well. To remain within cultural anthropological terminology, the structure of the concept of the life-world provides us with an *etic* language that, however, formally has been generated in *emic* way.

Of course one could argue that this approach is the result of a particular culture, so that when we apply it to a foreign culture it indeed does amount to ethnocentric naturalization. We can counter this argument with the fact that the life-world concept described here circumvents this risk as far as possible (and it was shown above that self-explication cannot be totally disregarded) because it does not generate any "expectations" with regard to the contents of the other's life-forms but simply formulates their constitutive mechanisms as revealed by analysis on a phenomenological, formal, and philosophical anthropological level. (Luckmann, 1999; Srubar, 1998) Let me present an example: It was shown that the temporality of acts of consciousness and action belongs to the constitution of meaningful reality. This postulates temporality as a dimension of the structure of the life-world that, at the same time, constitutes a condition of the dynamics of social reality and thus also a dimension of all life-forms. It, however, neither anticipates a specific semantic of this dimension, nor does it lead to an evaluation of different temporal semantics. Therefore only the assertion could be ethno-centric

that social reality, qua the life-world, always exhibits a temporal dimension in which on principle the potential of the historicity and thus the capability of change is present. Nevertheless, if we wanted to negate this kind of temporal dimension in foreign life-forms we would have to reject the principle of constructiveness and thus also the potential capacity for development of social systems and at the same time assign the subjective actors in these kinds of systems a construction of reality that would make learning *in* and transcendence *of* a cultural world once constructed in principle impossible.

What elements of the describing language can the concept of the life-world presented here have to offer us? We already described the most essential part of these elements during the previous discussion of the structure of the life-world and its genesis in the acts of consciousness and action of subjects living in the relative natural attitude. Here we are dealing with a "matrix" of the structure of the life-world as Luckmann already proposed. (Luckmann, 1979, 1990) This matrix is generated from intentionality, temporality, corporeality/embodiment and intersubjectivity of the human approach to the world and can be outlined with the pragmatic, temporal, spatial and social dimensions of the structure of the life-world, as they are formulated in the *Structures of the Life-World*. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1975, 1984) As opposed to Luckmann's concept, our matrix here is not static but rather the constituting mechanisms are seen as the—at least potential—generators of the dynamics, historicity and differentiation of the life-world. (Srubar, 1998) Only in this way can we grasp the stratification of the life-world into the manifold reality areas and meaning provinces systematically enough to disclose the reciprocal transcendence of different spheres of the life-world *and* the bridging of this transcendence by appresentative sign systems and communication as primordial constitutive mechanisms of the reality of the life-world.

We can now clearly see that the structures of the life-world can be used as a "formal" descriptive language and yet that these structures can be generated from mechanisms which have to be understood as constitutive mechanisms of social reality therefore quasi representing the "autopoesis" of the life-world. The embedding of language and communication in these mechanisms by means of which communicative acts join with acts of consciousness and action as activities that constitute the life-world, now also signifies an expansion of the foundation of the formal matrix of the structure of the life-world. Henceforth, this also includes the implicit connection of the forms of thought, language and action that,

notwithstanding its different realization in different cultures, represents a general mechanism that generates social reality and is immanent to the concept of the life-world. Life-forms can therefore be understood as the variations of this connection brought forth from the practical realization of the three forms.

If we were to follow the proposals put forth above, which presumptions arise in pragmatic research with regard to intercultural comparisons and intercultural understanding? First of all we have the primary ascertainment—which is not very surprising—that strangeness can only be determined via the comparison as a "comparative strangeness," that, however, the "naturalization tendencies" of the comparison, which are inherent to self-explication as a moment of interpretation, can be relativized by the evidence of the "existential strangeness" also immanent to the life-world. Secondly, it is presupposed that other life-forms are not homogeneous systems of symbols and interpretations but rather that they may include a variety of heterogeneous and incommensurable areas of reality and provinces of meaning that are related to each other through reciprocal transcendence. Furthermore, we can assume that this transcendence can be communicatively bridged and is bridged whereas, however, we have to heed the different shades or degrees of intersubjectivity that are found in the supposition of reciprocity that form the basis for communication. Moreover, the supposition holds true that life-forms as the connection of forms of thought, language and action are shaped in accordance with the matrix of the structure of the life-world. If we were to revert to the gradation of unfamiliarity to illustrate the "operationalization" of these suppositions, then we would find them on the level of "anthropological" intersubjectivity. They would have to be condensed by means of further empirical methods and, in particular, by discursive practices in order to reach the levels of "social" and "cultural" intersubjectivity in regard to the contents, whereby attention must be paid to the postulate of adequacy compliance to which also presupposes discursive processes. The discursivity of the comparison is thus in no way excluded because of the supposition of a universal matrix in the life-world as a *tertium comparationis* but rather is preserved in the phenomenological perspective of the life-world.

The chances of discursive reconstruction of strange life-forms, however, must be critically examined within the framework of the concept presented above. Here we will have to distinguish between the conditions of everyday and scientific discourse, even though—in accordance

with the postulate of adequacy—the "formal properties" of everyday discourse (Garfinkel/Sacks, 1979) are also methodologically binding for its scientific description. On the everyday level we must, above all things, maintain that even though there is a chance of a transcendental bridging in communication, the communication alone cannot guarantee the authenticity of the access to the other's life-form. This insight has been substantiated from several sides both theoretically and empirically. It is theoretically grounded on the differentiation between the stramgeness of the other and the "mutuality" of the "third realm" of meaning generated by communication that quasi "arches over" the otherness of the communicants. This communicative phenomenon has been substantiated by phenomenology, (Schutz, 1974; Waldenfels, 1997) system theory (Luhmann, 1984) as well as by pragmatism. (Mead, 1973) Empirically we can observe time and again that common traits of the reciprocity of perspectives, which appear to be very clear during the interaction, are embedded on the level of social—not to mention—cultural intersubjectivity in very different contexts of meaning, even if the lack of knowledge of these contexts does not threaten the success of the direct (short-term) intercultural interaction/communication. An excellent illustration of this is to be found in Sahlins's (1986; cf. Renn, 1999) analysis of the meeting between Captain Cook and his crew with the natives: While the intercultural contact on behalf of both sides proceeded successfully within the social form of exchanging goods, this was a more or less economically profane affair for the Europeans while the natives were acting within a sacral framework. The mutual understanding was restricted to the anthropological and rudimentary level of social intersubjectivity. A "working consensus" was nevertheless able to stabilize itself just as obviously, i.e., a "third realm" was established that enabled successful communication in the narrow spatial and temporal frameworks of individual interactions.

The level of this kind of working consensus is hardly ever overstepped even when there are no temporal restrictions of the contact as in Captain Cook's case, or when there is an intention to reach and to understand the socio-cultural level of the other's life-form. Studies on communication between priests and natives in the Philippines also illustrate this phenomenon. (Rafael, 1992) Here it is also evident that the communication within the context of the performance of a ritual was successful, however, even when the priests could speak the local language and made efforts to translate the holy texts in order to acculturate the catholic dogmatics, the working consensus on both sides remained firmly anchored

in the mutually misunderstood interpretative and social structures. The natives accepted, for example, the institution of confession as expressing the client-patron relationship familiar to them while the priests understood this as an expression of the native's conversion to Christianity. This illustrates that discursive processes in intercultural situations do not lead to a lucid understanding of the other but rather produce syncretic forms of thought, language and action that can on the one hand serve as bridges for successful interaction and communication yet on the other they cannot be detached from the meaning-constitutive reference to one-self. This signifies that, although it is impossible to access the life-forms of the other without communication and the data obtained by it, communication alone is also unable to reconstruct "pure otherness," but rather creates a "third realm" that encompasses the elements of the other as well as one's own. The interpretive self-explication of the other's life-form that is based on this kind of "third realm" does not just fall back purely on one's own schemes of interpretation but also to elements that "authentically" belong to the other; however, it is unable to remove these from one's own context.

The question, thus, is whether and how we can use the means of scientific reflection to comprehend everyday syncretism which, in our perspective, also constitutes the point of departure for the scientific reconstruction of the other's life-forms, in order to steer the discursive production of otherness into tracks that we are able to "control." First of all, we can proceed from the assumption that the discursive process of intercultural comparison is a kind of translation from one cultural context to another. (Aoki, 1992; Shimada, 1992) As problematic as this might seem from a scientific point of view, especially since the semiotic systems that would have to serve as the "starting point" are difficult to determine, it is however just as evident that this kind of "translation" takes place every day to overcome the transcendence of cultural life-forms in everyday life. Yet these processes have hardly been the subject of empirical studies. An exception to this are studies on "code switching" in bilingual families (Gumperz, 1982) in which the pragmatic dimension of the situated change from one language to the other was more the focus of the investigation than the semantic relation of the different codes. We can certainly expect that more focused studies on the everyday process of translation would produce findings that are also significant for the hypotheses on the constitution of social reality in one's own world. As long as these findings are not yet available, we will have to revert to

findings from the science of translation in order to evaluate the chances of "translation models" in the field of intercultural comparisons. However these findings do not deal with translations pertaining to everyday life but with artificial communicative genres. Generally it is also understood here that the result of a translation is a "third realm of meaning" that constitutes a syncretic intersection of two lingual codes that are not (or not totally) commensurable. From that point of view it is self-evident, too, that a translation is not provided by an assignment of equivalent signs code to code, but that there are semantic gaps to be bridged, in which a competent speaker chooses a different expression instead of the lexical equivalent because this expression contains "psychical and social" conditions and experiences that correspond to those of the expression to be translated. (Kade, 1981; Levy, 1981) In other words, in translation processes it is impossible to translate the other's meaning context without a partial naturalizing activation of self-explication, and not even then when the translator has a sufficient command of the foreign code and uses it with competence so that a reflexive controlled relation with the code is possible. The adequacy of the translation is, all in all, a result of decisions made by the translator based on this competence. In normal cases of a scientific comparison of cultures, however, we cannot assume the above mentioned conditions because the comparison generally goes here hand in hand with the reconstruction of the foreign "cultural code." The employment of discursive methods requires linguistic competence; however, this alone does not lead to the solution of the problem of a controlled relation with the communicatively created "third" as we have seen above. This would eventuate in a systematic protocol of the decisions made by the translator, the casuistic of which would then have to lead to the actual basis qua *tertium comparationis* of the comparison in question.

Thus it becomes clear that a controlled relation with the otherness that is produced by discourse is impossible without a meta-language that would allow us to systematically observe the decisions made while reconstructing the other's life-forms. A possible meta-language, of course, can be provided by any scientific categories what ever their construction may be. In that manner one can simply impose on other cultures constructs derived solely from scientific discourse and search, for example, for "power distance," "individuality," "avoidance of insecurity," etc. (Hofstede, 1997) These kinds of prescriptive categorical languages, however, have often been shown to have an extreme inclination for "natura-

lization" (Matthes, 1992; Straub/Shimada, 1999; Tenbruck, 1992) and stand out because of the instrumental arbitrariness with which the categories are formed. The instrumentality of intercultural comparisons made on this basis, therefore, has more of a commercial value. It is less suitable for offering a reconstruction of other life-forms that is commensurate with the *postulate of adequacy* discussed above. These problems can be avoided if we revert to concepts generated "proto-scientifically," i.e., concepts that describe the process of the constitution of social reality before there was any scientific intervention and thus strive to avoid "deforming" this reality by the formation of inadequate scientific theories. I hope that I have been able to show that the concept of the life-world and its structure can offer this kind of "control" in the sense of a *tertium comparationis*.

IV. The Structure of the Life-World and Cultural Comparison in the Context of the Empirical Sciences

The proto-scientific nature of the life-world does not signify that this concept is unrelated to or not compatible with the empirical sciences. On the contrary, the "philosophical anthropological" claim represented here is all about elucidating the intersections between the concept of the life-world and the sciences and keeping these intersections open to fill with the results of empirical research; however, the critique of the sciences inherent to the concept of the life-world must remain effective. (Husserl, 1962; Srubar, 1997) Nonetheless, if we were to apply the concept of the life-world as a frame to bond the sciences of the humanities to the structure of its object then we would see that even "positivistic" inadequate methods cannot entirely evade the implications of their life-world object but also must follow their life-world structure. This insight enables us to allow for the interdisciplinary diversity of heterodox approaches and to observe their findings within their "convergence to the life-world" instead of assessing them on the principles of a "pure doctrine."

Which intersections of the life-world theory will not only enable us to bridge the gap to empirical research but also promote it? An almost unlimited link to the sciences is represented by the postulation of the connection between forms of thought, language and action inherent to the concept of the life-world which it, of course, also shares with several of

the approaches in the social and cultural sciences.[2] This is not the place to present an overview of the research done in these areas. Therefore, I will only point out a few "classic" positions to illuminate the named connection in our context. I must emphasize that this subject still constitutes an open field of research as can be seen in the diversity of the individual positions. This will involve bringing to light some of the common characteristics of the connection of the three forms mentioned above with the help of examples.

Let us begin with the connection between forms of action and forms of thought. In the field of ethology, this connection has already been accepted and proven as the reciprocal relation of "the sphere of perception" and "the sphere of activity" since Uexküll. (Uexküll/Kriszat, 1970) This connection is also pursued in Piaget's genetic psychology that is based on concepts of assimilation and accommodation showing the intertwined relations of action and cognitive structures. In a sociological context, it is the interactional pragmatic tradition following Mead on which the context of forms of action and thought, that are characterized by speech gestures, are founded. This connection also seems to be suggested in the recent research on the autopoietic organisation of organisms by Maturana and Varela (1982). It must be emphasized that the approaches mentioned here repeatedly reveal the connection of forms of action and forms of thought as producing dimensions of the life-world in particular the temporal and spatial ones. The pragmatic construction of perception and action space has been shown by Uexküll, Mead, and Piaget as well although the approaches differ immensely. The same applies to the investigations by Piaget and Mead into the genesis of temporal concepts. Maturana and Varela also see temporality and spatiality as essential conditions for the self-constitution of living systems.

The connection of forms of thought and forms of speech has been a classical component of anthropological linguistics since Sapir and Whorf. Studies on the linguistic representation of time and space are

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2   This connection is at the moment the topic of discussion between the "normativists" and the "naturalists" in the analytical philosophy of language to be found under the catchword of "philosophy of the mind." However the results of this discussion clearly indicate that productive contributions to solving this problem will most likely come from the sciences themselves, since the decision whether the "normativists" or the "naturalists" are in the right ultimately depends on the empirical findings from linguistics and the social and cognitive sciences. Making philosophy more scientific, which is striven for by the analytics therefore has to pay the price of possibly moving philosophy towards insignificance. (Gluer, 1999; Kim, 1998; Bieri, 1997)

very prominent here. (Whorf, 1963) In Bernstein's studies and those of his successors in the area of the sociology of language, this connection repeatedly emerges but is not elucidated. (Bernstein, 1972; Oevermann, 1972) The connection between forms of thought and speech has been the goal of both sociological and anthropological studies of systems of classification since Durkheim. (Durkheim/Mauss, 1904) When looked at more closely, we should also consider at this point studies on the connection of forms of signs or media and forms of thought that point to categorical differences in the thought of literate and illiterate societies and pursue these differences more closely as a function of alphabetic or ideographic writings. (Goody, 1990; Stetter, 1997; Assmann/Assmann, 1994) Also, a great deal of literature on media effects (Burkart, 1998; Merten, 1999) traces down the connections between forms of media and thought.

The reciprocal relation between forms of speech and forms of action has also been the topic of many theoretical considerations and empirical studies. Elucidating this is Schutz's theory of language as the conveyor of relevance and typology that focuses, in particular, on the thematic, interpretive and pragmatic relevances transported via language (Schutz/Luckmann, 1975) in order to reveal their relation to action. In short, pragmatic relevance is reflected here in that which is specified by language and, at the same time, these names contain an interpretation of that which is specified that, on the other hand, suggests an intention or option of action. Aside from the intuitive examples, (as the difference between relevance structure carried by the words "gentleman" and "guy") this connection is substantiated by Lakoff's works on metaphors and their meaning in the context of action (1980). Also Labov's studies on the connection between social networks and the choice of speech (1980) varieties pragmatically elucidates the connection of forms of action and speech.

This brief presentation of evidence suggests two things: First of all, it becomes clear that the relation between forms of action, thought and language have been interdisciplinarily accepted, discerned and demonstrated as a basic constituting connection of the social and reality. This, too, justifies the suggestion to view life-forms as forms of this connection and thus to analyze and compare them with respect to interdisciplinary findings that should be viewed critically but whose relevance should not be judged primarily by narrow theoretical preferences. Secondly, the investigation of life-forms on the linguistic level may not

remain in an universe of linguistic holism, but rather the interdisciplinary findings call for approaches which link the linguistic level to extra-lingual areas within the constitution of reality. The linguistic level of life-forms can then be seen as one of the semantics that objectifies the connections of forms of action, thought and language shown above, while the concept of the diversity of the life-world strata suggests that we should always expect a variety of semantics when we approach other "cultural worlds." Semantics in this sense then constitutes an objectivi-zing selection of schemes of action and interpretation so that they can be understood in their orientating function as "conditioning" of communication, interaction and cognition. For the comparison of life-forms, these semantics offer us the advantage that their study allows for assumptions of forms of action and thought even when the action itself cannot or can no longer be observed, although we must always take into consideration the pragmatic-institutional component of semantics which is revealed either by the reconstruction of sources or by observation.

The study of individual dimensions of the life-world structure, namely, the temporal and spatial dimensions of social reality in different life-forms and cultures presents us with a further possibility of connecting the concept of the life-world to several fields of scientific research. We have just seen that the results of these investigations closely refer to the connection of forms of action, thought and language and are often constitutive for these forms. Therefore we can assume that the comparative study of temporal and spatial semantics constitutes a prominent approach to the understanding of foreign life-forms.

From the argumentation presented up to this point, it should have become clear that the many studies of temporal and spatial concepts in different life-forms or cultures are not just due to intra-scientific discourse, but that they do indeed follow the constitutive mechanisms of the life-world. Thus it is not by chance that the temporal concepts and semantics immanent to different cultures play a significant role in cultural anthropology. They serve there as a key to understanding other cultures or societies, (see for example: Evans-Pritchard, 1968; Whorf, 1963; Geertz, 1987) because the forms of action and thought are made comprehendible by assumed or observably ordering effects common to those semantics. The constitutive effect of spatial semantics, which continues all the way into the structures of kinship and clans and that seems to dominate the life-forms of archaic societies, has been also

substantiated in a number of studies. (Eliade, 1990; Müller, 1987; Levi-Strauss, 1967)

In the following, I would like to take a look at the temporal dimension in order to show how significant investigations of temporal and spatial semantics are for intercultural comparisons, and how they can be implemented with the concept of the life-world. The investigation into the temporal dimension of social reality and its semantics represents a traditional element of comparative studies of cultures.[3] These studies, on the one hand, attempt to reconstruct the temporal semantic or temporal interpretation of the culture under investigation and, on the other, they attempt—by comparing concepts of time and time perception—to answer the question of how capable a culture is of "modernization and evolution." Granet's and Needham's classic research chooses the Weberian question of China's "non-development" as compared to Western modernization (Weber, 1972) as their point of departure. Needham ultimately did not see rational "deficiencies" of the temporal concept as being the reason for China's "non-development" but rather postulates that Chinese spatial semantics that connect the cosmic macro-space and the social micro-space to one another had an inhibiting effect on development and social change. (Needham, 1979) In this context we must include the often discussed thesis of evolution and time perception where the linearity of time is said to promote modernization while the circularity of time impedes it. (Wendorff , 1980)

While this kind of study is located on the level of "self-images" and "cultivated semantics," (Luhmann, 1980: 19) Hallpike's studies, which are based on Piaget's genetic psychology, (1974, 1972) focus on the difference in cognitive development in pristine societies as dependent on their interpretation of time. There is also an idea of evolution in the background of this study that—and as Piaget did as well—sees abstract formal scientific thinking of the Western world as a quasi natural end for phylogenesis and ontogenesis. (Hallpike, 1984; Dux, 1989)

The critique of such an evolutionary universalizing of one temporal semantics (namely of a Western one) comes from the authors who point out that the developmental differences revealed in these kinds of comparisons are mostly products of euro-centric schemes of observation. These wrongly believe that global expansion of a temporal concept that is brought on by political and economic circumstances is the proof of its

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3   Whorf, 1963; Granet, 1985; Needham, 1979; Hallpike, 1979; Shimada, 1994; Fabian, 1983; Hall, 1983; Brislin, 1986; Maletzke, 1996; Wendorff, 1980; Dux, 1989.

epistemological universality. The critical objections to this idea of universal validity of a single cultural temporal semantics are first of all directed against the tendency of naturalization already mentioned above, (Matthes, 1992) that renders an adequate reconstruction of temporal semantics impossible. Secondly, however, they argue also against the resulting order of societies on an imaginary time axis that make many of the currently existing societies appear to be evolutionary forerunners of Western modernity. This kind of criticism prefers a concept of temporality that renounces universals and sticks with the different "everyday" forms of the interpretation of time in societies. (Fabian, 1983) This also subconsciously rejects the use of universals as a comparative basis for intercultural comparisons.

Against this background, the possibilities should now clearly stand out that the concept of the pragmatic life-world theory presented here has to offer to find a way out of the stagnating discourse about cultural comparisons and to move on to more productive forms of collaboration. By means of the concept of the life-world we can show how deep and on which level the social reality and the people who produce it are permeated by temporal structures and semantics. This structuring effect of the temporal dimension of the life-world can be traced from the level of individual biographical identity formation to complex forms of coordination of collective practice. The perspective of the life-world enables the differentiation and comprehension of the necessary variety of everyday and cultivated temporal semantics in which the structuring effects of the temporal dimension are objectivized. In this sense, we can then proceed to show that the temporal dimension of social reality—aside from the others—can be referred to as a universal of the intercultural comparison without a hypostatization of one cultural characterization of this dimension (which is justly criticized) leading to a universal interpretive scheme. Moreover, this concept is open enough to critically involve the interdisciplinary insights on the conditions of the constitution of social reality in its theoretical framework. It provides a way to see the constitutive mechanisms of the life-world also as mechanisms of differentiation and reveals the dynamics of meaning and semantics as an element in the evolution of societies, without forcing us to formulate a goal of these dynamics in order to define the developmental mechanisms, as is the case in modernization theories. Rather, it assumes that the potential for development is constituted in the temporality and reflexivity of the human approach to the world itself. How far this potential is realized

depends on the degree and type of reflexivity of semantics, for example, temporal semantics which can be made subject to empirical investigations, whereby the reflexivity of a particular semantics signifies its capacity to make its ordering effects available for the construction of social order. With the differentiation of "cold" and "hot" societies, Levy-Strauss teaches us that this in no way must correspond to the western idea of progress and development. (Levi-Strauss, 1975: 40ff.)

In this sense, the pragmatic life-world theory can serve us as a universal matrix for a comparison of life-forms and cultures. If the actual objective of the social and cultural sciences is to answer the question of how social order is possible, then the findings of such a comparison could be helpful in broadening our understanding of the constituting pro-cesses of human reality in an unprecedented way.

(translated by Allison Wetterlin)

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Schutz on Transcendence
and the Variety of Life-World Experience

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Abstract. *Since the 1980s it was commonly held that the practical action or working (Wirken) plays a central role in the life-world theory of Alfred Schutz. I recognize the significance of this interpretation, yet I question whether practical action alone is sufficient to explain the variety of life-world experiences. The long neglected notions like transcendence and appresentation in Schutz are explored in this paper to treat this question.*

The everyday life-world of the ordinary people can be basically characterized by praxis. In this world people make plans and projects for their future and attempt to realize them through practical action. On this basis people perceive and understand things around them. They are always in concrete situations, always have to deal with things and people in the surrounding world which Schutz also calls "the world of working." (*Wirkwelt*) "Working," or better "practical action," (Embree, 1988: 260) is different from the purely mental activities like scientific, philosophical contemplation or religious meditation. The Schutzian life-world theory can be therefore characterized as a "pragmatic theory of life-world." (Srubar, 1988: 10)

But can practical action alone clarify the whole range of life-world experiences? Are life-world experiences not also varied besides being pragmatic? For example, people have to utilize tools in order to achieve their ends; they have to communicate with people with the help of language, gesture or just mime; in their surroundings there are natural and cultural phenomena, some of them look familiar whereas others seem queer and incomprehensible. In their customary way of life they make plans about their future, trying to realize them through actions but also worrying about their failure. What is past could be recollected. What is experienced might be useful for the future because of the similarity of types. Certainly there are things that happen only once and remain unforgettable. Typification serves as the basis of the common-sense thinking. That is, unless people are confronted with totally new situations, they

will cope with the renewed situations with the help of experiences from the past. People have the knowledge to handle their everyday life-world situations. Some sorts of knowledge belong to them alone because everyone is more or less an expert in some fields. Yet most of his knowledge he shares with other people. To the extent that people share the same knowledge they belong to the same group; it can be a family, a clan, a society, or a region. People derive their common-sense knowledge mostly from other people rather than from their own experience, which means people learn things since their childhood from their surrounding world that is historical, social and cultural. The life-world itself is a historical, socio-cultural world. The culture involves a variety of things like art, religion and science that refer to domains beyond ordinary life. Lastly but not least importantly, the essential life phenomena like departure, separation, birth and death of others, growth and decline of one's own are not to be forgotten. How can all these be described and explicated? Do they share common characteristics? How does Schutz handle this problem?

In order to search for the answer, let us try to trace the development of Schutzian thought.

I. The Development of Schutzian Thought

The author who rearranged the posthumous writings of *The Structures of the Life-World,* Thomas Luckmann, points out that Schutz's thought, although scattered around more than thirty papers after the early major work *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* (1932) has nevertheless an obvious continuity. It is manifested in the description and clarification of the everyday life-world as social reality. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1979: 15) Luckmann emphasizes that Schutz inherits the descriptive method from Husserl and his life-world theory can be seen as the best continuation and development of Husserl. This viewpoint is to some extent questioned by another author, Ilja Srubar, who points out that after Schutz had recognized the true intention of Husserl's life-world theory, he was rather disappointed by Husserl. Schutz was namely dissatisfied with the Husserlian idea that the structures of the life-world should be constituted by the transcendental consciousness. That the life-world theory should be rooted in the transcendental phenomenology is for him completely unacceptable. Schutz therefore intended to develop a different life-world theory from Husserl and the concrete result was the philosophical

anthropology in his later writings. (Srubar, 1988: 265, 268) Srubar stresses that according to Schutz the true basis of life-world constitution lays in interaction between people rather than in transcendental consciousness. In other words, practical action (working), the world of working and the social world, which is based on the world of working, constitute the true core of Schutzian life-world theory. Basically, I agree with Srubar that Schutz develops his own life-world theory in his later thought, but I tend to disagree with him as he proceeds to say that we might acknowledge the different stages of development in Schutz's thought according to his attitude to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. If he sees clearly Schutz's rejection of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, particularly his dissatisfaction with Husserl's treatment of intersubjectivity, (Srubar, 1988: 256) then how can he contend that Schutz has different positions in earlier and later writings concerning transcendental phenomenology?

If we want to insist that Schutz has developed a new stage in later thought, I hold that we need to look elsewhere. Richard Grathoff has pointed out that Schutz managed once again to clarify the problems that he dealt with in his early major work. (Grathoff, 1989: 50) But how did Schutz do that? What are the new conceptions or viewpoints? The first impression reveals that after 1955 Schutz on the whole deals with life-world rather than social world which means he was more concerned with the constitution of the life-world structures than that of meaning in the social world. If this impression is justified, then one might ask the second question: on what basis did Schutz manage to explicate the constitution of the life-world?

In a letter Schutz wrote to his old acquaintance, Aron Gurwitsch, he said:

> What is transcended is the instantaneous now-here-thus, and the mechanism by means of which the transcendent is appresentatively incorporated into the now-here-thus is what makes the life-world at all possible. (Schutz/Gurwitsch, 1989: 235)

> So much concerning the general theory, which thus does not try to explain appresentaion in terms of transcendence, but rather the reverse, the structure of the life-world in terms of the experience of transcendence, in this essay more specifically: in terms of appresentation. (Schutz/Gurwitsch, 1989: 235)

These two remarks are noteworthy and instructive. Why are appresentation and transcendence so important in this context?

II. Transcendence and Appresentation

The notion "transcendence" did not appear in *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, nor even in the 1945 paper "On Multiple Realities" in which Schutz deals with the problems of imagination, dream, science, religion and art.[1] It appeared quite late, not until in the paper "Symbol, Reality, and Society" which appeared in 1955. It is therefore very likely that this concept of his was developed around the years between 1945 and 1955. Remarkably Schutz uses the ambiguous term "immanent transcendence" to indicate the other mind. The implication is that for Schutz transcendence does not just refer to the spheres that lie beyond the daily life-world. Instead it also refers to the phenomena inside the everyday life-world. In other words, transcendence can be applied to different levels of experience.

Nevertheless, transcendence is not at all a topic in the paper "Symbol, Reality, and Society;" instead his intention is to clarify the meaning of sign, symbol etc. that are relevant to the everyday life-world. Transcendence is hereby nothing but a by-product. Schutz's point is that in ordinary life people normally make use of marks, indications, signs and symbols, which Schutz names appresentational references, to overcome the various experiences of transcendence. The so-called appresentational references are rooted in the consciousness structure of appresentation. Now we need to make clear the meaning of appresentation.

Schutz derives this concept from Husserl. The latter uses appresentation to clarify the experience of others (*Fremderfahrung*). For Husserl it is basically a kind of mediate intentionality (*Mittelbarkeit der Intentionalität*) which is inseparably connected with direct experience. Appresentation thus understood is coupled with presentation. (Husserl, 1950: 139ff.) Schutz makes some transformations in this aspect. He regards appresentation itself as a coupling relation, the two sides of which

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[1]   It is true that Schutz in this paper does touch on the problem of transcendence, though he deals with it without using such a concept. This point is remarkably important, because Schutz obviously unfolds the same problem with the transcendence concept and the Husserlian notion of appresentation in the paper "Symbol, Reality, and Society." (Schutz, 1962: 287-356)

are then the appresenting and the appresented, and which is then applicable not only to the clarification of the experience of others, as Husserl conceives of it, but also to that of different transcendent experiences in the life-world. (Schutz/Gurwitsch, 1989: 226)

Besides, Schutz also introduces the notion of "order" to explain appresentation. In his understanding appresentation is not only a relation between two data in consciousness but between two orders or regions. This conception is based on the idea that no experience happens in isolation, but has to be located in a horizon. In other words, the two sides of the appresentational relation may refer to different or, in certain respects, the same order. (Schutz, 1962: 297ff.) For example, the material of a flag, no matter whether it is cloth, paper or anything else, belongs to the physical world. We could certainly conceive of the flag in this way, but somehow the significance of the flag seems to get lost. A flag is a flag only because it could represent something beyond itself, for example, a country, an association or a sport team. The latter refers to the transcendent level of the cultural to the material. A flag understood in this way connects, so to speak, two different worlds or two orders as Schutz puts it. In the case of dense smoke indicating a huge fire we would say that both the appresenting and the appresented sides belong to the same order of the physical world.

Schutz stresses that the appresenting does not necessarily have to be the perceptual experience, because the object in imagination might also be treated as the appresenting item. For example, a unicorn could signify chastity. In this way Schutz wants to defy the Husserlian conception that the so-called pure experience in the life-world always has the priority in an appresentational relationship.[2] We will come back to this point again later.

III. Appresentational References and Life-World Experiences

As was mentioned above, appresentation was used by Husserl to explicate the experience of others. Schutz transformed this concept and broadened its application, i.e. to all the experiences of transcendence in life-world. We are now going to clarify the relations between appresentational references and transcendent experiences.

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[2]   Schutz expresses this point most obviously in the correspondence with Gurwitsch. See Schutz/Gurwitsch, 1989: 236ff.

The first concerns the transcendent experience in space and time. According to Schutz the everyday life-world in which people live can be basically divided into "the world within my actual reach" and "the world within my potential reach." He says:

> This world as experienced through my natural attitude is the scene and also the object of my actions … In this attitude I experience the world as organized in space and time around myself as a center. The place my body occupies at a certain moment within this world, my natural "Here" is the starting point from which I take my bearing in space … And in a similar way, my actual "now" is the origin of all the time-perspectives under which I organize the events within the world, such as the categories of fore and aft, past and future … (Schutz, 1962: 306-307)

The world within my actual reach is what is commonly characterized as "here and now," whereas the world within my potential reach is the transcendence to "here and now." The importance of the latter can be easily recognized as long as we never stay at the same place. In daily life I move constantly from here to there and in the process of movements I might choose something as a mark to make my moving easy. The mark which is located before my eyes, so long as it refers to what lies beyond, is no longer just something before my eyes, it is rather the representative of what is not appearing directly. The signs over the highway, the indications at the entrance of a department store, the direction at the start of a hill path, all of these have the function of helping me reaching my goal with ease. Even a broken branch will have the same function during hiking in a forest. The direction over there and the mark before my eyes are closely combined together. In this case Schutz sees an overcoming of transcendence in space. Similarly a photograph could function as overcoming the distance in time as long as it helps remembering what happened before.

Schutz also explains this point with the help of intentionality of horizon. The happenings or objects over there and then, though not a part of the experience of now and here, exist somehow in the horizon of actual experience. In this way they are associated with the direct experience, and together with the latter they consist in what Schutz calls "the actual contents of experience." An appresentational relation is in principle an associative relation, which is a basic structure of consciousness, both

transcendentally and psychologically, as we have seen above. Schutz sees great importance in this consciousness structure by stressing that everywhere in the life-world we see appresentational references, (Schutz/ Luckmann, 1990: 333) the functions of which are the overcoming of various experience of transcendences. Thus far we have dealt with a mark as the first kind of apprentational reference which overcomes the transcendences in space and time. Before we move toward the second one, one remark has to be added. Schutz emphasizes that the mark requires no intersubjectivity, which means that what is regarded by someone as a mark does not need be consented to by others. Objectivity is barely the necessary condition in this connection; the example of the broken branch can best reveal this point.

The second appresentational reference Schutz calls indication. In principle this kind of reference has to do also with the transcendent experience in space and time. The difference from a mark is that it does not concern bodily movements. Instead it is concerned with the judgment about situations. Normally what we could experience directly is quite limited, yet for the sake of practical ends we always have an interest to know what we could not experience directly. "Interest" is a substantial notion in Schutz's theory of relevance. (Schutz, 1964: 235; 1971: 100ff.) He contends that in daily life our attention is not directed at all things in the surroundings. Something is always more important or more outstanding than the others. Importance depends on subjective interest. Things in which our interests lie become the core of our consciousness which Schutz names the "theme" of the consciousness. What is not related to the theme retreats to the periphery of consciousness, it then begets no attention. According to Schutz things that are connected with the theme have relevance.

Now Schutz asks: why are we interested in something? It can only be answered through practical ends. In order to realize these ends we require some means, taking some actions, which has what Schutz calls the motivation of ends (*Zweckmotivation*). In the projection of concrete actions, we will take consideration of what might help and what is irrelevant. The relevant things have the relevance of motivation. For example we will make plans, arrange the times to come, and care about the conditions in the future. If, for example, I plan to make an outdoor activity tomorrow, I will be eager to learn if this will be interrupted by bad weather. Modern people can make such judgments by noticing the weather forecast, or receiving a satellite overview picture through the internet. In the past peo-

ple might judge by way of observing the clouds or moon. Similarly with things in space, the dense smoke far away indicates fire, even though the great distance hinders me from seeing the fire apparently.

Just like marks, indication does not require intersubjectivity either. People can have their own way to make indications without consent from others. The reason why Schutz lays stress on this is obvious as long as we move to signs. Signs differ from marks and indications mainly just because of their presupposition of intersubjectivity.

The sign is the third kind of appresentational reference. What it overcomes is transcendence in the social world. Although Schutz construes three sorts of transcendence in the social world, the world of the other, the other mind and the we-relationship itself, yet what the sign concerns is nothing but the transcendence of the other mind.

In substance, Schutz agrees with Husserl that only the body of other has evidence for me in the experience of another mind. The other mind could never be experienced by me directly. (Schutz, 1962: 314) It could be comprehended merely by way of expressions like mime, gesture and above all language. These expressions are conceived of as expressions of what lie behind. In daily life people usually understand other people in this way without further questions. For example, the other might ask me a question that causes me to give him an answer and my answer might in turn cause his further inquiry and this exchange might eventually lead to a discussion.

Schutz wonders how can such interactive activities be possible? What are the necessary presuppositions? For Schutz "the general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives," (Schutz, 1962: 315ff.) which consists of two idealizations, plays a very important role. The first idealization called "the idealization of the interchangeability of standpoints" is related to the perceptive experience in space and time. So long as I am able to perceive objects only from "Here," whereas at the same time it is impossible for the other person to perceive things from here, a difference in perception is inevitable. Yet in daily life such differences are considered to be trivial and on the basis of the general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives I assume that people share the same experience with me. The second idealization called "the idealization of the congruency of the systems of relevance" has to do with the way people understand objects. The reason why I conceive of things differently from other people lies mostly in terms of the different structures of relevance (the meaning of which has been explained above). Although persons might have their own view-

points to comprehend objects, mostly they just do not care about such differences because their thinking is based on the idealization of the congruency of the systems of relevance.

With the general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives as background, I am able to communicate with other people with the help of the language, which Schutz takes to be a kind of appresentational reference, i.e. the sign. Schutz construes language or the sign as the sediment of cultural experiences in a society. It involves normally lots of typifications, abstractions and standardizations that are fundamental to the social interactions and communications. (Schutz, 1962: 326) Language is for Schutz, in short, an "objectivation and institutionalization of expressing the human ideas." (Srubar, 1988: 244) Objectivation implies that it is not only a construction of consciousness by certain people. Rather it is a social construction. It involves therefore a high degree of anonymity. Other cultural phenomena like folklore, institution and common-sense thinking share such characteristics, too. They all constitute the necessary requirements of a society that functions well.

The other transcendences in social life, though not directly connected with sign, may deserve our attention. Schutz names the world of other people, within actual or potential reach, also transcendence. This derives from the fact that others can never occupy my "Here." Reversibly it is the same that I cannot be at the same time in the other's present location which is always a "There" for me. But people regard such spatial differences with common sense thinking as trivial. The above mentioned "idealization of the interchangeability of standpoints" apparently plays an essential role. (Schutz, 1962: 317)

The third transcendence in social life, the we-relationship itself, as Schutz puts it, "although (it) originates in the mutual biographical involvement, transcends the existence of either of the consociates in the realm of everyday life." (Schutz, 1962: 318) Here we need to make a distinction between the pure we-relationship and the concrete we-relationship. The latter is normally also called the face-to-face relationship, which makes up the *soziale Umwelt*. Though compared with *soziale Mitwelt* it is foundational, yet it is still founded on another ground that is called the pure we-relationship. In *The Phenomenology of the Social World* Schutz characterizes the pure we-relationship as *Limesbegriff*, which can never be realized in the concrete social relationship. Only when we take on a theoretical attitude will we be able to catch the meaning of the pure we-relationship. Now in terms of appresentational

reference Schutz stresses that its meaning can only be grasped by way of an other appresentational reference than that used in the social life. Schutz calls it the symbol.

Essentially Schutz regards the symbol as a bridge connecting the everyday life-world and the worlds beyond. This fourth appresentational reference is completely different from the three former ones. Both the appresenting and the appresented items of the mark, the indication and the sign belong to the everyday life-world, whereas in the symbol only the appresenting side belongs to the everyday life-world, because the appresented side belongs to other worlds. We may take Schutz's own example about Dürer's famous picture "Knight, Death, and Demon" for an explication. (Schutz, 1962: 325)

The picture if seen from a material aspect, no matter if it is cloth, color, line or configuration can be classified as an object of the everyday world. Such objects are perceptible, i.e. can be experienced directly. Even the figures like horse, knight etc. have a resemblance to the objects in real life that are vividly perceptible. Yet if one stays at this level, he cannot be said to have comprehended this picture because the meaning of the author is not at all transmitted. According to Schutz, we have to see through the superficial side to catch the ideas that the artist wants to express. A work of art is in this conception a connection between two different worlds, normally the everyday life-world and the world of art. The latter is in itself a sphere of ideas that is transcendent to the world of the natural attitude. The artist expresses his ideas by way of the concretization that is a piece of work of art. In Dürer's picture "Knight, Death, and Demon" is depicted the general situation of human beings between two supernatural forces, according to Schutz.

The ideas thus expressed do not belong to the daily life at all, because the world of the natural attitude cannot but be characterized by actions oriented at reaching practical ends. The ideas expressed in art are something transcendent to this world. So are ideas in science and religion. And imaginations as well as dreams that deviate from the rationality in daily social life are also the same. All these transcendent phenomena that people experience as belonging to worlds beyond the everyday life-world could be connected to the daily life through symbols. As long as the daily life-world consists of different kinds of symbols, it is full of varieties. Through symbols people have the chance to connect to another region of meaning which Schutz names "finite province of meaning." The so-called "multiple realities" theory, by way of which Schutz deals with these

regions of meaning, is widely transformed through the introduction of the symbol understood as a kind of appresentational reference. Life-world theory, which Schutz develops relatively late in his thought, is thus obviously not to be fully comprehended without appresentation.

As was articulated above, the appresentational references are rooted in the structure of appresentation in consciousness. In sum, Schutz wants to say that the appresentation process refers basically to the experience that happens here and now, whereas the appresented item refers to that which can only be indirectly experienced. The latter, though not happening here and now, is still closely related to the direct experience. The above mentioned concept of "order" still needs some more clarification. Schutz stresses that transcendence does not refer to a certain sphere. This point is most obvious in the context of social life and "multiple reality" theory. For example, when I say that the other mind is transcendent, it is because I see from my order. Seen from his order, it would be totally contrary. It is a problem of relativity. Similarly, a scientist who remains in the world of science would claim that the daily life-world is transcendent, though in the eyes of ordinary people, the scientific world is a typically transcendent world to them. Any gap between different finite provinces of meaning is not easy to cross over. It is often a "shock" that accompanies such a "jump," as Schutz puts it metaphorically after Kierkegaard. (Schutz, 1962: 232)

Also already mentioned above, the transcendence concept is a by-product of the discussion of appresentational references. However, at the end of the paper "Symbol, Reality, and Society" Schutz says:

> The analysis of these transcendences—from those going beyond the limits of the world within his actual reach to those transgressing the paramount reality of everyday life—is a major task of any philosophical anthropology. (Schutz, 1962: 356)

According to Srubar philosophical anthropology could be regarded as the basic concern of Schutz. Accordingly we may easily conclude that the significance of the transcendence concept just can not be overlooked. If we look into the posthumous writings of *The Structures of the Life-World* more closely, the situation would be much clearer.

IV. The Experience of Transcendence

Drawing on Charles Morris, who is famous for the study of the symbol, Schutz is led to explain more clearly about transcendence together with appresentation. (L. Bryson et al., 1955: 203f.) So far as Morris can see, Schutz's explanation of the relation between transcendence and appresentation is not clear enough. He thus wonders whether the experience of transcendence happens first, then comes the appresentative relation; or do the experiences of transcendence and appresentative relations just overlap? (Schutz/Luckmann, 1990: 338)

Schutz answers: the so-called experience of the appresentational references is the experience of concrete references like the mark, the indication etc. So the experience of the appresentational references and the experience of transcendence do not overlap. Nevertheless, Schutz does not agree with the first alternative of Morris either, unless the so-called "come first" is interpreted as "grounding." But what does Schutz mean by "grounding?" Why does appresentational reference require the grounding of transcendent experience? Schutz transforms this question to be: why do the appresentational references appear? What is the ultimate cause? (Schutz/Luckmann, 1990: 338)

To begin with, Schutz speaks of Husserl's explanation of appresentation that is eventually rooted in sense-experience. In Schutz's view this is not sufficient to explain the origin of appresentation, because sense-experience is not at all the *Urtatsache des Bewusstseinslebens* (primary fact of conscious life). Instead it is "the experience of getting old and approaching death." He stresses that my own death is an experience of limitation and such limitation is experienced as limitation of horizon that is under no circumstances to be overcome. The *Urtatsache des Bewusstseinslebens* requires no pairing, no appresentational reference. On the contrary, all the appresentational references are rooted in this *Urerlebnis*. Schutz goes so far as to contend that all plans and related pragmatic relevances also originate in this *Erlebnis*. (Schutz/Luckmann, 1990: 339) They all obtain ultimate significance through it. Schutz compares this *Urerlebnis* with transcendences in the life-world such as leaving, sleep and the psychic states of other persons. For Schutz the latter can be overcome by way of appresentational references, but not the former.

That Schutz interprets transcendence and appresentational reference in an existential-ontological way reveals that transcendence seemingly plays

a much more important role than he had anticipated. The above cited remark: "transcendence … makes life-world possible" would no longer seem so strange as at first glance. I believe it is not at all a remark by chance.

Transcendence and life-world are accordingly very closely related. To be precise, the life-world experience is the experience of transcendence. All the experiences that happen in the structures of space-time, social life and the worlds beyond daily life (the so-called multiple realities) could be uniformly explicated in terms of transcendence and appresentation. Thus seen, the quoted sentence "the structures of the life-world are to be explained through the experience of transcendence" can be fully understood.

IV. Conclusion

Although Schutz contends that the life-world experience has to happen here and now and consists of evidence, the significance of such experiences depends much on their relation to the various transcendences that we have mentioned. Basically this point has been revealed in the assertion that the life-world experience is the experience of transcendence. Besides, we have also seen clearly that what connects the experience of here and now and the experience of transcendence is appresentational reference. If our explication is correct, then obviously the notion of transcendence and appresentation are anything but unessential in his later phase and in his life-world discourse. Regrettably these important notions are not completely developed to become his central notions like typification or relevance. Yet the incompleteness does not mean there is a defect at all. They could be and should be the initiation and inspiration for further developments.[3]

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[3]   Based on his notion of appresentation, I have proceeded to work on the pro-blem of cultural difference in connection with life-world notion. The paper "Schutz on Life-world and Cultural Difference" (Yu, 1999) can be viewed as the first step of this survey.

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